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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/77267-0.txt b/77267-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cc4ae61 --- /dev/null +++ b/77267-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,12740 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 77267 *** + + [Illustration] + + + + + GREAT COMMANDERS + OF MODERN TIMES + + AND + + THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815. + + + BY + + WILLIAM O’CONNOR MORRIS. + + + _Reprinted from the_ + “ILLUSTRATED NAVAL AND MILITARY MAGAZINE.” + + + “Faites la guerre offensive comme Alexandre, Annibal, César, + Gustave Adolphe, Turenne, le Prince Eugène et Fredéric; lisez, + relisez l’histoire de leurs quatre vingt trois campagnes; + modelez vous sur eux.”--NAPOLEON. + + + LONDON: W. H. ALLEN AND CO., LIMITED, + AND AT CALCUTTA. + + 1891. + + (_All Rights Reserved._) + + + + + LONDON: + PRINTED BY W. H. ALLEN AND CO., LIMITED, + 13, WATERLOO PLACE. + + + + + CONTENTS. + + [Illustration] + + GREAT COMMANDERS OF MODERN TIMES. + + + PAGE + + PREFACE v + + INTRODUCTION 1 + + CHAPTER I.--TURENNE 12 + + „ II.--MARLBOROUGH 36 + + „ III.--FREDERICK THE GREAT 68 + + „ IV.--NAPOLEON 102 + + „ V.-- „ (_continued_) 125 + + „ VI.-- „ (_continued_) 157 + + „ VII.-- „ (_continued_) 186 + + „ VIII.-- „ (_continued_) 214 + + „ IX.--WELLINGTON 238 + + „ X.--MOLTKE 274 + + + THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815. + + CHAPTER I. 315 + + „ II. 335 + + + + + LIST OF + + MAPS, PLANS, AND ILLUSTRATIONS. + + [Illustration] + + + FREDERICK THE GREAT _Frontispiece_ + + TURENNE _To face page_ 12 + + THEATRE OF WAR IN GERMANY „ 20 + + THEATRE OF WAR IN THE LOW COUNTRIES „ 28 + + MARLBOROUGH „ 36 + + THEATRE OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1704 „ 44 + + THEATRE OF CAMPAIGNS IN BELGIUM AND THE NORTH + OF FRANCE „ 54 + + THEATRE OF THE SEVEN YEARS’ WAR „ 76 + + BATTLES OF PRAGUE AND ZORNDORF „ 78 + + SEIDLITZ AT ROSSBACH „ 83 + + BATTLES OF ROSSBACH AND LEUTHEN „ 85 + + THEATRE OF THE CAMPAIGN IN NORTH ITALY „ 110 + + SKETCH MAP OF CENTRAL EUROPE „ 128 + + THEATRE OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1809 „ 160 + + THEATRE OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812 „ 174 + + NAPOLEON WATCHING THE BURNING OF MOSCOW „ 178 + + THEATRE OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1813 „ 188 + + THEATRE OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1814 „ 206 + + THEATRE OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 „ 218 + + NEY AT WATERLOO „ 226 + + WELLINGTON „ 238 + + THEATRE OF THE PENINSULA WAR „ 244 + + WELLINGTON AT TALAVERA „ 248 + + MOLTKE AND HIS MASTER „ 274 + + THEATRE OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1866 „ 281 + + THEATRE OF THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1870–71 „ 288 + + MAP OF BELGIUM „ 315 + + “THE IDOL OF THE SOLDIER’S SOUL” „ 320 + + ENGLAND’S HOPE, 1815 „ 324 + + “TAMBOUR, FAITES-MOI CADEAU D’UNE PRISE!” „ 338 + + PLAN OF THE BATTLEFIELD OF WATERLOO „ 350 + + + + + PREFACE. + + [Illustration] + + +This volume consists of a series of essays on Great Commanders of +Modern Times, and of two papers on the Campaign of 1815. I have to +thank the Editor of _The Illustrated Naval and Military Magazine_, +in which these studies originally appeared, for thinking them worthy +of republication; and my acknowledgments are due to the press for many +favourable notices. The text has been revised and slips of the pen +corrected; but I have made no substantial change in what I had at first +written. + +A civilian, who attempts to treat of military affairs, ought to bear in +mind the remark of Hannibal to the Greek sophist--“It is pretty, but it +is all nonsense.” Yet it is with the art of war as with lesser arts; +the unprofessional inquirer can attain knowledge of leading truths, +though he may not be able to master technical details. Thucydides +was perhaps not a soldier, but he observed this principle, and his +narrative of the siege of Syracuse is a masterpiece. An ordinary writer +is not worthy to unloose the shoe latchet of Thucydides; but he may, +in this matter, imitate the method of the great Athenian; and if he +has fair intelligence, works hard, and devotes laborious hours to +reflecting on the exploits of great captains, he may become, in some +measure, a sound military critic. These essays are not, I trust, wholly +devoid of the only merits I claim for them. + +The papers on the Campaign of 1815, though only sketches, are the least +fugitive pieces of any in this volume. I have formed my conclusions +after a careful study of nearly every valuable authority on the +subject; and I have had the advantage of some special information not +yet given to the public. I have described Napoleon as easily superior, +as a strategist, to his adversaries; while I have done justice to the +great qualities displayed by Wellington and Blücher, as soldiers, +I have dwelt on the grave strategic mistakes they committed. This +will not gratify national vanity; but, in my judgment, it is the +verdict which History will pronounce, nay, is already pronouncing, +upon the questions raised by this mighty conflict, after a full and +dispassionate investigation of the evidence. + +My short account of the Battle of Waterloo may be flatly contradicted, +or sharply criticized, in two particulars. I have described La Haye +Sainte as having been captured at about 4 P.M. on the 18th of June; +and I have left it to be inferred that only one column of the Imperial +Guard actually reached the British line. It would take too long to +explain why I have made these statements; I shall merely remark that +the testimony in their favour seems to me greatly to preponderate. + + _Gartnamona, Tullamore, + September 1890._ + + + GREAT COMMANDERS + + OF + + MODERN TIMES. + + + + + INTRODUCTION. + + BY A SOLDIER. + + +It will doubtless appear to some that this is a trite subject whose +interest has long ago evaporated, exhausted by the numerous and +competent pens which have treated it. The soldier, at all events, will +judge otherwise, and conclude that the careers of that small group +of demi-gods, commonly known as “great generals,” afford matter for +consideration which can never tire, and which gains in interest the +more it is analysed. As we vary our point of view, so the prospect +grows upon us and the more we admire its details. Again, passing +from select readers to the multitude, we have the sanction of a most +sagacious observer of mankind for retracing the ground which has been +so often trodden aforetime. + + Difficile est proprie communia dicere; tuque + Rectius Iliacum carmen deducis in actus, + Quam si proferres ignota indictaque primus. + +This being so, a concise summary like this of the campaigns of the +most eminent of these great military leaders will not prove devoid of +novelty and interest, as coming from the pen of one whom a civil career +has left free from professional prejudice, and the study of law has +trained to weigh conflicting evidence. These biographical summaries +include the following names:-- + + 1. Turenne. + 2. Marlborough. + 3. Frederick the Great. + 4. Napoleon. + 5. Wellington. + 6. Moltke. + +If in any particular we are at variance with the writer, it is that he +hardly attaches sufficient importance to the influence of Turenne’s +predecessor, Gustavus Adolphus, in the development of the military +art. We ourselves agree with Gfrörer, his German biographer, that the +Swedish king was the father of modern strategy, and the first really +great general since Julius Cæsar. As Judge O’Connor Morris points out, +many great soldiers lived during this long interval of time, but in +our opinion (and it is in accord with Napoleon’s) it was the campaigns +of the Swedish hero, and notably the Thirty Years’ War, which first +revealed the dawn of that science which in later days was brought to +such perfection by his successors. The tactical improvements introduced +by Gustavus were extensive, though cavalry still played too exclusive +a _rôle_ in his engagements; his reforms in the armament and +equipment of his troops were remarkable; nor is the military historian +oblivious of his services to good discipline and morality by the +Articles of War which he compiled and promulgated. + +Gustavus Adolphus, when he ascended the throne at the tender age +of seventeen, found his realm engaged in hostilities with Denmark, +Russia, and Poland. His successor, Charles XII., curiously enough, was +similarly entangled, but promptitude and good fortune in each case +enabled the monarch to assail his enemies in succession and beat them +in detail. The Danes already occupied the southern provinces of Sweden +and, in the spring of 1612, they advanced in two columns, intending +to move on Stockholm by the routes east and west of the Wettern Lake +which give access to the capital. This afforded the boy-king an +opportunity for signalizing his latent military talent. Posting his +forces at Jönköping, at the southernmost extremity of the lake, he +struck alternately at the divided columns of the Danish army till he +thrust them in disorderly retreat back to the sea-coast. Thus early +was the leading idea which governed the defence of France in 1814 +foreshadowed amid the rocks and lakes of Sweden. Peace with Denmark +resulted in 1613, and through the mediation of James I. of England. + +Russia was next assailed. Semi-barbarous at the time, that State was in +the throes of revolution brought about by the extinction of the House +of Ruric; and a project was actually on foot for her dismemberment, one +half to go to Sweden, the other to Poland. But Muscovite patriotism +defeated its execution. Michael Románoff was, in 1613, elected Tsar. +Gustavus at the same time landed in Esthonia, but effected little +beyond the capture of Gdoff, and in 1617 concluded peace, again through +the good offices of England. The Thirty Years’ War was looming in the +distance; the diplomacy of the Protestant Powers tended towards a union +against the Papacy. Thus both dynastic and religious considerations +recommended an attack on Poland to the judgment of Gustavus. Sigismund +III., her king, was both a bigoted Catholic and the rightful though +dethroned King of Sweden. Nothing could be effected in Germany leaving +such an active and embittered foe in flank and rear. At first the King +operated from Riga as a base, with the Dwina as his line of operations; +but experience soon taught that, to effect his purpose, he must strike +vigorously home at the heart of the adversary’s power. The theatre of +war was therefore transferred to West Prussia, then directly subject +to Poland, where he proceeded to establish a solid base on the coast, +by making himself master of the fortresses of Frauenburg, Elbing, +Marienburg, Stuhm, Mewe, Dirschau, and Oliva. Dantzig was besieged to +facilitate communication with Sweden and, in this case, the line chosen +by him for an eventual advance into the interior was the river Vistula. +In all of his campaigns we find Gustavus keeping up his communications +with the coast by means of a great river; he lived in times when +railways were not dreamt of and even roads could scarcely be said to +exist. A commodious port on the Baltic was also necessary for safe +communication with Sweden, and to serve as a depôt for stores. Thus his +strategy was far in advance of the practice of his renowned successors +Charles X. and Charles XII., who, great soldiers as they were, relapsed +into pre-Gustavus methods, though they had both the King’s example and +that of Turenne before them. + +During this “Prussian War,” as the Swedish historians designate +the struggle with Poland, Gustavus, involved himself in the Thirty +Years’ War by sending troops to succour the hard-pressed garrison of +Stralsund, then besieged by Wallenstein. This affront quickly brought a +division of 10,000 Imperialists to the fields of Poland. Nevertheless, +the belligerents concluded, in 1629, an armistice for the space of six +years, which enabled Gustavus to turn his attention to the horrible +struggle which was deluging Germany with blood, while securing his +recent acquisitions on the Baltic. In one particular, however, he +had persistently infringed the rules of conduct which should guide +the great Commander: he had recklessly exposed his life during this +Prussian campaign. During an action at Dirschau, the Swedes were on +the point of victory when a bullet struck their chief in the shoulder, +and he was borne insensible from the field. The action was stopped +in consequence, and it was this wound which ever afterwards made it +irksome for him to wear a cuirass, the absence of which probably +occasioned his death on the field of Lützen. On several other occasions +he escaped death or capture by a hair’s breadth. But it is only on +critical occasions that the leader of a host ought to risk his life. +The interests committed to his charge ought to be paramount in his +estimation. Cæsar and Napoleon both well knew when such a course seemed +necessary. + +We now approach the crowning enterprize of this “Lion of the North,” +his intervention in the Thirty Years’ War, with the glories which were +compressed into the short span of life which yet remained to him: an +enterprize which he had long dreamed of in secret, and the fatal +termination of which he probably only too plainly foresaw. + +He landed on the island of Usedom on the 26th June 1630. Separated +from the mainland by a narrow arm of the sea, it was admirably suited +for the purpose of a maritime base of operations. Gustavus, the first +who leaped ashore, sank on his knees, gave thanks to God, and, this +done, seized a spade and began to dig the trenches. The island of +Wollin was next subjugated, and the command of the mouth of the Oder +by this means secured. Tilly was absent, dancing attendance on the +Diet at Regensburg; Torquato Conti, his lieutenant, seemed paralyzed +by the emergency; Wallenstein had justly been deposed from the supreme +command. Embarking on the Stettiner Haff, the “Snow King,” as his +enemies contemptuously nick-named him, seized possession of Stettin in +July. In September he invaded the duchy of Mecklenburg, thus extending +his area of supply and acquiring a broad and solid base for operating +in relief of beleaguered Magdeburg. He drove Schaumburg, Conti’s +successor, as far as Frankfort-on-the-Oder, and by the close of the +year all the Pomeranian strongholds except Colberg, Greifswald, and +Demmin, were in his possession. Thus much to prove how systematic was +his system of warfare, and to show how carefully he fortified his base +before venturing into the interior of Germany. + +It must be noted that Gustavus continued active operations throughout +the winter, in contrast to the habits of the age. In January 1631 his +troops, clothed in sheep-skins, quitted Stettin, and New Brandenburg, +Loitz, Malchin, and Demmin fell to their arms. These successes brought +Tilly raging with fury on their track. Traversing Brandenburg amid +blood and flame, he captured New Brandenburg by assault. Gustavus had +skilfully concentrated his forces to protect the town at Friedland and +at Pasewalk, but was informed by his lieutenants that the troops were +so demoralized by the idea of encountering Tilly’s terrible bands that +they were not to be relied on! In this desperate emergency the genius +of the Swede stood by him. While Horn disputed the passage of the Peene +and Trebel by the Imperialists, the King ascended the Oder with the +bulk of his forces, and, taking post at Schwedt, menaced the enemy’s +right and rear so that Tilly rapidly retraced his steps, and, finding +the Swedish position impregnable, continued his retreat to Magdeburg. +When the field was clear, Gustavus, dashing out of his camp, appeared +before Frankfort-on-the-Oder. On the 3rd April the assault was sounded, +the gates were blown open by his petards, and the fortress succumbed +amid great slaughter. Shortly afterwards Landsberg encountered a +similar fate. + +In May the fall of Magdeburg startled the civilized world--a disaster +to be ascribed to the obstinacy and timidity of the Saxon and +Brandenburg electors, who hesitated to afford Gustavus their support. +In plain words, the King resolutely declined to advance to the city’s +relief till he had safe-guarded his line of retreat in conformity with +the maxims of what we now-a-days call strategy, but with him was merely +martial instinct. Possession of the fortresses which secured his line +of retreat was deliberately withheld from him by these Protestant +potentates until too late. But the bestial fury of the Imperialist +soldiery robbed Tilly of the fruits of victory. Instead of acquiring +a pivot whence to dominate North Germany, he was constrained to slink +back into Thuringia and the banks of the Unstruth. + +The indignation aroused by this massacre throughout the Protestant +world enabled Gustavus to coerce his brother-in-law of Berlin; a treaty +of alliance signed and sealed safe-guarded the Swedish rear, and the +King was in a position to execute a general advance across the Elbe +which placed his strategic front in a direction parallel to his base. +Having effected the passage near Tangermünde, he pitched his camp +at Werben, near the confluence of the Havel and Elbe, across which +he constructed a bridge. Immediately on receipt of the news, Tilly, +uniting with Pappenheim at Magdeburg, flew to the assault, but soon +experienced his opponent’s mettle. The King surprised the Imperialist +advance-guard by night near Burgstall, and destroyed 2,000 of their +cavalry. Tilly reconnoitred the works at Werben, but, not liking their +aspect, retired to Eisleben. He had lost one quarter of his numbers, +but was there raised to 30,000 men by the arrival of troops, liberated +from Italy by the treaty of Cherasco, under Count von Fürstenberg, so +that he was in a position to enforce the Imperial summons that the +Saxon Elector should surrender his army and revenues for Catholic +purposes. The insolent demand drove that Prince into the arms of +Sweden, and a convention was signed which placed his army together +with Wittenburg at the disposition of Gustavus. Leipzig capitulated to +Tilly and the Swedes crossed the Elbe, effecting a junction with the +Saxons on the banks of the Mulda. Two days later (the 7th September) +was fought the battle of Leipzig, which justified all the plans and +precautions of the Swedish strategist. + +Into the details of that great conflict it is not our business here to +inquire. The splendid tactical _coup d’œil_ of Gustavus has never +been called into question. Let us rather consider how he profited by +this amazing triumph. While the adversary withdrew into Thuringia, +Gustavus struck right across his communications with Bavaria, +pressing along the “Priest’s Lane,” the rich string of ecclesiastical +principalities which then lined the banks of the Main--that march which +is mentioned with admiration by the present biographer of Turenne. He +thus provided himself with a new and fertile base for operating against +the heart of the Empire at the expense of the Catholic party, while +the Saxons invested Leipzig and defended the line of the Elbe from the +enemy in Silesia. The Swedish King jealously guarded his communications +with the sea, which were demarked by the rivers Saale and Elbe. +Thuringia was garrisoned by Weimar troops; Halle by those of the Prince +of Anhalt; Banér invested Magdeburg, while Tott held Mecklenburg in +subjection. + +On the 26th September the King’s army, leaving Erfurt, began to ascend +the Main, and on the 10th October they took the episcopal fortress +of Würtzburg by assault. This calamity drew Tilly in hot haste to +the south. Towards the end of October his army, 40,000 strong, was +bivouacked along the Tauber, where, on the night of the 23rd, Gustavus +again cut up three Imperialist cavalry regiments which had bivouacked +in an exposed position. After a futile demonstration against +Ochsenfurt, where he lost heart on discovering the Swedes drawn up +beyond the Main, Tilly retreated in the direction of Nuremberg, when +Gustavus, leaving Horn to observe his movements, sped along that river +to Frankfort, into which capital he made his triumphal entry on the +17th November 1631. Meanwhile his antagonist, as if crushed in spirit +by the swift ruin which had overtaken his fortunes, raided about +Franconia at random, and seemed utterly incapable of arriving at any +fixed determination. Finally he imagined the assault of Nuremberg; +but a Protestant soldier, applying a slow-match to his store of +gunpowder, blew it into the air together with the projects of his +chief, who forthwith left Nuremberg and cantoned his troops in winter +quarters around Nördlingen. The Swede, however, was more energetic, and +crossing the Rhine at Oppenheim in defiance of the troops of Spain, +gained possession of the great fortress of Mentz as the reward of his +valour and activity. Here Gustavus spent Christmas with his Queen and +Chancellor, Oxenstierna, who had come from Sweden to meet him. He was +at the high pitch of his prosperity, courted by the petty princes +of Germany and by the envoys of more considerable Powers. He was +dreaming, it was said, of a Protestant Empire. But France, his ally, +had taken umbrage at his successes. Richelieu endeavoured to arrange a +pacification, but the sagacity or ambition of Gustavus impelled him to +decline these overtures. + +Early in 1632, Tilly, advancing from Nördlingen, surprised Horn at +Bamberg, forcing him down the valley of the Main till he was supported +by the King with 40,000 men. The Imperialists then retreated in their +turn, and Gustavus, suddenly crossing the river, nearly succeeded +in cutting them off from the Danube and Ingolstadt. Having entered +Nuremberg in triumph, he continued the pursuit, and turned the line of +the Danube by seizing, at Donauwörth, the only bridge left intact by +Tilly between Neuburg and Ulm. Tilly hurried his troops from Ingolstadt +to the Lech, in order to dispute the passage of the stream. Dissuaded +from attacking by his generals, who urged that Wallenstein’s army in +Bohemia was threatening his communications with the Baltic, Gustavus +persisted in his intention, replying that a demoralized enemy should be +crushed without allowing him a respite for recovery: his own retreat by +Donauwörth on Mentz was safe. He was out-voted in council, but acted on +his own opinion, and his able dispositions were crowned with perfect +success. The passage of the rapid current was forced. Tilly, like +Turenne, was slain by an unlucky round-shot. Gustavus did not pursue +vigorously--that art seems to have been invented by Napoleon--but +Augsburg formed a substantial prize for the victor. Here was the cradle +of the Protestant faith, and in days of religious bigotry this solemn +entry into the city must have caused rapturous sensations in Lutheran +hearts. Munich likewise received him with open gates. + +While repressing a revolt of the peasantry the King was suddenly +apprised that Wallenstein, having seized the Pass of Eger, had +entered Franconia, seeking to force the Thuringian defiles, and +opened communication with the Bavarians at Regensburg. This was the +contingency foreseen by those who had condemned the passage of the +Lech. Wallenstein, careless about his own communications or the +interests of the Empire he served, and desirous only of fixing his own +authority in North Germany while living at free-quarters, had thrust +himself between the Swedes and the Baltic Sea. In June therefore the +King, hurriedly retracing his steps, crossed the Danube at Donauwörth +in the endeavour to cut off the Bavarians in their march northwards +to join Wallenstein. In this he failed, but narrowly. The enemy had +given him the slip by requisitioning carts for their conveyance. He +entrenched himself at Nuremberg, was followed thither by Wallenstein, +and a terrible drama of slaughter, disease, and starvation, which +seemed to typify all the plagues of Egypt, was enacted around that +city. It resulted in a drawn battle; and the martial reputation of the +Swedish king suffered proportionate diminution. He had been withstood +successfully; nay, more, he had been the first to withdraw from it. +For this his moral nature was perhaps responsible. He could no longer +endure the pandemonium of human suffering which was in progress +around him, while to the cynical Wallenstein all this was a matter +of indifference. Strangely enough the Imperialists retreated north, +the Protestants southwards. Wallenstein swept through Saxony with +his ravenous, ruthless hordes; Gustavus once more subjected Bavaria +to his requisitions. War was to be made to support war; but let us +bear in mind that it was the fond hope of Wallenstein to establish an +empire for himself in North Germany; while it is surmised that his +adversary held not dissimilar views, though with nobler aspirations; +at all events his strategic base at this time was the city of Mentz +and the fertile valley of the Rhine in its proximity. But the inhuman +atrocities of the Imperialists in Saxony were again too much for the +sensitive nature of Gustavus; in addition to which, the statesman +will note that the Elector, a dubious ally, was likely to make terms +with the oppressor, and this would signify a permanent severance from +Sweden which could not be acquiesced in. On the 11th October, the King +directed his army north _viâ_ Donauwörth in two columns, and +by the end of the month was able to review them reunited at Erfurt. +Unfortunately his allies, the Saxons and Lüneburgers were still beyond +the Elbe, and a flank march in front of the concentrated Imperialists +became indispensible in order to effect a junction; for Wallenstein +and Pappenheim had judiciously united their forces near Leipzig, while +George of Lüneburg had disobeyed the King’s orders, which enjoined him +to rendezvous in Thuringia, and the Saxon Elector, as if paralysed +by dread of Wallenstein, was still in the depths of Silesia. Grimma +was the point indicated for concentration, thus well within striking +distance of the enemy; and Gustavus left Naumburg in this direction +on the 5th November. On the march, however, an intercepted letter was +placed in his hand. He learnt that Wallenstein, deeming the campaign +ended for that year, had permitted Pappenheim with 10,000 men to +depart on a raid into Westphalia, and had cantoned the remainder of +his forces in and around Lützen. At this sudden crisis, Gustavus +proved his title to a niche among the “demi-gods” of war. Instantly +wheeling his columns to the left, he advanced to the attack across +the vast plain which leads to the town of Lützen. But “Man proposes, +God disposes,” an adage which is peculiarly applicable to warlike +enterprize. The passage of the Rippach stream, strenuously defended +by Isolani’s Croats, stopped the Swedes till nightfall, a delay which +enabled Wallenstein to assemble his scattered forces; while a dense fog +next morning, which did not lift till 11 o’clock, prevented the attack +taking place at an early hour, and so afforded time for Pappenheim to +return with his troops to the field ere the close of the battle. But by +this time the great King had breathed his last, and Pappenheim roamed +the field in vain in order to cross swords with him. After a desperate +struggle, the Catholics suffered defeat, but the loss of the Protestant +champion converted disaster into a victory for their faith. + +In the long struggle which followed after his death, and lasted no less +than sixteen years, the name of TURENNE first became known to +fame. + + [Illustration] + + + + + CHAPTER I. + + TURENNE. + + +I remember hearing a soldier of promise remark that war had so +completely changed that it was useless to study the campaigns of +Napoleon. This foolish paradox represents ideas too common among +military men of late; and is about as true as an old notion, rudely +exploded on the great day of Austerlitz, that Frederick’s usual method +of giving battle was so infallible, under all circumstances, that a +long flank march under the guns of an enemy in position is scientific +strategy. An opinion is abroad that German genius has wrought such +a revolution in the art of war, that all that has gone before is +obsolete; that Moltke is a faultless commander, whose exploits surpass +those of all chiefs; nay, that mechanism and organization are the +best means of assuring success to armies in the field. It is time to +expose the perilous errors, mixed with particles of truth, in these +shallow statements. The subordinate methods and rules of war have been +largely changed, in the progress of the age, and especially through +its material inventions; but the higher parts of the art can never +vary, for they have their origin in the faculties of man, as grandly +developed in Cæsar and Hannibal as in the great captains of modern +times; and the exhibition of these, whatever may be the conditions of +time and other accidents, will always be matter of fruitful study. As +for the “faultlessness” of Moltke, that distinguished man would be the +first to admit that, like all generals, he has made grave and palpable +errors. Extraordinary, indeed, as have been his achievements, his +campaigns in Bohemia and France show that his strategic and tactical +mistakes were many; and though he is a real chief of the Napoleonic +school, he has done nothing that can be compared to the movements +round Mantua in 1796, to the Alpine march that led to Marengo, to the +manœuvres that immured Mack in Ulm, to the last swoop on Belgium in +1815. That mechanism and organization count for much, is a truth as +old as the days of the Legions; but the genius of leaders in directing +armies has always been the chief element of success in war; and, so +far from this being less the case at the present day than it has been +of old, this influence is now more than ever decisive. It is obvious, +in fact, that the powers of the chief will have increasingly greater +effect as armies have grown to immense proportions, and military +movements have become more complex, more extended, and, above all, +more rapid; and if a mere tactician will, perhaps, do less, on a given +field, than a century ago, victory in a campaign will, in this age, in +the main, depend on superior strategy. + + [Illustration: TURENNE.] + +I purpose, in this and subsequent articles, to endeavour to illustrate +the main principles and permanent lessons of the art of war in brief +sketches of the lives and the deeds of famous commanders of modern +times; and I shall try to dispel the notions that military history +before Sadowa is a mere old almanack, and that the exclusive study +of modern Prussian routine is the best education of the accomplished +soldier. For authority, I need only refer to Napoleon.[1] “Tactics,” +wrote that master of war, “manœuvres, the science of the engineer +and of the artillerist, can be learned in treatises, like geometry; +but knowledge of the high parts of war can be acquired only by study +of the history of war, and of the battles of great captains, and by +experience.” + +I have placed Turenne at the head of my list, not only because he comes +first in time, but because the art of war made immense progress during +the long career of this illustrious chief, was greatly improved by +his powerful genius, and gradually acquired a modern aspect. Before +I attempt, however, to sketch his exploits, I would say a word on the +condition of the art before it passed into his master hand. The leading +maxims of war were fully understood; and great commanders had, in many +a contest, shown what the qualities are which ensure success in the +strife of opposing armies. That a general in a campaign should have a +distinct object, that he should steadily endeavour to carry it out, +and that he should so combine his means as to promote his ends, were +recognised and approved principles; and the value of intelligence in +great movements, of energy and skill in the direction of troops and of +careful administration in military affairs, had been illustrated by +fine examples. Passing, too, from these universal truths, the principal +rules of strategic science had been ascertained in their main outlines, +and ably brought to the test of experience; nay, war had exhibited +grand instances of strategy, whether of offence or defence, which, +founded as it is on the peculiar character and faculties of individual +men, had never perhaps more noted champions than Hannibal and the +Roman Fabius. The advantage, for instance, of having the possession of +interior lines on a field of manœuvre had been clearly perceived by +Guébriant, and was repeatedly seen in the Thirty Years’ War; Gustavus +had shown what could be accomplished by rapid and well concerted +movements against the communications of a hostile army; and Wallenstein +had proved how great could be the power of firmness, endurance, and +patient skill in resisting even the most able enemy. + +The art, however, owing to many causes, had not as yet been nearly +developed, and had not even approached its present perfection. Fine +movements, indeed, were occasionally made; the march of Gustavus, for +example, down “the Priests’ Lane,” which carried him into the heart +of the Empire, and some of the marches of Parma, in an earlier age, +remain noble specimens of audacious genius. But strategy was still, +so to speak, cramped and limited by all kinds of obstacles, and it +could not attain the freedom and grandeur which it has exhibited in +the wars of this century. On every theatre of war, from Vienna to +Brussels, the state of husbandry was backward in the extreme; there +were immense wastes of morass and forest; and even the plain country +was not half cultivated. The roads, too, were comparatively few, and +even the main roads were, for the most part, bad; the great rivers had +but few bridges, and minor streams were not bridged at all; and the +passes across the chief mountain ranges were mere paths and tracks, +intricate and difficult. The natural impediments to the march of armies +were, therefore, many and often formidable; and these were greatly +increased by the numerous fortresses which had grown up since the +feudal age, and which, covering frontiers and main approaches, and +barring the way to an invader’s progress, could not easily be passed +by even a daring enemy. In addition to this, the means of supply and +of transport possessed by modern armies, either did not exist or were +very scanty; magazines, trains, and the many appliances that enable +troops of this day to live and move, were quite in an embryonic state; +and a general was often compelled to rely on plunder and rapine to +support his soldiery. In these circumstances, the rapid manœuvres and +the grand movements leading to decisive battles which belong to the +age of Napoleon and Moltke, could be witnessed only on a small scale, +and occurred only in rare instances. War, as a rule, had a contracted +aspect; and its ends were often different from those of our time. +Beset by impediments, even the greatest chiefs were frequently unable +to make long marches, or to attempt anything like audacious strategy; +and though Gustavus had fully seen that the main object of a campaign +was to cripple an adversary in pitched battles, this was not yet an +accepted principle. The art of war still largely consisted in wearing +out an enemy in petty combats, in devastation, and wrecking a country, +in incursions attended by partial success; and the aim of commanders +often was, not so much to defeat a hostile army as to find good +quarters in an unravaged province. Campaigns were late, slow, and had +small results; as a rule, winter campaigns were rare. Above all, it had +become a maxim that before invading an enemy’s country it was necessary +first to reduce its fortresses; months, and even years, were taken up +in sieges; and the art, it has been said, “seemed to flit around strong +places.” In short, owing to the local accidents and peculiarities of +the seventeenth century, strategy, though in existence and in a state +of progress, was still quite immature and imperfect. + +The science of Tactics had at this period made less progress than that +of Strategy. It had become recognized that the three arms should act +in concert, and support each other; and a distinct unity was seen in +battles, unlike the desultory combats of the Middle Ages. But one great +principle of modern tactics, that an army should be arrayed on the +ground, not according to any unchanging method but so that each arm +should turn to account the character and local features of the spot, +had scarcely entered the minds of men; it certainly had not been fully +established. An army took its position in a settled order: the cavalry +always on either wing, the infantry in the centre, and the guns in +front. There usually was a considerable reserve; and the importance, +for instance, of so placing cavalry that it could fall on an enemy +from under cover, or of so distributing guns that they could enfilade +infantry, or throw a concentrated or plunging fire, was as yet little, +if at all, understood. In these circumstances the marked diversity +which is a characteristic of modern battles, which makes no one exactly +resemble the other, and in consequence of which the tactical skill of +a chief in command is taxed to the utmost, existed only to a small +extent. There was a distinct sameness in the battles of the age, and +these usually consisted in a contest between the hostile footmen and +guns in the centre--a mere partial engagement without manœuvres--until +the success of the cavalry on either side enabled it to assail the +flank or the rear of the enemy. The tactics, therefore, of this period +were very different from those of our own; and this difference was +made greater through the change in the relations of the three arms, +and in the efficiency and the power of infantry, which has taken place +since the seventeenth century. At this period, cavalry was by far +the most important and capable arm; it was, in fact, the manœuvring +force in the field. The value of artillery was still unknown, for guns +were comparatively few and ill served; and footmen, often inferior in +numbers to horsemen, were a combined array of musketeers and pikemen, +invariably marshalled in dense masses, unequal to quick and difficult +movements, and utterly inferior to the infantry of this day in relative +strength, in the efficacy of fire, in ability either to attack or +defend, and in evolutions and manœuvres in the field. + +Under these conditions, a general gave his chief attention to his most +powerful arm; artillery and foot played a subordinate part; and, as +I have said, the event of battles was usually decided by a charge of +horsemen launched against an exposed side of a hostile army. But if +the tactics of those days were unlike ours, it is a mistake to suppose +that they did not afford full scope to superior skill and genius. The +front of battles was comparatively small; a general’s eye could command +the whole field, and victory usually depended on the inspiration of +the chief, who, with ready design, and at the fitting moment, could +direct his cavalry in collected force against a hesitating and already +shaken enemy. This was the distinctive gift of the famed Condé, and +of that born master of tactics, Cromwell; it was conspicuously proved +at Rocroy and Marston Moor; and it is a gift of the very highest +order, if it does not exactly resemble the faculties which prepared +Ramillies, Leuthen, and Austerlitz. For the rest, an army of this +period, considered as a whole, was very different from an army of the +nineteenth century; and this, too, affected the art of Tactics. In +numbers, it was comparatively small; 30,000 men would be a very large +army. It was deficient in unity and combined strength, for it was a +mere array of battalions and squadrons; divisions and corps were as yet +unknown, and a general-in-chief did not possess the supreme authority +now entrusted to him. The discipline, too, and the organization of +such an army was still far from good; the troops did not even wear a +uniform, and were more akin to a feudal militia than to regular and +trained soldiers; the muster rolls were always incomplete, owing to +the Falstaffian tricks of officers, as yet subject to little control, +and mutiny and insubordination were too common. Such an army, from the +nature of the case, would be a weak and uncertain instrument of war; +and this alone made the tactics of the day less decisive, as a general +rule, in results, than those of later great masters of war. + +The art of war at this time, in short, has been happily compared to +a bird, which eagerly spreads its wings for a flight, but is held, +checked by restraints, to the ground. I pass on to the great captain +whose life and career I attempt to illustrate. Turenne was born in +1611, a scion of the princely _noblesse_ of France, his father +being Sovereign Lord of Sedan, his mother a daughter of William the +Silent, who largely transmitted the high qualities of the House of +Nassau to her renowned offspring. As has happened with other famous +warriors--with Luxemburg, William III., and Wellington--the future +master of war was a sickly child; but from the earliest age he showed +strength of character. He was educated with remarkable care; and +though, unlike Condé, he was not a precocious genius--he remained +heavy and dull in exterior through life--still, even in those years, +the assiduous care with which he studied the campaigns of Cæsar, and +followed Alexander in his march to the Indus, revealed the natural +tendencies of the coming strategist. Turenne entered the service of the +Seven Provinces as a private soldier at the age of fourteen; and under +the care of his maternal uncle, Maurice of Nassau, and his successor +Henry, he took part in the long wars of sieges which marked the +conflict with Spain in the Low Countries. He fought his way steadily +up from the ranks; he seems to have owed little to birth or to favour; +but, though he gained distinction at the siege of Bois-le-Duc, this +was not the natural bent of his genius, and the value to him of these +essays in arms was probably to teach him the important truth, which +he illustrated in many striking instances, that “in war you should +march and not besiege,” that you should rather outmanœuvre and defeat +your enemy than waste months in attacking fortresses which fall of +themselves after success in the field. + +In 1630, when twenty years old, Turenne obtained a regiment from Louis +XIII. He addressed himself with untiring diligence to the discipline +and the training of his men; and, like Wellington--in matters like this +he had much in common with our great countryman--he was soon known +as a capable officer, and could justify his boast that his “corps +was equal to the best troops of the King’s household.” The young +colonel, however, made no way at Court; its frivolity and luxury were +distasteful to a mind singularly modest and sedate; its licentious +recklessness shocked a nature formed by the rigid tenets of Calvin; and +while Condé was already a star at the Louvre, Turenne, taciturn and +awkward, was scarcely noticed. The future great chief of the armies +of France served for many years in a subordinate rank; he passed, in +fact, through all inferior grades, though his merits were recognized +by good judges; but if this term of probation was unduly long, its +experience, he has said, was most precious, for it “fully taught him +a soldier’s calling.” Long before the close of the Thirty Years’ War, +Turenne was known as an able man, though his great powers had not yet +been developed. He was singled out for honours at the great siege +of Breisach; he showed remarkable skill and firmness in covering a +disastrous retreat from the Sarre; and he had won the praise of La +Valette and Saxe Weimar for his singular steadiness and coolness in +the field, and for the paternal care he took of his troops, a quality +in which his comrades of the _noblesse_, brave, but unreflecting, +were as a rule wanting. The chief point, however, of permanent interest +in this early part of the career of Turenne is the evidence it affords +of the dawn of those powers for which he was to be proudly eminent. +He occasionally had an independent command, and in this position he +never failed to display the gifts of a true strategist. In 1636 he +made a forced march, by which he surprised and routed Gallas. He +captured Maubeuge, combining his movements with those of his chief with +remarkable skill. At the siege of Turin, in 1640, he out-manœuvred and +baffled his enemy, and kept away the relieving army; in 1643 he made a +feint against Alessandria, which deceived his adversary, and enabled +him to seize the fortress of Trino. + +In 1643, as the Thirty Years’ War was nearing its end, Turenne received +the staff of a Marshal of France. His achievements during the next +two years will repay a careful reader’s attention; but I can only +glance at them in this sketch, for they scarcely reveal his peculiar +genius. He took part, under the Grand Condé, in the desperate combats +around Fribourg, marked by the daring and vigour of his chief, but, in +Napoleon’s judgment, worse than useless; we see proof of his strategic +powers in his operations between divided enemies in the Palatinate +at the close of 1644; and I cannot doubt but that the fine march of +Condé down the Rhine, after the fall of Philippsbourg, which made the +French masters of Landau, Mayence, and other cities on the German +bank, was due to the inspiration of Turenne. In 1645, having advanced +to the Tauber, and overrun the Franconian lowlands, the marshal was +surprised and routed by Mercy--a Lorraine chief, little known to fame, +but a great captain of the Thirty Years’ War; and we can gather from +this and other instances that the genius of Turenne, rather profound +than quick, made him less admirable in the sphere of tactics than he +was in the higher parts of war. He was soon again under the command +of Condé, and he led the left wing of the French army in the terrible +struggle around Nördlingen; but though he contributed to the success of +the day, the glory of the victory, doubtful as it was, belongs wholly +to his renowned chief, whose tenacity, boldness, and insight on the +field, plucked safety and even a triumph from danger. The campaign of +1646 distinctly brought out for the first time the special gifts of +Turenne in full relief, and to this day is a strategic masterpiece. The +Marshal was on the French bank of the Rhine, near Mayence, as the year +opened, and Mazarin had directed him to remain in his camps trusting to +a pledge that the Duke of Bavaria would not send aid to the Imperial +forces. The Duke, however, broke faith and marched against the Swedes, +hoping to defeat them as they moved into Westphalia, and to join hands +with the Archduke Leopold, advancing in force from Western Austria; and +had success attended this operation France would have probably lost her +best ally. Turenne made up his mind at once; without waiting for a word +from his Government, he broke up from Mayence, moved down the Rhine in +a march of astonishing speed for those days, and, having crossed the +river as far north as Wesel, he effected his junction with the Swedish +chief, Wrangel, on the Lahn, having forestalled his enemy by a movement +of singular skill and daring. + + [Illustration: + + _THEATRE OF WAR_ + IN + GERMANY] + +Turenne and Wrangel were now at the head of an army of more than +20,000 men; the hostile force, about equally strong, fell back +to Friedberg, north of the Main; and the Archduke, clinging to his +communications, began to retreat to the Danube by an exterior line, +through Schweinfurth and Nuremberg, towards the Bavarian plains. +Turenne seized the occasion with the eye of genius; holding the +chord of the arc, he advanced through Franconia by forced marches, +and attained Dönauworth, and while his adversary was toiling on his +eccentric movement, he crossed the Danube, pushed on to the Lech, and +boldly assailed the great place of Augsburg.[2] He failed in this +siege, having been persuaded by his Swedish colleague to attack Rain, +a little fortress of no importance; but his subsequent operations were +marked by genius and constancy of the highest order. The Archduke, +after weeks of delay, had crossed the Danube and approached the +Allies, and he took a strong position from Landsberg to Memmingen, +in order at once to cover Bavaria and to threaten the communications +of his audacious foes, who had advanced into the heart of Germany, +far from the Danube and even from the Rhine. It was now November, and +an ordinary chief would have fallen back to seek winter quarters, +foregoing the gains of the whole campaign; but Turenne resolved to take +the bolder course, and, against the advice of all his lieutenants, +he made a feint on Memmingen, and then, moving rapidly, seized the +communications of the Archduke at Landsberg and forced him, baffled +behind the Inn. This splendid campaign--a game of manœuvres in which +decisive success was gained without the risk of a single battle, which +shows the highest parts of a master of war, and in which Napoleon, a +draconic critic, can detect only a small mistake, the weakening the +attack on Augsburg to besiege Rain--detached Bavaria finally from the +Imperial cause, and, in truth, all but closed the Thirty Years’ War. + +The campaign of 1647, in which Turenne overcame a dangerous mutiny of +the German auxiliaries in the French army, is one of the many instances +of the strength of his character. That of 1648, the last of the Thirty +Years’ War, is a repetition of that of 1646, but scarcely gives proof +of equal genius; it is chiefly remarkable as the first occasion in +which Montecuculi, a worthy antagonist, and a friend of Turenne in +after years, exhibited his capacity in the field. I pass rapidly over +the next three years--an unhappy passage in the career of Turenne--for +they saw the most illustrious captain of France in arms against the +State and the National Government. Strong affection for a despoiled +brother, and the artful wiles of a beautiful siren--this was a weak +point in the warrior’s nature--caused Turenne to join the rebels of +the Fronde; but though excuses may be made for him, history has justly +condemned his conduct, and, like Marlborough but much less worthy of +blame, Turenne is an instance how revolution can pervert even the +noblest faculties. Turenne showed his strategic gifts in the contest; +he proposed to advance to Paris and to dictate peace, but he was +overruled by his Spanish colleagues, and he was soon afterwards beaten +by Du Plessis Praslin, in a pitched battle not far from Réthel, a point +of capital importance in the wars of that age. Turenne’s tactics, +Napoleon remarks on this occasion, were faulty and slow--this, in +truth, was his least perfect part; but Turenne, and even Condé, never +displayed that pre-eminence in war when opposed to France which they +exhibited when in command of Frenchmen. + +Turenne made his peace with Mazarin in 1652. Though naturally +distrusted by a Court he had betrayed, he soon made his extraordinary +powers felt, and in a few months he obtained the supreme direction of +military affairs in the war of the Second Fronde. Civil war is never +an attractive subject, but in this contest Turenne was opposed to the +Great Condé and the forces of Spain, and events have great and peculiar +interest. Turenne’s splendid faculties strategic insight, skill in +large manœuvres, judgment and constancy were never perhaps more grandly +seen. He proved himself far superior to his brilliant rival, though +it is but fair to say that the genius of Condé was repeatedly baffled +by Spanish obstinacy, and Turenne was justly hailed as the Saviour of +France and of the House of Bourbon when in the extreme of danger. He +out-manœuvred Condé at Blêneau, near the Loire, in a passage-of-arms +singled out by Napoleon, as a marvellous instance of military skill; +and he would probably have brought the war to an end had Mazarin +followed his sagacious counsels to march straight on Paris in 1652. +When he was compelled to obey the too cautious minister, and to +undertake the siege of Etampes--a timid half measure of no avail--he +raised the siege at a moment’s notice, with the decision that belongs +to great captains only, at the intelligence of the approach of Charles +of Lorraine; and the stand he made against the Duke’s army, which +prevented its junction with that of Condé, very probably saved the +royal cause. Turenne distinguished himself in the murderous fight of +St. Antoine, under the walls of Paris, and in the subsequent game of +manœuvres with Condé; and his commanding genius was again seen when a +double Spanish and Lorraine army marched towards the capital to assist +Condé, and threatened the Government with utter ruin. The Regent and +Mazarin, in the extreme of peril, wished to abandon Paris, and to fly +to Lyons; but Turenne saw that this precipitate retreat would prove +fatal to the Bourbon cause. He insisted on keeping his army on the +spot, and, standing in the path of his divided enemies, he baffled +the Spaniards on the line of the Somme, held the Duke of Lorraine +successfully at bay, and prevented either foe from joining hands with +Condé. The results of this generalship, not unworthy of the unrivalled +captain of 1814, were magical and completely decisive. Condé and his +troops were forced to leave Paris; the foreign invaders fell back to +the frontier; the young King and the Court entered the capital, to +the joy of the citizens; the Government was replaced in its seat, and +Turenne read in the nation’s eyes how he had closed the civil war and +restored the throne. In this remarkable contest he had given proof, +from first to last, of the highest faculties; but those, perhaps, which +most deserve notice are his insight in perceiving that Paris was the +centre on which to direct all efforts; his firmness in compelling the +Court to cling to the capital at any risk, and his astonishing skill in +repelling the enemies converging against him in greatly superior force. + +Though Mazarin had been replaced in power, Spain, in 1653, was still +able to send a larger force into the field than France. Turenne +conducted a Fabian campaign on the Oise, baffling the Archduke--his +foe in 1646--and taking care to avoid Condé; and he exhibited once more +what Napoleon has called “the divine side of the art of war,” in making +a stand in a strong position, where Condé had all but brought him to +bay, and imposing upon the cowed Spanish chiefs. In 1654 the reviving +strength of France began to prevail over Spain in decline. Turenne +appeared at the head of a large army, and he successfully raised the +siege of Arras, the capital of Burgundian Artois, in a night attack +of remarkable daring, in which he surprised the Austrian chief and +kept skilfully away from Condé’s lines. This was one of his greatest +exploits in the field, and France acquired a marked ascendency over her +enemies along her northern frontier. I can only refer to the next three +campaigns, in which the strategic gifts of Turenne and his admirable +firmness were again made manifest. True to his maxim, then a revelation +in war--“always march rather than make sieges”--he gradually advanced +to the Scheldt and the Lys, turning their fortresses by operations in +the field, and sitting down before them as seldom as possible; and +in less than three years he had overcome barriers[3] which hitherto +had been deemed invincible, and which had been theatres of war for +centuries without great or decisive results, a feat of generalship +which astounded Europe. The genius of Condé more than once shone out +in his efforts to avert Fate. He destroyed a part of Turenne’s army, +in the hands of an incapable colleague, at Valenciennes, in 1656; and +he brilliantly raised the siege of Cambray, an exploit marked out for +praise by Napoleon. + +The arms of France, however, directed by Turenne, made steady progress +despite these checks, and the fine campaign of 1658 brought the contest +with Spain to a glorious close. By this time Turenne had secured his +position in Spanish Flanders, and was formidably strong. The England of +Cromwell was in a league with France, and the allies resolved to attack +Dunkirk, the strongest place on the seaboard of Flanders, and long a +seat of piracy against British commerce. The fortress was difficult in +the extreme to master, not so much owing to its works and defences +as to the obstacles formed by the sea, the marshes, the woods, and +the canals which girdled it round; and it was protected by a large +Spanish force in observation not far from Ypres. Turenne crossed the +inundation let loose by the garrison, threw lines of investment round +the fortress, and blocked up the approaches along the coast. An English +fleet closed the port from the sea, and 5,000 of the renowned Ironsides +were disembarked to support the French. These operations, rapid in the +extreme for the age, surprised and disconcerted the Spanish chiefs, +and they hastily advanced to relieve Dunkirk with an army inferior in +force to the enemy, and not possessing a single gun. Turenne broke up +from his lines to attack; his left, the English contingent, rested +on the sea, covered by the batteries of the English squadron; his +centre and right formed a semi-circle, extending to the great canal +of Furnes; and as his troops advanced, Condé, it is said, exclaimed +to the young Duke of Gloucester that “all was lost.” The battle was +almost at once decided; Condé, on the Spanish left, did indeed wonders; +but the Ironsides, backed by the fire of the fleet--they were praised +by Turenne in the highest terms--annihilated the Spanish right in one +charge, and the whole Spanish army, deprived of artillery, lost heart +and became a mere mass of fugitives. The place fell, and was handed +over to England. Turenne, breaking up from his camps, took Bergues and +Gravelines, and overran the country, and he only stopped his victorious +march at Oudenarde, Spanish Flanders lying as it were at his feet. +Napoleon, however, contends that the marshal ought to have done more, +and pushed on to Brussels, success which would have brought the war +to an end; and this may be an instance, perhaps, in which Turenne’s +powerful, but somewhat slow intellect erred on the side of too prudent +caution. Yet we must bear in mind that the strategy of the seventeenth +could not be that of the nineteenth century. Turenne certainly +contemplated this very step, but declared that it was not practicable; +and, as it was, the campaign was a splendid triumph which soon brought +about the Peace of the Pyrenees. + +During the next twelve years France enjoyed repose, broken only by a +brief contest with Spain, caused by the claims of Louis XIV. on the +Low Countries in right of his consort. Turenne commanded the royal +army, captured Lille, and overran Flanders; but it is unnecessary to +dwell on these easy triumphs. The marshal was now the first subject +of France and admittedly the first soldier of Europe; and he played a +part of no small importance in the able French diplomacy of the time. +He gave much attention also to civil affairs, was a disciple of the +renowned Colbert, drew up reports on the condition of France which +showed real insight and marked sagacity, and proved that he possessed +administrative powers of the highest order in provincial government. +Like nearly all the highest _noblesse_ of France, he renounced +the Calvinist creed of his fathers--the will of the King was supreme +in this--but, like the illustrious Villars at a later day he condemned +the wrongs already done to the Huguenots, and ventured to utter a +weighty protest. His great work, however, at this period, was the +reorganization of the military power of France; and though Louvois +had a large share in this, Turenne is perhaps entitled to the chief +merit. His reforms were thorough and yet practical; he did not change +everything, and break with the past; but he so improved what he found +existing as to bring it to a high state of excellence, and the French +army, in his constructive hands, became a mighty instrument of war. + +Turenne’s method was to leave the army still largely in the hands +of the _noblesse_, and to allow it to retain a half feudal +character; but he not the less made it the force of the Crown, the +disciplined array of an all-powerful monarchy; and he so transformed +its institutions and spirit, and increased its strength, as to make +it by far the most formidable organization for war in Europe. The +_noblesse_ were allowed to retain their charges, and to raise +their levies as in former days; but they were subjected to the +strictest inspection; incapable officers were summarily dismissed, and +“men in buckram” and false returns were no longer permitted to exist. +While the feudal militia still remained, every inducement was offered +to encourage the men to enter the ranks of the regular troops; the +temporary disbanding of regiments ceased; and select corps--need we +name the Maison du Roi, the brilliant victors on many a field?--were +carefully formed, and inspired the army as a whole with their gallant +and martial spirit. These were great reforms if they stood alone, but +the process of improvement went much further. The hierarchy of the +service had its rules changed; the general-in-chief was made supreme +in everything; the three arms and their chiefs were placed under his +immediate control in all respects, and discipline and subordination to +one head were thus secured for the first time. Unity of command caused +unity in lower spheres; the comparatively loose formations, indeed, of +battalions and squadrons were not changed, but every regiment was clad +in uniform; and care was taken that all weapons should be constructed +and fashioned on the same patterns. Strenuous efforts, again, which +reveal the strategist, were made to accelerate movements in war; the +arrays of trains and carriages were greatly increased; the system of +magazines, of depôts of food, and of field hospitals was immensely +improved, and the mechanism of the army attained a degree of perfection +never witnessed before. Yet the greatest change of all remains to be +noticed--a change, Napoleon remarks, which made this period a new era +in war. A master of his art, Turenne had perceived that infantry, +hitherto kept in the background, was naturally the most important of +the arms; it could accomplish more in his wars of marches, even in that +age, than the more prized cavalry; and Turenne trebled its force in +the French service, reducing horse to much less significance, though +cavalry still, no doubt, retained its superiority in the shock of +battle. As for artillery, Turenne went with the age; the proportion of +guns, though comparatively small as regards the other arms for modern +times, was gradually but distinctly increased. + +Through these immense reforms, the army of France became, for many +years, the terror of Europe; and, except that the changes wrought in +formations by the discovery of the bayonet were as yet unknown, it had +acquired a really modern aspect. An opportunity arose, in 1672, to +prove this tremendous instrument of war. Louis XIV. invaded the Dutch +Republic; the French army and that of his allies exceeded 130,000 +men, a force never seen since the fall of Rome; and while Turenne and +Condé, now restored to France, advanced along the Sambre and crossed +the Meuse, the allied contingent under Luxemburg moved down the Rhine +by Mayence and Cologne. True to his strategic genius, Turenne insisted, +against the advice even of the audacious Condé, on “masking” Maastricht +and pressing forward; the operations of the invading host were marked +by a celerity hitherto unknown, and in less than two months the hostile +armies had crossed the Rhine near the Waal, had attained the Yssel and +had moved into the heart of the Seven Provinces. When the victorious +French had approached Amsterdam, Condé, always great on a field of +manœuvre, entreated the King to seize the dykes, which formed the +last defence of the capital of the States; and, had this been done, +the fortunes of Europe might have taken a wholly different turn. The +golden occasion was, however, lost; time and men were wasted in taking +fortresses; and William of Orange, a sickly youth, then for the first +time seen on the stage of history, saved the Commonwealth by cutting +the dykes and letting loose floods which made Amsterdam an island in +the midst of a submerged country, and effectually baffled the French +commanders. + + [Illustration: + + _THEATRE OF WAR_ + IN + THE LOW COUNTRIES] + +This bad generalship was due to Louvois, and, it is said, was inspired +by the King, never capable in operations in the field; but Turenne +must, at least, have assented, and Napoleon severely condemns the +Marshal for giving his sanction to unwise counsels which he scarcely +could have approved in his heart. This possibly may be another instance +in which Turenne was somewhat slow and too cautious; but probably he +shrank from opposing the will of a sovereign, then almost an idol, and +a minister already hostile to him; and it is scarcely to be supposed +that a chief of his powers, in full possession of the state of affairs, +would have committed a palpable strategic error. Be this as it may, +he soon had an occasion to exhibit once more his great capacity. The +invasion of the States, and the success of Louis, had alarmed Europe +and aroused Germany; Austria and Prussia joined hands for the first +time in war; and two German armies of superior strength were marched +towards the Rhine and threatened Alsace. Louis abandoned Holland and +his rapid conquests; Condé was despatched to defend the Rhine, and +Turenne was placed at the head of an army intended to confront the +Germans on the Main. The Marshal had soon seen through the projects of +his foes; he judged rightly that their real purpose was to unite on the +Meuse with William of Orange, not to venture alone to enter Alsace, and +he took his course with characteristic skill. Moving into the region +around Trèves, he established himself in the valley of the Moselle, +and when the Germans, as he expected, sought to cross the Palatinate +from Mayence, he successfully kept them for weeks at bay, held back the +army of the States on the Meuse, and completely frustrated the intended +junction. This fine strategy probably saved France from an invasion +upon her weakest frontier. + +Louvois had now openly broken with Turenne; the King, irritated at the +reverse in Holland, took part with the imperious minister, underrating +the Marshal’s last achievement, and Turenne found little favour at +court. It was impossible, however, to question his genius; he directed +the general plan of the campaign of 1673, and he held supreme command +on the German frontier. As the Austrians and Prussians fell back from +the Moselle, they began to diverge towards the Elbe and the Danube; +Turenne saw his advantage, and crossed the Rhine, and venturing on +a winter campaign, despite the remonstrances even of the King, he +advanced to the Weser, defeated the Prussians, and drove the Austrians +far beyond the Main. Prussia abandoned the Coalition for a time, but +the Emperor refused to give up the contest, and Turenne, for the +first and last time, was out-generalled on the theatre of war by an +antagonist not unworthy of him. Montecuculi, at the head of an Imperial +army, had advanced into the Franconian lowlands, eluding Turenne, who +was on the Tauber; he gained over one of the prince bishops, made +a forced march and got over the Main, and then having made a feint +on Alsace, he embarked with his troops upon the Rhine, effected his +junction with William of Orange at Bonn, and quickly reduced that +important fortress. This, Napoleon has said, is “the darkest cloud +on the reputation of this great captain;” but the glory of Turenne +was not long in eclipse; and he surpassed himself in the campaign of +1674, the most striking instance, perhaps, of his powers. The success +of Montecuculi had again roused Germany; Prussia and the Lesser +States took part with the Emperor, and France was threatened with a +more formidable League than she had ever encountered before. Turenne +directed operations once more; with admirable wisdom he neglected +the North, and urged the King to invade Franche Comté, an enterprise +crowned with complete success; and he took again his station on the +Rhine, watching the masses of foes collected against him. + +Every movement he made in the contest that followed is a masterpiece +of a great strategist. Turenne, crossing the Rhine, advanced to the +Neckar, threw himself between the armies converging against him; and, +having routed the Austrians near Sinsheim, turned boldly against the +Northern Germans, marching from the Elbe and the plains of Brandenburg. +To gain time and to check their progress, he ravaged the Palatinate +with unflinching sternness; and though history condemns the act, and +Turenne only once adopted this course, it was justified by the laws +of war of the age--nay, by those of a much later period. The Germans +had reached Mayence by the end of August, and before long had entered +Alsace; the Imperial army was close at hand, and it was the purpose of +the Imperial chiefs to invade France with the combined forces, when the +Prussian contingent had come into line. Turenne saw the danger, and did +not hesitate; with an energy worthy of the youthful Bonaparte, he fell +on his foes before their junction, and he defeated them in a fierce +fight at Entzheim, a day memorable if it were for this only--that +Marlborough served on the marshal’s staff, and received the thanks of +his chief for his conduct. This reverse, however, only checked the +enemy; the Great Elector brought up his army. Turenne was obliged to +fall back to the Vosges, and a huge wave of Teutonic conquest seemed +about to overflow the plains of Champagne. Had the Germans pushed on +they might have reached Paris, where confusion and terror already +reigned; but they paused at the decisive moment. They seem to have +dreaded the strokes of Turenne, who had skilfully taken a position +on their flank, and they methodically settled in winter quarters in +Alsace, having let a grand opportunity pass. The subsequent operations +of their great adversary, in conception at least, were of the highest +order. Deceiving his enemy and scorning the hardships of winter among +the Alsatian hills, Turenne feigned to retreat into Lorraine; he then +counter-marched with remarkable quickness, defiled behind the Vosges +with a devoted army which appreciated the admirable skill of its chief, +and, having screened the movement by the mountain barrier, broke in +through the gap of Belfort on the astounded Germans, and surprised +them completely divided and scattered. The effects of this masterly +stroke were immense; the Great Elector was routed at Turckheim, Turenne +pressed forward and threatened Strasbourg, and the horde of invaders, +baffled and humbled, were only too glad to get across the Rhine. + +The movement behind the Vosges of Turenne which surprised the Germans +and caused their defeat has a certain resemblance, it will be +perceived, to the march of Napoleon, screened by the Alps, which after +Marengo gave him Italy. Turenne, however, the reader will note, fell on +his enemy, when he had reached him, in front, and his triumph though +great was not overwhelming; Napoleon descended on the rear of Mélas, +and, though he ran many risks, he completely conquered. Turenne, the +Emperor insists, would have achieved more had he crossed the Vosges in +the middle of the chain, and struck the flank and rear of the Germans; +in that event, the invaders, perhaps, would have never been able to +attain the Rhine. This criticism is, in theory, perfect; but though +Napoleon, in the place of Turenne, would probably have played the more +daring game, the Vosges in those days were most difficult to pass; the +operation would have been very hazardous, and the two movements, in +fact, illustrate the difference between the natures of the two men. + +I have reached the last campaign of Turenne, a long game of manœuvre +between two great strategists, in which the marshal perished on the +very edge of victory. The League against France, though shattered, +still held together; and faulty generalship having been the cause of +the signal discomfiture of 1674, Montecuculi was sent, in 1675, to cope +with Turenne, still upon the Rhine. The Imperial commander, having +threatened Philipsburg, crossed the river near Spires and invaded +Alsace; but Turenne, instead of attacking his foe, crossed the river +near Strasbourg, and, reaching Wilstedt, struck at the communications +of the hostile army; and this forced his adversary to recross the +Rhine. Turenne, having gained this strategic advantage, and carried +the war into German territory, took a position between Strasbourg and +Ottenheim, the place where he had bridged the Rhine; but Ottenheim +is at some distance from Strasbourg, and the French army was very +much divided. Montecuculi approached the Marshal’s camps, and missed +a grand opportunity to strike, which, Napoleon remarks, Condé would +have seized; Turenne, perceiving the danger, raised his bridge, placed +it near Strasbourg, and drew in his forces; and Montecuculi, again +baffled, descended the Rhine and occupied Freistett, his object being +to cross the Rhine at that point by means of a bridge, to be sent down +from Strasbourg--then, it will be borne in mind, an Imperial city--and +his ultimate end being to re-enter Alsace. Turenne, however, barred +the course of the Rhine, by redoubts and batteries carefully placed; +and having thus prevented the passage of the bridge, he, for the third +time, out-manœuvred his enemy and kept him bound with his army to +Germany. The antagonists now held their camps for some months, each +watching the other, and seeking a chance; but Turenne was the first to +move. He crossed the Rench by an undefended ford; and this movement +compelled his enemy to retreat, for it threatened his communications, +and almost reached his flank. Montecuculi, utterly foiled and +out-generalled, abandoned at once the valley of the Rhine, and made for +the defiles of Würtemberg. Turenne, hanging on his foe, pursued; and, +by the close of July, he had attained the Sassbach, assured that he +would triumph in a great and decisive battle. Fate, however, withheld +from Turenne a victory justly earned by his most able strategy. He was +struck down by a shot from a hostile battery, and Montecuculi escaped +from the toils which had been admirably laid around him. The Imperial +chief, indeed--a remarkable man, and in this campaign he was suffering +from disease--when apprised of the death of his renowned adversary, at +once boldly resumed the offensive. The French army, deprived of the +genius which had led it to victory for many years, was soon in full +retreat on the Rhine; and having fallen into the hands of incapable +chiefs, it was nearly involved in a crushing disaster. The history +of war has few more striking instances of what a commander is to his +troops than the reverses which, after the fall of Turenne, followed +the course of his steady success before it; and the passionate cry of +his defeated soldiery, to the worthless men who stood in his place, +“Give us Magpie”--the warrior’s charger--“to lead us!” is only an +exaggeration of a substantial truth. Montecuculi’s eulogy on Turenne is +well-known; but the offensive return which he made with confidence and +victoriously after his great rival’s death is a more expressive and a +finer epitaph. + +Sorrowing Ilium mourned her mighty shade; the remains of Turenne were +borne to St. Denis, and laid in the tombs of the Kings of France, an +honour never again conferred on a subject. They were spared even by +the Jacobin hands which violated the royal abodes of death in the +madness of Paris in 1793; and they now fitly rest beside those of +Napoleon. A word on the place of this great man among the masters of +the noblest of arts. The peculiar gifts of Turenne were a far-sighted +and calm intelligence, sagacity of the finest kind, and admirable +constancy and force of character, and these made him one of the first +of generals, though he did not possess, in the highest degree, the +dazzling imagination, the power of thought and of calculation, and the +astonishing energy which distinguish Napoleon and, perhaps, Hannibal. +These qualities made him a consummate strategist, few chiefs have +ever moved on a theatre of war with the perfect skill and success of +Turenne; few have known how to make grand manœuvres with as certain +results, and with equal brilliancy; and his great wars of marches, +replacing sieges, were an inspiration of most striking genius. As +for special illustration of his strategic powers, Turenne has been +surpassed by Napoleon alone in the art of reaching the communications +of a foe, and of operating between separate hostile masses; and he was +safer than Napoleon in these efforts, though he did not accomplish such +marvels of war. Considering the state of the art in his time, no chief +perhaps has ever achieved more than Turenne by scientific movements; +he triumphed in several campaigns by mere marches without fighting +a single battle, and yet his success was complete and decisive, as +was specially seen in 1646 and 1675. In fact, strategy made little +progress for many years after this great captain; and yet Turenne did +not quite attain the highest rank among modern strategists, for his +intellect was somewhat wanting in quickness, and his nature in what is +called the sacred fire; he let grand opportunities slip, and in three +great instances, at least, he did not do what probably might have been +accomplished by him. + +These defects--and genius is never perfect--made him a tactician of the +second order only; he had not Condé’s inspired thought on the field; +and for a commander of extraordinary gifts, he suffered defeat in many +instances. Yet the decision and firmness which were among his qualities +stood him in good stead, even in the conduct of troops; no general has +ever known better how to make a bold stand, and to impose on an enemy; +and it was one of his special characteristics that he could overcome +defeat, and that he was most formidable after a reverse of fortune. +For the rest, Turenne, like most great captains, had administrative +powers of the highest order; he, usually, even in his long marches, +contrived to have his army in good condition; he remodelled the +military organisation of France, and made it by far the best in +Europe; and, as an administrator, he had this distinctive merit--that +he was in advance of the ideas of his time. I must add a word on the +relations between this illustrious chief and the armies he led. Turenne +had a truly chivalrous nature; he was singularly considerate to his +lieutenants, and though he could be stern and severe when needful, he +made the largest allowance for mere errors, and never blamed others +for shortcomings of his own. No general has ever had more devoted +officers; and this magnanimous character was admired and recognized by +every chief who was opposed to him, by Leopold, Montecuculi, and even +the arrogant Condé. As for his troops, Turenne was most chary of their +blood, resembling Wellington in this respect; and, like Wellington +too--a regimental officer, versed in the details of professional +work--Turenne knew their wants and gave much attention to them. As has +always happened with real chiefs, Turenne fashioned his soldiers to his +own nature; they were not rapid and vehement in in his hands as they +were in those of Condé and Villars; but he made them steady, enduring, +bold, but tenacious; and their phrase, “our father,” shows how he was +beloved by them. Except for one unhappy lapse, the career of Turenne +does “honour to humanity,” to quote the words of his ablest adversary +and yet sympathetic friend. + + [Illustration] + + + + + CHAPTER II. + + MARLBOROUGH. + + +A thorough estimate of Marlborough would fill a volume, and I must +confine myself to the military career of one described by a great +historian as “a prodigy of turpitude,” who “combined the genius of +Richelieu with the genius of Turenne.” John Churchill was born in +1650, the offspring of parents who ranked among the landed gentry +of Devon and Dorset, and who, without apparent gifts of their own, +transmitted supreme ability to two descendants. Little is known about +the first years of the boy; but the attachment he felt through life +for the Church of England was probably more due to his Cavalier birth +than to the assiduous care of a clerical tutor; and, unlike the Great +Condé, Turenne, and Villars, he was not trained to arms by constant +practice and study. It is, perhaps, mere gossip that he owed his first +commission to the shame of a sister, Arabella Churchill, the mother of +Berwick by James II.; and we might pass over his amour with Barbara +Palmer, if it did not bring out, at an early age, proof of the love of +money, which was a master vice of his richly endowed but most complex +nature. He first saw war in an admirable school, having been placed +on the staff of Turenne; he served under that great commander in the +memorable campaigns of 1672 and 1674; soon attracted the special notice +of his chief as an officer of extraordinary promise, and was publicly +thanked by him on the field of Entzheim for the cool intrepidity which +was one of his distinctive qualities. It is impossible to doubt that +this experience was of the greatest advantage to the future warrior; +and though there is a difference in the genius of the men, we may, +I think, trace the example of Turenne in more than one of the great +feats of Marlborough. The young, but already distinguished, soldier +in 1678 married Sarah Jennings, then a beauty of Grammont, but long +afterwards to become the Atossa of Pope’s vengeance, and the marriage, +which led to a domestic history of a most strange and eventful kind, +had a decisive effect on the fortunes alike of Churchill, of England, +and even of Europe. The pair flourished at the little Court of the Duke +of York, held in his provincial capital; and it is unnecessary to tell +how the wife became Lady of the Bedchamber to the Princess Anne, and +acquired an ascendency over the future Queen which was to be followed +by the most momentous results. During these years, Churchill first gave +proof of the diplomatic skill which, at a later time, was to make him +the master of the Grand Alliance. He negotiated some of the underhand +bargains of Charles II. with Louis XIV., designed to make England a +vassal of France, and for this and other services he obtained the +reward of a Scotch, then akin to an Irish, peerage. + + [Illustration: MARLBOROUGH.] + +At the accession of James II. to the throne, Lord Churchill was made +again an agent to obtain a bribe from the great Bourbon Sovereign; but +though he was raised to the English Peerage, and he really crushed the +rising of Monmouth by his direction of the Royal troops at Sedgemoor, +he was left rather in the shade during the trying time when the King +was carrying out his fatal policy against the laws, the liberties, +and the Church of England. I do not justify his desertion of James, +when at the head of his men, at a critical moment, but his guilt was +shared by the first men of the time; and if self-interest, perhaps, +was his ruling motive, the strong sympathy he certainly felt for the +Church in part, I believe, determined his conduct. He participated in +the Revolution and its spoils, was made Earl of Marlborough, and was +given a seat at the Council of Nine, which ruled England, under Mary, +in the absence of William; and he again gave proof of his military +gifts in a sharp combat in the Low Countries, in his admirable conduct +of the war in Ireland, and in his always able and successful advice. +He was already the foremost of English soldiers, and his genius and +promise had been recognized by more than one of the King’s veterans; +but he was never really liked by William III., and the great captain +who, had he been in command, would have changed the fortunes of +Steenkirk and Landen, was usually kept at home in a subordinate place. +Marlborough betrayed and abandoned William in turn. I shall not attempt +to excuse the act; but soaring ambition, wounded to the quick, and +the scorn of inferior men raised over his head, had probably more +to do with his conduct than alarm at the prospect of the return of +James, or a desire to place the Princess Anne on the throne; and in +judging these things, we must never forget that many of his peers and +colleagues were no less to blame, and that Revolution had destroyed +loyalty, divided allegiance, and blighted good faith in the hearts of +three-fourths of our leading statesmen. At this conjuncture, however, +one act of Marlborough stands out marked as a foul deed of shame; he +treacherously disclosed the descent on Brest, caused the death of an +honoured companion-in-arms, and involved a large British force in +destruction; and, corrupt and bad as the age was, had the crime and its +author become known, the head of the criminal would, no doubt, have +justly fallen on the block at Tower Hill. Marlborough, in fact, could +not endure his late disgrace; he feared for his life, and made up his +mind to come to terms at St. Germains, at any risk, and he sacrificed +Talmash, without scruple, in order to weaken a detested Government, and +to promote his own selfish ends. + +The treason of Marlborough, in the affair of Brest, was unsuspected by +the men of his time; but it is characteristic of a revolutionary age +that William ere long turned to him again, though in merited disgrace +for other offences. His ability, in fact, was necessary to the State, +and politicians had few scruples; and the diplomatist who had shown +skill and tact in the negotiations of the Stuarts with Louis XIV. +was employed, and with marked success, by the King in cementing the +Grand Alliance against the Bourbon Monarchy. On the death of William, +Marlborough received the command of the English forces destined for the +contest with France, and through the influence of Heinsius, the great +Dutch Minister, he was placed at the head of the armies of the States. +His reputation, already eminent, entitled him to this high position; +but almost from the first he gained an ascendency in the direction of +the military affairs of England which no other British general has +possessed. This, as is well known, was due to the complete control +his wife exercised over the Queen; Mrs. Freeman governed Mrs. Morley, +and practically nearly guided the State; and Marlborough enjoyed more +real authority than belonged to William, in England at least, until +near the end of the war of the Spanish Succession. On the other hand, +the English commander was by this time in his fifty-second year; he +had never conducted war on a great scale, though he had proved himself +to be a most able soldier, and it seemed scarcely probable that he +could cope, with success, with the trained and experienced generals +of France, brought up amidst the traditions of Turenne and Condé. No +one dreamed, when Marlborough assumed his command, that Blenheim and +Ramillies were not distant; and though the Allies had some advantages +which they did not possess in previous contests, France had hitherto +confronted Europe with success; and, as Spain and Bavaria were now on +her side, the chances seemed to be in the main in her favour. + +I must glance at the state of the military art at the beginning of the +war of the Spanish Succession. Since the invasion of Holland in 1672, +war had assumed ample and even vast dimensions; very large armies had +appeared in the field, and the contest which had closed at the Peace of +Ryswick had extended from the Shannon to the far wilds of Hungary. The +obstacles, to the march of troops, which had existed in the preceding +age, had been, to a certain extent, lessened; roads and agriculture had +slightly improved; and owing to the great development of the efficacy +of the attack, due to the engineering genius of Vauban, the power of +fortresses had much declined, and they could scarcely ever offer a +prolonged resistance, or permanently shield an endangered frontier. +Strategy ought, therefore, to have made distinct progress; but exactly +the contrary had been the case. No genius had appeared to turn to +account the advantages offered by the new conditions, and the art +had retrograded; for while all that belongs to what is material in it +conduced to its advance, the intelligence which it requires to give it +grandeur, and to rule matter, had been largely wanting. The operations +of war during the thirty years before Marlborough emerged on the scene +had been comparatively timid and slow; vast as were the masses arrayed +in the field, we see scarcely a single great combination, a remarkable +march, or a decisive battle, except in the case of the Turkish hordes; +campaigns were feebly directed and had few results; and though sieges +took much less time than formerly, armies seldom ventured to pass +fortresses, or to make daring attempts at invasion. The reason simply +was, there were no consummate chiefs; William III., Câtinat, Louis of +Baden, Luxemburg, each with special and real merits of his own, were +all generals of the second order, and the “sublime part of the art,” +in Napoleon’s language, had had no masters to bring out its splendours +since the grave had closed on Turenne and Condé. One peculiarity of the +strategy of the time deserves the attention of the careful student, +and it exhibits a marked backward tendency. The generals of the first +half of the seventeenth century had made considerable use of great +defensive lines; but Turenne had nearly exploded this system, and his +triumphs were mainly due to his masterly movements. During the period +that followed, inferior men went back to the routine of the past; as +fortresses became of less importance, huge barriers were raised to +cover frontiers, and whole campaigns were spent in manœuvres to turn or +to force these artificial obstacles. This indicates a decline in the +art, though the value of these lines was often great, and[4] it has, +perhaps, been underrated in our time. + +While strategy had thus, for a moment, declined, a change had passed +over the art of tactics. Armies had continued to grow in numbers, +and infantry--its importance becoming recognized--was now the arm +of greatest force on a field of battle. The bayonet, too, had been +invented, and this invention, almost a revolution in itself, by +degrees largely modified the old formations of the age of Gustavus, +Turenne, and Condé. The masses of pikemen and musketeers arrayed in +dense squares and close columns, were gradually replaced by extended +lines of infantry, whose weapon combined the powers of the musket and +pike; and though these lines were still deep and serried, foot, owing +to the change, covered far more ground on a given field than had been +the case formerly. The general result of these two circumstances was +that, in almost all instances, the front of battles was enlarged to an +immense extent; instead of occupying a few hundred yards, armies about +to engage filled vast spaces, and as these could scarcely ever be open +plains, and usually presented local features, such as woods, streams, +hills, and folds of the ground, it became of increased importance to +turn to account these peculiarities in any impending conflict. Skill in +tactics, accordingly, began to consist less in seizing an opportunity +to throw cavalry upon infantry exposed or broken than in so arranging +the three arms, and employing them as to derive advantage from the +special characteristics of the field; and the old order of battle, +horse on either wing, foot in the centre, and guns in front, as a fixed +system, became obsolete; and each arm began to be so disposed as to +be made most effective, having regard to the actual situation and its +accidents of place. This change, though slow, had become manifest; it +had been conspicuously seen on the great day of Zenta, where the powers +of Eugene were first displayed; and battles, though very different from +what they are now, had assumed an essentially modern aspect, troops +acting in concert, by no method of routine, but so as always best to +support each other, and to make use of the ground with this object in +view. + +The tactics, however, of this age, in what may be called their +subordinate parts, had little in common with those of a later period. +Cavalry was still considered the most active arm, and far the most +efficient in the shock of battle; the proportion of horsemen to foot +was still much larger than it has become in the present century, and +a general still mainly relied on cavalry for the decisive movements +that assured victory. Though infantry, too, had greatly increased +in numbers, and its power in action had been largely multiplied, it +was still deemed rather an arm to support, to defend, and to cover +the ground, than to strike; the old traditions still clung to it; its +lines, four deep at least, were clumsy and heavy, and did not furnish +sufficient fire; it often was formed in dense columns, and it had never +yet decided a battle by its own special and unaided efforts. As for +artillery, guns were still few, and the days of horse artillery had +not come; and though the power of the arm had been much augmented, +and its true uses had been partly ascertained, it was still in an +undeveloped state. The tactics of the day, therefore, so far as regards +the handling of the three arms, were still immature; and one of the +methods of these, the blending together in single or in successive +lines of horsemen and footmen, in an offensive movement, though often +witnessed, is now obsolete. For the rest, armies were still loosely +formed; they were still arrays of battalions and squadrons, and they +were as yet without that complete unity which has made them more +perfect instruments of war. As for discipline and equipment, little had +been changed since the grand reforms of Louvois and Turenne; armies +had become bodies of regular troops with officers, as a rule, of a +noble class; and the system of magazines, of depôts of supplies, and +of trains remained what it had been, strategic science having made no +progress. The organization of the French army was still decidedly the +best in Europe; but it had been imitated with more or less success by +more than one of the Continental armies; and the difference in this +respect was probably less than it had been thirty years previously. +As for the British army, it already possessed fine regiments, of +unsurpassed worth; but, as has always happened, it was badly organized, +and its organization, such as it was, owed much to the care of William +III. + +I must pass rapidly over the two first campaigns, in which Marlborough +held supreme command. The theatre of the war was the Low Countries +as, indeed, was usually the case with him; and, as Spain was now +in alliance with France, the French armies occupied the Belgian +provinces from the mouths of the Scheldt to the Lower Meuse. Either +from over-confidence, however, or perhaps, because the incapable +Chamillart had become his minister, Louis XIV., at the beginning of +the war, paid little attention to this frontier; and Marlborough was +largely superior in force when the campaign of 1702 opened. The object +of the British commander was to master the course of the Meuse, with a +view to gain a base for more decisive efforts; though hampered already +by the Dutch deputies, and the many impediments of a coalition, his +march was a series of easy triumphs; Venloo, Liège, and other places +fell, with Kaiserwerth on the Middle Rhine; and, if Boufflers made a +gallant resistance, he was compelled to fall back to the Upper Meuse. +Marlborough received a dukedom for these services. The recompense now +appears extravagant, and was, doubtless, largely due to the favour of +the Queen; but we must recollect that the arms of France had scarcely +ever been checked before, and for half a century had been deemed +invincible. + +The operations of the campaign of 1703 first distinctly brought out +the powers of Marlborough in designing great combinations of war, and +should be studied by those who deny that he possessed the gift of +strategic genius. The French had been forced back to the Upper Meuse, +but they still held most of the Belgian strongholds, and they occupied +a vast system of defensive lines, formed by the rivers and forests of +an intricate country, and extending from the Mehaigne, not far from +Namur, to the verge of Antwerp, and thence to Ostend. Marlborough +aiming, as he always did, at a vital point, and seeking to carry the +war to the frontier of France, but knowing the difficulties of a direct +attack, resolved to turn and pass this great obstacle, and thence to +advance to the French seaboard; and the measures he took to accomplish +his “great design,” as he called it, in perfectly true language, were +in the highest degree admirable. The French, largely reinforced, +held the lines and the fortresses with probably[5] 130,000 men; the +strength of the allies was not 100,000, but Marlborough possessed the +immense advantage, ever to be borne in mind by an English chief, of +the mastery of the movable base of the sea, and he clearly saw how to +turn this to account. His plan, simple alike and excellent, was to hold +Boufflers, now supported by Villeroy, in check himself with the bulk +of his forces; in the meantime the lines were to be assailed by Cohorn +and Opdam with the Dutch army, and this attack was to be combined with +a descent on the coast, to be made to the south by an English fleet, +in order to harass and perplex the enemy. This grand project which, +in its conception, reveals the genius of a great captain, and which +ought to have sent the allied armies past the French lines to the Upper +Lys, was frustrated by the errors of the Dutch commanders, and by the +jealousies and intrigues too common in a league. Cohorn neglected +his mission to ravage a province; Opdam made a false and premature +movement, and before Marlborough had his grasp on his enemy, Boufflers, +leaving Villeroy in Marlborough’s front, and making a forced march +with conspicuous skill, anticipated Opdam as he approached Antwerp, +and defeated him with heavy loss at Eckeren. The “great design” had +thus been revealed and baffled; but Marlborough believed it could yet +be accomplished, and moving on Antwerp with the mass of his army, +he proposed to force the French to fight a great battle, hoping, if +successful, to get across their lines. Timid and divided counsels, +however, prevailed; the Dutch commanders refused to second their +colleague, and Marlborough, bitterly vexed, returned to the Meuse. The +capture of the small place of Huy was the only fruit of the campaign of +1703, and Marlborough was so indignant at the conduct of the Dutch that +he was on the point of throwing up his command. + + [Illustration: + + THEATRE OF THE + CAMPAIGN + of 1704.] + +Happily for the Grand Alliance, ambition and interest diverted +Marlborough from this hasty purpose; and the memorable campaign of +1704 was to be the most renowned of his triumphs. Bavaria had joined +France in 1703; a real chief, the illustrious Villars, had overcome +Louis of Baden on the Rhine, had marched into the Swabian lowlands, and +had defeated a German force on the Danube; and had the Elector of +Bavaria followed his counsels, and his colleagues in Italy given him +aid, he would have anticipated the campaign of 1805, and have ended +the war by a march on Vienna. Villars, however, was disliked at Munich +and Versailles, and, unlike Marlborough, had an unhappy temper; he was +recalled for a squabble with the Elector; and his place was filled by +the incompetent Marsin, who could not even comprehend his strategy. +Yet the situation of the Empire remained most critical; a combined +French and Bavarian army threatened the capital from the Iller and the +Inn; the insurrection of Hungary raged in the East; and Austria might +be overrun and even subdued if the grand project of Villars were ably +carried out. Eugene, the first of the Imperialist chiefs, perceived the +danger and sought to avert it; he addressed himself, not in vain, to +Marlborough; and a plan of operations was agreed between them, which, +it was hoped, would detach Bavaria from France, and at least prevent an +advance on Vienna. + +The situation of the belligerent armies on the theatre of war shows +that it was difficult in the extreme to give effect to any combination +of the kind. Marlborough commanded the principal force of the allies; +but he was on the Meuse far away from the Danube, and was held in +check, as it appeared, by Villeroy, with an army that ought to have +sufficed for the purpose; Tallard, at the head of a powerful army, was +on the Rhine, confronting a much weaker enemy--the contingent, in fact, +defeated by Villars--drawn within the well-known lines of Stolhoffen, +formed to prevent an attack from Alsace; and the Elector and Marsin +were in Swabia, greatly superior in force to Louis of Baden, who held +the approaches from the Black Forest. For Marlborough to attain the +heart of the Empire, through these masses of surrounding enemies, +seemed to be almost an impossible task; but he encountered the risk, +and adopted a project which, I am convinced, was a thought of Eugene’s, +for it bears the mark of his peculiar genius, in which grandeur was +combined with rashness. Breaking up from the Lower Meuse, on the 19th +of May, at the head of, perhaps, 70,000 men, increased as he advanced, +by German contingents, he crossed the Rhine and made for Mayence; he +then pressed forward to the Main and the Neckar, and having traversed +the Franconian plains, he reached the Danube near Ulm on the 22nd of +June, and joined hands with Louis of Baden, a movement resembling the +best of Turenne’s as regards its admirable speed and decision. His +despatches prove that he was fully aware of the peril of this audacious +march, with Villeroy in his rear and Tallard on his flank; but possibly +no other course was open; and, as always happened with him, he did not +hesitate, and he executed his task with consummate skill. Marlborough +and Baden were now immensely superior in force to the Elector and +Marsin, who, on being informed of the approach of Marlborough, had +advanced from the Iller, and attained the Danube; and the allied chiefs +did not lose an instant in turning their present advantage to account. +Leaving a considerable force to restrain the enemy, they moved down the +Danube quickly to Donauwörth; and after a fierce and well-contested +struggle stormed the heights of the Schellenberg covering the town, +and became masters of the course of the river. Within a few days, the +victorious army was overrunning the Bavarian plains and harrying them, +after the fashion of the age, in order to force the Elector to yield; +Marlborough having completely transformed the situation for a time by +operations which had astounded Europe. + +While Marlborough had thus attained and overcome the Danube, what +had been the conduct of the French commanders he had left behind on +the Meuse and the Rhine? Villeroy had nearly 40,000 men in hand; +the army of Tallard, even allowing for a detachment sent in the +spring to Marsin, must have been about 45,000 strong; and had these +chiefs been capable men, they ought to have prevented Marlborough’s +movement, though, it is fair to remark, they were bound and hampered +by injudicious orders from Versailles. Had they combined their armies +and crossed the Rhine, they ought easily to have carried the lines of +Stolhoffen--these did not stop Villars a few years afterwards--and +crushed the feeble army of defence; and they then ought to have been +able to have forestalled Marlborough, in what was a strategic flank +march of extreme risk, to have at least fallen on his communications +between the Neckar, the Main, and the Danube, and to have perhaps +compelled him to fight in positions where the loss of a battle would +have been ruinous. Villeroy and Tallard, however, were not great +chiefs; they marched and counter-marched, lost many weeks, and allowed +their enemy to pass them by; and it was only in July, when Marlborough +and Baden were, we have seen, in the heart of Bavaria, that they took +anything like a decided course. Their armies, before united, were now +again divided; Villeroy crossed the Rhine to observe the lines of +Stolhoffen, occupied now by Eugene, at the head of, perhaps, 30,000 +men; and Tallard made for the Black Forest, with a force probably +35,000 strong, in order to join hands with the Elector and Marsin. + +The junction was effected on the 4th of August, not far from the +central town of Augsburg, and the collected armies must have formed +a mass of nearly 70,000 men at least, for the most part troops of +the best quality. Meanwhile, Villeroy had altogether failed to hold +Eugene along the Rhine in check; that great captain, when aware of +the movement of Tallard, resolved to give support to Marlborough and +Baden, already menaced by the combined enemies; and he broke up from +his lines and flew to the Danube, with a force of about 15,000 men, +having left a detachment to keep back Villeroy, and having baffled that +most worthless commander. He was at Höchstedt on the 8th of August--the +scene of the victory gained by Villars--and, leaving his small force on +the northern bank, he crossed the Danube to confer with Marlborough, at +the time at Aichach, to the north-east of Augsburg. A grand opportunity +was offered again to the French, who, in this campaign, seemed always +to miss the occasion. The combined Bavarian and French armies were, +at this moment, quite near Höchstedt; and had they made a rapid and +decisive movement, they might have crushed the isolated wing of Eugene, +and have placed Marlborough, who had been left by Baden, in order to +make the siege of Ingoldstadt, in a position of the most critical kind, +in a hostile country, with an enemy on his flank, and separated from +his base on the Danube. Tallard, Marsin, and the Elector, however, +paused; they crossed the Danube, indeed, at Lauingen; but they did not +attempt to fall on Eugene; and Marlborough, meanwhile--he clearly saw +his danger--marched with extraordinary speed from Aichach, and came +into line with his daring colleague, west of Donauwörth on the 11th of +August. The allied chiefs decided to attack the enemy, who, by this +time, was in a strong position, in a region of marsh and forest, where +the stream of the Nebel falls into the Danube through a plain bounded +by the villages of Lützingen and Blenheim. Less confident men would +hardly have run the risk, for the hostile army already threatened the +line of their communications northwards; and a serious defeat might +have been destruction. + +I can only describe in faint outline the great and decisive battle +that followed. By the early dawn of the 13th of August, the allied +army had passed the defiles which lead through Dapfheim into the +plain of the Nebel, and began to take up its positions for attack. +Marlborough and Eugene had hoped to surprise the enemy, and Tallard +and Marsin were really unprepared; in fact, with the Elector, they +thought that the allies were falling back on Nördlingen, on the line of +their communications with the Main. The French and Bavarians, however, +were soon ready; but some hours passed before the hostile armies had +joined in the actual shock of battle. Each was from 55,000 to 60,000 +strong; but the French and Bavarian army, a veteran force, was probably +a better instrument of war than the composite masses of many races +collected under the allied standards. The dispositions, however, of the +French marshals were essentially bad, and gave the great commanders +opposed to them a distinct advantage. Tallard and Marsin seem to have +been convinced that the Nebel, which ran across their front, was +impassable or could be passed only by an enemy with extreme difficulty; +and that if Lützingen and Blenheim, with the neighbouring village of +Oberglau, were held in strong force, the allies, should they advance +on the Nebel, would be stopped at the centre by a powerful obstacle, +and on either wing could be easily repelled. They divided their army +accordingly into two masses, each, it would seem, of nearly equal +force; and while they crowded their right wing at Blenheim, and +placed large bodies of men at Oberglau, and at Lützingen on their +left wing, their extended centre was weakly occupied by a long line +of cavalry only, supported by an insignificant body of footmen. This +conception was altogether ill-founded; the obstacle of the Nebel was +not very great, and were it once forced it would fare ill with the +thin and ill-guarded French centre, and even with the wings--with the +right especially, cooped up in Blenheim and close to the Danube. The +vice of the arrangement, there is reason to believe, was perceived +by Marlborough almost at once; the masses of the allied army were so +arrayed as to be ready to assail the hostile centre; and Tallard, who +commanded the French right, when he saw this, it is said, asked Marsin, +who was in command of the French left, to send reinforcements to the +threatened point, but only received an angry refusal. + +The battle began at about 9 A.M., Marlborough attacking Blenheim from +the allied left, while Eugene made a circuitous march on the right; +and the attack on Blenheim--which, I conceive, was a feint only to +deceive the enemy--was repulsed with no inconsiderable loss. At about +noon, when he had been made aware that Eugene was engaged with Marsin, +Marlborough made a first great effort against the French centre; and +a mass of cavalry, formed in two lines, with a mass of infantry in +their front and their rear, was launched forward to cross the Nebel. +The French horsemen, however, were not wanting to themselves; they +fell with terrible effect on the hostile array as it was entangled +and confused in the passage; and though part of Marlborough’s troops +succeeded in the attempt, they were held to the spot and made no +progress. Meanwhile, a secondary allied attack on Oberglau had +altogether failed; and though Marlborough’s presence restored the +contest, it has been thought that had Tallard and Marsin co-operated +at this moment in a counter-attack, the French and Bavarian army might +have won a victory. Eugene, however, who, with an inferior force, had +held Marsin in check by prodigious efforts, sent a detachment to the +aid of his colleague, and about 4 P.M. Marlborough was once more free +to strike what he had seen from the first was the vulnerable point in +the hostile position. Massing footmen and horsemen once more together, +he hurled them against the French centre; and though the French cavalry +fought to the last, their weak support of infantry gave way, and the +centre yielded to the overwhelming pressure. The victorious army, with +Marlborough at its head, was now master of the whole position of its +foes; and turning in full force against the French right, shut up in +Blenheim and pressed against the Danube, it compelled it, almost at +once, to surrender. Marsin and the Elector, who, unlike Eugene, had +done nothing to aid a companion in arms, contrived to effect their +retreat in safety; but an accident only averted their ruin. The loss +of the victors was, probably, from 11,000 to 12,000 men; that of the +French and Bavarians was 40,000; and the routed army was, in fact, +destroyed. + +This splendid campaign, decisive as it was, cannot be deemed a +strategic masterpiece. The project of the march from the Meuse to the +Danube, with Villeroy in the rear and Tallard on the Rhine, was too +hazardous to deserve high praise;[6] and Eugene, I repeat, was, I +think, its author, though Marlborough is, of course, responsible for +it. Had Condé been in the place of Villeroy, and Turenne held the staff +of Tallard, Marlborough, I believe, would not have attained Donauwörth, +and the great campaign of 1704 would have probably had a different +issue. Remarkable, too, as was the skill of Eugene in eluding Villeroy, +and pushing on to the Danube, in order to join his colleague, he ought +not to have left an isolated detachment in little force within reach +of an enemy fourfold in strength; and had Tallard and Marsin been real +chiefs, they would have crushed Eugene and have placed Marlborough in +extreme peril, when he stood alone and inferior in force in his camp +at[7] Aichach. Apart, however, from these risks and mistakes, Eugene +and Marlborough, especially the last, carried out their plans with +consummate ability. The march from the Meuse, by the Main, to the +Danube, was a prodigy of execution for the age; the advance to the +Schellenberg was rapid and brilliant; and the forced march from Aichach +to join Eugene was admirable for its quickness and boldness. The +decision, too, to give battle at Blenheim was characteristic of great +captains; it was hazardous, but a retreat would have lost the whole +fruits of a successful campaign, and very probably would have been +fatal. + +Nevertheless, it is upon the field of Blenheim that Marlborough’s +genius becomes most manifest. With that perfect insight which never +failed him, he at once perceived what was false and defective in the +disposition of the hostile army. He concentrated his forces against +the one weak point; and though he was beaten back and even placed +in danger, he never relaxed his efforts, carrying out his purpose +with inflexible constancy and calm firmness until he had pierced the +enemy’s centre, and made a decisive victory certain. Here we see the +development of what we may call the new tactics in full perfection. +Tallard and Marsin did not comprehend the ground, and unskilfully +arrayed their troops upon it. Marlborough took in the situation at +a glance, and so conducted the battle that an overwhelming mass was +brought to bear on the decisive spot. Nothing, too, could have been +more admirable than the loyalty of Eugene to his colleague; but for +his support Marlborough might have lost the battle; and the result of +Blenheim was, in fact, due to the unrivalled tactics of the one chief +and the chivalrous and unselfish zeal of the other. As for the French +Marshals, the arrangements they made might have succeeded against +inferior men; but, if formidable in appearance they were radically bad; +though Tallard of the two is the least to blame, for he understood the +mistake that was made; and Marsin deserves the severest censure for +disregarding Tallard’s advice, and for neglecting all through to send +him assistance--a too characteristic fault of the warriors of France. +The conduct of the allied army was such as great chiefs almost always +obtain from the troops they lead. English, Austrians, and Prussians +fought like heroes; but the French and Bavarians had perhaps the +better army--and the French cavalry made magnificent efforts, if the +surrender at Blenheim betrays the weakness of the French soldier in the +hour of defeat. Blenheim, in truth, was a general’s not a soldier’s +battle; the triumph of genius in command, not of mere valour. + +Blenheim saved the Empire, and set Germany free; and the defeated army, +a shattered wreck, reaching the Rhine in fragments, fled into Alsace. +Having cleared the German bank of the river, the Allies sat down +before the great place of Landau, which covered the approaches to the +French frontier; but, though the fortress made an heroic resistance, +Marlborough had entered the Palatinate by the close of autumn, had +seized the important points of Trarbach and Trêves, and had secured a +base for the invasion of France. Everything, he hoped, would be ready +by the early spring--armies still seldom held the field in winter--and +his purpose was to advance into Lorraine by the valleys of the Moselle +and the Sarre, with an army of 100,000 men formed of contingents of +many nations, the line long afterwards marked out by Gneisenau, and +followed by Moltke in 1870. This indicates a true strategic eye; and, +in fact, in strategy as well as in tactics Marlborough always detected +the fault in the cuirass, and seized the vulnerable point on the scene +before him. The great Englishman, however, had not the good fortune of +the renowned Dane many years afterwards. Marlborough was not seconded +as Moltke was. Louis of Baden, who on the field of manœuvre held the +place of the Crown Prince of Prussia in August 1870, refused to move +even a man from the Rhine; and though Marlborough advanced to the +Moselle, in the early summer of 1705, in order to force the hand of his +colleague, he had not sufficient force to make a decisive movement. +Marlborough, too, had a very different man to cope with from Napoleon +III.; his antagonist was Villars, already proved to be incomparably the +greatest of living French chiefs, and destined to justify the proud +title of “Invincible,” given by a grateful Sovereign. The operations of +Villars were able in the extreme; assailing the heads of Marlborough’s +columns, but taking care to cover his own flanks, he retreated to the +well known position of Sierk, resting on the Moselle and a chain of +heights, and he calmly awaited the victor of Blenheim. The hostile +armies were each about 50,000 strong--the Memoirs of Villars are +incorrect in making out that his foe had 80,000 men; but Marlborough, +deprived of the support of Baden, did not venture to risk an attack, +and, after waiting some days, he recoiled, baffled, and fell back to +the country round Trêves. He was so angry that he sent a message to +Villars to explain the cause of his retreat; but though his colleague +was wholly to blame, Villars had gained his object and had saved France +from an invasion which might have ended the war. + +Marlborough was ere long recalled to the theatre which had been the +scene of his first exploits. Villeroy by this time had returned to the +Meuse with an army greatly strengthened since the year before, and, at +the head of about 70,000 men, he had retaken Huy, advanced down the +Meuse, and seized the important town of Liège. Terror now prevailed in +the councils of the States; their chief commander, Auverquerque, had +been defeated; and Marlborough was compelled to break up from Trêves, +to abandon the hope of invading France, and to try to restore the war +in the Low Countries. He had joined Auverquerque by the first week of +July, and he instantly assumed a bold offensive at the head of about +60,000 men. Villeroy, a noisy braggart and an incapable chief, was +out-manœuvred and lost Huy; and he had soon fallen back to the great +French lines extending across Belgium from the Mehaigne to the sea, +which had been the scene of operations in 1703. Marlborough, despite +a protest of the Dutch deputies--they hampered him in all his great +movements--resolved, to master and pass the obstacle; he marched +across the well-known field of Landen, which had witnessed Luxemburg’s +brilliant triumph, and deceiving Villeroy by well-designed feints, he +forced the lines near Tirlemont on the Gheete, winning a bloody combat, +and taking many prisoners. The beaten army fell back to the Dyle, in +the hope of covering Louvain and Brussels, but Marlborough crossed the +stream at Genappe; and on the 18th of August he was about to assail +the French in position not far from Waterloo--a village then wholly +unknown to fame--when once more Dutch fears and jealousies prevented +his fighting a decisive battle. He was again so indignant that he +wrote to England, declaring that he would leave his command; and his +operations, in truth, had been shamefully thwarted. Deserted by Baden +in the beginning of the year, he had failed in his project of invading +France; crossed by the Generals and Commissioners of the States, he +had not been able to bring Villeroy to bay, and the only result of the +campaign of 1705, which might have seen the Allies on the Marne and +the Seine, was the capture of the French lines in Belgium, a result +important indeed, but not very remarkable. + +Marlborough spent the winter of 1705–6 in visiting crowned heads of +the Grand Alliance; a master of diplomacy as well as of war, he threw +the spell of commanding genius over the King of Denmark and the King +of Prussia, and secured pledges of support for the ensuing campaign. +He had been so ill-treated by the States that he wished to invade the +South of France in 1706, in concert with his loyal colleague, Eugene; +and it would be a curious speculation whether this effort, which failed +in his absence in 1706–7, and has never yet been attended with success, +would have succeeded had Marlborough been in command. He was, however, +induced to return to the Low Countries, and he advanced towards the +Meuse to threaten Namur, a great strategic point for a march into +France, with an army of about 60,000 men. With the infatuation that +befalls despots, Louis XIV. still had faith in Villeroy, and though +deprived of the protection of the lines, the Marshal was ordered to +take the offensive. Villeroy was advancing towards Leuwe with an army +equal in numbers, at least, to that of his foe, when he met Marlborough +on his march southwards, in a country of marsh, woodland, and low +hills, between the Mehaigne and the lesser Gheete, crowned by the +insignificant village of Ramillies. + + [Illustration: THEATRE OF + + THE + + CAMPAIGNS + + in + + Belgium and North of France.] + +A few words must suffice to trace the incidents of the great battle +that followed. On the 23rd of May 1706, the French army, with a +Bavarian wing--the Elector still clung to the fortunes of France--was +seen arrayed on a range of upland, extending from near the course of +the Mehaigne to beyond the little Gheete, on the hill of St. André, +the villages of Ramillies and Autre Eglise, and a morass formed by the +Gheete and its feeders, covering the position across three-fourths +of its front. Villeroy had formed his army into two masses, his right +nearly upon the Mehaigne, but strongly occupying an old Roman road +which led across the plain in a line with the river, his centre and +left along the marshes of the Gheete; and he held Ramillies and Autre +Eglise as fortified outposts. The position seemed formidable, as at +Blenheim, but the eagle eye of Marlborough saw at a glance that his +enemy’s arrangements had two marked defects, and that able manœuvring +would assure him victory. Villeroy’s centre and left, especially the +left, covered by an impassable swamp, was not assailable; but neither +could he attack that side; and Marlborough held the chord of the arc in +front of the French Marshal’s position. Marlborough prepared his battle +with that unerring judgment which scarcely ever forsook him in war; and +the result was a splendid and complete triumph. The English chief began +by a feint against the French left, which, of course, was repelled +without difficulty; but it had the effect which Marlborough hoped for; +Villeroy detached from his right to support his left, weakening thus +his army at the real point of attack. Marlborough fell once more on the +French left, in order to distract the attention of his foe; and then, +turning his shorter line to account, and moving rapidly a great body +of troops unseen by Villeroy, behind a hill and a wood, he struck the +French right in overwhelming force, his men threefold in numbers, at +the critical point, pressing forward along the Roman causeway into the +very heart of the hostile position. The French centre and left, held +bound to the spot, and scarcely able to move, saw the battle lost, and +made few efforts to avert defeat; and though the French right fought +well for a time, the resistance was not like that at Blenheim, for +the French soldier had lost the moral power of success. The villages +of Ramillies and Autre Eglise were quickly stormed, without heavy +loss; and the French right was ere long overpowered, and fled from +the field in despair and rout. Villeroy’s centre and left, being not +assailable, drew off for a time in fair order; but the contagion +of defeat soon affected the men, and his whole army became a horde +of fugitives, abandoning guns and standards, and were captured by +thousands. Marlborough followed up his victory with the strokes of a +master; he was free to act and he achieved wonders; and in a few days +at most the whole of Belgium and its fortresses had become his spoils. +Brussels, Ghent, Antwerp, and even Ostend fell with a rapidity for that +age surprising; the French, hopelessly demoralized, made no stand, and, +before the autumn had closed, the allied standards had been carried +to the Lys and the Scheldt, and waved ominously near the frontier of +France. + +I would select Ramillies as the most distinctive and characteristic +of Marlborough’s battles. Eugene shares the honours of Blenheim with +him, and the issue hung in suspense at Blenheim; but Ramillies was +a masterpiece all his own, and the victory was never for a moment +doubtful. The day was won by a single stroke of tactics; and here +again we see the peculiar excellence of Marlborough in the highest +perfection, his genius in taking advantage of the ground, and in +turning to account the faults of his enemy. France seemed fallen after +the campaign of 1706, marked, not only by this immense disaster, but +by Eugene’s grand campaign on the Po, through which the French were +expelled from Italy; yet the exhausted nation suddenly made one of +those prodigious and heroic efforts which have so often astounded +Europe. Berwick, a nephew of Marlborough, and in war a Churchill, +reconquered Spain in the great fight of Almanza; and an attempt to +invade Provence and to besiege Toulon, though conducted by Eugene, +completely failed. Meanwhile Louis XIV., taught at last by misfortune, +had replaced Villeroy in his command by Vendôme, a man of many gifts +and many evil qualities; and the King strained the resources of his +realm to the utmost to make head against his foes in the Low Countries. +Vendôme took the field with about 100,000 men; Marlborough certainly +was inferior in force; and the campaign of 1707 was spent in manœuvres +between the Lys, the Scheldt, and the Sambre, with little results. + +I shall only glance at the campaign of 1708, for though Marlborough +gained a succession of triumphs, it was less marked, perhaps, by his +peculiar genius than by the fatal dissensions of the French chiefs, +and the profound demoralization of the French army. Vendôme recovered +Ghent, and the line of the Lys; he even passed the Scheldt, and +advanced to the Dender, and though he failed to capture Oudenarde, +he held a favourable position when he confronted Marlborough on the +Dender, in the first days of July. He was embarrassed, however, by +a fatal burden; the Duke of Burgundy, rather a monk than a soldier, +shared with him an ill-defined command; and the Duke insisted on +falling back to the Scheldt, renouncing the initiative with timid +weakness. Marlborough by this time had been joined by Eugene, who +had moved from the Moselle into Belgium; and the two chiefs advanced +to the relief of Oudenarde, resolved, if possible, to fight a great +battle. The march of the French had been extremely slow, owing to the +bickerings of the Duke and Vendôme; but they were collected upon the +Scheldt near Gaveren; and they ought to have made the Allies rue an +audacious attempt to cross the river. The divided chiefs, however, sent +forward only a weak detachment to dispute the passage. This was cut +to pieces after a short struggle; and Marlborough and his colleague +bridged the Scheldt under the beard, so to speak, of the ill-directed +enemy. The hostile armies met, on the 11th of July, in a region of +plain and forest outside Oudenarde. Each was probably about 70,000 +strong; and the fortunes of France were once more marred by timidity +and divided counsels. Marlborough had gained ground on the French +right, when Vendôme wished to attack from his left, but the Duke of +Burgundy had resolved to fall back; and though the retreat began in +good order, the French troops, hard pressed and wretchedly led, broke +up by degrees in ignominious flight. The defeated army was unable to +rally until it had found a refuge near Ghent; and Marlborough and +Eugene, pressing boldly forward, overran the country between the Lys +and the Scheldt, and sate down before the vast stronghold of Lille. +I cannot dwell on the great siege that followed, the most remarkable +of the whole contest. Lille was a place of extraordinary strength. It +was defended by Boufflers with a large garrison; it was surrounded by +neighbouring friendly fortresses, and it had the support of the army +that had fought at Oudenarde, and of another army of relief which, +under Berwick, had followed the steps of Eugene from the Moselle. To +capture such a stronghold appeared impossible--Vendôme ridiculed the +very notion, and yet Marlborough and Eugene accomplished the task, +though Boufflers made an heroic resistance. This undoubtedly was in +a great measure due to the ability and daring of the allied chiefs. +Eugene clung to the fortress with tenacious constancy, and Marlborough +gave proof of extraordinary resource in covering the siege and in +maintaining his communications open through all kinds of obstacles. Yet +Lille would probably not have fallen but for the animosities of the +French commanders. Vendôme openly quarrelled with the Duke of Burgundy, +and Berwick sullenly stood aloof from both; and the two armies of +relief did almost nothing. The moral power, too, of the French soldiery +was fatally injured by these disputes and failures; and when Lille +fell, the war seemed about to close in a triumphant march of the Allies +on Paris. + +At this crisis, indeed, the condition of France was such as might +have made even men like Richelieu and Turenne begin to despair. The +convulsive effort of 1707 had failed; the Allies were on the verge of +Artois; and the Monarchy in decline, and the exhausted nation seemed +unable to confront the mass of their enemies. Yet Louis XIV. did not +lose heart; he refused the insolent proposals of the Dutch to take up +arms against his own grandson, and he appealed, not in vain, to an +heroic people. Recruits flocked in thousands to defend the lilies; +the misery, in truth, and the prostration of France, increased the +numbers that joined her armies; but everything that constitutes +organized force--supplies, depôts, and magazines, were wanting. The +King, however, throwing prejudice aside, at last confided the army +on his northern frontier to the one commander who had never failed +in the calamitous war of the Spanish Succession. History and gossip +have alike been unjust to Villars; he was ridiculed in England and +hated at Versailles, but he was a general of extraordinary powers, +for he combined almost in the highest degree the great faculties of +Turenne and Condé. Yet when Villars, in the spring of 1709, assumed the +command of his master’s army, he was almost appalled at the prospect +before him; he was at the head of perhaps 100,000 men, but he was so +ill supplied that he could make no movement. It is on occasions like +these that French soldiers, when ably directed, show at their best. +Villars in a few weeks had obtained the means of operating with some +hope of success, and he had breathed into his troops that extreme +self-confidence which was one of his most distinctive qualities. By the +early summer he was in positions of formidable strength, in the space +between the heads of the Lys and the Scheldt, and covering the low +ranges overlooking Artois; and he had protected himself with defensive +lines that extended almost from the feeders of the Scheldt to the sea. +Marlborough and Eugene were now at the head of from 110,000 to 120,000 +men, and Marlborough, with true strategic insight, proposed to turn +the French lines by the coast, combining the attack with a descent on +Boulogne, supported by British troops and a fleet, and then, passing +the Somme and masking its fortresses, to press forward boldly to the +capital of France. This was a recurrence to the “great design” of +1703, and worthy of a chief of supreme genius; and it is an additional +proof that Marlborough perceived, with perfect clearness, the immense +importance to an English army of the command of the sea. The Dutch +deputies, however, refused to sanction a movement they doubtless could +not understand; and Eugene, I believe, agreed with them, for, as we +shall see, he had formed a plan of quite a different kind to invade +France. The Allies had now “to take the bull by the horns,” and to +enter France through the network of fortresses, of rivers, canals, +and intricate woodland, which still covers her northern frontier; and +issuing from Lille in great strength, they proceeded to invest the +stronghold of Tournay, in order to secure and widen their base. The +place fell after a weak resistance, and Marlborough and Eugene now +turned against Mons, still pursuing the same methodical warfare, and +hoping to master the line of the Sambre. This was too much for Villars, +who would have been placed in extreme difficulty had the Allies gained +the heads of the Sambre without a contest. He issued from his lines +in the first week of September, and by the 10th he had taken a strong +position in a wide opening between two masses of woodland, not far from +the beleaguered fortress, which overlook the heathy plain and the +hamlet of Malplaquet, ever since a great name. He fortified ground, +naturally perilous to attack, with all the resources of the art of the +engineer; and he boldly awaited the advance of the enemy. + +The allied chiefs had meant to attack Villars before he had made these +formidable lines; but, as usual, they were crossed by the deputies +of the States, and the result proved how disastrous had been their +meddling. In the early dawn of the 11th of September, Marlborough and +Eugene put their army in motion, and the French army was soon descried +holding a position which has been aptly described as “an infernal +gulf surrounded by fire.” The French right and left were respectively +covered by the woods of Lanière and of Taisnière, which crescent-like +converged towards each other; the wood of Sart spread beyond that of +Taisnière; and the French centre holding the space between, in the +opening that leads to the plain of Malplaquet, was massed behind a +triple line of entrenchments, with apertures to allow the free use of +cavalry. The position, in short, was of extraordinary strength, and it +was held by troops who, under the spell of Villars, ably seconded by +the gallant Boufflers, who had volunteered to assist his colleague, +were animated by heroic ardour. Yet Marlborough and Eugene did not +hesitate; and they marshalled their forces for the most desperate and +best contested struggle of the war, in which princely soldiers from +all the lands of Europe took part, like knights in a tournament to +the death. The numbers on each side were not far from equal,[8] the +Allies having a slight advantage--about 100,000 to 90,000 men; but, +prodigiously strong as its position was, the French army, crowded with +rude levies, could not be compared as an efficient force with the +victorious legions of many campaigns, and the allied chiefs possibly +trusted too much to an inferiority repeatedly proved. + +The plan of Eugene and Marlborough seems to have been to turn the +French left and to force the left centre, making only a secondary +effort against the right; and Eugene, after a prolonged contest, +fairly expelled the enemy from the wood of Sart. The Prince, supported +by Marlborough in force, now advanced upon the wood of Taisnière, and +a murderous struggle kept fortune in suspense, until Villars, drawing +a body of troops from his centre, drove back Eugene in a furious +onslaught, conspicuous for the valour of the Irish exiles,[9] “ever and +everywhere, true” to the Bourbon lilies. The situation of the Allies +was now critical, when a wound deprived the French of the genius of +their chief; and as the detachment made by Villars had weakened their +line to a considerable extent--he was hurrying to the endangered +point when he fell--Marlborough, seizing the occasion with his +wonted judgment, made a tremendous attack on the enemy’s centre. The +first range of entrenchments was ere long carried, but the obstacles +presented by the lines behind, and the heroism of the defence, kept the +issue doubtful. A magnificent effort made by the household troops of +France for a time forced the assailants back; and even when the inner +entrenchments were won the French centre prolonged the still undecided +battle. Meanwhile the false attack on the French right had been turned +into an attack in full force. The Prince of Orange, carried away by +excitement, advanced along the wood of Lanière, and tried to storm the +hostile entrenchments in front, and his troops were literally mown +down in thousands by enemies who suffered little loss. The battle was +raging until 3 P.M., when a flank movement, most skilfully +made by Eugene, outside the verge of the wood of Taisnière, began to +endanger the French left, and threatened the only line of retreat; and +this caused Boufflers, now in supreme command, to draw gradually off +from the scene of carnage. The Allies, utterly worn out, and cruelly +stricken, made no attempt to molest the enemy, and the French fell back +a few miles only, in perfect order, and not the least disheartened. +Villars, it is said, exclaimed from his litter, that “he expected his +army to fight again, as soon as it had had a moment of repose.” + +Marlborough and Eugene won this terrible battle, the greatest by far +of the eighteenth century, in what may be called a military sense; +for the French army retired from the field, and Mons fell a few weeks +afterwards. But it was not an inconsiderate boast of Villars that +Malplaquet was truly a Pyrrhic victory; the Allies lost fully 20,000 +men, the French probably not half that number; the Dutch contingent +never recovered from the fight; and the frightful slaughter of the +allied soldiery provoked angry discontent in England, and sent a thrill +of alarm through the enemies of France. Eugene and Marlborough, in the +actual battle, displayed as usual their great powers; but the whole +enterprise was, perhaps, too hazardous; and if, as has been alleged, +Marlborough chose to fight in order to keep up the war party at home, +he was justly punished for an unprincipled act, for Malplaquet shook +the Grand Alliance to its base. Villars showed admirable skill in +choosing his ground, and strengthening a naturally strong position, +and in arranging his troops upon it; he, too, was a master of the new +tactics, and he would not improbably have repulsed his foes had he not +been disabled at a critical moment. As it is, Malplaquet does him the +highest honour; it is a proof of his extraordinary gifts, that, with an +army inferior in every respect, he should have inflicted losses on the +allied army at least twofold greater than that of his own, and that he +successfully stemmed the tide of misfortune which had for years set in +against France. + +I shall merely refer to the two campaigns of 1710 and 1711, for +Marlborough is not their real hero, and his great qualities, though +seen in them, do not appear in their accustomed splendour, owing to +adverse circumstances which combined against him. He was supported +by Eugene in the first of these years; and the allied chiefs, in the +absence of Villars, forced the lines he had made the year before, and +invested and took the place of Douay, on the second line of the French +fortresses of the north. Villars, however, though still suffering from +his wound, was in command by the end of May, and he constructed a new +great defensive barrier, extending from the Scarpe to the neighbourhood +of Boulogne, and adding enormously to the many obstacles of a region +already protected by nature and art. The Allies reached the lines, +and Eugene, as was his wont, for a daring exploit, gave his voice +for an attack in force; but the Dutch, remembering Malplaquet, held +back; Marlborough, it is believed, agreed with them, and the two great +captains had to content themselves with taking Bethune, St. Vénant, +and Aire, little places around the head of the Lys, which cost them +thousands of their best soldiers. Villars, meanwhile, showed little +sign of life; but he kept on extending his lines until they formed an +immense position of defence, spreading from the coast to the heads of +the Sambre; and he boasted, not, we shall see, in vain, that the enemy +should advance no further. In 1711 Marlborough had not Eugene with him, +but he was at the head of a very large army; and the campaign was spent +in a game of manœuvres, in which Villars and he were fairly matched. +The Englishman succeeded at last in forcing the lines, which were too +long to be covered at all points; but the capture of the insignificant +place of Bouchain was the only prize of immense efforts; and though +the wits of Versailles and St. James’s cried scorn at the _ne plus +ultra_ of Villars, that great chief had really attained his object, +and had successfully shielded the French frontier. These campaigns, +in fact, have been misdescribed by English partisans in Marlborough’s +interest. The true victor was, beyond dispute, Villars; he had +compelled the Allies to waste their strength in sieges, which simply +had no results; he had proved himself to be a master in defence, as +remarkable as he had been in attack; and, combining genius in politics +and war, he had gained for France what she needed, time to dissolve the +Grand Alliance already weakened. It would be unfair, however, to say +that Marlborough was wanting to himself in this contest; as a military +exploit, his forcing the lines of Villars was an admirable feat; but, +in truth, he was circumscribed and baffled by the turn which affairs +had for some time been taking in England and upon the Continent. He +had for years been almost supreme in England, and had had full control +over her resources for war; but Sarah Jennings and Anne Stuart had +quarrelled; Mrs. Masham had crept to the ear of the Queen; Malplaquet +had aroused a storm in England; the Ministers in power sought means +to destroy him; he received no real support from the Whigs; and he had +become the object of grave charges, partly the clamours of faction, +but, in part, well founded. On the other hand, France had triumphed in +Spain; the success of Villars had saved her in the north; the Dutch and +the English had had enough of war; and the Grand Alliance was being +broken up largely owing to the rapacity of the House of Austria. In +1710 and 1711, Marlborough had no scope for his commanding genius; he +was no longer able to make great efforts; he knew that his splendid +career was drawing to a close. + +Before the beginning of 1712, Marlborough had been deprived of all his +military commands, dismissed from office amidst shouts of obloquy, and +threatened with impeachment for crimes against the State. He was not +brought to a public trial; and some of the accusations heaped upon +him were certainly false, and now seem ridiculous. But he wisely left +England with his disgraced wife; and though he was not convicted of +malversation and fraud, the unscrupulous ambition and avaricious greed +which were perhaps his most distinctive vices were dragged into light +by a great deal of evidence. It is remarkable, too, though no commander +has ever been more beloved by his troops, that he was distrusted +by some of his best officers; and if his treason at Brest remained +unknown, he was disliked and suspected by both Whigs and Tories. + +The value, however, of his genius in war, was conspicuously proved, in +an indirect way, in the memorable campaign of 1712. England had now +withdrawn from the Grand Alliance, but the Emperor still maintained +the struggle; and Eugene, who hated Louis XIV., and had confirmed his +master in his warlike purpose, was placed at the head of a great army +intended to invade and to subdue France. He was now in possession of +most of the fortresses which cover the northern French frontier, and +his position was so formidable that Louis XIV., when he gave Villars +once more the army of the North, and bade the warrior farewell at +Versailles, exclaimed that, should fortune prove adverse, “the King +and the Marshal would perish together.” The plan of Eugene, his base +now secure, was to capture the strongholds near the heads of the +Oise, and then marching down the open valley of the stream, the path +followed for ages by the House of Austria and its generals in assailing +France, to pass by the fortified lines of the Somme, and to finish the +war by an advance on the capital. He sate down to invest Landrecies, +now almost the only obstacle in his way, and his army was so confident +in itself and its chief that it called its lines “the approaches to +Paris.” This resembled, in some respects, the daring march on Turin in +1706; but Eugene had made a strategic mistake; arguing from what he +thought was the timid attitude of Villars, in the campaign of 1710, +he believed that the Marshal would never attack, and he spread his +army, in ill-connected posts, from Landrecies to near Marchiennes on +the frontier, leaving a detachment to guard a weak point at Denain. +The Prince had to deal with a different foe from the chiefs he had +routed in 1706; his adversary was a man of genius, full of resource +and thought, in execution admirable. Villars by this time was in his +lines near Cambray; he quickly detected Eugene’s error, and he took +advantage of it with consummate skill. Breaking up from his camps, he +made a forced march as though he was trying to relieve Landrecies; he +ostentatiously gave out that this was his purpose, and then, screening +the movement with perfect art, and counter-marching with extreme +rapidity, he fell in full force on the communications of his foe, and +attacked Denain in largely superior numbers. The results of this fine +strategy were almost marvellous; the detachment guarding Denain was +destroyed; a large body of troops, hurried up by Eugene to join in the +defence, was utterly routed, and the whole army of invasion, smitten in +the flank, and losing its communications, was compelled to retreat, and +to fall back, baffled, behind the frontier. Villars made the very most +of this splendid success; the siege of Landrecies was instantly raised; +the French fortresses, which had been the prizes of many campaigns, +were soon retaken, and the standards of France were ere long seen +waving in triumph along the course of the Sambre. France was finally +saved by this grand feat of arms, and before a year had passed, Villars +was in the heart of Germany, had driven Eugene beyond the Rhine, and +had compelled the Emperor to sue for peace. France had never such an +awakening again until, rescuing her from defeat and anarchy, Napoleon +won the great fight of Marengo. + +In the Revolution which followed the death of Queen Anne, Marlborough +was placed again in command of the army; but he was disliked by George +I. and his ministers; and it is significant that he never regained +anything like his old authority in the State. The last years of +his life were somewhat obscure; he gradually survived his splendid +faculties, and he died, little regretted, in 1722. I cannot notice his +diplomatic career; enough to say that he was the master spirit of the +Grand Alliance during many years; he kept its ill-connected structure +together, and three-fourths of the Princes of Christendom inclined +before the genius of an English subject. As a statesman, Marlborough +was less successful; he misinterpreted the spirit of the time during +the later years of the great war he directed; but his errors and fall +were largely due to the faults and the temper of his imperious wife, +whom he loved with a fondness not unmixed with terror. A word as to +his achievements in the noble art of which he was one of the greatest +masters. Marlborough was endowed with the choicest gifts of a warrior; +it was his special characteristic that daring, constancy, imagination, +and prudence were blended in him in proportions of the happiest kind; +and it is a peculiarity of his career that he attained supreme command, +for the first time, at a period of life when most great captains have +done their work, and that he was never defeated in a pitched battle. +It has been said that he had little strategic genius; but a study of +his campaigns confutes this error; he was capable of great combinations +in war; and if, as a strategist, he accomplished less than other +commanders of the first order, this is partly to be ascribed to the +contracted theatre which usually was the scene of his exploits, and +partly to the interference of the Dutch and their deputies, and to the +jealousies and discords of a divided League. Two strategic gifts he +certainly possessed in a measure accorded to few commanders; he always +perceived the weak point of an enemy on a field of manœuvre as well as +of battle, and he was pre-eminent in making the most of success, and +in drawing decisive results from victory. In pure strategy, however, he +was, I think, inferior in originality to Turenne, and he achieved less +than Villars and Eugene, two great names in this sphere of the art; +but as a strategist he is second alone to those illustrious chiefs of +his era; and he contributed largely to the grand revival of strategy, +after a season of decline, which was seen in the War of the Spanish +Succession. We must go to the field of battle to behold the genius of +Marlborough in its highest perfection. He may have been equalled as a +tactician, but he has never been surpassed; his judgment in placing an +army on the ground and in detecting the vulnerable points of an enemy; +his constancy in pressing an attack home at the spot where success +would be most complete, and his wonderful resource and calmness in +peril, were unrivalled among the men of his time; and neither Eugene +nor Villars can show a Ramillies, a masterpiece of purely tactical +skill. For the rest, Marlborough was a great leader of men, like all +generals of the first order; and “Corporal John” was as adored by his +troops as was the “Little Corporal” of another age. It is melancholy +to observe that deep scars of guilt mar the beauty of this magnificent +figure; and that we must see in it the dimmed brightness and the ruined +glory of the fallen archangel, as well as his majesty and commanding +power. Every allowance ought in justice to be made for Marlborough; +his crimes were those of a revolutionary age; and few of the leading +Englishmen of his day were free from the stain of disloyal, bad faith; +but the treason of Brest was a foul deed of wickedness. A singular vein +of baseness and meanness ran through, like alloy, this grand nature; +and whatever excuses may be made for him, there are “damned spots” upon +Marlborough’s fame. + + [Illustration] + + + + + CHAPTER III. + + FREDERICK THE GREAT. + + +Frederick II. of Prussia, known as the Great, was born in 1712. The +associations of his boyhood and early youth were ill fitted to bring +out the qualities of a nature which, with many defects, was essentially +that of a soldier and statesman. His father, Frederick William, had +some parts which entitle him to a place among able rulers; but, even +as a king, he was a harsh tyrant, and in his private life and social +relations he was scarcely better than a coarse-minded savage. History +has fully dwelt on his strange acts and habits; how, with ministers +mere submissive satellites, he governed his kingdom with a rod of iron; +how he sate, in what was called his Tobacco Parliament, directing the +affairs of a growing state according to his despotic fancies; how he +reduced his household to the level of lackeys, caned nobles, ladies, +and domestics alike, and was wont to storm against them with oaths and +curses; how, in order to enlarge an overgrown army, he turned Prussia +into an immense barrack; and how he exaggerated in his treatment of +his wife and family the barbarities he inflicted on his terrified +subjects. That a lad, gifted with fine intelligence, who had a strong +will and a genuine sympathy with Letters, Art, and the pursuits of +Science, should, as he grew up, regard with disgust this system of +cruel and grotesque oppression, and should fiercely resent the inhuman +discipline to which he was himself subjected, was only natural and to +be expected; and Frederick and his father seem to have hated each other +during several years with a cordial hate. It is unnecessary to dwell +on this dreary episode in the life of the great future sovereign; the +Crown Prince was beaten, half starved, and drilled into obedience, with +a severity that became a byeword; he was forbidden books and liberal +studies; and having sought refuge in flight from these unnatural +wrongs, he was thrown into prison, condemned to death, and perhaps only +escaped a malefactor’s fate through the intercession of the Imperial +Head of Germany. + +In the revulsion of feeling caused by this tyranny, Frederick drew +more and more away from the King, his methods of ruling, his ways, +and his habits; and when the advent of manhood set him partly free, +he surrounded himself with youthful friends of a somewhat wild and +licentious turn, indulged freely in the pleasures of his age, and led +a life which was a tacit protest against the meanness, the rudeness +and the barbarism of the Court. His leisure hours, however, were not +wasted; he read a great deal, and to real profit; he attracted several +French men of letters to the country house where he passed his time, +and, amongst others, made the acquaintance of Voltaire; and though he +dabbled in a poetaster’s calling, he wrote books which give proof of a +keen intellect, not original, but receptive and powerful. He was looked +upon, in those days, as a wit and a philosopher of the Parisian type; +but this was a superficial judgment, due to the accident of his life +of restraints, and the genuine character of the man was completely +different. Frederick had far more in common with his half brutish +father than, probably, he was himself aware. His instincts were for +despotic power; he had, at bottom, the Prussian military taste; and he +sympathized with the display of authority in all departments of the +State and of Government, and even in the relations of private life, +though not exactly after the paternal fashion. As years advanced, +too, and his mind developed, he became alive to the real merits, +marred as they were by extravagant faults, of the old King’s system of +administration and rule. Prussia, a weak state in the midst of great +monarchies, required a large defensive force, and the Prussian army had +been made the best in Europe; Prussia needed an increase of national +strength, and during the reign of Frederick William her population had +multiplied and she had grown fast in wealth. The Crown Prince and his +father became reconciled; and though, to outward seeming, they were +perfect contrasts, they drew towards each other in feeling and thought, +and were practically agreed on the national policy. Frederick went to +the wars to please his father, and served with some distinction in the +last campaign of Eugene, in 1734. Soon after this the King committed +a charge to his heir which was, in after years, to become a cause of +great events in Europe. The House of Hohenzollern conceived that it had +an old claim on the rich lands of Silesia, for centuries a province of +the Austrian Monarchy; and Frederick William had often insisted that he +had been cheated out of his legitimate rights. Almost in his last days +he entreated his son and coming successor to vindicate those rights, in +language of passionate wrath and earnestness. + +The old King passed away in 1740; and the first act of the Prince, like +our Henry V., was to get rid of the Falstaffs and Poinses who had been +the former companions of his youth, though he retained his literary +friends and tastes, and, indeed, held to them during an eventful life. +His second act was to raise the Prussian army, which, in the days of +the Great Elector, had never exceeded 40,000 men--and which had seemed +of portentous numbers when made 80,000 strong by his late father--to +fully 100,000 effective troops, a military force out of all proportion +to what was only a third-rate kingdom. Within a few months, he had +taken advantage of the bereavement and weakness of Maria Theresa; had +laid claim to the whole of Silesia, and had overrun the province with +thousands of soldiers before the young Archduchess could even attempt +resistance. It was a rapacious and an ignoble act; but, to do him +justice, Frederick was no hypocrite; he did not pretend that he was +carrying out the injunctions of a revered parent, and he has cynically +avowed that his ruling motives were greedy ambition and the desire of +fame. It is idle, too, as Macaulay has done, to lay to his charge the +whole guilt of the terrible and world-wide contest that followed; the +simple truth is that all the Powers of Europe, tired of a long peace +and restored in strength, were eager for acquisitions and conquests. +France especially sought to regain her influence in Germany, and to +weaken her old foe, Austria; and Frederick was not much worse than his +crowned fellows. + +I must glance at the condition of the military art when Frederick made +his first essays in it. There had been little wars and rumours of +wars since the great settlement of the Peace of Utrecht, and Austria +had overcome the hosts of Islam, but Europe had generally enjoyed +repose during the long period of twenty-five years, and there had been +nothing resembling the mighty conflicts which had marked the protracted +reign of Louis XIV. No occasion, therefore, had presented itself for +an exhibition of strategy like that of Turenne, or of tactics like +those of Blenheim and Ramillies; and the chiefs of the last great war +had died--Marlborough, unlamented, in his rest at Blenheim; Eugene, +Villars, and Berwick, covered with honours, and followed to the grave +by national mourning. The armies, too, of the great military Powers +had been out of joint, and had lost experience and efficiency during +prolonged inaction; that of Austria, despite the warnings of Eugene, +had been neglected and allowed to decline; the British army had almost +gone to pieces, and that of France, though formidable in numbers and +renown, too faithfully represented the feebleness of the State, and the +vices of the Regency and of Louis XV. Yet if the art of war seemed thus +in eclipse, the theory of war, as usually happens in periods of rest, +had had careful students; the elements of military power had grown in +Europe, and the facilities to make war on a large scale had been to +a certain extent augmented. Saxe, about this time, had done a good +deal in simplifying and quickening manœuvres in reviews; Montalembert, +struck by the immense advantage secured to the attack by Vauban’s +methods, had begun to think of transforming fortresses, and experience +of the bayonet had caused the numbers of the infantry in every army +to be considerably increased, and had made infantry formations more +light and flexible. The general growth of population, too, had made the +available resources of war greater; the progress of husbandry and the +development of roads had enlarged the possible scope of strategy; and +the spirit of the age, more humane and civilized, was opposed to the +devastation and waste practised in the wars of the seventeenth century, +and even to such expedients as great defensive lines, which necessarily +injured whole tracts of country. The art, therefore, though it had +recently had no grand illustration, was in a state in which progress +was at least possible; and a European struggle, there was reason to +believe, might bring into the field armies more numerous and more +easily moved than ever had been the case formerly. The most striking +military fact of the time remains, however, to be yet noticed. While +all other armies had relatively declined, that of Prussia had, I have +said, grown to dimensions amazing for so small a State, and her army of +100,000 men was, even in mere numbers, in 1741, considerably greater +than that of Austria, and only less, by a third, than that of France. +Nor were mere numbers anything like a test of the real military power +of the Prussian army. Frederick William’s mania for big Grenadiers and +for giant Guards may appear ridiculous; but the King had doubled the +strength of the force which he deemed necessary to protect the State; +and his army had become, in his hands, the hardest and best fashioned +instrument of war which, hitherto, had been formed in Europe. The +subject of his incessant care, it had been drilled, disciplined, and +trained in manœuvres by officers of experience and skill, brought up +in the great school of Marlborough and Eugene; and its infantry, in +particular, had acquired a precision and celerity of movement, and an +efficacy of fire--this last partly due to the iron ramrod, then used by +the Prussian soldier alone--which no army in Europe could even nearly +equal. An Achilles only was required to prove this mighty weapon of +unrivalled temper. + +This is not the place to examine the policy of Frederick, in the war of +the Succession of Austria. He wrested Silesia from the Empress-Queen, +and by alternately taking the side of France and of Austria, and +throwing his weighty sword into the scales of Power, the young ruler of +a petty monarchy became the arbiter of two-thirds of the Continent. It +is indisputable that he had no scruples, and that he often broke faith +in this game of ambition; but he gave proof of no common statecraft, +of precocious dexterity, and of great strength of purpose; and he has +some right to plead at the Bar of History that, with the exception of +Maria Theresa, he dealt with Kings and Ministers as false as himself. +His kinsman, George II., was not unwilling to see Prussia effaced +from the map of Europe, and he was treated by Louis XV. as a mere +pawn of France, to be used and sacrificed to promote her objects. Nor +shall I dwell at length on the first attempts of Frederick to conduct +campaigns and to direct armies. He had not great original genius in +war, or in any department of human activity, but his intellect was +vivid, penetrating, strong; he was observant, and quick in seizing +ideas, and he devoted himself with such steadfast patience to every +pursuit undertaken by him that he ultimately became a proficient in +it. These faculties made him the first soldier of an age deficient in +great commanders; but his progress as a warrior was slow and uncertain; +and, indeed, his triumphs, even to the last, were rather due, I think, +to the force of his character, and the superiority of his disciplined +army, than to pre-eminent excellence in the military art. + +The first campaigns of Frederick scarcely require the careful attention +of the student of war. He occasionally showed a happy conception, +and, as was always his wont, he was prompt and vigorous in taking the +initiative and in striking his foe. But he was out-generalled in more +than one instance; and in the campaign of 1744 he narrowly escaped +ruin at the hands of Traun, though it is but fair to observe that +this was largely caused by the incapacity and tardiness of his French +allies. The battles of Frederick during these years--and this is true, +indeed, as to his whole career--deserve more notice than his general +movements; and they have this special interest, that they attest the +advance he made by degrees in tactics, and the admirable qualities of +the army he led. His attack at Mollwitz cannot be justified, for the +Austrians held his line of retreat, and defeat, which was probable, +would have been destruction. As has often been pointed out, he made +no attempt to turn to account the manœuvring power of his troops; but +though he was driven from the field with his horsemen, the terrible +fire and the unflinching constancy of his infantry gave him victory +at last. At Chotusitz we, perhaps, see the first example of that +insight on the ground which became one of his distinctive merits, +inferior as he always remained, I think, in this important respect to +Marlborough. He charged with his right wing at a critical moment, and +the movement possibly assured his success, though the result of the +battle was mainly due, beyond question, to his tenacious soldiery. +In the operations that led to Hohenfriedberg he displayed no little +resource and skill; he lured the Austrians on to make an attack in +which the chances were in his favour; and though he committed a mistake +in disposing his troops, which the victor of Ramillies would have, +perhaps, made fatal--he left a wide gap in an ill-arranged line--still +the Austrians did not seize the occasion, and their incoherent and +partial efforts were easily defeated by his well-directed movements. It +was at Sohr, however, that we see the first instance of the favourite +manœuvre employed by Frederick, which, taking advantage as it did of +the peculiar excellences of his formidable and highly-trained army, +became the means of giving him many a victory, though occasionally +he abused it, with disastrous results. By this time it had become +evident that his troops infinitely surpassed the sluggish Austrians in +rapidity and precision of movement; and like all soldiers, he was, of +course, aware that could he attain and turn an enemy’s flank without +endangering his own position, he would necessarily gain an immense +advantage. At Sohr, accordingly, availing himself of the “mobility” +and marching power of his army, Frederick turned the Austrian flank +with one of his wings, throwing the other back, and only bringing it +up when the turning movement had proved successful; and the battle was +won by these agile tactics. This manœuvre, repeated on many fields, +was the celebrated “attack in oblique order,” ever associated with the +name of the King, and the theme of a great deal of foolish writing; +it has proved successful or unsuccessful as it has been rightly or +wrongly adopted; and the first condition of its success, it will be +perceived, is the possession of an army more active than its foe, +better disciplined, and more exact in its movements. + +Prussia was at peace during the ten years that followed the first great +defeat of Maria Theresa. Frederick had reached the prime of vigorous +manhood, and a word must be said on the character of his rule, and +on the tenor and pursuits of his life. His system of government bore +a strong resemblance to that of his eccentric father, but with this +difference--that mere arbitrary power was tempered by clear-sighted +intelligence, and often had enlightened, if ambitious, objects. He +was a severe, a meddling, and a pitiless despot; but he checked the +abuses of feudal nobles, protected the rights of the middle classes +and the poor, enforced toleration in a still bigoted age, as a rule +respected justice and law, and, on the whole, had regard to the +national interests. The worst features of his _régime_ were that +he carried the rigid methods of the camp into the free relations of +social life, and that he tried to regulate commerce and agriculture +according to crude ideas of his own; but if he checked the natural +expansion of the State, and if his monopolies and laws of trade did +great mischief, and were often failures, still his absolutism was, +in the main, beneficent. Prussia was better governed under his stern +discipline than any one of the Great Powers of the Continent; the +nation made astonishing progress, and the conquest of Silesia proved +a blessing to a people which always detested the Hapsburgs. As for +Frederick himself, he was the most industrious and hard-working Head +of a State ever seen, and yet he found time for music and art, and for +the society of the best men of letters; and though his quarrel with +Voltaire and the jokes and sarcasms he indulged in at the expense of +his guests showed that he could be a tyrant even in his hours of ease, +he was far the most accomplished Sovereign of his time. As may be +supposed, however, the King devoted his chief attention to the care of +his army, and everything, in fact, was subordinated to it. He does not +appear to have loved war, but he knew that enemies hemmed him round; +he resolved to hold a high place among the leading Powers, and he left +nothing undone to bring to perfection the great military instrument he +had already proved. The army, growing with the growth of the people, +and recruited from the lately-annexed province, was increased from +100,000 to 160,000 men, and it increased in efficiency even more than +in numbers. The Prussian cavalry had not been equal to that of Austria +in the Silesian war; it was fashioned into a most admirable arm; and +it is probable, indeed, that no cavalry has surpassed the squadrons +of the renowned Seidlitz. As for artillery, the beginning of horse +artillery--a revolution in the arm--may be traced to this time; and +while the drill and discipline of the famous Prussian infantry were +continued and even largely improved, every effort was made to render +its fire more formidable than it had been before, and to cause its +evolutions to be more exact and rapid. Frederick’s army, in fact, +trained to march, to change front, to wheel into line, to gather to a +flank, to throw masses of horsemen on a selected point, and, besides, +to turn its weapons to the best account, and all this with amazing +precision and quickness, was, compared to other continental armies, +like a practised athlete to a thick-winded clown; and though it was +organized still in battalions and squadrons--for corps and divisions +came afterwards--its power, “its mobility,” its capacity for war, would +be deemed wonderful even in our day. + +In 1755–6 the occasion came to test again the value of this mighty +force. The Empress-Queen had never forgotten Silesia; she thirsted for +revenge on one she deemed a robber; and she had succeeded at last in +combining a League of the Great Powers against the Prussian upstart, +who had exasperated the harlot who reigned at Versailles, and the +adulteress supreme in the Muscovite Empire, by his poignant jests on +their notorious vices. France, Austria, and Russia agreed to divide +the spoils of conquered Prussia among themselves; Sweden and the +small German States sought a share of the prey; and it was believed +throughout Europe that the Prussian Monarchy, before a year had closed, +would be a thing of the past. Frederick saw clearly the extent of his +peril, but he saw, too, that he had one chance; the armies of the +League were comparatively weak, and, what was more important, were +wholly unprepared; he could move his great army at a moment’s notice, +and he seized the occasion with characteristic energy. Taking the +initiative fearlessly, he struck at once, and in the spring of 1756 his +trained legions had entered the plains of Saxony, and were pouring +through the gaps in the Bohemian hills. + + [Illustration: Theatre of the + + SEVEN YEARS WAR] + +The great War of the Seven Years had begun; and, as regards the +military operations of the King, it presents three distinct and well +marked phases. France and Russia sent no forces into the field against +Prussia in 1756, and Frederick had to cope with Saxony and Austria +only, whose united armies were no match for his own. He seized Dresden +with an overwhelming force; shut the Saxons up in the entrenched camp +of Pirna; and invaded Bohemia in two great masses, the first, under his +own command, moving up the Elbe, the second led by Schwerin, a most +distinguished veteran, advancing from Silesia, at a great distance, +and with the mountains between, by the Pass of Nachod. The Austrian +army, inferior in force, on the theatre, probably 60,000 to 90,000 +men, was also divided into two parts; Piccolomini, a descendant of a +well-known chief of the Thirty Years’ War, held Schwerin in check with +a comparatively small detachment of troops; Browne, with the principal +army, confronted Frederick; and an indecisive battle was fought at +Lobositz, on the banks of the Elbe, in which the contending armies seem +to have been not far from equal in numbers. The campaign terminated +to the advantage of Prussia; Browne failed to disengage the Saxons +at Pirna; their army, surrounded, laid down its arms; and Frederick +incorporated the men with his own troops, for Germans were usually +ready to enter his service. The success was unexpected, and even great; +yet, as Napoleon has justly remarked, Frederick might certainly have +done more. Schwerin was paralysed by an insignificant force; the King +at Lobositz was not stronger than Browne; and in these operations, as +often happened, his bold strategy was very far from perfect. + +The campaign of 1757, the most memorable of Frederick’s career, falls +naturally into two parts; and it deserves the close attention of the +student of war, for it strikingly illustrates the merits and the +defects of this renowned, yet sometimes unsafe, commander. France and +Russia, still unprepared, did simply nothing, until the early summer +of the year; and Austria, now without Saxon aid, was left isolated for +months to sustain the contest. Frederick was again certainly superior +in force; he had 100,000 men at least, the best troops in Europe, +against 90,000 Austrians, to a great extent of indifferent quality; +and assuming the offensive he once more invaded Bohemia, by the valley +of the Elbe, Schwerin, as in the preceding year, moving from Silesia, +again separated from the main army, but at a less distance than in +1756. By the 1st of May the King had sate down before Prague, having +advanced by the western bank of the Moldau; and Schwerin was still +several marches off, with the Elbe and the Moldau between himself and +Frederick. By this time Charles of Lorraine had taken a position along +a series of heights not far from Prague, and his purpose was not to +offer battle until he had been joined by Daun, moving from Moravia with +about 25,000 men. Frederick, eager to prevent the intended junction, +bridged the Moldau under the eye of the enemy, leaving a detachment +upon the western bank; meanwhile Schwerin had passed the Elbe, pressing +forward to Prague by forced marches; and the two Prussian armies +had come into line by nightfall upon the 5th of May, the Austrians +remaining wholly inactive. The King resolved to attack before Daun +could come up, and by the morning of the 6th his troops were in motion, +longing and prepared for a decisive struggle. The Austrian army, about +60,000 strong, held a defensive position along a range of hills sinking +towards the east into lowlands and marshes divided by rivers and small +lakes; the left resting on Prague and the Moldau, the centre and right +extending to the hamlet of Kyge, near where the hills fall into the +half-flooded plain. Frederick was probably equal to his foe in numbers, +and judging that the Austrian centre and left could not be forced, he +decided on turning his adversary’s right, though the movement was one +of extreme hazard, for it placed his army with its rear towards Daun, +known to be advancing to assist his colleague. The Prussian army, +separated by difficult ground from its enemy, marched in oblique order, +with extraordinary speed and precision; and it had soon fastened on +the Austrian right, making fierce efforts to outflank and destroy it. +Lorraine, however, had thrown back this wing; it presented a new front +to the advancing foes, and the attack of the Prussians was greatly +impeded by the swamps and ponds covering the Austrian line, which made +it difficult in the extreme to pierce. The battle raged for some hours +with uncertain fortunes; but the Austrian left and centre continued +motionless, and did not even attempt a counter attack, although the +occasion was most promising. A gap was formed in the angle where the +right of Lorraine had been thrown back from the main body; Frederick +kept pouring troops against the enemy’s flank, and after prodigious +efforts, in which the aged Schwerin, a pupil of Marlborough, met a +soldier’s death, the Austrian right was at last broken, and the whole +Austrian army lost the position, 12,000 men having been cut off from +Prague and compelled to seek refuge in the camp of Daun. + + [Illustration: BATTLE OF PRAG + + 6^{TH} MAY 1787. + + _a.a.a. First position of Austrian Army._ + _b.b.b. Second position to meet the Prussian Attack._ + _c.c. Prussians under Kieth._ + _d.d. First position of Prussian Army._ + _e.e. Second position of Prussian Army._ + _f. Schwerin’s Prussians._ + _g. Prussian Horse._ + _h. Mannstein’s Attack._ + _i. Place of Schwerin’s Monument._] + + [Illustration: BATTLE OF ZORNDORF + + 25^{TH} AUGUST, 1788. + + _a.a. Prussian Army about to cross the Mützel._ + _b.b.b. Prussian Army ranked for Battle._ + _c. Russian Baggage._ + _d.d. Prussian Infantry._ + _e.e. Prussian Cavalry._ + _f. Prussian Baggage._] + +Frederick had shown great tactical skill in this battle, and constancy +of a high order; he had detected the vulnerable point in his enemy’s +line, and he never relaxed his efforts until he had gained the day. +In this instance, too, his favourite movement was justifiable in many +respects; the Prussians gathered on the Austrian flank, protected by +difficult ground between, and a counter attack would have been no +easy matter. Nevertheless, his success was largely due to the immense +superiority of the army he led. Compared to the sluggish Austrians, +as has been said, it was “a panther darting upon an ox.” Had Charles +of Lorraine been a great chief, he would have paralyzed the attack +by a movement from his left; and had this succeeded, Frederick, not +improbably, would have been hemmed in between the Prince and Daun. +In this part of the campaign, as in many cases, the strategy of the +King was essentially faulty; and had he had to deal with a general +like Turenne, he would have been baffled, out-manœuvred, and forced +to retreat without having a chance of fighting a decisive battle. +The invasion of Bohemia on a double line by the Elbe and Silesia, at +far distances, seems to have been justified by recent events--any +other operation is, besides, difficult in the case of an attack from +Prussia--but the principles of the art do not vary; and, as Napoleon +has said, this strategy gave the Austrian chiefs an immense advantage. +Charles of Lorraine, firmly established in Prague, and holding a +central position between the King and Schwerin, ought to have prevented +their junction with ease; and had he been anything like a master of +war he would have marched against each, and beaten both in detail. The +King, too, committed great mistakes--in bridging the Moldau within +reach of his enemy; in leaving a detachment on the western bank, when +he had made up his mind to fight a great battle; and, above all, in +venturing to place his army exposed on its rear to the army of Daun. +Had Charles of Lorraine had the gifts of Condé, the Prussian army, +superior as it was, would have bitterly rued these false movements. + +The King, after his victory, besieged Prague; but his sieges were +scarcely ever successful. He drew no lines round the beleaguered +fortress, but contented himself with a mere blockade; and it was well +for him that Charles of Lorraine remained motionless, and made scarcely +a sally, for, as Napoleon has pointed out, an active enemy would have +made Frederick pay dear for his rash conduct, a remark which proves +what would have been the judgment of the Emperor on Bazaine at Metz. +After six weeks of delay round Prague, the King was obliged to move +a large part of his army to encounter an approaching army of relief. +Daun had fallen back after the defeat of his colleague, having rallied +the 12,000 fugitives of Prague; but ere long he was reinforced, and +by the second week of June he had reached the Elbe, and was drawing +near Prague with 50,000 men. Frederick marched to oppose him with an +army not less probably than 40,000 strong; and on the 18th--a great +day in war--Daun was discovered holding a strong position, extending +from near the Elbe at Kolin, along eminences, with an open country in +front, to the hamlet of Hradschin. The King, elated perhaps by his +recent victory, resolved to repeat the successful manœuvre of Prague; +neglecting the Austrian centre and left, he decided on falling on +Daun’s right, and the Prussians once more marched, in their usual +fashion, to storm a village and heights that overlook Kolin. Frederick, +however, seems not to have reconnoitred the ground, and to have held +his adversary in complete contempt; his left, as it gathered on the +Austrian flank, had exposed itself to a counter-attack, for the field +allowed this offensive movement; and, besides, the oblique order was +not properly kept, for his right wing and centre were scarcely thrown +back, and simply followed the advancing left. The movement, in fact, +was a flank march, within reach of an enemy able to strike home; and +the result, as usually happens, was a great disaster. The Prussian left +was checked by a body of cavalry; Daun crushed the centre and right by +well-placed batteries; and though he did not cause his army boldly to +engage, he moved it forward so that his enemy was ravaged by a storm +of destructive missiles, and ran the gauntlet of deadly musketry. The +Prussian left, isolated, was at last routed, though it fought with +courage worthy of all praise; and the whole army was driven from the +field with a loss of fully a third of its numbers. + +Pedants, who have deemed the attack in oblique order a talisman which +assures victory under all conditions of place and position, have tried +to explain away this crushing defeat; but Napoleon’s judgment is +evidently correct. Frederick made a flank march in open ground, under +the beard of Daun, within striking distance, and the result was like +what occurred at Austerlitz. Kolin forced the King to raise the siege +of Prague, to abandon Bohemia, and to fall back on Silesia; and had +his antagonists been great generals, he might have been overwhelmed +before he had passed the ranges which overlook the Silesian lowlands. +But Lorraine did not even break up from Prague till July, many days +after the battle; Daun, a stout soldier of the school of Wallenstein, +fond of entrenched camps and defensive lines, but in no sense of the +word a strategist, lost a week in chanting Te Deums in his camp, to +use Napoleon’s sarcastic phrase; and Frederick effected his escape +with little further loss, and held positions between Zittau and +Bautzen. Nearly two months passed in petty operations, the Austrians +plainly shunning a contest, and taking no advantage of their splendid +success, when the apparition of new and formidable enemies on the scene +compelled the King to retreat towards the Lower Elbe. + +We have now reached the second phase of the war, and the second part of +the campaign of 1757. Up to this time Frederick had had to cope almost +wholly with the Austrians only, and had been superior in force on the +theatre of war; the balance was now heavily inclined against him, +and it was the conviction of Europe, as it had been from the first, +that he would be annihilated by the League of the Continent. France +had by this time two armies in Germany; the one 80,000 strong, under +the command of D’Estrées, the second not less than 50,000 men, partly +composed of contingents of the small German States, led by Soubise, +one of the Pompadour’s favourites; and Turenne and Villars had overrun +Germany, and threatened Vienna with less forces. Meanwhile, Sweden +had assailed the Pomeranian seaboard; a Russian army of 60,000 men +had crossed the Niemen and attained the Pregel; and though the forces +of the Allies were far apart, and D’Estrées was held in check for the +time in Hanover by the Duke of Cumberland--the warrior of Fontenoy +and Culloden--it seemed impossible that Prussia could withstand the +enormous masses arrayed against her. Frederick, always great in the +hour of danger, saw what was before him, and made up his mind; though +still suffering from the effects of Kolin, he resolved to advance at +once against his nearest enemy, Soubise, who had approached the Saale, +in the hope of striking a decisive blow; and leaving about 40,000 men +to keep the Austrians back, he marched with about 25,000--he had lately +been reinforced--to make head against the French commander. Soubise, a +degenerate scion of the great House of Rohan, and one of the poorest +creatures who ever led an army, though nearly double in numbers, fell +back before the King; and several weeks were lost in petty manœuvres, +Soubise always seeking to avoid fighting, conduct fatal beyond all +others to French soldiers. The news of the success of the Allies +elsewhere on the theatre at last, however, compelled the French chief +to abandon his timid attitude, and towards the close of October the +army of Soubise returned to the Saale, and crossed the river, though +it recrossed at the approach of its enemy. On the 5th of November, +the Prussian army, which had made a short retrograde movement, was +encamped, perhaps 22,000 strong, in a position near the Saale, with its +left at Rossbach; and Soubise, who had fully 45,000 men, thought +that he had caught Frederick, and could cut off his retreat. Full of +the theory of the oblique order, but utterly ignorant how to apply it, +he defiled in loose and irregular masses, without even an advanced +guard, under the eye of his adversary, and well within his reach, in +order to fall on his rear, and to turn his right; and the result of +this insensate flank march was ruinous and most disgraceful defeat. +Frederick, watching like a bird of prey its quarry, allowed Soubise +to march to his fate; then changing his front, moving on the chord of +an arc, and screening his operations with great skill, he smote the +heads of the allied columns, unprotected and surprised, with the fire +of well-placed batteries and the charges of the renowned horsemen of +Seidlitz; and the whole army of Soubise was literally scattered and +half-destroyed by the efforts of a force of only 6,000 or 7,000 men. + + [Illustration: SEIDLITZ AT ROSSBACH.] + +Rossbach was one of Frederick’s most brilliant victories; Soubise +was effaced for the rest of the campaign, and his shattered forces +recrossed the Rhine. The result of the battle was evidently due to the +stupid false movement of the allied chiefs; but the King turned this +to the best account, and his tactics were in all respects admirable. +This triumph greatly strengthened the Prussian cause, and sent a thrill +of exultation through German hearts; for Rossbach was the first great +fight in which Germans, led by a German, had defeated Frenchmen; and +the traditions of the day kept hope alive in the breasts of many a +German soldier during the sad years that followed the rout of Jena. +The arms of the King, however, had been unsuccessful on other parts of +the theatre of war; and, as the close of 1757 approached, his position +was one of increasing danger. A contingent of Swedes had, indeed, been +driven from Pomerania and forced into Stralsund; but the Russians had +gained a great victory at Jägersdorf, near the banks of the Pregel; +and though they had recrossed the Niemen as winter came on, the army +opposed to them had been severely treated. The chief peril, however, +which threatened Frederick came from Austria and Maria Theresa, his +implacable and untiring enemy. Lorraine and Daun had been largely +reinforced after Kolin, and ordered to press forward; and at the head +of probably 90,000 men, they gradually bore back and drove towards the +Oder the detachment, not perhaps half in numbers, which the King had +given to his lieutenant, Bevern. The Austrian generals seem to have +thought that their mission was to reconquer Silesia; they besieged and +captured Schweidnitz and Breslau; Austrian horsemen were let loose on +the province; and Bevern was defeated under the walls of Breslau with +terrible loss, and was ere long a prisoner. + +The intelligence reached the King some three weeks after Rossbach; his +decision was formed with his wonted promptness, and he hastened to the +Oder by forced marches, from the Saale across the lowlands of Saxony. +On the 3rd of December he had joined hands with Ziethen, one of his +best officers, who had succeeded to the command of Bevern; but the +united armies were not more than 35,000 or 36,000 men, for death and +desertion had carried off thousands. The Austrians were still probably +75,000 strong--they were certainly in immensely superior numbers--and +it seems astonishing that Lorraine and Daun did not try to trample +the enemy in the dust who was moving against them from Glogau upon +the Oder, and could not have had even half their force. The memory of +Rossbach, however, was, perhaps, too recent; and, leaving Breslau, +they took a position, defensive as usual, along eminences that look +down on the village of Leuthen. The left, under Lorraine, approached +the Schweidnitz, a feeder of the Oder, but with a broad space between; +the centre held a long line behind Leuthen, with hills and ravines +before its front; and the right, with Daun in command, stretched down +to a forest and hamlet known by the name of Ny-pern. Frederick, having +carefully reconnoitred the ground, put his army in motion early on +the 5th of December; an advanced guard was easily driven in; and he +pushed forward his right as quickly as possible, to turn and outflank +the enemy’s left. This time, however, the attack in oblique order was +a most skilful and well-planned movement; the Prussian centre and left +were thrown back until the effort of the right had told; what was +more important, the army marched, screened by the valleys and hills, +before the Austrian front; a thick mist, too, hung over the plain, and +concealed the advance of the Prussian line; and this, therefore, +was not a flank march within easy reach of a well-placed enemy. The +Prussian right had soon turned and beaten the troops of Lorraine, which +happened to be about the worst in the Austrian army; and though the +Prince endeavoured to throw back his left, and to form a new front, +as he had done at Prague, his efforts proved fruitless, and his whole +wing was routed. The centre and left of the King now bore down in +irresistible force on the shaken army; and though the Austrian chiefs +did all that brave men could do to restore the fortunes of the day, and +Daun especially made a bold attempt to advance the Austrian right for a +great counter attack, their exertions ultimately were of no avail, and +they were driven, utterly defeated, beyond the Schweidnitz. The losses +of the victors were not more than 2,000 or 3,000 men; those of the +vanquished were fully 15,000, with, it is said, 150 guns; and Breslau, +with a very large garrison and all the wounded and sick of the Austrian +army, was in a few days in the hands of Frederick. Lorraine and Daun +fled from Silesia as best they could, and the situation of affairs, +from the Elbe to the Oder, had been completely transformed by a single +battle. + + [Illustration: BATTLE OF ROSSBACH. + + 5^{TH} NOVEMBER, 1737. + + _a. a. First position of Combined Army._ + _b. b. First position of Prussian Camp._ + _c. c. Advance of Prussian Army._ + _d. d. Second position of Combined Army._ + _e. e. Prussians retire to Rossbach._ + _f. French Cavalry, under S^t. Germain._ + _g. g. March of Combin^d. Army, to attack Prussian rear._ + _h. Prussian attack led by Seidlitz._ + _i. Position of Prussian Guns._] + + + [Illustration: BATTLE OF LEUTHEN + + 5^{TH} DECEMBER, 1757. + + _a. a. Austrian Army._ + _b. b. Position of Saxon Forepost, under Nostitz._ + _c. c. Advance of Prussian Army._ + _d. Lucchesi’s Cavalry, reinforced, by Daun._ + _e. Left wing, under Nadasti._ + _f. Friedrich’s hill of observation._ + _g. g. Prussian Army about to attack._ + _h. Ziethen’s Cavalry._ + _i. i. i. Retreat of Austrians._] + +“Leuthen,” says Napoleon, “is Frederick’s masterpiece”; an army, +“wholly inferior in force and partly composed of beaten troops,” +defeated and routed an army twofold in numbers, and that too with +insignificant loss. The victory is the glory of the attack in oblique +order, for the Austrian left was turned and destroyed without +endangering the assailing army; the Prussian centre and right were +engaged at the fitting time; and though a counter attack was tried, +it failed, partly owing to the difficulties of the ground, which with +the mist had screened the King’s offensive movement. But, as Napoleon +has rightly observed, the attack in this instance had nothing in +common “with a flank march in the face of your enemy”; and it was “in +conformity with true principles.” The League against Frederick remained +unbroken, notwithstanding the reverses of 1757; and in 1758 he had +still to confront France, Austria, Russia, and the lesser States of +Germany. The odds against him were still enormous; but the armies of +the Coalition were widely scattered--Maria Theresa alone had her heart +in the contest--and Frederick had gained one great ally which has often +turned the scale in wars on the Continent. By this time the first Pitt +was supreme in England; he was engaged in a death struggle with the +French for empire in India, and in the Far West; and he turned his +eye of genius on the heroic warrior who had conquered at Rossbach, at +Prague, and at Leuthen. The minister supported Frederick with a small +contingent of troops, and lavished on him immense subsidies, which the +King turned to excellent account; and Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, a +very able man, replaced the Duke of Cumberland, and opposed the forces +of France on the Weser, the Rhine, and the Main, with an army made up +of German auxiliaries. I cannot dwell on these operations, disgraceful +in the very highest degree to the fribbles and fops who now led the +armies of France at the Pompadour’s bidding; suffice it to say that the +Prince of Clermont and poor Soubise were completely beaten, and the +French were driven again beyond the Rhine. + +I turn to the theatre of war on the Elbe and the Oder, where Frederick +directed the forces of Prussia. At the beginning of the campaign of +1758, he had one army on foot in Silesia, threatening Daun, who had +replaced Lorraine, and had fallen behind the Bohemian hills; a second +army, under Prince Henry of Prussia, confronted the forces of the +small German states in Saxony and along the Elbe; a third observed the +Russians upon the Oder, and the King had perhaps 140,000 men to oppose +to 250,000, not reckoning the French and Prince Ferdinand’s army. The +disparity of numbers was, therefore, immense; but Frederick had all +the shorter lines on the theatre; the Russians could do nothing for +months; and the occasion was one from which Turenne would have probably +drawn no little advantage. Strategy, however, was the weak point +of Frederick; and his first operations in this campaign show small +comprehension of the art of war. Instead of attacking Daun, inferior in +force and isolated, he had recourse to the methods of the second-rate +chiefs of the seventeenth century, now long exploded; he invaded +Moravia, and laid siege to Olmütz, as if the capture of the fortress, +important as it is, could have been attended with great results. The +siege, too, was conducted without regard to military rules, and the +science of the engineer; lines were not drawn to invest the place; the +besieging army was left exposed in widely divided camps that invited an +attack; and, above all, the supplies required for the siege were drawn +from Neisse, at a great distance, and through the difficult passes +of the Silesian range. It was fortunate that, at this juncture, the +recollections of Leuthen paralysed Daun. Had he fallen on the besieging +army, he might have destroyed it; but though he loitered for weeks, and +remained inactive, he did not wholly throw away the occasion. With the +assistance of Loudon, the most brilliant chief of Austria in the Seven +Years’ War, he contrived to intercept and destroy a convoy directed +from Neisse, with munitions for the siege; and the King recoiled from +Olmütz deservedly baffled. Frederick was now in a situation of grave +peril; he was almost surrounded by Daun and Loudon; his army was +in want and distress; and had Daun been a great commander he would +either have forced it against the Bohemian hills, or made it run the +gauntlet of ever-harassing foes, defeat in either instance involving +ruin. The King, however, was always great in such crises of fortune; +out-manœuvring and gaining on his slow adversary, who never knew what +promptness can effect in war, he advanced from Olmütz into Bohemia, and +then, hastening along the verge of the hills, he emerged successfully +into Silesia, making his way through the passes without loss. The march +was one of the most brilliant and daring of the war. + +These operations lasted from the opening of the campaign until the end +of July 1758. Frederick had suffered no defeat like that of Kolin; but +he had missed an opportunity to strike Daun, and he had only escaped a +disaster at Olmütz by his admirable presence of mind and energy. The +Russians meanwhile had crossed the Niemen and the Vistula, and had +attained the Oder; and, about the middle of July, they had attacked +Cüstrin, and drawn near the detachment advanced to hold them in check. +The King marched from Silesia against this fresh enemy; the Russian +chief, Fermor, when informed of his approach raised the siege, and +on the 25th of August had taken a position in a marshy plain in the +angle between the Oder and Warta, and overlooking the little hamlet +of Zorndorf. His army, about 55,000 strong, was separated from its +baggage, left in its camps, and it was drawn up in a huge rectangle, +a kind of formation which had proved most formidable to the Turkish +hordes, but ill fitted to resist a European army. Frederick, with +perhaps 35,000 men, and evidently treating his enemy with contempt, +marched right round the vast immovable mass, and attacked it with his +left in his wonted manner. His guns wrought frightful havoc in the +densely-packed square; but he had once more risked a flank march in +open ground, and Fermor flung a ponderous force on the advancing wing, +which was nearly crushed by the Muscovite onset. The battle raged for +some hours with the most savage fury; the Russians displayed the dogged +courage of their race, but Seidlitz and his splendid horsemen turned +the scale at last, and Fermor sullenly retired from the field, the +victors, however, being unable to seize his baggage or to turn their +success to the least advantage. + +Having thus disposed of this tenacious foe, Frederick was compelled +to retrace his steps towards the Elbe, for his presence in this +region had again become necessary. Daun, after his partial success +in Moravia, had not advanced, as he ought to have done, and joining +the army of the lesser German States, had not overwhelmed Prince +Henry of Prussia, an operation which was within his power; but he +had not been altogether inactive. He had detached Loudon to fall on +the King; he had laid siege to Neisse in Silesia, and he had made a +movement which threatened Dresden, timid half measures showing the very +poorest strategy. Frederick had reached Dresden by the second week of +September, confounding the projects of his hesitating foe; and he set +off ere long to relieve Neisse, at the head of about 40,000 men, Daun +menacing his flank in his camp at Stolpen. A pause in the operations +followed, due probably to the formidable attitude of Daun; but, by the +close of September, the King had attained Bautzen in full march for the +beleaguered fortress. By this time Daun had been rejoined by Loudon; +their united forces must have been from 75,000 to 90,000 strong, and +the Austrian chief had taken a position at Hochkirch, amidst woods and +hills, barring an advance on Neisse. Frederick was close to Hochkirch +by the 11th of October; he did simply nothing for two days, for he +was waiting the arrival of supplies from Bautzen; and, confident +that Daun would not venture to attack, he felt assured that when his +preparations were made, he could easily turn the position of his foe. +He paid dearly for his imprudent scorn of an adversary who, though not +a great chief, was by no means a contemptible soldier, and who was +seconded, besides, by a very able lieutenant. Daun had had ample time +to satisfy himself of the numerical weakness of the hostile army; his +arrangements were made on the night of the 13th, and on the morning +of the 14th, he attacked in full force, and all but hemmed in the +astounded Prussians, who, caught and surprised, were completely routed. +The King extricated himself with extreme difficulty, and at a loss +of fully 10,000 men; but, as usual, Daun made no use of success, and +Frederick plucked safety and glory from imminent danger. Always rising +superior to adverse fortune, he fell back a short distance only, and +perceiving that Daun continued motionless, he actually stole a march +on his inactive enemy as soon as his army was fit to march, and made +for Neisse with extreme celerity. This was a stroke of extraordinary +boldness and skill; and Frederick gained his object, with a defeated +army, in the face of a victorious and immensely superior enemy. The +siege of Neisse was raised on the 5th of November; Daun, instead +of closing on Frederick’s rear, having idly turned aside to menace +Dresden, a demonstration that altogether failed. + +The campaign of 1758, like that of 1757, shows the true qualities +of Frederick in war; they were those of an inferior strategist, of +a tactician of a very high order, but who sometimes made surprising +mistakes, and was specially prone to underrate his enemy, and of +a chief who, possessing a noble army, occasionally gave proof of +extraordinary resource, and, in particular, was able to subdue dangers +which would have overwhelmed a less determined captain. The King ought +to have defeated Daun in the first months of the contest, when the +Austrian commander stood almost alone; he should not have attempted the +siege of Olmütz; he should not have risked a flank march at Zorndorf, +incapable of manœuvring as the Russians were; above all, he should not +have pitched his camp at Hochkirch, and given Daun a grand opportunity +to strike, simply because he thought him a dull commander. On the other +hand, Zorndorf was a real victory, no doubt due in a great degree +to Seidlitz, but partly also to the energy of the King. Frederick +completely baffled his foes at Dresden, and his conduct after Hochkirch +in bearding the victors, in eluding them, and in raising the siege of +Neisse, was that of a soldier of wonderful powers, though he owed his +success mainly to the inactivity of Daun. + +There is a sameness in the course of the Seven Years’ War, which in +some measure detracts from its interest. The contending armies held +nearly the same positions in 1759, when the campaign opened, as had +been the case in 1758, and their relative strength was nearly in the +same proportions. The French, under Contades and De Broglie, invaded +Hanover from the Rhine and the Main; they were opposed as before +by Prince Ferdinand, and though De Broglie gained some success at +Bergen--the first and last smile of fortune in this war on France--they +were ultimately defeated with heavy loss at Minden--a day memorable for +the bravery of the British contingent, and for the incapacity of Lord +George Sackville--and they fell back discomfited behind the Rhine. In +Central Germany, Frederick was again in Silesia and Prince Henry once +more in Saxony; Daun was outside Bohemia and the Silesian frontier, +and the forces of the small German States on the Saxon plains; and the +Russians who, after Zorndorf, had returned to their steppes, were still +hundreds of miles distant, and had not even drawn near the Vistula. +Apart from the French and Prince Ferdinand’s armies, Frederick had +still perhaps 120,000 men to oppose to 200,000 or 220,000; but as +had happened in the two preceding campaigns, he was not inferior in +force, where he was in supreme command, for the Russians were, for some +months, outside the immediate sphere of action. In these circumstances +he might once more have attempted to strike a weighty blow at Daun, +and Napoleon condemns him for missing the chance; but the Prussian +army had suffered immense losses, and was now crowded with ill-trained +levies; and he deserves less censure for this inaction than in the +campaign of 1758. Several weeks were spent in small operations, which +show that the strength of the King had begun to decline; he attempted +nothing resembling a decisive movement, and the war languished on the +space between the Elbe and the Oder. Meanwhile his enemies had, for the +first time, formed something of a real combination against him. The +Empress Elizabeth was savage at the defeat of Zorndorf; Maria Theresa +had not changed, and a Russian army, fully 70,000 strong, led by +Soltykoff, a true Muscovite, was directed to join hands with the main +Austrian army, and to try to crush Frederick with overwhelming numbers. +Soltykoff having crossed the Vistula about the middle of May, was upon +the Oder in the first days of August, having routed a Prussian body +of troops on his march; Daun, meanwhile, had despatched Loudon from +Silesia to aid the Russian chief, and their united armies, about 80,000 +strong, had soon effected their junction near Frankfort. Frederick had +advanced, to parry the blow, to the Oder, with perhaps 40,000 or 45,000 +men, and the hostile forces encountered each other at Kunersdorf, close +to Frankfort, upon the 12th of August. The battle is chiefly remarkable +for the characteristic stubbornness and tenacity of the Muscovite +infantry. Frederick’s manœuvres gained some success at first; indeed, +Soltykoff was nearly forced into the Oder, but his men rallied behind a +line of entrenchments, and the Prussians recoiled, hopelessly beaten, +from the bloodstained defences. The King lost a third of his army, and +nearly all his guns, and was with difficulty able to get across the +Oder. + +The situation of Frederick after Kunersdorf was critical in the +extreme, and might have been made desperate. Daun, obeying Maria +Theresa’s orders, had advanced from Silesia towards the lower Oder; +and, when informed of the results of the battle, he moved slowly to +Triebel on the Neisse, about six marches distant from the victorious +army. Had Soltykoff and Daun now combined their movements, and +cordially acted in real concert, they could have opposed fully 120,000 +men, in a central position, to Prince Henry and to Frederick and his +beaten army; and as the Prussian forces were widely divided, and could +not have been 80,000 strong, not to speak of the demoralization of +defeat, Daun and Soltykoff ought to have crushed their enemy. The +discords and jealousies of a Coalition, as has often happened, perhaps, +saved the King and his fortunes at this perilous juncture. The Austrian +and Russian generals disliked each other; the policy of their Courts +had already begun to diverge on the question of the Turkish Empire; and +Soltykoff was indignant that he had been joined only by the detachment +sent forward by Daun under Loudon. The Russians and Austrians did not +unite, as was quite possible, about the 25th of August, and Frederick +turned this brief respite to the best advantage. His shattered army +was reinforced by levies from the north; the artillery he had lost was +replaced from Berlin; and he was soon at the head of 40,000 men, while +Prince Henry had thrown himself, with no ordinary daring, between the +two hostile armies. Daun fell back towards Saxony in the first days +of September, completely giving up the object of the campaign; before +long Soltykoff was in full retreat, and had recrossed the Vistula by +the approach of winter; and thus Kunersdorf proved an all but barren +victory; Frederick had once more escaped from the toils, and the two +Empresses saw their projects frustrated. + +The campaign, nevertheless, was a losing one to the King, and it +terminated in a very great disaster. During the time when he had been +compelled to move to the Oder, in order to face the Russians, the army +of the small German states, with some aid from Daun, had taken the +offensive upon the Elbe; and, after capturing Torgau and Wittenberg, +it had laid siege to Dresden towards the end of August, the city, it +will be recollected, having been in the hands of the Prussians since +1756, and being their main depôt and place of arms. The attack had been +unsuccessful until the news of Kunersdorf reached the commandant, with +a letter from the King, empowering him to treat and to withdraw the +garrison; the capitulation was signed in the first days of September, +and the portal of Bohemia and the main strategic point of Saxony were +thus permanently lost to Frederick, who stormed in vain against his +ill-used subordinate. The fall of Dresden was a great reverse, but it +was followed by a still greater misfortune. The King, after the failure +of the allied armies to join hands, had remained in observation for a +time on the Oder; but towards the close of October he fell ill, and +for some weeks he was unable to do anything. Prince Henry, meanwhile, +had followed the movements of Daun, and had marched into Saxony; and a +series of petty operations followed, which are not worthy of special +notice. By November, Frederick, himself again, had marched into Saxony +and approached Dresden; and, with a want of perception difficult to +understand, he committed a mistake, in Napoleon’s judgment the most +inexcusable of his chequered career. Daun was at the head of his army +in Saxony; a large Austrian garrison was in Dresden; and there was +no reason to imagine that this resolute soldier was contemplating a +retrograde movement. The King, however, took it into his head that +his adversary was about to retreat into Bohemia; and always despising +Daun, spite of Kolin and Hochkirch, he sent off 12,000 men from the +main army to intercept the supposed movement. The officer in command +protested in vain; Daun closed on his foe in irresistible force; and +the whole Prussian detachment, hemmed in and powerless, was compelled +ignominiously to lay down its arms. Napoleon’s remarks on the surrender +of Maxen possess lasting and peculiar interest for the generation that +has witnessed Metz and Sedan. + +The third phase of the struggle had now come; Frederick, superior in +force until the summer of 1757, was henceforward wholly over-matched by +his enemies. The symptoms of decline which had become apparent in the +strength of Prussia in 1759 had been greatly aggravated by late events; +the losses at Kunersdorf and Maxen had been immense; Frederick had been +deprived of some of his best lieutenants, and the magnificent army with +which he had begun the war had been reduced to a mere skeleton. On the +other hand, his obstinate resistance had exasperated his foes; even +the listless and worthless Louis XV., notwithstanding the terrible +reverses of France in Canada, in Hindustan, and upon every sea, began +to be ashamed of defeats on the Rhine and the Weser; and Maria Theresa +and Elizabeth continued united in their thirst for vengeance. The +Coalition made gigantic efforts to bring the unequal contest to a +close; France placed 140,000 men on the Main and the Rhine; in Silesia +Loudon had 50,000; Daun was at the head of 80,000 troops of the +Empress-Queen and the lesser German States, encamped round Dresden and +in the Saxon plains; and Soltykoff commanded 70,000 Russians directed +from the Vistula to attain the Oder. To resist these immense masses, +the most numerous that had ever been seen in arms in Europe, Frederick +could only oppose Prince Ferdinand and 70,000 men to the French army, +twofold in numbers; and though he was still subsidised by the gold +of Pitt, and he had a central position between his foes, he had not +more than 100,000 men, composed largely of mere recruits, to contend +with the great Russian and Austro-German armies. The eagles seemed +to be gathering on their intended prey, but Frederick had resources +in himself and in the patriotic nation he ruled which the Coalition +had not taken into account. His fierce, determined, and heroic nature +exhibited itself in its grandest aspect; extreme as his peril was, he +had no thought of yielding; his centralized and severe government still +drew men and supplies from his half-ruined kingdom, and his people, +proud of their renowned Sovereign, strained every nerve to fight to the +last. + +The opening of the campaign of 1760 seemed to portend the speedy +ruin of the King; Loudon forced a Prussian detachment 10,000 strong +to surrender at Landshut, in Silesia, a repetition of the disaster +at Maxen; and Frederick vainly attempted to lay siege to Dresden, an +operation as unwise as the siege of Olmütz, which Daun frustrated +without difficulty, but which, had he been a great general, he ought to +have rendered all but fatal. By this time Loudon had captured Glatz, +and was overrunning the Silesian plains; the King, anxious about the +annexed province, which Maria Theresa burned to reconquer, set off +from Saxony by forced marches; but Daun followed on a parallel line, +and in the second week of August, he had nearly joined Loudon, and +closed round Frederick and his much weaker army. At daybreak on the +15th, Loudon attacked Frederick at Liegnitz, near the stream of the +Katzbach, the army of Daun being almost in sight; but the double +movement was ill-combined, and the King extricated himself, and even +gained a victory. His position, however, was still most critical, +and had Soltykoff, who had approached the Oder, co-operated with the +Austrian chiefs, the King, humanly speaking, must have succumbed. +Prince Henry, however, again interposed--a mere demonstration proved +sufficient; the jealousies of the Allies did the rest; and Soltykoff, +instead of striking down Frederick, merely marched northwards and +plundered Berlin, a diversion that proved of no importance. The King, +saved from destruction, returned into Saxony; the armies of Loudon and +Daun diverged; and while Loudon remained in Silesia, Daun followed his +adversary with the main army, and took a position at Torgau, on the +Elbe. Frederick attacked Daun on the 3rd of November, assailing him at +once in flank and front. The attack he conducted in person completely +failed; but Ziethen retrieved the fortunes of the day, and the Austrian +army was at last defeated. The “hind doomed to death” was not yet to +die, and, after many vicissitudes and a marvellous escape, Frederick +still held his own between the Elbe and the Oder. Meanwhile, as usual, +the great French army had invaded Germany, and had accomplished +nothing; Prince Ferdinand, as heretofore, had held it in check. + +I shall pass rapidly over the last scenes of the internecine and +protracted contest. The situation of Frederick in 1761 was much the +same as in the year before, save that the process of exhaustion had +told more on his resources than on those of his enemies. The French +Court made really great efforts to repair the humiliation of four years +of reverses; it put on foot a magnificent army of not less than 160,000 +men, a force, Napoleon has remarked, sufficient to have conquered +Germany if properly led; but its chief was the worthless Soubise; and +baffled and out-manœuvred by Prince Ferdinand, it returned to its +winter quarters without winning a battle. On the true theatre of war +in Germany the King was again immensely inferior in force; he had +probably less than 100,000 men against 220,000 or 250,000; but these +last, as always, were widely divided. The two Empresses recurred to +the project which had all but succeeded in 1759. Daun, who had been +severely wounded at Torgau, was left in Saxony to confront Prince +Henry, and Loudon, now the real chief of the Austrian armies, advanced +from Silesia, to unite with Boutourline, a new commander of the Russian +forces. The King, utterly outnumbered, had recourse to the antiquated +and barbarous method of wasting whole tracts to keep back Loudon; +but the Austrian general made his way to the Oder; and, having left +a detachment to besiege Schweidnitz, he effected his juncture with +Boutourline’s army at Jauer, near Liegnitz, at the close of August. +Frederick entrenched himself within defensive lines, after the fashion +of the preceding century; he had lost the initiative, and waited on +his foes, and he was ere long surrounded in his camps at Bunzelwitz by +enemies nearly fourfold in numbers. Loudon, a real general, was eager +to storm the lines, and, Napoleon thinks, must have destroyed the +King had Boutourline concurred in the attack; but Muscovite jealousy +interfered once more, and the Russian commander stiffly refused to +support his colleague, and marched northwards. Frederick escaped, as +had often happened, by a kind of marvel; meanwhile, Daun had remained +inactive in Saxony, and the only results of a campaign which should +have overwhelmed Prussia were that the Russians established themselves +on the Baltic, ready for speedier operations in the following year, and +that Loudon captured the great place of Schweidnitz, the key, as it has +been called, of Silesia. + +1762 was the last year of the war, and as it opened the prospects of +the King had never seemed to be so gloomy and hopeless. The circle of +his enemies was narrowing round him; Daun and a powerful army held +possession of Saxony and the line of the Elbe; Loudon occupied Silesia +in great force; the Russians were preparing to march from Kolberg; and +the French had 100,000 men in the heart of Germany. Frederick thought +that the end had at last come; yet, unshaken by the approach of the +tempest, he confronted it with heroic constancy, and like a lion who +marks the advance of the hunters, he moved hither and thither with the +wrecks of his armies, watching an opportunity to strike with effect, +and determined to challenge fortune to the last. As had always happened +in the Seven Years’ War, the French operations completely failed, and +Frederick contrived to recruit his forces with 20,000 Germans in the +Austrian service, unwisely disbanded at this supreme moment. Yet these +gleams of success appeared extinguished by an event that portended +complete ruin; the fall of Pitt in detaching England from Prussia, and +depriving her of her only ally, made the cause of the King apparently +hopeless. Nevertheless, his grand strength of character was justly +recompensed, and at the eleventh hour a series of strange incidents +changed the whole state of affairs in Europe. The Empress Elizabeth +suddenly died; her successor, Peter, became an ally of the King; and +though Catherine, his murderess, who seized his crown, did not adopt +the policy of her late husband, Russia withdrew finally from the +Coalition. This became the signal of the dissolution of the League; +France, disgraced and defeated all over the globe, made an ignominious +peace with England and Prussia; and Maria Theresa, left isolated, and +threatened by the Turk, the old foe of Austria, was compelled sullenly +to give up the contest. The last event of the war was the recapture of +Schweidnitz by the Prussian army; Frederick had successfully withstood +the Great Powers of the Continent, and all that Austria, that Russia, +that France had done had not even wrested Silesia from his hands. + +A few weeks after the Peace of Hubertsburg, the King and his army +entered Berlin in triumph. The pageant was very different from that +witnessed in 1866 and in 1871, when Prussia had driven Austria from +her high place in Germany, and had annihilated the military power of +France. The magnificence of war was not to be seen; splendid troops +did not line the squares and the streets; there was no procession of +superb trophies attesting a series of amazing victories. The army which +had begun the contest had well-nigh perished; its ranks were filled by +men not of the stock of Brandenburg; its standards in rags, and its +war-worn aspect attested the vicissitudes and defeats of a long and +uncertain struggle. Yet the spectacle was one of enduring interest, +big with great results in a far distant future. That army, made up +of many elements from different parts of the great German race, like +Wallenstein’s army of a century before, embodied, however feebly, +the as yet vague idea that Germany was a nation of one blood and +language; and it was the precursor of the patriotic league which rose +and fought for Germany in 1813–14, and of the gigantic hosts which, in +our day, conquered the unity of Germany at Sadowa and Sedan. Frederick +had no sympathy with what, in his time, was merely a dream of a few +enthusiasts; in taste and thought he was through life a Frenchman, +and he never really looked beyond Prussian interests, yet he was the +second Arminius of the Teutonic race, and the Seven Years’ War was +a new era for Germany. For many years, however, his own energy, and +those of his people, were engrossed in efforts to repair the appalling +ruin which had befallen his kingdom. Prussia was a land of desolation +when he sheathed his sword; her population had diminished a tenth; her +youth, equal to war, had been reduced one sixth; savage hordes from the +East had overrun her provinces; every town was darkened with tokens of +mourning; Silesia had more than one silent and deserted village. The +Government, too, had become more despotic in the course of the war than +it had ever been; the pressure of arbitrary taxation was frightful; a +prying Inquisition had entered the homes of all, and, as has been said, +“everything that was not military violence was anarchy.” + +Yet the King was never before so revered by his subjects, and he +remained the object of their love and esteem in an age when, in the +decay of loyalty, every throne of the Continent was being undermined. +This profound national sentiment was partly due to the real merits of +the King as a ruler, but mainly, no doubt, to the patriotic pride of +the martial and ambitious people of Prussia, which has never ceased to +boast that, under its Great Frederick, it defeated the armed strength +of three-fourths of Europe. This legend, indeed, is to a great extent +a fable; the “miraculous,” as Napoleon has said, disappears upon an +impartial survey of Frederick’s exploits in the Seven Years’ War. +For many months he was superior in force on the theatre; Austria, +all through, was his only determined enemy; Russia was too distant +to act with effect, and had a real interest not to weaken Prussia; +and France either did not put forth her force, or--the Bellona of +Europe--committed the weapons of Condé and Turenne to Soubise and +Clermont, in their hands the darts of an impotent Priam. Even as it +was, too, on more than one occasion the King must have been overwhelmed +and ruined but for the dissensions of the Coalition; and it was his +peculiar good fortune that, if we except Loudon--and this able and +brilliant chief held high command for a few months only--he had to +cope with generals of the third order. Yet admitting all this, and +recollecting besides the many military shortcomings of the King--and +his errors were sometimes of the gravest kind--still his achievements +are justly held by Prussia as a glorious possession above price; they +remain, and will for ever remain, a grand monument of what constancy, +decision, and energy can accomplish against odds which appeared +impossible to resist. + +After the termination of the Seven Years’ War, Frederick never fought +a battle again. He was threatened, indeed, in 1775, by an Austrian +invasion to regain Silesia; and in 1778 the Emperor Joseph arrayed +a great army against Prussia, to assert his claims to a part of +Bavaria. These hostilities, however, came to nothing, and the King +was allowed, during a long space of time, to carry out the policy +he had laid down for himself. It was a policy of craft and ambition +abroad; and Frederick, in his fixed purpose of enlarging Prussia, +was a chief author of the partition of Poland, a crime shared by +Catherine, and even by Maria Theresa--the conscience of the last +was, however, stung--and the cause of unnumbered woes to Europe. His +domestic policy remained one of enlightened despotism, of equal laws +and of strong government, of arbitrary, but tolerably just, rule; and +his kingdom recovered within a short time from most of the effects of +the Seven Years’ War, and made rapid strides in wealth and prosperity. +The King was justly deemed the first sovereign of his age; but the +three accomplices in the destruction of Poland suffered cruelly for +a great national wrong; but for this, Revolution would have been +quelled in France in 1792 and 1793; but for this, Austria would not +have bled at Austerlitz, and Prussia and Russia mourned for Jena and +Friedland. Though the centralized government of Frederick, too, seemed +a masterpiece of wisdom and power, it proved unable to stand the strain +of ill fortune, and it perished with the renowned Prussian army in the +agony of 1806–7. Frederick died peacefully in 1786, having survived +nearly all the sovereigns of his time. One of his last acts was to +form a league against the pretensions of Imperial Austria; but he was +utterly unconscious that a tempest was at hand which was to destroy the +monarchies of the eighteenth century, and to create a new Prussia out +of the wrecks of the old. + +I turn to my immediate subject. What is the place of the King among +great commanders? Frederick had not supreme original genius; he +was deficient in imagination, and often in judgment; but he had a +powerful mind, intensely quick perception, activity and perseverance +beyond praise; and he was endowed, besides, with a force of character +and a steadfastness seldom bestowed on man. These qualities made +him the greatest captain of an age wanting in masters of the art; +and he accomplished wonders, spite of his many faults, with an army +infinitely the best in Europe. As a strategist, he stands low in the +second order; his ideas were occasionally sound and brilliant, but the +plans of his campaigns were, for the most part, bad; and he had not +the faculty of those great combinations which disclose real strategic +genius. Holding, as he usually did, a central position between enemies +widely apart, he would repeatedly have defeated them in detail had +he possessed the science and the gifts of Turenne; and had he had to +cope, not with the Lorraines and the Dauns, but with the general of +Castiglione and Rivoli, he would have been struck down over and over +again, as the result of his false and ill-directed movements. His +place as a tactician is much higher. Frederick had real insight and +skill on the field; he possessed a great deal of Marlborough’s power +of detecting the vulnerable points of an enemy, and of striking at +them until success was attained, and his favourite manœuvre, when +properly understood, is an illustration of the great principle that +you should always so place your troops on the ground as to turn it to +the best advantage, and to make the most of their powers upon it. Yet +the King had not Marlborough’s unerring skill; even as a tactician he +made great mistakes. He was deservedly beaten at Kolin and Hochkirch; +he had the great fault of sometimes losing his temper. There is a bad +mannerism in his conduct of battles, and more than once he completely +ignored the conditions under which, and under which alone, the attack +in oblique order could be risked or justified. The title of Frederick +to rank among the first of warriors depends less, in fact, upon his +intellectual faculties than upon his grand and extraordinary moral +qualities, tenacity, and marvellous strength of character; no general +has surpassed him in the rare gift of overcoming difficulties, and +escaping from peril; no general, not even Arthur Wellesley, has +confronted a huge superiority of force with more calmness and firmness +of purpose; no general, not even his countryman Blücher, a subaltern in +the Seven Years’ War, has excelled him in rising above defeat, and in +mastering an enemy who had seemed secure in victory. If Napoleon says +truly--and who can doubt it?--that a strong nature is the greatest gift +of a chief, Frederick is eminent among the masters of war. + + + + + CHAPTER IV. + + NAPOLEON. + + +The years that followed the peace of Hubertsburg were a period of +repose, if not for mankind, at least for five-sixths of Continental +Europe. Russia, indeed, half an Asiatic Power, carrying out the designs +of Peter the Great, under the rule of a bad but most able woman, +advanced beyond the Tanais to the heads of the Euxine; and Austria, +deprived of the genius of Eugene, was more than once engaged in a +doubtful contest with Islam, formidable even in decay. But France was +scarcely involved in war, apart from a naval struggle with England; +hardly a shot was fired in despoiling Poland; save for demonstrations +that came to nothing, Germany was at peace from the Rhine to the Oder; +and though England founded an Empire in Hindustan, and the Great +Republic of the Far West was born, the conflicts that led to these +mighty events were outside the pale of the European world. As happened +after the peace of Utrecht, few occasions arose during this long season +of comparative rest for the illustration of the military art, by +examples in the field; the chiefs of the Seven Years’ War passed slowly +away; and their successors in the direction of armies, for the most +part men of the third order, were generally content to adhere stolidly +to the traditions and methods of that great contest. The attack in +oblique order was assumed to be an infallible method to win a battle +by theorists who did not understand the difference between Kolin, +Rossbach, and Leuthen; and Napoleon has described, with sarcastic +pleasantry, how pedants were wont to flock to Potsdam to behold the +manœuvres of the Prussian army engaged in movements to turn a flank at +reviews; the great King who still commanded in person, laughing quietly +at their shallow conceits. It is remarkable, however, that on the one +occasion when Germany was seriously threatened with war, from 1762 to +1791, the strategy and even the tactics of Daun prevailed over those +of his renowned antagonist. In 1778 Frederick put two armies in motion +to invade Bohemia, by the double line of the operations of 1866; but +Loudon and Lacy formed a great entrenched camp. In this position they +awaited an attack, interposing between the divided enemy; and the King +did not venture even to offer battle. + +Meanwhile, changes fraught with momentous results, in the approaching +era of world-wide conflict, were gradually making themselves felt +in Europe. The armed strength of Russia was immensely increased; +and her armies growing with the expanding Empire, though still +imperfectly equipped and organized, became instruments of war in the +hands of Suvóroff, very different from the half-barbarian hosts which +had displayed their savage constancy at Zorndorf and Künersdorf. +Simultaneously the military power of Austria, under the rule of the +dreamy reformer, Joseph, had relatively declined to a great extent; +and the famous Prussian army, though still formidable in numbers, in +discipline and in real worth had begun, even in the last years of +Frederick, to lose much of its old efficiency; and after his death, it +fell distinctly away from the high standard of the Seven Years’ War. As +for the French army, it had been augmented, and, to outward appearance, +had much improved; the Government and the nation had made great efforts +to efface the shame of days such as Minden and Rossbach; camps of +instruction were formed in parts of the country where the troops were +carefully trained and drilled; and the artillery of France, at all +times excellent, was remodelled, and became far the best in Europe. +Yet the Revolution, already at hand, had impaired the military power +of the State; the _noblesse_, still holding all high commands, +gave no successors to Condé and Turenne; there were fatal dissensions +between the officers and the men; and though the army was very much +better than it had been when led by Soubise, it was not the unrivalled +army of Louis XIV. It may be said, therefore, that old Europe, from the +Niemen to the Tagus, was ill-prepared, at the close of this period, for +a great war; and as for the British army, it was deemed of no account +after the disasters of Saratoga and York Town. Concurrently with these +changes, the material progress which had been marked in Europe since +the seventeenth century, had gone on with increased development, and +had continued to affect the conditions of war. While the populations +of the different States had multiplied and yielded ample elements +of military force, agriculture had made a rapid advance; and the +inventions of the second half of the eighteenth century had given a +remarkable impulse to every urban industry. Vast tracts of marsh, of +forest, of waste, had been enclosed and brought under cultivation; new +roads and bridges had been largely made; insignificant hamlets had +become towns, and towns had grown into great cities more flourishing +and peopled, in some instances, than the older cities they had, in +fact, supplanted. As the general result, from a military point of view, +the consequences were that armies in the field could obtain far ampler +means of supply than ever had been the case before; on most theatres of +war they would possess more roads and facilities of movement than in +previous contests; and the defensive power of fortresses, for a century +in decline, had become less than it had ever been, and, indeed, was of +little avail on several frontiers. + +This period of repose, as has often happened, was marked by +speculations of different kinds on the theory and practice of the +Art of War. The military writers of the day, however, were, without +exception, inferior men; and this is strange when we bear in mind that +the age was about to behold a display of military genius of the highest +order. The great increase of roads and of the means of manœuvring did +not suggest to these dull theorists that armies could make more rapid +movements, and could concentrate more quickly on given points than had +been possible in former times; on the contrary, these facts gave rise +to a notion that it had become necessary, in operations in the field, +to separate armies into numerous masses, and to cover all avenues that +were liable to attack. This false principle was largely confirmed +by the growth in the size of European armies, which had been one of +the results of the peace. These, it was assumed, in the event of war, +would be developed into vast proportions; and how was it possible to +move these large arrays, save by marching on a greatly extended front, +and occupying all the roads on the theatre? Nor did it occur to these +writers that the immense increase in the products of husbandry, which +had been witnessed in most parts of Europe, might enable armies to draw +their supplies more fully from resources on the spot, and, therefore, +to move with more ease and freedom than had been conceivable a century +before; they emphatically insisted on the necessity of magazines, +and of laying in enormous means of subsistence beforehand; and they +believed that war would be more methodical as armies grew into larger +dimensions. In theory, strategy became much less bold than in the days +of Turenne and Marlborough; the system of advances upon an immense +front, holding all the roads, and moving very slowly, with huge trains +of impedimenta and supplies, replaced the daring manœuvres of these +famous chiefs; and it contributed not a little to the change that +Europe was stirred by no great impulse, that the age seemed indisposed +to war, and that military energy appeared deadened through the +influences of the last half of the century. + +Some progress, however, had been made in tactics, and in the mechanism +and formation of armies. The method of the attack in oblique order +was still considered the best possible; but means to defeat it had +been devised, though these had not yet been proved in the field. +Frederick’s outflanking movement was a rapid advance, made in line, +when the enemy’s wing was attained; but, admirable as was the training +of the Prussian army, this was always attended with difficulty and +delay, especially in broken and intricate ground; and it was proposed +to encounter this by attacks in columns, more flexible and easily +handled than lines, these being preceded by clouds of skirmishers--an +American idea of the War of Independence--which would cover the onset +of the larger masses, and, to a considerable extent, would screen +their march. In this way the attack in oblique order, it was argued, +might be met and repelled by a simpler and quicker method of tactics; +a new offensive system might replace the old; and, in any event, an +army ought not to remain passive and to allow itself to be turned on +a wing, as had repeatedly happened in the Seven Years’ War. All this, +however, as yet was mere theory, unconfirmed by actual experience in +the field; and, for the rest, the current strategic notions had made +their influence felt in tactics, and movements widely divided upon the +theatre, suggested similar movements in actual battle. In some respects +armies had been much improved; the increase of their numbers had caused +battalions and squadrons to be formed into brigades and divisions, more +unity being given to the collective mass; the value of horse artillery +had been fully recognized; and, as I have said, France had taken the +lead in bringing her artillery to a high point of excellence. + +The Art of War seemed thus in a state of decay, and was being affected +by the new theories, when the French Revolution, like a volcano, burst +suddenly upon a terrified world. The invasion of Champagne in 1792 was +followed by Valmy and Jemmapes; and, in 1793, the hosts of old Europe +gathered in arms against the bloodstained Republic, which had flung the +head of a king to its foes, and had proclaimed the new Evangel of the +Rights of Man on the ruins of a fallen altar and throne. The military +operations of the next few years were marked by the want of strategic +insight, and by the uncertain and unproved tactics which had grown out +of the speculations of the age: and--apart from the tremendous issues +at stake--are not of enduring and special interest. Not, indeed, that +the wretched failures of the Allies where wholly due to feeble and bad +generalship; they were largely caused by events in the East of Europe, +by the discords and selfishness of the Coalition, and even by its +essential weakness. Beside that they were not prepared for war, the +partition of Poland made the great German Powers comparatively without +resources on the Rhine; it has been said, indeed, that they had no +real wish to effect the restoration of the Bourbon Monarchy, lest it +should avenge a dark international crime. Austria and Prussia, too, and +the lesser German States were at odds with each other, and would not +act in concert; the avowed purpose of the Allies to dismember France +threw an enormous weight into the scale against them; and, at the very +crisis of the campaign of 1793, when they could without difficulty +have advanced to Paris, they separated their forces in order to reduce +strong places meant to be permanently retained. + +The timidity, however, and the false principles which marked the +conduct of these campaigns contributed mainly to their ignominious end. +The chiefs of the Coalition divided their armies in fractions, upon an +immense front, extending from the Var to the Meuse and the Lys; they +occupied all the main approaches to France; and they moved extremely +slowly, and with great magazines and incumbrances, through a most +fertile country where celerity was of supreme importance, and where +their troops could find ample supplies on the spot. As the inevitable +result, their forces were weak at every point of their enormous line, +and were nowhere able to strike with effect; they were actually unequal +to passing fortresses which they sate down to besiege and occupy, +though a relieving army was seldom at hand; and their advance was so +tardy and beset by hindrances, that they gave France what she most +needed--time to organise her strength and to make the war national. +The errors, however, of the new strategy were conspicuous also on the +French side, though not, perhaps, in such great proportions. The French +armies, like those of their foes, were usually disseminated on a vast +front, and were, therefore, feeble on the whole theatre; and though +Carnot made one or two good movements, and showed that he knew the +importance of interior lines along the space between the Rhine and the +Lys, the plans of his campaigns as a rule were bad, and displayed the +same defects as those of the Allies. On the other hand, the operations +of the French were more rapid than those of their enemies; having no +magazines and impedimenta of the kind, they flung themselves like a +horde on the country, lived on it, and yet appeared in the field; but +though this system made their movements more quick, their efforts were +usually ill-directed, and had the Coalition shown skill and energy, +it must have triumphed in 1793–94. The tactics of the belligerent +armies were also influenced by recent theories, and were tentative, +unsettled, and in a state of transition. The Prussians attacked, at +Valmy, in the oblique order, but they were driven back by the fine +French artillery; the Austrians, at Jemmapes, followed the methods of +Daun, awaited the enemy in a strong position, and were overwhelmed +by superior numbers. In other engagements the Allies adopted the +system of attack in ill-combined columns, and were often beaten by +their more active foes. More regularity is seen in the tactics of the +French, though these as yet were quite immature and imperfect. The +practice of advancing in columns, with skirmishers in front, borrowed +from speculations already known, fell in well with the existing state +of the revolutionary military power of France; the myriads of young +levies which filled her armies were formed into masses given cohesion +by the disciplined soldiers of the old Monarchy; and these were +launched recklessly against the lines of their foes, and, fired as they +were with patriotic passion, occasionally gained important success, +especially in intricate and wooded country. By degrees these bodies +became real soldiers, though their formations were as yet rude; their +immense numbers and their enthusiasm told; though there is little doubt +they would not have saved France had they not had the support of her +regular army. + +Ere long the hour came, and the man appeared who was to educe order out +of these chaotic elements, to turn to account, with consummate skill, +the new conditions available in war, and to raise the first of arts +to the extreme of perfection. Napoleon Bonaparte was born in 1769, a +scion of a House of the _noblesse_ of Florence--the birthplace of +many illustrious men--which had emigrated from Italy in the sixteenth +century, and, since that time had found a home in Corsica. The child +was cradled, so to speak, in war; the traditions of Paoli filled his +mind in infancy, and it may well be that the heroic figure of the +legislator and champion of his little island had an influence on the +future author of the Code, and on the chief who raised France to the +heights of glory. Napoleon was sent at an early age to the well-known +Military School of Brienne, one of the foundations of the Bourbon +Kings, and he passed from thence to a Royal school in Paris, to +complete his education for the profession of arms. Little is known +about him in these boyish years; he was grave, taciturn, and fond of +books, especially of the historical and romantic kind; but except that +he excelled in mathematical science, and that he impressed his teachers +with an undefined sense of power, he was not considered a lad of +extraordinary parts. He entered the army at the age of sixteen, and the +bent of his genius became apparent in his assiduous attention to the +history of war, and especially in his constant study of military maps, +pursuits that gave token of the great future strategist. Though born +a gentleman, and retaining through life many of the instincts of the +ancient _régime_, Napoleon at this time was a needy youth, with no +hope of rising under the old order of things; and it is not surprising, +when the Revolution broke out, that he eagerly took to the new ideas, +and ranged himself on the side of the soldier, in the divisions that +filled the army with discord. As events progressed, he certainly had +relations with Robespierre and some of the Terrorists; but this passage +in his career is still ill-explained. We may accept his statement that +he always stood aloof from Jacobin anarchy and its deeds of blood; +and his well-known exclamation, on the 10th of August, when the Swiss +Guards were slaughtered by a Parisian rabble, shows that, even in those +days, he had that profound contempt of popular movements of every kind +which was one of his most distinctive qualities. + +He was a captain of artillery at the memorable siege of Toulon in +1793; and on this occasion he first gave proof of his extraordinary +capacity in war. Toulon was vainly attacked from the land side, for +its communications with the sea were open; and the French army, led +by incapable men, was too weak to master its walls and its ramparts. +But the Allied fleets were the main defence of the place; these were +crowded within the port and the roadsteads; and they were liable to +be destroyed were they exposed to the fire of powerful batteries from +a small projecting headland. At a council of war Napoleon declared +that this point, when occupied, would be the key to Toulon; and the +truth was so evident that he convinced his superiors. His admirable +prevision was soon realised. When the promontory was seized, the +hostile squadrons, completely commanded, at once put to sea, and Toulon +fell in an instant as if by magic. This exploit justly attracted +attention. Bonaparte was next employed on the Italian frontier, where +his strategic ability manifested itself in turning the positions of the +Piedmontese army; and, at the instance of the Government, he quelled +the revolt of the Sections on the 13th Vendémiaire, and in this service +he showed that he had remarkable presence of mind and firmness. He was +now known as a soldier of high promise; and, having married Josephine +Beauharnais--partly owing to the influence of her old lover, Barras, +but partly, too, because of his acknowledged powers--he was given the +command, in the spring of 1796, of some 38,000 or 40,000 men encamped +along the Genoese seaboard, with general orders to invade Italy. This +operation, however, was to be quite secondary to those of the great +armies about to enter Germany, with Jourdan and Moreau at their head; +and some of the Directory, it is said, wished to get rid, in this way, +of an importunate young man who had pestered them with grand strategic +projects pronounced by experienced chiefs to be wild extravagance. + +I have now reached the campaigns of Napoleon; I can describe them only +in the barest outline; but I must dwell for a moment on that of Italy. +The army, in the hands of the young general, had suffered terrible +privations, and was in extreme want; but it was composed of trained and +enthusiastic soldiers; it had several good subordinate chiefs, and it +could be made a most formidable instrument of war under the guidance +and inspiration of a great commander. Spread along the coast from Nice +to the verge of Genoa, it was confronted by a Sardinian and an Austrian +army, perhaps 60,000 strong, if united, led by Colli and Beaulieu, +experienced generals, but veterans of the old school; and their forces, +based on Turin and Milan, held the hill country, where the French +Alps decline and join the extreme western Apennines. Napoleon’s first +operations strikingly illustrate the intelligence of the theatre and +the skill in stratagem in which no military chief can be compared with +him. Giving out that he was about to advance by Genoa, he made a +feigned demonstration on his right, causing Beaulieu largely to detach +to his left; and then, counter-marching with extreme celerity, he +poured his troops through the Cadibona Pass, the lowest eminence in the +uniting ranges, and surrounded and routed part of the Austrian centre. +Beaulieu and Colli endeavouring to concentrate, presented their forces, +still divided, to their foe; these were defeated at Dego and Millesimo; +and the baffled chiefs retreated on Acqui and Ceva, diverging towards +their bases at Milan and Turin, and leaving a widening interval between +their shattered armies. Napoleon, standing in strength between his +antagonists, detached a wing to hold Beaulieu in check, and then +drawing together the rest of his forces, he pursued Colli, struck him +down at Mondovi, and compelled the King of Sardinia to sue for peace. +He took care to secure his communications with France by insisting on +the cession of the Piedmontese fortresses; and having thus gained a new +base--he had quietly disregarded injunctions from Paris to stir up a +revolution in Piedmont--he set off to pursue Beaulieu, in retreat along +the northern bank of the Po. + + [Illustration: Theatre of the Campaigns in NORTH ITALY] + +Deceiving again his adversary by a false rumour, Napoleon next made +a forced march to the river, advancing, as he has said, “with the +speed of a torrent,” and gathering his supplies on his way, from the +country; and crossing at Piacenza, he forestalled the Austrians, +threatened their rear, and forced them to retire on the Adda. A fierce +engagement at Lodi followed, in which Bonaparte showed remarkable skill +in securing every advantage on the ground; Beaulieu, out-manœuvred, +fell back to the Mincio, and Napoleon entered Milan in triumph, +having, like Turenne, conquered by a war of marches. The French army +now had some days of repose; its chief employed them in assuring his +base, in levying requisitions in immense quantities, and in making +preparations for fresh exploits; and if he showed no scruple in these +measures, and, in fact, he organized rapine on an enormous scale, he +established himself firmly in the heart of Lombardy. Towards the close +of May Napoleon advanced to the Mincio; Beaulieu, trying to cover the +stream at all points, was easily dislodged by a daring attack, and +the Austrian army, beaten and cowed, was forced to take refuge in +the hills of the Tyrol. By this time Bonaparte had received orders +from the Directory to march from the Po to the Tiber, to drive the +Pope from Rome, and to rouse Southern Italy; but he refused to follow +false strategic plans which, he declared, would involve his army in +ruin; and with admirable insight he addressed himself to operations +which, if successful, would, he hoped, give France the great prize of +Italy. The Austrians were his only formidable foes; the whole peninsula +would succumb if their military strength was really broken; and the +problem was how to attain this end with a small French army advanced +to the Mincio. In the line of the Adige Napoleon perceived the true +theatre on which to operate; the river, bounded on the west by the Lake +of Garda, hemmed in by mountains as it flowed southward, and ending +in tracts of widespreading marshes, afforded an enormously strong +barrier, especially if it were held on both banks; and accordingly he +took possession of the stream, having, without hesitation, seized the +fortresses of the Venetian Republic, on its lower course, and having, +meanwhile, sat down to besiege Mantua, the last stronghold still +retained by Austria. The conception, original, grand, and simple alike, +was an inspiration of true strategic genius, and one of the finest of +a marvellous career. Summer had now come, and as the Austrian armies +had as yet made no signs of appearing, Napoleon employed this breathing +time in pressing forward the attack on Mantua, and in strengthening the +power of France in Italy. + +The Emperor, meanwhile, had made great efforts to retrieve the late +reverses of his troops in Lombardy. The French armies under Moreau +and Jourdan, directed on widely distant lines, according to the false +strategy of the day, had been held in check by the Archduke Charles, +and had achieved no real success in Germany; and Würmser, a veteran +of high repute, was despatched from the Upper Rhine with about 30,000 +men, to reinforce the defeated army of Beaulieu--that general had been +deprived of his command--and with orders to drive the French out of +Italy. The Austrian army cannot have been less than from 60,000 to +70,000 strong; Bonaparte had perhaps only 40,000 men besieging Mantua, +and along the Adige; and as the value of that barrier, in the hands +of a master, was not understood in the Imperial councils, the defeat +of the French seemed a foregone conclusion. Believing that Napoleon +would retain his hold on Mantua, or, at least, would hesitate until +it was too late, Würmser divided his army into three masses, the left +and centre under the General-in-Chief moving down the Adige by the +valleys and hills that meet the eastern shores of the Lake of Garda, +the right, led by Quasdanovich, along the western shore, the object +being that the combined forces should close round and stifle the French +near Mantua. Napoleon waited until the movement was made plain, and +his resolution was at once taken with the strength of character of +a great captain. He raised the siege of Mantua on the last night of +July, and his enemies being divided by the lake, he turned against +Quasdanovich, who was nearest at hand, and drove his advanced guard +back for a long distance. Würmser, meanwhile, had forced his way to +the Mincio; dividing his army, he detached a part to attack the French +supposed to be still round Mantua, and he sent another part to unite +with Quasdanovich, assumed by his chief to be close at hand. This gave +Bonaparte an opportunity to strike; he had by this time his whole +army together; and while he kept Quasdanovich baffled, in check, he +encountered the separated forces of Würmser, and routed them in detail, +at Lonato first, and then, decisively, at Castiglione. Quasdanovich had +already fallen back; Würmser was compelled to recross the Mincio, and +his broken army was so demoralised, that he had to ascend the Adige and +fly into the Tyrol. + +Napoleon now exhibited one of his most striking qualities, his terrible +skill in pursuing a defeated enemy. Relying on the moral power of his +victories, he marched north of the lake along both shores; and then, +concentrating his forces, he beat Davidowich, a lieutenant of Würmser, +at Roveredo, just as that tenacious chief had planned another advance +on Mantua, moving, on this occasion, from the Tyrol eastwards, to the +Lower Adige. Napoleon, leaving a detachment to restrain Davidowich, +pressed Würmser with indefatigable energy, came up with him in the +defiles of the Brenta, overthrew him completely at Bassano, and drove +him, with the mere wreck of an army, into the low country east of the +Adige. The situation of the veteran appeared desperate; he was cut off +from retreat to the Tyrol; a triumphant enemy was upon his rear; and +how was he to get across the Lower Adige, held by French garrisons, +where it could be passed, before Bonaparte should reach and destroy +him? Napoleon thought he had his foe in his toils; but Würmser was a +bold and undaunted soldier, and he managed to force the passage at +Legnago, and even to make good his way to Mantua, striking down some +small hostile bodies in his path. The old chief, proud of this trifling +success, attempted to make a stand near Mantua; but he was driven into +the fortress with loss; and Mantua was again invested. In a brief +campaign of about six weeks, Napoleon, with a very inferior force, +had annihilated a far more powerful enemy; and all that remained of +Würmser’s army were a few thousand men far away in the Tyrol, and a +few thousand more imprisoned in Mantua, a burden rather than a relief +to the garrison. Such extraordinary success had never been witnessed +before, and it was obviously due to the genius of the French commander. + +Austria, nevertheless, with characteristic firmness, did not yet +give up the protracted contest. Moreau and Jourdan by this time +were in retreat towards the Rhine, the Archduke Charles, who, in +this campaign had operated between divided enemies, with a feeble +approach to Napoleon’s skill, having gained real success in Germany; +and considerable reinforcements were sent to the Tyrol, and to the +plain country known as Friuli, and were placed under the command of +Alvinzi, another old general of some distinction, with directions at +any cost to relieve Mantua. Alvinzi had passed the Isonzo by the end +of October with from 30,000 to 40,000 men, Davidowich being still in +the Tyrol with 15,000 to 18,000; and the plan of the Austrian chief +was to make these divided masses converge at Verona upon the Adige; +and, having forced the passage, to march to the Mincio. The main French +army at this time held the lowlands between the Brenta and the Adige, +a considerable detachment under Vaubois being in the Tyrol watching +the enemy; and as Napoleon in this instance persisted in continuing +the siege of Mantua, and kept a large force around the place, he had +not 40,000 men altogether in the field. The first operations of the +Austrian leaders were attended with success that might have been made +decisive. Masséna, the ablest lieutenant of Bonaparte, held Alvinzi, +indeed, in check on the Brenta; but Vaubois was driven, in defeat, from +the Tyrol; the important position of Rivoli was lost; and Davidowich +had approached Verona by the first week of November. The principal +army of the French was now compelled to fall back; Napoleon sent a +detachment to support Vaubois; but though Rivoli, the key to Verona, +was regained, Alvinzi had advanced and drawn near the city. Napoleon +attacked him fiercely at Caldiero, but the French recoiled, baffled, +from a very strong position; and had Davidowich at this moment pressed +forward boldly, and Alvinzi made good use of his success, they might +have effected their junction, seized Verona, and made their way across +the Adige. But the spell of defeat was on the Austrian chiefs; and +Napoleon, seizing his one chance with marvellous skill, plucked a +glorious triumph out of the extreme of peril. + +Abandoning Verona, he crossed the Adige; he moved quickly down the +stream and recrossed it, and then he suddenly fell on his astounded +foe, advancing along the dykes of Arcola, through the morasses of the +Lower Adige, where the agility and vehemence of the French soldiery +would, he foresaw, give them a great advantage. The battle raged +confusedly for several days; Napoleon more than once led his men in +person; Davidowich, meanwhile, had reconquered Rivoli; but skill and +French valour at last prevailed, and the two Austrian armies were +ultimately compelled to fall back behind the Brenta and into the Tyrol +discomfited, and with immense losses. Austria, however, would not +confess defeat; great efforts were made to restore her armies; and +Alvinzi assumed the offensive again, in the first days of January 1797. +He had even now probably 60,000 men against 35,000 or 40,000 French; +and his plan was to descend the Adige, to occupy Rivoli, and then to +seize Verona, and to press on to Mantua, a diversion being at the same +time made on the Lower Adige by his lieutenant, Provera. By the 14th +of January the Austrian columns had surrounded Rivoli on every side; +but in the difficult march through the hills, their artillery and +cavalry had been attached to one column only, on the best road, and +this gave Napoleon, who had his army in hand, though very inferior in +force, a decided advantage. The issue of the battle was never doubtful; +Masséna displayed conspicuous skill; the Austrians, smitten down by +the French guns, and unable to reply, lost heart and were beaten; and +Alvinzi drew off, overthrown and routed. It is unnecessary to dwell on +the last scenes of the contest; Provera contrived to cross the Adige, +and even to make his way to Mantua; but he was crushed by Napoleon, +who had hurried from Rivoli, and on the 11th of January laid down his +arms. The fate of Mantua was now sealed; three efforts to relieve the +place had failed; the garrison was reduced to extremities; and Würmser +capitulated in a few days. The last Italian fortress of Austria had +fallen; but this was nothing compared to her other losses. Army after +army had perished in the attempt to dislodge Bonaparte from the Adige, +and the Empire was completely exhausted. + +By this time the main seat of the war had been transferred from the +Rhine and the Danube to the Adige, the Isonzo, and the hills of the +Tyrol; a man of genius had transformed the situation. I shall not refer +to the close of the struggle. The Archduke Charles, the last hope of +the Hapsburgs, endeavoured in vain to arrest the march of Bonaparte +across the Carnic Alps, into the valleys of the Drave and the Mur. In +the second week of April the youthful conqueror beheld the steeples +of Vienna from the heights of the Simmering, having, with an army +never 50,000 strong, subdued Italy and shattered the power of Austria. +Nor can I notice Leoben and Campo Formio, or moralize on the Fall of +Venice; nor can I comment on the profound statecraft, very different +from the revolutionary cant, shown by Napoleon in the negotiations for +peace. Yet a word must be said, by way of comment, on the memorable +campaign of 1796–97, by some considered its great author’s masterpiece. +The dazzling imagination, one of the most striking, and yet a dangerous +gift of Napoleon, was not seen in this passage of arms as distinctly as +in more than one that followed; but every other faculty of a master of +war was exhibited in the highest perfection. The first accomplishment +of a true strategist, skill in so understanding the theatre of war as +to make it subserve his ends in view, was displayed in more than one +notable instance; the perception of the importance of the Cadibona +Pass, and the grand choice of the Adige as a barrier, are examples that +cannot escape the reader. Nor less admirable was the exhibition of +another great strategic gift, the combination of force on the decisive +points, the usual prelude of real success. Napoleon, always weaker +than his foes, if united, was often stronger on the scene of immediate +action, and this was largely due to his wonderful powers, if it was +also caused by the faults of adversaries who persisted in following a +false strategic system. No commander besides, not even Turenne, had +approached Napoleon in the great art of manœuvring between divided +enemies, of striking them left and right in succession, and of gaining +the flank and rear of a hostile army; the operations against Würmser, +and the march to Piacenza, are admirable specimens of this kind of +excellence. In the movements, too, and manœuvres of Bonaparte, we see a +splendour, and yet a scientific method, and, perhaps most distinctly, +a skill in stratagem peculiar to himself, and hitherto scarcely known; +and as for his tactics, the genius with which he chose the ground at +Arcola stamps him at once as a master in the highest sphere of this +art. Nor less remarkable were his moral qualities; his energy and +resolution, for example, appear conspicuously in the raising of the +siege of Mantua; and no one but Napoleon would have ventured to cross +the will of the Directory, as he did more than once, at the risk of his +fortune, and perhaps of his life. + +Yet in this marvellous display of genius and power we can occasionally +see defects and faults. Napoleon risked too much in continuing the +siege of Mantua at the approach of Alvinzi. He should not, perhaps, +have fought at Caldiero; and we trace signs of that over-confidence in +success, which certainly was his most distinctive error. One general +cause of the extreme brilliancy of his movements should be carefully +noted. Napoleon, unlike the first revolutionary chiefs, did not merely +throw his troops on a country and allow them to plunder to obtain +subsistence; he well knew the fatal results of this system, and he +organized magazines and depôts with care; but he perceived, with true +insight, that, in Italy at least, it was nearly always possible to +find resources on the spot; and his army accordingly moved with much +less impediments than that of the heavily-encumbered Austrians, and +was often able to assume a bold offensive which generals of the old +type would have deemed impossible. This method, however, which he +made almost perfect, had a dangerous side as yet unseen, but to be +manifested in a still distant future. For the rest, Napoleon, in the +campaign of Italy, had good subordinates and an army that became most +formidable in his master hand; but the force that really determined +events was the great military genius which had suddenly appeared. + +I shall pass over Napoleon’s career in the East, the Pyramids, and the +failure at Acre; these campaigns but slightly illustrate his genius in +war. His object in his descent on Egypt was to march through Syria and +Persia to the Indus. He always maintained that the design was feasible; +but our present knowledge shows that it was quite impossible, and +in this, as in other of his military plans, his soaring imagination +overcame his judgment. On his return to France in the winter of 1799 +he easily supplanted the tottering Government, and, as First Consul, +seized supreme power; and though I shall not comment on the 18th +Brumaire, it may fairly be said that this _coup d’état_ saved +France and restored her to her place in Europe. A second Coalition had +been formed against her, during Napoleon’s absence, after the Battle +of the Nile. Prussia, indeed, held aloof, but Russia appeared in +formidable strength on the theatre of war; and Austria, aided by the +gold and the troops of England, once more placed powerful armies in +the field. Notwithstanding the examples of the campaign of 1796, that +of 1799 proceeded on the late false principles. The war was conducted +on an enormous front, from the Texel, along the Rhine, to the Tiber; +and the armies on both sides were split into fractions, comparatively +inefficient on a vast field of manœuvre. The Allies, however, gained +important success. Masséna, indeed, saved France at Zürich; but +Suvóroff drove the French out of Italy, and the Austrians, reversing +the events of 1796, advanced from the Mincio, and approached the French +Alps. When Napoleon, who, in a few months, had accomplished wonders +of administrative skill, in restoring the finances and power of the +State, had, in the beginning of 1800, to survey the military affairs +of France, her situation was still critical in the extreme. Russia, +indeed, had abandoned the Allied cause, but Austria had put her whole +strength forth. One great Imperial army, led by Mélas, covered Italy +from the Adige to the Tanaro; another, under Kray, was in the Swabian +lowlands, holding the southern approaches to the Black Forest; and +France, with forces reduced and weakened, was threatened with invasion +on the Rhine and the Var. + +A man of surpassing powers in war was, however, for the first time at +her head; and this proved sufficient to turn the scale of Fortune. +Napoleon’s project for the campaign was not completely realised; but +it was the most striking perhaps of his great career, and it ended in +a succession of triumphs. With that wonderful glance which read the +whole theatre, and saw how to make the best use of it, the First Consul +perceived that the two hostile armies were separated by the vast space +of Switzerland, at this time in the possession of the French; and +the army of Mélas, about 100,000 strong, and intended ultimately to +enter Provence, was the principal army, on what ought to have been the +secondary point of attack only; while that of Kray, perhaps 90,000 men, +designed, if successful, to attain Alsace, was a subordinate force on +the chief scene of action. These being the facts, and as France held +Switzerland, projecting like a huge natural bastion between the enemy’s +widely-divided masses, Napoleon gave Moreau the main French army--it +contained perhaps 100,000 troops--with directions to cross the Rhine +at Schaffhausen, to fall in full force on the rear of Kray, and to cut +him off from his line of retreat; Moreau, at the fitting time, sending +a large detachment across the St. Gothard in order to aid the movements +of the French chief in Italy. Napoleon selected for 1800 the scene of +his exploits in 1796–97; and his design was, avoiding the Piedmontese +fortresses, to cross the Alps by the Great St. Bernard range, and then +rapidly descending, to seize the lines of the communications of Mélas +with the Adige, and supported by the detachment from Moreau, to force +the Austrians to fight in a disastrous position. The First Consul +calculated that about 40,000 men--France at this juncture could not +yield more--would, with the aid from the main army, suffice for his +purpose; but as it was of the first importance to allow the Austrians +to advance into the far end of Italy, and to engage themselves on the +line of the Var, it was necessary to conceal as much as possible the +formation and destination of the new army of Italy, and especially +to screen its advance to the Alps. To attain his end Napoleon tasked +to the utmost the dexterity in stratagem in which he stands supreme. +He assembled a collection of bad troops at Dijon, and ostentatiously +announced this was his Italian army; but in the meantime he quietly +drew together his real force from different parts of France, masking +the operation with the greatest care and forethought. The main army, +I have said, was to cross the St. Bernard; but a small column was to +march by the pass of Mont Cenis--the ordinary military way through the +Alps--in order effectually to deceive the enemy. + +The campaign only began in earnest in spring, though hostilities had +not ceased through the winter. In the first week of May Mélas had +part of his army besieging Genoa, under his lieutenant, Ott, Masséna +making a stubborn defence; Elsnitz, another Austrian, was upon the Var, +confronted by Suchet, a capable chief well known in the Peninsular War +afterwards; and the rest of the Imperial army held Piedmont, extending +thence to the Adige and the Mincio. Meanwhile, Moreau, a general of +the second order, had feared to execute Napoleon’s design, and to fall +on the rear of Kray by Schaffhausen; he had crossed the Rhine, after +his own fashion, by complicated and even hazardous movements, merely +threatening, not striking Kray, with effect; but he had forced the +weaker hostile army back; and he was able to fulfil one great part +of his mission, and to send 20,000 men across the St. Gothard, under +Moncey, one of the Napoleonic marshals. The First Consul took the +field in the second week of May; his army, secretly moved to the Swiss +frontier, its strength still unknown to its enemy, crossed the Great +St. Bernard from the 16th to the 19th; and simultaneously the secondary +force moved forward through the pass of Mont Cenis. The hill fort of +Bard arrested the French for a moment; but the obstacle was overcome +skilfully; and by the 23rd the advanced guard of Napoleon was in the +valley of the Dora, and in full march for Piedmont. By this time Mélas +had heard of the advance of the enemy, but he refused to believe in the +force of the French army; he allowed Ott and Elsnitz to remain where +they were; and though he moved to Turin in person, it was with not more +than a few thousand men, for he felt assured that his divisions in +Piedmont would be able to give a good account of Napoleon. The Austrian +chief, too, at this critical moment, was deceived by the apparition of +the column from Mont Cenis; he thought that it was the chief part of +the hostile army; and falling into the snare that had been laid for +him, he halted at Turin to draw in his forces. + +This gave Napoleon the opportunity he sought; he marched from the +Dora across the Sesia and the Ticino with his wonted celerity; and he +entered Milan on the 2nd of June, already menacing the communications +of his foe. He was soon joined by Moncey’s detachment, and being now +at the head of 60,000 men, he crossed the Po, holding both its banks, +and closed on the rear of the main Austrian army, thrown forward almost +to the frontier of France. Mélas, seriously alarmed, gave orders to +concentrate his still very superior force; but Ott lingered to receive +the keys of Genoa, which yielded only after a most stern resistance, +and left a large garrison in the fallen city; Elsnitz was routed by +Suchet in his retreat from the Var; and the Austrian army was immensely +weakened, when in the second week of June it lay round Alessandria, +Ott, who had endeavoured to attain the Po, having been driven back +at Montebello with loss. By this time Napoleon had his army divided +on either bank of the Po, Moncey watching the course of its Alpine +feeders, Napoleon holding the famous Stradella Pass, where the spurs of +the Apennines approach the river; and his enemy, even now, was within +his toils. But the First Consul gave Mélas credit for more strategic +skill than he really possessed; he thought that the Austrian, after +the fall of Genoa, might endeavour to make his escape by the coast, or +might fall back and overpower Suchet; and he debouched into the great +plain of Marengo, in order to observe and close on his foe. His army +was not 30,000 strong; that of Mélas was probably 40,000; it was very +superior in cavalry and guns, which gave it a marked advantage in open +ground; and no doubt can exist that in risking this movement Napoleon +made a great strategic error. Mélas, a stout warrior of the school +of Daun, attacked the French fiercely on the 14th of June, hoping to +defeat his enemy and to escape from the net thrown around him with +such forethought and skill; and he nearly attained a decisive victory. +Desaix, however, a trusted lieutenant of Bonaparte, arriving from a +distance, restored the battle; the horsemen of Kellerman changed the +fortunes of the day, and the Austrians at last were completely beaten. +The result was then seen of the masterly movements which had brought +Napoleon on the rear of Mélas; the defeated army was compelled to make +terms, and it evacuated the peninsula even beyond the Mincio. France +had regained Italy by a march and a battle. + +Austria, always tenacious, resisted for months, and Moreau gained a +great victory at Hohenlinden, success in part due to the overboldness +of John, a brother of the Archduke Charles, who imagined he had +mastered Napoleon’s strategy. But Marengo had been the decisive +stroke: Austria fought for honour only, after the loss of Italy; +and ere long she accepted the Peace of Lunéville, followed by the +peace of Amiens between France and England. The campaign of 1800 is +the most dazzling of Napoleon’s masterpieces, though marred by what +might have been a fatal error. Full justice, perhaps, has never been +done to the surpassing ability of the First Consul in perceiving the +advantage given to France by her hold of Switzerland, and the false +position of the Austrian armies; for two Napoleons were required on +the scene, to realise completely one grand conception. Had Bonaparte +been in the place of Moreau, and debouched from Schaffhausen across +the Rhine, Kray would have been cut off, and Vienna laid open; and +the ruin of Mélas and the Conquest of Italy was, in fact, half only +of what might have been done. Yet, as it was, Switzerland was made a +kind of sallyport, to place the French armies on the rear of their +foes; Moreau was rightly given the superior force to paralyse Kray, +and to keep him off from the Rhine; Napoleon properly distributed the +inferior force in Italy, under his own command, for it would suffice +to defeat operations in the Var; and though Moreau failed to destroy +Kray, Napoleon succeeded in destroying Mélas, thrown forward perilously +on the French frontier. Intelligence of the theatre and splendour of +design were never, perhaps, more finely displayed; the ordinary reader +will dwell on the Alpine march; but the true student of war will rather +note the exquisite art with which the army of Italy was collected, +formed, and moved to the Alps, all without the enemy’s knowledge; the +admirable skill by which Mélas was deceived through the demonstration +at Mont Cenis; the celerity of the advance on Milan, and the perfect +arrangements made to combine with Moncey, and then to encompass the +foe. Genius and power of stratagem have never accomplished more; and +had Napoleon remained near the Stradella Pass--Turenne certainly would +have done this--the execution of his plan would have been perfect. +But this wonderful chief was not only too confident throughout his +whole career, but often showed[10] impatience when near his enemy; +these faults nearly caused him to lose the campaign; and he certainly +ought not to have fought at Marengo, for the chances were in his +opponent’s favour, though an advance towards Alessandria might have +been justified, for Mélas might, perhaps, have escaped by the seaboard, +or have crushed Suchet with his weak detachment. + +I cannot dwell on the Government of the First Consul, on the Code, the +Concordat, the Pacification of La Vendée, the restoration of order +and peace in France, the foundation of the only institutions and laws +which have lasted during her subsequent history; nor can I comment +on his external policy, the settlement of Italy in the interests of +France, and the extension of her influence through the Lesser States +of Germany. I shall only remark that if these achievements reveal +the near advent of despotism at home, and the spirit of encroaching +ambition abroad, they display administrative excellence of the first +order, and profound, if hard and unscrupulous, statecraft; and they +bear the marks of ineffaceable greatness. I cannot, moreover, enlarge +on the causes which led to the rupture of the Peace of Amiens, and +involved England and France in a death struggle. Nor shall I describe +the Flotilla and the Camp of Boulogne, the accumulation of a great +army destined to cross the Channel, and to invade our coasts, and the +energy, the perseverance, and the careful forethought with which this +last was prepared to effect the descent. Yet a remark must be made +on the fine combinations thought out by Napoleon to carry out his +purpose, for they are a notable example of his skill in stratagem. +His arrangements to embark his army, and to make the passage, in the +flotilla, were but a part of the design; they were largely intended +to mask his purpose; his real plan was to conduct the descent under +the protection of a fleet which should command the Channel. How +indefatigably, and with what consummate art, the First Consul toiled +to effect his object, his correspondence abundantly proves; and, it +must be added, he well nigh succeeded. The Admiralty was deceived, and +Nelson was lured away; and had French seamen been nearly as good as our +own, and Villeneuve been a capable chief, Napoleon would have mastered +the narrow seas for a time, and his army would have stood on our +shores. That he would have found a Moscow, in England, our countrymen +believe; he certainly would have been imprisoned within the ground he +occupied, for our fleets would have cut him off from France, and his +enterprise would probably have been a failure. All this, however, is +speculation only; England undoubtedly was in grave danger, and her +Government did not understand her enemy; though it deserves notice +that Napoleon’s idea, that he would subdue England by pulling down the +Throne and setting a Republic up in its place, was not only a huge +mistake, but tends to show he did not believe that he could succeed +only by mere force of arms. + + + + + CHAPTER V. + + NAPOLEON (_continued_). + + +The return of Pitt to power, at the call of the nation; the aggressive +foreign policy of the first Consul, and the atrocious execution of the +Duc D’Enghien--a crime that may be palliated but not excused--soon led +to a new Coalition against France. Prussia, indeed, gorged with spoil +after the peace of Basle, stood apart, as she had done in 1799, as if +secretly ashamed of an ignoble part; but Russia and Austria joined +hands with England. Other petty States took the same side, and by the +summer of 1805 the Allies had come to a general agreement to take the +offensive. Before this time Napoleon had become Emperor, with the +universal acclaim of the French people, and the crowned soldier, who +had raised France from the depths of disaster to the head of Europe, +and whose strong hand had put anarchy down, now wielded the resources +of a mighty State, and made the revolutionary forces which he used and +hated the ministers of immense despotic power. The military strength +of France, though it was enlarged afterwards, was now really at its +extreme height, and Napoleon’s army of this period was by far the +finest he ever commanded. I must glance at the characteristics of this +magnificent force, justly known by the name of the Grand Army, and +infinitely the most formidable organization for war which hitherto +had been arrayed in Europe. Apart from small Italian and German +contingents, the Grand Army at this time was composed of Frenchmen, for +the most part troops in the flower of life, but with a large admixture +of veteran soldiers; and this vast body was inflamed with a strong +spirit of enthusiasm, of patriotism of its own kind, of thirst for +glory, and of intense confidence in an unrivalled leader. Its physical +and moral force was, therefore, enormous; and as five-sixths of it +had for many months been assembled in the great Camp of Boulogne--the +general name of many leaguers--and the troops had been inured to the +hard training of war, its military condition had attained perfection. +It probably numbered at this time about 200,000 men in the first line, +with reserves, perhaps, 200,000 more; and, regiment for regiment, I +certainly think it formed a more efficient instrument of war than the +huge national armies of recent days, composed far too largely of young +conscripts, and never yet subjected to the strain of ill-fortune. + +The general organization of this great force was perfectly adapted, +in Napoleon’s hands, to the conditions of war in the first years of +this century. Brigades and divisions had now been formed into corps, +each under the command of able chiefs, too accustomed, indeed, to look +up to Napoleon, and not given sufficient freedom of action, but all +skilful and experienced soldiers; and the army had more cohesiveness +and real power than ever had been the case formerly. Napoleon, however, +apart from these masses, each an independent army in itself, had +large cavalry and artillery reserves; and he usually kept them under +his immediate control, to wield “his club of Hercules” for decisive +strokes. The Grand Army, too, like that of Louis XIV., had its _corps +d’élite_--the Imperial Guard--the tenth legion of the modern +Cæsar, and this superb force on many a hard-fought day turned by its +mighty preponderance the scales of fortune. As for the tactics of +the army, they had been perfected in the experience of a long series +of wars; columns of infantry, not as yet too dense, and preceded by +skirmishers, were formed for attack; but they were always supported by +cavalry and guns; and Napoleon invariably took special care that the +three arms should act in concert. These arrangements had given great +flexibility and yet strength to the improved formations; and it was +clearly apparent that the new methods were superior to those of the +Seven Years’ War. As for the mechanism of the army, if I may use the +word, the whole system of assuring supplies, of establishing magazines +and depôts, and of procuring continual relays of troops, which German +science has brought to perfection, had been largely matured by +Napoleon; and though he always “made war sustain war,” that is, he +usually trusted to resources on the spot in order to enable his troops +to move freely, he was most attentive to the wants of his soldiers, and +provided for them with great administrative skill. Yet, formidable as +it was, the Grand Army had marked defects which require notice. It had +never lost the habits of the Revolutionary Wars; Napoleon’s system, +indeed, promoted rapine; it retained some of the instincts of the +savage hordes let loose in 1793–94; it was crowded with ignorant and +bad officers, the survivors of the huge conventional levies; and the +arrangements of the staff were far from good. It still bore the marks +of a revolutionary age; and in all these respects it was very inferior +to the great army formed by Roon and Moltke. + +The Allies had set their armies in motion by the first week of +September 1805. They had nearly half a million of men on foot; but, +partly owing to divided counsels, and partly to the disastrous mistake +of subordinating military to political ends, this gigantic force was +injudiciously arranged on the theatre. Four separate attacks had +been designed; the first by a small English and Swedish force from +Hanover and the North German seaboard; the second by an Austrian and +a great Russian army, to be assembled upon the banks of the Danube +and ultimately to invade Alsace; the third on northern Italy from the +Adige and the Tyrol, conducted by the Archdukes Charles and John; +and the fourth by an English and Russian contingent disembarked from +a fleet on the coast of Naples. But the first and last attacks were +mere weak diversions, which could not alarm a true strategist; as +regards the second, the Russian army, still in Galicia and Poland, +was at an immense distance from the Austrians upon the Upper Danube; +and as for the third, the ambition of the House of Hapsburg, eager +to regain its Italian possessions, had repeated the mistake of 1800, +its chiefs having placed far too great a force on secondary points, +without sufficient regard for those which were of supreme importance, +the space between the Middle Rhine and the Danube. Napoleon seized +the situation with the eye of genius; and the plan of his operations +was at once formed. Neglecting Northern Germany and Southern Italy, +and employing only an inferior force to hold the Austrian Princes in +check--they were in command of 100,000 men--he resolved to fall on the +Austrian army on the Danube, which, not more than 85,000 strong, was +thrown forward on the country round Ulm, to surround and destroy it, +under its chief Mack, as Mélas had been destroyed five years before, +and thus to cut it off completely from the distant Russian army, which +could not be on the spot at the time. + +I can only glance at the operations that followed, less dazzling than +those which led to Marengo, but in principle and method essentially +the same, and a notable instance of the great maxim in war, set at +nought in 1793 to 1799, but always observed by real commanders, that +you should find and strike at the decisive point, and assail an enemy +where he is most vulnerable. The Grand Army marched across France from +the camp of Boulogne with a celerity which confounded its foes; two +corps, under Bernadotte and Marmont, created of late Imperial Marshals, +advanced from Hanover and the flats of Holland; a corp of Bavarians +joined the French; and the collected masses, nearly 200,000 strong, +were drawn together to the Rhine and the Main, ready to attain the +Danube, in the last days of September. These movements led to the great +surrender of Ulm, a most remarkable event in the wars of this century. +Masking the general movement by sending detachments of cavalry into +and along the Black Forest--the stratagem again of the column of Mont +Cenis--and spreading his masses over the Franconian plains, the Emperor +moved the converging arrays from the great arc of Strasburg, Mayence, +and Würtzburg; and by the second week of October they were upon the +Danube already interposed between Ulm and Vienna. The net was now +rapidly drawn round Mack, who, stricken with terror, remained almost +motionless, changing front about Ulm, and doing scarcely anything to +strike at the enemy gathering in on all sides. Some mistakes were made +in completing the toils, almost inevitable in manœuvres of the kind, +which a capable chief might have turned to account; but these were +rectified within a few hours; three bodies of Austrians made their +escape; but Mack simply waited on events, unlike Mélas, made no attempt +to break through, and capitulated with the mass of his army on the +19th of October. The greater part of the forces which had got off were +intercepted and made prisoners; and thus a whole army was literally +swept from the theatre by a march without striking one effective blow. +Europe never witnessed a scene of the kind again until Metz fell +through the treason of Bazaine. + + [Illustration: + + Sketch Map of + CENTRAL EUROPE] + +Napoleon, in his rapid advance on Ulm, had spread his army over a +vast circumference because no possible foes were at hand; he had made +the best use of the good roads which now generally traversed France +and Germany; and he had thus turned to the greatest advantage one of +the new existing conditions of war. The front of the Allied attack +had been broken; and the paralysis, so to speak, of the head, had +caused the collapse of the inferior members. The eccentric operations +in the North of Germany and in Southern Italy came to nothing; the +Archduke Charles and the Archduke John--the first had been defeated at +Caldiero, a revenge for the failure of 1796--were compelled to fall +back from the Adige and the Tyrol; and the way from Ulm to Vienna +lay open. The Emperor, giving effect, in another age, to the great +conception of Villars in 1703, marched with the Grand Army down the +valley of the Danube, protecting his wings from possible attacks; the +Isar, the Inn, the Traun, and the Ens, lines capable of defence, were +passed and mastered; and, by the middle of November, the triumphant +conqueror had entered the capital of the German Cæsars. By this time +the advanced corps of the Russian army, which had marched from Galicia +and had attained the Inn, had rallied the fragments of Mack’s forces; +its chief, Kutusof, a name to become famous, had fallen back, and left +Vienna to its fate; and he had come into line with his colleague, +Buxhöwden, who had been marching from the Polish frontier, and had +made his way into the plains of Moravia. Napoleon broke up from Vienna +to pursue his foes, though, notwithstanding his wonderful success, +his position was already not free from danger. In the march on Ulm, +Bernadotte had crossed a Prussian district; this had incensed the King +and even the nation, for some time chafing at its neutral attitude, and +Prussia had begun to prepare for war, and to assemble troops on the +Elbe and the Oder. The Grand Army, too, had suffered heavy losses in +its forced marches into the heart of Austria; the system of living upon +conquered provinces had not sufficed for enormous bodies of men; and +thousands of stragglers, marauders, deserters, swarmed along the tracts +from the Rhine to the Danube. The Archdukes, too, in retreat from the +south, were straining every nerve to attain Moravia; and should Prussia +march an army through the Bohemian passes, and throw her sword into +the scale of the Allies, the French, isolated, would, with winter at +hand, and far from their base, be soon compelled to confront an immense +superiority of force. + +Napoleon, however, always confident--the modern Cæsar had faith in his +fortunes--did not hesitate to march into Moravia; and he was at Brünn +by the third week of November, with a considerable part of the Grand +Army. At this moment Kutusof and Buxhöwden were near Olmütz about +80,000 strong; some Austrian contingents had united with them; Prussia +had actually promised to attack Napoleon; the Archdukes were but a few +marches off; and had the Allies only waited a fortnight, they could +have assembled nearly 200,000 men to fight a great battle with the +French Emperor, who could not have assembled 100,000. But folly and +presumption were in the Russian camp, and the young Czar, Alexander, +was persuaded to take the offensive, and to advance from Olmütz before +the available supports of the Allies were near. A theorist contributed +to this fatal resolve, and his pedantry led to a tremendous disaster. +Napoleon at this time was in position not far from Brünn, on the banks +of the Goldbach, in front of the little town of Austerlitz; and though +he had really about 70,000 men in hand, two of his corps were at some +distance. Weyrother, an Austrian general officer, proposed a grand +plan, to descend from Olmütz, to turn the right wing of the French +on the Goldbach, and to cut Napoleon off from retreat on Vienna, by +a formidable attack in the oblique order. The Allied army, perhaps +80,000 men, was close to the Goldbach on the 1st of December, its +columns arranged for the offensive movement ostentatiously talked of +and soon made apparent; and Weyrother announced a great coming victory. +Napoleon, who had drawn in his two corps, beheld with delight this +reckless strategy--a flank march along a wide front, under the beard +of the chief of Arcola and Rivoli; that “army is mine,” he proudly +said, and he made the prediction known in an address to his soldiers. +Anticipating what would happen--in part at least--he had assumed a +timid defensive attitude, in order to lure his enemies on--another +instance of his wonderful powers of stratagem. + +The sun of Austerlitz rose on the 2nd, to illuminate one of the great +scenes of history. The nature of the ground forbade the manœuvre +contemplated by the Allied leaders. Towards their left, in the space in +which they proposed to outflank and defeat the French right, spread a +region of marsh, around the Goldbach, of wide lakes, and of intricate +country, with the hamlets of Sokolnitz and Telnitz hard by; and it +formed at once a difficult position to force, and a line favourable in +the extreme for defence. Their centre filled the plain round the hill +of Pratzen, and was, therefore, dangerously exposed to attack, should +it be weakened by a detachment to the left; and their right was almost +wholly “in the air,” and liable to be turned and destroyed by the low +hill of Santon. Napoleon had seized the characteristics of the scene +with the insight of the great chief of Ramillies, and his dispositions +were made to turn to the best advantage the local peculiarities which +he saw before him. He had already secured a second line of retreat, +was not bound to his base on Vienna, and was perfectly free to act +as he pleased; and his arrangements were the piece of a master of +tactics. He placed Davoust, one of the best of the marshals, with +only a few thousand men on his right--reinforcements, however, were +ready for them--for he wished to draw the enemy on to his ruin, and +the position he knew was easy of defence; but Soult, afterwards Duke +of Dalmatia, Bernadotte and his corps, with the Imperial Guard, were +massed together in formidable strength, to carry the plain and heights +of Pratzen; and Lannes, with the left and a reserve, held the hill of +Santon and the lowlands around, with every advantage for an effort +against the Allied right. The battle-field, therefore, was made, so to +speak, a theatre by the antagonist chiefs, to assure defeat and victory +alike; and Kutusof, it is said, foretold the issue with an assurance +equal to that of Napoleon. + +These operations led to the great fight of Austerlitz, the masterpiece +of war, I think, of this century. By the early dawn, four big Austrian +and Russian masses were in motion to turn Napoleon’s right, advancing +slowly in the oblique order; but they toiled painfully through the +difficult ground; and they were kept at bay by the little force of +Davoust, which, holding Sokolnitz and Telnitz, defied their efforts. +Ere long a tremendous onslaught of war burst suddenly upon the Allied +centre, thinned by the divisions sent to the left; Napoleon, who, like +a crouching tiger, had reserved his strength until it was time to +spring, launched Soult and Bernadotte against Pratzen, and the enemy’s +centre was cut through spite of heroic efforts. Meanwhile Lannes had +assailed the enemy’s right; here, too, a noble resistance was made; +but science and skill, force being nearly equal, must always prevail +over the sternest courage; and victory soon declared for the French. +Early in the afternoon the Allied centre and right, half ruined, were +a dissolving mass; and though the left had forced Davoust back some +distance, it was isolated and entangled in an intricate region. It +was beginning to retreat, its cumbrous masses demoralised and showing +signs of panic, when Napoleon turned against it with that determined +energy which he nearly always displayed in a successful battle. His +victorious centre was brought to bear in irresistible power on the +flying enemy; a horrible scene of carnage followed; the Austrians and +Russians were slain or captured in thousands without an attempt at +resistance; and multitudes perished in the lakes near the Goldbach, the +French artillery shattering their frozen surface. The stricken army was +well-nigh destroyed; it lost all its guns; and nearly half its numbers, +and its fragments were scattered in every direction. The coalition +succumbed under this mighty stroke; Prussia said “Hail” to the +conqueror, and licked his hand; Alexander was too glad to escape beyond +the Niemen, with the remains of his army; and Austria, her constancy +at last broken, was compelled to accept the Peace of Pressburg, which +deprived her of all she had retained in Italy, and contracted the +limits of her shrunken empire. In the general dismay of Continental +Europe, England alone had consolation and hope; she had lost Nelson, +but that greatest of seamen had annihilated the fleets of France and +Spain on the ever memorable day of Trafalgar. + +It is unnecessary to dwell on the first part of this campaign; for the +operations that led to the surrender of Mack were, I have said, akin to +those that hemmed in Mélas. The Allies were in a false position on the +theatre of war, as the Austrians were in 1800; Napoleon enveloped one +of their armies, as before Marengo he had closed round the Austrians. +The movements of 1805 were less fascinating, I have remarked, than +those of 1800; and the great superiority of Napoleon over Mack in +numbers make them less astonishing and strike the mind less; but they +were conducted upon a grander scale, were more scientific, and were +better prepared. The march on Vienna was a fine operation; but it will +always remain questionable if the Emperor ought to have hazarded the +advance into Moravia; assuredly had the Allies fallen back and waited, +he would have been exposed to the gravest perils. + +The grand incident of the contest is, however, Austerlitz, a battle +that should be studied by every thinker on war. It is a poor account of +this mighty conflict to say that it represents the system of Frederick +at odds with that of Napoleon, and exploded by it; the result depends +on much deeper causes than tactical orders on a field of battle. No +doubt the Allies tried to attack in Frederick’s fashion; no doubt the +French attacked in columns with skirmishers; no doubt the hostile +armies may be compared “to a long bar of iron, inferior in strength +and suppleness to a chain of many links,” to use the metaphor of an +accomplished writer. But Austerlitz was not an affair of mere methods +of offence; it was the triumph of marvellous genius in war over +pedantry and ignorance of the higher parts of tactics. The Allies +placed themselves on the ground as badly as possible; they made a +long flank march under the guns of an enemy; their turning movement +inevitably failed in the region in which the attempt was made; and +had Daun been before them they would have been defeated, though Daun +could no more have achieved Austerlitz than he could have written +_Othello_ and _Hamlet_. On the other hand, Napoleon occupied +the ground with perfect judgment, made every feature in it conform +to his ends; placed his army upon it in the exact positions in which +its attack would be most decisive, and made the very most of the +false moves of his enemies. The result was complete; only two-thirds +of an army rather weaker than its foe in numbers, and much weaker in +guns, simply shattered to atoms a more powerful force, with a loss +comparatively very small; and this, though the Austrians and Russians +fought extremely well. In all this we see what Napoleon has called +the “divine side of war,” not its mere evolutions; the difference, he +has said, is that between a “book of the _Iliad_ and a page of +a grammar.” Yet masterpiece as this great battle was, I do not think +it surpasses Ramillies in the dispositions that were made before it, +and in the manner in which the enemy was reached and conquered. We see +the same insight in both instances; the same thorough perception of +the nature of the ground, and the means of taking the best advantage +of it; the same perfect appreciation of the faults of the enemy, the +same admirable distribution of the victorious armies. In one respect, +however, Marlborough perhaps was inferior to Napoleon in execution; he +did not strike down Villeroy with the tremendous force with which the +Emperor crushed the Allies, and did not show the same wonderful power +in victory. Yet I hesitate here, for we must remember Blenheim, and +the absolute destruction of Tallard’s army; and in comparing the two +battles, we must bear in mind that the three arms in Napoleon’s day had +acquired a “mobility” and a power in the field unknown in the first +part of the eighteenth century, and were, therefore, far more effective +against a defeated army. + +I cannot notice the Confederation of the Rhine, the creation of vassal +kingdoms beyond France, as appendages to the House of Bonaparte, and +the enormous extension of the French Empire from the Zuider Zee to the +extreme verge of Italy. The dream of setting up again the throne of +Charlemagne in the generation of the French Revolution, and of holding +down martial States by sheer force of arms, is characteristic of the +extravagance sometimes seen in Napoleon; and it indicates also that +profound scorn of anything resembling popular rights and movements +which is a marked feature of his wonderful nature. War broke out soon +again on the Continent, and Prussia, unaided, challenged the French +Empire. That Power had been willing to wound, and yet afraid to strike; +she had feigned submission after the rout of Austerlitz, but she +remained angry and vexed at heart, and the domineering conduct of the +Imperial conqueror goaded her at last to proclaim hostilities. The +Court and even the nation rushed to arms; the misgivings expressed by +veterans of the Seven Years’ War, who had followed events from 1794 to +1805, were disregarded with false confidence; and two armies, about +150,000 strong, led by Prince Hohenlohe and the Duke of Brunswick, +marched from the Elbe and the Oder to the Thuringian Forest. + +The operations of the campaign of 1806 are, perhaps, less marked by +Napoleon’s genius than that of more than one previous contest; but they +achieved success that even now seems marvellous, and they conspicuously +illustrate one of his peculiar gifts, power in annihilating a defeated +enemy. The Grand Army, about 180,000 strong, was on the Main, not +having returned to France when the Prussian chiefs had assumed the +offensive, and the Emperor joined it in the first week of October. +At this moment Hohenlohe and Brunswick were contemplating an advance +to the Rhine. Bold strategy, they boasted, was all that was needed +to overcome the Corsican upstart, and the Grand Army was spread from +Würtzburg to Bamberg capable of being easily moved on their flank. +Napoleon determined to gain this advantage, and, forming his army +into three great masses, he began to traverse the defiles that lead +from the southern verge of the forest towards the Saale and the +Elster. The movement, executed with his wonted promptitude, brought +the Grand Army into the plains between the two rivers on the 10th of +October, threatening the communications of the enemy with the Elbe; and +Hohenlohe and Brunswick, passing from boasting to terror, fell back +towards Weimar and Jena, to approach the Elbe. Napoleon, who, at the +beginning of the campaign, expressed unfeigned respect for the famous +army of Frederick, would not at first believe that generals of a great +school would make such a hasty retrograde movement; and he drew part +of his forces together, expecting to fight a great battle near Gera +and Auma, points in the valleys of the Saale and the Elster. This +miscalculation cost him the loss of some time, for his enemy had no +intention to stand, and, meanwhile, the retreating armies had fallen +back a considerable way towards the Elbe, the main body under Brunswick +making for the line of the Unstrutt, a feeder of the Saale, and the +defile of Kosen, a smaller force, led by Hohenlohe, halting near Jena +in order to call in outlying detachments, and then to follow Brunswick +to the Elbe. Napoleon began to pursue when he had ascertained his +mistake; he was greatly elated by the results of partial engagements +with small hostile bodies, in which the superiority of the French +tactics was manifest, and he wished to compel the Prussians to accept +battle. But his information was still imperfect; he would not credit +so rapid a flight; he believed that by far the greatest part of the +enemy’s army was concentrating near and around Jena; and his plan was +to overwhelm it in front, and to cut off its retreat. With this object +in view, he directed Davoust and Bernadotte to seize the defile of +Kosen, crossing the Saale at the points of Naumburg and Dornburg; and +with the main part of the Grand Army spread out in many columns he drew +near the river and advanced on Jena. + +These operations led to Jena and Auerstadt, fought on the 14th of +October 1806. By the night of the 13th Napoleon had seized, had +occupied by an advanced guard, and had crowned with guns brought up +with infinite toil--the Emperor followed the train in person--the +Landgrafenberg heights, since known by his name, which commanded the +approaches to the plains beyond; and from this point he saw the army +of Hohenlohe, the bivouacs marked by miles of fires, extending along +the region between Jena and Weimar. He made his dispositions for a +great battle, still fixed in the belief that Hohenlohe’s army was +the principal part of the hostile forces; and as he knew that, in +any event, he would be in preponderating strength on the field, he +prepared to attack Hohenlohe in front, and to turn both his flanks, +and he directed Davoust to advance even beyond Kosen, to defeat, if +he could, the army of Brunswick, and to close on the rear of the two +Prussian armies. The battle of Jena began in the early morning; the +first movement of Napoleon was to debouche from the Landgrafenberg into +the plains beyond, and this was accomplished with little difficulty, +Hohenlohe having altogether failed to perceive the importance of this +position. When the French army had fully taken its ground, Napoleon +had 100,000 men against 60,000, and the issue of the battle could not +be doubtful. Ney, indeed, the ill-fated “bravest of the brave,” the +warrior of Elchingen and of the Moskwa, engaged his troops prematurely, +and met a severe repulse; and the Prussians displayed the stern +devotion, and even the precision and skill in manœuvre characteristic +of them in the Seven Years’ War. But Hohenlohe’s force, weaker as +it was, was divided; the attack of Lannes, the Guard and Murat in +front--the chief of the Imperial cavalry is well known to fame--that +of Soult and Augereau, another marshal, on either flank, became +impossible to resist; and though the Prussians “fought like tigers,” an +eye-witness has said, and Napoleon[11] sincerely praised them in his +account of the battle, Hohenlohe’s army was before long routed. + +Meanwhile a battle of a very different kind had raged at Auerstadt, a +few miles off, on the line of the retreat of the defeated Prussians. +Davoust had issued, as he had been ordered, from the defile of Kosen; +but as he advanced he became aware of the great strength of the army +of Brunswick, and he entreated Bernadotte to come to his aid. That +chief, however, insisted on remaining at Dornburg, relying on the +letter of Napoleon’s despatches; and it is doubtful whether this unwise +resolve is to be attributed to the servile obedience characteristic +of the Imperial marshals, or to miserable jealousy and dislike of a +colleague. Davoust was now left with about 27,000 men to confront +Brunswick, who must have had 70,000 had his force been well in hand; +and the Marshal directed one of the finest battles of the whole period +of the wars of Napoleon. He tenaciously kept Brunswick at bay for +hours, but he must have been overwhelmed had Brunswick displayed the +energy of the Austrian chief at Marengo; and in that event the two +Prussian armies would have successfully effected their retreat to the +Elbe. Brunswick, however, and most of the Prussian leaders, fell, and +in a fatal hour the wretched advice was given to retire, and seek the +support of Hohenlohe’s army, known to be making a stand at Jena. Within +two or three hours the wrecks of that perishing force became entangled +with the troops of Auerstadt; the contagion of demoralisation and +panic spread, and the two armies broke up in headlong flight, ravaged +and never let to rest by the French cavalry. Once more Napoleon gave +proof of his skill in pursuit, and on this occasion with extraordinary +results. The Prussian army had no reserves; the beaten force was +completely scattered, and made for the course of the Lower Elbe, and +the French Emperor, seizing the chord of the arc, forced it, in masses +of shattered fragments, northwards, and cut off five-sixths of it from +all possible retreat. Within a few days the conqueror had entered +Berlin; some 20,000 fugitives were the sole relics of a fine army of +150,000 men; these were driven into the wastes of the Lower Vistula, +and the military power of Prussia was destroyed. Terrible scenes of +weakness and despair followed; great fortresses opened their gates to +hussars, and the monarchy of the chief of Leuthen toppled down in ruin. +One of the last divisions that surrendered was that of Blücher, a rude +soldier brought up in the school of Frederick, and destined to win a +name in history. + +The campaign of Jena, it has been remarked, bears a singular +resemblance to that of 1870, in which, however, victory passed from +Gaul to Teuton. In both instances there was the same arrogance and +precipitate haste on the defeated side; in both the same hesitation +followed by panic; in both the same superiority of force, generalship, +of all, in short, that secures success in war on the side of the +triumphant conquerors; in both the same utter collapse of a great +military State. Prussia, however, unlike France, made no national +effort to struggle out from under the heel of the victor. There was no +siege of Berlin like that of Paris; no Prussian Chanzy made his powers +manifest; no Prussian Gambetta refused to despair of his country, or +organized a resistance, misdirected no doubt, but not the less heroic +and even formidable. In this campaign, I have said, the strategic gifts +of the Emperor are not so strikingly seen as in others which I have +tried to sketch. The plan of debouching into the valleys of the Saale +and the Elster from the edge of the forest, though certainly the best, +would have probably occurred to a general of the second rank; and, +as a matter of fact, it occurred to Jomini, then a young officer in +the Imperial Service. In the operations, moreover, that led to Jena, +Napoleon made more than one real mistake; he lost time in preparing to +fight near Gera and Auma. He was convinced that he was dealing with the +main Prussian army at Jena. He ordered Davoust to advance beyond the +pass of Kosen, and to close on the enemy, upon the false assumption +that the force of Brunswick was not very great; and owing to these +misconceptions, he so placed his army on the scene of the two battles +that Davoust escaped a complete defeat by a chance only--a result that +would have caused the failure of the campaign. Most probably Bernadotte +was to blame for not joining his brother Marshal, and averting a +blow that might have been disastrous; but Napoleon’s orders to go to +Dornburg seem clear, and, in any case, as General-in-Chief, he is +mainly accountable for a decided error. Yet the true student of war +will not think the less of the Emperor for mistakes such as these. The +greatest commanders must make mistakes, for they must act at once on +imperfect knowledge; and the aphorism of Turenne is the simple truth, +“He is the best general whose mistakes are the fewest.”[12] For the +rest, in the campaign of 1806, Napoleon’s general conceptions were, as +always, masterly. It is not surprising that he could not believe in +the precipitate flight of a most renowned army; and his arrangements +in the actual contest at Jena were those of a captain of the highest +order; though he was so superior in force, they have little interest. +What is to be chiefly dwelt on in this campaign is its illustration +of the wonderful powers of Napoleon in destroying a retreating enemy. +Many a chief would have followed the Prussians to the Elbe; the +Emperor completely cut off their retreat, forced them into nooks and +corners where they could not escape, and compelled the great body of +them to lay down their arms. Napier was, perhaps, thinking of this +great achievement when he compares Napoleon’s battle to the “wave that +effaces the landscape.” + +Napoleon, after the subjugation of Prussia, came into conflict with a +more distant enemy. Alexander, the future head of the Holy Alliance, +half French in ideas, but at heart a despot, had undertaken again to +defend Old Europe; and notwithstanding the experience of Austerlitz, +had solemnly vowed to avenge Prussia. His armies, however, moving +slowly through the immense spaces of the Russian Empire, were unable +to avert the ruin of Jena, or to prevent the fall of the Prussian +Monarchy; it was November before they reached the Niemen, and they had +not approached the Vistula for some time afterwards. The conqueror, +who, in the intoxication of success, had launched against England +the well-known Decree which declared her excluded from commerce with +Europe, and established the famous Continental system, resolved to +march against the new foe, and to strike down the Russians in the +wilds of Poland. He made preparations, in Berlin, for a great winter +campaign; and, looking behind and before, he left nothing undone to +gain opinion in France, to make his military power irresistible on the +theatre of war, and to secure a fresh base for an offensive movement. +His arrangements were far-sighted and masterly; for there is no wilder +mistake than to suppose that Napoleon, though his imagination at times +overcame his judgment, was not always the most profound and capable, as +well as the boldest, of strategists. Magnificent public works enchanted +Paris; rewards were lavished upon the Grand Army; and France, ever +liable to be carried away by “glory,” was, so to speak, entranced in +dreams of Imperial grandeur. Meanwhile thousands of levies were called +to join the eagles; the fatal system of anticipating the conscription +began; vast bodies of troops were sent from the Confederation of the +Rhine, from Italy, from Holland, and even from Spain; and these were +stationed at intervals along the space extending from the Rhine to the +Elbe and the Oder. Nor did the Emperor omit precautions to provide for +these immense masses; the granaries of Germany were made to furnish +supplies; the French cavalry were remounted in regiments from the +establishments of the troopers of Seidlitz; and enormous magazines were +prepared to support the hosts of Western Europe, in their march to the +East. Napoleon, too, cast a scrutinizing eye on possible enemies and +possible allies; he arrayed an army in Italy to observe Austria; and he +tried to cajole the Sultan into attacking the Czar. + +Towards the close of November, the Grand Army, extending from the Meuse +and the Rhine to beyond the Oder, had reached the great strength of +300,000 men; and Napoleon expected a speedy triumph. Yet that vast host +was already different from the soldiers of Austerlitz and of Boulogne, +it was a “_colluvies gentium_,” in the historian’s words; it was +crowded with young levies and half false auxiliaries; and the wand of +the magician, so to speak, had changed in his hands. As yet, however, +these elements of decline were not perceptible to any large extent; the +warriors of Jena formed the first line; and the front of the Grand Army +was moved to the Vistula, strong detachments being made to protect its +flanks, and to subdue the fortresses Prussia still held in Silesia. +Napoleon had reached Posen by the end of November; his troops had soon +covered the plains of Poland; and when he attained the scenes of the +famous Partition, the Poles greeted him as the coming liberator of +their race. The Emperor, however, true to a nature to which popular +stirrings were simply abhorrent, put off his suppliants with fair +speeches; he enrolled the Poles in his ranks by thousands; but he never +sought to make them an independent people. Irresistible in strength, +as he believed himself to be, he had no wish to exasperate Austria, +one of the partners in the destruction of Poland; and hard statecraft +concurred with instinct in causing him to adopt a purely selfish +policy. As yet, however, all went well; the Grand Army, probably +130,000 strong, held the line of the Vistula, and filled the tract +between Thorn and Warsaw by the second week of December; the remains of +the Prussian forces, and two Russian armies which had approached the +river fell back at all points; and the formidable barrier of the great +stream of Poland, held on both banks, was completely mastered. + +The position of the enemy on the theatre of war now invited one +of Napoleon’s strokes. The hostile armies were widely apart, and +disseminated upon a vast semi-circle; Lestocq, with the relics of Jena, +about 20,000 strong, holding a line from Soldau to the Lower Vistula; +Beningsen, a Russian chief, with perhaps 50,000 men, being in the angle +where the Narew and the Wkra meet before they merge in the Vistula’s +waters; Buxhöwden, with probably 40,000, being far in the rear around +Ostrolenka, in the country about the Upper Narew. The Grand Army, +between Thorn and Warsaw, was in possession, therefore, of all the +shorter lines on the field of manœuvre against its foes; and Bernadotte +and Ney, on the left, were directed to attack and overwhelm Lestocq, +while the corps of Augereau, of Lannes, of Davoust, and the Guard, +with Soult in the rear, were to fall on Beningsen, to cut him off from +Buxhöwden, and to drive the two armies into the deserts between the +Bug and the Narew. The project was worthy of its renowned author; and +the Grand Army began the movement from the Vistula in the last days of +December. Napoleon, however, for the first time, found the forces of +Nature and the state of the theatre arrayed against his rapid offensive +strategy; and his conception was not even nearly realised. The region +traversed was one of morasses and woods; there were scarcely any +supplies to be found on the spot; the French soldiery, living on +magazines from the rear, and sinking in expanses of swamp, were hardly +able to march; and the cavalry could not ascertain the movements +of the enemy behind whole leagues of forest. Comparative failure +was the result; the allied armies effected their retreat; Lestocq +eluded Ney and Bernadotte; Beningsen, who had encountered Lannes at +Pultusk, and Davoust at Golymin, without a defeat--the corps of the +Marshals had been misdirected, for it was impossible to reconnoitre +the country--contrived to join Buxhöwden, though with great loss; and +the converging armies found rest for some days on the vast and lonely +plains of Eastern Poland. Napoleon, baffled, returned to the Vistula +and placed the Grand Army in winter quarters extending from Warsaw +almost to the coast; and his forces were spread on an immense line, +for it was difficult in the extreme to find supplies, and there was no +apprehension of possible danger. + +Beningsen, however--he had been placed in supreme command--elated at +what he deemed success, resolved to assume a bold offensive; he defiled +between the long screen of forest and lakes, which divides the Narew +from the Passarge; and he all but reached the corps of Bernadotte and +Ney, a nearly isolated wing of the hostile army. Napoleon prepared a +decisive counter-stroke; he ordered Bernadotte and Ney to fall back, +with the view of luring the enemy on; and he directed the other corps +of the Grand Army to close on the rear of the Russian chief, when +fully committed to the forward movement. It was a design worthy of the +chief of Austerlitz; but Beningsen found it out through an intercepted +despatch, and he instantly fell back from the Passarge to the Alle, +in the hope of escaping his terrible enemy. Napoleon pursued with his +accustomed energy; the vast plains, hardened by the frosts of the +North, enabled his troops to move more rapidly; and he came up with +his adversary, in position, round Eylau, where Beningsen, urged by +his army, had consented to stand. The battle was fought on the 8th of +February 1807; it was one of the most sanguinary of the wars of that +age, and in the result it was a mere Pyrrhic victory. Each army was +about 80,000 strong; but the Russians had many more guns; and this told +heavily on the lines of the French, for Napoleon delayed his attack for +some hours in order to allow his supports to come up. It is unnecessary +to retrace the scenes of a conflict unmarked by peculiar tactical skill +and notable chiefly for the stubborn constancy shown by the Muscovite +soldier on many a field. The centre of the French, attacked in a +tempest of snow, was shattered, and well nigh pierced through: a charge +of Murat, and all his horsemen failed against the tenacious Russian +infantry; the arrival on the scene of Davoust and Lestocq made the +issue at several moments doubtful; but the scale was ultimately turned +by Ney, who had hastened to the spot, by a forced march. The Russians, +scarcely defeated, only just fell back; and Napoleon had suffered too +much to move. + +The carnage of Eylau on both sides was terrible; the corps of Augereau +was nearly destroyed; and the Russians, packed in dense masses, had +suffered frightfully from the continuous fire of the French artillery. +But of the two conflicting hosts, the Grand Army was certainly the one +most exposed to peril; the Russians were almost on their own ground; +it was far from its base, with Germany in its rear, and its position +for a time became extremely critical. Napoleon’s triumphs, in fact, +had been so unbroken, that he was deemed vanquished even in a drawn +battle; a thrill of alarm and anxiety ran through France, and the +humbled Continent was stirred to its depths. Had Beningsen possessed +the gifts of Frederick, he would, at this juncture, have resumed the +offensive; in that event, Napoleon must have retreated to the Vistula, +at least, perhaps to the Oder; Austria, in all probability, would have +taken the field; and the great Teutonic rising of 1813 might have been +witnessed in 1807. But the Russian chief, though a capable man, was +not a commander of the foremost rank; he had suffered immense loss, +and he retired behind the Alle in order to place his army in winter +quarters, confessing defeat by this retrograde movement. Indomitable +constancy, we shall see hereafter, was not one of Napoleon’s +distinctive qualities, but he perfectly knew what a prodigious effect +an imposing attitude has on mankind, and would necessarily have in +the present state of Europe; and his conduct was that of a consummate +warrior. In order to convince a doubting world that Eylau had been +a French victory, he moved his army forward a little distance, and +instead of falling back on the line of the Vistula, he ostentatiously +placed every corps at hand in cantonments behind the course of the +Passarge, braving a northern winter on the very verge of Russia. +Meanwhile, he applied himself, with that amazing energy, that mastery +of detail, that administrative power, for which he has perhaps had no +equal, to reinforce and secure the Grand Army; to establish it firmly +in its present position; and to make his military ascendency supreme. +Two fresh levies of conscripts were made; his vassal kings, and still +submissive Allies, were compelled to furnish more contingents to the +theatre of war, and to comply with enormous demands for supplies; the +forces required to hold Austria in check and to keep Prussia down +were largely increased; Masséna was summoned with his corps from +Italy to strengthen the front of the Grand Army; and Mortier, Duke +of Treviso, another marshal, was sent with a considerable detachment +to the Pomeranian seaboard, in order to guard against a descent from +Stralsund on the communications and flank of the Imperial hosts +expected to be made by a British force. Concurrently, a corps under +Marshal Lefebvre was moved to undertake the siege of Danzig, a place of +capital importance still held by Prussia; the sieges of the Silesian +strongholds were pressed, and an alliance at last was made with the +Sultan, who even proclaimed war against the Russian Empire. Months were +spent in making their last preparations, at Osterode, near the banks of +the Passarge; and Napoleon’s correspondence alone can give the student +of war an adequate notion of the prodigious ability of their great +author. + +The Emperor’s exertions were completely successful; the Nemesis of +conquest had not yet drawn near; and by the spring of 1807 his military +power was established on broader foundations than ever; and he was +ready to take the field with most imposing forces. By this time Eylau +was a mere recollection; the Continent had relapsed into bondage; and +the Imperial armies, filled with bad elements as they were, reached +the enormous number of half a million of men, spread from Champagne +to the limits of Eastern Prussia. Meanwhile, no attack had been made +from Stralsund; Danzig had fallen with the Silesian fortresses; the +Porte had compelled Duckworth to leave the Dardanelles; the Turk was +in arms against the Czar; and the cause of old Europe seemed once +more desperate. With both his flanks covered, and his base secure, +Napoleon had 160,000 men in perfect order upon the Passarge, ready to +take the offensive at the first moment when the growth of vegetation +would supply the means of subsistence to his thousands of horses. Yet +such is the waste and strain of war that, even at this time, 60,000 +men were missing from the rolls of the Grand Army, and spread along +its rear, living on plunder and straggling; and this, notwithstanding +the astonishing efforts of Napoleon throughout the whole winter. In +fact, railways being as yet unknown, the means of transport were still +imperfect, and the admirable arrangements by which the German armies +of the present day are moved and supplied were impossible, especially +along an enormous line. + +The success of the Czar in reinforcing his armies had been trifling +compared with that of Napoleon; and England, as we have seen, had made +no diversion. The Russian Guards were despatched from St. Petersburg, +and troops were in march from other parts of the Empire; but Beningsen, +in the last days of May, had scarcely more than 120,000 men to oppose +to the Grand Army of 160,000; and this though the Russians were close +to their frontier, and the Emperor was hundreds of miles from the +Rhine. In these circumstances, the Russian chief ought to have stood +cautiously on the defensive; but he endeavoured to repeat the attempt +of the winter; and breaking up from his camps on the 5th of June, he +fell on Ney, somewhat widely detached, and on the extreme left of the +Grand Army. Ney, however, a tactician of real skill, held the enemy +in check, and slowly fell back; Napoleon tried a counter-attack once +more; and he marched against Beningsen, from the Passarge, in the hope +of gathering on his flank and rear. The Russian contrived to effect +his escape; a great entrenched camp which, after the fashion of Daun, +he had fortified, arrested the onset of the French; and he reached +the Alle and began to retreat along the right or eastern bank of the +river, in the hope, apparently, of reaching Königsberg, where immense +supplies had been stored for his army. The Emperor followed along the +western bank, his object, too, being to attain Königsberg; and his +foremost corps came abreast of the Russians, the rest of the Grand Army +being somewhat divided, and a considerable part being in the rear. +This state of affairs encouraged Beningsen, in an evil hour, to try to +attack his enemy. On the 14th of June 1807, he began to cross to the +left bank of the Alle, at daybreak, with more than half his army; and +by mid-day he had assailed the corps of Lannes, for the moment isolated +and in advance. The French marshal, however, made a determined stand; +in a short time Mortier, the Guard, the chief part of the cavalry, and +Napoleon, had arrived on the scene, and the corps of Bernadotte and Ney +soon made their appearance. + +Napoleon seized the position of affairs at a glance, and made +everything ready to destroy an enemy who had recklessly offered battle +with a great stream in his rear. With complete mastery of the grander +part of tactics, he commanded Lannes and Mortier to fall back, in order +to draw Beningsen some distance forward; and Ney and Victor, another +marshal, in temporary command of Bernadotte’s troops, were directed to +seize the bridges thrown across the river not far from the little town +of Friedland by Beningsen, and to cut off his retreat. This admirable +stroke completely succeeded; and apart from the fact that Napoleon’s +forces were by this time greatly superior in numbers, the defeat of the +Russians had been rendered certain. Beningsen fell imprudently into the +snare; Lannes and Mortier seemed to yield to the Russian masses; and +when these had advanced too far to escape, Ney, covering his attack +with a tremendous fire, and his colleague made the decisive movement. +The bridges were taken and destroyed after a stout resistance; and the +Russians were forced back against a deep river, hemmed in, captured, +and drowned in multitudes. A fragment only of the army got across the +Alle; and Beningsen fled to the line of the Niemen, followed by his +indefatigable and pitiless foe. The Grand Army halted on the Muscovite +frontier; the Czar had no choice but to seek an armistice; and the +French eagles which had flown from the Channel, overshadowing Germany +in their ravening flight, closed their Imperial wings on the edge of +Old Europe. Troops of Tartars and Kalmucks armed with bows and arrows, +and scattered along the banks of the Niemen, in the vain hope of +arresting Fate, attested the exhaustion of the Russian Empire. + +The twofold campaign of Eylau and Friedland does not exhibit in its +highest aspects Napoleon’s marvellous genius in the field. His project +of attacking the Allied armies on the Wkra and Narew, at the close +of 1806, undoubtedly was worthy of a great strategist; and his plan +of falling back to draw Beningsen, and of doubling on him when he +marched from the Passarge, reveals once more his pre-eminent gift of +stratagem. The stroke delivered at Friedland, decisive and splendid, +was that, too, of a master of tactics in their highest sense; the +vulnerable side of the enemy was at once detected; and his position +on the battle-field was made to cause his ruin. Still, the strategy +of the Emperor in this contest comparatively failed in more than one +instance; the extension of his cantonments--this was due, I repeat to +the extreme difficulty of supporting his army--exposed him to attacks +of a formidable kind; and he barely escaped defeat at Eylau. The most +conspicuous proof this campaign affords of his military capacity is +his steadfast attitude amidst a host of enemies, when beyond the +Vistula, and his administrative triumph in restoring his army; these +are examples of powers of different kinds, but alike indicate supreme +ability. The chief lesson of this campaign, however, is that even +Napoleon’s wonderful gifts could not overcome impassable obstacles; +his grand offensive strategy hardly succeeded, because the conditions +forbade success; his brilliant manœuvres missed their mark, because his +troops could not live in Poland as they had lived in the fertile plains +of Italy, and could not move rapidly in wastes of swamp; the Phaeton +of war found himself opposed by the forces of Nature and well nigh +succumbed. + +The end, nevertheless, was as yet distant; and Fortune raised her +favourite to a still more dazzling eminence. Napoleon had felt, during +recent events, that prodigious as his military power was, he was +isolated in a hostile or unfaithful Europe, and he resolved to turn +to account his recent victory by endeavouring to make his humbled +adversary a permanent ally of the French Empire. To attain this end +he had two great advantages, the ascendency of astonishing success, +and a power of subjugating men which seemed like magic; and Alexander, +indeed, wounded to the quick by the conduct of England in the affair +of Stralsund, was ready to yield to England’s deadly enemy. In the +presence of their armies on either bank, the two Sovereigns met on +a raft on the Niemen; the town of Tilsit was chosen as the seat of +the conferences which immediately followed; and the fascinations of +Napoleon had soon won over the young Czar to alliance, and even to +friendship. All that passed in these interviews is still unknown, +but the Revolutionary Monarch and the half Oriental despot agreed to +re-model the map of Europe, and formed plans of the most far-reaching +ambition. Each declared England the common enemy; and Alexander +consented, at Napoleon’s instance, to adopt the Imperial Continental +system, to close the ports of Russia to British commerce, to summon +England to make peace at once, and, should she refuse, to array against +her the navies of every state in Europe, invited or compelled to obey +the mandate. Meanwhile, Sweden was to be despoiled of Finland; the +never-changing ambition of the Czars was to be gratified by great +Turkish provinces; Constantinople was talked of as a prey; and a +Russian advance to the Indus, it is believed, was discussed. In return +for these immense concessions to a defeated enemy, Napoleon obtained +the recognition of the French Empire, and of the order of things he +had set up in Europe; the Czar pledged himself to make common cause +with his ally in his contest with England; and Alexander perhaps agreed +to the conquest of Spain. To complete the new arrangement of the +European world, in the interest of the Lords of the West and the East, +Prussia was to lose nearly half her territory, and to be reduced to a +second-rate power. Napoleon announced that he would have gone farther +but for his regard for his Imperial friend. Saxony was to be made a +counterpoise to her old rival in Germany, as a mere French dependency; +and the craving of the Poles for national life was to be appeased by +the mock creation of a Grand Duchy of Warsaw for the House of Saxony. + +I cannot dwell on the policy of Tilsit, unequivocally condemned by all +writers. It was a conspicuous instance of the extravagance sometimes +shown by Napoleon, even in war, but often in the less familiar sphere +of politics. It was a mistake to challenge England, the ruler of the +seas, and the treasurer of Europe, to prolong a contest in which, after +Trafalgar, she could not be invaded; and the Continental system was a +chimera of force more injurious to French than to British interests. It +was a mistake to reverse the policy of France for centuries, to abandon +Sweden, and to betray the Turks, especially when these had become her +allies; and it was idle to suppose that the fiat of a Czar would add to +the stability of the French Empire. It was a mistake, too, of the worst +kind to trample on the State and the people of Frederick; and it was an +insult to the Poles to put the nation off with the phantom of a Grand +Duchy of Warsaw. But the greatest mistake of all was to give a free +rein to the ambitious impulses of two despots; to place the Partition +of Europe at the will of two men essentially opposed in nature and +interests; to suppose that the rulers of France and Russia could ever +join in a lasting alliance. General war, the shifting of the boundaries +of States, the destruction for a time of the European system, and +implacable international passions and hate, were the inevitable +results of this scheme of rapine; and beside that it had no element of +strength and endurance, it was certain to lead to a rupture between its +authors. In this unnatural arrangement we see no trace of the genius of +Richelieu, of Cavour, of Bismarck; it was a mere ephemeral product of +force, in opposition to the nature of things, and simply impossible to +become permanent. This, however, was not perceived by the conqueror, +covered with the adulation of France and the Continent; and Napoleon +at this moment might, indeed, imagine that his power was beyond the +perils of Fortune. + +A word on the state of Napoleon’s Empire, at this time at the height +of its greatness, though its borders were to be still extended. France +had long ago reached what the national instinct had pointed to as +her natural limits; she was bounded by the Rhine, the Alps, and the +Pyrenees; but girdled all round by dependent States, and supreme in +Italy and in fully half of Germany, she was really the mistress of +Continental Europe. Nor was this immense dominion the mere spoil of +conquest; the vigorous and able rule of Napoleon had done wonders +for old France, and had conferred the greatest benefits on her new +possessions; and the institutions he founded still flourish far beyond +the Rhine, and even along the Danube. The prosperity of the Empire +was growing and splendid; the continuance of order and the collapse +of anarchy had given free play to the energetic interests which the +Revolution had called into being; nay, the tributary States had, to +a great extent, been renovated by the hand of Napoleon. The creative +genius of the Emperor, too, had accomplished marvels in administration +and finance, and had completed fine monuments of material grandeur; +magnificent roads overcame the Alps, and connected the Atlantic with +the Mediterranean shores; and Paris, rich with treasures of art from +all lands, and crowded with new and imposing structures, put on the +aspect of Imperial Rome, and gathered into her lap the fairest spoils +of conquest. Military power, besides, invincible as yet, and the glory +of years of triumphs in war, protected this fabric of far-spread +dominion; the ruling race still prevailed in the Grand Army; its +commanders, lavishly rewarded, were docile instruments of a chief still +in the flower of his age; and the flaws and defects in it were not yet +conspicuous. Nevertheless, even now, one or two deep thinkers, amidst +the terror and submission of three-fourths of Europe, had declared +that the Empire could not be lasting. With its vassal Bonapartes, its +enormous extent, its sway over subdued but mighty races, its mediæval +pomp, its _parvenu noblesse_, its violence, and its despotism +of the sword, it was an anachronism in the nineteenth century; its +grandeur and even its beneficence could not hide its oppression; it +was established among a people prone to change, and demoralized by +Revolutionary passions; and, in antagonism to all moral and social +forces, it depended on a single life and a conqueror’s genius. Greater +as it was, too, than the monarchy of Louis XIV., it was shut out from +the sea by England, a source of weakness and peril to a maritime State; +and it had no foundations in the organic structure, the history, or the +traditions of the French people. Most ominous of all, the Empire seemed +to destroy intellect and public worth in France: it was barren of great +men of letters, and of great citizens; it produced only soldiers and a +servile herd of functionaries. + +I pass over the immediate results of Tilsit, the oppression of every +small neutral Power, Copenhagen, the invasion of Finland, and the +dissensions which, following the friendship pledged on the Niemen, were +left unappeased by the meeting at Erfurt of the two potentates already +distrusting each other. Napoleon soon began to repent of the promises +he had made to Alexander respecting the Turks; but he continued to use +the Russian alliance, unstable as it was, for his grasping ambition. +The Czar, I have said, perhaps consented that his conqueror should +work his will on Spain; and before the Grand Army had nearly returned +to France, Napoleon had begun to make preparations to annex the whole +of the Iberian Peninsula. A quarrel was forced on Portugal, on the +pretence that she was evading the Continental system, and would not +exclude English trade from her ports; and Junot, Duke of Abrantes in +the Napoleonic peerage, was sent with an army of conscripts, at the +close of 1807, from the Pyreneean frontier, to occupy Lisbon. The +fate of Spain had been already settled; that Monarchy had, for many +years, been almost an abject vassal of France; it had given her ships, +soldiers, and a noble colony; and it had sacrificed a navy in her cause +at Trafalgar. But the fiat had gone forth that the House of Bonaparte +should replace the House of Bourbon on the throne of Charles V. Junot +was ordered to “observe” the Spanish fortresses; and large bodies +of French troops were gradually moved towards the borders of Spain, +from the Loire and the Garonne. I cannot dwell on the Machiavellian +statecraft which brought about the invasion that followed, on Aranjuez, +and the plot of Bayonne. The dotard Charles fell into the arms of the +tempter; the rights of Ferdinand his son were set aside with contempt, +and Joseph, a brother of Napoleon, put off the Crown of Naples to +assume that of Spain and the Indies. + +The Emperor, however, might have recollected what the character is of +that strange people, which has more than once baffled the greatest +warriors, amidst the ranges of its hills and defiles, and has done +wonders in the defence of its cities. Spain sprang up to a man, from +the coasts of Galicia to Andalusia and the Pillars of Hercules; “Death +to the foreigner!” was the fierce national cry; local juntas were +formed in every province to direct and sustain the great movement; +levies were poured into the army by thousands; and a call to arms, like +that of France in 1793, led to an almost universal rising. Napoleon +ere long found that it was no easy task to pacify and subdue a country +like this; and his contemptuous scorn of popular passions--“the +stirrings of the _canaille_” was a common phrase of his--made +him neglect obvious precautions of war, and had soon involved his +arms in a signal disaster. When the insurrection broke out, in the +summer of 1808, he had about 120,000 men in Spain, along the main +roads between Bayonne and Burgos; and had he operated after his wonted +fashion, he could easily have conquered the northern provinces. But +in his disdain of “armed mobs,” he tried to overrun the whole country +at once; and, simply ignoring every rule of strategy, he divided his +armies into small fractions, and sent them, in flying columns, west, +east, and south. Thus employed, his forces could not perform their +task; Bessières, indeed, a marshal, the Duke of Istria, routed a +considerable army at Rio Seco; Moncey penetrated into the heart of +Valencia; and Dupont, a soldier of brilliant promise, marched into +Andalusia, sacked Cordova, and even approached Cadiz. The insurrection, +nevertheless, was everywhere; swarms of guerillas, gathering on all +points of vantage, and impossible to destroy, cut off the French by +hundreds; and Moncey and other generals found themselves checked by +armed multitudes, formidable behind ramparts. Ere long, terrible news +from the south arrived; Dupont was caught and surrounded by the chief +part of the regular army of the fallen Monarchy, in the recesses of +the Sierra Morena, and with his troops was compelled to lay down his +arms; and though possibly he might have done more than he did, he was +hemmed in by immensely superior numbers. Even worse intelligence came +from Portugal, and the French army at the mouth of the Tagus. I shall +afterwards review the career of Wellington; enough here to say that he +first set foot in Portugal in the early days of August 1808; and he +defeated Junot, who by this time, too, was isolated in the midst of a +national rising, with considerable loss to the French, at Vimeiro. The +beaten chief and his army were too glad to effect their escape from +a victorious foe, and an insurgent country, by accepting terms; and +they were ultimately embarked in British transports, and landed on the +western coast of France. By the autumn of 1808 the French armies in +Spain, humbled and baffled by a despised enemy, had evacuated almost +the whole Peninsula, and had fallen back behind the course of the Ebro. + +The indignation and amazement of the Lord of the Continent at these +untoward events, may be easily conceived. The great master of war had +been found wanting; “a French general,” he exclaimed, “had justified +Mack”; and, worst of all, his trained and disciplined troops had failed +before rude and half-armed masses. He shut Dupont up in a State prison, +and kept him immured through the rest of his reign; and how bitterly +he felt the disgrace of his arms is seen in his admirable remarks, +made at St. Helena, on the ruinous effects of capitulations in the +field. The Emperor lost no time in endeavouring to repair the injured +renown of the French army--the Czar and his ministers had secretly +rejoiced--and, in November 1808, he left the capital and invaded Spain +with an enormous force, determined, he wrote, “to put down rebellion.” +He had five corps and the Guard in his hands; the weak Spanish armies, +indulging in foolish boasts, and spread upon an immense line, extending +from Biscay to the verge of Aragon, were pierced through and scattered +like sheep; and Espinosa and Tudela were two battles that were little +better than huge butcheries. Yet these “examples,” as they were called +by the Emperor, were not attended by decisive success. Napoleon’s +manœuvres were perfectly designed; but plunged in the depths of a +hostile country, and utterly unable to procure intelligence, Soult and +Ney failed to cut off the retreat of the Spaniards, and the wrecks +of their routed forces were soon restored by insurrectionary levies +flocking in by thousands. The way to the capital was, however, open; +Napoleon mastered the Somo Sierra by a magnificent charge of his Polish +horsemen, for he scorned to make a regular attack; and he entered +Madrid, in the last days of December, at the head of a force that +defied resistance. King Joseph was now installed on his throne; but +there was no popular voice to say “God bless him”; the city was one +of silence and mourning; and though a Constitution was announced for +Spain, which abolished all kinds of old abuses and inaugurated many +real reforms, the invaders remained as detested as ever. Against the +feeble protests of his crowned dependant, Napoleon continued to rule by +terror and force; when, as 1808 was closing, his attention was directed +to a new enemy. + +After Vimeiro, the successful army, placed under the command of Sir +John Moore, had held Lisbon and been reinforced; and a fresh body of +troops, led by Sir David Baird, had landed at Corunna to assist the +Spaniards. Moore had marched northwards and joined Baird; and near +the close of December he had approached Valladolid, threatening the +communications of the French with Bayonne, and at the head of about +30,000 men. Napoleon had soon broken up from Madrid with an army +perhaps 40,000 strong; he crossed the Guadarramas by a forced march in +the hope of reaching and crushing his foe; and he directed Soult to +combine the movement so as to fall on the rear of the British force. +Moore, however, ably changing the line of his operations, made for +Corunna; the Emperor pressed his enemy in vain; and he abandoned the +pursuit in the first days of January, the attitude of Austria having +become menacing and requiring his immediate presence in France. It is +unnecessary to dwell on the events that followed; the British army +made good its retreat, though with heavy loss, through the mountainous +tracts that divide Leon from the Galician seaboard; and Soult proved +unable to to bring it to bay. Moore turned to fight at Corunna when +about to embark; he beat Soult off in a well contested action; and +though he fell, he knew that he had saved his army. He had shown great +ability in this brief campaign, remarkable for this too, that it was +one of the few occasions on which the Imperial Guard beheld British +troops, until ruin lowered on it on the field of Waterloo. + + + + + CHAPTER VI. + + NAPOLEON--(_continued_). + + +The Emperor, on his return to Paris, found a rupture with Austria +already imminent. That great Power, tenacious but always prudent, had +been forced to accept the Peace of Pressburg; but she never intended +permanently to submit to an arrangement that perilously weakened +the State. Meanwhile, she had been treated by Napoleon as a kind of +reluctant vassal; he had armed against her in 1806–7; she had been shut +out from the settlement of Tilsit, she had been compelled to accede to +the Continental system; and she was alarmed at the announced extension +of Russia along the verge of her Eastern provinces. She had gradually +been increasing her forces for war; a great national militia--a strange +institution in the realms of the Hapsburgs--had been created; her +armies had been remodelled on the French system, and had adopted the +French tactics; she had accepted large subsidies from the British +Government; and Stadion, a patriot, and a deadly enemy of France, had +for some time been her First Minister. The diversion of a large part +of the Grand Army from the Rhine, and the successive disasters in +Spain and Portugal, afforded her the opportunity she sought; and she +had made great preparations for a fresh struggle with France, during +the events of 1808 in Spain. Napoleon, unwilling to have two wars on +his hands, tried to induce the Czar to enforce peace, by intervening +in arms in Galicia; but Alexander eluded the demand; and, though he +pretended to threaten Austria, and even sent an army to her eastern +frontier, intended ultimately, perhaps, to act against the French, he +really maintained a strict neutrality. The French Emperor concealed +his resentment; and instantly made ready “to punish Austria” for what +he called “her perjured and shameless conduct.” His administrative +faculties were again taxed to the utmost to attain his great ends; but, +as in 1807, they proved adequate. + +A considerable part of the Grand Army was recalled from Spain, and +moved to the Rhine; the French garrisons which had occupied the +Prussian fortresses were replaced by Poles, and restored to their +colours; and Italy and the Confederation of the Rhine were again +directed to yield their auxiliaries. Meanwhile conscripts were +enrolled in thousands; a levy was made from past conscriptions which +produced numbers of adult men; ingenious devices were tried to obtain +a much needed supply of inferior officers; and though the finances +of France were strained, the _matériel_ for a great war was +rapidly increased, and directed to the Rhine and thence towards the +Danube. By the early spring of 1809, Napoleon had more than 400,000 +men on foot; but the Grand Army too much resembled that which had +been drawn together in 1807; though it had a great advantage in two +respects, it was not summoned to fight on the verge of the Continent, +and its inherent defects were not so apparent; and the Bavarians, who +filled a large space in its ranks, had been for centuries foes of the +Austrians. Yet Austria had had the start of Napoleon, notwithstanding +his genius and his vast resources; she was ready to strike with effect +before him; and had she struck at the end of March 1809 she might +have achieved important success. She had learned a lesson from 1800 +and 1805; and her forces were now arrayed on the theatre of the war +at hand with a due regard to strategy. Her main army, nearly 200,000 +strong, and under the command of the Archduke Charles, was in Bohemia, +approaching the Danube, and obsering Bavaria, known to be hostile; a +considerable force, under the Archduke John, was in the Tyrol--lost +through Austerlitz, but always loyal to the House of Hapsburg--and was +ready to make a descent on Italy; and detachments were on the frontiers +to watch the Poles and the Russians--these last were not really +feared--and to observe Istria and Dalmatia, now Italian provinces. +The Archduke Charles, therefore, was in formidable strength on what +was the principal scene of action; and the forces of Napoleon were +still much weaker, being not more than about 100,000 men, the corps of +Davoust, advanced to Ratisbon, and the Bavarians holding the course of +the Isar. The rest of the Grand Army was as yet on the Rhine, or only +near the extreme heads of the Danube; and the Archduke had an immense +opportunity. For the rest, the Emperor had assembled a large army to +defend Italy, and had given it to Eugene, son of the Empress Josephine; +but this was only a secondary force; the valley of the Danube was the +decisive point in the operations about to begin. + +Napoleon was fully aware of the danger; and at this very time he +gave positive orders that, should the Austrians take the offensive, +Davoust and the Bavarians should fall back on Donauwörth, and wait +the arrival of reinforcements. These injunctions, however, were not +complied with; even now the reason is not known--the two exposed corps +retained their positions; and had the Archduke advanced from Bohemia, +he must have taken Ratisbon and overwhelmed Davoust. But he hesitated, +and lost precious days; and at last, listening to feeble counsels--at +heart he was not convinced by them--he broke up from his camps, made a +circuitous march, crossed the Danube at Lintz, and arrived on the Inn, +the ordinary line of Austrian attacks on Bavaria. He was on the Isar by +the 15th of April, at the head of about 140,000 men; he had left 40,000 +behind in Bohemia; and he forced the passage in three great masses, the +Bavarians falling back, and drawing towards the Danube, midway between +Ingoldstadt and Ratisbon. Had the Archduke collected his forces and +moved rapidly, he should have still crushed Davoust, as yet, “in the +air,” and in great peril; but he kept them apart on distant lines, and +he actually detached his right wing towards Ratisbon, in the belief, +it would seem, that his Bohemian corps would join him there and cut +off Davoust. By this time, the 18th of April, Napoleon, who had left +the capital five days before, had reached Ingoldstadt upon the Danube; +and the situation of affairs was such that the ablest commander might +have felt alarm. Davoust was still at Ratisbon with 60,000 men; the +Bavarians and other German auxiliaries were around Neustadt, perhaps +50,000 strong; and a part of the corps of Lannes, in the temporary +command of Oudinot, afterwards Duke of Reggio, was with that of Masséna +in march from Augsburg, both numbering perhaps 50,000 soldiers. The +hostile armies were thus nearly equal in force; but that of the +Archduke, although divided at greater distances than it ought to have +been, was far more concentrated than the French army, which had been +almost surprised and was still out-generalled. + +In this difficult position the situation was changed in an incredibly +short time by Napoleon’s skill and, it must be added, by the Archduke’s +blunders. Davoust was drawn in from Ratisbon towards the German corps; +this was a flank march with an enemy at hand, but it led only to slight +combats, and was not seriously checked or molested;[13] and Masséna and +Oudinot were pushed forward with extreme velocity to Pfaffenhoffen, +to threaten the Austrian left which, in its march from the Isar, was +round Mainburg, not far from the Danube. These movements were executed +by the 19th; and thus Napoleon’s army was well drawn together, its +right gathering on the enemy’s flank, while that of the Archduke +remained still scattered. The operations that followed recalled the +exploits of the youthful chief of the army of Italy. On the 20th, the +Emperor attacked the Austrian centre, now separated from the right near +Ratisbon, with part of the corps of Davoust and the German contingents; +he remained with the Germans during the battle--a marked instance +of military tact--and he defeated the enemy with heavy loss near +Abensberg. Meanwhile Oudinot and Masséna had reached the Austrian left, +and had forced it back in retreat towards the Isar; and this, with the +success at Abensberg, led to a complete triumph. Napoleon, leaving a +large detachment to keep back the Archduke, bore down on the retiring +enemy; and, joining Masséna, drove the Austrian left across the Isar, +utterly beaten, and pursued to the Isar by a great mass of cavalry. The +Emperor next turned against his remaining foes; the Archduke drew +in his right on his centre, and endeavoured to stand on the 22nd; but +he was struck down at Eckmühl by superior forces; and with difficulty +effected his escape on Ratisbon. By this time his lieutenant, +Bellegarde, had reached the place with the Bohemian force, but farther +resistance had become impossible; and the Archduke, with the remains +of the principal army, was compelled to cross to the northern bank of +the Danube. The shattered left wing was on the southern bank; and thus +the great army which had crossed the Isar a few days before with every +prospect of success had been cut in two, and was in eccentric retreat, +divided by a broad and impassable river. + + [Illustration: Theatre of the + + CAMPAIGN + + of 1809.] + + [Illustration: The Field of + + WAGRAM] + +This splendid success on the principal scene effaced the results of +French reverses on secondary parts of the theatre of war. Eugene +Beauharnais had been defeated at Sacile, and driven behind the line +of the Adige; the Tyrolese had broken out in revolt, and an Austrian +army had entered Warsaw, and overrun the adjoining region. But Napoleon +held the course of the Danube; the way to Vienna was thrown open; and +victory at the decisive point made him master of the situation for the +time. He was soon joined by the Guard, by fresh German contingents, +by Bernadotte, and a great mass of cavalry; and, having detached +Lefebvre to subdue the Tyrol, he began his second march to the Austrian +capital. The operations were not so easy and rapid as they had been +in 1805. Davoust was sent to the northern bank of the Danube, to +observe the movements of the Archduke Charles; the defeated left wing, +under the Archduke Louis, fought a desperate action against Masséna +in pursuit; it crossed the Danube by the last bridge near Krems; and +though Napoleon mastered the line of the stream, and covered his +communications with large detachments, the two Archdukes effected their +junction, and ere long had reached the great plain of the Marchfield, +which stretches down to the northern front of Vienna. The Emperor +entered the city on the 11th of May, and as he had probably 100,000 +men, and the Archdukes had barely 80,000, he resolved to cross to the +northern bank of the Danube, to overwhelm his much weaker enemy, and to +finish the war in one decisive battle. But how was a river hundreds +of yards wide, of great depth, and with a powerful current, to be +traversed by a large army under the guns of an enemy still formidable +and holding the opposite bank? Napoleon’s extraordinary skill in +choosing the ground for every operation of war was not found wanting, +and his selection of the spot for the passage was perfect. Just below +Vienna, a very large island, that will be known in history by its name +of Lobau, breaks for some miles the course of the Danube; the channel +between it and the southern bank, held by the French, is profound and +broad; but it nearly touches the northern bank, and is only divided +from the Marchfeld by a narrow channel. Napoleon, screening the work by +all possible means, threw a strong bridge over the great channel, thus +connecting Lobau with the southern bank; and as the island is of ample +size, he massed into it a large part of his army, and made preparations +to secure the passage across the narrow channel by numerous bridges. + +By the 20th of May the corps of Masséna, 30,000 strong, had debouched +from the island across these ways into the edge of the Marchfeld; and +it entrenched itself in the two villages of Aspern and Essling, its +chief assured that the greater part of the army would cross by the +morrow. The main bridge, however, over the great arm of the Danube--and +it will be borne in mind there was only one--was broken in the night by +the force of the current; and on the 21st the Archduke Charles attacked +Masséna with greatly superior forces. The villages were defended with +great skill and courage; but though the French succeeded in maintaining +their ground, thousands were very nearly forced into the river; and had +the Archduke struck home he must have been victorious. Great efforts +were made on both sides to renew the struggle the following day; Lannes +with his corps, and part of the Guard and the cavalry, effected the +passage during the night; and the Archduke called up all the reserves +at hand, to make a stroke for a complete triumph. A murderous battle +was fought on the 22nd; Lannes--he met a soldier’s death on the +field--made a formidable attack on the Austrian centre; and Masséna was +about to debouch from Essling, when the news arrived that the principal +bridge had broken down again, and had become impassable, and that +munitions were short for a prolonged contest. The advance of the French +was at once checked; their lines fell back behind Aspern and Essling, +and though they kept their hold on the bloodstained Marchfeld, they +suffered frightfully from the converging fire of the hostile batteries +arrayed against them. By the 23rd they had taken a position in Lobau; +and the army was so shattered that Napoleon’s marshals pronounced an +immediate retreat necessary. + +Napoleon peremptorily set at nought these counsels; and, maintaining +the attitude he had held at Eylau, refused to allow his army to stir +from the island. His position, however, had become critical; the long +line of his communications with the Rhine was largely guarded by mere +auxiliaries; indignant Prussia was struggling in her chains; the +secret societies, which were to rouse Germany to arms, spread from the +North Sea to the Danube; and the French had escaped a disaster by mere +accident. Yet their chief relied on his genius and the terror of his +name, as he had relied when upon the Passarge; and the event justified +his proud self-confidence. He evidently had perceived that it was a +capital mistake to have committed his army to a single bridge across +a river of the first order; and he applied himself, with accustomed +decision and skill, to make the passage of the Danube assured, and +to enable the Grand Army, whatever its size, to issue from Lobau and +command the Marchfeld. I cannot describe the admirable works--marvels +of engineering, never, perhaps, equalled--constructed under his eye, +to carry out his purpose; his _Correspondence_ remains to attest +these monuments of his gifts as a warrior. The neighbourhood of a great +city fortunately supplied the material required for his designs; in +twenty days, three great bridges--one of boats, two on piles--spanned +the main channel, and formed causeways, completely protected, and +strong enough to bear the weight of the largest masses; and the +efforts of the enemy to destroy them, by various devices, proved +quite abortive. At the same time, Lobau was made a vast entrenched +camp, armed with numerous batteries to defy attack; it was occupied +by ever-increasing forces, as the strength of the Grand Army was +raised; and preparations were made so to bridge the small channel that +it could become, so to speak, a series of highways. Meanwhile, the +Emperor strained to the utmost his faculties to bring every available +man and horse to the scene of decisive action. Eugene, who, after the +success at Ratisbon, had followed the Archduke John from Italy, and +was approaching Hungary, was called to the Danube; so was Macdonald, +another marshal, honourably known in history as Duke of Tarentum; +Marmont, Duke of Ragusa--an unhappy name--was summoned with his corps +from the Dalmatian wilds; and while the lines of communications were +firmly held, reinforcements were sent to the Grand Army from the +divisions placed higher up the Danube. By these means the Emperor had +made the passage of the river as certain as that of a plain; and he +calculated on having about 180,000 men concentrated for the grand and +final effort. + +The Archduke Charles, on the other hand, had failed to see through +Napoleon’s projects, and had not made nearly such good use of his +time, though placed in the centre of the Austrian monarchy. He seems +to have convinced himself that a great army could not issue from the +camps in Lobau, within two or even three days; and if he fortified +Aspern and Essling, he did not guard the approaches eastward, though +the island extends along these to the Marchfeld. His army, therefore, +was not prepared for an attack from Lobau, sudden and in immense force, +especially to the east of the villages; and it was spread through the +Marchfeld, some miles from the Danube, offering a vantage ground to +his terrible enemy. Nor had the Archduke, though a general-in-chief, +and having it would seem unlimited powers, strengthened his army as +much as ought to have been possible. He left a very large detachment +on the Polish frontier, where its presence could be of no avail; +and he did not insist that the Archduke John--an insubordinate and +conceited theorist--should join him with all his troops on the Danube. +The Austrian army, therefore, was certainly weaker than it might have +been on the principal point; and it had not been largely reinforced by +reserves or levies. It appears probable that it did not exceed 140,000 +or 150,000 men, a force comparatively small if we bear in mind that of +the two antagonists one was at home on the Danube, the other, far from +the Rhine. In this, as in everything else, the contrast between the +commanders opposed is most striking. + +All was in readiness by the first week of July, for the grand +operation of crossing the Danube. Thousands of troops, with all +the impedimenta of war, guns, trains, field hospitals, and a huge +_matériel_, had defiled over the great bridge; and on the night +of the 4th, 160,000, French, Saxons, Bavarians, Italians, Poles, and +auxiliaries from the petty German States--Napoleon’s concentration had +been made complete--were assembled in the entrenched camp of Lobau. +Demonstrations had been made to deceive the enemy, and to conceal +the real points of the passage; but the movement, though screened in +part by the darkness, was soon heard along the silent shores. In an +incredibly short time, not less than six bridges were thrown over the +small arm of the river; and the army began to cross to the northern +bank, covered by the fire of hundreds of guns in position. The +different divisions--the Emperor himself had arranged their march with +extraordinary care--were directed towards the expanse of the Marchfeld +east of the points of Aspern and Essling; and they scarcely encountered +any resistance, as this vast space had escaped the Archduke’s notice. +By the early morning of the 5th, 70,000 men had taken possession of +the far-spreading plain; the rest of the Grand Army followed in order, +and by the afternoon its extending masses held a long line from the +right at Glinzendorf, to the extreme left on the verge of the Danube, +the fortified posts of Aspern and Essling having been turned by this +movement and rendered useless. The Austrian army, though completely +surprised and out-manœuvred by Napoleon’s strategy--a masterpiece from +every point of view--had, by this time, advanced towards the enemy; +some skirmishes of little importance occurred; but an effort made +by Bernadotte against the Austrian centre, not far from Wagram, was +sharply repulsed. + +The hostile armies made their bivouacs in the plain, and prepared +for the great fight of the morrow. The morning of the 6th rose on +the great arrays that extended, on either side, for miles; and it +witnessed the most far-spreading battle which had yet been fought in +the civilized world. I cannot retrace the scenes of the contest; and, +indeed, they have no features of peculiar interest. The Archduke, +certainly much inferior in numbers, had resolved, with little prudence, +to attack; and his general plan was to fall on the French right, so to +force it back as to enable his brother, the Archduke John, to arrive +on the field, and simultaneously to assail the French left in great +strength, and to endeavour to cut it off from the Danube. The effort +against the right failed; for Napoleon, aware that the Archduke John +was approaching, had placed Davoust and Oudinot, with a great body of +troops, on that wing; but the attack on the left proved formidable +in the extreme. Masséna and Bernadotte were almost driven from the +field; and the young levies and auxiliaries fled in thousands. Panic +began to spread through the Grand Army--no longer the army of Jena +and Austerlitz--and had the Archduke made the most of his success, he +might, perhaps, have achieved victory. The extension, however, of both +his wings had left his centre comparatively weak; and Napoleon was not +slow to seize the occasion. He massed the whole Italian army, together +with other contingents and the Imperial Guard, and struck a terrible +blow at the vulnerable point; and the attack was preceded by such a +fire of cannon as had never before been seen in the field. The battle, +however, continued to rage; the Austrians fought with devoted courage; +the ardour of the auxiliaries was not great; and though the pressure +was taken off the Emperor’s left, and Bernadotte and Masséna regained +ground, the Archduke in the main retained his positions. His left, at +last, was forced by a well-directed attack; Davoust and Oudinot carried +the low uplands of Wagram; and the Austrian army slowly left the +field, as the Archduke John showed no signs of appearing. The retreat, +however, was not molested. The result of the day might have been +different had the Archduke had the support of his brother; the carnage +of the battle had, indeed, been terrible; but the victors captured +few guns or prisoners; and Wagram did not approach Austerlitz. Still, +Austria had made her last effort; she submitted to a humiliating +peace; and Napoleon returned in triumph to France, though he had been +made painfully aware that the Grand Army was not the instrument of war +he had at one time wielded. + +Napoleon’s genius in war shone grandly out in the memorable campaign +of 1809. The movements around Ratisbon, he has said himself, were the +most perfect of his military career; and it would be impertinence to +dispute his opinion. His army, in a position of extreme difficulty, was +extricated by a series of marches, scientific, rapid, and daring alike; +and the enemy, who had gained a marked advantage, was out-manœuvred +and completely defeated. Decision, energy, consummate skill, and +the boldness that runs risk when there is no help for it, are the +distinctive marks of these wonderful efforts; and the operations +against the Austrians, when once divided, are equal to those against +Beaulieu and Colli. The march on Vienna, though not as rapid and +decisive as in 1805, was in complete accordance with true strategy; it +was bold, and yet made thoroughly safe; and the communications with the +Rhine were made quite secure--as regards the numbers of defenders at +least--for in this respect the Emperor was never careless. After the +failure at Aspern and Essling, too, the resolution of Napoleon to hold +his ground, spite of doubting lieutenants, and a plotting Continent, +reveals the chief of supreme capacity; and the administrative powers, +the untiring energy, and the masterly art with which he drew together +every possible man to the decisive point, deserve the admiration of +all students of war. As for his choice of Lobau as the place to cross +the Danube, in the face of the enemy, it is characteristic of his all +but perfect insight; the means he employed to protect his army, and +to render the passage safe and certain, are models of conspicuous +forethought and skill; and the movement by which he turned the +position of the Archduke, caused his defences to fall, and attained +the Marchfeld, at the head of immense forces, was a most striking +exploit. Yet, in these dazzling displays of genius, one grave error +was indisputably made; the relying on a single bridge to conduct a +great army across the Danube cannot be justified; this nearly led to +a frightful disaster; and here we see, once more, that confident +arrogance and that too passionate energy which show that the faculties +of this marvellous being were not always controlled and balanced by +sound judgment. + +It should be added that these prodigies of war could not have occurred +had Napoleon had an adversary worthy to cope with him. The Archduke +Charles was a learned soldier; he had studied war, and proved more than +equal to confront men like Moreau and Jourdan; but in his operations at +Ratisbon, in his indecision at Essling, in his failure to prevent the +French from crossing the Danube, in his remissness in not collecting +his forces, in the incapacity with which he allowed his enemy to issue +in to the plain of the Marchfeld,[14] we see a commander quite of the +second order; and, in truth, like all the Continental generals,[15] +he was paralyzed by terror when before Napoleon. As for the Emperor +at Wagram, his skill in the great moves of tactics was conspicuous +in his attack on the Austrian centre when weakened by the extension +of the wings; the Archduke, too, did wrong in attacking, though he +all but routed the French left; but these are not the most striking +features of this well-contested battle. What the student of war should +specially observe is that Wagram marks a notable change in the quality +of the armies which met in conflict; a change that was to be yet more +developed. The Austrians fought with heroic courage; they were animated +by a strong national feeling, seen among them, perhaps, for the first +time; they were wholly unlike the mere soldiers who had been routed +under Beaulieu and Würmser. On the other hand, the Grand Army showed +signs of weakness; except the Bavarians, the immense contingents of the +auxiliaries were half-hearted and feeble; and the young French levies +disbanded in thousands. The Austrian tactics and the formations of the +troops, had also been extremely improved, while that of the Grand Army +had changed for the worse. Conscious of the inferiority of the men in +their hands, the French commanders had tried to make up for this by +rendering their columns of attack more large and solid; and Napoleon +had begun to adopt the system of increasing the number of guns to +support his infantry. The density of the masses formed in this way--and +the skirmishers, too, were not what they had been--made them heavy +and inefficient in the shock of battle, and exposed them when engaged +to most destructive fire; and the change in the proportion of foot to +artillery was followed by evil results to both arms. + +I cannot allude to the divorce of Josephine, the sacrifice of the +young child of the Cæsars, flung into Napoleon’s arms as a hostage +of war, and the further extension of the immense Empire which, in +its author’s eyes, grew in strength as he enlarged its limits. To +ordinary observers, the power of the Emperor seemed at its highest in +1810–1811; the Continent had succumbed to his omnipotent will; he had +annexed Rome, Holland, and the Hanse Towns without a word of protest +from the great German States; the Pope was a captive in gilded chains; +the material and moral forces of five-sixths of Europe had yielded to +that all controlling dominion. Yet the Empire was distinctly declining; +and the truth had been perceived by more than one statesman, and by +soldiers as different from each other as Blücher and Wellington. +Napoleon at this time had 800,000 men in arms, including all his +reserves for war; but the Grand Army had for some years resembled the +enfeebled army of Imperial Rome, filled with barbarians who hated her +yoke; the dominant race had ceased to be supreme in it; and unwilling +or lukewarm allies, nay, the forces of conquered and reluctant nations, +sustained the ill-cemented structure of conquest, itself an unnatural +and monstrous portent. While central and eastern Europe, too, seemed to +submit to bondage, Spain continued the struggle against her oppressor; +the ubiquitous insurrection had never ceased, and defied the efforts +of the Imperial Marshals; and the arms of Napoleon had received an +affront, and had suffered reverses which had amazed Europe. Masséna had +recoiled from Torres Vedras; a small British army, under an unknown +commander, had baffled the might of the whole French Empire, and +had triumphed upon the Douro and at Talavera; and the jealousies and +discords of Napoleon’s lieutenants had led to all kinds of untoward +events, and had wasted his forces throughout the Peninsula. There +was light at one point amidst the gloom which seemed to enshroud a +vanquished world; and though Germany--then a divided land, and wholly +unsuited to partisan warfare--had returned to quiescence after Wagram, +the growing indignation against the rule of France, which had already +made itself felt, was preparing the way for a universal rising. + +Yet the signs that the Empire was in decay were not less apparent in +France herself, the centre of that domination of the sword. The nation, +always prone to change, had begun to get tired of a despotism opposed +to “the principles of 1789”; its appetite for glory had been more than +sated; new ideas and forces growing up within it already indicated +another coming era. The power of these tendencies had been greatly +increased by the sufferings the people were now enduring, by the +severity of the Imperial rule, by the poverty and distress it had for +some time entailed on once flourishing cities and districts. Flattering +bodies of State and satellites of power might boast that France was the +Queen of Europe; but the devouring waste of the Spanish war brought +desolation to thousands of hearths; and peace, under Napoleon, appeared +impossible. The never ceasing demands of the conscription, too, +provoked general and bitter discontent; the laws on this “blood-tax” +had been made barbarous; and the extent of the burdens imposed by +the State had become, year after year, more onerous. The Continental +system, besides, the most extravagant of Napoleon’s projects, while it +led him to aim at universal conquest, enormously lessened the resources +of France; Marseilles, Bordeaux, and Havre became half deserted, and +seethed with indignation at the Imperial rule; and the Continental war +with England destroyed French commerce. In addition, the finances had +begun to decline; the frightful results of 1791–98 became apparent in +a great falling off of youths fitted to enter the army; and, in short, +despotism had done its work of exhaustion, causing general decay. +The feeling of stability and of assured greatness which had pervaded +France at the peace of Amiens had for some time been passing away; +and, a most significant fact, though a son was born to Napoleon--heir +of world-wide grandeur--this made no change in the general sentiment. +Yet the conqueror, from the heights of his splendour, did not see the +shadows of night approaching; and though the war in Spain consumed the +flower of his armies, and he had seen at Wagram what the Grand Army +was, and the condition of France had become ominous, and Europe, he +knew, was hostile to him, he committed himself to the most gigantic +enterprise which ambition has ever, perhaps, suggested. False to +his own genius, which must have shown him that Spain had become the +principal scene of action for him, he resolved to invade and subdue +Russia. + +Peace, in fact, with the great Power of the North, had, for several +years, been almost hopeless. The League of Tilsit was an impossible +compact, full of seeds of disunion and ultimate strife; and war between +France and Russia had become imminent. The Russian nobles detested the +French alliance; the trade of Russia perished under the Continental +system; the establishment of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, a kind of +pledge that Poland might again be a nation, was a direct menace to +Russian ambition; and Russia could not regard with indifference the +subjection to France of three-fourths of Germany. Alexander soon +escaped from the spell of Napoleon; he secured, indeed, the spoils +flung to him; but he bitterly resented Napoleon’s conduct in having +extended the Grand Duchy, and in refusing to promise that he would +not restore Poland; and he was indignant at the recent annexations +to France. On the other hand, the Emperor had not forgotten the +lukewarmness and, perhaps, the treachery of the Czar in the contest +of 1809; he charged him with evading the Continental system; he +pretended that he was an ally of England; he treated with scorn his +solemn protests against the addition of Holland and the Hanse Towns to +the Empire. Preparations were made on both sides for war, as early as +the autumn of 1811; Alexander abandoned the Continental system; made +overtures to England, which were received; entered into negotiations +with his Ottoman foes; and began to draw together two large armies +towards the heads of the Dwina and Dnieper--the river frontiers of old +Muscovy--there to be combined with a third army from the South, when +peace had been made with the Turks. The arrangements of Napoleon for +his gigantic enterprise were, necessarily, on a much larger scale; they +were extraordinary in extent and grandeur; and they exhibit in the very +highest degree his characteristic skill in stratagem, and his great +capacity for organizing war. One of his first objects was to gain time +to collect his enormous military means, and to advance his huge arrays, +when ready for the field, by degrees even to the Russian frontier, +without opposition on the part of the enemy; and having attained this +position of vantage, and mastered the resources of Eastern Europe, +his purpose was to pour across the Niemen such forces that to resist +would be useless. To reach these ends, he kept up a show of diplomatic +professions for months, which bewildered the Czar and made him +hesitate; and, meanwhile, he secretly and swiftly combined the forces +of Western Europe for his prodigious venture. His experiences of 1806–7 +made him perfectly aware of the difficulties of a task which no other +man would have dreamed of attempting; but he said, “My means are vast, +and I can devour obstacles”; and he addressed himself to the mighty +work with wonted perseverance and administrative power. + +His first care was to provide for the huge armies which were to march +into the wastes of Russia; and for this purpose, as in 1806–7 the +resources of Poland, of Prussia, and even of States on the Rhine, were +placed in requisition for immense supplies; bases of operation and +magazines were formed along the tract from the Elbe to the Vistula; a +system of water-carriage, admirably planned, conducted all that was +required for armed multitudes to the Vistula and the mouths of the +Niemen; and the expedition was delayed until the summer of 1812, in +order that myriads of horses should find pasture on the long march +to the Russian frontier. Meanwhile, Napoleon collected the forces he +deemed necessary for this colossal effort. Austria was now his ally, +and Prussia a vassal; and both Powers furnished contingents to the +Imperial host, which were to join as it approached the Niemen. Bavaria, +Italy, the Confederation of the Rhine, and Holland, of course, obeyed +their master and arrayed troops in immense numbers; and unhappy Poland, +deceived yet trusting, sent tens of thousands of her brilliant horsemen +to take part in a crusade which might give her freedom. France, the +dominant Power, once more saw the Grand Army collected in strength; +but Napoleon did not, in 1812, anticipate the conscription as in 1807; +he enrolled masses of levies and reserves; but he dreaded an outburst +of hostile opinion; and he tried to lessen the strain of the war on +Frenchmen. By these various expedients 600,000 men, collected from +every part of old Europe, were arrayed in arms in the spring of 1812; +and these vast masses were slowly moved to their positions between +the Rhine and the Vistula. Napoleon set off from Paris on the 1st of +May; he left France, alarmed and discontented, behind; scarcely a +cheer greeted the departing conqueror; his very Marshals disliked the +enterprise; and even his docile Ministers and mute bodies of State were +anxious and feared some great coming danger. Another sight, however, +rose before his eyes when he entered Dresden after a rapid journey; +a humbled Continent, in the person of the Head of the Hapsburgs, of +kings, princes, dominations, and powers, bowed before the Charlemagne +of a changed world; Napoleon received such homage as was never seen +since Rome hailed her ruler as a god; and the enterprise was deemed so +assured of success that it was talked of as a mere passage of arms. The +Emperor reached the Niemen in the last week of June; and by this time +the first line of the Grand Army, numbering upwards of 420,000 men, +with 70,000 cavalry, and 1,200 guns, was extended along the Russian +frontier, from the verge of the Baltic to the Galician plains. The +sight might have turned the head of a Xerxes; but to the experienced +eye of a great master of war, it ought to have been significant of evil +omens. In that enormous army there were probably not more than 100,000 +really good French troops; the rest was an assemblage of young French +levies, of Austrians and Prussians, enemies of France, of auxiliaries +who, except the Poles, had no sympathy with her cause or her chief, and +who had, for the most part, showed what they were at Wagram. + +The centre of the host, led by Napoleon, with Oudinot, Ney, Davoust, +and Murat, inferior chiefs, crossed the Niemen on the 24th of June, in +the angle, entering at Kovno, the Russian frontier; the left, composed +of the corps of Macdonald and the Prussian contingent, crossed round +Tilsit; and the right, an enormous array, comprising the army of +Eugene, Poniatowski and the Poles, for the present commanded by Jerome +Bonaparte, King of Westphalia, with his auxiliaries, the two corps +of St. Cyr and Junot, and far away, Schwartzenburg with the Austrian +forces marched along the space between the centre and the heads of +the Bug. This movement, which enabled the Grand Army to issue into +Lithuania as from a salient, brought it almost within reach of the +hostile armies, which, under Barclay de Tolly, by descent a Scotchman, +and Bagration, a chief of the Muscovite nobles, had advanced from +the Dwina and Dnieper, where their sources meet, and had approached +the Niemen with no fixed purpose. The generals of the Czar, all but +surprised and out-manœuvred, fell back at all points; and Napoleon +was at Vilna, within four days having gained an immense strategic +advantage. He made a long halt of about a fortnight; this has been +condemned as a capital error, even by the cautious and far-seeing[16] +Wellington, and, as events happened, it would have been better +perhaps had he pressed, at all hazards, his offensive movement. But +his _Correspondence_ shows that, from a military point of view, +this delay may be very well justified; the Grand Army, burdened with +impedimenta of all kinds--a necessity in districts with few resources, +and filled with weak elements, was in a bad condition; the auxiliaries +and conscripts had fallen away in thousands; and time was required to +reorganize huge arrays already beginning to dissolve and break up. + + [Illustration: Theatre, of the + + CAMPAIGN + + of 1812.] + +The situation, in short, had brought the Emperor to a stand; and yet an +opportunity was given him to strike the Czar a blow more decisive than +his sword could inflict. He was in one of the capitals of ancient +Poland; he was greeted with enthusiasm once more by the conquered +race; and had he spoken the words “Poland is to be free,” the Russian +Empire would have been thrown back at once to the distant limits of old +Muscovy. But Napoleon adhered to the policy of 1806; he caressed the +Poles and enrolled their levies; but he paltered with their demands to +be made a nation; and he even intimated that he would not annul the +Partition. Meanwhile, after a few days of delay, he despatched Davoust +and part of his right wing to pursue Bagration, trying now to join his +colleague by a circuitous march; but partly owing to the difficulties +of a way through immense woodlands scarcely traversed by roads, and +to the slow movements of heavily-laden troops, and partly to disputes +between Davoust and King Jerome, the effort failed; Bagration escaped; +and he ultimately attained the Dnieper. By this time the Emperor had +formed a great plan to cut off and annihilate Barclay de Tolly, who +had dangerously exposed himself to his foe; and the project was worthy +of a great master of war. A German theorist, possibly struck by the +results of Wellington’s defence of Portugal, had persuaded the Czar to +construct a huge camp at Drissa upon the Lower Dwina, to concentrate +within it his two armies, and to offer battle behind its fortified +lines; and Barclay had reluctantly obeyed the command; Bagration, +too, drawing near him from the distant Dnieper. This strategy, it is +needless to say, had nothing in common with that of Torres Vedras; it +was really the old routine of an obsolete school; and Napoleon broke +up from Vilna on the 16th of July, hoping to surround Barclay, to +destroy him in his camp, and then to turn and overwhelm Bagration. +In all human probability he would have succeeded, had the Russian +commander stood in his lines; but Barclay saw his peril, and left them +in time; and he made a very able movement to Vitepsk, across the front +of the approaching enemy, in order to reach and join his colleague. +The Emperor pursued with his wonted energy; but nature and the defects +of the army interposed; and he attained Vitepsk too late to catch and +destroy an enemy still eluding his grasp. He was again forced to make +a long halt at Vitepsk, from the reasons which had made him halt +at Vilna; the state of the Grand Army had become alarming, and the +appalling fact was brought before the eyes of its chief, that, though +no real battle had yet been fought, 150,000 men were missing out of +the 420,000 who had begun the invasion. Such waste of war had never +been seen before; yet Napoleon still had faith in his genius; he made +a daring flank march, behind a screen of forests, in order to effect +a junction with his right; and this, he hoped, would enable him to +reach the enemy between the Dwina and Dnieper, and compel him to fight. +The movement had only partial success; a fierce encounter took place +at Smolensk; but the French army only gained ruins, and Barclay and +Bagration, having joined hands at last, disappeared into the remote +interior. + +Napoleon’s manœuvres up to this time were worthy of his strategic +genius; in theory they had been almost faultless; but they had been +baffled by obstacles not to be overcome, and by the conditions of the +war and the state of the army. The middle of August had now arrived; +the Emperor was at the portals of old Russia, hundreds of miles +from his nearest base in Germany; was he to advance further into +the recesses of the East, and to brave the fate of Crassus in the +Parthian deserts? His lieutenants, to a man, entreated him to halt; +to establish himself between the Dwina and Dnieper; to call up all +available reserves; and, extending his wings on either side, to overrun +Volhynia and subdue Courland. This probably would have been done by +Turenne or Wellington; but there were military reasons against a delay, +which must have led to a winter campaign; and after long reflection, +the spoiled child of Fortune resolved to advance to Moscow, and to +find peace, after victory, in the old capital of the Czars. Yet he +did not take this momentous step inconsiderately, or without ample +precautions; he exclaimed: “I will find no Pultowa on my way”; and he +left nothing undone to render his communications secure, and to avert +every peril from the invading army. His situation, at this moment, +appeared safe; for to the left Macdonald occupied Courland, and was +besieging the important place of Riga; Oudinot had defeated the corps +of Wittgenstein, left behind by Barclay in the retreat from Drissa; +and Schwartzenberg had repulsed the army of the South, moving, under +Tormazoff, from the Pruth and the Dniester. Yet the Emperor would +“make assurance doubly sure;” he summoned Victor, with his corps, +to Smolensk; he ordered Augereau to advance towards the Niemen; he +moved up his second line to the tracts round the Oder; he organized +Lithuania under a local government, and directed the formation of +immense magazines at Smolensk, Vilna, and all the way to the Niemen. +He broke up from Smolensk, in the last week of August, at the head of +about 160,000 men, the best and most solid part of the Grand Army. The +troops had been provided with large supplies, for the Russians had +wasted the line of the retreat, even in Lithuania, without the aid of +the people, and it had been foreseen that in old Russia the peasantry +would assist in the work; and for some days the invaders moved without +distress along the vast uplands, which divide the streams that reach +the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Caspian. As soon, however, as +provisions fell short, the army began to suffer terribly in what had +been made a harried wilderness; 30,000 stragglers became missing; and +Napoleon declared, that if nothing new occurred, he would return to +Smolensk and find winter quarters. At this critical time, intelligence +arrived which caused him again to pursue his march. The Russian army, +furious at a retreat of hundreds of miles before the invaders, had +insisted on fighting a great battle; the Czar had dreaded to refuse the +demand; and Barclay had been replaced by Kutusoff, the chief who had +made his mark in 1805, and who, though approving Barclay’s conduct, had +promised to encounter the approaching enemy. On the 5th of September +1812, the horsemen of Murat came in sight of the Russians, in position +along a line extending from Borodino on their right to the wood and +village of Outitza on their left, their front covered by redoubts and +field works. Both armies spent the following day in preparation for the +conflict at hand, and as light rose on the morning of the 7th, Napoleon +exclaimed to his staff of Marshals: “It was time; but there is the +Sun of Austerlitz!” The armies opposed were about equal in numbers, +130,000 to 140,000 men; and for some time the course of the battle went +rapidly and decidedly on the side of the French. Napoleon, with the eye +of a master, had seized the weak point of his adversary, and assailed +his left; the redoubts and other defences were stormed and captured, +and Kutusoff, who had unskilfully crowded his right with masses of +troops that could hardly move, was in extreme peril. Had the Emperor +at this crisis sent part of his reserve to complete the defeat of his +foe, he must have won the battle, but he refused to believe in such +rapid success; he was not as active as was his wont on the field, and +a change soon came in the tide of Fortune. The Russians, after a great +effort, retook the redoubts; Kutusoff detached troops by degrees from +his right, and the battle raged furiously for several hours in which +each side fought with heroic courage. At last the Russian left was +again broken; once more the French stormed the fortified works, and, +though a fine charge was made by the Russian cavalry, the defeated army +began to fall back. Napoleon was implored to launch the Guard, at this +decisive moment, against the enemy; but he remained inactive, and would +not employ it; and the battle closed with a frightful duel of guns, in +which the Russians were literally slain in thousands. The struggle was +the bloodiest ever seen in war; the Russians lost nearly 50,000 men, +the French probably 80,000; and though the beaten army drew off from +the field, Borodino was only a greater Eylau. + + [Illustration: NAPOLEON WATCHING THE BURNING OF MOSCOW FROM THE + PETROVSKI PALACE.] + +Napoleon was ill on this terrible day; and it has been supposed that +his powerful frame showed on this occasion, for the first time, the +symptoms of a disease that was to prove mortal. His hesitation, +however, to use his reserves and the Guard has been explained by +himself: “I will not,” he said, “throw away my best protection” at +an “immense distance from its nearest supports”; but this fact alone +condemns the whole enterprise. On the 14th of September 1812, the Grand +Army beheld the temples and domes of Moscow rising from the surrounding +plains; it had soon filled an almost deserted city; and the Conqueror, +at the summit, as he dreamed, of his unequalled fortunes--his eagles +were on the Niemen, the Elbe, and the Tagus--imagined that Alexander +would sue for peace, as he had sued for it after the rout of Friedland. +Before many hours the capital, self-destroyed, was a hurricane of +devouring flame--a sinister monument of internecine war--and the +victorious army had to establish itself in a desolate expanse of +charred ruins, spreading far into a wasted country. Yet Napoleon +clung to the wreck of Moscow; he believed that the enemy would be +forced to treat; he slaked the pride of his still exulting soldiers by +grand reviews and exhibitions of their power; and, as supplies were +found in abundance in underground recesses, the army retained its +order and discipline. Weeks, nevertheless, ebbed away and the Czar +made no sign. Meantime Kutusoff had rallied his defeated army, had +distributed it in a series of camps, some distance from Moscow, on the +flank of his foe; and while the French cavalry and artillery became +rapidly feeble--there was no suitable food for the horses--thousands +of recruits, and especially a host of Cossacks, the Bedouins of the +deserts of the North, assembled to defend “Holy Russia” to the death. +At this crisis--always in this consistent--the Emperor refused to adopt +a course which must have compelled Alexander to yield. He would not +listen to the idea of proclaiming the freedom of the enormous masses +of serfs in the Muscovite Empire; and, rejecting even now the notion +of retreat, he formed vast designs for a march on St. Petersburg, or a +descent into Southern Russia to find winter quarters. His lieutenants, +however, condemned schemes strategically grand, but perhaps impossible. +He did not silence them with his wonted authority in the critical +position in which they all stood, and at last, in the middle of +October, he consented to retreat, the delays which had already +occurred having no doubt been largely due to the guile of Kutusoff, +who, anticipating the future with sagacious forethought, feigned +negotiations to deceive and detain his enemy. The retrograde movement +began on the 19th of October; and the Grand Army, as it defiled out +of Moscow, presented a strange and ominous aspect. It was still about +100,000 strong; the infantry were in a tolerable state, but the cavalry +and horse artillery were few and enfeebled; the proportion of guns +was far too great, and the divisions, bearing with them an enormous +booty, and dragging a huge _matériel_ and _impedimenta_, +were incapable of making an energetic movement. Napoleon endeavoured +to steal a march on Kutusoff, still on his flank, but at a wide +distance, and to retreat towards Kalouga, to the south-west of Moscow, +through a fertile region not yet destroyed; and probably he would have +attained his object had he had an efficient and active army. But his +enemy forestalled him at Malo-Yaroslavetz; a murderous and indecisive +battle followed; and Napoleon--it was the first council of war he ever +summoned--yielded to his Marshals, and abandoned the attempt to break +through and reach Kalouga, a decision fraught with momentous results. +The French army was now forced back on the line by which it had +advanced to Moscow, but it had sufficient provisions for some days; the +climate as yet was not threatening; the Russians cautiously kept aloof, +and the still hopeful soldiery believed they would reach Smolensk and +good quarters in ten or twelve forced marches. Ere long, however, the +supplies fell short; the army, passing through a ruined country, was +scarcely able to procure the means of life, however widely it spread +to pillage; men began to disband and straggle in thousands, and want +hastened the destruction of all that gives power to armed men. Early +in November, the icy hand of winter fell suddenly on the host already +breaking up; horses died in multitudes in a single night; guns, trains, +carriages were lost and abandoned; and the army became a shattered +horde without resources, military strength, or discipline. Kutusoff, +who had steadily followed the retreat, saw that the expected time had +come; swarms of his light horsemen hung on the rear of the French, +cutting off the wounded, and making numerous prisoners; and attacks, +hesitating at first, but growing formidable, were made on the exposed +flanks of the retreating masses, now almost wholly without the help of +cavalry. The perishing army reached Smolensk by the middle of November; +it had dwindled from 100,000 soldiers to 40,000 worn out fugitives, +deprived of the greater part of their guns and _matériel_; and it +was soon discovered that the the long-expected haven could not afford +refuge even for some days. The magazines, which Napoleon had commanded +to be made, were not furnished with nearly sufficient supplies; they +were not properly secured or guarded, and the famishing soldiery +recklessly wasted and plundered the scanty resources they had, for +subordination and military obedience had been almost lost. + +At Smolensk, Napoleon received intelligence more appalling than ever +had reached a commander. Victor and his corps had come up to Smolensk, +and had thrown reinforcements into the town, but he had left under the +stress of the gravest peril. Wittgenstein, whose army had been largely +increased, had eluded Macdonald far away in Courland, and had defeated +Oudinot, very inferior in force; and Victor had marched to assist his +colleague. The two Marshals, however, could not shake off their foe; +Wittgenstein was advancing on the Upper Dwina, at the head of about +45,000 men; and the left wing, therefore, of the Grand Army, once +apparently secure, was in daily growing danger. Meantime, Tormazoff +had been joined by Tchitchakoff, an admiral, with a fresh army from +the south. The Saxon auxiliaries had been defeated; Schwartzenberg, +at a hint given from Vienna, had fallen back before the approaching +enemy; and Napoleon’s right wing was left uncovered and threatened by +nearly 50,000 men. Kutusoff was already close to Smolensk; what if he +continued his ceaseless attacks, while the hostile forces, converging +from the rear, should drive in the already broken wings, and should +close on the rear of the army from Moscow? Mack and Mélas were never +in such a woeful plight, and Napoleon at once broke up from Smolensk, +to make a great effort to avert destruction. He had not been equal to +himself since he had left Moscow; whether illness had impaired his +great faculties, or, more probably, because he had no experience of +defeat; and, underrating the real force and the skill of Kutusoff, he +sent off his army, strengthened in some degree, in separate masses, +that scarcely supported each other. The Russian chief seized the +occasion, and became more bold. He endeavoured to cut off a large part +of the retreating forces, and though the effort failed, the French had +to run the gauntlet of enemies ever gathering on their flanks and their +rear, and slaying, capturing, and destroying thousands. The horrors of +the retreat to Smolensk were surpassed; the dissolving masses, which +had been 60,000 strong when they left the place, were but 20,000; and +the heroism of Ney, who covered the rear, was the one gleam of light +in a long night of darkness. Victor and Oudinot had now drawn close +to Napoleon, but Kutusoff, Tchitchakoff, and Wittgenstein were at +hand; and the three French armies, 70,000 fugitives in the last days +of November, found themselves arrested by the broad and half-frozen +Beresina, while the enemy, fully 120,000 strong, was gathering on +all sides to prevent the retreat. The situation seemed utterly +hopeless, but Napoleon’s genius suddenly revived; and he extricated +himself from the jaws of destruction by one of the finest efforts he +ever made in his career. Deceiving his adversaries by feints of all +kinds--he actually drove a huge body of stragglers to the wrong place +to conceal his purpose--he threw two bridges over the wintry stream; +the soldiers who could move and keep together succeeded in crossing +under the Russian batteries; thousands perished, indeed, but the army +was saved; though Wellington has observed, with strict truth, that had +the Russian commanders struck home, it must have been destroyed as a +military force. I shall not dwell on the closing scenes of the retreat: +the wrecks of Moscow, and the corps of Victor and Oudinot, were about +50,000 men when the Beresina was passed; the enemy had abandoned the +pursuit; and yet these bodies shrunk to about 30,000 in not more than +five or six marches. At Smorgoni Napoleon left his army, in order, +he told the Marshals, to awaken France; political considerations +plead for the act, but it would not have been done by Turenne or +Frederick; and, with other instances, it shows, I think, that this +supreme military genius, matchless in success, was not equally great +in extreme adversity. After the Emperor’s departure, the diminishing +arrays toiled hopelessly through the Lithuanian wastes; each day very +many hundreds dropped off; Murat, placed in command, all but lost his +head; reinforcements caught the contagion of despair, and the armed +multitude completely broke up. The frightful scenes of demoralization +and terror witnessed at Smolensk recurred at Vilna. Great magazines had +been collected there, but they were sacked and destroyed by the mobs +which attacked them; and the French fled to the Niemen in petty knots +and bands, and at last sought refuge behind the Vistula. Such a tragedy +of war had never been seen since the immense host of the Assyrian +tyrant perished through the inscrutable will of Omnipotence. More than +half a million of soldiers, including reserves, had crossed the Niemen +a few months before; 50,000 did not recross the stream, and the cavalry +and artillery were almost destroyed. The losses of the Russians were +also terrible; but bearing in mind that they were at home, and that +numbers of the disbanded and wounded rejoined their colours, they were +ultimately, perhaps, not more than 120,000 men. + +The causes of this immense disaster, the prelude to the fall of the +French Empire, have been examined by many writers. We may dismiss +the pretence that “it was all the cold.” This equally affected both +armies, and it weakened the Russians quite as much as the French. The +conflagration of Moscow no doubt contributed largely to the events that +followed. The Grand Army but for the fire, might have found winter +quarters in a rich capital; but we can hardly agree with Napoleon’s +phrase: “I would have emerged like a ship from the ice in spring”; his +cavalry and artillery would have been ruined, for the horses had no +hay, and would have had insufficient provender. The chief causes of the +catastrophe are, I think, two: the Grand Army was the worst instrument +of war, which Napoleon had hitherto had in his hands; it was feeble +despite its enormous size; more than half the soldiers were bad or +unwilling; and it was incapable of great and rapid efforts, especially +in a theatre of war like Russia. The paramount cause, however, beyond +dispute, was that the grand offensive strategy of the French Emperor +was all but impossible in such a campaign. The army, unable to find +resources on the line of march, was obliged either to carry large +supplies with it or to scatter over the country to obtain subsistence; +in either case, daring and decisive movements were frustrated or had +few results; and, curiously enough, the very expedients Napoleon +adopted to support his troops, great magazines at a variety of +points, so encumbered them that they baffled his efforts. As for the +Emperor, his conduct in the campaign has never yet, perhaps, had an +impartial critic. His operations at the beginning of the war bear +the ineffaceable stamp of his powers: they were masterly, perfectly +conceived, and brilliant; and had he commanded the army of Austerlitz, +he might have separated Bagration and Barclay, and perhaps won a Jena, +before he reached Smolensk. It is wholly untrue besides, that he +plunged into the depths of old Muscovy without forethought; he spared +no pains to make his bases secure, and to protect his communications +in every way; and his great faculties were seen in perfection in his +escape on the Beresina from a host of enemies. Undoubtedly, however, +he may have been too cautious in husbanding his reserves at Borodino; +he certainly delayed too long at Moscow; he ought not to have recoiled +at Malo-Yaroslavetz; he should not have divided his columns when he +left Smolensk; he ought never to have given Murat the command of his +army. All these, however, were mere mistakes, and every commander must +sometimes go wrong; but what really was most to blame in him was his +inactivity during a great part of the retreat, and his abandonment of +his troops at Smorgoni. This indicates a defect in this great master; +there were vulnerable points in the Achilles of war, and Napoleon +never was in the hour of misfortune the perfect chief he was in the +hour of triumph. Still, his capital error in the campaign was that +the enterprise, as he conducted it, was beyond his powers: he defied +space and Nature when he advanced to Moscow, and he paid the penalty in +terrific ruin. The result might have been different had his operations +been more methodical and more prudent; and here we see, again, how +imagination and pride occasionally mastered his better judgment. As +regards the Russian commanders, their first movements were timid, +aimless, and yet presumptuous; they ought not to have approached the +frontier; they should have kept away from the camp of Drissa; they +ought not to have fought at Borodino at all, a battle, besides, which +they directly badly; and if they imitated Wellington in the retreat +from the Dwina, the imitation was poor and unskilful. Barclay, however, +showed resource in the march to Smolensk; and though Kutusoff probably +could have done more than he did, his choice of a position on the +Emperor’s flank, and his unceasing attacks on the retreating enemy, are +good illustrations of the military art. Nevertheless, the fame of the +Russian chiefs, due to the results of the war of 1812, has diminished +with the progress of time; and none of them can rank as truly great +captains. The most conspicuous fact on the victorious side is the +stern endurance of the Russian soldiery, and the resolution shown +by the Czar and the nation; thus patriotism in Spain and in Muscovy +baffled Napoleon. Two of the most striking incidents of the war, as +a whole, are Napoleon’s refusal to set the Poles free, and even at +Moscow to emancipate the serfs; in his hatred of all that is national, +liberal, popular--of what he called the “ideology of the Rights of +Man”--he would not adopt measures that would have disabled his foe, and +certainly would have saved the Grand Army. + + + + + CHAPTER VII. + + NAPOLEON--(_continued_). + + +Napoleon--he had travelled in disguise through Poland and +Germany--returned to Paris as 1812 was closing. On his arrival he had +proofs, not to be mistaken, of the increase of the adverse opinion +of France, and of the real instability of the Imperial throne. An +obscure Republican officer had conspired against him; and though the +conspiracy had been nipped in the bud, the capital had heard of the +crime with indifference; and, most significantly, no one seemed to +think that the infant King of Rome--his ill-fated son, the Astyanax of +the fallen House of Bonaparte as he was called by the captive of St. +Helena--would succeed to the heritage of the French Empire. Napoleon, +after reproving his still servile ministers, and the silent and docile +Bodies of the State, addressed himself to redeem the pledge he had +given his lieutenants when he left Smorgoni; he exerted himself with +even more than characteristic energy--“I am now General, not Emperor,” +is a phrase in his letters--to repair the tremendous disaster which +had befallen his arms; and he was seconded with real zeal by a nation +which, though the Revolutionary fervour had ceased, and it feared and +disliked the Imperial rule, has often done wonders in an effort to +retain the military supremacy which is its great ambition. The Emperor, +who had called out the Conscription of 1813, ventured to anticipate +and call out the Conscription of 1814; immense bodies of National +Guards were enrolled, and invited to serve; the depôts of the Empire +were emptied, to furnish every trained soldier who could bear arms; +_matériel_ of war was found in abundance in the arsenals of France +to replace what had been lost; and veterans of the past and officers +from Spain were forthcoming in hundreds to prepare the new levies. The +genius of Napoleon and the ardour of France were successful, to an +extent that appears astonishing; half a million of armed men were on +foot by the early spring of 1813; gifts of horses, and purchases on +an immense scale, had in some measure replaced the destruction of the +cavalry which had disappeared in the retreat; and though these masses +could scarcely be called an army, they were being skilfully drilled +and organized, and they had the national aptitude to become quickly +soldiers. Napoleon had calculated that, by the coming summer, he would +be able to take the field at the head of 250,000 men, with armies of +reserve on the Rhine and the Elbe; and he had boasted that with these +forces, and the troops that had come back from Russia, he would conquer +the Czar and keep Germany down. Events, however, had completely changed +since he had abandoned the wreck of the Grand Army. When he set off +from Smorgoni, Macdonald on the left and the Prussian contingent were +almost intact; Schwartzenburg, on the far right, had a considerable +force; though the army from Moscow was almost destroyed, a great part +of the second line of the Grand Army, assembled in 1812, was cantoned +between the Elbe and the Vistula; and Napoleon’s previsions, therefore, +were not illusory. But since his return to France, the Prussian corps, +and its chief, had ostentatiously revolted and joined the enemy; +Macdonald, hard pressed and deserted, had escaped with difficulty, +through a host of enemies, and attained the Vistula; Schwartzenburg, +with his Austrians, had marched into Galicia, and evidently was waiting +on the policy of his Court; the army that had left the Beresina had, +we have seen, perished; and down-trodden Prussia had suddenly flamed +out in a tremendous explosion of national passion, which was rapidly +making itself felt through Germany, prepared for years for a patriotic +outbreak. Murat, left in command of the French army, proved utterly +unable to confront misfortune; he fled to his treasured kingdom of +Naples; and the conduct of operations was given to Eugene Beauharnais, +devoted to the Emperor, but not a great chief. Eugene, collecting the +fragments of Macdonald’s corps and the survivors of the troops who had +entered Russia, had endeavoured to make a stand on the Vistula; but +the approach of the Russians and Prussians, and the rising of Prussia, +compelled him ere long to fall back; and he ultimately retreated to +the line of the Elbe, bringing along with him the greater part of what +had been the second line of the army of 1812. He was in positions on +the Elbe, in the first days of March, at the head of perhaps 45,000 +men; about 40,000 were in march from the Oder; and these, apart from +a few thousands more sent to strengthen the garrisons in the Prussian +fortresses, were the whole forces that could be brought together out +of the enormous mass of 600,000 soldiers arrayed, the year before, to +invade Russia! Yet Eugene had conducted the retreat ably; and this was +admitted, at the time, by the sternest of censors. + +These disasters frustrated Napoleon’s projects, and accelerated his +appearance in the field. He endeavoured to arrange the dispute with +Rome, acquiring influence again in Imperial France; issued a paper +money to sustain the finances, too like the assignats of 1791–3; the +Treasury was in a critical state; and he was at Mayence in the middle +of April, having summoned the Princes of the Confederation of the +Rhine to arm and put down the great Teutonic rising, described by him +as a mere “Jacobin movement.” His troops had been for some time in +motion, and were probably 120,000 strong on the Rhine; and he hoped +that with these and the army of Eugene he would surprise and overpower +his enemies, who had incautiously exposed themselves to his terrible +strokes. I shall say a word hereafter on the reorganization of the +Prussian army, after the ruin of Jena, and of the great consequences +which flowed from it; but the suddenness of events had taken the nation +by surprise; it had not had time to put forth its strength; and, for +the present, the Prussian forces in the field were not more than 50,000 +or 60,000 soldiers. The Russians had a much larger army, but their +chiefs were obliged to leave detachments behind; and when they joined +hands with their new allies, in march from the Vistula to the Oder, +the collected forces were probably not more than 130,000 or 140,000 +strong. + + [Illustration: Theatre, of the + + CAMPAIGN + + of 1813.] + +In this position of affairs, against the advice of Kutusoff--the +warrior died a few weeks afterwards--the Czar, dazzled by an +immense triumph, and yielding to the prayers of the Prussian +commanders--Blücher was the most pressing and bold of these--was +persuaded to advance into the heart of Germany, in order to turn to +account the national rising, and to sweep into it the Confederation +of the Rhine; and the allied armies had approached the Elbe, about +100,000 men in the first line, disseminated, too, in divided masses. +This was the repetition of the faulty strategy which had led to Jena +and all that followed; and though times had changed, and Napoleon had +suffered disasters beyond example in war, the movement was wrong from +a military point of view, for it placed the Allies, thrown much too +forward, and comparatively weak, in a situation of peril. Soon after +the Emperor had reached Mayence, his enemy had mastered the line of the +Elbe: York, the Prussian chief, who had been the first to revolt, and +Wittgenstein threatening the great place of Magdeburg, at the head of +about 35,000 men, Wintzingerode, a Russian, and fiery Blücher holding +the river round Dresden with perhaps 50,000, and Milaradovitch, with +about 15,000, advancing along the edge of Bohemia, to encourage Austria +in a policy hostile to France. This disposition of the allied forces +gave Napoleon an opportunity to strike; he drew Eugene towards him with +admirable skill from the Elbe, behind the Saale, as a screen; he broke +up from Mayence with about 100,000 men, and made for the Saale, through +the scenes of Jena; his purpose being to join Eugene, and at the head +of their united forces, 140,000 strong at least, to surprise and assail +the divided enemy, to cut him off from the Elbe and Dresden, and to +force him against the Bohemian ranges, where it would be difficult to +avoid destruction. The Emperor and the Prince effected their junction, +between Merseburg and Naumburg, on the 30th of April; the young levies +of France and the war-worn troops of 1812 met with sympathetic pride; +and the Grand Army, given the name again, marched across the Elster +into the great plains of Leipsic, in order to carry out a strategic +project as brilliant as any of its renowned author’s. The troops of +Jena and Austerlitz were, however, gone; the movement of the army was +extremely slow; the want of sufficient cavalry was severely felt; and +Napoleon was compelled to advance cautiously, for the enemy was known +to be at hand, and reconnoitring was difficult. A skirmish, in which +Bessières perished, gave the Emperor a warning he did not despise; and +he moved into the open tract between Lützen and Leipsic, combining +his corps with such skill that each could easily and quickly support +the other. Meanwhile, however, the main part of the allied forces had +drawn together, and at the suggestion of Diebitch, a real future chief, +and at the entreaty of Blücher, passionate to fight, it was resolved +to assail the Emperor in the vast and unprotected plain, where the +Russian and Prussian cavalry would have an immense advantage, though +Milaradovitch was many leagues distant. + +On the 2nd of May Eugene had attained Leipsic, and was attacking the +town with an advanced guard, when the hostile army, about 70,000 +strong, fell furiously on the French centre, holding, under the command +of Ney, a cluster of villages, but otherwise exposed in the great +tract around them. The young French soldiers, fired by the heroism of +their chief, made a gallant resistance for some time; but strength and +practised valour gradually prevailed; there was nothing to oppose to +the allied squadrons, and the centre of Napoleon was all but broken, +when the precautions he had so carefully taken enabled him to restore +the uncertain battle. The corps of Marmont, of Oudinot, of Bertrand, +so placed as to come into line quickly, reinforced by degrees the +divisions of Ney; the Emperor was soon on the scene with the Guard; +and a converging line of fire began to envelop the enemy, greatly +over-matched in numbers, and carried destruction into his diminishing +ranks. A desperate effort, however, made by Blücher, nearly pierced +through the French centre once more; and it required the discipline +and power of the invincible Guard--still largely composed of trained +soldiers--to win for Napoleon a doubtful victory. The Allies left the +field in unbroken array; few prisoners or guns were taken by the +French; and owing to the feebleness of their levies, and the want of +horsemen, anything like effective pursuit was impossible. + +Lützen, like Eylau, was a fruitless battle, and must have suggested +painful thoughts to Napoleon. His strategy had been after his wonted +fashion; the Allies had made a distinct mistake in fighting without +Milaradovitch; the French army had been largely superior in numbers, +and yet it had narrowly escaped defeat. The young soldiers, no doubt, +had shown brilliant courage, but they had recoiled before their veteran +foes; the Emperor had been saved only by his wise caution, the enemy +had successfully effected his retreat, and from their weakness in horse +the French had accomplished little. The great object Napoleon had +had in view, forcing the Allies into the Bohemian hills in complete +ruin, had not been attained; and operations which, with the Old Grand +Army, would probably have led to a second Jena, had proved to a great +extent abortive. He had, however, restored the glory of his arms, and +he entered Dresden in a few days in triumph. He soon compelled the +old King of Saxony, wavering in his faith, like all the Allies, to +furnish him with a large contingent; and his other vassals among the +German princes sent troops at his imperious command, ready to abandon +him at the first change of fortune. He set off from Dresden in the +middle of May, confident that the enemy had at last fallen into his +hands. The Russians and Prussians, after Lützen, had recrossed the +Elbe and marched into Saxony, and they had been directed to the verge +of Bohemia, in the hope of winning Austria to their cause. That Power, +always tenacious, but always wary, was still an ostensible ally of +France, and was bound to Napoleon through the young Empress, but it had +long been playing a double game; it had dealt with the Czar in 1812; +it had winked at Schwartzenburg’s evident neglect to cover the Grand +Army during the retreat; it was not heedless of German opinion; and, +under the direction of the sagacious Metternich, it was seeking to turn +the situation to its own advantage. It had offered council to all the +belligerents, had gradually taken the attitude of a powerful arbiter, +and had quietly begun to prepare armaments; but though sympathy and +instinct drew it towards the Allies, it feared the Emperor’s power, +and it was still neutral. The Allies, however, thought they could gain +Austria, especially as Napoleon had charged her with bad faith, and, +sacrificing military ends to politics, they had placed their armies +in positions round Bautzen, at a short distance from the Bohemian +frontier. The operations that followed were on a theatre made memorable +in the Seven Years’ War, not far from the famous field of Hochkirch, +where Daun had surprised and and defeated Frederick. + +Fancy may picture the shade of the old Austrian chief directing the +conduct of the Allies; they had entrenched themselves within two +defensive lines, covered by the Spree, and a stream behind; and in +these positions, with little power of movement, they had resolved to +await the shock of Napoleon. That great warrior, on the other hand, had +imitated Frederick to this extent; he would attack the enemy in front, +and reach his flank, but the turning was to be a strategic movement, +carried out far off, and perfectly safe, not a tactical stroke on the +field and hazardous. The battles that followed are full of interest, +and should be carefully studied by a thinker on war. The Emperor +attacked on the 20th of May; he perceived with his wonted insight that +the force of the enemies was too large on their left; so, neglecting +the Tronsberg heights, which they held with this wing, he directed his +main effort against their centre and right, placed along the marshy +ground that surrounded the Spree. The resistance was prolonged and +vigorous; but passive defence had often failed before, and was certain +to fail under the strokes of Napoleon, and the first position was at +last forced, the French being greatly superior in numbers, perhaps +150,000 to 110,000 men. The Emperor renewed the attack next day, but +meanwhile he had taken care to mature an operation promising decisive +success. Ney had been ordered to march on Würchen and Hochkirch at the +head of about 50,000 men, making a long circuit far to the left, and +when the enemy had yielded to the attack in front, he was to close in +on his line of retreat, and to place him in the position of Mélas. The +second line of defence was also carried, and when the Emperor beheld +his foes falling back, he looked eagerly in the direction where his +trusted lieutenant was to be on the spot, to make his triumph complete. +Ney, however, whether it was because his young troops had been slow in +their movement, or, more probably, because he had lost something of the +perfect confidence of unbroken success, had hesitated when far from +the main army, and never attained the points of Würchen and Hochkirch; +Blücher confronted him with heroic energy, the defeated army found an +avenue of escape, and it effected its retreat, though with heavy loss. +The indignation of Napoleon may be conceived; he had a right to find a +Marengo at Bautzen, and yet, master as he was, he had once more been +baffled. “What a butchery for nothing!” was his angry remark when he +found that the enemy had escaped from the toils. + +Napoleon was all himself at Bautzen; his strategy and tactics were +alike perfect; and the manœuvres which ought to have destroyed his +enemies, prove his immense superiority to Frederick in the field, when +following, partly, Frederick’s methods. The Allies were completely +defeated, and fell back; the Grand Army advanced to the Oder; and +once more the Emperor beheld the vision of the Continent prostrate +under his eagles. Yet the Prussians and Russians had not been crushed; +Napoleon had learned, by hard experience how inefficient his army +was, especially in the essential force of cavalry; and, confident in +himself and the magic of his sword, he accepted the famous armistice of +Pleistwitz, with the object, as he avowed afterwards, of organizing and +training his immature levies, of increasing them, above all, in horses, +and of making them capable of great offensive movements. This truce +has been called the greatest mistake of his life; and history fully +confirms the judgment. The Allies, though baffled, had not been broken; +the Czar, eager to become a second lord of the Continent, had engaged +the strength of his realms in the war; and Prussia, placing herself at +the head of Germany, was proving what her armed might had become, and +gave reliance and weight to the great rising now in full force from the +Rhine to the Oder. + +The military power of that martial State had become transformed since +the day of Jena, and was now capable of immense development. The army +had been reorganized in all its parts; the officers, no longer a mere +noble caste, comprised men of all classes fit to do their duty; and +the soldiery, fired with intense patriotism, were burning to avenge +and restore the nation. The most remarkable change which had taken +place, however, was in the effective force and the character of this +fierce array of warriors. Napoleon had restricted the numbers of the +Prussian army; but his craft and oppression had not attained his ends; +the contingent under arms was not large; but the conscription had been +applied to Prussia; thousands of youths had yearly passed through the +ranks, and had learned the elementary work of soldiers; and the army +was now capable of being enlarged to 200,000 or 250,000 men, especially +under a strong popular impulse. Scharnhorst had, in fact, outwitted +the Emperor; the foundations had been laid of the great system of +which we have witnessed the results in war in this age; and in the +summer of 1813 Prussia was able to place fully 200,000 men in line for +the approaching contest. Meanwhile, immense bodies of troops had been +marched from the Niemen to take part in the struggle in Germany; and it +was calculated that, should Austria join the Allies, 900,000 men would +appear in the field to engage with Napoleon in a mortal struggle. The +forces available for the imperilled Emperor were hopelessly inferior +to these enormous masses. France could yield no further supplies of +troops; and even reckoning the contingents of the Confederation of +the Rhine, notoriously disaffected and eager to desert, 600,000 men +formed the extreme limit of the soldiers capable of joining the Grand +Army, and 200,000 of these, at least, were of scarcely any use. The +armistice, therefore, was a capital error; yet Napoleon maintained his +attitude of pride; he employed the breathing time he had chosen for +this end, in drilling and improving his young levies, in purchasing +horses in vast quantities, in making, in a word, the Grand Army an +instrument fitting to answer his purpose; and considering its state and +its imperfect structure, it is astonishing what was accomplished by +his untiring energy, by the practised skill of high and subordinate +officers, and by the willingness and intelligence of the French +soldiery. His capacity and genius shone out splendidly, though his +health showed occasional signs of weakness; and he gradually matured a +gigantic design of contending for Empire in the plains of Saxony, to +which he trusted for ultimate success. + +The theatre of war bore a kind of resemblance to that in which he had +triumphed in 1796–7; the Bohemian hills were like those of the Tyrol; +the Elbe, like the Adige, was a great river barrier; and the Emperor, +in his own words, “took again to the trade” of the warrior who had +struck down the Hapsburgs, with a relatively small force, on the verge +of Italy. Napoleon took possession of the whole course of the Elbe +from the Erzgebirge to its mouths at Hamburg; he secured the passages +at every point in order to have full freedom of action; he placed the +bulk of his forces around Dresden, with detachments, however, along the +stream; he threw secondary armies out to the Oder, while he kept his +communications with the Rhine well guarded; and, at the head of from +300,000 to 350,000 men, he made ready to defy his enemies, whatever +their strength, on this vast field of manœuvre. His letters breathe +nothing but stern confidence; he felt convinced that he could defeat +the Allies; and his assurance was such that, playing for his old +domination, he left thousands of troops shut up in the fortresses of +the Oder and Vistula. + +By this time it had become apparent that Austria would be of immense +weight should she place her sword into either scale; and the Allies and +Napoleon during the truce endeavoured to win her over and to obtain her +support. Her inclinations had been never doubtful; she had favoured +Russia and Prussia all through. Napoleon, too, had insulted her by +bribes and threats, and had almost outraged Metternich in a fit of +passion; but she refused for many weeks to make up her mind; and it was +only the success of Wellington in Spain, and especially the great day +of Vitoria, that at last determined her halting purpose. On the 10th +of August 1813 she declared war against France once more; 250,000 men, +who had been assembled in Bohemia, joined the allied standards; and +Napoleon, with ruin impending in Spain, with France even now on the +point of exhaustion, and with auxiliaries, for the most part, worse +than useless, was left to confront the power of Europe. + +The forces on the theatre of war in Saxony were about 500,000 to +800,000 men--50,000 French were between the Rhine and the Lower +Elbe--and the disproportion of numbers against the Emperor was less +than it had been against the youthful Bonaparte. But the situation, +even in pure strategy, was less favourable to Napoleon than it had been +in 1796: and other circumstances increased the chances against him. +The long line of the Elbe was more difficult to hold than the short +and scarcely passable line of the Adige; the secondary armies that +reached the Oder were far more exposed, and less easy to call in, than +the detachments of Masséna and Vaubois; the retreat of the French army +was better assured in 1796 than in 1813, and all this gave the Allies +advantages, and subjected the Emperor to real dangers, which scarcely +existed in the earlier contest. + +The allied armies, it should be added, were different troops from +those of Alvinzi and Würmser; the young levies of 1813 were not the +fierce Republicans of 1796; and here again the scale turned against +Napoleon. He maintained, however, his unbending attitude; and the plan +of operations formed by the Allies, if well designed, proves how he +was still dreaded. Their general purpose was to attack and weaken his +lieutenants, in their distant positions; to avoid a great battle with +their terrible foe, but to wear out his strength in repeated marches; +and then, and only then, to risk an encounter, when their superiority +of force would make success certain. This strategy, if timid, had real +merits; and it shows how, in most respects, the condition of affairs +was different from what it had been in the campaign of Italy. As was +his wont, Napoleon took the initiative; he set off from Dresden, in +the middle of August, to attack Blücher, already seen to be by far his +most resolute enemy, and he had soon driven him back to the Katzbach, +for the Prussian chief, as had been agreed on, retreated, when made +aware of his presence. Meanwhile, Schwartzenburg, with the chief part +of the Austrian army, had issued through the Bohemian passes, and, +gathering Russians and Prussians on the way, had advanced against +Dresden in the Emperor’s absence; and St. Cyr, who had been left to +defend the city, announced that he had no means to resist an enemy +apparently 200,000 strong. Napoleon returned, to make head against the +approaching foes; he hesitated whether he would attack Schwartzenburg, +and fall on his rear, as he had attacked Würmser in the defiles of +the Brenta; but time and distance made the attempt hazardous; and he +marched with 100,000 men to the relief of Dresden. A terrible battle +was fought on the 26th and 27th of August; the Allies were greatly +superior in numbers, perhaps 190,000 to 140,000 men; but Napoleon had +his genius, and the advantage of the ground; he rested his weakened +centre on the defences of the place, and assailed Schwartzenburg with +both his wings in great force; and he gained a complete and splendid +victory, remarkable for the death of Moreau in an Austrian camp. The +Emperor’s fortunes seemed restored, when a sudden disaster befell his +arms. Before he reached Dresden he had sent off a lieutenant, Vandamme, +to menace Schwartzenburg on his march, near Pirna; and as the allied +army had been utterly beaten, and was retreating in disorder through +the Bohemian hills, he ordered Vandamme to push forward boldly, +and to close in force on the enemy’s rear, intending to second the +movement himself. The events that followed are still obscure; Vandamme +seized Culm and the Austrian slope of the range; but Mortier and St. +Cyr perhaps did not support their colleague; Napoleon,[17] owing to +illness, or to some unknown cause, did not advance with the Imperial +Guard; and Vandamme was left almost wholly isolated. In this position +he was assailed by the defeated army; he was overwhelmed by superior +numbers; a Prussian detachment hemmed him in, and, instead of breaking +up a routed enemy, he was compelled to surrender and lay down his +arms. Thirty thousand men were thus lost to the Emperor; it had become +evident that, in the present war, the events of Auerstadt would not +happen again; the apparition of a hostile force on the rear of his foes +would no longer make them disperse and succumb. + +Culm effaced Dresden, and disasters fell in quick succession on the +secondary parts of the Grand Army, far away from its centre. Macdonald +and Poniatowski were completely defeated, on the verge of Silesia, by +fierce old Blücher; and their shattered levies dissolved in multitudes. +A similar reverse befell Oudinot, who had approached Berlin, at the +hands of Bernadotte--the Marshal had given up his staff, had been +declared heir to the throne of Sweden, and was now an obsequious +vassal of the Czar--and this front of the Grand Army was also broken. +Napoleon, losing heavily already through long forced marches, hastened +from Dresden again to assail Blücher; but the veteran fell back into +the Silesian plains and the Emperor failed to bring his foe to bay. +Ney was now directed to march on Berlin with another division of +the secondary arrays; but he was routed, with crushing effect, at +Dennewitz; for Napoleon, who had intended to join hands with him, had +been recalled to the Elbe to oppose Schwartzenburg, threatening Dresden +from Bohemia again; and the Marshal had been, like Vandamme, isolated. +Through these successive defeats the Grand Army had lost nearly 100,000 +men, whole regiments disbanding, disease falling with cruel severity on +the young soldiers, and many of the auxiliaries breaking out in mutiny; +and it had become evident that Napoleon’s plan for the campaign, as +a whole, could not be realised, that his forces on the Oder were far +too distant, that his strength was being destroyed by his fruitless +efforts to support them, and to strike with effect,[18] and that his +enemies had learned his game, and would not approach him to court +defeat. He drew in the remains of his shattered armies, and placed them +in collected strength on the Elbe, holding the bridges and passages at +all points; and, still hopeful, he awaited the attacks of the Allies +in a central position, analogous to that which he had held at Mantua, +but not, I have said, so favourable to the French. His enemies paused, +still afraid to assail the terrible adversary who had so often proved +what genius could achieve in a situation like this. A long series +of manœuvres followed, but at last Blücher and Bernadotte made for +the Elbe; Schwartzenburg finally issued from the hills, and the huge +converging masses, describing a great arc, were directed towards the +central point of Leipsic, in order to fall on the line of Napoleon’s +retreat, and to cut him off from his communications with the Rhine. + +The Emperor thought his opportunity come; he was operating between +widely divided enemies, and he had accomplished wonders when so placed; +and, following exactly his strategy in 1796, he left St. Cyr and Lobau +to hold Dresden; detached Murat with about 50,000 men or more[19] to +restrain Schwartzenburg, and advanced in person against Blücher and +Bernadotte, with perhaps 140,000 of the main army. Operations, however, +on the long line of the Elbe were more uncertain and likely to fail +than on the short and difficult line of the Adige; and other causes +concurred to frustrate a project marked with the accustomed skill of +its author. Blücher crossed the Elbe in the second week of October, +and, eluding Napoleon, made for Schwartzenburg, though his colleague +Bernadotte was still far off; and it seems certain that this audacious +movement, not scientific but bold to rashness, and very characteristic +of the Prussian chief, was unknown to the Emperor for some days on +a vast and imperfectly observed theatre. Napoleon now resolved to +overwhelm Bernadotte, to advance and to occupy Berlin, the centre of +the great Teutonic movement--a “focus of insurrection,” in Imperial +language--and this grand stroke was, I believe, possible,[20] had the +conditions of the war been of the ordinary kind. But intelligence came +that the Bavarian troops were dangerous, and that Bavaria herself was +to make common cause with the Allies; and Schwartzenburg was moving +down the Elbe, on the left or western bank, to approach Blücher. +Napoleon was compelled to abandon his project; he directed Murat to +come to his aid, though he did not call in his divisions at Dresden; +and collecting all his other available forces, he marched towards +Leipsic with the view of assuring a retreat to the Rhine, should this +be necessary, but ready to fight a decisive battle. His attempt to +reach and strike his divided enemies, and to repeat the marvels of +1796, had failed; and he was now exposed, with a greatly weakened army, +to be surrounded, beaten, and cut off from France, by enemies immensely +superior in numbers, Germany, up to the Rhine, conspiring on his rear, +and his German auxiliaries eager to revolt. Strategically, his position +resembled that on the Beresina a few months before, though the peril +was not yet frightful or imminent. + +Apart from general causes affecting the contest--a word must be said +on these afterwards--the student of war should note the reasons why +the strategy of 1813 had results opposite to those of the strategy of +1796. Napoleon was the same commander on both occasions; and his great +faculties had not diminished, though his bodily strength was not what +it had been, and his arrogant confidence had certainly increased. But +the barrier of the Elbe could not be defended as that of the Adige +had been, and Blücher mastered it easily with a large army, effecting +his junction with the Austrian forces; the French corps detached to +the Oder were far from the main army, and were not in hand, like the +small bodies which covered Mantua, so that instead of strengthening +they weakened Napoleon, by compelling him to make harassing marches; +the Emperor, when threatened by his foes at Leipsic, had no choice but +to concentrate his troops, for otherwise his retreat would be barred; +and the Grand Army, though improved since the spring, was an imperfect +and not trustworthy instrument. Yet the chief reason, perhaps, has +yet to be noticed: Würmser and Alvinzi in 1796–7 exposed themselves +to Napoleon’s strokes, and were struck right and left, and beaten in +detail; the Allies took a wholly opposite course; they kept steadily +aloof from the enemy they feared; they did not venture to approach him +until he was almost crippled, and they gave but few chances to his +grand offensive strategy. + +History dwells on the famous days of Leipsic, for they set Germany free +from the Imperial yoke, and finally broke down the power of Napoleon; +but they have few features of interest for the student of war. +Schwartzenburg attacked Napoleon, on the 16th of October, in positions +a considerable way from Leipsic with probably 200,000 men; and Blücher, +though not yet in line with his colleague, simultaneously attacked with +about 70,000. The efforts of the assailants were still feeble; the +Emperor had perhaps 170,000 men, and stood between enemies still apart; +a magnificent charge of the French cavalry, reorganized and admirably +led by Murat, was nearly attended with marked success; and though +Blücher and his Prussians made some progress, the battle was drawn, and +had no result. + +Retreat for Napoleon was now easy; the way to the Elster and the +Rhine was open, and might have been made completely secure; and +Schwartzenburg, at least, would have been too rejoiced to leave a +golden bridge for his still dreaded enemy. But Napoleon refused to +acknowledge defeat; he insisted on gambling with adverse fortune, and +scorning to fall back before foes he despised, he resolved to stand +and fight a decisive battle. The 17th was spent in preparations on +both sides; Bernadotte and Beningsen came up with their armies, and +the combined allied forces probably reached the enormous number of +300,000 men. The Emperor had no reinforcements to expect; the Grand +Army was not 150,000 strong, and the issue of the conflict could hardly +be doubtful. Yet the attacks of the Allies were partial and timid; +they have been compared to the peckings of crows round an expiring +eagle; the French fought admirably when brought to bay, and but for the +defection of the Saxon contingent, it is questionable if they would +have suffered defeat. A retreat, however, had become necessary; it +was precipitate, and it led to a frightful disaster. The Elster had +not been bridged by the French; the retiring columns were stopped or +retarded; an explosion destroyed the one bridge over the stream; a +large part of the Grand Army was cut off; Poniatowski perished with +thousands of his troops; and the allied commanders could now fairly +boast that they had won a great and decisive victory· The remains +of the defeated army, strewing its path with wounded, dying, and +straggling men, moved feebly across the Franconian lowlands; a ray of +light shone on its arms for a moment, for Napoleon crushed a Bavarian +force which had endeavoured to cut him off, but it was a mere mass of +fugitives when it attained the Rhine. By the flight from Saxony, the +corps left at Dresden and the distant garrisons on the Oder and Vistula +were completely and irrevocably lost. + +Napoleon, it is scarcely necessary to say, ought not to have fought +the second battle of Leipsic; he should have retreated after the first +battle; and he ought to have bridged the Elster for his still large +army. Turenne and Marlborough would not have made such mistakes; but +those who have really studied this wonderful being will understand +how he made them, despite his genius. Independently of the military +causes which made the results of the campaign in Saxony so different +from those of the campaign of Italy, there was a general cause for +Napoleon’s overthrow; he contended for the prize of his whole Empire, +for domination over three-fourths of Europe; this is the true reason +why he threw forward secondary armies from the Elbe to the Oder, and +why he left thousands of men in the Prussian fortresses, operations +contrary to sound principle, and wholly opposed to his own wonted +strategy. Ambition, arrogance, and the lust of power, in fact, +“distorted”--as has been truly said--“the marvellous conceptions of the +matchless chief,” and he underrated the strength and the resolution of +his foes, and vainly trusted to the last to false auxiliaries, for whom +treachery to the flag meant faith to their country, rising to a man +against wrong and oppression. + +On his return to Paris, in the middle of November, the Emperor had +soon abundant proofs of the ruin of his power, and of the collapse of +his Empire. The relics of the Grand Army, spread along the Rhine, +scarcely exceeded 100,000 men; until reorganized they were of no use; +they were dying in heaps by contagious disease; they required horses, +guns, and all kinds of _matériel_; and the demoralization of +the troops had become frightful. Yet even this was by no means the +worst: the huge fabric of conquest formed by the sword was evidently +doomed by the sword to perish. Soult had been driven by Wellington +beyond the Pyrenees, and was endeavouring to defend the Adour and +Gascony; Suchet had recoiled to the line of the Ebro; the mock throne +of Joseph had been abandoned; the Confederation of the Rhine had +vanished, annihilated by the rising of Germany; Eugene, beaten by +a secondary Austrian force, had been repelled to the Adige and the +Mincio; unfortunate Murat was plotting treason, and trafficking with +the enemy to save Naples; Holland, half beggared by the Continental +system, was striving to shake off Imperial bondage; and stirrings of +revolt were feared in Belgium, and in the German provinces west of the +Rhine. Even in old France the position of affairs, and the state of +the public mind, was portentous of ruin. The nation had lavished most +of its youth fit for war in the effort of the year before; the depots +were empty and the arsenals stripped; supplies of arms of all kinds +were short; and the _matériel_ of war which remained to the Empire +was now, for the most part, beyond France, stored in fortresses on the +Elbe, the Adige, and the Po. The destruction, too, of the material +resources of France, was less ominous than the national attitude. The +fervour of 1813 had completely disappeared; the mass of the people had +become indifferent to patriotism, and only thought of repose; and the +cries against the Empire heard in 1812, swelled into a vast murmur +from ruined cities, from half-starving seaports, from discontented +provinces. Even the machinery of government was breaking down; the +conscription was evaded in whole districts; there was an increasing +movement not to pay taxes; and the Treasury, buoyed up by paper for a +time, was scarcely able to avert bankruptcy. The very functionaries of +the Empire forgot their servility; the silent Bodies of the State dared +to make complaints; the military chiefs secretly condemned the war; and +a conspiracy against Napoleon, immature as yet, was slowly formed by +disgraced Ministers, by the remains of the Royalists and Republicans, +scarcely heard of since the 18th Brumaire, by the men of new ideas, who +aspired to give free institutions to a reformed France, and to save her +from despotism and ruin at hand. + +The Emperor proudly confronted misfortune; and did not abandon his +still assured confidence, that he would emerge safe from this vast +sea of troubles. One circumstance fed his hopes at this crisis; the +Coalition had paused after Leipsic; its armies had halted as they +approached the Rhine; and it made overtures of peace to Napoleon, +partly because it feared a death struggle with him, and partly because +it had begun to be divided in interests, passions and feelings. The +Emperor sent an ambiguous reply, to proposals which would have left +him ruler of a France enlarged to the “natural boundaries”; but it is +questionable if he really wished to treat; and, like the armistice +of Pleistwitz, this was a capital error. He was convinced that he +would not be assailed for some months; he made preparations for a new +campaign; and it is evident his purpose, once more, was to contend +for a scarcely diminished Empire. He called out the Conscription of +1815; forced old soldiers into the ranks of the army; made another +appeal to the pride of Frenchmen; supplied the failing Treasury from +his Privy Purse; endeavoured to restore the _matériel_ of war; +and tried to arouse the passions of 1798 against “an invasion of the +sacred soil”, though, as he bitterly said, he had “crushed Revolution +and would not rely on his worst enemy.” These efforts, however, though +his administrative powers and genius for organization were as great as +ever, produced comparatively small results; France could not and would +not supply the means required to further his ambitious ends; and yet, +I have said, his intention was to play again for supreme dominion. If +Soult was required to oppose Wellington, Suchet was left in Spain, and +Eugene in Italy; the forces which still remained to France were not +concentrated within her borders, for Napoleon thought invasion remote, +and would not give up his ambitious projects; and this strategy, +essentially false, and unlike that of the best days of the Emperor, +largely detracts from the conspicuous merits of the grand campaign of +1814. The Allies did not give their foe the long breathing time on +which he had unwisely reckoned. Divided as they were, they had a common +enemy. They resented Napoleon’s still warlike attitude; and when signs +of his real position had become manifest, in the rising of Holland, the +defection of Murat, the victorious progress of the arms of Wellington, +the misery of France, and the growing hatred of the Imperial rule from +the Scheldt to the Po, they resolved to seize the occasion, and to +cross the Rhine. By the end of December and the first days of January, +the forces of the Coalition, spread on a vast front, were set in motion +to invade France; and this bold offensive effort beyond question +disconcerted Napoleon, who would not believe in such resolution and +well-sustained energy. + +Schwartzenburg, at the head of about 160,000 men, marched from Basle, +across the plains of Franche Comté; Blücher, with an army perhaps +60,000 strong, advanced from Mayence and Mannheim, and traversed the +Vosges; and Bulow and Wintzingerode, far to the north, moved, with +probably 70,000 troops, from the upper Rhine towards the Aisne and the +Oise, the object of the chiefs of these converging masses being to +unite in Champagne and to press on to the capital. The invasion was so +sudden that the surprised Emperor had but small forces to oppose to it. +The remains of his armies, not half reorganized and only recruited to +a slight extent, fell back at all points, through Lorraine and Alsace, +not more, probably, than 80,000 strong; and the invaders for weeks met +no resistance. By the close of January Schwartzenburg had crossed the +range to the east of the great upland of Langres, and had arrived at +the heads of the Seine; Blücher had passed Nancy, the old capital of +Lorraine, and was in full march for the Upper Marne; and though the +Northern column was far in the rear, a speedy advance to Paris was +deemed imminent. The only enemies in the way were the shattered corps +of Mortier, Oudinot, and Gérard, round Troyes, of Macdonald, Marmont, +Victor and Ney around Châlons; and though these had been hastily +reinforced, they certainly could not oppose 90,000 men, largely +composed of beaten and despondent soldiers, to victorious enemies at +least twofold in numbers. + +Having left Paris, and sternly rebuked one of the heretofore +servile Bodies of the State, which at this crisis found heart to +murmur, Napoleon reached Châlons in the last days of January. Some +reinforcements were upon the march; but, for the moment, he brought +nothing but his skill to assist his collected marshals, who with +shattered forces had begun to despair. Yet he retained his haughty +and serene confidence; he had formed a general plan of operations for +the campaign which once more revealed his unrivalled power of turning +the theatre of war to account, and his insight into passing events; +and it was to lead to some of his most splendid exploits. Blücher +and Schwartzenburg had advanced from divergent bases; their supports +in the rear were far distant; they had the old Prussian and Austrian +dislike of each other, and they had now reached the valley of the Marne +and the Seine, deep rivers traversed at many points by the main roads +converging on Paris, the object aimed at by the allied chiefs. They +would probably, therefore, march on two lines, Blücher along the Marne, +his colleague by the Seine, and would be separated by a wide distance; +and the obstacles which the rivers might be made to present would give +a great advantage to a really able enemy. Napoleon had fully perceived +this; he resolved to oppose one front of defence to a double front of +divided attack, and, interposing between his foes, to strike them in +succession and to beat them in detail; and for this purpose he had +given orders to fortify the passages on the Marne and the Seine, and +had formed his base in the intermediate districts. This was one of his +most brilliant conceptions, but the Emperor was very nearly crushed in +his first operations through his extreme confidence. In an effort to +attain Blücher, drawing near his colleague, he fought an indecisive +battle at Brienne--the place where he first studied war--and he was +defeated with heavy loss at La Rothière, an engagement he certainly +should have avoided, for his enemies were nearly threefold in numbers. +His situation appeared hopeless; he had not more 70,000 men to oppose +to fully 200,000, when his mastery of his art and the blunders of +his foes changed the position of affairs, and caused a last ray of +glory to irradiate the ruin of his falling Empire. As he had expected, +the allied generals, after La Rothière, fell respectively back to +the Marne and the Seine, and moved along the rivers; Schwartzenberg +marched slowly along the Seine, throwing out detachments to protect his +flanks--for hostile bodies were approaching from the south; Blücher, +passionate and impulsive, pushed along the Marne, spreading out his +army in disconnected fractions, and burning to run a winning race to +the capital. + + [Illustration: Theatre, of the CAMPAIGN of 1814.] + +Napoleon, like an eagle watching his quarry, sent Oudinot and Victor to +keep back Schwartzenburg, holding the passages of the Seine in force, +and with the rest of his army, perhaps 50,000 strong, he hastened to +the Marne to fall on Blücher, whose exposed and divided flank was laid +bare to him. The weather was dreadful, and the cross-roads bad; the +French army was filled with boyish conscripts, and was encumbered with +far too many guns, which retarded the heavy and cumbrous columns--these +evils had gone on increasing since Wagram--but Napoleon’s genius +overcame all hindrances; and the effects of the movement were well-nigh +magical. Bursting into the midst of his terrified foes, he overwhelmed +Olsuvieff at Champaubert, routed Sacken completely at Montmirail, +defeated York at Chateau-Thierry, and finally hurled Blücher back to +Châlons, having disabled for a time a whole host of enemies. He now +turned against Schwartzenburg, who, pressing Victor and Oudinot back, +had gradually advanced along the Seine; and no doubt can exist that, +had he been free to act, the Emperor would have descended on the +Austrian’s flank. But alarm and discontent prevailed in Paris, and in +order to produce an immediate effect, Napoleon was obliged to approach +the capital, and to attack Schwartzenburg, when reached, in front. +These operations could not have the results of the terrible strokes +against Blücher’s flank; nevertheless, the Austrian chief was beaten; +he retreated eastward as far as Troyes; a demonstration by Blücher in +his aid proved useless, and by the close of February 1814 the forces of +the Coalition, cruelly shattered, were again at the heads of the Marne +and the Seine. Genius had triumphed over ill-directed force; and the +allied commanders were so despondent that they actually sought and +obtained an armistice. + +The events that followed strikingly illustrate the character of the +antagonist chiefs, and the peculiarities of the struggle for Empire. +Napoleon’s[21] arrogance exceeded all bounds; he exclaimed, “We shall +soon be again on the Vistula”; and his letters breathe intense scorn +of his foes, and absolute reliance on his own military strength. Full +of these illusions, he still refused to summon Eugene across the Alps +from Italy; and though he drew detachments from the armies of Soult +and Suchet, and organized a force under Augereau in the South, he +did not bring nearly all his available forces to the decisive point, +the theatre in Champagne. Had he conformed to his early and perfect +strategy, Schwartzenburg, menaced by Eugene, and with Augereau on his +flank--and Suchet might have joined--would have no doubt retreated; +Blücher could not have remained isolated; the campaign of 1814 would +have had a different close; and this, I repeat, must be borne in mind +in judging the Emperor’s conduct as a whole. + +The operations of the Allies had no resemblance to those of their +renowned antagonist; they were timid for the most part, and confessed +weakness; but they were prudent, and marked by decision and firmness. +At a great council of war held near Troyes, the Czar, the Emperor of +Austria, the King of Prussia, and the representatives of the great +Powers were present;[22] the admission was made that Blücher and +Schwartzenburg could not hope for success against Napoleon, though +he had but about 80,000 men, and their armies, strongly reinforced, +were 200,000; the difficulty of operating along the Marne and the +Seine, with their enemy between them, was frankly recognized; it was +resolved to bring up the greater part of the army of the North, under +Wintzingerode and Bülow, to turn the scale decisively; and whatever +may be thought of these councils of fear, this was certainly wise and +true strategy. Hostilities, which had never really ceased, began again +in the first days of March: and Blücher, with perhaps 60,000 men--he +had reorganized his army with characteristic energy--moved along the +Marne again in the hope of destroying the isolated corps of Marmont +and Mortier, for the present covering the main roads to Paris. The +Marshals, however, retreated behind the Ourcq; and Blücher, rash to a +fault, and not taught by disaster, crossed the Marne, and endeavoured +to bring them to bay. This gave Napoleon his opportunity again. +Quitting his central position, he bore down on Blücher, now far from +his colleague, and crossed the Marne; and he was soon on the track of +the Prussian chief, who, in extreme peril, was making for the Aisne, +with but a feeble chance of getting over the river. + +A fortunate accident saved Blücher, when perhaps on the verge of a +terrible overthrow. The commandant of Soissons, a weak man, opened his +gates to Bülow and Wintzingerode, advancing from the North, as had been +arranged; the only passage on the Aisne fell into their hands, and +Blücher joined with delight his new colleagues, their united forces +being about 100,000 men. Napoleon had not more than 60,000; but his +passionate ardour mastered his judgment, as had often happened in his +chequered career; he attacked the Allies at Craonne and Laon, and, as +at La Rothière he was completely beaten, though he destroyed a hostile +body in his retreat. His second effort against Blücher had, therefore, +had very different results from those of his first; he had suffered +greatly at Craonne and Laon, battles which he certainly should not have +risked; and he was now obliged to return to the Seine, with an army +weakened and beginning to lose hope. He had left Oudinot and Macdonald, +replacing Victor, to hold Schwartzenburg in check, as in the first +instance; but the Austrian chief, in the Emperor’s absence, had forced +the passage of the Seine, and approached Paris; his advanced guard +was not far from Melun; and the capital, seething with passion and +terror, had not only made no preparations to resist, but was beginning +to declare against the tottering Empire, especially since Wellington’s +victories in the South. Napoleon left Mortier and Marmont to observe +Blücher, and calling up his forces to come into line with him, he +endeavoured to operate on the rear of Schwartzenburg; he compelled the +cautious Austrian to fall back; but he was surprised on the Aube, near +the town of Arcis, was forced to fight a stern but a losing battle, +and was ultimately obliged to cross the river. He had failed against +Schwartzenburg as he had failed against Blücher. How different might +the result have been had he called Eugene and Suchet to his aid in +Champagne! + +The Allies were now in overwhelming force; they thoroughly understood +Napoleon’s game, and he could no longer continue his late strategy. +He adopted a course almost the counterpart of his projected march on +Berlin in 1813--baffled, we have seen, by various accidents--which +has been differently judged by disputing critics, but which, as a +mere military move, may be pronounced admirable. His garrisons on the +Vistula and Oder were lost; but he had large garrisons in the French +fortresses, which, hitherto blockaded by the allied armies, had been +nearly set free by the immense demands of Blücher and Schwartzenburg +for reinforcements; and he resolved to make use of what he called those +“dead forces,” to collect a powerful army, to descend on the rear of +his foes, and to cut off their communications with the Rhine. He always +declared that this plan was possible, and when we consider the timid +weakness which usually marked the conduct of the Allies, it presented +many chances of success, had France been really true to the Empire. +He broke up from the Aube in the third week of March, and summoning +Mortier and Marmont to join him, made for Vitry upon the Upper Marne, +his object being to attain the Meuse and, rallying the forces released +from the fortresses, to attack Schwartzenburg and to seize the line of +his retreat at the head of about 120,000 men, the troops from Lyons and +the south supporting the movement. + +The Emperor’s letters still breathe the perfect confidence which +distinguished them throughout the whole campaign; and he haughtily +spurned proposals for peace, which even now, at the eleventh hour, +would have left him the France of Louis XVI. Events, however, were soon +to show the vanity of the false dreams of ambition. The conspiracy +which had been hatching for months in the capital, against the Empire, +had become mature; it was joined by Talleyrand and other dismissed +Ministers, by Liberals, Bourbon and Jacobin partisans, and means were +found to inform the Allies that should they advance on Paris Napoleon +would fall. A second great council of war was held by the leaders of +the Coalition on the 24th of March; and it was unanimously decided to +march on the capital, leaving a detachment only to observe Napoleon. +The allied armies pushed rapidly on by the now abandoned and unguarded +lines which, hitherto, they had failed to master, driving before them +the feeble corps of Mortier and Marmont, who had been unable to join +the Emperor, and could not offer a show of resistance; and on the 29th +of March the armies of Continental Europe had come in view of the proud +city which, for twenty years, had been the ardent focus of revolution, +of war, of glory, of Empire. The marshals fought a battle honourable +to both, but it was impossible to withstand the great host of enemies. +A capitulation was signed the following day; and Russians, Austrians, +Prussians, Swedes, Bavarians, and soldiers from every part of Germany, +took possession of the fallen yet not mourning capital. A few hours +sufficed to complete the ruin of the despotism of force which had long +been supreme. The young Empress and the Imperial Court vanished; the +Bodies of the State, for years the instruments of a tyranny they had +cringed to but had learned to hate, declared the throne of Napoleon +forfeited, and Paris heard, not without rejoicings, that the Monarchy +of the Bourbons, which its frenzied citizens had shed oceans of blood +to destroy for ever, was to be restored at the will of the conquerors. + +Meanwhile, Napoleon, informed of these events, had hastily abandoned +his march eastwards; he was at Fontainebleau on the 2nd of April, at +the head of nearly 70,000 men, and treating as nought all that had +been accomplished, he still resolved to strike a blow for Empire. +The military situation was not quite hopeless. The generals of the +Coalition had most unwisely distributed their armies around Paris, +divided by the streams of the Marne and the Seine; and everything was +to be dreaded, in a position of this kind, from the terrible enemy +placed in their rear. Napoleon made overtures to negotiate, but it is +tolerably certain his real object was to gain a few hours to make a +desperate effort, and to surprise his foes in their false security; and +he has left it on record that he must have won a decisive battle at the +very gates of Paris. His marshals, however, refused to follow their +chief in a course they believed desperate; Marmont went over, with his +corps, to the Allies, and the conqueror saw his invincible sword fall +from his grasp through the ill-will and the treachery of the companions +in arms he had long led to victory. He abdicated, after the Bodies of +the State had pronounced finally; and--a terrible lesson to those who +abuse power, and a terrible proof how faith and loyalty are blighted +in a revolutionary age--Fontainebleau became quickly a silent desert, +abandoned by the functionaries who had grovelled at his feet. His noble +words of farewell to the veterans of the Guard in some measure lessen +the ignominy of scenes on which the historian dwells with pain; but +one incident of shame has yet to be noticed. The fallen Emperor took +poison, to end a life of despair. The attempt at self-destruction, +perhaps happily, failed, but this is another proof that, when all +seemed lost, Napoleon had not the indomitable firmness of very inferior +warriors. + +Napoleon’s operations in 1814, as regards the struggle in Champagne +at least, have always been classed with his finest efforts. It was a +prodigy of skill that, with a bad army, he should have baffled enemies +threefold in numbers, should have all but overwhelmed Blücher, and +should have kept the issue of events in suspense; the general of 1796 +reappears, in full perfection, in this splendid strategy. Yet even +in these noble displays of the art, he fell into serious and plain +errors; he ought not to have fought at least four battles, unnecessary, +and with the chances against him; and he made two grave mistakes, +which proved fatal--the attempt to contend for his whole Empire, +and the omission to concentrate his forces during the armistice. His +generalship in 1814, considered as a whole, was not equal to that of +1796, and his campaigns of 1812, of 1813, and even of 1814, remind me +of Turner’s latest pictures; we see the hand of the master everywhere, +but there is a want of proportion and real harmony, and the result is +sad and general failure. + + [Illustration] + + + + + CHAPTER VIII. + + NAPOLEON (_continued_). + + +I must pass over the attempt to resettle the boundaries, at Vienna, of +a changed Continent; nor can I dwell on the pretensions of the Czar +to sit in the seat of Napoleon without his genius, on the rapacity +of Prussia and the craft of Talleyrand, and on the league between +Austria, England, and France, to restrain the ambition of the Northern +Powers. Nor can I notice Napoleon’s brief rule in Elba, though the +administrative powers of the fallen Lord of the Continent were +exhibited in this narrow sphere, and have left honourable traditions +not yet forgotten. I must also avoid even a short account of the +failure of the Restoration in France; how Louis XVIII., well-meaning +but feeble, spite of the memories of the old _régime_, fell into +the hands of Royalist zealots, and marred the grace of the freedom +he claimed to concede; how impossible it became to reconcile the +pretensions of returned _émigrés_ and a ruined _noblesse_ +with the interests grown out of the Revolution; how the army, +transformed and made the appanage of a Court, chafed in silence, and +regretted its unrivalled chief; how the nation after a brief hour +of repose, felt humiliated that it had been reduced to the position +of a lesser Power of Europe. The discords of the Coalition, and the +unsettled state of France, were not lost on the extraordinary man who +watched events from his speck in the sea, and who had not forgotten +his vanished Empire. Napoleon quitted Elba in February 1815, on the +most wonderful enterprise of his whole career. A flotilla bore the +few hundred men imprudently left him by the Allies; Fortune smiled +treacherously on her audacious favourite, and he had soon landed on +the shores of Provence, in order, in the face of embattled Europe, to +subvert a Government founded on an European triumph. The very thought +seemed akin to folly, and yet it became an accomplished fact in a +fortnight. With that insight which was one of his greatest gifts, +Napoleon avoided the cities of the coast and the great military +stations of his old marshals; he flung himself into the valleys of +Dauphiné, a district hostile to the restored Monarchy, and his march +seemed like the spread of some mighty influence, which power and +authority were unable to withstand. Grasse, Sisteron, and Gap were +rapidly passed; a regiment near Grenoble welcomed the sight of its old +commander, and fell at his knees; the garrison of the town greeted him +with exulting shouts, and wherever a part of the army beheld Napoleon, +it followed him, swayed as by an enchanter’s spell. Macdonald, with his +staff, was expelled from Lyons; Ney, meaning to be loyal, was carried +away in the universal military revolt; other chiefs found it impossible +to resist; and the discrowned exile was soon on his way to the capital +at the head of a great and hourly increasing force. + +Napoleon was at the Tuileries once more on the 20th of March; “his +eagles,” in his expressive language, “had flown from steeple to steeple +to the towers of Nôtre Dame,” and France, dazzled, surprised, and +disliking the Bourbons, accepted a revolution which seemed a kind of +portent. The King fled into Belgium with his Court, his nobles, and +a few officers of the Empire, who would not break their oaths; the +army easily put down two or three risings of Royalists in the Southern +Provinces; and Napoleon boasted, with truth, that he regained his +throne at the cost of scarcely a drop of blood. After this astonishing +return to Empire, Napoleon offered peace, and to remain satisfied with +the France of the Treaties of 1814; and probably he was sincere in +these overtures. Yet it is not surprising that he was not believed; +he had broken faith with Europe in leaving Elba, and, partly through +terror and partly from hate, the Allies proscribed him as an enemy +of mankind. He addressed himself to the defence of France, but the +movement which had set him on the throne was essentially a military +revolt; the fierce animosities of French factions embarrassed his +Government and weakened the State; the restored Empire was viewed +with distrust by Royalists, Liberals, and the old Republicans; the +nation treated with indifferent contempt free institutions offered +by Imperial hands; and the Chambers, which Napoleon convened to give +popular support to his imperilled power, were full of secret or avowed +conspirators. Nevertheless, let detractors say what they please, his +exertions were mighty and worthy of him; his genius as an administrator +shone with fresh brightness, though his health was evidently on the +decline, and in a few weeks he had made preparations to resist the +Coalition which must be deemed wonderful. One circumstance gave him +precious resources; more than 100,000 prisoners of war, trained and +excellent soldiers, had been restored to France; and by making use of +these and additional veterans, and by employing conscripts and National +Guards, he raised the army, which had been reduced to impotence, to a +state of formidable strength and efficiency. Meanwhile, he gave its +old organization and structure to the instrument of war he had so long +wielded; the Guard reappeared, and the loved eagles; corps, divisions, +and reserves were again formed; great exertions were made to provide +arms, horses, and _impedimenta_ of all kinds; and Paris, which +had fallen at once in 1814, was to a considerable extent, fortified. +By June 1815, half-a-million of men were on foot to take part in the +impending conflict; about 250,000 of these were ready; and paper money +supplied the Treasury with the means of seconding a great effort which, +in existing circumstances, was, I repeat, astonishing. + +Two plans of operations presented themselves. Had France been united +and loyal as a whole, Napoleon would have, no doubt, followed the grand +precedent of the year before, under conditions much more favourable +to success; he would have encountered the Coalition in Champagne +with forces far more powerful than in 1814, and with Paris a strong +entrenched camp in his rear, and recollecting what he achieved on +the Marne and the Seine, his triumph would have been not at all +improbable. The second plan was much more hazardous; but it was in +harmony with Napoleon’s genius, and it followed methods which had often +secured him victory. The Coalition had a million of men in arms; but +these masses were spread from the Scheldt to the Po, and easterly, +from the Rhine to the Oder; and the extreme right of the immense line +of invasion, the two armies of Blücher and Wellington was isolated +and thrown forward in Belgium. It might be practicable then, as it +had been at Ulm, to cut off and destroy this detached force; and many +circumstances concurred to give a well-directed attack a real chance +of success. The armies of Blücher and Wellington were widely apart; +they rested upon divergent bases; they were commanded by chiefs of +opposite natures; their centre was weak and greatly exposed; their line +of communication was a single road, at a short distance only from the +French frontier, and behind this line lay a difficult country which +would make their subsequent concentration no easy matter. + +Seizing the situation with the eye of a master, Napoleon saw in this +position of affairs an admirable opportunity to strike with effect; and +he resolved to assail and break through the allied centre, and to try +to defeat Blücher and Wellington in detail, as he had defeated Beaulieu +and Colli in the campaign of Italy. The means he adopted to carry out +his project rank among the finest operations of his life, and form a +conspicuous instance of his gift of stratagem. Concealing the movement +with consummate skill, he drew together four corps from the vast +space between Lille and Metz to the edge of the frontier; the Guard, +another corps, and the cavalry marched from the interior; and the +collected masses, perfectly arranged, converged gradually along this +immense front, under the eye of the enemy, yet without his knowledge! +No more splendid effort has been made in war; and had the Emperor had +the complete force--150,000 men--which he reckoned on to begin the +campaign, in all probability he would have triumphed. A rising in La +Vendée deprived him, however, at the last moment, of 20,000 soldiers; +but the die was cast, and he did not hesitate; and he set off from +Paris on the 12th of June to challenge Fortune in a supreme trial. His +admirable directions had been admirably fulfilled. On the evening of +the 14th June 1815, 128,000 Frenchmen, comprising 22,000 horse and 350 +guns, were assembled from near Maubeuge to near Philippeville, where +the French frontier then entered Belgium; and screened by the Sambre, +they were a few miles from Charleroi, where the great road to Brussels +gave an easy approach to the comparatively feeble centre of the Allies. + +The army was in motion at daybreak on the 15th, the Emperor’s object +being to cross the Sambre, to occupy Charleroi, and by a forced march +to seize the points of Quatre Bras and Sombreffe, on the great cross +road between Nivelles and Namur, the only line on which his foes +could unite without obstacles of no small difficulty. The operation +was not quite successful; delays and different accidents occurred. +Ziethen, too, one of Blücher’s lieutenants, had checked the advance, +not without skill, but Napoleon’s project was nearly realised; the +great mass of the French was beyond Charleroi, and within easy reach +of Quatre Bras and Sombreffe before night closed on the 15th; and the +allied centre was threatened if not severed, and could only close up +in effective force, under, so to speak, the guns of the enemy. The +conduct, meanwhile, of the hostile chiefs had perfectly fulfilled +Napoleon’s previsions, and had given him already an immense advantage. +Blücher had, characteristically, placed three of his corps in positions +around, or not far from, Sombreffe, even now almost in Napoleon’s +grasp; but his fourth corps was many leagues distant, and could not +reach Sombreffe for a battle next day. On the other hand, Wellington, +circumspect and cautious, and without experience of Napoleon’s +strategy, had hesitated and delayed at Brussels; he had not taken a +step to join his colleague until late in the night of the 15th; and +even then, fearing for his communications and his right, he had not +advanced in force towards Quatre Bras, where his junction with Blücher +would be accomplished. The allied line of communication, therefore, on +the lateral road of Nivelles-Namur was not held by the Allies in force; +it was all but in the hands of the enemy. The allied centre was +completely exposed, and Napoleon might reasonably expect either to +beat in detail the allied chiefs, should they venture to offer battle, +or to seize the points of Quatre Bras and Sombreffe, and to interpose +between Blücher and Wellington. + + [Illustration: + + Theatre of the + CAMPAIGN + of 1815.] + +This was the situation on the morning of the 16th, and it was full +of great, nay, of splendid, promise. Napoleon was now at Charleroi, +about to start for Fleurus, and to take the command of his corps near +Sombreffe. He has been charged with delay, I think unjustly, and he +was not fully aware of the enemy’s movements; but his general position +was so good, and his general directions were so well planned, that +accidents only robbed him of a decisive victory. He ordered Ney on his +left to seize Quatre Bras, driving back any forces of the Duke at hand. +The Marshal was then to descend on the rear of Blücher, who was to be +attacked near Sombreffer, in front, by the Emperor; and had this grand +manœuvre been properly carried out, Blücher must have been routed and +forced away to the Meuse, and Wellington would have been in the extreme +of peril, for both generals were now trying to join hands at Quatre +Bras and Sombreffe, and were laying themselves open to the whole force +of Napoleon. Ney could have easily fulfilled his mission; but he had +lost the confidence of better days; he waited many hours before he even +tried to move; and he failed to accomplish his main task, falling from +Quatre Bras on the rear of Blücher. + +Napoleon, meanwhile, marching from Fleurus, had attacked Blücher +between Sombreffe and Ligny. The battle raged furiously for a +considerable time, to the disadvantage of the Prussians on the whole, +but no decisive success had been won; and the Emperor, perceiving that +no force was closing on Blücher from the direction of Ney, tried to +attain his object by another method. One of Ney’s corps had advanced +slowly; the Emperor directed this towards Blücher’s flank, while +Blücher was to be assailed, as before, in front; and had this stroke +been pressed home, the result would have been the same as that of +the first projected attack. D’Erlon, however, the unlucky chief of +this corps, was, when on the path of victory, called up by Ney, hard +pressed by Wellington at this moment; and Napoleon, I think, must have +concurred in this, for the defeat of Ney would have been disastrous, +though this extreme caution was, perhaps, an error. Blücher escaped +destruction through these mishaps; but Napoleon’s attack in front had +partial success, and the Prussian army was driven, in defeat, from +the field. On the other side of the scenes of manœuvre, Ney, we have +seen, had not reached Blücher, and had missed his mark; he had most +unfortunately recalled D’Erlon, and he had suffered a repulse from +the hands of Wellington, who had kept Quatre Bras though with much +difficulty. Ney, however, had gained a strategic advantage; he had +prevented Wellington from joining Blücher, and as Blücher had been +forced away from Sombreffe, the Duke would be compelled to retreat; +the line of communication of the allied armies was practically already +in Napoleon’s hands; and his operations had been largely successful, +if they had not led to a second Jena, as he had reason to expect a few +hours before. Such had been the result of his fine strategy, although +that result had not been complete; and it should be borne in mind that +the allied armies were not far from double his own in numbers. + +The allied generals, obliged, through the defeat of Ligny, to abandon +their proper line of junction--the great road between Nivelles +and Namur--were now thrown back into the country behind it, the +thick-wooded and marshy valley of the Dyle, very difficult for the +passage of armies. The real student of war will not doubt as to what +their movements ought to have been; they should either have united +their forces at once, a few miles behind Quatre Bras and Sombreffe, +or they should have retreated two marches away to Brussels, where, +having an overwhelming superiority of strength, they might have derided +Napoleon’s efforts. They took, however, an intermediate course--a half +measure often disastrous in war; Blücher fell back some twenty miles +to Wavre, the Duke fell back from Quatre Bras to Waterloo, and holding +these positions they meant to join hands and accept, if offered, a +great battle. + +The idolaters of success, supposed to cover everything, have praised +this as scientific strategy, but it was bad strategy, and dangerous +in the extreme. Wavre is considerably farther from Waterloo than +Sombreffe is from Quatre Bras; what is more important, a most intricate +country divides Wavre from Waterloo, and in this operation Blücher and +Wellington were playing into the hands of their renowned adversary. +Napoleon was given three alternatives, each big with the promise +of immense success. He might call on his victorious army to make a +forced march, might fall either on Blücher or Wellington, and defeat +either within a few hours, before Wavre or Waterloo were reached; or +collecting together all his forces, he might attack Blücher at Wavre, +or the Duke at Waterloo, before either could join the other; or, in +truer accordance with the principles of the art, he might restrain +Blücher, with a retarding force, sent quickly from Ligny to hold him +in check, and might attack Wellington with the mass of his army--the +favourite manœuvre, in which he has had no rival--and in any of these +cases he must have triumphed, over-matched as he was by his foes in +numbers. The double retreat on Wavre and Waterloo was therefore a +thoroughly false movement; and the General of Rivoli would have made it +fatal. But the General of Rivoli, full of genius as ever, had lost the +iron strength of twenty years before. Napoleon returned after Ligny, +to Fleurus, ill; he went to sleep and could not see his staff, and +this illness, at a crisis in the campaign, saved the Allies, and had +momentous results. + +During the night of the 16th and the morning of the 17th, the French +army remained motionless. Soult and Ney literally did nothing, no +preparations for marching were made; the Emperor sent no orders from +Fleurus; and, worst of all, Grouchy given the command of the right on +the 16th, made no real effort to reconnoitre the Prussians, and to find +out where they had gone. Disease, in fact, had weakened the energy of +the chief; his lieutenants, fashioned to servitude, let things drift, +and the opportunity of the 16th, given on the 17th once more, was lost +never again to return. Napoleon was back at Ligny in the forenoon of +the 17th; a letter of Soult, the Chief of the Staff, proves that his +first intention was to halt for the day, for he believed that the +Prussians, completely routed, were falling back on their base, towards +the Meuse, and there would be time, he thought, to turn against and +defeat Wellington. On learning, however, from Ney, on the left, that +parts of the Duke’s forces were still at Quatre Bras, he resolved to +advance, and try to destroy them; and he made preparations, now very +late, for a combined movement against the Allies. He divided his army +into two groups; at the head of the first, about 72,000 men, he meant +to attack Wellington and bring him to bay; he gave Grouchy the second, +about 34,000 strong, and he informed the Marshal that his mission was +to pursue Blücher and to keep him in sight, and to interpose between +Blücher and Wellington who, the Emperor added, was to be assailed +should he stand near the neighbouring forest of Soignies. + +Napoleon broke up from Ligny early in the afternoon; he was soon joined +by Ney at Quatre Bras, and he endeavoured to harass the rearguard of +the Duke, who by this time had his main force at Waterloo. The pursuit, +however, had no results--it was too late, in fact, to be of use--and +an extraordinary tempest of rain had broken over the country, and all +but stopped marching. Before night fell, the heads of the French army +had reached the low hills that overlook Waterloo, and a large army was +evidently in position before them. Napoleon halted, hopeful of a great +coming battle; but some hours before he sent directions to Grouchy, on +his right, which require attention. Before leaving Ligny the Emperor, +we have seen, believed that Blücher was making for his base, and had +spoken to Grouchy in that sense; but on his way from Ligny to Quatre +Bras he was made aware that a large Prussian force had been seen on +the Orneau, near Gembloux. He immediately sent new orders to Grouchy, +and directed him to advance on Gembloux, and, of course, generally to +comply with his first orders. Grouchy, who had broken up from Ligny +late, set off for Gembloux in the afternoon; and though Blücher had +had a long start, and Gembloux was by no means the best position to +be taken for an advance on Wavre, still the Emperor’s directions +were correct enough to have enabled a bold and capable chief to have +fulfilled his all-important mission, to have attained Blücher and +kept him off from Wellington. Grouchy reached Gembloux rather late at +night--the state of the roads and the weather excuse him--and he can +hardly be blamed, though the fact is strange, that even at this time he +was not informed with perfect accuracy about the Prussian movements. +Within a short time, however, he had ascertained that a great part +of Blücher’s army had made for Wavre; another part, he was told, was +marching on Perwez, towards the Meuse. He communicated this important +news to the Emperor, and he expressly added, “that he would advance +on Wavre, should the mass of the Prussians go that way, in order to +separate Blücher from Wellington,” proving that he perfectly understood +his mission. + +This intelligence--received during the night of the 17th--was +calculated to make Napoleon certain, especially as it was his own idea, +that he had nothing to fear from the Prussian army; he thought only of +fighting Wellington, and he made preparations to attack on the morrow. +The Prussian veteran, however, who more than once had baffled the +Emperor by his audacious movements, had resolved, whatever the risk, to +advance on Waterloo. He had rallied his whole army around Wavre, his +first corps, that of Bülow, had come into line, and he had given his +word to the Duke, who on the faith of the pledge was in position to +fight at Waterloo, that “the whole Prussian army would be on the field +by the early forenoon of the 18th of June.” Blücher nobly endeavoured +to fulfil his promise. Bülow broke up from Wavre at daybreak on the +18th, but the obstacles he met were formidable in the extreme; he was +still far from Wellington’s lines at noon, and his three colleagues, +Ziethen, Pirch and Thielmann, were still close to Wavre, nearly a march +distant, and were on a perilous flank march, in long straggling +columns. + +Meanwhile Grouchy had left Gembloux for Wavre, to follow up the +enemy--he had now ascertained that all Blücher’s army had gathered +round the place the night before--but his operations were simply +wretched. He knew that Napoleon meant to fight Wellington, should +Wellington make a stand at Soignies; he knew that he was detached +to hold Blücher in check, and to keep him completely apart from +Wellington; he knew that the Prussians had been round Wavre, and had +informed his master, in part, of the fact; he knew that Wavre was a +march from Soignies and Waterloo, and he knew that at Gembloux he +was some fourteen miles from Wavre. Knowing all this, he should have +left Gembloux at the first peep of dawn on the 18th of June, and have +advanced as quickly as possible; and common sense should have taught +him so to make for Wavre as to get across the Dyle, in order to draw +near Napoleon and to cut off Blücher on his way to Wellington, for +probably Blücher was making the attempt. He took exactly the opposite +course; he left Gembloux many hours too late; his movement on Wavre was +pitiably slow, and he made for Wavre, not over the Dyle, which would +have soon placed him on the flank of Blücher, but along the stream, +striking Blücher, if reached, in the rear, and pushing him, so to +speak, on Wellington. This miserable generalship led to what followed; +and Grouchy was so obstinate, and so blind to fact, that when he heard +the far-distant thunder of Waterloo, he refused to follow the sagacious +advice of Gérard and to march, at the eleventh hour, towards the flank +of the enemy! + +While these operations, big with a great future, had been taking place +on Napoleon’s right, the Emperor had attacked Wellington, who, with +faith in his colleague, awaited his foe in a long-studied position. +Napoleon had intended to attack early, but the state of the roads +and the weather made an attack hazardous, and he delayed some hours, +greatly to the Duke’s advantage. The Emperor’s general plan--the last +exhibition of his genius in the sphere of higher tactics--was to turn +Wellington’s left and to force his centre, making a demonstration to +engage his right; his adversary’s was to hold his ground until the +arrival of Blücher would make success certain. The grand attack on +the British left and centre failed, partly owing to the excellence +of the British troops, and partly to the density and cumbrousness of +the French columns; and the feint on Wellington’s right had no more +success, and led to terrible waste of blood. + +By this time Napoleon had learned that Bülow was gathering on his flank +with 30,000 men, but he hoped this was a stray column which Grouchy +might arrest and perhaps destroy, and he turned fiercely against the +centre of his foe, abandoning the effort against the British left, +which, with Bülow at hand, would have been too hazardous. This attack +was successful to some extent; La Haye Sainte, a fortified post, was +captured. This made a gap in Wellington’s defence, and Napoleon, +confident that victory was at hand, launched a great mass of cavalry +against the Duke’s centre, intending to support the movement with the +Imperial Guard. But at this crisis of the battle Blücher was near. +Despising wounds, defeat, and days of fatigue, he ordered Bülow to fall +on the Emperor’s flank. This prevented the attack the Guard was to +make, and though the French horsemen made heroic exertions, the British +and German infantry “stood rooted in the earth”; and the cavalry, +recklessly squandered by Ney but not supported by foot, were at last +beaten. + +During all this time, Bülow had been striking Napoleon’s right; but at +about 7 this attack seemed spent. The French still occupied the thin +red line of Wellington, the artillery of Grouchy was heard at Wavre--a +pledge that he was keeping the Prussians back--and victory for France +seemed yet possible. Napoleon formed the Guard into two great columns, +but Wellington had admirably strengthened his centre; the first column +was fairly beaten, and the second, kept in reserve, could give it no +aid. A sudden change now came over the battle; parts of the corps +of Ziethen and Pirch appeared on the field; the attack of Bülow was +fiercely renewed; British squadrons, let loose, swept over the plain; +and the Duke, seeing the day was won, ordered a general advance of his +worn-out army. The French, routed and surrounded, had soon no army, and +night closed on a scene of carnage and ruin, the presage of Napoleon’s +second fall. + +Napoleon’s plan of attack on his last field was perfect, but his +tactics at Waterloo show many errors. He was certainly in difficulties +after the flank attack of Bülow, but he allowed his troops to be wasted +in the feint on our right; he made a premature use of his noble +cavalry, and he perhaps missed an opportunity to strike with the Guard +before Bülow’s diversion had become serious. For these mistakes he must +be held responsible, though he was badly seconded by his lieutenants, +especially by Ney--desperate, and stung by conscience--but all this was +because, as is now well known,[23] he was ill and worn out on the 18th +of June. The Duke, on the other hand, was the soul of the defence. He +made, indeed, a grave strategic mistake in leaving a large detachment +far off on his right, but his conduct of the battle was above praise; +and though he must have lost Waterloo had not the Prussians come up, +still the defeat would not have been the rout to which Napoleon had +looked with confidence. + +Nevertheless, the result of Waterloo flowed from combinations outside +the field. It was caused by the junction of part of Blücher’s army with +Wellington; and the question for the student of war is, ought this +junction to have been prevented by Grouchy, detached by the Emperor to +make it impossible? The answer must largely depend on conjecture; but +I, for one, can have few doubts. Had Grouchy left Gembloux at daybreak +on the 18th, and, crossing the Dyle, made for Blücher’s flank, he would +have surprised the Prussian army in divided columns on a flank march of +extreme peril; and, giving Blücher credit for his splendid energy, I +am convinced he would have paused to confront his enemy, and this must +have prevented him reaching Wellington. The same result would have, +perhaps, followed, and this is Napoleon’s deliberate view[24]--not +impartial, perhaps, but not to be dismissed--had Grouchy simply marched +on Wavre in time, and fastened upon the rear of Blücher. The Emperor +insists that, even in this case, not a Prussian division would have +attained Waterloo. The arguments urged against these conclusions +disregard the peril of the march from Wavre, and the very events of +the day confute them. Grouchy, who should have been near Wavre at 11 +A.M., did not reach it until 4 P.M., and yet his apparition stopped +the Prussian army; Ziethen and Pirch were delayed, Thielmann was left +at Wavre, and Blücher brought only 45,000 men, out of 90,000, to the +field of Waterloo, and that too only between 4 A.M. and 8 P.M. In view +of this fact, I can draw but one inference, and in this controversy all +that has been written by Charras, and authors of his school, seems to +me worthless. + + [Illustration: NEY AT WATERLOO.] + +A word on this memorable campaign, as a whole, and as to the lessons +it really teaches. Napoleon’s first operations were a masterpiece of +war; and these, and the grave strategic faults of the Allies--Blücher +ran into the lion’s mouth, the Duke did not know how sudden was his +spring--exposed both to alarming danger, and ought to have secured the +Emperor a decisive victory. The errors, however, of Ney and D’Erlon +saved Blücher at Ligny from utter ruin, and Napoleon’s over caution as +regards D’Erlon--though this is theory after the event--was certainly +unfortunate to the interests of France. The double retreat at Wavre +and Waterloo--another palpable strategic fault--gave Napoleon a second +great opportunity. No doubt can exist for those who understand his +career, that he would have seized it early on the 17th had he been +the chief of a few years before,[25] but he was no longer equal to +prolonged fatigue, and the negligence of his lieutenants and his +slumber at Fleurus lost him a chance not again afforded by fortune. +His prospects were not equally good on the 18th; he calculated on +destroying Wellington, but this, I believe, was beyond his powers, and +his delays, and the direction given to Grouchy and his wing, made it +possible for Blücher to join Wellington, a possibility that might have +been wholly excluded. Nevertheless, he ought to have gained Waterloo. +The arrangement of Grouchy’s force was sufficiently correct to have +enabled Grouchy to stop Blücher, and though the Emperor made more than +one mistake--and supreme genius is not omniscience--we still see in +this campaign the matchless strategist, great as ever in intellect, +but no longer equal, through physical weakness, to work out his +conceptions. Yet when this has been said, justice should be done to the +allied chiefs; and they deserved their triumph. Both, no doubt, made +serious strategic errors; from first to last they proved themselves +to be, strategically, unfit to cope with Napoleon, but both exhibited +as soldiers the finest qualities. Blücher’s conduct in rallying his +defeated army, and in attempting the march on Waterloo, shows energy +of the highest order. Wellington’s constancy and tactical skill at +Waterloo are admirable specimens of his genius in defence. The test of +the merits of the two commanders is to compare their conduct with what +would have been the conduct of any other chief of the Coalition opposed +to Napoleon; Schwartzenburg would not have risked the march from Wavre, +the Archduke Charles would have fallen back from Waterloo when he found +that the promised support was late, and in either event the Emperor +would have won the battle. Two subordinate causes of the issue of the +campaign cannot, in addition, be passed over. Napoleon’s army was too +small; 128,000 men could, with difficulty, be opposed to 224,000, and +this led to a distribution of his force--his wings not being well +connected with a weak centre--which partly explains his lieutenants’ +faults, if it does not afford an excuse for them. The Prussian army, +besides, was a different army from that which had succumbed at Jena. +Napoleon refused to see the distinction; he would not believe--as, in +all instances, disregarding national and popular feeling--that it could +rally after Ligny, and draw near Wellington, and this had something +to do with his overthrow, though, I repeat, Blücher could not have +succeeded had Grouchy been a capable chief. + +I shall not dwell on the closing scenes of a most strange and eventful +history. Napoleon at St. Helena realised the legend of the fabled +Prometheus; Genius, in conflict with Supreme Fact, was chained to a +rock, and held down by Force, and humanity turns away from the agony. +Yet impartial history will truly say that it was just to deprive +the great troubler of the world of liberty, and the animosities and +fears of the time account for, if they do not excuse, the indignities +suffered by the fallen Emperor. The student of war will turn with +gratitude to the rich fruits of Napoleon’s exile, his writings on +the art, in thought and style superior to all productions of the +kind, and those who imagine that German genius has created the latest +developments of war will be surprised to learn that if we omit what +belongs to purely material inventions, it has been anticipated at every +point by Napoleon. + +My estimate of this extraordinary man can be easily gathered from what +I have written. Nature gave her prodigy an imagination such as she gave +to Dante and Milton; she added a power of calculation and thought, such +as she bestowed on Newton and Laplace; she contributed a superabundant +and practical energy, embracing alike what was great and small, such as +scarcely ever has been seen in man, and she conferred craft, dexterity, +readiness, and firmness of character in a most ample measure. Gifts +such as these would have made Napoleon one of the greatest of generals +in any age; but he fell on a time when the progress of husbandry and +facilities of locomotion, greatly increased, had created new conditions +for the military art; and when, too, Revolution in France had given a +powerful impulse to the human mind, and had made it singularly bold +and aspiring. Genius and circumstance thus concurred to place Napoleon +almost at once at the head of all warriors of modern times; and for +years it seemed, as if Fortune, whatever he did in the field, assured +him victory. He was unrivalled, from the first, as a strategist; the +plans of his early campaigns are marvels of genius as distinctive as +those of Shakspeare or Raphael; but though imagination is their most +striking feature, this as yet, as a rule, is controlled by judgment, +and astonishing as they are, they are thoroughly practical. The +peculiar excellence of these prodigies of art is the mastery of the +theatre of war, and Napoleon’s power in making it answer his ends; +the campaign on the Adige, that which led to Marengo, and that of +Austerlitz are perhaps the finest specimens of this supreme merit. +Conceptions, however, in war are useless unless skilful execution +follows; and Napoleon’s execution of his strategic projects was more +wonderful than the projects themselves. In these operations he, of +course, adhered to the methods of his great predecessors, for these +were in accord with the nature of things, and carried out principles +always true; for example, like every real strategist, his constant +object was to bring superior force to the decisive point, and so +to baffle and defeat the enemy; and, with these ends in view, like +Turenne, he struck repeatedly at the communications of his foe, and +endeavoured to gain his flank or rear; or, throwing himself between +divided enemies, attacked them in detail, and beat them down in +succession. But all this he did with an originality of design, with a +force of calculation, and, above all perhaps, with a power of stratagem +unequalled by Turenne or by any commander of modern times. + +Nothing since the days of Hannibal can be compared to the descent +from the Alps, which conquered Italy, and to the march from the +Channel to the Danube, which destroyed a whole army by manœuvres, +and threw the gates of distant Vienna open. These marvels of war, it +must be borne in mind, however, were due not to Napoleon alone; they +were to be attributed, in a great degree, to circumstance and to his +perfect appreciation of it. From the new conditions made possible in +war, from the growth of agriculture and the multiplication of roads, +armies could subsist, in every fertile country, for the most part, +on resources on the spot, and could therefore dispense, to a certain +extent, with _impedimenta_ necessary before; they could also march +on a variety of lines with a rapidity never before possible; and the +art, so to speak, was given wings, and could take a flight into a new +sphere. First of the men of his time, Napoleon grasped these facts; +his armies living on the tracts they passed through, and making use +of every available road that was compatible with their safety on the +march, moved, not without magazines, indeed, nor without a solid base +and all kinds of supplies, but with a celerity never before known; and +the young chief out-manœuvred and terrified generals accustomed only +to the methods of the past. This was one of the secrets of Napoleon’s +early success; his genius fell in with and made the most of the new +conditions of the art of war, and for a long time he came, he saw, and +he conquered. Yet what had been a talisman might prove a peril, should +these conditions happen to fail; and history was to illustrate this by +most striking examples. + +Napoleon was thus the first of strategists; he stands supreme, like +a Himalayan peak; there is nothing equal to him in this sphere of +the art. He has been surpassed in the lesser tactics; he never was a +regimental leader; he commanded in chief at too early an age to have +had practical experience of the three arms; he perhaps underrated the +strength of infantry, and rather exaggerated the force of cavalry, +and the only arm he thoroughly understood was artillery. But in the +province of the higher tactics, where strategy and tactics blend with +each other, his pre-eminence nearly, if not quite, reappears. He +detected the decisive point on a field of battle, and the true way to +cope with an enemy, almost as surely as on a great field of manœuvre; +but faults I shall notice were here sometimes seen, and I do not think +he excelled Marlborough, a tactician of the very first order. As a +military administrator he was, perhaps, unrivalled. His industry, his +grasp of facts in the mass, and his extraordinary mastery of details +were marvellous; and though the Grand Army had many defects, for it was +the hasty creation of an age of war, still it was the best army that +had been seen since the Legions; and, unlike the conscript armies of +our age, it was subjected to trials they have never endured. Napoleon’s +_Correspondence_ can alone give us a notion of his administrative +powers; and their results are most conspicuous in his immense +preparations for the campaign of 1807, for the passage of the Danube in +1809, for the invasion of Russia in 1812; and for the restoration of +the military strength of France in 1813 and 1815. + +No wonder, then, that this prodigious genius, backed by favouring +circumstances, and the French Revolution, should have transformed the +art, to a great extent, and have given it an aspect of new grandeur. +Turenne did great things between the Scheldt and the Inn; Marlborough +did great things between the Meuse and the Danube; Frederick did great +things on the Elbe and the Oder; but what were these achievements, +splendid as they are, compared to Napoleon’s march of conquest? He +moves from the Var to the Po and the Adige, strikes down the power of +the House of Hapsburg, and dictates peace within sight of Vienna. He +issues from Switzerland across the Alps, envelops his enemy and gains +Italy; and had he had a lieutenant equal to himself, he would have +destroyed the Austrian armies in Swabia in 1800. He imprisons Mack in +1805, enters Vienna with an army encamped, a few weeks before, within +sight of our coasts, and annihilates for a time the military power of +Austria and Russia on the great day of Austerlitz, the most perfect +battle of the nineteenth century. The tale is the same the following +year; the operations are less striking, but Jena overwhelms the army +of Frederick, and a few days of well-planned manœuvres makes Napoleon +master of the Prussian monarchy. + +His unbroken success comes here to an end; but even in his campaigns +of chequered fortunes, nay of disasters, we see the same grandeur, +marred as it often is, of conception and action. He defies Nature, and +receives her warnings in Poland; he narrowly escapes defeat at Eylau, +but his genius and will re-establish his power, and he strikes the +Czar down on the verge of old Europe. He defies national right and +feeling in Spain and Portugal, and meets reverses justly deserved; +but he hastens across the Somo Sierra to Madrid, and for the time he +subdues the Peninsula. When called back to France by the sound of war +on the Danube, he rectifies errors made in his absence by operations +of consummate skill; he once more reaches and conquers Vienna, and +having challenged Fortune at Aspern and Essling, he answers her rebuff +by a prodigious effort of energy and perseverance at Lobau, and he +ultimately triumphs on the field of Wagram. + +The Nemesis of power attains him at last; his army is engulfed in the +snows of Russia, beyond the confines of the Western World, and yet +his movements are admirably designed, and his capacity was, perhaps, +never more conspicuous than at the Beresina. He reorganizes his forces +in 1813, with a rapidity and completeness that confound the Allies; +and though he loses at last his hold on Germany, he wins four great +battles, is able to make the issue of the contest doubtful for months, +and succumbs at Leipsic perhaps through defection only. + +In the campaign of 1814 he aims at too much, yet his genius shines out +with such malignant splendour that his enemies shrink in terror from +it; he is victorious over and over again, and he is only overwhelmed +because France and Paris will not support his Empire. In 1815 he +sinks at last, through the effects of a crushing military reverse; +yet even in this campaign, spite of the faults of lieutenants and the +determination and energy of foes, the presence of the great master is +seen everywhere; and he only just misses splendid success. + +Humanity, however, is never perfect, and there were many flaws in +this marvellous nature. The intensity of his imagination occasionally +mastered the prudence and calculating powers of Napoleon; we see this +even in his early years, in his project to march from the Nile to +the Indus, in his scheme of a descent on our coasts in the face of +immensely superior fleets; and we see it more clearly in his later +campaigns, in the advance from Smolensk into the depths of Muscovy, in +the attempt to reconquer the continent in 1813, in the resolution to +strike for the whole Empire, and not to recall all his forces to the +decisive point on the theatre in 1814. This dangerous quality sometimes +marred the strategy of Napoleon, and marked it with extravagance. He +was not so safe a strategist as Turenne, and his strategic reverses +were as great as his triumphs. Over confidence, too, and extreme +arrogance, combined with this excess of imaginative force, form +distinctive faults of Napoleon in war. We see them, even from the +first, in the campaigns of Italy; they appear plainly in his march on +Marengo, and nearly caused him to lose the battle; they are visible in +his advance on Austerlitz; they are conspicuous in his campaigns in +Poland; they largely contributed to the ruin of 1812; they prevented +him from saving his army at Leipsic; they lured him on to his fall in +1814; they are exhibited in 1815, in the false conviction that Blücher, +after Ligny, was utterly routed, and could not rally his shattered army. + +To this fault must be added another, a kind of passionate desire to +crush an enemy, whatever the risk, on the field of battle. Napoleon +showed this at Caldiero in 1796; perhaps at Eylau in 1807, distinctly +in 1809 at Aspern and Essling; and most remarkably, and with the +worst results, at La Rothière, Craonne, Laon, and Arcis in 1814. +This even lessens his excellence as a tactician. With his marvellous +insight, in comprehending the ground and the weak points of a foe, he +sometimes attacked imprudently, and deserved defeat. He had not the +calm intelligence of Marlborough on the field, and here he is certainly +less great than Marlborough. Napoleon, too, had another defect, of a +moral kind, not to be overlooked; no one could hold a prouder or a +more daring attitude, no one knew better the power of the renown of +arms, but he did not confront misfortune, when hope seemed lost, with +the indomitable constancy of some warriors. He was unequal to himself +during the retreat from Russia--he ought not, I think, to have quitted +his army; he tried to kill himself in 1814; and in this respect he +falls below Frederick, who, in all others, is not to be compared to him. + +Yet the most marked of his failures and shortcomings as a leader in +war have yet to be noticed. He thoroughly understood the material +conditions which made his grand offensive strategy possible. Yet he +disregarded the fact when these largely failed; he endeavoured to make +the same daring movements in barren Poland as in fertile Italy, in the +swamps and forests of Russia as in the plains of Germany; and though +he laboured to avert the resulting dangers, he could do so only in a +slight degree, and he failed when nature began to fail him. + +Napoleon, too, had this special fault; he had many of the instincts +of the old _régime_; he simply abhorred Jacobinism, and all +its doings; he believed in force only as the means of ruling; and +throughout his career he had a rooted dislike and contempt of all +popular movements and feelings. This tendency led him into capital +errors, even from a purely military point of view; he believed that +he could conquer England by a descent; he scorned the national rising +in Spain, though it destroyed the flower of his best armies; he would +not lift a hand to liberate Poland, though this must have disabled +the Czar; he would not even at Moscow set the serfs free; he laughed +at German and Russian patriotism, and found the results of his scoffs +at Leipsic; he called the liberal movement of France at the close +of his reign, “metaphysical nonsense and visionary stuff,” and this +contributed to his fall in 1814. + +In politics in the highest sense, and even in the larger affairs +of State, Napoleon did not attain supreme greatness. In this noble +province of wisdom and conduct, his genius was not in its true sphere, +the force of his intellect was out of its place; he followed false +lights, and fell into the gravest errors. His ideas of politics were +derived from the ambitious traditions of the old Monarchy, and from +the frightful scenes of the French Revolution, and his conception of +ruling was to extend the domination of France over a subject Continent, +and to keep down anarchy at home by despotic power, magnificent, +even national, but sternly repressive. His capacity, his craft, his +untiring energy were tasked to the utmost to compass these ends. The +Empire bestrode three-fourths of Europe; it extinguished Jacobinism +for some years in France, it nursed her in dreams of warlike glory, it +established order, prosperity, and material grandeur. Yet this vast +fabric of conquest and force, which, like the Satanic temple of the +poet’s vision, “rose like an exhalation,” as quickly vanished. The +Empire, founded on international wrong, and depending for its existence +on the enforced submission of great races conquered, but spurning the +yoke, was a defiance to Law divine and human; it was a contradiction to +the nature of things; and the methods by which its author upheld it, +harsh tyranny, statecraft, and the Continental system, were assurances +of his speedy overthrow. + +As for Napoleon’s system of domestic government, splendid as it +seemed, and as it was for a time, it had no stability and could not +endure; it rested on the mere rule of the sword; it had no solid +support in old institutions, in settled traditions, in powerful +orders of men; it was a despotism controlling a demoralised people, +in which revolution had destroyed faith and loyalty. The character, +too, of this rule was bad; the execution of the Duc D’Enghien, and +many similar deeds of blood, were crimes that shocked the conscience +of mankind. Napoleon’s Bodies of State, his spy system, his organized +informers, his repression of thought, remind us of the Rome of the +later Cæsars; and, curiously enough, he hated Tacitus, the immortal +censor of Imperial tyranny. Yet the Empire was not a mere scheme of +oppression. It had a grand and beneficent side; it bears the marks of +the administrative gifts and capacity of its great creator; it largely +civilized while it subdued; it saved France from the vile rule of +demagogues; it gave her all that is solid in her social fabric, and the +Codes will outlive Marengo and Jena. + +A word on Napoleon in his tent and his camp, the natural home of this +mighty spirit. The great captain was, in the main, a kind master to +submissive lieutenants; he lavished wealth and honours on his generals +and marshals; he was usually good-natured to these docile servitors. +But his personality was so overpowering that he made his subordinates +mere pawns on the board; he deprived them of self-reliance and freedom, +and as his nature was not magnanimous, he repeatedly blamed them for +his own errors. The results were injurious to him as a chief. Few of +his marshals were fit for independent command; they had little power of +initiative or true capacity, and they indemnified themselves for his +rebukes and gibes by squabbling, and often thwarting each other, as was +notably seen in Spain and Portugal. It was otherwise with the mass of +the army; here Napoleon’s influence was immense for good. He obtained +efforts from French soldiers, which no other chief has ever obtained; +his presence among them it has been said, was equal to 40,000 men; he +was prodigal of their blood, and set at nought their sufferings, if any +object was to be attained; but he was careful of their wants, knew how +to win their hearts, and was adored with a truly idolatrous passion. + +As has been seen in the case of other great men, the inner life of +Napoleon had repulsive features; the figure loses majesty, when +undraped of its trappings. He had been brought up in an age of +wickedness, and Napoleon could lie, cheat, and forge with complete +indifference, if anything was to be gained by it. His manner and +voice could charm and fascinate, but his imperious nature made him +rude and brusque; he could scold and fly into fits of temper; “his +very caresses,” it has been said, “were feline”; he could be coarsely +familiar and suddenly savage. In his general bearing there was a want +of repose, of true self-respect, of natural dignity. In all these +respects, as in the weightier matters which pertain to the master art +of Empire, Napoleon falls far behind Cæsar through unquestionably the +superior of Cæsar in war. + + [Illustration] + + + + + CHAPTER IX. + + WELLINGTON. + + +Arthur Wellesley was born in 1769, a few weeks before the birth of +Napoleon. His family belonged to “the English in Ireland”--a happy +expression of Mr. Froude; and the future soldier and statesman in his +great career displayed many of the distinctive qualities of a ruling +caste which, though of late decried by traders in faction for selfish +purposes, has nevertheless given more than a due proportion of eminent +men to the service of England. The ancient seat of the Wellesleys has +been long a ruin; the traditions of Meath yield few records concerning +a House which produced two of the most illustrious names in our +eventful history, and all that is really known about the first years +of Arthur is that he was a sickly child, overlooked by his parents. +At Eton the boy showed none of the brilliancy of his elder brother +Richard, a precocious genius; he was unnoticed at the military school +of Angers, and no one who saw the two youths in these years would have +thought that the fame of “the Wellesley of Assaye” would eclipse that +of “the Wellesley of Mysore.” + + [Illustration: WELLINGTON.] + +Arthur obtained his first commission in 1787; passed rapidly +through the intermediate grades, after the bad fashion of that age +of privilege, and was placed, through interest, at the head of the +Thirty-third, just as the Great War with France had begun. During the +intervening period he had held a seat for the borough of Trim in the +Irish Parliament, and had been on the staff of the Lord Lieutenant +Camden; and some faint memories of his life in those days have survived +down to the present time. Passing by idle gossip, the young member +spoke on the Catholic Relief Bill of 1798; the speech, though dry and +blunt, goes straight to the point, and is characteristic in many ways; +and an old house on the quays of Dublin which commands the Liffey and +the adjoining streets, and which, it is said, he urged the Government +to buy, remains to this day to prove that Wellington had in early youth +a true military eye. It is impossible to doubt that, even in these +years, Arthur had studied and read a great deal, and was well-versed +in his professional work. He had acquired a command of the English +and French tongues which made him the master of a vigorous style, not +brilliant or striking, but clear and solid; his writings nearly of +this date give proof of thorough information on many subjects, and of +singularly ripe and disciplined thought; and from the first moment that +he obtained a regiment, he made his mark as a most promising officer. +Like Turenne, Wellesley addressed himself with untiring industry to +the care of his men; he enforced discipline with a steady hand, and +showed that he had the faculty of command; and, like Turenne, he was +soon able to boast that his corps was well-ordered and very efficient. +The occasion quickly came when the young colonel was to show that he +possessed qualities above those of the common herd of men. + +In the unfortunate campaign of 1794 the Thirty-third formed part of +the British army, which, under the command of the Duke of York, had +been separated from the main allied force retreating on a divergent +line to the Meuse, and which, hardly pressed by the Republican levies, +advancing upon the flood-tide of victory, was endeavouring to make its +way into Holland. Wellesley distinguished himself in several rearguard +actions, displaying from the first the skill in defence, the resource +in danger, and the perfect self-reliance, which were peculiar gifts of +the future chief; and it is significant that he was chosen to cover the +retreat, a task he performed with marked ability. These experiences +made a profound impression on a remarkably penetrating and sagacious +mind; they seem to have led him to observe carefully, and to form an +admirably just estimate of what he called “the new methods” of French +warfare, and of what was good and defective in them; they enabled him +to realise the immense abuses then prevalent in the Continental armies, +and to a considerable extent in our own; and, unquestionably, they +were of the greatest use as a preparation for the Peninsular War. It +is remarkable that, after this first essay in arms, most honourable +as it had been to him, Wellesley tried to give up a military career, +and actually applied for a post in the Civil Service; the reason he +assigned was that he saw little chance of advancement through merit +in the British army, to the shortcomings of which he had become fully +alive. + +Fate happily disregarded Wellesley’s prayers; and having escaped exile +to the West Indies, he was sent off to Calcutta in 1797. A short time +afterwards, his brother Richard, the Marquis Wellesley of a later day, +arrived in India as Governor-General, and the real career of Arthur +may be said to have opened. Much of his correspondence of this period +remains, and it bears the marks of the prudent forethought, of the +clear insight into men and things, and, above all, of the moderation of +view, which distinguished Wellington when at the summit of fame. He was +often consulted by the Governor-General, and it is interesting to note +how the ambitious statesman,[26] a more brilliant but a less scrupulous +man, was more than once restrained by the calm-minded soldier. Arthur +Wellesley’s judgments on Indian affairs were such as Marcus Aurelius +might have made had he been a Pro-consul in a province of Rome; he was +the constant advocate of peace with honour, of keeping the strictest +faith with the Princes of Hindustan, of no undue extension of our +growing Empire; and yet he thoroughly understood the true nature of +that wonderful domination which, in spite of itself, was winning its +way to supremacy in the East, in virtue partly of its own force, and +in part of the decay of all powers around it, and of the jealousies +and discords of its numerous foes. Another characteristic of these +papers is this: they show that the writer had admirable views on +military and civil administration alike; and the remarks on the whole +system of our Indian Government, which repeatedly occur, are profound +and striking. Peace in India at this time had become impossible; the +inglorious satrapy of Sir John Shore had only encouraged the hopes of +our enemies; and the news of Napoleon’s descent on Egypt, and of his +avowed project to march to the Indus, had animated Tippoo Sahib to +endeavour to break the settlement made by Cornwallis in 1793. I shall +not repeat the often-told tale of the dealings of “citizen Tippoo” with +the Directory of France; of the assistance he received from French +soldiers of fortune; of the siege of Seringapatam, and his death; this +scarcely belongs to Wellesley’s career, who was a subordinate only in +the attack on the fortress, and who, in these operations, happened to +meet one of the few reverses he met through life. He was made Governor +of Seringapatam, and afterwards of Mysore; and in this position he +first gave proof not only of great administrative powers, but of that +capacity for ruling alien races--for reconciling the ascendency of +the English name with the obedience of people completely different--a +gift partly due, perhaps,[27] to his Irish experience, and partly to +firmness, patience, and a strict regard to justice, which stood him in +good stead in Spain and Portugal. Ere long Wellesley, now raised to the +rank of General, had an opportunity to show what he was in command. + +He had distinguished himself, when at Mysore, in putting down a +Mahratta partisan who had ravaged the country with part of Tippoo’s +forces; and when Scindiah and Holkar in 1803 made a determined +effort to destroy our Empire, Wellesley was placed at the head of an +independent army, and advanced from Madras into the Central Provinces. +I pass over his forced march to Poona, considered in those days a +remarkable feat, and his rapid operations in the Deccan; and I proceed +at once to the really grand exploit which gave him, for the first time, +a great name in India. Wellesley and Stevenson, in September 1803, were +near the Kaitna, one of the Godavery’s streams, at the head of about +16,000 men; Scindiah’s army, 50,000 strong, commanded and organized +by French officers, was in camp at no great distance; and the two +Englishmen agreed to attack it, on lines divided by a wide range of +hills, strategy which, even in the case of Indian warfare, was too +hazardous, and cannot be justified. Wellesley came up with the enemy +at Assaye, his colleague being still far away; and, as more than once +was seen in his career, his boldness on the ground and his quickness in +action made more than amends for a strategic error. Disregarding all +odds, like Clive at Plassey, he instantly fell on the masses before +him; and though the issue of the battle was doubtful for a time, +nothing could stand against his British foot and horsemen, and in a +few hours he gained a complete victory. Stevenson arrived before long, +and the campaign ended in the easy triumph of Wellesley’s arms, and +in a large increase of our Indian dominions. Yet Assaye had, perhaps, +other results; the strategy of Wellesley was, no doubt, faulty; and the +battle probably gave Napoleon, who let nothing escape him in war, that +first false impression of the “Sepoy general,” which caused him greatly +to undervalue Wellington, with fatal consequences to France in the +Peninsular contest. + +Wellington always looked back on India with pride; and nearly two +generations after Assaye, when he had been for many years the first of +living Englishmen, he actually proposed to set off for the East, when +danger threatened our power on the Indus. An attentive observer will, +indeed, perceive that his career in Hindustan foreshadows, in part, his +more renowned career in Portugal and Spain; we see in both the same +sober wisdom, the same administrative gifts, the same intrepid conduct, +if Wellesley had no opportunity to display his skill in defence +in Asiatic warfare. He was back in England a few weeks before the +memorable events of Ulm and Trafalgar; but he was relegated at first to +a civil post, and he became Chief Secretary for Ireland under the Duke +of Richmond. + +The state of the island was very critical; the fires of 1798 were still +smouldering, and the unpopularity of the Union strengthened the hands +of the remains of the rebel Irish faction, which continually looked +to France for aid, though, characteristically, scorned by Napoleon. +Wellesley ruled after the fashion of those days: that is, he kept +Celtic discontent down and threw bribes and places to greedy seekers of +both, in order to extend ministerial influence; but he was perfectly +aware of the many abuses then prevalent in the social condition of +Ireland, and his warnings on the subject now appear prophetic. He was +at the bombardment of Copenhagen in 1807; was chosen by Lord Cathcart +to arrange the terms of the surrender of the fleet with the Danish +commander; and won golden opinions in this delicate task from brave +enemies, whom he seems to have pitied. At last, in the summer of 1808, +fortune found for him a place on the theatre of the great events +which were stirring the Continent especially adapted to his peculiar +genius, and launched him on the career which has made him famous. By +this time Napoleon’s first invasion of Spain was ending in calamitous +failure; the French armies were falling back at all points, and the +British Government resolved to strike a blow at Junot and his corps, +isolated in the midst of Portugal. Wellesley set off from Cork in the +middle of July, at the head of about 10,000 men; and a remark he made +to his friend Croker, when leaving, shows the character of the man +and his strong nature. “The French armies,” he said, “have beaten all +the Continent. They have, it seems, adopted a new system; they have +out-manœuvred every enemy they have met, but I do not think they will +outmanœuvre me, though, as a matter of course, I may be outnumbered.” + +Wellesley had landed at Mondego Bay in the first week of August; he was +soon joined by about 5,000 men under General Spencer, from the south +of Spain, and he ultimately had nearly 20,000 troops, by the addition +of a British division and some Portuguese auxiliaries. The effect of +the descent was to throw a superior hostile force on the communications +of Junot’s army, and to place it in grave peril, for it was split in +fractions; and Wellesley hoped to cut it off from Lisbon, and, should +a detachment under Sir John Moore co-operate, even to intercept its +retreat on Elvas, and so to cause its complete ruin. This able plan +was frustrated by a series of accidents, though it led to a brilliant +if not a decisive victory. Wellesley attacked and defeated a French +division at Roliça on the 17th of August; and he was in turn assailed +when on the march to Lisbon, at Vimeiro, not far from the coast, by +Junot, who had assumed the offensive with from 14,000 to 16,000 men. +The efforts of the French completely failed; and as their defeated +columns drew off, Wellesley eagerly tried to follow up his success, and +to force Junot against the Tagus, where, even without the aid of Moore, +he might destroy the Marshal. This bold and brilliant stroke was, +however, prevented by the interference of Sir Harry Burrard, a veteran +of the old school, who had come from England, unluckily, to take the +chief command, and the French army escaped unmolested. The Convention +of Cintra soon followed; and though a storm of indignation arose at the +time, because Junot and his troops were landed in France, it is but +fair to remark that as Moore did not complete the operation laid out +for him, the French would probably have made good their retreat. The +one real opportunity was lost at Vimeiro, owing to a change of leaders +at a critical moment. + + [Illustration: Theatre, of the + + PENINSULAR WAR.] + +This short campaign brought out one of the gifts of Wellesley, capacity +for bold offensive movements, not on a grand scale but within limits +where readiness and vigour are of special value. His ability was +recognized at the inquiry held in England, after the affair of Cintra; +and he returned to Portugal in the spring of 1809 in supreme command of +a mixed force of British and of Portuguese troops, perhaps altogether +40,000 strong, which had been assembled for the defence of Lisbon, +and had been organized by Generals Cradock and Beresford. Affairs in +the Peninsula had, by this time, completely changed since the year +before; and it was universally believed in Europe that the whole +country would in a few months become a vassal province of the French +Empire. Napoleon had invaded Spain for the second time, at the head of +forces that nothing could resist; he had swept aside the rude levies +that crossed his path. Saragossa had fallen; a British army, led by +Moore, had narrowly escaped destruction; the national insurrection +seemed, for the moment, crushed; and fully 300,000 veteran soldiers, +commanded by skilful and successful chiefs, were gathered round the +eagles for a march of conquest from the Ebro to the mouth of the Tagus. +Yet Wellesley, with deep sagacity and grand strength of character, +refused, in this state of things, to despair; and he drew elements +of hope from the peculiar nature of a theatre of operations he had +carefully scanned, and from the conditions of French invasion in Spain +and Portugal. Portugal, open to England through the command of the sea, +and scarcely accessible from the Spanish frontier, the only avenue open +to the French armies, could, he insisted, be defended with success, by +a small British force if well supported by the national militia and the +Portuguese Government; and he relied greatly on the immense impediments +which would necessarily beset the French in Spain, owing partly to +the ubiquitous guerrilla risings, partly to the intricacies of a +region of mountains and defiles, partly to the exposed state of the +communications with France, assailable along a vast line, and partly +to the extreme difficulty of concentrating and supporting large forces +which, upon Napoleon’s principles of war, would be compelled to subsist +in a poor and barren country on resources principally drawn from the +spot. These admirable views, set out in detail before Wellesley reached +Portugal in 1809, anticipate the course of the Peninsular war, and in a +great measure foreshadow its event; and if they do not equal Napoleon’s +conceptions in splendour, science, and imaginative force, they indicate +real genius for defence and military wisdom of the highest order. +Wellesley’s first operations were of happy augury, and realised his +predictions with full completeness. Napoleon, before he set off for +Wagram, had made preparations to invade Portugal on what he considered +a sufficient scale, while he continued to extend his power in Spain; +and for this purpose he had directed Soult to march on Lisbon with an +army supposed to be at least 40,000 strong, while Victor was to second +the movement by the valley of the Tagus with about an equal force. +Soult, however, pursued by swarms of guerrillas and making his way +with extreme difficulty, reached Oporto with less than 25,000 men; +though Victor routed a Spanish army, he never approached the Portuguese +frontier; and when Wellesley arrived in Lisbon the two Marshals were +far from each other, unable to co-operate, nay, perhaps, unwilling, and +not in sufficient force to subdue Portugal. Wellesley, rightly aiming +at his nearest foe, marched against Soult with about 30,000 men; and +the operations that followed were very brilliant. + +Soult, dreaming of a throne for himself in Portugal, and a somewhat +indolent though a very able man, was surprised and assailed by his +bold adversary; the Douro was crossed by the British army, under the +eyes of a powerful hostile force, by a movement of singular daring and +skill; and a detachment ably sent off by Wellesley all but cut off the +Marshal’s retreat, and nearly involved him in utter ruin. In fact, +Soult only contrived to escape by abandoning his _impedimenta_, +and crossing the ranges that lead into Spain with the wreck of an army, +and the invasion of Portugal ignominiously failed. + +The passage of the Douro in the face of Soult is another instance +of the skill of Wellesley in offensive movements upon a contracted +theatre. He now turned his attention towards Victor, far off, yet in +the lowlands of the Tagus; but a long pause in the operations took +place, due, partly, to the maladministration of the British army, +partly to disputes with the dullard Cuesta, in command of the Spanish +army of the west, and partly, too, perhaps, because the English general +had not the fierce energy, in a situation like this, of the warrior +of the campaign of Italy. Wellesley had defeated Soult by the middle +of May; he did not even attempt to advance against Victor until the +last days of June, and it was the third week of July before his army, +having effected its junction with that of Cuesta, was in the valley of +the Upper Tagus, marching in pursuit of the French Marshal. The allied +chiefs were now at the head of about 20,000 British troops and 40,000 +Spaniards, mostly new levies; their purpose was to attack Victor, +falling back leisurely towards Talavera; and they moved up the Tagus, +not without hope that they might ultimately reach the Spanish capital, +for they expected aid from a Spanish army in the south. + +The long delay which had occurred, however, had enabled the French +armies in the Peninsula to draw towards each other in formidable +strength; the corps of Soult, reorganized and recruited, that of Ney, +and that of Mortier were but a few marches off, behind the screen of +the Avila range. King Joseph at Madrid had a considerable force, which +might easily join hands with Victor; and Wellesley and Cuesta were +in fact moving into the midst of immensely superior foes, strategy +difficult to understand and not to be justified. In the operations that +followed, the French lost one of the best opportunities they ever had +to destroy our power in Portugal and Spain; and the glitter of success +ought not to blind us to the perils incurred by the British commander, +from which he only escaped by accident. In the last days of July Joseph +had come into line with Victor, who had been well-nigh caught. Their +united armies were near Talavera, at least 45,000 strong; and pressing +orders had been given to Soult, to fall on the flank of the allied +army, with the corps of Ney, of Mortier, and his own, 60,000 excellent +troops at least; a movement not in any way difficult, for it only +required a short march, and the passes from the hills were but weakly +guarded. These dispositions were by no means perfect, but they promised +brilliant and decisive success; and they failed only through a series +of mishaps and errors. On the 27th of July Victor attacked the Allies, +in position at Talavera, between the Tagus on their right and a set +of knolls and low hills on the left; and his first effort altogether +failed, though he concentrated his main strength against the British +troops. + +The attack was premature and imprudent, for obviously it was the +true course of the French to wait until the advance of Soult would +enable them to assail the Allies, in front and flank, in overwhelming +strength; but Victor, jealous perhaps of his colleague, and eager to +win on his own account, insisted on renewing the fight on the 28th. +The battle raged furiously for several hours; all the attacks on the +British left were baffled; but the intrepidity and skill of Wellesley +were taxed to the utmost to save the centre, and though he undoubtedly +gained the day, the French army drew off unbroken. Ere long, however, +the advanced guard of Soult made its appearance in the plains of the +Tagus; the defeated army resumed the offensive, and in the first days +of August a great French host, from 85,000 to 100,000 strong, was +menacing the Allies in front and rear, and seemed as if on the verge of +a splendid triumph. Had the counsels of Soult, to press on and attack, +prevailed at this juncture, it is difficult to see how Wellesley and +Cuesta could have escaped; and in that event the combined French armies +would not improbably have overrun Portugal, and, perhaps, have even +attained Lisbon. The danger, however, passed away; the French chiefs +separated, and did nothing; and Wellesley, placing the Tagus between +himself and his foes, made good his retreat across the frontier, though +unsupported by his worthless ally, whose conduct, it has been thought, +was not free from treachery. + + [Illustration: WELLINGTON AT TALAVERA.] + +Wellesley received a peerage for Talavera, and the battle is honourable +to the British army and its chief. The attacks of Victor were ill +conducted, but fully 35,000 French soldiers were opposed to less than +20,000 Englishmen; and yet they retired from the field, defeated. +Talavera, indeed, like Vimeiro before, had proved that the modern +French tactics were not calculated to achieve success against those +long in use in the British service, as regards defensive battles at +least; columns and skirmishers failed to make an impression on the +formidable line of the British infantry, a result which was seen two +thousand years ago in the inferiority of the Greek phalanx to the Roman +legion. Wellesley’s first dispositions were not very good; he did not +occupy the ground in force on his left; but he displayed great resource +and skill on the 28th, and he deserved the victory he fairly won. His +strategy, however, in this campaign was ill conceived, and, indeed, +bad; and it can be explained, perhaps, on the supposition only that he +had no idea what a great hostile force was ready to descend through +the hills on his flank, as he marched in fancied security up the +Tagus. As for the French operations, the plan of the double movement +of Victor and Soult was not ill designed; but it was frustrated by the +inconsiderate haste of Victor, who attacked before the approach of his +colleague; and Napoleon truly observed that combinations like these are +ever liable to mischance and failure, and that Wellesley ought to have +been allowed to advance until the net was made certain to close around +him. Wellesley, however, as it was, only just escaped. The wrath of +Napoleon[28] knew no bounds, for a great opportunity had no doubt been +lost; and the mistake of the English commander confirmed the Emperor in +the low estimate he had formed of an enemy, who was anything but “the +presumptuous, rash sciolist” he held up to ridicule after this campaign. + +By this time Wagram had been fought. After the defeat of Austria, +the whole Continent was more than ever under the yoke of Napoleon; +Spain and Portugal were the only points where there was even a show +of resistance to that colossal force; and as the Emperor poured fresh +masses of troops into Spain, and announced that he would march on +Lisbon in person, even the British Government, injured at home by the +calamitous issue of the descent on Walcheren, began to quail and to +wish to give up the contest. Yet Wellington--we now use the revered +name--retained his calm and unbroken confidence; and though the +subjugation of Spain seemed imminent--for three Spanish armies had been +completely routed, and Andalusia was being overrun--he still contended +that the defence of Portugal could be successfully maintained even +in existing circumstances. After his retreat from the Tagus, he had +returned to Lisbon; and, in the autumn of 1809, despite of the fears of +ministers at home, and of the reluctant aid afforded by the Portuguese +Regency--a corrupt and incapable body of men--he made preparations for +the memorable stand in Portugal which has gained him enduring renown. +His own army was now about 30,000 strong; the Portuguese army, drilled +and led by Englishmen, had become a trustworthy force of about equal +strength; and the addition of other Peninsular levies had placed him +in command of more than 100,000 men. Such arrays, however, Wellington +clearly saw could not hope to contend, even in Portugal, against the +masses of which Napoleon disposed, unless means were taken to place +a barrier in the way of the invaders, behind which the forces of the +defence could be securely rallied. For this purpose he chose a position +between the Atlantic and the mouths of the Tagus, covered in front by +a succession of heights, and most difficult to turn on either flank; +and thousands of labourers were quietly employed, with a secrecy which +appears surprising, in constructing the famous Lines which will make +the name of Torres Vedras long live in history. These great works +formed a triple range of entrenchments, thirty miles in length on +their exterior face and about eight in their second extension; the +third was a vast fortified camp, from which the army, if forced, could +embark; and the whole were protected by all the means available to the +art of the engineer, redoubts, inundations, stockades, escarpments, +and formidable batteries commanding vulnerable points. In this +“impregnable citadel,” as has well been said, Wellington “deposited +the independence” of Portugal at first, and ultimately, as it turned +out, of Spain; and clinging to a rock on the verge of the ocean, while +all was fear and mistrust around, he steadily confronted the might of +Napoleon, the undisputed lord of a vanquished Continent. History has no +grander instance of heroic constancy, and of self-reliance justified by +the event. + +By the early summer of 1810, the French armies in Spain had reached +the enormous number of 350,000 fighting men, and Napoleon believed the +whole Peninsula to be within his grasp. Engrossed, however, with his +overgrown Empire, and meditating already the invasion of Russia, he +had renounced the idea of crossing the Pyrenees, and conducting the +approaching campaign himself; and this was one of the greatest mistakes +of his life. The Emperor, shut out from the sea by England, and unable +to procure intelligence in Spain, had not the least notion, strange as +it may appear, of the real force in the hands of Wellington, still less +of the Lines of Torres Vedras, and his plan for the contest, formed +without knowledge, was misconceived and false to his own strategy. +He believed that the British army was not 25,000 strong; he took no +account of the Portuguese forces; he thought that the way to Lisbon was +open, or barred only by natural obstacles; and instead of concentrating +200,000 men, in order to overpower Wellington and to turn the Lines on +the landward side, at the verge of the mouth of the Tagus--a difficult +but a possible enterprise--he disposed his armies in such a fashion +that, as the event proved, they were largely wasted and were not strong +enough on the decisive point on the theatre. Reasoning on his false +data, he left Macdonald and Suchet to reduce the east of Spain; he +allowed Soult to remain in the south with a great army, to no useful +purpose, and calculating that this force would be more than sufficient, +he placed 70,000 men in the hands of Masséna, by far the first of +the imperial marshals, with orders to besiege the north-eastern +frontier fortresses, and to “drive the English into their ships from +Lisbon.” This dissemination of his military strength, so contrary to +the principles of war, was due not to wilfulness or over-confidence, +but simply to ignorance of the real facts; the Emperor knew that the +British army was the one enemy he should first dispose of, and he +conceived that he had made this result certain; but his reckonings and +previsions were wholly wrong, and his projects were based on disastrous +errors. The remarkable campaign of 1810 was to illustrate this in +a most striking way, and forms Wellington’s true title to glory in +war. Masséna began operations in the first days of June by investing +Ciudad Rodrigo, a famous stronghold and the key of Portugal from the +west of Spain, and as he was not to advance until after the summer +heats, he conducted the siege in a leisurely manner, though disease +and want had begun to prey on his army. Wellington, who had approached +the beleaguered fortress at the head of about 30,000 men, when made +aware of the strength of the French merely observed the enemy from +secure positions; and all the devices of Masséna to tempt him to fight +were fruitless against his steadfast prudence. Ciudad had fallen by +the middle of July; Almeida, a neighbouring stronghold, met the same +fate, and Masséna had set his army in motion--it numbered about 60,000 +men--to invade Portugal in the third week of September, the Marshal +advancing along the Mondego, and the British commander falling back +before him. By the 27th the French had entered a region of mountains +and defiles between the great ranges of the Sierra Alcoba and the +Sierra Estrella, and they found Wellington and his troops in position +on the ridge of Busaco, awaiting their enemy. Masséna did not hesitate +to attack, for he had a great superiority of force; but once more the +column was repulsed by the line, and the assailants only reached the +well-defended heights to be smitten down by the steady British footmen. +The Marshal, bold and persevering, now discovered a track which enabled +him to move his army and turn Wellington’s left. This was not the fault +of the English chief, for he had given directions to secure the pass; +but his position had become no longer tenable, and the French entered +Coimbra in high heart, and confident that they would soon attain Lisbon. + +Masséna, utterly ignorant of what was before him, shared this hope with +Ney and Junot, his chief lieutenants; and leaving his wounded and sick +men at Coimbra, spite of a guerrilla warfare gathering on his path, +“the spoiled child of victory” pressed boldly forward, making for the +Lower Tagus and the Portuguese capital. To his great astonishment, the +hostile army, which had retreated slowly and made scarcely a sign, +seemed suddenly to disappear from his view; and Masséna only discovered +the cause when, in the middle of October, he saw the Lines of Torres +Vedras rising in formidable strength, and his enemy, he knew, was +entrenched behind them. + +Masséna’s army had, by this time, been reduced to about 50,000 men, and +his adversary had fully 100,000, within lines not to be attacked in +front. Ney and Junot were for an immediate retreat, but the warrior of +Zürich, of Genoa, of Essling, whose great merit was tenacious boldness, +refused to listen to these desponding counsels. He searched the barrier +before him at every point, and only fell back when the state of his +troops had warned him that a further stay was impossible. In his +march from Busaco, Wellington had given orders to ravage the country, +and to destroy its harvests; and though we may, perhaps, regret that +he had recourse to a barbarous and obsolete mode of warfare, it was +very efficacious against invaders who had no magazines when they +left the frontier, and relied for supplies on organized plunder. +Within a few weeks after it had reached the Lines, Masséna’s army, +practised as it was in extortion and rapine, was half-famished; and +the Marshal recoiled from Torres Vedras baffled and indignant, but not +disheartened. Concealing the movement with great skill, he established +his troops in strong positions round Santarem, on the Lower Tagus, +where he was almost inaccessible to attack, and where, at the same +time, he had several lines of retreat, and he might receive aid from +the French army in the South should it advance to the opposite bank +of the river. Here the Marshal made a determined stand, disregarding +the murmurs of inferior men; he sent flying columns through the +surrounding region to obtain means of subsistence by force or terror; +he constructed bridges to cross the Tagus, and he despatched Foy, a +very able man, to Paris, to ask for reinforcements and to inform the +Emperor of the critical state of affairs in Portugal. + +Napoleon saw his messenger before the end of November, and it might +have been supposed that the first of strategists would have sent +every available man, as quickly as possible, to Masséna’s aid, for +everything, it had become manifest, depended on the course of events +on the Tagus. But the Emperor was not pleased with the Marshal, on +account of Busaco and the march from Coimbra. He persisted in holding +Wellington cheap; he refused to believe in the strength of the Lines; +he would see no foes but the British army, and the measures he adopted +were quite inadequate to meet a situation already of peril. He ordered +a detachment to be sent from the North of Spain, and to join hands with +Masséna’s army; and he directed Soult to the Tagus from Andalusia, a +distance requiring a long and arduous march, giving his lieutenant, +besides, a dangerous latitude. The results, due partly to want of +knowledge, but principally to obstinacy and unwise arrogance, proved +most disastrous to the Imperial arms. + +The detachment from the north reached Masséna’s camp, but instead +of being 20,000 strong, as had been promised, it was not 10,000, +a reinforcement of little worth; and Soult never approached the +Marshal, either because the difficulties in his way were immense +or because, as has often happened with French commanders, and was +conspicuously seen in the Peninsular War, he was selfishly jealous +of a superior colleague. Yet Masséna clung to his positions to the +last. In this unfortunate campaign he showed the great qualities which +have deservedly given him renown in history; and it was not until the +whole adjoining country had been turned into a desolate waste that he +reluctantly yielded to dire necessity. He broke up from Santarem in +March 1811, having, to Wellington’s amazement, contrived to live for +nearly four months on the tracts around him; and his retreat was one +of extreme difficulty, for the British army was soon pressing on his +rear; Coimbra had been taken, and swarms of partisans were gathering +around on every side. The Marshal, however, proved equal to himself; +he conducted the movement with the greatest skill; Ney distinguished +himself in more than one action; and the French army ultimately +recrossed the frontier, having saved its honour, it may be truly said, +but having injured its fair fame by atrocious excesses. It had been +reduced to 40,000 men, in miserable plight and greatly demoralized; +a quarrel between Masséna and Ney increased disorder and destroyed +discipline; and Portugal had been set free, and, as time was to show, +was not to be invaded by Frenchmen again. + +Torres Vedras is Wellington’s crown of fame, and gives him his true +place among great commanders. The Lines might have, perhaps, been +turned, had Napoleon put forth his whole strength; but they baffled the +force believed by the Emperor to be sufficient to conquer Portugal and +to drive Wellington out of the entire Peninsula. The conception of the +defence was very fine, for Torres Vedras was all but impregnable; but +the conception was nothing to the moral grandeur of the attitude of +the heroic soldier, who from this rocky nook defied the mighty hosts +which certainly might have been arrayed against him. It adds, too, +to the just renown of Wellington that he met a foeman worthy of his +steel. Masséna possibly made mistakes; he ought not to have fought at +Busaco; it is astonishing that he was not informed of the Lines when +he reached Coimbra, a few marches distant; and he ought not, perhaps, +to have quitted that place, leaving thousands of enemies gathering on +his rear. But the Marshal gave proof of powers of a very high order; +he stood before Torres Vedras to the last moment, surrounded by, +but overcoming danger; his choice of his positions at Santarem may +almost be called a stroke of genius; and he conducted the retreat with +consummate judgment. Apart, indeed, from the decisive effects caused +by Wellington’s masterly defence, the failure of the campaign should +be ascribed, not to Masséna, but to the French Emperor. Napoleon, +ignorant of the real state of affairs, did not give his lieutenant a +sufficient army; when made aware of the existence of the Lines, and +of the strength of his enemy’s forces, he took half measures, which +proved abortive; and the condemnation he passed on his greatest Marshal +was simply a device to screen his own errors, want of real knowledge, +contempt of his foes, and directing war at a distance from the scene. +The results of Torres Vedras were immense; the glory of the French arms +was deeply tarnished; a great general had suddenly appeared, who had +baffled completely the Imperial legions. Continental soldiers began +to study the methods of Wellington with eager hope; the fears of the +Government at home vanished, and it resolved to prosecute the war with +vigour; the complaints of the Junta at Lisbon were silenced; and, +above all, Wellington had been confirmed in the accuracy of his views +respecting the contest, and became the master of largely increased +resources. Secure for the present from attack in Portugal, he began +to make preparations to resist the French along the western frontier +of Spain; and he already hoped that the day was at hand when he might +carry the war into Castile and Leon. + +The campaign of 1811 was a prelude to operations he had already +planned; but it was one of many vicissitudes, and of doubtful fortune. +Wellington commanding the resources of England from the sea, really +wielding the power of the Portuguese Government, and turning to account +the great advantage afforded him by a central position between enemies +divided and scattered, besieged Almeida, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Badajoz, +which, with Napoleon, he correctly judged should be mastered to make +Portugal secure, and to open an avenue to enter Spain. He failed, +however, against the two last strongholds; and though Barrosa and +Albuera shed splendid lustre on the British arms, the campaign had no +marked results, and Wellington was, more than once, in the gravest +peril. The power of Napoleon, though diminished by drafts from Spain +for the invasion of Russia, was, in fact, still prodigiously strong; +and had the Emperor directed it, he would, humanly speaking, have even +now subjugated Spain and Portugal. Masséna, having reinforced his army, +attacked Wellington at Fuentes de Onoro; the English only just escaped +defeat, owing to a dispute between two French chiefs; and Wellington, +indeed, has fairly acknowledged that “had Boney been in command” he +would have lost the battle. On two occasions, moreover, the British +commander might have been overwhelmed if ably assailed. Marmont--who +replaced Masséna, unjustly disgraced--and Soult assembled a great army +to relieve Badajoz, and ought to have won a real victory had they +fallen on Wellington; and Marmont might soon afterwards have attacked +his enemy at Fuentes Guinaldos with fourfold numbers. But the tide +in the affairs of men was setting against Napoleon, and was leading +his sagacious foe to fortune. The conditions of the war, which he had +clearly foreseen, made the dangers of Wellington less than they seemed; +the French Marshals, far apart from each other, and unable to feed +their troops in a wasted country, could not draw together their divided +forces for anything like a well-combined movement; and their increasing +discords, the neglect of their master to examine thoroughly the +situation in Spain, and, above all, the ascendency of success already +gained by the British army and its chief, told with powerful effect on +the course of events. + +During the last months of 1811, the British chief made great +preparations to renew his efforts against Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz. +He had secretly brought up a powerful siege train to the frontier +without the enemy’s knowledge; he had made his communications with +the sea easy, by opening the navigation of the Upper Douro; and the +position of the French armies on the theatre of war remarkably favoured +his audacious enterprize. The forces of Napoleon in Spain still +numbered at least 250,000 men; but part of Marmont’s army had been +detached to the East; Soult was in cantonments around Seville; no other +French army was near Portugal; and the fortresses had been left almost +uncovered, for the Emperor had not the least idea that Wellington had +the means to besiege and take them. The English commander first pounced +on Ciudad, and captured it, after a furious assault, in the first days +of January of 1812; and in a few weeks he had triumphed at Badajoz, +the heroism of the attack and the skill of the defence forming a grand +episode of the Peninsular War. His troops suffered enormous losses, and +the British engineers were not, perhaps, as experienced as the French, +in this part of the craft; but Wellington’s only chance was to hurry on +the attack; two relieving armies were not distant; and he properly made +sacrifices for a great object. The fall of the two strongholds incensed +Napoleon; but here again he had himself to blame; Marmont had fairly +warned him of the danger at hand; and this is another striking instance +of his ignorance of what was going on in Spain, and of the mischief of +regulating its affairs from Paris. The success of the British chief at +Ciudad and Badajoz laid open the Spanish frontier from Portugal, and +he resolved to carry out his project of entering Spain; for though his +army was very inferior in force to those of Marmont and Soult combined, +the conditions of the war remained in his favour. + +The marshals, as in 1811, were widely apart; they could hardly unite +their armies in a ruined country; and their enemy held a position +between them with an army whose wants were well supplied, and with +little apprehension that the hostile forces in his front could be +largely increased. The first care of Wellington was to seize the +passages on the Tagus which enabled Soult and Marmont to communicate +with each other by a short line; and then, leaving a detachment to +observe Soult, he crossed the frontier in the second week of June +and marched against Marmont with about 40,000 men. The marshal fell +back behind the Douro, in order to collect his scattered forces, +abandoning works which he had constructed as a centre of defence, in +the place of Ciudad; but he was a brilliant, if not a great chief; and +he quickly showed that he had no notion of abandoning the initiative +to the British general. Marmont recrossed the Douro on the 16th of +July, about equal in force to Wellington, but the passage was only a +feint; he crossed the river once more, and made for Tordesillas, an +able movement which brought him near to reinforcements coming from +Madrid, and threatened his adversary’s right and communications with +Portugal. A series of fine manœuvres followed, the French chief ever +trying to outflank his enemy, and the English seeking to cover his line +of retreat; and there can be no doubt that in this game of marches, +the French army was the more agile of the two, and Marmont gained a +distinct advantage. By the 22nd, the marshal had nearly reached the +road from Salamanca to Ciudad Rodrigo, the main communication of his +foe with the frontier; and Wellington was about to decamp as he best +could, when a single false movement gave him a chance and enabled +him to win a glorious victory. Marmont, eager and impetuous, and +perhaps jealous that Jourdan, the leader of the succours at hand, +would claim a share in the hoped-for triumph, incautiously extended +his left too far, in order to cut off the retreat of his enemy. A gap +was thus made in the French line; Wellington seized the occasion with +his accustomed promptness, and he instantly directed a fierce attack +against his antagonist’s left and exposed centre. The marshal at this +moment fell wounded, but his fall could not have changed the event; +his able lieutenant, Clausel, made a fine effort to reform the French +on a new position, and even assumed an offensive attitude, but the +error had been made, and been turned to account; and though the French +made a really gallant stand, their weakened line was pierced through +and through, and they were forced to abandon the fatal field, where +Marmont had hoped to avenge his countrymen for a long succession of +repeated defeats. + +Salamanca and the operations before it are characteristic of Wellington +as a chief. He was certainly out-generalled in the first movements, +mainly because the French marched better than the British army; but +probably he would have escaped unscathed, though Marmont had gained a +position on his flank, had he been allowed to retreat unmolested. He +was, however, unwisely attacked and in a reckless fashion; he instantly +fell on the enemy’s centre, with the quickness and daring which marked +his offensive movements on the ground, and he made the French general +pay dearly for venturing on a flank march within reach of his enemy. +Salamanca, in fact, has a strong resemblance to Austerlitz up to a +certain point, but it wants the grandeur and effect of Austerlitz; +and in this, as in all instances, Wellington showed that he could not +follow up a victory with the energy and wonderful art of Napoleon. + +As for Marmont, he was at first dexterous, but he made an immense +mistake in extending his left. Like Victor at Talavera, he should have +waited until his reinforcements had come into line; and this, no doubt, +is another example how[29] the characteristic envy of French commanders +had the worst effects in the Peninsular War. The results of Salamanca +were very great, though Clausel rallied the beaten army with an ability +deserving of high praise, and was soon out of the reach of pursuit; the +battle exposed the long line of the communications of the French with +Madrid, and the prospect of a formidable attack on this vital point, as +Wellington had foreseen from the first--and this, too, was Napoleon’s +judgment--placed the entire fabric of the Emperor’s power in the +Peninsula in no small danger. + +Napoleon was now far away in the wilds of Russia; and in his absence +the conduct of the French chiefs was marked by precipitate fear and +haste, which, critical as the situation was, was unwarranted, and does +them no small discredit. Joseph fled in inglorious haste from Madrid; +the forces of Clausel and those in the north were drawn together to +hold and guard the communications between Bayonne and Castile; Suchet +in the far east was directed to move; and Soult, in the south, received +positive orders to evacuate Andalusia and to join the King, though +the Marshal was pressing the siege of Cadiz and had matured projects, +not ill-designed, for invading Portugal while Wellington was away. A +single well-aimed stroke had, in short, imperilled the whole position +of the French in Spain, and their operations were so faulty that their +domination seemed about to collapse. + +In this state of affairs a single incident caused, for a time, a turn +in the tide of fortune, and even placed Wellington in such straits that +he would have been, not improbably, crushed had Napoleon commanded +the French armies. He had entered Madrid in triumph in the middle of +August, but he was soon on the track of the retreating enemy; and +having driven Clausel’s army before him, he sat down before Burgos +towards the close of September, hoping to master the great avenue from +France into Spain. The fortress was small, but had an able commandant; +the British chief had scarcely a heavy gun; the garrison made a stern +resistance, and after fierce efforts and very great losses, the +assailants were compelled to raise the siege and to fall back before a +host of enemies. + +The annals of war present few such examples of the value of a +well-defended stronghold at a critical juncture. Burgos had held out +for a whole month. The time thus gained enabled Soult to come into +line with the other French armies being collected in Castile and the +north, and Wellington had no choice but to retreat at once before the +huge masses directed against him. He conducted the movement with real +ability, but his troops were to a great extent demoralized, and on +one occasion the English commander was saved by a mere chance from +the gravest danger. His army had reached Salamanca by the middle of +November; it was within easy reach of the united French armies, twofold +probably, at least, in strength, and had the French generals fallen +boldly on they ought to have gained a decisive victory. Jourdan eagerly +counselled the true course, but Soult, by nature rather a thoughtful +strategist than an energetic and determined soldier, and borne down +by the ascendency of the British arms, insisted on merely pressing +the retreat, and Wellington was soon across the Spanish frontier. The +Marshals had lost another of the great occasions afforded them in the +Peninsular War. + +The campaign of 1812, notwithstanding the disastrous retreat from +Burgos, was nevertheless ruinous in its effects to the French. +Salamanca had been a decisive defeat; the Imperial commanders had +not attacked Wellington, falling back with a much weaker force; the +invaders had permanently quitted the south; above all, the precarious +nature of Napoleon’s power in the Peninsula had been clearly +established. In this position of affairs, the tremendous tale of the +destruction of the Grand Army in Russia fell with immense effect on +the minds of men; it raised the hopes of Wellington to the highest +pitch--he had always foretold that some catastrophe would befall +Napoleon in his career of conquest--it animated his troops with fresh +confidence; it sent a thrill of exultation through Spain and Portugal; +it awed and paralyzed the leaders of the French armies. By this time +Wellington had all England at his back; he was supreme in Portugal, +and swayed the Regency by the glory of success, by his administrative +power, by his impartial justice to the Portuguese race; and he was made +Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish armies, and disposed for the first +time of the military strength of Spain, in spite of the clamour of +factions in the distracted Cortes against a “heretic and domineering +foreigner.” He was now able to place in the field forces nearly +equal in numbers to his foes, and in the spring of 1813 he had his +preparations made for a great effort to set the Peninsula free. The +Imperial armies, however, were still formidably strong, from 190,000 to +200,000 men; they were superior to the Spanish and Portuguese levies, +and as we look back at the course of events, we see that even now, had +they been ably led, they possibly might have achieved success, and +certainly might have avoided disaster. But they were ill-distributed +on the theatre of war; Suchet, in the east, had by far too large a +force; Soult had left Spain, deprived of his command; Jourdan and +Joseph were very inferior men; the strength of the army confronting +Wellington on the frontier was by no means sufficient; the guerrilla +rising was more fierce than ever; and the French commanders had lost +hope and confidence. The general plan of Wellington was to assail the +enemy from many points, in order to distract and detain his forces, and +at the same time to fall in great strength on the exposed line of the +communications of the French; and though faults may, perhaps, be found +in his strategy, the conception was fine, and was admirably carried +out. Suchet was held in check by Murray with a small body of men; +Joseph, who had returned to Madrid, was menaced from the south; a large +Spanish army was assembled in the north; and, meanwhile, Wellington +prepared the master stroke on which he relied for final success. His +army, now about 90,000 strong, advanced from the frontier in the last +days of May, divided into three great masses on a wide front, with +hill ranges between; its chief gave an opportunity, perhaps, but there +was no great warrior to cross his path. It had soon mastered the +line of the Douro, driving before it foes much weaker in numbers; it +gradually united, joined hands with the levies of the north, and found +a new base on the Biscayan seaboard in the English fleet; and then it +seized the main avenues between France and Spain, and sped in full +force to the Upper Ebro. This formidable movement compelled Joseph to +evacuate Madrid, and to draw together all available troops to attempt +a defence; and the French armies in Castile were ere long concentrated +around Vitoria upon the Zadorra--confused masses, already disheartened, +and burdened by _impedimenta_ such as never before weighed down +unlucky troops in retreat. The battle that followed, fought on the 21st +of June, was of enormous importance in its results, but has little +interest for the student of war. The French were, perhaps, 70,000 +strong; but 15,000 men had been detached to guard convoys, and to +secure a retreat; the English commander had about 80,000, and the event +was never for a moment doubtful. Nothing could stand against the onset +of the British troops, superior in numbers, and flushed with success; +their foes fought well, as they always did, and Reille, the descendant +of an Irish exile, distinguished himself by skill and valour; but the +main road to Bayonne was lost, and the French were gradually thrown +back on the mountain roads that extend to the frontier. The beaten +army, however, was not hardly pressed; it effected its retreat in fair +order, but it lost nearly all its guns and _matériel_, and it left +behind the spoils of a ravaged country, accumulated through years of +unscrupulous plunder, and strewn over the field in immense profusion. + +Vitoria, fitly called the Leipsic of the south, drove all the French +armies out of Spain, with the exception of Suchet’s force in the east, +and the garrisons of Pampeluna and San Sebastian, reinforced by Joseph +before he crossed the Pyrenees. Napoleon, by this time, had made a +prodigious effort to retrieve the disasters of the campaign in Russia; +France had answered his summons to the field with energy; and he had +won great victories at Lützen and Bautzen, followed by the suspension +of arms at Pleistwitz. Austria now held the balance between the +belligerent Powers; she had long inclined to the allied cause, but she +dreaded Napoleon, and held aloof until Vitoria determined her purpose +and she threw in her lot with the Coalition which, in a few months, +overthrew the Emperor. The campaign of 1813 in Spain, therefore, +was really of supreme importance, and a word of comment should be +pronounced upon it. The general plan of Wellington was, perhaps, to +be justified, as affairs stood; it was his only offensive combination +on a grand scale; it was perfectly executed, and it was completely +successful. Yet it was no masterpiece of science or genius. The +movements by which the old base of Portugal was thrown off, and a new +base acquired, and by which the French armies were ever outflanked and +their communications threatened and seized, and the march on Vitoria, +have been justly admired; but the wide dislocation of Wellington’s +forces as they left the frontier was, in theory, a fault, and it would +have given Turenne or Napoleon an immense chance, which they would have +turned to such advantage that the course of events might have been +changed at the outset. The splendour of the result cannot conceal the +fact that the issue of the campaign was rather due to the incapacity +and the demoralization of the French commanders than to conspicuous +excellence in the strategy of their foe. Could they have defended the +line of the Douro, as Bonaparte had defended the line of the Adige, +nay, had they fallen back on the Ebro in time, and concentrated their +still fine armies for a decisive battle on equal terms, they might even +yet have repulsed Wellington, and assuredly they would not have lost +Spain. This was Napoleon’s judgment, and, in this instance, I think it +certainly was correct; his views on the military situation in Spain in +1813 are worthy of him; and here, again, had he been in command, events +would probably have taken a different turn. He was naturally indignant +at the rout of Vitoria; and having summarily got rid of Joseph and +Jourdan, he sent Soult, with extensive powers, to the Pyrenees, to +take the command of his shattered forces, and to endeavour at least +to defend the frontier. The next phase of the contest is of extreme +interest, and deserves careful and impartial study. Soult found the +French army--a confused wreck of armies--in a pitiable state of want +and despondency; and his first care was to secure a base at Bayonne, +and to reorganize and restore his defeated forces. He effected a great +deal in a few weeks, for he was an administrator of no ordinary powers; +and by the close of July he had his preparations made to assume the +offensive with happy promise. + +At this time the forces of Wellington--altogether about 70,000 +strong--were before Pampeluna and San Sebastian, and along the range +of the western Pyrenees; and this gave Soult--he was about equal in +force--an extremely favourable opportunity to attack, for he commanded +the passes which led from the plains. He concentrated a very superior +force against his adversary’s right, concealing the movement with great +skill; and his first operations had real success; he fairly bore back +the weak hostile wing, and he nearly reached Pampeluna and relieved +the garrison. But Wellington, always ready on the ground, was too +quick for an enemy able in thought but in execution rather dull and +weak; he raised the siege of San Sebastian and reinforced his right; +Soult attacked at Sauroren, and was repulsed, one of his lieutenants, +D’Erlon, being not up in time, on this as on a far greater occasion; +the ascendency of unbroken success did the rest, and in a subsequent +effort the French Marshal was nearly surrounded at the head of his +troops. He recrossed the frontier, a well-designed plan having ended in +heavy loss and discomfiture. + +The English commander, free from attack for a time, now resolved to +take Pampeluna and San Sebastian before attempting to invade France. +This conduct has been described as timid, and it enabled Soult to +prepare large means of defence, but obviously it was judicious and +right; the issue of the war in Saxony was still uncertain, and should +Soult be joined by Suchet they would be in great strength. San +Sebastian made a protracted resistance, but the place was stormed in +the second week of September, Soult having tried in vain to relieve +it, and Pampeluna fell at the close of October. Wellington had invaded +France a short time previously, and it should be observed that he +crossed the frontier before Leipsic, and months before the Allies were +on the Rhine. The time spent in the sieges had, nevertheless, given +Soult opportunities which he had made the most of; he had constructed +lines on the Bidassoa and Nivelle, the last almost as strong as those +of Torres Vedras, and he awaited his enemy in a situation like that of +Villars in 1710–11. His army, however, had lost heart, and was crowded +with rude levies and mutinous Germans; he had not the inspiration of +the renowned Villars, and nothing could stand against the overpowering +force of the British soldiery in the full pride of victory. Wellington +carried the lines in the second week of November, displaying great +skill in his dispositions for the attack, and before long he had +approached Bayonne, on the confluence of the Nive and the Adour, where +Soult had entrenched himself in very strong positions. The British +commander, perhaps over confident, perhaps from the want of strategic +genius--this undoubtedly was characteristic of him--escaped narrowly +a severe reverse; he had divided his army upon the Nive, and Soult, +availing himself of his command of the rivers, and of the interior line +he possessed, fell on his adversary with skill in design, and tried +to overwhelm his separated foes. The peril of Wellington was great +for a time, but Soult had the manner of Napoleon, not his masterly +power; he did not press the attack home, and his troops were beaten +by the tenacity of the British footmen. A pause in the operations +followed, and had the Emperor, even at this supreme crisis, ordered +Suchet to come into line with Soult, abandoning Spain, now really +lost, the French would have been superior in force to Wellington, and +affairs might have taken a different aspect. But Napoleon would strike +for his whole Empire, a false conception which mars the splendour of +the memorable campaign of 1814; he left Suchet in Catalonia, holding +the fortresses; the two marshals, besides, did not agree, with the +usual tendencies of French commanders; the organized plunder of the +French army, in marked contrast with that of the Allies, exasperated +the populations of the south against it; the Royalist party began +to lift its head after the first defeats of Napoleon in Champagne, +and Soult was left isolated to resist Wellington amidst the ruin +and crash of a perishing Empire. The British general resumed the +offensive in the early spring of 1814; he had won golden opinions, +even from the invaded Gascons, for the strict discipline he made his +troops observe, for the exactness with which he paid for supplies, for +his humane government of the country he held, and though he was not +without real difficulties of his own--he was condemned in the Cortes +and denounced in Portugal, and he actually sent back a large Spanish +detachment because he could not control their excesses--still he was +greatly superior in strength to his foe, and his arms were obviously +on the verge of triumph. Nevertheless, Soult made an admirable stand; +his army was being constantly weakened by drafts for the army on the +Marne and Seine; it was oppressed by the prospect of coming defeat, +and yet the Marshal proved that he was a real chief, and this is the +best part of his chequered career. He disputed stubbornly every inch +of the country between the lines of the Adour and the Garonne; he +kept Wellington many weeks in check, and though ultimately repulsed +with loss, he very nearly won a battle at Orthez, and at last he took +a formidable position at Toulouse, still doggedly contending against +adverse fortune. The battle was fought on the 10th of April, unhappily +after peace had been made; superiority in numbers and the moral power +of success explain, and partly justify, Wellington’s tactics; but he +risked a flank march of peculiar danger, under the eye of an enemy +watching to strike, and had Soult struck home at the decisive moment +he probably would have won a victory. The Marshal, however, as was his +wont, was remiss in action; the French army was unequal to itself, +and Wellington forced his adversary to leave Toulouse, though the +battle was really nearly drawn. Toulouse, indeed, adds nothing to his +renown as a warrior; his true titles to fame in this campaign are his +administrative virtues, and the most significant fact that he detained +forces in the south which might have turned the scales of fortune in +the struggle in Champagne. + +Wellington was back in England in 1814, justly greeted by the acclaim +of the nation, raised to the highest honour the Peerage can give, +and ever since known as “the Duke” to his countrymen. His exploits, +indeed, had been truly great; with an army, swelled no doubt by +auxiliaries, but seldom numbering more than 30,000 British troops, he +had destroyed the power of Napoleon in Spain and Portugal, backed by +300,000 French veterans, had defeated the best Marshals of France one +after the other, had fought his way from the Tagus to the Garonne, had +thrown his sword, with effect, into the balance of events trembling +in the east of France, had ruled the Peninsula with a far-sighted +wisdom, spite of the passions of faction, admired everywhere. The +fame of Wellington as a commander depends, beyond question, on his +direction of the Peninsular war; and an impartial judgment should +be pronounced upon it. We may pass by enthusiasts who ascribe his +success to genius never approached in his day, and the notion current +seventy years ago that an English soldier can beat three Frenchmen; +and we may equally reject the French delusion that Wellington owed +everything to the freaks of Fortune. It must be recognized that in +the war, small as his force was compared to his foes, he had certain +advantages of peculiar value; he had the command of the sea, and of +the resources of England; his position in Portugal was formidably +strong; he was supported by a vast national rising; he stood in the +centre of divided enemies; whereas the French armies, large as they +were, had most vulnerable communications to guard, were exposed to +swarms of destructive guerrillas, were necessarily separated by vast +hill ranges, and, owing mainly to the Napoleonic system of warfare, +were unable to muster for any time in strength because they could not +subsist in a barren country. These conditions of the strife were all +in favour of the British chief, and told powerfully; but this does +not in the least detract from his merits; he anticipated them with +prophetic insight, and they simply made his defence possible; just as +Napoleon’s choice of the Adige enabled him to baffle the whole power +of Austria. It should be admitted, too, that throughout the contest he +was greatly seconded by the shortcomings of his foes; more than once +he ought to have been overwhelmed or crushed, but for the miserable +discords of the French marshals; and Napoleon himself played into his +hands by his ignorance of events, by his lust of conquest, by the +false system of directing war from an immense distance; above all, by +his contemptuous disregard of an adversary most unwisely scorned. Yet +this, the only meaning of what has been called the “good fortune that +attended Wellington,” does not lessen his title to fame; I certainly +think, had he had to encounter Napoleon with all the Peninsular armies +he would have been forced out of Spain and Portugal, nay, he might +have been beaten in 1811, 1812, and 1813; but, tried by this test, +we might just as well deny Napoleon genius in war; he would not have +won Rivoli, Jena, Austerlitz, had he been opposed to really great +captains. Undoubtedly, moreover, in these campaigns the generalship +of Wellington was not of as high an order as some eulogists have made +it out to be; he committed grave strategic mistakes; his plan for the +offensive on a great scale, and at a distance, is not very striking--I +refer especially to 1813; his tactics were sometimes far from perfect; +he was not masterly in following up success; there is something narrow +and contracted in some of his movements. But when this has been said, +he gave proof of genius in defence of the rarest kind; his campaign of +Torres Vedras reaches the sublime, in conception and execution alike; +he was admirable in rapid and bold attack; he was almost always great +on the field; his tenacity and judgment are above praise. Add his +most remarkable administrative powers, his capacity for ruling foreign +races, and his moderation in the hour of success, resembling in this +the great warriors of Rome, and we shall understand how he will live +in history. A word, too, should be said on his British troops; that +army--largely his own creation--which he said--and Wellington was no +boaster--“could go anywhere and do anything.” From the first moment his +soldiery showed the high qualities of their race, endurance, vigour, +fierceness in attack, perseverance in defence, and the skill in the +use of their arms of the archers of Crecy. The army, however, was for +a time ill-organized; its movements were slow, and it was overburdened +with camp-followers and _impedimenta_; its officers, heroes in the +fight, were seldom skilful; in short, it was an imperfect instrument +of war. It is one of Wellington’s distinctive merits that he made that +army, always superior to the French in discipline, fortitude, and +steadiness in the field--and this, indeed, is the true reason why its +line was able to defeat their columns--equal to the best of Napoleon’s +armies--the Emperor has made the admission himself--in readiness, in +training, in skill in manœuvring; though Salamanca tends to show that +in the power of movement it was not the equal of its most agile foes. + +Great as a soldier, but certainly greater as a man, it was the destiny +of Wellington in 1815 to meet the most perfect master of modern war. +The campaign of Waterloo belongs to the career of Napoleon, and in a +sketch of his extraordinary deeds I have endeavoured to retrace its +main features. Idle flatterers and the idolaters of success have given +Wellington the palm in this mighty conflict, but he knew that he was +out-manœuvred, and he did not claim it; and he disliked the subject, +when all the facts were known, though he wrote on it in extreme old +age. The simple truth is that Blücher and Wellington, considering the +enormous hosts being arrayed against him, did not think that Napoleon +would spring on Belgium; even their own forces, they well knew, were +nearly double those of their foe; and though they made dispositions on +the supposition of an attack, these were ill-conceived and essentially +faulty. Their armies, in the first place, were spread along an immense +line, with divergent bases; in the second, they were scattered up and +down Belgium; in the third, they were far too near the frontier, at the +points of concentration marked out for them; and in the fourth, the two +chiefs were too far from each other, and could not communicate without +perilous delays. + +Availing himself of these palpable mistakes, Napoleon broke in on the +exposed centre of his adversaries with a grandeur of design and a skill +in execution never surpassed; he was close to their weak line on the +15th of June, and a single march had placed them in extreme danger. +Then came the confusion and the divided counsels common with allied +chiefs, and foreseen by their foe. Blücher rushed hastily to confront +the Emperor before his army had been drawn together; Wellington, +misconceiving the real state of affairs, stopped, hesitated, and left +a wide gap open; and an opportunity was afforded to the General of +1796, as favourable as ever was won by genius. But for a series of +misadventures I have noticed elsewhere, he ought to have overwhelmed +Blücher with ease on the 16th; and, in that event, nothing could +have saved Wellington, though the French were only 128,000 against +224,000[30] men. Strategy had only just missed one of its grandest +triumphs; in fact, the allied chiefs were all but checkmated, though +Wellington made an able stand at Quatre Bras, and this went some way +to baffle the Emperor. Napoleon was given another chance on the 17th, +by the double retreat on Wavre and Waterloo, which might have proved +fatal to both his adversaries; but he was not well, and his lieutenants +failed him. Soult, always indolent, was greatly to blame; the retreat +of the Prussians was not followed up; Grouchy was detached late to hold +Blücher in check; and when Napoleon, true to the principles of the art, +turned against Wellington and attained Waterloo, he was not aware that +the Prussians were near and were ready to unite with the Duke, mainly +owing to the faults of the incapable Grouchy. + +The morning of the 18th saw Napoleon and Wellington confronting each +other for the first time; the state of the weather, no doubt, gave the +British chief an unforeseen advantage. The Emperor’s plan of attack +was perfect; but Wellington’s dispositions were also excellent, except +that he made the strategic error of leaving a large detachment behind +at Hal. In the great battle that followed Napoleon was ill, and the +tactics of the French were incoherent and bad; the genius of Wellington +in defence reappeared, and shone out with conspicuous lustre; and this +great quality largely redeemed his shortcomings in this memorable +campaign. He fought Waterloo on the assumption that Blücher would +join him early with the whole Prussian army; no aid reached him until +nearly 5 P.M.; Ziethen and Pirch, who decided the result of +the day, were not on the field until after 8 P.M.; and yet +Wellington, with a very inferior army, contrived, during seven long +hours, to resist successfully the Imperial host, and he had fairly +repulsed the attack of the Guard before Ziethen and Pirch dealt the +final stroke. His intrepidity, his tenacity, his tactical power on +that memorable day were worthy of him; no other general on the allied +side, it may confidently be said, would have made such a stand; and +though he would almost certainly have lost the battle but for the +arrival of Bülow in the early afternoon, still the defeat would not, I +think, have been crushing, and Napoleon must have at last succumbed. +Nevertheless, Waterloo, as I have endeavoured to prove, was decided by +operations outside the field. Had Grouchy been equal to his appointed +task, Blücher ought not to have been able to reach his colleague; the +strategy of Napoleon throughout the campaign, spite of mistakes and +failures, well-nigh triumphed; and the one merit of Wellington--and it +was immense--was the masterly defence he made at Waterloo. + +The Duke commanded the Army of Occupation in France, after the second +fall of Napoleon and the return of the Bourbons, and he admirably +fulfilled a most arduous mission. He has been condemned for not saving +Ney; but he had no right to interfere with the Government of France, +and he showed characteristic tact and clemency in his relations with +the French army, the Court, and the nation. His grand civil career +begins at this point; but I must pass from it with scarcely a word of +comment. He was a representative of England at the great Congress which +met at Vienna to resettle Europe; and he was engaged in other important +missions of the kind. In these diplomatic duties he was, no doubt, +inferior to Marlborough in suavity and delicate art; he was sometimes, +indeed, outspoken and blunt, but his simplicity, his candour, his ripe +judgment, made him a negotiator of a very high order. His position as +a statesman was noble and striking. His nature and profession drew him +to the Tory Party, and he was for years its acknowledged head; his +ideal was a strong aristocratic government; he detested modern Radical +cant and theory; and though he was a Constitutional politician in the +broadest sense, he did not understand the play and tendency of popular +forces. But he had no sympathy with extreme Toryism; he ridiculed the +Holy Alliance and its dreams; he knew how to make concessions in time; +no reformer more sternly put down abuses; he was always Conservative, +but wise and moderate. He commanded the army for some years; in this +high office, unlike Turenne, with whom he had certain points in common, +he was not in advance of the ideas of his time; he was rather obstinate +and narrow in his views; but one great work he at least prepared; he +urged the necessity for assuring the defence of England, and this +generation at last has accepted his teaching. He spoke very often in +the House of Lords; as an orator he had no accomplishments, but it +was said he always “hit the nail on the head,” and his sagacity was, +perhaps, the more noted because it was not set off by eloquence. As +he grew old, he became the national mentor; his counsels were felt to +be words of wisdom, and his place in the State was one of commanding +dignity. + +He passed quietly away in 1852; England mourned him as her foremost +citizen, and she justly regards him as the most illustrious of +her worthies of the nineteenth century. It ought to be possible +to pronounce a sound judgment on his military career, after all +these years, and yet impartiality is still difficult. Wellington +was endowed by nature with real wisdom, with strength of character +seldom equalled, with singular moderation and calmness of thought, +and yet with a rapid intelligence and clear insight. She denied him +imagination, passion, and, in some measure, sympathy; and we see these +excellences and defects in his life as a warrior. As a strategist, +on the offensive, he stands low; for strategy, in this aspect, must +see into the unknown, and requires a fiery energy he did not possess; +and he was incapable of such exploits as the campaign of Marengo. In +defensive strategy, however, he has been never excelled; for here the +elements of the problem are easier to ascertain, and sagacity and +firmness are most effective; and his campaign of Torres Vedras is, +beyond comparison, the finest specimen of defence, in the strict sense +of the word, that was seen in the Great War with France. As a tactician +he was admirable in attack and defence, for when the field was before +him, his promptness, his coolness, his constancy, stood him in good +stead; but he was, on the whole, better in defence than attack; his +Salamanca falls short of his Waterloo; and he was inferior to some +tacticians in his arrangements on the ground, and, conspicuously, in +following up a victory. Though there was something contracted in his +exhibitions of the art, he has no doubtful place among great captains; +and yet Wellington was greatest, perhaps, as a citizen, by reason of +his profound wisdom, his administrative powers, his statesmanlike +views, and, above all, his capacity for ruling alien races. In one +quality of a chief he was, no doubt, deficient. He was respected, but +not beloved, by his officers and men; he could not command their hearts +like Napoleon or Condé, and this was largely due to the Spartan turn +of character which distinguishes the aristocratic caste of Ireland. +Taken altogether, he was one of the most illustrious men who have ever +appeared on the stage of History; his grand life justified the poet’s +epitaph: “O Tower full square to all the winds that blew!” + + [Illustration] + + + + + CHAPTER X. + + MOLTKE. + + +I feel it difficult to attempt a sketch which must be inadequate, and +perhaps partial. Moltke is a living man, though in extreme old age; +flattery and envy have obscured his real image; and his place among +great commanders is still a problem. Yet the General who triumphed +in 1866–70, and whose name history links with Sadowa and Sedan, is +assuredly a master of modern war; and I shall try to disengage his +personality from the facts accumulated around it and still imperfectly +known. Helmuth Charles von Moltke was born in 1800, a scion of a noble +Danish house, of ancient descent but shattered fortunes. The family had +produced more than one good soldier. It appears in the Thirty Years’ +War; the father of Moltke attained the rank of General in his country’s +service, and was, perhaps, an officer in the Prussian army; and one of +his uncles perished amidst the wreck of the Grand Army in the retreat +from Moscow. Little is known about him in early boyhood, except that +he grew up under the cold shade of poverty; his first recollection +was of the sack of Lübeck, where Blücher succumbed after the ruin of +Jena; in his case, the strong impressions of youth were formed by the +events of the gigantic strife which marked the beginning of the present +century; he saw the Continent at the feet of Napoleon; he was a witness +of the great rising of Germany; he may be said to have watched Leipsic, +Montmirail, and Waterloo. The image of war, therefore, in its grandest +aspects, and with consequences akin to a world-wide earthquake, +was stamped on his mind when it was most ductile; and these +associations, doubtless, had much to do with the distrust of France as +the disturber of Europe, and the blended scorn and dislike of all that +is French which were to be characteristic of the future warrior. Moltke +became a cadet at the Military School of Copenhagen at an early age; +and some years afterwards, having meanwhile obtained a commission in +the Prussian service, he was a pupil at the Staff College of Berlin, an +institution which may be traced to Frederick, and which has always been +of very high repute. The youth made his mark at both these seminaries; +privation had steeled his strong nature; his intelligence was superior, +and his industry intense; he had a special faculty for mastering facts, +and a fine taste in Letters and Science, resembling Frederick in all +these respects; and it is no mere tradition that his promise was great, +when he received his first appointment on the Prussian staff. Moltke +passed some years at a desk in Berlin, doing the routine duties of the +War Office; and as he had fallen on the days of the Long Peace, which +followed the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, the prospect was faint +that the accomplished soldier would ever become an illustrious warrior. + + [Illustration: MOLTKE AND HIS MASTER.] + +When he was past thirty, however, he found an opening for the display +of some of his eminent parts; when travelling through the East, he +attracted the notice of Sultan Mahmoud, lately engaged in the task of +transforming the Turkish army; and Moltke gave him valuable advice, +especially on the defence of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. Like +Eugene of Savoy, it was his fortune also to see war for the first time, +as it was carried on by the arms of Islam. In company with a small +party of Prussian officers, he was present at the decisive fight of +Nisib, which made Mehemet Ali an independent ruler; and it has been +said that he recommended a movement which might have made the result of +the battle different. Moltke has left a record of these experiences in +a series of letters, still of value; but a history from his pen of the +Russian invasion of the Ottoman Empire in 1828–29 is the most important +monument of this part of his career. The book reveals the nature of the +man; it wants imagination and the charm of genius; but it is thoroughly +well-informed and full of good criticism; and while it does justice +to the powers of Diebitsch, its peculiar characteristic is the minute +attention bestowed by the writer on all that relates to the mechanism +and organization of the contending armies, and to the geography of +the theatre of war. The reputation of Moltke grew by degrees; in the +fine words of the Roman poet, it was like the silent growth of a tree; +he rose slowly to the rank of general, and he was for some time the +first aide-de-camp of the Crown Prince of Prussia, the late Emperor +Frederick of no inglorious memory. He made several visits of state with +his chief, and has left an interesting account of all that he saw; but +his mind was engrossed by what belongs to war; and it is curious to +observe that he has far more praise for the steadiness and obedience +of the Russian infantry than for the agility and intelligence of the +French soldiery, associated in his mind with carelessness and want of +discipline. + +In 1857 Moltke received the office of Chief of the Staff of the +Prussian army. The position was one of the highest eminence; it had +been filled by distinguished men; but the names of these are of no +significance compared to that of the renowned soldier who has made it +famous in all lands. Moltke was in his fifty-eighth year when he was +raised to the post; he had never commanded troops in the field, nay, +had taken no part in European warfare; and yet he possessed qualities +which made his selection for the place a great day in Prussian history, +for scarcely a living man so thoroughly understood what were to be the +true conditions of war in our time, what its characteristics, and its +coming development. We shall perceive this better if we glance at the +state of the art during the long period of almost unbroken peace which +succeeded Waterloo. For more than thirty years after 1815, every Power +in Europe felt the exhaustion caused by the gigantic strife at the +first part of the century; and though “the war drum was not hushed,” in +the poet’s language, their energies were mainly directed to the great +problems, political and social, which had come into question. In this +state of affairs they generally reduced their armies; what was more +important, they took little heed of all that concerns the military art, +and their war offices were, without exception, directed by men whose +minds had been formed on the battle-fields of the preceding age. When +the Revolution of 1848 passed over the Continent, the Russian army was +far the most powerful in Europe; the armies of France, of Austria, of +Prussia, of England, had largely declined from their old standards; and +the great names of Wellington, of Soult, of Paskiévitch, were typical +of the system of unchanging routine, which, in every service, prevailed +in high places. + +This strong conservatism was not much shaken by the memorable events +of the next few years. The military operations of 1848–49 resembled +those of 1805–14, except that they displayed less genius; and even +the experience of the Crimean War did not produce a wide-spread +conviction that a new era in the art was about to open. Nevertheless, +throughout those long years since the Peace, forces of all kinds had +been steadily at work, which were to affect greatly the phenomena +of war, and if not to change the essential truths it teaches, to +modify it profoundly in some of its aspects. The population of every +State had continued to increase, especially in Central and Eastern +Europe; and the rude material, therefore, of military power had been +augmented, and was still growing. The resources of most nations had +been doubled and trebled; agriculture had made enormous strides; roads +and communications had become more numerous; and while this progress, +dating from centuries before, had been going on with accelerated speed, +a new element of mighty force had appeared in the railway system, +which, spreading over Europe, had made the means of transport and of +locomotion infinitely more easy, more vast, and more rapid than ever +had been known before in history. Though the truth had not dawned on +ordinary minds, it had become certain, thirty years ago, that in any +great European contest armies would be larger than they had ever been; +and the facilities of moving huge bodies of troops, and of munitions +and supplies on a prodigious scale, it is now perceived, were to have +these results; that the efficacy of fortresses was still further to +decline, and that military operations might be more ample, have more +celerity, and be more decisive than had been the case even in the age +of Napoleon. Other influences, too, had made themselves felt, to +be attended with great results in war. The age was one of material +inventions; the weapons of destruction used by armies had been almost +transformed within a brief period; and appliances of a different kind +had, to a certain extent, been turned to account. Rifled cannon and +the breech-loading musket had been manufactured and partly employed; +these mechanical improvements, it is now apparent, have necessarily +led to changed formations and tactics; and the discovery of the field +telegraph has, in some measure perhaps, affected strategy. Education, +moreover, after the Peace had been generally diffused through Europe, +especially in Prussia and Northern Germany; this had greatly increased +the self-reliance and the intelligence of the individual soldier; and +the result, we can now see, has had a potent influence in the conduct +of armies and the arrangements of war. + +It was the distinctive merit, I have said, of Moltke, that he +appreciated these facts, and all that resulted from them, with perfect +judgment and the most sagacious insight. He was deeply versed in +the history of war; like every true student of it, he had seen that +Napoleon was, by many degrees, the first of captains, and he had +the capacity to perceive that the new conditions, especially the +development of the railway system, favoured the grand and daring +Napoleonic strategy. He grasped the truth, too, that the immense +size of the armies in coming European conflicts would lead to more +independence in separate commands, and would require a larger number +of able chiefs than ever had been the case before; and he saw that +preparation was more than ever necessary, the operations of modern +war being so quick and decisive. The superiority of a rapid and bold +offensive, the advantage of the diffusion of skill in the high ranks +of an army, and the value of careful organization and well-planned +arrangement, formed, so to speak, his military faith; and, coming to +other details, he distinctly declared that the new arms would make the +efficacy of fire the greatest element of success, that the importance +of mere charges would largely decline, that formations in the field +would become more flexible, and less dense than they had been formerly, +and that real culture and mental training made a man an infinitely +better soldier. + +Moltke impressed these principles, which thirty years ago were not +generally accepted or understood, on the Prussian army from the first +moment, and with what results is now well known. The first great +event in this part of his life was the reorganization of the military +strength of Prussia, a reform completed in 1860. This vast work was +probably due more to the king and Roon than to anyone else; but Moltke, +we may be sure, approved of the measures by which the numbers of the +army were largely increased and its real efficiency was, perhaps, +quadrupled. The new arrangements did not change the bases on which +the military power of Prussia rested, the general duty of the subject +to serve, and the organization of the army on the local system; but +the yearly contingent of recruits was augmented a third, the time for +service in the reserve was doubled, and the army, which had become too +like a militia by a large admixture of landwehr, was made a completely +distinct force, the landwehr forming only its last reserve. The hand of +Moltke may be distinctly seen in almost every improvement thenceforward +made in this great force, composed, after 1860, of fully half a million +of trained fighting-men. Holding fast to the principle that offensive +strategy would more than ever succeed in modern war, he directed his +efforts to have the Prussian army ready to take the field as quickly +as possible, and to be prepared to attack at once; with this object +in view, the local arrangement of the national forces was steadily +retained, for it assured the rapid assembly of masses of troops; but it +was subjected to minute and careful central direction; and elaborate +preparations of all kinds were made to secure speedy “mobilization,” +and the regular transport of whatever is required for the conduct of +a campaign by turning railways and other communications to account. +Another great object of Moltke was to provide for general efficiency +through all commands, from the highest down to the lowest grades. He +had excellent materials for this at hand, in the practised officers +who abound in Prussia; and steadily applying himself to his task, he +succeeded by degrees in placing the army under the control of capable +men, from top to bottom, producing in this way that hierarchy of good +leaders which Thucydides declared, two thousand years ago, was one of +the secrets of Spartan success; and creating that division of skilful +labour which has become a necessity in modern war. Moltke addressed +himself, also, to the reforms in tactics which he had foreseen were +to be essential; but here his exertions were less successful; he was +steadily obstructed by routine and tradition; his own views, probably, +were not fully formed, and years were to elapse before the Prussian +army was to attain its present excellence in this sphere of the +art. The greatest reform, however, effected by Moltke remains to be +stated, and had immense results. The Prussian Staff stood high since +the days of Frederick; but under the care of its greatest chief, it +gradually reached a state of extreme perfection. Divided mainly into +two branches, it supplied the commanders of corps with able advisers, +trained in strategy, in tactics, in the direction of troops, and in +providing for their needs in the field; and it has accumulated stores +of knowledge in all that relates to military history, to the geography +of war, to the resources and armies of civilized states, which have +proved to be of the greatest practical value. Moltke, it should be +added, like all true leaders, inspired the army generally with his high +aims and spirit; he encouraged the mental training of soldiers and +officers, but he paid special attention to order, discipline, and to +everything that secures obedience to command. + + [Illustration: Theatre, of the + + CAMPAIGN + + of 1866.] + +Moltke could never have accomplished these tasks had he not had the +all-powerful support of the King, a really able and far-sighted ruler, +and a soldier of no ordinary gifts. Within seven years from the time +when he was raised to his post, the Prussian army, which since 1848 had +fallen low in universal repute, had, under Moltke’s care, become, we +know now, unquestionably the first of European armies, as superior to +those of every other State as the army of Frederick was to the armies +of his day. The time was at hand when the strength and worth of this +mighty instrument was to be proved in the field. I pass over the petty +Danish war, and proceed to the great conflict of 1866, fought with +memorable and lasting results for the Continent. Prussia instantly took +a bold offensive attitude, and the celerity with which her main forces +were “mobilized” and directed towards the Bohemian frontier, with +every requirement to begin a campaign, surprised all who understood the +subject. The invasion, too, of the Northern German States was admirably +planned and well carried out; and the ability with which a small +Prussian army held in check and baffled the whole of South Germany +remains a specimen of fine generalship. The distribution, however, +of the principal army on the theatre of war to oppose Austria can be +praised by the courtiers of fortune only, and is certainly open to +grave objections. + +On the 15th of June 1866 this huge array, about 250,000 strong, and +divided into three great masses, was disseminated along an immense +front, extending from the Elbe almost to the Oder, and not far from +the main Bohemian range; the right, the Army of the Elbe, being near +Torgau, the centre, or First Army, being around Sorau, the Second Army, +the left, holding the tract round Neisse. At this moment the chief +Austrian army, nearly equal in numbers, reckoning its Saxon allies, +was in Moravia, spreading about Olmütz; it held a central position +between scattered foes, and it is now acknowledged that it was ready +to advance, and could have assumed a decided offensive. It is vain to +deny that in this state of affairs it already possessed an immense +advantage; and, whatever the cause, the Prussian strategy which gave +it this grand chance must be deemed faulty. All the apologies that +have been made on this subject will not mislead the true student of +war. It has been urged that the dislocation of the Prussian armies was +necessary “to cover Berlin and Breslau”; but this argument is of no +avail. You should never risk a whole army for such objects, and if you +try to defend everything, you run all hazards. It has been said, again, +that it was not possible to assemble the Prussian forces in any other +way, regard being had to the lines of railways; but that is no reason +why the three armies should have been distant from each other near +the Bohemian frontier. Lastly, it has been alleged that the superior +quality of the Prussian troops, if considered, excuses their chiefs; +but this superiority had yet to be proved; and any operation, however +defective, may be justified by this kind of reasoning. The examples set +by really great captains show what Benedek--a good soldier, but unfit +to command a large army--might have accomplished at this conjuncture. +Napoleon, in the place of the Austrian chief, would have made for +the salient of the Bohemian hills--would have debouched through the +passes into the Saxon plains, and holding the army of the Elbe by a +detachment in check, would have fallen in superior force on the First +Army, and then would have turned victoriously against the Second +Army, which, thrown forward into Upper Silesia, might have been cut +off from its base and destroyed. Turenne, less daring but more safe, +would have advanced to the southern verge of the Bohemian range, and, +occupying the position he always sought to gain, would have invited the +attack of his divided enemies, and interposing between them would have +beaten them in detail. In either case, the Prussians should have been +defeated; and, indeed, why they were placed in this way on the theatre +has never yet been really explained. + +On the 16th of June the Army of the Elbe entered Saxony, and had soon +seized Dresden; and about the 20th it had nearly joined hands with +the First Army which, under Prince Frederick Charles, had been moved +close to the Bohemian frontier. The Prussian right and centre were thus +almost united; but the left, commanded by the Crown Prince, which had +advanced from Neisse towards the passes near Glatz, was isolated from +its supports, and at a great distance; and if the invaders were not in +immediate danger--for Benedek had only begun to move--their strategic +position remained critical. In this situation the Prussian armies, now +practically two, not three masses, were directed to pass through the +range, and, approaching each other, to effect their junction around +Gitschin, a point considerably to the south of the hills, not far from +where Benedek had some troops, and where he might have had five-sixths +of his army. This strategy was exactly the same in kind as that which +had proved fatal in 1796, when attempted against the chief of Rivoli; +and the excuses that have been made for it are weak and baseless. Two +large armies, such as those of Prussia were, though far from each +other, are no doubt in less peril if they invite the attack of a single +army equal to both in strength, than two small armies would be under +like conditions, and this would specially be the case where, as in +the present instance, the field of manœuvre was somewhat contracted. +All this, however, proves no more than that the converging movement +of 1866 was less to be blamed than that of Würmser; it does not show +that it can be justified, and the experience of ages clearly condemns +it. Benedek, who broke up from Olmütz on the 17th of June, might have +reached Gitschin with the mass of his forces before the Prussian armies +could have come into line; and in that event he would have had at least +an opportunity to fall on his divided enemies, and to achieve success, +more or less important. Unfortunately for himself, however, the +Austrian chief was unable to seize the occasion before him; instead of +turning his central position to account, and advancing northward with +all his corps in hand, he adopted half-measures of extreme feebleness. +He sent a detachment only, comparatively small, to hold the Prussian +right and centre in check. He struck at the Prussian left with inferior +forces, and he hung back himself with the mass of his army, irresolute, +hesitating, and, at best, inactive. + +The result was what might have been expected. Clam Gallas and the Saxon +contingent were overpowered by Prince Frederick Charles, who attacked +with largely superior forces; the Crown Prince, as he emerged from +the defiles, defeated with ease the three hostile corps opposed to +his much more powerful army, and though the issue was partly due to +the excellence of the Prussian infantry, and to the efficacy of the +arms they wielded, it is chiefly to be ascribed to the grave faults +and the shortcomings of the Austrian leader. The victorious armies, +though still far apart, now advanced along the heads of the Iser and +the Elbe. The Austrians, beaten and demoralized, slowly fell back; and +yet such was the inherent advantage of the central position still held +by Benedek, that had he known how to make a true use of it he might +even yet have turned the tide of ill-fortune. By the 29th of June he +had his army nearly united; the two Prussian armies were leagues from +each other, and part of the First Army was dangerously exposed; and +it has been justly remarked that had Benedek boldly attacked Prince +Frederick Charles on this day, he ought to have won a real victory, +and, in that event, he would still have had a chance to strike and +defeat the Crown Prince of Prussia. As is well known, however, the +ill-fated chief did not attempt an offensive return, and continued his +retreat until he had passed the Bistritz; here, like Daun, he took a +position of defence, and he passively awaited the onset of his foes, +anticipating already impending ruin. Yet even at this moment, had he +been a general of a high order, he might perhaps have triumphed. I +have no space to describe the great day of Sadowa; it was, no doubt, +a splendid and decisive victory; but the operations of the Prussians +once more gave their enemy an advantage which he might have seized, and +turned to account with immense results. The First and Second Armies +remained still divided; for many hours on that eventful forenoon, an +almost insignificant force was opposed to the mass of the Austrian +army; and it was only when the Crown Prince reached the field, at about +2 P.M., and was able to attack, that the chances of the battle +became equal, and that success was made even possible. Had Benedek at +any previous moment fallen in full force on Prince Frederick Charles, +it is difficult to suppose that the Austrian chief might not have, at +least, averted defeat. + +The campaign of Sadowa is a striking instance how generals who steadily +carry out ably a plan essentially faulty in itself may defeat a +commander who waits on his foe, and cannot take the initiative or seize +the occasion. In justice, however, to a departed veteran, let us say +that the Prussian army was, in most respects, very superior to that +arrayed against it; the Austrian army was crowded with discontented +levies; the Prussians, too, possessed a breech-loading rifle, the fire +of which had great effect, though it is idle to contend that it decided +the war; and these facts told in the final issue. As for the Prussian +strategy, it was not good. We can imagine the shades of Turenne and +Napoleon indignant that a violation of their art should have been +followed by ill-deserved success; and if Moltke really directed these +operations of 1866, his first essays in war are not admirable. The +movements, however, which led to Sadowa are almost identical with those +of Frederick in Bohemia in 1756–57; and I cannot help conjecturing +that King William--his reverence for his ancestor was a kind of +worship--was in a great measure their true author, though those of +Frederick have been condemned by Napoleon with no uncertain censure. + +After the events of 1866, it became apparent that Prussia and France +would ere long quarrel; and I must say a word on the preparations made +by the two Powers before the impending conflict, and on their military +resources when it at last broke out. Northern Germany was practically +added to Prussia; treaties were made with the Southern German States; +the unity of Germany for war was well-nigh accomplished; and the German +armies which could be brought into the field, more or less organized +on the Prussian model, reached the enormous number of a million of +men, 500,000 forming the first fighting line. Extraordinary attention, +moreover, was given to the improvement of the instrument of war which +had crushed the power of Austria in three weeks, and to the removal of +every defect which had been discovered in it. The “mobilization” was +made more effective; the experience of 1866 was turned to account to +make the evolutions of foot more quick and exact, and to adapt infantry +tactics to modern arms. Great pains were taken to reform the cavalry, +which had been scarcely equal to the fine squadrons of Austria, led +by the brilliant Edelsheim, and to give it celerity and strength in +the field; and the artillery, it may be said, was transformed, old +smooth-bore guns being finally condemned, and artillery tactics being +greatly changed by abandoning the system of huge reserves of guns--a +tradition of the Napoleonic era, but obsolete under the new conditions +of war--and by directing every battery that could be made available as +quickly as possible to the front of battle. By these means the Prussian +army of 1866 was expanded into the vast German army which overran +France from the Rhine to the Loire; and the hosts which triumphed at +Metz and Sedan were infinitely more formidable in all respects than +that which had overwhelmed Benedek. + +Let us now turn to the attitude of France, in view of the contest +known to be imminent. Napoleon III. and one or two French chiefs had +not failed to observe the immense increase of the military power +of Prussia and Germany; and they perceived how enormous was the +importance of the great trained reserve of the German system, which +had nothing corresponding to it in their own. The Emperor and Marshal +Niel accordingly proposed that the nominal reserves of the French +army--masses of men on paper--should be in some degree disciplined, +and that the Garde Mobile, a new force, should be formed; and had this +been effected the military power of France would have been largely +augmented, though it would have been still very inferior to that of +Germany. Tradition and faction, however, prevailed; a reform, of which +Napoleon had laid down the lines at St. Helena fifty years before, was +disregarded and not carried out; and the strength of France for war was +left as it was, that is, miserably weak compared to that of Germany. +This difference was in itself immense, but there were other differences +of perhaps equal moment. France was not prepared for a great modern +war; her military organization was out of joint; she had not had a good +Minister of War since Soult; her chiefs, formed for the most part in +Africa, had little strategic or scientific knowledge; she had nothing +resembling the Prussian Staff, the brain of the army, as it has well +been called; she had not in her service the perfect gradation of united +commands which was one secret of the success of Prussia in 1866. Her +whole military hierarchy, and all that depends on it was, therefore, +in far from a good state; her chiefs had no settled convictions in +war, and were divided upon the great question whether the offensive or +defensive was the better strategy; and, besides that it was weak and +without a real reserve, the condition of her army was very defective. +It was, no doubt, a fine professional army; but it had been injured by +the system of commuting service; it had many bad and worn-out soldiers; +it had not been practised in manœuvres in the field; it had not +anything like fixed rules of tactics; and though its infantry possessed +an excellent rifle, much better than the needle-gun of Prussia, and +its cavalry was a noble arm, its artillery was very inferior to that +of the Germans. The most marked distinction, however, between the two +nations in their capacity for a campaign has yet to be noted. The +railway system of Germany was designed for war; that of France was +formed on no such principle; the local system of Prussia made it quite +certain that the German army would be placed in the field more quickly +than that of France could be under her centralized and ill-arranged +system; and these two circumstances, little perceived at the time, were +of extreme if not of decisive importance. + +The general result of this state of things was that Germany could +“mobilize” and send into the field half a million of men, backed by +enormous reserves, well organized, disciplined, trained, and commanded, +within three weeks after a declaration of war; that France could hardly +assemble three hundred thousand soldiers, unsupported by any solid +reserve, ill-prepared, and under inefficient chiefs; and that, in point +of time, she would be far behind her enemy. There was no comparison, +therefore, between the two powers, and France had scarcely a chance of +success, though if her military strength had been well directed, she +need never have signed the Treaty of Frankfort. The conflict began in +July 1870. Napoleon III., the mere shadow of a mighty name, assumed +the command of the French armies, and his plan was to advance from +behind Metz and Strasbourg, to cross the Rhine between Spires and +Landau, and to interpose between the South and North German forces, +which, it was assumed, would not be ready in time, and divided. The +project, the Emperor has told us himself, was founded on that of his +uncle in 1815; but Moltke had foreseen and provided against it, and +it is useless to examine a mere scheme on paper, which was no sooner +conceived than it proved abortive. Napoleon III. calculated that he +would have 250,000 men round Metz and Strasbourg ready to march, with +50,000 in immediate reserve; but he had little administrative power +or resource; the existing system of France proved inefficient; her +organization for war broke down, the “mobilization” of her troops was +slow and partial, and when the Emperor reached Metz in the third week +of July, he had not assembled 200,000 soldiers, and these were hardly +in a state to take the field. This was very different from that prodigy +of skill, the concentration on the Sambre before Waterloo; and in these +circumstances, the unhappy sovereign ought to have renounced a hopeless +offensive, and to have placed his army on the line of the Moselle, +in order to defend the Vosges and Alsace, a course which Moltke +believed he would take. But the Emperor thought he had no choice. He +was goaded on by opinion in France; the folly of allowing politics to +master strategy, one main cause of the disasters that followed, had +already begun to produce its results; and he advanced to the frontier +with forces, compared to those of the Germans, pitiably weak, and but +ill-provided with all kinds of requirements. When he had attained +Alsace and the Sarre he paused, afraid to strike, but he felt that he +was not in nearly sufficient strength, and, waiting on his enemy, he +allowed his army to be disseminated upon a vast arc, extending from +Thionville to the gap of Belfort, and dangerously exposed along its +front. + +The conduct of Germany and of the German chiefs contrasted most +strikingly with this exhibition of maladministration, feebleness, +and incapacity for war. The contest, Frenchmen thought, was a mere +affair of “glory”; in Germany it caused a great national rising for +unity and independence, and to avenge Jena. The Teutonic race sprang +fiercely to arms; the feuds between North and South Germany ceased; the +orders for the “mobilization” of the German armies were carried out +with wonderful skill and precision, and more than 300,000 men, with +great reserves behind, were in a few days arrayed on the frontier, +an astonishing result of patriotism and organization for war, partly +due to a well-planned railway system. Three great armies were now +quickly formed. This time Moltke certainly had the general direction +of operations in the field, and he instantly assumed a determined +offensive. The situation dictated his plan; there was nothing original +in it, as has been said by flatterers. In fact, it was that of +Marlborough in 1705, and it had been actually laid down by Gneisenau; +it consisted, simply, in invading France from the Palatinate, along +her most exposed frontier, but it was executed in the main ably, and +with conspicuous forethought and vigour. The First Army, led by the +veteran Steinmetz, advanced from Treves towards the Lower Sarre; the +Second, under Prince Frederick Charles, moved from Mayence through the +German Vosges; and the Third, commanded by the Crown Prince of Prussia, +marched across the Rhine and attained the Lauter, the three masses +acting well in concert. The poor affair of Sarrebruck only quickened +the movement; and, in the first week of August, a great tempest of war +burst over the verge of Lorraine and Alsace. The first efforts of the +Germans were, no doubt, premature; Frossard might have gained some +success at Spicheren had he been seconded by the corps in his rear, +and the impatience of the invaders, and of one or two of their chiefs, +precipitated the well-fought battle of Wörth. Moltke, however, is not +to be blamed for this; he was far away from those scenes of action, and +his strategy completely attained his object, though his subordinates +made more than one mistake. As for Wörth, it does honour to the arms +of France; on that day 45,000 Frenchmen held double their number, for +hours, at bay; and the issue might have been very different had De +Failly come into line, as was possible. Macmahon, however, a soldier +but no chief, cannot escape blame for not having drawn off his troops +while retreat was still open and safe, especially when the great +superiority of the enemy in force and in artillery had become clearly +manifest. + + [Illustration: Theatre of the + + CAMPAIGNS + + of 1870–71.] + +Spicheren shattered the front of the French army--it had been named the +Army of the Rhine; and Wörth forced its right wing in confusion and +rout far to the south, in eccentric retreat, laying bare the defeated +centre and left. Napoleon III. fell back with his beaten forces; and +the next few days, big with the fate of France, witnessed a wretched +succession of divided counsels. It was proposed to attempt a stand on +the Nied, in Lorraine, to join Macmahon, or to call him up to Metz; +but all that was done was to retreat on the fortress, to cause a weak +reserve to advance from Châlons, and to impair the moral worth of the +French soldiery, when ill-led, never great in misfortune. Meanwhile, +the hosts of the invaders, largely reinforced, were moving slowly +through the passes of the Vosges; the First and Second Armies filling +the tracts between the Sarre, the Nied, and the Seille, the Third Army +far to the south, round Nancy; and, whatever may be said, ample time +was given to their enemy to make good a retreat westward. This movement +was not arranged until the 12th of August, a precious week having been +thrown away; and the Emperor handed over his command to Bazaine, a +chief, whose antecedents had, at best, been doubtful, with a general +direction to fall back on the Meuse. Moltke’s plan of operations became +now developed; the First Army was moved towards Metz, in order to +detain the retreating enemy; part of the Second Army was pushed across +the Moselle, its march screened with remarkable skill; and the Third +Army made a step westward, the object being to force the Army of the +Rhine into the north of France, and to cut it off from Paris. + +Steinmetz attacked Bazaine on the 14th of August. The battle was stern +and well contested; but it kept the French back for a whole day, and +it facilitated, as was intended, the forward movement of the Second +and Third Armies, which was Moltke’s object. A great mistake, however, +was here made; the German chief believed that the Army of the Rhine +was already far to the north of Metz; but Bazaine was moving directly +westward, and on the evening of the 15th he had his whole army, at +least 140,000 strong, concentrated along the roads that lead from Metz +to Verdun, by Mars La Tour and Etain. One German corps only was on +the spot; Prince Frederick Charles, no doubt unaware of the immense +superiority of his enemy in force, attacked on the morning of the +16th; and had Bazaine had any skill in war, he ought to have swept his +assailant from his path. The Marshal, however, could not handle an +army; he kept the Imperial Guard inactive near Metz, he made little +use of two of his corps; the hard pressed Germans were reinforced by +degrees; a magnificent effort of the German cavalry had a marked effect +on the fortunes of the day; and evening fell on a scene of carnage, +in which neither side could lay a claim to victory. The result proved +the ascendency won by the Germans, and was for them a splendid passage +of arms; but the effects of Moltke’s error were not yet got over--it +was like that of Napoleon before Auerstadt--for, as I have remarked, +the campaign of 1870 resembles that of Jena in many respects; he had +not 80,000 men in hand, and Bazaine had still a strategic advantage, +from which a real chief would have at least plucked safety. As Prince +Frederick Charles has said, he should have attacked on the 17th; and in +that event he ought to have won a battle, or, at all events, have made +good his way to Verdun, a result which would have given a new turn to +the war. A much grander game, however, was open to him; and a German +commentator--Moltke, I suspect--has remarked that Napoleon would have +played it, and have perhaps gained important success. On this day, a +decisive moment in the campaign, the First Army was still east of Metz; +the Second Army was partly west of the Moselle; the Third Army was +leagues away to the south; and the communications of the invaders would +be dangerously exposed, could an enemy descend from Metz on Nancy. Had +Bazaine, therefore, fallen back on the fortress, and issued from it in +force on the 18th, advancing between the Moselle and the Seille, he +ought to have been able to seize and hold the line of operations of +the hostile armies, and the consequences must have been very great. +He might have stopped the invasion, perhaps for weeks; he would have +certainly saved himself and his army, and the situation would have been +wholly changed. + +Unhappily for France, she had not a captain who could seize the one +great occasion given by Fortune in the first part of the war of +1870–71. Bazaine, a soldier fit to command a division, but utterly +unable to direct large masses, had experience of the power of modern +arms, and he had a fixed belief that mere defensive tactics were the +means to assure success in battle. He resolved, therefore, to stand +and to fight; and he arranged his forces, still 120,000 strong, along +a range of uplands, from near Metz on the left to St. Privat and +Roncourt on the right, which formed a fine position for a passive +defence, the system on which the Marshal relied. Moltke, on the 17th, +drew together the greater part of the First and Second Armies across +the Moselle; the huge masses, probably 210,000 men, were west of Metz +on the morning of the 18th, intercepting, a retreat to the Meuse and +Verdun; but, strange as it may appear, the German commander was still +ill-informed of his enemy’s movements; he believed that Bazaine was +falling back northwards, and when he discovered where the French were, +he was convinced, for some hours, that the positions they held did not +extend nearly as far as Roncourt. This and other mistakes dispose of +the theory that Moltke is a kind of Providence on the field, gravely +asserted by certain worshippers of success, and tend to show that +German reconnoitring may be less perfect than has been said; but fools +only can claim omniscience for chiefs; and, in fact, under the new +conditions of war, with its vast operations and its immense battles, +the ablest captains will fall into error more frequently than has been +the case formerly. + +Partly owing to the miscalculations of the German leader, and partly +to tactics essentially false, the tremendous battle of the 18th of +August--known to history by the name of Gravelotte--was undecided up +to the last moment, large as was the superiority of Moltke’s forces. +The assailants, thinking they were turning the French right, fell +in front on the centre strongly entrenched, and failed to make the +slightest impression on it; Steinmetz, on the German right, made +repeated charges, in the close columns of the days of his youth, and +the First Army suffered enormous losses. The Prussian Guard, too, were +cruelly stricken in an attempt to carry St. Privat by storm; indeed, +until near nightfall, the Army of the Rhine had a marked advantage +along the whole line of battle; and had it been able to make a grand +counter-attack, especially when the right of its foe was shattered, +it not improbably would have achieved success. At last, however, the +inherent vices of a passive defence became manifest; the German chiefs, +given the offensive all through, and allowed to search the positions +of the French everywhere, brought their masses to bear against the +extreme French right; Roncourt was carried by a great turning movement; +the whole position became untenable, and the French army gradually +fell back on Metz. Yet no doubt can now exist that had Bazaine been +a capable chief on that terrible day, the battle would have been at +least drawn, inferior as were his troops in numbers, and, in some +degree, disheartened by defeat. Had the Imperial Guard, as was quite +possible, been moved to the aid of the French right, the last effort of +the Germans must have failed; and in that event the contending armies +would have retained their places on the field unchanged. The Marshal, +however, unequal to his task, and thinking only of merely holding his +ground, kept this noble reserve near Metz unengaged; and 20,000 men +were left out of the struggle who could have turned the balance in the +scales of Fortune. Gravelotte, in truth, is a notable instance how a +resolute offensive, even though ill-conducted, may, notwithstanding the +arms of the age, prevail over passive tactics of defence; the attack +on the French right, made at the last moment, after many mistakes, +gained decisive success; and all the efforts of an army which had not +the means to attempt at any time a counter-attack, and simply waited +in position on its foes, proved ultimately fruitless, though for +hours hopeful. The battle, the student of war will note, has a strong +resemblance to that of Malplaquet; but the operations of the Germans +are not to be compared in skill to those of Marlborough and Eugene; +and the tricolour was defended by a very different chief from the +illustrious warrior who upheld the lilies. + +Within two or three days after Gravelotte, the German armies had closed +around Metz and the army of Bazaine, which had clung to the fortress. +The left wing and centre of the whole French army were thus, so to +speak, removed from the theatre, at least for active operations in +the field; and, notwithstanding mistakes and shortcomings, the plan +of Moltke, if not realised, had been attended with more than expected +success. The right wing, half destroyed at Wörth, remained, and we turn +to the movements of this force, on which the fortune of France for the +time depended. Macmahon had been joined by De Failly and his troops, +by the corps which had been placed at Belfort, and by a new corps +despatched from the capital; and by the 20th of August the collected +array, numbering from 120,000 to 130,000 men, was assembled around the +great camp of Châlons. The Marshal was in supreme command; he properly +resolved to keep the only army now left to France to defend Paris; but +as Bazaine conceivably might be not distant, he marched on the 21st +to Rheims, holding a position on the flank of the German invasion, +and in the hope that his brother chief might approach, but with the +determination to fall back on the capital. This was in conformity with +the principles of war; and had Macmahon kept firm to his purpose, the +catastrophe that followed would not have happened, and France would not +have mourned for the extreme of disaster. Unfortunately, however, the +Duke of Magenta, a hero in the field but a weak man--the character is +by no means uncommon--was led astray by pernicious counsels; Palikao, +a new Minister of War, whose chief thought was for the tottering +Empire, and to satisfy the desires of Paris, insisted that Metz must +be relieved; and he urged Macmahon to advance to the Meuse, to slip +outside the flank of the hostile armies, and descending from Montmédy +on the beleaguered fortresses, to join hands with and to extricate +Bazaine, and to strike a bold stroke for a decisive victory. In an evil +hour for France and himself, the marshal gave ear to a fatal project, +as reckless as ever was made in war; for the march to the Meuse, and +thence as far as Metz, would be a flank march of the most hazardous +kind, the enemy holding the chord of the arc; it would be a march +perilously near the Belgian frontier, where a lost battle would mean +ruin; it was a march to be made by an enfeebled army in the midst of +the victorious Germans, threefold in numbers; above all, it was a march +which would draw away from Paris, the centre and vital point of the +national defence, the only organized force that remained to protect +it. Macmahon, it is said, was still doubting--he knew that the course +proposed was insensate, not strategy, but the throw of a gambler--when +an ambiguous message sent by Bazaine, and implying that he was on +his way from Metz northwards, at last caused the luckless commander +to yield. Once more the plainest military rules were sacrificed to +political ends; and once more Bellona, who brooks no rival, was, so to +speak, challenged and wildly provoked. The army of Châlons broke up +from Rheims on the 23rd, and it was on the Upper Aisne on the 25th, +approaching the region of defiles and forests, which extends from the +Ardennes to the Meuse. Macmahon spared no effort to make the movement +rapid, for celerity he knew was his only chance; but the march of his +army became slow, and by the 27th it was still far from the Meuse, in +the tract between Tourteron, Le Chêne, and Buzancy. It had already +begun to shows signs of weakness; it was ill-provided and badly +organized; the soldiers were discontented and ill-disciplined, and the +mind of its chief was full of misgivings. + +I proceed to the operations of the German armies, very different +from those of their ill-directed enemies. The main body of the First +and Second Armies was required for the investment of Metz; but three +corps, called the Army of the Meuse, were detached to co-operate with +the Third Army, by this time west of the Moselle, in the borderlands +of Lorraine and Champagne; and the converging masses, 230,000 strong, +advanced steadily upon a broad front towards the heads of the Marne and +the great roads to Paris. By the 24th of August, the cavalry outposts +which preceded the movement had ascertained that the Army of Châlons +had left Rheims, and was on its way to the Aisne eastward; but Moltke +refused for some time to credit the rumour that it was making for +Metz, for this, he rightly thought, would be the height of folly. He +learned the truth, however, positively on the 25th, and his resolution +was formed with that prompt decision which is a characteristic of real +chiefs, and has been exhibited by him at grave crises. The measures he +took to baffle Palikao’s scheme were not wonders of genius, as has been +said by flatterers, but they show true insight, and most comprehensive +judgment; and they were carried out with consummate skill. The Army of +the Meuse was directed to recross the river; two corps were detached +from Metz to join it, and to stop Macmahon should he get near the +fortress; and the Third Army was ordered to advance northwards through +the district of the Argonnes and the Ardennes--the scene of the +campaign of Valmy--and to gather on the flank and rear of the Army of +Châlons, which would thus be placed in a difficult strait at least. +The execution of this fine strategic movement was admirable in the +highest degree; the great invading hosts, ruled by one master’s will, +well-led, supplied, and trained for the field, marched with speed and +precision through an intricate country, and the careful preparation, +the organization for war, the perfect unity and gradation of command, +and the intelligence of the individual soldier, which are distinctive +marks of the army of Prussia, were made fully and grandly manifest. + +By the 27th of August the German squadrons were gathering rapidly upon +their foes; Macmahon, though without the least notion of the enormous +force that was closing round him, perceived that his army was in grave +peril, and he gave orders for a retreat on Mézières, hoping to attain +Paris by a march from the frontier. For the second time, however, the +incapable chief succumbed to the temptation he should have spurned. A +message, that “revolution would break out should Bazaine be abandoned +at Metz,” induced him to continue the advance to the Meuse, and to +court the ruin which he knew was probable; and it is but just to +observe that Napoleon III.--he accompanied the Marshal since he had +left Châlons--protested against conduct which was almost criminal.[31] +Macmahon now tried to make a forced march; his army was divided into +two great columns, in order to make its movements rapid, and the +first column reached the river safely, and had crossed it by the 29th +of August. The second column, however, was far to the south, and +separated by a full march from the first; it was largely composed of +beaten troops, already desponding, nay, half-mutinous; it was charged +with _impedimenta_ of all kinds, and it toiled slowly through +the passes and thickets it had to traverse on its way to the Meuse. +This gave Moltke the opportunity to strike; the Army of the Meuse was +recalled to the west of the stream, the two corps from Metz having +been sent back; a part of the Third Army was pushed forward, and the +Germans fell with terrible effect on their enemies, caught in flank +and surprised, at Beaumont and other places in their march. The second +column was routed with immense loss; it reached the Meuse a mere +shattered wreck, pursued by the indefatigable Prussian horsemen; and +its ruin involved a part of the first column, which crossed the river +to give it support. By the evening of the 30th the Army of Châlons, one +corps of it as far as Carignan, was on the eastern bank of the Meuse, +but half of the French troops were a demoralized mass; and the German +advanced guards were already at hand, in close communication with the +hosts in their rear. + +Macmahon, at this time, was at Carignan; he confidently expected that +he would reach Metz; he boasted, it is said, that victory was at hand. +The news of the events of the 30th dispelled these dreams; he hurriedly +fell back with his one intact corps, and by the morning of the 31st +he had assembled the still large, but beaten, Army of Châlons in the +tract that surrounds the fortress and town of Sedan. The state of the +French troops was of the worst omen; but an occasion was still open +to a great chief, to extricate them from impending ruin. Mézières was +not distant, and a French corps had reached the place to support the +Marshal; the Meuse spread between his army and the foe, and had he +left his _impedimenta_ behind, and made a rapid march, without +the loss of an hour, he would certainly have escaped with the great +mass of his forces. It is this circumstance which makes the strategy +of Moltke inferior, fine as it was, to that which shut up Mack in +Ulm; and the Grand Army, it will be borne in mind, had been saved on +the Beresina when in far worse straits. Macmahon, however, would not +stir from Sedan; there is reason to believe he never knew the immense +strength of the hostile force, and he arrayed his army, “ready,” he +said, “to fight,” along the uplands, encircled by streams and villages, +which overlook Sedan and the valley below. The evening of the 31st had +come; the German horsemen made the situation known; and Moltke, who up +to this time had only hoped that he might succeed in forcing his enemy +across the frontier, saw that he could reckon on a decisive triumph. +Orders were issued for an immediate night march; the great German +divisions, perfectly led, and the men scenting approaching victory, +moved rapidly over the space between, and preparations were made to +assail and surround the feeble and shattered Army of Châlons. + +It is unnecessary to retrace the scenes of Sedan, the just retribution +of foolishness in command, a battle decreed by Fate, in its irony, +to be fought around the birthplace of Turenne. The French were first +attacked, on that fatal morning, on their southern and eastern front +towards the Chiers; and they made for a time a gallant resistance, +though the fall of Macmahon and a squabble between two of his +lieutenants had a bad effect on the troops. By degrees, however, the +overwhelming pressure of forces immensely superior told; the line +of defence on the Givonne was carried; and the French were driven +back, on Sedan, routed, and huddled around the walls of the fortress. +Meanwhile a tremendous attack had been made on the northern and +western fronts of the defence; the Germans advancing to the heights +of Illy, and moving from the opposite side round the bend of the +Meuse, which half encircles the outskirts of Sedan, closed gradually +round their doomed foes; and though the French cavalry made heroic +efforts, and one corps nobly struggled to the last, it was impossible +to withstand overpowering numbers. The last remains of the Army of +Châlons were forced, like the first, against the fortress; the German +artillery--throughout the campaign it had proved an arm of enormous +strength--was brought to bear in masses on the perishing wreck; the +fire of 500 pieces searched the scene of carnage; and a white flag soon +announced that resistance, no longer possible, had completely ceased. +Within a few hours 85,000 men, the survivors of more than 120,000, the +victims of worse than insensate leading, were a collection of helpless +prisoners of war; and their cries of impotent fury and despair--this +was the attitude of by far the greater part--only provoked the pitying +scorn of the victors. + +This immense disaster, added to that of Metz, all but destroyed the +military power of Imperial France on the theatre of war. Moltke had +acted harshly at the capitulation of Sedan; he had no respect for the +French character; like Hannibal and Napoleon, he treated the force of +patriotic passion with contempt; and, leaving a considerable detachment +behind, he directed an immediate advance on Paris. The German armies +rolled steadily onward, through the valleys of the Aisne, the Oise, +and the Marne, masking fortresses and occupying points on their way; +and they appeared before the capital on the 19th of September, the +chiefs convinced they would meet no resistance. Their expectations +seemed about to be realised; an attempt to assail the invaders in +flank, as they gathered upon the uplands south of the Seine, was +easily defeated, and had bad results; and the Germans were permitted, +without a further effort, to surround and invest the beleaguered +city. Their lines, constructed with skill and forethought, spread on +a circumference of great extent, from the confluence of the Seine and +the Marne, by St. Denis, round through Versailles to Bonneuil; and +though the besieging forces were at this moment not 150,000 strong, no +doubt existed in the German camp--it was, indeed, the general belief of +Europe--that a few days would see the surrender of Paris. + +Weeks, however, passed, and it became apparent that this calculation +was a complete error. The Empire had fallen on the 4th of September; a +Government of national defence had been formed; and this Revolution, +in the main caused by the passionate wrath of the great mass of the +citizens, quickened the general resolve that the capital should hold +out, and confront the power of the German armies. Preparations had been +made to stand a siege; immense supplies of provisions had been stored; +the _enceinte_ and the forts which protect the city had been +hastily manned and armed; enormous bodies of men had been assembled to +take part in the defence of the place; these were supported by a corps +of trained soldiers, and by the corps which had appeared at Mézières, +and had been brought back after a skilful retreat; and though these +arrangements were rude and imperfect, the strength of the city to +resist attack was infinitely greater than Moltke had supposed. Sorties +began to be made by degrees; these, though always repulsed, were not +contemptible; the armament of the forts was completed; redoubts and +entrenchments rose at many points to strengthen and to perfect the +zone of defence; the citizens, warlike in all ages, though in peace +addicted to pleasure and ease, acquired gradually something like +discipline; the materials at least of armies were formed, and Paris +assumed the aspect of a huge fortified camp, with a garrison certainly +immense in numbers. Moltke took pains to secure his position; he +tacitly admitted that he had made a mistake in marching on the capital +without having his communications or his base assured, and with forces +comparatively small; but he held his ground with determined constancy; +he summoned reinforcements to head-quarters, and several corps were +employed in besieging Strasbourg and other strongholds on the way +from the frontier, and in overrunning Burgundy and Franche Comté. The +front and lines of the invasion were thus strengthened; and, though +time had passed, the submission of France was held to be a fact of +the immediate future. The German chief was to be again deceived, as +many warriors had been before, in his estimate of a people, great and +heroic, despite of many national faults and failings. It is all very +well for the Prussian Staff to sneer at Gambetta, as it has done in its +book; but he was a man of great powers, if of real shortcomings; and +he was but the most striking figure of millions of Frenchmen. A great +and sudden national rising took place; it was more spontaneous than +that of 1793; in an incredibly short time 250,000 men were in arms to +resist the German hosts; and by making use of the resources of France +for war--old soldiers, troops in depôts, and reserves--vast arrays were +mustered, which at least contained the elements of real military power. +These levies, of course, were bad soldiers, but they were formidable +in numbers and in aptitude for war; and, whatever may be said, the +position of Moltke had become critical as October was closing; the +German armies were, for the most part, engaged on the investment of +Paris and to the east of Metz; they were conquerors, and had all the +power of success; but they were exposed to attack from within and +without at the centres to which they were, as it were, bound; and they +were in the midst of an immense insurrection spreading all round. + +At this conjuncture, a great disaster showed that Fortune was still +most adverse to France. Bazaine had been shut up since Gravelotte +at Metz; he had kept his army almost inactive, and he had made no +real effort to break the investment. I cannot examine the crooked +intrigues in which he played an ignoble part; but he surrendered the +great fortress on the 28th of October, and the world beheld the most +disgraceful capitulation ever known in war. Even on his pitiful system +of passive defence, the Marshal did not nearly do his duty; the place +could have held out a fortnight longer, and the respite would have +been of extreme importance. The First and Second Armies were now set +free to take part in the great invasion; several corps were sent to +the north, to crush levies formed in Normandy and other provinces. One +was despatched to support the siege; and the remainder, under Prince +Frederick Charles, held the tract between the heads of the Seine +and Burgundy. The grasp of the Germans on France was thus greatly +strengthened; yet the position of Moltke was so unsafe that it was +endangered by a single trifling reverse. An army, partly composed of +good troops, but in the main of improvised levies, had been assembled +south of the Loire; it had been placed in the hands of D’Aurelle, +a veteran of real organizing skill, and in a few weeks it numbered +60,000 men, and had acquired something like military worth and power. +A Bavarian detachment, perhaps 20,000 strong, and a division under the +Grand-Duke of Mecklenburg, sent off to put down insurrection in the +west, were the only hostile forces between this large mass of Frenchmen +and the lines round Paris; and D’Aurelle, aided by a young chief, +Chanzy, who was to prove that France had yet real captains, resolved +to attack the Bavarians and to retake Orleans, which had fallen into +the enemy’s hands. The Army of the Loire broke up from its camps, +and crossed the river in the first days in November; it fell on the +Bavarians near the little town of Coulmiers. Had the orders of Chanzy +been well carried out, and a turning movement been completed in time, +the invaders must have been utterly routed; but, as it was, they were +beaten with loss; and they were compelled to fall back on the roads to +Paris, abandoning Orleans and the adjoining region. + +When this intelligence arrived, unfeigned alarm prevailed at the +German head-quarters at Versailles; the besiegers were threatened +by an army of relief, and by the unknown multitudes of armed men in +Paris; and disseminated as they were on an immense circumference, +they were in a situation of no common peril. Moltke made up his mind, +as became a true chief; he despatched pressing orders to Prince +Frederick Charles to hasten to the capital by forced marches; and, like +Bonaparte before Mantua--a Journal, said to be his, alludes to this--he +resolved, whatever the result, to raise the siege should the Army of +the Loire appear from the south. This single circumstance shows how +precarious the position of the Germans had become; and had D’Aurelle +boldly followed up his success the consequences to France might have +been momentous. Chanzy, it is known, was for the more daring course; +Napoleon would have taken it, I cannot doubt; and though it is idle to +speculate now, the siege would certainly have been given up and the +war would have taken a different turn. D’Aurelle, however, refused +to advance; he constructed a great entrenched camp near Orleans; and +here he increased and trained his levies, hoping before long to resume +the offensive. This, probably, was too great caution; but there were +reasons for the step of real weight. Prince Frederick Charles was but +a few marches off, and should he reach the flank of the Army of the +Loire, on its way to the capital, he would perhaps destroy the best +organized force possessed by France. This clearly shows that had Metz +resisted, and detained the Prince only a few days longer, the French +chief would have had, and perhaps would have seized, an admirable +occasion offered by Fortune; and, indeed, a German writer has drily +remarked that “the capitulation came in the very nick of time.” + +The victory of Coulmiers sent a thrill through France, enormously +increased the power of Gambetta, and caused levies to flock to the war +in thousands. Notwithstanding the fall of Metz, and all that followed +from it, the situation of the Germans was still critical; and owing to +the undoubted strategic mistake of marching on Paris with too weak a +force, their movements had been incoherent, and far from masterly. By +the close of November the Great City had formed three armies out of +her armed multitudes; and two of them, probably 150,000 strong, had +acquired a certain degree of efficiency; the third, perhaps 200,000 +men, being only fit to defend the ramparts. I cannot describe the +great sortie which followed; Ducrot crossed the Marne and carried +two villages, which had been made part of the besiegers’ lines; but +ultimately he was compelled to retreat; and, in fact, the effort was +doomed to failure, for the zone of investment and the zone of defence +had by this time become all but impregnable, or could be mastered only +by the art of the engineer. The sortie from Paris was contemporaneous +with an advance of the army of D’Aurelle’s northwards; but here +Gambetta unhappily intervened, and his meddling and presumption did +enormous mischief. The young civilian had done, no doubt, great things, +but since Coulmiers, he had become a kind of Dictator--the history +of France has too many examples how foolish hero-worship has such +results--he insisted that the Army of the Loire should make for the +capital, whatever the risk, though Prince Frederick Charles was near +at hand; and, as he had made that army 150,000 strong, he refused to +believe that there was serious danger. D’Aurelle and Chanzy protested +in vain; two detached corps of the Army of the Loire were directed +against Prince Frederick Charles, and were easily defeated by an +inferior force; and the Prince, a chief of a very high order, made +immediate preparations for a great counter-stroke. The Grand Duke and +the Bavarians had been approaching; he quickly united these forces to +his own, and he bore down in irresistible strength on the army, mainly +of recruits, opposed to him. The centre of the Army of the Loire was +broken; its wings fell off in eccentric retreat; one part was driven +across the river, and the triumphant invaders re-entered Orleans, +having gained rapid and complete success. By the first days of December +it had become apparent that Paris could not burst the chain cast around +her; and the army had been shattered which had been employed, unwisely +at the moment, as an army of relief. + +The prospect for France was dark and mournful; but light shone at +one point on the gloomy scene. D’Aurelle had been unjustly dismissed +by Gambetta; and the part of his defeated army which had crossed the +Loire had been placed in the hands of Bourbaki, the chief of the late +Imperial Guard. Chanzy, however, commanded the remaining part; and a +series of operations followed which show that he had real genius in +war. He was attacked by the Grand Duke in all the flush of victory; but +he had been reinforced by Gambetta’s orders; he took a strong position, +covering both his flanks; and then with true insight he assumed the +offensive, essential in the case of French soldiers; and, on the whole, +he obtained some success. Prince Frederick Charles now fiercely turned +against him; he concentrated all his available forces; but Chanzy +made a magnificent stand; and his conduct deserves the very highest +praise. Perceiving that the relief of Paris should be the true object +of the French armies in the field, he fell back from the Loire to the +Sarthe, drawing toward the capital with great skill; and in this he +showed that he was a real strategist. Nor was he less admirable as a +tactician; he continually, in retreat, took an offensive attitude; he +turned defensive positions to the best account, and he contrived that +the superiority of the French rifle should tell with full effect on +the advancing enemy. Prince Frederick Charles pursued in vain; Chanzy +made good his way to Le Mans; he was nearer to Paris than when he had +left the Loire; his army had not been once beaten; and the Germans +were not only worn out, but showed signs of demoralization and fear, +for thousands had perished to no purpose; the hardships of the winter +campaign had been frightful; and it seemed impossible to overcome the +enemy.[32] + +A pause in the conflict now occurred, to the astonishment of Europe, +still doubtful--a war of races, in which colossal force was confronted +by a national rising. The Germans were still, for the most part, +victorious; their armies surrounded imprisoned Paris; they had mastered +most of the fortresses of France, proved to be of little use in the +struggle; and they had made their lines of operations secure, and +had overrun a full third of the country. But Chanzy was in the field +unconquered; Faidherbe, a commander of real gifts, had admirably +conducted a campaign in the north, attacking the invaders when he +saw a chance, and falling back on the strongholds of the Somme; +Bourbaki was at the head of a great force, continually increasing, +on the Middle Loire; and France had realised her proud boast that +she had but “to stamp her foot, and legions would spring from the +earth at her bidding.” Grave[33] anxiety was felt at head-quarters at +Versailles, spite of noisy boasting of German triumphs; and Moltke, +reading the facts with a true general’s eye, insisted on having large +reinforcements to strengthen the wearied and thinned invaders. Troops +in tens of thousands from the trained reserves of Germany were called +into the field; shrunken regiments and corps were restored in numbers; +new corps entered the east of France, and preparations were made on +an immense scale to quicken, by a bombardment, the fall of Paris. The +organization of the German armies, though strained to the utmost, bore +the test; and if the trials of the war had told heavily on the young +soldiers who crowded the ranks, a fierce national passion still upheld +the invasion. Moltke made excellent use of these new forces. Up to this +time, his movements had suffered from the effects of the premature +advance on Paris; but the error was now completely rectified, and his +dispositions were able in the extreme. Keeping his grasp on the capital +with stern tenacity, he so distributed his corps on the theatre of +war that a far-spreading external zone of resistance protected the +inner zone of investment; and should an attempt, therefore, be made +to relieve Paris, he would have a double set of armies to oppose the +French and interior lines on the whole circumference. Secure within +this circle, he defied the enemy, but he was ready at all points to +take a bold offensive, and he eschewed the whole system of mere passive +defence. The exertions of France were also prodigious. Independently +of the Parisian forces, she had placed 500,000 men in the field, with +from 1,300 to 1,400 guns, and history, despite the Prussian staff, will +pronounce this a gigantic effort. These levies, however, were most +inferior troops. They were no match for their trained adversaries; they +were not equal to long marches, and at this supreme moment they were +wrongly directed. Chanzy, the master-spirit of the national defence, +saw what the situation was, and what it required; he appreciated the +ability of Moltke’s strategy; but even now he did not despair of +success, and in a despatch, marked with true insight in war, he urged +that all the provincial armies should endeavour to combine and march +on the capital, which, in turn, should fiercely attack the besiegers. +This last effort would, I believe, have failed; but it was the true +course and perfectly conceived; and it was that which Moltke expected +and feared. Unhappily for France, Gambetta rejected the counsels of +her most distinguished soldier, and, giving ear to a silly theorist, +he adopted a plan for the operations at hand, false in principle and, +as facts stood, ruinous. At this moment Werder, in the east of France, +was engaged with his corps in the siege of Belfort; the garrison was +making a firm stand; Bourbaki, in command of his large army, was in +the Nivernais, on the verge of Burgundy; Garibaldi had a motley array +near Dijon, and a large army was ready to march from the south. In this +state of affairs, instead of directing all the forces of France in a +march on Paris, Gambetta resolved to make a great effect to relieve +Belfort and to enter Alsace. For this purpose the collective forces of +Bourbaki, Garibaldi, and the south were to join, and the result, it +was hoped, would place the French armies on the communications of the +invaders from the Rhine, and would have great and glorious results. +This plan, strikingly resembling those of Carnot in 1793–1794, was, +even in the abstract, misconceived; the detachment to the east of the +French armies would expose and isolate Chanzy on the west, and even +were the communications of the Germans reached, this would be at a +point too remote to relieve Paris, or seriously to affect the issue +of the campaign. But, in the actual state of affairs, the project was +little less than foolishness; the armies intended to relieve Belfort +and to attain Alsace were not equal to a great operation of real +danger, and the scheme in truth was of much the same kind as that which +had led to the catastrophe of Sedan. + +In the last days of December, Bourbaki’s army set off from the +Nivernais to reach Franche Comté. The march of the columns was pitiably +slow; the troops suffered terribly from cold and disease; and signs of +evil omen had become manifest long before Belfort had been approached. +This eccentric movement set the Grand Duke and Prince Frederick Charles +completely free to attack Chanzy upon the Sarthe; and the German +chiefs, who had had their forces recruited to a very large extent, +broke up from Chartres, Nogent le Rotrou, and Orleans, and bore down +on the French commander, advancing on an ever narrowing front. Chanzy +had detached flying columns to observe the enemy; these fell back as +the assailants drew near; and the French army, by the 10th of January, +was concentrated within its lines at Le Mans, which had been fortified +with skill and care. A fierce and protracted struggle followed; +Chanzy, very different from the incapable Bazaine, really did wonders +with his raw young troops; but, at nightfall on the 11th, his extreme +right was turned by a desperate effort of Prince Frederick Charles. +He evacuated Le Mans, and lost thousands of prisoners; but he made +good his way to the Mayenne; and here he still kept his foes at bay, +having in his retreat drawn nearer Paris. He was still full of hope, +and wrote in that sense; but before long a tremendous disaster befell +the ill-fated forces of France in the east. Bourbaki was joined by a +part of Garibaldi’s troops, and by the army moving from the south; and +with this force, fully 130,000 strong, he crossed the Ognon, and almost +reached Belfort. He was, however, defeated with ease by Werder, with a +force very inferior in numbers; and, after one or two fruitless efforts +to outmanœuvre his victorious enemy, he fell back baffled, and made for +Besançon. Here he gave up his command, and tried to commit suicide; his +ruined army continued to retreat, but Moltke saw that his opportunity +had come and he turned it to account, with great skill and decision. +Three corps were detached from the external zone; Manteuffel, at the +head of them, bore down on the enemy; Werder, with part of his corps, +pressed forward from Belfort; and Bourbaki’s whole army, under its new +chief, Clinchant, was surrounded and driven across the Swiss frontier. +This was the end of Gambetta’s ambitious enterprise, which alike had +caused the defeat of Chanzy and had ruined the last hope of success for +the provincial armies. + +It fared almost as ill with France in the north, on the theatre where +Faidherbe conducted the war. That skilful officer had continued the +game of harassing the enemy, and falling back; and he had even fought +a battle at Bapaume, which he had some right to describe as a victory. +But about the middle of January he advanced towards St. Quentin, in the +hope, it is supposed, of either relieving Paris, or of making eastward +towards Bourbaki’s army. Moltke sent off a corps from the zone of +investment, and defeated him with considerable loss; and, though he +effected his retreat to Lille, his forces were for the time paralyzed. +The military strength of France outside Paris was thus rendered almost +powerless; Moltke had made the best use of his interior lines, on a +great and complex field of manœuvre; and the false direction given to +Bourbaki’s army had practically decided the contest in the field. The +proud capital alone remained; and invincible famine was already at +hand. In the first days of January the bombardment began; for fully +three weeks shot and shell crashed through all parts of the beleaguered +city; but no impression was made on the _enceinte_ or the forts, +and still less on the great mass of the citizens. The attack, in fact, +altogether failed; it does no credit to the German Engineers, and it +attests Moltke’s dislike of Frenchmen; and it must be condemned as +barbarous warfare, for it was known that Paris must ere long surrender. +Towards the end of the month the end came; a last sortie for the honour +of arms was easily repulsed with great slaughter; and on the 28th of +January 1871 the capitulation was signed. German horsemen defiled under +the Arch of the Star, a monument to the Grand Army, as the Guards of +Napoleon had passed through Berlin; the tricolour has been plucked +down from Metz and Strasbourg; and France mourns the calamitous Peace +of Frankfort. Yet the defence of Paris, and the efforts made by the +improvised armies of Chanzy and Faidherbe, were exploits worthy of a +great nation; in the hour of misfortune France may say, like her king, +that she has not lost honour; the resistance she made, all things +considered, was grander than that of 1793, and it has redeemed the +ignominy of Metz and Sedan. + +The success of the conquerors in this gigantic war is the greatest, +perhaps, recorded in history. The Imperial Army of France was carried +away captive; her improvised armies were nearly half destroyed; her +fortresses yielded one after another; her capital held out, but +succumbed to famine. The theme is a fine idol for the worshippers of +success; and Moltke has been held up to the admiration of mankind as +the greatest military genius in the annals of war. Yet, if we calmly +examine the course of the contest, we perceive that the operations of +the German chief do not reveal one grand strategic conception, and are +characterized by several grave errors; they exhibit science, decision, +and strength of character, and perfect execution of the thoughts of +others, not originality, or “the faultlessness” claimed for them. +Moltke--and this does not detract from his fame--owed much to his +foes, and much to fortune; Bazaine and MacMahon, in different ways, +sink to the level of the Soubises and Clermonts; the fall of Metz was +a godsend to Germany; but Chanzy was a warrior of real powers; he kept +the issue of the struggle long doubtful, and had he had the supreme +control of the forces of France, it is impossible to say what might not +have happened. Some of the lessons taught by the war are commonplace; +well-organized armies, of overwhelming strength, defeat armies inferior +in every respect; trained and disciplined troops beat raw levies; +disaster is all but certain to follow when the simplest rules of the +military art are disregarded for supposed reasons of State. Two great +facts, however, require special notice; the German armies are the most +formidable which have ever appeared in the modern world; there is an +element of weakness in their young soldiers, but they represent a +mighty race in arms, ready at any moment to march on to conquest; and +this has been the result of years of training. On the other hand, the +national rising of France, after Metz and Sedan, was a noble movement; +it was marked by heroic courage and self-sacrifice; and yet it failed, +and probably was doomed to fail, though the resources of France for war +are enormous, and the French are a people of born soldiers. + +I have come to the last of my Great Commanders; what is Moltke’s place +in that august succession? It is difficult to catch a true likeness +of a figure not in the perspective of Time, and whose career belongs +to the history of the day. Moltke has many, I think, of the gifts +of Frederick; he is a thoroughly accomplished and educated man; he +has extraordinary force of application and thought; his perseverance +deserves the highest praise; and though he has not been tried by the +test of ill-fortune, he has evidently the tenacity and firmness of the +Prussian king. Like Frederick, however, he wants supreme genius and the +imaginative power of the greatest chiefs; but he is far superior to +Frederick in all that relates to the large combinations and movements +of war, though probably his inferior on the field of battle. It is his +special characteristic that he was one of the first to see what are the +new conditions of war in this age, and that he turned them to the very +best account; the Prussian Army and that of the lesser German States +have been, in a great measure, created by him; and Moltke, I conceive, +has “organized victory” more thoroughly than has ever before been seen. +His place as a strategist is more doubtful; his countrymen have called +him “the great strategist,” but this is the exaggeration of national +sympathy; and in this sphere of the art, I certainly think he holds an +inferior rank to Turenne, and he has not even approached the height of +Napoleon. We miss originality in his conceptions of war. If he really +directed the converging movement into Bohemia, in 1866, whatever have +been the modifications of the art, this was inconsistent with its true +principles; his advance on Paris was a distinct mistake; and in his +operations at Metz we see many errors which Bazaine possibly might have +made disastrous. His peculiar strategic merit is that he can work out +to perfection accepted views, and improve upon the ideas of others; +but in this there is not the masterly power seen in the campaigns of +1674 and 1675, of 1796 and of 1800. Still Moltke is a real chief of the +grand school of Napoleon; he can move large armies on a wide theatre +with remarkable forethought and scientific skill; his marches against +the army of Châlons, and the army of Bourbaki, are very fine, and he +made the best use of his interior lines in the final operations around +Paris. His merits as a tactician are less easy to estimate; in the case +of the immense battles of the present day, the real head of an army +can do no more than make arrangements of a general kind; but if he +directed Gravelotte, it was ill-directed, though it is well known he +condemned Steinmetz; and in theory he is a master of modern tactics. +Moltke seems to have a cold and passionless nature; like Wellington, he +has commanded the respect of officers and men but not their devotion; +Prince Frederick Charles was the real hero, in the eyes of the German +soldiery in 1870–71; and this remarkable chief possessed in a high +degree the peculiar gifts of his greatest ancestor. It is astonishing, +however, if we bear in mind that Moltke was in his sixty-seventh year +when he first commanded an army in the field, that he should have +achieved what he has achieved. He is a great commander, beyond dispute, +and as an administrator in war he has never been excelled. + + [Illustration] + +[Illustration: Map of BELGIUM.] + + + THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815. + + + + + CHAPTER I. + + +I purpose, in this and a subsequent chapter, to describe the main +features of the Campaign of 1815, and to endeavour to pronounce a +fair judgment upon it. Of the interest of the subject it is needless +to speak; this grand passage of arms will attract the attention of +history to it in the same degree as the contest decided on the field +of Zama, or the last struggle between Pompey and Cæsar. Yet this is +not my chief reason for attempting this sketch; I venture to think, +though a large literature has grown up round the theme of Waterloo, +that there is still room for an impartial study, brief though it be, +of the leading incidents of this ever-memorable and most decisive +conflict. Many causes, in fact, have concurred to obscure the truth +respecting the Campaign of 1815, and to prevent a just estimate being +formed of it. On some points our knowledge is still imperfect; passion +and prejudice have distorted the facts, on several others of the first +importance; and commentators on Waterloo, even including the chief +actors in the drama, have, in most instances, either made palpable and +grave mistakes, or have applied a kind of criticism to the course of +events, essentially, and from the nature of the case, fallacious. The +narratives of Napoleon, in some of their parts, bear the ineffaceable +marks of his genius, but they abound in serious errors of detail, and +in places they are far from just or honest. The apology of Wellington, +though the most truthful of men, written as it was in far advanced +age, is not trustworthy in many respects; and all that has emanated +from the Prussian staff is by no means accurate, or even always candid. +As for historians, Thiers has composed a romance confuted by the +evidence in most important points; and the same may be said of the +host of Frenchmen who, like him, have slavishly followed Napoleon. We +have had a like class of writers in England; from Siborne to Hooper +it has been the fashion to describe the Duke as faultless in 1815, in +plain defiance of unquestionable facts; and Dutch, Belgian, and German +authors have equally erred in claiming praise for chiefs of their races +beyond their merits. Then we have commentators, of whom Charras is by +far the ablest and most perfect specimen, partisans who test operations +of war by an impossible standard of mere theory, and who, in this way, +have succeeded in making the greatest chiefs seem inferior men; and +Chesney’s _Essay_, though in parts excellent, is by no means free +from this most unsound criticism. Passing by General Hamley’s valuable +sketch, I believe Jomini’s account of Waterloo to be, even now, the +best extant narrative; but it is necessarily wanting in many respects, +in the information obtained since his day. I shall try to follow, in +these chapters, the method which, in an inquiry of this kind, will most +probably lead to just conclusions; that is, I shall rely[34] only on +contemporaneous documents, the genuineness of which is not doubtful; +and I shall endeavour to judge of events as they happened, from the +point of view of those who took part in them, and not by the mere +abstract rules of strategy. + +I have no space to discuss the arrangements made beforehand by Napoleon +to meet the League of Europe in 1815; but they were most able and +even wonderful, and the detraction of Charras is false and unjust. +The memories of an immortal campaign would have caused the Emperor +to defend France on the Marne and the Seine, with fortified Paris a +pivot for his operations and a vast entrenched camp; but the state of +opinion made this plan impossible, and he resolved to assume a daring +offensive. His design, resembling in its main features the strategy +which led to Ulm and Austerlitz, may be left with confidence to judges +of the art, and bears the clear stamp of his transcendent genius. A +million of armed men were advancing on France from the Scheldt, the +Rhine, the Oder, and the Po; but the hosts of the Allies were widely +apart, and at unequal distances from the points of attack; and the +extreme right of the vast front of invasion, composed of the armies of +Blücher and Wellington, was isolated, and close to the French frontier. +It was possible, therefore, to make a sudden spring on this detached +part of the Coalition’s forces, to surprise and to overthrow it in +detail; and if decisive success were achieved, there were reasons to +believe that Napoleon’s triumph might bring the war at once to a close. +The situation, besides, of the menaced armies in Belgium invited a +daring attack, even though made with an inferiority of force. They were +disseminated along a wide front, from Ghent to Liège, a hundred miles +in length, and from thirty-five to fifty miles in depth, from Brussels +to the edge of French territory; they were scattered in divisions, +covering the roads that led, in many lines, from the frontier of +France; and two days, at least, were required before they could +even nearly concentrate on a given field of battle. They were thus +vulnerable at all points, and the strategy which placed them in such +positions has long ago been condemned as false; but many and decisive +reasons concurred to induce Napoleon to select their centre, and the +space where their inner flanks met, as the first spot on which to +direct his efforts. + +Were he to assail the Allies on either wing, he would press their +armies against each other, and favour rather than retard their +junction, the very event to be most avoided; and, besides, they were in +greater strength on these lines than at those points of their centre +at which their separate forces came in contact. Again, Wellington +was based on the sea, from Brussels and Ghent to Ostend and Antwerp; +the base of Blücher was the Rhine and Cologne. Were their centre, +therefore, fiercely attacked, and their armies compelled to diverge +from each other, the probability was that each chief would fall back +on his proper base, as happened in the campaign of 1794, and that +the Emperor would be able to interpose and, perhaps, to overwhelm +their recoiling forces. Other considerations combined to determine +the purpose of the most profound of generals. Blücher was known to be +hasty and bold to a fault; the genius of Wellington was circumspect and +cautious; and Napoleon calculated--rightly, as the event proved--that +should he fall suddenly on the allied centre, Blücher would hurry +forward to repel the attack, and that Wellington would be slow to +advance; and this single circumstance, it was not unlikely, would +give the Imperial chief an admirable chance to beat in detail his +divided enemies. The peculiarities of the theatre, too, encouraged +an attempt against the allied centre. At each side of this point the +French frontier at this time ran into Belgian territory, especially +from Valenciennes to Rocroy; a great main road by Charleroi to Brussels +nearly traversed the space where the Allies met, and led into the +heart of the Belgic provinces; the communication between the Allies +depended chiefly on one lateral road, extending from Nivelles to Namur +eastwards, and behind this lay a difficult region of hills and marshes +watered by the Dyle, and unfavourable to the junction of divided +armies. Should Napoleon, therefore, advance on this path, he would have +the shortest line of attack from France; he would have an avenue into +the midst of the camps of his foes, and conducting him to the Belgian +capital; and should he once be able to force his adversaries from their +main point of contact, the Nivelles and Namur road, they would find it +no easy task to reunite, and they would probably be placed in serious +peril. + +The Allies were thus to be struck at their centre, and their separated +hosts to be rent asunder as Beaulieu and Colli, twenty years before, +when Bonaparte was first revealed to Fortune, were assailed from the +Genoese seaboard and driven in eccentric retreat from Piedmont. An +untoward event at the outset increased the difficulties of carrying +out a plan, which may be pronounced one of the most brilliant even +of Napoleon’s marvellous career. The united armies of Blücher and +Wellington were about 224,000 strong; the Emperor reckoned that +150,000 men were required to assure his operations success; and it may +confidently be said that, had he had this force, he would, humanly +speaking, have been victorious, spite of the misadventures and faults +of the Campaign. A sudden rising in La Vendée, however, deprived him +of 20,000 good troops; but, though this added largely to his adverse +chances, his position was such that he still resolved to persevere +in his audacious project. The execution of his profound design was +admirable, and, indeed, all but perfect. The divisions intended to make +the movement were encamped along the northern frontier of France, or +thrown back southward almost to the capital; and the problem was how to +draw together these widely separated bodies of men, and to concentrate +them at the appointed spot, without interference on the part of +the enemy, and without even his knowledge, if this were possible. +The operation was accomplished with success, largely through that +remarkable skill in stratagem which was one of Napoleon’s distinctive +gifts. While the corps on the frontier, their march concealed by +different expedients with consummate art, were collected together +from the vast distance which extends from Lille and Valenciennes to +Metz, the corps in the interior were moved forward by degrees, and +the united masses were brought into contact, at the points indicated +by their great head and leader. On the evening of the 14th June 1815, +nearly 128,000 Frenchmen, including 22,000 cavalry, and with 350 guns, +had effected their junction, on a narrow front, on the very verge of +the plains of Belgium, a few miles from the banks of the Sambre, and +converging towards the great main road, running, we have seen, from +Charleroi to Brussels; and the concentration, if not quite complete, +was, in the circumstances in which it was made, one of the finest known +in the annals of war. The Emperor’s left wing, about 45,000 strong, +composed of the 2nd and 1st Corps, in the experienced hands of Reille +and D’Erlon, was near the Sambre at Leez and Solre; the centre, nearly +68,000 men, comprising the Imperial Guard, the 3rd Corps of Vandamme, +the 6th Corps, with Lobau as its chief, and the cavalry reserves, +under the command of Grouchy, lay in the country around Beaumont; +and the right wing, the 4th Corps, led by the brilliant Gérard, and +numbering perhaps 15,000 soldiers, was, in part, at Philippeville, +its appointed station, a part, however, being half a march distant, +the single detachment that had not fulfilled its mission. The purpose +of Napoleon was to conduct these forces, assembled at his bidding as +if by magic, at daybreak against the enemy in his camps; to cross the +Sambre, to enter Charleroi, holding the main road to Brussels before +referred to; and having taken possession of the adjoining country, and +overpowered, if possible, any foes in his path, to press on to the road +from Nivelles to Namur, to occupy on it Quatre Bras and Sombreffe, +the two points where the allied commanders would probably attempt to +effect their junction, and having attained this position of vantage, to +interpose between their divided armies, completing the first act in the +drama of the Campaign. + +Having made a spirit-stirring address to his troops, Napoleon set +his army in motion at about 3 A.M. on the 15th of June. The +left wing was not long in crossing the Sambre; soon after mid-day the +corps of Reille, that of D’Erlon being some miles behind, had passed +the bridge which spans the stream near the town of Marchiennes--it +had been left intact by the enemy--and the great French columns had +easily pressed back a detachment of the Prussian corps of Ziethen, in +observation along the frontier. The march of the centre was greatly +delayed; an advance-guard of cavalry, with a weak support of foot, +entered Charleroi, indeed, and was over the Sambre a short time after +the left wing--the bridge at Charleroi, too, was not broken--but an +accident had kept back Vandamme; and it was past three in the afternoon +before a part of the Guard, the 3rd Corps, and part of the reserve of +cavalry had made their way out of the narrow streets of Charleroi, +Lobau and much of the cavalry being still in the rear. The progress of +the right wing was even more retarded; it did not move until a part +at least of its backward detachment had come into line; the march of +the troops was, in some measure, checked by the villainous treason of +Bourmont; the country to be traversed was close and difficult; and +it was about five before it had passed the Sambre, even in part, +across the bridge at Châtelet--unbroken like those of Marchiennes and +Charleroi--more than half the corps being on the southern bank of +the river. These delays enabled the bulk of Ziethen’s forces--their +head-quarters had been at Charleroi--to effect their retreat before the +advancing French, and frequently to arrest the heads of their columns. +The Prussian commander had manœuvred ably, though he had greatly erred +in not destroying the bridges; Ziethen made good his way to Fleurus, +with a loss of not more than 2,000 men, any hope which Napoleon may +have entertained of surprising and crushing his isolated corps having +been at an early hour frustrated. Mainly, too, from this cause, the +Emperor failed to seize the two points of Quatre Bras and Sombreffe, +on the cross road from Nivelles to Namur, which had been the object of +his march on the 15th; and the day, as Charras has said, was, in part, +incomplete. + + [Illustration: “THE IDOL OF THE SOLDIER’S + SOUL.”--_Byron._] + +Nevertheless, Napoleon had already attained considerable and most +promising success; and he might even now reckon on approaching victory. +As evening closed one division of the left wing, supported by a large +body of horsemen, was at Frasnes, quite near Quatre Bras; and, in fact, +it had been prevented from gaining that point only by a demonstration +made by the young Prince of Saxe Weimar, anticipating his orders by +several hours. The remainder of the left wing, now under the command of +Ney--the Marshal had reached Charleroi some time in the afternoon--was +extended from Gosselies to Jumet, holding the great road from Charleroi +to Brussels, and from ten to thirteen miles from Quatre Bras, a single +division approaching the centre; and a march of a few hours could +place it in force on one of the chief points of the allied line of +junction. As for the centre, Lobau, and part of the Guard and of the +heavy cavalry were still near Charleroi; but Vandamme and the great +body of the Guard and of the cavalry reserve were not far from Fleurus, +a few miles only from the point of Sombreffe, by which Blücher would +unite with Wellington, and filling the country back to Charleroi; +while the right wing of Gérard was at a half march’s distance. The +main body of the French army, about 100,000 strong, had thus attained +positions near the allied centre, which already made it difficult in +the extreme for Blücher and Wellington to combine their forces along +the road from Nivelles to Namur; if the Emperor had not cut his foes +in two, he threatened their communication in a most dangerous way; he +was master of the main road from Charleroi to Brussels almost up to the +point of Quatre Bras; and notwithstanding several mishaps, he had not +30,000 men in his rear. He had every reason to assert, as he did, that +if not wholly, he was, in the main, satisfied with the results of the +operations of the day. + +What had been the dispositions of the allied chiefs, while Napoleon had +gained this immense advantage? Neither Blücher nor Wellington seriously +thought that their adversary would venture to invade Belgium, for +his inferiority of force was well known to them; and Wellington was +convinced that the Emperor would await the attack of the Coalition, +as he had awaited it the year before. This partly explains, though it +does not justify, the dissemination of their scattered forces; and, as +has been said, it is now conceded that this strategy was essentially +faulty. They admitted, however, that an attack was possible, and +everything tends to show that Blücher conceived that an attack on +his centre and left was the most probable; while the Duke certainly +believed that the blow would be most likely directed against his right. +As an attempt, however, against their centre might be made, they had +made provision for this contingency; and it had been arranged between +them that should Napoleon advance by Charleroi on the great road to +Brussels, striking at the point of contact of their inner flanks, +each should concentrate in force on the road from Nivelles to Namur, +holding the two positions of Quatre Bras and Sombreffe, which they felt +assured they could occupy in time, though the mass of their armies +was far distant, and Quatre Bras and Sombreffe were but a march from +the frontier. These calculations might have proved correct in the +case of a foe of ordinary powers; but in that of a consummate master +of his art they were pregnant, as Charras has said, with danger. The +Duke, however, and Blücher were not surprised, as has been alleged, +in the true sense of the word, though they were out-generalled by +Napoleon’s movement. As early as the afternoon of the 14th of June, +Ziethen had learned that the French had approached the frontier, and +he immediately despatched the news to Blücher at his head-quarters, +miles off at Namur. The Prussian army was about 118,000 strong, +including 12,000 horsemen and 312 guns; but its four corps were widely +apart: the first, that of Ziethen, being around Charleroi; the second, +that of Pirch, in camp at Namur; the third, under Thielmann, to the +south-east at Ciney; the fourth led by Bülow far away at Liège; and +it was all but impossible that the collective mass could be united on +the road from Nivelles to Namur before nightfall on the 16th of June. +The ardent veteran, however, eager for the fray, at about midnight on +the 14th, when Napoleon’s advance might be presumed, ordered a general +concentration of his army on Sombreffe, as had been agreed between +himself and Wellington; the Prussian chiefs gave proof of extreme +activity; and while Ziethen, who, as we have seen, had skilfully +retarded the march of the French, fell back to Fleurus, and thence +to Sombreffe, Pirch, by the night of the 15th of June, had got near +Mazy, four miles from Sombreffe, with three of the four divisions of +his corps, the fourth being a short way in the rear; while Thielmann +had attained Namur, half a march from the intended point of junction. +Three corps, therefore, of Blücher’s army could be at Sombreffe on the +16th by noon, ready to encounter the shock of Napoleon, and doubtless +expecting support from Wellington. The corps of Bülow, however, could +not be up in time; notwithstanding his energy, Blücher had assembled +only three-fourths of his army; and, in the actual position of affairs, +could he confidently rely on the aid of his colleague? + +At this moment, indeed, the French outposts were close to the allied +line of junction, and Wellington had made scarcely a sign of moving. +The army of the Duke was about 106,000 men--of these 14,000, or nearly +so, were cavalry--with 196 guns; and it was spread over even a larger +space than that of the veteran Prussian warrior. A motley array of +many races, it had been hastily formed into three masses; the first +corps, under the Prince of Orange, scattered over an arc from Genappe +to Mons, and covering two of the main roads from the frontier; the +second, in the skilful hands of Hill, extending westward as far as +the Scheldt, from near Braine le Comte to Ath, Leuze, and Oudenarde, +observing, too, the approaches from France; and the third, or the +reserve, at Brussels, a long distance off, round the head-quarters of +Wellington. A fraction only of the first corps was thus near the road +from Nivelles to Namur; the dispositions of the Duke were, in truth, +made to protect his right and his communications with the sea, and +time was required before he could send anything like a strong force to +the support of Blücher. By nightfall on the 15th, when the heads of +the French column were but a few miles from Quatre Bras and Sombreffe, +the army of Wellington had scarcely stirred, and it was some hours +afterwards before the British chief set it in motion in the direction +of Blücher, and that, too, slowly, and as if with reluctance. The Duke +had heard from Ziethen in the afternoon of the day, that the French +were crossing the Sambre, and near Charleroi, and the intelligence +was subsequently confirmed by Blücher; but thinking that Napoleon was +making a feint, and believing that his own right was menaced, he waited +upon his enemy’s movements, and merely ordered his lieutenants to be +in readiness. As is well known, indeed, he went to the historical ball +given at Brussels by the Duchess of Richmond; and it was after ten +at night, when he had been made aware that Napoleon had mastered and +passed Charleroi, that he took anything like a decisive step. Hill and +the Prince of Orange were now directed to concentrate their troops, +and to move to their left; but they were to hold a line from Enghien +to Nivelles; the reserve at Brussels was still kept back, and nothing +like a considerable force was to be drawn towards the allied points of +junction, or to be so placed as to approach Blücher. The wide interval, +in fact, from Nivelles to Quatre Bras, and thence by the main road +to Sombreffe--the communication with the Prussians---was to be left +uncovered, and whatever mere partisans may urge, there is not a word to +be said for this strategy. Happily for the Allies, subordinates of the +Duke interpreted the situation better than their chief. Saxe-Weimar, we +have seen, had advanced to Quatre Bras, and checked Ney in his forward +march, and Perponcher, a general in the Dutch service, ere long had +occupied that most important point, though he held it with a single +division only, which could scarcely offer a prolonged resistance. By +midnight Wellington gave further orders for a general concentration +to his left, and the reserve from Brussels was directed towards +Nivelles; but these orders were extremely late, and it had become most +improbable that the British commander would be able to master the road +from Nivelles to Namur, even now almost in the grasp of his enemy, to +advance along it by Quatre Bras, and approaching Sombreffe, to unite +with Blücher. It was, indeed, far more likely that the divided armies +would be attacked, and beaten in detail. + + [Illustration: ENGLAND’S HOPE, 1815.] + +The previsions on which Napoleon had formed the plan of his campaign +had thus been realised, up to this point, in their main particulars. +The divergence of the bases of the allied chiefs had left their +centre weak and ill-joined. It was now, after the retreat of Ziethen, +connected only by a thread of vedettes; it was within easy distance of +the French army; and should it be attacked, and cut in two, Blücher +and Wellington would fall back, and probably separate, happy if they +escaped a disastrous reverse. Blücher, again, had rushed forward to +confront his enemy, leaving 30,000 of his troops far off; Wellington +had paused, hesitated, and not approached his colleague, and an +admirable chance had been thus afforded to the General of Arcola +and Rivoli. The allied commanders, in fact, whatever may be said by +apologists, and by worshippers of success, had laid themselves open to +a terrible stroke, and though Napoleon is a most exacting critic, I can +see no answer to his profound remark, that, out-manœuvred as they had +been on the 15th, Blücher ought not to have made for Sombreffe “already +under the guns of his enemy,” and Wellington ought not to have tried +to join him, but that both chiefs should have endeavoured to unite +on a line, in the rear, between Wavre and Waterloo. Their strategy, +in short, was bad, and they only escaped defeat owing to a set of +accidents in which fortune baffled their mighty adversary. + +We have reached the morning of the 16th of June, and we turn to the +operations of the French army, and to the direction given it by its +Imperial leader. Napoleon had returned to Charleroi on the night +of the 15th, to “take repose for his wearied frame”; his physical +strength had been long declining; and possibly even on the first day +of the campaign, he began to give proof of those failing bodily powers +which was certainly exhibited before the contest closed.[35] Yet, +though murmurs were heard in the French camp, both Jomini and Charras +seem to me to reason too much on mere theory, and to fall into the +error of judging only by the event, when they charge the Emperor with +sluggishness and delay in his conduct on the morning of the 16th. A +large part of the French army was still in the rear; Napoleon did +not and could not certainly know the exact positions of the allied +armies; he was about to thrust himself between two hostile masses, each +nearly equal to his own force in numbers; and though he could have +done more had he been omniscient, the circumstances required caution +in any forward movement. Be this as it may, his orders were given, at +Charleroi, at about 8 A.M.; and if they were founded on wrong +assumptions, they proved his perfect knowledge of his art, and were +admirably adapted to the events that happened. These orders, contained +in four despatches, two from the Emperor to Ney and Grouchy, and two +from Soult, the Chief of the Staff, to the same generals, prove that +Napoleon did not believe he would be seriously opposed on that day; +he thought that his left wing would easily pass Quatre Bras, and +that his centre and right wing would easily pass Sombreffe; and he +conceived that it was not improbable that he would enter Brussels on +the morning of the 17th. This calculation was, no doubt, false; but +it was founded on the true strategic view that Wellington and Blücher +would not now endeavour to make a stand at Quatre Bras and Sombreffe, +on the threatened road from Nivelles to Namur; and what Charras and +others fail to point out, but what the real student of war will dwell +on, is that, ignorant as he was of the actual facts, the dispositions +made by Napoleon were in accordance with sound principles, and fitted +to meet the situation of affairs. Ney, in command of the left wing, +was ordered to advance, and go beyond Quatre Bras, concentrating the +2nd and 1st Corps, supported by Kellerman’s heavy cavalry, and holding +the great road from Charleroi to Brussels; while Grouchy, entrusted +in the Emperor’s brief absence, with the centre, the right wing, and +the cavalry reserves, was to pass Sombreffe, and to attain Gembloux, +attacking any enemy in his path, and to stand on a parallel line with +Ney. As the army, however, should be well united, Ney was enjoined to +detach a division to Marbais, a village near Sombreffe and Gembloux, to +give support if required to the centre and right wing; and the Emperor +added that, at about noon, he would be on the spot to assume the +supreme command.[36] + +Napoleon’s orders despatched from Charleroi reached the chiefs of the +2nd and 1st corps, spread, we have seen, from Gosselies to Jumet, on +the great road from Charleroi to Brussels, at about 10 A.M. or +a little before; they reached Ney at Frasnes at about 11 A.M.; +and as[37] Reille and D’Erlon had been directed to advance by the +aide-de-camp who carried the Imperial message; Ney might have been in +possession of Quatre Bras at about 1 or 1.30 P.M.; at the head +of 45,000 men, and might have crushed Perponcher’s feeble division, at +the time standing alone at that place. In that event Ney could have +seized Quatre Bras, in conformity with the Imperial orders, and have +made the required detachment on Marbais; and had this been done, the +16th of June would certainly have witnessed a second Jena. We pass from +the French left wing to the centre and right wing, directed, we have +seen, at the time, on Sombreffe, and intended to prolong their march to +Gembloux. Napoleon had reached Fleurus by 11 A.M.; the Guard, +the 3rd and 4th Corps, with most of the cavalry reserves, for a moment +under the command of Grouchy, had passed, at about 1 P.M., +into the Emperor’s hands; the division detached from the left wing +on the 15th had come into line, and Lobau, with the 6th corps, was +marching from the rear. By this time Blücher stood in the path of +the French in an advance on Gembloux; he was in force on the road +from Nivelles to Namur, and his three corps held a formidable line, +extending from Sombreffe almost to Marbais, and fronted by the villages +of Ligny, St. Amand, and La Haye. Napoleon seems to have disbelieved +at first that his adversary could be in strength on the field; but at +2 P.M. he sent a message to Ney enjoining him to complete the +movement on Marbais, and to fall on the flank and rear of Blücher, and +at the same moment the Emperor marched his army from Fleurus against +his enemy. + +The armies opposed were about equal in force, if we reckon +the approaching corps of Lobau; the French being inferior in +numbers--78,000 to 87,000 men--but having more guns and more numerous +horsemen; but the superiority of Napoleon’s tactics gave him the +advantage almost from the first moment. The villages, indeed, before +the Prussian front proved defences of remarkable strength, and were +taken and retaken with little results; but Napoleon occupied a full +third of Blücher’s forces by merely threatening his communications +to his left. The French batteries caused frightful destruction in +the Prussian reserves, which had been recklessly exposed; and while +Blücher brought most of his troops into action, the Emperor husbanded +his men for a final stroke. The battle, however, was raging furiously +and wholly undecided at 4 P.M.; and as Blücher’s rear was not +assailed from Marbais, and the roar of cannon announced a battle at +Quatre Bras, Napoleon formed a fresh combination to surprise and to +overwhelm his enemy. By this time he had no doubt learned that D’Erlon, +who ought to have been in line with Ney three hours previously, was +still in the rear; so he sent[38] an order to D’Erlon to turn aside +from Quatre Bras, and, moving towards Ligny, to fall in full force at +St. Amand on the right and the rear of Blücher, accomplishing thus, +in a different way, the results of an attack from Marbais. D’Erlon +had approached Ligny within an hour, but he had so marched that +Vandamme pronounced the apparition to be that of an enemy--a part, +probably, of Wellington’s force--and the Emperor despatched[39] a +general officer to ascertain how the fact stood, retarding meanwhile +the course of the battle. Ere long the advancing columns were seen to +draw off, and to disappear from the field; Ney, in fact, now assailed +by superior numbers, had angrily ordered D’Erlon to Quatre Bras, and +D’Erlon, Napoleon at least consenting--the Emperor would have been in +extreme peril had his left wing been defeated and forced--abandoned +a movement which, if pushed home, would have given his master a +splendid triumph.[40] It was now 6.30 P.M., and it was time +for Napoleon to endeavour to strike a decisive blow, the march of +D’Erlon having not only ended in a disastrous false movement, but +caused unfortunate delays at Ligny. During all this time the Prussians +and French had been engaged in mortal encounter, but Napoleon’s skill +had borne its natural fruits. Blücher’s left had been held in check +and paralysed; the Prussian losses had been enormous; the veteran’s +reserves had been thrown away, and in an effort to outflank Napoleon’s +left, Blücher had weakened and almost laid bare his centre. The +Emperor, who had his reserves in hand, launched the Guard and a mass of +cavalry against the endangered point; the Prussian centre was broken +after a fierce contest, and Blücher’s whole army was driven from the +field, the corps of Lobau, which had come up from Charleroi, hanging +on the retreat of the defeated enemy. The losses of the French were +about 11,000 men, those of the Prussians not far from 30,000, including +10,000 disbanded fugitives; but how different would the result have +been had Ney or D’Erlon fallen on the rear of Blücher! + +While the star of Napoleon still shone at Ligny, it had begun to wane +hard by at Quatre Bras; and the faulty disposition of his left wing +had saved Blücher from a complete overthrow. We left Ney at Frasnes, +having received the order of 8 A.M. at about 11 A.M.; and the Emperor’s +aide-de-camp, we may be quite certain, informed the Marshal that he +had communicated the order to Reille and D’Erlon, the chiefs of the +2nd and 1st Corps, at this moment at Gosselies and Jumet, about ten +miles off, along the broad highway from Charleroi to Brussels. That +order directed Ney to advance beyond Quatre Bras, collecting his 45,000 +men, but making a detachment to the right at Marbais; and Ney might +have begun at once to execute a movement which, if well carried out, +would perhaps have changed the fortunes of Europe. Ney, at 11 A.M., +had 9,000 good troops, of whom 4,000 were fine cavalry, at Frasnes, +actually in his hands: his only foe was Perponcher’s weak division, +7,000 infantry, with but a few guns, and almost wholly unsupported by +horse; and the Marshal knew that within three hours he might expect +the aid of more than 30,000 soldiers, including a magnificent body of +cavalry. Had Ney, therefore, been the chief of Elchingen, he could +easily have overwhelmed Perponcher; and directing Reille and D’Erlon to +expedite their march, he could have passed Quatre Bras, and detached to +Marbais, at from 1.30 to 2.30 P.M., without encountering any enemy in +force. But, as the whole course of the Campaign proves, Ney had become +demoralized, like most of his colleagues, by the events of 1812–14, and +that even in a greater degree; he fought with a halter round his neck, +and was by turns timid and unwisely bold; and he not only did not make +a step forward, but seems to have made no effort to induce Reille and +D’Erlon to accelerate their movements and to come into line. This delay +saved Blücher, and gave Wellington just sufficient time to repair, +in part, the tardiness and hesitation of the 15th, to check Ney, and +to baffle Napoleon in the manœuvre he had planned, which would have +crushed the Prussians. The Duke reached Quatre Bras--but with an escort +only, his advancing divisions were still distant--at about 11 A.M. on +the 16th; and he rode off to near Ligny to confer with Blücher, whose +faulty arrangements to meet Napoleon he condemned in a characteristic +phrase--“they will be damnably beaten,” he said to his Staff--but to +whom he promised support, “if possible.” Meanwhile, Ney showed no +sign of moving: Reille advanced slowly, and the march of D’Erlon from +the rear was a succession of delays; and it was 2 P.M. before the +French Marshal--one division of Reille had come to his aid--made even +an attempt to attack Quatre Bras. It is unnecessary to retrace the +scenes of a combat, in itself not of supreme importance, though it had +much to do with the issue of the Campaign. Perponcher’s division and +other supports were nearly overwhelmed at 4 P.M.; but reinforcements +came up by degrees, moving in haste from Nivelles and other points, +which ultimately turned the scale against Ney. The Duke, returning +from Ligny, displayed on the field the intrepidity and the genius in +defence which were his distinctive gifts in war; and Ney, as night +closed, retreated on Frasnes, having failed to fulfil his appointed +mission, which, I repeat, might have been accomplished, having, +however, prevented Wellington from sending a man to Blücher. The +Marshal had been supported by Reille’s corps only, and by Kellerman’s +corps of horsemen; D’Erlon, loitering in the rear, had been directed, +we have seen, to another field at Ligny, and when recalled by Ney came +into line too late to be of any use, or even to fire a shot; and Ney +had conducted the battle ably, and even performed an important service, +though he had thrown away a part of his superb heavy cavalry. He had, +however, proved unequal to his task; he had not carried out Napoleon’s +designs, which ought to have led to Blücher’s ruin, as, beyond +question, he might have done; and though Reille and D’Erlon, especially +the last, who contrived on the 16th to do simply nothing, are in a +greater degree to blame, he cannot escape a share of censure. + +The first part of the Campaign of 1815 ends with the battles of +Ligny and Quatre Bras. Napoleon’s operations, up to the evening of +the 16th, had been attended with marked success, which might easily +have been complete and decisive. Selecting, with perfect insight, the +true point of attack, he had conducted his army with admirable skill +and secrecy to the Belgian frontier; and aiming at the centre of the +Allies, the weakest and most vulnerable part of their line, he had +drawn close to it on the 15th June. His enemies had been unable to +arrest his progress, disseminated on a broad and deep front; and the +impetuosity of Blücher, and the caution of Wellington, gave him, as +he had foreseen, a favourable chance to divide his adversaries, and +to beat them in detail. Blücher had hurried to Sombreffe to confront +the Emperor, leaving a fourth part of his army behind; the Duke had +paused, hesitated, and delayed in moving, and it was hours after +Napoleon had passed Charleroi that Wellington even made an attempt to +draw near his endangered colleague, even then directing his troops +to points distant from the selected place of junction. This was the +situation on the morning of the 16th, and it gave Napoleon a great +advantage, which almost led to a crowning triumph. He may, perhaps, +have delayed at this moment, though in this judgment I cannot concur, +and his projects were founded on imperfect knowledge; but his general +dispositions were so excellent that he ought to have overwhelmed the +Prussian army. Having directed Ney, with his left wing, to pass Quatre +Bras and to detach to Marbais, he marched to Fleurus and attacked +Blücher; and had the attack in front at Ligny been combined with an +attack in the rear from Marbais, Ligny must have terminated in another +Jena. Exactly the same result would have followed had D’Erlon, who had +lagged in the rear, continued his movement upon St. Amand; and a series +of misadventures alone saved Blücher from a crushing disaster. Ney +was not equal to his appointed mission; he lost the occasion to reach +Quatre Bras, to advance, and to occupy Marbais. Reille and D’Erlon +did not second their chief; and D’Erlon, when launched on the path of +victory, was turned aside by an order of Ney, Napoleon, I certainly +think, consenting. The blame of these failures must be divided between +Ney, Reille, and D’Erlon, who deserves the most; Napoleon, too, may not +have been bold enough, though this is mere theory after the event; but +the fact remains that, but for unlucky accidents, Napoleon would have +annihilated his foe. As it was, Ligny was a real victory. The Prussian +army lost a third of its numbers, and Blücher was driven from the only +road by which he could readily join Wellington into a difficult and +intricate country. Meanwhile, though Ney had not accomplished all that +his master had a right to expect from him, he had, at the opposite side +of the line, attacked Wellington and held him in check. The Duke, his +forces coming up late and in fragments, was unable to send assistance +to his imperilled colleague; and though he had compelled Ney to fall +back a little, Ligny made it necessary that he should quickly retreat, +happy if he could effect his escape. Napoleon had thus succeeded on +the 16th, though his triumph had been incomplete and partial. He had +defeated Blücher, and kept Wellington at bay; and, above all, he had +forced the Allies to abandon the road from Nivelles to Namur, their +natural and their only easy line of junction. Would they diverge as +Beaulieu and Colli had done, and give the General of the Campaign of +Italy an opportunity to ruin them in detail? To Napoleon the prospect +seemed full of promise, and yet all was not light on the scene before +him. He had not gained a decisive victory. Blücher and Wellington were +no ordinary foes; their armies nearly doubled his own; might they not +yet close on the Imperial Eagle, which, terrible and swift as had been +its swoop, had not thoroughly grasped and destroyed its quarry? + + [Illustration] + + + + + CHAPTER II. + +In one of the last and fiercest struggles at Ligny, Blücher had been +unhorsed and severely hurt, and the command of the Prussian army +devolved on Gneisenau, a capable and scientific officer. It was near +nightfall when Ligny had been won--the delay occasioned by the affair +of D’Erlon had been injurious in the extreme to the French--and, +perceiving that no enemy pressed on his rear, Gneisenau halted, and +made preparations to retreat. But whither was the defeated army to +move? Was it to fall back on its communications with the Rhine, opening +to Napoleon the path to Brussels, and separating itself completely from +Wellington; or was it to endeavour to join its allies, abandoning its +line of operations for the time, but appealing to Fortune in another +battle? Gneisenau, urged, it is said, by his heroic chief, who gave the +order at night from his litter, resolved to adopt the second course; +and the Prussian army was directed on Wavre, a town about twenty +miles from Sombreffe, and divided from it by the difficult country--a +region of hills and lowlands watered by the Dyle--which lay behind the +road from Nivelles to Namur. Wavre is about nine or ten miles from +Waterloo, a village in front of the Forest of Soignies, and north of +a position marked out by Wellington as an admirable field for a great +defensive battle; and it was this circumstance, well known to Blücher, +which doubtless led him to fall back on Wavre, in spite of the many +impediments in the way, impediments which had caused Napoleon to +expect that, if forced from the road from Nivelles to Namur, Blücher +would most probably recoil on his base, and not attempt to join +Wellington through a mass of obstacles. By daybreak on the 17th, the +first corps of Ziethen, and the second of Pirch were on their way to +Wavre, by Tilly and Gentinnes, villages some miles to the north-west +of Sombreffe; and the third corps of Thielmann, charged to cover the +movement, broke up some hours later, and made for Gembloux, one of +the points, we have seen, which Napoleon hoped to have reached in the +advance of the day before, and to the east of Tilly and Gentinnes. The +Prussian army was still greatly shaken, and especially was short of +food and munitions; but no enemy harassed or observed the retreat; and +before long it was joined by Bülow, who had hastened to march by Hannut +to Gembloux, and brought 30,000 fresh soldiers to Blücher. + +Meanwhile, Wellington, who, as night closed on the 16th, had had at +Quatre Bras a mass of about 37,000 men, was joined ere long by some +8,000 more, marched from Brussels and points on his right, and he was +thus now equal in numbers with Ney, who had by this time his two corps +in hand[41]; though he was dangerously exposed should Ney and Napoleon +be able to reach him with their united forces. Owing to an accident +which befell a Prussian officer, the Duke was not informed of the +defeat of Blücher until the early morning of the 17th; he thereupon +resolved at once to retreat, but having been apprised that the Prussian +army was in full march from Sombreffe to Wavre, and would soon be ready +to fight again, he decided on stopping the retreat at Waterloo, and +on awaiting there the attack of the French, if he could rely on the +support of his veteran colleague. The retrograde movement of the Duke +from Quatre Bras, screened by a considerable body of horsemen, began +at about 10 A.M., and continued for hours; and, in addition +to his 45,000 men, he summoned about 21,000 at Nivelles, and perhaps +4,000 more from outlying points, to Waterloo, the scene of the intended +conflict. Fearful and jealous for his right, however, all through, he +left a large force near Braine le Comte and Hal; and his whole army, in +fact, was never concentrated. + +The Allies, falling back from their true line of junction, the main +road from Nivelles to Namur, were thus trying to unite on a second +line, by the bad roads from Wavre to Waterloo. This strategy has been +praised by the worshippers of success, even by soldiers like Charras +and Chesney, and, in the event, it was more than justified; it was, +nevertheless, essentially faulty. It is impossible to refute Napoleon’s +logic; either Blücher, after his defeat at Ligny, ought to have moved +directly on Wellington’s army, joining it either at Genappe or at least +at Waterloo, or both the Allied chiefs ought to have fallen farther +back, to have placed the Forest of Soignies between themselves and +their foe, and concentrating their forces around Brussels, to have +opposed 200,000 men or more to the 100,000 of the French Emperor, who, +in that case, would have been out-generalled and could scarcely have +ventured to offer battle. The double retreat on Wavre and Waterloo was, +in fact, an imperfect half measure, so often fatal in the operations +of war; Wavre was more distant from Waterloo than Sombreffe was from +Quatre Bras, by certainly two or three miles, and, what was infinitely +more important, was divided from Waterloo by a most intricate country; +and, in making this movement, Blücher and Wellington were exposing +themselves to crushing defeat, and were rendering their junction +extremely difficult. It was to be assumed that a man like Napoleon +would be exactly informed of the line of their march, and would do +what was the best for his interests; and had Napoleon, on the morning +of the 17th, called on his victorious army to make a great effort, he +would probably have reached either Blücher or Wellington, still widely +apart, and beaten either in detail. Nay, had he, collecting his whole +forces, and moving more slowly, either attacked Blücher at Wavre or +the Duke at Waterloo, on the 18th, he would almost certainly have won +a great battle before the Allies could succeed in uniting. Exactly +the same result would have followed had he, acting on more correct +principles--and supposing, of course, as was to be expected, that he +was thoroughly apprised of the allied movements--detached a part of his +army to hold Blücher in check, and assailed Wellington with the mass of +his forces; in that case all the chances were that he would be able +to overpower Wellington, and to prevent Blücher at Wavre from sending +a man to Waterloo. Considering the situation, time, and distance, +the boasted retreat of the Allies, therefore, cannot be vindicated, +whatever may be said; it exposed them once more to be defeated in +detail; and unquestionably their best strategic course was to have +effected their junction in the rear, on Brussels, thus completely +baffling their great antagonist and not exposing themselves to danger. + + [Illustration: “TAMBOUR, FAITES-MOI CADEAU D’UNE PRISE!”] + +The state of affairs, however, in the camp of the French had singularly +favoured the plan of the Allies, and had already saved them from +impending peril. Over confident in success, his distinctive fault, +Napoleon was convinced that the Prussian army had been[42] completely +routed at Ligny, and could not reappear on the scene for some time; and +he returned to Fleurus, utterly worn out by the anxieties and fatigues +of the two preceding days. He appears to have given no explicit +orders, but he left Soult and Grouchy in temporary command; and these +lieutenants, experienced as they were, did nothing to repair the gross +want of vigilance due, probably, to the state of Napoleon’s health. +Soult seems not to have even sent a message to Ney, a few miles off, +to the left; no attempt during the night was made to discover the +line of the Prussian retreat, still less to molest the defeated foe; +and Grouchy especially, a cavalry chief, instead of reconnoitering in +every direction to ascertain where the enemy was, despatched only one +body of horsemen along the road from Sombreffe to Namur, that is, far +away from the Prussian line of march. In this negligence and slackness +we see no sign of the marvellous activity of Jena and Ratisbon; and +Charras, I believe, is perfectly right when he says that Napoleon’s +“long sleep” at Fleurus made the success of Ligny of no use to him, +though Charras, always unjust to the Emperor, makes no allowance for +his physical weakness, and refuses to blame either Soult or Grouchy. +It was about 9 A.M. on the morning of the 17th when Napoleon +drove from Fleurus to Ligny--he had been extremely unwell for +hours[43]--and everything tends to prove he had no doubt but that the +strength of the Prussian army was broken, and his first idea was that +his own army should take rest[44] on the spot for the day. He ordered a +grand review of his troops, and spent two hours at least on the field +of Ligny, distributing rewards and attending the wounded; and it was +not until near noon--having learned from Ney that part of the British +army was still at Quatre Bras--that he seems to have resolved on a +forward movement. By this time Blücher had completely escaped, and, +in fact, was not many miles from Wavre; the Duke was in full retreat +on Waterloo; and the chance which Napoleon[45] certainly had, and +which the youthful warrior of 1796 would most probably have turned to +account, that of falling either on Blücher or Wellington in the early +morning of the 17th, had been lost never again to return. + +The delay, too, in the operations of the French, coupled with the +neglect of Soult and Grouchy, had caused the Emperor to remain in +ignorance of the true direction of Blücher’s march, and had confirmed +him in a false impression, which, though not the main cause of his +subsequent ruin, undoubtedly in part contributed to it. Clinging to the +conception which he had formed from the first, he was now absolutely +convinced that, after Ligny, Blücher was falling back on his base +to the Rhine; and the unlucky reconnaissance made in the morning, +which pointed to a Prussian retreat by Namur--some prisoners and guns +had been taken by the French--only went to strengthen his erroneous +judgment. He resolved, therefore, following the grand precedent of +1796, against Beaulieu and Colli--his cardinal idea in the campaign of +1815--to direct the mass of his army against Wellington, and to keep +Blücher away with a force sufficient to hold the defeated Prussians in +check while he should endeavour to overpower the Duke. This strategy +was perfectly correct in principle, but the delay of the morning +had been most unfortunate, and the project was founded on a false +assumption of the direction taken by Blücher’s forces. + +The whole French army--except one division left in reserve, it had +suffered so much--was now divided into two groups; the first composed +of the Guard, a part of the 6th Corps, and some 8,000 horsemen, +marching on Quatre Bras, to unite with Ney, with the 2nd and 1st Corps, +and about 7,000 cavalry; the second comprising the 3rd and 4th Corps, +one division of the 6th, and about 5,000 horsemen. The first group, +about 72,000 strong, with not less than 240 guns, was to be under the +Emperor’s command, and was intended to reach and attack Wellington; the +second, some 34,000 men, with from 96 to 100 guns, was the wing that +was destined to restrain Blücher. Napoleon broke up from Ligny soon +after noon, and gave the command of this wing to Grouchy, enjoining him +to “pursue and attack the Prussians, and to keep Blücher continually in +sight,” and indicating Namur as, most probably, the direction of the +retreat of the enemy. The Emperor, too, I can have no doubt, informed +his lieutenant that his mission was[46] to interpose between Blücher +and Wellington; and, in fact, an experienced chief like Grouchy must +have understood that this was the object of his being detached from +the main French army. The direction, however, of the restraining wing +was late; Blücher had gained fourteen hours on the foe sent against +him; his retreat was on Wavre, not on Namur; and it had already +become no easy task to come up with him, and to hold him in check. +Grouchy, alarmed at what had been devolved on him, expostulated with +his Imperial master; but Napoleon curtly told him “to find out the +enemy,” and set off to join Ney at Quatre Bras. He met the Marshal at +about 2 P.M.; their united forces were massed together, and +they were directed against the army of Wellington, for some hours, we +have seen, in retreat. Ney had continued stationary at Quatre Bras, +until the Emperor came on to him, and for this inaction he has been +severely blamed; but the reproach is[47] too exacting, and by no means +just; the army of Wellington had been placed in safety; and even had +Ney advanced from Quatre Bras as soon as he saw Napoleon moving from +Ligny, and pressed on the rear of the British force, he could not +have gained any marked success. Napoleon began the pursuit at about 3 +P.M., following Wellington along the great road to Brussels, +leading by Genappe to the Forest of Soignies; but great results were +no longer possible; the French merely harassed the retiring cavalry; +and, in fact, an extraordinary tempest of rain made military operations +practically useless. At about 7 P.M. the advanced guard of the +French reached the low hills above La Belle Alliance, in front of the +position of Waterloo; and in reply to a challenge made by Napoleon, +the fire of many batteries informed the Emperor that a large army was +collected at a short distance from him. + +We turn to the operations of Grouchy’s wing, detached, we have seen, +late to follow up Blücher. Grouchy had not set his 34,000 men in +motion from Ligny until about 3 P.M., and for this he has +been harshly condemned; but, considering that his troops were widely +scattered, and that Napoleon did not advance from Quatre Bras until the +same hour, or nearly so, I am satisfied the censure is not deserved. +The Marshal, a brave but irresolute man--he had shown what he was at +Bantry in 1796--was hesitating what direction to take, when a positive +order from Napoleon came to determine his still uncertain purpose. The +Emperor, when on his way to Quatre Bras, had received the intelligence +that a large Prussian force had been seen on the Orneau, not far from +Gembloux; and he instantly sent off a messenger to Grouchy--through +Bertrand, and not through the Chief of the Staff--every sentence of +which should be carefully studied. In this important despatch Napoleon, +we see,[48] believed that Blücher was still falling back, with at least +the mass of his army, eastwards; but the proximity of the Prussians at +Gembloux surprised him; and he distinctly pointed out that “Blücher +and Wellington might endeavour to unite, and to offer battle, in +order to cover Liège or Brussels.” Suspecting part of the truth, +but still uninformed, he now ordered Grouchy to occupy Gembloux--he +evidently thought that from this point the line of Blücher’s retreat +would be ascertained, and that Grouchy would hold a position between +the Prussians and the main French army--and he desired Grouchy “to +communicate with head-quarters,” by “cavalry detachments,” along “the +road from Namur,” showing thus he believed that the Prussian chief was +probably retiring in force towards Liège, that is, towards his base on +the Rhine. + +This order was still founded on the false impression of the direction +really taken by Blücher, for Gembloux is to the east of Wavre, and +thirteen or fourteen miles from that place; but in spite of all that +the Emperor’s censors have said, it was sufficiently correct to have +enabled Grouchy, had he been a capable and active chief, to have, in +the main, fulfilled his mission, and to have interposed between Blücher +and Wellington. Grouchy set off without further delay--responsibility +was a heavy load on him; the storm of rain which had kept back Napoleon +retarded also the Marshal’s columns; the roads, too, to Gembloux were +exceedingly bad; and it was not until 9 P.M. that the whole +force of Grouchy was collected near and around Gembloux, part east of +the town and part still in the rear. Grouchy had pushed on to Gembloux +some hours before, with an advanced guard, to endeavour to find out the +true direction of Blücher’s retreat; but though it is certainly strange +that this was not discovered beyond the possibility of doubt by this +time, and the march to Gembloux had been slow, I believe the Marshal +cannot fairly be blamed. In this position of affairs Grouchy sent a +despatch to the Emperor, now in front of Waterloo, at 10 P.M. +on the night of the 17th, and another at 2 A.M. on the morning +of the 18th; and these, too, require close attention. In the first +of these letters Grouchy announced that the Prussian army was still +falling back, almost certainly formed[49] “into two great columns,” the +one moving on Wavre by Sart les Walhain, a place a few miles to the +north-east of Gembloux, the other retiring on Perwez towards Liège; +and the Marshal added that if “the mass of the enemy had made its way +to Wavre” he would “follow it up in that direction,” “in order to +separate Blücher from Wellington.” The second letter has been lost, +but its contents are known; the Marshal wrote that he was about to +march on Wavre by Sart les Walhain on the track of Blücher; and this +is confirmed by a third message,[50] sent to Pajol, one of his light +cavalry chiefs, which directed a speedy advance on Wavre. + +The information thus conveyed by Grouchy was only a partial approach to +the truth, and it was calculated to mislead Napoleon, and to inspire +him with disastrous false confidence. Blücher was not retreating in +two divergent columns; he had never thought of drawing towards Liège; +and, at this moment, the night of the 17th, the four corps of his +army, now well supplied and rested, and still numbering about 90,000 +men, with from 270 to 280 guns, had been concentrated around Wavre, +on either bank of the stream of the Dyle, and ready in the morning +to march on Waterloo. The knowledge even now acquired by Grouchy was +amply sufficient to urge that chief to advance on Wavre as quickly as +possible, for it was by that line only that, from his point of view, +even one hostile column could join Wellington; and his letters prove +that he understood his mission. But his messages to Napoleon were of +such a nature as to cause the Emperor to feel assured--especially as +this was his own idea--that a large part at least of the Prussian army +was leagues away in retreat eastward, and could not possibly assist +the Duke; and, in any case, he had a right to infer that if part of +Blücher’s forces was at Wavre, Grouchy would be fully able to hold it +in check. Buoyed up by these hopes, the Emperor spent half the night +of the 17th in watching the lines of fire which marked the British +bivouacs, and he had but one fear, that the state of the weather--the +rain had continued to descend in torrents--would prevent him from +bringing Wellington to bay, and would enable the English chief to +decamp ere the morrow. It is, however, a complete mistake to suppose, +as Charras and other detractors have urged, that the Emperor at this +critical moment altogether neglected to watch his right, or to keep +in communication with Grouchy at Gembloux. I cannot, indeed, accept +his statement,[51] for it can hardly be reconciled with the published +documents, that he directed Grouchy, on the night of the 17th, to +send a detachment to the main French army, in order to fall on the +flank of Wellington--the counterpart of the march from Quatre Bras to +Marbais--though this incident of the campaign has been ill explored; +and there are reasons to think the order was made, apparently opposed +to the known evidence. But he sent horsemen to scour the country +towards Gembloux, and even within some miles of Wavre. He certainly +ascertained, before daybreak on the 18th, that a Prussian column was +near Wavre, and he communicated, we shall see, the news to Grouchy. +Relying, however, on the Marshal’s account, he assumed that Grouchy +would be in sufficient force to paralyze and perhaps destroy this foe, +and he was justified, from what he had been told, in a supposition of +the kind. + +It was now the morning of the 18th of June, and Napoleon perceived, +with exulting pride, that Wellington had not attempted to retreat, and +that the Duke’s army retained its positions. The Emperor felt assured +of a decisive victory; he was certain that Grouchy could easily master +any forces that might threaten his right, if such forces were at hand +at all; and he exclaimed to Ney, as they sate at breakfast, that the +“chances were ten to one in their favour.” Napoleon had intended to +have his army in line, and to begin the battle at 9 A.M.,[52] +but the severity of the weather had made the ground very difficult +for the manœuvring of guns. He believed that a grand demonstration +would shake the nerves of the Belgian and Dutch troops, who had been +lately in the Imperial service, but who now formed a large part of +Wellington’s force; and, at the instance, it is said, of Drouot, one +of his most skilful and trusted officers, he put off the attack for +nearly three hours, the state of his frame, which needed repose, very +probably, too, affecting his purpose. This delay was immensely in the +Duke’s favour. Waterloo, but for it, could hardly have been won, and +it may truly be said that, on this day, the sun in its courses fought +against Napoleon. Meanwhile Wellington had drawn together his army, +about 70,000 strong, comprising 13,000 cavalry, and 160 guns; and +relying on the pledge of the word of Blücher, who, conquering pain +and superior to defeat, had promised to come up in line at Waterloo, +“with his whole army,” by the “forenoon at latest,” he calmly awaited +the attack of his renowned antagonist. He might, even at this moment, +have had a much larger force on the ground, for, apprehensive for his +right to the last, he had left 17,000 men far away at Hal, a strategic +mistake which cannot be justified, and which placed him in grave peril +during the ensuing battle. + +While Waterloo was being thus prepared, Blücher had broken up from +his camps round Wavre, intent on carrying the support to his English +colleague which he felt would secure the Allies a triumph. The veteran +did not suspect that Grouchy was not far off with 34,000 men; the +Duke and Blücher, in fact, believed that Napoleon had all his army in +hand, with the exception of the one corps of Vandamme; and this single +calculation condemns the generalship of the double movement on Wavre +and Waterloo; for had Napoleon had 90,000 men to oppose to the 70,000 +of Wellington, and been able to attack early on the 18th, Blücher +never could have been up in time to avert a defeat that must have +been certain. No hostile column, however, appeared from Gembloux, to +threaten the Prussians on their flank march, and yet the difficulties +and obstacles in the way--imperfectly understood by the Prussian +staff--were so great that the advance from Wavre was exceedingly slow, +and perilously delayed. Bülow, starting from beyond the Dyle at break +of day, was not at Chapelle St. Lambert, with even a few men, until +noon, still far from Napoleon’s right; Pirch and Ziethen were not in +march for Waterloo until 11.30 A.M., and even then lingered; +and Thielmann, with a considerable part of his corps, was left behind +to defend Wavre. Nothing but the heroic ardour of Blücher and the +energy of his fierce soldiery enabled the movement to be made at all, +and but for accidents and bad generalship I think it could not have +been accomplished with results leading to success at Waterloo. + +While Blücher was thus toiling to attain Waterloo, Grouchy was on his +way from Gembloux to Wavre. To appreciate thoroughly this passage of +the campaign, I must ask the reader to retrace his steps, and to turn +back to part of the preceding narrative. Grouchy, sent to Gembloux +with 34,000 men, to pursue and to attack Blücher, and, doubtless, to +keep him aloof from Wellington, had not ascertained, even at the close +of the 17th, the exact positions of the whole Prussian army; but he +had been informed that part of it was falling back on Liège, and that +another part was retreating on Wavre; and he had, in the two letters +cited, apprised Napoleon that “should the mass of the Prussians go +that way,” he would take care to advance on Wavre, and thus “separate +Blücher from Wellington.” This information was not wholly correct, but +it was so to a certain extent; and it ought to have at once suggested +to Grouchy--a general-in-chief in command of an army, and he perfectly +understood his mission--the necessity of marching quickly on Wavre by +the earliest dawn of the 18th; for any Prussian column retiring on +Liège was abandoning altogether the theatre, and might, therefore, +be left alone; whereas a Prussian column directed to Wavre would be +approaching Wellington, and might molest Napoleon. This was the more +essential, because the Emperor, upon leaving for Quatre Bras, had told +Grouchy that his intention was to attack the Duke should he make a +stand “in front of the Forest of Soignies,” the very spot where the +Duke now was; and also, notably, because the Marshal’s despatches were +such as would lead Napoleon to think that no Prussians could even +approach Waterloo. The duty of Grouchy to keep Blücher and the Duke +apart ought to have induced him likewise, in his march from Gembloux, +to draw towards Wavre along roads tending towards the Emperor’s +position and Blücher’s flank, should the Prussians attempt to make for +Waterloo; for thus only could he accomplish his task, of which he was +well aware, as his own messages show. These roads existed, and were +even open; they led across the Dyle by two stone bridges at Mousty and +Ottignies, left intact as those on the Sambre had been on the 15th; +and they could have borne Grouchy’s army in seven hours at latest--the +distance, we have said, is thirteen or fourteen miles--either to +Wavre, or to intermediate points between Wavre and the Duke’s lines at +Waterloo. + +Common sense, therefore, should have inspired Grouchy to leave +Gembloux as early as possible on the 18th, to divide his troops +into two columns at least, in order to expedite the march, and to +make for Wavre by Mousty and Ottignies; and had this been done, I +agree with Jomini, Blücher would not have made his way to Waterloo. +Unfortunately, Grouchy, we have seen, had resolved to advance from +Gembloux on Wavre--and he was hesitating even in this purpose--not +by the roads that would bring him on Blücher’s flank, but by Sart les +Walhain, and a circuitous road that would place him only on Blücher’s +rear, and therefore in a much worse position to intercept a Prussian +flank march on Waterloo; but though this was a grave strategic error, +it was perhaps not an irreparable mistake. Where Grouchy’s conduct +cannot be excused, and what condemns him at the bar of history, is +that, in opposition to his obvious duty and to the rules of mere common +prudence, he left Gembloux at[53] so late an hour that it became +difficult to attain Wavre in time to be of much use to Napoleon; and +that he so disposed his army as to render its march unnecessarily and +even extraordinarily slow. Instead of breaking up at 3 or 4 A.M., he +did not break up until 8 or 9 A.M.; instead of forming his men into two +columns at least, he allowed them to march in one huge column; and thus +hours of inestimable worth were lost, and a movement which ought to +have been as quick as possible was retarded in every conceivable way. + +Napoleon, meantime, had been preparing a grand and decisive attack on +Wellington. His army had been some time in motion to take the positions +assigned to it, when he sent off by Soult a message to Grouchy, at +this moment on his way from Gembloux. In this letter, written at 10 +A.M., the Chief of the Staff informed Grouchy that, besides +the two columns the Marshal had mentioned, intelligence had been +received of a third Prussian column falling back on Wavre by Gentinnes; +and he approved of Grouchy’s intended march on Wavre--inferred from +the despatch of 2 A.M.--but he enjoined him to approach the +Emperor, and to enter into communication with the main French army, +which, he added, was about to engage in battle “near Waterloo,” before +“the Forest of Soignies.” By 11 A.M., Napoleon’s legions had +taken their ground on their last field, and the annals of war have +seldom presented so magnificent and imposing a spectacle, described +by the Emperor himself in most striking language. The French army, +spread out like a gigantic fan, resplendent in all the pomp of battle, +was formed into three great masses; the first, composed of the 2nd +and 1st Corps, deployed in lines from Mon Plaisir on the left to near +Frischermont on the extreme right; the second, a superb array of +cavalry, in line, to the rear of Reille and D’Erlon; and the third, +in close columns, made up of cavalry, of Lobau’s 6th corps, and of +the Imperial Guard, intended to deal the decisive stroke. Napoleon’s +position crossed two roads, one the great highway from Charleroi to +Brussels, the other a good cross road from Nivelles running into +the first at Mont St. Jean; and the three arms could concur in the +attack, though his adversary’s front was protected by obstacles, and +the rain of fifteen hours had made an attack difficult through dense +fields of rye and miry enclosures. The Emperor rode in front of his +line, accompanied by his gorgeous staff; exulting cheers burst from +the martial host, proud of the renown of a hundred victories; and +the sight, as Napoleon calculated, made a profound impression on the +thousands of men in the hostile array who had but recently served under +the Imperial eagles. + +The Duke, however, had his arrangements made; they fully revealed his +defensive skill; and if some of the auxiliaries had faint hearts, +he knew that he could thoroughly rely on his British and most of +his German soldiery. His lines, running from his right to his left, +extended from beyond Hougoumont, in front of Mon Plaisir, to Papelotte +and La Haye, in front of Frischermont; but he had some thousands of men +on his extreme right, holding Merbe Braine and Braine L’Alleud, and +communicating by vedettes with Hal, where, we have seen, he had left +17,000 men; and his extreme left had outposts reaching to Ohain, on the +road to Wavre, whench he expected Blücher. Hill commanded the right +wing, Picton held the left, the Prince of Orange was at the centre; and +though the Duke’s army presented a less compact front than that of his +Imperial foe, it was admirably arranged for a defensive battle. Before +the position stood the château of Hougoumont, covering the right and +the right centre of the Duke; beyond was the farm of La Haye Sainte and +the hamlets of Papelotte and La Haye, advanced posts on his centre +and left; and these points of vantage had been carefully fortified and +held by considerable bodies of men, to break the first fury of the +French attack. Behind these obstacles the main army held a formidable +position, guarding the two roads from Charleroi to Brussels and that +from Nivelles; and it had this special characteristic, that its +possessors could sweep the assailant’s columns at all points with fire, +and that it afforded cover in the rear to screen the reserves, exactly +the opposite of the case of the Prussians at Ligny. The Duke, however, +like all true generals, did not rely only on a passive defence; a +cross-road just behind the main position enabled all arms to manœuvre +freely, and the cavalry massed behind the British centre had facilities +to advance from most points of the line. + +I can only attempt a mere sketch of one of the most memorable battles +of all time. The plan of Napoleon’s attack, in which we perceive +the last exhibition of his genius in war, was to turn Wellington’s +left--by many degrees the weakest point of the British position--and, +simultaneously, to force his centre; success in this operation would +not only separate the Duke’s army completely from Blücher, but would +cut off its retreat upon Brussels, and would force it into an intricate +country where escape from a victorious foe would be difficult. This +great effort was to be made by the corps of D’Erlon, supported by the +fire of an array of batteries accumulated in front of La Haye Sainte, +and thence as far as Papelotte and La Haye; and it was to be sustained +by the Imperial Guard, by Lobau, and by a large reserve of cavalry; but +it was to be masked by a feint against Wellington’s right, in order +to screen the decisive movement, and to draw the enemy’s attention +away from it. Napoleon gave the signal at 11.30 A.M., and +part of Reille’s corps on the Emperor’s left advanced boldly against +Hougoumont, in front, we have seen, of the right of the British +position. The château and the adjoining grounds, composed of a wood, an +orchard and walled enclosures, afforded an excellent centre of defence; +and though the French surrounded the place in thousands--nearly all +Reille’s men became engaged--and captured most of the approaches to +the house, and though some of the Duke’s auxiliaries fled, the British +Guards stubbornly clung to the spot, and made their resistance good +to the last. The effect of this attack, in which we see precipitate +haste on the part of the French--a defect in their tactics throughout +the day--was to weaken most seriously the second corps, and to turn +a diversion into a principal effort; and this admirably answered the +Duke’s purpose, for the force of his foe was broken on obstacles, and +his own position was left intact. + + [Illustration: + + PLAN OF + the Battlefield of + WATERLOO, + showing positions of + OPPOSING ARMIES.] + +It was now 1 P.M., and Napoleon was about to send an order +to Ney for the grand attack, when he descried a body of troops on his +right, at a considerable distance, near Chapelle St. Lambert, and he +was soon apprised that this was the advance guard of Bülow’s corps, +30,000 strong, already gathering menacingly on his flank. The Emperor +detached Lobau, with 10,000 men, to the right, to hold this new foe +in check, exclaiming that “Grouchy had lost him thirty chances”; and +he instantly sent off a message to Grouchy, desiring the Marshal to +approach Waterloo, and if possible, to fall on the rear of Bülow; +some indication, perhaps, that Napoleon believed a part of Grouchy’s +force would be at once available, and possibly showing that the +disputed order of the previous night may have been given. Meanwhile the +batteries bearing on Wellington’s line from La Haye Sainte to Papelotte +and La Haye--a mass of from 70 to 80 guns, opposed by a much weaker +artillery force--had been carrying destruction into the British ranks; +and about 1.30 P.M. Ney was directed to carry the Duke’s +left, and to storm his centre. The assailants advanced in four huge +columns of extraordinary depth, and with their flanks uncovered--this +vicious formation has been acknowledged, but the author of it is not +known--they moved slowly through the difficult ground; they swept +away a Belgian division, which did not attempt to abide their onset; +but they failed before Picton and his tenacious infantry, though +they attained the crest of the British position. The Duke seized the +occasion with perfect skill; and seeing that the French were already +shaken, he launched against them a mass of heavy cavalry, which, in a +few moments, carried all before it, forced the enemy’s columns in rout +backwards, and clinging to their unprotected sides, captured two eagles +and 2,000 prisoners. The horsemen, pressing the pursuit too far, were +nearly destroyed by a counter-attack of hostile cavalry from Napoleon’s +lines; but this magnificent charge completely defeated the first great +effort made by the Emperor, and had a marked effect on the fortunes of +the day. + +It was nearly 3 P.M., and Napoleon’s prospects, which had +appeared so brilliant, had become clouded. Bülow had moved forward +from Chapelle St. Lambert; Lobau, greatly outnumbered, was falling +back; a messenger had arrived from Gembloux announcing that Grouchy was +miles distant; and Wellington had completely maintained his position. +It is difficult to determine what, in this state of affairs, was the +exact purpose formed by Napoleon; but he probably resolved to watch +the movement of Bülow; and renouncing his attack on the Duke’s left, +which would seriously endanger his own right, he turned against the +British centre, for the present suspending a decisive effort. Ney +was ordered to seize the advanced post of La Haye Sainte, and the +place was mastered at about 4 P.M.,[54] after a furious and +well-contested struggle, in which the French cavalry made their power +manifest. A gap was now opened in Wellington’s front; guns were brought +up to bear on his line; a part of his troops fell back for shelter +behind the crest of his main position. Napoleon seems to have believed +in the beginning of a retreat, and he directed a large part of his +cavalry reserve, with Ney at their head, to advance on the enemy, +his purpose being, it seems probable, to sustain the movement by the +Imperial Guard. The French horsemen advanced in superb confidence; +carried the eminences held by the hostile infantry, and sent terror +into the hearts of the inferior troops who crowded the ranks of +the Duke’s army, though checked by the squares of the British and +German footmen, who exhibited the most heroic constancy. It seems now +certain that Napoleon meant to follow up this partial success, when a +diversion caused him to forego his purpose. Bülow had hesitated to +make a serious attack; but Blücher had joined his halting lieutenant, +and the fiery veteran, seeing how critical[55] was the situation of +Wellington’s army, ordered an immediate advance on Napoleon’s flank. +The Emperor was now fighting two battles; his attention was for some +time engrossed in repelling Bülow’s attack on his right; and this, +indeed, became so formidable that a considerable part of the Imperial +Guard was required to stem the enemy’s progress. Ney, meanwhile, +had been making desperate efforts with his cavalry to break the +British centre; he employed the last reserve of this splendid force, +undoubtedly against his master’s wishes;[56] but though Wellington’s +line had been severely shaken, and thousands of fugitives covered his +rear, and enormous gaps had been made in his army, the enemy’s cavalry, +unsupported by foot, were unable to force the British position, held by +squares “rooted,” it has been said, “in the earth.” + +The battle was undecided at 7 P.M.; but Bülow’s attack had +been repelled; Ney maintained his hold on the British front; the +cannon of Grouchy were heard from Wavre, a pledge that he was keeping +back the Prussians; and Reille and D’Erlon had made some progress in +their efforts against the British right and centre. Napoleon thought +his opportunity had come; a final stroke, he believed, would secure +him victory, and forming the Guard into two great columns, supported +by guns and the wreck of his cavalry, he directed one against the +Duke’s centre, holding the second in reserve to sustain the movement. +Wellington’s army had suffered immense losses; death, desertion, +flight, had carried off thousands; undoubtedly he was in serious peril; +and he now probably felt how grave had been the error of leaving 17,000 +men at Hal. But, though “night or Blücher,” significant words which +fell from him, showed that he knew his danger, he had made everything +ready to meet his foe; and drawing in his right wing behind his centre, +he had even now a powerful reserve to oppose to Napoleon’s supreme +effort. The onset of the first column of the Guard for a time overbore +all resistance; but it was arrested by the British Guards, by the +renowned 52nd, and by a division of Dutchmen led by Chassé, and the +defeated column swayed slowly backward, expecting the support of the +approaching reserve. The needful assistance was never to come. Just +at this moment part of the two corps of Ziethen and Pirch came into +line. The French right was suddenly rent asunder, and a mass of British +cavalry flooding the plain spread confusion and panic through the +beaten army. The Duke now ordered a general advance; a terrible scene +of ruin and disaster followed. The Imperial Guard fought nobly to the +last; but the rest of Napoleon’s routed troops became a mere chaos of +dissolving fugitives, pursued with relentless hate by the Prussians, +and scattered along the roads that lead across the Sambre. Not thirty +thousand men of the perishing host were ever, probably, seen under arms +again. The losses of the victors were not less than 22,000 or 23,000 +men, and nearly 7,000 of these were Prussians. + +Napoleon at Waterloo gave little proof of the energy and resource of +Jena and Austerlitz. The plan of his attack was, indeed, perfect, and +during the greater part of the day he was in a position of extreme +difficulty, and he was badly seconded by his lieutenants, who displayed +feverish impatience and great want of caution. But he did not prevent +the waste of his troops round Hougoumont; he allowed Ney to engage a +large part at least of his cavalry in a premature movement; he did +not seize the occasion he perhaps had to attack in full force before +Bülow’s diversion. He was remiss and inactive throughout the battle; +and this was due, there is now no doubt, to physical exhaustion[57] and +long impaired health. The Duke, on the other hand, was the soul of +the defence; he conducted the battle with wonderful skill, directing +every movement at the right moment, making counter attacks when these +were opportune, keeping a sufficient reserve for the supreme trial, +and breathing into his men his stern sense of duty, his tenacity, and +inflexible constancy. His management of the contest was so admirable +that he held his ground, though he had expected Blücher in force on the +field before mid-day, and though, humanly speaking, he must have lost +the battle but for the intervention of the Prussian army--his composite +force of 70,000 men, much weaker in guns, was not to be compared to the +72,000 troops under the Emperor’s flag--still, I venture to think that +even without this aid, he would not have suffered the crushing defeat +on which Napoleon’s hopes for the campaign rested. His one mistake, in +fact, on this memorable day was the isolating 17,000 men at Hal; this +certainly exposed him to real danger; but then this was a strategic not +a tactical error. Nevertheless, Waterloo was decided by combinations +outside the field; and we turn to the operations of Grouchy, the main +cause, I believe of Napoleon’s overthrow. + +The Marshal breaking up, we have seen, from Gembloux at least five or +six hours too late, and marching with extraordinary slewness, reached +Sart les Walhain at about 11:30--he was still eight or ten miles from +Wavre--and at that place the thunder of cannon, far to the left, gave +token of a great distant battle. Gérard, with true insight, at once +urged Grouchy to cross the Dyle by Mousty and Ottignies, and to draw +near the Emperor, known to be at Waterloo; for by so doing, Gérard +justly argued, Wavre would be turned should it be attacked, and the +French would attain the flank of Blücher, who, Gérard felt certain, +was trying to join Wellington. Grouchy refused to listen to sagacious +counsels, which, had they inspired him twelve hours before, would have +perhaps changed the course of events in Europe, and which even now +might have borne fruit; and he set off with his whole force for Wavre, +where he expected to find the Prussian army. By this time Bülow was +at Chapelle St. Lambert, but with a weak advanced guard only. Pirch +and Ziethen were just breaking up from Wavre, and Thielmann was about +to join them; but a great change took place in the Prussian movements +when, at about 1 P.M., intelligence came that the enemy was approaching +Wavre. Part of the corps of Pirch was ordered to fall back; the march +of Ziethen was greatly retarded; and Thielmann was directed to remain +at Wavre, and to make head against the scarcely expected foe. By 4 +P.M., Grouchy was close to Wavre, having marched on the place, not +across the Dyle towards the flank of Blücher, but along the river, +thus striking Blücher’s extreme rear, and pushing him, so to speak, +on Wellington; the Marshal opened fire at once on the town, having +just received Soult’s letter of 10 A.M., which, no doubt, sanctioned +an advance on Wavre, but ordered Grouchy to approach the Emperor. It +is useless to follow the events of a combat of no importance to the +result of the campaign; Thielmann, with only 18,000 men, contrived +to hold Grouchy some hours in check; and meanwhile Bülow, completely +free to act, and Pirch and Ziethen, all danger removed, succeeded in +reaching Waterloo and in crushing Napoleon. Yet, bad as it was, the +position of Grouchy made the Prussians cautious and kept them back; +Pirch and Ziethen were only just up in time; and of an army of 90,000 +men, not 50,000 made their way to Waterloo. By 7 P.M. Grouchy received +the letter of 1 P.M., sent off from Napoleon’s lines at the news of +the apparition of Bülow; the Marshal crossed the Dyle, and tried to +approach the Emperor; but the movement was now altogether too late; the +French army and its chief had succumbed. + +The junction of Blücher and Wellington, therefore, led to the +overwhelming defeat of Waterloo; but for this, Napoleon would have won +the battle--the chances, at least, were all in his favour--despite the +tactical errors of the French, and the admirable defensive resource of +Wellington. It follows that the great and capital question, as regards +this part of the Campaign of 1815, is, Could Grouchy have prevented +this junction, for if he could, he must be held responsible for the +catastrophe which befell the Emperor? The answer must largely depend +on conjecture; but an impartial student of war, I think, especially +if he can weigh evidence, will give it distinctly in the affirmative. +Considerations, obvious and yet decisive, should have urged Grouchy, +we have seen, to leave Gembloux in the early dawn of the 18th, to cross +the Dyle at Mousty and Ottignies, and to approach Wavre as quickly +as possible; the idea, it will be observed, flashed on Gérard’s mind +the moment he heard the cannon of Waterloo. If the Marshal had taken +this rational course, he would have been over the river at about 11 +A.M.,[58] and, in that event, as affairs stood, he would +have seriously menaced the flank of Bülow, toiling painfully, in long +straggling columns, on the way from Wavre to Chapelle St. Lambert, and +he would have been nearer Napoleon’s lines than the corps of Ziethen, +of Pirch, and of Thielmann, still near Wavre, and not on the march for +Waterloo. + +What, in these circumstances, would Blücher have done, giving him +full credit for his daring and energy? He would have been surprised +in a perilous flank march, through a difficult and almost impassable +country, for he had no conception that Grouchy would be near; and +his army would have been almost divided by an enemy threatening its +separate parts. In this state of things I cannot doubt but that he +would not have permitted Bülow to advance farther, or his three +remaining corps to make a move towards Waterloo, until he had disposed +of Grouchy; he would have drawn the mass of his forces together. All +this would have been an affair of hours. Grouchy could have made a +prolonged resistance, and, meanwhile, Napoleon, free to bring the +whole strength of his more powerful army against the Duke, would +have triumphed over his much weaker enemy. The same results would, +have, perhaps, followed had Grouchy, without attempting to cross +the Dyle, reached Wavre at 11 A.M., as he might have done; +Pirch, Ziethen, and Thielmann would not have moved; Bülow, isolated, +would not have dared to attack, and the French army would still have +gained a victory. Even had Grouchy, at the eleventh hour, listened to +the excellent advice of Gérard, and crossed the Dyle at Mousty and +Ottignies, he might possibly have averted a complete catastrophe. The +movement could not have interfered with the attack of Bülow, but it +might have arrested Pirch and Ziethen, and it was these chiefs who, at +the last moment, dealt the French army the final mortal stroke. + +It is impossible, therefore, to acquit Grouchy; he is mainly to +blame for the result of Waterloo. This conclusion, however, has been +assailed, with confidence, on two lines of argument. Napoleon, it is +said, was not aware, from first to last, whither Blücher had gone; he +despatched Grouchy from Sombreffe too late; Gembloux was not the true +point on which the force of the Marshal should have been directed. +Napoleon gave Grouchy no precise orders; he misled his lieutenant, +and kept him in the dark; he approved, late on the 18th, the march on +Wavre, and he has, therefore, to thank himself for his own overthrow. +We may grant the premises, yet they do not sustain the inference or +exonerate Grouchy. Admitting that Napoleon believed that Blücher was +falling back on his base after Ligny; that he should have sent Grouchy +on his track much sooner; and that Gembloux was not the best place +to be assigned for the restraining wing; still, it was the duty of +Grouchy, knowing what he had learned on the 17th, to have left Gembloux +at daybreak on the 18th, and marched rapidly on or towards Wavre; and +had he done this, he would, I believe, have stopped the Prussians +and averted Waterloo. As for Napoleon not having given directions to +Grouchy of an exact kind, and having sanctioned the tardy advance on +Wavre, the first statement assumes that Grouchy was not an independent +general-in-chief, in command of a distinct army, and the second is +opposed to the known evidence. Napoleon approved of the march to Wavre, +but not at a late hour, or at a snail’s pace; he certainly thought, +and had a right to think, if a Prussian force existed at Wavre--the +reader will recollect the letter of the 18th, pointing to his growing +suspicion of the fact--that his lieutenant would be able to hold it in +check, and this required an early and speedy march from Gembloux. This +reasoning, in fact, errs in two respects; it ascribes to the mistakes +Napoleon made results with which they are not chargeable; it assumes +that Napoleon, in front of Wellington, was to instruct Grouchy, in +front of Blücher, in his conduct, in the minutest details; it takes for +granted that Grouchy, the head of the army, was a mere puppet to be +directed in every operation he was to undertake, and that by his chief +at a wide distance from him. The argument, when examined, falls to the +ground; it cannot stand the test of impartial criticism. + +The second contention, urged by Charras, rests on the fact that the +army of Grouchy was very much weaker than that of Blücher; but though +made with a parade of science, it does not mislead a true student of +war. Grouchy, the argument runs, had but 34,000 men to oppose to the +90,000 of Blücher; the Prussian was an able, nay, a great soldier; and +had Grouchy done all that man could do, he could not, his force was so +inferior, have prevented the junction of Blücher and Wellington, and +conjured away the disaster of Waterloo. Assume that Grouchy manœuvred +rightly, had left Gembloux at the first possible moment, had marched +rapidly, had seized Mousty and Ottignies, and had mastered the Dyle +before mid-day, his adversary would have at once recognized, that the +Prussians were nearly three to one to the French, and this would have +determined Blücher’s purpose. The Prussian marshal, aware of this fact, +would have sent Pirch and Ziethen to hold Grouchy in check, and marched +on Waterloo with Bülow and Thielmann; or he would have allowed Grouchy +to draw near his flank, and, fending him off, would have moved on +Wellington with three-fourths of his army at least; and in either case +he would have joined the Duke, and both would have overwhelmed Napoleon. + +This looks well on paper, and in mere theory; but is contradicted by +the realities of war. Had Grouchy attained the Dyle by noon, he would +have completely surprised Blücher, have caught him with an army far +apart, on a flank march of the most critical kind; and in this position +of affairs it is morally certain that Blücher would have reconnoitred +and paused, would have waited to draw together his army, and would +have fought a pitched battle with Grouchy, before he even thought of +uniting with Wellington. In that event, inferior in numbers as he was, +Grouchy would have detained the Prussians for hours; Blücher would +have lost the chance of joining the Duke; and Waterloo would have +been a French victory. The lessons of war, and the great authority of +Jomini in this matter, confute the reasoning of a partizan censor, +and the very incidents of the day point to the same conclusion. The +mere apparition of Grouchy on the wrong bank of the Dyle, late as the +hour was when he had approached Wavre, delayed the general movement +of the Prussian army; and half of it never attained Waterloo. How +different must the result have been had Grouchy crossed the Dyle at +the true point, and gathered upon the flank of Blücher; in that case +not even one Prussian division would, I think, have come to the aid of +Wellington. + +Grouchy, in short, was the Emperor’s evil genius on the great and +terrible day of Waterloo; Napoleon has written, with perfect truth, +that he could no more foresee his lieutenant’s conduct than he could +assume that Grouchy would be swallowed up, with his army, by an +unexpected earthquake. The Campaign of 1815 may be summed up in a +few sentences. Striking at the extreme right, for the time isolated, +of the hosts about to invade France, and screening the movement with +wonderful skill, Napoleon collects an army of 128,000 men on the edge +of France, running into Belgium, his object being to attack Blücher +and Wellington, commanding about 224,000 men, but whose two armies +were widely divided, in scattered groups, from Liège to Ghent and +Charleroi. The Emperor, aiming at the allied centre, the weakest and +most assailable point, begins the movement on the 15th of June; he +does not, owing to a set of accidents, reach the strategic points +of Quatre Bras and Sombreffe on the true line of junction of his +antagonists, the lateral road from Nivelles to Namur; but his columns +at nightfall are close to these, and his adversaries already are placed +in danger. Blücher, meanwhile, acting as Napoleon had hoped, marches to +Sombreffe with three-fourths of his army only; the Duke, fulfilling the +expectations of his foe, lingers, hesitates, and delays his movements; +and on the 16th Napoleon has a grand chance of reaching and beating +his enemy in detail. His plans, if formed on a false impression, are +nevertheless so correct in principle, that had they been carried out +ably the Prussian army must have been destroyed; but Ney, Reille, +and D’Erlon failed: the Emperor is perhaps over-cautious in not +pressing D’Erlon’s advance on St. Amand; and Blücher escapes, through +misadventures, which alone save him from complete ruin. Ligny, however, +is a real French victory; and, meanwhile, Ney, though unequal to his +task, fights an indecisive action at Quatre Bras; and though forced to +fall back, he so far succeeds that he prevents Wellington from sending +aid to his colleague, and, in fact, gains a strategic advantage. The +close of the 16th sees Napoleon victorious upon the main scene of the +contest, having only just failed to make Ligny a counterpart of the +rout of Jena. + +The 17th has come; the Allies, compelled to abandon their proper line +of junction, retreat separately and in distant groups on a second line, +between Wavre and Waterloo; they intend ultimately to unite on this; +and this project, though crowned with success, was false strategy +that might have proved their ruin. The French army, on this eventful +day, makes a long halt not easy to explain; the retiring enemy is not +pursued or watched; and this delay and remissness--utterly unlike the +energy of Napoleon on the path of victory--and probably largely due +to his declining health, save Blücher and Wellington from the gravest +peril, and singularly aid their future projects. Napoleon does not +move until noon from Ligny, his purpose being to attack Wellington, +for several hours falling back on Waterloo; he has a noble army 72,000 +strong to cope with 70,000 men of the Duke, more than a third of these +being inferior troops; and he detaches Grouchy, with about 34,000, +to pursue Blücher and to keep him away from Wellington. The Emperor +follows the Duke from Quatre Bras, and finds his adversary in force +near Waterloo; and meantime, though he remains convinced that Blücher +is retiring on his base, he directs Grouchy to occupy Gembloux, having +heard that Prussians were approaching that place. Grouchy reaches +Gembloux by the night of the 17th; he informs his master that the +Prussian army is in retreat in two great masses, one directed to Wavre, +the other to Liège: and he shows that he understands his mission, and +that he will endeavour “to separate Blücher and Wellington.” This +report perfectly reassures the Emperor; he makes preparations for a +decisive battle; but the elements interfere to retard his purpose, and +he does not attack the Duke until near noon on the 18th. Meanwhile +Grouchy, whose plain duty it was to leave Gembloux early, and to march +on Wavre across the Dyle on the flank of Blücher as rapidly as his +troops could move, breaks up hours too late, proceeds with strange +slowness, and reaches Wavre in the afternoon only, striking Blücher +in the extreme rear, but still detaining a part of his army. During +all this time the great fight of Waterloo has been raging with varying +fortunes; the French tactics are faulty, the Duke’s admirable. In +the afternoon Bülow reaches Napoleon; the Emperor is engaged in a +double battle. Ney recklessly squanders his master’s cavalry, but +Bülow is for a time repulsed; and the Emperor makes a final effort to +break Wellington’s centre with the Guard. The attack fails, but all +is not over until part of two fresh Prussian corps turns the scale +decisively against the French, and Waterloo ends in a frightful rout. +The Prussians, in fact, who might have been detained by Grouchy, were +all but left free to advance on Waterloo; they reached the field in the +very nick of time. Grouchy kept back directly only 18,000 men; and yet, +miserable as his operations were, they indirectly retarded the Prussian +army, a significant proof of what might have occurred had Grouchy been +a capable chief. + +Having reviewed the incidents of this great Campaign, let us disengage +the permanent lessons it teaches an impartial student of war. Napoleon +operated with too small an army: 128,000 men could hardly overcome +224,000. He had a right to count on his transcendent genius; he had +no right to assume that the Allies would make the grave strategic +mistakes they made, or would give him the opportunities they gave. In +consequence of this numerical weakness he was compelled to divide his +army into two masses not sufficiently connected by an intermediate +body; and this partly explains, though it does not excuse, the errors +of Ney to the left on the 16th, and those of Grouchy to the right +on the 18th. Had the Emperor had the 20,000 men he had intended to +bring into the field, he would have had a force sufficient to fill +this interval, and in that event he would have doubtless triumphed. +The intellectual powers of Napoleon were splendidly exhibited in the +contest; his plan for the Campaign is a masterpiece of art; his plan of +attack at Waterloo defies criticism; his general ideas, though he made +mistakes--for the greatest generals must necessarily err--reveal the +wholly unrivalled strategist. His bodily strength, however, failed him: +to this, I doubt not, we ought to ascribe the delays and carelessness +of the 17th, and certainly this weakness had much to do with the +inactivity and slackness he betrayed at Waterloo. It may well be, +too, that his complete faith in himself had been diminished by recent +events. Like Richard at Bosworth, he has recorded-- + + I had not the alacrity of spirit, + Or cheer of mind that I was wont to have; + +and the great player against Fate may, in this mighty hazard, have +thrown his last die with a trembling hand. We may perhaps see +hesitation, and even timidity, in his allowing D’Erlon to return to +Quatre Bras, and in not pressing the movement on St. Amand home; +and the same shortcomings may be possibly traced in his not seizing +a real chance at Waterloo, when La Haye Sainte had been taken, and +before Bülow had made a serious attack on his flank. Yet it was his +lieutenants’ errors that lost the campaign; on the 16th they failed +on the left; Grouchy, on the 18th was worse than useless; and we can +understand his bitter expression that victory was twice wrested from +his hands through incomprehensible faults of subordinates. In this +campaign, so to speak, the sun of Austerlitz seems about to break out +in its old splendour; but malignant influences intercept its rays, and +it sets at last in disastrous night. + +To turn to the Allies, Blücher and Wellington were adversaries of +a very different kind from the Beaulieu and Colli of 1796. Both +certainly, made great strategic mistakes; both were more than once +in imminent peril; and we see in their conduct the divided counsels +repeatedly fatal to a Coalition and its chiefs. But both, in different +ways, were great soldiers; they cordially co-operated in a common +design; and the heroism of Blücher, mastering defeat, and the tenacity +and tactical skill of Wellington, are admirable specimens of great +parts in war. Another cause of the ultimate success of the Allies +should be carefully noted. Napoleon, in his last address to his troops, +referred scornfully to the Prussians of Jena, and exclaimed “Are not +we and they the same men?” and like many great chiefs he took no heed +of national and patriotic passion. The Prussian army of 1815 was not, +however, “the same men” as the Prussian army of 1806; it was fired +with an intense hatred of France, and with an intense love of the +Fatherland; and it was capable of very different efforts from those +of the serf-like troops of Brunswick. Napoleon, relying on former +experience, believed that the army defeated at Ligny would recoil +on its base, and, beyond doubt, would not make a dangerous march on +Waterloo; but the reasoning of strategy, as has often happened, was +baffled by the ardour of a devoted soldiery; though had Grouchy been +equal to his task all this energy would have come to nothing. In Spain +and Russia Napoleon had suffered immense disasters from his inborn +contempt of patriotic and popular sentiment; and this indifference +had something to do with the final issue of the strife at Waterloo. +But when all has been said, the Emperor’s genius all but triumphed in +the campaign of 1815; he was nearly successful although opposed to +adversaries almost twofold in numbers; and victory was only wrested +from him through the mistakes of others. Notwithstanding Zama, Hannibal +remains the pre-eminent figure of ancient war; Napoleon is the great +captain of modern times, though ruin overtook him on the plains of +Belgium. + + [Illustration] + + +Printed by W. H. Allen & Co., Limited, 13, Waterloo Place, London, S.W. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] _Napoleon Correspondence_, vol. xxxi., p. 365. + +[2] Compare this with the movement, described on p. 8, which was made +by Gustavus Adolphus in pursuit of Tilly. + +[3] French armies had before this taken many of these fortresses, but +they had been retaken on the first turn of fortune. + +[4] Napoleon never made use of lines of this kind, but nothing escaped +him, and he had the example of Torres Vedras; at St. Helena he made +admirable observations on this system of defence. + +[5] Every real student of the wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth +centuries knows the difficulty of forming anything like a just estimate +of the numbers of the armies in conflict. This is mainly due to the +systematic practice of enumeration by battalions and squadrons, bodies +always in a state of change; and besides, national pride and interest +have obscured the truth. I have taken some pains to collate the +authorities, and to arrive at an estimate approximately correct. + +[6] This march, in fact, strongly resembles Eugene’s famous march +up the Po in 1706, described by Napoleon as “a marvellous piece of +audacity,” but it was far more perilous. + +[7] Coxe, though a dull is a conscientious writer, and occasionally he +had good military assistance. Alone, as far as I know, of commentators +on the campaign of 1704, he points out the risk to which, at this +juncture, Eugene and Marlborough were exposed. Napoleon wrote on +Marlborough, but his observations have never been published; it would +be most interesting to know his judgment on this passage in the +campaign. + +[8] It is more difficult to arrive at an estimate of the strength +of the contending armies in the case of Malplaquet than in that of +any other great battle of the war. I think my calculation is fairly +accurate. + +[9] “_Semper et ubique fideles_” was the proud and well-merited +device on the flag of the Irish brigade. + +[10] This is the sagacious and just judgment of Wellington, a genius of +quite a different kind, but a great admirer of Napoleon. + +[11] Bulletin of the Grand Army the day after the battle: “L’armée +ennemie était nombreuse et montrait une belle cavalerie; ses manœuvres +étaient executées avec précision et rapidité.” + +[12] This saying has been ascribed to Napoleon; it belongs to +Turenne: “Les plus habiles sont ceux qui font seulement le moins de +fautes.”--_Memoires_, p. 5. Ed. Hachette, 1877. + +[13] The last words of Napoleon’s despatch to Masséna are +characteristic: “Activité. Activité, vitesse! Je me recommande à vous.” + +[14] The monarchies and aristocracies of old Europe had an immense +opinion of the Archduke Charles; but his reputation has steadily +declined. He was as inferior to Napoleon as Pompey, the admiration of +the Roman patricians, was to Cæsar. + +[15] “Mais, Monseigneur, figurez vous qu’au lieu de Bonaparte, +c’est Jourdan que vous avez devant vous,” was the exclamation of an +aide-de-camp, when the Archduke was in this mood of fear and hesitation. + +[16] See a masterly paper, from Wellington’s hand, on the campaign +of 1812. The Duke’s knowledge of the facts is not complete, for the +_Napoleon Correspondence_ had not yet been published; but the +criticism is admirable. I have made ample use of it in this sketch. +_Despatches, Correspondence, and Memoranda of Field-Marshal the Duke +of Wellington, K.G._, vol. iii., 1866. + +[17] Napoleon was certainly unwell; poison has been suspected; but +probably he was again showing signs of disease. + +[18] It has been said--and the fact is probable--that the general +scheme of the operations of the Allies was formed by Moreau, a chief of +the second order, but a capable, sagacious, and far-sighted soldier. +Their strategy was better than that of the Russians in 1812, and than +their own in 1814. + +[19] Owing to the losses of the French by disease, desertion, and +defection, it is impossible to determine, even approximately, the +numbers of the Grand Army in this part of the campaign. Those of the +Allies are better known; but patriotism and pride have tended to make +them smaller than they were. + +[20] Napier insists on this, though he was so enthusiastic an idolator +of Napoleon that he is not an impartial judge. + +[21] Napoleon’s exultation at his feats and those of his army was +extravagant. “Ce qu’ils ont fait,” he wrote on 12th February, “ne peut +se comparer qu’aux romans de chevalerie et aux hommes d’armes de ces +temps où, par l’effet de leurs armures et l’adresse de leurs chevaux, +un en battait trois ou quatre cents.” + +[22] Lord Caetlereagh, who was at this council, could not comprehend +why Blücher and Schwartzenburg could not defeat Napoleon with their +enormous superiority of numbers; and demurred to the expense--England +was the paymaster of the Coalition--of bringing up Wintzingerode and +Bülow. “Milord,” said a bystander, “vous ne connaissez pas cet homme!” + +[23] The authorities on the state of Napoleon’s health during the +campaign of 1815 will be found in Mr. Dorsey Gardener’s book on +Waterloo, pp. 34, 36. + +[24] “Si le maréchal Grouchy eût campé devant Wavre le soir du 17, +l’armée prussienne n’eut fait aucun détachment pour secourir l’armée +anglaise.”--_Correspondence_, vol. xxxi., p. 213. No doubt Grouchy +could not have reached Wavre on the night of the 17th, but he might +have been there at 11 A.M. on the morning of the 18th; and +the result would have been practically the same. Bülow would not have +attacked, or perhaps even approached Waterloo, had he been isolated. + +[25] Jomini knew more about Napoleon than any other commentator on +the Emperor and is naturally astonished at the delays of the 17th +of June. The real cause was not then known, but Jomini’s words are +significant. _Précis de la Campagne de 1815_, p. 185. “Pour ceux +qui se rappellent l’étonnante activité qui présida aux évènements de +Ratisbonne en 1809, de Dresde en 1813, de Champaubert et de Montmirail +en 1814, ce nouveau temps perdu sera toujours une chose inexplicable de +la part de Napoléon.” + +[26] Lord Wellesley’s epitaph, chosen by himself, is strikingly +characteristic:--“Super et Garamantas et Indos protulit imperium.” + +[27] It is most remarkable how many of the Irish Protestant aristocracy +have distinguished themselves in India. Besides the two Wellesleys, +the names of Eyre Coote, of Gough, of the Lawrences, of Canning, of +Dufferin, will at once occur to the reader. This, no doubt, may in part +be traced to their hereditary ascendency over the Celtic Irish. + +[28] Napoleon wrote thus to Clarke 18th August 1809: “Quelle belle +occasion on a manquée! 30,000 Anglais et 150 lieues des côtes devant +100,000 hommes des meilleures troupes du monde! Mon Dieu! qu’est ce +qu’une armée sans chef!”--_Correspondence_, vol. xix., p. 362. + +[29] Napoleon received the news of Salamanca on the eve of Borodino. +His criticism of Marmont is striking and just. + +[30] I refer to the combined forces of the Allies. The Duke’s army was +from 100,000 to 106,000 strong, counting all the troops in Belgium. + +[31] This is the expression of Napoleon in a somewhat analogous case. +The orders of a Government, if not precise, obviously should not excuse +a general-in-chief on the spot. + +[32] Chanzy, a singularly modest and truthful man, gives this account +of the state of the Germans after the retreat to Le Mans: “L’ennemi, +contenu partout, était devenu de moins en moins entreprenant; il était +facile de voir que pas plus que les nôtres, ses troupes n’avaient +pas résisté à la fatigué; ses hommes étaient, eux aussi, grandement +démoralisés par cette resistance d’une lutte qui se reproduisait +constamment, alors qu’ils la croyaient terminée; le désordre se +mettait parfois dans ses colonnes malgré sa solide organisation et sa +discipline.” + +[33] This message from Berlin, at this juncture, is very +significant:--“La position militaire est regardée comme critique dans +les cercles bien informés. On a des inquietudes sur l’issue finale de +la lutte.” + +[34] My limits preclude me from citing extracts from these authorities. +But I shall, when it is required, indicate them; and I hope I shall +accurately express their meaning and purport. + +[35] Napoleon had shown signs of illness in the campaigns of 1812, +1813, and 1814, and was in bad health in 1815. Mr. Dorsey Gardner in +his useful work on Waterloo, pp. 34–36, has adduced ample evidence to +prove that Napoleon was unwell and out of sorts on the 16th, 17th, and +18th June; and this, I know, was remarked by Soult on the morning of +Waterloo. + +[36] After the publication of these despatches, and of other documents, +especially those collected by the son of Ney, we must reject Napoleon’s +statement that Ney received “positive orders,” to occupy Quatre Bras +on the evening of the 15th, and to advance from that place, “at +daybreak,” on the 16th. Still, I think Napoleon indicated a movement +of the kind to his lieutenant on the 15th; the _Moniteur_ of the +18th contains a despatch of the 15th, which announces that “Ney had his +head-quarters at Quatre Bras.” The point, however, is not of very great +importance; had the Emperor’s orders of 8 A.M. on the 16th +been intelligently and rapidly carried out, Ney would have done all +that was required, and Napoleon would have gained decisive success. + +[37] The failure of Ney to attain Quatre Bras, and to send a division +to Marbais, before the arrival of a sufficient part of Wellington’s +army to arrest the Marshal’s progress, saved Blücher from destruction +on the 16th of June, and was fraught with the most momentous +consequences, and the truth on this subject has been studiously +concealed. Charras and the detractors of Napoleon, eager to condemn +the Emperor, and English writers, desirous of hiding what might have +happened through Wellington’s tardiness, concur in insinuating that +Reille and D’Erlon were not to begin their movement until they had +received their orders from Ney, who would have to send despatches from +Frasnes back to them, and contend, therefore, that Ney could not have +been in great force at Quatre Bras before 3.30 or 4.30 P.M., +at which time he was fully engaged with Wellington, and could not +even master Quatre Bras. This, however, is a complete mistake: Reille +and D’Erlon have acknowledged that they received the order for their +movement from the aide-de-camp at about 10 A.M.; and, in +fact, Ney could have swept all before him at Quatre Bras soon after 1 +P.M., and have made the detachment to Marbais, had the order +been properly carried out. See the letters of D’Erlon, of Reille, and +of Durutte, quoted by the Prince La Tour D’Auvergne in his book on +Waterloo, p. 149, p. 170, and p. 171. + +[38] A host of witnesses, Soult is the most conspicuous--his well-known +testimony of the 17th of June, the day after Ligny, has been shamefully +garbled by Charras--have proved that Napoleon sent this order to +D’Erlon; and the fact, I conceive, is indisputable. It is denied, +in the face of the evidence, by those only who, seeking to censure +Napoleon and to excuse Wellington, pretend that the Emperor had not the +means of gaining a decisive victory over Blücher after 1 P.M. +on the 16th of June. Even after the failure of the projected movement +from Marbais the means were ample; D’Erlon would have annihilated +Blücher had he struck the Prussian right and rear at St. Amand. + +[39] This was Dejean, a favourite aide-de-camp of Napoleon. As the +evidence shows that the Emperor ordered D’Erlon to Ligny, so it +indicates that he must have permitted D’Erlon to abandon his march, +and to retrace his steps towards Quatre Bras when peremptorily ordered +to do so by Ney. This, in the events which happened, was over-caution, +for D’Erlon would have destroyed Blücher had he carried out Napoleon’s +order, and Ney, hard pressed as he was at Quatre Bras, could have held +his ground against Wellington without the aid of D’Erlon; and this, +I conceive, is the reason that Napoleon’s commentaries on this most +important subject are vague and unsatisfactory. + +[40] D’Erlon detached a division to observe St. Amand before he +counter-marched to Quatre Bras. This division, however, merely +reconnoitred, and took no part in the battle; it was simply useless. + +[41] With Kellerman’s heavy cavalry. + +[42] “L’armée Prussienne a été mise en déroute” is the expression of +Soult, in the well known letter of the 17th, written under the eye +perhaps of Napoleon, certainly according to his ideas. + +[43] Dorsey Gardner (p. 34) cites conclusive testimony to show “that +Napoleon went to bed immediately after the close of the battle of +Ligny, and was in such a condition that none of his staff dared enter +his chamber to procure his sanction for vitally important orders, and +that on the morning of the 17th there was the same impossibility of +getting access to him.” + +[44] See, again, Soult’s letter of 17th, “La journée d’aujourd’hui +est nécessaire pour terminer cette opération, et pour compléter +les munitions, rallier les militaires isolés et fair rentrer les +détachements.” + +[45] What Napoleon might have accomplished on the morning of the 17th +is very ably shown by Charras (p. 203, vol. i.), but with too much +regard to mere theory. + +[46] This has been denied by Grouchy, but is distinctly to be inferred +from his own letters; and, as Jomini observes, the situation dictated +the order. Gerard, who however, is unjust to Grouchy, declares that +Napoleon gave the most precise instructions nearly to this effect. + +[47] Napoleon, conscious of the evil results of the delays of the 17th, +condemns Ney for not having fallen on Wellington, at least when the +Imperial army was on the march. This criticism, however, is not well +founded, or even honest. Napoleon had a right to complain of Ney on the +16th and 18th, not on the 17th. + +[48] The operations of Grouchy on the 17th and 18th of June had a +decisive effect on the issue of the campaign, and have been the subject +of volumes of controversy. I have relied mainly on the papers written +at the time, but in part guided by Jomini’s sagacious direction. +Napoleon, writing at St. Helena, was largely ignorant of the details +of these movements, and is unjust to his luckless subordinate. Thiers, +and authors of the Napoleonic school, exaggerate the unfairness of +the Emperor; on the other hand, Charras, Chesney, and others are +not trustworthy authorities, and are thoroughly prejudiced against +Napoleon. This part of Charras’ book is the theoretic reasoning, after +the event, of a malignant partisan critic. + +[49] Grouchy also incidentally refers to a third column retreating by +Namur. + +[50] This despatch was discovered by the Prince La Tour D’Auvergne (see +his book on _Waterloo_, p. 318), and is of extreme importance. +It was written “at daybreak, on the 18th, and ordered Pajol to hasten +to Tourinnes, “_afin que nous poussions en avant de Wavre, le plus +promptement possible_.” + +[51] This is one of the most obscure and disputed passages of the +campaign. Napoleon positively declares that he ordered Grouchy to +detach 7,000 men from Gembloux to attack Wellington, and he is followed +by Thiers and a number of writers. But, as Charras and others have +fairly pointed out, no copy of the order can be found in the register +of the Chief of the Staff; the name of the bearer has never been given, +and the order seems inconsistent with a subsequent message sent to +Grouchy in the morning of the 18th. Still there are indications that +the order was given; Napoleon would hardly utter an audacious falsehood +on such a subject. Thiers narrates an anecdote which confirms his +conclusion; and, as we have already seen, the Emperor did not always +convey his directions through Soult. The matter, however, is scarcely +of the capital importance ascribed to it by some writers. + +[52] This is placed beyond doubt by Prince La Tour D’Auvergne, +_Waterloo_, p. 251, and disposes of the able but ill-founded +remarks of Charras. + +[53] Detractors of Napoleon and encomiasts of the Allies have concurred +in endeavouring to excuse Grouchy. They begin by referring to the state +of the weather on the morning of the 18th as accounting for Grouchy’s +delay in leaving Gembloux. It is enough to reply that Bülow started for +Waterloo at daybreak through a most difficult country. + +[54] I cannot accept General Shaw Kennedy’s statement that La Haye +Sainte was not taken until 6 P.M.; it is contradicted by every +other contemporaneous authority. + +[55] See on this point Blücher’s official account of Waterloo, never +contradicted by Wellington. English writers will not acknowledge the +enormous importance of Bülow’s attack. + +[56] Napoleon, to the latest hour of his life, attributed to Ney the +sacrifice of his last cavalry reserve, and declared it was one main +cause of the rout of Waterloo. Ney acted recklessly on the 18th June; +he had the hot fit and cold fit of a desperate man by turns in this +campaign. + +[57] Dorsey Gardner, on the authority of two of Napoleon’s staff +officers, gives this account of the Emperor at Waterloo (p. 36): “he +remained motionless, for long intervals, seated at a table, frequently +sinking upon it.” + +[58] Grouchy might, I think, have been over the Dyle before 11 +A.M.; but I accept the time of Charras, who has made it as +late as possible; “before noon” is his exact phrase. + + +Transcriber’s Notes: + +1. Obvious printers’, punctuation and spelling errors have been +corrected silently. + +2. Some hyphenated and non-hyphenated versions of the same words have +been retained as in the original. + +3. Italics are shown as _xxx_. + + + + + + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 77267 *** diff --git a/77267-h/77267-h.htm b/77267-h/77267-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6258164 --- /dev/null +++ b/77267-h/77267-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,13675 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html> +<html lang="en"> +<head> + <meta charset="UTF-8"> + <title> + Great Commanders of Modern Times | Project Gutenberg + </title> + <link rel="icon" href="images/cover.jpg" type="image/x-cover"> + <style> + +body { + margin-left: 10%; + margin-right: 10%; +} + + h1,h2 { + text-align: center; /* all headings centered */ + clear: both; + font-weight: normal; +} + +h2 {font-size: 110%;} + +.subhed { display: block; margin-top: 1em; font-size: 80%; font-weight: normal; } + +p { + margin-top: .51em; + text-align: justify; + margin-bottom: .49em; + text-indent: 1.2em; +} + +.p0 {margin-top: 0em;} +.p1 {margin-top: 1em;} +.p2 {margin-top: 2em;} +.p4 {margin-top: 4em;} +.p6 {margin-top: 6em;} + +hr { + width: 33%; + margin-top: 2em; + margin-bottom: 2em; + margin-left: 33.5%; + margin-right: 33.5%; + clear: both; +} + +div.chapter {page-break-before: always;} + +div.parent { text-align: center; } +ul.left { display: inline-block; text-align: left; + list-style-type: none; } + +table { +margin: auto; +width:auto; +border: 0; +border-spacing: 0; +border-collapse: collapse; } + +td { +padding: 0em .2em 0em 2.5em; +border: .1em none white; +text-align: left; +text-indent: -2em; } + +th.chap { +font-weight: normal; +font-size: x-small; +text-align: right; +padding-left: 1em; } + +th.pag { +font-weight: normal; +font-size: x-small; +text-align: right; +padding-left: 2em; } + +th.header { +padding: 1.5em .2em .2em .2em; +text-align: center; +text-indent: 0em; +font-size: 100%; +font-weight: normal;} + +td.chn { +text-align: right; +vertical-align: top; +padding-right: 1em; } + +td.cht { +text-align: left; +vertical-align: top; +padding-left: 1.5em; +text-indent: -1em;} + +td.cht1 { +text-align: left; +vertical-align: top; +padding-left: 1em;} + +td.pag { +text-align: right; +vertical-align: bottom; +padding-left: 2em;} + + td.ctr { + text-align: center; + text-indent: 0em; + padding-left: 0em; + vertical-align: top; } + +.pagenum { /* uncomment the next line for invisible page numbers */ + /* visibility: hidden; */ + position: absolute; + left: 92%; + font-size: small; + text-align: right; + font-style: normal; + font-weight: normal; + font-variant: normal; + text-indent: 0; +} /* page numbers */ + +.blockquot { + margin-left: 5%; + margin-right: 10%; + font-size: 90%; +} + +.xs { font-size: x-small;} + +.sm { font-size: small;} + +.lg { font-size: large;} + +.xl { font-size: x-large;} + +.smaller {font-size: 90%; } + +.center {text-align: center; + text-indent: 0em;} + +.left1 { text-align: left; + text-indent: 3em;} + +.smcap {font-variant: small-caps;} + +.allsmcap {font-variant: small-caps; text-transform: lowercase;} + +/* Images */ + +img { + max-width: 100%; + height: auto; +} + +.figcenter { + margin: auto; + text-align: center; + page-break-inside: avoid; + max-width: 100%; +} + +/* Footnotes */ +.footnotes {border: 1px dashed;} + +.footnote {margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-size: 0.9em;} + +.footnote .label {position: absolute; right: 84%; text-align: right;} + +.fnanchor { + vertical-align: super; + font-size: .8em; + text-decoration: + none; +} + +/* Poetry */ +.poetry-container +{ +text-align: center; +font-size: 90%; +} + +.poetry +{ +display: inline-block; +text-align: left; +margin-left: 2.5em; +line-height: 100%; +} + +.poetry .stanza +{ +margin: .5em 0em .5em 1em; +} + +/* Transcriber's notes */ +.transnote {background-color: #E6E6FA; + color: black; + font-size:small; + padding:0.5em; + margin-bottom:5em; + font-family:sans-serif, serif; +} + + </style> +</head> +<body> +<div style='text-align:center'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 77267 ***</div> + + + <div class="figcenter" id="frontispiece"> + <img + class="p1" + src="images/frontispiece.jpg" + alt=""> + </div> + + +<h1> +GREAT COMMANDERS<br> +</h1> + +<p class="center xs p2">AND</p> + +<p class="center lg p2">THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815.</p> + + +<p class="center xs p4">BY</p> + +<p class="center">WILLIAM O’CONNOR MORRIS.</p> + + +<p class="center p2 xs"><i>Reprinted from the</i><br> +“<span class="smcap">Illustrated Naval and Military Magazine</span>.”</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> +<p class="sm">“Faites la guerre offensive comme Alexandre, Annibal, César, +Gustave Adolphe, Turenne, le Prince Eugène et Fredéric; lisez, +relisez l’histoire de leurs quatre vingt trois campagnes; +modelez vous sur eux.”—<span class="smcap">Napoleon.</span></p> +</div> + +<p class="center p4 sm">LONDON: W. H. ALLEN AND CO., LIMITED,<br> +<span class="xs">AND AT CALCUTTA.</span></p> + +<p class="center xs">1891.</p> + +<p class="center xs">(<i>All Rights Reserved.</i>)</p> + + +<div class="chapter"> +<p class="center xs p6">LONDON:<br> +PRINTED BY W. H. ALLEN AND CO., LIMITED,<br> +13, WATERLOO PLACE.</p> + + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="p4">CONTENTS.</h2> +</div> + + <div class="figcenter"> + <img + class="p0" + src="images/i_004.jpg" + alt=""> + </div> + +<table class="smaller" style="max-width: 50em"> + <tr> + <th class="header" colspan="4">GREAT COMMANDERS OF MODERN TIMES.</th> + </tr> + + <tr> + <th></th> + <th></th> + <th></th> + <th class="pag">PAGE</th> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="cht" colspan="3">PREFACE</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#Page_v">v</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="cht" colspan="3">INTRODUCTION</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#Page_1">1</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="ctr">CHAPTER</td> + <td class="chn">I.—</td> + <td class="cht1 smcap">Turenne</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#Page_12">12</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="ctr">„</td> + <td class="chn">II.—</td> + <td class="cht1 smcap">Marlborough</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#Page_36">36</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="ctr">„</td> + <td class="chn">III.—</td> + <td class="cht1 smcap">Frederick the Great</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#Page_68">68</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="ctr">„</td> + <td class="chn">IV.—</td> + <td class="cht1 smcap">Napoleon</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#Page_102">102</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="ctr">„</td> + <td class="chn">V.—</td> + <td class="cht"> „  (<i>continued</i>)</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#Page_125">125</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="ctr">„</td> + <td class="chn">VI.—</td> + <td class="cht"> „  (<i>continued</i>)</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#Page_157">157</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="ctr">„</td> + <td class="chn">VII.—</td> + <td class="cht"> „  (<i>continued</i>)</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#Page_186">186</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="ctr">„</td> + <td class="chn">VIII.—</td> + <td class="cht"> „  (<i>continued</i>)</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#Page_214">214</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="ctr">„</td> + <td class="chn">IX.—</td> + <td class="cht1 smcap">Wellington</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#Page_238">238</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="ctr">„</td> + <td class="chn">X.—</td> + <td class="cht1 smcap">Moltke</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#Page_274">274</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <th class="header" colspan="4">THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815.</th> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="ctr">CHAPTER</td> + <td class="cht" colspan="2"> I.</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#Page_315">315</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="ctr">„</td> + <td class="cht" colspan="2">II.</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#Page_335">335</a></td> + </tr> +</table> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="p4">LIST OF</h2> +</div> + +<p class="center xl">MAPS, PLANS, AND ILLUSTRATIONS.</p> + + <div class="figcenter"> + <img + class="p0" + src="images/i_005.jpg" + alt=""> + </div> + +<table class="smaller" style="max-width: 50em"> + <tr> + <td class="cht smcap">Frederick the Great</td> + <td class="ctr"></td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#frontispiece"><i>Frontispiece</i></a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="cht smcap">Turenne</td> + <td class="ctr"><i>To face page</i></td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#i_b_012fp">12</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="cht smcap">Theatre of War in Germany</td> + <td class="ctr">„</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#i_b_020fp">20</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="cht smcap">Theatre of War in the Low Countries</td> + <td class="ctr">„</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#i_b_028fp">28</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="cht smcap">Marlborough</td> + <td class="ctr">„</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#i_b_036fp">36</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="cht smcap">Theatre of the Campaign of 1704</td> + <td class="ctr">„</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#i_b_044fp">44</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="cht smcap">Theatre of Campaigns in Belgium and the North of France</td> + <td class="ctr">„</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#i_b_054fp">54</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="cht smcap">Theatre of the Seven Years’ War</td> + <td class="ctr">„</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#i_b_076fp">76</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="cht smcap">Battles of Prague and Zorndorf</td> + <td class="ctr">„</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#i_b_078a">78</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="cht smcap">Seidlitz at Rossbach</td> + <td class="ctr">„</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#i_b_083fp">83</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="cht smcap">Battles of Rossbach and Leuthen</td> + <td class="ctr">„</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#i_b_085afp">85</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="cht smcap">Theatre of the Campaign in North Italy</td> + <td class="ctr">„</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#i_b_110fp">110</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="cht smcap">Sketch Map of Central Europe</td> + <td class="ctr">„</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#i_b_128fp">128</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="cht smcap">Theatre of the Campaign of 1809</td> + <td class="ctr">„</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#i_b_160afp">160</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="cht smcap">Theatre of the Campaign of 1812</td> + <td class="ctr">„</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#i_b_174fp">174</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="cht smcap">Napoleon Watching the Burning of Moscow</td> + <td class="ctr">„</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#i_b_178fp">178</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="cht smcap">Theatre of the Campaign of 1813</td> + <td class="ctr">„</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#i_b_188fp">188</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="cht smcap">Theatre of the Campaign of 1814</td> + <td class="ctr">„</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#i_b_206fp">206</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="cht smcap">Theatre of the Campaign of 1815</td> + <td class="ctr">„</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#i_b_218fp">218</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="cht smcap">Ney at Waterloo</td> + <td class="ctr">„</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#i_b_226fp">226</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="cht smcap">Wellington</td> + <td class="ctr">„</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#i_b_238fp">238</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="cht smcap">Theatre of the Peninsula War</td> + <td class="ctr">„</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#i_b_244fp">244</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="cht smcap">Wellington at Talavera</td> + <td class="ctr">„</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#i_b_248fp">248</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="cht smcap">Moltke and His Master</td> + <td class="ctr">„</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#i_b_274fp">274</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="cht smcap">Theatre of the Campaign of 1866</td> + <td class="ctr">„</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#i_b_281fp">281</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="cht smcap">Theatre of the Campaigns of 1870–71</td> + <td class="ctr">„</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#i_b_288fp">288</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="cht smcap">Map of Belgium</td> + <td class="ctr">„</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#i_b_315fp">315</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="cht smcap">“The Idol of the Soldier’s Soul”</td> + <td class="ctr">„</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#i_b_320fp">320</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="cht smcap">England’s Hope, 1815</td> + <td class="ctr">„</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#i_b_324">324</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="cht smcap">“Tambour, faites-moi cadeau d’une prise!”</td> + <td class="ctr">„</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#i_b_338fp">338</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td class="cht smcap">Plan of the Battlefield of Waterloo</td> + <td class="ctr">„</td> + <td class="pag"><a href="#i_b_350fp">350</a></td> + </tr> +</table> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_v">[v]</span></p> + +<h2 class="p4">PREFACE.</h2> +</div> + + <div class="figcenter"> + <img + class="p0" + src="images/i_006.jpg" + alt=""> + </div> + +<p>This volume consists of a series of essays on Great Commanders of +Modern Times, and of two papers on the Campaign of 1815. I have to +thank the Editor of <i>The Illustrated Naval and Military Magazine</i>, +in which these studies originally appeared, for thinking them worthy +of republication; and my acknowledgments are due to the press for many +favourable notices. The text has been revised and slips of the pen +corrected; but I have made no substantial change in what I had at first +written.</p> + +<p>A civilian, who attempts to treat of military affairs, ought to bear in +mind the remark of Hannibal to the Greek sophist—“It is pretty, but it +is all nonsense.” Yet it is with the art of war as with lesser arts; +the unprofessional inquirer can attain knowledge of leading truths, +though he may not be able to master technical details. Thucydides +was perhaps not a soldier, but he observed this principle, and his +narrative of the siege of Syracuse is a masterpiece. An ordinary writer +is not worthy to unloose the shoe latchet of Thucydides; but he may, +in this matter, imitate the method of the great Athenian; and if he +has fair intelligence, works hard, and devotes laborious hours to +reflecting on the exploits of great captains, he may become, in some +measure, a sound military critic. These essays are not, I trust, wholly +devoid of the only merits I claim for them.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_vi">[vi]</span></p> + +<p>The papers on the Campaign of 1815, though only sketches, are the least +fugitive pieces of any in this volume. I have formed my conclusions +after a careful study of nearly every valuable authority on the +subject; and I have had the advantage of some special information not +yet given to the public. I have described Napoleon as easily superior, +as a strategist, to his adversaries; while I have done justice to the +great qualities displayed by Wellington and Blücher, as soldiers, +I have dwelt on the grave strategic mistakes they committed. This +will not gratify national vanity; but, in my judgment, it is the +verdict which History will pronounce, nay, is already pronouncing, +upon the questions raised by this mighty conflict, after a full and +dispassionate investigation of the evidence.</p> + +<p>My short account of the Battle of Waterloo may be flatly contradicted, +or sharply criticized, in two particulars. I have described La Haye +Sainte as having been captured at about 4 P.M. on the 18th of June; +and I have left it to be inferred that only one column of the Imperial +Guard actually reached the British line. It would take too long to +explain why I have made these statements; I shall merely remark that +the testimony in their favour seems to me greatly to preponderate.</p> + +<p><i>Gartnamona, Tullamore,</i></p> + +<p class="left1"><i>September 1890.</i></p> + + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_1">[1]</span></p> + +<p class="center xl p4">GREAT COMMANDERS<br> +<span class="xs">OF</span><br> +MODERN TIMES.</p> +</div> + +<h2>INTRODUCTION.<br> +<span class="subhed">BY A SOLDIER.</span></h2></div> + +<p>It will doubtless appear to some that this is a trite subject whose +interest has long ago evaporated, exhausted by the numerous and +competent pens which have treated it. The soldier, at all events, will +judge otherwise, and conclude that the careers of that small group +of demi-gods, commonly known as “great generals,” afford matter for +consideration which can never tire, and which gains in interest the +more it is analysed. As we vary our point of view, so the prospect +grows upon us and the more we admire its details. Again, passing +from select readers to the multitude, we have the sanction of a most +sagacious observer of mankind for retracing the ground which has been +so often trodden aforetime.</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>Difficile est proprie communia dicere; tuque</div> + <div>Rectius Iliacum carmen deducis in actus,</div> + <div>Quam si proferres ignota indictaque primus.</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p>This being so, a concise summary like this of the campaigns of the +most eminent of these great military leaders will not prove devoid of +novelty and interest, as coming from the pen of one whom a civil career +has left free from professional prejudice, and the study of law has +trained to weigh<span class="pagenum" id="Page_2">[2]</span> conflicting evidence. These biographical summaries +include the following names:—</p> + +<div class="parent"> +<ul class="left smaller" style="margin-top: 0em"> + <li>1. Turenne.</li> + <li>2. Marlborough.</li> + <li>3. Frederick the Great.</li> + <li>4. Napoleon.</li> + <li>5. Wellington.</li> + <li>6. Moltke.</li> +</ul> +</div> + +<p>If in any particular we are at variance with the writer, it is that he +hardly attaches sufficient importance to the influence of Turenne’s +predecessor, Gustavus Adolphus, in the development of the military +art. We ourselves agree with Gfrörer, his German biographer, that the +Swedish king was the father of modern strategy, and the first really +great general since Julius Cæsar. As Judge O’Connor Morris points out, +many great soldiers lived during this long interval of time, but in +our opinion (and it is in accord with Napoleon’s) it was the campaigns +of the Swedish hero, and notably the Thirty Years’ War, which first +revealed the dawn of that science which in later days was brought to +such perfection by his successors. The tactical improvements introduced +by Gustavus were extensive, though cavalry still played too exclusive +a <i>rôle</i> in his engagements; his reforms in the armament and +equipment of his troops were remarkable; nor is the military historian +oblivious of his services to good discipline and morality by the +Articles of War which he compiled and promulgated.</p> + +<p>Gustavus Adolphus, when he ascended the throne at the tender age +of seventeen, found his realm engaged in hostilities with Denmark, +Russia, and Poland. His successor, Charles XII., curiously enough, was +similarly entangled, but promptitude and good fortune in each case +enabled the monarch to assail his enemies in succession and beat them +in detail. The Danes already occupied the southern provinces of Sweden +and, in the spring of 1612, they advanced in two columns, intending +to move on Stockholm by the routes east and west of the Wettern Lake<span class="pagenum" id="Page_3">[3]</span> +which give access to the capital. This afforded the boy-king an +opportunity for signalizing his latent military talent. Posting his +forces at Jönköping, at the southernmost extremity of the lake, he +struck alternately at the divided columns of the Danish army till he +thrust them in disorderly retreat back to the sea-coast. Thus early +was the leading idea which governed the defence of France in 1814 +foreshadowed amid the rocks and lakes of Sweden. Peace with Denmark +resulted in 1613, and through the mediation of James I. of England.</p> + +<p>Russia was next assailed. Semi-barbarous at the time, that State was in +the throes of revolution brought about by the extinction of the House +of Ruric; and a project was actually on foot for her dismemberment, one +half to go to Sweden, the other to Poland. But Muscovite patriotism +defeated its execution. Michael Románoff was, in 1613, elected Tsar. +Gustavus at the same time landed in Esthonia, but effected little +beyond the capture of Gdoff, and in 1617 concluded peace, again through +the good offices of England. The Thirty Years’ War was looming in the +distance; the diplomacy of the Protestant Powers tended towards a union +against the Papacy. Thus both dynastic and religious considerations +recommended an attack on Poland to the judgment of Gustavus. Sigismund +III., her king, was both a bigoted Catholic and the rightful though +dethroned King of Sweden. Nothing could be effected in Germany leaving +such an active and embittered foe in flank and rear. At first the King +operated from Riga as a base, with the Dwina as his line of operations; +but experience soon taught that, to effect his purpose, he must strike +vigorously home at the heart of the adversary’s power. The theatre of +war was therefore transferred to West Prussia, then directly subject +to Poland, where he proceeded to establish a solid base on the coast, +by making himself master of the fortresses of Frauenburg, Elbing, +Marienburg, Stuhm, Mewe, Dirschau, and Oliva. Dantzig was besieged to +facilitate communication with Sweden and, in this case, the line chosen +by him for an eventual advance into the interior was the river Vistula. +In all of his campaigns we find Gustavus keeping up his communications +with the coast by means<span class="pagenum" id="Page_4">[4]</span> of a great river; he lived in times when +railways were not dreamt of and even roads could scarcely be said to +exist. A commodious port on the Baltic was also necessary for safe +communication with Sweden, and to serve as a depôt for stores. Thus his +strategy was far in advance of the practice of his renowned successors +Charles X. and Charles XII., who, great soldiers as they were, relapsed +into pre-Gustavus methods, though they had both the King’s example and +that of Turenne before them.</p> + +<p>During this “Prussian War,” as the Swedish historians designate +the struggle with Poland, Gustavus, involved himself in the Thirty +Years’ War by sending troops to succour the hard-pressed garrison of +Stralsund, then besieged by Wallenstein. This affront quickly brought a +division of 10,000 Imperialists to the fields of Poland. Nevertheless, +the belligerents concluded, in 1629, an armistice for the space of six +years, which enabled Gustavus to turn his attention to the horrible +struggle which was deluging Germany with blood, while securing his +recent acquisitions on the Baltic. In one particular, however, he +had persistently infringed the rules of conduct which should guide +the great Commander: he had recklessly exposed his life during this +Prussian campaign. During an action at Dirschau, the Swedes were on +the point of victory when a bullet struck their chief in the shoulder, +and he was borne insensible from the field. The action was stopped +in consequence, and it was this wound which ever afterwards made it +irksome for him to wear a cuirass, the absence of which probably +occasioned his death on the field of Lützen. On several other occasions +he escaped death or capture by a hair’s breadth. But it is only on +critical occasions that the leader of a host ought to risk his life. +The interests committed to his charge ought to be paramount in his +estimation. Cæsar and Napoleon both well knew when such a course seemed +necessary.</p> + +<p>We now approach the crowning enterprize of this “Lion of the North,” +his intervention in the Thirty Years’ War, with the glories which were +compressed into the short span of life which yet remained to him: an +enterprize which he had long dreamed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_5">[5]</span> of in secret, and the fatal +termination of which he probably only too plainly foresaw.</p> + +<p>He landed on the island of Usedom on the 26th June 1630. Separated +from the mainland by a narrow arm of the sea, it was admirably suited +for the purpose of a maritime base of operations. Gustavus, the first +who leaped ashore, sank on his knees, gave thanks to God, and, this +done, seized a spade and began to dig the trenches. The island of +Wollin was next subjugated, and the command of the mouth of the Oder +by this means secured. Tilly was absent, dancing attendance on the +Diet at Regensburg; Torquato Conti, his lieutenant, seemed paralyzed +by the emergency; Wallenstein had justly been deposed from the supreme +command. Embarking on the Stettiner Haff, the “Snow King,” as his +enemies contemptuously nick-named him, seized possession of Stettin in +July. In September he invaded the duchy of Mecklenburg, thus extending +his area of supply and acquiring a broad and solid base for operating +in relief of beleaguered Magdeburg. He drove Schaumburg, Conti’s +successor, as far as Frankfort-on-the-Oder, and by the close of the +year all the Pomeranian strongholds except Colberg, Greifswald, and +Demmin, were in his possession. Thus much to prove how systematic was +his system of warfare, and to show how carefully he fortified his base +before venturing into the interior of Germany.</p> + +<p>It must be noted that Gustavus continued active operations throughout +the winter, in contrast to the habits of the age. In January 1631 his +troops, clothed in sheep-skins, quitted Stettin, and New Brandenburg, +Loitz, Malchin, and Demmin fell to their arms. These successes brought +Tilly raging with fury on their track. Traversing Brandenburg amid +blood and flame, he captured New Brandenburg by assault. Gustavus had +skilfully concentrated his forces to protect the town at Friedland and +at Pasewalk, but was informed by his lieutenants that the troops were +so demoralized by the idea of encountering Tilly’s terrible bands that +they were not to be relied on! In this desperate emergency the genius +of the Swede stood by him. While Horn disputed the passage of the Peene +and Trebel by the Imperialists, the King<span class="pagenum" id="Page_6">[6]</span> ascended the Oder with the +bulk of his forces, and, taking post at Schwedt, menaced the enemy’s +right and rear so that Tilly rapidly retraced his steps, and, finding +the Swedish position impregnable, continued his retreat to Magdeburg. +When the field was clear, Gustavus, dashing out of his camp, appeared +before Frankfort-on-the-Oder. On the 3rd April the assault was sounded, +the gates were blown open by his petards, and the fortress succumbed +amid great slaughter. Shortly afterwards Landsberg encountered a +similar fate.</p> + +<p>In May the fall of Magdeburg startled the civilized world—a disaster +to be ascribed to the obstinacy and timidity of the Saxon and +Brandenburg electors, who hesitated to afford Gustavus their support. +In plain words, the King resolutely declined to advance to the city’s +relief till he had safe-guarded his line of retreat in conformity with +the maxims of what we now-a-days call strategy, but with him was merely +martial instinct. Possession of the fortresses which secured his line +of retreat was deliberately withheld from him by these Protestant +potentates until too late. But the bestial fury of the Imperialist +soldiery robbed Tilly of the fruits of victory. Instead of acquiring +a pivot whence to dominate North Germany, he was constrained to slink +back into Thuringia and the banks of the Unstruth.</p> + +<p>The indignation aroused by this massacre throughout the Protestant +world enabled Gustavus to coerce his brother-in-law of Berlin; a treaty +of alliance signed and sealed safe-guarded the Swedish rear, and the +King was in a position to execute a general advance across the Elbe +which placed his strategic front in a direction parallel to his base. +Having effected the passage near Tangermünde, he pitched his camp +at Werben, near the confluence of the Havel and Elbe, across which +he constructed a bridge. Immediately on receipt of the news, Tilly, +uniting with Pappenheim at Magdeburg, flew to the assault, but soon +experienced his opponent’s mettle. The King surprised the Imperialist +advance-guard by night near Burgstall, and destroyed 2,000 of their +cavalry. Tilly reconnoitred the works at Werben, but, not liking their +aspect, retired to Eisleben. He had lost one quarter of his numbers, +but<span class="pagenum" id="Page_7">[7]</span> was there raised to 30,000 men by the arrival of troops, liberated +from Italy by the treaty of Cherasco, under Count von Fürstenberg, so +that he was in a position to enforce the Imperial summons that the +Saxon Elector should surrender his army and revenues for Catholic +purposes. The insolent demand drove that Prince into the arms of +Sweden, and a convention was signed which placed his army together +with Wittenburg at the disposition of Gustavus. Leipzig capitulated to +Tilly and the Swedes crossed the Elbe, effecting a junction with the +Saxons on the banks of the Mulda. Two days later (the 7th September) +was fought the battle of Leipzig, which justified all the plans and +precautions of the Swedish strategist.</p> + +<p>Into the details of that great conflict it is not our business here to +inquire. The splendid tactical <i>coup d’œil</i> of Gustavus has never +been called into question. Let us rather consider how he profited by +this amazing triumph. While the adversary withdrew into Thuringia, +Gustavus struck right across his communications with Bavaria, +pressing along the “Priest’s Lane,” the rich string of ecclesiastical +principalities which then lined the banks of the Main—that march which +is mentioned with admiration by the present biographer of Turenne. He +thus provided himself with a new and fertile base for operating against +the heart of the Empire at the expense of the Catholic party, while +the Saxons invested Leipzig and defended the line of the Elbe from the +enemy in Silesia. The Swedish King jealously guarded his communications +with the sea, which were demarked by the rivers Saale and Elbe. +Thuringia was garrisoned by Weimar troops; Halle by those of the Prince +of Anhalt; Banér invested Magdeburg, while Tott held Mecklenburg in +subjection.</p> + +<p>On the 26th September the King’s army, leaving Erfurt, began to ascend +the Main, and on the 10th October they took the episcopal fortress +of Würtzburg by assault. This calamity drew Tilly in hot haste to +the south. Towards the end of October his army, 40,000 strong, was +bivouacked along the Tauber, where, on the night of the 23rd, Gustavus +again cut up three Imperialist cavalry regiments which had bivouacked +in an exposed position.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_8">[8]</span> After a futile demonstration against +Ochsenfurt, where he lost heart on discovering the Swedes drawn up +beyond the Main, Tilly retreated in the direction of Nuremberg, when +Gustavus, leaving Horn to observe his movements, sped along that river +to Frankfort, into which capital he made his triumphal entry on the +17th November 1631. Meanwhile his antagonist, as if crushed in spirit +by the swift ruin which had overtaken his fortunes, raided about +Franconia at random, and seemed utterly incapable of arriving at any +fixed determination. Finally he imagined the assault of Nuremberg; +but a Protestant soldier, applying a slow-match to his store of +gunpowder, blew it into the air together with the projects of his +chief, who forthwith left Nuremberg and cantoned his troops in winter +quarters around Nördlingen. The Swede, however, was more energetic, and +crossing the Rhine at Oppenheim in defiance of the troops of Spain, +gained possession of the great fortress of Mentz as the reward of his +valour and activity. Here Gustavus spent Christmas with his Queen and +Chancellor, Oxenstierna, who had come from Sweden to meet him. He was +at the high pitch of his prosperity, courted by the petty princes +of Germany and by the envoys of more considerable Powers. He was +dreaming, it was said, of a Protestant Empire. But France, his ally, +had taken umbrage at his successes. Richelieu endeavoured to arrange a +pacification, but the sagacity or ambition of Gustavus impelled him to +decline these overtures.</p> + +<p>Early in 1632, Tilly, advancing from Nördlingen, surprised Horn at +Bamberg, forcing him down the valley of the Main till he was supported +by the King with 40,000 men. The Imperialists then retreated in their +turn, and Gustavus, suddenly crossing the river, nearly succeeded +in cutting them off from the Danube and Ingolstadt. Having entered +Nuremberg in triumph, he continued the pursuit, and turned the line of +the Danube by seizing, at Donauwörth, the only bridge left intact by +Tilly between Neuburg and Ulm. Tilly hurried his troops from Ingolstadt +to the Lech, in order to dispute the passage of the stream. Dissuaded +from attacking by his generals, who urged that Wallenstein’s army in +Bohemia was threatening his communications with the Baltic,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_9">[9]</span> Gustavus +persisted in his intention, replying that a demoralized enemy should be +crushed without allowing him a respite for recovery: his own retreat by +Donauwörth on Mentz was safe. He was out-voted in council, but acted on +his own opinion, and his able dispositions were crowned with perfect +success. The passage of the rapid current was forced. Tilly, like +Turenne, was slain by an unlucky round-shot. Gustavus did not pursue +vigorously—that art seems to have been invented by Napoleon—but +Augsburg formed a substantial prize for the victor. Here was the cradle +of the Protestant faith, and in days of religious bigotry this solemn +entry into the city must have caused rapturous sensations in Lutheran +hearts. Munich likewise received him with open gates.</p> + +<p>While repressing a revolt of the peasantry the King was suddenly +apprised that Wallenstein, having seized the Pass of Eger, had +entered Franconia, seeking to force the Thuringian defiles, and +opened communication with the Bavarians at Regensburg. This was the +contingency foreseen by those who had condemned the passage of the +Lech. Wallenstein, careless about his own communications or the +interests of the Empire he served, and desirous only of fixing his own +authority in North Germany while living at free-quarters, had thrust +himself between the Swedes and the Baltic Sea. In June therefore the +King, hurriedly retracing his steps, crossed the Danube at Donauwörth +in the endeavour to cut off the Bavarians in their march northwards +to join Wallenstein. In this he failed, but narrowly. The enemy had +given him the slip by requisitioning carts for their conveyance. He +entrenched himself at Nuremberg, was followed thither by Wallenstein, +and a terrible drama of slaughter, disease, and starvation, which +seemed to typify all the plagues of Egypt, was enacted around that +city. It resulted in a drawn battle; and the martial reputation of the +Swedish king suffered proportionate diminution. He had been withstood +successfully; nay, more, he had been the first to withdraw from it. +For this his moral nature was perhaps responsible. He could no longer +endure the pandemonium of human suffering which was in progress +around him, while to the cynical Wallenstein all this was a matter<span class="pagenum" id="Page_10">[10]</span> +of indifference. Strangely enough the Imperialists retreated north, +the Protestants southwards. Wallenstein swept through Saxony with +his ravenous, ruthless hordes; Gustavus once more subjected Bavaria +to his requisitions. War was to be made to support war; but let us +bear in mind that it was the fond hope of Wallenstein to establish an +empire for himself in North Germany; while it is surmised that his +adversary held not dissimilar views, though with nobler aspirations; +at all events his strategic base at this time was the city of Mentz +and the fertile valley of the Rhine in its proximity. But the inhuman +atrocities of the Imperialists in Saxony were again too much for the +sensitive nature of Gustavus; in addition to which, the statesman +will note that the Elector, a dubious ally, was likely to make terms +with the oppressor, and this would signify a permanent severance from +Sweden which could not be acquiesced in. On the 11th October, the King +directed his army north <i>viâ</i> Donauwörth in two columns, and +by the end of the month was able to review them reunited at Erfurt. +Unfortunately his allies, the Saxons and Lüneburgers were still beyond +the Elbe, and a flank march in front of the concentrated Imperialists +became indispensible in order to effect a junction; for Wallenstein +and Pappenheim had judiciously united their forces near Leipzig, while +George of Lüneburg had disobeyed the King’s orders, which enjoined him +to rendezvous in Thuringia, and the Saxon Elector, as if paralysed +by dread of Wallenstein, was still in the depths of Silesia. Grimma +was the point indicated for concentration, thus well within striking +distance of the enemy; and Gustavus left Naumburg in this direction +on the 5th November. On the march, however, an intercepted letter was +placed in his hand. He learnt that Wallenstein, deeming the campaign +ended for that year, had permitted Pappenheim with 10,000 men to +depart on a raid into Westphalia, and had cantoned the remainder of +his forces in and around Lützen. At this sudden crisis, Gustavus +proved his title to a niche among the “demi-gods” of war. Instantly +wheeling his columns to the left, he advanced to the attack across +the vast plain which leads to the town of Lützen. But “Man proposes, +God disposes,” an adage<span class="pagenum" id="Page_11">[11]</span> which is peculiarly applicable to warlike +enterprize. The passage of the Rippach stream, strenuously defended +by Isolani’s Croats, stopped the Swedes till nightfall, a delay which +enabled Wallenstein to assemble his scattered forces; while a dense fog +next morning, which did not lift till 11 o’clock, prevented the attack +taking place at an early hour, and so afforded time for Pappenheim to +return with his troops to the field ere the close of the battle. But by +this time the great King had breathed his last, and Pappenheim roamed +the field in vain in order to cross swords with him. After a desperate +struggle, the Catholics suffered defeat, but the loss of the Protestant +champion converted disaster into a victory for their faith.</p> + +<p>In the long struggle which followed after his death, and lasted no less +than sixteen years, the name of <span class="smcap">Turenne</span> first became known to +fame.</p> + + <div class="figcenter"> + <img + class="p2" + src="images/i_020.jpg" + alt=""> + </div> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_12">[12]</span></p> + +<h2>CHAPTER I.<br> +<span class="subhed smcap">Turenne.</span></h2></div> + +<p>I remember hearing a soldier of promise remark that war had so +completely changed that it was useless to study the campaigns of +Napoleon. This foolish paradox represents ideas too common among +military men of late; and is about as true as an old notion, rudely +exploded on the great day of Austerlitz, that Frederick’s usual method +of giving battle was so infallible, under all circumstances, that a +long flank march under the guns of an enemy in position is scientific +strategy. An opinion is abroad that German genius has wrought such +a revolution in the art of war, that all that has gone before is +obsolete; that Moltke is a faultless commander, whose exploits surpass +those of all chiefs; nay, that mechanism and organization are the +best means of assuring success to armies in the field. It is time to +expose the perilous errors, mixed with particles of truth, in these +shallow statements. The subordinate methods and rules of war have been +largely changed, in the progress of the age, and especially through +its material inventions; but the higher parts of the art can never +vary, for they have their origin in the faculties of man, as grandly +developed in Cæsar and Hannibal as in the great captains of modern +times; and the exhibition of these, whatever may be the conditions of +time and other accidents, will always be matter of fruitful study. As +for the “faultlessness” of Moltke, that distinguished man would be the +first to admit that, like all generals, he has made grave and palpable +errors. Extraordinary, <span class="pagenum" id="Page_13">[13]</span>indeed, as have been his achievements, his +campaigns in Bohemia and France show that his strategic and tactical +mistakes were many; and though he is a real chief of the Napoleonic +school, he has done nothing that can be compared to the movements +round Mantua in 1796, to the Alpine march that led to Marengo, to the +manœuvres that immured Mack in Ulm, to the last swoop on Belgium in +1815. That mechanism and organization count for much, is a truth as +old as the days of the Legions; but the genius of leaders in directing +armies has always been the chief element of success in war; and, so +far from this being less the case at the present day than it has been +of old, this influence is now more than ever decisive. It is obvious, +in fact, that the powers of the chief will have increasingly greater +effect as armies have grown to immense proportions, and military +movements have become more complex, more extended, and, above all, +more rapid; and if a mere tactician will, perhaps, do less, on a given +field, than a century ago, victory in a campaign will, in this age, in +the main, depend on superior strategy.</p> + + <div class="figcenter" id="i_b_012fp"> + <img + class="p1" + src="images/i_b_012fp.jpg" + alt=""> + <p class="p0 sm center">TURENNE.</p> + </div> + +<p>I purpose, in this and subsequent articles, to endeavour to illustrate +the main principles and permanent lessons of the art of war in brief +sketches of the lives and the deeds of famous commanders of modern +times; and I shall try to dispel the notions that military history +before Sadowa is a mere old almanack, and that the exclusive study +of modern Prussian routine is the best education of the accomplished +soldier. For authority, I need only refer to Napoleon.<a id="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> “Tactics,” +wrote that master of war, “manœuvres, the science of the engineer +and of the artillerist, can be learned in treatises, like geometry; +but knowledge of the high parts of war can be acquired only by study +of the history of war, and of the battles of great captains, and by +experience.”</p> + +<p>I have placed Turenne at the head of my list, not only because he comes +first in time, but because the art of war made immense progress during +the long career of this illustrious chief, was greatly improved by +his powerful genius, and gradually acquired a modern<span class="pagenum" id="Page_14">[14]</span> aspect. Before +I attempt, however, to sketch his exploits, I would say a word on the +condition of the art before it passed into his master hand. The leading +maxims of war were fully understood; and great commanders had, in many +a contest, shown what the qualities are which ensure success in the +strife of opposing armies. That a general in a campaign should have a +distinct object, that he should steadily endeavour to carry it out, +and that he should so combine his means as to promote his ends, were +recognised and approved principles; and the value of intelligence in +great movements, of energy and skill in the direction of troops and of +careful administration in military affairs, had been illustrated by +fine examples. Passing, too, from these universal truths, the principal +rules of strategic science had been ascertained in their main outlines, +and ably brought to the test of experience; nay, war had exhibited +grand instances of strategy, whether of offence or defence, which, +founded as it is on the peculiar character and faculties of individual +men, had never perhaps more noted champions than Hannibal and the +Roman Fabius. The advantage, for instance, of having the possession of +interior lines on a field of manœuvre had been clearly perceived by +Guébriant, and was repeatedly seen in the Thirty Years’ War; Gustavus +had shown what could be accomplished by rapid and well concerted +movements against the communications of a hostile army; and Wallenstein +had proved how great could be the power of firmness, endurance, and +patient skill in resisting even the most able enemy.</p> + +<p>The art, however, owing to many causes, had not as yet been nearly +developed, and had not even approached its present perfection. Fine +movements, indeed, were occasionally made; the march of Gustavus, for +example, down “the Priests’ Lane,” which carried him into the heart +of the Empire, and some of the marches of Parma, in an earlier age, +remain noble specimens of audacious genius. But strategy was still, +so to speak, cramped and limited by all kinds of obstacles, and it +could not attain the freedom and grandeur which it has exhibited in +the wars of this century. On every theatre of war, from Vienna to +Brussels, the state of husbandry was backward in the extreme; there +were immense wastes of morass<span class="pagenum" id="Page_15">[15]</span> and forest; and even the plain country +was not half cultivated. The roads, too, were comparatively few, and +even the main roads were, for the most part, bad; the great rivers had +but few bridges, and minor streams were not bridged at all; and the +passes across the chief mountain ranges were mere paths and tracks, +intricate and difficult. The natural impediments to the march of armies +were, therefore, many and often formidable; and these were greatly +increased by the numerous fortresses which had grown up since the +feudal age, and which, covering frontiers and main approaches, and +barring the way to an invader’s progress, could not easily be passed +by even a daring enemy. In addition to this, the means of supply and +of transport possessed by modern armies, either did not exist or were +very scanty; magazines, trains, and the many appliances that enable +troops of this day to live and move, were quite in an embryonic state; +and a general was often compelled to rely on plunder and rapine to +support his soldiery. In these circumstances, the rapid manœuvres and +the grand movements leading to decisive battles which belong to the +age of Napoleon and Moltke, could be witnessed only on a small scale, +and occurred only in rare instances. War, as a rule, had a contracted +aspect; and its ends were often different from those of our time. +Beset by impediments, even the greatest chiefs were frequently unable +to make long marches, or to attempt anything like audacious strategy; +and though Gustavus had fully seen that the main object of a campaign +was to cripple an adversary in pitched battles, this was not yet an +accepted principle. The art of war still largely consisted in wearing +out an enemy in petty combats, in devastation, and wrecking a country, +in incursions attended by partial success; and the aim of commanders +often was, not so much to defeat a hostile army as to find good +quarters in an unravaged province. Campaigns were late, slow, and had +small results; as a rule, winter campaigns were rare. Above all, it had +become a maxim that before invading an enemy’s country it was necessary +first to reduce its fortresses; months, and even years, were taken up +in sieges; and the art, it has been said, “seemed to flit around strong +places.” In short, owing to the local accidents and peculiarities of +the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_16">[16]</span> seventeenth century, strategy, though in existence and in a state +of progress, was still quite immature and imperfect.</p> + +<p>The science of Tactics had at this period made less progress than that +of Strategy. It had become recognized that the three arms should act +in concert, and support each other; and a distinct unity was seen in +battles, unlike the desultory combats of the Middle Ages. But one great +principle of modern tactics, that an army should be arrayed on the +ground, not according to any unchanging method but so that each arm +should turn to account the character and local features of the spot, +had scarcely entered the minds of men; it certainly had not been fully +established. An army took its position in a settled order: the cavalry +always on either wing, the infantry in the centre, and the guns in +front. There usually was a considerable reserve; and the importance, +for instance, of so placing cavalry that it could fall on an enemy +from under cover, or of so distributing guns that they could enfilade +infantry, or throw a concentrated or plunging fire, was as yet little, +if at all, understood. In these circumstances the marked diversity +which is a characteristic of modern battles, which makes no one exactly +resemble the other, and in consequence of which the tactical skill of +a chief in command is taxed to the utmost, existed only to a small +extent. There was a distinct sameness in the battles of the age, and +these usually consisted in a contest between the hostile footmen and +guns in the centre—a mere partial engagement without manœuvres—until +the success of the cavalry on either side enabled it to assail the +flank or the rear of the enemy. The tactics, therefore, of this period +were very different from those of our own; and this difference was +made greater through the change in the relations of the three arms, +and in the efficiency and the power of infantry, which has taken place +since the seventeenth century. At this period, cavalry was by far +the most important and capable arm; it was, in fact, the manœuvring +force in the field. The value of artillery was still unknown, for guns +were comparatively few and ill served; and footmen, often inferior in +numbers to horsemen, were a combined array of musketeers and pikemen, +invariably marshalled in dense masses, unequal to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_17">[17]</span> quick and difficult +movements, and utterly inferior to the infantry of this day in relative +strength, in the efficacy of fire, in ability either to attack or +defend, and in evolutions and manœuvres in the field.</p> + +<p>Under these conditions, a general gave his chief attention to his most +powerful arm; artillery and foot played a subordinate part; and, as +I have said, the event of battles was usually decided by a charge of +horsemen launched against an exposed side of a hostile army. But if +the tactics of those days were unlike ours, it is a mistake to suppose +that they did not afford full scope to superior skill and genius. The +front of battles was comparatively small; a general’s eye could command +the whole field, and victory usually depended on the inspiration of +the chief, who, with ready design, and at the fitting moment, could +direct his cavalry in collected force against a hesitating and already +shaken enemy. This was the distinctive gift of the famed Condé, and +of that born master of tactics, Cromwell; it was conspicuously proved +at Rocroy and Marston Moor; and it is a gift of the very highest +order, if it does not exactly resemble the faculties which prepared +Ramillies, Leuthen, and Austerlitz. For the rest, an army of this +period, considered as a whole, was very different from an army of the +nineteenth century; and this, too, affected the art of Tactics. In +numbers, it was comparatively small; 30,000 men would be a very large +army. It was deficient in unity and combined strength, for it was a +mere array of battalions and squadrons; divisions and corps were as yet +unknown, and a general-in-chief did not possess the supreme authority +now entrusted to him. The discipline, too, and the organization of +such an army was still far from good; the troops did not even wear a +uniform, and were more akin to a feudal militia than to regular and +trained soldiers; the muster rolls were always incomplete, owing to +the Falstaffian tricks of officers, as yet subject to little control, +and mutiny and insubordination were too common. Such an army, from the +nature of the case, would be a weak and uncertain instrument of war; +and this alone made the tactics of the day less decisive, as a general +rule, in results, than those of later great masters of war.</p> + +<p>The art of war at this time, in short, has been happily compared<span class="pagenum" id="Page_18">[18]</span> to +a bird, which eagerly spreads its wings for a flight, but is held, +checked by restraints, to the ground. I pass on to the great captain +whose life and career I attempt to illustrate. Turenne was born in +1611, a scion of the princely <i>noblesse</i> of France, his father +being Sovereign Lord of Sedan, his mother a daughter of William the +Silent, who largely transmitted the high qualities of the House of +Nassau to her renowned offspring. As has happened with other famous +warriors—with Luxemburg, William III., and Wellington—the future +master of war was a sickly child; but from the earliest age he showed +strength of character. He was educated with remarkable care; and +though, unlike Condé, he was not a precocious genius—he remained +heavy and dull in exterior through life—still, even in those years, +the assiduous care with which he studied the campaigns of Cæsar, and +followed Alexander in his march to the Indus, revealed the natural +tendencies of the coming strategist. Turenne entered the service of the +Seven Provinces as a private soldier at the age of fourteen; and under +the care of his maternal uncle, Maurice of Nassau, and his successor +Henry, he took part in the long wars of sieges which marked the +conflict with Spain in the Low Countries. He fought his way steadily +up from the ranks; he seems to have owed little to birth or to favour; +but, though he gained distinction at the siege of Bois-le-Duc, this +was not the natural bent of his genius, and the value to him of these +essays in arms was probably to teach him the important truth, which +he illustrated in many striking instances, that “in war you should +march and not besiege,” that you should rather outmanœuvre and defeat +your enemy than waste months in attacking fortresses which fall of +themselves after success in the field.</p> + +<p>In 1630, when twenty years old, Turenne obtained a regiment from Louis +XIII. He addressed himself with untiring diligence to the discipline +and the training of his men; and, like Wellington—in matters like this +he had much in common with our great countryman—he was soon known +as a capable officer, and could justify his boast that his “corps +was equal to the best troops of the King’s household.” The young +colonel, however, made no way at Court; its frivolity and luxury were +distasteful to a mind singularly<span class="pagenum" id="Page_19">[19]</span> modest and sedate; its licentious +recklessness shocked a nature formed by the rigid tenets of Calvin; and +while Condé was already a star at the Louvre, Turenne, taciturn and +awkward, was scarcely noticed. The future great chief of the armies +of France served for many years in a subordinate rank; he passed, in +fact, through all inferior grades, though his merits were recognized +by good judges; but if this term of probation was unduly long, its +experience, he has said, was most precious, for it “fully taught him +a soldier’s calling.” Long before the close of the Thirty Years’ War, +Turenne was known as an able man, though his great powers had not yet +been developed. He was singled out for honours at the great siege +of Breisach; he showed remarkable skill and firmness in covering a +disastrous retreat from the Sarre; and he had won the praise of La +Valette and Saxe Weimar for his singular steadiness and coolness in +the field, and for the paternal care he took of his troops, a quality +in which his comrades of the <i>noblesse</i>, brave, but unreflecting, +were as a rule wanting. The chief point, however, of permanent interest +in this early part of the career of Turenne is the evidence it affords +of the dawn of those powers for which he was to be proudly eminent. +He occasionally had an independent command, and in this position he +never failed to display the gifts of a true strategist. In 1636 he +made a forced march, by which he surprised and routed Gallas. He +captured Maubeuge, combining his movements with those of his chief with +remarkable skill. At the siege of Turin, in 1640, he out-manœuvred and +baffled his enemy, and kept away the relieving army; in 1643 he made a +feint against Alessandria, which deceived his adversary, and enabled +him to seize the fortress of Trino.</p> + +<p>In 1643, as the Thirty Years’ War was nearing its end, Turenne received +the staff of a Marshal of France. His achievements during the next +two years will repay a careful reader’s attention; but I can only +glance at them in this sketch, for they scarcely reveal his peculiar +genius. He took part, under the Grand Condé, in the desperate combats +around Fribourg, marked by the daring and vigour of his chief, but, in +Napoleon’s judgment, worse than useless; we see proof of his strategic +powers in his operations<span class="pagenum" id="Page_20">[20]</span> between divided enemies in the Palatinate +at the close of 1644; and I cannot doubt but that the fine march of +Condé down the Rhine, after the fall of Philippsbourg, which made the +French masters of Landau, Mayence, and other cities on the German +bank, was due to the inspiration of Turenne. In 1645, having advanced +to the Tauber, and overrun the Franconian lowlands, the marshal was +surprised and routed by Mercy—a Lorraine chief, little known to fame, +but a great captain of the Thirty Years’ War; and we can gather from +this and other instances that the genius of Turenne, rather profound +than quick, made him less admirable in the sphere of tactics than he +was in the higher parts of war. He was soon again under the command +of Condé, and he led the left wing of the French army in the terrible +struggle around Nördlingen; but though he contributed to the success of +the day, the glory of the victory, doubtful as it was, belongs wholly +to his renowned chief, whose tenacity, boldness, and insight on the +field, plucked safety and even a triumph from danger. The campaign of +1646 distinctly brought out for the first time the special gifts of +Turenne in full relief, and to this day is a strategic masterpiece. The +Marshal was on the French bank of the Rhine, near Mayence, as the year +opened, and Mazarin had directed him to remain in his camps trusting to +a pledge that the Duke of Bavaria would not send aid to the Imperial +forces. The Duke, however, broke faith and marched against the Swedes, +hoping to defeat them as they moved into Westphalia, and to join hands +with the Archduke Leopold, advancing in force from Western Austria; and +had success attended this operation France would have probably lost her +best ally. Turenne made up his mind at once; without waiting for a word +from his Government, he broke up from Mayence, moved down the Rhine in +a march of astonishing speed for those days, and, having crossed the +river as far north as Wesel, he effected his junction with the Swedish +chief, Wrangel, on the Lahn, having forestalled his enemy by a movement +of singular skill and daring.</p> + + <div class="figcenter" id="i_b_020fp"> + <img + class="p1" + src="images/i_b_020fp.jpg" + alt=""> + <p class="p0 sm center"><i>THEATRE OF WAR</i><br> +IN<br> +GERMANY]</p> + </div> + +<p>Turenne and Wrangel were now at the head of an army of more than +20,000 men; the hostile force, about equally strong, fell back +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_21">[21]</span>to Friedberg, north of the Main; and the Archduke, clinging to his +communications, began to retreat to the Danube by an exterior line, +through Schweinfurth and Nuremberg, towards the Bavarian plains. +Turenne seized the occasion with the eye of genius; holding the +chord of the arc, he advanced through Franconia by forced marches, +and attained Dönauworth, and while his adversary was toiling on his +eccentric movement, he crossed the Danube, pushed on to the Lech, and +boldly assailed the great place of Augsburg.<a id="FNanchor_2" href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> He failed in this +siege, having been persuaded by his Swedish colleague to attack Rain, +a little fortress of no importance; but his subsequent operations were +marked by genius and constancy of the highest order. The Archduke, +after weeks of delay, had crossed the Danube and approached the +Allies, and he took a strong position from Landsberg to Memmingen, +in order at once to cover Bavaria and to threaten the communications +of his audacious foes, who had advanced into the heart of Germany, +far from the Danube and even from the Rhine. It was now November, and +an ordinary chief would have fallen back to seek winter quarters, +foregoing the gains of the whole campaign; but Turenne resolved to take +the bolder course, and, against the advice of all his lieutenants, +he made a feint on Memmingen, and then, moving rapidly, seized the +communications of the Archduke at Landsberg and forced him, baffled +behind the Inn. This splendid campaign—a game of manœuvres in which +decisive success was gained without the risk of a single battle, which +shows the highest parts of a master of war, and in which Napoleon, a +draconic critic, can detect only a small mistake, the weakening the +attack on Augsburg to besiege Rain—detached Bavaria finally from the +Imperial cause, and, in truth, all but closed the Thirty Years’ War.</p> + +<p>The campaign of 1647, in which Turenne overcame a dangerous mutiny of +the German auxiliaries in the French army, is one of the many instances +of the strength of his character. That of 1648, the last of the Thirty +Years’ War, is a repetition of that of 1646, but scarcely gives proof +of equal genius; it is chiefly remarkable<span class="pagenum" id="Page_22">[22]</span> as the first occasion in +which Montecuculi, a worthy antagonist, and a friend of Turenne in +after years, exhibited his capacity in the field. I pass rapidly over +the next three years—an unhappy passage in the career of Turenne—for +they saw the most illustrious captain of France in arms against the +State and the National Government. Strong affection for a despoiled +brother, and the artful wiles of a beautiful siren—this was a weak +point in the warrior’s nature—caused Turenne to join the rebels of +the Fronde; but though excuses may be made for him, history has justly +condemned his conduct, and, like Marlborough but much less worthy of +blame, Turenne is an instance how revolution can pervert even the +noblest faculties. Turenne showed his strategic gifts in the contest; +he proposed to advance to Paris and to dictate peace, but he was +overruled by his Spanish colleagues, and he was soon afterwards beaten +by Du Plessis Praslin, in a pitched battle not far from Réthel, a point +of capital importance in the wars of that age. Turenne’s tactics, +Napoleon remarks on this occasion, were faulty and slow—this, in +truth, was his least perfect part; but Turenne, and even Condé, never +displayed that pre-eminence in war when opposed to France which they +exhibited when in command of Frenchmen.</p> + +<p>Turenne made his peace with Mazarin in 1652. Though naturally +distrusted by a Court he had betrayed, he soon made his extraordinary +powers felt, and in a few months he obtained the supreme direction of +military affairs in the war of the Second Fronde. Civil war is never +an attractive subject, but in this contest Turenne was opposed to the +Great Condé and the forces of Spain, and events have great and peculiar +interest. Turenne’s splendid faculties strategic insight, skill in +large manœuvres, judgment and constancy were never perhaps more grandly +seen. He proved himself far superior to his brilliant rival, though +it is but fair to say that the genius of Condé was repeatedly baffled +by Spanish obstinacy, and Turenne was justly hailed as the Saviour of +France and of the House of Bourbon when in the extreme of danger. He +out-manœuvred Condé at Blêneau, near the Loire, in a passage-of-arms +singled out by Napoleon, as a marvellous instance of military skill; +and he<span class="pagenum" id="Page_23">[23]</span> would probably have brought the war to an end had Mazarin +followed his sagacious counsels to march straight on Paris in 1652. +When he was compelled to obey the too cautious minister, and to +undertake the siege of Etampes—a timid half measure of no avail—he +raised the siege at a moment’s notice, with the decision that belongs +to great captains only, at the intelligence of the approach of Charles +of Lorraine; and the stand he made against the Duke’s army, which +prevented its junction with that of Condé, very probably saved the +royal cause. Turenne distinguished himself in the murderous fight of +St. Antoine, under the walls of Paris, and in the subsequent game of +manœuvres with Condé; and his commanding genius was again seen when a +double Spanish and Lorraine army marched towards the capital to assist +Condé, and threatened the Government with utter ruin. The Regent and +Mazarin, in the extreme of peril, wished to abandon Paris, and to fly +to Lyons; but Turenne saw that this precipitate retreat would prove +fatal to the Bourbon cause. He insisted on keeping his army on the +spot, and, standing in the path of his divided enemies, he baffled +the Spaniards on the line of the Somme, held the Duke of Lorraine +successfully at bay, and prevented either foe from joining hands with +Condé. The results of this generalship, not unworthy of the unrivalled +captain of 1814, were magical and completely decisive. Condé and his +troops were forced to leave Paris; the foreign invaders fell back to +the frontier; the young King and the Court entered the capital, to +the joy of the citizens; the Government was replaced in its seat, and +Turenne read in the nation’s eyes how he had closed the civil war and +restored the throne. In this remarkable contest he had given proof, +from first to last, of the highest faculties; but those, perhaps, which +most deserve notice are his insight in perceiving that Paris was the +centre on which to direct all efforts; his firmness in compelling the +Court to cling to the capital at any risk, and his astonishing skill in +repelling the enemies converging against him in greatly superior force.</p> + +<p>Though Mazarin had been replaced in power, Spain, in 1653, was still +able to send a larger force into the field than France. Turenne +conducted a Fabian campaign on the Oise, baffling the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_24">[24]</span> Archduke—his +foe in 1646—and taking care to avoid Condé; and he exhibited once more +what Napoleon has called “the divine side of the art of war,” in making +a stand in a strong position, where Condé had all but brought him to +bay, and imposing upon the cowed Spanish chiefs. In 1654 the reviving +strength of France began to prevail over Spain in decline. Turenne +appeared at the head of a large army, and he successfully raised the +siege of Arras, the capital of Burgundian Artois, in a night attack +of remarkable daring, in which he surprised the Austrian chief and +kept skilfully away from Condé’s lines. This was one of his greatest +exploits in the field, and France acquired a marked ascendency over her +enemies along her northern frontier. I can only refer to the next three +campaigns, in which the strategic gifts of Turenne and his admirable +firmness were again made manifest. True to his maxim, then a revelation +in war—“always march rather than make sieges”—he gradually advanced +to the Scheldt and the Lys, turning their fortresses by operations in +the field, and sitting down before them as seldom as possible; and +in less than three years he had overcome barriers<a id="FNanchor_3" href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> which hitherto +had been deemed invincible, and which had been theatres of war for +centuries without great or decisive results, a feat of generalship +which astounded Europe. The genius of Condé more than once shone out +in his efforts to avert Fate. He destroyed a part of Turenne’s army, +in the hands of an incapable colleague, at Valenciennes, in 1656; and +he brilliantly raised the siege of Cambray, an exploit marked out for +praise by Napoleon.</p> + +<p>The arms of France, however, directed by Turenne, made steady progress +despite these checks, and the fine campaign of 1658 brought the contest +with Spain to a glorious close. By this time Turenne had secured his +position in Spanish Flanders, and was formidably strong. The England of +Cromwell was in a league with France, and the allies resolved to attack +Dunkirk, the strongest place on the seaboard of Flanders, and long a +seat of piracy against British commerce. The fortress was difficult in +the extreme to master, not so<span class="pagenum" id="Page_25">[25]</span> much owing to its works and defences +as to the obstacles formed by the sea, the marshes, the woods, and +the canals which girdled it round; and it was protected by a large +Spanish force in observation not far from Ypres. Turenne crossed the +inundation let loose by the garrison, threw lines of investment round +the fortress, and blocked up the approaches along the coast. An English +fleet closed the port from the sea, and 5,000 of the renowned Ironsides +were disembarked to support the French. These operations, rapid in the +extreme for the age, surprised and disconcerted the Spanish chiefs, +and they hastily advanced to relieve Dunkirk with an army inferior in +force to the enemy, and not possessing a single gun. Turenne broke up +from his lines to attack; his left, the English contingent, rested +on the sea, covered by the batteries of the English squadron; his +centre and right formed a semi-circle, extending to the great canal +of Furnes; and as his troops advanced, Condé, it is said, exclaimed +to the young Duke of Gloucester that “all was lost.” The battle was +almost at once decided; Condé, on the Spanish left, did indeed wonders; +but the Ironsides, backed by the fire of the fleet—they were praised +by Turenne in the highest terms—annihilated the Spanish right in one +charge, and the whole Spanish army, deprived of artillery, lost heart +and became a mere mass of fugitives. The place fell, and was handed +over to England. Turenne, breaking up from his camps, took Bergues and +Gravelines, and overran the country, and he only stopped his victorious +march at Oudenarde, Spanish Flanders lying as it were at his feet. +Napoleon, however, contends that the marshal ought to have done more, +and pushed on to Brussels, success which would have brought the war +to an end; and this may be an instance, perhaps, in which Turenne’s +powerful, but somewhat slow intellect erred on the side of too prudent +caution. Yet we must bear in mind that the strategy of the seventeenth +could not be that of the nineteenth century. Turenne certainly +contemplated this very step, but declared that it was not practicable; +and, as it was, the campaign was a splendid triumph which soon brought +about the Peace of the Pyrenees.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_26">[26]</span></p> + +<p>During the next twelve years France enjoyed repose, broken only by a +brief contest with Spain, caused by the claims of Louis XIV. on the +Low Countries in right of his consort. Turenne commanded the royal +army, captured Lille, and overran Flanders; but it is unnecessary to +dwell on these easy triumphs. The marshal was now the first subject +of France and admittedly the first soldier of Europe; and he played a +part of no small importance in the able French diplomacy of the time. +He gave much attention also to civil affairs, was a disciple of the +renowned Colbert, drew up reports on the condition of France which +showed real insight and marked sagacity, and proved that he possessed +administrative powers of the highest order in provincial government. +Like nearly all the highest <i>noblesse</i> of France, he renounced +the Calvinist creed of his fathers—the will of the King was supreme +in this—but, like the illustrious Villars at a later day he condemned +the wrongs already done to the Huguenots, and ventured to utter a +weighty protest. His great work, however, at this period, was the +reorganization of the military power of France; and though Louvois +had a large share in this, Turenne is perhaps entitled to the chief +merit. His reforms were thorough and yet practical; he did not change +everything, and break with the past; but he so improved what he found +existing as to bring it to a high state of excellence, and the French +army, in his constructive hands, became a mighty instrument of war.</p> + +<p>Turenne’s method was to leave the army still largely in the hands +of the <i>noblesse</i>, and to allow it to retain a half feudal +character; but he not the less made it the force of the Crown, the +disciplined array of an all-powerful monarchy; and he so transformed +its institutions and spirit, and increased its strength, as to make +it by far the most formidable organization for war in Europe. The +<i>noblesse</i> were allowed to retain their charges, and to raise +their levies as in former days; but they were subjected to the +strictest inspection; incapable officers were summarily dismissed, and +“men in buckram” and false returns were no longer permitted to exist. +While the feudal militia still remained, every inducement was offered +to encourage the men to enter the ranks of the regular troops; the +temporary disbanding of regiments ceased;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_27">[27]</span> and select corps—need we +name the Maison du Roi, the brilliant victors on many a field?—were +carefully formed, and inspired the army as a whole with their gallant +and martial spirit. These were great reforms if they stood alone, but +the process of improvement went much further. The hierarchy of the +service had its rules changed; the general-in-chief was made supreme +in everything; the three arms and their chiefs were placed under his +immediate control in all respects, and discipline and subordination to +one head were thus secured for the first time. Unity of command caused +unity in lower spheres; the comparatively loose formations, indeed, of +battalions and squadrons were not changed, but every regiment was clad +in uniform; and care was taken that all weapons should be constructed +and fashioned on the same patterns. Strenuous efforts, again, which +reveal the strategist, were made to accelerate movements in war; the +arrays of trains and carriages were greatly increased; the system of +magazines, of depôts of food, and of field hospitals was immensely +improved, and the mechanism of the army attained a degree of perfection +never witnessed before. Yet the greatest change of all remains to be +noticed—a change, Napoleon remarks, which made this period a new era +in war. A master of his art, Turenne had perceived that infantry, +hitherto kept in the background, was naturally the most important of +the arms; it could accomplish more in his wars of marches, even in that +age, than the more prized cavalry; and Turenne trebled its force in +the French service, reducing horse to much less significance, though +cavalry still, no doubt, retained its superiority in the shock of +battle. As for artillery, Turenne went with the age; the proportion of +guns, though comparatively small as regards the other arms for modern +times, was gradually but distinctly increased.</p> + +<p>Through these immense reforms, the army of France became, for many +years, the terror of Europe; and, except that the changes wrought in +formations by the discovery of the bayonet were as yet unknown, it had +acquired a really modern aspect. An opportunity arose, in 1672, to +prove this tremendous instrument of war. Louis XIV. invaded the Dutch +Republic; the French army and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_28">[28]</span> that of his allies exceeded 130,000 +men, a force never seen since the fall of Rome; and while Turenne and +Condé, now restored to France, advanced along the Sambre and crossed +the Meuse, the allied contingent under Luxemburg moved down the Rhine +by Mayence and Cologne. True to his strategic genius, Turenne insisted, +against the advice even of the audacious Condé, on “masking” Maastricht +and pressing forward; the operations of the invading host were marked +by a celerity hitherto unknown, and in less than two months the hostile +armies had crossed the Rhine near the Waal, had attained the Yssel and +had moved into the heart of the Seven Provinces. When the victorious +French had approached Amsterdam, Condé, always great on a field of +manœuvre, entreated the King to seize the dykes, which formed the +last defence of the capital of the States; and, had this been done, +the fortunes of Europe might have taken a wholly different turn. The +golden occasion was, however, lost; time and men were wasted in taking +fortresses; and William of Orange, a sickly youth, then for the first +time seen on the stage of history, saved the Commonwealth by cutting +the dykes and letting loose floods which made Amsterdam an island in +the midst of a submerged country, and effectually baffled the French +commanders.</p> + + <div class="figcenter" id="i_b_028fp"> + <img + class="p1" + src="images/i_b_028fp.jpg" + alt=""> + <p class="p0 sm center"><i>THEATRE OF WAR</i><br> +IN<br> +THE LOW COUNTRIES</p> + </div> + +<p>This bad generalship was due to Louvois, and, it is said, was inspired +by the King, never capable in operations in the field; but Turenne +must, at least, have assented, and Napoleon severely condemns the +Marshal for giving his sanction to unwise counsels which he scarcely +could have approved in his heart. This possibly may be another instance +in which Turenne was somewhat slow and too cautious; but probably he +shrank from opposing the will of a sovereign, then almost an idol, and +a minister already hostile to him; and it is scarcely to be supposed +that a chief of his powers, in full possession of the state of affairs, +would have committed a palpable strategic error. Be this as it may, +he soon had an occasion to exhibit once more his great capacity. The +invasion of the States, and the success of Louis, had alarmed Europe +and aroused Germany; Austria and Prussia joined hands for the first +time in war; and two German armies of superior strength were marched +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_29">[29]</span>towards the Rhine and threatened Alsace. Louis abandoned Holland and +his rapid conquests; Condé was despatched to defend the Rhine, and +Turenne was placed at the head of an army intended to confront the +Germans on the Main. The Marshal had soon seen through the projects of +his foes; he judged rightly that their real purpose was to unite on the +Meuse with William of Orange, not to venture alone to enter Alsace, and +he took his course with characteristic skill. Moving into the region +around Trèves, he established himself in the valley of the Moselle, +and when the Germans, as he expected, sought to cross the Palatinate +from Mayence, he successfully kept them for weeks at bay, held back the +army of the States on the Meuse, and completely frustrated the intended +junction. This fine strategy probably saved France from an invasion +upon her weakest frontier.</p> + +<p>Louvois had now openly broken with Turenne; the King, irritated at the +reverse in Holland, took part with the imperious minister, underrating +the Marshal’s last achievement, and Turenne found little favour at +court. It was impossible, however, to question his genius; he directed +the general plan of the campaign of 1673, and he held supreme command +on the German frontier. As the Austrians and Prussians fell back from +the Moselle, they began to diverge towards the Elbe and the Danube; +Turenne saw his advantage, and crossed the Rhine, and venturing on +a winter campaign, despite the remonstrances even of the King, he +advanced to the Weser, defeated the Prussians, and drove the Austrians +far beyond the Main. Prussia abandoned the Coalition for a time, but +the Emperor refused to give up the contest, and Turenne, for the +first and last time, was out-generalled on the theatre of war by an +antagonist not unworthy of him. Montecuculi, at the head of an Imperial +army, had advanced into the Franconian lowlands, eluding Turenne, who +was on the Tauber; he gained over one of the prince bishops, made +a forced march and got over the Main, and then having made a feint +on Alsace, he embarked with his troops upon the Rhine, effected his +junction with William of Orange at Bonn, and quickly reduced that +important fortress. This, Napoleon has said, is “the darkest<span class="pagenum" id="Page_30">[30]</span> cloud +on the reputation of this great captain;” but the glory of Turenne +was not long in eclipse; and he surpassed himself in the campaign of +1674, the most striking instance, perhaps, of his powers. The success +of Montecuculi had again roused Germany; Prussia and the Lesser +States took part with the Emperor, and France was threatened with a +more formidable League than she had ever encountered before. Turenne +directed operations once more; with admirable wisdom he neglected +the North, and urged the King to invade Franche Comté, an enterprise +crowned with complete success; and he took again his station on the +Rhine, watching the masses of foes collected against him.</p> + +<p>Every movement he made in the contest that followed is a masterpiece +of a great strategist. Turenne, crossing the Rhine, advanced to the +Neckar, threw himself between the armies converging against him; and, +having routed the Austrians near Sinsheim, turned boldly against the +Northern Germans, marching from the Elbe and the plains of Brandenburg. +To gain time and to check their progress, he ravaged the Palatinate +with unflinching sternness; and though history condemns the act, and +Turenne only once adopted this course, it was justified by the laws +of war of the age—nay, by those of a much later period. The Germans +had reached Mayence by the end of August, and before long had entered +Alsace; the Imperial army was close at hand, and it was the purpose of +the Imperial chiefs to invade France with the combined forces, when the +Prussian contingent had come into line. Turenne saw the danger, and did +not hesitate; with an energy worthy of the youthful Bonaparte, he fell +on his foes before their junction, and he defeated them in a fierce +fight at Entzheim, a day memorable if it were for this only—that +Marlborough served on the marshal’s staff, and received the thanks of +his chief for his conduct. This reverse, however, only checked the +enemy; the Great Elector brought up his army. Turenne was obliged to +fall back to the Vosges, and a huge wave of Teutonic conquest seemed +about to overflow the plains of Champagne. Had the Germans pushed on +they might have reached Paris, where confusion and terror already +reigned; but they paused at the decisive moment. They seem to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_31">[31]</span> have +dreaded the strokes of Turenne, who had skilfully taken a position +on their flank, and they methodically settled in winter quarters in +Alsace, having let a grand opportunity pass. The subsequent operations +of their great adversary, in conception at least, were of the highest +order. Deceiving his enemy and scorning the hardships of winter among +the Alsatian hills, Turenne feigned to retreat into Lorraine; he then +counter-marched with remarkable quickness, defiled behind the Vosges +with a devoted army which appreciated the admirable skill of its chief, +and, having screened the movement by the mountain barrier, broke in +through the gap of Belfort on the astounded Germans, and surprised +them completely divided and scattered. The effects of this masterly +stroke were immense; the Great Elector was routed at Turckheim, Turenne +pressed forward and threatened Strasbourg, and the horde of invaders, +baffled and humbled, were only too glad to get across the Rhine.</p> + +<p>The movement behind the Vosges of Turenne which surprised the Germans +and caused their defeat has a certain resemblance, it will be +perceived, to the march of Napoleon, screened by the Alps, which after +Marengo gave him Italy. Turenne, however, the reader will note, fell on +his enemy, when he had reached him, in front, and his triumph though +great was not overwhelming; Napoleon descended on the rear of Mélas, +and, though he ran many risks, he completely conquered. Turenne, the +Emperor insists, would have achieved more had he crossed the Vosges in +the middle of the chain, and struck the flank and rear of the Germans; +in that event, the invaders, perhaps, would have never been able to +attain the Rhine. This criticism is, in theory, perfect; but though +Napoleon, in the place of Turenne, would probably have played the more +daring game, the Vosges in those days were most difficult to pass; the +operation would have been very hazardous, and the two movements, in +fact, illustrate the difference between the natures of the two men.</p> + +<p>I have reached the last campaign of Turenne, a long game of manœuvre +between two great strategists, in which the marshal perished on the +very edge of victory. The League<span class="pagenum" id="Page_32">[32]</span> against France, though shattered, +still held together; and faulty generalship having been the cause of +the signal discomfiture of 1674, Montecuculi was sent, in 1675, to cope +with Turenne, still upon the Rhine. The Imperial commander, having +threatened Philipsburg, crossed the river near Spires and invaded +Alsace; but Turenne, instead of attacking his foe, crossed the river +near Strasbourg, and, reaching Wilstedt, struck at the communications +of the hostile army; and this forced his adversary to recross the +Rhine. Turenne, having gained this strategic advantage, and carried +the war into German territory, took a position between Strasbourg and +Ottenheim, the place where he had bridged the Rhine; but Ottenheim +is at some distance from Strasbourg, and the French army was very +much divided. Montecuculi approached the Marshal’s camps, and missed +a grand opportunity to strike, which, Napoleon remarks, Condé would +have seized; Turenne, perceiving the danger, raised his bridge, placed +it near Strasbourg, and drew in his forces; and Montecuculi, again +baffled, descended the Rhine and occupied Freistett, his object being +to cross the Rhine at that point by means of a bridge, to be sent down +from Strasbourg—then, it will be borne in mind, an Imperial city—and +his ultimate end being to re-enter Alsace. Turenne, however, barred +the course of the Rhine, by redoubts and batteries carefully placed; +and having thus prevented the passage of the bridge, he, for the third +time, out-manœuvred his enemy and kept him bound with his army to +Germany. The antagonists now held their camps for some months, each +watching the other, and seeking a chance; but Turenne was the first to +move. He crossed the Rench by an undefended ford; and this movement +compelled his enemy to retreat, for it threatened his communications, +and almost reached his flank. Montecuculi, utterly foiled and +out-generalled, abandoned at once the valley of the Rhine, and made for +the defiles of Würtemberg. Turenne, hanging on his foe, pursued; and, +by the close of July, he had attained the Sassbach, assured that he +would triumph in a great and decisive battle. Fate, however, withheld +from Turenne a victory justly earned by his most able strategy. He was +struck<span class="pagenum" id="Page_33">[33]</span> down by a shot from a hostile battery, and Montecuculi escaped +from the toils which had been admirably laid around him. The Imperial +chief, indeed—a remarkable man, and in this campaign he was suffering +from disease—when apprised of the death of his renowned adversary, at +once boldly resumed the offensive. The French army, deprived of the +genius which had led it to victory for many years, was soon in full +retreat on the Rhine; and having fallen into the hands of incapable +chiefs, it was nearly involved in a crushing disaster. The history +of war has few more striking instances of what a commander is to his +troops than the reverses which, after the fall of Turenne, followed +the course of his steady success before it; and the passionate cry of +his defeated soldiery, to the worthless men who stood in his place, +“Give us Magpie”—the warrior’s charger—“to lead us!” is only an +exaggeration of a substantial truth. Montecuculi’s eulogy on Turenne is +well-known; but the offensive return which he made with confidence and +victoriously after his great rival’s death is a more expressive and a +finer epitaph.</p> + +<p>Sorrowing Ilium mourned her mighty shade; the remains of Turenne were +borne to St. Denis, and laid in the tombs of the Kings of France, an +honour never again conferred on a subject. They were spared even by +the Jacobin hands which violated the royal abodes of death in the +madness of Paris in 1793; and they now fitly rest beside those of +Napoleon. A word on the place of this great man among the masters of +the noblest of arts. The peculiar gifts of Turenne were a far-sighted +and calm intelligence, sagacity of the finest kind, and admirable +constancy and force of character, and these made him one of the first +of generals, though he did not possess, in the highest degree, the +dazzling imagination, the power of thought and of calculation, and the +astonishing energy which distinguish Napoleon and, perhaps, Hannibal. +These qualities made him a consummate strategist, few chiefs have +ever moved on a theatre of war with the perfect skill and success of +Turenne; few have known how to make grand manœuvres with as certain +results, and with equal brilliancy; and his great wars of marches, +replacing sieges, were an inspiration<span class="pagenum" id="Page_34">[34]</span> of most striking genius. As +for special illustration of his strategic powers, Turenne has been +surpassed by Napoleon alone in the art of reaching the communications +of a foe, and of operating between separate hostile masses; and he was +safer than Napoleon in these efforts, though he did not accomplish such +marvels of war. Considering the state of the art in his time, no chief +perhaps has ever achieved more than Turenne by scientific movements; +he triumphed in several campaigns by mere marches without fighting +a single battle, and yet his success was complete and decisive, as +was specially seen in 1646 and 1675. In fact, strategy made little +progress for many years after this great captain; and yet Turenne did +not quite attain the highest rank among modern strategists, for his +intellect was somewhat wanting in quickness, and his nature in what is +called the sacred fire; he let grand opportunities slip, and in three +great instances, at least, he did not do what probably might have been +accomplished by him.</p> + +<p>These defects—and genius is never perfect—made him a tactician of the +second order only; he had not Condé’s inspired thought on the field; +and for a commander of extraordinary gifts, he suffered defeat in many +instances. Yet the decision and firmness which were among his qualities +stood him in good stead, even in the conduct of troops; no general has +ever known better how to make a bold stand, and to impose on an enemy; +and it was one of his special characteristics that he could overcome +defeat, and that he was most formidable after a reverse of fortune. +For the rest, Turenne, like most great captains, had administrative +powers of the highest order; he, usually, even in his long marches, +contrived to have his army in good condition; he remodelled the +military organisation of France, and made it by far the best in +Europe; and, as an administrator, he had this distinctive merit—that +he was in advance of the ideas of his time. I must add a word on the +relations between this illustrious chief and the armies he led. Turenne +had a truly chivalrous nature; he was singularly considerate to his +lieutenants, and though he could be stern and severe when needful, he +made the largest allowance for mere<span class="pagenum" id="Page_35">[35]</span> errors, and never blamed others +for shortcomings of his own. No general has ever had more devoted +officers; and this magnanimous character was admired and recognized by +every chief who was opposed to him, by Leopold, Montecuculi, and even +the arrogant Condé. As for his troops, Turenne was most chary of their +blood, resembling Wellington in this respect; and, like Wellington +too—a regimental officer, versed in the details of professional +work—Turenne knew their wants and gave much attention to them. As has +always happened with real chiefs, Turenne fashioned his soldiers to his +own nature; they were not rapid and vehement in in his hands as they +were in those of Condé and Villars; but he made them steady, enduring, +bold, but tenacious; and their phrase, “our father,” shows how he was +beloved by them. Except for one unhappy lapse, the career of Turenne +does “honour to humanity,” to quote the words of his ablest adversary +and yet sympathetic friend.</p> + + <div class="figcenter"> + <img + class="p2" + src="images/i_050.jpg" + alt=""> + </div> + + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_36">[36]</span></p> + +<h2>CHAPTER II.<br> +<span class="subhed smcap">Marlborough.</span></h2></div> + +<p>A thorough estimate of Marlborough would fill a volume, and I must +confine myself to the military career of one described by a great +historian as “a prodigy of turpitude,” who “combined the genius of +Richelieu with the genius of Turenne.” John Churchill was born in +1650, the offspring of parents who ranked among the landed gentry +of Devon and Dorset, and who, without apparent gifts of their own, +transmitted supreme ability to two descendants. Little is known about +the first years of the boy; but the attachment he felt through life +for the Church of England was probably more due to his Cavalier birth +than to the assiduous care of a clerical tutor; and, unlike the Great +Condé, Turenne, and Villars, he was not trained to arms by constant +practice and study. It is, perhaps, mere gossip that he owed his first +commission to the shame of a sister, Arabella Churchill, the mother of +Berwick by James II.; and we might pass over his amour with Barbara +Palmer, if it did not bring out, at an early age, proof of the love of +money, which was a master vice of his richly endowed but most complex +nature. He first saw war in an admirable school, having been placed +on the staff of Turenne; he served under that great commander in the +memorable campaigns of 1672 and 1674; soon attracted the special notice +of his chief as an officer of extraordinary promise, and was publicly +thanked by him on the field of Entzheim for the cool intrepidity which +was one of his distinctive qualities. It is impossible to doubt that +this experience was of the greatest advantage to the future warrior; +and though there is a difference in the genius of <span class="pagenum" id="Page_37">[37]</span>the men, we may, +I think, trace the example of Turenne in more than one of the great +feats of Marlborough. The young, but already distinguished, soldier +in 1678 married Sarah Jennings, then a beauty of Grammont, but long +afterwards to become the Atossa of Pope’s vengeance, and the marriage, +which led to a domestic history of a most strange and eventful kind, +had a decisive effect on the fortunes alike of Churchill, of England, +and even of Europe. The pair flourished at the little Court of the Duke +of York, held in his provincial capital; and it is unnecessary to tell +how the wife became Lady of the Bedchamber to the Princess Anne, and +acquired an ascendency over the future Queen which was to be followed +by the most momentous results. During these years, Churchill first gave +proof of the diplomatic skill which, at a later time, was to make him +the master of the Grand Alliance. He negotiated some of the underhand +bargains of Charles II. with Louis XIV., designed to make England a +vassal of France, and for this and other services he obtained the +reward of a Scotch, then akin to an Irish, peerage.</p> + + <div class="figcenter" id="i_b_036fp"> + <img + class="p1" + src="images/i_b_036fp.jpg" + alt=""> + <p class="p0 sm center">MARLBOROUGH.</p> + </div> + +<p>At the accession of James II. to the throne, Lord Churchill was made +again an agent to obtain a bribe from the great Bourbon Sovereign; but +though he was raised to the English Peerage, and he really crushed the +rising of Monmouth by his direction of the Royal troops at Sedgemoor, +he was left rather in the shade during the trying time when the King +was carrying out his fatal policy against the laws, the liberties, +and the Church of England. I do not justify his desertion of James, +when at the head of his men, at a critical moment, but his guilt was +shared by the first men of the time; and if self-interest, perhaps, +was his ruling motive, the strong sympathy he certainly felt for the +Church in part, I believe, determined his conduct. He participated in +the Revolution and its spoils, was made Earl of Marlborough, and was +given a seat at the Council of Nine, which ruled England, under Mary, +in the absence of William; and he again gave proof of his military +gifts in a sharp combat in the Low Countries, in his admirable conduct +of the war in Ireland, and in his always able and successful advice. +He was already the foremost of English<span class="pagenum" id="Page_38">[38]</span> soldiers, and his genius and +promise had been recognized by more than one of the King’s veterans; +but he was never really liked by William III., and the great captain +who, had he been in command, would have changed the fortunes of +Steenkirk and Landen, was usually kept at home in a subordinate place. +Marlborough betrayed and abandoned William in turn. I shall not attempt +to excuse the act; but soaring ambition, wounded to the quick, and +the scorn of inferior men raised over his head, had probably more +to do with his conduct than alarm at the prospect of the return of +James, or a desire to place the Princess Anne on the throne; and in +judging these things, we must never forget that many of his peers and +colleagues were no less to blame, and that Revolution had destroyed +loyalty, divided allegiance, and blighted good faith in the hearts of +three-fourths of our leading statesmen. At this conjuncture, however, +one act of Marlborough stands out marked as a foul deed of shame; he +treacherously disclosed the descent on Brest, caused the death of an +honoured companion-in-arms, and involved a large British force in +destruction; and, corrupt and bad as the age was, had the crime and its +author become known, the head of the criminal would, no doubt, have +justly fallen on the block at Tower Hill. Marlborough, in fact, could +not endure his late disgrace; he feared for his life, and made up his +mind to come to terms at St. Germains, at any risk, and he sacrificed +Talmash, without scruple, in order to weaken a detested Government, and +to promote his own selfish ends.</p> + +<p>The treason of Marlborough, in the affair of Brest, was unsuspected by +the men of his time; but it is characteristic of a revolutionary age +that William ere long turned to him again, though in merited disgrace +for other offences. His ability, in fact, was necessary to the State, +and politicians had few scruples; and the diplomatist who had shown +skill and tact in the negotiations of the Stuarts with Louis XIV. +was employed, and with marked success, by the King in cementing the +Grand Alliance against the Bourbon Monarchy. On the death of William, +Marlborough received the command of the English forces destined for the +contest with France, and through the influence of Heinsius, the great +Dutch<span class="pagenum" id="Page_39">[39]</span> Minister, he was placed at the head of the armies of the States. +His reputation, already eminent, entitled him to this high position; +but almost from the first he gained an ascendency in the direction of +the military affairs of England which no other British general has +possessed. This, as is well known, was due to the complete control +his wife exercised over the Queen; Mrs. Freeman governed Mrs. Morley, +and practically nearly guided the State; and Marlborough enjoyed more +real authority than belonged to William, in England at least, until +near the end of the war of the Spanish Succession. On the other hand, +the English commander was by this time in his fifty-second year; he +had never conducted war on a great scale, though he had proved himself +to be a most able soldier, and it seemed scarcely probable that he +could cope, with success, with the trained and experienced generals +of France, brought up amidst the traditions of Turenne and Condé. No +one dreamed, when Marlborough assumed his command, that Blenheim and +Ramillies were not distant; and though the Allies had some advantages +which they did not possess in previous contests, France had hitherto +confronted Europe with success; and, as Spain and Bavaria were now on +her side, the chances seemed to be in the main in her favour.</p> + +<p>I must glance at the state of the military art at the beginning of the +war of the Spanish Succession. Since the invasion of Holland in 1672, +war had assumed ample and even vast dimensions; very large armies had +appeared in the field, and the contest which had closed at the Peace of +Ryswick had extended from the Shannon to the far wilds of Hungary. The +obstacles, to the march of troops, which had existed in the preceding +age, had been, to a certain extent, lessened; roads and agriculture had +slightly improved; and owing to the great development of the efficacy +of the attack, due to the engineering genius of Vauban, the power of +fortresses had much declined, and they could scarcely ever offer a +prolonged resistance, or permanently shield an endangered frontier. +Strategy ought, therefore, to have made distinct progress; but exactly +the contrary had been the case. No genius had appeared to turn to +account the advantages offered by the new<span class="pagenum" id="Page_40">[40]</span> conditions, and the art +had retrograded; for while all that belongs to what is material in it +conduced to its advance, the intelligence which it requires to give it +grandeur, and to rule matter, had been largely wanting. The operations +of war during the thirty years before Marlborough emerged on the scene +had been comparatively timid and slow; vast as were the masses arrayed +in the field, we see scarcely a single great combination, a remarkable +march, or a decisive battle, except in the case of the Turkish hordes; +campaigns were feebly directed and had few results; and though sieges +took much less time than formerly, armies seldom ventured to pass +fortresses, or to make daring attempts at invasion. The reason simply +was, there were no consummate chiefs; William III., Câtinat, Louis of +Baden, Luxemburg, each with special and real merits of his own, were +all generals of the second order, and the “sublime part of the art,” +in Napoleon’s language, had had no masters to bring out its splendours +since the grave had closed on Turenne and Condé. One peculiarity of the +strategy of the time deserves the attention of the careful student, +and it exhibits a marked backward tendency. The generals of the first +half of the seventeenth century had made considerable use of great +defensive lines; but Turenne had nearly exploded this system, and his +triumphs were mainly due to his masterly movements. During the period +that followed, inferior men went back to the routine of the past; as +fortresses became of less importance, huge barriers were raised to +cover frontiers, and whole campaigns were spent in manœuvres to turn or +to force these artificial obstacles. This indicates a decline in the +art, though the value of these lines was often great, and<a id="FNanchor_4" href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> it has, +perhaps, been underrated in our time.</p> + +<p>While strategy had thus, for a moment, declined, a change had passed +over the art of tactics. Armies had continued to grow in numbers, +and infantry—its importance becoming recognized—was now the arm +of greatest force on a field of battle. The bayonet, too, had been +invented, and this invention, almost a revolution<span class="pagenum" id="Page_41">[41]</span> in itself, by +degrees largely modified the old formations of the age of Gustavus, +Turenne, and Condé. The masses of pikemen and musketeers arrayed in +dense squares and close columns, were gradually replaced by extended +lines of infantry, whose weapon combined the powers of the musket and +pike; and though these lines were still deep and serried, foot, owing +to the change, covered far more ground on a given field than had been +the case formerly. The general result of these two circumstances was +that, in almost all instances, the front of battles was enlarged to an +immense extent; instead of occupying a few hundred yards, armies about +to engage filled vast spaces, and as these could scarcely ever be open +plains, and usually presented local features, such as woods, streams, +hills, and folds of the ground, it became of increased importance to +turn to account these peculiarities in any impending conflict. Skill in +tactics, accordingly, began to consist less in seizing an opportunity +to throw cavalry upon infantry exposed or broken than in so arranging +the three arms, and employing them as to derive advantage from the +special characteristics of the field; and the old order of battle, +horse on either wing, foot in the centre, and guns in front, as a fixed +system, became obsolete; and each arm began to be so disposed as to +be made most effective, having regard to the actual situation and its +accidents of place. This change, though slow, had become manifest; it +had been conspicuously seen on the great day of Zenta, where the powers +of Eugene were first displayed; and battles, though very different from +what they are now, had assumed an essentially modern aspect, troops +acting in concert, by no method of routine, but so as always best to +support each other, and to make use of the ground with this object in +view.</p> + +<p>The tactics, however, of this age, in what may be called their +subordinate parts, had little in common with those of a later period. +Cavalry was still considered the most active arm, and far the most +efficient in the shock of battle; the proportion of horsemen to foot +was still much larger than it has become in the present century, and +a general still mainly relied on cavalry for the decisive movements +that assured victory. Though infantry,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_42">[42]</span> too, had greatly increased +in numbers, and its power in action had been largely multiplied, it +was still deemed rather an arm to support, to defend, and to cover +the ground, than to strike; the old traditions still clung to it; its +lines, four deep at least, were clumsy and heavy, and did not furnish +sufficient fire; it often was formed in dense columns, and it had never +yet decided a battle by its own special and unaided efforts. As for +artillery, guns were still few, and the days of horse artillery had +not come; and though the power of the arm had been much augmented, +and its true uses had been partly ascertained, it was still in an +undeveloped state. The tactics of the day, therefore, so far as regards +the handling of the three arms, were still immature; and one of the +methods of these, the blending together in single or in successive +lines of horsemen and footmen, in an offensive movement, though often +witnessed, is now obsolete. For the rest, armies were still loosely +formed; they were still arrays of battalions and squadrons, and they +were as yet without that complete unity which has made them more +perfect instruments of war. As for discipline and equipment, little had +been changed since the grand reforms of Louvois and Turenne; armies +had become bodies of regular troops with officers, as a rule, of a +noble class; and the system of magazines, of depôts of supplies, and +of trains remained what it had been, strategic science having made no +progress. The organization of the French army was still decidedly the +best in Europe; but it had been imitated with more or less success by +more than one of the Continental armies; and the difference in this +respect was probably less than it had been thirty years previously. +As for the British army, it already possessed fine regiments, of +unsurpassed worth; but, as has always happened, it was badly organized, +and its organization, such as it was, owed much to the care of William +III.</p> + +<p>I must pass rapidly over the two first campaigns, in which Marlborough +held supreme command. The theatre of the war was the Low Countries +as, indeed, was usually the case with him; and, as Spain was now +in alliance with France, the French armies occupied the Belgian +provinces from the mouths of the Scheldt to the Lower Meuse. Either +from over-confidence, however, or<span class="pagenum" id="Page_43">[43]</span> perhaps, because the incapable +Chamillart had become his minister, Louis XIV., at the beginning of +the war, paid little attention to this frontier; and Marlborough was +largely superior in force when the campaign of 1702 opened. The object +of the British commander was to master the course of the Meuse, with a +view to gain a base for more decisive efforts; though hampered already +by the Dutch deputies, and the many impediments of a coalition, his +march was a series of easy triumphs; Venloo, Liège, and other places +fell, with Kaiserwerth on the Middle Rhine; and, if Boufflers made a +gallant resistance, he was compelled to fall back to the Upper Meuse. +Marlborough received a dukedom for these services. The recompense now +appears extravagant, and was, doubtless, largely due to the favour of +the Queen; but we must recollect that the arms of France had scarcely +ever been checked before, and for half a century had been deemed +invincible.</p> + +<p>The operations of the campaign of 1703 first distinctly brought out +the powers of Marlborough in designing great combinations of war, and +should be studied by those who deny that he possessed the gift of +strategic genius. The French had been forced back to the Upper Meuse, +but they still held most of the Belgian strongholds, and they occupied +a vast system of defensive lines, formed by the rivers and forests of +an intricate country, and extending from the Mehaigne, not far from +Namur, to the verge of Antwerp, and thence to Ostend. Marlborough +aiming, as he always did, at a vital point, and seeking to carry the +war to the frontier of France, but knowing the difficulties of a direct +attack, resolved to turn and pass this great obstacle, and thence to +advance to the French seaboard; and the measures he took to accomplish +his “great design,” as he called it, in perfectly true language, were +in the highest degree admirable. The French, largely reinforced, +held the lines and the fortresses with probably<a id="FNanchor_5" href="#Footnote_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_44">[44]</span> 130,000 men; the +strength of the allies was not 100,000, but Marlborough possessed the +immense advantage, ever to be borne in mind by an English chief, of +the mastery of the movable base of the sea, and he clearly saw how to +turn this to account. His plan, simple alike and excellent, was to hold +Boufflers, now supported by Villeroy, in check himself with the bulk +of his forces; in the meantime the lines were to be assailed by Cohorn +and Opdam with the Dutch army, and this attack was to be combined with +a descent on the coast, to be made to the south by an English fleet, +in order to harass and perplex the enemy. This grand project which, +in its conception, reveals the genius of a great captain, and which +ought to have sent the allied armies past the French lines to the Upper +Lys, was frustrated by the errors of the Dutch commanders, and by the +jealousies and intrigues too common in a league. Cohorn neglected +his mission to ravage a province; Opdam made a false and premature +movement, and before Marlborough had his grasp on his enemy, Boufflers, +leaving Villeroy in Marlborough’s front, and making a forced march +with conspicuous skill, anticipated Opdam as he approached Antwerp, +and defeated him with heavy loss at Eckeren. The “great design” had +thus been revealed and baffled; but Marlborough believed it could yet +be accomplished, and moving on Antwerp with the mass of his army, +he proposed to force the French to fight a great battle, hoping, if +successful, to get across their lines. Timid and divided counsels, +however, prevailed; the Dutch commanders refused to second their +colleague, and Marlborough, bitterly vexed, returned to the Meuse. The +capture of the small place of Huy was the only fruit of the campaign of +1703, and Marlborough was so indignant at the conduct of the Dutch that +he was on the point of throwing up his command.</p> + + <div class="figcenter" id="i_b_044fp"> + <img + class="p1" + src="images/i_b_044fp.jpg" + alt=""> + <p class="p0 sm center">THEATRE OF THE<br> +CAMPAIGN<br> +of 1704.</p> + </div> + +<p>Happily for the Grand Alliance, ambition and interest diverted +Marlborough from this hasty purpose; and the memorable campaign of +1704 was to be the most renowned of his triumphs. Bavaria had joined +France in 1703; a real chief, the illustrious Villars, had overcome +Louis of Baden on the Rhine, had marched into the Swabian lowlands, and +had defeated a German <span class="pagenum" id="Page_45">[45]</span>force on the Danube; and had the Elector of +Bavaria followed his counsels, and his colleagues in Italy given him +aid, he would have anticipated the campaign of 1805, and have ended +the war by a march on Vienna. Villars, however, was disliked at Munich +and Versailles, and, unlike Marlborough, had an unhappy temper; he was +recalled for a squabble with the Elector; and his place was filled by +the incompetent Marsin, who could not even comprehend his strategy. +Yet the situation of the Empire remained most critical; a combined +French and Bavarian army threatened the capital from the Iller and the +Inn; the insurrection of Hungary raged in the East; and Austria might +be overrun and even subdued if the grand project of Villars were ably +carried out. Eugene, the first of the Imperialist chiefs, perceived the +danger and sought to avert it; he addressed himself, not in vain, to +Marlborough; and a plan of operations was agreed between them, which, +it was hoped, would detach Bavaria from France, and at least prevent an +advance on Vienna.</p> + +<p>The situation of the belligerent armies on the theatre of war shows +that it was difficult in the extreme to give effect to any combination +of the kind. Marlborough commanded the principal force of the allies; +but he was on the Meuse far away from the Danube, and was held in +check, as it appeared, by Villeroy, with an army that ought to have +sufficed for the purpose; Tallard, at the head of a powerful army, was +on the Rhine, confronting a much weaker enemy—the contingent, in fact, +defeated by Villars—drawn within the well-known lines of Stolhoffen, +formed to prevent an attack from Alsace; and the Elector and Marsin +were in Swabia, greatly superior in force to Louis of Baden, who held +the approaches from the Black Forest. For Marlborough to attain the +heart of the Empire, through these masses of surrounding enemies, +seemed to be almost an impossible task; but he encountered the risk, +and adopted a project which, I am convinced, was a thought of Eugene’s, +for it bears the mark of his peculiar genius, in which grandeur was +combined with rashness. Breaking up from the Lower Meuse, on the 19th +of May, at the head of, perhaps, 70,000 men, increased as he advanced, +by German contingents, he crossed the Rhine and made<span class="pagenum" id="Page_46">[46]</span> for Mayence; he +then pressed forward to the Main and the Neckar, and having traversed +the Franconian plains, he reached the Danube near Ulm on the 22nd of +June, and joined hands with Louis of Baden, a movement resembling the +best of Turenne’s as regards its admirable speed and decision. His +despatches prove that he was fully aware of the peril of this audacious +march, with Villeroy in his rear and Tallard on his flank; but possibly +no other course was open; and, as always happened with him, he did not +hesitate, and he executed his task with consummate skill. Marlborough +and Baden were now immensely superior in force to the Elector and +Marsin, who, on being informed of the approach of Marlborough, had +advanced from the Iller, and attained the Danube; and the allied chiefs +did not lose an instant in turning their present advantage to account. +Leaving a considerable force to restrain the enemy, they moved down the +Danube quickly to Donauwörth; and after a fierce and well-contested +struggle stormed the heights of the Schellenberg covering the town, +and became masters of the course of the river. Within a few days, the +victorious army was overrunning the Bavarian plains and harrying them, +after the fashion of the age, in order to force the Elector to yield; +Marlborough having completely transformed the situation for a time by +operations which had astounded Europe.</p> + +<p>While Marlborough had thus attained and overcome the Danube, what +had been the conduct of the French commanders he had left behind on +the Meuse and the Rhine? Villeroy had nearly 40,000 men in hand; +the army of Tallard, even allowing for a detachment sent in the +spring to Marsin, must have been about 45,000 strong; and had these +chiefs been capable men, they ought to have prevented Marlborough’s +movement, though, it is fair to remark, they were bound and hampered +by injudicious orders from Versailles. Had they combined their armies +and crossed the Rhine, they ought easily to have carried the lines of +Stolhoffen—these did not stop Villars a few years afterwards—and +crushed the feeble army of defence; and they then ought to have been +able to have forestalled Marlborough, in what was a strategic flank +march of extreme risk, to have at least fallen on his communications +between<span class="pagenum" id="Page_47">[47]</span> the Neckar, the Main, and the Danube, and to have perhaps +compelled him to fight in positions where the loss of a battle would +have been ruinous. Villeroy and Tallard, however, were not great +chiefs; they marched and counter-marched, lost many weeks, and allowed +their enemy to pass them by; and it was only in July, when Marlborough +and Baden were, we have seen, in the heart of Bavaria, that they took +anything like a decided course. Their armies, before united, were now +again divided; Villeroy crossed the Rhine to observe the lines of +Stolhoffen, occupied now by Eugene, at the head of, perhaps, 30,000 +men; and Tallard made for the Black Forest, with a force probably +35,000 strong, in order to join hands with the Elector and Marsin.</p> + +<p>The junction was effected on the 4th of August, not far from the +central town of Augsburg, and the collected armies must have formed +a mass of nearly 70,000 men at least, for the most part troops of +the best quality. Meanwhile, Villeroy had altogether failed to hold +Eugene along the Rhine in check; that great captain, when aware of +the movement of Tallard, resolved to give support to Marlborough and +Baden, already menaced by the combined enemies; and he broke up from +his lines and flew to the Danube, with a force of about 15,000 men, +having left a detachment to keep back Villeroy, and having baffled that +most worthless commander. He was at Höchstedt on the 8th of August—the +scene of the victory gained by Villars—and, leaving his small force on +the northern bank, he crossed the Danube to confer with Marlborough, at +the time at Aichach, to the north-east of Augsburg. A grand opportunity +was offered again to the French, who, in this campaign, seemed always +to miss the occasion. The combined Bavarian and French armies were, +at this moment, quite near Höchstedt; and had they made a rapid and +decisive movement, they might have crushed the isolated wing of Eugene, +and have placed Marlborough, who had been left by Baden, in order to +make the siege of Ingoldstadt, in a position of the most critical kind, +in a hostile country, with an enemy on his flank, and separated from +his base on the Danube. Tallard, Marsin, and the Elector, however, +paused; they crossed the Danube, indeed, at<span class="pagenum" id="Page_48">[48]</span> Lauingen; but they did not +attempt to fall on Eugene; and Marlborough, meanwhile—he clearly saw +his danger—marched with extraordinary speed from Aichach, and came +into line with his daring colleague, west of Donauwörth on the 11th of +August. The allied chiefs decided to attack the enemy, who, by this +time, was in a strong position, in a region of marsh and forest, where +the stream of the Nebel falls into the Danube through a plain bounded +by the villages of Lützingen and Blenheim. Less confident men would +hardly have run the risk, for the hostile army already threatened the +line of their communications northwards; and a serious defeat might +have been destruction.</p> + +<p>I can only describe in faint outline the great and decisive battle +that followed. By the early dawn of the 13th of August, the allied +army had passed the defiles which lead through Dapfheim into the +plain of the Nebel, and began to take up its positions for attack. +Marlborough and Eugene had hoped to surprise the enemy, and Tallard +and Marsin were really unprepared; in fact, with the Elector, they +thought that the allies were falling back on Nördlingen, on the line of +their communications with the Main. The French and Bavarians, however, +were soon ready; but some hours passed before the hostile armies had +joined in the actual shock of battle. Each was from 55,000 to 60,000 +strong; but the French and Bavarian army, a veteran force, was probably +a better instrument of war than the composite masses of many races +collected under the allied standards. The dispositions, however, of the +French marshals were essentially bad, and gave the great commanders +opposed to them a distinct advantage. Tallard and Marsin seem to have +been convinced that the Nebel, which ran across their front, was +impassable or could be passed only by an enemy with extreme difficulty; +and that if Lützingen and Blenheim, with the neighbouring village of +Oberglau, were held in strong force, the allies, should they advance +on the Nebel, would be stopped at the centre by a powerful obstacle, +and on either wing could be easily repelled. They divided their army +accordingly into two masses, each, it would seem, of nearly equal +force; and while they crowded their right wing at Blenheim, and +placed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_49">[49]</span> large bodies of men at Oberglau, and at Lützingen on their +left wing, their extended centre was weakly occupied by a long line +of cavalry only, supported by an insignificant body of footmen. This +conception was altogether ill-founded; the obstacle of the Nebel was +not very great, and were it once forced it would fare ill with the +thin and ill-guarded French centre, and even with the wings—with the +right especially, cooped up in Blenheim and close to the Danube. The +vice of the arrangement, there is reason to believe, was perceived +by Marlborough almost at once; the masses of the allied army were so +arrayed as to be ready to assail the hostile centre; and Tallard, who +commanded the French right, when he saw this, it is said, asked Marsin, +who was in command of the French left, to send reinforcements to the +threatened point, but only received an angry refusal.</p> + +<p>The battle began at about 9 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, Marlborough attacking +Blenheim from the allied left, while Eugene made a circuitous march +on the right; and the attack on Blenheim—which, I conceive, was a +feint only to deceive the enemy—was repulsed with no inconsiderable +loss. At about noon, when he had been made aware that Eugene was +engaged with Marsin, Marlborough made a first great effort against +the French centre; and a mass of cavalry, formed in two lines, with a +mass of infantry in their front and their rear, was launched forward +to cross the Nebel. The French horsemen, however, were not wanting +to themselves; they fell with terrible effect on the hostile array +as it was entangled and confused in the passage; and though part of +Marlborough’s troops succeeded in the attempt, they were held to the +spot and made no progress. Meanwhile, a secondary allied attack on +Oberglau had altogether failed; and though Marlborough’s presence +restored the contest, it has been thought that had Tallard and Marsin +co-operated at this moment in a counter-attack, the French and +Bavarian army might have won a victory. Eugene, however, who, with an +inferior force, had held Marsin in check by prodigious efforts, sent +a detachment to the aid of his colleague, and about 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> +Marlborough was once more free to strike what he had seen from the +first was the vulnerable point in the hostile position. Massing +footmen and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_50">[50]</span> horsemen once more together, he hurled them against the +French centre; and though the French cavalry fought to the last, their +weak support of infantry gave way, and the centre yielded to the +overwhelming pressure. The victorious army, with Marlborough at its +head, was now master of the whole position of its foes; and turning in +full force against the French right, shut up in Blenheim and pressed +against the Danube, it compelled it, almost at once, to surrender. +Marsin and the Elector, who, unlike Eugene, had done nothing to aid a +companion in arms, contrived to effect their retreat in safety; but +an accident only averted their ruin. The loss of the victors was, +probably, from 11,000 to 12,000 men; that of the French and Bavarians +was 40,000; and the routed army was, in fact, destroyed.</p> + +<p>This splendid campaign, decisive as it was, cannot be deemed a +strategic masterpiece. The project of the march from the Meuse to the +Danube, with Villeroy in the rear and Tallard on the Rhine, was too +hazardous to deserve high praise;<a id="FNanchor_6" href="#Footnote_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> and Eugene, I repeat, was, I +think, its author, though Marlborough is, of course, responsible for +it. Had Condé been in the place of Villeroy, and Turenne held the staff +of Tallard, Marlborough, I believe, would not have attained Donauwörth, +and the great campaign of 1704 would have probably had a different +issue. Remarkable, too, as was the skill of Eugene in eluding Villeroy, +and pushing on to the Danube, in order to join his colleague, he ought +not to have left an isolated detachment in little force within reach +of an enemy fourfold in strength; and had Tallard and Marsin been real +chiefs, they would have crushed Eugene and have placed Marlborough in +extreme peril, when he stood alone and inferior in force in his camp +at<a id="FNanchor_7" href="#Footnote_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> Aichach. Apart, however, from these risks and mistakes, Eugene +and Marlborough, especially the last, carried out their plans with<span class="pagenum" id="Page_51">[51]</span> +consummate ability. The march from the Meuse, by the Main, to the +Danube, was a prodigy of execution for the age; the advance to the +Schellenberg was rapid and brilliant; and the forced march from Aichach +to join Eugene was admirable for its quickness and boldness. The +decision, too, to give battle at Blenheim was characteristic of great +captains; it was hazardous, but a retreat would have lost the whole +fruits of a successful campaign, and very probably would have been +fatal.</p> + +<p>Nevertheless, it is upon the field of Blenheim that Marlborough’s +genius becomes most manifest. With that perfect insight which never +failed him, he at once perceived what was false and defective in the +disposition of the hostile army. He concentrated his forces against +the one weak point; and though he was beaten back and even placed +in danger, he never relaxed his efforts, carrying out his purpose +with inflexible constancy and calm firmness until he had pierced the +enemy’s centre, and made a decisive victory certain. Here we see the +development of what we may call the new tactics in full perfection. +Tallard and Marsin did not comprehend the ground, and unskilfully +arrayed their troops upon it. Marlborough took in the situation at +a glance, and so conducted the battle that an overwhelming mass was +brought to bear on the decisive spot. Nothing, too, could have been +more admirable than the loyalty of Eugene to his colleague; but for +his support Marlborough might have lost the battle; and the result of +Blenheim was, in fact, due to the unrivalled tactics of the one chief +and the chivalrous and unselfish zeal of the other. As for the French +Marshals, the arrangements they made might have succeeded against +inferior men; but, if formidable in appearance they were radically bad; +though Tallard of the two is the least to blame, for he understood the +mistake that was made; and Marsin deserves the severest censure for +disregarding Tallard’s advice, and for neglecting all through to send +him assistance—a too characteristic fault of the warriors of France. +The conduct of the allied army was such as great chiefs almost always +obtain from the troops they lead. English, Austrians, and Prussians +fought like heroes; but the French and Bavarians had perhaps the +better army—and the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_52">[52]</span> French cavalry made magnificent efforts, if the +surrender at Blenheim betrays the weakness of the French soldier in the +hour of defeat. Blenheim, in truth, was a general’s not a soldier’s +battle; the triumph of genius in command, not of mere valour.</p> + +<p>Blenheim saved the Empire, and set Germany free; and the defeated army, +a shattered wreck, reaching the Rhine in fragments, fled into Alsace. +Having cleared the German bank of the river, the Allies sat down +before the great place of Landau, which covered the approaches to the +French frontier; but, though the fortress made an heroic resistance, +Marlborough had entered the Palatinate by the close of autumn, had +seized the important points of Trarbach and Trêves, and had secured a +base for the invasion of France. Everything, he hoped, would be ready +by the early spring—armies still seldom held the field in winter—and +his purpose was to advance into Lorraine by the valleys of the Moselle +and the Sarre, with an army of 100,000 men formed of contingents of +many nations, the line long afterwards marked out by Gneisenau, and +followed by Moltke in 1870. This indicates a true strategic eye; and, +in fact, in strategy as well as in tactics Marlborough always detected +the fault in the cuirass, and seized the vulnerable point on the scene +before him. The great Englishman, however, had not the good fortune of +the renowned Dane many years afterwards. Marlborough was not seconded +as Moltke was. Louis of Baden, who on the field of manœuvre held the +place of the Crown Prince of Prussia in August 1870, refused to move +even a man from the Rhine; and though Marlborough advanced to the +Moselle, in the early summer of 1705, in order to force the hand of his +colleague, he had not sufficient force to make a decisive movement. +Marlborough, too, had a very different man to cope with from Napoleon +III.; his antagonist was Villars, already proved to be incomparably the +greatest of living French chiefs, and destined to justify the proud +title of “Invincible,” given by a grateful Sovereign. The operations of +Villars were able in the extreme; assailing the heads of Marlborough’s +columns, but taking care to cover his own flanks, he retreated to the +well known position of Sierk, resting on the Moselle and a chain of +heights,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_53">[53]</span> and he calmly awaited the victor of Blenheim. The hostile +armies were each about 50,000 strong—the Memoirs of Villars are +incorrect in making out that his foe had 80,000 men; but Marlborough, +deprived of the support of Baden, did not venture to risk an attack, +and, after waiting some days, he recoiled, baffled, and fell back to +the country round Trêves. He was so angry that he sent a message to +Villars to explain the cause of his retreat; but though his colleague +was wholly to blame, Villars had gained his object and had saved France +from an invasion which might have ended the war.</p> + +<p>Marlborough was ere long recalled to the theatre which had been the +scene of his first exploits. Villeroy by this time had returned to the +Meuse with an army greatly strengthened since the year before, and, at +the head of about 70,000 men, he had retaken Huy, advanced down the +Meuse, and seized the important town of Liège. Terror now prevailed in +the councils of the States; their chief commander, Auverquerque, had +been defeated; and Marlborough was compelled to break up from Trêves, +to abandon the hope of invading France, and to try to restore the war +in the Low Countries. He had joined Auverquerque by the first week of +July, and he instantly assumed a bold offensive at the head of about +60,000 men. Villeroy, a noisy braggart and an incapable chief, was +out-manœuvred and lost Huy; and he had soon fallen back to the great +French lines extending across Belgium from the Mehaigne to the sea, +which had been the scene of operations in 1703. Marlborough, despite +a protest of the Dutch deputies—they hampered him in all his great +movements—resolved, to master and pass the obstacle; he marched +across the well-known field of Landen, which had witnessed Luxemburg’s +brilliant triumph, and deceiving Villeroy by well-designed feints, he +forced the lines near Tirlemont on the Gheete, winning a bloody combat, +and taking many prisoners. The beaten army fell back to the Dyle, in +the hope of covering Louvain and Brussels, but Marlborough crossed the +stream at Genappe; and on the 18th of August he was about to assail +the French in position not far from Waterloo—a village then wholly +unknown to fame—when once more Dutch fears and jealousies prevented +his fighting a decisive battle. He was again<span class="pagenum" id="Page_54">[54]</span> so indignant that he +wrote to England, declaring that he would leave his command; and his +operations, in truth, had been shamefully thwarted. Deserted by Baden +in the beginning of the year, he had failed in his project of invading +France; crossed by the Generals and Commissioners of the States, he +had not been able to bring Villeroy to bay, and the only result of the +campaign of 1705, which might have seen the Allies on the Marne and +the Seine, was the capture of the French lines in Belgium, a result +important indeed, but not very remarkable.</p> + +<p>Marlborough spent the winter of 1705–6 in visiting crowned heads of +the Grand Alliance; a master of diplomacy as well as of war, he threw +the spell of commanding genius over the King of Denmark and the King +of Prussia, and secured pledges of support for the ensuing campaign. +He had been so ill-treated by the States that he wished to invade the +South of France in 1706, in concert with his loyal colleague, Eugene; +and it would be a curious speculation whether this effort, which failed +in his absence in 1706–7, and has never yet been attended with success, +would have succeeded had Marlborough been in command. He was, however, +induced to return to the Low Countries, and he advanced towards the +Meuse to threaten Namur, a great strategic point for a march into +France, with an army of about 60,000 men. With the infatuation that +befalls despots, Louis XIV. still had faith in Villeroy, and though +deprived of the protection of the lines, the Marshal was ordered to +take the offensive. Villeroy was advancing towards Leuwe with an army +equal in numbers, at least, to that of his foe, when he met Marlborough +on his march southwards, in a country of marsh, woodland, and low +hills, between the Mehaigne and the lesser Gheete, crowned by the +insignificant village of Ramillies.</p> + + <div class="figcenter" id="i_b_054fp"> + <img + class="p1" + src="images/i_b_054fp.jpg" + alt=""> + <p class="p0 sm center">THEATRE OF<br> +THE<br> +CAMPAIGNS<br> +in<br> +Belgium and North of France.</p> + </div> + +<p>A few words must suffice to trace the incidents of the great battle +that followed. On the 23rd of May 1706, the French army, with a +Bavarian wing—the Elector still clung to the fortunes of France—was +seen arrayed on a range of upland, extending from near the course of +the Mehaigne to beyond the little Gheete, on the hill of St. André, +the villages of Ramillies and Autre Eglise, and a morass formed by the +Gheete and its feeders, covering the position across <span class="pagenum" id="Page_55">[55]</span>three-fourths +of its front. Villeroy had formed his army into two masses, his right +nearly upon the Mehaigne, but strongly occupying an old Roman road +which led across the plain in a line with the river, his centre and +left along the marshes of the Gheete; and he held Ramillies and Autre +Eglise as fortified outposts. The position seemed formidable, as at +Blenheim, but the eagle eye of Marlborough saw at a glance that his +enemy’s arrangements had two marked defects, and that able manœuvring +would assure him victory. Villeroy’s centre and left, especially the +left, covered by an impassable swamp, was not assailable; but neither +could he attack that side; and Marlborough held the chord of the arc in +front of the French Marshal’s position. Marlborough prepared his battle +with that unerring judgment which scarcely ever forsook him in war; and +the result was a splendid and complete triumph. The English chief began +by a feint against the French left, which, of course, was repelled +without difficulty; but it had the effect which Marlborough hoped for; +Villeroy detached from his right to support his left, weakening thus +his army at the real point of attack. Marlborough fell once more on the +French left, in order to distract the attention of his foe; and then, +turning his shorter line to account, and moving rapidly a great body +of troops unseen by Villeroy, behind a hill and a wood, he struck the +French right in overwhelming force, his men threefold in numbers, at +the critical point, pressing forward along the Roman causeway into the +very heart of the hostile position. The French centre and left, held +bound to the spot, and scarcely able to move, saw the battle lost, and +made few efforts to avert defeat; and though the French right fought +well for a time, the resistance was not like that at Blenheim, for +the French soldier had lost the moral power of success. The villages +of Ramillies and Autre Eglise were quickly stormed, without heavy +loss; and the French right was ere long overpowered, and fled from +the field in despair and rout. Villeroy’s centre and left, being not +assailable, drew off for a time in fair order; but the contagion +of defeat soon affected the men, and his whole army became a horde +of fugitives, abandoning guns and standards, and were captured by +thousands. Marlborough<span class="pagenum" id="Page_56">[56]</span> followed up his victory with the strokes of a +master; he was free to act and he achieved wonders; and in a few days +at most the whole of Belgium and its fortresses had become his spoils. +Brussels, Ghent, Antwerp, and even Ostend fell with a rapidity for that +age surprising; the French, hopelessly demoralized, made no stand, and, +before the autumn had closed, the allied standards had been carried +to the Lys and the Scheldt, and waved ominously near the frontier of +France.</p> + +<p>I would select Ramillies as the most distinctive and characteristic +of Marlborough’s battles. Eugene shares the honours of Blenheim with +him, and the issue hung in suspense at Blenheim; but Ramillies was +a masterpiece all his own, and the victory was never for a moment +doubtful. The day was won by a single stroke of tactics; and here +again we see the peculiar excellence of Marlborough in the highest +perfection, his genius in taking advantage of the ground, and in +turning to account the faults of his enemy. France seemed fallen after +the campaign of 1706, marked, not only by this immense disaster, but +by Eugene’s grand campaign on the Po, through which the French were +expelled from Italy; yet the exhausted nation suddenly made one of +those prodigious and heroic efforts which have so often astounded +Europe. Berwick, a nephew of Marlborough, and in war a Churchill, +reconquered Spain in the great fight of Almanza; and an attempt to +invade Provence and to besiege Toulon, though conducted by Eugene, +completely failed. Meanwhile Louis XIV., taught at last by misfortune, +had replaced Villeroy in his command by Vendôme, a man of many gifts +and many evil qualities; and the King strained the resources of his +realm to the utmost to make head against his foes in the Low Countries. +Vendôme took the field with about 100,000 men; Marlborough certainly +was inferior in force; and the campaign of 1707 was spent in manœuvres +between the Lys, the Scheldt, and the Sambre, with little results.</p> + +<p>I shall only glance at the campaign of 1708, for though Marlborough +gained a succession of triumphs, it was less marked, perhaps, by his +peculiar genius than by the fatal dissensions of the French chiefs, +and the profound demoralization of the French army. Vendôme recovered +Ghent, and the line of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_57">[57]</span> Lys; he even passed the Scheldt, and +advanced to the Dender, and though he failed to capture Oudenarde, +he held a favourable position when he confronted Marlborough on the +Dender, in the first days of July. He was embarrassed, however, by +a fatal burden; the Duke of Burgundy, rather a monk than a soldier, +shared with him an ill-defined command; and the Duke insisted on +falling back to the Scheldt, renouncing the initiative with timid +weakness. Marlborough by this time had been joined by Eugene, who +had moved from the Moselle into Belgium; and the two chiefs advanced +to the relief of Oudenarde, resolved, if possible, to fight a great +battle. The march of the French had been extremely slow, owing to the +bickerings of the Duke and Vendôme; but they were collected upon the +Scheldt near Gaveren; and they ought to have made the Allies rue an +audacious attempt to cross the river. The divided chiefs, however, sent +forward only a weak detachment to dispute the passage. This was cut +to pieces after a short struggle; and Marlborough and his colleague +bridged the Scheldt under the beard, so to speak, of the ill-directed +enemy. The hostile armies met, on the 11th of July, in a region of +plain and forest outside Oudenarde. Each was probably about 70,000 +strong; and the fortunes of France were once more marred by timidity +and divided counsels. Marlborough had gained ground on the French +right, when Vendôme wished to attack from his left, but the Duke of +Burgundy had resolved to fall back; and though the retreat began in +good order, the French troops, hard pressed and wretchedly led, broke +up by degrees in ignominious flight. The defeated army was unable to +rally until it had found a refuge near Ghent; and Marlborough and +Eugene, pressing boldly forward, overran the country between the Lys +and the Scheldt, and sate down before the vast stronghold of Lille. +I cannot dwell on the great siege that followed, the most remarkable +of the whole contest. Lille was a place of extraordinary strength. It +was defended by Boufflers with a large garrison; it was surrounded by +neighbouring friendly fortresses, and it had the support of the army +that had fought at Oudenarde, and of another army of relief which, +under Berwick, had followed the steps of Eugene from the Moselle. To +capture<span class="pagenum" id="Page_58">[58]</span> such a stronghold appeared impossible—Vendôme ridiculed the +very notion, and yet Marlborough and Eugene accomplished the task, +though Boufflers made an heroic resistance. This undoubtedly was in +a great measure due to the ability and daring of the allied chiefs. +Eugene clung to the fortress with tenacious constancy, and Marlborough +gave proof of extraordinary resource in covering the siege and in +maintaining his communications open through all kinds of obstacles. Yet +Lille would probably not have fallen but for the animosities of the +French commanders. Vendôme openly quarrelled with the Duke of Burgundy, +and Berwick sullenly stood aloof from both; and the two armies of +relief did almost nothing. The moral power, too, of the French soldiery +was fatally injured by these disputes and failures; and when Lille +fell, the war seemed about to close in a triumphant march of the Allies +on Paris.</p> + +<p>At this crisis, indeed, the condition of France was such as might +have made even men like Richelieu and Turenne begin to despair. The +convulsive effort of 1707 had failed; the Allies were on the verge of +Artois; and the Monarchy in decline, and the exhausted nation seemed +unable to confront the mass of their enemies. Yet Louis XIV. did not +lose heart; he refused the insolent proposals of the Dutch to take up +arms against his own grandson, and he appealed, not in vain, to an +heroic people. Recruits flocked in thousands to defend the lilies; +the misery, in truth, and the prostration of France, increased the +numbers that joined her armies; but everything that constitutes +organized force—supplies, depôts, and magazines, were wanting. The +King, however, throwing prejudice aside, at last confided the army +on his northern frontier to the one commander who had never failed +in the calamitous war of the Spanish Succession. History and gossip +have alike been unjust to Villars; he was ridiculed in England and +hated at Versailles, but he was a general of extraordinary powers, +for he combined almost in the highest degree the great faculties of +Turenne and Condé. Yet when Villars, in the spring of 1709, assumed the +command of his master’s army, he was almost appalled at the prospect +before him; he was at the head of perhaps 100,000 men, but he was so +ill supplied that he could<span class="pagenum" id="Page_59">[59]</span> make no movement. It is on occasions like +these that French soldiers, when ably directed, show at their best. +Villars in a few weeks had obtained the means of operating with some +hope of success, and he had breathed into his troops that extreme +self-confidence which was one of his most distinctive qualities. By the +early summer he was in positions of formidable strength, in the space +between the heads of the Lys and the Scheldt, and covering the low +ranges overlooking Artois; and he had protected himself with defensive +lines that extended almost from the feeders of the Scheldt to the sea. +Marlborough and Eugene were now at the head of from 110,000 to 120,000 +men, and Marlborough, with true strategic insight, proposed to turn +the French lines by the coast, combining the attack with a descent on +Boulogne, supported by British troops and a fleet, and then, passing +the Somme and masking its fortresses, to press forward boldly to the +capital of France. This was a recurrence to the “great design” of +1703, and worthy of a chief of supreme genius; and it is an additional +proof that Marlborough perceived, with perfect clearness, the immense +importance to an English army of the command of the sea. The Dutch +deputies, however, refused to sanction a movement they doubtless could +not understand; and Eugene, I believe, agreed with them, for, as we +shall see, he had formed a plan of quite a different kind to invade +France. The Allies had now “to take the bull by the horns,” and to +enter France through the network of fortresses, of rivers, canals, +and intricate woodland, which still covers her northern frontier; and +issuing from Lille in great strength, they proceeded to invest the +stronghold of Tournay, in order to secure and widen their base. The +place fell after a weak resistance, and Marlborough and Eugene now +turned against Mons, still pursuing the same methodical warfare, and +hoping to master the line of the Sambre. This was too much for Villars, +who would have been placed in extreme difficulty had the Allies gained +the heads of the Sambre without a contest. He issued from his lines +in the first week of September, and by the 10th he had taken a strong +position in a wide opening between two masses of woodland, not far from +the beleaguered fortress, which overlook the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_60">[60]</span> heathy plain and the +hamlet of Malplaquet, ever since a great name. He fortified ground, +naturally perilous to attack, with all the resources of the art of the +engineer; and he boldly awaited the advance of the enemy.</p> + +<p>The allied chiefs had meant to attack Villars before he had made these +formidable lines; but, as usual, they were crossed by the deputies +of the States, and the result proved how disastrous had been their +meddling. In the early dawn of the 11th of September, Marlborough and +Eugene put their army in motion, and the French army was soon descried +holding a position which has been aptly described as “an infernal +gulf surrounded by fire.” The French right and left were respectively +covered by the woods of Lanière and of Taisnière, which crescent-like +converged towards each other; the wood of Sart spread beyond that of +Taisnière; and the French centre holding the space between, in the +opening that leads to the plain of Malplaquet, was massed behind a +triple line of entrenchments, with apertures to allow the free use of +cavalry. The position, in short, was of extraordinary strength, and it +was held by troops who, under the spell of Villars, ably seconded by +the gallant Boufflers, who had volunteered to assist his colleague, +were animated by heroic ardour. Yet Marlborough and Eugene did not +hesitate; and they marshalled their forces for the most desperate and +best contested struggle of the war, in which princely soldiers from +all the lands of Europe took part, like knights in a tournament to +the death. The numbers on each side were not far from equal,<a id="FNanchor_8" href="#Footnote_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> the +Allies having a slight advantage—about 100,000 to 90,000 men; but, +prodigiously strong as its position was, the French army, crowded with +rude levies, could not be compared as an efficient force with the +victorious legions of many campaigns, and the allied chiefs possibly +trusted too much to an inferiority repeatedly proved.</p> + +<p>The plan of Eugene and Marlborough seems to have been to turn the +French left and to force the left centre, making only a secondary +effort against the right; and Eugene, after<span class="pagenum" id="Page_61">[61]</span> a prolonged contest, +fairly expelled the enemy from the wood of Sart. The Prince, supported +by Marlborough in force, now advanced upon the wood of Taisnière, and +a murderous struggle kept fortune in suspense, until Villars, drawing +a body of troops from his centre, drove back Eugene in a furious +onslaught, conspicuous for the valour of the Irish exiles,<a id="FNanchor_9" href="#Footnote_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> “ever and +everywhere, true” to the Bourbon lilies. The situation of the Allies +was now critical, when a wound deprived the French of the genius of +their chief; and as the detachment made by Villars had weakened their +line to a considerable extent—he was hurrying to the endangered +point when he fell—Marlborough, seizing the occasion with his +wonted judgment, made a tremendous attack on the enemy’s centre. The +first range of entrenchments was ere long carried, but the obstacles +presented by the lines behind, and the heroism of the defence, kept the +issue doubtful. A magnificent effort made by the household troops of +France for a time forced the assailants back; and even when the inner +entrenchments were won the French centre prolonged the still undecided +battle. Meanwhile the false attack on the French right had been turned +into an attack in full force. The Prince of Orange, carried away by +excitement, advanced along the wood of Lanière, and tried to storm the +hostile entrenchments in front, and his troops were literally mown +down in thousands by enemies who suffered little loss. The battle was +raging until 3 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, when a flank movement, most skilfully +made by Eugene, outside the verge of the wood of Taisnière, began to +endanger the French left, and threatened the only line of retreat; and +this caused Boufflers, now in supreme command, to draw gradually off +from the scene of carnage. The Allies, utterly worn out, and cruelly +stricken, made no attempt to molest the enemy, and the French fell back +a few miles only, in perfect order, and not the least disheartened. +Villars, it is said, exclaimed from his litter, that “he expected his +army to fight again, as soon as it had had a moment of repose.”</p> + +<p>Marlborough and Eugene won this terrible battle, the greatest<span class="pagenum" id="Page_62">[62]</span> by far +of the eighteenth century, in what may be called a military sense; +for the French army retired from the field, and Mons fell a few weeks +afterwards. But it was not an inconsiderate boast of Villars that +Malplaquet was truly a Pyrrhic victory; the Allies lost fully 20,000 +men, the French probably not half that number; the Dutch contingent +never recovered from the fight; and the frightful slaughter of the +allied soldiery provoked angry discontent in England, and sent a thrill +of alarm through the enemies of France. Eugene and Marlborough, in the +actual battle, displayed as usual their great powers; but the whole +enterprise was, perhaps, too hazardous; and if, as has been alleged, +Marlborough chose to fight in order to keep up the war party at home, +he was justly punished for an unprincipled act, for Malplaquet shook +the Grand Alliance to its base. Villars showed admirable skill in +choosing his ground, and strengthening a naturally strong position, +and in arranging his troops upon it; he, too, was a master of the new +tactics, and he would not improbably have repulsed his foes had he not +been disabled at a critical moment. As it is, Malplaquet does him the +highest honour; it is a proof of his extraordinary gifts, that, with an +army inferior in every respect, he should have inflicted losses on the +allied army at least twofold greater than that of his own, and that he +successfully stemmed the tide of misfortune which had for years set in +against France.</p> + +<p>I shall merely refer to the two campaigns of 1710 and 1711, for +Marlborough is not their real hero, and his great qualities, though +seen in them, do not appear in their accustomed splendour, owing to +adverse circumstances which combined against him. He was supported +by Eugene in the first of these years; and the allied chiefs, in the +absence of Villars, forced the lines he had made the year before, and +invested and took the place of Douay, on the second line of the French +fortresses of the north. Villars, however, though still suffering from +his wound, was in command by the end of May, and he constructed a new +great defensive barrier, extending from the Scarpe to the neighbourhood +of Boulogne, and adding enormously to the many obstacles of a region +already protected by nature and art. The Allies reached<span class="pagenum" id="Page_63">[63]</span> the lines, +and Eugene, as was his wont, for a daring exploit, gave his voice +for an attack in force; but the Dutch, remembering Malplaquet, held +back; Marlborough, it is believed, agreed with them, and the two great +captains had to content themselves with taking Bethune, St. Vénant, +and Aire, little places around the head of the Lys, which cost them +thousands of their best soldiers. Villars, meanwhile, showed little +sign of life; but he kept on extending his lines until they formed an +immense position of defence, spreading from the coast to the heads of +the Sambre; and he boasted, not, we shall see, in vain, that the enemy +should advance no further. In 1711 Marlborough had not Eugene with him, +but he was at the head of a very large army; and the campaign was spent +in a game of manœuvres, in which Villars and he were fairly matched. +The Englishman succeeded at last in forcing the lines, which were too +long to be covered at all points; but the capture of the insignificant +place of Bouchain was the only prize of immense efforts; and though +the wits of Versailles and St. James’s cried scorn at the <i>ne plus +ultra</i> of Villars, that great chief had really attained his object, +and had successfully shielded the French frontier. These campaigns, +in fact, have been misdescribed by English partisans in Marlborough’s +interest. The true victor was, beyond dispute, Villars; he had +compelled the Allies to waste their strength in sieges, which simply +had no results; he had proved himself to be a master in defence, as +remarkable as he had been in attack; and, combining genius in politics +and war, he had gained for France what she needed, time to dissolve the +Grand Alliance already weakened. It would be unfair, however, to say +that Marlborough was wanting to himself in this contest; as a military +exploit, his forcing the lines of Villars was an admirable feat; but, +in truth, he was circumscribed and baffled by the turn which affairs +had for some time been taking in England and upon the Continent. He +had for years been almost supreme in England, and had had full control +over her resources for war; but Sarah Jennings and Anne Stuart had +quarrelled; Mrs. Masham had crept to the ear of the Queen; Malplaquet +had aroused a storm in England; the Ministers in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_64">[64]</span> power sought means +to destroy him; he received no real support from the Whigs; and he had +become the object of grave charges, partly the clamours of faction, +but, in part, well founded. On the other hand, France had triumphed in +Spain; the success of Villars had saved her in the north; the Dutch and +the English had had enough of war; and the Grand Alliance was being +broken up largely owing to the rapacity of the House of Austria. In +1710 and 1711, Marlborough had no scope for his commanding genius; he +was no longer able to make great efforts; he knew that his splendid +career was drawing to a close.</p> + +<p>Before the beginning of 1712, Marlborough had been deprived of all his +military commands, dismissed from office amidst shouts of obloquy, and +threatened with impeachment for crimes against the State. He was not +brought to a public trial; and some of the accusations heaped upon +him were certainly false, and now seem ridiculous. But he wisely left +England with his disgraced wife; and though he was not convicted of +malversation and fraud, the unscrupulous ambition and avaricious greed +which were perhaps his most distinctive vices were dragged into light +by a great deal of evidence. It is remarkable, too, though no commander +has ever been more beloved by his troops, that he was distrusted +by some of his best officers; and if his treason at Brest remained +unknown, he was disliked and suspected by both Whigs and Tories.</p> + +<p>The value, however, of his genius in war, was conspicuously proved, in +an indirect way, in the memorable campaign of 1712. England had now +withdrawn from the Grand Alliance, but the Emperor still maintained +the struggle; and Eugene, who hated Louis XIV., and had confirmed his +master in his warlike purpose, was placed at the head of a great army +intended to invade and to subdue France. He was now in possession of +most of the fortresses which cover the northern French frontier, and +his position was so formidable that Louis XIV., when he gave Villars +once more the army of the North, and bade the warrior farewell at +Versailles, exclaimed that, should fortune prove adverse, “the King +and the Marshal would perish together.” The plan of Eugene, his base +now secure, was to capture the strongholds near the heads of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_65">[65]</span> +Oise, and then marching down the open valley of the stream, the path +followed for ages by the House of Austria and its generals in assailing +France, to pass by the fortified lines of the Somme, and to finish the +war by an advance on the capital. He sate down to invest Landrecies, +now almost the only obstacle in his way, and his army was so confident +in itself and its chief that it called its lines “the approaches to +Paris.” This resembled, in some respects, the daring march on Turin in +1706; but Eugene had made a strategic mistake; arguing from what he +thought was the timid attitude of Villars, in the campaign of 1710, +he believed that the Marshal would never attack, and he spread his +army, in ill-connected posts, from Landrecies to near Marchiennes on +the frontier, leaving a detachment to guard a weak point at Denain. +The Prince had to deal with a different foe from the chiefs he had +routed in 1706; his adversary was a man of genius, full of resource +and thought, in execution admirable. Villars by this time was in his +lines near Cambray; he quickly detected Eugene’s error, and he took +advantage of it with consummate skill. Breaking up from his camps, he +made a forced march as though he was trying to relieve Landrecies; he +ostentatiously gave out that this was his purpose, and then, screening +the movement with perfect art, and counter-marching with extreme +rapidity, he fell in full force on the communications of his foe, and +attacked Denain in largely superior numbers. The results of this fine +strategy were almost marvellous; the detachment guarding Denain was +destroyed; a large body of troops, hurried up by Eugene to join in the +defence, was utterly routed, and the whole army of invasion, smitten in +the flank, and losing its communications, was compelled to retreat, and +to fall back, baffled, behind the frontier. Villars made the very most +of this splendid success; the siege of Landrecies was instantly raised; +the French fortresses, which had been the prizes of many campaigns, +were soon retaken, and the standards of France were ere long seen +waving in triumph along the course of the Sambre. France was finally +saved by this grand feat of arms, and before a year had passed, Villars +was in the heart of Germany, had driven Eugene beyond the Rhine, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_66">[66]</span> +had compelled the Emperor to sue for peace. France had never such an +awakening again until, rescuing her from defeat and anarchy, Napoleon +won the great fight of Marengo.</p> + +<p>In the Revolution which followed the death of Queen Anne, Marlborough +was placed again in command of the army; but he was disliked by George +I. and his ministers; and it is significant that he never regained +anything like his old authority in the State. The last years of +his life were somewhat obscure; he gradually survived his splendid +faculties, and he died, little regretted, in 1722. I cannot notice his +diplomatic career; enough to say that he was the master spirit of the +Grand Alliance during many years; he kept its ill-connected structure +together, and three-fourths of the Princes of Christendom inclined +before the genius of an English subject. As a statesman, Marlborough +was less successful; he misinterpreted the spirit of the time during +the later years of the great war he directed; but his errors and fall +were largely due to the faults and the temper of his imperious wife, +whom he loved with a fondness not unmixed with terror. A word as to +his achievements in the noble art of which he was one of the greatest +masters. Marlborough was endowed with the choicest gifts of a warrior; +it was his special characteristic that daring, constancy, imagination, +and prudence were blended in him in proportions of the happiest kind; +and it is a peculiarity of his career that he attained supreme command, +for the first time, at a period of life when most great captains have +done their work, and that he was never defeated in a pitched battle. +It has been said that he had little strategic genius; but a study of +his campaigns confutes this error; he was capable of great combinations +in war; and if, as a strategist, he accomplished less than other +commanders of the first order, this is partly to be ascribed to the +contracted theatre which usually was the scene of his exploits, and +partly to the interference of the Dutch and their deputies, and to the +jealousies and discords of a divided League. Two strategic gifts he +certainly possessed in a measure accorded to few commanders; he always +perceived the weak point of an enemy on a field of manœuvre as well as +of battle, and he was pre-eminent in making the most of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_67">[67]</span> success, and +in drawing decisive results from victory. In pure strategy, however, he +was, I think, inferior in originality to Turenne, and he achieved less +than Villars and Eugene, two great names in this sphere of the art; +but as a strategist he is second alone to those illustrious chiefs of +his era; and he contributed largely to the grand revival of strategy, +after a season of decline, which was seen in the War of the Spanish +Succession. We must go to the field of battle to behold the genius of +Marlborough in its highest perfection. He may have been equalled as a +tactician, but he has never been surpassed; his judgment in placing an +army on the ground and in detecting the vulnerable points of an enemy; +his constancy in pressing an attack home at the spot where success +would be most complete, and his wonderful resource and calmness in +peril, were unrivalled among the men of his time; and neither Eugene +nor Villars can show a Ramillies, a masterpiece of purely tactical +skill. For the rest, Marlborough was a great leader of men, like all +generals of the first order; and “Corporal John” was as adored by his +troops as was the “Little Corporal” of another age. It is melancholy +to observe that deep scars of guilt mar the beauty of this magnificent +figure; and that we must see in it the dimmed brightness and the ruined +glory of the fallen archangel, as well as his majesty and commanding +power. Every allowance ought in justice to be made for Marlborough; +his crimes were those of a revolutionary age; and few of the leading +Englishmen of his day were free from the stain of disloyal, bad faith; +but the treason of Brest was a foul deed of wickedness. A singular vein +of baseness and meanness ran through, like alloy, this grand nature; +and whatever excuses may be made for him, there are “damned spots” upon +Marlborough’s fame.</p> + + <div class="figcenter"> + <img + class="p2" + src="images/i_088.jpg" + alt=""> + </div> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_68">[68]</span></p> + +<h2>CHAPTER III.<br> +<span class="subhed smcap">Frederick the Great.</span></h2></div> + +<p>Frederick II. of Prussia, known as the Great, was born in 1712. The +associations of his boyhood and early youth were ill fitted to bring +out the qualities of a nature which, with many defects, was essentially +that of a soldier and statesman. His father, Frederick William, had +some parts which entitle him to a place among able rulers; but, even +as a king, he was a harsh tyrant, and in his private life and social +relations he was scarcely better than a coarse-minded savage. History +has fully dwelt on his strange acts and habits; how, with ministers +mere submissive satellites, he governed his kingdom with a rod of iron; +how he sate, in what was called his Tobacco Parliament, directing the +affairs of a growing state according to his despotic fancies; how he +reduced his household to the level of lackeys, caned nobles, ladies, +and domestics alike, and was wont to storm against them with oaths and +curses; how, in order to enlarge an overgrown army, he turned Prussia +into an immense barrack; and how he exaggerated in his treatment of +his wife and family the barbarities he inflicted on his terrified +subjects. That a lad, gifted with fine intelligence, who had a strong +will and a genuine sympathy with Letters, Art, and the pursuits of +Science, should, as he grew up, regard with disgust this system of +cruel and grotesque oppression, and should fiercely resent the inhuman +discipline to which he was himself subjected, was only natural and to +be expected; and Frederick and his father seem to have hated each other +during<span class="pagenum" id="Page_69">[69]</span> several years with a cordial hate. It is unnecessary to dwell +on this dreary episode in the life of the great future sovereign; the +Crown Prince was beaten, half starved, and drilled into obedience, with +a severity that became a byeword; he was forbidden books and liberal +studies; and having sought refuge in flight from these unnatural +wrongs, he was thrown into prison, condemned to death, and perhaps only +escaped a malefactor’s fate through the intercession of the Imperial +Head of Germany.</p> + +<p>In the revulsion of feeling caused by this tyranny, Frederick drew +more and more away from the King, his methods of ruling, his ways, +and his habits; and when the advent of manhood set him partly free, +he surrounded himself with youthful friends of a somewhat wild and +licentious turn, indulged freely in the pleasures of his age, and led +a life which was a tacit protest against the meanness, the rudeness +and the barbarism of the Court. His leisure hours, however, were not +wasted; he read a great deal, and to real profit; he attracted several +French men of letters to the country house where he passed his time, +and, amongst others, made the acquaintance of Voltaire; and though he +dabbled in a poetaster’s calling, he wrote books which give proof of a +keen intellect, not original, but receptive and powerful. He was looked +upon, in those days, as a wit and a philosopher of the Parisian type; +but this was a superficial judgment, due to the accident of his life +of restraints, and the genuine character of the man was completely +different. Frederick had far more in common with his half brutish +father than, probably, he was himself aware. His instincts were for +despotic power; he had, at bottom, the Prussian military taste; and he +sympathized with the display of authority in all departments of the +State and of Government, and even in the relations of private life, +though not exactly after the paternal fashion. As years advanced, +too, and his mind developed, he became alive to the real merits, +marred as they were by extravagant faults, of the old King’s system of +administration and rule. Prussia, a weak state in the midst of great +monarchies, required a large defensive force, and the Prussian army had +been made the best in Europe; Prussia needed an increase of national +strength, and during the reign of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_70">[70]</span> Frederick William her population had +multiplied and she had grown fast in wealth. The Crown Prince and his +father became reconciled; and though, to outward seeming, they were +perfect contrasts, they drew towards each other in feeling and thought, +and were practically agreed on the national policy. Frederick went to +the wars to please his father, and served with some distinction in the +last campaign of Eugene, in 1734. Soon after this the King committed +a charge to his heir which was, in after years, to become a cause of +great events in Europe. The House of Hohenzollern conceived that it had +an old claim on the rich lands of Silesia, for centuries a province of +the Austrian Monarchy; and Frederick William had often insisted that he +had been cheated out of his legitimate rights. Almost in his last days +he entreated his son and coming successor to vindicate those rights, in +language of passionate wrath and earnestness.</p> + +<p>The old King passed away in 1740; and the first act of the Prince, like +our Henry V., was to get rid of the Falstaffs and Poinses who had been +the former companions of his youth, though he retained his literary +friends and tastes, and, indeed, held to them during an eventful life. +His second act was to raise the Prussian army, which, in the days of +the Great Elector, had never exceeded 40,000 men—and which had seemed +of portentous numbers when made 80,000 strong by his late father—to +fully 100,000 effective troops, a military force out of all proportion +to what was only a third-rate kingdom. Within a few months, he had +taken advantage of the bereavement and weakness of Maria Theresa; had +laid claim to the whole of Silesia, and had overrun the province with +thousands of soldiers before the young Archduchess could even attempt +resistance. It was a rapacious and an ignoble act; but, to do him +justice, Frederick was no hypocrite; he did not pretend that he was +carrying out the injunctions of a revered parent, and he has cynically +avowed that his ruling motives were greedy ambition and the desire of +fame. It is idle, too, as Macaulay has done, to lay to his charge the +whole guilt of the terrible and world-wide contest that followed; the +simple truth is that all the Powers of Europe, tired of a long peace +and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_71">[71]</span> restored in strength, were eager for acquisitions and conquests. +France especially sought to regain her influence in Germany, and to +weaken her old foe, Austria; and Frederick was not much worse than his +crowned fellows.</p> + +<p>I must glance at the condition of the military art when Frederick made +his first essays in it. There had been little wars and rumours of +wars since the great settlement of the Peace of Utrecht, and Austria +had overcome the hosts of Islam, but Europe had generally enjoyed +repose during the long period of twenty-five years, and there had been +nothing resembling the mighty conflicts which had marked the protracted +reign of Louis XIV. No occasion, therefore, had presented itself for +an exhibition of strategy like that of Turenne, or of tactics like +those of Blenheim and Ramillies; and the chiefs of the last great war +had died—Marlborough, unlamented, in his rest at Blenheim; Eugene, +Villars, and Berwick, covered with honours, and followed to the grave +by national mourning. The armies, too, of the great military Powers +had been out of joint, and had lost experience and efficiency during +prolonged inaction; that of Austria, despite the warnings of Eugene, +had been neglected and allowed to decline; the British army had almost +gone to pieces, and that of France, though formidable in numbers and +renown, too faithfully represented the feebleness of the State, and the +vices of the Regency and of Louis XV. Yet if the art of war seemed thus +in eclipse, the theory of war, as usually happens in periods of rest, +had had careful students; the elements of military power had grown in +Europe, and the facilities to make war on a large scale had been to +a certain extent augmented. Saxe, about this time, had done a good +deal in simplifying and quickening manœuvres in reviews; Montalembert, +struck by the immense advantage secured to the attack by Vauban’s +methods, had begun to think of transforming fortresses, and experience +of the bayonet had caused the numbers of the infantry in every army +to be considerably increased, and had made infantry formations more +light and flexible. The general growth of population, too, had made the +available resources of war greater; the progress of husbandry and the +development of roads had enlarged the possible scope of strategy; and +the spirit<span class="pagenum" id="Page_72">[72]</span> of the age, more humane and civilized, was opposed to the +devastation and waste practised in the wars of the seventeenth century, +and even to such expedients as great defensive lines, which necessarily +injured whole tracts of country. The art, therefore, though it had +recently had no grand illustration, was in a state in which progress +was at least possible; and a European struggle, there was reason to +believe, might bring into the field armies more numerous and more +easily moved than ever had been the case formerly. The most striking +military fact of the time remains, however, to be yet noticed. While +all other armies had relatively declined, that of Prussia had, I have +said, grown to dimensions amazing for so small a State, and her army of +100,000 men was, even in mere numbers, in 1741, considerably greater +than that of Austria, and only less, by a third, than that of France. +Nor were mere numbers anything like a test of the real military power +of the Prussian army. Frederick William’s mania for big Grenadiers and +for giant Guards may appear ridiculous; but the King had doubled the +strength of the force which he deemed necessary to protect the State; +and his army had become, in his hands, the hardest and best fashioned +instrument of war which, hitherto, had been formed in Europe. The +subject of his incessant care, it had been drilled, disciplined, and +trained in manœuvres by officers of experience and skill, brought up +in the great school of Marlborough and Eugene; and its infantry, in +particular, had acquired a precision and celerity of movement, and an +efficacy of fire—this last partly due to the iron ramrod, then used by +the Prussian soldier alone—which no army in Europe could even nearly +equal. An Achilles only was required to prove this mighty weapon of +unrivalled temper.</p> + +<p>This is not the place to examine the policy of Frederick, in the war of +the Succession of Austria. He wrested Silesia from the Empress-Queen, +and by alternately taking the side of France and of Austria, and +throwing his weighty sword into the scales of Power, the young ruler of +a petty monarchy became the arbiter of two-thirds of the Continent. It +is indisputable that he had no scruples, and that he often broke faith +in this game of ambition;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_73">[73]</span> but he gave proof of no common statecraft, +of precocious dexterity, and of great strength of purpose; and he has +some right to plead at the Bar of History that, with the exception of +Maria Theresa, he dealt with Kings and Ministers as false as himself. +His kinsman, George II., was not unwilling to see Prussia effaced +from the map of Europe, and he was treated by Louis XV. as a mere +pawn of France, to be used and sacrificed to promote her objects. Nor +shall I dwell at length on the first attempts of Frederick to conduct +campaigns and to direct armies. He had not great original genius in +war, or in any department of human activity, but his intellect was +vivid, penetrating, strong; he was observant, and quick in seizing +ideas, and he devoted himself with such steadfast patience to every +pursuit undertaken by him that he ultimately became a proficient in +it. These faculties made him the first soldier of an age deficient in +great commanders; but his progress as a warrior was slow and uncertain; +and, indeed, his triumphs, even to the last, were rather due, I think, +to the force of his character, and the superiority of his disciplined +army, than to pre-eminent excellence in the military art.</p> + +<p>The first campaigns of Frederick scarcely require the careful attention +of the student of war. He occasionally showed a happy conception, +and, as was always his wont, he was prompt and vigorous in taking the +initiative and in striking his foe. But he was out-generalled in more +than one instance; and in the campaign of 1744 he narrowly escaped +ruin at the hands of Traun, though it is but fair to observe that +this was largely caused by the incapacity and tardiness of his French +allies. The battles of Frederick during these years—and this is true, +indeed, as to his whole career—deserve more notice than his general +movements; and they have this special interest, that they attest the +advance he made by degrees in tactics, and the admirable qualities of +the army he led. His attack at Mollwitz cannot be justified, for the +Austrians held his line of retreat, and defeat, which was probable, +would have been destruction. As has often been pointed out, he made +no attempt to turn to account the manœuvring power of his troops; but +though he was driven from the field with his horsemen, the terrible +fire and the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_74">[74]</span> unflinching constancy of his infantry gave him victory +at last. At Chotusitz we, perhaps, see the first example of that +insight on the ground which became one of his distinctive merits, +inferior as he always remained, I think, in this important respect to +Marlborough. He charged with his right wing at a critical moment, and +the movement possibly assured his success, though the result of the +battle was mainly due, beyond question, to his tenacious soldiery. +In the operations that led to Hohenfriedberg he displayed no little +resource and skill; he lured the Austrians on to make an attack in +which the chances were in his favour; and though he committed a mistake +in disposing his troops, which the victor of Ramillies would have, +perhaps, made fatal—he left a wide gap in an ill-arranged line—still +the Austrians did not seize the occasion, and their incoherent and +partial efforts were easily defeated by his well-directed movements. It +was at Sohr, however, that we see the first instance of the favourite +manœuvre employed by Frederick, which, taking advantage as it did of +the peculiar excellences of his formidable and highly-trained army, +became the means of giving him many a victory, though occasionally +he abused it, with disastrous results. By this time it had become +evident that his troops infinitely surpassed the sluggish Austrians in +rapidity and precision of movement; and like all soldiers, he was, of +course, aware that could he attain and turn an enemy’s flank without +endangering his own position, he would necessarily gain an immense +advantage. At Sohr, accordingly, availing himself of the “mobility” +and marching power of his army, Frederick turned the Austrian flank +with one of his wings, throwing the other back, and only bringing it +up when the turning movement had proved successful; and the battle was +won by these agile tactics. This manœuvre, repeated on many fields, +was the celebrated “attack in oblique order,” ever associated with the +name of the King, and the theme of a great deal of foolish writing; +it has proved successful or unsuccessful as it has been rightly or +wrongly adopted; and the first condition of its success, it will be +perceived, is the possession of an army more active than its foe, +better disciplined, and more exact in its movements.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_75">[75]</span></p> + +<p>Prussia was at peace during the ten years that followed the first great +defeat of Maria Theresa. Frederick had reached the prime of vigorous +manhood, and a word must be said on the character of his rule, and +on the tenor and pursuits of his life. His system of government bore +a strong resemblance to that of his eccentric father, but with this +difference—that mere arbitrary power was tempered by clear-sighted +intelligence, and often had enlightened, if ambitious, objects. He +was a severe, a meddling, and a pitiless despot; but he checked the +abuses of feudal nobles, protected the rights of the middle classes +and the poor, enforced toleration in a still bigoted age, as a rule +respected justice and law, and, on the whole, had regard to the +national interests. The worst features of his <i>régime</i> were that +he carried the rigid methods of the camp into the free relations of +social life, and that he tried to regulate commerce and agriculture +according to crude ideas of his own; but if he checked the natural +expansion of the State, and if his monopolies and laws of trade did +great mischief, and were often failures, still his absolutism was, +in the main, beneficent. Prussia was better governed under his stern +discipline than any one of the Great Powers of the Continent; the +nation made astonishing progress, and the conquest of Silesia proved +a blessing to a people which always detested the Hapsburgs. As for +Frederick himself, he was the most industrious and hard-working Head +of a State ever seen, and yet he found time for music and art, and for +the society of the best men of letters; and though his quarrel with +Voltaire and the jokes and sarcasms he indulged in at the expense of +his guests showed that he could be a tyrant even in his hours of ease, +he was far the most accomplished Sovereign of his time. As may be +supposed, however, the King devoted his chief attention to the care of +his army, and everything, in fact, was subordinated to it. He does not +appear to have loved war, but he knew that enemies hemmed him round; +he resolved to hold a high place among the leading Powers, and he left +nothing undone to bring to perfection the great military instrument he +had already proved. The army, growing with the growth of the people, +and recruited from the lately-annexed province, was increased from +100,000 to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_76">[76]</span> 160,000 men, and it increased in efficiency even more than +in numbers. The Prussian cavalry had not been equal to that of Austria +in the Silesian war; it was fashioned into a most admirable arm; and +it is probable, indeed, that no cavalry has surpassed the squadrons +of the renowned Seidlitz. As for artillery, the beginning of horse +artillery—a revolution in the arm—may be traced to this time; and +while the drill and discipline of the famous Prussian infantry were +continued and even largely improved, every effort was made to render +its fire more formidable than it had been before, and to cause its +evolutions to be more exact and rapid. Frederick’s army, in fact, +trained to march, to change front, to wheel into line, to gather to a +flank, to throw masses of horsemen on a selected point, and, besides, +to turn its weapons to the best account, and all this with amazing +precision and quickness, was, compared to other continental armies, +like a practised athlete to a thick-winded clown; and though it was +organized still in battalions and squadrons—for corps and divisions +came afterwards—its power, “its mobility,” its capacity for war, would +be deemed wonderful even in our day.</p> + +<p>In 1755–6 the occasion came to test again the value of this mighty +force. The Empress-Queen had never forgotten Silesia; she thirsted for +revenge on one she deemed a robber; and she had succeeded at last in +combining a League of the Great Powers against the Prussian upstart, +who had exasperated the harlot who reigned at Versailles, and the +adulteress supreme in the Muscovite Empire, by his poignant jests on +their notorious vices. France, Austria, and Russia agreed to divide +the spoils of conquered Prussia among themselves; Sweden and the +small German States sought a share of the prey; and it was believed +throughout Europe that the Prussian Monarchy, before a year had closed, +would be a thing of the past. Frederick saw clearly the extent of his +peril, but he saw, too, that he had one chance; the armies of the +League were comparatively weak, and, what was more important, were +wholly unprepared; he could move his great army at a moment’s notice, +and he seized the occasion with characteristic energy. Taking the +initiative fearlessly, he struck at once, and in the spring of 1756 his +trained legions had <span class="pagenum" id="Page_77">[77]</span>entered the plains of Saxony, and were pouring +through the gaps in the Bohemian hills.</p> + + <div class="figcenter" id="i_b_076fp"> + <img + class="p1" + src="images/i_b_076fp.jpg" + alt=""> + <p class="p0 sm center">Theatre of the<br> +SEVEN YEARS WAR</p> + </div> + +<p>The great War of the Seven Years had begun; and, as regards the +military operations of the King, it presents three distinct and well +marked phases. France and Russia sent no forces into the field against +Prussia in 1756, and Frederick had to cope with Saxony and Austria +only, whose united armies were no match for his own. He seized Dresden +with an overwhelming force; shut the Saxons up in the entrenched camp +of Pirna; and invaded Bohemia in two great masses, the first, under his +own command, moving up the Elbe, the second led by Schwerin, a most +distinguished veteran, advancing from Silesia, at a great distance, +and with the mountains between, by the Pass of Nachod. The Austrian +army, inferior in force, on the theatre, probably 60,000 to 90,000 +men, was also divided into two parts; Piccolomini, a descendant of a +well-known chief of the Thirty Years’ War, held Schwerin in check with +a comparatively small detachment of troops; Browne, with the principal +army, confronted Frederick; and an indecisive battle was fought at +Lobositz, on the banks of the Elbe, in which the contending armies seem +to have been not far from equal in numbers. The campaign terminated +to the advantage of Prussia; Browne failed to disengage the Saxons +at Pirna; their army, surrounded, laid down its arms; and Frederick +incorporated the men with his own troops, for Germans were usually +ready to enter his service. The success was unexpected, and even great; +yet, as Napoleon has justly remarked, Frederick might certainly have +done more. Schwerin was paralysed by an insignificant force; the King +at Lobositz was not stronger than Browne; and in these operations, as +often happened, his bold strategy was very far from perfect.</p> + +<p>The campaign of 1757, the most memorable of Frederick’s career, falls +naturally into two parts; and it deserves the close attention of the +student of war, for it strikingly illustrates the merits and the +defects of this renowned, yet sometimes unsafe, commander. France and +Russia, still unprepared, did simply nothing, until the early summer +of the year; and Austria, now without Saxon aid, was left isolated for +months to sustain the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_78">[78]</span> contest. Frederick was again certainly superior +in force; he had 100,000 men at least, the best troops in Europe, +against 90,000 Austrians, to a great extent of indifferent quality; +and assuming the offensive he once more invaded Bohemia, by the valley +of the Elbe, Schwerin, as in the preceding year, moving from Silesia, +again separated from the main army, but at a less distance than in +1756. By the 1st of May the King had sate down before Prague, having +advanced by the western bank of the Moldau; and Schwerin was still +several marches off, with the Elbe and the Moldau between himself and +Frederick. By this time Charles of Lorraine had taken a position along +a series of heights not far from Prague, and his purpose was not to +offer battle until he had been joined by Daun, moving from Moravia with +about 25,000 men. Frederick, eager to prevent the intended junction, +bridged the Moldau under the eye of the enemy, leaving a detachment +upon the western bank; meanwhile Schwerin had passed the Elbe, pressing +forward to Prague by forced marches; and the two Prussian armies +had come into line by nightfall upon the 5th of May, the Austrians +remaining wholly inactive. The King resolved to attack before Daun +could come up, and by the morning of the 6th his troops were in motion, +longing and prepared for a decisive struggle. The Austrian army, about +60,000 strong, held a defensive position along a range of hills sinking +towards the east into lowlands and marshes divided by rivers and small +lakes; the left resting on Prague and the Moldau, the centre and right +extending to the hamlet of Kyge, near where the hills fall into the +half-flooded plain. Frederick was probably equal to his foe in numbers, +and judging that the Austrian centre and left could not be forced, he +decided on turning his adversary’s right, though the movement was one +of extreme hazard, for it placed his army with its rear towards Daun, +known to be advancing to assist his colleague. The Prussian army, +separated by difficult ground from its enemy, marched in oblique order, +with extraordinary speed and precision; and it had soon fastened on +the Austrian right, making fierce efforts to outflank and destroy it. +Lorraine, however, had thrown back this wing; it presented a new front +to the advancing foes, <span class="pagenum" id="Page_79">[79]</span>and the attack of the Prussians was greatly +impeded by the swamps and ponds covering the Austrian line, which made +it difficult in the extreme to pierce. The battle raged for some hours +with uncertain fortunes; but the Austrian left and centre continued +motionless, and did not even attempt a counter attack, although the +occasion was most promising. A gap was formed in the angle where the +right of Lorraine had been thrown back from the main body; Frederick +kept pouring troops against the enemy’s flank, and after prodigious +efforts, in which the aged Schwerin, a pupil of Marlborough, met a +soldier’s death, the Austrian right was at last broken, and the whole +Austrian army lost the position, 12,000 men having been cut off from +Prague and compelled to seek refuge in the camp of Daun.</p> + + <div class="figcenter" id="i_b_078a"> + <img + class="p1" + src="images/i_b_078a.jpg" + alt=""> + <p class="p0 sm center">BATTLE OF PRAG</p> + <p class="p0 sm center">6<sup>TH</sup> MAY 1787.</p> +<div class="parent"> +<ul class="left sm" style="margin-top: 0em"> + <li><i>a.a.a. First position of Austrian Army.</i></li> + <li><i>b.b.b. Second position to meet the Prussian Attack.</i></li> + <li> <i>c.c. Prussians under Kieth.</i></li> + <li> <i>d.d. First position of Prussian Army.</i></li> + <li> <i>e.e. Second position of Prussian Army.</i></li> + <li>  <i>f. Schwerin’s Prussians.</i></li> + <li>  <i>g. Prussian Horse.</i></li> + <li>  <i>h. Mannstein’s Attack.</i></li> + <li>  <i>i. Place of Schwerin’s Monument.</i></li> +</ul> +</div> + + <div class="figcenter" id="i_b_078b"> + <img + class="p1" + src="images/i_b_078b.jpg" + alt=""> + <p class="p0 sm center">BATTLE OF ZORNDORF</p> + <p class="p0 sm center">25<sup>TH</sup> AUGUST, 1788.</p> +<div class="parent"> +<ul class="left smaller" style="margin-top: 0em"> + <li> <i>a.a. Prussian Army about to cross the Mützel.</i></li> + <li><i>b.b.b. Prussian Army ranked for Battle.</i></li> + <li>  <i>c. Russian Baggage.</i></li> + <li> <i>d.d. Prussian Infantry.</i></li> + <li> <i>e.e. Prussian Cavalry.</i></li> + <li>  <i>f. Prussian Baggage.</i></li> +</ul> +</div> + </div> + +<p>Frederick had shown great tactical skill in this battle, and constancy +of a high order; he had detected the vulnerable point in his enemy’s +line, and he never relaxed his efforts until he had gained the day. +In this instance, too, his favourite movement was justifiable in many +respects; the Prussians gathered on the Austrian flank, protected by +difficult ground between, and a counter attack would have been no +easy matter. Nevertheless, his success was largely due to the immense +superiority of the army he led. Compared to the sluggish Austrians, +as has been said, it was “a panther darting upon an ox.” Had Charles +of Lorraine been a great chief, he would have paralyzed the attack +by a movement from his left; and had this succeeded, Frederick, not +improbably, would have been hemmed in between the Prince and Daun. +In this part of the campaign, as in many cases, the strategy of the +King was essentially faulty; and had he had to deal with a general +like Turenne, he would have been baffled, out-manœuvred, and forced +to retreat without having a chance of fighting a decisive battle. +The invasion of Bohemia on a double line by the Elbe and Silesia, at +far distances, seems to have been justified by recent events—any +other operation is, besides, difficult in the case of an attack from +Prussia—but the principles of the art do not vary; and, as Napoleon +has said, this strategy gave the Austrian chiefs an immense advantage. +Charles of Lorraine, firmly established<span class="pagenum" id="Page_80">[80]</span> in Prague, and holding a +central position between the King and Schwerin, ought to have prevented +their junction with ease; and had he been anything like a master of +war he would have marched against each, and beaten both in detail. The +King, too, committed great mistakes—in bridging the Moldau within +reach of his enemy; in leaving a detachment on the western bank, when +he had made up his mind to fight a great battle; and, above all, in +venturing to place his army exposed on its rear to the army of Daun. +Had Charles of Lorraine had the gifts of Condé, the Prussian army, +superior as it was, would have bitterly rued these false movements.</p> + +<p>The King, after his victory, besieged Prague; but his sieges were +scarcely ever successful. He drew no lines round the beleaguered +fortress, but contented himself with a mere blockade; and it was well +for him that Charles of Lorraine remained motionless, and made scarcely +a sally, for, as Napoleon has pointed out, an active enemy would have +made Frederick pay dear for his rash conduct, a remark which proves +what would have been the judgment of the Emperor on Bazaine at Metz. +After six weeks of delay round Prague, the King was obliged to move +a large part of his army to encounter an approaching army of relief. +Daun had fallen back after the defeat of his colleague, having rallied +the 12,000 fugitives of Prague; but ere long he was reinforced, and +by the second week of June he had reached the Elbe, and was drawing +near Prague with 50,000 men. Frederick marched to oppose him with an +army not less probably than 40,000 strong; and on the 18th—a great +day in war—Daun was discovered holding a strong position, extending +from near the Elbe at Kolin, along eminences, with an open country in +front, to the hamlet of Hradschin. The King, elated perhaps by his +recent victory, resolved to repeat the successful manœuvre of Prague; +neglecting the Austrian centre and left, he decided on falling on +Daun’s right, and the Prussians once more marched, in their usual +fashion, to storm a village and heights that overlook Kolin. Frederick, +however, seems not to have reconnoitred the ground, and to have held +his adversary in complete contempt; his left, as it gathered on the +Austrian flank, had exposed itself<span class="pagenum" id="Page_81">[81]</span> to a counter-attack, for the field +allowed this offensive movement; and, besides, the oblique order was +not properly kept, for his right wing and centre were scarcely thrown +back, and simply followed the advancing left. The movement, in fact, +was a flank march, within reach of an enemy able to strike home; and +the result, as usually happens, was a great disaster. The Prussian left +was checked by a body of cavalry; Daun crushed the centre and right by +well-placed batteries; and though he did not cause his army boldly to +engage, he moved it forward so that his enemy was ravaged by a storm +of destructive missiles, and ran the gauntlet of deadly musketry. The +Prussian left, isolated, was at last routed, though it fought with +courage worthy of all praise; and the whole army was driven from the +field with a loss of fully a third of its numbers.</p> + +<p>Pedants, who have deemed the attack in oblique order a talisman which +assures victory under all conditions of place and position, have tried +to explain away this crushing defeat; but Napoleon’s judgment is +evidently correct. Frederick made a flank march in open ground, under +the beard of Daun, within striking distance, and the result was like +what occurred at Austerlitz. Kolin forced the King to raise the siege +of Prague, to abandon Bohemia, and to fall back on Silesia; and had +his antagonists been great generals, he might have been overwhelmed +before he had passed the ranges which overlook the Silesian lowlands. +But Lorraine did not even break up from Prague till July, many days +after the battle; Daun, a stout soldier of the school of Wallenstein, +fond of entrenched camps and defensive lines, but in no sense of the +word a strategist, lost a week in chanting Te Deums in his camp, to +use Napoleon’s sarcastic phrase; and Frederick effected his escape +with little further loss, and held positions between Zittau and +Bautzen. Nearly two months passed in petty operations, the Austrians +plainly shunning a contest, and taking no advantage of their splendid +success, when the apparition of new and formidable enemies on the scene +compelled the King to retreat towards the Lower Elbe.</p> + +<p>We have now reached the second phase of the war, and the second part of +the campaign of 1757. Up to this time<span class="pagenum" id="Page_82">[82]</span> Frederick had had to cope almost +wholly with the Austrians only, and had been superior in force on the +theatre of war; the balance was now heavily inclined against him, +and it was the conviction of Europe, as it had been from the first, +that he would be annihilated by the League of the Continent. France +had by this time two armies in Germany; the one 80,000 strong, under +the command of D’Estrées, the second not less than 50,000 men, partly +composed of contingents of the small German States, led by Soubise, +one of the Pompadour’s favourites; and Turenne and Villars had overrun +Germany, and threatened Vienna with less forces. Meanwhile, Sweden +had assailed the Pomeranian seaboard; a Russian army of 60,000 men +had crossed the Niemen and attained the Pregel; and though the forces +of the Allies were far apart, and D’Estrées was held in check for the +time in Hanover by the Duke of Cumberland—the warrior of Fontenoy +and Culloden—it seemed impossible that Prussia could withstand the +enormous masses arrayed against her. Frederick, always great in the +hour of danger, saw what was before him, and made up his mind; though +still suffering from the effects of Kolin, he resolved to advance at +once against his nearest enemy, Soubise, who had approached the Saale, +in the hope of striking a decisive blow; and leaving about 40,000 men +to keep the Austrians back, he marched with about 25,000—he had lately +been reinforced—to make head against the French commander. Soubise, a +degenerate scion of the great House of Rohan, and one of the poorest +creatures who ever led an army, though nearly double in numbers, fell +back before the King; and several weeks were lost in petty manœuvres, +Soubise always seeking to avoid fighting, conduct fatal beyond all +others to French soldiers. The news of the success of the Allies +elsewhere on the theatre at last, however, compelled the French chief +to abandon his timid attitude, and towards the close of October the +army of Soubise returned to the Saale, and crossed the river, though +it recrossed at the approach of its enemy. On the 5th of November, +the Prussian army, which had made a short retrograde movement, was +encamped, perhaps 22,000 strong, in a position near the Saale, with its +left at Rossbach; and Soubise, who had fully 45,000 men, <span class="pagenum" id="Page_83">[83]</span>thought +that he had caught Frederick, and could cut off his retreat. Full of +the theory of the oblique order, but utterly ignorant how to apply it, +he defiled in loose and irregular masses, without even an advanced +guard, under the eye of his adversary, and well within his reach, in +order to fall on his rear, and to turn his right; and the result of +this insensate flank march was ruinous and most disgraceful defeat. +Frederick, watching like a bird of prey its quarry, allowed Soubise +to march to his fate; then changing his front, moving on the chord of +an arc, and screening his operations with great skill, he smote the +heads of the allied columns, unprotected and surprised, with the fire +of well-placed batteries and the charges of the renowned horsemen of +Seidlitz; and the whole army of Soubise was literally scattered and +half-destroyed by the efforts of a force of only 6,000 or 7,000 men.</p> + + <div class="figcenter" id="i_b_083fp"> + <img + class="p1" + src="images/i_b_083fp.jpg" + alt=""> + <p class="p0 sm center">SEIDLITZ AT ROSSBACH.</p> + </div> + +<p>Rossbach was one of Frederick’s most brilliant victories; Soubise +was effaced for the rest of the campaign, and his shattered forces +recrossed the Rhine. The result of the battle was evidently due to the +stupid false movement of the allied chiefs; but the King turned this +to the best account, and his tactics were in all respects admirable. +This triumph greatly strengthened the Prussian cause, and sent a thrill +of exultation through German hearts; for Rossbach was the first great +fight in which Germans, led by a German, had defeated Frenchmen; and +the traditions of the day kept hope alive in the breasts of many a +German soldier during the sad years that followed the rout of Jena. +The arms of the King, however, had been unsuccessful on other parts of +the theatre of war; and, as the close of 1757 approached, his position +was one of increasing danger. A contingent of Swedes had, indeed, been +driven from Pomerania and forced into Stralsund; but the Russians had +gained a great victory at Jägersdorf, near the banks of the Pregel; +and though they had recrossed the Niemen as winter came on, the army +opposed to them had been severely treated. The chief peril, however, +which threatened Frederick came from Austria and Maria Theresa, his +implacable and untiring enemy. Lorraine and Daun had been largely +reinforced after Kolin, and ordered to press forward; and at the head +of probably 90,000 men, they gradually bore back and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_84">[84]</span> drove towards the +Oder the detachment, not perhaps half in numbers, which the King had +given to his lieutenant, Bevern. The Austrian generals seem to have +thought that their mission was to reconquer Silesia; they besieged and +captured Schweidnitz and Breslau; Austrian horsemen were let loose on +the province; and Bevern was defeated under the walls of Breslau with +terrible loss, and was ere long a prisoner.</p> + +<p>The intelligence reached the King some three weeks after Rossbach; his +decision was formed with his wonted promptness, and he hastened to the +Oder by forced marches, from the Saale across the lowlands of Saxony. +On the 3rd of December he had joined hands with Ziethen, one of his +best officers, who had succeeded to the command of Bevern; but the +united armies were not more than 35,000 or 36,000 men, for death and +desertion had carried off thousands. The Austrians were still probably +75,000 strong—they were certainly in immensely superior numbers—and +it seems astonishing that Lorraine and Daun did not try to trample +the enemy in the dust who was moving against them from Glogau upon +the Oder, and could not have had even half their force. The memory of +Rossbach, however, was, perhaps, too recent; and, leaving Breslau, +they took a position, defensive as usual, along eminences that look +down on the village of Leuthen. The left, under Lorraine, approached +the Schweidnitz, a feeder of the Oder, but with a broad space between; +the centre held a long line behind Leuthen, with hills and ravines +before its front; and the right, with Daun in command, stretched down +to a forest and hamlet known by the name of Ny-pern. Frederick, having +carefully reconnoitred the ground, put his army in motion early on +the 5th of December; an advanced guard was easily driven in; and he +pushed forward his right as quickly as possible, to turn and outflank +the enemy’s left. This time, however, the attack in oblique order was +a most skilful and well-planned movement; the Prussian centre and left +were thrown back until the effort of the right had told; what was +more important, the army marched, screened by the valleys and hills, +before the Austrian front; a thick mist, too, hung over the plain, and +concealed the advance of the Prussian <span class="pagenum" id="Page_85">[85]</span>line; and this, therefore, +was not a flank march within easy reach of a well-placed enemy. The +Prussian right had soon turned and beaten the troops of Lorraine, which +happened to be about the worst in the Austrian army; and though the +Prince endeavoured to throw back his left, and to form a new front, +as he had done at Prague, his efforts proved fruitless, and his whole +wing was routed. The centre and left of the King now bore down in +irresistible force on the shaken army; and though the Austrian chiefs +did all that brave men could do to restore the fortunes of the day, and +Daun especially made a bold attempt to advance the Austrian right for a +great counter attack, their exertions ultimately were of no avail, and +they were driven, utterly defeated, beyond the Schweidnitz. The losses +of the victors were not more than 2,000 or 3,000 men; those of the +vanquished were fully 15,000, with, it is said, 150 guns; and Breslau, +with a very large garrison and all the wounded and sick of the Austrian +army, was in a few days in the hands of Frederick. Lorraine and Daun +fled from Silesia as best they could, and the situation of affairs, +from the Elbe to the Oder, had been completely transformed by a single +battle.</p> + + <div class="figcenter" id="i_b_085afp"> + <img + class="p1" + src="images/i_b_085afp.jpg" + alt=""> + <p class="p0 sm center">BATTLE OF ROSSBACH.</p> + <p class="p0 sm center">5<sup>TH</sup> NOVEMBER, 1737.</p> +<div class="parent"> +<ul class="left sm" style="margin-top: 0em"> + <li><i>a. a. First position of Combined Army.</i></li> + <li><i>b. b. First position of Prussian Camp.</i></li> + <li><i>c. c. Advance of Prussian Army.</i></li> + <li><i>d. d. Second position of Combined Army.</i></li> + <li><i>e. e. Prussians retire to Rossbach.</i></li> + <li><i> f. French Cavalry, under S<sup>t</sup>. Germain.</i></li> + <li><i>g. g. March of Combin<sup>d</sup>. Army, to attack Prussian rear.</i></li> + <li><i> h. Prussian attack led by Seidlitz.</i></li> + <li><i> i. Position of Prussian Guns.</i></li> +</ul> +</div> + </div> + + <div class="figcenter" id="i_b_085bfp"> + <img + class="p1" + src="images/i_b_085bfp.jpg" + alt=""> + <p class="p0 sm center">BATTLE OF LEUTHEN</p> + <p class="p0 sm center">5<sup>TH</sup> DECEMBER, 1757.</p> +<div class="parent"> +<ul class="left smaller" style="margin-top: 0em"> + <li> <i>a. a. Austrian Army.</i></li> + <li> <i>b. b. Position of Saxon Forepost, under Nostitz.</i></li> + <li> <i>c. c. Advance of Prussian Army.</i></li> + <li>   <i>d. Lucchesi’s Cavalry, reinforced, by Daun.</i></li> + <li>   <i>e. Left wing, under Nadasti.</i></li> + <li>   <i>f. Friedrich’s hill of observation.</i></li> + <li> <i>g. g. Prussian Army about to attack.</i></li> + <li>   <i>h. Ziethen’s Cavalry.</i></li> + <li><i>i. i. i. Retreat of Austrians.</i></li> +</ul> +</div> + </div> + +<p>“Leuthen,” says Napoleon, “is Frederick’s masterpiece”; an army, +“wholly inferior in force and partly composed of beaten troops,” +defeated and routed an army twofold in numbers, and that too with +insignificant loss. The victory is the glory of the attack in oblique +order, for the Austrian left was turned and destroyed without +endangering the assailing army; the Prussian centre and right were +engaged at the fitting time; and though a counter attack was tried, +it failed, partly owing to the difficulties of the ground, which with +the mist had screened the King’s offensive movement. But, as Napoleon +has rightly observed, the attack in this instance had nothing in +common “with a flank march in the face of your enemy”; and it was “in +conformity with true principles.” The League against Frederick remained +unbroken, notwithstanding the reverses of 1757; and in 1758 he had +still to confront France, Austria, Russia, and the lesser States of +Germany. The odds against him were still enormous; but the armies of +the Coalition were widely scattered—Maria Theresa alone had<span class="pagenum" id="Page_86">[86]</span> her heart +in the contest—and Frederick had gained one great ally which has often +turned the scale in wars on the Continent. By this time the first Pitt +was supreme in England; he was engaged in a death struggle with the +French for empire in India, and in the Far West; and he turned his +eye of genius on the heroic warrior who had conquered at Rossbach, at +Prague, and at Leuthen. The minister supported Frederick with a small +contingent of troops, and lavished on him immense subsidies, which the +King turned to excellent account; and Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, a +very able man, replaced the Duke of Cumberland, and opposed the forces +of France on the Weser, the Rhine, and the Main, with an army made up +of German auxiliaries. I cannot dwell on these operations, disgraceful +in the very highest degree to the fribbles and fops who now led the +armies of France at the Pompadour’s bidding; suffice it to say that the +Prince of Clermont and poor Soubise were completely beaten, and the +French were driven again beyond the Rhine.</p> + +<p>I turn to the theatre of war on the Elbe and the Oder, where Frederick +directed the forces of Prussia. At the beginning of the campaign of +1758, he had one army on foot in Silesia, threatening Daun, who had +replaced Lorraine, and had fallen behind the Bohemian hills; a second +army, under Prince Henry of Prussia, confronted the forces of the +small German states in Saxony and along the Elbe; a third observed the +Russians upon the Oder, and the King had perhaps 140,000 men to oppose +to 250,000, not reckoning the French and Prince Ferdinand’s army. The +disparity of numbers was, therefore, immense; but Frederick had all +the shorter lines on the theatre; the Russians could do nothing for +months; and the occasion was one from which Turenne would have probably +drawn no little advantage. Strategy, however, was the weak point +of Frederick; and his first operations in this campaign show small +comprehension of the art of war. Instead of attacking Daun, inferior in +force and isolated, he had recourse to the methods of the second-rate +chiefs of the seventeenth century, now long exploded; he invaded +Moravia, and laid siege to Olmütz, as if the capture of the fortress, +important as it is, could have been attended<span class="pagenum" id="Page_87">[87]</span> with great results. The +siege, too, was conducted without regard to military rules, and the +science of the engineer; lines were not drawn to invest the place; the +besieging army was left exposed in widely divided camps that invited an +attack; and, above all, the supplies required for the siege were drawn +from Neisse, at a great distance, and through the difficult passes +of the Silesian range. It was fortunate that, at this juncture, the +recollections of Leuthen paralysed Daun. Had he fallen on the besieging +army, he might have destroyed it; but though he loitered for weeks, and +remained inactive, he did not wholly throw away the occasion. With the +assistance of Loudon, the most brilliant chief of Austria in the Seven +Years’ War, he contrived to intercept and destroy a convoy directed +from Neisse, with munitions for the siege; and the King recoiled from +Olmütz deservedly baffled. Frederick was now in a situation of grave +peril; he was almost surrounded by Daun and Loudon; his army was +in want and distress; and had Daun been a great commander he would +either have forced it against the Bohemian hills, or made it run the +gauntlet of ever-harassing foes, defeat in either instance involving +ruin. The King, however, was always great in such crises of fortune; +out-manœuvring and gaining on his slow adversary, who never knew what +promptness can effect in war, he advanced from Olmütz into Bohemia, and +then, hastening along the verge of the hills, he emerged successfully +into Silesia, making his way through the passes without loss. The march +was one of the most brilliant and daring of the war.</p> + +<p>These operations lasted from the opening of the campaign until the end +of July 1758. Frederick had suffered no defeat like that of Kolin; but +he had missed an opportunity to strike Daun, and he had only escaped a +disaster at Olmütz by his admirable presence of mind and energy. The +Russians meanwhile had crossed the Niemen and the Vistula, and had +attained the Oder; and, about the middle of July, they had attacked +Cüstrin, and drawn near the detachment advanced to hold them in check. +The King marched from Silesia against this fresh enemy; the Russian +chief, Fermor, when informed of his approach raised the siege,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_88">[88]</span> and +on the 25th of August had taken a position in a marshy plain in the +angle between the Oder and Warta, and overlooking the little hamlet +of Zorndorf. His army, about 55,000 strong, was separated from its +baggage, left in its camps, and it was drawn up in a huge rectangle, +a kind of formation which had proved most formidable to the Turkish +hordes, but ill fitted to resist a European army. Frederick, with +perhaps 35,000 men, and evidently treating his enemy with contempt, +marched right round the vast immovable mass, and attacked it with his +left in his wonted manner. His guns wrought frightful havoc in the +densely-packed square; but he had once more risked a flank march in +open ground, and Fermor flung a ponderous force on the advancing wing, +which was nearly crushed by the Muscovite onset. The battle raged for +some hours with the most savage fury; the Russians displayed the dogged +courage of their race, but Seidlitz and his splendid horsemen turned +the scale at last, and Fermor sullenly retired from the field, the +victors, however, being unable to seize his baggage or to turn their +success to the least advantage.</p> + +<p>Having thus disposed of this tenacious foe, Frederick was compelled +to retrace his steps towards the Elbe, for his presence in this +region had again become necessary. Daun, after his partial success +in Moravia, had not advanced, as he ought to have done, and joining +the army of the lesser German States, had not overwhelmed Prince +Henry of Prussia, an operation which was within his power; but he +had not been altogether inactive. He had detached Loudon to fall on +the King; he had laid siege to Neisse in Silesia, and he had made a +movement which threatened Dresden, timid half measures showing the very +poorest strategy. Frederick had reached Dresden by the second week of +September, confounding the projects of his hesitating foe; and he set +off ere long to relieve Neisse, at the head of about 40,000 men, Daun +menacing his flank in his camp at Stolpen. A pause in the operations +followed, due probably to the formidable attitude of Daun; but, by the +close of September, the King had attained Bautzen in full march for the +beleaguered fortress. By this time Daun had been rejoined by Loudon; +their united forces<span class="pagenum" id="Page_89">[89]</span> must have been from 75,000 to 90,000 strong, and +the Austrian chief had taken a position at Hochkirch, amidst woods and +hills, barring an advance on Neisse. Frederick was close to Hochkirch +by the 11th of October; he did simply nothing for two days, for he +was waiting the arrival of supplies from Bautzen; and, confident +that Daun would not venture to attack, he felt assured that when his +preparations were made, he could easily turn the position of his foe. +He paid dearly for his imprudent scorn of an adversary who, though not +a great chief, was by no means a contemptible soldier, and who was +seconded, besides, by a very able lieutenant. Daun had had ample time +to satisfy himself of the numerical weakness of the hostile army; his +arrangements were made on the night of the 13th, and on the morning +of the 14th, he attacked in full force, and all but hemmed in the +astounded Prussians, who, caught and surprised, were completely routed. +The King extricated himself with extreme difficulty, and at a loss +of fully 10,000 men; but, as usual, Daun made no use of success, and +Frederick plucked safety and glory from imminent danger. Always rising +superior to adverse fortune, he fell back a short distance only, and +perceiving that Daun continued motionless, he actually stole a march +on his inactive enemy as soon as his army was fit to march, and made +for Neisse with extreme celerity. This was a stroke of extraordinary +boldness and skill; and Frederick gained his object, with a defeated +army, in the face of a victorious and immensely superior enemy. The +siege of Neisse was raised on the 5th of November; Daun, instead +of closing on Frederick’s rear, having idly turned aside to menace +Dresden, a demonstration that altogether failed.</p> + +<p>The campaign of 1758, like that of 1757, shows the true qualities +of Frederick in war; they were those of an inferior strategist, of +a tactician of a very high order, but who sometimes made surprising +mistakes, and was specially prone to underrate his enemy, and of +a chief who, possessing a noble army, occasionally gave proof of +extraordinary resource, and, in particular, was able to subdue dangers +which would have overwhelmed a less determined captain. The King ought +to have defeated Daun in the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_90">[90]</span> first months of the contest, when the +Austrian commander stood almost alone; he should not have attempted the +siege of Olmütz; he should not have risked a flank march at Zorndorf, +incapable of manœuvring as the Russians were; above all, he should not +have pitched his camp at Hochkirch, and given Daun a grand opportunity +to strike, simply because he thought him a dull commander. On the other +hand, Zorndorf was a real victory, no doubt due in a great degree +to Seidlitz, but partly also to the energy of the King. Frederick +completely baffled his foes at Dresden, and his conduct after Hochkirch +in bearding the victors, in eluding them, and in raising the siege of +Neisse, was that of a soldier of wonderful powers, though he owed his +success mainly to the inactivity of Daun.</p> + +<p>There is a sameness in the course of the Seven Years’ War, which in +some measure detracts from its interest. The contending armies held +nearly the same positions in 1759, when the campaign opened, as had +been the case in 1758, and their relative strength was nearly in the +same proportions. The French, under Contades and De Broglie, invaded +Hanover from the Rhine and the Main; they were opposed as before +by Prince Ferdinand, and though De Broglie gained some success at +Bergen—the first and last smile of fortune in this war on France—they +were ultimately defeated with heavy loss at Minden—a day memorable for +the bravery of the British contingent, and for the incapacity of Lord +George Sackville—and they fell back discomfited behind the Rhine. In +Central Germany, Frederick was again in Silesia and Prince Henry once +more in Saxony; Daun was outside Bohemia and the Silesian frontier, +and the forces of the small German States on the Saxon plains; and the +Russians who, after Zorndorf, had returned to their steppes, were still +hundreds of miles distant, and had not even drawn near the Vistula. +Apart from the French and Prince Ferdinand’s armies, Frederick had +still perhaps 120,000 men to oppose to 200,000 or 220,000; but as +had happened in the two preceding campaigns, he was not inferior in +force, where he was in supreme command, for the Russians were, for some +months, outside the immediate sphere of action. In these circumstances +he might once more have attempted<span class="pagenum" id="Page_91">[91]</span> to strike a weighty blow at Daun, +and Napoleon condemns him for missing the chance; but the Prussian +army had suffered immense losses, and was now crowded with ill-trained +levies; and he deserves less censure for this inaction than in the +campaign of 1758. Several weeks were spent in small operations, which +show that the strength of the King had begun to decline; he attempted +nothing resembling a decisive movement, and the war languished on the +space between the Elbe and the Oder. Meanwhile his enemies had, for the +first time, formed something of a real combination against him. The +Empress Elizabeth was savage at the defeat of Zorndorf; Maria Theresa +had not changed, and a Russian army, fully 70,000 strong, led by +Soltykoff, a true Muscovite, was directed to join hands with the main +Austrian army, and to try to crush Frederick with overwhelming numbers. +Soltykoff having crossed the Vistula about the middle of May, was upon +the Oder in the first days of August, having routed a Prussian body +of troops on his march; Daun, meanwhile, had despatched Loudon from +Silesia to aid the Russian chief, and their united armies, about 80,000 +strong, had soon effected their junction near Frankfort. Frederick had +advanced, to parry the blow, to the Oder, with perhaps 40,000 or 45,000 +men, and the hostile forces encountered each other at Kunersdorf, close +to Frankfort, upon the 12th of August. The battle is chiefly remarkable +for the characteristic stubbornness and tenacity of the Muscovite +infantry. Frederick’s manœuvres gained some success at first; indeed, +Soltykoff was nearly forced into the Oder, but his men rallied behind a +line of entrenchments, and the Prussians recoiled, hopelessly beaten, +from the bloodstained defences. The King lost a third of his army, and +nearly all his guns, and was with difficulty able to get across the +Oder.</p> + +<p>The situation of Frederick after Kunersdorf was critical in the +extreme, and might have been made desperate. Daun, obeying Maria +Theresa’s orders, had advanced from Silesia towards the lower Oder; +and, when informed of the results of the battle, he moved slowly to +Triebel on the Neisse, about six marches distant from the victorious +army. Had Soltykoff and Daun now combined<span class="pagenum" id="Page_92">[92]</span> their movements, and +cordially acted in real concert, they could have opposed fully 120,000 +men, in a central position, to Prince Henry and to Frederick and his +beaten army; and as the Prussian forces were widely divided, and could +not have been 80,000 strong, not to speak of the demoralization of +defeat, Daun and Soltykoff ought to have crushed their enemy. The +discords and jealousies of a Coalition, as has often happened, perhaps, +saved the King and his fortunes at this perilous juncture. The Austrian +and Russian generals disliked each other; the policy of their Courts +had already begun to diverge on the question of the Turkish Empire; and +Soltykoff was indignant that he had been joined only by the detachment +sent forward by Daun under Loudon. The Russians and Austrians did not +unite, as was quite possible, about the 25th of August, and Frederick +turned this brief respite to the best advantage. His shattered army +was reinforced by levies from the north; the artillery he had lost was +replaced from Berlin; and he was soon at the head of 40,000 men, while +Prince Henry had thrown himself, with no ordinary daring, between the +two hostile armies. Daun fell back towards Saxony in the first days +of September, completely giving up the object of the campaign; before +long Soltykoff was in full retreat, and had recrossed the Vistula by +the approach of winter; and thus Kunersdorf proved an all but barren +victory; Frederick had once more escaped from the toils, and the two +Empresses saw their projects frustrated.</p> + +<p>The campaign, nevertheless, was a losing one to the King, and it +terminated in a very great disaster. During the time when he had been +compelled to move to the Oder, in order to face the Russians, the army +of the small German states, with some aid from Daun, had taken the +offensive upon the Elbe; and, after capturing Torgau and Wittenberg, +it had laid siege to Dresden towards the end of August, the city, it +will be recollected, having been in the hands of the Prussians since +1756, and being their main depôt and place of arms. The attack had been +unsuccessful until the news of Kunersdorf reached the commandant, with +a letter from the King, empowering him to treat and to withdraw the +garrison; the capitulation was signed in the first days of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_93">[93]</span> September, +and the portal of Bohemia and the main strategic point of Saxony were +thus permanently lost to Frederick, who stormed in vain against his +ill-used subordinate. The fall of Dresden was a great reverse, but it +was followed by a still greater misfortune. The King, after the failure +of the allied armies to join hands, had remained in observation for a +time on the Oder; but towards the close of October he fell ill, and +for some weeks he was unable to do anything. Prince Henry, meanwhile, +had followed the movements of Daun, and had marched into Saxony; and a +series of petty operations followed, which are not worthy of special +notice. By November, Frederick, himself again, had marched into Saxony +and approached Dresden; and, with a want of perception difficult to +understand, he committed a mistake, in Napoleon’s judgment the most +inexcusable of his chequered career. Daun was at the head of his army +in Saxony; a large Austrian garrison was in Dresden; and there was +no reason to imagine that this resolute soldier was contemplating a +retrograde movement. The King, however, took it into his head that +his adversary was about to retreat into Bohemia; and always despising +Daun, spite of Kolin and Hochkirch, he sent off 12,000 men from the +main army to intercept the supposed movement. The officer in command +protested in vain; Daun closed on his foe in irresistible force; and +the whole Prussian detachment, hemmed in and powerless, was compelled +ignominiously to lay down its arms. Napoleon’s remarks on the surrender +of Maxen possess lasting and peculiar interest for the generation that +has witnessed Metz and Sedan.</p> + +<p>The third phase of the struggle had now come; Frederick, superior in +force until the summer of 1757, was henceforward wholly over-matched by +his enemies. The symptoms of decline which had become apparent in the +strength of Prussia in 1759 had been greatly aggravated by late events; +the losses at Kunersdorf and Maxen had been immense; Frederick had been +deprived of some of his best lieutenants, and the magnificent army with +which he had begun the war had been reduced to a mere skeleton. On the +other hand, his obstinate resistance had exasperated his foes; even<span class="pagenum" id="Page_94">[94]</span> +the listless and worthless Louis XV., notwithstanding the terrible +reverses of France in Canada, in Hindustan, and upon every sea, began +to be ashamed of defeats on the Rhine and the Weser; and Maria Theresa +and Elizabeth continued united in their thirst for vengeance. The +Coalition made gigantic efforts to bring the unequal contest to a +close; France placed 140,000 men on the Main and the Rhine; in Silesia +Loudon had 50,000; Daun was at the head of 80,000 troops of the +Empress-Queen and the lesser German States, encamped round Dresden and +in the Saxon plains; and Soltykoff commanded 70,000 Russians directed +from the Vistula to attain the Oder. To resist these immense masses, +the most numerous that had ever been seen in arms in Europe, Frederick +could only oppose Prince Ferdinand and 70,000 men to the French army, +twofold in numbers; and though he was still subsidised by the gold +of Pitt, and he had a central position between his foes, he had not +more than 100,000 men, composed largely of mere recruits, to contend +with the great Russian and Austro-German armies. The eagles seemed +to be gathering on their intended prey, but Frederick had resources +in himself and in the patriotic nation he ruled which the Coalition +had not taken into account. His fierce, determined, and heroic nature +exhibited itself in its grandest aspect; extreme as his peril was, he +had no thought of yielding; his centralized and severe government still +drew men and supplies from his half-ruined kingdom, and his people, +proud of their renowned Sovereign, strained every nerve to fight to the +last.</p> + +<p>The opening of the campaign of 1760 seemed to portend the speedy +ruin of the King; Loudon forced a Prussian detachment 10,000 strong +to surrender at Landshut, in Silesia, a repetition of the disaster +at Maxen; and Frederick vainly attempted to lay siege to Dresden, an +operation as unwise as the siege of Olmütz, which Daun frustrated +without difficulty, but which, had he been a great general, he ought to +have rendered all but fatal. By this time Loudon had captured Glatz, +and was overrunning the Silesian plains; the King, anxious about the +annexed province, which Maria Theresa burned to reconquer, set off +from Saxony by forced marches; but Daun followed on a parallel line, +and in the second<span class="pagenum" id="Page_95">[95]</span> week of August, he had nearly joined Loudon, and +closed round Frederick and his much weaker army. At daybreak on the +15th, Loudon attacked Frederick at Liegnitz, near the stream of the +Katzbach, the army of Daun being almost in sight; but the double +movement was ill-combined, and the King extricated himself, and even +gained a victory. His position, however, was still most critical, +and had Soltykoff, who had approached the Oder, co-operated with the +Austrian chiefs, the King, humanly speaking, must have succumbed. +Prince Henry, however, again interposed—a mere demonstration proved +sufficient; the jealousies of the Allies did the rest; and Soltykoff, +instead of striking down Frederick, merely marched northwards and +plundered Berlin, a diversion that proved of no importance. The King, +saved from destruction, returned into Saxony; the armies of Loudon and +Daun diverged; and while Loudon remained in Silesia, Daun followed his +adversary with the main army, and took a position at Torgau, on the +Elbe. Frederick attacked Daun on the 3rd of November, assailing him at +once in flank and front. The attack he conducted in person completely +failed; but Ziethen retrieved the fortunes of the day, and the Austrian +army was at last defeated. The “hind doomed to death” was not yet to +die, and, after many vicissitudes and a marvellous escape, Frederick +still held his own between the Elbe and the Oder. Meanwhile, as usual, +the great French army had invaded Germany, and had accomplished +nothing; Prince Ferdinand, as heretofore, had held it in check.</p> + +<p>I shall pass rapidly over the last scenes of the internecine and +protracted contest. The situation of Frederick in 1761 was much the +same as in the year before, save that the process of exhaustion had +told more on his resources than on those of his enemies. The French +Court made really great efforts to repair the humiliation of four years +of reverses; it put on foot a magnificent army of not less than 160,000 +men, a force, Napoleon has remarked, sufficient to have conquered +Germany if properly led; but its chief was the worthless Soubise; and +baffled and out-manœuvred by Prince Ferdinand, it returned to its +winter quarters without winning a battle. On the true theatre of war +in Germany the King was again<span class="pagenum" id="Page_96">[96]</span> immensely inferior in force; he had +probably less than 100,000 men against 220,000 or 250,000; but these +last, as always, were widely divided. The two Empresses recurred to +the project which had all but succeeded in 1759. Daun, who had been +severely wounded at Torgau, was left in Saxony to confront Prince +Henry, and Loudon, now the real chief of the Austrian armies, advanced +from Silesia, to unite with Boutourline, a new commander of the Russian +forces. The King, utterly outnumbered, had recourse to the antiquated +and barbarous method of wasting whole tracts to keep back Loudon; +but the Austrian general made his way to the Oder; and, having left +a detachment to besiege Schweidnitz, he effected his juncture with +Boutourline’s army at Jauer, near Liegnitz, at the close of August. +Frederick entrenched himself within defensive lines, after the fashion +of the preceding century; he had lost the initiative, and waited on +his foes, and he was ere long surrounded in his camps at Bunzelwitz by +enemies nearly fourfold in numbers. Loudon, a real general, was eager +to storm the lines, and, Napoleon thinks, must have destroyed the +King had Boutourline concurred in the attack; but Muscovite jealousy +interfered once more, and the Russian commander stiffly refused to +support his colleague, and marched northwards. Frederick escaped, as +had often happened, by a kind of marvel; meanwhile, Daun had remained +inactive in Saxony, and the only results of a campaign which should +have overwhelmed Prussia were that the Russians established themselves +on the Baltic, ready for speedier operations in the following year, and +that Loudon captured the great place of Schweidnitz, the key, as it has +been called, of Silesia.</p> + +<p>1762 was the last year of the war, and as it opened the prospects of +the King had never seemed to be so gloomy and hopeless. The circle of +his enemies was narrowing round him; Daun and a powerful army held +possession of Saxony and the line of the Elbe; Loudon occupied Silesia +in great force; the Russians were preparing to march from Kolberg; and +the French had 100,000 men in the heart of Germany. Frederick thought +that the end had at last come; yet, unshaken by the approach of the +tempest, he confronted it with heroic constancy, and like a lion who +marks the advance<span class="pagenum" id="Page_97">[97]</span> of the hunters, he moved hither and thither with the +wrecks of his armies, watching an opportunity to strike with effect, +and determined to challenge fortune to the last. As had always happened +in the Seven Years’ War, the French operations completely failed, and +Frederick contrived to recruit his forces with 20,000 Germans in the +Austrian service, unwisely disbanded at this supreme moment. Yet these +gleams of success appeared extinguished by an event that portended +complete ruin; the fall of Pitt in detaching England from Prussia, and +depriving her of her only ally, made the cause of the King apparently +hopeless. Nevertheless, his grand strength of character was justly +recompensed, and at the eleventh hour a series of strange incidents +changed the whole state of affairs in Europe. The Empress Elizabeth +suddenly died; her successor, Peter, became an ally of the King; and +though Catherine, his murderess, who seized his crown, did not adopt +the policy of her late husband, Russia withdrew finally from the +Coalition. This became the signal of the dissolution of the League; +France, disgraced and defeated all over the globe, made an ignominious +peace with England and Prussia; and Maria Theresa, left isolated, and +threatened by the Turk, the old foe of Austria, was compelled sullenly +to give up the contest. The last event of the war was the recapture of +Schweidnitz by the Prussian army; Frederick had successfully withstood +the Great Powers of the Continent, and all that Austria, that Russia, +that France had done had not even wrested Silesia from his hands.</p> + +<p>A few weeks after the Peace of Hubertsburg, the King and his army +entered Berlin in triumph. The pageant was very different from that +witnessed in 1866 and in 1871, when Prussia had driven Austria from +her high place in Germany, and had annihilated the military power of +France. The magnificence of war was not to be seen; splendid troops +did not line the squares and the streets; there was no procession of +superb trophies attesting a series of amazing victories. The army which +had begun the contest had well-nigh perished; its ranks were filled by +men not of the stock of Brandenburg; its standards in rags, and its +war-worn aspect attested the vicissitudes and defeats of a long and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_98">[98]</span> +uncertain struggle. Yet the spectacle was one of enduring interest, +big with great results in a far distant future. That army, made up +of many elements from different parts of the great German race, like +Wallenstein’s army of a century before, embodied, however feebly, +the as yet vague idea that Germany was a nation of one blood and +language; and it was the precursor of the patriotic league which rose +and fought for Germany in 1813–14, and of the gigantic hosts which, in +our day, conquered the unity of Germany at Sadowa and Sedan. Frederick +had no sympathy with what, in his time, was merely a dream of a few +enthusiasts; in taste and thought he was through life a Frenchman, +and he never really looked beyond Prussian interests, yet he was the +second Arminius of the Teutonic race, and the Seven Years’ War was +a new era for Germany. For many years, however, his own energy, and +those of his people, were engrossed in efforts to repair the appalling +ruin which had befallen his kingdom. Prussia was a land of desolation +when he sheathed his sword; her population had diminished a tenth; her +youth, equal to war, had been reduced one sixth; savage hordes from the +East had overrun her provinces; every town was darkened with tokens of +mourning; Silesia had more than one silent and deserted village. The +Government, too, had become more despotic in the course of the war than +it had ever been; the pressure of arbitrary taxation was frightful; a +prying Inquisition had entered the homes of all, and, as has been said, +“everything that was not military violence was anarchy.”</p> + +<p>Yet the King was never before so revered by his subjects, and he +remained the object of their love and esteem in an age when, in the +decay of loyalty, every throne of the Continent was being undermined. +This profound national sentiment was partly due to the real merits of +the King as a ruler, but mainly, no doubt, to the patriotic pride of +the martial and ambitious people of Prussia, which has never ceased to +boast that, under its Great Frederick, it defeated the armed strength +of three-fourths of Europe. This legend, indeed, is to a great extent +a fable; the “miraculous,” as Napoleon has said, disappears upon an +impartial survey of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_99">[99]</span> Frederick’s exploits in the Seven Years’ War. +For many months he was superior in force on the theatre; Austria, +all through, was his only determined enemy; Russia was too distant +to act with effect, and had a real interest not to weaken Prussia; +and France either did not put forth her force, or—the Bellona of +Europe—committed the weapons of Condé and Turenne to Soubise and +Clermont, in their hands the darts of an impotent Priam. Even as it +was, too, on more than one occasion the King must have been overwhelmed +and ruined but for the dissensions of the Coalition; and it was his +peculiar good fortune that, if we except Loudon—and this able and +brilliant chief held high command for a few months only—he had to +cope with generals of the third order. Yet admitting all this, and +recollecting besides the many military shortcomings of the King—and +his errors were sometimes of the gravest kind—still his achievements +are justly held by Prussia as a glorious possession above price; they +remain, and will for ever remain, a grand monument of what constancy, +decision, and energy can accomplish against odds which appeared +impossible to resist.</p> + +<p>After the termination of the Seven Years’ War, Frederick never fought +a battle again. He was threatened, indeed, in 1775, by an Austrian +invasion to regain Silesia; and in 1778 the Emperor Joseph arrayed +a great army against Prussia, to assert his claims to a part of +Bavaria. These hostilities, however, came to nothing, and the King +was allowed, during a long space of time, to carry out the policy +he had laid down for himself. It was a policy of craft and ambition +abroad; and Frederick, in his fixed purpose of enlarging Prussia, +was a chief author of the partition of Poland, a crime shared by +Catherine, and even by Maria Theresa—the conscience of the last +was, however, stung—and the cause of unnumbered woes to Europe. His +domestic policy remained one of enlightened despotism, of equal laws +and of strong government, of arbitrary, but tolerably just, rule; and +his kingdom recovered within a short time from most of the effects of +the Seven Years’ War, and made rapid strides in wealth and prosperity. +The King was justly deemed the first sovereign of his age; but the +three accomplices in the destruction of Poland suffered cruelly<span class="pagenum" id="Page_100">[100]</span> for +a great national wrong; but for this, Revolution would have been +quelled in France in 1792 and 1793; but for this, Austria would not +have bled at Austerlitz, and Prussia and Russia mourned for Jena and +Friedland. Though the centralized government of Frederick, too, seemed +a masterpiece of wisdom and power, it proved unable to stand the strain +of ill fortune, and it perished with the renowned Prussian army in the +agony of 1806–7. Frederick died peacefully in 1786, having survived +nearly all the sovereigns of his time. One of his last acts was to +form a league against the pretensions of Imperial Austria; but he was +utterly unconscious that a tempest was at hand which was to destroy the +monarchies of the eighteenth century, and to create a new Prussia out +of the wrecks of the old.</p> + +<p>I turn to my immediate subject. What is the place of the King among +great commanders? Frederick had not supreme original genius; he +was deficient in imagination, and often in judgment; but he had a +powerful mind, intensely quick perception, activity and perseverance +beyond praise; and he was endowed, besides, with a force of character +and a steadfastness seldom bestowed on man. These qualities made +him the greatest captain of an age wanting in masters of the art; +and he accomplished wonders, spite of his many faults, with an army +infinitely the best in Europe. As a strategist, he stands low in the +second order; his ideas were occasionally sound and brilliant, but the +plans of his campaigns were, for the most part, bad; and he had not +the faculty of those great combinations which disclose real strategic +genius. Holding, as he usually did, a central position between enemies +widely apart, he would repeatedly have defeated them in detail had +he possessed the science and the gifts of Turenne; and had he had to +cope, not with the Lorraines and the Dauns, but with the general of +Castiglione and Rivoli, he would have been struck down over and over +again, as the result of his false and ill-directed movements. His +place as a tactician is much higher. Frederick had real insight and +skill on the field; he possessed a great deal of Marlborough’s power +of detecting the vulnerable points of an enemy, and of striking at +them until success was attained, and his favourite manœuvre,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_101">[101]</span> when +properly understood, is an illustration of the great principle that +you should always so place your troops on the ground as to turn it to +the best advantage, and to make the most of their powers upon it. Yet +the King had not Marlborough’s unerring skill; even as a tactician he +made great mistakes. He was deservedly beaten at Kolin and Hochkirch; +he had the great fault of sometimes losing his temper. There is a bad +mannerism in his conduct of battles, and more than once he completely +ignored the conditions under which, and under which alone, the attack +in oblique order could be risked or justified. The title of Frederick +to rank among the first of warriors depends less, in fact, upon his +intellectual faculties than upon his grand and extraordinary moral +qualities, tenacity, and marvellous strength of character; no general +has surpassed him in the rare gift of overcoming difficulties, and +escaping from peril; no general, not even Arthur Wellesley, has +confronted a huge superiority of force with more calmness and firmness +of purpose; no general, not even his countryman Blücher, a subaltern in +the Seven Years’ War, has excelled him in rising above defeat, and in +mastering an enemy who had seemed secure in victory. If Napoleon says +truly—and who can doubt it?—that a strong nature is the greatest gift +of a chief, Frederick is eminent among the masters of war.</p> + + <div class="figcenter"> + <img + class="p2" + src="images/i_020.jpg" + alt=""> + </div> + + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_102">[102]</span></p> + +<h2>CHAPTER IV.<br> +<span class="subhed smcap">Napoleon.</span></h2></div> + +<p>The years that followed the peace of Hubertsburg were a period of +repose, if not for mankind, at least for five-sixths of Continental +Europe. Russia, indeed, half an Asiatic Power, carrying out the designs +of Peter the Great, under the rule of a bad but most able woman, +advanced beyond the Tanais to the heads of the Euxine; and Austria, +deprived of the genius of Eugene, was more than once engaged in a +doubtful contest with Islam, formidable even in decay. But France was +scarcely involved in war, apart from a naval struggle with England; +hardly a shot was fired in despoiling Poland; save for demonstrations +that came to nothing, Germany was at peace from the Rhine to the Oder; +and though England founded an Empire in Hindustan, and the Great +Republic of the Far West was born, the conflicts that led to these +mighty events were outside the pale of the European world. As happened +after the peace of Utrecht, few occasions arose during this long season +of comparative rest for the illustration of the military art, by +examples in the field; the chiefs of the Seven Years’ War passed slowly +away; and their successors in the direction of armies, for the most +part men of the third order, were generally content to adhere stolidly +to the traditions and methods of that great contest. The attack in +oblique order was assumed to be an infallible method to win a battle +by theorists who did not understand the difference between Kolin, +Rossbach, and Leuthen; and Napoleon has described, with sarcastic +pleasantry, how pedants were wont to flock<span class="pagenum" id="Page_103">[103]</span> to Potsdam to behold the +manœuvres of the Prussian army engaged in movements to turn a flank at +reviews; the great King who still commanded in person, laughing quietly +at their shallow conceits. It is remarkable, however, that on the one +occasion when Germany was seriously threatened with war, from 1762 to +1791, the strategy and even the tactics of Daun prevailed over those +of his renowned antagonist. In 1778 Frederick put two armies in motion +to invade Bohemia, by the double line of the operations of 1866; but +Loudon and Lacy formed a great entrenched camp. In this position they +awaited an attack, interposing between the divided enemy; and the King +did not venture even to offer battle.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile, changes fraught with momentous results, in the approaching +era of world-wide conflict, were gradually making themselves felt +in Europe. The armed strength of Russia was immensely increased; +and her armies growing with the expanding Empire, though still +imperfectly equipped and organized, became instruments of war in the +hands of Suvóroff, very different from the half-barbarian hosts which +had displayed their savage constancy at Zorndorf and Künersdorf. +Simultaneously the military power of Austria, under the rule of the +dreamy reformer, Joseph, had relatively declined to a great extent; +and the famous Prussian army, though still formidable in numbers, in +discipline and in real worth had begun, even in the last years of +Frederick, to lose much of its old efficiency; and after his death, it +fell distinctly away from the high standard of the Seven Years’ War. As +for the French army, it had been augmented, and, to outward appearance, +had much improved; the Government and the nation had made great efforts +to efface the shame of days such as Minden and Rossbach; camps of +instruction were formed in parts of the country where the troops were +carefully trained and drilled; and the artillery of France, at all +times excellent, was remodelled, and became far the best in Europe. +Yet the Revolution, already at hand, had impaired the military power +of the State; the <i>noblesse</i>, still holding all high commands, +gave no successors to Condé and Turenne; there were fatal dissensions +between the officers and the men; and though the army was very much +better than it had been when led<span class="pagenum" id="Page_104">[104]</span> by Soubise, it was not the unrivalled +army of Louis XIV. It may be said, therefore, that old Europe, from the +Niemen to the Tagus, was ill-prepared, at the close of this period, for +a great war; and as for the British army, it was deemed of no account +after the disasters of Saratoga and York Town. Concurrently with these +changes, the material progress which had been marked in Europe since +the seventeenth century, had gone on with increased development, and +had continued to affect the conditions of war. While the populations +of the different States had multiplied and yielded ample elements +of military force, agriculture had made a rapid advance; and the +inventions of the second half of the eighteenth century had given a +remarkable impulse to every urban industry. Vast tracts of marsh, of +forest, of waste, had been enclosed and brought under cultivation; new +roads and bridges had been largely made; insignificant hamlets had +become towns, and towns had grown into great cities more flourishing +and peopled, in some instances, than the older cities they had, in +fact, supplanted. As the general result, from a military point of view, +the consequences were that armies in the field could obtain far ampler +means of supply than ever had been the case before; on most theatres of +war they would possess more roads and facilities of movement than in +previous contests; and the defensive power of fortresses, for a century +in decline, had become less than it had ever been, and, indeed, was of +little avail on several frontiers.</p> + +<p>This period of repose, as has often happened, was marked by +speculations of different kinds on the theory and practice of the +Art of War. The military writers of the day, however, were, without +exception, inferior men; and this is strange when we bear in mind that +the age was about to behold a display of military genius of the highest +order. The great increase of roads and of the means of manœuvring did +not suggest to these dull theorists that armies could make more rapid +movements, and could concentrate more quickly on given points than had +been possible in former times; on the contrary, these facts gave rise +to a notion that it had become necessary, in operations in the field, +to separate armies into numerous masses, and to cover all avenues that +were liable to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_105">[105]</span> attack. This false principle was largely confirmed +by the growth in the size of European armies, which had been one of +the results of the peace. These, it was assumed, in the event of war, +would be developed into vast proportions; and how was it possible to +move these large arrays, save by marching on a greatly extended front, +and occupying all the roads on the theatre? Nor did it occur to these +writers that the immense increase in the products of husbandry, which +had been witnessed in most parts of Europe, might enable armies to draw +their supplies more fully from resources on the spot, and, therefore, +to move with more ease and freedom than had been conceivable a century +before; they emphatically insisted on the necessity of magazines, +and of laying in enormous means of subsistence beforehand; and they +believed that war would be more methodical as armies grew into larger +dimensions. In theory, strategy became much less bold than in the days +of Turenne and Marlborough; the system of advances upon an immense +front, holding all the roads, and moving very slowly, with huge trains +of impedimenta and supplies, replaced the daring manœuvres of these +famous chiefs; and it contributed not a little to the change that +Europe was stirred by no great impulse, that the age seemed indisposed +to war, and that military energy appeared deadened through the +influences of the last half of the century.</p> + +<p>Some progress, however, had been made in tactics, and in the mechanism +and formation of armies. The method of the attack in oblique order +was still considered the best possible; but means to defeat it had +been devised, though these had not yet been proved in the field. +Frederick’s outflanking movement was a rapid advance, made in line, +when the enemy’s wing was attained; but, admirable as was the training +of the Prussian army, this was always attended with difficulty and +delay, especially in broken and intricate ground; and it was proposed +to encounter this by attacks in columns, more flexible and easily +handled than lines, these being preceded by clouds of skirmishers—an +American idea of the War of Independence—which would cover the onset +of the larger masses, and, to a considerable extent, would screen +their march. In this way the attack in oblique order, it was argued, +might be<span class="pagenum" id="Page_106">[106]</span> met and repelled by a simpler and quicker method of tactics; +a new offensive system might replace the old; and, in any event, an +army ought not to remain passive and to allow itself to be turned on +a wing, as had repeatedly happened in the Seven Years’ War. All this, +however, as yet was mere theory, unconfirmed by actual experience in +the field; and, for the rest, the current strategic notions had made +their influence felt in tactics, and movements widely divided upon the +theatre, suggested similar movements in actual battle. In some respects +armies had been much improved; the increase of their numbers had caused +battalions and squadrons to be formed into brigades and divisions, more +unity being given to the collective mass; the value of horse artillery +had been fully recognized; and, as I have said, France had taken the +lead in bringing her artillery to a high point of excellence.</p> + +<p>The Art of War seemed thus in a state of decay, and was being affected +by the new theories, when the French Revolution, like a volcano, burst +suddenly upon a terrified world. The invasion of Champagne in 1792 was +followed by Valmy and Jemmapes; and, in 1793, the hosts of old Europe +gathered in arms against the bloodstained Republic, which had flung the +head of a king to its foes, and had proclaimed the new Evangel of the +Rights of Man on the ruins of a fallen altar and throne. The military +operations of the next few years were marked by the want of strategic +insight, and by the uncertain and unproved tactics which had grown out +of the speculations of the age: and—apart from the tremendous issues +at stake—are not of enduring and special interest. Not, indeed, that +the wretched failures of the Allies where wholly due to feeble and bad +generalship; they were largely caused by events in the East of Europe, +by the discords and selfishness of the Coalition, and even by its +essential weakness. Beside that they were not prepared for war, the +partition of Poland made the great German Powers comparatively without +resources on the Rhine; it has been said, indeed, that they had no +real wish to effect the restoration of the Bourbon Monarchy, lest it +should avenge a dark international crime. Austria and Prussia, too, and +the lesser German States were at odds with each other, and would<span class="pagenum" id="Page_107">[107]</span> not +act in concert; the avowed purpose of the Allies to dismember France +threw an enormous weight into the scale against them; and, at the very +crisis of the campaign of 1793, when they could without difficulty +have advanced to Paris, they separated their forces in order to reduce +strong places meant to be permanently retained.</p> + +<p>The timidity, however, and the false principles which marked the +conduct of these campaigns contributed mainly to their ignominious end. +The chiefs of the Coalition divided their armies in fractions, upon an +immense front, extending from the Var to the Meuse and the Lys; they +occupied all the main approaches to France; and they moved extremely +slowly, and with great magazines and incumbrances, through a most +fertile country where celerity was of supreme importance, and where +their troops could find ample supplies on the spot. As the inevitable +result, their forces were weak at every point of their enormous line, +and were nowhere able to strike with effect; they were actually unequal +to passing fortresses which they sate down to besiege and occupy, +though a relieving army was seldom at hand; and their advance was so +tardy and beset by hindrances, that they gave France what she most +needed—time to organise her strength and to make the war national. +The errors, however, of the new strategy were conspicuous also on the +French side, though not, perhaps, in such great proportions. The French +armies, like those of their foes, were usually disseminated on a vast +front, and were, therefore, feeble on the whole theatre; and though +Carnot made one or two good movements, and showed that he knew the +importance of interior lines along the space between the Rhine and the +Lys, the plans of his campaigns as a rule were bad, and displayed the +same defects as those of the Allies. On the other hand, the operations +of the French were more rapid than those of their enemies; having no +magazines and impedimenta of the kind, they flung themselves like a +horde on the country, lived on it, and yet appeared in the field; but +though this system made their movements more quick, their efforts were +usually ill-directed, and had the Coalition shown skill and energy, +it must have triumphed in 1793–94. The tactics of the belligerent +armies were<span class="pagenum" id="Page_108">[108]</span> also influenced by recent theories, and were tentative, +unsettled, and in a state of transition. The Prussians attacked, at +Valmy, in the oblique order, but they were driven back by the fine +French artillery; the Austrians, at Jemmapes, followed the methods of +Daun, awaited the enemy in a strong position, and were overwhelmed +by superior numbers. In other engagements the Allies adopted the +system of attack in ill-combined columns, and were often beaten by +their more active foes. More regularity is seen in the tactics of the +French, though these as yet were quite immature and imperfect. The +practice of advancing in columns, with skirmishers in front, borrowed +from speculations already known, fell in well with the existing state +of the revolutionary military power of France; the myriads of young +levies which filled her armies were formed into masses given cohesion +by the disciplined soldiers of the old Monarchy; and these were +launched recklessly against the lines of their foes, and, fired as they +were with patriotic passion, occasionally gained important success, +especially in intricate and wooded country. By degrees these bodies +became real soldiers, though their formations were as yet rude; their +immense numbers and their enthusiasm told; though there is little doubt +they would not have saved France had they not had the support of her +regular army.</p> + +<p>Ere long the hour came, and the man appeared who was to educe order out +of these chaotic elements, to turn to account, with consummate skill, +the new conditions available in war, and to raise the first of arts +to the extreme of perfection. Napoleon Bonaparte was born in 1769, a +scion of a House of the <i>noblesse</i> of Florence—the birthplace of +many illustrious men—which had emigrated from Italy in the sixteenth +century, and, since that time had found a home in Corsica. The child +was cradled, so to speak, in war; the traditions of Paoli filled his +mind in infancy, and it may well be that the heroic figure of the +legislator and champion of his little island had an influence on the +future author of the Code, and on the chief who raised France to the +heights of glory. Napoleon was sent at an early age to the well-known +Military School of Brienne, one of the foundations of the Bourbon +Kings, and he<span class="pagenum" id="Page_109">[109]</span> passed from thence to a Royal school in Paris, to +complete his education for the profession of arms. Little is known +about him in these boyish years; he was grave, taciturn, and fond of +books, especially of the historical and romantic kind; but except that +he excelled in mathematical science, and that he impressed his teachers +with an undefined sense of power, he was not considered a lad of +extraordinary parts. He entered the army at the age of sixteen, and the +bent of his genius became apparent in his assiduous attention to the +history of war, and especially in his constant study of military maps, +pursuits that gave token of the great future strategist. Though born +a gentleman, and retaining through life many of the instincts of the +ancient <i>régime</i>, Napoleon at this time was a needy youth, with no +hope of rising under the old order of things; and it is not surprising, +when the Revolution broke out, that he eagerly took to the new ideas, +and ranged himself on the side of the soldier, in the divisions that +filled the army with discord. As events progressed, he certainly had +relations with Robespierre and some of the Terrorists; but this passage +in his career is still ill-explained. We may accept his statement that +he always stood aloof from Jacobin anarchy and its deeds of blood; +and his well-known exclamation, on the 10th of August, when the Swiss +Guards were slaughtered by a Parisian rabble, shows that, even in those +days, he had that profound contempt of popular movements of every kind +which was one of his most distinctive qualities.</p> + +<p>He was a captain of artillery at the memorable siege of Toulon in +1793; and on this occasion he first gave proof of his extraordinary +capacity in war. Toulon was vainly attacked from the land side, for +its communications with the sea were open; and the French army, led +by incapable men, was too weak to master its walls and its ramparts. +But the Allied fleets were the main defence of the place; these were +crowded within the port and the roadsteads; and they were liable to +be destroyed were they exposed to the fire of powerful batteries from +a small projecting headland. At a council of war Napoleon declared +that this point, when occupied, would be the key to Toulon; and the +truth was so evident that he convinced his superiors. His admirable +prevision<span class="pagenum" id="Page_110">[110]</span> was soon realised. When the promontory was seized, the +hostile squadrons, completely commanded, at once put to sea, and Toulon +fell in an instant as if by magic. This exploit justly attracted +attention. Bonaparte was next employed on the Italian frontier, where +his strategic ability manifested itself in turning the positions of the +Piedmontese army; and, at the instance of the Government, he quelled +the revolt of the Sections on the 13th Vendémiaire, and in this service +he showed that he had remarkable presence of mind and firmness. He was +now known as a soldier of high promise; and, having married Josephine +Beauharnais—partly owing to the influence of her old lover, Barras, +but partly, too, because of his acknowledged powers—he was given the +command, in the spring of 1796, of some 38,000 or 40,000 men encamped +along the Genoese seaboard, with general orders to invade Italy. This +operation, however, was to be quite secondary to those of the great +armies about to enter Germany, with Jourdan and Moreau at their head; +and some of the Directory, it is said, wished to get rid, in this way, +of an importunate young man who had pestered them with grand strategic +projects pronounced by experienced chiefs to be wild extravagance.</p> + +<p>I have now reached the campaigns of Napoleon; I can describe them only +in the barest outline; but I must dwell for a moment on that of Italy. +The army, in the hands of the young general, had suffered terrible +privations, and was in extreme want; but it was composed of trained and +enthusiastic soldiers; it had several good subordinate chiefs, and it +could be made a most formidable instrument of war under the guidance +and inspiration of a great commander. Spread along the coast from Nice +to the verge of Genoa, it was confronted by a Sardinian and an Austrian +army, perhaps 60,000 strong, if united, led by Colli and Beaulieu, +experienced generals, but veterans of the old school; and their forces, +based on Turin and Milan, held the hill country, where the French +Alps decline and join the extreme western Apennines. Napoleon’s first +operations strikingly illustrate the intelligence of the theatre and +the skill in stratagem in which no military chief can be compared with +him. Giving out that he was about to advance by <span class="pagenum" id="Page_111">[111]</span>Genoa, he made a +feigned demonstration on his right, causing Beaulieu largely to detach +to his left; and then, counter-marching with extreme celerity, he +poured his troops through the Cadibona Pass, the lowest eminence in the +uniting ranges, and surrounded and routed part of the Austrian centre. +Beaulieu and Colli endeavouring to concentrate, presented their forces, +still divided, to their foe; these were defeated at Dego and Millesimo; +and the baffled chiefs retreated on Acqui and Ceva, diverging towards +their bases at Milan and Turin, and leaving a widening interval between +their shattered armies. Napoleon, standing in strength between his +antagonists, detached a wing to hold Beaulieu in check, and then +drawing together the rest of his forces, he pursued Colli, struck him +down at Mondovi, and compelled the King of Sardinia to sue for peace. +He took care to secure his communications with France by insisting on +the cession of the Piedmontese fortresses; and having thus gained a new +base—he had quietly disregarded injunctions from Paris to stir up a +revolution in Piedmont—he set off to pursue Beaulieu, in retreat along +the northern bank of the Po.</p> + + <div class="figcenter" id="i_b_110fp"> + <img + class="p1" + src="images/i_b_110fp.jpg" + alt=""> + <p class="p0 sm center">Theatre of the Campaigns in NORTH ITALY</p> + </div> + +<p>Deceiving again his adversary by a false rumour, Napoleon next made +a forced march to the river, advancing, as he has said, “with the +speed of a torrent,” and gathering his supplies on his way, from the +country; and crossing at Piacenza, he forestalled the Austrians, +threatened their rear, and forced them to retire on the Adda. A fierce +engagement at Lodi followed, in which Bonaparte showed remarkable skill +in securing every advantage on the ground; Beaulieu, out-manœuvred, +fell back to the Mincio, and Napoleon entered Milan in triumph, +having, like Turenne, conquered by a war of marches. The French army +now had some days of repose; its chief employed them in assuring his +base, in levying requisitions in immense quantities, and in making +preparations for fresh exploits; and if he showed no scruple in these +measures, and, in fact, he organized rapine on an enormous scale, he +established himself firmly in the heart of Lombardy. Towards the close +of May Napoleon advanced to the Mincio; Beaulieu, trying to cover the +stream at all points, was easily dislodged by a daring attack, and +the Austrian army, beaten and cowed, was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_112">[112]</span> forced to take refuge in +the hills of the Tyrol. By this time Bonaparte had received orders +from the Directory to march from the Po to the Tiber, to drive the +Pope from Rome, and to rouse Southern Italy; but he refused to follow +false strategic plans which, he declared, would involve his army in +ruin; and with admirable insight he addressed himself to operations +which, if successful, would, he hoped, give France the great prize of +Italy. The Austrians were his only formidable foes; the whole peninsula +would succumb if their military strength was really broken; and the +problem was how to attain this end with a small French army advanced +to the Mincio. In the line of the Adige Napoleon perceived the true +theatre on which to operate; the river, bounded on the west by the Lake +of Garda, hemmed in by mountains as it flowed southward, and ending +in tracts of widespreading marshes, afforded an enormously strong +barrier, especially if it were held on both banks; and accordingly he +took possession of the stream, having, without hesitation, seized the +fortresses of the Venetian Republic, on its lower course, and having, +meanwhile, sat down to besiege Mantua, the last stronghold still +retained by Austria. The conception, original, grand, and simple alike, +was an inspiration of true strategic genius, and one of the finest of +a marvellous career. Summer had now come, and as the Austrian armies +had as yet made no signs of appearing, Napoleon employed this breathing +time in pressing forward the attack on Mantua, and in strengthening the +power of France in Italy.</p> + +<p>The Emperor, meanwhile, had made great efforts to retrieve the late +reverses of his troops in Lombardy. The French armies under Moreau +and Jourdan, directed on widely distant lines, according to the false +strategy of the day, had been held in check by the Archduke Charles, +and had achieved no real success in Germany; and Würmser, a veteran +of high repute, was despatched from the Upper Rhine with about 30,000 +men, to reinforce the defeated army of Beaulieu—that general had been +deprived of his command—and with orders to drive the French out of +Italy. The Austrian army cannot have been less than from 60,000 to +70,000 strong; Bonaparte had perhaps only 40,000 men besieging Mantua, +and along<span class="pagenum" id="Page_113">[113]</span> the Adige; and as the value of that barrier, in the hands +of a master, was not understood in the Imperial councils, the defeat +of the French seemed a foregone conclusion. Believing that Napoleon +would retain his hold on Mantua, or, at least, would hesitate until +it was too late, Würmser divided his army into three masses, the left +and centre under the General-in-Chief moving down the Adige by the +valleys and hills that meet the eastern shores of the Lake of Garda, +the right, led by Quasdanovich, along the western shore, the object +being that the combined forces should close round and stifle the French +near Mantua. Napoleon waited until the movement was made plain, and +his resolution was at once taken with the strength of character of +a great captain. He raised the siege of Mantua on the last night of +July, and his enemies being divided by the lake, he turned against +Quasdanovich, who was nearest at hand, and drove his advanced guard +back for a long distance. Würmser, meanwhile, had forced his way to +the Mincio; dividing his army, he detached a part to attack the French +supposed to be still round Mantua, and he sent another part to unite +with Quasdanovich, assumed by his chief to be close at hand. This gave +Bonaparte an opportunity to strike; he had by this time his whole +army together; and while he kept Quasdanovich baffled, in check, he +encountered the separated forces of Würmser, and routed them in detail, +at Lonato first, and then, decisively, at Castiglione. Quasdanovich had +already fallen back; Würmser was compelled to recross the Mincio, and +his broken army was so demoralised, that he had to ascend the Adige and +fly into the Tyrol.</p> + +<p>Napoleon now exhibited one of his most striking qualities, his terrible +skill in pursuing a defeated enemy. Relying on the moral power of his +victories, he marched north of the lake along both shores; and then, +concentrating his forces, he beat Davidowich, a lieutenant of Würmser, +at Roveredo, just as that tenacious chief had planned another advance +on Mantua, moving, on this occasion, from the Tyrol eastwards, to the +Lower Adige. Napoleon, leaving a detachment to restrain Davidowich, +pressed Würmser with indefatigable energy, came up with him in the +defiles of the Brenta, overthrew him completely at Bassano, and drove +him, with the mere wreck of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_114">[114]</span> an army, into the low country east of the +Adige. The situation of the veteran appeared desperate; he was cut off +from retreat to the Tyrol; a triumphant enemy was upon his rear; and +how was he to get across the Lower Adige, held by French garrisons, +where it could be passed, before Bonaparte should reach and destroy +him? Napoleon thought he had his foe in his toils; but Würmser was a +bold and undaunted soldier, and he managed to force the passage at +Legnago, and even to make good his way to Mantua, striking down some +small hostile bodies in his path. The old chief, proud of this trifling +success, attempted to make a stand near Mantua; but he was driven into +the fortress with loss; and Mantua was again invested. In a brief +campaign of about six weeks, Napoleon, with a very inferior force, +had annihilated a far more powerful enemy; and all that remained of +Würmser’s army were a few thousand men far away in the Tyrol, and a +few thousand more imprisoned in Mantua, a burden rather than a relief +to the garrison. Such extraordinary success had never been witnessed +before, and it was obviously due to the genius of the French commander.</p> + +<p>Austria, nevertheless, with characteristic firmness, did not yet +give up the protracted contest. Moreau and Jourdan by this time +were in retreat towards the Rhine, the Archduke Charles, who, in +this campaign had operated between divided enemies, with a feeble +approach to Napoleon’s skill, having gained real success in Germany; +and considerable reinforcements were sent to the Tyrol, and to the +plain country known as Friuli, and were placed under the command of +Alvinzi, another old general of some distinction, with directions at +any cost to relieve Mantua. Alvinzi had passed the Isonzo by the end +of October with from 30,000 to 40,000 men, Davidowich being still in +the Tyrol with 15,000 to 18,000; and the plan of the Austrian chief +was to make these divided masses converge at Verona upon the Adige; +and, having forced the passage, to march to the Mincio. The main French +army at this time held the lowlands between the Brenta and the Adige, +a considerable detachment under Vaubois being in the Tyrol watching +the enemy; and as Napoleon in this instance persisted in continuing +the siege of Mantua, and kept a large force around the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_115">[115]</span> place, he had +not 40,000 men altogether in the field. The first operations of the +Austrian leaders were attended with success that might have been made +decisive. Masséna, the ablest lieutenant of Bonaparte, held Alvinzi, +indeed, in check on the Brenta; but Vaubois was driven, in defeat, from +the Tyrol; the important position of Rivoli was lost; and Davidowich +had approached Verona by the first week of November. The principal +army of the French was now compelled to fall back; Napoleon sent a +detachment to support Vaubois; but though Rivoli, the key to Verona, +was regained, Alvinzi had advanced and drawn near the city. Napoleon +attacked him fiercely at Caldiero, but the French recoiled, baffled, +from a very strong position; and had Davidowich at this moment pressed +forward boldly, and Alvinzi made good use of his success, they might +have effected their junction, seized Verona, and made their way across +the Adige. But the spell of defeat was on the Austrian chiefs; and +Napoleon, seizing his one chance with marvellous skill, plucked a +glorious triumph out of the extreme of peril.</p> + +<p>Abandoning Verona, he crossed the Adige; he moved quickly down the +stream and recrossed it, and then he suddenly fell on his astounded +foe, advancing along the dykes of Arcola, through the morasses of the +Lower Adige, where the agility and vehemence of the French soldiery +would, he foresaw, give them a great advantage. The battle raged +confusedly for several days; Napoleon more than once led his men in +person; Davidowich, meanwhile, had reconquered Rivoli; but skill and +French valour at last prevailed, and the two Austrian armies were +ultimately compelled to fall back behind the Brenta and into the Tyrol +discomfited, and with immense losses. Austria, however, would not +confess defeat; great efforts were made to restore her armies; and +Alvinzi assumed the offensive again, in the first days of January 1797. +He had even now probably 60,000 men against 35,000 or 40,000 French; +and his plan was to descend the Adige, to occupy Rivoli, and then to +seize Verona, and to press on to Mantua, a diversion being at the same +time made on the Lower Adige by his lieutenant, Provera. By the 14th +of January the Austrian columns had surrounded Rivoli on every side; +but in the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_116">[116]</span> difficult march through the hills, their artillery and +cavalry had been attached to one column only, on the best road, and +this gave Napoleon, who had his army in hand, though very inferior in +force, a decided advantage. The issue of the battle was never doubtful; +Masséna displayed conspicuous skill; the Austrians, smitten down by +the French guns, and unable to reply, lost heart and were beaten; and +Alvinzi drew off, overthrown and routed. It is unnecessary to dwell on +the last scenes of the contest; Provera contrived to cross the Adige, +and even to make his way to Mantua; but he was crushed by Napoleon, +who had hurried from Rivoli, and on the 11th of January laid down his +arms. The fate of Mantua was now sealed; three efforts to relieve the +place had failed; the garrison was reduced to extremities; and Würmser +capitulated in a few days. The last Italian fortress of Austria had +fallen; but this was nothing compared to her other losses. Army after +army had perished in the attempt to dislodge Bonaparte from the Adige, +and the Empire was completely exhausted.</p> + +<p>By this time the main seat of the war had been transferred from the +Rhine and the Danube to the Adige, the Isonzo, and the hills of the +Tyrol; a man of genius had transformed the situation. I shall not refer +to the close of the struggle. The Archduke Charles, the last hope of +the Hapsburgs, endeavoured in vain to arrest the march of Bonaparte +across the Carnic Alps, into the valleys of the Drave and the Mur. In +the second week of April the youthful conqueror beheld the steeples +of Vienna from the heights of the Simmering, having, with an army +never 50,000 strong, subdued Italy and shattered the power of Austria. +Nor can I notice Leoben and Campo Formio, or moralize on the Fall of +Venice; nor can I comment on the profound statecraft, very different +from the revolutionary cant, shown by Napoleon in the negotiations for +peace. Yet a word must be said, by way of comment, on the memorable +campaign of 1796–97, by some considered its great author’s masterpiece. +The dazzling imagination, one of the most striking, and yet a dangerous +gift of Napoleon, was not seen in this passage of arms as distinctly as +in more than one that followed; but every other faculty of a master of +war was exhibited in the highest perfection.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_117">[117]</span> The first accomplishment +of a true strategist, skill in so understanding the theatre of war as +to make it subserve his ends in view, was displayed in more than one +notable instance; the perception of the importance of the Cadibona +Pass, and the grand choice of the Adige as a barrier, are examples that +cannot escape the reader. Nor less admirable was the exhibition of +another great strategic gift, the combination of force on the decisive +points, the usual prelude of real success. Napoleon, always weaker +than his foes, if united, was often stronger on the scene of immediate +action, and this was largely due to his wonderful powers, if it was +also caused by the faults of adversaries who persisted in following a +false strategic system. No commander besides, not even Turenne, had +approached Napoleon in the great art of manœuvring between divided +enemies, of striking them left and right in succession, and of gaining +the flank and rear of a hostile army; the operations against Würmser, +and the march to Piacenza, are admirable specimens of this kind of +excellence. In the movements, too, and manœuvres of Bonaparte, we see a +splendour, and yet a scientific method, and, perhaps most distinctly, +a skill in stratagem peculiar to himself, and hitherto scarcely known; +and as for his tactics, the genius with which he chose the ground at +Arcola stamps him at once as a master in the highest sphere of this +art. Nor less remarkable were his moral qualities; his energy and +resolution, for example, appear conspicuously in the raising of the +siege of Mantua; and no one but Napoleon would have ventured to cross +the will of the Directory, as he did more than once, at the risk of his +fortune, and perhaps of his life.</p> + +<p>Yet in this marvellous display of genius and power we can occasionally +see defects and faults. Napoleon risked too much in continuing the +siege of Mantua at the approach of Alvinzi. He should not, perhaps, +have fought at Caldiero; and we trace signs of that over-confidence in +success, which certainly was his most distinctive error. One general +cause of the extreme brilliancy of his movements should be carefully +noted. Napoleon, unlike the first revolutionary chiefs, did not merely +throw his troops on a country and allow them to plunder to obtain +subsistence; he well<span class="pagenum" id="Page_118">[118]</span> knew the fatal results of this system, and he +organized magazines and depôts with care; but he perceived, with true +insight, that, in Italy at least, it was nearly always possible to +find resources on the spot; and his army accordingly moved with much +less impediments than that of the heavily-encumbered Austrians, and +was often able to assume a bold offensive which generals of the old +type would have deemed impossible. This method, however, which he +made almost perfect, had a dangerous side as yet unseen, but to be +manifested in a still distant future. For the rest, Napoleon, in the +campaign of Italy, had good subordinates and an army that became most +formidable in his master hand; but the force that really determined +events was the great military genius which had suddenly appeared.</p> + +<p>I shall pass over Napoleon’s career in the East, the Pyramids, and the +failure at Acre; these campaigns but slightly illustrate his genius in +war. His object in his descent on Egypt was to march through Syria and +Persia to the Indus. He always maintained that the design was feasible; +but our present knowledge shows that it was quite impossible, and +in this, as in other of his military plans, his soaring imagination +overcame his judgment. On his return to France in the winter of 1799 +he easily supplanted the tottering Government, and, as First Consul, +seized supreme power; and though I shall not comment on the 18th +Brumaire, it may fairly be said that this <i>coup d’état</i> saved +France and restored her to her place in Europe. A second Coalition had +been formed against her, during Napoleon’s absence, after the Battle +of the Nile. Prussia, indeed, held aloof, but Russia appeared in +formidable strength on the theatre of war; and Austria, aided by the +gold and the troops of England, once more placed powerful armies in +the field. Notwithstanding the examples of the campaign of 1796, that +of 1799 proceeded on the late false principles. The war was conducted +on an enormous front, from the Texel, along the Rhine, to the Tiber; +and the armies on both sides were split into fractions, comparatively +inefficient on a vast field of manœuvre. The Allies, however, gained +important success. Masséna, indeed, saved France at Zürich; but +Suvóroff drove<span class="pagenum" id="Page_119">[119]</span> the French out of Italy, and the Austrians, reversing +the events of 1796, advanced from the Mincio, and approached the French +Alps. When Napoleon, who, in a few months, had accomplished wonders +of administrative skill, in restoring the finances and power of the +State, had, in the beginning of 1800, to survey the military affairs +of France, her situation was still critical in the extreme. Russia, +indeed, had abandoned the Allied cause, but Austria had put her whole +strength forth. One great Imperial army, led by Mélas, covered Italy +from the Adige to the Tanaro; another, under Kray, was in the Swabian +lowlands, holding the southern approaches to the Black Forest; and +France, with forces reduced and weakened, was threatened with invasion +on the Rhine and the Var.</p> + +<p>A man of surpassing powers in war was, however, for the first time at +her head; and this proved sufficient to turn the scale of Fortune. +Napoleon’s project for the campaign was not completely realised; but +it was the most striking perhaps of his great career, and it ended in +a succession of triumphs. With that wonderful glance which read the +whole theatre, and saw how to make the best use of it, the First Consul +perceived that the two hostile armies were separated by the vast space +of Switzerland, at this time in the possession of the French; and +the army of Mélas, about 100,000 strong, and intended ultimately to +enter Provence, was the principal army, on what ought to have been the +secondary point of attack only; while that of Kray, perhaps 90,000 men, +designed, if successful, to attain Alsace, was a subordinate force on +the chief scene of action. These being the facts, and as France held +Switzerland, projecting like a huge natural bastion between the enemy’s +widely-divided masses, Napoleon gave Moreau the main French army—it +contained perhaps 100,000 troops—with directions to cross the Rhine +at Schaffhausen, to fall in full force on the rear of Kray, and to cut +him off from his line of retreat; Moreau, at the fitting time, sending +a large detachment across the St. Gothard in order to aid the movements +of the French chief in Italy. Napoleon selected for 1800 the scene of +his exploits in 1796–97; and his design was, avoiding the Piedmontese +fortresses, to cross the Alps by the Great St. Bernard range, and then +rapidly<span class="pagenum" id="Page_120">[120]</span> descending, to seize the lines of the communications of Mélas +with the Adige, and supported by the detachment from Moreau, to force +the Austrians to fight in a disastrous position. The First Consul +calculated that about 40,000 men—France at this juncture could not +yield more—would, with the aid from the main army, suffice for his +purpose; but as it was of the first importance to allow the Austrians +to advance into the far end of Italy, and to engage themselves on the +line of the Var, it was necessary to conceal as much as possible the +formation and destination of the new army of Italy, and especially +to screen its advance to the Alps. To attain his end Napoleon tasked +to the utmost the dexterity in stratagem in which he stands supreme. +He assembled a collection of bad troops at Dijon, and ostentatiously +announced this was his Italian army; but in the meantime he quietly +drew together his real force from different parts of France, masking +the operation with the greatest care and forethought. The main army, +I have said, was to cross the St. Bernard; but a small column was to +march by the pass of Mont Cenis—the ordinary military way through the +Alps—in order effectually to deceive the enemy.</p> + +<p>The campaign only began in earnest in spring, though hostilities had +not ceased through the winter. In the first week of May Mélas had +part of his army besieging Genoa, under his lieutenant, Ott, Masséna +making a stubborn defence; Elsnitz, another Austrian, was upon the Var, +confronted by Suchet, a capable chief well known in the Peninsular War +afterwards; and the rest of the Imperial army held Piedmont, extending +thence to the Adige and the Mincio. Meanwhile, Moreau, a general of +the second order, had feared to execute Napoleon’s design, and to fall +on the rear of Kray by Schaffhausen; he had crossed the Rhine, after +his own fashion, by complicated and even hazardous movements, merely +threatening, not striking Kray, with effect; but he had forced the +weaker hostile army back; and he was able to fulfil one great part +of his mission, and to send 20,000 men across the St. Gothard, under +Moncey, one of the Napoleonic marshals. The First Consul took the +field in the second week of May; his army, secretly moved to the Swiss +frontier, its strength still unknown to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_121">[121]</span> its enemy, crossed the Great +St. Bernard from the 16th to the 19th; and simultaneously the secondary +force moved forward through the pass of Mont Cenis. The hill fort of +Bard arrested the French for a moment; but the obstacle was overcome +skilfully; and by the 23rd the advanced guard of Napoleon was in the +valley of the Dora, and in full march for Piedmont. By this time Mélas +had heard of the advance of the enemy, but he refused to believe in the +force of the French army; he allowed Ott and Elsnitz to remain where +they were; and though he moved to Turin in person, it was with not more +than a few thousand men, for he felt assured that his divisions in +Piedmont would be able to give a good account of Napoleon. The Austrian +chief, too, at this critical moment, was deceived by the apparition of +the column from Mont Cenis; he thought that it was the chief part of +the hostile army; and falling into the snare that had been laid for +him, he halted at Turin to draw in his forces.</p> + +<p>This gave Napoleon the opportunity he sought; he marched from the +Dora across the Sesia and the Ticino with his wonted celerity; and he +entered Milan on the 2nd of June, already menacing the communications +of his foe. He was soon joined by Moncey’s detachment, and being now +at the head of 60,000 men, he crossed the Po, holding both its banks, +and closed on the rear of the main Austrian army, thrown forward almost +to the frontier of France. Mélas, seriously alarmed, gave orders to +concentrate his still very superior force; but Ott lingered to receive +the keys of Genoa, which yielded only after a most stern resistance, +and left a large garrison in the fallen city; Elsnitz was routed by +Suchet in his retreat from the Var; and the Austrian army was immensely +weakened, when in the second week of June it lay round Alessandria, +Ott, who had endeavoured to attain the Po, having been driven back +at Montebello with loss. By this time Napoleon had his army divided +on either bank of the Po, Moncey watching the course of its Alpine +feeders, Napoleon holding the famous Stradella Pass, where the spurs of +the Apennines approach the river; and his enemy, even now, was within +his toils. But the First Consul gave Mélas credit for more strategic +skill than he really possessed; he thought that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_122">[122]</span> the Austrian, after +the fall of Genoa, might endeavour to make his escape by the coast, or +might fall back and overpower Suchet; and he debouched into the great +plain of Marengo, in order to observe and close on his foe. His army +was not 30,000 strong; that of Mélas was probably 40,000; it was very +superior in cavalry and guns, which gave it a marked advantage in open +ground; and no doubt can exist that in risking this movement Napoleon +made a great strategic error. Mélas, a stout warrior of the school +of Daun, attacked the French fiercely on the 14th of June, hoping to +defeat his enemy and to escape from the net thrown around him with +such forethought and skill; and he nearly attained a decisive victory. +Desaix, however, a trusted lieutenant of Bonaparte, arriving from a +distance, restored the battle; the horsemen of Kellerman changed the +fortunes of the day, and the Austrians at last were completely beaten. +The result was then seen of the masterly movements which had brought +Napoleon on the rear of Mélas; the defeated army was compelled to make +terms, and it evacuated the peninsula even beyond the Mincio. France +had regained Italy by a march and a battle.</p> + +<p>Austria, always tenacious, resisted for months, and Moreau gained a +great victory at Hohenlinden, success in part due to the overboldness +of John, a brother of the Archduke Charles, who imagined he had +mastered Napoleon’s strategy. But Marengo had been the decisive +stroke: Austria fought for honour only, after the loss of Italy; +and ere long she accepted the Peace of Lunéville, followed by the +peace of Amiens between France and England. The campaign of 1800 is +the most dazzling of Napoleon’s masterpieces, though marred by what +might have been a fatal error. Full justice, perhaps, has never been +done to the surpassing ability of the First Consul in perceiving the +advantage given to France by her hold of Switzerland, and the false +position of the Austrian armies; for two Napoleons were required on +the scene, to realise completely one grand conception. Had Bonaparte +been in the place of Moreau, and debouched from Schaffhausen across +the Rhine, Kray would have been cut off, and Vienna laid open; and +the ruin of Mélas and the Conquest of Italy was, in fact, half<span class="pagenum" id="Page_123">[123]</span> only +of what might have been done. Yet, as it was, Switzerland was made a +kind of sallyport, to place the French armies on the rear of their +foes; Moreau was rightly given the superior force to paralyse Kray, +and to keep him off from the Rhine; Napoleon properly distributed the +inferior force in Italy, under his own command, for it would suffice +to defeat operations in the Var; and though Moreau failed to destroy +Kray, Napoleon succeeded in destroying Mélas, thrown forward perilously +on the French frontier. Intelligence of the theatre and splendour of +design were never, perhaps, more finely displayed; the ordinary reader +will dwell on the Alpine march; but the true student of war will rather +note the exquisite art with which the army of Italy was collected, +formed, and moved to the Alps, all without the enemy’s knowledge; the +admirable skill by which Mélas was deceived through the demonstration +at Mont Cenis; the celerity of the advance on Milan, and the perfect +arrangements made to combine with Moncey, and then to encompass the +foe. Genius and power of stratagem have never accomplished more; and +had Napoleon remained near the Stradella Pass—Turenne certainly would +have done this—the execution of his plan would have been perfect. +But this wonderful chief was not only too confident throughout his +whole career, but often showed<a id="FNanchor_10" href="#Footnote_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> impatience when near his enemy; +these faults nearly caused him to lose the campaign; and he certainly +ought not to have fought at Marengo, for the chances were in his +opponent’s favour, though an advance towards Alessandria might have +been justified, for Mélas might, perhaps, have escaped by the seaboard, +or have crushed Suchet with his weak detachment.</p> + +<p>I cannot dwell on the Government of the First Consul, on the Code, the +Concordat, the Pacification of La Vendée, the restoration of order +and peace in France, the foundation of the only institutions and laws +which have lasted during her subsequent history; nor can I comment +on his external policy, the settlement of Italy in the interests of +France, and the extension of her influence through the Lesser States +of Germany. I shall only<span class="pagenum" id="Page_124">[124]</span> remark that if these achievements reveal +the near advent of despotism at home, and the spirit of encroaching +ambition abroad, they display administrative excellence of the first +order, and profound, if hard and unscrupulous, statecraft; and they +bear the marks of ineffaceable greatness. I cannot, moreover, enlarge +on the causes which led to the rupture of the Peace of Amiens, and +involved England and France in a death struggle. Nor shall I describe +the Flotilla and the Camp of Boulogne, the accumulation of a great +army destined to cross the Channel, and to invade our coasts, and the +energy, the perseverance, and the careful forethought with which this +last was prepared to effect the descent. Yet a remark must be made +on the fine combinations thought out by Napoleon to carry out his +purpose, for they are a notable example of his skill in stratagem. +His arrangements to embark his army, and to make the passage, in the +flotilla, were but a part of the design; they were largely intended +to mask his purpose; his real plan was to conduct the descent under +the protection of a fleet which should command the Channel. How +indefatigably, and with what consummate art, the First Consul toiled +to effect his object, his correspondence abundantly proves; and, it +must be added, he well nigh succeeded. The Admiralty was deceived, and +Nelson was lured away; and had French seamen been nearly as good as our +own, and Villeneuve been a capable chief, Napoleon would have mastered +the narrow seas for a time, and his army would have stood on our +shores. That he would have found a Moscow, in England, our countrymen +believe; he certainly would have been imprisoned within the ground he +occupied, for our fleets would have cut him off from France, and his +enterprise would probably have been a failure. All this, however, is +speculation only; England undoubtedly was in grave danger, and her +Government did not understand her enemy; though it deserves notice +that Napoleon’s idea, that he would subdue England by pulling down the +Throne and setting a Republic up in its place, was not only a huge +mistake, but tends to show he did not believe that he could succeed +only by mere force of arms.</p> +<hr class="chap"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_125">[125]</span></p> + +<h2>CHAPTER V.<br> +<span class="subhed"><span class="smcap">Napoleon</span> (<i>continued</i>).</span></h2></div> + +<p>The return of Pitt to power, at the call of the nation; the aggressive +foreign policy of the first Consul, and the atrocious execution of the +Duc D’Enghien—a crime that may be palliated but not excused—soon led +to a new Coalition against France. Prussia, indeed, gorged with spoil +after the peace of Basle, stood apart, as she had done in 1799, as if +secretly ashamed of an ignoble part; but Russia and Austria joined +hands with England. Other petty States took the same side, and by the +summer of 1805 the Allies had come to a general agreement to take the +offensive. Before this time Napoleon had become Emperor, with the +universal acclaim of the French people, and the crowned soldier, who +had raised France from the depths of disaster to the head of Europe, +and whose strong hand had put anarchy down, now wielded the resources +of a mighty State, and made the revolutionary forces which he used and +hated the ministers of immense despotic power. The military strength +of France, though it was enlarged afterwards, was now really at its +extreme height, and Napoleon’s army of this period was by far the +finest he ever commanded. I must glance at the characteristics of this +magnificent force, justly known by the name of the Grand Army, and +infinitely the most formidable organization for war which hitherto +had been arrayed in Europe. Apart from small Italian and German +contingents, the Grand Army at this time was composed of Frenchmen, for +the most part troops in the flower of life, but with a large admixture +of veteran soldiers; and this vast body was inflamed with a strong +spirit of enthusiasm, of patriotism of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_126">[126]</span> its own kind, of thirst for +glory, and of intense confidence in an unrivalled leader. Its physical +and moral force was, therefore, enormous; and as five-sixths of it +had for many months been assembled in the great Camp of Boulogne—the +general name of many leaguers—and the troops had been inured to the +hard training of war, its military condition had attained perfection. +It probably numbered at this time about 200,000 men in the first line, +with reserves, perhaps, 200,000 more; and, regiment for regiment, I +certainly think it formed a more efficient instrument of war than the +huge national armies of recent days, composed far too largely of young +conscripts, and never yet subjected to the strain of ill-fortune.</p> + +<p>The general organization of this great force was perfectly adapted, +in Napoleon’s hands, to the conditions of war in the first years of +this century. Brigades and divisions had now been formed into corps, +each under the command of able chiefs, too accustomed, indeed, to look +up to Napoleon, and not given sufficient freedom of action, but all +skilful and experienced soldiers; and the army had more cohesiveness +and real power than ever had been the case formerly. Napoleon, however, +apart from these masses, each an independent army in itself, had +large cavalry and artillery reserves; and he usually kept them under +his immediate control, to wield “his club of Hercules” for decisive +strokes. The Grand Army, too, like that of Louis XIV., had its <i>corps +d’élite</i>—the Imperial Guard—the tenth legion of the modern +Cæsar, and this superb force on many a hard-fought day turned by its +mighty preponderance the scales of fortune. As for the tactics of +the army, they had been perfected in the experience of a long series +of wars; columns of infantry, not as yet too dense, and preceded by +skirmishers, were formed for attack; but they were always supported by +cavalry and guns; and Napoleon invariably took special care that the +three arms should act in concert. These arrangements had given great +flexibility and yet strength to the improved formations; and it was +clearly apparent that the new methods were superior to those of the +Seven Years’ War. As for the mechanism of the army, if I may use<span class="pagenum" id="Page_127">[127]</span> the +word, the whole system of assuring supplies, of establishing magazines +and depôts, and of procuring continual relays of troops, which German +science has brought to perfection, had been largely matured by +Napoleon; and though he always “made war sustain war,” that is, he +usually trusted to resources on the spot in order to enable his troops +to move freely, he was most attentive to the wants of his soldiers, and +provided for them with great administrative skill. Yet, formidable as +it was, the Grand Army had marked defects which require notice. It had +never lost the habits of the Revolutionary Wars; Napoleon’s system, +indeed, promoted rapine; it retained some of the instincts of the +savage hordes let loose in 1793–94; it was crowded with ignorant and +bad officers, the survivors of the huge conventional levies; and the +arrangements of the staff were far from good. It still bore the marks +of a revolutionary age; and in all these respects it was very inferior +to the great army formed by Roon and Moltke.</p> + +<p>The Allies had set their armies in motion by the first week of +September 1805. They had nearly half a million of men on foot; but, +partly owing to divided counsels, and partly to the disastrous mistake +of subordinating military to political ends, this gigantic force was +injudiciously arranged on the theatre. Four separate attacks had +been designed; the first by a small English and Swedish force from +Hanover and the North German seaboard; the second by an Austrian and +a great Russian army, to be assembled upon the banks of the Danube +and ultimately to invade Alsace; the third on northern Italy from the +Adige and the Tyrol, conducted by the Archdukes Charles and John; +and the fourth by an English and Russian contingent disembarked from +a fleet on the coast of Naples. But the first and last attacks were +mere weak diversions, which could not alarm a true strategist; as +regards the second, the Russian army, still in Galicia and Poland, +was at an immense distance from the Austrians upon the Upper Danube; +and as for the third, the ambition of the House of Hapsburg, eager +to regain its Italian possessions, had repeated the mistake of 1800, +its chiefs having placed far too great a force on secondary points, +without sufficient regard for those which were of supreme importance, +the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_128">[128]</span> space between the Middle Rhine and the Danube. Napoleon seized +the situation with the eye of genius; and the plan of his operations +was at once formed. Neglecting Northern Germany and Southern Italy, +and employing only an inferior force to hold the Austrian Princes in +check—they were in command of 100,000 men—he resolved to fall on the +Austrian army on the Danube, which, not more than 85,000 strong, was +thrown forward on the country round Ulm, to surround and destroy it, +under its chief Mack, as Mélas had been destroyed five years before, +and thus to cut it off completely from the distant Russian army, which +could not be on the spot at the time.</p> + +<p>I can only glance at the operations that followed, less dazzling than +those which led to Marengo, but in principle and method essentially +the same, and a notable instance of the great maxim in war, set at +nought in 1793 to 1799, but always observed by real commanders, that +you should find and strike at the decisive point, and assail an enemy +where he is most vulnerable. The Grand Army marched across France from +the camp of Boulogne with a celerity which confounded its foes; two +corps, under Bernadotte and Marmont, created of late Imperial Marshals, +advanced from Hanover and the flats of Holland; a corp of Bavarians +joined the French; and the collected masses, nearly 200,000 strong, +were drawn together to the Rhine and the Main, ready to attain the +Danube, in the last days of September. These movements led to the great +surrender of Ulm, a most remarkable event in the wars of this century. +Masking the general movement by sending detachments of cavalry into +and along the Black Forest—the stratagem again of the column of Mont +Cenis—and spreading his masses over the Franconian plains, the Emperor +moved the converging arrays from the great arc of Strasburg, Mayence, +and Würtzburg; and by the second week of October they were upon the +Danube already interposed between Ulm and Vienna. The net was now +rapidly drawn round Mack, who, stricken with terror, remained almost +motionless, changing front about Ulm, and doing scarcely anything to +strike at the enemy gathering in on all sides. Some mistakes were made +in completing <span class="pagenum" id="Page_129">[129]</span>the toils, almost inevitable in manœuvres of the kind, +which a capable chief might have turned to account; but these were +rectified within a few hours; three bodies of Austrians made their +escape; but Mack simply waited on events, unlike Mélas, made no attempt +to break through, and capitulated with the mass of his army on the +19th of October. The greater part of the forces which had got off were +intercepted and made prisoners; and thus a whole army was literally +swept from the theatre by a march without striking one effective blow. +Europe never witnessed a scene of the kind again until Metz fell +through the treason of Bazaine.</p> + + <div class="figcenter" id="i_b_128fp"> + <img + class="p1" + src="images/i_b_128fp.jpg" + alt=""> + <p class="p0 sm center">Sketch Map of CENTRAL EUROPE</p> + </div> + +<p>Napoleon, in his rapid advance on Ulm, had spread his army over a +vast circumference because no possible foes were at hand; he had made +the best use of the good roads which now generally traversed France +and Germany; and he had thus turned to the greatest advantage one of +the new existing conditions of war. The front of the Allied attack +had been broken; and the paralysis, so to speak, of the head, had +caused the collapse of the inferior members. The eccentric operations +in the North of Germany and in Southern Italy came to nothing; the +Archduke Charles and the Archduke John—the first had been defeated at +Caldiero, a revenge for the failure of 1796—were compelled to fall +back from the Adige and the Tyrol; and the way from Ulm to Vienna +lay open. The Emperor, giving effect, in another age, to the great +conception of Villars in 1703, marched with the Grand Army down the +valley of the Danube, protecting his wings from possible attacks; the +Isar, the Inn, the Traun, and the Ens, lines capable of defence, were +passed and mastered; and, by the middle of November, the triumphant +conqueror had entered the capital of the German Cæsars. By this time +the advanced corps of the Russian army, which had marched from Galicia +and had attained the Inn, had rallied the fragments of Mack’s forces; +its chief, Kutusof, a name to become famous, had fallen back, and left +Vienna to its fate; and he had come into line with his colleague, +Buxhöwden, who had been marching from the Polish frontier, and had +made his way into the plains of Moravia. Napoleon broke up from Vienna +to pursue his foes, though, notwithstanding his wonderful success, +his position<span class="pagenum" id="Page_130">[130]</span> was already not free from danger. In the march on Ulm, +Bernadotte had crossed a Prussian district; this had incensed the King +and even the nation, for some time chafing at its neutral attitude, and +Prussia had begun to prepare for war, and to assemble troops on the +Elbe and the Oder. The Grand Army, too, had suffered heavy losses in +its forced marches into the heart of Austria; the system of living upon +conquered provinces had not sufficed for enormous bodies of men; and +thousands of stragglers, marauders, deserters, swarmed along the tracts +from the Rhine to the Danube. The Archdukes, too, in retreat from the +south, were straining every nerve to attain Moravia; and should Prussia +march an army through the Bohemian passes, and throw her sword into +the scale of the Allies, the French, isolated, would, with winter at +hand, and far from their base, be soon compelled to confront an immense +superiority of force.</p> + +<p>Napoleon, however, always confident—the modern Cæsar had faith in his +fortunes—did not hesitate to march into Moravia; and he was at Brünn +by the third week of November, with a considerable part of the Grand +Army. At this moment Kutusof and Buxhöwden were near Olmütz about +80,000 strong; some Austrian contingents had united with them; Prussia +had actually promised to attack Napoleon; the Archdukes were but a few +marches off; and had the Allies only waited a fortnight, they could +have assembled nearly 200,000 men to fight a great battle with the +French Emperor, who could not have assembled 100,000. But folly and +presumption were in the Russian camp, and the young Czar, Alexander, +was persuaded to take the offensive, and to advance from Olmütz before +the available supports of the Allies were near. A theorist contributed +to this fatal resolve, and his pedantry led to a tremendous disaster. +Napoleon at this time was in position not far from Brünn, on the banks +of the Goldbach, in front of the little town of Austerlitz; and though +he had really about 70,000 men in hand, two of his corps were at some +distance. Weyrother, an Austrian general officer, proposed a grand +plan, to descend from Olmütz, to turn the right wing of the French +on the Goldbach, and to cut Napoleon off from retreat on Vienna, by +a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_131">[131]</span> formidable attack in the oblique order. The Allied army, perhaps +80,000 men, was close to the Goldbach on the 1st of December, its +columns arranged for the offensive movement ostentatiously talked of +and soon made apparent; and Weyrother announced a great coming victory. +Napoleon, who had drawn in his two corps, beheld with delight this +reckless strategy—a flank march along a wide front, under the beard +of the chief of Arcola and Rivoli; that “army is mine,” he proudly +said, and he made the prediction known in an address to his soldiers. +Anticipating what would happen—in part at least—he had assumed a +timid defensive attitude, in order to lure his enemies on—another +instance of his wonderful powers of stratagem.</p> + +<p>The sun of Austerlitz rose on the 2nd, to illuminate one of the great +scenes of history. The nature of the ground forbade the manœuvre +contemplated by the Allied leaders. Towards their left, in the space in +which they proposed to outflank and defeat the French right, spread a +region of marsh, around the Goldbach, of wide lakes, and of intricate +country, with the hamlets of Sokolnitz and Telnitz hard by; and it +formed at once a difficult position to force, and a line favourable in +the extreme for defence. Their centre filled the plain round the hill +of Pratzen, and was, therefore, dangerously exposed to attack, should +it be weakened by a detachment to the left; and their right was almost +wholly “in the air,” and liable to be turned and destroyed by the low +hill of Santon. Napoleon had seized the characteristics of the scene +with the insight of the great chief of Ramillies, and his dispositions +were made to turn to the best advantage the local peculiarities which +he saw before him. He had already secured a second line of retreat, +was not bound to his base on Vienna, and was perfectly free to act +as he pleased; and his arrangements were the piece of a master of +tactics. He placed Davoust, one of the best of the marshals, with +only a few thousand men on his right—reinforcements, however, were +ready for them—for he wished to draw the enemy on to his ruin, and +the position he knew was easy of defence; but Soult, afterwards Duke +of Dalmatia, Bernadotte and his corps, with the Imperial Guard, were<span class="pagenum" id="Page_132">[132]</span> +massed together in formidable strength, to carry the plain and heights +of Pratzen; and Lannes, with the left and a reserve, held the hill of +Santon and the lowlands around, with every advantage for an effort +against the Allied right. The battle-field, therefore, was made, so to +speak, a theatre by the antagonist chiefs, to assure defeat and victory +alike; and Kutusof, it is said, foretold the issue with an assurance +equal to that of Napoleon.</p> + +<p>These operations led to the great fight of Austerlitz, the masterpiece +of war, I think, of this century. By the early dawn, four big Austrian +and Russian masses were in motion to turn Napoleon’s right, advancing +slowly in the oblique order; but they toiled painfully through the +difficult ground; and they were kept at bay by the little force of +Davoust, which, holding Sokolnitz and Telnitz, defied their efforts. +Ere long a tremendous onslaught of war burst suddenly upon the Allied +centre, thinned by the divisions sent to the left; Napoleon, who, like +a crouching tiger, had reserved his strength until it was time to +spring, launched Soult and Bernadotte against Pratzen, and the enemy’s +centre was cut through spite of heroic efforts. Meanwhile Lannes had +assailed the enemy’s right; here, too, a noble resistance was made; +but science and skill, force being nearly equal, must always prevail +over the sternest courage; and victory soon declared for the French. +Early in the afternoon the Allied centre and right, half ruined, were +a dissolving mass; and though the left had forced Davoust back some +distance, it was isolated and entangled in an intricate region. It +was beginning to retreat, its cumbrous masses demoralised and showing +signs of panic, when Napoleon turned against it with that determined +energy which he nearly always displayed in a successful battle. His +victorious centre was brought to bear in irresistible power on the +flying enemy; a horrible scene of carnage followed; the Austrians and +Russians were slain or captured in thousands without an attempt at +resistance; and multitudes perished in the lakes near the Goldbach, the +French artillery shattering their frozen surface. The stricken army was +well-nigh destroyed; it lost all its guns; and nearly half its numbers, +and its fragments were scattered in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_133">[133]</span> every direction. The coalition +succumbed under this mighty stroke; Prussia said “Hail” to the +conqueror, and licked his hand; Alexander was too glad to escape beyond +the Niemen, with the remains of his army; and Austria, her constancy +at last broken, was compelled to accept the Peace of Pressburg, which +deprived her of all she had retained in Italy, and contracted the +limits of her shrunken empire. In the general dismay of Continental +Europe, England alone had consolation and hope; she had lost Nelson, +but that greatest of seamen had annihilated the fleets of France and +Spain on the ever memorable day of Trafalgar.</p> + +<p>It is unnecessary to dwell on the first part of this campaign; for the +operations that led to the surrender of Mack were, I have said, akin to +those that hemmed in Mélas. The Allies were in a false position on the +theatre of war, as the Austrians were in 1800; Napoleon enveloped one +of their armies, as before Marengo he had closed round the Austrians. +The movements of 1805 were less fascinating, I have remarked, than +those of 1800; and the great superiority of Napoleon over Mack in +numbers make them less astonishing and strike the mind less; but they +were conducted upon a grander scale, were more scientific, and were +better prepared. The march on Vienna was a fine operation; but it will +always remain questionable if the Emperor ought to have hazarded the +advance into Moravia; assuredly had the Allies fallen back and waited, +he would have been exposed to the gravest perils.</p> + +<p>The grand incident of the contest is, however, Austerlitz, a battle +that should be studied by every thinker on war. It is a poor account of +this mighty conflict to say that it represents the system of Frederick +at odds with that of Napoleon, and exploded by it; the result depends +on much deeper causes than tactical orders on a field of battle. No +doubt the Allies tried to attack in Frederick’s fashion; no doubt the +French attacked in columns with skirmishers; no doubt the hostile +armies may be compared “to a long bar of iron, inferior in strength +and suppleness to a chain of many links,” to use the metaphor of an +accomplished writer. But Austerlitz was not an affair of mere methods +of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_134">[134]</span> offence; it was the triumph of marvellous genius in war over +pedantry and ignorance of the higher parts of tactics. The Allies +placed themselves on the ground as badly as possible; they made a +long flank march under the guns of an enemy; their turning movement +inevitably failed in the region in which the attempt was made; and +had Daun been before them they would have been defeated, though Daun +could no more have achieved Austerlitz than he could have written +<i>Othello</i> and <i>Hamlet</i>. On the other hand, Napoleon occupied +the ground with perfect judgment, made every feature in it conform +to his ends; placed his army upon it in the exact positions in which +its attack would be most decisive, and made the very most of the +false moves of his enemies. The result was complete; only two-thirds +of an army rather weaker than its foe in numbers, and much weaker in +guns, simply shattered to atoms a more powerful force, with a loss +comparatively very small; and this, though the Austrians and Russians +fought extremely well. In all this we see what Napoleon has called +the “divine side of war,” not its mere evolutions; the difference, he +has said, is that between a “book of the <i>Iliad</i> and a page of +a grammar.” Yet masterpiece as this great battle was, I do not think +it surpasses Ramillies in the dispositions that were made before it, +and in the manner in which the enemy was reached and conquered. We see +the same insight in both instances; the same thorough perception of +the nature of the ground, and the means of taking the best advantage +of it; the same perfect appreciation of the faults of the enemy, the +same admirable distribution of the victorious armies. In one respect, +however, Marlborough perhaps was inferior to Napoleon in execution; he +did not strike down Villeroy with the tremendous force with which the +Emperor crushed the Allies, and did not show the same wonderful power +in victory. Yet I hesitate here, for we must remember Blenheim, and +the absolute destruction of Tallard’s army; and in comparing the two +battles, we must bear in mind that the three arms in Napoleon’s day had +acquired a “mobility” and a power in the field unknown in the first +part of the eighteenth century, and were, therefore, far more effective +against a defeated army.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_135">[135]</span></p> + +<p>I cannot notice the Confederation of the Rhine, the creation of vassal +kingdoms beyond France, as appendages to the House of Bonaparte, and +the enormous extension of the French Empire from the Zuider Zee to the +extreme verge of Italy. The dream of setting up again the throne of +Charlemagne in the generation of the French Revolution, and of holding +down martial States by sheer force of arms, is characteristic of the +extravagance sometimes seen in Napoleon; and it indicates also that +profound scorn of anything resembling popular rights and movements +which is a marked feature of his wonderful nature. War broke out soon +again on the Continent, and Prussia, unaided, challenged the French +Empire. That Power had been willing to wound, and yet afraid to strike; +she had feigned submission after the rout of Austerlitz, but she +remained angry and vexed at heart, and the domineering conduct of the +Imperial conqueror goaded her at last to proclaim hostilities. The +Court and even the nation rushed to arms; the misgivings expressed by +veterans of the Seven Years’ War, who had followed events from 1794 to +1805, were disregarded with false confidence; and two armies, about +150,000 strong, led by Prince Hohenlohe and the Duke of Brunswick, +marched from the Elbe and the Oder to the Thuringian Forest.</p> + +<p>The operations of the campaign of 1806 are, perhaps, less marked by +Napoleon’s genius than that of more than one previous contest; but they +achieved success that even now seems marvellous, and they conspicuously +illustrate one of his peculiar gifts, power in annihilating a defeated +enemy. The Grand Army, about 180,000 strong, was on the Main, not +having returned to France when the Prussian chiefs had assumed the +offensive, and the Emperor joined it in the first week of October. +At this moment Hohenlohe and Brunswick were contemplating an advance +to the Rhine. Bold strategy, they boasted, was all that was needed +to overcome the Corsican upstart, and the Grand Army was spread from +Würtzburg to Bamberg capable of being easily moved on their flank. +Napoleon determined to gain this advantage, and, forming his army +into three great masses, he began to traverse the defiles that lead<span class="pagenum" id="Page_136">[136]</span> +from the southern verge of the forest towards the Saale and the +Elster. The movement, executed with his wonted promptitude, brought +the Grand Army into the plains between the two rivers on the 10th of +October, threatening the communications of the enemy with the Elbe; and +Hohenlohe and Brunswick, passing from boasting to terror, fell back +towards Weimar and Jena, to approach the Elbe. Napoleon, who, at the +beginning of the campaign, expressed unfeigned respect for the famous +army of Frederick, would not at first believe that generals of a great +school would make such a hasty retrograde movement; and he drew part +of his forces together, expecting to fight a great battle near Gera +and Auma, points in the valleys of the Saale and the Elster. This +miscalculation cost him the loss of some time, for his enemy had no +intention to stand, and, meanwhile, the retreating armies had fallen +back a considerable way towards the Elbe, the main body under Brunswick +making for the line of the Unstrutt, a feeder of the Saale, and the +defile of Kosen, a smaller force, led by Hohenlohe, halting near Jena +in order to call in outlying detachments, and then to follow Brunswick +to the Elbe. Napoleon began to pursue when he had ascertained his +mistake; he was greatly elated by the results of partial engagements +with small hostile bodies, in which the superiority of the French +tactics was manifest, and he wished to compel the Prussians to accept +battle. But his information was still imperfect; he would not credit +so rapid a flight; he believed that by far the greatest part of the +enemy’s army was concentrating near and around Jena; and his plan was +to overwhelm it in front, and to cut off its retreat. With this object +in view, he directed Davoust and Bernadotte to seize the defile of +Kosen, crossing the Saale at the points of Naumburg and Dornburg; and +with the main part of the Grand Army spread out in many columns he drew +near the river and advanced on Jena.</p> + +<p>These operations led to Jena and Auerstadt, fought on the 14th of +October 1806. By the night of the 13th Napoleon had seized, had +occupied by an advanced guard, and had crowned with guns brought up +with infinite toil—the Emperor followed the train in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_137">[137]</span> person—the +Landgrafenberg heights, since known by his name, which commanded the +approaches to the plains beyond; and from this point he saw the army +of Hohenlohe, the bivouacs marked by miles of fires, extending along +the region between Jena and Weimar. He made his dispositions for a +great battle, still fixed in the belief that Hohenlohe’s army was +the principal part of the hostile forces; and as he knew that, in +any event, he would be in preponderating strength on the field, he +prepared to attack Hohenlohe in front, and to turn both his flanks, +and he directed Davoust to advance even beyond Kosen, to defeat, if +he could, the army of Brunswick, and to close on the rear of the two +Prussian armies. The battle of Jena began in the early morning; the +first movement of Napoleon was to debouche from the Landgrafenberg into +the plains beyond, and this was accomplished with little difficulty, +Hohenlohe having altogether failed to perceive the importance of this +position. When the French army had fully taken its ground, Napoleon +had 100,000 men against 60,000, and the issue of the battle could not +be doubtful. Ney, indeed, the ill-fated “bravest of the brave,” the +warrior of Elchingen and of the Moskwa, engaged his troops prematurely, +and met a severe repulse; and the Prussians displayed the stern +devotion, and even the precision and skill in manœuvre characteristic +of them in the Seven Years’ War. But Hohenlohe’s force, weaker as +it was, was divided; the attack of Lannes, the Guard and Murat in +front—the chief of the Imperial cavalry is well known to fame—that +of Soult and Augereau, another marshal, on either flank, became +impossible to resist; and though the Prussians “fought like tigers,” an +eye-witness has said, and Napoleon<a id="FNanchor_11" href="#Footnote_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> sincerely praised them in his +account of the battle, Hohenlohe’s army was before long routed.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile a battle of a very different kind had raged at Auerstadt, a +few miles off, on the line of the retreat of the defeated Prussians. +Davoust had issued, as he had been ordered, from the defile of Kosen; +but as he advanced he became<span class="pagenum" id="Page_138">[138]</span> aware of the great strength of the army +of Brunswick, and he entreated Bernadotte to come to his aid. That +chief, however, insisted on remaining at Dornburg, relying on the +letter of Napoleon’s despatches; and it is doubtful whether this unwise +resolve is to be attributed to the servile obedience characteristic +of the Imperial marshals, or to miserable jealousy and dislike of a +colleague. Davoust was now left with about 27,000 men to confront +Brunswick, who must have had 70,000 had his force been well in hand; +and the Marshal directed one of the finest battles of the whole period +of the wars of Napoleon. He tenaciously kept Brunswick at bay for +hours, but he must have been overwhelmed had Brunswick displayed the +energy of the Austrian chief at Marengo; and in that event the two +Prussian armies would have successfully effected their retreat to the +Elbe. Brunswick, however, and most of the Prussian leaders, fell, and +in a fatal hour the wretched advice was given to retire, and seek the +support of Hohenlohe’s army, known to be making a stand at Jena. Within +two or three hours the wrecks of that perishing force became entangled +with the troops of Auerstadt; the contagion of demoralisation and +panic spread, and the two armies broke up in headlong flight, ravaged +and never let to rest by the French cavalry. Once more Napoleon gave +proof of his skill in pursuit, and on this occasion with extraordinary +results. The Prussian army had no reserves; the beaten force was +completely scattered, and made for the course of the Lower Elbe, and +the French Emperor, seizing the chord of the arc, forced it, in masses +of shattered fragments, northwards, and cut off five-sixths of it from +all possible retreat. Within a few days the conqueror had entered +Berlin; some 20,000 fugitives were the sole relics of a fine army of +150,000 men; these were driven into the wastes of the Lower Vistula, +and the military power of Prussia was destroyed. Terrible scenes of +weakness and despair followed; great fortresses opened their gates to +hussars, and the monarchy of the chief of Leuthen toppled down in ruin. +One of the last divisions that surrendered was that of Blücher, a rude +soldier brought up in the school of Frederick, and destined to win a +name in history.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_139">[139]</span></p> + +<p>The campaign of Jena, it has been remarked, bears a singular +resemblance to that of 1870, in which, however, victory passed from +Gaul to Teuton. In both instances there was the same arrogance and +precipitate haste on the defeated side; in both the same hesitation +followed by panic; in both the same superiority of force, generalship, +of all, in short, that secures success in war on the side of the +triumphant conquerors; in both the same utter collapse of a great +military State. Prussia, however, unlike France, made no national +effort to struggle out from under the heel of the victor. There was no +siege of Berlin like that of Paris; no Prussian Chanzy made his powers +manifest; no Prussian Gambetta refused to despair of his country, or +organized a resistance, misdirected no doubt, but not the less heroic +and even formidable. In this campaign, I have said, the strategic gifts +of the Emperor are not so strikingly seen as in others which I have +tried to sketch. The plan of debouching into the valleys of the Saale +and the Elster from the edge of the forest, though certainly the best, +would have probably occurred to a general of the second rank; and, +as a matter of fact, it occurred to Jomini, then a young officer in +the Imperial Service. In the operations, moreover, that led to Jena, +Napoleon made more than one real mistake; he lost time in preparing to +fight near Gera and Auma. He was convinced that he was dealing with the +main Prussian army at Jena. He ordered Davoust to advance beyond the +pass of Kosen, and to close on the enemy, upon the false assumption +that the force of Brunswick was not very great; and owing to these +misconceptions, he so placed his army on the scene of the two battles +that Davoust escaped a complete defeat by a chance only—a result that +would have caused the failure of the campaign. Most probably Bernadotte +was to blame for not joining his brother Marshal, and averting a +blow that might have been disastrous; but Napoleon’s orders to go to +Dornburg seem clear, and, in any case, as General-in-Chief, he is +mainly accountable for a decided error. Yet the true student of war +will not think the less of the Emperor for mistakes such as these. The +greatest commanders must make mistakes, for they must act at once on +imperfect knowledge; and the aphorism of Turenne is the simple truth, +“He is<span class="pagenum" id="Page_140">[140]</span> the best general whose mistakes are the fewest.”<a id="FNanchor_12" href="#Footnote_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> For the +rest, in the campaign of 1806, Napoleon’s general conceptions were, as +always, masterly. It is not surprising that he could not believe in +the precipitate flight of a most renowned army; and his arrangements +in the actual contest at Jena were those of a captain of the highest +order; though he was so superior in force, they have little interest. +What is to be chiefly dwelt on in this campaign is its illustration +of the wonderful powers of Napoleon in destroying a retreating enemy. +Many a chief would have followed the Prussians to the Elbe; the +Emperor completely cut off their retreat, forced them into nooks and +corners where they could not escape, and compelled the great body of +them to lay down their arms. Napier was, perhaps, thinking of this +great achievement when he compares Napoleon’s battle to the “wave that +effaces the landscape.”</p> + +<p>Napoleon, after the subjugation of Prussia, came into conflict with a +more distant enemy. Alexander, the future head of the Holy Alliance, +half French in ideas, but at heart a despot, had undertaken again to +defend Old Europe; and notwithstanding the experience of Austerlitz, +had solemnly vowed to avenge Prussia. His armies, however, moving +slowly through the immense spaces of the Russian Empire, were unable +to avert the ruin of Jena, or to prevent the fall of the Prussian +Monarchy; it was November before they reached the Niemen, and they had +not approached the Vistula for some time afterwards. The conqueror, +who, in the intoxication of success, had launched against England +the well-known Decree which declared her excluded from commerce with +Europe, and established the famous Continental system, resolved to +march against the new foe, and to strike down the Russians in the +wilds of Poland. He made preparations, in Berlin, for a great winter +campaign; and, looking behind and before, he left nothing undone to +gain opinion in France, to make his military power irresistible on the +theatre of war, and to secure a fresh base for an offensive movement. +His arrangements were far-sighted and masterly; for there is no<span class="pagenum" id="Page_141">[141]</span> wilder +mistake than to suppose that Napoleon, though his imagination at times +overcame his judgment, was not always the most profound and capable, as +well as the boldest, of strategists. Magnificent public works enchanted +Paris; rewards were lavished upon the Grand Army; and France, ever +liable to be carried away by “glory,” was, so to speak, entranced in +dreams of Imperial grandeur. Meanwhile thousands of levies were called +to join the eagles; the fatal system of anticipating the conscription +began; vast bodies of troops were sent from the Confederation of the +Rhine, from Italy, from Holland, and even from Spain; and these were +stationed at intervals along the space extending from the Rhine to the +Elbe and the Oder. Nor did the Emperor omit precautions to provide for +these immense masses; the granaries of Germany were made to furnish +supplies; the French cavalry were remounted in regiments from the +establishments of the troopers of Seidlitz; and enormous magazines were +prepared to support the hosts of Western Europe, in their march to the +East. Napoleon, too, cast a scrutinizing eye on possible enemies and +possible allies; he arrayed an army in Italy to observe Austria; and he +tried to cajole the Sultan into attacking the Czar.</p> + +<p>Towards the close of November, the Grand Army, extending from the Meuse +and the Rhine to beyond the Oder, had reached the great strength of +300,000 men; and Napoleon expected a speedy triumph. Yet that vast host +was already different from the soldiers of Austerlitz and of Boulogne, +it was a “<i>colluvies gentium</i>,” in the historian’s words; it was +crowded with young levies and half false auxiliaries; and the wand of +the magician, so to speak, had changed in his hands. As yet, however, +these elements of decline were not perceptible to any large extent; the +warriors of Jena formed the first line; and the front of the Grand Army +was moved to the Vistula, strong detachments being made to protect its +flanks, and to subdue the fortresses Prussia still held in Silesia. +Napoleon had reached Posen by the end of November; his troops had soon +covered the plains of Poland; and when he attained the scenes of the +famous Partition, the Poles greeted him as the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_142">[142]</span> coming liberator of +their race. The Emperor, however, true to a nature to which popular +stirrings were simply abhorrent, put off his suppliants with fair +speeches; he enrolled the Poles in his ranks by thousands; but he never +sought to make them an independent people. Irresistible in strength, +as he believed himself to be, he had no wish to exasperate Austria, +one of the partners in the destruction of Poland; and hard statecraft +concurred with instinct in causing him to adopt a purely selfish +policy. As yet, however, all went well; the Grand Army, probably +130,000 strong, held the line of the Vistula, and filled the tract +between Thorn and Warsaw by the second week of December; the remains of +the Prussian forces, and two Russian armies which had approached the +river fell back at all points; and the formidable barrier of the great +stream of Poland, held on both banks, was completely mastered.</p> + +<p>The position of the enemy on the theatre of war now invited one +of Napoleon’s strokes. The hostile armies were widely apart, and +disseminated upon a vast semi-circle; Lestocq, with the relics of Jena, +about 20,000 strong, holding a line from Soldau to the Lower Vistula; +Beningsen, a Russian chief, with perhaps 50,000 men, being in the angle +where the Narew and the Wkra meet before they merge in the Vistula’s +waters; Buxhöwden, with probably 40,000, being far in the rear around +Ostrolenka, in the country about the Upper Narew. The Grand Army, +between Thorn and Warsaw, was in possession, therefore, of all the +shorter lines on the field of manœuvre against its foes; and Bernadotte +and Ney, on the left, were directed to attack and overwhelm Lestocq, +while the corps of Augereau, of Lannes, of Davoust, and the Guard, +with Soult in the rear, were to fall on Beningsen, to cut him off from +Buxhöwden, and to drive the two armies into the deserts between the +Bug and the Narew. The project was worthy of its renowned author; and +the Grand Army began the movement from the Vistula in the last days of +December. Napoleon, however, for the first time, found the forces of +Nature and the state of the theatre arrayed against his rapid offensive +strategy; and his conception was not even nearly realised. The region +traversed was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_143">[143]</span> one of morasses and woods; there were scarcely any +supplies to be found on the spot; the French soldiery, living on +magazines from the rear, and sinking in expanses of swamp, were hardly +able to march; and the cavalry could not ascertain the movements +of the enemy behind whole leagues of forest. Comparative failure +was the result; the allied armies effected their retreat; Lestocq +eluded Ney and Bernadotte; Beningsen, who had encountered Lannes at +Pultusk, and Davoust at Golymin, without a defeat—the corps of the +Marshals had been misdirected, for it was impossible to reconnoitre +the country—contrived to join Buxhöwden, though with great loss; and +the converging armies found rest for some days on the vast and lonely +plains of Eastern Poland. Napoleon, baffled, returned to the Vistula +and placed the Grand Army in winter quarters extending from Warsaw +almost to the coast; and his forces were spread on an immense line, +for it was difficult in the extreme to find supplies, and there was no +apprehension of possible danger.</p> + +<p>Beningsen, however—he had been placed in supreme command—elated at +what he deemed success, resolved to assume a bold offensive; he defiled +between the long screen of forest and lakes, which divides the Narew +from the Passarge; and he all but reached the corps of Bernadotte and +Ney, a nearly isolated wing of the hostile army. Napoleon prepared a +decisive counter-stroke; he ordered Bernadotte and Ney to fall back, +with the view of luring the enemy on; and he directed the other corps +of the Grand Army to close on the rear of the Russian chief, when +fully committed to the forward movement. It was a design worthy of the +chief of Austerlitz; but Beningsen found it out through an intercepted +despatch, and he instantly fell back from the Passarge to the Alle, +in the hope of escaping his terrible enemy. Napoleon pursued with his +accustomed energy; the vast plains, hardened by the frosts of the +North, enabled his troops to move more rapidly; and he came up with +his adversary, in position, round Eylau, where Beningsen, urged by +his army, had consented to stand. The battle was fought on the 8th of +February 1807; it was one of the most sanguinary of the wars of that +age,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_144">[144]</span> and in the result it was a mere Pyrrhic victory. Each army was +about 80,000 strong; but the Russians had many more guns; and this told +heavily on the lines of the French, for Napoleon delayed his attack for +some hours in order to allow his supports to come up. It is unnecessary +to retrace the scenes of a conflict unmarked by peculiar tactical skill +and notable chiefly for the stubborn constancy shown by the Muscovite +soldier on many a field. The centre of the French, attacked in a +tempest of snow, was shattered, and well nigh pierced through: a charge +of Murat, and all his horsemen failed against the tenacious Russian +infantry; the arrival on the scene of Davoust and Lestocq made the +issue at several moments doubtful; but the scale was ultimately turned +by Ney, who had hastened to the spot, by a forced march. The Russians, +scarcely defeated, only just fell back; and Napoleon had suffered too +much to move.</p> + +<p>The carnage of Eylau on both sides was terrible; the corps of Augereau +was nearly destroyed; and the Russians, packed in dense masses, had +suffered frightfully from the continuous fire of the French artillery. +But of the two conflicting hosts, the Grand Army was certainly the one +most exposed to peril; the Russians were almost on their own ground; +it was far from its base, with Germany in its rear, and its position +for a time became extremely critical. Napoleon’s triumphs, in fact, +had been so unbroken, that he was deemed vanquished even in a drawn +battle; a thrill of alarm and anxiety ran through France, and the +humbled Continent was stirred to its depths. Had Beningsen possessed +the gifts of Frederick, he would, at this juncture, have resumed the +offensive; in that event, Napoleon must have retreated to the Vistula, +at least, perhaps to the Oder; Austria, in all probability, would have +taken the field; and the great Teutonic rising of 1813 might have been +witnessed in 1807. But the Russian chief, though a capable man, was +not a commander of the foremost rank; he had suffered immense loss, +and he retired behind the Alle in order to place his army in winter +quarters, confessing defeat by this retrograde movement. Indomitable +constancy, we shall see hereafter, was not one of Napoleon’s +distinctive qualities, but he<span class="pagenum" id="Page_145">[145]</span> perfectly knew what a prodigious effect +an imposing attitude has on mankind, and would necessarily have in +the present state of Europe; and his conduct was that of a consummate +warrior. In order to convince a doubting world that Eylau had been +a French victory, he moved his army forward a little distance, and +instead of falling back on the line of the Vistula, he ostentatiously +placed every corps at hand in cantonments behind the course of the +Passarge, braving a northern winter on the very verge of Russia. +Meanwhile, he applied himself, with that amazing energy, that mastery +of detail, that administrative power, for which he has perhaps had no +equal, to reinforce and secure the Grand Army; to establish it firmly +in its present position; and to make his military ascendency supreme. +Two fresh levies of conscripts were made; his vassal kings, and still +submissive Allies, were compelled to furnish more contingents to the +theatre of war, and to comply with enormous demands for supplies; the +forces required to hold Austria in check and to keep Prussia down +were largely increased; Masséna was summoned with his corps from +Italy to strengthen the front of the Grand Army; and Mortier, Duke +of Treviso, another marshal, was sent with a considerable detachment +to the Pomeranian seaboard, in order to guard against a descent from +Stralsund on the communications and flank of the Imperial hosts +expected to be made by a British force. Concurrently, a corps under +Marshal Lefebvre was moved to undertake the siege of Danzig, a place of +capital importance still held by Prussia; the sieges of the Silesian +strongholds were pressed, and an alliance at last was made with the +Sultan, who even proclaimed war against the Russian Empire. Months were +spent in making their last preparations, at Osterode, near the banks of +the Passarge; and Napoleon’s correspondence alone can give the student +of war an adequate notion of the prodigious ability of their great +author.</p> + +<p>The Emperor’s exertions were completely successful; the Nemesis of +conquest had not yet drawn near; and by the spring of 1807 his military +power was established on broader foundations than ever; and he was +ready to take the field with most imposing forces. By this time Eylau +was a mere recollection; the Continent<span class="pagenum" id="Page_146">[146]</span> had relapsed into bondage; and +the Imperial armies, filled with bad elements as they were, reached +the enormous number of half a million of men, spread from Champagne +to the limits of Eastern Prussia. Meanwhile, no attack had been made +from Stralsund; Danzig had fallen with the Silesian fortresses; the +Porte had compelled Duckworth to leave the Dardanelles; the Turk was +in arms against the Czar; and the cause of old Europe seemed once +more desperate. With both his flanks covered, and his base secure, +Napoleon had 160,000 men in perfect order upon the Passarge, ready to +take the offensive at the first moment when the growth of vegetation +would supply the means of subsistence to his thousands of horses. Yet +such is the waste and strain of war that, even at this time, 60,000 +men were missing from the rolls of the Grand Army, and spread along +its rear, living on plunder and straggling; and this, notwithstanding +the astonishing efforts of Napoleon throughout the whole winter. In +fact, railways being as yet unknown, the means of transport were still +imperfect, and the admirable arrangements by which the German armies +of the present day are moved and supplied were impossible, especially +along an enormous line.</p> + +<p>The success of the Czar in reinforcing his armies had been trifling +compared with that of Napoleon; and England, as we have seen, had made +no diversion. The Russian Guards were despatched from St. Petersburg, +and troops were in march from other parts of the Empire; but Beningsen, +in the last days of May, had scarcely more than 120,000 men to oppose +to the Grand Army of 160,000; and this though the Russians were close +to their frontier, and the Emperor was hundreds of miles from the +Rhine. In these circumstances, the Russian chief ought to have stood +cautiously on the defensive; but he endeavoured to repeat the attempt +of the winter; and breaking up from his camps on the 5th of June, he +fell on Ney, somewhat widely detached, and on the extreme left of the +Grand Army. Ney, however, a tactician of real skill, held the enemy +in check, and slowly fell back; Napoleon tried a counter-attack once +more; and he marched against Beningsen, from the Passarge, in the hope +of gathering on his flank and rear. The<span class="pagenum" id="Page_147">[147]</span> Russian contrived to effect +his escape; a great entrenched camp which, after the fashion of Daun, +he had fortified, arrested the onset of the French; and he reached +the Alle and began to retreat along the right or eastern bank of the +river, in the hope, apparently, of reaching Königsberg, where immense +supplies had been stored for his army. The Emperor followed along the +western bank, his object, too, being to attain Königsberg; and his +foremost corps came abreast of the Russians, the rest of the Grand Army +being somewhat divided, and a considerable part being in the rear. +This state of affairs encouraged Beningsen, in an evil hour, to try to +attack his enemy. On the 14th of June 1807, he began to cross to the +left bank of the Alle, at daybreak, with more than half his army; and +by mid-day he had assailed the corps of Lannes, for the moment isolated +and in advance. The French marshal, however, made a determined stand; +in a short time Mortier, the Guard, the chief part of the cavalry, and +Napoleon, had arrived on the scene, and the corps of Bernadotte and Ney +soon made their appearance.</p> + +<p>Napoleon seized the position of affairs at a glance, and made +everything ready to destroy an enemy who had recklessly offered battle +with a great stream in his rear. With complete mastery of the grander +part of tactics, he commanded Lannes and Mortier to fall back, in order +to draw Beningsen some distance forward; and Ney and Victor, another +marshal, in temporary command of Bernadotte’s troops, were directed to +seize the bridges thrown across the river not far from the little town +of Friedland by Beningsen, and to cut off his retreat. This admirable +stroke completely succeeded; and apart from the fact that Napoleon’s +forces were by this time greatly superior in numbers, the defeat of the +Russians had been rendered certain. Beningsen fell imprudently into the +snare; Lannes and Mortier seemed to yield to the Russian masses; and +when these had advanced too far to escape, Ney, covering his attack +with a tremendous fire, and his colleague made the decisive movement. +The bridges were taken and destroyed after a stout resistance; and the +Russians were forced back against a deep river, hemmed in, captured, +and drowned in multitudes. A fragment<span class="pagenum" id="Page_148">[148]</span> only of the army got across the +Alle; and Beningsen fled to the line of the Niemen, followed by his +indefatigable and pitiless foe. The Grand Army halted on the Muscovite +frontier; the Czar had no choice but to seek an armistice; and the +French eagles which had flown from the Channel, overshadowing Germany +in their ravening flight, closed their Imperial wings on the edge of +Old Europe. Troops of Tartars and Kalmucks armed with bows and arrows, +and scattered along the banks of the Niemen, in the vain hope of +arresting Fate, attested the exhaustion of the Russian Empire.</p> + +<p>The twofold campaign of Eylau and Friedland does not exhibit in its +highest aspects Napoleon’s marvellous genius in the field. His project +of attacking the Allied armies on the Wkra and Narew, at the close +of 1806, undoubtedly was worthy of a great strategist; and his plan +of falling back to draw Beningsen, and of doubling on him when he +marched from the Passarge, reveals once more his pre-eminent gift of +stratagem. The stroke delivered at Friedland, decisive and splendid, +was that, too, of a master of tactics in their highest sense; the +vulnerable side of the enemy was at once detected; and his position +on the battle-field was made to cause his ruin. Still, the strategy +of the Emperor in this contest comparatively failed in more than one +instance; the extension of his cantonments—this was due, I repeat to +the extreme difficulty of supporting his army—exposed him to attacks +of a formidable kind; and he barely escaped defeat at Eylau. The most +conspicuous proof this campaign affords of his military capacity is +his steadfast attitude amidst a host of enemies, when beyond the +Vistula, and his administrative triumph in restoring his army; these +are examples of powers of different kinds, but alike indicate supreme +ability. The chief lesson of this campaign, however, is that even +Napoleon’s wonderful gifts could not overcome impassable obstacles; +his grand offensive strategy hardly succeeded, because the conditions +forbade success; his brilliant manœuvres missed their mark, because his +troops could not live in Poland as they had lived in the fertile plains +of Italy, and could not move rapidly in wastes of swamp; the Phaeton +of war<span class="pagenum" id="Page_149">[149]</span> found himself opposed by the forces of Nature and well nigh +succumbed.</p> + +<p>The end, nevertheless, was as yet distant; and Fortune raised her +favourite to a still more dazzling eminence. Napoleon had felt, during +recent events, that prodigious as his military power was, he was +isolated in a hostile or unfaithful Europe, and he resolved to turn +to account his recent victory by endeavouring to make his humbled +adversary a permanent ally of the French Empire. To attain this end +he had two great advantages, the ascendency of astonishing success, +and a power of subjugating men which seemed like magic; and Alexander, +indeed, wounded to the quick by the conduct of England in the affair +of Stralsund, was ready to yield to England’s deadly enemy. In the +presence of their armies on either bank, the two Sovereigns met on +a raft on the Niemen; the town of Tilsit was chosen as the seat of +the conferences which immediately followed; and the fascinations of +Napoleon had soon won over the young Czar to alliance, and even to +friendship. All that passed in these interviews is still unknown, +but the Revolutionary Monarch and the half Oriental despot agreed to +re-model the map of Europe, and formed plans of the most far-reaching +ambition. Each declared England the common enemy; and Alexander +consented, at Napoleon’s instance, to adopt the Imperial Continental +system, to close the ports of Russia to British commerce, to summon +England to make peace at once, and, should she refuse, to array against +her the navies of every state in Europe, invited or compelled to obey +the mandate. Meanwhile, Sweden was to be despoiled of Finland; the +never-changing ambition of the Czars was to be gratified by great +Turkish provinces; Constantinople was talked of as a prey; and a +Russian advance to the Indus, it is believed, was discussed. In return +for these immense concessions to a defeated enemy, Napoleon obtained +the recognition of the French Empire, and of the order of things he +had set up in Europe; the Czar pledged himself to make common cause +with his ally in his contest with England; and Alexander perhaps agreed +to the conquest of Spain. To complete the new arrangement of the +European world, in the interest of the Lords of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_150">[150]</span> West and the East, +Prussia was to lose nearly half her territory, and to be reduced to a +second-rate power. Napoleon announced that he would have gone farther +but for his regard for his Imperial friend. Saxony was to be made a +counterpoise to her old rival in Germany, as a mere French dependency; +and the craving of the Poles for national life was to be appeased by +the mock creation of a Grand Duchy of Warsaw for the House of Saxony.</p> + +<p>I cannot dwell on the policy of Tilsit, unequivocally condemned by all +writers. It was a conspicuous instance of the extravagance sometimes +shown by Napoleon, even in war, but often in the less familiar sphere +of politics. It was a mistake to challenge England, the ruler of the +seas, and the treasurer of Europe, to prolong a contest in which, after +Trafalgar, she could not be invaded; and the Continental system was a +chimera of force more injurious to French than to British interests. It +was a mistake to reverse the policy of France for centuries, to abandon +Sweden, and to betray the Turks, especially when these had become her +allies; and it was idle to suppose that the fiat of a Czar would add to +the stability of the French Empire. It was a mistake, too, of the worst +kind to trample on the State and the people of Frederick; and it was an +insult to the Poles to put the nation off with the phantom of a Grand +Duchy of Warsaw. But the greatest mistake of all was to give a free +rein to the ambitious impulses of two despots; to place the Partition +of Europe at the will of two men essentially opposed in nature and +interests; to suppose that the rulers of France and Russia could ever +join in a lasting alliance. General war, the shifting of the boundaries +of States, the destruction for a time of the European system, and +implacable international passions and hate, were the inevitable +results of this scheme of rapine; and beside that it had no element of +strength and endurance, it was certain to lead to a rupture between its +authors. In this unnatural arrangement we see no trace of the genius of +Richelieu, of Cavour, of Bismarck; it was a mere ephemeral product of +force, in opposition to the nature of things, and simply impossible to +become permanent. This, however, was not perceived by the conqueror, +covered with the adulation of France<span class="pagenum" id="Page_151">[151]</span> and the Continent; and Napoleon +at this moment might, indeed, imagine that his power was beyond the +perils of Fortune.</p> + +<p>A word on the state of Napoleon’s Empire, at this time at the height +of its greatness, though its borders were to be still extended. France +had long ago reached what the national instinct had pointed to as +her natural limits; she was bounded by the Rhine, the Alps, and the +Pyrenees; but girdled all round by dependent States, and supreme in +Italy and in fully half of Germany, she was really the mistress of +Continental Europe. Nor was this immense dominion the mere spoil of +conquest; the vigorous and able rule of Napoleon had done wonders +for old France, and had conferred the greatest benefits on her new +possessions; and the institutions he founded still flourish far beyond +the Rhine, and even along the Danube. The prosperity of the Empire +was growing and splendid; the continuance of order and the collapse +of anarchy had given free play to the energetic interests which the +Revolution had called into being; nay, the tributary States had, to +a great extent, been renovated by the hand of Napoleon. The creative +genius of the Emperor, too, had accomplished marvels in administration +and finance, and had completed fine monuments of material grandeur; +magnificent roads overcame the Alps, and connected the Atlantic with +the Mediterranean shores; and Paris, rich with treasures of art from +all lands, and crowded with new and imposing structures, put on the +aspect of Imperial Rome, and gathered into her lap the fairest spoils +of conquest. Military power, besides, invincible as yet, and the glory +of years of triumphs in war, protected this fabric of far-spread +dominion; the ruling race still prevailed in the Grand Army; its +commanders, lavishly rewarded, were docile instruments of a chief still +in the flower of his age; and the flaws and defects in it were not yet +conspicuous. Nevertheless, even now, one or two deep thinkers, amidst +the terror and submission of three-fourths of Europe, had declared +that the Empire could not be lasting. With its vassal Bonapartes, its +enormous extent, its sway over subdued but mighty races, its mediæval +pomp, its <i>parvenu noblesse</i>, its violence, and its despotism +of the sword, it was an anachronism in the nineteenth century; its +grandeur and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_152">[152]</span> even its beneficence could not hide its oppression; it +was established among a people prone to change, and demoralized by +Revolutionary passions; and, in antagonism to all moral and social +forces, it depended on a single life and a conqueror’s genius. Greater +as it was, too, than the monarchy of Louis XIV., it was shut out from +the sea by England, a source of weakness and peril to a maritime State; +and it had no foundations in the organic structure, the history, or the +traditions of the French people. Most ominous of all, the Empire seemed +to destroy intellect and public worth in France: it was barren of great +men of letters, and of great citizens; it produced only soldiers and a +servile herd of functionaries.</p> + +<p>I pass over the immediate results of Tilsit, the oppression of every +small neutral Power, Copenhagen, the invasion of Finland, and the +dissensions which, following the friendship pledged on the Niemen, were +left unappeased by the meeting at Erfurt of the two potentates already +distrusting each other. Napoleon soon began to repent of the promises +he had made to Alexander respecting the Turks; but he continued to use +the Russian alliance, unstable as it was, for his grasping ambition. +The Czar, I have said, perhaps consented that his conqueror should +work his will on Spain; and before the Grand Army had nearly returned +to France, Napoleon had begun to make preparations to annex the whole +of the Iberian Peninsula. A quarrel was forced on Portugal, on the +pretence that she was evading the Continental system, and would not +exclude English trade from her ports; and Junot, Duke of Abrantes in +the Napoleonic peerage, was sent with an army of conscripts, at the +close of 1807, from the Pyreneean frontier, to occupy Lisbon. The +fate of Spain had been already settled; that Monarchy had, for many +years, been almost an abject vassal of France; it had given her ships, +soldiers, and a noble colony; and it had sacrificed a navy in her cause +at Trafalgar. But the fiat had gone forth that the House of Bonaparte +should replace the House of Bourbon on the throne of Charles V. Junot +was ordered to “observe” the Spanish fortresses; and large bodies +of French troops were gradually moved towards the borders of Spain, +from the Loire<span class="pagenum" id="Page_153">[153]</span> and the Garonne. I cannot dwell on the Machiavellian +statecraft which brought about the invasion that followed, on Aranjuez, +and the plot of Bayonne. The dotard Charles fell into the arms of the +tempter; the rights of Ferdinand his son were set aside with contempt, +and Joseph, a brother of Napoleon, put off the Crown of Naples to +assume that of Spain and the Indies.</p> + +<p>The Emperor, however, might have recollected what the character is of +that strange people, which has more than once baffled the greatest +warriors, amidst the ranges of its hills and defiles, and has done +wonders in the defence of its cities. Spain sprang up to a man, from +the coasts of Galicia to Andalusia and the Pillars of Hercules; “Death +to the foreigner!” was the fierce national cry; local juntas were +formed in every province to direct and sustain the great movement; +levies were poured into the army by thousands; and a call to arms, like +that of France in 1793, led to an almost universal rising. Napoleon +ere long found that it was no easy task to pacify and subdue a country +like this; and his contemptuous scorn of popular passions—“the +stirrings of the <i>canaille</i>” was a common phrase of his—made +him neglect obvious precautions of war, and had soon involved his +arms in a signal disaster. When the insurrection broke out, in the +summer of 1808, he had about 120,000 men in Spain, along the main +roads between Bayonne and Burgos; and had he operated after his wonted +fashion, he could easily have conquered the northern provinces. But +in his disdain of “armed mobs,” he tried to overrun the whole country +at once; and, simply ignoring every rule of strategy, he divided his +armies into small fractions, and sent them, in flying columns, west, +east, and south. Thus employed, his forces could not perform their +task; Bessières, indeed, a marshal, the Duke of Istria, routed a +considerable army at Rio Seco; Moncey penetrated into the heart of +Valencia; and Dupont, a soldier of brilliant promise, marched into +Andalusia, sacked Cordova, and even approached Cadiz. The insurrection, +nevertheless, was everywhere; swarms of guerillas, gathering on all +points of vantage, and impossible to destroy, cut off the French by +hundreds; and Moncey and other generals found themselves<span class="pagenum" id="Page_154">[154]</span> checked by +armed multitudes, formidable behind ramparts. Ere long, terrible news +from the south arrived; Dupont was caught and surrounded by the chief +part of the regular army of the fallen Monarchy, in the recesses of +the Sierra Morena, and with his troops was compelled to lay down his +arms; and though possibly he might have done more than he did, he was +hemmed in by immensely superior numbers. Even worse intelligence came +from Portugal, and the French army at the mouth of the Tagus. I shall +afterwards review the career of Wellington; enough here to say that he +first set foot in Portugal in the early days of August 1808; and he +defeated Junot, who by this time, too, was isolated in the midst of a +national rising, with considerable loss to the French, at Vimeiro. The +beaten chief and his army were too glad to effect their escape from +a victorious foe, and an insurgent country, by accepting terms; and +they were ultimately embarked in British transports, and landed on the +western coast of France. By the autumn of 1808 the French armies in +Spain, humbled and baffled by a despised enemy, had evacuated almost +the whole Peninsula, and had fallen back behind the course of the Ebro.</p> + +<p>The indignation and amazement of the Lord of the Continent at these +untoward events, may be easily conceived. The great master of war had +been found wanting; “a French general,” he exclaimed, “had justified +Mack”; and, worst of all, his trained and disciplined troops had failed +before rude and half-armed masses. He shut Dupont up in a State prison, +and kept him immured through the rest of his reign; and how bitterly +he felt the disgrace of his arms is seen in his admirable remarks, +made at St. Helena, on the ruinous effects of capitulations in the +field. The Emperor lost no time in endeavouring to repair the injured +renown of the French army—the Czar and his ministers had secretly +rejoiced—and, in November 1808, he left the capital and invaded Spain +with an enormous force, determined, he wrote, “to put down rebellion.” +He had five corps and the Guard in his hands; the weak Spanish armies, +indulging in foolish boasts, and spread upon an immense line, extending +from Biscay to the verge of Aragon, were pierced through and scattered +like sheep; and Espinosa and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_155">[155]</span> Tudela were two battles that were little +better than huge butcheries. Yet these “examples,” as they were called +by the Emperor, were not attended by decisive success. Napoleon’s +manœuvres were perfectly designed; but plunged in the depths of a +hostile country, and utterly unable to procure intelligence, Soult and +Ney failed to cut off the retreat of the Spaniards, and the wrecks +of their routed forces were soon restored by insurrectionary levies +flocking in by thousands. The way to the capital was, however, open; +Napoleon mastered the Somo Sierra by a magnificent charge of his Polish +horsemen, for he scorned to make a regular attack; and he entered +Madrid, in the last days of December, at the head of a force that +defied resistance. King Joseph was now installed on his throne; but +there was no popular voice to say “God bless him”; the city was one +of silence and mourning; and though a Constitution was announced for +Spain, which abolished all kinds of old abuses and inaugurated many +real reforms, the invaders remained as detested as ever. Against the +feeble protests of his crowned dependant, Napoleon continued to rule by +terror and force; when, as 1808 was closing, his attention was directed +to a new enemy.</p> + +<p>After Vimeiro, the successful army, placed under the command of Sir +John Moore, had held Lisbon and been reinforced; and a fresh body of +troops, led by Sir David Baird, had landed at Corunna to assist the +Spaniards. Moore had marched northwards and joined Baird; and near +the close of December he had approached Valladolid, threatening the +communications of the French with Bayonne, and at the head of about +30,000 men. Napoleon had soon broken up from Madrid with an army +perhaps 40,000 strong; he crossed the Guadarramas by a forced march in +the hope of reaching and crushing his foe; and he directed Soult to +combine the movement so as to fall on the rear of the British force. +Moore, however, ably changing the line of his operations, made for +Corunna; the Emperor pressed his enemy in vain; and he abandoned the +pursuit in the first days of January, the attitude of Austria having +become menacing and requiring his immediate presence in France. It is +unnecessary to dwell on the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_156">[156]</span> events that followed; the British army +made good its retreat, though with heavy loss, through the mountainous +tracts that divide Leon from the Galician seaboard; and Soult proved +unable to to bring it to bay. Moore turned to fight at Corunna when +about to embark; he beat Soult off in a well contested action; and +though he fell, he knew that he had saved his army. He had shown great +ability in this brief campaign, remarkable for this too, that it was +one of the few occasions on which the Imperial Guard beheld British +troops, until ruin lowered on it on the field of Waterloo.</p> + + <div class="figcenter"> + <img + class="p2" + src="images/i_189.jpg" + alt=""> + </div> + + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_157">[157]</span></p> + +<h2>CHAPTER VI.<br> +<span class="subhed"><span class="smcap">Napoleon</span>—(<i>continued</i>).</span></h2></div> + +<p>The Emperor, on his return to Paris, found a rupture with Austria +already imminent. That great Power, tenacious but always prudent, had +been forced to accept the Peace of Pressburg; but she never intended +permanently to submit to an arrangement that perilously weakened +the State. Meanwhile, she had been treated by Napoleon as a kind of +reluctant vassal; he had armed against her in 1806–7; she had been shut +out from the settlement of Tilsit, she had been compelled to accede to +the Continental system; and she was alarmed at the announced extension +of Russia along the verge of her Eastern provinces. She had gradually +been increasing her forces for war; a great national militia—a strange +institution in the realms of the Hapsburgs—had been created; her +armies had been remodelled on the French system, and had adopted the +French tactics; she had accepted large subsidies from the British +Government; and Stadion, a patriot, and a deadly enemy of France, had +for some time been her First Minister. The diversion of a large part +of the Grand Army from the Rhine, and the successive disasters in +Spain and Portugal, afforded her the opportunity she sought; and she +had made great preparations for a fresh struggle with France, during +the events of 1808 in Spain. Napoleon, unwilling to have two wars on +his hands, tried to induce the Czar to enforce peace, by intervening +in arms in Galicia; but Alexander eluded the demand; and, though he +pretended to threaten Austria, and even sent an army to her eastern +frontier, intended ultimately, perhaps, to act against the French,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_158">[158]</span> he +really maintained a strict neutrality. The French Emperor concealed +his resentment; and instantly made ready “to punish Austria” for what +he called “her perjured and shameless conduct.” His administrative +faculties were again taxed to the utmost to attain his great ends; but, +as in 1807, they proved adequate.</p> + +<p>A considerable part of the Grand Army was recalled from Spain, and +moved to the Rhine; the French garrisons which had occupied the +Prussian fortresses were replaced by Poles, and restored to their +colours; and Italy and the Confederation of the Rhine were again +directed to yield their auxiliaries. Meanwhile conscripts were +enrolled in thousands; a levy was made from past conscriptions which +produced numbers of adult men; ingenious devices were tried to obtain +a much needed supply of inferior officers; and though the finances +of France were strained, the <i>matériel</i> for a great war was +rapidly increased, and directed to the Rhine and thence towards the +Danube. By the early spring of 1809, Napoleon had more than 400,000 +men on foot; but the Grand Army too much resembled that which had +been drawn together in 1807; though it had a great advantage in two +respects, it was not summoned to fight on the verge of the Continent, +and its inherent defects were not so apparent; and the Bavarians, who +filled a large space in its ranks, had been for centuries foes of the +Austrians. Yet Austria had had the start of Napoleon, notwithstanding +his genius and his vast resources; she was ready to strike with effect +before him; and had she struck at the end of March 1809 she might +have achieved important success. She had learned a lesson from 1800 +and 1805; and her forces were now arrayed on the theatre of the war +at hand with a due regard to strategy. Her main army, nearly 200,000 +strong, and under the command of the Archduke Charles, was in Bohemia, +approaching the Danube, and obsering Bavaria, known to be hostile; a +considerable force, under the Archduke John, was in the Tyrol—lost +through Austerlitz, but always loyal to the House of Hapsburg—and was +ready to make a descent on Italy; and detachments were on the frontiers +to watch the Poles and the Russians—these last were not really +feared—and to observe Istria and Dalmatia, now Italian provinces. +The<span class="pagenum" id="Page_159">[159]</span> Archduke Charles, therefore, was in formidable strength on what +was the principal scene of action; and the forces of Napoleon were +still much weaker, being not more than about 100,000 men, the corps of +Davoust, advanced to Ratisbon, and the Bavarians holding the course of +the Isar. The rest of the Grand Army was as yet on the Rhine, or only +near the extreme heads of the Danube; and the Archduke had an immense +opportunity. For the rest, the Emperor had assembled a large army to +defend Italy, and had given it to Eugene, son of the Empress Josephine; +but this was only a secondary force; the valley of the Danube was the +decisive point in the operations about to begin.</p> + +<p>Napoleon was fully aware of the danger; and at this very time he +gave positive orders that, should the Austrians take the offensive, +Davoust and the Bavarians should fall back on Donauwörth, and wait +the arrival of reinforcements. These injunctions, however, were not +complied with; even now the reason is not known—the two exposed corps +retained their positions; and had the Archduke advanced from Bohemia, +he must have taken Ratisbon and overwhelmed Davoust. But he hesitated, +and lost precious days; and at last, listening to feeble counsels—at +heart he was not convinced by them—he broke up from his camps, made a +circuitous march, crossed the Danube at Lintz, and arrived on the Inn, +the ordinary line of Austrian attacks on Bavaria. He was on the Isar by +the 15th of April, at the head of about 140,000 men; he had left 40,000 +behind in Bohemia; and he forced the passage in three great masses, the +Bavarians falling back, and drawing towards the Danube, midway between +Ingoldstadt and Ratisbon. Had the Archduke collected his forces and +moved rapidly, he should have still crushed Davoust, as yet, “in the +air,” and in great peril; but he kept them apart on distant lines, and +he actually detached his right wing towards Ratisbon, in the belief, +it would seem, that his Bohemian corps would join him there and cut +off Davoust. By this time, the 18th of April, Napoleon, who had left +the capital five days before, had reached Ingoldstadt upon the Danube; +and the situation of affairs was such that the ablest commander might +have felt alarm. Davoust was still at Ratisbon<span class="pagenum" id="Page_160">[160]</span> with 60,000 men; the +Bavarians and other German auxiliaries were around Neustadt, perhaps +50,000 strong; and a part of the corps of Lannes, in the temporary +command of Oudinot, afterwards Duke of Reggio, was with that of Masséna +in march from Augsburg, both numbering perhaps 50,000 soldiers. The +hostile armies were thus nearly equal in force; but that of the +Archduke, although divided at greater distances than it ought to have +been, was far more concentrated than the French army, which had been +almost surprised and was still out-generalled.</p> + +<p>In this difficult position the situation was changed in an incredibly +short time by Napoleon’s skill and, it must be added, by the Archduke’s +blunders. Davoust was drawn in from Ratisbon towards the German corps; +this was a flank march with an enemy at hand, but it led only to slight +combats, and was not seriously checked or molested;<a id="FNanchor_13" href="#Footnote_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> and Masséna and +Oudinot were pushed forward with extreme velocity to Pfaffenhoffen, +to threaten the Austrian left which, in its march from the Isar, was +round Mainburg, not far from the Danube. These movements were executed +by the 19th; and thus Napoleon’s army was well drawn together, its +right gathering on the enemy’s flank, while that of the Archduke +remained still scattered. The operations that followed recalled the +exploits of the youthful chief of the army of Italy. On the 20th, the +Emperor attacked the Austrian centre, now separated from the right near +Ratisbon, with part of the corps of Davoust and the German contingents; +he remained with the Germans during the battle—a marked instance +of military tact—and he defeated the enemy with heavy loss near +Abensberg. Meanwhile Oudinot and Masséna had reached the Austrian left, +and had forced it back in retreat towards the Isar; and this, with the +success at Abensberg, led to a complete triumph. Napoleon, leaving a +large detachment to keep back the Archduke, bore down on the retiring +enemy; and, joining Masséna, drove the Austrian left across the Isar, +utterly beaten, and pursued to the Isar by a great mass of cavalry. The +Emperor next <span class="pagenum" id="Page_161">[161]</span>turned against his remaining foes; the Archduke drew +in his right on his centre, and endeavoured to stand on the 22nd; but +he was struck down at Eckmühl by superior forces; and with difficulty +effected his escape on Ratisbon. By this time his lieutenant, +Bellegarde, had reached the place with the Bohemian force, but farther +resistance had become impossible; and the Archduke, with the remains +of the principal army, was compelled to cross to the northern bank of +the Danube. The shattered left wing was on the southern bank; and thus +the great army which had crossed the Isar a few days before with every +prospect of success had been cut in two, and was in eccentric retreat, +divided by a broad and impassable river.</p> + + <div class="figcenter" id="i_b_160afp"> + <img + class="p1" + src="images/i_b_160afp.jpg" + alt=""> + <p class="p0 sm center">Theatre of the<br> +CAMPAIGN<br> +of 1809.</p> + </div> + + <div class="figcenter" id="i_b_160bfp"> + <img + class="p1" + src="images/i_b_160bfp.jpg" + alt=""> + <p class="p0 sm center">The Field of<br> +WAGRAM</p> + </div> + +<p>This splendid success on the principal scene effaced the results of +French reverses on secondary parts of the theatre of war. Eugene +Beauharnais had been defeated at Sacile, and driven behind the line +of the Adige; the Tyrolese had broken out in revolt, and an Austrian +army had entered Warsaw, and overrun the adjoining region. But Napoleon +held the course of the Danube; the way to Vienna was thrown open; and +victory at the decisive point made him master of the situation for the +time. He was soon joined by the Guard, by fresh German contingents, +by Bernadotte, and a great mass of cavalry; and, having detached +Lefebvre to subdue the Tyrol, he began his second march to the Austrian +capital. The operations were not so easy and rapid as they had been +in 1805. Davoust was sent to the northern bank of the Danube, to +observe the movements of the Archduke Charles; the defeated left wing, +under the Archduke Louis, fought a desperate action against Masséna +in pursuit; it crossed the Danube by the last bridge near Krems; and +though Napoleon mastered the line of the stream, and covered his +communications with large detachments, the two Archdukes effected their +junction, and ere long had reached the great plain of the Marchfield, +which stretches down to the northern front of Vienna. The Emperor +entered the city on the 11th of May, and as he had probably 100,000 +men, and the Archdukes had barely 80,000, he resolved to cross to the +northern bank of the Danube, to overwhelm his much weaker enemy, and to +finish the war in one decisive battle. But how was a river<span class="pagenum" id="Page_162">[162]</span> hundreds +of yards wide, of great depth, and with a powerful current, to be +traversed by a large army under the guns of an enemy still formidable +and holding the opposite bank? Napoleon’s extraordinary skill in +choosing the ground for every operation of war was not found wanting, +and his selection of the spot for the passage was perfect. Just below +Vienna, a very large island, that will be known in history by its name +of Lobau, breaks for some miles the course of the Danube; the channel +between it and the southern bank, held by the French, is profound and +broad; but it nearly touches the northern bank, and is only divided +from the Marchfeld by a narrow channel. Napoleon, screening the work by +all possible means, threw a strong bridge over the great channel, thus +connecting Lobau with the southern bank; and as the island is of ample +size, he massed into it a large part of his army, and made preparations +to secure the passage across the narrow channel by numerous bridges.</p> + +<p>By the 20th of May the corps of Masséna, 30,000 strong, had debouched +from the island across these ways into the edge of the Marchfeld; and +it entrenched itself in the two villages of Aspern and Essling, its +chief assured that the greater part of the army would cross by the +morrow. The main bridge, however, over the great arm of the Danube—and +it will be borne in mind there was only one—was broken in the night by +the force of the current; and on the 21st the Archduke Charles attacked +Masséna with greatly superior forces. The villages were defended with +great skill and courage; but though the French succeeded in maintaining +their ground, thousands were very nearly forced into the river; and had +the Archduke struck home he must have been victorious. Great efforts +were made on both sides to renew the struggle the following day; Lannes +with his corps, and part of the Guard and the cavalry, effected the +passage during the night; and the Archduke called up all the reserves +at hand, to make a stroke for a complete triumph. A murderous battle +was fought on the 22nd; Lannes—he met a soldier’s death on the +field—made a formidable attack on the Austrian centre; and Masséna was +about to debouch from Essling, when the news arrived that the principal +bridge had<span class="pagenum" id="Page_163">[163]</span> broken down again, and had become impassable, and that +munitions were short for a prolonged contest. The advance of the French +was at once checked; their lines fell back behind Aspern and Essling, +and though they kept their hold on the bloodstained Marchfeld, they +suffered frightfully from the converging fire of the hostile batteries +arrayed against them. By the 23rd they had taken a position in Lobau; +and the army was so shattered that Napoleon’s marshals pronounced an +immediate retreat necessary.</p> + +<p>Napoleon peremptorily set at nought these counsels; and, maintaining +the attitude he had held at Eylau, refused to allow his army to stir +from the island. His position, however, had become critical; the long +line of his communications with the Rhine was largely guarded by mere +auxiliaries; indignant Prussia was struggling in her chains; the +secret societies, which were to rouse Germany to arms, spread from the +North Sea to the Danube; and the French had escaped a disaster by mere +accident. Yet their chief relied on his genius and the terror of his +name, as he had relied when upon the Passarge; and the event justified +his proud self-confidence. He evidently had perceived that it was a +capital mistake to have committed his army to a single bridge across +a river of the first order; and he applied himself, with accustomed +decision and skill, to make the passage of the Danube assured, and +to enable the Grand Army, whatever its size, to issue from Lobau and +command the Marchfeld. I cannot describe the admirable works—marvels +of engineering, never, perhaps, equalled—constructed under his eye, +to carry out his purpose; his <i>Correspondence</i> remains to attest +these monuments of his gifts as a warrior. The neighbourhood of a great +city fortunately supplied the material required for his designs; in +twenty days, three great bridges—one of boats, two on piles—spanned +the main channel, and formed causeways, completely protected, and +strong enough to bear the weight of the largest masses; and the +efforts of the enemy to destroy them, by various devices, proved +quite abortive. At the same time, Lobau was made a vast entrenched +camp, armed with numerous batteries to defy attack; it was occupied +by ever-increasing forces, as the strength of the Grand Army was +raised;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_164">[164]</span> and preparations were made so to bridge the small channel that +it could become, so to speak, a series of highways. Meanwhile, the +Emperor strained to the utmost his faculties to bring every available +man and horse to the scene of decisive action. Eugene, who, after the +success at Ratisbon, had followed the Archduke John from Italy, and +was approaching Hungary, was called to the Danube; so was Macdonald, +another marshal, honourably known in history as Duke of Tarentum; +Marmont, Duke of Ragusa—an unhappy name—was summoned with his corps +from the Dalmatian wilds; and while the lines of communications were +firmly held, reinforcements were sent to the Grand Army from the +divisions placed higher up the Danube. By these means the Emperor had +made the passage of the river as certain as that of a plain; and he +calculated on having about 180,000 men concentrated for the grand and +final effort.</p> + +<p>The Archduke Charles, on the other hand, had failed to see through +Napoleon’s projects, and had not made nearly such good use of his +time, though placed in the centre of the Austrian monarchy. He seems +to have convinced himself that a great army could not issue from the +camps in Lobau, within two or even three days; and if he fortified +Aspern and Essling, he did not guard the approaches eastward, though +the island extends along these to the Marchfeld. His army, therefore, +was not prepared for an attack from Lobau, sudden and in immense force, +especially to the east of the villages; and it was spread through the +Marchfeld, some miles from the Danube, offering a vantage ground to +his terrible enemy. Nor had the Archduke, though a general-in-chief, +and having it would seem unlimited powers, strengthened his army as +much as ought to have been possible. He left a very large detachment +on the Polish frontier, where its presence could be of no avail; +and he did not insist that the Archduke John—an insubordinate and +conceited theorist—should join him with all his troops on the Danube. +The Austrian army, therefore, was certainly weaker than it might have +been on the principal point; and it had not been largely reinforced by +reserves or levies. It appears probable that it did not exceed 140,000 +or<span class="pagenum" id="Page_165">[165]</span> 150,000 men, a force comparatively small if we bear in mind that of +the two antagonists one was at home on the Danube, the other, far from +the Rhine. In this, as in everything else, the contrast between the +commanders opposed is most striking.</p> + +<p>All was in readiness by the first week of July, for the grand +operation of crossing the Danube. Thousands of troops, with all +the impedimenta of war, guns, trains, field hospitals, and a huge +<i>matériel</i>, had defiled over the great bridge; and on the night +of the 4th, 160,000, French, Saxons, Bavarians, Italians, Poles, and +auxiliaries from the petty German States—Napoleon’s concentration had +been made complete—were assembled in the entrenched camp of Lobau. +Demonstrations had been made to deceive the enemy, and to conceal +the real points of the passage; but the movement, though screened in +part by the darkness, was soon heard along the silent shores. In an +incredibly short time, not less than six bridges were thrown over the +small arm of the river; and the army began to cross to the northern +bank, covered by the fire of hundreds of guns in position. The +different divisions—the Emperor himself had arranged their march with +extraordinary care—were directed towards the expanse of the Marchfeld +east of the points of Aspern and Essling; and they scarcely encountered +any resistance, as this vast space had escaped the Archduke’s notice. +By the early morning of the 5th, 70,000 men had taken possession of +the far-spreading plain; the rest of the Grand Army followed in order, +and by the afternoon its extending masses held a long line from the +right at Glinzendorf, to the extreme left on the verge of the Danube, +the fortified posts of Aspern and Essling having been turned by this +movement and rendered useless. The Austrian army, though completely +surprised and out-manœuvred by Napoleon’s strategy—a masterpiece from +every point of view—had, by this time, advanced towards the enemy; +some skirmishes of little importance occurred; but an effort made +by Bernadotte against the Austrian centre, not far from Wagram, was +sharply repulsed.</p> + +<p>The hostile armies made their bivouacs in the plain, and prepared +for the great fight of the morrow. The morning of the 6th rose on<span class="pagenum" id="Page_166">[166]</span> +the great arrays that extended, on either side, for miles; and it +witnessed the most far-spreading battle which had yet been fought in +the civilized world. I cannot retrace the scenes of the contest; and, +indeed, they have no features of peculiar interest. The Archduke, +certainly much inferior in numbers, had resolved, with little prudence, +to attack; and his general plan was to fall on the French right, so to +force it back as to enable his brother, the Archduke John, to arrive +on the field, and simultaneously to assail the French left in great +strength, and to endeavour to cut it off from the Danube. The effort +against the right failed; for Napoleon, aware that the Archduke John +was approaching, had placed Davoust and Oudinot, with a great body of +troops, on that wing; but the attack on the left proved formidable +in the extreme. Masséna and Bernadotte were almost driven from the +field; and the young levies and auxiliaries fled in thousands. Panic +began to spread through the Grand Army—no longer the army of Jena +and Austerlitz—and had the Archduke made the most of his success, he +might, perhaps, have achieved victory. The extension, however, of both +his wings had left his centre comparatively weak; and Napoleon was not +slow to seize the occasion. He massed the whole Italian army, together +with other contingents and the Imperial Guard, and struck a terrible +blow at the vulnerable point; and the attack was preceded by such a +fire of cannon as had never before been seen in the field. The battle, +however, continued to rage; the Austrians fought with devoted courage; +the ardour of the auxiliaries was not great; and though the pressure +was taken off the Emperor’s left, and Bernadotte and Masséna regained +ground, the Archduke in the main retained his positions. His left, at +last, was forced by a well-directed attack; Davoust and Oudinot carried +the low uplands of Wagram; and the Austrian army slowly left the +field, as the Archduke John showed no signs of appearing. The retreat, +however, was not molested. The result of the day might have been +different had the Archduke had the support of his brother; the carnage +of the battle had, indeed, been terrible; but the victors captured +few guns or prisoners; and Wagram did not approach Austerlitz. Still, +Austria had made her last effort; she submitted to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_167">[167]</span> a humiliating +peace; and Napoleon returned in triumph to France, though he had been +made painfully aware that the Grand Army was not the instrument of war +he had at one time wielded.</p> + +<p>Napoleon’s genius in war shone grandly out in the memorable campaign +of 1809. The movements around Ratisbon, he has said himself, were the +most perfect of his military career; and it would be impertinence to +dispute his opinion. His army, in a position of extreme difficulty, was +extricated by a series of marches, scientific, rapid, and daring alike; +and the enemy, who had gained a marked advantage, was out-manœuvred +and completely defeated. Decision, energy, consummate skill, and +the boldness that runs risk when there is no help for it, are the +distinctive marks of these wonderful efforts; and the operations +against the Austrians, when once divided, are equal to those against +Beaulieu and Colli. The march on Vienna, though not as rapid and +decisive as in 1805, was in complete accordance with true strategy; it +was bold, and yet made thoroughly safe; and the communications with the +Rhine were made quite secure—as regards the numbers of defenders at +least—for in this respect the Emperor was never careless. After the +failure at Aspern and Essling, too, the resolution of Napoleon to hold +his ground, spite of doubting lieutenants, and a plotting Continent, +reveals the chief of supreme capacity; and the administrative powers, +the untiring energy, and the masterly art with which he drew together +every possible man to the decisive point, deserve the admiration of +all students of war. As for his choice of Lobau as the place to cross +the Danube, in the face of the enemy, it is characteristic of his all +but perfect insight; the means he employed to protect his army, and +to render the passage safe and certain, are models of conspicuous +forethought and skill; and the movement by which he turned the +position of the Archduke, caused his defences to fall, and attained +the Marchfeld, at the head of immense forces, was a most striking +exploit. Yet, in these dazzling displays of genius, one grave error +was indisputably made; the relying on a single bridge to conduct a +great army across the Danube cannot be justified; this nearly led to +a frightful disaster; and here we see, once more, that confident<span class="pagenum" id="Page_168">[168]</span> +arrogance and that too passionate energy which show that the faculties +of this marvellous being were not always controlled and balanced by +sound judgment.</p> + +<p>It should be added that these prodigies of war could not have occurred +had Napoleon had an adversary worthy to cope with him. The Archduke +Charles was a learned soldier; he had studied war, and proved more than +equal to confront men like Moreau and Jourdan; but in his operations at +Ratisbon, in his indecision at Essling, in his failure to prevent the +French from crossing the Danube, in his remissness in not collecting +his forces, in the incapacity with which he allowed his enemy to issue +in to the plain of the Marchfeld,<a id="FNanchor_14" href="#Footnote_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> we see a commander quite of the +second order; and, in truth, like all the Continental generals,<a id="FNanchor_15" href="#Footnote_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> +he was paralyzed by terror when before Napoleon. As for the Emperor +at Wagram, his skill in the great moves of tactics was conspicuous +in his attack on the Austrian centre when weakened by the extension +of the wings; the Archduke, too, did wrong in attacking, though he +all but routed the French left; but these are not the most striking +features of this well-contested battle. What the student of war should +specially observe is that Wagram marks a notable change in the quality +of the armies which met in conflict; a change that was to be yet more +developed. The Austrians fought with heroic courage; they were animated +by a strong national feeling, seen among them, perhaps, for the first +time; they were wholly unlike the mere soldiers who had been routed +under Beaulieu and Würmser. On the other hand, the Grand Army showed +signs of weakness; except the Bavarians, the immense contingents of the +auxiliaries were half-hearted and feeble; and the young French levies +disbanded in thousands. The Austrian tactics and the formations of the +troops, had also been extremely improved, while that of the Grand Army +had changed for the worse. Conscious of the inferiority<span class="pagenum" id="Page_169">[169]</span> of the men in +their hands, the French commanders had tried to make up for this by +rendering their columns of attack more large and solid; and Napoleon +had begun to adopt the system of increasing the number of guns to +support his infantry. The density of the masses formed in this way—and +the skirmishers, too, were not what they had been—made them heavy +and inefficient in the shock of battle, and exposed them when engaged +to most destructive fire; and the change in the proportion of foot to +artillery was followed by evil results to both arms.</p> + +<p>I cannot allude to the divorce of Josephine, the sacrifice of the +young child of the Cæsars, flung into Napoleon’s arms as a hostage +of war, and the further extension of the immense Empire which, in +its author’s eyes, grew in strength as he enlarged its limits. To +ordinary observers, the power of the Emperor seemed at its highest in +1810–1811; the Continent had succumbed to his omnipotent will; he had +annexed Rome, Holland, and the Hanse Towns without a word of protest +from the great German States; the Pope was a captive in gilded chains; +the material and moral forces of five-sixths of Europe had yielded to +that all controlling dominion. Yet the Empire was distinctly declining; +and the truth had been perceived by more than one statesman, and by +soldiers as different from each other as Blücher and Wellington. +Napoleon at this time had 800,000 men in arms, including all his +reserves for war; but the Grand Army had for some years resembled the +enfeebled army of Imperial Rome, filled with barbarians who hated her +yoke; the dominant race had ceased to be supreme in it; and unwilling +or lukewarm allies, nay, the forces of conquered and reluctant nations, +sustained the ill-cemented structure of conquest, itself an unnatural +and monstrous portent. While central and eastern Europe, too, seemed to +submit to bondage, Spain continued the struggle against her oppressor; +the ubiquitous insurrection had never ceased, and defied the efforts +of the Imperial Marshals; and the arms of Napoleon had received an +affront, and had suffered reverses which had amazed Europe. Masséna had +recoiled from Torres Vedras; a small British army, under an unknown +commander, had baffled the might of the whole<span class="pagenum" id="Page_170">[170]</span> French Empire, and +had triumphed upon the Douro and at Talavera; and the jealousies and +discords of Napoleon’s lieutenants had led to all kinds of untoward +events, and had wasted his forces throughout the Peninsula. There +was light at one point amidst the gloom which seemed to enshroud a +vanquished world; and though Germany—then a divided land, and wholly +unsuited to partisan warfare—had returned to quiescence after Wagram, +the growing indignation against the rule of France, which had already +made itself felt, was preparing the way for a universal rising.</p> + +<p>Yet the signs that the Empire was in decay were not less apparent in +France herself, the centre of that domination of the sword. The nation, +always prone to change, had begun to get tired of a despotism opposed +to “the principles of 1789”; its appetite for glory had been more than +sated; new ideas and forces growing up within it already indicated +another coming era. The power of these tendencies had been greatly +increased by the sufferings the people were now enduring, by the +severity of the Imperial rule, by the poverty and distress it had for +some time entailed on once flourishing cities and districts. Flattering +bodies of State and satellites of power might boast that France was the +Queen of Europe; but the devouring waste of the Spanish war brought +desolation to thousands of hearths; and peace, under Napoleon, appeared +impossible. The never ceasing demands of the conscription, too, +provoked general and bitter discontent; the laws on this “blood-tax” +had been made barbarous; and the extent of the burdens imposed by +the State had become, year after year, more onerous. The Continental +system, besides, the most extravagant of Napoleon’s projects, while it +led him to aim at universal conquest, enormously lessened the resources +of France; Marseilles, Bordeaux, and Havre became half deserted, and +seethed with indignation at the Imperial rule; and the Continental war +with England destroyed French commerce. In addition, the finances had +begun to decline; the frightful results of 1791–98 became apparent in +a great falling off of youths fitted to enter the army; and, in short, +despotism had done its work of exhaustion, causing general decay. +The feeling of stability and of assured greatness which had pervaded +France<span class="pagenum" id="Page_171">[171]</span> at the peace of Amiens had for some time been passing away; +and, a most significant fact, though a son was born to Napoleon—heir +of world-wide grandeur—this made no change in the general sentiment. +Yet the conqueror, from the heights of his splendour, did not see the +shadows of night approaching; and though the war in Spain consumed the +flower of his armies, and he had seen at Wagram what the Grand Army +was, and the condition of France had become ominous, and Europe, he +knew, was hostile to him, he committed himself to the most gigantic +enterprise which ambition has ever, perhaps, suggested. False to +his own genius, which must have shown him that Spain had become the +principal scene of action for him, he resolved to invade and subdue +Russia.</p> + +<p>Peace, in fact, with the great Power of the North, had, for several +years, been almost hopeless. The League of Tilsit was an impossible +compact, full of seeds of disunion and ultimate strife; and war between +France and Russia had become imminent. The Russian nobles detested the +French alliance; the trade of Russia perished under the Continental +system; the establishment of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, a kind of +pledge that Poland might again be a nation, was a direct menace to +Russian ambition; and Russia could not regard with indifference the +subjection to France of three-fourths of Germany. Alexander soon +escaped from the spell of Napoleon; he secured, indeed, the spoils +flung to him; but he bitterly resented Napoleon’s conduct in having +extended the Grand Duchy, and in refusing to promise that he would +not restore Poland; and he was indignant at the recent annexations +to France. On the other hand, the Emperor had not forgotten the +lukewarmness and, perhaps, the treachery of the Czar in the contest +of 1809; he charged him with evading the Continental system; he +pretended that he was an ally of England; he treated with scorn his +solemn protests against the addition of Holland and the Hanse Towns to +the Empire. Preparations were made on both sides for war, as early as +the autumn of 1811; Alexander abandoned the Continental system; made +overtures to England, which were received; entered into negotiations +with his Ottoman foes; and began to draw together two large armies +towards the heads of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_172">[172]</span> Dwina and Dnieper—the river frontiers of old +Muscovy—there to be combined with a third army from the South, when +peace had been made with the Turks. The arrangements of Napoleon for +his gigantic enterprise were, necessarily, on a much larger scale; they +were extraordinary in extent and grandeur; and they exhibit in the very +highest degree his characteristic skill in stratagem, and his great +capacity for organizing war. One of his first objects was to gain time +to collect his enormous military means, and to advance his huge arrays, +when ready for the field, by degrees even to the Russian frontier, +without opposition on the part of the enemy; and having attained this +position of vantage, and mastered the resources of Eastern Europe, +his purpose was to pour across the Niemen such forces that to resist +would be useless. To reach these ends, he kept up a show of diplomatic +professions for months, which bewildered the Czar and made him +hesitate; and, meanwhile, he secretly and swiftly combined the forces +of Western Europe for his prodigious venture. His experiences of 1806–7 +made him perfectly aware of the difficulties of a task which no other +man would have dreamed of attempting; but he said, “My means are vast, +and I can devour obstacles”; and he addressed himself to the mighty +work with wonted perseverance and administrative power.</p> + +<p>His first care was to provide for the huge armies which were to march +into the wastes of Russia; and for this purpose, as in 1806–7 the +resources of Poland, of Prussia, and even of States on the Rhine, were +placed in requisition for immense supplies; bases of operation and +magazines were formed along the tract from the Elbe to the Vistula; a +system of water-carriage, admirably planned, conducted all that was +required for armed multitudes to the Vistula and the mouths of the +Niemen; and the expedition was delayed until the summer of 1812, in +order that myriads of horses should find pasture on the long march +to the Russian frontier. Meanwhile, Napoleon collected the forces he +deemed necessary for this colossal effort. Austria was now his ally, +and Prussia a vassal; and both Powers furnished contingents to the +Imperial host, which were to join as it approached the Niemen. Bavaria, +Italy, the Confederation of the Rhine, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_173">[173]</span> Holland, of course, obeyed +their master and arrayed troops in immense numbers; and unhappy Poland, +deceived yet trusting, sent tens of thousands of her brilliant horsemen +to take part in a crusade which might give her freedom. France, the +dominant Power, once more saw the Grand Army collected in strength; +but Napoleon did not, in 1812, anticipate the conscription as in 1807; +he enrolled masses of levies and reserves; but he dreaded an outburst +of hostile opinion; and he tried to lessen the strain of the war on +Frenchmen. By these various expedients 600,000 men, collected from +every part of old Europe, were arrayed in arms in the spring of 1812; +and these vast masses were slowly moved to their positions between +the Rhine and the Vistula. Napoleon set off from Paris on the 1st of +May; he left France, alarmed and discontented, behind; scarcely a +cheer greeted the departing conqueror; his very Marshals disliked the +enterprise; and even his docile Ministers and mute bodies of State were +anxious and feared some great coming danger. Another sight, however, +rose before his eyes when he entered Dresden after a rapid journey; +a humbled Continent, in the person of the Head of the Hapsburgs, of +kings, princes, dominations, and powers, bowed before the Charlemagne +of a changed world; Napoleon received such homage as was never seen +since Rome hailed her ruler as a god; and the enterprise was deemed so +assured of success that it was talked of as a mere passage of arms. The +Emperor reached the Niemen in the last week of June; and by this time +the first line of the Grand Army, numbering upwards of 420,000 men, +with 70,000 cavalry, and 1,200 guns, was extended along the Russian +frontier, from the verge of the Baltic to the Galician plains. The +sight might have turned the head of a Xerxes; but to the experienced +eye of a great master of war, it ought to have been significant of evil +omens. In that enormous army there were probably not more than 100,000 +really good French troops; the rest was an assemblage of young French +levies, of Austrians and Prussians, enemies of France, of auxiliaries +who, except the Poles, had no sympathy with her cause or her chief, and +who had, for the most part, showed what they were at Wagram.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_174">[174]</span></p> + +<p>The centre of the host, led by Napoleon, with Oudinot, Ney, Davoust, +and Murat, inferior chiefs, crossed the Niemen on the 24th of June, in +the angle, entering at Kovno, the Russian frontier; the left, composed +of the corps of Macdonald and the Prussian contingent, crossed round +Tilsit; and the right, an enormous array, comprising the army of +Eugene, Poniatowski and the Poles, for the present commanded by Jerome +Bonaparte, King of Westphalia, with his auxiliaries, the two corps +of St. Cyr and Junot, and far away, Schwartzenburg with the Austrian +forces marched along the space between the centre and the heads of +the Bug. This movement, which enabled the Grand Army to issue into +Lithuania as from a salient, brought it almost within reach of the +hostile armies, which, under Barclay de Tolly, by descent a Scotchman, +and Bagration, a chief of the Muscovite nobles, had advanced from +the Dwina and Dnieper, where their sources meet, and had approached +the Niemen with no fixed purpose. The generals of the Czar, all but +surprised and out-manœuvred, fell back at all points; and Napoleon +was at Vilna, within four days having gained an immense strategic +advantage. He made a long halt of about a fortnight; this has been +condemned as a capital error, even by the cautious and far-seeing<a id="FNanchor_16" href="#Footnote_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> +Wellington, and, as events happened, it would have been better +perhaps had he pressed, at all hazards, his offensive movement. But +his <i>Correspondence</i> shows that, from a military point of view, +this delay may be very well justified; the Grand Army, burdened with +impedimenta of all kinds—a necessity in districts with few resources, +and filled with weak elements, was in a bad condition; the auxiliaries +and conscripts had fallen away in thousands; and time was required to +reorganize huge arrays already beginning to dissolve and break up.</p> + + <div class="figcenter" id="i_b_174fp"> + <img + class="p1" + src="images/i_b_174fp.jpg" + alt=""> + <p class="p0 sm center">Theatre, of the<br> +CAMPAIGN<br> +of 1812.</p> + </div> + +<p>The situation, in short, had brought the Emperor to a stand; and yet an +opportunity was given him to strike the Czar a blow more decisive than +his sword could inflict. He was <span class="pagenum" id="Page_175">[175]</span>in one of the capitals of ancient +Poland; he was greeted with enthusiasm once more by the conquered +race; and had he spoken the words “Poland is to be free,” the Russian +Empire would have been thrown back at once to the distant limits of old +Muscovy. But Napoleon adhered to the policy of 1806; he caressed the +Poles and enrolled their levies; but he paltered with their demands to +be made a nation; and he even intimated that he would not annul the +Partition. Meanwhile, after a few days of delay, he despatched Davoust +and part of his right wing to pursue Bagration, trying now to join his +colleague by a circuitous march; but partly owing to the difficulties +of a way through immense woodlands scarcely traversed by roads, and +to the slow movements of heavily-laden troops, and partly to disputes +between Davoust and King Jerome, the effort failed; Bagration escaped; +and he ultimately attained the Dnieper. By this time the Emperor had +formed a great plan to cut off and annihilate Barclay de Tolly, who +had dangerously exposed himself to his foe; and the project was worthy +of a great master of war. A German theorist, possibly struck by the +results of Wellington’s defence of Portugal, had persuaded the Czar to +construct a huge camp at Drissa upon the Lower Dwina, to concentrate +within it his two armies, and to offer battle behind its fortified +lines; and Barclay had reluctantly obeyed the command; Bagration, +too, drawing near him from the distant Dnieper. This strategy, it is +needless to say, had nothing in common with that of Torres Vedras; it +was really the old routine of an obsolete school; and Napoleon broke +up from Vilna on the 16th of July, hoping to surround Barclay, to +destroy him in his camp, and then to turn and overwhelm Bagration. +In all human probability he would have succeeded, had the Russian +commander stood in his lines; but Barclay saw his peril, and left them +in time; and he made a very able movement to Vitepsk, across the front +of the approaching enemy, in order to reach and join his colleague. +The Emperor pursued with his wonted energy; but nature and the defects +of the army interposed; and he attained Vitepsk too late to catch and +destroy an enemy still eluding his grasp. He was again forced to make +a long halt at Vitepsk, from the reasons<span class="pagenum" id="Page_176">[176]</span> which had made him halt +at Vilna; the state of the Grand Army had become alarming, and the +appalling fact was brought before the eyes of its chief, that, though +no real battle had yet been fought, 150,000 men were missing out of +the 420,000 who had begun the invasion. Such waste of war had never +been seen before; yet Napoleon still had faith in his genius; he made +a daring flank march, behind a screen of forests, in order to effect +a junction with his right; and this, he hoped, would enable him to +reach the enemy between the Dwina and Dnieper, and compel him to fight. +The movement had only partial success; a fierce encounter took place +at Smolensk; but the French army only gained ruins, and Barclay and +Bagration, having joined hands at last, disappeared into the remote +interior.</p> + +<p>Napoleon’s manœuvres up to this time were worthy of his strategic +genius; in theory they had been almost faultless; but they had been +baffled by obstacles not to be overcome, and by the conditions of the +war and the state of the army. The middle of August had now arrived; +the Emperor was at the portals of old Russia, hundreds of miles +from his nearest base in Germany; was he to advance further into +the recesses of the East, and to brave the fate of Crassus in the +Parthian deserts? His lieutenants, to a man, entreated him to halt; +to establish himself between the Dwina and Dnieper; to call up all +available reserves; and, extending his wings on either side, to overrun +Volhynia and subdue Courland. This probably would have been done by +Turenne or Wellington; but there were military reasons against a delay, +which must have led to a winter campaign; and after long reflection, +the spoiled child of Fortune resolved to advance to Moscow, and to +find peace, after victory, in the old capital of the Czars. Yet he +did not take this momentous step inconsiderately, or without ample +precautions; he exclaimed: “I will find no Pultowa on my way”; and he +left nothing undone to render his communications secure, and to avert +every peril from the invading army. His situation, at this moment, +appeared safe; for to the left Macdonald occupied Courland, and was +besieging the important place of Riga; Oudinot had defeated the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_177">[177]</span> corps +of Wittgenstein, left behind by Barclay in the retreat from Drissa; +and Schwartzenberg had repulsed the army of the South, moving, under +Tormazoff, from the Pruth and the Dniester. Yet the Emperor would +“make assurance doubly sure;” he summoned Victor, with his corps, +to Smolensk; he ordered Augereau to advance towards the Niemen; he +moved up his second line to the tracts round the Oder; he organized +Lithuania under a local government, and directed the formation of +immense magazines at Smolensk, Vilna, and all the way to the Niemen. +He broke up from Smolensk, in the last week of August, at the head of +about 160,000 men, the best and most solid part of the Grand Army. The +troops had been provided with large supplies, for the Russians had +wasted the line of the retreat, even in Lithuania, without the aid of +the people, and it had been foreseen that in old Russia the peasantry +would assist in the work; and for some days the invaders moved without +distress along the vast uplands, which divide the streams that reach +the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Caspian. As soon, however, as +provisions fell short, the army began to suffer terribly in what had +been made a harried wilderness; 30,000 stragglers became missing; and +Napoleon declared, that if nothing new occurred, he would return to +Smolensk and find winter quarters. At this critical time, intelligence +arrived which caused him again to pursue his march. The Russian army, +furious at a retreat of hundreds of miles before the invaders, had +insisted on fighting a great battle; the Czar had dreaded to refuse the +demand; and Barclay had been replaced by Kutusoff, the chief who had +made his mark in 1805, and who, though approving Barclay’s conduct, had +promised to encounter the approaching enemy. On the 5th of September +1812, the horsemen of Murat came in sight of the Russians, in position +along a line extending from Borodino on their right to the wood and +village of Outitza on their left, their front covered by redoubts and +field works. Both armies spent the following day in preparation for the +conflict at hand, and as light rose on the morning of the 7th, Napoleon +exclaimed to his staff of Marshals: “It was time; but there is the +Sun of Austerlitz!” The armies opposed were about equal in numbers,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_178">[178]</span> +130,000 to 140,000 men; and for some time the course of the battle went +rapidly and decidedly on the side of the French. Napoleon, with the eye +of a master, had seized the weak point of his adversary, and assailed +his left; the redoubts and other defences were stormed and captured, +and Kutusoff, who had unskilfully crowded his right with masses of +troops that could hardly move, was in extreme peril. Had the Emperor +at this crisis sent part of his reserve to complete the defeat of his +foe, he must have won the battle, but he refused to believe in such +rapid success; he was not as active as was his wont on the field, and +a change soon came in the tide of Fortune. The Russians, after a great +effort, retook the redoubts; Kutusoff detached troops by degrees from +his right, and the battle raged furiously for several hours in which +each side fought with heroic courage. At last the Russian left was +again broken; once more the French stormed the fortified works, and, +though a fine charge was made by the Russian cavalry, the defeated army +began to fall back. Napoleon was implored to launch the Guard, at this +decisive moment, against the enemy; but he remained inactive, and would +not employ it; and the battle closed with a frightful duel of guns, in +which the Russians were literally slain in thousands. The struggle was +the bloodiest ever seen in war; the Russians lost nearly 50,000 men, +the French probably 80,000; and though the beaten army drew off from +the field, Borodino was only a greater Eylau.</p> + + <div class="figcenter" id="i_b_178fp" style="max-width: 367px"> + <img + class="p1" + src="images/i_b_178fp.jpg" + alt=""> + <p class="p0 sm center">NAPOLEON WATCHING THE BURNING OF MOSCOW FROM THE +PETROVSKI PALACE.</p> + </div> + +<p>Napoleon was ill on this terrible day; and it has been supposed that +his powerful frame showed on this occasion, for the first time, the +symptoms of a disease that was to prove mortal. His hesitation, +however, to use his reserves and the Guard has been explained by +himself: “I will not,” he said, “throw away my best protection” at +an “immense distance from its nearest supports”; but this fact alone +condemns the whole enterprise. On the 14th of September 1812, the Grand +Army beheld the temples and domes of Moscow rising from the surrounding +plains; it had soon filled an almost deserted city; and the Conqueror, +at the summit, as he dreamed, of his unequalled fortunes—his eagles +were on the Niemen, the Elbe, and the Tagus—imagined that <span class="pagenum" id="Page_179">[179]</span>Alexander +would sue for peace, as he had sued for it after the rout of Friedland. +Before many hours the capital, self-destroyed, was a hurricane of +devouring flame—a sinister monument of internecine war—and the +victorious army had to establish itself in a desolate expanse of +charred ruins, spreading far into a wasted country. Yet Napoleon +clung to the wreck of Moscow; he believed that the enemy would be +forced to treat; he slaked the pride of his still exulting soldiers by +grand reviews and exhibitions of their power; and, as supplies were +found in abundance in underground recesses, the army retained its +order and discipline. Weeks, nevertheless, ebbed away and the Czar +made no sign. Meantime Kutusoff had rallied his defeated army, had +distributed it in a series of camps, some distance from Moscow, on the +flank of his foe; and while the French cavalry and artillery became +rapidly feeble—there was no suitable food for the horses—thousands +of recruits, and especially a host of Cossacks, the Bedouins of the +deserts of the North, assembled to defend “Holy Russia” to the death. +At this crisis—always in this consistent—the Emperor refused to adopt +a course which must have compelled Alexander to yield. He would not +listen to the idea of proclaiming the freedom of the enormous masses +of serfs in the Muscovite Empire; and, rejecting even now the notion +of retreat, he formed vast designs for a march on St. Petersburg, or a +descent into Southern Russia to find winter quarters. His lieutenants, +however, condemned schemes strategically grand, but perhaps impossible. +He did not silence them with his wonted authority in the critical +position in which they all stood, and at last, in the middle of +October, he consented to retreat, the delays which had already +occurred having no doubt been largely due to the guile of Kutusoff, +who, anticipating the future with sagacious forethought, feigned +negotiations to deceive and detain his enemy. The retrograde movement +began on the 19th of October; and the Grand Army, as it defiled out +of Moscow, presented a strange and ominous aspect. It was still about +100,000 strong; the infantry were in a tolerable state, but the cavalry +and horse artillery were few and enfeebled; the proportion of guns +was far too great, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_180">[180]</span> the divisions, bearing with them an enormous +booty, and dragging a huge <i>matériel</i> and <i>impedimenta</i>, +were incapable of making an energetic movement. Napoleon endeavoured +to steal a march on Kutusoff, still on his flank, but at a wide +distance, and to retreat towards Kalouga, to the south-west of Moscow, +through a fertile region not yet destroyed; and probably he would have +attained his object had he had an efficient and active army. But his +enemy forestalled him at Malo-Yaroslavetz; a murderous and indecisive +battle followed; and Napoleon—it was the first council of war he ever +summoned—yielded to his Marshals, and abandoned the attempt to break +through and reach Kalouga, a decision fraught with momentous results. +The French army was now forced back on the line by which it had +advanced to Moscow, but it had sufficient provisions for some days; the +climate as yet was not threatening; the Russians cautiously kept aloof, +and the still hopeful soldiery believed they would reach Smolensk and +good quarters in ten or twelve forced marches. Ere long, however, the +supplies fell short; the army, passing through a ruined country, was +scarcely able to procure the means of life, however widely it spread +to pillage; men began to disband and straggle in thousands, and want +hastened the destruction of all that gives power to armed men. Early +in November, the icy hand of winter fell suddenly on the host already +breaking up; horses died in multitudes in a single night; guns, trains, +carriages were lost and abandoned; and the army became a shattered +horde without resources, military strength, or discipline. Kutusoff, +who had steadily followed the retreat, saw that the expected time had +come; swarms of his light horsemen hung on the rear of the French, +cutting off the wounded, and making numerous prisoners; and attacks, +hesitating at first, but growing formidable, were made on the exposed +flanks of the retreating masses, now almost wholly without the help of +cavalry. The perishing army reached Smolensk by the middle of November; +it had dwindled from 100,000 soldiers to 40,000 worn out fugitives, +deprived of the greater part of their guns and <i>matériel</i>; and it +was soon discovered that the the long-expected haven could not afford +refuge even for some<span class="pagenum" id="Page_181">[181]</span> days. The magazines, which Napoleon had commanded +to be made, were not furnished with nearly sufficient supplies; they +were not properly secured or guarded, and the famishing soldiery +recklessly wasted and plundered the scanty resources they had, for +subordination and military obedience had been almost lost.</p> + +<p>At Smolensk, Napoleon received intelligence more appalling than ever +had reached a commander. Victor and his corps had come up to Smolensk, +and had thrown reinforcements into the town, but he had left under the +stress of the gravest peril. Wittgenstein, whose army had been largely +increased, had eluded Macdonald far away in Courland, and had defeated +Oudinot, very inferior in force; and Victor had marched to assist his +colleague. The two Marshals, however, could not shake off their foe; +Wittgenstein was advancing on the Upper Dwina, at the head of about +45,000 men; and the left wing, therefore, of the Grand Army, once +apparently secure, was in daily growing danger. Meantime, Tormazoff +had been joined by Tchitchakoff, an admiral, with a fresh army from +the south. The Saxon auxiliaries had been defeated; Schwartzenberg, +at a hint given from Vienna, had fallen back before the approaching +enemy; and Napoleon’s right wing was left uncovered and threatened by +nearly 50,000 men. Kutusoff was already close to Smolensk; what if he +continued his ceaseless attacks, while the hostile forces, converging +from the rear, should drive in the already broken wings, and should +close on the rear of the army from Moscow? Mack and Mélas were never +in such a woeful plight, and Napoleon at once broke up from Smolensk, +to make a great effort to avert destruction. He had not been equal to +himself since he had left Moscow; whether illness had impaired his +great faculties, or, more probably, because he had no experience of +defeat; and, underrating the real force and the skill of Kutusoff, he +sent off his army, strengthened in some degree, in separate masses, +that scarcely supported each other. The Russian chief seized the +occasion, and became more bold. He endeavoured to cut off a large part +of the retreating forces, and though the effort failed, the French had +to run the gauntlet of enemies ever gathering on their flanks and their +rear, and slaying, capturing,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_182">[182]</span> and destroying thousands. The horrors of +the retreat to Smolensk were surpassed; the dissolving masses, which +had been 60,000 strong when they left the place, were but 20,000; and +the heroism of Ney, who covered the rear, was the one gleam of light +in a long night of darkness. Victor and Oudinot had now drawn close +to Napoleon, but Kutusoff, Tchitchakoff, and Wittgenstein were at +hand; and the three French armies, 70,000 fugitives in the last days +of November, found themselves arrested by the broad and half-frozen +Beresina, while the enemy, fully 120,000 strong, was gathering on +all sides to prevent the retreat. The situation seemed utterly +hopeless, but Napoleon’s genius suddenly revived; and he extricated +himself from the jaws of destruction by one of the finest efforts he +ever made in his career. Deceiving his adversaries by feints of all +kinds—he actually drove a huge body of stragglers to the wrong place +to conceal his purpose—he threw two bridges over the wintry stream; +the soldiers who could move and keep together succeeded in crossing +under the Russian batteries; thousands perished, indeed, but the army +was saved; though Wellington has observed, with strict truth, that had +the Russian commanders struck home, it must have been destroyed as a +military force. I shall not dwell on the closing scenes of the retreat: +the wrecks of Moscow, and the corps of Victor and Oudinot, were about +50,000 men when the Beresina was passed; the enemy had abandoned the +pursuit; and yet these bodies shrunk to about 30,000 in not more than +five or six marches. At Smorgoni Napoleon left his army, in order, +he told the Marshals, to awaken France; political considerations +plead for the act, but it would not have been done by Turenne or +Frederick; and, with other instances, it shows, I think, that this +supreme military genius, matchless in success, was not equally great +in extreme adversity. After the Emperor’s departure, the diminishing +arrays toiled hopelessly through the Lithuanian wastes; each day very +many hundreds dropped off; Murat, placed in command, all but lost his +head; reinforcements caught the contagion of despair, and the armed +multitude completely broke up. The frightful scenes of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_183">[183]</span> demoralization +and terror witnessed at Smolensk recurred at Vilna. Great magazines had +been collected there, but they were sacked and destroyed by the mobs +which attacked them; and the French fled to the Niemen in petty knots +and bands, and at last sought refuge behind the Vistula. Such a tragedy +of war had never been seen since the immense host of the Assyrian +tyrant perished through the inscrutable will of Omnipotence. More than +half a million of soldiers, including reserves, had crossed the Niemen +a few months before; 50,000 did not recross the stream, and the cavalry +and artillery were almost destroyed. The losses of the Russians were +also terrible; but bearing in mind that they were at home, and that +numbers of the disbanded and wounded rejoined their colours, they were +ultimately, perhaps, not more than 120,000 men.</p> + +<p>The causes of this immense disaster, the prelude to the fall of the +French Empire, have been examined by many writers. We may dismiss +the pretence that “it was all the cold.” This equally affected both +armies, and it weakened the Russians quite as much as the French. The +conflagration of Moscow no doubt contributed largely to the events that +followed. The Grand Army but for the fire, might have found winter +quarters in a rich capital; but we can hardly agree with Napoleon’s +phrase: “I would have emerged like a ship from the ice in spring”; his +cavalry and artillery would have been ruined, for the horses had no +hay, and would have had insufficient provender. The chief causes of the +catastrophe are, I think, two: the Grand Army was the worst instrument +of war, which Napoleon had hitherto had in his hands; it was feeble +despite its enormous size; more than half the soldiers were bad or +unwilling; and it was incapable of great and rapid efforts, especially +in a theatre of war like Russia. The paramount cause, however, beyond +dispute, was that the grand offensive strategy of the French Emperor +was all but impossible in such a campaign. The army, unable to find +resources on the line of march, was obliged either to carry large +supplies with it or to scatter over the country to obtain subsistence; +in either case, daring and decisive movements were frustrated or had +few results;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_184">[184]</span> and, curiously enough, the very expedients Napoleon +adopted to support his troops, great magazines at a variety of +points, so encumbered them that they baffled his efforts. As for the +Emperor, his conduct in the campaign has never yet, perhaps, had an +impartial critic. His operations at the beginning of the war bear +the ineffaceable stamp of his powers: they were masterly, perfectly +conceived, and brilliant; and had he commanded the army of Austerlitz, +he might have separated Bagration and Barclay, and perhaps won a Jena, +before he reached Smolensk. It is wholly untrue besides, that he +plunged into the depths of old Muscovy without forethought; he spared +no pains to make his bases secure, and to protect his communications +in every way; and his great faculties were seen in perfection in his +escape on the Beresina from a host of enemies. Undoubtedly, however, +he may have been too cautious in husbanding his reserves at Borodino; +he certainly delayed too long at Moscow; he ought not to have recoiled +at Malo-Yaroslavetz; he should not have divided his columns when he +left Smolensk; he ought never to have given Murat the command of his +army. All these, however, were mere mistakes, and every commander must +sometimes go wrong; but what really was most to blame in him was his +inactivity during a great part of the retreat, and his abandonment of +his troops at Smorgoni. This indicates a defect in this great master; +there were vulnerable points in the Achilles of war, and Napoleon +never was in the hour of misfortune the perfect chief he was in the +hour of triumph. Still, his capital error in the campaign was that +the enterprise, as he conducted it, was beyond his powers: he defied +space and Nature when he advanced to Moscow, and he paid the penalty in +terrific ruin. The result might have been different had his operations +been more methodical and more prudent; and here we see, again, how +imagination and pride occasionally mastered his better judgment. As +regards the Russian commanders, their first movements were timid, +aimless, and yet presumptuous; they ought not to have approached the +frontier; they should have kept away from the camp of Drissa; they +ought not to have fought at Borodino at all, a battle, besides, which +they directly badly; and if<span class="pagenum" id="Page_185">[185]</span> they imitated Wellington in the retreat +from the Dwina, the imitation was poor and unskilful. Barclay, however, +showed resource in the march to Smolensk; and though Kutusoff probably +could have done more than he did, his choice of a position on the +Emperor’s flank, and his unceasing attacks on the retreating enemy, are +good illustrations of the military art. Nevertheless, the fame of the +Russian chiefs, due to the results of the war of 1812, has diminished +with the progress of time; and none of them can rank as truly great +captains. The most conspicuous fact on the victorious side is the +stern endurance of the Russian soldiery, and the resolution shown +by the Czar and the nation; thus patriotism in Spain and in Muscovy +baffled Napoleon. Two of the most striking incidents of the war, as +a whole, are Napoleon’s refusal to set the Poles free, and even at +Moscow to emancipate the serfs; in his hatred of all that is national, +liberal, popular—of what he called the “ideology of the Rights of +Man”—he would not adopt measures that would have disabled his foe, and +certainly would have saved the Grand Army.</p> + + <div class="figcenter"> + <img + class="p2" + src="images/i_224.jpg" + alt=""> + </div> + + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_186">[186]</span></p> + +<h2>CHAPTER VII.<br> +<span class="subhed"><span class="smcap">Napoleon</span>—(<i>continued</i>).</span></h2></div> + +<p>Napoleon—he had travelled in disguise through Poland and +Germany—returned to Paris as 1812 was closing. On his arrival he had +proofs, not to be mistaken, of the increase of the adverse opinion +of France, and of the real instability of the Imperial throne. An +obscure Republican officer had conspired against him; and though the +conspiracy had been nipped in the bud, the capital had heard of the +crime with indifference; and, most significantly, no one seemed to +think that the infant King of Rome—his ill-fated son, the Astyanax of +the fallen House of Bonaparte as he was called by the captive of St. +Helena—would succeed to the heritage of the French Empire. Napoleon, +after reproving his still servile ministers, and the silent and docile +Bodies of the State, addressed himself to redeem the pledge he had +given his lieutenants when he left Smorgoni; he exerted himself with +even more than characteristic energy—“I am now General, not Emperor,” +is a phrase in his letters—to repair the tremendous disaster which +had befallen his arms; and he was seconded with real zeal by a nation +which, though the Revolutionary fervour had ceased, and it feared and +disliked the Imperial rule, has often done wonders in an effort to +retain the military supremacy which is its great ambition. The Emperor, +who had called out the Conscription of 1813, ventured to anticipate +and call out the Conscription of 1814; immense bodies of National +Guards were enrolled, and invited to serve; the depôts of the Empire +were emptied, to furnish every trained<span class="pagenum" id="Page_187">[187]</span> soldier who could bear arms; +<i>matériel</i> of war was found in abundance in the arsenals of France +to replace what had been lost; and veterans of the past and officers +from Spain were forthcoming in hundreds to prepare the new levies. The +genius of Napoleon and the ardour of France were successful, to an +extent that appears astonishing; half a million of armed men were on +foot by the early spring of 1813; gifts of horses, and purchases on +an immense scale, had in some measure replaced the destruction of the +cavalry which had disappeared in the retreat; and though these masses +could scarcely be called an army, they were being skilfully drilled +and organized, and they had the national aptitude to become quickly +soldiers. Napoleon had calculated that, by the coming summer, he would +be able to take the field at the head of 250,000 men, with armies of +reserve on the Rhine and the Elbe; and he had boasted that with these +forces, and the troops that had come back from Russia, he would conquer +the Czar and keep Germany down. Events, however, had completely changed +since he had abandoned the wreck of the Grand Army. When he set off +from Smorgoni, Macdonald on the left and the Prussian contingent were +almost intact; Schwartzenburg, on the far right, had a considerable +force; though the army from Moscow was almost destroyed, a great part +of the second line of the Grand Army, assembled in 1812, was cantoned +between the Elbe and the Vistula; and Napoleon’s previsions, therefore, +were not illusory. But since his return to France, the Prussian corps, +and its chief, had ostentatiously revolted and joined the enemy; +Macdonald, hard pressed and deserted, had escaped with difficulty, +through a host of enemies, and attained the Vistula; Schwartzenburg, +with his Austrians, had marched into Galicia, and evidently was waiting +on the policy of his Court; the army that had left the Beresina had, +we have seen, perished; and down-trodden Prussia had suddenly flamed +out in a tremendous explosion of national passion, which was rapidly +making itself felt through Germany, prepared for years for a patriotic +outbreak. Murat, left in command of the French army, proved utterly +unable to confront misfortune; he fled to his treasured kingdom of +Naples; and the conduct of operations was given to Eugene Beauharnais, +devoted to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_188">[188]</span> the Emperor, but not a great chief. Eugene, collecting the +fragments of Macdonald’s corps and the survivors of the troops who had +entered Russia, had endeavoured to make a stand on the Vistula; but +the approach of the Russians and Prussians, and the rising of Prussia, +compelled him ere long to fall back; and he ultimately retreated to +the line of the Elbe, bringing along with him the greater part of what +had been the second line of the army of 1812. He was in positions on +the Elbe, in the first days of March, at the head of perhaps 45,000 +men; about 40,000 were in march from the Oder; and these, apart from +a few thousands more sent to strengthen the garrisons in the Prussian +fortresses, were the whole forces that could be brought together out +of the enormous mass of 600,000 soldiers arrayed, the year before, to +invade Russia! Yet Eugene had conducted the retreat ably; and this was +admitted, at the time, by the sternest of censors.</p> + +<p>These disasters frustrated Napoleon’s projects, and accelerated his +appearance in the field. He endeavoured to arrange the dispute with +Rome, acquiring influence again in Imperial France; issued a paper +money to sustain the finances, too like the assignats of 1791–3; the +Treasury was in a critical state; and he was at Mayence in the middle +of April, having summoned the Princes of the Confederation of the +Rhine to arm and put down the great Teutonic rising, described by him +as a mere “Jacobin movement.” His troops had been for some time in +motion, and were probably 120,000 strong on the Rhine; and he hoped +that with these and the army of Eugene he would surprise and overpower +his enemies, who had incautiously exposed themselves to his terrible +strokes. I shall say a word hereafter on the reorganization of the +Prussian army, after the ruin of Jena, and of the great consequences +which flowed from it; but the suddenness of events had taken the nation +by surprise; it had not had time to put forth its strength; and, for +the present, the Prussian forces in the field were not more than 50,000 +or 60,000 soldiers. The Russians had a much larger army, but their +chiefs were obliged to leave detachments behind; and when they joined +hands with their new allies, in march from <span class="pagenum" id="Page_189">[189]</span>the Vistula to the Oder, +the collected forces were probably not more than 130,000 or 140,000 +strong.</p> + + <div class="figcenter" id="i_b_188fp"> + <img + class="p1" + src="images/i_b_188fp.jpg" + alt=""> + <p class="p0 sm center">Theatre, of the<br> +CAMPAIGN<br> +of 1813.</p> + </div> + +<p>In this position of affairs, against the advice of Kutusoff—the +warrior died a few weeks afterwards—the Czar, dazzled by an +immense triumph, and yielding to the prayers of the Prussian +commanders—Blücher was the most pressing and bold of these—was +persuaded to advance into the heart of Germany, in order to turn to +account the national rising, and to sweep into it the Confederation +of the Rhine; and the allied armies had approached the Elbe, about +100,000 men in the first line, disseminated, too, in divided masses. +This was the repetition of the faulty strategy which had led to Jena +and all that followed; and though times had changed, and Napoleon had +suffered disasters beyond example in war, the movement was wrong from +a military point of view, for it placed the Allies, thrown much too +forward, and comparatively weak, in a situation of peril. Soon after +the Emperor had reached Mayence, his enemy had mastered the line of the +Elbe: York, the Prussian chief, who had been the first to revolt, and +Wittgenstein threatening the great place of Magdeburg, at the head of +about 35,000 men, Wintzingerode, a Russian, and fiery Blücher holding +the river round Dresden with perhaps 50,000, and Milaradovitch, with +about 15,000, advancing along the edge of Bohemia, to encourage Austria +in a policy hostile to France. This disposition of the allied forces +gave Napoleon an opportunity to strike; he drew Eugene towards him with +admirable skill from the Elbe, behind the Saale, as a screen; he broke +up from Mayence with about 100,000 men, and made for the Saale, through +the scenes of Jena; his purpose being to join Eugene, and at the head +of their united forces, 140,000 strong at least, to surprise and assail +the divided enemy, to cut him off from the Elbe and Dresden, and to +force him against the Bohemian ranges, where it would be difficult to +avoid destruction. The Emperor and the Prince effected their junction, +between Merseburg and Naumburg, on the 30th of April; the young levies +of France and the war-worn troops of 1812 met with sympathetic pride; +and the Grand Army, given the name again, marched across the Elster +into the great<span class="pagenum" id="Page_190">[190]</span> plains of Leipsic, in order to carry out a strategic +project as brilliant as any of its renowned author’s. The troops of +Jena and Austerlitz were, however, gone; the movement of the army was +extremely slow; the want of sufficient cavalry was severely felt; and +Napoleon was compelled to advance cautiously, for the enemy was known +to be at hand, and reconnoitring was difficult. A skirmish, in which +Bessières perished, gave the Emperor a warning he did not despise; and +he moved into the open tract between Lützen and Leipsic, combining +his corps with such skill that each could easily and quickly support +the other. Meanwhile, however, the main part of the allied forces had +drawn together, and at the suggestion of Diebitch, a real future chief, +and at the entreaty of Blücher, passionate to fight, it was resolved +to assail the Emperor in the vast and unprotected plain, where the +Russian and Prussian cavalry would have an immense advantage, though +Milaradovitch was many leagues distant.</p> + +<p>On the 2nd of May Eugene had attained Leipsic, and was attacking the +town with an advanced guard, when the hostile army, about 70,000 +strong, fell furiously on the French centre, holding, under the command +of Ney, a cluster of villages, but otherwise exposed in the great +tract around them. The young French soldiers, fired by the heroism of +their chief, made a gallant resistance for some time; but strength and +practised valour gradually prevailed; there was nothing to oppose to +the allied squadrons, and the centre of Napoleon was all but broken, +when the precautions he had so carefully taken enabled him to restore +the uncertain battle. The corps of Marmont, of Oudinot, of Bertrand, +so placed as to come into line quickly, reinforced by degrees the +divisions of Ney; the Emperor was soon on the scene with the Guard; +and a converging line of fire began to envelop the enemy, greatly +over-matched in numbers, and carried destruction into his diminishing +ranks. A desperate effort, however, made by Blücher, nearly pierced +through the French centre once more; and it required the discipline +and power of the invincible Guard—still largely composed of trained +soldiers—to win for Napoleon a doubtful victory. The Allies left the +field in unbroken array; few<span class="pagenum" id="Page_191">[191]</span> prisoners or guns were taken by the +French; and owing to the feebleness of their levies, and the want of +horsemen, anything like effective pursuit was impossible.</p> + +<p>Lützen, like Eylau, was a fruitless battle, and must have suggested +painful thoughts to Napoleon. His strategy had been after his wonted +fashion; the Allies had made a distinct mistake in fighting without +Milaradovitch; the French army had been largely superior in numbers, +and yet it had narrowly escaped defeat. The young soldiers, no doubt, +had shown brilliant courage, but they had recoiled before their veteran +foes; the Emperor had been saved only by his wise caution, the enemy +had successfully effected his retreat, and from their weakness in horse +the French had accomplished little. The great object Napoleon had +had in view, forcing the Allies into the Bohemian hills in complete +ruin, had not been attained; and operations which, with the Old Grand +Army, would probably have led to a second Jena, had proved to a great +extent abortive. He had, however, restored the glory of his arms, and +he entered Dresden in a few days in triumph. He soon compelled the +old King of Saxony, wavering in his faith, like all the Allies, to +furnish him with a large contingent; and his other vassals among the +German princes sent troops at his imperious command, ready to abandon +him at the first change of fortune. He set off from Dresden in the +middle of May, confident that the enemy had at last fallen into his +hands. The Russians and Prussians, after Lützen, had recrossed the +Elbe and marched into Saxony, and they had been directed to the verge +of Bohemia, in the hope of winning Austria to their cause. That Power, +always tenacious, but always wary, was still an ostensible ally of +France, and was bound to Napoleon through the young Empress, but it had +long been playing a double game; it had dealt with the Czar in 1812; +it had winked at Schwartzenburg’s evident neglect to cover the Grand +Army during the retreat; it was not heedless of German opinion; and, +under the direction of the sagacious Metternich, it was seeking to turn +the situation to its own advantage. It had offered council to all the +belligerents, had gradually taken the attitude of a powerful arbiter, +and had<span class="pagenum" id="Page_192">[192]</span> quietly begun to prepare armaments; but though sympathy and +instinct drew it towards the Allies, it feared the Emperor’s power, +and it was still neutral. The Allies, however, thought they could gain +Austria, especially as Napoleon had charged her with bad faith, and, +sacrificing military ends to politics, they had placed their armies +in positions round Bautzen, at a short distance from the Bohemian +frontier. The operations that followed were on a theatre made memorable +in the Seven Years’ War, not far from the famous field of Hochkirch, +where Daun had surprised and and defeated Frederick.</p> + +<p>Fancy may picture the shade of the old Austrian chief directing the +conduct of the Allies; they had entrenched themselves within two +defensive lines, covered by the Spree, and a stream behind; and in +these positions, with little power of movement, they had resolved to +await the shock of Napoleon. That great warrior, on the other hand, had +imitated Frederick to this extent; he would attack the enemy in front, +and reach his flank, but the turning was to be a strategic movement, +carried out far off, and perfectly safe, not a tactical stroke on the +field and hazardous. The battles that followed are full of interest, +and should be carefully studied by a thinker on war. The Emperor +attacked on the 20th of May; he perceived with his wonted insight that +the force of the enemies was too large on their left; so, neglecting +the Tronsberg heights, which they held with this wing, he directed his +main effort against their centre and right, placed along the marshy +ground that surrounded the Spree. The resistance was prolonged and +vigorous; but passive defence had often failed before, and was certain +to fail under the strokes of Napoleon, and the first position was at +last forced, the French being greatly superior in numbers, perhaps +150,000 to 110,000 men. The Emperor renewed the attack next day, but +meanwhile he had taken care to mature an operation promising decisive +success. Ney had been ordered to march on Würchen and Hochkirch at the +head of about 50,000 men, making a long circuit far to the left, and +when the enemy had yielded to the attack in front, he was to close in +on his line of retreat, and to place him in the position of Mélas. The +second<span class="pagenum" id="Page_193">[193]</span> line of defence was also carried, and when the Emperor beheld +his foes falling back, he looked eagerly in the direction where his +trusted lieutenant was to be on the spot, to make his triumph complete. +Ney, however, whether it was because his young troops had been slow in +their movement, or, more probably, because he had lost something of the +perfect confidence of unbroken success, had hesitated when far from +the main army, and never attained the points of Würchen and Hochkirch; +Blücher confronted him with heroic energy, the defeated army found an +avenue of escape, and it effected its retreat, though with heavy loss. +The indignation of Napoleon may be conceived; he had a right to find a +Marengo at Bautzen, and yet, master as he was, he had once more been +baffled. “What a butchery for nothing!” was his angry remark when he +found that the enemy had escaped from the toils.</p> + +<p>Napoleon was all himself at Bautzen; his strategy and tactics were +alike perfect; and the manœuvres which ought to have destroyed his +enemies, prove his immense superiority to Frederick in the field, when +following, partly, Frederick’s methods. The Allies were completely +defeated, and fell back; the Grand Army advanced to the Oder; and +once more the Emperor beheld the vision of the Continent prostrate +under his eagles. Yet the Prussians and Russians had not been crushed; +Napoleon had learned, by hard experience how inefficient his army +was, especially in the essential force of cavalry; and, confident in +himself and the magic of his sword, he accepted the famous armistice of +Pleistwitz, with the object, as he avowed afterwards, of organizing and +training his immature levies, of increasing them, above all, in horses, +and of making them capable of great offensive movements. This truce +has been called the greatest mistake of his life; and history fully +confirms the judgment. The Allies, though baffled, had not been broken; +the Czar, eager to become a second lord of the Continent, had engaged +the strength of his realms in the war; and Prussia, placing herself at +the head of Germany, was proving what her armed might had become, and +gave reliance and weight to the great rising now in full force from the +Rhine to the Oder.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_194">[194]</span></p> + +<p>The military power of that martial State had become transformed since +the day of Jena, and was now capable of immense development. The army +had been reorganized in all its parts; the officers, no longer a mere +noble caste, comprised men of all classes fit to do their duty; and +the soldiery, fired with intense patriotism, were burning to avenge +and restore the nation. The most remarkable change which had taken +place, however, was in the effective force and the character of this +fierce array of warriors. Napoleon had restricted the numbers of the +Prussian army; but his craft and oppression had not attained his ends; +the contingent under arms was not large; but the conscription had been +applied to Prussia; thousands of youths had yearly passed through the +ranks, and had learned the elementary work of soldiers; and the army +was now capable of being enlarged to 200,000 or 250,000 men, especially +under a strong popular impulse. Scharnhorst had, in fact, outwitted +the Emperor; the foundations had been laid of the great system of +which we have witnessed the results in war in this age; and in the +summer of 1813 Prussia was able to place fully 200,000 men in line for +the approaching contest. Meanwhile, immense bodies of troops had been +marched from the Niemen to take part in the struggle in Germany; and it +was calculated that, should Austria join the Allies, 900,000 men would +appear in the field to engage with Napoleon in a mortal struggle. The +forces available for the imperilled Emperor were hopelessly inferior +to these enormous masses. France could yield no further supplies of +troops; and even reckoning the contingents of the Confederation of +the Rhine, notoriously disaffected and eager to desert, 600,000 men +formed the extreme limit of the soldiers capable of joining the Grand +Army, and 200,000 of these, at least, were of scarcely any use. The +armistice, therefore, was a capital error; yet Napoleon maintained his +attitude of pride; he employed the breathing time he had chosen for +this end, in drilling and improving his young levies, in purchasing +horses in vast quantities, in making, in a word, the Grand Army an +instrument fitting to answer his purpose; and considering its state and +its imperfect structure, it is astonishing what was accomplished by +his untiring<span class="pagenum" id="Page_195">[195]</span> energy, by the practised skill of high and subordinate +officers, and by the willingness and intelligence of the French +soldiery. His capacity and genius shone out splendidly, though his +health showed occasional signs of weakness; and he gradually matured a +gigantic design of contending for Empire in the plains of Saxony, to +which he trusted for ultimate success.</p> + +<p>The theatre of war bore a kind of resemblance to that in which he had +triumphed in 1796–7; the Bohemian hills were like those of the Tyrol; +the Elbe, like the Adige, was a great river barrier; and the Emperor, +in his own words, “took again to the trade” of the warrior who had +struck down the Hapsburgs, with a relatively small force, on the verge +of Italy. Napoleon took possession of the whole course of the Elbe +from the Erzgebirge to its mouths at Hamburg; he secured the passages +at every point in order to have full freedom of action; he placed the +bulk of his forces around Dresden, with detachments, however, along the +stream; he threw secondary armies out to the Oder, while he kept his +communications with the Rhine well guarded; and, at the head of from +300,000 to 350,000 men, he made ready to defy his enemies, whatever +their strength, on this vast field of manœuvre. His letters breathe +nothing but stern confidence; he felt convinced that he could defeat +the Allies; and his assurance was such that, playing for his old +domination, he left thousands of troops shut up in the fortresses of +the Oder and Vistula.</p> + +<p>By this time it had become apparent that Austria would be of immense +weight should she place her sword into either scale; and the Allies and +Napoleon during the truce endeavoured to win her over and to obtain her +support. Her inclinations had been never doubtful; she had favoured +Russia and Prussia all through. Napoleon, too, had insulted her by +bribes and threats, and had almost outraged Metternich in a fit of +passion; but she refused for many weeks to make up her mind; and it was +only the success of Wellington in Spain, and especially the great day +of Vitoria, that at last determined her halting purpose. On the 10th +of August 1813 she declared war against France once more; 250,000 men, +who had been assembled in Bohemia, joined the allied standards;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_196">[196]</span> and +Napoleon, with ruin impending in Spain, with France even now on the +point of exhaustion, and with auxiliaries, for the most part, worse +than useless, was left to confront the power of Europe.</p> + +<p>The forces on the theatre of war in Saxony were about 500,000 to +800,000 men—50,000 French were between the Rhine and the Lower +Elbe—and the disproportion of numbers against the Emperor was less +than it had been against the youthful Bonaparte. But the situation, +even in pure strategy, was less favourable to Napoleon than it had been +in 1796: and other circumstances increased the chances against him. +The long line of the Elbe was more difficult to hold than the short +and scarcely passable line of the Adige; the secondary armies that +reached the Oder were far more exposed, and less easy to call in, than +the detachments of Masséna and Vaubois; the retreat of the French army +was better assured in 1796 than in 1813, and all this gave the Allies +advantages, and subjected the Emperor to real dangers, which scarcely +existed in the earlier contest.</p> + +<p>The allied armies, it should be added, were different troops from +those of Alvinzi and Würmser; the young levies of 1813 were not the +fierce Republicans of 1796; and here again the scale turned against +Napoleon. He maintained, however, his unbending attitude; and the plan +of operations formed by the Allies, if well designed, proves how he +was still dreaded. Their general purpose was to attack and weaken his +lieutenants, in their distant positions; to avoid a great battle with +their terrible foe, but to wear out his strength in repeated marches; +and then, and only then, to risk an encounter, when their superiority +of force would make success certain. This strategy, if timid, had real +merits; and it shows how, in most respects, the condition of affairs +was different from what it had been in the campaign of Italy. As was +his wont, Napoleon took the initiative; he set off from Dresden, in +the middle of August, to attack Blücher, already seen to be by far his +most resolute enemy, and he had soon driven him back to the Katzbach, +for the Prussian chief, as had been agreed on, retreated, when made +aware of his presence. Meanwhile, Schwartzenburg,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_197">[197]</span> with the chief part +of the Austrian army, had issued through the Bohemian passes, and, +gathering Russians and Prussians on the way, had advanced against +Dresden in the Emperor’s absence; and St. Cyr, who had been left to +defend the city, announced that he had no means to resist an enemy +apparently 200,000 strong. Napoleon returned, to make head against the +approaching foes; he hesitated whether he would attack Schwartzenburg, +and fall on his rear, as he had attacked Würmser in the defiles of +the Brenta; but time and distance made the attempt hazardous; and he +marched with 100,000 men to the relief of Dresden. A terrible battle +was fought on the 26th and 27th of August; the Allies were greatly +superior in numbers, perhaps 190,000 to 140,000 men; but Napoleon had +his genius, and the advantage of the ground; he rested his weakened +centre on the defences of the place, and assailed Schwartzenburg with +both his wings in great force; and he gained a complete and splendid +victory, remarkable for the death of Moreau in an Austrian camp. The +Emperor’s fortunes seemed restored, when a sudden disaster befell his +arms. Before he reached Dresden he had sent off a lieutenant, Vandamme, +to menace Schwartzenburg on his march, near Pirna; and as the allied +army had been utterly beaten, and was retreating in disorder through +the Bohemian hills, he ordered Vandamme to push forward boldly, +and to close in force on the enemy’s rear, intending to second the +movement himself. The events that followed are still obscure; Vandamme +seized Culm and the Austrian slope of the range; but Mortier and St. +Cyr perhaps did not support their colleague; Napoleon,<a id="FNanchor_17" href="#Footnote_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> owing to +illness, or to some unknown cause, did not advance with the Imperial +Guard; and Vandamme was left almost wholly isolated. In this position +he was assailed by the defeated army; he was overwhelmed by superior +numbers; a Prussian detachment hemmed him in, and, instead of breaking +up a routed enemy, he was compelled to surrender and lay down his +arms. Thirty thousand men were thus lost to the Emperor; it had become +evident that, in the present<span class="pagenum" id="Page_198">[198]</span> war, the events of Auerstadt would not +happen again; the apparition of a hostile force on the rear of his foes +would no longer make them disperse and succumb.</p> + +<p>Culm effaced Dresden, and disasters fell in quick succession on the +secondary parts of the Grand Army, far away from its centre. Macdonald +and Poniatowski were completely defeated, on the verge of Silesia, by +fierce old Blücher; and their shattered levies dissolved in multitudes. +A similar reverse befell Oudinot, who had approached Berlin, at the +hands of Bernadotte—the Marshal had given up his staff, had been +declared heir to the throne of Sweden, and was now an obsequious +vassal of the Czar—and this front of the Grand Army was also broken. +Napoleon, losing heavily already through long forced marches, hastened +from Dresden again to assail Blücher; but the veteran fell back into +the Silesian plains and the Emperor failed to bring his foe to bay. +Ney was now directed to march on Berlin with another division of +the secondary arrays; but he was routed, with crushing effect, at +Dennewitz; for Napoleon, who had intended to join hands with him, had +been recalled to the Elbe to oppose Schwartzenburg, threatening Dresden +from Bohemia again; and the Marshal had been, like Vandamme, isolated. +Through these successive defeats the Grand Army had lost nearly 100,000 +men, whole regiments disbanding, disease falling with cruel severity on +the young soldiers, and many of the auxiliaries breaking out in mutiny; +and it had become evident that Napoleon’s plan for the campaign, as +a whole, could not be realised, that his forces on the Oder were far +too distant, that his strength was being destroyed by his fruitless +efforts to support them, and to strike with effect,<a id="FNanchor_18" href="#Footnote_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> and that his +enemies had learned his game, and would not approach him to court +defeat. He drew in the remains of his shattered armies, and placed them +in collected strength on the Elbe, holding the bridges and passages at +all points; and, still hopeful, he awaited<span class="pagenum" id="Page_199">[199]</span> the attacks of the Allies +in a central position, analogous to that which he had held at Mantua, +but not, I have said, so favourable to the French. His enemies paused, +still afraid to assail the terrible adversary who had so often proved +what genius could achieve in a situation like this. A long series +of manœuvres followed, but at last Blücher and Bernadotte made for +the Elbe; Schwartzenburg finally issued from the hills, and the huge +converging masses, describing a great arc, were directed towards the +central point of Leipsic, in order to fall on the line of Napoleon’s +retreat, and to cut him off from his communications with the Rhine.</p> + +<p>The Emperor thought his opportunity come; he was operating between +widely divided enemies, and he had accomplished wonders when so placed; +and, following exactly his strategy in 1796, he left St. Cyr and Lobau +to hold Dresden; detached Murat with about 50,000 men or more<a id="FNanchor_19" href="#Footnote_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> to +restrain Schwartzenburg, and advanced in person against Blücher and +Bernadotte, with perhaps 140,000 of the main army. Operations, however, +on the long line of the Elbe were more uncertain and likely to fail +than on the short and difficult line of the Adige; and other causes +concurred to frustrate a project marked with the accustomed skill of +its author. Blücher crossed the Elbe in the second week of October, +and, eluding Napoleon, made for Schwartzenburg, though his colleague +Bernadotte was still far off; and it seems certain that this audacious +movement, not scientific but bold to rashness, and very characteristic +of the Prussian chief, was unknown to the Emperor for some days on +a vast and imperfectly observed theatre. Napoleon now resolved to +overwhelm Bernadotte, to advance and to occupy Berlin, the centre of +the great Teutonic movement—a “focus of insurrection,” in Imperial +language—and this grand stroke was, I believe, possible,<a id="FNanchor_20" href="#Footnote_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> had the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_200">[200]</span> +conditions of the war been of the ordinary kind. But intelligence came +that the Bavarian troops were dangerous, and that Bavaria herself was +to make common cause with the Allies; and Schwartzenburg was moving +down the Elbe, on the left or western bank, to approach Blücher. +Napoleon was compelled to abandon his project; he directed Murat to +come to his aid, though he did not call in his divisions at Dresden; +and collecting all his other available forces, he marched towards +Leipsic with the view of assuring a retreat to the Rhine, should this +be necessary, but ready to fight a decisive battle. His attempt to +reach and strike his divided enemies, and to repeat the marvels of +1796, had failed; and he was now exposed, with a greatly weakened army, +to be surrounded, beaten, and cut off from France, by enemies immensely +superior in numbers, Germany, up to the Rhine, conspiring on his rear, +and his German auxiliaries eager to revolt. Strategically, his position +resembled that on the Beresina a few months before, though the peril +was not yet frightful or imminent.</p> + +<p>Apart from general causes affecting the contest—a word must be said +on these afterwards—the student of war should note the reasons why +the strategy of 1813 had results opposite to those of the strategy of +1796. Napoleon was the same commander on both occasions; and his great +faculties had not diminished, though his bodily strength was not what +it had been, and his arrogant confidence had certainly increased. But +the barrier of the Elbe could not be defended as that of the Adige +had been, and Blücher mastered it easily with a large army, effecting +his junction with the Austrian forces; the French corps detached to +the Oder were far from the main army, and were not in hand, like the +small bodies which covered Mantua, so that instead of strengthening +they weakened Napoleon, by compelling him to make harassing marches; +the Emperor, when threatened by his foes at Leipsic, had no choice but +to concentrate his troops, for otherwise his retreat would be barred; +and the Grand Army, though improved since the spring, was an imperfect +and not trustworthy instrument. Yet the chief reason, perhaps, has +yet to be noticed: Würmser and Alvinzi in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_201">[201]</span> 1796–7 exposed themselves +to Napoleon’s strokes, and were struck right and left, and beaten in +detail; the Allies took a wholly opposite course; they kept steadily +aloof from the enemy they feared; they did not venture to approach him +until he was almost crippled, and they gave but few chances to his +grand offensive strategy.</p> + +<p>History dwells on the famous days of Leipsic, for they set Germany free +from the Imperial yoke, and finally broke down the power of Napoleon; +but they have few features of interest for the student of war. +Schwartzenburg attacked Napoleon, on the 16th of October, in positions +a considerable way from Leipsic with probably 200,000 men; and Blücher, +though not yet in line with his colleague, simultaneously attacked with +about 70,000. The efforts of the assailants were still feeble; the +Emperor had perhaps 170,000 men, and stood between enemies still apart; +a magnificent charge of the French cavalry, reorganized and admirably +led by Murat, was nearly attended with marked success; and though +Blücher and his Prussians made some progress, the battle was drawn, and +had no result.</p> + +<p>Retreat for Napoleon was now easy; the way to the Elster and the +Rhine was open, and might have been made completely secure; and +Schwartzenburg, at least, would have been too rejoiced to leave a +golden bridge for his still dreaded enemy. But Napoleon refused to +acknowledge defeat; he insisted on gambling with adverse fortune, and +scorning to fall back before foes he despised, he resolved to stand +and fight a decisive battle. The 17th was spent in preparations on +both sides; Bernadotte and Beningsen came up with their armies, and +the combined allied forces probably reached the enormous number of +300,000 men. The Emperor had no reinforcements to expect; the Grand +Army was not 150,000 strong, and the issue of the conflict could hardly +be doubtful. Yet the attacks of the Allies were partial and timid; +they have been compared to the peckings of crows round an expiring +eagle; the French fought admirably when brought to bay, and but for the +defection of the Saxon contingent, it is questionable if they would +have suffered defeat. A retreat, however, had become necessary; it +was precipitate, and it led to a frightful disaster. The Elster had +not been<span class="pagenum" id="Page_202">[202]</span> bridged by the French; the retiring columns were stopped or +retarded; an explosion destroyed the one bridge over the stream; a +large part of the Grand Army was cut off; Poniatowski perished with +thousands of his troops; and the allied commanders could now fairly +boast that they had won a great and decisive victory· The remains +of the defeated army, strewing its path with wounded, dying, and +straggling men, moved feebly across the Franconian lowlands; a ray of +light shone on its arms for a moment, for Napoleon crushed a Bavarian +force which had endeavoured to cut him off, but it was a mere mass of +fugitives when it attained the Rhine. By the flight from Saxony, the +corps left at Dresden and the distant garrisons on the Oder and Vistula +were completely and irrevocably lost.</p> + +<p>Napoleon, it is scarcely necessary to say, ought not to have fought +the second battle of Leipsic; he should have retreated after the first +battle; and he ought to have bridged the Elster for his still large +army. Turenne and Marlborough would not have made such mistakes; but +those who have really studied this wonderful being will understand +how he made them, despite his genius. Independently of the military +causes which made the results of the campaign in Saxony so different +from those of the campaign of Italy, there was a general cause for +Napoleon’s overthrow; he contended for the prize of his whole Empire, +for domination over three-fourths of Europe; this is the true reason +why he threw forward secondary armies from the Elbe to the Oder, and +why he left thousands of men in the Prussian fortresses, operations +contrary to sound principle, and wholly opposed to his own wonted +strategy. Ambition, arrogance, and the lust of power, in fact, +“distorted”—as has been truly said—“the marvellous conceptions of the +matchless chief,” and he underrated the strength and the resolution of +his foes, and vainly trusted to the last to false auxiliaries, for whom +treachery to the flag meant faith to their country, rising to a man +against wrong and oppression.</p> + +<p>On his return to Paris, in the middle of November, the Emperor had +soon abundant proofs of the ruin of his power, and of the collapse of +his Empire. The relics of the Grand Army, spread<span class="pagenum" id="Page_203">[203]</span> along the Rhine, +scarcely exceeded 100,000 men; until reorganized they were of no use; +they were dying in heaps by contagious disease; they required horses, +guns, and all kinds of <i>matériel</i>; and the demoralization of +the troops had become frightful. Yet even this was by no means the +worst: the huge fabric of conquest formed by the sword was evidently +doomed by the sword to perish. Soult had been driven by Wellington +beyond the Pyrenees, and was endeavouring to defend the Adour and +Gascony; Suchet had recoiled to the line of the Ebro; the mock throne +of Joseph had been abandoned; the Confederation of the Rhine had +vanished, annihilated by the rising of Germany; Eugene, beaten by +a secondary Austrian force, had been repelled to the Adige and the +Mincio; unfortunate Murat was plotting treason, and trafficking with +the enemy to save Naples; Holland, half beggared by the Continental +system, was striving to shake off Imperial bondage; and stirrings of +revolt were feared in Belgium, and in the German provinces west of the +Rhine. Even in old France the position of affairs, and the state of +the public mind, was portentous of ruin. The nation had lavished most +of its youth fit for war in the effort of the year before; the depots +were empty and the arsenals stripped; supplies of arms of all kinds +were short; and the <i>matériel</i> of war which remained to the Empire +was now, for the most part, beyond France, stored in fortresses on the +Elbe, the Adige, and the Po. The destruction, too, of the material +resources of France, was less ominous than the national attitude. The +fervour of 1813 had completely disappeared; the mass of the people had +become indifferent to patriotism, and only thought of repose; and the +cries against the Empire heard in 1812, swelled into a vast murmur +from ruined cities, from half-starving seaports, from discontented +provinces. Even the machinery of government was breaking down; the +conscription was evaded in whole districts; there was an increasing +movement not to pay taxes; and the Treasury, buoyed up by paper for a +time, was scarcely able to avert bankruptcy. The very functionaries of +the Empire forgot their servility; the silent Bodies of the State dared +to make complaints; the military chiefs secretly condemned the war; and +a conspiracy<span class="pagenum" id="Page_204">[204]</span> against Napoleon, immature as yet, was slowly formed by +disgraced Ministers, by the remains of the Royalists and Republicans, +scarcely heard of since the 18th Brumaire, by the men of new ideas, who +aspired to give free institutions to a reformed France, and to save her +from despotism and ruin at hand.</p> + +<p>The Emperor proudly confronted misfortune; and did not abandon his +still assured confidence, that he would emerge safe from this vast +sea of troubles. One circumstance fed his hopes at this crisis; the +Coalition had paused after Leipsic; its armies had halted as they +approached the Rhine; and it made overtures of peace to Napoleon, +partly because it feared a death struggle with him, and partly because +it had begun to be divided in interests, passions and feelings. The +Emperor sent an ambiguous reply, to proposals which would have left +him ruler of a France enlarged to the “natural boundaries”; but it is +questionable if he really wished to treat; and, like the armistice +of Pleistwitz, this was a capital error. He was convinced that he +would not be assailed for some months; he made preparations for a new +campaign; and it is evident his purpose, once more, was to contend +for a scarcely diminished Empire. He called out the Conscription of +1815; forced old soldiers into the ranks of the army; made another +appeal to the pride of Frenchmen; supplied the failing Treasury from +his Privy Purse; endeavoured to restore the <i>matériel</i> of war; +and tried to arouse the passions of 1798 against “an invasion of the +sacred soil”, though, as he bitterly said, he had “crushed Revolution +and would not rely on his worst enemy.” These efforts, however, though +his administrative powers and genius for organization were as great as +ever, produced comparatively small results; France could not and would +not supply the means required to further his ambitious ends; and yet, +I have said, his intention was to play again for supreme dominion. If +Soult was required to oppose Wellington, Suchet was left in Spain, and +Eugene in Italy; the forces which still remained to France were not +concentrated within her borders, for Napoleon thought invasion remote, +and would not give up his ambitious projects; and this strategy, +essentially false, and unlike that of the best days of the Emperor,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_205">[205]</span> +largely detracts from the conspicuous merits of the grand campaign of +1814. The Allies did not give their foe the long breathing time on +which he had unwisely reckoned. Divided as they were, they had a common +enemy. They resented Napoleon’s still warlike attitude; and when signs +of his real position had become manifest, in the rising of Holland, the +defection of Murat, the victorious progress of the arms of Wellington, +the misery of France, and the growing hatred of the Imperial rule from +the Scheldt to the Po, they resolved to seize the occasion, and to +cross the Rhine. By the end of December and the first days of January, +the forces of the Coalition, spread on a vast front, were set in motion +to invade France; and this bold offensive effort beyond question +disconcerted Napoleon, who would not believe in such resolution and +well-sustained energy.</p> + +<p>Schwartzenburg, at the head of about 160,000 men, marched from Basle, +across the plains of Franche Comté; Blücher, with an army perhaps +60,000 strong, advanced from Mayence and Mannheim, and traversed the +Vosges; and Bulow and Wintzingerode, far to the north, moved, with +probably 70,000 troops, from the upper Rhine towards the Aisne and the +Oise, the object of the chiefs of these converging masses being to +unite in Champagne and to press on to the capital. The invasion was so +sudden that the surprised Emperor had but small forces to oppose to it. +The remains of his armies, not half reorganized and only recruited to +a slight extent, fell back at all points, through Lorraine and Alsace, +not more, probably, than 80,000 strong; and the invaders for weeks met +no resistance. By the close of January Schwartzenburg had crossed the +range to the east of the great upland of Langres, and had arrived at +the heads of the Seine; Blücher had passed Nancy, the old capital of +Lorraine, and was in full march for the Upper Marne; and though the +Northern column was far in the rear, a speedy advance to Paris was +deemed imminent. The only enemies in the way were the shattered corps +of Mortier, Oudinot, and Gérard, round Troyes, of Macdonald, Marmont, +Victor and Ney around Châlons; and though these had been hastily +reinforced, they certainly could not oppose 90,000 men, largely<span class="pagenum" id="Page_206">[206]</span> +composed of beaten and despondent soldiers, to victorious enemies at +least twofold in numbers.</p> + +<p>Having left Paris, and sternly rebuked one of the heretofore +servile Bodies of the State, which at this crisis found heart to +murmur, Napoleon reached Châlons in the last days of January. Some +reinforcements were upon the march; but, for the moment, he brought +nothing but his skill to assist his collected marshals, who with +shattered forces had begun to despair. Yet he retained his haughty +and serene confidence; he had formed a general plan of operations for +the campaign which once more revealed his unrivalled power of turning +the theatre of war to account, and his insight into passing events; +and it was to lead to some of his most splendid exploits. Blücher +and Schwartzenburg had advanced from divergent bases; their supports +in the rear were far distant; they had the old Prussian and Austrian +dislike of each other, and they had now reached the valley of the Marne +and the Seine, deep rivers traversed at many points by the main roads +converging on Paris, the object aimed at by the allied chiefs. They +would probably, therefore, march on two lines, Blücher along the Marne, +his colleague by the Seine, and would be separated by a wide distance; +and the obstacles which the rivers might be made to present would give +a great advantage to a really able enemy. Napoleon had fully perceived +this; he resolved to oppose one front of defence to a double front of +divided attack, and, interposing between his foes, to strike them in +succession and to beat them in detail; and for this purpose he had +given orders to fortify the passages on the Marne and the Seine, and +had formed his base in the intermediate districts. This was one of his +most brilliant conceptions, but the Emperor was very nearly crushed in +his first operations through his extreme confidence. In an effort to +attain Blücher, drawing near his colleague, he fought an indecisive +battle at Brienne—the place where he first studied war—and he was +defeated with heavy loss at La Rothière, an engagement he certainly +should have avoided, for his enemies were nearly threefold in numbers. +His situation appeared hopeless; he had not more 70,000 men to oppose +to fully 200,000, when his mastery of his art and the <span class="pagenum" id="Page_207">[207]</span>blunders of +his foes changed the position of affairs, and caused a last ray of +glory to irradiate the ruin of his falling Empire. As he had expected, +the allied generals, after La Rothière, fell respectively back to +the Marne and the Seine, and moved along the rivers; Schwartzenberg +marched slowly along the Seine, throwing out detachments to protect his +flanks—for hostile bodies were approaching from the south; Blücher, +passionate and impulsive, pushed along the Marne, spreading out his +army in disconnected fractions, and burning to run a winning race to +the capital.</p> + + <div class="figcenter" id="i_b_206fp"> + <img + class="p1" + src="images/i_b_206fp.jpg" + alt=""> + <p class="p0 sm center">Theatre, of the CAMPAIGN of 1814.</p> + </div> + +<p>Napoleon, like an eagle watching his quarry, sent Oudinot and Victor to +keep back Schwartzenburg, holding the passages of the Seine in force, +and with the rest of his army, perhaps 50,000 strong, he hastened to +the Marne to fall on Blücher, whose exposed and divided flank was laid +bare to him. The weather was dreadful, and the cross-roads bad; the +French army was filled with boyish conscripts, and was encumbered with +far too many guns, which retarded the heavy and cumbrous columns—these +evils had gone on increasing since Wagram—but Napoleon’s genius +overcame all hindrances; and the effects of the movement were well-nigh +magical. Bursting into the midst of his terrified foes, he overwhelmed +Olsuvieff at Champaubert, routed Sacken completely at Montmirail, +defeated York at Chateau-Thierry, and finally hurled Blücher back to +Châlons, having disabled for a time a whole host of enemies. He now +turned against Schwartzenburg, who, pressing Victor and Oudinot back, +had gradually advanced along the Seine; and no doubt can exist that, +had he been free to act, the Emperor would have descended on the +Austrian’s flank. But alarm and discontent prevailed in Paris, and in +order to produce an immediate effect, Napoleon was obliged to approach +the capital, and to attack Schwartzenburg, when reached, in front. +These operations could not have the results of the terrible strokes +against Blücher’s flank; nevertheless, the Austrian chief was beaten; +he retreated eastward as far as Troyes; a demonstration by Blücher in +his aid proved useless, and by the close of February 1814 the forces of +the Coalition, cruelly shattered, were again at the heads of the Marne +and the Seine. Genius had triumphed over ill-directed force; and the +allied commanders<span class="pagenum" id="Page_208">[208]</span> were so despondent that they actually sought and +obtained an armistice.</p> + +<p>The events that followed strikingly illustrate the character of the +antagonist chiefs, and the peculiarities of the struggle for Empire. +Napoleon’s<a id="FNanchor_21" href="#Footnote_21" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> arrogance exceeded all bounds; he exclaimed, “We shall +soon be again on the Vistula”; and his letters breathe intense scorn +of his foes, and absolute reliance on his own military strength. Full +of these illusions, he still refused to summon Eugene across the Alps +from Italy; and though he drew detachments from the armies of Soult +and Suchet, and organized a force under Augereau in the South, he +did not bring nearly all his available forces to the decisive point, +the theatre in Champagne. Had he conformed to his early and perfect +strategy, Schwartzenburg, menaced by Eugene, and with Augereau on his +flank—and Suchet might have joined—would have no doubt retreated; +Blücher could not have remained isolated; the campaign of 1814 would +have had a different close; and this, I repeat, must be borne in mind +in judging the Emperor’s conduct as a whole.</p> + +<p>The operations of the Allies had no resemblance to those of their +renowned antagonist; they were timid for the most part, and confessed +weakness; but they were prudent, and marked by decision and firmness. +At a great council of war held near Troyes, the Czar, the Emperor of +Austria, the King of Prussia, and the representatives of the great +Powers were present;<a id="FNanchor_22" href="#Footnote_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> the admission was made that Blücher and +Schwartzenburg could not hope for success against Napoleon, though +he had but about 80,000 men, and their armies, strongly reinforced, +were 200,000; the difficulty of operating along the Marne and the +Seine, with their enemy<span class="pagenum" id="Page_209">[209]</span> between them, was frankly recognized; it was +resolved to bring up the greater part of the army of the North, under +Wintzingerode and Bülow, to turn the scale decisively; and whatever +may be thought of these councils of fear, this was certainly wise and +true strategy. Hostilities, which had never really ceased, began again +in the first days of March: and Blücher, with perhaps 60,000 men—he +had reorganized his army with characteristic energy—moved along the +Marne again in the hope of destroying the isolated corps of Marmont +and Mortier, for the present covering the main roads to Paris. The +Marshals, however, retreated behind the Ourcq; and Blücher, rash to a +fault, and not taught by disaster, crossed the Marne, and endeavoured +to bring them to bay. This gave Napoleon his opportunity again. +Quitting his central position, he bore down on Blücher, now far from +his colleague, and crossed the Marne; and he was soon on the track of +the Prussian chief, who, in extreme peril, was making for the Aisne, +with but a feeble chance of getting over the river.</p> + +<p>A fortunate accident saved Blücher, when perhaps on the verge of a +terrible overthrow. The commandant of Soissons, a weak man, opened his +gates to Bülow and Wintzingerode, advancing from the North, as had been +arranged; the only passage on the Aisne fell into their hands, and +Blücher joined with delight his new colleagues, their united forces +being about 100,000 men. Napoleon had not more than 60,000; but his +passionate ardour mastered his judgment, as had often happened in his +chequered career; he attacked the Allies at Craonne and Laon, and, as +at La Rothière he was completely beaten, though he destroyed a hostile +body in his retreat. His second effort against Blücher had, therefore, +had very different results from those of his first; he had suffered +greatly at Craonne and Laon, battles which he certainly should not have +risked; and he was now obliged to return to the Seine, with an army +weakened and beginning to lose hope. He had left Oudinot and Macdonald, +replacing Victor, to hold Schwartzenburg in check, as in the first +instance; but the Austrian chief, in the Emperor’s absence, had forced +the passage of the Seine, and approached Paris; his advanced guard +was not far<span class="pagenum" id="Page_210">[210]</span> from Melun; and the capital, seething with passion and +terror, had not only made no preparations to resist, but was beginning +to declare against the tottering Empire, especially since Wellington’s +victories in the South. Napoleon left Mortier and Marmont to observe +Blücher, and calling up his forces to come into line with him, he +endeavoured to operate on the rear of Schwartzenburg; he compelled the +cautious Austrian to fall back; but he was surprised on the Aube, near +the town of Arcis, was forced to fight a stern but a losing battle, +and was ultimately obliged to cross the river. He had failed against +Schwartzenburg as he had failed against Blücher. How different might +the result have been had he called Eugene and Suchet to his aid in +Champagne!</p> + +<p>The Allies were now in overwhelming force; they thoroughly understood +Napoleon’s game, and he could no longer continue his late strategy. +He adopted a course almost the counterpart of his projected march on +Berlin in 1813—baffled, we have seen, by various accidents—which +has been differently judged by disputing critics, but which, as a +mere military move, may be pronounced admirable. His garrisons on the +Vistula and Oder were lost; but he had large garrisons in the French +fortresses, which, hitherto blockaded by the allied armies, had been +nearly set free by the immense demands of Blücher and Schwartzenburg +for reinforcements; and he resolved to make use of what he called those +“dead forces,” to collect a powerful army, to descend on the rear of +his foes, and to cut off their communications with the Rhine. He always +declared that this plan was possible, and when we consider the timid +weakness which usually marked the conduct of the Allies, it presented +many chances of success, had France been really true to the Empire. +He broke up from the Aube in the third week of March, and summoning +Mortier and Marmont to join him, made for Vitry upon the Upper Marne, +his object being to attain the Meuse and, rallying the forces released +from the fortresses, to attack Schwartzenburg and to seize the line of +his retreat at the head of about 120,000 men, the troops from Lyons and +the south supporting the movement.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_211">[211]</span></p> + +<p>The Emperor’s letters still breathe the perfect confidence which +distinguished them throughout the whole campaign; and he haughtily +spurned proposals for peace, which even now, at the eleventh hour, +would have left him the France of Louis XVI. Events, however, were soon +to show the vanity of the false dreams of ambition. The conspiracy +which had been hatching for months in the capital, against the Empire, +had become mature; it was joined by Talleyrand and other dismissed +Ministers, by Liberals, Bourbon and Jacobin partisans, and means were +found to inform the Allies that should they advance on Paris Napoleon +would fall. A second great council of war was held by the leaders of +the Coalition on the 24th of March; and it was unanimously decided to +march on the capital, leaving a detachment only to observe Napoleon. +The allied armies pushed rapidly on by the now abandoned and unguarded +lines which, hitherto, they had failed to master, driving before them +the feeble corps of Mortier and Marmont, who had been unable to join +the Emperor, and could not offer a show of resistance; and on the 29th +of March the armies of Continental Europe had come in view of the proud +city which, for twenty years, had been the ardent focus of revolution, +of war, of glory, of Empire. The marshals fought a battle honourable +to both, but it was impossible to withstand the great host of enemies. +A capitulation was signed the following day; and Russians, Austrians, +Prussians, Swedes, Bavarians, and soldiers from every part of Germany, +took possession of the fallen yet not mourning capital. A few hours +sufficed to complete the ruin of the despotism of force which had long +been supreme. The young Empress and the Imperial Court vanished; the +Bodies of the State, for years the instruments of a tyranny they had +cringed to but had learned to hate, declared the throne of Napoleon +forfeited, and Paris heard, not without rejoicings, that the Monarchy +of the Bourbons, which its frenzied citizens had shed oceans of blood +to destroy for ever, was to be restored at the will of the conquerors.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile, Napoleon, informed of these events, had hastily abandoned +his march eastwards; he was at Fontainebleau on the 2nd of April, at +the head of nearly 70,000 men, and treating as<span class="pagenum" id="Page_212">[212]</span> nought all that had +been accomplished, he still resolved to strike a blow for Empire. +The military situation was not quite hopeless. The generals of the +Coalition had most unwisely distributed their armies around Paris, +divided by the streams of the Marne and the Seine; and everything was +to be dreaded, in a position of this kind, from the terrible enemy +placed in their rear. Napoleon made overtures to negotiate, but it is +tolerably certain his real object was to gain a few hours to make a +desperate effort, and to surprise his foes in their false security; and +he has left it on record that he must have won a decisive battle at the +very gates of Paris. His marshals, however, refused to follow their +chief in a course they believed desperate; Marmont went over, with his +corps, to the Allies, and the conqueror saw his invincible sword fall +from his grasp through the ill-will and the treachery of the companions +in arms he had long led to victory. He abdicated, after the Bodies of +the State had pronounced finally; and—a terrible lesson to those who +abuse power, and a terrible proof how faith and loyalty are blighted +in a revolutionary age—Fontainebleau became quickly a silent desert, +abandoned by the functionaries who had grovelled at his feet. His noble +words of farewell to the veterans of the Guard in some measure lessen +the ignominy of scenes on which the historian dwells with pain; but +one incident of shame has yet to be noticed. The fallen Emperor took +poison, to end a life of despair. The attempt at self-destruction, +perhaps happily, failed, but this is another proof that, when all +seemed lost, Napoleon had not the indomitable firmness of very inferior +warriors.</p> + +<p>Napoleon’s operations in 1814, as regards the struggle in Champagne +at least, have always been classed with his finest efforts. It was a +prodigy of skill that, with a bad army, he should have baffled enemies +threefold in numbers, should have all but overwhelmed Blücher, and +should have kept the issue of events in suspense; the general of 1796 +reappears, in full perfection, in this splendid strategy. Yet even +in these noble displays of the art, he fell into serious and plain +errors; he ought not to have fought at least four battles, unnecessary, +and with the chances against him; and he made two grave mistakes, +which proved fatal—the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_213">[213]</span> attempt to contend for his whole Empire, +and the omission to concentrate his forces during the armistice. His +generalship in 1814, considered as a whole, was not equal to that of +1796, and his campaigns of 1812, of 1813, and even of 1814, remind me +of Turner’s latest pictures; we see the hand of the master everywhere, +but there is a want of proportion and real harmony, and the result is +sad and general failure.</p> + + <div class="figcenter"> + <img + class="p2" + src="images/i_256.jpg" + alt=""> + </div> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_214">[214]</span></p> + +<h2>CHAPTER VIII.<br> +<span class="subhed"><span class="smcap">Napoleon</span> (<i>continued</i>).</span></h2></div> + +<p>I must pass over the attempt to resettle the boundaries, at Vienna, of +a changed Continent; nor can I dwell on the pretensions of the Czar +to sit in the seat of Napoleon without his genius, on the rapacity +of Prussia and the craft of Talleyrand, and on the league between +Austria, England, and France, to restrain the ambition of the Northern +Powers. Nor can I notice Napoleon’s brief rule in Elba, though the +administrative powers of the fallen Lord of the Continent were +exhibited in this narrow sphere, and have left honourable traditions +not yet forgotten. I must also avoid even a short account of the +failure of the Restoration in France; how Louis XVIII., well-meaning +but feeble, spite of the memories of the old <i>régime</i>, fell into +the hands of Royalist zealots, and marred the grace of the freedom +he claimed to concede; how impossible it became to reconcile the +pretensions of returned <i>émigrés</i> and a ruined <i>noblesse</i> +with the interests grown out of the Revolution; how the army, +transformed and made the appanage of a Court, chafed in silence, and +regretted its unrivalled chief; how the nation after a brief hour +of repose, felt humiliated that it had been reduced to the position +of a lesser Power of Europe. The discords of the Coalition, and the +unsettled state of France, were not lost on the extraordinary man who +watched events from his speck in the sea, and who had not forgotten +his vanished Empire. Napoleon quitted Elba in February 1815, on the +most wonderful enterprise of his whole career. A flotilla bore the +few hundred men<span class="pagenum" id="Page_215">[215]</span> imprudently left him by the Allies; Fortune smiled +treacherously on her audacious favourite, and he had soon landed on +the shores of Provence, in order, in the face of embattled Europe, to +subvert a Government founded on an European triumph. The very thought +seemed akin to folly, and yet it became an accomplished fact in a +fortnight. With that insight which was one of his greatest gifts, +Napoleon avoided the cities of the coast and the great military +stations of his old marshals; he flung himself into the valleys of +Dauphiné, a district hostile to the restored Monarchy, and his march +seemed like the spread of some mighty influence, which power and +authority were unable to withstand. Grasse, Sisteron, and Gap were +rapidly passed; a regiment near Grenoble welcomed the sight of its old +commander, and fell at his knees; the garrison of the town greeted him +with exulting shouts, and wherever a part of the army beheld Napoleon, +it followed him, swayed as by an enchanter’s spell. Macdonald, with his +staff, was expelled from Lyons; Ney, meaning to be loyal, was carried +away in the universal military revolt; other chiefs found it impossible +to resist; and the discrowned exile was soon on his way to the capital +at the head of a great and hourly increasing force.</p> + +<p>Napoleon was at the Tuileries once more on the 20th of March; “his +eagles,” in his expressive language, “had flown from steeple to steeple +to the towers of Nôtre Dame,” and France, dazzled, surprised, and +disliking the Bourbons, accepted a revolution which seemed a kind of +portent. The King fled into Belgium with his Court, his nobles, and +a few officers of the Empire, who would not break their oaths; the +army easily put down two or three risings of Royalists in the Southern +Provinces; and Napoleon boasted, with truth, that he regained his +throne at the cost of scarcely a drop of blood. After this astonishing +return to Empire, Napoleon offered peace, and to remain satisfied with +the France of the Treaties of 1814; and probably he was sincere in +these overtures. Yet it is not surprising that he was not believed; +he had broken faith with Europe in leaving Elba, and, partly through +terror and partly from hate, the Allies proscribed him as an enemy +of mankind. He addressed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_216">[216]</span> himself to the defence of France, but the +movement which had set him on the throne was essentially a military +revolt; the fierce animosities of French factions embarrassed his +Government and weakened the State; the restored Empire was viewed +with distrust by Royalists, Liberals, and the old Republicans; the +nation treated with indifferent contempt free institutions offered +by Imperial hands; and the Chambers, which Napoleon convened to give +popular support to his imperilled power, were full of secret or avowed +conspirators. Nevertheless, let detractors say what they please, his +exertions were mighty and worthy of him; his genius as an administrator +shone with fresh brightness, though his health was evidently on the +decline, and in a few weeks he had made preparations to resist the +Coalition which must be deemed wonderful. One circumstance gave him +precious resources; more than 100,000 prisoners of war, trained and +excellent soldiers, had been restored to France; and by making use of +these and additional veterans, and by employing conscripts and National +Guards, he raised the army, which had been reduced to impotence, to a +state of formidable strength and efficiency. Meanwhile, he gave its +old organization and structure to the instrument of war he had so long +wielded; the Guard reappeared, and the loved eagles; corps, divisions, +and reserves were again formed; great exertions were made to provide +arms, horses, and <i>impedimenta</i> of all kinds; and Paris, which +had fallen at once in 1814, was to a considerable extent, fortified. +By June 1815, half-a-million of men were on foot to take part in the +impending conflict; about 250,000 of these were ready; and paper money +supplied the Treasury with the means of seconding a great effort which, +in existing circumstances, was, I repeat, astonishing.</p> + +<p>Two plans of operations presented themselves. Had France been united +and loyal as a whole, Napoleon would have, no doubt, followed the grand +precedent of the year before, under conditions much more favourable +to success; he would have encountered the Coalition in Champagne +with forces far more powerful than in 1814, and with Paris a strong +entrenched camp in his rear, and recollecting what he achieved on +the Marne and the Seine, his<span class="pagenum" id="Page_217">[217]</span> triumph would have been not at all +improbable. The second plan was much more hazardous; but it was in +harmony with Napoleon’s genius, and it followed methods which had often +secured him victory. The Coalition had a million of men in arms; but +these masses were spread from the Scheldt to the Po, and easterly, +from the Rhine to the Oder; and the extreme right of the immense line +of invasion, the two armies of Blücher and Wellington was isolated +and thrown forward in Belgium. It might be practicable then, as it +had been at Ulm, to cut off and destroy this detached force; and many +circumstances concurred to give a well-directed attack a real chance +of success. The armies of Blücher and Wellington were widely apart; +they rested upon divergent bases; they were commanded by chiefs of +opposite natures; their centre was weak and greatly exposed; their line +of communication was a single road, at a short distance only from the +French frontier, and behind this line lay a difficult country which +would make their subsequent concentration no easy matter.</p> + +<p>Seizing the situation with the eye of a master, Napoleon saw in this +position of affairs an admirable opportunity to strike with effect; and +he resolved to assail and break through the allied centre, and to try +to defeat Blücher and Wellington in detail, as he had defeated Beaulieu +and Colli in the campaign of Italy. The means he adopted to carry out +his project rank among the finest operations of his life, and form a +conspicuous instance of his gift of stratagem. Concealing the movement +with consummate skill, he drew together four corps from the vast +space between Lille and Metz to the edge of the frontier; the Guard, +another corps, and the cavalry marched from the interior; and the +collected masses, perfectly arranged, converged gradually along this +immense front, under the eye of the enemy, yet without his knowledge! +No more splendid effort has been made in war; and had the Emperor had +the complete force—150,000 men—which he reckoned on to begin the +campaign, in all probability he would have triumphed. A rising in La +Vendée deprived him, however, at the last moment, of 20,000 soldiers; +but the die was cast, and he did not hesitate; and he set off from +Paris on the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_218">[218]</span> 12th of June to challenge Fortune in a supreme trial. His +admirable directions had been admirably fulfilled. On the evening of +the 14th June 1815, 128,000 Frenchmen, comprising 22,000 horse and 350 +guns, were assembled from near Maubeuge to near Philippeville, where +the French frontier then entered Belgium; and screened by the Sambre, +they were a few miles from Charleroi, where the great road to Brussels +gave an easy approach to the comparatively feeble centre of the Allies.</p> + +<p>The army was in motion at daybreak on the 15th, the Emperor’s object +being to cross the Sambre, to occupy Charleroi, and by a forced march +to seize the points of Quatre Bras and Sombreffe, on the great cross +road between Nivelles and Namur, the only line on which his foes +could unite without obstacles of no small difficulty. The operation +was not quite successful; delays and different accidents occurred. +Ziethen, too, one of Blücher’s lieutenants, had checked the advance, +not without skill, but Napoleon’s project was nearly realised; the +great mass of the French was beyond Charleroi, and within easy reach +of Quatre Bras and Sombreffe before night closed on the 15th; and the +allied centre was threatened if not severed, and could only close up +in effective force, under, so to speak, the guns of the enemy. The +conduct, meanwhile, of the hostile chiefs had perfectly fulfilled +Napoleon’s previsions, and had given him already an immense advantage. +Blücher had, characteristically, placed three of his corps in positions +around, or not far from, Sombreffe, even now almost in Napoleon’s +grasp; but his fourth corps was many leagues distant, and could not +reach Sombreffe for a battle next day. On the other hand, Wellington, +circumspect and cautious, and without experience of Napoleon’s +strategy, had hesitated and delayed at Brussels; he had not taken a +step to join his colleague until late in the night of the 15th; and +even then, fearing for his communications and his right, he had not +advanced in force towards Quatre Bras, where his junction with Blücher +would be accomplished. The allied line of communication, therefore, on +the lateral road of Nivelles-Namur was not held by the Allies in force; +it was all but in the hands of the enemy. The allied centre was +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_219">[219]</span>completely exposed, and Napoleon might reasonably expect either to +beat in detail the allied chiefs, should they venture to offer battle, +or to seize the points of Quatre Bras and Sombreffe, and to interpose +between Blücher and Wellington.</p> + + <div class="figcenter" id="i_b_218fp"> + <img + class="p1" + src="images/i_b_218fp.jpg" + alt=""> + <p class="p0 sm center">Theatre of the<br> +CAMPAIGN<br> +of 1815.</p> + </div> + +<p>This was the situation on the morning of the 16th, and it was full +of great, nay, of splendid, promise. Napoleon was now at Charleroi, +about to start for Fleurus, and to take the command of his corps near +Sombreffe. He has been charged with delay, I think unjustly, and he +was not fully aware of the enemy’s movements; but his general position +was so good, and his general directions were so well planned, that +accidents only robbed him of a decisive victory. He ordered Ney on his +left to seize Quatre Bras, driving back any forces of the Duke at hand. +The Marshal was then to descend on the rear of Blücher, who was to be +attacked near Sombreffer, in front, by the Emperor; and had this grand +manœuvre been properly carried out, Blücher must have been routed and +forced away to the Meuse, and Wellington would have been in the extreme +of peril, for both generals were now trying to join hands at Quatre +Bras and Sombreffe, and were laying themselves open to the whole force +of Napoleon. Ney could have easily fulfilled his mission; but he had +lost the confidence of better days; he waited many hours before he even +tried to move; and he failed to accomplish his main task, falling from +Quatre Bras on the rear of Blücher.</p> + +<p>Napoleon, meanwhile, marching from Fleurus, had attacked Blücher +between Sombreffe and Ligny. The battle raged furiously for a +considerable time, to the disadvantage of the Prussians on the whole, +but no decisive success had been won; and the Emperor, perceiving that +no force was closing on Blücher from the direction of Ney, tried to +attain his object by another method. One of Ney’s corps had advanced +slowly; the Emperor directed this towards Blücher’s flank, while +Blücher was to be assailed, as before, in front; and had this stroke +been pressed home, the result would have been the same as that of +the first projected attack. D’Erlon, however, the unlucky chief of +this corps, was, when on the path of victory, called up by Ney, hard +pressed by Wellington<span class="pagenum" id="Page_220">[220]</span> at this moment; and Napoleon, I think, must have +concurred in this, for the defeat of Ney would have been disastrous, +though this extreme caution was, perhaps, an error. Blücher escaped +destruction through these mishaps; but Napoleon’s attack in front had +partial success, and the Prussian army was driven, in defeat, from +the field. On the other side of the scenes of manœuvre, Ney, we have +seen, had not reached Blücher, and had missed his mark; he had most +unfortunately recalled D’Erlon, and he had suffered a repulse from +the hands of Wellington, who had kept Quatre Bras though with much +difficulty. Ney, however, had gained a strategic advantage; he had +prevented Wellington from joining Blücher, and as Blücher had been +forced away from Sombreffe, the Duke would be compelled to retreat; +the line of communication of the allied armies was practically already +in Napoleon’s hands; and his operations had been largely successful, +if they had not led to a second Jena, as he had reason to expect a few +hours before. Such had been the result of his fine strategy, although +that result had not been complete; and it should be borne in mind that +the allied armies were not far from double his own in numbers.</p> + +<p>The allied generals, obliged, through the defeat of Ligny, to abandon +their proper line of junction—the great road between Nivelles +and Namur—were now thrown back into the country behind it, the +thick-wooded and marshy valley of the Dyle, very difficult for the +passage of armies. The real student of war will not doubt as to what +their movements ought to have been; they should either have united +their forces at once, a few miles behind Quatre Bras and Sombreffe, +or they should have retreated two marches away to Brussels, where, +having an overwhelming superiority of strength, they might have derided +Napoleon’s efforts. They took, however, an intermediate course—a half +measure often disastrous in war; Blücher fell back some twenty miles +to Wavre, the Duke fell back from Quatre Bras to Waterloo, and holding +these positions they meant to join hands and accept, if offered, a +great battle.</p> + +<p>The idolaters of success, supposed to cover everything, have<span class="pagenum" id="Page_221">[221]</span> praised +this as scientific strategy, but it was bad strategy, and dangerous +in the extreme. Wavre is considerably farther from Waterloo than +Sombreffe is from Quatre Bras; what is more important, a most intricate +country divides Wavre from Waterloo, and in this operation Blücher and +Wellington were playing into the hands of their renowned adversary. +Napoleon was given three alternatives, each big with the promise +of immense success. He might call on his victorious army to make a +forced march, might fall either on Blücher or Wellington, and defeat +either within a few hours, before Wavre or Waterloo were reached; or +collecting together all his forces, he might attack Blücher at Wavre, +or the Duke at Waterloo, before either could join the other; or, in +truer accordance with the principles of the art, he might restrain +Blücher, with a retarding force, sent quickly from Ligny to hold him +in check, and might attack Wellington with the mass of his army—the +favourite manœuvre, in which he has had no rival—and in any of these +cases he must have triumphed, over-matched as he was by his foes in +numbers. The double retreat on Wavre and Waterloo was therefore a +thoroughly false movement; and the General of Rivoli would have made it +fatal. But the General of Rivoli, full of genius as ever, had lost the +iron strength of twenty years before. Napoleon returned after Ligny, +to Fleurus, ill; he went to sleep and could not see his staff, and +this illness, at a crisis in the campaign, saved the Allies, and had +momentous results.</p> + +<p>During the night of the 16th and the morning of the 17th, the French +army remained motionless. Soult and Ney literally did nothing, no +preparations for marching were made; the Emperor sent no orders from +Fleurus; and, worst of all, Grouchy given the command of the right on +the 16th, made no real effort to reconnoitre the Prussians, and to find +out where they had gone. Disease, in fact, had weakened the energy of +the chief; his lieutenants, fashioned to servitude, let things drift, +and the opportunity of the 16th, given on the 17th once more, was lost +never again to return. Napoleon was back at Ligny in the forenoon of +the 17th; a letter of Soult, the Chief of the Staff, proves<span class="pagenum" id="Page_222">[222]</span> that his +first intention was to halt for the day, for he believed that the +Prussians, completely routed, were falling back on their base, towards +the Meuse, and there would be time, he thought, to turn against and +defeat Wellington. On learning, however, from Ney, on the left, that +parts of the Duke’s forces were still at Quatre Bras, he resolved to +advance, and try to destroy them; and he made preparations, now very +late, for a combined movement against the Allies. He divided his army +into two groups; at the head of the first, about 72,000 men, he meant +to attack Wellington and bring him to bay; he gave Grouchy the second, +about 34,000 strong, and he informed the Marshal that his mission was +to pursue Blücher and to keep him in sight, and to interpose between +Blücher and Wellington who, the Emperor added, was to be assailed +should he stand near the neighbouring forest of Soignies.</p> + +<p>Napoleon broke up from Ligny early in the afternoon; he was soon joined +by Ney at Quatre Bras, and he endeavoured to harass the rearguard of +the Duke, who by this time had his main force at Waterloo. The pursuit, +however, had no results—it was too late, in fact, to be of use—and +an extraordinary tempest of rain had broken over the country, and all +but stopped marching. Before night fell, the heads of the French army +had reached the low hills that overlook Waterloo, and a large army was +evidently in position before them. Napoleon halted, hopeful of a great +coming battle; but some hours before he sent directions to Grouchy, on +his right, which require attention. Before leaving Ligny the Emperor, +we have seen, believed that Blücher was making for his base, and had +spoken to Grouchy in that sense; but on his way from Ligny to Quatre +Bras he was made aware that a large Prussian force had been seen on +the Orneau, near Gembloux. He immediately sent new orders to Grouchy, +and directed him to advance on Gembloux, and, of course, generally to +comply with his first orders. Grouchy, who had broken up from Ligny +late, set off for Gembloux in the afternoon; and though Blücher had +had a long start, and Gembloux was by no means the best position to +be taken for an advance on Wavre, still the Emperor’s directions +were<span class="pagenum" id="Page_223">[223]</span> correct enough to have enabled a bold and capable chief to have +fulfilled his all-important mission, to have attained Blücher and +kept him off from Wellington. Grouchy reached Gembloux rather late at +night—the state of the roads and the weather excuse him—and he can +hardly be blamed, though the fact is strange, that even at this time he +was not informed with perfect accuracy about the Prussian movements. +Within a short time, however, he had ascertained that a great part +of Blücher’s army had made for Wavre; another part, he was told, was +marching on Perwez, towards the Meuse. He communicated this important +news to the Emperor, and he expressly added, “that he would advance +on Wavre, should the mass of the Prussians go that way, in order to +separate Blücher from Wellington,” proving that he perfectly understood +his mission.</p> + +<p>This intelligence—received during the night of the 17th—was +calculated to make Napoleon certain, especially as it was his own idea, +that he had nothing to fear from the Prussian army; he thought only of +fighting Wellington, and he made preparations to attack on the morrow. +The Prussian veteran, however, who more than once had baffled the +Emperor by his audacious movements, had resolved, whatever the risk, to +advance on Waterloo. He had rallied his whole army around Wavre, his +first corps, that of Bülow, had come into line, and he had given his +word to the Duke, who on the faith of the pledge was in position to +fight at Waterloo, that “the whole Prussian army would be on the field +by the early forenoon of the 18th of June.” Blücher nobly endeavoured +to fulfil his promise. Bülow broke up from Wavre at daybreak on the +18th, but the obstacles he met were formidable in the extreme; he was +still far from Wellington’s lines at noon, and his three colleagues, +Ziethen, Pirch and Thielmann, were still close to Wavre, nearly a march +distant, and were on a perilous flank march, in long straggling columns.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile Grouchy had left Gembloux for Wavre, to follow up the +enemy—he had now ascertained that all Blücher’s army had gathered +round the place the night before—but his operations were simply +wretched. He knew that Napoleon meant to fight<span class="pagenum" id="Page_224">[224]</span> Wellington, should +Wellington make a stand at Soignies; he knew that he was detached +to hold Blücher in check, and to keep him completely apart from +Wellington; he knew that the Prussians had been round Wavre, and had +informed his master, in part, of the fact; he knew that Wavre was a +march from Soignies and Waterloo, and he knew that at Gembloux he +was some fourteen miles from Wavre. Knowing all this, he should have +left Gembloux at the first peep of dawn on the 18th of June, and have +advanced as quickly as possible; and common sense should have taught +him so to make for Wavre as to get across the Dyle, in order to draw +near Napoleon and to cut off Blücher on his way to Wellington, for +probably Blücher was making the attempt. He took exactly the opposite +course; he left Gembloux many hours too late; his movement on Wavre was +pitiably slow, and he made for Wavre, not over the Dyle, which would +have soon placed him on the flank of Blücher, but along the stream, +striking Blücher, if reached, in the rear, and pushing him, so to +speak, on Wellington. This miserable generalship led to what followed; +and Grouchy was so obstinate, and so blind to fact, that when he heard +the far-distant thunder of Waterloo, he refused to follow the sagacious +advice of Gérard and to march, at the eleventh hour, towards the flank +of the enemy!</p> + +<p>While these operations, big with a great future, had been taking place +on Napoleon’s right, the Emperor had attacked Wellington, who, with +faith in his colleague, awaited his foe in a long-studied position. +Napoleon had intended to attack early, but the state of the roads +and the weather made an attack hazardous, and he delayed some hours, +greatly to the Duke’s advantage. The Emperor’s general plan—the last +exhibition of his genius in the sphere of higher tactics—was to turn +Wellington’s left and to force his centre, making a demonstration to +engage his right; his adversary’s was to hold his ground until the +arrival of Blücher would make success certain. The grand attack on +the British left and centre failed, partly owing to the excellence +of the British troops, and partly to the density and cumbrousness of +the French columns; and the feint on Wellington’s right had no more +success, and led to terrible waste of blood.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_225">[225]</span></p> + +<p>By this time Napoleon had learned that Bülow was gathering on his flank +with 30,000 men, but he hoped this was a stray column which Grouchy +might arrest and perhaps destroy, and he turned fiercely against the +centre of his foe, abandoning the effort against the British left, +which, with Bülow at hand, would have been too hazardous. This attack +was successful to some extent; La Haye Sainte, a fortified post, was +captured. This made a gap in Wellington’s defence, and Napoleon, +confident that victory was at hand, launched a great mass of cavalry +against the Duke’s centre, intending to support the movement with the +Imperial Guard. But at this crisis of the battle Blücher was near. +Despising wounds, defeat, and days of fatigue, he ordered Bülow to fall +on the Emperor’s flank. This prevented the attack the Guard was to +make, and though the French horsemen made heroic exertions, the British +and German infantry “stood rooted in the earth”; and the cavalry, +recklessly squandered by Ney but not supported by foot, were at last +beaten.</p> + +<p>During all this time, Bülow had been striking Napoleon’s right; but at +about 7 this attack seemed spent. The French still occupied the thin +red line of Wellington, the artillery of Grouchy was heard at Wavre—a +pledge that he was keeping the Prussians back—and victory for France +seemed yet possible. Napoleon formed the Guard into two great columns, +but Wellington had admirably strengthened his centre; the first column +was fairly beaten, and the second, kept in reserve, could give it no +aid. A sudden change now came over the battle; parts of the corps +of Ziethen and Pirch appeared on the field; the attack of Bülow was +fiercely renewed; British squadrons, let loose, swept over the plain; +and the Duke, seeing the day was won, ordered a general advance of his +worn-out army. The French, routed and surrounded, had soon no army, and +night closed on a scene of carnage and ruin, the presage of Napoleon’s +second fall.</p> + +<p>Napoleon’s plan of attack on his last field was perfect, but his +tactics at Waterloo show many errors. He was certainly in difficulties +after the flank attack of Bülow, but he allowed his troops to be wasted +in the feint on our right; he made a premature use<span class="pagenum" id="Page_226">[226]</span> of his noble +cavalry, and he perhaps missed an opportunity to strike with the Guard +before Bülow’s diversion had become serious. For these mistakes he must +be held responsible, though he was badly seconded by his lieutenants, +especially by Ney—desperate, and stung by conscience—but all this was +because, as is now well known,<a id="FNanchor_23" href="#Footnote_23" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> he was ill and worn out on the 18th +of June. The Duke, on the other hand, was the soul of the defence. He +made, indeed, a grave strategic mistake in leaving a large detachment +far off on his right, but his conduct of the battle was above praise; +and though he must have lost Waterloo had not the Prussians come up, +still the defeat would not have been the rout to which Napoleon had +looked with confidence.</p> + +<p>Nevertheless, the result of Waterloo flowed from combinations outside +the field. It was caused by the junction of part of Blücher’s army with +Wellington; and the question for the student of war is, ought this +junction to have been prevented by Grouchy, detached by the Emperor to +make it impossible? The answer must largely depend on conjecture; but +I, for one, can have few doubts. Had Grouchy left Gembloux at daybreak +on the 18th, and, crossing the Dyle, made for Blücher’s flank, he would +have surprised the Prussian army in divided columns on a flank march of +extreme peril; and, giving Blücher credit for his splendid energy, I +am convinced he would have paused to confront his enemy, and this must +have prevented him reaching Wellington. The same result would have, +perhaps, followed, and this is Napoleon’s deliberate view<a id="FNanchor_24" href="#Footnote_24" class="fnanchor">[24]</a>—not +impartial, perhaps, but not to be dismissed—had Grouchy simply marched +on Wavre in time, and fastened upon the rear of Blücher. The Emperor +insists that, even in this case, not a Prussian division would have +attained Waterloo. The arguments urged against these conclusions +disregard the peril of the march from <span class="pagenum" id="Page_227">[227]</span>Wavre, and the very events +of the day confute them. Grouchy, who should have been near Wavre at +11 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, did not reach it until 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and yet his +apparition stopped the Prussian army; Ziethen and Pirch were delayed, +Thielmann was left at Wavre, and Blücher brought only 45,000 men, +out of 90,000, to the field of Waterloo, and that too only between 4 +<span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> and 8 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> In view of this fact, I can draw but +one inference, and in this controversy all that has been written by +Charras, and authors of his school, seems to me worthless.</p> + + <div class="figcenter" id="i_b_226fp"> + <img + class="p1" + src="images/i_b_226fp.jpg" + alt=""> + <p class="p0 sm center">NEY AT WATERLOO.</p> + </div> + +<p>A word on this memorable campaign, as a whole, and as to the lessons +it really teaches. Napoleon’s first operations were a masterpiece of +war; and these, and the grave strategic faults of the Allies—Blücher +ran into the lion’s mouth, the Duke did not know how sudden was his +spring—exposed both to alarming danger, and ought to have secured the +Emperor a decisive victory. The errors, however, of Ney and D’Erlon +saved Blücher at Ligny from utter ruin, and Napoleon’s over caution as +regards D’Erlon—though this is theory after the event—was certainly +unfortunate to the interests of France. The double retreat at Wavre +and Waterloo—another palpable strategic fault—gave Napoleon a second +great opportunity. No doubt can exist for those who understand his +career, that he would have seized it early on the 17th had he been +the chief of a few years before,<a id="FNanchor_25" href="#Footnote_25" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> but he was no longer equal to +prolonged fatigue, and the negligence of his lieutenants and his +slumber at Fleurus lost him a chance not again afforded by fortune. +His prospects were not equally good on the 18th; he calculated on +destroying Wellington, but this, I believe, was beyond his powers, and +his delays, and the direction given to Grouchy and his wing, made it +possible for Blücher to join Wellington, a possibility that might have +been wholly<span class="pagenum" id="Page_228">[228]</span> excluded. Nevertheless, he ought to have gained Waterloo. +The arrangement of Grouchy’s force was sufficiently correct to have +enabled Grouchy to stop Blücher, and though the Emperor made more than +one mistake—and supreme genius is not omniscience—we still see in +this campaign the matchless strategist, great as ever in intellect, +but no longer equal, through physical weakness, to work out his +conceptions. Yet when this has been said, justice should be done to the +allied chiefs; and they deserved their triumph. Both, no doubt, made +serious strategic errors; from first to last they proved themselves +to be, strategically, unfit to cope with Napoleon, but both exhibited +as soldiers the finest qualities. Blücher’s conduct in rallying his +defeated army, and in attempting the march on Waterloo, shows energy +of the highest order. Wellington’s constancy and tactical skill at +Waterloo are admirable specimens of his genius in defence. The test of +the merits of the two commanders is to compare their conduct with what +would have been the conduct of any other chief of the Coalition opposed +to Napoleon; Schwartzenburg would not have risked the march from Wavre, +the Archduke Charles would have fallen back from Waterloo when he found +that the promised support was late, and in either event the Emperor +would have won the battle. Two subordinate causes of the issue of the +campaign cannot, in addition, be passed over. Napoleon’s army was too +small; 128,000 men could, with difficulty, be opposed to 224,000, and +this led to a distribution of his force—his wings not being well +connected with a weak centre—which partly explains his lieutenants’ +faults, if it does not afford an excuse for them. The Prussian army, +besides, was a different army from that which had succumbed at Jena. +Napoleon refused to see the distinction; he would not believe—as, in +all instances, disregarding national and popular feeling—that it could +rally after Ligny, and draw near Wellington, and this had something +to do with his overthrow, though, I repeat, Blücher could not have +succeeded had Grouchy been a capable chief.</p> + +<p>I shall not dwell on the closing scenes of a most strange and eventful +history. Napoleon at St. Helena realised the legend of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_229">[229]</span> the fabled +Prometheus; Genius, in conflict with Supreme Fact, was chained to a +rock, and held down by Force, and humanity turns away from the agony. +Yet impartial history will truly say that it was just to deprive +the great troubler of the world of liberty, and the animosities and +fears of the time account for, if they do not excuse, the indignities +suffered by the fallen Emperor. The student of war will turn with +gratitude to the rich fruits of Napoleon’s exile, his writings on +the art, in thought and style superior to all productions of the +kind, and those who imagine that German genius has created the latest +developments of war will be surprised to learn that if we omit what +belongs to purely material inventions, it has been anticipated at every +point by Napoleon.</p> + +<p>My estimate of this extraordinary man can be easily gathered from what +I have written. Nature gave her prodigy an imagination such as she gave +to Dante and Milton; she added a power of calculation and thought, such +as she bestowed on Newton and Laplace; she contributed a superabundant +and practical energy, embracing alike what was great and small, such as +scarcely ever has been seen in man, and she conferred craft, dexterity, +readiness, and firmness of character in a most ample measure. Gifts +such as these would have made Napoleon one of the greatest of generals +in any age; but he fell on a time when the progress of husbandry and +facilities of locomotion, greatly increased, had created new conditions +for the military art; and when, too, Revolution in France had given a +powerful impulse to the human mind, and had made it singularly bold +and aspiring. Genius and circumstance thus concurred to place Napoleon +almost at once at the head of all warriors of modern times; and for +years it seemed, as if Fortune, whatever he did in the field, assured +him victory. He was unrivalled, from the first, as a strategist; the +plans of his early campaigns are marvels of genius as distinctive as +those of Shakspeare or Raphael; but though imagination is their most +striking feature, this as yet, as a rule, is controlled by judgment, +and astonishing as they are, they are thoroughly practical. The +peculiar excellence of these prodigies of art is the mastery of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_230">[230]</span> +theatre of war, and Napoleon’s power in making it answer his ends; +the campaign on the Adige, that which led to Marengo, and that of +Austerlitz are perhaps the finest specimens of this supreme merit. +Conceptions, however, in war are useless unless skilful execution +follows; and Napoleon’s execution of his strategic projects was more +wonderful than the projects themselves. In these operations he, of +course, adhered to the methods of his great predecessors, for these +were in accord with the nature of things, and carried out principles +always true; for example, like every real strategist, his constant +object was to bring superior force to the decisive point, and so +to baffle and defeat the enemy; and, with these ends in view, like +Turenne, he struck repeatedly at the communications of his foe, and +endeavoured to gain his flank or rear; or, throwing himself between +divided enemies, attacked them in detail, and beat them down in +succession. But all this he did with an originality of design, with a +force of calculation, and, above all perhaps, with a power of stratagem +unequalled by Turenne or by any commander of modern times.</p> + +<p>Nothing since the days of Hannibal can be compared to the descent +from the Alps, which conquered Italy, and to the march from the +Channel to the Danube, which destroyed a whole army by manœuvres, +and threw the gates of distant Vienna open. These marvels of war, it +must be borne in mind, however, were due not to Napoleon alone; they +were to be attributed, in a great degree, to circumstance and to his +perfect appreciation of it. From the new conditions made possible in +war, from the growth of agriculture and the multiplication of roads, +armies could subsist, in every fertile country, for the most part, +on resources on the spot, and could therefore dispense, to a certain +extent, with <i>impedimenta</i> necessary before; they could also march +on a variety of lines with a rapidity never before possible; and the +art, so to speak, was given wings, and could take a flight into a new +sphere. First of the men of his time, Napoleon grasped these facts; +his armies living on the tracts they passed through, and making use +of every available road that was compatible with their safety on the +march, moved, not without magazines, indeed, nor without a solid base<span class="pagenum" id="Page_231">[231]</span> +and all kinds of supplies, but with a celerity never before known; and +the young chief out-manœuvred and terrified generals accustomed only +to the methods of the past. This was one of the secrets of Napoleon’s +early success; his genius fell in with and made the most of the new +conditions of the art of war, and for a long time he came, he saw, and +he conquered. Yet what had been a talisman might prove a peril, should +these conditions happen to fail; and history was to illustrate this by +most striking examples.</p> + +<p>Napoleon was thus the first of strategists; he stands supreme, like +a Himalayan peak; there is nothing equal to him in this sphere of +the art. He has been surpassed in the lesser tactics; he never was a +regimental leader; he commanded in chief at too early an age to have +had practical experience of the three arms; he perhaps underrated the +strength of infantry, and rather exaggerated the force of cavalry, +and the only arm he thoroughly understood was artillery. But in the +province of the higher tactics, where strategy and tactics blend with +each other, his pre-eminence nearly, if not quite, reappears. He +detected the decisive point on a field of battle, and the true way to +cope with an enemy, almost as surely as on a great field of manœuvre; +but faults I shall notice were here sometimes seen, and I do not think +he excelled Marlborough, a tactician of the very first order. As a +military administrator he was, perhaps, unrivalled. His industry, his +grasp of facts in the mass, and his extraordinary mastery of details +were marvellous; and though the Grand Army had many defects, for it was +the hasty creation of an age of war, still it was the best army that +had been seen since the Legions; and, unlike the conscript armies of +our age, it was subjected to trials they have never endured. Napoleon’s +<i>Correspondence</i> can alone give us a notion of his administrative +powers; and their results are most conspicuous in his immense +preparations for the campaign of 1807, for the passage of the Danube in +1809, for the invasion of Russia in 1812; and for the restoration of +the military strength of France in 1813 and 1815.</p> + +<p>No wonder, then, that this prodigious genius, backed by favouring<span class="pagenum" id="Page_232">[232]</span> +circumstances, and the French Revolution, should have transformed the +art, to a great extent, and have given it an aspect of new grandeur. +Turenne did great things between the Scheldt and the Inn; Marlborough +did great things between the Meuse and the Danube; Frederick did great +things on the Elbe and the Oder; but what were these achievements, +splendid as they are, compared to Napoleon’s march of conquest? He +moves from the Var to the Po and the Adige, strikes down the power of +the House of Hapsburg, and dictates peace within sight of Vienna. He +issues from Switzerland across the Alps, envelops his enemy and gains +Italy; and had he had a lieutenant equal to himself, he would have +destroyed the Austrian armies in Swabia in 1800. He imprisons Mack in +1805, enters Vienna with an army encamped, a few weeks before, within +sight of our coasts, and annihilates for a time the military power of +Austria and Russia on the great day of Austerlitz, the most perfect +battle of the nineteenth century. The tale is the same the following +year; the operations are less striking, but Jena overwhelms the army +of Frederick, and a few days of well-planned manœuvres makes Napoleon +master of the Prussian monarchy.</p> + +<p>His unbroken success comes here to an end; but even in his campaigns +of chequered fortunes, nay of disasters, we see the same grandeur, +marred as it often is, of conception and action. He defies Nature, and +receives her warnings in Poland; he narrowly escapes defeat at Eylau, +but his genius and will re-establish his power, and he strikes the +Czar down on the verge of old Europe. He defies national right and +feeling in Spain and Portugal, and meets reverses justly deserved; +but he hastens across the Somo Sierra to Madrid, and for the time he +subdues the Peninsula. When called back to France by the sound of war +on the Danube, he rectifies errors made in his absence by operations +of consummate skill; he once more reaches and conquers Vienna, and +having challenged Fortune at Aspern and Essling, he answers her rebuff +by a prodigious effort of energy and perseverance at Lobau, and he +ultimately triumphs on the field of Wagram.</p> + +<p>The Nemesis of power attains him at last; his army is engulfed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_233">[233]</span> in the +snows of Russia, beyond the confines of the Western World, and yet +his movements are admirably designed, and his capacity was, perhaps, +never more conspicuous than at the Beresina. He reorganizes his forces +in 1813, with a rapidity and completeness that confound the Allies; +and though he loses at last his hold on Germany, he wins four great +battles, is able to make the issue of the contest doubtful for months, +and succumbs at Leipsic perhaps through defection only.</p> + +<p>In the campaign of 1814 he aims at too much, yet his genius shines out +with such malignant splendour that his enemies shrink in terror from +it; he is victorious over and over again, and he is only overwhelmed +because France and Paris will not support his Empire. In 1815 he +sinks at last, through the effects of a crushing military reverse; +yet even in this campaign, spite of the faults of lieutenants and the +determination and energy of foes, the presence of the great master is +seen everywhere; and he only just misses splendid success.</p> + +<p>Humanity, however, is never perfect, and there were many flaws in +this marvellous nature. The intensity of his imagination occasionally +mastered the prudence and calculating powers of Napoleon; we see this +even in his early years, in his project to march from the Nile to +the Indus, in his scheme of a descent on our coasts in the face of +immensely superior fleets; and we see it more clearly in his later +campaigns, in the advance from Smolensk into the depths of Muscovy, in +the attempt to reconquer the continent in 1813, in the resolution to +strike for the whole Empire, and not to recall all his forces to the +decisive point on the theatre in 1814. This dangerous quality sometimes +marred the strategy of Napoleon, and marked it with extravagance. He +was not so safe a strategist as Turenne, and his strategic reverses +were as great as his triumphs. Over confidence, too, and extreme +arrogance, combined with this excess of imaginative force, form +distinctive faults of Napoleon in war. We see them, even from the +first, in the campaigns of Italy; they appear plainly in his march on +Marengo, and nearly caused him to lose the battle; they are visible in +his advance on Austerlitz; they are conspicuous<span class="pagenum" id="Page_234">[234]</span> in his campaigns in +Poland; they largely contributed to the ruin of 1812; they prevented +him from saving his army at Leipsic; they lured him on to his fall in +1814; they are exhibited in 1815, in the false conviction that Blücher, +after Ligny, was utterly routed, and could not rally his shattered army.</p> + +<p>To this fault must be added another, a kind of passionate desire to +crush an enemy, whatever the risk, on the field of battle. Napoleon +showed this at Caldiero in 1796; perhaps at Eylau in 1807, distinctly +in 1809 at Aspern and Essling; and most remarkably, and with the +worst results, at La Rothière, Craonne, Laon, and Arcis in 1814. +This even lessens his excellence as a tactician. With his marvellous +insight, in comprehending the ground and the weak points of a foe, he +sometimes attacked imprudently, and deserved defeat. He had not the +calm intelligence of Marlborough on the field, and here he is certainly +less great than Marlborough. Napoleon, too, had another defect, of a +moral kind, not to be overlooked; no one could hold a prouder or a +more daring attitude, no one knew better the power of the renown of +arms, but he did not confront misfortune, when hope seemed lost, with +the indomitable constancy of some warriors. He was unequal to himself +during the retreat from Russia—he ought not, I think, to have quitted +his army; he tried to kill himself in 1814; and in this respect he +falls below Frederick, who, in all others, is not to be compared to him.</p> + +<p>Yet the most marked of his failures and shortcomings as a leader in +war have yet to be noticed. He thoroughly understood the material +conditions which made his grand offensive strategy possible. Yet he +disregarded the fact when these largely failed; he endeavoured to make +the same daring movements in barren Poland as in fertile Italy, in the +swamps and forests of Russia as in the plains of Germany; and though +he laboured to avert the resulting dangers, he could do so only in a +slight degree, and he failed when nature began to fail him.</p> + +<p>Napoleon, too, had this special fault; he had many of the instincts +of the old <i>régime</i>; he simply abhorred Jacobinism, and all +its doings; he believed in force only as the means of ruling; and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_235">[235]</span> +throughout his career he had a rooted dislike and contempt of all +popular movements and feelings. This tendency led him into capital +errors, even from a purely military point of view; he believed that +he could conquer England by a descent; he scorned the national rising +in Spain, though it destroyed the flower of his best armies; he would +not lift a hand to liberate Poland, though this must have disabled +the Czar; he would not even at Moscow set the serfs free; he laughed +at German and Russian patriotism, and found the results of his scoffs +at Leipsic; he called the liberal movement of France at the close +of his reign, “metaphysical nonsense and visionary stuff,” and this +contributed to his fall in 1814.</p> + +<p>In politics in the highest sense, and even in the larger affairs +of State, Napoleon did not attain supreme greatness. In this noble +province of wisdom and conduct, his genius was not in its true sphere, +the force of his intellect was out of its place; he followed false +lights, and fell into the gravest errors. His ideas of politics were +derived from the ambitious traditions of the old Monarchy, and from +the frightful scenes of the French Revolution, and his conception of +ruling was to extend the domination of France over a subject Continent, +and to keep down anarchy at home by despotic power, magnificent, +even national, but sternly repressive. His capacity, his craft, his +untiring energy were tasked to the utmost to compass these ends. The +Empire bestrode three-fourths of Europe; it extinguished Jacobinism +for some years in France, it nursed her in dreams of warlike glory, it +established order, prosperity, and material grandeur. Yet this vast +fabric of conquest and force, which, like the Satanic temple of the +poet’s vision, “rose like an exhalation,” as quickly vanished. The +Empire, founded on international wrong, and depending for its existence +on the enforced submission of great races conquered, but spurning the +yoke, was a defiance to Law divine and human; it was a contradiction to +the nature of things; and the methods by which its author upheld it, +harsh tyranny, statecraft, and the Continental system, were assurances +of his speedy overthrow.</p> + +<p>As for Napoleon’s system of domestic government, splendid as<span class="pagenum" id="Page_236">[236]</span> it +seemed, and as it was for a time, it had no stability and could not +endure; it rested on the mere rule of the sword; it had no solid +support in old institutions, in settled traditions, in powerful +orders of men; it was a despotism controlling a demoralised people, +in which revolution had destroyed faith and loyalty. The character, +too, of this rule was bad; the execution of the Duc D’Enghien, and +many similar deeds of blood, were crimes that shocked the conscience +of mankind. Napoleon’s Bodies of State, his spy system, his organized +informers, his repression of thought, remind us of the Rome of the +later Cæsars; and, curiously enough, he hated Tacitus, the immortal +censor of Imperial tyranny. Yet the Empire was not a mere scheme of +oppression. It had a grand and beneficent side; it bears the marks of +the administrative gifts and capacity of its great creator; it largely +civilized while it subdued; it saved France from the vile rule of +demagogues; it gave her all that is solid in her social fabric, and the +Codes will outlive Marengo and Jena.</p> + +<p>A word on Napoleon in his tent and his camp, the natural home of this +mighty spirit. The great captain was, in the main, a kind master to +submissive lieutenants; he lavished wealth and honours on his generals +and marshals; he was usually good-natured to these docile servitors. +But his personality was so overpowering that he made his subordinates +mere pawns on the board; he deprived them of self-reliance and freedom, +and as his nature was not magnanimous, he repeatedly blamed them for +his own errors. The results were injurious to him as a chief. Few of +his marshals were fit for independent command; they had little power of +initiative or true capacity, and they indemnified themselves for his +rebukes and gibes by squabbling, and often thwarting each other, as was +notably seen in Spain and Portugal. It was otherwise with the mass of +the army; here Napoleon’s influence was immense for good. He obtained +efforts from French soldiers, which no other chief has ever obtained; +his presence among them it has been said, was equal to 40,000 men; he +was prodigal of their blood, and set at nought their sufferings, if any +object was to be<span class="pagenum" id="Page_237">[237]</span> attained; but he was careful of their wants, knew how +to win their hearts, and was adored with a truly idolatrous passion.</p> + +<p>As has been seen in the case of other great men, the inner life of +Napoleon had repulsive features; the figure loses majesty, when +undraped of its trappings. He had been brought up in an age of +wickedness, and Napoleon could lie, cheat, and forge with complete +indifference, if anything was to be gained by it. His manner and +voice could charm and fascinate, but his imperious nature made him +rude and brusque; he could scold and fly into fits of temper; “his +very caresses,” it has been said, “were feline”; he could be coarsely +familiar and suddenly savage. In his general bearing there was a want +of repose, of true self-respect, of natural dignity. In all these +respects, as in the weightier matters which pertain to the master art +of Empire, Napoleon falls far behind Cæsar through unquestionably the +superior of Cæsar in war.</p> + + <div class="figcenter"> + <img + class="p2" + src="images/i_050.jpg" + alt=""> + </div> + + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_238">[238]</span></p> + +<h2>CHAPTER IX.<br> +<span class="subhed smcap">Wellington</span></h2></div> + +<p>Arthur Wellesley was born in 1769, a few weeks before the birth of +Napoleon. His family belonged to “the English in Ireland”—a happy +expression of Mr. Froude; and the future soldier and statesman in his +great career displayed many of the distinctive qualities of a ruling +caste which, though of late decried by traders in faction for selfish +purposes, has nevertheless given more than a due proportion of eminent +men to the service of England. The ancient seat of the Wellesleys has +been long a ruin; the traditions of Meath yield few records concerning +a House which produced two of the most illustrious names in our +eventful history, and all that is really known about the first years +of Arthur is that he was a sickly child, overlooked by his parents. +At Eton the boy showed none of the brilliancy of his elder brother +Richard, a precocious genius; he was unnoticed at the military school +of Angers, and no one who saw the two youths in these years would have +thought that the fame of “the Wellesley of Assaye” would eclipse that +of “the Wellesley of Mysore.”</p> + + <div class="figcenter" id="i_b_238fp"> + <img + class="p1" + src="images/i_b_238fp.jpg" + alt=""> + <p class="p0 sm center">WELLINGTON.</p> + </div> + +<p>Arthur obtained his first commission in 1787; passed rapidly +through the intermediate grades, after the bad fashion of that age +of privilege, and was placed, through interest, at the head of the +Thirty-third, just as the Great War with France had begun. During the +intervening period he had held a seat for the borough of Trim in the +Irish Parliament, and had been on the staff of the <span class="pagenum" id="Page_239">[239]</span>Lord Lieutenant +Camden; and some faint memories of his life in those days have survived +down to the present time. Passing by idle gossip, the young member +spoke on the Catholic Relief Bill of 1798; the speech, though dry and +blunt, goes straight to the point, and is characteristic in many ways; +and an old house on the quays of Dublin which commands the Liffey and +the adjoining streets, and which, it is said, he urged the Government +to buy, remains to this day to prove that Wellington had in early youth +a true military eye. It is impossible to doubt that, even in these +years, Arthur had studied and read a great deal, and was well-versed +in his professional work. He had acquired a command of the English +and French tongues which made him the master of a vigorous style, not +brilliant or striking, but clear and solid; his writings nearly of +this date give proof of thorough information on many subjects, and of +singularly ripe and disciplined thought; and from the first moment that +he obtained a regiment, he made his mark as a most promising officer. +Like Turenne, Wellesley addressed himself with untiring industry to +the care of his men; he enforced discipline with a steady hand, and +showed that he had the faculty of command; and, like Turenne, he was +soon able to boast that his corps was well-ordered and very efficient. +The occasion quickly came when the young colonel was to show that he +possessed qualities above those of the common herd of men.</p> + +<p>In the unfortunate campaign of 1794 the Thirty-third formed part of +the British army, which, under the command of the Duke of York, had +been separated from the main allied force retreating on a divergent +line to the Meuse, and which, hardly pressed by the Republican levies, +advancing upon the flood-tide of victory, was endeavouring to make its +way into Holland. Wellesley distinguished himself in several rearguard +actions, displaying from the first the skill in defence, the resource +in danger, and the perfect self-reliance, which were peculiar gifts of +the future chief; and it is significant that he was chosen to cover the +retreat, a task he performed with marked ability. These experiences +made a profound impression on a remarkably penetrating and sagacious +mind; they seem to have led him to observe carefully, and to form an<span class="pagenum" id="Page_240">[240]</span> +admirably just estimate of what he called “the new methods” of French +warfare, and of what was good and defective in them; they enabled him +to realise the immense abuses then prevalent in the Continental armies, +and to a considerable extent in our own; and, unquestionably, they +were of the greatest use as a preparation for the Peninsular War. It +is remarkable that, after this first essay in arms, most honourable +as it had been to him, Wellesley tried to give up a military career, +and actually applied for a post in the Civil Service; the reason he +assigned was that he saw little chance of advancement through merit +in the British army, to the shortcomings of which he had become fully +alive.</p> + +<p>Fate happily disregarded Wellesley’s prayers; and having escaped exile +to the West Indies, he was sent off to Calcutta in 1797. A short time +afterwards, his brother Richard, the Marquis Wellesley of a later day, +arrived in India as Governor-General, and the real career of Arthur +may be said to have opened. Much of his correspondence of this period +remains, and it bears the marks of the prudent forethought, of the +clear insight into men and things, and, above all, of the moderation of +view, which distinguished Wellington when at the summit of fame. He was +often consulted by the Governor-General, and it is interesting to note +how the ambitious statesman,<a id="FNanchor_26" href="#Footnote_26" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> a more brilliant but a less scrupulous +man, was more than once restrained by the calm-minded soldier. Arthur +Wellesley’s judgments on Indian affairs were such as Marcus Aurelius +might have made had he been a Pro-consul in a province of Rome; he was +the constant advocate of peace with honour, of keeping the strictest +faith with the Princes of Hindustan, of no undue extension of our +growing Empire; and yet he thoroughly understood the true nature of +that wonderful domination which, in spite of itself, was winning its +way to supremacy in the East, in virtue partly of its own force, and +in part of the decay of all powers around it, and of the jealousies +and discords of its numerous foes. Another characteristic of these +papers is this: they show that the writer had admirable views on +military and civil administration alike; and the remarks<span class="pagenum" id="Page_241">[241]</span> on the whole +system of our Indian Government, which repeatedly occur, are profound +and striking. Peace in India at this time had become impossible; the +inglorious satrapy of Sir John Shore had only encouraged the hopes of +our enemies; and the news of Napoleon’s descent on Egypt, and of his +avowed project to march to the Indus, had animated Tippoo Sahib to +endeavour to break the settlement made by Cornwallis in 1793. I shall +not repeat the often-told tale of the dealings of “citizen Tippoo” with +the Directory of France; of the assistance he received from French +soldiers of fortune; of the siege of Seringapatam, and his death; this +scarcely belongs to Wellesley’s career, who was a subordinate only in +the attack on the fortress, and who, in these operations, happened to +meet one of the few reverses he met through life. He was made Governor +of Seringapatam, and afterwards of Mysore; and in this position he +first gave proof not only of great administrative powers, but of that +capacity for ruling alien races—for reconciling the ascendency of +the English name with the obedience of people completely different—a +gift partly due, perhaps,<a id="FNanchor_27" href="#Footnote_27" class="fnanchor">[27]</a> to his Irish experience, and partly to +firmness, patience, and a strict regard to justice, which stood him in +good stead in Spain and Portugal. Ere long Wellesley, now raised to the +rank of General, had an opportunity to show what he was in command.</p> + +<p>He had distinguished himself, when at Mysore, in putting down a +Mahratta partisan who had ravaged the country with part of Tippoo’s +forces; and when Scindiah and Holkar in 1803 made a determined +effort to destroy our Empire, Wellesley was placed at the head of an +independent army, and advanced from Madras into the Central Provinces. +I pass over his forced march to Poona, considered in those days a +remarkable feat, and his rapid operations in the Deccan; and I proceed +at once to the really grand exploit which gave him, for the first time, +a great name in India. Wellesley and Stevenson, in September 1803, were +near the Kaitna,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_242">[242]</span> one of the Godavery’s streams, at the head of about +16,000 men; Scindiah’s army, 50,000 strong, commanded and organized +by French officers, was in camp at no great distance; and the two +Englishmen agreed to attack it, on lines divided by a wide range of +hills, strategy which, even in the case of Indian warfare, was too +hazardous, and cannot be justified. Wellesley came up with the enemy +at Assaye, his colleague being still far away; and, as more than once +was seen in his career, his boldness on the ground and his quickness in +action made more than amends for a strategic error. Disregarding all +odds, like Clive at Plassey, he instantly fell on the masses before +him; and though the issue of the battle was doubtful for a time, +nothing could stand against his British foot and horsemen, and in a +few hours he gained a complete victory. Stevenson arrived before long, +and the campaign ended in the easy triumph of Wellesley’s arms, and +in a large increase of our Indian dominions. Yet Assaye had, perhaps, +other results; the strategy of Wellesley was, no doubt, faulty; and the +battle probably gave Napoleon, who let nothing escape him in war, that +first false impression of the “Sepoy general,” which caused him greatly +to undervalue Wellington, with fatal consequences to France in the +Peninsular contest.</p> + +<p>Wellington always looked back on India with pride; and nearly two +generations after Assaye, when he had been for many years the first of +living Englishmen, he actually proposed to set off for the East, when +danger threatened our power on the Indus. An attentive observer will, +indeed, perceive that his career in Hindustan foreshadows, in part, his +more renowned career in Portugal and Spain; we see in both the same +sober wisdom, the same administrative gifts, the same intrepid conduct, +if Wellesley had no opportunity to display his skill in defence +in Asiatic warfare. He was back in England a few weeks before the +memorable events of Ulm and Trafalgar; but he was relegated at first to +a civil post, and he became Chief Secretary for Ireland under the Duke +of Richmond.</p> + +<p>The state of the island was very critical; the fires of 1798 were still +smouldering, and the unpopularity of the Union<span class="pagenum" id="Page_243">[243]</span> strengthened the hands +of the remains of the rebel Irish faction, which continually looked +to France for aid, though, characteristically, scorned by Napoleon. +Wellesley ruled after the fashion of those days: that is, he kept +Celtic discontent down and threw bribes and places to greedy seekers of +both, in order to extend ministerial influence; but he was perfectly +aware of the many abuses then prevalent in the social condition of +Ireland, and his warnings on the subject now appear prophetic. He was +at the bombardment of Copenhagen in 1807; was chosen by Lord Cathcart +to arrange the terms of the surrender of the fleet with the Danish +commander; and won golden opinions in this delicate task from brave +enemies, whom he seems to have pitied. At last, in the summer of 1808, +fortune found for him a place on the theatre of the great events +which were stirring the Continent especially adapted to his peculiar +genius, and launched him on the career which has made him famous. By +this time Napoleon’s first invasion of Spain was ending in calamitous +failure; the French armies were falling back at all points, and the +British Government resolved to strike a blow at Junot and his corps, +isolated in the midst of Portugal. Wellesley set off from Cork in the +middle of July, at the head of about 10,000 men; and a remark he made +to his friend Croker, when leaving, shows the character of the man +and his strong nature. “The French armies,” he said, “have beaten all +the Continent. They have, it seems, adopted a new system; they have +out-manœuvred every enemy they have met, but I do not think they will +outmanœuvre me, though, as a matter of course, I may be outnumbered.”</p> + +<p>Wellesley had landed at Mondego Bay in the first week of August; he was +soon joined by about 5,000 men under General Spencer, from the south +of Spain, and he ultimately had nearly 20,000 troops, by the addition +of a British division and some Portuguese auxiliaries. The effect of +the descent was to throw a superior hostile force on the communications +of Junot’s army, and to place it in grave peril, for it was split in +fractions; and Wellesley hoped to cut it off from Lisbon, and, should +a detachment<span class="pagenum" id="Page_244">[244]</span> under Sir John Moore co-operate, even to intercept its +retreat on Elvas, and so to cause its complete ruin. This able plan +was frustrated by a series of accidents, though it led to a brilliant +if not a decisive victory. Wellesley attacked and defeated a French +division at Roliça on the 17th of August; and he was in turn assailed +when on the march to Lisbon, at Vimeiro, not far from the coast, by +Junot, who had assumed the offensive with from 14,000 to 16,000 men. +The efforts of the French completely failed; and as their defeated +columns drew off, Wellesley eagerly tried to follow up his success, and +to force Junot against the Tagus, where, even without the aid of Moore, +he might destroy the Marshal. This bold and brilliant stroke was, +however, prevented by the interference of Sir Harry Burrard, a veteran +of the old school, who had come from England, unluckily, to take the +chief command, and the French army escaped unmolested. The Convention +of Cintra soon followed; and though a storm of indignation arose at the +time, because Junot and his troops were landed in France, it is but +fair to remark that as Moore did not complete the operation laid out +for him, the French would probably have made good their retreat. The +one real opportunity was lost at Vimeiro, owing to a change of leaders +at a critical moment.</p> + + <div class="figcenter" id="i_b_244fp"> + <img + class="p1" + src="images/i_b_244fp.jpg" + alt=""> + <p class="p0 sm center">Theatre, of the<br> +PENINSULAR WAR.</p> + </div> + +<p>This short campaign brought out one of the gifts of Wellesley, capacity +for bold offensive movements, not on a grand scale but within limits +where readiness and vigour are of special value. His ability was +recognized at the inquiry held in England, after the affair of Cintra; +and he returned to Portugal in the spring of 1809 in supreme command of +a mixed force of British and of Portuguese troops, perhaps altogether +40,000 strong, which had been assembled for the defence of Lisbon, +and had been organized by Generals Cradock and Beresford. Affairs in +the Peninsula had, by this time, completely changed since the year +before; and it was universally believed in Europe that the whole +country would in a few months become a vassal province of the French +Empire. Napoleon had invaded Spain for the second time, at the head of +forces that nothing could resist; he had swept aside the rude levies +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_245">[245]</span>that crossed his path. Saragossa had fallen; a British army, led by +Moore, had narrowly escaped destruction; the national insurrection +seemed, for the moment, crushed; and fully 300,000 veteran soldiers, +commanded by skilful and successful chiefs, were gathered round the +eagles for a march of conquest from the Ebro to the mouth of the Tagus. +Yet Wellesley, with deep sagacity and grand strength of character, +refused, in this state of things, to despair; and he drew elements +of hope from the peculiar nature of a theatre of operations he had +carefully scanned, and from the conditions of French invasion in Spain +and Portugal. Portugal, open to England through the command of the sea, +and scarcely accessible from the Spanish frontier, the only avenue open +to the French armies, could, he insisted, be defended with success, by +a small British force if well supported by the national militia and the +Portuguese Government; and he relied greatly on the immense impediments +which would necessarily beset the French in Spain, owing partly to +the ubiquitous guerrilla risings, partly to the intricacies of a +region of mountains and defiles, partly to the exposed state of the +communications with France, assailable along a vast line, and partly +to the extreme difficulty of concentrating and supporting large forces +which, upon Napoleon’s principles of war, would be compelled to subsist +in a poor and barren country on resources principally drawn from the +spot. These admirable views, set out in detail before Wellesley reached +Portugal in 1809, anticipate the course of the Peninsular war, and in a +great measure foreshadow its event; and if they do not equal Napoleon’s +conceptions in splendour, science, and imaginative force, they indicate +real genius for defence and military wisdom of the highest order. +Wellesley’s first operations were of happy augury, and realised his +predictions with full completeness. Napoleon, before he set off for +Wagram, had made preparations to invade Portugal on what he considered +a sufficient scale, while he continued to extend his power in Spain; +and for this purpose he had directed Soult to march on Lisbon with an +army supposed to be at least 40,000 strong, while Victor was to second +the movement by the valley of the Tagus with about an equal force.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_246">[246]</span> +Soult, however, pursued by swarms of guerrillas and making his way +with extreme difficulty, reached Oporto with less than 25,000 men; +though Victor routed a Spanish army, he never approached the Portuguese +frontier; and when Wellesley arrived in Lisbon the two Marshals were +far from each other, unable to co-operate, nay, perhaps, unwilling, and +not in sufficient force to subdue Portugal. Wellesley, rightly aiming +at his nearest foe, marched against Soult with about 30,000 men; and +the operations that followed were very brilliant.</p> + +<p>Soult, dreaming of a throne for himself in Portugal, and a somewhat +indolent though a very able man, was surprised and assailed by his +bold adversary; the Douro was crossed by the British army, under the +eyes of a powerful hostile force, by a movement of singular daring and +skill; and a detachment ably sent off by Wellesley all but cut off the +Marshal’s retreat, and nearly involved him in utter ruin. In fact, +Soult only contrived to escape by abandoning his <i>impedimenta</i>, +and crossing the ranges that lead into Spain with the wreck of an army, +and the invasion of Portugal ignominiously failed.</p> + +<p>The passage of the Douro in the face of Soult is another instance +of the skill of Wellesley in offensive movements upon a contracted +theatre. He now turned his attention towards Victor, far off, yet in +the lowlands of the Tagus; but a long pause in the operations took +place, due, partly, to the maladministration of the British army, +partly to disputes with the dullard Cuesta, in command of the Spanish +army of the west, and partly, too, perhaps, because the English general +had not the fierce energy, in a situation like this, of the warrior +of the campaign of Italy. Wellesley had defeated Soult by the middle +of May; he did not even attempt to advance against Victor until the +last days of June, and it was the third week of July before his army, +having effected its junction with that of Cuesta, was in the valley of +the Upper Tagus, marching in pursuit of the French Marshal. The allied +chiefs were now at the head of about 20,000 British troops and 40,000 +Spaniards, mostly new levies; their purpose was to attack Victor, +falling back leisurely towards Talavera; and they moved up the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_247">[247]</span> Tagus, +not without hope that they might ultimately reach the Spanish capital, +for they expected aid from a Spanish army in the south.</p> + +<p>The long delay which had occurred, however, had enabled the French +armies in the Peninsula to draw towards each other in formidable +strength; the corps of Soult, reorganized and recruited, that of Ney, +and that of Mortier were but a few marches off, behind the screen of +the Avila range. King Joseph at Madrid had a considerable force, which +might easily join hands with Victor; and Wellesley and Cuesta were +in fact moving into the midst of immensely superior foes, strategy +difficult to understand and not to be justified. In the operations that +followed, the French lost one of the best opportunities they ever had +to destroy our power in Portugal and Spain; and the glitter of success +ought not to blind us to the perils incurred by the British commander, +from which he only escaped by accident. In the last days of July Joseph +had come into line with Victor, who had been well-nigh caught. Their +united armies were near Talavera, at least 45,000 strong; and pressing +orders had been given to Soult, to fall on the flank of the allied +army, with the corps of Ney, of Mortier, and his own, 60,000 excellent +troops at least; a movement not in any way difficult, for it only +required a short march, and the passes from the hills were but weakly +guarded. These dispositions were by no means perfect, but they promised +brilliant and decisive success; and they failed only through a series +of mishaps and errors. On the 27th of July Victor attacked the Allies, +in position at Talavera, between the Tagus on their right and a set +of knolls and low hills on the left; and his first effort altogether +failed, though he concentrated his main strength against the British +troops.</p> + +<p>The attack was premature and imprudent, for obviously it was the +true course of the French to wait until the advance of Soult would +enable them to assail the Allies, in front and flank, in overwhelming +strength; but Victor, jealous perhaps of his colleague, and eager to +win on his own account, insisted on renewing the fight on the 28th. +The battle raged furiously for several<span class="pagenum" id="Page_248">[248]</span> hours; all the attacks on the +British left were baffled; but the intrepidity and skill of Wellesley +were taxed to the utmost to save the centre, and though he undoubtedly +gained the day, the French army drew off unbroken. Ere long, however, +the advanced guard of Soult made its appearance in the plains of the +Tagus; the defeated army resumed the offensive, and in the first days +of August a great French host, from 85,000 to 100,000 strong, was +menacing the Allies in front and rear, and seemed as if on the verge of +a splendid triumph. Had the counsels of Soult, to press on and attack, +prevailed at this juncture, it is difficult to see how Wellesley and +Cuesta could have escaped; and in that event the combined French armies +would not improbably have overrun Portugal, and, perhaps, have even +attained Lisbon. The danger, however, passed away; the French chiefs +separated, and did nothing; and Wellesley, placing the Tagus between +himself and his foes, made good his retreat across the frontier, though +unsupported by his worthless ally, whose conduct, it has been thought, +was not free from treachery.</p> + + <div class="figcenter" id="i_b_248fp"> + <img + class="p1" + src="images/i_b_248fp.jpg" + alt=""> + <p class="p0 sm center">WELLINGTON AT TALAVERA.</p> + </div> + +<p>Wellesley received a peerage for Talavera, and the battle is honourable +to the British army and its chief. The attacks of Victor were ill +conducted, but fully 35,000 French soldiers were opposed to less than +20,000 Englishmen; and yet they retired from the field, defeated. +Talavera, indeed, like Vimeiro before, had proved that the modern +French tactics were not calculated to achieve success against those +long in use in the British service, as regards defensive battles at +least; columns and skirmishers failed to make an impression on the +formidable line of the British infantry, a result which was seen two +thousand years ago in the inferiority of the Greek phalanx to the Roman +legion. Wellesley’s first dispositions were not very good; he did not +occupy the ground in force on his left; but he displayed great resource +and skill on the 28th, and he deserved the victory he fairly won. His +strategy, however, in this campaign was ill conceived, and, indeed, +bad; and it can be explained, perhaps, on the supposition only that he +had no idea what a great hostile force was ready to descend through +the hills on his flank, as he marched in fancied <span class="pagenum" id="Page_249">[249]</span>security up the +Tagus. As for the French operations, the plan of the double movement +of Victor and Soult was not ill designed; but it was frustrated by the +inconsiderate haste of Victor, who attacked before the approach of his +colleague; and Napoleon truly observed that combinations like these are +ever liable to mischance and failure, and that Wellesley ought to have +been allowed to advance until the net was made certain to close around +him. Wellesley, however, as it was, only just escaped. The wrath of +Napoleon<a id="FNanchor_28" href="#Footnote_28" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> knew no bounds, for a great opportunity had no doubt been +lost; and the mistake of the English commander confirmed the Emperor in +the low estimate he had formed of an enemy, who was anything but “the +presumptuous, rash sciolist” he held up to ridicule after this campaign.</p> + +<p>By this time Wagram had been fought. After the defeat of Austria, +the whole Continent was more than ever under the yoke of Napoleon; +Spain and Portugal were the only points where there was even a show +of resistance to that colossal force; and as the Emperor poured fresh +masses of troops into Spain, and announced that he would march on +Lisbon in person, even the British Government, injured at home by the +calamitous issue of the descent on Walcheren, began to quail and to +wish to give up the contest. Yet Wellington—we now use the revered +name—retained his calm and unbroken confidence; and though the +subjugation of Spain seemed imminent—for three Spanish armies had been +completely routed, and Andalusia was being overrun—he still contended +that the defence of Portugal could be successfully maintained even +in existing circumstances. After his retreat from the Tagus, he had +returned to Lisbon; and, in the autumn of 1809, despite of the fears of +ministers at home, and of the reluctant aid afforded by the Portuguese +Regency—a corrupt and incapable body of men—he made preparations for +the memorable stand in Portugal which has gained him enduring<span class="pagenum" id="Page_250">[250]</span> renown. +His own army was now about 30,000 strong; the Portuguese army, drilled +and led by Englishmen, had become a trustworthy force of about equal +strength; and the addition of other Peninsular levies had placed him +in command of more than 100,000 men. Such arrays, however, Wellington +clearly saw could not hope to contend, even in Portugal, against the +masses of which Napoleon disposed, unless means were taken to place +a barrier in the way of the invaders, behind which the forces of the +defence could be securely rallied. For this purpose he chose a position +between the Atlantic and the mouths of the Tagus, covered in front by +a succession of heights, and most difficult to turn on either flank; +and thousands of labourers were quietly employed, with a secrecy which +appears surprising, in constructing the famous Lines which will make +the name of Torres Vedras long live in history. These great works +formed a triple range of entrenchments, thirty miles in length on +their exterior face and about eight in their second extension; the +third was a vast fortified camp, from which the army, if forced, could +embark; and the whole were protected by all the means available to the +art of the engineer, redoubts, inundations, stockades, escarpments, +and formidable batteries commanding vulnerable points. In this +“impregnable citadel,” as has well been said, Wellington “deposited +the independence” of Portugal at first, and ultimately, as it turned +out, of Spain; and clinging to a rock on the verge of the ocean, while +all was fear and mistrust around, he steadily confronted the might of +Napoleon, the undisputed lord of a vanquished Continent. History has no +grander instance of heroic constancy, and of self-reliance justified by +the event.</p> + +<p>By the early summer of 1810, the French armies in Spain had reached +the enormous number of 350,000 fighting men, and Napoleon believed the +whole Peninsula to be within his grasp. Engrossed, however, with his +overgrown Empire, and meditating already the invasion of Russia, he +had renounced the idea of crossing the Pyrenees, and conducting the +approaching campaign himself; and this was one of the greatest mistakes +of his life. The Emperor, shut out from the sea by England, and unable +to procure<span class="pagenum" id="Page_251">[251]</span> intelligence in Spain, had not the least notion, strange as +it may appear, of the real force in the hands of Wellington, still less +of the Lines of Torres Vedras, and his plan for the contest, formed +without knowledge, was misconceived and false to his own strategy. +He believed that the British army was not 25,000 strong; he took no +account of the Portuguese forces; he thought that the way to Lisbon was +open, or barred only by natural obstacles; and instead of concentrating +200,000 men, in order to overpower Wellington and to turn the Lines on +the landward side, at the verge of the mouth of the Tagus—a difficult +but a possible enterprise—he disposed his armies in such a fashion +that, as the event proved, they were largely wasted and were not strong +enough on the decisive point on the theatre. Reasoning on his false +data, he left Macdonald and Suchet to reduce the east of Spain; he +allowed Soult to remain in the south with a great army, to no useful +purpose, and calculating that this force would be more than sufficient, +he placed 70,000 men in the hands of Masséna, by far the first of +the imperial marshals, with orders to besiege the north-eastern +frontier fortresses, and to “drive the English into their ships from +Lisbon.” This dissemination of his military strength, so contrary to +the principles of war, was due not to wilfulness or over-confidence, +but simply to ignorance of the real facts; the Emperor knew that the +British army was the one enemy he should first dispose of, and he +conceived that he had made this result certain; but his reckonings and +previsions were wholly wrong, and his projects were based on disastrous +errors. The remarkable campaign of 1810 was to illustrate this in +a most striking way, and forms Wellington’s true title to glory in +war. Masséna began operations in the first days of June by investing +Ciudad Rodrigo, a famous stronghold and the key of Portugal from the +west of Spain, and as he was not to advance until after the summer +heats, he conducted the siege in a leisurely manner, though disease +and want had begun to prey on his army. Wellington, who had approached +the beleaguered fortress at the head of about 30,000 men, when made +aware of the strength of the French merely observed the enemy from +secure positions; and all the devices of Masséna to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_252">[252]</span> tempt him to fight +were fruitless against his steadfast prudence. Ciudad had fallen by +the middle of July; Almeida, a neighbouring stronghold, met the same +fate, and Masséna had set his army in motion—it numbered about 60,000 +men—to invade Portugal in the third week of September, the Marshal +advancing along the Mondego, and the British commander falling back +before him. By the 27th the French had entered a region of mountains +and defiles between the great ranges of the Sierra Alcoba and the +Sierra Estrella, and they found Wellington and his troops in position +on the ridge of Busaco, awaiting their enemy. Masséna did not hesitate +to attack, for he had a great superiority of force; but once more the +column was repulsed by the line, and the assailants only reached the +well-defended heights to be smitten down by the steady British footmen. +The Marshal, bold and persevering, now discovered a track which enabled +him to move his army and turn Wellington’s left. This was not the fault +of the English chief, for he had given directions to secure the pass; +but his position had become no longer tenable, and the French entered +Coimbra in high heart, and confident that they would soon attain Lisbon.</p> + +<p>Masséna, utterly ignorant of what was before him, shared this hope with +Ney and Junot, his chief lieutenants; and leaving his wounded and sick +men at Coimbra, spite of a guerrilla warfare gathering on his path, +“the spoiled child of victory” pressed boldly forward, making for the +Lower Tagus and the Portuguese capital. To his great astonishment, the +hostile army, which had retreated slowly and made scarcely a sign, +seemed suddenly to disappear from his view; and Masséna only discovered +the cause when, in the middle of October, he saw the Lines of Torres +Vedras rising in formidable strength, and his enemy, he knew, was +entrenched behind them.</p> + +<p>Masséna’s army had, by this time, been reduced to about 50,000 men, and +his adversary had fully 100,000, within lines not to be attacked in +front. Ney and Junot were for an immediate retreat, but the warrior of +Zürich, of Genoa, of Essling, whose great merit was tenacious boldness, +refused to listen to these desponding counsels. He searched the barrier +before him at<span class="pagenum" id="Page_253">[253]</span> every point, and only fell back when the state of his +troops had warned him that a further stay was impossible. In his +march from Busaco, Wellington had given orders to ravage the country, +and to destroy its harvests; and though we may, perhaps, regret that +he had recourse to a barbarous and obsolete mode of warfare, it was +very efficacious against invaders who had no magazines when they +left the frontier, and relied for supplies on organized plunder. +Within a few weeks after it had reached the Lines, Masséna’s army, +practised as it was in extortion and rapine, was half-famished; and +the Marshal recoiled from Torres Vedras baffled and indignant, but not +disheartened. Concealing the movement with great skill, he established +his troops in strong positions round Santarem, on the Lower Tagus, +where he was almost inaccessible to attack, and where, at the same +time, he had several lines of retreat, and he might receive aid from +the French army in the South should it advance to the opposite bank +of the river. Here the Marshal made a determined stand, disregarding +the murmurs of inferior men; he sent flying columns through the +surrounding region to obtain means of subsistence by force or terror; +he constructed bridges to cross the Tagus, and he despatched Foy, a +very able man, to Paris, to ask for reinforcements and to inform the +Emperor of the critical state of affairs in Portugal.</p> + +<p>Napoleon saw his messenger before the end of November, and it might +have been supposed that the first of strategists would have sent +every available man, as quickly as possible, to Masséna’s aid, for +everything, it had become manifest, depended on the course of events +on the Tagus. But the Emperor was not pleased with the Marshal, on +account of Busaco and the march from Coimbra. He persisted in holding +Wellington cheap; he refused to believe in the strength of the Lines; +he would see no foes but the British army, and the measures he adopted +were quite inadequate to meet a situation already of peril. He ordered +a detachment to be sent from the North of Spain, and to join hands with +Masséna’s army; and he directed Soult to the Tagus from Andalusia, a +distance requiring a long and arduous march, giving<span class="pagenum" id="Page_254">[254]</span> his lieutenant, +besides, a dangerous latitude. The results, due partly to want of +knowledge, but principally to obstinacy and unwise arrogance, proved +most disastrous to the Imperial arms.</p> + +<p>The detachment from the north reached Masséna’s camp, but instead +of being 20,000 strong, as had been promised, it was not 10,000, +a reinforcement of little worth; and Soult never approached the +Marshal, either because the difficulties in his way were immense +or because, as has often happened with French commanders, and was +conspicuously seen in the Peninsular War, he was selfishly jealous +of a superior colleague. Yet Masséna clung to his positions to the +last. In this unfortunate campaign he showed the great qualities which +have deservedly given him renown in history; and it was not until the +whole adjoining country had been turned into a desolate waste that he +reluctantly yielded to dire necessity. He broke up from Santarem in +March 1811, having, to Wellington’s amazement, contrived to live for +nearly four months on the tracts around him; and his retreat was one +of extreme difficulty, for the British army was soon pressing on his +rear; Coimbra had been taken, and swarms of partisans were gathering +around on every side. The Marshal, however, proved equal to himself; +he conducted the movement with the greatest skill; Ney distinguished +himself in more than one action; and the French army ultimately +recrossed the frontier, having saved its honour, it may be truly said, +but having injured its fair fame by atrocious excesses. It had been +reduced to 40,000 men, in miserable plight and greatly demoralized; +a quarrel between Masséna and Ney increased disorder and destroyed +discipline; and Portugal had been set free, and, as time was to show, +was not to be invaded by Frenchmen again.</p> + +<p>Torres Vedras is Wellington’s crown of fame, and gives him his true +place among great commanders. The Lines might have, perhaps, been +turned, had Napoleon put forth his whole strength; but they baffled the +force believed by the Emperor to be sufficient to conquer Portugal and +to drive Wellington out of the entire Peninsula. The conception of the +defence was very fine, for Torres Vedras was all but impregnable; but +the conception was nothing to the moral grandeur of the attitude of +the heroic soldier, who<span class="pagenum" id="Page_255">[255]</span> from this rocky nook defied the mighty hosts +which certainly might have been arrayed against him. It adds, too, +to the just renown of Wellington that he met a foeman worthy of his +steel. Masséna possibly made mistakes; he ought not to have fought at +Busaco; it is astonishing that he was not informed of the Lines when +he reached Coimbra, a few marches distant; and he ought not, perhaps, +to have quitted that place, leaving thousands of enemies gathering on +his rear. But the Marshal gave proof of powers of a very high order; +he stood before Torres Vedras to the last moment, surrounded by, +but overcoming danger; his choice of his positions at Santarem may +almost be called a stroke of genius; and he conducted the retreat with +consummate judgment. Apart, indeed, from the decisive effects caused +by Wellington’s masterly defence, the failure of the campaign should +be ascribed, not to Masséna, but to the French Emperor. Napoleon, +ignorant of the real state of affairs, did not give his lieutenant a +sufficient army; when made aware of the existence of the Lines, and +of the strength of his enemy’s forces, he took half measures, which +proved abortive; and the condemnation he passed on his greatest Marshal +was simply a device to screen his own errors, want of real knowledge, +contempt of his foes, and directing war at a distance from the scene. +The results of Torres Vedras were immense; the glory of the French arms +was deeply tarnished; a great general had suddenly appeared, who had +baffled completely the Imperial legions. Continental soldiers began +to study the methods of Wellington with eager hope; the fears of the +Government at home vanished, and it resolved to prosecute the war with +vigour; the complaints of the Junta at Lisbon were silenced; and, +above all, Wellington had been confirmed in the accuracy of his views +respecting the contest, and became the master of largely increased +resources. Secure for the present from attack in Portugal, he began +to make preparations to resist the French along the western frontier +of Spain; and he already hoped that the day was at hand when he might +carry the war into Castile and Leon.</p> + +<p>The campaign of 1811 was a prelude to operations he had already +planned; but it was one of many vicissitudes, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_256">[256]</span> of doubtful fortune. +Wellington commanding the resources of England from the sea, really +wielding the power of the Portuguese Government, and turning to account +the great advantage afforded him by a central position between enemies +divided and scattered, besieged Almeida, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Badajoz, +which, with Napoleon, he correctly judged should be mastered to make +Portugal secure, and to open an avenue to enter Spain. He failed, +however, against the two last strongholds; and though Barrosa and +Albuera shed splendid lustre on the British arms, the campaign had no +marked results, and Wellington was, more than once, in the gravest +peril. The power of Napoleon, though diminished by drafts from Spain +for the invasion of Russia, was, in fact, still prodigiously strong; +and had the Emperor directed it, he would, humanly speaking, have even +now subjugated Spain and Portugal. Masséna, having reinforced his army, +attacked Wellington at Fuentes de Onoro; the English only just escaped +defeat, owing to a dispute between two French chiefs; and Wellington, +indeed, has fairly acknowledged that “had Boney been in command” he +would have lost the battle. On two occasions, moreover, the British +commander might have been overwhelmed if ably assailed. Marmont—who +replaced Masséna, unjustly disgraced—and Soult assembled a great army +to relieve Badajoz, and ought to have won a real victory had they +fallen on Wellington; and Marmont might soon afterwards have attacked +his enemy at Fuentes Guinaldos with fourfold numbers. But the tide +in the affairs of men was setting against Napoleon, and was leading +his sagacious foe to fortune. The conditions of the war, which he had +clearly foreseen, made the dangers of Wellington less than they seemed; +the French Marshals, far apart from each other, and unable to feed +their troops in a wasted country, could not draw together their divided +forces for anything like a well-combined movement; and their increasing +discords, the neglect of their master to examine thoroughly the +situation in Spain, and, above all, the ascendency of success already +gained by the British army and its chief, told with powerful effect on +the course of events.</p> + +<p>During the last months of 1811, the British chief made great<span class="pagenum" id="Page_257">[257]</span> +preparations to renew his efforts against Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz. +He had secretly brought up a powerful siege train to the frontier +without the enemy’s knowledge; he had made his communications with +the sea easy, by opening the navigation of the Upper Douro; and the +position of the French armies on the theatre of war remarkably favoured +his audacious enterprize. The forces of Napoleon in Spain still +numbered at least 250,000 men; but part of Marmont’s army had been +detached to the East; Soult was in cantonments around Seville; no other +French army was near Portugal; and the fortresses had been left almost +uncovered, for the Emperor had not the least idea that Wellington had +the means to besiege and take them. The English commander first pounced +on Ciudad, and captured it, after a furious assault, in the first days +of January of 1812; and in a few weeks he had triumphed at Badajoz, +the heroism of the attack and the skill of the defence forming a grand +episode of the Peninsular War. His troops suffered enormous losses, and +the British engineers were not, perhaps, as experienced as the French, +in this part of the craft; but Wellington’s only chance was to hurry on +the attack; two relieving armies were not distant; and he properly made +sacrifices for a great object. The fall of the two strongholds incensed +Napoleon; but here again he had himself to blame; Marmont had fairly +warned him of the danger at hand; and this is another striking instance +of his ignorance of what was going on in Spain, and of the mischief of +regulating its affairs from Paris. The success of the British chief at +Ciudad and Badajoz laid open the Spanish frontier from Portugal, and +he resolved to carry out his project of entering Spain; for though his +army was very inferior in force to those of Marmont and Soult combined, +the conditions of the war remained in his favour.</p> + +<p>The marshals, as in 1811, were widely apart; they could hardly unite +their armies in a ruined country; and their enemy held a position +between them with an army whose wants were well supplied, and with +little apprehension that the hostile forces in his front could be +largely increased. The first care of Wellington was to seize the +passages on the Tagus which enabled Soult and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_258">[258]</span> Marmont to communicate +with each other by a short line; and then, leaving a detachment to +observe Soult, he crossed the frontier in the second week of June +and marched against Marmont with about 40,000 men. The marshal fell +back behind the Douro, in order to collect his scattered forces, +abandoning works which he had constructed as a centre of defence, in +the place of Ciudad; but he was a brilliant, if not a great chief; and +he quickly showed that he had no notion of abandoning the initiative +to the British general. Marmont recrossed the Douro on the 16th of +July, about equal in force to Wellington, but the passage was only a +feint; he crossed the river once more, and made for Tordesillas, an +able movement which brought him near to reinforcements coming from +Madrid, and threatened his adversary’s right and communications with +Portugal. A series of fine manœuvres followed, the French chief ever +trying to outflank his enemy, and the English seeking to cover his line +of retreat; and there can be no doubt that in this game of marches, +the French army was the more agile of the two, and Marmont gained a +distinct advantage. By the 22nd, the marshal had nearly reached the +road from Salamanca to Ciudad Rodrigo, the main communication of his +foe with the frontier; and Wellington was about to decamp as he best +could, when a single false movement gave him a chance and enabled +him to win a glorious victory. Marmont, eager and impetuous, and +perhaps jealous that Jourdan, the leader of the succours at hand, +would claim a share in the hoped-for triumph, incautiously extended +his left too far, in order to cut off the retreat of his enemy. A gap +was thus made in the French line; Wellington seized the occasion with +his accustomed promptness, and he instantly directed a fierce attack +against his antagonist’s left and exposed centre. The marshal at this +moment fell wounded, but his fall could not have changed the event; +his able lieutenant, Clausel, made a fine effort to reform the French +on a new position, and even assumed an offensive attitude, but the +error had been made, and been turned to account; and though the French +made a really gallant stand, their weakened line was pierced through +and through, and they were forced to abandon the fatal field, where<span class="pagenum" id="Page_259">[259]</span> +Marmont had hoped to avenge his countrymen for a long succession of +repeated defeats.</p> + +<p>Salamanca and the operations before it are characteristic of Wellington +as a chief. He was certainly out-generalled in the first movements, +mainly because the French marched better than the British army; but +probably he would have escaped unscathed, though Marmont had gained a +position on his flank, had he been allowed to retreat unmolested. He +was, however, unwisely attacked and in a reckless fashion; he instantly +fell on the enemy’s centre, with the quickness and daring which marked +his offensive movements on the ground, and he made the French general +pay dearly for venturing on a flank march within reach of his enemy. +Salamanca, in fact, has a strong resemblance to Austerlitz up to a +certain point, but it wants the grandeur and effect of Austerlitz; +and in this, as in all instances, Wellington showed that he could not +follow up a victory with the energy and wonderful art of Napoleon.</p> + +<p>As for Marmont, he was at first dexterous, but he made an immense +mistake in extending his left. Like Victor at Talavera, he should have +waited until his reinforcements had come into line; and this, no doubt, +is another example how<a id="FNanchor_29" href="#Footnote_29" class="fnanchor">[29]</a> the characteristic envy of French commanders +had the worst effects in the Peninsular War. The results of Salamanca +were very great, though Clausel rallied the beaten army with an ability +deserving of high praise, and was soon out of the reach of pursuit; the +battle exposed the long line of the communications of the French with +Madrid, and the prospect of a formidable attack on this vital point, as +Wellington had foreseen from the first—and this, too, was Napoleon’s +judgment—placed the entire fabric of the Emperor’s power in the +Peninsula in no small danger.</p> + +<p>Napoleon was now far away in the wilds of Russia; and in his absence +the conduct of the French chiefs was marked by precipitate fear and +haste, which, critical as the situation was, was unwarranted, and does +them no small discredit. Joseph fled in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_260">[260]</span> inglorious haste from Madrid; +the forces of Clausel and those in the north were drawn together to +hold and guard the communications between Bayonne and Castile; Suchet +in the far east was directed to move; and Soult, in the south, received +positive orders to evacuate Andalusia and to join the King, though +the Marshal was pressing the siege of Cadiz and had matured projects, +not ill-designed, for invading Portugal while Wellington was away. A +single well-aimed stroke had, in short, imperilled the whole position +of the French in Spain, and their operations were so faulty that their +domination seemed about to collapse.</p> + +<p>In this state of affairs a single incident caused, for a time, a turn +in the tide of fortune, and even placed Wellington in such straits that +he would have been, not improbably, crushed had Napoleon commanded +the French armies. He had entered Madrid in triumph in the middle of +August, but he was soon on the track of the retreating enemy; and +having driven Clausel’s army before him, he sat down before Burgos +towards the close of September, hoping to master the great avenue from +France into Spain. The fortress was small, but had an able commandant; +the British chief had scarcely a heavy gun; the garrison made a stern +resistance, and after fierce efforts and very great losses, the +assailants were compelled to raise the siege and to fall back before a +host of enemies.</p> + +<p>The annals of war present few such examples of the value of a +well-defended stronghold at a critical juncture. Burgos had held out +for a whole month. The time thus gained enabled Soult to come into +line with the other French armies being collected in Castile and the +north, and Wellington had no choice but to retreat at once before the +huge masses directed against him. He conducted the movement with real +ability, but his troops were to a great extent demoralized, and on +one occasion the English commander was saved by a mere chance from +the gravest danger. His army had reached Salamanca by the middle of +November; it was within easy reach of the united French armies, twofold +probably, at least, in strength, and had the French generals fallen +boldly on they ought to have gained a decisive victory. Jourdan eagerly +counselled the true course, but Soult, by nature rather a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_261">[261]</span> thoughtful +strategist than an energetic and determined soldier, and borne down +by the ascendency of the British arms, insisted on merely pressing +the retreat, and Wellington was soon across the Spanish frontier. The +Marshals had lost another of the great occasions afforded them in the +Peninsular War.</p> + +<p>The campaign of 1812, notwithstanding the disastrous retreat from +Burgos, was nevertheless ruinous in its effects to the French. +Salamanca had been a decisive defeat; the Imperial commanders had +not attacked Wellington, falling back with a much weaker force; the +invaders had permanently quitted the south; above all, the precarious +nature of Napoleon’s power in the Peninsula had been clearly +established. In this position of affairs, the tremendous tale of the +destruction of the Grand Army in Russia fell with immense effect on +the minds of men; it raised the hopes of Wellington to the highest +pitch—he had always foretold that some catastrophe would befall +Napoleon in his career of conquest—it animated his troops with fresh +confidence; it sent a thrill of exultation through Spain and Portugal; +it awed and paralyzed the leaders of the French armies. By this time +Wellington had all England at his back; he was supreme in Portugal, +and swayed the Regency by the glory of success, by his administrative +power, by his impartial justice to the Portuguese race; and he was made +Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish armies, and disposed for the first +time of the military strength of Spain, in spite of the clamour of +factions in the distracted Cortes against a “heretic and domineering +foreigner.” He was now able to place in the field forces nearly +equal in numbers to his foes, and in the spring of 1813 he had his +preparations made for a great effort to set the Peninsula free. The +Imperial armies, however, were still formidably strong, from 190,000 to +200,000 men; they were superior to the Spanish and Portuguese levies, +and as we look back at the course of events, we see that even now, had +they been ably led, they possibly might have achieved success, and +certainly might have avoided disaster. But they were ill-distributed +on the theatre of war; Suchet, in the east, had by far too large a +force; Soult had left Spain, deprived of his command; Jourdan and +Joseph were very inferior men;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_262">[262]</span> the strength of the army confronting +Wellington on the frontier was by no means sufficient; the guerrilla +rising was more fierce than ever; and the French commanders had lost +hope and confidence. The general plan of Wellington was to assail the +enemy from many points, in order to distract and detain his forces, and +at the same time to fall in great strength on the exposed line of the +communications of the French; and though faults may, perhaps, be found +in his strategy, the conception was fine, and was admirably carried +out. Suchet was held in check by Murray with a small body of men; +Joseph, who had returned to Madrid, was menaced from the south; a large +Spanish army was assembled in the north; and, meanwhile, Wellington +prepared the master stroke on which he relied for final success. His +army, now about 90,000 strong, advanced from the frontier in the last +days of May, divided into three great masses on a wide front, with +hill ranges between; its chief gave an opportunity, perhaps, but there +was no great warrior to cross his path. It had soon mastered the +line of the Douro, driving before it foes much weaker in numbers; it +gradually united, joined hands with the levies of the north, and found +a new base on the Biscayan seaboard in the English fleet; and then it +seized the main avenues between France and Spain, and sped in full +force to the Upper Ebro. This formidable movement compelled Joseph to +evacuate Madrid, and to draw together all available troops to attempt +a defence; and the French armies in Castile were ere long concentrated +around Vitoria upon the Zadorra—confused masses, already disheartened, +and burdened by <i>impedimenta</i> such as never before weighed down +unlucky troops in retreat. The battle that followed, fought on the 21st +of June, was of enormous importance in its results, but has little +interest for the student of war. The French were, perhaps, 70,000 +strong; but 15,000 men had been detached to guard convoys, and to +secure a retreat; the English commander had about 80,000, and the event +was never for a moment doubtful. Nothing could stand against the onset +of the British troops, superior in numbers, and flushed with success; +their foes fought well, as they always did, and Reille, the descendant +of an Irish exile, distinguished himself by skill and valour; but the +main road to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_263">[263]</span> Bayonne was lost, and the French were gradually thrown +back on the mountain roads that extend to the frontier. The beaten +army, however, was not hardly pressed; it effected its retreat in fair +order, but it lost nearly all its guns and <i>matériel</i>, and it left +behind the spoils of a ravaged country, accumulated through years of +unscrupulous plunder, and strewn over the field in immense profusion.</p> + +<p>Vitoria, fitly called the Leipsic of the south, drove all the French +armies out of Spain, with the exception of Suchet’s force in the east, +and the garrisons of Pampeluna and San Sebastian, reinforced by Joseph +before he crossed the Pyrenees. Napoleon, by this time, had made a +prodigious effort to retrieve the disasters of the campaign in Russia; +France had answered his summons to the field with energy; and he had +won great victories at Lützen and Bautzen, followed by the suspension +of arms at Pleistwitz. Austria now held the balance between the +belligerent Powers; she had long inclined to the allied cause, but she +dreaded Napoleon, and held aloof until Vitoria determined her purpose +and she threw in her lot with the Coalition which, in a few months, +overthrew the Emperor. The campaign of 1813 in Spain, therefore, +was really of supreme importance, and a word of comment should be +pronounced upon it. The general plan of Wellington was, perhaps, to +be justified, as affairs stood; it was his only offensive combination +on a grand scale; it was perfectly executed, and it was completely +successful. Yet it was no masterpiece of science or genius. The +movements by which the old base of Portugal was thrown off, and a new +base acquired, and by which the French armies were ever outflanked and +their communications threatened and seized, and the march on Vitoria, +have been justly admired; but the wide dislocation of Wellington’s +forces as they left the frontier was, in theory, a fault, and it would +have given Turenne or Napoleon an immense chance, which they would have +turned to such advantage that the course of events might have been +changed at the outset. The splendour of the result cannot conceal the +fact that the issue of the campaign was rather due to the incapacity +and the demoralization of the French commanders than to conspicuous<span class="pagenum" id="Page_264">[264]</span> +excellence in the strategy of their foe. Could they have defended the +line of the Douro, as Bonaparte had defended the line of the Adige, +nay, had they fallen back on the Ebro in time, and concentrated their +still fine armies for a decisive battle on equal terms, they might even +yet have repulsed Wellington, and assuredly they would not have lost +Spain. This was Napoleon’s judgment, and, in this instance, I think it +certainly was correct; his views on the military situation in Spain in +1813 are worthy of him; and here, again, had he been in command, events +would probably have taken a different turn. He was naturally indignant +at the rout of Vitoria; and having summarily got rid of Joseph and +Jourdan, he sent Soult, with extensive powers, to the Pyrenees, to +take the command of his shattered forces, and to endeavour at least +to defend the frontier. The next phase of the contest is of extreme +interest, and deserves careful and impartial study. Soult found the +French army—a confused wreck of armies—in a pitiable state of want +and despondency; and his first care was to secure a base at Bayonne, +and to reorganize and restore his defeated forces. He effected a great +deal in a few weeks, for he was an administrator of no ordinary powers; +and by the close of July he had his preparations made to assume the +offensive with happy promise.</p> + +<p>At this time the forces of Wellington—altogether about 70,000 +strong—were before Pampeluna and San Sebastian, and along the range +of the western Pyrenees; and this gave Soult—he was about equal in +force—an extremely favourable opportunity to attack, for he commanded +the passes which led from the plains. He concentrated a very superior +force against his adversary’s right, concealing the movement with great +skill; and his first operations had real success; he fairly bore back +the weak hostile wing, and he nearly reached Pampeluna and relieved +the garrison. But Wellington, always ready on the ground, was too +quick for an enemy able in thought but in execution rather dull and +weak; he raised the siege of San Sebastian and reinforced his right; +Soult attacked at Sauroren, and was repulsed, one of his lieutenants, +D’Erlon, being not up in time, on this as on a far greater occasion; +the ascendency of unbroken success did the rest, and in a subsequent<span class="pagenum" id="Page_265">[265]</span> +effort the French Marshal was nearly surrounded at the head of his +troops. He recrossed the frontier, a well-designed plan having ended in +heavy loss and discomfiture.</p> + +<p>The English commander, free from attack for a time, now resolved to +take Pampeluna and San Sebastian before attempting to invade France. +This conduct has been described as timid, and it enabled Soult to +prepare large means of defence, but obviously it was judicious and +right; the issue of the war in Saxony was still uncertain, and should +Soult be joined by Suchet they would be in great strength. San +Sebastian made a protracted resistance, but the place was stormed in +the second week of September, Soult having tried in vain to relieve +it, and Pampeluna fell at the close of October. Wellington had invaded +France a short time previously, and it should be observed that he +crossed the frontier before Leipsic, and months before the Allies were +on the Rhine. The time spent in the sieges had, nevertheless, given +Soult opportunities which he had made the most of; he had constructed +lines on the Bidassoa and Nivelle, the last almost as strong as those +of Torres Vedras, and he awaited his enemy in a situation like that of +Villars in 1710–11. His army, however, had lost heart, and was crowded +with rude levies and mutinous Germans; he had not the inspiration of +the renowned Villars, and nothing could stand against the overpowering +force of the British soldiery in the full pride of victory. Wellington +carried the lines in the second week of November, displaying great +skill in his dispositions for the attack, and before long he had +approached Bayonne, on the confluence of the Nive and the Adour, where +Soult had entrenched himself in very strong positions. The British +commander, perhaps over confident, perhaps from the want of strategic +genius—this undoubtedly was characteristic of him—escaped narrowly +a severe reverse; he had divided his army upon the Nive, and Soult, +availing himself of his command of the rivers, and of the interior line +he possessed, fell on his adversary with skill in design, and tried +to overwhelm his separated foes. The peril of Wellington was great +for a time, but Soult had the manner of Napoleon, not his masterly +power; he did not press the attack home, and his<span class="pagenum" id="Page_266">[266]</span> troops were beaten +by the tenacity of the British footmen. A pause in the operations +followed, and had the Emperor, even at this supreme crisis, ordered +Suchet to come into line with Soult, abandoning Spain, now really +lost, the French would have been superior in force to Wellington, and +affairs might have taken a different aspect. But Napoleon would strike +for his whole Empire, a false conception which mars the splendour of +the memorable campaign of 1814; he left Suchet in Catalonia, holding +the fortresses; the two marshals, besides, did not agree, with the +usual tendencies of French commanders; the organized plunder of the +French army, in marked contrast with that of the Allies, exasperated +the populations of the south against it; the Royalist party began +to lift its head after the first defeats of Napoleon in Champagne, +and Soult was left isolated to resist Wellington amidst the ruin +and crash of a perishing Empire. The British general resumed the +offensive in the early spring of 1814; he had won golden opinions, +even from the invaded Gascons, for the strict discipline he made his +troops observe, for the exactness with which he paid for supplies, for +his humane government of the country he held, and though he was not +without real difficulties of his own—he was condemned in the Cortes +and denounced in Portugal, and he actually sent back a large Spanish +detachment because he could not control their excesses—still he was +greatly superior in strength to his foe, and his arms were obviously +on the verge of triumph. Nevertheless, Soult made an admirable stand; +his army was being constantly weakened by drafts for the army on the +Marne and Seine; it was oppressed by the prospect of coming defeat, +and yet the Marshal proved that he was a real chief, and this is the +best part of his chequered career. He disputed stubbornly every inch +of the country between the lines of the Adour and the Garonne; he +kept Wellington many weeks in check, and though ultimately repulsed +with loss, he very nearly won a battle at Orthez, and at last he took +a formidable position at Toulouse, still doggedly contending against +adverse fortune. The battle was fought on the 10th of April, unhappily +after peace had been made; superiority in numbers and the moral power +of success explain, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_267">[267]</span> partly justify, Wellington’s tactics; but he +risked a flank march of peculiar danger, under the eye of an enemy +watching to strike, and had Soult struck home at the decisive moment +he probably would have won a victory. The Marshal, however, as was his +wont, was remiss in action; the French army was unequal to itself, +and Wellington forced his adversary to leave Toulouse, though the +battle was really nearly drawn. Toulouse, indeed, adds nothing to his +renown as a warrior; his true titles to fame in this campaign are his +administrative virtues, and the most significant fact that he detained +forces in the south which might have turned the scales of fortune in +the struggle in Champagne.</p> + +<p>Wellington was back in England in 1814, justly greeted by the acclaim +of the nation, raised to the highest honour the Peerage can give, +and ever since known as “the Duke” to his countrymen. His exploits, +indeed, had been truly great; with an army, swelled no doubt by +auxiliaries, but seldom numbering more than 30,000 British troops, he +had destroyed the power of Napoleon in Spain and Portugal, backed by +300,000 French veterans, had defeated the best Marshals of France one +after the other, had fought his way from the Tagus to the Garonne, had +thrown his sword, with effect, into the balance of events trembling +in the east of France, had ruled the Peninsula with a far-sighted +wisdom, spite of the passions of faction, admired everywhere. The +fame of Wellington as a commander depends, beyond question, on his +direction of the Peninsular war; and an impartial judgment should +be pronounced upon it. We may pass by enthusiasts who ascribe his +success to genius never approached in his day, and the notion current +seventy years ago that an English soldier can beat three Frenchmen; +and we may equally reject the French delusion that Wellington owed +everything to the freaks of Fortune. It must be recognized that in +the war, small as his force was compared to his foes, he had certain +advantages of peculiar value; he had the command of the sea, and of +the resources of England; his position in Portugal was formidably +strong; he was supported by a vast national rising; he stood in the +centre of divided enemies; whereas the French armies, large as they +were, had most vulnerable<span class="pagenum" id="Page_268">[268]</span> communications to guard, were exposed to +swarms of destructive guerrillas, were necessarily separated by vast +hill ranges, and, owing mainly to the Napoleonic system of warfare, +were unable to muster for any time in strength because they could not +subsist in a barren country. These conditions of the strife were all +in favour of the British chief, and told powerfully; but this does +not in the least detract from his merits; he anticipated them with +prophetic insight, and they simply made his defence possible; just as +Napoleon’s choice of the Adige enabled him to baffle the whole power +of Austria. It should be admitted, too, that throughout the contest he +was greatly seconded by the shortcomings of his foes; more than once +he ought to have been overwhelmed or crushed, but for the miserable +discords of the French marshals; and Napoleon himself played into his +hands by his ignorance of events, by his lust of conquest, by the +false system of directing war from an immense distance; above all, by +his contemptuous disregard of an adversary most unwisely scorned. Yet +this, the only meaning of what has been called the “good fortune that +attended Wellington,” does not lessen his title to fame; I certainly +think, had he had to encounter Napoleon with all the Peninsular armies +he would have been forced out of Spain and Portugal, nay, he might +have been beaten in 1811, 1812, and 1813; but, tried by this test, +we might just as well deny Napoleon genius in war; he would not have +won Rivoli, Jena, Austerlitz, had he been opposed to really great +captains. Undoubtedly, moreover, in these campaigns the generalship +of Wellington was not of as high an order as some eulogists have made +it out to be; he committed grave strategic mistakes; his plan for the +offensive on a great scale, and at a distance, is not very striking—I +refer especially to 1813; his tactics were sometimes far from perfect; +he was not masterly in following up success; there is something narrow +and contracted in some of his movements. But when this has been said, +he gave proof of genius in defence of the rarest kind; his campaign of +Torres Vedras reaches the sublime, in conception and execution alike; +he was admirable in rapid and bold attack; he was almost always great +on the field; his tenacity and judgment are above<span class="pagenum" id="Page_269">[269]</span> praise. Add his +most remarkable administrative powers, his capacity for ruling foreign +races, and his moderation in the hour of success, resembling in this +the great warriors of Rome, and we shall understand how he will live +in history. A word, too, should be said on his British troops; that +army—largely his own creation—which he said—and Wellington was no +boaster—“could go anywhere and do anything.” From the first moment his +soldiery showed the high qualities of their race, endurance, vigour, +fierceness in attack, perseverance in defence, and the skill in the +use of their arms of the archers of Crecy. The army, however, was for +a time ill-organized; its movements were slow, and it was overburdened +with camp-followers and <i>impedimenta</i>; its officers, heroes in the +fight, were seldom skilful; in short, it was an imperfect instrument +of war. It is one of Wellington’s distinctive merits that he made that +army, always superior to the French in discipline, fortitude, and +steadiness in the field—and this, indeed, is the true reason why its +line was able to defeat their columns—equal to the best of Napoleon’s +armies—the Emperor has made the admission himself—in readiness, in +training, in skill in manœuvring; though Salamanca tends to show that +in the power of movement it was not the equal of its most agile foes.</p> + +<p>Great as a soldier, but certainly greater as a man, it was the destiny +of Wellington in 1815 to meet the most perfect master of modern war. +The campaign of Waterloo belongs to the career of Napoleon, and in a +sketch of his extraordinary deeds I have endeavoured to retrace its +main features. Idle flatterers and the idolaters of success have given +Wellington the palm in this mighty conflict, but he knew that he was +out-manœuvred, and he did not claim it; and he disliked the subject, +when all the facts were known, though he wrote on it in extreme old +age. The simple truth is that Blücher and Wellington, considering the +enormous hosts being arrayed against him, did not think that Napoleon +would spring on Belgium; even their own forces, they well knew, were +nearly double those of their foe; and though they made dispositions on +the supposition of an attack, these were ill-conceived and essentially +faulty. Their armies, in the first<span class="pagenum" id="Page_270">[270]</span> place, were spread along an immense +line, with divergent bases; in the second, they were scattered up and +down Belgium; in the third, they were far too near the frontier, at the +points of concentration marked out for them; and in the fourth, the two +chiefs were too far from each other, and could not communicate without +perilous delays.</p> + +<p>Availing himself of these palpable mistakes, Napoleon broke in on the +exposed centre of his adversaries with a grandeur of design and a skill +in execution never surpassed; he was close to their weak line on the +15th of June, and a single march had placed them in extreme danger. +Then came the confusion and the divided counsels common with allied +chiefs, and foreseen by their foe. Blücher rushed hastily to confront +the Emperor before his army had been drawn together; Wellington, +misconceiving the real state of affairs, stopped, hesitated, and left +a wide gap open; and an opportunity was afforded to the General of +1796, as favourable as ever was won by genius. But for a series of +misadventures I have noticed elsewhere, he ought to have overwhelmed +Blücher with ease on the 16th; and, in that event, nothing could +have saved Wellington, though the French were only 128,000 against +224,000<a id="FNanchor_30" href="#Footnote_30" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> men. Strategy had only just missed one of its grandest +triumphs; in fact, the allied chiefs were all but checkmated, though +Wellington made an able stand at Quatre Bras, and this went some way +to baffle the Emperor. Napoleon was given another chance on the 17th, +by the double retreat on Wavre and Waterloo, which might have proved +fatal to both his adversaries; but he was not well, and his lieutenants +failed him. Soult, always indolent, was greatly to blame; the retreat +of the Prussians was not followed up; Grouchy was detached late to hold +Blücher in check; and when Napoleon, true to the principles of the art, +turned against Wellington and attained Waterloo, he was not aware that +the Prussians were near and were ready to unite with the Duke, mainly +owing to the faults of the incapable Grouchy.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_271">[271]</span></p> + +<p>The morning of the 18th saw Napoleon and Wellington confronting each +other for the first time; the state of the weather, no doubt, gave the +British chief an unforeseen advantage. The Emperor’s plan of attack +was perfect; but Wellington’s dispositions were also excellent, except +that he made the strategic error of leaving a large detachment behind +at Hal. In the great battle that followed Napoleon was ill, and the +tactics of the French were incoherent and bad; the genius of Wellington +in defence reappeared, and shone out with conspicuous lustre; and this +great quality largely redeemed his shortcomings in this memorable +campaign. He fought Waterloo on the assumption that Blücher would +join him early with the whole Prussian army; no aid reached him until +nearly 5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>; Ziethen and Pirch, who decided the result of +the day, were not on the field until after 8 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>; and yet +Wellington, with a very inferior army, contrived, during seven long +hours, to resist successfully the Imperial host, and he had fairly +repulsed the attack of the Guard before Ziethen and Pirch dealt the +final stroke. His intrepidity, his tenacity, his tactical power on +that memorable day were worthy of him; no other general on the allied +side, it may confidently be said, would have made such a stand; and +though he would almost certainly have lost the battle but for the +arrival of Bülow in the early afternoon, still the defeat would not, I +think, have been crushing, and Napoleon must have at last succumbed. +Nevertheless, Waterloo, as I have endeavoured to prove, was decided by +operations outside the field. Had Grouchy been equal to his appointed +task, Blücher ought not to have been able to reach his colleague; the +strategy of Napoleon throughout the campaign, spite of mistakes and +failures, well-nigh triumphed; and the one merit of Wellington—and it +was immense—was the masterly defence he made at Waterloo.</p> + +<p>The Duke commanded the Army of Occupation in France, after the second +fall of Napoleon and the return of the Bourbons, and he admirably +fulfilled a most arduous mission. He has been condemned for not saving +Ney; but he had no right to interfere with the Government of France, +and he showed characteristic tact and clemency in his relations with +the French army, the Court, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_272">[272]</span> the nation. His grand civil career +begins at this point; but I must pass from it with scarcely a word of +comment. He was a representative of England at the great Congress which +met at Vienna to resettle Europe; and he was engaged in other important +missions of the kind. In these diplomatic duties he was, no doubt, +inferior to Marlborough in suavity and delicate art; he was sometimes, +indeed, outspoken and blunt, but his simplicity, his candour, his ripe +judgment, made him a negotiator of a very high order. His position as +a statesman was noble and striking. His nature and profession drew him +to the Tory Party, and he was for years its acknowledged head; his +ideal was a strong aristocratic government; he detested modern Radical +cant and theory; and though he was a Constitutional politician in the +broadest sense, he did not understand the play and tendency of popular +forces. But he had no sympathy with extreme Toryism; he ridiculed the +Holy Alliance and its dreams; he knew how to make concessions in time; +no reformer more sternly put down abuses; he was always Conservative, +but wise and moderate. He commanded the army for some years; in this +high office, unlike Turenne, with whom he had certain points in common, +he was not in advance of the ideas of his time; he was rather obstinate +and narrow in his views; but one great work he at least prepared; he +urged the necessity for assuring the defence of England, and this +generation at last has accepted his teaching. He spoke very often in +the House of Lords; as an orator he had no accomplishments, but it +was said he always “hit the nail on the head,” and his sagacity was, +perhaps, the more noted because it was not set off by eloquence. As +he grew old, he became the national mentor; his counsels were felt to +be words of wisdom, and his place in the State was one of commanding +dignity.</p> + +<p>He passed quietly away in 1852; England mourned him as her foremost +citizen, and she justly regards him as the most illustrious of +her worthies of the nineteenth century. It ought to be possible +to pronounce a sound judgment on his military career, after all +these years, and yet impartiality is still difficult. Wellington +was endowed by nature with real wisdom, with<span class="pagenum" id="Page_273">[273]</span> strength of character +seldom equalled, with singular moderation and calmness of thought, +and yet with a rapid intelligence and clear insight. She denied him +imagination, passion, and, in some measure, sympathy; and we see these +excellences and defects in his life as a warrior. As a strategist, +on the offensive, he stands low; for strategy, in this aspect, must +see into the unknown, and requires a fiery energy he did not possess; +and he was incapable of such exploits as the campaign of Marengo. In +defensive strategy, however, he has been never excelled; for here the +elements of the problem are easier to ascertain, and sagacity and +firmness are most effective; and his campaign of Torres Vedras is, +beyond comparison, the finest specimen of defence, in the strict sense +of the word, that was seen in the Great War with France. As a tactician +he was admirable in attack and defence, for when the field was before +him, his promptness, his coolness, his constancy, stood him in good +stead; but he was, on the whole, better in defence than attack; his +Salamanca falls short of his Waterloo; and he was inferior to some +tacticians in his arrangements on the ground, and, conspicuously, in +following up a victory. Though there was something contracted in his +exhibitions of the art, he has no doubtful place among great captains; +and yet Wellington was greatest, perhaps, as a citizen, by reason of +his profound wisdom, his administrative powers, his statesmanlike +views, and, above all, his capacity for ruling alien races. In one +quality of a chief he was, no doubt, deficient. He was respected, but +not beloved, by his officers and men; he could not command their hearts +like Napoleon or Condé, and this was largely due to the Spartan turn +of character which distinguishes the aristocratic caste of Ireland. +Taken altogether, he was one of the most illustrious men who have ever +appeared on the stage of History; his grand life justified the poet’s +epitaph: “O Tower full square to all the winds that blew!”</p> + + <div class="figcenter"> + <img + class="p2" + src="images/i_224.jpg" + alt=""> + </div> + + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_274">[274]</span></p> + +<h2>CHAPTER X.<br> +<span class="subhed smcap">Moltke.</span></h2></div> + +<p>I feel it difficult to attempt a sketch which must be inadequate, and +perhaps partial. Moltke is a living man, though in extreme old age; +flattery and envy have obscured his real image; and his place among +great commanders is still a problem. Yet the General who triumphed +in 1866–70, and whose name history links with Sadowa and Sedan, is +assuredly a master of modern war; and I shall try to disengage his +personality from the facts accumulated around it and still imperfectly +known. Helmuth Charles von Moltke was born in 1800, a scion of a noble +Danish house, of ancient descent but shattered fortunes. The family had +produced more than one good soldier. It appears in the Thirty Years’ +War; the father of Moltke attained the rank of General in his country’s +service, and was, perhaps, an officer in the Prussian army; and one of +his uncles perished amidst the wreck of the Grand Army in the retreat +from Moscow. Little is known about him in early boyhood, except that +he grew up under the cold shade of poverty; his first recollection +was of the sack of Lübeck, where Blücher succumbed after the ruin of +Jena; in his case, the strong impressions of youth were formed by the +events of the gigantic strife which marked the beginning of the present +century; he saw the Continent at the feet of Napoleon; he was a witness +of the great rising of Germany; he may be said to have watched Leipsic, +Montmirail, and Waterloo. The image of war, therefore, in its grandest +aspects, and with consequences akin to a world-wide earthquake, +was stamped on his mind when it was most ductile; <span class="pagenum" id="Page_275">[275]</span>and these +associations, doubtless, had much to do with the distrust of France as +the disturber of Europe, and the blended scorn and dislike of all that +is French which were to be characteristic of the future warrior. Moltke +became a cadet at the Military School of Copenhagen at an early age; +and some years afterwards, having meanwhile obtained a commission in +the Prussian service, he was a pupil at the Staff College of Berlin, an +institution which may be traced to Frederick, and which has always been +of very high repute. The youth made his mark at both these seminaries; +privation had steeled his strong nature; his intelligence was superior, +and his industry intense; he had a special faculty for mastering facts, +and a fine taste in Letters and Science, resembling Frederick in all +these respects; and it is no mere tradition that his promise was great, +when he received his first appointment on the Prussian staff. Moltke +passed some years at a desk in Berlin, doing the routine duties of the +War Office; and as he had fallen on the days of the Long Peace, which +followed the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, the prospect was faint +that the accomplished soldier would ever become an illustrious warrior.</p> + + <div class="figcenter" id="i_b_274fp"> + <img + class="p1" + src="images/i_b_274fp.jpg" + alt=""> + <p class="p0 sm center">MOLTKE AND HIS MASTER.</p> + </div> + +<p>When he was past thirty, however, he found an opening for the display +of some of his eminent parts; when travelling through the East, he +attracted the notice of Sultan Mahmoud, lately engaged in the task of +transforming the Turkish army; and Moltke gave him valuable advice, +especially on the defence of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. Like +Eugene of Savoy, it was his fortune also to see war for the first time, +as it was carried on by the arms of Islam. In company with a small +party of Prussian officers, he was present at the decisive fight of +Nisib, which made Mehemet Ali an independent ruler; and it has been +said that he recommended a movement which might have made the result of +the battle different. Moltke has left a record of these experiences in +a series of letters, still of value; but a history from his pen of the +Russian invasion of the Ottoman Empire in 1828–29 is the most important +monument of this part of his career. The book reveals the nature of the +man; it wants imagination and the charm of genius; but it is thoroughly +well-informed and full of good<span class="pagenum" id="Page_276">[276]</span> criticism; and while it does justice +to the powers of Diebitsch, its peculiar characteristic is the minute +attention bestowed by the writer on all that relates to the mechanism +and organization of the contending armies, and to the geography of +the theatre of war. The reputation of Moltke grew by degrees; in the +fine words of the Roman poet, it was like the silent growth of a tree; +he rose slowly to the rank of general, and he was for some time the +first aide-de-camp of the Crown Prince of Prussia, the late Emperor +Frederick of no inglorious memory. He made several visits of state with +his chief, and has left an interesting account of all that he saw; but +his mind was engrossed by what belongs to war; and it is curious to +observe that he has far more praise for the steadiness and obedience +of the Russian infantry than for the agility and intelligence of the +French soldiery, associated in his mind with carelessness and want of +discipline.</p> + +<p>In 1857 Moltke received the office of Chief of the Staff of the +Prussian army. The position was one of the highest eminence; it had +been filled by distinguished men; but the names of these are of no +significance compared to that of the renowned soldier who has made it +famous in all lands. Moltke was in his fifty-eighth year when he was +raised to the post; he had never commanded troops in the field, nay, +had taken no part in European warfare; and yet he possessed qualities +which made his selection for the place a great day in Prussian history, +for scarcely a living man so thoroughly understood what were to be the +true conditions of war in our time, what its characteristics, and its +coming development. We shall perceive this better if we glance at the +state of the art during the long period of almost unbroken peace which +succeeded Waterloo. For more than thirty years after 1815, every Power +in Europe felt the exhaustion caused by the gigantic strife at the +first part of the century; and though “the war drum was not hushed,” in +the poet’s language, their energies were mainly directed to the great +problems, political and social, which had come into question. In this +state of affairs they generally reduced their armies; what was more +important, they took little heed of all that concerns the military art, +and their war offices were, without exception, directed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_277">[277]</span> by men whose +minds had been formed on the battle-fields of the preceding age. When +the Revolution of 1848 passed over the Continent, the Russian army was +far the most powerful in Europe; the armies of France, of Austria, of +Prussia, of England, had largely declined from their old standards; and +the great names of Wellington, of Soult, of Paskiévitch, were typical +of the system of unchanging routine, which, in every service, prevailed +in high places.</p> + +<p>This strong conservatism was not much shaken by the memorable events +of the next few years. The military operations of 1848–49 resembled +those of 1805–14, except that they displayed less genius; and even +the experience of the Crimean War did not produce a wide-spread +conviction that a new era in the art was about to open. Nevertheless, +throughout those long years since the Peace, forces of all kinds had +been steadily at work, which were to affect greatly the phenomena +of war, and if not to change the essential truths it teaches, to +modify it profoundly in some of its aspects. The population of every +State had continued to increase, especially in Central and Eastern +Europe; and the rude material, therefore, of military power had been +augmented, and was still growing. The resources of most nations had +been doubled and trebled; agriculture had made enormous strides; roads +and communications had become more numerous; and while this progress, +dating from centuries before, had been going on with accelerated speed, +a new element of mighty force had appeared in the railway system, +which, spreading over Europe, had made the means of transport and of +locomotion infinitely more easy, more vast, and more rapid than ever +had been known before in history. Though the truth had not dawned on +ordinary minds, it had become certain, thirty years ago, that in any +great European contest armies would be larger than they had ever been; +and the facilities of moving huge bodies of troops, and of munitions +and supplies on a prodigious scale, it is now perceived, were to have +these results; that the efficacy of fortresses was still further to +decline, and that military operations might be more ample, have more +celerity, and be more decisive than had been the case even in the age +of Napoleon. Other influences, too, had made themselves<span class="pagenum" id="Page_278">[278]</span> felt, to +be attended with great results in war. The age was one of material +inventions; the weapons of destruction used by armies had been almost +transformed within a brief period; and appliances of a different kind +had, to a certain extent, been turned to account. Rifled cannon and +the breech-loading musket had been manufactured and partly employed; +these mechanical improvements, it is now apparent, have necessarily +led to changed formations and tactics; and the discovery of the field +telegraph has, in some measure perhaps, affected strategy. Education, +moreover, after the Peace had been generally diffused through Europe, +especially in Prussia and Northern Germany; this had greatly increased +the self-reliance and the intelligence of the individual soldier; and +the result, we can now see, has had a potent influence in the conduct +of armies and the arrangements of war.</p> + +<p>It was the distinctive merit, I have said, of Moltke, that he +appreciated these facts, and all that resulted from them, with perfect +judgment and the most sagacious insight. He was deeply versed in +the history of war; like every true student of it, he had seen that +Napoleon was, by many degrees, the first of captains, and he had +the capacity to perceive that the new conditions, especially the +development of the railway system, favoured the grand and daring +Napoleonic strategy. He grasped the truth, too, that the immense +size of the armies in coming European conflicts would lead to more +independence in separate commands, and would require a larger number +of able chiefs than ever had been the case before; and he saw that +preparation was more than ever necessary, the operations of modern +war being so quick and decisive. The superiority of a rapid and bold +offensive, the advantage of the diffusion of skill in the high ranks +of an army, and the value of careful organization and well-planned +arrangement, formed, so to speak, his military faith; and, coming to +other details, he distinctly declared that the new arms would make the +efficacy of fire the greatest element of success, that the importance +of mere charges would largely decline, that formations in the field +would become more flexible, and less dense than they had been formerly, +and that real culture and mental training made a man an infinitely +better soldier.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_279">[279]</span></p> + +<p>Moltke impressed these principles, which thirty years ago were not +generally accepted or understood, on the Prussian army from the first +moment, and with what results is now well known. The first great +event in this part of his life was the reorganization of the military +strength of Prussia, a reform completed in 1860. This vast work was +probably due more to the king and Roon than to anyone else; but Moltke, +we may be sure, approved of the measures by which the numbers of the +army were largely increased and its real efficiency was, perhaps, +quadrupled. The new arrangements did not change the bases on which +the military power of Prussia rested, the general duty of the subject +to serve, and the organization of the army on the local system; but +the yearly contingent of recruits was augmented a third, the time for +service in the reserve was doubled, and the army, which had become too +like a militia by a large admixture of landwehr, was made a completely +distinct force, the landwehr forming only its last reserve. The hand of +Moltke may be distinctly seen in almost every improvement thenceforward +made in this great force, composed, after 1860, of fully half a million +of trained fighting-men. Holding fast to the principle that offensive +strategy would more than ever succeed in modern war, he directed his +efforts to have the Prussian army ready to take the field as quickly +as possible, and to be prepared to attack at once; with this object +in view, the local arrangement of the national forces was steadily +retained, for it assured the rapid assembly of masses of troops; but it +was subjected to minute and careful central direction; and elaborate +preparations of all kinds were made to secure speedy “mobilization,” +and the regular transport of whatever is required for the conduct of +a campaign by turning railways and other communications to account. +Another great object of Moltke was to provide for general efficiency +through all commands, from the highest down to the lowest grades. He +had excellent materials for this at hand, in the practised officers +who abound in Prussia; and steadily applying himself to his task, he +succeeded by degrees in placing the army under the control of capable +men, from top to bottom, producing in this way that hierarchy of good +leaders which Thucydides declared,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_280">[280]</span> two thousand years ago, was one of +the secrets of Spartan success; and creating that division of skilful +labour which has become a necessity in modern war. Moltke addressed +himself, also, to the reforms in tactics which he had foreseen were +to be essential; but here his exertions were less successful; he was +steadily obstructed by routine and tradition; his own views, probably, +were not fully formed, and years were to elapse before the Prussian +army was to attain its present excellence in this sphere of the +art. The greatest reform, however, effected by Moltke remains to be +stated, and had immense results. The Prussian Staff stood high since +the days of Frederick; but under the care of its greatest chief, it +gradually reached a state of extreme perfection. Divided mainly into +two branches, it supplied the commanders of corps with able advisers, +trained in strategy, in tactics, in the direction of troops, and in +providing for their needs in the field; and it has accumulated stores +of knowledge in all that relates to military history, to the geography +of war, to the resources and armies of civilized states, which have +proved to be of the greatest practical value. Moltke, it should be +added, like all true leaders, inspired the army generally with his high +aims and spirit; he encouraged the mental training of soldiers and +officers, but he paid special attention to order, discipline, and to +everything that secures obedience to command.</p> + + <div class="figcenter" id="i_b_281fp"> + <img + class="p1" + src="images/i_b_281fp.jpg" + alt=""> + <p class="p0 sm center">Theatre, of the<br> +CAMPAIGN<br> +of 1866.</p> + </div> + +<p>Moltke could never have accomplished these tasks had he not had the +all-powerful support of the King, a really able and far-sighted ruler, +and a soldier of no ordinary gifts. Within seven years from the time +when he was raised to his post, the Prussian army, which since 1848 had +fallen low in universal repute, had, under Moltke’s care, become, we +know now, unquestionably the first of European armies, as superior to +those of every other State as the army of Frederick was to the armies +of his day. The time was at hand when the strength and worth of this +mighty instrument was to be proved in the field. I pass over the petty +Danish war, and proceed to the great conflict of 1866, fought with +memorable and lasting results for the Continent. Prussia instantly took +a bold offensive attitude, and the celerity with which her main forces +were <span class="pagenum" id="Page_281">[281]</span>“mobilized” and directed towards the Bohemian frontier, with +every requirement to begin a campaign, surprised all who understood the +subject. The invasion, too, of the Northern German States was admirably +planned and well carried out; and the ability with which a small +Prussian army held in check and baffled the whole of South Germany +remains a specimen of fine generalship. The distribution, however, +of the principal army on the theatre of war to oppose Austria can be +praised by the courtiers of fortune only, and is certainly open to +grave objections.</p> + +<p>On the 15th of June 1866 this huge array, about 250,000 strong, and +divided into three great masses, was disseminated along an immense +front, extending from the Elbe almost to the Oder, and not far from +the main Bohemian range; the right, the Army of the Elbe, being near +Torgau, the centre, or First Army, being around Sorau, the Second Army, +the left, holding the tract round Neisse. At this moment the chief +Austrian army, nearly equal in numbers, reckoning its Saxon allies, +was in Moravia, spreading about Olmütz; it held a central position +between scattered foes, and it is now acknowledged that it was ready +to advance, and could have assumed a decided offensive. It is vain to +deny that in this state of affairs it already possessed an immense +advantage; and, whatever the cause, the Prussian strategy which gave +it this grand chance must be deemed faulty. All the apologies that +have been made on this subject will not mislead the true student of +war. It has been urged that the dislocation of the Prussian armies was +necessary “to cover Berlin and Breslau”; but this argument is of no +avail. You should never risk a whole army for such objects, and if you +try to defend everything, you run all hazards. It has been said, again, +that it was not possible to assemble the Prussian forces in any other +way, regard being had to the lines of railways; but that is no reason +why the three armies should have been distant from each other near +the Bohemian frontier. Lastly, it has been alleged that the superior +quality of the Prussian troops, if considered, excuses their chiefs; +but this superiority had yet to be proved; and any operation, however +defective, may be justified by this kind of reasoning. The examples set +by really great captains<span class="pagenum" id="Page_282">[282]</span> show what Benedek—a good soldier, but unfit +to command a large army—might have accomplished at this conjuncture. +Napoleon, in the place of the Austrian chief, would have made for +the salient of the Bohemian hills—would have debouched through the +passes into the Saxon plains, and holding the army of the Elbe by a +detachment in check, would have fallen in superior force on the First +Army, and then would have turned victoriously against the Second +Army, which, thrown forward into Upper Silesia, might have been cut +off from its base and destroyed. Turenne, less daring but more safe, +would have advanced to the southern verge of the Bohemian range, and, +occupying the position he always sought to gain, would have invited the +attack of his divided enemies, and interposing between them would have +beaten them in detail. In either case, the Prussians should have been +defeated; and, indeed, why they were placed in this way on the theatre +has never yet been really explained.</p> + +<p>On the 16th of June the Army of the Elbe entered Saxony, and had soon +seized Dresden; and about the 20th it had nearly joined hands with +the First Army which, under Prince Frederick Charles, had been moved +close to the Bohemian frontier. The Prussian right and centre were thus +almost united; but the left, commanded by the Crown Prince, which had +advanced from Neisse towards the passes near Glatz, was isolated from +its supports, and at a great distance; and if the invaders were not in +immediate danger—for Benedek had only begun to move—their strategic +position remained critical. In this situation the Prussian armies, now +practically two, not three masses, were directed to pass through the +range, and, approaching each other, to effect their junction around +Gitschin, a point considerably to the south of the hills, not far from +where Benedek had some troops, and where he might have had five-sixths +of his army. This strategy was exactly the same in kind as that which +had proved fatal in 1796, when attempted against the chief of Rivoli; +and the excuses that have been made for it are weak and baseless. Two +large armies, such as those of Prussia were, though far from each +other, are no doubt in less peril if they invite the attack of a single +army equal to both<span class="pagenum" id="Page_283">[283]</span> in strength, than two small armies would be under +like conditions, and this would specially be the case where, as in +the present instance, the field of manœuvre was somewhat contracted. +All this, however, proves no more than that the converging movement +of 1866 was less to be blamed than that of Würmser; it does not show +that it can be justified, and the experience of ages clearly condemns +it. Benedek, who broke up from Olmütz on the 17th of June, might have +reached Gitschin with the mass of his forces before the Prussian armies +could have come into line; and in that event he would have had at least +an opportunity to fall on his divided enemies, and to achieve success, +more or less important. Unfortunately for himself, however, the +Austrian chief was unable to seize the occasion before him; instead of +turning his central position to account, and advancing northward with +all his corps in hand, he adopted half-measures of extreme feebleness. +He sent a detachment only, comparatively small, to hold the Prussian +right and centre in check. He struck at the Prussian left with inferior +forces, and he hung back himself with the mass of his army, irresolute, +hesitating, and, at best, inactive.</p> + +<p>The result was what might have been expected. Clam Gallas and the Saxon +contingent were overpowered by Prince Frederick Charles, who attacked +with largely superior forces; the Crown Prince, as he emerged from +the defiles, defeated with ease the three hostile corps opposed to +his much more powerful army, and though the issue was partly due to +the excellence of the Prussian infantry, and to the efficacy of the +arms they wielded, it is chiefly to be ascribed to the grave faults +and the shortcomings of the Austrian leader. The victorious armies, +though still far apart, now advanced along the heads of the Iser and +the Elbe. The Austrians, beaten and demoralized, slowly fell back; and +yet such was the inherent advantage of the central position still held +by Benedek, that had he known how to make a true use of it he might +even yet have turned the tide of ill-fortune. By the 29th of June he +had his army nearly united; the two Prussian armies were leagues from +each other, and part of the First Army was dangerously exposed; and +it has been justly remarked that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_284">[284]</span> had Benedek boldly attacked Prince +Frederick Charles on this day, he ought to have won a real victory, +and, in that event, he would still have had a chance to strike and +defeat the Crown Prince of Prussia. As is well known, however, the +ill-fated chief did not attempt an offensive return, and continued his +retreat until he had passed the Bistritz; here, like Daun, he took a +position of defence, and he passively awaited the onset of his foes, +anticipating already impending ruin. Yet even at this moment, had he +been a general of a high order, he might perhaps have triumphed. I +have no space to describe the great day of Sadowa; it was, no doubt, +a splendid and decisive victory; but the operations of the Prussians +once more gave their enemy an advantage which he might have seized, and +turned to account with immense results. The First and Second Armies +remained still divided; for many hours on that eventful forenoon, an +almost insignificant force was opposed to the mass of the Austrian +army; and it was only when the Crown Prince reached the field, at about +2 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and was able to attack, that the chances of the battle +became equal, and that success was made even possible. Had Benedek at +any previous moment fallen in full force on Prince Frederick Charles, +it is difficult to suppose that the Austrian chief might not have, at +least, averted defeat.</p> + +<p>The campaign of Sadowa is a striking instance how generals who steadily +carry out ably a plan essentially faulty in itself may defeat a +commander who waits on his foe, and cannot take the initiative or seize +the occasion. In justice, however, to a departed veteran, let us say +that the Prussian army was, in most respects, very superior to that +arrayed against it; the Austrian army was crowded with discontented +levies; the Prussians, too, possessed a breech-loading rifle, the fire +of which had great effect, though it is idle to contend that it decided +the war; and these facts told in the final issue. As for the Prussian +strategy, it was not good. We can imagine the shades of Turenne and +Napoleon indignant that a violation of their art should have been +followed by ill-deserved success; and if Moltke really directed these +operations of 1866, his first essays in war are not admirable. The +movements, however, which led to Sadowa are almost identical with those +of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_285">[285]</span> Frederick in Bohemia in 1756–57; and I cannot help conjecturing +that King William—his reverence for his ancestor was a kind of +worship—was in a great measure their true author, though those of +Frederick have been condemned by Napoleon with no uncertain censure.</p> + +<p>After the events of 1866, it became apparent that Prussia and France +would ere long quarrel; and I must say a word on the preparations made +by the two Powers before the impending conflict, and on their military +resources when it at last broke out. Northern Germany was practically +added to Prussia; treaties were made with the Southern German States; +the unity of Germany for war was well-nigh accomplished; and the German +armies which could be brought into the field, more or less organized +on the Prussian model, reached the enormous number of a million of +men, 500,000 forming the first fighting line. Extraordinary attention, +moreover, was given to the improvement of the instrument of war which +had crushed the power of Austria in three weeks, and to the removal of +every defect which had been discovered in it. The “mobilization” was +made more effective; the experience of 1866 was turned to account to +make the evolutions of foot more quick and exact, and to adapt infantry +tactics to modern arms. Great pains were taken to reform the cavalry, +which had been scarcely equal to the fine squadrons of Austria, led +by the brilliant Edelsheim, and to give it celerity and strength in +the field; and the artillery, it may be said, was transformed, old +smooth-bore guns being finally condemned, and artillery tactics being +greatly changed by abandoning the system of huge reserves of guns—a +tradition of the Napoleonic era, but obsolete under the new conditions +of war—and by directing every battery that could be made available as +quickly as possible to the front of battle. By these means the Prussian +army of 1866 was expanded into the vast German army which overran +France from the Rhine to the Loire; and the hosts which triumphed at +Metz and Sedan were infinitely more formidable in all respects than +that which had overwhelmed Benedek.</p> + +<p>Let us now turn to the attitude of France, in view of the contest<span class="pagenum" id="Page_286">[286]</span> +known to be imminent. Napoleon III. and one or two French chiefs had +not failed to observe the immense increase of the military power +of Prussia and Germany; and they perceived how enormous was the +importance of the great trained reserve of the German system, which +had nothing corresponding to it in their own. The Emperor and Marshal +Niel accordingly proposed that the nominal reserves of the French +army—masses of men on paper—should be in some degree disciplined, +and that the Garde Mobile, a new force, should be formed; and had this +been effected the military power of France would have been largely +augmented, though it would have been still very inferior to that of +Germany. Tradition and faction, however, prevailed; a reform, of which +Napoleon had laid down the lines at St. Helena fifty years before, was +disregarded and not carried out; and the strength of France for war was +left as it was, that is, miserably weak compared to that of Germany. +This difference was in itself immense, but there were other differences +of perhaps equal moment. France was not prepared for a great modern +war; her military organization was out of joint; she had not had a good +Minister of War since Soult; her chiefs, formed for the most part in +Africa, had little strategic or scientific knowledge; she had nothing +resembling the Prussian Staff, the brain of the army, as it has well +been called; she had not in her service the perfect gradation of united +commands which was one secret of the success of Prussia in 1866. Her +whole military hierarchy, and all that depends on it was, therefore, +in far from a good state; her chiefs had no settled convictions in +war, and were divided upon the great question whether the offensive or +defensive was the better strategy; and, besides that it was weak and +without a real reserve, the condition of her army was very defective. +It was, no doubt, a fine professional army; but it had been injured by +the system of commuting service; it had many bad and worn-out soldiers; +it had not been practised in manœuvres in the field; it had not +anything like fixed rules of tactics; and though its infantry possessed +an excellent rifle, much better than the needle-gun of Prussia, and +its cavalry was a noble arm, its artillery was very<span class="pagenum" id="Page_287">[287]</span> inferior to that +of the Germans. The most marked distinction, however, between the two +nations in their capacity for a campaign has yet to be noted. The +railway system of Germany was designed for war; that of France was +formed on no such principle; the local system of Prussia made it quite +certain that the German army would be placed in the field more quickly +than that of France could be under her centralized and ill-arranged +system; and these two circumstances, little perceived at the time, were +of extreme if not of decisive importance.</p> + +<p>The general result of this state of things was that Germany could +“mobilize” and send into the field half a million of men, backed by +enormous reserves, well organized, disciplined, trained, and commanded, +within three weeks after a declaration of war; that France could hardly +assemble three hundred thousand soldiers, unsupported by any solid +reserve, ill-prepared, and under inefficient chiefs; and that, in point +of time, she would be far behind her enemy. There was no comparison, +therefore, between the two powers, and France had scarcely a chance of +success, though if her military strength had been well directed, she +need never have signed the Treaty of Frankfort. The conflict began in +July 1870. Napoleon III., the mere shadow of a mighty name, assumed +the command of the French armies, and his plan was to advance from +behind Metz and Strasbourg, to cross the Rhine between Spires and +Landau, and to interpose between the South and North German forces, +which, it was assumed, would not be ready in time, and divided. The +project, the Emperor has told us himself, was founded on that of his +uncle in 1815; but Moltke had foreseen and provided against it, and +it is useless to examine a mere scheme on paper, which was no sooner +conceived than it proved abortive. Napoleon III. calculated that he +would have 250,000 men round Metz and Strasbourg ready to march, with +50,000 in immediate reserve; but he had little administrative power +or resource; the existing system of France proved inefficient; her +organization for war broke down, the “mobilization” of her troops was +slow and partial, and when the Emperor reached Metz in the third week +of July, he had not assembled 200,000 soldiers, and these were hardly<span class="pagenum" id="Page_288">[288]</span> +in a state to take the field. This was very different from that prodigy +of skill, the concentration on the Sambre before Waterloo; and in these +circumstances, the unhappy sovereign ought to have renounced a hopeless +offensive, and to have placed his army on the line of the Moselle, +in order to defend the Vosges and Alsace, a course which Moltke +believed he would take. But the Emperor thought he had no choice. He +was goaded on by opinion in France; the folly of allowing politics to +master strategy, one main cause of the disasters that followed, had +already begun to produce its results; and he advanced to the frontier +with forces, compared to those of the Germans, pitiably weak, and but +ill-provided with all kinds of requirements. When he had attained +Alsace and the Sarre he paused, afraid to strike, but he felt that he +was not in nearly sufficient strength, and, waiting on his enemy, he +allowed his army to be disseminated upon a vast arc, extending from +Thionville to the gap of Belfort, and dangerously exposed along its +front.</p> + +<p>The conduct of Germany and of the German chiefs contrasted most +strikingly with this exhibition of maladministration, feebleness, +and incapacity for war. The contest, Frenchmen thought, was a mere +affair of “glory”; in Germany it caused a great national rising for +unity and independence, and to avenge Jena. The Teutonic race sprang +fiercely to arms; the feuds between North and South Germany ceased; the +orders for the “mobilization” of the German armies were carried out +with wonderful skill and precision, and more than 300,000 men, with +great reserves behind, were in a few days arrayed on the frontier, +an astonishing result of patriotism and organization for war, partly +due to a well-planned railway system. Three great armies were now +quickly formed. This time Moltke certainly had the general direction +of operations in the field, and he instantly assumed a determined +offensive. The situation dictated his plan; there was nothing original +in it, as has been said by flatterers. In fact, it was that of +Marlborough in 1705, and it had been actually laid down by Gneisenau; +it consisted, simply, in invading France from the Palatinate, along +her most exposed frontier, but it was executed in the main ably, and +with conspicuous forethought and vigour. <span class="pagenum" id="Page_289">[289]</span>The First Army, led by the +veteran Steinmetz, advanced from Treves towards the Lower Sarre; the +Second, under Prince Frederick Charles, moved from Mayence through the +German Vosges; and the Third, commanded by the Crown Prince of Prussia, +marched across the Rhine and attained the Lauter, the three masses +acting well in concert. The poor affair of Sarrebruck only quickened +the movement; and, in the first week of August, a great tempest of war +burst over the verge of Lorraine and Alsace. The first efforts of the +Germans were, no doubt, premature; Frossard might have gained some +success at Spicheren had he been seconded by the corps in his rear, +and the impatience of the invaders, and of one or two of their chiefs, +precipitated the well-fought battle of Wörth. Moltke, however, is not +to be blamed for this; he was far away from those scenes of action, and +his strategy completely attained his object, though his subordinates +made more than one mistake. As for Wörth, it does honour to the arms +of France; on that day 45,000 Frenchmen held double their number, for +hours, at bay; and the issue might have been very different had De +Failly come into line, as was possible. Macmahon, however, a soldier +but no chief, cannot escape blame for not having drawn off his troops +while retreat was still open and safe, especially when the great +superiority of the enemy in force and in artillery had become clearly +manifest.</p> + + <div class="figcenter" id="i_b_288fp"> + <img + class="p1" + src="images/i_b_288fp.jpg" + alt=""> + <p class="p0 sm center">Theatre of the<br> +CAMPAIGNS<br> +of 1870–71.</p> + </div> + +<p>Spicheren shattered the front of the French army—it had been named the +Army of the Rhine; and Wörth forced its right wing in confusion and +rout far to the south, in eccentric retreat, laying bare the defeated +centre and left. Napoleon III. fell back with his beaten forces; and +the next few days, big with the fate of France, witnessed a wretched +succession of divided counsels. It was proposed to attempt a stand on +the Nied, in Lorraine, to join Macmahon, or to call him up to Metz; +but all that was done was to retreat on the fortress, to cause a weak +reserve to advance from Châlons, and to impair the moral worth of the +French soldiery, when ill-led, never great in misfortune. Meanwhile, +the hosts of the invaders, largely reinforced, were moving slowly +through the passes of the Vosges; the First and Second Armies filling +the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_290">[290]</span> tracts between the Sarre, the Nied, and the Seille, the Third Army +far to the south, round Nancy; and, whatever may be said, ample time +was given to their enemy to make good a retreat westward. This movement +was not arranged until the 12th of August, a precious week having been +thrown away; and the Emperor handed over his command to Bazaine, a +chief, whose antecedents had, at best, been doubtful, with a general +direction to fall back on the Meuse. Moltke’s plan of operations became +now developed; the First Army was moved towards Metz, in order to +detain the retreating enemy; part of the Second Army was pushed across +the Moselle, its march screened with remarkable skill; and the Third +Army made a step westward, the object being to force the Army of the +Rhine into the north of France, and to cut it off from Paris.</p> + +<p>Steinmetz attacked Bazaine on the 14th of August. The battle was stern +and well contested; but it kept the French back for a whole day, and +it facilitated, as was intended, the forward movement of the Second +and Third Armies, which was Moltke’s object. A great mistake, however, +was here made; the German chief believed that the Army of the Rhine +was already far to the north of Metz; but Bazaine was moving directly +westward, and on the evening of the 15th he had his whole army, at +least 140,000 strong, concentrated along the roads that lead from Metz +to Verdun, by Mars La Tour and Etain. One German corps only was on +the spot; Prince Frederick Charles, no doubt unaware of the immense +superiority of his enemy in force, attacked on the morning of the +16th; and had Bazaine had any skill in war, he ought to have swept his +assailant from his path. The Marshal, however, could not handle an +army; he kept the Imperial Guard inactive near Metz, he made little +use of two of his corps; the hard pressed Germans were reinforced by +degrees; a magnificent effort of the German cavalry had a marked effect +on the fortunes of the day; and evening fell on a scene of carnage, +in which neither side could lay a claim to victory. The result proved +the ascendency won by the Germans, and was for them a splendid passage +of arms; but the effects of Moltke’s error were not yet got over—it +was like that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_291">[291]</span> of Napoleon before Auerstadt—for, as I have remarked, +the campaign of 1870 resembles that of Jena in many respects; he had +not 80,000 men in hand, and Bazaine had still a strategic advantage, +from which a real chief would have at least plucked safety. As Prince +Frederick Charles has said, he should have attacked on the 17th; and in +that event he ought to have won a battle, or, at all events, have made +good his way to Verdun, a result which would have given a new turn to +the war. A much grander game, however, was open to him; and a German +commentator—Moltke, I suspect—has remarked that Napoleon would have +played it, and have perhaps gained important success. On this day, a +decisive moment in the campaign, the First Army was still east of Metz; +the Second Army was partly west of the Moselle; the Third Army was +leagues away to the south; and the communications of the invaders would +be dangerously exposed, could an enemy descend from Metz on Nancy. Had +Bazaine, therefore, fallen back on the fortress, and issued from it in +force on the 18th, advancing between the Moselle and the Seille, he +ought to have been able to seize and hold the line of operations of +the hostile armies, and the consequences must have been very great. +He might have stopped the invasion, perhaps for weeks; he would have +certainly saved himself and his army, and the situation would have been +wholly changed.</p> + +<p>Unhappily for France, she had not a captain who could seize the one +great occasion given by Fortune in the first part of the war of +1870–71. Bazaine, a soldier fit to command a division, but utterly +unable to direct large masses, had experience of the power of modern +arms, and he had a fixed belief that mere defensive tactics were the +means to assure success in battle. He resolved, therefore, to stand +and to fight; and he arranged his forces, still 120,000 strong, along +a range of uplands, from near Metz on the left to St. Privat and +Roncourt on the right, which formed a fine position for a passive +defence, the system on which the Marshal relied. Moltke, on the 17th, +drew together the greater part of the First and Second Armies across +the Moselle; the huge masses, probably 210,000 men, were west of Metz +on the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_292">[292]</span> morning of the 18th, intercepting, a retreat to the Meuse and +Verdun; but, strange as it may appear, the German commander was still +ill-informed of his enemy’s movements; he believed that Bazaine was +falling back northwards, and when he discovered where the French were, +he was convinced, for some hours, that the positions they held did not +extend nearly as far as Roncourt. This and other mistakes dispose of +the theory that Moltke is a kind of Providence on the field, gravely +asserted by certain worshippers of success, and tend to show that +German reconnoitring may be less perfect than has been said; but fools +only can claim omniscience for chiefs; and, in fact, under the new +conditions of war, with its vast operations and its immense battles, +the ablest captains will fall into error more frequently than has been +the case formerly.</p> + +<p>Partly owing to the miscalculations of the German leader, and partly +to tactics essentially false, the tremendous battle of the 18th of +August—known to history by the name of Gravelotte—was undecided up +to the last moment, large as was the superiority of Moltke’s forces. +The assailants, thinking they were turning the French right, fell +in front on the centre strongly entrenched, and failed to make the +slightest impression on it; Steinmetz, on the German right, made +repeated charges, in the close columns of the days of his youth, and +the First Army suffered enormous losses. The Prussian Guard, too, were +cruelly stricken in an attempt to carry St. Privat by storm; indeed, +until near nightfall, the Army of the Rhine had a marked advantage +along the whole line of battle; and had it been able to make a grand +counter-attack, especially when the right of its foe was shattered, +it not improbably would have achieved success. At last, however, the +inherent vices of a passive defence became manifest; the German chiefs, +given the offensive all through, and allowed to search the positions +of the French everywhere, brought their masses to bear against the +extreme French right; Roncourt was carried by a great turning movement; +the whole position became untenable, and the French army gradually +fell back on Metz. Yet no doubt can now exist that had Bazaine been +a capable chief on that terrible day, the battle would have been at +least drawn, inferior as were his<span class="pagenum" id="Page_293">[293]</span> troops in numbers, and, in some +degree, disheartened by defeat. Had the Imperial Guard, as was quite +possible, been moved to the aid of the French right, the last effort of +the Germans must have failed; and in that event the contending armies +would have retained their places on the field unchanged. The Marshal, +however, unequal to his task, and thinking only of merely holding his +ground, kept this noble reserve near Metz unengaged; and 20,000 men +were left out of the struggle who could have turned the balance in the +scales of Fortune. Gravelotte, in truth, is a notable instance how a +resolute offensive, even though ill-conducted, may, notwithstanding the +arms of the age, prevail over passive tactics of defence; the attack +on the French right, made at the last moment, after many mistakes, +gained decisive success; and all the efforts of an army which had not +the means to attempt at any time a counter-attack, and simply waited +in position on its foes, proved ultimately fruitless, though for +hours hopeful. The battle, the student of war will note, has a strong +resemblance to that of Malplaquet; but the operations of the Germans +are not to be compared in skill to those of Marlborough and Eugene; +and the tricolour was defended by a very different chief from the +illustrious warrior who upheld the lilies.</p> + +<p>Within two or three days after Gravelotte, the German armies had closed +around Metz and the army of Bazaine, which had clung to the fortress. +The left wing and centre of the whole French army were thus, so to +speak, removed from the theatre, at least for active operations in +the field; and, notwithstanding mistakes and shortcomings, the plan +of Moltke, if not realised, had been attended with more than expected +success. The right wing, half destroyed at Wörth, remained, and we turn +to the movements of this force, on which the fortune of France for the +time depended. Macmahon had been joined by De Failly and his troops, +by the corps which had been placed at Belfort, and by a new corps +despatched from the capital; and by the 20th of August the collected +array, numbering from 120,000 to 130,000 men, was assembled around the +great camp of Châlons. The Marshal was in supreme command; he properly +resolved to keep the only army now left to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_294">[294]</span> France to defend Paris; but +as Bazaine conceivably might be not distant, he marched on the 21st +to Rheims, holding a position on the flank of the German invasion, +and in the hope that his brother chief might approach, but with the +determination to fall back on the capital. This was in conformity with +the principles of war; and had Macmahon kept firm to his purpose, the +catastrophe that followed would not have happened, and France would not +have mourned for the extreme of disaster. Unfortunately, however, the +Duke of Magenta, a hero in the field but a weak man—the character is +by no means uncommon—was led astray by pernicious counsels; Palikao, +a new Minister of War, whose chief thought was for the tottering +Empire, and to satisfy the desires of Paris, insisted that Metz must +be relieved; and he urged Macmahon to advance to the Meuse, to slip +outside the flank of the hostile armies, and descending from Montmédy +on the beleaguered fortresses, to join hands with and to extricate +Bazaine, and to strike a bold stroke for a decisive victory. In an evil +hour for France and himself, the marshal gave ear to a fatal project, +as reckless as ever was made in war; for the march to the Meuse, and +thence as far as Metz, would be a flank march of the most hazardous +kind, the enemy holding the chord of the arc; it would be a march +perilously near the Belgian frontier, where a lost battle would mean +ruin; it was a march to be made by an enfeebled army in the midst of +the victorious Germans, threefold in numbers; above all, it was a march +which would draw away from Paris, the centre and vital point of the +national defence, the only organized force that remained to protect +it. Macmahon, it is said, was still doubting—he knew that the course +proposed was insensate, not strategy, but the throw of a gambler—when +an ambiguous message sent by Bazaine, and implying that he was on +his way from Metz northwards, at last caused the luckless commander +to yield. Once more the plainest military rules were sacrificed to +political ends; and once more Bellona, who brooks no rival, was, so to +speak, challenged and wildly provoked. The army of Châlons broke up +from Rheims on the 23rd, and it was on the Upper Aisne on the 25th, +approaching the region of defiles and forests, which extends from<span class="pagenum" id="Page_295">[295]</span> the +Ardennes to the Meuse. Macmahon spared no effort to make the movement +rapid, for celerity he knew was his only chance; but the march of his +army became slow, and by the 27th it was still far from the Meuse, in +the tract between Tourteron, Le Chêne, and Buzancy. It had already +begun to shows signs of weakness; it was ill-provided and badly +organized; the soldiers were discontented and ill-disciplined, and the +mind of its chief was full of misgivings.</p> + +<p>I proceed to the operations of the German armies, very different +from those of their ill-directed enemies. The main body of the First +and Second Armies was required for the investment of Metz; but three +corps, called the Army of the Meuse, were detached to co-operate with +the Third Army, by this time west of the Moselle, in the borderlands +of Lorraine and Champagne; and the converging masses, 230,000 strong, +advanced steadily upon a broad front towards the heads of the Marne and +the great roads to Paris. By the 24th of August, the cavalry outposts +which preceded the movement had ascertained that the Army of Châlons +had left Rheims, and was on its way to the Aisne eastward; but Moltke +refused for some time to credit the rumour that it was making for +Metz, for this, he rightly thought, would be the height of folly. He +learned the truth, however, positively on the 25th, and his resolution +was formed with that prompt decision which is a characteristic of real +chiefs, and has been exhibited by him at grave crises. The measures he +took to baffle Palikao’s scheme were not wonders of genius, as has been +said by flatterers, but they show true insight, and most comprehensive +judgment; and they were carried out with consummate skill. The Army of +the Meuse was directed to recross the river; two corps were detached +from Metz to join it, and to stop Macmahon should he get near the +fortress; and the Third Army was ordered to advance northwards through +the district of the Argonnes and the Ardennes—the scene of the +campaign of Valmy—and to gather on the flank and rear of the Army of +Châlons, which would thus be placed in a difficult strait at least. +The execution of this fine strategic movement was admirable in the +highest degree; the great invading hosts, ruled by one<span class="pagenum" id="Page_296">[296]</span> master’s will, +well-led, supplied, and trained for the field, marched with speed and +precision through an intricate country, and the careful preparation, +the organization for war, the perfect unity and gradation of command, +and the intelligence of the individual soldier, which are distinctive +marks of the army of Prussia, were made fully and grandly manifest.</p> + +<p>By the 27th of August the German squadrons were gathering rapidly upon +their foes; Macmahon, though without the least notion of the enormous +force that was closing round him, perceived that his army was in grave +peril, and he gave orders for a retreat on Mézières, hoping to attain +Paris by a march from the frontier. For the second time, however, the +incapable chief succumbed to the temptation he should have spurned. A +message, that “revolution would break out should Bazaine be abandoned +at Metz,” induced him to continue the advance to the Meuse, and to +court the ruin which he knew was probable; and it is but just to +observe that Napoleon III.—he accompanied the Marshal since he had +left Châlons—protested against conduct which was almost criminal.<a id="FNanchor_31" href="#Footnote_31" class="fnanchor">[31]</a> +Macmahon now tried to make a forced march; his army was divided into +two great columns, in order to make its movements rapid, and the +first column reached the river safely, and had crossed it by the 29th +of August. The second column, however, was far to the south, and +separated by a full march from the first; it was largely composed of +beaten troops, already desponding, nay, half-mutinous; it was charged +with <i>impedimenta</i> of all kinds, and it toiled slowly through +the passes and thickets it had to traverse on its way to the Meuse. +This gave Moltke the opportunity to strike; the Army of the Meuse was +recalled to the west of the stream, the two corps from Metz having +been sent back; a part of the Third Army was pushed forward, and the +Germans fell with terrible effect on their enemies, caught in flank +and surprised, at Beaumont and other places in their march. The second +column was routed with immense loss; it reached the Meuse a mere<span class="pagenum" id="Page_297">[297]</span> +shattered wreck, pursued by the indefatigable Prussian horsemen; and +its ruin involved a part of the first column, which crossed the river +to give it support. By the evening of the 30th the Army of Châlons, one +corps of it as far as Carignan, was on the eastern bank of the Meuse, +but half of the French troops were a demoralized mass; and the German +advanced guards were already at hand, in close communication with the +hosts in their rear.</p> + +<p>Macmahon, at this time, was at Carignan; he confidently expected that +he would reach Metz; he boasted, it is said, that victory was at hand. +The news of the events of the 30th dispelled these dreams; he hurriedly +fell back with his one intact corps, and by the morning of the 31st +he had assembled the still large, but beaten, Army of Châlons in the +tract that surrounds the fortress and town of Sedan. The state of the +French troops was of the worst omen; but an occasion was still open +to a great chief, to extricate them from impending ruin. Mézières was +not distant, and a French corps had reached the place to support the +Marshal; the Meuse spread between his army and the foe, and had he +left his <i>impedimenta</i> behind, and made a rapid march, without +the loss of an hour, he would certainly have escaped with the great +mass of his forces. It is this circumstance which makes the strategy +of Moltke inferior, fine as it was, to that which shut up Mack in +Ulm; and the Grand Army, it will be borne in mind, had been saved on +the Beresina when in far worse straits. Macmahon, however, would not +stir from Sedan; there is reason to believe he never knew the immense +strength of the hostile force, and he arrayed his army, “ready,” he +said, “to fight,” along the uplands, encircled by streams and villages, +which overlook Sedan and the valley below. The evening of the 31st had +come; the German horsemen made the situation known; and Moltke, who up +to this time had only hoped that he might succeed in forcing his enemy +across the frontier, saw that he could reckon on a decisive triumph. +Orders were issued for an immediate night march; the great German +divisions, perfectly led, and the men scenting approaching victory, +moved rapidly over the space between, and preparations were made to +assail and surround the feeble and shattered Army of Châlons.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_298">[298]</span></p> + +<p>It is unnecessary to retrace the scenes of Sedan, the just retribution +of foolishness in command, a battle decreed by Fate, in its irony, +to be fought around the birthplace of Turenne. The French were first +attacked, on that fatal morning, on their southern and eastern front +towards the Chiers; and they made for a time a gallant resistance, +though the fall of Macmahon and a squabble between two of his +lieutenants had a bad effect on the troops. By degrees, however, the +overwhelming pressure of forces immensely superior told; the line +of defence on the Givonne was carried; and the French were driven +back, on Sedan, routed, and huddled around the walls of the fortress. +Meanwhile a tremendous attack had been made on the northern and +western fronts of the defence; the Germans advancing to the heights +of Illy, and moving from the opposite side round the bend of the +Meuse, which half encircles the outskirts of Sedan, closed gradually +round their doomed foes; and though the French cavalry made heroic +efforts, and one corps nobly struggled to the last, it was impossible +to withstand overpowering numbers. The last remains of the Army of +Châlons were forced, like the first, against the fortress; the German +artillery—throughout the campaign it had proved an arm of enormous +strength—was brought to bear in masses on the perishing wreck; the +fire of 500 pieces searched the scene of carnage; and a white flag soon +announced that resistance, no longer possible, had completely ceased. +Within a few hours 85,000 men, the survivors of more than 120,000, the +victims of worse than insensate leading, were a collection of helpless +prisoners of war; and their cries of impotent fury and despair—this +was the attitude of by far the greater part—only provoked the pitying +scorn of the victors.</p> + +<p>This immense disaster, added to that of Metz, all but destroyed the +military power of Imperial France on the theatre of war. Moltke had +acted harshly at the capitulation of Sedan; he had no respect for the +French character; like Hannibal and Napoleon, he treated the force of +patriotic passion with contempt; and, leaving a considerable detachment +behind, he directed an immediate advance on Paris. The German armies +rolled steadily onward,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_299">[299]</span> through the valleys of the Aisne, the Oise, +and the Marne, masking fortresses and occupying points on their way; +and they appeared before the capital on the 19th of September, the +chiefs convinced they would meet no resistance. Their expectations +seemed about to be realised; an attempt to assail the invaders in +flank, as they gathered upon the uplands south of the Seine, was +easily defeated, and had bad results; and the Germans were permitted, +without a further effort, to surround and invest the beleaguered +city. Their lines, constructed with skill and forethought, spread on +a circumference of great extent, from the confluence of the Seine and +the Marne, by St. Denis, round through Versailles to Bonneuil; and +though the besieging forces were at this moment not 150,000 strong, no +doubt existed in the German camp—it was, indeed, the general belief of +Europe—that a few days would see the surrender of Paris.</p> + +<p>Weeks, however, passed, and it became apparent that this calculation +was a complete error. The Empire had fallen on the 4th of September; a +Government of national defence had been formed; and this Revolution, +in the main caused by the passionate wrath of the great mass of the +citizens, quickened the general resolve that the capital should hold +out, and confront the power of the German armies. Preparations had been +made to stand a siege; immense supplies of provisions had been stored; +the <i>enceinte</i> and the forts which protect the city had been +hastily manned and armed; enormous bodies of men had been assembled to +take part in the defence of the place; these were supported by a corps +of trained soldiers, and by the corps which had appeared at Mézières, +and had been brought back after a skilful retreat; and though these +arrangements were rude and imperfect, the strength of the city to +resist attack was infinitely greater than Moltke had supposed. Sorties +began to be made by degrees; these, though always repulsed, were not +contemptible; the armament of the forts was completed; redoubts and +entrenchments rose at many points to strengthen and to perfect the +zone of defence; the citizens, warlike in all ages, though in peace +addicted to pleasure and ease, acquired gradually something like +discipline; the materials at least of armies were formed, and Paris +assumed the aspect of a huge fortified<span class="pagenum" id="Page_300">[300]</span> camp, with a garrison certainly +immense in numbers. Moltke took pains to secure his position; he +tacitly admitted that he had made a mistake in marching on the capital +without having his communications or his base assured, and with forces +comparatively small; but he held his ground with determined constancy; +he summoned reinforcements to head-quarters, and several corps were +employed in besieging Strasbourg and other strongholds on the way +from the frontier, and in overrunning Burgundy and Franche Comté. The +front and lines of the invasion were thus strengthened; and, though +time had passed, the submission of France was held to be a fact of +the immediate future. The German chief was to be again deceived, as +many warriors had been before, in his estimate of a people, great and +heroic, despite of many national faults and failings. It is all very +well for the Prussian Staff to sneer at Gambetta, as it has done in its +book; but he was a man of great powers, if of real shortcomings; and +he was but the most striking figure of millions of Frenchmen. A great +and sudden national rising took place; it was more spontaneous than +that of 1793; in an incredibly short time 250,000 men were in arms to +resist the German hosts; and by making use of the resources of France +for war—old soldiers, troops in depôts, and reserves—vast arrays were +mustered, which at least contained the elements of real military power. +These levies, of course, were bad soldiers, but they were formidable +in numbers and in aptitude for war; and, whatever may be said, the +position of Moltke had become critical as October was closing; the +German armies were, for the most part, engaged on the investment of +Paris and to the east of Metz; they were conquerors, and had all the +power of success; but they were exposed to attack from within and +without at the centres to which they were, as it were, bound; and they +were in the midst of an immense insurrection spreading all round.</p> + +<p>At this conjuncture, a great disaster showed that Fortune was still +most adverse to France. Bazaine had been shut up since Gravelotte +at Metz; he had kept his army almost inactive, and he had made no +real effort to break the investment. I cannot examine the crooked +intrigues in which he played an ignoble part;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_301">[301]</span> but he surrendered the +great fortress on the 28th of October, and the world beheld the most +disgraceful capitulation ever known in war. Even on his pitiful system +of passive defence, the Marshal did not nearly do his duty; the place +could have held out a fortnight longer, and the respite would have +been of extreme importance. The First and Second Armies were now set +free to take part in the great invasion; several corps were sent to +the north, to crush levies formed in Normandy and other provinces. One +was despatched to support the siege; and the remainder, under Prince +Frederick Charles, held the tract between the heads of the Seine +and Burgundy. The grasp of the Germans on France was thus greatly +strengthened; yet the position of Moltke was so unsafe that it was +endangered by a single trifling reverse. An army, partly composed of +good troops, but in the main of improvised levies, had been assembled +south of the Loire; it had been placed in the hands of D’Aurelle, +a veteran of real organizing skill, and in a few weeks it numbered +60,000 men, and had acquired something like military worth and power. +A Bavarian detachment, perhaps 20,000 strong, and a division under the +Grand-Duke of Mecklenburg, sent off to put down insurrection in the +west, were the only hostile forces between this large mass of Frenchmen +and the lines round Paris; and D’Aurelle, aided by a young chief, +Chanzy, who was to prove that France had yet real captains, resolved +to attack the Bavarians and to retake Orleans, which had fallen into +the enemy’s hands. The Army of the Loire broke up from its camps, +and crossed the river in the first days in November; it fell on the +Bavarians near the little town of Coulmiers. Had the orders of Chanzy +been well carried out, and a turning movement been completed in time, +the invaders must have been utterly routed; but, as it was, they were +beaten with loss; and they were compelled to fall back on the roads to +Paris, abandoning Orleans and the adjoining region.</p> + +<p>When this intelligence arrived, unfeigned alarm prevailed at the +German head-quarters at Versailles; the besiegers were threatened +by an army of relief, and by the unknown multitudes of armed men in +Paris; and disseminated as they were<span class="pagenum" id="Page_302">[302]</span> on an immense circumference, +they were in a situation of no common peril. Moltke made up his mind, +as became a true chief; he despatched pressing orders to Prince +Frederick Charles to hasten to the capital by forced marches; and, like +Bonaparte before Mantua—a Journal, said to be his, alludes to this—he +resolved, whatever the result, to raise the siege should the Army of +the Loire appear from the south. This single circumstance shows how +precarious the position of the Germans had become; and had D’Aurelle +boldly followed up his success the consequences to France might have +been momentous. Chanzy, it is known, was for the more daring course; +Napoleon would have taken it, I cannot doubt; and though it is idle to +speculate now, the siege would certainly have been given up and the +war would have taken a different turn. D’Aurelle, however, refused +to advance; he constructed a great entrenched camp near Orleans; and +here he increased and trained his levies, hoping before long to resume +the offensive. This, probably, was too great caution; but there were +reasons for the step of real weight. Prince Frederick Charles was but +a few marches off, and should he reach the flank of the Army of the +Loire, on its way to the capital, he would perhaps destroy the best +organized force possessed by France. This clearly shows that had Metz +resisted, and detained the Prince only a few days longer, the French +chief would have had, and perhaps would have seized, an admirable +occasion offered by Fortune; and, indeed, a German writer has drily +remarked that “the capitulation came in the very nick of time.”</p> + +<p>The victory of Coulmiers sent a thrill through France, enormously +increased the power of Gambetta, and caused levies to flock to the war +in thousands. Notwithstanding the fall of Metz, and all that followed +from it, the situation of the Germans was still critical; and owing to +the undoubted strategic mistake of marching on Paris with too weak a +force, their movements had been incoherent, and far from masterly. By +the close of November the Great City had formed three armies out of +her armed multitudes; and two of them, probably 150,000 strong, had +acquired a certain degree of efficiency; the third, perhaps 200,000<span class="pagenum" id="Page_303">[303]</span> +men, being only fit to defend the ramparts. I cannot describe the +great sortie which followed; Ducrot crossed the Marne and carried +two villages, which had been made part of the besiegers’ lines; but +ultimately he was compelled to retreat; and, in fact, the effort was +doomed to failure, for the zone of investment and the zone of defence +had by this time become all but impregnable, or could be mastered only +by the art of the engineer. The sortie from Paris was contemporaneous +with an advance of the army of D’Aurelle’s northwards; but here +Gambetta unhappily intervened, and his meddling and presumption did +enormous mischief. The young civilian had done, no doubt, great things, +but since Coulmiers, he had become a kind of Dictator—the history +of France has too many examples how foolish hero-worship has such +results—he insisted that the Army of the Loire should make for the +capital, whatever the risk, though Prince Frederick Charles was near +at hand; and, as he had made that army 150,000 strong, he refused to +believe that there was serious danger. D’Aurelle and Chanzy protested +in vain; two detached corps of the Army of the Loire were directed +against Prince Frederick Charles, and were easily defeated by an +inferior force; and the Prince, a chief of a very high order, made +immediate preparations for a great counter-stroke. The Grand Duke and +the Bavarians had been approaching; he quickly united these forces to +his own, and he bore down in irresistible strength on the army, mainly +of recruits, opposed to him. The centre of the Army of the Loire was +broken; its wings fell off in eccentric retreat; one part was driven +across the river, and the triumphant invaders re-entered Orleans, +having gained rapid and complete success. By the first days of December +it had become apparent that Paris could not burst the chain cast around +her; and the army had been shattered which had been employed, unwisely +at the moment, as an army of relief.</p> + +<p>The prospect for France was dark and mournful; but light shone at +one point on the gloomy scene. D’Aurelle had been unjustly dismissed +by Gambetta; and the part of his defeated army which had crossed the +Loire had been placed in the hands of Bourbaki, the chief of the late +Imperial Guard. Chanzy, however, commanded the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_304">[304]</span> remaining part; and a +series of operations followed which show that he had real genius in +war. He was attacked by the Grand Duke in all the flush of victory; but +he had been reinforced by Gambetta’s orders; he took a strong position, +covering both his flanks; and then with true insight he assumed the +offensive, essential in the case of French soldiers; and, on the whole, +he obtained some success. Prince Frederick Charles now fiercely turned +against him; he concentrated all his available forces; but Chanzy +made a magnificent stand; and his conduct deserves the very highest +praise. Perceiving that the relief of Paris should be the true object +of the French armies in the field, he fell back from the Loire to the +Sarthe, drawing toward the capital with great skill; and in this he +showed that he was a real strategist. Nor was he less admirable as a +tactician; he continually, in retreat, took an offensive attitude; he +turned defensive positions to the best account, and he contrived that +the superiority of the French rifle should tell with full effect on +the advancing enemy. Prince Frederick Charles pursued in vain; Chanzy +made good his way to Le Mans; he was nearer to Paris than when he had +left the Loire; his army had not been once beaten; and the Germans +were not only worn out, but showed signs of demoralization and fear, +for thousands had perished to no purpose; the hardships of the winter +campaign had been frightful; and it seemed impossible to overcome the +enemy.<a id="FNanchor_32" href="#Footnote_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a></p> + +<p>A pause in the conflict now occurred, to the astonishment of Europe, +still doubtful—a war of races, in which colossal force was confronted +by a national rising. The Germans were still, for the most part, +victorious; their armies surrounded imprisoned Paris; they had mastered +most of the fortresses of France, proved to be of little use in the +struggle; and they had made their lines of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_305">[305]</span> operations secure, and +had overrun a full third of the country. But Chanzy was in the field +unconquered; Faidherbe, a commander of real gifts, had admirably +conducted a campaign in the north, attacking the invaders when he +saw a chance, and falling back on the strongholds of the Somme; +Bourbaki was at the head of a great force, continually increasing, +on the Middle Loire; and France had realised her proud boast that +she had but “to stamp her foot, and legions would spring from the +earth at her bidding.” Grave<a id="FNanchor_33" href="#Footnote_33" class="fnanchor">[33]</a> anxiety was felt at head-quarters at +Versailles, spite of noisy boasting of German triumphs; and Moltke, +reading the facts with a true general’s eye, insisted on having large +reinforcements to strengthen the wearied and thinned invaders. Troops +in tens of thousands from the trained reserves of Germany were called +into the field; shrunken regiments and corps were restored in numbers; +new corps entered the east of France, and preparations were made on +an immense scale to quicken, by a bombardment, the fall of Paris. The +organization of the German armies, though strained to the utmost, bore +the test; and if the trials of the war had told heavily on the young +soldiers who crowded the ranks, a fierce national passion still upheld +the invasion. Moltke made excellent use of these new forces. Up to this +time, his movements had suffered from the effects of the premature +advance on Paris; but the error was now completely rectified, and his +dispositions were able in the extreme. Keeping his grasp on the capital +with stern tenacity, he so distributed his corps on the theatre of +war that a far-spreading external zone of resistance protected the +inner zone of investment; and should an attempt, therefore, be made +to relieve Paris, he would have a double set of armies to oppose the +French and interior lines on the whole circumference. Secure within +this circle, he defied the enemy, but he was ready at all points to +take a bold offensive, and he eschewed the whole system of mere passive +defence. The exertions of France were also prodigious. Independently +of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_306">[306]</span> Parisian forces, she had placed 500,000 men in the field, with +from 1,300 to 1,400 guns, and history, despite the Prussian staff, will +pronounce this a gigantic effort. These levies, however, were most +inferior troops. They were no match for their trained adversaries; they +were not equal to long marches, and at this supreme moment they were +wrongly directed. Chanzy, the master-spirit of the national defence, +saw what the situation was, and what it required; he appreciated the +ability of Moltke’s strategy; but even now he did not despair of +success, and in a despatch, marked with true insight in war, he urged +that all the provincial armies should endeavour to combine and march +on the capital, which, in turn, should fiercely attack the besiegers. +This last effort would, I believe, have failed; but it was the true +course and perfectly conceived; and it was that which Moltke expected +and feared. Unhappily for France, Gambetta rejected the counsels of +her most distinguished soldier, and, giving ear to a silly theorist, +he adopted a plan for the operations at hand, false in principle and, +as facts stood, ruinous. At this moment Werder, in the east of France, +was engaged with his corps in the siege of Belfort; the garrison was +making a firm stand; Bourbaki, in command of his large army, was in +the Nivernais, on the verge of Burgundy; Garibaldi had a motley array +near Dijon, and a large army was ready to march from the south. In this +state of affairs, instead of directing all the forces of France in a +march on Paris, Gambetta resolved to make a great effect to relieve +Belfort and to enter Alsace. For this purpose the collective forces of +Bourbaki, Garibaldi, and the south were to join, and the result, it +was hoped, would place the French armies on the communications of the +invaders from the Rhine, and would have great and glorious results. +This plan, strikingly resembling those of Carnot in 1793–1794, was, +even in the abstract, misconceived; the detachment to the east of the +French armies would expose and isolate Chanzy on the west, and even +were the communications of the Germans reached, this would be at a +point too remote to relieve Paris, or seriously to affect the issue +of the campaign. But, in the actual state of affairs, the project was +little less than foolishness; the armies intended<span class="pagenum" id="Page_307">[307]</span> to relieve Belfort +and to attain Alsace were not equal to a great operation of real +danger, and the scheme in truth was of much the same kind as that which +had led to the catastrophe of Sedan.</p> + +<p>In the last days of December, Bourbaki’s army set off from the +Nivernais to reach Franche Comté. The march of the columns was pitiably +slow; the troops suffered terribly from cold and disease; and signs of +evil omen had become manifest long before Belfort had been approached. +This eccentric movement set the Grand Duke and Prince Frederick Charles +completely free to attack Chanzy upon the Sarthe; and the German +chiefs, who had had their forces recruited to a very large extent, +broke up from Chartres, Nogent le Rotrou, and Orleans, and bore down +on the French commander, advancing on an ever narrowing front. Chanzy +had detached flying columns to observe the enemy; these fell back as +the assailants drew near; and the French army, by the 10th of January, +was concentrated within its lines at Le Mans, which had been fortified +with skill and care. A fierce and protracted struggle followed; +Chanzy, very different from the incapable Bazaine, really did wonders +with his raw young troops; but, at nightfall on the 11th, his extreme +right was turned by a desperate effort of Prince Frederick Charles. +He evacuated Le Mans, and lost thousands of prisoners; but he made +good his way to the Mayenne; and here he still kept his foes at bay, +having in his retreat drawn nearer Paris. He was still full of hope, +and wrote in that sense; but before long a tremendous disaster befell +the ill-fated forces of France in the east. Bourbaki was joined by a +part of Garibaldi’s troops, and by the army moving from the south; and +with this force, fully 130,000 strong, he crossed the Ognon, and almost +reached Belfort. He was, however, defeated with ease by Werder, with a +force very inferior in numbers; and, after one or two fruitless efforts +to outmanœuvre his victorious enemy, he fell back baffled, and made for +Besançon. Here he gave up his command, and tried to commit suicide; his +ruined army continued to retreat, but Moltke saw that his opportunity +had come and he turned it to account, with great skill and decision. +Three<span class="pagenum" id="Page_308">[308]</span> corps were detached from the external zone; Manteuffel, at the +head of them, bore down on the enemy; Werder, with part of his corps, +pressed forward from Belfort; and Bourbaki’s whole army, under its new +chief, Clinchant, was surrounded and driven across the Swiss frontier. +This was the end of Gambetta’s ambitious enterprise, which alike had +caused the defeat of Chanzy and had ruined the last hope of success for +the provincial armies.</p> + +<p>It fared almost as ill with France in the north, on the theatre where +Faidherbe conducted the war. That skilful officer had continued the +game of harassing the enemy, and falling back; and he had even fought +a battle at Bapaume, which he had some right to describe as a victory. +But about the middle of January he advanced towards St. Quentin, in the +hope, it is supposed, of either relieving Paris, or of making eastward +towards Bourbaki’s army. Moltke sent off a corps from the zone of +investment, and defeated him with considerable loss; and, though he +effected his retreat to Lille, his forces were for the time paralyzed. +The military strength of France outside Paris was thus rendered almost +powerless; Moltke had made the best use of his interior lines, on a +great and complex field of manœuvre; and the false direction given to +Bourbaki’s army had practically decided the contest in the field. The +proud capital alone remained; and invincible famine was already at +hand. In the first days of January the bombardment began; for fully +three weeks shot and shell crashed through all parts of the beleaguered +city; but no impression was made on the <i>enceinte</i> or the forts, +and still less on the great mass of the citizens. The attack, in fact, +altogether failed; it does no credit to the German Engineers, and it +attests Moltke’s dislike of Frenchmen; and it must be condemned as +barbarous warfare, for it was known that Paris must ere long surrender. +Towards the end of the month the end came; a last sortie for the honour +of arms was easily repulsed with great slaughter; and on the 28th of +January 1871 the capitulation was signed. German horsemen defiled under +the Arch of the Star, a monument to the Grand Army, as the Guards of +Napoleon had passed through Berlin; the tricolour has been plucked +down from Metz and Strasbourg;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_309">[309]</span> and France mourns the calamitous Peace +of Frankfort. Yet the defence of Paris, and the efforts made by the +improvised armies of Chanzy and Faidherbe, were exploits worthy of a +great nation; in the hour of misfortune France may say, like her king, +that she has not lost honour; the resistance she made, all things +considered, was grander than that of 1793, and it has redeemed the +ignominy of Metz and Sedan.</p> + +<p>The success of the conquerors in this gigantic war is the greatest, +perhaps, recorded in history. The Imperial Army of France was carried +away captive; her improvised armies were nearly half destroyed; her +fortresses yielded one after another; her capital held out, but +succumbed to famine. The theme is a fine idol for the worshippers of +success; and Moltke has been held up to the admiration of mankind as +the greatest military genius in the annals of war. Yet, if we calmly +examine the course of the contest, we perceive that the operations of +the German chief do not reveal one grand strategic conception, and are +characterized by several grave errors; they exhibit science, decision, +and strength of character, and perfect execution of the thoughts of +others, not originality, or “the faultlessness” claimed for them. +Moltke—and this does not detract from his fame—owed much to his +foes, and much to fortune; Bazaine and MacMahon, in different ways, +sink to the level of the Soubises and Clermonts; the fall of Metz was +a godsend to Germany; but Chanzy was a warrior of real powers; he kept +the issue of the struggle long doubtful, and had he had the supreme +control of the forces of France, it is impossible to say what might not +have happened. Some of the lessons taught by the war are commonplace; +well-organized armies, of overwhelming strength, defeat armies inferior +in every respect; trained and disciplined troops beat raw levies; +disaster is all but certain to follow when the simplest rules of the +military art are disregarded for supposed reasons of State. Two great +facts, however, require special notice; the German armies are the most +formidable which have ever appeared in the modern world; there is an +element of weakness in their young soldiers, but they represent a +mighty race in arms, ready at any moment to march on to conquest; and +this<span class="pagenum" id="Page_310">[310]</span> has been the result of years of training. On the other hand, the +national rising of France, after Metz and Sedan, was a noble movement; +it was marked by heroic courage and self-sacrifice; and yet it failed, +and probably was doomed to fail, though the resources of France for war +are enormous, and the French are a people of born soldiers.</p> + +<p>I have come to the last of my Great Commanders; what is Moltke’s place +in that august succession? It is difficult to catch a true likeness +of a figure not in the perspective of Time, and whose career belongs +to the history of the day. Moltke has many, I think, of the gifts +of Frederick; he is a thoroughly accomplished and educated man; he +has extraordinary force of application and thought; his perseverance +deserves the highest praise; and though he has not been tried by the +test of ill-fortune, he has evidently the tenacity and firmness of the +Prussian king. Like Frederick, however, he wants supreme genius and the +imaginative power of the greatest chiefs; but he is far superior to +Frederick in all that relates to the large combinations and movements +of war, though probably his inferior on the field of battle. It is his +special characteristic that he was one of the first to see what are the +new conditions of war in this age, and that he turned them to the very +best account; the Prussian Army and that of the lesser German States +have been, in a great measure, created by him; and Moltke, I conceive, +has “organized victory” more thoroughly than has ever before been seen. +His place as a strategist is more doubtful; his countrymen have called +him “the great strategist,” but this is the exaggeration of national +sympathy; and in this sphere of the art, I certainly think he holds an +inferior rank to Turenne, and he has not even approached the height of +Napoleon. We miss originality in his conceptions of war. If he really +directed the converging movement into Bohemia, in 1866, whatever have +been the modifications of the art, this was inconsistent with its true +principles; his advance on Paris was a distinct mistake; and in his +operations at Metz we see many errors which Bazaine possibly might have +made disastrous. His peculiar strategic merit is that he can work out +to perfection accepted<span class="pagenum" id="Page_311">[311]</span> views, and improve upon the ideas of others; +but in this there is not the masterly power seen in the campaigns of +1674 and 1675, of 1796 and of 1800. Still Moltke is a real chief of the +grand school of Napoleon; he can move large armies on a wide theatre +with remarkable forethought and scientific skill; his marches against +the army of Châlons, and the army of Bourbaki, are very fine, and he +made the best use of his interior lines in the final operations around +Paris. His merits as a tactician are less easy to estimate; in the case +of the immense battles of the present day, the real head of an army +can do no more than make arrangements of a general kind; but if he +directed Gravelotte, it was ill-directed, though it is well known he +condemned Steinmetz; and in theory he is a master of modern tactics. +Moltke seems to have a cold and passionless nature; like Wellington, he +has commanded the respect of officers and men but not their devotion; +Prince Frederick Charles was the real hero, in the eyes of the German +soldiery in 1870–71; and this remarkable chief possessed in a high +degree the peculiar gifts of his greatest ancestor. It is astonishing, +however, if we bear in mind that Moltke was in his sixty-seventh year +when he first commanded an army in the field, that he should have +achieved what he has achieved. He is a great commander, beyond dispute, +and as an administrator in war he has never been excelled.</p> + + <div class="figcenter"> + <img + class="p2" + src="images/i_256.jpg" + alt=""> + </div> + + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_315">[315]</span></p> + + <div class="figcenter" id="i_b_315fp"> + <img + class="p1" + src="images/i_b_315fp.jpg" + alt=""> + <p class="p0 sm center">Map of BELGIUM</p> + </div> + + + +<p class="center xl p2">THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815.</p> +</div> + +<h2>CHAPTER I.</h2> +</div> + + +<p>I purpose, in this and a subsequent chapter, to describe the main +features of the Campaign of 1815, and to endeavour to pronounce a +fair judgment upon it. Of the interest of the subject it is needless +to speak; this grand passage of arms will attract the attention of +history to it in the same degree as the contest decided on the field +of Zama, or the last struggle between Pompey and Cæsar. Yet this is +not my chief reason for attempting this sketch; I venture to think, +though a large literature has grown up round the theme of Waterloo, +that there is still room for an impartial study, brief though it be, +of the leading incidents of this ever-memorable and most decisive +conflict. Many causes, in fact, have concurred to obscure the truth +respecting the Campaign of 1815, and to prevent a just estimate being +formed of it. On some points our knowledge is still imperfect; passion +and prejudice have distorted the facts, on several others of the first +importance; and commentators on Waterloo, even including the chief +actors in the drama, have, in most instances, either made palpable and +grave mistakes, or have applied a kind of criticism to the course of +events, essentially, and from the nature of the case, fallacious. The +narratives of Napoleon, in some of their parts, bear the ineffaceable +marks of his genius, but they abound in serious errors of detail, and +in places they are far from just or honest. The apology of Wellington, +though the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_316">[316]</span> most truthful of men, written as it was in far advanced +age, is not trustworthy in many respects; and all that has emanated +from the Prussian staff is by no means accurate, or even always candid. +As for historians, Thiers has composed a romance confuted by the +evidence in most important points; and the same may be said of the +host of Frenchmen who, like him, have slavishly followed Napoleon. We +have had a like class of writers in England; from Siborne to Hooper +it has been the fashion to describe the Duke as faultless in 1815, in +plain defiance of unquestionable facts; and Dutch, Belgian, and German +authors have equally erred in claiming praise for chiefs of their races +beyond their merits. Then we have commentators, of whom Charras is by +far the ablest and most perfect specimen, partisans who test operations +of war by an impossible standard of mere theory, and who, in this way, +have succeeded in making the greatest chiefs seem inferior men; and +Chesney’s <i>Essay</i>, though in parts excellent, is by no means free +from this most unsound criticism. Passing by General Hamley’s valuable +sketch, I believe Jomini’s account of Waterloo to be, even now, the +best extant narrative; but it is necessarily wanting in many respects, +in the information obtained since his day. I shall try to follow, in +these chapters, the method which, in an inquiry of this kind, will most +probably lead to just conclusions; that is, I shall rely<a id="FNanchor_34" href="#Footnote_34" class="fnanchor">[34]</a> only on +contemporaneous documents, the genuineness of which is not doubtful; +and I shall endeavour to judge of events as they happened, from the +point of view of those who took part in them, and not by the mere +abstract rules of strategy.</p> + +<p>I have no space to discuss the arrangements made beforehand by Napoleon +to meet the League of Europe in 1815; but they were most able and +even wonderful, and the detraction of Charras is false and unjust. +The memories of an immortal campaign would have caused the Emperor +to defend France on the Marne and the Seine, with fortified Paris a +pivot for his operations and a vast entrenched camp; but the state of +opinion made this plan impossible,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_317">[317]</span> and he resolved to assume a daring +offensive. His design, resembling in its main features the strategy +which led to Ulm and Austerlitz, may be left with confidence to judges +of the art, and bears the clear stamp of his transcendent genius. A +million of armed men were advancing on France from the Scheldt, the +Rhine, the Oder, and the Po; but the hosts of the Allies were widely +apart, and at unequal distances from the points of attack; and the +extreme right of the vast front of invasion, composed of the armies of +Blücher and Wellington, was isolated, and close to the French frontier. +It was possible, therefore, to make a sudden spring on this detached +part of the Coalition’s forces, to surprise and to overthrow it in +detail; and if decisive success were achieved, there were reasons to +believe that Napoleon’s triumph might bring the war at once to a close. +The situation, besides, of the menaced armies in Belgium invited a +daring attack, even though made with an inferiority of force. They were +disseminated along a wide front, from Ghent to Liège, a hundred miles +in length, and from thirty-five to fifty miles in depth, from Brussels +to the edge of French territory; they were scattered in divisions, +covering the roads that led, in many lines, from the frontier of +France; and two days, at least, were required before they could +even nearly concentrate on a given field of battle. They were thus +vulnerable at all points, and the strategy which placed them in such +positions has long ago been condemned as false; but many and decisive +reasons concurred to induce Napoleon to select their centre, and the +space where their inner flanks met, as the first spot on which to +direct his efforts.</p> + +<p>Were he to assail the Allies on either wing, he would press their +armies against each other, and favour rather than retard their +junction, the very event to be most avoided; and, besides, they were in +greater strength on these lines than at those points of their centre +at which their separate forces came in contact. Again, Wellington +was based on the sea, from Brussels and Ghent to Ostend and Antwerp; +the base of Blücher was the Rhine and Cologne. Were their centre, +therefore, fiercely attacked, and their armies compelled to diverge +from each other, the probability was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_318">[318]</span> that each chief would fall back +on his proper base, as happened in the campaign of 1794, and that +the Emperor would be able to interpose and, perhaps, to overwhelm +their recoiling forces. Other considerations combined to determine +the purpose of the most profound of generals. Blücher was known to be +hasty and bold to a fault; the genius of Wellington was circumspect and +cautious; and Napoleon calculated—rightly, as the event proved—that +should he fall suddenly on the allied centre, Blücher would hurry +forward to repel the attack, and that Wellington would be slow to +advance; and this single circumstance, it was not unlikely, would +give the Imperial chief an admirable chance to beat in detail his +divided enemies. The peculiarities of the theatre, too, encouraged +an attempt against the allied centre. At each side of this point the +French frontier at this time ran into Belgian territory, especially +from Valenciennes to Rocroy; a great main road by Charleroi to Brussels +nearly traversed the space where the Allies met, and led into the +heart of the Belgic provinces; the communication between the Allies +depended chiefly on one lateral road, extending from Nivelles to Namur +eastwards, and behind this lay a difficult region of hills and marshes +watered by the Dyle, and unfavourable to the junction of divided +armies. Should Napoleon, therefore, advance on this path, he would have +the shortest line of attack from France; he would have an avenue into +the midst of the camps of his foes, and conducting him to the Belgian +capital; and should he once be able to force his adversaries from their +main point of contact, the Nivelles and Namur road, they would find it +no easy task to reunite, and they would probably be placed in serious +peril.</p> + +<p>The Allies were thus to be struck at their centre, and their separated +hosts to be rent asunder as Beaulieu and Colli, twenty years before, +when Bonaparte was first revealed to Fortune, were assailed from the +Genoese seaboard and driven in eccentric retreat from Piedmont. An +untoward event at the outset increased the difficulties of carrying +out a plan, which may be pronounced one of the most brilliant even +of Napoleon’s marvellous career. The united armies of Blücher and +Wellington were about 224,000<span class="pagenum" id="Page_319">[319]</span> strong; the Emperor reckoned that +150,000 men were required to assure his operations success; and it may +confidently be said that, had he had this force, he would, humanly +speaking, have been victorious, spite of the misadventures and faults +of the Campaign. A sudden rising in La Vendée, however, deprived him +of 20,000 good troops; but, though this added largely to his adverse +chances, his position was such that he still resolved to persevere +in his audacious project. The execution of his profound design was +admirable, and, indeed, all but perfect. The divisions intended to make +the movement were encamped along the northern frontier of France, or +thrown back southward almost to the capital; and the problem was how to +draw together these widely separated bodies of men, and to concentrate +them at the appointed spot, without interference on the part of +the enemy, and without even his knowledge, if this were possible. +The operation was accomplished with success, largely through that +remarkable skill in stratagem which was one of Napoleon’s distinctive +gifts. While the corps on the frontier, their march concealed by +different expedients with consummate art, were collected together +from the vast distance which extends from Lille and Valenciennes to +Metz, the corps in the interior were moved forward by degrees, and +the united masses were brought into contact, at the points indicated +by their great head and leader. On the evening of the 14th June 1815, +nearly 128,000 Frenchmen, including 22,000 cavalry, and with 350 guns, +had effected their junction, on a narrow front, on the very verge of +the plains of Belgium, a few miles from the banks of the Sambre, and +converging towards the great main road, running, we have seen, from +Charleroi to Brussels; and the concentration, if not quite complete, +was, in the circumstances in which it was made, one of the finest known +in the annals of war. The Emperor’s left wing, about 45,000 strong, +composed of the 2nd and 1st Corps, in the experienced hands of Reille +and D’Erlon, was near the Sambre at Leez and Solre; the centre, nearly +68,000 men, comprising the Imperial Guard, the 3rd Corps of Vandamme, +the 6th Corps, with Lobau as its chief, and the cavalry reserves, +under the command of Grouchy, lay in the country<span class="pagenum" id="Page_320">[320]</span> around Beaumont; +and the right wing, the 4th Corps, led by the brilliant Gérard, and +numbering perhaps 15,000 soldiers, was, in part, at Philippeville, +its appointed station, a part, however, being half a march distant, +the single detachment that had not fulfilled its mission. The purpose +of Napoleon was to conduct these forces, assembled at his bidding as +if by magic, at daybreak against the enemy in his camps; to cross the +Sambre, to enter Charleroi, holding the main road to Brussels before +referred to; and having taken possession of the adjoining country, and +overpowered, if possible, any foes in his path, to press on to the road +from Nivelles to Namur, to occupy on it Quatre Bras and Sombreffe, +the two points where the allied commanders would probably attempt to +effect their junction, and having attained this position of vantage, to +interpose between their divided armies, completing the first act in the +drama of the Campaign.</p> + +<p>Having made a spirit-stirring address to his troops, Napoleon set +his army in motion at about 3 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 15th of June. The +left wing was not long in crossing the Sambre; soon after mid-day the +corps of Reille, that of D’Erlon being some miles behind, had passed +the bridge which spans the stream near the town of Marchiennes—it +had been left intact by the enemy—and the great French columns had +easily pressed back a detachment of the Prussian corps of Ziethen, in +observation along the frontier. The march of the centre was greatly +delayed; an advance-guard of cavalry, with a weak support of foot, +entered Charleroi, indeed, and was over the Sambre a short time after +the left wing—the bridge at Charleroi, too, was not broken—but an +accident had kept back Vandamme; and it was past three in the afternoon +before a part of the Guard, the 3rd Corps, and part of the reserve of +cavalry had made their way out of the narrow streets of Charleroi, +Lobau and much of the cavalry being still in the rear. The progress of +the right wing was even more retarded; it did not move until a part +at least of its backward detachment had come into line; the march of +the troops was, in some measure, checked by the villainous treason of +Bourmont; the country to be traversed was close and difficult; and +it was about five before it had passed the Sambre, <span class="pagenum" id="Page_321">[321]</span>even in part, +across the bridge at Châtelet—unbroken like those of Marchiennes and +Charleroi—more than half the corps being on the southern bank of +the river. These delays enabled the bulk of Ziethen’s forces—their +head-quarters had been at Charleroi—to effect their retreat before the +advancing French, and frequently to arrest the heads of their columns. +The Prussian commander had manœuvred ably, though he had greatly erred +in not destroying the bridges; Ziethen made good his way to Fleurus, +with a loss of not more than 2,000 men, any hope which Napoleon may +have entertained of surprising and crushing his isolated corps having +been at an early hour frustrated. Mainly, too, from this cause, the +Emperor failed to seize the two points of Quatre Bras and Sombreffe, +on the cross road from Nivelles to Namur, which had been the object of +his march on the 15th; and the day, as Charras has said, was, in part, +incomplete.</p> + + <div class="figcenter" id="i_b_320fp"> + <img + class="p1" + src="images/i_b_320fp.jpg" + alt=""> + <p class="p0 sm center">“<span class="allsmcap">THE IDOL OF THE SOLDIER’S +SOUL.</span>”—<i>Byron.</i></p> + </div> + +<p>Nevertheless, Napoleon had already attained considerable and most +promising success; and he might even now reckon on approaching victory. +As evening closed one division of the left wing, supported by a large +body of horsemen, was at Frasnes, quite near Quatre Bras; and, in fact, +it had been prevented from gaining that point only by a demonstration +made by the young Prince of Saxe Weimar, anticipating his orders by +several hours. The remainder of the left wing, now under the command of +Ney—the Marshal had reached Charleroi some time in the afternoon—was +extended from Gosselies to Jumet, holding the great road from Charleroi +to Brussels, and from ten to thirteen miles from Quatre Bras, a single +division approaching the centre; and a march of a few hours could +place it in force on one of the chief points of the allied line of +junction. As for the centre, Lobau, and part of the Guard and of the +heavy cavalry were still near Charleroi; but Vandamme and the great +body of the Guard and of the cavalry reserve were not far from Fleurus, +a few miles only from the point of Sombreffe, by which Blücher would +unite with Wellington, and filling the country back to Charleroi; +while the right wing of Gérard was at a half march’s distance. The +main body of the French army, about 100,000 strong, had thus attained +positions<span class="pagenum" id="Page_322">[322]</span> near the allied centre, which already made it difficult in +the extreme for Blücher and Wellington to combine their forces along +the road from Nivelles to Namur; if the Emperor had not cut his foes +in two, he threatened their communication in a most dangerous way; he +was master of the main road from Charleroi to Brussels almost up to the +point of Quatre Bras; and notwithstanding several mishaps, he had not +30,000 men in his rear. He had every reason to assert, as he did, that +if not wholly, he was, in the main, satisfied with the results of the +operations of the day.</p> + +<p>What had been the dispositions of the allied chiefs, while Napoleon had +gained this immense advantage? Neither Blücher nor Wellington seriously +thought that their adversary would venture to invade Belgium, for +his inferiority of force was well known to them; and Wellington was +convinced that the Emperor would await the attack of the Coalition, +as he had awaited it the year before. This partly explains, though it +does not justify, the dissemination of their scattered forces; and, as +has been said, it is now conceded that this strategy was essentially +faulty. They admitted, however, that an attack was possible, and +everything tends to show that Blücher conceived that an attack on +his centre and left was the most probable; while the Duke certainly +believed that the blow would be most likely directed against his right. +As an attempt, however, against their centre might be made, they had +made provision for this contingency; and it had been arranged between +them that should Napoleon advance by Charleroi on the great road to +Brussels, striking at the point of contact of their inner flanks, +each should concentrate in force on the road from Nivelles to Namur, +holding the two positions of Quatre Bras and Sombreffe, which they felt +assured they could occupy in time, though the mass of their armies +was far distant, and Quatre Bras and Sombreffe were but a march from +the frontier. These calculations might have proved correct in the +case of a foe of ordinary powers; but in that of a consummate master +of his art they were pregnant, as Charras has said, with danger. The +Duke, however, and Blücher were not surprised, as has been alleged, +in the true sense of the word, though they were out-generalled by +Napoleon’s<span class="pagenum" id="Page_323">[323]</span> movement. As early as the afternoon of the 14th of June, +Ziethen had learned that the French had approached the frontier, and +he immediately despatched the news to Blücher at his head-quarters, +miles off at Namur. The Prussian army was about 118,000 strong, +including 12,000 horsemen and 312 guns; but its four corps were widely +apart: the first, that of Ziethen, being around Charleroi; the second, +that of Pirch, in camp at Namur; the third, under Thielmann, to the +south-east at Ciney; the fourth led by Bülow far away at Liège; and +it was all but impossible that the collective mass could be united on +the road from Nivelles to Namur before nightfall on the 16th of June. +The ardent veteran, however, eager for the fray, at about midnight on +the 14th, when Napoleon’s advance might be presumed, ordered a general +concentration of his army on Sombreffe, as had been agreed between +himself and Wellington; the Prussian chiefs gave proof of extreme +activity; and while Ziethen, who, as we have seen, had skilfully +retarded the march of the French, fell back to Fleurus, and thence +to Sombreffe, Pirch, by the night of the 15th of June, had got near +Mazy, four miles from Sombreffe, with three of the four divisions of +his corps, the fourth being a short way in the rear; while Thielmann +had attained Namur, half a march from the intended point of junction. +Three corps, therefore, of Blücher’s army could be at Sombreffe on the +16th by noon, ready to encounter the shock of Napoleon, and doubtless +expecting support from Wellington. The corps of Bülow, however, could +not be up in time; notwithstanding his energy, Blücher had assembled +only three-fourths of his army; and, in the actual position of affairs, +could he confidently rely on the aid of his colleague?</p> + +<p>At this moment, indeed, the French outposts were close to the allied +line of junction, and Wellington had made scarcely a sign of moving. +The army of the Duke was about 106,000 men—of these 14,000, or nearly +so, were cavalry—with 196 guns; and it was spread over even a larger +space than that of the veteran Prussian warrior. A motley array of +many races, it had been hastily formed into three masses; the first +corps, under the Prince of Orange, scattered over an arc from Genappe +to Mons, and covering two of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_324">[324]</span> the main roads from the frontier; the +second, in the skilful hands of Hill, extending westward as far as +the Scheldt, from near Braine le Comte to Ath, Leuze, and Oudenarde, +observing, too, the approaches from France; and the third, or the +reserve, at Brussels, a long distance off, round the head-quarters of +Wellington. A fraction only of the first corps was thus near the road +from Nivelles to Namur; the dispositions of the Duke were, in truth, +made to protect his right and his communications with the sea, and +time was required before he could send anything like a strong force to +the support of Blücher. By nightfall on the 15th, when the heads of +the French column were but a few miles from Quatre Bras and Sombreffe, +the army of Wellington had scarcely stirred, and it was some hours +afterwards before the British chief set it in motion in the direction +of Blücher, and that, too, slowly, and as if with reluctance. The Duke +had heard from Ziethen in the afternoon of the day, that the French +were crossing the Sambre, and near Charleroi, and the intelligence +was subsequently confirmed by Blücher; but thinking that Napoleon was +making a feint, and believing that his own right was menaced, he waited +upon his enemy’s movements, and merely ordered his lieutenants to be +in readiness. As is well known, indeed, he went to the historical ball +given at Brussels by the Duchess of Richmond; and it was after ten +at night, when he had been made aware that Napoleon had mastered and +passed Charleroi, that he took anything like a decisive step. Hill and +the Prince of Orange were now directed to concentrate their troops, +and to move to their left; but they were to hold a line from Enghien +to Nivelles; the reserve at Brussels was still kept back, and nothing +like a considerable force was to be drawn towards the allied points of +junction, or to be so placed as to approach Blücher. The wide interval, +in fact, from Nivelles to Quatre Bras, and thence by the main road +to Sombreffe—the communication with the Prussians—-was to be left +uncovered, and whatever mere partisans may urge, there is not a word to +be said for this strategy. Happily for the Allies, subordinates of the +Duke interpreted the situation better than their chief. Saxe-Weimar, we +have seen, had advanced to Quatre Bras, and checked Ney in his forward +march, and <span class="pagenum" id="Page_325">[325]</span>Perponcher, a general in the Dutch service, ere long had +occupied that most important point, though he held it with a single +division only, which could scarcely offer a prolonged resistance. By +midnight Wellington gave further orders for a general concentration +to his left, and the reserve from Brussels was directed towards +Nivelles; but these orders were extremely late, and it had become most +improbable that the British commander would be able to master the road +from Nivelles to Namur, even now almost in the grasp of his enemy, to +advance along it by Quatre Bras, and approaching Sombreffe, to unite +with Blücher. It was, indeed, far more likely that the divided armies +would be attacked, and beaten in detail.</p> + + <div class="figcenter" id="i_b_324"> + <img + class="p1" + src="images/i_b_324.jpg" + alt=""> + <p class="p0 sm center">ENGLAND’S HOPE, 1815.</p> + </div> + +<p>The previsions on which Napoleon had formed the plan of his campaign +had thus been realised, up to this point, in their main particulars. +The divergence of the bases of the allied chiefs had left their +centre weak and ill-joined. It was now, after the retreat of Ziethen, +connected only by a thread of vedettes; it was within easy distance of +the French army; and should it be attacked, and cut in two, Blücher +and Wellington would fall back, and probably separate, happy if they +escaped a disastrous reverse. Blücher, again, had rushed forward to +confront his enemy, leaving 30,000 of his troops far off; Wellington +had paused, hesitated, and not approached his colleague, and an +admirable chance had been thus afforded to the General of Arcola +and Rivoli. The allied commanders, in fact, whatever may be said by +apologists, and by worshippers of success, had laid themselves open to +a terrible stroke, and though Napoleon is a most exacting critic, I can +see no answer to his profound remark, that, out-manœuvred as they had +been on the 15th, Blücher ought not to have made for Sombreffe “already +under the guns of his enemy,” and Wellington ought not to have tried +to join him, but that both chiefs should have endeavoured to unite +on a line, in the rear, between Wavre and Waterloo. Their strategy, +in short, was bad, and they only escaped defeat owing to a set of +accidents in which fortune baffled their mighty adversary.</p> + +<p>We have reached the morning of the 16th of June, and we turn to the +operations of the French army, and to the direction given<span class="pagenum" id="Page_326">[326]</span> it by its +Imperial leader. Napoleon had returned to Charleroi on the night +of the 15th, to “take repose for his wearied frame”; his physical +strength had been long declining; and possibly even on the first day +of the campaign, he began to give proof of those failing bodily powers +which was certainly exhibited before the contest closed.<a id="FNanchor_35" href="#Footnote_35" class="fnanchor">[35]</a> Yet, +though murmurs were heard in the French camp, both Jomini and Charras +seem to me to reason too much on mere theory, and to fall into the +error of judging only by the event, when they charge the Emperor with +sluggishness and delay in his conduct on the morning of the 16th. A +large part of the French army was still in the rear; Napoleon did +not and could not certainly know the exact positions of the allied +armies; he was about to thrust himself between two hostile masses, each +nearly equal to his own force in numbers; and though he could have +done more had he been omniscient, the circumstances required caution +in any forward movement. Be this as it may, his orders were given, at +Charleroi, at about 8 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>; and if they were founded on wrong +assumptions, they proved his perfect knowledge of his art, and were +admirably adapted to the events that happened. These orders, contained +in four despatches, two from the Emperor to Ney and Grouchy, and two +from Soult, the Chief of the Staff, to the same generals, prove that +Napoleon did not believe he would be seriously opposed on that day; +he thought that his left wing would easily pass Quatre Bras, and +that his centre and right wing would easily pass Sombreffe; and he +conceived that it was not improbable that he would enter Brussels on +the morning of the 17th. This calculation was, no doubt, false; but +it was founded on the true strategic view that Wellington and Blücher +would not now endeavour to make a stand at Quatre Bras and Sombreffe, +on the threatened road from Nivelles to Namur; and what Charras and +others fail to point out, but what the real student of war will dwell +on, is that, ignorant as he was of the actual facts, the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_327">[327]</span> dispositions +made by Napoleon were in accordance with sound principles, and fitted +to meet the situation of affairs. Ney, in command of the left wing, +was ordered to advance, and go beyond Quatre Bras, concentrating the +2nd and 1st Corps, supported by Kellerman’s heavy cavalry, and holding +the great road from Charleroi to Brussels; while Grouchy, entrusted +in the Emperor’s brief absence, with the centre, the right wing, and +the cavalry reserves, was to pass Sombreffe, and to attain Gembloux, +attacking any enemy in his path, and to stand on a parallel line with +Ney. As the army, however, should be well united, Ney was enjoined to +detach a division to Marbais, a village near Sombreffe and Gembloux, to +give support if required to the centre and right wing; and the Emperor +added that, at about noon, he would be on the spot to assume the +supreme command.<a id="FNanchor_36" href="#Footnote_36" class="fnanchor">[36]</a></p> + +<p>Napoleon’s orders despatched from Charleroi reached the chiefs of the +2nd and 1st corps, spread, we have seen, from Gosselies to Jumet, on +the great road from Charleroi to Brussels, at about 10 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> or +a little before; they reached Ney at Frasnes at about 11 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>; +and as<a id="FNanchor_37" href="#Footnote_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> Reille and D’Erlon had been directed to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_328">[328]</span> advance by the +aide-de-camp who carried the Imperial message; Ney might have been in +possession of Quatre Bras at about 1 or 1.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>; at the head +of 45,000 men, and might have crushed Perponcher’s feeble division, at +the time standing alone at that place. In that event Ney could have +seized Quatre Bras, in conformity with the Imperial orders, and have +made the required detachment on Marbais; and had this been done, the +16th of June would certainly have witnessed a second Jena. We pass from +the French left wing to the centre and right wing, directed, we have +seen, at the time, on Sombreffe, and intended to prolong their march to +Gembloux. Napoleon had reached Fleurus by 11 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>; the Guard, +the 3rd and 4th Corps, with most of the cavalry reserves, for a moment +under the command of Grouchy, had passed, at about 1 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, +into the Emperor’s hands; the division detached from the left wing +on the 15th had come into line, and Lobau, with the 6th corps, was +marching from the rear. By this time Blücher stood in the path of +the French in an advance on Gembloux; he was in force on the road +from Nivelles to Namur, and his three corps held a formidable line, +extending from Sombreffe almost to Marbais, and fronted by the villages +of Ligny, St. Amand, and La Haye. Napoleon seems to have disbelieved +at first that his adversary could be in strength on the field; but at +2 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> he sent a message to Ney enjoining him to complete the +movement on Marbais, and to fall on the flank and rear of Blücher, and +at the same moment the Emperor marched his army from Fleurus against +his enemy.</p> + +<p>The armies opposed were about equal in force, if we reckon +the approaching corps of Lobau; the French being inferior in +numbers—78,000 to 87,000 men—but having more guns and more numerous +horsemen; but the superiority of Napoleon’s tactics gave him the +advantage almost from the first moment. The villages, indeed, before +the Prussian front proved defences of remarkable strength, and were +taken and retaken with little results; but Napoleon occupied a full +third of Blücher’s forces by merely threatening his communications +to his left. The French batteries caused frightful<span class="pagenum" id="Page_329">[329]</span> destruction in +the Prussian reserves, which had been recklessly exposed; and while +Blücher brought most of his troops into action, the Emperor husbanded +his men for a final stroke. The battle, however, was raging furiously +and wholly undecided at 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>; and as Blücher’s rear was not +assailed from Marbais, and the roar of cannon announced a battle at +Quatre Bras, Napoleon formed a fresh combination to surprise and to +overwhelm his enemy. By this time he had no doubt learned that D’Erlon, +who ought to have been in line with Ney three hours previously, was +still in the rear; so he sent<a id="FNanchor_38" href="#Footnote_38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> an order to D’Erlon to turn aside +from Quatre Bras, and, moving towards Ligny, to fall in full force at +St. Amand on the right and the rear of Blücher, accomplishing thus, +in a different way, the results of an attack from Marbais. D’Erlon +had approached Ligny within an hour, but he had so marched that +Vandamme pronounced the apparition to be that of an enemy—a part, +probably, of Wellington’s force—and the Emperor despatched<a id="FNanchor_39" href="#Footnote_39" class="fnanchor">[39]</a> a +general officer to ascertain how the fact stood, retarding meanwhile +the course of the battle. Ere long the advancing columns were seen to +draw off, and to disappear from the field; Ney, in fact, now assailed +by superior numbers, had angrily ordered D’Erlon to Quatre Bras, and +D’Erlon, Napoleon at least consenting—the Emperor would have been in +extreme peril had his left wing been defeated and forced—abandoned +a movement which, if pushed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_330">[330]</span> home, would have given his master a +splendid triumph.<a id="FNanchor_40" href="#Footnote_40" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> It was now 6.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and it was time +for Napoleon to endeavour to strike a decisive blow, the march of +D’Erlon having not only ended in a disastrous false movement, but +caused unfortunate delays at Ligny. During all this time the Prussians +and French had been engaged in mortal encounter, but Napoleon’s skill +had borne its natural fruits. Blücher’s left had been held in check +and paralysed; the Prussian losses had been enormous; the veteran’s +reserves had been thrown away, and in an effort to outflank Napoleon’s +left, Blücher had weakened and almost laid bare his centre. The +Emperor, who had his reserves in hand, launched the Guard and a mass of +cavalry against the endangered point; the Prussian centre was broken +after a fierce contest, and Blücher’s whole army was driven from the +field, the corps of Lobau, which had come up from Charleroi, hanging +on the retreat of the defeated enemy. The losses of the French were +about 11,000 men, those of the Prussians not far from 30,000, including +10,000 disbanded fugitives; but how different would the result have +been had Ney or D’Erlon fallen on the rear of Blücher!</p> + +<p>While the star of Napoleon still shone at Ligny, it had begun to wane +hard by at Quatre Bras; and the faulty disposition of his left wing +had saved Blücher from a complete overthrow. We left Ney at Frasnes, +having received the order of 8 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> at about 11 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>; +and the Emperor’s aide-de-camp, we may be quite certain, informed the +Marshal that he had communicated the order to Reille and D’Erlon, +the chiefs of the 2nd and 1st Corps, at this moment at Gosselies and +Jumet, about ten miles off, along the broad highway from Charleroi +to Brussels. That order directed Ney to advance beyond Quatre Bras, +collecting his 45,000 men, but making a detachment to the right at +Marbais; and Ney might have begun at once to execute a movement which, +if well carried out, would perhaps have changed the fortunes of Europe. +Ney, at 11 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, had 9,000 good troops, of whom 4,000 were<span class="pagenum" id="Page_331">[331]</span> +fine cavalry, at Frasnes, actually in his hands: his only foe was +Perponcher’s weak division, 7,000 infantry, with but a few guns, and +almost wholly unsupported by horse; and the Marshal knew that within +three hours he might expect the aid of more than 30,000 soldiers, +including a magnificent body of cavalry. Had Ney, therefore, been the +chief of Elchingen, he could easily have overwhelmed Perponcher; and +directing Reille and D’Erlon to expedite their march, he could have +passed Quatre Bras, and detached to Marbais, at from 1.30 to 2.30 +<span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, without encountering any enemy in force. But, as the +whole course of the Campaign proves, Ney had become demoralized, like +most of his colleagues, by the events of 1812–14, and that even in a +greater degree; he fought with a halter round his neck, and was by +turns timid and unwisely bold; and he not only did not make a step +forward, but seems to have made no effort to induce Reille and D’Erlon +to accelerate their movements and to come into line. This delay saved +Blücher, and gave Wellington just sufficient time to repair, in part, +the tardiness and hesitation of the 15th, to check Ney, and to baffle +Napoleon in the manœuvre he had planned, which would have crushed the +Prussians. The Duke reached Quatre Bras—but with an escort only, his +advancing divisions were still distant—at about 11 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on +the 16th; and he rode off to near Ligny to confer with Blücher, whose +faulty arrangements to meet Napoleon he condemned in a characteristic +phrase—“they will be damnably beaten,” he said to his Staff—but to +whom he promised support, “if possible.” Meanwhile, Ney showed no sign +of moving: Reille advanced slowly, and the march of D’Erlon from the +rear was a succession of delays; and it was 2 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> before +the French Marshal—one division of Reille had come to his aid—made +even an attempt to attack Quatre Bras. It is unnecessary to retrace +the scenes of a combat, in itself not of supreme importance, though it +had much to do with the issue of the Campaign. Perponcher’s division +and other supports were nearly overwhelmed at 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>; but +reinforcements came up by degrees, moving in haste from Nivelles and +other points, which ultimately turned the scale against Ney. The Duke, +returning from Ligny, displayed on<span class="pagenum" id="Page_332">[332]</span> the field the intrepidity and the +genius in defence which were his distinctive gifts in war; and Ney, +as night closed, retreated on Frasnes, having failed to fulfil his +appointed mission, which, I repeat, might have been accomplished, +having, however, prevented Wellington from sending a man to Blücher. +The Marshal had been supported by Reille’s corps only, and by +Kellerman’s corps of horsemen; D’Erlon, loitering in the rear, had been +directed, we have seen, to another field at Ligny, and when recalled by +Ney came into line too late to be of any use, or even to fire a shot; +and Ney had conducted the battle ably, and even performed an important +service, though he had thrown away a part of his superb heavy cavalry. +He had, however, proved unequal to his task; he had not carried out +Napoleon’s designs, which ought to have led to Blücher’s ruin, as, +beyond question, he might have done; and though Reille and D’Erlon, +especially the last, who contrived on the 16th to do simply nothing, +are in a greater degree to blame, he cannot escape a share of censure.</p> + +<p>The first part of the Campaign of 1815 ends with the battles of +Ligny and Quatre Bras. Napoleon’s operations, up to the evening of +the 16th, had been attended with marked success, which might easily +have been complete and decisive. Selecting, with perfect insight, the +true point of attack, he had conducted his army with admirable skill +and secrecy to the Belgian frontier; and aiming at the centre of the +Allies, the weakest and most vulnerable part of their line, he had +drawn close to it on the 15th June. His enemies had been unable to +arrest his progress, disseminated on a broad and deep front; and the +impetuosity of Blücher, and the caution of Wellington, gave him, as +he had foreseen, a favourable chance to divide his adversaries, and +to beat them in detail. Blücher had hurried to Sombreffe to confront +the Emperor, leaving a fourth part of his army behind; the Duke had +paused, hesitated, and delayed in moving, and it was hours after +Napoleon had passed Charleroi that Wellington even made an attempt to +draw near his endangered colleague, even then directing his troops +to points distant from the selected place of junction. This was the +situation on the morning of the 16th, and it gave Napoleon a great +advantage,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_333">[333]</span> which almost led to a crowning triumph. He may, perhaps, +have delayed at this moment, though in this judgment I cannot concur, +and his projects were founded on imperfect knowledge; but his general +dispositions were so excellent that he ought to have overwhelmed the +Prussian army. Having directed Ney, with his left wing, to pass Quatre +Bras and to detach to Marbais, he marched to Fleurus and attacked +Blücher; and had the attack in front at Ligny been combined with an +attack in the rear from Marbais, Ligny must have terminated in another +Jena. Exactly the same result would have followed had D’Erlon, who had +lagged in the rear, continued his movement upon St. Amand; and a series +of misadventures alone saved Blücher from a crushing disaster. Ney +was not equal to his appointed mission; he lost the occasion to reach +Quatre Bras, to advance, and to occupy Marbais. Reille and D’Erlon +did not second their chief; and D’Erlon, when launched on the path of +victory, was turned aside by an order of Ney, Napoleon, I certainly +think, consenting. The blame of these failures must be divided between +Ney, Reille, and D’Erlon, who deserves the most; Napoleon, too, may not +have been bold enough, though this is mere theory after the event; but +the fact remains that, but for unlucky accidents, Napoleon would have +annihilated his foe. As it was, Ligny was a real victory. The Prussian +army lost a third of its numbers, and Blücher was driven from the only +road by which he could readily join Wellington into a difficult and +intricate country. Meanwhile, though Ney had not accomplished all that +his master had a right to expect from him, he had, at the opposite side +of the line, attacked Wellington and held him in check. The Duke, his +forces coming up late and in fragments, was unable to send assistance +to his imperilled colleague; and though he had compelled Ney to fall +back a little, Ligny made it necessary that he should quickly retreat, +happy if he could effect his escape. Napoleon had thus succeeded on +the 16th, though his triumph had been incomplete and partial. He had +defeated Blücher, and kept Wellington at bay; and, above all, he had +forced the Allies to abandon the road from Nivelles to Namur, their +natural and their only easy line of junction. Would they diverge as +Beaulieu and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_334">[334]</span> Colli had done, and give the General of the Campaign of +Italy an opportunity to ruin them in detail? To Napoleon the prospect +seemed full of promise, and yet all was not light on the scene before +him. He had not gained a decisive victory. Blücher and Wellington were +no ordinary foes; their armies nearly doubled his own; might they not +yet close on the Imperial Eagle, which, terrible and swift as had been +its swoop, had not thoroughly grasped and destroyed its quarry?</p> + + <div class="figcenter"> + <img + class="p2" + src="images/i_050.jpg" + alt=""> + </div> + + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_335">[335]</span></p> + +<h2>CHAPTER II.</h2> +</div> + +<p>In one of the last and fiercest struggles at Ligny, Blücher had been +unhorsed and severely hurt, and the command of the Prussian army +devolved on Gneisenau, a capable and scientific officer. It was near +nightfall when Ligny had been won—the delay occasioned by the affair +of D’Erlon had been injurious in the extreme to the French—and, +perceiving that no enemy pressed on his rear, Gneisenau halted, and +made preparations to retreat. But whither was the defeated army to +move? Was it to fall back on its communications with the Rhine, opening +to Napoleon the path to Brussels, and separating itself completely from +Wellington; or was it to endeavour to join its allies, abandoning its +line of operations for the time, but appealing to Fortune in another +battle? Gneisenau, urged, it is said, by his heroic chief, who gave the +order at night from his litter, resolved to adopt the second course; +and the Prussian army was directed on Wavre, a town about twenty +miles from Sombreffe, and divided from it by the difficult country—a +region of hills and lowlands watered by the Dyle—which lay behind the +road from Nivelles to Namur. Wavre is about nine or ten miles from +Waterloo, a village in front of the Forest of Soignies, and north of +a position marked out by Wellington as an admirable field for a great +defensive battle; and it was this circumstance, well known to Blücher, +which doubtless led him to fall back on Wavre, in spite of the many +impediments in the way, impediments which had caused Napoleon to +expect that, if forced from the road from Nivelles to Namur, Blücher +would most probably recoil on his base, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_336">[336]</span> not attempt to join +Wellington through a mass of obstacles. By daybreak on the 17th, the +first corps of Ziethen, and the second of Pirch were on their way to +Wavre, by Tilly and Gentinnes, villages some miles to the north-west +of Sombreffe; and the third corps of Thielmann, charged to cover the +movement, broke up some hours later, and made for Gembloux, one of +the points, we have seen, which Napoleon hoped to have reached in the +advance of the day before, and to the east of Tilly and Gentinnes. The +Prussian army was still greatly shaken, and especially was short of +food and munitions; but no enemy harassed or observed the retreat; and +before long it was joined by Bülow, who had hastened to march by Hannut +to Gembloux, and brought 30,000 fresh soldiers to Blücher.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile, Wellington, who, as night closed on the 16th, had had at +Quatre Bras a mass of about 37,000 men, was joined ere long by some +8,000 more, marched from Brussels and points on his right, and he was +thus now equal in numbers with Ney, who had by this time his two corps +in hand<a id="FNanchor_41" href="#Footnote_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a>; though he was dangerously exposed should Ney and Napoleon +be able to reach him with their united forces. Owing to an accident +which befell a Prussian officer, the Duke was not informed of the +defeat of Blücher until the early morning of the 17th; he thereupon +resolved at once to retreat, but having been apprised that the Prussian +army was in full march from Sombreffe to Wavre, and would soon be ready +to fight again, he decided on stopping the retreat at Waterloo, and +on awaiting there the attack of the French, if he could rely on the +support of his veteran colleague. The retrograde movement of the Duke +from Quatre Bras, screened by a considerable body of horsemen, began +at about 10 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, and continued for hours; and, in addition +to his 45,000 men, he summoned about 21,000 at Nivelles, and perhaps +4,000 more from outlying points, to Waterloo, the scene of the intended +conflict. Fearful and jealous for his right, however, all through, he +left a large force near Braine le Comte and Hal; and his whole army, in +fact, was never concentrated.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_337">[337]</span></p> + +<p>The Allies, falling back from their true line of junction, the main +road from Nivelles to Namur, were thus trying to unite on a second +line, by the bad roads from Wavre to Waterloo. This strategy has been +praised by the worshippers of success, even by soldiers like Charras +and Chesney, and, in the event, it was more than justified; it was, +nevertheless, essentially faulty. It is impossible to refute Napoleon’s +logic; either Blücher, after his defeat at Ligny, ought to have moved +directly on Wellington’s army, joining it either at Genappe or at least +at Waterloo, or both the Allied chiefs ought to have fallen farther +back, to have placed the Forest of Soignies between themselves and +their foe, and concentrating their forces around Brussels, to have +opposed 200,000 men or more to the 100,000 of the French Emperor, who, +in that case, would have been out-generalled and could scarcely have +ventured to offer battle. The double retreat on Wavre and Waterloo was, +in fact, an imperfect half measure, so often fatal in the operations +of war; Wavre was more distant from Waterloo than Sombreffe was from +Quatre Bras, by certainly two or three miles, and, what was infinitely +more important, was divided from Waterloo by a most intricate country; +and, in making this movement, Blücher and Wellington were exposing +themselves to crushing defeat, and were rendering their junction +extremely difficult. It was to be assumed that a man like Napoleon +would be exactly informed of the line of their march, and would do +what was the best for his interests; and had Napoleon, on the morning +of the 17th, called on his victorious army to make a great effort, he +would probably have reached either Blücher or Wellington, still widely +apart, and beaten either in detail. Nay, had he, collecting his whole +forces, and moving more slowly, either attacked Blücher at Wavre or +the Duke at Waterloo, on the 18th, he would almost certainly have won +a great battle before the Allies could succeed in uniting. Exactly +the same result would have followed had he, acting on more correct +principles—and supposing, of course, as was to be expected, that he +was thoroughly apprised of the allied movements—detached a part of his +army to hold Blücher in check, and assailed Wellington with the mass of +his forces; in that case all the chances were that he<span class="pagenum" id="Page_338">[338]</span> would be able +to overpower Wellington, and to prevent Blücher at Wavre from sending +a man to Waterloo. Considering the situation, time, and distance, +the boasted retreat of the Allies, therefore, cannot be vindicated, +whatever may be said; it exposed them once more to be defeated in +detail; and unquestionably their best strategic course was to have +effected their junction in the rear, on Brussels, thus completely +baffling their great antagonist and not exposing themselves to danger.</p> + + <div class="figcenter" id="i_b_338fp"> + <img + class="p1" + src="images/i_b_338fp.jpg" + alt=""> + <p class="p0 sm center">“TAMBOUR, FAITES-MOI CADEAU D’UNE PRISE!”</p> + </div> + +<p>The state of affairs, however, in the camp of the French had singularly +favoured the plan of the Allies, and had already saved them from +impending peril. Over confident in success, his distinctive fault, +Napoleon was convinced that the Prussian army had been<a id="FNanchor_42" href="#Footnote_42" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> completely +routed at Ligny, and could not reappear on the scene for some time; and +he returned to Fleurus, utterly worn out by the anxieties and fatigues +of the two preceding days. He appears to have given no explicit +orders, but he left Soult and Grouchy in temporary command; and these +lieutenants, experienced as they were, did nothing to repair the gross +want of vigilance due, probably, to the state of Napoleon’s health. +Soult seems not to have even sent a message to Ney, a few miles off, +to the left; no attempt during the night was made to discover the +line of the Prussian retreat, still less to molest the defeated foe; +and Grouchy especially, a cavalry chief, instead of reconnoitering in +every direction to ascertain where the enemy was, despatched only one +body of horsemen along the road from Sombreffe to Namur, that is, far +away from the Prussian line of march. In this negligence and slackness +we see no sign of the marvellous activity of Jena and Ratisbon; and +Charras, I believe, is perfectly right when he says that Napoleon’s +“long sleep” at Fleurus made the success of Ligny of no use to him, +though Charras, always unjust to the Emperor, makes no allowance for +his physical weakness, and refuses to blame either Soult or Grouchy. +It was about 9 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the morning of the 17th when Napoleon +drove from Fleurus to <span class="pagenum" id="Page_339">[339]</span>Ligny—he had been extremely unwell for +hours<a id="FNanchor_43" href="#Footnote_43" class="fnanchor">[43]</a>—and everything tends to prove he had no doubt but that the +strength of the Prussian army was broken, and his first idea was that +his own army should take rest<a id="FNanchor_44" href="#Footnote_44" class="fnanchor">[44]</a> on the spot for the day. He ordered a +grand review of his troops, and spent two hours at least on the field +of Ligny, distributing rewards and attending the wounded; and it was +not until near noon—having learned from Ney that part of the British +army was still at Quatre Bras—that he seems to have resolved on a +forward movement. By this time Blücher had completely escaped, and, +in fact, was not many miles from Wavre; the Duke was in full retreat +on Waterloo; and the chance which Napoleon<a id="FNanchor_45" href="#Footnote_45" class="fnanchor">[45]</a> certainly had, and +which the youthful warrior of 1796 would most probably have turned to +account, that of falling either on Blücher or Wellington in the early +morning of the 17th, had been lost never again to return.</p> + +<p>The delay, too, in the operations of the French, coupled with the +neglect of Soult and Grouchy, had caused the Emperor to remain in +ignorance of the true direction of Blücher’s march, and had confirmed +him in a false impression, which, though not the main cause of his +subsequent ruin, undoubtedly in part contributed to it. Clinging to the +conception which he had formed from the first, he was now absolutely +convinced that, after Ligny, Blücher was falling back on his base +to the Rhine; and the unlucky reconnaissance made in the morning, +which pointed to a Prussian retreat by Namur—some prisoners and guns +had been taken by the French—only went to strengthen his erroneous +judgment. He resolved, therefore, following the grand precedent of +1796, against Beaulieu and Colli—his cardinal idea in the campaign of +1815—to direct the mass of his army against Wellington, and to keep +Blücher<span class="pagenum" id="Page_340">[340]</span> away with a force sufficient to hold the defeated Prussians in +check while he should endeavour to overpower the Duke. This strategy +was perfectly correct in principle, but the delay of the morning +had been most unfortunate, and the project was founded on a false +assumption of the direction taken by Blücher’s forces.</p> + +<p>The whole French army—except one division left in reserve, it had +suffered so much—was now divided into two groups; the first composed +of the Guard, a part of the 6th Corps, and some 8,000 horsemen, +marching on Quatre Bras, to unite with Ney, with the 2nd and 1st Corps, +and about 7,000 cavalry; the second comprising the 3rd and 4th Corps, +one division of the 6th, and about 5,000 horsemen. The first group, +about 72,000 strong, with not less than 240 guns, was to be under the +Emperor’s command, and was intended to reach and attack Wellington; the +second, some 34,000 men, with from 96 to 100 guns, was the wing that +was destined to restrain Blücher. Napoleon broke up from Ligny soon +after noon, and gave the command of this wing to Grouchy, enjoining him +to “pursue and attack the Prussians, and to keep Blücher continually in +sight,” and indicating Namur as, most probably, the direction of the +retreat of the enemy. The Emperor, too, I can have no doubt, informed +his lieutenant that his mission was<a id="FNanchor_46" href="#Footnote_46" class="fnanchor">[46]</a> to interpose between Blücher +and Wellington; and, in fact, an experienced chief like Grouchy must +have understood that this was the object of his being detached from +the main French army. The direction, however, of the restraining wing +was late; Blücher had gained fourteen hours on the foe sent against +him; his retreat was on Wavre, not on Namur; and it had already +become no easy task to come up with him, and to hold him in check. +Grouchy, alarmed at what had been devolved on him, expostulated with +his Imperial master; but Napoleon curtly told him “to find out the +enemy,” and set off to join Ney at Quatre Bras. He met the Marshal at +about 2 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>; their united forces<span class="pagenum" id="Page_341">[341]</span> were massed together, and +they were directed against the army of Wellington, for some hours, we +have seen, in retreat. Ney had continued stationary at Quatre Bras, +until the Emperor came on to him, and for this inaction he has been +severely blamed; but the reproach is<a id="FNanchor_47" href="#Footnote_47" class="fnanchor">[47]</a> too exacting, and by no means +just; the army of Wellington had been placed in safety; and even had +Ney advanced from Quatre Bras as soon as he saw Napoleon moving from +Ligny, and pressed on the rear of the British force, he could not +have gained any marked success. Napoleon began the pursuit at about 3 +<span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, following Wellington along the great road to Brussels, +leading by Genappe to the Forest of Soignies; but great results were +no longer possible; the French merely harassed the retiring cavalry; +and, in fact, an extraordinary tempest of rain made military operations +practically useless. At about 7 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the advanced guard of the +French reached the low hills above La Belle Alliance, in front of the +position of Waterloo; and in reply to a challenge made by Napoleon, +the fire of many batteries informed the Emperor that a large army was +collected at a short distance from him.</p> + +<p>We turn to the operations of Grouchy’s wing, detached, we have seen, +late to follow up Blücher. Grouchy had not set his 34,000 men in +motion from Ligny until about 3 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and for this he has +been harshly condemned; but, considering that his troops were widely +scattered, and that Napoleon did not advance from Quatre Bras until the +same hour, or nearly so, I am satisfied the censure is not deserved. +The Marshal, a brave but irresolute man—he had shown what he was at +Bantry in 1796—was hesitating what direction to take, when a positive +order from Napoleon came to determine his still uncertain purpose. The +Emperor, when on his way to Quatre Bras, had received the intelligence +that a large Prussian force had been seen on the Orneau, not far from +Gembloux; and he instantly sent off a messenger to Grouchy—through<span class="pagenum" id="Page_342">[342]</span> +Bertrand, and not through the Chief of the Staff—every sentence of +which should be carefully studied. In this important despatch Napoleon, +we see,<a id="FNanchor_48" href="#Footnote_48" class="fnanchor">[48]</a> believed that Blücher was still falling back, with at least +the mass of his army, eastwards; but the proximity of the Prussians at +Gembloux surprised him; and he distinctly pointed out that “Blücher +and Wellington might endeavour to unite, and to offer battle, in +order to cover Liège or Brussels.” Suspecting part of the truth, +but still uninformed, he now ordered Grouchy to occupy Gembloux—he +evidently thought that from this point the line of Blücher’s retreat +would be ascertained, and that Grouchy would hold a position between +the Prussians and the main French army—and he desired Grouchy “to +communicate with head-quarters,” by “cavalry detachments,” along “the +road from Namur,” showing thus he believed that the Prussian chief was +probably retiring in force towards Liège, that is, towards his base on +the Rhine.</p> + +<p>This order was still founded on the false impression of the direction +really taken by Blücher, for Gembloux is to the east of Wavre, and +thirteen or fourteen miles from that place; but in spite of all that +the Emperor’s censors have said, it was sufficiently correct to have +enabled Grouchy, had he been a capable and active chief, to have, in +the main, fulfilled his mission, and to have interposed between Blücher +and Wellington. Grouchy set off without further delay—responsibility +was a heavy load on him; the storm of rain which had kept back Napoleon +retarded also the Marshal’s columns; the roads, too, to Gembloux were +exceedingly bad; and it was not until 9 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> that the whole +force of Grouchy was collected near and around Gembloux, part east of +the town and part still in the rear. Grouchy had pushed on to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_343">[343]</span> Gembloux +some hours before, with an advanced guard, to endeavour to find out the +true direction of Blücher’s retreat; but though it is certainly strange +that this was not discovered beyond the possibility of doubt by this +time, and the march to Gembloux had been slow, I believe the Marshal +cannot fairly be blamed. In this position of affairs Grouchy sent a +despatch to the Emperor, now in front of Waterloo, at 10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> +on the night of the 17th, and another at 2 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the morning +of the 18th; and these, too, require close attention. In the first +of these letters Grouchy announced that the Prussian army was still +falling back, almost certainly formed<a id="FNanchor_49" href="#Footnote_49" class="fnanchor">[49]</a> “into two great columns,” the +one moving on Wavre by Sart les Walhain, a place a few miles to the +north-east of Gembloux, the other retiring on Perwez towards Liège; +and the Marshal added that if “the mass of the enemy had made its way +to Wavre” he would “follow it up in that direction,” “in order to +separate Blücher from Wellington.” The second letter has been lost, +but its contents are known; the Marshal wrote that he was about to +march on Wavre by Sart les Walhain on the track of Blücher; and this +is confirmed by a third message,<a id="FNanchor_50" href="#Footnote_50" class="fnanchor">[50]</a> sent to Pajol, one of his light +cavalry chiefs, which directed a speedy advance on Wavre.</p> + +<p>The information thus conveyed by Grouchy was only a partial approach to +the truth, and it was calculated to mislead Napoleon, and to inspire +him with disastrous false confidence. Blücher was not retreating in +two divergent columns; he had never thought of drawing towards Liège; +and, at this moment, the night of the 17th, the four corps of his +army, now well supplied and rested, and still numbering about 90,000 +men, with from 270 to 280 guns, had been concentrated around Wavre, +on either bank of the stream of the Dyle, and ready in the morning +to march on Waterloo. The knowledge even now acquired by Grouchy was +amply sufficient to urge that chief to advance on<span class="pagenum" id="Page_344">[344]</span> Wavre as quickly as +possible, for it was by that line only that, from his point of view, +even one hostile column could join Wellington; and his letters prove +that he understood his mission. But his messages to Napoleon were of +such a nature as to cause the Emperor to feel assured—especially as +this was his own idea—that a large part at least of the Prussian army +was leagues away in retreat eastward, and could not possibly assist +the Duke; and, in any case, he had a right to infer that if part of +Blücher’s forces was at Wavre, Grouchy would be fully able to hold it +in check. Buoyed up by these hopes, the Emperor spent half the night +of the 17th in watching the lines of fire which marked the British +bivouacs, and he had but one fear, that the state of the weather—the +rain had continued to descend in torrents—would prevent him from +bringing Wellington to bay, and would enable the English chief to +decamp ere the morrow. It is, however, a complete mistake to suppose, +as Charras and other detractors have urged, that the Emperor at this +critical moment altogether neglected to watch his right, or to keep +in communication with Grouchy at Gembloux. I cannot, indeed, accept +his statement,<a id="FNanchor_51" href="#Footnote_51" class="fnanchor">[51]</a> for it can hardly be reconciled with the published +documents, that he directed Grouchy, on the night of the 17th, to +send a detachment to the main French army, in order to fall on the +flank of Wellington—the counterpart of the march from Quatre Bras to +Marbais—though this incident of the campaign has been ill explored; +and there are reasons to think the order was made, apparently opposed +to the known evidence. But he sent horsemen to scour the country +towards Gembloux, and even within some miles of Wavre. He certainly +ascertained,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_345">[345]</span> before daybreak on the 18th, that a Prussian column was +near Wavre, and he communicated, we shall see, the news to Grouchy. +Relying, however, on the Marshal’s account, he assumed that Grouchy +would be in sufficient force to paralyze and perhaps destroy this foe, +and he was justified, from what he had been told, in a supposition of +the kind.</p> + +<p>It was now the morning of the 18th of June, and Napoleon perceived, +with exulting pride, that Wellington had not attempted to retreat, and +that the Duke’s army retained its positions. The Emperor felt assured +of a decisive victory; he was certain that Grouchy could easily master +any forces that might threaten his right, if such forces were at hand +at all; and he exclaimed to Ney, as they sate at breakfast, that the +“chances were ten to one in their favour.” Napoleon had intended to +have his army in line, and to begin the battle at 9 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>,<a id="FNanchor_52" href="#Footnote_52" class="fnanchor">[52]</a> +but the severity of the weather had made the ground very difficult +for the manœuvring of guns. He believed that a grand demonstration +would shake the nerves of the Belgian and Dutch troops, who had been +lately in the Imperial service, but who now formed a large part of +Wellington’s force; and, at the instance, it is said, of Drouot, one +of his most skilful and trusted officers, he put off the attack for +nearly three hours, the state of his frame, which needed repose, very +probably, too, affecting his purpose. This delay was immensely in the +Duke’s favour. Waterloo, but for it, could hardly have been won, and +it may truly be said that, on this day, the sun in its courses fought +against Napoleon. Meanwhile Wellington had drawn together his army, +about 70,000 strong, comprising 13,000 cavalry, and 160 guns; and +relying on the pledge of the word of Blücher, who, conquering pain +and superior to defeat, had promised to come up in line at Waterloo, +“with his whole army,” by the “forenoon at latest,” he calmly awaited +the attack of his renowned antagonist. He might, even at this moment, +have had a much larger force on the ground, for, apprehensive for his +right to the last, he had left 17,000 men far away at Hal, a strategic<span class="pagenum" id="Page_346">[346]</span> +mistake which cannot be justified, and which placed him in grave peril +during the ensuing battle.</p> + +<p>While Waterloo was being thus prepared, Blücher had broken up from +his camps round Wavre, intent on carrying the support to his English +colleague which he felt would secure the Allies a triumph. The veteran +did not suspect that Grouchy was not far off with 34,000 men; the +Duke and Blücher, in fact, believed that Napoleon had all his army in +hand, with the exception of the one corps of Vandamme; and this single +calculation condemns the generalship of the double movement on Wavre +and Waterloo; for had Napoleon had 90,000 men to oppose to the 70,000 +of Wellington, and been able to attack early on the 18th, Blücher +never could have been up in time to avert a defeat that must have +been certain. No hostile column, however, appeared from Gembloux, to +threaten the Prussians on their flank march, and yet the difficulties +and obstacles in the way—imperfectly understood by the Prussian +staff—were so great that the advance from Wavre was exceedingly slow, +and perilously delayed. Bülow, starting from beyond the Dyle at break +of day, was not at Chapelle St. Lambert, with even a few men, until +noon, still far from Napoleon’s right; Pirch and Ziethen were not in +march for Waterloo until 11.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, and even then lingered; +and Thielmann, with a considerable part of his corps, was left behind +to defend Wavre. Nothing but the heroic ardour of Blücher and the +energy of his fierce soldiery enabled the movement to be made at all, +and but for accidents and bad generalship I think it could not have +been accomplished with results leading to success at Waterloo.</p> + +<p>While Blücher was thus toiling to attain Waterloo, Grouchy was on his +way from Gembloux to Wavre. To appreciate thoroughly this passage of +the campaign, I must ask the reader to retrace his steps, and to turn +back to part of the preceding narrative. Grouchy, sent to Gembloux +with 34,000 men, to pursue and to attack Blücher, and, doubtless, to +keep him aloof from Wellington, had not ascertained, even at the close +of the 17th, the exact positions of the whole Prussian army; but he +had been informed that part of it was falling back on Liège, and that +another part was retreating on<span class="pagenum" id="Page_347">[347]</span> Wavre; and he had, in the two letters +cited, apprised Napoleon that “should the mass of the Prussians go +that way,” he would take care to advance on Wavre, and thus “separate +Blücher from Wellington.” This information was not wholly correct, but +it was so to a certain extent; and it ought to have at once suggested +to Grouchy—a general-in-chief in command of an army, and he perfectly +understood his mission—the necessity of marching quickly on Wavre by +the earliest dawn of the 18th; for any Prussian column retiring on +Liège was abandoning altogether the theatre, and might, therefore, +be left alone; whereas a Prussian column directed to Wavre would be +approaching Wellington, and might molest Napoleon. This was the more +essential, because the Emperor, upon leaving for Quatre Bras, had told +Grouchy that his intention was to attack the Duke should he make a +stand “in front of the Forest of Soignies,” the very spot where the +Duke now was; and also, notably, because the Marshal’s despatches were +such as would lead Napoleon to think that no Prussians could even +approach Waterloo. The duty of Grouchy to keep Blücher and the Duke +apart ought to have induced him likewise, in his march from Gembloux, +to draw towards Wavre along roads tending towards the Emperor’s +position and Blücher’s flank, should the Prussians attempt to make for +Waterloo; for thus only could he accomplish his task, of which he was +well aware, as his own messages show. These roads existed, and were +even open; they led across the Dyle by two stone bridges at Mousty and +Ottignies, left intact as those on the Sambre had been on the 15th; +and they could have borne Grouchy’s army in seven hours at latest—the +distance, we have said, is thirteen or fourteen miles—either to +Wavre, or to intermediate points between Wavre and the Duke’s lines at +Waterloo.</p> + +<p>Common sense, therefore, should have inspired Grouchy to leave +Gembloux as early as possible on the 18th, to divide his troops +into two columns at least, in order to expedite the march, and to +make for Wavre by Mousty and Ottignies; and had this been done, I +agree with Jomini, Blücher would not have made his way to Waterloo. +Unfortunately, Grouchy, we have seen, had resolved to advance from +Gembloux on Wavre—and he was hesitating even in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_348">[348]</span> this purpose—not +by the roads that would bring him on Blücher’s flank, but by Sart les +Walhain, and a circuitous road that would place him only on Blücher’s +rear, and therefore in a much worse position to intercept a Prussian +flank march on Waterloo; but though this was a grave strategic error, +it was perhaps not an irreparable mistake. Where Grouchy’s conduct +cannot be excused, and what condemns him at the bar of history, is +that, in opposition to his obvious duty and to the rules of mere common +prudence, he left Gembloux at<a id="FNanchor_53" href="#Footnote_53" class="fnanchor">[53]</a> so late an hour that it became +difficult to attain Wavre in time to be of much use to Napoleon; and +that he so disposed his army as to render its march unnecessarily +and even extraordinarily slow. Instead of breaking up at 3 or 4 +<span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, he did not break up until 8 or 9 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>; instead +of forming his men into two columns at least, he allowed them to march +in one huge column; and thus hours of inestimable worth were lost, and +a movement which ought to have been as quick as possible was retarded +in every conceivable way.</p> + +<p>Napoleon, meantime, had been preparing a grand and decisive attack on +Wellington. His army had been some time in motion to take the positions +assigned to it, when he sent off by Soult a message to Grouchy, at +this moment on his way from Gembloux. In this letter, written at 10 +<span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, the Chief of the Staff informed Grouchy that, besides +the two columns the Marshal had mentioned, intelligence had been +received of a third Prussian column falling back on Wavre by Gentinnes; +and he approved of Grouchy’s intended march on Wavre—inferred from +the despatch of 2 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>—but he enjoined him to approach the +Emperor, and to enter into communication with the main French army, +which, he added, was about to engage in battle “near Waterloo,” before +“the Forest of Soignies.” By 11 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, Napoleon’s legions had +taken their ground on their last field, and the annals of war have +seldom presented so magnificent and imposing a spectacle, described +by the Emperor himself in most striking language. The French army, +spread out<span class="pagenum" id="Page_349">[349]</span> like a gigantic fan, resplendent in all the pomp of battle, +was formed into three great masses; the first, composed of the 2nd +and 1st Corps, deployed in lines from Mon Plaisir on the left to near +Frischermont on the extreme right; the second, a superb array of +cavalry, in line, to the rear of Reille and D’Erlon; and the third, +in close columns, made up of cavalry, of Lobau’s 6th corps, and of +the Imperial Guard, intended to deal the decisive stroke. Napoleon’s +position crossed two roads, one the great highway from Charleroi to +Brussels, the other a good cross road from Nivelles running into +the first at Mont St. Jean; and the three arms could concur in the +attack, though his adversary’s front was protected by obstacles, and +the rain of fifteen hours had made an attack difficult through dense +fields of rye and miry enclosures. The Emperor rode in front of his +line, accompanied by his gorgeous staff; exulting cheers burst from +the martial host, proud of the renown of a hundred victories; and +the sight, as Napoleon calculated, made a profound impression on the +thousands of men in the hostile array who had but recently served under +the Imperial eagles.</p> + +<p>The Duke, however, had his arrangements made; they fully revealed his +defensive skill; and if some of the auxiliaries had faint hearts, +he knew that he could thoroughly rely on his British and most of +his German soldiery. His lines, running from his right to his left, +extended from beyond Hougoumont, in front of Mon Plaisir, to Papelotte +and La Haye, in front of Frischermont; but he had some thousands of men +on his extreme right, holding Merbe Braine and Braine L’Alleud, and +communicating by vedettes with Hal, where, we have seen, he had left +17,000 men; and his extreme left had outposts reaching to Ohain, on the +road to Wavre, whench he expected Blücher. Hill commanded the right +wing, Picton held the left, the Prince of Orange was at the centre; and +though the Duke’s army presented a less compact front than that of his +Imperial foe, it was admirably arranged for a defensive battle. Before +the position stood the château of Hougoumont, covering the right and +the right centre of the Duke; beyond was the farm of La Haye Sainte and +the hamlets of Papelotte and La<span class="pagenum" id="Page_350">[350]</span> Haye, advanced posts on his centre +and left; and these points of vantage had been carefully fortified and +held by considerable bodies of men, to break the first fury of the +French attack. Behind these obstacles the main army held a formidable +position, guarding the two roads from Charleroi to Brussels and that +from Nivelles; and it had this special characteristic, that its +possessors could sweep the assailant’s columns at all points with fire, +and that it afforded cover in the rear to screen the reserves, exactly +the opposite of the case of the Prussians at Ligny. The Duke, however, +like all true generals, did not rely only on a passive defence; a +cross-road just behind the main position enabled all arms to manœuvre +freely, and the cavalry massed behind the British centre had facilities +to advance from most points of the line.</p> + +<p>I can only attempt a mere sketch of one of the most memorable battles +of all time. The plan of Napoleon’s attack, in which we perceive +the last exhibition of his genius in war, was to turn Wellington’s +left—by many degrees the weakest point of the British position—and, +simultaneously, to force his centre; success in this operation would +not only separate the Duke’s army completely from Blücher, but would +cut off its retreat upon Brussels, and would force it into an intricate +country where escape from a victorious foe would be difficult. This +great effort was to be made by the corps of D’Erlon, supported by the +fire of an array of batteries accumulated in front of La Haye Sainte, +and thence as far as Papelotte and La Haye; and it was to be sustained +by the Imperial Guard, by Lobau, and by a large reserve of cavalry; but +it was to be masked by a feint against Wellington’s right, in order +to screen the decisive movement, and to draw the enemy’s attention +away from it. Napoleon gave the signal at 11.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, and +part of Reille’s corps on the Emperor’s left advanced boldly against +Hougoumont, in front, we have seen, of the right of the British +position. The château and the adjoining grounds, composed of a wood, an +orchard and walled enclosures, afforded an excellent centre of defence; +and though the French surrounded the place in thousands—nearly all +Reille’s men became <span class="pagenum" id="Page_351">[351]</span>engaged—and captured most of the approaches to +the house, and though some of the Duke’s auxiliaries fled, the British +Guards stubbornly clung to the spot, and made their resistance good +to the last. The effect of this attack, in which we see precipitate +haste on the part of the French—a defect in their tactics throughout +the day—was to weaken most seriously the second corps, and to turn +a diversion into a principal effort; and this admirably answered the +Duke’s purpose, for the force of his foe was broken on obstacles, and +his own position was left intact.</p> + + <div class="figcenter" id="i_b_350fp"> + <img + class="p1" + src="images/i_b_350fp.jpg" + alt=""> + <p class="p0 sm center">PLAN OF the Battlefield of WATERLOO,<br> +showing positions of OPPOSING ARMIES.</p> + </div> + +<p>It was now 1 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and Napoleon was about to send an order +to Ney for the grand attack, when he descried a body of troops on his +right, at a considerable distance, near Chapelle St. Lambert, and he +was soon apprised that this was the advance guard of Bülow’s corps, +30,000 strong, already gathering menacingly on his flank. The Emperor +detached Lobau, with 10,000 men, to the right, to hold this new foe +in check, exclaiming that “Grouchy had lost him thirty chances”; and +he instantly sent off a message to Grouchy, desiring the Marshal to +approach Waterloo, and if possible, to fall on the rear of Bülow; +some indication, perhaps, that Napoleon believed a part of Grouchy’s +force would be at once available, and possibly showing that the +disputed order of the previous night may have been given. Meanwhile the +batteries bearing on Wellington’s line from La Haye Sainte to Papelotte +and La Haye—a mass of from 70 to 80 guns, opposed by a much weaker +artillery force—had been carrying destruction into the British ranks; +and about 1.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Ney was directed to carry the Duke’s +left, and to storm his centre. The assailants advanced in four huge +columns of extraordinary depth, and with their flanks uncovered—this +vicious formation has been acknowledged, but the author of it is not +known—they moved slowly through the difficult ground; they swept +away a Belgian division, which did not attempt to abide their onset; +but they failed before Picton and his tenacious infantry, though +they attained the crest of the British position. The Duke seized the +occasion with perfect skill; and seeing that the French were already +shaken, he launched against them a mass of heavy cavalry, which, in a +few moments, carried all before it,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_352">[352]</span> forced the enemy’s columns in rout +backwards, and clinging to their unprotected sides, captured two eagles +and 2,000 prisoners. The horsemen, pressing the pursuit too far, were +nearly destroyed by a counter-attack of hostile cavalry from Napoleon’s +lines; but this magnificent charge completely defeated the first great +effort made by the Emperor, and had a marked effect on the fortunes of +the day.</p> + +<p>It was nearly 3 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and Napoleon’s prospects, which had +appeared so brilliant, had become clouded. Bülow had moved forward +from Chapelle St. Lambert; Lobau, greatly outnumbered, was falling +back; a messenger had arrived from Gembloux announcing that Grouchy was +miles distant; and Wellington had completely maintained his position. +It is difficult to determine what, in this state of affairs, was the +exact purpose formed by Napoleon; but he probably resolved to watch +the movement of Bülow; and renouncing his attack on the Duke’s left, +which would seriously endanger his own right, he turned against the +British centre, for the present suspending a decisive effort. Ney +was ordered to seize the advanced post of La Haye Sainte, and the +place was mastered at about 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>,<a id="FNanchor_54" href="#Footnote_54" class="fnanchor">[54]</a> after a furious and +well-contested struggle, in which the French cavalry made their power +manifest. A gap was now opened in Wellington’s front; guns were brought +up to bear on his line; a part of his troops fell back for shelter +behind the crest of his main position. Napoleon seems to have believed +in the beginning of a retreat, and he directed a large part of his +cavalry reserve, with Ney at their head, to advance on the enemy, +his purpose being, it seems probable, to sustain the movement by the +Imperial Guard. The French horsemen advanced in superb confidence; +carried the eminences held by the hostile infantry, and sent terror +into the hearts of the inferior troops who crowded the ranks of +the Duke’s army, though checked by the squares of the British and +German footmen, who exhibited the most heroic constancy. It seems now +certain that Napoleon meant to follow up this partial success, when a +diversion caused<span class="pagenum" id="Page_353">[353]</span> him to forego his purpose. Bülow had hesitated to +make a serious attack; but Blücher had joined his halting lieutenant, +and the fiery veteran, seeing how critical<a id="FNanchor_55" href="#Footnote_55" class="fnanchor">[55]</a> was the situation of +Wellington’s army, ordered an immediate advance on Napoleon’s flank. +The Emperor was now fighting two battles; his attention was for some +time engrossed in repelling Bülow’s attack on his right; and this, +indeed, became so formidable that a considerable part of the Imperial +Guard was required to stem the enemy’s progress. Ney, meanwhile, +had been making desperate efforts with his cavalry to break the +British centre; he employed the last reserve of this splendid force, +undoubtedly against his master’s wishes;<a id="FNanchor_56" href="#Footnote_56" class="fnanchor">[56]</a> but though Wellington’s +line had been severely shaken, and thousands of fugitives covered his +rear, and enormous gaps had been made in his army, the enemy’s cavalry, +unsupported by foot, were unable to force the British position, held by +squares “rooted,” it has been said, “in the earth.”</p> + +<p>The battle was undecided at 7 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>; but Bülow’s attack had +been repelled; Ney maintained his hold on the British front; the +cannon of Grouchy were heard from Wavre, a pledge that he was keeping +back the Prussians; and Reille and D’Erlon had made some progress in +their efforts against the British right and centre. Napoleon thought +his opportunity had come; a final stroke, he believed, would secure +him victory, and forming the Guard into two great columns, supported +by guns and the wreck of his cavalry, he directed one against the +Duke’s centre, holding the second in reserve to sustain the movement. +Wellington’s army had suffered immense losses; death, desertion, +flight, had carried off thousands; undoubtedly he was in serious peril; +and he now probably felt how grave had been the error of leaving 17,000 +men at Hal. But, though “night or Blücher,” significant words which +fell from him,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_354">[354]</span> showed that he knew his danger, he had made everything +ready to meet his foe; and drawing in his right wing behind his centre, +he had even now a powerful reserve to oppose to Napoleon’s supreme +effort. The onset of the first column of the Guard for a time overbore +all resistance; but it was arrested by the British Guards, by the +renowned 52nd, and by a division of Dutchmen led by Chassé, and the +defeated column swayed slowly backward, expecting the support of the +approaching reserve. The needful assistance was never to come. Just +at this moment part of the two corps of Ziethen and Pirch came into +line. The French right was suddenly rent asunder, and a mass of British +cavalry flooding the plain spread confusion and panic through the +beaten army. The Duke now ordered a general advance; a terrible scene +of ruin and disaster followed. The Imperial Guard fought nobly to the +last; but the rest of Napoleon’s routed troops became a mere chaos of +dissolving fugitives, pursued with relentless hate by the Prussians, +and scattered along the roads that lead across the Sambre. Not thirty +thousand men of the perishing host were ever, probably, seen under arms +again. The losses of the victors were not less than 22,000 or 23,000 +men, and nearly 7,000 of these were Prussians.</p> + +<p>Napoleon at Waterloo gave little proof of the energy and resource of +Jena and Austerlitz. The plan of his attack was, indeed, perfect, and +during the greater part of the day he was in a position of extreme +difficulty, and he was badly seconded by his lieutenants, who displayed +feverish impatience and great want of caution. But he did not prevent +the waste of his troops round Hougoumont; he allowed Ney to engage a +large part at least of his cavalry in a premature movement; he did +not seize the occasion he perhaps had to attack in full force before +Bülow’s diversion. He was remiss and inactive throughout the battle; +and this was due, there is now no doubt, to physical exhaustion<a id="FNanchor_57" href="#Footnote_57" class="fnanchor">[57]</a> and +long impaired health. The Duke, on the other hand, was the soul of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_355">[355]</span> +the defence; he conducted the battle with wonderful skill, directing +every movement at the right moment, making counter attacks when these +were opportune, keeping a sufficient reserve for the supreme trial, +and breathing into his men his stern sense of duty, his tenacity, and +inflexible constancy. His management of the contest was so admirable +that he held his ground, though he had expected Blücher in force on the +field before mid-day, and though, humanly speaking, he must have lost +the battle but for the intervention of the Prussian army—his composite +force of 70,000 men, much weaker in guns, was not to be compared to the +72,000 troops under the Emperor’s flag—still, I venture to think that +even without this aid, he would not have suffered the crushing defeat +on which Napoleon’s hopes for the campaign rested. His one mistake, in +fact, on this memorable day was the isolating 17,000 men at Hal; this +certainly exposed him to real danger; but then this was a strategic not +a tactical error. Nevertheless, Waterloo was decided by combinations +outside the field; and we turn to the operations of Grouchy, the main +cause, I believe of Napoleon’s overthrow.</p> + +<p>The Marshal breaking up, we have seen, from Gembloux at least five or +six hours too late, and marching with extraordinary slewness, reached +Sart les Walhain at about 11:30—he was still eight or ten miles from +Wavre—and at that place the thunder of cannon, far to the left, gave +token of a great distant battle. Gérard, with true insight, at once +urged Grouchy to cross the Dyle by Mousty and Ottignies, and to draw +near the Emperor, known to be at Waterloo; for by so doing, Gérard +justly argued, Wavre would be turned should it be attacked, and the +French would attain the flank of Blücher, who, Gérard felt certain, +was trying to join Wellington. Grouchy refused to listen to sagacious +counsels, which, had they inspired him twelve hours before, would have +perhaps changed the course of events in Europe, and which even now +might have borne fruit; and he set off with his whole force for Wavre, +where he expected to find the Prussian army. By this time Bülow was +at Chapelle St. Lambert, but with a weak advanced guard only. Pirch +and Ziethen were just breaking up<span class="pagenum" id="Page_356">[356]</span> from Wavre, and Thielmann was about +to join them; but a great change took place in the Prussian movements +when, at about 1 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, intelligence came that the enemy was +approaching Wavre. Part of the corps of Pirch was ordered to fall back; +the march of Ziethen was greatly retarded; and Thielmann was directed +to remain at Wavre, and to make head against the scarcely expected +foe. By 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, Grouchy was close to Wavre, having marched on +the place, not across the Dyle towards the flank of Blücher, but along +the river, thus striking Blücher’s extreme rear, and pushing him, so +to speak, on Wellington; the Marshal opened fire at once on the town, +having just received Soult’s letter of 10 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, which, no +doubt, sanctioned an advance on Wavre, but ordered Grouchy to approach +the Emperor. It is useless to follow the events of a combat of no +importance to the result of the campaign; Thielmann, with only 18,000 +men, contrived to hold Grouchy some hours in check; and meanwhile +Bülow, completely free to act, and Pirch and Ziethen, all danger +removed, succeeded in reaching Waterloo and in crushing Napoleon. Yet, +bad as it was, the position of Grouchy made the Prussians cautious +and kept them back; Pirch and Ziethen were only just up in time; and +of an army of 90,000 men, not 50,000 made their way to Waterloo. By +7 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Grouchy received the letter of 1 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, sent +off from Napoleon’s lines at the news of the apparition of Bülow; the +Marshal crossed the Dyle, and tried to approach the Emperor; but the +movement was now altogether too late; the French army and its chief had +succumbed.</p> + +<p>The junction of Blücher and Wellington, therefore, led to the +overwhelming defeat of Waterloo; but for this, Napoleon would have won +the battle—the chances, at least, were all in his favour—despite the +tactical errors of the French, and the admirable defensive resource of +Wellington. It follows that the great and capital question, as regards +this part of the Campaign of 1815, is, Could Grouchy have prevented +this junction, for if he could, he must be held responsible for the +catastrophe which befell the Emperor? The answer must largely depend +on conjecture; but an impartial student of war, I think, especially +if he can weigh evidence, will give it distinctly in the affirmative. +Considerations,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_357">[357]</span> obvious and yet decisive, should have urged Grouchy, +we have seen, to leave Gembloux in the early dawn of the 18th, to cross +the Dyle at Mousty and Ottignies, and to approach Wavre as quickly +as possible; the idea, it will be observed, flashed on Gérard’s mind +the moment he heard the cannon of Waterloo. If the Marshal had taken +this rational course, he would have been over the river at about 11 +<span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>,<a id="FNanchor_58" href="#Footnote_58" class="fnanchor">[58]</a> and, in that event, as affairs stood, he would +have seriously menaced the flank of Bülow, toiling painfully, in long +straggling columns, on the way from Wavre to Chapelle St. Lambert, and +he would have been nearer Napoleon’s lines than the corps of Ziethen, +of Pirch, and of Thielmann, still near Wavre, and not on the march for +Waterloo.</p> + +<p>What, in these circumstances, would Blücher have done, giving him +full credit for his daring and energy? He would have been surprised +in a perilous flank march, through a difficult and almost impassable +country, for he had no conception that Grouchy would be near; and +his army would have been almost divided by an enemy threatening its +separate parts. In this state of things I cannot doubt but that he +would not have permitted Bülow to advance farther, or his three +remaining corps to make a move towards Waterloo, until he had disposed +of Grouchy; he would have drawn the mass of his forces together. All +this would have been an affair of hours. Grouchy could have made a +prolonged resistance, and, meanwhile, Napoleon, free to bring the +whole strength of his more powerful army against the Duke, would +have triumphed over his much weaker enemy. The same results would, +have, perhaps, followed had Grouchy, without attempting to cross +the Dyle, reached Wavre at 11 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, as he might have done; +Pirch, Ziethen, and Thielmann would not have moved; Bülow, isolated, +would not have dared to attack, and the French army would still have +gained a victory. Even had Grouchy, at the eleventh hour, listened to +the excellent advice of Gérard, and crossed the Dyle at Mousty and +Ottignies, he might possibly have<span class="pagenum" id="Page_358">[358]</span> averted a complete catastrophe. The +movement could not have interfered with the attack of Bülow, but it +might have arrested Pirch and Ziethen, and it was these chiefs who, at +the last moment, dealt the French army the final mortal stroke.</p> + +<p>It is impossible, therefore, to acquit Grouchy; he is mainly to +blame for the result of Waterloo. This conclusion, however, has been +assailed, with confidence, on two lines of argument. Napoleon, it is +said, was not aware, from first to last, whither Blücher had gone; he +despatched Grouchy from Sombreffe too late; Gembloux was not the true +point on which the force of the Marshal should have been directed. +Napoleon gave Grouchy no precise orders; he misled his lieutenant, +and kept him in the dark; he approved, late on the 18th, the march on +Wavre, and he has, therefore, to thank himself for his own overthrow. +We may grant the premises, yet they do not sustain the inference or +exonerate Grouchy. Admitting that Napoleon believed that Blücher was +falling back on his base after Ligny; that he should have sent Grouchy +on his track much sooner; and that Gembloux was not the best place +to be assigned for the restraining wing; still, it was the duty of +Grouchy, knowing what he had learned on the 17th, to have left Gembloux +at daybreak on the 18th, and marched rapidly on or towards Wavre; and +had he done this, he would, I believe, have stopped the Prussians +and averted Waterloo. As for Napoleon not having given directions to +Grouchy of an exact kind, and having sanctioned the tardy advance on +Wavre, the first statement assumes that Grouchy was not an independent +general-in-chief, in command of a distinct army, and the second is +opposed to the known evidence. Napoleon approved of the march to Wavre, +but not at a late hour, or at a snail’s pace; he certainly thought, +and had a right to think, if a Prussian force existed at Wavre—the +reader will recollect the letter of the 18th, pointing to his growing +suspicion of the fact—that his lieutenant would be able to hold it in +check, and this required an early and speedy march from Gembloux. This +reasoning, in fact, errs in two respects; it ascribes to the mistakes +Napoleon made results with which they are not chargeable; it<span class="pagenum" id="Page_359">[359]</span> assumes +that Napoleon, in front of Wellington, was to instruct Grouchy, in +front of Blücher, in his conduct, in the minutest details; it takes for +granted that Grouchy, the head of the army, was a mere puppet to be +directed in every operation he was to undertake, and that by his chief +at a wide distance from him. The argument, when examined, falls to the +ground; it cannot stand the test of impartial criticism.</p> + +<p>The second contention, urged by Charras, rests on the fact that the +army of Grouchy was very much weaker than that of Blücher; but though +made with a parade of science, it does not mislead a true student of +war. Grouchy, the argument runs, had but 34,000 men to oppose to the +90,000 of Blücher; the Prussian was an able, nay, a great soldier; and +had Grouchy done all that man could do, he could not, his force was so +inferior, have prevented the junction of Blücher and Wellington, and +conjured away the disaster of Waterloo. Assume that Grouchy manœuvred +rightly, had left Gembloux at the first possible moment, had marched +rapidly, had seized Mousty and Ottignies, and had mastered the Dyle +before mid-day, his adversary would have at once recognized, that the +Prussians were nearly three to one to the French, and this would have +determined Blücher’s purpose. The Prussian marshal, aware of this fact, +would have sent Pirch and Ziethen to hold Grouchy in check, and marched +on Waterloo with Bülow and Thielmann; or he would have allowed Grouchy +to draw near his flank, and, fending him off, would have moved on +Wellington with three-fourths of his army at least; and in either case +he would have joined the Duke, and both would have overwhelmed Napoleon.</p> + +<p>This looks well on paper, and in mere theory; but is contradicted by +the realities of war. Had Grouchy attained the Dyle by noon, he would +have completely surprised Blücher, have caught him with an army far +apart, on a flank march of the most critical kind; and in this position +of affairs it is morally certain that Blücher would have reconnoitred +and paused, would have waited to draw together his army, and would +have fought a pitched battle with Grouchy, before he even thought of +uniting<span class="pagenum" id="Page_360">[360]</span> with Wellington. In that event, inferior in numbers as he was, +Grouchy would have detained the Prussians for hours; Blücher would +have lost the chance of joining the Duke; and Waterloo would have +been a French victory. The lessons of war, and the great authority of +Jomini in this matter, confute the reasoning of a partizan censor, +and the very incidents of the day point to the same conclusion. The +mere apparition of Grouchy on the wrong bank of the Dyle, late as the +hour was when he had approached Wavre, delayed the general movement +of the Prussian army; and half of it never attained Waterloo. How +different must the result have been had Grouchy crossed the Dyle at +the true point, and gathered upon the flank of Blücher; in that case +not even one Prussian division would, I think, have come to the aid of +Wellington.</p> + +<p>Grouchy, in short, was the Emperor’s evil genius on the great and +terrible day of Waterloo; Napoleon has written, with perfect truth, +that he could no more foresee his lieutenant’s conduct than he could +assume that Grouchy would be swallowed up, with his army, by an +unexpected earthquake. The Campaign of 1815 may be summed up in a +few sentences. Striking at the extreme right, for the time isolated, +of the hosts about to invade France, and screening the movement with +wonderful skill, Napoleon collects an army of 128,000 men on the edge +of France, running into Belgium, his object being to attack Blücher +and Wellington, commanding about 224,000 men, but whose two armies +were widely divided, in scattered groups, from Liège to Ghent and +Charleroi. The Emperor, aiming at the allied centre, the weakest and +most assailable point, begins the movement on the 15th of June; he +does not, owing to a set of accidents, reach the strategic points +of Quatre Bras and Sombreffe on the true line of junction of his +antagonists, the lateral road from Nivelles to Namur; but his columns +at nightfall are close to these, and his adversaries already are placed +in danger. Blücher, meanwhile, acting as Napoleon had hoped, marches to +Sombreffe with three-fourths of his army only; the Duke, fulfilling the +expectations of his foe, lingers, hesitates, and delays his movements; +and on the 16th Napoleon has a grand chance of reaching and beating +his enemy in detail.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_361">[361]</span> His plans, if formed on a false impression, are +nevertheless so correct in principle, that had they been carried out +ably the Prussian army must have been destroyed; but Ney, Reille, +and D’Erlon failed: the Emperor is perhaps over-cautious in not +pressing D’Erlon’s advance on St. Amand; and Blücher escapes, through +misadventures, which alone save him from complete ruin. Ligny, however, +is a real French victory; and, meanwhile, Ney, though unequal to his +task, fights an indecisive action at Quatre Bras; and though forced to +fall back, he so far succeeds that he prevents Wellington from sending +aid to his colleague, and, in fact, gains a strategic advantage. The +close of the 16th sees Napoleon victorious upon the main scene of the +contest, having only just failed to make Ligny a counterpart of the +rout of Jena.</p> + +<p>The 17th has come; the Allies, compelled to abandon their proper line +of junction, retreat separately and in distant groups on a second line, +between Wavre and Waterloo; they intend ultimately to unite on this; +and this project, though crowned with success, was false strategy +that might have proved their ruin. The French army, on this eventful +day, makes a long halt not easy to explain; the retiring enemy is not +pursued or watched; and this delay and remissness—utterly unlike the +energy of Napoleon on the path of victory—and probably largely due +to his declining health, save Blücher and Wellington from the gravest +peril, and singularly aid their future projects. Napoleon does not +move until noon from Ligny, his purpose being to attack Wellington, +for several hours falling back on Waterloo; he has a noble army 72,000 +strong to cope with 70,000 men of the Duke, more than a third of these +being inferior troops; and he detaches Grouchy, with about 34,000, +to pursue Blücher and to keep him away from Wellington. The Emperor +follows the Duke from Quatre Bras, and finds his adversary in force +near Waterloo; and meantime, though he remains convinced that Blücher +is retiring on his base, he directs Grouchy to occupy Gembloux, having +heard that Prussians were approaching that place. Grouchy reaches +Gembloux by the night of the 17th; he<span class="pagenum" id="Page_362">[362]</span> informs his master that the +Prussian army is in retreat in two great masses, one directed to Wavre, +the other to Liège: and he shows that he understands his mission, and +that he will endeavour “to separate Blücher and Wellington.” This +report perfectly reassures the Emperor; he makes preparations for a +decisive battle; but the elements interfere to retard his purpose, and +he does not attack the Duke until near noon on the 18th. Meanwhile +Grouchy, whose plain duty it was to leave Gembloux early, and to march +on Wavre across the Dyle on the flank of Blücher as rapidly as his +troops could move, breaks up hours too late, proceeds with strange +slowness, and reaches Wavre in the afternoon only, striking Blücher +in the extreme rear, but still detaining a part of his army. During +all this time the great fight of Waterloo has been raging with varying +fortunes; the French tactics are faulty, the Duke’s admirable. In +the afternoon Bülow reaches Napoleon; the Emperor is engaged in a +double battle. Ney recklessly squanders his master’s cavalry, but +Bülow is for a time repulsed; and the Emperor makes a final effort to +break Wellington’s centre with the Guard. The attack fails, but all +is not over until part of two fresh Prussian corps turns the scale +decisively against the French, and Waterloo ends in a frightful rout. +The Prussians, in fact, who might have been detained by Grouchy, were +all but left free to advance on Waterloo; they reached the field in the +very nick of time. Grouchy kept back directly only 18,000 men; and yet, +miserable as his operations were, they indirectly retarded the Prussian +army, a significant proof of what might have occurred had Grouchy been +a capable chief.</p> + +<p>Having reviewed the incidents of this great Campaign, let us disengage +the permanent lessons it teaches an impartial student of war. Napoleon +operated with too small an army: 128,000 men could hardly overcome +224,000. He had a right to count on his transcendent genius; he had +no right to assume that the Allies would make the grave strategic +mistakes they made, or would give him the opportunities they gave. In +consequence of this numerical weakness he was compelled to divide his +army into two masses not sufficiently connected by an intermediate +body; and this partly<span class="pagenum" id="Page_363">[363]</span> explains, though it does not excuse, the errors +of Ney to the left on the 16th, and those of Grouchy to the right +on the 18th. Had the Emperor had the 20,000 men he had intended to +bring into the field, he would have had a force sufficient to fill +this interval, and in that event he would have doubtless triumphed. +The intellectual powers of Napoleon were splendidly exhibited in the +contest; his plan for the Campaign is a masterpiece of art; his plan of +attack at Waterloo defies criticism; his general ideas, though he made +mistakes—for the greatest generals must necessarily err—reveal the +wholly unrivalled strategist. His bodily strength, however, failed him: +to this, I doubt not, we ought to ascribe the delays and carelessness +of the 17th, and certainly this weakness had much to do with the +inactivity and slackness he betrayed at Waterloo. It may well be, +too, that his complete faith in himself had been diminished by recent +events. Like Richard at Bosworth, he has recorded—</p> + + <div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div>I had not the alacrity of spirit,</div> + <div>Or cheer of mind that I was wont to have;</div> + </div> + </div> + </div> + +<p>and the great player against Fate may, in this mighty hazard, have +thrown his last die with a trembling hand. We may perhaps see +hesitation, and even timidity, in his allowing D’Erlon to return to +Quatre Bras, and in not pressing the movement on St. Amand home; +and the same shortcomings may be possibly traced in his not seizing +a real chance at Waterloo, when La Haye Sainte had been taken, and +before Bülow had made a serious attack on his flank. Yet it was his +lieutenants’ errors that lost the campaign; on the 16th they failed +on the left; Grouchy, on the 18th was worse than useless; and we can +understand his bitter expression that victory was twice wrested from +his hands through incomprehensible faults of subordinates. In this +campaign, so to speak, the sun of Austerlitz seems about to break out +in its old splendour; but malignant influences intercept its rays, and +it sets at last in disastrous night.</p> + +<p>To turn to the Allies, Blücher and Wellington were adversaries of +a very different kind from the Beaulieu and Colli of 1796. Both +certainly, made great strategic mistakes; both were more<span class="pagenum" id="Page_364">[364]</span> than once +in imminent peril; and we see in their conduct the divided counsels +repeatedly fatal to a Coalition and its chiefs. But both, in different +ways, were great soldiers; they cordially co-operated in a common +design; and the heroism of Blücher, mastering defeat, and the tenacity +and tactical skill of Wellington, are admirable specimens of great +parts in war. Another cause of the ultimate success of the Allies +should be carefully noted. Napoleon, in his last address to his troops, +referred scornfully to the Prussians of Jena, and exclaimed “Are not +we and they the same men?” and like many great chiefs he took no heed +of national and patriotic passion. The Prussian army of 1815 was not, +however, “the same men” as the Prussian army of 1806; it was fired +with an intense hatred of France, and with an intense love of the +Fatherland; and it was capable of very different efforts from those +of the serf-like troops of Brunswick. Napoleon, relying on former +experience, believed that the army defeated at Ligny would recoil +on its base, and, beyond doubt, would not make a dangerous march on +Waterloo; but the reasoning of strategy, as has often happened, was +baffled by the ardour of a devoted soldiery; though had Grouchy been +equal to his task all this energy would have come to nothing. In Spain +and Russia Napoleon had suffered immense disasters from his inborn +contempt of patriotic and popular sentiment; and this indifference +had something to do with the final issue of the strife at Waterloo. +But when all has been said, the Emperor’s genius all but triumphed in +the campaign of 1815; he was nearly successful although opposed to +adversaries almost twofold in numbers; and victory was only wrested +from him through the mistakes of others. Notwithstanding Zama, Hannibal +remains the pre-eminent figure of ancient war; Napoleon is the great +captain of modern times, though ruin overtook him on the plains of +Belgium.</p> + + <div class="figcenter"> + <img + class="p2" + src="images/i_050.jpg" + alt=""> + </div> + + + +<p class="center xs">Printed by W. H. Allen & Co., Limited, 13, Waterloo Place, London, S.W.</p> + + +<div class="footnotes"><h2>FOOTNOTES:</h2> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_1" href="#FNanchor_1" class="label">[1]</a> <i>Napoleon Correspondence</i>, vol. xxxi., p. 365.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_2" href="#FNanchor_2" class="label">[2]</a> Compare this with the movement, described on p. 8, which +was made by Gustavus Adolphus in pursuit of Tilly.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_3" href="#FNanchor_3" class="label">[3]</a> French armies had before this taken many of these +fortresses, but they had been retaken on the first turn of fortune.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_4" href="#FNanchor_4" class="label">[4]</a> Napoleon never made use of lines of this kind, but nothing +escaped him, and he had the example of Torres Vedras; at St. Helena he +made admirable observations on this system of defence.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_5" href="#FNanchor_5" class="label">[5]</a> Every real student of the wars of the seventeenth and +eighteenth centuries knows the difficulty of forming anything like +a just estimate of the numbers of the armies in conflict. This is +mainly due to the systematic practice of enumeration by battalions and +squadrons, bodies always in a state of change; and besides, national +pride and interest have obscured the truth. I have taken some pains to +collate the authorities, and to arrive at an estimate approximately +correct.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_6" href="#FNanchor_6" class="label">[6]</a> This march, in fact, strongly resembles Eugene’s famous +march up the Po in 1706, described by Napoleon as “a marvellous piece +of audacity,” but it was far more perilous.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_7" href="#FNanchor_7" class="label">[7]</a> Coxe, though a dull is a conscientious writer, and +occasionally he had good military assistance. Alone, as far as I know, +of commentators on the campaign of 1704, he points out the risk to +which, at this juncture, Eugene and Marlborough were exposed. Napoleon +wrote on Marlborough, but his observations have never been published; +it would be most interesting to know his judgment on this passage in +the campaign.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_8" href="#FNanchor_8" class="label">[8]</a> It is more difficult to arrive at an estimate of the +strength of the contending armies in the case of Malplaquet than in +that of any other great battle of the war. I think my calculation is +fairly accurate.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_9" href="#FNanchor_9" class="label">[9]</a> “<i>Semper et ubique fideles</i>” was the proud and +well-merited device on the flag of the Irish brigade.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_10" href="#FNanchor_10" class="label">[10]</a> This is the sagacious and just judgment of Wellington, a +genius of quite a different kind, but a great admirer of Napoleon.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_11" href="#FNanchor_11" class="label">[11]</a> Bulletin of the Grand Army the day after the battle: +“L’armée ennemie était nombreuse et montrait une belle cavalerie; ses +manœuvres étaient executées avec précision et rapidité.”</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_12" href="#FNanchor_12" class="label">[12]</a> This saying has been ascribed to Napoleon; it belongs to +Turenne: “Les plus habiles sont ceux qui font seulement le moins de +fautes.”—<i>Memoires</i>, p. 5. Ed. Hachette, 1877.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_13" href="#FNanchor_13" class="label">[13]</a> The last words of Napoleon’s despatch to Masséna are +characteristic: “Activité. Activité, vitesse! Je me recommande à vous.”</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_14" href="#FNanchor_14" class="label">[14]</a> The monarchies and aristocracies of old Europe had +an immense opinion of the Archduke Charles; but his reputation has +steadily declined. He was as inferior to Napoleon as Pompey, the +admiration of the Roman patricians, was to Cæsar.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_15" href="#FNanchor_15" class="label">[15]</a> “Mais, Monseigneur, figurez vous qu’au lieu de Bonaparte, +c’est Jourdan que vous avez devant vous,” was the exclamation of +an aide-de-camp, when the Archduke was in this mood of fear and +hesitation.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_16" href="#FNanchor_16" class="label">[16]</a> See a masterly paper, from Wellington’s hand, on the +campaign of 1812. The Duke’s knowledge of the facts is not complete, +for the <i>Napoleon Correspondence</i> had not yet been published; but +the criticism is admirable. I have made ample use of it in this sketch. +<i>Despatches, Correspondence, and Memoranda of Field-Marshal the Duke +of Wellington, K.G.</i>, vol. iii., 1866.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_17" href="#FNanchor_17" class="label">[17]</a> Napoleon was certainly unwell; poison has been suspected; +but probably he was again showing signs of disease.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_18" href="#FNanchor_18" class="label">[18]</a> It has been said—and the fact is probable—that the +general scheme of the operations of the Allies was formed by Moreau, a +chief of the second order, but a capable, sagacious, and far-sighted +soldier. Their strategy was better than that of the Russians in 1812, +and than their own in 1814.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_19" href="#FNanchor_19" class="label">[19]</a> Owing to the losses of the French by disease, desertion, +and defection, it is impossible to determine, even approximately, the +numbers of the Grand Army in this part of the campaign. Those of the +Allies are better known; but patriotism and pride have tended to make +them smaller than they were.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_20" href="#FNanchor_20" class="label">[20]</a> Napier insists on this, though he was so enthusiastic an +idolator of Napoleon that he is not an impartial judge.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_21" href="#FNanchor_21" class="label">[21]</a> Napoleon’s exultation at his feats and those of his army +was extravagant. “Ce qu’ils ont fait,” he wrote on 12th February, “ne +peut se comparer qu’aux romans de chevalerie et aux hommes d’armes +de ces temps où, par l’effet de leurs armures et l’adresse de leurs +chevaux, un en battait trois ou quatre cents.”</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_22" href="#FNanchor_22" class="label">[22]</a> Lord Caetlereagh, who was at this council, could not +comprehend why Blücher and Schwartzenburg could not defeat Napoleon +with their enormous superiority of numbers; and demurred to the +expense—England was the paymaster of the Coalition—of bringing +up Wintzingerode and Bülow. “Milord,” said a bystander, “vous ne +connaissez pas cet homme!”</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_23" href="#FNanchor_23" class="label">[23]</a> The authorities on the state of Napoleon’s health during +the campaign of 1815 will be found in Mr. Dorsey Gardener’s book on +Waterloo, pp. 34, 36.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_24" href="#FNanchor_24" class="label">[24]</a> “Si le maréchal Grouchy eût campé devant Wavre le soir +du 17, l’armée prussienne n’eut fait aucun détachment pour secourir +l’armée anglaise.”—<i>Correspondence</i>, vol. xxxi., p. 213. No +doubt Grouchy could not have reached Wavre on the night of the 17th, +but he might have been there at 11 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the morning of the +18th; and the result would have been practically the same. Bülow would +not have attacked, or perhaps even approached Waterloo, had he been +isolated.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_25" href="#FNanchor_25" class="label">[25]</a> Jomini knew more about Napoleon than any other +commentator on the Emperor and is naturally astonished at the delays +of the 17th of June. The real cause was not then known, but Jomini’s +words are significant. <i>Précis de la Campagne de 1815</i>, p. 185. +“Pour ceux qui se rappellent l’étonnante activité qui présida aux +évènements de Ratisbonne en 1809, de Dresde en 1813, de Champaubert et +de Montmirail en 1814, ce nouveau temps perdu sera toujours une chose +inexplicable de la part de Napoléon.”</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_26" href="#FNanchor_26" class="label">[26]</a> Lord Wellesley’s epitaph, chosen by himself, is +strikingly characteristic:—“Super et Garamantas et Indos protulit +imperium.”</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_27" href="#FNanchor_27" class="label">[27]</a> It is most remarkable how many of the Irish Protestant +aristocracy have distinguished themselves in India. Besides the two +Wellesleys, the names of Eyre Coote, of Gough, of the Lawrences, of +Canning, of Dufferin, will at once occur to the reader. This, no doubt, +may in part be traced to their hereditary ascendency over the Celtic +Irish.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_28" href="#FNanchor_28" class="label">[28]</a> Napoleon wrote thus to Clarke 18th August 1809: “Quelle +belle occasion on a manquée! 30,000 Anglais et 150 lieues des côtes +devant 100,000 hommes des meilleures troupes du monde! Mon Dieu! qu’est +ce qu’une armée sans chef!”—<i>Correspondence</i>, vol. xix., p. 362.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_29" href="#FNanchor_29" class="label">[29]</a> Napoleon received the news of Salamanca on the eve of +Borodino. His criticism of Marmont is striking and just.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_30" href="#FNanchor_30" class="label">[30]</a> I refer to the combined forces of the Allies. The Duke’s +army was from 100,000 to 106,000 strong, counting all the troops in +Belgium.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_31" href="#FNanchor_31" class="label">[31]</a> This is the expression of Napoleon in a somewhat +analogous case. The orders of a Government, if not precise, obviously +should not excuse a general-in-chief on the spot.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_32" href="#FNanchor_32" class="label">[32]</a> Chanzy, a singularly modest and truthful man, gives +this account of the state of the Germans after the retreat to Le +Mans: “L’ennemi, contenu partout, était devenu de moins en moins +entreprenant; il était facile de voir que pas plus que les nôtres, +ses troupes n’avaient pas résisté à la fatigué; ses hommes étaient, +eux aussi, grandement démoralisés par cette resistance d’une lutte +qui se reproduisait constamment, alors qu’ils la croyaient terminée; +le désordre se mettait parfois dans ses colonnes malgré sa solide +organisation et sa discipline.”</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_33" href="#FNanchor_33" class="label">[33]</a> This message from Berlin, at this juncture, is very +significant:—“La position militaire est regardée comme critique dans +les cercles bien informés. On a des inquietudes sur l’issue finale de +la lutte.”</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_34" href="#FNanchor_34" class="label">[34]</a> My limits preclude me from citing extracts from these +authorities. But I shall, when it is required, indicate them; and I +hope I shall accurately express their meaning and purport.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_35" href="#FNanchor_35" class="label">[35]</a> Napoleon had shown signs of illness in the campaigns of +1812, 1813, and 1814, and was in bad health in 1815. Mr. Dorsey Gardner +in his useful work on Waterloo, pp. 34–36, has adduced ample evidence +to prove that Napoleon was unwell and out of sorts on the 16th, 17th, +and 18th June; and this, I know, was remarked by Soult on the morning +of Waterloo.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_36" href="#FNanchor_36" class="label">[36]</a> After the publication of these despatches, and of other +documents, especially those collected by the son of Ney, we must reject +Napoleon’s statement that Ney received “positive orders,” to occupy +Quatre Bras on the evening of the 15th, and to advance from that +place, “at daybreak,” on the 16th. Still, I think Napoleon indicated a +movement of the kind to his lieutenant on the 15th; the <i>Moniteur</i> +of the 18th contains a despatch of the 15th, which announces that “Ney +had his head-quarters at Quatre Bras.” The point, however, is not of +very great importance; had the Emperor’s orders of 8 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on +the 16th been intelligently and rapidly carried out, Ney would have +done all that was required, and Napoleon would have gained decisive +success.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_37" href="#FNanchor_37" class="label">[37]</a> The failure of Ney to attain Quatre Bras, and to send +a division to Marbais, before the arrival of a sufficient part of +Wellington’s army to arrest the Marshal’s progress, saved Blücher +from destruction on the 16th of June, and was fraught with the most +momentous consequences, and the truth on this subject has been +studiously concealed. Charras and the detractors of Napoleon, eager to +condemn the Emperor, and English writers, desirous of hiding what might +have happened through Wellington’s tardiness, concur in insinuating +that Reille and D’Erlon were not to begin their movement until they had +received their orders from Ney, who would have to send despatches from +Frasnes back to them, and contend, therefore, that Ney could not have +been in great force at Quatre Bras before 3.30 or 4.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, +at which time he was fully engaged with Wellington, and could not +even master Quatre Bras. This, however, is a complete mistake: Reille +and D’Erlon have acknowledged that they received the order for their +movement from the aide-de-camp at about 10 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>; and, in +fact, Ney could have swept all before him at Quatre Bras soon after 1 +<span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and have made the detachment to Marbais, had the order +been properly carried out. See the letters of D’Erlon, of Reille, and +of Durutte, quoted by the Prince La Tour D’Auvergne in his book on +Waterloo, p. 149, p. 170, and p. 171.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_38" href="#FNanchor_38" class="label">[38]</a> A host of witnesses, Soult is the most conspicuous—his +well-known testimony of the 17th of June, the day after Ligny, has +been shamefully garbled by Charras—have proved that Napoleon sent +this order to D’Erlon; and the fact, I conceive, is indisputable. It +is denied, in the face of the evidence, by those only who, seeking to +censure Napoleon and to excuse Wellington, pretend that the Emperor +had not the means of gaining a decisive victory over Blücher after +1 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the 16th of June. Even after the failure of the +projected movement from Marbais the means were ample; D’Erlon would +have annihilated Blücher had he struck the Prussian right and rear at +St. Amand.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_39" href="#FNanchor_39" class="label">[39]</a> This was Dejean, a favourite aide-de-camp of Napoleon. +As the evidence shows that the Emperor ordered D’Erlon to Ligny, so it +indicates that he must have permitted D’Erlon to abandon his march, +and to retrace his steps towards Quatre Bras when peremptorily ordered +to do so by Ney. This, in the events which happened, was over-caution, +for D’Erlon would have destroyed Blücher had he carried out Napoleon’s +order, and Ney, hard pressed as he was at Quatre Bras, could have held +his ground against Wellington without the aid of D’Erlon; and this, +I conceive, is the reason that Napoleon’s commentaries on this most +important subject are vague and unsatisfactory.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_40" href="#FNanchor_40" class="label">[40]</a> D’Erlon detached a division to observe St. Amand before +he counter-marched to Quatre Bras. This division, however, merely +reconnoitred, and took no part in the battle; it was simply useless.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_41" href="#FNanchor_41" class="label">[41]</a> With Kellerman’s heavy cavalry.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_42" href="#FNanchor_42" class="label">[42]</a> “L’armée Prussienne a été mise en déroute” is the +expression of Soult, in the well known letter of the 17th, written +under the eye perhaps of Napoleon, certainly according to his ideas.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_43" href="#FNanchor_43" class="label">[43]</a> Dorsey Gardner (p. 34) cites conclusive testimony to show +“that Napoleon went to bed immediately after the close of the battle of +Ligny, and was in such a condition that none of his staff dared enter +his chamber to procure his sanction for vitally important orders, and +that on the morning of the 17th there was the same impossibility of +getting access to him.”</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_44" href="#FNanchor_44" class="label">[44]</a> See, again, Soult’s letter of 17th, “La journée +d’aujourd’hui est nécessaire pour terminer cette opération, et pour +compléter les munitions, rallier les militaires isolés et fair rentrer +les détachements.”</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_45" href="#FNanchor_45" class="label">[45]</a> What Napoleon might have accomplished on the morning of +the 17th is very ably shown by Charras (p. 203, vol. i.), but with too +much regard to mere theory.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_46" href="#FNanchor_46" class="label">[46]</a> This has been denied by Grouchy, but is distinctly to be +inferred from his own letters; and, as Jomini observes, the situation +dictated the order. Gerard, who however, is unjust to Grouchy, declares +that Napoleon gave the most precise instructions nearly to this effect.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_47" href="#FNanchor_47" class="label">[47]</a> Napoleon, conscious of the evil results of the delays of +the 17th, condemns Ney for not having fallen on Wellington, at least +when the Imperial army was on the march. This criticism, however, is +not well founded, or even honest. Napoleon had a right to complain of +Ney on the 16th and 18th, not on the 17th.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_48" href="#FNanchor_48" class="label">[48]</a> The operations of Grouchy on the 17th and 18th of June +had a decisive effect on the issue of the campaign, and have been +the subject of volumes of controversy. I have relied mainly on the +papers written at the time, but in part guided by Jomini’s sagacious +direction. Napoleon, writing at St. Helena, was largely ignorant of the +details of these movements, and is unjust to his luckless subordinate. +Thiers, and authors of the Napoleonic school, exaggerate the unfairness +of the Emperor; on the other hand, Charras, Chesney, and others are +not trustworthy authorities, and are thoroughly prejudiced against +Napoleon. This part of Charras’ book is the theoretic reasoning, after +the event, of a malignant partisan critic.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_49" href="#FNanchor_49" class="label">[49]</a> Grouchy also incidentally refers to a third column +retreating by Namur.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_50" href="#FNanchor_50" class="label">[50]</a> This despatch was discovered by the Prince La Tour +D’Auvergne (see his book on <i>Waterloo</i>, p. 318), and is of extreme +importance. It was written “at daybreak, on the 18th, and ordered Pajol +to hasten to Tourinnes, “<i>afin que nous poussions en avant de Wavre, +le plus promptement possible</i>.”</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_51" href="#FNanchor_51" class="label">[51]</a> This is one of the most obscure and disputed passages of +the campaign. Napoleon positively declares that he ordered Grouchy to +detach 7,000 men from Gembloux to attack Wellington, and he is followed +by Thiers and a number of writers. But, as Charras and others have +fairly pointed out, no copy of the order can be found in the register +of the Chief of the Staff; the name of the bearer has never been given, +and the order seems inconsistent with a subsequent message sent to +Grouchy in the morning of the 18th. Still there are indications that +the order was given; Napoleon would hardly utter an audacious falsehood +on such a subject. Thiers narrates an anecdote which confirms his +conclusion; and, as we have already seen, the Emperor did not always +convey his directions through Soult. The matter, however, is scarcely +of the capital importance ascribed to it by some writers.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_52" href="#FNanchor_52" class="label">[52]</a> This is placed beyond doubt by Prince La Tour D’Auvergne, +<i>Waterloo</i>, p. 251, and disposes of the able but ill-founded +remarks of Charras.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_53" href="#FNanchor_53" class="label">[53]</a> Detractors of Napoleon and encomiasts of the Allies have +concurred in endeavouring to excuse Grouchy. They begin by referring to +the state of the weather on the morning of the 18th as accounting for +Grouchy’s delay in leaving Gembloux. It is enough to reply that Bülow +started for Waterloo at daybreak through a most difficult country.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_54" href="#FNanchor_54" class="label">[54]</a> I cannot accept General Shaw Kennedy’s statement that La +Haye Sainte was not taken until 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>; it is contradicted by +every other contemporaneous authority.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_55" href="#FNanchor_55" class="label">[55]</a> See on this point Blücher’s official account of Waterloo, +never contradicted by Wellington. English writers will not acknowledge +the enormous importance of Bülow’s attack.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_56" href="#FNanchor_56" class="label">[56]</a> Napoleon, to the latest hour of his life, attributed to +Ney the sacrifice of his last cavalry reserve, and declared it was one +main cause of the rout of Waterloo. Ney acted recklessly on the 18th +June; he had the hot fit and cold fit of a desperate man by turns in +this campaign.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_57" href="#FNanchor_57" class="label">[57]</a> Dorsey Gardner, on the authority of two of Napoleon’s +staff officers, gives this account of the Emperor at Waterloo (p. +36): “he remained motionless, for long intervals, seated at a table, +frequently sinking upon it.”</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_58" href="#FNanchor_58" class="label">[58]</a> Grouchy might, I think, have been over the Dyle before +11 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>; but I accept the time of Charras, who has made it as +late as possible; “before noon” is his exact phrase.</p> + +</div> +</div> + + +<p class="transnote">Transcriber’s Notes:<br> +<br> +1. Obvious printers’, punctuation and spelling errors have been +corrected silently.<br> +<br> +2. Some hyphenated and non-hyphenated versions of the same words have +been retained as in the original.</p> + +<div style='text-align:center'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 77267 ***</div> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/77267-h/images/cover.jpg b/77267-h/images/cover.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..eae3951 --- /dev/null +++ b/77267-h/images/cover.jpg diff --git a/77267-h/images/frontispiece.jpg b/77267-h/images/frontispiece.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..2874d68 --- /dev/null +++ b/77267-h/images/frontispiece.jpg diff --git a/77267-h/images/i_004.jpg b/77267-h/images/i_004.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..0d6fc16 --- /dev/null +++ b/77267-h/images/i_004.jpg diff --git a/77267-h/images/i_005.jpg b/77267-h/images/i_005.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..08dc909 --- /dev/null +++ b/77267-h/images/i_005.jpg diff --git a/77267-h/images/i_006.jpg b/77267-h/images/i_006.jpg Binary 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Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b42239d --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for eBook #77267 +(https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/77267) |
