diff options
| author | pgww <pgww@lists.pglaf.org> | 2025-10-08 14:22:01 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | pgww <pgww@lists.pglaf.org> | 2025-10-08 14:22:01 -0700 |
| commit | ca0cbea2149f941079f797b6a4a815a73815e39d (patch) | |
| tree | 7ef93f2e8d716ba0b7939bbf65f78d74dc27e788 /77014-h | |
Diffstat (limited to '77014-h')
| -rw-r--r-- | 77014-h/77014-h.htm | 11856 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | 77014-h/images/cover.jpg | bin | 0 -> 225948 bytes |
2 files changed, 11856 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/77014-h/77014-h.htm b/77014-h/77014-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5c67378 --- /dev/null +++ b/77014-h/77014-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,11856 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html> +<html lang="en"> +<head> + <meta charset="UTF-8"> + <title> + Select works of Porphyry | Project Gutenberg + </title> + <link rel="icon" href="images/cover.jpg" type="image/x-cover"> + <style> + +a { + text-decoration: none; +} + +body { + margin-left: 10%; + margin-right: 10%; +} + +h1,h2,h3 { + text-align: center; + clear: both; +} + +h2.nobreak { + page-break-before: avoid; +} + +hr.chap { + margin-top: 2em; + margin-bottom: 2em; + clear: both; + width: 65%; + margin-left: 17.5%; + margin-right: 17.5%; +} + +div.chapter { + page-break-before: always; +} + +p { + margin-top: 0.5em; + text-align: justify; + margin-bottom: 0.5em; + text-indent: 1em; +} + +blockquote { + margin: 1.5em 10%; +} + +.center { + text-align: center; + text-indent: 0; +} + +.footnotes { + margin-top: 1em; + border: dashed 1px; +} + +.footnote { + margin-left: 10%; + margin-right: 10%; + font-size: 0.9em; +} + +.footnote .label { + position: absolute; + right: 84%; + text-align: right; +} + +.fnanchor { + vertical-align: super; + font-size: .8em; + text-decoration: none; +} + +.larger { + font-size: 150%; +} + +.lh { + line-height: 1.8em; +} + +.mid { + font-size: 120%; +} + +.noindent { + text-indent: 0; +} + +.pagenum { + position: absolute; + right: 4%; + font-size: smaller; + text-align: right; + font-style: normal; +} + +.poetry-container { + text-align: center; +} + +.poetry { + display: inline-block; + text-align: left; +} + +.poetry .stanza { + margin: 1em 0em 1em 0em; +} + +.poetry .verse { + padding-left: 3em; +} + +.poetry .indent0 { + text-indent: -3em; +} + +.right { + text-align: right; +} + +.smaller { + font-size: 80%; +} + +.smcap { + font-variant: small-caps; + font-style: normal; +} + +.titlepage { + text-align: center; + margin-top: 3em; + text-indent: 0; +} + +.x-ebookmaker img { + max-width: 100%; + width: auto; + height: auto; +} + +.x-ebookmaker .poetry { + display: block; + margin-left: 1.5em; +} + +.x-ebookmaker blockquote { + margin: 1.5em 5%; +} + + </style> + </head> +<body> +<div style='text-align:center'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 77014 ***</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_i">[i]</span></p> + +<p class="titlepage larger">SELECT WORKS<br> +<span class="smaller">OF</span><br> +PORPHYRY;</p> + +<p class="center lh"><span class="smaller">CONTAINING<br> +<span class="mid">HIS FOUR BOOKS ON</span></span><br> +ABSTINENCE FROM ANIMAL FOOD;<br> +<span class="smaller">HIS TREATISE ON</span><br> +THE HOMERIC CAVE OF THE NYMPHS;<br> +<span class="smaller">AND HIS</span><br> +AUXILIARIES<br> +<span class="smaller">TO THE</span><br> +PERCEPTION OF INTELLIGIBLE NATURES.</p> + +<p class="titlepage"><i>TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK</i><br> +<span class="smaller">BY</span><br> +THOMAS TAYLOR.</p> + +<p class="titlepage"><span class="smaller">WITH</span><br> +<span class="mid">AN APPENDIX,</span><br> +<span class="smaller">EXPLAINING THE ALLEGORY OF THE WANDERINGS OF ULYSSES.</span><br> +BY THE TRANSLATOR.</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>Και ουτω θεων και ανθρωπων θειων και ευδαιμονων βιος, απαλλαγη των αλλων +των τῃδε, ανηδονος των τῃδε, φυγη μονου προς μονον.—<span class="smcap">Plotini</span> Op. p. 771.</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p class="titlepage">LONDON:<br> +<span class="smaller">PRINTED FOR</span><br> +THOMAS RODD, 17, GREAT NEWPORT STREET.<br> +1823.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_ii">[ii]</span></p> + +<p class="titlepage smaller">LONDON:<br> +PRINTED BY J. MOYES, GREVILLE STREET.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_iii">[iii]</span></p> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p class="titlepage">TO<br> +<br> +<span class="mid">THE REV. WILLIAM JOHN JOLLIFFE,</span><br> +<br> +<span class="smaller">AS A TESTIMONY OF GREAT ESTEEM FOR HIS<br> +TALENTS AND WORTH,<br> +<br> +AND A TRIBUTE OF THE WARMEST GRATITUDE FOR<br> +HIS PATRONAGE,</span><br> +<br> +THIS WORK IS DEDICATED<br> +<br> +<span class="smaller" style="margin-left: 10em;"><i>BY THE TRANSLATOR</i>,</span><br> +<br> +<span style="margin-left: 12em;">THOMAS TAYLOR.</span></p> + +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_iv">[iv]</span></p> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_v">[v]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="INTRODUCTION">INTRODUCTION.</h2> + +</div> + +<p>Porphyry, the celebrated author of the treatises +translated in this volume, was dignified by his +contemporaries, and by succeeding Platonists, +with the appellation of <i>the philosopher</i>, on account +of his very extraordinary philosophical attainments. +He is likewise called by Simplicius, <i>the +most learned of the philosophers</i>, and is praised by +Proclus for his ιεροπρεπη νοηματα, or <i>conceptions +adapted to sanctity</i>; the truth of all which appellations +is by the following treatises most abundantly +and manifestly confirmed.</p> + +<p>A few biographical particulars only have been +transmitted to us respecting this great man, and +these are as follow. He was born at Tyre, in the +twelfth year of the reign of the Emperor Alexander +Severus, and in the two hundred and +thirty-third of the Christian era; and he died +at Rome, when he was more than seventy years +old, in the latter part of the Emperor Dioclesian’s +reign. He was also a disciple first of Longinus, +and afterwards of the great Plotinus, with whom +he became acquainted in the thirtieth year of his +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_vi">[vi]</span>age; and it is to Porphyry we are indebted for +the publication of the inestimable and uncommonly +profound works of that most extraordinary +man. For, as I have observed in my History +of the Restoration of the Platonic Theology, it +was a long time before Plotinus committed his +thoughts to writing, and gave the world a copy +of his inimitable mind. That light which was +destined to illuminate the philosophical world, +as yet shone with solitary splendour, or beamed +only on a beloved few; and it was through Porphyry +alone that it at length emerged from its +sanctuary, and displayed its radiance in full perfection, +and with unbounded diffusion. For Porphyry, +in the language of Eunapius, “like a +Mercurial chain let down for the benefit of +mortals, unfolded every thing with accuracy and +clearness, by the assistance of universal erudition.”</p> + +<p>We are likewise informed, by the same Eunapius, +that Porphyry, when he first associated +with Plotinus, bade farewell to all his other +preceptors, and totally applied himself to the +friendship of that wonderful man. Here he filled +his mind with science, as from a perennial and +never-satiating fount. But afterwards, being conquered, +as it were, by the magnitude of his doctrines, +he conceived a hatred of body, and could +no longer endure the fetters of mortality.—“Hence,” +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_vii">[vii]</span>says he⁠<a id="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>, “I formed an intention of +destroying myself, which Plotinus wonderfully +perceived; and as I was walking home, stood +before me, and said, <i>Your present design, O +Porphyry, is not the dictate of a sound intellect, but +rather of a soul raging with an atrabilarious fury</i>. +In consequence of this he ordered me to depart +from Rome; and accordingly I went to Sicily, +having heard that a certain worthy and elegant +man dwelt at that time about Lilybæum. And +thus, indeed, I was liberated from this perturbation +of soul; but was, in the meantime, hindered +from being with Plotinus till his death.”</p> + +<p>Porphyry also maintains a very distinguished +rank among those great geniuses who contributed +to the development of the genuine dogmas of +Plato, after they had been lost for upwards of +five hundred years; as I have shown in my above-mentioned +History of the Restoration of the Platonic +Theology. Among these dogmas, that which +is transcendently important is this,—that the ineffable +principle of things, which is denominated +by Plato <i>the good</i> and <i>the one</i>, is something superior +to intellect and being itself. This, as we are +informed by Proclus, was demonstrated by Porphyry, +by many powerful and beautiful arguments, +in his treatise Concerning Principles, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_viii">[viii]</span>which is unfortunately lost. And this dogma, +which was derived principally from the 6th book +of the Republic, and the Parmenides, of Plato, +and was adopted by all succeeding Platonists, is +copiously unfolded, and the truth of it supported +by reasoning replete with what Plato calls geometrical +necessities, by those two great philosophical +luminaries Proclus and Damascius⁠<a id="FNanchor_2" href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a>; the +former of whom was the Coryphæus of the Platonists, +and the latter possessed a profoundly investigating +mind.</p> + +<p>Of the disciples of Porphyry the most celebrated +was Iamblichus, a man of an uncommonly +penetrating genius, and who, like his master +Plato, on account of the sublimity of his conceptions, +and his admirable proficiency in theological +learning, was surnamed <i>the divine</i>. This +extraordinary man, though zealously attached to +the Platonic philosophy, yet explored the wisdom +of other sects, particularly of the Pythagoreans, +Egyptians, and Chaldeans; and formed one beautiful +system of recondite knowledge, from their +harmonious conjunction⁠<a id="FNanchor_3" href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a>.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_ix">[ix]</span></p> + +<p>With respect to the works of Porphyry which +are translated in this volume, the first, which +is <i>On Abstinence from Animal Food</i>, is a treatise +not only replete with great erudition, but is +remarkable for the purity of life which it inculcates, +and the sanctity of conception with which +it abounds. At the same time it must be remembered, +that it was written solely, as Porphyry +himself informs us, with a view to the man who +wishes in the present life to liberate himself as +much as possible from the fetters of the corporeal +nature, in order that he may elevate his intellectual +eye to the contemplation of <i>truly-existing +being</i> (το οντως ον,) and may establish himself in +deity as in his paternal port⁠<a id="FNanchor_4" href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a>. But such a one, as +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_x">[x]</span>he beautifully observes, must divest himself of +every thing of a mortal nature which he has +assumed, must withdraw himself from sense and +imagination, and the irrationality with which +they are attended, and from an adhering affection +and passion towards them; and must enter +the stadium naked and unclothed, striving for the +most glorious of all prizes, the Olympia of the +soul⁠<a id="FNanchor_5" href="#Footnote_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a>. Hence, says he, “my discourse is not +directed to those who are occupied in sordid +mechanical arts, nor to those who are engaged in +athletic exercises; neither to soldiers nor sailors, +nor rhetoricians, <i>nor to those who lead an active +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xi">[xi]</span>life</i>⁠<a id="FNanchor_6" href="#Footnote_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a>; but I write to the man who considers what +he is, whence he came, and whither he ought +to tend, and who, in what pertains to nutriment +and other necessary concerns, is different from +those who propose to themselves other kinds +of life; <i>for to none but such as these do I direct my +discourse</i>⁠<a id="FNanchor_7" href="#Footnote_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a>.” This treatise, also, is highly valuable +for the historical information which it contains, +independently of the philosophical beauties with +which it abounds.</p> + +<p>The <i>Explanation of the Homeric Cave of the +Nymphs</i>, which follows next, is not only remarkable +for the great erudition which it displays, but +also for containing some profound arcana of +the mythology and symbolical theology of the +Greeks.</p> + +<p>And the third treatise, which is denominated +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xii">[xii]</span><i>Auxiliaries to the Perception of Intelligibles</i>, may be +considered as an excellent introduction to the +works of Plotinus in general, from which a great +part of it is extracted, and in particular, to the +following books of that most sublime genius, viz. +On the Virtues⁠<a id="FNanchor_8" href="#Footnote_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a>; On the Impassivity of Incorporeal +Natures⁠<a id="FNanchor_9" href="#Footnote_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a>; and On Truly-Existing Being, +in which it is demonstrated that such being is +every where one and the same whole⁠<a id="FNanchor_10" href="#Footnote_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a>. This +Porphyrian treatise, also, is admirably calculated +to afford assistance to the student of the Theological +Elements of Proclus, a work never to be sufficiently +praised for the scientific accuracy, profundity +of conception, and luminous development +of the most important dogmas, which it displays.</p> + +<p>In the fourth place, Porphyry, in his treatise +On the Cave of the Nymphs, having informed us, +that Numenius, the Pythagorean, considered the +person of Ulysses, in the Odyssey, as the image +of a man who passes in a regular manner over the +stormy sea of generation, or a sensible life, and +thus at length arrives at a region where tempest +and seas are unknown, and finds a nation</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">“Who ne’er knew salt, or heard the billows roar:”</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class="noindent">I have endeavoured, by the assistance of this +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xiii">[xiii]</span>intimation, to unfold, in the Appendix which +concludes the work, the secret meaning of the +allegory; and, I trust, in a way which will not be +deemed by the intelligent reader either visionary +or vain.</p> + +<p>With respect to the translation of the treatises, +I have endeavoured faithfully to preserve both +the matter and manner of the author; and have +availed myself of the best editions of them, and, +likewise, of all the information which appeared to +me to be most important, and most appropriate, +from the remarks of critics and philologists, but +especially from the elucidations of philosophers. +This, I trust, will be evident from a perusal of the +notes which accompany the translation.</p> + +<p>Of all the other writings of Porphyry, besides +those translated in this volume, few unfortunately +have been preserved entire⁠<a id="FNanchor_11" href="#Footnote_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a>, the greater part of +what remains of them being fragments. Among +these fragments, however, there is one very +important, lately found by Angelus Maius, and +published by him, Mediol. 1816, 8vo. It is +nearly the whole of the Epistle of Porphyry to his +wife Marcella, in which I have discovered the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xiv">[xiv]</span>original of many of the Sentences of the celebrated +Sextus Pythagoricus⁠<a id="FNanchor_12" href="#Footnote_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a>, which have been +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xv">[xv]</span>hitherto supposed to be alone extant in the +fraudulent Latin version of the Presbyter Ruffinus. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xvi">[xvi]</span>And for an account of the other entire +works and fragments that are extant, and also +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xvii">[xvii]</span>of the lost writings of Porphyry, I refer the +reader to the Bibliotheca Græca of Fabricius, and +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xviii">[xviii]</span>to my before-mentioned History of the Restoration +of the Platonic Theology; in which latter +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xix">[xix]</span>work, in speaking of Porphyry’s lost treatise +on the Reascent of the Soul, I have given a +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_xx">[xx]</span>long and most interesting extract relative to that +treatise, from Synesius on Dreams.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"> + +<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_1" href="#FNanchor_1" class="label">[1]</a> In Vit. Plotin.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_2" href="#FNanchor_2" class="label">[2]</a> See the 2d book of my translation of Proclus on the +Theology of Plato, and the Introduction to my translation of +Plato, and notes on the 3d volume of that translation.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_3" href="#FNanchor_3" class="label">[3]</a> See my translation of his Life of Pythagoras, and also of +his treatise on the Mysteries. The Emperor Julian says of +Iamblichus, “that he was posterior in time, but not in genius, +to Plato himself.”</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_4" href="#FNanchor_4" class="label">[4]</a> Such a man as this, is arranged by Plotinus in the class +of <i>divine men</i>, in the following extract from my translation of his +treatise on Intellect, Ideas, and Real Being, Ennead V. 9. +The extract, which is uncommonly beautiful in the original, +forms the beginning of the treatise. “Since all men, from their +birth, employ sense prior to intellect, and are necessarily first +conversant with sensibles, some, proceeding no farther, pass +through life, considering these as the first and last of things, +and apprehending, that whatever is painful among these, is evil, +and whatever is pleasant, is good; thus, thinking it sufficient to +pursue the one and avoid the other. Those, too, among them, +who pretend to a greater share of reason than others, esteem +this to be wisdom; being affected in a manner similar to more +heavy birds, who, collecting many things from the earth, and +being oppressed with the weight, are unable to fly on high, +though they have received wings for this purpose from nature. +But others are in a small degree elevated from things subordinate, +the more excellent part of the soul recalling them from +pleasure to a more worthy pursuit. As they are, however, +unable to look on high, and as not possessing any thing else +which can afford them rest, they betake themselves, together +with the name of virtue, to actions and the election of things +inferior, from which they at first endeavoured to raise themselves, +though in vain. <i>In the third class is the race of divine men</i>, who +through a more excellent power, and with piercing eyes, acutely +perceive supernal light, to the vision of which they raise themselves, +above the clouds and darkness, as it were, of this lower +world, and there abiding, despise every thing in these regions of +sense; being no otherwise delighted with the place which is +truly and properly their own, than he who, after many wanderings, +is at length restored to his lawful country.”</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_5" href="#FNanchor_5" class="label">[5]</a> Page 23.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_6" href="#FNanchor_6" class="label">[6]</a> The translator of this work, and of the other treatises contained +in this volume, having been so circumstanced, that he +has been obliged to mingle the active with the contemplative +life (μετα θεωρητικου νου πολιτευομενος) in acquiring for himself +a knowledge of the philosophy of Plato, and disseminating that +philosophy for the good of others, has also found it expedient to +make use of a fleshy diet. Nothing, however, but an imperious +necessity, from causes which it would be superfluous to detail +at present, could have induced him to adopt animal, instead of +vegetable nutriment. But though he has been nurtured in +Eleatic and Academic studies, yet it has not been in Academic +bowers.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_7" href="#FNanchor_7" class="label">[7]</a> Page 19.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_8" href="#FNanchor_8" class="label">[8]</a> Ennead I. 2.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_9" href="#FNanchor_9" class="label">[9]</a> Ennead III. 6.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_10" href="#FNanchor_10" class="label">[10]</a> Ennead VI. lib. 4, 5.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_11" href="#FNanchor_11" class="label">[11]</a> For even with respect to the treatise On Abstinence from +Animal Food, there is every reason to believe that something is +wanting at the end of it.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_12" href="#FNanchor_12" class="label">[12]</a> See the Latin translation of these Sentences by Ruffinus, +in the Opuscula Mythologica of Gale. The Sentences which +are to be found in this Epistle of Porphyry, were published by +me, with some animadversions, in the Classical Journal, about +two years ago; but on account of the great importance of these +Sentences, and for the sake of those who may not have this +Journal in their possession, I shall here repeat what I have there +said on this subject.</p> + +<p>After having premised that great praise is due to the editor +for the publication of this Epistle, but that, as he has taken no +notice of the sources whence most of the beautiful moral sentences +with which this Epistle abounds, are derived, it becomes +necessary to unfold them to the reader, particularly as by this +means several of the Sentences of Sextus Pythagoricus may be +obtained in the original Greek;—I then observe:</p> + +<p>Previous, however, to this development, I shall present +the reader with the emendation of the following defective sentence +in p. 19: Το δε πεπαιδευσθαι ουκ εν πολυμαθειας αναληψει +... παλαξει δε των ψυχικων παθων εθεωρειτο. The editor, not +being an adept in the philosophy of Pythagoras and Plato, conceived +that παλαξει was a genuine word; for he remarks, “Nota +vocabulum παλαξις,” whereas it is only a part of a word, <i>i.e.</i> it +is a part of απαλλαξει. Hence, if after αναληψει, the words εν +απαλλαξει are inserted, the sentence of Porphyry will be perfect +both in its construction and meaning, and will be in English, +“Erudition does not consist in the resumption of polymathy, +but is to be surveyed in a liberation from the passions pertaining +to the soul.” The editor, not perceiving the necessity of this +emendation, has, by the following version, totally mistaken the +meaning of the sentence: “Bonam autem institutionem nunquam +æstimem, quæ cum eruditionis copia, animalium quoque +passionum contaminatione sordescat.”</p> + +<p>The first sentence of which I have discovered the source, is +from Sextus, and is the following, in p. 23: θεος μεν γαρ δειται +ουδενος· σοφος δε μονου θεου: <i>i.e.</i> “For God is not in want of any +thing; but the wise man is alone in want of God.” This, in +the version of Ruffinus, is: “Deus quidem nullius eget, fidelis +autem Dei solius.” (Vid. Opusc. Mytholog. 8vo. 1688, p. 646.)</p> + +<p>2. Πασης πραξεως και παντος εργου και λογου θεος εποπτης παρεστω +και εφορος, (p. 24): <i>i.e.</i> “Of every action, and of every deed +and word, God is present as the scrutator and inspector.” This +is evidently derived from the following sentence of Demophilus, +(Opusc. Mythol. p. 621): Εαν αει μνημονευης, οτι οπου αν ἦ η ψυχη +σου, και το σωμα εργον αποτελει, θεος εφεστηκεν εφορος, εν πασαις σου +ταις ευχαις και πραξεσιν, αιδεσθησῃ μεν του θεωρου το αληστον, εξεις δε +τον θεον συνοικον, <i>i.e.</i> “If you always remember, that wherever +your soul, or your body, performs any deed, God is present as +an inspector, in all your prayers and actions, you will reverence +the nature of an inspector, from whom nothing can be concealed, +and will have God for a cohabitant.” What immediately +follows in this paragraph is from Sextus, viz. και παντων +ων πραττομεν αγαθων τον θεον αιτιον ηγωμεθα: <i>i.e.</i> “Of all the +good that we do, we should consider God as the cause.” And +Sextus says, p. 648. “Deus in bonis actibus hominibus dux +est.” Porphyry adds: Των δε κακων αιτιοι ημεις εσμεν οι ελομενοι, +θεος δε αναιτιος. And the latter part is evidently from Sextus, +who says, p. 648, “Mali nullius autor est Deus.” Porphyry +further adds: Οθεν και ευκταιον τα αξια θεου· και αιτωμεθα ἃ μη +λαβοιμεν αν παρ’ ετερου· και ων ηγεμονες οι μετ’ αρετης πονοι, ταυτα +ευχομεθα γενεσθαι μετα τους πονους: <i>i.e.</i> “Hence we should ask +of God things which are worthy of him, and which we cannot +receive from any other. The goods also, of which labours are +the leaders, in conjunction with virtue, we should pray that we +may obtain after the labours [are accomplished].” All this is +from Sextus. For, in p. 648, he says: “Hæc posce à Deo, +quæ dignum est præstare Deum. Ea pete à Deo, quæ accipere +ab homine non potes. In quibus præcedere debet labor, hæc +tibi opta evenire post laborem.” Only, in this last sentence, +Ruffinus has omitted to add, after <i>labor</i>, the words <i>cum virtute</i>. +What Porphyry says, almost immediately after this, is precisely +the first of the Sentences of Demophilus, (Opusc. Mythol. +p. 626), viz. Ἃ δε κτησαμενος ου καθεξεις, μη αιτου παρα θεου· δωρον +γαρ θεου παν αναφαιρετον· ωστε ου δωσει ὃ μη καθεξεις: <i>i.e.</i> “Do +not ask of God that which, when you have obtained, you cannot +preserve. For every gift of God is incapable of being taken +away; so that he will not give that which you cannot retain.” +The sentence immediately following this is ascribed to Pythagoras, +and is to be found in the Sentences of Stobæus, (edit. +1609, p. 65): viz. Ων δε του σωματος απαλλαγεισα ου δεηθησῃ, +εκεινων καταφρονει· και ων αν απαλλαγεισα δεῃ, εις ταυτα συ +ασκουμενη τον θεον παρεκαλει γενεσθαι συλληπτορα. In Stobæus, +however, there is some difference, so as to render the sentence +more complete. For immediately after καταφρονει, there is παντων; +for δεηθησῃ there is δεησῃ; for δεῃ, δεησῃ; for τον θεον, τους +θεους; for συ ασκουμενη, σοι ασκουμενῳ; and instead of γενεσθαι +συλληπτορα, γενεσθαι σοι συλληπτορα. This, therefore, translated, +will be: “Despise all those things which, when liberated from +the body, you will not want; and exercising yourself in those +things, of which, when liberated from the body, you will be +in want, invoke the Gods to become your helpers.” In pp. 27 +and 28, Porphyry says, αιρετωτερου σοι οντος [χρηματα] εικη +βαλειν ἢ λογον· και το ηττασθαι τ’ αληθη λεγοντα, ἢ νικᾳν απατωντα: +<i>i.e.</i> “It should be more eligible to you carelessly to throw +away riches than reason; and to be vanquished when speaking +the truth, than to vanquish by deception.” And the latter part +of this sentence is to be found in Sextus: for in p. 649 he says, +“Melius est vinci vera dicentem, quam vincere, mentientem.” +Almost immediately after Porphyry adds, Αδυνατον τον αυτον +φιλοθεον τε ειναι και φιληδονον και φιλοσωματον· ο γαρ φιληδονος +και φιλοσωματος παντως και φιλοχρηματος· ο δὲ φιλοχρηματος, εξ +αναγκης αδικος· ο δε αδικος, και εις θεον και εις πατερας ανοσιος, και +εις τους αλλους παρανομος· ωστε κᾳν εκατομβας θυῃ, και μυριοις +αναθημασι νεως αγαλλῃ, ασεβης εστι και αθεος και τῃ προαιρεσει +ιεροσυλος· διο και παντα φιλοσωματον ως αθεον και μιαρον εκτρεπεσθαι +χρη. This sentence is the last of the Sentences of Demophilus, +(Opusc. Mythol. p. 625); but in Porphyry it is in one part +defective, and in another is fuller than in Demophilus. For in +the first colon, φιλοχρηματον is wanting: in the second colon, +after ο γαρ φιληδονος και φιλοσωματος, the words ο δε φιλοσωματος +are wanting. And in Demophilus, instead of ο δε αδικος και +εις θεον και εις πατερας ανοσιος, και εις τους αλλους παρανομος, there +is nothing more than ο δε αδικος, εις μεν θεον ανοσιος, εις δε ανθρωπους +παρανομος. In Demophilus also, after ωστε κᾳν εκατομβας θυῃ +the words και μυριοις αναθημασι τους νεως αγαλλῃ, are wanting. +And in Porphyry, after νεως αγαλλῃ, the words πολυ μαλλον +ανοσιωτερος εστι, και, are wanting. This sentence therefore, thus +amended, will be in English, “It is impossible for the same +person to be a lover of God, a lover of pleasure, a lover of body, +and a lover of riches. For a lover of pleasure is also a lover of +body; but a lover of body is entirely a lover of riches; and a +lover of riches is necessarily unjust. But he who is unjust +1s impious towards God and his parents, and lawless towards +others. So that, though he should sacrifice hecatombs, and +adorn temples with ten thousand gifts, he will be much more +unholy, impious, atheistical, and sacrilegious in his deliberate +choice. Hence it is necessary to avoid every lover of body, as +one who is without God, and is defiled.”</p> + +<p>3. The following passages in the epistle of Porphyry, are +from Sextus: Ο δε αξιος ανθρωπος θεου, θεος αν ειη, (p. 30) <i>i.e.</i> +“The man who is worthy of God, will be himself a God.” And +Sextus says, “Dignus Deo homo, deus est et in hominibus.” +(p. 654.) Porphyry says, Και τιμησεις μεν αριστα τον θεον, οταν τῳ +θεῳ την σαυτης διανοιαν ομοιωσεις, (p. 30,) <i>i.e.</i> “And you will +honour God in the best manner, when you assimilate your +reasoning power to God.” Thus also Sextus, “Optime honorat +Deum ille, qui mentem suam, quantum fieri potest, similem Deo +facit,” (p. 655.) Again, Porphyry says, Θεος δε ανθρωπον βεβαιοι +πρασσοντα καλα· κακων δε πραξεων κακος δαιμων ηγεμων, (p. 31): <i>i.e.</i> +“God corroborates man when he performs beautiful deeds; but +an evil dæmon is the leader of bad actions.” And Sextus says, +“Deus bonos actus hominum confirmat. Malorum actuum, +malus dæmon dux est.” (p. 653). Porphyry adds, Ψυχη δε σοφου +αρμοζεται προς θεον, αει θεον ορᾳ, συνεστιν αει θεῳ, (p. 31,) <i>i.e.</i> “The +soul of the wise man is adapted to God; it always beholds +God, and is always present with God.” Thus, too, Sextus, +“Sapientis anima audit Deum, sapientis anima aptatur à Deo, +sapientis anima semper est cum Deo,” (p. 655). There is, however, +some difference between the original and the Latin version, +which is most probably owing to the fraud of Ruffinus. And in +the last place, Porphyry says, Αλλα κρηπις ευσεβειας σοι νομιζεσθω +η φιλανθρωπια, (p. 58,) <i>i.e.</i> “Philanthropy should be considered +by you as the foundation of piety.” And Sextus says, “Fundamentum +et initium est cultûs Dei, amare Dei homines.” +(p. 654). Ruffinus, however, in this version, fraudulently translates +φιλανθρωπια, <i>amare Dei homines</i>, in order that this sentence, +as well as the others, might appear to be written by Sixtus the +bishop!</p> + +<p>4. The learned reader will find the following passages in +the Epistle of Porphyry, to be sentences of Demophilus, viz. +Λογον γαρ θεου τοις υπο δοξης διεφθαρμενοις λεγειν, κ.τ.λ. usque ad +ισον φερει, (p. 29). Ουχ η γλωττα του σοφου τιμιον παρα θεῳ, κ.τ.λ. +usque ad μονος ειδως ευξασθαι, (p. 32). Ου χολωθεντες ουν οι θεοι +βλαπτουσι, κ.τ.λ. usque ad θεῳ δε ουδεν αβουλητον, (p. 35). Ουτε +δακρυα και ικετειαι θεον επιστρεφουσι, ουτε θυηπολια θεον τιμωσιν, +ουτε αναθηματων πληθος κοσμουσι θεον, κ.τ.λ. usque ad ιεροσυλοις +χορηγια, (p. 36). In which passage, however, there is a remarkable +difference, as the learned reader will find, between the text +of Porphyry and that of Demophilus. Εαν ουν αει μνημονευῃς, +οτι οπου αν η ψυχη σου περιπατῃ, και το σωμα ενεργον (lege εργον,) +αποτελῃ, κ.τ.λ. usque ad τον θεον συνοικον, (p. 37). Ο συνετος +ανηρ και θεοφιλης, κ.τ.λ. usque ad σπουδαζεται πονησας, (p. 54). +Γυμνος δε αποσταλεις [σοφος] κ.τ.λ. usque ad επηκοος ο θεος, +(p. 54.) Χαλεπωτερον δουλευειν παθεσιν ἢ τυραννοις. And οσα γαρ +παθη ψυχης, τοσουτοι και ωμοι δεσποται, (p. 57). And lastly, +πολλῳ γαρ κρειττον τεθναναι ἢ δι’ ακρασιαν την ψυχην αμαυρωσαι, +(p. 58). In all these passages, it will be found, by comparing +them with Porphyry, that they occasionally differ from the text +of Demophilus, yet not so as to alter the sense.</p> + +<p>I only add, that many of the Sentences of Demophilus will +be found among those of Sextus. Nor is this at all wonderful, +as it was usual with the Pythagoreans, from their exalted notions +of friendship, to consider the work of one of them as the production +of all.</p></div> + +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_1">[1]</span></p> + +<h1>THE SELECT WORKS OF PORPHYRY.</h1> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="ON_ABSTINENCE_FROM_ANIMAL_FOOD_1">ON ABSTINENCE FROM ANIMAL FOOD.<br> +BOOK THE FIRST.</h2> + +</div> + +<p>1. Hearing from some of our acquaintance, O Firmus⁠<a id="FNanchor_13" href="#Footnote_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a>, +that you, having rejected a fleshless diet, have again +returned to animal food, at first I did not credit the +report, when I considered your temperance, and the +reverence which you have been taught to pay to those +ancient and pious men from whom we have received the +precepts of philosophy. But when others who came +after these confirmed this report, it appeared to me that +it would be too rustic and remote from the rational +method of persuasion to reprehend you, who neither, +according to the proverb, flying from evil have found +something better, nor according to Empedocles, having +lamented your former life, have converted yourself to one +that is more excellent. I have therefore thought it +worthy of the friendship which subsists between us, and +also adapted to those who have arranged their life conformably +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_2">[2]</span>to truth, to disclose your errors through a confutation +derived from an argumentative discussion.</p> + +<p>2. For when I considered with myself what could be +the cause of this alteration in your diet, I could by +no means suppose that it was for the sake of health and +strength, as the vulgar and idiots would say; since, on +the contrary, you yourself, when you were with us, confessed +that a fleshless diet contributed both to health and +to the proper endurance of philosophic labours; and +experience testifies, that in saying this you spoke the +truth. It appears, therefore, that you have returned to +your former illegitimate⁠<a id="FNanchor_14" href="#Footnote_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> + conduct, either through deception⁠<a id="FNanchor_15" href="#Footnote_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a>, +because you think it makes no difference with +respect to the acquisition of wisdom whether you use this +or that diet; or perhaps through some other cause of +which I am ignorant, which excited in you a greater fear +than that which could be produced by the impiety of +transgression. For I should not say that you have +despised the philosophic laws which we derived from our +ancestors, and which you have so much admired, through +intemperance, or for the sake of voracious gluttony; or +that you are naturally inferior to some of the vulgar, who, +when they have assented to laws, though contrary to +those under which they formerly lived, will suffer amputation +[rather than violate them], and will abstain from +certain animals on which they before fed, more than they +would from human flesh.</p> + +<p>3. But when I was also informed by certain persons +that you even employed arguments against those who +abstained from animal food, I not only pitied, but was +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_3">[3]</span>indignant with you, that, being persuaded by certain +frigid and very corrupt sophisms, you have deceived +yourself, and have endeavoured to subvert a dogma which is +both ancient and dear to the Gods. Hence it appeared to +me to be requisite not only to show you what our own +opinion is on this subject, but also to collect and dissolve +the arguments of our opponents, which are much stronger +than those adduced by you in multitude and power, and +every other apparatus; and thus to demonstrate, that +truth is not vanquished even by those arguments which +seem to be weighty, and much less by superficial +sophisms. For you are perhaps ignorant, that not a few +philosophers are adverse to abstinence from animal food, +but that this is the case with those of the Peripatetic and +Stoic sects, and with most of the Epicureans; the last +of whom have written in opposition to the philosophy of +Pythagoras and Empedocles, of which you once were +studiously emulous. To this abstinence, likewise, many +philologists are adverse, among whom Clodius the Neapolitan +wrote a treatise against those who abstain from +flesh. Of these men I shall adduce the disquisitions and +common arguments against this dogma, at the same time +omitting those reasons which are peculiarly employed by +them against the demonstrations of Empedocles.</p> + +<h3><i>The Arguments of the Peripatetics and Stoics, from Heraclides +Ponticus⁠<a id="FNanchor_16" href="#Footnote_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a>.</i></h3> + +<p>4. Our opponents therefore say, in the first place, +that justice will be confounded, and things immoveable +be moved, if we extend what is just, not only to the +rational, but also to the irrational nature; conceiving that +not only Gods and men pertain to us, but that there +is likewise an alliance between us and brutes, who [in +reality] have no conjunction with us. Nor shall we +employ some of them in laborious works, and use others +for food, from a conviction that the association which is +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_4">[4]</span>between us and them, in the same manner as that of +some foreign polity, pertains to a tribe different from +ours, and is dishonourable. For he who uses these as if +they were men, sparing and not injuring them, thus +endeavouring to adapt to justice that which it cannot +bear, both destroys its power, and corrupts that which is +appropriate, by the introduction of what is foreign. For +it necessarily follows, either that we act unjustly by +sparing them, or if we spare and do not employ them, +that it will be impossible for us to live. We shall also, +after a manner, live the life of brutes, if we reject the use +which they are capable of affording.</p> + +<p>5. For I shall omit to mention the innumerable multitude +of Nomades and Troglodytæ, who know of no other +nutriment than that of flesh; but to us who appear to +live mildly and philanthropically, what work would be +left for us on the earth or in the sea, what illustrious art, +what ornament of our food would remain, if we conducted +ourselves innoxiously and reverentially towards brutes, +as if they were of a kindred nature with us? For it +would be impossible to assign any work, any medicine, +or any remedy for the want which is destructive of +life, or that we can act justly, unless we preserve the +ancient boundary and law.</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">To fishes, savage beasts, and birds, devoid</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Of justice, Jove to devour each other</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Granted; but justice to mankind he gave⁠<a id="FNanchor_17" href="#Footnote_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a>.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class="noindent"><i>i.e.</i> towards each other.</p> + +<p>6. But it is not possible for us to act unjustly towards +those to whom we are not obliged to act justly. Hence, +for those who reject this reasoning, no other road of +justice is left, either broad or narrow, into which they can +enter. For, as we have already observed, our nature, not +being sufficient to itself, but indigent of many things, +would be entirely destroyed, and enclosed in a life +involved in difficulties, unorganic, and deprived of necessaries, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_5">[5]</span>if excluded from the assistance derived from +animals. It is likewise said, that those first men did not +live prosperously; for this superstition did not stop +at animals, but compelled its votaries even to spare +plants. For, indeed, what greater injury does he do, who +cuts the throat of an ox or a sheep, than he who cuts +down a fir tree or an oak? since, from the doctrine of +transmigration, a soul is also implanted in these. These +therefore are the principal arguments of the Stoics and +Peripatetics.</p> + +<h3><i>The Arguments of the Epicureans, from +Hermachus⁠<a id="FNanchor_18" href="#Footnote_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a>.</i></h3> + +<p>7. The Epicureans, however, narrating, as it were, +a long genealogy, say, that the ancient legislators, looking +to the association of life, and the mutual actions +of men, proclaimed that manslaughter was unholy, and +punished it with no casual disgrace. Perhaps, indeed, +a certain natural alliance which exists in men towards +each other, through the similitude of form and soul, +is the reason why they do not so readily destroy an +animal of this kind, as some of the other animals which +are conceded to our use. Nevertheless, the greatest +cause why manslaughter was considered as a thing +grievous to be borne, and impious, was the opinion that +it did not contribute to the whole nature and condition of +human life. For, from a principle of this kind, those who +are capable of perceiving the advantage arising from this +decree, require no other cause of being restrained from a +deed so dire. But those who are not able to have a +sufficient perception of this, being terrified by the magnitude +of the punishment, will abstain from readily destroying +each other. For those, indeed, who survey the +utility of the before-mentioned ordinance, will promptly +observe it; but those who are not able to perceive the +benefit with which it is attended, will obey the mandate, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_6">[6]</span>in consequence of fearing the threatenings of the laws; +which threatenings certain persons ordained for the sake of +those who could not, by a reasoning process, infer the +beneficial tendency of the decree, at the same time that +most would admit this to be evident.</p> + +<p>8. For none of those legal institutes which were +established from the first, whether written or unwritten, +and which still remain, and are adapted to be transmitted, +[from one generation to another] became lawful through +violence, but through the consent of those that used +them. For those who introduced things of this kind to +the multitude, excelled in wisdom, and not in strength of +body, and the power which subjugates the rabble. Hence, +through this, some were led to a rational consideration +of utility, of which before they had only an irrational +sensation, and which they had frequently forgotten; but +others were terrified by the magnitude of the punishments. +For it was not possible to use any other remedy +for the ignorance of what is beneficial, than the dread of +the punishment ordained by law. For this alone even +now keeps the vulgar in awe, and prevents them from +doing any thing, either publicly or privately, which is not +beneficial [to the community]. But if all men were +similarly capable of surveying and recollecting what is +advantageous, there would be no need of laws, but men +would spontaneously avoid such things as are prohibited, +and perform such as they were ordered to do. For +the survey of what is useful and detrimental, is a sufficient +incentive to the avoidance of the one and the +choice of the other. But the infliction of punishment +has a reference to those who do not foresee what is beneficial. +For impendent punishment forcibly compels such +as these to subdue those impulses which lead them +to useless actions, and to do that which is right.</p> + +<p>9. Hence also, legislators ordained, that even involuntary +manslaughter should not be entirely void of +punishment; in order that they might not only afford no +pretext for the voluntary imitation of those deeds which +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_7">[7]</span>were involuntarily performed, but also that they might +prevent many things of this kind from taking place, +which happen, in reality, involuntarily. For neither +is this advantageous through the same causes by which +men were forbidden voluntarily to destroy each other. +Since, therefore, of involuntary deeds, some proceed from +a cause which is unstable, and which cannot be guarded +against by human nature; but others are produced by +our negligence and inattention to different circumstances; +hence legislators, wishing to restrain that indolence which +is injurious to our neighbours, did not even leave an +involuntary noxious deed without punishment, but, +through the fear of penalties, prevented the commission +of numerous offences of this kind. I also am of opinion, +that the slaughters which are allowed by law, and which +receive their accustomed expiations through certain purifications, +were introduced by those ancient legislators, +who first very properly instituted these things for no +other reason than that they wished to prevent men +as much as possible from voluntary slaughter. For the +vulgar every where require something which may impede +them from promptly performing what is not advantageous +[to the community]. Hence those who first perceived +this to be the case, not only ordained the punishment +of fines, but also excited a certain other irrational dread, +through proclaiming those not to be pure who in any +way whatever had slain a man, unless they used purifications +after the commission of the deed. For that part of +the soul which is void of intellect, being variously disciplined, +acquired a becoming mildness, certain taming +arts having been from the first invented for the purpose +of subduing the irrational impulses of desire, by those +who governed the people. And one of the precepts promulgated +on this occasion was, that men should not +destroy each other without discrimination.</p> + +<p>10. Those, however, who first defined what we ought +to do, and what we ought not, very properly did not +forbid us to kill other animals. For the advantage +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_8">[8]</span>arising from these is effected by a contrary practice, +since it is not possible that men could be preserved, +unless they endeavoured to defend those who are nurtured +with themselves from the attacks of other animals. +At that time, therefore, some of those, of the most +elegant manners, recollecting that they abstained from +slaughter because it was useful to the public safety, they +also reminded the rest of the people in their mutual associations +of what was the consequence of this abstinence; +in order that, by refraining from the slaughter of their +kindred, they might preserve that communion which +greatly contributes to the peculiar safety of each individual. +But it was not only found to be useful for men +not to separate from each other, and not to do any thing +injurious to those who were collected together in the +same place, for the purpose of repelling the attacks +of animals of another species; but also for defence +against men whose design was to act nefariously. To a +certain extent, therefore, they abstained from the slaughter +of men, for these reasons, viz. in order that there might +be a communion among them in things that are necessary, +and that a certain utility might be afforded in each +of the above-mentioned incommodities. In the course of +time, however, when the offspring of mankind, through +their intercourse with each other, became more widely +extended, and animals of a different species were expelled, +certain persons directed their attention in a +rational way to what was useful to men in their mutual +nutriment, and did not alone recal this to their memory in +an irrational manner.</p> + +<p>11. Hence they endeavoured still more firmly to +restrain those who readily destroyed each other, and who, +through an oblivion of past transactions, prepared a more +imbecile defence. But in attempting to effect this, they +introduced those legal institutes which still remain in +cities and nations; the multitude spontaneously assenting +to them, in consequence of now perceiving, in a greater +degree, the advantage arising from an association with +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_9">[9]</span>each other. For the destruction of every thing noxious, +and the preservation of that which is subservient to +its extermination, similarly contribute to a fearless life. +And hence it is reasonable to suppose, that one of the +above-mentioned particulars was forbidden, but that the +other was not prohibited. Nor must it be said, that the +law allows us to destroy some animals which are not +corruptive of human nature, and which are not in any +other way injurious to our life. For, as I may say, +no animal among those which the law permits us to kill is +of this kind; since, if we suffered them to increase +excessively, they would become injurious to us. But +through the number of them which is now preserved, +certain advantages are imparted to human life. For +sheep and oxen, and every such like animal, when the +number of them is moderate, are beneficial to our necessary +wants; but if they become redundant in the extreme, +and far exceed the number which is sufficient, they then +become detrimental to our life; the latter by employing +their strength, in consequence of participating of this +through an innate power of nature, and the former, +by consuming the nutriment which springs up from the +earth for our benefit alone. Hence, through this cause, +the slaughter of animals of this kind is not prohibited, in +order that as many of them as are sufficient for our +use, and which we may be able easily to subdue, may be +left. For it is not with horses, oxen, and sheep, and +with all tame animals, as it is with lions and wolves, and, +in short, with all such as are called savage animals, that, +whether the number of them is small or great, no +multitude of them can be assumed, which, if left, would +alleviate the necessity of our life. And on this account, +indeed, we utterly destroy some of them; but of others, +we take away as many as are found to be more than commensurate +to our use.</p> + +<p>12. On this account, from the above-mentioned +causes, it is similarly requisite to think, that what pertains +to the eating of animals, was ordained by those who +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_10">[10]</span>from the first established the laws; and that the advantageous +and the disadvantageous were the causes why +some animals were permitted to be eaten and others not. +So that those who assert, that every thing beautiful and +just subsists conformably to the peculiar opinions of men +respecting those who established the laws, are full of +a certain most profound stupidity. For it is not possible +that this thing can take place in any other way than that +in which the other utilities of life subsist, such as those +that are salubrious, and an innumerable multitude of +others. Erroneous opinions, however, are entertained in +many particulars, both of a public and private nature. +For certain persons do not perceive those legal institutes, +which are similarly adapted to all men; but some, conceiving +them to rank among things of an indifferent +nature, omit them; while others, who are of a contrary +opinion, think that such things as are not universally profitable, +are every where advantageous. Hence, through +this cause, they adhere to things which are unappropriate; +though in certain particulars they discover what is +advantageous to themselves, and what contributes to +general utility. And among these are to be enumerated +the eating of animals, and the legally ordained destructions +which are instituted by most nations on account +of the peculiarity of the region. It is not necessary, +however, that these institutes should be preserved by us, +because we do not dwell in the same place as those did +by whom they were made. If, therefore, it was possible +to make a certain compact with other animals in the +same manner as with men, that we should not kill them, +nor they us, and that they should not be indiscriminately +destroyed by us, it would be well to extend justice as far +as to this; for this extent of it would be attended +with security. But since it is among things impossible, +that animals which are not recipients of reason should +participate with us of law, on this account, utility cannot +be in a greater degree procured by security from other +animals, than from inanimate natures. But we can alone +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_11">[11]</span>obtain security from the liberty which we now possess of +putting them to death. And such are the arguments of +the Epicureans.</p> + +<h3><i>The Arguments of Claudius the Neapolitan, who published a +Treatise against Abstinence from Animal Food.</i></h3> + +<p>13. It now remains, that we should adduce what +plebeians and the vulgar are accustomed to say on this +subject. For they say, that the ancients abstained from +animals, not through piety, but because they did not yet +know the use of fire; but that as soon as they became +acquainted with its utility, they then conceived it to +be most honourable and sacred. They likewise called it +Vesta, and from this the appellation of <i>convestals</i> or companions +was derived; and afterwards they began to use +animals. For it is natural to man to eat flesh, but contrary +to his nature to eat it raw. Fire, therefore, being +discovered, they embraced what is natural, and admitted +the eating of boiled and roasted flesh. Hence lynxes are +[said by Homer⁠<a id="FNanchor_19" href="#Footnote_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> to be] <i>crudivorous</i>, or <i>eaters of raw flesh</i>; +and of Priam, also, he says, as a disgraceful circumstance,</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">Raw flesh by you, O Priam, is devoured⁠<a id="FNanchor_20" href="#Footnote_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a>.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p>And,</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">Raw flesh, dilacerating, he devoured⁠<a id="FNanchor_21" href="#Footnote_21" class="fnanchor">[21]</a>.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p>And this is said, as if the eating of raw flesh pertained +to the impious. Telemachus, also, when Minerva +was his guest, placed before her not raw, but roasted +flesh. At first, therefore, men did not eat animals, for +man is not [naturally] a devourer of raw flesh. But +when the use of fire was discovered, fire was employed +not only for the cooking of flesh, but also for most other +eatables. For that man is not [naturally] adapted to eat +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_12">[12]</span>raw flesh, is evident from certain nations that feed on +fishes. For these they roast, some upon stones that +are very much heated by the sun; but others roast them +in the sand. That man, however, is adapted to feed on +flesh, is evident from this, that no nation abstains from +animal food. Nor is this adopted by the Greeks through +depravity, since the same custom is admitted by the barbarians.</p> + +<p>14. But he who forbids men to feed on animals, and +thinks it is unjust, will also say that it is not just to kill +them, and deprive them of life. Nevertheless, an innate +and just war is implanted in us against brutes. For some +of them voluntarily attack men, as, for instance, wolves +and lions; others not voluntarily, as serpents, since they +bite not, except they are trampled on. And some, +indeed, attack men; but others destroy the fruits of the +earth. From all these causes, therefore, we do not spare +the life of brutes; but we destroy those who commence +hostilities against us, as also those who do not, lest +we should suffer any evil from them. For there is no one +who, if he sees a serpent, will not, if he is able, destroy it, +in order that neither it, nor any other serpent, may bite a +man. And this arises, not only from our hatred of those +that are the destroyers of our race, but likewise from +that kindness which subsists between one man and +another. But though the war against brutes is just, yet +we abstain from many which associate with men. Hence, +the Greeks do not feed either on dogs, or horses, or +asses, because of these, those that are tame are of the +same species as the wild. Nevertheless, they eat swine +and birds. For a hog is not useful for any thing but +food. The Phœnicians, however, and Jews, abstain from +it, because, in short, it is not produced in those places. +For it is said, that this animal is not seen in Ethiopia +even at present. As, therefore, no Greek sacrifices +a camel or an elephant to the Gods, because Greece does +not produce these animals, so neither is a hog sacrificed +to the Gods in Cyprus or Phœnicia, because it is not +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_13">[13]</span>indigenous in those places. And, for the same reason, +neither do the Egyptians sacrifice this animal to the +Gods. In short, that some nations abstain from a hog, is +similar to our being unwilling to eat the flesh of camels.</p> + +<p>15. But why should any one abstain from animals? +Is it because feeding on them makes the soul or the body +worse? It is, however, evident, that neither of these is +deteriorated by it. For those animals that feed on flesh +are more sagacious than others, as they are venatic, and +possess an art by which they supply themselves with +food, and acquire power and strength; as is evident +in lions and wolves. So that the eating of flesh neither +injures the soul nor the body. This likewise is manifest, +both from the athlete, whose bodies become stronger +by feeding on flesh, and from physicians, who restore +bodies to health by the use of animal food. For this +is no small indication that Pythagoras did not think +sanely, that none of the wise men embraced his opinion; +since neither any one of the seven wise men, nor any +of the physiologists who lived after them, nor even the +most wise Socrates, or his followers, adopted it.</p> + +<p>16. Let it, however, be admitted that all men are +persuaded of the truth of this dogma, respecting abstinence +from animals. But what will be the boundary of +the propagation of animals? For no one is ignorant how +numerous the progeny is of the swine and the hare. +And to these add all other animals. Whence, therefore, +will they be supplied with pasture? And what will husbandmen +do? For they will not destroy those who destroy +the fruits of the earth. And the earth will not be able +to bear the multitude of animals. Corruption also will +be produced from the putridity of those that will die. +And thus, from pestilence taking place, no refuge will +be left. For the sea, and rivers, and marshes, will be +filled with fishes, and the air with birds, but the earth +will be full of reptiles of every kind.</p> + +<p>17. How many likewise will be prevented from having +their diseases cured, if animals are abstained from? +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_14">[14]</span>For we see that those who are blind recover their sight +by eating a viper. A servant of Craterus, the physician, +happening to be seized with a new kind of disease, in +which the flesh fell away from the bones, derived no +benefit from medicines; but by eating a viper prepared +after the manner of a fish, the flesh became conglutinated +to the bones, and he was restored to health. Many +other animals also, and their several parts, cure diseases +when they are properly used for that purpose; of all which +remedies he will be frustrated who rejects animal food.</p> + +<p>18. But if, as they say, plants also have a soul, what +will become of our life if we neither destroy animals +nor plants? If, however, he is not impious who cuts +off plants, neither will he who kills animals.</p> + +<p>19. But some one may, perhaps, say it is not proper +to destroy that which belongs to the same tribe with +ourselves; if the souls of animals are of the same essence +with ourselves. If, however, it should be granted that +souls are inserted in bodies voluntarily, it must be said +that it is through a love of juvenility: for in the season +of youth there is an enjoyment of all things. Why, +therefore, do they not again enter into the nature of +man? But if they enter voluntarily, and for the sake of +juvenility, and pass through every species of animals, +they will be much gratified by being destroyed. For +thus their return to the human form will be more rapid. +The bodies also which are eaten will not produce any +pain in the souls of those bodies, in consequence of the +souls being liberated from them; and they will love to +be implanted in the nature of man. Hence, as much as +they are pained on leaving the human form, so much will +they rejoice when they leave other bodies. For thus +they will more swiftly become man again, who predominates +over all irrational animals, in the same manner +as God does over men. There is, therefore, a sufficient +cause for destroying other animals, viz. their acting +unjustly in destroying men. But if the souls of men +are immortal, but those of irrational animals mortal, men +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_15">[15]</span>will not act unjustly by destroying irrational animals. +And if the souls of brutes are immortal, we shall benefit +them by liberating them from their bodies. For, by +killing them, we shall cause them to return to the human +nature.</p> + +<p>20. If, however, we [only] defend ourselves [in putting +animals to death], we do not act unjustly, but we +take vengeance on those that injure us. Hence, if the +souls of brutes are indeed immortal, we benefit them by +destroying them. But if their souls are mortal, we do +nothing impious in putting them to death. And if we +defend ourselves against them, how is it possible that in +so doing we should not act justly. For we destroy, +indeed, a serpent and a scorpion, though they do not +attack us, in order that some other person may not be +injured by them; and in so doing we defend the human +race in general. But shall we not act justly in putting +those animals to death, which either attack men, or those +that associate with men, or injure the fruits of the earth?</p> + +<p>21. If, however, some one should, nevertheless, think +it is unjust to destroy brutes, such a one should neither +use milk, nor wool, nor sheep, nor honey. For, as you +injure a man by taking from him his garments, thus, also, +you injure a sheep by shearing it. For the wool which +you take from it is its vestment. Milk, likewise, was +not produced for you, but for the young of the animal +that has it. The bee also collects honey as food for +itself; which you, by taking away, administer to your +own pleasure. I pass over in silence the opinion of the +Egyptians, that we act unjustly by meddling with plants. +But if these things were produced for our sake, then the +bee, being ministrant to us, elaborates honey, and the +wool grows on the back of sheep, that it may be an ornament +to us, and afford us a bland heat.</p> + +<p>22. Co-operating also with the Gods themselves in +what contributes to piety, we sacrifice animals: for, of +the Gods, Apollo, indeed, is called λυκοκτονος, <i>the slayer of +wolves</i>; and Diana, θηροκτονος, <i>the destroyer of wild beasts</i>. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_16">[16]</span>Demi-gods likewise, and all the heroes who excel us +both in origin and virtue, have so much approved of the +slaughter of animals, that they have sacrificed to the Gods +<i>Dodeceïdes</i>⁠<a id="FNanchor_22" href="#Footnote_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> and <i>Hecatombs</i>. But Hercules, among other +things, is celebrated for being an <i>ox-devourer</i>.</p> + +<p>23. It is, however, stupid to say that Pythagoras +exhorted men to abstain from animals, in order that he +might, in the greatest possible degree, prevent them from +eating each other. For, if all men at the time of Pythagoras +were anthropophagites, he must be delirious who +drew men away from other animals, in order that they +might abstain from devouring each other. For, on this +account, he ought rather to have exhorted them to +become anthropophagites, by showing them that it was an +equal crime to devour each other, and to eat the flesh +of oxen and swine. But if men at that time did not eat +each other, what occasion was there for this dogma? +And if he established this law for himself and his associates, +the supposition that he did so is disgraceful. For +it demonstrates that those who lived with Pythagoras +were anthropophagites.</p> + +<p>24. For we say that the very contrary of what he conjectured +would happen. For, if we abstained from animals, +we should not only be deprived of pleasure and +riches of this kind, but we should also lose our fields, +which would be destroyed by wild beasts; since the +whole earth would be occupied by serpents and birds, so +that it would be difficult to plough the land; the scattered +seeds would immediately be gathered by the birds; +and all such fruits as had arrived at perfection, would +be consumed by quadrupeds. But men being oppressed +by such a want of food, would be compelled, by bitter +necessity, to attack each other.</p> + +<p>25. Moreover, the Gods themselves, for the sake of a +remedy, have delivered mandates to many persons about +sacrificing animals. For history is full of instances of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_17">[17]</span>the Gods having ordered certain persons to sacrifice +animals, and, when sacrificed, to eat them. For, in the +return of the Heraclidæ, those who engaged in war +against Lacedæmon, in conjunction with Eurysthenes +and Proscles, through a want of necessaries, were compelled +to eat serpents, which the land at that time +afforded for the nutriment of the army. In Libya, also, +a cloud of locusts fell for the relief of another army that +was oppressed by hunger. The same thing likewise happened +at Gades. Bogus was a king of the Mauritanians, +who was slain by Agrippa in Mothone. He in that +place attacked the temple of Hercules, which was most +rich. But it was the custom of the priests daily to +sprinkle the altar with blood. That this, however, was +not effected by the decision of men, but by that of +divinity, the occasion at that time demonstrated. For, +the siege being continued for a long time, victims were +wanting. But the priest being dubious how he should +act, had the following vision in a dream. He seemed +to himself to be standing in the middle of the pillars +of the temple of Hercules, and afterwards to see a bird +sitting opposite to the altar, and endeavouring to fly +to it, but which at length flew into his hands. He +also saw that the altar was sprinkled with its blood. +Seeing this, he rose as soon as it was day, and went +to the altar, and standing on the turret, as he thought he +did in his dream, he looked round, and saw the very bird +which he had seen in his sleep. Hoping, therefore, that +his dream would be fulfilled, he stood still, saw the bird +fly to the altar and sit upon it, and deliver itself into the +hands of the high priest. Thus the bird was sacrificed, +and the altar sprinkled with blood. That, however, +which happened at Cyzicus, is still more celebrated than +this event. For Mithridates having besieged this city, +the festival of Proserpine was then celebrated, in which +it was requisite to sacrifice an ox. But the sacred +herds, from which it was necessary the victim should be +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_18">[18]</span>taken, fed opposite to the city, on the continent⁠<a id="FNanchor_23" href="#Footnote_23" class="fnanchor">[23]</a>: and +one of them was already marked for this purpose. When, +therefore, the hour demanded the sacrifice, the ox lowed, +and swam over the sea, and the guards of the city opened +the gates to it. Then the ox directly ran into the city, +and stood at the altar, and was sacrificed to the Goddess. +Not unreasonably, therefore, was it thought to be most +pious to sacrifice many animals, since it appeared that +the sacrifice of them was pleasing to the Gods.</p> + +<p>26. But what would be the condition of a city, if all +the citizens were of this opinion, [viz. that they should +abstain from destroying animals?] For how would they +repel their enemies, when they were attacked by them, +if they were careful in the extreme not to kill any one of +them? In this case, indeed, they must be immediately +destroyed. And it would be too prolix to narrate other +difficulties and inconveniences, which would necessarily +take place. That it is not, however, impious to slay and +feed on animals, is evident from this, that Pythagoras +himself, though those prior to him permitted the athletæ +to drink milk, and to eat cheese, irrigated with water; +but others, posterior to him, rejecting this diet, fed them +with dry figs; yet he, abrogating the ancient custom, +allowed them to feed on flesh, and found that such a +diet greatly increased their strength. Some also relate, +that the Pythagoreans themselves did not spare animals +when they sacrificed to the gods. Such, therefore, are +the arguments of Clodius, Heraclides Ponticus, Hermachus +the Epicurean, and the Stoics and Peripatetics, +[against abstinence from animal food]: among which +also are comprehended the arguments which were sent +to us by you, O Castricius. As, however, I intend to +oppose these opinions, and those of the multitude, I may +reasonably premise what follows.</p> + +<p>27. In the first place, therefore, it must be known +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_19">[19]</span>that my discourse does not bring with it an exhortation +to every description of men. For it is not directed to +those who are occupied in sordid mechanical arts, nor to +those who are engaged in athletic exercises; neither to +soldiers, nor sailors, nor rhetoricians, nor to those who +lead an active life. But I write to the man who considers +what he is, whence he came, and whither he ought +to tend, and who, in what pertains to nutriment, and +other necessary concerns, is different from those who +propose to themselves other kinds of life; for to none +but such as these do I direct my discourse. For, neither +in this common life can there be one and the same +exhortation to the sleeper, who endeavours to obtain +sleep through the whole of life, and who, for this purpose, +procures from all places things of a soporiferous nature, +as there is to him who is anxious to repel sleep, and to +dispose every thing about him to a vigilant condition. +But to the former it is necessary to recommend intoxication, +surfeiting, and satiety, and to exhort him to +choose a dark house, and</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">A bed luxuriant, broad, and soft,—</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class="noindent">as the poets say; and that he should procure for himself +all such things as are of a soporiferous nature, and which +are effective of sluggishness and oblivion, whether they +are odours, or ointments, or are liquid or solid medicines. +And to the latter it is requisite to advise the use of +a drink sober and without wine, food of an attenuated +nature, and almost approaching to fasting; a house lucid, +and participating of a subtle air and wind, and to urge +him to be strenuously excited by solicitude and thought, +and to prepare for himself a small and hard bed. But, +whether we are naturally adapted to this, I mean to +a vigilant life, so as to grant as little as possible to sleep, +since we do not dwell among those who are perpetually +vigilant, or whether we are designed to be in a soporiferous +state of existence, is the business of another discussion, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_20">[20]</span>and is a subject which requires very extended +demonstrations.</p> + +<p>28. To the man, however, who once suspects the +enchantments attending our journey through the present +life, and belonging to the place in which we dwell; who +also perceives himself to be naturally vigilant, and considers +the somniferous nature of the region which he +inhabits;—to this man addressing ourselves, we prescribe +food consentaneous to his suspicion and knowledge +of this terrene abode, and exhort him to suffer the +somnolent to be stretched on their beds, dissolved in +sleep. For it is requisite to be cautious, lest as those +who look on the blear-eyed contract an ophthalmy, and +as we gape when present with those who are gaping, +so we should be filled with drowsiness and sleep, when +the region which we inhabit is cold, and adapted to fill +the eyes with rheum, as being of a marshy nature, and +drawing down all those that dwell in it to a somniferous +and oblivious condition. If, therefore, legislators had +ordained laws for cities, with a view to a contemplative +and intellectual life, it would certainly be requisite to be +obedient to those laws, and to comply with what they +instituted concerning food. But if they established their +laws, looking to a life according to nature, and which is +said to rank as a medium, [between the irrational and the +intellectual life,] and to what the vulgar admit, who conceive +externals, and things which pertain to the body +to be good or evil, why should any one, adducing their +laws, endeavour to subvert a life, which is more excellent +than every law which is written and ordained for the multitude, +and which is especially conformable to an unwritten +and divine law? For such is the truth of the case.</p> + +<p>29. The contemplation which procures for us felicity, +does not consist, as same one may think it does, in a +multitude of discussions and disciplines; nor does it +receive any increase by a quantity of words. For if this +were the case, nothing would prevent those from being +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_21">[21]</span>happy by whom all disciplines are collected together [and +comprehended]. Now, however, every discipline by no +means gives completion to this contemplation, nor even +the disciplines which pertain to truly existing beings, +unless there is a conformity to them of our nature⁠<a id="FNanchor_24" href="#Footnote_24" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> and +life. For since there are, as it is said, in every purpose +three⁠<a id="FNanchor_25" href="#Footnote_25" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> ends, the end with us is to obtain the contemplation +of real being, the attainment of it procuring, as much +as it is possible for us, a conjunction of the contemplator +with the object of contemplation. For the reascent of +the soul is not to any thing else than true being itself, +nor is its conjunction with any other thing. But intellect +is truly-existing being; so that the end is to live according +to intellect. Hence such discussions and exoteric +disciplines as impede our purification, do not give completion +to our felicity. If, therefore, felicity consisted +in literary attainments, this end might be obtained by +those who pay no attention to their food and their +actions. But since for this purpose it is requisite to +exchange the life which the multitude lead for another, +and to become purified both in words and deeds, let +us consider what reasonings and what works will enable +us to obtain this end.</p> + +<p>30. Shall we say, therefore, that they will be such +as separate us from sensibles, and the passions which +pertain to them, and which elevate us as much as possible +to an intellectual, unimaginative, and impassive life; but +that the contraries to these are foreign, and deserve to be +rejected? And this by so much the more, as they +separate us from a life according to intellect. But, I +think, it must be admitted, that we should follow the +object to which intellect attracts us. For we resemble +those who enter into, or depart from a foreign region, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_22">[22]</span>not only because we are banished from our intimate +associates, but in consequence of dwelling in a foreign +land, we are filled with barbaric passions, and manners, +and legal institutes, and to all these have a great propensity. +Hence, he who wishes to return to his proper +kindred and associates, should not only with alacrity +begin the journey, but, in order that he may be properly +received, should meditate how he may divest himself +of every thing of a foreign nature which he has assumed, +and should recall to his memory such things as he +has forgotten, and without which he cannot be admitted +by his kindred and friends. After the same manner, +also, it is necessary, if we intend to return to things +which are truly our own, that we should divest ourselves +of every thing of a mortal nature which we have assumed, +together with an adhering affection towards it, and which +is the cause of our descent [into this terrestrial region;] +and that we should excite our recollection of that blessed +and eternal essence, and should hasten our return to +the nature which is without colour and without quality, +earnestly endeavouring to accomplish two things; one, +that we may cast aside every thing material and mortal; +but the other, that we may properly return, and be again +conversant with our true kindred, ascending to them in a +way contrary to that in which we descended hither. For +we were intellectual natures, and we still are essences +purified from all sense and irrationality; but we are complicated +with sensibles, through our incapability of eternally +associating with the intelligible, and through the +power of being conversant with terrestrial concerns. For +all the powers which energize in conjunction with sense +and body, are injured, in consequence of the soul not +abiding in the intelligible; (just as the earth, when in +a bad condition, though it frequently receives the seed +of wheat, yet produces nothing but tares), and this is +through a certain depravity of the soul, which does +not indeed destroy its essence from the generation of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_23">[23]</span>irrationality, but through this is conjoined with a mortal +nature, and is drawn down from its own proper to a +foreign condition of being.</p> + +<p>31. So that, if we are desirous of returning to those +natures with which we formerly associated, we must +endeavour to the utmost of our power to withdraw ourselves +from sense and imagination, and the irrationality +with which they are attended, and also from the passions +which subsist about them, as far as the necessity of our +condition in this life will permit. But such things as +pertain to intellect should be distinctly arranged, procuring +for it peace and quiet from the war with the +irrational part; that we may not only be auditors of +intellect and intelligibles, but may as much as possible +enjoy the contemplation of them, and, being established +in an incorporeal nature, may truly live through intellect; +and not falsely in conjunction with things allied to +bodies. We must therefore divest ourselves of our +manifold garments, both of this visible and fleshly vestment, +and of those with which we are internally clothed, +and which are proximate to our cutaneous habiliments; +and we must enter the stadium naked and unclothed, +striving for [the most glorious of all prizes] the Olympia +of the soul. The first thing, however, and without which +we cannot contend, is to divest ourselves of our garments. +But since of these some are external and others +internal, thus also with respect to the denudation, one +kind is through things which are apparent, but another +through such as are more unapparent. Thus, for instance, +not to eat, or not to receive what is offered to us, belongs to +things which are immediately obvious; but not to desire +is a thing more obscure; so that, together with deeds, we +must also withdraw ourselves from an adhering affection +and passion towards them. For what benefit shall we +derive by abstaining from deeds, when at the same time +we tenaciously adhere to the causes from which the +deeds proceed?</p> + +<p>32. But this departure [from sense, imagination, and +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_24">[24]</span>irrationality,] may be effected by violence, and also +by persuasion and by reason, through the wasting away, +and, as it may be said, oblivion and death of the passions; +which, indeed, is the best kind of departure, since +it is accomplished without oppressing that from which +we are divulsed. For, in sensibles, a divulsion by force +is not effected without either a laceration of a part, or a +vestige of avulsion. But this separation is introduced by +a continual negligence of the passions. And this negligence +is produced by an abstinence from those sensible +perceptions which excite the passions, and by a persevering +attention to intelligibles. And among these passions +or perturbations, those which arise from food are to +be enumerated.</p> + +<p>33. We should therefore abstain, no less than from +other things, from certain food, viz. such as is naturally +adapted to excite the passive part of our soul, concerning +which it will be requisite to consider as follows: There +are two fountains whose streams irrigate the bond by +which the soul is bound to the body; and from which +the soul being filled as with deadly potions, becomes +oblivious of the proper objects of her contemplation. +These fountains are pleasure and pain; of which sense +indeed is preparative, and the perception which is according +to sense, together with the imaginations, opinions, +and recollections which accompany the senses. But +from these, the passions being excited, and the whole of +the irrational nature becoming fattened, the soul is drawn +downward, and abandons its proper love of true being. +As much as possible, therefore, we must separate ourselves +from these. But the separation must be effected +by an avoidance of the passions which subsist through +the senses and the irrational part. But the senses are +employed either on objects of the sight, or of the hearing, +or of the taste, or the smell, or the touch; for sense is as +it were the metropolis of that foreign colony of passions +which we contain. Let us, therefore, consider how much +fuel of the passions enters into us through each of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_25">[25]</span>the senses. For this is effected partly by the view of +the contests of horses and the athlete, or those whose +bodies are contorted in dancing; and partly from the +survey of beautiful women. For these, ensnaring the +irrational nature, attack and subjugate it by all-various +deceptions.</p> + +<p>34. For the soul, being agitated with Bacchic fury +through all these by the irrational part, is made to leap, +to exclaim and vociferate, the external tumult being +inflamed by the internal, and which was first enkindled +by sense. But the excitations through the ears, and +which are of a passive nature, are produced by certain +noises and sounds, by indecent language and defamation, +so that many through these being exiled from reason, are +furiously agitated, and some, becoming effeminate, exhibit +all-various convolutions of the body. And who is +ignorant how much the use of fumigations, and the +exhalations of sweet odours, with which lovers supply the +objects of their love, fatten the irrational part of the +soul? But what occasion is there to speak of the passions +produced through the taste? For here, especially, there +is a complication of a twofold bond; one which is +fattened by the passions excited by the taste; and the +other, which we render heavy and powerful, by the introduction +of foreign bodies [<i>i.e.</i> of bodies different from +our own]. For, as a certain physician said, those are not +the only poisons which are prepared by the medical art; +but those likewise which we daily assume for food, both +in what we eat, and what we drink, and a thing of +a much more deadly nature is imparted to the soul +through these, than from the poisons which are compounded +for the purpose of destroying the body. And +as to the touch, it does all but transmute the soul into the +body, and produces in it certain inarticulate sounds, such +as frequently take place in inanimate bodies. And from +all these, recollections, imaginations, and opinions being +collected together, excite a swarm of passions, viz. of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_26">[26]</span>fear, desire, anger, love, voluptuousness⁠<a id="FNanchor_26" href="#Footnote_26" class="fnanchor">[26]</a>, pain, emulation, +solicitude, and disease, and cause the soul to be full +of similar perturbations.</p> + +<p>35. Hence, to be purified from all these is most difficult, +and requires a great contest, and we must bestow +much labour both by night and by day to be liberated +from an attention to them, and this, because we are +necessarily complicated with sense. Whence, also, as +much as possible, we should withdraw ourselves from +those places in which we may, though unwillingly, meet +with this hostile crowd. From experience, also, we +should avoid a contest with it, and even a victory over it, +and the want of exercise from inexperience.</p> + +<p>36. For we learn, that this conduct was adopted +by some of the celebrated ancient Pythagoreans and wise +men; some of whom dwelt in the most solitary places; +but others in temples and sacred groves, from which, +though they were in cities, all tumult and the multitude +were expelled. But Plato chose to reside in the Academy, +a place not only solitary and remote from the city, but +which was also said to be insalubrious. Others have not +spared even their eyes, through a desire of not being +divulsed from the inward contemplation [of reality]. If +some one, however, at the same time that he is conversant +with men, and while he is filling his senses with +the passions pertaining to them, should fancy that he can +remain impassive, he is ignorant that he both deceives +himself and those who are persuaded by him, nor does he +see that we are enslaved to many passions, through not +alienating ourselves from the multitude. For he did not +speak vainly, and in such a way as to falsify the nature +of [the Coryphæan] philosophers, who said of them, +“These, therefore, from their youth, neither know the +way to the forum, nor where the court of justice or +senate-house is situated, or any common place of assembly +belonging to the city.” They likewise neither hear nor +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_27">[27]</span>see laws, or decrees, whether orally promulgated or +written. And as to the ardent endeavours of their companions +to obtain magistracies, the associations of these, +their banquets and wanton feastings, accompanied by +pipers, these they do not even dream of accomplishing. +But whether any thing in the city has happened well +or ill, or what evil has befallen any one from his progenitors, +whether male or female, these are more concealed +from such a one, than, as it is said, how many +measures called choes the sea contains. And besides +this, he is even ignorant that he is ignorant⁠<a id="FNanchor_27" href="#Footnote_27" class="fnanchor">[27]</a> of all these +particulars. For he does not abstain from them for +the sake of renown, but, in reality, his body only dwells, +and is conversant in the city; but his reasoning power +considering all these as trifling and of no value, “he is +borne away,” according to Pindar, “on all sides, and does +not apply himself to any thing which is near.”</p> + +<p>37. In what is here said, Plato asserts, that the +Coryphæan philosopher, by not at all mingling himself +with the above-mentioned particulars, remains impassive +to them. Hence, he neither knows the way to the court +of justice nor the senate-house, nor any thing else which +has been before enumerated. He does not say, indeed, +that he knows and is conversant with these particulars, +and that, being conversant, and filling his senses with them, +yet does not know any thing about them; but, on the contrary, +he says, that abstaining from them, he is ignorant that +he is ignorant of them. He also adds, that this philosopher +does not even dream of betaking himself to banquets. +Much less, therefore, would he be indignant, if deprived +of broth, or pieces of flesh; nor, in short, will he admit +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_28">[28]</span>things of this kind. And will he not rather consider the +abstinence from all these as trifling, and a thing of no +consequence, but the assumption of them to be a thing of +great importance and noxious? For since there are two +paradigms in the order of things, one of a divine nature, +which is most happy, the other of that which is destitute +of divinity, and which is most miserable⁠<a id="FNanchor_28" href="#Footnote_28" class="fnanchor">[28]</a>; the Coryphæan +philosopher will assimilate himself to the one, but will +render himself dissimilar to the other, and will lead a life +conformable to the paradigm to which he is assimilated, +viz. a life satisfied with slender food, and sufficient to +itself, and in the smallest degree replete with mortal +natures.</p> + +<p>38. Hence, as long as any one is discordant about +food, and contends that this or that thing should be +eaten, but does not conceive that, if it were possible, we +should abstain from all food, assenting by this contention +to his passions, such a one forms a vain opinion, as if the +subjects of his dissension were things of no consequence. +He, therefore, who philosophizes, will not separate himself +[from his terrestrial bonds] by violence; for he who +is compelled to do this, nevertheless remains there from +whence he was forced to depart. Nor must it be +thought, that he who strengthens these bonds, effects a +thing of small importance. So that only granting to +nature what is necessary, and this of a light quality, and +through more slender food, he will reject whatever +exceeds this, as only contributing to pleasure. For he +will be persuaded of the truth of what Plato says, that +sense is a nail by which the soul is fastened to bodies⁠<a id="FNanchor_29" href="#Footnote_29" class="fnanchor">[29]</a>, +through the agglutination of the passions, and the enjoyment +of corporeal delight. For if sensible perceptions +were no impediment to the pure energy of the soul, why +would it be a thing of a dire nature to be in body, while +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_29">[29]</span>at the same time the soul remained impassive to the +motions of the body?</p> + +<p>39. How is it, also, that you have decided and said, +that you are not passive to things which you suffer, and +that you are not present with things by which you +are passively affected? For intellect, indeed, is present +with itself, though we are not present with it. But +he who departs from intellect, is in that place to which +he departs; and when, by discursive energies, he applies +himself upwards and downwards by his apprehension of +things, he is there where his apprehension is. But it +is one thing not to attend to sensibles, in consequence of +being present with other things, and another for a man +to think, that though he attends to sensibles yet he is +not present with them. Nor can any one show that +Plato admits this, without at the same time demonstrating +himself to be deceived. He, therefore, who submits +to the assumption of [every kind of] food, and +voluntarily betakes himself to [alluring] spectacles, to +conversation with the multitude, and laughter; such +a one, by thus acting, is there where the passion is which +he sustains. But he who abstains from these in consequence +of being present with other things, he it is +who, through his unskilfulness, not only excites laughter +in Thracian maid-servants, but in the rest of the vulgar, +and when he sits at a banquet, falls into the greatest perplexity, +not from any defect of sensation, or from a superior +accuracy of sensible perception, and energizing with the +irrational part of the soul alone; for Plato does not +venture to assert this; but because, in slanderous conversation, +he has nothing reproachful to say of any one, +as not knowing any evil of any one, because he has +not made individuals the subject of his meditation. +Being in such perplexity, therefore, he appears, says +Plato, to be ridiculous; and in the praises and boastings +of others, as he is manifestly seen to laugh, not dissemblingly, +but, in reality, he appears to be delirious.</p> + +<p>40. So that, through ignorance of, and abstaining +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_30">[30]</span>from sensible concerns, he is unacquainted with them. +But it is by no means to be admitted, that though +he should be familiar with sensibles, and should energize +through the irrational part, yet it is possible for him +[at the same time] genuinely to survey the objects of +intellect. For neither do they who assert that we have +two souls, admit that we can attend at one and the same +time to two different things. For thus they would make +a conjunction of two animals, which being employed +in different energies, the one would not be able to perceive +the operations of the other.</p> + +<p>41. But why would it be requisite that the passions +should waste away, that we should die with respect to +them, and that this should be daily the subject of our +meditation, if it was possible for us, as some assert, +to energize according to intellect, though we are at the +same time intimately connected with mortal concerns, and +this without the intuition of intellect? For intellect sees, +and intellect hears [as Epicharmus says]. But if, while +eating luxuriously, and drinking the sweetest wine, it +were possible to be present with immaterial natures, why +may not this be frequently effected while you are present +with, and are performing things which it is not becoming +even to mention? For these passions every where proceed +from the boy⁠<a id="FNanchor_30" href="#Footnote_30" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> which is in us. And you certainly +will admit that the baser these passions are, the more we +are drawn down towards them. For what will be the +distinction which ought here to be made, if you admit +that to some things it is not possible to be passive, without +being present with them, but that you may accomplish +other things, at the same time that you are +surveying intelligibles? For it is not because some things +are apprehended to be base by the multitude, but others +not. For all the above mentioned passions are base. +So that to the attainment of a life according to intellect, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_31">[31]</span>it is requisite to abstain from all these, in the same +manner as from venereal concerns. To nature therefore, +but little food must be granted, through the necessity +of generation [or of our connexion with a flowing condition +of being.] For, where sense and sensible apprehension +are, there a departure and separation from the +intelligible take place; and by how much stronger the +excitation is of the irrational part, by so much the greater +is the departure from intellection. For it is not possible +for us to be borne along to this place and to that, while +we are <i>here</i>, and yet be <i>there</i>, [i.e. be present with an +intelligible essence.] For our attentions to things are +not effected with a part, but with the whole of ourselves.</p> + +<p>42. But to fancy that he who is passively affected +according to sense, may, nevertheless, energize about +intelligibles, has precipitated many of the Barbarians to +destruction; who arrogantly assert, that though they +indulge in every kind of pleasure, yet they are able to +convert themselves to things of a different nature from +sensibles, at the same time that they are energizing with +the irrational part. For I have heard some persons +patronizing their infelicity after the following manner. +“We are not,” say they, “defiled by food, as neither is +the sea by the filth of rivers. For we have dominion +over all eatables, in the same manner as the sea over all +humidity. But if the sea should shut up its mouth, so +as not to receive the streams that now flow into it, it +would be indeed, with respect to itself, great; but, with +respect to the world, small, as not being able to receive +dirt and corruption. If, however, it was afraid of being +defiled, it would not receive these streams; but knowing +its own magnitude, it receives all things, and is not +averse to any thing which proceeds into it. In like +manner, say they, we also, if we were afraid of food, +should be enslaved by the conception of fear. But it is +requisite that all things should be obedient to us. For, +if we collect a little water, indeed, which has received +any filth, it becomes immediately defiled and oppressed +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_32">[32]</span>by the filth; but this is not the case with the profound +sea. Thus, also, aliments vanquish the pusillanimous; +but where there is an immense liberty with respect to +food, all things are received for nutriment, and no defilement +is produced.” These men, therefore, deceiving +themselves by arguments of this kind, act in a manner +conformable to their deception. But, instead of obtaining +liberty, being precipitated into an abyss of infelicity, +they are suffocated. This, also, induced some of the +Cynics to be desirous of eating every kind of food, in +consequence of their pertinaciously adhering to the cause +of errors, which we are accustomed to call a thing of an +indifferent nature.</p> + +<p>43. The man, however, who is cautious, and is suspicious +of the enchantments of nature, who has surveyed +the essential properties of body, and knows that it was +adapted as an instrument to the powers of the soul, will +also know how readily passion is prepared to accord with +the body, whether we are willing or not, when any thing +external strikes it, and the pulsation at length arrives at +perception. For perception is, as it were, an answer [to +that which causes the perception.] But the soul cannot +answer unless she wholly converts herself to the sound, +and transfers her animadversive eye to the pulsation. In +short, the irrational part not being able to judge to what +extent, how, whence, and what thing ought to be the +object of attention, but of itself being inconsiderate, like +horses without a charioteer⁠<a id="FNanchor_31" href="#Footnote_31" class="fnanchor">[31]</a>; whither it verges downward, +thither it is borne along, without any power of +governing itself in things external. Nor does it know +the fit time or the measure of the food which should +be taken, unless the eye of the charioteer is attentive +to it, which regulates and governs the motions of irrationality, +this part of the soul being essentially blind. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_33">[33]</span>But he who takes away from reason its dominion over +the irrational part, and permits it to be borne along, +conformably to its proper nature: such a one, yielding +to desire and anger, will suffer them to proceed to whatever +extent they please. On the contrary, the worthy +man will so act that his deeds may be conformable to +presiding reason, even in the energies of the irrational +part.</p> + +<p>44. And in this the worthy appears to differ from the +depraved man, that the former has every where reason +present, governing and guiding, like a charioteer, the +irrational part; but the latter performs many things +without reason for his guide. Hence the latter is said +to be most irrational, and is borne along in a disorderly +manner by irrationality; but the former is obedient to +reason, and superior to every irrational desire. This, +therefore, is the cause why the multitude err in words +and deeds, in desire and anger, and why, on the contrary, +good men act with rectitude, viz. that the former suffer +the boy within them to do whatever it pleases; but the +latter give themselves up to the guidance of the tutor of +the boy, [<i>i.e.</i> to reason] and govern what pertains to +themselves in conjunction with it. Hence in food, and +in other corporeal energies and enjoyments, the charioteer +being present, defines what is commensurate and +opportune. But when the charioteer is absent, and, as +some say, is occupied in his own concerns, then, if he +also has with him our attention, he does not permit +it to be disturbed, or at all to energize with the irrational +power. If, however, he should permit our attention to +be directed to the boy, unaccompanied by himself, he +would destroy the man, who would be precipitately borne +along by the folly of the irrational part.</p> + +<p>45. Hence, to worthy men, abstinence in food, and in +corporeal enjoyments and actions, is more appropriate +than abstinence in what pertains to the touch; because +though, while we touch bodies, it is necessary we should +descend from our proper manners to the instruction of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_34">[34]</span>that which is most irrational in us; yet this is still more +necessary in the assumption of food. For the irrational +nature is incapable of considering what will be the effect +of it, because this part of the soul is essentially ignorant +of that which is absent. But, with respect to food, if it +were possible to be liberated from it, in the same manner +as from visible objects, when they are removed from the +view; for we can attend to other things when the imagination +is withdrawn from them;—if this were possible, +it would be no great undertaking to be immediately +emancipated from the necessity of the mortal nature, by +yielding, in a small degree, to it. Since, however, a +prolongation of time in cooking and digesting food, and +together with this the co-operation of sleep and rest, +are requisite, and, after these, a certain temperament +from digestion, and a separation of excrements, it is +necessary that the tutor of the boy within us should +be present, who, selecting things of a light nature, and +which will be no impediment to him, may concede these +to nature, in consequence of foreseeing the future, and +the impediment which will be produced by his permitting +the desires to introduce to us a burden not easily to be +borne, through the trifling pleasure arising from the +deglutition of food.</p> + +<p>46. Reason, therefore, very properly rejecting the +much and the superfluous, will circumscribe what is +necessary in narrow boundaries, in order that it may not +be molested in procuring what the wants of the body +demand, through many things being requisite; nor being +attentive to elegance, will it need a multitude of servants; +nor endeavour to receive much pleasure in eating, nor, +through satiety, to be filled with much indolence; nor +by rendering its burden [the body] more gross, to become +somnolent; nor through the body being replete with +things of a fattening nature, to render the bond more +strong, but himself more sluggish and imbecile in the +performance of his proper works. For, let any man show +us who endeavours as much as possible to live according +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_35">[35]</span>to intellect, and not to be attracted by the passions of +the body, that animal food is more easily procured than +the food from fruits and herbs; or that the preparation +of the former is more simple than that of the latter, and, +in short, that it does not require cooks, but, when compared +with inanimate nutriment, is unattended by pleasure, +is lighter in concoction, and is more rapidly digested, +excites in a less degree the desires, and contributes less +to the strength of the body than a vegetable diet.</p> + +<p>47. If, however, neither any physician, nor philosopher, +nor wrestler, nor any one of the vulgar, has dared +to assert this, why should we not willingly abstain from +this corporeal burden? Why should we not, at the same +time, liberate ourselves from many inconveniences by +abandoning a fleshly diet? For we should not be liberated +from one only, but from myriads of evils, by accustoming +ourselves to be satisfied with things of the smallest +nature; viz. we should be freed from a superabundance +of riches, from numerous servants, a multitude of utensils, +a somnolent condition, from many and vehement +diseases, from medical assistance, incentives to venery, +more gross exhalations, an abundance of excrements, the +crassitude of the corporeal bond, from the strength which +excites to [base] actions, and, in short, from an Iliad of +evils. But from all these, inanimate and slender food, +and which is easily obtained, will liberate us, and will +procure for us peace, by imparting salvation to our +reasoning power. For, as Diogenes says, thieves and +enemies are not found among those that feed on maize⁠<a id="FNanchor_32" href="#Footnote_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a>, +but sycophants and tyrants are produced from those who +feed on flesh. The cause, however, of our being in want +of many things being taken away, together with the +multitude of nutriment introduced into the body, and +also the weight of digestibles being lightened, the eye +of the soul will become free, and will be established as in +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_36">[36]</span>a port beyond the smoke and the waves of the corporeal +nature.</p> + +<p>48. And this neither requires monition, nor demonstration, +on account of the evidence with which it is +immediately attended. Hence, not only those who endeavour +to live according to intellect, and who establish +for themselves an intellectual life, as the end of their +pursuits, have perceived that this abstinence was necessary +to the attainment of this end; but, as it appears +to me, nearly every philosopher, preferring frugality to +luxury, has rather embraced a life which is satisfied with +a little, than one that requires a multitude of things. +And, what will seem paradoxical to many, we shall find +that this is asserted and praised by men who thought +that pleasure is the end of those that philosophize. For +most of the Epicureans, beginning from the Corypheus of +their sect, appear to have been satisfied with maize and +fruits, and have filled their writings with showing how +little nature requires, and that its necessities may be +sufficiently remedied by slender and easily-procured food.</p> + +<p>49. For the wealth, say they, of nature is definite, +and easily obtained; but that which proceeds from vain +opinions, is indefinite, and procured with difficulty. For +things which may be readily obtained, remove in a +beautiful and abundantly sufficient manner that which, +through indigence, is the cause of molestation to the +flesh; and these are such as have the simple nature of +moist and dry aliments. But every thing else, say they, +which terminates in luxury, is not attended with a necessary +appetition, nor is it necessarily produced from a +certain something which is in pain; but partly arises +from the molestation and pungency solely proceeding +from something not being present; partly from joy; and +partly from vain and false dogmas, which neither pertain +to any natural defect, nor to the dissolution of the human +frame, those not being present. For things which may +every where be obtained, are sufficient for those purposes +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_37">[37]</span>which nature necessarily requires. But these, through +their simplicity and paucity, may be easily procured. +And he, indeed, who feeds on flesh, requires also inanimate +natures; but he who is satisfied with things inanimate, +is easily supplied from the half of what the other +wants, and needs but a small expense for the preparation +of his food.</p> + +<p>50. They likewise say, it is requisite that he who +prepares the necessaries of life, should not afterwards +make use of philosophy as an accession; but, having +obtained it, should, with a confident mind, thus genuinely +endure⁠<a id="FNanchor_33" href="#Footnote_33" class="fnanchor">[33]</a> the events of the day. For we shall commit +what pertains to ourselves to a bad counsellor, if we +measure and procure what is necessary to nature, without +philosophy. Hence it is necessary that those who philosophize +should provide things of this kind, and strenuously +attend to them as much as possible. But, so far +as there is a dereliction from thence, [<i>i.e.</i> from philosophizing], +which is not capable of effecting a perfect +purification⁠<a id="FNanchor_34" href="#Footnote_34" class="fnanchor">[34]</a>, so far we should not endeavour to procure +either riches or nutriment. In conjunction, therefore, +with philosophy, we should engage in things of this kind, +and be immediately persuaded that it is much better to +pursue what is the least, the most simple, and light in +nutriment. For that which is least, and is unattended +with molestation, is derived from that which is least⁠<a id="FNanchor_35" href="#Footnote_35" class="fnanchor">[35]</a>.</p> + +<p>51. The preparation also of these things, draws along +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_38">[38]</span>with it many impediments, either from the weight of the +body, [which they are adapted to increase,] or from the +difficulty of procuring them, or from their preventing the +continuity of the energy of our most principal reasonings⁠<a id="FNanchor_36" href="#Footnote_36" class="fnanchor">[36]</a>, +or from some other cause. For this energy then +becomes immediately useless, and does not remain +unchanged by the concomitant perturbations. It is necessary, +however, that a philosopher should hope that he +may not be in want of any thing through the whole of +life. But this hope will be sufficiently preserved by +things which are easily procured; while, on the other +hand, this hope is frustrated by things of a sumptuous +nature. The multitude, therefore, on this account, though +their possessions are abundant, incessantly labour to +obtain more, as if they were in want. But the recollection +that the greatest possible wealth has no power +worth mentioning of dissolving the perturbations of the +soul, will cause us to be satisfied with things easily +obtained, and of the most simple nature. Things also, +which are very moderate and obvious, and which may be +procured with the greatest facility, remove the tumult +occasioned by the flesh. But the deficiency of things of +a luxurious nature will not disturb him who meditates on +death. Farther still, the pain arising from indigence +is much milder than that which is produced by repletion, +and will be considered to be so by him who does not +deceive himself with vain opinions. Variety also of food +not only does not dissolve the perturbations of the soul, +but does not even increase the pleasure which is felt +by the flesh. For this is terminated as soon as pain is +removed⁠<a id="FNanchor_37" href="#Footnote_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a>. So that the feeding on flesh does not remove +any thing which is troublesome to nature, nor effect any +thing which, unless it is accomplished, will end in pain. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_39">[39]</span>But the pleasantness with which it is attended is violent, +and, perhaps, mingled with the contrary. For it does +not contribute to the duration of life, but to the variety +of pleasure; and in this respect resembles venereal enjoyments, +and the drinking of foreign wines, without which +nature is able to remain. For those things, without +which nature cannot last, are very few, and may be procured +easily, and in conjunction with justice, liberty, +quiet, and abundant leisure.</p> + +<p>52. Again, neither does animal food contribute, but is +rather an impediment to health. For health is preserved +through those things by which it is recovered. But it is +recovered through a most slender and fleshless diet; so +that by this also it is preserved. If, however, vegetable +food does not contribute to the strength of Milo, nor, in +short, to an increase of strength, neither does a philosopher +require strength, or an increase of it, if he intends +to give himself up to contemplation, and not to an active +and intemperate life. But it is not at all wonderful, that +the vulgar should fancy that animal food contributes to +health; for they also think that sensual enjoyments and +venery are preservative of health, none of which benefit +any one; and those that engage in them must be thankful +if they are not injured by them. And if many are not of +this opinion, it is nothing to us. For neither is any +fidelity and constancy in friendship and benevolence to +be found among the vulgar; nor are they capable of +receiving these, nor of participating of wisdom, or any +portion of it which deserves to be mentioned. Neither +do they understand what is privately or publicly advantageous; +nor are they capable of forming a judgment of +depraved and elegant manners, so as to distinguish the +one from the other. And, in addition to these things, +they are full of insolence and intemperance. On this +account, there is no occasion to fear that there will not +be those who will feed on animals.</p> + +<p>53. For if all men conceived rightly, there would be +no need of fowlers, or hunters, or fishermen, or swineherds. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_40">[40]</span>But animals governing themselves, and having +no guardian and ruler, would quickly perish, and be +destroyed by others, who would attack them and diminish +their multitude, as is found to be the case with myriads +of animals on which men do not feed. But all-various +folly incessantly dwelling with mankind, there will be an +innumerable multitude of those who will voraciously feed +on flesh. It is necessary however to preserve health; +not by the fear of death, but for the sake of not being +impeded in the attainment of the good which is derived +from contemplation. But that which is especially preservative +of health, is an undisturbed state of the soul, +and a tendency of the reasoning power towards truly +existing being. For much benefit is from hence derived +to the body, as our associates have demonstrated from +experience. Hence some who have been afflicted with +the gout in the feet and hands, to such a degree as to be +infested with it for eight entire years, have expelled it +through abandoning wealth, and betaking themselves to +the contemplation of divinity⁠<a id="FNanchor_38" href="#Footnote_38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a>. At the same time, therefore, +that they have abandoned riches, and a solicitude +about human concerns, they have also been liberated +from bodily disease. So that a certain state of the soul +greatly contributes both to health and to the good of +the whole body. And to this also, for the most part, +a diminution of nutriment contributes. In short, as +Epicurus likewise has rightly said, that food is to be +avoided, the enjoyment of which we desire and pursue, +but which, after we have enjoyed, we rank among things +of an unacceptable nature. But of this kind is every +thing luxuriant and gross. And in this manner those +are affected, who are vehemently desirous of such nutriment, +and through it are involved either in great expense, +or in disease, or repletion, or the privation of leisure⁠<a id="FNanchor_39" href="#Footnote_39" class="fnanchor">[39]</a>.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_41">[41]</span></p> + +<p>54. Hence also, in simple and slender food, repletion +is to be avoided, and every where we should consider +what will be the consequence of the possession or enjoyment +of it, what the magnitude of it is, and what molestation +of the flesh or of the soul it is capable of dissolving. +For we ought never to act indefinitely, but in +things of this kind we should employ a boundary and +measure; and infer by a reasoning process, that he who +fears to abstain from animal food, if he suffers himself to +feed on flesh through pleasure, is afraid of death. For +immediately, together with a privation of such food, he +conceives that something indefinitely dreadful will be +present, the consequence of which will be death. But +from these and similar causes, an insatiable desire is produced +of riches, possessions, and renown, together with +an opinion that every good is increased with these in a +greater extent of time, and the dread of death as of an +infinite evil. The pleasure however which is produced +through luxury, does not even approach to that which is +experienced by him who lives with frugality. For such a +one has great pleasure in thinking how little he requires. +For luxury, astonishment about venereal occupations, and +ambition about external concerns, being taken away, what +remaining use can there be of idle wealth, which will be +of no advantage to us whatever, but will only become a +burden, no otherwise than repletion?—while, on the +other hand, the pleasure arising from frugality is genuine +and pure. It is also necessary to accustom the body to +become alienated, as much as possible, from the pleasure +of the satiety arising from luxurious food, but not from +the fulness produced by a slender diet, in order that +moderation may proceed through all things, and that +what is necessary, or what is most excellent, may fix a +boundary to our diet. For he who thus mortifies his +body will receive every possible good, through being +sufficient to himself, and an assimilation to divinity. And +thus also, he will not desire a greater extent of time, as if +it would bring with it an augmentation of good. He will +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_42">[42]</span>likewise thus be truly rich, measuring wealth by a natural +bound, and not by vain opinions. Thus too, he will not +depend on the hope of the greatest pleasure, the existence +of which is incredible, since this would be most +troublesome. But he will remain satisfied with his present +condition, and will not be anxious to live for a longer +period of time.</p> + +<p>55. Besides this also, is it not absurd, that he who is +in great affliction, or is in some grievous external calamity, +or is bound with chains, does not even think of food, nor +concern himself about the means of obtaining it; but +when it is placed before him, refuses what is necessary to +his subsistence; and that the man who is truly in bonds, +and is tormented by inward calamities, should endeavour +to procure a variety of eatables, paying attention to +things through which he will strengthen his bonds? And +how is it possible that this should be the conduct of men +who know what they suffer, and not rather of those who +are delighted with their calamities, and who are ignorant +of the evils which they endure? For these are affected +in a way contrary to those who are in chains, and who +are conscious of their miserable condition; since these, +experiencing no gratification in the present life, and +being full of immense perturbation, insatiably aspire after +another life. For no one who can easily liberate himself +from all perturbations, will desire to possess silver tables +and couches, and to have ointments and cooks, splendid +vessels and garments, and suppers remarkable for their +sumptuousness and variety; but such a desire arises from +a perfect uselessness to every purpose of the present life, +from an indefinite generation of good, and from immense +perturbation. Hence some do not remember the past, +the recollection of it being expelled by the present; but +others do not inquire about the present, because they are +not gratified with existing circumstances.</p> + +<p>56. The contemplative philosopher, however, will invariably +adopt a slender diet. For he knows the particulars +in which his bond consists, so that he is not +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_43">[43]</span>capable of desiring luxuries. Hence, being delighted +with simple food, he will not seek for animal nutriment, +as if he was not satisfied with a vegetable diet. But if +the nature of the body in a philosopher was not such as +we have supposed it to be, and was not so tractable, and +so adapted to have its wants satisfied through things +easily procured, and it was requisite to endure some pains +and molestations for the sake of true salvation, ought we +not [willingly] to endure them? For when it is requisite +that we should be liberated from disease, do we not +voluntarily sustain many pains, viz. while we are cut, +covered with blood, burnt, drink bitter medicines, and +are purged through the belly, through emetics, and +through the nostrils, and do we not also reward those +who cause us to suffer in this manner? And this being +the case, ought we not to sustain every thing, though of +the most afflictive nature, with equanimity, for the sake of +being purified from internal disease, since our contest is +for immortality, and an association with divinity, from +which we are prevented through an association with the +body? By no means, therefore, ought we to follow the +laws of the body, which are violent and adverse to the +laws of intellect, and to the paths which lead to salvation. +Since, however, we do not now philosophize about the +endurance of pain, but about the rejection of pleasures +which are not necessary, what apology can remain for +those, who impudently endeavour to defend their own +intemperance?</p> + +<p>57. For if it is requisite not to dissemble any thing +through fear, but to speak freely, it is no otherwise +possible to obtain the end [of a contemplative life], than +by adhering to God, as if fastened by a nail, being +divulsed from body, and those pleasures of the soul +which subsist through it; since our salvation is effected +by deeds, and not by a mere attention to words. But +as it is not possible with any kind of diet, and, in short, +by feeding on flesh, to become adapted to an union with +even some partial deity, much less is this possible with +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_44">[44]</span>that God who is beyond all things, and is above a nature +simply incorporeal; but after all-various purifications, both +of soul and body, he who is naturally of an excellent +disposition, and lives with piety and purity, will scarcely +be thought worthy to perceive him. So that, by how +much more the Father of all things excels in simplicity, +purity, and sufficiency to himself, as being established +far beyond all material representation, by so much the +more is it requisite, that he who approaches to him +should be in every respect pure and holy, beginning from +his body, and ending internally, and distributing to each +of the parts, and in short to every thing which is present +with him, a purity adapted to the nature of each. Perhaps, +however, these things will not be contradicted by +any one. But it may be doubted, why we admit abstinence +from animal food to pertain to purity, though in +sacrifices we slay sheep and oxen, and conceive that +these immolations are pure and acceptable to the Gods. +Hence, since the solution of this requires a long discussion, +the consideration of sacrifices must be assumed +from another principle.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"> + +<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_13" href="#FNanchor_13" class="label">[13]</a> Porphyry elsewhere calls this Firmus Castricius his friend and +fellow disciple. See more concerning him in Porphyry’s Life of +Plotinus.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_14" href="#FNanchor_14" class="label">[14]</a> παρανομηματα. Porphyry calls the conduct of Firmus <i>illegitimate</i>, +because the feeding on flesh is for the most part contrary to the laws of +genuine philosophy.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_15" href="#FNanchor_15" class="label">[15]</a> The original in this place is, ἢ δι’ απατην ουν, ἢ το μηδεν διαφερειν ηγεισθαι +προς φρονησιν, κ.τ.λ.; but, for ἢ το μηδεν διαφερειν, I read δια το μηδεν διαφερειν. +And this appears to have been the reading which Felicianus found in his +MS.; for his version of this passage is, “Vel igitur deceptione inductus, +quod sive hoc sive illo modo vescaris, &c.”</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_16" href="#FNanchor_16" class="label">[16]</a> This philosopher was an auditor of Plato and Speusippus.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_17" href="#FNanchor_17" class="label">[17]</a> Hesiod. Op. et Di. lib. I. v. 275, &c.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_18" href="#FNanchor_18" class="label">[18]</a> This philosopher was a Mitylenæan, and is said to have been an +auditor of, and also the successor of, Epicurus.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_19" href="#FNanchor_19" class="label">[19]</a> Iliad, XI. v. 479.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_20" href="#FNanchor_20" class="label">[20]</a> Iliad, IV. v. 35.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_21" href="#FNanchor_21" class="label">[21]</a> Iliad, XXII. v. 347.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_22" href="#FNanchor_22" class="label">[22]</a> <i>i.e.</i> Sacrifices from twelve animals.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_23" href="#FNanchor_23" class="label">[23]</a> For Cyzicus was situated in an island.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_24" href="#FNanchor_24" class="label">[24]</a> In the original εαν μη προση και η κατ’ αυτα φυσιωσις και ζωη; but it is +obviously necessary for φυσιωσις to read φυσις.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_25" href="#FNanchor_25" class="label">[25]</a> viz. As it appears to me, a pleasurable, a profitable, and a virtuous +end, which last is a truly beautiful and good end.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_26" href="#FNanchor_26" class="label">[26]</a> For φιλτρων here, I read φιληδονιων.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_27" href="#FNanchor_27" class="label">[27]</a> The multitude are ignorant that they are ignorant with respect to +objects of all others the most splendid and real; but the Coryphæan +philosopher is ignorant that he is ignorant with respect to objects most +unsubstantial and obscure. The former ignorance is the consequence of +a defect, but the latter of a transcendency of gnostic energy. What +Porphyry here says of the Coryphæan philosopher, is derived from the +Theætetus of Plato.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_28" href="#FNanchor_28" class="label">[28]</a> See p. 52 of my translation of the Theætetus of Plato, from which +Dialogue, what Porphyry here says, as well as what he a little before said, +is derived.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_29" href="#FNanchor_29" class="label">[29]</a> See the Phædo of Plato, where this is asserted.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_30" href="#FNanchor_30" class="label">[30]</a> Sense, and that which is beautiful in the energies of sense, are thus +denominated by Plato.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_31" href="#FNanchor_31" class="label">[31]</a> The rational part of the soul is assimilated by Plato, in the Phædrus, +to a charioteer, and the two irrational parts, <i>desire</i> and <i>anger</i>, to two +horses. See my translation of that Dialogue.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_32" href="#FNanchor_32" class="label">[32]</a> A kind of bread made of milk and flour.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_33" href="#FNanchor_33" class="label">[33]</a> In the original, αλλα παρασκευασαμενον το θαρρειν τῃ ψυχῃ γνησιως ουτως +αντεχεσθαι των καθ’ ημεραν. But the editor of the quarto edition of this +work, who appears to have been nothing more than a mere verbal critic, +says, in a note on this passage, that the word αντεχεσθαι, signifies <i>pertinacissime +illis inhærere, nihil ultra studere</i>; whereas it must be +obvious to any man who understands what is here said, that in this +place it signifies <i>to endure</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_34" href="#FNanchor_34" class="label">[34]</a> In the original, ο μη κυριευσει της τελειας εκθαρρησεως; but for εκθαρρησεως +I read with Felicianus εκκαθαρσεως.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_35" href="#FNanchor_35" class="label">[35]</a> In the original, ελαχιστον γαρ και το οχληρον εκ του ελαχιστου. But it is +obviously necessary for οχληρον to read ανοχληρον, and yet this was not +perceived by the German editor of this work, Jacob Rhoer.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_36" href="#FNanchor_36" class="label">[36]</a> <i>i.e.</i> Of our reasonings about intelligible objects.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_37" href="#FNanchor_37" class="label">[37]</a> Conformable to this, it is beautifully observed by Aristotle, in his +Nicomachean Ethics, that corporeal pleasures are the remedies of pain, +and that they fill up the indigence of nature, but do not perfect any +energy of the [rational] soul.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_38" href="#FNanchor_38" class="label">[38]</a> This is said by Porphyry, in his Life of Plotinus, to have been the +case with the senator Rogatianus.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_39" href="#FNanchor_39" class="label">[39]</a> And leisure, to those who knew how rightly to employ it, is, as +Socrates said, καλλιστον κτηματων, “<i>the most beautiful of possessions</i>.”</p></div> + +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_45">[45]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="ON_ABSTINENCE_FROM_ANIMAL_FOOD_2">ON ABSTINENCE FROM ANIMAL FOOD.<br> +BOOK THE SECOND.</h2> + +</div> + +<p>1. Pursuing therefore the inquiries pertaining to simplicity +and purity of diet, we have now arrived, O Castricius, +at the discussion of sacrifices; the consideration +of which is difficult, and at the same time requires much +explanation, if we intend to decide concerning it in such +a way as will be acceptable to the Gods. Hence, as this +is the proper place for such a discussion, we shall now +unfold what appears to us to be the truth on this subject, +and what is capable of being narrated, correcting what +was overlooked in the hypothesis proposed from the +beginning.</p> + +<p>2. In the first place therefore we say, it does not +follow because animals are slain that it is necessary to eat +them. Nor does he who admits the one, I mean that they +should be slain, entirely prove that they should be eaten. +For the laws permit us to defend ourselves against +enemies who attack us [by killing them]; but it did not +seem proper to these laws to grant that we should eat +them, as being a thing contrary to the nature of man. In +the second place, it does not follow, that because it is +proper to sacrifice certain animals to dæmons, or Gods, +or certain powers, through causes either known or unknown +to men, it is therefore necessary to feed on +animals. For it may be shown, that men assumed +animals in sacrifices, which no one even of those who +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_46">[46]</span>are accustomed to feed on flesh, would endure to taste. +Moreover, in the slaying of animals, the same error is +overlooked. For it does not follow, that if it is requisite +to kill some, it is therefore necessary to slay all animals, +as neither must it be granted, that if irrational animals, +therefore men also may be slain.</p> + +<p>3. Besides, abstinence from animal food, as we have +said in the first book, is not simply recommended to all +men, but to philosophers, and to those especially, who +suspend their felicity from God, and the imitation of him. +For neither in the political life do legislators ordain that +the same things shall be performed by private individuals +and the priests, but conceding certain things to the multitude, +pertaining to food and other necessaries of life, they +forbid the priests to use them, punishing the transgression +of their mandates by death, or some great fine.</p> + +<p>4. For these things not being confused, but distinguished +in a proper manner, most of the opposing +arguments will be found to be vain. For the greater part +of them endeavour to show, either that it is necessary to +slay animals, on account of the injuries sustained from +them, and it is assumed as a thing consequent, that it is +proper to eat them; or because animals are slain in sacrifices, +it is inferred that therefore they may be eaten by +men. And again, if it is requisite to destroy certain +animals, on account of their ferocity, it is conceived, that +it must follow, that tame animals likewise ought to be +slain. If, also, some persons may be allowed to eat them, +such as those who engage in athletic exercises, soldiers, +and those who are employed in bodily labour, therefore +this may likewise be permitted to philosophers; and if to +some, therefore to all of them; though all these inferences +are bad, and are incapable of exhibiting any necessity for +their adoption. And, indeed, that all of them are bad, +will be immediately evident to men that are not contentious. +But some of these inferences we have already +confuted, and we shall show the fallacy of others as we +proceed. Now, however, we shall discuss what pertains +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_47">[47]</span>to the consideration of sacrifices, unfolding the principles +from which they originated, what the first sacrifices were, +and of what kind they were; how they came to be +changed, and whence the change arose; whether all +things ought to be sacrificed by a philosopher, and from +what animals sacrifices are made. In short, we shall +unfold every thing pertaining to the proposed subject, +discovering some things ourselves, but receiving others +from the ancients, and as much as possible directing our +attention to what is commensurate and adapted to the +hypothesis, [or thing intended to be investigated.]</p> + +<p>5. It seems that the period is of immense antiquity, +from which a nation, the most learned of all others⁠<a id="FNanchor_40" href="#Footnote_40" class="fnanchor">[40]</a>, +as Theophrastus says, and who inhabit the most sacred +region made by the Nile, began first, from the vestal +hearth, to sacrifice to the celestial Gods, not myrrh, or +cassia, nor the first-fruits of things mingled with the +crocus of frankincense; for these were assumed many +generations afterwards, in consequence of error gradually +increasing, when men, wanting the necessaries of life, +offered, with great labour and many tears, some drops +of these, as first-fruits, to the Gods. Hence, they did +not at first sacrifice these, but grass, which, as a certain +soft wool of prolific nature, they plucked with their hands. +For the earth produced trees prior to animals; and long +before trees grass, which germinates annually. Hence, +gathering the blades and roots, and all the germs of this +herb, they committed them to the flames, as a sacrifice to +the visible celestial Gods, to whom they paid immortal +honour through fire. For to these, also, we preserve in +temples an immortal fire, because it is especially most +similar to these divinities. But from the exhalation or +smoke [εκ δε της θυμιασεως] of things produced in the earth, +they called the offerings θυμιατηρια, <i>thumiateria</i>; <i>to sacrifice</i>, +they called θυειν, <i>thuein</i>, and <i>the sacrifices</i>, θυσιαι, <i>thusiai</i>; +all which, as if unfolding the error which was afterwards +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_48">[48]</span>introduced, we do not rightly interpret; since we call the +worship of the Gods through the immolation of animals +θυσια, <i>thusia</i>. But so careful were the ancients not to +transgress this custom, that against those who, neglecting +the pristine, introduced novel modes of sacrificing, they +employed <i>execrations</i>⁠<a id="FNanchor_41" href="#Footnote_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a>, and therefore they now denominate +the substances which are used for fumigations αρωματα, +<i>aromata</i>, i.e. <i>aromatics</i>, [or things of an execrable nature.] +The antiquity, however, of the before-mentioned fumigations +may be perceived by him who considers that many +now also sacrifice certain portions of odoriferous wood. +Hence, when after grass, the earth produced trees, and +men at first fed on the fruits of the oak, they offered to +the Gods but few of the fruits on account of their rarity, +but in sacrifices they burnt many of its leaves. After +this, however, when human life proceeded to a milder +nutriment, and sacrifices from nuts were introduced, they +said <i>enough of the oak</i>.</p> + +<p>6. But as barley first appeared after leguminous substances, +the race of men used it in primitive sacrifices, +moistening it for this purpose with water. Afterwards, +when they had broken and bruised it, so as to render +it eatable, as the instruments of this operation afforded a +divine assistance to human life, they concealed them in +an arcane place, and approached them as things of a +sacred nature. But esteeming the food produced from +it when bruised to be blessed, when compared with their +former nutriment, they offered, in fine, the first-fruits of +it to the Gods. Hence also now, at the end of the sacrifices, +we use fruits that are bruised or ground; testifying +by this how much fumigations have departed from +their ancient simplicity; at the same time not perceiving +on what account we perform each of these. Proceeding, +however, from hence, and being more abundantly supplied, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_49">[49]</span>both with other fruits and wheat, the first-fruits of +cakes, made of the fine flour of wheat, and of every +thing else, were offered in sacrifices to the Gods; many +flowers being collected for this purpose, and with these +all that was conceived to be beautiful, and adapted, by +its odour, to a divine sense, being mingled. From these, +also, some were used for garlands, and others were given +to the fire. But when they had discovered the use of +the divine drops of wine, and honey, and likewise of oil, +for the purposes of human life, then they sacrificed these +to their causes, the Gods.</p> + +<p>7. And these things appear to be testified by the +splendid procession in honour of the Sun and the Hours, +which is even now performed at Athens, and in which +there were other herbs besides grass, and also acorns, the +fruit of the crab tree, barley, wheat, a heap of dried figs, +cakes made of wheaten and barley flour; and, in the +last place, an earthen pot. This mode, however, of offering +first-fruits in sacrifices, having, at length, proceeded +to great illegality, the assumption of immolations, most +dire and full of cruelty, was introduced; so that it would +seem that the execrations which were formerly uttered +against us, have now received their consummation, in +consequence of men slaughtering animals, and defiling +altars with blood; and this commenced from that period +in which mankind tasted of blood, through having experienced +the evils of famine and war. Divinity, therefore, +as Theophrastus says, being indignant, appears to have +inflicted a punishment adapted to the crime. Hence +some men became atheists; but others, in consequence +of forming erroneous conceptions of a divine nature, may +be more justly called κακοφρονες, <i>kakophrones</i>, than κακοθεοι, +<i>kakotheoi</i>⁠<a id="FNanchor_42" href="#Footnote_42" class="fnanchor">[42]</a>, because they think that the Gods are depraved, +and in no respect naturally more excellent than +we are. Thus, therefore, some were seen to live without +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_50">[50]</span>sacrificing any thing, and without offering the first-fruits +of their possessions to the Gods; but others sacrificed +improperly, and made use of illegal oblations.</p> + +<p>8. Hence the Thoes⁠<a id="FNanchor_43" href="#Footnote_43" class="fnanchor">[43]</a>, who dwell in the confines of +Thrace, as they neither offered any first-fruits, nor sacrificed +to the Gods, were at that time suddenly taken away +from the rest of mankind; so that neither the inhabitants, +nor the city, nor the foundations of the houses, +could by any one be found.</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">“Men prone to ill, denied the Gods their due,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">And by their follies made their days but few.</div> + <div class="verse indent0">The altars of the bless’d neglected stand,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Without the offerings which the laws demand;</div> + <div class="verse indent0">But angry Jove in dust this people laid,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Because no honours to the Gods they paid.”</div> + </div> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse right"><span class="smcap">Hesiod.</span> Op. et Di. lib. i. v. 133.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class="noindent">Nor did they offer first-fruits to the Gods, as it was just +that they should. But with respect to the Bassarians, +who formerly were not only emulous of sacrificing bulls, +but also ate the flesh of slaughtered men, in the same +manner as we now do with other animals; for we offer +to the Gods some parts of them as first-fruits, and eat the +rest;—with respect to these men, who has not heard, +that insanely rushing on and biting each other, and in +reality feeding on blood, they did not cease to act in this +manner till the whole race was destroyed of those who +used sacrifices of this kind?</p> + +<p>9. The sacrifice, therefore, through animals is posterior +and most recent, and originated from a cause +which is not of a pleasing nature, like that of the sacrifice +from fruits, but received its commencement either +from famine, or some other unfortunate circumstance. +The causes, indeed, of the peculiar mactations among the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_51">[51]</span>Athenians, had their beginning either in ignorance, or +anger, or fear. For the slaughter of swine is attributed to +an involuntary error of Clymene, who, by unintentionally +striking, slew the animal. Hence her husband, being +terrified as if he had perpetrated an illegal deed, consulted +the oracle of the Pythian God about it. But as +the God did not condemn what had happened, the +slaughter of animals was afterwards considered as a thing +of an indifferent nature. The inspector, however, of +sacred rites, who was the offspring of prophets, wishing +to make an offering of first-fruits from sheep, was permitted +to do so, it is said, by an oracle, but with much +caution and fear. For the oracle was as follows:—</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">“Offspring of prophets, sheep by force to slay,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">The Gods permit not thee; but with wash’d hands</div> + <div class="verse indent0">For thee ’tis lawful any sheep to kill,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">That dies a voluntary death.”</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p>10. But a goat was first slain in Icarus, a mountain of +Attica, because it had cropped a vine. And Diomus, +who was a priest of Jupiter Polieus, was the first that +slew an ox; because, when the festival sacred to Jupiter, +and called Diipolia, was celebrated, and fruits were prepared +after the ancient manner, an ox approaching tasted +the sacred cake. But the priest, being aided by others +who were present, slew the ox. And these are the +causes, indeed, which are assigned by the Athenians for +this deed; but by others, other causes are narrated. All +of them, however, are full of explanations that are not +holy. But most of them assign famine, and the injustice +with which it is attended, as the cause. Hence men +having tasted of animals, they offered them in sacrifice, +as first-fruits, to the Gods; but prior to this, they were +accustomed to abstain from animal food. Whence, since +the sacrifice of animals is not more ancient than necessary +food, it may be determined from this circumstance +what ought to be the nutriment of men. But it does not +follow, because men have tasted of and offered animals in +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_52">[52]</span>sacrifices as first-fruits, that it must necessarily be admitted +to be pious to eat that which was not piously +offered to the Gods.</p> + +<p>11. But what especially proves that every thing of +this kind originated from injustice, is this, that the same +things are neither sacrificed nor eaten in every nation, +but that they conjecture what it is fit for them to do +from what they find to be useful to themselves. With +the Egyptians, therefore, and Phœnicians, any one would +sooner taste human flesh than the flesh of a cow. The +cause, however, is, that this animal being useful, is also +rare among them. Hence, though they eat bulls, and +offer them in sacrifice as first-fruits, yet they spare cows +for the sake of their progeny, and ordain that, if any one +kill them, it shall be considered as an expiation. And +thus, for the sake of utility in one and the same genus of +animals, they distinguish what is pious, and what is +impious. So that these particulars subsisting after this +manner, Theophrastus reasonably forbids those to sacrifice +animals who wish to be truly pious; employing +these, and other similar arguments, such as the following.</p> + +<p>12. In the first place, indeed, because we sacrificed +animals through the occurrence, as we have said, of +a greater necessity. For pestilence and war were the +causes that introduced the necessity of eating them. +Since, therefore, we are supplied with fruits, what occasion +is there to use the sacrifice of necessity? In the +next place, the remunerations of, and thanks for benefits, +are to be given differently to different persons, according +to the worth of the benefit conferred; so that the greatest +remunerations, and from things of the most honourable +nature, are to be given to those who have benefited us +in the greatest degree, and especially if they are the +causes of these gifts. But the most beautiful and honourable +of those things, by which the Gods benefit us, are +the fruits of the earth. For through these they preserve +us, and enable us to live legitimately; so that, from +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_53">[53]</span>these we ought to venerate them. Besides, it is requisite +to sacrifice those things by the sacrifice of which we +shall not injure any one. For nothing ought to be so +innoxious to all things as sacrifice. But if some one +should say, that God gave animals for our use, no less +than the fruits of the earth, yet it does not follow that +they are, therefore, to be sacrificed, because in so doing +they are injured, through being deprived of life. For +<i>sacrifice</i> is, as the name implies, something <i>holy</i>⁠<a id="FNanchor_44" href="#Footnote_44" class="fnanchor">[44]</a>. But +no one is holy who requites a benefit from things which +are the property of another, whether he takes fruits or +plants from one who is unwilling to be deprived of them. +For how can this be holy, when those are injured from +whom they are taken? If, however, he who takes away +fruits from others does not sacrifice with sanctity, it +cannot be holy to sacrifice things taken from others, +which are in every respect more honourable than the +fruits of the earth. For a more dire deed is thus perpetrated. +But soul is much more honourable than the +vegetable productions of the earth, which it is not fit, +by sacrificing animals, that we should take away.</p> + +<p>13. Some one, however, perhaps may say, that we +also take away something from plants [when we eat, and +sacrifice them to the Gods]. But the ablation is not +similar; since we do not take this away from those who +are unwilling that we should. For, if we omitted to +gather them, they would spontaneously drop their fruits. +The gathering of the fruits, also, is not attended with the +destruction of the plants, as it is when animals lose their +animating principle. And, with respect to the fruit +which we receive from bees, since this is obtained by our +labour, it is fit that we should derive a common benefit +from it. For bees collect their honey from plants; but +we carefully attend to them. On which account it is +requisite that such a division should be made [of our +attention and their labour] that they may suffer no injury. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_54">[54]</span>But that which is useless to them, and beneficial to us, +will be the reward which we receive from them [of our +attention to their concerns]. In sacrifices, therefore, we +should abstain from animals. For, though all things +are in reality the property of the Gods, yet plants appear +to be our property; since we sow and cultivate them, +and nourish them by other attentions which we pay to +them. We ought to sacrifice, therefore, from our own +property, and not from the property of others; since that +which may be procured at a small expense, and which +may easily be obtained, is more holy, more acceptable to +the Gods, and better adapted to the purposes of sacrifice, +and to the exercise of continual piety. Hence, that +which is neither holy, nor to be obtained at a small +expense, is not to be offered in sacrifice, even though it +should be present.</p> + +<p>14. But that animals do not rank among things which +may be procured easily, and at a small expense, may be +seen by directing our view to the greater part of our +race: for we are not now to consider that some men +abound in sheep, and others in oxen. In the first place, +therefore, there are many nations that do not possess any +of those animals which are offered in sacrifice, some +ignoble animals, perhaps, excepted. And, in the second +place, most of those that dwell in cities themselves, +possess these but rarely. But if some one should say +that the inhabitants of cities have not mild fruits in +abundance; yet, though this should be admitted, they +are not in want of the other vegetable productions of the +earth; nor is it so difficult to procure fruits as it is to +procure animals. Hence an abundance of fruits, and +other vegetables, is more easily obtained than that of +animals. But that which is obtained with facility, and at +a small expense, contributes to incessant and universal +piety.</p> + +<p>15. Experience also testifies that the Gods rejoice in +this more than in sumptuous offerings. For when that +Thessalian sacrificed to the Pythian deity oxen with gilt +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_55">[55]</span>horns, and hecatombs, Apollo said, that the offering +of Hermioneus was more gratifying to him, though he +had only sacrificed as much meal as he could take with +his three fingers out of a sack. But when the Thessalian, +on hearing this, placed all the rest of his offerings on the +altar, the God again said, that by so doing his present +was doubly more unacceptable to him than his former +offering. Hence the sacrifice which is attended with a +small expense is pleasing to the Gods, and divinity looks +more to the disposition and manners of those that sacrifice, +than to the multitude of the things which are +sacrificed.</p> + +<p>16. Theopompus likewise narrates things similar to +these, viz. that a certain Magnesian came from Asia +to Delphi; a man very rich, and abounding in cattle, and +that he was accustomed every year to make many and +magnificent sacrifices to the Gods, partly through the +abundance of his possessions, and partly through piety +and wishing to please the Gods. But being thus disposed, +he came to the divinity at Delphi, bringing with +him a hecatomb for the God, and magnificently honouring +Apollo, he consulted his oracle. Conceiving also that he +worshipped the Gods in a manner more beautiful than +that of all other men, he asked the Pythian deity who the +man was that, with the greatest promptitude, and in the +best manner, venerated divinity, and made the most +acceptable sacrifices, conceiving that on this occasion the +God would deem him to be pre-eminent. The Pythian +deity however answered, that Clearchus, who dwelt in +Methydrium, a town of Arcadia, worshipped the Gods in +a way surpassing that of all other men. But the Magnesian +being astonished, was desirous of seeing Clearchus, +and of learning from him the manner in which he performed +his sacrifices. Swiftly, therefore, betaking himself +to Methydrium, in the first place, indeed, he despised +the smallness and vileness of the town, conceiving that +neither any private person, nor even the whole city, could +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_56">[56]</span>honour the Gods more magnificently and more beautifully +than he did. Meeting, however, with the man, he +thought fit to ask him after what manner he reverenced +the Gods. But Clearchus answered him, that he diligently +sacrificed to them at proper times in every month +at the new moon, crowning and adorning the statues of +Hermes and Hecate, and the other sacred images which +were left to us by our ancestors, and that he also honoured +the Gods with frankincense, and sacred wafers and +cakes. He likewise said, that he performed public sacrifices +annually, omitting no festive day; and that in these +festivals he worshipped the Gods, not by slaying oxen, +nor by cutting victims into fragments, but that he sacrificed +whatever he might casually meet with, sedulously +offering the first-fruits to the Gods of all the vegetable +productions of the seasons, and of all the fruits with +which he was supplied. He added, that some of these he +placed before the [statues of the] Gods⁠<a id="FNanchor_45" href="#Footnote_45" class="fnanchor">[45]</a>, but that he +burnt others on their altars; and that, being studious of +frugality, he avoided the sacrificing of oxen.</p> + +<p>17. By some writers, also, it is related, that certain +tyrants, after the Carthaginians were conquered, having, +with great strife among themselves, placed hecatombs +before Apollo, afterwards inquired of the God with +which of the offerings he was most delighted; and that he +answered, contrary to all their expectation, that he was +most pleased with the cakes of Docimus. But this +Docimus was an inhabitant of Delphi, and cultivated +some rugged and stony land. Docimus, therefore, coming +on that day from the place which he cultivated, took +from a bag which was fastened round him a few handfuls +of meal, and sacrificed them to the God, who was more +delighted with his offering than with the magnificent +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_57">[57]</span>sacrifices of the tyrants. Hence, also, a certain poet, +because the affair was known, appears to have asserted +things of a similar kind, as we are informed by Antiphanes +in his Mystics:</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">In simple offerings most the Gods delight:</div> + <div class="verse indent0">For though before them hecatombs are placed,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Yet frankincense is burnt the last of all.</div> + <div class="verse indent0">An indication this that all the rest,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Preceding, was a vain expense, bestowed</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Through ostentation, for the sake of men;</div> + <div class="verse indent0">But a small offering gratifies the Gods.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p>Menander likewise, in the comedy called the Morose, +says,</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">Pious th’ oblation which with frankincense</div> + <div class="verse indent0">And <i>popanum</i>⁠<a id="FNanchor_46" href="#Footnote_46" class="fnanchor">[46]</a> is made; for in the fire</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Both these, when placed, divinity accepts.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p>18. On this account also, earthen, wooden, and wicker +vessels were formerly used, and especially in public sacrifices, +the ancients being persuaded that divinity is delighted +with things of this kind. Whence, even now, the +most ancient vessels, and which are made of wood, +are thought to be more divine, both on account of the +matter and the simplicity of the art by which they were +fashioned. It is said, therefore, that Æschylus, on his +brother’s asking him to write a Pæan in honour of +Apollo, replied, that the best Pæan was written by Tynnichus⁠<a id="FNanchor_47" href="#Footnote_47" class="fnanchor">[47]</a>; +and that if his composition were to be compared +with that of Tynnichus, the same thing would take place +as if new were compared with ancient statues. For +the latter, though they are simple in their formation, are +conceived to be divine; but the former, though they are +most accurately elaborated, produce indeed admiration, +but are not believed to possess so much of a divine +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_58">[58]</span>nature. Hence Hesiod, praising the law of ancient sacrifices, +very properly says,</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">Your country’s rites in sacrifice observe:</div> + <div class="verse indent0">[In pious works] the ancient law is best⁠<a id="FNanchor_48" href="#Footnote_48" class="fnanchor">[48]</a>.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p>19. But those who have written concerning sacred +operations and sacrifices, admonish us to be accurate +in preserving what pertains to the <i>popana</i>, because these +are more acceptable to the Gods than the sacrifice +which is performed through the mactation of animals. +Sophocles also, in describing a sacrifice which is pleasing +to divinity, says in his Polyidus:</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">The skins of sheep in sacrifice were used,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Libations too of wine, grapes well preserved,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">And fruits collected in a heap of every kind;</div> + <div class="verse indent0">The olive’s pinguid juice, and waxen work</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Most variegated, of the yellow bee.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p>Formerly, also, there were venerable monuments in +Delos of those who came from the Hyperboreans, bearing +handfuls [of fruits]. It is necessary, therefore, that, being +purified in our manners, we should make oblations, offering +to the Gods those sacrifices which are pleasing to +them, and not such as are attended with great expense. +Now, however, if a man’s body is not pure and invested +with a splendid garment, he does not think it is qualified +for the sanctity of sacrifice. But when he has rendered +his body splendid, together with his garment, though +his soul at the same time is not purified from vice, yet he +betakes himself to sacrifice, and thinks that it is a thing +of no consequence; as if divinity did not especially +rejoice in that which is most divine in our nature, when +it is in a pure condition, as being allied to his essence. +In Epidaurus, therefore, there was the following inscription +on the doors of the temple:</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">Into an odorous temple, he who goes</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Should pure and holy be; but to be wise</div> + <div class="verse indent0">In what to sanctity pertains, is to be pure.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_59">[59]</span></p> + +<p>20. But that God is not delighted with the amplitude +of sacrifices, but with any casual offering, is evident from +this, that of our daily food, whatever it may be that +is placed before us, we all of us make an offering to the +Gods, before we have tasted it ourselves; this offering +being small indeed, but the greatest testimony of honour +to divinity. Moreover, Theophrastus shows, by enumerating +many of the rites of different countries, that the +sacrifices of the ancients were from fruits, and he narrates +what pertains to libations in the following manner: “Ancient +sacrifices were for the most part performed with +sobriety. But those sacrifices are sober in which the +libations are made with water. Afterwards, however, +libations were made with honey. For we first receive +this liquid fruit prepared for us by the bees. In the +third place, libations were made with oil; and in the +fourth and last place with wine.”</p> + +<p>21. These things, however, are testified not only by +the pillars which are preserved in Cyrbe⁠<a id="FNanchor_49" href="#Footnote_49" class="fnanchor">[49]</a>, and which contain, +as it were, certain true descriptions of the Cretan +sacred rites of the Corybantes; but also by Empedocles, +who, in discussing what pertains to sacrifices and theogony, +or the generation of the Gods, says:</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">With them nor Mars nor tumult dire was found,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Nor Saturn, Neptune, or the sovereign Jove,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">But Venus [beauty’s] queen.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class="noindent">And Venus is friendship. Afterwards he adds,</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">With painted animals, and statues once</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Of sacred form, with unguents sweet of smell,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">The fume of frankincense and genuine myrrh,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">And with libations poured upon the ground</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Of yellow honey, Venus was propitious made.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p>Which ancient custom is still even now preserved by +some persons as a certain vestige of the truth. And in +the last place, Empedocles says,</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">Nor then were altars wet with blood of bulls</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Irrationally slain.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_60">[60]</span></p> + +<p>22. For, as it appears to me, when friendship and a +proper sense of the duties pertaining to kindred natures, +was possessed by all men, no one slaughtered any living +being, in consequence of thinking that other animals +were allied to him. But when strife and tumult, every +kind of contention, and the principle of war, invaded +mankind, then, for the first time, no one in reality spared +any one of his kindred natures. The following particulars, +likewise, ought to be considered: For, as though +there is an affinity between us and noxious men, who, +as it were, by a certain impetus of their own nature and +depravity, are incited to injure any one they may happen +to meet, yet we think it requisite that all of them should +be punished and destroyed; thus also, with respect to +those irrational animals that are naturally malefic and +unjust, and who are impelled to injure those that approach +them, it is perhaps fit that they should be destroyed. But +with respect to other animals who do not at all act +unjustly, and are not naturally impelled to injure us, it is +certainly unjust to destroy and murder them, no otherwise +than it would be to slay men who are not iniquitous. +And this seems to evince, that the justice between us +and other animals does not arise from some of them +being naturally noxious and malefic, but others not, as is +also the case with respect to men.</p> + +<p>23. Are therefore those animals to be sacrificed to the +Gods which are thought to be deserving of death? But +how can this be possible, if they are naturally depraved? +For it is no more proper to sacrifice such as these, than it +would be to sacrifice mutilated animals. For thus, +indeed, we shall offer the first-fruits of things of an evil +nature, but we shall not sacrifice for the sake of honouring +the Gods. Hence, if animals are to be sacrificed +to the Gods, we should sacrifice those that are perfectly +innoxious. It is however acknowledged, that those +animals are not to be destroyed who do not at all injure +us, so that neither are they to be sacrificed to the Gods. +If, therefore, neither these, nor those that are noxious, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_61">[61]</span>are to be sacrificed, is it not evident that we should +abstain from them more than from any thing else, and +that we should not sacrifice any one of them, though it is +fit that some of them should be destroyed?</p> + +<p>24. To which may be added, that we should sacrifice +to the Gods for the sake of three things, viz. either for +the sake of honouring them, or of testifying our gratitude, +or through our want of good. For, as we offer first-fruits +to good men, thus also we think it is necessary that +we should offer them to the Gods. But we honour +the Gods, either exploring the means of averting evils +and obtaining good, or when we have been previously +benefited, or in order that we may obtain some present +advantage and assistance, or merely for the purpose of +venerating the goodness of their nature. So that if the +first-fruits of animals are to be offered to the Gods, some +of them for the sake of this are to be sacrificed. For +whatever we sacrifice, we sacrifice for the sake of some +one of the above-mentioned particulars. Is it therefore +to be thought that God is honoured by us, when we are +directly seen to act unjustly through the first-fruits which +we offer to him? Or will he not rather think that he +is dishonoured by such a sacrifice, in which, by immolating +animals that have not at all injured us, we acknowledge +that we have acted unjustly. So that no one of +other animals is to be sacrificed for the sake of honouring +divinity. Nor yet are they to be sacrificed for the purpose +of testifying our gratitude to the Gods. For he who +makes a just retribution for the benefits he has received, +ought not to make it by doing an injury to certain other +animals. For he will no more appear to make a retribution +than he who, plundering his neighbour of his property, +should bestow it on another person for the sake of +honour. Neither are animals to be sacrificed for the sake +of obtaining a certain good of which we are in want. For +he who endeavours to be benefited by acting unjustly, is +to be suspected as one who would not be grateful even +when he is benefited. So that animals are not to be +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_62">[62]</span>sacrificed to the Gods through the expectation of deriving +advantage from the sacrifice. For he who does this, may +perhaps elude men, but it is impossible that he can elude +divinity. If, therefore, we ought to sacrifice for the +sake of a certain thing, but this is not to be done for the +sake of any of the before mentioned particulars, it is evident +that animals ought not to be sacrificed.</p> + +<p>25. For, by endeavouring to obliterate the truth of +these things through the pleasures which we derive from +sacrifices, we deceive ourselves, but cannot deceive divinity. +Of those animals, therefore, which are of an +ignoble nature, which do not impart to our life any superior +utility, and which do not afford us any pleasure, we +do not sacrifice any one to the Gods. For who ever +sacrificed serpents, scorpions, and apes, or any one of +such like animals? But we do not abstain from any one +of those animals which afford a certain utility to our life, +or which have something in them that contributes to our +enjoyments; since we, in reality, cut their throats, and +excoriate them, under the patronage of divinity⁠<a id="FNanchor_50" href="#Footnote_50" class="fnanchor">[50]</a>. For we +sacrifice to the Gods oxen and sheep, and besides these, +stags and birds, and fat hogs, though they do not at +all participate of purity, but afford us delight. And of +these animals, indeed, some, by co-operating with our +labours, afford assistance to our life, but others supply us +with food, or administer to our other wants. But those +which effect neither of these, yet, through the enjoyment +which is derived from them, are slain by men in sacrifices +similarly with those who afford us utility. We do not, +however, sacrifice asses or elephants, or any other of +those animals that co-operate with us in our labours, but +are not subservient to our pleasure; though, sacrificing +being excepted, we do not abstain from such like animals, +but we cut their throats on account of the delight with +which the deglutition of them is attended; and of those +which are fit to be sacrificed, we do not sacrifice such +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_63">[63]</span>as are acceptable to the Gods, but such as in a greater +degree gratify the desires of men; thus testifying against +ourselves, that we persist in sacrificing to the Gods, for +the sake of our own pleasure, and not for the sake of gratifying +the Gods.</p> + +<p>26. But of the Syrians, the Jews indeed, through the +sacrifice which they first made, even now, says Theophrastus, +sacrifice animals, and if we were persuaded by +them to sacrifice in the same way that they do, we should +abstain from the deed. For they do not feast on the +flesh of the sacrificed animals, but having thrown the +whole of the victims into the fire, and poured much honey +and wine on them during the night, they swiftly consume +the sacrifice, in order that the all-seeing sun may not +become a spectator of it. And they do this, fasting +during all the intermediate days, and through the whole +of this time, as belonging to the class of philosophers, +and also discourse with each other about the divinity⁠<a id="FNanchor_51" href="#Footnote_51" class="fnanchor">[51]</a>. +But in the night, they apply themselves to the theory of +the stars, surveying them, and through prayers invoking +God. For these make offerings both of other animals +and themselves, doing this from necessity, and not from +their own will. The truth of this, however, may be +learnt by any one who directs his attention to the Egyptians, +the most learned of all men; who are so far from +slaying other animals, that they make the images of these +to be imitations of the Gods; so adapted and allied do +they conceive these to be both to Gods and men.</p> + +<p>27. For at first, indeed, sacrifices of fruits were made +to the Gods; but, in the course of time, men becoming +negligent of sanctity, in consequence of fruits being +scarce, and, through the want of legitimate nutriment, +being impelled to eat each other; then supplicating +divinity with many prayers, they first began to make +oblations of themselves to the Gods, not only consecrating +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_64">[64]</span>to the divinities whatever among their possessions +was most beautiful, but, proceeding beyond this, they +sacrificed those of their own species. Hence, even to the +present time, not only in Arcadia, in the Lupercal festivals, +and in Carthage, men are sacrificed in common to +Saturn, but periodically, also, for the sake of remembering +the legal institute, they sprinkle the altars of those +of the same tribe with blood, although the rites of their +sacrifices exclude, by the voice of the crier, him from +engaging in them who is accused of human slaughter. +Proceeding therefore from hence, they made the bodies +of other animals supply the place of their own in sacrifices, +and again, through a satiety of legitimate nutriment, +becoming oblivious of piety, they were induced by +voracity to leave nothing untasted, nothing undevoured. +And this is what now happens to all men with respect to +the aliment from fruits. For when, by the assumption of +them, they have alleviated their necessary indigence, +then searching for a superfluity of satiety, they labour to +procure many things for food which are placed beyond +the limits of temperance. Hence, as if they had made no +ignoble sacrifices to the Gods, they proceeded also to +taste the animals which they immolated; and from this, +as a principle of the deed, the eating of animals became +an addition to men to the nutriment derived from fruits. +As, therefore, antiquity offered the first produce of fruits +to the Gods, and gladly, after their pious sacrifice, tasted +what they offered, thus also, when they sacrificed the +firstlings of animals to the divinities, they thought that +the same thing ought to be done by them, though ancient +piety did not ordain these particulars after this manner, +but venerated each of the Gods from fruits. For with such +oblations, both nature, and every sense of the human soul, +are delighted.</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">No altar then was wet with blood of bulls</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Irrationally slain; but this was thought</div> + <div class="verse indent0">To be of every impious deed the worst,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Limbs to devour of brutes deprived of life.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_65">[65]</span></p> + +<p>28. The truth of this may also be perceived from the +altar which is even now preserved about Delos, which, +because no animal is brought to, or is sacrificed upon it, +is called the altar of the pious. So that the inhabitants +not only abstain from sacrificing animals, but they likewise +conceive, that those who established, are similarly +pious with those who use the altar. Hence, the Pythagoreans +having adopted this mode of sacrifice, abstained +from animal food through the whole of life. But when +they distributed to the Gods a certain animal instead +of themselves, they merely tasted of it, living in reality +without touching other animals. We, however, do not +act after this manner; but being filled with animal diet, +we have arrived at this manifold illegality in our life +by slaughtering animals, and using them for food. For +neither is it proper that the altars of the Gods should be +defiled with murder, nor that food of this kind should be +touched by men, as neither is it fit that men should +eat one another; but the precept which is still preserved +at Athens, should be obeyed through the whole of life.</p> + +<p>29. For formerly, as we have before observed, when +men sacrificed to the Gods fruits and not animals, and did +not assume the latter for food, it is said, that a common +sacrifice being celebrated at Athens, one Diomus, or +Sopater, who was not a native, but cultivated some land +in Attica, seizing a sharp axe which was near to him, and +being excessively indignant, struck with it an ox, who, +coming from his labour, approached to a table, on which +were openly placed cakes and other offerings which were +to be burnt as a sacrifice to the Gods, and ate some, but +trampled on the rest of the offerings. The ox, therefore, +being killed, Diomus, whose anger was now appeased, at +the same time perceived what kind of deed he had perpetrated. +And the ox, indeed, he buried. But embracing +a voluntary banishment, as if he had been accused of +impiety, he fled to Crete. A great dryness, however, +taking place in the Attic land from vehement heat, and a +dreadful sterility of fruit, and the Pythian deity being in +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_66">[66]</span>consequence of it consulted by the general consent, the +God answered, that the Cretan exile must expiate the +crime; and that, if the murderer was punished, and the +statue of the slain ox was erected in the place in which it +fell, this would be beneficial both to those who had and +those who had not tasted its flesh. An inquiry therefore +being made into the affair, and Sopater, together with +the deed, having been discovered, he, thinking that he +should be liberated from the difficulty in which he was +now involved, through the accusation of impiety, if the +same thing was done by all men in common, said to +those who came to him, that it was necessary an ox +should be slain by the city. But, on their being dubious +who should strike the ox, he said that he would undertake +to do it, if they would make him a citizen, and +would be partakers with him of the slaughter. This, +therefore, being granted, they returned to the city, and +ordered the deed to be accomplished in such a way as +it is performed by them at present, [and which was as +follows:]</p> + +<p>30. They selected virgins who were drawers of water; +but these brought water for the purpose of sharpening an +axe and a knife. And these being sharpened, one person +gave the axe, another struck with it the ox, and a third +person cut the throat of the ox. But after this, having +excoriated the animal, all that were present ate of its +flesh. These things therefore being performed, they +sewed up the hide of the ox, and having stuffed it with +straw, raised it upright in the same form which it had +when alive, and yoked it to a plough, as if it was about +to work with it. Instituting also a judicial process, +respecting the slaughter of the ox, they cited all those +who were partakers of the deed, to defend their conduct. +But as the drawers of water accused those who sharpened +the axe and the knife, as more culpable than themselves, +and those who sharpened these instruments accused him +who gave the axe, and he accused him who cut the throat +of the ox, and this last person accused the knife,—hence, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_67">[67]</span>as the knife could not speak, they condemned it as the +cause of the slaughter. From that time also, even till +now, during the festival sacred to Jupiter, in the Acropolis, +at Athens, the sacrifice of an ox is performed after +the same manner. For, placing cakes on a brazen table, +they drive oxen round it, and the ox that tastes of the +cakes that are distributed on the table, is slain. The +race likewise of those who perform this, still remains. +And all those, indeed, who derive their origin from +Sopater are called <i>boutupoi</i> [i.e. <i>slayers of oxen</i>]; but +those who are descended from him that drove the ox +round the table, are called <i>kentriadai</i>, [or <i>stimulators</i>.] +And those who originate from him that cut the throat +of the ox, are denominated <i>daitroi</i>, [or <i>dividers</i>,] on account +of the banquet which takes place from the distribution +of flesh. But when they have filled the hide, and +the judicial process is ended, they throw the knife into +the sea.</p> + +<p>31. Hence, neither did the ancients conceive it to be +holy to slay animals that co-operated with us in works +beneficial to our life, and we should avoid doing this even +now. And as formerly it was not pious for men to injure +these animals, so now it should be considered as unholy +to slay them for the sake of food. If, however, this is to +be done from motives of religious reverence of the Gods, +yet every passion or affection which is essentially produced +from bodies is to be rejected, in order that we may +not procure food from improper substances, and thus +have an incentive to violence as the intimate associate +of our life. For by such a rejection we shall, at least, all +of us derive great benefit in what pertains to our mutual +security, if we do not in any thing else. For those whose +sense is averse to the destruction of animals of a species +different from their own, will evidently abstain from injuring +those of their own kind. Hence it would perhaps +have been best, if men in after-times had immediately +abstained from slaughtering these animals; but since no +one is free from error, it remains for posterity to take +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_68">[68]</span>away by purifications the crime of their ancestors, respecting +nutriment. This, however, will be effected, if, +placing before our eyes the dire nature of such conduct, +we exclaim with Empedocles:</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">Ah me, while yet exempt from such a crime,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Why was I not destroyed by cruel Time,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Before these lips began the guilty deed,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">On the dire nutriment of flesh to feed?</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class="noindent">For in those only the appropriate sense sympathetically +grieves for errors that have been committed, who endeavour +to find a remedy for the evils with which they are +afflicted; so that every one, by offering pure and holy +sacrifices to divinity, may through sanctity obtain the +greatest benefits from the Gods.</p> + +<p>32. But the benefit derived from fruits is the first and +the greatest of all others, and which, as soon as they are +matured, should alone be offered to the Gods, and to +Earth, by whom they are produced. For she is the +common Vesta of Gods and men; and it is requisite that +all of us, reclining on her surface, as on the bosom of our +mother and nurse, should celebrate her divinity, and love +her with a parental affection, as the source of our existence. +For thus, when we exchange this life for another, +we shall again be thought worthy of a residence in the +heavens, and of associating with all the celestial Gods, +whom, now beholding⁠<a id="FNanchor_52" href="#Footnote_52" class="fnanchor">[52]</a>, we ought to venerate with those +fruits of which they are the causes, sacrificing indeed to +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_69">[69]</span>them from all these, when they have arrived at maturity, +but not conceiving all of us to be sufficiently worthy to +sacrifice to the Gods. For as all things are not to be +sacrificed to the Gods, so neither perhaps are the Gods +gratified by the sacrifice of every one. This, therefore, is +the substance of the arguments adduced by Theophrastus, +to show that animals ought not to be sacrificed; exclusive +of the interspersed fabulous narrations, and a few things +which we have added to what he has said.</p> + +<p>33. I, however, shall not attempt to dissolve the legal +institutes which the several nations have established. For +it is not my design at present to speak about a polity. +But as the laws by which we are governed permit us to +venerate divinity by things of the most simple, and of an +inanimate nature, hence, selecting that which is the least +costly, let us sacrifice according to the law of the city, +and endeavour to offer an appropriate sacrifice, approaching +with consummate purity to the Gods. In short, if the +oblation of first-fruits is of any value, and is an acknowledgment +of thanks for the benefits which we receive, it +will be most irrational to abstain ourselves from animals, +and yet offer the first-fruits of these to the Gods. For +neither are the Gods worse than we are, so as to be in +want of those things of which we are not indigent, nor is +it holy to offer the first-fruits of that nutriment from +which we ourselves abstain. For we find it is usual with +men, that, when they refrain from animal food, they do +not make oblations of animals; but that they offer to the +Gods the first-fruits of what they themselves eat. Hence +also it is now fit, that he who abstains from animals +should offer the first-fruits of things which he touches +[for the purpose of food].</p> + +<p>34. Let us therefore also sacrifice, but let us sacrifice +in such a manner as is fit, offering different sacrifices to +different powers⁠<a id="FNanchor_53" href="#Footnote_53" class="fnanchor">[53]</a>; to the God indeed who is above all +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_70">[70]</span>things, as a certain wise man said, neither sacrificing with +incense, nor consecrating any thing sensible. For there +is nothing material, which is not immediately impure to +an immaterial nature. Hence, neither is vocal language, +nor internal speech, adapted to the highest God, when it +is defiled by any passion of the soul; but we should +venerate him in profound silence with a pure soul, and +with pure conceptions about him. It is necessary, therefore, +that being conjoined with and assimilated to him, +we should offer to him, as a sacred sacrifice, the elevation +of our intellect, which offering will be both a hymn and +our salvation. In an impassive contemplation, therefore, +of this divinity by the soul, the sacrifice to him is effected +in perfection; but to his progeny, the intelligible Gods, +hymns, orally enunciated, are to be offered. For to each +of the divinities, a sacrifice is to be made of the first-fruits +of the things which he bestows, and through which he +nourishes and preserves us. As, therefore, the husbandman +offers handfuls of the fruits and berries which the +season first produces; thus also we should offer to the +divinities the first-fruits of our conceptions of their transcendent +excellence, giving them thanks for the contemplation +which they impart to us, and for truly nourishing +us through the vision of themselves, which they afford us, +associating with, appearing to, and shining upon us, for +our salvation.</p> + +<p>35. Now, however, many of those who apply themselves +to philosophy are unwilling to do this; and, +pursuing renown rather than honouring divinity, they +are busily employed about statues, neither considering +whether they are to be reverenced or not, nor endeavouring +to learn from those who are divinely wise, to what +extent, and to what degree, it is requisite to proceed in +this affair. We, however, shall by no means contend with +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_71">[71]</span>these, nor are we very desirous of being well instructed +in a thing of this kind; but imitating holy and ancient +men, we offer to the Gods, more than any thing else, +the first-fruits of contemplation, which they have imparted +to us, and by the use of which we become partakers of +true salvation.</p> + +<p>36. The Pythagoreans, therefore, diligently applying +themselves to the study of numbers and lines, sacrificed +for the most part from these to the Gods, denominating, +indeed, a certain number Minerva, but another Diana, +and another Apollo: and again, they called one number +justice, but another temperance⁠<a id="FNanchor_54" href="#Footnote_54" class="fnanchor">[54]</a>. In diagrams also they +adopted a similar mode. And thus, by offerings of this +kind, they rendered the Gods propitious to them, so as +to obtain of them the object of their wishes, by the +things which they dedicated to, and the names by which +they invoked them. They likewise frequently employed +their aid in divination, and if they were in want of a +certain thing for the purpose of some investigation. In +order, therefore, to effect this, they made use of the Gods +within the heavens, both the erratic and non-erratic, of +all of whom it is requisite to consider the sun as the +leader; but to rank the moon in the second place; and +we should conjoin with these fire, in the third place, from +its alliance to them, as the theologist⁠<a id="FNanchor_55" href="#Footnote_55" class="fnanchor">[55]</a> says. He also +says that no animal is to be sacrificed; but that first-fruits +are to be offered from meal and honey, and the +vegetable productions of the earth. He adds, that fire +is not to be enkindled on a hearth defiled with gore; and +asserts other things of the like kind. For what occasion +is there to transcribe all that he says? for he who is +studious of piety knows, indeed, that to the Gods no +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_72">[72]</span>animal is to be sacrificed, but that a sacrifice of this kind +pertains to dæmons, and other powers, whether they are +beneficent, or depraved⁠<a id="FNanchor_56" href="#Footnote_56" class="fnanchor">[56]</a>. He likewise knows who those +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_73">[73]</span>are that ought to sacrifice to these, and to what extent +they ought to proceed in the sacrifices which they make. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_74">[74]</span>Other things, however, will be passed over by me in +silence. But what some Platonists have divulged, I shall +lay before the reader, in order that the things proposed +to be discussed, may become manifest to the intelligent. +What they have unfolded, therefore, is as follows:</p> + +<p>37. The first God being incorporeal, immoveable, and +impartible, and neither subsisting in any thing, nor +restrained in his energies, is not, as has been before +observed, in want of any thing external to himself, as +neither is the soul of the world; but this latter, containing +in itself the principle of that which is triply divisible, +and being naturally self-motive, is adapted to be moved +in a beautiful and orderly manner, and also to move the +body of the world according to the most excellent +reasons [i.e. productive principles or powers]. It is, +however, connected with and comprehends body, though +it is itself incorporeal, and liberated from the participation +of any passion. To the remaining Gods, therefore, to +the world, to the inerratic and erratic stars, who are +visible Gods, consisting of soul and body, thanks are to +be returned after the above-mentioned manner, through +sacrifices from inanimate natures. The multitude, therefore, +of those invisible beings remains for us, whom +Plato indiscriminately calls dæmons⁠<a id="FNanchor_57" href="#Footnote_57" class="fnanchor">[57]</a>; but of these, some +being denominated by men, obtain from them honours, +and other religious observances, similar to those which +are paid to the Gods; but others, who for the most part +are not explicitly denominated, receive an occult religious +reverence and appellation from certain persons in +villages and certain cities; and the remaining multitude +is called in common by the name of dæmons. The +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_75">[75]</span>general persuasion, however, respecting all these invisible +beings, is this, that if they become angry through being +neglected, and deprived of the religious reverence which +is due to them, they are noxious to those by whom they +are thus neglected, and that they again become beneficent, +if they are appeased by prayers, supplications, and +sacrifices, and other similar rites.</p> + +<p>38. But the confused notion which is formed of these +beings, and which has proceeded to great crimination, +necessarily requires that the nature of them should be +distinguished according to reason. For perhaps it will +be said, that it is requisite to show whence the error +concerning them originated among men. The distinction, +therefore, must be made after the following manner. +Such souls as are the progeny of the whole soul of the +universe, and who govern the great parts of the region +under the moon, these, being incumbent on a pneumatic +substance or spirit, and ruling over it conformably to +reason, are to be considered as good dæmons, who are +diligently employed in causing every thing to be beneficial +to the subjects of their government, whether they +preside over certain animals, or fruits, which are arranged +under their inspective care, or over things which subsist +for the sake of these, such as showers of rain, moderate +winds, serene weather, and other things which cooperate +with these, such as the good temperament of the seasons +of the year. They are also our leaders in the attainment +of music, and the whole of erudition, and likewise of +medicine and gymnastic, and of every thing else similar +to these. For it is impossible that these dæmons should +impart utility, and yet become, in the very same things, +the causes of what is detrimental. Among these two, +those <i>transporters</i>, as Plato calls them, [in his Banquet] +are to be enumerated, who announce the affairs of men +to the Gods, and the will of the Gods to men; carrying +our prayers, indeed, to the Gods as judges, but oracularly +unfolding to us the exhortations and admonitions +of the Gods. But such souls as do not rule over the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_76">[76]</span>pneumatic substance with which they are connected, +but for the most part are vanquished by it; these are +vehemently agitated and borne along [in a disorderly +manner,] when the irascible motions and the desires of +the pneumatic substance, receive an impetus. These +souls, therefore, are indeed dæmons, but are deservedly +called malefic dæmons.</p> + +<p>39. All these beings, likewise, and those who possess +a contrary power, are invisible, and perfectly imperceptible +by human senses; for they are not surrounded +with a solid body, nor are all of them of one form, +but they are fashioned in numerous figures. The forms, +however, which characterize their pneumatic substance, +at one time become apparent, but at another are invisible. +Sometimes also those that are malefic, change their +forms; but the pneumatic substance, so far as it is +corporeal, is passive and corruptible: and though, because +it is thus bound by the souls [that are incumbent on it,] +the form of it remains for a long time, yet it is not +eternal. For it is probable that something continually +flows from it, and also that it is nourished. The pneumatic +substance, therefore, of good dæmons, possesses +symmetry, in the same manner as the bodies of the visible +Gods; but the spirit of malefic dæmons is deprived +of symmetry, and in consequence of its abounding in +passivity, they are distributed about the terrestrial region. +Hence, there is no evil which they do not attempt to +effect; for, in short, being violent and fraudulent in their +manners, and being also deprived of the guardian care +of more excellent dæmons, they make, for the most part, +vehement and sudden attacks; sometimes endeavouring +to conceal their incursions, but at other times assaulting +openly. Hence the molestations which are produced by +them are rapid; but the remedies and corrections which +proceed from more excellent dæmons, appear to be more +slowly effected: for every thing which is good being +tractable and equable, proceeds in an orderly manner, +and does not pass beyond what is fit. By forming this +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_77">[77]</span>opinion, therefore, you will never fall into that most +absurd notion, that evil may be expected from the good, +or good from the evil. For this notion is not only +attended with absurdity, but the multitude, receiving +through it the most erroneous conceptions of the Gods, +disseminate them among the rest of mankind.</p> + +<p>40. It must be admitted, therefore, that one of the +greatest injuries occasioned by malefic dæmons is this, +that though they are the causes of the calamities which +take place about the earth, such as pestilence, sterility, +earthquakes, excessive dryness, and the like, yet they +endeavour to persuade us, that they are the causes of +things the most contrary to these, viz. of fertility, [salubrity, +and elementary peace.] Hence, they exonerate +themselves from blame, and, in the first place, endeavour +to avoid being detected as the sources of injury; and, +in the next place, they convert us to supplications and +sacrifices to the beneficent Gods, as if they were angry. +But they effect these, and things of a similar nature, in +consequence of wishing to turn us from right conceptions +of the Gods, and convert us to themselves; for they are +delighted with all such as act thus incongruously and +discordantly, and, as it were, assuming the persons of +other Gods, they enjoy the effects of our imprudence +and folly; conciliating to themselves the good opinion +of the vulgar, by inflaming the minds of men with the +love of riches, power, and pleasure, and filling them with +the desire of vain glory, from which sedition, and war, +and other things allied to these, are produced. But +that which is the most dire of all things, they proceed +still farther, and persuade men that similar things are +effected by the greatest Gods, and do not stop till they +even subject the most excellent of the divinities to these +calumnies, through whom they say every thing is in +perfect confusion. And not only the vulgar are affected +in this manner, but not a few also of those who are +conversant with philosophy. The cause of this, however, +extends equally to philosophers, and the vulgar; for of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_78">[78]</span>philosophers, those who do not depart from the prevailing +notions, fall into the same error with the multitude; +and again, the multitude, on hearing assertions from celebrated +men conformable to their own opinions, are in a +greater degree corroborated in conceiving things of this +kind of the Gods.</p> + +<p>41. For poetry also inflames the opinions of men, by +employing a diction adapted to produce astonishment +and enchantment, and not only allures the ears, but is +also capable of procuring belief in things that are most +impossible. At the same time, however, it is requisite +to be firmly persuaded, that what is good can never +injure, nor what is evil can ever be beneficial; for, as +Plato says, it is not the province of heat to refrigerate, +but of that which is contrary to heat; and, in like +manner, neither is it the province of that which is just +to injure. But divinity is naturally the most just of all +things; since otherwise he would not be divinity. Hence +this power and portion of good is not to be abscinded +from beneficent dæmons; for the power which is naturally +adapted, and wishes to injure, is contrary to the +power which is beneficent: but contraries can never +subsist about the same thing. As malefic dæmons, +therefore, injure the mortal race in many respects, and +sometimes in things of the greatest consequence, good +dæmons not only never cease to act conformably to their +office, but also, as much as possible, presignify to us the +dangers which are impendent from malefic dæmons, +unfolding these through dreams, through a divinely +inspired soul, and through many other things; so that +he who is capable of explaining what is signified, may +know and avoid all the perils with which he is threatened. +For they indicate [future events] to all men, but every +one cannot understand what they indicate, nor is every +one able to read what is written by them; but he alone +is able to do this, who has learnt their letters. All +enchantment, however, [or witchcraft,] is effected through +dæmons of a contrary nature; for those who perpetrate +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_79">[79]</span>evil through enchantments, especially venerate these +malefic beings, and the power that presides over them.</p> + +<p>42. For they are full of every kind of imagination, +and are sufficiently qualified to deceive, through effects +of a prodigious nature; and through these, unhappy men +procure philtres, and amatory allurements. For all +intemperance, and hope of possessing wealth and renown, +and especially deception, exist through these, since +falsehood is allied to these malevolent beings; <i>for they +wish to be considered as Gods, and the power which presides +over them is ambitious to appear to be the greatest God</i>. +These are they that rejoice in libations, and the savour +of sacrifices, through which their pneumatic vehicle is +fattened; for this vehicle lives through vapours and +exhalations, and the life of it is various through various +exhalations. It is likewise corroborated by the savour of +blood and flesh.</p> + +<p>43. On this account, a wise and temperate man will +be religiously afraid to use sacrifices of this kind, through +which he will attract to himself such-like dæmons; but +he will endeavour in all possible ways to purify his soul. +For these malefic beings do not attack a pure soul, +because it is dissimilar to them; but if it is necessary to +cities to render them propitious, this is nothing to us. +For by these riches, and things external and corporeal, +are thought to be good, and their contraries evil; but +the smallest attention is paid by them to the good of the +soul. We however, to the utmost of our ability, endeavour +not to be in want of those things which they +impart; but all our endeavour is to become similar to +God, and to the [divine] powers with which he is surrounded +both from what pertains to the soul, and from +externals; <i>and this is effected through an entire liberation +from the dominion of the passions, an evolved perception of +truly existing beings, and a vital tendency towards them</i>. +On the other hand, we strive to become dissimilar to +depraved men and evil dæmons, and, in short, to every +being that rejoices in a mortal and material nature. So +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_80">[80]</span>that, conformably to what is said by Theophrastus, we +also shall sacrifice from those things which theologists +permit us to use for this purpose; as well knowing, that +by how much the more we neglect to exempt ourselves +from the passions of the soul, by so much the more we +connect ourselves with a depraved power, and render it +necessary that he should become propitious to us. For, +as theologists say, it is necessary that those who are +bound⁠<a id="FNanchor_58" href="#Footnote_58" class="fnanchor">[58]</a> to things external, and have not yet vanquished +their passions, should avert the anger of this [malefic] +power; since, if they do not, there will be no end to their +labours.</p> + +<p>44. Thus far what pertains to sacrifices has been elucidated. +As we said, however, at first, as it is not entirely +necessary, if animals are to be sacrificed, that they are +also to be eaten, we shall now show that it is necessary +we should not eat them, though it may be sometimes +necessary that they should be sacrificed. For all theologists +agree in this, that in sacrifices, which are made for +the purpose of averting some evil, the immolated animals +are not to be tasted, but are to be used as expiations. +For, say they, no one should go into the city, nor into his +own house, till he has first purified his garments, and his +body, in rivers, or some fountain. So that they order +those whom they permit to sacrifice, to abstain from the +victims, and to purify themselves before they sacrifice by +fasting, and especially by abstaining from animals. They +add, <i>that purity is the guardian of piety; and is, as it were, +a symbol or divine seal, which secures its possessor from the +attacks and allurements of evil dæmons</i>. For such a one, +being contrarily disposed to, and more divine in his +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_81">[81]</span>operations than those by whom he is attacked, because +he is more pure both in his body and in the passions of +his soul, remains uninjured, in consequence of being surrounded +with purity as with a bulwark.</p> + +<p>45. Hence a defence of this kind has appeared to be +necessary even to enchanters; though it is not efficacious +with them on all occasions. For they invoke evil +dæmons for lascivious purposes. So that purity does not +belong to enchanters, but to divine men, and such as are +divinely wise; since it every where becomes a guard to +those that use it, and conciliates them with a divine +nature. I wish, therefore, that enchanters would make +use of purity continually, for then they would not employ +themselves in incantations, because, through this, they +would be deprived of the enjoyment of those things, for +the sake of which they act impiously. Whence becoming +full of passions, and abstaining for a short time from +impure food, they are notwithstanding replete with impurity, +and suffer the punishment of their illegal conduct +towards the whole of things, partly from those whom +they irritate, and partly from Justice, who perceives all +mortal deeds and conceptions. Both inward, therefore, +and external purity pertain to a divine man, who earnestly +endeavours to be liberated from the passions of the soul, +and who abstains from such food as excites the passions, +and is fed with divine wisdom; and by right conceptions +of, is assimilated to divinity himself. For such a man, +being consecrated by an intellectual sacrifice, approaches +to God in a white garment, and with a truly pure <i>impassivity</i> +of soul, and levity of body, and is not burdened +with foreign and external juices, and the passions of the +soul.</p> + +<p>46. For, indeed, it must not be admitted as necessary +in temples, which are consecrated by men to the Gods, +that those who enter into them should have their feet +pure, and their shoes free from every stain, but that in +the temple of the father [of all], which is this world, it is +not proper to preserve our ultimate and cutaneous vestment +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_82">[82]</span>pure, and to dwell in this temple with an undefiled +garment. For if the danger consisted only in the defilement +of the body, it might, perhaps, be lawful to neglect +it. But now, since every sensible body is attended with +an efflux of material dæmons, hence, together with the +impurity produced from flesh and blood, the power which +is friendly to, and familiar with, this impurity, is at the +same time present through similitude and alliance.</p> + +<p>47. Hence theologists have rightly paid attention to +abstinence. And these things were indicated to us by a +certain Egyptian⁠<a id="FNanchor_59" href="#Footnote_59" class="fnanchor">[59]</a>, who also assigned a most natural +cause of them, which was verified by experience. For, +since a depraved and irrational soul, when it leaves the +body, is still compelled to adhere to it, since the souls +also of those men who die by violence, are detained +about the body; this circumstance should prevent a man +from forcibly expelling his soul from the body. The +violent slaughter, therefore, of animals, compels souls +to be delighted with the bodies which they have left, but +the soul is by no means prevented from being there, +where it is attracted by a kindred nature; whence many +souls are seen to lament, and some remain about the +bodies that are unburied; which souls are improperly +used by enchanters, as subservient to their designs, being +compelled by them to occupy the body, or a part of the +body, which they have left. Since, therefore, these things +were well known to theologists, and they also perceived +the nature of a depraved soul, and its alliance to the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_83">[83]</span>bodies from which it was divulsed, and the pleasure +which it received from a union with them, they very properly +avoided animal food, in order that they might not +be disturbed by alien souls, violently separated from the +body and impure, and which are attracted to things of a +kindred nature, and likewise that they might not be +impeded by the presence of evil dæmons, in approaching +alone [or without being burdened with things of a foreign +nature] to the highest God⁠<a id="FNanchor_60" href="#Footnote_60" class="fnanchor">[60]</a>.</p> + +<p>48. For that the nature of a kindred body is attractive +of soul, experience abundantly taught these theologists. +Hence those who wish to receive into themselves the +souls of prophetic animals, swallow the most principal +parts of them, such as the hearts of crows, or of moles, or +of hawks. For thus they have soul present with, and +predicting to them like a God, and entering into them +together with the intromission of the body.</p> + +<p>49. Very properly, therefore, will the philosopher, and +who is also the priest of the God that is above all things, +abstain from all animal food, in consequence of earnestly +endeavouring to approach through himself alone to the +alone⁠<a id="FNanchor_61" href="#Footnote_61" class="fnanchor">[61]</a> God, without being disturbed by any attendants. +Such a one likewise is cautious, as being well acquainted +with the necessities of nature. For he who is truly a +philosopher, is skilled in, and an observer of many things, +understands the works of nature, is sagacious, temperate +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_84">[84]</span>and modest, and is in every respect the saviour of himself. +And as he who is the priest of a certain particular +God, is skilled in placing the statues of that divinity, and +in his orgies, mysteries, and the like, thus also he who is +the priest of the highest God, is skilled in the manner in +which his statue ought to be fashioned, and in purifications, +and other things through which he is conjoined +to this divinity.</p> + +<p>50. But if in the sacred rites which are here, those +that are priests and diviners order both themselves and +others to abstain from sepulchres, from impious men, +from menstrual purgations, and from venereal congress, +and likewise from base and mournful spectacles, and +from those auditions which excite the passions, (because +frequently, through those that are present being impure, +something appears which disturbs the diviner; on which +account it is said, that to sacrifice inopportunely, is attended +with greater detriment than gain);—if this, therefore, +is the case, will he, who is the priest of the father of +all things, suffer himself to become the sepulchre of dead +bodies? And will such a one, being full of defilement, +endeavour to associate with the transcendent God? It is +sufficient, indeed, that in fruits we assume parts of death, +for the support of our present life. This, however, is not +yet the place for such a discussion. We must, therefore, +still farther investigate what pertains to sacrifices.</p> + +<p>51. For some one may say that we shall subvert a +great part of divination, viz. that which is effected through +an inspection of the viscera, if we abstain from destroying +animals. He, therefore, who makes this objection, should +also destroy men: for it is said that future events are +more apparent in the viscera of men than in those of +brutes; and many of the Barbarians exercise the art of +divination through the entrails of men. As, however, it +would be an indication of great injustice, and inexhaustible +avidity, to destroy those of our own species for +the sake of divination, thus also it is unjust for the sake +of this to slay an irrational animal. But it does not +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_85">[85]</span>belong to the present discussion to investigate whether +Gods, or dæmons, or soul liberated from the animal [with +which it had been connected], exhibit signs of future +events to those who explore such signs, through the +indications which the viscera afford.</p> + +<p>52. Nevertheless, we permit those whose life is rolled +about externals, having once acted impiously towards +themselves, to be borne along to that to which they tend; +but we rightly say, that the man whom we designate as a +philosopher, and who is separated from externals, will not +be disturbed by dæmons, nor be in want of diviners, nor +of the viscera of animals. For he earnestly endeavours +to be separated from those things for the sake of which +divinations are effected. For he does not betake himself +to nuptials, in order that he may molest the diviner about +wedlock, or merchandise, or inquiries about a servant, +or an increase of property, or any other object of vulgar +pursuit. For the subjects of his investigation are not +clearly indicated by any diviner or viscera of animals. +But he, as we have said, approaching through himself to +the [supreme] God, who is established in the true inward +parts of himself, receives from thence the precepts of +eternal life, tending thither by a conflux of the whole of +himself, and instead of a diviner praying that he may +become a confabulator of the mighty Jupiter.</p> + +<p>53. For if such a one is impelled by some necessary +circumstance, there are good dæmons, who, to the man +living after this manner, and who is a domestic of +divinity, will indicate and prevent, through dreams and +symbols, and omens, what may come to pass, and what is +necessarily to be avoided. For it is only requisite to +depart from evil, and to know what is most honourable +in the whole of things, and every thing which in the +universe is good, friendly, and familiar. But vice, and an +ignorance of divine concerns, are dire, through which a +man is led to despise and defame things of which he has +no knowledge; since nature does not proclaim these particulars +with a voice which can be heard by the ears, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_86">[86]</span>but being herself intellectual⁠<a id="FNanchor_62" href="#Footnote_62" class="fnanchor">[62]</a>, she initiates through intellect +those who venerate her. And even though some one +should admit the art of divination for the sake of predicting +what is future, yet it does not from thence necessarily +follow that the flesh of animals is to be eaten; as +neither does it follow, that because it is proper to sacrifice +to Gods or dæmons, food from animals is therefore to +be introduced. For, not only the history which is related +by Theophrastus, but also many other narrations inform +us, that in ancient times men were sacrificed, yet it must +not be inferred that on this account men are to be eaten.</p> + +<p>54. And that we do not carelessly assert these things, +but that what we have said is abundantly confirmed by +history, the following narrations sufficiently testify. For +in Rhodes, on the sixth day of June, a man was sacrificed +to Saturn; which custom having prevailed for a +long time, was afterwards changed [into a more human +mode of sacrificing]. For one of those men who, by the +public decision, had been sentenced to death, was kept in +prison till the Saturnalia commenced; but as soon as +this festival began, they brought the man out of the gates +of the city, opposite to the temple of Aristobulus, and +giving him wine to drink, they cut his throat. But in the +island which is now called Salamis, but was formerly +denominated Coronis, in the month according to the +Cyprians Aphrodisius, a man was sacrificed to Agraule, +the daughter of Cecrops, and the nymph Agraulis. And +this custom continued till the time of Diomed. Afterwards +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_87">[87]</span>it was changed, so that a man was sacrificed to +Diomed. But the temples of Minerva, of Agraule, and +Diomed, were contained in one and the same enclosure. +The man also who was about to be slain, was first led by +young men thrice round the altar, afterwards the priest +pierced him with a lance in the stomach, and thus being +thrown on the pyre, he was entirely consumed.</p> + +<p>55. This sacred institute was, however, abolished by +Diphilus, the king of Cyprus, who flourished about the +time of Seleucus, the theologist. But Dæmon substituted +an ox for a man; thus causing the latter sacrifice +to be of equal worth with the former. Amosis also +abolished the law of sacrificing men in the Egyptian city +Heliopolis; the truth of which is testified by Manetho in +his treatise on Antiquity and Piety. But the sacrifice +was made to Juno, and an investigation took place, as if +they were endeavouring to find pure calves, and such as +were marked by the impression of a seal. Three men +also were sacrificed on the day appointed for this purpose, +in the place of whom Amosis ordered them to +substitute three waxen images. In Chios likewise, they +sacrificed a man to Omadius Bacchus⁠<a id="FNanchor_63" href="#Footnote_63" class="fnanchor">[63]</a>, the man being for +this purpose torn in pieces; and the same custom, as +Euelpis Carystius says, was adopted in Tenedos. To +which may be added, that the Lacedæmonians, as Apollodorus +says, sacrificed a man to Mars.</p> + +<p>56. Moreover the Phœnicians, in great calamities, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_88">[88]</span>either of war, or excessive dryness, or pestilence, sacrificed +some one of their dearest friends, who was selected +by votes for this purpose. The Phœnician history also +is replete with instances of men being sacrificed, which +history was written by Sanchoniatho in the Phœnician +tongue, and was interpreted into Greek in eight books, +by Philo Byblius. But Ister, in his collection of the +Cretan sacrifices, says that the Curetes formerly sacrificed +children to Saturn. And Pallas, who is the best of +those that have collected what pertains to the mysteries +of Mithras, says, that under the Emperor Adrian the +sacrificing of men was nearly totally abolished. For, +prior to his time, in Laodicea, which is in Syria, they +anciently sacrificed a virgin to Minerva, but now they +sacrifice a stag. The Carthaginians too, who dwell in +Libya, formerly sacrificed men; but this custom was +abolished by Iphicrates. And the Dumatii, a people of +Arabia, annually sacrificed a boy, whom they buried +under the altar, which was used by them as a statue. +But Phylarchus narrates, that it was the general custom of +all the Greeks, before they went to war, to immolate men. +I omit to mention the Thracians and Scythians, and also +the Athenians, who slew the daughter of Erechtheus and +Praxithea. And even at present, who is ignorant that +in the great city of Rome, in the festival of Jupiter Latialis, +they cut the throat of a man? Human flesh, however, +is not on this account to be eaten; though, through +a certain necessity, a man should be sacrificed. For, +when a famine takes place during a siege, some of the +besieged feed on each other, yet at the same time those +who do so are deemed execrable, and the deed is thought +to be impious.</p> + +<p>57. After the first war, likewise, waged by the Romans +against the Carthaginians, in order to obtain Sicily, when +the mercenary soldiers of the Phœnicians revolted, and, +together with them, those of Africa deserted, Amilcar, +who was surnamed Barkas, in attacking the Romans, was +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_89">[89]</span>reduced to such a scarcity of food, that at first his men +ate those that fell in battle; but afterwards, these failing, +they ate their captives; in the third place, their servants; +and in the last place, they attacked each other, and +devoured their fellow-soldiers, who were led to be slaughtered +for this purpose by lot. But Amilcar, taking those +men that were in his power, caused his elephants to +trample on such of the soldiers as had acted in this +manner, conceiving that it was not holy to suffer them to +be any longer mingled with other men; and neither did +he admit that men should be eaten because certain persons +had dared to do this; nor his son Hannibal, who, +when he was leading his army into Italy, was advised by +a certain person to accustom his troops to feed on human +flesh, in order that they might never be in want of food. +It does not follow, therefore, that because famine and +war have been the causes of eating other animals, it is +also requisite to feed on them for the sake of pleasure; as +neither must we admit, that on this account men are to be +eaten. Nor does it follow, that because animals are +sacrificed to certain powers, it is also requisite to eat +them. For neither do those who sacrifice men, on this +account, feed on human flesh. Through what has been +said, therefore, it is demonstrated, that it does not +entirely follow that animals are to be eaten because they +are sacrificed.</p> + +<p>58. But that those who had learnt what the nature is +of the powers in the universe, offered sacrifices through +blood, not to Gods, but to dæmons, is confirmed by +theologists themselves. For they also assert, that of +dæmons, some are malefic, but others beneficent, who will +not molest us, if we offer to them the first-fruits of those +things alone which we eat, and by which we nourish +either the soul or the body. After, therefore, we have +added a few observations more, in order to show that the +unperverted conceptions of the multitude accord with +a right opinion respecting the Gods, we shall conclude +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_90">[90]</span>this book. Those poets, therefore, who are wise, though +but in a small degree, say,</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">What man so credulous and void of mind,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">What man so ignorant, as to think the Gods</div> + <div class="verse indent0">In fiery bile and fleshless bones rejoice,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">For hungry dogs a nutriment not fit;</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Or that such offerers they will e’er reward?</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p>But another poet says,</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">My offerings to the Gods from cakes alone</div> + <div class="verse indent0">And frankincense shall be; for not to friends</div> + <div class="verse indent0">But deities my sacrifice I make.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p>59. Apollo also, when he orders men to sacrifice +according to paternal institutes, appears to refer every +thing to ancient custom. But the ancient custom of +sacrificing was, as we have before shown, with cakes and +fruits. Hence also, sacrifices were called θυσιαι, <i>thusiai</i>, +and θυηλαι, <i>thuelai</i>, and θυμελαι, <i>thumelai</i>, and αυτο το θυειν, +<i>auto to thuein</i>, i.e. <i>the act of sacrificing</i>, signified the same +thing as του θυμιᾳν, <i>tou thumian</i>, i.e. <i>to offer incense</i>, and +which is now called by us, επιθυειν, <i>epithuein</i>, i.e. <i>to sacrifice +something more</i>. For what we now call θυειν, <i>thuein</i>, <i>i.e. to +sacrifice</i>, the ancients denominated ερδειν, <i>erdein</i>, i.e. <i>to perform</i> +or <i>make</i>.</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">They perfect hecatombs of bulls, or goats,</div> + <div class="verse indent0"><i>Made</i> to Apollo.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p>60. But those who introduced costliness into sacrifices, +were ignorant that, in conjunction with this, they +also introduced a swarm of evils, viz. superstition, luxury, +an opinion that a divine nature may be corrupted by +gifts, and that a compensation may be made by sacrifices +for injustice. Or whence do some make an oblation +of three animals with gilded horns, but others of hecatombs? +And whence did Olympias, the mother of Alexander +[the Great,] sacrifice a thousand of each species of +animals, unless sumptuousness had at length proceeded to +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_91">[91]</span>superstition? But when the young man was informed +that the Gods rejoiced in magnificent sacrifices, and, +as they say, in solemn banquets of oxen and other animals, +how, though he was willing to act wisely, was it +possible that he could? How also, when he conceived +that these sacrifices were acceptable to the Gods, was it +possible he should not fancy that he was permitted to +act unjustly, when he might exonerate himself from +erroneous conduct through sacrifices? But if he had +been persuaded that the Gods have no need of these +things, and that they look to the manners of those who +approach to them, <i>and conceive that a right opinion of them, +and of things themselves, is the greatest sacrifice</i>, how is it +possible that he should not have been temperate, holy, +and just?</p> + +<p>61. To the Gods, indeed, the most excellent offering +is a pure intellect and an impassive soul, and also a +moderate oblation of our own property and of other +things, and this not negligently, but with the greatest +alacrity. For the honours which we pay to the Gods +should be accompanied by the same promptitude as that +with which we give the first seat to worthy men, and +with which we rise to, and salute them, and not by +the promptitude with which we pay a tribute. For man +must not use such language as the following to God:</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">If, O Philinus, you recal to mind,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">And love me for, the benefits which I</div> + <div class="verse indent0">On you conferr’d, ’tis well, since for the sake</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Of these alone my bounty was bestow’d.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p>For divinity is not satisfied with such assertions as +these. And hence Plato says [in his Laws], that it +pertains to a good man to sacrifice, and to be always +conversant with the Gods by prayers, votive offerings, +sacrifices, and every kind of religious worship; but that +to the bad man, much labour about the Gods is inefficacious +and vain. For the good man knows what ought to +be sacrificed, and from what it is requisite to abstain; +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_92">[92]</span>what things are to be offered to divinity, and of what the +first-fruits are to be sacrificed; but the bad man exhibiting +honours to the Gods from his own disposition and +his own pursuits, acts in so doing more impiously than +piously. Hence Plato thought, that a philosopher ought +not to be conversant with men of depraved habits; for +this is neither pleasing to the Gods, nor useful to men; +but the philosopher should endeavour to change such +men to a better condition, and if he cannot effect this, he +should be careful that he does not himself become +changed into their depravity. He adds, that having +entered into the right path, he should proceed in it, +neither fearing danger from the multitude, nor any other +blasphemy which may happen to take place. For it +would be a thing of a dire nature, that the Syrians indeed +will not taste fish, nor the Hebrews swine, nor most of the +Phœnicians and Egyptians cows; and though many kings +have endeavoured to change these customs, yet those +that adopt them would rather suffer death, than a transgression +of the law [which forbids them to eat these +animals]; and yet that we should choose to transgress the +laws of nature and divine precepts through the fear of +men, or of a certain denunciation of evil from them. For +the divine choir of Gods, and divine men, may justly +be greatly indignant with us, if it perceives us directing +our attention to the opinions of depraved men, and idly +looking to the terror with which they are attended, +though we daily meditate how we may become [philosophically] +dead to other things in the present life.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"> + +<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_40" href="#FNanchor_40" class="label">[40]</a> <i>i.e.</i> The Egyptians.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_41" href="#FNanchor_41" class="label">[41]</a> In the original αρασαμενους, which is derived from the verb αραομαι, +<i>imprecor</i>, <i>maledico</i>; and from hence, according to Porphyry, came the +word αρωματα.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_42" href="#FNanchor_42" class="label">[42]</a> <i>i.e.</i> May be rather called <i>malevolent</i> than <i>unhappy</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_43" href="#FNanchor_43" class="label">[43]</a> Fabricius is of opinion that these <i>Thoes</i> are the same with the +Acrothoitæ, mentioned by Simplicius in his Comment. in Epictet. from +Theophrastus.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_44" href="#FNanchor_44" class="label">[44]</a> In the original, η γαρ θυσια, οσια τις εστιν κατα τουνομα.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_45" href="#FNanchor_45" class="label">[45]</a> In the original, και τα μεν παρατιθεναι, which Felicianus very erroneously +renders, “alius siquidem mihi ad vescendem sumo;” but Valentinus +rightly, “et horum aliqua coram illis apponere.”</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_46" href="#FNanchor_46" class="label">[46]</a> A round, broad, and thin cake, which was offered in sacrifice +to the Gods.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_47" href="#FNanchor_47" class="label">[47]</a> Tynnichus, the Chalcidensian, is mentioned by Plato in his Io.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_48" href="#FNanchor_48" class="label">[48]</a> Vid. Hesiod, Fragm. v. 169.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_49" href="#FNanchor_49" class="label">[49]</a> A city of Crete.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_50" href="#FNanchor_50" class="label">[50]</a> <i>i.e.</i> Under the pretext of being patronized by divinity in so doing.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_51" href="#FNanchor_51" class="label">[51]</a> Porphyry, in what he here says of the Jews, alludes to that sect +of them called Essæans; concerning whom, see the 4th book of +this work.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_52" href="#FNanchor_52" class="label">[52]</a> In the original, ους νυν ορωντας τιμαν τουτους, κ.τ.λ., instead of which, +Reisk proposes to read, ους νυν ουχ ορωντας τιμαν δει [vel χρη] τουτοις, κ.τ.λ. +But the insertion of ουχ is most absurd: for the <i>celestial</i> are called +the <i>visible</i> Gods. Thus Plato, in the Timæus, in the speech of the +Demiurgus to the junior or mundane Gods, who consist of the <i>celestial</i> +and <i>sublunary</i> deities, calls the <i>celestial Gods</i> those that <i>visibly</i> revolve, +and the <i>sublunary</i>, those that become apparent when they please: +Επει ουν παντες οσοι τε περιπολουσι φανερως, και οσοι φαινονται καθ’ οσον αν εθελωσι +θεοι, γενεσιν εσχον, κ.τ.λ. Conformably, therefore, to the above translation, +I read, ους νυν ορωντας τιμαν δει τουτοις, κ.τ.λ. To which may be added, +that our author, in paragraph 37, expressly calls the stars <i>visible Gods</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_53" href="#FNanchor_53" class="label">[53]</a> In the original, Θύσομεν τοινυν και ημεις· αλλα θυσομεν, ως προσηκει, +διαφορους τας θυσιας, ως αν διαφοροις δυναμεσι προσαγοντες. This Valentinus +erroneously translates as follows: “Sacrificabimus igitur etiam et nos, +sed prout decet, victimas scilicet <i>eximias</i> potestatibus <i>eximiis</i> adducentes.” +For διαφορους and διαφοροις, in this passage, evidently mean +<i>different</i>, and not <i>excellent</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_54" href="#FNanchor_54" class="label">[54]</a> Concerning the appellations which the Pythagoreans gave to +numbers, see my Theoretic Arithmetic, in which also the occult +meaning of these appellations is unfolded.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_55" href="#FNanchor_55" class="label">[55]</a> “Plotinus ni fallor, aut Plato, sed ille potius,” says Reisk; but +every one who is at all conversant with Platonic writers, will immediately +see that by <i>the theologist</i>, Porphyry means <i>Orpheus</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_56" href="#FNanchor_56" class="label">[56]</a> Though Porphyry excelled in all philosophical knowledge, whence +also he was called κατ’ εξοχην, <i>the philosopher</i>, yet he was inferior to +his auditor Iamblichus, in theological information. On this account, +Iamblichus was called by all the Platonists posterior to him, <i>the divine</i>, +and <i>the great</i> priest. I shall present the reader, therefore, with an +extract from my translation of his treatise on the Mysteries, which +appears to me to be an admirable supplement to what Porphyry has +said in this book, about sacrificing animals, and a satisfactory answer +to the question whether they are to be sacrificed or not.</p> + +<p>In Chap. 14, therefore, of Sect. 5, he observes as follows: “We +shall begin the elucidation of this subject in the best possible manner, +if we demonstrate that the sacred law of sacrifices is connected with +the order of the Gods. In the first place, therefore, we say, that of +the Gods some are material, but others immaterial. And the material, +indeed, are those that comprehend matter in themselves, and adorn it; +but the immaterial are those that are perfectly exempt from, and +transcend matter: but, according to the sacrific art, it is requisite to +begin sacred operations from the material Gods; for the ascent to the +immaterial Gods will not otherwise be effected. The material Gods, +therefore, have a certain communication with matter, so far as they +preside over it. Hence they have dominion over things which happen +about matter, such as the division, percussion, repercussion, mutation, +generation, and corruption of all material bodies. He, therefore, who +wishes to worship these theurgically, in a manner adapted to them, +and to the dominion which they are allotted, should, as they are +material, employ a material mode of worship. For thus we shall be +wholly led to a familiarity with them, and worship them in an allied +and appropriate manner. <i>Dead bodies, therefore, and things deprived +of life, the slaying of animals, and the consumption of victims, and, in +short, the mutation of the matter which is offered, pertain to these +Gods, not by themselves, but on account of the matter over which they +preside.</i> For though they are, in the most eminent degree, separate +from it, yet, at the same time, they are present with it; and, though +they comprehend matter in an immaterial power, yet they are co-existent +with it. Things also that are governed, are not foreign from +their governors; and things which are subservient as instruments, are +not unadapted to those that use them. Hence it is foreign to the +immaterial Gods, to offer matter to them through sacrifices, but this is +most adapted to all the material Gods.”</p> + +<p>In the following chapter, Iamblichus observes, “that as there is a +time when we become wholly soul, are out of the body, and sublimely +revolve on high, in conjunction with all the immaterial Gods; so, likewise, +there is a two-fold mode of worship, one of which is simple, incorporeal, +and pure from all generation; and this mode pertains to undefiled +souls; but the other is replete with every thing of a material nature, and +is adapted to souls which are neither pure, nor liberated from all generation.” +He adds, “we must admit, therefore, that there are two-fold +species of sacrifices; one kind, indeed, pertaining to men who are not +entirely purified, which, as Heraclitus says, rarely happens to one man, +or to a certain easily-to-be-numbered few of mankind; but the other +kind being material, and consisting in mutation, is adapted to souls that +are still detained by the body. Hence, to cities and people not yet +liberated from sublunary fate, and the impending communion of bodies, +if such a mode of sacrifice as this latter is not permitted, they will wander +both from immaterial and material good. For they will not be able +to receive the former, and to the latter they will not offer what is +appropriate.”</p> + +<p>He farther informs us, in Chap. 22, that though the summit of the +sacrific art recurs to the most principal one of the whole multitude of +Gods [<i>i.e.</i> to the ineffable cause of all,] and at one and the same time +worships the many essences and principles that are [rooted and concentred] +in it; yet this happens at the latest period, and to a very few, and +that we must be satisfied, if it takes place, when the sun of life is setting. +“But,” says he, “our present discussion does not ordain laws for a man +of this kind; for he is superior to all law; but it promulgates a law such +as that of which we are now speaking, to those who are in want of a certain +divine legislation.” In the above passage, by “<i>a man of this kind</i>,” +Iamblichus most probably alludes to Plotinus, as both his works, and +the life of him, written by Porphyry, show that he was a man capable +of recurring to, and becoming united with the highest God, and thus at +the same time worshipping all the divine powers that are rooted in him.</p> + +<p>To what Iamblichus has thus excellently observed, may be added +what the philosopher Sallust says in his golden treatise On the Gods and +the World, viz. “that since life primarily subsists in the Gods, and there +is also a certain human life, but the latter desires to be united to +the former, a medium is required; for natures much distant from each +other cannot be conjoined without a medium; and it is necessary +that the medium should be similar to the connected natures. Life, +therefore, must necessarily be the medium of life. Hence, men of the +present day that are happy, and all the ancients, have sacrificed animals; +and this, indeed, not rashly, but in a way accommodated to every God, +with many other ceremonies respecting the cultivation of divinity.” Let +the <i>truly intellectual and pious man</i>, however, never forget that prayer, +as Proclus divinely observes, possesses <i>of itself</i> a supernatural perfection +and power.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_57" href="#FNanchor_57" class="label">[57]</a> For a more <i>theological</i> account of dæmons, I refer the reader to +my translation of the before-mentioned admirable treatise of Iamblichus +on the Mysteries.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_58" href="#FNanchor_58" class="label">[58]</a> In the original, ως γαρ φασιν οι θεολογοι τοις δεομενοις υπο των εκτος και +μηδεπω κρατουσιν των παθων, κ.τ.λ. But for δεομενοις, it is necessary to +read δεδεμενοις; and it is evident that both the Latin translators of this +work found δεδεμενοις in their manuscripts. For Felicianus has “qui +<i>devincti</i> externis rebus sunt,” and Valentinus, “qui rebus externis <i>illigantur</i>.” +Reisk, however, has taken no notice of this error in the +printed text.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_59" href="#FNanchor_59" class="label">[59]</a> Reisk, with his usual stupidity, where merely verbal emendations +are not concerned, says that this Egyptian is Plotinus, whose country +was Lycopolis, in Egypt. But what instance can be adduced, in all +antiquity, of the disciple of a philosopher speaking of his preceptor in +this indefinite manner? Is it not much more probable that this Egyptian +is the priest mentioned by Porphyry in his Life of Plotinus, who, at the +request of a certain friend of Plotinus, (which friend was, perhaps, Porphyry +himself,) exhibited to Plotinus, in the temple of Isis, at Rome, the +familiar dæmon, or, in modern language, the guardian angel of that +philosopher?</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_60" href="#FNanchor_60" class="label">[60]</a> Conformably to this, the Pythagorean Demophilus beautifully +observes, Γυμνος αποσταλεις σοφος, γυμνιτευων καλεσει τον πεμψαντα· μονου γαρ του +μη τοις αλλοτριοις πεφορτισμενου επηκοος ο θεος. <i>i.e.</i> “The wise man being sent +hither naked, should naked invoke him by whom he was sent. For he +alone is heard by divinity, who is not burdened with things of a foreign +nature.”</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_61" href="#FNanchor_61" class="label">[61]</a> This expression of “approaching <i>alone</i> to the <i>alone</i> God,” Porphyry +derived from his master, the great Plotinus, who divinely concludes +his Enneads as follows:—και ουτω θεων και ανθρωπων θειων και ευδαιμονων +βιος, απαλλαγη των αλλων των τῃδε, ανηδονος των τῃδε, φυγη μονου προς μονον—<i>i.e.</i> +“This, therefore, is the life of the Gods, and of divine and happy +men, a liberation from all terrene concerns, a life unaccompanied by +human pleasures, and <i>a flight of the alone to the alone</i>.”</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_62" href="#FNanchor_62" class="label">[62]</a> Nature, considered as the last of the causes which fabricate this +corporeal and sensible world, “bounds (says Proclus in Tim.) the progressions +of incorporeal essences, and is full of forms and powers, +through which she governs mundane affairs. And she is a Goddess, +indeed, considered as deified; but not according to the primary signification +of the word. By her summit likewise she comprehends the +heavens, but through these rules over the fluctuating empire of generation; +and she every where weaves together partial natures in admirable +conjunction with wholes.” See more on this subject in my translation +of that work.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_63" href="#FNanchor_63" class="label">[63]</a> This epithet is used in two of the Orphic hymns, viz. in Hymn LI. +7., and Hymn XXIX. 5. But the following appears to be the reason +why Bacchus is so called. Bacchus is the intellect, and Ippa the soul of +the world, according to the Orphic Theology; and the former is said by +Orpheus to be carried on the head of the latter. For so we are informed +by Proclus, in Tim. p. 124. Jacob de Rhoer, therefore, the editor of +this work, was grossly mistaken in saying, “Non dubito, quin ωμαδιος +Διονυσος, idem sit qui ωμηστης, crudivorus.” Scaliger, in his version of the +Hymns, very improperly translates ωμαδιος <i>bajulus</i>, <i>a porter</i>. For +Bacchus is <i>carried on</i>, but does not <i>carry</i> Ippa.</p></div> + +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_93">[93]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="ON_ABSTINENCE_FROM_ANIMAL_FOOD_3">ON ABSTINENCE FROM ANIMAL FOOD.<br> +BOOK THE THIRD.</h2> + +</div> + +<p>1. In the two preceding books, O Firmus Castricius, we +have demonstrated, that animal food does not contribute +either to temperance and frugality, or to the piety which +especially gives completion to the theoretic life, but +is rather hostile to it. Since, however, the most beautiful +part of justice consists in piety to the Gods, and this +is principally acquired through abstinence, there is no +occasion to fear that we shall violate justice towards men, +while we preserve piety towards the Gods. Socrates +therefore says, in opposition to those who contend that +pleasure is the supreme good, that though all swine and +goats should accord in this opinion, yet he should never +be persuaded that our felicity was placed in the enjoyment +of corporeal delight, as long as intellect has dominion +over all things. And we also say, that though +all wolves and vultures should praise the eating of flesh, +we should not admit that they spoke justly, as long as man +is by nature innoxious, and ought to abstain from procuring +pleasure for himself by injuring others. We shall pass +on, therefore, to the discussion of justice; and since our +opponents say that this ought only to be extended to +those of a similar species, and on this account deny that +irrational animals can be injured by men, let us exhibit +the true, and at the same time Pythagoric opinion, +and demonstrate that every soul which participates of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_94">[94]</span>sense and memory is rational. For this being demonstrated, +we may extend, as our opponents will also admit, +justice to every animal. But we shall epitomize what +has been said by the ancients on this subject.</p> + +<p>2. Since, however, with respect to reason, one kind, +according to the doctrine of the Stoics, is internal, but +the other external⁠<a id="FNanchor_64" href="#Footnote_64" class="fnanchor">[64]</a>; and again, one kind being right, but +the other erroneous, it is requisite to explain of which +of these two, animals, according to them, are deprived. +Are they therefore deprived of right reason alone? or are +they entirely destitute both of internal and externally +proceeding reason? They appear, indeed, to ascribe to +brutes an entire privation of reason, and not a privation +of right reason alone. For if they merely denied that +brutes possess right reason, animals would not be irrational, +but rational beings, in the same manner as nearly +all men are according to them. For, according to their +opinion, one or two wise men may be found in whom +alone right reason prevails, but all the rest of mankind are +depraved; though some of these make a certain proficiency, +but others are profoundly depraved, and yet, at +the same time, all of them are similarly rational. Through +the influence, therefore, of self-love, they say, that all +other animals are irrational; wishing to indicate by irrationality, +an entire privation of reason. If, however, it be +requisite to speak the truth, not only reason may plainly +be perceived in all animals, but in many of them it is so +great as to approximate to perfection.</p> + +<p>3. Since, therefore, reason is two-fold, one kind consisting +in external speech, but the other in the disposition +of the soul, we shall begin from that which is external, +and which is arranged according to the voice. But if +external reason is voice, which through the tongue is significant +of the internal passions of the soul (for this is the +most common definition of it, and is not adopted by one +sect [of philosophers] only, and if it is alone indicative of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_95">[95]</span>the conception of [internal] reason)—if this be the case, +in what pertaining to this are such animals as have a +voice deficient? Do they not discursively perceive the +manner in which they are inwardly affected, before it +is vocally enunciated by them? By a discursive perception, +however, I mean the perception produced by the +silent discourse which takes place in the soul. Since, +therefore, that which is vocally expressed by the tongue +is reason, in whatever manner it may be expressed, +whether in a barbarous or a Grecian, a canine or a bovine +mode, other animals also participate of it that are vocal; +men, indeed, speaking conformably to the human laws +[of speech], but other animals conformably to the laws +which they received from the Gods and nature. But +if we do not understand what they say, what is this +to the purpose? For the Greeks do not understand what +is said by the Indians, nor those who are educated in Attica +the language of the Scythians, or Thracians, or Syrians; +but the sound of the one falls on the ears of the other +like the clangor of cranes, though by others their +vocal sounds can be written and articulated, in the same +manner as ours can by us. Nevertheless, the vocal +sounds of the Syrians, for instance, or the Persians, are +to us inarticulate, and cannot be expressed by writing, +just as the speech of animals is unintelligible to all men. +For as we, when we hear the Scythians speak, apprehend, +by the auditory sense, a noise only and a sound, but are +ignorant of the meaning of what they say, because their +language appears to us to be nothing but a clangor, to +have no articulation, and to employ only one sound +either longer or shorter, the variety of which is not at all +significant to us, but to them the vocal sounds are intelligible, +and have a great difference, in the same manner +as our language has to us; the like also takes place +in the vocal sounds of other animals. For the several +species of these understand the language which is adapted +to them, but we only hear a sound, of the signification of +which we are ignorant, because no one who has learnt +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_96">[96]</span>our language, is able to teach us through ours the meaning +of what is said by brutes. If, however, it is requisite +to believe in the ancients, and also in those who have +lived in our times, and the times of our fathers, there are +some among these who are said to have heard and to +have understood the speech of animals. Thus, for instance, +this is narrated of Melampus and Tiresias, and +others of the like kind; and the same thing, not much +prior to our time, is related of Apollonius Tyanæus. For +it is narrated of him, that once, when he was with his +associates, a swallow happening to be present, and twittering, +he said, that the swallow indicated to other birds, +that an ass laden with corn had fallen down before +the city, and that in consequence of the fall of the ass, +the corn was spread on the ground⁠<a id="FNanchor_65" href="#Footnote_65" class="fnanchor">[65]</a>. An associate, also, +of mine informed me, that he once had a boy for a +servant, who understood the meaning of all the sounds of +birds, and who said, that all of them were prophetic, and +declarative of what would shortly happen. He added, +that he was deprived of this knowledge through his +mother, who, fearing that he would be sent to the +Emperor as a gift, poured urine into his ear when he was +asleep.</p> + +<p>4. Omitting, however, these things, through the +passion of incredulity, which is connascent with us, +I think there is no one who is ignorant, that there are +some nations even now who understand the sounds of +certain animals, through an alliance to those animals. +Thus, the Arabians understand the language of crows, +and the Tyrrhenians of eagles. And, perhaps, all men +would understand the language of all animals, if a dragon +were to lick their ears. Indeed, the variety and difference +in the vocal sounds of animals, indicate that they +are significant. Hence, we hear one sound when they +are terrified, but another, of a different kind, when they +call their associates, another when they summon their +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_97">[97]</span>young to food, another when they lovingly embrace each +other, and another when they incite to battle. And so +great is the difference in their vocal sounds, that, even by +those who have spent their whole life in the observation +of them, it is found to be extremely difficult to ascertain +their meaning, on account of their multitude. Diviners, +therefore, who predict from ravens and crows, when they +have noted the difference of the sounds, as far as to a +certain multitude, omit the rest, as not easily to be apprehended +by man. But when animals speak to each other, +these sounds are manifest and significant to them, though +they are not known to all of us. If, however, it appears +that they imitate us, that they learn the Greek tongue, +and understand their keepers, what man is so impudent +as not to grant that they are rational, because he does +not understand what they say? Crows, therefore, and +magpies, the robin redbreast, and the parrot, imitate men, +recollect what they have heard, are obedient to their preceptor +while he is teaching them; and many of them, +through what they have learnt, point out those that have +acted wrong in the house. But the Indian hyæna, which +the natives call crocotta, speaks in a manner so human, +and this without a teacher, as to go to houses, and call +that person whom he knows he can easily vanquish. He +also imitates the voice of him who is most dear, and +would most readily attend to the person whom he calls; +so that, though the Indians know this, yet being deceived +through the similitude, and obeying the call, they come +forth, and are destroyed. If, however, all animals do not +imitate, and all of them are not adapted to learn our +language, what is this to the purpose? For neither is +every man docile or imitative, I will not say of the vocal +sounds of animals, but of the five dialects of the Greek +tongue. To which may be added, that some animals, +perhaps, do not speak, because they have not been taught, +or because they are impeded by the ill conformation of +the instruments of speech. We, therefore, when we were +at Carthage, nurtured a tame partridge, which we caught +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_98">[98]</span>flying, and which, in process of time, and by associating +with us, became so exceedingly mild, that it was not only +sedulously attentive to us, caressed and sported with us, +but uttered a sound corresponding to the sound of our +voice, and, as far as it was capable, answered us; and this +in a manner different from that by which partridges are +accustomed to call each other. For it did not utter a +corresponding sound when we were silent, but when we +spoke to it.</p> + +<p>5. It is also narrated, that some dumb animals obey +their masters with more readiness than any domestic +servants. Hence, a lamprey was so accustomed to the +Roman Crassus, as to come to him when he called it by +its name; on which account Crassus was so affectionately +disposed towards it, that he exceedingly lamented its +death, though, prior to this, he had borne the loss of +three of his children with moderation. Many likewise +relate that the eels in Arethusa, and the shell-fish denominated +saperdæ, about Mæander, are obedient to +those that call them. Is not the imagination, therefore, +of an animal that speaks, the same, whether it proceeds +as far as to the tongue, or does not? And if this be the +case, is it not absurd to call the voice of man alone +[external] reason, but refuse thus to denominate the +voice of other animals? For this is just as if crows +should think that their voice alone is external reason, +but that we are irrational animals, because the meaning +of the sounds which we utter is not obvious to them; +or as if the inhabitants of Attica should thus denominate +their speech alone, and should think that those +are irrational who are ignorant of the Attic tongue, +though the inhabitants of Attica would sooner understand +the croaking of a crow, than the language of a +Syrian or a Persian. But is it not absurd to judge of +rationality and irrationality from apprehending or not +apprehending the meaning of vocal sounds, or from +silence and speech? For thus some one might say, that +the God who is above all things, and likewise the other +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_99">[99]</span>Gods, are not rational, because they do not speak. The +Gods, however, silently indicate their will, and birds +apprehend their will more rapidly than men, and when +they have apprehended it, they narrate it to men as much +as they are able, and different birds are the messengers to +men of different Gods. Thus, the eagle is the messenger +of Jupiter, the hawk and the crow of Apollo, the stork of +Juno, the crex and the bird of night of Minerva, the +crane of Ceres, and some other bird is the messenger of +some other deity. Moreover, those among us that observe +animals, and are nurtured together with them, know +the meaning of their vocal sounds. The hunter, therefore, +from the barking of his dog, perceives at one time, +indeed, that the dog explores a hare, but at another, that +the dog has found it; at one time, that he pursues the +game, at another that he has caught it, and at another +that he is in the wrong track, through having lost the +scent of it. Thus, too, the cowherd knows, at one time, +indeed, that a cow is hungry, or thirsty, or weary, and at +another, that she is incited to venery, or seeks her calf, +[from her different lowings]⁠<a id="FNanchor_66" href="#Footnote_66" class="fnanchor">[66]</a>. A lion also manifests by +his roaring that he threatens, a wolf by his howling that +he is in a bad condition, and shepherds, from the bleating +of sheep, know what the sheep want.</p> + +<p>6. Neither, therefore, are animals ignorant of the +meaning of the voice of men, when they are angry, or +speak kindly to, or call them, or pursue them, or ask them +to do something, or give something to them; nor, in +short, are they ignorant of any thing that is usually said +to them, but are aptly obedient to it; which it would be +impossible for them to do, unless that which is similar to +intellection energized, in consequence of being excited by +its similar. The immoderation of their passions, also, is +suppressed by certain modulations, and stags, bulls, and +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_100">[100]</span>other animals, from being wild become tame. Those, too, +who are decidedly of opinion that brutes are deprived of +reason, yet admit that dogs have a knowledge of dialectic, +and make use of the syllogism which consists of +many disjunctive propositions, when, in searching for +their game, they happen to come to a place where there +are three roads. For they thus reason, the beast has +either fled through this road, or through that, or through +the remaining road; but it has not fled either through +this, or through that, and therefore it must have fled +through the remaining third of these roads⁠<a id="FNanchor_67" href="#Footnote_67" class="fnanchor">[67]</a>. After +which syllogistic process, they resume their pursuit in +that road. It may, however, be readily said, that animals +do these things naturally, because they were not taught +by any one to do them; as if we also were not allotted +reason by nature, though we likewise give names to +things, because we are naturally adapted to do so. +Besides, if it be requisite to believe in Aristotle, animals +are seen to teach their offspring, not only something pertaining +to other things, but also to utter vocal sounds; as +the nightingale, for instance, teaches her young to sing. +And as he likewise says, animals learn many things from +each other, and many from men; and the truth of what +he asserts is testified by all the tamers of colts, by every +jockey, horseman, and charioteer, and by all hunters, +herdsmen, keepers of elephants, and masters of wild beasts +and birds. He, therefore, who estimates things rightly, will +be led, from these instances, to ascribe intelligence to +brutes; but he who is inconsiderate, and is ignorant of +these things, will be induced to act rashly, through his +inexhaustible avidity co-operating with him against them. +For how is it possible that he should not defame and +calumniate animals, who has determined to cut them in +pieces, as if they were stones? Aristotle, however, Plato, +Empedocles, Pythagoras, Democritus, and all such as +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_101">[101]</span>endeavoured to discover the truth concerning animals, +have acknowledged that they participate of reason.</p> + +<p>7. But it is now requisite to show that brutes have +internal reason. The difference, indeed, between our +reason and theirs, appears to consist, as Aristotle somewhere +says, not in essence, but in the more and the less; +just as many are of opinion, that the difference between +the Gods and us is not essential, but consists in this, that +in them there is a greater, and in us a less accuracy, of +the reasoning power⁠<a id="FNanchor_68" href="#Footnote_68" class="fnanchor">[68]</a>. And, indeed, so far as pertains to +sense and the remaining organization, according to the +sensoria and the flesh, every one nearly will grant that +these are similarly disposed in us, as they are in brutes. +For they not only similarly participate with us of natural +passions, and the motions produced through these, but +we may also survey in them such affections as are preternatural +and morbid. No one, however, of a sound mind, +will say that brutes are unreceptive of the reasoning +power, on account of the difference between their habit +of body and ours, when he sees that there is a great +variety of habit in men, according to their race, and the +nations to which they belong, and yet, at the same time, +it is granted that all of them are rational. An ass, therefore, +is afflicted with a catarrh, and if the disease flows to +his lungs, he dies in the same manner as a man. A horse, +too, is subject to purulence, and wastes away through it, +like a man. He is likewise attacked with rigour, the +gout, fever, and fury, in which case he is also said to +have a depressed countenance. A mare, when pregnant, +if she happens to smell a lamp when it is just extinguished, +becomes abortive, in the same manner as a +woman. An ox, and likewise a camel, are subject to +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_102">[102]</span>fever and insanity; a raven becomes scabby, and has +the leprosy; and also a dog, who, besides this, is +afflicted with the gout, and madness: but a hog is +subject to hoarseness, and in a still greater degree a dog; +whence this disease in a man is denominated from the +dog, <i>cynanche</i>. And these things are known to us, +because we are familiar with these animals; but of the +diseases of other animals we are ignorant, because we +do not associate with them. Castrated animals also +become more effeminate. Hence cocks, when they are +castrated, no longer crow; but their voice becomes +effeminate, like that of men who lose their testicles. It +is not possible, likewise, to distinguish the bellowing +and horns of a bull, when he is castrated, from those of +a cow. But stags, when they are castrated, no longer +cast off their horns, but retain them in the same manner +as eunuchs do their hairs; and if, when they are +castrated, they are without horns, they do not afterwards +produce them, just as it happens to those who, before +they have a beard, are made eunuchs. So that nearly +the bodies of all animals are similarly affected with ours, +with respect to the bodily calamities to which they are +subject.</p> + +<p>8. See, however, whether all the passions of the soul +in brutes, are not similar to ours; for it is not the province +of man alone to apprehend juices by the taste, +colours by the sight, odours by the smell, sounds by the +hearing, cold or heat, or other tangible objects, by the +touch; but the senses of brutes are capable of the same +perceptions. Nor are brutes deprived of sense because +they are not men, as neither are we to be deprived of +reason, because the Gods, if they possess it, are rational +beings. With respect to the senses, however, other +animals appear greatly to surpass us; for what man can +see so acutely as a dragon? (for this is not the fabulous +Lynceus). And hence the poets denominate <i>to see</i> +δρακειν, <i>drakein</i>: but an eagle, from a great height, sees +a hare. What man hears more acutely than cranes, who +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_103">[103]</span>are able to hear from an interval so great, as to be +beyond the reach of human sight? And as to smell, +almost all animals so much surpass us in this sense, that +things which fall on it, and are obvious to them, are +concealed from us; so that they know and smell the +several kinds of animals by their footsteps. Hence, men +employ dogs as their leaders, for the purpose of discovering +the retreat of a boar, or a stag. And we, indeed, +are slowly sensible of the constitution of the air; but +this is immediately perceived by other animals, so that +from them we derive indications of the future state of +the weather. With respect to juices also, they so accurately +know the distinction between them, that their +knowledge of what are morbific, salubrious, and deleterious +among these, surpasses that of physicians. But +Aristotle says, that animals whose sensitive powers are +more exquisite, are more prudent. And the diversities, +indeed, of bodies are capable of producing a facility or +difficulty of being passively affected, and of having reason, +more or less prompt in its energies; but they are not +capable of changing the essence of the soul, since neither +are they able to change the senses, nor to alter the +passions, nor to make them entirely abandon their proper +nature. It must be granted, therefore, that animals +participate more or less of reason, but not that they are +perfectly deprived of it; as neither must it be admitted +that one animal has reason, but another not. As, however, +in one and the same species of animals, one body is +more, but another less healthy; and, in a similar manner, +in diseases, in a naturally good, and a naturally bad, +disposition, there is a great difference; thus also in souls, +one is naturally good, but another depraved: and of +souls that are depraved, one has more, but another less, +of depravity. In good men, likewise, there is not the +same equality; for Socrates, Aristotle, and Plato, are +not similarly good. Nor is there sameness in a concordance +of opinions. Hence it does not follow, if we have +more intelligence than other animals, that on this account +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_104">[104]</span>they are to be deprived of intelligence; as neither must +it be said, that partridges do not fly, because hawks fly +higher; nor that other hawks do not fly, because the +bird called phassophonos⁠<a id="FNanchor_69" href="#Footnote_69" class="fnanchor">[69]</a> flies higher than these, and +than all other birds. Some one, therefore, may admit +that the soul is co-passive with the body, and that the +former suffers something from the latter, when the latter +is well or ill affected; but in this case it by no means +changes its nature: but if the soul is only co-passive to, +and uses the body as an instrument, she may be able to +effect many things through it, which we cannot, even +when it is organized differently from ours, and when it +is affected in a certain manner, may sympathize with it, +and yet may not change its proper nature.</p> + +<p>9. It must be demonstrated, therefore, that there is +a rational power in animals, and that they are not +deprived of prudence. And in the first place, indeed, +each of them knows whether it is imbecile or strong, +and, in consequence of this, it defends some parts of +itself, but attacks with others. Thus the panther uses +its teeth, the lion its nails and teeth, the horse its hoofs, +the ox its horns, the cock its spurs, and the scorpion its +sting; but the serpents in Egypt use their spittle, +(whence also they are called πτυαδες, <i>ptuades</i>, i.e. <i>spitters</i>,) +and with this they blind the eyes of those that approach +them: and thus a different animal uses a different part +of itself for attack, in order to save itself. Again, some +animals, viz. such as are robust, feed [and live] remote +from men; but others, who are of an ignoble nature, live +remote from stronger animals, and, on the contrary, +dwell nearer men. And of these, some dwell at a greater +distance from more robust animals, as sparrows and +swallows, who build their nests in the roofs of houses; +but others associate with men, as, for instance, dogs. +They likewise change their places of abode at certain +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_105">[105]</span>times, and know every thing which contributes to their +advantage. In a similar manner, in fishes and in birds, +a reasoning energy of this kind may be perceived; all +which particulars are abundantly collected by the +ancients, in their writings concerning the prudence of +animals; and they are copiously discussed by Aristotle, +who says, that by all animals an habitation subservient +to their subsistence and their safety, is most exquisitely +contrived.</p> + +<p>10. But he who says that these things are naturally +present with animals, is ignorant in asserting this, that +they are by nature rational; or if this is not admitted, +neither does reason subsist in us naturally, nor with the +perfection of it receive an increase, so far as we are +naturally adapted to receive it. A divine nature, indeed, +does not become rational⁠<a id="FNanchor_70" href="#Footnote_70" class="fnanchor">[70]</a> through learning, for there +never was a time in which he was irrational; but rationality +is consubsistent with his existence, and he is not +prevented from being rational, because he did not receive +reason through discipline: though, with respect to other +animals, in the same manner as with respect to men, +many things are taught them by nature, and some things +are imparted by discipline. Brutes, however, learn some +things from each other, but are taught others, as we +have said, by men. They also have memory, which is a +most principal thing in the resumption of reasoning and +prudence. They likewise have vices, and are envious; +though their bad qualities are not so widely extended as +in men: for their vices are of a lighter nature than +those of men. This, indeed, is evident; for the builder +of a house will never be able to lay the foundation of it, +unless he is sober; nor can a shipwright properly place +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_106">[106]</span>the keel of a ship, unless he is in health; nor a husbandman +plant a vine, unless he applies his mind to it; yet +nearly all men, when they are intoxicated, can beget +children. This, however, is not the case with other +animals; for they propagate for the sake of offspring, and +for the most part, when the males have made the female +pregnant, they no longer attempt to be connected with +her; nor, if they should attempt it, would the female +permit them. But the magnitude of the lascivious insolence +and intemperance of men in these things, is +evident. In other animals, however, the male is conscious +of the parturient throes of the female, and, for the most +part, partakes of the same pains; as is evident in cocks. +But others incubate together with the females; as the +males of doves. They likewise provide a proper place +for the delivery of their offspring; and after they have +brought forth their offspring, they both purify them and +themselves. And he who properly observes, will see +that every thing proceeds with them in an orderly +manner; that they fawn on him who nourishes them, +and that they know their master, and give indications of +him who acts insidiously.</p> + +<p>11. Who likewise is ignorant how much gregarious +animals preserve justice towards each other? for this is +preserved by ants, by bees, and by other animals of the +like kind. And who is ignorant of the chastity of female +ring-doves towards the males with whom they associate? +for they destroy those who are found by them to have +committed adultery. Or who has not heard of the +justice of storks towards their parents? For in the +several species of animals, a peculiar virtue is eminent, +to which each species is naturally adapted; nor because +this virtue is natural and stable, is it fit to deny that they +are rational? For it might be requisite to deprive them +of rationality, if their works were not the proper effects +of virtue and rational sagacity; but if we do not understand +how these works are effected, because we are +unable to penetrate into the reasoning which they use, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_107">[107]</span>we are not on this account to accuse them of irrationality; +for neither is any one able to penetrate into the intellect +of that divinity the sun, but from his works we assent +to those who demonstrate him to be an intellectual and +rational essence.</p> + +<p>12. But some one may very properly wonder at +those who admit that justice derives its subsistence from +the rational part, and who call those animals that have +no association with men, savage and unjust, and yet do +not extend justice as far as to those that do associate +with us; and which, in the same manner as men, would +be deprived of life, if they were deprived of human +society. Birds, therefore, and dogs, and many quadrupeds, +such as goats, horses, sheep, asses, and mules, +would perish, if deprived of an association with mankind. +Nature also, the fabricator of their frame, constituted +them so as to be in want of men, and fashioned men so +as to require their assistance; thus producing an innate +justice in them towards us, and in us towards them. +But it is not at all wonderful, if some of them are savage +towards men; for what Aristotle says is true, that if all +animals had an abundance of nutriment, they would not +act ferociously, either towards each other, or towards +men. For on account of food, though necessary and +slender, enmities and friendships are produced among +animals, and also on account of the places which they +occupy; but if men were reduced to such straits as +brutes are [with respect to food,] how much more savage +would they become than those animals that appear to be +wild? War and famine are indications of the truth of +this; for then men do not abstain from eating each +other; and even without war and famine, they eat +animals that are nurtured with them, and are perfectly +tame.</p> + +<p>13. Some one, however, may say, that brutes are +indeed rational animals, but have not a certain habitude, +proximity, or alliance to us; but he who asserts this will, +in the first place, make them to be irrational animals, in +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_108">[108]</span>consequence of depriving them of an alliance to our +nature. And, in the next place, he will make their +association with us to depend on the utility which we +derive from them, and not on the participation of reason. +The thing proposed by us, however, is to show that +brutes are rational animals, and not to inquire whether +there is any compact between them and us. For, with +respect to men, all of them do not league with us, +and yet no one would say, that he who does not enter +into a league with us is irrational. But many brutes are +slaves to men, and, as some one rightly says, though they +are in a state of servitude themselves, through the improbity +of men, yet, at the same time, by wisdom and justice, +they cause their masters to be their servants and curators. +Moreover, the vices of brutes are manifest, from which +especially their rationality is demonstrated. For they +are envious, and the males are rivals of each other with +respect to the favour of the females, and the females with +respect to the regard of the males. There is one vice, +however, which is not inherent in them, viz. acting insidiously +towards their benefactors, but they are perfectly +benevolent to those who are kind to them, and place +so much confidence in them, as to follow wherever they +may lead them, though it should even be to slaughter and +manifest danger. And though some one should nourish +them, not for their sake, but for his own, yet they will be +benevolently disposed towards their possessor. But men +[on the contrary] do not act with such hostility towards +any one, as towards him who has nourished them; nor do +they so much pray for the death of any one, as for +his death.</p> + +<p>14. Indeed, the operations of brutes are attended with +so much consideration⁠<a id="FNanchor_71" href="#Footnote_71" class="fnanchor">[71]</a>, that they frequently perceive, +that the food which is placed for them is nothing else +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_109">[109]</span>than a snare, though, either through intemperance or +hunger, they approach to it. And some of them, indeed, +do not approach to it immediately, but others slowly +accede to it. They also try whether it is possible to take +the food without falling into danger, and frequently in +consequence of rationality vanquishing passion, they depart +without being injured. Some of them too revile at, +and discharge their urine on the stratagem of men; but +others, through voracity, though they know that they +shall be captured, yet no less than the associates of +Ulysses, suffer themselves to die rather than not eat. +Some persons, likewise, have not badly endeavoured to +show from the places which animals are allotted, that +they are far more prudent than we are. For as those +beings that dwell in æther are rational, so also, say they, +are the animals which occupy the region proximate to +æther, viz. the air; afterwards aquatic animals differ from +these, and in the last place, the terrestrial differ from +the aquatic [in degrees of rationality]. And we belong +to the class of terrene animals dwelling in the sediment of +the universe. For in the Gods, we must not infer that +they possess a greater degree of excellence from the +places [which they illuminate], though in mortal natures +this may be admitted.</p> + +<p>15. Since, also, brutes acquire a knowledge of the arts, +and these such as are human, and learn to dance, to +drive a chariot, to fight a duel, to walk on ropes, to write +and read, to play on the pipe and the harp, to discharge +arrows, and to ride,—this being the case, can you +any longer doubt whether they possess that power which +is receptive of art, since the recipient of these arts may be +seen to exist in them? For where will they receive them, +unless reason is inherent in them in which the arts subsist? +For they do not hear our voice as if it was a mere +sound only, but they also perceive the difference in the +meaning of the words, which is the effect of rational +intelligence. But our opponents say, that animals perform +badly what is done by men. To this we reply, that +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_110">[110]</span>neither do men perform all things well. For if this +be not admitted, some men would be in vain victors in +a contest, and others vanquished. They add, that brutes +do not consult, nor form assemblies, nor act in a judicial +capacity. But tell me whether all men do this? Do not +actions in the multitude precede consultation? And +whence can any one demonstrate that brutes do not consult? +For no one can adduce an argument sufficient +to prove that they do not. But those show the contrary +to this, who have written minutely about animals. As to +other objections, which are adduced by our adversaries in +a declamatory way, they are perfectly frivolous; such, +for instance; as that brutes have no cities of their own. +For neither have the Scythians, who live in carts, +nor the Gods. Our opponents add, that neither have +brutes any written laws. To this we reply, that neither +had men while they were happy. For Apis is said to +have been the first that promulgated laws for the Greeks, +when they were in want of them.</p> + +<p>16. To men, therefore, on account of their voracity, +brutes do not appear to possess reason; but by the Gods +and divine men, they are honoured equally with sacred +suppliants. Hence, the God⁠<a id="FNanchor_72" href="#Footnote_72" class="fnanchor">[72]</a> said to Aristodicus, the +Cumean, that sparrows were his suppliants. Socrates +also, and prior to him, Rhadamanthus, swore by animals. +But the Egyptians conceive them to be Gods, whether +they, in reality, thought them to be so, or whether +they intentionally represented the Gods in the forms +of oxen, birds, and other animals, in order that these +animals might be no less abstained from than from men, +or whether they did this through other more mystical +causes⁠<a id="FNanchor_73" href="#Footnote_73" class="fnanchor">[73]</a>. Thus also the Greeks united a ram to the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_111">[111]</span>statue of Jupiter, but the horns of a bull to that of +Bacchus. They likewise fashioned the statue of Pan +from the form of a man and a goat; but they represented +the Muses and the Sirens winged, and also Victory, Iris, +Love, and Hermes. Pindar too, in his hymns, represents +the Gods, when they were expelled by Typhon, not +resembling men, but other animals. And Jupiter, when +in love with Pasiphae, is said to have become a bull; but +at another time, he is said to have been changed into an +eagle and a swan; through all which the ancients indicated +the honour which they paid to animals, and this in +a still greater degree when they assert that Jupiter was +nursed by a goat. The Cretans, from a law established +by Rhadamanthus, swore by all animals. Nor was +Socrates in jest when he swore by the dog and the goose; +but in so doing, he swore conformably to the just son +of Jupiter [Rhadamanthus]; nor did he sportfully say +that swans were his fellow-servants. But fables obscurely +signify, that animals have souls similar to ours, +when they say that the Gods in their anger changed men +into brutes, and that, when they were so changed, they +afterwards pitied and loved them. For things of this +kind are asserted of dolphins and halcyons, of nightingales +and swallows.</p> + +<p>17. Each of the ancients, likewise, who had been +prosperously nursed by animals, boasted more of this +than of their parents and educators. Thus, one boasted +of having been nursed by a she-wolf, another by a hind, +another by a she-goat, and another by a bee. But Semiramis +gloried in having been brought up by doves, Cyrus +in being nursed by a dog, and a Thracian in having a swan +for his nurse, who likewise bore the name of his nurse. +Hence also, the Gods obtained their surnames, as +Bacchus that of <i>Hinnuleus</i>, Apollo that of <i>Lyceus</i>, and, likewise +<i>Delphinius</i>, Neptune and Minerva that of <i>Equestris</i>. +But Hecate, when invoked by the names of a bull, a dog, +and a lioness, is more propitious. If, however, those who +sacrifice animals and eat them, assert that they are irrational, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_112">[112]</span>in order that they may mitigate the crime of +so doing, the Scythians also, who eat their parents, may +in like manner say that their parents are destitute of +reason.</p> + +<p>18. Through these arguments, therefore, and others +which we shall afterwards mention, in narrating the +opinions of the ancients, it is demonstrated that brutes +are rational animals, reason in most of them being indeed +imperfect, of which, nevertheless, they are not entirely +deprived. Since, however, justice pertains to rational +beings, as our opponents say, how is it possible not to +admit, that we should also act justly towards brutes? For +we do not extend justice to plants, because there appears +to be much in them which is unconnected with reason; +though of these, we are accustomed to use the fruits, but +not together with the fruits to cut off the trunks. We +collect, however, corn and leguminous substances, when, +being efflorescent, they have fallen on the earth, and are +dead. But no one uses for food the flesh of dead animals, +that of fish being excepted, unless they have been destroyed +by violence. So that in these things there +is much injustice. As Plutarch also says⁠<a id="FNanchor_74" href="#Footnote_74" class="fnanchor">[74]</a>, it does not +follow that, because our nature is indigent of certain +things, and we use these, we should therefore act unjustly +towards all things. For we are allowed to injure other +things to a certain extent, in order to procure the necessary +means of subsistence (if to take any thing from +plants, even while they are living, is an injury to them); +but to destroy other things through luxury, and for the +enjoyment of pleasure, is perfectly savage and unjust. +And the abstinence from these neither diminishes our +life nor our living happily. For if, indeed, the destruction +of animals and the eating of flesh were as requisite +as air and water, plants and fruits, without which it +is impossible to live, this injustice would be necessarily +connected with our nature. But if many priests of the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_113">[113]</span>Gods, and many kings of the barbarians, being attentive +to purity, and if, likewise, infinite species of animals +never taste food of this kind, yet live, and obtain their +proper end according to nature, is not he absurd who +orders us, because we are compelled to wage war with +certain animals, not to live peaceably with those with +whom it is possible to do so, but thinks, either that we +ought to live without exercising justice towards any +thing, or that, by exercising it towards all things, we +should not continue in existence? As, therefore, among +men, he who, for the sake of his own safety, or that of his +children or country, either seizes the wealth of certain +persons, or oppresses some region or city, has necessity +for the pretext of his injustice; but he who acts in +this manner through the acquisition of wealth, or through +satiety or luxurious pleasure, and for the purpose of +satisfying desires which are not necessary, appears to +be inhospitable, intemperate, and depraved;—thus too, +divinity pardons the injuries which are done to plants, +the consumption of fire and water, the shearing of sheep, +the milking of cows, and the taming of oxen, and subjugating +them to the yoke, for the safety and continuance +in life of those that use them. But to deliver animals +to be slaughtered and cooked, and thus be filled with +murder, not for the sake of nutriment and satisfying the +wants of nature, but making pleasure and gluttony the +end of such conduct, is transcendently iniquitous and +dire. For it is sufficient that we use, for laborious purposes, +though they have no occasion to labour themselves, +the progeny of horses, and asses, and bulls, as +Æschylus says, as our substitutes, who, by being tamed +and subjugated to the yoke, alleviate our toil.</p> + +<p>19. But with respect to him who thinks that we +should not use an ox for food, nor destroying and +corrupting spirit and life, place things on the table which +are only the allurements and elegancies of satiety, of +what does he deprive our life, which is either necessary +to our safety, or subservient to virtue? To compare +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_114">[114]</span>plants, however, with animals, is doing violence to the +order of things. For the latter are naturally sensitive, +and adapted to feel pain, to be terrified and hurt; on +which account also they may be injured. But the former +are entirely destitute of sensation, and in consequence of +this, nothing foreign, or evil, or hurtful, or injurious, can +befall them. For sensation is the principle of all alliance, +and of every thing of a foreign nature. But Zeno and his +followers assert, that alliance is the principle of justice. +And is it not absurd, since we see that many of our own +species live from sense alone, but do not possess intellect +and reason, and since we also see, that many of them surpass +the most terrible of wild beasts in cruelty, anger, +and rapine, being murderous of their children and their +parents, and also being tyrants, and the tools of kings [is +it not, I say, absurd,] to fancy that we ought to act justly +towards these, but that no justice is due from us to the +ox that ploughs, the dog that is fed with us, and the +animals that nourish us with their milk, and adorn our +bodies with their wool? Is not such an opinion most irrational +and absurd?</p> + +<p>20. But, by Jupiter, the assertion of Chrysippus is +considered by our opponents to be very probable, that +the Gods made us for the sake of themselves, and for the +sake of each other, and that they made animals for +the sake of us; horses, indeed, in order that they might +assist us in battle, dogs, that they might hunt with us, +and leopards, bears, and lions, for the sake of exercising +our fortitude. But the hog (for here the pleasantry +of Chrysippus is most delightful) was not made for +any other purpose than to be sacrificed; and God mingled +soul, as if it were salt, with the flesh of this animal, that +he might procure for us excellent food. In order, likewise, +that we might have an abundance of broth, and +luxurious suppers, divinity provided for us all-various +kinds of shell-fish, the fishes called purples, sea-nettles, +and the various kinds of winged animals; and this not +from a certain other cause, but only that he might supply +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_115">[115]</span>man with an exuberance of pleasure; in so doing, surpassing +all nurses [in kindness], and thickly filling with +pleasures and enjoyments the terrestrial place. Let him, +however, to whom these assertions appear to possess +a certain probability, and to participate of something +worthy of deity, consider what he will reply to the saying +of Carneades, that every thing which is produced by +nature, is <i>benefited</i> when it obtains the end to which it is +adapted, and for which it was generated. But <i>benefit</i> +is to be understood in a more general way, as signifying +what the Stoics call <i>useful</i>. The hog, however, [says he] +was produced by nature for the purpose of being slaughtered +and used for food; and when it suffers this, it +obtains the end for which it is adapted, and is benefited. +But if God fashioned animals for the use of men, in what +do we use flies, lice, bats, beetles, scorpions, and vipers? +of which some are odious to the sight, defile the touch, +are intolerable to the smell, and in their voice dire +and unpleasant; and others, on the contrary, are destructive +to those that meet with them. And with respect to +the <i>balænæ</i>, <i>pistrices</i>, and other species of whales, an infinite +number of which, as Homer says⁠<a id="FNanchor_75" href="#Footnote_75" class="fnanchor">[75]</a>, the loud-sounding +Amphitrite nourishes, does not the Demiurgus teach us, +that they were generated for the utility of the nature of +things⁠<a id="FNanchor_76" href="#Footnote_76" class="fnanchor">[76]</a>? And if our opponents should admit that all +things were not generated for us, and with a view to our +advantage, in addition to the distinction which they make +being very confused and obscure, we shall not avoid +acting unjustly, in attacking and noxiously using those +animals which were not produced for our sake, but +according to nature [<i>i.e.</i> for the sake of the universe], as +we were. I omit to mention, that if we define, by utility, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_116">[116]</span>things which pertain to us, we shall not be prevented +from admitting, that we were generated for the sake +of the most destructive animals, such as crocodiles, +balænæ, and dragons. For we are not in the least +benefited by them; but they seize and destroy men that +fall in their way, and use them for food; in so doing +acting not at all more cruelly than we do, excepting that +they commit this injustice through want and hunger, but +we through insolent wantonness, and for the sake of +luxury, frequently sporting in theatres, and in hunting +slaughter the greater part of animals. And by thus +acting, indeed, a murderous disposition and a brutal +nature become strengthened in us, and render us insensible +to pity: to which we may add, that those who first +dared to do this, blunted the greatest part of lenity, and +rendered it inefficacious. The Pythagoreans, however, +made lenity towards beasts to be an exercise of philanthropy +and commiseration. So that, how is it possible +they should not in a greater degree excite us to justice, +than those who assert that, by not slaughtering animals, +the justice which is usually exercised towards men will be +corrupted? For custom is most powerful in increasing +those passions in man which were gradually introduced +into his nature.</p> + +<p>21. It is so, say our antagonists; but as the immortal +is opposed to the mortal, the incorruptible to the corruptible, +and the incorporeal to the corporeal, so to the +rational essence which has an existence in the nature of +things, the irrational essence must be opposed, which has +a subsistence contrary to it; nor in so many conjugations +of things, is this alone to be left imperfect and mutilated. +[Our opponents, however, thus speak], as if we did not +grant this, or as if we had not shown that there is much +of the irrational among beings. For there is an abundance +of it in all the natures that are destitute of soul, nor do +we require any other opposition to that which is rational; +but immediately every thing which is deprived of soul, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_117">[117]</span>being irrational and without intellect, is opposed to that +which possesses reason and <i>dianoia</i>⁠<a id="FNanchor_77" href="#Footnote_77" class="fnanchor">[77]</a>. If, however, some +one should think fit to assert that not nature in common, +but the animated nature, is divided into that which possesses +and that which is without imagination, and into +that which is sensitive, and that which is deprived of +sensation, in order that these oppositions of habits and +privations may subsist about the same genus, as being +equiponderant;—he who says this speaks absurdly. For +it would be absurd to investigate in the animated nature +that which is sensitive, and that which is without sensation, +that which employs, and that which is without +imagination, because every thing animated is immediately +adapted to be sensitive and imaginative. So that neither +thus will he justly require, that one part of the animated +nature should be rational, but another irrational, when he +is speaking to men, who think that nothing participates +of sense which does not also participate of intelligence, +and that nothing is an animal in which opinion and +reasoning are not inherent, in the same manner as with +animals every sense and impulse are naturally present. +For nature, which they rightly assert produced all things +for the sake of a certain thing, and with reference to +a certain end, did not make an animal sensitive merely +that it might be passively affected, and possess sensible +perception; but as there are many things which are allied +and appropriate, and many which are foreign to it, it +would not be able to exist for the shortest space of time, +unless it learnt how to avoid some things, and to pursue +others. The knowledge, therefore, of both these, sense +similarly imparts to every animal; but the apprehension +and pursuit of what is useful, and the depulsion and +avoidance of what is destructive and painful, can by no +possible contrivance be present with those animals that +are incapable of reasoning, judging, and remembering, +and that do not naturally possess an animadversive power. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_118">[118]</span>For to those animals from whom you entirely take away +expectation, memory, design, preparation, hope, fear, +desire, and indignation, neither the eyes when present, +nor the ears, nor sense, nor phantasy, will be beneficial, +since they will be of no use; and it will be better to be +deprived of them than to labour, be in pain, and be +afflicted, without possessing the power of repelling these +molestations. There is, however, a treatise of Strato, the +physiologist, in which it is demonstrated, that it is not +possible to have a sensible perception of any thing without +the energy of intellection. For frequently the letters +of a book, which we cursorily consider by the sight, and +words which fall on the auditory sense, are concealed +from and escape us, when our intellect is attentive to +other things; but afterwards, when it returns to the thing +to which it was before inattentive, then, by recollection, +it runs through and pursues each of the before-mentioned +particulars. Hence also it is said [by Epicharmus],—</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">’Tis mind alone that sees and hears,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">And all besides is deaf and blind.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class="noindent">For the objects which fall on the eyes and the ears do +not produce a sensible perception of themselves, unless +that which is intellective is present. On which account, +also, king Cleomenes, when something that was recited was +applauded, being asked, if it did not also appear to him to +be excellent, left this to the decision of those that asked +him the question; for he said, that his intellect was at +the time in Peloponnesus. Hence it is necessary that +intellect should be present with all those with whom +sensible perception is present.</p> + +<p>22. Let us, however, admit that sense does not require +intellect for the accomplishment of its proper work, yet, +when energizing about what is appropriate and what is +foreign, it discerns the difference between the two, it +must then exercise the power of memory, and must dread +that which will produce pain, desire that which will be +beneficial, and contrive, if it is absent, how it may be +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_119">[119]</span>present, and will procure methods of pursuing and investigating +what is advantageous, and of avoiding and +flying from hostile occurrences. Indeed, our opponents, +in their Introductions, [as they call them], every where +inculcate these things with a tedious prolixity, defining +design to be an indication of perfection; the tendency of +intellect to the object of its perception, an impulse prior +to impulse; preparation, an action prior to action; and +memory, the comprehension of some past thing⁠<a id="FNanchor_78" href="#Footnote_78" class="fnanchor">[78]</a>, the +perception of which, when present, was obtained through +sense. For there is not any one of these which is not +rational, and all of them are present with all animals. +Thus, too, with respect to intellections, those which are +reposited in the mind, are called by them εννοιαι, <i>notions</i>; +but when they are in motion [through a discursive +energy] they denominate them διανοησεις, or <i>perceptions +obtained by a reasoning process</i>. But with respect to all +the passions, as they are in common acknowledged to be +depraved natures and opinions, it is wonderful that our +opponents should overlook the operations and motions +of brutes, many of which are the effects of anger, many +of fear, and, by Jupiter, of envy also and emulation. +Our opponents, too, themselves punish dogs and horses +when they do wrong; and this not in vain, but in order +to make them better, producing in them, through the +pain, a sorrow which we denominate repentance. But +the name of the pleasure which is received through the +ears is κηλησις, <i>i.e.</i> <i>an ear-alluring sweetness</i>; and the +delight which is received through the eyes is denominated +γοητεια, <i>i.e.</i> <i>enchantment</i>. Each of these, however, is +used towards brutes. Hence stags and horses are <i>allured</i> +by the harmony produced from reeds and flutes; and the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_120">[120]</span>crabs, called παγουροι, <i>paguri</i>, are evocated from their +caverns by the melody of reeds. The fish <i>thrissa</i>, likewise, +is said through harmony to come forth from its +retreats. Those, however, who speak stupidly about +these things, assert that animals are neither delighted, +nor enraged, nor terrified, nor make any provision for +what is necessary, nor remember; but they say that the +bee <i>as it were</i> remembers, that the swallow <i>as it were</i> provides +what is requisite, that the lion is <i>as it were</i> angry, +and that the stag is <i>as it were</i> afraid. And I know not +what answer to give to those who say that animals +neither see nor hear, but see <i>as it were</i>, and <i>as it were</i> +hear; that they do not utter vocal sounds, but <i>as it were</i> +utter them; and that, in short, they do not live, but <i>as it +were</i> live. For he who is truly intelligent, will readily +admit that these assertions are no more sane than the +former, and are similarly destitute of evidence. When, +however, on comparing with human manners and lives, +actions, and modes of living, those of animals, I see +much depravity in the latter, and no manifest tendency to +virtue as to the principal end, nor any proficiency, or +appetition of proficiency, I am dubious why nature gave +the beginning of perfection to those that are never able +to arrive at the end of it⁠<a id="FNanchor_79" href="#Footnote_79" class="fnanchor">[79]</a>. But this to our opponents +does not appear to be at all absurd. For as they admit +that the love of parents towards their offspring is the +principle in us of association and justice; yet, though +they perceive that this affection is abundant and strong +in animals, they nevertheless deny that they participate +of justice; which assertion is similarly defective with the +nature of mules, who, though they are not in want of any +generative member, since they have a penis and vulva, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_121">[121]</span>and receive pleasure from employing these parts, yet +they are not able to accomplish the end of generation. +Consider the thing, too, in another way: Is it not ridiculous +to say that such men as Socrates, Plato, and Zeno, +were not less vicious than any slave, but resembled slaves +in stupidity, intemperance, and injustice, and afterwards +blame the nature of brutes, as neither pure, nor formed +with sufficient accuracy for the attainment of virtue; thus +attributing to them a privation, and not a depravity and +imbecility of reason? Especially since they acknowledge +that there is a vice of the rational part of the soul, with +which every brute is replete. For we may perceive that +timidity, intemperance, injustice, and malevolence, are +inherent in many brutes.</p> + +<p>23. But he who thinks that the nature which is not +adapted to receive rectitude of reason, does not at all +receive reason, he, in the first place, does not differ from +one who fancies that an ape does not naturally participate +of deformity, nor a tortoise of tardity; because the +former is not receptive of beauty, nor the latter of celerity. +And, in the next place, this is the opinion of one who +does not perceive the obvious difference of things. For +reason, indeed, is ingenerated by nature; but right and +perfect reason is acquired by study and discipline. Hence +all animated beings participate of reason, but our opponents +cannot mention any man who possesses rectitude +of reason and wisdom [naturally], though the multitude +of men is innumerable. But as the sight of one animal +differs from that of another, and the flying of one bird +from that of another, (for hawks and grasshoppers do not +similarly see, nor eagles and partridges); thus, also, +neither does every thing which participates of reason +possess genius and acuteness in the highest perfection. +Indeed there are many indications in brutes of association, +fortitude, and craft, in procuring what is necessary, +and in economical conduct; as, on the contrary, +there are also indications in them of injustice, timidity, +and fatuity. Hence it is a question with some, which +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_122">[122]</span>are the more excellent, terrestrial or aquatic animals⁠<a id="FNanchor_80" href="#Footnote_80" class="fnanchor">[80]</a>? +And that there are these indications, is evident from +comparing storks with river horses: for the former +nourish, but the latter destroy their fathers, in order that +they may have connexion with their mothers. This is +likewise seen on comparing doves with partridges: for +the latter conceal and destroy their eggs, if the female, +during her incubation, refuses to be connected with +the male. But doves successively relieve each other in +incubation, alternately cherishing the eggs; and first, +indeed, they feed the young, and afterwards the male +strikes the female with his beak, and drives her to the +eggs and her young, if she has for a long time wandered +from them. Antipater, however, when he blames asses +and sheep for the neglect of purity, overlooks, I know not +how, lynxes and swallows; of which, the former remove +and entirely conceal and bury their excrement, but the +latter teach their young to throw it out of their nest. +Moreover, we do not say that one tree is more ignorant +than another, as we say that a sheep is more stupid than +a dog. Nor do we say that one herb is more timid than +another, as we do that a stag is more timid than a lion. +For, as in things which are immoveable, one is not slower +than another, and in things which are not vocal, one is +not less vocal than another: thus, too, in all things in +which the power of intellection is wanting, one thing cannot +be said to be more timid, more dull, or more intemperate +than another. For, as these qualities are present +differently in their different participants, they produce in +animals the diversities which we perceive. Nor is it +wonderful that man should so much excel other animals +in docility, sagacity, justice, and association. For many +brutes surpass all men in magnitude of body, and celerity +of foot, and likewise in strength of sight, and accuracy of +hearing; yet man is not on this account either deaf, or +blind, or powerless. But we run, though slower than +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_123">[123]</span>stags, and we see, though not so accurately as hawks; +and nature has not deprived us of strength and magnitude, +though our possession of these is nothing, when +compared with the strength and bulk of the elephant and +the camel. <i>Hence, in a similar manner, we must not say +that brutes, because their intellection is more dull than ours, +and because they reason worse than we do, neither energize +discursively, nor, in short, possess intellection and reason; but +it must be admitted that they possess these, though in an +imbecile and turbid manner, just as a dull and disordered eye +participates of sight.</i></p> + +<p>24. Innumerable instances, however, might be adduced +in proof of the natural sagacity of animals, if many +things of this kind had not by many persons been collected +and narrated. But this subject must be still further +considered. For it appears that it belongs to the same +thing, whether it be a part or a power, which is naturally +adapted to receive a certain thing, to be also disposed to +fall into a preternatural mode of subsistence, when it +becomes mutilated or diseased. Thus, the eye is adapted +to fall into blindness, the leg into lameness, and the +tongue into stammering; but nothing else is subject to +such defects. For blindness does not befall that which is +not naturally adapted to see, nor lameness that which is +not adapted to walk; nor is that which is deprived of a +tongue fitted to stammer, or lisp, or be dumb. Hence, +neither can that animal be delirious, or stupid, or insane, +in which intellection, and the discursive energy of reason, +are not naturally inherent. For it is not possible for any +thing to be passively affected which does not possess +a power, the passion of which is either privation, or mutilation, +or some other deprivation. Moreover, I have +met with mad dogs, and also rabid horses; and some +persons assert that oxen and foxes become mad. The +example of dogs, however, is sufficient for our purpose: +for it is a thing indubitable, and testifies that the animal +possesses no despicable portion of reason and discursive +energy, the passion of which, when disturbed and confounded, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_124">[124]</span>is fury and madness. For, when they are thus +affected, we do not see that there is any change in the +quality of their sight or hearing. But as he is absurd +who denies that a man is beside himself, and that his +intellectual, reasoning, and recollective powers, are corrupted, +when he is afflicted with melancholy or delirium, +(for it is usually said of those that are insane, that they +are not themselves, but have fallen off from reason): +thus, also, he who thinks that mad dogs suffer any thing +else than that of having the power, which is naturally +intellective, and is adapted to reason and recollect, full of +tumult and distortion, so as to cause them to be ignorant +of persons most dear to them, and abandon their accustomed +mode of living;—he who thus thinks, appears +either to overlook what is obvious; or, if he really perceives +what takes place, voluntarily contends against the +truth. And such are the arguments adduced by Plutarch +in many of his treatises against the Stoics and Peripatetics.</p> + +<p>25. But Theophrastus employs the following reasoning:—Those +that are generated from the same sources, +I mean from the same father and mother, are said by us +to be naturally allied to each other. And moreover, we +likewise conceive that those who derive their origin from +the same ancestors that we do, are allied to us, and also +that this is the case with our fellow-citizens, because they +participate with us of the same land, and are united to us +by the bonds of association. For we do not think that +the latter are allied to each other, and to us, through +deriving their origin from the same ancestors, unless it +should so happen that the first progenitors of these were +the sources of our race, or were derived from the same +ancestors. Hence I think we should say, that Greek is +allied and has an affinity to Greek, and Barbarian to Barbarian, +and all men to each other; for one of these two +reasons, either because they originate from the same +ancestors, or because they participate of the same food, +manners, and genus. Thus also we must admit that all +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_125">[125]</span>men have an affinity, and are allied to each other. And, +moreover, the principles of the bodies of all animals are +naturally the same. I do not say this with reference to +the first elements of their bodies; for plants also consist +of these; but I mean the seed, the flesh, and the connascent +genus of humours which is inherent in animals. +But animals are much more allied to each other, through +naturally possessing souls, which are not different from +each other, I mean in desire and anger; and besides +these, in the reasoning faculty, and, above all, in the +senses. But as with respect to bodies, so likewise with +respect to souls, some animals have them more, but others +less perfect, yet all of them have naturally the same principles. +And this is evident from the affinity of their +passions. If, however, what we have said is true, viz. +that such is the generation of the manners of animals, all +the tribes of them are indeed intellective, but they differ +in their modes of living, and in the temperature of the +first elements of which they consist. And if this be +admitted, the genus of other animals has an affinity, and +is allied to us. For, as Euripides says, they have all of +them the same food and the same spirit, the same purple +streams; and they likewise demonstrate that the common +parents of all of them are Heaven and Earth.</p> + +<p>26. Hence, since animals are allied to us, if it should +appear, according to Pythagoras, that they are allotted +the same soul that we are, he may justly be considered +as impious who does not abstain from acting unjustly +towards his kindred. Nor because some animals are +savage, is their alliance to us to be on this account +abscinded. For some men may be found who are no +less, and even more malefic than savage animals to their +neighbours, and who are impelled to injure any one they +may meet with, as if they were driven by a certain blast +of their own nature and depravity. Hence also, we +destroy such men; yet we do not cut them off from +an alliance to animals of a mild nature. Thus, therefore, +if likewise some animals are savage, these, as such, are to +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_126">[126]</span>be destroyed, in the same manner as men that are savage; +but our habitude or alliance to other and wilder animals +is not on this account to be abandoned. But neither +tame nor savage animals are to be eaten; as neither +are unjust men. Now, however, we act most unjustly, +destroying, indeed, tame animals, because some brutes +are savage and unjust, and feeding on such as are tame. +With respect to tame animals, however, we act with +a twofold injustice, because, though they are tame, we +slay them, and also, because we eat them. And, in short, +the death of these has a reference to the assumption +of them for food.</p> + +<p>To these, also, such arguments as the following may +be added. For he who says that the man who extends +the just as far as to brutes, corrupts the just, is ignorant +that he does not himself preserve justice, but increases +pleasure, which is hostile to justice. By admitting, therefore, +that pleasure is the end [of our actions], justice +is evidently destroyed. For to whom is it not manifest +that justice is increased through abstinence? For he who +abstains from every thing animated, though he may +abstain from such animals as do not contribute to the +benefit of society, will be much more careful not to injure +those of his own species. For he who loves the genus, +will not hate any species of animals; and by how much +the greater his love of the genus is⁠<a id="FNanchor_81" href="#Footnote_81" class="fnanchor">[81]</a>, by so much the +more will he preserve justice towards a part of the genus, +and that to which he is allied. He, therefore, who admits +that he is allied to all animals, will not injure any animal. +But he who confines justice to man alone, is prepared, +like one enclosed in a narrow space, to hurl from him the +prohibition of injustice. So that the Pythagorean is +more pleasing than the Socratic banquet. For Socrates +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_127">[127]</span>said, that hunger is the sauce of food; but Pythagoras +said, that to injure no one, and to be exhilarated with justice, +is the sweetest sauce; as the avoidance of animal +food, will also be the avoidance of unjust conduct with +respect to food. For God has not so constituted things, +that we cannot preserve ourselves without injuring others; +since, if this were the case, he would have connected us +with a nature which is the principle of injustice. Do not +they, however, appear to be ignorant of the peculiarity of +justice, who think that it was introduced from the +alliance of men to each other? For this will be nothing +more than a certain philanthropy; but justice consists in +abstaining from injuring any thing which is not noxious. +And our conception of the just man must be formed +according to the latter, and not according to the former +mode. Hence, therefore, since justice consists in not +injuring any thing, it must be extended as far as to every +animated nature. On this account, also, the essence +of justice consists in the rational ruling over the irrational, +and in the irrational being obedient to the rational part. +For when reason governs, and the irrational part is obedient +to its mandates, it follows, by the greatest necessity, +that man will be innoxious towards every thing. For the +passions being restrained, and desire and anger wasting +away, but reason possessing its proper empire, a similitude +to a more excellent nature [and to deity] immediately +follows. But the more excellent nature in the +universe is entirely innoxious, and, through possessing +a power which preserves and benefits all things, is itself +not in want of any thing. We, however, through justice +[when we exercise it], are innoxious towards all things, +but, through being connected with mortality, are indigent +of things of a necessary nature. But the assumption +of what is necessary, does not injure even plants, when +we take what they cast off; nor fruits, when we use such +of them as are dead; nor sheep, when through shearing +we rather benefit than injure them, and by partaking +of their milk, we in return afford them every proper attention. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_128">[128]</span>Hence, the just man appears to be one who deprives +himself of things pertaining to the body; yet he +does not [in reality] injure himself. For, by this management +of his body, and continence, he increases his inward +good, <i>i.e.</i> his similitude to God.</p> + +<p>27. By making pleasure, therefore, the end of life, +that which is truly justice cannot be preserved; since +neither such things as are primarily useful according +to nature, nor all such as are easily attainable, give completion +to felicity. For in many instances, the motions of +the irrational nature, and utility and indigence, have +been, and still are the sources of injustice. For men became +indigent [as they pretended] of animal food, in +order that they might preserve, as they said, the corporeal +frame free from molestation, and without being in want of +those things after which the animal nature aspires. But +if an assimilation to divinity is the end of life, an +innoxious conduct towards all things will be in the most +eminent degree preserved. As, therefore, he who is +led by his passions is innoxious only towards his children +and his wife, but despises and acts fraudulently towards +other persons, since, in consequence of the irrational part +predominating in him, he is excited to, and astonished +about mortal concerns; but he who is led by reason, preserves +an innoxious conduct towards his fellow-citizens, +and still more so towards strangers, and towards all men, +through having the irrational part in subjection, and +is therefore more rational and divine than the former +character;—thus also, he who does not confine harmless +conduct to men alone, but extends it to other animals, is +more similar to divinity; and if it was possible to extend +it even to plants, he would preserve this image in a still +greater degree. As, however, this is not possible, we +may in this respect lament, with the ancients⁠<a id="FNanchor_82" href="#Footnote_82" class="fnanchor">[82]</a>, the defect +of our nature, that we consist of such adverse and discordant +principles, so that we are unable to preserve our +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_129">[129]</span>divine part incorruptible, and in all respects innoxious. +For we are not unindigent in all things; the cause of +which is generation, and our becoming needy through the +abundant corporeal efflux which we sustain. But want +procures safety and ornament from things of a foreign +nature, which are necessary to the existence of our +mortal part. He, therefore, who is indigent of a greater +number of externals, is in a greater degree agglutinated +to penury; and by how much his wants increase, by +so much is he destitute of divinity, and an associate of +penury. For that which is similar to deity, through this +assimilation immediately possesses true wealth. But no +one who is [truly] rich and perfectly unindigent injures +any thing. For as long as any one injures another, +though he should possess the greatest wealth, and all the +acres of land which the earth contains, he is still poor, +and has want for his intimate associate. On this account, +also, he is unjust, without God, and impious, and enslaved +to every kind of depravity, which is produced by +the lapse of the soul into matter, through the privation of +good. Every thing, therefore, is nugatory to any one, as +long as he wanders from the principle of the universe; and +he is indigent of all things, while he does not direct his +attention to Porus [or the source of true abundance]. He +likewise yields to the mortal part of his nature, while he +remains ignorant of his real self. But Injustice is powerful +in persuading and corrupting those that belong to her +empire, because she associates with her votaries in conjunction +with Pleasure. As, however, in the choice of +lives, he is the more accurate judge who has obtained an +experience of both [the better and the worse kind of life], +than he is who has only experienced one of them; thus +also, in the choice and avoidance of what is proper, he is +a safer judge who, from that which is more, judges of that +which is less excellent, than he who from the less, judges of +the more excellent. Hence, he who lives according to intellect, +will more accurately define what is eligible and what +is not, than he who lives under the dominion of irrationality. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_130">[130]</span>For the former has passed through the irrational +life, as having from the first associated with it; but the +latter, having had no experience of an intellectual life, +persuades those that resemble himself, and acts with +nugacity, like a child among children. If, however, say +our opponents, all men were persuaded by these arguments, +what would become of us? Is it not evident that +we should be happy, injustice, indeed, being exterminated +from men, and justice being conversant with us, in the +same manner as it is in the heavens? But now this question +is just the same as if men should be dubious what +the life of the Danaids would be, if they were liberated +from the employment of drawing water in a sieve, and +attempting to fill a perforated vessel. For they are +dubious what would be the consequence if we should +cease to replenish our passions and desires, the whole of +which replenishing continually flows away through the +want of real good; since this fills up the ruinous clefts of +the soul more than the greatest of external necessaries. +Do you therefore ask, O man, what we should do? We +should imitate those that lived in the golden age, we +should imitate those of that period who were [truly] free. +For with them modesty, Nemesis, and Justice associated, +because they were satisfied with the fruits of the earth.</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">The fertile earth for them spontaneous yields</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Abundantly her fruits⁠<a id="FNanchor_83" href="#Footnote_83" class="fnanchor">[83]</a>.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p>But those who are liberated from slavery, obtain for +themselves what they before procured for their masters. +In like manner, also, do you, when liberated from the +servitude of the body, and a slavish attention to the +passions produced through the body, as, prior to this, you +nourished them in an all-various manner with externals, +so now nourish yourself all-variously with internal good, +justly assuming things which are [properly] your own, and +no longer by violence taking away things which are foreign +[to your true nature and real good].</p> + +<div class="footnotes"> + +<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_64" href="#FNanchor_64" class="label">[64]</a> This <i>external reason</i> (λογος προφορικος) is speech.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_65" href="#FNanchor_65" class="label">[65]</a> Philostratus relates this of Apollonius, in his Life of him.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_66" href="#FNanchor_66" class="label">[66]</a> The words within the brackets are added from the version of +Felicianus. Hence it appears, that the words εκ των διαφορων μυκηματων +are wanting in the original, after the word ζητει. But this defect is not +noticed by any of the editors.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_67" href="#FNanchor_67" class="label">[67]</a> Porphyry derived this from the treatise of Plutarch, in which it is +investigated whether <i>land</i> are more sagacious than <i>aquatic</i> animals.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_68" href="#FNanchor_68" class="label">[68]</a> This was the opinion of the Stoics; but is most erroneous. For +the supreme divinity, being superessential, transcends even intellect itself, +and much more reason, which is an evolved perception of things; and +this is also the case with every other deity, according to the Platonic +theology, when considered according to his hyparxis, or summit. See +my translation of Proclus on the Theology of Plato.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_69" href="#FNanchor_69" class="label">[69]</a> A musket, or male hawk of a small kind. This bird is mentioned +by Homer, Iliad, XIV. v. 238.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_70" href="#FNanchor_70" class="label">[70]</a> Reason in a divine intellect subsists causally, or in a way better +than reason, and therefore is not a discursive energy (διεξοδικη ενεργεια), +but an evolved cause of things. And though, in a divine soul, it is +discursive, or transitive, yet it differs from our reason in this, that it +perceives the whole of one form at once, and not by degrees, as we do +when we reason.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_71" href="#FNanchor_71" class="label">[71]</a> In the original, Ουτω δ’ εστι λογιστικα ων δρᾳ, κ.τ.λ. But for λογιστικα, +Lipsius proposes to read, λογικα, and Meerman λογικη. There is, however, +no occasion whatever to substitute any other word for λογιστικα, as, +with Platonic writers, το λογιστικον is equivalent to το λογιζομενον.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_72" href="#FNanchor_72" class="label">[72]</a> See the first book of Herodotus, chap. 159.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_73" href="#FNanchor_73" class="label">[73]</a> The more mystical cause why the Egyptians worshipped animals, +appears to me to be this, that they conceived a <i>living</i> to be preferable to +an <i>inanimate</i> image of divinity. Hence, they reverenced animals as +visible and living resemblances of certain invisible powers of the Gods.—See +Plutarch’s Treatise on Isis and Osiris.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_74" href="#FNanchor_74" class="label">[74]</a> See the Symposiacs of Plutarch, lib. ix. 8.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_75" href="#FNanchor_75" class="label">[75]</a> Odyss. XII. v. 96.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_76" href="#FNanchor_76" class="label">[76]</a> The latter part of this sentence, which in the original is τι ουκ +εδιδαξεν ημας ο δημιουργος οπη χρησιμα τη φυσει γεγονε; Valentinius most erroneously +translates, “quare nos rerum opifex non edocuit, quomodo à +natura in nostros usus facta fuerint?”</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_77" href="#FNanchor_77" class="label">[77]</a> <i>i.e.</i> The discursive energy of reason.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_78" href="#FNanchor_78" class="label">[78]</a> In the original, μνημην δε καταληψιν αξιωματος παρεληλυθότος, οὗ το παρον εξ +αισθησεως κατεληφθη; but for αξιωματος, I read πραγματος. Felicianus also +appears to have found this reading in his manuscript copy of this work; +for his version of the passage is, “vel memoriam <i>rei</i> præteritæ comprehensionem, +quam præsentem sensus perciperat.”</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_79" href="#FNanchor_79" class="label">[79]</a> This doubt may, perhaps, be solved, by admitting that brutes have +an imperfect rationality, or the very dregs of the rational faculty, by +which they form a link between men and zoophytes, just as zoophytes are +a link between brutes and merely vegetable substances. Brutes, therefore, +having an imperfect reason, possess only the beginning of perfection.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_80" href="#FNanchor_80" class="label">[80]</a> Plutarch has written a most ingenious treatise on this subject.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_81" href="#FNanchor_81" class="label">[81]</a> In the original, οσῳ μειζον το γενος το των ζωων, τοσουτῳ και προς το μερος +και το οικειον ταυτην διασωσει. On this passage, Reisk observes, “Forte +οσῳ μειζων η οικειωσις προς το γενος το των ζωων, τοσουτῳ (scilicet μαλλον) και προς +το μερος, κ.τ.λ.” But, instead of η οικειωσις, it appears to me that η φιλια +should be substituted.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_82" href="#FNanchor_82" class="label">[82]</a> Porphyry here particularly alludes to Empedocles.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_83" href="#FNanchor_83" class="label">[83]</a> Hesiod. Oper. v. 117.</p></div> + +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_131">[131]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="ON_ABSTINENCE_FROM_ANIMAL_FOOD_4">ON ABSTINENCE FROM ANIMAL FOOD.<br> +BOOK THE FOURTH.</h2> + +</div> + +<p>1. In the preceding books, O Castricius, we have nearly +answered all the arguments which in reality defend the +feeding on flesh, for the sake of incontinence and intemperance, +and which adduce impudent apologies for so +doing by ascribing a greater indigence to our nature than +is fit. Two particular inquiries, however, still remain; +in one of which the promise of advantage especially +deceives those who are corrupted by pleasure. And, +moreover, we shall confute the assertion of our opponents, +that no wise man, nor any nation, has rejected animal +food, as it leads those that hear it to great injustice, +through the ignorance of true history; and we shall also +endeavour to give the solutions of the question concerning +advantage, and to reply to other inquiries.</p> + +<p>2. But we shall begin from the abstinence of certain +nations, in the narration of which, what is asserted of the +Greeks will first claim our attention, as being the most +allied to us, and the most appropriate of all the witnesses +that can be adduced. Among those, therefore, that have concisely, +and at the same time accurately collected an account +of the affairs of the Greeks, is the Peripatetic Dicæarchus⁠<a id="FNanchor_84" href="#Footnote_84" class="fnanchor">[84]</a>, +who, in narrating the pristine life of the Greeks, says, the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_132">[132]</span>ancients, being generated with an alliance to the Gods, +were naturally most excellent, and led the best life; so +that, when compared to us of the present day, who consist +of an adulterated and most vile matter, they were +thought to be a golden race; and they slew no animal +whatever. The truth of this, he also says, is testified by +the poets, who denominate these ancients the golden race, +and assert that every good was present with them.</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">The fertile earth for them spontaneous bore</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Of fruits a copious and unenvy’d store;</div> + <div class="verse indent0">In blissful quiet then, unknown to strife,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">The worthy with the worthy passed their life⁠<a id="FNanchor_85" href="#Footnote_85" class="fnanchor">[85]</a>.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class="noindent">Which assertions, indeed, Dicæarchus explaining, says, +that a life of this kind was under Saturn; if it is proper +to consider it as a thing that once existed, and that it is a +life which has not been celebrated in vain, and if, laying +aside what is extremely fabulous, we may refer it to +a physical narration. All things, therefore, are very properly +said to have been then spontaneously produced; for +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_133">[133]</span>men did not procure any thing by labour, because they +were unacquainted with the agricultural art, and, in short, +had no knowledge of any other art. This very thing, +likewise, was the cause of their leading a life of leisure, +free from labours and care; and if it is proper to assent to +the decision of the most skilful and elegant of physicians, +it was also the cause of their being liberated from +disease. <i>For there is not any precept of physicians which +more contributes to health, than that which exhorts us not to +make an abundance of excrement</i>, from which those pristine +Greeks always preserved their bodies pure. For they +neither assumed such food as was stronger than the +nature of the body could bear, but such as could be vanquished +by the corporeal nature, nor more than was +moderate, on account of the facility of procuring it, +but for the most part less than was sufficient, on account +of its paucity. Moreover, there were neither any wars +among them, nor seditions with each other. For no +reward of contention worth mentioning was proposed +as an incentive, for the sake of which some one might be +induced to engage in such dissensions. So that the +principal thing in that life was leisure and rest from +necessary occupations, together with health, peace, and +friendship. But to those in after times, who, through +aspiring after things which greatly exceeded mediocrity, +fell into many evils, this pristine life became, as it was +reasonable to suppose it would, desirable. The slender +and extemporaneous food, however, of these first men, +is manifested by the saying which was afterwards proverbially +used, <i>enough of the oak</i>; this adage being probably +introduced by him who first changed the ancient mode of +living. A pastoral life succeeded to this, in which men +procured for themselves superfluous possessions, and +meddled with animals. For, perceiving that some of +them were innoxious, but others malefic and savage, they +tamed the former, but attacked the latter. At the same +time, together with this life, war was introduced. And +these things, says Dicæarchus, are not asserted by us, but +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_134">[134]</span>by those who have historically discussed a multitude +of particulars. For, as possessions were now of such +a magnitude as to merit attention, some ambitiously +endeavoured to obtain them, by collecting them [for their +own use], and calling on others to do the same, but +others directed their attention to the preservation of +them when collected. Time, therefore, thus gradually +proceeding, and men always directing their attention to +what appeared to be useful, they at length became conversant +with the third, and agricultural form of life. And +this is what is said by Dicæarchus, in his narration of the +manners of the ancient Greeks, and the blessed life which +they then led, to which abstinence from animal food contributed, +no less than other things. Hence, at that +period there was no war, because injustice was exterminated. +But afterwards, together with injustice towards +animals, war was introduced among men, and the endeavour +to surpass each other in amplitude of possessions. +On which account also, the audacity of those is wonderful, +who say that abstinence from animals is the mother +of injustice, since both history and experience testify, +that together with the slaughter of animals, war and +injustice were introduced.</p> + +<p>3. Hence, this being afterwards perceived by the +Lacedæmonian Lycurgus, though the eating of animals +then prevailed, yet he so arranged his polity, as to render +food of this kind requisite in the smallest degree. For +the allotted property of each individual did not consist in +herds of oxen, flocks of sheep, or an abundance of goats, +horses, and money, but in the possession of land, which +might produce for a man seventy medimni⁠<a id="FNanchor_86" href="#Footnote_86" class="fnanchor">[86]</a> of barley, and +for a woman twelve, and the quantity of liquid fruits in +the same proportion. For he thought that this quantity +of nutriment was sufficient to procure a good habit of body +and health, nothing else to obtain these being requisite. +Whence also it is said, that on returning to his country, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_135">[135]</span>after he had been for some time absent from it, and +perceiving, as he passed through the fields, that the corn +had just been reaped, and that the threshing-floors and +the heaps were parallel and equable, he laughed, and said +to those that were present, that all Laconia seemed to +belong to many brothers, who had just divided the land +among themselves. He added, that as he had therefore +expelled luxury from Sparta, it would be requisite also to +annul the use of money, both golden and silver, and to +introduce iron alone, as its substitute, and this of a great +bulk and weight, and of little value; so that as much of +it as should be worth ten minæ, should require a large +receptacle to hold it, and a cart drawn by two oxen to +carry it. But this being ordained, many species of injustice +were exterminated from Lacedæmon. For who +would attempt to thieve, or suffer himself to be corrupted +by gifts, or defraud or plunder another, when it was not +possible for him to conceal what he had taken, nor +possess it so as to be envied by others, nor derive any +advantage from coining it? Together with money also, +the useless arts were expelled, the works of the Lacedæmonians +not being saleable. For iron money could not +be exported to the other Greeks, nor was it esteemed by +them, but ridiculed. Hence, neither was it lawful to buy +any thing foreign, and which was intrinsically of no +worth, nor did ships laden with merchandise sail into +their ports, nor was any verbal sophist, or futile diviner, +or bawd, or artificer of golden and silver ornaments, permitted +to come to Laconia, because there money was of +no use. And thus luxury, being gradually deprived of +its incitements and nourishment, wasted away of itself. +Those likewise who possessed much derived no greater +advantage from it, than those who did not, as no egress +was afforded to abundance, since it was so obstructed by +impediments, that it was forced to remain in indolent +rest. Hence such household furniture as was in constant +use, and was necessary, such as beds, chairs, and tables, +these were made by them in the best manner; and the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_136">[136]</span>Laconic cup, which was called <i>cothon</i>, was, as Critias +says, especially celebrated in military expeditions. For +in these expeditions, the water which they drank, and +which was unpleasant to the sight, was concealed by the +colour of the cup; and the turbid part of the water falling +against the lips, through their prominency, that part of it +which was drank, was received in a purer condition by +the mouth. As we are informed, however, by Plutarch, +the legislator was the cause of these things. For the +artificers being liberated from useless works, exhibited +the beauty of art in things of a necessary nature.</p> + +<p>4. That he might also in a still greater degree oppose +luxury, and take away the ardent endeavour to obtain +wealth, he introduced a third, and most beautiful political +institution, viz. that of the citizens eating and drinking +together publicly; so that they might partake of the +same prescribed food in common, and might not be fed +at home, reclining on sumptuous couches, and placed +before elegant tables, through the hands of artificers and +cooks, being fattened in darkness, like voracious animals, +and corrupting their bodies, together with their morals, +by falling into every kind of luxury and repletion; as +such a mode of living would require much sleep, hot +baths, and abundant quiet, and such attentions as are +paid to the diseased. This indeed was a great thing; +but still greater than this, that, as Theophrastus says, +he caused wealth to be neglected, and to be of no value, +through the citizens eating at common tables, and the +frugality of their food. For there was no use, nor enjoyment +of riches; nor, in short, was there any thing to +gratify the sight, or any ostentatious display in the +whole apparatus, because both the poor and the rich +sat at the same table. Hence it was universally said, +that in Sparta alone, Plutus was seen to be blind, and +lying like an inanimate and immoveable picture. For +it was not possible for the citizens, having previously +feasted at home, to go to the common tables with +appetites already satiated with food. For the rest carefully +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_137">[137]</span>observed him who did not eat and drink with them, +and reviled him, as an intemperate person, and as one +who conducted himself effeminately with respect to the +common food. Hence these common tables were called +<i>phiditia</i>; either as being the causes of friendship and +benevolence, as if they were <i>philitia</i>, assuming δ for λ; +or as accustoming men [προς ευτελειαν και φειδω] to frugality, +and a slender diet. But the number of those that assembled +at the common table was fifteen, more or less. +And each person brought every month, for the purpose +of furnishing the table, a medimnus of flour, eight choas⁠<a id="FNanchor_87" href="#Footnote_87" class="fnanchor">[87]</a> +of wine, five pounds of cheese, two pounds and a half of +figs, and, besides all these, a very little quantity of money.</p> + +<p>5. Hence the children of those who ate thus sparingly +and temperately, came to these common tables, as to +schools of temperance, where they also heard political +discourses, and were spectators of liberal sports. Here, +likewise, they learnt to jest acrimoniously, without scurrility, +and to receive, without being indignant, the biting +jests of others. For this appeared to be extremely +Laconic, to be able to endure acrimonious jests; though +he who could not endure was permitted to refuse hearing +them, and the scoffer was immediately silent. Such, +therefore, was the frugality of the Lacedæmonians, with +respect to diet, though it was legally instituted for the +sake of the multitude. Hence those who came from this +polity are said to have been more brave and temperate, +and paid more attention to rectitude, than those who +came from other communities, which are corrupted both +in souls and bodies. And it is evident that perfect +abstinence is adapted to such a polity as this, but to +corrupt communities luxurious food⁠<a id="FNanchor_88" href="#Footnote_88" class="fnanchor">[88]</a>. If, likewise, we +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_138">[138]</span>direct our attention to such other nations as regarded +equity, mildness, and piety to the Gods, it will be evident +that abstinence was ordained by them, with a view +to the safety and advantage, if not of all, yet at least of +some of the citizens, who, sacrificing to, and worshipping +the Gods, on account of the city, might expiate the sins +of the multitude. For, in the mysteries, what the boy +who attends the altar accomplishes, by performing accurately +what he is commanded to do, in order to render +the Gods propitious to all those who have been initiated, +as far as to <i>muesis</i>⁠<a id="FNanchor_89" href="#Footnote_89" class="fnanchor">[89]</a> [αντι παντων των μυουμενων], <i>that</i>, in +nations and cities, priests are able to effect, by sacrificing +for all the people, and through piety inducing the Gods +to be attentive to the welfare of those that belong to them. +With respect to priests, therefore, the eating of all animals +is prohibited to some, but of certain animals to others, +whether you consider the customs of the Greeks or of +the barbarians, which are different in different nations. +So that all of them, collectively considered, or existing as +one, being assumed, it will be found that they abstain +from all animals. If, therefore, those who preside over +the safety of cities, and to whose care piety to the Gods +is committed, abstain from animals, how can any one +dare to accuse this abstinence as disadvantageous to +cities?</p> + +<p>6. Chæremon the Stoic, therefore, in his narration of +the Egyptian priests, who, he says, were considered by +the Egyptians as philosophers, informs us, that they +chose temples, as the places in which they might philosophize. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_139">[139]</span>For to dwell with the statues of the Gods is a +thing allied to the whole desire, by which the soul tends +to the contemplation of their divinities. And from the +divine veneration indeed, which was paid to them through +dwelling in temples, they obtained security, all men +honouring these philosophers, as if they were certain +sacred animals. They also led a solitary life, as they +only mingled with other men in solemn sacrifices and +festivals. But at other times the priests were almost inaccessible +to any one who wished to converse with them. +For it was requisite that he who approached to them +should be first purified, and abstain from many things; +and this is as it were a common sacred law respecting +the Egyptian priests. But these [philosophic priests], +having relinquished every other employment, and human +labours⁠<a id="FNanchor_90" href="#Footnote_90" class="fnanchor">[90]</a>, gave up the whole of their life to the contemplation +and worship of divine natures and to divine inspiration; +through the latter, indeed, procuring for themselves +honour, security, and piety; but through contemplation +science; and through both, a certain occult exercise of manners, +worthy of antiquity⁠<a id="FNanchor_91" href="#Footnote_91" class="fnanchor">[91]</a>. For to be always conversant +with divine knowledge and inspiration, removes those who +are so from all avarice, suppresses the passions, and excites +to an intellectual life. But they were studious of frugality +in their diet and apparel, and also of continence and +endurance, and in all things were attentive to justice and +equity. They likewise were rendered venerable, through +rarely mingling with other men. For during the time of +what are called purifications, they scarcely mingled with +their nearest kindred, and those of their own order, nor +were they to be seen by any one, unless it was requisite +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_140">[140]</span>for the necessary purposes of purification. For the sanctuary +was inaccessible to those who were not purified, +and they dwelt in holy places for the purpose of performing +divine works; but at all other times they associated +more freely with those who lived like themselves. +They did not, however, associate with any one who was +not a religious character. But they were always seen +near to the Gods, or to the statues of the Gods, the +latter of which they were beheld either carrying, or preceding +in a sacred procession, or disposing in an orderly +manner, with modesty and gravity; each of which operations +was not the effect of pride, but an indication of +some physical reason. Their venerable gravity also was +apparent from their manners. For their walking was +orderly, and their aspect sedate; and they were so +studious of preserving this gravity of countenance, that +they did not even wink, when at any time they were +unwilling to do so; and they seldom laughed, and when +they did, their laughter proceeded no farther than to a +smile. But they always kept their hands within their +garments. Each likewise bore about him a symbol, indicative +of the order which he was allotted in sacred +concerns; for there were many orders of priests. Their +diet also was slender and simple. For, with respect to +wine, some of them did not at all drink it, but others +drank very little of it, on account of its being injurious +to the nerves, oppressive to the head, an impediment to +invention, and an incentive to venereal desires. In many +other things also they conducted themselves with caution; +neither using bread at all in purifications, and at +those times in which they were not employed in purifying +themselves, they were accustomed to eat bread with +hyssop, cut into small pieces. For it is said, that hyssop +very much purifies the power of bread. But they, for the +most part, abstained from oil, the greater number of them +entirely; and if at any time they used it with pot-herbs, +they took very little of it, and only as much as was +sufficient to mitigate the taste of the herbs.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_141">[141]</span></p> + +<p>7. It was not lawful for them therefore to meddle +with the esculent and potable substances, which were +produced out of Egypt, and this contributed much to the +exclusion of luxury from these priests. But they abstained +from all the fish that was caught in Egypt, and +from such quadrupeds as had solid, or many-fissured +hoofs, and from such as were not horned; and likewise +from all such birds as were carnivorous. Many of them, +however, entirely abstained from all animals; and in purifications +this abstinence was adopted by all of them, for +then they did not even eat an egg. Moreover, they also +rejected other things, without being calumniated for so +doing. Thus, for instance, of oxen, they rejected the +females, and also such of the males as were twins, or +were speckled, or of a different colour, or alternately +varied in their form, or which were now tamed, as having +been already consecrated to labours, and resembled animals +that are honoured, or which were the images of any +thing [that is divine], or those that had but one eye, or +those that verged to a similitude of the human form. +There are also innumerable other observations pertaining +to the art of those who are called μοσχοσφραγισται, or who +stamp calves with a seal, and of which books have been +composed. But these observations are still more curious +respecting birds; as, for instance, that a turtle should not +be eaten; for it is said that a hawk frequently dismisses +this bird after he has seized it, and preserves its life, as a +reward for having had connexion with it. The Egyptian +priests, therefore, that they might not ignorantly meddle +with a turtle of this kind, avoided the whole species of +those birds. And these indeed were certain common +religious ceremonies; but there were different ceremonies, +which varied according to the class of the priests that +used them, and were adapted to the several divinities. +But chastity and purifications were common to all the +priests. When also the time arrived in which they were +to perform something pertaining to the sacred rites of +religion, they spent some days in preparatory ceremonies, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_142">[142]</span>some indeed forty-two, but others a greater, and others +a less number of days; yet never less than seven +days; and during this time they abstained from all +animals, and likewise from all pot-herbs and leguminous +substances, and, above all, from a venereal connexion +with women; for they never at any time had +connexion with males. They likewise washed themselves +with cold water thrice every day; viz. when they +rose from their bed, before dinner, and when they betook +themselves to sleep. But if they happened to be polluted +in their sleep by the emission of the seed, they immediately +purified their body in a bath. They also used cold +bathing at other times, but not so frequently as on the +above occasion. Their bed was woven from the branches +of the palm tree, which they call <i>bais</i>; and their bolster +was a smooth semi-cylindric piece of wood. But they +exercised themselves in the endurance of hunger and +thirst, and were accustomed to paucity of food through +the whole of their life.</p> + +<p>8. This also is a testimony of their continence, that, +though they neither exercised themselves in walking or +riding, yet they lived free from disease, and were sufficiently +strong for the endurance of moderate labours. +They bore therefore many burdens in the performance of +sacred operations, and accomplished many ministrant +works, which required more than common strength. But +they divided the night into the observation of the celestial +bodies, and sometimes devoted a part of it to offices of +purification; and they distributed the day into the worship +of the Gods, according to which they celebrated +them with hymns thrice or four times, viz. in the morning +and evening, when the sun is at his meridian altitude, and +when he is declining to the west. The rest of their time +they devoted to arithmetical and geometrical speculations, +always labouring to effect something, and to make some +new discovery, and, in short, continually exercising their +skill. In winter nights also they were occupied in the +same employments, being vigilantly engaged in literary +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_143">[143]</span>pursuits, as paying no attention to the acquisition of +externals, and being liberated from the servitude of that +bad master, excessive expense. Hence their unwearied +and incessant labour testifies their endurance, but their +continence is manifested by their liberation from the +desire of external good. To sail from Egypt likewise, +[i.e. to quit Egypt,] was considered by them to be one +of the most unholy things, in consequence of their being +careful to avoid foreign luxury and pursuits; for this +appeared to them to be alone lawful to those who were +compelled to do so by regal necessities. Indeed, they +were very anxious to continue in the observance of the +institutes of their country, and those who were found to +have violated them, though but in a small degree, were +expelled [from the college of the priests]. The true +method of philosophizing, likewise, was preserved by the +prophets, by the <i>hierostolistæ</i>⁠<a id="FNanchor_92" href="#Footnote_92" class="fnanchor">[92]</a>, and the sacred scribes, +and also by the <i>horologi</i>, or calculators of nativities. But +the rest of the priests, and of the pastophori⁠<a id="FNanchor_93" href="#Footnote_93" class="fnanchor">[93]</a>, curators +of temples, and ministers of the Gods, were similarly +studious of purity, yet not so accurately, and with such +great continence, as the priests of whom we have been +speaking. And such are the particulars which are narrated +of the Egyptians, by a man who was a lover of +truth, and an accurate writer, and who among the Stoics +strenuously and solidly philosophized.</p> + +<p>9. But the Egyptian priests, through the proficiency +which they made by this exercise, and similitude to +divinity, knew that divinity does not pervade through +man alone, and that soul is not enshrined in man alone +on the earth, but that it nearly passes through all animals. +On this account, in fashioning the images of the +Gods, they assumed every animal, and for this purpose +mixed together the human form and the forms of wild +beasts, and again the bodies of birds with the body of a +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_144">[144]</span>man. For a certain deity was represented by them in a +human shape as far as to the neck, but the face was that +of a bird, or a lion, or of some other animal. And again, +another divine resemblance had a human head, but the +other parts were those of certain other animals, some +of which had an inferior, but others a superior position; +through which they manifested, that these [<i>i.e.</i> brutes and +men], through the decision of the Gods, communicated +with each other, and that tame and savage animals are +nurtured together with us, not without the concurrence of +a certain divine will. Hence also, a lion is worshipped +as a God, and a certain part of Egypt, which is called +Nomos, has the surname of Leontopolis [or the city of the +lion], and another is denominated Busiris [from an ox], +and another Lycopolis [or the city of the wolf]. For +they venerated the power of God which extends to +all things through animals which are nurtured together, +and which each of the Gods imparts. They also reverenced +water and fire the most of all the elements, as +being the principal causes of our safety. And these +things are exhibited by them in temples; for even now, +on opening the sanctuary of Serapis, the worship is performed +through fire and water; he who sings the hymns +making a libation with water, and exhibiting fire, when, +standing on the threshold of the temple, he invokes the +God in the language of the Egyptians. Venerating, +therefore, these elements, they especially reverence those +things which largely participate of them, as partaking +more abundantly of what is sacred. But after these, they +venerate all animals, and in the village Anubis they worship +a man, in which place also they sacrifice to him, and +victims are there burnt in honour of him on an altar; but +he shortly after only eats that which was procured for +him as a man. Hence, as it is requisite to abstain from +man, so, likewise, from other animals. And farther still, +the Egyptian priests, from their transcendent wisdom +and association with divinity, discovered what animals +are more acceptable to the Gods [when dedicated to +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_145">[145]</span>them] than man. Thus they found that a hawk is dear +to the sun, since the whole of its nature consists of blood +and spirit. It also commiserates man, and laments over +his dead body, and scatters earth on his eyes, in which +these priests believe a solar light is resident. They likewise +discovered that a hawk lives many years, and that, +after it leaves the present life, it possesses a divining +power, is most rational and prescient when liberated +from the body, and gives perfection to statues, and moves +temples. A beetle will be detested by one who is ignorant +of and unskilled in divine concerns, but the Egyptians +venerate it, as an animated image of the sun. For +every beetle is a male, and emitting its genital seed in a +muddy place, and having made it spherical, it turns +round the seminal sphere in a way similar to that of the +sun in the heavens. It likewise receives a period of +twenty-eight days, which is a lunar period. In a similar +manner, the Egyptians philosophize about the ram, the +crocodile, the vulture, and the ibis, and, in short, about +every animal; so that, from their wisdom and transcendent +knowledge of divine concerns, they came at length +to venerate all animals⁠<a id="FNanchor_94" href="#Footnote_94" class="fnanchor">[94]</a>. An unlearned man, however, +does not even suspect that they, not being borne along +with the stream of the vulgar who know nothing, and not +walking in the path of ignorance, but passing beyond the +illiterate multitude, and that want of knowledge which +befals every one at first, were led to reverence things +which are thought by the vulgar to be of no worth.</p> + +<p>10. This also, no less than the above-mentioned particulars, +induced them to believe, that animals should be +reverenced [as images of the Gods], viz. that the soul +of every animal, when liberated from the body, was discovered +by them to be rational, to be prescient of futurity, +to possess an oracular power, and to be effective of +every thing which man is capable of accomplishing when +separated from the body. Hence they very properly +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_146">[146]</span>honoured them, and abstained from them as much as +possible. Since, however, the cause through which the +Egyptians venerated the Gods through animals requires +a copious discussion, and which would exceed the limits +of the present treatise, what has been unfolded respecting +this particular is sufficient for our purpose. Nevertheless, +this is not to be omitted, that the Egyptians, when they +buried those that were of noble birth, privately took away +the belly and placed it in a chest, and together with other +things which they performed for the sake of the dead +body, they elevated the chest towards the sun, whom +they invoked as a witness; an oration for the deceased +being at the same time made by one of those to whose +care the funeral was committed. But the oration which +Euphantus⁠<a id="FNanchor_95" href="#Footnote_95" class="fnanchor">[95]</a> has interpreted from the Egyptian tongue +was as follows: “O sovereign Sun, and all ye Gods who +impart life to men, receive me, and deliver me to the +eternal Gods as a cohabitant. For I have always +piously worshipped those divinities which were pointed +out to me by my parents as long as I lived in this +age, and have likewise always honoured those who procreated +my body. And, with respect to other men, I +have never slain any one, nor defrauded any one of what +he deposited with me, nor have I committed any other +atrocious deed. If, therefore, during my life I have acted +erroneously, by eating or drinking things which it is +unlawful to eat or drink, I have not erred through myself, +but through these,” pointing to the chest in which the +belly was contained. And having thus spoken, he threw +the chest into the river [Nile]; but buried the rest of the +body as being pure. After this manner, they thought an +apology ought to be made to divinity for what they had +eaten and drank, and for the insolent conduct which they +had been led to through the belly.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_147">[147]</span></p> + +<p>11. But among those who are known by us, the Jews, +before they first suffered the subversion of their legal +institutes under Antiochus, and afterwards under the +Romans, when also the temple in Jerusalem was captured, +and became accessible to all men to whom, prior +to this event, it was inaccessible, and the city itself was +destroyed;—before this took place, the Jews always +abstained from many animals, but peculiarly, which they +even now do, from swine. At that period, therefore, +there were three kinds of philosophers among them. And +of one kind, indeed, the Pharisees were the leaders, but of +another, the Sadducees, and of the third, which appears to +have been the most venerable, the Essæans. The mode of +life, therefore, of these third was as follows, as Josephus +frequently testifies in many of his writings. For in the +second book of his Judaic History, which he has completed +in seven books, and in the eighteenth of his Antiquities, +which consists of twenty books, and likewise in the +second of the two books which he wrote against the Greeks, +he speaks of these Essæans, and says, that they are of the +race of the Jews, and are in a greater degree than others +friendly to one another. They are averse to pleasures, +conceiving them to be vicious, but they are of opinion +that continence, and the not yielding to the passions, +constitute virtue. And they despise, indeed, wedlock, +but receiving the children of other persons, and instructing +them in disciplines while they are yet of a tender age, +they consider them as their kindred, and form them to +their own manners. And they act in this manner, not for +the purpose of subverting marriage, and the succession +arising from it, but in order to avoid the lasciviousness of +women. They are, likewise, despisers of wealth, and the +participation of external possessions among them in common +is wonderful; nor is any one to be found among +them who is richer than the rest. For it is a law with +them, that those who wish to belong to their sect, must +give up their property to it in common; so that among all +of them, there is not to be seen either the abjectness +of poverty, or the insolence of wealth; but the possessions +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_148">[148]</span>of each being mingled with those of the rest, there +was one property with all of them, as if they had been +brothers. They likewise conceived oil to be a stain to +the body, and that if any one, though unwillingly, was +anointed, he should [immediately] wipe his body. For +it was considered by them as beautiful to be squalid⁠<a id="FNanchor_96" href="#Footnote_96" class="fnanchor">[96]</a>, +and to be always clothed in white garments. But curators +of the common property were elected by votes, indistinctly +for the use of all. They have not, however, one +city, but in each city many of them dwell together, and +those who come among them from other places, if they +are of their sect, equally partake with them of their possessions, +as if they were their own. Those, likewise, +who first perceive these strangers, behave to them as if +they were their intimate acquaintance. Hence, when +they travel, they take nothing with them for the sake +of expenditure. But they neither change their garments +nor their shoes, till they are entirely torn, or destroyed by +time. They neither buy nor sell any thing, but each +of them giving what he possesses to him that is in want, +receives in return for it what will be useful to him. +Nevertheless, each of them freely imparts to others of +their sect what they may be in want of, without any remuneration.</p> + +<p>12. Moreover, they are peculiarly pious to divinity. +For before the sun rises they speak nothing profane, but they +pour forth certain prayers to him which they had received +from their ancestors, as if beseeching him to rise. Afterwards, +they are sent by their curators to the exercise of the +several arts in which they are skilled, and having till the +fifth hour strenuously laboured in these arts, they are afterwards +collected together in one place; and there, being +begirt with linen teguments, they wash their bodies with +cold water. After this purification, they enter into their own +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_149">[149]</span>proper habitation, into which no heterodox person is permitted +to enter. But they being pure, betake themselves +to the dining room, as into a certain sacred fane. In this +place, when all of them are seated in silence, the baker +places the bread in order, and the cook distributes to +each of them one vessel containing one kind of eatables. +Prior, however, to their taking the food which is pure +and sacred, a priest prays, and it is unlawful for any one +prior to the prayer to taste of the food. After dinner, +likewise, the priest again prays; so that both when they +begin, and when they cease to eat, they venerate divinity. +Afterwards, divesting themselves of these garments as +sacred, they again betake themselves to their work till +the evening; and, returning from thence, they eat and +drink in the same manner as before, strangers sitting with +them, if they should happen at that time to be present. +No clamour or tumult ever defiles the house in which +they dwell; but their conversation with each other is performed +in an orderly manner; and to those that are out +of the house, the silence of those within it appears as if it +was some terrific mystery. The cause, however, of this +quietness is their constant sobriety, and that with them +their meat and drink is measured by what is sufficient [to +the wants of nature]. But those who are very desirous +of belonging to their sect, are not immediately admitted +into it, but they must remain out of it for a year, adopting +the same diet, the Essæans giving them a rake, a girdle, +and a white garment. And if, during that time, they have +given a sufficient proof of their continence, they proceed +to a still greater conformity to the institutes of the sect, +and use purer water for the purposes of sanctity; though +they are not yet permitted to live with the Essæans. +For after this exhibition of endurance, their manners are +tried for two years more, and he who after this period +appears to deserve to associate with them, is admitted into +their society.</p> + +<p>13. Before, however, he who is admitted touches his +common food, he takes a terrible oath, in the first place, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_150">[150]</span>that he will piously worship divinity; in the next place, +that he will preserve justice towards men, and that he will +neither designedly, nor when commanded, injure any +one; in the third place, that he will always hate the unjust, +but strenuously assist the just; and in the fourth +place, that he will act faithfully towards all men, but +especially towards the rulers of the land, since no one +becomes a ruler without the permission of God; in the +fifth place, that if he should be a ruler, he will never +employ his power to insolently iniquitous purposes, nor +will surpass those that are in subjection to him in his +dress, or any other more splendid ornament; in the sixth +place, that he will always love the truth, and be hostile to +liars; in the seventh place, that he will preserve his hands +from theft, and his soul pure from unholy gain⁠<a id="FNanchor_97" href="#Footnote_97" class="fnanchor">[97]</a>; and, in +the eighth place, that he will conceal nothing from those +of his sect, nor divulge any thing to others pertaining to +the sect, though some one, in order to compel him, +should threaten him with death. In addition to these +things, also, they swear, that they will not impart the +dogmas of the sect to any one in any other way than that +in which they received them; that they will likewise +abstain from robbery⁠<a id="FNanchor_98" href="#Footnote_98" class="fnanchor">[98]</a>, and preserve the books of their +sect with the same care as the names of the angels. +Such, therefore, are their oaths. But those among them +that act criminally, and are ejected, perish by an evil +destiny. For, being bound by their oaths and their customs, +they are not capable of receiving food from others; +but feeding on herbs, and having their body emaciated +by hunger, they perish. Hence the Essæans, commiserating +many of these unfortunate men, receive them in +their last extremities into their society, thinking that +they have suffered sufficiently for their offences in having +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_151">[151]</span>been punished for them till they were on the brink of the +grave. But they give a rake to those who intend to +belong to their sect, in order that, when they sit for the +purpose of exonerating the belly, they may make a trench +a foot in depth, and completely cover themselves by their +garment, in order that they may not act contumeliously +towards the sun by polluting the rays of the God. And +so great, indeed, is their simplicity and frugality with +respect to diet, that they do not require evacuation till +the seventh day after the assumption of food, which day +they spend in singing hymns to God, and in resting from +labour. But from this exercise they acquire the power of +such great endurance, that even when tortured and burnt, +and suffering every kind of excruciating pain, they cannot +be induced either to blaspheme their legislator, or to +eat what they have not been accustomed to. And the +truth of this was demonstrated in their war with the +Romans. For then they neither flattered their tormentors, +nor shed any tears, but smiled in the midst of their +torments, and derided those that inflicted them, and +cheerfully emitted their souls, as knowing that they +should possess them again. For this opinion was firmly +established among them, that their bodies were indeed +corruptible, and that the matter of which they consisted +was not stable, but that their souls were immortal, and +would endure for ever, and that, proceeding from the +most subtle ether, they were drawn down by a natural +flux, and complicated with bodies; but that, when they +are no longer detained by the bonds of the flesh, then, as +if liberated from a long slavery, they will rejoice, and +ascend to the celestial regions. But from this mode of +living, and from being thus exercised in truth and piety, +there were many among them, as it is reasonable to suppose +there would be, who had a foreknowledge of future +events, as being conversant from their youth with sacred +books, different purifications, and the declarations of the +prophets. And such is the order [or sect] of the +Essæans among the Jews.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_152">[152]</span></p> + +<p>14. All of them, however, were forbidden to eat the +flesh of swine, or fish without scales, which the Greeks +call σελαχια, <i>i.e.</i> <i>cartilaginous</i>; or to eat any animal that +has solid hoofs. They were likewise forbidden not only +to refrain from eating, but also from killing animals that +fled to their houses as supplicants. Nor did the legislator +permit them to slay such animals as were parents +together with their young; but ordered them to spare, +even in a hostile land, and not put to death brutes that +assist us in our labours. Nor was the legislator afraid +that the race of animals which are not sacrificed, would, +through being spared from slaughter, be so increased in +multitude as to produce famine among men; for he knew, +in the first place, that multiparous animals live but for +a short time; and in the next place, that many of them +perish, unless attention is paid to them by men. Moreover, +he likewise knew that other animals would attack +those that increased excessively; of which this is an +indication, that we abstain from many animals, such as +lizards, worms, flies, serpents, and dogs, and yet, at the +same time, we are not afraid of perishing through hunger +by abstaining from them, though their increase is abundant. +And in the next place, it is not the same thing to +eat and to slay an animal. For we destroy many of the +above-mentioned animals, but we do not eat any of them.</p> + +<p>15. Farther still, it is likewise related that the Syrians +formerly abstained from animals, and, on this account, +did not sacrifice them to the Gods; but that afterwards +they sacrificed them, for the purpose of averting certain +evils; yet they did not at all admit of a fleshly diet. In +process of time, however, as Neanthes the Cyzicenean +and Asclepiades the Cyprian say, about the era of Pygmalion, +who was by birth a Phœnician, but reigned over +the Cyprians, the eating of flesh was admitted, from an +illegality of the following kind, which Asclepiades, in his +treatise concerning Cyprus and Phœnicia, relates as follows:—In +the first place, they did not sacrifice any +thing animated to the Gods; but neither was there any +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_153">[153]</span>law pertaining to a thing of this kind, because it was +prohibited by natural law. They are said, however, on a +certain occasion, in which one soul was required for +another, to have, for the first time, sacrificed a victim; +and this taking place, the whole of the victim was then +consumed by fire. But afterwards, when the victim was +burnt, a portion of the flesh fell on the earth, which was +taken by the priest, who, in so doing, having burnt his +fingers, involuntarily moved them to his mouth, as a +remedy for the pain which the burning produced. Having, +therefore, thus tasted of the roasted flesh, he also desired +to eat abundantly of it, and could not refrain from giving +some of it to his wife. Pygmalion, however, becoming +acquainted with this circumstance, ordered both the +priest and his wife to be hurled headlong from a steep +rock, and gave the priesthood to another person, who not +long after performing the same sacrifice, and eating the +flesh of the victim, fell into the same calamities as his +predecessor. The thing, however, proceeding still farther, +and men using the same kind of sacrifice, and through +yielding to desire, not abstaining from, but feeding on +flesh, the deed was no longer punished. Nevertheless +abstinence from fish continued among the Syrians till the +time of Menander: for he says,</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">The Syrians for example take, since these</div> + <div class="verse indent0">When by intemperance led of fish they eat,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Swoln in their belly and their feet become.</div> + <div class="verse indent0">With sack then cover’d, in the public way</div> + <div class="verse indent0">They on a dunghill sit, that by their lowly state,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">The Goddess may, appeas’d, the crime forgive.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p>16. Among the Persians, indeed, those who are wise +in divine concerns, and worship divinity, are called Magi; +for this is the signification of <i>Magus</i>, in the Persian +tongue. But so great and so venerable are these men +thought to be by the Persians, that Darius, the son +of Hystaspes, had among other things this engraved on +his tomb, that he had been the master of the Magi. They +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_154">[154]</span>are likewise divided into three genera, as we are informed +by Eubulus, who wrote the history of Mithra, in a treatise +consisting of many books. In this work he says, that +the first and most learned class of the Magi neither eat +nor slay any thing animated, but adhere to the ancient +abstinence from animals. The second class use some +animals indeed [for food], but do not slay any that are +tame. Nor do those of the third class, similarly with +other men, lay their hands on all animals. For the +dogma with all of them which ranks as the first is this, +that there is a transmigration of souls; and this they +also appear to indicate in the mysteries of Mithra. For +in these mysteries, obscurely signifying our having something +in common with brutes, they are accustomed to +call us by the names of different animals. Thus they +denominate the males who participate in the same mysteries +lions, but the females lionesses, and those who are +ministrant to these rites crows. With respect to their +fathers also, they adopt the same mode. For these are +denominated by them eagles and hawks. And he who +is initiated in the Leontic mysteries, is invested with all-various +forms of animals⁠<a id="FNanchor_99" href="#Footnote_99" class="fnanchor">[99]</a>; of which particulars, Pallas, in +his treatise concerning Mithra, assigning the cause, says, +that it is the common opinion that these things are to be +referred to the circle of the zodiac, but that truly and +accurately speaking, they obscurely signify something +pertaining to human souls, which, according to the Persians, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_155">[155]</span>are invested with bodies of all-various forms. For +the Latins also, says Eubulus, call some men, in their +tongue, boars and scorpions, lizards, and blackbirds. +After the same manner likewise the Persians denominate +the Gods the demiurgic causes of these: for they call +Diana a she-wolf; but the sun, a bull, a lion, a dragon, and +a hawk; and Hecate, a horse, a bull, a lioness, and a dog. +But most theologists say that the name of Proserpine +[της φερεφαττης] is derived from nourishing a ringdove, +[παρα το φερβειν την φατταν]: for the ringdove is sacred to +this Goddess⁠<a id="FNanchor_100" href="#Footnote_100" class="fnanchor">[100]</a>. Hence, also, the priests of Maia dedicate +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_156">[156]</span>to her a ringdove. And Maia is the same with Proserpine, +as being obstetric, and a nurse⁠<a id="FNanchor_101" href="#Footnote_101" class="fnanchor">[101]</a>. For this Goddess +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_157">[157]</span>is terrestrial, and so likewise is Ceres. To this +Goddess, also, a cock is consecrated; and on this account +those that are initiated in her mysteries abstain from +domestic birds. In the Eleusinian mysteries, likewise, the +initiated are ordered to abstain from domestic birds, from +fishes and beans, pomegranates and apples; which fruits +are as equally defiling to the touch, as a woman recently +delivered, and a dead body. But whoever is acquainted +with the nature of divinely-luminous appearances +[φασματα,] knows also on what account it is requisite to +abstain from all birds, and especially for him who hastens +to be liberated from terrestrial concerns, and to be +established with the celestial Gods. Vice, however, as +we have frequently said, is sufficiently able to patronize +itself, and especially when it pleads its cause among the +ignorant. Hence, among those that are moderately +vicious, some think that a dehortation of this kind is +vain babbling, and, according to the proverb, the nugacity +of old women; and others are of opinion that it is +superstition. But those who have made greater advances +in improbity, are prepared, not only to blaspheme those +who exhort to, and demonstrate the propriety of this +abstinence, but calumniate purity itself as enchantment +and pride. They, however, suffering the punishment of +their sins, both from Gods and men, are, in the first +place, sufficiently punished by a disposition [<i>i.e.</i> by a +depravity] of this kind. We shall, therefore, still farther +make mention of another foreign nation, renowned and +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_158">[158]</span>just, and believed to be pious in divine concerns, and +then pass on to other particulars.</p> + +<p>17. For the polity of the Indians being distributed +into many parts, there is one tribe among them of men +divinely wise, whom the Greeks are accustomed to call +Gymnosophists⁠<a id="FNanchor_102" href="#Footnote_102" class="fnanchor">[102]</a>. But of these there are two sects, over +one of which the Bramins preside, but over the other the +Samanæans. The race of the Bramins, however, receive +divine wisdom of this kind by succession, in the same +manner as the priesthood. But the Samanæans are +elected, and consist of those who wish to possess divine +knowledge. And the particulars respecting them are the +following, as the Babylonian Bardesanes⁠<a id="FNanchor_103" href="#Footnote_103" class="fnanchor">[103]</a> narrates, who +lived in the times of our fathers, and was familiar with +those Indians who, together with Damadamis, were sent +to Cæsar. All the Bramins originate from one stock; +for all of them are derived from one father and one +mother. But the Samanæans are not the offspring of +one family, being, as we have said, collected from every +nation of Indians. A Bramin, however, is not a subject +of any government, nor does he contribute any thing +together with others to government. And with respect +to those that are philosophers, among these some dwell +on mountains, and others about the river Ganges. And +those that live on mountains feed on autumnal fruits, and +on cows’ milk coagulated with herbs. But those that +reside near the Ganges, live also on autumnal fruits, +which are produced in abundance about that river. The +land likewise nearly always bears new fruit, together with +much rice, which grows spontaneously, and which they +use when there is a deficiency of autumnal fruits. But to +taste of any other nutriment, or, in short, to touch animal +food, is considered by them as equivalent to extreme +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_159">[159]</span>impurity and impiety. And this is one of their dogmas. +They also worship divinity with piety and purity. They +spend the day, and the greater part of the night, in +hymns and prayers to the Gods; each of them having a +cottage to himself, and living, as much as possible, alone. +For the Bramins cannot endure to remain with others, +nor to speak much; but when this happens to take place, +they afterwards withdraw themselves, and do not speak +for many days. They likewise frequently fast. But the +Samanæans are, as we have said, elected. When, however, +any one is desirous of being enrolled in their order, +he proceeds to the rulers of the city; but abandons the +city or village that he inhabited, and the wealth and all +the other property that he possessed. Having likewise +the superfluities of his body cut off, he receives a garment, +and departs to the Samanæans, but does not return either +to his wife or children, if he happens to have any, nor +does he pay any attention to them, or think that they at +all pertain to him. And, with respect to his children +indeed, the king provides what is necessary for them, and +the relatives provide for the wife. And such is the life +of the Samanæans. But they live out of the city, and +spend the whole day in conversation pertaining to +divinity. They have also houses and temples, built by +the king, in which there are stewards, who receive a +certain emolument from the king, for the purpose of +supplying those that dwell in them with nutriment. But +their food consists of rice, bread, autumnal fruits, and +pot-herbs. And when they enter into their house, the +sound of a bell being the signal of their entrance, those +that are not Samanæans depart from it, and the Samanæans +begin immediately to pray. But having prayed, +again, on the bell sounding as a signal, the servants give +to each Samanæan a platter, (for two of them do not eat +out of the same dish,) and feed them with rice. And to +him who is in want of a variety of food, a pot-herb is +added, or some autumnal fruit. But having eaten as +much as is requisite, without any delay they proceed to +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_160">[160]</span>their accustomed employments. All of them likewise are +unmarried, and have no possessions: and so much are +both these and the Bramins venerated by the other +Indians, that the king also visits them, and requests them +to pray to and supplicate the Gods, when any calamity +befals the country, or to advise him how to act.</p> + +<p>18. But they are so disposed with respect to death, +that they unwillingly endure the whole time of the present +life, as a certain servitude to nature, and therefore +they hasten to liberate their souls from the bodies [with +which they are connected]. Hence frequently, when +they are seen to be well, and are neither oppressed, nor +driven to desperation by any evil, they depart from life. +And though they previously announce to others that it is +their intention to commit suicide, yet no one impedes +them; but, proclaiming all those to be happy who thus +quit the present life, they enjoin certain things to the +domestics and kindred of the dead: so stable and true do +they, and also the multitude, believe the assertion to be, +that souls [in another life] associate with each other. +But as soon as those to whom they have proclaimed that +this is their intention, have heard the mandates given to +them, they deliver the body to fire, in order that they +may separate the soul from the body in the purest +manner, and thus they die celebrated by all the Samanæans. +For these men dismiss their dearest friends to death +more easily than others part with their fellow-citizens +when going the longest journeys. And they lament +themselves, indeed, as still continuing in life; but they +proclaim those that are dead to be blessed, in consequence +of having now obtained an immortal allotment. +Nor is there any sophist, such as there is now amongst +the Greeks, either among these Samanæans, or the above-mentioned +Bramins, who would be seen to doubt and +to say, if all men should imitate you [<i>i.e.</i> should imitate +those Samanæans who commit suicide], what would +become of us? Nor through these are human affairs confused. +For neither do all men imitate them, and those +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_161">[161]</span>who have, may be said to have been rather the causes of +equitable legislation, than of confusion to the different +nations of men. Moreover, the law did not compel +the Samanæans and Bramins to eat animal food, but, permitting +others to feed on flesh, it suffered these to be +a law to themselves, and venerated them as being superior +to law. Nor did the law subject these men to the +punishment which it inflicts, as if they were the primary +perpetrators of injustice, but it reserved this for others. +Hence, to those who ask, what would be the consequence +if all men imitated such characters as these, the saying of +Pythagoras must be the answer; that if all men were +kings, the passage through life would be difficult, yet regal +government is not on this account to be avoided. And [we +likewise say] that if all men were worthy, no administration +of a polity would be found in which the dignity that +probity merits would be preserved. Nevertheless, no one +would be so insane as not to think that all men should +earnestly endeavour to become worthy characters. Indeed, +the law grants to the vulgar many other things [besides a +fleshly diet], which, nevertheless, it does not grant to +a philosopher, nor even to one who conducts the affairs of +government in a proper manner. For it does not receive +every artist into the administration, though it does not +forbid the exercise of any art, nor yet men of every pursuit. +But it excludes those who are occupied in vile and +illiberal arts⁠<a id="FNanchor_104" href="#Footnote_104" class="fnanchor">[104]</a>, and, in short, all those who are destitute of +justice and the other virtues, from having any thing to do +with the management of public affairs. Thus, likewise, +the law does not forbid the vulgar from associating with +harlots, on whom at the same time it imposes a fine; but +thinks that it is disgraceful and base for men that are +moderately good to have any connexion with them. +Moreover, the law does not prohibit a man from spending +the whole of his life in a tavern, yet at the same time this +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_162">[162]</span>is most disgraceful even to a man of moderate worth. It +appears, therefore, that the same thing must also be said +with respect to diet. For that which is permitted to the +multitude, must not likewise be granted to the best of +men. For the man who is a philosopher, should especially +ordain for himself those sacred laws which the +Gods, and men who are followers of the Gods, have instituted. +But the sacred laws of nations and cities appear +to have ordained for sacred men purity, and to have +interdicted them animal food. They have also forbidden +the multitude to eat certain animals, either from motives +of piety, or on account of some injury which would be +produced by the food. So that it is requisite either to +imitate priests, or to be obedient to the mandates of all +legislators; but, in either way, he who is perfectly legal +and pious ought to abstain from all animals. For if some +who are only partially pious abstain from certain animals, +he who is in every respect pious will abstain from all +animals.</p> + +<p>19. I had almost, however, forgotten to adduce what +is said by Euripides, who asserts, that the prophets of +Jupiter in Crete abstained from animals. But what +is said by the chorus to Minos on this subject, is as +follows:</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">Sprung from Phœnicia’s royal line,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Son of Europa, nymph divine,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">And mighty Jove, thy envy’d reign</div> + <div class="verse indent0">O’er Crete extending, whose domain</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Is with a hundred cities crown’d—</div> + <div class="verse indent0">I leave yon consecrated ground,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Yon fane, whose beams the artist’s toil</div> + <div class="verse indent0">With cypress, rooted from the soil,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Hath fashion’d. In the mystic rites</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Initiated, life’s best delights</div> + <div class="verse indent0">I place in chastity alone,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Midst Night’s dread orgies wont to rove,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">The priest of Zagreus⁠<a id="FNanchor_105" href="#Footnote_105" class="fnanchor">[105]</a> and of Jove;</div> +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_163">[163]</span> + <div class="verse indent0">Feasts of crude flesh I now decline,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">And wave aloof the blazing pine</div> + <div class="verse indent0">To Cybele, nor fear to claim</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Her own Curete’s hallow’d name;</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Clad in a snowy vest I fly</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Far from the throes of pregnancy,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Never amidst the tombs intrude,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">And slay no animal for food.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p>20. For holy men were of opinion that purity consisted +in a thing not being mingled with its contrary, and +that mixture is defilement. Hence, they thought that +nutriment should be assumed from fruits, and not from +dead bodies, and that we should not, by introducing +that which is animated to our nature, defile what is +administered by nature. But they conceived, that the +slaughter of animals, as they are sensitive, and the +depriving them of their souls, is a defilement to the +living; and that the pollution is much greater, to mingle +a body which was once sensitive, but is now deprived of +sense, with a sensitive and living being. Hence universally, +the purity pertaining to piety consists in rejecting +and abstaining from many things, and in an abandonment +of such as are of a contrary nature, and the assumption of +such as are appropriate and concordant. On this account, +venereal connexions are attended with defilement. For +in these, a conjunction takes place of the female with the +male; and the seed, when retained by the woman, and +causing her to be pregnant, defiles the soul, through its +association with the body; but when it does not produce +conception, it pollutes, in consequence of becoming a +lifeless mass. The connexion also of males with males +defiles, because it is an emission of seed as it were into a +dead body, and because it is contrary to nature. And, in +short, all venery, and emissions of the seed in sleep, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_164">[164]</span>pollute, because the soul becomes mingled with the body, +and is drawn down to pleasure. The passions of the soul +likewise defile, through the complication of the irrational +and effeminate part with reason, the internal masculine +part. For, in a certain respect, defilement and pollution +manifest the mixture of things of an heterogeneous +nature, and especially when the abstersion of this mixture +is attended with difficulty. Whence, also, in tinctures +which are produced through mixture, one species being +complicated with another, this mixture is denominated +a defilement.</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">As when some woman with a lively red</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Stains the pure iv’ry——</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class="noindent">says Homer⁠<a id="FNanchor_106" href="#Footnote_106" class="fnanchor">[106]</a>. And again, painters call the mixtures of +colours, corruptions. It is usual, likewise, to denominate +that which is unmingled and pure, incorruptible, and to +call that which is genuine, unpolluted. For water, when +mingled with earth, is corrupted, and is not genuine. +But water which is diffluent, and runs with tumultuous +rapidity, leaves behind in its course the earth which it +carries in its stream.</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">When from a limpid and perennial fount</div> + <div class="verse indent0">It defluous runs——</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class="noindent">as Hesiod says⁠<a id="FNanchor_107" href="#Footnote_107" class="fnanchor">[107]</a>. For such water is salubrious, because +it is uncorrupted and unmixed. The female, likewise, that +does not receive into herself the exhalation of seed, +is said to be uncorrupted. So that the mixture of contraries +is corruption and defilement. For the mixture of +dead with living bodies, and the insertion of beings that +were once living and sentient into animals, and of dead +into living flesh, may be reasonably supposed to introduce +defilement and stains to our nature; just, again, as +the soul is polluted when it is invested with the body. +Hence, he who is born, is polluted by the mixture of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_165">[165]</span>his soul with body; and he who dies, defiles his body, +through leaving it a corpse, different and foreign from +that which possesses life. The soul, likewise, is polluted +by anger and desire, and the multitude of passions of +which in a certain respect diet is a co-operating cause. +But as water which flows through a rock is more uncorrupted +than that which runs through marshes, because it +does not bring with it much mud; thus, also, the soul +which administers its own affairs in a body that is dry, +and is not moistened by the juices of foreign flesh, is in a +more excellent condition, is more uncorrupted, and is +more prompt for intellectual energy. Thus too, it is said, +that the thyme which is the driest and the sharpest +to the taste, affords the best honey to bees. The dianoëtic, +therefore, or discursive power of the soul, is polluted; +or rather, he who energizes dianoëtically, when this +energy is mingled with the energies of either the imaginative +or doxastic power. But purification consists in +a separation from all these, and the wisdom which is +adapted to divine concerns, is a desertion of every thing +of this kind. The proper nutriment, likewise, of each +thing, is that which essentially preserves it. Thus you +may say, that the nutriment of a stone is the cause of its +continuing to be a stone, and of firmly remaining in a +lapideous form; but the nutriment of a plant is that +which preserves it in increase and fructification; and of +an animated body, that which preserves its composition. +It is one thing, however, to nourish, and another to +fatten; and one thing to impart what is necessary, and +another to procure what is luxurious. Various, therefore, +are the kinds of nutriment, and various also is the nature +of the things that are nourished. And it is necessary, +indeed, that all things should be nourished, but we +should earnestly endeavour to fatten our most principal +parts. Hence, the nutriment of the rational soul is that +which preserves it in a rational state. But this is intellect; +so that it is to be nourished by intellect; and we +should earnestly endeavour that it may be fattened +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_166">[166]</span>through this, rather than that the flesh may become +pinguid through esculent substances. For intellect preserves +for us eternal life, but the body when fattened +causes the soul to be famished, through its hunger after a +blessed life not being satisfied, increases our mortal part, +since it is of itself insane, and impedes our attainment of +an immortal condition of being. It likewise defiles by +corporifying the soul, and drawing her down to that +which is foreign to her nature. And the magnet, indeed, +imparts, as it were, a soul to the iron which is placed +near it; and the iron, though most heavy, is elevated, and +runs to the spirit of the stone. Should he, therefore, who +is suspended from incorporeal and intellectual deity, be +anxiously busied in procuring food which fattens the +body, that is an impediment to intellectual perception? +Ought he not rather, by contracting what is necessary +to the flesh into that which is little and easily procured, +be <i>himself</i> nourished, by adhering to God more closely +than the iron to the magnet? I wish, indeed, that our +nature was not so corruptible, and that it were possible +we could live free from molestation, even without the +nutriment derived from fruits. O that, as Homer⁠<a id="FNanchor_108" href="#Footnote_108" class="fnanchor">[108]</a> says, +we were not in want either of meat or drink, that we +might be truly immortal!—the poet in thus speaking +beautifully signifying, that food is the auxiliary not only +of life, but also of death. If, therefore, we were not +in want even of vegetable aliment, we should be by +so much the more blessed, in proportion as we should be +more immortal. But now, being in a mortal condition, +we render ourselves, if it be proper so to speak, still more +mortal, through becoming ignorant that, by the addition +of this mortality, the soul, as Theophrastus says, does +not only confer a great benefit on the body by being its +inhabitant, but gives herself wholly to it⁠<a id="FNanchor_109" href="#Footnote_109" class="fnanchor">[109]</a>. Hence, it is +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_167">[167]</span>much to be wished that we could easily obtain the life +celebrated in fables, in which hunger and thirst are +unknown; so that, by stopping the every-way-flowing +river of the body, we might in a very little time be +present with the most excellent natures, to which he who +accedes, since deity is there, is himself a God. But how +is it possible not to lament the condition of the generality +of mankind, who are so involved in darkness as to cherish +their own evil, and who, in the first place, hate themselves, +and him who truly begot them, and afterwards, +those who admonish them, and call on them to return +from ebriety to a sober condition of being? Hence, dismissing +things of this kind, will it not be requisite to pass +on to what remains to be discussed?</p> + +<p>21. Those then who oppose the Nomades, or Troglodytæ⁠<a id="FNanchor_110" href="#Footnote_110" class="fnanchor">[110]</a>, +or Ichthyophagi, to the legal institutes of the nations +which we have adduced, are ignorant that these people were +brought to the necessity of eating animals through the infecundity +of the region they inhabit, which is so barren, that it +does not even produce herbs, but only shores and sands. +And this necessity is indicated by their not being able to +make use of fire, through the want of combustible materials; +but they dry their fish on rocks, or on the shore. And +these indeed live after this manner from necessity. There +are, however, certain nations whose manners are rustic, +and who are naturally savage; but it is not fit that those +who are equitable judges should, from such instances as +these, calumniate human nature. For thus we should not +only be dubious whether it is proper to eat animals, but +also, whether we may not eat men, and adopt all other +savage manners. It is related, therefore, that the Massagetæ +and the Derbices consider those of their kindred to +be most miserable who die spontaneously. Hence, preventing +their dearest friends from dying naturally, they +slay them when they are old, and eat them. The Tibareni +hurl from rocks their nearest relatives, even while +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_168">[168]</span>living, when they are old. And with respect to the Hyrcani +and Caspii, the one exposed the living, but the other +the dead, to be devoured by birds and dogs. But the +Scythians bury the living with the dead, and cut their +throats on the pyres of the dead by whom they were +especially beloved. The Bactrii likewise cast those +among them that are old, even while living, to the dogs. +And Stasanor, who was one of Alexander’s prefects, +nearly lost his government through endeavouring to +destroy this custom. As, however, we do not on account +of these examples subvert mildness of conduct towards +men, so neither should we imitate those nations that feed +on flesh through necessity, but we should rather imitate +the pious, and those who consecrate themselves to the +Gods. For Democrates⁠<a id="FNanchor_111" href="#Footnote_111" class="fnanchor">[111]</a> says, that to live badly, and not +prudently, temperately, and piously, is not to live in +reality⁠<a id="FNanchor_112" href="#Footnote_112" class="fnanchor">[112]</a>, but to die for a long time.</p> + +<p>22. It now remains that we should adduce a few +examples of certain individuals, as testimonies in favour +of abstinence from animal food. For the want of these +was one of the accusations which were urged against us. +We learn, therefore, that Triptolemus was the most +ancient of the Athenian legislators; of whom Hermippus⁠<a id="FNanchor_113" href="#Footnote_113" class="fnanchor">[113]</a>, +in the second book of his treatise on Legislators, +writes as follows: “It is said, that Triptolemus established +laws for the Athenians. And the philosopher +Xenocrates asserts, that three of his laws still remain +in Eleusis, which are these, Honour your parents; Sacrifice +to the Gods from the fruits of the earth; Injure +not animals.” Two of these, therefore, he says, are +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_169">[169]</span>properly instituted. For it is necessary that we should +as much as possible recompense our parents for the +benefits which they have conferred on us; and that +we should offer to the Gods the first-fruits of the +things useful to our life, which they have imparted to +us. But with respect to the third law, he is dubious +as to the intention of Triptolemus, in ordering the Athenians +to abstain from animals. Was it, says he, because +he thought it was a dire thing to slay kindred natures, +or because he perceived it would happen, that the most +useful animals would be destroyed by men for food? +Wishing, therefore, to make our life as mild as possible, +he endeavoured to preserve those animals that associate +with men, and which are especially tame. Unless, indeed, +because having ordained that men should honour +the Gods by offering to them first-fruits, he therefore +added this third law, conceiving that this mode of worship +would continue for a longer time, if sacrifices +through animals were not made to the Gods. But as +many other causes, though not very accurate, of the promulgation +of these laws, are assigned by Xenocrates, +thus much from what has been said is sufficient for our +purpose, that abstinence from animals was one of the +legal institutes of Triptolemus. Hence, those who afterwards +violated this law, being compelled by great necessity, +and involuntary errors, fell, as we have shown, +into this custom of slaughtering and eating animals. +The following, also, is mentioned as a law of Draco: +“Let this be an eternal <i>sacred law</i>⁠<a id="FNanchor_114" href="#Footnote_114" class="fnanchor">[114]</a> to the inhabitants +of Attica, and let its authority be predominant for +ever; viz. that the Gods, and indigenous Heroes, be +worshipped publicly, conformably to the laws of the +country, delivered by our ancestors; and also, that they +be worshipped privately, according to the ability of each +individual, in conjunction with auspicious words, the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_170">[170]</span>firstlings of fruits, and annual cakes. So that this law +ordains, that divinity should be venerated by the first +offerings of fruits which are used by men, and cakes +made of the fine flour of wheat.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_115" href="#Footnote_115" class="fnanchor">[115]</a></p> + +<div class="footnotes"> + +<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_84" href="#FNanchor_84" class="label">[84]</a> There were many celebrated men of this name among the ancients, +concerning which vid. Fabric. Biblioth. Græc. L. III. c. 11.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_85" href="#FNanchor_85" class="label">[85]</a> These lines are from Hesiod. Oper. 116. The different ages, however, +of mankind, which are celebrated by Hesiod in his Works and +Days, signify the different lives which the individuals of the human +species pass through; and as Proclus on Hesiod beautifully observes, +they may be comprehended in this triad, the <i>golden</i>, the <i>silver</i>, and the +<i>brazen</i> age. But by the <i>golden</i> age an intellectual life is implied. For +such a life is pure, impassive, and free from sorrow; and of this impassivity +and purity, gold is an image, through never being subject to rust or +putrefaction. Such a life, too, is very properly said to be under Saturn, +because Saturn is an <i>intellectual</i> God, or a God characterised by intellect. +By the <i>silver</i> age, a rustic and natural life is implied, in which the +attention of the rational soul is entirely directed to the care of the body, +but without proceeding to extreme depravity. And by the <i>brazen</i> age, a +dire, tyrannic, and cruel life is implied, which is entirely passive, and +proceeds to the very extremity of vice. The order, also, of these metals, +harmonizes, as Proclus observes, with that of the lives. “For,” says he, +“<i>gold</i> is <i>solar-form</i>, because the sun is solely immaterial light. But +<i>silver</i> is <i>lunar-form</i>, because the moon partakes of shadow, just as silver +partakes of rust. And <i>brass</i> is <i>earthly</i>, so far as not having a nature +similar to a lucid body; it is replete with abundance of corruption.”</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_86" href="#FNanchor_86" class="label">[86]</a> The medimnus was a measure containing six bushels.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_87" href="#FNanchor_87" class="label">[87]</a> An Attic measure, containing six Attic pints.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_88" href="#FNanchor_88" class="label">[88]</a> In the original, και δηλον ως τοιαυτῃ πολιτειᾳ οικειον, το της αποχης της +παντελους, ταις δε διεφθαρμεναις, το της βρωσεως. But the latter part of this +sentence is evidently defective, though the defect is not noticed either +by Valentinus, or Reiske, or Rhoer. It appears therefore to me, that +της τρυφης is wanting; so that for το της βρωσεως, we should read το της +τρυφης της βρωσεως. And my conjecture is justified by the version of +Felicianus, which is, “Huic autem abstinentiam, cæteris <i>luxuriam</i> +victus fuisse peculiarem perspicuum est.”</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_89" href="#FNanchor_89" class="label">[89]</a> Those who, in being initiated, <i>closed the eyes</i>, which <i>muesis</i> +signifies, no longer (says Hermias in Phædrum) received by sense +those divine mysteries, but with the pure soul itself. See my Dissertation +on the Eleusinian and Bacchic Mysteries.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_90" href="#FNanchor_90" class="label">[90]</a> In the original, και πορους ανθρωπινους; but for πορους I read πονους, and +Felicianus appears to have found the same reading in his MS.; for his +version is, “laboribusque humanis.” Neither Reisk, however, nor +Rhoer, have at all noticed the word πορους as improper in this place.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_91" href="#FNanchor_91" class="label">[91]</a> Much is related about the Egyptian priests by Herodotus, lib. ii. +37. With respect to Chæremon, the decisions of the ancients concerning +him are very discordant.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_92" href="#FNanchor_92" class="label">[92]</a> <i>i.e.</i> Those to whose care the sacred vestments were committed.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_93" href="#FNanchor_93" class="label">[93]</a> These were so denominated from carrying the little receptacles in +which the images of the Gods were contained.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_94" href="#FNanchor_94" class="label">[94]</a> See on this subject Plutarch’s excellent treatise of Isis and Osiris.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_95" href="#FNanchor_95" class="label">[95]</a> Fabricius is of opinion, that this <i>Euphantus</i> is the same with the +<i>Ecphantus</i> mentioned by Iamblichus (in Vit. Pyth.) as one of the Pythagoreans. +Vid. Fabric. Bibl. Græc. lib. ii. c. 13.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_96" href="#FNanchor_96" class="label">[96]</a> This is not wonderful; for the Jews appear to have been always +negligent of cleanliness. The intelligent reader will easily perceive that +there is some similitude between these Essæans and the ancient Pythagoreans, +but that the latter were infinitely superior to the former. See +my translation of Iamblichus’ Life of Pythagoras.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_97" href="#FNanchor_97" class="label">[97]</a> This was a very necessary oath for these Essæans to take; as the +Jews in general, if we may believe Tacitus and other ancient historians, +were always a people immoderately addicted to gain.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_98" href="#FNanchor_98" class="label">[98]</a> As the Essæans appear to have been an exception to the rest of the +Jews, the reason is obvious why they took this oath.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_99" href="#FNanchor_99" class="label">[99]</a> Similar to this was the garment with which Apuleius was invested +after his initiation into the mysteries of Isis, and which he describes as +follows:—“There [<i>i.e.</i> on a wooden throne] I sat conspicuous, in a +garment which was indeed linen, but was elegantly painted. A precious +cloak also depended from my shoulders behind my back, as far as +to my heels. Nevertheless, to whatever part of me you directed your +view, you might see that I was remarkable by the animals which were +painted round my vestment, in various colours. Here were Indian +dragons, there Hyperborean griffins, which the other hemisphere generates +in the form of a winged animal. Men devoted to the service of +divinity, call this cloak the Olympic garment.”—See Book II. of my +translation of the Metamorphosis of Apuleius.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_100" href="#FNanchor_100" class="label">[100]</a> Proclus, however, in his Scholia on the Cratylus of Plato, gives a +much more theological account of the derivation of the name of Proserpine, +as follows:—“Socrates now delivers these three vivific monads +in a consequent order, viz. Ceres, Juno, Proserpine; calling the first +the mother, the second the sister, and the third the daughter of the +Demiurgus [Jupiter]. All of them, however, are partakers of the whole +of fabrication; the first in an exempt manner, and intellectually; the +second in a fontal manner, and, at the same time, in a way adapted to a +principle [αρχικως]; and the third in a manner adapted to a principle +and a leader [αρχικως και ηγεμονικως].</p> + +<p>“Of these Goddesses the last is allotted triple powers, and impartibly +and uniformly comprehends three monads of Gods. But she is called +Core [κορη] through the purity of her essence, and her undefiled transcendency +in her generations. She also possesses a first, middle, and last +empire; and according to her summit, indeed, she is called Diana by +Orpheus; but, according to her middle, Proserpine; and according to +the extremity of the order, Minerva. Likewise, according to an essence +transcending the other powers of this triple vivific order, the dominion of +Hecate is established; but according to a middle power, and which is +generative of wholes, that of soul; and, according to intellectual conversion, +that of Virtue⁠<a id="FNanchor_A" href="#Footnote_A" class="fnanchor">[A]</a>. Ceres, therefore, subsisting on high, and among +the supermundane Gods, uniformly extends this triple order of divinities; +and, together with Jupiter, generates Bacchus, who impartibly presides +over partible fabrication. But beneath, in conjunction with Pluto, she +is particularly beheld according to the middle characteristic: for it is +this which, proceeding every where, imparts vivification to the last of +things. Hence she is called Proserpine, because she especially associates +with Pluto, and, together with him, distributes in an orderly manner +the extremities of the universe. And, according to her extremities, +indeed, she is said to be a virgin, and to remain undefiled; but, according +to her middle, to be conjoined with Hades, and to beget the Furies in +the subterranean regions. She, therefore, is also called Ceres, but +after another manner than the supermundane and ruling Ceres. For the +one is the connective unity of the three vivific principles; but the +other is the middle of them, in herself possessing the peculiarities of the +extremes. Hence, in the Proserpine conjoined with Pluto, you will find +the peculiarities of Hecate and Minerva; but these extremes subsist in +her occultly, while the peculiarity of the middle shines forth, and that +which is characteristic of ruling soul, which in the supermundane Ceres +was of a <i>ruling</i>⁠<a id="FNanchor_B" href="#Footnote_B" class="fnanchor">[B]</a> nature, but here subsists according to a +mundane peculiarity.”</p> + +<p>Proclus farther observes, “that Proserpine is denominated either +through judging of forms, and separating them from each other, thus +obscurely signifying the subversion of slaughter⁠<a id="FNanchor_C" href="#Footnote_C" class="fnanchor">[C]</a>, (δια το κρινειν τα ειδη, και +χωριζειν αλληλων ως του φονου την αναιρεσιν αινιττομενον,) or through separating +souls perfectly from bodies, through a conversion to things on high, +which is the most fortunate slaughter and death to such as are worthy of it. +(ἢ δια το χωριζειν τας ψυχας τελεως εκ των σωματων δια της προς τα ανω επιστροφης, +οπερ εστιν ευτυχεστατος φονος και θανατος τοις αξιουμενοις ταυτου.) But the name +φερεφαττα, <i>Pherephatta</i>, is adapted to Proserpine, according to a contact +with generation; but according to wisdom and counsel, to Minerva. At +the same time, however, all the appellations by which she is distinguished, +are adapted to the perfection of soul. On this account, also, +she is called Proserpine, and not by the names of the extremes; since +that which was ravished by Pluto, is this middle deity; the extremes at +the same time being firmly established in themselves; according to which +Ceres is said to remain a virgin.”</p> + +<p><a id="Footnote_A" href="#FNanchor_A">[A]</a> Proclus says this conformably to the theology of the Chaldeans; +for, according to that theology, the first monad of the vivific triad is +<i>Hecate</i>, the second <i>Soul</i>, and the third <i>Virtue</i>.</p> + +<p><a id="Footnote_B" href="#FNanchor_B">[B]</a> That is, of a supermundane nature; for the <i>ruling</i> are the +<i>supermundane</i> Gods.</p> + +<p><a id="Footnote_C" href="#FNanchor_C">[C]</a> Proclus here alludes to the war which subsists among forms through +their union with matter, and which Proserpine subverts by separating +them from each other.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_101" href="#FNanchor_101" class="label">[101]</a> The first subsistence of Maia, who, according to the Orphic theology, +is the same with the Goddess Night, is at the summit of <i>the intelligible, +and at the same time intellectual</i> order, and is wholly absorbed in the +intelligible. As we are also informed by Proclus (in Cratylum), “She +is the paradigm of Ceres. For immortal Night is the nurse of the Gods +[according to Orpheus]. Night, however, is the cause of aliment intelligibly: +for the intelligible is, as the Chaldean Oracle says, the aliment +of the intellectual orders of Gods. But Ceres, first of all, separates the +two kinds of aliment [nectar and ambrosia] in the Gods.” He adds, +“Hence our sovereign mistress [δεσποινα], Ceres, not only generates +life, but that which gives perfection to life; and this from supernal +natures, to such as are last. For <i>virtue is the perfection of souls</i>.”</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_102" href="#FNanchor_102" class="label">[102]</a> Concerning the Indian philosophers, see the second book of Diodorus +Siculus.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_103" href="#FNanchor_103" class="label">[103]</a> This is the Bardesanes who lived in the time of Marcus Antoninus, +and who wrote a treatise on the Lake of Probation in India, which is +mentioned by Porphyry in his fragment De Styge, preserved by Stobæus.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_104" href="#FNanchor_104" class="label">[104]</a> Βαναυσοι, <i>i.e.</i> dirty mechanics and bellows-blowers, an appellation +by which Plato in his Rivals designates the <i>experimentalists</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_105" href="#FNanchor_105" class="label">[105]</a> Zagreus is an epithet of Bacchus. Wodhull, however, from whose +translation of Euripides the above lines are taken, is greatly mistaken in +saying, that “it is evident from the hymns of Orpheus that Zagreus was +a name given to Bacchus at his sacred rites.” For the word Ζαγρευς +(Zagreus) is not to be found either in the hymns of Orpheus, or in any +other of the Orphic writings that are extant.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_106" href="#FNanchor_106" class="label">[106]</a> Iliad, IV. v. 141.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_107" href="#FNanchor_107" class="label">[107]</a> Oper. et Dies, 595.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_108" href="#FNanchor_108" class="label">[108]</a> Iliad, V. v. 341.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_109" href="#FNanchor_109" class="label">[109]</a> In the original, ου πολυ το ενοικιον, ως φησι που Θεοφραστος, τῳ σωματι +διδουσης της ψυχης, κ.τ.λ. But for ου πολυ το ενοικιον, it appears to me to be +necessary to read, ου μονον πολυ το ενοικιον, κ.τ.λ.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_110" href="#FNanchor_110" class="label">[110]</a> Vid. Diod. Sic. lib. iii. 32.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_111" href="#FNanchor_111" class="label">[111]</a> Reisk says, that he does not know who this Democrates is; but +there can, I think, be no doubt of its being the Pythagorean of that +name, whose Golden Sentences are extant in the Opuscula Mythologica +of Gale, of which see Mr. Bridgman’s translation.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_112" href="#FNanchor_112" class="label">[112]</a> In the original, ου κακως ζῃν ειναι. But for ου κακως, I read, +ουκ οντως. For without this emendation, Democrates will contradict +himself.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_113" href="#FNanchor_113" class="label">[113]</a> This Hermippus is also cited by Diogenes Laertius in Pyth.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_114" href="#FNanchor_114" class="label">[114]</a> In the original, θεσμος, which, as we are informed by Proclus, +signifies <i>divine order, and a uniform boundary</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_115" href="#FNanchor_115" class="label">[115]</a> This book is evidently imperfect, because there are wanting at +the end examples of illustrious Greeks and Romans, who, from the +most remote antiquity, abstained from animal food. And this was also +obvious to Reisk.</p></div> + +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_171">[171]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="ON_THE_CAVE_OF_THE_NYMPHS"><span class="smaller">ON</span><br> +THE CAVE OF THE NYMPHS,<br> +<span class="smaller"><span class="smaller">IN THE</span><br> +THIRTEENTH BOOK OF THE ODYSSEY.</span></h2> + +</div> + +<p>1. What does Homer obscurely signify by the cave in +Ithaca, which he describes in the following verses?</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">“High at the head a branching olive grows,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">And crowns the pointed cliffs with shady boughs.</div> + <div class="verse indent0">A cavern pleasant, though involv’d in night,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Beneath it lies, the Naiades’ delight:</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Where bowls and urns of workmanship divine</div> + <div class="verse indent0">And massy beams in native marble shine;</div> + <div class="verse indent0">On which the Nymphs amazing webs display,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Of purple hue, and exquisite array.</div> + <div class="verse indent0">The busy bees within the urns secure</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Honey delicious, and like nectar pure.</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Perpetual waters through the grotto glide,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">A lofty gate unfolds on either side;</div> + <div class="verse indent0">That to the north is pervious to mankind;</div> + <div class="verse indent0">The sacred south t’ immortals is consign’d.”</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class="noindent">That the poet, indeed, does not narrate these particulars +from historical information, is evident from this, that +those who have given us a description of the island, +have, as Cronius⁠<a id="FNanchor_116" href="#Footnote_116" class="fnanchor">[116]</a> says, made no mention of such a cave +being found in it. This likewise, says he, is manifest, +that it would be absurd for Homer to expect, that in +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_172">[172]</span>describing a cave fabricated merely by poetical license, +and thus artificially opening a path to Gods and men +in the region of Ithaca, he should gain the belief of mankind. +And it is equally absurd to suppose, that nature +herself should point out, in this place, one path for the +descent of all mankind, and again another path for all the +Gods. For, indeed, the whole world is full of Gods and +men: but it is impossible to be persuaded, that in the +Ithacensian cave men descend, and Gods ascend. Cronius, +therefore, having premised thus much, says, that it +is evident, not only to the wise but also to the vulgar, +that the poet, under the veil of allegory, conceals some +mysterious signification; thus compelling others to explore +what the gate of men is, and also what is the gate +of the Gods: what he means by asserting that this cave +of the Nymphs has two gates; and why it is both pleasant +and obscure, since darkness is by no means delightful, +but is rather productive of aversion and horror. Likewise, +what is the reason why it is not simply said to +be the cave of the Nymphs, but it is accurately added, +of the Nymphs which are called Naiades? Why, also, is +the cave represented as containing bowls and amphoræ, +when no mention is made of their receiving any liquor, +but bees are said to deposit their honey in these vessels +as in hives? Then, again, why are oblong beams adapted +to weaving placed here for the Nymphs; and these not +formed from wood, or any other pliable matter, but from +stone, as well as the amphoræ and bowls? Which last +circumstance is, indeed, less obscure; but that, on these +stony beams, the Nymphs should weave purple garments, +is not only wonderful to the sight, but also to the auditory +sense. For who would believe that Goddesses weave +garments in a cave involved in darkness, and on stony +beams; especially while he hears the poet asserting, that +the purple webs of the Goddesses were visible. In +addition to these things likewise, this is admirable, that +the cave should have a twofold entrance; one made for +the descent of men, but the other for the ascent of Gods. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_173">[173]</span>And again, that the gate, which is pervious by men, +should be said to be turned towards the north wind, but +the portal of the Gods to the south; and why the poet +did not rather make use of the west and the east for this +purpose; since nearly all temples have their statues and +entrances turned towards the east; but those who enter +them look towards the west, when standing with their +faces turned towards the statues, they honour and worship +the Gods. Hence, since this narration is full of such +obscurities, it can neither be a fiction casually devised for +the purpose of procuring delight, nor an exposition of +a topical history; but something allegorical must be +indicated in it by the poet, who likewise mystically places +an olive near the cave. All which particulars the ancients +thought very laborious to investigate and unfold; and +we, with their assistance, shall now endeavour to develope +the secret meaning of the allegory. Those persons, therefore, +appear to have written very negligently about the +situation of the place, who think that the cave, and what +is narrated concerning it, are nothing more than a fiction +of the poet. But the best and most accurate writers of +geography, and among these Artemidorus the Ephesian, +in the fifth book of his work, which consists of eleven +books, thus writes: “The island of Ithaca, containing an +extent of eighty-five stadia⁠<a id="FNanchor_117" href="#Footnote_117" class="fnanchor">[117]</a>, is distant from Panormus, +a port of Cephalenia, about twelve stadia. It has a port +named Phorcys, in which there is a shore, and on that +shore a cave, in which the Phæacians are reported to have +placed Ulysses.” This cave, therefore, will not be entirely +an Homeric fiction. But whether the poet describes it +as it really is, or whether he has added something to it of +his own invention, nevertheless the same inquiries remain; +whether the intention of the poet is investigated, or of +those who founded the cave. For, neither did the +ancients establish temples without fabulous symbols, nor +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_174">[174]</span>does Homer rashly narrate the particulars pertaining to +things of this kind. But how much the more any one +endeavours to show that this description of the cave +is not an Homeric fiction, but prior to Homer was consecrated +to the Gods, by so much the more will this consecrated +cave be found to be full of ancient wisdom. And +on this account it deserves to be investigated, and it is +requisite that its symbolical consecration should be amply +unfolded into light.</p> + +<p>2. The ancients, indeed, very properly consecrated a +cave to the world, whether assumed collectively, according +to the whole of itself, or separately, according to its +parts. Hence they considered earth as a symbol of that +matter of which the world consists; on which account +some thought that matter and earth are the same; +through the cave indicating the world, which was generated +from matter. For caves are, for the most part, +spontaneous productions, and connascent with the earth, +being comprehended by one uniform mass of stone; the +interior parts of which are concave, but the exterior parts +are extended over an indefinite portion of land. And the +world being spontaneously produced, [<i>i.e.</i> being produced +by no external, but from an internal cause,] and being +also self-adherent, is allied to matter; which, according +to a secret signification, is denominated a stone and a +rock, on account of its sluggish and repercussive nature +with respect to form: the ancients, at the same time, +asserting that matter is infinite through its privation of +form. Since, however, it is continually flowing, and is +of itself destitute of the supervening investments of form, +through which it participates of <i>morphe</i>⁠<a id="FNanchor_118" href="#Footnote_118" class="fnanchor">[118]</a>, and becomes +visible, the flowing waters, darkness, or, as the poet says, +obscurity of the cavern, were considered by the ancients +as apt symbols of what the world contains, on account of +the matter with which it is connected. Through matter, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_175">[175]</span>therefore, the world is obscure and dark; but through +the connecting power, and orderly distribution of form, +from which also it is called <i>world</i>, it is beautiful and +delightful. Hence it may very properly be denominated +a cave; as being lovely, indeed, to him who first enters +into it, through its participation of forms, but obscure +to him who surveys its foundation, and examines it with +an intellectual eye. So that its exterior and superficial +parts, indeed, are pleasant, but its interior and profound +parts are obscure, [and its very bottom is darkness itself]. +Thus also the Persians, mystically signifying the descent +of the soul into the sublunary regions, and its regression +from it, initiate the mystic [or him who is admitted to the +arcane sacred rites] in a place which they denominate +a cavern. For, as Eubulus says, Zoroaster was the first +who consecrated, in the neighbouring mountains of Persia, +a spontaneously produced cave, florid, and having +fountains, in honour of Mithra, the maker and father of +all things; a cave, according to Zoroaster, bearing a +resemblance of the world, which was fabricated by +Mithra. But the things contained in the cavern being +arranged according to commensurate intervals, were +symbols of the mundane elements and climates.</p> + +<p>3. After this Zoroaster likewise, it was usual with +others to perform the rites pertaining to the mysteries in +caverns and dens, whether spontaneously produced, or +made by the hands. For, as they established temples, +groves, and altars, to the celestial Gods, but to the +terrestrial Gods, and to heroes, altars alone, and to the +subterranean divinities pits and cells; so to the world +they dedicated caves and dens; as likewise to Nymphs⁠<a id="FNanchor_119" href="#Footnote_119" class="fnanchor">[119]</a>, +on account of the water which trickles, or is diffused in +caverns, over which the Naiades, as we shall shortly observe, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_176">[176]</span>preside. Not only, however, did the ancients make a +cavern, as we have said, to be a symbol of the world, or +of a generated and sensible nature; but they also assumed +it as a symbol of all invisible powers; because, as caverns +are obscure and dark, so the essence of these powers +is occult. Hence Saturn fabricated a cavern in the ocean +itself, and concealed in it his children. Thus, too, Ceres +educated Proserpine, with her Nymphs, in a cave; and +many other particulars of this kind may be found in the +writings of theologists. But that the ancients dedicated +caverns to Nymphs, and especially to the Naiades, who +dwell near fountains, and who are called Naiades from the +streams over which they preside, is manifest from the +hymn to Apollo, in which it is said: “The Nymphs +residing in caves shall deduce fountains of intellectual +waters to thee, (according to the divine voice of the +Muses,) which are the progeny of a terrene spirit. Hence +waters, bursting through every river, shall exhibit to +mankind perpetual effusions of sweet streams⁠<a id="FNanchor_120" href="#Footnote_120" class="fnanchor">[120]</a>.” From +hence, as it appears to me, the Pythagoreans, and after +them Plato, showed that the world is a cavern and a den. +For the powers which are the leaders of souls, thus speak +in a verse of Empedocles:</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">Now at this secret cavern we’re arrived.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class="noindent">And by Plato, in the 7th book of his Republic, it is said, +“Behold men as if dwelling in a subterraneous cavern, +and in a den-like habitation, whose entrance is widely +expanded to the admission of the light through the whole +cave.” But when the other person in the Dialogue says, +“You adduce an unusual and wonderful similitude,” he +replies, “The whole of this image, friend Glauco, must +be adapted to what has been before said, assimilating this +receptacle, which is visible through the sight, to the +habitation of a prison; but the light of the fire which is +in it to the power of the sun.”</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_177">[177]</span></p> + +<p>4. That theologists therefore considered caverns as +symbols of the world, and of mundane powers, is, through +this, manifest. And it has been already observed by us, +that they also considered a cave as a symbol of the +intelligible essence; being impelled to do so by different +and not the same conceptions. For they were of +opinion, that a cave is a symbol of the sensible world, +because caverns are dark, stony, and humid; and they +asserted, that the world is a thing of this kind, through +the matter of which it consists, and through its repercussive +and flowing nature. But they thought it to be a +symbol of the intelligible world, because that world is +invisible to sensible perception, and possesses a firm and +stable essence. Thus, also, partial powers are unapparent, +and especially those which are inherent in matter. +For they formed these symbols, from surveying the +spontaneous production of caves, and their nocturnal, +dark, and stony nature; and not entirely, as some suspect, +from directing their attention to the figure of a cavern. +For every cave is not spherical, as is evident from this +Homeric cave with a twofold entrance. But since a +cavern has a twofold similitude, the present cave must +not be assumed as an image of the intelligible, but of the +sensible essence. For in consequence of containing perpetually-flowing +streams of water, it will not be a symbol +of an intelligible hypostasis, but of a material essence. +On this account also, it is sacred to Nymphs, not the +mountain, <i>or rural⁠<a id="FNanchor_121" href="#Footnote_121" class="fnanchor">[121]</a> Nymphs</i>, or others of the like kind, +but to the Naiades, who are thus denominated from streams +of water. For we peculiarly call the Naiades, and the +powers that preside over waters, Nymphs; and this +term, also, is commonly applied to all souls descending into +generation. For the ancients thought that these souls are +incumbent on water which is inspired by divinity, as Numenius +says, who adds, that on this account, a prophet +asserts, that the Spirit of God moved on the waters. The +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_178">[178]</span>Egyptians likewise, on this account, represent all dæmons, +and also the sun, and, in short, all the planets⁠<a id="FNanchor_122" href="#Footnote_122" class="fnanchor">[122]</a>, not standing +on any thing solid, but on a sailing vessel; for souls +descending into generation fly to moisture. Hence, also, +Heraclitus says, “that moisture appears delightful and +not deadly to souls;” but the lapse into generation is +delightful to them. And in another place [speaking of +unembodied souls], he says, “We live their death, and +we die their life.” Hence the poet calls those that are +in generation <i>humid</i>, because they have souls which are +<i>profoundly</i> steeped in moisture. On this account, such +souls delight in blood and humid seed; but water is the +nutriment of the souls of plants. Some likewise are of +opinion, that the bodies in the air, and in the heavens, +are nourished by vapours from fountains and rivers, and +other exhalations. But the Stoics assert, that the sun is +nourished by the exhalation from the sea; the moon from +the vapours of fountains and rivers; and the stars from +the exhalation of the earth. Hence, according to them, +the sun is an intellectual composition formed from the +sea; the moon from river waters; and the stars from +terrene exhalations.</p> + +<p>5. It is necessary, therefore, that souls, whether +they are corporeal or incorporeal, while they attract to +themselves body, and especially such as are about to be +bound to blood and moist bodies, should verge to humidity, +and be corporalized, in consequence of being +drenched in moisture. Hence the souls of the dead are +evocated by the effusion of bile and blood; and souls +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_179">[179]</span>that are lovers of body, by attracting a moist spirit, condense +this humid vehicle like a cloud. For moisture condensed +in the air constitutes a cloud. But the pneumatic +vehicle being condensed in these souls, becomes visible +through an excess of moisture. And among the number +of these we must reckon those apparitions of images, +which, from a spirit coloured by the influence of imagination, +present themselves to mankind. But pure souls are +averse from generation; so that, as Heraclitus says, “<i>a +dry soul is the wisest</i>.” Hence, here also, the spirit becomes +moist and more aqueous through the desire of coition, +the soul thus attracting a humid vapour from verging to +generation. Souls, therefore, proceeding into generation, +are the Nymphs called Naiades. Hence it is usual to call +those that are married Nymphs, as being conjoined to +generation, and to pour water into baths from fountains, +or rivers, or perpetual rills.</p> + +<p>6. This world, then, is sacred and pleasant to souls +who have now proceeded into nature, and to natal +dæmons, though it is essentially dark and <i>obscure</i>; [ηεροειδης], +from which some have suspected that souls also are of an +<i>obscure</i> nature, [αερωδως,] and essentially consist of air. +Hence a cavern, which is both pleasant and dark, will be +appropriately consecrated to souls on the earth, conformably +to its similitude to the world; in which, as in +the greatest of all temples, souls reside. To the Nymphs +likewise, who preside over waters, a cavern, in which +there are perpetually flowing streams, is adapted. Let, +therefore, this present cavern be consecrated to souls, +and, among the more partial powers, to nymphs, that +preside over streams and fountains, and who, on this +account, are called <i>fontal</i> and <i>Naiades</i>. What, therefore, +are the different symbols, some of which are adapted to +souls, but others to the aquatic powers, in order that we +may apprehend that this cavern is consecrated in common +to both? Let the stony bowls, then, and the amphoræ, +be symbols of the aquatic Nymphs. For these are, +indeed, the symbols of Bacchus, but their composition is +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_180">[180]</span>fictile, <i>i.e.</i> consists of baked earth; and these are +friendly to the vine, the gift of the God; since the fruit +of the vine is brought to a proper maturity by the celestial +fire of the sun. But the stony bowls and amphoræ, are +in the most eminent degree adapted to the Nymphs who +preside over the water that flows from rocks. And to +souls that descend into generation, and are occupied in +corporeal energies, what symbol can be more appropriate +than those instruments pertaining to weaving? Hence, +also, the poet ventures to say, “that on these the +Nymphs weave purple webs, admirable to the view.” For +the formation of the flesh is on and about the bones, +which in the bodies of animals resemble stones. Hence +these instruments of weaving consist of stone, and not of +any other matter. But the purple webs will evidently be +the flesh which is woven from the blood. For purple +woollen garments are tinged from blood; and wool is +dyed from animal juice. The generation of flesh, also, is +through and from blood. Add, too, that the body is +a garment with which the soul is invested, a thing +wonderful to the sight, whether this refers to the composition +of the soul, or contributes to the colligation of the +soul [to the whole of a visible essence]. Thus, also, +Proserpine, who is the inspective guardian of every thing +produced from seed, is represented by Orpheus as weaving +a web⁠<a id="FNanchor_123" href="#Footnote_123" class="fnanchor">[123]</a>; and the heavens are called by the ancients +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_181">[181]</span>a veil, in consequence of being, as it were, the vestment +of the celestial Gods.</p> + +<p>7. Why, therefore, are the amphoræ said not to be +filled with water, but with honey-combs? For in these +Homer says the bees deposit their honey. But this is +evident from the word τιθαιβωσσειν, which signifies τιθεναι +την βοσιν; <i>i.e.</i> to deposit aliment. And honey is the +nutriment of bees. Theologists, also, have made honey +subservient to many and different symbols, because it +consists of many powers; since it is both cathartic and +preservative. Hence, through honey, bodies are preserved +from putrefaction, and inveterate ulcers are purified. +Farther still, it is also sweet to the taste, and is +collected by bees, who are ox-begotten, from flowers. +When, therefore, those who are initiated in the Leontic +sacred rites, pour honey instead of water on their hands; +they are ordered [by the initiator] to have their hands +pure from every thing productive of molestation, and +from every thing noxious and detestable. Other initiators +[into the same mysteries] employ fire, which is of a +cathartic nature, as an appropriate purification. And +they likewise purify the tongue from all the defilement of +evil with honey. But the Persians, when they offer +honey to the guardian of fruits, consider it as the symbol +of a preserving and defending power. Hence some persons +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_182">[182]</span>have thought that the nectar and ambrosia⁠<a id="FNanchor_124" href="#Footnote_124" class="fnanchor">[124]</a>, which +the poet pours into the nostrils of the dead, for the +purpose of preventing putrefaction, is honey; since honey +is the food of the Gods. On this account, also, the same +poet somewhere calls nectar ερυθρον; for such is the colour +of honey, [viz. it is a deep yellow]. But whether or not +honey is to be taken for nectar, we shall elsewhere more +accurately examine. In Orpheus, likewise, Saturn is +ensnared by Jupiter through honey. For Saturn, being +filled with honey, is intoxicated, his senses are darkened, +as if from the effects of wine, and he sleeps; just as +Porus, in the Banquet of Plato, is filled with nectar; for +wine was not (says he) yet known. The Goddess Night, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_183">[183]</span>too, in Orpheus, advises Jupiter to make use of honey as +an artifice. For she says to him—</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">When stretch’d beneath the lofty oaks you view</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Saturn, with honey by the bees produc’d,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Sunk in ebriety⁠<a id="FNanchor_125" href="#Footnote_125" class="fnanchor">[125]</a>, fast bind the God.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class="noindent">This, therefore, takes place, and Saturn being bound, +is castrated in the same manner as Heaven; the theologist +obscurely signifying by this, that divine natures +become through pleasure bound, and drawn down into +the realms of generation; and also that, when dissolved +in pleasure, they emit certain seminal powers. Hence +Saturn castrates Heaven, when descending to earth, +through a desire of coition⁠<a id="FNanchor_126" href="#Footnote_126" class="fnanchor">[126]</a>. But the sweetness of +honey signifies, with theologists, the same thing as the +pleasure arising from copulation, by which Saturn, being +ensnared, was castrated. For Saturn, and his sphere, +are the first of the orbs that move contrary to the course +of Cœlum, or the heavens. Certain powers, however, +descend both from Heaven [or the inerratic sphere] and +the planets. But Saturn receives the powers of Heaven, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_184">[184]</span>and Jupiter the powers of Saturn. Since, therefore, honey +is assumed in purgations, and as an antidote to putrefaction, +and is indicative of the pleasure which draws +souls downward to generation; it is a symbol well +adapted to aquatic Nymphs, on account of the unputrescent +nature of the waters over which they preside, +their purifying power, and their co-operation with generation. +For water co-operates in the work of generation. +On this account the bees are said, by the poet, to deposit +their honey in bowls and amphoræ; the bowls being +a symbol of fountains, and therefore a bowl is placed +near to Mithra, instead of a fountain; but the amphoræ +are symbols of the vessels with which we draw water +from fountains. And fountains and streams are adapted +to aquatic Nymphs, and still more so to the Nymphs that +are souls, which the ancients peculiarly called bees, as +the efficient causes of sweetness. Hence Sophocles does +not speak unappropriately when he says of souls—</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">In swarms while wandering, from the dead,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">A humming sound is heard.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p>8. The priestesses of Ceres, also, as being initiated +into the mysteries of the terrene Goddess, were called by +the ancients bees; and Proserpine herself was denominated +by them <i>honied</i>. The moon, likewise, who presides +over generation, was called by them a bee, and also +a bull. And Taurus is the exaltation of the moon. But +bees are ox-begotten. And this appellation is also given +to souls proceeding into generation. The God, likewise, +who is occultly connected with generation, is a stealer of +oxen. To which may be added, that honey is considered +as a symbol of death, and on this account, it is usual to +offer libations of honey to the terrestrial Gods; but gall +is considered as a symbol of life; whether it is obscurely +signified by this, that the life of the soul dies through +pleasure, but through bitterness the soul resumes its life, +whence, also, bile is sacrificed to the Gods; or whether it +is, because death liberates from molestation, but the present +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_185">[185]</span>life is laborious and bitter. All souls, however, +proceeding into generation, are not simply called bees, +but those who will live in it justly, and who, after having +performed such things as are acceptable to the Gods, will +again return [to their kindred stars]. For this insect +loves to return to the place from whence it first came, +and is eminently just and sober. Whence, also, the libations +which are made with honey are called sober. Bees, +likewise, do not sit on beans, which were considered by +the ancients as a symbol of generation proceeding in a +right line, and without flexure; because this leguminous +vegetable is almost the only seed-bearing plant, whose +stalk is perforated throughout without any intervening +knots⁠<a id="FNanchor_127" href="#Footnote_127" class="fnanchor">[127]</a>. We must therefore admit, that honey-combs +and bees are appropriate and common symbols of the +aquatic Nymphs, and of souls that are married [as it +were] to [the humid and fluctuating nature of] generation.</p> + +<p>9. Caves, therefore, in the most remote periods of +antiquity, were consecrated to the Gods, before temples +were erected to them. Hence, the Curetes in Crete +dedicated a cavern to Jupiter; in Arcadia, a cave was +sacred to the Moon, and to Lycean Pan; and in Naxus, +to Bacchus. But wherever Mithra was known, they propitiated +the God in a cavern. With respect, however, to +this Ithacensian cave, Homer was not satisfied with +saying that it had two gates, but adds, that one of the +gates was turned towards the north, but the other, which +was more divine, to the south. He also says, that the +northern gate was pervious to descent, but does not indicate +whether this was also the case with the southern +gate. For of this, he only says, “It is inaccessible to +men, but it is the path of the immortals.”</p> + +<p>10. It remains, therefore, to investigate what is indicated +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_186">[186]</span>by this narration, whether the poet describes a +cavern which was in reality consecrated by others, or +whether it is an enigma of his own invention. Since, +however, a cavern is an image and symbol of the world, +as Numenius and his familiar Cronius assert, there are +two extremities in the heavens, viz. the winter tropic, than +which nothing is more southern, and the summer tropic, +than which nothing is more northern. But the summer +tropic is in Cancer, and the winter tropic in Capricorn. +And since Cancer is nearest to us, it is very properly attributed +to the Moon, which is the nearest of all the heavenly +bodies to the earth. But as the southern pole, by its +great distance, is invisible to us, hence Capricorn is attributed +to Saturn, the highest and most remote of all +the planets. Again, the signs from Cancer to Capricorn, +are situated in the following order: and the first of these +is Leo, which is the house of the Sun; afterwards Virgo, +which is the house of Mercury; Libra, the house of +Venus; Scorpius, of Mars; Sagittarius, of Jupiter; and +Capricornus, of Saturn. But from Capricorn in an inverse +order, Aquarius is attributed to Saturn; Pisces, to Jupiter; +Aries, to Mars; Taurus, to Venus; Gemini, to Mercury; +and, in the last place, Cancer to the Moon.</p> + +<p>11. Theologists therefore assert, that these two gates +are Cancer and Capricorn; but Plato calls them entrances. +And of these, theologists say, that Cancer is +the gate through which souls descend; but Capricorn +that through which they ascend. Cancer is indeed +northern, and adapted to descent; but Capricorn is southern, +and adapted to ascent⁠<a id="FNanchor_128" href="#Footnote_128" class="fnanchor">[128]</a>. The northern parts, likewise, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_187">[187]</span>pertain to souls descending into generation. And +the gates of the cavern which are turned to the north, are +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_188">[188]</span>rightly said to be pervious to the descent of men; but +the southern gates are not the avenues of the Gods, but +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_189">[189]</span>of souls ascending to the Gods. On this account, the +poet does not say that they are the avenues of the Gods, +but of immortals; this appellation being also common to +our souls, which are <i>per se</i>, or essentially, immortal. It is +said, that Parmenides mentions these two gates in his +treatise On the Nature of Things; as likewise, that they +are not unknown to the Romans and Egyptians. For +the Romans celebrate their Saturnalia when the Sun is in +Capricorn; and during this festivity, slaves wear the +shoes of those that are free, and all things are distributed +among them in common; the legislator obscurely signifying +by this ceremony, that through this gate of the +heavens, those who are now born slaves will be liberated +through the Saturnian festival, and the house attributed +to Saturn, <i>i.e.</i> Capricorn, when they live again, and +return to the fountain of life. Since, however, the path +from Capricorn is adapted to ascent⁠<a id="FNanchor_129" href="#Footnote_129" class="fnanchor">[129]</a>, hence the Romans +denominate that month in which the Sun, turning from +Capricorn to the east, directs his course to the north, +Januarius, or January, from <i>janua</i>, a gate. But with the +Egyptians, the beginning of the year is not Aquarius, as +with the Romans, but Cancer. For the star Sothis, +which the Greeks call the Dog, is near to Cancer. And +the rising of Sothis is the new moon with them, this +being the principle of generation to the world. On this +account, the gates of the Homeric cavern are not dedicated +to the east and west, nor to the equinoctial signs, +Aries and Libra, but to the north and south, and to +those celestial signs which, towards the south, are most +southerly, and, towards the north, are most northerly; +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_190">[190]</span>because this cave was sacred to souls and aquatic +Nymphs. But these places are adapted to souls descending +into generation, and afterwards separating themselves +from it. Hence, a place near to the equinoctial circle +was assigned to Mithra as an appropriate seat. And on +this account he bears the sword of Aries, which is +a martial sign. He is likewise carried in the Bull, which +is the sign of Venus. For Mithra, as well as the Bull, is +the demiurgus and lord of generation⁠<a id="FNanchor_130" href="#Footnote_130" class="fnanchor">[130]</a>. But he is placed +near the equinoctial circle, having the northern parts on +his right hand, and the southern on his left. They likewise +arranged towards the south the southern hemisphere, +because it is hot; but the northern hemisphere +towards the north, through the coldness of the north +wind.</p> + +<p>12. The ancients, likewise, very reasonably connected +winds with souls proceeding into generation, and again +separating themselves from it, because, as some think, +souls attract a spirit, and have a pneumatic essence. But +the north wind is adapted to souls falling into generation; +and, on this account, the northern blasts refresh +those who are dying, and when they can scarcely draw +their breath. On the contrary, the southern gales dissolve +life. For the north wind, indeed, from its superior +coldness, congeals [as it were, the animal life], and +detains it in the frigidity of terrene generation. But the +south wind being hot, dissolves this life, and sends it +upward to the heat of a divine nature. Since, however, +our terrene habitation is more northern, it is proper that +souls which are born in it should be familiar with the +north wind; but those that exchange this life for a better, +with the south wind. This also is the cause why the +north wind is at its commencement great; but the south +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_191">[191]</span>wind, at its termination. For the former is situated +directly over the inhabitants of the northern part of the +globe; but the latter is at a great distance from them; +and the blast from places very remote, is more tardy than +from such as are near. But when it is coacervated, then +it blows abundantly, and with vigour. Since, however, +souls proceed into generation through the northern gate, +hence this wind is said to be amatory. For, as the poet +says,</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">Boreas, enamour’d of the sprightly train,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Conceal’d his godhead in a flowing mane.</div> + <div class="verse indent0">With voice dissembled, to his loves he neigh’d,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">And coursed the dappled beauties o’er the mead:</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Hence sprung twelve others of unrivall’d kind,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Swift as their mother mares, and father wind⁠<a id="FNanchor_131" href="#Footnote_131" class="fnanchor">[131]</a>.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p>It is also said, that Boreas ravished Orithya⁠<a id="FNanchor_132" href="#Footnote_132" class="fnanchor">[132]</a>, from +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_192">[192]</span>whom he begot Zetis and Calais. But as the south +is attributed to the Gods, hence, when the Sun is at +his meridian, the curtains in temples are drawn before +the statues of the Gods; in consequence of observing the +Homeric precept, “that it is not lawful for men to enter +temples when the Sun is inclined to the south;” for this +is the path of the immortals. Hence, when the God is at +his meridian altitude, the ancients placed a symbol of +mid-day and of the south in the gates of temples⁠<a id="FNanchor_133" href="#Footnote_133" class="fnanchor">[133]</a>; and, +on this account, in other gates also, it was not lawful +to speak at all times, because gates were considered +as sacred. Hence, too, the Pythagoreans, and the +wise men among the Egyptians, forbade speaking while +passing through doors or gates; for then they venerated +in silence that God who is the principle of wholes [and, +therefore of all things].</p> + +<p>13. Homer likewise knew that gates are sacred, as is +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_193">[193]</span>evident from his representing Oeneus, when supplicating, +shaking the gate:</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">The gates he shakes, and supplicates the son⁠<a id="FNanchor_134" href="#Footnote_134" class="fnanchor">[134]</a>.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p>He also knew the gates of the heavens which are committed +to the guardianship of the Hours; which gates +originate in cloudy places, and are opened and shut by +the clouds. For he says.</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">Whether dense clouds they close, or wide unfold⁠<a id="FNanchor_135" href="#Footnote_135" class="fnanchor">[135]</a>.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p>And on this account, these gates emit a bellowing +sound, because thunders roar through the clouds:</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">Heaven’s gates spontaneous open to the powers;</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Heaven’s bellowing portals, guarded by the Hours⁠<a id="FNanchor_136" href="#Footnote_136" class="fnanchor">[136]</a>.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p>He likewise elsewhere speaks of the gates of the Sun, +signifying by these Cancer and Capricorn; for the Sun +proceeds as far as to these signs, when he descends from +the north to the south, and from thence ascends again to +the northern parts. But Capricorn and Cancer are situated +about the galaxy, being allotted the extremities +of this circle; Cancer, indeed, the northern, but Capricorn +the southern extremity of it. According to Pythagoras, +also, the <i>people of dreams</i>⁠<a id="FNanchor_137" href="#Footnote_137" class="fnanchor">[137]</a>, are the souls which are +said to be collected in the galaxy, this circle being +so called from the milk with which souls are nourished +when they fall into generation. Hence, those who evocate +departed souls, sacrifice to them by a libation of milk +mingled with honey; because, through the allurements +of sweetness, they will proceed into generation; with the +birth of man, milk being naturally produced. Farther +still, the southern regions produce small bodies; for it is +usual with heat to attenuate them in the greatest degree. +But all bodies generated in the north are large, as is +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_194">[194]</span>evident in the Celtæ, the Thracians, and the Scythians; +and these regions are humid, and abound with pastures. +For the word Boreas is derived from Βορα, which signifies +nutriment. Hence, also, the wind which blows from +a land abounding in nutriment, is called Βορρας, as being +of a nutritive nature. From these causes, therefore, the +northern parts are adapted to the mortal tribe, and to +souls that fall into the realms of generation. But the +southern parts are adapted to that which is immortal⁠<a id="FNanchor_138" href="#Footnote_138" class="fnanchor">[138]</a>, +just as the eastern parts of the world are attributed to the +Gods, but the western to dæmons. For, in consequence +of nature originating from diversity, the ancients every +where made that which has a twofold entrance to be +a symbol of the nature of things. For the progression is +either through that which is intelligible, or through that +which is sensible. And if through that which is sensible, +it is either through the sphere of the fixed stars, or +through the sphere of the planets. And again, it is either +through an immortal, or through a mortal progression. +One centre, likewise, is above, but the other beneath the +earth; and the one is eastern, but the other western. +Thus, too, some parts of the world are situated on the +left, but others on the right hand: and night is opposed +to day. On this account, also, harmony consists of, and +<i>proceeds</i>⁠<a id="FNanchor_139" href="#Footnote_139" class="fnanchor">[139]</a> through contraries. Plato also says, that there +are two openings⁠<a id="FNanchor_140" href="#Footnote_140" class="fnanchor">[140]</a>, one of which affords a passage to +souls ascending to the heavens, but the other to souls +descending to the earth. And, according to theologists, +the Sun and Moon are the gates of souls, which ascend +through the Sun, and descend through the Moon. With +Homer, likewise, there are two tubs,</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">From which the lot of every one he fills,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Blessings to these, to those distributes ills⁠<a id="FNanchor_141" href="#Footnote_141" class="fnanchor">[141]</a>.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_195">[195]</span></p> + +<p>But Plato, in the Gorgias, by tubs intends to signify +souls, some of which are malefic, but others beneficent, +and some of which are rational, but others irrational⁠<a id="FNanchor_142" href="#Footnote_142" class="fnanchor">[142]</a>. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_196">[196]</span>Souls, however, are [analogous to] tubs, because they +contain in themselves energies and habits, as in a vessel. +In Hesiod too, we find one tub closed, but the other +opened by Pleasure, who scatters its contents every +where, Hope alone remaining behind. For in those +things in which a depraved soul, being dispersed about +matter, deserts the proper order of its essence; in all +these, it is accustomed to feed itself with [the pleasing +prospects of] auspicious hope.</p> + +<p>14. Since, therefore, every twofold entrance is a +symbol of nature, this Homeric cavern has, very properly, +not one portal only, but two gates, which differ from +each other conformably to things themselves; of which +one pertains to Gods and good [dæmons⁠<a id="FNanchor_143" href="#Footnote_143" class="fnanchor">[143]</a>], but the other +to mortals, and depraved natures. Hence, Plato took +occasion to speak of bowls, and assumes tubs instead of +amphoræ, and two openings, as we have already observed, +instead of two gates. Pherecydes Syrus also mentions +recesses and trenches, caverns, doors, and gates; and +through these obscurely indicates the generations of +souls, and their separation from these material realms. +And thus much for an explanation of the Homeric cave, +which we think we have sufficiently unfolded without +adducing any farther testimonies from ancient philosophers +and theologists, which would give a needless +extent to our discourse.</p> + +<p>15. One particular, however, remains to be explained, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_197">[197]</span>and that is the symbol of the olive planted at the top of +the cavern; since Homer appears to indicate something +very admirable by giving it such a position. For he does +not merely say that an olive grows in this place, but that it +flourishes on the summit of the cavern.</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">“High at the head a branching olive grows,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Beneath, a gloomy grotto’s cool recess.”</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p>But the growth of the olive in such a situation, is not +fortuitous, as some one may suspect, but contains the +enigma of the cavern. For since the world was not produced +rashly and casually, but is the work of divine wisdom +and an intellectual nature, hence an olive, the +symbol of this wisdom, flourishes near the present cavern, +which is an image of the world. For the olive is the +plant of Minerva; and Minerva is wisdom. But this +Goddess being produced from the head of Jupiter, the +theologist has discovered an appropriate place for the +olive, by consecrating it at the summit of the port; signifying +by this, that the universe is not the effect of +a casual event, and the work of irrational fortune, but +that it is the offspring of an intellectual nature and divine +wisdom, which is separated, indeed, from it [by a difference +of essence], but yet is near to it, through being +established on the summit of the whole port; [<i>i.e.</i> from +the dignity and excellence of its nature governing the +whole with consummate wisdom]. Since, however, an +olive is ever-flourishing, it possesses a certain peculiarity +in the highest degree adapted to the revolutions of souls +in the world; for to such souls this cave [as we have +said] is sacred. For in summer, the white leaves of the +olive tend upward, but in winter, the whiter leaves are +bent downward. On this account, also, in prayers and +supplications, men extend the branches of an olive, ominating +from this, that they shall exchange the sorrowful +darkness of danger for the fair light of security and +peace. The olive, therefore, being naturally ever-flourishing, +bears fruit which is the auxiliary of labour [by +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_198">[198]</span>being its reward]; it is also sacred to Minerva; supplies +the victors in athletic labours with crowns; and affords a +friendly branch to the suppliant petitioner. Thus, too, +the world is governed by an intellectual nature, and +is conducted by a wisdom eternal and ever-flourishing; +by which the rewards of victory are conferred on +the conquerors in the athletic race of life, as the +reward of severe toil and patient perseverance. And the +Demiurgus, who connects and contains the world [in +ineffable comprehensions], invigorates miserable and suppliant +souls.</p> + +<p>16. In this cave, therefore, says Homer, all external +possessions must be deposited. Here, naked, and assuming +a suppliant habit, afflicted in body, casting aside +every thing superfluous, and being averse to the energies +of sense, it is requisite to sit at the foot of the olive, and +consult with Minerva by what means we may most effectually +destroy that hostile rout of passions which insidiously +lurk in the secret recesses of the soul. Indeed, as +it appears to me, it was not without reason that Numenius +and his followers thought the person of Ulysses in the +Odyssey represented to us a man, who passes in a regular +manner over the dark and stormy sea of generation, and +thus at length arrives at that region where tempests and +seas are unknown, and finds a nation</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">“Who ne’er knew salt, or heard the billows roar.”</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p>17. Again, according to Plato, the deep, the sea, and +a tempest, are images of a material nature. And on this +account, I think, the poet called the port by the name of +Phorcys. For he says, “It is the port of the ancient marine +Phorcys⁠<a id="FNanchor_144" href="#Footnote_144" class="fnanchor">[144]</a>.” The daughter, likewise, of this God is mentioned +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_199">[199]</span>in the beginning of the Odyssey. But from +Thoosa the Cyclops was born, whom Ulysses deprived of +sight. And this deed of Ulysses became the occasion of +reminding him of his errors, till he was safely landed in +his native country. On this account, too, a seat under +the olive is proper to Ulysses, as to one who implores +divinity, and would appease his natal dæmon with a suppliant +branch. For it will not be simply, and in a +concise way, possible for any one to be liberated from this +sensible life, who blinds this dæmon, and renders his +energies inefficacious; but he who dares to do this, will +be pursued by the anger⁠<a id="FNanchor_145" href="#Footnote_145" class="fnanchor">[145]</a> of the marine and material +Gods, whom it is first requisite to appease by sacrifices, +labours, and patient endurance; at one time, indeed, contending +with the passions, and at another employing +enchantments and deceptions, and by these, transforming +himself in an all-various manner; in order that, being at +length divested of the torn garments [by which his true +person was concealed], he may recover the ruined empire +of his soul. Nor will he even then be liberated from +labours; but this will be effected when he has entirely +passed over the raging sea, and, though still living, +becomes so ignorant of marine and material works +[through deep attention to intelligible concerns], as to +mistake an oar for a corn-van.</p> + +<p>18. It must not, however, be thought, that interpretations +of this kind are forced, and nothing more than the +conjectures of ingenious men; but when we consider the +great wisdom of antiquity, and how much Homer excelled +in intellectual prudence, and in an accurate knowledge of +every virtue, it must not be denied that he has obscurely +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_200">[200]</span>indicated the images of things of a more divine nature in +the fiction of a fable. For it would not have been +possible to devise the whole of this hypothesis, unless +the figment had been transferred [to an appropriate +meaning] from certain established truths. But reserving +the discussion of this for another treatise, we shall +here finish our explanation of the present Cave of the +Nymphs.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"> + +<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_116" href="#FNanchor_116" class="label">[116]</a> This Cronius, the Pythagorean, is also mentioned by Porphyry, in +his Life of Plotinus.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_117" href="#FNanchor_117" class="label">[117]</a> <i>i.e.</i> Rather more than ten Italian miles and a half, eight stadia +making an Italian mile.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_118" href="#FNanchor_118" class="label">[118]</a> In the original, δι ου μορφουται. But <i>morphe</i>, as we are informed by +Simplicius, pertains to the colour, figure, and magnitude of superficies.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_119" href="#FNanchor_119" class="label">[119]</a> “Nymphs,” says Hermias, in his Scholia on the Phædrus of Plato, +“are Goddesses who preside over regeneration, and are ministrant to +Bacchus, the offspring of Semele. Hence they dwell near water, that is, +they are conversant with generation. But this Bacchus supplies the +regeneration of the whole sensible world.”</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_120" href="#FNanchor_120" class="label">[120]</a> These lines are not to be found in any of the hymns now extant, +ascribed to Homer.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_121" href="#FNanchor_121" class="label">[121]</a> In the original, ουδε ακραιων; but for ακραιων, I read, αγραιων.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_122" href="#FNanchor_122" class="label">[122]</a> In the original, τους τε Αιγυπτιους δια τουτο τους δαιμονας απαντας ουχ +εσταναι επι στερεου, αλλα παντας επι πλοιου, και τον ηλιον, και απλως παντας, ους +τινας ειδεναι χρη τας ψυχας επιποτωμενας τῳ υγρῳ, τας εις γενεσιν κατιουσας. But +after the words και απλως παντας, it appears to me to be requisite to insert +τους πλανητας. For Martianus Capella, in lib. ii. De Nuptiis Philologiæ, +speaking of the sun, says: “Ibi quandam navim, totius naturæ cursibus +diversa cupiditate moderantem, cunctaque flammarum congestione plenissimam, +beatis circumactam mercibus conspicatur. Cui <i>nautæ septem</i> +germani, tamen suique consimiles præsidebant,” &c. For in this passage +the seven sailors are evidently the seven planets.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_123" href="#FNanchor_123" class="label">[123]</a> The theological meaning of this Orphic fiction is beautifully unfolded +by Proclus, as follows:—“Orpheus says that the vivific cause +of partible natures [<i>i.e.</i> Proserpine], while she remained on high, weaving +the order of celestials, was a nymph, as being undefiled; and in consequence +of this connected with Jupiter, and abiding in her appropriate +manners; but that, proceeding from her proper habitation, she left her +webs unfinished, was ravished; having been ravished, was married; and +that being married she generated, in order that she might animate things +which have an adventitious life. For the unfinished state of her webs +indicates, I think, that the universe is imperfect or unfinished, as far as +to perpetual animals [<i>i.e.</i> The universe would be imperfect if nothing +inferior to the celestial Gods was produced]. Hence Plato says, that +the one Demiurgus calls on the many Demiurgi to weave together the +mortal and immortal natures; after a manner reminding us, that the +addition of the mortal genera is the perfection of the textorial life of the +universe, and also exciting our recollection of the divine Orphic fable, +and affording us interpretative causes of the unfinished webs of Proserpine.”—See +vol. ii. p. 356, of my translation of Proclus on the Timæus.</p> + +<p>The <i>unfinished webs</i> of Proserpine are also alluded to by Claudian, +in his poem De Raptu Proserpinæ, in the following verse:</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">Sensit adesse Deas, <i>imperfectumque laborem</i></div> + <div class="verse indent0"><i>Deserit</i>.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p>I only add, that, by ancient theologists, the shuttle was considered as +a signature of <i>separating</i>, a cup of <i>vivific</i>, a sceptre of <i>ruling</i>, and a key +of <i>guardian</i> power.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_124" href="#FNanchor_124" class="label">[124]</a> The theological meaning of nectar and ambrosia, is beautifully +unfolded by Hermias, in his Scholia on the Phædrus of Plato, published +by Ast, Lips. 1810, p. 145, where he informs us, that <i>ambrosia</i> is +analogous to dry nutriment, and that, on this account, it signifies an +establishment in causes; but that <i>nectar</i> is analogous to moist food, and +that it signifies the providential attention of the Gods to secondary +natures; the former being denominated, according to <i>a privation of the +mortal and corruptible</i> [κατα στερησιν του βροτου και φθαρτου]; but the latter, +according to <i>a privation of the funeral and sepulchral</i> [κατα στερησιν +του κτεριος ειρημενον και του ταφου]. And when the Gods are represented as +energizing providentially, they are said to drink nectar. Thus Homer, +in the beginning of the 4th book of the Iliad:</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">Οι δε θεοι παρ Ζηνι καθημενοι ηγοροωντο</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Χρυσεῳ εν δαπεδῳ, μετα δε σφισι ποτνια Ηβη</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Νεκταρ εῳνοχοει· τοι δε χρυσεοις δεπαεσσι</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Δειδεχατ’ αλληλους, Τρῳων πολιν εισοροωντες.</div> + </div> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">Now with each other, on the golden floor</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Seated near Jove, the Gods converse; to whom</div> + <div class="verse indent0">The venerable Hebe nectar bears,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">In golden goblets; and as these flow round,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Th’ immortals turn their careful eyes on Troy.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class="noindent">For then they providentially attend to the Trojans. The possession, +therefore, of immutable providence by the Gods is signified by their +drinking nectar; the exertion of this providence, by their beholding +Troy; and their communicating with each other in providential energies, +by receiving the goblets from each other.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_125" href="#FNanchor_125" class="label">[125]</a> Ebriety, when ascribed to divine natures by ancient theologists, +signifies a deific superessential energy, or an energy superior to intellect. +Hence, when Saturn is said by Orpheus to have been intoxicated with +honey or nectar, the meaning is, that he then energized providentially, in +a deific and super-intellectual manner.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_126" href="#FNanchor_126" class="label">[126]</a> Porphyry, though he excelled in philosophical, was deficient in theological +knowledge; of which what he now says of the castrations of Saturn +and Heaven, is a remarkable instance. For ancient theologists, by things +preternatural, adumbrated the transcendent nature of the Gods; by +such as are irrational, a power more divine than all reason; and by +things apparently base, incorporeal beauty. Hence, in the fabulous +narrations to which Porphyry now alludes, the genital parts must be +considered as symbols of prolific power; and the castration of these +parts as signifying the progression of this power into a subject order. +So that the fable means that the prolific powers of Saturn are called +forth into progression by Jupiter, and those of Heaven by Saturn; +Jupiter being inferior to Saturn, and Saturn to Heaven.—See the +Apology for the Fables of Homer, in vol. i. of my translation of Plato.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_127" href="#FNanchor_127" class="label">[127]</a> Hence, when Pythagoras exhorted his disciples to abstain from +beans, he intended to signify, that they should beware of a continued and +perpetual descent into the realms of generation.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_128" href="#FNanchor_128" class="label">[128]</a> Macrobius, in the 12th chapter of his Commentary on Scipio’s +Dream, has derived some of the ancient arcana which it contains from +what is here said by Porphyry. A part of what he has farther added, I +shall translate, on account of its excellence and connexion with the +above passage. “Pythagoras thought that the empire of Pluto began +downwards from the milky way, because souls falling from thence +appear to have already receded from the Gods. Hence he asserts, that +the nutriment of milk is first offered to infants, because their first motion +commences from the galaxy, when they begin to fall into terrene bodies. +On this account, since those who are about to descend are yet in +<i>Cancer</i>, and have not left the milky way, they rank in the order of the +Gods. But when, by falling, they arrive at the <i>Lion</i>, in this constellation +they enter on the exordium of their future condition. And because, +in the <i>Lion</i>, the rudiments of birth, and certain primary exercises +of human nature, commence; but <i>Aquarius</i> is opposite to the <i>Lion</i>, and +presently sets after the <i>Lion</i> rises; hence, when the sun is in <i>Aquarius</i>, +funeral rites are performed to departed souls, because he is then carried +in a sign which is contrary or adverse to human life. From the confine, +therefore, in which the zodiac and galaxy touch each other, the soul, +descending from a round figure, which is the only divine form, is produced +into a cone by its defluxion. And as a line is generated from a +point, and proceeds into length from an indivisible, so the soul, from its +own point, which is a monad, passes into the duad, which is the first +extension. And this is the essence which Plato, in the Timæus, calls +impartible, and at the same time partible, when he speaks of the nature of +the mundane soul. For as the soul of the world, so likewise that of man, +will be found to be in one respect without division, if the simplicity +of a divine nature is considered; and in another respect partible, if we +regard the diffusion of the former through the world, and of the latter +through the members of the body.</p> + +<p>“As soon, therefore, as the soul gravitates towards body in this first +production of herself, she begins to experience a material tumult, that is, +matter flowing into her essence. And this is what Plato remarks in the +Phædo, that the soul is drawn into body staggering with recent intoxication; +signifying by this, the new drink of matter’s impetuous flood, through +which the soul, becoming defiled and heavy, is drawn into a terrene +situation. But the starry <i>cup</i> placed between Cancer and the Lion, is a +symbol of this mystic truth, signifying that descending souls first experience +intoxication in that part of the heavens through the influx of +matter. Hence oblivion, the companion of intoxication, there begins +silently to creep into the recesses of the soul. For if souls retained in +their descent to bodies the memory of divine concerns, of which they +were conscious in the heavens, there would be no dissension among men +about divinity. But all, indeed, in descending, drink of oblivion; +though some more, and others less. On this account, though truth +is not apparent to all men on the earth, yet all exercise their opinions +about it; because <i>a defect of memory is the origin of opinion</i>. But +those discover most who have drank least of oblivion, because they +easily remember what they had known before in the heavens.</p> + +<p>“The soul, therefore, falling with this first weight from the zodiac and +milky way into each of the subject spheres, is not only clothed with the +accession of a luminous body, but produces the particular motions which +it is to exercise in the respective orbs. Thus in Saturn, it energizes +according to a ratiocinative and intellective power; in the sphere +of Jove, according to a practic power; in the orb of the Sun, according +to a sensitive and imaginative nature; but according to the motion +of desire in the planet Venus; of pronouncing and interpreting what it +perceives in the orb of Mercury; and according to a plantal or vegetable +nature, and a power of acting on body, when it enters into the lunar +globe. And this sphere, as it is the last among the divine orders, so it +is the first in our terrene situation. For this body, as it is the dregs +of divine natures, so it is the first animal substance. And this is the +difference between terrene and supernal bodies (under the latter of +which I comprehend the heavens, the stars, and the more elevated +elements,) that the latter are called upwards to be the seat of the soul, +and merit immortality from the very nature of the region, and an imitation +of sublimity; but the soul is drawn down to these terrene bodies, +and is on this account said to die when it is enclosed in this fallen region, +and the seat of mortality. Nor ought it to cause any disturbance that +we have so often mentioned the death of the soul, which we have pronounced +to be immortal. For the soul is not extinguished by its own +proper death, but is only overwhelmed for a time. Nor does it lose the +benefit of perpetuity by its temporal demersion. Since, when it deserves +to be purified from the contagion of vice, through its entire refinement +from body, it will be restored to the light of perennial life, and will +return to its pristine integrity and perfection.”</p> + +<p>“The powers, however, of the planets, which are the causes of +the energies of the soul in the several planetary spheres, are more +accurately described by Proclus, in p. 260 of his admirable Commentary +on the Timæus, as follows: ει δε βουλει και οτι των αγαθων +πλανητων Σεληνη μεν αιτια τοις θνητοις της φυσεως, το αυτοπτον αγαλμα ουσα +της πηγαιας φυσεως· Ηλιος δε δημιουργος των αισθησεων πασων, διοτι και του +οραν και του ορασθαι αιτιος· Ερμης δε των της φαντασιας κινησεων· αυτης γαρ της +φανταστικης ουσιας, ως μιας ουσης αισθησεως και φαντασιας, Ηλιος υποστατης· Αφροδιτη +δε των επιθυμητικων ορεξεων· Αρης δε των θυμοειδων κινησεων των κατα φυσιν εκαστοις· +κοινη δε των μεν ζωτικων πασων δυναμεων Ζευς, των δε γνωστικων Κρονος, διῃρηται γαρ +παντα τα ειδη τα αλογα εις ταυτας, <i>i.e.</i> “If you are willing, also, you may +say, that of the beneficent planets, the Moon is the cause to mortals of +nature, being herself the visible statue of fontal nature. But the Sun +is the Demiurgus of every thing sensible, in consequence of being the +cause of sight and visibility. Mercury is the cause of the motions of the +phantasy; for of the imaginative essence itself, so far as sense and phantasy +are one, the Sun is the producing cause. But Venus is the cause of +epithymetic appetites [or of the appetites pertaining to desire]; and +Mars, of the irascible motions which are conformable to nature. Of all +vital powers, however, Jupiter is the common cause; but of all gnostic +powers, Saturn. For all the irrational forms are divided into these.”</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_129" href="#FNanchor_129" class="label">[129]</a> For καταβατικη, in this place, it appears to me to be obviously +necessary to read αναβατικη. For Porphyry has above informed us, that +Capricorn is the gate through which souls ascend.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_130" href="#FNanchor_130" class="label">[130]</a> Hence Phanes, or Protogonus, who is the paradigm of the universe, +and who was absorbed by Jupiter, the Demiurgus, is represented by +Orpheus as having the head of a <i>bull</i> among other heads with which +he is adorned. And in the Orphic hymn to him, he is called <i>bull-roarer</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_131" href="#FNanchor_131" class="label">[131]</a> Iliad, lib. xx. v. 223, &c.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_132" href="#FNanchor_132" class="label">[132]</a> This fable is mentioned by Plato in the Phædrus, and is beautifully +unfolded as follows, by Hermias, in his Scholia on that Dialogue: “A +twofold solution may be given of this fable; one from history, more +ethical; but the other, transferring us [from parts] to wholes. And +the former of these is as follows: Orithya was the daughter of Erectheus, +and the priestess of Boreas; for each of the winds has a presiding deity, +which the telestic art, or the art pertaining to sacred mysteries, religiously +cultivates. To this Orithya, then, the God was so very propitious, +that he sent the north wind for the safety of the country; and besides +this, he is said to have assisted the Athenians in their naval battles. +Orithya, therefore, becoming enthusiastic, being possessed by her proper +God Boreas, and no longer energizing as a human being (for animals +cease to energize according to their own peculiarities, when possessed +by superior causes), died under the inspiring influence, and thus was said +to have been ravished by Boreas. And this is the more ethical explanation +of the fable.</p> + +<p>“But the second, which transfers the narration to wholes, and does +not entirely subvert the former, is the following: for divine fables often +employ transactions and histories, in subserviency, to the discipline of +wholes. It is said then, that Erectheus is the God that rules over the +three elements, air, water, and earth. Sometimes, however, he is considered +as alone the ruler of the earth, and sometimes as the presiding +deity of Attica alone. Of this deity Orithya is the daughter; and she +is the prolific power of the Earth, which is indeed coextended with the +word <i>Erectheus</i>, as the unfolding of the name signifies. For it is <i>the +prolific power of the Earth, flourishing and restored, according to the +seasons</i>. But Boreas is the providence of the Gods, supernally illuminating +secondary natures. For the providence of the Gods in the world +is signified by Boreas, because this divinity blows from lofty places. +And the elevating power of the Gods is signified by the south wind, because +this wind blows from low to lofty places; and besides this, <i>things +situated towards the south are more divine</i>. The providence of the Gods, +therefore, causes the prolific power of the Earth, or of the Attic land, to +<i>ascend</i>, and become visible.</p> + +<p>“Orithya also may be said to be a soul aspiring after things above, +from ορουω and θειω, according to the Attic custom of adding a letter +at the end of a word, which letter is here an “ω.” Such a soul, therefore, +is ravished by Boreas supernally blowing. But if Orithya was +hurled from a precipice, this also is appropriate, for such a soul dies +a philosophic, not receiving a physical death, and abandons a life pertaining +to her own deliberate choice, at the same time that she lives a +physical life. And philosophy, according to Socrates in the Phædo, +is nothing else than a meditation of death.”</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_133" href="#FNanchor_133" class="label">[133]</a> In the original, ιστασαν ουν και συμβολον της μεσημβριας και του νοτου, επι +τῃ θυρῃ, μεσημβριαζοντος του θεου, which Holstenius translates most erroneously +as follows: “Austrum igitur meridiei symbolum statuunt; cum +deus meridiano tempore ostio immineat.”</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_134" href="#FNanchor_134" class="label">[134]</a> Iliad, lib. xi. v. 579.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_135" href="#FNanchor_135" class="label">[135]</a> Iliad, lib. viii. v. 395.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_136" href="#FNanchor_136" class="label">[136]</a> Iliad, lib. viii. v. 393.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_137" href="#FNanchor_137" class="label">[137]</a> The souls of the suitors are said by Homer, in the 24th book of the +Odyssey (v. 11), to have passed, in their descent to the region of spirits, +beyond <i>the people of dreams</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_138" href="#FNanchor_138" class="label">[138]</a> Hence, the southern have always been more favourable to genius, +than the northern parts of the earth.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_139" href="#FNanchor_139" class="label">[139]</a> In the original, τοξευει; but instead of it, I read πορευει.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_140" href="#FNanchor_140" class="label">[140]</a> See my translation of the 10th book of his Republic.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_141" href="#FNanchor_141" class="label">[141]</a> Iliad, xxiv. v. 528.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_142" href="#FNanchor_142" class="label">[142]</a> The passage in the Gorgias of Plato, to which Porphyry here alludes, +is as follows:—“Soc. But, indeed, as you also say, life is a grievous +thing. For I should not wonder if Euripides spoke the truth when he +says: ‘Who knows whether to live is not to die, and to die is not to +live?’ And we, perhaps, are in reality dead. For I have heard from +one of the wise, that we are now dead; and that the body is our +sepulchre; but that the part of the soul in which the desires are contained, +is of such a nature that it can be persuaded, and hurled upwards +and downwards. Hence a certain elegant man, perhaps a Sicilian, +or an Italian, denominated, mythologizing, this part of the soul a tub, by +a derivation from the probable and the persuasive; and, likewise, he +called those that are stupid, or deprived of intellect, uninitiated. He +farther said, that the intemperate and uncovered nature of that part of +the soul in which the desires are contained, was like a pierced tub, +through its insatiable greediness.”</p> + +<p>What is here said by Plato is beautifully unfolded by Olymipiodorus, +in his MS. Commentary on the Gorgias, as follows:—“Euripides (in +Phryxo) says, that to live is to die, and to die to live. For the soul +coming hither, as she imparts life to the body, so she partakes [through +this] of a certain privation of life; but this is an evil. When separated, +therefore, from the body, she lives in reality: for she dies here, through +participating a privation of life, because the body becomes the source of +evils. And hence it is necessary to subdue the body.</p> + +<p>“But the meaning of the Pythagoric fable, which is here introduced +by Plato, is this: We are said to be dead, because, as we have before +observed, we partake of a privation of life. The sepulchre which we +carry about with us is, as Plato himself explains it, the body. But +Hades is the unapparent, because we are situated in obscurity, the soul +being in a state of servitude to the body. The tubs are the desires; +whether they are so called from our hastening to fill them, as if they +were tubs, or from desire persuading us that it is beautiful. The initiated, +therefore, <i>i.e.</i> those that have a perfect knowledge, pour into the entire +tub: for these have their tub full; or, in other words, have perfect +virtue. But the uninitiated, viz. those that possess nothing perfect, have +perforated tubs. For those that are in a state of servitude to desire +always wish to fill it, and are more inflamed; and on this account they +have perforated tubs, as being never full. But the sieve is the rational +soul mingled with the irrational. For the [rational] soul is called +a circle, because it seeks itself, and is itself sought; finds itself, and is +itself found. But the irrational soul imitates a right line, since it does +not revert to itself like a circle. So far, therefore, as the sieve is circular, +it is an image of the rational soul; but, as it is placed under the right +lines formed from the holes, it is assumed for the irrational soul. Right +lines, therefore, are in the middle of the cavities. Hence, by the sieve, +Plato signifies the rational in subjection to the irrational soul. But the +water is the flux of nature: for, as Heraclitus says, <i>moisture is the death +of the soul</i>.”</p> + +<p>In this extract the intelligent reader will easily perceive that the +occult signification of the <i>tubs</i> is more scientifically unfolded by Olympiodorus +than by Porphyry.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_143" href="#FNanchor_143" class="label">[143]</a> In the original, και τας μεν, θεοις τε και τοις αγαθοις προσηκουσας. But +after αγαθοις, I have no doubt we should insert δαιμοσι.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_144" href="#FNanchor_144" class="label">[144]</a> Phorcys is one among the ennead of Gods who, according to +Plato in the Timæus, fabricate generation. Of this deity, Proclus +observes, “that as the Jupiter in this ennead causes the unapparent +divisions and separation of forms made by Saturn to become apparent, +and as Rhea calls them forth into motion and generation; so Phorcys +inserts them in matter, produces sensible natures, and adorns the visible +essence, in order that there may not only be divisions of productive +principles [or forms] in natures and in souls, and in intellectual +essences prior to these; <i>but likewise in sensibles. For this is the peculiarity +of fabrication.</i>”</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_145" href="#FNanchor_145" class="label">[145]</a> “The anger of the Gods,” says Proclus, “is not an indication of +any passion in them, but demonstrates our inaptitude to participate +of their illuminations.”</p></div> + +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_201">[201]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="AUXILIARIES">AUXILIARIES<br> +<span class="smaller"><span class="smaller">TO THE</span><br> +PERCEPTION OF INTELLIGIBLE NATURES.</span></h2> + +</div> + +<h3>SECTION I.</h3> + +<p>1. Every body is in place; but nothing essentially incorporeal, +or any thing of this kind, has any locality.</p> + +<p>2. Things essentially incorporeal, because they are +more excellent than all body and place, are every where, +not with interval, but impartibly.</p> + +<p>3. Things essentially incorporeal, are not locally present +with bodies, but are present with them when they +please; by verging towards them so far as they are +naturally adapted so to verge. They are not, however, +present with them locally, but through habitude, proximity, +and alliance.</p> + +<p>4. Things essentially incorporeal, are not present with +bodies, by hypostasis and essence; for they are not +mingled with bodies. But they impart a certain power +which is proximate to bodies, through verging towards +them. For tendency constitutes a certain secondary +power proximate to bodies.</p> + +<p>5. Soul, indeed, is a certain medium between an impartible +essence, and an essence which is divisible about +bodies. But intellect is an impartible essence alone. And +qualities and material forms are divisible about bodies.</p> + +<p>6. Not every thing⁠<a id="FNanchor_146" href="#Footnote_146" class="fnanchor">[146]</a> which acts on another, effects +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_202">[202]</span>that which it does effect by approximation and contact; +but those natures which effect any thing by approximation +and contact, use approximation accidentally.</p> + +<p>7. The soul is bound to the body by a conversion +to the corporeal passions; and is again liberated by +becoming impassive to the body.</p> + +<p>8. That which nature binds, nature also dissolves: +and that which the soul binds, the soul likewise dissolves. +Nature, indeed, bound the body to the soul; +but the soul binds herself to the body. Nature, therefore, +liberates the body from the soul; but the soul +liberates herself from the body.</p> + +<p>9. Hence there is a twofold death; the one, indeed, +universally known, in which the body is liberated from +the soul; but the other peculiar to philosophers, in +which the soul is liberated from the body. Nor does the +one⁠<a id="FNanchor_147" href="#Footnote_147" class="fnanchor">[147]</a> entirely follow the other.</p> + +<p>10. We do not understand similarly in all things, but +in a manner adapted to the essence of each. For intellectual +objects we understand intellectually; but those +that pertain to soul rationally. We apprehend plants +spermatically; but bodies idolically [<i>i.e.</i> as images]; +and that which is above all these, super-intellectually and +super-essentially⁠<a id="FNanchor_148" href="#Footnote_148" class="fnanchor">[148]</a>.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_203">[203]</span></p> + +<p>11. Incorporeal hypostases, in descending, are distributed +into parts, and multiplied about individuals with +a diminution of power; but when they ascend by their +energies beyond bodies, they become united, and proceed +into a simultaneous subsistence, through exuberance of +power.</p> + +<p>12. The homonymous is not in bodies only, but life +also is among the number of things which have a multifarious +subsistence. For the life of a plant is different +from that of an animated being; the life of an intellectual +essence differs from that of the nature which is +beyond intellect; and the psychical differs from the intellectual +life. For these natures live, though nothing +which proceeds from, possesses a life similar to them.</p> + +<p>13. Every thing which generates by its very essence, +generates that which is inferior to itself⁠<a id="FNanchor_149" href="#Footnote_149" class="fnanchor">[149]</a>; and every thing +generated, is naturally converted to its generator. Of +generating natures, however, some are not at all converted +to the beings which they generate; but others are +partly converted to them, and partly not; and others are +only converted to their progeny, but are not converted to +themselves.</p> + +<p>14. Every thing generated, possesses from that which +is different from itself the cause of its generation, since +nothing is produced without a cause. Such generated +natures, however, as have their existence through composition, +these are on this account corruptible. But such +as, being simple and incomposite, possess their existence +in a simplicity of hypostasis, these being indissoluble, +are, indeed, incorruptible; yet they are said to be generated, +not as if they were composites, but as being +suspended from a certain cause. Bodies, therefore, are in +a twofold respect generated; as being suspended from a +certain producing cause; and as being composites. But +soul and intellect are only generated as being suspended +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_204">[204]</span>from a cause, and not as composites. Hence bodies are +generated, dissoluble and corruptible; but soul and intellect +are unbegotten, as being without composition, and +on this account indissoluble and incorruptible; yet they +are generated so far as they are suspended from a cause.</p> + +<p>15. Intellect is not the principle of all things; for +intellect is many things; but, prior to <i>the many</i>, it is +necessary that there should be <i>the one</i>. It is evident, +however, that intellect is many things. For it always +understands its conceptions, which are not one, but many; +and which are not any thing else than itself. If, therefore, +it is the same with its conceptions, but they are +many, intellect also will be many things. But that it +is the same with intelligibles [or the objects of its intellection], +may be thus demonstrated. For, if there is any +thing which intellect surveys, it will either survey this +thing as contained in itself, or as placed in something +else. And that intellect, indeed, contemplates or surveys, +is evident. For, in conjunction with intellection, +or intellectual perception, it will be intellect; but if you +deprive it of intellection, you will destroy its essence. It +is necessary, therefore, that, directing our attention to the +properties of knowledge, we should investigate the perception +of intellect. All the gnostic powers, then, which +we contain, are universally sense, imagination, and intellect⁠<a id="FNanchor_150" href="#Footnote_150" class="fnanchor">[150]</a>. +The power, however, which employs sense, surveys +by projecting itself to externals, not being united to the +objects which it surveys, but only receiving an impression +of, by exerting its energies upon them. When, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_205">[205]</span>therefore, the eye sees a visible object, it is impossible +that it should become the same with that which it perceives: +for it would not see if there was not an interval +between it and the object of its perception. And, after +the same manner, that which is touched, if it was the +same with that by which it is touched, would perish. +From which it is evident that sense, and that which +employs sense, must always tend to an external object, +in order to apprehend something sensible. In like +manner also, the phantasy, or imagination, always +tends to something external, and by this extension +of itself, gives subsistence to, or prepares an image; its +extension to what is external, indicating that the object +of its perception is a resemblance of something external. +And such, indeed, is the apprehension of these two +powers; neither of which verging to, and being collected +into itself, perceives either a sensible or insensible form.</p> + +<p>In intellect, however, the apprehension of its objects +does not subsist after this manner, but is effected by +converging to, and surveying itself. For by departing +from itself, in order to survey its own energies, and +become the eye of them, and the sight of essences, it will +not understand any thing. Hence, as sense is to that +which is sensible, so is intellect to that which is intelligible. +Sense, however, by, extending itself to externals, +finds that which is sensible situated in matter; but intellect +surveys the intelligible, by being collected into itself, +and not extended outwardly⁠<a id="FNanchor_151" href="#Footnote_151" class="fnanchor">[151]</a>. On this account some are +of opinion, that the hypostasis of intellect differs from +that of the phantasy only in name. For the phantasy, in +the rational animal, appeared to them to be intelligence. +As these men, however, suspended all things from matter +and a corporeal nature, it follows that they should also +suspend from these intellect. But our intellect surveys +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_206">[206]</span>both bodies and other essences. Hence it apprehends +them situated somewhere. But as the proper objects of +intellect have a subsistence out of matter, they will be +no where⁠<a id="FNanchor_152" href="#Footnote_152" class="fnanchor">[152]</a> [locally]. It is evident, therefore, that intellectual +natures are to be conjoined with intelligence. But +if intellectual natures are in intellect, it follows that intellect, +when it understands intelligibles, surveys both the +intelligible and itself; and that proceeding into itself, it +perceives intellectually, because it proceeds into intelligibles. +If, however, intellect understands many things, +and not one thing only, intellect also will necessarily +be many. But <i>the one</i> subsists prior to the many; so that +it is necessary that <i>the one</i> should be prior to intellect.</p> + +<p>16. Memory is not the conservation of imaginations, +but the power of calling forth <i>de novo</i> those conceptions +which had previously occupied the attention of the +mind⁠<a id="FNanchor_153" href="#Footnote_153" class="fnanchor">[153]</a>.</p> + +<p>17. Soul, indeed, contains the reasons [or forms] of +all things, but energizes according to them, either being +called forth to this energy by something else, or converting +itself to them inwardly. And when called forth +by something else, it introduces, as it were, the senses to +externals, but when it enters into itself, it becomes occupied +with intellectual conceptions. Hence some one may +say, that neither the senses, nor intellectual perceptions, +are without the phantasy; so that, as in the animal, the +senses are not without the passive affection of the sensitive +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_207">[207]</span>organs, in like manner intellections are not without +the phantasy. Perhaps, however, it may be said, in +answer to this, that, as an impression in the sensitive +organ is the concomitant of the sensitive animal, so analogously +a phantasm is the concomitant of the intellection +of the soul in man, considered as an animal⁠<a id="FNanchor_154" href="#Footnote_154" class="fnanchor">[154]</a>.</p> + +<p>18. Soul is an essence without magnitude, immaterial, +incorruptible, possessing its existence in life, and having +life from itself.</p> + +<p>19. The passivity of bodies is different from that of +incorporeal natures. For the passivity of bodies is +attended with mutation; but the adaptations and passions +of the soul are energies; yet they are by no means similar +to the calefactions and frigefactions of bodies. Hence, if +the passivity of bodies is accompanied by mutation, it +must be said that all incorporeal natures are impassive. +For the essences which are separated from matter and +bodies, are what they are in energy. But those things +which approximate to matter and bodies, are themselves, +indeed, impassive; but the natures in which they are surveyed +are passive. For when the animal perceives sensibly, +the soul [<i>i.e.</i> the rational soul] appears to be similar +to separate harmony⁠<a id="FNanchor_155" href="#Footnote_155" class="fnanchor">[155]</a>, of itself moving the chords adapted +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_208">[208]</span>to harmony; but the body is similar to the inseparable +harmony in the chords, [<i>i.e.</i> to the harmony which cannot +exist separate from the chords]. But the animal is the +cause of the motion, because it is an animated being. It +is, however, analogous to a musician, because it is harmonic; +but the bodies which are struck through sensitive +passion, are analogous to the harmonized chords of a +musical instrument. For in this instance, also, separate +harmony is not passively affected, but the chords. And +the musician, indeed, moves according to the harmony +which is in him; yet the chords would not be musically +moved, even though the musician wished that they should, +unless harmony ordered this to take place.</p> + +<p>20. Incorporeal natures are not denominated like +bodies, according to a participation in common of one +and the same genus; but they derive their appellation +from a mere privation with respect to bodies. Hence, +nothing hinders some of them from having a subsistence +as beings, but others as non-beings; some of them, from +being prior to, and others posterior to bodies; some, from +being separate, and others inseparable from bodies; some, +from having a subsistence by themselves, but others from +being indigent of things different from themselves, to +their existence; some, from being the same through +energies and self-motive lives, but others from subsisting +together with lives, and energies of a certain quality. +For they subsist according to a negation of the things +which they are not, and not according to the affirmation +of the things which they are.</p> + +<p>21. The properties of matter, according to the ancients, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_209">[209]</span>are the following: It is incorporeal; for it is different +from bodies. It is without life; for it is neither +intellect nor soul, nor vital from itself [<i>i.e.</i> essentially]. It +is also formless, variable, infinite, and powerless. Hence, +it is neither being, nor yet non-being. Not that it is non-being +like motion, but it is true non-being, the image +and phantasm of bulk, because it is that which bulk +primarily contains. It is likewise powerless, and the +desire of subsistence, has stability, but not in permanency, +and always appears in itself to be contrary. Hence, it is +both small and great, more and less, deficient and exceeding. +It is always becoming to be, or rising into existence; +abides not, and yet is unable to fly away; and +is the defect of all being. Hence, in whatever it announces +itself to be, it deceives; and though it should +appear to be great, it is nevertheless small. For it +resembles a flying mockery, eluding all pursuit, and +vanishing into non-entity. For its flight is not in place, +but is effected by its desertion of real being. Hence, +also, the images which are in it, are in an image more unreal +than themselves; just as in a mirror, where the thing +represented is in one place, and the representation of +it in another. It likewise appears to be full, yet contains +nothing, though it seems to possess all things⁠<a id="FNanchor_156" href="#Footnote_156" class="fnanchor">[156]</a>.</p> + +<p>22. All passions subsist about the same thing as that +about which corruption subsists; for the reception of +passion is the path to corruption. And the thing that is +the subject of passivity, is also the subject of corruption. +Nothing incorporeal, however, is corrupted. But some +of them either exist, or do not exist; so that they are not +at all passive. For that which is passive, ought not to be +a thing of this kind, but such as may be changed in +quality, and corrupted by the properties of the things +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_210">[210]</span>that enter into it, and cause it to be passive. For the +change in quality of that which is inherent, is not +casually effected. Neither, therefore, does matter suffer; +for it is of itself without quality. Nor do the forms +which enter into, and depart from it, suffer; but the +passion subsists about the composite from matter and +form, the very being of which consists in the union of the +two. For this, in the contrary powers and qualities of +the things which enter and produce passion, is seen to +be the subject of them. On which account, also, those +things, the life of which is externally derived, and does +not subsist from themselves, are capable of suffering both +the participation and the privation of life. But those +beings whose existence consists in an impassive life, +must necessarily possess a permanent life; just as a privation +of life, so far as it is a privation of it, is attended +with impassivity. As, therefore, to be changed and to +suffer pertain to the composite from matter and form, and +this is body, but matter is exempt from this; thus also, to +live and to die, and to suffer through the participation of +life and death, is beheld in the composite from soul and +body. Nevertheless, this does not happen to the soul; +because it is not a thing which consists of life and +the privation of life, but consists of life alone. And it +possesses this, because its essence is simple, and the +reason [or form] of the soul is self-motive⁠<a id="FNanchor_157" href="#Footnote_157" class="fnanchor">[157]</a>.</p> + +<p>23. An intellectual essence is so similar in its parts, +that the same⁠<a id="FNanchor_158" href="#Footnote_158" class="fnanchor">[158]</a> things exist both in a partial and an +all-perfect intellect. In an universal intellect, however, +partial natures subsist universally; but in a partial +intellect, both universals and particulars subsist partially.</p> + +<p>24. Of that essence, the existence of which is in life, +and the passions of which are lives, the death also consists +in a certain life, and not in a total privation of life; +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_211">[211]</span>because, neither is the deprivation of life in this essence +a passion, or a path which entirely leads to a non-vital +subsistence.</p> + +<p>25. In incorporeal lives, the progressions are effected +while the lives themselves remain firm and stable, nothing +pertaining to them being corrupted, or changed into the +hypostasis of things subordinate to them. Hence, neither +are the things to which they give subsistence produced +with a certain corruption or mutation. Nor do these +incorporeal lives subsist like generation, which participates +of corruption and mutation. Hence, they are +unbegotten and incorruptible, and on this account are +unfolded into light without generation and incorruptibly.</p> + +<p>26. Of that nature which is beyond intellect, many +things are asserted through intellection, but it is surveyed +by a cessation of intellectual energy better than with it⁠<a id="FNanchor_159" href="#Footnote_159" class="fnanchor">[159]</a>; +just as with respect to one who is asleep, many things +are asserted of him while he is in that state by those who +are awake; but the proper knowledge and apprehension +of his dormant condition, is only to be obtained through +sleep. For the similar is known by the similar; because +<i>all knowledge is an assimilation to the object of knowledge</i>.</p> + +<p>27. With respect to that which is non-being, we +either produce it, being ourselves separated from real +being, or we have a preconception of it, as adhering to +being. Hence, if we are separated from being, we have +not an antecedent conception of the non-being which is +above being, but our knowledge in this case is only that +of a false passion, such as that which happens to a man +when he departs from himself. For as a man may himself, +and through himself, be truly elevated to the non-being +which is above being, so, by departing from being,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_212">[212]</span> +he is led to the non-being which is a falling off from +being.</p> + +<p>28. The hypostasis of body is no impediment whatever +to that which is essentially incorporeal, so as to +prevent it from being where, and in such a way, as it +wishes to be. For as that which is without bulk is +incomprehensible by body, and does not at all pertain to +it, so that which has bulk cannot impede or obscure +an incorporeal nature, but lies before it like a non-entity. +Nor does that which is incorporeal pervade locally, when +it wishes to pass from one thing to another; for place is +consubsistent with bulk. Nor is it compressed by bodies. +For that which in any way whatever is connected with +bulk, may be compressed, and effect a transition locally; +but that which is entirely without bulk and without magnitude, +cannot be restrained by that which has bulk, and +does not participate of local motion. Hence, by a certain +disposition, it is found to be there, where it is +inclined to be, being with respect to place every where +and yet no where⁠<a id="FNanchor_160" href="#Footnote_160" class="fnanchor">[160]</a>. By <i>a certain disposition</i>, therefore, it +is either above the heavens, or is contained in a certain +part of the world. When, however, it is contained +in a certain part of the world, it is not visible to the +eyes, but the presence of it becomes manifest from its +works.</p> + +<p>29. It is necessary that an incorporeal nature, if it is +contained in body, should not be enclosed in it like a +wild beast in a den; (for no body is able thus to enclose +and comprehend it), nor is it contained in body in the +same way as a bladder contains something liquid, or +wind; but it is requisite that it should give subsistence to +certain powers which verge to what is external, through +its union with body; by which powers, when it descends, +it becomes complicated with body. Its conjunction, +therefore, with body, is effected through an ineffable +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_213">[213]</span>extension. Hence, nothing else binds it, but itself binds +itself to body. Neither, therefore, is it liberated from the +body, when the body is [mortally] wounded and corrupted, +but it liberates itself, by turning itself from an +adhering affection to the body.</p> + +<p>30. None of the hypostases which rank as wholes, and +are perfect, is converted to its own progeny; but all perfect +hypostases are elevated to their generators as far +as to the mundane body [or the body of the world]. For +this body, being perfect, is elevated to its soul, which +is intellectual: and on this account it is moved in a +circle. But the soul of this body is elevated to intellect; +and intellect, to the first principle of all things. All +beings, therefore, proceed to this principle as much as +possible, beginning from the last of things. The elevation, +however, to that which is first, is either proximate or +remote. Hence, these natures may not only be said to +aspire after the highest God, but also to enjoy him to the +utmost of their power. But in partial⁠<a id="FNanchor_161" href="#Footnote_161" class="fnanchor">[161]</a> hypostases, and +which are able to verge to many things, there is also +a desire of being converted to their progeny. Hence, +likewise, in these there is error, in these there is reprehensible +incredulity. These, therefore, matter injures, +because they are capable of being converted to it, being +at the same time able to be converted to divinity. Hence, +perfection gives subsistence to secondary from primary +natures, preserving them converted to the first of things; +but imperfection converts primary⁠<a id="FNanchor_162" href="#Footnote_162" class="fnanchor">[162]</a> to posterior natures, +and causes them to love the beings which have departed +from divinity prior to themselves.</p> + +<p>31. God is every where because he is no where: and +this is also true of intellect and soul: for each of these is +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_214">[214]</span>every where, because each is no where. But God indeed +is every where, and no where, with respect to all things +which are posterior to him; and he⁠<a id="FNanchor_163" href="#Footnote_163" class="fnanchor">[163]</a> alone is such as he +is, and such as he wills himself to be. Intellect is in God, +but is every where, and no where, with respect to the +natures posterior to it. And soul is in God and intellect, +and is every where and no where, in [or with respect to] +body⁠<a id="FNanchor_164" href="#Footnote_164" class="fnanchor">[164]</a>. + But body is in soul, and in intellect⁠<a id="FNanchor_165" href="#Footnote_165" class="fnanchor">[165]</a>, and in +God. And as all beings and non-beings are from and in +God, hence, he is neither beings nor non-beings, nor +subsists in them. For if, indeed, he was alone every +where, he would be all things and in all, but since he is +also no where, all things are produced through him, and +are contained in him, because he is every where. They +are, however, different from him, because he is no where. +Thus, likewise, intellect being every where and no where, +is the cause of souls, and of the natures posterior to +souls; yet intellect is not soul, nor the natures posterior +to soul, nor subsists in them; because it is not only +every where, but is also no where, with respect to the +natures posterior to it. And soul is neither body, nor in +body, but is the cause of body; because being every +where, it is also no where, with respect to body. And +this progression of things in the universe extends as far +as to that which is neither able to be at once every where, +nor at once no where, but partially participates of each of +these⁠<a id="FNanchor_166" href="#Footnote_166" class="fnanchor">[166]</a>.</p> + +<p>32. The soul does not exist on the earth [when it is +conversant with terrene natures,] in the same manner +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_215">[215]</span>as bodies accede to the earth; but a subsistence of the +soul on the earth, signifies its presiding over terrene +bodies. Thus, also, the soul is said to be in Hades, when +it presides over its image⁠<a id="FNanchor_167" href="#Footnote_167" class="fnanchor">[167]</a>, which is naturally adapted to +be in place, but possesses its hypostasis in darkness. +So that if Hades is a subterranean dark place, the soul, +though not divulsed from being, will exist in Hades, by +attracting to itself its image. For when the soul departs +from the solid body, the spirit accompanies it which it +had collected from the starry spheres. But as from its +adhering affection to the body, it exerts a partial reason, +through which it possesses an habitude to a body of a +certain quality, in performing the energies of life;—hence, +from this adhesion to body, the form of the phantasy +is impressed in the spirit, and thus the image is +attracted by the soul. The soul, however, is said to be +in Hades, because the spirit obtains a formless and +obscure nature. And as a heavy and moist spirit pervades +as far as to subterranean places, hence the soul is +said to proceed under the earth. Not that this essence of +the soul changes one place for another, and subsists in +place, but it receives the habitudes of bodies which are +naturally adapted to change their places, and to be +allotted a subsistence in place; such-like bodies receiving +it according to aptitudes, from being disposed after a +certain manner towards it. For the soul, conformably to +the manner in which it is disposed, finds an appropriate +body. Hence, when it is disposed in a purer manner, +it has a connascent body which approximates to an +ethereal nature, and this is an ethereal body. But when it +proceeds from reason to the energies of the phantasy, +then its connascent body is of a solar-form nature. And +when it becomes effeminate and vehemently excited by +corporeal form, then it is connected with a lunar-form +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_216">[216]</span>body. When, however, it falls into bodies which consist +of humid vapours, then a perfect ignorance of real being +follows, together with darkness and infancy.</p> + +<p>Moreover, in its egress from the body, if it still +possesses a spirit turbid from humid exhalations, it then +attracts to itself a shadow, and becomes heavy; a spirit +of this kind naturally striving to penetrate into the +recesses of the earth, unless a certain other cause draws +it in a contrary direction. As therefore the soul, when +surrounded with this testaceous and terrene vestment, +necessarily lives on the earth; so likewise when it +attracts a moist spirit, it is necessarily surrounded with +the image. But it attracts moisture when it continually +endeavours to associate with nature, whose operations +are effected in moisture, and which are rather under than +upon the earth. When, however, the soul earnestly +endeavours to depart from nature, then she becomes a +dry splendour, without a shadow, and without a cloud, or +mist. For moisture gives subsistence to a mist in the +air; but dryness constitutes a dry splendour from exhalation.</p> + +<p>33. The things which are truly predicated of a sensible +and material nature, are these: that it has, in every +respect, a diffused and dispersed subsistence; that it +is mutable; that it has its existence in difference; that +it is a composite; that it subsists by itself, [as the subject +or recipient of other things;] that it is beheld in place, +and in bulk: and other properties similar to these are +asserted of it. But the following particulars are predicated +of truly existing being, and which itself subsists +from itself; viz. that it is always established in itself; +that it has an existence perpetually similar and the same; +that it is essentialized in sameness; that it is immutable +according to essence, is uncompounded, is neither dissoluble, +nor in place, nor is dispersed into bulk; and is +neither generated, nor capable of being destroyed: and +other properties are asserted of it similar to these. To +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_217">[217]</span>which predications adhering, we should neither ourselves +assert any thing repugnant to them, concerning the +different nature of sensible and truly-existing beings, +nor assent to those who do.</p> + +<h3>SECTION II.</h3> + +<p>34. There is one kind of virtues pertaining to the +political character, and another to the man who tends to +contemplation, and who, on this account, is called theoretic, +and is now a beholder [of intellectual and intelligible +natures]. And there are also other virtues pertaining +to intellect, so far as it is intellect, and separate +from soul. The virtues indeed of the political character, +and which consist in the moderation of the passions, are +characterized by following and being obedient to the +reasoning about that which is becoming in actions. +Hence, looking to an innoxious converse with neighbours, +these virtues are denominated, from the aggregation of +fellowship, political. And here prudence indeed subsists +about the reasoning part; fortitude about the irascible +part; temperance in the consent and symphony of the +epithymetic⁠<a id="FNanchor_168" href="#Footnote_168" class="fnanchor">[168]</a> with the reasoning part; and justice, in each +of these performing its proper employment with respect to +governing and being governed. But the virtues of him +who proceeds to the contemplative life, consist in a +departure from terrestrial concerns. Hence, also, they +are called purifications, being surveyed in the refraining +from corporeal actions, and avoiding sympathies with the +body. For these are the virtues of the soul elevating +itself to true being. The political virtues therefore +adorn the mortal man, and are the forerunners of purifications. +For it is necessary that he who is adorned by +the <i>cathartic</i> virtues, should abstain from doing any thing +precedaneously in conjunction with body. Hence, in +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_218">[218]</span>these purifications, not to opine with body, but to energize +alone, gives subsistence to <i>prudence</i>; which derives +its perfection through energizing intellectually with +purity. But not to be similarly passive with the body, +constitutes <i>temperance</i>. Not to fear a departure from +body, as into something void, and non-entity, gives subsistence +to <i>fortitude</i>. But when reason and intellect are +the leaders, and there is no resistance [from the irrational +part], <i>justice</i> is produced. The disposition therefore, +according to the political virtues, is surveyed in the +moderation of the passions; having for its end to live as +man conformable to nature. But the disposition, according +to the theoretic virtues, is beheld in apathy⁠<a id="FNanchor_169" href="#Footnote_169" class="fnanchor">[169]</a>, the end +of which is a similitude to God.</p> + +<p>Since, however, of purification, one kind consists in +purifying, but another pertains to those that are purified, +the cathartic virtues are surveyed according to both these +significations of purification. For the end of purification +is to become pure. But since purification, and the being +purified, are an ablation of every thing foreign, the good +resulting from them will be different from that which +purifies; so, that if that which is purified was good +prior to the impurity with which it is defiled, purification +is sufficient. That, however, which remains after purification, +is good, and not purification. The nature of the +soul also was not good [prior to purification], but is +that which is able to partake of good, and is boniform. +For if this were not the case, it would not have become +situated in evil. The good therefore of the soul consists +in being united to its generator, but its evil in an association +with things subordinate to itself. Its evil also is +twofold; the one arising from an association with terrestrial +natures, but the other from doing this with an +excess of the passions. Hence, all the political virtues +which liberate the soul from one evil, may be denominated +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_219">[219]</span>virtues, and are honourable. But the cathartic are +more honourable, and liberate it from evil, so far as it is +soul. It is necessary therefore, that the soul, when +purified, should associate with its generator. Hence, the +virtue of it, after its conversion, consists in a scientific +knowledge of [true] being; but this will not be the case, +unless conversion precedes.</p> + +<p>There is, therefore, another genus of virtues after the +cathartic and political, and which are the virtues of the +soul <i>energizing intellectually</i>. And here, indeed, wisdom +and prudence consist in the contemplation of those things +which intellect possesses. But <i>justice</i> consists in performing +what is appropriate in conformity to, and energizing +according to intellect. <i>Temperance</i> is an inward +conversion of the soul to intellect. And <i>fortitude</i> is +apathy, according to a similitude of that to which the soul +looks, and which is naturally impassive. These virtues +also, in the same manner as the others, alternately follow +each other.</p> + +<p>The fourth species of the virtues, is that of the paradigms +subsisting in intellect: which are more excellent +than the psychical virtues, and exist as the paradigms of +these; the virtues of the soul being the similitudes of +them. And intellect indeed is that in which all things +subsist at once as paradigms. Here, therefore, prudence +is science; but intellect that knows [all things] is wisdom. +Temperance is that which is converted to itself. The +proper work of intellect, is the performance of its appropriate +duty, [and this is justice⁠<a id="FNanchor_170" href="#Footnote_170" class="fnanchor">[170]</a>.] But fortitude is sameness, +and the abiding with purity in itself, through an +abundance of power. There are therefore four genera of +virtues; of which, indeed, some pertain to intellect, +concur with the essence of it, and are paradigmatic. +Others pertain to soul now looking to intellect, and +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_220">[220]</span>being filled from it. Others belong to the soul of man, +purifying itself, and becoming purified from the body, and +the irrational passions. And others are the virtues of the +soul of man, adorning the man, through giving measure +and bound to the irrational nature, and producing moderation +in the passions. <i>And he indeed, who has the greater +virtues, has also necessarily the less; but the contrary is not +true, that he who has the less, has also the greater virtues.</i> +Nor will he who possesses the greater, energize precedaneously +according to the less, but only so far as the +necessities of the mortal nature require. The scope also +of the virtues, is, as we have said, generically different in +the different virtues. For the scope of the <i>political</i> virtues, +is to give measure to the passions in their practical +energies according to nature. But the scope of the +<i>cathartic</i> virtues, is entirely to obliterate the remembrance +of the passions; and the scope of the rest subsists +analogously to what has been before said. Hence, he +who energizes according to the <i>practical</i> virtues, is a +<i>worthy</i> man; but he who energizes according to the +<i>cathartic</i> virtues, is an <i>angelic man</i>, or is also <i>a good +dæmon</i>. He who energizes according to the <i>intellectual</i> +virtues alone is <i>a God</i>; but he who energizes according +to the <i>paradigmatic</i> virtues, is <i>the father of the Gods</i>. We, +therefore, ought especially to pay attention to the <i>cathartic</i> +virtues, since we may obtain these in the present life. +But through these, the ascent is to the more honourable +virtues. Hence, it is requisite to survey to what degree +purification may be extended: for it is a separation from +body, and from the passive motion of the irrational part. +But how this may be effected, and to what extent, must +now be unfolded.</p> + +<p>In the first place, indeed, it is necessary that he who +intends to acquire this purification, should, as the foundation +and basis of it, know himself to be a soul bound in +a foreign thing, and in a different essence. In the second +place, as that which is raised from this foundation, he +should collect himself from the body, and as it were from +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_221">[221]</span>different places, so as to be disposed in a manner perfectly +impassive with respect to the body. For he who energizes +uninterruptedly according to sense, though he may +not do this with an adhering affection, and the enjoyment +resulting from pleasure, yet, at the same time, his +attention is dissipated about the body, in consequence of +becoming through sense⁠<a id="FNanchor_171" href="#Footnote_171" class="fnanchor">[171]</a> in contact with it. But we are +addicted to the pleasures or pains of sensibles; in conjunction +with a promptitude, and converging sympathy; +from which disposition it is requisite to be purified. <i>This, +however, will be effected by admitting necessary pleasures, and +the sensations of them, merely as remedies, or as a liberation +from pain⁠<a id="FNanchor_172" href="#Footnote_172" class="fnanchor">[172]</a>, in order that [the rational part] may not be +impeded [in its energies].</i> Pain also must be taken away. +But if this is not possible, it must be mildly diminished. +And it will be diminished, if the soul is not copassive +with it. Anger, likewise, must as much as possible +be taken away; and must by no means be premeditated. +But if it cannot be entirely removed, deliberate +choice must not be mingled with it, but the unpremeditated +motion must be the impulse of the irrational +part. <i>That however which is unpremeditated, is imbecile +and small.</i> All fear likewise must be expelled. For +he who is adapted to this purification, will fear nothing. +Here, however, if it should take place, it will be unpremeditated. +Anger therefore and fear must be used +for the purpose of admonition. But the desire of +every thing base must be exterminated. Such a one also, +so far as he is a cathartic philosopher, will not desire +meats and drinks [except so far as they are necessary]. +Neither must there be the unpremeditated in natural +venereal connexions; <i>but if this should take place, it must +only be as far as to that precipitate imagination which +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_222">[222]</span>energizes in sleep</i>. In short, the intellectual soul itself of +the purified man must be liberated from all these [corporeal +propensities]. He must likewise endeavour, that +what is moved to the irrational nature of corporeal +passions, may be moved without sympathy, and without +animadversion; so that the motions themselves may be +immediately dissolved, through their vicinity to the +reasoning power. This, however, will not take place +while the purification is proceeding to its perfection; but +will happen to those in whom reason rules without opposition. +Hence, in these, the inferior part will so venerate +reason, that it will be indignant if it is at all moved, +in consequence of not being quiet when its master is +present, and will reprove itself for its imbecility. These, +however, are yet only moderations of the passions, but +at length terminate in apathy. For when copassivity +is entirely exterminated, then apathy is present with him +who is purified from this passivity. For passion becomes +moved when reason imparts excitation, through verging +[to the irrational nature].</p> + +<p>35. Every thing which is situated somewhere, is there +situated according to its own nature, and not preternaturally. +For body, therefore, which subsists in matter +and bulk, to be somewhere, is to be in place. Hence, for +the body of the world, which is material and has bulk, to +be every where, is to be extended with interval, and +to subsist in the place of interval. But a subsistence in +place, is not at all present with the intelligible world, nor, +in short, with that which is immaterial, and essentially +incorporeal, because it is without bulk, and without interval; +so that the ubiquity of an incorporeal nature is not +local. Hence, neither will one part of it be here, but +another there; for if this were the case, it would not be +out of place, nor without interval; but wherever it is, the +whole of it is there. Nor is it indeed in this, but not +in another place; for thus it would be comprehended by +one place, but separated from another. Nor is it remote +from this thing, but near to that; in the same manner as +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_223">[223]</span>remoteness and nearness are asserted of things which are +adapted to be in place, according to the measures of +intervals. Hence, the sensible is present, indeed, with +the intelligible world, according to interval, but [a truly] +incorporeal nature is present with the world impartibly, +and unaccompanied by interval. The impartible, likewise, +when it is in that which has interval, is wholly +in every part of it, being one and the same in number [in +every part of it]. That which is impartible, therefore, +and without multitude, becomes extended into magnitude, +and multiplied, when intimately connected with that +which is naturally multitudinous, and endued with magnitude; +and thus the latter receives the former in such +a way as it is adapted to receive it, and not such as +the former truly is. But that which is partible and +multitudinous, is received by that which is naturally +impartible and without multitude, impartibly and non-multitudinously, +and after this manner is present with it; +<i>i.e.</i> the impartible is present impartibly, without plurality, +and without a subsistence in place, conformably to its +own nature, with that which is partible, and which is +naturally multitudinous, and exists in place. But that +which is partible, multiplied, and in place, is present with +the impartible essence, partibly, multitudinously, and +locally. Hence, it is necessary, in the survey of these +natures, to preserve and not confound the peculiarities of +each; or rather, we should not imagine or opine of that +which is incorporeal, such properties as pertain to bodies, +or any thing of the like kind. For no one would ascribe +to bodies the peculiarities of a genuinely incorporeal +essence. For all of us are familiar with bodies; but the +knowledge of incorporeal natures is attainable by us with +great difficulty; because, through not being able to +behold them intuitively, we are involved in doubt about +their nature; and this takes place as long as we are under +the dominion of imagination.</p> + +<p>Thus, therefore, you should say, If that which is in +place, is out of, or has departed from itself, through +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_224">[224]</span>having proceeded into bulk, that which is intelligible +is not in place, and is in itself, because it has not +proceeded into corporeal extension. Hence, if the former +is an image, the latter is an archetype. And the +former, indeed, derives its being through the intelligible; +but the latter subsists in [and through] itself. For every +[physical] image is the image of intellect. It is also +requisite that, calling to mind the peculiarities of both +these, we should not wonder at the discrepance which +takes place in their congress with each other; if, in +short, it is proper on this occasion to use the word +congress. For we are not now surveying the congress of +bodies, but of things which are entirely distinct from +each other, according to peculiarity of hypostasis. Hence, +also, this congress is different from every thing which is +usually surveyed in things essentially the same. Neither, +therefore, is it temperament, or mixture, or conjunction, +or apposition, but subsists in a way different from all +these; appearing, indeed, in all the mutual participations +of consubstantial natures, in whatever way this may be +effected; but transcending every thing that falls under +the apprehension of sense. Hence, an intelligible essence +is wholly present without interval, with all the parts of +that which has interval, though they should happen to be +infinite in number. Nor is it present distributed into +parts, giving a part to a part; nor being multiplied, does +it multitudinously impart itself to multitude; but it is +wholly present with the parts of that which is extended +into bulk, and with each individual of the multitude, and +all the bulk impartibly, and without plurality, and as +numerically one. But it pertains to those natures to +enjoy it partibly, and in a distributed manner, whose +power is dissipated into different parts. And to these it +frequently happens, that through a defect of their own +nature, they counterfeit an intelligible essence; so that +doubts arise respecting that essence, which appears to +have passed from its own nature into theirs.</p> + +<p>36. Truly-existing being is neither great nor small, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_225">[225]</span>for magnitude and parvitude are properly the peculiarities +of bulk. But true being transcends both magnitude and +parvitude; and is above the greatest, and above the +least; and is numerically one and the same, though it is +found to be simultaneously participated by every thing +that is greatest, and every thing that is least. You must +not, therefore, conceive of it as something which is +greatest; as you will then be dubious how, being that +which is greatest, it is present with the smallest masses, +without being diminished or contracted. Nor must you +conceive of it as something which is least; since you will +thus again be dubious how, being that which is least, it is +present with the greatest masses, without being multiplied +or increased, or without receiving addition. But at +one and the same time receiving into the greatest magnitude +that which transcends the greatest bulk, and into +the least magnitude that which transcends the least⁠<a id="FNanchor_173" href="#Footnote_173" class="fnanchor">[173]</a>, you +will be able to conceive how the same thing, abiding +in itself, may be simultaneously seen in any casual magnitude, +and in infinite multitudes and corporeal masses. +For according to its own peculiarity, it is present with +the magnitude of the world impartibly and without magnitude. +It also antecedes the bulk of the world, and +comprehends every part of it, in its own impartibility; just +as, <i>vice versa</i>, the world, by its multitude of parts, is multifariously +present, as far as it is able, with truly-existing +being, yet cannot comprehend it, neither with the whole +of its bulk, nor the whole of its power; but meets with +it in all its parts as that which is infinite, and cannot be +passed beyond; and this both in other respects, and +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_226">[226]</span>because truly-existing being is entirely free from all corporeal +extension.</p> + +<p>37. That which is greater in bulk, is less in power, +when compared, not with things of a similar kind, but +with those that are of a different species, or of a different +essence. For bulk is, as it were, the departure of a +thing from itself, and a division of power into the smallest +parts. Hence, that which transcends in power, is foreign +from all bulk. For power proceeding into itself, is filled +with itself, and, by corroborating itself, obtains its proper +strength; on which account, body proceeding into bulk +through a diminution of power, is as much remote from +truly-incorporeal being, as that which truly exists is from +being exhausted by bulk; for the latter abides in the +magnitude of the same power, through an exemption +from bulk. As, therefore, truly-existing being is, with +reference to a corporeal mass, without magnitude and +without bulk; thus also, that which is corporeal is, with +reference to truly-existing being, imbecile and powerless. +For that which is greatest by magnitude of power, is +exempt from all bulk; so that the world existing every +where, and, as it is said, meeting with real being which is +truly every where, is not able to comprehend the magnitude +of its power. It meets, however, with true being, +which is not partibly present with it, but is present without +magnitude, and without any definite limitation. The +presence, therefore, of truly-existing being with the world, +is not local, but assimilative, so far as it is possible +for body to be assimilated to that which is incorporeal, +and for that which is incorporeal to be surveyed in +a body assimilated to it. Hence, an incorporeal nature is +not present with body, so far as it is not possible for that +which is material to be assimilated to a perfectly immaterial +nature; and it is present, so far as a corporeal can +be assimilated to an incorporeal essence. Nevertheless, +this is not effected through reception; since, if it were, +each would be corrupted. For the material, indeed, in +receiving the immaterial nature, would be corrupted, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_227">[227]</span>through being changed into it; and the immaterial +essence would become material. Assimilations, therefore, +and participations of powers, and the deficiency of power, +proceed into things which are thus different in essence +from each other, into each other. The world, therefore, +is very far from possessing the power of real being; and +real being is very remote from the imbecility of a material +nature. But that which subsists between these, assimilating +and being assimilated, and conjoining the extremes +to each other, becomes the cause of deception about the +extremes, in consequence of applying, through the assimilation, +the one to the other.</p> + +<p>38. Truly-existing being is said to be many things, not +by a subsistence in different places, nor in the measures of +bulk, nor by coacervation, nor by the circumscriptions or +comprehensions⁠<a id="FNanchor_174" href="#Footnote_174" class="fnanchor">[174]</a> of divisible parts, but by a difference +which is immaterial, without bulk, and without plurality, +and which is divided according to multitude. Hence, +also, it is one; not as one body, nor as in one place; nor +as one bulk; nor as one which is many things; because +it is different so far as it is one, and its difference is both +divided and united. For its difference is not externally +acquired, nor adscititious, nor obtained through the participation +of something else, but it is many things from +itself. For, remaining one, it energizes with all energies, +because, through sameness, it constitutes all difference; +not being surveyed in the difference of one thing with +respect to another, as is the case in bodies. For, on the +contrary, in these, unity subsists in difference; because +diversity has in them a precedaneous existence; but the +unity which they contain is externally and adscititiously +derived. For in truly existing being, indeed, unity and +sameness precede; but difference is generated, from this +unity being energetic. <i>Hence, true being is multiplied in +impartibility; but body is united in multitude and bulk.</i> The +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_228">[228]</span>former also is established in itself, subsisting in itself +according to unity; but the latter is never in itself, +because it receives its hypostasis in an extension of +existence. The former, therefore, is an all-energetic one; +but the latter is an united multitude. Hence, it is requisite +to explore how the former is one and different; and +again, how the latter is multitude and one. Nor must we +transfer the peculiarities of the one to those which pertain +to the other.</p> + +<p>39. It is not proper to think that the multitude of +souls was generated on account of the multitude of +bodies; but it is necessary to admit that, prior to bodies, +there were many souls, and one soul [the cause of the +many]. Nor does the one and whole soul prevent the +subsistence in it of many souls; nor do the multitude of +souls distribute by division the one soul into themselves. +For they are distinct from, but are not abscinded from +the soul, which ranks as a whole; nor do they distribute +into minute parts this whole soul into themselves. They +are also present with each other without confusion; nor +do they produce the whole soul by coacervation. For +they are not separated from each other by any boundaries; +nor, again, are they confused with each other; just as +neither are many sciences confused in one soul [by which +they are possessed]. For these sciences do not subsist +in the soul like bodies, as things of a different essence +from it; but they are certain energies of the soul. For +the nature of soul possesses an infinite power. Every +thing also that occurs in it is soul; and all souls are [in a +certain respect] one; and again, the soul which ranks as +a whole, is different from all the rest. For as bodies, +though divided to infinity, do not end in that which is +incorporeal, but alone receive a difference of segments +according to bulk; thus also soul, being a vital form, +may be conceived to consist of forms <i>ad infinitum</i>. For +it possesses specific differences, and the whole of it subsists +together with, or without these. For, if there is in +the soul that which is as it were a part divided from the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_229">[229]</span>rest of the parts, yet, at the same time that there is difference, +the sameness remains. If, however, in bodies, in +which difference predominates over sameness, nothing +incorporeal when it accedes cuts off the union, but all +the parts remain essentially united, and are divided by +qualities and other forms; what ought we to assert and +conceive of a specific incorporeal life, in which sameness +is more prevalent than difference; to which nothing +foreign to form is subjected, and from which the union of +bodies is derived? Nor does body, when it becomes connected +with soul, cut off its union, though it is an impediment +to its energies in many respects. But the sameness +of soul produces and discovers all things through +itself, through its specific energy, which proceeds to +infinity; since any part of it whatever is capable of +effecting all things, when it is liberated and purified from +a conjunction with bodies; just as any part of seed possesses +the power of the whole seed. As, however, seed, +when it is united with matter, predominates over it, +according to each of the productive principles which the +seeds contain; and all the seed, its power being collected +into one, possesses the whole of its power in each of the +parts; thus also, in the immaterial soul, that which may +be conceived as a part, has the power of the whole soul. +But that part of it which verges to matter, is vanquished, +indeed, by the form to which it verges, and yet is adapted +to associate with immaterial form, though it is connected +with matter, when withdrawing itself from a material +nature, it is converted to itself. Since, however, through +verging to matter, it becomes in want of all things, and +suffers an emptiness of its proper power; but when it is +elevated to intellect, is found to possess a plenitude of all +its powers; hence those who first obtained a knowledge +of this plenitude of the soul, very properly indicated its +emptiness by calling it <i>poverty</i>, and its fulness by denominating +it <i>satiety</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_230">[230]</span></p> + +<h3>SECTION III.</h3> + +<p>40. The ancients, wishing to exhibit to us the peculiarity +of incorporeal being, so far as this can be effected +by words, when they assert that it is one, immediately +add, that it is likewise all things; by which they signified +that it is not some one⁠<a id="FNanchor_175" href="#Footnote_175" class="fnanchor">[175]</a> of the things which are known +by the senses. Since, however, we suspect that this +incorporeal one is different from sensibles, in consequence +of not perceiving this total one, which is all +things according to one, in a sensible nature, and which +is so because this one is all things:—hence the ancients +added, that <i>it is one so far as one</i>; in order that we might +understand that what is all things in truly existing being, +is something uncompounded, and that we might withdraw +ourselves from the conception of a coacervation. +When likewise they say that it is every where, they add +that it is no where. When also they assert that it is in +all things, they add, that it is no where in every thing. +Thus, too, when they say, that it is in all things, and in +every divisible nature which is adapted to receive it, they +add, that it is a whole in a whole. And, in short, they +render it manifest to us, through contrary peculiarities; +at one and the same time assuming these, in order that +we may exterminate, from the apprehension of it, the +fictitious conceptions which are derived from bodies, and +which obscure the cognoscible peculiarities of real being.</p> + +<p>41. When you have assumed an eternal essence, +infinite in itself according to power, and begin to perceive +intellectually an hypostasis unwearied, untamed, and +never-failing, but transcending in the most pure and +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_231">[231]</span>genuine life, and full from itself; and which is likewise +established in itself, satisfied with, and seeking nothing +but itself:—to this essence, if you add a subsistence +in place, or a relation to a certain thing, at the same time +that you [appear to] diminish it, by ascribing to it an +indigence of place, or a relative condition of being, you +do not [in reality] diminish this essence, but you separate +yourself from the perception of it, by receiving as a veil +the phantasy which runs under your conjectural apprehension +of it. For you cannot pass beyond, or stop, or +render more perfect, or effect the least change in a thing +of this kind, because it is impossible for it to be in the +smallest degree deficient. For it is much more never-failing +than any perpetually flowing fountain can be conceived +to be. If, however, you are unable to keep pace +with it, and to become assimilated to the intelligible all, +you should not investigate any thing pertaining to real +being; or, if you do, you will deviate from the path that +leads to it, and will look to something else. But if you +investigate nothing else, being established in yourself and +your own essence, you will be assimilated to the intelligible +universe, and will not adhere to any thing posterior +to it. Neither, therefore, should you say, I am of a +great magnitude. For, omitting this greatness, you will +become universal; though you were universal prior to +this. But, together with the universal, something else +was present with you, and you became less by the addition; +because the addition was not from truly-existing +being. For to that you cannot add any thing. When, +therefore, any thing is added from non-being, a place +is afforded to Poverty as an associate, accompanied by +an indigence of all things. Hence, dismissing non-being, +you will then become sufficient to yourself⁠<a id="FNanchor_176" href="#Footnote_176" class="fnanchor">[176]</a>. For he will +not return properly to himself who does not dismiss things +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_232">[232]</span>of a more vile and abject nature, and who opines himself +to be something naturally small, and not to be such as he +truly is. For thus he, at one and the same time, departs +both from himself, and from truly-existing being. When, +also, any one is present with that which is present in +himself, then he is present with true being, which is every +where. But when you withdraw from yourself, then, +likewise, you recede from real being;—of such great +consequence is it, for a man to be present with that which +is present with himself, [<i>i.e.</i> with his rational part], and +to be absent from that which is external to him.</p> + +<p>If, however, true being is present with us, but non-being +is absent, and real being is not present with us in +conjunction with other things [of a nature foreign to it]; +it does not accede in order that it may be present, but we +depart from it, when it is not present [with things of +a different nature]. And why should this be considered +as wonderful? For you when present are not absent from +yourself; and yet you are not present with yourself, +though present. And you are both present with and +absent from yourself when you survey other things, and +omit to behold yourself. If, therefore, you are thus +present, and yet not [in reality] present with yourself, +and on this account are ignorant of yourself, and in a +greater degree discover all things, though remote from +your essence, than yourself, with which you are naturally +present, why should you wonder if that which is not +present is remote from you who are remote from it, +because you have become remote from yourself? For, by +how much the more you are [truly] present with yourself, +though it is present, and inseparably conjoined with you, +by so much the more will you be present with real being, +which is so essentially united to you, that it is as impossible +for it to be divulsed from you, as for you to be +separated from yourself. So that it is universally possible +to know what is present with real being, and what +is absent from it, though it is every where present, and +again is also no where. For those who are able to proceed +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_233">[233]</span>into their own essence intellectually, and to obtain +a knowledge of it, will, in the knowledge itself, and the +science accompanying this knowledge, be able to recover +or regain themselves, through the union of that which +knows with that which is known. And with those, who +are present with themselves, truly-existing being will +also be present. But from such as abandon the proper +being of themselves to other things,—from these, as they +are absent from themselves, true being will also be +absent. If, however, we are naturally adapted to be +established in the same essence, to be rich from ourselves, +and not to descend to that which we are not; in +so doing becoming in want of ourselves, and thus again +associating with Poverty, though Porus⁠<a id="FNanchor_177" href="#Footnote_177" class="fnanchor">[177]</a> [or Plenty] is +present;—and if we are cut off from real being, from +which we are not separated either by place, or essence, +nor by any thing else, through our conversion to non-being, +we suffer as a just punishment of our abandonment +of true being, a departure from, and ignorance +of ourselves. And again, by a proper attention to, we +recover ourselves, and become united to divinity. It is, +therefore, rightly said, that the soul is confined in body +as in a prison, and is there detained in chains like a +fugitive slave⁠<a id="FNanchor_178" href="#Footnote_178" class="fnanchor">[178]</a>. We should, however, [earnestly] endeavour +to be liberated from our bonds. For, through +being converted to these sensible objects, we desert ourselves, +though we are of a divine origin, and are, as +Empedocles says,</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">Heaven’s exiles, straying from the orb of light.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_234">[234]</span></p> + +<p class="noindent">So that every depraved life is full of servitude; and on +this account is without God and unjust, the spirit in +it being full of impiety, and consequently of injustice. +And thus, again, it is rightly said, that justice is to be +found in the performance of that which is the province of +him who performs it. The image also of true justice +consists in distributing to each of those with whom we +live, that which is due to the desert of each.</p> + +<p>42. That which possesses its existence in another +[<i>i.e.</i> in something different from itself], and is not essentialized +in itself, separably from another, if it should be +converted to itself, in order to know itself, without that in +which it is essentialized, withdrawing itself from it; +would be corrupted by this knowledge, in consequence of +separating itself from its essence. But that which is able +to know itself without the subject in which it exists, and +is able to withdraw itself from this subject, without the +destruction of itself, cannot be essentialized in that, from +which it is capable of converting itself to itself, without +being corrupted, and of knowing itself by its own energies. +Hence, if sight, and every sensitive power, neither +perceives itself, nor apprehends or preserves itself by +separating itself from body; but intellect, when it separates +itself from body, then especially perceives intellectually, +is converted to itself, and is not corrupted;—it +is evident that the sensitive powers obtain the power of +energizing through the body; but that intellect possesses +its energies and its essence not in body, but in itself.</p> + +<p>43. Incorporeal natures are properly denominated, +and conceived to be what they are, according to a privation +of body; just as, according to the ancients, matter, +and the form which is in matter, and also natures and +[physical] powers, are apprehended by an abstraction +from matter. And after the same manner place, time, and +the boundaries of things, are apprehended. For all such +things are denominated according to a privation of body. +There are likewise other things which are said to be +incorporeal improperly, not according to a privation of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_235">[235]</span>body, but, in short, because they are not naturally adapted +to generate body⁠<a id="FNanchor_179" href="#Footnote_179" class="fnanchor">[179]</a>. Hence those of the former signification +subsist in bodies; but those of the second are +perfectly separated from bodies, and from those incorporeal +natures which subsist about bodies. For bodies, +indeed, are in place, and boundaries are in body. But +intellect, and intellectual reason, neither subsist in place +nor in body; nor proximately give existence to bodies, +nor subsist together with bodies, or with those incorporeal +natures which are denominated according to a +privation of bodies. Neither, therefore, if a certain +incorporeal vacuum should be conceived to exist, would +it be possible for intellect to be in a vacuum. For a +vacuum may be the recipient of body; but it is impossible +that it should be the recipient of intellect, and afford +a place for its energy. Since, however, the genus of an +incorporeal nature appears to be twofold, one of these +the followers of Zeno do not at all admit, but they adopt +the other; and perceiving that the former is not such as +the latter, they entirely subvert it, though they ought +rather to conceive that it is of another genus, and not +to fancy that, because it is not the latter, it has no +existence.</p> + +<p>44. Intellect and the intelligible are one thing, and +sense and that which is sensible another. And the intelligible, +indeed, is conjoined with intellect, but that which +is sensible with sense. Neither, however, can sense by +itself apprehend itself.... But the intelligible, which +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_236">[236]</span>is conjoined with intellect, and intellect, which is conjoined +with the intelligible, by no means fall under the +perception of sense. Intellect, however, is intelligible to +intellect. But if intellect is the intelligible object of +intellect, intellect will be its own intelligible object. If, +therefore, intellect is an intellectual and not a sensible +object, it will be intelligible. But if it is intelligible to +intellect, and not to sense, it will also be intelligent. The +same thing, therefore, will be that which is intelligent, +or intellectually perceives, and which is intellectually perceived, +or is intelligible; and this will be true of the +whole with respect to the whole; but not as he who +rubs, and he who is rubbed. Intellect, therefore, does +not intellectually perceive by one part, and is intellectually +perceived by another: for it is impartible, and +the whole is an intelligible object of the whole. It is +likewise wholly intellect, having nothing in itself which +can be conceived to be deprived of intelligence. Hence +one part of it does not intellectually perceive, but not +another part of it⁠<a id="FNanchor_180" href="#Footnote_180" class="fnanchor">[180]</a>. For, so far as it does not intellectually +perceive, it will be unintelligent. Neither, therefore, +departing from this thing, does it pass on to that. +For of that from which it departs, it has no intellectual +perception. But if there is no transition in its intellections, +it intellectually perceives all things at once. +If, therefore, it understands all things at once, and not +this thing now, but another afterwards, it understands +all things instantaneously and always....⁠<a id="FNanchor_181" href="#Footnote_181" class="fnanchor">[181]</a></p> + +<p>Hence, if all things are instantaneously perceived by +it, its perceptions have nothing to do with the past and +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_237">[237]</span>the future, but subsist in an indivisible untemporal <i>now</i>; +so that the simultaneous, both according to multitude, +and according to temporal interval, are present with +intellect. Hence, too, all things subsist in it according +to one, and in one, without interval, and without time. +But if this be the case, there is nothing discursive +or transitive in its intellections, and consequently they +are without motion. Hence, they are energies according +to one, subsisting in one, and without increase or mutation, +or any transition. If, however, the multitude subsists +according to one, and the energy is collected +together at once, and without time, an essence of this +kind must necessarily always subsist in [an intelligible] +one. But this is eternity. Hence, eternity is present +with intellect. That nature, however, which does not +perceive intellectually according to one, and in one, but +transitively, and with motion, so that in understanding it +leaves one thing and apprehends another, divides and +proceeds discursively,—this nature [which is soul] subsists +in conjunction with time. For with a motion of this +kind, the future and the past are consubsistent. But +soul, changing its conceptions, passes from one thing to +another; not that the prior conceptions depart, and +the posterior accede in their place, but there is, as it +were, a transition of the former, though they remain +in the soul, and the latter accede, as if from some other +place. They do not, however, accede in reality from +another place; but they appear to do so in consequence +of the self-motion of the soul, and through her eye being +directed to a survey of the different forms which she contains, +and which have the relation of parts to her whole +essence. For she resembles a fountain not flowing outwardly, +but circularly scattering its streams into itself. +With the motion, therefore, of soul, time is consubsistent; +but eternity is consubsistent with the permanency +of intellect in itself⁠<a id="FNanchor_182" href="#Footnote_182" class="fnanchor">[182]</a>. It is not, however, divided +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_238">[238]</span>from intellect in the same manner as time is from soul; +because in intellect the consubsistent essences are united. +But that which is perpetually moved, is the source of +a false opinion of eternity, through the immeasurable +extent of its motion producing a conception of eternity. +And that which abides [in one,] is falsely conceived to be +the same with that which is [perpetually] moved. For +that which is perpetually moved, evolves the time of +itself in the same manner as <i>the now</i> of itself, and multiplies +it, according to a temporal progression. Hence, +some have apprehended that time is to be surveyed in +permanency no less than in motion; and that eternity, as +we have said, is infinite time; just as if each of these +imparted its own properties to the other; time, which +is always moved, adumbrating eternity by the perpetuity of +itself, and the sameness of its motion; and eternity, through +being established in sameness of energy, becoming similar +to time, by the permanency of itself arising from energy. +In sensibles, however, the time of one thing is distinct +from that of another. Thus, for instance, there is one +time of the sun, and another of the moon, one time of the +morning-star, and another of each of the planets. Hence, +also, there is a different year of different planets. The +year, likewise, which comprehends these times, terminates +as in a summit in the motion of the soul [of +the universe,] according to the imitation of which the +celestial orbs are moved. The motion of this soul, however, +being of a different nature from that of the planets, +the time of the former also is different from that of +the latter. For the latter subsists with interval, and +is distinguished from the former by local motions and +transitions.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"> + +<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_146" href="#FNanchor_146" class="label">[146]</a> In the original, Ου το ποιουν εις αλλο, πελασει και αφῃ ποιει, α ποιει· κ.τ.λ. +But it is evident, from the sense of the whole passage, that, for Ου το +ποιουν, we should read, Ου παν το ποιουν, κ.τ.λ.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_147" href="#FNanchor_147" class="label">[147]</a> The article ο is wanting here in the original before ετερος.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_148" href="#FNanchor_148" class="label">[148]</a> Knowledge subsists conformably to the nature by which it is possessed, +and not conformably to the thing known. Hence it is either +better than, or co-ordinate with, or inferior to the object of knowledge. +Thus the rational soul has a knowledge of sensibles, which is superior to +sensibles; but it knows itself with a co-ordinate knowledge; and its +knowledge of divinity is inferior to the object of knowledge. Porphyry, +therefore, is not correct in what he here says. This dogma respecting +the conformity of knowledge to that which knows, rather than to the +thing known, originated from the divine Iamblichus, as we are informed +by Ammonius in his commentary on Aristotle’s treatise De Interpretatione, +and is adopted by Proclus (in Parmenid.). Boetius likewise +employs it in his reasoning in lib. v. about the prescience of divinity. +None of his commentators, however, have noticed the source from +whence it was derived.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_149" href="#FNanchor_149" class="label">[149]</a> Because here the generator is that <i>primarily</i> which the thing generated +is <i>secondarily</i>. See my translation of Proclus’s Theological +Elements.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_150" href="#FNanchor_150" class="label">[150]</a> Porphyry here summarily comprehends the rational gnostic powers +of the soul in intellect, because, being rational, they are expansions of +intellect properly so called. But these powers, beginning from the lowest, +are <i>opinion</i>, <i>dianoia</i>, and the summit of dianoia, which summit is the +intellect of the human soul, and is that power, by the light of which we +perceive the truth of axioms, it being intuitive perception. <i>Dianoia</i> is +the discursive energy of reason; or it is that power which reasons scientifically, +deriving the principles of its reasoning from intellect. And +<i>opinion</i> is that power which knows <i>that</i> a thing is, but is ignorant of the +cause of it, or <i>why</i> it is.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_151" href="#FNanchor_151" class="label">[151]</a> In the original, ει δε μη εξω εκτεινομενος; but for ει δε μη, it appears to +me to be obviously necessary to read ουδε μη.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_152" href="#FNanchor_152" class="label">[152]</a> In the original, εξω δε οντων υλης, ουδαμου αν ειη ταυτα; which Holstenius, +wholly mistaking the meaning, most erroneously translates, “At si +extra materiam sint, neutiquam id fieri poterit.” Farther on, Porphyry +asserts, that God, intellect, and soul, are no where, according to corporeal +locality.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_153" href="#FNanchor_153" class="label">[153]</a> In the original, η μνημη ουκ εστι φαντασιων σωτηρια, αλλα των μελετηθεντων +προβαλλεσθαι εκ νεας προβληματα. But for προβληματα, I read προλημματα. +This power, by which Porphyry characterizes memory, is of a +stable nature. And hence memory is <i>stability of knowledge</i>, in the +same manner as immortality is <i>stability of life</i>, and eternity <i>stability of +being</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_154" href="#FNanchor_154" class="label">[154]</a> See the notes on the 3d book of my translation of Aristotle’s +treatise on the Soul, and also my translation of Plotinus on Felicity. +“The phantasy,” says Olympiodorus (in Platonis Phæd.) “is an impediment +to our intellectual conceptions; and hence, when we are agitated +by the inspiring influence of Divinity, if the phantasy intervenes, the +enthusiastic energy ceases: for enthusiasm and the phantasy are contrary +to each other. Should it be asked, whether the soul is able to +energize without the phantasy? we reply, that its perception of universals +proves that it is able. It has perceptions, therefore, independent of the +phantasy; at the same time, however, the phantasy attends it in its +energies, just as a storm pursues him who sails on the sea.”</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_155" href="#FNanchor_155" class="label">[155]</a> The analogy of the soul to harmony, is more accurately unfolded +as follows, by Olympiodorus, in his Commentary on the Phædo of Plato, +than it is in this place by Porphyry: “Harmony has a triple subsistence. +For it is either harmony itself, or it is that which is first harmonized, and +which is such according to the whole of itself; or it is that which +is secondarily harmonized, and which partially participates of harmony. +The first of these must be assigned to intellect, the second to soul, and +the third to body. This last, too, is corruptible, because it subsists in a +subject; but the other two are incorruptible, because they are neither +composites, nor dependent on a subject. Hence, the rational soul +is analogous to a musician, but the animated body to harmonized +chords; for the former has a subsistence separate, but the latter inseparable +from the musical instrument.”</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_156" href="#FNanchor_156" class="label">[156]</a> What Porphyry here says about matter, is derived from the treatise +of Plotinus, <i>On the Impassivity of Incorporeal Natures</i>, to my translation +of which I refer the reader.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_157" href="#FNanchor_157" class="label">[157]</a> See my translation of the before-mentioned treatise of Plotinus.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_158" href="#FNanchor_158" class="label">[158]</a> For τα οντα here, I read τα αυτα.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_159" href="#FNanchor_159" class="label">[159]</a> Hence, it is beautifully said in the Clavis of Hermes Trismegistus, +“that the knowledge of <i>the good</i> [or the supreme principle of things], is +a divine silence, and the quiescence of all the senses.” See, also, on this +subject, a most admirable extract from Damascius, περι αρχων, at the end +of the 3d volume of my Plato.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_160" href="#FNanchor_160" class="label">[160]</a> For that which is truly incorporeal, is <i>every where</i> virtually, <i>i.e.</i> in +power and efficacy, but is <i>no where</i> locally.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_161" href="#FNanchor_161" class="label">[161]</a> For μερισταις here, I read, μερικαις. For Porphyry is here speaking +of essences which are opposed to <i>such as rank as wholes</i>, as is evident +from the whole of this paragraph.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_162" href="#FNanchor_162" class="label">[162]</a> The primary natures of which Porphyry is now speaking, are +rational partial souls, such as ours; for the natures superior to these, are +never converted to beings posterior to themselves.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_163" href="#FNanchor_163" class="label">[163]</a> For αυτου, <i>isthic</i>, I read, αυτος.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_164" href="#FNanchor_164" class="label">[164]</a> In the original, και ψυχη εν νῳ τε και θεῳ πανταχου, και ουδαμου εν σωματι, +but it appears to me to be necessary to read, και ψυχη εν νῳ τε και θεῳ, και +πανταχου και ουδαμου εν σωματι.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_165" href="#FNanchor_165" class="label">[165]</a> και εν νῳ, is omitted in the original, but ought to be inserted, as +is evident from the version of Holstenius.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_166" href="#FNanchor_166" class="label">[166]</a> The irrational life is a thing of this kind, which is partly separable +and partly inseparable from body. Hence, so far as it is inseparable +from body, it partakes of the <i>every where</i>; but, so far as it is separable, +of the <i>no where</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_167" href="#FNanchor_167" class="label">[167]</a> <i>i.e.</i> The animal spirit, or pneumatic soul, in which the rational +soul suffers her punishments in Hades.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_168" href="#FNanchor_168" class="label">[168]</a> <i>i.e.</i> That part of the soul which is the source of all-various desires.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_169" href="#FNanchor_169" class="label">[169]</a> This philosophic apathy is not, as is stupidly supposed by most of +the present day, insensibility, but a perfect subjugation of the passions +to reason.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_170" href="#FNanchor_170" class="label">[170]</a> The words και δικαιοσυνη, are omitted in the original. But it is +evident from the treatise of Plotinus “On the Virtues,” that they ought +to be inserted. For what Porphyry says in this Section about the +virtues, is derived from that treatise.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_171" href="#FNanchor_171" class="label">[171]</a> Instead of κατ’ αυτην, here it is necessary to read, κατ’ αισθησιν.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_172" href="#FNanchor_172" class="label">[172]</a> Conformably to this, as we have before observed, Aristotle says in +the 7th Book of his Nicomachean Ethics, “that corporeal pleasures are +remedies against pain, and that they fill up the indigence of nature, but +perfect no energy of the rational soul.”</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_173" href="#FNanchor_173" class="label">[173]</a> In the original, αλλα το εκβεβηκος τον μεγιστον ογκον, εις το μεγιστον, και +τον ελαχιστον εις το ελαχιστον, αμα λαβων, κ.τ.λ. This Holstenius most +erroneously translates, “Verum id quod maximam molem intervallo +maximo, et minimam minimo excedit simul sumens, &c.” For a truly +incorporeal nature, such as that of which Porphyry is now speaking, has +nothing to do with interval, and, therefore, does not by interval surpass +either the greatest or the least corporeal mass; but is received +transcendently by the greatest and the least magnitude.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_174" href="#FNanchor_174" class="label">[174]</a> For διαληψεσιν, here, I read καταληψεσιν, and Holstenius also has in +this place <i>comprehensionibus</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_175" href="#FNanchor_175" class="label">[175]</a> In the original, καθο εν τι των κατ’ αισθησιν συνεγνωσμενων; but it +appears to me to be necessary, after καθο, to insert the words ουκ εστιν. +For incorporeal being is not like some one of the things which are +known by the senses, because no one of these is one, and, at the same +time, all things. Holstenius did not perceive the necessity of this +emendation, as is evident from his version of the passage.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_176" href="#FNanchor_176" class="label">[176]</a> Immediately after this something is wanting in the original, (as is +evident from the asterisks,) which, as it appears to me, no conjecture +can appropriately supply.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_177" href="#FNanchor_177" class="label">[177]</a> In the original, και δια τουτων παλιν τῃ πενιᾳ συνειναι, καιπερ παροντος +αυτου; but for αυτου, I read πορου; as it appears to me that Porphyry is +here alluding to what is said by Diotima, in the Banquet of Plato, concerning +the parents of Love, viz. that they are <i>Poverty</i> and <i>Porus</i>, or +<i>Plenty</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_178" href="#FNanchor_178" class="label">[178]</a> See the Phædo of Plato. But something is here wanting in the +original, as is evident not only from the asterisks, but from the want of +connexion in the words themselves.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_179" href="#FNanchor_179" class="label">[179]</a> <i>i.e.</i> They are not adapted to be the immediate causes of body, +because they are perfectly separated from it. The original is, ηδη δε ην +αλλα καταχρηστικως λεγομενα ασωματα, ου κατα στερησιν σωματος, κατα δε ολως μη +πεφυκεναι γεννᾳν σωμα. Holstenius, not understanding what is here said by +Porphyry, translates the words κατα δε ολως μη πεφυκεναι γεννᾳν σωμα, “sed +quod nullum omnino corpus generare possunt.” For Porphyry, as is +evident from what immediately follows, is here speaking of natures +which are perfectly separated from bodies, and which are, therefore, not +naturally adapted to be the immediate generators of them, not through +any deficiency, but through transcendency of power.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_180" href="#FNanchor_180" class="label">[180]</a> In the original, διο ουχι τοδε μεν εαυτου νοει, τοδε δε ου νοει, which Holstenius +erroneously translates, “Ideoque non quidem unam sui partem +intelligit, alteram vero non intelligit.” For Porphyry is not here speaking +of intellect surveying its parts, but of its being <i>wholly</i> intellective. +This is evident from what immediately follows.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_181" href="#FNanchor_181" class="label">[181]</a> The asterisks in the original denote something is wanting. Nevertheless, +what immediately follows them, is evidently connected with +what immediately precedes.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_182" href="#FNanchor_182" class="label">[182]</a> See the fourth book of my translation of Proclus, on the Timæus of +Plato, in which the nature of time and eternity is most admirably +unfolded. See, also, my translation of Plotinus, on Eternity and Time. +In these works, what both these divine men have said of eternity, and +what the former has said of time, contains, as it appears to me, the +<i>ne plus ultra</i> of philosophical investigation on these most abstruse +subjects.</p></div> + +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_239">[239]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="APPENDIX">APPENDIX.</h2> + +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_240">[240]</span></p> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_241">[241]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak">APPENDIX.<br> +ON THE WANDERINGS OF ULYSSES.</h2> + +</div> + +<p>In my History of the Restoration of the Platonic Theology +[see Vol. II. of my Proclus on Euclid,] and in a +note accompanying my translation of the treatise of Porphyry, +on the Cave of the Nymphs, in that work, I +attempted, from the hints afforded by Porphyry, and the +work of an anonymous Greek writer, De Ulyxis Erroribus, +to unfold the latent meaning of the wanderings +of Ulysses, as narrated by Homer. But as, from my continued +application to the philosophy of Plato for upwards +of forty years, I now know much more of that philosophy +than I then did, a period of thirty-five years having +elapsed from that to the present time, I shall again +attempt to explain those wanderings, rejecting some +things, and retaining others which I had adopted before.</p> + +<p>In the first place, it is necessary to observe, that +Ulysses does not rank among the first heroic characters, +or in other words, he was not one of those heroes who +descend into the regions of mortality at certain periods, +not only in compliance with that necessity through which +all partial souls such as ours descend periodically, but +also for the purpose of benefiting others, and leading +them back to their pristine state of perfection. Hence, +he was by no means such an exalted hero as Hercules, or +Pythagoras, or Socrates, or Plato; for they largely benefited +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_242">[242]</span>others; but he only benefited himself. For all his +companions perished prior to his arrival at Ithaca. So +that he was able to save himself, but not others. +“Hence,” says Olympiodorus, in his MS. Scholia on the +Gorgias of Plato, “it is said, that Ulysses wandered on +the sea by the will of Neptune. For by this it is +signified that the Odyssean life was neither terrestrial, nor +yet celestial, but between these. Since, therefore, Neptune +is the lord of the middle natures, on this account it +is said, that Ulysses wandered through the will of Neptune, +because he had a Neptunian allotment. Thus, also, +theologists speak of the sons of Jupiter, Neptune, and +Pluto, regarding the allotment of each. For we say, that +he who has a divine and celestial polity, is the son of +Jupiter; that he who has a terrestrial polity, is the son of +Pluto; and he is the son of Neptune, whose polity or +allotment is between these⁠<a id="FNanchor_183" href="#Footnote_183" class="fnanchor">[183]</a>.” Hence Ulysses, from his +Neptunian allotment, was a man who ranked among the +middle class of characters that transcend the majority of +mankind.</p> + +<p>In the next place, in order to understand accurately +the recondite meaning of the wanderings of Ulysses, it is +requisite to know what the most divine and theological +poet Homer indicates by the Trojan war in the Iliad. For +Homer, by combining fiction with historical facts, has +delivered to us some very occult, mystic, and valuable +information, in those two admirable poems, the Iliad and +Odyssey. Hence, by those who directed their attention +to this recondite information, he was said, conformably +to the tragical mode of speaking, which was usual with +the most ancient writers, to have been blind, because, as +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_243">[243]</span>Proclus observes⁠<a id="FNanchor_184" href="#Footnote_184" class="fnanchor">[184]</a>, he separated himself from sensible +beauty, and extended the intellect of his soul to invisible +and true harmony. He was said, therefore, to be blind, +because <i>that</i> intellectual beauty to which he raised himself +cannot be perceived by corporeal eyes. Thus, too, +Orpheus is tragically said to have been lacerated in +an all-various manner, because men of that age <i>partially</i> +participated of his mystic doctrine. The <i>principal part</i> of +it, however, was received by the Lesbians; and on this +account, his <i>head</i>, when separated from his body, is said +to have been carried to Lesbos. Hence, the Platonic +Hermeas, conformably to this opinion of the occult +meaning of the Iliad, beautifully explains as follows the +Trojan war, in his Scholia on the Phædrus of Plato:</p> + +<p>“By <i>Ilion</i>, we must understand the generated and +material place, which is so denominated from <i>mud and +matter</i> (παρα την ιλυν και την υλην,) and in which there are +war and sedition. But the Trojans are material forms, +and all the lives which subsist about bodies. Hence, +also, the Trojans are called <i>genuine</i> (ιθαγενεις). For all the +lives which subsist about bodies, and irrational⁠<a id="FNanchor_185" href="#Footnote_185" class="fnanchor">[185]</a> souls, +are favourable and attentive to their proper matter. On +the contrary, the Greeks are rational souls, coming from +Greece, <i>i.e.</i> from the intelligible into matter. Hence, the +Greeks are called <i>foreigners</i> (επηλυδες,) and vanquish the +Trojans, as being of a superior order. But they fight +with each other about the image of Helen, as the poet +says [about the image of Eneas].</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">Around the phantom Greeks and Trojans fight⁠<a id="FNanchor_186" href="#Footnote_186" class="fnanchor">[186]</a>.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class="noindent">Helen signifying intelligible beauty, being a certain <i>vessel</i> +(ελενοη τις ουσα,) attracting to itself intellect. An efflux, +therefore, of this intelligible beauty is imparted to matter +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_244">[244]</span>through Venus; and about this efflux of beauty the +Greeks fight with the Trojans [<i>i.e.</i> rational with irrational +lives⁠<a id="FNanchor_187" href="#Footnote_187" class="fnanchor">[187]</a>]. And those, indeed, that oppose and vanquish +matter, return to the intelligible world, which is their +true country; but those who do not, as is the case with +the multitude, are bound to matter. As, therefore, the +prophet, in the tenth book of the Republic, previously to +the descent of souls, announces to them how they may +return [to their pristine felicity], according to periods of +a thousand and ten thousand years; thus, also, Calchas +predicts to the Greeks their return in ten years, the +number ten being the symbol of a perfect period. And +as, in the lives of souls, some are elevated through philosophy, +others through the amatory art, and others through +the royal and warlike disciplines; so with respect to the +Greeks, some act with rectitude through prudence, but +others through war or love, and their return is different +[according to their different pursuits].”</p> + +<p>The first obviously fabulous adventure, then, of +Ulysses, is that of the Lotophagi, which Homer beautifully +narrates, and whose narration Pope very elegantly +translates as follows:</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">The trees around them all their fruit produce,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Lotos the name, and dulcet is the juice⁠<a id="FNanchor_188" href="#Footnote_188" class="fnanchor">[188]</a>!</div> + <div class="verse indent0">(Thence call’d Lotophagi) which, whoso tastes,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Insatiate riots in the sweet repasts,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Nor other home, nor other care intends,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">But quits his house, his country, and his friends.</div> +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_245">[245]</span> <div class="verse indent0">The three we sent from off th’ enchanting ground</div> + <div class="verse indent0">We dragg’d reluctant, and by force we bound:</div> + <div class="verse indent0">The rest in haste forsook the pleasing shore,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Or, the charm tasted, had return’d no more⁠<a id="FNanchor_189" href="#Footnote_189" class="fnanchor">[189]</a>.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p>Plato, in the 8th book of his Republic, has admirably +unfolded to us what the <i>lotos</i> occultly indicates, viz. that +it signifies “false and arrogant reasonings and opinions:” +for daily experience shows that nothing is more enchanting +and delicious than these to such as have made no +solid proficiency in virtue, and who, like some of the +companions of Ulysses, being fascinated by erroneous +conceptions, consign their true country and true kindred +to oblivion, and desire to live for ever lost in the intoxication +of fallacious delight.</p> + +<p>The next adventure of Ulysses is that of the Cyclops, +whom he deprived of sight, and irritated by reproaches. +But according to Porphyry, in the above-mentioned +excellent treatise, this is no other than the natal dæmon +of Ulysses, or the dæmon to whose protecting power +he became subject, as soon as he was born⁠<a id="FNanchor_190" href="#Footnote_190" class="fnanchor">[190]</a>. In order, +however, to understand perfectly the arcane meaning +of this fable, it is necessary to observe, that according to +the ancient theology, those souls that in the present life +will speedily return to their pristine felicity in the intelligible +world, have not the essential dæmon, or the +dæmon which is inseparable from the essence of the soul, +different from the dæmon that presides over the birth; for +they are one and the same. But the case is otherwise +with more imperfect souls; as the natal is in these different +from the <i>essential</i> dæmon⁠<a id="FNanchor_191" href="#Footnote_191" class="fnanchor">[191]</a>. As Ulysses, therefore, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_246">[246]</span>does not rank among the more perfect heroic characters, +and was not one who in the present life is immediately +ascending to his kindred star, or, in Platonic language, to +the paternal port, the soul’s true paradise of rest; but was +a man who, prior to this, had many laborious wanderings +to accomplish, and many difficulties and dangers of no +common magnitude to sustain, his <i>natal</i> was not the +same with his <i>essential</i> dæmon. As he is, however, +departing from a sensible to an intellectual life, though +circuitously and slowly, he is represented in so doing as +blinding and irritating his <i>natal</i> dæmon. For he who +blinds the eye of sense, and extinguishes its light, after +his will has profoundly assented to its use, must expect +punishment for the deed; as necessary ultimately to his +own peculiar good, and the general order of the universe. +Indeed, troubles and misfortunes resulting from such +undertakings, not only contribute to appease the anger of +their authors, but likewise purify and benefit the subjects +of their revenge. According to the Greek theology, +therefore, he who, in the present life, while he is in +the road of virtue, and is eagerly searching for wisdom, +perceives that there is a great resemblance between his +destiny and that of Ulysses, may safely conclude, that +either here, or in a prior state of existence, he has voluntarily +submitted to the power of his natal dæmon, and +has now deprived him of sight; or in other words, +has abandoned a life of sense; and that he has been +profoundly delighted with the nature of matter, and is +now abrogating the confessions which he made. This, +too, is insinuated in the beautiful story of Cupid and +Psyche, by Apuleius, when the terrestrial Venus sends +Mercury with a book in which her name is inscribed, to +apprehend Psyche as a fugitive from her mistress. For +this whole story relates to the descent of the soul into +this terrene body, and its wanderings and punishments, +till it returns to its true country and pristine felicity⁠<a id="FNanchor_192" href="#Footnote_192" class="fnanchor">[192]</a>.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_247">[247]</span></p> + +<p>In the next fable, which is that of Æolus, the poet +appears to me to signify that providence of divinity +which is of an elevating and guardian nature, the +influence of which, when properly received by the subjects +of it, enables them to pass with security over the +stormy sea of life to their native land; but when this +influence is neglected through the sleep of reason, the +negligence is followed by a temporary destruction of +hope. This providence also of the Gods is not only one, but +<i>all-various</i>, which Homer appears to indicate by Æolus; +the word αιολος signifying various and manifold. As the +advancement, therefore, of Ulysses in the virtues is as yet +imperfect, extending no farther than to the <i>ethical</i> and +<i>political</i>, which are but adumbrations of the <i>true</i> virtues, +the cathartic and theoretic⁠<a id="FNanchor_193" href="#Footnote_193" class="fnanchor">[193]</a>, he is said to have fallen +asleep, and to have been thereby disappointed of his wishes, +his soul not being at that time in a truly vigilant state, as +not having yet elevated its eye to real being from objects +of sense which resemble the delusions of dreams.</p> + +<p>By the adventure of the Lestrigons, which follows +in the next place, Homer represents to us Ulysses flying +from voracity, and fierce and savage manners; a flight +indispensably necessary, as preparatory to his attainment +of the higher virtues.</p> + +<p>In the next adventure, which contains the beautiful +allegory of Circe, we shall find some deep arcana of +philosophy contained, exclusive of its connexion with +Ulysses. By the Æean isle, then, in which the palace of +Circe was situated, the region of sorrow and lamentation +is signified, as is evident from the name of the island +itself. And, by Circe, we must understand the Goddess +of sense. For thus Porphyry, in Stobæus, p. 141: +“Homer calls the period and revolution of regeneration +in a circle, Circe, the daughter of the Sun, who perpetually +connects and combines all corruption with generation, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_248">[248]</span>and generation again with corruption.” And this +is asserted still more explicitly by Proclus, in his Scholia +on the Cratylus of Plato. For he says, “Circe is that +divine power which weaves all the life contained in +the four elements, and, at the same time, by her song +harmonizes the whole sublunary world. But the shuttle +with which she weaves, is represented by theologists as +golden, because her essence is intellectual, pure, immaterial, +and unmingled with generation; all which is signified +by the shuttle being golden. And her employment +consists in <i>separating</i>⁠<a id="FNanchor_194" href="#Footnote_194" class="fnanchor">[194]</a> stable things from such as are +in motion, according to divine diversity.” And he also +informs us, “that Circe ranks among the divinities who +preside over generation, or the regions of sense.” Homer, +too, with great propriety, represents Circe, who rules over +the realms of generation, as waited on by Nymphs sprung +from fountains; for Nymphs, says Hermias (in Plat. +Phædrum,) are Goddesses who preside over regeneration, +and are the attendants of Bacchus, the son of Semele. +On this account, they are present with water; that is, +they ascend, as it were, into, and rule over generation. +But this Dionysius, or Bacchus, supplies the regeneration +of every sensible nature.</p> + +<p>Hence we may observe, that the Æean isle, or this +region of sense, is, with great propriety, called the abode +of trouble and lamentation. In this region, then, the +companions of Ulysses, in consequence of being very +imperfect characters, are changed, through the incantations +of the Goddess, into brutes, <i>i.e.</i> into unworthy and +irrational habits and manners. Ulysses, however, as one +who is returning, though slowly, to the proper perfection +of his nature, is, by the assistance of Mercury, or reason, +prevented from destruction. Hence intellect, roused by +its impassive power, and at the same time armed with +prudent anger, and the plant moly, or temperance, which +is able to repel the allurements of pleasure, wars on +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_249">[249]</span>sensible delight, and prevents the effects of its transforming +power. Ulysses, also, though he was not able to lead +his companions back to their native land, the paternal +port of the soul, yet saves them from being transformed, +through the enchantments of sense, into an irrational +life.</p> + +<p>After this follows the allegory respecting the descent +of Ulysses into <i>Hades</i>, which occultly signifies, that he +still lived a life according to sense, and not according to +intellect, and that, in consequence of not having yet vanquished +a terrestrial life, he was involved in <i>obscurity</i>. +For ancient wise men universally considered Hades as commencing +in the present state of existence, and that sense is +nothing more than the energy of the dormant soul, and a +perception, as it were, of the delusions of dreams, as I have +abundantly proved in my treatise on the Mysteries. The +secret meaning, also, of what Ulysses saw in Hades, is no +less beautiful than profound, as the following extract +from the manuscript Commentary of Olympiodorus, on +the Gorgias of Plato, abundantly evinces: “Ulysses,” +says he, “descending into Hades, saw, among others, +Sysiphus, and Tityus, and Tantalus. And Tityus he saw +lying on the earth, and a vulture devouring his liver; the +liver signifying that he lived solely according to the +<i>epithymetic</i> part of his nature [or that part of the soul +which is the source of desires,] and that through this, +indeed, he was, indeed, internally prudent; but earth +signifying the terrestrial condition of his prudence. But +Sysiphus, living under the dominion of ambition and +anger, was employed in continually rolling a stone up an +eminence, because it perpetually descended again; its +descent implying the vicious government of himself; and +his rolling the stone, the hard, refractory, and, as it were, +rebounding condition of his life. And, lastly, he saw +Tantalus extended by the side of a lake, and that there +was a tree before him, with abundance of fruit on its +branches, which he desired to gather, but it vanished +from his view. And this indeed indicates, that he lived +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_250">[250]</span>under the dominion of the phantasy; but his hanging +over the lake, and in vain attempting to drink, denotes +the elusive, humid, and rapidly-gliding condition of such +a life.”</p> + +<p>We must now, however, view Ulysses passing from +sense to imagination; in the course of which voyage he +is assailed by various temptations of great power, and +destructive effect. We shall perceive him victorious in +some of these, and sinking under others; but struggling +against the incursions of all. Among the first of these is +the enchanting melody of the Sirens,</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">Whose song is death, and makes destruction please.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class="noindent">But what is occultly signified by the Sirens, is beautifully +unfolded by Proclus, on the Cratylus of Plato, as follows: +“The divine Plato knew that there are three +kinds of Sirens; the <i>celestial</i>, which is under the government +of Jupiter; <i>that which is effective of generation</i>, and +is under the government of Neptune; and <i>that which is +cathartic</i>, and is under the government of Pluto. It is +common to all these, to incline all things through an +harmonic motion to their ruling Gods. Hence, when the +soul is in the heavens, they are desirous of uniting it to +the divine life which flourishes there. But it is proper +that souls living in generation should sail beyond them, +like the Homeric Ulysses, that they may not be allured +by generation, of which the sea is an image. And when +souls are in Hades, the Sirens are desirous of uniting +them through intellectual conceptions to Pluto. So that +Plato knew that in the kingdom of Hades there are +Gods, dæmons, and souls, who dance, as it were, round +Pluto, allured by the Sirens that dwell there.” Ulysses, +therefore, as now proceeding to a life which is under the +dominion of imagination, but which is superior to a life +consisting wholly in sensitive energies, abandons those +alluring and fraudulent pleasures of sense, which charm +the soul with flattering and mellifluous incantations. +Hence he closes with divine reasons and energies, as with +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_251">[251]</span>wax, the impulses of desire and the organs of sense; +so that every passage being barred from access, they may +in vain warble the song of ecstasy, and expect to ruin the +soul by the enchanting strain. He also restrains the +corporeal assaults by the bands of morality, and thus +employs the senses without yielding to their impetuous +invasions; and experiences delight without resigning the +empire of reason to its fascinating control.</p> + +<p>Ulysses, having escaped the dangers of the Sirens, +passes on to the rocks of Scylla and Charybdis, of terrific +appearance and irresistible force. By these two rocks +the poet seems to signify the passions of anger and +desire, and their concomitants, that compress human life +on both sides; and which every one must experience +who proceeds, like Ulysses, in a regular manner to an +intellectual state of existence. Some of these are, like +Scylla, of a lofty malignity; fraudulent, yet latent and +obscure, as being concealed in the penetration of the +soul. And such is revenge, and other passions of a +similar kind. In these recesses a dæmon, the prince of +such passions, resides. For the Chaldean oracles assert +that terrestrial dæmons dwell in the soul, which is replete +with irrational affections⁠<a id="FNanchor_195" href="#Footnote_195" class="fnanchor">[195]</a>. This dæmon also may justly +be denominated a dire and enraged dog, who partly +exposes his own malice, and partly hides it in impenetrable +obscurity. Hence he is capable of producing mischief +in a twofold respect. For he privately hurts by +malignant stratagems, openly ravishes the soul on the +lofty rock of fury, and rends it with the triple evil of +deadly teeth, viz. dereliction of duty, hatred of humanity, +and self-conceit. Indeed, a dæmon of this kind will be +perpetually vigilant in endeavouring to destroy, at one +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_252">[252]</span>time the whole, and at another time a part of the soul +of one, struggling, like Ulysses, against passion, and +yielding reluctantly to its invasions.</p> + +<p>But the other affections which pertain to desire are +of a more corporeal nature, and are more conspicuously +depraved. A wild fig-tree, <i>i.e.</i> the will, is produced on +the top of this rock; wild, indeed, on account of its free +nature, but sweet in fruition; and under which, often +through the day, the impetuosities of the boiling body +are accustomed to absorb and destroy the man, agitating +upwards and downwards inflamed desire; so that mighty +destruction, both to soul and body, is produced by their +mutual consent. But it is highly proper that a rock of +this last kind should be anxiously avoided by one, who, +like Ulysses, is labouring to return to his true country +and friends. Hence, if necessity requires, he will rather +expose himself to the other: for there the energy of +thought, and of the soul’s simple motions, is alone necessary +to be exerted, and it is easy to recover the pristine +habit of the soul. In short, the poet seems to represent, +by this allegory of the two rocks, as well the dangers +which spontaneously arise from the irascible part of the +soul, as those which are the effect of deliberation, and +are of a corporeal nature; both of which must be sustained, +or one at least, by a necessary consequence. For +it is impossible that neither of them should be experienced +by one who is passing over the stormy ocean +of a sensible life.</p> + +<p>After this succeeds the allegory of the Trinacrian +isle, containing the herds sacred to the God of day, +which were violated by the companions of Ulysses; but +not without the destruction of the authors of this impiety, +and the most dreadful danger to Ulysses. By the result +of this fable, the poet evidently shows that punishment +attends the sacrilegious and the perjured; and teaches us +that we should perpetually reverence divinity, with the +greatest sanctity of mind, and be cautious how we commit +any thing in divine concerns contrary to piety of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_253">[253]</span>manners and purity of thought. But Homer, by attributing +sense to the flesh and hides of the slain herds, +manifestly evinces that every base deed universally proclaims +the iniquity of its author; but that perjury and +sacrilege are attended with the most glaring indications +of guilt, and the most horrid signatures of approaching +vengeance and inevitable ruin. We may here, too, observe, +that the will of Ulysses was far from consenting +to this impious deed; and that, though his passions +prevailed at length over his reason, it was not till after +frequent admonition had been employed, and great diligence +exerted, to prevent its execution. This, indeed, +is so eminently true, that his guilt was the consequence +of surprise, and not of premeditated design; which +Homer appears to insinuate by relating that Ulysses was +asleep when his associates committed the offence.</p> + +<p>In the next fable we find Ulysses, impelled by the +southern wind towards the rocks of Scylla and Charybdis; +in the latter of which he found safety, by clinging +to the fig-tree which grew on its summit, till she refunded +the mast, on which he rode after the tempest. But the +secret meaning of the allegory appears to me to be as +follows:—Ulysses, who has not yet taken leave of a life +according to sense, is driven by the warmth of passion, +represented by the southern gales, into the dire vortex of +insane desires, which frequently boiling over, and tossing +on high the storms of depraved affections, plunges into +ruin the soul obnoxious to its waves. However, perceiving +the danger to which he is exposed, when the +base storms begin to swell, and the whirlpools of depravity +roar, he seizes the helm of temperance, and binds +himself fast to the solid texture of his remaining virtue. +The waves of desire are, indeed, tempestuous in the +extreme; but before he is forcibly merged, by the rage +of the passions, into the depths of depravity, he tenaciously +adheres to his unconsenting will, seated, as it +were, on the lofty summit of terrene desire. For this, +like the wild fig-tree, affords the best refuge to the soul +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_254">[254]</span>struggling with the billows of base perturbations. Hence +he thus recovers the integrity which he had lost, and +afterwards swims without danger over the waves of +temptation; ever watchful and assiduous, while he sails +through this impetuous river of the flesh, and is exposed +to the stormy blasts of heated passion and destructive +vice. Hence, too, while he is thus affected, and anxious +lest the loss from unworthy affections should return upon +himself, he will escape being lacerated by the teeth of +Anger, though she should terribly and fiercely bark in +the neighbourhood of Desire, and endeavour, like Scylla, +to snatch him on her lofty rock. For those who are +involuntarily disturbed, like Ulysses, by the billows of +Desire, suffer no inconvenience from the depraved rock +of Wrath; but considering the danger of their present +situation, they relinquish the false confidence produced +by rage for modest diffidence and anxious hope.</p> + +<p>Hitherto we have followed Ulysses in his voyage +over the turbulent and dangerous ocean of sense; in +which we have seen him struggling against the storms +of temptation, and in danger of perishing through the +tempestuous billows of vice. We must now attend him +in the region of imagination, and mark his progress from +the enchanted island, till he regains the long-lost empire +of his soul. That the poet then, by Calypso, occultly +signifies the phantasy or imagination, is, I think, evident +from his description of her abode. For she is represented +as dwelling in a cavern, illuminated by a great fire; and +this cave is surrounded with a thick wood, is watered by +four fountains, and is situated in an island, remote from +any habitable place, and environed by the mighty ocean. +All which particulars correspond with the phantasy, as I +presume the following observations will evince. In the +first place, the primary and proper vehicle of the phantasy, +or, as it is called by the Platonic philosophers, <i>the +imaginative spirit</i>, is attenuated and ethereal, and is therefore +naturally luminous. In the next place, the island +is said to be surrounded with a thick wood, which +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_255">[255]</span>evidently corresponds to a material nature, or this body, +with which the phantasy is invested. For υλη, or <i>matter</i>, +also signifies <i>a wood</i>. But the four fountains, by which +the cave is watered, occultly signify the four gnostic +powers of the soul, <i>intellect</i>, <i>the discursive energy of reason</i>, +<i>opinion</i>, <i>and sense</i>; with all which the phantasy, being also +a gnostic power, communicates; so that it receives images, +like a mirror, from all of them, and retains those which +it receives from the senses, when the objects by which +they were produced are no longer present. Hence the +imagination, or the phantasy, [φαντασια,] is denominated +from being των φανεντων στασις, <i>the permanency of appearances</i>. +And, in the last place, the island is said to be +environed by the ocean; which admirably accords with +a corporeal nature, for ever flowing, without admitting +any periods of repose. And thus much for the secret +agreement of the cavern and island with the region of +imagination.</p> + +<p>But the poet, by denominating the Goddess Calypso, +and the island Ogygia, appears to me very evidently to +confirm the preceding exposition. For Calypso is derived +from καλυπτω, which signifies <i>to cover as with a veil</i>; and +Ogygia is from ωγυγιος, <i>ancient</i>. And as the imaginative +spirit is the primary vehicle of the rational soul, which +it derived from the planetary spheres, and in which it +descended to the sublunary regions, it may with great +propriety be said to cover the soul as with a fine garment +or veil; and it is no less properly denominated <i>ancient</i>, +when considered as the first vehicle of the soul.</p> + +<p>In this region of the phantasy, then, Ulysses is represented +as an involuntary captive, continually employed in +bewailing his absence from his true country, and ardently +longing to depart from the fascinating embraces of the +Goddess. For thus his situation is beautifully described +by the poet:</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">But sad Ulysses, by himself apart,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Pour’d the big sorrows of his swelling heart;</div> +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_256">[256]</span> + <div class="verse indent0">All on the lonely shore he sat to weep,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">And roll’d his eyes around the restless deep;</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Tow’rd his lov’d coast he roll’d his eyes in vain,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Till dimm’d with rising grief they stream’d again⁠<a id="FNanchor_196" href="#Footnote_196" class="fnanchor">[196]</a>.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class="noindent">His return, however, is at length effected through Mercury, +or reason, who prevails on the Goddess to yield to +his dismission. Hence, after her consent, Ulysses is, +with great propriety, said to have placed himself on the +throne on which Mercury had sate: for reason then +resumes her proper seat when the reasoning power is +about to abandon the delusive and detaining charms of +imagination. But Homer appears to me to insinuate +something admirable when he represents Ulysses, on his +departure from Calypso, sailing by night, and contemplating +the order and light of the stars, in the following +beautiful lines:</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">And now, rejoicing in the prosperous gales,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">With beating heart Ulysses spread his sails;</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Plac’d at the helm he sate, and mark’d the skies,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Nor clos’d in sleep his ever watchful eyes.</div> + <div class="verse indent0">There viewed the Pleiads, and the northern team,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">And great Orion’s more refulgent beam;</div> + <div class="verse indent0">To which around the axle of the sky</div> + <div class="verse indent0">The Bear, revolving, points his golden eye;</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Who shines exalted on the ethereal plain,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Nor bathes his blazing forehead in the main⁠<a id="FNanchor_197" href="#Footnote_197" class="fnanchor">[197]</a>.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class="noindent">For what he here says of Ulysses, is perfectly conformable +to what is said by Plato in the 7th book of his +Republic, respecting the man who is to be led from the +cave, which he there describes, to the light of day, +<i>i.e.</i> from a sensible to an intellectual life, viz. “that he +will more easily see what the heavens contain, and the +heavens themselves, by <i>looking in the night to the light of +the stars and the moon</i>, than by day looking on the sun, +and the light of the sun.” For by this, as Proclus well +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_257">[257]</span>observes, “Plato signifies the contemplation of intelligibles, +of which the stars and their light are imitations, +so far as all of them partake of the form of the sun, in the +same manner as intelligibles are characterized by the +nature of <i>the good</i>. These, then, such a one must contemplate, +that he may understand their essence, and +those summits of their nature, by which they are deiform +processions from the ineffable principle of things.” +Ulysses, therefore, who is hastening to an intellectual +life, contemplates these lucid objects with vigilant eyes, +rejoicing in the illuminations and assistance they afford +him while sailing over the dark ocean of a sensible life.</p> + +<p>But as he is now earnestly engaged in departing from +sense, he must unavoidably be pursued by the anger of +Neptune, the lord of generation and a sensible life, whose +service he has forsaken, and whose offspring he has +blinded by stratagem, and irritated by reproach. Hence, +in the midst of these delightful contemplations, he is +almost overwhelmed by the waves of misfortune, roused +by the wrath of his implacable foe. He is, however, +through divine assistance, or Leucothea, enabled to sustain +the dreadful storm. For, receiving from divinity the +immortal fillet of true fortitude, and binding it under his +breast, (the proper seat of courage,) he encounters the +billows of adversity, and bravely shoots along the +boisterous ocean of life. It must, however, be carefully +observed, that the poet is far from ascribing a certain +passion to a divine nature, when he speaks of the anger of +Neptune: for, in thus speaking, he, as well as other theologists, +intended only to signify our inaptitude to the +participation of its beneficent influence.</p> + +<p>Ulysses therefore, having with much difficulty escaped +the dangers arising from the wrath of Neptune, lands at +length on the island of Phæacia, where he is hospitably +received, and honourably dismissed. Now, as it is proper +that he who, like Ulysses, departs from the delusions of +imagination, should immediately betake himself to the +more intellectual light of the rational energy of the soul, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_258">[258]</span>the land of Phæacia ought to correspond to our intellectual +part, and particularly to that portion of it which is +denominated in Greek <i>dianoia</i>, and which is characterized +by the power of reasoning scientifically, deriving the +principles of its discursive energy from intellect. And +that it has this correspondence, the following observations +will, I persuade myself, abundantly evince. In the first +place, then, this island is represented by the poet as +enjoying a perpetual spring, which plainly indicates that +it is not any terrestrial situation. Indeed, the critical +commentators have been so fully convinced of this, that +they acknowledge Homer describes Phæacia as one of the +Fortunate Islands; but they have not attempted to penetrate +his design, in such a description. If, however, we +consider the perfect liberty, unfading variety, and endless +delight, which our intellectual part affords, we shall find +that it is truly the Fortunate Island of the soul, in which, +by the exercise of the theoretic virtues, it is possible for +a man, even in the present life, to obtain genuine felicity, +though not in that perfection as when he is liberated from +the body. With respect to the Fortunate Islands, their +occult meaning is thus beautifully unfolded by Olympiodorus, +in his MS. commentary on the Gorgias of Plato: +Δει δε ειδεναι οτι αι νησοι υπερκυπτουσι της θαλασσης ανωτερω +ουσαι, την ουν πολιτειαν την υπερκυψασαν του βιου και της γενησεως, +μακαρων νησους καλουσι· ταυτον δε εστι και το ηλυσιον πεδιον. +δια τοι τουτο και ο Ηρακλης τελευταιον αθλον, εν τοις εσπεριοις +μερεσιν εποιησατο, αντι κατηγωνισατο τον σκοτεινον και χθονιον +βιον, και λοιπον εν ημερα, ο εστιν εν αληθειᾳ και φωτι εζη: <i>i.e.</i> “It +is necessary to know that islands are raised above, being +higher than the sea. A condition of being, therefore, +which transcends this corporeal life and generation, is +denominated the islands of the blessed; but these are +the same with the Elysian fields. And on this account, +Hercules is reported to have accomplished his last labour +in the Hesperian regions; signifying by this, that having +vanquished an obscure and terrestrial life, he afterwards +lived in open day, that is, in truth and resplendent light.” +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_259">[259]</span>In the next place, the poet, by his description of the +palace of Alcinous, the king of this island, admirably +indicates the pure and splendid light of the energy of +reason. For he says of it:</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">The front appear’d with radiant splendours gay,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Bright as the lamp of night, or orb of day.</div> + <div class="verse indent0">The walls were massy brass: the cornice high</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Blue metals crown’d in colours of the sky.</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Rich plates of gold the folding doors incase;</div> + <div class="verse indent0">The pillars silver on a brazen base.</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Silver the lintels deep projecting o’er,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">And gold the ringlets that command the door.</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Two rows of stately dogs on either hand,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">In sculptur’d gold, and labour’d silver, stand.</div> + <div class="verse indent0">These Vulcan form’d intelligent to wait</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Immortal guardians at Alcinous’ gate⁠<a id="FNanchor_198" href="#Footnote_198" class="fnanchor">[198]</a>.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class="noindent">And he represents it as no less internally luminous by +night.</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">Refulgent pedestals the walls surround,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Which boys of gold with flaming torches crown’d;</div> + <div class="verse indent0">The polish’d ore, reflecting ev’ry ray,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Blaz’d on the banquets with a double day.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class="noindent">Indeed Homer, by his description of the outside of this +palace, sufficiently indicates its agreement with the planet +Mercury, the deity of which presides over the rational +energy. For this God, in the language of Proclus⁠<a id="FNanchor_199" href="#Footnote_199" class="fnanchor">[199]</a>, +“unfolds into light intellectual gifts, fills all things with +divine <i>reasons</i> [<i>i.e.</i> forms, and productive principles,] +elevates souls to intellect, wakens them as from a profound +sleep, converts them through investigation to themselves, +and by a certain obstetric art and invention of +pure intellect, brings them to a blessed life.” According +to astronomers, likewise, the planet Mercury is resplendent +with the colours of all the other planets. Thus +Baptista Porta in Cœlest. Physiog. p. 88. “Videbis +in eo Saturni luridum, Martis ignem, Jovis candidum, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_260">[260]</span>Veneris flavum, necnon utriusque nitor, hilaritasque, et +ob id non peculiaris formæ, sed eorum formam capit, cum +quibus associatur, ob id in describendo ejus colore astrologi +differunt.” <i>i.e.</i> “You may perceive in this planet +the pale colour of Saturn, the fire of Mars, the whiteness +of Jupiter, and the yellow of Venus; and likewise the +brilliancy and hilarity of each. On this account it is not +of a peculiar form, but receives the form of its associates, +and thus causes astrologers to differ in describing its +colour.”</p> + +<p>But that the island of Phæacia is the dominion of +reason, is, I think, indisputably confirmed by Homer’s +account of the ships fabricated by its inhabitants. For +of these, he says:</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">So shalt thou instant reach the realm assign’d,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">In wond’rous ships self-mov’d, instinct with mind.</div> + <div class="verse indent0">No helm secures their course, no pilot guides,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Like man intelligent they plough the tides,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Conscious of ev’ry coast and ev’ry bay,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">That lies beneath the sun’s all-seeing ray;</div> + <div class="verse indent0">And veil’d in clouds impervious to the eye,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Fearless and rapid through the deep they fly⁠<a id="FNanchor_200" href="#Footnote_200" class="fnanchor">[200]</a>.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class="noindent">For it is absurd to suppose that Homer would employ +such an hyperbole, in merely describing the excellency of +the Phæacian ships. Hence, as it so greatly surpasses +the bounds of probability, and is so contrary to the +admirable prudence which Homer continually displays, it +can only be admitted as an allegory, pregnant with latent +meaning, and the recondite wisdom of antiquity. The +poet likewise adds respecting the Phæacians:</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">These did the ruler of the deep ordain</div> + <div class="verse indent0">To build proud navies, and command the main;</div> + <div class="verse indent0">On canvas wings to cut the wat’ry way,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">No bird more light, <i>no thought more swift than they</i>.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class="noindent">The last of which lines so remarkably agrees with the +preceding explanation, that I presume no stronger confirmation +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_261">[261]</span>can be desired. Nor is the original less satisfactory:</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">των νεες ωκειαι ωσει πτερον ηε νοημα⁠<a id="FNanchor_201" href="#Footnote_201" class="fnanchor">[201]</a>,</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class="noindent"><i>i.e.</i> “The ships of these men are swift as a wing, or as +<i>a conception of the mind</i>.” But the inhabitants of the +palace are represented as spending their days in continual +festivity, and unceasing mirth; in listening to the harmony +of the lyre, or in forming the tuneful mazes of the +joyful dance. For to the man who lives under the guidance +of reason, or to the good man, every day, as Diogenes +said, is a festival. Hence, such a one is constantly employed +in tuning the lyre of recollection, in harmonious +revolutions about an intelligible essence, and the never-satiating +and deifying banquet of intellect.</p> + +<p>And here we may observe how much the behaviour of +Ulysses, at the palace of Alcinous, confirms the preceding +exposition, and accords with his character, as a man +passing in a regular manner from the delusions of sense, +to the realities of intellectual enjoyment. For as he is +now converted to himself, and is seated in the palace of +reason, it is highly proper that he should call to mind his +past conduct, and be afflicted with the survey; and that he +should be wakened to sorrow by the lyre of reminiscence, +and weep over the follies of his past active life. Hence, +when the divine bard Demodocus, inspired by the fury of +the Muses, sings the contention between Ulysses and +Achilles, on his golden lyre, Ulysses is vehemently affected +with the relation. And when the inhabitants of the palace, +<i>i.e.</i> the powers and energies of the rational soul, transported +with the song, demanded its repetition.</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">Again Ulysses veil’d his pensive head,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Again, unmann’d, a shower of sorrow shed.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class="noindent">For to the man who is making a proficiency in virtue, the +recollection of his former conduct is both pleasing and +painful; pleasing, so far as in some instances it was +attended with rectitude, but painful so far as in others it +was erroneous.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_262">[262]</span></p> + +<p>Ulysses, also, is with the greatest propriety represented +as relating his past adventures in the palace of Alcinous. +For as he now betakes himself to the intellectual light of +the reasoning power, it is highly necessary that he should +review his past conduct, faithfully enumerate the errors of +his life, and anxiously solicit a return to true manners, +and perfect rectitude of mind. As likewise he is now on +his passage, by the pure energy of reason to regain the +lost empire of his soul, he is represented as falling into so +profound a sleep in his voyage, as to be insensible for +some time of its happy consummation; by which the poet +indicates his being separated from sensible concerns, and +wholly converted to the energies of the rational soul. +Nor is it without reason that the poet represents Ithaca, +as presenting itself to the mariners’ view, when the bright +morning star emerges from the darkness of night. For +thus he sings:</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">But when the morning star, with early ray,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Flam’d in the front of heav’n and promis’d day;</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Like distant clouds, the mariner descries</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Fair Ithaca’s emerging hills arise⁠<a id="FNanchor_202" href="#Footnote_202" class="fnanchor">[202]</a>.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class="noindent">Since it is only by the dawning beams of intellect, that +the discursive energy of reason can gain a glimpse of the +native country and proper seat of empire of the soul.</p> + +<p>Ulysses therefore, being now converted to the energies +of the rational soul, and anxious to commence the +cathartic virtues, recognizes, through the assistance of +Minerva, or wisdom, his native land: and immediately +enters into a consultation with the Goddess, how he may +effectually banish the various perturbations and inordinate +desires, which yet lurk in the penetralia of his soul. For +this purpose, it is requisite that he should relinquish all +external possessions, mortify every sense, and employ +every stratagem, which may finally destroy these malevolent +foes. Hence, the garb of poverty, the wrinkles of +age, and the want of the necessaries of life, are symbols +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_263">[263]</span>of mortified habits, desertion of sensible pursuits, and an +intimate conversion to intellectual good. For the sensitive +eye must now give place to the purer sight of the +rational soul; and the strength and energies of the corporeal +nature must yield to the superior vigour of intellectual +exertion, and the severe exercise of cathartic virtue. +And this, Homer appears most evidently to indicate in +the following beautiful lines:</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">Now seated in the olive’s sacred shade,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Confer the hero and the martial maid.</div> + <div class="verse indent0">The Goddess of the azure eyes began:</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Son of Laertes! much experienc’d man!</div> + <div class="verse indent0">The suitor train thy earliest care demand,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Of that luxurious race to rid the land.</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Three years thy house their lawless rule has seen,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">And proud addresses to the matchless queen⁠<a id="FNanchor_203" href="#Footnote_203" class="fnanchor">[203]</a>;</div> + <div class="verse indent0">But she thy absence mourns from day to day,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">And inly bleeds, and silent wastes away;</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Elusive of the bridal hour, she gives</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Fond hopes to all, and all with hopes deceives⁠<a id="FNanchor_204" href="#Footnote_204" class="fnanchor">[204]</a>.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p>Hence:</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">It fits thee now to wear a dark disguise,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">And secret walk unknown to mortal eyes;</div> + <div class="verse indent0">For this my hand shall wither ev’ry grace,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">And ev’ry elegance of form and face,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">O’er thy smooth skin a bark of wrinkles spread,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Turn hoar the auburn honours of thy head,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Disfigure every limb with coarse attire,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">And in thine eyes extinguish all the fire;</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Add all the wants and the decays of life,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Estrange thee from thy own; thy son, thy wife;</div> + <div class="verse indent0">From the loath’d object ev’ry sight shall turn,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">And the blind suitors their destruction scorn⁠<a id="FNanchor_205" href="#Footnote_205" class="fnanchor">[205]</a>.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p>After this follows the discovery of Ulysses to Telemachus, +which is no less philosophically sublime than +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_264">[264]</span>poetically beautiful. For, by Telemachus, we must understand +<i>a true scientific conception of things</i>; since this is +the legitimate offspring of the energy of the rational soul, +in conjunction with philosophy. Hence Ulysses, while +employed in the great work of mortification, recognizes +his genuine offspring, and secretly plans with him the +destruction of his insidious foes. And hence we may +see the propriety of Telemachus being represented as +exploring his absent father, and impatient for his return. +For the rational soul then alone associates with a true +conception of things, when it withdraws itself from +sensible delights, and meditates a restoration of its fallen +dignity and original sway.</p> + +<p>And now Ulysses presents himself to our view in the +habits of mortification, hastening to his long deserted +palace, or the occult recesses of his soul, that he may +mark the conduct and plan the destruction of those baneful +passions which are secretly attempting to subvert the +empire of his mind. Hence, the poet very properly and +pathetically exclaims:</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">And now his city strikes the monarch’s eyes,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Alas! how chang’d! a man of miseries;</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Propt on a staff, a beggar, old and bare,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">In tatter’d garments, flutt’ring with the air⁠<a id="FNanchor_206" href="#Footnote_206" class="fnanchor">[206]</a>.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p>However, as this disguise was solely assumed for the +purpose of procuring ancient purity and lawful rule, he +divests himself of the torn garments of mortification, +as soon as he begins the destruction of occult desires; +and resumes the proper dignity and strength of his +genuine form. But it is not without reason that Penelope, +who is the image of philosophy, furnishes the +instrument by which the hostile rout of passions are +destroyed. For what besides the arrows of philosophy +can extirpate the leading bands of impurity and vice? +Hence, as soon as he is furnished with this irresistible +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_265">[265]</span>weapon, he no longer defers the ruin of his insidious +foes, but</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">Then fierce the hero o’er the threshold strode;</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Stript of his rags, he blaz’d out like a God.</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Full in their face the lifted bow he bore,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">And quiver’d deaths a formidable store;</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Before his feet the rattling show’r he threw,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">And thus terrific to the suitor crew⁠<a id="FNanchor_207" href="#Footnote_207" class="fnanchor">[207]</a>.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p>But Homer represents Penelope as remaining ignorant +of Ulysses, even after the suitors are destroyed, and he is +seated on the throne of majesty, anxious to be known, and +impatient to return her chaste and affectionate embrace. +For thus he describes her:</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">Then gliding through the marble valves in state,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Oppos’d before the shining fire she sate.</div> + <div class="verse indent0">The monarch, by a column high enthron’d.</div> + <div class="verse indent0">His eye withdrew, and fixed it on the ground,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Anxious to hear his queen the silence break:</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Amaz’d she sate, and impotent to speak;</div> + <div class="verse indent0">O’er all the man her eyes she rolls in vain,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Now hopes, now fears, now knows, then doubts again⁠<a id="FNanchor_208" href="#Footnote_208" class="fnanchor">[208]</a>.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p>By which Homer indicates, that Philosophy, through +her long absence from the soul, and the foreign manners +and habits which the soul had assumed, is a stranger +to it, so that it is difficult for her to recognize the union +and legitimate association which once subsisted between +them. However, in order to facilitate this discovery, +Ulysses renders all pure and harmonious within the +recesses of his soul; and, by the assistance of Minerva, or +wisdom, resumes the garb and dignity which he had formerly +displayed.</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">Then instant to the bath (the monarch cries,)</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Bid the gay youth and sprightly virgins rise,</div> +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_266">[266]</span> <div class="verse indent0">Thence all descend in pomp and proud array,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">And bid the dome resound the mirthful lay;</div> + <div class="verse indent0">While the sweet lyrist airs of raptures sings,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">And forms the dance responsive to the strings⁠<a id="FNanchor_209" href="#Footnote_209" class="fnanchor">[209]</a>.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p>And afterwards, Ulysses is described as appearing, +through the interposition of Minerva, <i>like one of the +immortals</i>.</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">So Pallas his heroic form improves,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">With bloom divine, and like a God he moves⁠<a id="FNanchor_210" href="#Footnote_210" class="fnanchor">[210]</a>.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p>For, indeed, he who, like Ulysses, has completely +destroyed the domination of his passions, and purified +himself, through the cathartic virtues, from their defiling +nature, no longer ranks in the order of mortals, but +is assimilated to divinity. And now, in order that he +may become entirely known to Philosophy, that chaste +Penelope of the soul, it is only requisite for him to relate +the secrets of their mystic union, and recognize the +bower of intellectual love. For then perfect recollection +will ensue; and the anxiety of diffidence will be +changed into transports of assurance, and tears of rapturous +delight.</p> + +<p>And thus we have attended Ulysses in his various +wanderings and woes, till, through the <i>cathartic</i> virtues, +he recovers the ruined empire of his soul. But, as it +is requisite that he should, in the next place, possess and +energize according to the theoretic or contemplative +virtues, the end of which is a union with deity, as far +as this can be effected by man in the present life, Homer +only indicates to us his attainment of this end, without +giving a detail of the gradual advances by which he +arrived at this consummate felicity. This union is +occultly signified by Ulysses first beholding, and afterwards +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_267">[267]</span>ardently embracing his father with ecstatic delight. +With most admirable propriety, also, is Ulysses represented +as proceeding, in order to effect this union, by +himself <i>alone</i>, to his father who is also <i>alone</i>.</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0"><i>Alone</i> and unattended, let me try</div> + <div class="verse indent0">If yet I share the old man’s memory⁠<a id="FNanchor_211" href="#Footnote_211" class="fnanchor">[211]</a>,</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class="noindent">says Ulysses. And afterwards it is said,</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">But all <i>alone</i> the hoary king he found⁠<a id="FNanchor_212" href="#Footnote_212" class="fnanchor">[212]</a>.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class="noindent">For a union with the ineffable <i>one</i> of the Demiurgus, the +true father of the soul, can only be accomplished by the +soul recurring to its own <i>unity</i>; and having for this +purpose previously dismissed and abandoned every thing +foreign to it. This occurrence, indeed, of the soul with +deity, is, as Plotinus divinely says, φυγη μονου προς μονον⁠<a id="FNanchor_213" href="#Footnote_213" class="fnanchor">[213]</a>, +<i>a flight of the alone to the alone</i>, in which most beautiful +expression I have no doubt he alludes to this mystic +termination of the wanderings of Ulysses, in the embraces +of his father. Proclus also, in a no less admirable +manner, alludes to this union in his Commentaries on +the Timæus of Plato⁠<a id="FNanchor_214" href="#Footnote_214" class="fnanchor">[214]</a>. The allusion is in his comment +on the words, “It is difficult, therefore, to discover the +maker and father of this universe; and, when found, it is +impossible to speak of him to all men.” On this passage +Proclus observes: “It is necessary that the soul, becoming +an intellectual world, and being as much as +possible assimilated to the whole intelligible world, +should introduce herself to the maker of the universe; +and from this introduction, should, in a certain respect, +become familiar with him through a continued intellectual +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_268">[268]</span>energy. For uninterrupted energy about any thing +calls forth and resuscitates our dormant ideas. But +through this familiarity, becoming stationed at the door +of the father, it is necessary that we should be united to +him. For discovery is this, to meet with him, to be +united to him, <i>to associate alone with the alone</i>, and to see +him himself, the soul hastily withdrawing herself from +every other energy to him. For, being present with her +father, she then considers scientific discussions to be but +words⁠<a id="FNanchor_215" href="#Footnote_215" class="fnanchor">[215]</a>, banquets together with him on the truth of real +being, and in pure splendour is purely initiated in entire +and stable visions. Such, therefore, is the discovery of +the father, not that which is doxastic [or pertaining to +opinion]; for this is dubious, and not very remote from +the irrational life. Neither is it scientific; for this is +syllogistic and composite, and does not come into contact +with the intellectual essence of the intellectual Demiurgus. +But it is that which subsists according to intellectual +vision itself, a contact with the intelligible, and +a union with the demiurgic intellect. For this may +properly be denominated difficult, either as hard to +obtain, presenting itself to souls after every evolution +of life, or as the true labour of souls. For, after the +wandering about generation, after purification, and the +light of science, intellectual energy and the intellect +which is in us shine forth, placing the soul in the father +as in a port, purely establishing her in demiurgic intellections, +and conjoining light with light; not such as +that of science, but more beautiful, more intellectual, +and partaking more of the nature of <i>the one</i> than this. +<i>For this is the paternal port, and the discovery of the father, +viz. an undefiled union with him.</i>”</p> + +<p>With great beauty also, and in perfect conformity to +the most recondite theology, is the father of Ulysses +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_269">[269]</span>represented as coarsely clothed, and occupied in botanical +labours:</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">But all alone the hoary king he found;</div> + <div class="verse indent0">His habit coarse, but warmly wrapt around;</div> + <div class="verse indent0">His head, that bow’d with many a pensive care,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Fenc’d with a double cap of goatskin hair;</div> + <div class="verse indent0">His buskins old, in former service torn,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">But well repair’d; and gloves against the thorn.</div> + <div class="verse indent0">In this array the kingly gard’ner stood,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">And clear’d a plant, encumber’d with its wood⁠<a id="FNanchor_216" href="#Footnote_216" class="fnanchor">[216]</a>.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class="noindent">For this simplicity, and coarseness of the garb of Laertes, +considered as an image of the true father of Ulysses, +is, in every respect, conformable to the method adopted +by ancient mythologists in their adumbrations of deity. +For they imitated the transcendency of divine natures +by things preternatural; a power more divine than all +reason by things irrational; and, by apparent deformity, a +beauty which surpasses every thing corporeal. This +array, therefore, of the father of Ulysses, is, in the language +of Proclus, indicative “of an essence established +in the simplicity of <i>the one</i>, and vehemently rejoicing, as +some one of the piously wise says, in an unadorned +privation of form, and extending it to those who are able +to survey it⁠<a id="FNanchor_217" href="#Footnote_217" class="fnanchor">[217]</a>.” And the botanical labours of Laertes are +an image of the providential attention of the Demiurgus +to the immediate ramifications and blossoms of his own +divine essence, in which they are ineffably rooted, and +from which they eternally germinate.</p> + +<p>Though Ulysses, however, is placed through the +theoretic virtues in the paternal port, as far as this is +possible to be effected in the present life, yet we must +remember, according to the beautiful observation of Porphyry, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_270">[270]</span>that he is not freed from molestation, till he has +passed over the raging sea of a material nature; <i>i.e.</i> has +become impassive⁠<a id="FNanchor_218" href="#Footnote_218" class="fnanchor">[218]</a> to the excitations of the irrational +life, and is entirely abstracted from external concerns. +For,</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">Then heav’n decrees in peace to end his days,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">And steal himself from life by slow decays;</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Unknown to pain, in age resign his breath.</div> + <div class="verse indent0">When late stern Neptune points the shaft of death;</div> + <div class="verse indent0">To the dark grave retiring as to rest;</div> + <div class="verse indent0">His people blessing, by his people blest⁠<a id="FNanchor_219" href="#Footnote_219" class="fnanchor">[219]</a>.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p>I shall only observe farther, that Plotinus also considered +the wanderings of Ulysses as a fabulous narration +containing a latent meaning, such as that which +we have above unfolded. This is evident from the following +extract from his admirable treatise <i>on the Beautiful</i>: +“It is here, then, [in order to survey the beautiful +itself] that we may more truly exclaim.</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">Haste, let us fly and all our sails expand,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">To gain our dear, our long-lost native land⁠<a id="FNanchor_220" href="#Footnote_220" class="fnanchor">[220]</a>.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class="noindent">But by what leading stars shall we direct our flight, +and by what means avoid the magic power of Circe, +and the detaining charms of Calypso? For thus the +fable of Ulysses obscurely signifies, which feigns him +abiding an unwilling exile, though pleasant spectacles +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_271">[271]</span>were continually presented to his sight; and every thing +was proffered to invite his stay, which can delight the +senses and captivate the heart. But our true country, +like that of Ulysses, is from whence we came, and where +our father lives⁠<a id="FNanchor_221" href="#Footnote_221" class="fnanchor">[221]</a>.”</p> + +<div class="footnotes"> + +<h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_183" href="#FNanchor_183" class="label">[183]</a> Δια τοι τουτο, και τον Οδυσσεα λεγουσι κατα θαλατταν πλανασθαι βουλῃ του +Ποσειδωνος· σημαινουσι γαρ την Οδυσσειον ζωην, οτι ουδε χθονια ην, αλλ’ ουδε μην ετι +ουρανια, αλλα μεση· επει ουν ο Ποσειδων του μεταξυ κυριος εστι, δια τουτο και τον +Οδυσσεα φασι βουλῃ Ποσειδωνος [supple πλανασθαι·] επειδη τον κληρον του Ποσειδωνος +ειχεν· ουτω γουν και τους μεν φασι Διος υιους, τους δε Ποσειδωνος, τους δε Πλουτωνος, +προς τους κληρους εκαστου· τον μεν γαρ εχοντα θειαν και ουρανιαν πολιτειαν Διος +φαμεν υιον, τον δε χθονιαν, Πλουτωνος, τον δε την μεταξυ Ποσειδωνος.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_184" href="#FNanchor_184" class="label">[184]</a> In Plat. Polit. p. 398.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_185" href="#FNanchor_185" class="label">[185]</a> Instead of αναλογοι ψυχαι, in this place, it is necessary to read +αλογοι ψυχαι.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_186" href="#FNanchor_186" class="label">[186]</a> Iliad, V. v. 451.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_187" href="#FNanchor_187" class="label">[187]</a> Conformably to this, Proclus, in Plat. Polit. p. 398, says, “that +all the beauty subsisting about generation [or the regions of sense], from +the fabrication of things, is signified by Helen; about which there is +a perpetual battle of souls, till the more intellectual having vanquished +the more irrational forms of life, return to the place from whence they +originally came.” For the beauty which is in the realms of generation, +is an efflux of intelligible beauty.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_188" href="#FNanchor_188" class="label">[188]</a> This second line is, in Pope’s version, “Lotos the name, divine, +nectarious juice!” which I have altered as above, as being more +conformable to the original.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_189" href="#FNanchor_189" class="label">[189]</a> Lib. ix. l. 94, &c.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_190" href="#FNanchor_190" class="label">[190]</a> Vid. Censoris, De Die Natali, cap. iii.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_191" href="#FNanchor_191" class="label">[191]</a> This is evident from the following passage in the Commentary of +Proclus, on the First Alcibiades of Plato: Ταις μεν ουν αποκαταστατικως +ζωσαις ψυχαις ο αυτος εστιν ανω κανταυθα δαιμων· ταις δε ατελεστεραις αλλος μεν ο +κατ’ ουσιαν δαιμων, αλλος δε ο κατα τον προβεβλημενον βιον. p. 37, Edit. Creuz. +But for a copious account of the essential dæmon, and of the different +orders and offices of dæmon, see the notes accompanying my translation +of the First Alcibiades, Phædo, and Gorgias of Plato.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_192" href="#FNanchor_192" class="label">[192]</a> See the note (p. 90) accompanying my translation of the Metamorphosis +of Apuleius.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_193" href="#FNanchor_193" class="label">[193]</a> For an accurate account of the gradation of the virtues, see Porphyry’s +Auxiliaries to Intelligibles, p. 217.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_194" href="#FNanchor_194" class="label">[194]</a> For the shuttle is a symbol of separating power.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_195" href="#FNanchor_195" class="label">[195]</a> And this is the meaning of the Chaldaic oracle,—</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">Σον αγγειον θηρες χθονος οικησουσιν.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class="noindent"><i>i.e.</i> “The wild beasts of the earth shall inhabit thy vessel.” For, as +Psellus well observes, by <i>the vessel</i>, the composite temperature of the +soul is signified, and by the wild beasts of the earth, terrestrial dæmons.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_196" href="#FNanchor_196" class="label">[196]</a> Odyss. lib. v. 82, &c. The translation by Pope.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_197" href="#FNanchor_197" class="label">[197]</a> Ibid. lib. v. 269, &c.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_198" href="#FNanchor_198" class="label">[198]</a> Odyss. lib. vii. 84, &c. The translation by Pope.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_199" href="#FNanchor_199" class="label">[199]</a> In Euclid. Element. lib. i. p. 14.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_200" href="#FNanchor_200" class="label">[200]</a> Odyss. lib. viii. 556, &c.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_201" href="#FNanchor_201" class="label">[201]</a> Odyss. lib. vii. 33.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_202" href="#FNanchor_202" class="label">[202]</a> Odyss. lib. xiii. 93, &c.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_203" href="#FNanchor_203" class="label">[203]</a> <i>i.e.</i> Philosophy; for of this Penelope is an image.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_204" href="#FNanchor_204" class="label">[204]</a> Odyss. lib. xiii. 373, &c.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_205" href="#FNanchor_205" class="label">[205]</a> Odyss. lib. xiii. 397, &c. The translation of the above, and +likewise of all the following passages from the Odyssey, is by Pope.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_206" href="#FNanchor_206" class="label">[206]</a> Odyss. lib. xvii. 201, &c.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_207" href="#FNanchor_207" class="label">[207]</a> Odyss. lib. xxii. 1, &c.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_208" href="#FNanchor_208" class="label">[208]</a> Odyss. lib. xxiii. 88, &c.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_209" href="#FNanchor_209" class="label">[209]</a> Odyss. lib. xxiii. 131, &c.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_210" href="#FNanchor_210" class="label">[210]</a> Odyss. lib. xxiii. 163, &c.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_211" href="#FNanchor_211" class="label">[211]</a> Odyss. lib. xxiv. 215, &c.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_212" href="#FNanchor_212" class="label">[212]</a> Ibid. lib. xxiv. 225.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_213" href="#FNanchor_213" class="label">[213]</a> These are the concluding words of the last book of his last Ennead.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_214" href="#FNanchor_214" class="label">[214]</a> See vol. i. p. 254, of my translation of that work.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_215" href="#FNanchor_215" class="label">[215]</a> This is in consequence of a union with the Demiurgus being so +much superior to scientific perception.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_216" href="#FNanchor_216" class="label">[216]</a> Odyss. lib. xxiv. 225, &c.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_217" href="#FNanchor_217" class="label">[217]</a> τα μεν γαρ εστι θεια και εν τῃ απλοτητι του ενος ιδρυμενα την ακαλλοπιστον +ευμορφιαν· (lege αμορφιαν) ως φησι τις των τα οσια σοφων, διαφεροντως αγαπωντα, +και προτεινοντα τοις εις αυτα βλεπειν δυναμενοις.—Procl. in Parmenid. lib. i. +p. 38. 8vo. Parisiis, 1821.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_218" href="#FNanchor_218" class="label">[218]</a> This impassivity, or perfect subjugation of the passions to reason, +which is the <i>true apathy</i> of the Stoics and Platonists, is indicated by +Ulysses finding a nation</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">“Who ne’er knew salt or heard the billows roar.”</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_219" href="#FNanchor_219" class="label">[219]</a> Odyss. lib. xxiii. 281, &c. By <i>the people</i>, in these lines, the +inferior parts or powers of the soul are indicated.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_220" href="#FNanchor_220" class="label">[220]</a> Iliad, lib. ii. 140, and lib. ix. 27.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_221" href="#FNanchor_221" class="label">[221]</a> See my paraphrased translation of this treatise, p. 37, &c.</p></div> + +</div> + +<p class="titlepage">THE END.</p> + +<p class="titlepage smaller">LONDON:<br> +PRINTED BY J. MOYES, GREVILLE STREET.</p> + +<div style='text-align:center'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 77014 ***</div> +</body> +</html> + diff --git a/77014-h/images/cover.jpg b/77014-h/images/cover.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..5f2af97 --- /dev/null +++ b/77014-h/images/cover.jpg |
