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diff --git a/77014-0.txt b/77014-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1f0373d --- /dev/null +++ b/77014-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,9285 @@ + +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 77014 *** + + + + + + + SELECT WORKS + OF + PORPHYRY; + + CONTAINING + HIS FOUR BOOKS ON + ABSTINENCE FROM ANIMAL FOOD; + HIS TREATISE ON + THE HOMERIC CAVE OF THE NYMPHS; + AND HIS + AUXILIARIES + TO THE + PERCEPTION OF INTELLIGIBLE NATURES. + + _TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK_ + + BY + THOMAS TAYLOR. + + WITH + AN APPENDIX, + EXPLAINING THE ALLEGORY OF THE WANDERINGS OF ULYSSES. + BY THE TRANSLATOR. + + Και ουτω θεων και ανθρωπων θειων και ευδαιμονων βιος, + απαλλαγη των αλλων των τῃδε, ανηδονος των τῃδε, φυγη + μονου προς μονον.—PLOTINI Op. p. 771. + + LONDON: + PRINTED FOR + THOMAS RODD, 17, GREAT NEWPORT STREET. + 1823. + + LONDON: + PRINTED BY J. MOYES, GREVILLE STREET. + + + + + TO + + THE REV. WILLIAM JOHN JOLLIFFE, + + AS A TESTIMONY OF GREAT ESTEEM FOR HIS + TALENTS AND WORTH, + + AND A TRIBUTE OF THE WARMEST GRATITUDE FOR + HIS PATRONAGE, + + THIS WORK IS DEDICATED + + _BY THE TRANSLATOR_, + + THOMAS TAYLOR. + + + + +INTRODUCTION. + + +Porphyry, the celebrated author of the treatises translated in this +volume, was dignified by his contemporaries, and by succeeding +Platonists, with the appellation of _the philosopher_, on account of his +very extraordinary philosophical attainments. He is likewise called by +Simplicius, _the most learned of the philosophers_, and is praised by +Proclus for his ιεροπρεπη νοηματα, or _conceptions adapted to sanctity_; +the truth of all which appellations is by the following treatises most +abundantly and manifestly confirmed. + +A few biographical particulars only have been transmitted to us +respecting this great man, and these are as follow. He was born at Tyre, +in the twelfth year of the reign of the Emperor Alexander Severus, and +in the two hundred and thirty-third of the Christian era; and he died at +Rome, when he was more than seventy years old, in the latter part of the +Emperor Dioclesian’s reign. He was also a disciple first of Longinus, +and afterwards of the great Plotinus, with whom he became acquainted in +the thirtieth year of his age; and it is to Porphyry we are indebted +for the publication of the inestimable and uncommonly profound works +of that most extraordinary man. For, as I have observed in my History +of the Restoration of the Platonic Theology, it was a long time before +Plotinus committed his thoughts to writing, and gave the world a copy +of his inimitable mind. That light which was destined to illuminate the +philosophical world, as yet shone with solitary splendour, or beamed +only on a beloved few; and it was through Porphyry alone that it at +length emerged from its sanctuary, and displayed its radiance in full +perfection, and with unbounded diffusion. For Porphyry, in the language +of Eunapius, “like a Mercurial chain let down for the benefit of mortals, +unfolded every thing with accuracy and clearness, by the assistance of +universal erudition.” + +We are likewise informed, by the same Eunapius, that Porphyry, when +he first associated with Plotinus, bade farewell to all his other +preceptors, and totally applied himself to the friendship of that +wonderful man. Here he filled his mind with science, as from a perennial +and never-satiating fount. But afterwards, being conquered, as it were, +by the magnitude of his doctrines, he conceived a hatred of body, and +could no longer endure the fetters of mortality.—“Hence,” says he[1], +“I formed an intention of destroying myself, which Plotinus wonderfully +perceived; and as I was walking home, stood before me, and said, _Your +present design, O Porphyry, is not the dictate of a sound intellect, but +rather of a soul raging with an atrabilarious fury_. In consequence of +this he ordered me to depart from Rome; and accordingly I went to Sicily, +having heard that a certain worthy and elegant man dwelt at that time +about Lilybæum. And thus, indeed, I was liberated from this perturbation +of soul; but was, in the meantime, hindered from being with Plotinus till +his death.” + +Porphyry also maintains a very distinguished rank among those great +geniuses who contributed to the development of the genuine dogmas of +Plato, after they had been lost for upwards of five hundred years; as +I have shown in my above-mentioned History of the Restoration of the +Platonic Theology. Among these dogmas, that which is transcendently +important is this,—that the ineffable principle of things, which is +denominated by Plato _the good_ and _the one_, is something superior to +intellect and being itself. This, as we are informed by Proclus, was +demonstrated by Porphyry, by many powerful and beautiful arguments, +in his treatise Concerning Principles, which is unfortunately lost. +And this dogma, which was derived principally from the 6th book of the +Republic, and the Parmenides, of Plato, and was adopted by all succeeding +Platonists, is copiously unfolded, and the truth of it supported by +reasoning replete with what Plato calls geometrical necessities, by those +two great philosophical luminaries Proclus and Damascius[2]; the former +of whom was the Coryphæus of the Platonists, and the latter possessed a +profoundly investigating mind. + +Of the disciples of Porphyry the most celebrated was Iamblichus, a man +of an uncommonly penetrating genius, and who, like his master Plato, +on account of the sublimity of his conceptions, and his admirable +proficiency in theological learning, was surnamed _the divine_. This +extraordinary man, though zealously attached to the Platonic philosophy, +yet explored the wisdom of other sects, particularly of the Pythagoreans, +Egyptians, and Chaldeans; and formed one beautiful system of recondite +knowledge, from their harmonious conjunction[3]. + +With respect to the works of Porphyry which are translated in this +volume, the first, which is _On Abstinence from Animal Food_, is a +treatise not only replete with great erudition, but is remarkable for the +purity of life which it inculcates, and the sanctity of conception with +which it abounds. At the same time it must be remembered, that it was +written solely, as Porphyry himself informs us, with a view to the man +who wishes in the present life to liberate himself as much as possible +from the fetters of the corporeal nature, in order that he may elevate +his intellectual eye to the contemplation of _truly-existing being_ +(το οντως ον,) and may establish himself in deity as in his paternal +port[4]. But such a one, as he beautifully observes, must divest himself +of every thing of a mortal nature which he has assumed, must withdraw +himself from sense and imagination, and the irrationality with which +they are attended, and from an adhering affection and passion towards +them; and must enter the stadium naked and unclothed, striving for the +most glorious of all prizes, the Olympia of the soul[5]. Hence, says +he, “my discourse is not directed to those who are occupied in sordid +mechanical arts, nor to those who are engaged in athletic exercises; +neither to soldiers nor sailors, nor rhetoricians, _nor to those who lead +an active life_[6]; but I write to the man who considers what he is, +whence he came, and whither he ought to tend, and who, in what pertains +to nutriment and other necessary concerns, is different from those who +propose to themselves other kinds of life; _for to none but such as these +do I direct my discourse_[7].” This treatise, also, is highly valuable +for the historical information which it contains, independently of the +philosophical beauties with which it abounds. + +The _Explanation of the Homeric Cave of the Nymphs_, which follows next, +is not only remarkable for the great erudition which it displays, but +also for containing some profound arcana of the mythology and symbolical +theology of the Greeks. + +And the third treatise, which is denominated _Auxiliaries to the +Perception of Intelligibles_, may be considered as an excellent +introduction to the works of Plotinus in general, from which a great +part of it is extracted, and in particular, to the following books of +that most sublime genius, viz. On the Virtues[8]; On the Impassivity +of Incorporeal Natures[9]; and On Truly-Existing Being, in which it is +demonstrated that such being is every where one and the same whole[10]. +This Porphyrian treatise, also, is admirably calculated to afford +assistance to the student of the Theological Elements of Proclus, a work +never to be sufficiently praised for the scientific accuracy, profundity +of conception, and luminous development of the most important dogmas, +which it displays. + +In the fourth place, Porphyry, in his treatise On the Cave of the Nymphs, +having informed us, that Numenius, the Pythagorean, considered the person +of Ulysses, in the Odyssey, as the image of a man who passes in a regular +manner over the stormy sea of generation, or a sensible life, and thus at +length arrives at a region where tempest and seas are unknown, and finds +a nation + + “Who ne’er knew salt, or heard the billows roar:” + +I have endeavoured, by the assistance of this intimation, to unfold, +in the Appendix which concludes the work, the secret meaning of the +allegory; and, I trust, in a way which will not be deemed by the +intelligent reader either visionary or vain. + +With respect to the translation of the treatises, I have endeavoured +faithfully to preserve both the matter and manner of the author; and +have availed myself of the best editions of them, and, likewise, of all +the information which appeared to me to be most important, and most +appropriate, from the remarks of critics and philologists, but especially +from the elucidations of philosophers. This, I trust, will be evident +from a perusal of the notes which accompany the translation. + +Of all the other writings of Porphyry, besides those translated in this +volume, few unfortunately have been preserved entire[11], the greater +part of what remains of them being fragments. Among these fragments, +however, there is one very important, lately found by Angelus Maius, +and published by him, Mediol. 1816, 8vo. It is nearly the whole of the +Epistle of Porphyry to his wife Marcella, in which I have discovered +the original of many of the Sentences of the celebrated Sextus +Pythagoricus[12], which have been hitherto supposed to be alone extant +in the fraudulent Latin version of the Presbyter Ruffinus. And for +an account of the other entire works and fragments that are extant, +and also of the lost writings of Porphyry, I refer the reader to the +Bibliotheca Græca of Fabricius, and to my before-mentioned History of +the Restoration of the Platonic Theology; in which latter work, in +speaking of Porphyry’s lost treatise on the Reascent of the Soul, I have +given a long and most interesting extract relative to that treatise, +from Synesius on Dreams. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] In Vit. Plotin. + +[2] See the 2d book of my translation of Proclus on the Theology of +Plato, and the Introduction to my translation of Plato, and notes on the +3d volume of that translation. + +[3] See my translation of his Life of Pythagoras, and also of his +treatise on the Mysteries. The Emperor Julian says of Iamblichus, “that +he was posterior in time, but not in genius, to Plato himself.” + +[4] Such a man as this, is arranged by Plotinus in the class of _divine +men_, in the following extract from my translation of his treatise +on Intellect, Ideas, and Real Being, Ennead V. 9. The extract, which +is uncommonly beautiful in the original, forms the beginning of the +treatise. “Since all men, from their birth, employ sense prior to +intellect, and are necessarily first conversant with sensibles, some, +proceeding no farther, pass through life, considering these as the first +and last of things, and apprehending, that whatever is painful among +these, is evil, and whatever is pleasant, is good; thus, thinking it +sufficient to pursue the one and avoid the other. Those, too, among +them, who pretend to a greater share of reason than others, esteem this +to be wisdom; being affected in a manner similar to more heavy birds, +who, collecting many things from the earth, and being oppressed with the +weight, are unable to fly on high, though they have received wings for +this purpose from nature. But others are in a small degree elevated from +things subordinate, the more excellent part of the soul recalling them +from pleasure to a more worthy pursuit. As they are, however, unable +to look on high, and as not possessing any thing else which can afford +them rest, they betake themselves, together with the name of virtue, to +actions and the election of things inferior, from which they at first +endeavoured to raise themselves, though in vain. _In the third class is +the race of divine men_, who through a more excellent power, and with +piercing eyes, acutely perceive supernal light, to the vision of which +they raise themselves, above the clouds and darkness, as it were, of this +lower world, and there abiding, despise every thing in these regions of +sense; being no otherwise delighted with the place which is truly and +properly their own, than he who, after many wanderings, is at length +restored to his lawful country.” + +[5] Page 23. + +[6] The translator of this work, and of the other treatises contained +in this volume, having been so circumstanced, that he has been obliged +to mingle the active with the contemplative life (μετα θεωρητικου νου +πολιτευομενος) in acquiring for himself a knowledge of the philosophy of +Plato, and disseminating that philosophy for the good of others, has also +found it expedient to make use of a fleshy diet. Nothing, however, but an +imperious necessity, from causes which it would be superfluous to detail +at present, could have induced him to adopt animal, instead of vegetable +nutriment. But though he has been nurtured in Eleatic and Academic +studies, yet it has not been in Academic bowers. + +[7] Page 19. + +[8] Ennead I. 2. + +[9] Ennead III. 6. + +[10] Ennead VI. lib. 4, 5. + +[11] For even with respect to the treatise On Abstinence from Animal +Food, there is every reason to believe that something is wanting at the +end of it. + +[12] See the Latin translation of these Sentences by Ruffinus, in the +Opuscula Mythologica of Gale. The Sentences which are to be found in this +Epistle of Porphyry, were published by me, with some animadversions, in +the Classical Journal, about two years ago; but on account of the great +importance of these Sentences, and for the sake of those who may not have +this Journal in their possession, I shall here repeat what I have there +said on this subject. + +After having premised that great praise is due to the editor for the +publication of this Epistle, but that, as he has taken no notice of the +sources whence most of the beautiful moral sentences with which this +Epistle abounds, are derived, it becomes necessary to unfold them to the +reader, particularly as by this means several of the Sentences of Sextus +Pythagoricus may be obtained in the original Greek;—I then observe: + +Previous, however, to this development, I shall present the reader +with the emendation of the following defective sentence in p. 19: Το +δε πεπαιδευσθαι ουκ εν πολυμαθειας αναληψει ... παλαξει δε των ψυχικων +παθων εθεωρειτο. The editor, not being an adept in the philosophy of +Pythagoras and Plato, conceived that παλαξει was a genuine word; for he +remarks, “Nota vocabulum παλαξις,” whereas it is only a part of a word, +_i.e._ it is a part of απαλλαξει. Hence, if after αναληψει, the words +εν απαλλαξει are inserted, the sentence of Porphyry will be perfect both +in its construction and meaning, and will be in English, “Erudition +does not consist in the resumption of polymathy, but is to be surveyed +in a liberation from the passions pertaining to the soul.” The editor, +not perceiving the necessity of this emendation, has, by the following +version, totally mistaken the meaning of the sentence: “Bonam autem +institutionem nunquam æstimem, quæ cum eruditionis copia, animalium +quoque passionum contaminatione sordescat.” + +The first sentence of which I have discovered the source, is from Sextus, +and is the following, in p. 23: θεος μεν γαρ δειται ουδενος· σοφος δε +μονου θεου: _i.e._ “For God is not in want of any thing; but the wise +man is alone in want of God.” This, in the version of Ruffinus, is: “Deus +quidem nullius eget, fidelis autem Dei solius.” (Vid. Opusc. Mytholog. +8vo. 1688, p. 646.) + +2. Πασης πραξεως και παντος εργου και λογου θεος εποπτης παρεστω και +εφορος, (p. 24): _i.e._ “Of every action, and of every deed and word, +God is present as the scrutator and inspector.” This is evidently derived +from the following sentence of Demophilus, (Opusc. Mythol. p. 621): Εαν +αει μνημονευης, οτι οπου αν ἦ η ψυχη σου, και το σωμα εργον αποτελει, +θεος εφεστηκεν εφορος, εν πασαις σου ταις ευχαις και πραξεσιν, αιδεσθησῃ +μεν του θεωρου το αληστον, εξεις δε τον θεον συνοικον, _i.e._ “If you +always remember, that wherever your soul, or your body, performs any +deed, God is present as an inspector, in all your prayers and actions, +you will reverence the nature of an inspector, from whom nothing can +be concealed, and will have God for a cohabitant.” What immediately +follows in this paragraph is from Sextus, viz. και παντων ων πραττομεν +αγαθων τον θεον αιτιον ηγωμεθα: _i.e._ “Of all the good that we do, we +should consider God as the cause.” And Sextus says, p. 648. “Deus in +bonis actibus hominibus dux est.” Porphyry adds: Των δε κακων αιτιοι +ημεις εσμεν οι ελομενοι, θεος δε αναιτιος. And the latter part is +evidently from Sextus, who says, p. 648, “Mali nullius autor est Deus.” +Porphyry further adds: Οθεν και ευκταιον τα αξια θεου· και αιτωμεθα ἃ +μη λαβοιμεν αν παρ’ ετερου· και ων ηγεμονες οι μετ’ αρετης πονοι, ταυτα +ευχομεθα γενεσθαι μετα τους πονους: _i.e._ “Hence we should ask of God +things which are worthy of him, and which we cannot receive from any +other. The goods also, of which labours are the leaders, in conjunction +with virtue, we should pray that we may obtain after the labours [are +accomplished].” All this is from Sextus. For, in p. 648, he says: “Hæc +posce à Deo, quæ dignum est præstare Deum. Ea pete à Deo, quæ accipere +ab homine non potes. In quibus præcedere debet labor, hæc tibi opta +evenire post laborem.” Only, in this last sentence, Ruffinus has omitted +to add, after _labor_, the words _cum virtute_. What Porphyry says, +almost immediately after this, is precisely the first of the Sentences of +Demophilus, (Opusc. Mythol. p. 626), viz. Ἃ δε κτησαμενος ου καθεξεις, +μη αιτου παρα θεου· δωρον γαρ θεου παν αναφαιρετον· ωστε ου δωσει ὃ μη +καθεξεις: _i.e._ “Do not ask of God that which, when you have obtained, +you cannot preserve. For every gift of God is incapable of being taken +away; so that he will not give that which you cannot retain.” The +sentence immediately following this is ascribed to Pythagoras, and is to +be found in the Sentences of Stobæus, (edit. 1609, p. 65): viz. Ων δε του +σωματος απαλλαγεισα ου δεηθησῃ, εκεινων καταφρονει· και ων αν απαλλαγεισα +δεῃ, εις ταυτα συ ασκουμενη τον θεον παρεκαλει γενεσθαι συλληπτορα. In +Stobæus, however, there is some difference, so as to render the sentence +more complete. For immediately after καταφρονει, there is παντων; for +δεηθησῃ there is δεησῃ; for δεῃ, δεησῃ; for τον θεον, τους θεους; for συ +ασκουμενη, σοι ασκουμενῳ; and instead of γενεσθαι συλληπτορα, γενεσθαι +σοι συλληπτορα. This, therefore, translated, will be: “Despise all those +things which, when liberated from the body, you will not want; and +exercising yourself in those things, of which, when liberated from the +body, you will be in want, invoke the Gods to become your helpers.” In +pp. 27 and 28, Porphyry says, αιρετωτερου σοι οντος [χρηματα] εικη βαλειν +ἢ λογον· και το ηττασθαι τ’ αληθη λεγοντα, ἢ νικᾳν απατωντα: _i.e._ “It +should be more eligible to you carelessly to throw away riches than +reason; and to be vanquished when speaking the truth, than to vanquish +by deception.” And the latter part of this sentence is to be found in +Sextus: for in p. 649 he says, “Melius est vinci vera dicentem, quam +vincere, mentientem.” Almost immediately after Porphyry adds, Αδυνατον +τον αυτον φιλοθεον τε ειναι και φιληδονον και φιλοσωματον· ο γαρ +φιληδονος και φιλοσωματος παντως και φιλοχρηματος· ο δὲ φιλοχρηματος, εξ +αναγκης αδικος· ο δε αδικος, και εις θεον και εις πατερας ανοσιος, και +εις τους αλλους παρανομος· ωστε κᾳν εκατομβας θυῃ, και μυριοις αναθημασι +νεως αγαλλῃ, ασεβης εστι και αθεος και τῃ προαιρεσει ιεροσυλος· διο και +παντα φιλοσωματον ως αθεον και μιαρον εκτρεπεσθαι χρη. This sentence is +the last of the Sentences of Demophilus, (Opusc. Mythol. p. 625); but +in Porphyry it is in one part defective, and in another is fuller than +in Demophilus. For in the first colon, φιλοχρηματον is wanting: in the +second colon, after ο γαρ φιληδονος και φιλοσωματος, the words ο δε +φιλοσωματος are wanting. And in Demophilus, instead of ο δε αδικος και +εις θεον και εις πατερας ανοσιος, και εις τους αλλους παρανομος, there +is nothing more than ο δε αδικος, εις μεν θεον ανοσιος, εις δε ανθρωπους +παρανομος. In Demophilus also, after ωστε κᾳν εκατομβας θυῃ the words και +μυριοις αναθημασι τους νεως αγαλλῃ, are wanting. And in Porphyry, after +νεως αγαλλῃ, the words πολυ μαλλον ανοσιωτερος εστι, και, are wanting. +This sentence therefore, thus amended, will be in English, “It is +impossible for the same person to be a lover of God, a lover of pleasure, +a lover of body, and a lover of riches. For a lover of pleasure is also +a lover of body; but a lover of body is entirely a lover of riches; and +a lover of riches is necessarily unjust. But he who is unjust 1s impious +towards God and his parents, and lawless towards others. So that, though +he should sacrifice hecatombs, and adorn temples with ten thousand gifts, +he will be much more unholy, impious, atheistical, and sacrilegious in +his deliberate choice. Hence it is necessary to avoid every lover of +body, as one who is without God, and is defiled.” + +3. The following passages in the epistle of Porphyry, are from Sextus: +Ο δε αξιος ανθρωπος θεου, θεος αν ειη, (p. 30) _i.e._ “The man who is +worthy of God, will be himself a God.” And Sextus says, “Dignus Deo +homo, deus est et in hominibus.” (p. 654.) Porphyry says, Και τιμησεις +μεν αριστα τον θεον, οταν τῳ θεῳ την σαυτης διανοιαν ομοιωσεις, (p. 30,) +_i.e._ “And you will honour God in the best manner, when you assimilate +your reasoning power to God.” Thus also Sextus, “Optime honorat Deum +ille, qui mentem suam, quantum fieri potest, similem Deo facit,” (p. +655.) Again, Porphyry says, Θεος δε ανθρωπον βεβαιοι πρασσοντα καλα· +κακων δε πραξεων κακος δαιμων ηγεμων, (p. 31): _i.e._ “God corroborates +man when he performs beautiful deeds; but an evil dæmon is the leader +of bad actions.” And Sextus says, “Deus bonos actus hominum confirmat. +Malorum actuum, malus dæmon dux est.” (p. 653). Porphyry adds, Ψυχη δε +σοφου αρμοζεται προς θεον, αει θεον ορᾳ, συνεστιν αει θεῳ, (p. 31,) +_i.e._ “The soul of the wise man is adapted to God; it always beholds +God, and is always present with God.” Thus, too, Sextus, “Sapientis +anima audit Deum, sapientis anima aptatur à Deo, sapientis anima semper +est cum Deo,” (p. 655). There is, however, some difference between the +original and the Latin version, which is most probably owing to the +fraud of Ruffinus. And in the last place, Porphyry says, Αλλα κρηπις +ευσεβειας σοι νομιζεσθω η φιλανθρωπια, (p. 58,) _i.e._ “Philanthropy +should be considered by you as the foundation of piety.” And Sextus says, +“Fundamentum et initium est cultûs Dei, amare Dei homines.” (p. 654). +Ruffinus, however, in this version, fraudulently translates φιλανθρωπια, +_amare Dei homines_, in order that this sentence, as well as the others, +might appear to be written by Sixtus the bishop! + +4. The learned reader will find the following passages in the Epistle of +Porphyry, to be sentences of Demophilus, viz. Λογον γαρ θεου τοις υπο +δοξης διεφθαρμενοις λεγειν, κ.τ.λ. usque ad ισον φερει, (p. 29). Ουχ η +γλωττα του σοφου τιμιον παρα θεῳ, κ.τ.λ. usque ad μονος ειδως ευξασθαι, +(p. 32). Ου χολωθεντες ουν οι θεοι βλαπτουσι, κ.τ.λ. usque ad θεῳ δε +ουδεν αβουλητον, (p. 35). Ουτε δακρυα και ικετειαι θεον επιστρεφουσι, +ουτε θυηπολια θεον τιμωσιν, ουτε αναθηματων πληθος κοσμουσι θεον, κ.τ.λ. +usque ad ιεροσυλοις χορηγια, (p. 36). In which passage, however, there +is a remarkable difference, as the learned reader will find, between the +text of Porphyry and that of Demophilus. Εαν ουν αει μνημονευῃς, οτι οπου +αν η ψυχη σου περιπατῃ, και το σωμα ενεργον (lege εργον,) αποτελῃ, κ.τ.λ. +usque ad τον θεον συνοικον, (p. 37). Ο συνετος ανηρ και θεοφιλης, κ.τ.λ. +usque ad σπουδαζεται πονησας, (p. 54). Γυμνος δε αποσταλεις [σοφος] +κ.τ.λ. usque ad επηκοος ο θεος, (p. 54.) Χαλεπωτερον δουλευειν παθεσιν +ἢ τυραννοις. And οσα γαρ παθη ψυχης, τοσουτοι και ωμοι δεσποται, (p. +57). And lastly, πολλῳ γαρ κρειττον τεθναναι ἢ δι’ ακρασιαν την ψυχην +αμαυρωσαι, (p. 58). In all these passages, it will be found, by comparing +them with Porphyry, that they occasionally differ from the text of +Demophilus, yet not so as to alter the sense. + +I only add, that many of the Sentences of Demophilus will be found among +those of Sextus. Nor is this at all wonderful, as it was usual with the +Pythagoreans, from their exalted notions of friendship, to consider the +work of one of them as the production of all. + + + + +THE SELECT WORKS OF PORPHYRY. + + + + +ON ABSTINENCE FROM ANIMAL FOOD. + +BOOK THE FIRST. + + +1. Hearing from some of our acquaintance, O Firmus[13], that you, having +rejected a fleshless diet, have again returned to animal food, at first +I did not credit the report, when I considered your temperance, and the +reverence which you have been taught to pay to those ancient and pious +men from whom we have received the precepts of philosophy. But when +others who came after these confirmed this report, it appeared to me that +it would be too rustic and remote from the rational method of persuasion +to reprehend you, who neither, according to the proverb, flying from +evil have found something better, nor according to Empedocles, having +lamented your former life, have converted yourself to one that is more +excellent. I have therefore thought it worthy of the friendship which +subsists between us, and also adapted to those who have arranged their +life conformably to truth, to disclose your errors through a confutation +derived from an argumentative discussion. + +2. For when I considered with myself what could be the cause of this +alteration in your diet, I could by no means suppose that it was for the +sake of health and strength, as the vulgar and idiots would say; since, +on the contrary, you yourself, when you were with us, confessed that a +fleshless diet contributed both to health and to the proper endurance +of philosophic labours; and experience testifies, that in saying this +you spoke the truth. It appears, therefore, that you have returned to +your former illegitimate[14] conduct, either through deception[15], +because you think it makes no difference with respect to the acquisition +of wisdom whether you use this or that diet; or perhaps through some +other cause of which I am ignorant, which excited in you a greater fear +than that which could be produced by the impiety of transgression. For +I should not say that you have despised the philosophic laws which we +derived from our ancestors, and which you have so much admired, through +intemperance, or for the sake of voracious gluttony; or that you are +naturally inferior to some of the vulgar, who, when they have assented +to laws, though contrary to those under which they formerly lived, will +suffer amputation [rather than violate them], and will abstain from +certain animals on which they before fed, more than they would from human +flesh. + +3. But when I was also informed by certain persons that you even employed +arguments against those who abstained from animal food, I not only +pitied, but was indignant with you, that, being persuaded by certain +frigid and very corrupt sophisms, you have deceived yourself, and have +endeavoured to subvert a dogma which is both ancient and dear to the +Gods. Hence it appeared to me to be requisite not only to show you what +our own opinion is on this subject, but also to collect and dissolve the +arguments of our opponents, which are much stronger than those adduced +by you in multitude and power, and every other apparatus; and thus to +demonstrate, that truth is not vanquished even by those arguments which +seem to be weighty, and much less by superficial sophisms. For you are +perhaps ignorant, that not a few philosophers are adverse to abstinence +from animal food, but that this is the case with those of the Peripatetic +and Stoic sects, and with most of the Epicureans; the last of whom have +written in opposition to the philosophy of Pythagoras and Empedocles, of +which you once were studiously emulous. To this abstinence, likewise, +many philologists are adverse, among whom Clodius the Neapolitan wrote +a treatise against those who abstain from flesh. Of these men I shall +adduce the disquisitions and common arguments against this dogma, at the +same time omitting those reasons which are peculiarly employed by them +against the demonstrations of Empedocles. + + +_The Arguments of the Peripatetics and Stoics, from Heraclides +Ponticus[16]._ + +4. Our opponents therefore say, in the first place, that justice will be +confounded, and things immoveable be moved, if we extend what is just, +not only to the rational, but also to the irrational nature; conceiving +that not only Gods and men pertain to us, but that there is likewise an +alliance between us and brutes, who [in reality] have no conjunction with +us. Nor shall we employ some of them in laborious works, and use others +for food, from a conviction that the association which is between us and +them, in the same manner as that of some foreign polity, pertains to a +tribe different from ours, and is dishonourable. For he who uses these +as if they were men, sparing and not injuring them, thus endeavouring +to adapt to justice that which it cannot bear, both destroys its power, +and corrupts that which is appropriate, by the introduction of what is +foreign. For it necessarily follows, either that we act unjustly by +sparing them, or if we spare and do not employ them, that it will be +impossible for us to live. We shall also, after a manner, live the life +of brutes, if we reject the use which they are capable of affording. + +5. For I shall omit to mention the innumerable multitude of Nomades and +Troglodytæ, who know of no other nutriment than that of flesh; but to us +who appear to live mildly and philanthropically, what work would be left +for us on the earth or in the sea, what illustrious art, what ornament +of our food would remain, if we conducted ourselves innoxiously and +reverentially towards brutes, as if they were of a kindred nature with +us? For it would be impossible to assign any work, any medicine, or any +remedy for the want which is destructive of life, or that we can act +justly, unless we preserve the ancient boundary and law. + + To fishes, savage beasts, and birds, devoid + Of justice, Jove to devour each other + Granted; but justice to mankind he gave[17]. + +_i.e._ towards each other. + +6. But it is not possible for us to act unjustly towards those to whom +we are not obliged to act justly. Hence, for those who reject this +reasoning, no other road of justice is left, either broad or narrow, +into which they can enter. For, as we have already observed, our nature, +not being sufficient to itself, but indigent of many things, would be +entirely destroyed, and enclosed in a life involved in difficulties, +unorganic, and deprived of necessaries, if excluded from the assistance +derived from animals. It is likewise said, that those first men did +not live prosperously; for this superstition did not stop at animals, +but compelled its votaries even to spare plants. For, indeed, what +greater injury does he do, who cuts the throat of an ox or a sheep, +than he who cuts down a fir tree or an oak? since, from the doctrine of +transmigration, a soul is also implanted in these. These therefore are +the principal arguments of the Stoics and Peripatetics. + + +_The Arguments of the Epicureans, from Hermachus[18]._ + +7. The Epicureans, however, narrating, as it were, a long genealogy, say, +that the ancient legislators, looking to the association of life, and +the mutual actions of men, proclaimed that manslaughter was unholy, and +punished it with no casual disgrace. Perhaps, indeed, a certain natural +alliance which exists in men towards each other, through the similitude +of form and soul, is the reason why they do not so readily destroy an +animal of this kind, as some of the other animals which are conceded to +our use. Nevertheless, the greatest cause why manslaughter was considered +as a thing grievous to be borne, and impious, was the opinion that it +did not contribute to the whole nature and condition of human life. +For, from a principle of this kind, those who are capable of perceiving +the advantage arising from this decree, require no other cause of being +restrained from a deed so dire. But those who are not able to have a +sufficient perception of this, being terrified by the magnitude of the +punishment, will abstain from readily destroying each other. For those, +indeed, who survey the utility of the before-mentioned ordinance, will +promptly observe it; but those who are not able to perceive the benefit +with which it is attended, will obey the mandate, in consequence of +fearing the threatenings of the laws; which threatenings certain persons +ordained for the sake of those who could not, by a reasoning process, +infer the beneficial tendency of the decree, at the same time that most +would admit this to be evident. + +8. For none of those legal institutes which were established from the +first, whether written or unwritten, and which still remain, and are +adapted to be transmitted, [from one generation to another] became lawful +through violence, but through the consent of those that used them. For +those who introduced things of this kind to the multitude, excelled in +wisdom, and not in strength of body, and the power which subjugates the +rabble. Hence, through this, some were led to a rational consideration of +utility, of which before they had only an irrational sensation, and which +they had frequently forgotten; but others were terrified by the magnitude +of the punishments. For it was not possible to use any other remedy for +the ignorance of what is beneficial, than the dread of the punishment +ordained by law. For this alone even now keeps the vulgar in awe, and +prevents them from doing any thing, either publicly or privately, which +is not beneficial [to the community]. But if all men were similarly +capable of surveying and recollecting what is advantageous, there would +be no need of laws, but men would spontaneously avoid such things as +are prohibited, and perform such as they were ordered to do. For the +survey of what is useful and detrimental, is a sufficient incentive to +the avoidance of the one and the choice of the other. But the infliction +of punishment has a reference to those who do not foresee what is +beneficial. For impendent punishment forcibly compels such as these to +subdue those impulses which lead them to useless actions, and to do that +which is right. + +9. Hence also, legislators ordained, that even involuntary manslaughter +should not be entirely void of punishment; in order that they might +not only afford no pretext for the voluntary imitation of those deeds +which were involuntarily performed, but also that they might prevent +many things of this kind from taking place, which happen, in reality, +involuntarily. For neither is this advantageous through the same causes +by which men were forbidden voluntarily to destroy each other. Since, +therefore, of involuntary deeds, some proceed from a cause which is +unstable, and which cannot be guarded against by human nature; but +others are produced by our negligence and inattention to different +circumstances; hence legislators, wishing to restrain that indolence +which is injurious to our neighbours, did not even leave an involuntary +noxious deed without punishment, but, through the fear of penalties, +prevented the commission of numerous offences of this kind. I also am +of opinion, that the slaughters which are allowed by law, and which +receive their accustomed expiations through certain purifications, +were introduced by those ancient legislators, who first very properly +instituted these things for no other reason than that they wished to +prevent men as much as possible from voluntary slaughter. For the vulgar +every where require something which may impede them from promptly +performing what is not advantageous [to the community]. Hence those who +first perceived this to be the case, not only ordained the punishment +of fines, but also excited a certain other irrational dread, through +proclaiming those not to be pure who in any way whatever had slain a man, +unless they used purifications after the commission of the deed. For that +part of the soul which is void of intellect, being variously disciplined, +acquired a becoming mildness, certain taming arts having been from the +first invented for the purpose of subduing the irrational impulses +of desire, by those who governed the people. And one of the precepts +promulgated on this occasion was, that men should not destroy each other +without discrimination. + +10. Those, however, who first defined what we ought to do, and what we +ought not, very properly did not forbid us to kill other animals. For the +advantage arising from these is effected by a contrary practice, since +it is not possible that men could be preserved, unless they endeavoured +to defend those who are nurtured with themselves from the attacks of +other animals. At that time, therefore, some of those, of the most +elegant manners, recollecting that they abstained from slaughter because +it was useful to the public safety, they also reminded the rest of the +people in their mutual associations of what was the consequence of this +abstinence; in order that, by refraining from the slaughter of their +kindred, they might preserve that communion which greatly contributes to +the peculiar safety of each individual. But it was not only found to be +useful for men not to separate from each other, and not to do any thing +injurious to those who were collected together in the same place, for +the purpose of repelling the attacks of animals of another species; but +also for defence against men whose design was to act nefariously. To a +certain extent, therefore, they abstained from the slaughter of men, +for these reasons, viz. in order that there might be a communion among +them in things that are necessary, and that a certain utility might be +afforded in each of the above-mentioned incommodities. In the course of +time, however, when the offspring of mankind, through their intercourse +with each other, became more widely extended, and animals of a different +species were expelled, certain persons directed their attention in a +rational way to what was useful to men in their mutual nutriment, and did +not alone recal this to their memory in an irrational manner. + +11. Hence they endeavoured still more firmly to restrain those who +readily destroyed each other, and who, through an oblivion of past +transactions, prepared a more imbecile defence. But in attempting to +effect this, they introduced those legal institutes which still remain +in cities and nations; the multitude spontaneously assenting to them, +in consequence of now perceiving, in a greater degree, the advantage +arising from an association with each other. For the destruction of +every thing noxious, and the preservation of that which is subservient +to its extermination, similarly contribute to a fearless life. And +hence it is reasonable to suppose, that one of the above-mentioned +particulars was forbidden, but that the other was not prohibited. Nor +must it be said, that the law allows us to destroy some animals which +are not corruptive of human nature, and which are not in any other way +injurious to our life. For, as I may say, no animal among those which the +law permits us to kill is of this kind; since, if we suffered them to +increase excessively, they would become injurious to us. But through the +number of them which is now preserved, certain advantages are imparted +to human life. For sheep and oxen, and every such like animal, when the +number of them is moderate, are beneficial to our necessary wants; but +if they become redundant in the extreme, and far exceed the number which +is sufficient, they then become detrimental to our life; the latter by +employing their strength, in consequence of participating of this through +an innate power of nature, and the former, by consuming the nutriment +which springs up from the earth for our benefit alone. Hence, through +this cause, the slaughter of animals of this kind is not prohibited, in +order that as many of them as are sufficient for our use, and which we +may be able easily to subdue, may be left. For it is not with horses, +oxen, and sheep, and with all tame animals, as it is with lions and +wolves, and, in short, with all such as are called savage animals, that, +whether the number of them is small or great, no multitude of them can be +assumed, which, if left, would alleviate the necessity of our life. And +on this account, indeed, we utterly destroy some of them; but of others, +we take away as many as are found to be more than commensurate to our use. + +12. On this account, from the above-mentioned causes, it is similarly +requisite to think, that what pertains to the eating of animals, was +ordained by those who from the first established the laws; and that the +advantageous and the disadvantageous were the causes why some animals +were permitted to be eaten and others not. So that those who assert, +that every thing beautiful and just subsists conformably to the peculiar +opinions of men respecting those who established the laws, are full of a +certain most profound stupidity. For it is not possible that this thing +can take place in any other way than that in which the other utilities +of life subsist, such as those that are salubrious, and an innumerable +multitude of others. Erroneous opinions, however, are entertained in many +particulars, both of a public and private nature. For certain persons do +not perceive those legal institutes, which are similarly adapted to all +men; but some, conceiving them to rank among things of an indifferent +nature, omit them; while others, who are of a contrary opinion, think +that such things as are not universally profitable, are every where +advantageous. Hence, through this cause, they adhere to things which +are unappropriate; though in certain particulars they discover what is +advantageous to themselves, and what contributes to general utility. And +among these are to be enumerated the eating of animals, and the legally +ordained destructions which are instituted by most nations on account of +the peculiarity of the region. It is not necessary, however, that these +institutes should be preserved by us, because we do not dwell in the same +place as those did by whom they were made. If, therefore, it was possible +to make a certain compact with other animals in the same manner as with +men, that we should not kill them, nor they us, and that they should not +be indiscriminately destroyed by us, it would be well to extend justice +as far as to this; for this extent of it would be attended with security. +But since it is among things impossible, that animals which are not +recipients of reason should participate with us of law, on this account, +utility cannot be in a greater degree procured by security from other +animals, than from inanimate natures. But we can alone obtain security +from the liberty which we now possess of putting them to death. And such +are the arguments of the Epicureans. + + +_The Arguments of Claudius the Neapolitan, who published a Treatise +against Abstinence from Animal Food._ + +13. It now remains, that we should adduce what plebeians and the vulgar +are accustomed to say on this subject. For they say, that the ancients +abstained from animals, not through piety, but because they did not yet +know the use of fire; but that as soon as they became acquainted with its +utility, they then conceived it to be most honourable and sacred. They +likewise called it Vesta, and from this the appellation of _convestals_ +or companions was derived; and afterwards they began to use animals. For +it is natural to man to eat flesh, but contrary to his nature to eat it +raw. Fire, therefore, being discovered, they embraced what is natural, +and admitted the eating of boiled and roasted flesh. Hence lynxes are +[said by Homer[19] to be] _crudivorous_, or _eaters of raw flesh_; and of +Priam, also, he says, as a disgraceful circumstance, + + Raw flesh by you, O Priam, is devoured[20]. + +And, + + Raw flesh, dilacerating, he devoured[21]. + +And this is said, as if the eating of raw flesh pertained to the impious. +Telemachus, also, when Minerva was his guest, placed before her not raw, +but roasted flesh. At first, therefore, men did not eat animals, for man +is not [naturally] a devourer of raw flesh. But when the use of fire was +discovered, fire was employed not only for the cooking of flesh, but +also for most other eatables. For that man is not [naturally] adapted +to eat raw flesh, is evident from certain nations that feed on fishes. +For these they roast, some upon stones that are very much heated by the +sun; but others roast them in the sand. That man, however, is adapted to +feed on flesh, is evident from this, that no nation abstains from animal +food. Nor is this adopted by the Greeks through depravity, since the same +custom is admitted by the barbarians. + +14. But he who forbids men to feed on animals, and thinks it is unjust, +will also say that it is not just to kill them, and deprive them of life. +Nevertheless, an innate and just war is implanted in us against brutes. +For some of them voluntarily attack men, as, for instance, wolves and +lions; others not voluntarily, as serpents, since they bite not, except +they are trampled on. And some, indeed, attack men; but others destroy +the fruits of the earth. From all these causes, therefore, we do not +spare the life of brutes; but we destroy those who commence hostilities +against us, as also those who do not, lest we should suffer any evil +from them. For there is no one who, if he sees a serpent, will not, if +he is able, destroy it, in order that neither it, nor any other serpent, +may bite a man. And this arises, not only from our hatred of those that +are the destroyers of our race, but likewise from that kindness which +subsists between one man and another. But though the war against brutes +is just, yet we abstain from many which associate with men. Hence, the +Greeks do not feed either on dogs, or horses, or asses, because of these, +those that are tame are of the same species as the wild. Nevertheless, +they eat swine and birds. For a hog is not useful for any thing but food. +The Phœnicians, however, and Jews, abstain from it, because, in short, +it is not produced in those places. For it is said, that this animal is +not seen in Ethiopia even at present. As, therefore, no Greek sacrifices +a camel or an elephant to the Gods, because Greece does not produce +these animals, so neither is a hog sacrificed to the Gods in Cyprus or +Phœnicia, because it is not indigenous in those places. And, for the +same reason, neither do the Egyptians sacrifice this animal to the Gods. +In short, that some nations abstain from a hog, is similar to our being +unwilling to eat the flesh of camels. + +15. But why should any one abstain from animals? Is it because feeding +on them makes the soul or the body worse? It is, however, evident, that +neither of these is deteriorated by it. For those animals that feed on +flesh are more sagacious than others, as they are venatic, and possess +an art by which they supply themselves with food, and acquire power and +strength; as is evident in lions and wolves. So that the eating of flesh +neither injures the soul nor the body. This likewise is manifest, both +from the athlete, whose bodies become stronger by feeding on flesh, and +from physicians, who restore bodies to health by the use of animal food. +For this is no small indication that Pythagoras did not think sanely, +that none of the wise men embraced his opinion; since neither any one of +the seven wise men, nor any of the physiologists who lived after them, +nor even the most wise Socrates, or his followers, adopted it. + +16. Let it, however, be admitted that all men are persuaded of the truth +of this dogma, respecting abstinence from animals. But what will be +the boundary of the propagation of animals? For no one is ignorant how +numerous the progeny is of the swine and the hare. And to these add all +other animals. Whence, therefore, will they be supplied with pasture? And +what will husbandmen do? For they will not destroy those who destroy the +fruits of the earth. And the earth will not be able to bear the multitude +of animals. Corruption also will be produced from the putridity of those +that will die. And thus, from pestilence taking place, no refuge will be +left. For the sea, and rivers, and marshes, will be filled with fishes, +and the air with birds, but the earth will be full of reptiles of every +kind. + +17. How many likewise will be prevented from having their diseases +cured, if animals are abstained from? For we see that those who are +blind recover their sight by eating a viper. A servant of Craterus, the +physician, happening to be seized with a new kind of disease, in which +the flesh fell away from the bones, derived no benefit from medicines; +but by eating a viper prepared after the manner of a fish, the flesh +became conglutinated to the bones, and he was restored to health. Many +other animals also, and their several parts, cure diseases when they +are properly used for that purpose; of all which remedies he will be +frustrated who rejects animal food. + +18. But if, as they say, plants also have a soul, what will become of our +life if we neither destroy animals nor plants? If, however, he is not +impious who cuts off plants, neither will he who kills animals. + +19. But some one may, perhaps, say it is not proper to destroy that which +belongs to the same tribe with ourselves; if the souls of animals are +of the same essence with ourselves. If, however, it should be granted +that souls are inserted in bodies voluntarily, it must be said that it +is through a love of juvenility: for in the season of youth there is an +enjoyment of all things. Why, therefore, do they not again enter into +the nature of man? But if they enter voluntarily, and for the sake of +juvenility, and pass through every species of animals, they will be much +gratified by being destroyed. For thus their return to the human form +will be more rapid. The bodies also which are eaten will not produce any +pain in the souls of those bodies, in consequence of the souls being +liberated from them; and they will love to be implanted in the nature +of man. Hence, as much as they are pained on leaving the human form, +so much will they rejoice when they leave other bodies. For thus they +will more swiftly become man again, who predominates over all irrational +animals, in the same manner as God does over men. There is, therefore, a +sufficient cause for destroying other animals, viz. their acting unjustly +in destroying men. But if the souls of men are immortal, but those of +irrational animals mortal, men will not act unjustly by destroying +irrational animals. And if the souls of brutes are immortal, we shall +benefit them by liberating them from their bodies. For, by killing them, +we shall cause them to return to the human nature. + +20. If, however, we [only] defend ourselves [in putting animals to +death], we do not act unjustly, but we take vengeance on those that +injure us. Hence, if the souls of brutes are indeed immortal, we benefit +them by destroying them. But if their souls are mortal, we do nothing +impious in putting them to death. And if we defend ourselves against +them, how is it possible that in so doing we should not act justly. For +we destroy, indeed, a serpent and a scorpion, though they do not attack +us, in order that some other person may not be injured by them; and in so +doing we defend the human race in general. But shall we not act justly in +putting those animals to death, which either attack men, or those that +associate with men, or injure the fruits of the earth? + +21. If, however, some one should, nevertheless, think it is unjust to +destroy brutes, such a one should neither use milk, nor wool, nor sheep, +nor honey. For, as you injure a man by taking from him his garments, +thus, also, you injure a sheep by shearing it. For the wool which you +take from it is its vestment. Milk, likewise, was not produced for you, +but for the young of the animal that has it. The bee also collects honey +as food for itself; which you, by taking away, administer to your own +pleasure. I pass over in silence the opinion of the Egyptians, that we +act unjustly by meddling with plants. But if these things were produced +for our sake, then the bee, being ministrant to us, elaborates honey, and +the wool grows on the back of sheep, that it may be an ornament to us, +and afford us a bland heat. + +22. Co-operating also with the Gods themselves in what contributes to +piety, we sacrifice animals: for, of the Gods, Apollo, indeed, is called +λυκοκτονος, _the slayer of wolves_; and Diana, θηροκτονος, _the destroyer +of wild beasts_. Demi-gods likewise, and all the heroes who excel us +both in origin and virtue, have so much approved of the slaughter of +animals, that they have sacrificed to the Gods _Dodeceïdes_[22] and +_Hecatombs_. But Hercules, among other things, is celebrated for being an +_ox-devourer_. + +23. It is, however, stupid to say that Pythagoras exhorted men to abstain +from animals, in order that he might, in the greatest possible degree, +prevent them from eating each other. For, if all men at the time of +Pythagoras were anthropophagites, he must be delirious who drew men away +from other animals, in order that they might abstain from devouring each +other. For, on this account, he ought rather to have exhorted them to +become anthropophagites, by showing them that it was an equal crime to +devour each other, and to eat the flesh of oxen and swine. But if men +at that time did not eat each other, what occasion was there for this +dogma? And if he established this law for himself and his associates, the +supposition that he did so is disgraceful. For it demonstrates that those +who lived with Pythagoras were anthropophagites. + +24. For we say that the very contrary of what he conjectured would +happen. For, if we abstained from animals, we should not only be deprived +of pleasure and riches of this kind, but we should also lose our fields, +which would be destroyed by wild beasts; since the whole earth would be +occupied by serpents and birds, so that it would be difficult to plough +the land; the scattered seeds would immediately be gathered by the birds; +and all such fruits as had arrived at perfection, would be consumed by +quadrupeds. But men being oppressed by such a want of food, would be +compelled, by bitter necessity, to attack each other. + +25. Moreover, the Gods themselves, for the sake of a remedy, have +delivered mandates to many persons about sacrificing animals. For +history is full of instances of the Gods having ordered certain persons +to sacrifice animals, and, when sacrificed, to eat them. For, in the +return of the Heraclidæ, those who engaged in war against Lacedæmon, in +conjunction with Eurysthenes and Proscles, through a want of necessaries, +were compelled to eat serpents, which the land at that time afforded for +the nutriment of the army. In Libya, also, a cloud of locusts fell for +the relief of another army that was oppressed by hunger. The same thing +likewise happened at Gades. Bogus was a king of the Mauritanians, who +was slain by Agrippa in Mothone. He in that place attacked the temple of +Hercules, which was most rich. But it was the custom of the priests daily +to sprinkle the altar with blood. That this, however, was not effected by +the decision of men, but by that of divinity, the occasion at that time +demonstrated. For, the siege being continued for a long time, victims +were wanting. But the priest being dubious how he should act, had the +following vision in a dream. He seemed to himself to be standing in the +middle of the pillars of the temple of Hercules, and afterwards to see +a bird sitting opposite to the altar, and endeavouring to fly to it, +but which at length flew into his hands. He also saw that the altar was +sprinkled with its blood. Seeing this, he rose as soon as it was day, and +went to the altar, and standing on the turret, as he thought he did in +his dream, he looked round, and saw the very bird which he had seen in +his sleep. Hoping, therefore, that his dream would be fulfilled, he stood +still, saw the bird fly to the altar and sit upon it, and deliver itself +into the hands of the high priest. Thus the bird was sacrificed, and the +altar sprinkled with blood. That, however, which happened at Cyzicus, is +still more celebrated than this event. For Mithridates having besieged +this city, the festival of Proserpine was then celebrated, in which it +was requisite to sacrifice an ox. But the sacred herds, from which it was +necessary the victim should be taken, fed opposite to the city, on the +continent[23]: and one of them was already marked for this purpose. When, +therefore, the hour demanded the sacrifice, the ox lowed, and swam over +the sea, and the guards of the city opened the gates to it. Then the ox +directly ran into the city, and stood at the altar, and was sacrificed to +the Goddess. Not unreasonably, therefore, was it thought to be most pious +to sacrifice many animals, since it appeared that the sacrifice of them +was pleasing to the Gods. + +26. But what would be the condition of a city, if all the citizens were +of this opinion, [viz. that they should abstain from destroying animals?] +For how would they repel their enemies, when they were attacked by them, +if they were careful in the extreme not to kill any one of them? In this +case, indeed, they must be immediately destroyed. And it would be too +prolix to narrate other difficulties and inconveniences, which would +necessarily take place. That it is not, however, impious to slay and feed +on animals, is evident from this, that Pythagoras himself, though those +prior to him permitted the athletæ to drink milk, and to eat cheese, +irrigated with water; but others, posterior to him, rejecting this diet, +fed them with dry figs; yet he, abrogating the ancient custom, allowed +them to feed on flesh, and found that such a diet greatly increased their +strength. Some also relate, that the Pythagoreans themselves did not +spare animals when they sacrificed to the gods. Such, therefore, are the +arguments of Clodius, Heraclides Ponticus, Hermachus the Epicurean, and +the Stoics and Peripatetics, [against abstinence from animal food]: among +which also are comprehended the arguments which were sent to us by you, O +Castricius. As, however, I intend to oppose these opinions, and those of +the multitude, I may reasonably premise what follows. + +27. In the first place, therefore, it must be known that my discourse +does not bring with it an exhortation to every description of men. For +it is not directed to those who are occupied in sordid mechanical arts, +nor to those who are engaged in athletic exercises; neither to soldiers, +nor sailors, nor rhetoricians, nor to those who lead an active life. But +I write to the man who considers what he is, whence he came, and whither +he ought to tend, and who, in what pertains to nutriment, and other +necessary concerns, is different from those who propose to themselves +other kinds of life; for to none but such as these do I direct my +discourse. For, neither in this common life can there be one and the same +exhortation to the sleeper, who endeavours to obtain sleep through the +whole of life, and who, for this purpose, procures from all places things +of a soporiferous nature, as there is to him who is anxious to repel +sleep, and to dispose every thing about him to a vigilant condition. But +to the former it is necessary to recommend intoxication, surfeiting, and +satiety, and to exhort him to choose a dark house, and + + A bed luxuriant, broad, and soft,— + +as the poets say; and that he should procure for himself all such things +as are of a soporiferous nature, and which are effective of sluggishness +and oblivion, whether they are odours, or ointments, or are liquid or +solid medicines. And to the latter it is requisite to advise the use of +a drink sober and without wine, food of an attenuated nature, and almost +approaching to fasting; a house lucid, and participating of a subtle air +and wind, and to urge him to be strenuously excited by solicitude and +thought, and to prepare for himself a small and hard bed. But, whether we +are naturally adapted to this, I mean to a vigilant life, so as to grant +as little as possible to sleep, since we do not dwell among those who are +perpetually vigilant, or whether we are designed to be in a soporiferous +state of existence, is the business of another discussion, and is a +subject which requires very extended demonstrations. + +28. To the man, however, who once suspects the enchantments attending +our journey through the present life, and belonging to the place in +which we dwell; who also perceives himself to be naturally vigilant, and +considers the somniferous nature of the region which he inhabits;—to +this man addressing ourselves, we prescribe food consentaneous to his +suspicion and knowledge of this terrene abode, and exhort him to suffer +the somnolent to be stretched on their beds, dissolved in sleep. For it +is requisite to be cautious, lest as those who look on the blear-eyed +contract an ophthalmy, and as we gape when present with those who are +gaping, so we should be filled with drowsiness and sleep, when the region +which we inhabit is cold, and adapted to fill the eyes with rheum, as +being of a marshy nature, and drawing down all those that dwell in it to +a somniferous and oblivious condition. If, therefore, legislators had +ordained laws for cities, with a view to a contemplative and intellectual +life, it would certainly be requisite to be obedient to those laws, +and to comply with what they instituted concerning food. But if they +established their laws, looking to a life according to nature, and which +is said to rank as a medium, [between the irrational and the intellectual +life,] and to what the vulgar admit, who conceive externals, and things +which pertain to the body to be good or evil, why should any one, +adducing their laws, endeavour to subvert a life, which is more excellent +than every law which is written and ordained for the multitude, and which +is especially conformable to an unwritten and divine law? For such is the +truth of the case. + +29. The contemplation which procures for us felicity, does not consist, +as same one may think it does, in a multitude of discussions and +disciplines; nor does it receive any increase by a quantity of words. +For if this were the case, nothing would prevent those from being happy +by whom all disciplines are collected together [and comprehended]. +Now, however, every discipline by no means gives completion to this +contemplation, nor even the disciplines which pertain to truly existing +beings, unless there is a conformity to them of our nature[24] and life. +For since there are, as it is said, in every purpose three[25] ends, the +end with us is to obtain the contemplation of real being, the attainment +of it procuring, as much as it is possible for us, a conjunction of +the contemplator with the object of contemplation. For the reascent of +the soul is not to any thing else than true being itself, nor is its +conjunction with any other thing. But intellect is truly-existing being; +so that the end is to live according to intellect. Hence such discussions +and exoteric disciplines as impede our purification, do not give +completion to our felicity. If, therefore, felicity consisted in literary +attainments, this end might be obtained by those who pay no attention to +their food and their actions. But since for this purpose it is requisite +to exchange the life which the multitude lead for another, and to become +purified both in words and deeds, let us consider what reasonings and +what works will enable us to obtain this end. + +30. Shall we say, therefore, that they will be such as separate us from +sensibles, and the passions which pertain to them, and which elevate us +as much as possible to an intellectual, unimaginative, and impassive +life; but that the contraries to these are foreign, and deserve to be +rejected? And this by so much the more, as they separate us from a life +according to intellect. But, I think, it must be admitted, that we should +follow the object to which intellect attracts us. For we resemble those +who enter into, or depart from a foreign region, not only because we are +banished from our intimate associates, but in consequence of dwelling in +a foreign land, we are filled with barbaric passions, and manners, and +legal institutes, and to all these have a great propensity. Hence, he who +wishes to return to his proper kindred and associates, should not only +with alacrity begin the journey, but, in order that he may be properly +received, should meditate how he may divest himself of every thing of a +foreign nature which he has assumed, and should recall to his memory such +things as he has forgotten, and without which he cannot be admitted by +his kindred and friends. After the same manner, also, it is necessary, +if we intend to return to things which are truly our own, that we should +divest ourselves of every thing of a mortal nature which we have assumed, +together with an adhering affection towards it, and which is the cause +of our descent [into this terrestrial region;] and that we should excite +our recollection of that blessed and eternal essence, and should hasten +our return to the nature which is without colour and without quality, +earnestly endeavouring to accomplish two things; one, that we may cast +aside every thing material and mortal; but the other, that we may +properly return, and be again conversant with our true kindred, ascending +to them in a way contrary to that in which we descended hither. For we +were intellectual natures, and we still are essences purified from all +sense and irrationality; but we are complicated with sensibles, through +our incapability of eternally associating with the intelligible, and +through the power of being conversant with terrestrial concerns. For +all the powers which energize in conjunction with sense and body, are +injured, in consequence of the soul not abiding in the intelligible; +(just as the earth, when in a bad condition, though it frequently +receives the seed of wheat, yet produces nothing but tares), and this is +through a certain depravity of the soul, which does not indeed destroy +its essence from the generation of irrationality, but through this is +conjoined with a mortal nature, and is drawn down from its own proper to +a foreign condition of being. + +31. So that, if we are desirous of returning to those natures with which +we formerly associated, we must endeavour to the utmost of our power to +withdraw ourselves from sense and imagination, and the irrationality with +which they are attended, and also from the passions which subsist about +them, as far as the necessity of our condition in this life will permit. +But such things as pertain to intellect should be distinctly arranged, +procuring for it peace and quiet from the war with the irrational part; +that we may not only be auditors of intellect and intelligibles, but +may as much as possible enjoy the contemplation of them, and, being +established in an incorporeal nature, may truly live through intellect; +and not falsely in conjunction with things allied to bodies. We must +therefore divest ourselves of our manifold garments, both of this visible +and fleshly vestment, and of those with which we are internally clothed, +and which are proximate to our cutaneous habiliments; and we must enter +the stadium naked and unclothed, striving for [the most glorious of all +prizes] the Olympia of the soul. The first thing, however, and without +which we cannot contend, is to divest ourselves of our garments. But +since of these some are external and others internal, thus also with +respect to the denudation, one kind is through things which are apparent, +but another through such as are more unapparent. Thus, for instance, +not to eat, or not to receive what is offered to us, belongs to things +which are immediately obvious; but not to desire is a thing more obscure; +so that, together with deeds, we must also withdraw ourselves from an +adhering affection and passion towards them. For what benefit shall we +derive by abstaining from deeds, when at the same time we tenaciously +adhere to the causes from which the deeds proceed? + +32. But this departure [from sense, imagination, and irrationality,] +may be effected by violence, and also by persuasion and by reason, +through the wasting away, and, as it may be said, oblivion and death of +the passions; which, indeed, is the best kind of departure, since it is +accomplished without oppressing that from which we are divulsed. For, +in sensibles, a divulsion by force is not effected without either a +laceration of a part, or a vestige of avulsion. But this separation is +introduced by a continual negligence of the passions. And this negligence +is produced by an abstinence from those sensible perceptions which excite +the passions, and by a persevering attention to intelligibles. And among +these passions or perturbations, those which arise from food are to be +enumerated. + +33. We should therefore abstain, no less than from other things, from +certain food, viz. such as is naturally adapted to excite the passive +part of our soul, concerning which it will be requisite to consider +as follows: There are two fountains whose streams irrigate the bond +by which the soul is bound to the body; and from which the soul being +filled as with deadly potions, becomes oblivious of the proper objects +of her contemplation. These fountains are pleasure and pain; of which +sense indeed is preparative, and the perception which is according to +sense, together with the imaginations, opinions, and recollections +which accompany the senses. But from these, the passions being excited, +and the whole of the irrational nature becoming fattened, the soul is +drawn downward, and abandons its proper love of true being. As much as +possible, therefore, we must separate ourselves from these. But the +separation must be effected by an avoidance of the passions which subsist +through the senses and the irrational part. But the senses are employed +either on objects of the sight, or of the hearing, or of the taste, or +the smell, or the touch; for sense is as it were the metropolis of that +foreign colony of passions which we contain. Let us, therefore, consider +how much fuel of the passions enters into us through each of the senses. +For this is effected partly by the view of the contests of horses and +the athlete, or those whose bodies are contorted in dancing; and partly +from the survey of beautiful women. For these, ensnaring the irrational +nature, attack and subjugate it by all-various deceptions. + +34. For the soul, being agitated with Bacchic fury through all these by +the irrational part, is made to leap, to exclaim and vociferate, the +external tumult being inflamed by the internal, and which was first +enkindled by sense. But the excitations through the ears, and which +are of a passive nature, are produced by certain noises and sounds, by +indecent language and defamation, so that many through these being exiled +from reason, are furiously agitated, and some, becoming effeminate, +exhibit all-various convolutions of the body. And who is ignorant how +much the use of fumigations, and the exhalations of sweet odours, with +which lovers supply the objects of their love, fatten the irrational part +of the soul? But what occasion is there to speak of the passions produced +through the taste? For here, especially, there is a complication of a +twofold bond; one which is fattened by the passions excited by the taste; +and the other, which we render heavy and powerful, by the introduction +of foreign bodies [_i.e._ of bodies different from our own]. For, as +a certain physician said, those are not the only poisons which are +prepared by the medical art; but those likewise which we daily assume +for food, both in what we eat, and what we drink, and a thing of a much +more deadly nature is imparted to the soul through these, than from the +poisons which are compounded for the purpose of destroying the body. And +as to the touch, it does all but transmute the soul into the body, and +produces in it certain inarticulate sounds, such as frequently take place +in inanimate bodies. And from all these, recollections, imaginations, +and opinions being collected together, excite a swarm of passions, viz. +of fear, desire, anger, love, voluptuousness[26], pain, emulation, +solicitude, and disease, and cause the soul to be full of similar +perturbations. + +35. Hence, to be purified from all these is most difficult, and requires +a great contest, and we must bestow much labour both by night and by +day to be liberated from an attention to them, and this, because we are +necessarily complicated with sense. Whence, also, as much as possible, +we should withdraw ourselves from those places in which we may, though +unwillingly, meet with this hostile crowd. From experience, also, we +should avoid a contest with it, and even a victory over it, and the want +of exercise from inexperience. + +36. For we learn, that this conduct was adopted by some of the celebrated +ancient Pythagoreans and wise men; some of whom dwelt in the most +solitary places; but others in temples and sacred groves, from which, +though they were in cities, all tumult and the multitude were expelled. +But Plato chose to reside in the Academy, a place not only solitary and +remote from the city, but which was also said to be insalubrious. Others +have not spared even their eyes, through a desire of not being divulsed +from the inward contemplation [of reality]. If some one, however, at +the same time that he is conversant with men, and while he is filling +his senses with the passions pertaining to them, should fancy that he +can remain impassive, he is ignorant that he both deceives himself and +those who are persuaded by him, nor does he see that we are enslaved to +many passions, through not alienating ourselves from the multitude. For +he did not speak vainly, and in such a way as to falsify the nature of +[the Coryphæan] philosophers, who said of them, “These, therefore, from +their youth, neither know the way to the forum, nor where the court of +justice or senate-house is situated, or any common place of assembly +belonging to the city.” They likewise neither hear nor see laws, or +decrees, whether orally promulgated or written. And as to the ardent +endeavours of their companions to obtain magistracies, the associations +of these, their banquets and wanton feastings, accompanied by pipers, +these they do not even dream of accomplishing. But whether any thing in +the city has happened well or ill, or what evil has befallen any one from +his progenitors, whether male or female, these are more concealed from +such a one, than, as it is said, how many measures called choes the sea +contains. And besides this, he is even ignorant that he is ignorant[27] +of all these particulars. For he does not abstain from them for the sake +of renown, but, in reality, his body only dwells, and is conversant in +the city; but his reasoning power considering all these as trifling and +of no value, “he is borne away,” according to Pindar, “on all sides, and +does not apply himself to any thing which is near.” + +37. In what is here said, Plato asserts, that the Coryphæan philosopher, +by not at all mingling himself with the above-mentioned particulars, +remains impassive to them. Hence, he neither knows the way to the court +of justice nor the senate-house, nor any thing else which has been before +enumerated. He does not say, indeed, that he knows and is conversant with +these particulars, and that, being conversant, and filling his senses +with them, yet does not know any thing about them; but, on the contrary, +he says, that abstaining from them, he is ignorant that he is ignorant of +them. He also adds, that this philosopher does not even dream of betaking +himself to banquets. Much less, therefore, would he be indignant, if +deprived of broth, or pieces of flesh; nor, in short, will he admit +things of this kind. And will he not rather consider the abstinence from +all these as trifling, and a thing of no consequence, but the assumption +of them to be a thing of great importance and noxious? For since there +are two paradigms in the order of things, one of a divine nature, which +is most happy, the other of that which is destitute of divinity, and +which is most miserable[28]; the Coryphæan philosopher will assimilate +himself to the one, but will render himself dissimilar to the other, and +will lead a life conformable to the paradigm to which he is assimilated, +viz. a life satisfied with slender food, and sufficient to itself, and in +the smallest degree replete with mortal natures. + +38. Hence, as long as any one is discordant about food, and contends +that this or that thing should be eaten, but does not conceive that, if +it were possible, we should abstain from all food, assenting by this +contention to his passions, such a one forms a vain opinion, as if the +subjects of his dissension were things of no consequence. He, therefore, +who philosophizes, will not separate himself [from his terrestrial bonds] +by violence; for he who is compelled to do this, nevertheless remains +there from whence he was forced to depart. Nor must it be thought, that +he who strengthens these bonds, effects a thing of small importance. +So that only granting to nature what is necessary, and this of a light +quality, and through more slender food, he will reject whatever exceeds +this, as only contributing to pleasure. For he will be persuaded of the +truth of what Plato says, that sense is a nail by which the soul is +fastened to bodies[29], through the agglutination of the passions, and +the enjoyment of corporeal delight. For if sensible perceptions were no +impediment to the pure energy of the soul, why would it be a thing of +a dire nature to be in body, while at the same time the soul remained +impassive to the motions of the body? + +39. How is it, also, that you have decided and said, that you are not +passive to things which you suffer, and that you are not present with +things by which you are passively affected? For intellect, indeed, is +present with itself, though we are not present with it. But he who +departs from intellect, is in that place to which he departs; and when, +by discursive energies, he applies himself upwards and downwards by his +apprehension of things, he is there where his apprehension is. But it is +one thing not to attend to sensibles, in consequence of being present +with other things, and another for a man to think, that though he attends +to sensibles yet he is not present with them. Nor can any one show that +Plato admits this, without at the same time demonstrating himself to be +deceived. He, therefore, who submits to the assumption of [every kind +of] food, and voluntarily betakes himself to [alluring] spectacles, +to conversation with the multitude, and laughter; such a one, by thus +acting, is there where the passion is which he sustains. But he who +abstains from these in consequence of being present with other things, +he it is who, through his unskilfulness, not only excites laughter in +Thracian maid-servants, but in the rest of the vulgar, and when he sits +at a banquet, falls into the greatest perplexity, not from any defect +of sensation, or from a superior accuracy of sensible perception, and +energizing with the irrational part of the soul alone; for Plato does +not venture to assert this; but because, in slanderous conversation, +he has nothing reproachful to say of any one, as not knowing any evil +of any one, because he has not made individuals the subject of his +meditation. Being in such perplexity, therefore, he appears, says Plato, +to be ridiculous; and in the praises and boastings of others, as he is +manifestly seen to laugh, not dissemblingly, but, in reality, he appears +to be delirious. + +40. So that, through ignorance of, and abstaining from sensible +concerns, he is unacquainted with them. But it is by no means to be +admitted, that though he should be familiar with sensibles, and should +energize through the irrational part, yet it is possible for him [at the +same time] genuinely to survey the objects of intellect. For neither do +they who assert that we have two souls, admit that we can attend at one +and the same time to two different things. For thus they would make a +conjunction of two animals, which being employed in different energies, +the one would not be able to perceive the operations of the other. + +41. But why would it be requisite that the passions should waste away, +that we should die with respect to them, and that this should be daily +the subject of our meditation, if it was possible for us, as some assert, +to energize according to intellect, though we are at the same time +intimately connected with mortal concerns, and this without the intuition +of intellect? For intellect sees, and intellect hears [as Epicharmus +says]. But if, while eating luxuriously, and drinking the sweetest wine, +it were possible to be present with immaterial natures, why may not this +be frequently effected while you are present with, and are performing +things which it is not becoming even to mention? For these passions +every where proceed from the boy[30] which is in us. And you certainly +will admit that the baser these passions are, the more we are drawn down +towards them. For what will be the distinction which ought here to be +made, if you admit that to some things it is not possible to be passive, +without being present with them, but that you may accomplish other +things, at the same time that you are surveying intelligibles? For it +is not because some things are apprehended to be base by the multitude, +but others not. For all the above mentioned passions are base. So that +to the attainment of a life according to intellect, it is requisite to +abstain from all these, in the same manner as from venereal concerns. To +nature therefore, but little food must be granted, through the necessity +of generation [or of our connexion with a flowing condition of being.] +For, where sense and sensible apprehension are, there a departure and +separation from the intelligible take place; and by how much stronger +the excitation is of the irrational part, by so much the greater is the +departure from intellection. For it is not possible for us to be borne +along to this place and to that, while we are _here_, and yet be _there_, +[i.e. be present with an intelligible essence.] For our attentions to +things are not effected with a part, but with the whole of ourselves. + +42. But to fancy that he who is passively affected according to sense, +may, nevertheless, energize about intelligibles, has precipitated many +of the Barbarians to destruction; who arrogantly assert, that though +they indulge in every kind of pleasure, yet they are able to convert +themselves to things of a different nature from sensibles, at the same +time that they are energizing with the irrational part. For I have heard +some persons patronizing their infelicity after the following manner. “We +are not,” say they, “defiled by food, as neither is the sea by the filth +of rivers. For we have dominion over all eatables, in the same manner as +the sea over all humidity. But if the sea should shut up its mouth, so +as not to receive the streams that now flow into it, it would be indeed, +with respect to itself, great; but, with respect to the world, small, as +not being able to receive dirt and corruption. If, however, it was afraid +of being defiled, it would not receive these streams; but knowing its own +magnitude, it receives all things, and is not averse to any thing which +proceeds into it. In like manner, say they, we also, if we were afraid of +food, should be enslaved by the conception of fear. But it is requisite +that all things should be obedient to us. For, if we collect a little +water, indeed, which has received any filth, it becomes immediately +defiled and oppressed by the filth; but this is not the case with the +profound sea. Thus, also, aliments vanquish the pusillanimous; but where +there is an immense liberty with respect to food, all things are received +for nutriment, and no defilement is produced.” These men, therefore, +deceiving themselves by arguments of this kind, act in a manner +conformable to their deception. But, instead of obtaining liberty, being +precipitated into an abyss of infelicity, they are suffocated. This, +also, induced some of the Cynics to be desirous of eating every kind of +food, in consequence of their pertinaciously adhering to the cause of +errors, which we are accustomed to call a thing of an indifferent nature. + +43. The man, however, who is cautious, and is suspicious of the +enchantments of nature, who has surveyed the essential properties of +body, and knows that it was adapted as an instrument to the powers of +the soul, will also know how readily passion is prepared to accord with +the body, whether we are willing or not, when any thing external strikes +it, and the pulsation at length arrives at perception. For perception +is, as it were, an answer [to that which causes the perception.] But +the soul cannot answer unless she wholly converts herself to the sound, +and transfers her animadversive eye to the pulsation. In short, the +irrational part not being able to judge to what extent, how, whence, +and what thing ought to be the object of attention, but of itself +being inconsiderate, like horses without a charioteer[31]; whither +it verges downward, thither it is borne along, without any power of +governing itself in things external. Nor does it know the fit time or +the measure of the food which should be taken, unless the eye of the +charioteer is attentive to it, which regulates and governs the motions of +irrationality, this part of the soul being essentially blind. But he who +takes away from reason its dominion over the irrational part, and permits +it to be borne along, conformably to its proper nature: such a one, +yielding to desire and anger, will suffer them to proceed to whatever +extent they please. On the contrary, the worthy man will so act that his +deeds may be conformable to presiding reason, even in the energies of the +irrational part. + +44. And in this the worthy appears to differ from the depraved man, +that the former has every where reason present, governing and guiding, +like a charioteer, the irrational part; but the latter performs many +things without reason for his guide. Hence the latter is said to be most +irrational, and is borne along in a disorderly manner by irrationality; +but the former is obedient to reason, and superior to every irrational +desire. This, therefore, is the cause why the multitude err in words +and deeds, in desire and anger, and why, on the contrary, good men act +with rectitude, viz. that the former suffer the boy within them to do +whatever it pleases; but the latter give themselves up to the guidance +of the tutor of the boy, [_i.e._ to reason] and govern what pertains to +themselves in conjunction with it. Hence in food, and in other corporeal +energies and enjoyments, the charioteer being present, defines what is +commensurate and opportune. But when the charioteer is absent, and, as +some say, is occupied in his own concerns, then, if he also has with +him our attention, he does not permit it to be disturbed, or at all to +energize with the irrational power. If, however, he should permit our +attention to be directed to the boy, unaccompanied by himself, he would +destroy the man, who would be precipitately borne along by the folly of +the irrational part. + +45. Hence, to worthy men, abstinence in food, and in corporeal enjoyments +and actions, is more appropriate than abstinence in what pertains to the +touch; because though, while we touch bodies, it is necessary we should +descend from our proper manners to the instruction of that which is most +irrational in us; yet this is still more necessary in the assumption of +food. For the irrational nature is incapable of considering what will be +the effect of it, because this part of the soul is essentially ignorant +of that which is absent. But, with respect to food, if it were possible +to be liberated from it, in the same manner as from visible objects, +when they are removed from the view; for we can attend to other things +when the imagination is withdrawn from them;—if this were possible, it +would be no great undertaking to be immediately emancipated from the +necessity of the mortal nature, by yielding, in a small degree, to it. +Since, however, a prolongation of time in cooking and digesting food, and +together with this the co-operation of sleep and rest, are requisite, +and, after these, a certain temperament from digestion, and a separation +of excrements, it is necessary that the tutor of the boy within us should +be present, who, selecting things of a light nature, and which will be +no impediment to him, may concede these to nature, in consequence of +foreseeing the future, and the impediment which will be produced by his +permitting the desires to introduce to us a burden not easily to be +borne, through the trifling pleasure arising from the deglutition of food. + +46. Reason, therefore, very properly rejecting the much and the +superfluous, will circumscribe what is necessary in narrow boundaries, +in order that it may not be molested in procuring what the wants of the +body demand, through many things being requisite; nor being attentive to +elegance, will it need a multitude of servants; nor endeavour to receive +much pleasure in eating, nor, through satiety, to be filled with much +indolence; nor by rendering its burden [the body] more gross, to become +somnolent; nor through the body being replete with things of a fattening +nature, to render the bond more strong, but himself more sluggish and +imbecile in the performance of his proper works. For, let any man show +us who endeavours as much as possible to live according to intellect, +and not to be attracted by the passions of the body, that animal food +is more easily procured than the food from fruits and herbs; or that +the preparation of the former is more simple than that of the latter, +and, in short, that it does not require cooks, but, when compared with +inanimate nutriment, is unattended by pleasure, is lighter in concoction, +and is more rapidly digested, excites in a less degree the desires, and +contributes less to the strength of the body than a vegetable diet. + +47. If, however, neither any physician, nor philosopher, nor wrestler, +nor any one of the vulgar, has dared to assert this, why should we not +willingly abstain from this corporeal burden? Why should we not, at the +same time, liberate ourselves from many inconveniences by abandoning a +fleshly diet? For we should not be liberated from one only, but from +myriads of evils, by accustoming ourselves to be satisfied with things +of the smallest nature; viz. we should be freed from a superabundance +of riches, from numerous servants, a multitude of utensils, a somnolent +condition, from many and vehement diseases, from medical assistance, +incentives to venery, more gross exhalations, an abundance of excrements, +the crassitude of the corporeal bond, from the strength which excites +to [base] actions, and, in short, from an Iliad of evils. But from all +these, inanimate and slender food, and which is easily obtained, will +liberate us, and will procure for us peace, by imparting salvation to +our reasoning power. For, as Diogenes says, thieves and enemies are not +found among those that feed on maize[32], but sycophants and tyrants are +produced from those who feed on flesh. The cause, however, of our being +in want of many things being taken away, together with the multitude of +nutriment introduced into the body, and also the weight of digestibles +being lightened, the eye of the soul will become free, and will be +established as in a port beyond the smoke and the waves of the corporeal +nature. + +48. And this neither requires monition, nor demonstration, on account +of the evidence with which it is immediately attended. Hence, not only +those who endeavour to live according to intellect, and who establish +for themselves an intellectual life, as the end of their pursuits, have +perceived that this abstinence was necessary to the attainment of this +end; but, as it appears to me, nearly every philosopher, preferring +frugality to luxury, has rather embraced a life which is satisfied with +a little, than one that requires a multitude of things. And, what will +seem paradoxical to many, we shall find that this is asserted and praised +by men who thought that pleasure is the end of those that philosophize. +For most of the Epicureans, beginning from the Corypheus of their sect, +appear to have been satisfied with maize and fruits, and have filled +their writings with showing how little nature requires, and that its +necessities may be sufficiently remedied by slender and easily-procured +food. + +49. For the wealth, say they, of nature is definite, and easily obtained; +but that which proceeds from vain opinions, is indefinite, and procured +with difficulty. For things which may be readily obtained, remove in a +beautiful and abundantly sufficient manner that which, through indigence, +is the cause of molestation to the flesh; and these are such as have the +simple nature of moist and dry aliments. But every thing else, say they, +which terminates in luxury, is not attended with a necessary appetition, +nor is it necessarily produced from a certain something which is in pain; +but partly arises from the molestation and pungency solely proceeding +from something not being present; partly from joy; and partly from vain +and false dogmas, which neither pertain to any natural defect, nor to +the dissolution of the human frame, those not being present. For things +which may every where be obtained, are sufficient for those purposes +which nature necessarily requires. But these, through their simplicity +and paucity, may be easily procured. And he, indeed, who feeds on flesh, +requires also inanimate natures; but he who is satisfied with things +inanimate, is easily supplied from the half of what the other wants, and +needs but a small expense for the preparation of his food. + +50. They likewise say, it is requisite that he who prepares the +necessaries of life, should not afterwards make use of philosophy as an +accession; but, having obtained it, should, with a confident mind, thus +genuinely endure[33] the events of the day. For we shall commit what +pertains to ourselves to a bad counsellor, if we measure and procure +what is necessary to nature, without philosophy. Hence it is necessary +that those who philosophize should provide things of this kind, and +strenuously attend to them as much as possible. But, so far as there +is a dereliction from thence, [_i.e._ from philosophizing], which is +not capable of effecting a perfect purification[34], so far we should +not endeavour to procure either riches or nutriment. In conjunction, +therefore, with philosophy, we should engage in things of this kind, +and be immediately persuaded that it is much better to pursue what is +the least, the most simple, and light in nutriment. For that which is +least, and is unattended with molestation, is derived from that which is +least[35]. + +51. The preparation also of these things, draws along with it many +impediments, either from the weight of the body, [which they are +adapted to increase,] or from the difficulty of procuring them, or from +their preventing the continuity of the energy of our most principal +reasonings[36], or from some other cause. For this energy then becomes +immediately useless, and does not remain unchanged by the concomitant +perturbations. It is necessary, however, that a philosopher should hope +that he may not be in want of any thing through the whole of life. But +this hope will be sufficiently preserved by things which are easily +procured; while, on the other hand, this hope is frustrated by things of +a sumptuous nature. The multitude, therefore, on this account, though +their possessions are abundant, incessantly labour to obtain more, as if +they were in want. But the recollection that the greatest possible wealth +has no power worth mentioning of dissolving the perturbations of the +soul, will cause us to be satisfied with things easily obtained, and of +the most simple nature. Things also, which are very moderate and obvious, +and which may be procured with the greatest facility, remove the tumult +occasioned by the flesh. But the deficiency of things of a luxurious +nature will not disturb him who meditates on death. Farther still, the +pain arising from indigence is much milder than that which is produced by +repletion, and will be considered to be so by him who does not deceive +himself with vain opinions. Variety also of food not only does not +dissolve the perturbations of the soul, but does not even increase the +pleasure which is felt by the flesh. For this is terminated as soon as +pain is removed[37]. So that the feeding on flesh does not remove any +thing which is troublesome to nature, nor effect any thing which, unless +it is accomplished, will end in pain. But the pleasantness with which +it is attended is violent, and, perhaps, mingled with the contrary. For +it does not contribute to the duration of life, but to the variety of +pleasure; and in this respect resembles venereal enjoyments, and the +drinking of foreign wines, without which nature is able to remain. For +those things, without which nature cannot last, are very few, and may be +procured easily, and in conjunction with justice, liberty, quiet, and +abundant leisure. + +52. Again, neither does animal food contribute, but is rather an +impediment to health. For health is preserved through those things by +which it is recovered. But it is recovered through a most slender and +fleshless diet; so that by this also it is preserved. If, however, +vegetable food does not contribute to the strength of Milo, nor, in +short, to an increase of strength, neither does a philosopher require +strength, or an increase of it, if he intends to give himself up to +contemplation, and not to an active and intemperate life. But it is +not at all wonderful, that the vulgar should fancy that animal food +contributes to health; for they also think that sensual enjoyments and +venery are preservative of health, none of which benefit any one; and +those that engage in them must be thankful if they are not injured by +them. And if many are not of this opinion, it is nothing to us. For +neither is any fidelity and constancy in friendship and benevolence to +be found among the vulgar; nor are they capable of receiving these, +nor of participating of wisdom, or any portion of it which deserves to +be mentioned. Neither do they understand what is privately or publicly +advantageous; nor are they capable of forming a judgment of depraved and +elegant manners, so as to distinguish the one from the other. And, in +addition to these things, they are full of insolence and intemperance. On +this account, there is no occasion to fear that there will not be those +who will feed on animals. + +53. For if all men conceived rightly, there would be no need of fowlers, +or hunters, or fishermen, or swineherds. But animals governing +themselves, and having no guardian and ruler, would quickly perish, +and be destroyed by others, who would attack them and diminish their +multitude, as is found to be the case with myriads of animals on which +men do not feed. But all-various folly incessantly dwelling with mankind, +there will be an innumerable multitude of those who will voraciously +feed on flesh. It is necessary however to preserve health; not by the +fear of death, but for the sake of not being impeded in the attainment +of the good which is derived from contemplation. But that which is +especially preservative of health, is an undisturbed state of the soul, +and a tendency of the reasoning power towards truly existing being. For +much benefit is from hence derived to the body, as our associates have +demonstrated from experience. Hence some who have been afflicted with +the gout in the feet and hands, to such a degree as to be infested with +it for eight entire years, have expelled it through abandoning wealth, +and betaking themselves to the contemplation of divinity[38]. At the +same time, therefore, that they have abandoned riches, and a solicitude +about human concerns, they have also been liberated from bodily disease. +So that a certain state of the soul greatly contributes both to health +and to the good of the whole body. And to this also, for the most part, +a diminution of nutriment contributes. In short, as Epicurus likewise +has rightly said, that food is to be avoided, the enjoyment of which we +desire and pursue, but which, after we have enjoyed, we rank among things +of an unacceptable nature. But of this kind is every thing luxuriant and +gross. And in this manner those are affected, who are vehemently desirous +of such nutriment, and through it are involved either in great expense, +or in disease, or repletion, or the privation of leisure[39]. + +54. Hence also, in simple and slender food, repletion is to be avoided, +and every where we should consider what will be the consequence of the +possession or enjoyment of it, what the magnitude of it is, and what +molestation of the flesh or of the soul it is capable of dissolving. For +we ought never to act indefinitely, but in things of this kind we should +employ a boundary and measure; and infer by a reasoning process, that he +who fears to abstain from animal food, if he suffers himself to feed on +flesh through pleasure, is afraid of death. For immediately, together +with a privation of such food, he conceives that something indefinitely +dreadful will be present, the consequence of which will be death. But +from these and similar causes, an insatiable desire is produced of +riches, possessions, and renown, together with an opinion that every +good is increased with these in a greater extent of time, and the dread +of death as of an infinite evil. The pleasure however which is produced +through luxury, does not even approach to that which is experienced +by him who lives with frugality. For such a one has great pleasure in +thinking how little he requires. For luxury, astonishment about venereal +occupations, and ambition about external concerns, being taken away, what +remaining use can there be of idle wealth, which will be of no advantage +to us whatever, but will only become a burden, no otherwise than +repletion?—while, on the other hand, the pleasure arising from frugality +is genuine and pure. It is also necessary to accustom the body to become +alienated, as much as possible, from the pleasure of the satiety arising +from luxurious food, but not from the fulness produced by a slender diet, +in order that moderation may proceed through all things, and that what is +necessary, or what is most excellent, may fix a boundary to our diet. For +he who thus mortifies his body will receive every possible good, through +being sufficient to himself, and an assimilation to divinity. And thus +also, he will not desire a greater extent of time, as if it would bring +with it an augmentation of good. He will likewise thus be truly rich, +measuring wealth by a natural bound, and not by vain opinions. Thus too, +he will not depend on the hope of the greatest pleasure, the existence of +which is incredible, since this would be most troublesome. But he will +remain satisfied with his present condition, and will not be anxious to +live for a longer period of time. + +55. Besides this also, is it not absurd, that he who is in great +affliction, or is in some grievous external calamity, or is bound with +chains, does not even think of food, nor concern himself about the means +of obtaining it; but when it is placed before him, refuses what is +necessary to his subsistence; and that the man who is truly in bonds, and +is tormented by inward calamities, should endeavour to procure a variety +of eatables, paying attention to things through which he will strengthen +his bonds? And how is it possible that this should be the conduct of men +who know what they suffer, and not rather of those who are delighted with +their calamities, and who are ignorant of the evils which they endure? +For these are affected in a way contrary to those who are in chains, and +who are conscious of their miserable condition; since these, experiencing +no gratification in the present life, and being full of immense +perturbation, insatiably aspire after another life. For no one who can +easily liberate himself from all perturbations, will desire to possess +silver tables and couches, and to have ointments and cooks, splendid +vessels and garments, and suppers remarkable for their sumptuousness and +variety; but such a desire arises from a perfect uselessness to every +purpose of the present life, from an indefinite generation of good, and +from immense perturbation. Hence some do not remember the past, the +recollection of it being expelled by the present; but others do not +inquire about the present, because they are not gratified with existing +circumstances. + +56. The contemplative philosopher, however, will invariably adopt a +slender diet. For he knows the particulars in which his bond consists, +so that he is not capable of desiring luxuries. Hence, being delighted +with simple food, he will not seek for animal nutriment, as if he was +not satisfied with a vegetable diet. But if the nature of the body +in a philosopher was not such as we have supposed it to be, and was +not so tractable, and so adapted to have its wants satisfied through +things easily procured, and it was requisite to endure some pains and +molestations for the sake of true salvation, ought we not [willingly] to +endure them? For when it is requisite that we should be liberated from +disease, do we not voluntarily sustain many pains, viz. while we are cut, +covered with blood, burnt, drink bitter medicines, and are purged through +the belly, through emetics, and through the nostrils, and do we not also +reward those who cause us to suffer in this manner? And this being the +case, ought we not to sustain every thing, though of the most afflictive +nature, with equanimity, for the sake of being purified from internal +disease, since our contest is for immortality, and an association with +divinity, from which we are prevented through an association with the +body? By no means, therefore, ought we to follow the laws of the body, +which are violent and adverse to the laws of intellect, and to the paths +which lead to salvation. Since, however, we do not now philosophize about +the endurance of pain, but about the rejection of pleasures which are not +necessary, what apology can remain for those, who impudently endeavour to +defend their own intemperance? + +57. For if it is requisite not to dissemble any thing through fear, but +to speak freely, it is no otherwise possible to obtain the end [of a +contemplative life], than by adhering to God, as if fastened by a nail, +being divulsed from body, and those pleasures of the soul which subsist +through it; since our salvation is effected by deeds, and not by a mere +attention to words. But as it is not possible with any kind of diet, and, +in short, by feeding on flesh, to become adapted to an union with even +some partial deity, much less is this possible with that God who is +beyond all things, and is above a nature simply incorporeal; but after +all-various purifications, both of soul and body, he who is naturally +of an excellent disposition, and lives with piety and purity, will +scarcely be thought worthy to perceive him. So that, by how much more the +Father of all things excels in simplicity, purity, and sufficiency to +himself, as being established far beyond all material representation, by +so much the more is it requisite, that he who approaches to him should +be in every respect pure and holy, beginning from his body, and ending +internally, and distributing to each of the parts, and in short to every +thing which is present with him, a purity adapted to the nature of each. +Perhaps, however, these things will not be contradicted by any one. But +it may be doubted, why we admit abstinence from animal food to pertain +to purity, though in sacrifices we slay sheep and oxen, and conceive +that these immolations are pure and acceptable to the Gods. Hence, since +the solution of this requires a long discussion, the consideration of +sacrifices must be assumed from another principle. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[13] Porphyry elsewhere calls this Firmus Castricius his friend and +fellow disciple. See more concerning him in Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus. + +[14] παρανομηματα. Porphyry calls the conduct of Firmus _illegitimate_, +because the feeding on flesh is for the most part contrary to the laws of +genuine philosophy. + +[15] The original in this place is, ἢ δι’ απατην ουν, ἢ το μηδεν +διαφερειν ηγεισθαι προς φρονησιν, κ.τ.λ.; but, for ἢ το μηδεν διαφερειν, +I read δια το μηδεν διαφερειν. And this appears to have been the reading +which Felicianus found in his MS.; for his version of this passage is, +“Vel igitur deceptione inductus, quod sive hoc sive illo modo vescaris, +&c.” + +[16] This philosopher was an auditor of Plato and Speusippus. + +[17] Hesiod. Op. et Di. lib. I. v. 275, &c. + +[18] This philosopher was a Mitylenæan, and is said to have been an +auditor of, and also the successor of, Epicurus. + +[19] Iliad, XI. v. 479. + +[20] Iliad, IV. v. 35. + +[21] Iliad, XXII. v. 347. + +[22] _i.e._ Sacrifices from twelve animals. + +[23] For Cyzicus was situated in an island. + +[24] In the original εαν μη προση και η κατ’ αυτα φυσιωσις και ζωη; but +it is obviously necessary for φυσιωσις to read φυσις. + +[25] viz. As it appears to me, a pleasurable, a profitable, and a +virtuous end, which last is a truly beautiful and good end. + +[26] For φιλτρων here, I read φιληδονιων. + +[27] The multitude are ignorant that they are ignorant with respect to +objects of all others the most splendid and real; but the Coryphæan +philosopher is ignorant that he is ignorant with respect to objects +most unsubstantial and obscure. The former ignorance is the consequence +of a defect, but the latter of a transcendency of gnostic energy. What +Porphyry here says of the Coryphæan philosopher, is derived from the +Theætetus of Plato. + +[28] See p. 52 of my translation of the Theætetus of Plato, from which +Dialogue, what Porphyry here says, as well as what he a little before +said, is derived. + +[29] See the Phædo of Plato, where this is asserted. + +[30] Sense, and that which is beautiful in the energies of sense, are +thus denominated by Plato. + +[31] The rational part of the soul is assimilated by Plato, in the +Phædrus, to a charioteer, and the two irrational parts, _desire_ and +_anger_, to two horses. See my translation of that Dialogue. + +[32] A kind of bread made of milk and flour. + +[33] In the original, αλλα παρασκευασαμενον το θαρρειν τῃ ψυχῃ γνησιως +ουτως αντεχεσθαι των καθ’ ημεραν. But the editor of the quarto edition +of this work, who appears to have been nothing more than a mere verbal +critic, says, in a note on this passage, that the word αντεχεσθαι, +signifies _pertinacissime illis inhærere, nihil ultra studere_; whereas +it must be obvious to any man who understands what is here said, that in +this place it signifies _to endure_. + +[34] In the original, ο μη κυριευσει της τελειας εκθαρρησεως; but for +εκθαρρησεως I read with Felicianus εκκαθαρσεως. + +[35] In the original, ελαχιστον γαρ και το οχληρον εκ του ελαχιστου. But +it is obviously necessary for οχληρον to read ανοχληρον, and yet this was +not perceived by the German editor of this work, Jacob Rhoer. + +[36] _i.e._ Of our reasonings about intelligible objects. + +[37] Conformable to this, it is beautifully observed by Aristotle, in his +Nicomachean Ethics, that corporeal pleasures are the remedies of pain, +and that they fill up the indigence of nature, but do not perfect any +energy of the [rational] soul. + +[38] This is said by Porphyry, in his Life of Plotinus, to have been the +case with the senator Rogatianus. + +[39] And leisure, to those who knew how rightly to employ it, is, as +Socrates said, καλλιστον κτηματων, “_the most beautiful of possessions_.” + + + + +ON ABSTINENCE FROM ANIMAL FOOD. + +BOOK THE SECOND. + + +1. Pursuing therefore the inquiries pertaining to simplicity and purity +of diet, we have now arrived, O Castricius, at the discussion of +sacrifices; the consideration of which is difficult, and at the same time +requires much explanation, if we intend to decide concerning it in such a +way as will be acceptable to the Gods. Hence, as this is the proper place +for such a discussion, we shall now unfold what appears to us to be the +truth on this subject, and what is capable of being narrated, correcting +what was overlooked in the hypothesis proposed from the beginning. + +2. In the first place therefore we say, it does not follow because +animals are slain that it is necessary to eat them. Nor does he who +admits the one, I mean that they should be slain, entirely prove that +they should be eaten. For the laws permit us to defend ourselves against +enemies who attack us [by killing them]; but it did not seem proper to +these laws to grant that we should eat them, as being a thing contrary to +the nature of man. In the second place, it does not follow, that because +it is proper to sacrifice certain animals to dæmons, or Gods, or certain +powers, through causes either known or unknown to men, it is therefore +necessary to feed on animals. For it may be shown, that men assumed +animals in sacrifices, which no one even of those who are accustomed +to feed on flesh, would endure to taste. Moreover, in the slaying of +animals, the same error is overlooked. For it does not follow, that if it +is requisite to kill some, it is therefore necessary to slay all animals, +as neither must it be granted, that if irrational animals, therefore men +also may be slain. + +3. Besides, abstinence from animal food, as we have said in the first +book, is not simply recommended to all men, but to philosophers, and to +those especially, who suspend their felicity from God, and the imitation +of him. For neither in the political life do legislators ordain that the +same things shall be performed by private individuals and the priests, +but conceding certain things to the multitude, pertaining to food and +other necessaries of life, they forbid the priests to use them, punishing +the transgression of their mandates by death, or some great fine. + +4. For these things not being confused, but distinguished in a proper +manner, most of the opposing arguments will be found to be vain. For the +greater part of them endeavour to show, either that it is necessary to +slay animals, on account of the injuries sustained from them, and it is +assumed as a thing consequent, that it is proper to eat them; or because +animals are slain in sacrifices, it is inferred that therefore they +may be eaten by men. And again, if it is requisite to destroy certain +animals, on account of their ferocity, it is conceived, that it must +follow, that tame animals likewise ought to be slain. If, also, some +persons may be allowed to eat them, such as those who engage in athletic +exercises, soldiers, and those who are employed in bodily labour, +therefore this may likewise be permitted to philosophers; and if to some, +therefore to all of them; though all these inferences are bad, and are +incapable of exhibiting any necessity for their adoption. And, indeed, +that all of them are bad, will be immediately evident to men that are not +contentious. But some of these inferences we have already confuted, and +we shall show the fallacy of others as we proceed. Now, however, we shall +discuss what pertains to the consideration of sacrifices, unfolding the +principles from which they originated, what the first sacrifices were, +and of what kind they were; how they came to be changed, and whence the +change arose; whether all things ought to be sacrificed by a philosopher, +and from what animals sacrifices are made. In short, we shall unfold +every thing pertaining to the proposed subject, discovering some things +ourselves, but receiving others from the ancients, and as much as +possible directing our attention to what is commensurate and adapted to +the hypothesis, [or thing intended to be investigated.] + +5. It seems that the period is of immense antiquity, from which a nation, +the most learned of all others[40], as Theophrastus says, and who inhabit +the most sacred region made by the Nile, began first, from the vestal +hearth, to sacrifice to the celestial Gods, not myrrh, or cassia, nor +the first-fruits of things mingled with the crocus of frankincense; for +these were assumed many generations afterwards, in consequence of error +gradually increasing, when men, wanting the necessaries of life, offered, +with great labour and many tears, some drops of these, as first-fruits, +to the Gods. Hence, they did not at first sacrifice these, but grass, +which, as a certain soft wool of prolific nature, they plucked with +their hands. For the earth produced trees prior to animals; and long +before trees grass, which germinates annually. Hence, gathering the +blades and roots, and all the germs of this herb, they committed them +to the flames, as a sacrifice to the visible celestial Gods, to whom +they paid immortal honour through fire. For to these, also, we preserve +in temples an immortal fire, because it is especially most similar to +these divinities. But from the exhalation or smoke [εκ δε της θυμιασεως] +of things produced in the earth, they called the offerings θυμιατηρια, +_thumiateria_; _to sacrifice_, they called θυειν, _thuein_, and _the +sacrifices_, θυσιαι, _thusiai_; all which, as if unfolding the error +which was afterwards introduced, we do not rightly interpret; since we +call the worship of the Gods through the immolation of animals θυσια, +_thusia_. But so careful were the ancients not to transgress this custom, +that against those who, neglecting the pristine, introduced novel modes +of sacrificing, they employed _execrations_[41], and therefore they +now denominate the substances which are used for fumigations αρωματα, +_aromata_, i.e. _aromatics_, [or things of an execrable nature.] The +antiquity, however, of the before-mentioned fumigations may be perceived +by him who considers that many now also sacrifice certain portions of +odoriferous wood. Hence, when after grass, the earth produced trees, and +men at first fed on the fruits of the oak, they offered to the Gods but +few of the fruits on account of their rarity, but in sacrifices they +burnt many of its leaves. After this, however, when human life proceeded +to a milder nutriment, and sacrifices from nuts were introduced, they +said _enough of the oak_. + +6. But as barley first appeared after leguminous substances, the race +of men used it in primitive sacrifices, moistening it for this purpose +with water. Afterwards, when they had broken and bruised it, so as to +render it eatable, as the instruments of this operation afforded a divine +assistance to human life, they concealed them in an arcane place, and +approached them as things of a sacred nature. But esteeming the food +produced from it when bruised to be blessed, when compared with their +former nutriment, they offered, in fine, the first-fruits of it to the +Gods. Hence also now, at the end of the sacrifices, we use fruits that +are bruised or ground; testifying by this how much fumigations have +departed from their ancient simplicity; at the same time not perceiving +on what account we perform each of these. Proceeding, however, from +hence, and being more abundantly supplied, both with other fruits and +wheat, the first-fruits of cakes, made of the fine flour of wheat, and of +every thing else, were offered in sacrifices to the Gods; many flowers +being collected for this purpose, and with these all that was conceived +to be beautiful, and adapted, by its odour, to a divine sense, being +mingled. From these, also, some were used for garlands, and others were +given to the fire. But when they had discovered the use of the divine +drops of wine, and honey, and likewise of oil, for the purposes of human +life, then they sacrificed these to their causes, the Gods. + +7. And these things appear to be testified by the splendid procession in +honour of the Sun and the Hours, which is even now performed at Athens, +and in which there were other herbs besides grass, and also acorns, the +fruit of the crab tree, barley, wheat, a heap of dried figs, cakes made +of wheaten and barley flour; and, in the last place, an earthen pot. +This mode, however, of offering first-fruits in sacrifices, having, at +length, proceeded to great illegality, the assumption of immolations, +most dire and full of cruelty, was introduced; so that it would seem that +the execrations which were formerly uttered against us, have now received +their consummation, in consequence of men slaughtering animals, and +defiling altars with blood; and this commenced from that period in which +mankind tasted of blood, through having experienced the evils of famine +and war. Divinity, therefore, as Theophrastus says, being indignant, +appears to have inflicted a punishment adapted to the crime. Hence some +men became atheists; but others, in consequence of forming erroneous +conceptions of a divine nature, may be more justly called κακοφρονες, +_kakophrones_, than κακοθεοι, _kakotheoi_[42], because they think that +the Gods are depraved, and in no respect naturally more excellent than +we are. Thus, therefore, some were seen to live without sacrificing any +thing, and without offering the first-fruits of their possessions to the +Gods; but others sacrificed improperly, and made use of illegal oblations. + +8. Hence the Thoes[43], who dwell in the confines of Thrace, as they +neither offered any first-fruits, nor sacrificed to the Gods, were at +that time suddenly taken away from the rest of mankind; so that neither +the inhabitants, nor the city, nor the foundations of the houses, could +by any one be found. + + “Men prone to ill, denied the Gods their due, + And by their follies made their days but few. + The altars of the bless’d neglected stand, + Without the offerings which the laws demand; + But angry Jove in dust this people laid, + Because no honours to the Gods they paid.” + + HESIOD. Op. et Di. lib. i. v. 133. + +Nor did they offer first-fruits to the Gods, as it was just that they +should. But with respect to the Bassarians, who formerly were not only +emulous of sacrificing bulls, but also ate the flesh of slaughtered men, +in the same manner as we now do with other animals; for we offer to the +Gods some parts of them as first-fruits, and eat the rest;—with respect +to these men, who has not heard, that insanely rushing on and biting each +other, and in reality feeding on blood, they did not cease to act in this +manner till the whole race was destroyed of those who used sacrifices of +this kind? + +9. The sacrifice, therefore, through animals is posterior and most +recent, and originated from a cause which is not of a pleasing nature, +like that of the sacrifice from fruits, but received its commencement +either from famine, or some other unfortunate circumstance. The causes, +indeed, of the peculiar mactations among the Athenians, had their +beginning either in ignorance, or anger, or fear. For the slaughter +of swine is attributed to an involuntary error of Clymene, who, by +unintentionally striking, slew the animal. Hence her husband, being +terrified as if he had perpetrated an illegal deed, consulted the +oracle of the Pythian God about it. But as the God did not condemn +what had happened, the slaughter of animals was afterwards considered +as a thing of an indifferent nature. The inspector, however, of sacred +rites, who was the offspring of prophets, wishing to make an offering +of first-fruits from sheep, was permitted to do so, it is said, by an +oracle, but with much caution and fear. For the oracle was as follows:— + + “Offspring of prophets, sheep by force to slay, + The Gods permit not thee; but with wash’d hands + For thee ’tis lawful any sheep to kill, + That dies a voluntary death.” + +10. But a goat was first slain in Icarus, a mountain of Attica, because +it had cropped a vine. And Diomus, who was a priest of Jupiter Polieus, +was the first that slew an ox; because, when the festival sacred to +Jupiter, and called Diipolia, was celebrated, and fruits were prepared +after the ancient manner, an ox approaching tasted the sacred cake. +But the priest, being aided by others who were present, slew the ox. +And these are the causes, indeed, which are assigned by the Athenians +for this deed; but by others, other causes are narrated. All of them, +however, are full of explanations that are not holy. But most of them +assign famine, and the injustice with which it is attended, as the cause. +Hence men having tasted of animals, they offered them in sacrifice, as +first-fruits, to the Gods; but prior to this, they were accustomed to +abstain from animal food. Whence, since the sacrifice of animals is +not more ancient than necessary food, it may be determined from this +circumstance what ought to be the nutriment of men. But it does not +follow, because men have tasted of and offered animals in sacrifices as +first-fruits, that it must necessarily be admitted to be pious to eat +that which was not piously offered to the Gods. + +11. But what especially proves that every thing of this kind originated +from injustice, is this, that the same things are neither sacrificed +nor eaten in every nation, but that they conjecture what it is fit for +them to do from what they find to be useful to themselves. With the +Egyptians, therefore, and Phœnicians, any one would sooner taste human +flesh than the flesh of a cow. The cause, however, is, that this animal +being useful, is also rare among them. Hence, though they eat bulls, and +offer them in sacrifice as first-fruits, yet they spare cows for the +sake of their progeny, and ordain that, if any one kill them, it shall +be considered as an expiation. And thus, for the sake of utility in one +and the same genus of animals, they distinguish what is pious, and what +is impious. So that these particulars subsisting after this manner, +Theophrastus reasonably forbids those to sacrifice animals who wish to be +truly pious; employing these, and other similar arguments, such as the +following. + +12. In the first place, indeed, because we sacrificed animals through the +occurrence, as we have said, of a greater necessity. For pestilence and +war were the causes that introduced the necessity of eating them. Since, +therefore, we are supplied with fruits, what occasion is there to use +the sacrifice of necessity? In the next place, the remunerations of, and +thanks for benefits, are to be given differently to different persons, +according to the worth of the benefit conferred; so that the greatest +remunerations, and from things of the most honourable nature, are to +be given to those who have benefited us in the greatest degree, and +especially if they are the causes of these gifts. But the most beautiful +and honourable of those things, by which the Gods benefit us, are the +fruits of the earth. For through these they preserve us, and enable us +to live legitimately; so that, from these we ought to venerate them. +Besides, it is requisite to sacrifice those things by the sacrifice of +which we shall not injure any one. For nothing ought to be so innoxious +to all things as sacrifice. But if some one should say, that God gave +animals for our use, no less than the fruits of the earth, yet it does +not follow that they are, therefore, to be sacrificed, because in so +doing they are injured, through being deprived of life. For _sacrifice_ +is, as the name implies, something _holy_[44]. But no one is holy who +requites a benefit from things which are the property of another, whether +he takes fruits or plants from one who is unwilling to be deprived of +them. For how can this be holy, when those are injured from whom they +are taken? If, however, he who takes away fruits from others does not +sacrifice with sanctity, it cannot be holy to sacrifice things taken from +others, which are in every respect more honourable than the fruits of the +earth. For a more dire deed is thus perpetrated. But soul is much more +honourable than the vegetable productions of the earth, which it is not +fit, by sacrificing animals, that we should take away. + +13. Some one, however, perhaps may say, that we also take away something +from plants [when we eat, and sacrifice them to the Gods]. But the +ablation is not similar; since we do not take this away from those who +are unwilling that we should. For, if we omitted to gather them, they +would spontaneously drop their fruits. The gathering of the fruits, also, +is not attended with the destruction of the plants, as it is when animals +lose their animating principle. And, with respect to the fruit which +we receive from bees, since this is obtained by our labour, it is fit +that we should derive a common benefit from it. For bees collect their +honey from plants; but we carefully attend to them. On which account it +is requisite that such a division should be made [of our attention and +their labour] that they may suffer no injury. But that which is useless +to them, and beneficial to us, will be the reward which we receive from +them [of our attention to their concerns]. In sacrifices, therefore, we +should abstain from animals. For, though all things are in reality the +property of the Gods, yet plants appear to be our property; since we sow +and cultivate them, and nourish them by other attentions which we pay to +them. We ought to sacrifice, therefore, from our own property, and not +from the property of others; since that which may be procured at a small +expense, and which may easily be obtained, is more holy, more acceptable +to the Gods, and better adapted to the purposes of sacrifice, and to the +exercise of continual piety. Hence, that which is neither holy, nor to +be obtained at a small expense, is not to be offered in sacrifice, even +though it should be present. + +14. But that animals do not rank among things which may be procured +easily, and at a small expense, may be seen by directing our view to +the greater part of our race: for we are not now to consider that some +men abound in sheep, and others in oxen. In the first place, therefore, +there are many nations that do not possess any of those animals which are +offered in sacrifice, some ignoble animals, perhaps, excepted. And, in +the second place, most of those that dwell in cities themselves, possess +these but rarely. But if some one should say that the inhabitants of +cities have not mild fruits in abundance; yet, though this should be +admitted, they are not in want of the other vegetable productions of +the earth; nor is it so difficult to procure fruits as it is to procure +animals. Hence an abundance of fruits, and other vegetables, is more +easily obtained than that of animals. But that which is obtained with +facility, and at a small expense, contributes to incessant and universal +piety. + +15. Experience also testifies that the Gods rejoice in this more than +in sumptuous offerings. For when that Thessalian sacrificed to the +Pythian deity oxen with gilt horns, and hecatombs, Apollo said, that the +offering of Hermioneus was more gratifying to him, though he had only +sacrificed as much meal as he could take with his three fingers out of +a sack. But when the Thessalian, on hearing this, placed all the rest +of his offerings on the altar, the God again said, that by so doing his +present was doubly more unacceptable to him than his former offering. +Hence the sacrifice which is attended with a small expense is pleasing to +the Gods, and divinity looks more to the disposition and manners of those +that sacrifice, than to the multitude of the things which are sacrificed. + +16. Theopompus likewise narrates things similar to these, viz. that +a certain Magnesian came from Asia to Delphi; a man very rich, and +abounding in cattle, and that he was accustomed every year to make many +and magnificent sacrifices to the Gods, partly through the abundance +of his possessions, and partly through piety and wishing to please +the Gods. But being thus disposed, he came to the divinity at Delphi, +bringing with him a hecatomb for the God, and magnificently honouring +Apollo, he consulted his oracle. Conceiving also that he worshipped the +Gods in a manner more beautiful than that of all other men, he asked the +Pythian deity who the man was that, with the greatest promptitude, and +in the best manner, venerated divinity, and made the most acceptable +sacrifices, conceiving that on this occasion the God would deem him to +be pre-eminent. The Pythian deity however answered, that Clearchus, who +dwelt in Methydrium, a town of Arcadia, worshipped the Gods in a way +surpassing that of all other men. But the Magnesian being astonished, +was desirous of seeing Clearchus, and of learning from him the manner in +which he performed his sacrifices. Swiftly, therefore, betaking himself +to Methydrium, in the first place, indeed, he despised the smallness +and vileness of the town, conceiving that neither any private person, +nor even the whole city, could honour the Gods more magnificently and +more beautifully than he did. Meeting, however, with the man, he thought +fit to ask him after what manner he reverenced the Gods. But Clearchus +answered him, that he diligently sacrificed to them at proper times +in every month at the new moon, crowning and adorning the statues of +Hermes and Hecate, and the other sacred images which were left to us by +our ancestors, and that he also honoured the Gods with frankincense, +and sacred wafers and cakes. He likewise said, that he performed public +sacrifices annually, omitting no festive day; and that in these festivals +he worshipped the Gods, not by slaying oxen, nor by cutting victims into +fragments, but that he sacrificed whatever he might casually meet with, +sedulously offering the first-fruits to the Gods of all the vegetable +productions of the seasons, and of all the fruits with which he was +supplied. He added, that some of these he placed before the [statues of +the] Gods[45], but that he burnt others on their altars; and that, being +studious of frugality, he avoided the sacrificing of oxen. + +17. By some writers, also, it is related, that certain tyrants, after the +Carthaginians were conquered, having, with great strife among themselves, +placed hecatombs before Apollo, afterwards inquired of the God with which +of the offerings he was most delighted; and that he answered, contrary +to all their expectation, that he was most pleased with the cakes of +Docimus. But this Docimus was an inhabitant of Delphi, and cultivated +some rugged and stony land. Docimus, therefore, coming on that day from +the place which he cultivated, took from a bag which was fastened round +him a few handfuls of meal, and sacrificed them to the God, who was more +delighted with his offering than with the magnificent sacrifices of +the tyrants. Hence, also, a certain poet, because the affair was known, +appears to have asserted things of a similar kind, as we are informed by +Antiphanes in his Mystics: + + In simple offerings most the Gods delight: + For though before them hecatombs are placed, + Yet frankincense is burnt the last of all. + An indication this that all the rest, + Preceding, was a vain expense, bestowed + Through ostentation, for the sake of men; + But a small offering gratifies the Gods. + +Menander likewise, in the comedy called the Morose, says, + + Pious th’ oblation which with frankincense + And _popanum_[46] is made; for in the fire + Both these, when placed, divinity accepts. + +18. On this account also, earthen, wooden, and wicker vessels were +formerly used, and especially in public sacrifices, the ancients +being persuaded that divinity is delighted with things of this kind. +Whence, even now, the most ancient vessels, and which are made of +wood, are thought to be more divine, both on account of the matter +and the simplicity of the art by which they were fashioned. It is +said, therefore, that Æschylus, on his brother’s asking him to write a +Pæan in honour of Apollo, replied, that the best Pæan was written by +Tynnichus[47]; and that if his composition were to be compared with that +of Tynnichus, the same thing would take place as if new were compared +with ancient statues. For the latter, though they are simple in their +formation, are conceived to be divine; but the former, though they are +most accurately elaborated, produce indeed admiration, but are not +believed to possess so much of a divine nature. Hence Hesiod, praising +the law of ancient sacrifices, very properly says, + + Your country’s rites in sacrifice observe: + [In pious works] the ancient law is best[48]. + +19. But those who have written concerning sacred operations and +sacrifices, admonish us to be accurate in preserving what pertains to +the _popana_, because these are more acceptable to the Gods than the +sacrifice which is performed through the mactation of animals. Sophocles +also, in describing a sacrifice which is pleasing to divinity, says in +his Polyidus: + + The skins of sheep in sacrifice were used, + Libations too of wine, grapes well preserved, + And fruits collected in a heap of every kind; + The olive’s pinguid juice, and waxen work + Most variegated, of the yellow bee. + +Formerly, also, there were venerable monuments in Delos of those who came +from the Hyperboreans, bearing handfuls [of fruits]. It is necessary, +therefore, that, being purified in our manners, we should make oblations, +offering to the Gods those sacrifices which are pleasing to them, and not +such as are attended with great expense. Now, however, if a man’s body +is not pure and invested with a splendid garment, he does not think it +is qualified for the sanctity of sacrifice. But when he has rendered his +body splendid, together with his garment, though his soul at the same +time is not purified from vice, yet he betakes himself to sacrifice, +and thinks that it is a thing of no consequence; as if divinity did not +especially rejoice in that which is most divine in our nature, when it +is in a pure condition, as being allied to his essence. In Epidaurus, +therefore, there was the following inscription on the doors of the temple: + + Into an odorous temple, he who goes + Should pure and holy be; but to be wise + In what to sanctity pertains, is to be pure. + +20. But that God is not delighted with the amplitude of sacrifices, +but with any casual offering, is evident from this, that of our daily +food, whatever it may be that is placed before us, we all of us make +an offering to the Gods, before we have tasted it ourselves; this +offering being small indeed, but the greatest testimony of honour to +divinity. Moreover, Theophrastus shows, by enumerating many of the rites +of different countries, that the sacrifices of the ancients were from +fruits, and he narrates what pertains to libations in the following +manner: “Ancient sacrifices were for the most part performed with +sobriety. But those sacrifices are sober in which the libations are made +with water. Afterwards, however, libations were made with honey. For we +first receive this liquid fruit prepared for us by the bees. In the third +place, libations were made with oil; and in the fourth and last place +with wine.” + +21. These things, however, are testified not only by the pillars which +are preserved in Cyrbe[49], and which contain, as it were, certain true +descriptions of the Cretan sacred rites of the Corybantes; but also by +Empedocles, who, in discussing what pertains to sacrifices and theogony, +or the generation of the Gods, says: + + With them nor Mars nor tumult dire was found, + Nor Saturn, Neptune, or the sovereign Jove, + But Venus [beauty’s] queen. + +And Venus is friendship. Afterwards he adds, + + With painted animals, and statues once + Of sacred form, with unguents sweet of smell, + The fume of frankincense and genuine myrrh, + And with libations poured upon the ground + Of yellow honey, Venus was propitious made. + +Which ancient custom is still even now preserved by some persons as a +certain vestige of the truth. And in the last place, Empedocles says, + + Nor then were altars wet with blood of bulls + Irrationally slain. + +22. For, as it appears to me, when friendship and a proper sense of the +duties pertaining to kindred natures, was possessed by all men, no one +slaughtered any living being, in consequence of thinking that other +animals were allied to him. But when strife and tumult, every kind of +contention, and the principle of war, invaded mankind, then, for the +first time, no one in reality spared any one of his kindred natures. +The following particulars, likewise, ought to be considered: For, as +though there is an affinity between us and noxious men, who, as it were, +by a certain impetus of their own nature and depravity, are incited to +injure any one they may happen to meet, yet we think it requisite that +all of them should be punished and destroyed; thus also, with respect to +those irrational animals that are naturally malefic and unjust, and who +are impelled to injure those that approach them, it is perhaps fit that +they should be destroyed. But with respect to other animals who do not +at all act unjustly, and are not naturally impelled to injure us, it is +certainly unjust to destroy and murder them, no otherwise than it would +be to slay men who are not iniquitous. And this seems to evince, that the +justice between us and other animals does not arise from some of them +being naturally noxious and malefic, but others not, as is also the case +with respect to men. + +23. Are therefore those animals to be sacrificed to the Gods which are +thought to be deserving of death? But how can this be possible, if they +are naturally depraved? For it is no more proper to sacrifice such as +these, than it would be to sacrifice mutilated animals. For thus, indeed, +we shall offer the first-fruits of things of an evil nature, but we shall +not sacrifice for the sake of honouring the Gods. Hence, if animals +are to be sacrificed to the Gods, we should sacrifice those that are +perfectly innoxious. It is however acknowledged, that those animals are +not to be destroyed who do not at all injure us, so that neither are they +to be sacrificed to the Gods. If, therefore, neither these, nor those +that are noxious, are to be sacrificed, is it not evident that we should +abstain from them more than from any thing else, and that we should not +sacrifice any one of them, though it is fit that some of them should be +destroyed? + +24. To which may be added, that we should sacrifice to the Gods for +the sake of three things, viz. either for the sake of honouring them, +or of testifying our gratitude, or through our want of good. For, as +we offer first-fruits to good men, thus also we think it is necessary +that we should offer them to the Gods. But we honour the Gods, either +exploring the means of averting evils and obtaining good, or when we have +been previously benefited, or in order that we may obtain some present +advantage and assistance, or merely for the purpose of venerating the +goodness of their nature. So that if the first-fruits of animals are +to be offered to the Gods, some of them for the sake of this are to be +sacrificed. For whatever we sacrifice, we sacrifice for the sake of some +one of the above-mentioned particulars. Is it therefore to be thought +that God is honoured by us, when we are directly seen to act unjustly +through the first-fruits which we offer to him? Or will he not rather +think that he is dishonoured by such a sacrifice, in which, by immolating +animals that have not at all injured us, we acknowledge that we have +acted unjustly. So that no one of other animals is to be sacrificed for +the sake of honouring divinity. Nor yet are they to be sacrificed for the +purpose of testifying our gratitude to the Gods. For he who makes a just +retribution for the benefits he has received, ought not to make it by +doing an injury to certain other animals. For he will no more appear to +make a retribution than he who, plundering his neighbour of his property, +should bestow it on another person for the sake of honour. Neither are +animals to be sacrificed for the sake of obtaining a certain good of +which we are in want. For he who endeavours to be benefited by acting +unjustly, is to be suspected as one who would not be grateful even when +he is benefited. So that animals are not to be sacrificed to the Gods +through the expectation of deriving advantage from the sacrifice. For +he who does this, may perhaps elude men, but it is impossible that he +can elude divinity. If, therefore, we ought to sacrifice for the sake of +a certain thing, but this is not to be done for the sake of any of the +before mentioned particulars, it is evident that animals ought not to be +sacrificed. + +25. For, by endeavouring to obliterate the truth of these things through +the pleasures which we derive from sacrifices, we deceive ourselves, but +cannot deceive divinity. Of those animals, therefore, which are of an +ignoble nature, which do not impart to our life any superior utility, and +which do not afford us any pleasure, we do not sacrifice any one to the +Gods. For who ever sacrificed serpents, scorpions, and apes, or any one +of such like animals? But we do not abstain from any one of those animals +which afford a certain utility to our life, or which have something in +them that contributes to our enjoyments; since we, in reality, cut their +throats, and excoriate them, under the patronage of divinity[50]. For we +sacrifice to the Gods oxen and sheep, and besides these, stags and birds, +and fat hogs, though they do not at all participate of purity, but afford +us delight. And of these animals, indeed, some, by co-operating with our +labours, afford assistance to our life, but others supply us with food, +or administer to our other wants. But those which effect neither of +these, yet, through the enjoyment which is derived from them, are slain +by men in sacrifices similarly with those who afford us utility. We do +not, however, sacrifice asses or elephants, or any other of those animals +that co-operate with us in our labours, but are not subservient to our +pleasure; though, sacrificing being excepted, we do not abstain from +such like animals, but we cut their throats on account of the delight +with which the deglutition of them is attended; and of those which are +fit to be sacrificed, we do not sacrifice such as are acceptable to the +Gods, but such as in a greater degree gratify the desires of men; thus +testifying against ourselves, that we persist in sacrificing to the Gods, +for the sake of our own pleasure, and not for the sake of gratifying the +Gods. + +26. But of the Syrians, the Jews indeed, through the sacrifice which +they first made, even now, says Theophrastus, sacrifice animals, and if +we were persuaded by them to sacrifice in the same way that they do, +we should abstain from the deed. For they do not feast on the flesh of +the sacrificed animals, but having thrown the whole of the victims into +the fire, and poured much honey and wine on them during the night, they +swiftly consume the sacrifice, in order that the all-seeing sun may +not become a spectator of it. And they do this, fasting during all the +intermediate days, and through the whole of this time, as belonging to +the class of philosophers, and also discourse with each other about the +divinity[51]. But in the night, they apply themselves to the theory of +the stars, surveying them, and through prayers invoking God. For these +make offerings both of other animals and themselves, doing this from +necessity, and not from their own will. The truth of this, however, may +be learnt by any one who directs his attention to the Egyptians, the most +learned of all men; who are so far from slaying other animals, that they +make the images of these to be imitations of the Gods; so adapted and +allied do they conceive these to be both to Gods and men. + +27. For at first, indeed, sacrifices of fruits were made to the Gods; +but, in the course of time, men becoming negligent of sanctity, in +consequence of fruits being scarce, and, through the want of legitimate +nutriment, being impelled to eat each other; then supplicating divinity +with many prayers, they first began to make oblations of themselves +to the Gods, not only consecrating to the divinities whatever among +their possessions was most beautiful, but, proceeding beyond this, they +sacrificed those of their own species. Hence, even to the present time, +not only in Arcadia, in the Lupercal festivals, and in Carthage, men are +sacrificed in common to Saturn, but periodically, also, for the sake of +remembering the legal institute, they sprinkle the altars of those of the +same tribe with blood, although the rites of their sacrifices exclude, by +the voice of the crier, him from engaging in them who is accused of human +slaughter. Proceeding therefore from hence, they made the bodies of other +animals supply the place of their own in sacrifices, and again, through +a satiety of legitimate nutriment, becoming oblivious of piety, they +were induced by voracity to leave nothing untasted, nothing undevoured. +And this is what now happens to all men with respect to the aliment from +fruits. For when, by the assumption of them, they have alleviated their +necessary indigence, then searching for a superfluity of satiety, they +labour to procure many things for food which are placed beyond the limits +of temperance. Hence, as if they had made no ignoble sacrifices to the +Gods, they proceeded also to taste the animals which they immolated; +and from this, as a principle of the deed, the eating of animals became +an addition to men to the nutriment derived from fruits. As, therefore, +antiquity offered the first produce of fruits to the Gods, and gladly, +after their pious sacrifice, tasted what they offered, thus also, when +they sacrificed the firstlings of animals to the divinities, they thought +that the same thing ought to be done by them, though ancient piety did +not ordain these particulars after this manner, but venerated each of the +Gods from fruits. For with such oblations, both nature, and every sense +of the human soul, are delighted. + + No altar then was wet with blood of bulls + Irrationally slain; but this was thought + To be of every impious deed the worst, + Limbs to devour of brutes deprived of life. + +28. The truth of this may also be perceived from the altar which is even +now preserved about Delos, which, because no animal is brought to, or +is sacrificed upon it, is called the altar of the pious. So that the +inhabitants not only abstain from sacrificing animals, but they likewise +conceive, that those who established, are similarly pious with those +who use the altar. Hence, the Pythagoreans having adopted this mode of +sacrifice, abstained from animal food through the whole of life. But when +they distributed to the Gods a certain animal instead of themselves, +they merely tasted of it, living in reality without touching other +animals. We, however, do not act after this manner; but being filled with +animal diet, we have arrived at this manifold illegality in our life by +slaughtering animals, and using them for food. For neither is it proper +that the altars of the Gods should be defiled with murder, nor that +food of this kind should be touched by men, as neither is it fit that +men should eat one another; but the precept which is still preserved at +Athens, should be obeyed through the whole of life. + +29. For formerly, as we have before observed, when men sacrificed to the +Gods fruits and not animals, and did not assume the latter for food, +it is said, that a common sacrifice being celebrated at Athens, one +Diomus, or Sopater, who was not a native, but cultivated some land in +Attica, seizing a sharp axe which was near to him, and being excessively +indignant, struck with it an ox, who, coming from his labour, approached +to a table, on which were openly placed cakes and other offerings which +were to be burnt as a sacrifice to the Gods, and ate some, but trampled +on the rest of the offerings. The ox, therefore, being killed, Diomus, +whose anger was now appeased, at the same time perceived what kind of +deed he had perpetrated. And the ox, indeed, he buried. But embracing +a voluntary banishment, as if he had been accused of impiety, he fled +to Crete. A great dryness, however, taking place in the Attic land from +vehement heat, and a dreadful sterility of fruit, and the Pythian deity +being in consequence of it consulted by the general consent, the God +answered, that the Cretan exile must expiate the crime; and that, if the +murderer was punished, and the statue of the slain ox was erected in +the place in which it fell, this would be beneficial both to those who +had and those who had not tasted its flesh. An inquiry therefore being +made into the affair, and Sopater, together with the deed, having been +discovered, he, thinking that he should be liberated from the difficulty +in which he was now involved, through the accusation of impiety, if the +same thing was done by all men in common, said to those who came to him, +that it was necessary an ox should be slain by the city. But, on their +being dubious who should strike the ox, he said that he would undertake +to do it, if they would make him a citizen, and would be partakers with +him of the slaughter. This, therefore, being granted, they returned to +the city, and ordered the deed to be accomplished in such a way as it is +performed by them at present, [and which was as follows:] + +30. They selected virgins who were drawers of water; but these brought +water for the purpose of sharpening an axe and a knife. And these being +sharpened, one person gave the axe, another struck with it the ox, +and a third person cut the throat of the ox. But after this, having +excoriated the animal, all that were present ate of its flesh. These +things therefore being performed, they sewed up the hide of the ox, and +having stuffed it with straw, raised it upright in the same form which +it had when alive, and yoked it to a plough, as if it was about to work +with it. Instituting also a judicial process, respecting the slaughter of +the ox, they cited all those who were partakers of the deed, to defend +their conduct. But as the drawers of water accused those who sharpened +the axe and the knife, as more culpable than themselves, and those who +sharpened these instruments accused him who gave the axe, and he accused +him who cut the throat of the ox, and this last person accused the +knife,—hence, as the knife could not speak, they condemned it as the +cause of the slaughter. From that time also, even till now, during the +festival sacred to Jupiter, in the Acropolis, at Athens, the sacrifice of +an ox is performed after the same manner. For, placing cakes on a brazen +table, they drive oxen round it, and the ox that tastes of the cakes +that are distributed on the table, is slain. The race likewise of those +who perform this, still remains. And all those, indeed, who derive their +origin from Sopater are called _boutupoi_ [i.e. _slayers of oxen_]; +but those who are descended from him that drove the ox round the table, +are called _kentriadai_, [or _stimulators_.] And those who originate +from him that cut the throat of the ox, are denominated _daitroi_, +[or _dividers_,] on account of the banquet which takes place from the +distribution of flesh. But when they have filled the hide, and the +judicial process is ended, they throw the knife into the sea. + +31. Hence, neither did the ancients conceive it to be holy to slay +animals that co-operated with us in works beneficial to our life, and we +should avoid doing this even now. And as formerly it was not pious for +men to injure these animals, so now it should be considered as unholy +to slay them for the sake of food. If, however, this is to be done +from motives of religious reverence of the Gods, yet every passion or +affection which is essentially produced from bodies is to be rejected, +in order that we may not procure food from improper substances, and thus +have an incentive to violence as the intimate associate of our life. For +by such a rejection we shall, at least, all of us derive great benefit +in what pertains to our mutual security, if we do not in any thing else. +For those whose sense is averse to the destruction of animals of a +species different from their own, will evidently abstain from injuring +those of their own kind. Hence it would perhaps have been best, if +men in after-times had immediately abstained from slaughtering these +animals; but since no one is free from error, it remains for posterity +to take away by purifications the crime of their ancestors, respecting +nutriment. This, however, will be effected, if, placing before our eyes +the dire nature of such conduct, we exclaim with Empedocles: + + Ah me, while yet exempt from such a crime, + Why was I not destroyed by cruel Time, + Before these lips began the guilty deed, + On the dire nutriment of flesh to feed? + +For in those only the appropriate sense sympathetically grieves for +errors that have been committed, who endeavour to find a remedy for the +evils with which they are afflicted; so that every one, by offering pure +and holy sacrifices to divinity, may through sanctity obtain the greatest +benefits from the Gods. + +32. But the benefit derived from fruits is the first and the greatest +of all others, and which, as soon as they are matured, should alone be +offered to the Gods, and to Earth, by whom they are produced. For she +is the common Vesta of Gods and men; and it is requisite that all of +us, reclining on her surface, as on the bosom of our mother and nurse, +should celebrate her divinity, and love her with a parental affection, +as the source of our existence. For thus, when we exchange this life for +another, we shall again be thought worthy of a residence in the heavens, +and of associating with all the celestial Gods, whom, now beholding[52], +we ought to venerate with those fruits of which they are the causes, +sacrificing indeed to them from all these, when they have arrived at +maturity, but not conceiving all of us to be sufficiently worthy to +sacrifice to the Gods. For as all things are not to be sacrificed to +the Gods, so neither perhaps are the Gods gratified by the sacrifice of +every one. This, therefore, is the substance of the arguments adduced by +Theophrastus, to show that animals ought not to be sacrificed; exclusive +of the interspersed fabulous narrations, and a few things which we have +added to what he has said. + +33. I, however, shall not attempt to dissolve the legal institutes which +the several nations have established. For it is not my design at present +to speak about a polity. But as the laws by which we are governed permit +us to venerate divinity by things of the most simple, and of an inanimate +nature, hence, selecting that which is the least costly, let us sacrifice +according to the law of the city, and endeavour to offer an appropriate +sacrifice, approaching with consummate purity to the Gods. In short, if +the oblation of first-fruits is of any value, and is an acknowledgment of +thanks for the benefits which we receive, it will be most irrational to +abstain ourselves from animals, and yet offer the first-fruits of these +to the Gods. For neither are the Gods worse than we are, so as to be in +want of those things of which we are not indigent, nor is it holy to +offer the first-fruits of that nutriment from which we ourselves abstain. +For we find it is usual with men, that, when they refrain from animal +food, they do not make oblations of animals; but that they offer to the +Gods the first-fruits of what they themselves eat. Hence also it is now +fit, that he who abstains from animals should offer the first-fruits of +things which he touches [for the purpose of food]. + +34. Let us therefore also sacrifice, but let us sacrifice in such a +manner as is fit, offering different sacrifices to different powers[53]; +to the God indeed who is above all things, as a certain wise man said, +neither sacrificing with incense, nor consecrating any thing sensible. +For there is nothing material, which is not immediately impure to an +immaterial nature. Hence, neither is vocal language, nor internal speech, +adapted to the highest God, when it is defiled by any passion of the +soul; but we should venerate him in profound silence with a pure soul, +and with pure conceptions about him. It is necessary, therefore, that +being conjoined with and assimilated to him, we should offer to him, +as a sacred sacrifice, the elevation of our intellect, which offering +will be both a hymn and our salvation. In an impassive contemplation, +therefore, of this divinity by the soul, the sacrifice to him is effected +in perfection; but to his progeny, the intelligible Gods, hymns, +orally enunciated, are to be offered. For to each of the divinities, +a sacrifice is to be made of the first-fruits of the things which he +bestows, and through which he nourishes and preserves us. As, therefore, +the husbandman offers handfuls of the fruits and berries which the +season first produces; thus also we should offer to the divinities the +first-fruits of our conceptions of their transcendent excellence, giving +them thanks for the contemplation which they impart to us, and for truly +nourishing us through the vision of themselves, which they afford us, +associating with, appearing to, and shining upon us, for our salvation. + +35. Now, however, many of those who apply themselves to philosophy +are unwilling to do this; and, pursuing renown rather than honouring +divinity, they are busily employed about statues, neither considering +whether they are to be reverenced or not, nor endeavouring to learn from +those who are divinely wise, to what extent, and to what degree, it is +requisite to proceed in this affair. We, however, shall by no means +contend with these, nor are we very desirous of being well instructed in +a thing of this kind; but imitating holy and ancient men, we offer to the +Gods, more than any thing else, the first-fruits of contemplation, which +they have imparted to us, and by the use of which we become partakers of +true salvation. + +36. The Pythagoreans, therefore, diligently applying themselves to the +study of numbers and lines, sacrificed for the most part from these to +the Gods, denominating, indeed, a certain number Minerva, but another +Diana, and another Apollo: and again, they called one number justice, but +another temperance[54]. In diagrams also they adopted a similar mode. And +thus, by offerings of this kind, they rendered the Gods propitious to +them, so as to obtain of them the object of their wishes, by the things +which they dedicated to, and the names by which they invoked them. They +likewise frequently employed their aid in divination, and if they were in +want of a certain thing for the purpose of some investigation. In order, +therefore, to effect this, they made use of the Gods within the heavens, +both the erratic and non-erratic, of all of whom it is requisite to +consider the sun as the leader; but to rank the moon in the second place; +and we should conjoin with these fire, in the third place, from its +alliance to them, as the theologist[55] says. He also says that no animal +is to be sacrificed; but that first-fruits are to be offered from meal +and honey, and the vegetable productions of the earth. He adds, that fire +is not to be enkindled on a hearth defiled with gore; and asserts other +things of the like kind. For what occasion is there to transcribe all +that he says? for he who is studious of piety knows, indeed, that to the +Gods no animal is to be sacrificed, but that a sacrifice of this kind +pertains to dæmons, and other powers, whether they are beneficent, or +depraved[56]. He likewise knows who those are that ought to sacrifice to +these, and to what extent they ought to proceed in the sacrifices which +they make. Other things, however, will be passed over by me in silence. +But what some Platonists have divulged, I shall lay before the reader, in +order that the things proposed to be discussed, may become manifest to +the intelligent. What they have unfolded, therefore, is as follows: + +37. The first God being incorporeal, immoveable, and impartible, and +neither subsisting in any thing, nor restrained in his energies, is not, +as has been before observed, in want of any thing external to himself, as +neither is the soul of the world; but this latter, containing in itself +the principle of that which is triply divisible, and being naturally +self-motive, is adapted to be moved in a beautiful and orderly manner, +and also to move the body of the world according to the most excellent +reasons [i.e. productive principles or powers]. It is, however, +connected with and comprehends body, though it is itself incorporeal, +and liberated from the participation of any passion. To the remaining +Gods, therefore, to the world, to the inerratic and erratic stars, who +are visible Gods, consisting of soul and body, thanks are to be returned +after the above-mentioned manner, through sacrifices from inanimate +natures. The multitude, therefore, of those invisible beings remains for +us, whom Plato indiscriminately calls dæmons[57]; but of these, some +being denominated by men, obtain from them honours, and other religious +observances, similar to those which are paid to the Gods; but others, +who for the most part are not explicitly denominated, receive an occult +religious reverence and appellation from certain persons in villages +and certain cities; and the remaining multitude is called in common by +the name of dæmons. The general persuasion, however, respecting all +these invisible beings, is this, that if they become angry through being +neglected, and deprived of the religious reverence which is due to them, +they are noxious to those by whom they are thus neglected, and that they +again become beneficent, if they are appeased by prayers, supplications, +and sacrifices, and other similar rites. + +38. But the confused notion which is formed of these beings, and which +has proceeded to great crimination, necessarily requires that the nature +of them should be distinguished according to reason. For perhaps it will +be said, that it is requisite to show whence the error concerning them +originated among men. The distinction, therefore, must be made after the +following manner. Such souls as are the progeny of the whole soul of the +universe, and who govern the great parts of the region under the moon, +these, being incumbent on a pneumatic substance or spirit, and ruling +over it conformably to reason, are to be considered as good dæmons, who +are diligently employed in causing every thing to be beneficial to the +subjects of their government, whether they preside over certain animals, +or fruits, which are arranged under their inspective care, or over things +which subsist for the sake of these, such as showers of rain, moderate +winds, serene weather, and other things which cooperate with these, +such as the good temperament of the seasons of the year. They are also +our leaders in the attainment of music, and the whole of erudition, and +likewise of medicine and gymnastic, and of every thing else similar to +these. For it is impossible that these dæmons should impart utility, and +yet become, in the very same things, the causes of what is detrimental. +Among these two, those _transporters_, as Plato calls them, [in his +Banquet] are to be enumerated, who announce the affairs of men to the +Gods, and the will of the Gods to men; carrying our prayers, indeed, +to the Gods as judges, but oracularly unfolding to us the exhortations +and admonitions of the Gods. But such souls as do not rule over the +pneumatic substance with which they are connected, but for the most +part are vanquished by it; these are vehemently agitated and borne along +[in a disorderly manner,] when the irascible motions and the desires of +the pneumatic substance, receive an impetus. These souls, therefore, are +indeed dæmons, but are deservedly called malefic dæmons. + +39. All these beings, likewise, and those who possess a contrary power, +are invisible, and perfectly imperceptible by human senses; for they +are not surrounded with a solid body, nor are all of them of one form, +but they are fashioned in numerous figures. The forms, however, which +characterize their pneumatic substance, at one time become apparent, but +at another are invisible. Sometimes also those that are malefic, change +their forms; but the pneumatic substance, so far as it is corporeal, is +passive and corruptible: and though, because it is thus bound by the +souls [that are incumbent on it,] the form of it remains for a long time, +yet it is not eternal. For it is probable that something continually +flows from it, and also that it is nourished. The pneumatic substance, +therefore, of good dæmons, possesses symmetry, in the same manner as +the bodies of the visible Gods; but the spirit of malefic dæmons is +deprived of symmetry, and in consequence of its abounding in passivity, +they are distributed about the terrestrial region. Hence, there is no +evil which they do not attempt to effect; for, in short, being violent +and fraudulent in their manners, and being also deprived of the guardian +care of more excellent dæmons, they make, for the most part, vehement +and sudden attacks; sometimes endeavouring to conceal their incursions, +but at other times assaulting openly. Hence the molestations which are +produced by them are rapid; but the remedies and corrections which +proceed from more excellent dæmons, appear to be more slowly effected: +for every thing which is good being tractable and equable, proceeds in +an orderly manner, and does not pass beyond what is fit. By forming this +opinion, therefore, you will never fall into that most absurd notion, +that evil may be expected from the good, or good from the evil. For this +notion is not only attended with absurdity, but the multitude, receiving +through it the most erroneous conceptions of the Gods, disseminate them +among the rest of mankind. + +40. It must be admitted, therefore, that one of the greatest injuries +occasioned by malefic dæmons is this, that though they are the causes +of the calamities which take place about the earth, such as pestilence, +sterility, earthquakes, excessive dryness, and the like, yet they +endeavour to persuade us, that they are the causes of things the most +contrary to these, viz. of fertility, [salubrity, and elementary peace.] +Hence, they exonerate themselves from blame, and, in the first place, +endeavour to avoid being detected as the sources of injury; and, in +the next place, they convert us to supplications and sacrifices to the +beneficent Gods, as if they were angry. But they effect these, and things +of a similar nature, in consequence of wishing to turn us from right +conceptions of the Gods, and convert us to themselves; for they are +delighted with all such as act thus incongruously and discordantly, and, +as it were, assuming the persons of other Gods, they enjoy the effects of +our imprudence and folly; conciliating to themselves the good opinion of +the vulgar, by inflaming the minds of men with the love of riches, power, +and pleasure, and filling them with the desire of vain glory, from which +sedition, and war, and other things allied to these, are produced. But +that which is the most dire of all things, they proceed still farther, +and persuade men that similar things are effected by the greatest +Gods, and do not stop till they even subject the most excellent of the +divinities to these calumnies, through whom they say every thing is in +perfect confusion. And not only the vulgar are affected in this manner, +but not a few also of those who are conversant with philosophy. The cause +of this, however, extends equally to philosophers, and the vulgar; for +of philosophers, those who do not depart from the prevailing notions, +fall into the same error with the multitude; and again, the multitude, on +hearing assertions from celebrated men conformable to their own opinions, +are in a greater degree corroborated in conceiving things of this kind of +the Gods. + +41. For poetry also inflames the opinions of men, by employing a diction +adapted to produce astonishment and enchantment, and not only allures +the ears, but is also capable of procuring belief in things that are +most impossible. At the same time, however, it is requisite to be firmly +persuaded, that what is good can never injure, nor what is evil can ever +be beneficial; for, as Plato says, it is not the province of heat to +refrigerate, but of that which is contrary to heat; and, in like manner, +neither is it the province of that which is just to injure. But divinity +is naturally the most just of all things; since otherwise he would not +be divinity. Hence this power and portion of good is not to be abscinded +from beneficent dæmons; for the power which is naturally adapted, and +wishes to injure, is contrary to the power which is beneficent: but +contraries can never subsist about the same thing. As malefic dæmons, +therefore, injure the mortal race in many respects, and sometimes in +things of the greatest consequence, good dæmons not only never cease +to act conformably to their office, but also, as much as possible, +presignify to us the dangers which are impendent from malefic dæmons, +unfolding these through dreams, through a divinely inspired soul, and +through many other things; so that he who is capable of explaining +what is signified, may know and avoid all the perils with which he is +threatened. For they indicate [future events] to all men, but every one +cannot understand what they indicate, nor is every one able to read what +is written by them; but he alone is able to do this, who has learnt their +letters. All enchantment, however, [or witchcraft,] is effected through +dæmons of a contrary nature; for those who perpetrate evil through +enchantments, especially venerate these malefic beings, and the power +that presides over them. + +42. For they are full of every kind of imagination, and are sufficiently +qualified to deceive, through effects of a prodigious nature; and through +these, unhappy men procure philtres, and amatory allurements. For all +intemperance, and hope of possessing wealth and renown, and especially +deception, exist through these, since falsehood is allied to these +malevolent beings; _for they wish to be considered as Gods, and the power +which presides over them is ambitious to appear to be the greatest God_. +These are they that rejoice in libations, and the savour of sacrifices, +through which their pneumatic vehicle is fattened; for this vehicle lives +through vapours and exhalations, and the life of it is various through +various exhalations. It is likewise corroborated by the savour of blood +and flesh. + +43. On this account, a wise and temperate man will be religiously afraid +to use sacrifices of this kind, through which he will attract to himself +such-like dæmons; but he will endeavour in all possible ways to purify +his soul. For these malefic beings do not attack a pure soul, because +it is dissimilar to them; but if it is necessary to cities to render +them propitious, this is nothing to us. For by these riches, and things +external and corporeal, are thought to be good, and their contraries +evil; but the smallest attention is paid by them to the good of the soul. +We however, to the utmost of our ability, endeavour not to be in want +of those things which they impart; but all our endeavour is to become +similar to God, and to the [divine] powers with which he is surrounded +both from what pertains to the soul, and from externals; _and this is +effected through an entire liberation from the dominion of the passions, +an evolved perception of truly existing beings, and a vital tendency +towards them_. On the other hand, we strive to become dissimilar to +depraved men and evil dæmons, and, in short, to every being that rejoices +in a mortal and material nature. So that, conformably to what is said by +Theophrastus, we also shall sacrifice from those things which theologists +permit us to use for this purpose; as well knowing, that by how much the +more we neglect to exempt ourselves from the passions of the soul, by so +much the more we connect ourselves with a depraved power, and render it +necessary that he should become propitious to us. For, as theologists +say, it is necessary that those who are bound[58] to things external, and +have not yet vanquished their passions, should avert the anger of this +[malefic] power; since, if they do not, there will be no end to their +labours. + +44. Thus far what pertains to sacrifices has been elucidated. As we said, +however, at first, as it is not entirely necessary, if animals are to be +sacrificed, that they are also to be eaten, we shall now show that it is +necessary we should not eat them, though it may be sometimes necessary +that they should be sacrificed. For all theologists agree in this, that +in sacrifices, which are made for the purpose of averting some evil, the +immolated animals are not to be tasted, but are to be used as expiations. +For, say they, no one should go into the city, nor into his own house, +till he has first purified his garments, and his body, in rivers, or some +fountain. So that they order those whom they permit to sacrifice, to +abstain from the victims, and to purify themselves before they sacrifice +by fasting, and especially by abstaining from animals. They add, _that +purity is the guardian of piety; and is, as it were, a symbol or divine +seal, which secures its possessor from the attacks and allurements of +evil dæmons_. For such a one, being contrarily disposed to, and more +divine in his operations than those by whom he is attacked, because he +is more pure both in his body and in the passions of his soul, remains +uninjured, in consequence of being surrounded with purity as with a +bulwark. + +45. Hence a defence of this kind has appeared to be necessary even to +enchanters; though it is not efficacious with them on all occasions. +For they invoke evil dæmons for lascivious purposes. So that purity +does not belong to enchanters, but to divine men, and such as are +divinely wise; since it every where becomes a guard to those that use +it, and conciliates them with a divine nature. I wish, therefore, that +enchanters would make use of purity continually, for then they would not +employ themselves in incantations, because, through this, they would be +deprived of the enjoyment of those things, for the sake of which they act +impiously. Whence becoming full of passions, and abstaining for a short +time from impure food, they are notwithstanding replete with impurity, +and suffer the punishment of their illegal conduct towards the whole of +things, partly from those whom they irritate, and partly from Justice, +who perceives all mortal deeds and conceptions. Both inward, therefore, +and external purity pertain to a divine man, who earnestly endeavours to +be liberated from the passions of the soul, and who abstains from such +food as excites the passions, and is fed with divine wisdom; and by right +conceptions of, is assimilated to divinity himself. For such a man, being +consecrated by an intellectual sacrifice, approaches to God in a white +garment, and with a truly pure _impassivity_ of soul, and levity of body, +and is not burdened with foreign and external juices, and the passions of +the soul. + +46. For, indeed, it must not be admitted as necessary in temples, which +are consecrated by men to the Gods, that those who enter into them should +have their feet pure, and their shoes free from every stain, but that in +the temple of the father [of all], which is this world, it is not proper +to preserve our ultimate and cutaneous vestment pure, and to dwell in +this temple with an undefiled garment. For if the danger consisted only +in the defilement of the body, it might, perhaps, be lawful to neglect +it. But now, since every sensible body is attended with an efflux of +material dæmons, hence, together with the impurity produced from flesh +and blood, the power which is friendly to, and familiar with, this +impurity, is at the same time present through similitude and alliance. + +47. Hence theologists have rightly paid attention to abstinence. And +these things were indicated to us by a certain Egyptian[59], who also +assigned a most natural cause of them, which was verified by experience. +For, since a depraved and irrational soul, when it leaves the body, is +still compelled to adhere to it, since the souls also of those men who +die by violence, are detained about the body; this circumstance should +prevent a man from forcibly expelling his soul from the body. The violent +slaughter, therefore, of animals, compels souls to be delighted with the +bodies which they have left, but the soul is by no means prevented from +being there, where it is attracted by a kindred nature; whence many souls +are seen to lament, and some remain about the bodies that are unburied; +which souls are improperly used by enchanters, as subservient to their +designs, being compelled by them to occupy the body, or a part of the +body, which they have left. Since, therefore, these things were well +known to theologists, and they also perceived the nature of a depraved +soul, and its alliance to the bodies from which it was divulsed, and the +pleasure which it received from a union with them, they very properly +avoided animal food, in order that they might not be disturbed by alien +souls, violently separated from the body and impure, and which are +attracted to things of a kindred nature, and likewise that they might +not be impeded by the presence of evil dæmons, in approaching alone [or +without being burdened with things of a foreign nature] to the highest +God[60]. + +48. For that the nature of a kindred body is attractive of soul, +experience abundantly taught these theologists. Hence those who wish to +receive into themselves the souls of prophetic animals, swallow the most +principal parts of them, such as the hearts of crows, or of moles, or of +hawks. For thus they have soul present with, and predicting to them like +a God, and entering into them together with the intromission of the body. + +49. Very properly, therefore, will the philosopher, and who is also the +priest of the God that is above all things, abstain from all animal food, +in consequence of earnestly endeavouring to approach through himself +alone to the alone[61] God, without being disturbed by any attendants. +Such a one likewise is cautious, as being well acquainted with the +necessities of nature. For he who is truly a philosopher, is skilled +in, and an observer of many things, understands the works of nature, is +sagacious, temperate and modest, and is in every respect the saviour +of himself. And as he who is the priest of a certain particular God, +is skilled in placing the statues of that divinity, and in his orgies, +mysteries, and the like, thus also he who is the priest of the highest +God, is skilled in the manner in which his statue ought to be fashioned, +and in purifications, and other things through which he is conjoined to +this divinity. + +50. But if in the sacred rites which are here, those that are priests and +diviners order both themselves and others to abstain from sepulchres, +from impious men, from menstrual purgations, and from venereal congress, +and likewise from base and mournful spectacles, and from those auditions +which excite the passions, (because frequently, through those that are +present being impure, something appears which disturbs the diviner; on +which account it is said, that to sacrifice inopportunely, is attended +with greater detriment than gain);—if this, therefore, is the case, +will he, who is the priest of the father of all things, suffer himself +to become the sepulchre of dead bodies? And will such a one, being full +of defilement, endeavour to associate with the transcendent God? It is +sufficient, indeed, that in fruits we assume parts of death, for the +support of our present life. This, however, is not yet the place for such +a discussion. We must, therefore, still farther investigate what pertains +to sacrifices. + +51. For some one may say that we shall subvert a great part of +divination, viz. that which is effected through an inspection of the +viscera, if we abstain from destroying animals. He, therefore, who makes +this objection, should also destroy men: for it is said that future +events are more apparent in the viscera of men than in those of brutes; +and many of the Barbarians exercise the art of divination through +the entrails of men. As, however, it would be an indication of great +injustice, and inexhaustible avidity, to destroy those of our own species +for the sake of divination, thus also it is unjust for the sake of this +to slay an irrational animal. But it does not belong to the present +discussion to investigate whether Gods, or dæmons, or soul liberated from +the animal [with which it had been connected], exhibit signs of future +events to those who explore such signs, through the indications which the +viscera afford. + +52. Nevertheless, we permit those whose life is rolled about externals, +having once acted impiously towards themselves, to be borne along to that +to which they tend; but we rightly say, that the man whom we designate as +a philosopher, and who is separated from externals, will not be disturbed +by dæmons, nor be in want of diviners, nor of the viscera of animals. +For he earnestly endeavours to be separated from those things for the +sake of which divinations are effected. For he does not betake himself +to nuptials, in order that he may molest the diviner about wedlock, or +merchandise, or inquiries about a servant, or an increase of property, or +any other object of vulgar pursuit. For the subjects of his investigation +are not clearly indicated by any diviner or viscera of animals. But +he, as we have said, approaching through himself to the [supreme] God, +who is established in the true inward parts of himself, receives from +thence the precepts of eternal life, tending thither by a conflux of the +whole of himself, and instead of a diviner praying that he may become a +confabulator of the mighty Jupiter. + +53. For if such a one is impelled by some necessary circumstance, there +are good dæmons, who, to the man living after this manner, and who is +a domestic of divinity, will indicate and prevent, through dreams and +symbols, and omens, what may come to pass, and what is necessarily to be +avoided. For it is only requisite to depart from evil, and to know what +is most honourable in the whole of things, and every thing which in the +universe is good, friendly, and familiar. But vice, and an ignorance +of divine concerns, are dire, through which a man is led to despise +and defame things of which he has no knowledge; since nature does not +proclaim these particulars with a voice which can be heard by the ears, +but being herself intellectual[62], she initiates through intellect +those who venerate her. And even though some one should admit the art of +divination for the sake of predicting what is future, yet it does not +from thence necessarily follow that the flesh of animals is to be eaten; +as neither does it follow, that because it is proper to sacrifice to Gods +or dæmons, food from animals is therefore to be introduced. For, not +only the history which is related by Theophrastus, but also many other +narrations inform us, that in ancient times men were sacrificed, yet it +must not be inferred that on this account men are to be eaten. + +54. And that we do not carelessly assert these things, but that what we +have said is abundantly confirmed by history, the following narrations +sufficiently testify. For in Rhodes, on the sixth day of June, a man +was sacrificed to Saturn; which custom having prevailed for a long +time, was afterwards changed [into a more human mode of sacrificing]. +For one of those men who, by the public decision, had been sentenced to +death, was kept in prison till the Saturnalia commenced; but as soon as +this festival began, they brought the man out of the gates of the city, +opposite to the temple of Aristobulus, and giving him wine to drink, +they cut his throat. But in the island which is now called Salamis, +but was formerly denominated Coronis, in the month according to the +Cyprians Aphrodisius, a man was sacrificed to Agraule, the daughter of +Cecrops, and the nymph Agraulis. And this custom continued till the time +of Diomed. Afterwards it was changed, so that a man was sacrificed +to Diomed. But the temples of Minerva, of Agraule, and Diomed, were +contained in one and the same enclosure. The man also who was about to be +slain, was first led by young men thrice round the altar, afterwards the +priest pierced him with a lance in the stomach, and thus being thrown on +the pyre, he was entirely consumed. + +55. This sacred institute was, however, abolished by Diphilus, the king +of Cyprus, who flourished about the time of Seleucus, the theologist. +But Dæmon substituted an ox for a man; thus causing the latter sacrifice +to be of equal worth with the former. Amosis also abolished the law of +sacrificing men in the Egyptian city Heliopolis; the truth of which is +testified by Manetho in his treatise on Antiquity and Piety. But the +sacrifice was made to Juno, and an investigation took place, as if they +were endeavouring to find pure calves, and such as were marked by the +impression of a seal. Three men also were sacrificed on the day appointed +for this purpose, in the place of whom Amosis ordered them to substitute +three waxen images. In Chios likewise, they sacrificed a man to Omadius +Bacchus[63], the man being for this purpose torn in pieces; and the same +custom, as Euelpis Carystius says, was adopted in Tenedos. To which may +be added, that the Lacedæmonians, as Apollodorus says, sacrificed a man +to Mars. + +56. Moreover the Phœnicians, in great calamities, either of war, or +excessive dryness, or pestilence, sacrificed some one of their dearest +friends, who was selected by votes for this purpose. The Phœnician +history also is replete with instances of men being sacrificed, which +history was written by Sanchoniatho in the Phœnician tongue, and was +interpreted into Greek in eight books, by Philo Byblius. But Ister, in +his collection of the Cretan sacrifices, says that the Curetes formerly +sacrificed children to Saturn. And Pallas, who is the best of those +that have collected what pertains to the mysteries of Mithras, says, +that under the Emperor Adrian the sacrificing of men was nearly totally +abolished. For, prior to his time, in Laodicea, which is in Syria, they +anciently sacrificed a virgin to Minerva, but now they sacrifice a stag. +The Carthaginians too, who dwell in Libya, formerly sacrificed men; but +this custom was abolished by Iphicrates. And the Dumatii, a people of +Arabia, annually sacrificed a boy, whom they buried under the altar, +which was used by them as a statue. But Phylarchus narrates, that it +was the general custom of all the Greeks, before they went to war, to +immolate men. I omit to mention the Thracians and Scythians, and also +the Athenians, who slew the daughter of Erechtheus and Praxithea. And +even at present, who is ignorant that in the great city of Rome, in the +festival of Jupiter Latialis, they cut the throat of a man? Human flesh, +however, is not on this account to be eaten; though, through a certain +necessity, a man should be sacrificed. For, when a famine takes place +during a siege, some of the besieged feed on each other, yet at the same +time those who do so are deemed execrable, and the deed is thought to be +impious. + +57. After the first war, likewise, waged by the Romans against the +Carthaginians, in order to obtain Sicily, when the mercenary soldiers +of the Phœnicians revolted, and, together with them, those of Africa +deserted, Amilcar, who was surnamed Barkas, in attacking the Romans, was +reduced to such a scarcity of food, that at first his men ate those +that fell in battle; but afterwards, these failing, they ate their +captives; in the third place, their servants; and in the last place, they +attacked each other, and devoured their fellow-soldiers, who were led to +be slaughtered for this purpose by lot. But Amilcar, taking those men +that were in his power, caused his elephants to trample on such of the +soldiers as had acted in this manner, conceiving that it was not holy +to suffer them to be any longer mingled with other men; and neither did +he admit that men should be eaten because certain persons had dared to +do this; nor his son Hannibal, who, when he was leading his army into +Italy, was advised by a certain person to accustom his troops to feed on +human flesh, in order that they might never be in want of food. It does +not follow, therefore, that because famine and war have been the causes +of eating other animals, it is also requisite to feed on them for the +sake of pleasure; as neither must we admit, that on this account men are +to be eaten. Nor does it follow, that because animals are sacrificed to +certain powers, it is also requisite to eat them. For neither do those +who sacrifice men, on this account, feed on human flesh. Through what +has been said, therefore, it is demonstrated, that it does not entirely +follow that animals are to be eaten because they are sacrificed. + +58. But that those who had learnt what the nature is of the powers in the +universe, offered sacrifices through blood, not to Gods, but to dæmons, +is confirmed by theologists themselves. For they also assert, that of +dæmons, some are malefic, but others beneficent, who will not molest us, +if we offer to them the first-fruits of those things alone which we eat, +and by which we nourish either the soul or the body. After, therefore, we +have added a few observations more, in order to show that the unperverted +conceptions of the multitude accord with a right opinion respecting the +Gods, we shall conclude this book. Those poets, therefore, who are wise, +though but in a small degree, say, + + What man so credulous and void of mind, + What man so ignorant, as to think the Gods + In fiery bile and fleshless bones rejoice, + For hungry dogs a nutriment not fit; + Or that such offerers they will e’er reward? + +But another poet says, + + My offerings to the Gods from cakes alone + And frankincense shall be; for not to friends + But deities my sacrifice I make. + +59. Apollo also, when he orders men to sacrifice according to paternal +institutes, appears to refer every thing to ancient custom. But the +ancient custom of sacrificing was, as we have before shown, with cakes +and fruits. Hence also, sacrifices were called θυσιαι, _thusiai_, and +θυηλαι, _thuelai_, and θυμελαι, _thumelai_, and αυτο το θυειν, _auto to +thuein_, i.e. _the act of sacrificing_, signified the same thing as του +θυμιᾳν, _tou thumian_, i.e. _to offer incense_, and which is now called +by us, επιθυειν, _epithuein_, i.e. _to sacrifice something more_. For +what we now call θυειν, _thuein_, _i.e. to sacrifice_, the ancients +denominated ερδειν, _erdein_, i.e. _to perform_ or _make_. + + They perfect hecatombs of bulls, or goats, + _Made_ to Apollo. + +60. But those who introduced costliness into sacrifices, were ignorant +that, in conjunction with this, they also introduced a swarm of evils, +viz. superstition, luxury, an opinion that a divine nature may be +corrupted by gifts, and that a compensation may be made by sacrifices +for injustice. Or whence do some make an oblation of three animals with +gilded horns, but others of hecatombs? And whence did Olympias, the +mother of Alexander [the Great,] sacrifice a thousand of each species of +animals, unless sumptuousness had at length proceeded to superstition? +But when the young man was informed that the Gods rejoiced in magnificent +sacrifices, and, as they say, in solemn banquets of oxen and other +animals, how, though he was willing to act wisely, was it possible +that he could? How also, when he conceived that these sacrifices were +acceptable to the Gods, was it possible he should not fancy that he was +permitted to act unjustly, when he might exonerate himself from erroneous +conduct through sacrifices? But if he had been persuaded that the Gods +have no need of these things, and that they look to the manners of those +who approach to them, _and conceive that a right opinion of them, and of +things themselves, is the greatest sacrifice_, how is it possible that he +should not have been temperate, holy, and just? + +61. To the Gods, indeed, the most excellent offering is a pure intellect +and an impassive soul, and also a moderate oblation of our own property +and of other things, and this not negligently, but with the greatest +alacrity. For the honours which we pay to the Gods should be accompanied +by the same promptitude as that with which we give the first seat to +worthy men, and with which we rise to, and salute them, and not by the +promptitude with which we pay a tribute. For man must not use such +language as the following to God: + + If, O Philinus, you recal to mind, + And love me for, the benefits which I + On you conferr’d, ’tis well, since for the sake + Of these alone my bounty was bestow’d. + +For divinity is not satisfied with such assertions as these. And hence +Plato says [in his Laws], that it pertains to a good man to sacrifice, +and to be always conversant with the Gods by prayers, votive offerings, +sacrifices, and every kind of religious worship; but that to the bad +man, much labour about the Gods is inefficacious and vain. For the good +man knows what ought to be sacrificed, and from what it is requisite to +abstain; what things are to be offered to divinity, and of what the +first-fruits are to be sacrificed; but the bad man exhibiting honours to +the Gods from his own disposition and his own pursuits, acts in so doing +more impiously than piously. Hence Plato thought, that a philosopher +ought not to be conversant with men of depraved habits; for this is +neither pleasing to the Gods, nor useful to men; but the philosopher +should endeavour to change such men to a better condition, and if he +cannot effect this, he should be careful that he does not himself become +changed into their depravity. He adds, that having entered into the right +path, he should proceed in it, neither fearing danger from the multitude, +nor any other blasphemy which may happen to take place. For it would be +a thing of a dire nature, that the Syrians indeed will not taste fish, +nor the Hebrews swine, nor most of the Phœnicians and Egyptians cows; and +though many kings have endeavoured to change these customs, yet those +that adopt them would rather suffer death, than a transgression of the +law [which forbids them to eat these animals]; and yet that we should +choose to transgress the laws of nature and divine precepts through the +fear of men, or of a certain denunciation of evil from them. For the +divine choir of Gods, and divine men, may justly be greatly indignant +with us, if it perceives us directing our attention to the opinions +of depraved men, and idly looking to the terror with which they are +attended, though we daily meditate how we may become [philosophically] +dead to other things in the present life. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[40] _i.e._ The Egyptians. + +[41] In the original αρασαμενους, which is derived from the verb αραομαι, +_imprecor_, _maledico_; and from hence, according to Porphyry, came the +word αρωματα. + +[42] _i.e._ May be rather called _malevolent_ than _unhappy_. + +[43] Fabricius is of opinion that these _Thoes_ are the same with the +Acrothoitæ, mentioned by Simplicius in his Comment. in Epictet. from +Theophrastus. + +[44] In the original, η γαρ θυσια, οσια τις εστιν κατα τουνομα. + +[45] In the original, και τα μεν παρατιθεναι, which Felicianus very +erroneously renders, “alius siquidem mihi ad vescendem sumo;” but +Valentinus rightly, “et horum aliqua coram illis apponere.” + +[46] A round, broad, and thin cake, which was offered in sacrifice to the +Gods. + +[47] Tynnichus, the Chalcidensian, is mentioned by Plato in his Io. + +[48] Vid. Hesiod, Fragm. v. 169. + +[49] A city of Crete. + +[50] _i.e._ Under the pretext of being patronized by divinity in so +doing. + +[51] Porphyry, in what he here says of the Jews, alludes to that sect of +them called Essæans; concerning whom, see the 4th book of this work. + +[52] In the original, ους νυν ορωντας τιμαν τουτους, κ.τ.λ., instead +of which, Reisk proposes to read, ους νυν ουχ ορωντας τιμαν δει [vel +χρη] τουτοις, κ.τ.λ. But the insertion of ουχ is most absurd: for the +_celestial_ are called the _visible_ Gods. Thus Plato, in the Timæus, in +the speech of the Demiurgus to the junior or mundane Gods, who consist of +the _celestial_ and _sublunary_ deities, calls the _celestial Gods_ those +that _visibly_ revolve, and the _sublunary_, those that become apparent +when they please: Επει ουν παντες οσοι τε περιπολουσι φανερως, και οσοι +φαινονται καθ’ οσον αν εθελωσι θεοι, γενεσιν εσχον, κ.τ.λ. Conformably, +therefore, to the above translation, I read, ους νυν ορωντας τιμαν δει +τουτοις, κ.τ.λ. To which may be added, that our author, in paragraph 37, +expressly calls the stars _visible Gods_. + +[53] In the original, Θύσομεν τοινυν και ημεις· αλλα θυσομεν, ως +προσηκει, διαφορους τας θυσιας, ως αν διαφοροις δυναμεσι προσαγοντες. +This Valentinus erroneously translates as follows: “Sacrificabimus igitur +etiam et nos, sed prout decet, victimas scilicet _eximias_ potestatibus +_eximiis_ adducentes.” For διαφορους and διαφοροις, in this passage, +evidently mean _different_, and not _excellent_. + +[54] Concerning the appellations which the Pythagoreans gave to numbers, +see my Theoretic Arithmetic, in which also the occult meaning of these +appellations is unfolded. + +[55] “Plotinus ni fallor, aut Plato, sed ille potius,” says Reisk; +but every one who is at all conversant with Platonic writers, will +immediately see that by _the theologist_, Porphyry means _Orpheus_. + +[56] Though Porphyry excelled in all philosophical knowledge, whence +also he was called κατ’ εξοχην, _the philosopher_, yet he was inferior +to his auditor Iamblichus, in theological information. On this account, +Iamblichus was called by all the Platonists posterior to him, _the +divine_, and _the great_ priest. I shall present the reader, therefore, +with an extract from my translation of his treatise on the Mysteries, +which appears to me to be an admirable supplement to what Porphyry has +said in this book, about sacrificing animals, and a satisfactory answer +to the question whether they are to be sacrificed or not. + +In Chap. 14, therefore, of Sect. 5, he observes as follows: “We shall +begin the elucidation of this subject in the best possible manner, if we +demonstrate that the sacred law of sacrifices is connected with the order +of the Gods. In the first place, therefore, we say, that of the Gods some +are material, but others immaterial. And the material, indeed, are those +that comprehend matter in themselves, and adorn it; but the immaterial +are those that are perfectly exempt from, and transcend matter: but, +according to the sacrific art, it is requisite to begin sacred operations +from the material Gods; for the ascent to the immaterial Gods will not +otherwise be effected. The material Gods, therefore, have a certain +communication with matter, so far as they preside over it. Hence they +have dominion over things which happen about matter, such as the +division, percussion, repercussion, mutation, generation, and corruption +of all material bodies. He, therefore, who wishes to worship these +theurgically, in a manner adapted to them, and to the dominion which +they are allotted, should, as they are material, employ a material mode +of worship. For thus we shall be wholly led to a familiarity with them, +and worship them in an allied and appropriate manner. _Dead bodies, +therefore, and things deprived of life, the slaying of animals, and the +consumption of victims, and, in short, the mutation of the matter which +is offered, pertain to these Gods, not by themselves, but on account +of the matter over which they preside._ For though they are, in the +most eminent degree, separate from it, yet, at the same time, they are +present with it; and, though they comprehend matter in an immaterial +power, yet they are co-existent with it. Things also that are governed, +are not foreign from their governors; and things which are subservient +as instruments, are not unadapted to those that use them. Hence it +is foreign to the immaterial Gods, to offer matter to them through +sacrifices, but this is most adapted to all the material Gods.” + +In the following chapter, Iamblichus observes, “that as there is a time +when we become wholly soul, are out of the body, and sublimely revolve on +high, in conjunction with all the immaterial Gods; so, likewise, there is +a two-fold mode of worship, one of which is simple, incorporeal, and pure +from all generation; and this mode pertains to undefiled souls; but the +other is replete with every thing of a material nature, and is adapted +to souls which are neither pure, nor liberated from all generation.” +He adds, “we must admit, therefore, that there are two-fold species of +sacrifices; one kind, indeed, pertaining to men who are not entirely +purified, which, as Heraclitus says, rarely happens to one man, or to a +certain easily-to-be-numbered few of mankind; but the other kind being +material, and consisting in mutation, is adapted to souls that are still +detained by the body. Hence, to cities and people not yet liberated from +sublunary fate, and the impending communion of bodies, if such a mode of +sacrifice as this latter is not permitted, they will wander both from +immaterial and material good. For they will not be able to receive the +former, and to the latter they will not offer what is appropriate.” + +He farther informs us, in Chap. 22, that though the summit of the +sacrific art recurs to the most principal one of the whole multitude of +Gods [_i.e._ to the ineffable cause of all,] and at one and the same +time worships the many essences and principles that are [rooted and +concentred] in it; yet this happens at the latest period, and to a very +few, and that we must be satisfied, if it takes place, when the sun +of life is setting. “But,” says he, “our present discussion does not +ordain laws for a man of this kind; for he is superior to all law; but +it promulgates a law such as that of which we are now speaking, to those +who are in want of a certain divine legislation.” In the above passage, +by “_a man of this kind_,” Iamblichus most probably alludes to Plotinus, +as both his works, and the life of him, written by Porphyry, show that he +was a man capable of recurring to, and becoming united with the highest +God, and thus at the same time worshipping all the divine powers that are +rooted in him. + +To what Iamblichus has thus excellently observed, may be added what the +philosopher Sallust says in his golden treatise On the Gods and the +World, viz. “that since life primarily subsists in the Gods, and there +is also a certain human life, but the latter desires to be united to +the former, a medium is required; for natures much distant from each +other cannot be conjoined without a medium; and it is necessary that +the medium should be similar to the connected natures. Life, therefore, +must necessarily be the medium of life. Hence, men of the present day +that are happy, and all the ancients, have sacrificed animals; and +this, indeed, not rashly, but in a way accommodated to every God, with +many other ceremonies respecting the cultivation of divinity.” Let the +_truly intellectual and pious man_, however, never forget that prayer, +as Proclus divinely observes, possesses _of itself_ a supernatural +perfection and power. + +[57] For a more _theological_ account of dæmons, I refer the reader to my +translation of the before-mentioned admirable treatise of Iamblichus on +the Mysteries. + +[58] In the original, ως γαρ φασιν οι θεολογοι τοις δεομενοις υπο των +εκτος και μηδεπω κρατουσιν των παθων, κ.τ.λ. But for δεομενοις, it is +necessary to read δεδεμενοις; and it is evident that both the Latin +translators of this work found δεδεμενοις in their manuscripts. For +Felicianus has “qui _devincti_ externis rebus sunt,” and Valentinus, “qui +rebus externis _illigantur_.” Reisk, however, has taken no notice of this +error in the printed text. + +[59] Reisk, with his usual stupidity, where merely verbal emendations are +not concerned, says that this Egyptian is Plotinus, whose country was +Lycopolis, in Egypt. But what instance can be adduced, in all antiquity, +of the disciple of a philosopher speaking of his preceptor in this +indefinite manner? Is it not much more probable that this Egyptian is +the priest mentioned by Porphyry in his Life of Plotinus, who, at the +request of a certain friend of Plotinus, (which friend was, perhaps, +Porphyry himself,) exhibited to Plotinus, in the temple of Isis, at Rome, +the familiar dæmon, or, in modern language, the guardian angel of that +philosopher? + +[60] Conformably to this, the Pythagorean Demophilus beautifully +observes, Γυμνος αποσταλεις σοφος, γυμνιτευων καλεσει τον πεμψαντα· μονου +γαρ του μη τοις αλλοτριοις πεφορτισμενου επηκοος ο θεος. _i.e._ “The +wise man being sent hither naked, should naked invoke him by whom he was +sent. For he alone is heard by divinity, who is not burdened with things +of a foreign nature.” + +[61] This expression of “approaching _alone_ to the _alone_ God,” +Porphyry derived from his master, the great Plotinus, who divinely +concludes his Enneads as follows:—και ουτω θεων και ανθρωπων θειων και +ευδαιμονων βιος, απαλλαγη των αλλων των τῃδε, ανηδονος των τῃδε, φυγη +μονου προς μονον—_i.e._ “This, therefore, is the life of the Gods, and +of divine and happy men, a liberation from all terrene concerns, a life +unaccompanied by human pleasures, and _a flight of the alone to the +alone_.” + +[62] Nature, considered as the last of the causes which fabricate +this corporeal and sensible world, “bounds (says Proclus in Tim.) the +progressions of incorporeal essences, and is full of forms and powers, +through which she governs mundane affairs. And she is a Goddess, indeed, +considered as deified; but not according to the primary signification +of the word. By her summit likewise she comprehends the heavens, but +through these rules over the fluctuating empire of generation; and she +every where weaves together partial natures in admirable conjunction with +wholes.” See more on this subject in my translation of that work. + +[63] This epithet is used in two of the Orphic hymns, viz. in Hymn LI. +7., and Hymn XXIX. 5. But the following appears to be the reason why +Bacchus is so called. Bacchus is the intellect, and Ippa the soul of +the world, according to the Orphic Theology; and the former is said by +Orpheus to be carried on the head of the latter. For so we are informed +by Proclus, in Tim. p. 124. Jacob de Rhoer, therefore, the editor of this +work, was grossly mistaken in saying, “Non dubito, quin ωμαδιος Διονυσος, +idem sit qui ωμηστης, crudivorus.” Scaliger, in his version of the Hymns, +very improperly translates ωμαδιος _bajulus_, _a porter_. For Bacchus is +_carried on_, but does not _carry_ Ippa. + + + + +ON ABSTINENCE FROM ANIMAL FOOD. + +BOOK THE THIRD. + + +1. In the two preceding books, O Firmus Castricius, we have demonstrated, +that animal food does not contribute either to temperance and frugality, +or to the piety which especially gives completion to the theoretic life, +but is rather hostile to it. Since, however, the most beautiful part of +justice consists in piety to the Gods, and this is principally acquired +through abstinence, there is no occasion to fear that we shall violate +justice towards men, while we preserve piety towards the Gods. Socrates +therefore says, in opposition to those who contend that pleasure is the +supreme good, that though all swine and goats should accord in this +opinion, yet he should never be persuaded that our felicity was placed +in the enjoyment of corporeal delight, as long as intellect has dominion +over all things. And we also say, that though all wolves and vultures +should praise the eating of flesh, we should not admit that they spoke +justly, as long as man is by nature innoxious, and ought to abstain +from procuring pleasure for himself by injuring others. We shall pass +on, therefore, to the discussion of justice; and since our opponents +say that this ought only to be extended to those of a similar species, +and on this account deny that irrational animals can be injured by men, +let us exhibit the true, and at the same time Pythagoric opinion, and +demonstrate that every soul which participates of sense and memory is +rational. For this being demonstrated, we may extend, as our opponents +will also admit, justice to every animal. But we shall epitomize what has +been said by the ancients on this subject. + +2. Since, however, with respect to reason, one kind, according to the +doctrine of the Stoics, is internal, but the other external[64]; and +again, one kind being right, but the other erroneous, it is requisite +to explain of which of these two, animals, according to them, are +deprived. Are they therefore deprived of right reason alone? or are they +entirely destitute both of internal and externally proceeding reason? +They appear, indeed, to ascribe to brutes an entire privation of reason, +and not a privation of right reason alone. For if they merely denied +that brutes possess right reason, animals would not be irrational, but +rational beings, in the same manner as nearly all men are according to +them. For, according to their opinion, one or two wise men may be found +in whom alone right reason prevails, but all the rest of mankind are +depraved; though some of these make a certain proficiency, but others are +profoundly depraved, and yet, at the same time, all of them are similarly +rational. Through the influence, therefore, of self-love, they say, that +all other animals are irrational; wishing to indicate by irrationality, +an entire privation of reason. If, however, it be requisite to speak the +truth, not only reason may plainly be perceived in all animals, but in +many of them it is so great as to approximate to perfection. + +3. Since, therefore, reason is two-fold, one kind consisting in external +speech, but the other in the disposition of the soul, we shall begin from +that which is external, and which is arranged according to the voice. But +if external reason is voice, which through the tongue is significant of +the internal passions of the soul (for this is the most common definition +of it, and is not adopted by one sect [of philosophers] only, and if it +is alone indicative of the conception of [internal] reason)—if this be +the case, in what pertaining to this are such animals as have a voice +deficient? Do they not discursively perceive the manner in which they +are inwardly affected, before it is vocally enunciated by them? By a +discursive perception, however, I mean the perception produced by the +silent discourse which takes place in the soul. Since, therefore, that +which is vocally expressed by the tongue is reason, in whatever manner +it may be expressed, whether in a barbarous or a Grecian, a canine or a +bovine mode, other animals also participate of it that are vocal; men, +indeed, speaking conformably to the human laws [of speech], but other +animals conformably to the laws which they received from the Gods and +nature. But if we do not understand what they say, what is this to the +purpose? For the Greeks do not understand what is said by the Indians, +nor those who are educated in Attica the language of the Scythians, or +Thracians, or Syrians; but the sound of the one falls on the ears of the +other like the clangor of cranes, though by others their vocal sounds +can be written and articulated, in the same manner as ours can by us. +Nevertheless, the vocal sounds of the Syrians, for instance, or the +Persians, are to us inarticulate, and cannot be expressed by writing, +just as the speech of animals is unintelligible to all men. For as we, +when we hear the Scythians speak, apprehend, by the auditory sense, a +noise only and a sound, but are ignorant of the meaning of what they +say, because their language appears to us to be nothing but a clangor, +to have no articulation, and to employ only one sound either longer or +shorter, the variety of which is not at all significant to us, but to +them the vocal sounds are intelligible, and have a great difference, in +the same manner as our language has to us; the like also takes place +in the vocal sounds of other animals. For the several species of these +understand the language which is adapted to them, but we only hear a +sound, of the signification of which we are ignorant, because no one who +has learnt our language, is able to teach us through ours the meaning of +what is said by brutes. If, however, it is requisite to believe in the +ancients, and also in those who have lived in our times, and the times of +our fathers, there are some among these who are said to have heard and +to have understood the speech of animals. Thus, for instance, this is +narrated of Melampus and Tiresias, and others of the like kind; and the +same thing, not much prior to our time, is related of Apollonius Tyanæus. +For it is narrated of him, that once, when he was with his associates, +a swallow happening to be present, and twittering, he said, that the +swallow indicated to other birds, that an ass laden with corn had fallen +down before the city, and that in consequence of the fall of the ass, the +corn was spread on the ground[65]. An associate, also, of mine informed +me, that he once had a boy for a servant, who understood the meaning of +all the sounds of birds, and who said, that all of them were prophetic, +and declarative of what would shortly happen. He added, that he was +deprived of this knowledge through his mother, who, fearing that he would +be sent to the Emperor as a gift, poured urine into his ear when he was +asleep. + +4. Omitting, however, these things, through the passion of incredulity, +which is connascent with us, I think there is no one who is ignorant, +that there are some nations even now who understand the sounds of certain +animals, through an alliance to those animals. Thus, the Arabians +understand the language of crows, and the Tyrrhenians of eagles. And, +perhaps, all men would understand the language of all animals, if a +dragon were to lick their ears. Indeed, the variety and difference in the +vocal sounds of animals, indicate that they are significant. Hence, we +hear one sound when they are terrified, but another, of a different kind, +when they call their associates, another when they summon their young +to food, another when they lovingly embrace each other, and another +when they incite to battle. And so great is the difference in their +vocal sounds, that, even by those who have spent their whole life in the +observation of them, it is found to be extremely difficult to ascertain +their meaning, on account of their multitude. Diviners, therefore, who +predict from ravens and crows, when they have noted the difference of the +sounds, as far as to a certain multitude, omit the rest, as not easily +to be apprehended by man. But when animals speak to each other, these +sounds are manifest and significant to them, though they are not known to +all of us. If, however, it appears that they imitate us, that they learn +the Greek tongue, and understand their keepers, what man is so impudent +as not to grant that they are rational, because he does not understand +what they say? Crows, therefore, and magpies, the robin redbreast, and +the parrot, imitate men, recollect what they have heard, are obedient +to their preceptor while he is teaching them; and many of them, through +what they have learnt, point out those that have acted wrong in the +house. But the Indian hyæna, which the natives call crocotta, speaks in +a manner so human, and this without a teacher, as to go to houses, and +call that person whom he knows he can easily vanquish. He also imitates +the voice of him who is most dear, and would most readily attend to the +person whom he calls; so that, though the Indians know this, yet being +deceived through the similitude, and obeying the call, they come forth, +and are destroyed. If, however, all animals do not imitate, and all of +them are not adapted to learn our language, what is this to the purpose? +For neither is every man docile or imitative, I will not say of the vocal +sounds of animals, but of the five dialects of the Greek tongue. To which +may be added, that some animals, perhaps, do not speak, because they have +not been taught, or because they are impeded by the ill conformation +of the instruments of speech. We, therefore, when we were at Carthage, +nurtured a tame partridge, which we caught flying, and which, in process +of time, and by associating with us, became so exceedingly mild, that it +was not only sedulously attentive to us, caressed and sported with us, +but uttered a sound corresponding to the sound of our voice, and, as far +as it was capable, answered us; and this in a manner different from that +by which partridges are accustomed to call each other. For it did not +utter a corresponding sound when we were silent, but when we spoke to it. + +5. It is also narrated, that some dumb animals obey their masters with +more readiness than any domestic servants. Hence, a lamprey was so +accustomed to the Roman Crassus, as to come to him when he called it by +its name; on which account Crassus was so affectionately disposed towards +it, that he exceedingly lamented its death, though, prior to this, +he had borne the loss of three of his children with moderation. Many +likewise relate that the eels in Arethusa, and the shell-fish denominated +saperdæ, about Mæander, are obedient to those that call them. Is not the +imagination, therefore, of an animal that speaks, the same, whether it +proceeds as far as to the tongue, or does not? And if this be the case, +is it not absurd to call the voice of man alone [external] reason, but +refuse thus to denominate the voice of other animals? For this is just as +if crows should think that their voice alone is external reason, but that +we are irrational animals, because the meaning of the sounds which we +utter is not obvious to them; or as if the inhabitants of Attica should +thus denominate their speech alone, and should think that those are +irrational who are ignorant of the Attic tongue, though the inhabitants +of Attica would sooner understand the croaking of a crow, than the +language of a Syrian or a Persian. But is it not absurd to judge of +rationality and irrationality from apprehending or not apprehending the +meaning of vocal sounds, or from silence and speech? For thus some one +might say, that the God who is above all things, and likewise the other +Gods, are not rational, because they do not speak. The Gods, however, +silently indicate their will, and birds apprehend their will more rapidly +than men, and when they have apprehended it, they narrate it to men as +much as they are able, and different birds are the messengers to men of +different Gods. Thus, the eagle is the messenger of Jupiter, the hawk and +the crow of Apollo, the stork of Juno, the crex and the bird of night +of Minerva, the crane of Ceres, and some other bird is the messenger of +some other deity. Moreover, those among us that observe animals, and are +nurtured together with them, know the meaning of their vocal sounds. The +hunter, therefore, from the barking of his dog, perceives at one time, +indeed, that the dog explores a hare, but at another, that the dog has +found it; at one time, that he pursues the game, at another that he has +caught it, and at another that he is in the wrong track, through having +lost the scent of it. Thus, too, the cowherd knows, at one time, indeed, +that a cow is hungry, or thirsty, or weary, and at another, that she is +incited to venery, or seeks her calf, [from her different lowings][66]. +A lion also manifests by his roaring that he threatens, a wolf by his +howling that he is in a bad condition, and shepherds, from the bleating +of sheep, know what the sheep want. + +6. Neither, therefore, are animals ignorant of the meaning of the voice +of men, when they are angry, or speak kindly to, or call them, or pursue +them, or ask them to do something, or give something to them; nor, in +short, are they ignorant of any thing that is usually said to them, but +are aptly obedient to it; which it would be impossible for them to do, +unless that which is similar to intellection energized, in consequence +of being excited by its similar. The immoderation of their passions, +also, is suppressed by certain modulations, and stags, bulls, and other +animals, from being wild become tame. Those, too, who are decidedly of +opinion that brutes are deprived of reason, yet admit that dogs have a +knowledge of dialectic, and make use of the syllogism which consists of +many disjunctive propositions, when, in searching for their game, they +happen to come to a place where there are three roads. For they thus +reason, the beast has either fled through this road, or through that, or +through the remaining road; but it has not fled either through this, or +through that, and therefore it must have fled through the remaining third +of these roads[67]. After which syllogistic process, they resume their +pursuit in that road. It may, however, be readily said, that animals +do these things naturally, because they were not taught by any one to +do them; as if we also were not allotted reason by nature, though we +likewise give names to things, because we are naturally adapted to do so. +Besides, if it be requisite to believe in Aristotle, animals are seen to +teach their offspring, not only something pertaining to other things, but +also to utter vocal sounds; as the nightingale, for instance, teaches +her young to sing. And as he likewise says, animals learn many things +from each other, and many from men; and the truth of what he asserts is +testified by all the tamers of colts, by every jockey, horseman, and +charioteer, and by all hunters, herdsmen, keepers of elephants, and +masters of wild beasts and birds. He, therefore, who estimates things +rightly, will be led, from these instances, to ascribe intelligence to +brutes; but he who is inconsiderate, and is ignorant of these things, +will be induced to act rashly, through his inexhaustible avidity +co-operating with him against them. For how is it possible that he should +not defame and calumniate animals, who has determined to cut them in +pieces, as if they were stones? Aristotle, however, Plato, Empedocles, +Pythagoras, Democritus, and all such as endeavoured to discover the +truth concerning animals, have acknowledged that they participate of +reason. + +7. But it is now requisite to show that brutes have internal reason. The +difference, indeed, between our reason and theirs, appears to consist, +as Aristotle somewhere says, not in essence, but in the more and the +less; just as many are of opinion, that the difference between the Gods +and us is not essential, but consists in this, that in them there is a +greater, and in us a less accuracy, of the reasoning power[68]. And, +indeed, so far as pertains to sense and the remaining organization, +according to the sensoria and the flesh, every one nearly will grant that +these are similarly disposed in us, as they are in brutes. For they not +only similarly participate with us of natural passions, and the motions +produced through these, but we may also survey in them such affections +as are preternatural and morbid. No one, however, of a sound mind, will +say that brutes are unreceptive of the reasoning power, on account of +the difference between their habit of body and ours, when he sees that +there is a great variety of habit in men, according to their race, and +the nations to which they belong, and yet, at the same time, it is +granted that all of them are rational. An ass, therefore, is afflicted +with a catarrh, and if the disease flows to his lungs, he dies in the +same manner as a man. A horse, too, is subject to purulence, and wastes +away through it, like a man. He is likewise attacked with rigour, the +gout, fever, and fury, in which case he is also said to have a depressed +countenance. A mare, when pregnant, if she happens to smell a lamp when +it is just extinguished, becomes abortive, in the same manner as a woman. +An ox, and likewise a camel, are subject to fever and insanity; a +raven becomes scabby, and has the leprosy; and also a dog, who, besides +this, is afflicted with the gout, and madness: but a hog is subject to +hoarseness, and in a still greater degree a dog; whence this disease in a +man is denominated from the dog, _cynanche_. And these things are known +to us, because we are familiar with these animals; but of the diseases +of other animals we are ignorant, because we do not associate with them. +Castrated animals also become more effeminate. Hence cocks, when they +are castrated, no longer crow; but their voice becomes effeminate, like +that of men who lose their testicles. It is not possible, likewise, to +distinguish the bellowing and horns of a bull, when he is castrated, +from those of a cow. But stags, when they are castrated, no longer cast +off their horns, but retain them in the same manner as eunuchs do their +hairs; and if, when they are castrated, they are without horns, they do +not afterwards produce them, just as it happens to those who, before they +have a beard, are made eunuchs. So that nearly the bodies of all animals +are similarly affected with ours, with respect to the bodily calamities +to which they are subject. + +8. See, however, whether all the passions of the soul in brutes, are not +similar to ours; for it is not the province of man alone to apprehend +juices by the taste, colours by the sight, odours by the smell, sounds +by the hearing, cold or heat, or other tangible objects, by the touch; +but the senses of brutes are capable of the same perceptions. Nor are +brutes deprived of sense because they are not men, as neither are we to +be deprived of reason, because the Gods, if they possess it, are rational +beings. With respect to the senses, however, other animals appear greatly +to surpass us; for what man can see so acutely as a dragon? (for this +is not the fabulous Lynceus). And hence the poets denominate _to see_ +δρακειν, _drakein_: but an eagle, from a great height, sees a hare. +What man hears more acutely than cranes, who are able to hear from an +interval so great, as to be beyond the reach of human sight? And as to +smell, almost all animals so much surpass us in this sense, that things +which fall on it, and are obvious to them, are concealed from us; so that +they know and smell the several kinds of animals by their footsteps. +Hence, men employ dogs as their leaders, for the purpose of discovering +the retreat of a boar, or a stag. And we, indeed, are slowly sensible +of the constitution of the air; but this is immediately perceived by +other animals, so that from them we derive indications of the future +state of the weather. With respect to juices also, they so accurately +know the distinction between them, that their knowledge of what are +morbific, salubrious, and deleterious among these, surpasses that of +physicians. But Aristotle says, that animals whose sensitive powers are +more exquisite, are more prudent. And the diversities, indeed, of bodies +are capable of producing a facility or difficulty of being passively +affected, and of having reason, more or less prompt in its energies; but +they are not capable of changing the essence of the soul, since neither +are they able to change the senses, nor to alter the passions, nor to +make them entirely abandon their proper nature. It must be granted, +therefore, that animals participate more or less of reason, but not that +they are perfectly deprived of it; as neither must it be admitted that +one animal has reason, but another not. As, however, in one and the same +species of animals, one body is more, but another less healthy; and, in +a similar manner, in diseases, in a naturally good, and a naturally bad, +disposition, there is a great difference; thus also in souls, one is +naturally good, but another depraved: and of souls that are depraved, one +has more, but another less, of depravity. In good men, likewise, there +is not the same equality; for Socrates, Aristotle, and Plato, are not +similarly good. Nor is there sameness in a concordance of opinions. Hence +it does not follow, if we have more intelligence than other animals, that +on this account they are to be deprived of intelligence; as neither must +it be said, that partridges do not fly, because hawks fly higher; nor +that other hawks do not fly, because the bird called phassophonos[69] +flies higher than these, and than all other birds. Some one, therefore, +may admit that the soul is co-passive with the body, and that the former +suffers something from the latter, when the latter is well or ill +affected; but in this case it by no means changes its nature: but if the +soul is only co-passive to, and uses the body as an instrument, she may +be able to effect many things through it, which we cannot, even when it +is organized differently from ours, and when it is affected in a certain +manner, may sympathize with it, and yet may not change its proper nature. + +9. It must be demonstrated, therefore, that there is a rational power in +animals, and that they are not deprived of prudence. And in the first +place, indeed, each of them knows whether it is imbecile or strong, and, +in consequence of this, it defends some parts of itself, but attacks +with others. Thus the panther uses its teeth, the lion its nails and +teeth, the horse its hoofs, the ox its horns, the cock its spurs, and +the scorpion its sting; but the serpents in Egypt use their spittle, +(whence also they are called πτυαδες, _ptuades_, i.e. _spitters_,) and +with this they blind the eyes of those that approach them: and thus a +different animal uses a different part of itself for attack, in order +to save itself. Again, some animals, viz. such as are robust, feed [and +live] remote from men; but others, who are of an ignoble nature, live +remote from stronger animals, and, on the contrary, dwell nearer men. +And of these, some dwell at a greater distance from more robust animals, +as sparrows and swallows, who build their nests in the roofs of houses; +but others associate with men, as, for instance, dogs. They likewise +change their places of abode at certain times, and know every thing +which contributes to their advantage. In a similar manner, in fishes and +in birds, a reasoning energy of this kind may be perceived; all which +particulars are abundantly collected by the ancients, in their writings +concerning the prudence of animals; and they are copiously discussed by +Aristotle, who says, that by all animals an habitation subservient to +their subsistence and their safety, is most exquisitely contrived. + +10. But he who says that these things are naturally present with animals, +is ignorant in asserting this, that they are by nature rational; or +if this is not admitted, neither does reason subsist in us naturally, +nor with the perfection of it receive an increase, so far as we are +naturally adapted to receive it. A divine nature, indeed, does not become +rational[70] through learning, for there never was a time in which he +was irrational; but rationality is consubsistent with his existence, +and he is not prevented from being rational, because he did not receive +reason through discipline: though, with respect to other animals, in +the same manner as with respect to men, many things are taught them by +nature, and some things are imparted by discipline. Brutes, however, +learn some things from each other, but are taught others, as we have +said, by men. They also have memory, which is a most principal thing in +the resumption of reasoning and prudence. They likewise have vices, and +are envious; though their bad qualities are not so widely extended as in +men: for their vices are of a lighter nature than those of men. This, +indeed, is evident; for the builder of a house will never be able to lay +the foundation of it, unless he is sober; nor can a shipwright properly +place the keel of a ship, unless he is in health; nor a husbandman plant +a vine, unless he applies his mind to it; yet nearly all men, when they +are intoxicated, can beget children. This, however, is not the case with +other animals; for they propagate for the sake of offspring, and for the +most part, when the males have made the female pregnant, they no longer +attempt to be connected with her; nor, if they should attempt it, would +the female permit them. But the magnitude of the lascivious insolence +and intemperance of men in these things, is evident. In other animals, +however, the male is conscious of the parturient throes of the female, +and, for the most part, partakes of the same pains; as is evident in +cocks. But others incubate together with the females; as the males of +doves. They likewise provide a proper place for the delivery of their +offspring; and after they have brought forth their offspring, they both +purify them and themselves. And he who properly observes, will see that +every thing proceeds with them in an orderly manner; that they fawn +on him who nourishes them, and that they know their master, and give +indications of him who acts insidiously. + +11. Who likewise is ignorant how much gregarious animals preserve justice +towards each other? for this is preserved by ants, by bees, and by other +animals of the like kind. And who is ignorant of the chastity of female +ring-doves towards the males with whom they associate? for they destroy +those who are found by them to have committed adultery. Or who has not +heard of the justice of storks towards their parents? For in the several +species of animals, a peculiar virtue is eminent, to which each species +is naturally adapted; nor because this virtue is natural and stable, +is it fit to deny that they are rational? For it might be requisite +to deprive them of rationality, if their works were not the proper +effects of virtue and rational sagacity; but if we do not understand how +these works are effected, because we are unable to penetrate into the +reasoning which they use, we are not on this account to accuse them +of irrationality; for neither is any one able to penetrate into the +intellect of that divinity the sun, but from his works we assent to those +who demonstrate him to be an intellectual and rational essence. + +12. But some one may very properly wonder at those who admit that justice +derives its subsistence from the rational part, and who call those +animals that have no association with men, savage and unjust, and yet +do not extend justice as far as to those that do associate with us; and +which, in the same manner as men, would be deprived of life, if they +were deprived of human society. Birds, therefore, and dogs, and many +quadrupeds, such as goats, horses, sheep, asses, and mules, would perish, +if deprived of an association with mankind. Nature also, the fabricator +of their frame, constituted them so as to be in want of men, and +fashioned men so as to require their assistance; thus producing an innate +justice in them towards us, and in us towards them. But it is not at all +wonderful, if some of them are savage towards men; for what Aristotle +says is true, that if all animals had an abundance of nutriment, they +would not act ferociously, either towards each other, or towards men. +For on account of food, though necessary and slender, enmities and +friendships are produced among animals, and also on account of the places +which they occupy; but if men were reduced to such straits as brutes +are [with respect to food,] how much more savage would they become than +those animals that appear to be wild? War and famine are indications of +the truth of this; for then men do not abstain from eating each other; +and even without war and famine, they eat animals that are nurtured with +them, and are perfectly tame. + +13. Some one, however, may say, that brutes are indeed rational animals, +but have not a certain habitude, proximity, or alliance to us; but he +who asserts this will, in the first place, make them to be irrational +animals, in consequence of depriving them of an alliance to our nature. +And, in the next place, he will make their association with us to depend +on the utility which we derive from them, and not on the participation +of reason. The thing proposed by us, however, is to show that brutes are +rational animals, and not to inquire whether there is any compact between +them and us. For, with respect to men, all of them do not league with us, +and yet no one would say, that he who does not enter into a league with +us is irrational. But many brutes are slaves to men, and, as some one +rightly says, though they are in a state of servitude themselves, through +the improbity of men, yet, at the same time, by wisdom and justice, they +cause their masters to be their servants and curators. Moreover, the +vices of brutes are manifest, from which especially their rationality +is demonstrated. For they are envious, and the males are rivals of each +other with respect to the favour of the females, and the females with +respect to the regard of the males. There is one vice, however, which is +not inherent in them, viz. acting insidiously towards their benefactors, +but they are perfectly benevolent to those who are kind to them, and +place so much confidence in them, as to follow wherever they may lead +them, though it should even be to slaughter and manifest danger. And +though some one should nourish them, not for their sake, but for his +own, yet they will be benevolently disposed towards their possessor. But +men [on the contrary] do not act with such hostility towards any one, +as towards him who has nourished them; nor do they so much pray for the +death of any one, as for his death. + +14. Indeed, the operations of brutes are attended with so much +consideration[71], that they frequently perceive, that the food which is +placed for them is nothing else than a snare, though, either through +intemperance or hunger, they approach to it. And some of them, indeed, do +not approach to it immediately, but others slowly accede to it. They also +try whether it is possible to take the food without falling into danger, +and frequently in consequence of rationality vanquishing passion, they +depart without being injured. Some of them too revile at, and discharge +their urine on the stratagem of men; but others, through voracity, though +they know that they shall be captured, yet no less than the associates +of Ulysses, suffer themselves to die rather than not eat. Some persons, +likewise, have not badly endeavoured to show from the places which +animals are allotted, that they are far more prudent than we are. For as +those beings that dwell in æther are rational, so also, say they, are +the animals which occupy the region proximate to æther, viz. the air; +afterwards aquatic animals differ from these, and in the last place, the +terrestrial differ from the aquatic [in degrees of rationality]. And we +belong to the class of terrene animals dwelling in the sediment of the +universe. For in the Gods, we must not infer that they possess a greater +degree of excellence from the places [which they illuminate], though in +mortal natures this may be admitted. + +15. Since, also, brutes acquire a knowledge of the arts, and these such +as are human, and learn to dance, to drive a chariot, to fight a duel, to +walk on ropes, to write and read, to play on the pipe and the harp, to +discharge arrows, and to ride,—this being the case, can you any longer +doubt whether they possess that power which is receptive of art, since +the recipient of these arts may be seen to exist in them? For where +will they receive them, unless reason is inherent in them in which the +arts subsist? For they do not hear our voice as if it was a mere sound +only, but they also perceive the difference in the meaning of the words, +which is the effect of rational intelligence. But our opponents say, +that animals perform badly what is done by men. To this we reply, that +neither do men perform all things well. For if this be not admitted, +some men would be in vain victors in a contest, and others vanquished. +They add, that brutes do not consult, nor form assemblies, nor act in a +judicial capacity. But tell me whether all men do this? Do not actions in +the multitude precede consultation? And whence can any one demonstrate +that brutes do not consult? For no one can adduce an argument sufficient +to prove that they do not. But those show the contrary to this, who +have written minutely about animals. As to other objections, which are +adduced by our adversaries in a declamatory way, they are perfectly +frivolous; such, for instance; as that brutes have no cities of their +own. For neither have the Scythians, who live in carts, nor the Gods. +Our opponents add, that neither have brutes any written laws. To this we +reply, that neither had men while they were happy. For Apis is said to +have been the first that promulgated laws for the Greeks, when they were +in want of them. + +16. To men, therefore, on account of their voracity, brutes do not appear +to possess reason; but by the Gods and divine men, they are honoured +equally with sacred suppliants. Hence, the God[72] said to Aristodicus, +the Cumean, that sparrows were his suppliants. Socrates also, and prior +to him, Rhadamanthus, swore by animals. But the Egyptians conceive them +to be Gods, whether they, in reality, thought them to be so, or whether +they intentionally represented the Gods in the forms of oxen, birds, and +other animals, in order that these animals might be no less abstained +from than from men, or whether they did this through other more mystical +causes[73]. Thus also the Greeks united a ram to the statue of Jupiter, +but the horns of a bull to that of Bacchus. They likewise fashioned the +statue of Pan from the form of a man and a goat; but they represented the +Muses and the Sirens winged, and also Victory, Iris, Love, and Hermes. +Pindar too, in his hymns, represents the Gods, when they were expelled +by Typhon, not resembling men, but other animals. And Jupiter, when in +love with Pasiphae, is said to have become a bull; but at another time, +he is said to have been changed into an eagle and a swan; through all +which the ancients indicated the honour which they paid to animals, and +this in a still greater degree when they assert that Jupiter was nursed +by a goat. The Cretans, from a law established by Rhadamanthus, swore +by all animals. Nor was Socrates in jest when he swore by the dog and +the goose; but in so doing, he swore conformably to the just son of +Jupiter [Rhadamanthus]; nor did he sportfully say that swans were his +fellow-servants. But fables obscurely signify, that animals have souls +similar to ours, when they say that the Gods in their anger changed men +into brutes, and that, when they were so changed, they afterwards pitied +and loved them. For things of this kind are asserted of dolphins and +halcyons, of nightingales and swallows. + +17. Each of the ancients, likewise, who had been prosperously nursed by +animals, boasted more of this than of their parents and educators. Thus, +one boasted of having been nursed by a she-wolf, another by a hind, +another by a she-goat, and another by a bee. But Semiramis gloried in +having been brought up by doves, Cyrus in being nursed by a dog, and a +Thracian in having a swan for his nurse, who likewise bore the name of +his nurse. Hence also, the Gods obtained their surnames, as Bacchus that +of _Hinnuleus_, Apollo that of _Lyceus_, and, likewise _Delphinius_, +Neptune and Minerva that of _Equestris_. But Hecate, when invoked by +the names of a bull, a dog, and a lioness, is more propitious. If, +however, those who sacrifice animals and eat them, assert that they are +irrational, in order that they may mitigate the crime of so doing, the +Scythians also, who eat their parents, may in like manner say that their +parents are destitute of reason. + +18. Through these arguments, therefore, and others which we shall +afterwards mention, in narrating the opinions of the ancients, it is +demonstrated that brutes are rational animals, reason in most of them +being indeed imperfect, of which, nevertheless, they are not entirely +deprived. Since, however, justice pertains to rational beings, as our +opponents say, how is it possible not to admit, that we should also act +justly towards brutes? For we do not extend justice to plants, because +there appears to be much in them which is unconnected with reason; though +of these, we are accustomed to use the fruits, but not together with the +fruits to cut off the trunks. We collect, however, corn and leguminous +substances, when, being efflorescent, they have fallen on the earth, +and are dead. But no one uses for food the flesh of dead animals, that +of fish being excepted, unless they have been destroyed by violence. So +that in these things there is much injustice. As Plutarch also says[74], +it does not follow that, because our nature is indigent of certain +things, and we use these, we should therefore act unjustly towards all +things. For we are allowed to injure other things to a certain extent, +in order to procure the necessary means of subsistence (if to take any +thing from plants, even while they are living, is an injury to them); +but to destroy other things through luxury, and for the enjoyment of +pleasure, is perfectly savage and unjust. And the abstinence from these +neither diminishes our life nor our living happily. For if, indeed, +the destruction of animals and the eating of flesh were as requisite +as air and water, plants and fruits, without which it is impossible to +live, this injustice would be necessarily connected with our nature. But +if many priests of the Gods, and many kings of the barbarians, being +attentive to purity, and if, likewise, infinite species of animals never +taste food of this kind, yet live, and obtain their proper end according +to nature, is not he absurd who orders us, because we are compelled to +wage war with certain animals, not to live peaceably with those with whom +it is possible to do so, but thinks, either that we ought to live without +exercising justice towards any thing, or that, by exercising it towards +all things, we should not continue in existence? As, therefore, among +men, he who, for the sake of his own safety, or that of his children or +country, either seizes the wealth of certain persons, or oppresses some +region or city, has necessity for the pretext of his injustice; but he +who acts in this manner through the acquisition of wealth, or through +satiety or luxurious pleasure, and for the purpose of satisfying desires +which are not necessary, appears to be inhospitable, intemperate, and +depraved;—thus too, divinity pardons the injuries which are done to +plants, the consumption of fire and water, the shearing of sheep, the +milking of cows, and the taming of oxen, and subjugating them to the +yoke, for the safety and continuance in life of those that use them. +But to deliver animals to be slaughtered and cooked, and thus be filled +with murder, not for the sake of nutriment and satisfying the wants of +nature, but making pleasure and gluttony the end of such conduct, is +transcendently iniquitous and dire. For it is sufficient that we use, for +laborious purposes, though they have no occasion to labour themselves, +the progeny of horses, and asses, and bulls, as Æschylus says, as our +substitutes, who, by being tamed and subjugated to the yoke, alleviate +our toil. + +19. But with respect to him who thinks that we should not use an ox for +food, nor destroying and corrupting spirit and life, place things on +the table which are only the allurements and elegancies of satiety, of +what does he deprive our life, which is either necessary to our safety, +or subservient to virtue? To compare plants, however, with animals, +is doing violence to the order of things. For the latter are naturally +sensitive, and adapted to feel pain, to be terrified and hurt; on which +account also they may be injured. But the former are entirely destitute +of sensation, and in consequence of this, nothing foreign, or evil, or +hurtful, or injurious, can befall them. For sensation is the principle +of all alliance, and of every thing of a foreign nature. But Zeno and +his followers assert, that alliance is the principle of justice. And is +it not absurd, since we see that many of our own species live from sense +alone, but do not possess intellect and reason, and since we also see, +that many of them surpass the most terrible of wild beasts in cruelty, +anger, and rapine, being murderous of their children and their parents, +and also being tyrants, and the tools of kings [is it not, I say, +absurd,] to fancy that we ought to act justly towards these, but that no +justice is due from us to the ox that ploughs, the dog that is fed with +us, and the animals that nourish us with their milk, and adorn our bodies +with their wool? Is not such an opinion most irrational and absurd? + +20. But, by Jupiter, the assertion of Chrysippus is considered by our +opponents to be very probable, that the Gods made us for the sake of +themselves, and for the sake of each other, and that they made animals +for the sake of us; horses, indeed, in order that they might assist us +in battle, dogs, that they might hunt with us, and leopards, bears, and +lions, for the sake of exercising our fortitude. But the hog (for here +the pleasantry of Chrysippus is most delightful) was not made for any +other purpose than to be sacrificed; and God mingled soul, as if it +were salt, with the flesh of this animal, that he might procure for us +excellent food. In order, likewise, that we might have an abundance of +broth, and luxurious suppers, divinity provided for us all-various kinds +of shell-fish, the fishes called purples, sea-nettles, and the various +kinds of winged animals; and this not from a certain other cause, but +only that he might supply man with an exuberance of pleasure; in so +doing, surpassing all nurses [in kindness], and thickly filling with +pleasures and enjoyments the terrestrial place. Let him, however, to +whom these assertions appear to possess a certain probability, and to +participate of something worthy of deity, consider what he will reply to +the saying of Carneades, that every thing which is produced by nature, is +_benefited_ when it obtains the end to which it is adapted, and for which +it was generated. But _benefit_ is to be understood in a more general +way, as signifying what the Stoics call _useful_. The hog, however, [says +he] was produced by nature for the purpose of being slaughtered and used +for food; and when it suffers this, it obtains the end for which it is +adapted, and is benefited. But if God fashioned animals for the use of +men, in what do we use flies, lice, bats, beetles, scorpions, and vipers? +of which some are odious to the sight, defile the touch, are intolerable +to the smell, and in their voice dire and unpleasant; and others, on +the contrary, are destructive to those that meet with them. And with +respect to the _balænæ_, _pistrices_, and other species of whales, an +infinite number of which, as Homer says[75], the loud-sounding Amphitrite +nourishes, does not the Demiurgus teach us, that they were generated for +the utility of the nature of things[76]? And if our opponents should +admit that all things were not generated for us, and with a view to our +advantage, in addition to the distinction which they make being very +confused and obscure, we shall not avoid acting unjustly, in attacking +and noxiously using those animals which were not produced for our +sake, but according to nature [_i.e._ for the sake of the universe], +as we were. I omit to mention, that if we define, by utility, things +which pertain to us, we shall not be prevented from admitting, that we +were generated for the sake of the most destructive animals, such as +crocodiles, balænæ, and dragons. For we are not in the least benefited +by them; but they seize and destroy men that fall in their way, and use +them for food; in so doing acting not at all more cruelly than we do, +excepting that they commit this injustice through want and hunger, but +we through insolent wantonness, and for the sake of luxury, frequently +sporting in theatres, and in hunting slaughter the greater part of +animals. And by thus acting, indeed, a murderous disposition and a brutal +nature become strengthened in us, and render us insensible to pity: to +which we may add, that those who first dared to do this, blunted the +greatest part of lenity, and rendered it inefficacious. The Pythagoreans, +however, made lenity towards beasts to be an exercise of philanthropy +and commiseration. So that, how is it possible they should not in a +greater degree excite us to justice, than those who assert that, by not +slaughtering animals, the justice which is usually exercised towards +men will be corrupted? For custom is most powerful in increasing those +passions in man which were gradually introduced into his nature. + +21. It is so, say our antagonists; but as the immortal is opposed to +the mortal, the incorruptible to the corruptible, and the incorporeal +to the corporeal, so to the rational essence which has an existence in +the nature of things, the irrational essence must be opposed, which has +a subsistence contrary to it; nor in so many conjugations of things, is +this alone to be left imperfect and mutilated. [Our opponents, however, +thus speak], as if we did not grant this, or as if we had not shown that +there is much of the irrational among beings. For there is an abundance +of it in all the natures that are destitute of soul, nor do we require +any other opposition to that which is rational; but immediately every +thing which is deprived of soul, being irrational and without intellect, +is opposed to that which possesses reason and _dianoia_[77]. If, however, +some one should think fit to assert that not nature in common, but the +animated nature, is divided into that which possesses and that which is +without imagination, and into that which is sensitive, and that which +is deprived of sensation, in order that these oppositions of habits and +privations may subsist about the same genus, as being equiponderant;—he +who says this speaks absurdly. For it would be absurd to investigate in +the animated nature that which is sensitive, and that which is without +sensation, that which employs, and that which is without imagination, +because every thing animated is immediately adapted to be sensitive and +imaginative. So that neither thus will he justly require, that one part +of the animated nature should be rational, but another irrational, when +he is speaking to men, who think that nothing participates of sense +which does not also participate of intelligence, and that nothing is +an animal in which opinion and reasoning are not inherent, in the same +manner as with animals every sense and impulse are naturally present. +For nature, which they rightly assert produced all things for the sake +of a certain thing, and with reference to a certain end, did not make an +animal sensitive merely that it might be passively affected, and possess +sensible perception; but as there are many things which are allied and +appropriate, and many which are foreign to it, it would not be able to +exist for the shortest space of time, unless it learnt how to avoid +some things, and to pursue others. The knowledge, therefore, of both +these, sense similarly imparts to every animal; but the apprehension and +pursuit of what is useful, and the depulsion and avoidance of what is +destructive and painful, can by no possible contrivance be present with +those animals that are incapable of reasoning, judging, and remembering, +and that do not naturally possess an animadversive power. For to those +animals from whom you entirely take away expectation, memory, design, +preparation, hope, fear, desire, and indignation, neither the eyes when +present, nor the ears, nor sense, nor phantasy, will be beneficial, since +they will be of no use; and it will be better to be deprived of them +than to labour, be in pain, and be afflicted, without possessing the +power of repelling these molestations. There is, however, a treatise of +Strato, the physiologist, in which it is demonstrated, that it is not +possible to have a sensible perception of any thing without the energy of +intellection. For frequently the letters of a book, which we cursorily +consider by the sight, and words which fall on the auditory sense, are +concealed from and escape us, when our intellect is attentive to other +things; but afterwards, when it returns to the thing to which it was +before inattentive, then, by recollection, it runs through and pursues +each of the before-mentioned particulars. Hence also it is said [by +Epicharmus],— + + ’Tis mind alone that sees and hears, + And all besides is deaf and blind. + +For the objects which fall on the eyes and the ears do not produce a +sensible perception of themselves, unless that which is intellective +is present. On which account, also, king Cleomenes, when something +that was recited was applauded, being asked, if it did not also appear +to him to be excellent, left this to the decision of those that asked +him the question; for he said, that his intellect was at the time in +Peloponnesus. Hence it is necessary that intellect should be present with +all those with whom sensible perception is present. + +22. Let us, however, admit that sense does not require intellect for +the accomplishment of its proper work, yet, when energizing about what +is appropriate and what is foreign, it discerns the difference between +the two, it must then exercise the power of memory, and must dread that +which will produce pain, desire that which will be beneficial, and +contrive, if it is absent, how it may be present, and will procure +methods of pursuing and investigating what is advantageous, and of +avoiding and flying from hostile occurrences. Indeed, our opponents, in +their Introductions, [as they call them], every where inculcate these +things with a tedious prolixity, defining design to be an indication of +perfection; the tendency of intellect to the object of its perception, +an impulse prior to impulse; preparation, an action prior to action; +and memory, the comprehension of some past thing[78], the perception +of which, when present, was obtained through sense. For there is not +any one of these which is not rational, and all of them are present +with all animals. Thus, too, with respect to intellections, those which +are reposited in the mind, are called by them εννοιαι, _notions_; but +when they are in motion [through a discursive energy] they denominate +them διανοησεις, or _perceptions obtained by a reasoning process_. But +with respect to all the passions, as they are in common acknowledged to +be depraved natures and opinions, it is wonderful that our opponents +should overlook the operations and motions of brutes, many of which are +the effects of anger, many of fear, and, by Jupiter, of envy also and +emulation. Our opponents, too, themselves punish dogs and horses when +they do wrong; and this not in vain, but in order to make them better, +producing in them, through the pain, a sorrow which we denominate +repentance. But the name of the pleasure which is received through the +ears is κηλησις, _i.e._ _an ear-alluring sweetness_; and the delight +which is received through the eyes is denominated γοητεια, _i.e._ +_enchantment_. Each of these, however, is used towards brutes. Hence +stags and horses are _allured_ by the harmony produced from reeds and +flutes; and the crabs, called παγουροι, _paguri_, are evocated from +their caverns by the melody of reeds. The fish _thrissa_, likewise, is +said through harmony to come forth from its retreats. Those, however, +who speak stupidly about these things, assert that animals are neither +delighted, nor enraged, nor terrified, nor make any provision for what +is necessary, nor remember; but they say that the bee _as it were_ +remembers, that the swallow _as it were_ provides what is requisite, +that the lion is _as it were_ angry, and that the stag is _as it were_ +afraid. And I know not what answer to give to those who say that animals +neither see nor hear, but see _as it were_, and _as it were_ hear; that +they do not utter vocal sounds, but _as it were_ utter them; and that, +in short, they do not live, but _as it were_ live. For he who is truly +intelligent, will readily admit that these assertions are no more sane +than the former, and are similarly destitute of evidence. When, however, +on comparing with human manners and lives, actions, and modes of living, +those of animals, I see much depravity in the latter, and no manifest +tendency to virtue as to the principal end, nor any proficiency, or +appetition of proficiency, I am dubious why nature gave the beginning of +perfection to those that are never able to arrive at the end of it[79]. +But this to our opponents does not appear to be at all absurd. For as +they admit that the love of parents towards their offspring is the +principle in us of association and justice; yet, though they perceive +that this affection is abundant and strong in animals, they nevertheless +deny that they participate of justice; which assertion is similarly +defective with the nature of mules, who, though they are not in want of +any generative member, since they have a penis and vulva, and receive +pleasure from employing these parts, yet they are not able to accomplish +the end of generation. Consider the thing, too, in another way: Is it +not ridiculous to say that such men as Socrates, Plato, and Zeno, were +not less vicious than any slave, but resembled slaves in stupidity, +intemperance, and injustice, and afterwards blame the nature of brutes, +as neither pure, nor formed with sufficient accuracy for the attainment +of virtue; thus attributing to them a privation, and not a depravity +and imbecility of reason? Especially since they acknowledge that there +is a vice of the rational part of the soul, with which every brute is +replete. For we may perceive that timidity, intemperance, injustice, and +malevolence, are inherent in many brutes. + +23. But he who thinks that the nature which is not adapted to receive +rectitude of reason, does not at all receive reason, he, in the first +place, does not differ from one who fancies that an ape does not +naturally participate of deformity, nor a tortoise of tardity; because +the former is not receptive of beauty, nor the latter of celerity. And, +in the next place, this is the opinion of one who does not perceive the +obvious difference of things. For reason, indeed, is ingenerated by +nature; but right and perfect reason is acquired by study and discipline. +Hence all animated beings participate of reason, but our opponents cannot +mention any man who possesses rectitude of reason and wisdom [naturally], +though the multitude of men is innumerable. But as the sight of one +animal differs from that of another, and the flying of one bird from that +of another, (for hawks and grasshoppers do not similarly see, nor eagles +and partridges); thus, also, neither does every thing which participates +of reason possess genius and acuteness in the highest perfection. +Indeed there are many indications in brutes of association, fortitude, +and craft, in procuring what is necessary, and in economical conduct; +as, on the contrary, there are also indications in them of injustice, +timidity, and fatuity. Hence it is a question with some, which are the +more excellent, terrestrial or aquatic animals[80]? And that there are +these indications, is evident from comparing storks with river horses: +for the former nourish, but the latter destroy their fathers, in order +that they may have connexion with their mothers. This is likewise seen +on comparing doves with partridges: for the latter conceal and destroy +their eggs, if the female, during her incubation, refuses to be connected +with the male. But doves successively relieve each other in incubation, +alternately cherishing the eggs; and first, indeed, they feed the young, +and afterwards the male strikes the female with his beak, and drives +her to the eggs and her young, if she has for a long time wandered from +them. Antipater, however, when he blames asses and sheep for the neglect +of purity, overlooks, I know not how, lynxes and swallows; of which, the +former remove and entirely conceal and bury their excrement, but the +latter teach their young to throw it out of their nest. Moreover, we +do not say that one tree is more ignorant than another, as we say that +a sheep is more stupid than a dog. Nor do we say that one herb is more +timid than another, as we do that a stag is more timid than a lion. For, +as in things which are immoveable, one is not slower than another, and +in things which are not vocal, one is not less vocal than another: thus, +too, in all things in which the power of intellection is wanting, one +thing cannot be said to be more timid, more dull, or more intemperate +than another. For, as these qualities are present differently in their +different participants, they produce in animals the diversities which +we perceive. Nor is it wonderful that man should so much excel other +animals in docility, sagacity, justice, and association. For many brutes +surpass all men in magnitude of body, and celerity of foot, and likewise +in strength of sight, and accuracy of hearing; yet man is not on this +account either deaf, or blind, or powerless. But we run, though slower +than stags, and we see, though not so accurately as hawks; and nature +has not deprived us of strength and magnitude, though our possession +of these is nothing, when compared with the strength and bulk of the +elephant and the camel. _Hence, in a similar manner, we must not say that +brutes, because their intellection is more dull than ours, and because +they reason worse than we do, neither energize discursively, nor, in +short, possess intellection and reason; but it must be admitted that they +possess these, though in an imbecile and turbid manner, just as a dull +and disordered eye participates of sight._ + +24. Innumerable instances, however, might be adduced in proof of the +natural sagacity of animals, if many things of this kind had not by many +persons been collected and narrated. But this subject must be still +further considered. For it appears that it belongs to the same thing, +whether it be a part or a power, which is naturally adapted to receive +a certain thing, to be also disposed to fall into a preternatural mode +of subsistence, when it becomes mutilated or diseased. Thus, the eye is +adapted to fall into blindness, the leg into lameness, and the tongue +into stammering; but nothing else is subject to such defects. For +blindness does not befall that which is not naturally adapted to see, nor +lameness that which is not adapted to walk; nor is that which is deprived +of a tongue fitted to stammer, or lisp, or be dumb. Hence, neither can +that animal be delirious, or stupid, or insane, in which intellection, +and the discursive energy of reason, are not naturally inherent. For it +is not possible for any thing to be passively affected which does not +possess a power, the passion of which is either privation, or mutilation, +or some other deprivation. Moreover, I have met with mad dogs, and also +rabid horses; and some persons assert that oxen and foxes become mad. +The example of dogs, however, is sufficient for our purpose: for it is a +thing indubitable, and testifies that the animal possesses no despicable +portion of reason and discursive energy, the passion of which, when +disturbed and confounded, is fury and madness. For, when they are thus +affected, we do not see that there is any change in the quality of their +sight or hearing. But as he is absurd who denies that a man is beside +himself, and that his intellectual, reasoning, and recollective powers, +are corrupted, when he is afflicted with melancholy or delirium, (for it +is usually said of those that are insane, that they are not themselves, +but have fallen off from reason): thus, also, he who thinks that mad dogs +suffer any thing else than that of having the power, which is naturally +intellective, and is adapted to reason and recollect, full of tumult and +distortion, so as to cause them to be ignorant of persons most dear to +them, and abandon their accustomed mode of living;—he who thus thinks, +appears either to overlook what is obvious; or, if he really perceives +what takes place, voluntarily contends against the truth. And such are +the arguments adduced by Plutarch in many of his treatises against the +Stoics and Peripatetics. + +25. But Theophrastus employs the following reasoning:—Those that are +generated from the same sources, I mean from the same father and mother, +are said by us to be naturally allied to each other. And moreover, we +likewise conceive that those who derive their origin from the same +ancestors that we do, are allied to us, and also that this is the case +with our fellow-citizens, because they participate with us of the same +land, and are united to us by the bonds of association. For we do not +think that the latter are allied to each other, and to us, through +deriving their origin from the same ancestors, unless it should so happen +that the first progenitors of these were the sources of our race, or +were derived from the same ancestors. Hence I think we should say, that +Greek is allied and has an affinity to Greek, and Barbarian to Barbarian, +and all men to each other; for one of these two reasons, either because +they originate from the same ancestors, or because they participate of +the same food, manners, and genus. Thus also we must admit that all +men have an affinity, and are allied to each other. And, moreover, the +principles of the bodies of all animals are naturally the same. I do +not say this with reference to the first elements of their bodies; for +plants also consist of these; but I mean the seed, the flesh, and the +connascent genus of humours which is inherent in animals. But animals +are much more allied to each other, through naturally possessing souls, +which are not different from each other, I mean in desire and anger; and +besides these, in the reasoning faculty, and, above all, in the senses. +But as with respect to bodies, so likewise with respect to souls, some +animals have them more, but others less perfect, yet all of them have +naturally the same principles. And this is evident from the affinity of +their passions. If, however, what we have said is true, viz. that such +is the generation of the manners of animals, all the tribes of them are +indeed intellective, but they differ in their modes of living, and in the +temperature of the first elements of which they consist. And if this be +admitted, the genus of other animals has an affinity, and is allied to +us. For, as Euripides says, they have all of them the same food and the +same spirit, the same purple streams; and they likewise demonstrate that +the common parents of all of them are Heaven and Earth. + +26. Hence, since animals are allied to us, if it should appear, according +to Pythagoras, that they are allotted the same soul that we are, he +may justly be considered as impious who does not abstain from acting +unjustly towards his kindred. Nor because some animals are savage, is +their alliance to us to be on this account abscinded. For some men may be +found who are no less, and even more malefic than savage animals to their +neighbours, and who are impelled to injure any one they may meet with, as +if they were driven by a certain blast of their own nature and depravity. +Hence also, we destroy such men; yet we do not cut them off from an +alliance to animals of a mild nature. Thus, therefore, if likewise some +animals are savage, these, as such, are to be destroyed, in the same +manner as men that are savage; but our habitude or alliance to other +and wilder animals is not on this account to be abandoned. But neither +tame nor savage animals are to be eaten; as neither are unjust men. Now, +however, we act most unjustly, destroying, indeed, tame animals, because +some brutes are savage and unjust, and feeding on such as are tame. +With respect to tame animals, however, we act with a twofold injustice, +because, though they are tame, we slay them, and also, because we eat +them. And, in short, the death of these has a reference to the assumption +of them for food. + +To these, also, such arguments as the following may be added. For he who +says that the man who extends the just as far as to brutes, corrupts +the just, is ignorant that he does not himself preserve justice, but +increases pleasure, which is hostile to justice. By admitting, therefore, +that pleasure is the end [of our actions], justice is evidently +destroyed. For to whom is it not manifest that justice is increased +through abstinence? For he who abstains from every thing animated, +though he may abstain from such animals as do not contribute to the +benefit of society, will be much more careful not to injure those of his +own species. For he who loves the genus, will not hate any species of +animals; and by how much the greater his love of the genus is[81], by so +much the more will he preserve justice towards a part of the genus, and +that to which he is allied. He, therefore, who admits that he is allied +to all animals, will not injure any animal. But he who confines justice +to man alone, is prepared, like one enclosed in a narrow space, to hurl +from him the prohibition of injustice. So that the Pythagorean is more +pleasing than the Socratic banquet. For Socrates said, that hunger is +the sauce of food; but Pythagoras said, that to injure no one, and to +be exhilarated with justice, is the sweetest sauce; as the avoidance of +animal food, will also be the avoidance of unjust conduct with respect +to food. For God has not so constituted things, that we cannot preserve +ourselves without injuring others; since, if this were the case, he would +have connected us with a nature which is the principle of injustice. +Do not they, however, appear to be ignorant of the peculiarity of +justice, who think that it was introduced from the alliance of men to +each other? For this will be nothing more than a certain philanthropy; +but justice consists in abstaining from injuring any thing which is not +noxious. And our conception of the just man must be formed according +to the latter, and not according to the former mode. Hence, therefore, +since justice consists in not injuring any thing, it must be extended as +far as to every animated nature. On this account, also, the essence of +justice consists in the rational ruling over the irrational, and in the +irrational being obedient to the rational part. For when reason governs, +and the irrational part is obedient to its mandates, it follows, by the +greatest necessity, that man will be innoxious towards every thing. For +the passions being restrained, and desire and anger wasting away, but +reason possessing its proper empire, a similitude to a more excellent +nature [and to deity] immediately follows. But the more excellent nature +in the universe is entirely innoxious, and, through possessing a power +which preserves and benefits all things, is itself not in want of any +thing. We, however, through justice [when we exercise it], are innoxious +towards all things, but, through being connected with mortality, are +indigent of things of a necessary nature. But the assumption of what +is necessary, does not injure even plants, when we take what they cast +off; nor fruits, when we use such of them as are dead; nor sheep, when +through shearing we rather benefit than injure them, and by partaking +of their milk, we in return afford them every proper attention. Hence, +the just man appears to be one who deprives himself of things pertaining +to the body; yet he does not [in reality] injure himself. For, by this +management of his body, and continence, he increases his inward good, +_i.e._ his similitude to God. + +27. By making pleasure, therefore, the end of life, that which is truly +justice cannot be preserved; since neither such things as are primarily +useful according to nature, nor all such as are easily attainable, +give completion to felicity. For in many instances, the motions of the +irrational nature, and utility and indigence, have been, and still are +the sources of injustice. For men became indigent [as they pretended] +of animal food, in order that they might preserve, as they said, the +corporeal frame free from molestation, and without being in want of those +things after which the animal nature aspires. But if an assimilation to +divinity is the end of life, an innoxious conduct towards all things +will be in the most eminent degree preserved. As, therefore, he who is +led by his passions is innoxious only towards his children and his wife, +but despises and acts fraudulently towards other persons, since, in +consequence of the irrational part predominating in him, he is excited +to, and astonished about mortal concerns; but he who is led by reason, +preserves an innoxious conduct towards his fellow-citizens, and still +more so towards strangers, and towards all men, through having the +irrational part in subjection, and is therefore more rational and divine +than the former character;—thus also, he who does not confine harmless +conduct to men alone, but extends it to other animals, is more similar +to divinity; and if it was possible to extend it even to plants, he +would preserve this image in a still greater degree. As, however, this +is not possible, we may in this respect lament, with the ancients[82], +the defect of our nature, that we consist of such adverse and discordant +principles, so that we are unable to preserve our divine part +incorruptible, and in all respects innoxious. For we are not unindigent +in all things; the cause of which is generation, and our becoming needy +through the abundant corporeal efflux which we sustain. But want procures +safety and ornament from things of a foreign nature, which are necessary +to the existence of our mortal part. He, therefore, who is indigent of +a greater number of externals, is in a greater degree agglutinated to +penury; and by how much his wants increase, by so much is he destitute +of divinity, and an associate of penury. For that which is similar to +deity, through this assimilation immediately possesses true wealth. But +no one who is [truly] rich and perfectly unindigent injures any thing. +For as long as any one injures another, though he should possess the +greatest wealth, and all the acres of land which the earth contains, he +is still poor, and has want for his intimate associate. On this account, +also, he is unjust, without God, and impious, and enslaved to every kind +of depravity, which is produced by the lapse of the soul into matter, +through the privation of good. Every thing, therefore, is nugatory to any +one, as long as he wanders from the principle of the universe; and he is +indigent of all things, while he does not direct his attention to Porus +[or the source of true abundance]. He likewise yields to the mortal part +of his nature, while he remains ignorant of his real self. But Injustice +is powerful in persuading and corrupting those that belong to her empire, +because she associates with her votaries in conjunction with Pleasure. +As, however, in the choice of lives, he is the more accurate judge who +has obtained an experience of both [the better and the worse kind of +life], than he is who has only experienced one of them; thus also, in +the choice and avoidance of what is proper, he is a safer judge who, +from that which is more, judges of that which is less excellent, than +he who from the less, judges of the more excellent. Hence, he who lives +according to intellect, will more accurately define what is eligible +and what is not, than he who lives under the dominion of irrationality. +For the former has passed through the irrational life, as having from +the first associated with it; but the latter, having had no experience +of an intellectual life, persuades those that resemble himself, and +acts with nugacity, like a child among children. If, however, say our +opponents, all men were persuaded by these arguments, what would become +of us? Is it not evident that we should be happy, injustice, indeed, +being exterminated from men, and justice being conversant with us, in the +same manner as it is in the heavens? But now this question is just the +same as if men should be dubious what the life of the Danaids would be, +if they were liberated from the employment of drawing water in a sieve, +and attempting to fill a perforated vessel. For they are dubious what +would be the consequence if we should cease to replenish our passions and +desires, the whole of which replenishing continually flows away through +the want of real good; since this fills up the ruinous clefts of the soul +more than the greatest of external necessaries. Do you therefore ask, O +man, what we should do? We should imitate those that lived in the golden +age, we should imitate those of that period who were [truly] free. For +with them modesty, Nemesis, and Justice associated, because they were +satisfied with the fruits of the earth. + + The fertile earth for them spontaneous yields + Abundantly her fruits[83]. + +But those who are liberated from slavery, obtain for themselves what they +before procured for their masters. In like manner, also, do you, when +liberated from the servitude of the body, and a slavish attention to the +passions produced through the body, as, prior to this, you nourished +them in an all-various manner with externals, so now nourish yourself +all-variously with internal good, justly assuming things which are +[properly] your own, and no longer by violence taking away things which +are foreign [to your true nature and real good]. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[64] This _external reason_ (λογος προφορικος) is speech. + +[65] Philostratus relates this of Apollonius, in his Life of him. + +[66] The words within the brackets are added from the version of +Felicianus. Hence it appears, that the words εκ των διαφορων μυκηματων +are wanting in the original, after the word ζητει. But this defect is not +noticed by any of the editors. + +[67] Porphyry derived this from the treatise of Plutarch, in which it is +investigated whether _land_ are more sagacious than _aquatic_ animals. + +[68] This was the opinion of the Stoics; but is most erroneous. For the +supreme divinity, being superessential, transcends even intellect itself, +and much more reason, which is an evolved perception of things; and +this is also the case with every other deity, according to the Platonic +theology, when considered according to his hyparxis, or summit. See my +translation of Proclus on the Theology of Plato. + +[69] A musket, or male hawk of a small kind. This bird is mentioned by +Homer, Iliad, XIV. v. 238. + +[70] Reason in a divine intellect subsists causally, or in a way better +than reason, and therefore is not a discursive energy (διεξοδικη +ενεργεια), but an evolved cause of things. And though, in a divine soul, +it is discursive, or transitive, yet it differs from our reason in this, +that it perceives the whole of one form at once, and not by degrees, as +we do when we reason. + +[71] In the original, Ουτω δ’ εστι λογιστικα ων δρᾳ, κ.τ.λ. But for +λογιστικα, Lipsius proposes to read, λογικα, and Meerman λογικη. There +is, however, no occasion whatever to substitute any other word for +λογιστικα, as, with Platonic writers, το λογιστικον is equivalent to το +λογιζομενον. + +[72] See the first book of Herodotus, chap. 159. + +[73] The more mystical cause why the Egyptians worshipped animals, +appears to me to be this, that they conceived a _living_ to be preferable +to an _inanimate_ image of divinity. Hence, they reverenced animals +as visible and living resemblances of certain invisible powers of the +Gods.—See Plutarch’s Treatise on Isis and Osiris. + +[74] See the Symposiacs of Plutarch, lib. ix. 8. + +[75] Odyss. XII. v. 96. + +[76] The latter part of this sentence, which in the original is τι ουκ +εδιδαξεν ημας ο δημιουργος οπη χρησιμα τη φυσει γεγονε; Valentinius most +erroneously translates, “quare nos rerum opifex non edocuit, quomodo à +natura in nostros usus facta fuerint?” + +[77] _i.e._ The discursive energy of reason. + +[78] In the original, μνημην δε καταληψιν αξιωματος παρεληλυθότος, οὗ +το παρον εξ αισθησεως κατεληφθη; but for αξιωματος, I read πραγματος. +Felicianus also appears to have found this reading in his manuscript copy +of this work; for his version of the passage is, “vel memoriam _rei_ +præteritæ comprehensionem, quam præsentem sensus perciperat.” + +[79] This doubt may, perhaps, be solved, by admitting that brutes have +an imperfect rationality, or the very dregs of the rational faculty, by +which they form a link between men and zoophytes, just as zoophytes are a +link between brutes and merely vegetable substances. Brutes, therefore, +having an imperfect reason, possess only the beginning of perfection. + +[80] Plutarch has written a most ingenious treatise on this subject. + +[81] In the original, οσῳ μειζον το γενος το των ζωων, τοσουτῳ και προς +το μερος και το οικειον ταυτην διασωσει. On this passage, Reisk observes, +“Forte οσῳ μειζων η οικειωσις προς το γενος το των ζωων, τοσουτῳ +(scilicet μαλλον) και προς το μερος, κ.τ.λ.” But, instead of η οικειωσις, +it appears to me that η φιλια should be substituted. + +[82] Porphyry here particularly alludes to Empedocles. + +[83] Hesiod. Oper. v. 117. + + + + +ON ABSTINENCE FROM ANIMAL FOOD. + +BOOK THE FOURTH. + + +1. In the preceding books, O Castricius, we have nearly answered all the +arguments which in reality defend the feeding on flesh, for the sake of +incontinence and intemperance, and which adduce impudent apologies for +so doing by ascribing a greater indigence to our nature than is fit. Two +particular inquiries, however, still remain; in one of which the promise +of advantage especially deceives those who are corrupted by pleasure. +And, moreover, we shall confute the assertion of our opponents, that no +wise man, nor any nation, has rejected animal food, as it leads those +that hear it to great injustice, through the ignorance of true history; +and we shall also endeavour to give the solutions of the question +concerning advantage, and to reply to other inquiries. + +2. But we shall begin from the abstinence of certain nations, in the +narration of which, what is asserted of the Greeks will first claim our +attention, as being the most allied to us, and the most appropriate of +all the witnesses that can be adduced. Among those, therefore, that +have concisely, and at the same time accurately collected an account of +the affairs of the Greeks, is the Peripatetic Dicæarchus[84], who, in +narrating the pristine life of the Greeks, says, the ancients, being +generated with an alliance to the Gods, were naturally most excellent, +and led the best life; so that, when compared to us of the present day, +who consist of an adulterated and most vile matter, they were thought to +be a golden race; and they slew no animal whatever. The truth of this, he +also says, is testified by the poets, who denominate these ancients the +golden race, and assert that every good was present with them. + + The fertile earth for them spontaneous bore + Of fruits a copious and unenvy’d store; + In blissful quiet then, unknown to strife, + The worthy with the worthy passed their life[85]. + +Which assertions, indeed, Dicæarchus explaining, says, that a life of +this kind was under Saturn; if it is proper to consider it as a thing +that once existed, and that it is a life which has not been celebrated in +vain, and if, laying aside what is extremely fabulous, we may refer it +to a physical narration. All things, therefore, are very properly said +to have been then spontaneously produced; for men did not procure any +thing by labour, because they were unacquainted with the agricultural +art, and, in short, had no knowledge of any other art. This very thing, +likewise, was the cause of their leading a life of leisure, free from +labours and care; and if it is proper to assent to the decision of the +most skilful and elegant of physicians, it was also the cause of their +being liberated from disease. _For there is not any precept of physicians +which more contributes to health, than that which exhorts us not to make +an abundance of excrement_, from which those pristine Greeks always +preserved their bodies pure. For they neither assumed such food as was +stronger than the nature of the body could bear, but such as could be +vanquished by the corporeal nature, nor more than was moderate, on +account of the facility of procuring it, but for the most part less than +was sufficient, on account of its paucity. Moreover, there were neither +any wars among them, nor seditions with each other. For no reward of +contention worth mentioning was proposed as an incentive, for the sake of +which some one might be induced to engage in such dissensions. So that +the principal thing in that life was leisure and rest from necessary +occupations, together with health, peace, and friendship. But to those in +after times, who, through aspiring after things which greatly exceeded +mediocrity, fell into many evils, this pristine life became, as it was +reasonable to suppose it would, desirable. The slender and extemporaneous +food, however, of these first men, is manifested by the saying which +was afterwards proverbially used, _enough of the oak_; this adage being +probably introduced by him who first changed the ancient mode of living. +A pastoral life succeeded to this, in which men procured for themselves +superfluous possessions, and meddled with animals. For, perceiving +that some of them were innoxious, but others malefic and savage, they +tamed the former, but attacked the latter. At the same time, together +with this life, war was introduced. And these things, says Dicæarchus, +are not asserted by us, but by those who have historically discussed +a multitude of particulars. For, as possessions were now of such a +magnitude as to merit attention, some ambitiously endeavoured to obtain +them, by collecting them [for their own use], and calling on others to +do the same, but others directed their attention to the preservation of +them when collected. Time, therefore, thus gradually proceeding, and men +always directing their attention to what appeared to be useful, they +at length became conversant with the third, and agricultural form of +life. And this is what is said by Dicæarchus, in his narration of the +manners of the ancient Greeks, and the blessed life which they then led, +to which abstinence from animal food contributed, no less than other +things. Hence, at that period there was no war, because injustice was +exterminated. But afterwards, together with injustice towards animals, +war was introduced among men, and the endeavour to surpass each other in +amplitude of possessions. On which account also, the audacity of those +is wonderful, who say that abstinence from animals is the mother of +injustice, since both history and experience testify, that together with +the slaughter of animals, war and injustice were introduced. + +3. Hence, this being afterwards perceived by the Lacedæmonian Lycurgus, +though the eating of animals then prevailed, yet he so arranged his +polity, as to render food of this kind requisite in the smallest degree. +For the allotted property of each individual did not consist in herds +of oxen, flocks of sheep, or an abundance of goats, horses, and money, +but in the possession of land, which might produce for a man seventy +medimni[86] of barley, and for a woman twelve, and the quantity of +liquid fruits in the same proportion. For he thought that this quantity +of nutriment was sufficient to procure a good habit of body and health, +nothing else to obtain these being requisite. Whence also it is said, +that on returning to his country, after he had been for some time absent +from it, and perceiving, as he passed through the fields, that the corn +had just been reaped, and that the threshing-floors and the heaps were +parallel and equable, he laughed, and said to those that were present, +that all Laconia seemed to belong to many brothers, who had just divided +the land among themselves. He added, that as he had therefore expelled +luxury from Sparta, it would be requisite also to annul the use of money, +both golden and silver, and to introduce iron alone, as its substitute, +and this of a great bulk and weight, and of little value; so that as much +of it as should be worth ten minæ, should require a large receptacle +to hold it, and a cart drawn by two oxen to carry it. But this being +ordained, many species of injustice were exterminated from Lacedæmon. +For who would attempt to thieve, or suffer himself to be corrupted by +gifts, or defraud or plunder another, when it was not possible for him +to conceal what he had taken, nor possess it so as to be envied by +others, nor derive any advantage from coining it? Together with money +also, the useless arts were expelled, the works of the Lacedæmonians +not being saleable. For iron money could not be exported to the other +Greeks, nor was it esteemed by them, but ridiculed. Hence, neither was +it lawful to buy any thing foreign, and which was intrinsically of no +worth, nor did ships laden with merchandise sail into their ports, nor +was any verbal sophist, or futile diviner, or bawd, or artificer of +golden and silver ornaments, permitted to come to Laconia, because there +money was of no use. And thus luxury, being gradually deprived of its +incitements and nourishment, wasted away of itself. Those likewise who +possessed much derived no greater advantage from it, than those who did +not, as no egress was afforded to abundance, since it was so obstructed +by impediments, that it was forced to remain in indolent rest. Hence such +household furniture as was in constant use, and was necessary, such as +beds, chairs, and tables, these were made by them in the best manner; +and the Laconic cup, which was called _cothon_, was, as Critias says, +especially celebrated in military expeditions. For in these expeditions, +the water which they drank, and which was unpleasant to the sight, was +concealed by the colour of the cup; and the turbid part of the water +falling against the lips, through their prominency, that part of it which +was drank, was received in a purer condition by the mouth. As we are +informed, however, by Plutarch, the legislator was the cause of these +things. For the artificers being liberated from useless works, exhibited +the beauty of art in things of a necessary nature. + +4. That he might also in a still greater degree oppose luxury, and take +away the ardent endeavour to obtain wealth, he introduced a third, and +most beautiful political institution, viz. that of the citizens eating +and drinking together publicly; so that they might partake of the same +prescribed food in common, and might not be fed at home, reclining on +sumptuous couches, and placed before elegant tables, through the hands +of artificers and cooks, being fattened in darkness, like voracious +animals, and corrupting their bodies, together with their morals, by +falling into every kind of luxury and repletion; as such a mode of +living would require much sleep, hot baths, and abundant quiet, and such +attentions as are paid to the diseased. This indeed was a great thing; +but still greater than this, that, as Theophrastus says, he caused +wealth to be neglected, and to be of no value, through the citizens +eating at common tables, and the frugality of their food. For there was +no use, nor enjoyment of riches; nor, in short, was there any thing to +gratify the sight, or any ostentatious display in the whole apparatus, +because both the poor and the rich sat at the same table. Hence it was +universally said, that in Sparta alone, Plutus was seen to be blind, and +lying like an inanimate and immoveable picture. For it was not possible +for the citizens, having previously feasted at home, to go to the common +tables with appetites already satiated with food. For the rest carefully +observed him who did not eat and drink with them, and reviled him, as +an intemperate person, and as one who conducted himself effeminately +with respect to the common food. Hence these common tables were called +_phiditia_; either as being the causes of friendship and benevolence, as +if they were _philitia_, assuming δ for λ; or as accustoming men [προς +ευτελειαν και φειδω] to frugality, and a slender diet. But the number of +those that assembled at the common table was fifteen, more or less. And +each person brought every month, for the purpose of furnishing the table, +a medimnus of flour, eight choas[87] of wine, five pounds of cheese, two +pounds and a half of figs, and, besides all these, a very little quantity +of money. + +5. Hence the children of those who ate thus sparingly and temperately, +came to these common tables, as to schools of temperance, where they +also heard political discourses, and were spectators of liberal sports. +Here, likewise, they learnt to jest acrimoniously, without scurrility, +and to receive, without being indignant, the biting jests of others. For +this appeared to be extremely Laconic, to be able to endure acrimonious +jests; though he who could not endure was permitted to refuse hearing +them, and the scoffer was immediately silent. Such, therefore, was the +frugality of the Lacedæmonians, with respect to diet, though it was +legally instituted for the sake of the multitude. Hence those who came +from this polity are said to have been more brave and temperate, and paid +more attention to rectitude, than those who came from other communities, +which are corrupted both in souls and bodies. And it is evident that +perfect abstinence is adapted to such a polity as this, but to corrupt +communities luxurious food[88]. If, likewise, we direct our attention to +such other nations as regarded equity, mildness, and piety to the Gods, +it will be evident that abstinence was ordained by them, with a view to +the safety and advantage, if not of all, yet at least of some of the +citizens, who, sacrificing to, and worshipping the Gods, on account of +the city, might expiate the sins of the multitude. For, in the mysteries, +what the boy who attends the altar accomplishes, by performing accurately +what he is commanded to do, in order to render the Gods propitious to all +those who have been initiated, as far as to _muesis_[89] [αντι παντων των +μυουμενων], _that_, in nations and cities, priests are able to effect, by +sacrificing for all the people, and through piety inducing the Gods to +be attentive to the welfare of those that belong to them. With respect +to priests, therefore, the eating of all animals is prohibited to some, +but of certain animals to others, whether you consider the customs of the +Greeks or of the barbarians, which are different in different nations. +So that all of them, collectively considered, or existing as one, being +assumed, it will be found that they abstain from all animals. If, +therefore, those who preside over the safety of cities, and to whose care +piety to the Gods is committed, abstain from animals, how can any one +dare to accuse this abstinence as disadvantageous to cities? + +6. Chæremon the Stoic, therefore, in his narration of the Egyptian +priests, who, he says, were considered by the Egyptians as philosophers, +informs us, that they chose temples, as the places in which they might +philosophize. For to dwell with the statues of the Gods is a thing +allied to the whole desire, by which the soul tends to the contemplation +of their divinities. And from the divine veneration indeed, which was +paid to them through dwelling in temples, they obtained security, all men +honouring these philosophers, as if they were certain sacred animals. +They also led a solitary life, as they only mingled with other men in +solemn sacrifices and festivals. But at other times the priests were +almost inaccessible to any one who wished to converse with them. For it +was requisite that he who approached to them should be first purified, +and abstain from many things; and this is as it were a common sacred +law respecting the Egyptian priests. But these [philosophic priests], +having relinquished every other employment, and human labours[90], gave +up the whole of their life to the contemplation and worship of divine +natures and to divine inspiration; through the latter, indeed, procuring +for themselves honour, security, and piety; but through contemplation +science; and through both, a certain occult exercise of manners, worthy +of antiquity[91]. For to be always conversant with divine knowledge and +inspiration, removes those who are so from all avarice, suppresses the +passions, and excites to an intellectual life. But they were studious +of frugality in their diet and apparel, and also of continence and +endurance, and in all things were attentive to justice and equity. They +likewise were rendered venerable, through rarely mingling with other +men. For during the time of what are called purifications, they scarcely +mingled with their nearest kindred, and those of their own order, nor +were they to be seen by any one, unless it was requisite for the +necessary purposes of purification. For the sanctuary was inaccessible +to those who were not purified, and they dwelt in holy places for +the purpose of performing divine works; but at all other times they +associated more freely with those who lived like themselves. They did +not, however, associate with any one who was not a religious character. +But they were always seen near to the Gods, or to the statues of the +Gods, the latter of which they were beheld either carrying, or preceding +in a sacred procession, or disposing in an orderly manner, with modesty +and gravity; each of which operations was not the effect of pride, but +an indication of some physical reason. Their venerable gravity also was +apparent from their manners. For their walking was orderly, and their +aspect sedate; and they were so studious of preserving this gravity of +countenance, that they did not even wink, when at any time they were +unwilling to do so; and they seldom laughed, and when they did, their +laughter proceeded no farther than to a smile. But they always kept their +hands within their garments. Each likewise bore about him a symbol, +indicative of the order which he was allotted in sacred concerns; for +there were many orders of priests. Their diet also was slender and +simple. For, with respect to wine, some of them did not at all drink it, +but others drank very little of it, on account of its being injurious to +the nerves, oppressive to the head, an impediment to invention, and an +incentive to venereal desires. In many other things also they conducted +themselves with caution; neither using bread at all in purifications, and +at those times in which they were not employed in purifying themselves, +they were accustomed to eat bread with hyssop, cut into small pieces. +For it is said, that hyssop very much purifies the power of bread. But +they, for the most part, abstained from oil, the greater number of them +entirely; and if at any time they used it with pot-herbs, they took very +little of it, and only as much as was sufficient to mitigate the taste of +the herbs. + +7. It was not lawful for them therefore to meddle with the esculent +and potable substances, which were produced out of Egypt, and this +contributed much to the exclusion of luxury from these priests. But +they abstained from all the fish that was caught in Egypt, and from +such quadrupeds as had solid, or many-fissured hoofs, and from such as +were not horned; and likewise from all such birds as were carnivorous. +Many of them, however, entirely abstained from all animals; and in +purifications this abstinence was adopted by all of them, for then they +did not even eat an egg. Moreover, they also rejected other things, +without being calumniated for so doing. Thus, for instance, of oxen, +they rejected the females, and also such of the males as were twins, +or were speckled, or of a different colour, or alternately varied in +their form, or which were now tamed, as having been already consecrated +to labours, and resembled animals that are honoured, or which were the +images of any thing [that is divine], or those that had but one eye, +or those that verged to a similitude of the human form. There are also +innumerable other observations pertaining to the art of those who are +called μοσχοσφραγισται, or who stamp calves with a seal, and of which +books have been composed. But these observations are still more curious +respecting birds; as, for instance, that a turtle should not be eaten; +for it is said that a hawk frequently dismisses this bird after he has +seized it, and preserves its life, as a reward for having had connexion +with it. The Egyptian priests, therefore, that they might not ignorantly +meddle with a turtle of this kind, avoided the whole species of those +birds. And these indeed were certain common religious ceremonies; but +there were different ceremonies, which varied according to the class of +the priests that used them, and were adapted to the several divinities. +But chastity and purifications were common to all the priests. When also +the time arrived in which they were to perform something pertaining +to the sacred rites of religion, they spent some days in preparatory +ceremonies, some indeed forty-two, but others a greater, and others a +less number of days; yet never less than seven days; and during this time +they abstained from all animals, and likewise from all pot-herbs and +leguminous substances, and, above all, from a venereal connexion with +women; for they never at any time had connexion with males. They likewise +washed themselves with cold water thrice every day; viz. when they rose +from their bed, before dinner, and when they betook themselves to sleep. +But if they happened to be polluted in their sleep by the emission of the +seed, they immediately purified their body in a bath. They also used cold +bathing at other times, but not so frequently as on the above occasion. +Their bed was woven from the branches of the palm tree, which they call +_bais_; and their bolster was a smooth semi-cylindric piece of wood. But +they exercised themselves in the endurance of hunger and thirst, and were +accustomed to paucity of food through the whole of their life. + +8. This also is a testimony of their continence, that, though they +neither exercised themselves in walking or riding, yet they lived free +from disease, and were sufficiently strong for the endurance of moderate +labours. They bore therefore many burdens in the performance of sacred +operations, and accomplished many ministrant works, which required more +than common strength. But they divided the night into the observation +of the celestial bodies, and sometimes devoted a part of it to offices +of purification; and they distributed the day into the worship of the +Gods, according to which they celebrated them with hymns thrice or +four times, viz. in the morning and evening, when the sun is at his +meridian altitude, and when he is declining to the west. The rest of +their time they devoted to arithmetical and geometrical speculations, +always labouring to effect something, and to make some new discovery, +and, in short, continually exercising their skill. In winter nights also +they were occupied in the same employments, being vigilantly engaged +in literary pursuits, as paying no attention to the acquisition of +externals, and being liberated from the servitude of that bad master, +excessive expense. Hence their unwearied and incessant labour testifies +their endurance, but their continence is manifested by their liberation +from the desire of external good. To sail from Egypt likewise, [i.e. +to quit Egypt,] was considered by them to be one of the most unholy +things, in consequence of their being careful to avoid foreign luxury +and pursuits; for this appeared to them to be alone lawful to those +who were compelled to do so by regal necessities. Indeed, they were +very anxious to continue in the observance of the institutes of their +country, and those who were found to have violated them, though but in a +small degree, were expelled [from the college of the priests]. The true +method of philosophizing, likewise, was preserved by the prophets, by the +_hierostolistæ_[92], and the sacred scribes, and also by the _horologi_, +or calculators of nativities. But the rest of the priests, and of the +pastophori[93], curators of temples, and ministers of the Gods, were +similarly studious of purity, yet not so accurately, and with such great +continence, as the priests of whom we have been speaking. And such are +the particulars which are narrated of the Egyptians, by a man who was +a lover of truth, and an accurate writer, and who among the Stoics +strenuously and solidly philosophized. + +9. But the Egyptian priests, through the proficiency which they made +by this exercise, and similitude to divinity, knew that divinity does +not pervade through man alone, and that soul is not enshrined in man +alone on the earth, but that it nearly passes through all animals. On +this account, in fashioning the images of the Gods, they assumed every +animal, and for this purpose mixed together the human form and the forms +of wild beasts, and again the bodies of birds with the body of a man. +For a certain deity was represented by them in a human shape as far as +to the neck, but the face was that of a bird, or a lion, or of some +other animal. And again, another divine resemblance had a human head, +but the other parts were those of certain other animals, some of which +had an inferior, but others a superior position; through which they +manifested, that these [_i.e._ brutes and men], through the decision of +the Gods, communicated with each other, and that tame and savage animals +are nurtured together with us, not without the concurrence of a certain +divine will. Hence also, a lion is worshipped as a God, and a certain +part of Egypt, which is called Nomos, has the surname of Leontopolis +[or the city of the lion], and another is denominated Busiris [from an +ox], and another Lycopolis [or the city of the wolf]. For they venerated +the power of God which extends to all things through animals which +are nurtured together, and which each of the Gods imparts. They also +reverenced water and fire the most of all the elements, as being the +principal causes of our safety. And these things are exhibited by them in +temples; for even now, on opening the sanctuary of Serapis, the worship +is performed through fire and water; he who sings the hymns making a +libation with water, and exhibiting fire, when, standing on the threshold +of the temple, he invokes the God in the language of the Egyptians. +Venerating, therefore, these elements, they especially reverence those +things which largely participate of them, as partaking more abundantly of +what is sacred. But after these, they venerate all animals, and in the +village Anubis they worship a man, in which place also they sacrifice +to him, and victims are there burnt in honour of him on an altar; but +he shortly after only eats that which was procured for him as a man. +Hence, as it is requisite to abstain from man, so, likewise, from other +animals. And farther still, the Egyptian priests, from their transcendent +wisdom and association with divinity, discovered what animals are more +acceptable to the Gods [when dedicated to them] than man. Thus they +found that a hawk is dear to the sun, since the whole of its nature +consists of blood and spirit. It also commiserates man, and laments over +his dead body, and scatters earth on his eyes, in which these priests +believe a solar light is resident. They likewise discovered that a +hawk lives many years, and that, after it leaves the present life, it +possesses a divining power, is most rational and prescient when liberated +from the body, and gives perfection to statues, and moves temples. A +beetle will be detested by one who is ignorant of and unskilled in divine +concerns, but the Egyptians venerate it, as an animated image of the sun. +For every beetle is a male, and emitting its genital seed in a muddy +place, and having made it spherical, it turns round the seminal sphere +in a way similar to that of the sun in the heavens. It likewise receives +a period of twenty-eight days, which is a lunar period. In a similar +manner, the Egyptians philosophize about the ram, the crocodile, the +vulture, and the ibis, and, in short, about every animal; so that, from +their wisdom and transcendent knowledge of divine concerns, they came +at length to venerate all animals[94]. An unlearned man, however, does +not even suspect that they, not being borne along with the stream of the +vulgar who know nothing, and not walking in the path of ignorance, but +passing beyond the illiterate multitude, and that want of knowledge which +befals every one at first, were led to reverence things which are thought +by the vulgar to be of no worth. + +10. This also, no less than the above-mentioned particulars, induced +them to believe, that animals should be reverenced [as images of the +Gods], viz. that the soul of every animal, when liberated from the body, +was discovered by them to be rational, to be prescient of futurity, to +possess an oracular power, and to be effective of every thing which man +is capable of accomplishing when separated from the body. Hence they very +properly honoured them, and abstained from them as much as possible. +Since, however, the cause through which the Egyptians venerated the Gods +through animals requires a copious discussion, and which would exceed +the limits of the present treatise, what has been unfolded respecting +this particular is sufficient for our purpose. Nevertheless, this is not +to be omitted, that the Egyptians, when they buried those that were of +noble birth, privately took away the belly and placed it in a chest, and +together with other things which they performed for the sake of the dead +body, they elevated the chest towards the sun, whom they invoked as a +witness; an oration for the deceased being at the same time made by one +of those to whose care the funeral was committed. But the oration which +Euphantus[95] has interpreted from the Egyptian tongue was as follows: “O +sovereign Sun, and all ye Gods who impart life to men, receive me, and +deliver me to the eternal Gods as a cohabitant. For I have always piously +worshipped those divinities which were pointed out to me by my parents as +long as I lived in this age, and have likewise always honoured those who +procreated my body. And, with respect to other men, I have never slain +any one, nor defrauded any one of what he deposited with me, nor have I +committed any other atrocious deed. If, therefore, during my life I have +acted erroneously, by eating or drinking things which it is unlawful +to eat or drink, I have not erred through myself, but through these,” +pointing to the chest in which the belly was contained. And having thus +spoken, he threw the chest into the river [Nile]; but buried the rest of +the body as being pure. After this manner, they thought an apology ought +to be made to divinity for what they had eaten and drank, and for the +insolent conduct which they had been led to through the belly. + +11. But among those who are known by us, the Jews, before they first +suffered the subversion of their legal institutes under Antiochus, and +afterwards under the Romans, when also the temple in Jerusalem was +captured, and became accessible to all men to whom, prior to this event, +it was inaccessible, and the city itself was destroyed;—before this took +place, the Jews always abstained from many animals, but peculiarly, which +they even now do, from swine. At that period, therefore, there were three +kinds of philosophers among them. And of one kind, indeed, the Pharisees +were the leaders, but of another, the Sadducees, and of the third, +which appears to have been the most venerable, the Essæans. The mode of +life, therefore, of these third was as follows, as Josephus frequently +testifies in many of his writings. For in the second book of his Judaic +History, which he has completed in seven books, and in the eighteenth +of his Antiquities, which consists of twenty books, and likewise in the +second of the two books which he wrote against the Greeks, he speaks +of these Essæans, and says, that they are of the race of the Jews, and +are in a greater degree than others friendly to one another. They are +averse to pleasures, conceiving them to be vicious, but they are of +opinion that continence, and the not yielding to the passions, constitute +virtue. And they despise, indeed, wedlock, but receiving the children of +other persons, and instructing them in disciplines while they are yet +of a tender age, they consider them as their kindred, and form them to +their own manners. And they act in this manner, not for the purpose of +subverting marriage, and the succession arising from it, but in order +to avoid the lasciviousness of women. They are, likewise, despisers +of wealth, and the participation of external possessions among them +in common is wonderful; nor is any one to be found among them who is +richer than the rest. For it is a law with them, that those who wish to +belong to their sect, must give up their property to it in common; so +that among all of them, there is not to be seen either the abjectness of +poverty, or the insolence of wealth; but the possessions of each being +mingled with those of the rest, there was one property with all of them, +as if they had been brothers. They likewise conceived oil to be a stain +to the body, and that if any one, though unwillingly, was anointed, he +should [immediately] wipe his body. For it was considered by them as +beautiful to be squalid[96], and to be always clothed in white garments. +But curators of the common property were elected by votes, indistinctly +for the use of all. They have not, however, one city, but in each city +many of them dwell together, and those who come among them from other +places, if they are of their sect, equally partake with them of their +possessions, as if they were their own. Those, likewise, who first +perceive these strangers, behave to them as if they were their intimate +acquaintance. Hence, when they travel, they take nothing with them for +the sake of expenditure. But they neither change their garments nor their +shoes, till they are entirely torn, or destroyed by time. They neither +buy nor sell any thing, but each of them giving what he possesses to him +that is in want, receives in return for it what will be useful to him. +Nevertheless, each of them freely imparts to others of their sect what +they may be in want of, without any remuneration. + +12. Moreover, they are peculiarly pious to divinity. For before the sun +rises they speak nothing profane, but they pour forth certain prayers to +him which they had received from their ancestors, as if beseeching him +to rise. Afterwards, they are sent by their curators to the exercise of +the several arts in which they are skilled, and having till the fifth +hour strenuously laboured in these arts, they are afterwards collected +together in one place; and there, being begirt with linen teguments, they +wash their bodies with cold water. After this purification, they enter +into their own proper habitation, into which no heterodox person is +permitted to enter. But they being pure, betake themselves to the dining +room, as into a certain sacred fane. In this place, when all of them are +seated in silence, the baker places the bread in order, and the cook +distributes to each of them one vessel containing one kind of eatables. +Prior, however, to their taking the food which is pure and sacred, a +priest prays, and it is unlawful for any one prior to the prayer to taste +of the food. After dinner, likewise, the priest again prays; so that both +when they begin, and when they cease to eat, they venerate divinity. +Afterwards, divesting themselves of these garments as sacred, they +again betake themselves to their work till the evening; and, returning +from thence, they eat and drink in the same manner as before, strangers +sitting with them, if they should happen at that time to be present. No +clamour or tumult ever defiles the house in which they dwell; but their +conversation with each other is performed in an orderly manner; and to +those that are out of the house, the silence of those within it appears +as if it was some terrific mystery. The cause, however, of this quietness +is their constant sobriety, and that with them their meat and drink +is measured by what is sufficient [to the wants of nature]. But those +who are very desirous of belonging to their sect, are not immediately +admitted into it, but they must remain out of it for a year, adopting the +same diet, the Essæans giving them a rake, a girdle, and a white garment. +And if, during that time, they have given a sufficient proof of their +continence, they proceed to a still greater conformity to the institutes +of the sect, and use purer water for the purposes of sanctity; though +they are not yet permitted to live with the Essæans. For after this +exhibition of endurance, their manners are tried for two years more, and +he who after this period appears to deserve to associate with them, is +admitted into their society. + +13. Before, however, he who is admitted touches his common food, he +takes a terrible oath, in the first place, that he will piously worship +divinity; in the next place, that he will preserve justice towards men, +and that he will neither designedly, nor when commanded, injure any one; +in the third place, that he will always hate the unjust, but strenuously +assist the just; and in the fourth place, that he will act faithfully +towards all men, but especially towards the rulers of the land, since +no one becomes a ruler without the permission of God; in the fifth +place, that if he should be a ruler, he will never employ his power +to insolently iniquitous purposes, nor will surpass those that are in +subjection to him in his dress, or any other more splendid ornament; in +the sixth place, that he will always love the truth, and be hostile to +liars; in the seventh place, that he will preserve his hands from theft, +and his soul pure from unholy gain[97]; and, in the eighth place, that +he will conceal nothing from those of his sect, nor divulge any thing +to others pertaining to the sect, though some one, in order to compel +him, should threaten him with death. In addition to these things, also, +they swear, that they will not impart the dogmas of the sect to any one +in any other way than that in which they received them; that they will +likewise abstain from robbery[98], and preserve the books of their sect +with the same care as the names of the angels. Such, therefore, are +their oaths. But those among them that act criminally, and are ejected, +perish by an evil destiny. For, being bound by their oaths and their +customs, they are not capable of receiving food from others; but feeding +on herbs, and having their body emaciated by hunger, they perish. Hence +the Essæans, commiserating many of these unfortunate men, receive them +in their last extremities into their society, thinking that they have +suffered sufficiently for their offences in having been punished for +them till they were on the brink of the grave. But they give a rake to +those who intend to belong to their sect, in order that, when they sit +for the purpose of exonerating the belly, they may make a trench a foot +in depth, and completely cover themselves by their garment, in order that +they may not act contumeliously towards the sun by polluting the rays of +the God. And so great, indeed, is their simplicity and frugality with +respect to diet, that they do not require evacuation till the seventh +day after the assumption of food, which day they spend in singing hymns +to God, and in resting from labour. But from this exercise they acquire +the power of such great endurance, that even when tortured and burnt, +and suffering every kind of excruciating pain, they cannot be induced +either to blaspheme their legislator, or to eat what they have not been +accustomed to. And the truth of this was demonstrated in their war with +the Romans. For then they neither flattered their tormentors, nor shed +any tears, but smiled in the midst of their torments, and derided those +that inflicted them, and cheerfully emitted their souls, as knowing that +they should possess them again. For this opinion was firmly established +among them, that their bodies were indeed corruptible, and that the +matter of which they consisted was not stable, but that their souls were +immortal, and would endure for ever, and that, proceeding from the most +subtle ether, they were drawn down by a natural flux, and complicated +with bodies; but that, when they are no longer detained by the bonds of +the flesh, then, as if liberated from a long slavery, they will rejoice, +and ascend to the celestial regions. But from this mode of living, and +from being thus exercised in truth and piety, there were many among them, +as it is reasonable to suppose there would be, who had a foreknowledge of +future events, as being conversant from their youth with sacred books, +different purifications, and the declarations of the prophets. And such +is the order [or sect] of the Essæans among the Jews. + +14. All of them, however, were forbidden to eat the flesh of swine, +or fish without scales, which the Greeks call σελαχια, _i.e._ +_cartilaginous_; or to eat any animal that has solid hoofs. They were +likewise forbidden not only to refrain from eating, but also from killing +animals that fled to their houses as supplicants. Nor did the legislator +permit them to slay such animals as were parents together with their +young; but ordered them to spare, even in a hostile land, and not put to +death brutes that assist us in our labours. Nor was the legislator afraid +that the race of animals which are not sacrificed, would, through being +spared from slaughter, be so increased in multitude as to produce famine +among men; for he knew, in the first place, that multiparous animals +live but for a short time; and in the next place, that many of them +perish, unless attention is paid to them by men. Moreover, he likewise +knew that other animals would attack those that increased excessively; +of which this is an indication, that we abstain from many animals, such +as lizards, worms, flies, serpents, and dogs, and yet, at the same time, +we are not afraid of perishing through hunger by abstaining from them, +though their increase is abundant. And in the next place, it is not the +same thing to eat and to slay an animal. For we destroy many of the +above-mentioned animals, but we do not eat any of them. + +15. Farther still, it is likewise related that the Syrians formerly +abstained from animals, and, on this account, did not sacrifice them +to the Gods; but that afterwards they sacrificed them, for the purpose +of averting certain evils; yet they did not at all admit of a fleshly +diet. In process of time, however, as Neanthes the Cyzicenean and +Asclepiades the Cyprian say, about the era of Pygmalion, who was by birth +a Phœnician, but reigned over the Cyprians, the eating of flesh was +admitted, from an illegality of the following kind, which Asclepiades, in +his treatise concerning Cyprus and Phœnicia, relates as follows:—In the +first place, they did not sacrifice any thing animated to the Gods; but +neither was there any law pertaining to a thing of this kind, because +it was prohibited by natural law. They are said, however, on a certain +occasion, in which one soul was required for another, to have, for the +first time, sacrificed a victim; and this taking place, the whole of the +victim was then consumed by fire. But afterwards, when the victim was +burnt, a portion of the flesh fell on the earth, which was taken by the +priest, who, in so doing, having burnt his fingers, involuntarily moved +them to his mouth, as a remedy for the pain which the burning produced. +Having, therefore, thus tasted of the roasted flesh, he also desired to +eat abundantly of it, and could not refrain from giving some of it to his +wife. Pygmalion, however, becoming acquainted with this circumstance, +ordered both the priest and his wife to be hurled headlong from a steep +rock, and gave the priesthood to another person, who not long after +performing the same sacrifice, and eating the flesh of the victim, +fell into the same calamities as his predecessor. The thing, however, +proceeding still farther, and men using the same kind of sacrifice, and +through yielding to desire, not abstaining from, but feeding on flesh, +the deed was no longer punished. Nevertheless abstinence from fish +continued among the Syrians till the time of Menander: for he says, + + The Syrians for example take, since these + When by intemperance led of fish they eat, + Swoln in their belly and their feet become. + With sack then cover’d, in the public way + They on a dunghill sit, that by their lowly state, + The Goddess may, appeas’d, the crime forgive. + +16. Among the Persians, indeed, those who are wise in divine concerns, +and worship divinity, are called Magi; for this is the signification +of _Magus_, in the Persian tongue. But so great and so venerable are +these men thought to be by the Persians, that Darius, the son of +Hystaspes, had among other things this engraved on his tomb, that he +had been the master of the Magi. They are likewise divided into three +genera, as we are informed by Eubulus, who wrote the history of Mithra, +in a treatise consisting of many books. In this work he says, that +the first and most learned class of the Magi neither eat nor slay any +thing animated, but adhere to the ancient abstinence from animals. The +second class use some animals indeed [for food], but do not slay any +that are tame. Nor do those of the third class, similarly with other +men, lay their hands on all animals. For the dogma with all of them +which ranks as the first is this, that there is a transmigration of +souls; and this they also appear to indicate in the mysteries of Mithra. +For in these mysteries, obscurely signifying our having something in +common with brutes, they are accustomed to call us by the names of +different animals. Thus they denominate the males who participate in +the same mysteries lions, but the females lionesses, and those who are +ministrant to these rites crows. With respect to their fathers also, +they adopt the same mode. For these are denominated by them eagles and +hawks. And he who is initiated in the Leontic mysteries, is invested +with all-various forms of animals[99]; of which particulars, Pallas, in +his treatise concerning Mithra, assigning the cause, says, that it is +the common opinion that these things are to be referred to the circle +of the zodiac, but that truly and accurately speaking, they obscurely +signify something pertaining to human souls, which, according to the +Persians, are invested with bodies of all-various forms. For the Latins +also, says Eubulus, call some men, in their tongue, boars and scorpions, +lizards, and blackbirds. After the same manner likewise the Persians +denominate the Gods the demiurgic causes of these: for they call Diana a +she-wolf; but the sun, a bull, a lion, a dragon, and a hawk; and Hecate, +a horse, a bull, a lioness, and a dog. But most theologists say that +the name of Proserpine [της φερεφαττης] is derived from nourishing a +ringdove, [παρα το φερβειν την φατταν]: for the ringdove is sacred to +this Goddess[100]. Hence, also, the priests of Maia dedicate to her a +ringdove. And Maia is the same with Proserpine, as being obstetric, and a +nurse[101]. For this Goddess is terrestrial, and so likewise is Ceres. +To this Goddess, also, a cock is consecrated; and on this account those +that are initiated in her mysteries abstain from domestic birds. In the +Eleusinian mysteries, likewise, the initiated are ordered to abstain +from domestic birds, from fishes and beans, pomegranates and apples; +which fruits are as equally defiling to the touch, as a woman recently +delivered, and a dead body. But whoever is acquainted with the nature +of divinely-luminous appearances [φασματα,] knows also on what account +it is requisite to abstain from all birds, and especially for him who +hastens to be liberated from terrestrial concerns, and to be established +with the celestial Gods. Vice, however, as we have frequently said, is +sufficiently able to patronize itself, and especially when it pleads its +cause among the ignorant. Hence, among those that are moderately vicious, +some think that a dehortation of this kind is vain babbling, and, +according to the proverb, the nugacity of old women; and others are of +opinion that it is superstition. But those who have made greater advances +in improbity, are prepared, not only to blaspheme those who exhort to, +and demonstrate the propriety of this abstinence, but calumniate purity +itself as enchantment and pride. They, however, suffering the punishment +of their sins, both from Gods and men, are, in the first place, +sufficiently punished by a disposition [_i.e._ by a depravity] of this +kind. We shall, therefore, still farther make mention of another foreign +nation, renowned and just, and believed to be pious in divine concerns, +and then pass on to other particulars. + +17. For the polity of the Indians being distributed into many parts, +there is one tribe among them of men divinely wise, whom the Greeks are +accustomed to call Gymnosophists[102]. But of these there are two sects, +over one of which the Bramins preside, but over the other the Samanæans. +The race of the Bramins, however, receive divine wisdom of this kind by +succession, in the same manner as the priesthood. But the Samanæans are +elected, and consist of those who wish to possess divine knowledge. And +the particulars respecting them are the following, as the Babylonian +Bardesanes[103] narrates, who lived in the times of our fathers, and +was familiar with those Indians who, together with Damadamis, were sent +to Cæsar. All the Bramins originate from one stock; for all of them are +derived from one father and one mother. But the Samanæans are not the +offspring of one family, being, as we have said, collected from every +nation of Indians. A Bramin, however, is not a subject of any government, +nor does he contribute any thing together with others to government. +And with respect to those that are philosophers, among these some dwell +on mountains, and others about the river Ganges. And those that live on +mountains feed on autumnal fruits, and on cows’ milk coagulated with +herbs. But those that reside near the Ganges, live also on autumnal +fruits, which are produced in abundance about that river. The land +likewise nearly always bears new fruit, together with much rice, which +grows spontaneously, and which they use when there is a deficiency of +autumnal fruits. But to taste of any other nutriment, or, in short, +to touch animal food, is considered by them as equivalent to extreme +impurity and impiety. And this is one of their dogmas. They also worship +divinity with piety and purity. They spend the day, and the greater part +of the night, in hymns and prayers to the Gods; each of them having a +cottage to himself, and living, as much as possible, alone. For the +Bramins cannot endure to remain with others, nor to speak much; but when +this happens to take place, they afterwards withdraw themselves, and do +not speak for many days. They likewise frequently fast. But the Samanæans +are, as we have said, elected. When, however, any one is desirous of +being enrolled in their order, he proceeds to the rulers of the city; but +abandons the city or village that he inhabited, and the wealth and all +the other property that he possessed. Having likewise the superfluities +of his body cut off, he receives a garment, and departs to the Samanæans, +but does not return either to his wife or children, if he happens to +have any, nor does he pay any attention to them, or think that they at +all pertain to him. And, with respect to his children indeed, the king +provides what is necessary for them, and the relatives provide for the +wife. And such is the life of the Samanæans. But they live out of the +city, and spend the whole day in conversation pertaining to divinity. +They have also houses and temples, built by the king, in which there are +stewards, who receive a certain emolument from the king, for the purpose +of supplying those that dwell in them with nutriment. But their food +consists of rice, bread, autumnal fruits, and pot-herbs. And when they +enter into their house, the sound of a bell being the signal of their +entrance, those that are not Samanæans depart from it, and the Samanæans +begin immediately to pray. But having prayed, again, on the bell sounding +as a signal, the servants give to each Samanæan a platter, (for two of +them do not eat out of the same dish,) and feed them with rice. And to +him who is in want of a variety of food, a pot-herb is added, or some +autumnal fruit. But having eaten as much as is requisite, without any +delay they proceed to their accustomed employments. All of them likewise +are unmarried, and have no possessions: and so much are both these and +the Bramins venerated by the other Indians, that the king also visits +them, and requests them to pray to and supplicate the Gods, when any +calamity befals the country, or to advise him how to act. + +18. But they are so disposed with respect to death, that they unwillingly +endure the whole time of the present life, as a certain servitude to +nature, and therefore they hasten to liberate their souls from the bodies +[with which they are connected]. Hence frequently, when they are seen +to be well, and are neither oppressed, nor driven to desperation by any +evil, they depart from life. And though they previously announce to +others that it is their intention to commit suicide, yet no one impedes +them; but, proclaiming all those to be happy who thus quit the present +life, they enjoin certain things to the domestics and kindred of the +dead: so stable and true do they, and also the multitude, believe the +assertion to be, that souls [in another life] associate with each other. +But as soon as those to whom they have proclaimed that this is their +intention, have heard the mandates given to them, they deliver the body +to fire, in order that they may separate the soul from the body in the +purest manner, and thus they die celebrated by all the Samanæans. For +these men dismiss their dearest friends to death more easily than others +part with their fellow-citizens when going the longest journeys. And they +lament themselves, indeed, as still continuing in life; but they proclaim +those that are dead to be blessed, in consequence of having now obtained +an immortal allotment. Nor is there any sophist, such as there is now +amongst the Greeks, either among these Samanæans, or the above-mentioned +Bramins, who would be seen to doubt and to say, if all men should imitate +you [_i.e._ should imitate those Samanæans who commit suicide], what +would become of us? Nor through these are human affairs confused. For +neither do all men imitate them, and those who have, may be said to +have been rather the causes of equitable legislation, than of confusion +to the different nations of men. Moreover, the law did not compel the +Samanæans and Bramins to eat animal food, but, permitting others to feed +on flesh, it suffered these to be a law to themselves, and venerated +them as being superior to law. Nor did the law subject these men to the +punishment which it inflicts, as if they were the primary perpetrators of +injustice, but it reserved this for others. Hence, to those who ask, what +would be the consequence if all men imitated such characters as these, +the saying of Pythagoras must be the answer; that if all men were kings, +the passage through life would be difficult, yet regal government is not +on this account to be avoided. And [we likewise say] that if all men were +worthy, no administration of a polity would be found in which the dignity +that probity merits would be preserved. Nevertheless, no one would be +so insane as not to think that all men should earnestly endeavour to +become worthy characters. Indeed, the law grants to the vulgar many +other things [besides a fleshly diet], which, nevertheless, it does not +grant to a philosopher, nor even to one who conducts the affairs of +government in a proper manner. For it does not receive every artist into +the administration, though it does not forbid the exercise of any art, +nor yet men of every pursuit. But it excludes those who are occupied in +vile and illiberal arts[104], and, in short, all those who are destitute +of justice and the other virtues, from having any thing to do with the +management of public affairs. Thus, likewise, the law does not forbid +the vulgar from associating with harlots, on whom at the same time it +imposes a fine; but thinks that it is disgraceful and base for men that +are moderately good to have any connexion with them. Moreover, the law +does not prohibit a man from spending the whole of his life in a tavern, +yet at the same time this is most disgraceful even to a man of moderate +worth. It appears, therefore, that the same thing must also be said with +respect to diet. For that which is permitted to the multitude, must not +likewise be granted to the best of men. For the man who is a philosopher, +should especially ordain for himself those sacred laws which the Gods, +and men who are followers of the Gods, have instituted. But the sacred +laws of nations and cities appear to have ordained for sacred men purity, +and to have interdicted them animal food. They have also forbidden the +multitude to eat certain animals, either from motives of piety, or on +account of some injury which would be produced by the food. So that it is +requisite either to imitate priests, or to be obedient to the mandates of +all legislators; but, in either way, he who is perfectly legal and pious +ought to abstain from all animals. For if some who are only partially +pious abstain from certain animals, he who is in every respect pious will +abstain from all animals. + +19. I had almost, however, forgotten to adduce what is said by Euripides, +who asserts, that the prophets of Jupiter in Crete abstained from +animals. But what is said by the chorus to Minos on this subject, is as +follows: + + Sprung from Phœnicia’s royal line, + Son of Europa, nymph divine, + And mighty Jove, thy envy’d reign + O’er Crete extending, whose domain + Is with a hundred cities crown’d— + I leave yon consecrated ground, + Yon fane, whose beams the artist’s toil + With cypress, rooted from the soil, + Hath fashion’d. In the mystic rites + Initiated, life’s best delights + I place in chastity alone, + Midst Night’s dread orgies wont to rove, + The priest of Zagreus[105] and of Jove; + Feasts of crude flesh I now decline, + And wave aloof the blazing pine + To Cybele, nor fear to claim + Her own Curete’s hallow’d name; + Clad in a snowy vest I fly + Far from the throes of pregnancy, + Never amidst the tombs intrude, + And slay no animal for food. + +20. For holy men were of opinion that purity consisted in a thing not +being mingled with its contrary, and that mixture is defilement. Hence, +they thought that nutriment should be assumed from fruits, and not +from dead bodies, and that we should not, by introducing that which +is animated to our nature, defile what is administered by nature. But +they conceived, that the slaughter of animals, as they are sensitive, +and the depriving them of their souls, is a defilement to the living; +and that the pollution is much greater, to mingle a body which was once +sensitive, but is now deprived of sense, with a sensitive and living +being. Hence universally, the purity pertaining to piety consists in +rejecting and abstaining from many things, and in an abandonment of +such as are of a contrary nature, and the assumption of such as are +appropriate and concordant. On this account, venereal connexions are +attended with defilement. For in these, a conjunction takes place of +the female with the male; and the seed, when retained by the woman, and +causing her to be pregnant, defiles the soul, through its association +with the body; but when it does not produce conception, it pollutes, in +consequence of becoming a lifeless mass. The connexion also of males with +males defiles, because it is an emission of seed as it were into a dead +body, and because it is contrary to nature. And, in short, all venery, +and emissions of the seed in sleep, pollute, because the soul becomes +mingled with the body, and is drawn down to pleasure. The passions of +the soul likewise defile, through the complication of the irrational +and effeminate part with reason, the internal masculine part. For, in a +certain respect, defilement and pollution manifest the mixture of things +of an heterogeneous nature, and especially when the abstersion of this +mixture is attended with difficulty. Whence, also, in tinctures which are +produced through mixture, one species being complicated with another, +this mixture is denominated a defilement. + + As when some woman with a lively red + Stains the pure iv’ry—— + +says Homer[106]. And again, painters call the mixtures of colours, +corruptions. It is usual, likewise, to denominate that which is unmingled +and pure, incorruptible, and to call that which is genuine, unpolluted. +For water, when mingled with earth, is corrupted, and is not genuine. +But water which is diffluent, and runs with tumultuous rapidity, leaves +behind in its course the earth which it carries in its stream. + + When from a limpid and perennial fount + It defluous runs—— + +as Hesiod says[107]. For such water is salubrious, because it is +uncorrupted and unmixed. The female, likewise, that does not receive +into herself the exhalation of seed, is said to be uncorrupted. So that +the mixture of contraries is corruption and defilement. For the mixture +of dead with living bodies, and the insertion of beings that were once +living and sentient into animals, and of dead into living flesh, may be +reasonably supposed to introduce defilement and stains to our nature; +just, again, as the soul is polluted when it is invested with the body. +Hence, he who is born, is polluted by the mixture of his soul with body; +and he who dies, defiles his body, through leaving it a corpse, different +and foreign from that which possesses life. The soul, likewise, is +polluted by anger and desire, and the multitude of passions of which in +a certain respect diet is a co-operating cause. But as water which flows +through a rock is more uncorrupted than that which runs through marshes, +because it does not bring with it much mud; thus, also, the soul which +administers its own affairs in a body that is dry, and is not moistened +by the juices of foreign flesh, is in a more excellent condition, is +more uncorrupted, and is more prompt for intellectual energy. Thus too, +it is said, that the thyme which is the driest and the sharpest to the +taste, affords the best honey to bees. The dianoëtic, therefore, or +discursive power of the soul, is polluted; or rather, he who energizes +dianoëtically, when this energy is mingled with the energies of either +the imaginative or doxastic power. But purification consists in a +separation from all these, and the wisdom which is adapted to divine +concerns, is a desertion of every thing of this kind. The proper +nutriment, likewise, of each thing, is that which essentially preserves +it. Thus you may say, that the nutriment of a stone is the cause of its +continuing to be a stone, and of firmly remaining in a lapideous form; +but the nutriment of a plant is that which preserves it in increase +and fructification; and of an animated body, that which preserves its +composition. It is one thing, however, to nourish, and another to fatten; +and one thing to impart what is necessary, and another to procure what is +luxurious. Various, therefore, are the kinds of nutriment, and various +also is the nature of the things that are nourished. And it is necessary, +indeed, that all things should be nourished, but we should earnestly +endeavour to fatten our most principal parts. Hence, the nutriment of +the rational soul is that which preserves it in a rational state. But +this is intellect; so that it is to be nourished by intellect; and we +should earnestly endeavour that it may be fattened through this, rather +than that the flesh may become pinguid through esculent substances. For +intellect preserves for us eternal life, but the body when fattened +causes the soul to be famished, through its hunger after a blessed life +not being satisfied, increases our mortal part, since it is of itself +insane, and impedes our attainment of an immortal condition of being. +It likewise defiles by corporifying the soul, and drawing her down to +that which is foreign to her nature. And the magnet, indeed, imparts, +as it were, a soul to the iron which is placed near it; and the iron, +though most heavy, is elevated, and runs to the spirit of the stone. +Should he, therefore, who is suspended from incorporeal and intellectual +deity, be anxiously busied in procuring food which fattens the body, +that is an impediment to intellectual perception? Ought he not rather, +by contracting what is necessary to the flesh into that which is little +and easily procured, be _himself_ nourished, by adhering to God more +closely than the iron to the magnet? I wish, indeed, that our nature +was not so corruptible, and that it were possible we could live free +from molestation, even without the nutriment derived from fruits. O +that, as Homer[108] says, we were not in want either of meat or drink, +that we might be truly immortal!—the poet in thus speaking beautifully +signifying, that food is the auxiliary not only of life, but also of +death. If, therefore, we were not in want even of vegetable aliment, we +should be by so much the more blessed, in proportion as we should be more +immortal. But now, being in a mortal condition, we render ourselves, if +it be proper so to speak, still more mortal, through becoming ignorant +that, by the addition of this mortality, the soul, as Theophrastus says, +does not only confer a great benefit on the body by being its inhabitant, +but gives herself wholly to it[109]. Hence, it is much to be wished +that we could easily obtain the life celebrated in fables, in which +hunger and thirst are unknown; so that, by stopping the every-way-flowing +river of the body, we might in a very little time be present with the +most excellent natures, to which he who accedes, since deity is there, +is himself a God. But how is it possible not to lament the condition of +the generality of mankind, who are so involved in darkness as to cherish +their own evil, and who, in the first place, hate themselves, and him +who truly begot them, and afterwards, those who admonish them, and call +on them to return from ebriety to a sober condition of being? Hence, +dismissing things of this kind, will it not be requisite to pass on to +what remains to be discussed? + +21. Those then who oppose the Nomades, or Troglodytæ[110], or +Ichthyophagi, to the legal institutes of the nations which we have +adduced, are ignorant that these people were brought to the necessity of +eating animals through the infecundity of the region they inhabit, which +is so barren, that it does not even produce herbs, but only shores and +sands. And this necessity is indicated by their not being able to make +use of fire, through the want of combustible materials; but they dry +their fish on rocks, or on the shore. And these indeed live after this +manner from necessity. There are, however, certain nations whose manners +are rustic, and who are naturally savage; but it is not fit that those +who are equitable judges should, from such instances as these, calumniate +human nature. For thus we should not only be dubious whether it is proper +to eat animals, but also, whether we may not eat men, and adopt all +other savage manners. It is related, therefore, that the Massagetæ and +the Derbices consider those of their kindred to be most miserable who +die spontaneously. Hence, preventing their dearest friends from dying +naturally, they slay them when they are old, and eat them. The Tibareni +hurl from rocks their nearest relatives, even while living, when they +are old. And with respect to the Hyrcani and Caspii, the one exposed the +living, but the other the dead, to be devoured by birds and dogs. But +the Scythians bury the living with the dead, and cut their throats on +the pyres of the dead by whom they were especially beloved. The Bactrii +likewise cast those among them that are old, even while living, to the +dogs. And Stasanor, who was one of Alexander’s prefects, nearly lost his +government through endeavouring to destroy this custom. As, however, we +do not on account of these examples subvert mildness of conduct towards +men, so neither should we imitate those nations that feed on flesh +through necessity, but we should rather imitate the pious, and those who +consecrate themselves to the Gods. For Democrates[111] says, that to live +badly, and not prudently, temperately, and piously, is not to live in +reality[112], but to die for a long time. + +22. It now remains that we should adduce a few examples of certain +individuals, as testimonies in favour of abstinence from animal food. +For the want of these was one of the accusations which were urged +against us. We learn, therefore, that Triptolemus was the most ancient +of the Athenian legislators; of whom Hermippus[113], in the second book +of his treatise on Legislators, writes as follows: “It is said, that +Triptolemus established laws for the Athenians. And the philosopher +Xenocrates asserts, that three of his laws still remain in Eleusis, +which are these, Honour your parents; Sacrifice to the Gods from the +fruits of the earth; Injure not animals.” Two of these, therefore, he +says, are properly instituted. For it is necessary that we should as +much as possible recompense our parents for the benefits which they have +conferred on us; and that we should offer to the Gods the first-fruits +of the things useful to our life, which they have imparted to us. But +with respect to the third law, he is dubious as to the intention of +Triptolemus, in ordering the Athenians to abstain from animals. Was +it, says he, because he thought it was a dire thing to slay kindred +natures, or because he perceived it would happen, that the most useful +animals would be destroyed by men for food? Wishing, therefore, to make +our life as mild as possible, he endeavoured to preserve those animals +that associate with men, and which are especially tame. Unless, indeed, +because having ordained that men should honour the Gods by offering to +them first-fruits, he therefore added this third law, conceiving that +this mode of worship would continue for a longer time, if sacrifices +through animals were not made to the Gods. But as many other causes, +though not very accurate, of the promulgation of these laws, are assigned +by Xenocrates, thus much from what has been said is sufficient for our +purpose, that abstinence from animals was one of the legal institutes +of Triptolemus. Hence, those who afterwards violated this law, being +compelled by great necessity, and involuntary errors, fell, as we +have shown, into this custom of slaughtering and eating animals. The +following, also, is mentioned as a law of Draco: “Let this be an eternal +_sacred law_[114] to the inhabitants of Attica, and let its authority +be predominant for ever; viz. that the Gods, and indigenous Heroes, be +worshipped publicly, conformably to the laws of the country, delivered by +our ancestors; and also, that they be worshipped privately, according to +the ability of each individual, in conjunction with auspicious words, the +firstlings of fruits, and annual cakes. So that this law ordains, that +divinity should be venerated by the first offerings of fruits which are +used by men, and cakes made of the fine flour of wheat.”[115] + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[84] There were many celebrated men of this name among the ancients, +concerning which vid. Fabric. Biblioth. Græc. L. III. c. 11. + +[85] These lines are from Hesiod. Oper. 116. The different ages, however, +of mankind, which are celebrated by Hesiod in his Works and Days, +signify the different lives which the individuals of the human species +pass through; and as Proclus on Hesiod beautifully observes, they may +be comprehended in this triad, the _golden_, the _silver_, and the +_brazen_ age. But by the _golden_ age an intellectual life is implied. +For such a life is pure, impassive, and free from sorrow; and of this +impassivity and purity, gold is an image, through never being subject to +rust or putrefaction. Such a life, too, is very properly said to be under +Saturn, because Saturn is an _intellectual_ God, or a God characterised +by intellect. By the _silver_ age, a rustic and natural life is implied, +in which the attention of the rational soul is entirely directed to the +care of the body, but without proceeding to extreme depravity. And by +the _brazen_ age, a dire, tyrannic, and cruel life is implied, which is +entirely passive, and proceeds to the very extremity of vice. The order, +also, of these metals, harmonizes, as Proclus observes, with that of the +lives. “For,” says he, “_gold_ is _solar-form_, because the sun is solely +immaterial light. But _silver_ is _lunar-form_, because the moon partakes +of shadow, just as silver partakes of rust. And _brass_ is _earthly_, so +far as not having a nature similar to a lucid body; it is replete with +abundance of corruption.” + +[86] The medimnus was a measure containing six bushels. + +[87] An Attic measure, containing six Attic pints. + +[88] In the original, και δηλον ως τοιαυτῃ πολιτειᾳ οικειον, το της +αποχης της παντελους, ταις δε διεφθαρμεναις, το της βρωσεως. But the +latter part of this sentence is evidently defective, though the defect +is not noticed either by Valentinus, or Reiske, or Rhoer. It appears +therefore to me, that της τρυφης is wanting; so that for το της βρωσεως, +we should read το της τρυφης της βρωσεως. And my conjecture is justified +by the version of Felicianus, which is, “Huic autem abstinentiam, cæteris +_luxuriam_ victus fuisse peculiarem perspicuum est.” + +[89] Those who, in being initiated, _closed the eyes_, which _muesis_ +signifies, no longer (says Hermias in Phædrum) received by sense those +divine mysteries, but with the pure soul itself. See my Dissertation on +the Eleusinian and Bacchic Mysteries. + +[90] In the original, και πορους ανθρωπινους; but for πορους I read +πονους, and Felicianus appears to have found the same reading in his MS.; +for his version is, “laboribusque humanis.” Neither Reisk, however, nor +Rhoer, have at all noticed the word πορους as improper in this place. + +[91] Much is related about the Egyptian priests by Herodotus, lib. ii. +37. With respect to Chæremon, the decisions of the ancients concerning +him are very discordant. + +[92] _i.e._ Those to whose care the sacred vestments were committed. + +[93] These were so denominated from carrying the little receptacles in +which the images of the Gods were contained. + +[94] See on this subject Plutarch’s excellent treatise of Isis and Osiris. + +[95] Fabricius is of opinion, that this _Euphantus_ is the same with +the _Ecphantus_ mentioned by Iamblichus (in Vit. Pyth.) as one of the +Pythagoreans. Vid. Fabric. Bibl. Græc. lib. ii. c. 13. + +[96] This is not wonderful; for the Jews appear to have been always +negligent of cleanliness. The intelligent reader will easily perceive +that there is some similitude between these Essæans and the ancient +Pythagoreans, but that the latter were infinitely superior to the former. +See my translation of Iamblichus’ Life of Pythagoras. + +[97] This was a very necessary oath for these Essæans to take; as the +Jews in general, if we may believe Tacitus and other ancient historians, +were always a people immoderately addicted to gain. + +[98] As the Essæans appear to have been an exception to the rest of the +Jews, the reason is obvious why they took this oath. + +[99] Similar to this was the garment with which Apuleius was invested +after his initiation into the mysteries of Isis, and which he describes +as follows:—“There [_i.e._ on a wooden throne] I sat conspicuous, in a +garment which was indeed linen, but was elegantly painted. A precious +cloak also depended from my shoulders behind my back, as far as to my +heels. Nevertheless, to whatever part of me you directed your view, +you might see that I was remarkable by the animals which were painted +round my vestment, in various colours. Here were Indian dragons, there +Hyperborean griffins, which the other hemisphere generates in the form of +a winged animal. Men devoted to the service of divinity, call this cloak +the Olympic garment.”—See Book II. of my translation of the Metamorphosis +of Apuleius. + +[100] Proclus, however, in his Scholia on the Cratylus of Plato, gives +a much more theological account of the derivation of the name of +Proserpine, as follows:—“Socrates now delivers these three vivific monads +in a consequent order, viz. Ceres, Juno, Proserpine; calling the first +the mother, the second the sister, and the third the daughter of the +Demiurgus [Jupiter]. All of them, however, are partakers of the whole +of fabrication; the first in an exempt manner, and intellectually; the +second in a fontal manner, and, at the same time, in a way adapted to a +principle [αρχικως]; and the third in a manner adapted to a principle and +a leader [αρχικως και ηγεμονικως]. + +“Of these Goddesses the last is allotted triple powers, and impartibly +and uniformly comprehends three monads of Gods. But she is called Core +[κορη] through the purity of her essence, and her undefiled transcendency +in her generations. She also possesses a first, middle, and last empire; +and according to her summit, indeed, she is called Diana by Orpheus; but, +according to her middle, Proserpine; and according to the extremity of +the order, Minerva. Likewise, according to an essence transcending the +other powers of this triple vivific order, the dominion of Hecate is +established; but according to a middle power, and which is generative +of wholes, that of soul; and, according to intellectual conversion, +that of Virtue[A]. Ceres, therefore, subsisting on high, and among the +supermundane Gods, uniformly extends this triple order of divinities; +and, together with Jupiter, generates Bacchus, who impartibly presides +over partible fabrication. But beneath, in conjunction with Pluto, she +is particularly beheld according to the middle characteristic: for it is +this which, proceeding every where, imparts vivification to the last of +things. Hence she is called Proserpine, because she especially associates +with Pluto, and, together with him, distributes in an orderly manner the +extremities of the universe. And, according to her extremities, indeed, +she is said to be a virgin, and to remain undefiled; but, according to +her middle, to be conjoined with Hades, and to beget the Furies in the +subterranean regions. She, therefore, is also called Ceres, but after +another manner than the supermundane and ruling Ceres. For the one is +the connective unity of the three vivific principles; but the other +is the middle of them, in herself possessing the peculiarities of the +extremes. Hence, in the Proserpine conjoined with Pluto, you will find +the peculiarities of Hecate and Minerva; but these extremes subsist in +her occultly, while the peculiarity of the middle shines forth, and that +which is characteristic of ruling soul, which in the supermundane Ceres +was of a _ruling_[B] nature, but here subsists according to a mundane +peculiarity.” + +Proclus farther observes, “that Proserpine is denominated either through +judging of forms, and separating them from each other, thus obscurely +signifying the subversion of slaughter[C], (δια το κρινειν τα ειδη, και +χωριζειν αλληλων ως του φονου την αναιρεσιν αινιττομενον,) or through +separating souls perfectly from bodies, through a conversion to things +on high, which is the most fortunate slaughter and death to such as are +worthy of it. (ἢ δια το χωριζειν τας ψυχας τελεως εκ των σωματων δια της +προς τα ανω επιστροφης, οπερ εστιν ευτυχεστατος φονος και θανατος τοις +αξιουμενοις ταυτου.) But the name φερεφαττα, _Pherephatta_, is adapted +to Proserpine, according to a contact with generation; but according +to wisdom and counsel, to Minerva. At the same time, however, all the +appellations by which she is distinguished, are adapted to the perfection +of soul. On this account, also, she is called Proserpine, and not by the +names of the extremes; since that which was ravished by Pluto, is this +middle deity; the extremes at the same time being firmly established in +themselves; according to which Ceres is said to remain a virgin.” + +[A] Proclus says this conformably to the theology of the Chaldeans; for, +according to that theology, the first monad of the vivific triad is +_Hecate_, the second _Soul_, and the third _Virtue_. + +[B] That is, of a supermundane nature; for the _ruling_ are the +_supermundane_ Gods. + +[C] Proclus here alludes to the war which subsists among forms through +their union with matter, and which Proserpine subverts by separating them +from each other. + +[101] The first subsistence of Maia, who, according to the Orphic +theology, is the same with the Goddess Night, is at the summit of _the +intelligible, and at the same time intellectual_ order, and is wholly +absorbed in the intelligible. As we are also informed by Proclus (in +Cratylum), “She is the paradigm of Ceres. For immortal Night is the +nurse of the Gods [according to Orpheus]. Night, however, is the cause +of aliment intelligibly: for the intelligible is, as the Chaldean Oracle +says, the aliment of the intellectual orders of Gods. But Ceres, first +of all, separates the two kinds of aliment [nectar and ambrosia] in the +Gods.” He adds, “Hence our sovereign mistress [δεσποινα], Ceres, not only +generates life, but that which gives perfection to life; and this from +supernal natures, to such as are last. For _virtue is the perfection of +souls_.” + +[102] Concerning the Indian philosophers, see the second book of Diodorus +Siculus. + +[103] This is the Bardesanes who lived in the time of Marcus Antoninus, +and who wrote a treatise on the Lake of Probation in India, which is +mentioned by Porphyry in his fragment De Styge, preserved by Stobæus. + +[104] Βαναυσοι, _i.e._ dirty mechanics and bellows-blowers, +an appellation by which Plato in his Rivals designates the +_experimentalists_. + +[105] Zagreus is an epithet of Bacchus. Wodhull, however, from whose +translation of Euripides the above lines are taken, is greatly mistaken +in saying, that “it is evident from the hymns of Orpheus that Zagreus +was a name given to Bacchus at his sacred rites.” For the word Ζαγρευς +(Zagreus) is not to be found either in the hymns of Orpheus, or in any +other of the Orphic writings that are extant. + +[106] Iliad, IV. v. 141. + +[107] Oper. et Dies, 595. + +[108] Iliad, V. v. 341. + +[109] In the original, ου πολυ το ενοικιον, ως φησι που Θεοφραστος, τῳ +σωματι διδουσης της ψυχης, κ.τ.λ. But for ου πολυ το ενοικιον, it appears +to me to be necessary to read, ου μονον πολυ το ενοικιον, κ.τ.λ. + +[110] Vid. Diod. Sic. lib. iii. 32. + +[111] Reisk says, that he does not know who this Democrates is; but there +can, I think, be no doubt of its being the Pythagorean of that name, +whose Golden Sentences are extant in the Opuscula Mythologica of Gale, of +which see Mr. Bridgman’s translation. + +[112] In the original, ου κακως ζῃν ειναι. But for ου κακως, I read, ουκ +οντως. For without this emendation, Democrates will contradict himself. + +[113] This Hermippus is also cited by Diogenes Laertius in Pyth. + +[114] In the original, θεσμος, which, as we are informed by Proclus, +signifies _divine order, and a uniform boundary_. + +[115] This book is evidently imperfect, because there are wanting at the +end examples of illustrious Greeks and Romans, who, from the most remote +antiquity, abstained from animal food. And this was also obvious to Reisk. + + + + +ON THE CAVE OF THE NYMPHS, IN THE THIRTEENTH BOOK OF THE ODYSSEY. + + +1. What does Homer obscurely signify by the cave in Ithaca, which he +describes in the following verses? + + “High at the head a branching olive grows, + And crowns the pointed cliffs with shady boughs. + A cavern pleasant, though involv’d in night, + Beneath it lies, the Naiades’ delight: + Where bowls and urns of workmanship divine + And massy beams in native marble shine; + On which the Nymphs amazing webs display, + Of purple hue, and exquisite array. + The busy bees within the urns secure + Honey delicious, and like nectar pure. + Perpetual waters through the grotto glide, + A lofty gate unfolds on either side; + That to the north is pervious to mankind; + The sacred south t’ immortals is consign’d.” + +That the poet, indeed, does not narrate these particulars from historical +information, is evident from this, that those who have given us a +description of the island, have, as Cronius[116] says, made no mention +of such a cave being found in it. This likewise, says he, is manifest, +that it would be absurd for Homer to expect, that in describing a cave +fabricated merely by poetical license, and thus artificially opening a +path to Gods and men in the region of Ithaca, he should gain the belief +of mankind. And it is equally absurd to suppose, that nature herself +should point out, in this place, one path for the descent of all mankind, +and again another path for all the Gods. For, indeed, the whole world is +full of Gods and men: but it is impossible to be persuaded, that in the +Ithacensian cave men descend, and Gods ascend. Cronius, therefore, having +premised thus much, says, that it is evident, not only to the wise but +also to the vulgar, that the poet, under the veil of allegory, conceals +some mysterious signification; thus compelling others to explore what +the gate of men is, and also what is the gate of the Gods: what he means +by asserting that this cave of the Nymphs has two gates; and why it is +both pleasant and obscure, since darkness is by no means delightful, +but is rather productive of aversion and horror. Likewise, what is the +reason why it is not simply said to be the cave of the Nymphs, but it is +accurately added, of the Nymphs which are called Naiades? Why, also, is +the cave represented as containing bowls and amphoræ, when no mention is +made of their receiving any liquor, but bees are said to deposit their +honey in these vessels as in hives? Then, again, why are oblong beams +adapted to weaving placed here for the Nymphs; and these not formed from +wood, or any other pliable matter, but from stone, as well as the amphoræ +and bowls? Which last circumstance is, indeed, less obscure; but that, on +these stony beams, the Nymphs should weave purple garments, is not only +wonderful to the sight, but also to the auditory sense. For who would +believe that Goddesses weave garments in a cave involved in darkness, +and on stony beams; especially while he hears the poet asserting, that +the purple webs of the Goddesses were visible. In addition to these +things likewise, this is admirable, that the cave should have a twofold +entrance; one made for the descent of men, but the other for the ascent +of Gods. And again, that the gate, which is pervious by men, should be +said to be turned towards the north wind, but the portal of the Gods to +the south; and why the poet did not rather make use of the west and the +east for this purpose; since nearly all temples have their statues and +entrances turned towards the east; but those who enter them look towards +the west, when standing with their faces turned towards the statues, +they honour and worship the Gods. Hence, since this narration is full of +such obscurities, it can neither be a fiction casually devised for the +purpose of procuring delight, nor an exposition of a topical history; but +something allegorical must be indicated in it by the poet, who likewise +mystically places an olive near the cave. All which particulars the +ancients thought very laborious to investigate and unfold; and we, with +their assistance, shall now endeavour to develope the secret meaning +of the allegory. Those persons, therefore, appear to have written very +negligently about the situation of the place, who think that the cave, +and what is narrated concerning it, are nothing more than a fiction of +the poet. But the best and most accurate writers of geography, and among +these Artemidorus the Ephesian, in the fifth book of his work, which +consists of eleven books, thus writes: “The island of Ithaca, containing +an extent of eighty-five stadia[117], is distant from Panormus, a port +of Cephalenia, about twelve stadia. It has a port named Phorcys, in +which there is a shore, and on that shore a cave, in which the Phæacians +are reported to have placed Ulysses.” This cave, therefore, will not be +entirely an Homeric fiction. But whether the poet describes it as it +really is, or whether he has added something to it of his own invention, +nevertheless the same inquiries remain; whether the intention of the +poet is investigated, or of those who founded the cave. For, neither did +the ancients establish temples without fabulous symbols, nor does Homer +rashly narrate the particulars pertaining to things of this kind. But how +much the more any one endeavours to show that this description of the +cave is not an Homeric fiction, but prior to Homer was consecrated to the +Gods, by so much the more will this consecrated cave be found to be full +of ancient wisdom. And on this account it deserves to be investigated, +and it is requisite that its symbolical consecration should be amply +unfolded into light. + +2. The ancients, indeed, very properly consecrated a cave to the world, +whether assumed collectively, according to the whole of itself, or +separately, according to its parts. Hence they considered earth as a +symbol of that matter of which the world consists; on which account +some thought that matter and earth are the same; through the cave +indicating the world, which was generated from matter. For caves are, +for the most part, spontaneous productions, and connascent with the +earth, being comprehended by one uniform mass of stone; the interior +parts of which are concave, but the exterior parts are extended over an +indefinite portion of land. And the world being spontaneously produced, +[_i.e._ being produced by no external, but from an internal cause,] +and being also self-adherent, is allied to matter; which, according to +a secret signification, is denominated a stone and a rock, on account +of its sluggish and repercussive nature with respect to form: the +ancients, at the same time, asserting that matter is infinite through +its privation of form. Since, however, it is continually flowing, and +is of itself destitute of the supervening investments of form, through +which it participates of _morphe_[118], and becomes visible, the flowing +waters, darkness, or, as the poet says, obscurity of the cavern, were +considered by the ancients as apt symbols of what the world contains, +on account of the matter with which it is connected. Through matter, +therefore, the world is obscure and dark; but through the connecting +power, and orderly distribution of form, from which also it is called +_world_, it is beautiful and delightful. Hence it may very properly be +denominated a cave; as being lovely, indeed, to him who first enters into +it, through its participation of forms, but obscure to him who surveys +its foundation, and examines it with an intellectual eye. So that its +exterior and superficial parts, indeed, are pleasant, but its interior +and profound parts are obscure, [and its very bottom is darkness itself]. +Thus also the Persians, mystically signifying the descent of the soul +into the sublunary regions, and its regression from it, initiate the +mystic [or him who is admitted to the arcane sacred rites] in a place +which they denominate a cavern. For, as Eubulus says, Zoroaster was +the first who consecrated, in the neighbouring mountains of Persia, a +spontaneously produced cave, florid, and having fountains, in honour +of Mithra, the maker and father of all things; a cave, according to +Zoroaster, bearing a resemblance of the world, which was fabricated by +Mithra. But the things contained in the cavern being arranged according +to commensurate intervals, were symbols of the mundane elements and +climates. + +3. After this Zoroaster likewise, it was usual with others to perform +the rites pertaining to the mysteries in caverns and dens, whether +spontaneously produced, or made by the hands. For, as they established +temples, groves, and altars, to the celestial Gods, but to the +terrestrial Gods, and to heroes, altars alone, and to the subterranean +divinities pits and cells; so to the world they dedicated caves and dens; +as likewise to Nymphs[119], on account of the water which trickles, or is +diffused in caverns, over which the Naiades, as we shall shortly observe, +preside. Not only, however, did the ancients make a cavern, as we have +said, to be a symbol of the world, or of a generated and sensible nature; +but they also assumed it as a symbol of all invisible powers; because, as +caverns are obscure and dark, so the essence of these powers is occult. +Hence Saturn fabricated a cavern in the ocean itself, and concealed in +it his children. Thus, too, Ceres educated Proserpine, with her Nymphs, +in a cave; and many other particulars of this kind may be found in the +writings of theologists. But that the ancients dedicated caverns to +Nymphs, and especially to the Naiades, who dwell near fountains, and who +are called Naiades from the streams over which they preside, is manifest +from the hymn to Apollo, in which it is said: “The Nymphs residing in +caves shall deduce fountains of intellectual waters to thee, (according +to the divine voice of the Muses,) which are the progeny of a terrene +spirit. Hence waters, bursting through every river, shall exhibit to +mankind perpetual effusions of sweet streams[120].” From hence, as it +appears to me, the Pythagoreans, and after them Plato, showed that the +world is a cavern and a den. For the powers which are the leaders of +souls, thus speak in a verse of Empedocles: + + Now at this secret cavern we’re arrived. + +And by Plato, in the 7th book of his Republic, it is said, “Behold men +as if dwelling in a subterraneous cavern, and in a den-like habitation, +whose entrance is widely expanded to the admission of the light through +the whole cave.” But when the other person in the Dialogue says, “You +adduce an unusual and wonderful similitude,” he replies, “The whole of +this image, friend Glauco, must be adapted to what has been before said, +assimilating this receptacle, which is visible through the sight, to the +habitation of a prison; but the light of the fire which is in it to the +power of the sun.” + +4. That theologists therefore considered caverns as symbols of the world, +and of mundane powers, is, through this, manifest. And it has been +already observed by us, that they also considered a cave as a symbol of +the intelligible essence; being impelled to do so by different and not +the same conceptions. For they were of opinion, that a cave is a symbol +of the sensible world, because caverns are dark, stony, and humid; and +they asserted, that the world is a thing of this kind, through the matter +of which it consists, and through its repercussive and flowing nature. +But they thought it to be a symbol of the intelligible world, because +that world is invisible to sensible perception, and possesses a firm and +stable essence. Thus, also, partial powers are unapparent, and especially +those which are inherent in matter. For they formed these symbols, from +surveying the spontaneous production of caves, and their nocturnal, dark, +and stony nature; and not entirely, as some suspect, from directing their +attention to the figure of a cavern. For every cave is not spherical, +as is evident from this Homeric cave with a twofold entrance. But since +a cavern has a twofold similitude, the present cave must not be assumed +as an image of the intelligible, but of the sensible essence. For in +consequence of containing perpetually-flowing streams of water, it will +not be a symbol of an intelligible hypostasis, but of a material essence. +On this account also, it is sacred to Nymphs, not the mountain, _or +rural[121] Nymphs_, or others of the like kind, but to the Naiades, who +are thus denominated from streams of water. For we peculiarly call the +Naiades, and the powers that preside over waters, Nymphs; and this term, +also, is commonly applied to all souls descending into generation. For +the ancients thought that these souls are incumbent on water which is +inspired by divinity, as Numenius says, who adds, that on this account, +a prophet asserts, that the Spirit of God moved on the waters. The +Egyptians likewise, on this account, represent all dæmons, and also +the sun, and, in short, all the planets[122], not standing on any thing +solid, but on a sailing vessel; for souls descending into generation +fly to moisture. Hence, also, Heraclitus says, “that moisture appears +delightful and not deadly to souls;” but the lapse into generation is +delightful to them. And in another place [speaking of unembodied souls], +he says, “We live their death, and we die their life.” Hence the poet +calls those that are in generation _humid_, because they have souls +which are _profoundly_ steeped in moisture. On this account, such souls +delight in blood and humid seed; but water is the nutriment of the souls +of plants. Some likewise are of opinion, that the bodies in the air, and +in the heavens, are nourished by vapours from fountains and rivers, and +other exhalations. But the Stoics assert, that the sun is nourished by +the exhalation from the sea; the moon from the vapours of fountains and +rivers; and the stars from the exhalation of the earth. Hence, according +to them, the sun is an intellectual composition formed from the sea; the +moon from river waters; and the stars from terrene exhalations. + +5. It is necessary, therefore, that souls, whether they are corporeal +or incorporeal, while they attract to themselves body, and especially +such as are about to be bound to blood and moist bodies, should verge +to humidity, and be corporalized, in consequence of being drenched in +moisture. Hence the souls of the dead are evocated by the effusion of +bile and blood; and souls that are lovers of body, by attracting a +moist spirit, condense this humid vehicle like a cloud. For moisture +condensed in the air constitutes a cloud. But the pneumatic vehicle being +condensed in these souls, becomes visible through an excess of moisture. +And among the number of these we must reckon those apparitions of images, +which, from a spirit coloured by the influence of imagination, present +themselves to mankind. But pure souls are averse from generation; so +that, as Heraclitus says, “_a dry soul is the wisest_.” Hence, here +also, the spirit becomes moist and more aqueous through the desire +of coition, the soul thus attracting a humid vapour from verging to +generation. Souls, therefore, proceeding into generation, are the Nymphs +called Naiades. Hence it is usual to call those that are married Nymphs, +as being conjoined to generation, and to pour water into baths from +fountains, or rivers, or perpetual rills. + +6. This world, then, is sacred and pleasant to souls who have now +proceeded into nature, and to natal dæmons, though it is essentially +dark and _obscure_; [ηεροειδης], from which some have suspected that +souls also are of an _obscure_ nature, [αερωδως,] and essentially +consist of air. Hence a cavern, which is both pleasant and dark, will +be appropriately consecrated to souls on the earth, conformably to its +similitude to the world; in which, as in the greatest of all temples, +souls reside. To the Nymphs likewise, who preside over waters, a cavern, +in which there are perpetually flowing streams, is adapted. Let, +therefore, this present cavern be consecrated to souls, and, among the +more partial powers, to nymphs, that preside over streams and fountains, +and who, on this account, are called _fontal_ and _Naiades_. What, +therefore, are the different symbols, some of which are adapted to +souls, but others to the aquatic powers, in order that we may apprehend +that this cavern is consecrated in common to both? Let the stony bowls, +then, and the amphoræ, be symbols of the aquatic Nymphs. For these are, +indeed, the symbols of Bacchus, but their composition is fictile, _i.e._ +consists of baked earth; and these are friendly to the vine, the gift +of the God; since the fruit of the vine is brought to a proper maturity +by the celestial fire of the sun. But the stony bowls and amphoræ, are in +the most eminent degree adapted to the Nymphs who preside over the water +that flows from rocks. And to souls that descend into generation, and +are occupied in corporeal energies, what symbol can be more appropriate +than those instruments pertaining to weaving? Hence, also, the poet +ventures to say, “that on these the Nymphs weave purple webs, admirable +to the view.” For the formation of the flesh is on and about the bones, +which in the bodies of animals resemble stones. Hence these instruments +of weaving consist of stone, and not of any other matter. But the purple +webs will evidently be the flesh which is woven from the blood. For +purple woollen garments are tinged from blood; and wool is dyed from +animal juice. The generation of flesh, also, is through and from blood. +Add, too, that the body is a garment with which the soul is invested, a +thing wonderful to the sight, whether this refers to the composition of +the soul, or contributes to the colligation of the soul [to the whole +of a visible essence]. Thus, also, Proserpine, who is the inspective +guardian of every thing produced from seed, is represented by Orpheus as +weaving a web[123]; and the heavens are called by the ancients a veil, +in consequence of being, as it were, the vestment of the celestial Gods. + +7. Why, therefore, are the amphoræ said not to be filled with water, +but with honey-combs? For in these Homer says the bees deposit their +honey. But this is evident from the word τιθαιβωσσειν, which signifies +τιθεναι την βοσιν; _i.e._ to deposit aliment. And honey is the nutriment +of bees. Theologists, also, have made honey subservient to many and +different symbols, because it consists of many powers; since it is both +cathartic and preservative. Hence, through honey, bodies are preserved +from putrefaction, and inveterate ulcers are purified. Farther still, +it is also sweet to the taste, and is collected by bees, who are +ox-begotten, from flowers. When, therefore, those who are initiated in +the Leontic sacred rites, pour honey instead of water on their hands; +they are ordered [by the initiator] to have their hands pure from every +thing productive of molestation, and from every thing noxious and +detestable. Other initiators [into the same mysteries] employ fire, +which is of a cathartic nature, as an appropriate purification. And they +likewise purify the tongue from all the defilement of evil with honey. +But the Persians, when they offer honey to the guardian of fruits, +consider it as the symbol of a preserving and defending power. Hence +some persons have thought that the nectar and ambrosia[124], which the +poet pours into the nostrils of the dead, for the purpose of preventing +putrefaction, is honey; since honey is the food of the Gods. On this +account, also, the same poet somewhere calls nectar ερυθρον; for such is +the colour of honey, [viz. it is a deep yellow]. But whether or not honey +is to be taken for nectar, we shall elsewhere more accurately examine. +In Orpheus, likewise, Saturn is ensnared by Jupiter through honey. For +Saturn, being filled with honey, is intoxicated, his senses are darkened, +as if from the effects of wine, and he sleeps; just as Porus, in the +Banquet of Plato, is filled with nectar; for wine was not (says he) yet +known. The Goddess Night, too, in Orpheus, advises Jupiter to make use +of honey as an artifice. For she says to him— + + When stretch’d beneath the lofty oaks you view + Saturn, with honey by the bees produc’d, + Sunk in ebriety[125], fast bind the God. + +This, therefore, takes place, and Saturn being bound, is castrated in +the same manner as Heaven; the theologist obscurely signifying by this, +that divine natures become through pleasure bound, and drawn down into +the realms of generation; and also that, when dissolved in pleasure, +they emit certain seminal powers. Hence Saturn castrates Heaven, when +descending to earth, through a desire of coition[126]. But the sweetness +of honey signifies, with theologists, the same thing as the pleasure +arising from copulation, by which Saturn, being ensnared, was castrated. +For Saturn, and his sphere, are the first of the orbs that move contrary +to the course of Cœlum, or the heavens. Certain powers, however, descend +both from Heaven [or the inerratic sphere] and the planets. But Saturn +receives the powers of Heaven, and Jupiter the powers of Saturn. +Since, therefore, honey is assumed in purgations, and as an antidote +to putrefaction, and is indicative of the pleasure which draws souls +downward to generation; it is a symbol well adapted to aquatic Nymphs, on +account of the unputrescent nature of the waters over which they preside, +their purifying power, and their co-operation with generation. For water +co-operates in the work of generation. On this account the bees are said, +by the poet, to deposit their honey in bowls and amphoræ; the bowls being +a symbol of fountains, and therefore a bowl is placed near to Mithra, +instead of a fountain; but the amphoræ are symbols of the vessels with +which we draw water from fountains. And fountains and streams are adapted +to aquatic Nymphs, and still more so to the Nymphs that are souls, +which the ancients peculiarly called bees, as the efficient causes of +sweetness. Hence Sophocles does not speak unappropriately when he says of +souls— + + In swarms while wandering, from the dead, + A humming sound is heard. + +8. The priestesses of Ceres, also, as being initiated into the mysteries +of the terrene Goddess, were called by the ancients bees; and Proserpine +herself was denominated by them _honied_. The moon, likewise, who +presides over generation, was called by them a bee, and also a bull. +And Taurus is the exaltation of the moon. But bees are ox-begotten. And +this appellation is also given to souls proceeding into generation. The +God, likewise, who is occultly connected with generation, is a stealer +of oxen. To which may be added, that honey is considered as a symbol +of death, and on this account, it is usual to offer libations of honey +to the terrestrial Gods; but gall is considered as a symbol of life; +whether it is obscurely signified by this, that the life of the soul +dies through pleasure, but through bitterness the soul resumes its life, +whence, also, bile is sacrificed to the Gods; or whether it is, because +death liberates from molestation, but the present life is laborious and +bitter. All souls, however, proceeding into generation, are not simply +called bees, but those who will live in it justly, and who, after having +performed such things as are acceptable to the Gods, will again return +[to their kindred stars]. For this insect loves to return to the place +from whence it first came, and is eminently just and sober. Whence, also, +the libations which are made with honey are called sober. Bees, likewise, +do not sit on beans, which were considered by the ancients as a symbol of +generation proceeding in a right line, and without flexure; because this +leguminous vegetable is almost the only seed-bearing plant, whose stalk +is perforated throughout without any intervening knots[127]. We must +therefore admit, that honey-combs and bees are appropriate and common +symbols of the aquatic Nymphs, and of souls that are married [as it were] +to [the humid and fluctuating nature of] generation. + +9. Caves, therefore, in the most remote periods of antiquity, were +consecrated to the Gods, before temples were erected to them. Hence, the +Curetes in Crete dedicated a cavern to Jupiter; in Arcadia, a cave was +sacred to the Moon, and to Lycean Pan; and in Naxus, to Bacchus. But +wherever Mithra was known, they propitiated the God in a cavern. With +respect, however, to this Ithacensian cave, Homer was not satisfied with +saying that it had two gates, but adds, that one of the gates was turned +towards the north, but the other, which was more divine, to the south. He +also says, that the northern gate was pervious to descent, but does not +indicate whether this was also the case with the southern gate. For of +this, he only says, “It is inaccessible to men, but it is the path of the +immortals.” + +10. It remains, therefore, to investigate what is indicated by this +narration, whether the poet describes a cavern which was in reality +consecrated by others, or whether it is an enigma of his own invention. +Since, however, a cavern is an image and symbol of the world, as Numenius +and his familiar Cronius assert, there are two extremities in the +heavens, viz. the winter tropic, than which nothing is more southern, and +the summer tropic, than which nothing is more northern. But the summer +tropic is in Cancer, and the winter tropic in Capricorn. And since Cancer +is nearest to us, it is very properly attributed to the Moon, which is +the nearest of all the heavenly bodies to the earth. But as the southern +pole, by its great distance, is invisible to us, hence Capricorn is +attributed to Saturn, the highest and most remote of all the planets. +Again, the signs from Cancer to Capricorn, are situated in the following +order: and the first of these is Leo, which is the house of the Sun; +afterwards Virgo, which is the house of Mercury; Libra, the house of +Venus; Scorpius, of Mars; Sagittarius, of Jupiter; and Capricornus, of +Saturn. But from Capricorn in an inverse order, Aquarius is attributed to +Saturn; Pisces, to Jupiter; Aries, to Mars; Taurus, to Venus; Gemini, to +Mercury; and, in the last place, Cancer to the Moon. + +11. Theologists therefore assert, that these two gates are Cancer and +Capricorn; but Plato calls them entrances. And of these, theologists +say, that Cancer is the gate through which souls descend; but Capricorn +that through which they ascend. Cancer is indeed northern, and adapted +to descent; but Capricorn is southern, and adapted to ascent[128]. The +northern parts, likewise, pertain to souls descending into generation. +And the gates of the cavern which are turned to the north, are rightly +said to be pervious to the descent of men; but the southern gates are not +the avenues of the Gods, but of souls ascending to the Gods. On this +account, the poet does not say that they are the avenues of the Gods, but +of immortals; this appellation being also common to our souls, which are +_per se_, or essentially, immortal. It is said, that Parmenides mentions +these two gates in his treatise On the Nature of Things; as likewise, +that they are not unknown to the Romans and Egyptians. For the Romans +celebrate their Saturnalia when the Sun is in Capricorn; and during this +festivity, slaves wear the shoes of those that are free, and all things +are distributed among them in common; the legislator obscurely signifying +by this ceremony, that through this gate of the heavens, those who are +now born slaves will be liberated through the Saturnian festival, and the +house attributed to Saturn, _i.e._ Capricorn, when they live again, and +return to the fountain of life. Since, however, the path from Capricorn +is adapted to ascent[129], hence the Romans denominate that month in +which the Sun, turning from Capricorn to the east, directs his course +to the north, Januarius, or January, from _janua_, a gate. But with the +Egyptians, the beginning of the year is not Aquarius, as with the Romans, +but Cancer. For the star Sothis, which the Greeks call the Dog, is near +to Cancer. And the rising of Sothis is the new moon with them, this being +the principle of generation to the world. On this account, the gates of +the Homeric cavern are not dedicated to the east and west, nor to the +equinoctial signs, Aries and Libra, but to the north and south, and to +those celestial signs which, towards the south, are most southerly, and, +towards the north, are most northerly; because this cave was sacred +to souls and aquatic Nymphs. But these places are adapted to souls +descending into generation, and afterwards separating themselves from +it. Hence, a place near to the equinoctial circle was assigned to Mithra +as an appropriate seat. And on this account he bears the sword of Aries, +which is a martial sign. He is likewise carried in the Bull, which is the +sign of Venus. For Mithra, as well as the Bull, is the demiurgus and lord +of generation[130]. But he is placed near the equinoctial circle, having +the northern parts on his right hand, and the southern on his left. They +likewise arranged towards the south the southern hemisphere, because +it is hot; but the northern hemisphere towards the north, through the +coldness of the north wind. + +12. The ancients, likewise, very reasonably connected winds with souls +proceeding into generation, and again separating themselves from it, +because, as some think, souls attract a spirit, and have a pneumatic +essence. But the north wind is adapted to souls falling into generation; +and, on this account, the northern blasts refresh those who are dying, +and when they can scarcely draw their breath. On the contrary, the +southern gales dissolve life. For the north wind, indeed, from its +superior coldness, congeals [as it were, the animal life], and detains +it in the frigidity of terrene generation. But the south wind being hot, +dissolves this life, and sends it upward to the heat of a divine nature. +Since, however, our terrene habitation is more northern, it is proper +that souls which are born in it should be familiar with the north wind; +but those that exchange this life for a better, with the south wind. This +also is the cause why the north wind is at its commencement great; but +the south wind, at its termination. For the former is situated directly +over the inhabitants of the northern part of the globe; but the latter +is at a great distance from them; and the blast from places very remote, +is more tardy than from such as are near. But when it is coacervated, +then it blows abundantly, and with vigour. Since, however, souls proceed +into generation through the northern gate, hence this wind is said to be +amatory. For, as the poet says, + + Boreas, enamour’d of the sprightly train, + Conceal’d his godhead in a flowing mane. + With voice dissembled, to his loves he neigh’d, + And coursed the dappled beauties o’er the mead: + Hence sprung twelve others of unrivall’d kind, + Swift as their mother mares, and father wind[131]. + +It is also said, that Boreas ravished Orithya[132], from whom he begot +Zetis and Calais. But as the south is attributed to the Gods, hence, when +the Sun is at his meridian, the curtains in temples are drawn before the +statues of the Gods; in consequence of observing the Homeric precept, +“that it is not lawful for men to enter temples when the Sun is inclined +to the south;” for this is the path of the immortals. Hence, when the +God is at his meridian altitude, the ancients placed a symbol of mid-day +and of the south in the gates of temples[133]; and, on this account, in +other gates also, it was not lawful to speak at all times, because gates +were considered as sacred. Hence, too, the Pythagoreans, and the wise +men among the Egyptians, forbade speaking while passing through doors or +gates; for then they venerated in silence that God who is the principle +of wholes [and, therefore of all things]. + +13. Homer likewise knew that gates are sacred, as is evident from his +representing Oeneus, when supplicating, shaking the gate: + + The gates he shakes, and supplicates the son[134]. + +He also knew the gates of the heavens which are committed to the +guardianship of the Hours; which gates originate in cloudy places, and +are opened and shut by the clouds. For he says. + + Whether dense clouds they close, or wide unfold[135]. + +And on this account, these gates emit a bellowing sound, because thunders +roar through the clouds: + + Heaven’s gates spontaneous open to the powers; + Heaven’s bellowing portals, guarded by the Hours[136]. + +He likewise elsewhere speaks of the gates of the Sun, signifying by these +Cancer and Capricorn; for the Sun proceeds as far as to these signs, when +he descends from the north to the south, and from thence ascends again +to the northern parts. But Capricorn and Cancer are situated about the +galaxy, being allotted the extremities of this circle; Cancer, indeed, +the northern, but Capricorn the southern extremity of it. According to +Pythagoras, also, the _people of dreams_[137], are the souls which are +said to be collected in the galaxy, this circle being so called from +the milk with which souls are nourished when they fall into generation. +Hence, those who evocate departed souls, sacrifice to them by a libation +of milk mingled with honey; because, through the allurements of +sweetness, they will proceed into generation; with the birth of man, milk +being naturally produced. Farther still, the southern regions produce +small bodies; for it is usual with heat to attenuate them in the greatest +degree. But all bodies generated in the north are large, as is evident +in the Celtæ, the Thracians, and the Scythians; and these regions are +humid, and abound with pastures. For the word Boreas is derived from +Βορα, which signifies nutriment. Hence, also, the wind which blows from +a land abounding in nutriment, is called Βορρας, as being of a nutritive +nature. From these causes, therefore, the northern parts are adapted to +the mortal tribe, and to souls that fall into the realms of generation. +But the southern parts are adapted to that which is immortal[138], +just as the eastern parts of the world are attributed to the Gods, +but the western to dæmons. For, in consequence of nature originating +from diversity, the ancients every where made that which has a twofold +entrance to be a symbol of the nature of things. For the progression +is either through that which is intelligible, or through that which is +sensible. And if through that which is sensible, it is either through +the sphere of the fixed stars, or through the sphere of the planets. And +again, it is either through an immortal, or through a mortal progression. +One centre, likewise, is above, but the other beneath the earth; and +the one is eastern, but the other western. Thus, too, some parts of +the world are situated on the left, but others on the right hand: and +night is opposed to day. On this account, also, harmony consists of, and +_proceeds_[139] through contraries. Plato also says, that there are two +openings[140], one of which affords a passage to souls ascending to the +heavens, but the other to souls descending to the earth. And, according +to theologists, the Sun and Moon are the gates of souls, which ascend +through the Sun, and descend through the Moon. With Homer, likewise, +there are two tubs, + + From which the lot of every one he fills, + Blessings to these, to those distributes ills[141]. + +But Plato, in the Gorgias, by tubs intends to signify souls, some of +which are malefic, but others beneficent, and some of which are rational, +but others irrational[142]. Souls, however, are [analogous to] tubs, +because they contain in themselves energies and habits, as in a vessel. +In Hesiod too, we find one tub closed, but the other opened by Pleasure, +who scatters its contents every where, Hope alone remaining behind. For +in those things in which a depraved soul, being dispersed about matter, +deserts the proper order of its essence; in all these, it is accustomed +to feed itself with [the pleasing prospects of] auspicious hope. + +14. Since, therefore, every twofold entrance is a symbol of nature, this +Homeric cavern has, very properly, not one portal only, but two gates, +which differ from each other conformably to things themselves; of which +one pertains to Gods and good [dæmons[143]], but the other to mortals, +and depraved natures. Hence, Plato took occasion to speak of bowls, and +assumes tubs instead of amphoræ, and two openings, as we have already +observed, instead of two gates. Pherecydes Syrus also mentions recesses +and trenches, caverns, doors, and gates; and through these obscurely +indicates the generations of souls, and their separation from these +material realms. And thus much for an explanation of the Homeric cave, +which we think we have sufficiently unfolded without adducing any farther +testimonies from ancient philosophers and theologists, which would give a +needless extent to our discourse. + +15. One particular, however, remains to be explained, and that is the +symbol of the olive planted at the top of the cavern; since Homer appears +to indicate something very admirable by giving it such a position. For +he does not merely say that an olive grows in this place, but that it +flourishes on the summit of the cavern. + + “High at the head a branching olive grows, + Beneath, a gloomy grotto’s cool recess.” + +But the growth of the olive in such a situation, is not fortuitous, as +some one may suspect, but contains the enigma of the cavern. For since +the world was not produced rashly and casually, but is the work of divine +wisdom and an intellectual nature, hence an olive, the symbol of this +wisdom, flourishes near the present cavern, which is an image of the +world. For the olive is the plant of Minerva; and Minerva is wisdom. But +this Goddess being produced from the head of Jupiter, the theologist has +discovered an appropriate place for the olive, by consecrating it at the +summit of the port; signifying by this, that the universe is not the +effect of a casual event, and the work of irrational fortune, but that +it is the offspring of an intellectual nature and divine wisdom, which +is separated, indeed, from it [by a difference of essence], but yet is +near to it, through being established on the summit of the whole port; +[_i.e._ from the dignity and excellence of its nature governing the whole +with consummate wisdom]. Since, however, an olive is ever-flourishing, +it possesses a certain peculiarity in the highest degree adapted to the +revolutions of souls in the world; for to such souls this cave [as we +have said] is sacred. For in summer, the white leaves of the olive tend +upward, but in winter, the whiter leaves are bent downward. On this +account, also, in prayers and supplications, men extend the branches of +an olive, ominating from this, that they shall exchange the sorrowful +darkness of danger for the fair light of security and peace. The olive, +therefore, being naturally ever-flourishing, bears fruit which is the +auxiliary of labour [by being its reward]; it is also sacred to Minerva; +supplies the victors in athletic labours with crowns; and affords a +friendly branch to the suppliant petitioner. Thus, too, the world is +governed by an intellectual nature, and is conducted by a wisdom eternal +and ever-flourishing; by which the rewards of victory are conferred on +the conquerors in the athletic race of life, as the reward of severe toil +and patient perseverance. And the Demiurgus, who connects and contains +the world [in ineffable comprehensions], invigorates miserable and +suppliant souls. + +16. In this cave, therefore, says Homer, all external possessions must +be deposited. Here, naked, and assuming a suppliant habit, afflicted in +body, casting aside every thing superfluous, and being averse to the +energies of sense, it is requisite to sit at the foot of the olive, and +consult with Minerva by what means we may most effectually destroy that +hostile rout of passions which insidiously lurk in the secret recesses +of the soul. Indeed, as it appears to me, it was not without reason that +Numenius and his followers thought the person of Ulysses in the Odyssey +represented to us a man, who passes in a regular manner over the dark and +stormy sea of generation, and thus at length arrives at that region where +tempests and seas are unknown, and finds a nation + + “Who ne’er knew salt, or heard the billows roar.” + +17. Again, according to Plato, the deep, the sea, and a tempest, are +images of a material nature. And on this account, I think, the poet +called the port by the name of Phorcys. For he says, “It is the port of +the ancient marine Phorcys[144].” The daughter, likewise, of this God is +mentioned in the beginning of the Odyssey. But from Thoosa the Cyclops +was born, whom Ulysses deprived of sight. And this deed of Ulysses became +the occasion of reminding him of his errors, till he was safely landed +in his native country. On this account, too, a seat under the olive is +proper to Ulysses, as to one who implores divinity, and would appease his +natal dæmon with a suppliant branch. For it will not be simply, and in +a concise way, possible for any one to be liberated from this sensible +life, who blinds this dæmon, and renders his energies inefficacious; but +he who dares to do this, will be pursued by the anger[145] of the marine +and material Gods, whom it is first requisite to appease by sacrifices, +labours, and patient endurance; at one time, indeed, contending with +the passions, and at another employing enchantments and deceptions, and +by these, transforming himself in an all-various manner; in order that, +being at length divested of the torn garments [by which his true person +was concealed], he may recover the ruined empire of his soul. Nor will +he even then be liberated from labours; but this will be effected when +he has entirely passed over the raging sea, and, though still living, +becomes so ignorant of marine and material works [through deep attention +to intelligible concerns], as to mistake an oar for a corn-van. + +18. It must not, however, be thought, that interpretations of this kind +are forced, and nothing more than the conjectures of ingenious men; +but when we consider the great wisdom of antiquity, and how much Homer +excelled in intellectual prudence, and in an accurate knowledge of every +virtue, it must not be denied that he has obscurely indicated the images +of things of a more divine nature in the fiction of a fable. For it would +not have been possible to devise the whole of this hypothesis, unless the +figment had been transferred [to an appropriate meaning] from certain +established truths. But reserving the discussion of this for another +treatise, we shall here finish our explanation of the present Cave of the +Nymphs. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[116] This Cronius, the Pythagorean, is also mentioned by Porphyry, in +his Life of Plotinus. + +[117] _i.e._ Rather more than ten Italian miles and a half, eight stadia +making an Italian mile. + +[118] In the original, δι ου μορφουται. But _morphe_, as we are informed +by Simplicius, pertains to the colour, figure, and magnitude of +superficies. + +[119] “Nymphs,” says Hermias, in his Scholia on the Phædrus of Plato, +“are Goddesses who preside over regeneration, and are ministrant to +Bacchus, the offspring of Semele. Hence they dwell near water, that +is, they are conversant with generation. But this Bacchus supplies the +regeneration of the whole sensible world.” + +[120] These lines are not to be found in any of the hymns now extant, +ascribed to Homer. + +[121] In the original, ουδε ακραιων; but for ακραιων, I read, αγραιων. + +[122] In the original, τους τε Αιγυπτιους δια τουτο τους δαιμονας απαντας +ουχ εσταναι επι στερεου, αλλα παντας επι πλοιου, και τον ηλιον, και απλως +παντας, ους τινας ειδεναι χρη τας ψυχας επιποτωμενας τῳ υγρῳ, τας εις +γενεσιν κατιουσας. But after the words και απλως παντας, it appears to me +to be requisite to insert τους πλανητας. For Martianus Capella, in lib. +ii. De Nuptiis Philologiæ, speaking of the sun, says: “Ibi quandam navim, +totius naturæ cursibus diversa cupiditate moderantem, cunctaque flammarum +congestione plenissimam, beatis circumactam mercibus conspicatur. Cui +_nautæ septem_ germani, tamen suique consimiles præsidebant,” &c. For in +this passage the seven sailors are evidently the seven planets. + +[123] The theological meaning of this Orphic fiction is beautifully +unfolded by Proclus, as follows:—“Orpheus says that the vivific cause +of partible natures [_i.e._ Proserpine], while she remained on high, +weaving the order of celestials, was a nymph, as being undefiled; and +in consequence of this connected with Jupiter, and abiding in her +appropriate manners; but that, proceeding from her proper habitation, +she left her webs unfinished, was ravished; having been ravished, was +married; and that being married she generated, in order that she might +animate things which have an adventitious life. For the unfinished +state of her webs indicates, I think, that the universe is imperfect or +unfinished, as far as to perpetual animals [_i.e._ The universe would be +imperfect if nothing inferior to the celestial Gods was produced]. Hence +Plato says, that the one Demiurgus calls on the many Demiurgi to weave +together the mortal and immortal natures; after a manner reminding us, +that the addition of the mortal genera is the perfection of the textorial +life of the universe, and also exciting our recollection of the divine +Orphic fable, and affording us interpretative causes of the unfinished +webs of Proserpine.”—See vol. ii. p. 356, of my translation of Proclus on +the Timæus. + +The _unfinished webs_ of Proserpine are also alluded to by Claudian, in +his poem De Raptu Proserpinæ, in the following verse: + + Sensit adesse Deas, _imperfectumque laborem_ + _Deserit_. + +I only add, that, by ancient theologists, the shuttle was considered as a +signature of _separating_, a cup of _vivific_, a sceptre of _ruling_, and +a key of _guardian_ power. + +[124] The theological meaning of nectar and ambrosia, is beautifully +unfolded by Hermias, in his Scholia on the Phædrus of Plato, published +by Ast, Lips. 1810, p. 145, where he informs us, that _ambrosia_ is +analogous to dry nutriment, and that, on this account, it signifies an +establishment in causes; but that _nectar_ is analogous to moist food, +and that it signifies the providential attention of the Gods to secondary +natures; the former being denominated, according to _a privation of the +mortal and corruptible_ [κατα στερησιν του βροτου και φθαρτου]; but the +latter, according to _a privation of the funeral and sepulchral_ [κατα +στερησιν του κτεριος ειρημενον και του ταφου]. And when the Gods are +represented as energizing providentially, they are said to drink nectar. +Thus Homer, in the beginning of the 4th book of the Iliad: + + Οι δε θεοι παρ Ζηνι καθημενοι ηγοροωντο + Χρυσεῳ εν δαπεδῳ, μετα δε σφισι ποτνια Ηβη + Νεκταρ εῳνοχοει· τοι δε χρυσεοις δεπαεσσι + Δειδεχατ’ αλληλους, Τρῳων πολιν εισοροωντες. + + Now with each other, on the golden floor + Seated near Jove, the Gods converse; to whom + The venerable Hebe nectar bears, + In golden goblets; and as these flow round, + Th’ immortals turn their careful eyes on Troy. + +For then they providentially attend to the Trojans. The possession, +therefore, of immutable providence by the Gods is signified by their +drinking nectar; the exertion of this providence, by their beholding +Troy; and their communicating with each other in providential energies, +by receiving the goblets from each other. + +[125] Ebriety, when ascribed to divine natures by ancient theologists, +signifies a deific superessential energy, or an energy superior +to intellect. Hence, when Saturn is said by Orpheus to have been +intoxicated with honey or nectar, the meaning is, that he then energized +providentially, in a deific and super-intellectual manner. + +[126] Porphyry, though he excelled in philosophical, was deficient in +theological knowledge; of which what he now says of the castrations of +Saturn and Heaven, is a remarkable instance. For ancient theologists, by +things preternatural, adumbrated the transcendent nature of the Gods; +by such as are irrational, a power more divine than all reason; and +by things apparently base, incorporeal beauty. Hence, in the fabulous +narrations to which Porphyry now alludes, the genital parts must be +considered as symbols of prolific power; and the castration of these +parts as signifying the progression of this power into a subject order. +So that the fable means that the prolific powers of Saturn are called +forth into progression by Jupiter, and those of Heaven by Saturn; Jupiter +being inferior to Saturn, and Saturn to Heaven.—See the Apology for the +Fables of Homer, in vol. i. of my translation of Plato. + +[127] Hence, when Pythagoras exhorted his disciples to abstain from +beans, he intended to signify, that they should beware of a continued and +perpetual descent into the realms of generation. + +[128] Macrobius, in the 12th chapter of his Commentary on Scipio’s Dream, +has derived some of the ancient arcana which it contains from what is +here said by Porphyry. A part of what he has farther added, I shall +translate, on account of its excellence and connexion with the above +passage. “Pythagoras thought that the empire of Pluto began downwards +from the milky way, because souls falling from thence appear to have +already receded from the Gods. Hence he asserts, that the nutriment of +milk is first offered to infants, because their first motion commences +from the galaxy, when they begin to fall into terrene bodies. On this +account, since those who are about to descend are yet in _Cancer_, and +have not left the milky way, they rank in the order of the Gods. But +when, by falling, they arrive at the _Lion_, in this constellation +they enter on the exordium of their future condition. And because, +in the _Lion_, the rudiments of birth, and certain primary exercises +of human nature, commence; but _Aquarius_ is opposite to the _Lion_, +and presently sets after the _Lion_ rises; hence, when the sun is in +_Aquarius_, funeral rites are performed to departed souls, because he is +then carried in a sign which is contrary or adverse to human life. From +the confine, therefore, in which the zodiac and galaxy touch each other, +the soul, descending from a round figure, which is the only divine form, +is produced into a cone by its defluxion. And as a line is generated +from a point, and proceeds into length from an indivisible, so the soul, +from its own point, which is a monad, passes into the duad, which is the +first extension. And this is the essence which Plato, in the Timæus, +calls impartible, and at the same time partible, when he speaks of the +nature of the mundane soul. For as the soul of the world, so likewise +that of man, will be found to be in one respect without division, if +the simplicity of a divine nature is considered; and in another respect +partible, if we regard the diffusion of the former through the world, and +of the latter through the members of the body. + +“As soon, therefore, as the soul gravitates towards body in this first +production of herself, she begins to experience a material tumult, that +is, matter flowing into her essence. And this is what Plato remarks +in the Phædo, that the soul is drawn into body staggering with recent +intoxication; signifying by this, the new drink of matter’s impetuous +flood, through which the soul, becoming defiled and heavy, is drawn into +a terrene situation. But the starry _cup_ placed between Cancer and the +Lion, is a symbol of this mystic truth, signifying that descending souls +first experience intoxication in that part of the heavens through the +influx of matter. Hence oblivion, the companion of intoxication, there +begins silently to creep into the recesses of the soul. For if souls +retained in their descent to bodies the memory of divine concerns, of +which they were conscious in the heavens, there would be no dissension +among men about divinity. But all, indeed, in descending, drink of +oblivion; though some more, and others less. On this account, though +truth is not apparent to all men on the earth, yet all exercise their +opinions about it; because _a defect of memory is the origin of opinion_. +But those discover most who have drank least of oblivion, because they +easily remember what they had known before in the heavens. + +“The soul, therefore, falling with this first weight from the zodiac and +milky way into each of the subject spheres, is not only clothed with the +accession of a luminous body, but produces the particular motions which +it is to exercise in the respective orbs. Thus in Saturn, it energizes +according to a ratiocinative and intellective power; in the sphere of +Jove, according to a practic power; in the orb of the Sun, according to a +sensitive and imaginative nature; but according to the motion of desire +in the planet Venus; of pronouncing and interpreting what it perceives +in the orb of Mercury; and according to a plantal or vegetable nature, +and a power of acting on body, when it enters into the lunar globe. And +this sphere, as it is the last among the divine orders, so it is the +first in our terrene situation. For this body, as it is the dregs of +divine natures, so it is the first animal substance. And this is the +difference between terrene and supernal bodies (under the latter of which +I comprehend the heavens, the stars, and the more elevated elements,) +that the latter are called upwards to be the seat of the soul, and merit +immortality from the very nature of the region, and an imitation of +sublimity; but the soul is drawn down to these terrene bodies, and is +on this account said to die when it is enclosed in this fallen region, +and the seat of mortality. Nor ought it to cause any disturbance that we +have so often mentioned the death of the soul, which we have pronounced +to be immortal. For the soul is not extinguished by its own proper +death, but is only overwhelmed for a time. Nor does it lose the benefit +of perpetuity by its temporal demersion. Since, when it deserves to be +purified from the contagion of vice, through its entire refinement from +body, it will be restored to the light of perennial life, and will return +to its pristine integrity and perfection.” + +“The powers, however, of the planets, which are the causes of the +energies of the soul in the several planetary spheres, are more +accurately described by Proclus, in p. 260 of his admirable Commentary +on the Timæus, as follows: ει δε βουλει και οτι των αγαθων πλανητων +Σεληνη μεν αιτια τοις θνητοις της φυσεως, το αυτοπτον αγαλμα ουσα της +πηγαιας φυσεως· Ηλιος δε δημιουργος των αισθησεων πασων, διοτι και του +οραν και του ορασθαι αιτιος· Ερμης δε των της φαντασιας κινησεων· αυτης +γαρ της φανταστικης ουσιας, ως μιας ουσης αισθησεως και φαντασιας, Ηλιος +υποστατης· Αφροδιτη δε των επιθυμητικων ορεξεων· Αρης δε των θυμοειδων +κινησεων των κατα φυσιν εκαστοις· κοινη δε των μεν ζωτικων πασων δυναμεων +Ζευς, των δε γνωστικων Κρονος, διῃρηται γαρ παντα τα ειδη τα αλογα εις +ταυτας, _i.e._ “If you are willing, also, you may say, that of the +beneficent planets, the Moon is the cause to mortals of nature, being +herself the visible statue of fontal nature. But the Sun is the Demiurgus +of every thing sensible, in consequence of being the cause of sight and +visibility. Mercury is the cause of the motions of the phantasy; for of +the imaginative essence itself, so far as sense and phantasy are one, +the Sun is the producing cause. But Venus is the cause of epithymetic +appetites [or of the appetites pertaining to desire]; and Mars, of the +irascible motions which are conformable to nature. Of all vital powers, +however, Jupiter is the common cause; but of all gnostic powers, Saturn. +For all the irrational forms are divided into these.” + +[129] For καταβατικη, in this place, it appears to me to be obviously +necessary to read αναβατικη. For Porphyry has above informed us, that +Capricorn is the gate through which souls ascend. + +[130] Hence Phanes, or Protogonus, who is the paradigm of the universe, +and who was absorbed by Jupiter, the Demiurgus, is represented by Orpheus +as having the head of a _bull_ among other heads with which he is +adorned. And in the Orphic hymn to him, he is called _bull-roarer_. + +[131] Iliad, lib. xx. v. 223, &c. + +[132] This fable is mentioned by Plato in the Phædrus, and is beautifully +unfolded as follows, by Hermias, in his Scholia on that Dialogue: “A +twofold solution may be given of this fable; one from history, more +ethical; but the other, transferring us [from parts] to wholes. And the +former of these is as follows: Orithya was the daughter of Erectheus, and +the priestess of Boreas; for each of the winds has a presiding deity, +which the telestic art, or the art pertaining to sacred mysteries, +religiously cultivates. To this Orithya, then, the God was so very +propitious, that he sent the north wind for the safety of the country; +and besides this, he is said to have assisted the Athenians in their +naval battles. Orithya, therefore, becoming enthusiastic, being possessed +by her proper God Boreas, and no longer energizing as a human being +(for animals cease to energize according to their own peculiarities, +when possessed by superior causes), died under the inspiring influence, +and thus was said to have been ravished by Boreas. And this is the more +ethical explanation of the fable. + +“But the second, which transfers the narration to wholes, and does not +entirely subvert the former, is the following: for divine fables often +employ transactions and histories, in subserviency, to the discipline +of wholes. It is said then, that Erectheus is the God that rules over +the three elements, air, water, and earth. Sometimes, however, he +is considered as alone the ruler of the earth, and sometimes as the +presiding deity of Attica alone. Of this deity Orithya is the daughter; +and she is the prolific power of the Earth, which is indeed coextended +with the word _Erectheus_, as the unfolding of the name signifies. For it +is _the prolific power of the Earth, flourishing and restored, according +to the seasons_. But Boreas is the providence of the Gods, supernally +illuminating secondary natures. For the providence of the Gods in the +world is signified by Boreas, because this divinity blows from lofty +places. And the elevating power of the Gods is signified by the south +wind, because this wind blows from low to lofty places; and besides this, +_things situated towards the south are more divine_. The providence of +the Gods, therefore, causes the prolific power of the Earth, or of the +Attic land, to _ascend_, and become visible. + +“Orithya also may be said to be a soul aspiring after things above, from +ορουω and θειω, according to the Attic custom of adding a letter at the +end of a word, which letter is here an “ω.” Such a soul, therefore, is +ravished by Boreas supernally blowing. But if Orithya was hurled from a +precipice, this also is appropriate, for such a soul dies a philosophic, +not receiving a physical death, and abandons a life pertaining to her own +deliberate choice, at the same time that she lives a physical life. And +philosophy, according to Socrates in the Phædo, is nothing else than a +meditation of death.” + +[133] In the original, ιστασαν ουν και συμβολον της μεσημβριας και του +νοτου, επι τῃ θυρῃ, μεσημβριαζοντος του θεου, which Holstenius translates +most erroneously as follows: “Austrum igitur meridiei symbolum statuunt; +cum deus meridiano tempore ostio immineat.” + +[134] Iliad, lib. xi. v. 579. + +[135] Iliad, lib. viii. v. 395. + +[136] Iliad, lib. viii. v. 393. + +[137] The souls of the suitors are said by Homer, in the 24th book of +the Odyssey (v. 11), to have passed, in their descent to the region of +spirits, beyond _the people of dreams_. + +[138] Hence, the southern have always been more favourable to genius, +than the northern parts of the earth. + +[139] In the original, τοξευει; but instead of it, I read πορευει. + +[140] See my translation of the 10th book of his Republic. + +[141] Iliad, xxiv. v. 528. + +[142] The passage in the Gorgias of Plato, to which Porphyry here +alludes, is as follows:—“Soc. But, indeed, as you also say, life is a +grievous thing. For I should not wonder if Euripides spoke the truth when +he says: ‘Who knows whether to live is not to die, and to die is not to +live?’ And we, perhaps, are in reality dead. For I have heard from one +of the wise, that we are now dead; and that the body is our sepulchre; +but that the part of the soul in which the desires are contained, is of +such a nature that it can be persuaded, and hurled upwards and downwards. +Hence a certain elegant man, perhaps a Sicilian, or an Italian, +denominated, mythologizing, this part of the soul a tub, by a derivation +from the probable and the persuasive; and, likewise, he called those that +are stupid, or deprived of intellect, uninitiated. He farther said, that +the intemperate and uncovered nature of that part of the soul in which +the desires are contained, was like a pierced tub, through its insatiable +greediness.” + +What is here said by Plato is beautifully unfolded by Olymipiodorus, in +his MS. Commentary on the Gorgias, as follows:—“Euripides (in Phryxo) +says, that to live is to die, and to die to live. For the soul coming +hither, as she imparts life to the body, so she partakes [through this] +of a certain privation of life; but this is an evil. When separated, +therefore, from the body, she lives in reality: for she dies here, +through participating a privation of life, because the body becomes the +source of evils. And hence it is necessary to subdue the body. + +“But the meaning of the Pythagoric fable, which is here introduced by +Plato, is this: We are said to be dead, because, as we have before +observed, we partake of a privation of life. The sepulchre which we carry +about with us is, as Plato himself explains it, the body. But Hades is +the unapparent, because we are situated in obscurity, the soul being in +a state of servitude to the body. The tubs are the desires; whether they +are so called from our hastening to fill them, as if they were tubs, or +from desire persuading us that it is beautiful. The initiated, therefore, +_i.e._ those that have a perfect knowledge, pour into the entire tub: +for these have their tub full; or, in other words, have perfect virtue. +But the uninitiated, viz. those that possess nothing perfect, have +perforated tubs. For those that are in a state of servitude to desire +always wish to fill it, and are more inflamed; and on this account they +have perforated tubs, as being never full. But the sieve is the rational +soul mingled with the irrational. For the [rational] soul is called a +circle, because it seeks itself, and is itself sought; finds itself, and +is itself found. But the irrational soul imitates a right line, since +it does not revert to itself like a circle. So far, therefore, as the +sieve is circular, it is an image of the rational soul; but, as it is +placed under the right lines formed from the holes, it is assumed for +the irrational soul. Right lines, therefore, are in the middle of the +cavities. Hence, by the sieve, Plato signifies the rational in subjection +to the irrational soul. But the water is the flux of nature: for, as +Heraclitus says, _moisture is the death of the soul_.” + +In this extract the intelligent reader will easily perceive that the +occult signification of the _tubs_ is more scientifically unfolded by +Olympiodorus than by Porphyry. + +[143] In the original, και τας μεν, θεοις τε και τοις αγαθοις +προσηκουσας. But after αγαθοις, I have no doubt we should insert δαιμοσι. + +[144] Phorcys is one among the ennead of Gods who, according to Plato +in the Timæus, fabricate generation. Of this deity, Proclus observes, +“that as the Jupiter in this ennead causes the unapparent divisions and +separation of forms made by Saturn to become apparent, and as Rhea calls +them forth into motion and generation; so Phorcys inserts them in matter, +produces sensible natures, and adorns the visible essence, in order that +there may not only be divisions of productive principles [or forms] in +natures and in souls, and in intellectual essences prior to these; _but +likewise in sensibles. For this is the peculiarity of fabrication._” + +[145] “The anger of the Gods,” says Proclus, “is not an indication of any +passion in them, but demonstrates our inaptitude to participate of their +illuminations.” + + + + +AUXILIARIES TO THE PERCEPTION OF INTELLIGIBLE NATURES. + + +SECTION I. + +1. Every body is in place; but nothing essentially incorporeal, or any +thing of this kind, has any locality. + +2. Things essentially incorporeal, because they are more excellent than +all body and place, are every where, not with interval, but impartibly. + +3. Things essentially incorporeal, are not locally present with bodies, +but are present with them when they please; by verging towards them so +far as they are naturally adapted so to verge. They are not, however, +present with them locally, but through habitude, proximity, and alliance. + +4. Things essentially incorporeal, are not present with bodies, by +hypostasis and essence; for they are not mingled with bodies. But they +impart a certain power which is proximate to bodies, through verging +towards them. For tendency constitutes a certain secondary power +proximate to bodies. + +5. Soul, indeed, is a certain medium between an impartible essence, +and an essence which is divisible about bodies. But intellect is an +impartible essence alone. And qualities and material forms are divisible +about bodies. + +6. Not every thing[146] which acts on another, effects that which it +does effect by approximation and contact; but those natures which effect +any thing by approximation and contact, use approximation accidentally. + +7. The soul is bound to the body by a conversion to the corporeal +passions; and is again liberated by becoming impassive to the body. + +8. That which nature binds, nature also dissolves: and that which the +soul binds, the soul likewise dissolves. Nature, indeed, bound the body +to the soul; but the soul binds herself to the body. Nature, therefore, +liberates the body from the soul; but the soul liberates herself from the +body. + +9. Hence there is a twofold death; the one, indeed, universally known, +in which the body is liberated from the soul; but the other peculiar to +philosophers, in which the soul is liberated from the body. Nor does the +one[147] entirely follow the other. + +10. We do not understand similarly in all things, but in a manner +adapted to the essence of each. For intellectual objects we understand +intellectually; but those that pertain to soul rationally. We apprehend +plants spermatically; but bodies idolically [_i.e._ as images]; and that +which is above all these, super-intellectually and super-essentially[148]. + +11. Incorporeal hypostases, in descending, are distributed into parts, +and multiplied about individuals with a diminution of power; but when +they ascend by their energies beyond bodies, they become united, and +proceed into a simultaneous subsistence, through exuberance of power. + +12. The homonymous is not in bodies only, but life also is among the +number of things which have a multifarious subsistence. For the life +of a plant is different from that of an animated being; the life of an +intellectual essence differs from that of the nature which is beyond +intellect; and the psychical differs from the intellectual life. For +these natures live, though nothing which proceeds from, possesses a life +similar to them. + +13. Every thing which generates by its very essence, generates that which +is inferior to itself[149]; and every thing generated, is naturally +converted to its generator. Of generating natures, however, some are not +at all converted to the beings which they generate; but others are partly +converted to them, and partly not; and others are only converted to their +progeny, but are not converted to themselves. + +14. Every thing generated, possesses from that which is different from +itself the cause of its generation, since nothing is produced without a +cause. Such generated natures, however, as have their existence through +composition, these are on this account corruptible. But such as, being +simple and incomposite, possess their existence in a simplicity of +hypostasis, these being indissoluble, are, indeed, incorruptible; yet +they are said to be generated, not as if they were composites, but as +being suspended from a certain cause. Bodies, therefore, are in a twofold +respect generated; as being suspended from a certain producing cause; +and as being composites. But soul and intellect are only generated as +being suspended from a cause, and not as composites. Hence bodies +are generated, dissoluble and corruptible; but soul and intellect +are unbegotten, as being without composition, and on this account +indissoluble and incorruptible; yet they are generated so far as they are +suspended from a cause. + +15. Intellect is not the principle of all things; for intellect is many +things; but, prior to _the many_, it is necessary that there should be +_the one_. It is evident, however, that intellect is many things. For +it always understands its conceptions, which are not one, but many; +and which are not any thing else than itself. If, therefore, it is the +same with its conceptions, but they are many, intellect also will be +many things. But that it is the same with intelligibles [or the objects +of its intellection], may be thus demonstrated. For, if there is any +thing which intellect surveys, it will either survey this thing as +contained in itself, or as placed in something else. And that intellect, +indeed, contemplates or surveys, is evident. For, in conjunction with +intellection, or intellectual perception, it will be intellect; but if +you deprive it of intellection, you will destroy its essence. It is +necessary, therefore, that, directing our attention to the properties +of knowledge, we should investigate the perception of intellect. All +the gnostic powers, then, which we contain, are universally sense, +imagination, and intellect[150]. The power, however, which employs +sense, surveys by projecting itself to externals, not being united to +the objects which it surveys, but only receiving an impression of, by +exerting its energies upon them. When, therefore, the eye sees a visible +object, it is impossible that it should become the same with that which +it perceives: for it would not see if there was not an interval between +it and the object of its perception. And, after the same manner, that +which is touched, if it was the same with that by which it is touched, +would perish. From which it is evident that sense, and that which employs +sense, must always tend to an external object, in order to apprehend +something sensible. In like manner also, the phantasy, or imagination, +always tends to something external, and by this extension of itself, +gives subsistence to, or prepares an image; its extension to what is +external, indicating that the object of its perception is a resemblance +of something external. And such, indeed, is the apprehension of these two +powers; neither of which verging to, and being collected into itself, +perceives either a sensible or insensible form. + +In intellect, however, the apprehension of its objects does not subsist +after this manner, but is effected by converging to, and surveying +itself. For by departing from itself, in order to survey its own +energies, and become the eye of them, and the sight of essences, it will +not understand any thing. Hence, as sense is to that which is sensible, +so is intellect to that which is intelligible. Sense, however, by, +extending itself to externals, finds that which is sensible situated +in matter; but intellect surveys the intelligible, by being collected +into itself, and not extended outwardly[151]. On this account some are +of opinion, that the hypostasis of intellect differs from that of the +phantasy only in name. For the phantasy, in the rational animal, appeared +to them to be intelligence. As these men, however, suspended all things +from matter and a corporeal nature, it follows that they should also +suspend from these intellect. But our intellect surveys both bodies and +other essences. Hence it apprehends them situated somewhere. But as the +proper objects of intellect have a subsistence out of matter, they will +be no where[152] [locally]. It is evident, therefore, that intellectual +natures are to be conjoined with intelligence. But if intellectual +natures are in intellect, it follows that intellect, when it understands +intelligibles, surveys both the intelligible and itself; and that +proceeding into itself, it perceives intellectually, because it proceeds +into intelligibles. If, however, intellect understands many things, and +not one thing only, intellect also will necessarily be many. But _the +one_ subsists prior to the many; so that it is necessary that _the one_ +should be prior to intellect. + +16. Memory is not the conservation of imaginations, but the power of +calling forth _de novo_ those conceptions which had previously occupied +the attention of the mind[153]. + +17. Soul, indeed, contains the reasons [or forms] of all things, but +energizes according to them, either being called forth to this energy +by something else, or converting itself to them inwardly. And when +called forth by something else, it introduces, as it were, the senses +to externals, but when it enters into itself, it becomes occupied with +intellectual conceptions. Hence some one may say, that neither the +senses, nor intellectual perceptions, are without the phantasy; so that, +as in the animal, the senses are not without the passive affection of +the sensitive organs, in like manner intellections are not without the +phantasy. Perhaps, however, it may be said, in answer to this, that, as +an impression in the sensitive organ is the concomitant of the sensitive +animal, so analogously a phantasm is the concomitant of the intellection +of the soul in man, considered as an animal[154]. + +18. Soul is an essence without magnitude, immaterial, incorruptible, +possessing its existence in life, and having life from itself. + +19. The passivity of bodies is different from that of incorporeal +natures. For the passivity of bodies is attended with mutation; but the +adaptations and passions of the soul are energies; yet they are by no +means similar to the calefactions and frigefactions of bodies. Hence, +if the passivity of bodies is accompanied by mutation, it must be said +that all incorporeal natures are impassive. For the essences which are +separated from matter and bodies, are what they are in energy. But those +things which approximate to matter and bodies, are themselves, indeed, +impassive; but the natures in which they are surveyed are passive. For +when the animal perceives sensibly, the soul [_i.e._ the rational soul] +appears to be similar to separate harmony[155], of itself moving the +chords adapted to harmony; but the body is similar to the inseparable +harmony in the chords, [_i.e._ to the harmony which cannot exist +separate from the chords]. But the animal is the cause of the motion, +because it is an animated being. It is, however, analogous to a musician, +because it is harmonic; but the bodies which are struck through sensitive +passion, are analogous to the harmonized chords of a musical instrument. +For in this instance, also, separate harmony is not passively affected, +but the chords. And the musician, indeed, moves according to the harmony +which is in him; yet the chords would not be musically moved, even though +the musician wished that they should, unless harmony ordered this to take +place. + +20. Incorporeal natures are not denominated like bodies, according to a +participation in common of one and the same genus; but they derive their +appellation from a mere privation with respect to bodies. Hence, nothing +hinders some of them from having a subsistence as beings, but others as +non-beings; some of them, from being prior to, and others posterior to +bodies; some, from being separate, and others inseparable from bodies; +some, from having a subsistence by themselves, but others from being +indigent of things different from themselves, to their existence; some, +from being the same through energies and self-motive lives, but others +from subsisting together with lives, and energies of a certain quality. +For they subsist according to a negation of the things which they are +not, and not according to the affirmation of the things which they are. + +21. The properties of matter, according to the ancients, are the +following: It is incorporeal; for it is different from bodies. It is +without life; for it is neither intellect nor soul, nor vital from +itself [_i.e._ essentially]. It is also formless, variable, infinite, +and powerless. Hence, it is neither being, nor yet non-being. Not that +it is non-being like motion, but it is true non-being, the image and +phantasm of bulk, because it is that which bulk primarily contains. It +is likewise powerless, and the desire of subsistence, has stability, but +not in permanency, and always appears in itself to be contrary. Hence, it +is both small and great, more and less, deficient and exceeding. It is +always becoming to be, or rising into existence; abides not, and yet is +unable to fly away; and is the defect of all being. Hence, in whatever +it announces itself to be, it deceives; and though it should appear to +be great, it is nevertheless small. For it resembles a flying mockery, +eluding all pursuit, and vanishing into non-entity. For its flight is not +in place, but is effected by its desertion of real being. Hence, also, +the images which are in it, are in an image more unreal than themselves; +just as in a mirror, where the thing represented is in one place, and +the representation of it in another. It likewise appears to be full, yet +contains nothing, though it seems to possess all things[156]. + +22. All passions subsist about the same thing as that about which +corruption subsists; for the reception of passion is the path to +corruption. And the thing that is the subject of passivity, is also the +subject of corruption. Nothing incorporeal, however, is corrupted. But +some of them either exist, or do not exist; so that they are not at all +passive. For that which is passive, ought not to be a thing of this kind, +but such as may be changed in quality, and corrupted by the properties +of the things that enter into it, and cause it to be passive. For the +change in quality of that which is inherent, is not casually effected. +Neither, therefore, does matter suffer; for it is of itself without +quality. Nor do the forms which enter into, and depart from it, suffer; +but the passion subsists about the composite from matter and form, the +very being of which consists in the union of the two. For this, in the +contrary powers and qualities of the things which enter and produce +passion, is seen to be the subject of them. On which account, also, those +things, the life of which is externally derived, and does not subsist +from themselves, are capable of suffering both the participation and +the privation of life. But those beings whose existence consists in an +impassive life, must necessarily possess a permanent life; just as a +privation of life, so far as it is a privation of it, is attended with +impassivity. As, therefore, to be changed and to suffer pertain to the +composite from matter and form, and this is body, but matter is exempt +from this; thus also, to live and to die, and to suffer through the +participation of life and death, is beheld in the composite from soul and +body. Nevertheless, this does not happen to the soul; because it is not a +thing which consists of life and the privation of life, but consists of +life alone. And it possesses this, because its essence is simple, and the +reason [or form] of the soul is self-motive[157]. + +23. An intellectual essence is so similar in its parts, that the +same[158] things exist both in a partial and an all-perfect intellect. In +an universal intellect, however, partial natures subsist universally; but +in a partial intellect, both universals and particulars subsist partially. + +24. Of that essence, the existence of which is in life, and the passions +of which are lives, the death also consists in a certain life, and not in +a total privation of life; because, neither is the deprivation of life +in this essence a passion, or a path which entirely leads to a non-vital +subsistence. + +25. In incorporeal lives, the progressions are effected while the lives +themselves remain firm and stable, nothing pertaining to them being +corrupted, or changed into the hypostasis of things subordinate to them. +Hence, neither are the things to which they give subsistence produced +with a certain corruption or mutation. Nor do these incorporeal lives +subsist like generation, which participates of corruption and mutation. +Hence, they are unbegotten and incorruptible, and on this account are +unfolded into light without generation and incorruptibly. + +26. Of that nature which is beyond intellect, many things are asserted +through intellection, but it is surveyed by a cessation of intellectual +energy better than with it[159]; just as with respect to one who is +asleep, many things are asserted of him while he is in that state by +those who are awake; but the proper knowledge and apprehension of his +dormant condition, is only to be obtained through sleep. For the similar +is known by the similar; because _all knowledge is an assimilation to the +object of knowledge_. + +27. With respect to that which is non-being, we either produce it, being +ourselves separated from real being, or we have a preconception of it, +as adhering to being. Hence, if we are separated from being, we have not +an antecedent conception of the non-being which is above being, but our +knowledge in this case is only that of a false passion, such as that +which happens to a man when he departs from himself. For as a man may +himself, and through himself, be truly elevated to the non-being which +is above being, so, by departing from being, he is led to the non-being +which is a falling off from being. + +28. The hypostasis of body is no impediment whatever to that which is +essentially incorporeal, so as to prevent it from being where, and in +such a way, as it wishes to be. For as that which is without bulk is +incomprehensible by body, and does not at all pertain to it, so that +which has bulk cannot impede or obscure an incorporeal nature, but lies +before it like a non-entity. Nor does that which is incorporeal pervade +locally, when it wishes to pass from one thing to another; for place is +consubsistent with bulk. Nor is it compressed by bodies. For that which +in any way whatever is connected with bulk, may be compressed, and effect +a transition locally; but that which is entirely without bulk and without +magnitude, cannot be restrained by that which has bulk, and does not +participate of local motion. Hence, by a certain disposition, it is found +to be there, where it is inclined to be, being with respect to place +every where and yet no where[160]. By _a certain disposition_, therefore, +it is either above the heavens, or is contained in a certain part of the +world. When, however, it is contained in a certain part of the world, it +is not visible to the eyes, but the presence of it becomes manifest from +its works. + +29. It is necessary that an incorporeal nature, if it is contained in +body, should not be enclosed in it like a wild beast in a den; (for no +body is able thus to enclose and comprehend it), nor is it contained in +body in the same way as a bladder contains something liquid, or wind; but +it is requisite that it should give subsistence to certain powers which +verge to what is external, through its union with body; by which powers, +when it descends, it becomes complicated with body. Its conjunction, +therefore, with body, is effected through an ineffable extension. +Hence, nothing else binds it, but itself binds itself to body. Neither, +therefore, is it liberated from the body, when the body is [mortally] +wounded and corrupted, but it liberates itself, by turning itself from an +adhering affection to the body. + +30. None of the hypostases which rank as wholes, and are perfect, is +converted to its own progeny; but all perfect hypostases are elevated +to their generators as far as to the mundane body [or the body of the +world]. For this body, being perfect, is elevated to its soul, which +is intellectual: and on this account it is moved in a circle. But the +soul of this body is elevated to intellect; and intellect, to the first +principle of all things. All beings, therefore, proceed to this principle +as much as possible, beginning from the last of things. The elevation, +however, to that which is first, is either proximate or remote. Hence, +these natures may not only be said to aspire after the highest God, but +also to enjoy him to the utmost of their power. But in partial[161] +hypostases, and which are able to verge to many things, there is also a +desire of being converted to their progeny. Hence, likewise, in these +there is error, in these there is reprehensible incredulity. These, +therefore, matter injures, because they are capable of being converted +to it, being at the same time able to be converted to divinity. Hence, +perfection gives subsistence to secondary from primary natures, +preserving them converted to the first of things; but imperfection +converts primary[162] to posterior natures, and causes them to love the +beings which have departed from divinity prior to themselves. + +31. God is every where because he is no where: and this is also true of +intellect and soul: for each of these is every where, because each is +no where. But God indeed is every where, and no where, with respect to +all things which are posterior to him; and he[163] alone is such as he +is, and such as he wills himself to be. Intellect is in God, but is every +where, and no where, with respect to the natures posterior to it. And +soul is in God and intellect, and is every where and no where, in [or +with respect to] body[164]. But body is in soul, and in intellect[165], +and in God. And as all beings and non-beings are from and in God, hence, +he is neither beings nor non-beings, nor subsists in them. For if, +indeed, he was alone every where, he would be all things and in all, but +since he is also no where, all things are produced through him, and are +contained in him, because he is every where. They are, however, different +from him, because he is no where. Thus, likewise, intellect being every +where and no where, is the cause of souls, and of the natures posterior +to souls; yet intellect is not soul, nor the natures posterior to soul, +nor subsists in them; because it is not only every where, but is also no +where, with respect to the natures posterior to it. And soul is neither +body, nor in body, but is the cause of body; because being every where, +it is also no where, with respect to body. And this progression of things +in the universe extends as far as to that which is neither able to be at +once every where, nor at once no where, but partially participates of +each of these[166]. + +32. The soul does not exist on the earth [when it is conversant with +terrene natures,] in the same manner as bodies accede to the earth; +but a subsistence of the soul on the earth, signifies its presiding +over terrene bodies. Thus, also, the soul is said to be in Hades, when +it presides over its image[167], which is naturally adapted to be in +place, but possesses its hypostasis in darkness. So that if Hades is a +subterranean dark place, the soul, though not divulsed from being, will +exist in Hades, by attracting to itself its image. For when the soul +departs from the solid body, the spirit accompanies it which it had +collected from the starry spheres. But as from its adhering affection +to the body, it exerts a partial reason, through which it possesses an +habitude to a body of a certain quality, in performing the energies of +life;—hence, from this adhesion to body, the form of the phantasy is +impressed in the spirit, and thus the image is attracted by the soul. +The soul, however, is said to be in Hades, because the spirit obtains a +formless and obscure nature. And as a heavy and moist spirit pervades +as far as to subterranean places, hence the soul is said to proceed +under the earth. Not that this essence of the soul changes one place +for another, and subsists in place, but it receives the habitudes of +bodies which are naturally adapted to change their places, and to be +allotted a subsistence in place; such-like bodies receiving it according +to aptitudes, from being disposed after a certain manner towards it. For +the soul, conformably to the manner in which it is disposed, finds an +appropriate body. Hence, when it is disposed in a purer manner, it has a +connascent body which approximates to an ethereal nature, and this is an +ethereal body. But when it proceeds from reason to the energies of the +phantasy, then its connascent body is of a solar-form nature. And when it +becomes effeminate and vehemently excited by corporeal form, then it is +connected with a lunar-form body. When, however, it falls into bodies +which consist of humid vapours, then a perfect ignorance of real being +follows, together with darkness and infancy. + +Moreover, in its egress from the body, if it still possesses a spirit +turbid from humid exhalations, it then attracts to itself a shadow, and +becomes heavy; a spirit of this kind naturally striving to penetrate +into the recesses of the earth, unless a certain other cause draws it +in a contrary direction. As therefore the soul, when surrounded with +this testaceous and terrene vestment, necessarily lives on the earth; so +likewise when it attracts a moist spirit, it is necessarily surrounded +with the image. But it attracts moisture when it continually endeavours +to associate with nature, whose operations are effected in moisture, +and which are rather under than upon the earth. When, however, the soul +earnestly endeavours to depart from nature, then she becomes a dry +splendour, without a shadow, and without a cloud, or mist. For moisture +gives subsistence to a mist in the air; but dryness constitutes a dry +splendour from exhalation. + +33. The things which are truly predicated of a sensible and material +nature, are these: that it has, in every respect, a diffused and +dispersed subsistence; that it is mutable; that it has its existence in +difference; that it is a composite; that it subsists by itself, [as the +subject or recipient of other things;] that it is beheld in place, and +in bulk: and other properties similar to these are asserted of it. But +the following particulars are predicated of truly existing being, and +which itself subsists from itself; viz. that it is always established +in itself; that it has an existence perpetually similar and the same; +that it is essentialized in sameness; that it is immutable according +to essence, is uncompounded, is neither dissoluble, nor in place, nor +is dispersed into bulk; and is neither generated, nor capable of being +destroyed: and other properties are asserted of it similar to these. To +which predications adhering, we should neither ourselves assert any +thing repugnant to them, concerning the different nature of sensible and +truly-existing beings, nor assent to those who do. + + +SECTION II. + +34. There is one kind of virtues pertaining to the political character, +and another to the man who tends to contemplation, and who, on this +account, is called theoretic, and is now a beholder [of intellectual and +intelligible natures]. And there are also other virtues pertaining to +intellect, so far as it is intellect, and separate from soul. The virtues +indeed of the political character, and which consist in the moderation +of the passions, are characterized by following and being obedient to +the reasoning about that which is becoming in actions. Hence, looking to +an innoxious converse with neighbours, these virtues are denominated, +from the aggregation of fellowship, political. And here prudence indeed +subsists about the reasoning part; fortitude about the irascible +part; temperance in the consent and symphony of the epithymetic[168] +with the reasoning part; and justice, in each of these performing its +proper employment with respect to governing and being governed. But +the virtues of him who proceeds to the contemplative life, consist in +a departure from terrestrial concerns. Hence, also, they are called +purifications, being surveyed in the refraining from corporeal actions, +and avoiding sympathies with the body. For these are the virtues of the +soul elevating itself to true being. The political virtues therefore +adorn the mortal man, and are the forerunners of purifications. For it +is necessary that he who is adorned by the _cathartic_ virtues, should +abstain from doing any thing precedaneously in conjunction with body. +Hence, in these purifications, not to opine with body, but to energize +alone, gives subsistence to _prudence_; which derives its perfection +through energizing intellectually with purity. But not to be similarly +passive with the body, constitutes _temperance_. Not to fear a departure +from body, as into something void, and non-entity, gives subsistence to +_fortitude_. But when reason and intellect are the leaders, and there +is no resistance [from the irrational part], _justice_ is produced. The +disposition therefore, according to the political virtues, is surveyed +in the moderation of the passions; having for its end to live as man +conformable to nature. But the disposition, according to the theoretic +virtues, is beheld in apathy[169], the end of which is a similitude to +God. + +Since, however, of purification, one kind consists in purifying, but +another pertains to those that are purified, the cathartic virtues are +surveyed according to both these significations of purification. For +the end of purification is to become pure. But since purification, and +the being purified, are an ablation of every thing foreign, the good +resulting from them will be different from that which purifies; so, that +if that which is purified was good prior to the impurity with which it +is defiled, purification is sufficient. That, however, which remains +after purification, is good, and not purification. The nature of the soul +also was not good [prior to purification], but is that which is able to +partake of good, and is boniform. For if this were not the case, it would +not have become situated in evil. The good therefore of the soul consists +in being united to its generator, but its evil in an association with +things subordinate to itself. Its evil also is twofold; the one arising +from an association with terrestrial natures, but the other from doing +this with an excess of the passions. Hence, all the political virtues +which liberate the soul from one evil, may be denominated virtues, and +are honourable. But the cathartic are more honourable, and liberate it +from evil, so far as it is soul. It is necessary therefore, that the +soul, when purified, should associate with its generator. Hence, the +virtue of it, after its conversion, consists in a scientific knowledge of +[true] being; but this will not be the case, unless conversion precedes. + +There is, therefore, another genus of virtues after the cathartic +and political, and which are the virtues of the soul _energizing +intellectually_. And here, indeed, wisdom and prudence consist in the +contemplation of those things which intellect possesses. But _justice_ +consists in performing what is appropriate in conformity to, and +energizing according to intellect. _Temperance_ is an inward conversion +of the soul to intellect. And _fortitude_ is apathy, according to a +similitude of that to which the soul looks, and which is naturally +impassive. These virtues also, in the same manner as the others, +alternately follow each other. + +The fourth species of the virtues, is that of the paradigms subsisting +in intellect: which are more excellent than the psychical virtues, and +exist as the paradigms of these; the virtues of the soul being the +similitudes of them. And intellect indeed is that in which all things +subsist at once as paradigms. Here, therefore, prudence is science; but +intellect that knows [all things] is wisdom. Temperance is that which is +converted to itself. The proper work of intellect, is the performance +of its appropriate duty, [and this is justice[170].] But fortitude is +sameness, and the abiding with purity in itself, through an abundance +of power. There are therefore four genera of virtues; of which, indeed, +some pertain to intellect, concur with the essence of it, and are +paradigmatic. Others pertain to soul now looking to intellect, and being +filled from it. Others belong to the soul of man, purifying itself, and +becoming purified from the body, and the irrational passions. And others +are the virtues of the soul of man, adorning the man, through giving +measure and bound to the irrational nature, and producing moderation +in the passions. _And he indeed, who has the greater virtues, has also +necessarily the less; but the contrary is not true, that he who has +the less, has also the greater virtues._ Nor will he who possesses the +greater, energize precedaneously according to the less, but only so far +as the necessities of the mortal nature require. The scope also of the +virtues, is, as we have said, generically different in the different +virtues. For the scope of the _political_ virtues, is to give measure +to the passions in their practical energies according to nature. +But the scope of the _cathartic_ virtues, is entirely to obliterate +the remembrance of the passions; and the scope of the rest subsists +analogously to what has been before said. Hence, he who energizes +according to the _practical_ virtues, is a _worthy_ man; but he who +energizes according to the _cathartic_ virtues, is an _angelic man_, or +is also _a good dæmon_. He who energizes according to the _intellectual_ +virtues alone is _a God_; but he who energizes according to the +_paradigmatic_ virtues, is _the father of the Gods_. We, therefore, ought +especially to pay attention to the _cathartic_ virtues, since we may +obtain these in the present life. But through these, the ascent is to the +more honourable virtues. Hence, it is requisite to survey to what degree +purification may be extended: for it is a separation from body, and from +the passive motion of the irrational part. But how this may be effected, +and to what extent, must now be unfolded. + +In the first place, indeed, it is necessary that he who intends to +acquire this purification, should, as the foundation and basis of it, +know himself to be a soul bound in a foreign thing, and in a different +essence. In the second place, as that which is raised from this +foundation, he should collect himself from the body, and as it were from +different places, so as to be disposed in a manner perfectly impassive +with respect to the body. For he who energizes uninterruptedly according +to sense, though he may not do this with an adhering affection, and the +enjoyment resulting from pleasure, yet, at the same time, his attention +is dissipated about the body, in consequence of becoming through +sense[171] in contact with it. But we are addicted to the pleasures or +pains of sensibles; in conjunction with a promptitude, and converging +sympathy; from which disposition it is requisite to be purified. +_This, however, will be effected by admitting necessary pleasures, and +the sensations of them, merely as remedies, or as a liberation from +pain[172], in order that [the rational part] may not be impeded [in its +energies]._ Pain also must be taken away. But if this is not possible, +it must be mildly diminished. And it will be diminished, if the soul +is not copassive with it. Anger, likewise, must as much as possible be +taken away; and must by no means be premeditated. But if it cannot be +entirely removed, deliberate choice must not be mingled with it, but +the unpremeditated motion must be the impulse of the irrational part. +_That however which is unpremeditated, is imbecile and small._ All fear +likewise must be expelled. For he who is adapted to this purification, +will fear nothing. Here, however, if it should take place, it will be +unpremeditated. Anger therefore and fear must be used for the purpose +of admonition. But the desire of every thing base must be exterminated. +Such a one also, so far as he is a cathartic philosopher, will not +desire meats and drinks [except so far as they are necessary]. Neither +must there be the unpremeditated in natural venereal connexions; _but if +this should take place, it must only be as far as to that precipitate +imagination which energizes in sleep_. In short, the intellectual soul +itself of the purified man must be liberated from all these [corporeal +propensities]. He must likewise endeavour, that what is moved to the +irrational nature of corporeal passions, may be moved without sympathy, +and without animadversion; so that the motions themselves may be +immediately dissolved, through their vicinity to the reasoning power. +This, however, will not take place while the purification is proceeding +to its perfection; but will happen to those in whom reason rules without +opposition. Hence, in these, the inferior part will so venerate reason, +that it will be indignant if it is at all moved, in consequence of not +being quiet when its master is present, and will reprove itself for its +imbecility. These, however, are yet only moderations of the passions, +but at length terminate in apathy. For when copassivity is entirely +exterminated, then apathy is present with him who is purified from this +passivity. For passion becomes moved when reason imparts excitation, +through verging [to the irrational nature]. + +35. Every thing which is situated somewhere, is there situated according +to its own nature, and not preternaturally. For body, therefore, which +subsists in matter and bulk, to be somewhere, is to be in place. Hence, +for the body of the world, which is material and has bulk, to be every +where, is to be extended with interval, and to subsist in the place +of interval. But a subsistence in place, is not at all present with +the intelligible world, nor, in short, with that which is immaterial, +and essentially incorporeal, because it is without bulk, and without +interval; so that the ubiquity of an incorporeal nature is not local. +Hence, neither will one part of it be here, but another there; for if +this were the case, it would not be out of place, nor without interval; +but wherever it is, the whole of it is there. Nor is it indeed in this, +but not in another place; for thus it would be comprehended by one place, +but separated from another. Nor is it remote from this thing, but near +to that; in the same manner as remoteness and nearness are asserted of +things which are adapted to be in place, according to the measures of +intervals. Hence, the sensible is present, indeed, with the intelligible +world, according to interval, but [a truly] incorporeal nature is +present with the world impartibly, and unaccompanied by interval. The +impartible, likewise, when it is in that which has interval, is wholly +in every part of it, being one and the same in number [in every part of +it]. That which is impartible, therefore, and without multitude, becomes +extended into magnitude, and multiplied, when intimately connected +with that which is naturally multitudinous, and endued with magnitude; +and thus the latter receives the former in such a way as it is adapted +to receive it, and not such as the former truly is. But that which is +partible and multitudinous, is received by that which is naturally +impartible and without multitude, impartibly and non-multitudinously, and +after this manner is present with it; _i.e._ the impartible is present +impartibly, without plurality, and without a subsistence in place, +conformably to its own nature, with that which is partible, and which is +naturally multitudinous, and exists in place. But that which is partible, +multiplied, and in place, is present with the impartible essence, +partibly, multitudinously, and locally. Hence, it is necessary, in the +survey of these natures, to preserve and not confound the peculiarities +of each; or rather, we should not imagine or opine of that which is +incorporeal, such properties as pertain to bodies, or any thing of the +like kind. For no one would ascribe to bodies the peculiarities of a +genuinely incorporeal essence. For all of us are familiar with bodies; +but the knowledge of incorporeal natures is attainable by us with great +difficulty; because, through not being able to behold them intuitively, +we are involved in doubt about their nature; and this takes place as long +as we are under the dominion of imagination. + +Thus, therefore, you should say, If that which is in place, is out of, +or has departed from itself, through having proceeded into bulk, that +which is intelligible is not in place, and is in itself, because it +has not proceeded into corporeal extension. Hence, if the former is an +image, the latter is an archetype. And the former, indeed, derives its +being through the intelligible; but the latter subsists in [and through] +itself. For every [physical] image is the image of intellect. It is also +requisite that, calling to mind the peculiarities of both these, we +should not wonder at the discrepance which takes place in their congress +with each other; if, in short, it is proper on this occasion to use the +word congress. For we are not now surveying the congress of bodies, but +of things which are entirely distinct from each other, according to +peculiarity of hypostasis. Hence, also, this congress is different from +every thing which is usually surveyed in things essentially the same. +Neither, therefore, is it temperament, or mixture, or conjunction, or +apposition, but subsists in a way different from all these; appearing, +indeed, in all the mutual participations of consubstantial natures, in +whatever way this may be effected; but transcending every thing that +falls under the apprehension of sense. Hence, an intelligible essence is +wholly present without interval, with all the parts of that which has +interval, though they should happen to be infinite in number. Nor is +it present distributed into parts, giving a part to a part; nor being +multiplied, does it multitudinously impart itself to multitude; but it +is wholly present with the parts of that which is extended into bulk, +and with each individual of the multitude, and all the bulk impartibly, +and without plurality, and as numerically one. But it pertains to those +natures to enjoy it partibly, and in a distributed manner, whose power is +dissipated into different parts. And to these it frequently happens, that +through a defect of their own nature, they counterfeit an intelligible +essence; so that doubts arise respecting that essence, which appears to +have passed from its own nature into theirs. + +36. Truly-existing being is neither great nor small, for magnitude +and parvitude are properly the peculiarities of bulk. But true being +transcends both magnitude and parvitude; and is above the greatest, and +above the least; and is numerically one and the same, though it is found +to be simultaneously participated by every thing that is greatest, and +every thing that is least. You must not, therefore, conceive of it as +something which is greatest; as you will then be dubious how, being that +which is greatest, it is present with the smallest masses, without being +diminished or contracted. Nor must you conceive of it as something which +is least; since you will thus again be dubious how, being that which is +least, it is present with the greatest masses, without being multiplied +or increased, or without receiving addition. But at one and the same time +receiving into the greatest magnitude that which transcends the greatest +bulk, and into the least magnitude that which transcends the least[173], +you will be able to conceive how the same thing, abiding in itself, +may be simultaneously seen in any casual magnitude, and in infinite +multitudes and corporeal masses. For according to its own peculiarity, +it is present with the magnitude of the world impartibly and without +magnitude. It also antecedes the bulk of the world, and comprehends every +part of it, in its own impartibility; just as, _vice versa_, the world, +by its multitude of parts, is multifariously present, as far as it is +able, with truly-existing being, yet cannot comprehend it, neither with +the whole of its bulk, nor the whole of its power; but meets with it in +all its parts as that which is infinite, and cannot be passed beyond; +and this both in other respects, and because truly-existing being is +entirely free from all corporeal extension. + +37. That which is greater in bulk, is less in power, when compared, not +with things of a similar kind, but with those that are of a different +species, or of a different essence. For bulk is, as it were, the +departure of a thing from itself, and a division of power into the +smallest parts. Hence, that which transcends in power, is foreign from +all bulk. For power proceeding into itself, is filled with itself, and, +by corroborating itself, obtains its proper strength; on which account, +body proceeding into bulk through a diminution of power, is as much +remote from truly-incorporeal being, as that which truly exists is from +being exhausted by bulk; for the latter abides in the magnitude of the +same power, through an exemption from bulk. As, therefore, truly-existing +being is, with reference to a corporeal mass, without magnitude and +without bulk; thus also, that which is corporeal is, with reference +to truly-existing being, imbecile and powerless. For that which is +greatest by magnitude of power, is exempt from all bulk; so that the +world existing every where, and, as it is said, meeting with real being +which is truly every where, is not able to comprehend the magnitude of +its power. It meets, however, with true being, which is not partibly +present with it, but is present without magnitude, and without any +definite limitation. The presence, therefore, of truly-existing being +with the world, is not local, but assimilative, so far as it is possible +for body to be assimilated to that which is incorporeal, and for that +which is incorporeal to be surveyed in a body assimilated to it. Hence, +an incorporeal nature is not present with body, so far as it is not +possible for that which is material to be assimilated to a perfectly +immaterial nature; and it is present, so far as a corporeal can be +assimilated to an incorporeal essence. Nevertheless, this is not effected +through reception; since, if it were, each would be corrupted. For the +material, indeed, in receiving the immaterial nature, would be corrupted, +through being changed into it; and the immaterial essence would become +material. Assimilations, therefore, and participations of powers, and +the deficiency of power, proceed into things which are thus different +in essence from each other, into each other. The world, therefore, is +very far from possessing the power of real being; and real being is very +remote from the imbecility of a material nature. But that which subsists +between these, assimilating and being assimilated, and conjoining +the extremes to each other, becomes the cause of deception about the +extremes, in consequence of applying, through the assimilation, the one +to the other. + +38. Truly-existing being is said to be many things, not by a subsistence +in different places, nor in the measures of bulk, nor by coacervation, +nor by the circumscriptions or comprehensions[174] of divisible parts, +but by a difference which is immaterial, without bulk, and without +plurality, and which is divided according to multitude. Hence, also, +it is one; not as one body, nor as in one place; nor as one bulk; nor +as one which is many things; because it is different so far as it is +one, and its difference is both divided and united. For its difference +is not externally acquired, nor adscititious, nor obtained through the +participation of something else, but it is many things from itself. For, +remaining one, it energizes with all energies, because, through sameness, +it constitutes all difference; not being surveyed in the difference of +one thing with respect to another, as is the case in bodies. For, on +the contrary, in these, unity subsists in difference; because diversity +has in them a precedaneous existence; but the unity which they contain +is externally and adscititiously derived. For in truly existing being, +indeed, unity and sameness precede; but difference is generated, +from this unity being energetic. _Hence, true being is multiplied in +impartibility; but body is united in multitude and bulk._ The former +also is established in itself, subsisting in itself according to unity; +but the latter is never in itself, because it receives its hypostasis in +an extension of existence. The former, therefore, is an all-energetic +one; but the latter is an united multitude. Hence, it is requisite to +explore how the former is one and different; and again, how the latter is +multitude and one. Nor must we transfer the peculiarities of the one to +those which pertain to the other. + +39. It is not proper to think that the multitude of souls was generated +on account of the multitude of bodies; but it is necessary to admit +that, prior to bodies, there were many souls, and one soul [the cause +of the many]. Nor does the one and whole soul prevent the subsistence +in it of many souls; nor do the multitude of souls distribute by +division the one soul into themselves. For they are distinct from, but +are not abscinded from the soul, which ranks as a whole; nor do they +distribute into minute parts this whole soul into themselves. They are +also present with each other without confusion; nor do they produce the +whole soul by coacervation. For they are not separated from each other +by any boundaries; nor, again, are they confused with each other; just +as neither are many sciences confused in one soul [by which they are +possessed]. For these sciences do not subsist in the soul like bodies, +as things of a different essence from it; but they are certain energies +of the soul. For the nature of soul possesses an infinite power. Every +thing also that occurs in it is soul; and all souls are [in a certain +respect] one; and again, the soul which ranks as a whole, is different +from all the rest. For as bodies, though divided to infinity, do not +end in that which is incorporeal, but alone receive a difference of +segments according to bulk; thus also soul, being a vital form, may +be conceived to consist of forms _ad infinitum_. For it possesses +specific differences, and the whole of it subsists together with, or +without these. For, if there is in the soul that which is as it were a +part divided from the rest of the parts, yet, at the same time that +there is difference, the sameness remains. If, however, in bodies, in +which difference predominates over sameness, nothing incorporeal when +it accedes cuts off the union, but all the parts remain essentially +united, and are divided by qualities and other forms; what ought we to +assert and conceive of a specific incorporeal life, in which sameness +is more prevalent than difference; to which nothing foreign to form is +subjected, and from which the union of bodies is derived? Nor does body, +when it becomes connected with soul, cut off its union, though it is an +impediment to its energies in many respects. But the sameness of soul +produces and discovers all things through itself, through its specific +energy, which proceeds to infinity; since any part of it whatever is +capable of effecting all things, when it is liberated and purified from +a conjunction with bodies; just as any part of seed possesses the power +of the whole seed. As, however, seed, when it is united with matter, +predominates over it, according to each of the productive principles +which the seeds contain; and all the seed, its power being collected into +one, possesses the whole of its power in each of the parts; thus also, +in the immaterial soul, that which may be conceived as a part, has the +power of the whole soul. But that part of it which verges to matter, is +vanquished, indeed, by the form to which it verges, and yet is adapted to +associate with immaterial form, though it is connected with matter, when +withdrawing itself from a material nature, it is converted to itself. +Since, however, through verging to matter, it becomes in want of all +things, and suffers an emptiness of its proper power; but when it is +elevated to intellect, is found to possess a plenitude of all its powers; +hence those who first obtained a knowledge of this plenitude of the soul, +very properly indicated its emptiness by calling it _poverty_, and its +fulness by denominating it _satiety_. + + +SECTION III. + +40. The ancients, wishing to exhibit to us the peculiarity of incorporeal +being, so far as this can be effected by words, when they assert that +it is one, immediately add, that it is likewise all things; by which +they signified that it is not some one[175] of the things which are +known by the senses. Since, however, we suspect that this incorporeal +one is different from sensibles, in consequence of not perceiving +this total one, which is all things according to one, in a sensible +nature, and which is so because this one is all things:—hence the +ancients added, that _it is one so far as one_; in order that we might +understand that what is all things in truly existing being, is something +uncompounded, and that we might withdraw ourselves from the conception +of a coacervation. When likewise they say that it is every where, they +add that it is no where. When also they assert that it is in all things, +they add, that it is no where in every thing. Thus, too, when they say, +that it is in all things, and in every divisible nature which is adapted +to receive it, they add, that it is a whole in a whole. And, in short, +they render it manifest to us, through contrary peculiarities; at one and +the same time assuming these, in order that we may exterminate, from the +apprehension of it, the fictitious conceptions which are derived from +bodies, and which obscure the cognoscible peculiarities of real being. + +41. When you have assumed an eternal essence, infinite in itself +according to power, and begin to perceive intellectually an hypostasis +unwearied, untamed, and never-failing, but transcending in the most +pure and genuine life, and full from itself; and which is likewise +established in itself, satisfied with, and seeking nothing but itself:—to +this essence, if you add a subsistence in place, or a relation to a +certain thing, at the same time that you [appear to] diminish it, by +ascribing to it an indigence of place, or a relative condition of being, +you do not [in reality] diminish this essence, but you separate yourself +from the perception of it, by receiving as a veil the phantasy which runs +under your conjectural apprehension of it. For you cannot pass beyond, +or stop, or render more perfect, or effect the least change in a thing +of this kind, because it is impossible for it to be in the smallest +degree deficient. For it is much more never-failing than any perpetually +flowing fountain can be conceived to be. If, however, you are unable +to keep pace with it, and to become assimilated to the intelligible +all, you should not investigate any thing pertaining to real being; +or, if you do, you will deviate from the path that leads to it, and +will look to something else. But if you investigate nothing else, being +established in yourself and your own essence, you will be assimilated to +the intelligible universe, and will not adhere to any thing posterior +to it. Neither, therefore, should you say, I am of a great magnitude. +For, omitting this greatness, you will become universal; though you were +universal prior to this. But, together with the universal, something else +was present with you, and you became less by the addition; because the +addition was not from truly-existing being. For to that you cannot add +any thing. When, therefore, any thing is added from non-being, a place is +afforded to Poverty as an associate, accompanied by an indigence of all +things. Hence, dismissing non-being, you will then become sufficient to +yourself[176]. For he will not return properly to himself who does not +dismiss things of a more vile and abject nature, and who opines himself +to be something naturally small, and not to be such as he truly is. For +thus he, at one and the same time, departs both from himself, and from +truly-existing being. When, also, any one is present with that which is +present in himself, then he is present with true being, which is every +where. But when you withdraw from yourself, then, likewise, you recede +from real being;—of such great consequence is it, for a man to be present +with that which is present with himself, [_i.e._ with his rational +part], and to be absent from that which is external to him. + +If, however, true being is present with us, but non-being is absent, +and real being is not present with us in conjunction with other things +[of a nature foreign to it]; it does not accede in order that it may be +present, but we depart from it, when it is not present [with things of +a different nature]. And why should this be considered as wonderful? +For you when present are not absent from yourself; and yet you are not +present with yourself, though present. And you are both present with and +absent from yourself when you survey other things, and omit to behold +yourself. If, therefore, you are thus present, and yet not [in reality] +present with yourself, and on this account are ignorant of yourself, +and in a greater degree discover all things, though remote from your +essence, than yourself, with which you are naturally present, why should +you wonder if that which is not present is remote from you who are remote +from it, because you have become remote from yourself? For, by how much +the more you are [truly] present with yourself, though it is present, and +inseparably conjoined with you, by so much the more will you be present +with real being, which is so essentially united to you, that it is as +impossible for it to be divulsed from you, as for you to be separated +from yourself. So that it is universally possible to know what is present +with real being, and what is absent from it, though it is every where +present, and again is also no where. For those who are able to proceed +into their own essence intellectually, and to obtain a knowledge of +it, will, in the knowledge itself, and the science accompanying this +knowledge, be able to recover or regain themselves, through the union +of that which knows with that which is known. And with those, who are +present with themselves, truly-existing being will also be present. But +from such as abandon the proper being of themselves to other things,—from +these, as they are absent from themselves, true being will also be +absent. If, however, we are naturally adapted to be established in the +same essence, to be rich from ourselves, and not to descend to that which +we are not; in so doing becoming in want of ourselves, and thus again +associating with Poverty, though Porus[177] [or Plenty] is present;—and +if we are cut off from real being, from which we are not separated either +by place, or essence, nor by any thing else, through our conversion to +non-being, we suffer as a just punishment of our abandonment of true +being, a departure from, and ignorance of ourselves. And again, by a +proper attention to, we recover ourselves, and become united to divinity. +It is, therefore, rightly said, that the soul is confined in body as in +a prison, and is there detained in chains like a fugitive slave[178]. +We should, however, [earnestly] endeavour to be liberated from our +bonds. For, through being converted to these sensible objects, we desert +ourselves, though we are of a divine origin, and are, as Empedocles says, + + Heaven’s exiles, straying from the orb of light. + +So that every depraved life is full of servitude; and on this account +is without God and unjust, the spirit in it being full of impiety, and +consequently of injustice. And thus, again, it is rightly said, that +justice is to be found in the performance of that which is the province +of him who performs it. The image also of true justice consists in +distributing to each of those with whom we live, that which is due to the +desert of each. + +42. That which possesses its existence in another [_i.e._ in something +different from itself], and is not essentialized in itself, separably +from another, if it should be converted to itself, in order to know +itself, without that in which it is essentialized, withdrawing itself +from it; would be corrupted by this knowledge, in consequence of +separating itself from its essence. But that which is able to know +itself without the subject in which it exists, and is able to withdraw +itself from this subject, without the destruction of itself, cannot be +essentialized in that, from which it is capable of converting itself +to itself, without being corrupted, and of knowing itself by its own +energies. Hence, if sight, and every sensitive power, neither perceives +itself, nor apprehends or preserves itself by separating itself +from body; but intellect, when it separates itself from body, then +especially perceives intellectually, is converted to itself, and is not +corrupted;—it is evident that the sensitive powers obtain the power of +energizing through the body; but that intellect possesses its energies +and its essence not in body, but in itself. + +43. Incorporeal natures are properly denominated, and conceived to be +what they are, according to a privation of body; just as, according to +the ancients, matter, and the form which is in matter, and also natures +and [physical] powers, are apprehended by an abstraction from matter. +And after the same manner place, time, and the boundaries of things, are +apprehended. For all such things are denominated according to a privation +of body. There are likewise other things which are said to be incorporeal +improperly, not according to a privation of body, but, in short, because +they are not naturally adapted to generate body[179]. Hence those of +the former signification subsist in bodies; but those of the second are +perfectly separated from bodies, and from those incorporeal natures which +subsist about bodies. For bodies, indeed, are in place, and boundaries +are in body. But intellect, and intellectual reason, neither subsist +in place nor in body; nor proximately give existence to bodies, nor +subsist together with bodies, or with those incorporeal natures which +are denominated according to a privation of bodies. Neither, therefore, +if a certain incorporeal vacuum should be conceived to exist, would it +be possible for intellect to be in a vacuum. For a vacuum may be the +recipient of body; but it is impossible that it should be the recipient +of intellect, and afford a place for its energy. Since, however, the +genus of an incorporeal nature appears to be twofold, one of these the +followers of Zeno do not at all admit, but they adopt the other; and +perceiving that the former is not such as the latter, they entirely +subvert it, though they ought rather to conceive that it is of another +genus, and not to fancy that, because it is not the latter, it has no +existence. + +44. Intellect and the intelligible are one thing, and sense and that +which is sensible another. And the intelligible, indeed, is conjoined +with intellect, but that which is sensible with sense. Neither, however, +can sense by itself apprehend itself.... But the intelligible, which +is conjoined with intellect, and intellect, which is conjoined with +the intelligible, by no means fall under the perception of sense. +Intellect, however, is intelligible to intellect. But if intellect is the +intelligible object of intellect, intellect will be its own intelligible +object. If, therefore, intellect is an intellectual and not a sensible +object, it will be intelligible. But if it is intelligible to intellect, +and not to sense, it will also be intelligent. The same thing, therefore, +will be that which is intelligent, or intellectually perceives, and +which is intellectually perceived, or is intelligible; and this will be +true of the whole with respect to the whole; but not as he who rubs, +and he who is rubbed. Intellect, therefore, does not intellectually +perceive by one part, and is intellectually perceived by another: for +it is impartible, and the whole is an intelligible object of the whole. +It is likewise wholly intellect, having nothing in itself which can be +conceived to be deprived of intelligence. Hence one part of it does not +intellectually perceive, but not another part of it[180]. For, so far as +it does not intellectually perceive, it will be unintelligent. Neither, +therefore, departing from this thing, does it pass on to that. For of +that from which it departs, it has no intellectual perception. But if +there is no transition in its intellections, it intellectually perceives +all things at once. If, therefore, it understands all things at once, and +not this thing now, but another afterwards, it understands all things +instantaneously and always....[181] + +Hence, if all things are instantaneously perceived by it, its perceptions +have nothing to do with the past and the future, but subsist in an +indivisible untemporal _now_; so that the simultaneous, both according +to multitude, and according to temporal interval, are present with +intellect. Hence, too, all things subsist in it according to one, and +in one, without interval, and without time. But if this be the case, +there is nothing discursive or transitive in its intellections, and +consequently they are without motion. Hence, they are energies according +to one, subsisting in one, and without increase or mutation, or any +transition. If, however, the multitude subsists according to one, and +the energy is collected together at once, and without time, an essence +of this kind must necessarily always subsist in [an intelligible] one. +But this is eternity. Hence, eternity is present with intellect. That +nature, however, which does not perceive intellectually according to one, +and in one, but transitively, and with motion, so that in understanding +it leaves one thing and apprehends another, divides and proceeds +discursively,—this nature [which is soul] subsists in conjunction with +time. For with a motion of this kind, the future and the past are +consubsistent. But soul, changing its conceptions, passes from one thing +to another; not that the prior conceptions depart, and the posterior +accede in their place, but there is, as it were, a transition of the +former, though they remain in the soul, and the latter accede, as if from +some other place. They do not, however, accede in reality from another +place; but they appear to do so in consequence of the self-motion of the +soul, and through her eye being directed to a survey of the different +forms which she contains, and which have the relation of parts to her +whole essence. For she resembles a fountain not flowing outwardly, +but circularly scattering its streams into itself. With the motion, +therefore, of soul, time is consubsistent; but eternity is consubsistent +with the permanency of intellect in itself[182]. It is not, however, +divided from intellect in the same manner as time is from soul; because +in intellect the consubsistent essences are united. But that which is +perpetually moved, is the source of a false opinion of eternity, through +the immeasurable extent of its motion producing a conception of eternity. +And that which abides [in one,] is falsely conceived to be the same with +that which is [perpetually] moved. For that which is perpetually moved, +evolves the time of itself in the same manner as _the now_ of itself, +and multiplies it, according to a temporal progression. Hence, some have +apprehended that time is to be surveyed in permanency no less than in +motion; and that eternity, as we have said, is infinite time; just as +if each of these imparted its own properties to the other; time, which +is always moved, adumbrating eternity by the perpetuity of itself, and +the sameness of its motion; and eternity, through being established +in sameness of energy, becoming similar to time, by the permanency of +itself arising from energy. In sensibles, however, the time of one thing +is distinct from that of another. Thus, for instance, there is one time +of the sun, and another of the moon, one time of the morning-star, and +another of each of the planets. Hence, also, there is a different year +of different planets. The year, likewise, which comprehends these times, +terminates as in a summit in the motion of the soul [of the universe,] +according to the imitation of which the celestial orbs are moved. The +motion of this soul, however, being of a different nature from that of +the planets, the time of the former also is different from that of the +latter. For the latter subsists with interval, and is distinguished from +the former by local motions and transitions. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[146] In the original, Ου το ποιουν εις αλλο, πελασει και αφῃ ποιει, α +ποιει· κ.τ.λ. But it is evident, from the sense of the whole passage, +that, for Ου το ποιουν, we should read, Ου παν το ποιουν, κ.τ.λ. + +[147] The article ο is wanting here in the original before ετερος. + +[148] Knowledge subsists conformably to the nature by which it is +possessed, and not conformably to the thing known. Hence it is either +better than, or co-ordinate with, or inferior to the object of knowledge. +Thus the rational soul has a knowledge of sensibles, which is superior +to sensibles; but it knows itself with a co-ordinate knowledge; and its +knowledge of divinity is inferior to the object of knowledge. Porphyry, +therefore, is not correct in what he here says. This dogma respecting the +conformity of knowledge to that which knows, rather than to the thing +known, originated from the divine Iamblichus, as we are informed by +Ammonius in his commentary on Aristotle’s treatise De Interpretatione, +and is adopted by Proclus (in Parmenid.). Boetius likewise employs it in +his reasoning in lib. v. about the prescience of divinity. None of his +commentators, however, have noticed the source from whence it was derived. + +[149] Because here the generator is that _primarily_ which the thing +generated is _secondarily_. See my translation of Proclus’s Theological +Elements. + +[150] Porphyry here summarily comprehends the rational gnostic powers +of the soul in intellect, because, being rational, they are expansions +of intellect properly so called. But these powers, beginning from the +lowest, are _opinion_, _dianoia_, and the summit of dianoia, which summit +is the intellect of the human soul, and is that power, by the light of +which we perceive the truth of axioms, it being intuitive perception. +_Dianoia_ is the discursive energy of reason; or it is that power which +reasons scientifically, deriving the principles of its reasoning from +intellect. And _opinion_ is that power which knows _that_ a thing is, but +is ignorant of the cause of it, or _why_ it is. + +[151] In the original, ει δε μη εξω εκτεινομενος; but for ει δε μη, it +appears to me to be obviously necessary to read ουδε μη. + +[152] In the original, εξω δε οντων υλης, ουδαμου αν ειη ταυτα; which +Holstenius, wholly mistaking the meaning, most erroneously translates, +“At si extra materiam sint, neutiquam id fieri poterit.” Farther on, +Porphyry asserts, that God, intellect, and soul, are no where, according +to corporeal locality. + +[153] In the original, η μνημη ουκ εστι φαντασιων σωτηρια, αλλα των +μελετηθεντων προβαλλεσθαι εκ νεας προβληματα. But for προβληματα, I read +προλημματα. This power, by which Porphyry characterizes memory, is of a +stable nature. And hence memory is _stability of knowledge_, in the same +manner as immortality is _stability of life_, and eternity _stability of +being_. + +[154] See the notes on the 3d book of my translation of Aristotle’s +treatise on the Soul, and also my translation of Plotinus on Felicity. +“The phantasy,” says Olympiodorus (in Platonis Phæd.) “is an impediment +to our intellectual conceptions; and hence, when we are agitated by +the inspiring influence of Divinity, if the phantasy intervenes, the +enthusiastic energy ceases: for enthusiasm and the phantasy are contrary +to each other. Should it be asked, whether the soul is able to energize +without the phantasy? we reply, that its perception of universals +proves that it is able. It has perceptions, therefore, independent of +the phantasy; at the same time, however, the phantasy attends it in its +energies, just as a storm pursues him who sails on the sea.” + +[155] The analogy of the soul to harmony, is more accurately unfolded as +follows, by Olympiodorus, in his Commentary on the Phædo of Plato, than +it is in this place by Porphyry: “Harmony has a triple subsistence. For +it is either harmony itself, or it is that which is first harmonized, and +which is such according to the whole of itself; or it is that which is +secondarily harmonized, and which partially participates of harmony. The +first of these must be assigned to intellect, the second to soul, and the +third to body. This last, too, is corruptible, because it subsists in a +subject; but the other two are incorruptible, because they are neither +composites, nor dependent on a subject. Hence, the rational soul is +analogous to a musician, but the animated body to harmonized chords; for +the former has a subsistence separate, but the latter inseparable from +the musical instrument.” + +[156] What Porphyry here says about matter, is derived from the treatise +of Plotinus, _On the Impassivity of Incorporeal Natures_, to my +translation of which I refer the reader. + +[157] See my translation of the before-mentioned treatise of Plotinus. + +[158] For τα οντα here, I read τα αυτα. + +[159] Hence, it is beautifully said in the Clavis of Hermes Trismegistus, +“that the knowledge of _the good_ [or the supreme principle of things], +is a divine silence, and the quiescence of all the senses.” See, also, on +this subject, a most admirable extract from Damascius, περι αρχων, at the +end of the 3d volume of my Plato. + +[160] For that which is truly incorporeal, is _every where_ virtually, +_i.e._ in power and efficacy, but is _no where_ locally. + +[161] For μερισταις here, I read, μερικαις. For Porphyry is here speaking +of essences which are opposed to _such as rank as wholes_, as is evident +from the whole of this paragraph. + +[162] The primary natures of which Porphyry is now speaking, are rational +partial souls, such as ours; for the natures superior to these, are never +converted to beings posterior to themselves. + +[163] For αυτου, _isthic_, I read, αυτος. + +[164] In the original, και ψυχη εν νῳ τε και θεῳ πανταχου, και ουδαμου εν +σωματι, but it appears to me to be necessary to read, και ψυχη εν νῳ τε +και θεῳ, και πανταχου και ουδαμου εν σωματι. + +[165] και εν νῳ, is omitted in the original, but ought to be inserted, as +is evident from the version of Holstenius. + +[166] The irrational life is a thing of this kind, which is partly +separable and partly inseparable from body. Hence, so far as it is +inseparable from body, it partakes of the _every where_; but, so far as +it is separable, of the _no where_. + +[167] _i.e._ The animal spirit, or pneumatic soul, in which the rational +soul suffers her punishments in Hades. + +[168] _i.e._ That part of the soul which is the source of all-various +desires. + +[169] This philosophic apathy is not, as is stupidly supposed by most of +the present day, insensibility, but a perfect subjugation of the passions +to reason. + +[170] The words και δικαιοσυνη, are omitted in the original. But it is +evident from the treatise of Plotinus “On the Virtues,” that they ought +to be inserted. For what Porphyry says in this Section about the virtues, +is derived from that treatise. + +[171] Instead of κατ’ αυτην, here it is necessary to read, κατ’ αισθησιν. + +[172] Conformably to this, as we have before observed, Aristotle says in +the 7th Book of his Nicomachean Ethics, “that corporeal pleasures are +remedies against pain, and that they fill up the indigence of nature, but +perfect no energy of the rational soul.” + +[173] In the original, αλλα το εκβεβηκος τον μεγιστον ογκον, εις το +μεγιστον, και τον ελαχιστον εις το ελαχιστον, αμα λαβων, κ.τ.λ. This +Holstenius most erroneously translates, “Verum id quod maximam molem +intervallo maximo, et minimam minimo excedit simul sumens, &c.” For a +truly incorporeal nature, such as that of which Porphyry is now speaking, +has nothing to do with interval, and, therefore, does not by interval +surpass either the greatest or the least corporeal mass; but is received +transcendently by the greatest and the least magnitude. + +[174] For διαληψεσιν, here, I read καταληψεσιν, and Holstenius also has +in this place _comprehensionibus_. + +[175] In the original, καθο εν τι των κατ’ αισθησιν συνεγνωσμενων; but it +appears to me to be necessary, after καθο, to insert the words ουκ εστιν. +For incorporeal being is not like some one of the things which are known +by the senses, because no one of these is one, and, at the same time, all +things. Holstenius did not perceive the necessity of this emendation, as +is evident from his version of the passage. + +[176] Immediately after this something is wanting in the original, (as is +evident from the asterisks,) which, as it appears to me, no conjecture +can appropriately supply. + +[177] In the original, και δια τουτων παλιν τῃ πενιᾳ συνειναι, καιπερ +παροντος αυτου; but for αυτου, I read πορου; as it appears to me that +Porphyry is here alluding to what is said by Diotima, in the Banquet of +Plato, concerning the parents of Love, viz. that they are _Poverty_ and +_Porus_, or _Plenty_. + +[178] See the Phædo of Plato. But something is here wanting in the +original, as is evident not only from the asterisks, but from the want of +connexion in the words themselves. + +[179] _i.e._ They are not adapted to be the immediate causes of body, +because they are perfectly separated from it. The original is, ηδη δε ην +αλλα καταχρηστικως λεγομενα ασωματα, ου κατα στερησιν σωματος, κατα δε +ολως μη πεφυκεναι γεννᾳν σωμα. Holstenius, not understanding what is here +said by Porphyry, translates the words κατα δε ολως μη πεφυκεναι γεννᾳν +σωμα, “sed quod nullum omnino corpus generare possunt.” For Porphyry, as +is evident from what immediately follows, is here speaking of natures +which are perfectly separated from bodies, and which are, therefore, not +naturally adapted to be the immediate generators of them, not through any +deficiency, but through transcendency of power. + +[180] In the original, διο ουχι τοδε μεν εαυτου νοει, τοδε δε ου νοει, +which Holstenius erroneously translates, “Ideoque non quidem unam sui +partem intelligit, alteram vero non intelligit.” For Porphyry is not here +speaking of intellect surveying its parts, but of its being _wholly_ +intellective. This is evident from what immediately follows. + +[181] The asterisks in the original denote something is wanting. +Nevertheless, what immediately follows them, is evidently connected with +what immediately precedes. + +[182] See the fourth book of my translation of Proclus, on the Timæus +of Plato, in which the nature of time and eternity is most admirably +unfolded. See, also, my translation of Plotinus, on Eternity and Time. In +these works, what both these divine men have said of eternity, and what +the former has said of time, contains, as it appears to me, the _ne plus +ultra_ of philosophical investigation on these most abstruse subjects. + + + + +APPENDIX. + + + + +APPENDIX. + +ON THE WANDERINGS OF ULYSSES. + + +In my History of the Restoration of the Platonic Theology [see Vol. II. +of my Proclus on Euclid,] and in a note accompanying my translation +of the treatise of Porphyry, on the Cave of the Nymphs, in that work, +I attempted, from the hints afforded by Porphyry, and the work of an +anonymous Greek writer, De Ulyxis Erroribus, to unfold the latent meaning +of the wanderings of Ulysses, as narrated by Homer. But as, from my +continued application to the philosophy of Plato for upwards of forty +years, I now know much more of that philosophy than I then did, a period +of thirty-five years having elapsed from that to the present time, I +shall again attempt to explain those wanderings, rejecting some things, +and retaining others which I had adopted before. + +In the first place, it is necessary to observe, that Ulysses does not +rank among the first heroic characters, or in other words, he was not +one of those heroes who descend into the regions of mortality at certain +periods, not only in compliance with that necessity through which all +partial souls such as ours descend periodically, but also for the purpose +of benefiting others, and leading them back to their pristine state of +perfection. Hence, he was by no means such an exalted hero as Hercules, +or Pythagoras, or Socrates, or Plato; for they largely benefited others; +but he only benefited himself. For all his companions perished prior +to his arrival at Ithaca. So that he was able to save himself, but not +others. “Hence,” says Olympiodorus, in his MS. Scholia on the Gorgias +of Plato, “it is said, that Ulysses wandered on the sea by the will of +Neptune. For by this it is signified that the Odyssean life was neither +terrestrial, nor yet celestial, but between these. Since, therefore, +Neptune is the lord of the middle natures, on this account it is said, +that Ulysses wandered through the will of Neptune, because he had a +Neptunian allotment. Thus, also, theologists speak of the sons of +Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, regarding the allotment of each. For we say, +that he who has a divine and celestial polity, is the son of Jupiter; +that he who has a terrestrial polity, is the son of Pluto; and he is the +son of Neptune, whose polity or allotment is between these[183].” Hence +Ulysses, from his Neptunian allotment, was a man who ranked among the +middle class of characters that transcend the majority of mankind. + +In the next place, in order to understand accurately the recondite +meaning of the wanderings of Ulysses, it is requisite to know what the +most divine and theological poet Homer indicates by the Trojan war in +the Iliad. For Homer, by combining fiction with historical facts, has +delivered to us some very occult, mystic, and valuable information, in +those two admirable poems, the Iliad and Odyssey. Hence, by those who +directed their attention to this recondite information, he was said, +conformably to the tragical mode of speaking, which was usual with +the most ancient writers, to have been blind, because, as Proclus +observes[184], he separated himself from sensible beauty, and extended +the intellect of his soul to invisible and true harmony. He was said, +therefore, to be blind, because _that_ intellectual beauty to which he +raised himself cannot be perceived by corporeal eyes. Thus, too, Orpheus +is tragically said to have been lacerated in an all-various manner, +because men of that age _partially_ participated of his mystic doctrine. +The _principal part_ of it, however, was received by the Lesbians; and +on this account, his _head_, when separated from his body, is said to +have been carried to Lesbos. Hence, the Platonic Hermeas, conformably to +this opinion of the occult meaning of the Iliad, beautifully explains as +follows the Trojan war, in his Scholia on the Phædrus of Plato: + +“By _Ilion_, we must understand the generated and material place, which +is so denominated from _mud and matter_ (παρα την ιλυν και την υλην,) and +in which there are war and sedition. But the Trojans are material forms, +and all the lives which subsist about bodies. Hence, also, the Trojans +are called _genuine_ (ιθαγενεις). For all the lives which subsist about +bodies, and irrational[185] souls, are favourable and attentive to their +proper matter. On the contrary, the Greeks are rational souls, coming +from Greece, _i.e._ from the intelligible into matter. Hence, the Greeks +are called _foreigners_ (επηλυδες,) and vanquish the Trojans, as being +of a superior order. But they fight with each other about the image of +Helen, as the poet says [about the image of Eneas]. + + Around the phantom Greeks and Trojans fight[186]. + +Helen signifying intelligible beauty, being a certain _vessel_ (ελενοη +τις ουσα,) attracting to itself intellect. An efflux, therefore, of this +intelligible beauty is imparted to matter through Venus; and about this +efflux of beauty the Greeks fight with the Trojans [_i.e._ rational +with irrational lives[187]]. And those, indeed, that oppose and vanquish +matter, return to the intelligible world, which is their true country; +but those who do not, as is the case with the multitude, are bound to +matter. As, therefore, the prophet, in the tenth book of the Republic, +previously to the descent of souls, announces to them how they may return +[to their pristine felicity], according to periods of a thousand and +ten thousand years; thus, also, Calchas predicts to the Greeks their +return in ten years, the number ten being the symbol of a perfect period. +And as, in the lives of souls, some are elevated through philosophy, +others through the amatory art, and others through the royal and warlike +disciplines; so with respect to the Greeks, some act with rectitude +through prudence, but others through war or love, and their return is +different [according to their different pursuits].” + +The first obviously fabulous adventure, then, of Ulysses, is that of the +Lotophagi, which Homer beautifully narrates, and whose narration Pope +very elegantly translates as follows: + + The trees around them all their fruit produce, + Lotos the name, and dulcet is the juice[188]! + (Thence call’d Lotophagi) which, whoso tastes, + Insatiate riots in the sweet repasts, + Nor other home, nor other care intends, + But quits his house, his country, and his friends. + The three we sent from off th’ enchanting ground + We dragg’d reluctant, and by force we bound: + The rest in haste forsook the pleasing shore, + Or, the charm tasted, had return’d no more[189]. + +Plato, in the 8th book of his Republic, has admirably unfolded to us +what the _lotos_ occultly indicates, viz. that it signifies “false and +arrogant reasonings and opinions:” for daily experience shows that +nothing is more enchanting and delicious than these to such as have made +no solid proficiency in virtue, and who, like some of the companions of +Ulysses, being fascinated by erroneous conceptions, consign their true +country and true kindred to oblivion, and desire to live for ever lost in +the intoxication of fallacious delight. + +The next adventure of Ulysses is that of the Cyclops, whom he deprived +of sight, and irritated by reproaches. But according to Porphyry, in +the above-mentioned excellent treatise, this is no other than the natal +dæmon of Ulysses, or the dæmon to whose protecting power he became +subject, as soon as he was born[190]. In order, however, to understand +perfectly the arcane meaning of this fable, it is necessary to observe, +that according to the ancient theology, those souls that in the present +life will speedily return to their pristine felicity in the intelligible +world, have not the essential dæmon, or the dæmon which is inseparable +from the essence of the soul, different from the dæmon that presides +over the birth; for they are one and the same. But the case is otherwise +with more imperfect souls; as the natal is in these different from the +_essential_ dæmon[191]. As Ulysses, therefore, does not rank among the +more perfect heroic characters, and was not one who in the present life +is immediately ascending to his kindred star, or, in Platonic language, +to the paternal port, the soul’s true paradise of rest; but was a man +who, prior to this, had many laborious wanderings to accomplish, and many +difficulties and dangers of no common magnitude to sustain, his _natal_ +was not the same with his _essential_ dæmon. As he is, however, departing +from a sensible to an intellectual life, though circuitously and slowly, +he is represented in so doing as blinding and irritating his _natal_ +dæmon. For he who blinds the eye of sense, and extinguishes its light, +after his will has profoundly assented to its use, must expect punishment +for the deed; as necessary ultimately to his own peculiar good, and the +general order of the universe. Indeed, troubles and misfortunes resulting +from such undertakings, not only contribute to appease the anger of their +authors, but likewise purify and benefit the subjects of their revenge. +According to the Greek theology, therefore, he who, in the present life, +while he is in the road of virtue, and is eagerly searching for wisdom, +perceives that there is a great resemblance between his destiny and that +of Ulysses, may safely conclude, that either here, or in a prior state of +existence, he has voluntarily submitted to the power of his natal dæmon, +and has now deprived him of sight; or in other words, has abandoned +a life of sense; and that he has been profoundly delighted with the +nature of matter, and is now abrogating the confessions which he made. +This, too, is insinuated in the beautiful story of Cupid and Psyche, +by Apuleius, when the terrestrial Venus sends Mercury with a book in +which her name is inscribed, to apprehend Psyche as a fugitive from her +mistress. For this whole story relates to the descent of the soul into +this terrene body, and its wanderings and punishments, till it returns to +its true country and pristine felicity[192]. + +In the next fable, which is that of Æolus, the poet appears to me to +signify that providence of divinity which is of an elevating and guardian +nature, the influence of which, when properly received by the subjects +of it, enables them to pass with security over the stormy sea of life to +their native land; but when this influence is neglected through the sleep +of reason, the negligence is followed by a temporary destruction of hope. +This providence also of the Gods is not only one, but _all-various_, +which Homer appears to indicate by Æolus; the word αιολος signifying +various and manifold. As the advancement, therefore, of Ulysses in the +virtues is as yet imperfect, extending no farther than to the _ethical_ +and _political_, which are but adumbrations of the _true_ virtues, the +cathartic and theoretic[193], he is said to have fallen asleep, and to +have been thereby disappointed of his wishes, his soul not being at that +time in a truly vigilant state, as not having yet elevated its eye to +real being from objects of sense which resemble the delusions of dreams. + +By the adventure of the Lestrigons, which follows in the next place, +Homer represents to us Ulysses flying from voracity, and fierce and +savage manners; a flight indispensably necessary, as preparatory to his +attainment of the higher virtues. + +In the next adventure, which contains the beautiful allegory of Circe, +we shall find some deep arcana of philosophy contained, exclusive of its +connexion with Ulysses. By the Æean isle, then, in which the palace of +Circe was situated, the region of sorrow and lamentation is signified, +as is evident from the name of the island itself. And, by Circe, we must +understand the Goddess of sense. For thus Porphyry, in Stobæus, p. 141: +“Homer calls the period and revolution of regeneration in a circle, +Circe, the daughter of the Sun, who perpetually connects and combines all +corruption with generation, and generation again with corruption.” And +this is asserted still more explicitly by Proclus, in his Scholia on the +Cratylus of Plato. For he says, “Circe is that divine power which weaves +all the life contained in the four elements, and, at the same time, by +her song harmonizes the whole sublunary world. But the shuttle with +which she weaves, is represented by theologists as golden, because her +essence is intellectual, pure, immaterial, and unmingled with generation; +all which is signified by the shuttle being golden. And her employment +consists in _separating_[194] stable things from such as are in motion, +according to divine diversity.” And he also informs us, “that Circe +ranks among the divinities who preside over generation, or the regions +of sense.” Homer, too, with great propriety, represents Circe, who +rules over the realms of generation, as waited on by Nymphs sprung from +fountains; for Nymphs, says Hermias (in Plat. Phædrum,) are Goddesses who +preside over regeneration, and are the attendants of Bacchus, the son +of Semele. On this account, they are present with water; that is, they +ascend, as it were, into, and rule over generation. But this Dionysius, +or Bacchus, supplies the regeneration of every sensible nature. + +Hence we may observe, that the Æean isle, or this region of sense, is, +with great propriety, called the abode of trouble and lamentation. In +this region, then, the companions of Ulysses, in consequence of being +very imperfect characters, are changed, through the incantations of the +Goddess, into brutes, _i.e._ into unworthy and irrational habits and +manners. Ulysses, however, as one who is returning, though slowly, to +the proper perfection of his nature, is, by the assistance of Mercury, +or reason, prevented from destruction. Hence intellect, roused by its +impassive power, and at the same time armed with prudent anger, and the +plant moly, or temperance, which is able to repel the allurements of +pleasure, wars on sensible delight, and prevents the effects of its +transforming power. Ulysses, also, though he was not able to lead his +companions back to their native land, the paternal port of the soul, yet +saves them from being transformed, through the enchantments of sense, +into an irrational life. + +After this follows the allegory respecting the descent of Ulysses into +_Hades_, which occultly signifies, that he still lived a life according +to sense, and not according to intellect, and that, in consequence +of not having yet vanquished a terrestrial life, he was involved in +_obscurity_. For ancient wise men universally considered Hades as +commencing in the present state of existence, and that sense is nothing +more than the energy of the dormant soul, and a perception, as it were, +of the delusions of dreams, as I have abundantly proved in my treatise +on the Mysteries. The secret meaning, also, of what Ulysses saw in +Hades, is no less beautiful than profound, as the following extract +from the manuscript Commentary of Olympiodorus, on the Gorgias of +Plato, abundantly evinces: “Ulysses,” says he, “descending into Hades, +saw, among others, Sysiphus, and Tityus, and Tantalus. And Tityus he +saw lying on the earth, and a vulture devouring his liver; the liver +signifying that he lived solely according to the _epithymetic_ part of +his nature [or that part of the soul which is the source of desires,] +and that through this, indeed, he was, indeed, internally prudent; +but earth signifying the terrestrial condition of his prudence. But +Sysiphus, living under the dominion of ambition and anger, was employed +in continually rolling a stone up an eminence, because it perpetually +descended again; its descent implying the vicious government of himself; +and his rolling the stone, the hard, refractory, and, as it were, +rebounding condition of his life. And, lastly, he saw Tantalus extended +by the side of a lake, and that there was a tree before him, with +abundance of fruit on its branches, which he desired to gather, but it +vanished from his view. And this indeed indicates, that he lived under +the dominion of the phantasy; but his hanging over the lake, and in vain +attempting to drink, denotes the elusive, humid, and rapidly-gliding +condition of such a life.” + +We must now, however, view Ulysses passing from sense to imagination; in +the course of which voyage he is assailed by various temptations of great +power, and destructive effect. We shall perceive him victorious in some +of these, and sinking under others; but struggling against the incursions +of all. Among the first of these is the enchanting melody of the Sirens, + + Whose song is death, and makes destruction please. + +But what is occultly signified by the Sirens, is beautifully unfolded by +Proclus, on the Cratylus of Plato, as follows: “The divine Plato knew +that there are three kinds of Sirens; the _celestial_, which is under +the government of Jupiter; _that which is effective of generation_, and +is under the government of Neptune; and _that which is cathartic_, and +is under the government of Pluto. It is common to all these, to incline +all things through an harmonic motion to their ruling Gods. Hence, when +the soul is in the heavens, they are desirous of uniting it to the +divine life which flourishes there. But it is proper that souls living +in generation should sail beyond them, like the Homeric Ulysses, that +they may not be allured by generation, of which the sea is an image. And +when souls are in Hades, the Sirens are desirous of uniting them through +intellectual conceptions to Pluto. So that Plato knew that in the kingdom +of Hades there are Gods, dæmons, and souls, who dance, as it were, round +Pluto, allured by the Sirens that dwell there.” Ulysses, therefore, as +now proceeding to a life which is under the dominion of imagination, but +which is superior to a life consisting wholly in sensitive energies, +abandons those alluring and fraudulent pleasures of sense, which charm +the soul with flattering and mellifluous incantations. Hence he closes +with divine reasons and energies, as with wax, the impulses of desire +and the organs of sense; so that every passage being barred from access, +they may in vain warble the song of ecstasy, and expect to ruin the soul +by the enchanting strain. He also restrains the corporeal assaults by the +bands of morality, and thus employs the senses without yielding to their +impetuous invasions; and experiences delight without resigning the empire +of reason to its fascinating control. + +Ulysses, having escaped the dangers of the Sirens, passes on to the rocks +of Scylla and Charybdis, of terrific appearance and irresistible force. +By these two rocks the poet seems to signify the passions of anger and +desire, and their concomitants, that compress human life on both sides; +and which every one must experience who proceeds, like Ulysses, in a +regular manner to an intellectual state of existence. Some of these are, +like Scylla, of a lofty malignity; fraudulent, yet latent and obscure, +as being concealed in the penetration of the soul. And such is revenge, +and other passions of a similar kind. In these recesses a dæmon, the +prince of such passions, resides. For the Chaldean oracles assert that +terrestrial dæmons dwell in the soul, which is replete with irrational +affections[195]. This dæmon also may justly be denominated a dire and +enraged dog, who partly exposes his own malice, and partly hides it in +impenetrable obscurity. Hence he is capable of producing mischief in a +twofold respect. For he privately hurts by malignant stratagems, openly +ravishes the soul on the lofty rock of fury, and rends it with the triple +evil of deadly teeth, viz. dereliction of duty, hatred of humanity, and +self-conceit. Indeed, a dæmon of this kind will be perpetually vigilant +in endeavouring to destroy, at one time the whole, and at another time a +part of the soul of one, struggling, like Ulysses, against passion, and +yielding reluctantly to its invasions. + +But the other affections which pertain to desire are of a more corporeal +nature, and are more conspicuously depraved. A wild fig-tree, _i.e._ the +will, is produced on the top of this rock; wild, indeed, on account of +its free nature, but sweet in fruition; and under which, often through +the day, the impetuosities of the boiling body are accustomed to absorb +and destroy the man, agitating upwards and downwards inflamed desire; +so that mighty destruction, both to soul and body, is produced by their +mutual consent. But it is highly proper that a rock of this last kind +should be anxiously avoided by one, who, like Ulysses, is labouring to +return to his true country and friends. Hence, if necessity requires, +he will rather expose himself to the other: for there the energy of +thought, and of the soul’s simple motions, is alone necessary to be +exerted, and it is easy to recover the pristine habit of the soul. In +short, the poet seems to represent, by this allegory of the two rocks, +as well the dangers which spontaneously arise from the irascible part of +the soul, as those which are the effect of deliberation, and are of a +corporeal nature; both of which must be sustained, or one at least, by a +necessary consequence. For it is impossible that neither of them should +be experienced by one who is passing over the stormy ocean of a sensible +life. + +After this succeeds the allegory of the Trinacrian isle, containing the +herds sacred to the God of day, which were violated by the companions +of Ulysses; but not without the destruction of the authors of this +impiety, and the most dreadful danger to Ulysses. By the result of this +fable, the poet evidently shows that punishment attends the sacrilegious +and the perjured; and teaches us that we should perpetually reverence +divinity, with the greatest sanctity of mind, and be cautious how we +commit any thing in divine concerns contrary to piety of manners and +purity of thought. But Homer, by attributing sense to the flesh and hides +of the slain herds, manifestly evinces that every base deed universally +proclaims the iniquity of its author; but that perjury and sacrilege are +attended with the most glaring indications of guilt, and the most horrid +signatures of approaching vengeance and inevitable ruin. We may here, +too, observe, that the will of Ulysses was far from consenting to this +impious deed; and that, though his passions prevailed at length over his +reason, it was not till after frequent admonition had been employed, and +great diligence exerted, to prevent its execution. This, indeed, is so +eminently true, that his guilt was the consequence of surprise, and not +of premeditated design; which Homer appears to insinuate by relating that +Ulysses was asleep when his associates committed the offence. + +In the next fable we find Ulysses, impelled by the southern wind towards +the rocks of Scylla and Charybdis; in the latter of which he found +safety, by clinging to the fig-tree which grew on its summit, till she +refunded the mast, on which he rode after the tempest. But the secret +meaning of the allegory appears to me to be as follows:—Ulysses, who has +not yet taken leave of a life according to sense, is driven by the warmth +of passion, represented by the southern gales, into the dire vortex of +insane desires, which frequently boiling over, and tossing on high the +storms of depraved affections, plunges into ruin the soul obnoxious +to its waves. However, perceiving the danger to which he is exposed, +when the base storms begin to swell, and the whirlpools of depravity +roar, he seizes the helm of temperance, and binds himself fast to the +solid texture of his remaining virtue. The waves of desire are, indeed, +tempestuous in the extreme; but before he is forcibly merged, by the rage +of the passions, into the depths of depravity, he tenaciously adheres to +his unconsenting will, seated, as it were, on the lofty summit of terrene +desire. For this, like the wild fig-tree, affords the best refuge to the +soul struggling with the billows of base perturbations. Hence he thus +recovers the integrity which he had lost, and afterwards swims without +danger over the waves of temptation; ever watchful and assiduous, while +he sails through this impetuous river of the flesh, and is exposed to +the stormy blasts of heated passion and destructive vice. Hence, too, +while he is thus affected, and anxious lest the loss from unworthy +affections should return upon himself, he will escape being lacerated by +the teeth of Anger, though she should terribly and fiercely bark in the +neighbourhood of Desire, and endeavour, like Scylla, to snatch him on +her lofty rock. For those who are involuntarily disturbed, like Ulysses, +by the billows of Desire, suffer no inconvenience from the depraved rock +of Wrath; but considering the danger of their present situation, they +relinquish the false confidence produced by rage for modest diffidence +and anxious hope. + +Hitherto we have followed Ulysses in his voyage over the turbulent and +dangerous ocean of sense; in which we have seen him struggling against +the storms of temptation, and in danger of perishing through the +tempestuous billows of vice. We must now attend him in the region of +imagination, and mark his progress from the enchanted island, till he +regains the long-lost empire of his soul. That the poet then, by Calypso, +occultly signifies the phantasy or imagination, is, I think, evident +from his description of her abode. For she is represented as dwelling +in a cavern, illuminated by a great fire; and this cave is surrounded +with a thick wood, is watered by four fountains, and is situated in an +island, remote from any habitable place, and environed by the mighty +ocean. All which particulars correspond with the phantasy, as I presume +the following observations will evince. In the first place, the primary +and proper vehicle of the phantasy, or, as it is called by the Platonic +philosophers, _the imaginative spirit_, is attenuated and ethereal, and +is therefore naturally luminous. In the next place, the island is said +to be surrounded with a thick wood, which evidently corresponds to a +material nature, or this body, with which the phantasy is invested. For +υλη, or _matter_, also signifies _a wood_. But the four fountains, by +which the cave is watered, occultly signify the four gnostic powers of +the soul, _intellect_, _the discursive energy of reason_, _opinion_, +_and sense_; with all which the phantasy, being also a gnostic power, +communicates; so that it receives images, like a mirror, from all of +them, and retains those which it receives from the senses, when the +objects by which they were produced are no longer present. Hence the +imagination, or the phantasy, [φαντασια,] is denominated from being των +φανεντων στασις, _the permanency of appearances_. And, in the last place, +the island is said to be environed by the ocean; which admirably accords +with a corporeal nature, for ever flowing, without admitting any periods +of repose. And thus much for the secret agreement of the cavern and +island with the region of imagination. + +But the poet, by denominating the Goddess Calypso, and the island Ogygia, +appears to me very evidently to confirm the preceding exposition. For +Calypso is derived from καλυπτω, which signifies _to cover as with a +veil_; and Ogygia is from ωγυγιος, _ancient_. And as the imaginative +spirit is the primary vehicle of the rational soul, which it derived +from the planetary spheres, and in which it descended to the sublunary +regions, it may with great propriety be said to cover the soul as with a +fine garment or veil; and it is no less properly denominated _ancient_, +when considered as the first vehicle of the soul. + +In this region of the phantasy, then, Ulysses is represented as an +involuntary captive, continually employed in bewailing his absence from +his true country, and ardently longing to depart from the fascinating +embraces of the Goddess. For thus his situation is beautifully described +by the poet: + + But sad Ulysses, by himself apart, + Pour’d the big sorrows of his swelling heart; + All on the lonely shore he sat to weep, + And roll’d his eyes around the restless deep; + Tow’rd his lov’d coast he roll’d his eyes in vain, + Till dimm’d with rising grief they stream’d again[196]. + +His return, however, is at length effected through Mercury, or reason, +who prevails on the Goddess to yield to his dismission. Hence, after her +consent, Ulysses is, with great propriety, said to have placed himself +on the throne on which Mercury had sate: for reason then resumes her +proper seat when the reasoning power is about to abandon the delusive and +detaining charms of imagination. But Homer appears to me to insinuate +something admirable when he represents Ulysses, on his departure from +Calypso, sailing by night, and contemplating the order and light of the +stars, in the following beautiful lines: + + And now, rejoicing in the prosperous gales, + With beating heart Ulysses spread his sails; + Plac’d at the helm he sate, and mark’d the skies, + Nor clos’d in sleep his ever watchful eyes. + There viewed the Pleiads, and the northern team, + And great Orion’s more refulgent beam; + To which around the axle of the sky + The Bear, revolving, points his golden eye; + Who shines exalted on the ethereal plain, + Nor bathes his blazing forehead in the main[197]. + +For what he here says of Ulysses, is perfectly conformable to what is +said by Plato in the 7th book of his Republic, respecting the man who +is to be led from the cave, which he there describes, to the light +of day, _i.e._ from a sensible to an intellectual life, viz. “that +he will more easily see what the heavens contain, and the heavens +themselves, by _looking in the night to the light of the stars and the +moon_, than by day looking on the sun, and the light of the sun.” For +by this, as Proclus well observes, “Plato signifies the contemplation +of intelligibles, of which the stars and their light are imitations, so +far as all of them partake of the form of the sun, in the same manner as +intelligibles are characterized by the nature of _the good_. These, then, +such a one must contemplate, that he may understand their essence, and +those summits of their nature, by which they are deiform processions from +the ineffable principle of things.” Ulysses, therefore, who is hastening +to an intellectual life, contemplates these lucid objects with vigilant +eyes, rejoicing in the illuminations and assistance they afford him while +sailing over the dark ocean of a sensible life. + +But as he is now earnestly engaged in departing from sense, he must +unavoidably be pursued by the anger of Neptune, the lord of generation +and a sensible life, whose service he has forsaken, and whose offspring +he has blinded by stratagem, and irritated by reproach. Hence, in the +midst of these delightful contemplations, he is almost overwhelmed by the +waves of misfortune, roused by the wrath of his implacable foe. He is, +however, through divine assistance, or Leucothea, enabled to sustain the +dreadful storm. For, receiving from divinity the immortal fillet of true +fortitude, and binding it under his breast, (the proper seat of courage,) +he encounters the billows of adversity, and bravely shoots along the +boisterous ocean of life. It must, however, be carefully observed, that +the poet is far from ascribing a certain passion to a divine nature, when +he speaks of the anger of Neptune: for, in thus speaking, he, as well +as other theologists, intended only to signify our inaptitude to the +participation of its beneficent influence. + +Ulysses therefore, having with much difficulty escaped the dangers +arising from the wrath of Neptune, lands at length on the island of +Phæacia, where he is hospitably received, and honourably dismissed. Now, +as it is proper that he who, like Ulysses, departs from the delusions of +imagination, should immediately betake himself to the more intellectual +light of the rational energy of the soul, the land of Phæacia ought to +correspond to our intellectual part, and particularly to that portion of +it which is denominated in Greek _dianoia_, and which is characterized +by the power of reasoning scientifically, deriving the principles of its +discursive energy from intellect. And that it has this correspondence, +the following observations will, I persuade myself, abundantly evince. +In the first place, then, this island is represented by the poet as +enjoying a perpetual spring, which plainly indicates that it is not +any terrestrial situation. Indeed, the critical commentators have been +so fully convinced of this, that they acknowledge Homer describes +Phæacia as one of the Fortunate Islands; but they have not attempted to +penetrate his design, in such a description. If, however, we consider +the perfect liberty, unfading variety, and endless delight, which our +intellectual part affords, we shall find that it is truly the Fortunate +Island of the soul, in which, by the exercise of the theoretic virtues, +it is possible for a man, even in the present life, to obtain genuine +felicity, though not in that perfection as when he is liberated from +the body. With respect to the Fortunate Islands, their occult meaning +is thus beautifully unfolded by Olympiodorus, in his MS. commentary +on the Gorgias of Plato: Δει δε ειδεναι οτι αι νησοι υπερκυπτουσι της +θαλασσης ανωτερω ουσαι, την ουν πολιτειαν την υπερκυψασαν του βιου και +της γενησεως, μακαρων νησους καλουσι· ταυτον δε εστι και το ηλυσιον +πεδιον. δια τοι τουτο και ο Ηρακλης τελευταιον αθλον, εν τοις εσπεριοις +μερεσιν εποιησατο, αντι κατηγωνισατο τον σκοτεινον και χθονιον βιον, +και λοιπον εν ημερα, ο εστιν εν αληθειᾳ και φωτι εζη: _i.e._ “It is +necessary to know that islands are raised above, being higher than the +sea. A condition of being, therefore, which transcends this corporeal +life and generation, is denominated the islands of the blessed; but these +are the same with the Elysian fields. And on this account, Hercules is +reported to have accomplished his last labour in the Hesperian regions; +signifying by this, that having vanquished an obscure and terrestrial +life, he afterwards lived in open day, that is, in truth and resplendent +light.” In the next place, the poet, by his description of the palace +of Alcinous, the king of this island, admirably indicates the pure and +splendid light of the energy of reason. For he says of it: + + The front appear’d with radiant splendours gay, + Bright as the lamp of night, or orb of day. + The walls were massy brass: the cornice high + Blue metals crown’d in colours of the sky. + Rich plates of gold the folding doors incase; + The pillars silver on a brazen base. + Silver the lintels deep projecting o’er, + And gold the ringlets that command the door. + Two rows of stately dogs on either hand, + In sculptur’d gold, and labour’d silver, stand. + These Vulcan form’d intelligent to wait + Immortal guardians at Alcinous’ gate[198]. + +And he represents it as no less internally luminous by night. + + Refulgent pedestals the walls surround, + Which boys of gold with flaming torches crown’d; + The polish’d ore, reflecting ev’ry ray, + Blaz’d on the banquets with a double day. + +Indeed Homer, by his description of the outside of this palace, +sufficiently indicates its agreement with the planet Mercury, the +deity of which presides over the rational energy. For this God, in +the language of Proclus[199], “unfolds into light intellectual gifts, +fills all things with divine _reasons_ [_i.e._ forms, and productive +principles,] elevates souls to intellect, wakens them as from a profound +sleep, converts them through investigation to themselves, and by a +certain obstetric art and invention of pure intellect, brings them to a +blessed life.” According to astronomers, likewise, the planet Mercury +is resplendent with the colours of all the other planets. Thus Baptista +Porta in Cœlest. Physiog. p. 88. “Videbis in eo Saturni luridum, +Martis ignem, Jovis candidum, Veneris flavum, necnon utriusque nitor, +hilaritasque, et ob id non peculiaris formæ, sed eorum formam capit, cum +quibus associatur, ob id in describendo ejus colore astrologi differunt.” +_i.e._ “You may perceive in this planet the pale colour of Saturn, the +fire of Mars, the whiteness of Jupiter, and the yellow of Venus; and +likewise the brilliancy and hilarity of each. On this account it is not +of a peculiar form, but receives the form of its associates, and thus +causes astrologers to differ in describing its colour.” + +But that the island of Phæacia is the dominion of reason, is, I think, +indisputably confirmed by Homer’s account of the ships fabricated by its +inhabitants. For of these, he says: + + So shalt thou instant reach the realm assign’d, + In wond’rous ships self-mov’d, instinct with mind. + No helm secures their course, no pilot guides, + Like man intelligent they plough the tides, + Conscious of ev’ry coast and ev’ry bay, + That lies beneath the sun’s all-seeing ray; + And veil’d in clouds impervious to the eye, + Fearless and rapid through the deep they fly[200]. + +For it is absurd to suppose that Homer would employ such an hyperbole, +in merely describing the excellency of the Phæacian ships. Hence, as it +so greatly surpasses the bounds of probability, and is so contrary to +the admirable prudence which Homer continually displays, it can only be +admitted as an allegory, pregnant with latent meaning, and the recondite +wisdom of antiquity. The poet likewise adds respecting the Phæacians: + + These did the ruler of the deep ordain + To build proud navies, and command the main; + On canvas wings to cut the wat’ry way, + No bird more light, _no thought more swift than they_. + +The last of which lines so remarkably agrees with the preceding +explanation, that I presume no stronger confirmation can be desired. Nor +is the original less satisfactory: + + των νεες ωκειαι ωσει πτερον ηε νοημα[201], + +_i.e._ “The ships of these men are swift as a wing, or as _a conception +of the mind_.” But the inhabitants of the palace are represented as +spending their days in continual festivity, and unceasing mirth; in +listening to the harmony of the lyre, or in forming the tuneful mazes of +the joyful dance. For to the man who lives under the guidance of reason, +or to the good man, every day, as Diogenes said, is a festival. Hence, +such a one is constantly employed in tuning the lyre of recollection, +in harmonious revolutions about an intelligible essence, and the +never-satiating and deifying banquet of intellect. + +And here we may observe how much the behaviour of Ulysses, at the palace +of Alcinous, confirms the preceding exposition, and accords with his +character, as a man passing in a regular manner from the delusions of +sense, to the realities of intellectual enjoyment. For as he is now +converted to himself, and is seated in the palace of reason, it is highly +proper that he should call to mind his past conduct, and be afflicted +with the survey; and that he should be wakened to sorrow by the lyre of +reminiscence, and weep over the follies of his past active life. Hence, +when the divine bard Demodocus, inspired by the fury of the Muses, sings +the contention between Ulysses and Achilles, on his golden lyre, Ulysses +is vehemently affected with the relation. And when the inhabitants of the +palace, _i.e._ the powers and energies of the rational soul, transported +with the song, demanded its repetition. + + Again Ulysses veil’d his pensive head, + Again, unmann’d, a shower of sorrow shed. + +For to the man who is making a proficiency in virtue, the recollection of +his former conduct is both pleasing and painful; pleasing, so far as in +some instances it was attended with rectitude, but painful so far as in +others it was erroneous. + +Ulysses, also, is with the greatest propriety represented as relating his +past adventures in the palace of Alcinous. For as he now betakes himself +to the intellectual light of the reasoning power, it is highly necessary +that he should review his past conduct, faithfully enumerate the errors +of his life, and anxiously solicit a return to true manners, and perfect +rectitude of mind. As likewise he is now on his passage, by the pure +energy of reason to regain the lost empire of his soul, he is represented +as falling into so profound a sleep in his voyage, as to be insensible +for some time of its happy consummation; by which the poet indicates +his being separated from sensible concerns, and wholly converted to the +energies of the rational soul. Nor is it without reason that the poet +represents Ithaca, as presenting itself to the mariners’ view, when the +bright morning star emerges from the darkness of night. For thus he sings: + + But when the morning star, with early ray, + Flam’d in the front of heav’n and promis’d day; + Like distant clouds, the mariner descries + Fair Ithaca’s emerging hills arise[202]. + +Since it is only by the dawning beams of intellect, that the discursive +energy of reason can gain a glimpse of the native country and proper seat +of empire of the soul. + +Ulysses therefore, being now converted to the energies of the rational +soul, and anxious to commence the cathartic virtues, recognizes, through +the assistance of Minerva, or wisdom, his native land: and immediately +enters into a consultation with the Goddess, how he may effectually +banish the various perturbations and inordinate desires, which yet lurk +in the penetralia of his soul. For this purpose, it is requisite that +he should relinquish all external possessions, mortify every sense, +and employ every stratagem, which may finally destroy these malevolent +foes. Hence, the garb of poverty, the wrinkles of age, and the want of +the necessaries of life, are symbols of mortified habits, desertion of +sensible pursuits, and an intimate conversion to intellectual good. For +the sensitive eye must now give place to the purer sight of the rational +soul; and the strength and energies of the corporeal nature must yield to +the superior vigour of intellectual exertion, and the severe exercise of +cathartic virtue. And this, Homer appears most evidently to indicate in +the following beautiful lines: + + Now seated in the olive’s sacred shade, + Confer the hero and the martial maid. + The Goddess of the azure eyes began: + Son of Laertes! much experienc’d man! + The suitor train thy earliest care demand, + Of that luxurious race to rid the land. + Three years thy house their lawless rule has seen, + And proud addresses to the matchless queen[203]; + But she thy absence mourns from day to day, + And inly bleeds, and silent wastes away; + Elusive of the bridal hour, she gives + Fond hopes to all, and all with hopes deceives[204]. + +Hence: + + It fits thee now to wear a dark disguise, + And secret walk unknown to mortal eyes; + For this my hand shall wither ev’ry grace, + And ev’ry elegance of form and face, + O’er thy smooth skin a bark of wrinkles spread, + Turn hoar the auburn honours of thy head, + Disfigure every limb with coarse attire, + And in thine eyes extinguish all the fire; + Add all the wants and the decays of life, + Estrange thee from thy own; thy son, thy wife; + From the loath’d object ev’ry sight shall turn, + And the blind suitors their destruction scorn[205]. + +After this follows the discovery of Ulysses to Telemachus, which is +no less philosophically sublime than poetically beautiful. For, by +Telemachus, we must understand _a true scientific conception of things_; +since this is the legitimate offspring of the energy of the rational +soul, in conjunction with philosophy. Hence Ulysses, while employed in +the great work of mortification, recognizes his genuine offspring, and +secretly plans with him the destruction of his insidious foes. And hence +we may see the propriety of Telemachus being represented as exploring +his absent father, and impatient for his return. For the rational soul +then alone associates with a true conception of things, when it withdraws +itself from sensible delights, and meditates a restoration of its fallen +dignity and original sway. + +And now Ulysses presents himself to our view in the habits of +mortification, hastening to his long deserted palace, or the occult +recesses of his soul, that he may mark the conduct and plan the +destruction of those baneful passions which are secretly attempting +to subvert the empire of his mind. Hence, the poet very properly and +pathetically exclaims: + + And now his city strikes the monarch’s eyes, + Alas! how chang’d! a man of miseries; + Propt on a staff, a beggar, old and bare, + In tatter’d garments, flutt’ring with the air[206]. + +However, as this disguise was solely assumed for the purpose of procuring +ancient purity and lawful rule, he divests himself of the torn garments +of mortification, as soon as he begins the destruction of occult desires; +and resumes the proper dignity and strength of his genuine form. But it +is not without reason that Penelope, who is the image of philosophy, +furnishes the instrument by which the hostile rout of passions are +destroyed. For what besides the arrows of philosophy can extirpate the +leading bands of impurity and vice? Hence, as soon as he is furnished +with this irresistible weapon, he no longer defers the ruin of his +insidious foes, but + + Then fierce the hero o’er the threshold strode; + Stript of his rags, he blaz’d out like a God. + Full in their face the lifted bow he bore, + And quiver’d deaths a formidable store; + Before his feet the rattling show’r he threw, + And thus terrific to the suitor crew[207]. + +But Homer represents Penelope as remaining ignorant of Ulysses, even +after the suitors are destroyed, and he is seated on the throne of +majesty, anxious to be known, and impatient to return her chaste and +affectionate embrace. For thus he describes her: + + Then gliding through the marble valves in state, + Oppos’d before the shining fire she sate. + The monarch, by a column high enthron’d. + His eye withdrew, and fixed it on the ground, + Anxious to hear his queen the silence break: + Amaz’d she sate, and impotent to speak; + O’er all the man her eyes she rolls in vain, + Now hopes, now fears, now knows, then doubts again[208]. + +By which Homer indicates, that Philosophy, through her long absence from +the soul, and the foreign manners and habits which the soul had assumed, +is a stranger to it, so that it is difficult for her to recognize the +union and legitimate association which once subsisted between them. +However, in order to facilitate this discovery, Ulysses renders all pure +and harmonious within the recesses of his soul; and, by the assistance of +Minerva, or wisdom, resumes the garb and dignity which he had formerly +displayed. + + Then instant to the bath (the monarch cries,) + Bid the gay youth and sprightly virgins rise, + Thence all descend in pomp and proud array, + And bid the dome resound the mirthful lay; + While the sweet lyrist airs of raptures sings, + And forms the dance responsive to the strings[209]. + +And afterwards, Ulysses is described as appearing, through the +interposition of Minerva, _like one of the immortals_. + + So Pallas his heroic form improves, + With bloom divine, and like a God he moves[210]. + +For, indeed, he who, like Ulysses, has completely destroyed the +domination of his passions, and purified himself, through the cathartic +virtues, from their defiling nature, no longer ranks in the order of +mortals, but is assimilated to divinity. And now, in order that he may +become entirely known to Philosophy, that chaste Penelope of the soul, +it is only requisite for him to relate the secrets of their mystic +union, and recognize the bower of intellectual love. For then perfect +recollection will ensue; and the anxiety of diffidence will be changed +into transports of assurance, and tears of rapturous delight. + +And thus we have attended Ulysses in his various wanderings and woes, +till, through the _cathartic_ virtues, he recovers the ruined empire of +his soul. But, as it is requisite that he should, in the next place, +possess and energize according to the theoretic or contemplative virtues, +the end of which is a union with deity, as far as this can be effected +by man in the present life, Homer only indicates to us his attainment of +this end, without giving a detail of the gradual advances by which he +arrived at this consummate felicity. This union is occultly signified by +Ulysses first beholding, and afterwards ardently embracing his father +with ecstatic delight. With most admirable propriety, also, is Ulysses +represented as proceeding, in order to effect this union, by himself +_alone_, to his father who is also _alone_. + + _Alone_ and unattended, let me try + If yet I share the old man’s memory[211], + +says Ulysses. And afterwards it is said, + + But all _alone_ the hoary king he found[212]. + +For a union with the ineffable _one_ of the Demiurgus, the true father +of the soul, can only be accomplished by the soul recurring to its own +_unity_; and having for this purpose previously dismissed and abandoned +every thing foreign to it. This occurrence, indeed, of the soul with +deity, is, as Plotinus divinely says, φυγη μονου προς μονον[213], _a +flight of the alone to the alone_, in which most beautiful expression I +have no doubt he alludes to this mystic termination of the wanderings +of Ulysses, in the embraces of his father. Proclus also, in a no less +admirable manner, alludes to this union in his Commentaries on the Timæus +of Plato[214]. The allusion is in his comment on the words, “It is +difficult, therefore, to discover the maker and father of this universe; +and, when found, it is impossible to speak of him to all men.” On this +passage Proclus observes: “It is necessary that the soul, becoming an +intellectual world, and being as much as possible assimilated to the +whole intelligible world, should introduce herself to the maker of the +universe; and from this introduction, should, in a certain respect, +become familiar with him through a continued intellectual energy. For +uninterrupted energy about any thing calls forth and resuscitates our +dormant ideas. But through this familiarity, becoming stationed at +the door of the father, it is necessary that we should be united to +him. For discovery is this, to meet with him, to be united to him, _to +associate alone with the alone_, and to see him himself, the soul hastily +withdrawing herself from every other energy to him. For, being present +with her father, she then considers scientific discussions to be but +words[215], banquets together with him on the truth of real being, and in +pure splendour is purely initiated in entire and stable visions. Such, +therefore, is the discovery of the father, not that which is doxastic [or +pertaining to opinion]; for this is dubious, and not very remote from the +irrational life. Neither is it scientific; for this is syllogistic and +composite, and does not come into contact with the intellectual essence +of the intellectual Demiurgus. But it is that which subsists according +to intellectual vision itself, a contact with the intelligible, and a +union with the demiurgic intellect. For this may properly be denominated +difficult, either as hard to obtain, presenting itself to souls after +every evolution of life, or as the true labour of souls. For, after the +wandering about generation, after purification, and the light of science, +intellectual energy and the intellect which is in us shine forth, placing +the soul in the father as in a port, purely establishing her in demiurgic +intellections, and conjoining light with light; not such as that of +science, but more beautiful, more intellectual, and partaking more of the +nature of _the one_ than this. _For this is the paternal port, and the +discovery of the father, viz. an undefiled union with him._” + +With great beauty also, and in perfect conformity to the most recondite +theology, is the father of Ulysses represented as coarsely clothed, and +occupied in botanical labours: + + But all alone the hoary king he found; + His habit coarse, but warmly wrapt around; + His head, that bow’d with many a pensive care, + Fenc’d with a double cap of goatskin hair; + His buskins old, in former service torn, + But well repair’d; and gloves against the thorn. + In this array the kingly gard’ner stood, + And clear’d a plant, encumber’d with its wood[216]. + +For this simplicity, and coarseness of the garb of Laertes, considered as +an image of the true father of Ulysses, is, in every respect, conformable +to the method adopted by ancient mythologists in their adumbrations +of deity. For they imitated the transcendency of divine natures by +things preternatural; a power more divine than all reason by things +irrational; and, by apparent deformity, a beauty which surpasses every +thing corporeal. This array, therefore, of the father of Ulysses, is, in +the language of Proclus, indicative “of an essence established in the +simplicity of _the one_, and vehemently rejoicing, as some one of the +piously wise says, in an unadorned privation of form, and extending it +to those who are able to survey it[217].” And the botanical labours of +Laertes are an image of the providential attention of the Demiurgus to +the immediate ramifications and blossoms of his own divine essence, in +which they are ineffably rooted, and from which they eternally germinate. + +Though Ulysses, however, is placed through the theoretic virtues in the +paternal port, as far as this is possible to be effected in the present +life, yet we must remember, according to the beautiful observation of +Porphyry, that he is not freed from molestation, till he has passed over +the raging sea of a material nature; _i.e._ has become impassive[218] to +the excitations of the irrational life, and is entirely abstracted from +external concerns. For, + + Then heav’n decrees in peace to end his days, + And steal himself from life by slow decays; + Unknown to pain, in age resign his breath. + When late stern Neptune points the shaft of death; + To the dark grave retiring as to rest; + His people blessing, by his people blest[219]. + +I shall only observe farther, that Plotinus also considered the +wanderings of Ulysses as a fabulous narration containing a latent +meaning, such as that which we have above unfolded. This is evident from +the following extract from his admirable treatise _on the Beautiful_: “It +is here, then, [in order to survey the beautiful itself] that we may more +truly exclaim. + + Haste, let us fly and all our sails expand, + To gain our dear, our long-lost native land[220]. + +But by what leading stars shall we direct our flight, and by what means +avoid the magic power of Circe, and the detaining charms of Calypso? +For thus the fable of Ulysses obscurely signifies, which feigns him +abiding an unwilling exile, though pleasant spectacles were continually +presented to his sight; and every thing was proffered to invite his +stay, which can delight the senses and captivate the heart. But our true +country, like that of Ulysses, is from whence we came, and where our +father lives[221].” + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[183] Δια τοι τουτο, και τον Οδυσσεα λεγουσι κατα θαλατταν πλανασθαι +βουλῃ του Ποσειδωνος· σημαινουσι γαρ την Οδυσσειον ζωην, οτι ουδε χθονια +ην, αλλ’ ουδε μην ετι ουρανια, αλλα μεση· επει ουν ο Ποσειδων του μεταξυ +κυριος εστι, δια τουτο και τον Οδυσσεα φασι βουλῃ Ποσειδωνος [supple +πλανασθαι·] επειδη τον κληρον του Ποσειδωνος ειχεν· ουτω γουν και τους +μεν φασι Διος υιους, τους δε Ποσειδωνος, τους δε Πλουτωνος, προς τους +κληρους εκαστου· τον μεν γαρ εχοντα θειαν και ουρανιαν πολιτειαν Διος +φαμεν υιον, τον δε χθονιαν, Πλουτωνος, τον δε την μεταξυ Ποσειδωνος. + +[184] In Plat. Polit. p. 398. + +[185] Instead of αναλογοι ψυχαι, in this place, it is necessary to read +αλογοι ψυχαι. + +[186] Iliad, V. v. 451. + +[187] Conformably to this, Proclus, in Plat. Polit. p. 398, says, “that +all the beauty subsisting about generation [or the regions of sense], +from the fabrication of things, is signified by Helen; about which +there is a perpetual battle of souls, till the more intellectual having +vanquished the more irrational forms of life, return to the place from +whence they originally came.” For the beauty which is in the realms of +generation, is an efflux of intelligible beauty. + +[188] This second line is, in Pope’s version, “Lotos the name, divine, +nectarious juice!” which I have altered as above, as being more +conformable to the original. + +[189] Lib. ix. l. 94, &c. + +[190] Vid. Censoris, De Die Natali, cap. iii. + +[191] This is evident from the following passage in the Commentary of +Proclus, on the First Alcibiades of Plato: Ταις μεν ουν αποκαταστατικως +ζωσαις ψυχαις ο αυτος εστιν ανω κανταυθα δαιμων· ταις δε ατελεστεραις +αλλος μεν ο κατ’ ουσιαν δαιμων, αλλος δε ο κατα τον προβεβλημενον βιον. +p. 37, Edit. Creuz. But for a copious account of the essential dæmon, and +of the different orders and offices of dæmon, see the notes accompanying +my translation of the First Alcibiades, Phædo, and Gorgias of Plato. + +[192] See the note (p. 90) accompanying my translation of the +Metamorphosis of Apuleius. + +[193] For an accurate account of the gradation of the virtues, see +Porphyry’s Auxiliaries to Intelligibles, p. 217. + +[194] For the shuttle is a symbol of separating power. + +[195] And this is the meaning of the Chaldaic oracle,— + + Σον αγγειον θηρες χθονος οικησουσιν. + +_i.e._ “The wild beasts of the earth shall inhabit thy vessel.” For, +as Psellus well observes, by _the vessel_, the composite temperature of +the soul is signified, and by the wild beasts of the earth, terrestrial +dæmons. + +[196] Odyss. lib. v. 82, &c. The translation by Pope. + +[197] Ibid. lib. v. 269, &c. + +[198] Odyss. lib. vii. 84, &c. The translation by Pope. + +[199] In Euclid. Element. lib. i. p. 14. + +[200] Odyss. lib. viii. 556, &c. + +[201] Odyss. lib. vii. 33. + +[202] Odyss. lib. xiii. 93, &c. + +[203] _i.e._ Philosophy; for of this Penelope is an image. + +[204] Odyss. lib. xiii. 373, &c. + +[205] Odyss. lib. xiii. 397, &c. The translation of the above, and +likewise of all the following passages from the Odyssey, is by Pope. + +[206] Odyss. lib. xvii. 201, &c. + +[207] Odyss. lib. xxii. 1, &c. + +[208] Odyss. lib. xxiii. 88, &c. + +[209] Odyss. lib. xxiii. 131, &c. + +[210] Odyss. lib. xxiii. 163, &c. + +[211] Odyss. lib. xxiv. 215, &c. + +[212] Ibid. lib. xxiv. 225. + +[213] These are the concluding words of the last book of his last Ennead. + +[214] See vol. i. p. 254, of my translation of that work. + +[215] This is in consequence of a union with the Demiurgus being so much +superior to scientific perception. + +[216] Odyss. lib. xxiv. 225, &c. + +[217] τα μεν γαρ εστι θεια και εν τῃ απλοτητι του ενος ιδρυμενα την +ακαλλοπιστον ευμορφιαν· (lege αμορφιαν) ως φησι τις των τα οσια +σοφων, διαφεροντως αγαπωντα, και προτεινοντα τοις εις αυτα βλεπειν +δυναμενοις.—Procl. in Parmenid. lib. i. p. 38. 8vo. Parisiis, 1821. + +[218] This impassivity, or perfect subjugation of the passions to reason, +which is the _true apathy_ of the Stoics and Platonists, is indicated by +Ulysses finding a nation + + “Who ne’er knew salt or heard the billows roar.” + +[219] Odyss. lib. xxiii. 281, &c. By _the people_, in these lines, the +inferior parts or powers of the soul are indicated. + +[220] Iliad, lib. ii. 140, and lib. ix. 27. + +[221] See my paraphrased translation of this treatise, p. 37, &c. + + +THE END. + + LONDON: + PRINTED BY J. MOYES, GREVILLE STREET. + + + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 77014 *** |