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III.</p> + +<p class="titlepage">CHICAGO:<br> +THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO.<br> +1892-1893</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_ii">[ii]</span></p> + +<p class="titlepage smaller smcap">Copyright, 1893,<br> +by<br> +The Open Court Publishing Co.</p> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_iii">[iii]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="CONTENTS_OF_VOLUME_III">CONTENTS OF VOLUME III.</h2> + +</div> + +<table> + <tr> + <td></td> + <td class="tdpg smaller">PAGE</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td colspan="2" class="tdc">ARTICLES.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Auta, The Doctrine of. By C. Lloyd Morgan</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#THE_DOCTRINE_OF_AUTA">161</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Cruelty and Pity in Woman. By Guillaume Ferrero</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#CRUELTY_AND_PITY_IN_WOMAN">220</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Doctrine of Auta, The. By C. Lloyd Morgan</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#THE_DOCTRINE_OF_AUTA">161</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Education, Nationalisation of, and the Universities. By H. von + Holst</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#NATIONALISATION_OF_EDUCATION">493</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Evolutionary Love. By Charles S. Peirce</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#EVOLUTIONARY_LOVE">176</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Foundations of Theism, The. By E. D. Cope</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#THE_FOUNDATIONS_OF_THEISM">623</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Founder of Tychism, The: His Methods, Philosophy, and Criticisms. + Editor</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#THE_FOUNDER_OF_TYCHISM">571</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Fourth Dimension, The By Hermann Schubert</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#THE_FOURTH_DIMENSION">402</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Hindu Monism. By Richard Garbe</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#HINDU_MONISM">51</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Insects, The Nervous Ganglia of. By Alfred Binet</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#THE_NERVOUS_GANGLIA_OF_INSECTS">35</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Intuition and Reason. By Christine Ladd Franklin</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#INTUITION_AND_REASON">211</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Issues of “Synechism,” The. By G. M. McCrie</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#THE_ISSUES_OF_SYNECHISM">380</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Love, Evolutionary. By Charles S. Peirce</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#EVOLUTIONARY_LOVE">176</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Man’s Glassy Essence. By Charles S. Peirce</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#MANS_GLASSY_ESSENCE">1</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Meaning and Metaphor. By Lady Victoria Welby</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#MEANING_AND_METAPHOR">510</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Mental Mummies. By Felix L. Oswald</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#MENTAL_MUMMIES">30</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Modern Science, Religion and. By F. Jodl</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#RELIGION_AND_MODERN_SCIENCE">329</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Monism, Hindu. By Richard Garbe</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#HINDU_MONISM">51</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Nationalisation of Education and the Universities. By H. von + Holst</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#NATIONALISATION_OF_EDUCATION">493</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Necessitarians, Reply to the. By Charles S. Peirce</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#REPLY_TO_THE_NECESSITARIANS">526</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Necessity, The Idea of: Its Basis and Its Scope. Editor</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#THE_IDEA_OF_NECESSITY">68</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Necessity, The Superstition of. By John Dewey</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#THE_SUPERSTITION_OF_NECESSITY">362</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Panbiotism, Panpsychism and. Editor</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#PANPSYCHISM_AND_PANBIOTISM">234</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Panpsychism and Panbiotism. Editor</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#PANPSYCHISM_AND_PANBIOTISM">234</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Reason, Intuition and. By Christine Ladd Franklin</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#INTUITION_AND_REASON">211</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Religion and Modern Science. By F. Jodl</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#RELIGION_AND_MODERN_SCIENCE">329</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Religion of Science, The. Editor</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#THE_RELIGION_OF_SCIENCE">352</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Renan: A Discourse Given at South Place Chapel, London. By + Moncure D. Conway</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#RENAN">201</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_iv">[iv]</span></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Reply to the Necessitarians. By Charles S. Peirce</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#REPLY_TO_THE_NECESSITARIANS">526</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Science, The Religion of. Editor</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#THE_RELIGION_OF_SCIENCE">352</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Superstition of Necessity, The. By John Dewey</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#THE_SUPERSTITION_OF_NECESSITY">362</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>“Synechism,” The Issues of. By G. M. McCrie</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#THE_ISSUES_OF_SYNECHISM">380</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Theism, The Foundations of. By E. D. Cope</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#THE_FOUNDATIONS_OF_THEISM">623</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Thought in America, The Future of. By E. D. Cope</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#THE_FUTURE_OF_THOUGHT_IN_AMERICA">23</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Tychism, The Founder of: His Methods, Philosophy, and + Criticisms. Editor</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#THE_FOUNDER_OF_TYCHISM">571</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Universities, Nationalisation of Education and the. By H. von + Holst</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#NATIONALISATION_OF_EDUCATION">493</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Woman, Cruelty and Pity in. By Guillaume Ferrero</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#CRUELTY_AND_PITY_IN_WOMAN">220</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td colspan="2" class="tdc">LITERARY CORRESPONDENCE.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>France. By Lucien Arréat</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#FRANCE_I">111</a>, <a href="#FRANCE_II">258</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>France, The Religious Outlook in. By Theodore Stanton</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#FRANCE_III_I">450</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Germany. By Christian Ufer</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#GERMANY_II">264</a>, <a href="#GERMANY_IV">640</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>New French Books. By Lucien Arréat</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#FRANCE_III_II">456</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Recent Evolutionary Studies in Germany. By Carus Sterne</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#GERMANY_I">97</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td colspan="2" class="tdc">CRITICISMS AND DISCUSSIONS.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>A Letter from Mr. Herbert Spencer</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#A_LETTER_FROM_MR_HERBERT_SPENCER">272</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Comte and Turgot. By Louis Belrose, Jr.</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#COMTE_AND_TURGOT">118</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Is Monism Arbitrary? Editor</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#IS_MONISM_ARBITRARY">124</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>James’s Psychology, Observations on Some Points of. By W. + L. Worcester</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#OBSERVATIONS">285</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Logic as Relation Lore. By F. C. Russell</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#LOGIC_AS_RELATION-LORE">272</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Mathematics a Description of Operations with Pure Forms. + Editor</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#MATHEMATICS">133</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Reply to a Critic, A. By Edward T. Dixon</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#A_REPLY_TO_A_CRITIC">127</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Sensation, Prof. Ernst Mach’s Term</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#PROFESSOR_ERNST_MACHS_TERM_SENSATION">298</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Some Remarks Upon Professor James’s Discussion of Attention. + By Hiram M. Stanley</td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#SOME_REMARKS">122</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td colspan="2" class="tdc">BOOK REVIEWS.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><i>Acht Abhandlungen, Herrn Professor Dr. Karl Ludwig + Michelet zum 90. Geburtstag</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_478">478</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Arréat, Lucien. <i>Psychologie du Peintre</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_142">142</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Baets, l’Abbé Maurice de. <i>L’école d’anthropologie + criminelle</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_649">649</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Becker, George F. <i>Finite Homogeneous Strain, Flow, and + Rupture of Rocks</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_480">480</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Berendt, M. and J. Friedländer. <i>Der Pessimismus im Lichte + einer höheren Weltauffassung</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_477">477</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Binet, Alfred. <i>Les Altérations de la Personnalité</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_145">145</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Blackwell, Antoinette Brown. <i>The Philosophy of Individuality, + or the One and the Many</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_649">649</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Cattell, James McKeen, and George Stuart Fullerton. <i>On the + Perception of Small Differences</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_141">141</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_v">[v]</span></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Delbœuf, J. <i>L’Hypnotisme devant les Chambres Legislatives + Belges</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_318">318</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Dessoir, Max. <i>Ueber den Hautsinn</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_319">319</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Dixon, Edward T. <i>An Essay on Reasoning</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_138">138</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Dreher, Eugen. <i>Der Materialismus, eine Verirrung des + menschlichen Geistes, widerlegt durch eine zeitgemässe + Weltanschauung</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_479">479</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Edinger, L. <i>Vergleichend-entwickelungsgeschichtliche und + anatomische Studien im Bereiche der Hirnanatomie. 3. Riechapparat + und Ammonshorn</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_648">648</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Engel, Gustav. <i>Die Philosophie und die sociale Frage</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_478">478</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Eucken, Rudolf. <i>Die Grundbegriffe der Gegenwart</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_650">650</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Friedländer, J. and M. Berendt. <i>Der Pessimismus im Lichte + einer höheren Weltauffassung</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_477">477</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Fullerton, George Stuart, and James McKeen Cattel. <i>On the + Perception of Small Differences</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_141">141</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>George, Henry. <i>A Perplexed Philosopher</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_482">482</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Gutberlet, Constantin. <i>Die Willensfreiheit und ihre Gegner</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_646">646</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Hiller, H. Croft. <i>Against Dogma and Free-Will</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_649">649</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Hirth, Georges. <i>Physiologie de L’Art</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_143">143</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Holtzmann, Heinrich Julius. <i>Hand-Commentar zum neuen Testament. + IV. Evangelium, Briefe und Offenbarung des Johannes</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_643">643</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Holtzmann, Heinrich Julius. <i>Lehrbuch der historisch-kritischen + Einleitung in das neue Testament</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_150">150</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Janet, Pierre. <i>État mental des hystériques les stigmates + mentaux</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_648">648</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Joël, Karl. <i>Der echte und der Xenophontische Sokrates</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_480">480</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Jones, E. E. Constance. <i>An Introduction to General Logic</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_314">314</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Lindemann, Ferdinand. <i>Vorlesungen über Geometrie</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_314">314</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Lotze, Hermann. <i>Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_140">140</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Lubbock, John. <i>The Beauties of Nature</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_323">323</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Meynert, Theodore. <i>Sammlung von populär-wissenschaftlichen + Vorträgen über den Bau und die Leistungen des Gehirns</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_151">151</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Mik, J. <i>Graber’s Leitfaden der Zoologie für die oberen + Classen der Mittelschulen</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_322">322</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Münsterberg, Hugo. <i>Beiträge zur experimentellen Psychologie</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_304">304</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Oelzelt-Newin, Anton. <i>Ueber sittliche Dispositionen</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_323">323</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Offner, Max. <i>Ueber die Grundformen der Vorstellungsverbindung</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_479">479</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Paszkowski, Wilhelm. <i>Wie steht es jetzt mit der Philosophie, + und was haben wir von ihr zu hoffen?</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_478">478</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Paulsen, Friedrich. <i>Einleitung in die Philosophie</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_466">466</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Rolfes, Eugen. <i>Die Aristotelische Auffassung vom Verhältnisse + Gottes zur Welt und zum Menschen</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_311">311</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Royce, Josiah. <i>The Spirit of Modern Philosophy</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_306">306</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Royer, Clémence. <i>Recherches d’optique physiologique et + physique</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_320">320</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_vi">[vi]</span></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Salter, William M. <i>First Steps in Philosophy</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_470">470</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Schellwien, Robert. <i>Max Stirner und Friedrich Nietzsche</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_311">311</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Schmidt, Johannes. <i>Die Urheimath der Indogermanen und das + europäische Zahlsystem</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_149">149</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Schmidkunz, Hans. <i>Der Hypnotismus in gemeinfasslicher + Darstellung</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_317">317</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Sharp, Frank Chapman. <i>The Æsthetic Element in Morality</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_650">650</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Sidgwick, Alfred. <i>Distinction and the Criticism of Beliefs</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_312">312</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Spencer, Herbert. <i>Social Statics and Justice</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_136">136</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Sterne, Carus. <i>Natur und Kunst</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_323">323</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Topinard, Paul. <i>L’Homme dans la Nature</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_146">146</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Topinard, Paul. <i>L’Anthropologie du Bengale</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_322">322</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Tufts, James Hayden. <i>The Sources of Development of Kant’s + Teleology</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_312">312</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Verworn, Max. <i>Die Bewegung der lebendigen Substanz</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_321">321</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Williams, C. M. <i>A Review of the Systems of Ethics Founded + on the Theory of Evolution</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_474">474</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Wundt, Wilhelm. <i>Vorlesungen über die Menschen- und Thierseele</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_300">300</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Wundt, Wilhelm. <i>Hypnotismus und Suggestion</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_315">315</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Wundt, Wilhelm. <i>Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie</i></td> + <td class="tdpg"><a href="#Page_648">648</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td colspan="2" class="tdc">PERIODICALS</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td colspan="2" class="tdpg"><a href="#PERIODICALS_I">153-160</a>; <a href="#PERIODICALS_II">325-328</a>; + <a href="#PERIODICALS_III">488-492</a>; <a href="#PERIODICALS_IV">651-658.</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td colspan="2" class="tdc">APPENDIX.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><a href="#plates">Plates</a> belonging to the article “The Nervous + Ganglia of Insects.” (In No. 1 of this volume.)</td> + <td class="tdpg"></td> + </tr> +</table> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_1">[1]</span></p> + +<div class="masthead"> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Vol. III.</span> +<span class="smcap spacer">October, 1892.</span> +<span class="smcap">No. 1.</span></p> + +<h2>THE MONIST.</h2> + +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h3 class="nobreak" id="MANS_GLASSY_ESSENCE">MAN’S GLASSY ESSENCE.</h3> + +</div> + +<p>In <i>The Monist</i> for January, 1891, I tried to show what conceptions +ought to form the brick and mortar of a philosophical system. +Chief among these was that of absolute chance for which I argued +again in last April’s number.⁠<a id="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> In July, I applied another fundamental +idea, that of continuity, to the law of mind. Next in order, I +have to elucidate, from the point of view chosen, the relation between +the psychical and physical aspects of a substance.</p> + +<p>The first step towards this ought, I think, to be the framing of +a molecular theory of protoplasm. But before doing that, it seems +indispensable to glance at the constitution of matter, in general. We +shall, thus, unavoidably make a long detour; but, after all, our pains +will not be wasted, for the problems of the papers that are to follow +in the series will call for the consideration of the same question.</p> + +<p>All physicists are rightly agreed the evidence is overwhelming +which shows all sensible matter is composed of molecules in swift +motion and exerting enormous mutual attractions, and perhaps repulsions, +too. Even Sir William Thomson, Lord Kelvin, who wishes +to explode action at a distance and return to the doctrine of a plenum, +not only speaks of molecules, but undertakes to assign definite +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_2">[2]</span>magnitudes to them. The brilliant Judge Stallo, a man who did not +always rightly estimate his own qualities in accepting tasks for himself, +declared war upon the atomic theory in a book well worth careful +perusal. To the old arguments in favor of atoms which he found +in Fechner’s monograph, he was able to make replies of considerable +force, though they were not sufficient to destroy those arguments. +But against modern proofs he made no headway at all. +These set out from the mechanical theory of heat. Rumford’s experiments +showed that heat is not a substance. Joule demonstrated +that it was a form of energy. The heating of gases under constant +volume, and other facts instanced by Rankine, proved that it could +not be an energy of strain. This drove physicists to the conclusion +that it was a mode of motion. Then it was remembered that +John Bernoulli had shown that the pressure of gases could be accounted +for by assuming their molecules to be moving uniformly in +rectilinear paths. The same hypothesis was now seen to account +for Avogadro’s law, that in equal volumes of different kinds of gases +exposed to the same pressure and temperature are contained equal +numbers of molecules. Shortly after, it was found to account for +the laws of diffusion and viscosity of gases, and for the numerical +relation between these properties. Finally, Crookes’s radiometer +furnished the last link in the strongest chain of evidence which supports +any physical hypothesis.</p> + +<p>Such being the constitution of gases, liquids must clearly be +bodies in which the molecules wander in curvilinear paths, while in +solids they move in orbits or quasi-orbits. (See my definition <i>solid</i> +II, 1, in the “Century Dictionary.”)</p> + +<p>We see that the resistance to compression and to interpenetration +between sensible bodies is, by one of the prime propositions of +the molecular theory, due in large measure to the kinetical energy +of the particles, which must be supposed to be quite remote from +one another, on the average, even in solids. This resistance is no +doubt influenced by finite attractions and repulsions between the +molecules. All the impenetrability of bodies which we can observe +is, therefore, a limited impenetrability due to kinetic and positional +energy. This being the case, we have no logical right to suppose +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_3">[3]</span>that absolute impenetrability, or the exclusive occupancy of space, +belongs to molecules or to atoms. It is an unwarranted hypothesis, +not a <i>vera causa</i>.⁠<a id="FNanchor_2" href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> Unless we are to give up the theory of energy, +finite positional attractions and repulsions between molecules must +be admitted. Absolute impenetrability would amount to an infinite +repulsion at a certain distance. No analogy of known phenomena +exists to excuse such a wanton violation of the principle of continuity +as such a hypothesis is. In short, we are logically bound to +adopt the Boscovichian idea that an atom is simply a distribution +of component potential energy throughout space, (this distribution +being absolutely rigid,) combined with inertia. The potential energy +belongs to two molecules, and is to be conceived as different +between molecules <i>A</i> and <i>B</i> from what it is between molecules <i>A</i> +and <i>C</i>. The distribution of energy is not necessarily spherical. Nay, +a molecule may conceivably have more than one centre; it may even +have a central curve, returning into itself. But I do not think there +are any observed facts pointing to such multiple or linear centres. +On the other hand, many facts relating to crystals, especially those +observed by Voigt,⁠<a id="FNanchor_3" href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> go to show that the distribution of energy is +harmonical but not concentric. We can easily calculate the forces +which such atoms must exert upon one another by considering⁠<a id="FNanchor_4" href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> that +they are equivalent to aggregations of pairs of electrically positive +and negative points infinitely near to one another. About such an +atom there would be regions of positive and of negative potential, +and the number and distribution of such regions would determine +the valency of the atom, a number which it is easy to see would in +many cases be somewhat indeterminate. I must not dwell further +upon this hypothesis, at present. In another paper, its consequences +will be further considered.</p> + +<p>I cannot assume that the students of philosophy who read this +magazine are thoroughly versed in modern molecular physics, and +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_4">[4]</span>therefore it is proper to mention that the governing principle in this +branch of science is Clausius’s law of the virial. I will first state +the law, and then explain the peculiar terms of the statement. This +statement is that the total kinetic energy of the particles of a system +in stationary motion is equal to the total virial. By a <i>system</i> is here +meant a number of particles acting upon one another.⁠<a id="FNanchor_5" href="#Footnote_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> Stationary +motion is a quasi-orbital motion among a system of particles so that +none of them are removed to indefinitely great distances nor acquire +indefinitely great velocities. The kinetic energy of a particle is the +work which would be required to bring it to rest, independently of +any forces which may be acting upon it. The virial of a pair of +particles is half the work which the force which actually operates +between them would do if, being independent of the distance, it +were to bring them together. The equation of the virial is</p> + +<p class="center">½Σ<i>mv</i>² = ½ΣΣ<i>Rr</i>.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp100" id="formula01" style="max-width: 14.0625em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/formula01.jpg" alt=""> +</figure> + +<p>Here <i>m</i> is the mass of a particle, <i>v</i> its velocity, <i>R</i> is the attraction +between two particles, and <i>r</i> is the distance between them. The +sign Σ on the left hand side signifies that the values of <i>mv</i>² are to +be summed for all the particles, and ΣΣ on the right hand side +signifies that the values of <i>Rr</i> are to be summed for all the pairs of +particles. If there is an external pressure <i>P</i> (as from the atmosphere) +upon the system, and the volume of vacant space within the boundary +of that pressure is <i>V</i>, then the virial must be understood as +including ³⁄₂<i>PV</i>, so that the equation is</p> + +<p class="center">½Σ<i>mv</i>² = ³⁄₂<i>PV</i> + ½ΣΣ<i>Rr</i>.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp100" id="formula02" style="max-width: 20.3125em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/formula02.jpg" alt=""> +</figure> + +<p>There is strong (if not demonstrative) reason for thinking that the +temperature of any body above the absolute zero (-273° C.), is proportional +to the average kinetic energy of its molecules, or say <i>aθ</i>, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_5">[5]</span>where <i>a</i> is a constant and <i>θ</i> is the absolute temperature. Hence, +we may write the equation</p> + +<p class="center"><i>aθ</i> = ½<i>m̅v̅</i>²̅ = ³⁄₂<i>PV̅</i> + ½Σ<i>R̅r̅</i></p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp100" id="formula03" style="max-width: 21.875em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/formula03.jpg" alt=""> +</figure> + +<p class="noindent">where the heavy lines above the different expressions signify that +the average values for single molecules are to be taken. In 1872, a +student in the University of Leyden, Van der Waals, propounded in +his thesis for the doctorate a specialisation of the equation of the +virial which has since attracted great attention. Namely, he writes it</p> + +<p class="center"><i>aθ</i> = (<i>P</i> + (<i>c</i>⁄<i>V</i>²))(<i>V</i>-<i>b</i>).</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp100" id="formula04" style="max-width: 21.875em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/formula04.jpg" alt=""> +</figure> + +<p>The quantity <i>b</i> is the volume of a molecule, which he supposes to +be an impenetrable body, and all the virtue of the equation lies in +this term which makes the equation a cubic in <i>V</i>, which is required +to account for the shape of certain isothermal curves.⁠<a id="FNanchor_6" href="#Footnote_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> But if the +idea of an impenetrable atom is illogical, that of an impenetrable +molecule is almost absurd. For the kinetical theory of matter +teaches us that a molecule is like a solar system or star-cluster in +miniature. Unless we suppose that in all heating of gases and +vapors internal work is performed upon the molecules, implying +that their atoms are at considerable distances, the whole kinetical +theory of gases falls to the ground. As for the term added to <i>P</i>, +there is no more than a partial and roughly approximative justification +for it. Namely, let us imagine two spheres described round a +particle as their centre, the radius of the larger being so great as to +include all the particles whose action upon the centre is sensible, +while the radius of the smaller is so large that a good many molecules +are included within it. The possibility of describing such a +sphere as the outer one implies that the attraction of the particles +varies at some distances inversely as some higher power of the distance +than the cube, or, to speak more clearly, that the attraction +multiplied by the cube of the distance diminishes as the distance +increases; for the number of particles at a given distance from any +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_6">[6]</span>one particle is proportionate to the square of that distance and +each of these gives a term of the virial which is the product of the +attraction into the distance. Consequently unless the attraction +multiplied by the cube of the distance diminished so rapidly with +the distance as soon to become insensible, no such outer sphere as +is supposed could be described. However, ordinary experience +shows that such a sphere is possible; and consequently there must +be distances at which the attraction does thus rapidly diminish as +the distance increases. The two spheres, then, being so drawn, +consider the virial of the central particle due to the particles between +them. Let the density of the substance be increased, say, +<i>N</i> times. Then, for every term, <i>Rr</i>, of the virial before the condensation, +there will be <i>N</i> terms of the same magnitude after the +condensation. Hence, the virial of each particle will be proportional +to the density, and the equation of the virial becomes</p> + +<p class="center"><i>aθ</i> = <i>PV̅</i> + <i>c</i>⁄<i>V̅</i>.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp100" id="formula05" style="max-width: 12.5em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/formula05.jpg" alt=""> +</figure> + +<p>This omits the virial within the inner sphere, the radius of which +is so taken that within that distance the number of particles is not +proportional to the number in a large sphere. For Van der Waals +this radius is the diameter of his hard molecules, which assumption +gives his equation. But it is plain that the attraction between the +molecules must to a certain extent modify their distribution, unless +some peculiar conditions are fulfilled. The equation of Van der +Waals can be approximately true therefore only for a gas. In a +solid or liquid condition, in which the removal of a small amount of +pressure has little effect on the volume, and where consequently the +virial must be much greater than <i>PV̅</i>, the virial must increase with +the volume. For suppose we had a substance in a critical condition +in which an increase of the volume would diminish the virial more +than it would increase ³⁄₂<i>PV̅</i>. If we were forcibly to diminish the +volume of such a substance, when the temperature became equalised, +the pressure which it could withstand would be less than before, +and it would be still further condensed, and this would go on +indefinitely until a condition were reached in which an increase of +volume would increase ³⁄₂<i>PV̅</i> more than it would decrease the virial. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_7">[7]</span>In the case of solids, at least, <i>P</i> may be zero; so that the state +reached would be one in which the virial increases with the volume, +or the attraction between the particles does not increase so fast with +a diminution of their distance as it would if the attraction were inversely +as the distance.</p> + +<p>Almost contemporaneously with Van der Waals’s paper, another +remarkable thesis for the doctorate was presented at Paris by +Amagat. It related to the elasticity and expansion of gases, and to +this subject the superb experimenter, its author, has devoted his +whole subsequent life. Especially interesting are his observations +of the volumes of ethylene and of carbonic acid at temperatures +from 20° to 100° and at pressures ranging from an ounce to 5000 +pounds to the square inch. As soon as Amagat had obtained these +results, he remarked that the “coefficient of expansion at constant +volume,” as it is absurdly called, that is, the rate of variation of the +pressure with the temperature, was very nearly constant for each +volume. This accords with the equation of the virial, which gives</p> + +<p class="center"><i>dp</i>⁄<i>dθ</i> = <i>a</i>⁄<i>V̅</i> - <i>d</i>Σ<i>R̅r̅</i>⁄<i>dθ</i>.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp100" id="formula06" style="max-width: 12.5em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/formula06.jpg" alt=""> +</figure> + +<p>Now, the virial must be nearly independent of the temperature, and +therefore the last term almost disappears. The virial would not +be quite independent of the temperature, because if the temperature +(i. e. the square of the velocity of the molecules) is lowered, +and the pressure correspondingly lowered, so as to make the volume +the same, the attractions of the molecules will have more time to +produce their effects, and consequently, the pairs of molecules the +closest together will be held together longer and closer; so that the +virial will generally be increased by a decrease of temperature. +Now, Amagat’s experiments do show an excessively minute effect of +this sort, at least, when the volumes are not too small. However, the +observations are well enough satisfied by assuming the “coefficient +of expansion at constant volume” to consist wholly of the first term, +<i>a</i>/(<i>V</i>). Thus, Amagat’s experiments enable us to determine the values +of <i>a</i> and thence to calculate the virial; and this we find varies for +carbonic acid gas nearly inversely to (<i>V</i>)⁰˙⁹. There is, thus, a rough +approximation to satisfying Van der Waals’s equation. But the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_8">[8]</span>most interesting result of Amagat’s experiments, for our purpose at +any rate, is that the quantity <i>a</i>, though nearly constant for any one +volume, differs considerably with the volume, nearly doubling when +the volume is reduced fivefold. This can only indicate that the +mean kinetic energy of a given mass of the gas for a given temperature +is greater the more the gas is compressed. But the laws of +mechanics appear to enjoin that the mean kinetic energy of a moving +particle shall be constant at any given temperature. The only +escape from contradiction, then, is to suppose that the mean mass +of a moving particle diminishes upon the condensation of the gas. +In other words, many of the molecules are dissociated, or broken up +into atoms or sub-molecules. The idea that dissociation should be +favored by diminishing the volume will be pronounced by physicists, +at first blush, as contrary to all our experience. But it must be +remembered that the circumstances we are speaking of, that of a +gas under fifty or more atmospheres pressure, are also unusual. +That the “coefficient of expansion under constant volume” when +multiplied by the volumes should increase with a decrement of the +volume is also quite contrary to ordinary experience; yet it undoubtedly +takes place in all gases under great pressure. Again, +the doctrine of Arrhenius⁠<a id="FNanchor_7" href="#Footnote_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> is now generally accepted, that the molecular +conductivity of an electrolyte is proportional to the dissociation +of ions. Now the molecular conductivity of a fused electrolyte is +usually superior to that of a solution. Here is a case, then, in which +diminution of volume is accompanied by increased dissociation.</p> + +<p>The truth is that several different kinds of dissociation have to +be distinguished. In the first place, there is the dissociation of a +chemical molecule to form chemical molecules under the regular +action of chemical laws. This may be a double decomposition, as +when iodhydric acid is dissociated, according to the formula</p> + +<p class="center"><i>HI</i> + <i>HI</i> = <i>HH</i> + <i>II</i>;</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp100" id="formula07" style="max-width: 17.1875em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/formula07.jpg" alt=""> +</figure> + +<p class="noindent">or, it may be a simple decomposition, as when pentachloride of +phosphorus is dissociated according to the formula</p> + +<p class="center"><i>PCl</i>₅ = <i>PCl</i>₃ + <i>ClCl</i>.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp100" id="formula08" style="max-width: 20.3125em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/formula08.jpg" alt=""> +</figure> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_9">[9]</span></p> + +<p>All these dissociations require, according to the laws of thermochemistry, +an elevated temperature. In the second place, there is +the dissociation of a physically polymerous molecule, that is, of +several chemical molecules joined by physical attractions. This I +am inclined to suppose is a common concomitant of the heating of +solids and liquids; for in these bodies there is no increase of compressibility +with the temperature at all comparable with the increase +of the expansibility. But, in the third place, there is the dissociation +with which we are now concerned, which must be supposed to +be a throwing off of unsaturated sub-molecules or atoms from the +molecule. The molecule may, as I have said, be roughly likened +to a solar system. As such, molecules are able to produce perturbations +of one another’s internal motions; and in this way a planet, +i. e. a sub-molecule, will occasionally get thrown off and wander +about by itself, till it finds another unsaturated sub-molecule with +which it can unite. Such dissociation by perturbation will naturally +be favored by the proximity of the molecules to one another.</p> + +<p>Let us now pass to the consideration of that special substance, +or rather class of substances, whose properties form the chief subject +of botany and of zoölogy, as truly as those of the silicates form the +chief subject of mineralogy: I mean the life-slimes, or protoplasm. +Let us begin by cataloguing the general characters of these slimes. +They one and all exist in two states of aggregation, a solid or nearly +solid state and a liquid or nearly liquid state; but they do not pass +from the former to the latter by ordinary fusion. They are readily +decomposed by heat, especially in the liquid state; nor will they +bear any considerable degree of cold. All their vital actions take +place at temperatures very little below the point of decomposition. +This extreme instability is one of numerous facts which demonstrate +the chemical complexity of protoplasm. Every chemist will agree +that they are far more complicated than the albumens. Now, albumen +is estimated to contain in each molecule about a thousand +atoms; so that it is natural to suppose that the protoplasms contain +several thousands. We know that while they are chiefly composed +of oxygen, hydrogen, carbon, and nitrogen, a large number +of other elements enter into living bodies in small proportions; and +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_10">[10]</span>it is likely that most of these enter into the composition of protoplasms. +Now, since the numbers of chemical varieties increase at +an enormous rate with the number of atoms per molecule, so that +there are certainly hundreds of thousands of substances whose molecules +contain twenty atoms or fewer, we may well suppose that the +number of protoplasmic substances runs into the billions or trillions. +Professor Cayley has given a mathematical theory of “trees,” with +a view of throwing a light upon such questions; and in that light +the estimate of trillions (in the English sense) seems immoderately +moderate. It is true that an opinion has been emitted, and defended +among biologists, that there is but one kind of protoplasm; but the +observations of biologists, themselves, have almost exploded that +hypothesis, which from a chemical standpoint appears utterly incredible. +The anticipation of the chemist would decidedly be that enough +different chemical substances having protoplasmic characters might +be formed to account, not only for the differences between nerve-slime +and muscle-slime, between whale-slime and lion-slime, but +also for those minuter pervasive variations which characterise different +breeds and single individuals.</p> + +<p>Protoplasm, when quiescent, is, broadly speaking, solid; but +when it is disturbed in an appropriate way, or sometimes even +spontaneously without external disturbance, it becomes, broadly +speaking, liquid. A moner in this state is seen under the microscope +to have streams within its matter; a slime-mould slowly flows by +force of gravity. The liquefaction starts from the point of disturbance +and spreads through the mass. This spreading, however, +is not uniform in all directions; on the contrary it takes at one +time one course, at another another, through the homogeneous +mass, in a manner that seems a little mysterious. The cause of +disturbance being removed, these motions gradually (with higher +kinds of protoplasm, quickly) cease, and the slime returns to its +solid condition.</p> + +<p>The liquefaction of protoplasm is accompanied by a mechanical +phenomenon. Namely, some kinds exhibit a tendency to draw themselves +up into a globular form. This happens particularly with the +contents of muscle-cells. The prevalent opinion, founded on some +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_11">[11]</span>of the most exquisite experimental investigations that the history of +science can show, is undoubtedly that the contraction of muscle-cells +is due to osmotic pressure; and it must be allowed that that is a +factor in producing the effect. But it does not seem to me that it +satisfactorily accounts even for the phenomena of muscular contraction; +and besides, even naked slimes often draw up in the same +way. In this case, we seem to recognise an increase of the surface-tension. +In some cases, too, the reverse action takes place, extraordinary +pseudopodia being put forth, as if the surface-tension were +diminished in spots. Indeed, such a slime always has a sort of skin, +due no doubt to surface-tension, and this seems to give way at the +point where a pseudopodium is put forth.</p> + +<p>Long-continued or frequently repeated liquefaction of the protoplasm +results in an obstinate retention of the solid state, which we +call fatigue. On the other hand repose in this state, if not too much +prolonged, restores the liquefiability. These are both important +functions.</p> + +<p>The life-slimes have, further, the peculiar property of growing. +Crystals also grow; their growth, however, consists merely in attracting +matter like their own from the circumambient fluid. To +suppose the growth of protoplasm of the same nature, would be to +suppose this substance to be spontaneously generated in copious +supplies wherever food is in solution. Certainly, it must be granted +that protoplasm is but a chemical substance, and that there is +no reason why it should not be formed synthetically like any other +chemical substance. Indeed, Clifford has clearly shown that we have +overwhelming evidence that it is so formed. But to say that such +formation is as regular and frequent as the assimilation of food is +quite another matter. It is more consonant with the facts of observation +to suppose that assimilated protoplasm is formed at the instant +of assimilation, under the influence of the protoplasm already +present. For each slime in its growth preserves its distinctive characters +with wonderful truth, nerve-slime growing nerve-slime and +muscle-slime muscle-slime, lion-slime growing lion-slime, and all the +varieties of breeds and even individual characters being preserved +in the growth. Now it is too much to suppose there are billions +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_12">[12]</span>of different kinds of protoplasm floating about wherever there is +food.</p> + +<p>The frequent liquefaction of protoplasm increases its power of +assimilating food; so much so, indeed, that it is questionable whether +in the solid form it possesses this power.</p> + +<p>The life-slime wastes as well as grows; and this too takes place +chiefly if not exclusively in its liquid phases.</p> + +<p>Closely connected with growth is reproduction; and though in +higher forms this is a specialised function, it is universally true that +wherever there is protoplasm, there is, will be, or has been a power +of reproducing that same kind of protoplasm in a separated organism. +Reproduction seems to involve the union of two sexes; though +it is not demonstrable that this is always requisite.</p> + +<p>Another physical property of protoplasm is that of taking habits. +The course which the spread of liquefaction has taken in the past is +rendered thereby more likely to be taken in the future; although +there is no absolute certainty that the same path will be followed +again.</p> + +<p>Very extraordinary, certainly, are all these properties of protoplasm; +as extraordinary as indubitable. But the one which has +next to be mentioned, while equally undeniable, is infinitely more +wonderful. It is that protoplasm feels. We have no direct evidence +that this is true of protoplasm universally, and certainly some kinds +feel far more than others. But there is a fair analogical inference +that all protoplasm feels. It not only feels but exercises all the functions +of mind.</p> + +<p>Such are the properties of protoplasm. The problem is to find +a hypothesis of the molecular constitution of this compound which +will account for these properties, one and all.</p> + +<p>Some of them are obvious results of the excessively complicated +constitution of the protoplasm molecule. All very complicated substances +are unstable; and plainly a molecule of several thousand +atoms may be separated in many ways into two parts in each of +which the polar chemical forces are very nearly saturated. In the +solid protoplasm, as in other solids, the molecules must be supposed +to be moving as it were in orbits, or, at least, so as not to wander +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_13">[13]</span>indefinitely. But this solid cannot be melted, for the same reason +that starch cannot be melted; because an amount of heat insufficient +to make the entire molecules wander is sufficient to break them +up completely and cause them to form new and simpler molecules. +But when one of the molecules is disturbed, even if it be not quite +thrown out of its orbit at first, sub-molecules of perhaps several +hundred atoms each are thrown off from it. These will soon acquire +the same mean kinetic energy as the others, and therefore velocities +several times as great. They will naturally begin to wander, and +in wandering will perturb a great many other molecules and cause +them in their turn to behave like the one originally deranged. So +many molecules will thus be broken up, that even those that are intact +will no longer be restrained within orbits, but will wander about +freely. This is the usual condition of a liquid, as modern chemists +understand it; for in all electrolytic liquids there is considerable +dissociation.</p> + +<p>But this process necessarily chills the substance, not merely on +account of the heat of chemical combination, but still more because +the number of separate particles being greatly increased, the mean +kinetic energy must be less. The substance being a bad conductor, +this heat is not at once restored. Now the particles moving more +slowly, the attractions between them have time to take effect, and +they approach the condition of equilibrium. But their dynamic +equilibrium is found in the restoration of the solid condition, which +therefore takes place, if the disturbance is not kept up.</p> + +<p>When a body is in the solid condition, most of its molecules +must be moving at the same rate, or, at least, at certain regular sets +of rates; otherwise the orbital motion would not be preserved. The +distances of neighboring molecules must always be kept between a +certain maximum and a certain minimum value. But if, without +absorption of heat, the body be thrown into a liquid condition, the +distances of neighboring molecules will be far more unequally distributed, +and an effect upon the virial will result. The chilling of +protoplasm upon its liquefaction must also be taken into account. +The ordinary effect will no doubt be to increase the cohesion and +with that the surface-tension, so that the mass will tend to draw itself +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_14">[14]</span>up. But in special cases, the virial will be increased so much +that the surface-tension will be diminished at points where the temperature +is first restored. In that case, the outer film will give way +and the tension at other places will aid in causing the general fluid +to be poured out at those points, forming pseudopodia.</p> + +<p>When the protoplasm is in a liquid state, and then only, a solution +of food is able to penetrate its mass by diffusion. The protoplasm +is then considerably dissociated; and so is the food, like all +dissolved matter. If then the separated and unsaturated sub-molecules +of the food happen to be of the same chemical species as sub-molecules +of the protoplasm, they may unite with other sub-molecules +of the protoplasm to form new molecules, in such a fashion +that when the solid state is resumed, there may be more molecules +of protoplasm than there were at the beginning. It is like the jack-knife +whose blade and handle, after having been severally lost and +replaced, were found and put together to make a new knife.</p> + +<p>We have seen that protoplasm is chilled by liquefaction, and +that this brings it back to the solid state, when the heat is recovered. +This series of operations must be very rapid in the case of +nerve-slime and even of muscle-slime, and may account for the unsteady +or vibratory character of their action. Of course, if assimilation +takes place, the heat of combination, which is probably trifling, +is gained. On the other hand, if work is done, whether by +nerve or by muscle, loss of energy must take place. In the case of +the muscle, the mode by which the instantaneous part of the fatigue +is brought about is easily traced out. If when the muscle contracts +it be under stress, it will contract less than it otherwise would do, +and there will be a loss of heat. It is like an engine which should +work by dissolving salt in water and using the contraction during +the solution to lift a weight, the salt being recovered afterwards by +distillation. But the major part of fatigue has nothing to do with +the correlation of forces. A man must labor hard to do in a quarter +of an hour the work which draws from him enough heat to cool his +body by a single degree. Meantime, he will be getting heated, he +will be pouring out extra products of combustion, perspiration, etc., +and he will be driving the blood at an accelerated rate through minute +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_15">[15]</span>tubes at great expense. Yet all this will have little to do with +his fatigue. He may sit quietly at his table writing, doing practically +no physical work at all, and yet in a few hours be terribly +fagged. This seems to be owing to the deranged sub-molecules of +the nerve-slime not having had time to settle back into their proper +combinations. When such sub-molecules are thrown out, as they +must be from time to time, there is so much waste of material.</p> + +<p>In order that a sub-molecule of food may be thoroughly and +firmly assimilated into a broken molecule of protoplasm, it is necessary +not only that it should have precisely the right chemical +composition, but also that it should be at precisely the right spot at +the right time and should be moving in precisely the right direction +with precisely the right velocity. If all these conditions are not fulfilled, +it will be more loosely retained than the other parts of the +molecule; and every time it comes round into the situation in which +it was drawn in, relatively to the other parts of that molecule and +to such others as were near enough to be factors in the action, it will +be in special danger of being thrown out again. Thus, when a partial +liquefaction of the protoplasm takes place many times to about the +same extent, it will, each time, be pretty nearly the same molecules +that were last drawn in that are now thrown out. They will be +thrown out, too, in about the same way, as to position, direction of +motion, and velocity, in which they were drawn in; and this will be +in about the same course that the ones last before them were thrown +out. Not exactly, however; for the very cause of their being thrown +off so easily is their not having fulfilled precisely the conditions of +stable retention. Thus, the law of habit is accounted for, and with +it its peculiar characteristic of not acting with exactitude.</p> + +<p>It seems to me that this explanation of habit, aside from the +question of its truth or falsity, has a certain value as an addition to +our little store of mechanical examples of actions analogous to habit. +All the others, so far as I know, are either statical or else involve +forces which, taking only the sensible motions into account, violate +the law of energy. It is so with the stream that wears its own bed. +Here, the sand is carried to its most stable situation and left there. +The law of energy forbids this; for when anything reaches a position +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_16">[16]</span>of stable equilibrium, its momentum will be at a maximum, so that +it can according to this law only be left at rest in an unstable situation. +In all the statical illustrations, too, things are brought into +certain states and left there. A garment receives folds and keeps +them; that is, its limit of elasticity is exceeded. This failure to +spring back is again an apparent violation of the law of energy; for +the substance will not only not spring back of itself (which might +be due to an unstable equilibrium being reached) but will not even +do so when an impulse that way is applied to it. Accordingly, +Professor James says “the phenomena of habit ... are due to the +plasticity of the ... materials.” Now, plasticity of materials means +the having of a low limit of elasticity. (See the “Century Dictionary,” +under <i>solid</i>.) But the hypothetical constitution of protoplasm +here proposed involves no forces but attractions and repulsions +strictly following the law of energy. The action here, that is, the +throwing of an atom out of its orbit in a molecule, and the entering +of a new atom into nearly, but not quite the same orbit, is somewhat +similar to the molecular actions which may be supposed to take +place in a solid strained beyond its limit of elasticity. Namely, +in that case certain molecules must be thrown out of their orbits, +to settle down again shortly after into new orbits. In short, the +plastic solid resembles protoplasm in being partially and temporarily +liquefied by a slight mechanical force. But the taking of a set by +a solid body has but a moderate resemblance to the taking of a +habit, inasmuch as the characteristic feature of the latter, its inexactitude +and want of complete determinacy, is not so marked in the +former, if it can be said to be present there, at all.</p> + +<p>The truth is that though the molecular explanation of habit is +pretty vague on the mathematical side, there can be no doubt that +systems of atoms having polar forces would act substantially in that +manner, and the explanation is even too satisfactory to suit the convenience +of an advocate of tychism. For it may fairly be urged +that since the phenomena of habit may thus result from a purely +mechanical arrangement, it is unnecessary to suppose that habit-taking +is a primordial principle of the universe. But one fact +remains unexplained mechanically, which concerns not only the facts +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_17">[17]</span>of habit, but all cases of actions apparently violating the law of +energy; it is that all these phenomena depend upon aggregations of +trillions of molecules in one and the same condition and neighborhood; +and it is by no means clear how they could have all been +brought and left in the same place and state by any conservative +forces. But let the mechanical explanation be as perfect as it may, +the state of things which it supposes presents evidence of a primordial +habit-taking tendency. For it shows us like things acting in +like ways because they are alike. Now, those who insist on the +doctrine of necessity will for the most part insist that the physical +world is entirely individual. Yet law involves an element of generality. +Now to say that generality is primordial, but generalisation +not, is like saying that diversity is primordial but diversification +not. It turns logic upside down. At any rate, it is clear that +nothing but a principle of habit, itself due to the growth by habit of +an infinitesimal chance tendency toward habit-taking, is the only +bridge that can span the chasm between the chance-medley of chaos +and the cosmos of order and law.</p> + +<p>I shall not attempt a molecular explanation of the phenomena +of reproduction, because that would require a subsidiary hypothesis, +and carry me away from my main object. Such phenomena, universally +diffused though they be, appear to depend upon special +conditions; and we do not find that all protoplasm has reproductive +powers.</p> + +<p>But what is to be said of the property of feeling? If consciousness +belongs to all protoplasm, by what mechanical constitution is +this to be accounted for? The slime is nothing but a chemical compound. +There is no inherent impossibility in its being formed synthetically +in the laboratory, out of its chemical elements; and if it +were so made, it would present all the characters of natural protoplasm. +No doubt, then, it would feel. To hesitate to admit this +would be puerile and ultra-puerile. By what element of the molecular +arrangement, then, would that feeling be caused? This question +cannot be evaded or pooh-poohed. Protoplasm certainly does +feel; and unless we are to accept a weak dualism, the property +must be shown to arise from some peculiarity of the mechanical system. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_18">[18]</span>Yet the attempt to deduce it from the three laws of mechanics, +applied to never so ingenious a mechanical contrivance, would +obviously be futile. It can never be explained, unless we admit that +physical events are but degraded or undeveloped forms of psychical +events. But once grant that the phenomena of matter are but the +result of the sensibly complete sway of habits upon mind, and it +only remains to explain why in the protoplasm these habits are to +some slight extent broken up, so that according to the law of mind, +in that special clause of it sometimes called the principle of accommodation,⁠<a id="FNanchor_8" href="#Footnote_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> +feeling becomes intensified. Now the manner in which +habits generally get broken up is this. Reactions usually terminate +in the removal of a stimulus; for the excitation continues as +long as the stimulus is present. Accordingly, habits are general +ways of behavior which are associated with the removal of stimuli. +But when the expected removal of the stimulus fails to occur, the +excitation continues and increases, and non-habitual reactions take +place; and these tend to weaken the habit. If, then, we suppose +that matter never does obey its ideal laws with absolute precision, +but that there are almost insensible fortuitous departures from regularity, +these will produce, in general, equally minute effects. But +protoplasm is in an excessively unstable condition; and it is the +characteristic of unstable equilibrium, that near that point excessively +minute causes may produce startlingly large effects. Here +then, the usual departures from regularity will be followed by others +that are very great; and the large fortuitous departures from law so +produced, will tend still further to break up the laws, supposing +that these are of the nature of habits. Now, this breaking up of +habit and renewed fortuitous spontaneity will, according to the law +of mind, be accompanied by an intensification of feeling. The nerve-protoplasm +is, without doubt, in the most unstable condition of any +kind of matter; and consequently, there the resulting feeling is the +most manifest.</p> + +<p>Thus we see that the idealist has no need to dread a mechanical +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_19">[19]</span>theory of life. On the contrary, such a theory, fully developed, +is bound to call in a tychistic idealism as its indispensable adjunct. +Wherever chance-spontaneity is found, there, in the same proportion, +feeling exists. In fact, chance is but the outward aspect of that +which within itself is feeling. I long ago showed that real existence, +or thing-ness, consists in regularities. So, that primeval chaos in +which there was no regularity was mere nothing, from a physical aspect. +Yet it was not a blank zero; for there was an intensity of +consciousness there in comparison with which all that we ever feel +is but as the struggling of a molecule or two to throw off a little of +the force of law to an endless and innumerable diversity of chance +utterly unlimited.</p> + +<p>But after some atoms of the protoplasm have thus become partially +emancipated from law, what happens next to them? To understand +this, we have to remember that no mental tendency is so +easily strengthened by the action of habit as is the tendency to take +habits. Now, in the higher kinds of protoplasm, especially, the +atoms in question have not only long belonged to one molecule or +another of the particular mass of slime of which they are parts; but +before that, they were constituents of food of a protoplasmic constitution. +During all this time, they have been liable to lose habits +and to recover them again; so that now, when the stimulus is removed, +and the foregone habits tend to reassert themselves, they do +so in the case of such atoms with great promptness. Indeed, the +return is so prompt that there is nothing but the feeling to show +conclusively that the bonds of law have ever been relaxed.</p> + +<p>In short, diversification is the vestige of chance-spontaneity; +and wherever diversity is increasing, there chance must be operative. +On the other hand, wherever uniformity is increasing, habit +must be operative. But wherever actions take place under an established +uniformity, there so much feeling as there may be takes the +mode of a sense of reaction. That is the manner in which I am led +to define the relation between the fundamental elements of consciousness +and their physical equivalents.</p> + +<p>It remains to consider the physical relations of general ideas. +It may be well here to reflect that if matter has no existence except +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_20">[20]</span>as a specialisation of mind, it follows that whatever affects matter +according to regular laws is itself matter. But all mind is directly +or indirectly connected with all matter, and acts in a more or less +regular way; so that all mind more or less partakes of the nature of +matter. Hence, it would be a mistake to conceive of the psychical +and the physical aspects of matter as two aspects absolutely distinct. +Viewing a thing from the outside, considering its relations of +action and reaction with other things, it appears as matter. Viewing +it from the inside, looking at its immediate character as feeling, it +appears as consciousness. These two views are combined when we +remember that mechanical laws are nothing but acquired habits, +like all the regularities of mind, including the tendency to take +habits, itself; and that this action of habit is nothing but generalisation, +and generalisation is nothing but the spreading of feelings. +But the question is, how do general ideas appear in the molecular +theory of protoplasm?</p> + +<p>The consciousness of a habit involves a general idea. In each +action of that habit certain atoms get thrown out of their orbit, and +replaced by others. Upon all the different occasions it is different +atoms that are thrown off, but they are analogous from a physical +point of view, and there is an inward sense of their being analogous. +Every time one of the associated feelings recurs, there is a more or +less vague sense that there are others, that it has a general character, +and of about what this general character is. We ought not, I +think, to hold that in protoplasm habit never acts in any other than +the particular way suggested above. On the contrary, if habit be +a primary property of mind, it must be equally so of matter, as a +kind of mind. We can hardly refuse to admit that wherever chance +motions have general characters, there is a tendency for this generality +to spread and to perfect itself. In that case, a general idea is +a certain modification of consciousness which accompanies any regularity +or general relation between chance actions.</p> + +<p>The consciousness of a general idea has a certain “unity of the +ego,” in it, which is identical when it passes from one mind to another. +It is, therefore, quite analogous to a person; and, indeed, a +person is only a particular kind of general idea. Long ago, in the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_21">[21]</span><i>Journal of Speculative Philosophy</i> (Vol. III, p. 156), I pointed out +that a person is nothing but a symbol involving a general idea; but +my views were, then, too nominalistic to enable me to see that +every general idea has the unified living feeling of a person.</p> + +<p>All that is necessary, upon this theory, to the existence of a +person is that the feelings out of which he is constructed should be +in close enough connection to influence one another. Here we can +draw a consequence which it may be possible to submit to experimental +test. Namely, if this be the case, there should be something +like personal consciousness in bodies of men who are in intimate +and intensely sympathetic communion. It is true that when the +generalisation of feeling has been carried so far as to include all +within a person, a stopping-place, in a certain sense, has been attained; +and further generalisation will have a less lively character. +But we must not think it will cease. <i>Esprit de corps</i>, national sentiment, +sympathy, are no mere metaphors. None of us can fully +realise what the minds of corporations are, any more than one of +my brain-cells can know what the whole brain is thinking. But the +law of mind clearly points to the existence of such personalities, +and there are many ordinary observations which, if they were critically +examined and supplemented by special experiments, might, +as first appearances promise, give evidence of the influence of such +greater persons upon individuals. It is often remarked that on one +day half a dozen people, strangers to one another, will take it into +their heads to do one and the same strange deed, whether it be a +physical experiment, a crime, or an act of virtue. When the thirty +thousand young people of the society for Christian Endeavor were +in New York, there seemed to me to be some mysterious diffusion +of sweetness and light. If such a fact is capable of being made out +anywhere, it should be in the church. The Christians have always +been ready to risk their lives for the sake of having prayers in common, +of getting together and praying simultaneously with great +energy, and especially for their common body, for “the whole state +of Christ’s church militant here in earth,” as one of the missals has +it. This practice they have been keeping up everywhere, weekly, +for many centuries. Surely, a personality ought to have developed +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_22">[22]</span>in that church, in that “bride of Christ,” as they call it, or else +there is a strange break in the action of mind, and I shall have to +acknowledge my views are much mistaken. Would not the societies +for psychical research be more likely to break through the clouds, +in seeking evidences of such corporate personality, than in seeking +evidences of telepathy, which, upon the same theory, should be a +far weaker phenomenon?</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">C. S. Peirce.</span></p> + +<div class="footnotes"> + +<h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_1" href="#FNanchor_1" class="label">[1]</a> I am rejoiced to find, since my last paper was printed, that a philosopher as +subtle and profound as Dr. Edmund Montgomery has long been arguing for the +same element in the universe. Other world-renowned thinkers, as M. Renouvier +and M. Delbœuf, appear to share this opinion.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_2" href="#FNanchor_2" class="label">[2]</a> By a <i>vera causa</i>, in the logic of science, is meant a state of things known to +exist in some cases and supposed to exist in other cases, because it would account +for observed phenomena.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_3" href="#FNanchor_3" class="label">[3]</a> Wiedemann, <i>Annalen</i>, 1887-1889.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_4" href="#FNanchor_4" class="label">[4]</a> See Maxwell on Spherical Harmonics, in his <i>Electricity and Magnetism</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_5" href="#FNanchor_5" class="label">[5]</a> The word <i>system</i> has three peculiar meanings in mathematics. (<i>A.</i>) It means +an orderly exposition of the truths of astronomy, and hence a theory of the motions +of the stars; as the Ptolemaic <i>system</i>, the Copernican <i>system</i>. This is much like +the sense in which we speak of the Calvinistic <i>system</i> of theology, the Kantian +<i>system</i> of philosophy, etc. (<i>B.</i>) It means the aggregate of the planets considered as +all moving in somewhat the same way, as the solar <i>system</i>; and hence any aggregate +of particles moving under mutual forces. (<i>C.</i>) It means a number of forces +acting simultaneously upon a number of particles.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_6" href="#FNanchor_6" class="label">[6]</a> But, in fact, an inspection of these curves is sufficient to show that they are +of a higher degree than the third. For they have the line <i>V</i> = 0, or some line <i>V</i> a +constant for an asymptote, while for small values of <i>P</i>, the values of (<i>d</i>²)<i>P</i>/(<i>dV</i>)² are +positive.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_7" href="#FNanchor_7" class="label">[7]</a> Anticipated by Clausius as long ago as 1857; and by Williamson in 1851.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_8" href="#FNanchor_8" class="label">[8]</a> “Physiologically, ... accommodation means the breaking up of a habit.... +Psychologically, it means reviving consciousness.” Baldwin, <i>Psychology</i>, Part III +ch. i., § 5.</p></div> + +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_23">[23]</span></p> + +<h3 class="nobreak" id="THE_FUTURE_OF_THOUGHT_IN_AMERICA">THE FUTURE OF THOUGHT IN AMERICA.</h3> + +</div> + +<p>History teaches us the nature of the degenerative and destructive +agencies in national life. These are of various kinds, +but they may be generally included under the heads of Physical +Vices, Superstitions, and Selfish Ambitions. These have become +possible through excess of emotional, and deficiency of rational +states of the mind. When a large part of a population is influenced +by emotional rather than by rational modes of thought, unethical +conduct has full opportunity, and suffering and destruction are sure +to follow. All races and nations are subject to such disorders, if +only in some cases during their periods of infancy and of degeneracy.</p> + +<p>The peoples of Europe have difficulties and dangers which are +due to their own peculiar situation. The people of North America +have to meet certain risks of a somewhat different character, owing +to our peculiar position. In Europe we see an accumulation of +many races who reached their <i>Ultima Thule</i> at the coast of the Atlantic, +and who have had to accommodate themselves to each other +as best they could. Speaking different languages and having different +political organisations, they have consolidated into separate +nations. This result has only been reached after many conflicts, +and the result has been the combination and absorption of smaller +states into greater, such as we find them to-day. This result has +not terminated conflicts; it has reduced their frequency but has increased +their scope and importance. To-day the antagonisms of +these nations impose great burdens upon them, but they are at the +same time productive of great good.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_24">[24]</span></p> + +<p>With men as with other animals excellence is the result of use +and exercise. With animals this exercise has been compulsory, and +has been due largely to the pressure of hunger. Among men intellectual +and ethical excellence may be due to compulsion, or it may +result from the capacity to develop lofty ideals. In the former case +man is driven; in the latter case he is led. Now the organisation +of human society is such, that if man will not be led, he is driven. +The “mills of the Gods” are ever ready for those who lag behind +in the progress of the race. But there are mills and mills, and no +mill has yet appeared in human history better calculated to grind +out a good grist from an intellectual point of view, than western +Eurasia, or Europe. The emulations and antagonisms of so many +nations have stimulated men to do their best, and have stimulated +governments to aid them in doing it, for several centuries. The +result has been modern art, modern science pure and applied, and +modern philosophy. To produce all this however, Europe has been +under pressure, and the pressure has been in some, if not all of its +countries, more or less galling.</p> + +<p>The European, in order to escape local tyranny, political, social, +or theological, or to better his chances of physical living, has +come to America. He has taken possession, and has bettered his +condition from a physical point of view, most successfully. The +question that interests us now, is whether he has bettered himself +in any other way, and whether he is going to continue the mental +progress which has so distinguished his history in Europe. Population +is rapidly increasing, and the increasing severity of the +“struggle for existence” which will follow, will stimulate men to +increased excellence in their methods of obtaining a livelihood, but +will it develop the mind in any other direction? We have before us +in the case of China, the effect of close industrial competition in a +dense population, without corresponding intellectual development. +What is the outlook for the American? Will the process of natural +selection only, the “devil-take-the-hindmost” doctrine of Darwin, +be sufficient to develop the higher mental faculties, or having developed +them, to enable them to survive and to become general, or +not?</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_25">[25]</span></p> + +<p>In the first place we lack in America the great stimulus to mental +progress already referred to, international jealousy and emulation. +In this respect we are situated very much like the Chinese, +but if anything less favorably. We practically own the continent. +We have no fear of Tartar invasions from the west nor Japanese +from the north east. The Canadians are of identical race with ourselves, +and are almost certain to become identical in nationality +with us. We are accustomed to boast ourselves of this, and to look +with great satisfaction on our isolated position among nations. But +our self-gratulation must be greatly tempered by the reflection that +such isolation is only beneficial so long as we can maintain our ideals +without external stimulus. And this is something that few nations +have so far been able to accomplish. It is true, however, that the +Atlantic ocean is not so wide as it was formerly, and we are truly +one of the family of the Indo-European nations. But we will miss +the effect of the daily stimulus which they afford each other, and +the daily contact which transmits so much from man to man.</p> + +<p>What is our present intellectual rank among these nations to-day; +meaning by this our status in actual production of intellectual +work, and leaving aside history? Without any great competence +to speak on many branches of such work, I may be not far from +correct; if I summarise as follows: In music and sculpture unproductive; +in painting and literature (as an art) good, but weak in +quantity in comparison with our population. In sciences, feeble in +many branches, but very productive in some others. I refer to pure +science. In applied science we stand high. In philosophy as a nation, +weak.</p> + +<p>But we have the future before us. If there is a demand for +the products of pure thought in this country, the supply will come. +Much may be expected of our race. We will hope that the demand +will grow, for at present it is not as large as it ought to be. It is +of course easy for thought to “run in accustomed channels,” and +many people there are in this as in all other countries, who believe +that sufficient is already known, and that he who would disturb +current opinions is a “disturber of the peace.” Strange as it may +seem, in this comparatively new country we have one special inducement +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_26">[26]</span>to this habit of mind. This is to be found in our political +system, which requires an unhesitating submission to the will of the +majority.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>Here is our second danger. We are apt to confuse mental submission +with physical submission. Physical submission to the will +of the majority is generally necessary for physical reasons, with +which we are all familiar. Ballots are simply a peaceful representation +of bullets, and we anticipate the submission to the latter by submission +to the former. But the mind should be free. Current or +popular opinions are not always correct. In fact if they were, reform +or progress would be unnecessary. A proposal for change always +begins with a minority, and much time may often elapse before +such change becomes acceptable to the majority. Before the +majority accepts a new step of progress the progressive idea cannot +govern physically. It must be content to be unpopular for a greater +or less time. Now the politician naturally dreads unpopularity, +for it is political death. And just in proportion as we are politicians +do we share in this unfortunate mental attitude. And how many +Americans are not politicians? It is the prevalent ethical disease +of Americans. If it becomes general, the progress of this country +is ended, and her fate among nations is sealed. Her manhood is +gone, and woman may well feel her hand itch to</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">“Defeat their dirty tricks</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Confound their politics.”</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p>The prevalence of the habit of submission to what we know to +be wrong in this country is simply detestable. Herbert Spencer has +given us some excellent advice on this subject, and we will do well +to heed it. The habit extends all the way through political, scientific, +and domestic economy. The unpopularity of the reformer is +expressed in the term “kicker,” which is applied to him among the +lower classes in this country. As one of its advocates once said to +me, it is the “American System,” and there was a strong element +of truth in his assertion. With such people, criticism is identical +with quarrelling, for they cannot conceive of any motive for endeavoring +to reform some abuse or correct some error, but personal +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_27">[27]</span>rancor. Such an attitude is a sure mark of intellectual mediocrity +and ethical incapacity, and it infinitely increases the pains of the reformer, +and readily converts him into a martyr. However, there +are a good many men left in this country, and there are agencies +at work which will probably keep up the supply.</p> + +<p>In the absence of compulsion in the form of external or civil +wars and other disasters, the churches are doing a good work in +keeping ideals before the people, and in inviting corresponding +practical life. It is true that their efforts are more or less retarded +by the insistence on erroneous and even absurd opinions about +some things, but they do infinite service in teaching that “man +shall not live by bread alone,” nor by the mere display of physical +possessions. They teach that there are ideals of truth and beauty +better worth living for, and that the mind is the greater part of man. +It is the churches which make the majority of scientists and philosophers, +as they formerly did of painters. Then let the churches +flourish. Like the nations of Europe, their emulations and antagonisms +bring out the truth. The Presbyterians have to solve the +knotty questions of biblical inspiration and divine order. The +Methodists will have to study the nature and value of human emotions. +The Friends will know what is to be known of immediate +divine influence. The Catholics have learned how to restrain in +some measure the most thoughtless of mankind. The Unitarians +and Ethical Culturists are proving that man may retain and live up +to high ideals without much or any theology. So long as there is +no philosophy or none to speak of in America, the evolution of +thought will come from the conflicts of the theologies; a peaceful +war which is far less wasteful than physical wars. Theology has +been generally in Europe the parent of philosophy, and so it will be +here. From the various stages and conditions of the agitation will +spring science and art. By this method man is led into progress by +measures which involve the best attributes of his nature, instead of +being driven by appeals to his lower motives, or by physical force. +In this progress moral courage is not lost, but it is developed; and +criticism is truth’s best weapon, and is not a cause of offense. That +this progress in the churches is real, is proven by our Woodrow, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_28">[28]</span>McQueary, Briggs, and others, and it will go on as long as the love +of truth and moral courage exist in those organisations.</p> + +<p>It is interesting to remember that this struggle of opinions has +passed through the same stages in Europe wherever the love of +truth has had an abiding place. This is especially true of Germany, +where also philosophy has had so large a development in relatively +modern times. But we need something more than opinions to counteract +the dangers which threaten earnestness of character in this +country, which I have pointed out. Active organisations are necessary, +which shall resist tendencies to crystallisation from both +sides. Non-theological people must be stimulated to maintain ethical +ideals; and theological people must be restrained from smothering +them under useless and obstructive dogmas and practices. It +is too true that while some theological dogmas include high ethical +ideals, other dogmas discredit them by deriving them from incredible +sources, and seeking to sustain them by incredible sanctions. Where +such dogmas are sincerely held, true thought is suppressed, knowledge +makes slow progress, and ethical life is more difficult.</p> + +<p>As already remarked, we cannot yet claim to be, as a nation, +distinguished for profound thinking on the subjects of highest human +interest; nor yet are we the most thoughtless. Ignorance of +the possibilities of mind is not so general as in some parts of Europe, +but it is greater than in others. Material objects and interests occupy +almost as exclusively the minds of the majority of our citizens +whom we are accustomed to consider “intelligent,” as among the +unintelligent. Hence our proneness to boast of our material greatness, +instead of our intellectual conquests. Hence that weakest of +all forms of self-praise, the publication of the dimensions of our +country and its rapid growth, as though these were indications of +our superiority as a people or as a race. This is repeated <i>ad nauseam</i>, +while our real merits, our contributions to the stock of the +world’s progress in thought, knowledge, and mental power, are +passed by in silence. Our newspaper press reflects this state of affairs, +since they generally think it their best policy to follow rather +than lead public opinion. There are, however, noteworthy exceptions +to this character of the press both in the east and the west, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_29">[29]</span>which we owe to the superiority of the men who edit and direct +them.</p> + +<p>In the conduct of our schools and of our scientific organisations, +we have a corresponding exhibition of mediocrity or worse, with a +few noble and distinguished exceptions. A mere interest in education +and research does not confer competency to direct and sustain +them; yet an interest in such matters is generally the only qualification +demanded of the directors of such institutions, provided they +understand how to buy, sell, and invest money. It is to be hoped +that this state of affairs will some day pass away, and that men who +are influential in such matters will some time know enough themselves +to distinguish between the false and the true, and between +men of ability and adventurers who are after the money and position +with which our institutions of learning and our scientific enterprises +can endow them. This reform will progress exactly in proportion +as it is understood how much human happiness depends on true research +and on correct thinking, and how little on revelation and on +ancient dogma.</p> + +<p>It is not, I repeat, sufficiently understood, how much human +conduct depends on correct thinking. How much financial dishonesty +would be averted by a rational thought as to the inevitable +consequences? How much social irregularity would be prevented +by a similar treatment of the subject? How much hatred and wasteful +antagonism would the world lack, if the ordinary conditions of +living were understood and acted on! So the cultivation of the rational +mind is of incalculable importance, and if we wish to prosper +as a nation we must bend our energies to the pleasant task this +problem presents to us. Neglect of our mental powers means degeneracy +and decay; while their cultivation means power and happiness. +Wealth, except as a means of attaining this end, after physical +necessities are supplied, is simply useless.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">E. D. Cope.</span></p> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_30">[30]</span></p> + +<h3 class="nobreak" id="MENTAL_MUMMIES">MENTAL MUMMIES.</h3> + +</div> + +<p>If we should name the most important factor in the changes which +have gradually widened the contrast between modern science +and the scholasticism of the Middle Ages, we might define it as a +“progressive recognition of hereditary influences.”</p> + +<p>There was a time when each individual of the human race was +considered a separate accident, called into existence by an act of +unlimited, arbitrary power, and apt to be as suddenly changed, even +unto a complete inversion of his former moral being, by a merciful, +or revengeful, caprice of the same power.</p> + +<p>Biology has since taught us to apply the doctrine of evolution +to the problems of our own moral and physical nature, to trace the +tendencies of bygone times to their effects in the present age, to +consider individuals the outcome of a long series of precedent influences, +and to recognise the truth that the length of those influences +is proportioned to the persistence of the result.</p> + +<p>Intelligent statesmen were the first to appreciate the practical +value of those facts. The advisers of Alexander II. did not waste +their time in a hopeless attempt to convert the freedom-worshipping +natives of the Caucasus into devotees of Muscovite despotism, but +at once confronted them with the alternative of exile or death. Our +Indian commissioners early realised the impossibility of turning the +descendants of a long ancestry of deer-hunters into tillers of the soil, +and transferred the survivors of the long race-war to a territory where +they could for better or worse, indulge their incurable penchant. +The Groot Fontein penitentiary of the Transvaal Republic became +the grave of so many Caffirs that the managers at last abandoned +the plan of inuring nomads to the restraints of sedentary occupation, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_31">[31]</span>and saved the lives, if not the souls of their convicts by sending +them about in chain-gangs to mend the irrigation ditches of the border +settlements.</p> + +<p>Hereditary influences cannot be obliterated by force of rhetoric +or of government edicts and it would solve many riddles if we would +apply that principle to phenomena of ethical and religious evolution. +How else shall we explain the fact that in less than sixty +years the doctrine of Protestantism spread from central Germany to +the highland hamlets of Scotland and Scandinavia, while in Spain, +Portugal, and Italy a very decided progress in general intelligence +has failed to lead to a similar result? How shall we account for the +success of Christian missionaries in Tasmania and Otaheiti and their +utter failure in Burmah and Hindostan? How for the persecution-proof +vitality of Judaism, the ready collapse of Mormonism, or the +revival of crass mystic delusions in the midst of our realistic civilisation?</p> + +<p>There is no doubt that the average Spanish sailor, or village-shopkeeper +of to-day possesses a larger stock of general information +than the average Brunswick school-teacher of the sixteenth century. +Yet one of the least learned of those school-teachers could, by instinct, +sufficiently appreciate the significance of the Protestant revolt to +celebrate its triumph by a big bonfire and what our western friends +would, call a “grand war-dance,” on a height near the little town of +Wolfenbüttel. Why does Pedro Gonzales still cross himself at the +mention of a heretic, while Peter Jansen would as soon return to +the pig-sty hovels of the mediæval serfs as crawl back under the +yoke of Jesuitry? How could the bogs of foggy Ireland and the +vegas of sunny Spain nourish equally imperishable roots of a plant +that failed to get a firm foot-hold in the sands of Brandenburgh?</p> + +<p>The solution of those enigmas can be found in the circumstance +that the doctrine of anti-naturalism had extended its influence to the +character of many European nations, and that the character-traits +of a race are less amenable to rapid changes than its intellectual +standards. On the soul-organism of the Latin races the thousand +years influence of monastic tyranny has left traces which the light of +science will fail to efface for centuries to come. The propaganda +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_32">[32]</span>of a manlier creed has thus been defeated, not only by their ignorance, +but by their aversion to mental efforts, by their habitual reliance +on miracles, by their incurable indifference to the claims of +truth and the merits of intellectual independence, by their hereditary +mistrust in the competence of their natural instinct. To their moral +palate a doctrine which nauseates their northern neighbors has become +a pleasant narcotic; they have been forced to swallow the +opium of pessimism till a craving for the repetition of the mind-enervating +dose has become a second nature; they hug the cross +that has proved a symbol of death to their noblest reformers.</p> + +<p>Against that influence of perverted instincts the logic of mental +revelations avails but little. “Propositions which would appear +self-evident to certain mental constitutions,” says Dr. Carpenter, +“are apt to be very differently received by others, according to their +conformity or discordance with that <i>aggregate of preformed opinion</i> +which has grown up in the minds of each. For just as we try whether +a new piece of furniture which is offered us does or does not fit into +a certain recess in our apartment, and accept or decline it accordingly, +so we try a new proposition which is offered to our mental +acceptance. If it either at once fits in or can by argument or discussion +be brought to fit in to some recess in our fabrics of thought, +we give our assent to it by admitting it to its appropriate place. +But if it neither fits in the first instance nor can by any means be +brought to fit, the mind automatically rejects it.”</p> + +<p>It is true that logical demonstrations may become complete +enough to defy dissent, but even from facts which force themselves +upon the acceptance of every rational human being, different individuals +will draw widely different inferences. That the mind of man +may become a receptacle for irreconcilable doctrines is strikingly +illustrated, by the simultaneous acceptance of the Old and New Testament +of our heterogeneous scripture, and in the same way obstinate +bigots manage to associate scientific truth and dogmatic absurdities. +Darwin and Moses may occupy adjoining quarters in the fabric of +the same cosmogony; the rule of three may become a passive concomitant +of Trinitarian dogmas. The torch of truth may be permitted +to flicker in a secluded recess of souls which refuse it the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_33">[33]</span>privilege of throwing its rays in certain directions. Education may +fail to reclaim hereditary bigotry. In the winter of 1559 the rabble +of Madrid assembled to witness the death of Don Carlos de Seso, a +Spanish nobleman whose ancestors had fought at Granada and +Toledo. His brother had been the favorite hunting-companion of +Charles V.; one of his uncles had sacrificed his life in deciding the +victory of Pavia; Don Carlos himself had acquired renown both as +a soldier and a scholar, but in the latter capacity he had confessed +his sympathy with certain doctrines of Martin Luther, and the Holy +Inquisition had sentenced him to anticipate his doom in the flames +of the stake. King Philip II. honored the <i>auto da fé</i> with his presence, +and frowned in a way which the condemned freethinker mistook +for a disapproval of his sentence. “O King! can you thus +witness the torture of your subjects?” exclaimed De Seso. “Deliver +us from so cruel a death which even our enemies admit we +have not deserved.” “I would help carrying faggots to burn my +own son,” replied the King, “if he had incurred your unspeakable +guilt.” Yet Philip the Second was one of the best-educated princes +of his century. In mathematics, astronomy, ancient and modern +languages, geography, and history, he was far better informed than +Landgraf Philip of Hessen, who would have risked his own life to +save that of a loyal cavalier.</p> + +<p>There are mental mummies who cannot be revived by removing +their grave-shrouds and clothing them in modern drapery; the principle +of conservatism has penetrated their very veins and the marrow +of their bones. It is by no means unconceivable that a popular +leader like Garibaldi or Porfirio Diaz should succeed in persuading +a million of his countrymen to renounce the yoke of Rome and build +Protestant chapels, but the result would be largely limited to a +change of nomenclature. Before long the dissenters would march +in procession with a wonder-working tooth of John Wesley or kiss +a shred from the petticoat of the Holy Maid of Kent. They would +groan at the mention of Rome, but exorcise spooks with the initials +of Ulric Zwingli, and abstain from work on the anniversary of every +Protestant martyr. They would try to redeem drunkards by sprinkling +them with consecrated water from the holy rivers of Kansas, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_34">[34]</span>and celebrate Arbor Day only by invoking the spirit of Prof. G. P. +Marsh, as a patron-saint of climate-improving forests. Under the +stimulus of industrial influences, they might transfer the cross from +way-side shrines to telegraph-poles, but they would persist in the +worship of sorrow.</p> + +<p>The creed which has turned the happiest countries of our globe +into a grave of their former prosperity, is a medley of miraculism +and anti-naturalism, and the experience of the last century has proved +that both can survive the repudiation of Rome and even of Galilee. +The mania of renunciation, after the abolishment of monasteries and +nunneries, continued its dismal rites in Quaker-garb and Shaker +temples of celibacy. The miracle-hunger of millions who have learned +to scorn the clumsy tricks of the cowled exorcist, gratifies its appetite +in the mystic gloom of the dark cabinet. Rustic supernaturalists, +deprived of such luxuries, indemnify themselves by retailing +the marvels of the serpent-charm and joint-snake superstition.</p> + +<p>A curious psychological problem suggests itself in the question +how far the charm of the “sour-grape philosophy” may contribute +to the persistence of certain forms of moral nihilism. Condemned +criminals almost invariably “renounce the vanities” of a life which +the Court of Appeals has refused to save, and in a scaffold-speech, +quoted in Galignani’s <i>Messenger</i> of May 6th, 1837, the English murderer +Joseph Greenacre expressed his conviction that his crime had +been the means of saving his soul, because “death on the gibbet +was one of the surest passports to heaven.”</p> + +<p>For similar reasons degenerate nations, after realising the doom +of their national welfare, are apt to renounce the glory of a forfeited +world, and to consider misery, poverty, and shame so many stepping-stones +to the bliss of a better life beyond the grave. After habitual +sins against the health-laws of nature have avenged themselves in +cureless diseases, decrepit bigots may find solace even in that most +insane tenet of their dualistic creed which teaches them to despise +the body as the enemy of the soul.</p> + +<p>A natural effect of pessimism may thus, in course of time, become +one of its perpetuating causes.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">Felix L. Oswald.</span></p> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_35">[35]</span></p> + +<h3 class="nobreak" id="THE_NERVOUS_GANGLIA_OF_INSECTS">THE NERVOUS GANGLIA OF INSECTS.</h3> + +</div> + +<h4>I.</h4> + +<p>Although the internal structure of the brain of insects has +been the object of numerous and important investigations, +among which we must place those of Dietl, Flögel, Bellonci, and +Viallanes (who have applied the method of sections to the study +of this organ), no attention has as yet been paid to the other +nerve-centres of insects, and in particular to the ganglia of the ventral +chain. Writers have contented themselves with describing the +external form of these ganglia, and their anatomical relations to the +other organic parts; but nothing has been done to throw light upon +their inward structure. All the knowledge which we have on this +subject is very meagre and dates far back to the works of the old +writers, who, like Newport, had at their disposal no other means of +study than the microscopic examination of organs viewed either +transparently or in dilacerated preparations. A method so defective +could render but incomplete results, and indeed in many cases erroneous +ones.</p> + +<p>We have sought to supply this much to be regretted lack of +entomological knowledge, by applying to the ventral ganglia of insects +the admirable method of sectional cutting, which has brought +about such marked advances in contemporaneous zoölogy.</p> + +<p>I need hardly insist on the interest of this research. We shall +only remark that all anatomical study bears an unfinished aspect, up +to the moment at which we grasp the meaning of the organs which +we describe; physiology is a necessary complement of anatomy, it +is that which gives to it a meaning. Therefore, when we dissect an +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_36">[36]</span>organ, which, as in the case of an insect’s brain, is endowed with +the most complex psychical properties of which these animals are +capable, we find ourselves in the presence of parts whose functions +almost entirely escape us. What is, for example, that peculiar organ +to which we have given the name of the “pedunculate” body? +Anatomists have described with the greatest care its connections +and portrayed its external contour; but we cannot discover, or even +conjecture its uses. It would be necessary to understand the habits +of thought and the feelings of an insect, to be able to assign a rôle to +parts so complex and so delicate as those contained within its brain.</p> + +<p>The study of the ventral ganglia seems to us to be capable of +conducting us to a better result, for in everything that concerns these +nerve-masses, physiology is more advanced, and, in all cases, clearer. +The ganglia of the thorax, for example, are in the main motory centres; +the principal nerves that are sent out from them are to be +found in the wings and in the feet; the study of the terrestrial, +aquatic, and aerial locomotion of insects has already formed the subject +of quite a number of important scientific works; we are now +upon well-known ground, and we may hope that it will be possible +to establish some connection between the anatomical structure of +ventral ganglia and the functions which these ganglia control.</p> + +<p>This hope appears to us to be the more legitimate, because we +can make use of all the resources of comparative anatomy to work +out the problem. If we consider any particular function, for example, +that of flying, we notice that in species which resemble each +other this function is exercised under totally different conditions; +the same organ acquires different uses, and these variations become +singularly instructive when we can trace their relationship to the +particular structure of a nerve-ganglion. Thus, one of the large +wings of the dragon-fly, which is almost like a bird in the range and +power of its flight, becomes the elytrum of the beetle; the elytrum +is a stiff wing covered by chitinised matter and serving as a protection +to a part of the thorax and abdomen. Sometimes the elytrum is +used in flying, as in the case of the cockchafer. In other lamellicorn +insects, in the <i>Cetonia</i> for instance, the elytrum is not used in flight; +it merely moves aside so as to allow the second pair of wings to unfold. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_37">[37]</span>Its rôle becomes still less active in the golden carabus, in <i>Procrustes</i>, +in <i>Blaps</i>, and many other <i>Coleoptera</i>, whose two elytra are +found on one vertical line, and form but one single and immovable +portion; then the second pair of wings disappear; from the +physiological point of view, the animal becomes apterous. In another +and different order, the order <i>Diptera</i>, it is the second pair of +wings that undergo an important modification; they cease to be used +in flying, and are transformed into an organ of equipoise: they are +used for maintaining equilibrium.</p> + +<p>All these physiological variations, taking place in the self-same +organ, must in all probability have their counterpart in the internal +anatomy of the ganglion that governs the organ, and the comparative +study of this ganglion in different species will enable us perhaps +to discover the functions of some of its parts. Thus, if we +consider by hypothesis, as the nerve-centre of flight, some small lobe +which is found occupying this or that place in a thoracic ganglion, +the disappearance or modification of this lobe in species not possessing +the faculty of flying, might serve to throw additional light +upon such an interpretation.</p> + +<p>What we have just said with regard to flight is equally applicable +to terrestrial locomotion, which also represents in itself many +varieties. The typal insect possesses three pairs of feet, whence +the name of hexapods, but there are particular species which drop +a pair of feet, for instance, the <i>Lepidoptera</i> of the genus <i>Vanessa</i>; in +others, the physiological function of the foot varies; in the case of +the carrion-beetle (a necrophagus coleopter) it serves as an instrument +of tillage, to dig with; for the cricket, the third pair of feet are used +for the purpose of leaping; for the <i>Dytiscus</i>, it serves as an oar, +and so on. We must also bear in mind the curious fact that there +exists in the larvæ of certain insects what are called supplementary +feet, having only a transient existence and disappearing at maturity; +the caterpillar, the larva of the butterfly, has five pairs of supplementary +feet. These notable facts demonstrated by comparative +anatomy, cannot fail to furnish us with valuable information concerning +the functions of the complex organs found in the ganglia +of the thorax.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_38">[38]</span></p> + +<p>But this is not all. We have not enumerated all the contributions +of comparative anatomy to the problem which we are now about +to consider; we may make use of the method of comparison without +bringing the different types into juxtaposition, but by viewing the +nervous system of only a single animal in its entirety. We know in +fact that the body of an insect is formed by a definite number of +segments, all constructed on the same fundamental plan and arranged +in a linear series. Each one of these segments is joined to a nerve-ganglion, +which is all its own and supplies it with sensibility and +motility, the two elementary properties of nervous activity. In the +course of development, these ganglia have the power of changing +their positions; and it is not uncommon to find that the greater +number of the abdominal ganglia move up into the thorax; each +one, nevertheless, retaining its nerve-relationship to its own segment. +Now all the segments of an insect’s body are not called upon +to play the same rôle; a division of labor has been effected among +them with regard to the functions which they are found to exercise: +as we have already seen, the ganglia of the thorax are essentially +centres of locomotion; in the head, one of the ganglia, the sub-œsophageal, +furnishes the nerves of the buccal portions; the other +one, the brain, is connected with particular nerves and becomes +the centre of the highest form of psychical activity of which the +creature is capable. We have here a number of modifications superadded +to the original plan. Yet the original plan should again be +met with in the ganglia that have been least differentiated, such as +those in the abdominal region; and the comparison between an abdominal +and a thoracic ganglion, for instance, is well calculated to +show what are the primal and fundamental structures, and what +are the secondary ones which have been superadded and have become +necessary for the execution of the more complex functions. +The study of embryonic and larval forms so easily observed in insects, +will most probably conduct us to the same result. And thus +perhaps by continuous efforts, all guided by the same governing +idea, we shall ultimately arrive at the analogies that exist between +the cerebroid ganglia and the humblest ganglia belonging to the ventral +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_39">[39]</span>chain, and thus finally be able to understand the action of the +nerve-substance.</p> + +<p>The importance of this object, which, be it clearly understood, +can never be attained except by the united effort of many workers, +is well calculated to command our strenuous exertions and to encourage +us in surmounting the difficulties of a study which is as yet almost +entirely new.</p> + +<h4>II.</h4> + +<p>We shall restrict ourselves in this article to the consideration of +one particular case; we shall describe a single ganglion of the insect. +The type we have chosen, for reasons too lengthy to enumerate, is a +Coleopter of the family of <i>Melolonthidæ</i>; the <i>Rhizotrogus solstitialis</i>, +a small beetle very commonly found in the southwest of France. +We will now proceed to the consideration of the first thoracic ganglion.</p> + +<p>The prothoracic ganglion in the rhizotrogus is joined by very +short connective filaments to the second thoracic ganglion, and also +to the sub-œsophageal ganglion; this latter ganglion, we must note +<i>en passant</i>, being situated in the thorax. If with a pair of scissors +we sever the head of the rhizotrogus, we find that the remainder of +the body contains not only the thoracic ganglia, but also the sub-œsophageal; +a peculiarity which, from a physiological point of view, +is very interesting.</p> + +<p>The ganglion of the pro-thorax, which is greater in width than +it is in length, bears a vague resemblance to a cone the base of +which is turned towards the sub-œsophageal ganglion, whilst the apex +points towards the second ganglion of the thorax. From the lower +part spring two large nerves, their starting-point being nearer the +ventral than the dorsal surface, a fact clearly comprehended when +we find that the fibres of these nerves extend for the most part into +the first pair of feet, that is to say, into those organs that lie underneath +the horizontal plane of the ganglion. The connective filaments +which penetrate the ganglion anteriorly enter it nearer the +dorsal surface than the ventral, this last being extremely convex. +Dissection throws no additional light upon the anatomy of the ganglion. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_40">[40]</span>But by means of a series of sections, we find that it is composed +of a mass of fibrillar substance which occupies its centre portion +and of a layer of nerve-cells surrounding the fibrillar substance. +This fibrillar mass is, owing to its great volume, far the most important, +and constitutes in itself alone about four-fifths of the organ. +The fibrillary structure can only be satisfactorily analysed by using +on it osmic acid, or other equivalent reagents which dissociate it and +admit of its being reduced to a certain number of clearly differentiated +elements. Whenever osmic acid or a similar reagent has not +been employed, or has not sufficiently penetrated the ganglion, owing +to the obstacle presented by a thick conjunctival covering or envelope, +the fibrillar substance takes on a homogeneous aspect that +effectually renders all analysis of it impossible. Everything depends +on the employment of a good method of preparation.</p> + +<p>When the ganglion has been properly prepared, we perceive a +very material difference in the appearance of the fibrillar substance +when we compare the dorsal with the ventral region of the ganglion. +We can do this very satisfactorily by a longitudinal section, extending +through both regions. In such a section close to the median +line but not confounded with it (see <a href="#plate3">Cut 16</a>)⁠<a id="FNanchor_9" href="#Footnote_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> we perceive that the ventral +region is occupied by a cord or string of substance which owing +to the action of the osmic acid has become very black, and which is +formed of so dense a tissue, that we can with difficulty separate it +into fibres and fibrillæ. This cord, which, by reason of its position and +shape, I propose naming the <i>ventral column</i>, extends over the ventral +surface of the ganglion in a longitudinal direction; at both its anterior +and posterior extremities it is carried on by fibres extending into the +ventral columns of the other ganglia, in such a manner that the entire +series of ganglia are united by one continuous ventral cord.</p> + +<p>If we look at a transverse section (see <a href="#plate4">Cut 26</a>), the cord, which +is recognised by its dark color and by its position near the ventral +surface of the fibrillar substance, will be seen to have the form of +two almost perfect circles. The ventral column thus presents a +circular section, is duplex and symmetrical: there exist two separate +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_41">[41]</span>and distinct ventral columns, separate at least for a certain length; +a fact which must be considered in connection with the primitive +duality of the ganglion.</p> + +<p>In every section where the columns remain distinct from each +other, they are separated either by fibres and conjunctival cells, +or by nerve-fibres emanating from the cells of the ventral region +and proceeding in an upward direction between the two columns. +At the other points, the two columns join on the median line. This +union is effected in different ways, either by the two columns coming +directly together, thus merging into a single mass, or by a commissure +which describes the arc of a circle underneath the two columns, +or else by the inferior ventral lobule.</p> + +<p>We give the name of inferior ventral lobule to a small lobule +of fibrillar substance, situated beneath the ventral column. When +looked at in a horizontal section not passing through the median +line (see <a href="#plate3">Cut 17</a>), this lobule presents the appearance of a rounded +protuberance, breaking the almost rectilinear contour of the ventral +column. As this characteristic peculiarity is repeated in the internal +structure of all the ganglia, we may use it to ascertain the number of +the ganglia, whenever these present the appearance of being fused +into one compact mass; we may see the practical application of this +remark by observing the sub-œsophageal ganglion.</p> + +<p>In a succession of horizontal sections, the starting point of which +is the ventral region, the first mass of fibrillar substance met with +by the knife is the inferior ventral lobule, which is formed (see <a href="#plate1">Cut 1</a>) +by two rounded fasciculi, placed symmetrically on either side of the +median line and joined together by a transverse commissure.</p> + +<p>In these sections, we also perceive fibres of the crural nerve, +which, after having extended over a certain length of the ganglion, +penetrate into the substance of the inferior ventral lobule (<a href="#plate1">Cut 2</a>). +In transverse sections (<a href="#plate4">Cut 23</a>) we find the two ventral lobules placed +beneath the two columns which they help to support, and into which +they gradually merge; and we also perceive the transverse commissure +which joins the two. We shall call this the <i>transverse commissure +of the inferior ventral lobule</i>.</p> + +<p>Let us now pass on to the examination of the upper surface of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_42">[42]</span>the ventral column. This surface is covered by a cluster of very fine +fibrils rather sparsely disposed; we can clearly follow their course +by means of a longitudinal section (<a href="#plate3">Cut 17</a>); we see them again in a +horizontal section (<a href="#plate1">Cut 5</a>). To continue the general description of +the ganglion we must now consider the dorsal region. It is, as we +have previously stated, occupied by a fibrillar substance not so dense +as that which composes the ventral column, and we will give the general +name of dorsal lobe to this region, reserving the name ventral +lobe for the region which embraces the ventral column and its adjoining +parts. The dorsal lobe presents as its distinctive characteristic +the feature that it is crossed longitudinally by a succession of connective +filaments clearly seen in the longitudinal section of <a href="#plate3">Cut 16</a>.</p> + +<p>We have already stated that the ventral column receives fibres +issuing from the ganglion in front and sends out others to the ganglia +in the rear. We shall call the totality of these fibres <i>the connective +ventral filaments</i>, and shall call the totality of those that traverse +the dorsal lobe <i>the dorsal connective filaments</i>.</p> + +<p>The connective filaments which join the sub-œsophageal to the +first thoracic ganglion, and which, between these two ganglia, are +composed of a dense fasciculus of fibres, distribute these fibres, at +the point at which they enter the prothoracic ganglia, in different +directions; one set of fibres proceeds towards the ventral column, +these are the ventral connective filaments; a second set traverses +the dorsal lobe, and are the dorsal connective filaments.</p> + +<p>Whilst the ventral connective filaments soon merge into the +very dense substance of the ventral column, the dorsal connective +filaments, on the contrary, remain distinct from the organs which +they traverse, and preserve their individuality throughout. They +take directions in three different planes (see <a href="#plate3">Cut 16</a>), consequently +they can be subdivided into superior, medial, and inferior dorsal connective +filaments.</p> + +<p>Newport seems to have observed this distinction of fibres; and +he has given the name of sensory column to this first division, +and that of motor column to the second. Unfortunately the drawings +and figures he has published, though schematically correct, +are not clear. We do not adopt his terminology, in the first place +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_43">[43]</span>because he designates the organs after their supposed functions, +and we have made it a rule never to use controvertible physiological +suppositions to designate anatomical organs; and besides, though +the name of column is applicable to the connective ventral filaments, +we cannot apply it to the connective dorsal filaments, which are subdivided +into three pairs of fibrous fasciculi and do not in the least +resemble a column.</p> + +<p>In the study of <i>Melolontha vulgaris</i>, we have been able to establish +in the most absolute manner that there exists a considerable +histological difference between the connective filaments of the ventral +region and those of the dorsal. Though we have not yet noticed +this difference in <i>Rhizotrogus</i> in any marked degree, nevertheless it +has seemed to us needful to point it out here, because the fact is of +such vast importance that it cannot fail to be general. The dorsal +connective filaments, whilst they preserve their individuality in +their passage across the dorsal lobe of the ganglion, penetrate nevertheless +into some small masses of dotted substance which are found +in the path of their entrance into the ganglion. The mass annexed +to the inferior dorsal connective filament, is above all very important +and is directly connected with the ventral column. As the connective +filaments are in pairs, each of these possesses a distinct +mass of fibrillar substance and both the masses attached to the same +pair of connective filaments are joined by a commissure.</p> + +<p>Let us now say a few words about the nerves which proceed +toward the prothoracic ganglion. There exists here but one single +pair of nerves, extremely important and very extensive. This is +the crural nerve. To this nerve are attached the organs which are +superadded to the primary structure of the ganglion, such as we +have described it, and which in consequence renders the primitive +structure more complex. We shall perceive the importance attached +to the idea of a <i>superadded</i> organ, when we study the abdominal +ganglia, where the organs we are about to describe are either completely +wanting or are but imperfectly developed.</p> + +<p>If now we examine a transversal section taken a little in front +of the place from whence the crural nerves emerge (<a href="#plate4">Cut 19</a>), we +shall notice that the central part of the ganglion is occupied by the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_44">[44]</span>ventral column and the upper part by the dorsal lobe. In addition +to this, in the lateral regions of the ganglion we find two important +masses of fibrillar substance. At this point these two masses remain +distinct from the parts we have just mentioned, and on the other hand +they are in connection with the crural nerves. The latter send a part, +and unquestionably the greater part, of their fibres into the lateral +lobes. In a section slightly posterior to the preceding one, also transversal, +a very important change has taken place; the two lateral lobules, +always connected with the crural nerves, have also established +connections with the centre of the ganglion, and in the sections further +on the fusion is complete. As these lateral lobules possess the +characteristics mentioned, only at the point at which the crural +nerves emerge, we shall call them the <i>crural lobes</i>. Thus we find in +the prothoracic ganglion three principal lobes: (1) the crural lobe, +which is double, symmetrical, and lateral, (2) the dorsal lobe, (3) +the ventral lobe. These two last, in contradistinction to the crural +lobe, will be classed together under the common term <i>central lobe</i>.</p> + +<p>And now to finish this summary description of the prothoracic +ganglion, we will point out an important disposition of the connective +tissue which divides the ganglion into two halves, one anterior, +the other posterior. We can easily understand this disposition by +looking at a longitudinal section passing exactly through the median +line. From the dorsal surface of the ganglion, may be seen descending +a bundle of cells and connective fibres, which, in the form of +a column, are directed toward the centre of the ganglion; these +cells and fibres do not meet any important organ on their way, the +dorsal connective filaments always taking a lateral course. A fasciculus, +similarly composed of cells and conjunctival fibres, starting +from the ventral surface of the ganglion, appears to meet this conjunctival +column (<a href="#plate3">Cut 18</a>). This curious disposition appears to be, +as M. Henneguy has ingeniously suggested to me, a trace of the anterior +development of the ganglion which had been formed of two +distinct portions that have been naturally <i>welded</i> together along +the median line; the connective fasciculi corresponding to the point +where the welding has been incomplete, and representing the survival +of a portion of the walls of the two ganglia.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_45">[45]</span></p> + +<h4>III.</h4> + +<p>As the ganglion which we have just described contains some +structural difficulties not easy of comprehension, let us proceed +with our description under another form, following the order of our +illustrations.</p> + +<p><a href="#plate1">Figure 1</a> is the first horizontal section, cut through the ventral +region of the ganglion; the knife has here met the lower ventral +lobule, which at this point shows itself double; the two halves being +joined by a double transversal commissure. <a href="#plate1">Section 2</a>, made at a point +a little higher than the preceding one, shows us at the centre the +lower ventral lobule as increased in size; and in the lateral part of +the figure appears a new organ, the crural lobule, which is here entirely +merged into the lower ventral lobule. The crural lobule is traversed +by fibres from the crural nerve, which instead of being entirely +lost in its substance, proceed still further, passing into the lower ventral +lobule. <a href="#plate1">Section 3</a> merely brings into prominence an important +transversal commissure. In <a href="#plate1">Section 4</a>, the inferior ventral lobule +is replaced by the ventral column, which appears double, is symmetrical, +and united by a transversal commissure; this commissure +being formed of fibrillar substance. The ventral column is closely +connected on each side with the crural lobule; it is besides crossed +by the ventral connective fibres, which can be seen emerging from +its anterior and posterior extremities. <a href="#plate1">Section 5</a> allows us to examine +thoroughly the disposition of those ventral connective fibres; we see +that while they penetrate the ganglion, they also pass through two +symmetrical masses of fibrillar substance; these two masses, which +we name the anterior ventral lobules, are joined together by a transversal +commissure. After having traversed the anterior ventral lobules, +to which it appears they give a portion of their fibres, the +ventral connective filaments pass through the ganglion in an antero-posterior +direction, and we see them penetrating the two posterior +ventral lobules. The last named lobules, which remind us by their +position and appearance of the anterior lobules, receive in addition +fibres issuing from the crural lobules; but they do not receive them +all, because we notice quite a number of these fibres advancing +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_46">[46]</span>directly into the second thoracic ganglion. After emerging from the +posterior ventral lobules, the ventral connective filaments pass into +the second thoracic ganglion, where we see them penetrate into the +anterior ventral lobules.</p> + +<p>With <a href="#plate1">Figure 6</a>, we leave the ventral lobe of the ganglion and +come to the lower portions of the dorsal lobule. The important +filaments crossing this section from the front to the back are called +lower dorsal connective filaments. We notice as they proceed some +small masses of dotted substance, and, in addition to these, dark +colored dots which are the result of the knife having cut crosswise +through several fascicles of ascending fibres. We shall find out by +means of the sections taken from different parts and placed so as to +allow of our better observation, what these ascending fibres are. +The crural lobule, always exhibits the same characteristics. We +have given it a homogeneous aspect in our drawing. As a fact it +presents in its sections a vast number of structural details. But +these details being very difficult to understand, we prefer not to dwell +upon them.</p> + +<p><a href="#plate2">Section 7</a> passes through the very midst of the lower dorsal connective +filaments; these filaments being in two pairs, one external +and the other internal. The external pair, situated somewhat lower, +has here disappeared, and the inner pair is the only one to be seen. +Some transversal fibres, whose direction appears to me difficult to +follow, divide the inside dorsal connective filaments at two different +points, and assume the figure of a square; this square has two black +dots, produced by the section of the ascending fibres.</p> + +<p>A little higher, in <a href="#plate2">Figure 8</a>, the lower connective filaments have +disappeared and the fibrillar substance of the ganglion is furrowed +by long transversal fibres, of which a part seems to serve the function +of joining the two crural lobules, whilst the remainder, proceeding +towards the black dots before mentioned, continue their progress +with the fasciculi of ascending fibres. These are no other than +ascending fibres which, having changed their direction at the plane +of the section, proceed almost in a horizontal plane. In <a href="#plate2">Section 9</a> we +follow the course of the medial dorsal connective filaments, separated +from the lower connective filaments by the fibres having a +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_47">[47]</span>transverse direction, seen in <a href="#plate2">Figure 8</a>. The medial dorsal connective +filaments are four in number, an outer pair and an inner pair. At the +moment when they leave the prothoracic ganglion, they cross a region +where the fibrillar substance is both thicker and darker. In <a href="#plate2">Figure +10</a> the medial connective filaments are on the point of disappearing; +they receive certain fibres coming from the crural lobules, which +are now reduced in dimensions. <a href="#plate2">Section 11</a> shows us the lower +dorsal connective filaments, which are the slenderest of all and of +which there are but one pair; the crural lobule now disappears. In +the middle of the figure, we observe a small collection of conjunctival +cells which, as we have supposed, indicates the point where in +the course of development the two symmetrical portions of the ganglion +have not been perfectly fused together. Finally <a href="#plate2">Section 12</a> +shows two lateral masses of fibrillar substance, separated by a strip +of conjunctival membrane.</p> + +<p>We will now take up the series of longitudinal sections, the study +of which will demand very special attention. We shall there meet +again with the organs which we have already examined in the horizontal +sections; and we shall perceive that the alterations and modifications +presented to us by the difference in our point of observation, +bring out very important changes in the appearance of those +organs. The sectional method of examination is also one of analysis. +In order to reconstruct an organ in its complete form and to +conceive of it in space, our mind must bring into a single focus what +the sections have represented in a fragmentary manner: we must, +in short, substitute synthesis for analysis.</p> + +<p><a href="#plate3">Figure 13</a> represents the first and exterior longitudinal section; +it hardly touches the ganglion; in the front we see the starting +point of the crural nerve, and also a portion of the periphery of +the crural lobule. The crural nerve exhibits several roots, the +most important of which occupy the ventral region. <a href="#plate3">Figure 14</a>, +though very elementary, brings out many important points; we see +here the crural lobule, which has increased in size and extends +from the ventral to the dorsal region; a fact which has already been +indicated in the horizontal sections, the crural lobule having been +shown in them at all points. This lobule is almost circular in form. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_48">[48]</span>Along its ventral region, we perceive some of the fibres of the crural +nerve which do not penetrate into the lobule; these are the ones +we met with in the <a href="#plate1">figures 2 and 3</a>: they are the fibres which pass +directly into the lower ventral lobule. With <a href="#plate3">Section 15</a>, we leave the +lateral regions of the ganglion and come to the dorsal and ventral +regions; we must notice that the crural lobule is continuous with the +central fibrillar mass and has no precise limits. In <a href="#plate3">Section 15</a> the +ventral column appears, reduced in size. In the front of it we observe +an incisure through which certain nerve-cells send their prolongations +into the fibrillar substance.</p> + +<p><a href="#plate3">Figure 16</a> shows us the complete junction of all the connective +filaments traversing the ganglion; first the ventral column, with the +connective ventral filaments starting from both its extremities; and +then the three dorsal connective filaments, which preserve their individuality +distinct, while they cross the dorsal lobe of the ganglion. +The lower dorsal connective filament is distinguished from the others +by a small compact mass of fibrillar substance through which it +passes. We must note that the fibrillar substance becomes thicker +at the point where the whole series of connective filaments enter the +ganglion, and the same thing is repeated at the place where they +leave the first thoracic ganglion to enter into the second. The ventral +column is distinguished from the other parts of the ganglion by +the dark color which it assumes through the action of the osmic +acid; it presents black granules which, examined with a strong lens, +show small fasciculi of fibres running in a parallel direction. The +cells which line the lower surface of the ventral column do not throw +out any prolongations; they are exceedingly small, but do not otherwise +present any special feature.</p> + +<p><a href="#plate3">Figure 17</a> is but very slightly different from the preceding one: +the ventral column is simply strengthened on its lower surface by the +lower ventral lobule. The position of this lobule is interesting to +note. We have already mentioned that each ganglion is divided +into two halves by a column of conjunctival tissue, one anterior +and the other posterior. In <a href="#plate3">Section 17</a> we see the granulated projection +of the ventral portion of this conjunctival column. In order +to simplify it we have shown no conjunctival tissue in our illustration. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_49">[49]</span>We may nevertheless notice, that the nerve-cells at the point +marked <i>c. c.</i> seem to separate one from the other, and show a triangular +space between them, filled with conjunctival cells. If the +segment had not been cut so obliquely, (and this obliqueness in the +sections is almost unavoidable when dealing with such very small +organs,) we should also perceive on the dorsal line of the section the +projection of the dorsal part of the conjunctival column; in fact we +shall see this projection in the figure which follows. The presence +of the conjunctival column separates, as we have said, each ganglion +into two parts, one anterior the other posterior. These portions are +not at all symmetrical. We see in <a href="#plate3">Section 17</a> that the lower ventral +lobule is found only in the anterior part. Finally from the ventral +column rises an important fasciculus of ascending fibres, which we +have already seen in the horizontal diagrams; it is difficult for us +to ascertain what these fibres are. In the <a href="#plate3">18th and last section</a> we +approach nearer the median line. The ventral column at this level +has the appearance of being divided into two trunks. The ventral +connective filaments are clearly seen upon its upper surface. Among +the dorsal connective filaments the middle one alone remains visible +and receives a certain number of fibres from the ascending fasciculus.</p> + +<p>To complete our description let us glance at the series of transverse +sections. In <a href="#plate4">Figure 19</a> the two crural lobules have not yet +united and are not yet merged into the dorsal-ventral lobe. This +junction does not take place until we come to <a href="#plate4">Figure 20</a>. Here, at +this level, we see in addition the circular segment of the two ventral +columns, which by their dark color are sharply outlined against the +remainder of the fibrillar substance. To the right and left of these +two columns we perceive small masses of dotted substance; we +merely call attention to them and shall not describe them. <a href="#plate4">Figure +21</a> furnishes no noteworthy modifications of the preceding. We +simply see a few cells of the periphery sending out their prolongations +into the fibrillar substance. The point at which they thus penetrate +it has already been indicated in <a href="#plate3">Figure 15</a>. In <a href="#plate4">Figure 22</a> we +have a section of several dorsal connective filaments; among others +a lower root of the crural nerve is here seen to pass along the ventral +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_50">[50]</span>surface of the fibrillar substance without penetrating into the +crural lobule. Does there exist an upper root of the same nerve, +which follows the upper surface of the dotted substance? We do +not dare to decide the question. One thing is certain, and that is +that if the nerve does exist it is accompanied along its path by a great +number of widely ramified tracheæ, of which we see a drawing in <i>tr.</i> +In the three figures which follow (<a href="#plate4">23, 24, 25</a>) the ventral column +presents an interesting series of modifications. First of all, in <a href="#plate4">Figure +23</a>, it is surrounded by the lower ventral lobule, of which the two +masses are in a lateral position, and whose commissures pass underneath +the column. We see in the same <a href="#plate4">Figure 23</a> the two lower +roots of the crural nerve, advancing towards the column. In the +<a href="#plate4">24th section</a> the two roots have reached the column, and two other +nerves cross the crural lobule; doubtless their destination is the +lower dorsal connective filaments, but of this we have no clear indication. +In the <a href="#plate4">24th section</a> two other crural roots also enter +the lower ventral lobule. This section is very favorable for the examination +of the ascending fasciculus which we have already noticed +in the longitudinal sections. It seems to us certain that this fasciculus +terminates in the middle dorsal connective filament. Its origin +is more uncertain. It seems to spring from the ventral column, or +else to come from crural roots which, after having traversed the +crural lobule, reascend towards the dorsal lobe of the ganglion, describing +a curve exteriorily concave. It is possible that this ascending +fasciculus has both these origins. The <a href="#plate4">26th and last section</a> +shows us the ventral column on a larger scale; the two columns +being distinct from each other, though united at the lower extremity +by a commissure. The <i>ensemble</i> of the figure strikingly reminds one +of a section of the abdominal ganglion.</p> + +<p>Here our description ends. We have not sought to follow up +every fibre in all its details, nor to describe completely the anatomy +of each organ. Our intention has merely been to give a synthetic +notion of a nervous ganglion. Subsequent studies made on other +ganglia will demonstrate the general application of this idea.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">Alfred Binet.</span></p> + +<div class="footnotes"> + +<h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_9" href="#FNanchor_9" class="label">[9]</a> For the cuts, see the <a href="#plates">plates in the Appendix</a> of this number.</p></div> + +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_51">[51]</span></p> + +<h3 class="nobreak" id="HINDU_MONISM">HINDU MONISM.<br> +<span class="smaller">WHO WERE ITS AUTHORS, PRIESTS OR WARRIORS?</span></h3> + +</div> + +<p>Among all the forms of government class government is the +worst. Carthage was governed by merchants, and the mercantile +spirit of its policy led finally to the destruction of the city. +Sparta was governed by warriors, and in spite of the glory of Thermopylæ +it was doomed to stagnation. India was governed by priests, +and the weal of the nation was sacrificed with reckless indifference +to their interests. It appears that for the welfare of the community +the harmonious co-operation of all classes is not only desirable but +also indispensable.</p> + +<p>Yet it is often claimed that mankind is greatly indebted to nations +or states ruled by class government, for having worked out the +particular occupation of the ruling class to a perfection which otherwise +it would not have reached. This is at least doubtful.</p> + +<p>Carthage was eager to establish monopolies, but she contributed +little to the higher development of commerce and trade among mankind.</p> + +<p>Sparta raised brave men, but was not progressive, even in the +science of war, and was worsted by so weak an adversary as Thebes. +Modern strategists could learn something from Epaminondas, but +little, if anything, from the Lacedæmonians.</p> + +<p>Priestcraft has attained to a power in India unparalleled in the +history of other nations, and it is no exaggeration to say that priest-rule +was the ruin of the country. Yet the wisdom of the Brahmans +has become proverbial. Their philosophy is praised as original and +profound, and it is well known that the first monistic world-conception +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_52">[52]</span>was thought out in ancient India. But we shall see later on +what the real share of the Brahmans in this great work has been.</p> + +<p>In the very earliest ages of Hindu antiquity, revealed to us in +the songs of the Rig-veda, we meet with priests who claimed the +power of making sacrifices to the gods in a manner especially acceptable +to them, and who thus rose to great power, influence, and +wealth. To this ancient period of Hindu history we can trace the +origin of the Hindu castes, essentially a result of priestly egotism, and +which up to this day has weighed down the Indian people like a +nightmare. The organisation of the priestly class into an exclusive, +privileged body, as well as the final development of the castes, did +not, however, take place until the time represented by the second period +of the ancient Hindu literature; by the literature, that is to say, +of the Yajur-vedas or the Vedas of the sacrificial formulæ, and the +Brâhmanas and Sûtras, both of which describe the sacrificial ceremonies, +the former with, the latter without theological comments. +The contents of these works illustrate the origin of the Hindu hierarchy +and castes; but it is often necessary to read between the lines. +The greatest authority on this rich literature, Prof. A. Weber, of +Berlin, in the tenth volume of the series “Hindu Studies” which he +edits, has published his inquiries concerning this subject in a very +learned treatise, entitled “Collectanea über die Kastenverhältnisse +in der Brâhmana und Sûtra,” of which I have made considerable use +in the following pages.</p> + +<p>In these books the Brahmans assert their claims with startling +candor. In several passages—to begin with the most striking feature—they +announce themselves as real gods wandering on earth. +“There are two kinds of gods,” it is said, “the true gods and the +learned Brahmans, who recite the Veda.” “The Brahman represents +all gods.” “He is the god of gods.” This is perhaps the most +remarkable instance of priestly arrogance in all history. Thus it +cannot at all surprise us that the Brahmans, as earthly gods, placed +themselves above king and nobility; but it appears rather strange +that the kings and warriors should have allowed to them the first +place in the government. But as a matter of fact, they did do so +and were compelled to do so. From mysterious legends in the great +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_53">[53]</span>Hindu epic poem we infer, that bloody wars have been waged for +supremacy, in which the nobility was defeated.</p> + +<p>The legends of this epos are thus important additions to the +sources with which we are concerned. This struggle, which the +Brahmans in all likelihood caused to be fought out for them by the +great masses of the people, has been ascribed to the warriors having +robbed the priests of the treasures which the latter had acquired +by the performance of the sacrifices; and this part of the legend is +so highly probable that we cannot treat it as a pure myth, especially +if we take into consideration the circumstances of those times. It +was the first attempt at secularisation in the history of the world, +and the results were very disastrous to those who were then in +secular power.</p> + +<p>The Brahmans did not establish a social hierarchy or ecclesiastical +ranks, nor did they participate in the government, except +that the king was bound to employ a Brahman as Purohita or house-priest, +who occupied as such the position of prime minister. If, +however, they succeeded in dominating the nobility and the whole +people, it was principally on account of their greater knowledge, of +which they boasted, and especially on account of the sacrificial arts, +by the proper exercise of which in those times, all favors could be +obtained from the gods. For a duly performed sacrifice, which +would last weeks, months, nay, years, the Brahmans charged of +course a high fee. A fee of ten thousand oxen was prescribed for a +certain ceremony, a hundred thousand for another one, and a later +teacher of ritualism charged 240,000 for the same service. And this +was not yet the climax of priestly avarice, which—to use an expression +of Professor Weber—indulges in veritable orgies in these +books. After one has gone through the endless description of a +ceremony, one finds at the end the remark that the whole sacrifice +has no effect, unless the proper fee be paid to the priest. And—to +use a term of modern life—lest competition should reduce the prices +or spoil the business, a rule was established, that no one should +take a fee which another one had refused. (Weber, p. 54.)</p> + +<p>The sacrificial rituals, so trying and tedious for us, are the only +literary production of these dull centuries before the rising of philosophical +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_54">[54]</span>speculation, and the great historical importance they possess +is simply due to the light they throw on the moral depravity of +the Brahmans as a class.</p> + +<p>The following fact will fully show to what extent sexual debaucheries +were indulged in. The priest was enjoined, by a special +rule, not to commit adultery with the wife of another during a particularly +holy ceremony. But he who could not practice continence, +was allowed to expiate his sin by an offering of milk to Varuna and +Mitra.</p> + +<p>Numerous passages in the books on ritualism furnish us interesting +illustrations of the great indulgence which the Brahmans had +for each other’s weaknesses. The officiating priest is taught how to +proceed during the sacrifice, if he wants to wrong the man who employs +and pays him, or how to deviate from the prescribed rules, +if he wants to rob his employer of his seeing, hearing, children, +property, or position. The lack of confidence that resulted is best +illustrated by a ceremony, the introduction of which, at the beginning +of the sacrifice, became gradually necessary. By a solemn oath +the officiating minister and the client bound themselves not to injure +each other during the performance of the holy act. Consequently, +the strange notions of right, which the Brahmans had in those times, +will not surprise us. “Murder of any one but a Brahman is no murder.” +“An arbitrator must decide in favor of the Brahman and not +in favor of his opponent, if the latter is not a Brahman.” Such maxims +are laid down in the texts with shameless insolence.</p> + +<p>It is plain that the caste system greatly contributed to increase +the power and influence of the priests, because in a country where +the people are divided into classes, the priest always succeeds in +inciting at his wish the one against the other.</p> + +<p>After the Brahmans came as second caste the Kshattriyas (literally: +the ruling class, i. e., king, nobility, soldiers); and as third +caste the Vaisyas (the bulk of the people: farmers, merchants, etc.). +The conquered non-Aryan aborigines were foreordained by the gods +to serve the Aryan castes and especially the Brahmans. They were +called Súdras (serfs) and had neither civil nor religious rights. +“The Súdra is the servant of others; he can be cast out or killed.” +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_55">[55]</span>By this humane maxim were the Brahmans guided in their conduct +towards the aborigines.</p> + +<p>With such a state of things, as it appears in the old books, the +priesthood ought to have been well pleased. But the Brahmans +were not; they desired still greater advantages and carried out the +caste system to a most absurd extent. The result is embodied in +the famous law-book of Manu, the exact date of which we do not yet +know, but which must be placed at the beginning of our era. The +condition of things of which I shall now speak, was accordingly developed +during the last centuries before Christ. Though we may suppose +that some rules of this code have remained a mere theory and +have never been carried out, there remains enough to show the +social life of those times in a poor light. Köppen, in the first +chapters of his book on Buddhism, has severely but justly judged +the social organisation, as it appears in Manu’s law-book; but as +the age of this code was overrated at his time, he was led to one +erroneous conclusion: he attributes the historical process, of which +we speak, to the period before Buddha, while it really took place +after Buddha: L. von Schröder, in his work “Indian Literature +and History,” in the twenty-ninth lecture, gives us a good view of +those times.</p> + +<p>Different passages in Manu’s code show us that the claim of +the Brahmans to divinity had not decreased in the course of the +centuries. “The Brahmans are to be venerated at all times, as they +are the highest divinity.” “By his very origin the Brahman is a +god, even to the gods.”</p> + +<p>The many practical privileges they enjoyed were of still greater +value. They were exempt from taxation under all circumstances, +“even if the king should starve.” For the greatest crimes they could +not be executed or chastised, nor was their property liable to confiscation, +while at the same time the criminal law was very harsh +towards the other castes and especially towards the Súdras. The +penalties increased proportionately: the lower the caste to which the +criminal belonged, the higher the punishment; and the fines also +increased in proportion to the rank of the caste to which the injured +man belonged. The money-lender was allowed to exact (monthly) +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_56">[56]</span>two per cent. of a Brahman, three of a Kshattriya, four of a Vaisya, +five of a Súdra. All these laws show how the Brahmans understood +the art of advancing their interests. The Súdra was by the code +deprived of all rights. “The Brahman may consider him as a slave +and is therefore entitled to take his property, as the property of the +slave belongs to the master.” “The Súdra shall not acquire wealth, +even if he be in a position to do so, as such conduct gives offense to +the Brahman.”</p> + +<p>But all these things are harmless when compared with the principles +by which the Brahmans reduced to the most miserable of +lives numberless human creatures who had committed no wrong +except that their origin did not agree with the political scheme of +the priests. Formerly it had been lawful for the members of the +three Aryan castes, after having married a girl of the same caste, to +take other wives of a lower caste besides, and no disgrace attached +to their children. The son of a Brahman and a Vaisya—or even of +a Súdra woman—was therefore a Brahman. But this was no longer +the case under the code of Manu.</p> + +<p>If the parents belonged to different castes, the children did not +follow either father or mother, but they formed a mixed caste and +the law distinctly regulates their occupations and trades. This +theory gave birth to a great number of mixed castes, who were more +or less despised. And the social standing of many of them grew still +worse on account of an absurd maxim which degraded the Indian people +to the level of grass and plants. Good seed in a bad soil gives of +course a poorer return than in good soil; still the crop is endurable. +But weed introduced into good soil produces weed abundantly. +According to this theory of the Brahmans the children were below +the father, if he had married a wife of a higher caste. The lowest +and most execrable creature therefore is the son of a Súdra and a +Brahman woman. The destiny of a Súdra was of course hard and +unhappy, but the misery of the offspring of such a marriage, of the +Chandâla, defies all description. “He shall live far from the abodes +of other men and bear signs by which everybody can recognise and +avoid him, as his contact pollutes. Only in daytime shall he be admitted +into the villages, as then people can avoid him. He shall +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_57">[57]</span>possess but common animals like dogs and donkeys, eat out of broken +plates, put on the dresses of the dead, etc. They were compelled +to serve as executioners. To the utmost degree of contempt and +misery has the proud Brahman reduced these poor creatures.” +(Schröder, pp. 423-424.)</p> + +<p>But the Chandâla was not the last in the Brahmanic scale, +which suppressed all dignity in human nature; his offspring, though +he had only a wife of the Súdra caste, was necessarily still below +him. Thus originated a great number of mixed castes, one more +despised than the other, and despising one another. Most of these +outcasts take their names from the Indian aborigines and are thus +placed on the same level with the most contemptible tribes. Some +of the things I have cited about the mixed castes, may have been +merely a theory of the Brahmans; however, the actual existence of +classes of people reduced by the clergy to a sort of animal life, has +been sufficiently verified by foreign travellers.</p> + +<p>In modern times the separation of the people has been going +on very rapidly; so much so, that nearly every trade or profession +now forms a caste of its own, having no social intercourse with, +nor patriotic feelings for the other castes. This condition of things +is due to the influence of the Brahmans, for it has grown out of the +social order they have founded.</p> + +<p>It is not my task to arraign the Brahmans for the sins they have +committed; but simply to illustrate to my readers, how little they +cared for and had at heart the interests of their people. One will, +upon the whole, feel inclined to denounce the selfishness and immorality +of the Brahmans, but on the other hand will acknowledge +with admiration the intellectual work they have done, and forgive +them much for the profound thoughts with which they have enriched +their country and the whole world. Is it not the wisdom of +the Brahmans that has given to the word India a sound that stirs +the hearts of all to whom the struggle for the highest truth appears +as the highest phenomenon in the history of civilisation? But suppose +it can be shown that the greatest of all the wisdom of the Brahman, +the monistic doctrine of the All-in-One, which has had the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_58">[58]</span>greatest influence on the intellectual life of modern times, was not +discovered by them?</p> + +<p>Before I enter on this question, of the greatest importance from +an historical point of view, I will give a short sketch of the period +of Indian history in which this doctrine was established.</p> + +<p>For centuries the Brahmans had heaped sacrifice on sacrifice +and multiplied symbolical explanations without end. All this distinctly +bore the stamp of priestly sophistry. Suddenly higher +thoughts arise. The learning handed down by tradition and the +sacrificial system are, it is true, not altogether abandoned; the mind, +however, is no longer satisfied with the mysteries of the sacrifices, +but aims at higher and more sublime truth. The age of intellectual +darkness is followed by a new era, the characteristic of which is the +ambition to solve the problems of life and to understand the relation +of the individual to the absolute. All the efforts of the human mind +are now bent on solving the question of the eternal Unity, from +which all phenomena have emanated and which every one perceives +within his own self. It is the age of the Upanishads, those famous +books, which, as soon as they were known in Europe, filled all +scholars with wild enthusiasm and admiration. I refer only to +the old Upanishads, that date from the eighth to the sixth century +<span class="allsmcap">B. C.</span>, not to the great number of books of the same name, but not of +the same value—there are over 200 of them—which appeared after +the Christian era. The Upanishads reveal the struggle of the mind +to reach the highest truth. Though they indulge occasionally in +strange speculations, still the idea of Brahma, of the universal soul, +of the absolute, of the thing in itself, is the ever-recurring subject +of their thoughts, which culminate in the idea that the Atman, the +inner self of man, is naught but the eternal and endless Brahma. A +wonderful pathos animates the language of the Upanishads and testifies +to the sublime feelings in which the thinkers of those times +sought the great mystery of existence. They look for all kinds of +expressions, metaphors and figures, in order to couch in words what +cannot be described by words. We read for instance in the venerable +Brihadâranyaka Upanishad: “That which lives on the earth, +but is different from the earth, that which is the moving power of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_59">[59]</span>the earth, that is your Self, the inner immortal ruler.” The same +is predicated of water, fire, ether, wind, sun, moon, and stars; and +then the chapter ends as follows: “Unseen, he sees; unheard, he +hears; unminded, he minds; unknown, he knows. There is none +that sees but he; there is none that hears but he; there is none that +minds but he; there is none that knows but he. He is thy soul, the +inner ruler. Whatever is different from him, is perishable.”</p> + +<p>In the same celebrated Upanishad appears a woman, named +Gârgî, and moved by thirst of knowledge she inquires of the wise +Yâjnavalkya: “That which is beyond the sky and beneath the earth, +and between sky and earth, that which is, was, and shall be, in what +and with what is it interwoven (that is: in what does it live and +move)?” Yâjnavalkya, in order to try the intellectual power of the +woman, gives an evasive answer: “In the ether.” But Gârgî, perceiving +that this answer did not contain the final truth, asks: “In +what is the ether woven?” And Yâjnavalkya replied: “O Gârgî, +that is what the Brahman calls the Eternal; it is neither big, nor +small, nor large, nor short, without connection, without contact; by +the Eternal are ruled heaven and earth, sun and moon, days and +nights; the power of the Eternal directs the rivers south or west or +to any other point of the compass. Whoever parts from this world +without having understood the Eternal, is miserable.”</p> + +<p>In the Chândogya Upanishad, a book of no less importance, +the same wisdom is taught by a man named Uddâlaka to his son +Shvetaketu in the form of several parables. We see them standing +in front of a Nyagrodha tree, that kind of fig-tree that everywhere +sends roots from the branches down to the ground, thus producing +new trunks, until in the course of time <i>one</i> tree resembles a green +pillared hall. And in front of such a tree, the most beautiful symbol +of ever-youthful nature, the following conversation takes place between +father and son: “Get me a fruit of this tree.”—“Here it is.”—“Break +it.”—“It is broken.”—“What do you see in it?”—“I +see quite small kernels.”—“Break one of them.”—“It is broken.”—“What +do you see in it?”—“Nothing.”—Then the father said: +“The fine matter that you cannot see has produced this big tree, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_60">[60]</span>and believe me, my dear son, this same matter, of which the earth +is composed, is the Absolute, the Universal Soul,—it is you.”</p> + +<p>The eternal ground of all existence which every one carries in +himself, Being as it is in itself, and as it is immediately perceived in +thinking, was, accordingly recognised as the sole reality, and all +the manifold changes of the phenomenal world were called Maya, +a sham, a delusion, a mockery of the senses. We see, it is a consistent +monism which is taught in the Upanishads.</p> + +<p>I do not intend here either to criticise the Brahman conception +of monism or to contrast it with modern forms of monism. All +monisms have at least one thing in common, viz. they all recognise +the paramount importance of consistency of thought as a basic principle +in philosophy. And to have propounded a monism for the first +time is a feat which cannot be overestimated. What remains of this +essay will be devoted to the investigation of the question, whether +this feat is duly or unduly credited to the Brahmans.</p> + +<p>It may first be mentioned, that a few scholars like Weber, Max +Müller, Regnaud, Deussen, and Bhandarkar, pointed out, a long +time ago, certain facts which show that another class of the Hindu +nation founded the monistic doctrine of the old Upanishads. But +the attention of the great public has never been called to this subject, +which deserves to be known by all interested in Indian history.</p> + +<p>In the second book of the Brihadâranyaka Upanishad, of which +I have already cited two passages, is found the following story, of +which also the fourth book of Kaushîtaki Upanishad gives a slightly +different version.</p> + +<p>The proud and learned Brahman Bâlâki Gârgya comes on his +journey to Ajâtashatru, prince of Benares, and says to him: “I will +announce you the Brahma.” The king, highly pleased, promises +him a great reward, a thousand cows. The Brahman begins to expound +his wisdom: “The Spirit (that is the power) in the sun I +venerate as the Brahma.” But the king interrupted him, saying +that he knew that already. Then the Brahman speaks about the +Spirit in the moon, in lightning, ether, wind, fire, water, but the +king knows all that. And whatsoever the Gârgya might say, is not +new to the king. The Brahman became silent. But Ajâtashatru +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_61">[61]</span>asked him: “Is that all?” and Gârgya answered: “Yes, that is all.” +Then the king said: “Your little knowledge is not the Brahma;” +whereupon Gârgya declared that he should like to be one of the +king’s pupils. Ajâtashatru replied: “It is against nature, that a +Brahman should learn from a warrior and depend on him for the +understanding of the Brahma, but I will show it you nevertheless.” +The king took him to a sleeping man and spoke to the latter; but +he did not get up. When the king touched him with his hand, he +arose. The king then asked the Brahman: “While this man was +sleeping where was his mind, and whence did it return now?” +Gârgya could not give an answer. Then the king explained to him, +that the mind or the Self of the sleeping man was wandering around +in dream, that all places were open to him, that he could be a great +king or a great Brahman; but that there was still a higher condition +of felicity, that is, absorption in dreamless sleep, without consciousness. +In this condition the Self of man, not affected by the outside +world, reposes in his true essence and knows no difference between +Atman and Brahma.</p> + +<p>Another story, reported in the fifth book of Chândogya Upanishad +and in the sixth book of Brihadâranyaka Upanishad, is perhaps +of still greater importance.</p> + +<p>The young Brahman Shvetaketu comes to a convention, where +the King Pravâhana Jaivâli asks him: “Has your father instructed +you?”—“Yes, sir.”—“Do you know to what place the dead go?” +And three more questions he put to the young Brahman, who was +compelled to admit that he knew nothing about them. Discouraged, +he returned to his father and reproached him: “Although you have +not imparted any knowledge to me, you claim that you have instructed +me. A <i>simple king</i> has asked me three questions and I could +not answer a single one.” The father replied: “You have known +me sufficiently to understand that I taught you all I knew. Come, +let us go to the king and learn from him.” The king received the +Brahman with great honors and requested him to select a present. +But Gautama refuses all earthly gifts, gold, cows, horses, female +slaves, and asks the king to answer the questions he had put to +his son. At first the king was unwilling, but after a while he agreed +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_62">[62]</span>to it and said, that no one on earth could give information on those +subjects, except a warrior. And the following words of the king’s +are very significant: “Would that neither you nor your ancestors +had trespassed on us, that this truth might never have set up her +residence among Brahmans. But to you, since you are so inquiring, +I will communicate our wisdom.”</p> + +<p>Substantially the same story is found at the beginning of the +Kaushîtaki Upanishad, except that the king appears under the name +Chitra.</p> + +<p>Omitting points of less importance, I shall only give in a brief +form the contents of the eleventh and the following chapters of the +fifth book of the Chândogya Upanishad, where again a man of the +warrior caste, Ashvapati, prince of the Kekaya, is shown in possession +of the highest wisdom. A number of highly learned Brahmans +were speculating on the following problems: “What is our Self? +What is the Brahma?” and they decided to go to Uddâlaka Aruni, +who, as they knew, was investigating the “Omnipresent Self.” But +Aruni said to himself: “Now, they will ask me and I am not able +to answer all their questions”; consequently he requested his visitors +to go with him to Ashvapati. The latter receives them with +great honors, invites them to stay with him, promising them presents +as high as their fees for sacrifices. But they replied: “A man +must communicate what he knows. You are just now seeking the +‘Omnipresent Self’; disclose to us what it is?” The king, said: +“I will answer you to-morrow.” The following day, without having +received them among his pupils, that is, without a ceremonial reception +as was usual, he asked them: “What do you venerate as +the Self?” They replied: “Heaven, sun, wind, ether, water, earth.” +The king reminded them that they were all mistaken in considering +the Omnipresent Self as a finite and limited being; it was the infinite, +the infinitely small and the infinitely great.</p> + +<p>The weight of these stories is very plain. Whether they refer +to real facts or merely reflect the views of those times in the form of +legends, cannot be decided. However, the question of the historical +truth of these stories has no bearing whatever. The fact that they +are to be found in genuine Brahmanic writings, in books which are +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_63">[63]</span>considered in India as the basis of the Brahman caste, speaks a +plain language. It shows, that the thought of claiming the monistic +doctrine of the Brahma-Atman as the inheritance of their caste, +did not occur to the authors of the old Upanishads, or that they +dared not claim it; it may be that they did not yet realise the great +importance of the same. Of course in the following ages this science +became the exclusive property of the Brahmans and was cultivated +and developed by them during twenty centuries—but this does +not do away with the fact that it originated among the warrior +caste. The men of this caste recognised at once the hollowness of +the sacrificial system and its absurd symbolical character; and to +them is due the credit of having disclosed a new world of thought +and of having accomplished a revolution in the intellectual life of Ancient +India. When we learn that the Brahmans continued the sacrificial +system, even after having adopted the new creed, and by representing +religious ceremonials as the first step to knowledge, thus +combined two wholly heterogeneous elements; we may justly conclude +that things have taken the same course in Ancient India as in +other countries. Progressive ideas are first opposed by the priesthood, +their born enemy, until they have become so powerful that +they cannot be opposed any longer, whereupon the priest adopts +them and tries to harmonise them with his superstitions.</p> + +<p>But the ideas mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, the substance +of what is commonly called “Hindu wisdom,” are not all +that the warriors have done for the religion and philosophy of the +people. The noble Gautama of Kapilavastu, the best known of all +Hindus, who established Buddhism about 500 years before Christ, +was also a Kshattriya, and according to the more recent tradition, +which alone was formerly known, the son of a king; but according +to the earlier sources, disclosed by Oldenberg, he was the son of a +landed proprietor. Buddha, “the Enlightened,” under which +name he is known all over the world, most strenuously opposed the +sacrificial system and the superstitions of the Brahmans. The ceremonies +and the science of the priesthood seemed to him a perfect +fraud, and the caste system an absurd institution; he taught that the +final beatitude is within the reach of the lowest man, as well as of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_64">[64]</span>the Brahman and the king; that every one, without distinction of +birth, can attain to “salvation” by contempt of the world, self-denial, +and devotion to the welfare of his fellow beings.</p> + +<p>Oldenberg’s excellent book on Buddha, the newest standard +work on this subject, makes it unnecessary for me to dwell at +length on the doctrine of the greatest of all Hindus; only in regard +to one important point, which has a direct bearing on the subject +under consideration, do I differ from his opinion. According to the +oldest sources, Buddha’s method of teaching is, to a great extent, beyond +the understanding of the bulk of the people; not a popular, but +an abstract philosophical one. For intrinsic reasons, I believe that +the old sources do not give a correct report of this matter, and we +must not forget that centuries separate them from Buddha. Oldenberg +himself raises the point, whether the dry and tedious ecclesiastical +style, in which Buddha’s thoughts are clothed by those sources, +truly reflects the spoken word. He says on page 181: “Whoever +reads the words which the sacred books attribute to Buddha will +doubt that the form in which Buddha taught his precepts is to be +identified with that abstract and sometimes abstruse metaphysical +language. A youthful, invigorating spirit, pervading alike teacher +and disciples, is the true picture of those times, admitting of no unnatural +or artificial features.”</p> + +<p>In spite of this, he comes to the conclusion that “the solemn +and stern way of speaking, peculiar to Buddha, has been better expressed +by tradition than by what we would feel tempted to substitute.” +I am not of this opinion. In India a great success could +not have been obtained but by overpowering eloquence and a popular +method, intelligible to all, and proceeding by parables and metaphors.</p> + +<p>If Buddha had only appealed to the intellect of his nearest surroundings, +consisting merely of aristocratic elements, if he had not +found his way to the heart of the people, his monastery would very +likely have shared the destiny of the other religious congregations of +his age, which have all disappeared, except one. As the doctrines of +these monasteries or their founders do not substantially differ from +each other, and as it cannot be ascribed to mere chance that +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_65">[65]</span>Buddha’s doctrine has developed into a universal religion, having +the greatest number of adherents, there remains but one hypothesis +to account for this fact, and that is the superiority of Buddha’s way +of teaching. The erroneousness of the generally prevailing opinion +that Buddha was in his time the only founder of a new religion, and +that he suddenly revolutionised the social organisation of the Indian +people, has been clearly established by recent investigations. In fact, +he was a “primus inter pares,” one of those numerous ascetics who +were striving for and preaching “liberation” from the eternal transmigration.</p> + +<p>Besides Buddha’s, only one congregation has survived: the +Jaina, having numerous members in the western part of India. The +principles of the Jaina are very similar to those of Buddha; so much +so that until recently it was considered merely as a sect of Buddhism, +while it is really a religion of its own, founded by a contemporary +or a predecessor of Buddha, named Vardhamâna Jnâtaputra—in +the language of the people, Vaddhamâna Nâtaputta—in the same +part of the country where Buddha rose. The only difference between +the two religions is this: Vardhamâna lays great stress on +castigation; while the more progressive Buddha declares it useless—nay, +pernicious. The important point in regard to the object of +our essay is this: that the founder of Jaina, which occupies a high +place in the history of Hindu culture, was also a member of the +Warrior Caste.</p> + +<p>We shall now have to consider another production of the Indian +mind, the very name of which is unknown to most of our readers, +although it offers the most interesting religious problems. I refer +to the doctrine of the Bhâgavatas or Pâncharâtras. These names, +of which the former is the earlier and original one, designate a religious +sect in North India, whose existence in the fourth century <span class="allsmcap">B. C.</span> +is authentically proved, but which can be placed with great probability +in the time before Buddha. They professed a common-sense +monotheism, independent of the traditions of the old Brahmans, and +venerated God under different names: Bhagavant, “The Sublime,” +whence their name is derived; Nârâyana, “Son of Man;” Purashottamma, +“The Supreme Being”; but generally under the name +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_66">[66]</span>Krishna Vâsudeva, “Son of Vâsudeva”. The character of their worship +produced feelings identical with the Christian love and devotion +to God. The Hindu word for this feeling is Chakti, and for him who +was penetrated by the same, Chakta. As the word Chakti cannot be +found or has not been found in the Hindu literature earlier than the +era of Christ, several scholars are inclined to attribute the Chakti to +the influence of Christianity, especially Professor Weber, who deserves +the highest praise for his researches concerning Krishna worship. +Weber has proved in several of his books, especially in a +highly interesting treatise on Krishna’s birth, that numerous Christian +notions have entered into the later Krishna legends (the similarity +of the names, Krishna and Christ, accounts for it): for instance, +the birth of Christ among the shepherds, the story about the +stable, and others of the same kind. In spite of this, I cannot embrace +the opinion that the Chakti has been brought from a foreign +country, because its first appearance belongs to a period in which +Christian influences cannot be found. As I cannot go into details +without discussing very difficult points, requiring a great deal of +erudition, I will only say that whoever is familiar with the old +Hindu civilisation will easily understand that the Chakti is of genuine +Hindu origin. Monotheistic notions can be traced to the oldest +periods of Hindu antiquity, and the Hindu mind has always been +animated by a high aspiration towards God; so that it should not +surprise us that this feature of the Hindu character has produced +a religion popular and independent of philosophical speculation, +consisting in love and devotion to God. The founder of this religion +was Krishna Vâsudeva, afterwards raised to divine dignity, or +rather identified with the deity; from his name and from the legends +attached to his name, he was a member of the Warrior Caste. As +early as the epoch of the Mahâbhârata, the great Indian epic poem, +the Brahmans appropriated to themselves the name and work of +Krishna, and transformed the venerated hero into the God Vishnu; +thus increasing their strength by adopting a doctrine not of Brahmanic +origin.</p> + +<p>We have thus found that the profound philosophical monism of +the Upanishads, the highly moral religions of Buddha and Jaina, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_67">[67]</span>and last, not least, the creed of the Bhâgavatas, based on pure devotion +to God, did not originate among the Brahmans.</p> + +<p>However favorably we may judge of the achievements of the +Brahmans in all branches of science, and I am far from vilifying +their merits, still it is certain that the greatest intellectual performances +of India, nay, all such in India that have been beneficial to +mankind, were accomplished by men of the Warrior Caste.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">Richard Garbe.</span></p> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_68">[68]</span></p> + +<h3 class="nobreak" id="THE_IDEA_OF_NECESSITY">THE IDEA OF NECESSITY, ITS BASIS AND ITS SCOPE.</h3> + +</div> + +<p>The idea of necessity, although a fundamental concept in philosophy +and science, has not as yet been so clearly defined +that all thinkers would agree as to its meaning and significance. +Necessity is frequently identified with compulsion, and thus it is +supposed to be incompatible with freedom of will. It is also identified +with fate, as if it were a destiny that existed above the will of +man and the powers of nature, similar to the Moira of the ancients. +It is said to exclude chance in every possible conception of the term +and to cause the evolution of the world to proceed by a predetermined +arrangement, like the mechanism of a clock.</p> + +<p>We cannot endorse Mr. Charles S. Peirce’s objection to the +doctrine of necessity, but we side with him when he denounces the +mechanical philosophy for considering minds as “part of the physical +world in such a sense that the laws of mechanics determine +everything that happens.” Mr. Peirce is right when he rebukes the +mechanical philosopher for “entering consciousness under the head +of sundries as a forgotten trifle.” In some sense minds are parts of +the physical, i. e. the natural, world, but they are not parts of that +province of nature which constitutes the special domain of physics +and mechanics. Ideas are not motions and cannot be explained by +mechanical laws.</p> + +<p>Having criticised in a former article of ours Mr. Peirce’s position, +and having rejected the indeterminism proposed by him, we +shall discuss in the following pages the basis and scope of the idea +of necessity.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_69">[69]</span></p> + +<p>The idea of necessity is based upon the conception of sameness, +and we find that the existence of samenesses is a feature of the world +in which we live. The existence of samenesses is a fact of experience, +and upon the presence of this fact depends the possibility +of the origin, the being, and the development of the thinking mind +itself.</p> + +<p>Necessity, as we understand it, must be carefully distinguished +from the idea of fate. Although we accept without reserve the doctrine +of determinism, we do not mean to deny the important part +that chance plays in the world—not absolute chance, which according +to Mr. Peirce is exempt from law, but that same chance of which +the throw of a die is a typical instance. And bearing in mind that +necessity is not a power outside of nature and above the will of man, +but that it resides in them as the quality of sameness, we abandon +the view that identifies necessity with compulsion; recognising thus, +that freedom of the will is not incompatible with our view of necessitarianism.</p> + +<h4>I. THE BASIS OF NECESSITY.</h4> + +<p>The standpoint from which we shall treat this subject is that of +monistic positivism,—the method which accepts no doctrine, theory, +or law unless it be a formulation of facts. Facts are the bottom-rock +to which we can and must dig down. At the same time, wherever +facts appear contradictory to one another, we should not be +satisfied, but continue to investigate until they are systematised so +as to form a unitary entirety.</p> + +<p>Before we begin our inquiry into the existence or non-existence +of necessity, it is advisable to define the meaning of the term.</p> + +<p>The Latin word <i>necesse</i> is most probably a compound of the +negative <i>ne</i> and the supine <i>cessum</i> from <i>cedere</i> to yield, to move. +“Necessary,” according to this etymology, would mean that which +does not yield but abides. Thus it is the inevitable; it is that which +is or will be.</p> + +<p>It is in this sense that the word is still used, or at least ought to +be used, and in this sense we shall also use it.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_70">[70]</span></p> + +<p>Every word naturally acquires by a more or less appropriate +application a series of meanings. So “necessary” means also that +which is needful, that which is essential, that which is indispensable +and requisite; it also means that which is done under compulsion. +It is understood that we exclude all the other meanings of necessary +except the original one, which is its properly philosophical meaning.</p> + +<p>The idea of necessity is closely allied to the idea of sameness. +In order to understand the former we must be clear concerning +the meaning of the latter.</p> + +<h5>THE IDEA OF SAMENESS.</h5> + +<p>There exist a number of synonyms often used indiscriminately; +they are: identity, sameness, equality, congruity, similarity, and +likeness. By “identity” we generally understand a sameness in +every respect, absolute sameness; by “equality”, a sameness that +can be expressed in figures. Equality is always a measurable sameness, +and refers to quantity, mass, size, length, height, age, etc. +Likeness and similitude are samenesses of form or of proportion, +albeit not of size. It is often used as a partial sameness of impressions, +not so much as they are in themselves, but as they appear to +the mind. Congruity is a synonym of sameness in the province of +geometry, denoting the coincidence of figures when laid upon one +another.⁠<a id="FNanchor_10" href="#Footnote_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a></p> + +<p>The logical principle of identity, so-called, it appears to me, +ought to be named the principle of sameness, for it has not reference +to the absolute sameness of a thing with itself.⁠<a id="FNanchor_11" href="#Footnote_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> The statement +<i>A</i> = <i>A</i> does not mean that this particular thing <i>A</i> is itself and +that therefore the one <i>A</i> is one and the same thing. It is a general +statement and means that all <i>A</i>, in so far as they are <i>A</i>, are the +same. The statement <i>A</i> = <i>A</i>, as I take it, presupposes the existence +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_71">[71]</span>of a number of <i>A’s</i>; otherwise it would have no sense, and it +would not only be empty, (as we know from Kant that all formal +statements are,) but meaningless and useless. It would be of no +avail either in logic or in science.</p> + +<p>In consideration of the fact that the idea of sameness is a fundamental +concept in our scientific, logical, and philosophical reasoning, +it is astonishing that no satisfactory definition of it is to be found. +To define “same” as “one in substance; not other, ... of one nature +or general character, of one kind, degree, or amount,” as is +done in the “Century Dictionary,” is no improvement upon “Webster,” +who defines it as “not different or other; identical. Of like +kind, species, sort, dimensions or the like; not different in character +or in the quality or qualities compared; ... like.” However, +dictionaries are not encyclopædias; and they have perhaps a right +to define same as identical, and identical as same.</p> + +<p>Mr. James Ward, in the “Encyclopædia Britannica,” (XVI, 81, +in his excellent article on “Psychology,”) incidentally complains +about the ambiguity of the word “same”; he proposes a distinction +between “material identity” and “individual identity,” but this +does not solve the difficulty. Flemming’s “Vocabulary of Philosophy” +(4th ed. edited by Calderwood) contains several articles on +“identical” and on “identity” without discussing in any one of +them the meaning of “same” or of “identical.”</p> + +<p>What then is the meaning of same?</p> + +<p>Let us first consider the etymology of the word. The root of +“same” is found in almost all Indo-European languages; it is preserved +in the first syllable of the Latin “similis” and “simul,” in +the second syllable of the German “Zu<i>samm</i>en”; in the Greek +“ἅμα” and “ὅμοιος,” and the Sanskrit “sama,” all of which denote +a togetherness. Thus the etymological meaning seems to signify +what is classed in one category. Accordingly, the present +meaning as defined by the dictionaries, as being that which is “of +one nature or not different in character,” has not changed; at any +rate if there is any change, it is slight. Yet it is desirable to bring +out and set in a clear light the purport of the word and its essence.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_72">[72]</span></p> + +<p>What, then, is the economic service and function of the idea of +“sameness” in the household of thought?</p> + +<p>“Sameness” is that feature in two things or states of things, in +two processes or modes of action, which brings it to pass that the one +may be replaced by the other without altering for a certain purpose +the state of things or affecting the result of the entire process. Popularly +expressed, sameness is the capability of one thing’s being substituted +for another.</p> + +<p>There is no need of discussing or proving the truism, that, +properly speaking, there is no absolute sameness, no identity in +the strict sense of the term. This was the meaning of Heraclitus’s +idea of the perpetual flux of things, expressed in his πάντα ῥεῖ. +There are no two moments in time, no two points in space, no +two atoms of matter actually identical, and we cannot enter into the +identical river twice.</p> + +<p>Cratylus tried to outdo Heraclitus, by saying that we cannot +even enter once into the identical river, for while entering, not only +the river changes but also we ourselves; and Cratylus is perfectly +right.</p> + +<p>We have purposely substituted in Heraclitus’s proposition +“identical” for “same,” because this change is needed to bring out +the truth of the idea. Heraclitus and Cratylus cease to be right if +we use the word same as above defined. We enter indeed the same +river twice. The river of to-day is, for a certain purpose, quite the +same as the river of yesterday, in so far namely as the river of to-day +and the river of yesterday serve a certain and the same purpose: +for other purposes this same river will perhaps not be the same. +The geographer and historian speak of the Rhine as that stream of +water which since time immemorial has flowed down from the St. +Gotthardt to the North Sea. Accordingly, if we stand on the bank of +the Rhine, it is quite correct to say that this is the same river that +was crossed by Cæsar. Let the purpose of our thoughts be changed, +and we shall no longer be permitted to speak of sameness. Suppose +we had seen the Rhine for the first time in its beautiful emerald coloring, +and had come again after a rainy day to admire its beauty, +should we not be justified in exclaiming: This is not the same river!</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_73">[73]</span></p> + +<p>Sameness, accordingly, depends upon a special purpose. If in +a chemical combination a metal is wanted, it may be all the same +whether we use iron, zinc, lead, or gold. That is to say, it is all the +same for bringing about a special result; yet it is not all the same +in other respects. The weight and certain other qualities of the +metals are different, and also the cost.</p> + +<h5>SAMENESS AND MIND.</h5> + +<p>Sameness depending upon a special purpose, the question +arises, Is there any objective sameness in the world, or is sameness a +mere subjective addition to things? Is sameness something “real” +or is it purely mental?</p> + +<p>This is the old quarrel between the Nominalists and Realists +among the Schoolmen. It lies at the bottom of the problem of universals +and particulars, and we should say, it is only a special form +of the question, “Are relations objective qualities of existence or +are they products of the mind?” which was discussed in a former +number (<i>The Monist</i>, II, 2, pp. 240-42). The idea of sameness represents +the most important relation that exists; and if any relation +is real, the relation of sameness must be real also.</p> + +<p>If sameness depends upon a special purpose, it appears that +there can be no sameness without that purpose; and the purpose +being purely mental, the sameness also would seem to be purely +mental. But this is not so. Sameness is an idea, and it is no exception +to other ideas. All ideas are mental symbols formed for a special +purpose; but, being symbols of something, ideas are representative +of some reality, or of some feature of a reality, or of some +relation between two or several things. Every idea stands for something; +and this quality of the significance of ideas is called their +meaning or their import.</p> + +<p>The question now is, How does the idea of sameness originate +in the world where, as we stated above, there is no absolute sameness, +no identity? Our answer is that sameness, not identity, is a +general feature of this world of reality, which impresses itself upon +every mind from the very beginning of the mind’s origin.</p> + +<p>We can go farther in our statement and make it more emphatic: +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_74">[74]</span>Mind originates and grows only on the ground of the fact that sameness +is a feature of the world, and is recognised as such by feeling +substance.</p> + +<p>Two points or two congruent geometrical figures being in different +places are not identical. But they are of such a nature that, +so far as regards the purposes of geometry, one serves the purposes +in question just as well as the other, or one can be replaced by the +other; and this quality is called their sameness.</p> + +<p>Now as a matter of fact there are no two concrete things in +the world in which there cannot be found some sameness. Both +somehow affect sentiency; we say they consist of matter. Both +can be measured in size, breadth, and height: we say, they are extended. +Both are at any given moment in a certain relation to +other things: we say, they are in space. Both have a definite form +and consist of one or several special structures (i. e., so to say, inside-forms). +All things can in some way or other be classed together +under one heading. These samenesses of things go along with differences, +and the degree of sameness in the different things varies +greatly. Whether there is any sameness and difference at all in the +world, cannot be decided <i>a priori</i>, but is a problem which can be +solved only on the ground of, first, an <i>a posteriori</i> statement of the +facts, second, a systematical arrangement of the facts. If this is +accomplished we can venture into a methodical investigation as to +the nature of the samenesses as well as the differences that obtain in +the universe, and having arranged them in a system, we can apply +<i>a priori</i> this system to facts with which we are not as yet acquainted.</p> + +<p>The many samenesses which are experienced are not purely +mental additions; they are not mere subjective imputations transferred +upon objective existence. They are real; i. e. there are in +the objective things actual features which allow of certain substitutions. +A ray of light awakens in some feeling substance the traces +left by former rays of light; and this reawakening is called memory. +The perception of sameness is the beginning of mind, and it +involves the perception of difference as a natural consequence.</p> + +<p>Suppose that the stuff of which the world consists were capable +of acquiring feeling, but there were no samenesses whatever; +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_75">[75]</span>which would mean that every smallest piece of the world-stuff were +a particular thing by itself and in every respect unlike every other +piece, of a different material or of no material at all, of different size +or of no size at all, and also possessed of a different number of space +dimensions. In such a world all the impacts made upon a sentient +being would be different; not one would be like the other, and all +feelings would present a chaos without uniformities, worse than the +most complex crazy-quilt. Under such circumstances mind would +be impossible: it would neither originate nor could it develop.</p> + +<p>On the other hand suppose again that the stuff of which the +world consists were capable of acquiring feeling in some certain +formation, and that there were samenesses in the world and in the +events of the world. Would not mind necessarily originate in such +a world? Given feeling substance in a world of samenesses and +differences, these samenesses will produce analogous samenesses of +impression upon the feeling substance, which will be perceived as +samenesses of feeling. The preservation of the traces left in the +feeling substance (supposing this substance to live on indefinitely) +will in the long run result in the formation of special sense-organs. +It will later on, with the aid of word-symbolism, lead to the formation +of universals, for universals are nothing but samenesses perceived. +It will then create with the assistance of abstraction the +realm of scientific thought, representing the uniformities of the events +of the world in exact formulas.</p> + +<h5>THE EXISTENCE OF SAMENESSES A FACT.</h5> + +<p>The question whether there are samenesses at all in the world, +is in our opinion settled. It is a fact that there are samenesses. +The uniformities of the world are a matter of indubitable experience—indubitable +because our very existence as thinking beings, as +minds, is conditioned by this fact. We see the mind of every child +develop out of his perception of samenesses. Our scientists teach +us that the race-soul, like a great immortal individual, is the product +of the accumulated experience of samenesses; and all future +progress, in science as well as in civilisation, in mechanical invention +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_76">[76]</span>as well as in ethics, depends upon the trustworthiness of the samenesses +stated to exist in the objective world.</p> + +<p>The question of the ultimate <i>raison d’être</i> of the samenesses and +differences, is another question; and it would lead us too far here to +discuss it. In several details the problem is not as yet ripe for solution. +A full solution of the problem would be tantamount to the +exposition of a complete knowledge of the world. Suffice it here to +say that we have reasons to think of the world-stuff as being of the +same nature throughout. The chemical elements seem to be different +configurations of one and the same substance. In this way all +difference would have to be explained as a difference of form.</p> + +<p>The form of reality possesses sameness and difference in all its +parts. Space in its sameness is by experience found to be tri-dimensional, +which means, it is determinable throughout by three coördinates; +while its differences are due to the position of the points considered. +For the purpose of the geometrician space is uniform, but +for the purpose, say of the architect, it is not uniform. To the geometrician +two congruent triangles, whether they are in the cellar or +in the garret, are the same. However, to the architect the position +of two congruent triangles in his design of a house is by no means +the same. Every single point of space has its special and individual +qualities.</p> + +<p>The whole business of science is to systematise the samenesses +of experience, and to present them in such convenient formulas that +they can be used for guidance in our actions.</p> + +<p>The most comprehensive formulation of the sameness of the +universe as a whole has found its expression in the law of the conservation +of matter and energy. This law rests upon the experience, +corroborated by experiments, that causation is transformation. It +states that the total amount of matter and the total amount of energy +remain constant. There is no creation out of nothing and no conversion +of something into nothing.</p> + +<h5>EINDEUTIG BESTIMMT.</h5> + +<p>After this sketch of the importance of sameness, (a subject which +we have by no means exhausted,) we return to the idea of necessity. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_77">[77]</span>The ideas of sameness and necessity are closely related. A world +of sameness is a world in which necessity rules, and necessity means +regularity and order.</p> + +<p>German scientists have a very good expression to denote the +formulation of events in a manner which describes them in their +necessary course. If they have succeeded in finding the sameness +in the instances of a certain class of events, they say that it is <i>eindeutig +bestimmt</i>, which means, the sameness is determined in a way +that admits of no equivocation; it is complete, representing solely and +purely that feature upon the presence of which the result depends. +Whatever is thus <i>eindeutig bestimmt</i>, is recognised in its necessity. +The presence of that feature which makes it <i>eindeutig bestimmt</i>, determines +the event to take place; and this being determined, its +inevitableness, the <i>it will be</i> of the process, is all there is to necessity.</p> + +<p>All natural phenomena that can be <i>eindeutig bestimmt</i> are necessary +in their happening. A world which with regard to the total +amount of its matter and energy is the same to-day and yesterday +and will be the same to-morrow, a world whose laws of form possess +a sameness throughout, so that it allows of formulating and applying +them in their rigidity to all facts present, past, and future, a world +in which all the changes are transformations determinable with the +assistance of formal laws, can be relied upon and the course of its +events can be computed.</p> + +<p>Such <i>is</i> the world in which we live; and taking this ground I +say, the world is a cosmos, it is no chaos; and noticing that being +possessed of sameness is an intrinsic and inalienable feature of the +world, I am inclined to add the world never was and never will be +a chaos. And this, if it be true at all, is true not only in general +and as it were wholesale, but in its minutest details. If there were +deficiencies of this order in the unobservable details, they would not +be diminished by being summed up in large and ever larger amounts; +on the contrary, they would increase; they would grow in proportion. +This not being the case, we have not the slightest reason +to doubt that in those realms of minutest existence into which, from +the grossness and the lack of precision of our organs and instruments +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_78">[78]</span>of observation, we cannot penetrate, the same order and regularity +obtains as in those regions which lie open to our investigation. +In other words: From this standpoint, existence is, so to say, +permeated by law throughout; every event is determined and any +kind of absolute chance is excluded.</p> + +<p>Following Kant’s etymology we understand by <i>a posteriori</i> the +sensory elements, and by <i>a priori</i> the formal elements of our experience. +The queer expression “a priori” is in so far justified as +formal truths (such as geometrical, arithmetical, logical rules) are +formulas expressing the universal samenesses of the form of existence. +They contain the laws of form in a shape that is <i>eindeutig +bestimmt</i>, so that an experimenter will know them <i>a priori</i> to be so. +<i>A priori</i> means beforehand. An experimenter knows certain things +even before he makes his experiments. The <i>a priori</i> elements of +experience are by no means innate truths; nor are they the historical +beginning of experience. On the contrary. In their abstract +purity they appear as a very late product of man’s mental evolution.</p> + +<p>The <i>a priori</i> systems of thought are not arbitrary constructions; +they are constructions raised out of the recognition of the formal, +i. e. the relational, samenesses that appear in experience. All possibilities +of a certain class of relations can be exhausted and formulated +in theorems. As such they can be used as references to assist +in the explanation and determination of new experiences. We know +some part of any new experience with which we are confronted +even before we have investigated it. We know certain laws of its +form, and by reference to these known laws we are enabled to reduce +the unknown to the known, to analyse the process and set +forth that feature of it which makes <i>eindeutig bestimmt</i>.</p> + +<h4>II. THE SCOPE OF NECESSITY.</h4> + +<p>Mr. Peirce objects to necessitarianism, and classes it together +with materialism and the mechanical philosophy, speaking of the +latter as the most logical form of necessitarianism. In consonance +with the dictionary-definitions of these words, he contrasts them to +the doctrine of the freedom of the will and also to miracles—the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_79">[79]</span>latter, we must confess, being a dangerous concession to certain theological +conceptions.</p> + +<p>The “Century Dictionary” defines “necessitarianism” as</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“The theory that the will is subject to the general mechanical law of cause +and effect.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>And “necessitarian” as</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“One who maintains the doctrine of philosophical necessity, in opposition to +that of the freedom of the will: opposed to libertarian.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>The word “determinism” is regarded as a synonym of necessitarianism. +Its first definition in the “Century Dictionary” reads +as follows:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“A term invented by Sir William Hamilton to denote the doctrine of the necessitarian +philosophers, who hold that man’s actions are uniformly determined by +motives acting upon his character, and that he has not the power to choose to act +in one way so long as he prefers on the whole to act in another way.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>Hamilton’s definition as here presented is puzzling. If the +words “choose” and “prefer on the whole” are <i>not</i> meant to be +tautological, there is no sense in it; for no determinist denies that a +man might “upon the whole” prefer to act this way, while he has +the power to choose, and for special considerations perhaps does +choose, to act in another way. However, if the words “choose” +and “prefer on the whole” are meant to be tautological, the self-contradictoriness +of the statement is too palpable for a Hamilton. +Is there anybody who would maintain that a man who chooses to +act in one way can at the same time, under the very same circumstances, +and he remaining the very same man of the same character +and intentions, choose to act in another way?</p> + +<p>While we accept determinism and also necessitarianism in the +sense that all events (the actions of willing beings included) are determined, +we cannot accept either the mechanical philosophy or +materialism as the terms are commonly understood.</p> + +<p>We find materialism defined as</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“The metaphysical doctrine that matter is the only substance, and that matter +and its motions constitute the universe.” (“Century Dictionary,” 2d sense.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_80">[80]</span></p> + +<p>The mechanical philosophy is explained <i>sub voce</i> “atomic” as</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“[The view that] from the diverse combination and motions of ... atoms all +things, including the soul, were supposed to arise.” <i>Ibid.</i></p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>Determinism is simply the negation of absolute chance. It +does not exclude chance in the original sense of the word as an unexpected +event, as something that befalls one without his seeking it +or making the event—chance being derived from ML. <i>cadentia</i>, i. e. +the falling, as in a throw of dice.</p> + +<p>The “Century Dictionary” defines “chance” in sense 9, as</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“Fortuity; especially the absence of a cause necessitating an event.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>This is absolute chance, the existence of which we deny. The +“Century Dictionary” adds the following little note:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“Absolute chance, the (supposed) spontaneous occurrence of events undetermined +by any general law or by any free volition. According to Aristotle, events +may come about in three ways: first, by necessity or an external compulsion; second, +by nature or the development of an inward germinal tendency; and third, by +chance, without any determining cause or principle whatever, by lawless, sporadic +originality.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_12" href="#Footnote_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a></p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>We understand chance as being, from certain premisses, an incalculable +coincidence, either not intended to be calculated, or, for +certain reasons, from a given standpoint with a limited and definite +amount of knowledge, not capable of calculation. Determinism, as +we understand the term, does not imply as the “Century Dictionary” +has it in its definition of necessitarianism, that “the law of +cause and effect” is “mechanical.” It simply asserts that the law of +cause and effect holds good universally, and that there is no effect +that is not definitely determined, according to the nature of the +things in action, by causes and all their circumstances.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_81">[81]</span></p> + +<h5>NECESSITY AND CHANCE.</h5> + +<p>Mr. Peirce says:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“<i>All</i> the diversity and specificalness of events is attributable to chance—diversification, +specificalness, and irregularity of things, I suppose is chance—and +this diversity cannot be due to laws that are immutable.” (P. 332.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>Our world-view leads us to other conclusions; we say:</p> + +<p>Every specificalness or particularity is such by possessing a +certain form and standing in a definite relation (in time as well as +space) to all other things of the universe. Of every concrete thing +we can say it is now and here, or it was then and there. It is or +was made up in this special way, and it stands or it stood in these +special relations to its surroundings. Proportions, relations, forms—these +are what account for the diversification and specificalness of +all things in the universe; they are what explain the irregularities +of individual cases and of all those events which appear as chance +to him who, although he may be well informed about the nature +of a thing, does not know the relation of its complex surroundings, +exercising according to law their disturbing influence upon its actions +which otherwise would be uniform.</p> + +<p>And since no two spots of space and no two instances of time +are the same, since the relations of every atom are different in every +position and at every moment of its existence, we need not be astonished +to find diversity and specificalness in this world of samenesses.</p> + +<p>We do not believe in absolute chance, but we believe in chance.</p> + +<p>What is chance?</p> + +<p>Chance is any event not especially intended, either not calculated, +or, with a given and limited stock of knowledge, incalculable.</p> + +<p>Gunpowder was, according to the legend, invented by chance. +Berthold Schwartz intended to make gold, yet when the mixture +was ignited, he began to understand that it was an explosive. +When I say that I met a friend by chance, I mean that the meeting +was unintentional. I had not foreseen it and perhaps could not +foresee it. When we call a throw of dice pure chance, we mean +that the incidents which condition the turning up of these or those +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_82">[82]</span>special faces of the dice have not been or cannot be calculated. We +do not mean that the law of cause and effect is suspended; we mean +that we are unable to determine the effect. That which would make +this or that throw <i>eindeutig bestimmt</i> is either not known to us, or, if +it were known, is of such a nature that we cannot produce the desired +effect with any certainty. Matters are so arranged in the game +of dice that the slightest incident changes the result, and these incidents +are either not within our ken or not within the range of our +power. Chance, accordingly, as we understand it, is no exception +to necessity; it does not happen contrary to law, and is in each case +the strict result of a definite cause under definite circumstances.</p> + +<p>Absolute chance is something quite different. Absolute chance +is that which is incalculable because of the absence of law. Mr. +Peirce says:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“Another argument, or convenient commonplace, is that absolute chance is +<i>inconceivable</i>. This word has eight current significations. The ‘Century Dictionary’ +enumerates six. Those who talk like this will hardly be persuaded to say in +what sense they mean that chance is inconceivable.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>Absolute chance is “inconceivable” as the word is defined by +the “Century Dictionary” in the second sense: It is</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p class="noindent">“unacceptable to the mind because involving a violation of laws believed to be well +established by positive evidence.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>Absolute chance is not unthinkable in the sense of unimaginable. +We can very well depict a case of absolute chance in our +imagination, just as we can tell and describe in minutest details the +fairy tale of Alladin’s lamp; just as we can in our imagination depict +a creation out of nothing. But he who accepts that the world is +in its innermost nature a cosmos, that its events are strictly and +throughout regulated by law, cannot at the same time think that +there are nooks and crevices in which the law does not operate. Absolute +chance actually involves the idea of a creation out of nothing; +and thus it stands in contradiction to the law of the preservation of +matter and energy. Absolute chance which means that the very +same thing under the very same conditions can act in this or in some +other way, that it need not act in exactly the same way, involves a +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_83">[83]</span>belief in either the creation of a not existing quality out of nothing, +or the disappearance of existing qualities into nothing.</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce says:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“It seems to me that every throw of sixes with a pair of dice is a manifest instance +of chance.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>Yes, of chance; but not of that chance the existence of which +Mr. Peirce maintains—not of absolute chance. Every throw of dice, +every toss of head or tail, are exactly determined by circumstances. +We call it chance only in so far as we cannot calculate and predetermine +the result.</p> + +<p>Suppose you take two large silver coins between your thumb +and the first two fingers, one coin parallel to and a little above the +other. Suppose tails are up in both. Drop the lower coin without +an effort just as it would fall, about twenty inches, and you may be +sure that, in spite of yourself, it will turn up head. Then drop the +upper one and it will not turn, but plump right down showing tail. +There are certain mechanical reasons for the one case as well as for +the other. As soon as we know the law and can apply it, the case +ceases to be an instance of chance.</p> + +<p>Dice, the roulette, and other games of chance are so arranged, +that the determinating circumstances are too numerous and also too +complex, one interfering with and being disturbed by the others, to +admit of any adequate calculation or predetermination. An arrangement +of conditions which in this way eludes the calculation of a +definite set of possibilities, is called by Professor Kries <i>gleiche Spielräume</i> +or equal chances. And the province of equal chances is and +will remain the proper sphere of the calculus of probabilities.</p> + +<p>Professor Nitsche objects to Kries’s proposition, saying that +absolutely equal chances are impossible and an equal chance (<i>ein +gleicher Spielräume</i>) is nothing but the objectification of a judgment +of equal value.⁠<a id="FNanchor_13" href="#Footnote_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> We find no fault with Nitsche’s objection; there +are no absolutely equal chances; and what is called “equal chance” +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_84">[84]</span>means that the strength of two or several anticipations is of the same +degree; that our belief and doubt as to the turning up of one, two, +three, four, five, or six spots of a die are equally justified. The objective +conditions which justify such equality of several expectations +is what Kries (if we understand him correctly) calls <i>gleiche Spielräume</i>. +But <i>gleiche Spielräume</i> do not imply absolute chance. We +might as well expect that all the six faces of a die should turn up +simultaneously in one throw, as that any one of them should turn +up by absolute chance.</p> + +<p>While absolute chance cannot be admitted, partly because we +are not in need of it, (since the irregularities of nature can be sufficiently +explained otherwise,) and partly because the idea of absolute +chance if it were needed, is incompatible with our world-conception, +we shall, nevertheless, have to concede to chance, as we understand +the term, a very important rôle in the evolution of life. The formation +of worlds and the history of mankind depend to a great extent +upon chances similar to the throws of dice. There are many possibilities, +and now this, now that, will, according to the circumstances, +be realised—of course in each case with strict necessity.</p> + +<p>Let us illustrate this idea by an example.</p> + +<p>The formation of about seventy elements out of the original +world-substance, which may be supposed to be homogeneous, does +not appear to depend upon chance. Their universal appearance in +all parts of the universe suggests the hypothesis that their formation +is the inevitable result of a gradual condensation of nebular +substances. We find everywhere, according to the stage of condensation, +a gradual appearance, first of the lighter, then of the heavier +elements. There seems to be no possibility of the formation of other +elements than those known to us (including here the hypothetical +elements which are still missing in the Mendeljeff series and at the +same time, at least, not excluding a further continuance of the +series). These elements or none, it appears, must be formed out of +the original substance of our world. Let us here assume, for argument’s +sake, that it were so beyond question, and that we knew the nature +of the world-substance to be such as to condense, if it condenses +at all, into no other but these forms, which we call chemical elements. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_85">[85]</span>This would be a limitation of possibilities. Exactly so the throws +Of dice are limited. With the dice commonly in use we cannot +throw fractions; nor can we throw either zero, or seven, or any other +higher number. We can throw only whole numbers, integrals from +one up to six. But while we thus assume that the formation of the +elements is limited to those actually existing, the proportion in which +the elements may be distributed in the different nebulæ and solar +systems, is apparently very different. Suppose we had a full knowledge +of the intrinsic nature of the world-substance and were standing +outside the universe observing the process of world-formations; +we could not from this knowledge alone predict all that would happen. +We should on our assumption be able to predict <i>a priori</i> that such +elements would be formed. But whether the different elements would +be generated in these or in other proportions appears to depend upon +the presence of certain conditions, perhaps the rapidity of motion, the +heat produced by friction, the temperature of the surrounding cosmic +space, any knowledge of which is not included in our knowledge +of the nature of the world-substance. These conditions may vary, +nay, so far as we can judge they actually do vary; and any apparently +slight variation of them, or even one of them, will result in different +effects of great consequence. Without a detailed knowledge +of all these special conditions, simply from a supposed <i>a priori</i> +knowledge of the world-substance, the idiosyncrasy of this or that +particular solar system could not be <i>a priori</i> determined. Here it +will be such, and there, under perhaps slightly different circumstances, +it will be entirely other. Here the centre of gravity may +be in one great mass, there again it may be divided in two, so that +the planets circle around two suns.</p> + +<p>From this point of view we have to call these results products +of chance.</p> + +<p>To a being who not only might be supposed to know the intrinsic +nature of existence, but could have present before his mind every +event of the great interacting cosmos in its entire complexity, this +kind of chance would, of course, also disappear. To him all states of +things would appear throughout as <i>eindeutig bestimmt</i>. Yet, although +in this way necessity permeates all events that take place, we do not +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_86">[86]</span>intend to deny the irregularity of detail,⁠<a id="FNanchor_14" href="#Footnote_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> the specificalness of the +particulars, the diversity of individual incidents and existences. According +to our conception of nature they must remain, and we need +not attribute them to absolute chance. To attribute irregularities to +absolute chance (as Mr. Peirce does) is actually an abandonment of +explaining them. The specificalness and particularity of nature can +be said to be due to chance in so far only as they do not depend +upon and are not determinable by the nature of the things under +consideration, but result (with strict necessity of course) from the +ever-changing conformations of surrounding circumstances.</p> + +<p>Thus the fate of a man depends mainly upon his character,—the +proverb says, “Every man is the architect of his own fortune”—but +not entirely. There are sometimes coincidences determining +the fates of men, and through them the fates of whole nations. And +these coincidences do not result from their character.</p> + +<p>Let everybody think of his own fate. Part of his life has been +what it was because he is such a man as he is; and we can, within +certain limits, predict the fate of a youth with whose character we +are familiar. But how much of our lives depends upon circumstances +which could be foreseen only by an omniscient being, and which, as +we might properly say, if we do not misunderstand the term, is due +to chance!</p> + +<h5>FREE WILL.</h5> + +<p>Compulsion is generally considered as a synonym of necessity. +But the usage of the term necessity in the sense of compulsion is, +in our opinion, very inappropriate, because misleading. Necessity +and compulsion should not be confounded; for compulsion excludes +free will and “necessity” does not.</p> + +<p>A government compels its citizens to obey certain unpopular +laws; the victorious army compels the enemy to surrender. The +obedience of the citizens and the surrender of the enemy are acts +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_87">[87]</span>done under compulsion; they are not acts of free will. But a man +of a certain character wills, under given circumstances and in the +absence of compulsion, <i>necessarily</i> in the way in which he does. The +determination of a free will is not a matter of chance but of necessity. +Yet the determining factors are not outside but inside; they are not +due to compulsion, not to the pressure of a foreign power, but to +the nature of the willing being himself.</p> + +<p>This, then, is the definition of “free”: A being is free if it is +unrestrained, so that it acts according to its own nature. As is its +nature, so it wills; as it wills, so it acts. If we know the character +of a man and the situation in which he is placed, we can predict his +choice as the necessary result of his nature. His decision, although +it is free and not under compulsion, is not an outcome of chance +which might under the same conditions be different, but is the inevitable +result of necessity.</p> + +<p>If by free will we had to understand that the decisions of the +will are the result either of chance or of absolute chance, the foremost +duty of the educator would be to make man unfree, to insert +certain dominant ideas into his mind, destined to determine his will. +The free man according to this definition of free will as being due +to chance, would be a person whose actions are more whimsical than +the fancies of lunatics. We reject this conception of the freedom +of the will.</p> + +<p>In our opinion a will is free if it is unrestrained so that it can act +according to its nature. Our conception of free will does not stand +in contradiction to the doctrine of “determinism” as defined by the +“Century Dictionary” in its second sense:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“In general, the doctrine that whatever is or happens is entirely determined by +antecedent causes.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<h5>THE MECHANICAL PHILOSOPHY.</h5> + +<p>We distinguish between (1) mechanical, (2) physical, (3) chemical, +(4) physiological, and (5) psychical events.</p> + +<p>A mechanical phenomenon is a change of place which does not +involve a change of the constitution of the parts moved. E. g., a +stone is pushed; its position is altered, but the stone remains the +same.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_88">[88]</span></p> + +<p>A physical phenomenon is an event in which the molecular +state of the bodies in action is altered. Water heated becomes +steam, frozen it becomes ice. The three states have different molecular +configurations.</p> + +<p>Chemical phenomena are such in which the constitution of the +atoms is altered. The characteristic qualities of hydrogen, for example, +are different when combined with different elements or when +isolated. Each combination is a peculiar substance with peculiar +qualities and not a mixture or combination of the qualities of the isolated +elements.</p> + +<p>Physiological processes are all those changes that take place in +the living irritable substance of plants and animals, such as nutrition, +growth, and propagation. Its characteristic features are (1) hunger +or thirst, i. e. the want of certain materials (food), (2) the reception +of the wanted materials by suction or other means, which in +some cases are a quite mechanical or physical process, not unlike +the afflux of oxygen caused by a burning candle or the suction of +water by a sponge, and (3) the assimilation of food. The materials +received are distributed in the places wanted, thus adding to the +building up of the living substance according to the nature of its +structure. This produces as a natural result (4) the phenomenon +of growth with a preservation of form. (5) Propagation is a special +kind of growth; it is the growth of a part that at some stage of its +development becomes an independent individual.</p> + +<p>Psychical phenomena are such in which feelings and the meanings +of feelings are the determinant factors.</p> + +<p>It is apparent that all these terms, mechanical, physical, chemical, +physiological, and psychical, are mere abstracts. In describing +a mechanical phenomenon, we limit our attention to the mechanical +change. We do not mean to say that the body moved does not possess +chemical, physical, perhaps physiological, or even psychical +qualities. The calculation of the curve of a jump is a mechanical +problem, although the jumping body may be a human being. However, +the question why did the man jump, is a psychical question. +The motive of the jump is an idea in that class of mental activity +characterised as purpose. The man had an end in view. And this +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_89">[89]</span>idea of an end to be realised is the combined result of special conditions +and of the character of the man.</p> + +<p>The different spheres of mechanical, physical, chemical, physiological, +and psychical actions being abstractions, it is obvious that +science when dealing with so-called purely mechanical phenomena, +has to do with a fiction. There are no purely mechanical phenomena. +There are features of reality which are purely mechanical; and +these we call motions. But the world does not consist of motions +only. It also possesses other qualities.</p> + +<p>The mechanical philosopher assumes that the world consists of +matter and motion only, and so he feels warranted in the hope that +every event that takes place, the actions of man included, can be explained +by the laws of motion. Yet the premiss is wrong, and we +may anticipate that the conclusion also will prove erroneous. And +so it is.</p> + +<p>The laws of motion are applicable to and will explain all motions; +but they are not applicable to that which is not motion.</p> + +<p>It is inconceivable how we can hope to explain a feeling by the +laws of motion; and so the fond hope of explaining the problems of +the nature of the soul by mechanics is preposterous. No objection +can be made to the possibility of explaining the delicate motions in +the nervous substance of the brain by the laws of molar or molecular +mechanics. But these explanations would throw no light upon the +causation that takes place in the mind. The properly psychical phenomena, +the properly intelligent action of thought, could not be explained +in this way. For the world of mentality introduces quite a +new factor into the sphere of being.</p> + +<p>What is this new factor?</p> + +<p>The nature of mental activity consists in the symbolism of feelings. +Feelings, being different under different conditions and the +same under same conditions, become representative of their corresponding +causes, and thus the objects of experience are depicted in +feeling symbols.</p> + +<p>Representativeness, accordingly, is the nature of mind.</p> + +<p>The question, How certain brain-structures operate, is a question +of the mechanics of nervous substance, and further, the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_90">[90]</span>question, How thought-operations take place, is a question, so to +say, of logical mechanics. But the question, Why a certain idea +responds to certain stimuli and not to others, does not admit of a +mechanical explanation or formulation. The answer to this question +will be a description of the nature of the idea; and the nature +of the idea is not a motion: it is the meaning of which the idea is +possessed.</p> + +<p>The action of a mind depends upon the meaning of certain symbols. +A written or spoken word has a special meaning, and this meaning +becomes the determinant factor of mind action. The meaning of +a word is not a piece of matter, neither is it a motion. It is something +<i>sui generis</i>. I do not say that there is any inexplicable mystery connected +with it. On the contrary, wonderful as the fact is, it is not +mysterious; it does not stand in contradiction to any other fact of +nature. Symbols stand for something; they indicate, denote, or +signify something. This significance is called their meaning; and +mind is a system of symbols in states of awareness.</p> + +<p>Now, neither states of awareness are mechanical, nor is the +meaning of words anything mechanical. How can we hope for a +mechanical explanation either of the soul or the mind or of any +mental action?</p> + +<p>Suppose, for instance, a general receives a message containing a +few words. He opens the paper, he reads it, and all on a sudden, +his mind is in a tumult of excitement. What is it that produces the +excitement? Is it any motion? Yes! In a certain sense, it is a +motion: it is the reading of the paper. This is the cause. Yet not +the reading as such excites his consternation. He might read other +messages all the day long without any such an effect. Plainly, the +causative element of the cause is not the reading, not the motions of +which the reading consists, not the shape of the written characters +and their combinations in groups, called words. It is something +more subtle even than that. It is the significance of the writing. It +is the meaning of the written characters. It is the purport that is +attached to the word-symbols.</p> + +<p>The origin of mind accordingly introduces a factor which has +nothing to do with mechanics; and the simplest psychical reflexes, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_91">[91]</span>including those physiological reflexes which we must suppose to +have originated by conscious adaptation and then been submerged +into unconsciousness, cannot be explained from mechanical or +physical laws alone.</p> + +<h5>SPONTANEITY.</h5> + +<p>While we thus reject the conception of the mechanical philosophy +and also of materialism, we do not say that there are motions +either in the brain or anywhere else which form exceptions to the +laws of mechanics. The laws of mechanics hold good for all motions. +The laws of mechanics are formal laws: they do not explain +why bodies gravitate; but they describe how they gravitate; and the +latter is much more useful to know than the former. There is (as +we conceive it) no deep secret in the problem why bodies gravitate; +they gravitate because they possess a quality which attracts them to +each other with a force directly as their masses and inversely as the +squares of their distances. In a word, gravity is the intrinsic nature +of masses, it is an inalienable part of their existence. Thus +whenever bodies gravitate, we are confronted with an act of spontaneity.</p> + +<p>Attempts have been made to explain gravitation without the +assumption of spontaneity, by the pressure of an atom-surrounding +ether. But that only defers the question; for the spontaneity, in +that case, would have to be placed in the ether. Whatever be the +merits of the explanations of gravitation by a <i>vis a tergo</i>, we must +recognise the fact that no motion can take place in the world, no +pressure can be exercised, without there being somewhere some +spontaneous something that moves or presses. Spontaneity is a +universal feature of nature.</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce uses the term “spontaneity” in a different sense +from ours. He identifies spontaneity with absolute chance. He +means by it the irregularities that arise without cause, thus producing +departures from law. We call that action spontaneous which is not +due to external influence but springs from the nature of the things +in action.</p> + +<p>Spontaneous is derived from the Latin <i>spons</i>, “will,” which as +a noun was obsolete at the classical period of Roman literature and +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_92">[92]</span>occurred only in such forms as <i>sponte</i>, “of one’s own will, of one’s +own accord.” If a man acts of his own will, free from and not biassed +by the influence of other men, his action is spontaneous. A free +man’s action is not arbitrary, unless arbitrariness⁠<a id="FNanchor_15" href="#Footnote_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> be the character +of the man; it is not an exception to law; it is, if the character of the +man is known, calculable in advance, for every free action is spontaneous: +it springs immediately from the character of the man; it is +the direct expression of his will; it reveals the nature of his very +being, thus showing the man himself, and not something beyond or +outside of him.</p> + +<p>Taking the word spontaneity in this sense, we say: Masses +gravitate spontaneously; they are self-moving; their motion is due +to their gravity, and gravity is their intrinsic nature.</p> + +<p>Exactly as the laws of mechanics explain the “how” of motions +but not why there is motion at all, the “why” depending upon the +nature of each moving body, so the “how” of the brain-motions is +explicable by mechanical laws, but the “why” depends upon the +nature of the moving material. The brain-atoms are possessed of +the same spontaneity as the atoms of a gravitating stone. Yet there +is present an additional feature; there are present states of awareness, +and these states of awareness possess meaning, both of which are +items which the chemist cannot find by chemical analysis. Neither +states of awareness nor their meanings can be weighed on any scales, +be they ever so delicate, nor are they determinable in foot-pounds.</p> + +<p>Yet while mechanics is not applicable to mental facts, the realm +of mentality is by no means to be surrendered to indeterminism. +Mr. Peirce describes the domain of mind as the absence of law and +the prevalence of absolute chance, of an indetermined and indeterminable +sporting. This is not so. While the fact must be recognised +that the nature of the mind is not something mechanical, its +action is nevertheless determined by laws—not by mechanical laws, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_93">[93]</span>but by psychical and mental laws. These psychical and mental laws +are in one respect of exactly the same nature as mechanical laws; they +describe the samenesses of certain facts of reality. And the facts of +the ideal domain of thought, the facts of subjectivity, are no less +real than the grosser facts of mechanical motion, which are the facts +of objectivity.</p> + +<p>The term mechanical is often used in the sense of “lacking life +or spirit” (“Century Dictionary,” p. 3679). This is justifiable in +so far only as when we speak of mechanical phenomena we do not +mean psychical or any other phenomena. It is true that that which +makes this or that idea respond to a certain stimulus is not a mechanical +but a mental quality, but the action itself, in so far as it is +a motion, is and remains mechanical. Thus it happens that the +laws of mechanics, far from being anti-spiritual, are the means by +which we learn to understand and objectively to represent the action +of mental phenomena.</p> + +<p>In this connection attention may be called to the efforts of modern +logicians to construct thinking machines which will perform the +work of mental operations in a purely mechanical way. You propose +the problem by adjusting certain indicators; then you turn the +crank, and the machine does the rest. The results will come out +with unfailing exactness.</p> + +<p>The attempt made to construct thinking machines cannot as +yet be called successful. Nevertheless they are not impossibilities. +Calculating machines of various constructions are in practical use +and doing satisfactory work, not only in addition and subtraction +but also in multiplication and division, and even in extracting roots +and in raising numbers to higher powers. Calculations are undoubtedly +one kind of thought, and if calculations can be performed +by machines, there is no theoretical reason why we should not be +able to construct logical machines, which shall perform the operations +of deductive and even of inductive thought with perfect accuracy.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_94">[94]</span></p> + +<h4>CONCLUSION.</h4> + +<p>Determinism does not make freedom impossible and natural +laws do not suppress the spontaneity of nature.</p> + +<p>Natural laws are not a power forcing a certain mode of action +upon things; they are not an oppression of nature. Natural laws +are simply a description of nature as nature is. There is no “must” +in nature in the sense of compulsion, as if there were two things, +(1) a master (i. e. the law) giving a command, and (2) a slave (i. e. +the single facts) obeying the command. The situation is not dualistic, +but monistic. There is an “is” in nature, and this “is” is +constant. There is a certain sameness in nature. In spite of all +changes it remains the same; and thus even the apparent irregularities +preserve throughout an unvarying consistency. The facts of +nature express the character of nature; they are nature herself. +Briefly, the “is” of nature (if we are permitted to personify her) +does not describe that which nature must do, but that which nature +wills to do; it describes how she acts spontaneously, of her own free +will, in conformity with her innermost being and consistently with +her permanent character.</p> + +<p>The main difference that obtains between the actions of inanimate +nature so-called and rational beings is not the absence and +presence of spontaneity, (for spontaneity is in both,) but the absence +and presence of mind: and mind is not only the subjectivity of existence; +mind is not merely sentiency, i. e. the awareness of feelings; +mind is the representative symbolism of subjectivity.</p> + +<p>There are sufficient reasons to assume that all objective existence, +which appears to us as matter in motion, possesses a subjectivity, +the nature of which depends upon the mode of the interaction +of its elements. This subjectivity appears in organised substance +as feeling and develops naturally into mind.</p> + +<p>The essence of nature, accordingly, is not materiality, but spirituality. +Materiality is the character of nature as it affects sentient +beings; but its innermost self, as it were, its subjectivity, its psychical +aspect is revealed in the appearance of the spirit-life of rational +beings—of minds.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_95">[95]</span></p> + +<p>While we fully recognise the spirituality of nature as nature’s +innermost essence and as an ineradicable feature of reality, we cannot +with Mr. Peirce place mind at the beginning of the world. There +is a great difference between spirituality and mind. One is the source +and condition of the other. One is permanent, the other is transient. +One is the abstract view of a universal quality of the world, +eternal and everlasting, as much indestructible as matter and energy; +the other is an individual formation that originates, grows, and develops; +that can be broken and built again; that dies with the body +and rises again in new generations; that decays, as the foliage of the +trees falls in winter, yet reappears, as the verdure reappears in +spring; for the life of nature is immortal.</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce, regarding determinism as that view which does not +recognise the freedom of will, has an original and in our conception +a wrong view on the one hand of natural laws, which are to him mere +habits acquired by the world, and on the other hand of chance, or +arbitrary sportiveness, (i. e. that which is not determinable by law,) +which he identifies with mind and with the spontaneity of freedom. +Mind is to him the beginning of all. Mind remains mind, according +to his view, so long as it is irregular, producing out of its own undetermined +being sporadic effects without order or consistency. As +soon as mind takes to habits, it grows mechanical; by creating regularity +it disappears; and the result is matter in motion according to +mechanical laws. Matter, accordingly, is said to be “effete mind.” +Law in our view is the divinity of nature; according to Mr. Peirce +it is the termination of nature’s irregularities: it comes to suppress +her freedom and to supplant her mentality by mechanicalism. An +element of pure chance, however, survives, which, appears in the +free will of man, in miracles, and in nature’s irregularities, and this +element of pure chance will remain until in the infinitely distant +future, mind becomes crystallised into an absolutely perfect, rational, +and symmetrical system. Such is in brief Mr. Peirce’s view of the +rôle played by mind in the world-process.</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce’s views of chance and law seem to come to the rescue +of certain theological dogmas, which represent the world-order +as the product of a divine mind. We doubt very much whether +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_96">[96]</span>Mr. Peirce’s position be tenable even from the standpoint of the +scientific theologian. For the order of the world, as it appears in +natural laws, must be, and is recognised even by the theist, as part +and parcel of God’s eternal being. The scientist who formulates +<i>sub specie aeternitatis</i> certain facts of nature, say the “how” of gravitating +bodies, describes a certain quality of God himself; he describes +something that is immutable, eternal, everlasting; it is not +the whole of God, but it is certainly one feature of Jahveh, of that +which is, was, and will be as it is.</p> + +<p>In contradistinction to Mr. Peirce, we recognise, that the regularity +of the whole is preserved in the specificalness of its individual +particulars, that there are samenesses in this world of changes and +diversities, and that if all reality is regarded as being essentially the +same throughout, all the diversities and apparent irregularities can +very well be explained as resulting from peculiar forms, combinations, +and relations. Furthermore, we recognise that natural laws +are compatible with the spontaneity of nature and that the necessity +with which a free man acts according to his character, does not reverse +his freedom of will.</p> + +<p>Nature is self-acting throughout; nature is free; even inanimate +nature is spontaneous. But a higher freedom rises with the appearance +of mind. And there are degrees of this higher freedom +which can be determined with great exactness, for they correspond +to the range of the mentality of each creature. Mentality develops +by the observation of samenesses, and it reaches rationality by the +recognition of natural laws. The recognition of natural laws is a +view of some natural phenomena in their eternal aspect, and we +call them truths. So much is natural law and freedom interconnected +that the recognition of natural laws widens the range of freedom; +and obedience to them raises man out of his dependence upon his +surroundings to a state of dominion over the creation in which he +becomes the master of natural forces.</p> + +<p>What a deep significance lies in the saying of the apostle: +“The truth shall make you free!”</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">Editor.</span></p> + +<div class="footnotes"> + +<h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_10" href="#FNanchor_10" class="label">[10]</a> The adjective “like” is an abbreviation of “alike”; and “a-like” (M.E. +<i>alyke</i>, A.S. <i>gelic</i>, O.H.G. <i>galih</i>, M.H.G. <i>gelich</i>, M.G. <i>gleich</i>) is a compound of the +prefix a with <i>lic</i> body, shape, figure.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_11" href="#FNanchor_11" class="label">[11]</a> I am satisfied that logical identity is intended to mean sameness. I suppose +that the word identity, being Latin and a kind of international term, appeared +to logicians preferable to the Saxon word “sameness” or the German “Gleichheit.” +We need not look for any deeper reason for the adoption of the term.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_12" href="#FNanchor_12" class="label">[12]</a> Knowing that Mr. Peirce is one of the most prominent contributors to the +<i>Century Dictionary</i>, I may be pardoned for surmising that, perhaps with the exception +of the parenthesised word “(supposed)” he is the author of this passage and very +likely of most of the other quotations of philosophical terms we have adduced from +the same source.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_13" href="#FNanchor_13" class="label">[13]</a> <i>Die Principien der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung</i> by Johannes von Kries. See +also Meinong’s review of the book (in <i>Gött. gel Anz.</i>, No. 2, p. 56 et seqq.) and Ad. +Nitsche’s article on the subject (in <i>Vierteljahrsschrift für wiss. Phil.</i> of 1892. XVI. +1, p. 26).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_14" href="#FNanchor_14" class="label">[14]</a> By irregularity of detail we understand simply a lack of uniformity, but not +exceptions to law. If irregularity be defined as exception to law, we should say, +There is no irregularity in the world, while at the same time nothing is uniform: +for every particle of the world is in its time and space relations and otherwise different +from every other particle.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_15" href="#FNanchor_15" class="label">[15]</a> Arbitrary, as used here, means capricious, uncertain, unreasonable. A man’s +action is capricious if he is biassed by the present motive alone, without considering +other motives which he would have under other circumstances. A deliberate man +equalises, as it were, his actions by forming rules of conduct. An arbitrary man +does not recognise rules or laws, made either by himself or by others.</p></div> + +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_97">[97]</span></p> + +<h3 class="nobreak" id="LITERARY_CORRESPONDENCE_I">LITERARY CORRESPONDENCE</h3> + +</div> + +<h4 class="nobreak" id="GERMANY_I">I.<br> +<span class="smaller">RECENT EVOLUTIONARY STUDIES IN GERMANY.</span></h4> + +<p>Since Darwin’s death, his theory, which in Germany more than +elsewhere received its development, has but few decisive steps in +advance to point to, even though the circle of its adherents has +been enlarged and though in many respects and in special directions +it has been rendered more complete and placed upon a firmer foundation. +It is a gratifying fact, that most, if not all, of the recent +discoveries in zoology, palæontology, and particularly in developmental +history, are easily and completely reconcilable with the principles +originally established; so that the views which we have +reached on this subject have lost more and more the characters of +a purely hypothetical fabric.</p> + +<p>But the accurate investigations of developmental history have +unquestionably furnished the most important material in proof of +the theory in question, and the principles established in this department, +in the main the results of the labors of German investigators +(E. von Baer, Fritz Müller, E. Haeckel), have been verified in a +truly surprising manner.</p> + +<p>It is true that Darwin himself in no way undervalued the importance +of the results of the studies in question, but how little the +facts known at the time of the enunciation of his theory of natural +selection sufficed, is most clearly proved by the fact that E. von +Baer and Louis Agassiz, who at that time were perhaps the greatest +authorities in embryology, assumed a hostile attitude towards the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_98">[98]</span>new Darwinian theory. Agassiz’s combination of the points of +agreement of palæontology and embryology, his explanation of extinct +forms as “prophetic types,” proved a veritable hindrance to the +perception of the truth, and Carl Vogt, who was his co-worker at +that time, appears to have been the last to set up any opposition to +the “fundamental biogenetic principle,” that the development of the +individual repeats in an abbreviated form the history of his race. +Vogt, formerly the champion of advanced views, appears to-day as +the leader of the small band of the opposition.</p> + +<p>If we compare the recently published fourth edition of Haeckel’s +<i>Anthropogeny</i>, 1891, and the eighth edition of his <i>History of Creation</i>, +with the early editions, we cannot help remarking, with considerable +astonishment, despite the enormous increase of fresh +material, the fact that little in the old plans and principles of the +work needs correction. Even the bold generalisations, the inference +as to the identity of form of the original beginnings of all of the middle +or higher classes of animals, the “Gastræa Theory” of Haeckel, +at first so violently opposed, the stress laid upon the equivalence of +the blastoderms in the various orders of animals, nay, even many +of the animal genealogies, really only asserted as a working hypothesis, +have stood the test beyond all expectation; although Du +Bois-Reymond insinuated that the pedigrees of the heroes of +Homer were more worthy of credit. To appreciate the complete +victory of these ideas one need but refer to the discourse <i>On +Recapitulation in Embryology</i> with which A. Milnes Marshall opened +the meeting of the Biological Section of the British Natural History +Society at Leeds, September, 1890.</p> + +<p>The very conspicuous irregularities in the formation of organised +bodies, which formerly were regarded as monstrosities, or as the +freaks and riddles of the formative instinct, the hare-lips, the cleft +palates, cases of microcephaly, etc., or the conspicuous want of +symmetry in the physical structure of the plaice and sole, formerly +made use of by Mivart and Schimper as unassailable counterproofs +of Darwin’s doctrines, have shaped themselves into the most decisive +verifications of his theory; as in fact, generally, a number of the +most splendid evidences of the correctness of the theory have, as the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_99">[99]</span>result of exact investigations in organic evolution, proceeded from +the most obstinate of its supposed difficulties. Thus, for example, +as proof that birds are far removed from the other classes of vertebrates, +the circumstance had been cited that certain parts connected +with the visual organs are in them situated at the side of the brain, +instead of on the dorsal surface, as is the case with the other vertebrates. +But a more exact observation has shown that this variation +in formation is a secondary result, since in each previous period +of development these same organs in the young birds lie, exactly as +in the case of the other vertebrates, on the dorsal surface, and only +shortly before leaving the egg do they move downward to the sides. +In many cases where the development of parts preservable in fossil +conditions is under consideration, as for instance portions of the +skeleton, the hard integuments, and the teeth, a direct proof may, +by comparison, be furnished of the truth of the fact of the correspondence +of the embryological formations of living animals with +the final and permanent forms of their extinct representatives, a fact +which was indeed acknowledged by Agassiz and Vogt, but completely +misunderstood. We need only to recall to mind the +exact parallelism which Alexander Agassiz and Neumayer have +demonstrated to exist in the case of echinoderms, Huxley, Marsh, and +others in the formation of the wings of birds, the pelvis of birds, or +the hoofs of horses, in order to stamp this view as one that cannot +be refuted.</p> + +<p>Nevertheless, those opposed to this view, as Carl Vogt, His, +Heufen, and others, have not abandoned their position as a hopeless +one, and in recent years have relied particularly upon those cases +which Haeckel, and before him, Fritz Müller, characterised as a +falsification (cenogenesis⁠<a id="FNanchor_16" href="#Footnote_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a>) or a supplementary alteration and abbreviation +of the natural process of development. “Nature is no falsifier,” +these opponents proclaim with emphasis, and everything it +does is correct and true, and “this false heart alone brings untruth +and deceit into the true heaven,” they cry with Wallenstein. People +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_100">[100]</span>who rely on verbal sophistries merely betray thereby their want of +valid counter-arguments. A <i>mala fides</i> on the part of nature can of +course never be the subject of discussion among reasonable beings, +but a deviation in the process of development of certain varieties +from the typical path of the development of the remaining varieties +of the species, is <i>felt</i> as a falsification by every investigator who has +thoroughly studied the regular processes, for the reason that it has +a tendency to <i>obscure</i> the original facts. Thus, for example, in the +embryos of certain vertebrates the æsophagus is temporarily completely +closed, as Balfour has observed in young sharks, Bles and +Marshall in frogs; and this state of affairs may well be considered +as a falsification, since an animate being with a closed æsophagus is +a natural contradiction, which can never have existed and here happens +as a supplementary and temporary process.</p> + +<p>As a rule such deviations from the normal course may be classified +as consequences of a prolonged residence of the animal germs +in the egg or in the womb, the result of which is that owing to the +presence of an abundant quantity of nourishing yolk, or through +direct connection with the circulatory system of the mother, they in +the early stages of their development are relieved of the necessity of +acquiring nourishment through their own efforts, and therefore all +the contrivances necessary to that purpose may be dispensed with. +For this reason we find the primitive processes of development, as +Professor Sollas has lately shown, most frequently preserved in +marine animals which have never changed nor abandoned their element +in the course of the history of their species, in the case of +which, therefore, no occasion could ever have arisen for supplementary +changes in the process of their development. Much more frequently +do we meet with this change in the case of fresh-water +animals, for often the rapid currents of their elements, for example +a river, will not suffer these to leave the egg in any very helpless +larval condition, and in addition fresh water is subject to other unfavorable +changes, as the drying up of streams. Also the larvæ of +carnivorous animals, which from the very beginning of independent +life need more strength to acquire their means of existence, are so +completely developed in the richly provisioned eggs in which they +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_101">[101]</span>take their form, that they emerge therefrom in an almost perfected +state of being, as, for example, young sharks and cephalopods. In +this kind of animal life, as well as in the case of forms which are +brought forth alive from the parent, although they see the light of +day much later, comparatively, there takes place not only a great +abbreviation of the first stages of existence in the entering upon a +more direct path of development, but also changes occur in the form +of the original designs because of the limitation of room due to the +presence of yolk in the egg, the reason for which is easy to perceive. +In many other cases the mechanical cause of the change in development +can be directly recognised; for example, in the case of, the tree-toad +of the Antilles (<i>Hylodes marticinensis</i>), which, owing to the absence +of pools lasting through the dry season, is obliged of necessity +to remain in the egg during its tadpole stage, that is to say, to +skip this stage, as it were; for which reason the formation of external +gills in its case is entirely omitted.</p> + +<p>The explanation of the origin of new organs seemed at first to +afford an insuperable difficulty to the Darwinian theory, since, as +Mivart objected, it was not possible to perceive how natural selection +could be able to effect the formation of new organs unless they +executed corresponding functions from the very beginning. This +difficulty, however, has been completely overcome by the theory of +altered functions (<i>Functionswechsel</i>) which was first proposed by +Dorhn, and particularly in recent years by Kleinenberg. According +to this theory, in all these cases we have simply to deal with a +gradual change in form of already existing organs, which, originally +being used to perform one set of functions, are modified so as to perform +another. Thus the later developed organs of mastication and +the feelers of insects were originally organs of locomotion, legs; and +these in the still earlier stages of creeping motion performed appropriate +functions as the crooked appendages of the body-rings. The +wings of birds were, in their progenitors, forelegs; the tongue of +air-breathing vertebrates originated from the fish-bladder, which before +that was chiefly an organ of swimming.</p> + +<p>The knowledge thus acquired of the natural connection of the +processes of evolution also explains, according to Kleinenberg, why +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_102">[102]</span>organs which are at present completely useless, must yet necessarily +appear in the formation of the embryo; for example, the gill-openings +in the higher classes of vertebrates, which have no functions to perform +at any stage of vertebral development, and which furnished +Meckel the first intimation of the fundamental biogenetic law. But +as soon as it was explained that the gill-openings furnished the foundation +of the development of later-appearing organs with actual +functions to perform, it was rendered clear why they should continually +recur; namely, because they form the indispensable links +of a chain which extends from the dim past of the type in question +down to the present time.</p> + +<p>There is no doubt that profounder researches in evolutionary +history will furnish still more important results: for instance, the +more perfect elucidation of the pedigree of mammals; for in this +province even our domestic animals are not sufficiently investigated. +Every new effort in this direction, for example the recent work of +Klever on the evolution of the teeth of the horse, and other investigations +concerning the formation of special organs, has invariably +shown that much in this field yet remains to be discovered. We +have only to recall to mind the recent investigations relating to the +development of the pineal gland, which in the last decennium have +also led to the discovery of a rudimentary occipital eye, which seems +to have actually existed and performed functions in numerous early +representatives of the vertebrates, but to-day is simply a fact of history, +and has given rise to an organ which Descartes considered as +the seat of the soul. We may here also refer to the recent investigations +concerning the earlier developmental stages of the duckbills, +which have completely confirmed what the theory asserted in advance +and required; namely, that they fill the vacancy between the +egg-laying reptiles and the mammalia which bring forth their young +alive.</p> + +<p>Only a few years ago Carl Vogt vehemently opposed the opinion +of the duckbills being transitional types, and sought to explain +their inferior stage of organisation, which is also evidenced in their +low blood temperature, as the results of a stunting process (degeneration, +so called). They formed a degenerated branch of marsupials, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_103">[103]</span>nothing more. Later, the remarkable yet long anticipated +fact was revealed by Haacke and Caldwell, 1884, that the duckbills +are egg-laying mammals, a character which certainly could not have +been acquired through degeneration, but which simply shows that +they are closely related to extinct reptilian forms. In one other respect, +namely, with regard to their supply of teeth, the process of +degeneration must indeed be admitted. On this point, Poulton and +Thomas discovered a few years ago that in their early stages they +really do possess true teeth, which, however, just as in the case of +certain carnivorous cetacea, later completely disappear, and are replaced +by a sort of horny teeth. This, however, is really not a true +degeneration, but rather a special adaptation, doubtless beneficial +to the animal in some way or other; and with as little reason as +we may regard birds as a degenerated race in comparison with their +progenitors, because they have lost the numerous teeth which these +possessed, with just as little reason can we hold that the duckbills, +in their general organisation, have suffered any retrogression worth +mentioning. On the contrary, the recent investigations of Marsh +and Lemoine concerning the mammals of the Jurassic and Cretaceous +periods point more and more distinctly to the conclusion, +that there existed among these mammals a very large number which +possessed the same degree of organisation as the duckbills of to-day, +now represented by only a few species; a supposition which +the adherents of the theory of evolution made twenty-five years ago. +I do not know that the pedigrees of the heroes of Homer have been +so well preserved!</p> + +<p>In many other directions, however, speculation of late years +in Germany has considerably digressed from the facts of experience +and from all probability; especially with reference to the +questions of propagation, variation, and heredity. Here, first of all, +are to be mentioned the works of Weismann, <i>Ueber die Continuität +des Keimplasmas</i> (1885), <i>Die Bedeutung der sexuellen Fortpflanzung +für die Selectionstheorie</i> (1886), <i>Der Rückschritt in der Natur</i> (1886), +<i>Die Bedeutung der Richtungskörperchen für die Vererbungstheorie</i> +(1887), <i>Die Hypothese der Vererbung von Verletzungen</i> (1889), and +<i>Ueber Amphimixis</i> (1891).</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_104">[104]</span></p> + +<p>If we revert to the beginnings of this movement we shall find +that it is intimately connected with the more exact study of the processes +of fecundation as perfected through the researches of Strassburger, +the Hertwigs, and other investigators. In connection with +the ideas of Nägeli concerning the so-called idioplasm, the notion +was reached that the matter determinative of heredity was contained +in the nucleoli, and that by the union of the paternal and maternal +nucleoli the sum-total of the parental hereditary tendencies is transmitted +to the offspring. This view was to a certain degree verified +by the experiments of the brothers Hertwig in removing the nucleoli +of the eggs of the sea-urchin; the result being that eggs containing +the nucleoli alone, furnished, through artificial impregnation, results +resembling the female parent, whereas eggs from which the nucleoli +had been removed, furnished germs completely corresponding to the +traits of the male parent.</p> + +<p>Other processes of fecundation, to which we shall soon recur, +had since 1876 produced the impression in the minds of a number +of naturalists that the germ-material led an independent life in the +bodies of organisms, that it possessed only an internal development, +and required from the body nothing but nourishment in order +to multiply itself, and to develop its internal powers uninfluenced +by the various vicissitudes of the body. In the year 1876 Gustav +Jaeger in Germany, and Francis Galton, a cousin of Darwin, almost +at the same time in England, called attention to the observation +made some time previously, that in certain animals, particularly +in insects, the development of the egg into the young offspring +begins with the withdrawal of a small portion of the germ from the +component substance of the embryo, which remains at first unchanged +and only later multiplies. This observation was generalised +and accepted. At the commencement of every sexual multiplication +the germ-substance, after impregnation, is divided into two +parts, according to its future purpose; an ontogenetic or personal +part, out of which the body is built up, and a phylogenetic or germinal +part, which at first is stored up unused in the individual, but +later furnishes new germ-cells. This idea led Weismann to his view +of the continuity of the germ-plasm, which forms an unbroken line +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_105">[105]</span>of descent from the first beginnings of the species and which is simply +nourished by the organisms in which it has its temporary abode. +From this germ-plasm spring <i>secondarily</i> the cells that go to make +up the body (soma); but from these soma-cells no new <i>germ</i>-cells +can originate, and consequently none of its inherent or adscititious +qualities are capable of transmission. The somatic cells make up +the mortal and perishable forms of life, while the germ-cells alone +insure the further existence and immortality of the race.</p> + +<p>It is easy to perceive that these views, if they could be maintained, +would completely transform the Darwinian theory. Since, +if the somatic cells, that is, the body-parts of animals and plants, +with all their adaptations to soil and climate, to definite modes of +life, etc., are to be deprived of every power to transmit hereditary +characters, then the so-called Lamarckian theory, which should +really bear the name of Erasmus Darwin, would be deprived of +every foundation which it possesses. Neither the increase in +strength of the members of the body, acquired by use and practice, +nor their weakness created by their non-use could be inherited; and +in just as small a degree could changes caused by external influences, +bodily injuries, sickness, entail consequences which were inheritable. +This being the case, then also all those views would be untenable +which seek to explain the important effects of time as the result +of the accumulation and augmentation of the minute impressions +of the external environment. If the variations which are generated +by means of external influences are not capable of transmission, +then the direct adaptation must commence at the beginning in the +case of every following generation; an accumulation is impossible.</p> + +<p>We can observe, however, in every particular case, the complete +harmony in which every living being exists with its surroundings +and mode of life; and observe in closely related species the +most various adaptations to the elements in which they live: climate, +food, nay, even to the particular companions with which they associate; +with the result that many plants have shaped the structure of +their flowers to conform to the physical anatomy of the insect which +ordinarily effects their fertilisation, and that animals assume the figure +and form of some associate who is safe from hostile assaults, or even +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_106">[106]</span>completely adopt different modes of life where it is necessary to +enter a life-partnership with a strange animal or plant. But, granting +that the most widely extended capability of adaptation is a thing +of daily experience, there still arises the question how we shall explain +this quality, which can only be brought about by slow degrees, +without taking into account the factor of heredity in the transmission +of acquired qualities. The theory of Weismann attempts this, +in that it takes for granted an infinite variability in the germ-formative +materials, and guides the new forms and variations thus begotten +into the really true path, that is, into the most successful +paths, through the process of natural selection (that is, through the +survival of the fittest as regards environment and all other things). +According to this doctrine, external circumstances have no direct +influence whatever upon the variation of species, as Erasmus Darwin, +Lamarck, and the founder of the theory of natural selection +and all his followers up to that time supposed, but we have to +have recourse to a pure theory of natural selection, and call to our +aid an, even now, rather obscure phenomenon, occurring in connection +with sexual impregnation, which has been called “the expulsion +of the polar bodies,” an extrusion of minute qualities of +germ-plasm from the germ-cells while in union. By the processes +of crossing, which continually recur, a vast number of the most +manifold hereditary tendencies are united in the germ-material. +Then certain of these are ejected, so that others acquire supremacy; +and in this manner the way is opened for the origination of a vast +number of possible combinations. In this way the path is clear to a +theory of perfect mechanical variability, in which the germ-material +has only to transmit the characters which spontaneously arise in it, +and yet affords an investigator endowed with any imagination the +possibility of understanding the origin of the great variety and final +purpose of the world. It is Frohschammer’s “principle of the imagination +as the creator of the world” translated into comprehensible +formulæ. The simplicity thus reached by the elimination of all +direct influences from the external world, has won the adherency of +many investigators following in Darwin’s steps, particularly in England; +but whilst Wallace, Galton, Ray Lankester, and others have +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_107">[107]</span>expressed their full assent to it, other and not less eminent authorities, +as Herbert Spencer, Haeckel, Fritz Müller, and Virchow, +have emphatically rejected it.</p> + +<p>The reasons in favor of this assumption are, as is indeed the +whole view itself, mainly of a theoretical nature; the arguments of +the opposition are divided into philosophical and experiential propositions. +The philosophical opposition is mainly based on the fact +that, from the very beginning, there is assigned to the germ-material, +as it unceasingly continues its existence, an infinite variety of +capacities which the external world cannot affect, and that all progress +and advancement takes place as the result of the <i>loss</i> of the +originally endowed powers and tendencies. On this theory a family +of acrobats or race-horses would not acquire their powers through +the gradual augmentation by practice of their feats of skill and endurance, +but because these powers were originally resident in them, +and every factor incompatible with them was gradually eliminated. +On the other hand, these views approach in a dangerous degree to +the theories of predestination and preformation, the overthrow of +which has been justly regarded as one of the greatest advances of +science.</p> + +<p>Still more important must be considered the objections of empirical +science, which up to this time was completely convinced of +the heredity of acquired qualities. Popular experience, as well as +that of physicians, universally speaks of inherited disease-germs, and +in certain cases, particularly in mental diseases, physicians are so +thoroughly convinced of their inheritability that the first question +put to the relatives of such sufferers usually is whether the disease +has ever appeared in the parents or family of the patient. This +fact is so deeply grounded in the general belief, that the modern +naturalistic school of novelists, the school of Zola, Ibsen, and their +associates, are wont to devote their main efforts to the problem of +inherited evils. Now the inheritability of certain evil conditions, +even though proved, would not by any means be an absolute disproof +of Weismann’s theory; for, inclined as much as we may be to +derive diseases from mistakes and sins against a natural mode of +life, such as colds, drunkenness, dissipation, mental and bodily +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_108">[108]</span>over-exertion, we yet cannot deny <i>a priori</i> that blastogenic diseases, +or diseases originating in the germ-plasm, may exist, which without +any doubt would then be transmissible. It also does not lie +beyond the realms of possibility that congenital malformations, such +as hare-lips, supernumerary fingers, and the defects which show a remarkable +disposition to heredity, fall into this category. These +blastogenic germs of disease would then, of course, have to be distinguished +from the somatogenic diseases (or the diseases produced +in the body by external causes), which never could be inherited.</p> + +<p>From this point of view the question as to the hereditary consequences +of external injuries has given rise to great efforts to prove +experimentally the truth of this belief, which has existed for centuries. +In almost every part of the globe we meet with the assertion +that hornless cattle, such, for example, as are bred in South +America, or the tailless cats of the Isle of Man, or other domestic +animals with similar deficiencies, are descended from a progenitor +which lost its horns or its tail through disease or other mishap. +Since now, recently, similar assertions have again been put forward +to the effect that tailless cats are found among the descendants +of feline progenitors who have been robbed of their posterior ornaments +by an act of violence, and these cases have been discussed in +connection with the pangenesis theory of Darwin, according to which +each part of the body is believed to supply material contributions to +the germ-plasm, Weismann determined to institute experiments on +this point. He started the breeding of white mice whose tails were +regularly cut off, without finding as a result, from among 840 +young ones derived from such mutilated progenitors, a single one +having a malformation or missing tail. However, even this experiment +cannot be regarded as an absolute proof, as it at first view +might seem, and the negative result was foreseen by the writer of +these lines. It is a clear conclusion that if in the case of many +vertebrates, for example, salamanders and lizards, as well as in the +case of most invertebrates, missing limbs and tails are renewed in +the course of their lifetime, it would indeed be very remarkable if +their renewal should not take place, at least in the case of the complete +rejuvenation of new birth.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_109">[109]</span></p> + +<p>Darwin himself had concluded, from his own experience and +that of others, that injuries and similar inflicted acts of violence are +the cause of hereditary consequences only in cases where they bring +about some long-continued and wasting disease, and thus produce +some permanent effect on the bodily constitution. For this reason, +especially injuries to main nerve-tracts in parts near the centres are +readily accompanied by hereditary consequences, because they interfere +with the nutrition of the members supplied by them. +Brown-Séquard has observed in a great number of cases of guinea +pigs whose nerve-roots he had severed, that the offspring of the animals +operated upon developed diseases of the eyes, ears, and other +organs which conformed regularly to the character of the operation, +and could therefore be predicted; and also noted malformations +and deficiencies, amounting even to the complete disappearance of +the eye-balls, such as never arise or have been observed in these +animals without violent interference. His positive results regarding +the hereditability of the evil consequences of disturbing operations +have a decided advantage in numbers and scope over the negative +results of Weismann; and it is not clear how the belief in the +non-hereditability of somatic conditions will accommodate itself to +them.</p> + +<p>But if conditions of the body produced by such sudden interferences +have under certain circumstances entailed hereditary consequences, +how much more should we expect this same result from +slowly effected constitutional changes, which external influences, +working uninterruptedly for hundreds of years, bring about in an +organism which has been transported into a new element, into new +surroundings, or into a different climate. Not at all infrequently +does the coming together and union of two new organisms beget +hereditary changes which can be explained only through the direct +influence of the one upon the other. Thus, for example, in the +case of plants in hot countries which are protected against the assaults +of leaf-devouring ants by body-guards of smaller ants, and +also in species of quite different families, as, for example, in <i>Cecropia</i> +of the order <i>Euphorbiaceæ</i>, and in some <i>Triplaris</i> species among +the <i>Polygonaceæ</i>, we find little chambers, approachable through +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_110">[110]</span>small openings in the stems, which serve the ants protecting the +plants as dwelling and breeding places. Are we to believe now, in +regard to this fact, that these plants, so different in their nature, +have produced through voluntary variations the stems which contain +these openings, or are we to believe we have to deal here with +openings acquired through inheritance which originally were bored +in the stems by the ants at the most appropriate points? Surely +the first conclusion, which would uphold Weismann’s theory, has +but a very slight degree of probability in its favor, whilst the latter, +which would overthrow his view, is very highly probable. And +such examples could be cited in great numbers.</p> + +<p>It is also to be remembered that the power of variation is not +exhibited solely in sexually created individuals, as it should be according +to Weismann’s theory, but frequently also in non-sexual +multiplication, where no amphimixis (mingling) occurs. It is well +known that the majority of the sporting varieties of our trees, for +example, <i>Fagus sanguinea</i>, and the so-called weeping varieties, that +is, abnormal varieties with pendent twigs, forms with split, spotted, +or white leaves, are wont first to appear on single branches of old +trees, in which the continuity of the protoplasm unquestionably existed, +but no amphimixis or extrusion of the polar bodies took place. +It is also the generally received opinion of naturalists that the lowest +classes of animal and plant life are universally multiplied by +non-sexual means. And if this is so, it is not clear how higher +forms which sexually propagate can be derived from them, if the +latter have originally to furnish the fundamental conditions of variation. +The adherents of Neo-Darwinism will, accordingly, have to +furnish many additional facts if they wish to invest their theory +with any degree of probability.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">Carus Sterne.</span></p> + +<div class="footnotes"> + +<h5>FOOTNOTES:</h5> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_16" href="#FNanchor_16" class="label">[16]</a> <i>Cenogenesis</i>, from κενός, empty, fruitless (and γένεσις, birth); not from κοινός, +common, the derivatives of which are sometimes written “c<i>e</i>no.”—<span class="smcap">Ed.</span></p></div> + +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_111">[111]</span></p> + +<h4 class="nobreak" id="FRANCE_I">II.<br> +<span class="smaller">FRANCE.</span></h4> + +<p>The study of personality, from the point of view of pathological +psychology, has already supplied us with numerous books. +<span class="smcap">M. Alfred Binet</span>, in his fine work, <i>Les Altérations de la Personnalité</i>, +has undertaken to present systematically to us these alterations +in their entirety, while restricting himself to ascertained results, and +avoiding disputed points. He exhibits to us the “dismemberment +of the ego” in diseased states, the frequent rupture of that “unity +of consciousness” which is the principal attribute of the normal individual.</p> + +<p>Clinical observation has established the existence in certain +subjects of successive personalities, and in others that of co-existing +personalities; the experiences of suggestion have at last allowed of +analogous morbid phenomena being provoked, in such a manner +that cases may be varied and rendered still more instructive. The +simple movements provoked in normal persons in states of distraction, +of which many very curious examples may be found in M. Binet’s +book, are the recognised mark of a subconsciousness; but it +is often possible, under the same conditions and with the same processes, +to provoke in a hypnotisable hysteric individual an actual +sub-personality, that is to say, to augment the phenomena which +attentive observers have long since remarked in every-day life.</p> + +<p>It cannot be doubted that, on the one hand, it is possible to +produce in an insensible limb a great variety of subconscious actions, +and all sorts of reactions; and when they are recorded by the +graphic method, it is perceived that with the fingers of his insensible +hand, the subject has made movements the form of which varies +according to the receiving apparatus (the dynamograph, drum, +pencil, etc.). These movements thus exhibit the truly psychological +marks of adaptation, and seem to reveal the existence of an intelligence +which is other than that of the ego of the subject, and which +acts without his assistance and even unknown to him.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_112">[112]</span></p> + +<p>On the other hand, numerous experiences of very different kinds +show that the subject whose anæsthetic arm, for example, is pricked, +can have an idea of the stimulation, although he does not perceive +it. He does not feel the prickings, but the excitation calls forth the +idea of their number: he counts them as a normal individual would +do; “only, in hysterical individuals, the first part of the process +occurs in one consciousness, and the second in another.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_17" href="#Footnote_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a></p> + +<p>It can hardly be denied that these different consciousnesses are +distinct; since experience proves that each can have its own perceptions, +its own memory, and even a moral character. However, +their relative value with respect to each other matters little. We are +compelled to consider, with M. Ribot, the ego as a “coördination” +of states of consciousness, admitting of infinitely variable groupings. +According to the old conception of the ego, the personality, with respect +to secondary consciousnesses, was compared to a coachman +who had ceased to have control over his horses. This comparison +is now insufficient, since it may happen that the coachman falls +asleep on the box, and that one of the horses then governs the set, +regulating, more or less perfectly, the pace of the others by its own +gait. Spiritualists, however, will never consent to put the ego in +the place of the coachman. “A stone detached from the complex +structure of the personality,” M. Binet now tells us, “can become +the starting point of a new structure, which rises rapidly by the side +of the old. Whereupon a disaggregation of the psychological elements +is produced.” This comparison is certainly more precise and +more in accordance with facts.</p> + +<p>Moreover, there remains to be explained how the mental compound +which constitutes the ego has been constructed from its elements. +M. Binet shows, <i>à propos</i> of this question, that the association +of ideas is powerless to explain the genesis of personality; +associations alone, as proved by the experiences of suggestion, +are not sufficient to restore forgotten memories. Neither is memory +the sole factor in personality; since, in certain conditions a person +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_113">[113]</span>may, while preserving the consciousness and the memory of certain +of his mental states, nevertheless repudiate these mental states and +consider them as foreign to himself.</p> + +<p>This question is still an open one. But there exist certainly +some grounds for our seeking in the division of consciousness the +key to certain psychological facts, like unconscious cerebration. +Such a key would be the action of detached consciousnesses and detached +memories, that afterwards immediately enter the current of +general consciousness. Finally, “it is possible,” as M. Binet says +in conclusion, “that consciousness may be the privilege of certain +of our psychic acts; it is possible also that it exists everywhere in +our organism, and it may be even that it accompanies every manifestation +of life.”</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>In his new work, <i>Agnosticisme</i>, <span class="smcap">M. de Roberty</span> studies with special +care the position of modern doctrines with regard to the unknown, +the great <i>x</i> of philosophic speculations—God, Idea, Matter, +Noumenon or Unknowable. Although perhaps a little hastily written, +and somewhat obscure, his book nevertheless enforces conviction. +“Our conception of the world,” says M. de Roberty, “embraces solely +the things that we <i>know</i> (feel, perceive, imagine, analyse, compare, +etc.), and does not comprise the least jot or tittle of what we <i>do not +know</i>. <i>For us</i>, therefore, there can be no question of any relations +except between two classes of <i>known</i> elements: that which constitutes +the object of scientific research, and that which is outside of +science. The latter class represents <i>our</i> unknown, which is always +<i>relative and purely human</i>.” Here, indeed, we have the true point +of view, that which we shall all reach, though perhaps at first unknown +to ourselves; and I shall be much surprised if the philosophers +do not at last decide to wipe out the formidable <i>Unknowable</i> set up by +Spencer as the ultimate entity. We shall speak no more of the +fathomless universe, but of the still unexplored universe; of the unknown, +not of the unknowable.</p> + +<p>There is, however, another aspect of the question. Let us suppose +the unknown got rid of; or to be more precise,—and if we regard +with M. de Roberty the psychic centres as special receivers in +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_114">[114]</span>which the cosmical energy empties itself, resolving itself into sensation +and idea, and from whence it spreads itself anew as motion,—let +us suppose that we have summed up all the energies received +and emitted, and verified the law which reduces memory to the conservation +of energy; let us suppose in fine that philosophy shall +have found in the ego the synthesis of the non-ego, expressed “in +symbolic abbreviations and in signs,” and shall have realised the +“logical monism” which reduces things to their ideas: would the +intellect—and would the sensibility—even then be completely satisfied? +Can we conceive a state in which the curiosity of man as to +all that concerns himself will be at rest, and when he will cease to +be disquieted about the cause of suffering and of life? Kant long +ago propounded this question. But, according to M. de Roberty, +the thinker who is “a prey to the afflux of emotion referred to by +Kant,” the man “given over to the desire for another kind of knowledge +than that of experience,” are, in the category of intellectual +emotions, diseased and “perverted” persons. “The sentiments, +so varied in aspect and in strength, which inspire us,” writes he, +“the contemplation of the unknown, determine the mental illusion +which materialises, so to say, our ignorance and transforms the unknown +into the unknowable.”</p> + +<p>Would it be inconsistent, however, to preserve the emotion of +the unknown without “materialising” it, without pronouncing any +dangerous scientific <i>ignorabimus</i>? M. de Roberty does not accept +this situation,—which was that of Littré. I do not know whether +any one will discover the “vaccine,” as he calls it, “of the pessimist +emotion which has produced agnosticism or latent religiosity.” If +this constitutes a mental malady, I fear much that it will be incurable. +As long as there is unhappiness in life, there will also be +unsatisfied curiosity, and for a very long time to come, inquietude.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>The last publication of <span class="smcap">Lombroso</span> and <span class="smcap">Laschi</span>, <i>Le Crime politique +et les Revolutions, par rapport au droit, à l’anthropologie criminelle +et à la science du gouvernement</i> (Political Crime and Revolutions, +in their Relation to Law, Criminal Anthropology, and the Science +of Government) of which we here have a French translation, is, I +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_115">[115]</span>will not say, the worst written, but the most confused work imaginable. +Its arrangement is clear, but its examples are given without +any order whatever. The facts presented are abundant, but they are +taken rather too much at haphazard, and often too uncritically. The +worst is that its very thesis is weak, badly formulated or elusive in +places. What a pity it is that so much erudition should be expended, +and so many valuable data be brought together without better success +in displaying to the best advantage these riches, and also, let me +say, without so many times having had occasion to appear so clearly +in the wrong! M. Lombroso remains unmoved, unfortunately, in his +high sounding and unqualified hypothesis of “diseased genius.” He +continues to develop it and to defend it in this latest book of his, +which is replete with instructive details, and which is undoubtedly +the first considerable attempt at an etiology of revolutions and of +political crime.</p> + +<p>The complex doctrine of Lombroso could be sufficiently summed +up, if I am not mistaken, by uniting word to word—by the mathematical +sign of equality—philoneism (or the love of novelties) with +the revolutionary spirit, the revolutionary spirit with genius, genius +with insanity, insanity with criminality, and criminality, finally, with +progress. But what a detestable thing progress would then be! +We should have to protect ourselves against it as we do against a +pestilence. The evolution of societies does not take place without +great waste and loss, as we all know. It should be carefully shown +what these losses are. The study of the conditions of social progress +ought to be made in greater detail than is here found. The terms +of the imagined equation, which here hovers before our eyes, should +in fine, if any comparison is to be effected between them, be subjected +to a much more exact quantitative and qualitative analysis.</p> + +<p>For example, let us take genius. Of what kinds of genius does +Lombroso speak? It seems to be sufficient for him that a man has +attracted attention, and made himself talked about, to entitle him +to be called great, while perhaps he is only a blusterer, a braggart, +a servile imitator, a mere <i>homunculus</i>. In this way the quantity of +geniuses and talented individuals he has unearthed is something +extraordinary. The result of this is a radical error in his tables of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_116">[116]</span>the distribution of geniuses. The superiority that he attributes, in +this respect, to certain of our southern departments, as compared +with the Norman departments, for example, would have to be reversed +if we considered the relative quality and kind of the genius +involved. For the same reason, the relation established between +genius and republican modes of government is undoubtedly not so +precise and simple as is stated. But the worst of it is that in thus +augmenting the number of men of genius, it is found that we have, +in consequence of the above mentioned equation, also increased the +number of the demented and the degenerate!</p> + +<p>If, moreover, it is true that the conservative mind, with less +genius, insanity, and criminality, is evidence of the senility of the +race, how can we accept the thesis that genius and the spirit of +innovation are also absolute evidence of a neurasthenic condition? +Shall we deny sound nerves to robust and vigorous youth? This, +indeed, is not what Lombroso wished to assert. Yet the famous +thesis always confronts us: <i>Latet anguis in herba</i>. The least sign of +degeneracy is enough for him to brand a man, and not only are all +geniuses in his eyes unbalanced, but even the insane are without +any ado baptised geniuses; with the result that all is heaped together +in one great mass—genius, insanity, and spirit of revolution.</p> + +<p>I shall not dwell any longer on these criticisms. They are +simply intended as an admonition to the learned M. Lombroso +against the allurements of a badly founded theory, and against the +dangers arising from a too hasty preparation of his books. Whatever +may be its defects, he has at least brought together in his +present book many ideas. I advise all to read with care what he +says about women (and how many will find him misoneistic on this +point!), concerning their great influence in <i>rebellions</i>, which are +always barren of results, and their impotence in <i>revolutions</i>, which +are always productive of good. In the second part of his work, +namely, in the section entitled <i>Juridical and Political Applications</i>, +nearly all he says is to be commended. I agree with the authors—or +I do not wish to forget M. Laschi—as to what they tell us in relation +particularly to pettifogging parlementarianism and public +instruction. Their conclusions are perhaps not connected with the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_117">[117]</span>thesis in any very intimate manner. But this is not of much consequence, +as they possess an independent value of their own.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>In a previous communication I referred to the work of Savvas-Pacha +on Musulman jurisprudence. I have now to announce a +work entitled <i>Souvenirs du Monde musulman</i>, by <span class="smcap">M. Ch. Mismer</span>, +(published by Hachette,) the fourth and last volume of a valuable +series which is greatly deserving of attention. M. Mismer, who has +lived a long time in the East—at Constantinople, in Crete, and in +Egypt—and was acquainted with the leading personages of the +Empire, does not hesitate to return here to the theory which he set +forth more than twenty years ago in his <i>Soirées de Constantinople</i>, his +theory, namely, of the social advantages, and even the superiority, +of Islamism over Christianity; subject however to the special worth +of the races which belong to either of these two forms of religion. +This opinion is not lightly uttered, and it will appear the more +striking in view of the present crisis of social and moral decomposition +which is now spreading throughout the western nations.</p> + +<p>In the work of M. Mismer will be found some of the great and +striking qualities of the observing and thoughtful mind. In connection +with a special problem of great importance in public instruction, +that of heredity, I shall call to the attention of my readers +the following statement, made with reference to the young men of +the “Egyptian Mission” in France, directed by M. Mismer for ten +years. “The capacity of a pupil,” says he, “was always found to +be intimately connected with the cerebral culture of his ancestors +and the faculties constituting the superiorities of his race.” “It was +the same,” adds he, “from the moral standpoint.” Undoubtedly, +if M. Mismer had taken the pains to make a note of the facts +summed up in his statement, and to present the full case of the numerous +pupil’s that he has had under his care, he would have been +able to furnish science with data of the greatest value. Let us at +least receive his lessons as he offers them to us. They are the fruit +of the experience of a “man of action,” and it speaks well for an +observation that it has rendered good service in practice.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">Lucien Arréat.</span></p> + +<div class="footnotes"> + +<h5>FOOTNOTES:</h5> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_17" href="#FNanchor_17" class="label">[17]</a> The hypothesis of the division of consciousness explains, consequently, much +better than that of the motive force of mental images, the facts of automatic writing +(spiritism). [The works of Binet, Roberty, and Lombroso are published by Alcan.]</p></div> + +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_118">[118]</span></p> + +<h3 class="nobreak" id="CRITICISMS_AND_DISCUSSIONS_I">CRITICISMS AND DISCUSSIONS.</h3> + +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h4 class="nobreak" id="COMTE_AND_TURGOT">COMTE AND TURGOT.</h4> + +</div> + +<p class="noindent"><i>To the Editor of The Monist</i>:</p> + +<p>Your “note of inquiry” mentioned on p. 611 of the last <i>Monist</i> is answered in +full by Littré in <i>Auguste Comte et la Philosophie Positive</i>, where Turgot’s name +heads the third chapter. He shows that the latter discovered the law of the three +stages, theological, metaphysical, and positive, by the following quotation from his +<i>Histoire des progrès de l’esprit humain</i>.</p> + +<p>“While the connection between physical effects was yet unknown, nothing was +more natural than to suppose that they were produced by intelligent beings, invisible +and resembling ourselves; for what else could they have resembled? Everything +that happened without the intervention of man, had its god, whose worship was +soon established by fear or hope, and this worship was conceived in accordance +with the deference accorded powerful men; for the gods were only more powerful +men and more or less perfect according as they were the product of an age more or +less enlightened as to the true perfections of humanity. When philosophers had +recognised the absurdity of these fables, without however having obtained true +light upon natural history, they imagined an explanation of the causes of phenomena +by abstract expressions, such as essences and faculties: expressions that nevertheless +explained nothing and that were reasoned about as if they had been beings, +new divinities substituted for the old ones. These analogies were followed out, and +faculties were multiplied to account for each effect. It was only very late, in observing +the mechanical action that bodies have upon one another, that other hypotheses +were drawn from this mechanics, (<i>de cette mécanique</i>) which mathematics +could develop and experience verify.”</p> + +<p>Littré calls attention to “the great sureness of judgment” that led Turgot to +cite only physical phenomena when he spoke of those that had ceased to be interpreted +either theologically or metaphysically. “When he wrote this passage, positivity +(I use this word, a necessary creation of M. Comte’s) was only beginning to +reach chemical phenomena and had not yet attained those of biology and sociology.”</p> + +<p>But, says Littré, “after reserving the rights of priority for this eminent thinker, +there is nothing to prevent M. Comte from keeping all the part that he had made +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_119">[119]</span>himself and that belongs to him. Three principal points mark Comte’s independence +of Turgot. The latter saw in the conception nothing more than an idea to +meditate upon; Comte saw in it a sociological law; Turgot did not attach to it a +sketch of human development; Comte developed with the aid of this law the whole +historical series; Turgot did not perceive that he held one of the necessary elements +of a philosophy; Comte, in the same flight of thought, went from history become +science to philosophy become positive. The sociological law, isolated in Turgot, +makes part, in Comte, of a vast whole: there were therefore two independent creations. +Either M. Comte had not read Turgot, or, more probably, he had read him +at a time when this passage, which to-day awakens attention, had no particular +significance.”</p> + +<p>The fourth chapter in Littré’s Life of Comte has for heading the names of Kant +and Condorcet. The whole of the former’s remarkable sketch of general history is +given and reference is made to the letter in chap. viii, where Comte, in 1824, being +twenty-six years old, says to M. d’Eichthal, his former pupil, “I have read and +reread with infinite pleasure Kant’s little treatise; it is prodigious for the epoch, +and if I had known it six or seven years sooner it would have saved me trouble. I +am delighted that you have translated it; it can contribute very efficaciously to preparing +minds for positive philosophy. Its general conception or at least its method +is still metaphysical, but the details show the positive spirit at every instant. I had +always regarded Kant not only as a very strong head, but as the metaphysician that +approaches the nearest to positive philosophy. But this reading has greatly fortified +and especially given precision to my conviction in that regard. If Condorcet +had had knowledge of this writing, which I do not believe, very little merit would +remain to him, since he can pretend only to that of the conception, which is almost +as firm and, in some respects, even clearer in Kant. As for me, after this reading +I can find in myself, up to the present time, no other value than that of having +systematised and fixed the conception that had been sketched by Kant unknown to +me, which I owe chiefly to a scientific education; and even the most positive and +distinct step that I have taken after him, seems to me only the discovery of the law +of the passage of human ideas through the three stages, theological, metaphysical, +and scientific; a law that appears to me to be the foundation of the work whose +execution Kant has counselled. I thank my lack of erudition to-day; for if my +work, such as it is now, had been preceded by a study of Kant’s treatise, it would +have lost much of its value in my eyes. I conceive now, as you said, that, for the +German philosophers that are familiar with this treatise, my work will really have +a great effect only with the second part.” This work was a short one reprinted in +Saint-Simon’s <i>Catéchisme des industriels</i> and called “A System of Positive Politics.” +It had been inserted two years before, under the title of “A Plan of the +Work Necessary for the Reorganisation of Society,” in a pamphlet of Saint-Simon’s, +without Comte’s name, and it was because the latter insisted, this time, upon an +acknowledgment of his authorship that Saint-Simon broke with him. The “second +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_120">[120]</span>part,” which was to produce the great effect upon the German philosophers, never +appeared; or rather, it soon grew to be the <i>Course of Positive Philosophy</i>, begun on +the 2d of April, 1826, before Humboldt, Blainville, and other celebrated listeners.</p> + +<p>The term <i>positive philosophy</i> had long been used by Saint-Simon and his school, +Comte among the rest, not in the special sense that the latter now gave it, but as a +“generic name for the whole of science.” The first use of the words as we now +understand them is in a letter from Comte to M. d’Eichthal, dated Aug. 5, 1824. +“I cannot help recalling your judicious reflection upon the influence that social +physics, once formed, will have upon scientific philosophy. I go even further than +you, for I think that it will be only then that a veritable philosophy of the sciences +can exist. All the philosophical ideas that are there to-day, although very precious +up to that time, appear to me to have nothing more than a simply provisory (provisoire) +character. I shall speak a little about this relation in the general preface +that I announce to you, where I shall explain that the true title of my work would +be <i>positive philosophy</i>, and that if I preferred <i>politics</i>, it is because that is the most +urgent philosophical application and the one that is to found the science, but that +later I or you or others will complete this system of ideas by the encyclopedic re-coinage +of all our positive cognitions (connaissances), which ought really to be conceived +as a single mass, although, for good culture, it is indispensable to preserve +and to push even, in one sense, further than it is, the division of labor, so that each +special savant can always, subsequently, conceive the relation of his branch and +even of his twig to the universal trunk.”</p> + +<p>In a letter of about this date Comte refers to his habit of never rewriting anything. +His memory permitted him to look upon a volume as finished when it had +been thought out and before a line had been written. But even in his letters we +notice some of the disadvantages of this procedure, which, while conducive to unity, +sacrifices literary form.</p> + +<p>It is true that Comte studied under Saint-Simon; but, according to Littré, his +purely philosophical dependence was very slight, while his influence upon his +master was important. “What forms the distinguishing characteristic of Saint-Simon +at the epoch when he lived, is the social destination that he assigns without +hesitating to the ideas that preoccupy him. He has, as we have seen, only the most +confused notion of what this philosophy will be; but, no matter what it is to be, he +consecrates it in advance to the reorganisation of society.”</p> + +<p>As regards Condorcet, Comte enthusiastically acknowledges his indebtedness +to the “Sketch of an Historical Table of the Progress of the Human Mind,” and +even goes beyond the facts, as he did in his praise of Kant.</p> + +<p>Littré makes a fair division of credit among others as well as those already +named, and concludes as follows: “Turgot had discovered that human conceptions, +at first theological, afterwards become metaphysical and end by being positive. +Kant had known that history is a natural phenomenon, subjected to a determinate +course, and Condorcet, pushed harder than his predecessors by advancing time,” +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_121">[121]</span>(he had been condemned to death) “had attempted to trace a table that should put +in evidence the enchainment of the progresses of civilisation. These are great +things, but they are still only rudiments; for neither Turgot nor his successors +make use of the discovered law to found upon this general fact evolution; Kant, +who perceives clearly the necessity of conceiving history as regulated by the conditions +inherent to humanity, is unable to base this important notion on anything better +than an <i>à priori</i> idea” (the metaphysical principle that nature does nothing in +vain, and that as human faculties do not reach their development in the individual, +who is ephemeral, they must do so in the species, which is durable) “and thus he +leaves it incapable of fixing the attention of a century whose tendencies were more +and more positive; lastly Condorcet has no other guide than the negative philosophy +of the eighteenth century in a work to which it could bring only contradiction.”</p> + +<p>John Stuart Mill says of Comte that “far from pretending to originality when +he had really no right to do so, he was eager to attach his most original thoughts +to every germ of a similar idea that he met with among his predecessors.”</p> + +<p>Speaking for himself, Littré says of the law of the three stages, “I do not reject +it, I restrain it. As long as we remain in the scientific order and consider the conception +of the world first theological, then metaphysical, finally positive, the law of +the three stages has its full efficacy in directing the speculations of history.... +But in history all is not comprised in the scientific order. M. Comte, who has said +somewhere that it is necessary to suppose, at the beginning of humanity, certain +notions that were neither theological nor metaphysical, has indicated the germ, I +will not say of my objection, but of my restriction. In fact this law of the three +stages comprehends neither industrial, nor moral, nor æsthetic development. It has +however, the excellent character of being relative to the speculations in which evolution +by filiation is most manifest and consequently of giving a positive notion of +the march of history.”</p> + +<p>Is it true, as stated on p. 565 of <i>The Monist</i> for July, that Stuart Mill adopted +Hume’s “erroneous conception of causality” to the extent implied in the following +passage? “This idea of ‘sequence’ however was exactly Hume’s mistake, adopted +by Mr. Mill, and through Mr. Mill popularised among English thinkers. If the +nature of cause and effect were really constituted by invariable sequence, then the +night might be called the effect of the day because night is invariably consequent +upon day.”</p> + +<p>The only authority at hand on the island from which I write is Clemenceau’s +translation of Mill’s “Auguste Comte and Positivism,” where, on p. 61, I read as +follows, “The succession of day and night is just as much an invariable succession +as the alternate exposition of the earth’s two opposite sides to the sun. Yet day +and night are not the cause of each other; why? Because their succession, although +invariable, according to our experience, is not so unconditionally: these phenomena +succeed each other only upon the condition that the presence and the absence of +the sun succeed each other; and if this alternation were to cease, day and night +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_122">[122]</span>would not follow each other. There are thus two kinds of uniformities of succession, +one without conditions, the other dependent on the former: laws of causation, +and other successions which depend on these laws.”</p> + +<p>In a note Mill refers to his <i>System of Deductive and Inductive Logic</i>.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">Louis Belrose, Jr.</span></p> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h4 class="nobreak" id="SOME_REMARKS">SOME REMARKS UPON PROFESSOR JAMES’S DISCUSSION OF ATTENTION.</h4> + +</div> + +<p>In his recent treatise on psychology Professor James discusses in an interesting +and suggestive way the relation of ideation to attention, maintaining that “ideational +preparation ... is concerned in all attentive acts.” Attention is “anticipatory +imagination” or “preperception” which prepares the mind for what it is to experience. +Thus the schoolboy, listening for the clock to strike twelve, anticipates in +imagination and is prepared to hear perfectly the very first sound of the striking.</p> + +<p>It is undoubtedly true that in the form of attention we term expectant, where +we are awaiting <i>some given impression</i>, there is a representing, antedating experience, +which may be a preparatory preperception. But with a wrong imaging of what is +to be experienced there is hindrance, as when in a dark quiet room we are led to +expect sensation of light but actually receive sensation of sound. Very often, indeed, +our anticipations make us unprepared for experience. Further, the experiments +adduced by Professor James from Wundt and Helmholtz are in the single +form of expectant attention, and we must remark that in these experiments the reagent +is also experimenter, and this introduces a new attention, consciousness of +consciousness, and that of a peculiar kind, which complicates an already complex +consciousness. In general we may say that experimentally incited consciousness is +artificial, at least as far as it feels itself as such, and for certain points like simple +attention this tends to vitiate results. Self-experimentation or experiment on those +conscious of it as such may mislead in certain cases, and must, so far as this element +of consciousness of experiment is not allowed for. In physical science things +always act naturally whether with observation or experiment, but in psychology +observation, other things being equal, is more trustworthy than experiment.</p> + +<p>In all cases of expectant or experimentally expectant attention, the attention +does not, however, lie in the expectancy or in the imaging as such, but it is merely +the will effort concerned in these operations. Yet as we may expect without effort, +and preconceive without volition, attention is necessarily involved in neither. A +perception or a preperception is an attention only as accomplished by will with +effort, but only an unattention when purely involuntary. Professor James’s use of +attention as preperception brings us back to the common idea of attention, as any +consciousness which cognises something. This is so inbred in thought and language +that it is most difficult to avoid using the term in this sense. Many psychologists +like Mr. James and Mr. Sully frequently mention attention as a will phenomenon +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_123">[123]</span>but they do not treat it under will, and they constantly return to the cognition meaning. +Höffding, however, treats attention under psychology of will. Attention as +the exercise of will in building up and maintaining cognitive activity, is naturally +treated under cognition; but it is on the whole safer and better to discuss attention +under will so as to keep it sharply distinguished from the presentation form which +it vitalises. I have endeavored to hold the term strictly to this sense, yet it is not +unlikely I may sometimes unwittingly countenance the common confusion, but trust +the instances will be few.</p> + +<p>When we have, then, a case of expectant attention we must distinguish the attention +in the imaging from the attention in the actual cognising. It is, indeed, +true for us almost invariably that cognitive strain without immediate realisation is +incentive to ideating. In listening in the night in vain for a sound we hear in imagination +many sounds, and we form preparatory ideas of what we are to hear. +Sense-adjustments call up a train of sensations in ideal form. But it is obvious that +low intelligences which have no power of expectancy or ideation do yet really attend. +The very first cognitions and all early cognitions by their very newness and +difficulty were attentions long before ideation was evolved. With low organisms, +as cognitive power extends only to the present in time and space, immediacy of reaction +is imperatively demanded, and every tension of cognitive apparatus is immediately +directive of motor apparatus so that suitable motion is at once accomplished. +The cognition, though dim and evanescent factor, is yet powerfully energised, +and so a true attention. Always with lowest sentiencies, and often with +higher, pain is suddenly realised without anticipation, followed quickly by attention +as strong effort to cognise the nature and quality of the pain-giver and so to effectually +get rid of pain-giver and pain.</p> + +<p>Preliminary idea, then, cannot occur in early attentions and in late attentions +it is by no means necessary. It is said that we see only what we look for, but it +must be answered that seeing commonly happens without any looking for. The +kindergarten child, Professor James to the contrary notwithstanding, is not confined +in his seeing to merely those things which he has been told to see and whose names +have been given him. A child continually asks, What is that? and is quick to discern +the absolutely new and strange. He accomplishes a wide variety of attentions +without ideas and gives himself almost entirely to immediate presentations.</p> + +<p>To be sure, every one sees only what he is prepared to see, only what is made +possible for him by his mental constitution as determined by his own pre-experience +and the experience of his ancestors, but this does not signify ideation. Every cognising +is conditioned by the past, but this does not call for a reawakening and projecting +in ideal form at every instance of cognitive effort, before any real cognition +is reached.</p> + +<p>In fact, many, if not the most of our attentions, are merely intensifyings of +some present cognition, of some cognitive psychosis which has simply come or happened. +Take the instance of attention to marginal retinal images, this certainly +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_124">[124]</span>does not always imply preperception, the forming of an idea of what we are to see, +though in the cases mentioned by Professor James it may. For example, I was +writing the above seated with my profile to the window when I became suddenly +aware, through the physiological agency of a marginal image, of a moving object to +my right. This perception of bare undefined object was spontaneous, a pure given; +I exercised no will in attaining it, and so the state of cognition was not an attention. +However, by attending, by intensifying the cognition by will effort, I perceive that +the indefinite object is a man walking on the sidewalk, who is of a certain height, +clothed in a certain way, etc. I do not trace the least ideation in the whole process, +the slight attending as act of will did not imply any anterior or posterior idea +or representation. The reason for the will act was the intrinsic interest of movement, +and this intrinsic interest arises in the fact that moving objects have had for +all life a special pleasure-pain significance, the moving object is the most dangerous, +and so motion perceived has become ingrained in mind as a special stimulant of attention. +This habit of attentiveness to things in motion survives and continues for +cases where it is of no use and even of harm; thus, in the present instance, it diverts +me from my work. It is obvious that attention often occurs in the same way +for other senses without preliminary idea.</p> + +<p>On the whole we must conclude that attention is a much abused term, and it is +to be hoped that psychologists will for the future keep to the definite and best use +of the term; namely, to denote cognitive effort in all its degrees and modes.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">Hiram M. Stanley.</span></p> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h4 class="nobreak" id="IS_MONISM_ARBITRARY">IS MONISM ARBITRARY?</h4> + +</div> + +<p>In Vol. II, No. 3, of <i>The Monist</i>, a very kind criticism appeared from the pen +of Mr. Francis C. Russell of the doctrine of a double-faced unity of mind and matter. +It was said that this doctrine is very far from inducing that final satisfaction which +we rightly expect of a competent theory, and the critic propounded as a possible +explanation of mental phenomena the postulate of a conservation of spirit. He calls +spirit the elementary basis of consciousness considered as a quality. Spirit would +be the subjectivity of nature, the elements of feeling, or as Professor Morgan calls it +metakinesis; and consciousness would originate in the same way as electricity, i. e., +by rending spirit asunder into positive and negative spirit so as to produce a tension. +This would account for the appearance and disappearance of consciousness in that +spiritual “dynamo” which is called the nervous system.</p> + +<p>This proposition seems to be highly acceptable because it stands upon the principle +of a conservation of substance and attempts to represent the phenomenon of +consciousness as due to a transformation. But does it for that reason remove the +difficulties of the doctrine of a double-faced unity of nature, which, as Mr. Russell +says, “is open to the charge of being arbitrary and brings no access of insight”? +Is not perhaps the term double-faced unity (which is none of my invention, and +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_125">[125]</span>which I have been careful to avoid) a misleading and unsatisfactory term? Why +should nature be double-faced? Why are feeling and motion the only two attributes +of natural phenomena? Is this not arbitrary? Could nature not be just as +well a treble or quadruple-faced unity. Nature might possess, as Spinoza actually +declares, infinite attributes of which these two only, viz. extension and thought, i. e. +motion and feeling, happen to be known to us.</p> + +<p>It is this apparent arbitrariness which bars our insight and deprives us of the +satisfaction that ought to attend the real solution of a problem. But let us avoid +the term double-faced unity; let us speak of the subjectivity and the objectivity of +nature, and the clouds will disappear.</p> + +<p>The doctrine of a double-faced unity has been criticised as dualism, and the +proposition that nature consists of two radically different attributes—exactly of two, +not more and not less—must most decidedly appear as dualism. But is it dualistic +to say that every subject appears to its objects not as a subject but as an object +among other objects? Certainly not.</p> + +<p>The relativity of the terms subject and object affords us the key to a comprehension +of the situation. This world of ours is a world of relations. The phenomena +of nature exhibit an unceasing activity; they consist of constant changes, and every +change, every motion, has a whence and a whither. Every transformation is a +series of events among which any prior one is called cause and any subsequent one +effect.</p> + +<p>If we regard feeling and motion as two attributes of nature, we are actually on +the brink of dualism, and we shall understand how Spinoza, in order to escape from +dualism and arrive at a monistic view, assumed without any plausible argument the +existence of an infinite number of attributes. This assumption however is of no +avail, for the problem would arise: How is it that we know only two of all these +infinite attributes? Why do we not know any other? and why are we unable to +form even a dim notion of any other? If they exist why do they exhibit no effects +upon us? Perhaps because we ourselves and this world of ours consist only of +two! And if they exhibit no effects upon us and upon our world, can they be said +to exist at all? Might we not, in that case, consider them as non-existent and count +the two known attributes alone as actual realities? Thus the dualism would remain; +and Spinoza’s monism is only apparent.</p> + +<p>The same objection cannot be made if we remain conscious of the fact that +feelings are as much abstracts as motions. Subjectivity and objectivity are correlative +terms. There is as little a duality in the idea, that subjects presuppose objects +as that effects presuppose causes. There are not causes in the world which +are nothing but causes, nor are there effects which are nothing but effects. Take for +instance an historical event. Was Cæsar’s death a cause or an effect? Plainly, +this depends upon the view we take. As the sequence of the wounds which Cæsar +received from his assassins it was an effect; as the beginning of the civil war consequent +thereupon it was a cause. If I look at you, you are the object and I am +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_126">[126]</span>the subject. If you look at me, it is the reverse. Thus the relation of a certain +thing to its surroundings makes of it a subject, while the surroundings are its objects.</p> + +<p>Subject and object being correlatives, we can very well understand why there +are no “subjects in themselves”; every subject is at the same time an object in +the objective world. We can further understand, why every subjectivity except +our own withdraws itself from direct observation. We can observe the movements +of organisms like ourselves and judge by way of analogy that they feel pain or enjoy +pleasure. We see their motions which betray certain feelings, but we can never +see the feelings themselves; and even supposing that we could enter into the brain +of a man and that the whole mechanism of brain-action were laid open to our inspection +in its minutest details, we should see motions, combinations and separations, +integrations and disintegrations, we should see the oxydation of the gray substance, +which would appear as a great turmoil and excitement, but we should see +(as Leibnitz says) no thoughts, no perceptions, no feelings. That it cannot be +otherwise is obvious when we consider that our objects will always present to us the +character of objectivity.</p> + +<p>But suppose We were an atom of oxygen and entered into the process of brain-action +as an active factor, our subjectivity would soon become absorbed and welded +into a higher unity with the subjectivity of the other atoms. We should then, as a +part of that brain’s consciousness, feel these feelings, perceptions, and thoughts; we +should, then, <i>be</i> the subject which we could not see and which we were searching +for in vain in the world of objectivity.</p> + +<p>This conception of the correlation of subjectivity and objectivity does not only +convincingly explain the unity of feeling and motion, it does not only establish a +satisfactory monism, it throws light also on some other of the questions that puzzle +us. How is it that we do not feel our brain-motions to be brain-motions? We feel +our feelings only; and when feeling our feelings we do not so much feel <i>that</i> we feel +as <i>what</i> we feel. In other words, we feel the contents of our feelings; we feel their +import, their meaning; we are aware of their significance; our consciousness is +conscious of the object, the presence of which is indicated by this special feeling. +Our attention is concentrated upon the messages conveyed by and contained in the +different feelings.</p> + +<p>These messages of certain feelings are the interpretations given either to certain +sense-impressions or they are the thought-symbols representing some abstracts, representing +certain features of sense-impressions.</p> + +<p>How little we feel our brain-motions when we think, can be learned from the +fact that some nations place the seat of thinking in the heart, others in the stomach +or even the bowels, while even so great a naturalist as Aristotle regarded the brain +as cold and insensible; he made the observation that man is in possession of the +relatively largest brain, but he understood its function so little that he thought it +served to cool the warmth rising from the heart.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_127">[127]</span></p> + +<p>It is strange that every subjective feeling so long as it remains within itself can +neither be localised nor determined. We know nothing whatever of the brain-motion +that thinks a certain idea. We can fairly assume that every idea is in its +objective existence a peculiar kind of brain motion taking place in a particular part +of the brain, but we are not conscious of the brain-motion as a special and localised +motion. We are quite unable to tell the difference that we must suppose to exist +between the forms of the brain-structures or combinations of brain-structures and +their motions when we think say for instances of virtue and of vice. We are conscious +only of the idea and not of their objective correlates.</p> + +<p>Whatever we know of our body, we know only through sensation; i. e., by +the same means by which we know of other things. Our body is to us, and is represented +with the assistance of the senses, as an object in the objective world. As +such it is localised and all its relations and activities are determined. Whatever +subjective feeling we have concerning any state of ourselves, remains indistinct +until with the help of the senses it is made an object to our observation. Who has +not as yet made the experience that he was unable to localise a toothache. The +pain itself gives no information either as to its nature and cause or as to the seat of +the suffering. The pain itself is purely subjective. All the objective facts have to +be localised with the assistance of the senses. The suspected regions must be made +the object of experiments and if any irritation of a certain spot increases the ache, +it will be assumed to be the seat of the pain. And even then how often is a patient +mistaken not only almost always as to the nature but often also as to the seat +of the pain.</p> + +<p>These facts appear strange, but they cease to be strange, when we consider +that the nature of subjectivity is feeling. Subjectivity can as little become directly +conscious of its own objectivity as an eye can look at itself. However, an eye can +look at its image in the mirror. So the complex of subjective existence, which is +through the interaction of an organism united in what we call a soul, can and does +turn the channels of its own senses back upon itself and thus forms an opinion +concerning its own objectivity. Man’s knowledge of his own objective existence is +not due to any internal and direct perception of self, but solely to the same experience +through which he receives information concerning the rest of the world.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">P. C.</span></p> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h4 class="nobreak" id="A_REPLY_TO_A_CRITIC">A REPLY TO A CRITIC.<br> +<span class="smaller">WITH A DISCUSSION OF NECESSARY TRUTHS.</span></h4> + +</div> + +<p class="noindent"><i>To the Editor of The Monist</i>:</p> + +<p>I hope it is not a breach of etiquette to ask you to forward to your reviewer the +following remarks in reply to his criticism of my work (<i>The Foundations of Geometry</i>, +reviewed in Vol. II, No. 1, of <i>The Monist</i>). If he is good enough to review my +second book also, I think they will clear up some misunderstandings.</p> + +<p>Your reviewer commences with some general remarks, against which I have +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_128">[128]</span>nothing to say. He then proceeds to consider my “requirements for a logical definition.” +Here he seems to find a difficulty—which may be due to my not having +expressed myself clearly. If so I hope he will read what I say on the same subject +in my <i>Essay on Reasoning</i>, which I cannot believe he will find “indefinite” or +not well “issuable.” But indeed I cannot see where his difficulty comes in with my +old statement of the case. I state perfectly clearly that requirements (3) and (4) are +not <i>logically</i> necessary for a definition, but are only required if that definition is intended +to give a <i>particular meaning</i> to the word. He tries to reduce my argument +<i>ad absurdum</i> by giving a definition of “troft.” But so far from being absurd his +definition is perfectly good. According to it “troft” would include in its denotation +all our percepts and concepts. When however he goes on to say “... These significant +names must be so used that the intellectual sensibility shall be excited to +perceive that which is intended to be defined,” I differ from him entirely. This is only +required for a <i>description</i>, not for a <i>definition</i> (see <i>Essay on Reasoning</i>, p. 53).</p> + +<p>Your reviewer’s only solid objection to my “requirements” seems to be that +the fourth includes all the rest. This is only true if the term proposed for definition +has an import which has already been determined; but even in such a case it is +better to consider the requirements separately, as I have given them. For the force +of objections under the different headings varies enormously. An objection under +heading (1), if established, would be fatal to any definition whatever. One under +heading (2) so far from being fatal would only be a suggestion for the improvement +of the definition. Objections under either of the headings (3) and (4) would only be +to the effect that the term as defined meant something different from what it was +desired that it should mean. It is however convenient to consider (3) and (4) separately +as it would generally be possible to decide (3) at once, whereas if a doubt +were raised under heading (4) it might lead to a prolonged discussion before it could +be laid. I do not however pretend that the “requirements” are laid down in my +<i>Foundations of Geometry</i> in the best possible form. Indeed I have altered the form +in my second essay. There is moreover one requirement for a logical definition +which is not included in my heading (1) in the <i>Foundations of Geometry</i>, though it +is included in (4). This defect is remedied in the <i>Essay on Reasoning</i> (p. 55). It is +curious that your reviewer should have missed this point, as it is the very one on +which he attacks my definition of “direction.” It is that the assertions in a definition +must not be <i>independent</i> of the meaning of the term defined. If they were, the +assertion would be equally true (or false) whatever meaning the term might have. +The <i>import</i> of the term would therefore be unlimited. In the case of explicit definitions +a similar error is called <i>circulus in definiendo</i>.</p> + +<p>When your reviewer goes on to attack my definition of “direction” why does +he change his front all at once, and disregard all the considerations he has just been +discussing? Why does he not apply my, or his own, requirements for a definition +to the case in point? The criticism he actually does put forward will not bear a +moment’s investigation. If my definition is “circular,” the assertion must be equally +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_129">[129]</span>true whatever meaning is ascribed to the term. Well, then, let us try the effect of +giving to it the meaning we ordinarily ascribe to “cheese.” Is it equally true that +“a cheese may be conceived to be indicated by naming two points, as the cheese +from one to the other”? Clearly not. But not only does this one assertion out of +my definition exclude the import of “cheese” from the meaning of “direction,” but, +more particularly, it distinguishes between the “three distinct but closely associated +notions” which your reviewer quite rightly says “become confused in thought and +expression unless the most solicitous care is taken to distinguish them.” This is exactly +the care which I <i>have</i> taken, by framing my definition.</p> + +<p>I need not say much about the rest of the criticism. Your reviewer’s remarks +on my definition of “angle” are simply due to the fact that he has not read the +definition carefully, and probably has not read the note on the top of page 36 at all. +It may make it clearer to him if I point out that if “we imagine a northeast-southwest +line cutting an east-west line,” we imagine <i>four</i> different directions and therefore +(4⋅3)/(1⋅2) = 6 angles. Two of these are the straight angles between the opposite +directions of each of the two lines. The other four are what Euclid calls “the +angles between the lines.” As an angle, according to my definition, has no local +habitation in space, it is, <i>prima facie</i>, meaningless to talk of the “right hand upper +angle.” But if this is only an abbreviation for “the angle between the directions +upwards and to the right,” then “the right hand upper angle” means the same as it +would in Euclid.</p> + +<p>With the remarks about the nature of the challenge I have thrown down I +heartily agree. May I however suggest that I have a right to expect that criticism +should be, not only “competent and candid,” but careful? It is a difficult subject, +and <i>I</i> at least am not always able to express myself in such a way that my meaning +cannot be misunderstood by any one. I think if your reviewer looks at what I have +said again, with the aid of what I say further in my <i>Essay on Reasoning</i>, he will see +that his criticisms have really originated in misunderstandings, and perhaps he will +alter his judgment that I have “come short of the high result to which I aspired.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_18" href="#Footnote_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a></p> + +<p>But my chief object in writing to you to-day is to bring specially to your notice +my ideas on the nature of so-called “necessary truths.” I am not quite clear how +far you will find my views harmonise with your own. To a great extent I am inclined +to think they are simply a further analysis of the views you express in <i>The Monist</i> +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_130">[130]</span>and in your <i>Fundamental Problems</i>. I will briefly sketch my own ideas and you +can then judge whether they are yours also or not.</p> + +<p>In my <i>Essay on Reasoning</i> I classify assertions as Truisms (assertions whose +truth depends solely on the definitions of their terms) and Real Assertions, +which convey some real subjective or objective information. I show that the validity +of all purely formal knowledge depends on the fact that it is deduced from definitions +alone, which are laid down <i>arbitrarily</i> and that the supposed peculiar certainty +of the theorems of pure mathematics is merely due to the fact that they are +all truisms. Thus, I think it a misnomer to call such theorems “necessary” truths. +It would be nearer the mark to call them “arbitrary” truths.</p> + +<p>There is no <i>necessity</i> whatever about the theorem “twice two is four.” “Two” +is defined as 1 + 1; “twice,” as the operation of adding a thing to itself. It follows +from this that “twice two” is 1 + 1 + 1 + 1; and this, by <i>definition</i>, is “four.” If +“four” were defined as 1 + 1 + 1, (and there is no “necessary” reason why it +should not be,) then “twice two” would <i>not</i> be “four.” The assertion “twice two +is four” conveys no real information whatever—at best it could only tell us what +one of its terms meant if they had not all been previously defined.</p> + +<p>I cannot insist too strongly on the importance of a proper understanding and +use of logical definition. If you desire to know whether a given assertion is true or +false, <i>a priori</i> or <i>a posteriori</i>, the first step in the investigation <span class="smcap">must</span> be to find out +how its terms were defined. If it turns out that the truth (or falsehood) of the assertion +can be formally deduced from these definitions, then the assertion is a truism +(or contradiction in terms): in either case it can give no real information, and even +if true cannot be a “necessary” truth. Only if the definitions of the terms are both +independent and consistent is it open to discussion how we might come to a knowledge +of the fact it expresses.</p> + +<p>I may briefly indicate here how I think the problem ought to be attacked. +“Objective facts” can only be established by induction. I do not mean by that +term necessarily the process described by Mill, but some similar process, based ultimately +on <i>inductio per enumerationem simplicem</i>. Now no such process can ever +lead to a necessary truth. The most fundamental and certain induction which can +be made, that which induces us to believe in the objectivity of our environment, +does not lead to a “necessary truth”; and much less can any other induction based +upon this one do so. “Objective facts” then may be established with greater or +less probability, but can never be <i>necessarily</i> true. But all inductions are based on +our perceptions, that is ultimately on our subjective sensations. And a man can, +nay, must be, absolutely certain of the reality of his own sensations though he cannot +be certain of the interpretations he puts upon them. If I have a toothache I +cannot be absolutely certain that I have a tooth, but, at least while the pain lasts, +I am <i>absolutely</i> certain that I have an ache. And so of any subjective sensation.</p> + +<p>I can similarly be absolutely certain that I entertain a given concept, while that +concept is before my mind; though of course it is possible that if I assert the possession +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_131">[131]</span>of that concept I may do so in language which may be misunderstood by the +person I am addressing. If then a man has certain concepts which he can call up +at will, the reality of those concepts, <i>qua</i> concepts, is to him a <i>necessary truth</i>. He +may lay down such necessary truths as axioms, and by their aid he may give real +subjective import to a symbolic argument, and so obtain new and complicated assertions +which are also to him necessary truths. This is what I do in my subjective +theory of geometry. That theory might be regarded as purely symbolic—the axioms +might have been left out, and all its conclusions looked upon as mere truisms. The +conclusions of geometry of four or more independent directions can perhaps <i>only</i> be +regarded as truisms. But by the aid of the axioms, geometry of two and three independent +directions can be given real subjective import, and its conclusions therefore +regarded as necessary truths, as long as they are only taken subjectively. They +may further be applied objectively by the aid of objective facts established by induction, +but in this case their validity is no greater than that of the primary facts, +the counterparts of the subjective axioms, which are employed to give the theory +objective import.</p> + +<p>I confess I have not studied Kant sufficiently to say that his views differ, materially +from mine, though I always thought they did until I read your interpretations +of them. Perhaps I misunderstood the sense in which Kant used the term +<i>a priori</i>. The term has been used in so many different senses that I prefer myself +to drop it altogether. If it merely refers to priority in time there can be no practical +doubt that, whether in the case of the human race or of an individual thinker, +a large amount of sense-experience must have preceded even so simple an <i>a priori</i> +judgment as “twice two is four.” If the term merely refers to priority in logical validity +it seems to me better to say that “such and such assertions are not dependent +upon experience.” But Kant says of the assertion “7 + 5 = 12” that it is not only +“<i>a priori</i>” but “synthetic”. By the latter term he means that its truth was <i>not</i> +deduced from definitions alone, and that the assertion therefore conveys real information. +In this I believe he was wrong, and though he afterwards declares that +“all knowledge <i>a priori</i> is empty and cannot give information about things,” unless +the true nature of <i>a priori</i> knowledge is made more clear, people will inevitably continue +to believe the contrary—and to believe moreover that Kant taught so.</p> + +<p>Any language which seems to imply that there is some dread necessity about +mathematical truths—that they could not be otherwise if they would—is very misleading. +Of course it is necessarily true that <i>if</i> you have seven objects and add +five more to them you will have in all twelve objects. But the whole objective +difficulty is begged by the supposition. “Much virtue in if!”</p> + +<p>As I understand it the essence of the “laws” of pure mathematics is that they +are verbal, that is they are only abbreviated expressions of the results of certain +verbal processes. If the processes are repeated and the results similarly expressed, +the results must always be the same. Our reason cannot “inform us about the form +of existence” unless it is first given, as the <i>data</i> or facts which correspond to the definitions +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_132">[132]</span>of our symbolic arguments. It is only because our reasoning faculties are +limited that symbolic arguments are necessary at all—that it is not evident to us at +once that the conclusions of the most intricate mathematical calculations are given +to us along with the <i>data</i>. Given the data, then in all possible worlds the conclusions +must indeed follow, but only because they really are already <i>in</i> the data which +were given.</p> + +<p>It may be that you will not only agree with all I have said, but have already +said much of it yourself. But there are some passages in your <i>Fundamental Problems</i> +which seem to imply otherwise. I think the great objection I have to urge +against Kant, and also perhaps against you, is that you do not distinguish as clearly +as I could wish between symbolic argument and real, though subjective, knowledge. +And the only way to distinguish between them is by inquiring into the definitions of +the terms.</p> + +<p>For example, on p. 165 of <i>Fundamental Problems</i> you say that to four-dimensional +beings Kepler’s third law “would most probably appear as ‘the cubes of +their times of revolution being proportional to their mean distances to the fourth +power.’”</p> + +<p>Now what sort of assertion do you take Kepler’s law to be? Originally it was +a purely empirical law obtained by pure induction. If the four-dimensional people +obtained their law the same way why should the result appear different to them? +Or do you conceive the law to be deduced from Newton’s theory of gravitation? But +even so the law of the inverse square was obtained empirically. If you think that +law can be explained (as the analogous law for the distribution of light can) by the +supposition that the integral of the force over all points at a given distance from the +origin is constant, still this supposition is purely gratuitous unless established by induction +from experience. If you grant any one of these suppositions you can by +symbolic argument obtain the law corresponding to Kepler’s for a four-dimensional +space. But I may mention that in no case does the result you anticipate come out. +On the first two suppositions the law would be unaltered. On the last supposition +the law of gravity would be changed to the inverse cube; but after that the solution +of the problem has nothing to do with four dimensions—it is a two-dimensional +problem only. The result is that in general planets could not move in closed orbits +at all. They might conceivably revolve in circles, but such a condition would be +unstable, and if it obtained their periodic times would vary as the squares of their +distances.</p> + +<p>Again you say (p. 74) “the doctrine of the ‘conservation of matter and energy,’ +although it has been discovered with the assistance of experience, can be proved in +its full scope by pure reason alone.” I should very much like to see your proof +(which I cannot find in <i>Fundamental Problems</i>). How do you define the terms of the +doctrine? Do you deduce the proof from these definitions—that is do you make it +a truism? Or do you base it upon subjective axioms as I do my geometry? Or if +you base it on objective facts, how do you prove those facts by pure reason alone? +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_133">[133]</span>And if it is purely a subjective proof, how, can you say the doctrine is proved “in its +full scope”? Surely objective applications come within its scope?</p> + +<p>It would not be fair in me to ask you to publish my reply to your reviewer’s +criticisms, though if that reply is justified the criticism must have done the prospects +of my book some injury, seeing from what a quarter it comes. But I hope you will see +your way to publishing the latter part of this letter in <i>The Monist</i>, together with +your reply to it, if you think it worthy of such a distinction.</p> + +<p>I have just come across, in this month’s <i>Nineteenth Century</i>, another remarkable +instance of reasoning which seems to be rendered entirely nugatory by the want of +proper definitions. It is asserted that conceptual thought is impossible without +language. At first sight this would certainly appear to be a real assertion. It follows +from it that since dogs have no language they have no “conceptual thought.” +But it may be plainly shown that dogs do entertain “general notions,” which in ordinary +English would be included under the head of “conceptual thought.” The +apparent contradiction is however explained when it appears that the author distinguishes +general notions as “concepts” or “recepts,” according as they <i>are</i> or <i>are +not named</i>. This being his definition of “conceptual thought” as opposed to other +thought, it appears that the assertion is only a truism after all, and conveys no real +information whatever. To discuss it further is then mere waste of time. The author +of the assertion doubtless <i>wished</i> it to convey some information, but he did not +attend to his definitions and so failed to attain his object.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">Edward T. Dixon.</span></p> + +<div class="footnotes"> + +<h5>FOOTNOTES:</h5> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_18" href="#FNanchor_18" class="label">[18]</a> The reviewer of Mr. Dixon’s book has read these remarks on his criticism (<i>The Monist</i>, +Vol. II, No. 1, p. 126) and has given them what seems to him full consideration. He confesses that +he misunderstood what Mr. Dixon meant by “a direction.” (See the article “Logic as Relation-Lore” +to be published in a subsequent number.) In regard to the requirements for a logical definition +he must still abide by his former opinion. The need of a definition arises either from the inaccuracy +in the application of a term or from a supposed lack of knowledge as to its signification. +Hence to use the term itself in its own definition is to import into the definition the same vagueness +or ignorance which it is the very office of a definition to correct. When Mr. Dixon says that +it is requisite for a logical definition that the defining assertions “must not be <i>independent</i> of the +meaning of the term defined,” what is that but to say that the same must be <i>dependent</i> upon that +meaning? which, unless the reviewer again misunderstands the author, is to say that we must +understand the meaning of the term before we can understand the definition.</p> + +<p class="right">ρσλ.</p> + +</div> + +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h4 class="nobreak" id="MATHEMATICS">MATHEMATICS A DESCRIPTION OF OPERATIONS WITH PURE FORMS.<br> +<span class="smaller">IN REPLY TO MR. EDWARD DIXON.</span></h4> + +</div> + +<p>It is true, as Mr. Dixon says, that “Any language which seems to imply that +there is some dread necessity about mathematical truths is very misleading.” But +to say, as Mr. Dixon does in another passage, that the truisms of mathematics are +arbitrary truths, is more misleading still. The theorems of the formal sciences are +not “assertions whose truth depends solely on the definition of their terms.” They +are “real assertions which convey some real subjective or objective information.”</p> + +<p>Mr. Dixon objects to Kant’s assertion that 7 + 5 = 12 is not only <i>a priori</i> but +also synthetic. He declares, in contradistinction to Kant, that it is deduced from +definitions alone; that therefore it is empty, and cannot give any information about +things. This latter proposition, which is a phrase of Kant’s, appears in this context +as an inconsistency of Kant’s. And it would be an inconsistency, if it had to be understood +in the sense in which Mr. Dixon quotes it. We construe Kant’s phrase that +“the <i>a priori</i> is empty, and cannot give information about things,” in a different +way. We think that Kant intends to say that the <i>a priori</i> imparts real information +concerning relations and forms; but that it does not impart real information concerning +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_134">[134]</span>substances or the materiality of things. It is apparent that the assertion +7 + 5 = 12 cannot be derived from the definitions of 7 or 5. Similarly, the ideas of +higher mathematics are not deduced from the few definitions of elementary mathematics +that tell what points, lines, parallels, etc., are. Of what, then, are these +complex theorems of mathematics, products? They are not derived from sense-experience, +nor from the definitions of their ultimate elements.</p> + +<p>Is their origin mysterious? Here Kant leaves us in the lurch; he simply declares +that formal truth is <i>a priori</i> and transcendental; and those of his disciples who call +themselves, with preference, transcendentalists, have ample occasion to introduce +in this <i>lacuna</i> of Kantian thought, all the mysticism they please.</p> + +<p>The problem of the origin of the truths of formal sciences is not so difficult as it +is sometimes represented. The theorems of higher mathematics are the products of +certain <i>operations</i> performed with the elementary forms described in the definition +with which the mathematician starts. These operations are not arbitrary; they +are not merely verbal processes; they are realities of highest importance. Not material +realities, but realities, nevertheless. They are functions, and mathematics +deals with the products of functions. It is true that we might call twice two by +any other name than four; we might call it <i>vier</i>, or <i>quatre</i>, but the operation +1 + 1 + 1 + 1 would remain the same, by whatever name we call its result. Mathematical +truths, accordingly, are not empty in the sense that they are meaningless; +for they are significant in the highest degree. They give real information, not +about things, but about certain relations that obtain among things. They describe +certain operations in which formal relations are traced. And they describe them +exhaustively, so that the result is, as the Germans call it, <i>eindeutig bestimmt</i>, and +the result will, under all circumstances, be the same. Twice two <i>will always be</i> the +same as 1 + 1 + 1 + 1. This “it will always be,” is called necessary. There is +nothing dreadful about it, nor is there any mystery connected with it. It is not an +awful fate that decrees it, but it is the nature of sameness, that the same is and will +be the same, so long as it remains the same.</p> + +<p>It is often overlooked that every number in arithmetic is the result of an operation +which is symbolised by a certain figure. Numbers are not concrete things; and +as soon as we forget that they are products of a function, we are liable to lapse into +mistakes. This happens most frequently with the numbers “zero” and “infinite.” +The latter of these two symbols is often looked upon as a concrete thing; and because +the infinite, with actual reality, is, in its completeness, inconceivable, it has +made, of every one who stumbled over this stone of offence, a mystic, and many a +radical, fearless thinker bows down to worship before the idea of infinitude-function +as it would be if it were a real thing.</p> + +<p>Says Mr. Dixon, “Our reason cannot inform us about the form of existence, +unless it is first given.” This is very true. The form is given, and formal systems +such as the numerical system and the lines and figures of mathematics are mental +constructions built of the stones quarried out of the relational given in experience.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_135">[135]</span></p> + +<p>Form being given, we can reason about the form of existence in general. We +can have ready in our minds systems of pure forms to apply to all the various +cases of our experience. And this will help us in unravelling the problems of reality, +and in extending our knowledge in those fields with which we are little acquainted. +Far be it from us to consider the definitions, the operations, and the results of the +formal sciences as purely verbal; if they were, mathematics would lose all the great +importance which it undeniably possesses, and become mere verbiage.</p> + +<p>I confess that I do not understand Mr. Dixon when he says: “It is only because +our reasoning faculties are limited that symbolic arguments are necessary at +all.” In my opinion all mental activity is symbolic. Every idea is a symbol that +signifies something. It is not because our reasoning faculties are limited that symbolic +arguments are necessary at all, but symbolism is the nature of our mind, and +symbols are the elements with which our reasoning faculties have to deal. In this +sense, every argument is symbolic. If it symbolises sense-experience, it represents +our knowledge of what may be called the materiality of things. If it symbolises +operations with pure forms, it represents the purely formal relations of mathematics +logic, algebra, etc.</p> + +<p>The doctrine of the conservation of matter and energy in reality means nothing +more or less than that there is no increase or decrease in the world at large. Nothing +originates out of, and nothing disappears into, nothing. It means that twice +1 + 1 is 1 + 1 + 1 + 1, neither more nor less; or, in other words, it means that all +events are transformations. New things originate, but their newness consists in +their forms. In this sense the law of the conservation of matter and energy would +have to be called, from Mr. Dixon’s standpoint, other differences neglected, a +truism. It is not a truism, in the sense of being arbitrary, but in the sense of being +a purely formal truth, as are all mathematical theorems.</p> + +<p>Mr. Dixon refers to a passage in <i>Fundamental Problems</i>, in which I say that +“To four-dimensional beings, Kepler’s third law would most probably appear as the +cubes of the times of revolutions of the planets being proportional to their mean distances +to the fourth power.” His questions, “What sort of an assertion do you take +Kepler’s law to be?” and “Why should the result appear different to them?” show +that Mr. Dixon has overlooked the condition on which this proposition was made. +The first sentence of this paragraph begins with the words, “If space inhered, as +Kant maintains, in the thinking subject only, spatial relations and laws would appear +different to four-dimensional beings.” Space relations are not subjective, in my +opinion, but objective. Therefore, since space relations do not inhere in the thinking +subject only, because they are a feature of the objective world, and inhere in the +thinking subject in so far as it is at the same time an object in the objective world, +Kepler’s law would appear to four-dimensional beings, if they could exist at all, just +the same as it does to us three-dimensional beings.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">P. C.</span></p> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_136">[136]</span></p> + +<h3 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_REVIEWS_I">BOOK REVIEWS.</h3> + +</div> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">Social Statics.</span> Abridged and Revised; together with <span class="smcap">The Man versus The +State</span>. By <i>Herbert Spencer</i>. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1892.</h4> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">Justice.</span> Being Part IV of the Principles of Ethics. By <i>Herbert Spencer</i>. New +York: D. Appleton & Co., 1891.</h4> + +<p>Among Mr. Spencer’s most important books are those entitled <i>Justice</i> and +<i>Social Statics</i>. The latter, which first appeared in 1850, has just been republished +in about one-half of the original size, some parts having been transferred to the book +on <i>Justice</i>, and others omitted altogether. “One difference,” as he says, “is that +what there was in my first book of supernaturalistic interpretation has disappeared, +and the interpretation has become exclusively naturalistic—that is, evolutionary.” +Another change is that a demonstration of the injustice of socialism is substituted +for his former arguments, plainly repudiated in <i>Justice</i>, against private ownership +of land. Equally important is the omission of the chapter asserting “The Right to +Ignore the State.”</p> + +<p>The demand for Woman Suffrage has also been withdrawn from the new edition +of <i>Social Statics</i>, though it retains the original protest against “the reign of +man over woman,” and asserts an “equality of rights in the married state.” Here +again, Spencer’s final position must be sought in his <i>Justice</i> where it is urged +that women cannot justly have equal powers with men unless they have equal responsibilities. +They cannot serve their country as men do; and if they take an +equal share in the government, “their position is not one of equality but one of +supremacy.” Even in time of peace, they are, he thinks, too impulsive to vote +judiciously, too sympathetic to oppose “fostering the worse at the expense of the +better,” and too fond of “a worship of power under all its forms” to protect individual +liberty against the encroachment of authority. This objection seems particularly +strong, because there is still great danger of the growth of state despotism +at the expense of personal freedom, even in republics. Many recent instances are +given by Spencer in “The Man versus the State,” now reprinted in the same volume +with <i>Social Statics</i>; and it is urged in <i>Justice</i>, that even in the United States +“universal suffrage does not prevent an enormous majority of consumers from being +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_137">[137]</span>heavily taxed by a protective tariff for the benefit of a small minority of manufacturers +and artisans.”</p> + +<p>Our voters are much too ready to follow hasty impulses and unscrupulous +leaders; and both faults are most common among the most ignorant. How strongly +education encourages independence was acknowledged by those slave-holders who +said, “Our negroes shall not learn to read, for that makes them run away.” Public +schools have found their worst enemies among Popes and Czars, and their best +friends in the statesmen most honored by republics. There is no other institution +for whose advantages Americans are practically unanimous. The necessity of popular +education at the public cost is acknowledged by Huxley, Mill, and other advanced +thinkers so generally, that Spencer’s exceptionally hostile opinion ought not to be +taken as a self-evident truth.</p> + +<p>Mr. Spencer’s examination of this subject does not appear to have been so +thorough as the occasion demands. In denying that education prevents crime, he +relies mainly on Joseph Fletcher, who, as stated in both editions of <i>Social Statics</i>, +“has entered more elaborately into this question than perhaps any other writer +of the day,” and who admits that there is a “superficial evidence against instruction.” +Spencer takes no notice of Fletcher’s having succeeded completely in breaking +down this superficial evidence. In elaborate papers, published in the tenth, +eleventh, and twelfth volumes of <i>The Journal of the London Statistical Society</i>, +and illustrated by many tables and maps, Fletcher shows that the proportion to the +population, in various parts of England, of people unable to sign their names, corresponded +everywhere to the proportion of illegitimate births as well as of commitments +for crime. Separating these latter into classes according to degree of guilt, +he proves that the worst crimes are most common where there is the most ignorance. +Thus he is enabled to say, “The conclusion is therefore irresistible that education +is essential to the security of modern society.” That this testimony of Spencer’s +principal witness is really the truth can be further proved by the statistics in the +<i>Encyclopædia Britannica</i>, showing that between 1841 and 1876, while the percentage +of illiterates to population in England and Wales was reduced one-half, +that of criminals was reduced to one-third of what it was originally. (Vol. VIII, +pp. 221 and 249-251.)</p> + +<p>Spencer also refers to the fact that schools have sometimes been carried on in +the interest of despotism; but most kinds of food are easily adulterated; and education +is valuable, notwithstanding, as food for liberty. This last consideration disposes +completely of his comparison of state-churches with state-schools; and the +fact, mentioned in the revised but not in the original edition of <i>Social Statics</i>, that +opinions differ about the best methods of education, is really an additional instance +of the encouragement given by our system of public schools to independence of +thought.</p> + +<p>Spencer’s chief objection to this system is that it does not fit his theory that +“the liberty of each, limited by the like liberties of all, is the rule in conformity +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_138">[138]</span>with which society must be organised,” (p. 45). Such a “law of right social relationships,” +(p. 55) would, he admits, require us to repeal our laws against indecency, +abolish our Boards of Health, and close our poorhouses, postoffices, banks, and +lighthouses, except in so far as these institutions, like our streets and roads, might +be cared for by benevolent individuals. He does not tell us how a government, +thus limited to managing the police, army, and navy, could keep up a fire-department, +nor how new streets, roads, railways, or canals could be opened, in case the +owners of land put their prices too high for the projectors; but the most unfortunate +application of his theory would be to close our public schools.</p> + +<p>There is no danger of this, however; and the principal evil likely to result +from his pushing his theory so far, is that he prevents people from seeing its real +value, as indicating the direction in which our race has advanced and must make +all further progress. We shall keep on diminishing the power of the state over the +man, as well as that of the man over the child, but neither authority will ever be +abolished entirely. We shall dispense, sooner or later, with some of the public institutions +which Spencer condemns; but our common schools will, I think, last as +long as government itself. The abolitionists helped the slave to freedom by pointing +out the North Star; but they did not advise him to quit solid earth. This mistake, +although we grant that Spencer shows us our North Star, is sometimes made +in <i>Social Statics</i>.</p> + +<p>Timely help, too, is given by him, in a thoroughly practical way, to those reformers +who are passing out from under the cloud with a silver lining into a Cleveland +summer and a fair prospect of a Harrison fall. Among the words best worth +putting into actions at once, are these: “The right of exchange is as sacred as any +other right, and exists as much between members of different nations as between +members of the same nation. Morality knows nothing of geographical boundaries.” ... +“Hence, in putting a veto upon the commercial intercourse of two nations, +or in putting obstacles in the way of that intercourse, a government trenches +upon men’s liberties of action, and by so doing directly reverses its function. To +secure for each man the fullest freedom to exercise his faculties, compatible with +the like freedom of all others, we find to be the state’s duty. Now trade prohibitions +and trade restrictions not only do not secure this freedom, but they take it +away. So that in enforcing them the state is transformed from a maintainer of +rights into a violator of rights.” ... “Whether it kills, or robs, or enslaves, or +shackles by trade regulations, its guilt is alike in kind, and differs only in degree.” +(<i>Social Statics</i>, ed. of 1850, pp. 326, 327; ed. of 1892, p. 137).</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">F. M. H.</span></p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">An Essay on Reasoning.</span> By <i>Edward T. Dixon</i>. Cambridge (Eng): Deighton, +Bell, & Co. 1891. Pp. 88.</h4> + +<p>Some years ago the author of this essay made public certain views of his, on +“Geometry of Four Dimensions.” He was surprised to find that though his arguments +were received with incredulity they were not refuted. This result appeared +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_139">[139]</span>to him to be due to the fact that he was not understood, that his views on geometry +of even two and three dimensions being different from those commonly entertained, +he had failed of being understood, because he had not begun his explanation at the +beginning.</p> + +<p>He therefore set to work to analyse those views and ultimately published a book +on the subject. This book, <i>The Foundations of Geometry</i>, was reviewed by us in +<i>The Monist</i> of October, 1891. But now again the author regards himself as not +understood. He rested the positions and arguments of his book upon certain views +of logic and especially of definition, which depart from the orthodox views, and he +misjudged the fullness of explanation that would therefore become needful. Hence +this little essay.</p> + +<p>The proper approach to the views of the author is through his doctrine of definition. +Usually definition is regarded as finding its main motive and utility in the +convenience of social converse. The meaning of any term is regarded as resting +not in the choice of him who utters it, but in the suppositions of those who are addressed. +It is true that a license is accorded to any one upon a sufficient occasion +to give a special intent to some word, but only upon condition that that intent shall +be made sufficiently express, in other words well understood by those addressed. +Hence definition is usually taken to mean the recital or the precision of the meaning +of a term by means of language naturally apt for that end. There is no good sense +in pretending to effect either one of these ends by language that lacks natural ability +on that behalf.</p> + +<p>Now Mr. Dixon holds, if we understand him, that conventional usage is of very +subordinate consequence in this matter, that it pertains to the prerogative of an author +to throw upon those whom he addresses the task of gathering his meanings as +best they can; that even when he professes to explain his meanings he need not +seek and employ any plain, direct speech, but may supply his instruction indirectly: +may ask his audience to solve a problem, or to rightly guess what certain hints +mean; may require them to extract the meaning in question out of a set of assertions +that involve the same in a collateral way only. This he calls “implicit definition.” +It is analogous, he tells us, to an unsolved equation or set of equations in algebra. So +far as we are aware no one can claim priority of the author in respect to this expedient. +He seems to regard it as of great importance, and proposes by its aid to overcome +the difficulties that environ the fundamentals of geometry.</p> + +<p>We think that the author is led to put undue confidence in his implicit definition, +by his peculiar views upon propositions. He holds that all propositions can, +without loss or gain in the meanings as originally stated, be reduced to statements of +strict identity. This done, propositions can, as he thinks, be operated upon after the +fashion usual with equations. But we submit that between a logical proposition +and an algebraic equation there is a difference that is in general irreducible. For +example take this proposition, Every parent loves children. To alter this to, Every +parent is identical with some [or every] person that loves children, as is, we think, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_140">[140]</span>the prescription of Mr. Dixon, will not serve; for by reading our identity in the reverse +order we have: Some [or every] person that loves children is identical with +every parent.</p> + +<p>Mr. Dixon’s views in respect to terms and to the doctrine of denotation and +connotation depart as widely from the suppositions usually held, as do his views regarding +propositions and definition. To follow out the consequences of his proposed +innovations in any adequate fulness is forbidden to us by lack of space. We feel +sure that further reflection will lead him to much modification of his doctrines.</p> + +<p class="right">ρσλ.</p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion.</span> By <i>Hermann Lotze</i>. Edited by <i>E. C. +Conybeare</i>, M.A. London: Swan, Sonnenschein, & Co. New York: Macmillan +& Co. 1892. Pp. 176.</h4> + +<p>This book is an excellent translation of one of the most important works of a +prominent philosopher, who made an unusually strong impression upon the minds +of his contemporaries. Almost every line of this clean, accurate, and charming +translation betrays the translator’s devotion to the subject, for he has taken the utmost +care to bring out the ideas of the author in the same brilliant style for which +Professor Lotze is justly famous.</p> + +<p>The translator says in the preface: “I have completed and venture to publish +the following translation of Hermann Lotze’s <i>Lectures upon the Philosophy of +Religion</i> in the same hope in which it was undertaken by my late wife, that it +may be of use to some who cannot read the German original, and yet desire a concise +statement of the form in which one of the clearest-minded of our later thinkers +put to himself those great questions—as to the origin and destiny of the spirit of +man, as to life in general, and the meaning of the material universe—which occupy +us all at some time or another, many of us as soon as we have won food and shelter +for our bodies.”</p> + +<p>We do not share Mr. Conybeare’s and his deceased wife’s enthusiasm for the +author. Although we are not blind to the great deserts of Professor Lotze, his +amiable personality, the depth of his religious and emotional nature, the breadth of +his scholarly erudition, and the brilliancy of his ingenious, not to say poetical, presentation +of philosophical subjects, we cannot conceive that his work is come to +abide. On the contrary, we consider his philosophy as antiquated in many respects. +He considers problems that originate from a mere confusion of ideas, as +being insolvable in their nature, and attempts the solution of other problems with +inadequate methods. His thoughts still remind us of the ontological spirit of past +philosophies, and his principles are not in agreement with positivism and the +methods of scientific research.</p> + +<p>As an instance, we quote the following passage: “We must ever set aside any +attempt to describe in positive terms, or to construct in thought, the process by +which this absolute being came to be not only one, and that unconditionally, but +at the same time a many of things which condition one another reciprocally.”</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_141">[141]</span></p> + +<p>Lotze still believes in an “absolute unity” as something prior to the world of +reality, and he declares that “We cannot Know or Explain how this Absolute +Unity is also Many” (Sec. XXI); and even if an unconscious being could be a +Many-in-One, yet it could not, according to Lotze, generate consciousness (Sec. +XXV). We do not believe that this problem is insolvable, and do not, as does Lotze, +feel constrained to fall back on idealism. In fact, our position is so different from +Lotze’s that in spite of the full recognition of his genius, we feel as much severed +from him as if he belonged to ages long gone by.</p> + +<p>Mr. Conybeare’s translation is most certainly an invaluable work and is indispensable +for any English student of Lotze’s philosophy.</p> + +<p class="right">κρς.</p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">On the Perception of Small Differences, With Special Reference to the +Extent, Force, and Time of Movement.</span> By <i>George Stuart Fullerton</i> and +<i>James McKeen Cattell</i>. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. +1892. Pp. 159.</h4> + +<p>This volume of the Philosophical Series of Publications of the University of +Pennsylvania gives an account of a large number of experiments made for the purpose +of testing the perception of small differences of movement, of weight, and of +light. The most noticeable conclusion arrived at by the authors, is that they cannot +accept any of the received explanations of Weber’s law. They found from their +experiments, by the method of estimated amount of difference, that “we tend to +estimate the intensity of sensation as directly proportional to the intensity of the +stimulus; consequently, in so far as any deduction concerning quantitative relations +in sensation can be made from such estimation, the sensation increases as the stimulus +and not as its logarithm,” thus invalidating Fechner’s law. The authors believe +also that Weber’s law does not hold for the perception of movement, as they +find that the error of observation usually increases “as the stimulus is taken greater +but more slowly,” and that it is proportional to the square root of the stimulus. +Accordingly, they substitute for Weber’s law the following: “The error of observation +tends to increase as the square root of the magnitude, the increase being subject +to variation, whose amount and cause must be determined for each special +case.” It is proper to add, that Professor Fullerton gives only a qualified assent to +these conclusions, on the grounds that mathematicians are not agreed as to the +soundness of the theory upon which the law is based, and that the errors in question +may not be independent errors. He considers, however, the results obtained +by the authors “as sufficiently in accord with the laws to justify them in holding it +tentatively, and subject to criticism.”</p> + +<p>As Fechner’s law rests on that of Weber, and on assumptions which appear to +be incorrect, it also fails, and it follows that the psycho-physical, physiological, and +psychological theories put forward to account for the supposed logarithmic relation +between mental and physical processes are superfluous. From these conclusions +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_142">[142]</span>we may judge of the importance of the experiments made by Professors Fullerton +and Cattell, whose work requires to be carefully studied by all those interested in +the special questions to which it relates.</p> + +<p class="right">Ω.</p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">Psychologie du Peintre.</span> By <i>Lucien Arréat</i>. Paris: Félix Alcan. 1892. Pp. +<span class="smcap">lix</span>, 264. Price, 5 fr.</h4> + +<p>The author of this interesting work informs us that it does not aim at being a +natural history of society, nor is it even a study in professional psychology. This +is hardly correct, however, as such a study must be based on that of individuals, +and a writer of M. Arréat’s reputation cannot treat of a large group of individuals +without throwing light on the psychology of the whole class to which they belong. +He very aptly likens artists as a whole to a large family, the artist in design to a +genus of this family, and painters to a species. This has its varieties, and it is by +the study of these that the author seeks to arrive at a knowledge of the psychology +of the painter.</p> + +<p>Believing that there exists a relation between the temperament and the qualities +of the mind and that this is influenced by heredity, he devotes the first part +of the work to questions of physiology and heredity. The second part deals with +the painter’s vocation, his æsthetic sentiments, his professional memory, and, as the +evolution of art is connected with the progress of visual analysis, with his sense of +sight. Then comes an examination of the general mental qualities of the painter, +his intellectual character, his various phases of memory and aptitudes, and the influences +which affect his work. The fourth part of the book treats of the painter’s +character, his egoistic and sympathetic traits, his will, and his moral and social +traits. And finally reference is made to questions of pathology, particularly defects +of vision, and to “the miseries of genius.”</p> + +<p>On all these subjects M. Arréat has many acute remarks supported by numerous +facts, often derived from painters themselves, who thus, says the author, will +be found “living and speaking on each page, just as they are, and making themselves +known by their works, sympathetic or disagreeable, indifferent or superior, but always +interesting.” It is noticeable, in connection with the important subject of +heredity, that in a list of about three hundred painters almost two-thirds are sons +of painters or of workers in art, and M. Arréat thinks that if more complete information +were obtainable the proportion would be increased.</p> + +<p>In the chapter on the miseries of genius, the author takes exception to the view +expressed by M. Lombroso that the creative inspiration of genius is, at least in +some cases, the equivalent of epileptic convulsion. That genius may lead to insanity +is true; and M. Arréat admits that remarkable aptitudes have often appeared +in a family at the beginning of its degeneracy. But he adds that painters are for +the most part healthy, and they show hardly any more singularity than other men +may have. He concludes his work with the following words: “Genius makes use of, +as we have sufficiently shown, faculties which are common to nearly all men, if they +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_143">[143]</span>are unequally strong and variously distributed with each. Genius, moreover, in +the most elevated sense that it can be understood, is an exception among artists +themselves, and even in genius, the meeting together of several happy gifts is exceptional. +But it is willingly attributed to all those, whatever may be their art, +whose works are able to touch the human cords that vibrate the most profoundly. +Painters appear to us to compose a well-marked type among such. The reader has +seen the characters of it brought together and discussed in this volume: he will +preserve its living image after having closed the book.” This in itself furnishes a +sufficient recommendation for the perusal of M. Arréat’s work, which apart from its +psychological value, is a perfect mine of gracefully written information about painters +and their peculiarities.</p> + +<p class="right">Ω.</p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">Physiologie de l’Art.</span> By <i>Georges Hirth</i>. Traduit de l’Allemand et précédé +d’une Introduction par <i>Lucien Arréat</i>. Paris: Félix Alcan. 1892. Pp. 247.</h4> + +<p>We have now occasion to review a work on a subject much akin to the preceding—a +work which has been translated from the German by the same author, M. Lucien +Arréat, and supplied by him with a very interesting introduction. This Introduction +is in reality a résumé by M. Arréat of a series of studies by M. Hirth on +physiological optics. These studies are of great importance and are classed by the +French editor under the three heads of Form, Illumination, and Movement. The +first of these comprises the subjects of monocular and binocular vision, the depth +and the bilateral enlargement of the visual field, perspective and identical points. +Under the head of illumination the effect of the “double bath of light” through +the two eyes, the “luminous equation,” and the problems connected with optical +measurement are considered.</p> + +<p>We have not space to exhibit fully the author’s ideas on these topics, but we +can state what are regarded by M. Arréat as the two principle propositions which +give to them their life and unity. One of these propositions is, that the first function +of our dioptric apparatus consists in furnishing to our central visual organ, +which M. Hirth terms the <i>internal eye</i>, material which the latter has to interpret. +The other is that it is necessary to get rid of mathematical concepts, which are +much too rigid to be applied to the delicate problems of vision, and to fall back on +visual sensation such as it is. These propositions imply, moreover, the admission +of an electro chemical process, “without which the properties of the eye and the +marvels of vision remain inexplicable.” This last conclusion has a bearing on the +nature of memory, or the recollection of the impressions received by the nerves and +brain after the original excitation has disappeared. Thus, M. Hirth suggests that +when we know the physiological procedure in the impregnation of cerebral molecules, +or in their electric charging, memory will be found to be only the prolongation +of the duration of consecutive images.</p> + +<p>The inquiries of M. Hirth throw great light on the difference between monocular +and binocular vision, for information as to which and other details of his optical +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_144">[144]</span>theory we must refer our readers to M. Arréat’s Introduction. This concludes with +a consideration of the perception of light-movement, the reproduction of which is +said to require a special exercise of attention, direct or indirect. Here we have +the third degree of attention, according to the views of M. Hirth, who regards it as +artistic apperception, having its end in itself and capable of being reproduced through +co-ordination of the movements perceived.</p> + +<p>A considerable portion of the second and principal part of this work is occupied +with the psychology of attention and of the related subject memory. The latter is +defined by M. Hirth as “a sum of states of perception gradually accumulated by +the various organs of sense,” and it is thus not a special faculty of the mind. The +mental condition which results from the action of memory is what is known as <i>disposition</i>. +This disposition is transmitted from one generation to another, and becomes +innate as the memory of the species. But it is intimately connected with the +nervous system, and with the brain regarded as the electric storehouse of memories. +It is in accordance with these ideas that the author explains the transmission of +hereditary qualities, the problem which is at present engaging so much attention. +The innate organisation is a conservation of nervous quality or temperaments associated +with the anatomical disposition of the nervous system, and a certain condition +of electrical tension among the cerebral molecules. The transmission of ancestral +qualities depends, however, on the vigor and good condition of the germ, and +as the organisation received from our earliest ancestors is the most persistent, the +primitive “disposition” will subsist even without exercise whilst nutrition and circulation +assure the continuance of molecular growth.</p> + +<p>It is with the visual memory that the author is chiefly concerned, and he affirms +that the optical phenomena referred to in the Introduction compel us to admit the +existence in the brain of a central organ, which he terms the internal eye. In order +to determine the position of this organ, which is the real seat of visual perception, +to the exclusion of the retina, whose function has been overestimated, M. Hirth +considers the anatomical and physiological aspects of the question, and he accepts +the conclusion arrived at by H. Munk in his <i>Functions de l’écorce cerebrale</i>, that +perception is the function of a particular portion of the cerebral cortex. There +thus exist two visual centres or “internal eyes,” one in each convexity of the occipital +lobes, as shown in Plate V. of the present work. Munk’s researches would seem to +prove, moreover, that not only is there a general localisation of visual memories, +but that each memory is fixed in a precise and determined place. The centres of +memory and the centres of perception, which M. Hirth supposes to be simply a +phase of memory, are the same. Moreover attention is connected with perception, +but it is an imperfect state of memory. Attention requires the expenditure of force, +while perfect memory acts spontaneously; and it is only in this form, “exempt from +fatigue, that it becomes the passive servant of our instincts and sensations, of our +voluntary acts, of our labor.” Memory when perfect is automatic, and according +to the theory of M. Hirth, who does not accept M. Ribot’s monoideistic theory, it +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_145">[145]</span>is accompanied with automatic attention, which is the result of a gradual transformation +of “energetic” attention, and attains in a normal adult an incredible development +both in quantity and quality. This <i>latent</i> attention is required by the +existence of latent memory, which is properly spoken of by M. Hirth as an organic +attribute of the highest moment, seeing that it forms the basis of all individual acquirements. +It would seem to answer, however, to what is often spoken of as the +subconsciousness.</p> + +<p>We can understand how this doctrine of latent memory and latent attention +can have an important bearing on the question of the origin of the artistic sense, +especially as each brain centre may be supposed to have its own memory, and each +fundamental memory its special temperament. The activity of such centres is due +in great measure, as pointed out by M. Ribot, to nutrition and blood-circulation +but M. Hirth adds a third factor, electrical tension. According to his theory, cerebral +activity rests ultimately on electricity, the invisible currents of which, maintaining +the whole system in a state of tension, are “the inferior currents of the latent +memory,” the brain centres being electrical accumulators. This idea, which the +author applies also to the explanation of colored visual memories, is open to strong +critical objections. In relation to the particular subject of art, the author shows +that the hereditary transmission of talent depends on the active maintenance of the +special temperament of certain fundamental memories and their associations, and +talent itself therefore depends on the existence of such a temperament. We here +come in contact with M. Lombroso’s theory of the physiological degeneracy of genius, +which M. Hirth opposes with much force, and we think on the whole with success. +This discussion occupies the last chapter of a work that, as our readers will be able +to judge from the glance given here at some of its leading topics, has a scientific +value quite apart from the special subject of art which it is intended to illustrate, +and which it goes far towards establishing on a physiological basis.</p> + +<p class="right">Ω.</p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">Les Altérations de la Personnalité.</span> By <i>Alfred Binet</i>. Paris: Félix Alcan +1892. Pp. 323. Price, 6 fr.</h4> + +<p>In the present work, the accomplished director of the laboratory of physiological +psychology at the Sorbonne has brought together and systematised all the most +reliable phenomena bearing on one of the most curious subjects of inquiry now engaging +attention. Notwithstanding the disagreement between different experimenters +as to particular facts, all have arrived at the conclusion that, under special conditions, +the normal unity of consciousness may be broken, and that then there is the +production of several distinct consciousnesses “each of which can have its perceptions, +its memory, and even its moral character.” No one is better fitted than M. +Binet to perform the eclectic work he has undertaken of discussing the recent researches +on the alteration of personality, without regard to the special views of particular +schools.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_146">[146]</span></p> + +<p>The subject is considered by him under the three heads of Successive Personalities, +Coexisting Personalities, and The Alterations of Personality in the Experiences +of Suggestion. The two first parts deal chiefly with phenomena presented by somnambulic +and hysteric subjects. In the third part M. Binet applies the fact of the +duplication of personality to the explanation of the phenomena of spiritism, the +term he very properly gives to so-called spiritualism. He regards the supposed +spirit agent as the subconscious personality of the medium acting under the influence +of suggestion, a view which undoubtedly meets most of the actual facts of +spiritism.</p> + +<p>Notwithstanding the divisibility of the ego, there can be no doubt of the unity +of the personality under normal conditions. The question is as to the nature of this +unity, and the author follows M. Ribot in affirming that it consists in the coördination +of the elements which compose it. He repudiates the idea that memory is the +sole foundation of consciousness, as not only may one memory embrace different +states, but the same individual may have several memories, several consciousnesses, +and several personalities. For the opinion of M. Binet on other points we must +refer our readers to the work itself, which forms an important addition to the International +Scientific Library.</p> + +<p class="right">Ω.</p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">L’Homme dans la Nature.</span> By <i>Paul Topinard</i>. With 101 Illustrations in the +text. Paris: Félix Alcan. 1891. Pp. 350. Price, 6 fr.</h4> + +<p>The present is the third work in which Dr. Paul Topinard, the well-known +pupil and successor of M. Broca, the founder of French Anthropology, has given +to the public his general ideas in relation to the science of which he has made so +profound a study. In 1876 he published his <i>Anthropologie</i>, which reflected in +great measure the teaching of his master, Broca. Ten years later, in 1886, appeared +his larger and more important work, <i>Eléments d’anthropologie générale</i>, +which treated of the history and methods of anthropology, with various other subjects. +Now Dr. Topinard gives us his matured ideas on “Man in Nature,” by +which is meant physical nature, the object of the present work being to show the +place that man occupies physically among animals, and his probable origin or descent. +It is not surprising that a writer who was the pupil of Professor de Quatrefages +as well as of Professor Broca should declare himself a supporter of the principle +of unity of composition, formulated by M. Etienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, +from which flows that of evolution, that is the natural derivation of beings from +one another. As to the means by which this is brought about, the author reserves +his opinion until the publication of a further work which he has in preparation.</p> + +<p>Dr. Topinard devotes the second chapter of the present work to a consideration +of the position to be accorded to anthropology in relation to the other sciences. +He declares it to be a pure, concrete science, essentially anatomical and observatory, +and thus distinguishes it from ethnography, which has to do with peoples under +all their aspects. Both alike are branches of the science of man in its broadest +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_147">[147]</span>sense. If anything can be added to the author’s explanation, it is that anthropology +has to do with mankind as a series of <i>individuals</i>, while ethnography is concerned +with the <i>groups</i> into which such individuals are collected. This is not inconsistent +with Dr. Topinard’s definition of anthropology as the science “which +studies human races, the human species, and the place of man in the classification +of animals.” For all the facts on which it is based are derived from the observation +of individuals, and when races are compared with each other, they are compared +as ideal individuals, formed by a generalisation of certain prevailing qualities, +just as mankind by a similar process becomes an ideal individual, a scientific +Adam, who is compared with other animals. There is an apparent difficulty in relation +to psychology which Dr. Topinard claims entirely for anthropology, but it +disappears when we see how closely he associates psychology with physiology. He +says, and we quite agree with him, that “characters of a psychological nature, reduced +to their most simple expression, whether attributed to human races, or to +the general human type, belong to ordinary physiological characters; the corresponding +anatomical part takes its place by the side of other physical characters; +the theory and explanation of intellectual operations, of feelings and volitions, belong +to the special physiology of man and to the application of the ideas of general +physiology.”</p> + +<p>While accepting as correct the division of anthropology, in its restricted sense +into general and special, as proposed by Broca and Bertillon, the author thinks it +does not conform to the plan which should be adopted if it is desired to proceed, +by the method of analysis and synthesis, from the known to the unknown. The +plan adopted by Dr. Topinard is, by analogy with the procedures of general zoölogy, +to begin by recalling the general notions applicable to his subject as to the +distribution of animals by groups of varying values, the choice of characters on +which they repose, and the differences between the race, the species, the family, +and the order, these last forming the pivoting point of his views as to the place of +man in classification. Then commences the study of characteristics, the mode of +ascertaining them, of putting them to use and of appreciating their value, accompanied +by examples, drawn from special anthropology, proper to illustrate the +methods employed. Finally, a parallel is drawn between man and animals, that a +conclusion may be arrived at as to the place of man in the series of beings, and his +probable genealogy.</p> + +<p>All these points are carefully considered by the author, who has framed a +canon of the medium adult man of the European type, a figure based on which +forms the frontispiece to the work. The proportions of this figure are derived from +a comparison of all the most authentic published measurements, and the canon +framed from them conforms closely to that recognised in artists’ studios, except that +in the latter the arm is too short and the neck too long.</p> + +<p>The most generally interesting subjects discussed by the author are those connected +with the relationship of man to other animals, and particularly the structure +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_148">[148]</span>of the brain. Dr. Topinard makes a careful comparison of the cerebral convolutions +of various animals and man, with numerous illustrations, and he arrives at +the conclusion that none of the characters said to distinguish man from the anthropoid +apes are absolute; all are reducible to a question of degree of evolution, the +superior degree being sometimes found among the anthropoids, and the inferior degree +with man. The cerebral type of the anthropoids is a human type not completely +developed, or the cerebral type of man is a developed simian type. Man +thus undoubtedly belongs to the order of the Primates. After considering the form +and volume of the simian and human brains, the author remarks that “man alone +has a frontal lobe developed in all its parts, and filling up a large, concave, and +deep frontal shell which externally gives place to the forehead, one of the characteristics +of man.”</p> + +<p>Connected with the form and volume of the brain is the transformation of the +animal skull into the human skull, and the relation of this transformation to the +facial characteristics of man. These points, and also various questions connected +with the bipedal or quadrupedal attitude, and with the attitude and function of +prehension, are treated in detail, as are certain other distinctive simian and human +characters. A chapter is devoted to a consideration of the important subject of retrogressive +anomalies and rudimentary organs. In his concluding chapter Dr. +Topinard points out the place of man in animal classification, and refers to the +questions of his single or multiple origin, his genealogy and his future. In connection +with the subject of classification, the author dwells on the fact that man is not +the only relatively perfect animal, and yet that none of the mammalia, which we +admire for their beauty or for their usefulness, equal the monkeys in the possession +of a brain approaching the human type. The brain, the hand, and the attitude +are the three characteristics which especially connect man with the monkey, and +particularly with the anthropoids, and the question has long been agitated whether +in these particulars the last named is allied more closely to man or to the other +monkeys. Dr. Topinard affirms that in all these particulars the anthropoids should +be classed with the other monkeys, and therefore that man stands alone.</p> + +<p>As to the descent of man, the French anthropologist would seem to agree with +M. Vogt that the type from which man has developed was also the source of the +monkey and anthropoid types, and that it first appeared at the commencement of +the Miocene period, when the earliest monkeys succeeded to the Lemurian of the +preceding Eocene epoch. Dr. Topinard remarks that this conclusion is agreeable +to that of the eminent American palæontologist, Professor Cope, who makes man +descend directly from the Lemurian without passing through the monkeys and the +anthropoids, basing his opinion chiefly on dentition. The question of the descent +of man is connected with that of the singleness or multiplicity of his origin, and on +this point the author does not express a decided opinion. He says that all existing +types of humanity could be reduced to three, the Europo-Semitic, the Asiatico-American, +and the Negro; if not to two, the White and the Negro. He adds that, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_149">[149]</span>nevertheless, “in losing oneself in the depths of time, we can conceive the Negro, +born the first, giving birth successively to the Australoid with frizzled hair, to one +of the forms of the Brown stock with straight or wavy hair, and finally to the white +European.” Probably his actual opinion is to be gathered from his final statement +when comparing the order of the Primates to a tree, that the Lemurians are its roots +giving birth to several stems, of which one is that of the monkey, from which +branched the anthropoids, and another, whose point of contact with the first is unknown, +gives the actual human branch, which runs parallel to that of the anthropoids +without being connected with it, and goes beyond it.</p> + +<p>As to the future of the human race, Dr. Topinard affirms that the volume of the +brain will notably increase, that dolichocephaly will give place to a universal brachycephaly, +and that the cellules of the brain will be perfected in quality. As the human +brain is being thus perfected, the animals nearest to the human type will disappear, +and then man will really think himself the centre round which the universe +gravitates, the sovereign for whom nature has been created. But even then the +anatomist will bring him to himself by uttering the words of Broca, “Memento te +animalium esse.” This work, which forms volume seventy-three of the International +Scientific Library, is sure to be widely read, and it will be indispensable to the +student of anthropology, who will find in it all the information he requires on the +methods of the science.</p> + +<p class="right">Ω.</p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">Die Urheimath der Indogermanen und das europäische Zahlsystem.</span> By +<i>Johannes Schmidt</i>. Berlin, 1890. Pp. 56.</h4> + +<p>This essay is an important contribution to the problem of the place of origin of the +Indo-Germanic languages. The author is confident that while nothing certain was +known before, he has established at least one fact which will give us a clue to the +solution of the problem. This fact is the interference of the duodecimal system +with the decimal system. The former is of Babylonian origin, but its effects are +noticeable upon almost all the Aryan tongues. The duodecimal system is not +original with the Goths or with any of the Teutons, which can be proved by the fact +that 60 or a <i>Schock</i> was a round number, but not twelve, the etymology of twelve +(<i>twa-lif</i>) being two above a <i>lif</i>, which latter means a certain set. Thus when the +Gothic hundred as a rule meant 120, when for a long time they distinguished between +great hundreds (i. e. 120) and small hundreds (i. e. 100), this was due to +foreign influence. For if twelve had been the basis of their number system, a <i>lif</i> +would have meant twelve and the numerical arrangement would have progressed not +in 10 × 12 but consistently in 12 × 12 or 144. Everything points to the supposition +that the Babylonian <i>sossos</i> is still preserved in the German <i>Schock</i> (60). Accordingly, +says Schmidt, the Europeans must have been exposed to a strong influence of the +sexagesimal system; they must have been nearer to the centre of Babylonian civilisation +than are the valleys of the Indus and the Eastern Iran. Professor Schmidt +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_150">[150]</span>considers Penka as refuted and also all those who regard Europe as the home of +Indo-Germans.</p> + +<p>We have to add that the eminent philologist when, discussing the problem of +the cradle of the Indo-Germanic languages does not touch upon the other problem +of the home of the Aryans, the latter being mainly an anthropological question. +Schmidt says (p. 13): “I do not intend to enter into the problematic domain of anthropology. +The original race-characters of the Indo-Germanic nations, their +causes and the home in which they were moulded, also the physical conditions +and mixtures of the races which speak our languages, undoubtedly can be treated +with success only by the representatives of physical anthropology. But exactly +so the problem of the cradle of the original Indo-Germanic speech and the evolution +of its several languages, as they are known in history, can be solved only by +philologists.”</p> + +<p>This is very true. Perhaps we shall approach the subject with better success +if we learn to distinguish between the anthropological problem of the origin of the +Aryan race and the philological one of the origin of the Aryan languages. A European +origin of the one might not exclude an Asiatic origin of the other, and it +still remains possible, that European Aryans when migrating south and east developed +through their intercourse with semitic and other races the beginning of a civilisation +which powerfully affected all the Aryans, since there is ample evidence +that even in olden times a lively commerce took place between them. When Prussian +amber is found in Pelasgian graves, why should not the sexagesimal system of the +wealthy nations of the south have spread over northern countries?</p> + +<p class="right">κρς.</p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">Lehrbuch der historisch-kritischen Einleitung in das neue Testament.</span> +By <i>Heinrich Julius Holtzmann</i>. Dritte verbesserte und vermehrte Auflage. +Freiburg, i. B.: J. C. B. Mohr. 1892. Pp. 508. Price, 9 M.</h4> + +<p>It has been said that the scientific purpose of an academical text-book should +be to educate the student to scientific independence, and its practical purpose to +make it available for the adherents of all parties and denominations; and these two +purposes are the surer attained the less the author represents his own conception as +that which alone can be justified. This is the principle according to which Professor +Holtzmann’s <i>Lehrbuch</i> has been written. That he has fully attained his +aim, will not be doubted by those who know his previous and painstaking labors, +in which he proves himself as a theologian fully imbued with the spirit of science +and scientific critique.</p> + +<p>The first edition of this work appeared in 1885, the second in 1886, and the +present and third edition can make the just claim of being carefully revised and +perfected in every respect, so that it is to be regarded as a comprehensive, concise, +and clear review of the critical materials of the New Testament. There is no +doubt that the work as it now stands will remain the best book for reference of its +kind.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_151">[151]</span></p> + +<p>Professor Holtzmann in a brief introduction of seventeen pages sketches the history +and literature of New Testament criticism. The book is divided into two parts, +the first treating the subject in a general way, the second entering into its several +details. In the first part the author presents us with a history of the text and of its +traditions, explaining the causes of the alterations that were introduced either unintentionally +or by mistake; he reviews the critical apparatus for text-revision and also +the history of the printed and revised editions up to the present attempt at emendation. +Then a history of the canon is given, from the oldest Christian literature down +to the radical criticisms of the present time. In the second and special part we find a +careful compilation of all the criticisms concerning the single books and epistles of +the New Testament. The first chapter treats of St. Paul’s epistles to the Thessalonians, +Galatians, Corinthians, Romans, to Philemon, the Colossians, Ephesians, +Philippians, the pastoral epistles; further, the epistle to the Hebrews, which is non-Paulinian, +the two epistles of St. Peter, the epistle of St. Jude, and that of St. +James. The second chapter introduces us into the historical books of the synoptic +gospels and the Acts, where, in a brief review of fifty-seven pages, we find the same +data presented which are more fully explained in another publication of our author, +reviewed in <i>The Monist</i>, Vol II, No. 2.</p> + +<p>A new period in the development of Christian literature begins with all those +writings which go under the name of St. John. A discussion of these books is contained +in the third chapter, which treats of the apocalypse, the fourth gospel, and +St. John’s epistles. Not the least interest attaches to the fourth chapter, the subject +of which is the vast domain of the apocryphal books of the New Testament, +the number of which has, of late, been greatly increased by several new discoveries. +The subject divides itself naturally into apocryphal gospels (Chap. II), apocryphical +stories about the lives and deeds of the apostles (Chap. III), apocryphical epistles +(Chap. IV), and apocryphical apocalypses (Chap. V).</p> + +<p class="right">κρς.</p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">Sammlung von populär-wissenschaftlichen Vorträgen über den Bau und die +Leistungen des Gehirns.</span> By Professor <i>Theodor Meynert</i>. Vienna and +Leipsic: Wilhelm Braumüller. 1892. Pp. 253.</h4> + +<p>This latest publication of Professor Meynert’s was mentioned in the last number +of <i>The Monist</i> by Mr. Christian Ufer, in the department “Literary Correspondence.” +Since its appearance Professor Meynert has died. His name has stood foremost for +a great number of years in the ranks of psychiatrical investigators, and his contributions +to the science to which he was devoted, have, perhaps more than those of +any other, tended to its permanent advancement. The activity of his life has extended +over a great number of years, and his labors have not only been applied to +the theoretical interests of his science alone, but have also been directed—and this +is the most important part of every scientist’s work—to bringing the results of +his investigations into connection with the great body of knowledge at large, and +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_152">[152]</span>especially to putting in popular form, and bringing within the reach of the general +reader, the facts of the science which he contributed so much to establish.</p> + +<p>The present lectures date from the year 1868. They owe their origin to the +identification in later years of the interests of medicine with the interests which +every human being has at heart, of resolving the mysteries of mental operations generally. +Their main subject is the description and investigation of the structure of +the cerebral organs; and the elucidation in the light of such description of the psychical +operations of the brain. The fundamental facts of this province are not +difficult. The main thing required is to free ourselves from the impediments which +artificial thought on this subject has at all times imported into the consideration of +intellectual facts. Our knowledge in this domain is founded on observation and +introspection; not upon dialectics. Phenomena, simply, are presented to observation, +and not the ultimate essences of forces. So, too, the apparatus of observation and introspection +give only their own phenomena. Their contents are the animated external +world as it affects conscious beings, and involves, besides intuition, the facts of memory. +Unpersonal inherited memories, which take the form of instinct, are not forthcoming. +The present lectures do not pretend to give instruction in the anatomy of +the brain <i>per se</i>, but simply in so far as it is necessary to the understanding of the +brain’s mechanism. All things viewed, all things intuited are contents of consciousness, +which in its limitations to the sense-impressions of the individual being, we +term the ego, or <i>I</i>. In so far as the external world is the intuited contents of consciousness, +the extent of the latter is increased, the ego, the <i>I</i>, expands into the +secondary ego, or <i>I</i>. In this doctrine of a secondary ego the problems which grow +out of the behavior of individuals towards the external world are resolved in the +single explanation that the ego of each particular group of things seeks to preserve +itself by internal and external motions. The ego is simply in the possession of itself +in every extension which it acquires; if such extension consists of a common possession, +its desire and tendency to preserve such is simply explained by the fact that +such possession is the ego itself. Amongst the intuited objects of the ego are to be +classed also as component parts of the secondary ego of every individual, the other +living individualities of the world. From the point of view of this fact, the ego +appears in its social rôle. The present lectures consequently extend to the consideration +of the interactions of brains in society, to culture and civilisation, and seek +to establish the phenomena of these domains as facts of physical knowledge. The +method of physical inquiry is that of comparison by the alteration of the attendant +circumstances in which the psychical mechanism acts. Physiology bases it on experiment. +Nature also supplies experiments with the results that also embrace +phenomena of culture. In the directions indicated here, the diseases of the mind +afford a comparative means for the investigation of the phenomena of consciousness, +a doctrine of natural cerebral experiments, and a foundation for a knowledge of the +phenomena of mind.</p> + +<p class="right">μκρκ.</p> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_153">[153]</span></p> + +<h3 class="nobreak" id="PERIODICALS_I">PERIODICALS.</h3> + +</div> + +<h4>ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE.</h4> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. III. No. 5.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Ueber ein optisches Paradoxon.</span> By <i>Franz Brentano</i>.</p> + +<p>“<span class="smcap">Flatternde Herzen.</span>” By <i>Adolf Szili</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Ueber Begründung einer Blindenpsychologie von einem Blinden.</span> By +<i>Friedrich Hitschmann</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Bemerkungen über die von Lipps und Cornelius besprochene Nachbilderscheinung.</span> +By <i>Otto Schwarz</i>.</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. III. No. 6.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Beiträge zur Dioptrik des Auges.</span> By <i>M. Tscherning</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Optische Streitfragen.</span> By <i>Th. Lipps</i>.</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. IV. Nos. 1 and 2.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Ueber die Schätzung kleiner Zeitgrössen.</span> By <i>E Schumann</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Zum Begriff der Lokalzeichen.</span> By <i>C. Stumpf</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Zur Kenntniss des successiven Kontrastes.</span> By <i>Richard Hilbert</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Litteraturbericht.</span></p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>The first article is on an optical paradox. Let two equal parallel lines be +drawn, as in the cut below; then let two small straight lines be drawn from the extremities +of these in such a way that in the first they form acute angles with the +line and in the second, obtuse angles. The first, it will be seen, appears shorter +than the second. What is the explanation of this phenomenon?</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp100" id="cut1" style="max-width: 35.9375em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/cut1.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption> + <p>Cut 1.</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_154">[154]</span></p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp62" id="cut2" style="max-width: 15.625em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/cut2.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption> + <p>Cut 2.</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp37" id="cut3" style="max-width: 9.375em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/cut3.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption> + <p>Cut 3.</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp100" id="cut4" style="max-width: 40.625em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/cut4.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption> + <p>Cut 4.</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp100" id="cut5" style="max-width: 50.0em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/cut5.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption> + <p>Cut 5.</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>The author’s answer is, that this phenomenon is a consequence of the well-known +fact that we overestimate small angles, and underestimate large ones. The +presence of the lines has nothing to do with the optical illusion, as the inserted +cut, in which the lines are omitted, shows. (<a href="#cut2">Cut 2.</a>) The optical illusion is also not +present when the lines are rectangularly attached, as is <a href="#cut3">Cut 3</a>. These facts prove +that angular <i>inclination</i> is the decisive factor. The following cuts show this, the +first in a more and the second in a less marked degree. (<a href="#cut4">Cuts 4, 5.</a>) The simplest +case in which the explanatory factor of this phenomenon is involved, is that of the +estimation of the distance of an isolated point from the extremities of a short straight +line. The estimation of this distance is dependent upon our estimation of the angle +made by lines drawn from the point to the extremities of a short line. If this estimation +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_155">[155]</span>is false, it produces by an exact trigonometrical law, an error in the estimation +of the corresponding distance. This explains all. In our first figure the factor +of illusion is eight times presented: hence its marked character.</p> + +<p>The second article consists of a rather long series of experiments on the so-called +“flatternde Herzen” by Adolph Szili.</p> + +<p>The third article is on the foundations of a psychology of the blind, by a blind +man, Friedrich Hitschmann, of Vienna. This article contains a number of interesting +facts concerning the sensory, intellectual, and emotional life of blind people, +and affords a great many valuable hints for the development of the special psychology +which the author has in view.</p> + +<p>The first article of No. 6 of the <i>Zeitschrift</i> is a very exhaustive one, some sixty +pages in length, filled with special and technical investigations concerning the dioptrics +of the eye. When light passes from one refracting medium into another it is +partially reflected at the dividing surface, and transmits by reflection the objects +from which it has proceeded. This is also the case with the human eye, which is +itself a lens. The refracted pictures are the only pictures of importance to the possessor +of the eye; but just as in the construction of optical instruments, the reflected +or “lost” images are of supreme importance to the optician in the determination +of the properties of his productions, so these same pictures in the human eye +are of supreme importance to the physiologist and the psychologist. This is the +subject of Dr. Tscherning’s researches.</p> + +<p>In the second article Dr. Th. Lipps discusses some mooted questions of optics. +The first part of the article is a reply to Schwarz’s criticism in the preceding number +of the <i>Zeitschrift</i>. The second part is a review of Franz Brentano’s explanation +of the optical paradox, discussed in the second paragraph of this notice. Lipps declares, +that, though there is some truth in Brentano’s explanation, it is nevertheless an +error to believe that acute angles, <i>as such</i>, are overestimated, and obtuse angles, as +such, are underestimated. On the contrary, every time such errors in estimation +occur, there exist particular reasons for it, the character of which renders the attempt +impossible to derive the estimation of distance directly from the estimation +of angles. Lipps supports his position by actual facts. His chief and most philosophical +remark is, that it is a perilous and improper thing to do to explain isolated +optical illusions by isolated and independent hypotheses; optical illusions are not +exceptions: they constitute a class of phenomena in themselves, and they should +be considered in their natural and logical connection. (Hamburg and Leipsic: +Leopold Voss.).</p> + +<p class="right">μκρκ.</p> + +<h4>VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE. Vol. XVI. No. 3.</h4> + +<blockquote> + +<p><span class="smcap">Ueber Real- und Beziehungs-Urtheile.</span> By <i>J. v. Kries</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Was ist Logik?</span> By <i>A. Voigt</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Zur Psychologie der Landschaft.</span> By <i>R. Wlassak</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Des Nic. Tetens Stellung in der Geschichte der Philosophie.</span> By <i>M. +Dessoir</i>.</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>The articles of this magazine are usually very rigorous and learned; and the +contents of the present number are in keeping with its reputation. Prof. J. v. +Kries discusses in an essay, evoked by the recent articles of Riehl, the subject of +“real and relational judgments”; his object is to establish a classification, and display +the logical connection, of judgments generally. Real judgments are predications +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_156">[156]</span>concerning reality or actual facts; relational judgments predicate simple relations +of concepts, etc. The first requisite of a scientific exactness of thought, says Kries, +is the distinction and determination in any given case of judgments which are real +and judgments which are relational. In the second article, which is long and exhaustive, +Dr. Voigt endeavors to determine the characters and functions of the +different kinds of logic. In view of the great prominence into which algebraical +logic of late years has come, this article is one of considerable interest. Voigt defines +the pretensions and powers of the two opposing systems of philosophical and +algebraical logic, and attempts to set forth the justification of each. Voigt, as +opposed to Husserl, cordially recommends the study of algebraical logic to philosophers, +that both disciplines may profit by the intercourse. (Leipsic: O. R. Reisland.)</p> + +<p class="right">μκρκ.</p> + +<h4>PHILOSOPHISCHE MONATSHEFTE. Vol. XXVIII. Nos. 5 to 8.</h4> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Nos. 5 and 6.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Die Wirklichkeit als Phänomen des Geistes.</span> (Concluded.) By <i>A. Rosinski</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Wesen und Bedeutung der Impersonalien.</span> By <i>R. F. Kaindl</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Zur Geschichte und zum Problem der Aesthetik.</span> By <i>E. Kühnemann</i>.</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Nos. 7 and 8.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Ueber die Grundformen der Vorstellungsverbindung.</span> Psychologische +Studie. By <i>M Offner</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Zur Geschichte und zum Problem der Aesthetik.</span> (Concluded) By <i>E. +Kühnemann</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Werke zur Philosophie der Geschichte und des socialen Lebens</span> (Second +Article: <i>G. de Greef, Introduction à la sociologie</i>). By <i>F. Tönnies</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Recensionen.</span></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Litteraturbericht.</span></p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>A. Rosinski’s contribution is a metaphysical essay on reality viewed as a phenomenon +of the mind. The results of his discussion are these: that the world of +experience, with all its laws and phenomena, and all we assume to exist <i>per se</i>, is +referable wholly to ourselves; that the primal source and cause of all reality is not +a something which lies absolutely outside us, but is simply our own self, or ego. In +what sense reality is reality, the author proposes to discuss in future articles.</p> + +<p>Dr. Raimund Friedrich Kaindl discusses, in the second article, the character +and meaning of the impersonal verbs. The discussion is made both from the psychologico-logical +point of view, and from the point of view of comparative philology.</p> + +<p>The <i>Philosophische Monatshefte</i> contain, in each issue, a very exhaustive +bibliography of all the works which have appeared during the month in the provinces +connected with philosophy. This department is conducted by Dr. Ascherson, +the librarian of the Berlin University library, and forms a very important and valuable +feature of this magazine. (Berlin: Dr. R. Salinger.)</p> + +<p class="right">μκρκ.</p> + +<h4>ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PHILOSOPHIE UND PHILOSOPHISCHE KRITIK. Vol. 100. Nos. 1 and 2.</h4> + +<p>This well-known magazine, formerly edited by Dr. J. D. Fichte and Dr. Ulrici, is +now presided over by Dr. Richard Falckenberg, of Erlangen. It has reached its hundredth +volume, and with the present two numbers begins a new series. Its reviews +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_157">[157]</span>and lists of newly published works are comparatively complete. Its articles, though +generally tinged with scholasticism and chiefly treating of philosophico-historical +subjects, deal, nevertheless, with some modern and living questions; for example, +Dr. Max Schasler’s discussion of the proceedings on the recent Prussian school law; +Dr. Eugene Dreher’s consideration of the law of the conservation of force; and Dr. +Nikolaus von Seeland’s discussion of the deficiencies of the current theory of force. +The other articles are contributed by A. Wreschner, G. Frege, J. Zahlfleisch, and +Robert Schellwien. (Leipsic: C. E. M. Pfeffer.)</p> + +<p class="right">μκρκ.</p> + +<h4>THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. August, 1892. Vol. IV. No. 4.</h4> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS:</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Extent of the Cortex in Man, as Deduced from the Study of Laura +Bridgman’s Brain.</span> By <i>Henry H. Donaldson</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Some Influences which Affect the Rapidity of Voluntary Movements.</span> +By <i>F. B. Dresslar</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Experimental Research Upon the Phenomena of Attention.</span> By <i>James +R. Angell</i> and <i>Arthur H. Pierce</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Some Effects of Contrast.</span> By <i>A. Kirschmann</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Report on an Experimental Test of Musical Expressiveness.</span> By <i>Benjamin +Ives Gilman</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Psychological Literature.</span> (Worcester, Mass.: Clark University.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<h4>MIND. New Series. No. 3. July, 1892.</h4> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS:</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Lotze’s Antithesis between Thought and Things.</span> (I.) By <i>A. Eastwood</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Festal Origin of Human Speech.</span> By <i>J. Donovan</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Logical Calculus.</span> (III.) By <i>W. E. Johnson</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Field of Æesthetics Psychologically Considered.</span> (I.) By <i>H. R. +Marshall</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Discussions</span>: The Influence of Muscular States on Consciousness. By <i>Edmund +B. Delabarre</i>; Dr. Münsterberg and his Critics. By <i>E. B. Titchener</i>. The +Definition of Desire. By <i>Henry Rutgers Marshall</i>. Feeling, Belief, and +Judgment. By <i>J. Mark Baldwin</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Critical Notices.</span> (London: Williams & Norgate.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<h4>INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. July, 1892. Vol. II. No. 4.</h4> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS:</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Natural Selection in Morals.</span> By <i>S. Alexander</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">What should be the Attitude of the Pulpit to the Labor Problem?</span> By +<i>W. L. Sheldon</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Ethics of the Jewish Question.</span> By <i>Charles Zeublin</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Machiavelli’s Prince.</span> By <i>W. R. Thayer</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">On the Founding of a New Religion.</span> By <i>B. Carneri</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">An Analysis of the Idea of Obligation.</span> By <i>Frank Chapman Sharp</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Reviews.</span></p> + +</blockquote> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_158">[158]</span></p> + +<p>Prof. S. Alexander, in his lecture delivered before the Ethical Societies of +Cambridge and London, here reproduced, points out that the growth and change +of moral and social ideals are the result of a process of mental conflict. Professor +Sheldon thinks only a partial solution of the labor problem is possible until the +second coming of men somewhat of the type of St. Francis of Assisi, “who will +sacrifice their personal opportunities, abandon their station in the world, and go +down to apply their gifts and acquirements to the cause of the lower stratum of society.” +The religious as well as economic opposition to Judaism, according to Mr. +Charles Zeublin, is caused by the exclusiveness of the Jew, and his ultimate welfare +and that of his neighbors requires a humanitarian treatment within and without Judaism. +Mr. William R. Thayer shows that Machiavelli merely described things as +they were in his time, and deduced the laws which actually controlled the public +deeds of rulers; and that it is now “the duty of all men to sweep away the old +falsehood that rulers and governments are absolved from paying heed to those +ethical principles to which every individual is bound.” According to Mr. B. Carneri, +the living at peace with oneself and one’s fellow-men is possible only without +religion, “because there is no morality without contentment, and it is the highest +degree of discontent to strive for something beyond this world.” Mr. Frank Chapman +Sharp concludes that when the element of <i>the good</i> is taken out of the conception +of obligation, this degenerates into mere submission to an arbitrary imperative; +the foundation for the distinction between right and wrong must be sought in +something that appeals to us as good, and its ultimate criterion can be given only +by our chosen ideal. (Philadelphia: <i>International Journal of Ethics</i>, 118 S. +Twelfth Street.)</p> + +<p class="right">Ω.</p> + +<h4>THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. July, 1892. Vol. I. No. 4.</h4> + +<blockquote> + +<p><span class="smcap">Inhibition and Freedom of the Will.</span> By <i>Dr. James H. Hyslop</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">A Classification of Cases of Association.</span> By <i>Mary W. Calkins</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Origin of Pleasure and Pain.</span> By <i>Dr. Herbert Nichols</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">On Primitive Consciousness.</span> By <i>Hiram M. Stanley</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Reviews of Books.</span></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Summaries of Articles.</span></p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>The confusion incident to the old controversy about freedom is due, says Dr. +James H. Hyslop, to a failure to distinguish between the <i>proof</i> of freedom and the +<i>conditions</i> of it, that is, “the circumstances that are necessary to it, or the characteristics +that constitute it.” Freedom consists in “self-initiative and independence +of external causes, whether there be any choice between alternatives or not,” and +inhibition and deliberation bring about both of these circumstances. Miss Mary +W. Calkins rejects the ordinary division into association by contiguity and association +by similarity, and gives detailed summaries of the fundamental characteristics +of consciousness on which association depends and of the characteristics of association +proper; the ultimate fact of association, whether it be psychical or physical or +both, we do not understand. Dr. Herbert Nichols, in the first part of his article +on the “Origin of Pleasure and Pain,” considers the phenomena of pleasure and +pain associated with the action of the senses, and concludes that there is no “tangible +evidence indicating that pleasures and pains are inseparable attributes of other +senses or polar complements of each other,” and that separate sensations of pain +and of pleasure are probable. Mr. Hiram M. Stanley regards pure pain as primitive +mind, and pleasure as the polar opposite to it, although they are neither absolutely +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_159">[159]</span>essential one to the other, pleasure being traced to “an intermediary feeling +between pain as produced by excess, and pain from lack as differentiated form.” +Consciousness is fundamentally pain and pleasure as serving the organism in the +struggle for existence. (Boston, New York, Chicago: Ginn & Company.)</p> + +<p class="right">Ω.</p> + +<h4>THE NEW WORLD.</h4> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. I. No. 2.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Social Plaint.</span> By <i>E. Benjamin Andrews</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Religious Evolution.</span> By <i>Minot J. Savage</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Origin and Meaning of the Story of Sodom.</span> By <i>T. K. Cheyne</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Foundation of Buddhism.</span> By <i>Maurice Bloomfield</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Imagination in Religion.</span> By <i>Francis Tiffany</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The next Step in Christianity.</span> By <i>S. D. McConnell</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Implications of Self-Consciousness.</span> By <i>Josiah Royce</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">How I came into Christianity.</span> By <i>Nobuta Kishimoto</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">New Forms of Christian Education.</span> By <i>Mrs. Humphry Ward</i>.</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. I. No. 3.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Essence of Christianity.</span> By <i>Otto Pfleiderer</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Ecclesiastical Impedimenta.</span> By <i>J. Macbride Sterrett</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">New Testament Criticism and Religious Belief.</span> By <i>Orello Cone</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Thomas Paine.</span> By <i>John W. Chadwick</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Social Betterment.</span> By <i>Nicholas P. Gilman</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Rôle of the History of Religions in Modern Religious Education.</span> +By <i>Jean Réville</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">A Poet of His Century.</span> By <i>E. Cavazza</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Divine Love and Intelligence.</span> By <i>James C. Parsons</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Book Reviews.</span></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Summaries of Articles.</span> (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, & Company.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<h4>REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE.</h4> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: June, 1892. No. 198.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Existence et développement de la Volonté.</span> I. Existence de la Volonté. +By <i>A. Fouillée</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Sur quelques Idées du Baron d’Holbach.</span> By <i>A. Lalande</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Essai sur la Philosophie de Proudhon.</span> By <i>G. Sorel</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Travaux du Laboratoire de Psychologie Physiologique.</span></p> + +</blockquote> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: July, 1892. No. 199.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">L’inconnaissable dans la philosophie moderne.</span> By <i>G. Fonsegrive</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">La musique d’après Herbert Spencer.</span> By <i>J. Combarieu</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Essai sur la philosophie de Proudhon</span> (concluded). By <i>G. Sorel</i>.</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: August, 1892. No. 200.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Étude critique sur le mysticisme Moderne.</span> By <i>Rosenbach</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Le développement de la volonté.</span> By <i>A. Fouillée</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">La beauté organique: étude d’analyse esthétique.</span> By <i>A. Naville</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Analyses et Comptes Rendus.</span></p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>According to M. Fouillée, the principle which tends to dominate psychology +and physiology is the ubiquity of will and of feeling, and consequently of consciousness. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_160">[160]</span>Psychology will end by recognising the continuity and the transformation of +modes of psychical energy, as physics recognises the continuity and the transformation +of modes of physical energy, and philosophy will see in physical energy the +external expression of will.</p> + +<p>M. Fonsegrive maintains that the rejection of metaphysics as science, which +marks the modern theory of the unknowable, is the consequence of Kant’s <i>a priori</i> +theory as to the origin of our knowledge. The laws of the mind have no real existence +prior to experience, and universal and necessary notions can be discovered +only by mental analysis. In this manner the existence, and even the essence, of +metaphysical beings may be known, but only of such as experience puts in communication +with ourselves. Thus we know God as the necessary first cause, although +our notion of God is one of negation, of experimental notions.</p> + +<p>After showing that Spencer’s theory of music had numerous antecedents, and +that its conclusions are unacceptable on various grounds, M. Combarieu affirms +that the secret of the musical art is the identity of the musical idea with the imitation +or expression of the real world. All music contains a double verity; it is the +meeting place of the senses and of the rational world confounded in a unity which +is the work of art, as man is the combination of a soul and a body confounded in +the real unity of life. Spencer is an excessive simplifier, and does not see the complexity +of certain questions, which he seeks to resolve by undervaluing them. But +he has thrown light on one of the aspects of the musical problem.</p> + +<p>In this final essay on the philosophy of Proudhon, M. Sorel considers the theory +of justice by the light of the notion of free will. He differs somewhat from Proudhon, +and affirms that “the just man is the upright man such as our ideal conception +of antiquity represents him to us, but transformed by our consciousness as refined +by the influence of Christianity.” In dealing with the real organisation of societies +it is necessary to distinguish between matters of justice and those of right, which +includes that of force, of which war is an application. After showing the connection +of the economic <i>contradictions</i> of Proudhon with the state of war, and the value of +education for the realisation of equilibrium in the state. M. Sorel affirms that education +ought to be based on manual labor, for the explanation of which science +should be taught; and that instruction should endure throughout life, so that men +can elevate themselves and that an equilibrium may be obtained between knowledge +and industrial needs. (Paris: Félix Alcan.)</p> + +<p class="right">Ω.</p> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h3 class="nobreak" id="plates">APPENDIX.<br> +<span class="smaller">PLATES BELONGING TO THE ARTICLE “THE NERVOUS GANGLIA OF INSECTS.”</span></h3> + +</div> + +<h4>KEY TO THE PLATES.</h4> + +<ul> + <li>col. ven.—ventral column.</li> + <li>lob. dors.—dorsal lobe.</li> + <li>lob. ven.—ventral lobe.</li> + <li>lob. v. inf.—inferior or lower ventral lobule.</li> + <li>lob. cr.—crural lobule.</li> + <li>con. dors. sup—superior (or upper) dorsal connective filaments.</li> + <li>con. dors. moy.—medial dorsal connective filaments.</li> + <li>con. dors. inf.—inferior (or lower) dorsal connective filaments.</li> + <li>con. v.—ventral connective filaments.</li> + <li>n. cr.—crural nerve.</li> + <li>n. al.—alary nerve.</li> + <li>lob. al.—alary lobule.</li> + <li>rac. sup—upper (or superior) root.</li> + <li>rac. moy.—medial root.</li> + <li>rac. inf.—lower (or inferior) root.</li> + <li>fa. as.—ascending fasciculus.</li> +</ul> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp46" id="plate1" style="max-width: 31.25em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/plate1.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption> + <p>PLATE I.</p> + <p><i>Rhizotrogus solstitialis.</i> First thoracic ganglion. (Horizontal sections.)</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp46" id="plate2" style="max-width: 31.25em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/plate2.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption> + <p>PLATE II.</p> + <p><i>Rhizotrogus solstitialis.</i> First thoracic ganglion. (Horizontal sections.)</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp46" id="plate3" style="max-width: 31.25em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/plate3.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption> + <p>PLATE III.</p> + <p><i>Rhizotrogus solstitialis.</i> First thoracic ganglion. (Longitudinal sections.)</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp46" id="plate4" style="max-width: 31.25em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/plate4.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption> + <p>PLATE IV.</p> + <p><i>Rhizotrogus solstitialis.</i> First thoracic ganglion. (Transversal sections.)</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_161">[161]</span></p> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="masthead"> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Vol. III.</span> +<span class="smcap spacer">January, 1893.</span> +<span class="smcap">No. 2.</span></p> + +<h2>THE MONIST.</h2> + +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h3 class="nobreak" id="THE_DOCTRINE_OF_AUTA">THE DOCTRINE OF AUTA.</h3> + +</div> + +<p>In the “Scientific Proceedings of the Royal Dublin Society” +(Vol. VI, Part IX, p. 475, 1890), Dr. Johnstone Stoney, F. R. S., +published an interesting and carefully-reasoned paper “On the Relation +between Natural Science and Ontology.” The same author +had previously (1885), in a Friday evening discourse at the Royal +Institution of London, discussed the problem, “How Thought Presents +Itself Among the Phenomena of Nature.” Dr. Stoney’s communications +have not (I venture to think) received the consideration +to which they are entitled alike on the score of their logical consistency, +if his premisses and assumptions be granted, and by reason +of the author’s scientific eminence as a physicist. I therefore propose, +first, to endeavor to set forth his monistic <i>Doctrine of Auta</i>; +and secondly, to offer some criticisms thereon. Unfortunately Dr. +Stoney’s pages bristle with new technical terms, which, though no +doubt they have been serviceable to him in the attainment of precision +of thought, make his paper hard reading. Some of these I +shall introduce; others which seem less essential to the argument I +shall omit. It would be scarcely fair on the reader’s teeth or on the +author’s store to transfer all these hard nuts from Dublin to Chicago.</p> + +<p>No philosophical discussion of a problem involving perception +can be regarded as complete without the introduction of an orange. +Dr. Stoney, indeed, substitutes a fire; but this, though it shows +philosophical independence, cannot for a moment be sanctioned by +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_162">[162]</span>any good Berkeleyan. An orange then, as such, is a phenomenal +object formed, in a way we need not now consider, by the synthesis +of perceptions. These perceptions, themselves synthetic, Dr. Stoney +calls “tekmeria,” since they are signs within my mind that events +are happening in a part of the universe that is distinct from my +mind. The phenomenal object is supposed by men untrained in +inquiries relating to the mind to have a non-egoistic existence—that +is, an existence independent of the percipient mind. But this +supposition is found on careful scrutiny to be an error. It is a product +of mental synthesis, and is therefore termed by Dr. Stoney a +“syntheton.” It is also termed a “protheton” in contradistinction +to an “antitheton,” which we shall come to shortly.</p> + +<p>Now if the phenomenal orange is a “syntheton”—that is, a +product of perceptual synthesis—it clearly cannot be regarded as +the <i>cause</i> of the perceptions, through and by means of which it is +constructed in mental synthesis. Here popular thought and ordinary +language are apt to mislead us. For ordinary language is +throughout built upon the popular belief that the objects of the phenomenal +world are non-egoistic or independent <i>existences</i>, and, moreover, +that they are the cause of the perceptions which come into existence +when we exercise our senses. This is, however, “to put +the car before the horse.” It is to imagine that a structure built up +out of the effects of a thing can be the cause of those effects. The +phenomenal orange is built up of perceptions instead of being the +cause of them. Their cause is therefore to be sought elsewhere +than in the phenomenal world of objects. The orange, <i>qua</i> orange, +is therefore a “syntheton,” and cannot as such be the cause of the +perceptions or “tekmeria,” which go to its synthesis.</p> + +<p>Let us now look at these perceptions or “tekmeria” from +another point of view. They are states of consciousness: they are +<i>thoughts</i>, if we use this word in its widest extension to embrace +everything of which I or my fellow-men or the lower animals are +conscious. But my own thoughts are, so long as they last, things +that exist. They may be representative of something outside me, +but they <i>are</i> also <i>real existences</i>. While they last they constitute a +part of the universe of existing things. They are, in Dr. Stoney’s +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_163">[163]</span>terminology, <i>auta</i> (τά ὄντα αὐτά), the very things themselves. An +<i>auto</i> (we shall throughout <i>italicise</i> all that belongs to this autic order +of existence) is a <i>thing which really exists</i>, and in no wise depends +on the way we, human minds, may happen to regard it. Our impressions +or beliefs about it may be correct or may be erroneous; +but the term <i>auto</i> means the <i>thing itself</i>.</p> + +<p>Perceptions, then, inasmuch as they are thoughts, are <i>auta</i>. +They belong, moreover, to that class of real existences which, since +they are woven into the tissue of <i>minds</i> (my mind and the minds of +my fellow-men and of the lower animals) are termed <i>egoistic auta</i>. +They do not remain, however, persistent and unchanged; for perceptions +come and go and are modified as they pass like waves over +the surface of consciousness. What causes this coming and going, +and these changes in the <i>egoistic auta</i> we call perceptions? Not, as +we have already seen, the world of phenomenal objects! What +then, but other <i>auta</i>, which, since they produce effects upon men’s +minds through their senses, may be termed <i>sense-compelling auta</i>? +The phenomenal orange is thus a “syntheton” produced through a +synthesis of the effects wrought upon my <i>mind</i> by an autic existence, +called by Mr. Stoney the <i>onto-orange</i>. The phenomenal orange is, +as we have seen, a “protheton”; the <i>onto-orange</i> is its <i>antitheton</i> in +the universe of real existences.</p> + +<p>We are now beginning to open up Dr. Johnstone Stoney’s conception +of the relation of the autic <i>universe</i> to phenomenal Nature. +Nature is the totality of phenomenal objects; but corresponding +with each phenomenal object or “protheton” there is an <i>onto-object</i> +or <i>antitheton</i>; and the totality of <i>antitheta</i> constitute the <i>universe</i>. +<i>Minds</i>, mine and those of other beings, constitute the egoistic part +of the universe; the rest of the universe is constituted by <i>sense-compelling +auta</i>.</p> + +<p>We may liken the <i>sense-compelling universe</i> to a great machine in +motion, and the <i>tekmeria</i> or perceptions which it produces within +our minds to shadows cast by it. The laws of the movements of +the machine are the real laws of the universe—laws of nature are +but the laws of the changes which the shadows in consequence +undergo. It is these shadow laws alone which natural science can +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_164">[164]</span>reach: the real laws of the <i>universe</i> of which these are shadows are +beyond its grasp. In Nature the reflective eye of science sees not +only phenomenal objects, but the relations which they bear to each +other. But such relations are themselves phenomenal; they are +protheta of which the <i>onto-relations</i> of the real <i>universe</i> are the +<i>antitheta</i>. Every space-relation, therefore, in Nature—for instance, +that my foot is at present three yards from the fender—has a real +autic relation in the sense-compelling <i>universe</i>, which is its <i>antitheton</i>; +an <i>onto-relation</i> between the <i>onto-foot</i> and <i>onto-fender</i>, meaning by +these terms the <i>auta</i> which send men the tekmeria which, when +synthesised, furnish these two phenomenal objects. The space-relations +of Nature are but the shadows cast by the <i>autic relations</i> +within the <i>minds</i> of men, and perhaps some other animals.</p> + +<p>But among these shadows there can be no efficient causation. +When a change takes place in the sense-compelling <i>universe</i>, the +mighty machine will cast one shadow before the change and another +after. The second shadow will accordingly succeed the first in orderly +sequence, but the relation between the shadows is not the +relation of cause and effect. Accordingly, in the laws of Nature +which have been discovered by scientific investigation, we find +abundant instances of unfailingly concomitant events and of uniformities +of sequence, but not one single instance of cause and effect. +There is nothing competent to cause one body to exclude +another from the space it occupies. A statement of the fact is one +of the laws of Nature. If a stone be allowed to drop in the vicinity +of the earth, its downward speed is accelerated by a perfectly definite +law. This law is one of the Uniformities of Nature which scientific +inquiry has brought to light. But within the domain of Physics +there is no cause of acceleration. The facts as to what occurs in +Nature can be observed; the circumstances under which they occur +can be investigated; similar cases can be compared; and the laws +to which the simultaneous or successive events conform may be +brought to light. But here our knowledge ends. Physical science +has said its utmost.</p> + +<p>Now all this is changed when we turn to the only field of observation +accessible to us in which we are dealing directly with <i>auta</i>. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_165">[165]</span>The <i>thoughts</i> of which <i>I</i> consist, the thoughts which are my <i>mind</i>, +are <i>auta</i>; a very small group of <i>auta</i>, no doubt, in the mighty <i>Universe</i>, +but still an actual sample, though a very special and one-sided +sample of what <i>auta</i> really are. Now in the operations that go on +in my mind I do find instances, some few instances, of causes producing +effects. The familiar case of a geometrical demonstration +producing in a man’s mind a belief in the truth of the conclusion is +a case in point. Here the understanding of the proof is the efficient +cause of the belief in the conclusion which accompanies that understanding. +A wish to accomplish something, and a knowledge of +how to go about it, both of which are <i>thoughts</i> in the <i>mind</i>, are a +part of the efficient cause of subsequent events, unless counteracted +by other causes. A few other examples can be obtained from the +same small field of observation; and this is all that man, in his +isolated position, has any right to expect; for the bulk of his thoughts +are due, at least in large part, to autic causes which lie outside +his mind, and it is there also that those of his thoughts that are +known to be causes, usually exhibit their effects. When perceptions +arise in my mind, the effect indeed is within my mind, but the +cause is beyond it; and when I move my muscles the cause is within +my mind, but it is outside the mind that it operates. The instances +are indeed few where the causes and the effects are both within my +tiny group of <i>auta</i>, and it is only in these cases that I can have the +process of causes producing effects under my inspection.</p> + +<p>But since cases can be cited, however few, they suffice to establish +the fact that the relation of cause and effect, in its full sense, +does exist in some instances in the autic <i>universe</i>; whereas it has nowhere +any place within the domain of physical science. The relation +of cause and effect among other <i>auta</i> cannot from the nature of +the case be proved. But from its occurrence in that small part of +the <i>universe</i> which we do know, we may fairly assume its occurrence +in all parts of that <i>universe</i>. Such an assumption is at any rate +justifiable by scientific method.</p> + +<p>We must now pass to another point. The scientific analysis of +Nature by the physicist has led to an hypothesis which may be regarded +as the utmost simplification of which the shadows cast within +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_166">[166]</span>the human mind by the sense-compelling autic <i>universe</i> are susceptible. +This Dr. Stoney calls the Diacrinomenal Hypothesis; +according to which Nature is made up of objects each of which consists +of almost inconceivably minute and swift motions. The phenomenal +orange is a group of molecular motions; and if I bowl it +across the table the visible molar motion is a secondary motion of +that group of primary molecular motions which constitutes the phenomenal +object as such. And not only is the phenomenal object a +group of minute and swift motions, but all the steps between that +object and our brain, all that takes place in the air or æther, in our +organs of sense and nerves, can also be represented in terms of +motion. And finally a change consisting of motions takes place in +the brain itself, whereupon we become conscious of thought. That +change which would be appreciated as motions by a bystander who +could search into our brains while we are thinking, we should experience +to be <i>thought</i>. Thus we find that in certain cases the <i>autic +existence</i> that corresponds with motion, namely in the motions of +our own brain molecules, is <i>thought</i>. And the most probable hypothesis +as to the true relation of phenomenal Nature and the autic +<i>universe</i> is that what we have found to be true in some cases is +always true, and that in every case it is <i>thought</i> (or rather a change +in the causal relation in which thought stands to thought) which is +the <i>antitheton</i> of motion; so that the totality of all actual existences, +the <i>universe</i>, is in fact identical with the totality of existing <i>thought</i>. +Of course all this <i>thought</i>, with the exception of that tiny group that +is my <i>mind</i>, is as much outside my consciousness as are the thoughts +of my fellow-men and of the lower animals.</p> + +<p>Under this view the <i>minds</i> of men and of other animals are specialised +specks, as it were, of a vast ocean of <i>thought</i>, to which they +bear a like inconspicuous proportion to that borne by the few brain +motions of which they are the <i>antitheta</i>, to the totality of motions +throughout Nature. Under this view the laws of the <i>universe</i> are +the laws of <i>thought</i>. This is a very different thing, be it noted, from +saying that they are the laws of human thought. The laws of human +thought bear to them the same small proportion which the laws of +the action of the wheels of a watch upon one another bear to the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_167">[167]</span>entire science of dynamics. The science of dynamics could never +be evolved from a study of these laws. But perhaps it may not be +hopeless for man to attain some sound knowledge of the laws of +cosmic <i>thought</i>, inasmuch as we have some few instances of the +way <i>thought</i> acts upon <i>thought</i> open to our investigation in our own +minds, and since this is supplemented by our knowledge of the physical +laws of nature, which are a shadow, a probably complete shadow, +of all the laws of causation which operate throughout the <i>universe</i>, +throughout the all-embracing <i>Mind</i> of the great <i>Autos</i>.</p> + +<p>Such is Dr. Johnstone Stoney’s conception of the relation of +Natural Science to Ontology. I have presented it partly in his own +words, partly in mine. It has been my conscientious endeavor to +put it in as strong and favorable a light as possible, and not in any +way to weaken the strength of its logical consistency. The main +thesis may now be briefly summarised in the following propositions:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p class="hanging">The phenomenal object is a syntheton or product of mental +synthesis.</p> + +<p class="hanging">Its efficient cause is a <i>real existence</i> or <i>antitheton</i>.</p> + +<p class="hanging">Nature is the totality of phenomenal syntheta.</p> + +<p class="hanging">The <i>universe</i> is the totality of autic <i>antitheta</i>.</p> + +<p class="hanging">There is no causation in Nature; but the Uniformities of Nature +are the shadows of the causal Laws of the Universe.</p> + +<p class="hanging"><i>Thought</i> has no place in Nature: it is part of the autic <i>universe</i>.</p> + +<p class="hanging">The syntheton of which <i>thought</i> is the <i>antitheton</i> is the motion +of brain molecules.</p> + +<p class="hanging">It is a probable hypothesis that the <i>antitheta</i> of which the +motions of Diacrinomenal Nature are the syntheta, are +<i>thought</i>.</p> + +<p class="hanging">This is the monistic hypothesis, that there is but one kind of +existing thing, viz. <i>thought</i>; in contradistinction to the +dualistic hypothesis that there are two kinds of existing +things, <i>thought</i> and <i>motion</i>.</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>I now pass from the attitude of expositor to the attitude of critic. +And first I will attack a quite outstanding position, namely Dr. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_168">[168]</span>Stoney’s assumption that Clifford’s hypothesis which he supports +and extends is <i>the</i> monistic hypothesis, and by implication that it is +the <i>only</i> monistic hypothesis. In opposition to this I venture to +affirm that there are several forms or phases of monism. I have not +space to discuss the matter; and must content myself with a bare +enumeration of some of the logically possible forms of Dualism and +of Monism.</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p class="hanging">1) <span class="smcap">Dualism.</span></p> + +<blockquote class="sub"> + +<p><i>A.</i> <i>Synthetic Dualism</i>: according to which there are two entities, +the mind and the body; and these</p> + +<blockquote class="sub"> + +<p class="hanging"><i>a</i>) either work side by side, without interaction, in pre-established +harmony (<i>philosophic dualism</i>),</p> + +<p class="hanging"><i>b</i>) or interact the one on the other (<i>empirical dualism</i>).</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p><i>B.</i> <i>Analytic Dualism</i>: according to which there are two elements +as the result of analysis; <i>motion</i> (with or without a material basis) +and <i>consciousness</i>; the two elements being related in such a way that +consciousness is inseparably associated with certain complex modes +of motion.</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p class="hanging">2) <span class="smcap">Monism.</span></p> + +<blockquote class="sub"> + +<p><i>A.</i> <i>Synthetic monism</i>: according to which there is but one entity. +And this entity may be:</p> + +<blockquote class="sub"> + +<p class="hanging"><i>a</i>) The body, of which consciousness is a product (<i>materialistic +or physical monism</i>);</p> + +<p class="hanging"><i>b</i>) The mind, of which the body in common with the world of +phenomena is a fiction (<i>idealistic monism</i>);</p> + +<p class="hanging"><i>c</i>) The conscious organism, exhibiting certain transformations of +energy which are felt as psychical states (<i>scientific monism</i>).</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p><i>B.</i> <i>Analytic monism</i>: according to which analysis discloses but +one element; and this may be</p> + +<blockquote class="sub"> + +<p class="hanging"><i>a</i>) <i>motion</i>, of which (or of one phase of which) consciousness is +merely the psychical aspect (<i>analytic materialism</i>);</p> + +<p class="hanging"><i>b</i>) <i>consciousness</i>, of which motion is merely the phenomenal aspect +(<i>analytic psychism</i>);</p> + +<p class="hanging"><i>c</i>) <i>x</i> (<i>the unknowable</i>) of which motion is the physical aspect and +consciousness the psychical aspect (<i>monistic agnosticism</i>).</p> + +</blockquote> + +</blockquote> + +</blockquote> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_169">[169]</span></p> + +<p>Such are some of the forms or phases of monism as compared +with those of dualism. It will be seen that Dr. Johnstone Stoney’s +speculations fall under the head of what I have termed analytic +psychism, according to which the sole ultimate reality disclosed by +analysis is consciousness or thought. So far I have only reminded +my readers that this, though one form of monism, is not the only +form. To which Dr. Stoney may very possibly reply that it matters +not to him whether there are five or fifty-and-five monistic heresies +besides the true creed of which he is the prophet. He is only concerned +with the establishment of the true monistic faith. And as +herein I should very heartily agree with him, I will pass on without +delay to criticise an assumption that lies close to the heart and centre +of his hypothesis.</p> + +<p>On the first page of Dr. Stoney’s essay we read: “Let us, for +convenience, call these real existences <i>auta</i>—the very things themselves. +An <i>auto</i> is a thing that really exists, and in no wise depends +on the way we, human minds, may happen to regard it.” And on +the second page we read: “My own thoughts are, at all events, +things that exist: they at least are <i>auta</i> so long as they last. They +are, accordingly, while they last, a part of the <i>universe of existing +things</i>.” No proof is offered of this latter assumption that my +thought, human thought, is part of the universe of <i>auta</i>. I venture +to call this assumption in question. I demand proof of its validity. +Nay, I am ready to go further and roundly assert that my thoughts +are not <i>auta</i>, and furnish no evidence whatever as to the nature of +such <i>auta</i>. I am quite aware that I may seem to be giving the lie +to a direct deliverance of consciousness; and that it will be said that +it is obviously impossible to deny the existence of thought without +at the same time exercising that, the existence of which is denied—a +dictum which contains a very pretty play upon two different uses of +the word “existence.”</p> + +<p>I go back to the orange, without which as a philosopher I am +lost. I hold it in my hand, look steadfastly at it, and drink in with +my nostrils its fragrant aroma. What says consciousness? That +the phenomenal object I call an orange exists. It says nothing +about independent existence, nothing about <i>auta</i>. The direct deliverance +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_170">[170]</span>of consciousness is that an object-in-consciousness exists. +If a “plain man” says that the orange has a real existence, as such, +independent of consciousness, he is going beyond the direct deliverance. +And if a philosopher says that consciousness has a real existence, +as such, independent of the object, he too is going beyond +the direct deliverance. And if, as would seem to be the case, Dr. +Stoney relies on the deliverance of consciousness for the justification +of his statement that “perceptions, while they last, are <i>auta</i>, +real existences,” I submit that he is relying on a misinterpretation +of the deliverance of consciousness.</p> + +<p>The existence of the object-in-consciousness is the datum from +which plain man and philosopher alike must start. On this foundation +we must base all our reasonings and speculations. Physical +science directs its attention to the “object” side of the given relation. +And it reaches its “diacrinomenal” result that the orange +may for physical purposes be represented as a group of swift and +rapid molecular motions. But can physics at any stage of its analysis +shake itself free from the “consciousness” side of the relation? +Assuredly not. All that it can do is to represent the object-in-consciousness +we call an orange in terms of other objects-in-consciousness +we term molecular motions. Psychology directs its attention +to the “consciousness” side of the given relation. It analyses the +object-in-consciousness into percepts, sensations, and so forth. But +can psychology at any stage of its analysis shake itself free from the +“object” side of the relation? Assuredly not. All that it can do +is to represent the consciousness-of-the-object we call an orange, in +terms of the objects-in-consciousness we term sensations, relations +between sensations, and so forth.</p> + +<p>The relation of the consciousness-of-an-object to the object-in-consciousness +may be made clear by the analogy, which is something +more than an analogy of vision and the visual field. For clear +and distinct vision, a well-illuminated object of vision, and a healthy +organ of vision are necessary as coöperating factors. So, too, for +distinct consciousness a definite object-in-consciousness and a well-defined +consciousness-of-the-object are necessary as coöperating factors. +More than this. Unless there be some object of vision, however +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_171">[171]</span>vague, and some organ of vision, however dim, no vision at all +is possible. The coöperation of the two factors is essential. So, +too, unless there be some object-in-consciousness, however vague, +and some consciousness-of-the-object, however dim, no consciousness +at all, in anything like the human sense of the word “consciousness,” +is possible. Here, again, the coöperation of the two +factors is essential. <i>And neither factor is ever given in experience +without the other.</i></p> + +<p>Writing as I am, for readers of <i>The Monist</i>, I need hardly turn +aside to explain what I mean by an object-in-consciousness. And +yet perhaps a few words on the subject may not be out of place, and +may prevent possible misunderstanding. An object-in-consciousness +is not necessarily a tangible, visible object, like an orange. The +yellowness, the sweetness, the weight, the bare existence of the +orange, may each in turn be an object in consciousness. For the +physicist the tangible orange may be represented in terms of swift, +infinitesimal motions; and these, not less than the phenomenal +orange, are objects in consciousness. A conception of consciousness +itself, an imperfect conception, but the best we can frame, may +be an object of consciousness, just as a reflected image of the eye +may be to the eye an object of vision.</p> + +<p>It is generally believed by modern psychologists that all objects-in-consciousness +are derivable by processes of abstraction, generalisation, +and so forth, from the primitive datum of a perceptual object. +And it must be remembered that it is only in abstraction that +we distinguish between the object-in-consciousness and the consciousness-of-the-object. +The two terms of this, for us, inevitable +relation are given in inseparable coördination. But in abstract +thought we can distinguish the inseparable terms; distinguish in +thought, that is to say, what is inseparable in actual experience. +To continue the analogy of vision, we can make the one term focal, +while the other term remains marginal in the field of view. And +we can neglect, for the purposes of our thought and reason, the +marginal term. But we cannot get rid of it. We may deal, as in +physics, with motion, neglecting the consciousness in and through +which it is appreciated; but we cannot get rid of this consciousness. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_172">[172]</span>Or we can deal, as in psychology, with the consciousness, neglecting +the object-in-consciousness; but we cannot get rid of this object. +The object-out-of-consciousness and the consciousness-without-an-object, +are alike unknown—or, if the reader prefers it, unknowable, +which he may write with as many capital letters as seemeth to him +good. The common-sense realist believes in the existence of objects-out-of-consciousness. +The analytical psychist believes in the +existence of consciousness-without-an-object. Both are, if the views +here advocated be sound, attributing independent existence to that +which, so far as human knowledge is concerned, has only dependent +or relative existence.</p> + +<p>It is unfortunate that the terms “real” and “reality” should +ever have been applied to the independent existence of so-called +things-in-themselves. I think such terms as Dr. Stoney’s “autic” +and “autic existence” would be far preferable. For the word “real” +has a meaning and force which is quite definite. The orange that +I hold in my hand and see with my eyes is as real as real can be. +And if a philosopher steps in and says, “My dear sir, <i>that</i> is not real! +The real reality is, according to some, mind-stuff or consciousness; +according to others, motion of—well I don’t quite know what, so let +us simply call it motion; and according to others this real reality is +unknowable”—I say if a philosopher steps in and talks like this, one +is reminded of Lamb’s remark on Coleridge. Coleridge had been +maundering on, as was his wont, on “subject” and “object” and +all the rest of his second-hand German metaphysics, when Lamb +broke in, with his forcible stammer, in a stage whisper: “N-n-n-never +mind C-c-c-coleridge; it’s only his f-f-f-fun.”</p> + +<p>I repeat that the orange I hold in my hand and see with my +eyes is as real as real can be; and that we have here the standard +and criterion of reality not only for plain men but for philosophers. +In the perceptual object we have reality given in its clearest, fullest, +and most forcible form. Every step in the analysis of the perceptual +object-in-consciousness; every step in the analysis of the consciousness-of-the-object +takes us so far further from reality at its best. The +orange as an object-in-consciousness is far more real to me than +either the swift infinitesimal motions of the physicist, or the “syntheton” +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_173">[173]</span>of related and integrated sensations of the psychologist. +And when we reach the autic existence which is supposed to underlie +both motion and consciousness, we seem to get just as far as it is +possible for the human mind to get from the real orange with which +we started. And yet it is to this autic existence that metaphysicians +apply the term “real” in a different sense. For so far I have used +the word “real” for that which is given in experience. But metaphysically +the word “real” is used to indicate independence of experience. +I repeat that for this independent existence some such +word as Dr. Stoney’s “autic” would be far better and less misleading. +It would emphasise the distinction between <i>real</i>, that is to +say given in direct experience, and <i>autic</i>, that is to say independent +of experience.</p> + +<p>Accepting at any rate for our present purpose this distinction, +we have as coördinate realities the object-in-consciousness and the +consciousness-of-the-object. And these two are only different aspects +of the one great reality, the reality of experience. Of these two +aspects neither is more real than the other. The object-in-consciousness +is every bit as real as the consciousness-of-the-object; the +orange as real as our perception thereof. Both are intensely and +vitally real; but—here I am in opposition to Dr. Stoney—<i>neither is +autic</i>. I can find no warranty for such autic existence in direct experience +or the so-called deliverance of consciousness. Nor am I +aware of any process of reasoning by which it can be demonstrated.</p> + +<p>But, it may be said, is it not in accordance with scientific method +to make an assumption and then see how far such assumption is +justified by the results it enables us to reach? Assuredly such procedure +is allowable and often fruitful. It is not on such grounds, +however, that Dr. Stoney, if I rightly understand him, bases his +doctrine of the psychical nature of <i>auta</i>. Let us, nevertheless, pay a +moment’s attention to this assumption and the correlative assumption +of analytic materialism. Consciousness and matter-in-motion +(or bare motion perhaps) are the ultimate elements reached by the +psychologist on the one hand and the physicist on the other. Neither, +if he knows his business, pretends by this analysis to have reached +autic existence. But it is open to each to make an assumption. The +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_174">[174]</span>materialist says: I assume that motion is the true autic existence, of +which, under appropriate conditions, human consciousness is merely +a psychical aspect. The psychist says: I assume that consciousness +is the true autic existence, of which motion is merely the phenomenal +aspect. I confess that if I were forced to choose one of these two, +(which fortunately I am not,) I should elect to throw in my lot with +the materialists. For if justification by results is to be the criterion, +I hold that the results the materialists have to show far outweigh +any results which the analytic psychists can produce. But the fact +of the matter is that in neither case do the results flow from the +autic assumption. All the results are equally valid for the student +who holds fast to the relativity of object-in-consciousness to consciousness-of-the-object. +Since therefore the assumption is valueless +so far as practical results are concerned, and since it is somewhat +repugnant to sound reason to assume that either term of a given relationship +is the same out of relationship as it is in relation to its +fellow, I contend, as against both materialist and psychist, that it +fails to make good its claim to acceptance.</p> + +<p>What shall we say then of <i>auta</i> or <i>things in themselves</i>? Simply +that we do not know anything about them—that they are outside +the pale of human knowledge. If we even say they exist we are +using the word “exist” in an autic and unreal sense. It is phenomenal +Nature which constitutes the real Universe; of its autic <i>shadow</i>, +supposing that there be such a <i>shadow</i>, we know nothing. Need +we then stay to criticise this unknown <i>shadow</i>?</p> + +<p>Even if we take Dr. Johnstone Stoney’s hypothesis as it stands +we find a marked distinction between the sense-compelling <i>auta</i> and +the egoistic <i>auta</i>, or between the sense-compelling aspect of <i>auta</i> +and the egoistic or perceptive aspect. How is this distinction to be +explained and accounted for? I can see no answer to this question +save that the distinction is a matter of experience. Why not, then, +trust experience fully? Why go beyond it at all? Why not say that +both the sense-compelling aspect and the perceptive aspect are part +of the relation which is given in experience? If Dr. Stoney could +only see his way to this concession and could be led to adopt scientific +monism, which is based on relativity, he would still secure all +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_175">[175]</span>that is valuable in his hypothesis, and at the same time get rid of +the difficulties which as it stands encumber it. But it would no +longer be a doctrine of <i>auta</i>.</p> + +<p>For scientific monism is not a doctrine of <i>auta</i> but a doctrine of +phenomena—phenomena regarded not only in their physical but +also in their psychological aspect. Unifying these two diverse +aspects, it contends that the conscious organism is one and indivisible; +that it is a product of evolution; that in its physical or material +aspect this evolution has given rise to the body and brain; +that in its psychical or immaterial aspect it has given rise to the +mind and human consciousness; that these two aspects, though distinguishable +in analytic thought, are inseparable in phenomenal existence; +that just as the complex modes of energy of the human +brain have been evolved from the simpler modes of energy that are +found throughout organic and inorganic nature, so too the complex +modes of consciousness of the human mind have been evolved from +the simpler modes of infra-consciousness⁠<a id="FNanchor_19" href="#Footnote_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> that are associated with +merely organic and inorganic modes of energy. The last clause is +admittedly hypothetical. But it is submitted that the hypothesis is +one that is founded on strictly scientific and in no sense metaphysical +or autic analysis.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">C. Lloyd Morgan.</span></p> + +<div class="footnotes"> + +<h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_19" href="#FNanchor_19" class="label">[19]</a> See <i>Mental Evolution</i> in <i>The Monist</i>, Vol. II, No. 2 (Jan. 1892), p. 161.</p></div> + +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_176">[176]</span></p> + +<h3 class="nobreak" id="EVOLUTIONARY_LOVE">EVOLUTIONARY LOVE.</h3> + +</div> + +<h4>AT FIRST BLUSH. COUNTER-GOSPELS.</h4> + +<p>Philosophy, when just escaping from its golden pupa-skin, +mythology, proclaimed the great evolutionary agency of the +universe to be Love. Or, since this pirate-lingo, English, is poor +in such-like words, let us say Eros, the exuberance-love. Afterwards, +Empedocles set up passionate-love and hate as the two coördinate +powers of the universe. In some passages, kindness is the word. +But certainly, in any sense in which it has an opposite, to be senior +partner of that opposite, is the highest position that love can attain. +Nevertheless, the ontological gospeller, in whose days those views +were familiar topics, made the One Supreme Being, by whom all +things have been made out of nothing, to be cherishing-love. What, +then, can he say to hate? Never mind, at this time, what the scribe +of the apocalypse, if he were John, stung at length by persecution +into a rage unable to distinguish suggestions of evil from visions of +heaven, and so become the Slanderer of God to men, may have +dreamed. The question is rather what the sane John thought, or +ought to have thought, in order to carry out his idea consistently. +His statement that God is love seems aimed at that saying of Ecclesiastes +that we cannot tell whether God bears us love or hatred. +“Nay,” says John, “we can tell, and very simply! We know and +have trusted the love which God hath in us. God is love.” There is +no logic in this, unless it means, that God loves all men. In the preceding +paragraph, he had said, “God is light and in him is no darkness +at all.” We are to understand, then, that as darkness is merely +the defect of light, so hatred and evil are mere imperfect stages of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_177">[177]</span>ἀγάπη and ἀγαθόν, love and loveliness. This concords with that +utterance reported in John’s Gospel: “God sent not the Son into +the world to judge the world; but that the world should through +him be saved. He that believeth on him is not judged: he that believeth +not hath been judged already.... And this is the judgment, +that the light is come into the world, and that men loved darkness +rather than the light.” That is to say, God visits no punishment on +them; they punish themselves, by their natural affinity for the defective. +Thus, the love that God is, is not a love of which hatred is +the contrary; otherwise Satan would be a coördinate power; but it is +a love which embraces hatred as an imperfect stage of it, an Anteros—yea, +even needs hatred and hatefulness as its object. For self-love is +no love; so if God’s self is love, that which he loves must be defect +of love; just as a luminary can light up only that which otherwise +would be dark. Henry James, the Swedenborgian, says: “It is no +doubt very tolerable finite or creaturely love to love one’s own in +another, to love another for his conformity to one’s self: but nothing +can be in more flagrant contrast with the creative Love, all whose +tenderness <i>ex vi termini</i> must be reserved only for what intrinsically +is most bitterly hostile and negative to itself.” This is from “Substance +and Shadow: an Essay on the Physics of Creation.” It is a +pity he had not filled his pages with things like this, as he was able +easily to do, instead of scolding at his reader and at people generally, +until the physics of creation was well-nigh forgot. I must deduct, +however, from what I just wrote: obviously no genius could +make his every sentence as sublime as one which discloses for the +problem of evil its everlasting solution.</p> + +<p>The movement of love is circular, at one and the same impulse +projecting creations into independency and drawing them into harmony. +This seems complicated when stated so; but it is fully +summed up in the simple formula we call the Golden Rule. This +does not, of course, say, Do everything possible to gratify the egoistic +impulses of others, but it says, Sacrifice your own perfection to +the perfectionment of your neighbor. Nor must it for a moment be +confounded with the Benthamite, or Helvetian, or Beccarian motto, +Act for the greatest good of the greatest number. Love is not directed +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_178">[178]</span>to abstractions but to persons; not to persons we do not +know, nor to numbers of people, but to our own dear ones, our +family and neighbors. “Our neighbor,” we remember, is one whom +we live near, not locally perhaps, but in life and feeling.</p> + +<p>Everybody can see that the statement of St. John is the formula +of an evolutionary philosophy, which teaches that growth comes +only from love, from—I will not say self-<i>sacrifice</i>, but from the ardent +impulse to fulfil another’s highest impulse. Suppose, for example, +that I have an idea that interests me. It is my creation. It is my +creature; for as shown in last July’s <i>Monist</i>, it is a little person. I +love it; and I will sink myself in perfecting it. It is not by dealing +out cold justice to the circle of my ideas that I can make them grow, +but by cherishing and tending them as I would the flowers in my +garden. The philosophy we draw from John’s gospel is that this is +the way mind develops; and as for the cosmos, only so far as it yet +is mind, and so has life, is it capable of further evolution. Love, +recognising germs of loveliness in the hateful, gradually warms it +into life, and makes it lovely. That is the sort of evolution which +every careful student of my essay “The Law of Mind,” must see +that <i>synechism</i> calls for.</p> + +<p>The nineteenth century is now fast sinking into the grave, and +we all begin to review its doings and to think what character it is +destined to bear as compared with other centuries in the minds of +future historians. It will be called, I guess, the Economical Century; +for political economy has more direct relations with all the +branches of its activity than has any other science. Well, political +economy has its formula of redemption, too. It is this: Intelligence +in the service of greed ensures the justest prices, the fairest contracts, +the most enlightened conduct of all the dealings between men, and +leads to the <i>summum bonum</i>, food in plenty and perfect comfort. +Food for whom? Why, for the greedy master of intelligence. I do +not mean to say that this is one of the legitimate conclusions of +political economy, the scientific character of which I fully acknowledge. +But the study of doctrines, themselves true, will often temporarily +encourage generalisations extremely false, as the study of +physics has encouraged necessitarianism. What I say, then, is that +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_179">[179]</span>the great attention paid to economical questions, during our century +has induced an exaggeration of the beneficial effects of greed and of +the unfortunate results of sentiment, until there has resulted a philosophy +which comes unwittingly to this, that greed is the great +agent in the elevation of the human race and in the evolution of the +universe.</p> + +<p>I open a handbook of political economy,—the most typical and +middling one I have at hand,—and there find some remarks of which +I will here make a brief analysis. I omit qualifications, sops thrown +to Cerberus, phrases to placate Christian prejudice, trappings which +serve to hide from author and reader alike the ugly nakedness of the +greed-god. But I have surveyed my position. The author enumerates +“three motives to human action:</p> + +<p>The love of self;</p> + +<p>The love of a limited class having common interests and feelings +with one’s self;</p> + +<p>The love of mankind at large.”</p> + +<p>Remark, at the outset, what obsequious title is bestowed on +greed,—“the love of self.” Love! The second motive <i>is</i> love. In +place of “a limited class” put “certain persons,” and you have a +fair description. Taking “class” in the old-fashioned sense, a weak +kind of love is described. In the sequel, there seems to be some +haziness as to the delimitation of this motive. By the love of mankind +at large, the author does not mean that deep, subconscious +passion that is properly so called; but merely public-spirit, perhaps +little more than a fidget about pushing ideas. The author proceeds +to a comparative estimate of the worth of these motives. Greed, +says he, but using, of course, another word, “is not so great an evil +as is commonly supposed.... Every man can promote his own interests +a great deal more effectively than he can promote any one +else’s, or than any one else can promote his.” Besides, as he remarks +on another page, the more miserly a man is, the more good he does. +The second motive “is the most dangerous one to which society is +exposed.” Love is all very pretty: “no higher or purer source of +human happiness exists.” (Ahem!) But it is a “source of enduring +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_180">[180]</span>injury,” and, in short, should be overruled by something wiser. +What is this wiser motive? We shall see.</p> + +<p>As for public spirit, it is rendered nugatory by the “difficulties +in the way of its effective operation.” For example, it might suggest +putting checks upon the fecundity of the poor and the vicious; and +“no measure of repression would be too severe,” in the case of +criminals. The hint is broad. But unfortunately, you cannot induce +legislatures to take such measures, owing to the pestiferous “tender +sentiments of man towards man.” It thus appears, that public-spirit, +or Benthamism, is not strong enough to be the effective tutor +of love, (I am skipping to another page,) which must therefore be +handed over to “the motives which animate men in the pursuit of +wealth,” in which alone we can confide, and which “are in the +highest degree beneficent.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_20" href="#Footnote_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> Yes, in the “highest degree” without +exception are they beneficent to the being upon whom all their +blessings are poured out, namely, the Self, whose “sole object,” +says the writer in accumulating wealth is his individual “sustenance +and enjoyment.” Plainly, the author holds the notion that some +other motive might be in a higher degree beneficent even for the +man’s self to be a paradox wanting in good sense. He seeks to gloze +and modify his doctrine; but he lets the perspicacious reader see +what his animating principle is; and when, holding the opinions I +have repeated, he at the same time acknowledges that society could +not exist upon a basis of intelligent greed alone, he simply pigeonholes +himself as one of the eclectics of inharmonious opinions. He +wants his mammon flavored with a <i>soupçon</i> of god.</p> + +<p>The economists accuse those to whom the enunciation of their +atrocious villainies communicates a thrill of horror of being <i>sentimentalists</i>. +It may be so: I willingly confess to having some tincture +of sentimentalism in me, God be thanked! Ever since the French +Revolution brought this leaning of thought into ill-repute,—and not +altogether undeservedly, I must admit, true, beautiful, and good as +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_181">[181]</span>that great movement was,—it has been the tradition to picture sentimentalists +as persons incapable of logical thought and unwilling to +look facts in the eyes. This tradition may be classed with the French +tradition that an Englishman says <i>godam</i> at every second sentence, +the English tradition that an American talks about “Britishers,” +and the American tradition that a Frenchman carries forms of etiquette +to an inconvenient extreme, in short with all those traditions +which survive simply because the men who use their eyes and ears +are few and far between. Doubtless some excuse there was for all +those opinions in days gone by; and sentimentalism, when it was +the fashionable amusement to spend one’s evenings in a flood of tears +over a woeful performance on a candle-litten stage, sometimes made +itself a little ridiculous. But what after all is sentimentalism? It +is an <i>ism</i>, a doctrine, namely, the doctrine that great respect should +be paid to the natural judgments of the sensible heart. This is what +sentimentalism precisely is; and I entreat the reader to consider +whether to contemn is not of all blasphemies the most degrading. +Yet the nineteenth century has steadily contemned it, because it +brought about the Reign of Terror. That it did so is true. Still, +the whole question is one of <i>how much</i>. The reign of terror was +very bad; but now the Gradgrind banner has been this century +long flaunting in the face of heaven, with an insolence to provoke +the very skies to scowl and rumble. Soon a flash and quick peal +will shake economists quite out of their complacency, too late. The +twentieth century, in its latter half, shall surely see the deluge-tempest +burst upon the social order,—to clear upon a world as deep in +ruin as that greed-philosophy has long plunged it into guilt. No +post-thermidorian high jinks then!</p> + +<p>So a miser is a beneficent power in a community, is he? With +the same reason precisely, only in a much higher degree, you might +pronounce the Wall Street sharp to be a good angel, who takes +money from heedless persons not likely to guard it properly, who +wrecks feeble enterprises better stopped, and who administers wholesome +lessons to unwary scientific men, by passing worthless checks +upon them,—as you did, the other day, to me, my millionaire +Master in glomery, when you thought you saw your way to using +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_182">[182]</span>my process without paying for it, and of so bequeathing to your +children something to boast of their father about,—and who by a +thousand wiles puts money at the service of intelligent greed, in his +own person. Bernard Mandeville, in his “Fable of the Bees,” maintains +that private vices of all descriptions are public benefits, and +proves it, too, quite as cogently as the economist proves his point +concerning the miser. He even argues, with no slight force, that +but for vice civilisation would never have existed. In the same +spirit, it has been strongly maintained and is to-day widely believed +that all acts of charity and benevolence, private and public, go seriously +to degrade the human race.</p> + +<p>The “Origin of Species” of Darwin merely extends politico-economical +views of progress to the entire realm of animal and vegetable +life. The vast majority of our contemporary naturalists hold +the opinion that the true cause of those exquisite and marvellous +adaptations of nature for which, when I was a boy, men used to extol +the divine wisdom is that creatures are so crowded together that +those of them that happen to have the slightest advantage force those +less pushing into situations unfavorable to multiplication or even kill +them before they reach the age of reproduction. Among animals, +the mere mechanical individualism is vastly reënforced as a power +making for good by the animal’s ruthless greed. As Darwin puts +it on his title-page, it is the struggle for existence; and he should +have added for his motto: Every individual for himself, and the +Devil take the hindmost! Jesus, in his sermon on the Mount, expressed +a different opinion.</p> + +<p>Here, then, is the issue. The gospel of Christ says that progress +comes from every individual merging his individuality in sympathy +with his neighbors. On the other side, the conviction of the +nineteenth century is that progress takes place by virtue of every +individual’s striving for himself with all his might and trampling his +neighbor under foot whenever he gets a chance to do so. This may +accurately be called the Gospel of Greed.</p> + +<p>Much is to be said on both sides. I have not concealed, I could +not conceal, my own passionate predilection. Such a confession +will probably shock my scientific brethren. Yet the strong feeling +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_183">[183]</span>is in itself, I think, an argument of some weight in favor of the agapastic +theory of evolution,—so far as it may be presumed to bespeak +the normal judgment of the Sensible Heart. Certainly, if it were +possible to believe in agapasm without believing it warmly, that fact +would be an argument against the truth of the doctrine. At any +rate, since the warmth of feeling exists, it should on every account +be candidly confessed; especially since it creates a liability to one-sidedness +on my part against which it behooves my readers and me +to be severally on our guard.</p> + +<h4>SECOND THOUGHTS. IRENICA.</h4> + +<p>Let us try to define the logical affinities of the different theories +of evolution. Natural selection, as conceived by Darwin, is a mode +of evolution in which the only positive agent of change in the whole +passage from moner to man is fortuitous variation. To secure advance +in a definite direction chance has to be seconded by some action +that shall hinder the propagation of some varieties or stimulate +that of others. In natural selection, strictly so called, it is the crowding +out of the weak. In sexual selection, it is the attraction of beauty, +mainly.</p> + +<p>The “Origin of Species” was published toward the end of the +year 1859. The preceding years since 1846 had been one of the most +productive seasons,—or if extended so as to cover the great book +we are considering, <i>the</i> most productive period of equal length in +the entire history of science from its beginnings until now. The idea +that chance begets order, which is one of the corner-stones of modern +physics (although Dr. Carus considers it “the weakest point in +Mr. Peirce’s system,”) was at that time put into its clearest light. +Quetelet had opened the discussion by his “Letters on the Application +of Probabilities to the Moral and Political Sciences,” a work +which deeply impressed the best minds of that day, and to which Sir +John Herschel had drawn general attention in Great Britain. In +1857, the first volume of Buckle’s “History of Civilisation” had +created a tremendous sensation, owing to the use he made of this +same idea. Meantime, the “statistical method” had, under that very +name, been applied with brilliant success to molecular physics. Dr. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_184">[184]</span>John Herapath, an English chemist, had in 1847 outlined the kinetical +theory of gases in his “Mathematical Physics”; and the interest +the theory excited had been refreshed in 1856 by notable memoirs +by Clausius and Krönig. In the very summer preceding Darwin’s +publication, Maxwell had read before the British Association the +first and most important of his researches on this subject. The consequence +was that the idea that fortuitous events may result in a +physical law, and further that this is the way in which those laws +which appear to conflict with the principle of the conservation of +energy are to be explained, had taken a strong hold upon the minds +of all who were abreast of the leaders of thought. By such minds, +it was inevitable that the “Origin of Species,” whose teaching was +simply the application of the same principle to the explanation of another +“non-conservative” action, that of organic development, should +be hailed and welcomed. The sublime discovery of the conservation +of energy by Helmholtz in 1847, and that of the mechanical theory +of heat by Clausius and by Rankine, independently, in 1850, had +decidedly overawed all those who might have been inclined to sneer +at physical science. Thereafter a belated poet still harping upon +“science peddling with the names of things” would fail of his effect. +Mechanism was now known to be all, or very nearly so. All this +time, utilitarianism,—that improved substitute for the Gospel,—was +in its fullest feather; and was a natural ally of an individualistic +theory. Dean Mansell’s injudicious advocacy had led to mutiny +among the bondsmen of Sir William Hamilton, and the nominalism +of Mill had profited accordingly; and although the real science that +Darwin was leading men to was sure some day to give a death-blow +to the sham-science of Mill, yet there were several elements of the +Darwinian theory which were sure to charm the followers of Mill. +Another thing: anæsthetics had been in use for thirteen years. Already, +people’s acquaintance with suffering had dropped off very +much; and as a consequence, that unlovely hardness by which our +times are so contrasted with those that immediately preceded them, +had already set in, and inclined people to relish a ruthless theory. +The reader would quite mistake the drift of what I am saying if he +were to understand me as wishing to suggest that any of those things +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_185">[185]</span>(except perhaps Malthus) influenced Darwin himself. What I mean +is that his hypothesis, while without dispute one of the most ingenious +and pretty ever devised, and while argued with a wealth of +knowledge, a strength of logic, a charm of rhetoric, and above all +with a certain magnetic genuineness that was almost irresistible, +did not appear, at first, at all near to being proved; and to a sober +mind its case looks less hopeful now than it did twenty years ago; +but the extraordinarily favorable reception it met with was plainly +owing, in large measure, to its ideas being those toward which the +age was favorably disposed, especially, because of the encouragement +it gave to the greed-philosophy.</p> + +<p>Diametrically opposed to evolution by chance, are those theories +which attribute all progress to an inward necessary principle, +or other form of necessity. Many naturalists have thought that if +an egg is destined to go through a certain series of embryological +transformations, from which it is perfectly certain not to deviate, +and if in geological time almost exactly the same forms appear successively, +one replacing another in the same order, the strong presumption +is that this latter succession was as predeterminate and +certain to take place as the former. So, Nägeli, for instance, conceives +that it somehow follows from the first law of motion and the +peculiar, but unknown, molecular constitution of protoplasm, that +forms must complicate themselves more and more. Kölliker makes +one form generate another after a certain maturation has been accomplished. +Weismann, too, though he calls himself a Darwinian, +holds that nothing is due to chance, but that all forms are simple +mechanical resultants of the heredity from two parents.⁠<a id="FNanchor_21" href="#Footnote_21" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> It is very +noticeable that all these different sectaries seek to import into their +science a mechanical necessity to which the facts that come under +their observation do not point. Those geologists who think that the +variation of species is due to cataclasmic alterations of climate or of +the chemical constitution of the air and water are also making mechanical +necessity chief factor of evolution.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_186">[186]</span></p> + +<p>Evolution by sporting and evolution by mechanical necessity +are conceptions warring against one another. A third method, which +supersedes their strife, lies enwrapped in the theory of Lamarck. +According to his view, all that distinguishes the highest organic forms +from the most rudimentary has been brought about by little hypertrophies +or atrophies which have affected individuals early in their +lives, and have been transmitted to their offspring. Such a transmission +of acquired characters is of the general nature of habit-taking, +and this is the representative and derivative within the physiological +domain of the law of mind. Its action is essentially dissimilar +to that of a physical force; and that is the secret of the repugnance +of such necessitarians as Weismann to admitting its existence. The +Lamarckians further suppose that although some of the modifications +of form so transmitted were originally due to mechanical causes, yet +the chief factors of their first production were the straining of endeavor +and the overgrowth superinduced by exercise, together with +the opposite actions. Now, endeavor, since it is directed toward an +end, is essentially psychical, even though it be sometimes unconscious; +and the growth due to exercise, as I argued in my last paper, +follows a law of a character quite contrary to that of mechanics.</p> + +<p>Lamarckian evolution is thus evolution by the force of habit.—That +sentence slipped off my pen while one of those neighbors whose +function in the social cosmos seems to be that of an Interrupter, was +asking me a question. Of course, it is nonsense. Habit is mere inertia, +a resting on one’s oars, not a propulsion. Now it is energetic +projaculation (lucky there is such a word, or this untried hand might +have been put to inventing one) by which in the typical instances of +Lamarckian evolution the new elements of form are first created. +Habit, however, forces them to take practical shapes, compatible +with the structures they affect, and in the form of heredity and otherwise, +gradually replaces the spontaneous energy that sustains them. +Thus, habit plays a double part; it serves to establish the new features, +and also to bring them into harmony with the general morphology +and function of the animals and plants to which they belong. +But if the reader will now kindly give himself the trouble of turning +back a page or two, he will see that this account of Lamarckian evolution +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_187">[187]</span>coincides with the general description of the action of love, +to which, I suppose, he yielded his assent.</p> + +<p>Remembering that all matter is really mind, remembering, too, +the continuity of mind, let us ask what aspect Lamarckian evolution +takes on within the domain of consciousness. Direct endeavor can +achieve almost nothing. It is as easy by taking thought to add a +cubit to one’s stature, as it is to produce an idea acceptable to any +of the Muses by merely straining for it, before it is ready to come. +We haunt in vain the sacred well and throne of Mnemosyne; the +deeper workings of the spirit take place in their own slow way, without +our connivance. Let but their bugle sound, and we may then +make our effort, sure of an oblation for the altar of whatsoever divinity +its savor gratifies. Besides this inward process, there is the +operation of the environment, which goes to break up habits destined +to be broken up and so to render the mind lively. Everybody +knows that the long continuance of a routine of habit makes us lethargic, +while a succession of surprises wonderfully brightens the +ideas. Where there is a motion, where history is a-making, there +is the focus of mental activity, and it has been said that the arts and +sciences reside within the temple of Janus, waking when that is +open, but slumbering when it is closed. Few psychologists have +perceived how fundamental a fact this is. A portion of mind abundantly +commissured to other portions works almost mechanically. +It sinks to the condition of a railway junction. But a portion of mind +almost isolated, a spiritual peninsula, or <i>cul-de-sac</i>, is like a railway +terminus. Now mental commissures are habits. Where they abound, +originality is not needed and is not found; but where they are in +defect, spontaneity is set free. Thus, the first step in the Lamarckian +evolution of mind is the putting of sundry thoughts into situations +in which they are free to play. As to growth by exercise, I +have already shown, in discussing “Man’s Glassy Essence,” in last +October’s <i>Monist</i>, what its <i>modus operandi</i> must be conceived to be, +at least, until a second equally definite hypothesis shall have been +offered. Namely, it consists of the flying asunder of molecules, and +the reparation of the parts by new matter. It is, thus, a sort of reproduction. +It takes place only during exercise, because the activity +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_188">[188]</span>of protoplasm consists in the molecular disturbance which is its +necessary condition. Growth by exercise takes place also in the +mind. Indeed, that is what it is to <i>learn</i>. But the most perfect illustration +is the development of a philosophical idea by being put +into practice. The conception which appeared, at first, as unitary, +splits up into special cases; and into each of these new thought +must enter to make a practicable idea. This new thought, however, +follows pretty closely the model of the parent conception; and thus +a homogeneous development takes place. The parallel between this +and the course of molecular occurrences is apparent. Patient attention +will be able to trace all these elements in the transaction +called learning.</p> + +<p>Three modes of evolution have thus been brought before us; +evolution by fortuitous variation, evolution by mechanical necessity, +and evolution by creative love. We may term them <i>tychastic</i> evolution, +or <i>tychasm</i>, <i>anancastic</i> evolution, or <i>anancasm</i>, and <i>agapastic</i> +evolution, or <i>agapasm</i>. The doctrines which represent these as severally +of principal importance, we may term <i>tychasticism</i>, <i>anancasticism</i>, +and <i>agapasticism</i>. On the other hand the mere propositions +that absolute chance, mechanical necessity, and the law of love, are +severally operative in the cosmos, may receive the names of <i>tychism</i>, +<i>anancism</i>, and <i>agapism</i>.</p> + +<p>All three modes of evolution are composed of the same general +elements. Agapasm exhibits them the most clearly. The good result +is here brought to pass, first, by the bestowal of spontaneous +energy by the parent upon the offspring, and, second, by the disposition +of the latter to catch the general idea of those about it and +thus to subserve the general purpose. In order to express the relation +that tychasm and anancasm bear to agapasm, let me borrow +a word from geometry. An ellipse crossed by a straight line is a +sort of cubic curve; for a cubic is a curve which is cut thrice by a +straight line; now a straight line might cut the ellipse twice and its +associated straight line a third time. Still the ellipse with the straight +line across it would not have the characteristics of a cubic. It would +have, for instance, no contrary flexure, which no true cubic wants; +and it would have two nodes, which no true cubic has. The geometers +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_189">[189]</span>say that it is a <i>degenerate</i> cubic. Just so, tychasm and anancasm +are degenerate forms of agapasm.</p> + +<p>Men who seek to reconcile the Darwinian idea with Christianity +will remark that tychastic evolution, like the agapastic, depends +upon a reproductive creation, the forms preserved being those that +use the spontaneity conferred upon them in such wise as to be drawn +into harmony with their original, quite after the Christian scheme. +Very good! This only shows that just as love cannot have a contrary, +but must embrace what is most opposed to it, as a degenerate +case of it, so tychasm is a kind of agapasm. Only, in the tychastic +evolution progress is solely owing to the distribution of the napkin-hidden +talent of the rejected servant among those not rejected, just +as ruined gamesters leave their money on the table to make those +not yet ruined so much the richer. It makes the felicity of the +lambs just the damnation of the goats, transposed to the other side +of the equation. In genuine agapasm, on the other hand, advance +takes place by virtue of a positive sympathy among the created +springing from continuity of mind. This is the idea which tychasticism +knows not how to manage.</p> + +<p>The anancasticist might here interpose, claiming that the mode +of evolution for which he contends agrees with agapasm at the point +at which tychasm departs from it. For it makes development go +through certain phases, having its inevitable ebbs and flows, yet +tending on the whole to a foreordained perfection. Bare existence +by this its destiny betrays an intrinsic affinity for the good. Herein, +it must be admitted, anancasm shows itself to be in a broad acception +a species of agapasm. Some forms of it might easily be mistaken +for the genuine agapasm. The Hegelian philosophy is such +an anancasticism. With its revelatory religion, with its synechism +(however imperfectly set forth), with its “reflection,” the whole idea +of the theory is superb, almost sublime. Yet, after all, living freedom +is practically omitted from its method. The whole movement +is that of a vast engine, impelled by a <i>vis a tergo</i>, with a blind and +mysterious fate of arriving at a lofty goal. I mean that such an +engine it <i>would</i> be, if it really worked; but in point of fact, it is a +Keely motor. Grant that it really acts as it professes to act, and +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_190">[190]</span>there is nothing to do but accept the philosophy. But never was +there seen such an example of a long chain of reasoning,—shall I +say with a flaw in every link?—no, with every link a handful of sand, +squeezed into shape in a dream. Or say, it is a pasteboard model +of a philosophy that in reality does not exist. If we use the one +precious thing it contains, the idea of it, introducing the tychism +which the arbitrariness of its every step suggests, and make that the +support of a vital freedom which is the breath of the spirit of love, +we may be able to produce that genuine agapasticism, at which +Hegel was aiming.</p> + +<h4>A THIRD ASPECT. DISCRIMINATION.</h4> + +<p>In the very nature of things, the line of demarcation between +the three modes of evolution is not perfectly sharp. That does not +prevent its being quite real; perhaps it is rather a mark of its reality. +There is in the nature of things no sharp line of demarcation +between the three fundamental colors, red, green, and violet. But +for all that they are really different. The main question is whether +three radically different evolutionary elements have been operative; +and the second question is what are the most striking characteristics +of whatever elements have been operative.</p> + +<p>I propose to devote a few pages to a very slight examination of +these questions in their relation to the historical development of human +thought. I first formulate for the reader’s convenience the +briefest possible definitions of the three conceivable modes of development +of thought, distinguishing also two varieties of anancasm +and three of agapasm. The tychastic development of thought, then, +will consist in slight departures from habitual ideas in different directions +indifferently, quite purposeless and quite unconstrained +whether by outward circumstances or by force of logic, these new +departures being followed by unforeseen results which tend to fix +some of them as habits more than others. The anancastic development +of thought will consist of new ideas adopted without foreseeing +whither they tend, but having a character determined by causes +either external to the mind, such as changed circumstances of life, +or internal to the mind as logical developments of ideas already accepted, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_191">[191]</span>such as generalisations. The agapastic development of +thought is the adoption of certain mental tendencies, not altogether +heedlessly, as in tychasm, nor quite blindly by the mere force of +circumstances or of logic, as in anancasm, but by an immediate attraction +for the idea itself, whose nature is divined before the mind +possesses it, by the power of sympathy, that is, by virtue of the continuity +of mind; and this mental tendency may be of three varieties, +as follows. First, it may affect a whole people or community in its +collective personality, and be thence communicated to such individuals +as are in powerfully sympathetic connection with the collective +people, although they may be intellectually incapable of attaining +the idea by their private understandings or even perhaps of consciously +apprehending it. Second, it may affect a private person +directly, yet so that he is only enabled to apprehend the idea, or to +appreciate its attractiveness, by virtue of his sympathy with his +neighbors, under the influence of a striking experience or development +of thought. The conversion of St. Paul may be taken as an +example of what is meant. Third, it may affect an individual, independently +of his human affections, by virtue of an attraction it exercises +upon his mind, even before he has comprehended it. This is +the phenomenon which has been well called the <i>divination</i> of genius; +for it is due to the continuity between the man’s mind and the Most +High.</p> + +<p>Let us next consider by means of what tests we can discriminate +between these different categories of evolution. No absolute +criterion is possible in the nature of things, since in the nature of +things there is no sharp line of demarcation between the different +classes. Nevertheless, quantitative symptoms may be found by +which a sagacious and sympathetic judge of human nature may be +able to estimate the approximate proportions in which the different +kinds of influence are commingled.</p> + +<p>So far as the historical evolution of human thought has been +tychastic, it should have proceeded by insensible or minute steps; +for such is the nature of chances when so multiplied as to show +phenomena of regularity. For example, assume that of the native-born +white adult males of the United States in 1880, one fourth part +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_192">[192]</span>were below 5 feet 4 inches in stature and one fourth part above 5 +feet 8 inches. Then by the principles of probability, among the +whole population, we should expect</p> + +<table> + <tr> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">216</td> + <td>under</td> + <td class="tdr">4</td> + <td>feet</td> + <td class="tdr">6</td> + <td>inches,</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">216</td> + <td>above</td> + <td class="tdr">6</td> + <td>feet</td> + <td class="tdr">6</td> + <td>inches.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">48</td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td class="tdr">4</td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td class="tdr">5</td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">48</td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td class="tdr">6</td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td class="tdr">7</td> + <td class="c">”</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">9</td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td class="tdr">4</td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td class="tdr">4</td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">9</td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td class="tdr">6</td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td class="tdr">8</td> + <td class="c">”</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>less than</td> + <td class="tdr">2</td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td class="tdr">4</td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td class="tdr">3</td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td>less than</td> + <td class="tdr">2</td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td class="tdr">6</td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td class="tdr">9</td> + <td class="c">”</td> + </tr> +</table> + +<p>I set down these figures to show how insignificantly few are the +cases in which anything very far out of the common run presents +itself by chance. Though the stature of only every second man is +included within the four inches between 5 feet 4 inches and 5 feet 8 +inches, yet if this interval be extended by thrice four inches above +and below, it will embrace all our 8 millions odd of native-born +adult white males (of 1880), except only 9 taller and 9 shorter.</p> + +<p>The test of minute variation, if <i>not</i> satisfied, absolutely negatives +tychasm. If it <i>is</i> satisfied, we shall find that it negatives anancasm +but not agapasm. We want a positive test, satisfied by tychasm, +only. Now wherever we find men’s thought taking by imperceptible +degrees a turn contrary to the purposes which animate them, in spite +of their highest impulses, there, we may safely conclude, there has +been a tychastic action.</p> + +<p>Students of the history of mind there be of an erudition to fill +an imperfect scholar like me with envy edulcorated by joyous admiration, +who maintain that ideas when just started are and can be +little more than freaks, since they cannot yet have been critically +examined, and further that everywhere and at all times progress has +been so gradual that it is difficult to make out distinctly what original +step any given man has taken. It would follow that tychasm +has been the sole method of intellectual development. I have to confess +I cannot read history so; I cannot help thinking that while tychasm +has sometimes been operative, at others great steps covering +nearly the same ground and made by different men independently, +have been mistaken for a succession of small steps, and further that +students have been reluctant to admit a real entitative “spirit” of +an age or of a people, under the mistaken and unscrutinised impression +that they should thus be opening the door to wild and unnatural +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_193">[193]</span>hypotheses. I find, on the contrary, that, however it may be with +the education of individual minds, the historical development of +thought has seldom been of a tychastic nature, and exclusively in +backward and barbarising movements. I desire to speak with the +extreme modesty which befits a student of logic who is required to +survey so very wide a field of human thought that he can cover it +only by a reconnaisance, to which only the greatest skill and most +adroit methods can impart any value at all; but, after all, I can +only express my own opinions and not those of anybody else; and +in my humble judgment, the largest example of tychasm is afforded +by the history of Christianity, from about its establishment by Constantine, +to, say, the time of the Irish monasteries, an era or eon of +about 500 years. Undoubtedly the external circumstance which +more than all others at first inclined men to accept Christianity in +its loveliness and tenderness, was the fearful extent to which society +was broken up into units by the unmitigated greed and hard-heartedness +into which the Romans had seduced the world. And yet it was +that very same fact, more than any other external circumstance, that +fostered that bitterness against the wicked world of which the primitive +Gospel of Mark contains not a single trace. At least, I do not +detect it in the remark about the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, +where nothing is said about vengeance, nor even in that speech +where the closing lines of Isaiah are quoted, about the worm and +the fire that feed upon the “carcasses of the men that have transgressed +against me.” But little by little the bitterness increases +until in the last book of the New Testament, its poor distracted +author represents that all the time Christ was talking about having +come to save the world, the secret design was to catch the entire +human race, with the exception of a paltry 144000, and souse them +all in brimstone lake, and as the smoke of their torment went up for +ever and ever, to turn and remark, “There is no curse any more.” +Would it be an insensible smirk or a fiendish grin that should accompany +such an utterance? I wish I could believe St. John did not +write it; but it is his gospel which tells about the “resurrection +unto condemnation,”—that is of men’s being resuscitated just for +the sake of torturing them;—and, at any rate, the Revelation is a +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_194">[194]</span>very ancient composition. One can understand that the early Christians +were like men trying with all their might to climb a steep declivity +of smooth wet clay; the deepest and truest element of their +life, animating both heart and head, was universal-love; but they +were continually, and against their wills, slipping into a party spirit, +every slip serving as a precedent, in a fashion but too familiar to +every man. This party feeling insensibly grew until by about <span class="allsmcap">A. D.</span> +330 the lustre of the pristine integrity that in St. Mark reflects the +white spirit of light was so far tarnished that Eusebius, (the Jared +Sparks of that day,) in the preface to his History, could announce +his intention of exaggerating everything that tended to the glory of +the church and of suppressing whatever might disgrace it. His +Latin contemporary Lactantius is worse, still; and so the darkling +went on increasing until before the end of the century the great library +of Alexandria was destroyed by Theophilus,⁠<a id="FNanchor_22" href="#Footnote_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> until Gregory +the Great, two centuries later, burnt the great library of Rome, proclaiming +that “Ignorance is the mother of devotion,” (which is true, +just as oppression and injustice is the mother of spirituality,) until a +sober description of the state of the church would be a thing our not +too nice newspapers would treat as “unfit for publication.” All +this movement is shown by the application of the test given above +to have been tychastic. Another very much like it on a small scale, +only a hundred times swifter, for the study of which there are documents +by the library-full, is to be found in the history of the French +Revolution.</p> + +<p>Anancastic evolution advances by successive strides with pauses +between. The reason is that in this process a habit of thought having +been overthrown is supplanted by the next strongest. Now this +next strongest is sure to be widely disparate from the first, and as +often as not is its direct contrary. It reminds one of our old rule +of making the second candidate vice-president. This character, +therefore, clearly distinguishes anancasm from tychasm. The character +which distinguishes it from agapasm is its purposelessness. +But external and internal anancasm have to be examined separately. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_195">[195]</span>Development under the pressure of external circumstances, or cataclasmine +evolution, is in most cases unmistakable enough. It has +numberless degrees of intensity, from the brute force, the plain war, +which has more than once turned the current of the world’s thought, +down to the hard fact of evidence, or what has been taken for it, +which has been known to convince men by hordes. The only hesitation +that can subsist in the presence of such a history is a quantitative +one. Never are external influences the only ones which affect +the mind, and therefore it must be a matter of judgment for which +it would scarcely be worth while to attempt to set rules, whether a +given movement is to be regarded as principally governed from without +or not. In the rise of medieval thought, I mean scholasticism +and the synchronistic art developments, undoubtedly the crusades +and the discovery of the writings of Aristotle were powerful influences. +The development of scholasticism from Roscellin to Albertus +Magnus closely follows the successive steps in the knowledge +of Aristotle. Prantl thinks that that is the whole story, and few men +have thumbed more books than Carl Prantl. He has done good solid +work, notwithstanding his slap-dash judgments. But we shall never +make so much as a good beginning of comprehending scholasticism +until the whole has been systematically explored and digested by a +company of students regularly organised and held under rule for that +purpose. But as for the period we are now specially considering, +that which synchronised the Romanesque architecture, the literature +is easily mastered. It does not quite justify Prantl’s dicta as to the +slavish dependence of these authors upon their authorities. Moreover, +they kept a definite purpose steadily before their minds, throughout +all their studies. I am, therefore, unable to offer this period of +scholasticism as an example of pure external anancasm, which seems +to be the fluorine of the intellectual elements. Perhaps the recent +Japanese reception of western ideas is the purest instance of it in history. +Yet in combination with other elements, nothing is commoner. +If the development of ideas under the influence of the study of external +facts be considered as external anancasm,—it is on the border +between the external and the internal forms,—it is, of course, the +principal thing in modern learning. But Whewell, whose masterly +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_196">[196]</span>comprehension of the history of science critics have been too ignorant +properly to appreciate, clearly shows that it is far from being +the overwhelmingly preponderant influence, even there.</p> + +<p>Internal anancasm, or logical groping, which advances upon a +predestined line without being able to foresee whither it is to be carried +nor to steer its course, this is the rule of development of philosophy. +Hegel first made the world understand this; and he seeks +to make logic not merely the subjective guide and monitor of thought, +which was all it had been ambitioning before, but to be the very +main-spring of thinking, and not merely of individual thinking but of +discussion, of the history of the development of thought, of all history, +of all development. This involves a positive, clearly demonstrable +error. Let the logic in question be of whatever kind it may, +a logic of necessary inference or a logic of probable inference, (the +theory might perhaps be shaped to fit either,) in any case it supposes +that logic is sufficient of itself to determine what conclusion +follows from given premises; for unless it will do so much, it will +not suffice to explain why an individual train of reasoning should +take just the course it does take, to say nothing of other kinds of +development. It thus supposes that from given premises, only one +conclusion can logically be drawn, and that there is no scope at all +for free choice. That from given premises only one conclusion can +logically be drawn, is one of the false notions which have come from +logicians’ confining their attention to that Nantucket of thought, the +logic of non-relative terms. In the logic of relatives, it does not hold +good.</p> + +<p>One remark occurs to me. If the evolution of history is in considerable +part of the nature of internal anancasm, it resembles the +development of individual men; and just as 33 years is a rough but +natural unit of time for individuals, being the average age at which +man has issue, so there should be an approximate period at the end +of which one great historical movement ought to be likely to be supplanted +by another. Let us see if we can make out anything of the +kind. Take the governmental development of Rome as being sufficiently +long and set down the principal dates.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_197">[197]</span></p> + +<table> + <tr> + <td><span class="allsmcap">B. C.</span></td> + <td class="tdr">753,</td> + <td>Foundation of Rome.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="allsmcap">B. C.</span></td> + <td class="tdr">510,</td> + <td>Expulsion of the Tarquins.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="allsmcap">B. C.</span></td> + <td class="tdr">27,</td> + <td>Octavius assumes title Augustus.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="allsmcap">A. D.</span></td> + <td class="tdr">476,</td> + <td>End of Western Empire.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="allsmcap">A. D.</span></td> + <td class="tdr">962,</td> + <td>Holy Roman Empire.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="allsmcap">A. D.</span></td> + <td class="tdr">1453,</td> + <td>Fall of Constantinople.</td> + </tr> +</table> + +<p class="noindent">The last event was one of the most significant in history, especially +for Italy. The intervals are 243, 483, 502, 486, 491 years. All are +rather curiously near equal, except the first which is half the others. +Successive reigns of kings would not commonly be so near equal. +Let us set down a few dates in the history of thought.</p> + +<table> + <tr> + <td><span class="allsmcap">B. C.</span></td> + <td class="tdr">585,</td> + <td>Eclipse of Thales. Beginning of Greek philosophy.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="allsmcap">A. D.</span></td> + <td class="tdr">30,</td> + <td>The crucifixion.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="allsmcap">A. D.</span></td> + <td class="tdr">529,</td> + <td>Closing of Athenian schools. End of Greek philosophy.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="allsmcap">A. D.</span></td> + <td class="tdr">1125,</td> + <td>(Approximate) Rise of the Universities of Bologna and Paris.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="allsmcap">A. D.</span></td> + <td class="tdr">1543,</td> + <td>Publication of the “De Revolutionibus” of Copernicus. + Beginning of Modern Science.</td> + </tr> +</table> + +<p class="noindent">The intervals are 615, 499, 596, 418, years. In the history of metaphysics, +we may take the following:</p> + +<table> + <tr> + <td><span class="allsmcap">B. C.</span></td> + <td class="tdr">322,</td> + <td>Death of Aristotle.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="allsmcap">A. D.</span></td> + <td class="tdr">1274,</td> + <td>Death of Aquinas.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="allsmcap">A. D.</span></td> + <td class="tdr">1804,</td> + <td>Death of Kant.</td> + </tr> +</table> + +<p class="noindent">The intervals are 1595 and 530 years. The former is about thrice +the latter.</p> + +<p>From these figures, no conclusion can fairly be drawn. At the +same time, they suggest that perhaps there may be a rough natural +era of about 500 years. Should there be any independent evidence +of this, the intervals noticed may gain some significance.</p> + +<p>The agapastic development of thought should, if it exists, be +distinguished by its purposive character, this purpose being the development +of an idea. We should have a direct agapic or sympathetic +comprehension and recognition of it, by virtue of the continuity +of thought. I here take it for granted that such continuity of +thought has been sufficiently proved by the arguments used in my +paper on the “Law of Mind” in <i>The Monist</i> of last July. Even if +those arguments are not quite convincing in themselves, yet if they +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_198">[198]</span>are reënforced by an apparent agapasm in the history of thought, +the two propositions will lend one another mutual aid. The reader +will, I trust, be too well grounded in logic to mistake such mutual +support for a vicious circle in reasoning. If it could be shown directly +that there is such an entity as the “spirit of an age” or of a +people, and that mere individual intelligence will not account for all +the phenomena, this would be proof enough at once of agapasticism +and of synechism. I must acknowledge that I am unable to produce +a cogent demonstration of this; but I am, I believe, able to adduce +such arguments as will serve to confirm those which have been drawn +from other facts. I believe that all the greatest achievements of +mind have been beyond the powers of unaided individuals; and I +find, apart from the support this opinion receives from synechistic +considerations, and from the purposive character of many great movements, +direct reason for so thinking in the sublimity of the ideas and +in their occurring simultaneously and independently to a number of +individuals of no extraordinary general powers. The pointed Gothic +architecture in several of its developments appears to me to be of +such a character. All attempts to imitate it by modern architects +of the greatest learning and genius appear flat and tame, and are +felt by their authors to be so. Yet at the time the style was living, +there was quite an abundance of men capable of producing works of +this kind of gigantic sublimity and power. In more than one case, +extant documents show that the cathedral chapters, in the selection +of architects, treated high artistic genius as a secondary consideration, +as if there were no lack of persons able to supply that; and +the results justify their confidence. Were individuals in general, +then, in those ages possessed of such lofty natures and high intellect? +Such an opinion would break down under the first examination.</p> + +<p>How many times have men now in middle life seen great discoveries +made independently and almost simultaneously! The first +instance I remember was the prediction of a planet exterior to Uranus +by Leverrier and Adams. One hardly knows to whom the +principle of the conservation of energy ought to be attributed, although +it may reasonably be considered as the greatest discovery +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_199">[199]</span>science has ever made. The mechanical theory of heat was set forth +by Rankine and by Clausius during the same month of February, +1850; and there are eminent men who attribute this great step to +Thomson.⁠<a id="FNanchor_23" href="#Footnote_23" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> The kinetical theory of gases, after being started by +John Bernoulli and long buried in oblivion, was reinvented and applied +to the explanation not merely of the laws of Boyle, Charles, +and Avogadro, but also of diffusion and viscosity, by at least three +modern physicists separately. It is well known that the doctrine of +natural selection was presented by Wallace and by Darwin at the +same meeting of the British Association; and Darwin in his “Historical +Sketch” prefixed to the later editions of his book shows that +both were anticipated by obscure forerunners. The method of spectrum +analysis was claimed for Swan as well as for Kirchhoff, and there +were others who perhaps had still better claims. The authorship of +the Periodical Law of the Chemical Elements is disputed between a +Russian, a German, and an Englishman; although there is no room +for doubt that the principal merit belongs to the first. These are +nearly all the greatest discoveries of our times. It is the same with +the inventions. It may not be surprising that the telegraph should +have been independently made by several inventors, because it was +an easy corollary from scientific facts well made out before. But it +was not so with the telephone and other inventions. Ether, the first +anæsthetic, was introduced independently by three different New England +physicians. Now ether had been a common article for a century. +It had been in one of the pharmacopœias three centuries before. It +is quite incredible that its anæsthetic property should not have been +known; it was known. It had probably passed from mouth to ear +as a secret from the days of Basil Valentine; but for long it had +been a secret of the Punchinello kind. In New England, for many +years, boys had used it for amusement. Why then had it not been +put to its serious use? No reason can be given, except that the motive +to do so was not strong enough. The motives to doing so could +only have been desire for gain and philanthropy. About 1846, the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_200">[200]</span>date of the introduction, philanthropy was undoubtedly in an unusually +active condition. That sensibility, or sentimentalism, which +had been introduced in the previous century, had undergone a ripening +process, in consequence of which, though now less intense than +it had previously been, it was more likely to influence unreflecting +people than it had ever been. All three of the ether-claimants had +probably been influenced by the desire for gain; but nevertheless +they were certainly not insensible to the agapic influences.</p> + +<p>I doubt if any of the great discoveries ought, properly, to be +considered as altogether individual achievements; and I think many +will share this doubt. Yet, if not, what an argument for the continuity +of mind, and for agapasticism is here! I do not wish to be +very strenuous. If thinkers will only be persuaded to lay aside their +prejudices and apply themselves to studying the evidences of this +doctrine, I shall be fully content to await the final decision.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">Charles S. Peirce.</span></p> + +<div class="footnotes"> + +<h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_20" href="#FNanchor_20" class="label">[20]</a> How can a writer have any respect for science, as such, who is capable of +confounding with the scientific propositions of political economy, which have nothing +to say concerning what is “beneficent,” such brummagem generalisations as +this?</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_21" href="#FNanchor_21" class="label">[21]</a> I am happy to find that Dr. Carus, too, ranks Weismann among the opponents +of Darwin, notwithstanding his flying that flag.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_22" href="#FNanchor_22" class="label">[22]</a> See <i>Draper’s History of Intellectual Development</i>, chap. x.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_23" href="#FNanchor_23" class="label">[23]</a> Thomson, himself, in his article <i>Heat</i> in the <i>Encyclopedia Britannica</i>, never +once mentions the name of Clausius.</p></div> + +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_201">[201]</span></p> + +<h3 class="nobreak" id="RENAN">RENAN.<br> +<span class="smaller">A DISCOURSE GIVEN AT SOUTH PLACE CHAPEL, LONDON, OCTOBER, 9, 1892.</span></h3> + +</div> + +<p>“Be calm and resigned,” said Renan to his weeping wife. +“We undergo the laws of that nature of which we are manifestations. +We perish, we disappear, but heaven and earth remain, and +the march of time goes on for ever.”</p> + +<p>It is hard to-day to respond to these last words of the dying +philosopher. Heaven and earth remain, but they seem cold and grey +when the great heart in which they were united has ceased to beat, +and when our sweet English singer has gone silent. By the passing +away of the two highest-mounted minds in Europe this society is +especially bereaved. The earliest welcome given to the genius of +young Tennyson came from the pen of William Johnston Fox, the +first Minister of this Chapel; here has his spiritual pilgrimage been +followed, and its songs here sung as hymns. But for their magnitude +Tennyson and Renan might have been considered together. +They were children of the same spiritual epoch; the son of the +Catholic Church, and the English Rector’s son, were fellow-pilgrims +on the painful road of scepticism; they encountered the same phantoms, +were attended by the same mighty shades, and found no altar +but such as their own genius could raise and their glowing hearts +kindle in the wilderness of doubt and denial. Alike they distrusted +democracy, and dreamed of the ideal monarch,—as of Arthur, “flower +of kings,” whom ancient legends of Britain and Brittany said would +some day return to lead up the Golden Year. Renan loved to tell +the story of how Tennyson, roaming in Brittany, stopped at an inn +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_202">[202]</span>in Lannier, birthplace of Renan’s mother. In the morning the poet +demanded his account, but the hostess said, “There is nothing to +pay, Monsieur. It is you who have sung of our King Arthur.”</p> + +<p>But the people have a greatness of their own. They enshrine +Tennyson in Westminster Abbey, Renan in the Pantheon. The +career of Renan is a triumph of republican France. Under the Empire +he was deprived of his professorship, and of his office in the +Imperial Library, for writing the “Life of Jesus.” But the Republic +made him President of the College of France, gave him every honor, +in life as in death. The national homage to that ex-priest, that outspoken +rationalist, who flattered not the masses nor fawned on +power, is a high water-mark of civilisation. For it marks the rise +of a steady tide of liberty, and not the mere leap of waves under +some tempest of momentary emotion. The great fact is that this +unique heretic, thinker, and scholar, has been able, without compromising +his independence, without help of any sect or school, to +live his life, think his thought, and round out his life-work with completeness, +on the scene of a thousand martyrdoms.</p> + +<p>In Renan’s “Feuilles Détachées,” which appeared last spring +but is not yet translated, there are outbursts of gratitude to his time, +which, he says, has been good to him, and pardoned many faults. +He had just finished, he says, his “History of the People of Israel”—“the +serious work of my life.”</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“The bridge which it remained to me to build between Judaism and Christianism +is built.... In the ‘Life of Jesus’ I tried to exhibit the majestic growth of the +Galilean tree from the stock of its roots to the summit, where sing the birds of +heaven. In the volume just finished I have sought to make known the subsoil in +which shot the roots of Jesus. Thus my principal duty is accomplished. At the +Academy the work on the Rabbins also nears conclusion, and the <i>Corpus Inscriptionum +Semiticorum</i> is in excellent hands. So that now, having paid all my debts, I +am free enough to amuse myself a little, and without scruples to indulge myself with +the pleasure of gathering these leaves, often light enough.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>So radiant was the author, at sixty-nine, having achieved the +main schemes of a life which, at forty, was threatened with ruin by +intolerance. Of course it was but a small part of what he would +fain have accomplished. Last year (September 11) there was a festival, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_203">[203]</span>in the Island of Bréhat, where Renan was the chief speaker. +In the course of his address he said:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“Every year I used to come hither with my mother to visit my aunt Périne, +who loved me much, for she thought me like my father. Here on your rocks, and +in your paths, I formed plans and dreamed dreams, of which I have realised a third +or a quarter. That is much; I consider myself fortunate; I hold myself among the +privileged ones of life. I have been more sad than now, for I feared I might die +young (misfortune notably not arrived) and never produce what was in my mind. +Oh certainly, could I live a long time yet, I would know what to do. I have schemes +of work for three or four lives. I would write a history of the French Revolution, +showing it an attack of fever, grand, strange, horrible, and sublime; the foundation, +let us hope of something better. I would compose a history of Athens, almost day +by day; also a history of science and freethought, telling by what steps man has +come to know something of how the world is made; I would write a history of Brittany +in six volumes. I would study Chinese, and review critically all the problems +of Chinese history and literature. Of all that I would make nothing. There is a +crowd of things I wish to know and shall never know. But why reproach nature +for refusing me? Let us recognise what she has given us. I have traversed the +world at an interesting moment in its development, and, after all, have seen enough. +After my time humanity will do surprising things: I can rest content during eternity.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>The happiness of this venerable author, conscious that his life +is closing, his work ended,—a happiness not derived from any hope +of future reward, or even existence,—is a salient testimony of our +time. In one of these recent addresses Renan says: “Let us die +calmly, in the communion of humanity, the religion of the future.” +The dying Voltaire was fed with a wafer, even while he ridiculed it. +Renan partakes the communion of humanity, the religion of the +future. It may appear cold comfort to the superstitious, for they +comprehend not that to such a man the communion of humanity implies +an eternal life.</p> + +<p>In one sense Renan lived not quite threescore years and ten; in +another he lived ages on ages. By his mastery of Eastern and Oriental +languages and literatures, by his studies of ancient and modern +systems, he had familiarly dwelt among primitive tribes, with them +set up their sacred dolmens, knelt at their altars, travelled with their +migrations in India, Persia, Egypt, Syria, shared their pilgrimages +from lower to higher beliefs, listened to their prophets, visited the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_204">[204]</span>home of Mary and Joseph, walked with the disciples, conversed +with Jesus, witnessed the crucifixion, journeyed through the middle +ages, reached the Renaissance, passed through Protestantism, gathered +every spiritual flower of the nineteenth century. Such long +experience of the past, such knowledge of the attractions of humanity,—predicting +its fulfilments,—carry the thinker equally far into +the future. Knowing the angles of convergence in time’s rising +pyramid, he can calculate the apex, and look down from it. He is +able to rejoice in realisations of ideals now mere tendencies. His +immortality is present. Such to Renan meant that communion of +humanity, into which he entered by patient studies, and by the devotion +of his life to the spiritual essence of the world. And this +vision sustained him in his last hour.</p> + +<p>And let me here say, that Renan’s optimism was not based in +any belief in a superhuman providence, or any dynamic or compulsory +destiny in nature. It was his faith in the heart and brain of +man. In his last work he reminds youth that their efforts at new +abstractions and theologies are idle: the new notions will follow the +old into extinction. “Dear children,” he says—</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“Dear children, it is useless to give yourself so much headache to reach only a +change of error. Let us die calm, in the communion of humanity, the religion of +the future. The existence of the world is assured for a long time. The future of +science is guaranteed, for in the great scientific book everything adds itself and +nothing is lost. Error is not deep; no error lasts long. Be tranquil. Before a +thousand years, let us hope, the earth will find means to supply its exhausted coal, +and, in some degree, its diminished virtue. The resources of humanity are infinite. +Eternal works accomplish themselves without loss to the fountain of living forces, +ever rising again to the surface. Science, above all, will continue to astonish us by +its revelations, substituting the infinite of time and space for a poor creationism that +can no longer satisfy the imagination of a child. Religion also is true to the infinite. +When God shall be complete, he will be just. I am convinced that virtue will find +itself one day clearly to have been the better part. The merit is in affirming duty +against the apparent evidences. [As for the future] denying not, affirming not, let +us hope. Let us keep a place at our funerals for the music and the incense.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>It will be seen that Renan’s deity is the brother of man’s divinity. +God is as dependent on man as man on God. Natural evil is God’s +incompleteness: when man is complete God will be complete: there +will be no more injustice.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_205">[205]</span></p> + +<p>But I must warn you that while this is the way in which Renan +impresses me, he is not a man to be caught or held in any one +theory. He is the many-sided man of our time. When I heard his +lectures in his college, two years ago,—his French was so clear and +expressive that even a limping listener could follow him tolerably,—he +impressed me as a sort of Buddha. Buddha is supposed by some +to have got his large form by sitting so long in contemplation, by +others his size is regarded as a protest against the meagreness of +ill-fed ascetics. The unfurrowed serenity of Buddha’s face, his infantine +smile, were those of Renan, also the remembered music of +his voice. This association has been extended to Renan’s spiritual +nature by a letter of his to a friend, in his “Feuilles Détachées.” +He is fascinated by the legends of Buddha and Krishna which describe +them as multiplying themselves. When Buddha was born +into this world, ten thousand women entreated to be his nurses, and +Buddha multiplied himself into ten thousand babies. Each woman +believed that she alone had nursed the true Buddha. In the legend +of the god Krishna, he first appeared to some shepherdesses who +were dancing. The beautiful god multiplied himself into as many +forms as there were maidens, so that each believed, that she alone +had danced with Krishna, and through life kept her heart sacred to +him. Writing of these legends, Renan says:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“The ideal loses nothing by dividing itself: it is entire in each of its parts. +We live that part of Krishna which we assimilate according to our genius. The +ideal is for all partakers, like morsels modified to each taste. Each creates his divine +dancer. One refinement I would introduce into the legend of Krishna, should +I ever make it into a drama, or, better, a philosophic ballet: at the time when the +shepherdesses believed they were singly dancing with Krishna, he should find that +they were in reality dancing with different Krishnas. Each had made her Krishna +to her fancy, and when they came to describe to each other their heavenly lover, +they should find their visions in nowise alike; and nevertheless to each it was always +Krishna.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>The legend which thus charmed Renan has many correspondences +in religious history; in Christianity, for instance, where we +to-day find a hundred and fifty sects, each believing that it alone +has the true Christ for partner. But it applies to all great personalities, +and to all spiritual influences. The finest spirits frame no +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_206">[206]</span>systems, found no schools. They are akin to the sun and rain which +nourish and paint innumerable and diverse growths. It was so with +Emerson. Dean Stanley said that he heard many different preachers +in America, but their sermons were generally by Emerson. It was +preëminently the case with Renan. The Catholic, the Protestant, +the idealist, the sceptic, the man of the world, the mystic, the conservative, +the radical, provided they are unsophisticated like the +shepherdesses, not champions of some sect or party, find that Renan +has spoken better for them than they can for themselves; he knows +their secret heart, is their partner by unbounded sympathies. Yet +it is always the same Renan, full and entire in each and all of his +manifestations.</p> + +<p>Some time ago, when his friend Littré, the Positivist, was buried +by his family with Catholic rites, the aspersoir passed round the +grave, and came to Renan, who, like the rest, sprinkled holy water +on the coffin. There were cries of “Shame” among the freethinkers +present; but really it was the act of a man less sectarian than themselves. +The same tenderness that could not wound the family parting +for ever from their beloved, is visible in the gentleness with which +he treats old beliefs, when it is a question of affection or sentiment, +not of dogma and authority. They have died out of his mind utterly; +he sees the creeds already in their graves; he no longer fears +them, but is glad to soothe those who cling to their lifeless forms by +speaking kindly of their virtues in the past. His “Life of Jesus” +is, in large part, a wreath of immortelles laid on the tomb of a faith +to him utterly dead,—that is, faith in a supernatural Christ. He +once told me of a little island on the coast of his native Brittany, +from which some medieval saint was supposed to have driven monstrous +serpents, or worms. To that island the peasants still repair +to get a little of the soil to use as a—vermifuge. To similarly small +size had shrunk, in Renan’s view, the greatest dogmas and superstitions +of Christendom. Others might still compliment them with +fear and wrath, but Renan was tender to them because of their smallness. +He was endlessly good-natured with his ignorant opponents, +from whom he often received warning letters. Of one who wrote +him simply the words, <i>Remember, there is a Hell</i>, he said that this +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_207">[207]</span>monitor did not terrify him as much as he may have supposed. He +(Renan) would be rather glad to know for certain that there was beyond +the grave even a hell. And if he should go there he felt certain +that he would be able to address to the deity such subtle arguments +to prove that he ought not to remain there, but to be transferred to +paradise; (only he feared his exhorter’s paradise would be very dull,) +that he would presently be released.</p> + +<p>One purpose of the “Life of Jesus” has been mentioned, but +that work had also another and a higher aim. With a love like that +of Mary Magdalene, in whose rapt vision Jesus rose from the tomb, +to be transformed into a supernatural Christ, Renan sought to raise +out of the grave of that supernatural Christ the human Jesus. He +had travelled through Palestine, visited every spot associated with +the great teacher, and drew the most realistic portraiture he could +of the parents, home, friends, disciples, and daily life of Jesus. The +outcry against that book was a confession by theology of its utter +loss of the human personality of Jesus. There had been a time +when the religious heart loved to dwell on the sweet humanities of +Jesus. In the seventeenth century the poet, Thomas Dekker, wrote:</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent28">“The best of men</div> + <div class="verse indent0">That e’er wore earth about him was a sufferer;</div> + <div class="verse indent0">A soft, meek, patient, humble, tranquil spirit,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">The first true gentleman that ever breathed.”</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p>And such remembrance of Jesus, in his life among the people, his +friendships, smiles and tears, are found in the sermons of Tillotson, +South, Jeremy Taylor. But the descended God gradually consumed +the humanity. In the last century it became a heresy to consider +Jesus as a man. The man was crucified on a cross of dogmas; he +lay dead and buried under a stony theology, until Renan rolled away +the stone, raised him to life, clothed him with flesh and blood, invested +him with beauty, and said once more to the Pharisee, the +sceptic, the scoffer—<i>Behold the man!</i> For writing that book,—just +after Strauss had shown the Christ of Christendom a mythological +figure,—the churches should have clasped Renan’s knees. But for +it they heaped him with abuse, declared that Jewish bankers had +bribed him to write it, drove him from his professorship of Hebrew, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_208">[208]</span>reduced him to poverty. The Pope denounced him as “The European +Blasphemer.” He has been terribly avenged in his own country, +where every educated man has abandoned the church. And he +lived to see the Christianity of England striving to gain a new hold +on the people by following his brave gesture,—rationalising away +the supernatural Christ, and exalting the humanity of Jesus as the +sign of his divinity. The criticism of that work is not at all so destructive +as that of many who have written in the generation that has +elapsed since its appearance,—of Dr. Martineau, for instance, on +whom Oxford has conferred a doctor’s degree. Indeed, in reading +Renan’s “Life of Jesus” now, one is surprised by its concessions. +He accepts the four Gospels as coming from the first century, a belief +which even the learned theologians have abandoned. Some +newspaper has said that Renan borrowed from Strauss; on the contrary, +the fault of the book is that it did not borrow from Strauss, +and from English authors, who had proved that the Gospels are all +of the second century. That would have relieved him of the necessity +of apologising for Jesus in some matters of which Jesus never +heard, of which Paul in the first century knew nothing, as when he +intimates that Jesus may have once lent himself to an amiable deception. +No miracle was ever ascribed to Jesus by any writer of +his own century. In several other respects Renan’s “Life of Jesus,” +on its negative side, is behind the advance of research and criticism. +But those are small details compared with the spirit and general +purpose of the work. In this moment, when we are celebrating the +discovery of a western world, we may well pay homage to the scholar +who rediscovered and exhumed an eastern world, long buried under +débris of mythology and rubbish of superstitions. This Renan has +done in his series of works on the “Origins of Christianity,” beginning +with the “Life of Jesus,” dealing with the “Apostles,” with +“St. Paul,” with “Antichrist,” and other studies, leading up to his +“History of the People of Israel.”</p> + +<p>In all these works there is not a line that is not interesting, alike +to learned and unlearned. As some one has said, Renan could +make Hebrew roots blossom with roses and lilies. But that super-fine +art of his was carrying the cause of intellectual and religious +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_209">[209]</span>emancipation. For these works concerned the constitution of +Europe. This Great Britain, with all its physical freedom, is religiously +a mere dependency of Judea. Here men were formerly +burnt, until lately imprisoned, and even now denied equal advantages, +not in accordance with what Englishmen think, but with the +opinions of some ancient Jews. The voice of the Jews was the voice +of God. But Judea, like the Grand Llama, could rule only while +veiled. Renan unveiled it. He did it all the more effectually because +in the literary and philosophic spirit. All the ages of Judea, +from the first tribal groups to the movement of John the Baptist and +Jesus, are assigned their exact place as successive chapters of human +history, the natural origin of their mythology is explained, Jehovah +takes his seat beside Jupiter and Brahma, Jesus is revered with +Buddha and Zoroaster; and all this is done, not by mere opinion, +but by impregnable facts, unwearied researches, inflexible veracity. +It was also done lovingly. A superstition can survive combat, but +not explanation. Renan did much to remove Christianity from the +field of militant camps to the quiet province of literary investigation. +In the Republic of Letters there is no arbitrary authority. The +combat is left to salvation armies,—“theirs not to reason why.”</p> + +<p>There is a large Renan literature. More than three hundred +works represent the efforts of theology to get the resuscitated human +Jesus back into his grave again. Renan’s accessible life-work is +represented by about twenty-five volumes, of which some are philosophic +diversions written amid the heavy labours of his College, +and while collecting and preserving for scholars the whole body of +Semitic inscriptions. For more than twenty years Renan has been +training the young scholars of France—those who are to fashion +France in the future, and influence mankind. Those acquainted +with his larger works can realise his immense service in elevating +the standard of criticism, and establishing the method of exact research +and exact thought. But there are other works of Renan, +notably his <i>Philosophic Dramas</i>, not yet translated, from which may +be better gathered the great variety of his ability, the poetic play of +his genius, and the charm of his personality, which some of us have +personally felt, and which so won all hearts that even the priesthood +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_210">[210]</span>have not raised discordant notes in the homage and emotion with +which his nation has laid him in an honored grave.</p> + +<p>Farewell, great heart, and great leader! On your coffin I laid a +wreath of immortelles for friendship, for the homage of America, +and for the sake of this free English Society. For your victory is +ours also: your triumph is that of every independent mind on earth.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">Moncure D. Conway.</span></p> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_211">[211]</span></p> + +<h3 class="nobreak" id="INTUITION_AND_REASON">INTUITION AND REASON.</h3> + +</div> + +<p>The question whether we act more frequently from intuition or +reason, and the question that follows it, which faculty is the +more noble guide to conduct, would have no more interest for the +general public than any other of the subjects which the metaphysician +exercises his ingenuity upon,—than the question, for instance, +whether we execute a greater number of analytic or of synthetic +judgments in the course of the day,—were it not that there is an ancient +opinion to the effect that reason and intuition are marks respectively +of the manner of working of men’s and of women’s minds. +The opinion is wholly unfounded, and could only have had its origin +at a time when the psychology of the working of the human mind +was thoroughly misunderstood. As the very terms in which the +opinion is expressed make plain, it dates from the period when it +was the custom to speak of the human mind as having a lot of +separate “faculties” under its control, and of calling up now one +and now another of them to do its bidding. It is time that the belief +in the different quality of men’s and of women’s minds should +follow the whole antiquated machinery of “faculties” into the limbo +of old and worn-out fashions of thought and of speech.</p> + +<p>This illusion, however, like most of the illusions that have had +a firm foot-hold in their day, has a perfectly comprehensible reason +for its existence. It is not true that men’s minds and women’s +minds have a different way of working; but it is true that upon certain +occasions (and by far, the greatest number of occasions) we all—men, +women, and negroes alike—act from intuition, and that the +circumstances of women’s lives have hitherto been such as to make +their interests lie somewhat more exclusively in those regions in which +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_212">[212]</span>conduct is intuitive than in those in which it is long thought out. It +is not true that the Creator has made two separate kinds of mind for +men and for women; but it is true that society, as at present constituted, +offers two somewhat separate <i>fields of interest</i> for men and +for women, and that the nature of their conduct is of necessity determined +by the character of the action which is demanded of them.</p> + +<p>What is the difference for the psychologist, between the mental +state of a being who acts from reason, and of one who acts from intuition? +It is not a difference of the <i>kind of mind</i> which controls +him, but of the <i>kind of knowledge</i> upon which his present conduct is +based. If one individual has got at his command a lot of general +propositions bearing upon the case in hand, and if his familiarity +with them is not such that they flow together without conscious effort, +then he must laboriously piece them together, and think out +the conclusions which they necessitate. If another individual, having +led a different life, has had a lot of experiences which cover just +such cases as this, and if he has been taught by thousands of instances +that under these circumstances a certain course of conduct +will nearly always lead to good results, then he can trust to his hands +or his feet to execute that course of conduct without a moment’s aid +from conscious reflection; he can go on with his novel, or whatever +other pleasant occupation engages his attention, without the wear +and tear of mind which is involved in consciously thinking about +the circumstances in question.</p> + +<p>Now the differences in the mental processes of men and women +are exactly of this nature. They are differences dependent upon the +fact that the <i>knowledge</i> at their command—that is, the stored up +premises upon which action is based—is, to a certain extent, of a +different kind, and got from different sources. So far as the knowledge +is not of a different kind, the character of the action is not of +a different kind. There is an immense number of conclusions which +men and women alike “jump at,” every hour in the day; and some +of them represent reasoning so fixedly instinctive, that even the +closest attention does not enable us to drag it up into the light of +consciousness. How many people know that a certain feeling of +strain in the muscles which move the eyes is a sign of a certain distance +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_213">[213]</span>of an object looked at, and a different feeling of strain, a sign +of a different distance; and that when the eyes are fixed upon one +point, objects in the lateral field of view are judged to be nearer or +farther away than that point, according as the two disparate images +which they cast upon the two retinas are, the right-hand one or the +left hand one, the brighter? The common man <i>knows</i> that one object +is near and the other far, but he is not <i>conscious</i> even of the feeling +of strain, nor of the existence of double images; the physiological +psychologist knows the unconscious syllogism by which he +<i>must</i> reach his conclusion, but even he cannot, by any possibility, +make it cease to be instinctive,—that is, make himself conscious of +its different steps. On the other hand, no one, whether man or +woman, can pass from one proposition in geometry to another by a +process which is in any sense unconscious, though one person may +be obliged to give a much more strained attention to what he is +doing than another.</p> + +<p>Now it is very possible that a greater <i>number</i> of the actions of +women have their ground in unconscious causes than of the actions +of men. The subjects upon which action is of vital concern to them +have been different subjects, and hence their stored-up stock of +knowledge is knowledge about different subjects. To the woman of +the past, who was to a great extent confined to her own home, the +temper of her house-mates was what her happiness depended upon +more than anything else in the world. It was impossible that she +should not acquire a keen intelligence in interpreting every slightest +shade of expression upon the human face. But this sort of knowledge +is always instinctive, whether it is practised by men or by women. +If the eyes of the most reasonable man in the world should +chance to show him a certain curve of the lip and a certain elevation +of the posterior angle of the alæ of the nostrils on the face of the +fair lady to whom he was talking, would he try to call to mind the +pictures in Sir Charles Bell’s great work on expression and the general +theorems in Darwin’s book on the same subject, and piecing +this and that laboriously together, would he try to arrive at some +just conclusion regarding the contents of the fair lady’s mind? +Would he not, rather, instinctively change the subject of conversation, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_214">[214]</span>or even discreetly beat a retreat, long before he had time to +<i>think</i>? Women’s interests have been so exclusively social that they +have developed a sense for the physical expression of emotion which +makes society for them a matter of complicated relations, of delicate +susceptibility to play of feeling, which—except in the hyper-sensitive +period of courtship—is not common among men. But there +are men who are quite the equals of women in this respect; and if +any man is markedly deficient in these qualities, we recognise him +as belonging to a low and brutal type which is in process of extinction. +If a woman on the other hand, goes into business, she does +not fix the prices of her straw hats each morning in accordance with +the feelings which straw hats awaken in her when she first looks at +them, but in accordance with the fluctuations of the market. The +President of a New Hampshire Street Railway did not carry through +her improvements by her intuitions, but by a plain, common-sense +weighing of reasons. Nor are all masculine occupations under the +guidance of the reasoning faculty. If you go to a stove-man and +ask him to mend your smoking chimney, does he do it by reason? +Not a bit of it! There may be stove-men who have enough knowledge +of the laws which regulate the movements of masses of hot air +to be able to apply general principles to particular instances, but in +the course of a long and checkered experience with stove-men, it +has not been my lot to fall in with them. Their knowledge of chimneys, +such as it is, is got by experience and applied by intuition, +and nothing is farther from their minds than any trace of deductive +reasoning. It is not that there are men’s minds and women’s +minds, but that there are theoretical subjects and practical subjects, +and that knowledge is not the same kind of knowledge in both.</p> + +<p>Intuition, in the sense in which it is used when discussing male +and female minds, is a word of double meaning: it covers those actions +which we go through with by instinct, or inherited experience +ingrained from the beginning in our nervous structure, and those +which we perform automatically, or by individual experience become +so familiar that it can act as a guide without the aid of conscious +reflection. The relative distances of objects looked at we +know instinctively; the trained musician with mind intent upon expression, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_215">[215]</span>reads his notes automatically; the beginner at the piano +goes through a painful process of syllogism before each key is struck. +All is, at bottom, reason; in one case it is conscious; in another it +is unconscious, but can be forced into consciousness; in another, it +is unconscious and cannot by any effort be made conscious. Because +a woman’s interests lie more than a man’s in regions in which +thought is instinctive and automatic, it does not follow that she has +developed any peculiar powers of intuition. Nor is there any possibility +that mothers should occasionally transmit their powers of +intuition to favored sons, as Mr. Grant Allen, in the course of his +apotheosis of the uneducated woman, has somewhere suggested; +some men have poetic and æsthetic minds, and in regions of poetry +and art mental activity is largely of the instinctive kind. It is different +with powers of reasoning. Good powers of reasoning may be transmitted +from mother to son, but that is merely saying metaphorically +that a good firm texture of mind may be transmitted. Hume and +James Mill are two men who are supposed to owe much to their +mothers, but their peculiar powers are not usually considered to lie +in regions of intuition. No mother has ever produced an intuitive +mathematician. Nor would any one who knew anything about the +higher mathematics for a moment suppose that when a great mathematician +leaves out intermediate steps in a printed book, he had +jumped at his conclusions by instinct. It is simply that, with his +thorough knowledge of this particular subject, the intermediate steps +have seemed to him too easy to set down. If his book is hard to +read, it is simply because he has assumed a greater amount of +learning in his readers than they are in possession of.</p> + +<p>The question whether intuition or reason is the nobler faculty +is an exceedingly meaningless question. All knowledge which finds +frequent occasion to be put in practice has a tendency to become +first automatic and then instinctive. Human progress consists in +making conscious action automatic as soon as it can be done with +safety, and in setting free consciousness to attend to more and more +complicated combinations of circumstances. After the musician has +learned to read his notes mechanically, shall we urge him to go +back to the period of conscious linking of note to key, because reason +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_216">[216]</span>is a diviner gift than intuition? Is it desirable to turn the act +of walking into a conscious fitting of muscular tension to variations +in the position of the centre of gravity in order to distinguish ourselves +the more effectually from the brutes that perish? Reason is +merely intuition in its formative stage, and the sooner all our present +reasoned convictions become mechanical, and conscious thought +is set free to bring in more and more far reaching considerations to +bear upon our actions (including in that term our conclusions), the +sooner will a higher form of life be reached.</p> + +<p>Wundt’s students have made some experiments in his laboratory +in the last two or three years, which throw a great deal of light +upon this question,—they have caught automatism in the very act +of formation. It has been noticed that different observers differed +very much in the reaction time which they assigned to the several +senses,—that is, the time required, for instance, to hear the tap of +a bell, and to press a button in response. Wundt’s students found +that there are two different reaction times,—in one, time is taken to +bring the tap of the bell into the focus of consciousness and to decide +consciously what to do in response; in the other, the process +is unconscious. The first is nearly twice as long as the second, and +both are very constant quantities, for the same sense. The exact +figures are, in seconds:</p> + +<table> + <tr> + <th></th> + <th>FULL.</th> + <th>SHORT.</th> + <th></th> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Sound</td> + <td class="tdr">.216</td> + <td class="tdr">.127</td> + <td>N. Lange</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td class="tdr">.235</td> + <td class="tdr">.121</td> + <td>Belkin</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td class="tdr">.230</td> + <td class="tdr">.124</td> + <td>L. Lange</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Light</td> + <td class="tdr">.290</td> + <td class="tdr">.172</td> + <td>L. Lange</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td class="tdr">.291</td> + <td class="tdr">.182</td> + <td>Martius</td> + </tr> +</table> + +<p class="noindent">It may be inferred from this that, even in the simplest matters intuition +is very nearly twice as valuable a “faculty” as reason, as +far as economy of time is concerned. (It would be interesting to +determine the difference in fatigue.) But the interesting point is +that the experimenter can teach himself to give either reaction time +at his pleasure. If he thinks of his ears, he has a feeling of strain +in them, and a long reaction time; if he directs his attention to his +fingers (or if he thinks of indifferent matters) he is unconscious of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_217">[217]</span>what is going on, and his reaction time is short. It is plain that the +more of these educated brain-reflexes we can produce, the fuller and +more complicated lives we shall be capable of carrying on. It may +also be assumed that the ideal human being is the one who has +many brain-reflexes, but who is capable of bringing them all into +consciousness upon occasion. Connections that we cannot make +conscious are a frequent source of illusion. When we move the +eye-ball about by the will, objects seem to remain stationary; but +when, putting the finger on the under eyelid, we push the eye-ball +up and down in the socket, we cannot help <i>perceiving</i> that objects +are moving up and down. Prof. William James suggests as a good +experiment that some one who has eyes that he is not afraid of injuring +should do this pushing several hours a day, and see if he cannot +force conscious reason to do her work and to make him <i>see</i> that +the objects are not moving.</p> + +<p>For perfectly regular circumstances,—that is, for the world of +nature or of human character so far as is governed by fixed laws,—reflex +action presents an immense economy of time and work. To +provide against extraordinary emergencies, it would seem to be desirable +that we should have the power of interposing consciousness +in the chain which begins with stimulus and ends in action. Whenever +a large number of considerations, or considerations of an abstract +character, have to be weighed and balanced, then reason is +the only sufficient guide.</p> + +<p>That women have no deficiency in the power of putting this +and that together, when <i>this</i> and <i>that</i> are pieces of knowledge which +are in their possession, is absolutely proved by a single circumstance. +Geometry is a branch of learning which is entirely built +up out of abstract reason, pure and undefiled. Geometry is studied, +in the United States, in high schools, and it must not be forgotten +that there are in this country (according to the Report of the Bureau +of Education) <i>three times</i> as many girls as boys who take the high +school course. It cannot be said, therefore, (as is said of girls who +go to college) that the girls who go to the high school are a selected +lot; they are the very bone and fibre of the women who make up +the country. Now if women could not reason, we ought to hear a +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_218">[218]</span>great hue and cry from the teachers of the geometry classes about +the difficulty of teaching that subject to girls, and the girls ought to +lament and moan over the impossibility of getting safely through +with their demonstrations. Is this the case? I have never met with +a teacher of geometry who thought his boys did better than his girls,—I +have met with several who thought the reverse. As long ago +as 1865, Her Majesty’s Inspector of schools, after travelling through +this country, said: “The teachers all tell me that the girls do fully +as well as the boys in mathematics,—fully.” Nor are any sad effects +noticeable upon health or spirits. Day after day an army of girls +goes smiling into the class-room and comes smiling out, utterly unaware +that an unnatural wrench has been given to their delicate +minds, and that they are being rapidly transformed into monstrous +products of over-reason.</p> + +<p>If girls show no defect in reason in the class-room, neither do +boys show any defect in intuition,—in fact, their intuition about +stretched strings and lines on balls are usually better than those of +girls. I have kept a record for many years of errors committed by +boys and by girls, and I have not been able to detect any difference +in their character. It is true that it was a boy who once failed to +get a problem in trigonometry for a week, because it was not expressly +stated in the book that the milestones to which the problem +related were a mile apart. My intimate acquaintance with the character +of his mind prevented me, however, from attributing this failure +in intuition to his superior reasoning powers.</p> + +<p>The simple matter is that a good <i>mind</i> has good reasons and +good intuitions both. Both qualities are summed up in the expressive +popular phrase, “having your wits about you.” If you are in +full possession of your wits, you will trust to your instincts, when +you must; to your acquired reflexes, when there is no sign of danger; +and to your reason, when the question requires debate. It +would be greatly for the good of the race if the common virtues +should become more instinctive in men; and if women should be +put into a position in which they can reflect more wisely upon the +virtues which are only just in process of getting known to be such. +The only reason that women do not guide themselves by far-reaching +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_219">[219]</span>principles in their every-day conduct, is that they have not made +themselves acquainted with the doctrines of political economy and +of abstract ethics. When women are in full possession of the higher +education, there is no danger that they will not put it into practice, +so far as it leads to practice. The human mind is so constituted +that it cannot help taking account of all its knowledge. Propositions +merely learned by rote, or the truth of which it is not absolutely +convinced of, it may leave one side, but not what it really +<i>knows</i>. Nor is there any danger that woman will lose her powers of +intuition. The knowledge and skill which she has acquired in social +matters will not desert her because she has made herself familiar +with the speculations of philosophers, and can turn to them for +guidance in the intricate questions of conduct which the complexities +of modern life give rise to. So long as a woman’s highest duty +was to please her lord and master, her task was simple, but women +are now awake to a sense of wider responsibilities. They are now +aware that it is their highest duty <i>to be</i> the best possible kind +of a human being, and <i>to do</i> whatever lies within their strength towards +making the world the best possible kind of a world to live +in. For this end they have urgent need of <i>all</i> the gifts that God has +given them; and he who would cripple their reason on the ground +that intuition is a pleasing and a poetic guide, would do them a +grievous wrong.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">Christine Ladd Franklin.</span></p> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_220">[220]</span></p> + +<h3 class="nobreak" id="CRUELTY_AND_PITY_IN_WOMAN">CRUELTY AND PITY IN WOMAN.</h3> + +</div> + +<h4>I.<br> +CRUELTY.</h4> + +<p>Spencer says⁠<a id="FNanchor_24" href="#Footnote_24" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> that among savage nations the women are as +perverse as the men, and that if they do not work so much evil +it is because they are less able to do so. This is not entirely true; +doubtless women among savages are much more inclined to cruelty +than to pity, but, generally speaking, woman even at the very beginnings +of human evolution is less cruel than man.</p> + +<h5>WOMAN AND WAR.</h5> + +<p>Woman, even among savage nations, is rarely a warrior. In +the Antilles, the women watched over the safety of the islands whenever +their husbands went to war with the neighboring islands; they +were brave, strong, courageous, nearly equalling the men in their +cleverness in handling weapons.⁠<a id="FNanchor_25" href="#Footnote_25" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> Amongst the ancient Bretons, +armies were always commanded by women. In Dahomey, the élite +of the army is composed of a troop of six or seven thousand Amazons, +who are very ferocious, particularly in the mutilation of dead +bodies; women then become tigers, is a popular saying. Among the +ancient Scots, women followed the army, and cruelly mutilated the +prisoners. Among the Botocudos, when war breaks out between +the tribes, the men fight the men with sticks, and the women fight +the women, by scratching and by tearing the <i>botoques</i> (cylinders of +wood) from their ears and lips.⁠<a id="FNanchor_26" href="#Footnote_26" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> But these are all exceptional cases. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_221">[221]</span>Generally speaking, the savage woman plays a secondary part in +war; she acts as an auxiliary, picks up arrows, throws stones from a +distance, and carries the provisions etc.</p> + +<h5>REVENGE.</h5> + +<p>It is above all in revenge, that feminine cruelty shows itself the +most terrible. Man is capable of destroying whole families or nations, +to satisfy a particular revenge; but nothing equals the ingenuity +of woman, in slowly tormenting her victim, in gloating over his +sufferings and lengthening them out in order that her enjoyment of +vengeance may endure as long as possible.</p> + +<p>In Tasmania, when the <i>black war</i> broke out between the English +and the aborigines, the Tasmanian women terribly tortured the +prisoners, in order to avenge their companions who had been carried +off by the English. We must also attribute to the desire for vengeance, +the torments inflicted by the women upon prisoners of war +among the Red Indians.</p> + +<p>Elizabeth of Russia, betrayed by her lover, obliged him to +marry a deformed dwarf, and to pass his wedding night in an ice +palace, where the furniture and the bed were all of ice. The next +morning, attended by her Court, she went to present the newly wedded +pair with a bouquet. She found them, stretched out upon their +bed of ice, nearly frozen. She then banished her rival to Siberia +first causing her ears and nose to be cut off.</p> + +<p>A wealthy Russian Prince, in love with a very beautiful peasant +girl of fifteen, took her to live with him for five years; at the +end of which time, wishing to contract an alliance, he paid her a +sum of money in dower and obliged her to marry a peasant. The +young girl made no sign for ten years, until the death of her husband; +but after the lapse of that period, a rising having taken place among +the peasantry against the nobles, she excited them and led a body +of peasants to the castle of her ancient lover, had him taken and +dragged into his <i>izba</i>, harnessed him to the plough instead of the +oxen, and for three days obliged him thus to work, lashing him with +the whip each time that he fell to the ground. At night she led him +to the stable and made him lie down with the oxen; compelling him +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_222">[222]</span>to eat fodder with the beasts and making merry over his sorry plight. +This amusement lasted for three days, at the end of which time, the +man fell dead in one of the furrows he was ploughing.⁠<a id="FNanchor_27" href="#Footnote_27" class="fnanchor">[27]</a></p> + +<p>A Russian, an idle and worthless fellow who had let his wife +suffer hunger, proposed to her that she should be sold as a slave to +the Sultan. After some hesitation, she accepted and they started +off; but when they had gone about half the way, the husband having +fallen asleep intoxicated, the idea came into her mind to sell him +for a slave, in her place. She then tied him on the horse, started +off again on the road and arriving at the place of rendezvous, she +delivered her husband to the merchant, and remained to watch the +Turk push the half-awakened man into the boat, laughing whilst he +showered blows upon him.⁠<a id="FNanchor_28" href="#Footnote_28" class="fnanchor">[28]</a></p> + +<p>A young Russian peasant woman lived with a small land-owner, +who betrayed her; at last she took refuge with a band of brigands, +who treated her like a queen. One day she caused two of them to +capture her old lover, and had him brought to the camp where she +used him as a kind of living foot-stool: when she sat down she covered +him with a carpet and put her feet upon him, and when she +wanted to go out she made him carry her on his shoulders.</p> + +<h5>CRUELTY TO THE HELPLESS.</h5> + +<p>Woman sometimes displays the same amount of ingenuity in tormenting +the helpless creatures who may be in her power. I do not +know, says Bourgavel, any one more perfidious, immoral, or perverse +than the New Caledonian woman. In certain portions of Australia +women are mortal foes to each other. When the men wish to punish +any one of them, they turn her over to her companions, who +inflict upon her horrible tortures.⁠<a id="FNanchor_29" href="#Footnote_29" class="fnanchor">[29]</a> Sitting on her body, they cut her +flesh with sharpened stones.</p> + +<p>In Tasmania, as amongst the ancient Saxons, the unfaithful +wife was punished by her companions; she was not killed, but +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_223">[223]</span>she was tortured for a long time with sharp pointed stones or knives, +in all parts of her body.</p> + +<p>Women have often been cruel mistresses to their slaves. A lady +in Guiana, being envious of a very handsome mulatto slave, had her +branded on the mouth, cheeks and forehead. In the case of another +slave, who was also very beautiful, she had the tendon of Achilles +cut thus causing her to become a deformed and crippled monster.⁠<a id="FNanchor_30" href="#Footnote_30" class="fnanchor">[30]</a></p> + +<p>It is a notorious fact that Roman and Greek ladies often inflicted +most terrible punishments on their slaves, and that it was more +particularly towards the female slaves, the <i>ancillæ</i>, that the cruelty of +their mistresses was shown. The Roman ladies, if, while they were +having their hair dressed, they were vexed with their attendants, used +to thrust pins into their arms and breasts. Darwin relates that at +Rio Janeiro, an old lady possessed a kind of thumb screw which +she had had made expressly to crush the fingers of her slaves.</p> + +<h5>EPIDEMIC CRUELTY.</h5> + +<p>During periods of great national excitement, such as revolutions, +feminine cruelty shows how far it can go.</p> + +<p>The women, writes M. Du Camp, were the fiercest heroines of +the Commune; it was a woman who incited the assassination of the +Dominicans. When the hostages were shot, they surpassed the men +in cruelty; they taunted them with not knowing how to kill. When +employed to seek out the insurgents they were implacable; when +acting as infirmarians, they killed the wounded by giving them brandy +to drink.</p> + +<p>At the time of the French Revolution, on the days of execution, +writes M. Legouvé,⁠<a id="FNanchor_31" href="#Footnote_31" class="fnanchor">[31]</a> the front rows nearest the guillotine were reserved +for the women of the political clubs. They even hung on to +the boards of the scaffold, in order the better to witness the death +throes of the condemned, and drowned the cries of the victims by +their peals of laughter.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_224">[224]</span></p> + +<h4>II.<br> +PITY.</h4> + +<p>But again we find a series of contradictory facts, which bear +witness that the sentiment of pity also is much keener in woman +than in man.</p> + +<p>Even with animals, we observe this phenomenon. Hens often +separate two young cocks who are fighting together. Sir George +Le Grand Jacob has observed females of the wild goat (Steinbock) +raise with their heads he-goats that had been shot, support them +and help them to escape. Romanes relates, that sometimes the +female gibbon, takes great care of all the members of the troop +when they are wounded, even if they are not related.⁠<a id="FNanchor_32" href="#Footnote_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a></p> + +<p>The savage woman also is very often kind and good. It is notorious +that the explorers of savage countries have often escaped +serious perils, thanks to the kindness of the native women. Australasian +women have often revealed to European travellers the plots +laid against them by the men of their tribe: they have even risked +their own lives for that purpose.⁠<a id="FNanchor_33" href="#Footnote_33" class="fnanchor">[33]</a> Stanley, at the island of Bambyrch, +on the Nyanza, was roughly greeted by the natives, who were +desirous of exterminating his expedition; but a woman came to warn +him and to advise him to perform a certain ceremony with the King +Shekka by which he would acquire his friendship. In Senegambia +an old woman, meeting Mungo Park, who was half dead of starvation +and had just been despoiled by a negro king, gave him food, +and went away without waiting to be thanked. Another time the +same traveller, being left with nothing but his saddle, was hospitably +entertained by some women, whom he heard chant these words +as he fell asleep: “The winds roared and the rain beat, the poor +white man came and sat down under our tree, he had no mother to +give him milk, no wife to grind him corn. Let us take pity on the +white man, he has no mother, etc., etc.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_34" href="#Footnote_34" class="fnanchor">[34]</a> Michelet says that woman +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_225">[225]</span>was the first physician; and certainly she fulfils the office of infirmarian +among many savage peoples, the Esquimaux, the Mincopies, +etc. etc.</p> + +<p>In war the Samoan woman often interferes to make peace between +the belligerents. Among the Khonds, also, when two tribes +quarrel, the women sometimes make peace, calling in the intervention +of a third tribe. Quite recently, among the Montenegrins and +Albanians, fierce strife broke out between different families, but in +these fights, if a man took refuge with a woman and she covered +him with her apron, he was safe. Among the Bedouin Arabs a +woman can save the life of the condemned man who implores her +protection. So it also was among the Roman Vestals, when in the +streets they accidentally met a man condemned to death; it was required, +however, that the meeting should be evidently a chance +one, for it was feared that the privilege might be carried too far. +Among civilised nations this sentiment of pity becomes naturally +more developed. Christianity owed a great deal of its success among +women to the fact, that it knew how to make use of their pity, by +organising those associations of women which are its greatest ornament. +From the earliest years after the death of Jesus, in the cenobitic +form of society lived by the disciples of the Messiah, they +made use of the charitable sentiment of childless widows and created +the order of Deaconesses, which was devoted to the care of the poor +and the sick.⁠<a id="FNanchor_35" href="#Footnote_35" class="fnanchor">[35]</a> Legouvé says: “Women offered their services to +Christianity like a volunteer battalion consecrated to charitable work. +In the Apostles’ time their mission was one of sympathy and watchfulness, +a mother’s vocation; in the time of the Martyrs they remained +womanly in their modesty, while exhibiting a manly courage; in the +time of the Doctors, whilst orators speak and learned men write, +women continue to love and console.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_36" href="#Footnote_36" class="fnanchor">[36]</a></p> + +<p>This Christian tradition has survived and is still powerful, +thanks to the deeply laid sentiment of pity in the heart of woman. +“Private charity in Paris,” writes M. du Camp,⁠<a id="FNanchor_37" href="#Footnote_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> “is almost entirely +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_226">[226]</span>in the hands of women. There are in Paris women of the world, +young and beautiful, born for pleasure, accustomed to every luxury, +who visit the poor, nurse the sick, rock little motherless children, +and all this they do simply without a word of self-praise.”</p> + +<p>The society of “Les Dames du Calvaire,” in Paris, is composed +of widows, who, without binding themselves by religious vows, engage +to nurse the sick gathered into the hospitals of the association, +poor outcasts attacked by loathsome diseases—cancer, for example. +Women of wealth and belonging to great families often obtain admission +to this society. Female religious orders are rarely contemplative; +they are nearly always charitable in aim. “The Daughters +of Charity” possess establishments all over the known world; they +migrate, says M. du Camp, “like benevolent birds, carrying with +them the principle of self-sacrifice and the love of those that suffer. +In all countries I have visited, among sects most antagonistic to +their religion, I have beheld them at work; their faces shadowed by +the immense cap, which resembles the wings of a white swan; instructing +children, visiting the sick, caring for the plague-stricken, +blessed by our sailors whom they nurse in the French hospitals in +foreign lands.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_38" href="#Footnote_38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a></p> + +<p>Pity in woman is sometimes so powerful a sentiment that it supplies +the place in her of a higher faculty, intelligence. It was thus that +a humble servant-maid, without learning, who could neither read nor +write, founded one of the most prominent nursing sisterhoods in +France, “Les petites Soeurs des Pauvres,” which to-day numbers +3,400 sisters, and possesses 207 houses, where more than 25,000 old +men are received and cared for. In the first half of this century there +was such misery in Brittany that the old men were literally abandoned +by all. Jeanne Jugau, whose earnings hardly sufficed to maintain +herself, took in one, then two, then a number of them, without a +thought of her own poverty, slaving might and main for their support. +Two women, Virginie Tredaniel and Marie Catherine, helped +her; a priest, Le Pailleur, took the direction of their work, and in +a short time the order was founded, and grew apace. There, where +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_227">[227]</span>genius might have failed, the love and pity of a servant-maid succeeded.</p> + +<p>Another heroine of charity, though of a different type, was +Jeanne Garnier. She was perpetually haunted by a desire to do +good, to help and succour the unfortunate. M. du Camp has portrayed +her character in a most graphic manner: impulsive, prone +from childhood to adopt extreme measures, while in the convent she +was given to rebellious and untractable conduct, for which she was +sent away. When she was twenty years old she married; the love +she bore her husband and two sons was deep and ardent. Three +years after her marriage she had the unspeakable grief of losing both +husband and sons at one fell stroke. After this occurrence her life +had but one aim, ceaselessly and untiringly to succour and help the +sorrowful. One day she was told that a woman, disfigured by a cutaneous +disease, was lying in an attic in Lyons, abandoned by every +one. She went at once to her, ministered to her, and every day went +to wash her sores. Thus was suggested to her the founding of the +association of “Les Dames du Calvaire,” of which we have already +spoken, and the idea of pressing into the service of the sick, widows +who found themselves in the same position as herself. She was not +rich, but being an untiring and determined worker, capable of attacking +the same person ten times a day, she obtained money. When +they had to convey the sick to the new hospital, there was among +them one woman so horribly disfigured by burns that no conveyance +could be found whose driver was willing to take her. Jeanne Garnier +then took her on her own shoulders and carried her there herself. +The association of “Les Dames du Calvaire” was not the only charitable +work which owes its existence to her. She conceived a great +many other plans, of which many were carried out, for she never +ceased working, up to the moment of her death, which occurred at +forty-two years of age, of exhaustion.</p> + +<p>In the United States, where woman enjoys much greater freedom +than in Europe, she makes an excellent use of her liberty. In fact, +all associations of women have a charitable end in view; and these +societies not being subjected to the severe rules of Catholic religious +orders, and not requiring from their members so absolute a renunciation +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_228">[228]</span>of the pleasures of life, exhibit the most perfect and most modern +form of charitable associations, which have been known up to the +present day. The first woman’s club that was founded in that country, +the Sorosis, has for its object the amelioration of the condition +of shop-girls: it has also founded asylums for homeless children. +The Temperance Union, founded by women, seeks to stem the tide +of intemperance. The Women’s League has obtained the admission +of women on commissioners boards for schools and hospitals. The +College Settlement Girls, composed of female graduates from universities, +carry help into the purlieus of the city.⁠<a id="FNanchor_39" href="#Footnote_39" class="fnanchor">[39]</a></p> + +<h5>CRUELTY, PITY, AND THE MATERNAL SENTIMENT.</h5> + +<p>Is woman kind or cruel? Can we reconcile these two series of +facts, so contradictory in themselves? That is the question which +now comes before us. Let us seek, first of all, the origin and the +genesis of feminine cruelty. We have seen women exhibiting great +ingenuity in torturing; she does not wish to destroy her enemies, but +to torment and torture them; she seeks to protract their pain as +long as possible, and to lengthen out her enjoyment of vengeance. +On this point woman goes much further than man: for among savages +men do not amuse themselves by prolonging the miseries of +their enemies; they rather wreak their vengeance by killing them +at one stroke. Savages often make a wholesale carnage, massacring +whole tribes and nations. But it is always the woman who practices +the art of killing a man by inches, over a slow fire, as it were. +Thus we find that the redskins give their prisoners of war over to +their women. Notice, even at the present day, the difference between +the quarrels of men and women. Women scratch each other, +tear out the hair, fly at the eyes of their adversaries, trying to inflict +some painful wound: men give blows and stabs; they strive to disable +or stun their enemy, or to destroy him. There is the same +difference but on a smaller scale. This aptitude in inflicting pain is +an outgrowth of weakness. We know from the Darwinian theory of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_229">[229]</span>natural selection, and from the struggle for life, that every living +being must be provided with a certain number of means of defense +and offense, and amongst these means must be classed many instincts +and sentiments which spring from natural selection, adaptation, +and heredity. The cruelty of woman is one of these instincts +and sentiments. Woman not being powerful enough to destroy her +enemies, had to seek for the means of defending herself, by wounding +their more delicate organs, by inflicting such acute pain as would +serve to disable them. This tendency to protect one’s self by such +means has become instinctive by heredity; and so much the more +since the woman who was able thus to defend herself, had at the +outset of man’s evolution a far better chance of survival.</p> + +<p>All this is so true, that we find other weak creatures also to be +cruel. Children take pleasure in tormenting insects, birds, or little +dogs, and are very cruel to each other. I knew a child who used to +cut his nails like the teeth of a saw, in order to inflict more painful +scratches on his companions. Humming birds, says Brehm, are +the smallest and the cruelest of birds. When they are attacked by +a more powerful enemy they try to peck out his eyes with their long, +sharp beaks. The struggle for life and natural selection has provided +their weakness with this means of defense, and they are even cruel to +each other when they fight, to such an extent has the sentiment of +cruelty in them become instinctive.</p> + +<p>And now we must seek for the genesis of the other phenomenon, +pity. It is a notorious fact, that maternity being the great +function of woman, through the whole order of animal life, with the +exception of some few fishes, it is always the female who is thus the +benefactress of the race. Maternity is always an altruistic function; +in the inferior orders this altruism is a purely physical act, and consists +merely in a material sacrifice; (the detaching of a portion of +the maternal body, under the form of bud, or egg;) in the higher +orders, this altruism becomes psychical and consists in a conscious +sacrifice of self and of vitality in the interests of the race.</p> + +<p>What then is the essential nature of these altruistic sacrifices? +Maternity is protection given to weakness; for the infant is above +all other created things a being requiring succour.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_230">[230]</span></p> + +<p>It is thus that, the images relating to the state of weakness being +in great numbers strongly impressed on the mind of woman, when +one of them presents itself to her, by the law of association it +awakens all those maternal sentiments whose function it is to help +the weak. At first, motherhood only extends from a woman’s own +children to those of others; this is the first stage of pity, such as we +find it in the animals and among many undeveloped savage peoples. +Afterwards in a region of higher psychical development the sentiment +of pity broadens till it embraces a wider group, the sick, the +aged, those condemned to death; for all those unfortunates who +claim the pity of woman are the weak appealing for help to the +strong. It is only the weak who can inspire pity. Thus pity, in +woman, is but the outgrowth of the maternal sentiment applied to +a larger class of helpless people. “Woman,” says M. du Camp, +“may bind herself by the religious vow of chastity; but she is a +born mother and remains a mother, even though circumstances may +have broken the physical law of her sex. The Little Sisters of the +Poor, call their pensioners ‘the good little old men,’ and themselves +‘the good little sisters,’ their superior ‘the good little mother.’ +With them everybody is good and little; all these expressions are +the reflection of maternal love.”</p> + +<p>We must mention also, that one cause of a livelier sense of pity +in woman, is her own weakness and her lower intellect. “Anger,” +writes A. Bain, “the passion for war, are bound up with activity and +strength; conditions of weakness and of repose are favorable to the +softer sentiments.” Strong men who display great muscular or mental +activity, and who often experience the satisfactions arising from +power, only realise with extreme difficulty the feelings of the weak; +for, as H. Spencer remarks,⁠<a id="FNanchor_40" href="#Footnote_40" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> “to feel pity for any suffering which +we witness, we must have experienced it ourselves to the same extent +or in an approximate degree.” Thus healthy persons become, +after a serious sickness, more feeling than they formerly were for +those who are suffering; women are continually in a state of ill-health.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_231">[231]</span></p> + +<p>Besides which women have not been involved in the struggle +for life, as have men during the whole process of evolution: this +struggle for life implying, as it does, the necessity of pursuing one’s +own object irrespective of the ills which it may entail on the unhappy +competitors, and often rendering a man insensible to the sorrows of +those around him. To this we add, that love for man has not been +without influence in developing the sense of pity in woman. The +main characteristic of the love of woman towards man, is self-abnegation +and devotion; woman finds her happiness in devotion to the +man she loves and in making for him the most painful sacrifices. +Read the “Letters of Heloise,” the “Life of Carlyle,” or the “Life +of Mme. de Lespinasse.” Each woman, carries hidden in her heart, +an inexhaustible treasure of devotion which heredity has added to +through all the centuries, during which woman has lived in contact +with man and sought to win his good-will, displaying an affection +and an ardent zeal in his behalf; nothing then is easier than to spend +this treasure on the unhappy, when she has not found the man on +whom to lavish it.</p> + +<p>The close relationship between pity, maternity, and love, is also +shown by this fact, that the heroines of charity are almost always +widows without sons, or unmarried women. When a woman has a +husband or sons to love and cherish, she does not feel the same tenderness +towards the suffering; this goes to prove that if these two +sentiments are interchangeable, they are but two different forms of +the same thing.</p> + +<h5>PITY AND CRUELTY.</h5> + +<p>We are now in a position to answer the question: Is woman +kind or cruel? Pity and cruelty coexist together in her; we might +call this state in woman a state of unstable equilibrium; to-day she +is kind, divinely good, charitable; to-morrow she will be perverse +and cruel. On one side her feebleness renders her cruel, and her +impulsive nature prevents her from repressing the outbursts of anger +and of vengeance; on the other hand, the gentle habits of maternal +affection, her lower intelligence, and even the weakness of her nature +develop in her kindly sentiments. Woman may experience the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_232">[232]</span>strongest feelings of maternal affection at the sight of a helpless +creature; but that will not prevent her from cruelly persecuting a +rival, especially if she has been wounded in her sentiments of wife or +mother. Thus woman, who is the natural protector of the weak, +treats them oftentimes with a cruelty of which man is totally incapable. +Woman loves, hates, consoles, inflicts pain, according as +she finds herself in the presence of a friend, an enemy, a helpless +being, or of a rival.</p> + +<p>Many of the fiercest heroines of the Paris Commune, had been +trained nurses during the war, and distinguished for their devotion to +the sick. There is nothing astonishing in this, for contradiction in +feeling is so often a psychical law that a great Italian philosopher, +Robert Ardigò, has said that man is not a logical being.</p> + +<p>We have noticed before that weakness is in part the cause of +cruelty and partly also of pity, and this accounts for the co-existence +of the two contrary sentiments. They coexist because they have a +common origin. But this instability of equilibrium is lessened by +evolution, and pity becomes stronger than cruelty. Among civilised +nations the cruelty of women has become merely a moral attitude: +the civilised woman, less powerful than her savage sister, no more +subjects her enemies to physical pain, does not shed their blood; +she contents herself with slandering them, turning them into ridicule, +and humiliating them. The diminution of muscular strength is in +itself favorable to the softening of female character.</p> + +<p>Furthermore, sexual selection also helps in this; in the human +race as civilisation advances the male assumes more and more the +right of selection, and man shrinks instinctively from meeting in a +woman a high development of the qualities which he himself possesses, +for he wishes to dominate her and to be her superior. This explains +to us the singular fact, which we notice every day, that of a +<i>savant</i> marrying a stupid or unintelligent wife; this is why the normal +man, as also the vicious, choose gentle and good women when +they desire to found families. If sometimes the choice falls on a +wicked woman, it is because the man desires to form a criminal co-partnership, +such as was perhaps the normal condition of family life +during the early days of human evolution. Many of the domestic +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_233">[233]</span>tragedies which we witness to-day can be traced to no other cause +than this <i>penchant</i> of the male, even of the vicious, to choose the +woman who appears to be the most gentle. Women with their clear +penetration and sure instincts have seized upon this inclination in +man and made capital out of it with infinite ability: do we not see +many young women simulate a gentleness, a sweetness, and kindness +which they do not naturally possess in order to capture the good-will +of men? Women have thus practised the habit of repressing their +evil <i>penchants</i>, through interested motives, because they saw that +men chose the most gentle among them as wives.</p> + +<p>Besides sexual selection, physical grace plays a conspicuous +part, as well as those psychical qualities which are associated with +it. Man having set a high value on graceful demeanour, woman +sought and still seeks with all her strength to adorn herself with it.</p> + +<p>We know that by the law of association between the emotional +states and their outward expression, which mutually correspond, +each gesture, each attitude, and each graceful expression of the +countenance has a tendency to throw the mind into some sweet and +peaceful condition; this is why the culture of physical grace has +been for woman an exercise of goodness. This fostering of physical +beauty has had a beneficial influence on her moral character. We +might say that as woman grew in beauty, she became better. Finally +woman being in the present day more respected than in former times, +she has less often the occasion to exercise her instinctive cruelty, +which on this account is being gradually obliterated. Pity each day +becomes more and more the normal state of the feminine mind, and +cruelty the exception. In order to be cruel, a woman’s character +must be perverted, as is the case in female criminals, whose vice exceeds +that of man in similar circumstances. Or she must have received +some deep provocation, wounding her profoundly in her +deepest and tenderest sentiments, which has awakened the original +cruelty slumbering latent in the depths of her heart.</p> + +<p>We may thus predict that in the ages to come, woman will +become entirely good.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">Guillaume Ferrero.</span></p> + +<div class="footnotes"> + +<h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_24" href="#FNanchor_24" class="label">[24]</a> Spencer. <i>Principles of Sociology</i>, II., p. 361.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_25" href="#FNanchor_25" class="label">[25]</a> Irving. <i>Hist. of the Life and Voyages of Chris. Columbus</i>, II., p. 15.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_26" href="#FNanchor_26" class="label">[26]</a> Hovelacque. <i>Les débuts de l’humanité</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_27" href="#FNanchor_27" class="label">[27]</a> Sacher-Masoch. <i>Rev. des Deux Mondes.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_28" href="#FNanchor_28" class="label">[28]</a> Sacher-Masoch. Ibid.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_29" href="#FNanchor_29" class="label">[29]</a> Letourneau. <i>Evolution de la Morale</i>, p. 122.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_30" href="#FNanchor_30" class="label">[30]</a> Mantegazza. <i>Fisiologia etc.</i> Milan. 1889.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_31" href="#FNanchor_31" class="label">[31]</a> <i>Histoire morale des femmes.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_32" href="#FNanchor_32" class="label">[32]</a> Romanes. <i>Animal Intelligence</i>, Vol. II.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_33" href="#FNanchor_33" class="label">[33]</a> Hovelacque. <i>Op. cit.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_34" href="#FNanchor_34" class="label">[34]</a> Letourneau. <i>La Sociologie d’après l’ethnographie.</i> Paris, 1884.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_35" href="#FNanchor_35" class="label">[35]</a> Renan. <i>Les Apôtres.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_36" href="#FNanchor_36" class="label">[36]</a> Op. cit.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_37" href="#FNanchor_37" class="label">[37]</a> <i>La charité privée à Paris</i>, 1887.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_38" href="#FNanchor_38" class="label">[38]</a> Op. cit.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_39" href="#FNanchor_39" class="label">[39]</a> <i>The Forum.</i> 1891.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_40" href="#FNanchor_40" class="label">[40]</a> Spencer. <i>Principles of Psychology</i>, II, p. 648.</p></div> + +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_234">[234]</span></p> + +<h3 class="nobreak" id="PANPSYCHISM_AND_PANBIOTISM">PANPSYCHISM AND PANBIOTISM.</h3> + +</div> + +<h4>I. PROFESSOR HAECKEL’S PANPSYCHISM.</h4> + +<p>Professor Haeckel, in his article “Our Monism,”⁠<a id="FNanchor_41" href="#Footnote_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a> propounds +the theory of Panpsychism, which he considers as an +essential feature of Monism. He says:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“One highly important principle of my monism seems to me to be that I regard +<i>all</i> matter as <i>ensouled</i>, that is to say, as endowed with feeling (pleasure and pain) +and with motion, or, better, with the power of motion. As elementary (atomistic) +attraction and repulsion these powers are asserted in every simplest chemical process, +and on them is based also every other phenomenon, consequently also the +highest developed soul-activity of man.</p> + +<p>“Simplest example: sulphur and quicksilver rubbed together form cinnabar, +a new body of entirely different properties. This is possible only on the supposition +that the molecules (or atoms) of the two elements if brought within the proper distance, +mutually <i>feel</i> each other, by attraction move toward each other; on the decomposition +of a simple chemical compound the contrary takes place: repulsion. +(Empedocles’s doctrine of ‘the love and hatred of atoms.’)”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>Not being able to accept Professor Haeckel’s doctrine of Panpsychism, +I propose what might best be called Panbiotism, briefly +set forth in the maxim πᾶν βιωτόν; that is, everything is fraught +with life; it contains life; it has the ability to live.</p> + +<p>The word βιωτός is mostly used by Greek authors in the negative, +as in the phrase βίον οὐ βιωτόν, an unlivable life, in the sense +of a life unendurable or not worth living. Thus Sophocles and others. +The word βιωτός is embodied in the term Panbiotism in its etymological +sense of “livable.”</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_235">[235]</span></p> + +<p>I am willing to concede to Professor Haeckel that all nature is +alive. Indeed, I have most emphatically insisted on the doctrine +that there is a spontaneity pervading all nature. (See “Fundamental +Problems,” 2d ed., pp. 110 et seqq.)</p> + +<p>By spontaneity is to be understood that kind of activity which +springs from the nature of the being or thing which is active. A motion +that is caused by pressure or push is not spontaneous; but a motion, +the motive power of which resides in the moving object, is spontaneous. +Thus a cart rolling down a hill by its own weight performs +a spontaneous motion, but when drawn by horses moves, or rather +is moved, by pull without any spontaneity.⁠<a id="FNanchor_42" href="#Footnote_42" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> Now everything that +exists is possessed of certain qualities; its existence is of some definite, +peculiar kind, and this its peculiar kind is the character of the +thing. In the character of a thing lies the source of its spontaneous +actions. The spontaneous actions of the chemical elements depend +upon their qualities, which always react under certain circumstances +in a definite way, and under the same conditions in the same way. +The action of sulphur and quicksilver lies in the nature of these elements. +Their union is not passive, but active. They <i>are</i> not combined, +but they <i>do</i> combine. He who observes and studies nature +cannot be blind to the fact that an inalienable, intrinsic power is +resident in every thing that exists. This is true not only of organised +life, but also of the chemical elements as well as of gravitating masses. +The motion of a falling stone can, no more than the actions of +oxydising substances, be considered as ultimately due to an extraneous +pressure that makes them move by push, or to a <i>vis a tergo</i> +acting upon inert matter. These motions must be spontaneous; +they are due to powers inherent in the nature of reality. They are +self-motions, and in this sense we say that all nature is alive.</p> + +<p>The term “life” is here used in a broader sense than ordinarily. +It means spontaneity or self-motion, while in its common signification +the term “life” is restricted only to the spontaneous action of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_236">[236]</span>organised beings, i. e. of plants and animals. In order to distinguish +life in the broader sense from the narrower or common acceptance +of the term, we call the latter “organised life.”</p> + +<p>It is not impossible, and I consider it even as most probable, +that the difference between Professor Haeckel and myself rests on +a different usage of the term soul. But a vague or inconsistent +usage of the term, unless we are especially careful in so defining it +as to prevent misunderstandings, will inevitably beget errors. Thus +the doctrine of Panpsychism is liable to lead to fantastic ideas, and +to cause great confusion concerning the activity of what is generally +called inanimate nature.</p> + +<p>Soul (as I understand the term) is a system of sentient symbols.</p> + +<p>The problem of the origin of the soul is solved as soon as we +understand how feelings can acquire meaning.</p> + +<p>Suppose we have some sentient substance exposed to the impressions +of the surrounding world. The sense-impressions of the surrounding +world leave traces in the sentient substance; these traces, +which are structures of a certain form corresponding exactly to the +various impressions, are preserved and constitute a predisposition to +being very easily revived by impressions of the same kind. The revival +of feeling in traces left in the sentient structure from former +impressions is called memory. If a new impression of the same kind +as the traces of the former impressions affects a sentient being, the +new impression already finds a convenient path for its reception prepared. +Its peculiar vibration fits in the old trace and thus runs along +very easily in the memory-grooves of former impressions, reviving at +the same time the feelings perceived at their original formation. The +feeling thus caused is composed of several elements, which naturally +melt into one: first, there is that kind of feeling which is produced +by the present impression; secondly, there is the revival of former +feelings or memory-sensations; and thirdly, there is a feeling of congruence +resulting from the combination of these two. This third +element is a new and a very important feature. We suppose that it +is extremely insignificant in the beginning, but being a constantly +growing factor, it rapidly increases in importance. The stronger +and the more independent the memory-structures become, the more +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_237">[237]</span>clearly will their congruence with fresh sense-impressions be felt as +a congruence.</p> + +<p>This feeling of congruence is the simplest form of what psychologists +generally call “recognition.”</p> + +<p>The recognition of a sense-impression, as being the same as +some former sense-impression, adds to the feeling a new quality; it +imparts meaning to it. This feeling of a special kind will now stand +for something. In this way impressions upon sentient substance +will, in the course of their natural development, simply by the repetition +of similar and same impressions, come to indicate the presence +of certain conditions that cause the impression. This act of indicating +something, of symbolising the presence of a reality, of possessing +meaning, is the birth of soul. Sense-impressions that have acquired +meaning are called sensations. A sensation standing for a special +object symbolises that object. Abstract ideas are symbols of a higher +degree, but they remain symbols just the same. And it is the sentient +symbols which constitute the soul.</p> + +<p>Those actions which are regulated by the meanings of sentient +symbols of which a soul consists should alone, according to a strict +terminology, be called “psychical.” The falling stone, the chemical +elements, when combining or separating, etc., are alive; there is a +spontaneously acting power even in unorganised nature; but the actions +of unorganised nature are not determined by the meaning of +feelings, and, in truth, we have no reason to believe that their feelings—granting +that they really do possess feelings of some kind—are +freighted with even so much as the slightest inkling of significance. +In a word, there is no soul in the stone; there is no mind in the +water-fall; and there is nothing psychical in either oxygen or hydrogen. +But there is soul wherever meaning can be found as the regulating +motive of actions; there is purpose. And wherever purpose +is, there is mind.</p> + +<h4>II. PLEASURE AND PAIN.</h4> + +<p>Professor Haeckel goes still farther in the application of his +theory of Panpsychism: he speaks of the atoms not only as feeling +each other, but also as having pleasure and pain. This indicates +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_238">[238]</span>either that he is serious in his belief in the psychical nature of all +things, or it proves how dangerous it is to introduce an allegorical +expression the allegorical character of which is from the beginning +lost sight of.</p> + +<p>What are pleasure and pain?</p> + +<p>Pleasure and pain are known to us by experience; they are +feelings. Pleasure is an agreeable, pain a disagreeable feeling.</p> + +<p>Pleasure and pain are different from sensation. Sensations are +representative of certain somethings called objects. Pleasures and +pains, however, are not representative, they are purely subjective +states. There may be pleasurable or painful sensations, and there +may be pain indicating the presence of pain-producing objects, but +that does not concern us now. When speaking of pleasure and pain +we do not refer to the representative value of feelings, but consider +a merely subjective aspect, pleasure being the agreeableness, pain +the disagreeableness of feeling.</p> + +<p>Accordingly pleasure and pain presuppose the existence of an +organised system of feelings. An isolated feeling, we have learned, +is meaningless; it is still less pleasurable or painful. In order to +agree or disagree, there must be something with which to agree or +disagree. Therefore, although pleasure and pain are not symbols +indicative of some objective presence, they can take place only in +sentient organisms, in systems of feelings, in souls. Where these +complex conditions, indicative of the presence of a soul, are absent, +we have no right to speak of the presence of pleasure and pain.</p> + +<p>We cannot interpret the phenomena of unorganised nature as +being endowed with feelings of pleasure and pain. Pleasure and +pain are psychical phenomena, and psychical phenomena can take +place in souls only.</p> + +<p>We might as well speak of the presence of positive and negative +electricity in the cataract, the water-power of which is employed +to produce electricity. Electricity is, in such a case, transformed +water-power; but can we, for that reason, say that the motion of +water is either positive or negative electricity?</p> + +<p>All the motions of the objective world must be supposed to +have their subjective correlates; but the simplest forms of objective +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_239">[239]</span>phenomena cannot have those subjective correlates which, according +to our experience, appear and have their conditions of appearance +only in the most complex and highest developed forms of existence—in +organised nature.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>The physiological conditions of pleasure and pain are now just +beginning to be investigated (see Goldscheider’s article in Dubois-Reymond’s +<i>Archiv</i>, 1891), and most philosophical theories concerning +the nature of pleasure and pain are mere assumptions. Almost +all the views that are now current attempt an explanation by generalising +the idea of pleasure and pain so as to regard the feelings +of pleasure and pain as a universal feature of nature. This vicious +method of generalisation at the cost of discrimination has produced +much confusion in the world; and its influence is the more pernicious +as average minds are easily satisfied with generalities.</p> + +<p>Now, the theory of making pleasure and pain universal features +of existence is a palpably erroneous theory; it is a wrong generalisation. +It is true that sentient beings naturally seek pleasure and +avoid pain. But are we allowed, according to the laws of logic, to +transfer the special feature of the case to the whole class of all processes +where a seeking and an avoiding can be observed? Certainly +not. Because sentient beings are repelled by pain and attracted by +pleasure, we cannot say that every repulsion is due to pain and +that every attraction is due to pleasure.</p> + +<p>The theory according to which pleasure and pain alone are the +causes of attraction and repulsion we may fairly consider as a poetical +license justifiable within certain narrow limits, and actually justified +in so far as there is in every natural process some peculiar +feature that is analogous to the feelings of sentient beings. This +peculiar feature—viz. its subjectivity—is, as we have seen, not visible, +not observable; yet it exists: it is that something which in +the course of evolution becomes, in special combinations, first feeling +and then consciousness. But for that reason it is not as yet +either consciousness or feeling.</p> + +<p>While on the one hand the theories of pleasure and pain that +regard pleasure and pain as universal features of natural phenomena, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_240">[240]</span>are arrived at by a wrong method of generalisation, we find +on the other hand they do not agree with facts. They neither explain +nor account for the appearance or disappearance of real pleasures +and pains such as take place in animal life.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>Starting from merely theoretical considerations, Kant defines +pleasure as a feeling of furtherance, pain, as a feeling of hindrance +of life; and so prominent a physiologist and psychologist as Alexander +Bain says that “States of pleasure are connected with an increase, +states of pain, with an abatement of some or of all the vital +functions.”</p> + +<p>A consideration of the actual causes of our pleasures and pains +will prove the incorrectness of these views, which are also due to +wrong generalisations. An increase of the vital functions and a further +growth, either of the organs or of the whole organism, is very +often accompanied with pain. A growing tooth causes, as a rule, +as much pain as a decaying tooth. And if by some drug the decay +is hastened and the nerve is killed, there is, connected with the suppression +and sometimes with the mere abatement of the vital function, +an abatement of the pain also.</p> + +<p>Feelings of pleasure and pain presuppose that habits have been +formed in a sentient organism.</p> + +<p>Pain is not always a hindrance of life, nor is every hindrance +of life painful. Pain is not an abatement of the functions of life, +not a decay, nor a destruction. But pain is always a disturbance of +life and of the habits that have been formed.</p> + +<p>Growth is, under certain circumstances, as much a disturbance +as is decay. And decay, if it is simply an abatement or cessation of +function, is not accompanied with pain.</p> + +<p>While pain is always a disturbance of the functions of an organism, +pleasure is simply the gratification of wants; functions and +wants being formed by habits, we may briefly say that pleasure is +agreement, pain disagreement, with habits.</p> + +<p>There are natural wants and unnatural wants. There are habits +beneficial to the furtherance of life, and there are habits injurious +to the furtherance of life. The pleasure connected with the gratification +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_241">[241]</span>of wants does not depend on its being a furtherance or a +hindrance of life, but solely on the intensity of the want. And +the intensity of the want, again, depends on the degree to which a +habit has become inveterate.⁠<a id="FNanchor_43" href="#Footnote_43" class="fnanchor">[43]</a></p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>The theory of pleasure and pain which regards pleasure as indicative +of the growth, and pain, of the decay of life, leads ultimately +to the ethics of hedonism, which identifies the good with the pleasurable. +However, if our view of pleasure and pain be correct, it is +apparent that the pleasure theory in ethics is wrong in its very foundation. +The pleasurable would cease to be a criterion of goodness; +for many things are pleasurable that are bad, and many things are +painful that are good. Growth, development, progress, evolution +have often been, nay must mostly be bought with great pain, tribulation, +anxiety, and also with the renunciation of pleasures. On the +other hand the fulness of pleasure is always a very dangerous symptom +for any state of existence.</p> + +<p>The seeking of pleasure and the avoiding of pain are certainly +very questionable guides in determining what right conduct is. In +adopting pleasure and pain as the principles of ethics, we adulterate +the nature of morality; for morality exists and has been called into +being simply to counteract the dangerous allurances of that which +promises to produce pleasure and to avoid pain. Ethics has to teach +us how to live, how to develop, how to grow, how to make our lives +useful and serviceable. If ethics were simply a method of how to +obtain the greatest amount of pleasure, we might better openly confess +that there is no moral goodness but only pleasurableness, and +consequently that morality is a chimera and ethics a farce.</p> + +<p>A defender of the pleasure theory in ethics writes in reply to +this criticism of his view: “To seek pleasure and to avoid pain is +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_242">[242]</span>not wrong. Why shall we deprive men of their enjoyments?” Certainly, +everyone has a right to enjoy himself; every one has a right +to seek pleasure and to avoid pain. But seeking pleasure and avoiding +pain is not as yet ethical. Under ordinary circumstances it is +right enough to follow the natural impulses of seeking pleasure and +avoiding pain. But there are cases where seeking pleasure, be it for +ourselves or for others, and avoiding pain, be it for ourselves or for +others, become actual wrongs; not because present pleasures will +lead to future pains, but because certain pleasures are a hindrance +to the higher evolution of the soul.</p> + +<p>It is often said that the renunciation of pleasures is richly made +up for by the pleasures which are afforded in a more fully developed +life. But this, in my opinion, is not true. The adult has rather less +pleasures than the child, and the civilised or highly cultured man +does not enjoy himself as much, as easily, and as cheaply as does the +savage, the uncultured, the fool.</p> + +<h4>III. MR. THOMAS A. EDISON’S PANPSYCHISM.</h4> + +<p>Some time ago Mr. Thomas A. Edison was interviewed on the +question, “What is life?” Mr. Edison answered the question; and +his view is quite in accord with Professor Haeckel’s idea of panpsychism. +The article appeared first in a daily newspaper. Being remarkable +for its coincidence with the views of a great scientist, and +coming from the pen of so interesting a man as the famous inventor +of the phonograph, we deem it best to republish it in full, with Mr. +Edison’s permission, who, at the same time, acknowledged the copy +we sent him as correct.</p> + +<p>This is the article:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<h5>INTELLIGENT ATOMS.</h5> + +<p class="center">BY THOMAS A. EDISON.</p> + +<p>My mind is not of a speculative order, it is essentially practical, and when I am +making an experiment, I think only of getting something useful, of making electricity +perform work.</p> + +<p>I don’t soar; I keep down pretty close to earth. Of course there are problems +in life I can’t help thinking about, but I don’t try to study them out. It is necessary +that they should be studied, and men fitted for that work are doing it. I am not fitted +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_243">[243]</span>for it. I leave the theoretical study of electricity to the physicists, confining my +work to the practical application of the force. It is my belief, however, that every +atom of matter is intelligent, deriving energy from the primordial germ. The intelligence +of man is, I take it, the sum of the intelligences of the atoms of which he +is composed. Every atom has an intelligent power of selection and is always striving +to get into harmonious relation with other atoms. The human body is, I think, +maintained in its integrity by the intelligent persistence of its atoms, or rather by +an agreement between the atoms so to persist. When the harmonious adjustment +is destroyed the man dies, and the atoms seek other relations.</p> + +<p>I cannot regard the odor of decay but as the result of the efforts of the atoms +to dissociate themselves; they want to get away and make new combinations. Man, +therefore, may be regarded in some sort as a microcosm of atoms agreeing to constitute +his life as long as order and discipline can be maintained. But, of course, +there is dissatisfaction, rebellion and anarchy leading eventually to death, and through +death to new forms of life. For life I regard as indestructible.</p> + +<p>All matter lives, and everything that lives possesses intelligence. Consider +growing corn, for example. An atom of oxygen comes flying along the air. It seeks +combination with other atoms and goes to the corn, not by chance, but by intention. +It is seized by other atoms that need oxygen, and is packed away in the corn where +it can do its work. Now carbon, hydrogen and oxygen enter into the composition +of every organic substance in one form of arrangement or another. The formula +<i>CHO</i>, in fact, is almost universal.</p> + +<p>Very well, then, why does a free atom of carbon select any particular one out +of 50,000 or more possible positions unless it wants to? I cannot see how we can +deny intelligence to this act of volition on the part of the atom. To say that one +atom has an affinity for another is simply to use a big word. The atom is conscious +if man is conscious, is intelligent if man is intelligent, exercises will-power if man +does, is, in its own little way, all that man is. We are told by geologists that in the +earliest periods no form of life could exist on the earth.</p> + +<p>How do they know that? A crystal is devoid of this vital principle, they say, +and yet certain kinds of atoms invariably arrange themselves in a particular way to +form a crystal. They did that in geological periods antedating the appearance of +any form of life and have been doing it ever since in precisely the same way. Some +crystals form in branches like a fern. Why is there not life in the growth of a +crystal? Was the vital principle specially created at some particular period of the +earth’s history, or did it exist and control every atom of matter when the earth was +molten? I cannot avoid the conclusion that all matter is composed of intelligent +atoms and that life and mind are merely synonyms for the aggregation of atomic +intelligence.</p> + +<p>Of course there is a source of energy. Nature is a perpetual motion machine, +and perpetual motion implies a sustaining and impelling force.</p> + +<p>When I was in Berlin I met Du Bois-Reymond, and, wagging the end of my +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_244">[244]</span>finger, I said to him, “What is that? What moves that finger?” He said he didn’t +know; that investigators have for twenty-five years been trying to find out. If anybody +could tell him what wagged this finger, the problem of life would be solved.</p> + +<p>There are many forms of energy resulting from the combustion of coal under +a boiler. Some of these forms we know something about in a practical way, but +there may be many others we don’t know anything about.</p> + +<p>Perhaps electricity will itself be superseded in time, who knows? Now, a beefsteak +in the human stomach is equivalent to coal under a boiler. By oxidisation it +excites energy that does work, but what form of energy is it? It is not steam pressure. +It acts through the nerve-cells, performs work that can be measured in foot +pounds, and can be transformed into electricity, but the actual nature of this force +which produces this work—which makes effectual the mandate of the will—is unknown.</p> + +<p>It is not magnetism, it doesn’t attract iron. It is not electricity—at least such +a form of electricity as we are familiar with. Still, here it is necessary to be guarded, +because so many different forms of electricity are known to science that it would be +rash to say positively that we shall not class vital energy as a form of electrical +energy. We cannot argue anything from difference in speed. Nerve-force may +travel as fast as electricity, once it gets started. The apparent slowness may be in +the brain. It may take an appreciable time for the brain to set the force going.</p> + +<p>I made an experiment with a frog’s leg that indicates something of the kind. I +took a leg that was susceptible to galvanic current. The vibration produced a note +that was as high as a piccoto. While the leg was alive it responded to the electrical +current; when it was dead it would not respond. After the frog’s leg had been +lying in the laboratory three days I couldn’t make it squeal. The experiment was +conclusive as to this point: The vital force in the nerves of the leg was capable of +acting with speed enough to induce the vibration of the diaphragm necessary to produce +sound.</p> + +<p>Certainly this rate of speed is greater than physiologists appear to allow, and +it seems reasonable that there is a close affinity between vital energy and electricity. +I do not say they are identical; on the contrary I say they are very like. If one +could learn to make vital energy directly without fuel, that is without beefsteak in +the stomach, and in such manner that the human system could appropriate it, the +elixir of life would no longer be a dream of alchemy. But we have not yet learned +to make electricity directly, without the aid of fuel and steam.</p> + +<p>I believe this is possible; indeed, I have been experimenting in this direction +for some time past. But until we can learn to make electricity, like nature, out of +disturbed air, I am afraid the more delicate task of manufacturing vital energy so +that it can be bottled and sold at the family grocery store will have to be deferred.</p> + +<p>Electricity, by the way, is properly merely a form of energy, and not a fluid. +As for the ether which speculative science supposes to exist, I don’t know anything +about it. Nobody has discovered anything of the kind. In order to make their +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_245">[245]</span>theories hold together they have, it seems to me, created the ether. But the ether +imagined by them is unthinkable to me. I don’t say I disagree with them, because +I don’t pretend to have any theories of that kind, and am not competent to dispute +with speculative scientists. All I can say is, my mind is unable to accept the theory. +The ether, they say, is as rigid as steel and as soft as butter. I can’t catch on +to that idea.</p> + +<p>I believe that there are only two things in the universe—matter and energy. +Matter I can understand to be intelligent, for man himself I regard as so much matter. +Energy I know can take various forms, and manifest itself in various ways. +I can understand also that it works not only upon, but through, matter. What this +matter is, what this energy is, I do not know.</p> + +<p>However, it is possible that it is simply matter and energy, and that any desire +to know too much about the whole question should be diagnosed as a disease; such +a disease as German doctors are said to have discovered among the students of their +universities—the disease of asking questions.</p> + +</blockquote> + +<h5>THE NATURE OF INTELLIGENCE.</h5> + +<p>Mr. Thomas A. Edison’s article is full of suggestions which invite +further discussion. We must here limit ourselves solely to those +which touch the problem of Panpsychism and Panbiotism.</p> + +<p>Any one who has read Mr. Edison’s article will be struck with +the strange coincidence that obtains between his and Professor +Haeckel’s views. The famous naturalist considers what he calls +panpsychism as the corner-stone of his monism: he says that atoms +possess souls; and in a similar way the famous inventor believes in +the intelligence of atoms, he declares that atoms are endowed with +minds. There is certainly a deep truth in this conception of nature; +and yet we cannot accept it in the way it is presented by either Professor +Haeckel or Mr. Edison.</p> + +<p>With reference to Professor Haeckel’s views we have explained +why atoms, the actions of which are not endowed with meaning, +have no soul, and also why they cannot feel pleasure and pain. It +remains for us to explain why atoms are not in possession of intelligence.</p> + +<p>What is intelligence?</p> + +<p>That reaction upon a stimulus which takes place in the way it +does because of the presence of meaning, is called mental, or intelligent +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_246">[246]</span>action; and the ability to adjust action to mental representations +is intelligence.</p> + +<p>Intelligence is a psychical quality, and the psychical process +which is preparing to act with intelligence is called deliberation. +Deliberation is the successive revival of several soul-structures, either +of memories of former experiences, or of rules derived therefrom, +or of advice formerly received, including also new combinations of +these mental structures, and keeping in view the probable results of +the intended action. In a word, deliberation is thought, and thought +is an interaction among meaning-freighted feelings.</p> + +<p>Among these ideas, which in so far as they can influence action +(i. e. purposive motions) are called “motives,” the strongest one will +determine the result. Now, any atom of non-organised matter, say +an atom of hydrogen, acts (as we said above) with spontaneity. It +is in this sense as much alive as is any ever so complex vegetable or +animal substance. It is self-acting, and its action reveals the innermost +nature of its being just as much as the action of the man shows +the character of the man.</p> + +<p>There is, however, a great difference between the action of animal +beings whose action is regulated by the meanings of their feelings, +which in their totality we call the soul, and the actions of inorganic +matter, of crystals, minerals, gases, chemical elements, and +gravitating masses, all of which we comprise under the name “inanimate +nature.” The stone’s fall does not depend upon any representative +feeling; it depends solely upon that quality of the stone +which we popularly call its weight. Nor has the falling stone any +choice whether to fall or not to fall. Under certain circumstances +it falls. There is no act of deliberation preceding the fall. Nor has +it any choice concerning the direction of its fall. The surrounding +conditions, viz., its position with regard to the centre of the earth together +with its mass, determine the process. The stone’s action can +satisfactorily be explained without attributing to it psychical qualities. +The stone possesses no soul; it is void of mentality; and although +we believe that everything, organised or unorganised, is endowed +with subjectivity (by which we understand the conditions of +psychical life, or the potentiality of feeling and consciousness), this +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_247">[247]</span>subjectivity can only be analogous to the blind impulse of the stone’s +mass. If some other, psychical or mental, subjectivity were present, +we should say that it apparently does not enter as a factor in +the determination of the event. Accordingly such an assumption is +gratuitous. There is subjectivity, but there is no intelligence. There +is potentiality of feeling, but there is no consciousness. There is +present the elementary condition of that something which is going +to develop into mind, but there is no mind; there is no meaning-freighted +awareness of the surrounding conditions.</p> + +<p>Says Mr. Edison:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“The intelligence of man is, I take it, the sum of the intelligences of the atoms +of which he is composed.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>The sum total of the intelligences of the atoms in a human body +(if, in this connection, for the sake of argument, we grant that atoms +are intelligent) would not as yet make up the intelligence of man. +Suppose we are contemplating a mosaic picture or inscription. Are +such compositions really only the sum of the little stones? Are they +not rather a certain peculiar form in which these colored stones are +arranged? It is not the sum of the stones that makes the picture, +but the form of their composition. The picture is not contained in +any single one of them, nor is it the whole number of all the single +stones: it originates through their peculiar combination and consists +of the form in which they are combined.</p> + +<p>Mr. Edison’s explanation of the soul, applied to this example of +a mosaic picture, would be as follows: Every little stone is in itself +a little mosaic picture. The whole picture of the mosaic is the sum +of the little pictures of the stones of which it is composed.</p> + +<p>The intelligence of the soul, however, is not even as yet the +form in which feeling structures combine; it originates with the representative +faculty of the feeling structures. The soul is the organised +totality of a set of images and abstract mental symbols representing +the qualities, the influences, and the interactions of the different objects +of the surrounding world, the thinking subject included.</p> + +<p>Says Mr. Edison:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“Every atom has an intelligent power of selection, and is always striving to get +into harmonious relation with other atoms.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_248">[248]</span></p> + +<p>The latter is true; the former is an error. Every atom “is always +striving to get into harmonious relation with other atoms”; +this is its nature; and its nature being stable, consisting of certain +inalienable and intrinsic qualities, the atom acts with consistency. +Certain atoms, say atoms of hydrogen, are of such a nature +as to combine with certain other atoms, say atoms of oxygen, into +molecules that form a certain substance of peculiar properties, which, +if each atom of oxygen combines with two atoms of hydrogen, would +be <i>H₂O</i>, or water. This substance again, having certain definite +qualities, will in a temperature below freezing point crystallise at a +definite angle. The angle of crystallisation being the same for all +molecules <i>H₂O</i>, the result will necessarily be one of most marvellous +regularity. And not being able to observe the atoms in their secret +activity, not knowing all the details of nature’s marvellous laboratory, +we are astonished to find such a wonderfully harmonious relation. +And yet, considering the nature of things, we are urged to confess +that it is the result of an inevitable necessity, which takes place according +to strict mathematical laws.</p> + +<p>Although every atom strives, according to its nature, to get into +harmonious relation with other atoms, we do not see any “intelligent +power of selection” in the province of inorganic nature. Every atom +of inorganic substances acts according to its nature in one and the +same way throughout. There is no choice, no selection, allowed. +Choice and selection are faculties that are reserved for the higher +domains of psychical life, which originates in the domain of animal +existence when meaning, conditioned by the presence of sentiency, +rises into being and creates the soul.</p> + +<p>Supposing that through some combination of atoms their subjectivity +be combined in such a form as to produce sentiency or feeling, +we can very easily understand how this feeling will in time become +representative of the conditions by which it is affected. The +soul does not consist of the atoms of its organism, nor of the sum of +the qualities of the atoms. The soul consists of something more +subtle than matter: the soul consists of the meaning that is attached +to the different forms of the feelings which obtain in living organisms.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_249">[249]</span></p> + +<h5>THE PROBLEM OF THEISM.</h5> + +<p>The problem as to whether or not there is an element of feeling +present in the unorganised realm of nature, is connected also with the +problem of theism. The monistic view of the world, which considers +nature as alive throughout, can neither accept the old supernaturalism, +nor the materialistic theory of atheism. Theism, as it is usually +conceived, believes in a personal creator and ruler of the world. +Materialism denies the existence of any God; it regards matter and +its actions as the only reality.</p> + +<p>Monism does not regard mental phenomena as an incidental by-play +of blindly operating forces. It regards mind as a necessary product +of reality. Mind and the peculiar qualities of mind are characteristic +of the world-tree, of which it is the highest efflorescence we +know. From the fruit we can know the root, from the product we +can judge of the factors, in the creature we see the creator.</p> + +<p>That great something which has produced us, the All-power in +which we live and move and have our being, and obedience to the +laws of which are the conditions of life, of welfare, and of an advance +to higher life, is called with a popular religious name “God.”</p> + +<p>Let us comprise under the name “theism” all those views +which recognise any conception of God, and reserve the term anthropotheism +for that view which regards God as a person, a mind, +a conscious being, or a world-ego. Atheism in that case will be a +negation of the existence of God in any form, a negation of the All-power +of which we are parts and to which we have to conform; and +accordingly atheism will be also a negation of any authority of moral +conduct.</p> + +<p>We call attention to the fact that many who call themselves +atheists, simply because they do not believe in anthropotheism, are +according to this definition not to be classed among the atheists.</p> + +<p>What has monism to say, on the problem of the existence of +God?</p> + +<p>Prof. George J. Romanes, in an article which appeared some +time ago in the <i>Contemporary Review</i> under the title “The World as +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_250">[250]</span>an Eject,” declares that monism has left the problem of theism in +the same state it was in before. He says:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“The views of the late Professor Clifford concerning the influence of monism +on theism, are unsound. I am in full agreement with him in believing that monism +is destined to become the generally accepted theory of things, seeing that it is the +only theory of things which can receive the sanction of science on the one hand, and +of feeling on the other. But I disagree with him in holding that this theory is fraught +with implications of an anti-theistic kind. In my opinion, <i>this theory leaves the +question of theism very much where it was before</i>.⁠<a id="FNanchor_44" href="#Footnote_44" class="fnanchor">[44]</a> That is to say, while not furnishing +any independent proof of theism, it likewise fails to furnish any independent +disproof.</p> + +<p>“As a matter of methodical reasoning it appears to me that monism alone can +only lead to agnosticism. That is to say, it leaves a clear field of choice as between +theism and atheism.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_45" href="#Footnote_45" class="fnanchor">[45]</a></p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>Clifford says in the passage referred to by Professor Romanes:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“Reason, intelligence, and volition are properties of a complex which is made +up of elements themselves not rational, not intelligent, not conscious.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>Rational, intelligent, conscious beings, so far as their material +existence is concerned, are made up of elements not rational, not intelligent, +not conscious. But mind, reason, intelligence are not at all +made up of material elements; they are neither latent nor germinal +and least of all fully developed properties of the single atoms. Reason +can in our conception never be explained as a complex result of +the interaction of absolutely irrational elements. The material elements +of the world, it is true, are not intelligent, not conscious; but +the world as a whole (although <i>not</i> conscious and <i>not</i> endowed with +purposive volition) is at least <i>not ir</i>rational and not void of determination. +On the contrary the world as a whole is the prototype of +all rationality, and human reason is a mere image of the world-order. +What is the reason of a rational being but an incarnation of this +world-order?</p> + +<p>Reason is not a thing of matter; exactly so the world-order is +not a thing of matter. But it exists none the less; it is a reality. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_251">[251]</span>On the other hand, the world-order need neither be a personal being +nor the work of a personal being. The order that prevails in the +real world and in the laws of nature appears also in the ideal world, +in the laws of formal thought, in mathematics, and its kindred +sciences; and the same rationality that obtains in the ideal domain +permeates the realms of reality, the universe of objective existence.</p> + +<p>The idea that God created the world-order and dictated its laws +is a fanciful and poetical allegory; it is as such a pagan notion which +belongs in the same category with Hesiod’s Cosmology, but it is +scientifically and philosophically unthinkable. For God is eternal and +God’s being is eternal. God has not created his own attributes and +the world-order is simply an attribute of God; it is part and parcel +of his nature. Or can you think of God without that attribute of +irrefragable order that appears to science as necessity, to religion +as holiness, to ethics as justice, to art as the law of beauty, to the +mystic as the key to all the wonders of existence which though solving +all the problems remains most wonderful itself?</p> + +<p>The world as a whole, the cosmos, God, or whatever we call +the One and All, is the prototype of all reason, but he is not a mind; +he is not a system of sentient symbols; he is not a soul. Minds are +a special kind of God’s creatures; but God is not a creature: he is +the condition of the existence of creatures, he is the creator.</p> + +<p>The objection is made from materialistic quarters: “What is +the world as a whole but the sum of all atoms!” This is an error. +The world is not merely the sum of all its atoms; the universe does +not consist of innumerable little particles which in their combination +form the All. On the contrary: the world as a whole, existence in +its oneness, or speaking religiously God, is alone the only true reality; +all other things and beings are parts of him. Atoms are abstract +concepts; the existence of an atom and of its actions presupposes +the existence of the great whole of which it is a part, and without +which it would have no reality. There are no atoms in themselves. +Atoms regarded as things in themselves are a scientific superstition.</p> + +<p>Professor Romanes advances the proposition, that cosmical +events, being as highly complex as nervous phenomena, might be +possessed of a similar subjectivity. The nervous phenomena which +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_252">[252]</span>constitute the physiological action of mind in the province of objectivity +are, it is true, very complex, but complexity does not constitute +that characteristic feature on the presence of which depends the +origin of mind.</p> + +<p>Professor Romanes says:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“Both mind and matter in motion admit of degrees: first as to quantity, next +as to velocity, and lastly as to <i>complexity</i>. But the degrees of matter in motion are +found, in point of observable fact, not to correspond with those of mind, save in the +last particular of complexity, where there is unquestionably an evident correspondence.</p> + +<p>“Now, if we fix our attention merely on this subject-matter of complexity, and +refuse to be led astray by obviously false analogies of a more special kind, I think +that there can be no question that the macrocosm does furnish amply sufficient opportunity, +as it were, for the presence of subjectivity, even if it be assumed that subjectivity +can only be yielded by an order of complexity analogous to that of a nervous +system. For, considering the natural and dynamical system of the universe +as a whole, it is obvious that the complexity presented is greater than any of its +parts. Not only is it true that all these parts are included in the whole, and that +even the visible sidereal system alone presents movements of enormous intricacy, +but we find, for instance, that even within the limits of this small planet there is +presented to actual observation a peculiar form of circumscribed complex, fully comparable +to that of the individual brain, and yet external to each individual brain. +For the so-called ‘social organism,’ although composed of innumerable individual +personalities, is, with regard to each of its constituent units, a part of the objective +world—just as the human brain would be, were each of its constituent cells of a +construction sufficiently complex to yield a separate personality.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>The so-called social organism which is composed of innumerable +personalities undoubtedly yields a peculiar spiritual existence, +which cannot be explained solely as the sum of the parts and actions +of its constituent individuals. The relations in which the members +of society stand to each other are of an analogous importance to +the relations of the cells and organs in an organism. It is the form +that constitutes this or that kind of an organism, not the sum of +atoms, nor the intricacy or complexity of their combinations. Different +forms of perhaps the same material amount, and of the same +intricacy of combination, yield quite distinct types of individuality, +and every state, every nation, every society possesses, as it were a +personality of its own.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_253">[253]</span></p> + +<p>Mind is not constituted by complexity. Mind is a system of +sentient symbols. Wherever we find organisms acting in such a way +that their actions depend upon the <i>meanings</i> of certain stimuli, we +have to attribute to them that characteristic feature which we call +mind, or soul. The action of a falling stone is explainable without +attributing to it any mentality. There is no representative value, +no meaning in that quality of the stone which, under certain conditions, +makes the stone fall. However, if a man acts, the motive +of his action does not consist in the gravity of certain material particles +of his brain. It consists in the meaning that resides in certain +feelings. Without taking into consideration the meaning that dominates +the man’s motives, we cannot explain his action, and it is the +meaning of feelings that the soul consists of. Only where and when +we can discern the presence of meaning as the raison d’être of actions, +are we justified in calling phenomena mental. When the +action that takes place in response to a stimulus depends solely upon +the significance of a symbol, the inference is legitimate, nay, it is inevitable +and conclusive, that we have to deal with a mind. The motion +of a comet, which depends perhaps not only upon the gravity +of its mass, but also upon the chemical actions and explosions of its +constituent elements during its approach to the sun, may be ever so +intricate; but this does not in the least justify the assumption of the +presence of mind in the comet.</p> + +<p>The assumption of mind in inorganic nature is not only fantastical, +it is also needless. Facts are better explained without this +speculation.</p> + +<p>The world as a whole is not bare of subjectivity. In this we +agree with both Clifford and Romanes. But we do not identify +subjectivity and mind, the latter being a special and indeed a very +complex form of subjectivity. We suppose that subjectivity pervades +also all the processes of unorganised nature, and no less the +cosmic events; but be they ever so much more complex than nervous +phenomena, there is present only a non-mental subjectivity.</p> + +<p>Yet although the phenomena of so-called inanimate nature, be +they motions of celestial bodies or physical and chemical processes, +are non-mental, there is in every one of them present that grand +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_254">[254]</span>feature which is as it were the breath of God. This feature appears +in all the phenomena of nature, but in none of them more gloriously +than in the soul of man. Even the cosmical events of marvellous +sublimity appear as a mere prelude to the appearance of soul-life, +for in soul-life is focused all the divinity of nature. Reason is the +reflex of the world-order and thus a rational being is made in the +likeness of God.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp75" id="diagram" style="max-width: 31.25em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/diagram.jpg" alt=""> +</figure> + +<p>Professor Romanes presents the problem of the subjectivity of +existence by the adjoined diagram, which he explains as follows:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“Following Clifford, I will call these inferred subjectivities by the name of +‘ejects,’ and assign to them the symbol <i>Y</i>. Thus in the following discussion <i>X</i> = +the objective world, <i>Y</i>, the ejective world, and <i>Z</i>, the subjective world. Now, the +theory of monism supposes that <i>X</i>, <i>Y</i> and <i>Z</i> are all alike in kind, but presents no +definite teaching as to how far they may differ in degree. We may, however, at +once allow that between the psychological value of <i>Z</i> and that of <i>X</i>, there is a wide +difference of degree, and also that while the value of <i>Z</i> is a fixed quantity, that of +<i>Y</i> varies greatly in the different parts of the area <i>Y</i>.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>The deep shading of <i>Z</i> indicates consciousness, and consciousness +is that form of subjectivity which constitutes our mind. <i>Z</i> is +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_255">[255]</span>not, as Professor Romanes asserts that it is, a fixed quantity; it +varies greatly, as every one knows from his own experience. It is +lowest in trance or swoon or profound sleep. It is highest in +the state of concentrated attention. The ejective element, which we +assume to be present as a correlative concomitant in the objective +world, we assume, with Professor Romanes, varies greatly in the +different parts of the area <i>Y</i>. Like Professor Romanes, we also do +<i>not</i> assume the existence of any unshaded <i>X</i>. There is no objectivity +without its subjective correlate. But, according to the theory +of monism, the nature of the concomitant subjectivity is not unknowable: +it can be inferred from the nature of objective existence. The +subjectivity of the falling stone is most elementary, and <i>not mental</i>; +its action is not prompted by meaning. That something which impels +the stone to fall, and which science calls gravity, does not possess +any representative element. There is no symbolism involved +in gravity. There is no soul in the stone. The stone is not incited +to falling by any purpose; it has no end in view. Purpose originates +with and through the presence of representative symbols. According +to the theory of monism the shading of the surrounding zones is not +a matter concerning which we have to suspend our judgment. If +monism is true, we know very well how deeply we have to shade the +different phenomena of objective nature.</p> + +<p>Taking this view, we object to Professor Romanes’s conclusion +when he says:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“Without in any way straining the theory of monism, we may provisionally +shade <i>X</i> more deeply than <i>Z</i>, and this in some immeasurable degree.</p> + +<p>“Monism sanctions the shading of <i>X</i> as deeply as we choose; but the shading +which it sanctions is only provisional.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>While the presence of mind in the phenomena of the stellar +universe and of inorganic nature must decidedly be denied, I would +not, for that reason, declare that monism is atheistic.</p> + +<p>Monism is decidedly theistic although not anthropotheistic. It +is monotheistic in so far as it recognises that the all-existence in +which we live and move and have our being is the ἙΝ ΚΑΙ ΠΑΝ, +the One and All. But there is not the slightest reason for the theory, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_256">[256]</span>and there are sufficient reasons against it, that the universe is possessed +of a huge world-ego, that it is a person or a mind.</p> + +<p>We maintain on the one hand that the laws of nature are not +designs arranged With consciously preconceived purposes. Yet on +the other hand, we do not forget, that the world-order possesses +quite definite features and that the course of evolution runs in a very +unmistakable direction. We can plainly decipher its character, and +the great religious teachers of mankind have with a truly prophetic instinct +proclaimed the ethical injunctions to be derived therefrom—injunctions +which, millenniums after them, science has discovered +to be founded in the nature of things.</p> + +<p>God is no mind, yet God is mentality, the source of all mind: +God is not a spirit, but he is spirituality. The subjectivity of the +universe from which all consciousness rises is part of his being, and +whatever that subjectivity, considered as a whole, be or be not, that +much is certain, that in grandeur it corresponds to the objectivity of +the world. It does not think in symbols as a man does; it is not a +mind: but it exists nevertheless. Whatever it is like we learn from +the revelation of its appearance in objective existence, from the cosmic +order, the laws of nature, and the moral ideas of mankind.</p> + +<p>Knowledge of nature means knowledge of God, for nature is +God as he appears and the objectivity of being is the revelation of +God.</p> + +<p>We would not limit God to the subjectivity of nature: God is +both subjectivity and objectivity combined. He is that All-power +that is, was, and will be, thus being the ultimate authority of conduct.</p> + +<p>God is not a mind, he is more than a mind; God is not a system +of symbols, he is the reality symbolised in mind. He is not a person, +he is super-personal.</p> + +<p>He who does not see that the God of monism is greater than +the God of anthropotheism, had better believe in a personal God, +until he appreciates the truth that God is not personal but super-personal. +For after all anthropotheism is nearer the truth than +atheism, for atheism (well understood, the atheism of our definition +above) is a moral nihilism devised to shake off all ethical obligation +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_257">[257]</span>so as to make the lust of the moment and the pleasure of the individual +the supreme rule of action.</p> + +<p>Monism, accordingly, does not leave the problem of theism where +it was before. Monism proves that God is not to be conceived in +the likeness of man, but the reverse: man, being a system of symbols +representing the world, is to be conceived as having been made +or rather as having originated in the likeness of God. God is the +original, man is the copy. God is the whole, man is the part, in +which the whole finds a more or less correct representation. The picture +is not perfect, but the grandest duty a man has is the constant +approach to a greater perfection. Man is the temporal, God is the +eternal. Man is limited, God is the infinite.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">Editor.</span></p> + +<div class="footnotes"> + +<h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_41" href="#FNanchor_41" class="label">[41]</a> <i>The Monist</i>, Vol. II, No. 4.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_42" href="#FNanchor_42" class="label">[42]</a> Spontaneous motion (as here defined) does not mean action without a cause; +nor does the spontaneity of the cart exclude the co-operation of other spontaneities +(<i>e. g.</i> the attraction of the earth) entering as factors in bringing about the final +result.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_43" href="#FNanchor_43" class="label">[43]</a> This theory of pleasure and pain was first set forth in an editorial article +of No. 120 of <i>The Open Court</i>, which has been republished in the chapter “Pleasure +and Pain,” pp. 338-345, of <i>The Soul of Man</i>. A correct view of the nature of +pleasure and pain is of great importance, especially in ethics. Notwithstanding the +palpable erroneousness of the old view, several articles written by prominent authors +have appeared of late, that continue in the old strain without taking notice of the +criticism that overthrows the basis of their theories.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_44" href="#FNanchor_44" class="label">[44]</a> <i>Italics are ours.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_45" href="#FNanchor_45" class="label">[45]</a> This same position is maintained with equal vigor in Professor Romanes’s +latest work <i>Darwin and After Darwin</i>, pp. 412-442. The Open Court Publishing +Co., 1892.</p></div> + +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_258">[258]</span></p> + +<h3 class="nobreak" id="LITERARY_CORRESPONDENCE_II">LITERARY CORRESPONDENCE.</h3> + +</div> + +<h4 class="nobreak" id="FRANCE_II">I.<br> +<span class="smaller">FRANCE.</span></h4> + +<p>Dr. Paul Sollier has just published, in the Bibliothéque +Charcot-Debove,⁠<a id="FNanchor_46" href="#Footnote_46" class="fnanchor">[46]</a> a new and excellent work, <i>Les troubles de la +memoire</i>. This work is not identical in its purpose with that of M. Ribot; +it corrects the latter in certain points, completes and corroborates +it in others. M. Sollier set out to discuss this question solely +from a medical standpoint, which was intentionally passed over by +M. Ribot, but he has also necessarily touched upon its psychological +aspects, and, as he informs us himself, he was obliged on the whole +to make a medico-psychological study of the question.</p> + +<p>The subject is a vast one; one could include in it aphasia and +all the weaknesses resulting from the destruction of the brain-centres, +whether those of motion or of sensation. M. Sollier has taken the +pains to reduce it, however, to definite limits. He studies especially +the subject of acquired amnesia (diminutive changes and disaggregations +of the memory). He does not consider the subject of congenital +amnesia, which is an absence and not a loss of memory. Strictly +considered, the only cases of true amnesia, or <i>organic</i> amnesia, are +those which result from the destruction of the nerve-centres, since +in this case there is an absolute loss of the power of forming mental +images, and not simply an enfeebling or forgetting of them, which is +characteristic of <i>functional</i> amnesia. From a clinical standpoint amnesia +exists only in the last case. Though the effect may be the same +in both cases, the causes are not identical.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_259">[259]</span></p> + +<p>Clinical investigation cannot, however, overlook the diminutive +changes which take place in the memory and which, as early as +1817, were called by Louyer-Villermay dysmnesia, and which are +always closely allied to organic modifications of the brain. As regards +amnesia itself, it is important to distinguish simple amnesia +from retrogressive and progressive amnesia. M. Sollier explains the +motive causes of these different conditions with great lucidity, and +renders them easy of comprehension by means of ingenious illustrations.</p> + +<p>I call attention to the information he gives us as to the conditions +under which a revival of mental images takes place, p. 30; +to his criticism of Ribot’s opinion, according to which the power of +correctly locating events in the scale of time is the true characteristic +of psychical memory: it is quite enough if it reproduces events +as in the past, that is to say if there exists a conscious knowledge which +shows that the mental conception belongs to the past, or is, simply, +a remembrance, p. 35 and 40; to his remarks on the strengthening +of mental images due to the repetition of remembrances, the necessary +sequence of which is that a weakening of old memories follows +the destruction of accumulated mental images, p. 48; to his explanation +of the processes of retrogressive amnesia (coming suddenly after +an attack of vertigo, a blow, etc.) which he bases upon a supposition +of a group of mental conceptions in touch with one another, in such a +way that the loss of one leading conception in a group deprives this +group of sufficient consistency to form a conscious synthesis, p. 70.</p> + +<p>As regards the classifications of amnesia M. Sollier censures +that of M. Ribot as being neither openly psychological nor openly +clinical, and of taking successively as bases the extent of an observed +phenomenon, its evolution, its location in time. Moreover, from a +clinical standpoint it has led to a joining together of totally incongruous +disorders. M. Sollier therefore rejects it, and contents himself +with adopting first of all, with M. Falret, the natural classification +of general amnesia and of partial amnesia. Moreover, in taking +account of the systematising of lost remembrances, he proposes to +make a distinction as to the two varieties of systematised (functional) +and of non-systematised (organic) amnesia, considered from the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_260">[260]</span>purely psychological standpoint, p. 59. We should thus have, firstly, +the classification of general amnesia, including (A) true organic amnesia +(destruction of the centre of mental images), and, under the +classification of the systematised, (B) functional, or apparent, amnesia +(imperfect performance of the functions of the centres): this +latter subdividing into two groups, (<i>a</i>) amnesia with its varieties (<i>a´</i>) +simple, (<i>b´</i>) retrogressive, (<i>c´</i>) progressive, and (<i>b</i>) paramnesia: (<i>a´</i>) +that of locality, (<i>b´</i>) that of exactness; to which it is proper to add +(<i>c</i>) dysmnesia, which is organic-functional. Secondly, the classification +of partial amnesia whether systematised or not, which may be +either organic or functional. M. Sollier abandons, moreover, every +pathological or etiological classification as being exceedingly unsatisfactory. +In the presence of a patient, he justly remarks, the physician +can only employ semiology.—I will not enter here into the details of +the inquisitor-like investigation entered upon by the author. I must +even proceed without stopping through the observations intended for +medical men, which form the second part of the work, but I judge +that every reader will also find therein many facts which may prove +of interest. After having read it, one is more impressed than ever with +the importance and delicacy of the motive forces of the memory, in +noting the frequency and the varieties even of its sources of weakness. +M. Sollier has the credit of pointing them out—in the shape +of “defects in synthetical power” and in “will power”—in the +sources of weakness where one had not been accustomed to look for +them. It would be interesting, he thinks, to find out what part +amnesia may perhaps take in the pathogeny of certain nervous disorders, +and the influence which it has on their evolution. Specialists +for the insane might find therein a new subject of study, and psychology +will profit, on the other hand, by that which clinical experience +offers it. Is not its main object to learn to understand life as +a unit at the same time that it analyses it as a diversity?</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>When one passes from a book like that of M. Sollier to the work +of M. l’Abbé <span class="smcap">Maurice de Baets</span>, <i>Les bases de la morale et du droit</i>,⁠<a id="FNanchor_47" href="#Footnote_47" class="fnanchor">[47]</a> +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_261">[261]</span>one is impressed by the change of method. It has become impossible +for us to consider pathology as unallied to questions of morality; and +we have accomplished this great object of studying matters pertaining +to the moral world, the evolution of law, without seeking our +base of support in a religious faith or in a metaphysical affirmation. +Even M. l’Abbé de Baets himself declares emphatically that he desires +to adopt only one starting point from among those we are acquainted +with,—the verification of facts,—and truly he shows a good +will and knowledge; nevertheless the ground which he considers +so firm has, as we believe, no stability. All seems strange to us, if +I may so speak, in books of this description. The tone which is +peculiar to them, the nature of the facts cited, the progress of the +reasoning, impeach them just as surely as the blue color of his costume +reveals afar off an inhabitant of the Celestial Empire. I +am not an impassioned adversary of the clergy; far from it. I appreciate +their intentions and esteem their persons as one should, but +I am unable to share their opinions, and I consider indeed that they +deceive themselves when they think that faith has ever given to the +world an absolute assurance. It has not given it because it has not +proved sufficient. Mankind, variable and vacillating though it may +be, does not change its beliefs because of fickleness of heart: its +mental evolution takes place too slowly for that, and is also too +painful. The Catholic church of to-day has adopted as its watch-word +the return to St. Thomas of Aquinas; it will gain by this +unity of effort, without succeeding however in leading back the minds +of men to its point of view. The diverse ways we follow tend doubtless +as a matter of fact toward the same objective point, and run +more or less in the same direction; but humanity scarcely ever +passes back again over the paths which it has once traversed.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>We have another little volume by <span class="smcap">M. Lombroso</span>, <i>Les applications +de l’anthropologie criminelle</i>; a sequel to <i>Nouvelles recherches</i>, +which I have mentioned before. We find here interesting pages in +regard to transportation and reform schools, and a criticism of the new +theories of the penal code (Garofalo, Tarde, Sighele, Onanoff and +Blorg, Ferri)—a part of the question considered in the Congress. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_262">[262]</span>A chapter indeed is devoted to the subject of criminal anthropology +in modern literature, in regard to which it seems to me M. Lombroso +always makes more of a question than is desirable, but which +he well understands how to criticise. Then follow several pages on +the criminal type in art, after a work of Dr. Edward Lefort; then +comes a description of anthropological instruments and methods. I +will not affirm that this last work brings us much of novelty; it is +chiefly a new and energetic presentation of his views, and M. Lombroso +has no doubt whatever that by dint of striking the nail upon +the head he will succeed in driving it into the wall of his adversaries.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>The work of <span class="smcap">M. B. Bourdon</span>, <i>L’expression des emotions et des +tendances dans le langage</i>, is certainly one of the most curious books +one can read. He treats in an original manner of phonetical questions, +which are less rife in France than in England and Germany, +as to what sounds signify, or speech; what is their worth in intensity, +elevation, form or quality, duration; what phenomena are shown by +successions of intensity, of elevation, of elementary articulation, of +syllables, of words, etc., of duration; what are the relations of these +phenomena to versification and what comparison one can make between +writing and speech: such are the problems particularly studied, +at times with the aid of very simple but instructive facts culled +from experience.</p> + +<p>These studies—I need scarcely add that they are comparative +ones—are of interest for various reasons. They lead up to new ideas +of grammar and of language, and furnish arguments for a reform in +orthography of which M. Bourdon is a very warm partisan. His +readers will not be slow to notice for the matter of that, that he is +in regard to this frankly revolutionary; and it may seem paradoxical +to say to them, for example, that “the distinction between analytical +and synthetical languages is absolutely artificial, and could only be +produced through our bad systems of writing.” Writing, M. Bourdon +indeed remarks, introduces separations in places where spoken +language makes no pause. The English write <i>I will go</i>, they pronounce +it <i>Iwillgo</i>. The analysis which pertains to writing masks +the true cohesion of the spoken language, and “if in the past all +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_263">[263]</span>series of articulations had been written as a single word which were +in fact pronounced as a single word, we should not have known +the error which consists in opposing certain languages classed as +synthetical to others which we class as analytical.” The argument +is perhaps not a decisive one, and in the neo-Latin languages, for +example, one can scarcely deny that the analysis of the written language +has conformed to the work of decomposition of the antique +forms, so as to adapt itself to the new groupings of their essential +elements, groupings wherein these elements remain variable because +speech separates them effectively, in many cases by interpolating +governing words or others.</p> + +<p>But it is not my intention to enter into these detailed discussions. +I leave M. Bourdon in further calling attention to his last +chapter, <i>Ecriture</i>. Persons curious as to graphology will find in it +some good ideas concerning this method of “character reading.” +The author does not tell everything, and I have a suspicion that he +greatly despises certain signs valued by the graphologists, and arrived +at empirically, but we should note what he has actually said.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>Under the title, <i>Le monde physique, Essai de conception expérimentale</i>, +M. Dr. <span class="smcap">Julien Pioger</span> offers to the public a sketch of a +world-system. This system is summed up in the expression of “Universal +Solidarity,” and is based on the idea of infinitely minute +matter-particles, or “infinitesimals,” the mutual relations of which, +and their equilibrium, constitute the machinery of the universe. +The atomic-mechanical hypothesis, says M. Pioger, is wrong in +resolving matter into perfected differential particles and in assigning +to its atoms qualities which make of them either true material corpuscules +or a real entity, “a thing in itself.” On the contrary, far +from intending to assign a limit to materiality, the hypothesis of infinitesimals +confines itself to limiting the conception which we may +have of it. The infinitesimal corresponds to the infinitely small, +that is to say to the non-perfected, to the non-differentiable, beyond +our cognisance and our perceptivity; it expresses the most reduced +condition of the affinities which constitute matter; it is the expression +of the infinitesimal existence of that which we call motion, extension, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_264">[264]</span>ponderability, under the general name of matter. Now the +most simple thing which can be conceived of in the physical world, +is the <i>couple</i> formed by the essential equipoise of two infinitesimals. +In developing the couple it becomes possible to form the universe +in all its great variety. The solidarity of the parts in the whole appears +as the essential condition of existence of all that which Is—the +necessary condition of all individuality.</p> + +<p>In conclusion I call attention to two new editions, one the well-known +work of <span class="smcap">M. Bernard Pérez</span>, <i>Les trois premières années de l’enfant</i>, +fifth edition, revised and supplied with an introduction by Mr. +James Sully; the other <i>Les functions du cerveau</i>, by <span class="smcap">M. Jules Soury</span>, +a work highly esteemed, embodying the most recent researches.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">Lucien Arréat.</span></p> + +<div class="footnotes"> + +<h5>FOOTNOTES:</h5> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_46" href="#FNanchor_46" class="label">[46]</a> Rueff, publisher.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_47" href="#FNanchor_47" class="label">[47]</a> This book and the following ones are published by F. Alcan.</p></div> + +</div> + +<h4 class="nobreak" id="GERMANY_II">II.<br> +<span class="smaller">GERMANY.</span></h4> + +<p>One of our foremost psychiatrists, Professor v. Krafft-Ebing of +Vienna, says in his celebrated text-book on psychiatry: “If Pedagogy +made a more serious study of the character of man in his +psychopathological relations, many of the mistakes and severities +of our system of education would be removed, many an unsuitable +choice of vocation would be left unmade, and thus many a psychical +existence rescued.”</p> + +<p>Any one who is at all familiar with the most important doctrines +of the diseased phenomena of mental life, and who knows how +frequently psychical disturbances of a more or less serious nature +occur during childhood, will fully agree with Krafft-Ebing, and will +only regret that pedagogy, in this important direction, has completely +neglected its task.</p> + +<p>Although lately the necessity of psychiatric knowledge for the +pedagogue has been insisted upon in professional circles, for instance, +by Professor <span class="smcap">Struempell</span> in his <i>Pedagogic Pathology</i> (comp. <i>The +Monist</i> II, 106), yet instruction in this department occupies a wholly +subsidiary place in pedagogic education, and has not been made as +it should have been, an organic part of the same. The writer of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_265">[265]</span>these lines has accordingly discussed this subject in a special treatise, +maintaining that the most important diseased phenomena of +mental life might be treated as a part of pedagogic psychology +(comp. <i>The Monist</i> I, 619).</p> + +<p>The demands made were met in different ways. While the +English and American press accepted these demands without reserve +(for instance, in <span class="smcap">Hall’s</span> <i>Pedagogical Seminary</i>, I, 297), in Germany +there has been more caution displayed, inasmuch as the opposing +difficulties were regarded as greater than they probably were (Professor +<span class="smcap">Rein’s</span> <i>Pädagogische Studien</i>, 1892, Heft I).</p> + +<p>We have, however, simply to call to mind the doctrine which +more than twenty years ago Maudsley in his “Physiology and Pathology +of the Mind” laid such special emphasis upon, that psychic +laws are the same in healthy and diseased phenomena, only that +they do not operate under the same conditions and therefore produce +different symptoms. Far from its being true, therefore, that +the introduction of psychopathology into psychology can be opposed +by any especially well-founded objections, such a procedure will, on +the contrary, be found to be, just as Maudsley said, an appropriate +and absolutely indispensable auxiliary of the study of this science. +And that which was emphasised by Maudsley, and lately also by +<span class="smcap">Muensterberg</span> in the treatise already discussed in <i>The Monist</i> (II, +289), <i>On the Problems and Methods of Psychology</i> (Leipsic, 1891, Abel), +Ziehen has done in his “Outlines of Physiological Psychology” in +a manner which will be full of suggestions for the pedagogue (comp. +<i>The Monist</i> I, 598).</p> + +<p>To be sure, the work of Ziehen is very far from supplying all +that the pedagogue needs. We have in this work a vast mass of +valuable observations, which will have to be elaborated in a manner +that accords with the needs of pedagogy, if this science is to derive +any material profit from psychiatry. For the bibliography of this +subject we shall refer the reader to a former correspondence of ours +(<i>The Monist</i> II, 103), and select at present for examination one province +only,—a province which is deserving of especial consideration, +inasmuch as the phenomena which occur in it are phenomena which +most frequently confront the pedagogist, and are most likely to be +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_266">[266]</span>overlooked by the untrained eye. We refer to the <i>psychopathic subsidiary +phenomena</i> of <span class="smcap">Dr. Koch</span>, by which expression this author comprises +all the psychical irregularities, be they natural or acquired, +affecting the life of the human personality, which, though not even +in the severest cases amounting to actual mental disorders, yet in +the most favorable instances so affect the persons afflicted that they +appear as lacking the full possession of mental normality and capacity. +The second part of Koch’s work, mentioned in <i>The Monist</i> +in the place above cited, has just now appeared. (Ratisbon, 1892, +Otto Maier). Having discussed in the first part of his work inherited +and chronic psychopathic subsidiary phenomena, the author +now proceeds to discuss acquired subsidiary factors, and holds out +the prospect of a third part, on the appearance of which we shall +have occasion again to discuss the entire work from a different point +of view. For the present, only the pedagogic aspect of the question +interests us. On many readers, Koch’s book must have made the +impression,—to judge from his concluding remarks,—that the author +shares Lombroso’s point of view, and to very many pedagogues +such a position would be, from the very outset, a bad recommendation, +for it would necessarily, in the very nature of the case, involve +the pedagogue in great embarrassment, in the same way as it has +involved the philosophical jurist. But embarrassment is no reason +why we should close our ears to the truth, and if Lombroso should +be right in all his teachings, pedagogy would also be obliged to accommodate +its doctrines to his. Upon the whole, however, Koch is +opposed to him. Thus when he says: “What I commend Lombroso +for is that he has observed much, has collected rich materials, +and has been the source of great incentives in many directions, and +has worked suggestively in many ways; what I reproach him with +is that he has confounded the healthy with the diseased, and has +brought under one and the same category without sufficient and appropriate +tests, psychotic phenomena and phenomena which are +psychopathically merely of a subsidiary order; what I reject is his +theory of degeneration and his peculiar views of philosophy.”</p> + +<p>Material, such as Koch and others offer, must first be elaborated +into a pedagogic psychopathology—or better still into a pedagogic +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_267">[267]</span>pathopsychology—before pedagogy, as a whole, can assume +in this direction the proper form. Though we consider, now, this +preparatory work as indispensable, we can, nevertheless, not think +of denying the value of works which, without any profession of far-reaching +psychological analysis, put in effective and available form +for pedagogy the diseased phenomena of the mental life of children. +The first German work of this kind, so far as we know, is from the +pen of a Leipsic teacher, <span class="smcap">Gustav Siegert</span>, and bears the title <i>Problematische +Kindesnaturen</i>.⁠<a id="FNanchor_48" href="#Footnote_48" class="fnanchor">[48]</a> This little work is now followed by a +more comprehensive treatise, published by a Bremen alienist, Dr. +<span class="smcap">Scholz</span>, already known to the readers of <i>The Monist</i> (II, 104), and +bearing the title <i>Die Characterfehler des Kindes, eine Erziehungslehre +für Schule und Haus</i>.⁠<a id="FNanchor_49" href="#Footnote_49" class="fnanchor">[49]</a> Such books are valuable not only for the observations +they offer and the isolated explanations and pedagogic +advice they present, but also for the suggestions which the attentive +and psychologically cultivated reader can always receive from them.</p> + +<p>Like Siegert, Scholz principally shows us isolated child-types +wherein diseased qualities play a more or less pronounced rôle. But +while the former’s presentation is somewhat journalistic in style, that +of the latter is more didactic; although this tendency is not an absolutely +rigid one, as the author counts mothers as readers of his book. +But if the form of presentation leads one to infer greater profundity +in Scholz than in Siegert, this is in still higher degree the case with +the arrangement of the material. While Siegert strings his child-pictures +loosely together, Scholz arranges them according to real +psychological points of view, so that (remarkable to say) the faults +of children are discussed, first, in the province of feeling and sentiment, +then in that of representation, and finally in that of volition +and action. The introductory and concluding chapters show, also, +that Scholz attempts to enter more profoundly into the subject than +Siegert proposes, and we cherish the hope that, now that this popular +work has appeared, Scholz will very soon present us with a strictly +scientific book, in which he shall have occasion to deal with some +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_268">[268]</span>particular points, such as, for instance, falsehood and unchastity, +more comprehensively than was perhaps possible in a book intended +for his present circle of readers.</p> + +<p>With respect, now, to all systematic presentations of pedagogy, +psychopathology can, as we have before indicated, never attain in +them its proper position, until the above-mentioned preparatory +work has been completed. But this fact should not preclude one’s +calling especial attention to the importance of this province, at least +in some incidental manner.</p> + +<p>In such a work as the <i>Allgemeine Pädagogik</i> of <span class="smcap">Ziller</span>,⁠<a id="FNanchor_50" href="#Footnote_50" class="fnanchor">[50]</a> for instance, +the third edition of which has just been published by F. Mattes +of Leipsic, there surely was abundant opportunity to do this—an +opportunity which one might say almost amounted to obligation. +For Ziller treats hereditary and acquired characteristics in +great detail, and such treatment remains necessarily a one-sided +one, if abnormal traits are not considered in it. Ziller, with Herbart, +demands that individuality always be taken as the starting-point. +But how many child-individualities are there, which, in the different +periods of their development, may be regarded as fully normal!</p> + +<p>The reason of this omission must be looked for partly in the +circumstance, that Ziller, as well as the new editor of this otherwise +valuable work, belongs to the Herbartian school. If, namely, we +compare the psychological literature of the Herbartian school with +the publications of French, English, and American writers, or even +with the works which in recent times have issued from other philosophical +quarters of Germany, it will be unmistakably seen that +the pathological conditions of the mind have been little considered +by the followers of Herbart. Nor have voices been wanting, that +would make Herbart himself responsible for this error. He did not, +they say, sufficiently appreciate the importance of the pathological +phenomena of mind, and his pupils were in this respect influenced +by him. But this reproach will be found, on close examination, to +be untenable. Herbart, it is true, did express himself repeatedly +against the overestimation of “rare and curious phenomena,” unusual +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_269">[269]</span>mental states and such things,⁠<a id="FNanchor_51" href="#Footnote_51" class="fnanchor">[51]</a> and his warning is applicable +also to our epoch, which produces many psychological works in +which remarkable things are to be read but which contribute nothing +worth mentioning towards the explanation of even comparatively +simple events. Herbart holds, that the psychology of the normal +and ordinary states should be the first and principal object of scientific +attention; the explanation of much that is extraordinary will +then follow. With regard to this latter point, he remarks very positively: +“I do not, however, wish by this, to gainsay the value of +any real psychological observation. There must be a welcome place +in science for every experience.” It will be seen, therefore, that +Herbart is not at all far from the point of view of Maudsley and other +investigators. We find, in fact, that he mentions repeatedly abnormal +mental conditions, and also systematically treats them, even +quoting such celebrated alienists as Reil and Pinel (<i>Text-book of Psychology</i>, +§§ 142-149). The probability is, therefore, that psychopathology +would have been properly employed in Herbart’s psychology, +if it had been at all elaborated in his day, and its influence would +through Herbart have been directly felt in pedagogy, as no pedagogist +has made better or more careful use of psychology than he.</p> + +<p>But Herbart’s pupils have done no further work in the province +pointed out by him. It is true, his psychology has been made use +of by physicians like Griesinger and Spielmann, and recently also +to some extent by Krafft-Ebing, but the works of these men have +had no influence on the psychological text-books of the Herbartian +school, and consequently the science has up to the present day exerted +no noticeable influence on pedagogy, either in Waitz, in Stoy, +or in Ziller. In other pedagogic schools, this has, it is true, also +been the case; but in these, who make no pretensions of relying on +the teachings of psychology, the sin is more easily pardoned. But +this is not the only respect in which Ziller’s <i>Pedagogy</i> is not up to +the times. Ziller defined pedagogy as the influences, formed according +to ethical points of view, which are brought to bear on the +mind of the pupil, and would not admit influences brought to bear +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_270">[270]</span>on the body, in so far as such should enter into the pedagogic system. +This misconception also springs from Ziller’s adherence to +the Herbartian school, which represents, as we well know, a metaphysical +pluralism; but it is in a still higher degree due to the +fact, that in Ziller’s day both the intimate relation between physiological +and psychological processes had not been satisfactorily established, +and also were not sufficiently known to him. If it were +otherwise, his pluralism need by no means have necessarily led him +into such one-sidedness, for this metaphysical pluralism does not +exclude a monistic conception of <i>phenomena</i>; even assuming this +doctrine, one may say that motion and feeling are two different but +inseparable sides of the same phenomenon. The “real things” produce +by their interaction, simultaneously and of necessity, both an +inner side and an outer; for which reason one of our foremost psychologists, +Volkmann of Volkmar, explicitly terms Herbart’s psychology +monistic (<i>Text-book of Psychology</i>, second edition, I, 63).</p> + +<p>A psychologico-physiological work, from which the new editor +of Ziller’s <i>Pedagogy</i> might have extracted many valuable things, is +the book of the Italian <span class="smcap">Mosso</span>, <i>On Fatigue</i>, which has just been +translated into German,⁠<a id="FNanchor_52" href="#Footnote_52" class="fnanchor">[52]</a> and which will excite much attention owing +to the present active discussion of the question of overwork.</p> + +<p>Supplementary to this work I will also mention a little tract by +<span class="smcap">Dr. Burgerstein</span> of Vienna, entitled <i>Die Arbeitskurve einer Schulstunde</i>.⁠<a id="FNanchor_53" href="#Footnote_53" class="fnanchor">[53]</a> +This tract is a lecture, which the author gave at the Seventh +International Congress for Hygiene and Demography at London, +and in which he seeks to find by statistical methods, the duration +of a “school-period”—a very laboriously composed treatise +and one difficult to read, but possessed of high interest in psychological +and pedagogic respects.</p> + +<p>From pedagogy to evolution is but a step, at least it is in Ziller’s +development of Herbart’s ideas. It is true, Ziller has taken a +decided stand against Darwinism, for Ziller works with two contradictory +ideas; but his theory of education possesses points of resemblance +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_271">[271]</span>and analogy to the Darwin-Haeckel theory of development. +According to Ziller, each individual passes, also intellectually, +through all the stages of development that mankind at large +has passed through, only in a shorter time; and it is in conformity +with such succession that the order of the various courses of a pedagogical +system is to be arranged. Following Ziller’s precedent, +<span class="smcap">Professor Vaihinger</span>, of Halle, in his treatise <i>Naturforschung und +Schule</i> (Science and the Schools), has taken up the school-reform +initiated by Professor Preyer, and has expressly transferred the fundamental +law of biogenesis to pedagogy. How instruction is to be +arranged under this point of view, cannot be explained in this letter, +which is already long enough. We shall simply remark that the idea +has found in Germany a large number of both friends and opponents.</p> + +<p>The opponents have recently been joined by a natural scientist, +<span class="smcap">Dr. Hamann</span>, professor of zoology in Göttingen, who has just published +a book under the title <i>Entwicklungslehre und Darwinismus</i> +(Evolution and Darwinism),⁠<a id="FNanchor_54" href="#Footnote_54" class="fnanchor">[54]</a> in which he does not combat the theory +of evolution itself, but simply the Darwin-Haeckelian form of +that theory, placing himself in the ranks of His and Hensen. The +book appeared almost simultaneously with the fourth edition of +<span class="smcap">Haeckel’s</span> <i>Anthropogeny</i>,⁠<a id="FNanchor_55" href="#Footnote_55" class="fnanchor">[55]</a> but the author, nevertheless, in his supplementary +remarks, discusses the “apology” which Haeckel subjoined +to his work. Haeckel’s book needs no recommendation in +scientific circles; it will be sufficient to state that the work has been +subjected to essential alterations, but that its fundamental features +have remained the same.</p> + +<p>A new psychology, on the Darwinian basis, by Prof. <span class="smcap">Fritz +Schultze</span> of Dresden, is now in course of publication, entitled <i>Vergleichende +Seelenkunde</i> (Comparative Psychology⁠<a id="FNanchor_56" href="#Footnote_56" class="fnanchor">[56]</a>). The first part, +which treats of the fundamental principles of physiological psychology, +has already appeared. On the completion of the work we shall +have occasion to return to it.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">Chr. Ufer.</span></p> + +<div class="footnotes"> + +<h5>FOOTNOTES:</h5> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_48" href="#FNanchor_48" class="label">[48]</a> <i>Problematic Child-natures.</i> Leipsic, 1890, Robert Vogtländer.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_49" href="#FNanchor_49" class="label">[49]</a> <i>Faults of Character in Children, A System of Instruction for School and Home.</i> +Leipsic. Eduard Heinrich Mayer.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_50" href="#FNanchor_50" class="label">[50]</a> Compare also, <i>The Educational Review</i> (New York), Vol. II, page 30.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_51" href="#FNanchor_51" class="label">[51]</a> <i>Psychologie als Wissenschaft</i>, § 5.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_52" href="#FNanchor_52" class="label">[52]</a> Salomon Hirzel, Leipsic.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_53" href="#FNanchor_53" class="label">[53]</a> Hamburg, 1891, Leopold Voss.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_54" href="#FNanchor_54" class="label">[54]</a> Jena, 1892, Hermann Costenoble.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_55" href="#FNanchor_55" class="label">[55]</a> Leipsic, 1892, Engelmann.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_56" href="#FNanchor_56" class="label">[56]</a> Leipsic, 1892.</p></div> + +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_272">[272]</span></p> + +<h3 class="nobreak" id="CRITICISMS_AND_DISCUSSIONS_II">CRITICISMS AND DISCUSSIONS.</h3> + +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h4 class="nobreak" id="A_LETTER_FROM_MR_HERBERT_SPENCER">A LETTER FROM MR. HERBERT SPENCER.</h4> + +</div> + +<p class="noindent"><i>To the Editor of The Monist</i>:</p> + +<p>As I feel it a duty to reserve, for other purposes, the very small power of work +now left to me, I am obliged to decline entering upon a controversy. I must leave +readers to examine for themselves—little hoping, however, that they will do so.</p> + +<p>One point only I wish to note. The use of the expression “forms of thought,” +instead of “forms of intuition,” was simply an inadvertence; as will be manifest +on observing that though I have used the wrong expression in the note, I have used +the right expression in the text (p. 203), as also throughout my criticism of Kant’s +doctrine in <i>The Principles of Psychology</i>, Part VII, Chapter IV, “The Reasonings +of Metaphysicians,” § 399.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">Herbert Spencer.</span></p> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h4 class="nobreak" id="LOGIC_AS_RELATION-LORE">LOGIC AS RELATION-LORE.</h4> + +</div> + +<p>In the French <i>Revue Philosophique</i>, in the August and September 1891 numbers +of the same, M. George Mouret has an essay entitled “Mathematical Equality” +in the course of which and as though subsidiary to his ostensible purpose he +discourses upon the topics of relations and concepts and upon the fundamental +elements of logic in general. His essay is really more important as a contribution +to logical doctrine than as a treatment of mathematical equality.</p> + +<p>The scope of his discourse will be seen by reference to his closing paragraphs +in which he sums up what he considers to be the results achieved by him in his +essay. Therein, he says that he has “treated of the general theory of the composition +of concepts and relations and set the foundations of the logic of analysis and +the logic of definition.”</p> + +<h5>I. THE SPENCERIAN AXIOM.</h5> + +<p>The determining factor of every philosophical dissertation is of course some +very general supposition which is taken as established and which exercises a controlling +influence over all the observations of its author.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_273">[273]</span></p> + +<p>In this case this determining supposition is found in what M. Mouret calls his +“<i>axiom</i> of <i>symmetry</i>.” The same is thus stated by him “<i>Two things which have +the same symmetrical relations to a third thing have between them that same relation.</i>”</p> + +<p>M. Mouret is not one of those scholars that lack hospitality for other writings +than those of their own nationality. From this fault so noticeable in the work of so +many of the French scholars M. Mouret himself seems to be free. Indeed so far +as regards the previous work done in the domain he sets himself to examine, he accords +almost exclusive esteem to the writings of English thinkers. In fact he declares +himself so far as regards his present topic a disciple of Mr. Herbert Spencer +and puts his “axiom of symmetry” as an adaptation of that maxim of his said +master which is of the tenor as follows, viz: “<i>Things which have a definite relation +to the same thing have a definite relation to one another.</i>” This maxim, as Mr. +Spencer tells us, was suggested to him by a remark of the late eminent author who +is known to the world under the pseudonym of George Eliot, who herself stated it +under the form “<i>Things that have a constant relation to the same thing have a constant +relation to each other.</i>”</p> + +<p>Those who are well acquainted with the psychology of Mr. Spencer will recognise +that this maxim of his is made by him the very backbone of all his observations +upon reasoning. If it has the validity which he imputes to it, it has an importance +which it will be hard to overestimate, but if on the contrary, and as we +shall submit, it is in every form in which it has been stated, certainly unsound and +misleading, it is high time that its virtue should be brought into question.</p> + +<p>The <i>dicta</i> of the masters whether they first enounce the same or whether they +only give currency thereto by their ratification are always proper subjects for special +scrutiny. There is always found a disposition to accept them on their mere <i>ipse dixit</i> +without any attempt at criticism or independent observation. This is decisively <i>not</i> +the scientific mood or mode. The spirit of that modern leaven that is currently referred +to under the name of Science is characteristically a critical one, and one +that is considerably irreverent in regard to the authority of mere personality. In +this it is happily distinguished from the spirit that has marked the past history of +what may be called the “regular” schools of philosophy.</p> + +<p>M. Mouret is not alone in his inadvertent esteem for the maxim in question. +In the issue of <i>Mind</i> for October 1891 Mr. L. T. Hobhouse publishes an article entitled +“Induction and Deduction,” in which he gives an undue appraisal to the +worth of the maxim under consideration, even though the author of the article +seems to be well aware that said maxim stands in much need of qualification.</p> + +<p>We venture to say that this maxim in all its forms has gained whatever currency +it has enjoyed in virtue alone of the incompetent comprehension that too generally +prevails in regard to the nature and characteristics of that sort of things that are +relations.</p> + +<p>A notable example of this lack of comprehension is supplied in the logical treatise +of Mr. Carveth Read, a work ostensibly founded upon the significance of the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_274">[274]</span>category of relation and yet in which at the very start the author tells us that a relation +is something which is indefinable.</p> + +<h5>II. IMPORTANCE OF RELATION-LORE.</h5> + +<p>This topic of relations is one that is neglected in a degree that reflects no credit +upon the pretensions of those who undertake to instruct others in matters logical and +philosophical. The thing itself is in the thinking of every one and the term and its +derivations are in universal use. They are used as though they imported an idea +that no one was liable to misapply or to misunderstand. The truth, however, is +that of all the stock terms in our graver discourse this very word “relation” and +its derivatives are the ones that are oftenest heard and read without any lucidity of +mind concerning their proper intent as a part of their context. They are used with +an assortment of meanings and non-meanings that are quite distracting to try to follow +and quite vain to try and reconcile. In particular the difference between <i>relationship</i> +and <i>relation</i>, between the <i>ground</i> or <i>foundation</i> of the relation and the relation +itself, between the plural fact, whether of tendency, interaction, transition, or +<i>status</i>, that is a co-condition with the relations, and the relations that co-condition +that same plural fact, is constantly ignored in thinking and in the expression thereof, +to the more or less confusion in, and inconsequence of, the whole discourse delivered.</p> + +<p>It is no slight commendation of the perspicacity of M. Mouret to observe that +he has discovered that the way towards a resolution of the problems he sets himself +to work out lies through what to him appears the altogether unexplored regions of +relation-lore, for it is evident that he regards himself as a pioneer in this field.</p> + +<h5>III. WORKS ON RELATION-LORE IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE.</h5> + +<p>In observing this we cannot but hold M. Mouret unfortunate in not having been +put upon better lines of inquiry. He seems to have been wholly unaware of the +treasures of investigation in this domain that exist in the English language and that +for many years have been available for the student. His case in this respect is seen +in the exaltation which he gives to the semi-popular discourses of Mr. Spencer and +Mr. Read, as contrasted with the profound researches of DeMorgan and Boole and +their disciples. It is evident that he has judged concerning the comparative quality +of the various lines of English research not after an examination of his own, but +after the current popular renown. For example, he speaks of the work of DeMorgan +and Boole as presenting “only a simple mode of representing some of the logical +laws” and as being “surrounded with a formidable and complicated apparel which +disguises the value of their tentatives.”</p> + +<p>Since M. Mouret is manifestly an earnest student of the topic of relation-lore +this language shows that he has at best only a second or third-hand knowledge of +what DeMorgan and Boole really did. He ought to have known that in the recondite +field of research in question all really competent treatment of the same would be +very far from having any “popular” quality. For a man to discourse of relation-lore +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_275">[275]</span>in ignorance of what DeMorgan, the very father of the “Logic of Relatives,” +accomplished is like discoursing of Darwinism in ignorance of “The Origin of Species.”</p> + +<p>We opine that when M. Mouret shall have consulted the great memoir of +DeMorgan in the tenth volume of the “Cambridge Philosophical Transactions” or +better, when he shall have become acquainted with the more developed work of +Mr. C. S. Peirce, to whom beyond question relation-lore is most indebted for its +present state of progress, he will have a better esteem for the value of the “tentatives” +of DeMorgan and Boole and their disciples. Mr. Peirce has published three +principal papers on the subject in question. The first of these was published in 1870 +in the ninth volume of the “Memoirs of the American Academy of Arts and +Sciences.” Then in 1880 and in 1884, while Mr. Peirce was lecturer on logic at +Johns Hopkins University, he published in the <i>American Journal of Mathematics</i> +two papers dealing more or less extensively with relation-lore. One of these his +“<i>Hauptwerk</i>” as it is called by Professor Schroeder of Carlsruhe, appears in the +third volume of the journal mentioned and the other in the seventh volume of the +same. Mr. Peirce was one of the contributors to our new American “Century Dictionary,” +and in that work under the definitions of Relation and Relativity there appears +a summary treatment of the subject which is as we take it the work of Mr. +Peirce and which might have given to M. Mouret hints which he would have appreciated. +Also the editor of this magazine in his article “Are there Things in +Themselves?” in the January 1892 number thereof incidentally touches upon the +topic under consideration in such a way as to correct some of the more inveterate +misconceptions.</p> + +<h5>IV. M. MOURET’S THEORY OF RELATIONS.</h5> + +<p>The article of M. Mouret is in so many points so excellent a discourse that the +chief reflection one is inclined to make is that upon its own principles it ought to +have been better. He seems to have been widely awake to the primordial nature +of relations as philosophical data. He says: “Every notion or relation is a <i>function</i> +of relations more directly known and enters as a relational element into other +relations less proximate to the common sources,” and also that “every concept or +notion ought to resolve into a group of relations.”</p> + +<p>By such tokens as these we naturally look to see M. Mouret making it his +very first concern to explain fully the nature of those primordial data that are +relations. Indeed he seems himself to be fully aware of this natural expectation +for he says: “What then is a relation; what is a concept or notion? To this +double question an answer is necessary and a precise answer not consisting in the +substitution of one form of words for another form of words bearing the same +meaning or no meaning at all.”</p> + +<p>We cannot however find that he has done this. Instead of it and almost +while saying that every concept and notion ought to resolve in a group of relations +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_276">[276]</span>he announces, “What I have to examine is the constitution, the structure of these +<i>relation-generating groups</i>.” Thus he starts with a synthesis when what is needed +is analysis. He starts with supposing a group of relational elements indeterminate +in number and proceeds to inquire as to the conditions that must subsist with regard +to them, respectively and in combination, in order that a <i>definite</i> relation may +subsist as to a pair of the relational elements. These conditions he finds to be four +in number. First, he finds that—</p> + +<p>“It is necessary that every one of the terms of the group should be connected +one to the other by <i>definite relations</i>; that between any two terms there must always +be intermediate terms that connect them in a continuous way.” This he +calls the condition of “Solidarity.” Secondly, he finds that there must obtain the +condition of <i>Co-Existence</i>. By co-existence he intends—</p> + +<p>“Not a definite co-existence in time, that is to say, a relation of simultaneity +or concomitance, nor yet that established co-existence which constitutes the causal +relation, but an indefinite co-existence independent of the order of its terms and of +all consideration of time or duration.”</p> + +<p>Having thus supposed his group all well stocked with relations, he proceeds to +relegate most of them to the limbo of inconsequence by invoking a <i>principle</i> which +he calls the principle of <i>indetermination</i>. By virtue of this principle in every particular +case the <i>particular determinations</i> of all the terms become indeterminate and +those of the intermediate terms doubly so. Thus the supposed facts of the case +become fit for the existence of the <i>Third</i> condition, that of <i>Abstraction</i>, and for the +arising of a general concept or notion.</p> + +<p>But corresponding to every concept or notion is its negative or opposite concept +or notion. As this negative depends necessarily upon certain <i>particular determinations</i> +of the same terms that bear the <i>particular determinations</i> and which being +singly indeterminate admit of the positive concept or notion, there necessarily +must obtain two systems of singly indeterminate <i>particular determinations</i> relative +to but incompatible with one another, and so relative that the negation of one set +entails the obtaining of the other set, or in other words either set being negated entails +the obtaining of the other set. These facts constitute what M. Mouret calls +the <i>principle</i> of <i>incompatibility</i> and involve his <i>Fourth</i> condition of <i>Relativity</i> +stated by him as follows:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“All the particular determinations of the extreme terms must not be compatible +with the system and the negation of certain relations of the system must entail +the negation of the relation which they make between the extreme terms.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<h5>V. REFLECTIONS ON M. MOURET’S THEORY.</h5> + +<p>Now we cannot regard this as a successful attempt to explain the nature and +characteristics of relations, or to unfold the involutions of relation-lore.</p> + +<p>We fully realise that if every concept or relation resolves into a group of relations +we must in some form or other take what are relations in reality as data to begin +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_277">[277]</span>with, but this does not prevent us from taking our datum terms for our turn of +explanation as not requiring at present any recognition other than as relational elements. +What is needful as a prime requisite on the very start of any research in +relation-lore is to obtain a clear idea of what is meant by a relation. Meanings are +primarily matters of mental status. We have to determine the relation that subsists +between the mind and the object through the mediating interpretation of a +word, and the mental affection lies nearest and logically comes first. It may very +well be that the mental affection requires correction, but this cannot take place until +its faults are observed, and these cannot become evident until the mental affection is +itself duly understood.</p> + +<p>The disciples of that school of logic in which DeMorgan and Boole, both eminent +mathematicians, hold so exalted a rank as discoverers, regard cognition as arising +in consequence of brain functioning or <i>mental operation</i> and study the results of +this operation as yielding their import in dependence upon and only in dependence +upon the proper operation in virtue of which they arise.</p> + +<p>Now no cognition whatever, even of the most elementary sort, arises except in +connection with and in consequence of that operation of the sensibility which is +<i>distinction</i>. Distinction is of multitudinous and manifold aspects. In all its phases +whether it be passive or active it is naught else than the arising or the assigning of +relations. The attempt to posit an unqualifiedly absolute—that is, an unqualifiedly +unrelated—universe of discourse must be futile and blank, necessarily and insuperably. +Any form of notation that pretends to express such a universe of discourse, +is only saved, if at all, from being unqualifiedly nonsensical, by standing as antithetical—that +is, by being <i>related</i> to forms of notation that express relation and +nothing else than relation. This rigorously prime operation of distinction is not +only pure relation-ing but it is of that sort of relation-ing that is at once a distinguishing +and a conjoining. The “One and the Many” are insuperably implicit +therein. Distinction having operated to various extents, and thereby various relations +having come into view, we become aware of those items of experience +that are objects or facts. Each and every one of these objects or facts are in truth +distinguished and are therefore in no strict sense <i>indiscernible</i> from each other, but +since no science can possibly obtain in relation to mere particulars we find it useful +to disregard various points of distinction that obtain in respect to various objects +and facts and to converge our regard upon the points wherein distinction, not absolutely +vanishes, but <i>tends to vanish</i>.</p> + +<p>By this operation, which is <i>abstraction</i>, various objects and facts become in +mental regard fit and useful to be taken as copies of one another and as indifferent +for use in most of the turns of mental life.</p> + +<p>There are indeed various relations, objects, and facts, with respect to which no +further operation or operations of distinction than the mere distinctions of the time, +the place, or the occasion of their various manifestations have been applied nor +can without great difficulty be applied. But we are therefore by no means entitled +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_278">[278]</span>to say that such are in truth irresolvable. Contrarily, and reasoning inductively +we are justified in concluding that every relation, object, and fact will under analysis +of adequate power resolve without limit into other relations, objects, and facts.</p> + +<p>We are not yet prepared to see that the ultimate components of relations, objects, +and facts resolve into relations, and nothing but relations, because we are not +yet prepared with an explicit idea of the nature and characteristics of these elementary +objects.</p> + +<p>The study of M. Mouret since it starts with relations combining them under +the conditions of Solidarity Co-Existence, Abstraction and Relativity, (which are +nothing else than other relations or compounds of relations,) does not seem to us to +advance us at all in the most fundamental requisite. He says no more than to say +that in order for the groups of relations to generate further definite relations the +relations thus grouped together must be related to one another and then that most +of these relations must be disregarded.</p> + +<p>M. Mouret distinguishes, with respect to a relation three factors, the <i>Matter</i>, or +the relational elements grouped together, the <i>Form</i>, or the order in which the relational +elements are arrayed, and the <i>Foundation</i>.</p> + +<p>As his study of the topic of relations is professedly for the purpose of enabling +him the better to solve the nature of the relation of mathematical equality, his success +may be estimated by reference to his conclusions in regard to that relation. +These are as follows: “The relation of equality is formed of undetermined matter, +it possesses a binary form, and has for a condition a relation of indiscernibility +between the two elements.”</p> + +<p>Such conclusions appear to us to be impotent not to say erroneous. If two +things obtain at all, they obtain as two and not one, in very virtue of being distinguished +the one from the other. Except with regard to some more or less arbitrary +distinctions, like the distinction between coincident points, all distinctions obtain +only in virtue of some relation that can be nothing else than a point of <i>discernibility</i>. +Numbers and other mathematical things are taken as not-different not because +they are in truth indiscernible but because for the turn in hand their points of +difference are irrelevant.</p> + +<p>Concerning the much mooted question of the proper field of logic as a science +M. Mouret holds it to be the “science of relations and general concepts.” Although +we hold that logic is particularly concerned with the lore that is more directly +related to the phenomena of erroneous thinking and its correction, the view of M. +Mouret is not unacceptable. “Reasoning consists in the observation that where +certain relations subsist certain others are found,” as Mr. Peirce has remarked.</p> + +<h5>VI. CONCERNING MEANINGS AND EXPLANATIONS.</h5> + +<p>As preliminary to our account of relations we will make an observation which +seems to us of considerable use in connection therewith. It is not without its bearing +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_279">[279]</span>on the theory of definition or rather upon the broader theory of explanation. With +M. Mouret we hold that every concept and relation resolves into a compound of +relations. Since relations are data that are absolutely elementary at least so far +as we are at present instructed they are of course not subsumable under any other +sort of data that are better known. Moreover, whatever explanation we here make +must needs be made by means of written words. Thus an important question arises as +to what method is to be pursued in this special exigency. The theory of definition +leads us to the same difficulty, for although the meanings of many words can be defined +in terms that are more proximate to the elementary relations, we will always +come at last to terms that admit of no improved explanation by such a method. There +is no device of words that can evade or supersede the ultimate recourse to things. Now +the significations of words are learned in most cases not so much by definitions and +verbal descriptions as by <i>the observation of the various applications of the words</i>. Indeed +this is the primitive way in which the meanings of words are found out. The +child knows nothing of what, say, the word <i>horse</i> means until some one shows it an +actual horse and may be pointing to it says repeatedly, <i>horse</i>, in such a way as to +excite the observation of the child to the intended application of the word to the +thing. This is because the relation of every general sign to its object subsists only +in consequence of a mental association, and until this mental association is created +the sign has no meaning. The methods of evoking these mental associations are at +present quite unmethodical and do not receive the attention which their importance +merits. One feasible method is to present or to state a number of scenes that shall +present the object in various ways in connection with the sign thereof, and thus to +excite attention to the proper application of the sign. The geometer does this by +means of his diagrams without which or their mental counterparts all his mere +words would be in vain.</p> + +<p>Mr. Edward T. Dixon has lately published a work on the “Foundations of +Geometry” in which he would introduce as a fundamental datum what is really an +altogether new and exceedingly abstract conception which he calls by an old name, +that of <i>direction</i>. The old term has never been as yet taken in any abstract universal +sense because apart from definite right lines showing it as an attribute any +abstract universal meaning is wholly unassignable. But the conception that Mr. +Dixon would instal is removed in abstractness from such a universal yet one more +step in universality. A three-fold infinity of right lines differing in direction can +be drawn in ordinary space to each of which pertain two corresponding universals +of direction, one converse to the other. Now the conception of direction that +Mr. Dixon proposes for service as an elementary geometrical datum is the universal +that subsumes all these lower ranking universals as particulars. Of course +he has difficulty in even trying to explain what he means. Realising the impossibility +of subsuming it in any way he takes a method which if it were more thoroughly +applied, and wholly emancipated from the lingering notion of definition, +might have been more successful. As he actually left the matter his real meaning +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_280">[280]</span>can only be drawn from close study of the way in which he applies the term in his +discourse in general.</p> + +<p>Owing to its excessive abstractness his conception is wholly unfit for service in +elementary geometry. One has to become a good geometer before the conception +can even be approached.</p> + +<h5>VII. ANOTHER THEORY OF RELATIONS.</h5> + +<p>We shall proceed to explain what we regard as a true and adequate notion of a +relation by stating some scenes that display the same. We do not regard it as +needful to state many of them and we take for our first one, the common transaction +of making a donation. We have here for relational elements or terms as they +are usually called a set of three. Separately, or as not yet brought into relation in +virtue of the giving, there may be, say <i>G</i> an owner of <i>W</i> a watch and <i>R</i> the intended +beneficiary. The plural fact of the giving is the <i>relationship</i> or the <i>foundation</i> +of the <i>relations</i> that arise in virtue of said giving. This <i>foundation</i> becomes to +be in virtue of the creation of such relations by the giving. Either one of the set of +three may be taken as the datum of reference and according to the election in this +respect, the relations may differ and the technical names we are about to give will +vary in their application. Since simplicity will be gained thereby and also our +present turn fully subserved we will take <i>G</i> as the datum term of reference. So +taking it <i>G</i> is called the <i>relate</i> and both <i>W</i> and <i>R</i> are called the <i>correlates</i>. For +this present turn and in very virtue of the giving and only in virtue thereof <i>G</i> becomes +related to <i>W</i> and <i>R</i> in a certain relation one of the names of which is giver. +When <i>W</i> or <i>R</i> are taken as relates certain other relations appear, some of the +names of which are respectively <i>present</i> and <i>recipient</i>. In relation to the relation of +giver the relations of present and recipient are named <i>converse</i> relations, as are +likewise the relations of present and giver to the relation of recipient and the relations +of giver and recipient to the relation of present. Here are three distinct relations +growing out of the same relationship or foundation. As each relational element +has its corresponding negation, the true logical system of a set of three terms +involves not less than eight relations.</p> + +<p>We take for our second scene the case of a boundary. This might be a surface +or a point but we will take the special case of a line on a surface. Here we have +again a set of three, the spread on one side, <i>A</i>, the opposite spread, <i>B</i>, and the +line <i>L</i>. <i>A</i> has a certain relation, say above, to <i>L</i> and <i>B</i>, <i>B</i> has the certain relation, +below, to <i>A</i> and <i>L</i>, which relation is converse to the relation above: and <i>L</i> +has the certain relation, boundary, to <i>A</i> and <i>B</i> which relation is converse to the +relations above and below.</p> + +<p>The two examples now given are cases of the <i>conjugative</i> kind. The relationship +is a conjugative one and the relations are conjugative relations. The distinguishing +characteristic of a conjugative case is the fact essentially involved of the +mediation between relational elements by another certain element, or in other +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_281">[281]</span>words the bringing of diverse relational elements into relation by the function of another +relational element. Without the mediation or function of this conjugating +element neither the relationship nor the conjugative relations can exist. There is +reason to believe that all conjugative cases can be certified as cases of three relational +elements or as compounds of a number of such sets of three. To ordinary +uncritical thought which is largely constrained by the trammels of ordinary language +the most abundant sort of relations appears to be of that sort that are taken +to involve only two relational elements. These are cases of what are called <i>dual</i> +relationships and the relations that arise out of them are called <i>dual</i> relations. Such +are those like father, son, husband, wife, etc. Strictly viewed they ought to be regarded +as <i>degenerate</i> relationships and relations just as a pair of lines is regarded as +a degenerate conic.</p> + +<h5>VIII. CAUTIONS AND APPLICATIONS.</h5> + +<p>Now besides the error of confounding relations with relationship, it is a very +common fault to think and speak of a relation as being <i>between</i> two or more terms. +This imports into thought the thoroughly misleading idea of an intervening independent +existence for relations. Relations are attributive predicates of terms and +each one of them pertains strictly to its proper term or combination of terms, in +the same sense for this turn (<i>pro hac vice</i>) that qualities are held to pertain to their +so-called substances. And yet relations so pertain to their proper terms not in +virtue of such terms separately but in virtue of their membership in the plural fact +which obtains as the <i>relationship</i> or <i>foundation</i>. The notion of a relation as a +“betweenness” has perhaps been fostered by the exact coincidence of relations +pertaining to the several members of the same relationship. When on contemplating +the connection, say of two points, we observe that the distance of one from +the other is apparently indistinguishable from the distance of the other from the +one, we naturally overlook the fact that we are truly to regard the connection as the +coincidence of two really distinct relations, and regarding the pair of relations as +one thing and finding it not attributable to one point more than to the other we dissociate +it from both. But when we consider a pair of relations that are converse +to one another and that arise out of a dual relationship like that of husband and +wife we may see that there is <i>no</i> betweenness, no single relation that interlies, but +two relations, one the relation of husband and the other the converse relation of +wife.</p> + +<p>An interaction, say like that of approach under the influence of gravitation, is +a relationship. Each body stands in the relation of a <i>puller</i> of the other and the +mediating term which we find impossible to argue out of the account we call the +attraction of gravitation. In this case the relation of action of the one body is not +usually distinguished from the relation of action of the other one. Indeed this is +the case in all cases of mechanical action and we lay it down as a maxim that action +and reaction are equal but they are not alike since their directions are opposite. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_282">[282]</span>Sensation is a relationship, since it is our interaction. The object interacts with +the brain. As to the conjugating term we are as yet in the dark and so we are in +the habit of regarding this case as a dual relation. The relation of the brain to the +object is that of a <i>knower</i> and that of the object to the brain that of a <i>stimulater</i>. +Each character or mark of the object that becomes apparent gives rise to relations +and their respective converses each correlative pair of which are respectively so +many distinct interactions of detail in the entire interaction. Whatever an object +as known to us is, it is in virtue of those relations of brain action and detailed object +stimulation, which are relations and always relations. Since consciousness +exists only by the arising of relations of distinction, supposably in consequence of +internal brain interaction, is it presumptuous to allege that consciousness consists of +relations or a complex of relations?</p> + +<h5>IX. NATURE OF OBJECTS.</h5> + +<p>With regard to the object no one can prevent whoever may be so disposed, +from imputing to it various points of possession that do not and cannot interact with +the brain. So far as such imputed points are regarded as merely not yet interacting +but possible to interact with knowing substance such points in no wise differ in essential +nature from the known attributes. They are potential relations and nothing +else. But in so far as they are regarded as essentially impossible of ever interacting +with knowing substance in any possible stage of its development such regard is pure +nonsense and utterly without any assignable meaning. There is no occasion whatever +for such an imputation, for the existence of interaction actual or potential is +fully adequate to explain all that will ever present itself to be explained.</p> + +<p>At this point let us instruct ourselves with an example of the reasonings of a +much and deservedly honored philosopher. He says:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“In the most general predicate which is determined Being or existence—for all +things in the universe are determined beings—we have an evident two-foldness (a +composite nature) which allows of a further analysis into pure Being and determination.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>We will parallel this analysis. For the sake of simplicity we will take a limited +right line. It has the determinations straight and long, not length in the sense of +measure, for length is ambiguous in its intent, but length in its qualitative sense—its +linearity so to speak. Now separate from it first its straightness without however +giving to it any other determination, and then its quality of longness. We have +then a <i>pure</i> line, that is neither straight, nor long, nor anything else. Such is an example +of “Pure Being.” <i>We</i> say however that its very being as a line is absolutely +dependent on its determination as a long line; that such a determination alone constitutes +it a line, is at once its determination and its being, that there is no two-foldness +at all but only two names, and that as one-fold its determination as long +and its being vanish together. What is true of a line is true of all relations and +compounds of relations whatever.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_283">[283]</span></p> + +<p>Thus not only all knowledge but all existence so far as that term can ever have +any meaning is relative; relative to all intents and for every possible turn.</p> + +<p>To those who accept the essentials of this account of relations it will be easy +to see what is the nature of an object and that of a concept or notion. An object is a +relation or some congeries of relations that usually present themselves as a coherent +whole to our sensibility or to consciousness. This is primarily effected in virtue of +some efficacy which we cannot appropriate to ourselves, and so we distinguish our +own personality from that manifold that we call the objective world. It is pure +self-stultification after having made this most useful distinction to try and abolish +it. Nothing but an utter abolition of all useful thought can result from so taking +the data of experience.</p> + +<h5>X. NATURE OF A CONCEPT.</h5> + +<p>But objects are individual and generally found with various points of distinction +some of which are irrelevant to most of the turns of mental life. We therefore +neglect the irrelevant points and take many objects as copies of one another. This +process is <i>not</i> the formation of the concept or notion but it suggests and prompts that +formation. We cannot but regard it as an error to take a conception as a <i>sum</i> of +individuals. It seems to us to be rather in the nature of a <i>locus</i>. A curve contains +an infinity of points and yet the curve is not any sum of points even though it is +often allowable to speak of it as the sum of all its points. So any concept, say, +man, is not all the men that now live nor yet all the men that eternity both backwards +and forwards has contained and will contain. A concept is a manifold and +strictly universal and infinite in respect to the particulars it subsumes. We speak +of the infinitive mood of a verb because the meaning of the word as thus taken is +not put under any modification. In like manner the meaning of any concept though +subject to various limitations in its applications is as a concept merely to be regarded +as obtaining in a purely infinitive sense. Professor Jevons found a difficulty in +classifying what he called <i>material</i> terms, such as stone, sand, water, etc. Other +logicians have put such terms as singular terms, while still others have classed them +as general terms. There is a great variety of such terms. Potatoes, wheat, butter, +ice, cattle, water, hydrogen, the names of all the elements, ether, electricity, time, +space, love, virtue, etc., are instances. It seems to us that such terms are the normal +types of general terms and that the canonical forms of our universal propositions +ought to be unquantified not only as regards the predicates but also as regards +the subjects. Why not “man is animal” just as “lard is grease” or “man is +mortal” just as “butter is cheap”?</p> + +<p>Moreover the distinction between a general concept and one that is called +singular is only one of degree and not of kind. Every so-called singular term is +potentially at least only an individual instance under a possible general or universal +concept. A striking example of this potentiality is furnished by the modern generalisations +of that formerly singular term, space. If these observations are well +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_284">[284]</span>founded, the universals of thought even though arising out of the facts of experience +and rigidly beholden to experience for every last element out of which they are constructed, +form nevertheless a Formal-Thought-World, and the mind of man in virtue +of its powers of imaginative construction and generalisation has a constitution that +enables it to subsume the actual objective universe as only one particular of a universality +of a higher rank.</p> + +<p>Under such a conception of the objective world and the world of thought and +their relations the old dispute of realism versus nominalism would take a new aspect. +<i>Universals in re</i> even though they were admitted to exist would become universals +no longer in the higher universe of thought. True universals would only subsist as +universals of the world of mind. The laws of Form and Formal Thought would +thus become of chief moment in philosophy and no one could be recognised as properly +laying claim to the title of philosopher without proficiency therein.</p> + +<h5>XI. FALLACY OF THE SPENCERIAN AXIOM.</h5> + +<p>Concerning the “axiom of symmetry” only a few examples of its fallacy are +needful. Mutual friendship is certainly a “symmetrical” relation, but <i>A</i> and <i>C</i> may +be mutual friends and <i>B</i> and <i>C</i> mutual friends also, but it in no wise follows that <i>A</i> +and <i>B</i> are friends. They may be decidedly unfriendly as we often see the case. +Take a case of equilibrium the cases of which seem to be favorite ones with M. +Mouret. We suppose that planets may be regarded as in a relation of equilibrium +with the sun and yet these mere equilibrations with the sun do not make any equilibrium +between them. They do not knock together it is true but this is due to +their own direct relations and not their relations of equilibrium with the sun.</p> + +<p>The distances of points from each other is a “symmetrical” relation and yet +point <i>A</i> may be from point <i>C</i> the very same distance that point <i>B</i> is from <i>C</i>, but +the distance of points <i>A</i> and <i>B</i> from one another may vary from coincidence to +double the distance <i>A C</i>-<i>B C</i>.</p> + +<h5>XII. NATURE OF ARITHMETICAL EQUALITY.</h5> + +<p>Concerning the relation of “mathematical equality” there is no single relation +that obtains throughout mathematics as such. There is numerical equality upon +which the equality in service in numeric algebra is founded, and there is geometric +equality, the equality of vectors, etc., all different from one another. M. Mouret +seems to have only numeric equality in view. He claims this relation to be not only +of a very simple nature but that it is the very foundation of the notions of magnitude +and quantity. He even declares that mathematics could not exist without this +relation. Did he lose sight of the usual proof of Fourier’s celebrated theorem?</p> + +<p>As we have explained, things that are distinguished are not really alike but +only for certain turns taken to be so. This assimilation of things is of various +grades. In arithmetic, meaning arithmetic in its most general sense, the only logical +comprehension that the various numbers possess is respectively their greater +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_285">[285]</span>or less partitionability; <i>m</i> is the same as <i>n</i> means in arithmetic that whatever has +the numerical rank of <i>m</i> has also precisely the numerical rank of <i>n</i> no matter what +summations or other numerical operations <i>m</i> or <i>n</i> may represent. Identity of this +sort is arithmetical equality. It seems a simple relation for the reason that its intervention +very decisively simplifies our arithmetical comprehensions. It is however +a coincidence of two relations that are converse to one another. These relations are +“not less than” and “not greater than.” It is universally admitted that the more +inclusive a notion or concept is in extension, the more simple and primary it is than +any other notion or concept included as an instance under it. Now all equality is +“not less than” but not all “not less than” is necessarily equality; hence, “not +less than” is a wider and more primary notion than equality. On the same considerations +“not more than” is in the same case. Equality is the limiting case between +the variable and logically more simple cases of “not less than” and “not +more than.” The notion of quantity emerges on comparison however vague between +any two objects that have size, independently of the notion of equality. If +this were not true how could we have the notions of infinitely large and infinitely +small.</p> + +<p>It is indeed true that without the notion of equality the theory of numbers and +the mathematical analysis could subsist in a rudimentary state only, but to say that +they would not exist at all is rash and not maintainable. The relations “not less +than” “not more than” would still allow of some truly mathematical propositions, +operations, and calculations. In that essentially qualitative notation that is ordinary +language the relation that corresponds to equality is of very limited range but a +relation that is analogous to “not less than,” viz., supersumption, is very efficient.</p> + +<p>With a theory of numbers and a mathematical analysis using only the relations +“not less than” “not more than” in lieu of the relation of equality the fundamental +operations, addition and substitution, would find some scope of application +and hence the derivative operations, multiplication, powering, etc., and their inversions, +subtraction, division, etc., would obtain in some fashion and to some extent. +This can readily be seen by any one who is familiar with the way in which +expressions of inequality are used in modern mathematical analysis.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">Francis C. Russell.</span></p> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h4 class="nobreak" id="OBSERVATIONS">OBSERVATIONS ON SOME POINTS IN JAMES’S PSYCHOLOGY.</h4> + +</div> + +<h5>II. EMOTION.</h5> + +<p>Nothing in Professor James’s work will be likely to strike the average reader as +more paradoxical than his views on the subject of Emotion, which he must be allowed +to state in his own words. After premising that he will limit his discussion, +in the first instance, to what may be called the coarser emotions, as fear, grief, +rage, love, in which every one recognises a strong organic reverberation, he goes on +to say:</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_286">[286]</span></p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“Our natural way of thinking about these coarser emotions is that the mental +perception of some fact excites the mental affection called the emotion, and that +this latter state of mind gives rise to the bodily expression. My theory, on the contrary, +<i>is that the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the existing fact, +and that our feeling of the same changes, as they occur, is the emotion</i>. Common +sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, are frightened +and run; we are insulted by a rival, are angry and strike. The hypothesis here to +be defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect, that the one mental state +is not immediately induced by the other, that the bodily manifestations must first +be interposed between, and that the more rational statement is that we feel sorry +because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that +we strike, cry, or tremble, because we are sorry, angry or fearful, as the case may +be. Without the bodily state following on the perception, the latter would be +purely cognitive in form, pale, colorless, destitute of emotional warmth. We might +then see the bear and judge it best to run, receive the insult and deem it right to +strike, but we should not actually <i>feel</i> afraid or angry.</p> + +<p>“Stated in this crude way, the hypothesis is pretty sure to meet with immediate +disbelief. And yet neither many nor far-fetched considerations are required to +mitigate its paradoxical character, and possibly to produce conviction of its truth.</p> + +<p>“To begin with, no reader of the last two chapters will be inclined to doubt +the fact that <i>objects do excite bodily changes</i> by a preorganised mechanism, or the +farther fact <i>that the changes are so indefinitely numerous and subtle that the entire +organism may be called a sounding-board</i> which every change of consciousness, however +slight, may make reverberate....</p> + +<p>“The next thing to be noticed is this, that <i>every one of the bodily changes, whatsoever +it be, is <span class="smcap">felt</span>, acutely or obscurely, the moment it occurs</i>....</p> + +<p>“I now proceed to urge the vital point of my whole theory, which is this: <i>If +we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it +all the feelings of its bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind</i>, no ‘mind-stuff’ +out of which the emotion can be constituted, and that a cold and neutral state +of intellectual perception is all that remains. It is true that, although most people +when asked say that their introspection verifies this statement, some persist in saying +that it does not. Many cannot be made to understand the question. When you +beg them to imagine away every feeling of laughter and of tendency to laugh from +their consciousness of the ludicrousness of an object, and then to tell you what the +feeling of its ludicrousness would be like, whether it be anything more than the perception +that the object belongs to the class ‘funny,’ they persist in replying that the +thing proposed is a physical impossibility and that they always <i>must</i> laugh if they +see a funny object. Of course the task proposed is not the practical one of seeing +a ludicrous object and annihilating one’s tendency to laugh. It is the purely speculative +one of subtracting certain elements of feeling from an emotional state supposed +to exist in all its fulness, and saying what the residual elements are. I cannot +help thinking that all who rightly apprehend this problem will agree with the +proposition above laid down. What kind of an emotion of fear would be left if the +feeling neither of quickened heart-beats nor of shallow breathing, neither of trembling +lip nor of weakened limbs, neither of goose-flesh nor of visceral stirrings, +were present, it is quite impossible for me to think. Can one fancy the state of +rage and picture no ebullition in the chest, no flushing of the face, no dilatation of +the nostrils, no clenching of the teeth, no impulse to vigorous action, but in their +stead limp muscles, calm breathing and a placid face? The present writer, for one, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_287">[287]</span>certainly cannot. The rage is as completely evaporated as the sensation of its so-called +manifestations, and the only thing that can be supposed to take its place is +some cold-blooded and dispassionate sentence, confined entirely to the judicial realm, +to the effect that a certain person or persons merit chastisement for their sins. In +like manner of grief: what would it be without its tears, its sobs, its suffocation of +the heart, its pang in the breast-bone? A feelingless recognition that certain circumstances +are deplorable, and nothing more. Every passion in turn tells the +same story. A purely disembodied human emotion is a non-entity.” (P. 449 seq.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>It is, of course, impossible for me to give all the arguments by which Professor +James attempts to establish his position; the above quotations will make it clear +what it is—namely, that all our “feelings” are sensations.</p> + +<p>Before proceeding to consider some of the objections to this view of the matter, +it may be well to notice briefly what seems to be a gap in the author’s treatment of +it. In adult human beings, very few, comparatively, of what are ordinarily recognised +as emotions follow directly upon the perception of their objects, in the ordinary +sense of the word. His theory might perhaps suffice, without further explanation +for such cases as the “spitting” of blind kittens at the smell of a dog, or the +rage of a bull at the sight of a red cloth, or the startled feeling that we experience +at a loud and unexpected sound, if the latter should be called an emotion. But in +the immense majority of instances the emotions of which he treats arise in a very +different way.</p> + +<p>Some of his own illustrations will serve as well as any to show this. For instance, +neither running nor any other of the symptoms of fear which he enumerates +is the necessary result of seeing a bear. A chained or caged bear may excite only +feelings of curiosity, and a well armed hunter might experience only pleasurable +feelings at meeting one loose in the woods. It is not, then, the perception of the +bear that excites the movements of fear. We do not run from the bear unless we +suppose him capable of doing us bodily injury. Why should the expectation of being +eaten, for instance, set the muscles of our legs in motion? “Common sense” +would be likely to say it was because we object to being eaten, but according to +Professor James, the reason we dislike to be eaten is because we run away. So, +again, striking is not a reflex act, following on the hearing of an insult as sneezing +does on taking snuff. Whether the muscular movements or the emotions are the +primary thing, what both shall be depends on many things besides the words that +are spoken. To be accused of drunkenness or unchastity, for instance, would dispose +some persons to violence, but others might feel only the stirrings of pride at +what they would consider a tribute to their manhood. In those who considered +such a charge opprobrious, it might excite feelings of amusement, contempt, pity, +or grief towards the one making it, according to the estimation in which he was +held. To say that if it makes us strike we shall be angry, if it makes us laugh we +shall be amused, if it makes us weep we shall be grieved, does not go to the bottom of +the matter. According to the theory, the thought of the estimation in which we +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_288">[288]</span>are held by others is, in itself, entirely indifferent to us, and only affects our feelings +through the muscular movements it excites.</p> + +<p>In view of the variety of these movements in response to the same physical +stimulus in a case like this, the statement that objects excite bodily changes by a +preorganised mechanism explains nothing. We want to know why in one case a +given perception excites one set of movements, and in another an entirely different +set. Without attempting to decide whether or not a satisfactory explanation can be +given on Professor James’s hypothesis, I will only say, that, so far as I can see, he +nowhere attempts it. In his section on “The Genesis of the Various Emotions,” +(pp. 477 seq.), he only discusses the question how the various feelings come to be +associated with their respective movements. How the movements come to be associated +with the perceptions, he does not discuss at all.</p> + +<p>Turning now to the considerations which Professor James urges in support of +his theory, quoted above, the first two—that objects excite bodily changes and that +these changes are more or less distinctly felt—may pass unchallenged. I am disposed +to go as far with him as to admit that these feelings, in the cases which he +describes, may properly be considered components of the emotional state. But +when he affirms that there is nothing else—that if we subtract our consciousness of +peripheral sensations there would be no emotion left—it seems to me that he is going +very much too far. I should have no hesitation in saying that such a statement +of the case is contradicted by my consciousness, but as that would be merely setting +up my consciousness against his, without the possibility of an umpire, I will call attention +to some other considerations which seem to me to render it improbable.</p> + +<p>In the first place, it is to be noticed that the cases he instances in illustration +of his position are all of violent emotions. Admitting that we cannot have these +emotions, in such degree, without movements such as he describes, nor even imagine +how they would feel if such a thing were possible, it does not follow because they +cannot be separated that they are identical. We do not reason in this way in regard +to those feelings which are not commonly called emotions. I can no more imagine +myself in intense bodily pain without a tendency to groan and writhe than deeply +grieved without a tendency to weep, and yet no one, probably, would say that the +pain consisted solely in my consciousness of the groaning and writhing. If grief is +a kind of pain, it is to be expected that, in a high degree, it will produce bodily +movements more or less similar to those excited by other sorts of pain. All these +emotions, however, are capable of infinite gradations in intensity. The fear of losing +one’s pocket handkerchief is an emotion of the same kind as the fear of losing one’s +fortune. In Professor James’s description of fear, it is evident that he has abject +terror in mind; I hardly think it probable that he has any such sensations, when +he fears, for instance, that he will be late to dinner, and yet he must be differently +constituted from many of his fellow-men if his state of mind in such a case is merely +a cold, intellectual cognition of the fact that such a state of affairs would be undesirable.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_289">[289]</span></p> + +<p>The same is true of the other emotions he mentions. The feeling of the ludicrous +is, perhaps, the strongest case he cites, but in my own case slight degrees of +amusement do not excite laughter, or even any conscious disposition to laugh. +There is, at the most, in such cases, a tendency to smile, which may be overpowered +by some other emotion, without in the least impairing my feeling of amusement. It +seems to me certain that slight degrees of all the emotions mentioned may be unaccompanied +by any distinct consciousness of reflex movements. In such cases it is +only by a pretty strong effort of attention that we are able, if at all, to determine +what the bodily changes are, although we are distinctly aware of the emotion.</p> + +<p>Again, it is to be noticed that many actions, similar in character to those we +have been considering, are not associated with what are commonly called emotions. +Laughing and sobbing, for instance, are spasmodic movements of the muscles of +respiration, not strikingly different from hiccuping, and there seems no good reason +why the consciousness of the former two should usually be felt as strong emotional +excitement, while the latter is not. In some cases, movements identical with those +accompanying particular emotions may occur entirely independently of them. Shivering +from cold, for instance, is the same sort of a movement as may occur in violent +fright, but it does not make us feel frightened. The laughter excited in children +and sensitive persons by tickling of the skin is not necessarily accompanied by any +mirthful feelings. The act of vomiting may be the accompaniment of the most extreme +disgust, or it may occur without a trace of such emotion. Professor James +himself gives an instance of this sort that can hardly be bettered:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“The writer well remembers his astonishment, when a boy of seven or eight, +at fainting when he saw a horse bled. The blood was in a bucket, with a stick in +it, and if memory does not deceive him, he stirred it round and saw it drip from the +stick with no feeling save that of childish curiosity. Suddenly the world grew black +before his eyes, his ears began to buzz, and he knew no more. He had never heard +of the sight of blood producing faintness or sickness, and he had little repugnance +to it, and so little apprehension of any other sort of danger from it, that even at +that tender age, as he well remembers, he could not help wondering how the mere +physical presence of a pailful of crimson fluid could occasion in him such formidable +bodily effects” (p. 457).</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>Here we have a condition such as is sometimes experienced in connection with +the most extreme degree of fear or grief unaccompanied by any emotion except astonishment +at its occurrence. I presume that if a person should faint on hearing +bad news, Professor James would consider that one of the causes of his intense +emotion. Why did it have no such effect in this case?</p> + +<p>Assuming that the emotions are the effects and not the causes of what are usually +reckoned as their “expression,” it seems evident that a given movement or set +of movements must uniformly, at least in the same subject, give rise to the same +feeling, and that in the case of opposite emotions such as joy and grief, hope and +fear, the more intense the emotion, the more unlike must be the actions from which +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_290">[290]</span>it arises. Neither of these is the case. On the contrary, it would seem to be the +fact that the actions accompanying emotion tend to become more alike in proportion +to its intensity. It is not at all uncommon for people to weep from excess of joy as +well as of grief. Pallor and trembling are frequent accompaniments of the extremes +of hope as well as fear. The naturalist Wallace gives an account of his feelings on +capturing a rare and beautiful butterfly, which is worth quoting in this connection:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“The beauty and brilliancy of this insect are indescribable, and none but a +naturalist can understand the intense excitement I experienced when I at length +captured it. On taking it out of the net and opening the glorious wings, my heart +began to beat violently, the blood rushed to my head, and I felt more like fainting +than I have done when in prospect of immediate death. I had a headache the rest +of the day, so great was the excitement produced by what will appear to most people +a very inadequate cause” (“Malay Archipelago,” p. 342).</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>Here it is evident that a feeling of intense exultation gave rise to sensations +very similar, to say the least, to those of extreme fear.</p> + +<p>One other argument brought forward by the author deserves special notice in +this connection:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“The best proof that the immediate cause of emotion is a physical effect on +the nerves is furnished by <i>those pathological states in which the emotion is objectless</i>. +One of the chief merits, in fact, of the view which I propose, seems to be that we +can so easily formulate by its means pathological cases and normal cases under a +common scheme. In every asylum we find examples of absolutely unmotived fear, +anger, melancholy, or conceit, and others of an equally unmotived apathy, which +persists in spite of the best of outward reasons why it should give way. In the former +cases we must suppose the nervous machinery to be so ‘labile’ in some one +emotional direction that almost every stimulus (however inappropriate) causes it to +upset in that way, and to engender the particular complex of feelings of which the +psychic body of that emotion consists. Thus, to take one special instance, if inability +to draw deep breath, fluttering of the heart, and that peculiar epigastric +change felt as ‘precordial anxiety,’ with an irresistible tendency to take a somewhat +crouching attitude and to sit still, and with perhaps other visceral processes +not now known, all spontaneously occur together in a certain person; his feeling of +their combination is the emotion of dread, and he is the victim of what is known as +morbid fear” (p. 458).</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>Now, it is evident, of course, in such a case as this, that such a combination of +feelings as is here described is not a fortuitous coincidence of so many independent sensations. +They must have a common starting-point, which cannot well be elsewhere +than in the brain. But if this is the case, it seems to me to be begging the question +to assume that the sensations and not the emotion are the primary thing. On the +assumption that fear, in the normal condition, is the cause of the disturbances of +respiration, circulation, and the like, which accompany it, it is as easy to formulate +normal and pathological cases under a common scheme, by supposing it to be the +cause of the like disturbances in cases of morbid fear, as on the theory of Professor +James.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_291">[291]</span></p> + +<p>It seems to me, then, that the theory does not satisfactorily account for the +facts, so far as the involuntary, reflex accompaniments of motion are concerned.</p> + +<p>The difficulty is greatly increased when we consider the relations of emotion to +voluntary action. We have seen that reflex acts, similar to, or identical with those +in which Professor James believes emotion to consist, may occur independently of +emotion, in the ordinary acceptation of the term, at least. Strictly voluntary acts, on +the contrary, are always the concomitants of emotion of some sort. In the great +majority of the ordinary actions of life, they are the only motor phenomena of which +we are aware in this connection. Our whole daily conduct, in our business and +pleasure, our incomings and our outgoings, our downsittings and uprisings, is inseparably +associated with our likings and dislikings, our hopes and fears. What is +the nature of this association?</p> + +<p>Under the theory we are considering, two relations of voluntary acts to emotion +are possible. They may, like the involuntary reactions, constitute the emotion, or +unlike them, result from it. Professor James does not express himself on the general +question, but some of his illustrations seem to favor the former view. If the +man who meets a bear is frightened because he runs, or the one who is insulted, +angry because he strikes, the voluntary acts of running and striking must, in part, +at least, constitute the emotions of fear and anger in these cases. Let us, then, consider +this case first.</p> + +<p>If I see a shower coming up, and run for a shelter, the emotion is evidently of +the same kind, though perhaps less in degree, as in the case of the man who runs +from the bear. According to Professor James, I am afraid of getting wet because +I run. But supposing that, instead of running, I step into a shop and buy an umbrella. +The emotion is still the same. I am afraid of getting wet. Consequently, +so far as I can see, the fear, in this case, consists in buying the umbrella. Fear of +hunger, in like manner, might consist in laying in a store of provisions; fear of +poverty, in shoveling dirt at a dollar a day, and so on indefinitely. Anger, again, +may be associated with many other actions than striking. Shylock’s anger at Antonio’s +insults induced him to lend him money. Did the anger, or revengefulness, +or whatever we may call the passion, consist in the act of lending the money? I +hardly think it necessary to multiply instances in illustration of the fact that the +same act is often associated with the most contradictory emotions, and acts which +are ordinarily indifferent with the most intense feeling; that, in fact, there is no +such uniformity in the associations of emotion with voluntary conduct as the hypothesis +would seem to require. I incline to think that most people will believe, in +the cases cited by Professor James, that the running and the striking are the results, +not the causes of the fear and anger.</p> + +<p>If we assume such to be the case, we are no better off under the hypothesis we are +considering. Excluding voluntary movements, there is nothing left of the emotion, according +to Professor James, but the consciousness of involuntary, reflex acts resulting +from perception. The voluntary acts must, then, be directly caused by these. Now, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_292">[292]</span>in the first place, it is often difficult, if not impossible, to tell what these actions are. +What are the involuntary muscular contractions that impel a day-laborer to go to +the place of his work, and keep his voluntary muscular system in strenuous activity +all day, enduring fatigue and all the discomforts of the summer’s heat or winter’s +cold? It would probably puzzle him very much to tell, although he has a very clear +idea of why he does it. I doubt if, on his own hypothesis, Professor James himself +would find it easy to explain the constituents of the emotions which impel him to go +to the class-room at the appointed hour and conduct a recitation. But even in cases +in which we are distinctly conscious of involuntary action, there seems to be no +connection between it and the voluntary acts accompanying the emotion. In the +case of the man running from the bear, for instance, trembling lips, weakened limbs, +goose-flesh and visceral stirrings have nothing to do with running, but, on the contrary, +would rather tend to prevent it. In fact, it may be said, in general, that the +two classes of emotional activities are mutually antagonistic. The more involuntary +the action, the less efficient the voluntary activity is apt to be, as any one knows who +has had an attack of the “buck ague.” We should have, therefore, diminution of +the effect with increase of the cause.</p> + +<p>It seems, then, on the hypothesis, impracticable to account for the association +of voluntary action with emotion either on the supposition that the former is the +cause or the result of the latter. A third alternative—that there is no relation of +cause and effect in the case, and that the phenomena of emotion and action, although +constantly associated, are really independent, I will not discuss, as it does not commend +itself to my mind, and Professor James, elsewhere, expressly repudiates it. +It seems to me that the only reasonable conclusion is that emotion is something different +from either involuntary or voluntary muscular activity, and which may be +the cause of either or both.</p> + +<p>Professor James, after admitting that the view of the subject which he advocates +is only a hypothesis, and that much is lacking to its definitive proof, goes on +to say:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“The only way coercively to <i>dis</i>prove it, however, would be to take some emotion +and then exhibit qualities of feeling in it which should be <i>demonstrably</i> additional +to all those which could possibly be derived from the organs affected at the +time. But to detect with certainty such purely spiritual qualities of feeling would +obviously be a task beyond human power....</p> + +<p>“A positive proof of the theory would, on the other hand, be given, if we could +find a subject absolutely anæsthetic inside and out, but not paralytic, so that emotion-inspiring +objects might evoke the usual bodily expressions from him, but who, +on being consulted, should say that no subjective emotional affection was felt. Such +a man would be like one who, because he eats, appears to bystanders to be hungry, +but who afterwards confesses that he had no appetite at all.” (P. 455.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>Whether the truth of the first of the above paragraphs is to be conceded or not, +depends, I suppose, on the strength of proof necessary for coercion. The only way, +for instance, coercively to disprove the once prevalent theory that “lunacy” is due +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_293">[293]</span>to the influence of the moon would be to abolish the moon. Most intelligent people, +however, at the present day, accept the fact that there seems to be no coincidence +between the moon’s phases and the phenomena of insanity as sufficient proof +for practical purposes of the incorrectness of that theory. It seems to me that the +facts to which I have called attention show a somewhat similar lack of correspondence +in the case we have been considering. I am, however, unable to see why a +case of complete anæsthesia, such as is supposed in the second paragraph, would +not answer nearly as well for one side of the question as the other, according to the +presence or absence of emotion. To suppose that cutaneous and visceral sensations +are preserved unimpaired for purposes of emotion, while absolutely abolished +for all other purposes, would be putting a pretty severe strain on the faculty of +belief.</p> + +<p>Such cases, as Professor James says, are hard to find. He refers to one, reported +by Strümpell, in which a boy, anæsthetic within and without, with the exception +of one eye and one ear, was stated to have manifested shame, grief, surprise, +fear, and anger. He goes on, however, to say: “In observing him, however, no +such theory as the present one seems to have been thought of; and it always remains +possible that, just as he satisfied his natural appetites and necessities in cold +blood, with no inward feeling, so his emotional expressions may have been accompanied +by a quite cold heart.”</p> + +<p>Since Professor James’s work was published, two cases have been reported by +Berkley,⁠<a id="FNanchor_57" href="#Footnote_57" class="fnanchor">[57]</a> which, although not, perhaps, conclusive, are of interest in this connection. +In the first, the patient, a woman of English birth, age not stated, had complete +loss of sense of pain, heat and cold, pressure and equilibrium, of smell, taste, +and sight. The sense of touch, although not completely abolished, was very greatly +impaired. She recognised a hat, for instance, only after feeling of it for a long +time and then seemed doubtful about it. Her sense of the position of the extremities +was also very imperfect, although not entirely abolished; and there was some +deafness, although not enough to render her incapable of conversation. With regard +to her mental state, Dr. Berkley says:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“The psychical condition has undergone but slight change, she is possibly a +little apathetic, with some slight tendency towards a melancholic tone, but when +aroused and induced to converse for some time, this in great measure passes away. +The memory is quite good.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>Dr. Berkley was kind enough to give me the following additional information +about this patient, who, at the time of writing, was still under observation:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“Since the coming on of the dullness in hearing there has been a considerable +degree of apathy manifest. She is no longer conscious of the smaller noises that +occur around her, but is very readily aroused by the voice, and then takes a lively +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_294">[294]</span>interest in what is said to her: for instance a few days ago the resident physician +remarked to her that he was going to obtain a pair of crutches for her use; she +laughed heartily at the idea, and said she would fall and break her leg at the first +step.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>In response to further inquiries, he writes as follows:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“1) Visceral sensations. The clearest evidence of visceral sensation I have +noted in my article,” [warning of the necessity of evacuating the bowels and bladder +by a pricking pain in the lower part of the abdomen,] “no others were sufficiently +definite to be described. For two years there has been no feeling of hunger +or thirst, and as the diet has only been a few mouthfuls of milk at a time for nearly +that period, there has been no feeling of repletion.</p> + +<p>“2) When the patient laughs at a joke, there is a slight flushing of the face, +besides the ordinary contraction of the facial muscles; she is aware that she is +laughing, but besides acknowledging that she perceives no difference between the +act now, and some years ago, she is unable to describe the sensation further.</p> + +<p>“3) Anger. As I think I mentioned in my last letter, the patient has been a +person of unusually equal temper; an outbreak of real passion has never been observed +with her. When annoyed or teased by some of the other women, there is a +distinct corrugation of the forehead, accompanied by an exceedingly slight general +movement as if of aversion, no words, movement of the chest, clenching of the +hands, etc. She describes the sensation as one of repulsion.</p> + +<p>“Like Strümpell’s case she shows definitely shame, grief, surprise, fear, and +substituting for anger, repulsion.</p> + +<p>“My own impression derived from observation of the patient is, that all mental +emotional sensibilities are present and only a little less vivid than in the unanæsthetic +state; and that emotions are approximately natural, and not at all coldly dispassionate.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>In the second case, that of a Russian woman, aged thirty-five, there was complete +loss of cutaneous sensibility in all its qualities: the sense of position (“muscular +sense”) was almost completely abolished; the sense of taste was absent in the +anterior two-thirds of the tongue. Smell, sight, and hearing were preserved. She +had left the hospital before the article was written. In regard to her case, Dr. +Berkley writes:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“While in the most absolute state of anæsthesia (auditory and visual excepted) +there was no departure from a normal psyche; the woman would sometimes be +angered when she did not understand a question, at others would smile or shake her +head, and would frequently laugh and talk with another Russian woman in the +same ward. There was never the slightest apathy manifest after the first few days +of febrile movement.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>I give these cases for what they are worth. In the first, it is evidently impossible +to entirely exclude the presence of sensations caused by the reflex acts, and +the second, not having, apparently, been examined with special reference to the +subjective side of her emotional manifestations, may be open to the same objection +which Professor James makes against Strümpell’s case. To me it seems extremely +unlikely that, if the theory under discussion is correct, such an amount of anæsthesia +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_295">[295]</span>as existed in these cases would have produced no obvious effect on the emotions. +The fact that voluntary acts were performed by both these patients as well as by +Strümpell’s case, seems to me conclusive as to the existence of emotions of some +sort in all of them.</p> + +<p>It seems clear to me, from the foregoing considerations, that there are serious +difficulties in the way of accepting Professor James’s theory as an adequate explanation +of all the phenomena of emotion. On the other hand, I think it contains an +important truth, and that, by calling attention to it, he has rendered a real service +to psychology. In order to make it clear how far I agree with him, it will be necessary +to consider just what feelings are to be classed together under the head of +emotion.</p> + +<p>If we touch our fingers to a live coal, we are conscious of a sensation of heat, +and also of pain. If we take quinine into our mouths, it tastes bitter, and also disagreeable. +So in regard to a very large proportion of our sensations, we recognise +two elements—one which has to do with the qualities of the object, and, another +consisting of the pleasurable or painful way in which those qualities affect us. The +former may be called the objective element in sensation. We think of the heat as +residing in the coal, whether we are touching it or not, but it never occurs to us to +think of the coal as in pain. The pain is in us—an entirely subjective feeling. +Doubtless there is no more reason to think of heat, as it is appreciated by our +senses, as a property of the coal, than pain, but that is the way in which we naturally +think of it. That these two elements are really distinct is evident from the +fact that the different senses furnish them in different proportions. Comparatively +few sights, for instance, give any such sensuous pain to the eye as the sensation produced +by getting a grain of sand under the lid, which gives us very little information +in regard to the qualities of the offending substance. In fact, it is generally true +that intensity of pleasurable or painful sensation is a hindrance to exact knowledge +of its object. It is further evident from the fact that, in disease, one form of sensibility +may be abolished while the other is retained. A person may be able to feel +the slightest touch, and to recognise perfectly the size, shape, and texture of the +objects he handles, and yet feel no pain when cut, struck, nor burned, or he may have +even heightened sensibility to painful impressions with loss of the power to recognise +the sensible qualities of objects.</p> + +<p>Now, although we are accustomed to distinguish between emotions and purely +sensuous pleasures and pains, there are some points, at least, at which it is not easy +to draw the line. My pleasure in the anticipation of a good dinner is undoubtedly +an emotion. Is not my pleasure in eating it entitled to the same name, and does +not the latter consist in the reality of the sensations which in the former case were +enjoyed in imagination? Is not the enjoyment we feel in the smell of mignonette, +the tone of a sweet voice, the color and form of the rainbow, emotion? Yet it consists +largely, if not entirely, in the agreeableness of the sensations. Most people +would probably think it strange to hear hunger and thirst spoken of as emotions +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_296">[296]</span>but would readily agree that desire of food or drink is as much an emotion as any +other desire. Is the desire in this case anything more than the hunger or thirst?</p> + +<p>I am inclined to think that it is proper to call such pleasures and pains as I +have instanced above emotions, and if so, I see no reason for denying the name to +any sensuous pleasures and pains. If Professor James’s view is that all feeling is +sensation, I should say that all feeling is emotion. Whether this view is correct or +not, I do not see how Professor James can consistently refuse to accept it. On his +theory, the emotions which he discusses must owe their pleasurable or painful quality +to the pleasurable or painful nature of the sensations in which they consist. I +can see no valid ground for saying that some such feelings are emotions and others +are not. But the essence of emotion is pleasure or pain. Abstracting these qualities, +it would be an indifferent emotion, which, I think all would agree, is a contradiction +in terms. Possibly he might wish to limit the use of the term to those pleasurable +and painful feelings, which arise not directly, but in a reflex way. He might +say, for instance, that the disagreeableness to the ear of the creaking of an ungreased +axle is not, but the shudder which it gives a sensitive person is, emotion. +In that case, it must be admitted that a sneeze is emotion. His contention is that +we have no other pleasures or pains than those of sensation. If this be true, a setting +off of some sensations as emotions is, if not an arbitrary, a comparatively useless +procedure.</p> + +<p>My own view, then, is that the elements of sensation which I have spoken of as +objective and subjective might, with equal propriety, be characterised respectively +as intellectual and emotional, and that in this direction the theory under discussion, +although true as far as it goes, does not go far enough.</p> + +<p>However this may be, the admission or denial that these feelings are emotions +does not necessarily affect the question whether or not this is the only origin, of +pleasure and pain. As has already been said, those feelings to which no one will +deny the name of emotions are not usually, in adult human beings, at least, direct +reactions on sensation. If it be true that the start we give at the unexpected slamming +of a door is a sort of fright, it is a very rudimentary sort compared with that +which one feels when the cry of fire is raised in a crowded theatre. “A burnt +child dreads the fire.” It is not the sight of the fire, but the thought of the burning, +that arouses the emotion. When a man reads in the newspaper of the death +of a friend, or a rise in the value of property in which he is interested, it is not the +sight of the black marks on the white paper, but the beliefs which, through a long +and intricate series of associations they call up, which move his feelings. If he could +not read, he would see the same announcement without any emotion. The usual +origin of the emotions <i>par excellence</i> is by way of association.</p> + +<p>Suppose that I have taken a nauseous dose, and made a wry face over it. No +one, I presume, would question that the disagreeableness lay in the unpleasant +taste, and not in the distortion of the countenance. Now, suppose I have to repeat +the dose, and my face takes on a similar expression at the anticipation to that which +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_297">[297]</span>it wore when I took it originally. How does this come about? If I can trust my +own consciousness, it is because the vivid reproduction, in memory, of the unpleasant +taste is itself unpleasant. I do not see how it can well be otherwise. Professor +James says (p. 649) that “the first element of memory is the revival in the mind of +an image or copy of the original event.” How can I have a copy in my mind of a +pain if it is not painful? Take away the painfulness of it and there would be +nothing left. I might remember the circumstances under which it occurred, and +judge from them that I must have suffered pain, but I could not, it seems to me, remember +the pain itself. Whether that is possible or not, I feel sure that the fact, +in my own case, is, that my memory of a pain resembles it in the same way that my +memory of the circumstances in which it occurred resembles them. If this be the +fact, what can be more natural than that it should excite the same sort of associated +movements that were excited by the original sensation? I cannot make it seem any +more credible, to return to the example mentioned above, that my repugnance to a +repetition of the dose is due to my involuntary movements than that my discomfort +in taking it originally was due to the similar movements that occurred then.</p> + +<p>Suppose that a child who has eaten and enjoyed an orange is offered another. +The sight of it calls up the recollection of the agreeable taste, and the expectation +of a repetition of the pleasant experience excites expressions of pleasure. If the +fruit is snatched away, the disappointment at the loss of the expected pleasure is +distressing, and very probably may result in his weeping. I hardly think that any +one who will consult his own consciousness will say that the reason he likes the +taste of an orange is that it makes him laugh or smile to get it. He likes it because +it tastes good, and is sorry to lose it for the same reason. The laughing or weeping +is, I think, unquestionably the result of the pleasure or grief, not of the mere perception +of an object in itself indifferent.</p> + +<p>It is true that emotions of this sort do not always arise by way of personal association. +Young children are apt to be afraid of strangers, of large animals, and of +loud noises. I can remember being frightened at my first sight of a locomotive. +Here we come upon the questions of inherited experience and natural selection, +which can hardly be discussed in an article like this. The objects of which young +children are instinctively afraid, as a rule, are either dangerous themselves, or more +or less similar to dangerous objects. I see no more difficulty in supposing that +mental pleasure and pain, on the sight of special objects, may be a matter of organisation +than in the case of the analogous physical sensations.</p> + +<p>My view of the matter, then, is that emotion in the sense in which the word is +commonly used bears the same relation to perceptions or beliefs that feelings of +physical pleasure or pain do to the objective or intellectual quality of sensations. +I am inclined to think it proper to class all pleasurable and painful feelings together +as emotions. If this view is correct, it would, of course, include those feelings to +which Professor James would confine the term. I should not at all hesitate to admit +that the emotional state of a person who trembles and turns pale with fear is +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_298">[298]</span>different from that of one who preserves his self-possession in the presence of a danger +that he realises and dreads. I think it is true that the voluntary actions +prompted by an emotion have some tendency to intensify it. But, so far as I can +analyse my own feelings, the pleasures and pains of memory and imagination seem +to me just as real as those of sensation, and not at all to be confounded with them. +When I try to subtract all motor reactions and resulting sensations from the feeling +of fear, for instance, there remains not merely the intellectual perception that the +event dreaded is not desirable, but the perfectly distinct emotional consciousness +that I do not desire it.</p> + +<p>This view seems to be favored by the analogy between the relations of sensation +to reflex movement on the one hand, and of perception to voluntary movement +on the other, which will, I think, be found to be very complete. We have reflex +acts which are useful, such as breathing, the beating of the heart, swallowing and +coughing; and others, like groaning, weeping, and trembling, which seem to be useless. +In like manner, emotions of hope or fear may give rise to voluntary acts calculated +to enable the subject of the emotion to secure or avoid its object. If I burn +my fingers, my hand is involuntarily snatched away. Such would not be the case +if the burn caused no pain. If I see that the house is on fire, I try to escape, either +by extinguishing the fire or by getting out of the house. It seems to me evident +that I should not do so if the thought of being burned were not painful. Such emotions +may also occasion useless acts, more or less similar to those mentioned above. +A person who saw no way of escape from a burning house might tremble, weep, or +groan from fear.</p> + +<p>On the evolutionary hypothesis, it seems easy to understand how the reproduction, +by memory or imagination, of certain feelings might bring about movements +like those excited by the original feelings. Professor James would have us +believe that this reproduction is always, in itself, indifferent, that is, merely intellectual; +but that it is, nevertheless, capable of setting up the movements which, in +the case of peripheral stimuli, are the results of pleasure and pain, and that the consciousness +of these movements is, in such cases, the sole cause of the emotional condition. +Such a reversal of relations seems to me highly improbable. Each one +must decide for himself which view is more in accordance with the facts of his own +consciousness.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">W. L. Worcester.</span></p> + +<div class="footnotes"> + +<h5>FOOTNOTES:</h5> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_57" href="#FNanchor_57" class="label">[57]</a> <i>Two Cases of General Cutaneous and Sensory Anæsthesia, without Marked Psychical Implication.</i> +By Henry J. Berkley, M. D., Baltimore. [Brain, Part IV. 1891.]</p></div> + +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h4 class="nobreak" id="PROFESSOR_ERNST_MACHS_TERM_SENSATION">PROFESSOR ERNST MACH’S TERM SENSATION.<br> +<span class="smaller">SUPPLEMENTARY TO HIS CONTROVERSY WITH THE EDITOR.</span></h4> + +</div> + +<p><i>The Monist</i>, Vol. I, No. 3, contains a controversy between Prof. Ernst Mach +and myself on some questions of psycho-physics in which Professor Mach, having +reference to an editorial article on “Feeling and Motion,” regards sensations as the +“elements of reality,” “while motion,” he says, “is a mere mental auxiliary, an +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_299">[299]</span>artificial expedient.” “Physicists,” we are told, “have accustomed us to regard the +motions of atoms as more real than the green of trees. In the latter I see a (sensory) +fact, in the former a <i>Gedankending</i>, a thing of thought.”</p> + +<p>In contradistinction to Professor Mach I maintained that our scientific terms, +although abstract concepts and things of thought, or noumena, are after all descriptive +of actual facts; they are symbols representing features of reality. Motions, +i. e., that which is meant by the term motion, is a reality, and what the chemist +calls atoms is a definite quality of certain facts of experience. Atoms are not things +in themselves, as the name seems to suggest, but rather proportional relations conveniently +so expressed as if they were ultimate units or concrete little bodies of a +definite mass or weight. What atoms are, aside from representing the proportions +in which elements combine, we do not know. We may define “atom” as the minimal +weight in which an element enters into chemical combinations, but such atoms +have never been an object of observation. For aught we know, they may as little +be discrete bodies as a curve consists of discrete straight lines, which, as such, +would be unobservable only because infinitesimally small. The infinitely small +straight line into which a curve is analysed by mathematicians is a fiction, wisely +devised for calculating the path of the curve. This fiction is as Professor Mach +says, an artifice only, not a reality, or as I say, an allegoric expression to characterise +not whole concrete realities, but certain features of reality in their abstractness.</p> + +<p>Scientific terms are comparable to myths that contain deep religious truths. +The fiction of the myth is only the vehicle of its meaning. The naked meaning in +its abstract purity may be difficult to grasp. Thus our imagination steps in and +completes the picture so as to render it concrete and easily thinkable.</p> + +<p>Now, when several months ago I met Professor Mach at Prague, our conversation +naturally touched upon the problems which had formed the subject of our discussion. +Professor Mach assented to my speaking of scientific terms as abstracts. +That, accordingly, must be considered as the point of agreement. But when I proposed +that the term sensation also was according to my terminology an abstract term +representing one feature of reality only and excluding other features, Professor +Mach took exception to it, saying that he understands by sensation reality itself. +Very well then, this is the difference; and this difference is after all a difference of +terms only. I understand by sensation the psychical feature of the data of experience +only, to the exclusion of what may be called its physical aspect. Sensation +accordingly, as I use the term, is not the whole of the given reality but only one of +its qualities. If, as Professor Mach uses the term, sensation is another name for +reality, the main difference between our views appears to be removed.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">P. Carus.</span></p> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_300">[300]</span></p> + +<h3 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_REVIEWS_II">BOOK REVIEWS.</h3> + +</div> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">Vorlesungen über die Menschen- und Thierseele.</span> By <i>Wilhelm Wundt</i>. Zweite +umgearbeitete Auflage. Hamburg and Leipsic: Leopold Voss. 1892.</h4> + +<p>The new edition of Wundt’s <i>Menschen- und Thierseele</i> is one of the best existing +general introductions to psychology. It preserves nearly the just mean between +the purely introspective and abstract treatment and the substitution of physiology +for psychology with which recent treatises have familiarised us. The author +has completely rewritten the edition of 1863, which he regards as a youthful indiscretion +(<i>Jugendsünde</i>)—retaining only such chapters as could be brought into harmony +with his maturer views and with the developed science of psycho-physics that +has taken the place of the <i>Zukunftsprogramm</i> of thirty years ago. He has wisely +omitted all the superficial and diffuse chapters on comparative psychology and ethnology +which cumbered the original work; has silently ignored the fantastic speculations +as to the identity of electricity and nerve-force (one of the worst of the aforesaid +youthful sins); and practically abandoned (perhaps as too esoteric for popular +exposition) the elaborate reduction of sensations and perceptions to unconscious +judgments and inferences.</p> + +<p>The first thirteen or fourteen chapters offer a very clear and interesting résumé +of the chief doctrines of the <i>Physiologische Psychologie</i> in regard to sensations generally, +their measurements and qualities, Weber’s and Fechner’s laws, the special +sensations of color, hearing, and the muscular sense, and the problem of space perception. +Following the plan of the original work in these chapters, the author aims +less at completeness of statement than to present clearly the distinctive doctrines of +modern psychology. In the treatment of certain themes, e. g. Fechner’s law, and +the perception of space, he neglects, for the sake of clearness, qualifications of detail +which the special student must look for in the larger work. The last sixteen chapters +deal with the feelings, the will, consciousness, attention, association and apperception, +conception, abnormal and animal psychology and instinct, concluding +with two notable lectures on the “Freedom of the Will” and the “Immortality of +the Soul.” It is to these chapters that we must look for Wundt’s general psychological +and philosophical system. Profiting by recent criticisms he has here set +forth his characteristic doctrines in so clear and definite a final statement that further +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_301">[301]</span>misconception of them is hardly permissible. The remainder of this notice +will be devoted to what is perhaps the most interesting question thus suggested: +Wundt’s relation to the associationist psychology of Spencer on the one side, and to +the younger German school of experimental psychologists on the other. Wundt +ignores the Spencerian form of the associationist psychology, and the young psychologists +do injustice to Wundt, neither side apparently condescending to read with +attention the writings of the other. The debate, so far as it is not merely verbal, +springs from two real differences of method: (1) Wundt in his psychological analysis +habitually takes account of the problems of the theory of knowledge (<i>Erkenntnisstheorie</i>), +or ultimate metaphysics, which the young psychologists endeavor (not always +with success) systematically to exclude. (2) Wundt, gifted with superior powers of +introspection, is more aware than the young psychologists of the infinite complexity +and subtlety of mental states. He prefers, therefore, to a schematic simplification +of the phenomena a terminology and descriptive analysis that reflect in some measure +their manifold diversity. And thus while Wundt finds the pure associationist +psychology barren and tautologous, the young psychologists see in Wundt’s complicated +terminology only a shamefaced reversion to the discarded psychology of a substantial +soul endowed with autonomous “faculties.” But the analysis of our mental +states which Wundt gives by means of this terminology is really only a subtler restatement +of the analysis of Mill, Spencer, and Taine, to which the new psychology +has not been able to add anything of moment. It is true that he proclaims the inadequacy +of association, even when translated into the diagrams of a hypothetical +cerebral anatomy, to “explain” fully our conscious active mental life. But in this +he is at one with Spencer (ultimate scientific ideas), J. S. Mill (Examination of Hamilton), +and Schopenhauer (<i>Epiphilosophie</i>). It is gross injustice to stigmatise as an +abandonment of the scientific attitude of mind this occasional passing recognition of +the seeming ultimate inexplicability of things. In no single concrete instance can +it be shown that Wundt now sacrifices the recognised methods and postulates of +modern scientific investigation to the psychological hypostisations which his opponents +detect in his terminology.</p> + +<p>In confirmation of these statements I will give a brief summary of Wundt’s +doctrine of association and apperception with an occasional indication of its relation +to the psychology of Spencer. Wundt distinguishes the totality of mental states +which are perceived from the presentation at the focus of consciousness which is +apperceived. In this way (substituting everywhere <i>dunkel bewusst</i> for <i>unbewusst</i>) +he avoids the metaphysics of the unconscious, while getting the benefit of the entire +analysis of its advocates. I do not think the ultimate difficulty can be evaded in this +way, but will not stop to argue the point. A further advantage of this distinction +is that it makes possible a dynamic treatment of mental states as “events” in place +of the crude psychology that deals with the conditions of any mental state as so +many ready-made parts externally dovetailed into the completed product. The active +side of consciousness is taken into account from the outset. The mental state +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_302">[302]</span>at any moment is described by indicating the presentation which is then at the focus +of consciousness (apperceived) and the accompanying faintly conscious presentations +that qualify its tone and total effect. The given mental state is “explained” by +tracing out the dynamic readjustments that brought this particular presentation to +the focus, and grouped the faintly conscious presentations about it. Now the bringing +of a presentation to the focus of conscious attention is the primitive psychical +activity, the elementary act of will,⁠<a id="FNanchor_58" href="#Footnote_58" class="fnanchor">[58]</a> and since Wundt places this at the beginning +he rejects all evolution of will or instinct from reflex action, and thus, it will be +said, here at least puts himself in distinct opposition to advanced scientific thought. +Let us distinguish. So far as we are dealing with the developed minds we know, +Wundt’s distinction is merely the expression of an observed psychological fact. External +volition does go back to internal voluntary attention and this to a focussing +of consciousness for which apperception is as good a term as another. Such focussing +of the attention is for us now the primary reaction of the “self” on its received +impressions. Out of a given group of presentations I apperceive by preference one +and you another, because at the time my “self,” my mind, differs from yours. This +self may be only a convenient shorthand expression for a passive product of external +forces. The feeling of the reaction of the self may be an illusion, and its activity +may be merely the mechanical action of a relatively coherent group of presentations +when a new presentation is introduced among them, and the whole process +may be explicable in terms of associations. But the feeling exists, and Wundt has +described and analysed it better than any of his critics.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, if the question is of the hypothetical origin of mind, we are +at once brought face to face with an ultimate metaphysical problem which the new +psychology impatiently ignores, which Spencer grudgingly acknowledges, but which +Wundt and Kantians like Riehl find confronting them at every stage of their analysis. +Conscious mind cannot conceive of its own origin, and therefore all psychological +theories of development must postulate in some form the elements of consciousness +and will. Nothing that I could add to the dialectics of this question would +influence those who feel no difficulty here. They require a long course of Kantian +criticism or its equivalent. At any rate it is not fair polemic to class a thinker as +unscientific merely because he recognises this difficulty and gives it expression in +his psychology, instead of contemptuously relegating it to metaphysics.</p> + +<p>After thus laying the foundations in the doctrine of apperception for the psychology +both of cognition and of the will, Wundt proceeds to restate the associationist +analysis of Mill and Spencer in a more elaborate terminology but in substantial +agreement with Spencer till he reaches the “concept,” when the introduction +of apperception gives rise to a seeming difference. Spencer distinguishes simultaneous +from successive association as carefully as Wundt. What Wundt, after +Herbart calls “complications,” namely the joint reference to one object of a number +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_303">[303]</span>of disparate presentations of sense, is clearly described by Spencer (“Principles +of Psychology,” §§ 315-355); and Wundt’s “assimilations” do not differ +appreciably from Spencer’s “still less conscious” processes of “organic classification” +(“Principles of Psychology,” § 320). Into the metaphysics of the ultimate +relations of contiguity and similarity as laws of association I cannot enter here. +Similarity will always be recognised as ultimate by those who, like Spencer, approach +the problem first from the psychical side, while a purely materialistic treatment +in terms of nervous currents, such as we find in James, will endeavor to do +away altogether with similarity, which simply cannot be expressed in terms of +nerve-structure without reasoning in a circle. Wundt retains similarity but endeavors +to coördinate it with contiguity. The problem is really identical with the +final question of the relations of “mind” and “body,” and cannot be profitably +discussed apart from that question.</p> + +<p>Coming now to the concept and the judgment, we find Wundt affirming that +the different forms of simultaneous and successive association (as he has defined +them) are not an exhaustive classification of mental processes—that they do not include +the concept. Well, he is at liberty to define his own terms, and before we +accuse him of hypostasising a new faculty to account for the concept, let us scrutinise +his meaning. We shall find that he merely repeats, in a subtler terminology of +his own, the analysis of Berkeley, Mill, Taine, Spencer, and Romanes. These writers +treat the concept as a complicated associational group held together by the +word. Now Wundt, while conceding the theoretic admissibility of this form of +statement, holds that such groups present so many distinct characteristics that all +delicacy of psychological discrimination is sacrificed by confounding them under one +denomination with other associational complexes. He does not, like Professor James, +bid introspective psychology “throw up the sponge” here, but wishes to carry his +analysis into recesses which the instruments of the associationists are too clumsy to +explore. In the interests of this analysis he limits the term association to combinations +mediated by a limited number of elements. The (apperceived) concept, on the +other hand, is the product of the reaction of the total mind. This distinction (whatever +we may think of its absolute validity) expresses a finely observed psychological +truth. The distinctive quality of a concept consists, Wundt says, “<i>in dem begleitenden +Bewusstsein, dass die einzelne Vorstellung einen bloss stellvertretenden Werth besitze</i>.” +This feeling he calls the <i>Begriffsgefühl</i>, meaning thereby exactly what Professor +James means when he says that “the thoughts by which we know that we +mean the same thing are apt to be very different indeed from each other,” and that +“a polyp would be a conceptual thinker if a feeling of ‘Hollo! thingumbob again!’ +ever flitted through its mind.” Only, instead of “throwing up the sponge,” Wundt +goes on to give a very interesting account of this feeling in its various degrees of +clearness between the conceptual polyp and the conceiving man. Apperception is +invoked only to name and emphasise the feeling of activity of the self that enters +into the <i>Begriffsgefühl</i>, distinguishing it as a reaction of the total consciousness +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_304">[304]</span>from the relatively passive associations of what Romanes would call “recepts.” +Psychologists, however, will continue their fruitless debates on questions of terminology +and will still imagine that Wundt is a belated reactionist.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">Paul Shorey.</span></p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">Beiträge zur experimentellen Psychologie.</span> By <i>Hugo Münsterberg</i>. Heft 4. +Freiburg i. B. 1892.</h4> + +<p>Münsterberg’s fourth <i>Heft</i> begins with studies in association. If <i>a</i> and <i>b</i> have +been independently associated with <i>m</i>, can <i>a</i> call up <i>b</i> without the appearance in +consciousness of <i>m</i>? The affirmative answer of common experience was confirmed +by Scripture’s experiments. Associating five Japanese symbols with two series of +five German words, he found that a word of one series tended (without conscious +recollection of the Japanese symbol) to revive the particular word in the other series +that had been associated with the same symbol. Münsterberg, after repeating and +varying the experiment in a number of fields, denies that any such relation can be +observed. He may very well be right on the question of facts. It is <i>a priori</i> improbable +that a transitory and arbitrary association of a meaningless symbol could +modify appreciably the independent and accidental associative attractions of familiar +words and presentations. The philosophic interpretation is another question. +For our real knowledge it is a matter of indifference whether we fill out “missing +links” with “<i>dunkel bewusst</i>,” “<i>unbewusst</i>,” or “cerebral processes that have no +psychical correlates.” And yet how much of contemporary psychologising is a logomachy +raging around just this question.</p> + +<p>Münsterberg’s second series of experiments show clearly the part played by such +missing links in perception. A word is called out just before a complicated picture +is exhibited to the subject. He will usually perceive first in the picture some object +naturally associated with the word, even though the word has aroused no conscious +associations.</p> + +<p>Similarly (III) a hastily seen misprinted word will be interpreted variously according +to the associations of another word called out to the subject in advance.</p> + +<p>Another series of experiments has for result that even the most commonly associated +word-couples, as table and chair, have no fixed, unconditional associative +attraction for each other in the same or in different minds, but that the unit of attraction +is the “associative constellation.” This is only common sense, and artificial +experiments will never reveal anything in this field that we cannot learn quite as +well in the class room. “Table” will suggest “logarithm” if the boy is fresh from +the class in trigonometry.</p> + +<p>“The difference between men is in their principle of association” said Emerson +long ago. Münsterberg, who has in his archives records of fifty thousand experiments +in verbal associations, presents a table of the comparative frequency with +which substantives are associated with superior (more general) or inferior class +names, with adjectives or with verbs to which they stand in the relation of subject +or of object. His chief result is that minds which associate a noun with its higher +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_305">[305]</span>class name (<i>Ueberordner</i>) think of it as the subject of a verb and do not associate it +with an adjective. The <i>Unterordner</i> thinks of the noun as object of a verb and associates +it with an adjective. The adjective, then, is not the higher class to which +the substantive belongs, but a limitation of the substantive. The French, if they +please, may use this conclusion to refute Spencer’s contention that “white horse” +is a more natural order than <i>cheval blanc</i>.</p> + +<p>The first topic in “memory studies” is the persistence in the psycho-physical +mechanism of the disposition to an acquired automatic movement, even after the +memory of the nerve has been seemingly displaced by the habit of its contrary. The +experiments were trivial, such as shifting the position of an inkstand from right to +left in alternate months, or wearing a watch alternately in the right or left fob. The +result, a progressive diminution of the mistakes made after every change, may plausibly +be explained by the stimulated attention and consequent care of the experimenter. +The second topic treats of the effect of a time interval on the exactness of +our memory of sensations of movement in eyes and limbs. The section on “chain +reactions” is a methodological study of the various applications of this experimental +method. “The influence of nervous stimulants on psychic activities” is rather interesting +reading, but yields no important results. Alcohol depresses, tea and coffee +heighten the powers of memory and perception for an hour or two after absorption. +But the harmful effect of the alcohol sometimes passes away after the first hour. +<i>Grössenschätzung</i> is a study of our estimates of distances on a surface, made by passing +the hand over it at arm’s length, at half arm’s length, etc. From experiments +as to the estimate of absolute tone-distances (as distinguished from musical intervals) +Münsterberg concludes that pure measurements are not possible with three tones +only. Experiments with four tones do not, he says, confirm the law that distances +corresponding to equal differences of vibration are felt as equal.</p> + +<p>Physiologists have assumed that the symmetrical movement of the limbs as in +swimming or rowing is the natural one; and the alternating or independent movements, +as in walking or writing, are an acquisition involving inhibitions of the natural +innervations. “Even in adult life,” says Professor James, “there is an instinctive +tendency to revert to the bilateral movements of childhood.” Professor +Münsterberg was led to doubt this view by observing the unsymmetrical motions of +a baby in a warm bath, and experiment has confirmed his scepticism. Complicated +joint motions of both hands (tracing circles or other geometrical figures on a +surface) do not exhibit any tendency, when the attention is distracted, to assume +the symmetrical form. They rather tend to compensate each other in such a way +as to preserve equilibrium with the minimum strain on the other muscles of the +body, and this law leads as often to alternating as to symmetrical movements of the +arms or legs. The case is different of course with the muscles of the trunk, and may +be different in birds, as it would in us if we spent our lives in swimming or rowing.</p> + +<p>A new method of attacking the problem of localisation is to observe the effect of +altering the circulation in different parts of the brain. Tentative experiments on +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_306">[306]</span>one subject seem to show that verbal associations are readiest when the victim lies +on his left side, which is a happy coincidence with the localisation of the speech +centres in the left frontal convolutions. If these statistics can be trusted, it is inadvisable +to undertake hard mental labor with the head hanging back over the edge +of a chair!</p> + +<p>In the last chapter, certain simple experiments in our estimates of voluntary +movements in varying conditions of mind and body are made the basis of a far-reaching +theory of pleasure, pain, and judgment, the elements of which can be found +in Aristotle, Herbert Spencer, and James. Münsterberg found by repeated experiments +that the accuracy of attempted reproduction of a fixed and familiar amount +of centripetal or centrifugal movement of finger and thumb along a rod perpendicular +to his waistcoat varied with his condition of fatigue, pleasure, or pain. In a +pleasurable state of consciousness the centrifugal movement was exaggerated while +the centripetal fell short. In pain the reverse relation obtained. Hence he infers +a connection between pain and muscular flexion and pleasure and muscular extension, +or rather, he distinguishes the mere sensation of pain (<i>Schmerz</i>) and pleasure +(<i>Lust</i>) which may depend on integrations and disintegrations in the nerve-tissue, +from the accompanying feelings of agreeableness (<i>Wollust</i>) or disagreeableness +(<i>Unlust</i>) which are due to sensations aroused at the centres by movements of flexion +and extension throughout the body. He thus attaches his special theory of pleasure +and pain to Lange’s and James’s theory of the identity of the emotions with their +bodily concomitants—though he protests against the metaphysical implications of +the doctrine. The origin of the existing coördination of muscular flexions and extensions +with pleasure and pain, he explains teleologically on the principles of the +Spencerian psychology of evolution. He then proceeds, after Sigwart and Brentano, +to revive the old idea of Aristotle (whom he does not mention) that the judgment +(affirmative or negative) is rather the assumption of an attitude toward a presentation +(<i>Stellungsnehmende Akte</i>) than a mere conjunction of presentations. The affirmative +judgment is a faint incipient represented movement of the self towards a +suggested conjunction of presentations. The negative judgment is a similar movement +in the opposite direction. Ontogenetically these inchoate movements are later +than the movements of acceptance or rejection called forth by a painful or pleasurable +stimulus, and must therefore be treated as derivative phenomena. But the +Kantians may derive some comfort from Münsterberg’s final assurance that he too +believes that “<i>Erkenntnisstheoretisch das Urtheil primär ist</i>.”</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">Paul Shorey.</span></p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">The Spirit of Modern Philosophy.</span> By <i>Josiah Royce</i>, Ph. D. Boston and New +York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co.</h4> + +<p>We are told by Professor Royce in the preface to this book, that we are indebted +for it to the lady friend to whom it is gracefully dedicated, who asked him +“for some account of the more significant spiritual possessions of a few prominent +modern thinkers,” to be related “in comparatively brief and untechnical fashion.” +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_307">[307]</span>The larger portion of the work is taken up with that subject, exhibiting the general +growth of modern philosophical thought beginning with Spinozism, and terminating +with Monism as the outcome of the doctrine of Evolution. The author’s purpose +is constructive, however, as well as expository. He has his own philosophical +creed, suggested by what he knows of the progress and outcome of modern thought, +and the second portion of the work is the expression of his thoughts on the world-conception +which he regards as embodying the true spirit of modern philosophy. +Professor Royce justly lays stress on the fact that the theory of evolution is the +product of a genuine and continuous growth. He dwells particularly, moreover, +on the distinction between the <i>epistemological</i> sense of idealism, which “involves a +theory of the nature of our human knowledge,” and its <i>metaphysical</i> sense, in which +it is “a theory as to the nature of the real world, however we may come to know +that nature.” It is in accord with the latter sense that Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, +and their allies, as believing matter to be an expression of the world-spirit, are referred +to as the idealistic school; and it is in the metaphysical and not the epistemological +sense that the term idealism has been used since Hegel. The opposite of +a metaphysical idealist is “one who maintains the ultimate existence of wholly unspiritual +realities at the basis of experience and as the genuine truth of the +world—such unspiritual realities for instance as an absolute ‘Unknowable,’ or, +again, as what Hobbes meant by ‘Body.’” This is not, however, the view of +the author, who thinks that the metaphysical idealist alone is in possession of a +successful solution for the epistemological problem.</p> + +<p>Professor Royce divides modern philosophy into three great periods, of which +the first was one of pure and simple naturalism. The supernatural had then only a +secondary interest, and thought was governed by three ideas—“that nature is a +mechanism, that human reason is competent to grasp the truth of nature, and +that, since nature’s truth is essentially mathematical, geometry is the model science, +whose precision and necessity philosophy, too, must imitate.” During the second +period of modern philosophy there was a gradual change of thought objectivity. +Reason was still the instrument, but it was employed on the mind itself. It +came to be recognised that if man is part of nature’s mechanism, he is a knowing +mechanism. The age was, however, more than one of self-analysis. Rousseau +introduced a sentimental tendency from which came “a revival of passion, of poetry, +and of enthusiasm, whose influence we shall never outgrow.” To it is traceable +the French Revolution which overthrew all the mechanical restraints of civilisation, +and “demonstrated afresh to the world’s outer sense the central importance +of passion in the whole life of humanity.”</p> + +<p>The period of modern philosophy, which still continues, began with the publication +of Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason,” the essential doctrine of which is that +man’s nature is the real creator of man’s world, that visible nature is the expression +of the human spirit, the inner structure of which is therefore the deepest truth +for us. This idea is “as old as deeper spiritual faith itself,” and yet it is the very +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_308">[308]</span>soul of all our modern life because it is “the essentially humane view of reality.” +For fifty years Kant’s ideas ruled philosophic thought, and then, through the progress +of science, the doctrine of evolution received formulation, and confirmation +and “external nature has once more gained for us an imposing authority which +makes us in many ways sympathise afresh with the pure naturalism of the seventeenth +century.” We are compelled to omit any account of the author’s study of +the philosophies of Spinoza, Locke, and Berkeley, or the philosophic systems of +Kant and his successors of the German School of Idealists. Nor can we say anything +as to the doctrine of Evolution, which Professor Royce rightly regards as +having had its rise long before Darwin or Herbert Spencer. Before proceeding to +state his own views, the author takes a cursory glance at modern empirical monism +which he affirms to be rather a suggestion than a philosophy. It is not surprising, +therefore, that he is not content with it although he makes use of its ideas.</p> + +<p>Let us now see what are the “Suggestions” which Professor Royce offers as +his contribution towards the formation of a world-conception. These occupy the +last four chapters of the work, which are supplemented by a general summary in +the appendix, to the book. For the sake of conciseness we will make use of this +summary, according to which there are two phases of idealistic doctrine, the Analytic +Idealism of Berkeley and the Synthetic Idealism of Kant and his successors. +The former shows that if the world is to be knowable at all, it must be, in its deepest +nature, a world of ideas, that is, it exists “only in so far as beings with minds actually +<i>know it to be</i>.” The objection that nobody can <i>know</i> any reality beyond his +own self, is met by the synthetic phase of idealism which shows us that “there is +but one self in the world, the logos or world-mind. The <i>finite</i> self knows truth +beyond its own limitations, just because it is an organic part of the complete Self.” +What are the demands of idealism as thus stated? They have relation, first, to the +interpretation of the facts of experience, which must be in terms of the doctrine of +the world-mind, and, secondly, to experience itself, on which we depend “for the +revelation of that truth which, for us finite beings, must remain a fast ‘outer’ truth, +just because it is the content of other mind than our own bits of selfhood, and is +universally true for all intelligences.” The philosophy of experience having to do +with facts and with the interpretation of facts, it is necessary to distinguish between +what is really “outer” and what is “inner” about our finite experience. The +former embraces the world of facts, and a fact is something which must be describable +in some sort of universal terms. The principle of ordinary realism, “that you +must not be sentimental or otherwise emotional in your account of the truth of +things, but rather <i>exact in your descriptions of what things are</i>,” has a thoroughly +idealistic justification. Not appreciation, but description gives us outer truth, and +this is the characteristic presupposition of all natural science, which is concerned +with the universal aspects of things, as opposed to momentary and transient aspects. +That presupposition involves the assumption that the world is <i>essentially describable</i>. +But as only the well-knit, the orderly, that which conforms to law, can be described +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_309">[309]</span>science assumes the universality and rigidity of the laws of nature. It assumes +further, since the most exact descriptions are possible only in the case of processes +in Space and Time, of a mechanical type, that everything including man himself, +is a part of nature’s mechanism. A closer analysis, however, shows that, as one +can only describe what has been first appreciated, there must be universal types of +appreciation, and therefore, that “Ideals must be deeper than Mechanism, so that, +in order to be relatively describable, nature must embody purposes, and so be possessed +of worth.” The author’s conclusion is that the natural order is also a moral +order, and that therefore “the world of absolute self must appear to us as having +two aspects, one a temporal, the other an eternal aspect, one of law and one of +worth. Man then turns out to be at once a part of nature’s mechanism, and a +part of the moral order; at once temporally determined and morally free.”</p> + +<p>The final lecture presents the author’s views as to the solution of the problem +of evil. Professor Royce believes that all evil is part of a good order, and hence he +agrees with Hegel, who declared that life, however good, will always be restless, +longing, suffering, and who gloried in the paradox as the very essence of spirituality; +rather than with Schopenhauer, whose recognition, in another light, of the +universality of the same truth led him to abandon all hope in life. The justification +of the existence of an evil impulse comes just at the instant when it is hated and +condemned. Thus “condemning and conquering the evil will, makes it part of a +good will”; as pain and suffering have their compensation in their chastening +effect on the spirit. But to the enlightened soul it is not so much the painfulness +as “the blind irrationality of fortune that seems to drive God out of our thoughts +when we look at our world.” It is the capriciousness of life, arising from human +stupidity, that really makes it seem like an evil dream. What is the explanation of +this caprice given by the author? It is to be found in the creed of his idealism, +“This world is the world of the Logos.” It is “the suffering God, who is just our +own true self, who actually and in our flesh bears the sins of the world, and whose +natural body is pierced by the capricious wounds that hateful fools inflict upon +him.” And as our defeats are his, so his triumph and his eternal peace are ours also.</p> + +<p>Prof. Royce in making “only one more effort to define a ‘double-aspect’ +theory of the relations of the physical and the moral and æsthetic worlds,” affirms +that our philosophic insight teaches us that the world of matter in motion is simply +an external aspect of the appreciable world, that is, of the world of the Logos. +Of this, it is such an aspect “as can be expressed by finite consciousness in terms +of the space and time forms, and of the categories of empirical science.... Consequently +all its laws, all its necessity, its causation, its uniformity, belong, not to +its inner nature as such, but to the external show of this nature.” That which +actually appears to us is matter in motion, which furnishes the fact of the double +aspect, the inner intelligibility of which fact is problematical to us, but not so for +the Logos, who is our true Self, and who “completes the insight that for us is so +fragmentary.” This true Self, the Logos, is the only Self, and with it the deeper +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_310">[310]</span>self of man is identical. That this deeper self is “the self that knows in unity all +truth,” is declared to be no hypothesis, and therefore the existence of the Infinite +Self is perfectly sure. This Self “infinitely and reflectively transcends our consciousness, +and therefore, since it includes us, it is at the very least a person, and +more definitely conscious than we are; for what it possesses is self-reflecting knowledge.” +Finally, the true world, that is the world of appreciation, is the system of +the thoughts of the Logos, whose unity we know, just so far as we ourselves consciously +and rationally enter into it and form part of it. Therefore “in so far as we +have inner unity of thinking, in so far as we commune with our fellows, and in so +far as we rightly see significance in the outer universe, we are in and of the world +of appreciation that embodies the thought of the Logos.”</p> + +<p>Ingenious as this theory is, and notwithstanding the elements of truth it possesses, +we cannot accept it as conclusive. Its weakness is revealed in the last line +of the paragraph just quoted. If only the world of appreciation embodies the +thought of the Logos, what becomes of the world of fact? The latter is said to be +the outer aspect of the former, a notion which is apparently derived from the association +with man of body and mind. But the existence of mind, which we must +understand by the term Logos, in nature, although declared by Professor Royce to +be the only thing certain, is a mere inference, and even if the analogy of the human +organism justifies such an inference; it would require that if priority has to be +given to mind or matter in the universe it must be allowed to the latter. At birth +a human being has no mind, properly so-called, since it is the result of the activity +after birth of the organism, through the agency of the brain. It is true that the +human body possesses from the first the elements of the mind, or rather of the +feeling which thus exhibits itself; or, better still, the organic structure of which +feeling is the general function. The utmost that can be properly asserted of the +universe, therefore, is that it possesses a certain organic arrangement of its parts, +and therewith such a condition of feeling, or, what in this relation would be a better +term, sensitiveness, as is required by its organic character. In relation to such a +state of things the terms thought, consciousness, reflection, have no meaning so far +as we can judge. That organic aspect of the universe, moreover, leaves no room +for duality. Just as the human organism constitutes a perfect unity, although it is +made up of various organs and exhibits the properties attributed to both mind and +matter, so must the universe be such a perfect unity whatever its nature and attributes. +The human organism may, however, be strictly described as matter under +organic conditions, a description which is equally applicable to the universe, without +determining what those conditions are. Professor Royce objects to the Unknowable +of Herbert Spencer, but there is very little practical difference between +it and his own true Self, which, as the Absolute, is unknowable, although he is known +in the inner self of man, as Spencer’s Unknowable is known in the human consciousness. +Both Absolute and Unknowable are, however, merely names for Organic +Nature, which is seen in all things visible and is known by all her operations. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_311">[311]</span>These are governed by the laws of her very existence, and it is the uniformity of +which those laws are the expression which constitutes the moral law of the universe, +the breach of whose eternal order, whether this is established in the world of +matter or in the human mind, must be attended with consequences that are designated +by man as evil. We find only a world of description, which is nevertheless +one of moral order.</p> + +<p>Widely as we disagree on the grounds stated with the conclusions of Professor +Royce’s work, it is undoubtedly a valuable contribution to the discussion of the +world-problem. Its description of the characteristics of the philosophy of Kant and +of the German idealists is clear, though not intended to do more than exhibit the +spirit of their teaching, and it is written in a style which renders it easy reading. +It is a pity, therefore, that it is disfigured with such colloquialisms as <i>you’ll</i>, <i>isn’t</i>, +<i>can’t</i>, <i>don’t</i>, words which neither sound well, nor look well in print.</p> + +<p class="right">Ω.</p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">Die Aristotelische Auffassung vom Verhältnisse Gottes zur Welt und zum +Menschen.</span> By <i>Dr. Eugen Rolfes</i>. Berlin: Mayer & Müller. 1892.</h4> + +<p>This book is a scholastic “survival.” The author believes that Zeller’s interpretation +of Aristotle is wrong, and in five formal theses he endeavors to prove +<i>secundum artem</i> that the philosopher was a theist who taught the creation of the +world from nothing, and the immortality of the soul. In the defence of his theses +he manifests some ingenuity and industry, but no criticism. The work has no scientific +significance.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">P. S.</span></p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">Max Stirner und Friedrich Nietzsche.</span> Erscheinungen des modernen Geistes +und das Wesen des Menschen. By <i>Robert Schellwien</i>. Leipsic: C. E. M. +Pfeffer, 1892. Price 2 m 60 pf.</h4> + +<p>Individualism is the spirit of the age, and among all the champions of individualism +the most original, the most consistent, the boldest, are perhaps Max Stirner +and Friedrich Nietzsche. Robert Schellwien, in sketching their views in great outlines, +partly admires these courageous thinkers who dare to draw the consequences +of their principles to the very last even though they will appear absurd to the +world, partly censures the rashness with which they arrive at, and the superciliousness +with which they sometimes state, their opinions. Upon the whole the +author succeeds in impressing the reader that there is in these two peculiar geniuses +a gigantic strength, and that their views of truth, morality, and justice +deserve a greater attention than they have received. The reviewer is no admirer +of either Stirner or Nietzsche; he believes nevertheless that a careful analysis of +their erratic minds and lives will be very instructive. It will be first of pathological +and then even of more than pathological interest. The actual objective value of +the ideals truth, morality, and justice, will be best illustrated by showing all the consequences +of a consistent individualism. We hope that this pamphlet will grow +into a more comprehensive work; and in that case we should advise the author to +add short biographies of his heroes.</p> + +<p class="right">κρς.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_312">[312]</span></p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">The Sources and Development of Kant’s Teleology.</span> By <i>James Hayden Tufts</i>. +Chicago: University Press. 1892.</h4> + +<p>This little tract is an inaugural dissertation presented by Mr. Tufts to the University +of Freiburg for the attainment of the doctorate of philosophy. It is written +in English. Mr. Tuft’s dissertation is wholly historical. He simply seeks to expound +Kant’s true views. In this respect the work bears the marks of much research +and of a thorough exploitation of Kant’s works. Mr. Tuft’s concluding +words are that “with every new discovery of science, every advance in the ideals of +art and of the conduct of life, every development in religious faiths, comes anew +the task for philosophy to criticise, and through criticism to make a fresh attempt +to interpret from the unity of reason the manifold of life.”</p> + +<p class="right">μκρκ.</p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">Distinction and the Criticism of Beliefs.</span> By <i>Alfred Sidgwick</i>. London: Longmans, +Green, & Co. 1892.</h4> + +<p>This work might be described as an inquiry into the conflict between philosophy +and common sense, and its central idea as the continuity of nature. What bearing +this idea has on the inquiry is shown by the statement, that the distinction between +philosophy and common sense is only one of degree. And yet, regarded as methods, +or attempts to follow ideals, they may be sharply contrasted. This implies the existence +of distinctions, and hence arises the question how far distinction is consistent +with continuity in nature. The recognition of such a continuity requires the admission +of the unreality of distinctness, but this fact is not inconsistent with the use +of rough distinctions, which give rise to what the author terms effective ambiguity. +Here we have the field of the operation of common sense, which exhibits itself as +tact in the use of rough distinctions, while, on the other hand, philosophy may be +said to be concerned with the continuity which, from a superficial glance, might be +supposed to stand in opposition to distinction.</p> + +<p>The ultimate result which Mr. Sidgwick has in view is the reconciliation of philosophy +and common sense, although it is incidental to his main purpose, which is +the discussion of the best way of dealing with ambiguity, that is, of using rough distinctions. +The improvement suggested is the substitution of “reasoned discrimination” +for “haphazard tact,” and it is based on the doctrine that “the validity of +all distinctions is relative to the purpose for which they are used at the time.” This +cannot mean that distinction is merely relative, as it is said that there is no distinction +which is quite safe against being broken down. The implication is that a safe +distinction is possible, although difficult to find, and consistently with that view, the +doctrine has the double aim of repressing excessive belief in distinctions which are, +at least for the moment, invalid, and, on the other hand, of “enabling us to justify +for a passing purpose, distinctions which are faulty on the whole.” The justification +here arises from the use, and not from the distinctions themselves, although it +is evident there must be some basis for them, or they would be invalid. The element +of truth is derived from the continuity of nature, with which philosophy is +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_313">[313]</span>concerned, and hence the improvement in the method of common sense is to be +effected through its regulation by the method of philosophy.</p> + +<p>The justice of this view may be tested by its consequences, which are stated by +the author in reviewing the chief incidental aims of his book, as being those which +have to do with controversy, the faults of language, and the conflict between the +rival ideals, faith and doubt. “Philosophy,” we are told, “is doubt, just as science +is knowledge,” (a description which like many other things in this book we cannot +endorse,) and the true centre of philosophical interest in regard to rival ideals is +“to harmonise the dispute by seeking how to limit each ideal by its opposite.” +This is the aim of all real philosophy, which recognises that every ideal has an +element of truth. Philosophy is thus explanation, and Mr. Sidgwick avers one of +the great dividing forces in philosophy has always been “the rivalry between two +opposite methods of general explanation—that which explains small things by great +ones, the part by the whole, the many by the one (e. g. all earthly facts as related +to their one cause and substance); and that which explains great things by small +ones, the whole by its parts, the one by the many (e. g. the system of nature as a +‘concourse of atoms’).” Thus regarded, the distinction between philosophy and +common sense is simply one of method; and it may be said to consist in the use by +the former of rational doubt based on scientific knowledge, as distinguished from +the belief founded on popular wisdom which distinguishes the latter. Both alike, +however, are the fruit of observation, pushed further, nevertheless, in the one case +than in the other, which is practically the view expressed by the author.</p> + +<p>In considering the nature of philosophy, we have given the gist of Mr. Sidgwick’s +reflections on controversy, which is treated as the opposition of ideals. This +conflict is kept alive chiefly by doubt as to how abstract notions should be applied +in concrete cases, and largely owing to “the absence of that kind of sharp distinction +which is applicable, not only to the notions themselves, but to the actual facts +to which they pretend to refer.” This view is ably enforced, as well as the necessity +of applying to the conflict between ideals the rule laid down as to the purposive +validity of distinctions. The operation of this rule would be attended with concession +instead of assumption, there being, however, the admission, which is equivalent +to an assumption, that neither side of any ideal dispute is devoid of some truth as +well as some error. This is really required, if not by the continuity of nature, +yet by continuity in our interpretation of nature. This is continuity in thought, and +hence arises the difficulties connected with language which it is one of the author’s +incidental aims to point out. He supposes that language acts as a drag on the progress +of knowledge, owing to the <i>clumsiness</i> of words arising from the fact that +“things spoken of are always more full of change and movement than the words we +can use in speaking of them.”</p> + +<p>Mr. Sidgwick insists upon continuity, yet change itself may be evidence of at +least partial discontinuity. Our author remarks, in an appendix note on the continuity +of nature, that every change, as such, is a <i>saltus</i>, however small it may be, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_314">[314]</span>and that the same is true of any gap between the two extremes of nature and the intermediate +region. That such an intermediate region exists, is required by the continuity +of nature, which again is evidence of change, on the principle that every chain +is made up of a series of links. But as in the chain there is no real gap between the +links, so there is no actual discontinuity consequent on change in nature. The two +extremes may be regarded as prolongations of the intermediate region, and the +changes to which such prolongation is due may so occur that there may be discontinuity +between certain parts, as between the fibres of which a hempen rope is made, +and yet there be a perfectly continuous whole. We have an example of such a discontinuous +<i>continuum</i> in a beam of ordinary light, which presents not the slightest +gap, and which yet is made up of numberless undulations in different ratios representing +the six spectrum colors, each of which is, moreover, spread throughout the +whole of the beam. Here we see that continuity is quite consistent with distinction. +The latter may be regarded as discrimination of the various phases of the former, +and the distinction remains valid or otherwise according to the accuracy of the discrimination +or not. But constant change of distinction is required by progress in +knowledge which may be regarded as a thought representation, by discontinuous +steps, of the continuity of nature.</p> + +<p>As to the conflict between faith and doubt, the author considers the function of +scepticism as the search for grounds of belief, and thus doubt is said to be “rather +a friend than an enemy to those who remember that there is still some truth, on +any subject, for fallible men to learn,” as well as to those who are more interested +in the discovery of truth than in supporting their own beliefs.</p> + +<p class="right">Ω.</p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">Vorlesungen über Geometrie</span>, unter besonderer Benutzung der Vorträge von +Alfred Clebsch. By <i>Dr. Ferdinand Lindemann</i>. Leipsic: B. G. Teubner. +1891.</h4> + +<p>This first part of the second volume of Alfred Clebsch’s Lectures has been arranged +and treated by Professor Lindemann in the same way as the first, except +perhaps that the editor has extended his independent investigations rather further +than before, owing mainly to the fact that he had in addition to his own notes when +attending Professor Clebsch’s lectures in 1871-1872, only five folio pages of the late +master’s manuscript at his disposal. The present volume is divided into three parts. +I. The Point, Plane, and Straight Line. II. Surfaces of the Second Order and of +the Second Class. III. Fundamental Conceptions of Projective and Metrical Geometry. +Historical notices and references are added in foot-notes. Considering the +prominence of the editor as a mathematician, it would be a presumption on our part +to praise his work.</p> + +<p class="right">κρς.</p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">An Introduction to General Logic.</span> By <i>E. E. Constance Jones</i>. London: Longmans, +Green, & Co. 1892.</h4> + +<p>This work is another witness of the great interest now being taken in all that +pertains to the methods of knowledge.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_315">[315]</span></p> + +<p>Miss Jones, the author, is lecturer on logic at Girton College, Cambridge. During +an experience of several years in teaching, certain difficulties have very forcibly +pressed themselves upon her attention. She hopes by her book to aid in removing +these difficulties.</p> + +<p>It is certainly a good augury for women when their intellectual representatives +begin to show the disposition to turn towards the “dry light.” Logic and mathematics +are “dry” to be sure; that is, they are very apt to be <i>found</i> dry, very dry, +by beginners, and always by those who lack that real intellectual robustness which +is alone fit to meddle with fundamental problems. Hence these sober and severe +disciplines find little favor among those who seek merely for “showy” attainments, +those to whom whatever is “uninteresting” is intolerable, and those who regard +obscurity as inseparable from profundity. When then we find scholarly women +manifesting a real relish for this “dry light,” it gives promise of a coming day when +the intellectual appetite will rise above the level of mere entertainment, the level of +the playhouse and the circus, and take kindly, and perhaps zealously, to real edification.</p> + +<p>Miss Jones makes but very modest claims on behalf of her treatise. She has +not undertaken to innovate to any great extent upon the regular scheme. If in her +changes there is that which might especially provoke criticism, it is perhaps in the +nomenclature which she adopts. The traditional logic forms a system which has +its own proper merits and defects. It is of great historical interest, and its regular +terminology is almost indispensable for the proper illustration of its doctrines.</p> + +<p>We think also that the author fails to state the case in all its amplitude, when, +she lays it down as one of the most absolute and ultimate of all logical principles +that the self-evident ought to be believed. The truth is, as we conceive it, that the +self-evident is sure to be believed, and that in the face of any proposition that truly +bears its own justification along with it, any doctrine of logic is either useless or impertinent.</p> + +<p class="right">ρσλ.</p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">Hypnotismus und Suggestion.</span> By <i>W. Wundt</i>. Leipsic: Wilhelm Engelmann. +1892.</h4> + +<p>A Greek student translates κλεινός ‘small’; “You are thinking of the German +<i>klein</i>,” says the teacher quickly. Another renders ἡμείς γὰρ ἁγνοί, ‘we are lambs,’ +misled by a chance cross association with the Latin <i>agni</i>. Every careful self-observer +knows that there is no combination of memories, images, and resultant incipient +acts too absurd for some moments of confusion and mental fatigue. We +account for such confusions of thought by citing parallel cases and adding generally +that normal associations are liable to disintegration and abnormal recombination in +fatigued or excited conditions of the brain. If we seek a causal scientific explanation, +two methods are open to us: (1) we may attempt to map out in detail and describe +for all similar cases the pathways of association, or (2) we may endeavor to +define their physiological conditions and accompaniments in the nervous system. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_316">[316]</span>The first leads us at once into the metaphysics of the unconscious. The second +method, when we attempt to pass from a general to a specific correspondence, leads +to a hypothetical restatement of the observed psychological facts in terms of the latest +cerebral anatomy and physiology Now all serious scientific thinkers are fast coming +to the conclusion (on which Wundt’s book is based) that the phenomena of +dreams and of hypnotism are to be explained by the general laws of association as +revealed especially in the confused and obstructed associations of the normal state. +The critical and destructive part of Wundt’s sensible and timely work has two aims: +(1) to discriminate the attested phenomena of hypnotism from the alleged phenomena +of thought-transference, telepathy, and “possession” on which no serious +student will waste his words; and (2) to point out the confusions of thought in current +explanations of hypnotic phenomena, which either confine themselves to restatements +of the observed facts in terms of a hypothetical anatomy, or at any rate in +Wundt’s opinion base their physiological hypotheses on an inadequate psychological +analysis. His own constructive work is an attempt to supply the missing analysis +and accompany it with the most plausible physiological theory that our imperfect +science allows. Dreams and the illusions of the hypnotic subject are doubtless explicable +generally as derangements of the associative machinery. But they are +specific forms of abnormal association, the special characteristics of which we wish to +define. Suggestion, Wundt says (with James), is association accompanied by a +“limitation of consciousness to the images aroused by the association.” The scientific +problem is: <i>Wie entsteht die Einengung des Bewusstseins?</i> This narrowing of +consciousness manifests itself in a diminished sensibility to all impressions outside +of the suggestions. Dreams show the same features, accidental impressions of sense +or changes in the nutritive processes here taking the place of direct suggestions from +without. But in sleep and dreams the limitation of consciousness is conditioned by +general fatigue of the nervous system. In the hypnotic state it results not from +fatigue, but from neuro-dynamic and vaso-motor changes in the distribution of +tensions in the brain. Hence the superior intensity and vividness of the presentations +that are allowed to develop themselves. This altered equilibrium of the forces +of the brain is brought about by the suggestions of the operator, which are generally +guided by him to a more or less definite end. The resulting derangements of +normal associations are consequently less lawless than is the case in dreams. On +these principles Wundt explains the chief facts of hypnotism as follows: Automatic +obedience to the commands of the operator results simply from the fact that +every idea tends to realise itself in action, is an incipient act; and in the narrowed +consciousness of the hypnotic subject the idea suggested by the operator finds no +competitors in the struggle for existence as a reality. This explanation (which is +really as old as Spinoza) accounts also for positive hallucinations—there are no reductors, +as Taine would say. Negative hallucinations (the non-existence of an +existing door) may be explained sometimes by a contradictory positive hallucination +(as of a curtain covering the door) more often in the same way as hypnotic analgesia +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_317">[317]</span>by the familiar analogy of our insensibility to the toothache when the attention is +elsewhere strongly engaged. This is favored by the generally diminished sensibility +of the hypnotic subject. Post-hypnotic suggestions are associations depending +on partial memories, such as we have in the normal state when we merely recall an +image or an object without time-and-circumstance localisation. The subject who is +to execute a post-hypnotic suggestion at 7 o’clock is reminded by the striking of the +clock of an image of a thing to be done which the original command of the operator +associated with the stroke of seven. All else is forgotten. When the time limit is +not thus definitely marked, the process must be analogous to that whereby some +persons are able to waken at a predetermined hour in the morning. A latent association +is aroused into full activity by naturally recurring conditions of internal +physiological processes or external surroundings. Courtesy or prudence are perhaps +all that prevent the best explanation of certain extreme cases being the old one: +“the boy lied.” Wundt rejects the claim that suggestion is the experimental method +in psychology <i>par excellence</i>, for the very sufficient reason that the phenomena experimented +with are only very partially in the control of the operator and are +furthermore mainly pathological. He is far from disputing the practical efficacy of +hypnotic therapeutics in functional disorders, but he regards the hypnotic sleep as +a dangerous remedy, the employment of which should be limited to trained practitioners. +The subjection of the hypnotic subject to the will of the hypnotiser is <i>a +priori</i> an immoral relation to obtain between man and man unless justified by superior +medical necessities, but, quite apart from <i>a priori</i> ethics, indiscriminate hypnotisation +is to be discouraged as a direct cause of nervous degeneration. The book +closes as it began With a dignified but severe reprobation of those thinkers who in +the interests of occultism magnify the psychological significance of hypnotism and +disseminate superstition in the name of science.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">Paul Shorey.</span></p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">Der Hypnotismus in gemeinfasslicher Darstellung.</span> By <i>Dr. Hans Schmidkunz</i>. +Stuttgart: A. Zimmer (E. Mohrmann). 1892.</h4> + +<p>This book (266 pp.) is a popular compendium of hypnotism. The author, beginning +(I) with the hypnosis of common life, goes over the whole field as follows: +(II) the phenomena of hypnosis, (III) its application, (IV) the “beyond” of hypnotism, +(V) the conceptions of hypnotism, and (VI) its dangers. The seventh and last +chapter is a short history of the subject.</p> + +<p>Dr. Schmidkunz, Docent of philosophy at the University of Munich, is one of +the few who believe that there is a “beyond” in hypnotism. He says on p. 65: +“A hypnotised person was led through a room while sleeping. The experimenter +made a few passes over his head and then violently whirled his arm around in a +vertical direction before his subject. When the subject approached the marked +place, he recoiled from it crying with pain.” Our author asks, “what is this magnetic +wall to be regarded as? As a charm, as an obstacle of occult power, from +which the body recoils as from a wall of stone? If not, was it the subject’s soul that +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_318">[318]</span>recoiled? Was it the hypnotised person’s belief which created the wall?” etc. The +two interpretations, the one attributing the effect to a magnetic power, the other to +suggestion are typical. The former is bolder: he goes “beyond” hypnotism.</p> + +<p>Our author is one of those who go beyond hypnotism, and is not satisfied with +the theory that suggestion explains all. We may add that he regards telepathy as +a sufficiently established fact. Telepathy finds little support among scientists in +Germany, and Dr. Schmidkunz complains, in a circular letter to “Professor Wundt’s +and other Savants’ Critical Saltomortales” of the cool and depreciative treatment +which his book <i>Psychologie der Suggestion</i> received at the hands of men of science.</p> + +<p class="right">κρς.</p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">L’Hypnotisme devant les Chambres legislatives Belges.</span> Par <i>J. Delbœuf</i>. +Paris: Félix Alcan. Pp. 80.</h4> + +<p>In a recent number of <i>The Monist</i> Prof. J. Delbœuf gave the reasons which +have induced him to come to the conclusion that “persons in an hypnotic condition +preserve at least a sufficient portion of their intelligence, their reason, together +with freedom of action, to prevent them from committing deeds that neither their +conscience nor their habits approve of.” This opinion is entertained by many other +hypnotists, but the more general opinion is that “suggestion” may be made use of +for criminal purposes: Such is the case especially in France and in Belgium; and +acting on that supposition the medical faculty of the latter country promoted in the +legislative Chamber a law interdicting public hypnotic séances, and reserving the +practice of hypnotism as a therapeutic measure exclusively to medical men, as well +as the treatment of insane persons and those under twenty-one years of age. Professor +Delbœuf, who is not a medical man, naturally objects when those who but a +few years ago would have classed him and his fellow hypnotists as charlatans, seek +without reason to reserve for themselves the promising field of labor opened up by +the researches of others. He maintains that men are born hypnotisers as they are +born artists, and therefore to exclude all but medical men from the application of +the hypnotic power will often prevent its use for curative purposes. Moreover it is +a serious question for those who possess this natural gift. They might perform the +most praiseworthy actions and yet be subjected to a legal penalty. Professor Delbœuf +states that by hypnotism he cured a youth eighteen years of age of a mania for +stealing (<i>la manie du vol</i>), and thus saved him from unmerited dishonor. On another +occasion he had charge of a young wife who was possessed with the idea of +murdering her children, and after all other means had failed he was able to remove +the idea by suggestion extending over a period of eight days. He properly asks +whether the performance of such actions ought to be treated as criminal.</p> + +<p>The real question to be considered, however, is whether the practice of hypnotism +is likely to be made use of for criminal purposes if it is permitted to every one. +We much doubt whether any actual case of such an abuse has been legally established, +or whether suggestion could lead to the perpetration of a criminal act unless +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_319">[319]</span>there was a predisposition in that direction. Professor Delbœuf makes use, however, +of an apparent paradox which would seem to render abortive any such law of prevention +as that above referred to. It is that there is in reality no such thing as +hypnotism. M. Bernheim writes in a letter given in the present work, “for my +part, in the thousands of hypnotisations I have practised, I have never seen the least +inconvenience result. Undoubtedly very impressionable subjects can, under the +emotional influence of auto-suggestion, present certain nervous troubles; but these +a prudent operator can always calm by suggestion.” Professor Delbœuf relates +several cases of this kind within his own experience, which shows that severe nervous +pain can be removed by simple assertion that it does not exist. He affirms that +“the so-called hypnotic sleep is only a sign of suggestibility, and that it is not at all +necessary to suggestive therapeutics.”</p> + +<p>We may conclude this notice of a very interesting contribution to the discussion +as to the true nature and operation of hypnotism, by quoting the conclusions arrived +at by the author as to the proper mode of regulating its practice. He suggests +that representations of hypnotism should be permitted subject to the measures which +regulate public spectacles; that any one should be allowed to become a hypnotiser, +as he can become a shampooer or a truss-maker; that the hypnotist who gives remedies +should be punishable, since he exercises the art of curing without a diploma; +that he should not be allowed to hypnotise minors without the consent of the family; +and that he should be forbidden to treat a sick person without the written authorisation +of a medical man and under his direction. This rule Professor Delbœuf, +although he disapproves of the law which forbids the practice of medicine to those +who have not a diploma, has always acted on. He thinks that if medical men then +studied hypnotism and practised it themselves, hypnotisers who had no diplomas +would soon have nothing to do. This spirited defence by Professor Delbœuf of his +views will be widely read. Not the least interesting portion of it is the criticism, +with which it ends, of “the affair of the brothers Vandevoir,” where we read that +he is designated by his opponent M. Masoin “<i>doux et bon vieillard</i>” and “<i>l’homme +cheveu</i>”!</p> + +<p class="right">Ω.</p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">Ueber den Hautsinn.</span> By <i>Dr. phil. et med. Max Dessoir</i>, Privatdocenten an der +Universität zu Berlin. Separat-Abzug aus Archiv für Anatomie und Physiologie. +Physiologische Abtheilung. 1892.</h4> + +<p>This pamphlet, a reprint from the <i>Archiv für Anatomie und Physiologie</i> of +1892, is an elaborate and careful investigation into the <i>modus operandi</i> of skin sensations. +The first part is a discussion of the theory of sensation in general containing +(1) an analysis of the ideas <i>Gefühl</i>, <i>Empfindung</i>, and <i>Wahrnehmung</i>, (2) a +critique of Johannes Müller’s doctrine of specific energies, (3) an exposition of the +objectification of sensations. Feeling (<i>Empfindung</i>), according to the author, is, no +magnitude, its main feature is intensity, quality becomes important only in sensation +(<i>Wahrnehmung</i>). For the psychology of skin-sensations, we have to note the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_320">[320]</span>great influence of accompanying feelings (<i>Mitempfindungen</i>). The second part is +devoted to the author’s investigations of the sense of temperature. Dr. Dessoir rejects +Blix’s point theory; he regards the idea of two different end-apparatuses for +warm and cold sensations as an unfounded assumption, and claims that the temperature +sense is one mode of sensation possessing two qualities. The intensity of +temperature sensations depends not only upon the <i>vis viva</i> of the heat in the +stimulus; but also upon five other factors (1) the size of the surface affected, (2) the +duration of the affect, (3) the thickness of the epidermis, (4) its conductibility, and +(5), last not least, its temperature.</p> + +<p class="right">κρς.</p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">Recherches d’optique physiologique et physique.</span> By <i>Clémence Royer</i>. Brussels +Imprimerie Veuve Monnom. 1892.</h4> + +<p>The first part of this brochure consists chiefly of an examination of the theories +of M. M. Hirth and Chauveau on chromatic sensation. The talented authoress +disagrees with the view entertained by M. Chauveau, that the sensations of contrast +which are fused cerebrally, so as to give, when viewed with both eyes, a white +image, are subjective in an intellectual sense. The result is purely physico-physiological, +as it is even assuming the intervention of M. Hirth’s <i>interior eye</i>. Mad. +Royer regards the eyes organised so as to effect a fusion of the colors and forms +depicted on the two retinas, and she accepts the conclusion of M. Hirth, that they +lessen the real polychromism of objects, the inability to perceive the infra-red and +the ultra-violet rays concealing from us a considerable part “of the palette of +nature and of its chromatic scale.” The authoress refers with approval to the +theory of M. Charpentier that the complementary colors correspond to inverse undulatory +phases, which are destroyed by interference in the field of vision.</p> + +<p>The second part of Mad. Royer’s pamphlet is devoted to a consideration of the +photography of colors, and the theory of light. It points out that the photography +of colors, which has been effected to some extent by M. Lippmann, must be a physical +and not a chemical process. It is the result of the periodic compressions of +the sensitised silver-surface, due to the shocks it receives from the light undulations +of the ether, which so modify the surfaces of the silver atoms that they reflect +colored rays identical with those received from the object photographed. With +reference to the propagation of light, the authoress affirms that the atoms of matter, +as well as those of the ether, which differs from matter only in being imponderable +and without inertia, are centres of emanation of a continuous and impenetrable +fluid, which is however indefinitely expansible or compressible. The size and +form of atoms will thus depend on the compressions they receive, and they will be +able to accommodate themselves to the spaces to which they are confined by the +resistance of the atomic groups by which they are surrounded. But the world may +be regarded as consisting of three sorts of atoms: (1) those of the ether which possess +their primordial unity of expansive force and are endowed with perfect elasticity; +(2) those of ponderable matter, which have lost a portion of their expansive +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_321">[321]</span>force and elasticity; (3) those which are called vitaliferous, because they have regained +their expansive force, and are thus capable of autonomous movements +necessary to resist the compressions of the ether and to oppose the inertia of matter. +They thus answer to the cell-souls of Haeckel.</p> + +<p class="right">Ω.</p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">Die Bewegung der lebendigen Substanz.</span> Eine vergleichend-physiologische +Untersuchung der Contractionserscheinungen. By <i>Max Verworn</i>, Dr. +med., Privatdocent der Physiologie an der Universität Jena. Mit 19 Abbildungen. +Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1892.</h4> + +<p>The mechanism of muscle contraction and expansion and the motions of +amœboid substance have been recognised as one and the same problem; and several +naturalists, foremost among them Hofmeister, Engelmann, and Edmund +Montgomery have investigated it, fully aware of the enormous importance of the +subject. The present pamphlet is small, it contains only 103 pages, but it contains +the statement of the problem, a description of the author’s experiments, and his +solution so lucidly that one cannot read it without great satisfaction. Both processes, +expansion as well as contraction, are, according to Verworn, spontaneous +motions, and both are to be explained by chemotropy. Expansion, i. e., in +amœba the protrusion of pseudopodia, is due to the plasma’s hunger for the +oxygen, which is contained in the surrounding medium. Every irritation (electric +shocks, concussions, injuries etc.) causes a chemical decomposition of the oxygenised +plasma; it loses carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen, (as we know from the +waste products, carbonic acid, creatine, lactic acid,) and these substances are +exactly those which are most prominent in building up living substance. Irritations +without exception cause the plasma to return to the nucleus. The chemical +change in the plasma makes it hungry for the nuclear substances. The vital +process, accordingly, is an interaction between the nucleus, the plasma, and the +medium, so that in the constant exchange of materials the old structure is preserved; +and the fundamental features of the vital process are first the plasma’s +chemotropy for oxygen, causing centrifugal motions, and then its chemotropy for +nuclear substance, causing centripetal motions. The plasma saturated with nuclear +substances, shows a chemotropy for the oxygen of the medium; it moves in a +centrifugal direction, and the oxygenised plasma has become so unstable that it +breaks down on the slightest provocation. The decomposed plasma exhibits a +chemotropy for nuclear substance and thus returns in contripetal motions to the +centre. Without entering into details we may mention that this accounts also for +the fact that dying protoplasm always assumes a globular shape, until it crumbles +to pieces. The <i>rigor mortis</i> is the last vital action of living substance. The +plasma seeks once more the nuclear substance, but not finding sufficient material +for being built up again into a substance endowed with a chemotropy for oxygen +remains rigid until it decays.</p> + +<p>The author finds his theory to hold good for the actions of the striated and +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_322">[322]</span>nonstriated muscles, and also of ciliated tissues. Having shown that the vital functions +are due to the same forces that are observable in the retort of the chemist, he +adds: “The savage accordingly was not quite wrong when he drew no distinct line, +considering everything moving as alive. Life is motion. That old poetical view +of all nature being animated with life throughout was in possession of a germ of +truth, and our proud civilisation has actually made a retrogressive step in abandoning +this view.”</p> + +<p class="right">κρς.</p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">Graber’s Leitfaden der Zoologie für die oberen Classen der Mittelschulen.</span> +Vienna and Prague: F. Tempsky. 1892. Price 1 fl. 60 kr.</h4> + +<p>We had occasion in a recent number of <i>The Monist</i> to review an excellent text-book +of physics published by this same house. The present work on zoology is in +its second edition, and is intended, like the above-mentioned work of Professor +Mach’s, for high-school instruction. Professor Graber, its author, died before the +completion of the second edition, and the work was finished by J. Mik.</p> + +<p>Graber’s Zoology is unique in its class; it covers, within the restricted limits of +two hundred and sixty-one pages, the whole field of elementary biology, human physiology, +and zoology, as it is usually exploited in such books, and thus combines in +a single volume what is usually contained in two or three. The human organism +(Part 1) is made the starting-point of study in the work, and the explication of the +physiological and mechanical functions of animals are thus all grouped about this +central figure. In a concise form (55 pages) this book contains about all of human +anatomy and physiology that is usually learned in high-schools. Part 1 also contains, +at the end of the discussions, brief dietetic suggestions. “Systematic Zoology” +is taken up in the Second Part. This part is well analysed and arranged. The cuts +are also excellent. Attached to the book is a “Picture-Atlas.” This atlas contains +a number of colored plates, which depict various physiological and anatomical organs, +and also four beautiful representations of scenes from the Naples Aquarium. +Although this book will not be used by English school-students, it may be recommended +to students of scientific German who wish a good introduction into the +technical vocabulary of German biology and zoology, which to the foreigner is very +difficult.</p> + +<p class="right">μκρκ.</p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">L’Anthropologie du Bengale.</span> By <i>Paul Topinard</i>. Extracted from <i>L’Anthropologie</i> +for May-June, 1892. Paris: G. Masson.</h4> + +<p>The present contribution to the science of Anthropology by the Editor of <i>L’Anthropologie</i>, +is based on the anthropometric inquiries of Mr. H. H. Risley made +under instructions from the government of Bengal. The conclusions deduced by +Dr. Topinard from the large mass of material brought together by Mr. Risley, and +which relates to members of all the castes to be met with in Bengal, are of great +interest. He finds that the populations are much mixed, but that they may be divided +into three types, one tall and dolichocephalic, that of the Aryans; another short and +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_323">[323]</span>brachycephalic, derived from northern Asiatics; and the third short and dolichocephalic, +or that of the native blacks. India is a world by itself, and most of its +inhabitants belong to races of which there is no specimen in Europe. Dr. Topinard +naturally attaches more importance to physical than to ethnographical characters +as evidence of anthropological descent, and he is justified by Mr. Risley’s researches, +of which he speaks very highly; although he thinks they would have been more +fruitful if the anthropometrical instructions prepared by the French Anthropologist +had been more strictly adhered to. That they were not so is the more surprising as +Mr. Risley’s work is dedicated to Dr. Topinard himself.</p> + +<p class="right">Ω.</p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">Ueber sittliche Dispositionen.</span> By <i>Dr. Anton Oelzelt-Newin</i>, Privatdocent an +der Universität in Bern. Graz: Leuschner & Lubensky. 1892. Price Mk. 2 +70 Pf.</h4> + +<p>The main idea of this book is to prove that there are certain innate dispositions +forming the elements of morality. The elements of morality are according +to Dr. Oelzelt-Newin the attitudes of fear, anger, love, sympathy, shame, and pride. +Conscience is a complex which has developed from these six dispositions. Having +stated sufficient evidences for the heredity of moral dispositions and illustrated +the parallel phenomena of bodily states in their reference to moral alienation, the +author treats the six elements of morality in single chapters, explaining their causes +and the influence of conditions under which they develop either into virtues or +crimes. The essay (92 pp.) is a contribution to that ethical determinism which regards +evil as the necessary result of given factors. “Religious people should say: +Not Only the stone which falls from the roof and kills a just man, but also the will +of a criminal and the punishment of the judge are inscrutable ordinances of God. +That alone is a true theodicy.” As an optimist the author trusts that the evil +of the world will be conquered with legal means and enjoins priests to revise in +this sense their creed, jurists their law, and all men their love of mankind.</p> + +<p class="right">κρς.</p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">The Beauties of Nature.</span> And the Wonders of the World We live in. By Sir +<i>John Lubbock</i>. New York: Macmillan & Co. 1892. 429 pages. Price $1.50.</h4> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">Natur und Kunst.</span> Studien zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der Kunst. By <i>Carus +Sterne</i>. Berlin: Verein für deutsche Literatur. 1892.</h4> + +<p>The first of these two books is a delightful compilation by Sir John Lubbock. +It is another addition to that series of popular works which this well-known naturalist +is now giving to English-speaking peoples. It makes no pretension of being +scientific: it simply takes the world which science has revealed and shows us its +wonders and its beauties. Yet it insinuates many a scientific fact and inculcates +many a moral lesson. No one will regret the few hours that can be spent in its +perusal, and the stimulus derived from it will heighten the pleasure which every +religiously-minded heart takes in the contemplation of natural grandeur and truth. +In the main, it is intended for unscientific readers. It requires hardly any preparatory +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_324">[324]</span>knowledge to be understood; yet it sometimes touches on a truth that even +great thinkers overlook. Thus, <i>à propos</i> of the capacity for intact divisibility which +some life-forms possess, Sir John remarks that these considerations introduce “much +difficulty into our conception of the idea of an Individual.” “In fact,” he says, +“the realisation of the idea of an individual gradually becomes more and more difficult, +and the continuity of existence, even among the highest animals, gradually +forces itself upon us. I believe that as we become more rational, as we realise more +fully the conditions of existence, this consideration is likely to have important moral +results.” The work is divided into the following chapters: “Animal Life,” “Plant +Life;” “Woods and Fields,” “Mountains,” “Water,” “Rivers and Lakes,” “The +Sea,” “The Starry Heavens.”</p> + +<p>The second of the two books that head this review is by Carus Sterne. Few +men possess the wide technical knowledge and the same command of the historical +literature of his subject, that this investigator and writer possesses. Carus Sterne +unites with a rigorous scientific training the rare qualities of philosophical insight +and sound erudition. He possesses the scientific facts on which to base valid judgments, +and he deduces from these facts the inferences that affect the most important +problems of life—its culture and morality. We have had occasion before, to refer +to these phases of Carus Sterne’s activity as an author.</p> + +<p>In the present work the author of <i>Werden und Vergehen</i> discusses the relations +which obtain between nature and art. Here is not the place to give even a synopsis +of the great wealth of material which this book of 395 pages contains; we are allowed +simply to hint at its purport and methods. Carus Sterne defines the artistic +impulse in man to be a longing of the mind to rise above the ordinary routine of +physical existence. It is a lifting ourselves out of our every-day life. This cannot be +accomplished by the simple reproduction of the things of nature; such reproductions +have not in themselves an elevating effect. Art is not imitative, art is creative. It +uses color, form, space, merely as a means to give “local habitation” to an idea. +The imitation of actually existing things is the beginning of art; but it is its lowest +stage. Nature must be our guide, our norm, not our model. Here the middle road +is taken between the old and the new idea of art. That was ultra-idealistic, this is +ultra-realistic. The author then proceeds to discuss the notion of beauty in art and +nature (Part I) and finally takes up generally (Part II) the subject of the artistic +contemplation and reproduction of the world. All these topics, with their many +subdivisions, are treated in Carus Sterne’s best and most fascinating style. The work +is well illustrated, and all interested in the natural history of art will find in it a +storehouse of valuable material.</p> + +<p class="right">μκρκ.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"> + +<h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_58" href="#FNanchor_58" class="label">[58]</a> Cf. Ward, <i>Encyclopædia Britannica</i>, Vol. XX, p. 44.</p></div> + +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_325">[325]</span></p> + +<h3 class="nobreak" id="PERIODICALS_II">PERIODICALS.</h3> + +</div> + +<h4>ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE.</h4> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. IV. No. 3.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Ueber die sogenannte Conscience musculaire</span> (<span class="smcap">Duchenne</span>). By <i>A. Pick</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Eine neue Theorie der Lichtempfindungen.</span> By <i>Christine Ladd-Franklin</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Litteraturbericht.</span> (Hamburg and Leipsic: Leopold Voss.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>Mrs. Christine Ladd Franklin (a contributor to this number of <i>The Monist</i>) is +one of those few women who have actually won a well deserved reputation as a +thinker and scientific worker. She is an American by birth and the wife of an American +savant. It is pleasant to find her name in a German periodical among whose +editorial writers are men so prominent as Ebbinghaus, König, Exner, Helmholtz, +Hering, Kries, Lipps, G. E. Müller, Pelman, Preyer, and Stumpf. Mrs. Ladd +criticises Helmholtz and Hering, and thinks that the theories of Donders (in Gräfe’s +“Archiv,” 1884) and Göller (in Du Bois-Reymond’s “Archiv,” 1888) have not received +sufficient attention. In accord with their propositions, she sets forth an exceedingly +simple hypothesis which attempts an explanation of the three main colors +by atomic motions in the three different dimensions of space.</p> + +<h4>PHILOSOPHISCHE MONATSHEFTE.</h4> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. XXVIII. Nos. 9 and 10.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Ueber die Grundformen der Vorstellungsverbindung.</span> Psychologische +Studie. (Concluded.) By <i>M. Offner</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Der Begriff der Verschmelzung und damit Zusammenhängendes in +Stumpf’s “Tonpsychologie,” Band II.</span> By <i>Th. Lipps</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Werke zur Philosophie der Geschichte und des socialen Lebens</span> (Third +Article: <i>J. S. Mackenzie</i>, An Introduction to Social Philosophy; <i>J. H. Ferguson</i>, +The Philosophy of Civilisation; <i>W. A. Macdonald</i>, Humanitism). By +<i>F. Tönnies</i>.</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. XXIX. No. 1 and 2.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Die moderne Energetik in ihrer Bedeutung für die Erkenntnisskritik.</span> +By <i>K. Lasswitz</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Die sittliche Frage eine sociale Frage</span> (I). By <i>F. Staudinger</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Religionsphilosophische Thesen.</span> By <i>E. von Hartmann</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Litteraturbericht.</span> (Berlin: Dr. R. Salinger.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_326">[326]</span></p> + +<h4>ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PHILOSOPHIE UND PHILOSOPHISCHE KRITIK. Vol. 101. No. 1.</h4> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS:</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Psychologische Aphorismen.</span> By <i>Otto Liebmann</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Unterhalb und oberhalb von gut und böse.</span> By <i>Eduard von Hartmann</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Jahresbericht über Erscheinungen der anglo-amerikanischen Litteratur +aus der Zeit von 1890-1891.</span> By <i>Friedrich Jodl</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Zur Begrüssung des zweiten Hunderts der Bände dieser Zeitschrift.</span> By +<i>Prof. Dr. Rud. Seydel</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Recensionen.</span> (Leipsic: C. E. M. Pfeffer.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<h4>THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. October, 1892. Vol. V. No. 1.</h4> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS:</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Disturbance of the Attention During Simple Mental Processes.</span> By +<i>Edgar James Swift</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Pseudo-Chromesthesia, or the Association of Colors with Words, Letters, +and Sounds.</span> By <i>William O. Krohn</i>, Ph. D.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Report on an Experimental Test of Musical Expressiveness.</span> (Part II.) +By <i>Benjamin Ives Gilman</i>.</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>The present investigation made by Mr. Edgar James Swift shows that a disturbance +of the attention through sight is more effective in lengthening the reaction +time than when the disturbance comes through the sense of hearing; but whenever +the reaction follows a slight sensation, the time of choice is less affected by disturbances +of the attention than if the excitation is a sound. Dr. William O. Krohn concludes, +after carefully studying several hundred cases of pseudo-chromesthesia, that +a greater per cent. of them arise from some sort of cerebral work due to the close +relation of the cortical centres. Mr. Gilman concludes from experiments made with +various persons, that musical expressiveness has been overestimated, and that on +the emotional theory of its nature the importance of the art has also been overestimated. +(Worcester: J. H. Orpha.)</p> + +<h4>MIND. New Series. No. 4. October, 1892.</h4> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS:</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Field of Æsthetics Psychologically Considered, ii.</span> By <i>Henry +Rutgers Marshall</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Lotze’s Antithesis between Thought and Things, ii.</span> By <i>A. Eastwood</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Study of Crime.</span> By <i>Rev. W. D. Morrison</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">On the Properties of a One-dimensional Manifold.</span> By <i>Benj. Ives +Gilman</i>.</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>In his present article Mr. H. R. Marshall finds a basis for the differentiation +of Æsthetics from Hedonics, in “pleasure permanency in revival” as belonging +particularly to the former. Mr. Eastwood criticises Lotze’s antithesis between +thoughts and things which is closely connected with his erroneous opinion that +time is a property of things in themselves. The study of crime by Mr. W. D. Morrison +discusses crime under the three heads of the movement of crime, its causes, and +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_327">[327]</span>its repression, of which the last deals with the theory, the methods, and the efficacy +of punishment. In his discussion of the properties of a one-dimensional manifold, +examples of which are time, the straight line, quantity, intensity, number, and +pitch, Mr. B. I. Gilman, who was a pupil of Mr. C. S. Peirce, seeks to give a +formulation of one-dimensionality in which the general notion of relation and +converse relation is substituted for that of greater and less difference. This +number of <i>Mind</i> contains a voluminous note on the blind deaf-mute child, Helen +Keller, by Prof G. C. Robertson, the late editor, whose death is announced in the +same number. (London: Williams & Norgate.)</p> + +<p class="right">Ω.</p> + +<h4>INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. October, 1892. Vol. III. No. 1.</h4> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS:</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">The National Traits of the Germans as seen in their Religion.</span> By +<i>Prof. Otto Pfleiderer</i>, D. D., University of Berlin.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Philanthropy and Morality.</span> By <i>Father Huntington</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">International Quarrels and their Settlement.</span> By <i>Leonard H. West</i>, +LL. D., London University.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">1792.—Year 1.</span> By <i>David G. Ritchie</i>, Jesus College. Oxford.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Utilitarianism.</span> By <i>A. L. Hodder</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Book Reviews.</span></p> + +<p>(Philadelphia: <i>International Journal of Ethics</i>, 118 S. Twelfth Street.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<h4>THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.</h4> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. I. No. 5.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Psychogenesis.</span> By <i>President David J. Hill</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Problem of Epistemology.</span> By <i>Professor Andrew Seth</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Origin of Pleasure and Pain, (II.)</span> By <i>Dr. Herbert Nichols</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Discussions: Reality and “Idealism.”</span> By <i>F. C. S. Schiller</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Reviews of Books.</span></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Summaries of Articles.</span></p> + +</blockquote> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. I. No. 6.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Green’s Theory of the Moral Motive.</span> By <i>Prof. John Dewey</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Thought before Language.</span> By <i>Prof. William James</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Pleasure-Pain, and Sensation.</span> By <i>Henry Rutgers Marshall</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Reviews of Books.</span></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Summaries of Articles.</span></p> + +<p>(Boston. New York, Chicago: Ginn & Company.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<h4>THE NEW WORLD. December, 1892. Vol. I. No. 4.</h4> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS:</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Brahmo Somaj.</span> By <i>Protap Chunder Mozoomdar</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Future of Christianity.</span> By <i>William M. Salter</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Progressive Orthodoxy.</span> By <i>Egbert C. Smyth</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Michael Servetus.</span> By <i>Joseph Henry Allen</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_328">[328]</span></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Present Position of the Roman Catholic Church.</span> By <i>G. Santayana</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Church in Germany and the Social Question.</span> By <i>John Graham Brooks</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">A World Outside of Science.</span> By <i>Thomas Wentworth Higginson</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Birth and Infancy of Jesus.</span> By <i>Albert Réville</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Monistic Theory of the Soul.</span> By <i>James T. Bixby</i>.</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>The last article is a criticism to the point, discriminating and fair. The author +takes special notice of Dr. Carus’s position, whose views are recapitulated with accuracy, +but not accepted as convincing. (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, & Co.)</p> + +<h4>REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE.</h4> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: September, 1892. No. 201.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">La personnalité dans les rêves.</span> By <i>J.-.M. Guardia</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Histoire et philosophie religieuses.</span> By <i>M. Vernes</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Sur la terminologie philosophique.</span> By <i>Durand (de Gros)</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Comptes rendus et notices bibliographiques.</span></p> + +</blockquote> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: October, 1892. No. 202.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Du trouble des facultés musicales dans l’aphasie.</span> By <i>Dr. Brazier</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Le développement de la volonté.</span> (Concluded.) By <i>A. Fouillée</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Le mouvement pédagogique.</span> By <i>E. Blum</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Analyses et comptes rendus.</span></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Revues des périodiques étrangers.</span></p> + +</blockquote> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: November, 1892. No. 203.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">La psychologie de W. James.</span> By <i>L. Marillier</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">De l’unité de la science: les grandes synthèses du savoir.</span> By <i>E. de Roberty</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Sur les diverses formes du caractère.</span> By <i>Th. Ribot</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Variétés.</span></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Analyses et comptes rendus.</span></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Revue des périodiques étrangers.</span> (Paris: Félix Alcan.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<h4>PHILOSOPHISCHES JAHRBUCH. Vol. V. No. 4.</h4> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS:</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Die neueste Phase des Schopenhauerianismus.</span> (Concluded.) <i>Bäumker.</i></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Die speculativen Grundlagen der optischen Wellentheorie.</span> (Concluded.) +<i>S. J. Linsmeier.</i></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Religion und Entwickelungstheorie.</span> (Concluded.) <i>Schanz.</i></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Der Substanzbegriff bei Cartesius im Zusammenhang mit der scholastischen +und neueren Philosophie.</span> (Continued.) <i>S. J. (C.) Ludewig.</i></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Recensionen und Referate.</span> (Fulda: Fuldaer Actien-Druckerei.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_329">[329]</span></p> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="masthead"> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Vol. III.</span> +<span class="smcap spacer">April, 1893.</span> +<span class="smcap">No. 3.</span></p> + +<h2>THE MONIST.</h2> + +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h3 class="nobreak" id="RELIGION_AND_MODERN_SCIENCE">RELIGION AND MODERN SCIENCE.</h3> + +</div> + +<h4>I.</h4> + +<p>The ancient conflict between religion and science is now, at the +close of the nineteenth century, more animated than ever before. +This conflict has formed the intellectual pivot of civilisation +ever since Christianity first afforded the western peoples of Europe +the inconsistent spectacle of a religion which made abundant use in +its dogmatic constructions of the theories of contemporary science, +and yet assumed a hostile attitude towards the fundamental principle +of all science, the spirit of research and unbiassed judgment generally. +Rightly has one of the acutest modern critics of Christianity, +Ludwig Feuerbach,⁠<a id="FNanchor_59" href="#Footnote_59" class="fnanchor">[59]</a> maintained, that the Christian sophistic +philosophy is the necessary outcome of this inconsistency, which proclaims +as absolute truth a definite, historical revelation, such as is +found in the Bible, and simply assigns to the reason the subordinate +and improper office of harmonising and defending what is there laid +down.</p> + +<p>There are, it is true, a great number of people, who are not disposed +to see the bitterness of the conflict now raging. It has become +customary for us to look upon the nineteenth century as an +age of the comprehension of religion, and to distinguish it from the +eighteenth century, which is regarded as a period of mere religious +criticism. We boast of having rediscovered religion, and of having +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_330">[330]</span>secured to it a permanent province in the dominion of the mind. +But the facts of our public life stand in curious contradiction to these +assertions. In all civilised nations, in literature, in parliamentary +procedures, in all questions that relate to religious and moral life +or to education, the attentive observer will find that a profound +chasm divides humanity. Every one feels the desirableness of bridging +over this chasm, that the members of society may be united in +common labor; but again and again we are made to experience how +irreconcilable the respective claims of the opposed parties are. He +who has studied the bulls and encyclical letters of the last two popes, +Pius IX. and Leo XIII., and the commentaries on these utterances +in the <i>Civiltà Cattolica</i>, the official organ of the curia; he who is acquainted +with the polemical diatribes of the French Catholics against +the positivists and freethinkers, and against the school and church +legislation of the third republic; he who has any knowledge of that +mass of controversial literature, which the proclamation of the doctrine +of papal infallibility in the year 1870 evoked; he who has followed +the eventful and varied history of the so-called “Culturkampf” +in the German Empire, from the era of the minister Falk, down to the +recent bill for a new School-law in Prussia, defeated amidst the +greatest excitement in all parts of Germany; he who is the least bit +at home in the literary feuds which are being fought out in the domain +of historical theology concerning the validity and credibility of +the original sources of Christianity; he, finally, who will place the +writings of Cardinal Newman or of the Jesuits Pesch and Cathrein +by the side of those of Huxley and Spencer, by the side of those of +Du Bois-Reymond, Strauss, and Dühring: he, I say, who has gone +through with a critical spirit all that I have cited in the preceding +sentences, will surely not be apt to contradict this assertion of mine +that civilised humanity to-day is separated into two groups which +no longer understand each other, which do not speak the same language, +and which live in totally different worlds of thought and sentiment—at +least so far as this one critical point is concerned of man’s +relation to religion.</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">“<i>Wie Ja und Nein sind sie,</i></div> + <div class="verse indent0"><i>Wie Sturm und Regenbogen.</i>”</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_331">[331]</span></p> + +<p>Have we, then, learned nothing and forgotten nothing since the +days of rationalism? The tremendous labors which our own century +has devoted to the investigation of religion in all its forms, to the +unfolding of its connection with racial mind and sentiment, and of +its relation to civilisation generally, and finally to the elucidation of +the origin and development of the great forms of religion: has all +this had no other result than that we, after a century of the most +laborious research, again find ourselves in the same attitude of unintelligent +hostility towards religion and Christianity in which the +eighteenth century revelled, and out of which we have only fought +our way by the united efforts of a host of profoundly enlightened +minds?</p> + +<p>This argument has been advanced in opposition to the leaders +of the rationalistic movement and to the work of the eighteenth +century in varying forms, by the party which seeks to ally the science +of the present and the religion of the past. It is seriously said and +enjoined that only they who are far behind the science of the times +and hold aloof from the true spirit of the age can still assume the +repugnant attitude toward religion which was characteristic of the +mind of the eighteenth century.</p> + +<p>It is high time to point out the crude confusion of ideas which +lies at the basis of this argument. It confounds the historical understanding +of a thing with the philosophical approval of it. But +these are two totally distinct things. We understand a phenomenon +historically, when we are clear in our minds concerning the external +conditions and habits of thought of humanity from which it sprung; +when its main-springs of action and its purposes, as well as the effects +which have proceeded from it, are distinctly traceable. The +more closely our mental pictures of these things correspond to the +facts as they actually were at the origin, and the more they conduct +us from the mere surface of phenomena into the secrets of their psychological +and sociological connection, and teach us to understand +these things as products of mind and of society, the higher will our +historical knowledge of them be rated. In this sense the knowledge +which the eighteenth century had of religious phenomena was undoubtedly +very imperfect. True, even here great advances beyond +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_332">[332]</span>the age which preceded, are noticeable. People had ceased to regard +the origin of the Jewish and Christian religion as a supernatural +event and as the immediate work of God; all religions were +placed upon the same footing, as species of the same kind; and efforts +were made to discover their common characteristics and the +law of their origin. But the people of that period were not yet able +to arrive at the true essence of religious ideas and sentiments. They +were hardly in a position to describe them properly, let alone to explain +them. Of the hypotheses devised to throw some light into the +darkness that hung over the beginnings of religions, not one proved +itself competent to supply what was hoped for. All that they could +derive from these fictions was that notable caricature of religion +which their age had directly before its eyes, and to free themselves +from which they strained every nerve. With the keen vision of +hate they uncovered all the infirmities of religion, all the terrors and +iniquities which have followed in its train, all the injurious effects +to civilisation which have proceeded from it. They created a negative +picture of religion, which has lost nothing of its partial historical +truth by the fact that many of its features are farther withdrawn +from our immediate experience than they were from that of the +times in question.</p> + +<p>But it was the nineteenth century that first worked out the true +psychology of religious man, and again came into possession of that +spirit of congeniality which is absolutely necessary to our entering +into the mental life of far-distant times. To the men of the rationalistic +age the history of religion was simply the history of the obscuration +of the pure, natural religion, which was supposed to be +constituted of a rational idea of God and a system of humane ethics, +and which was indistinctly conceived at times as the logical, and at +times as the historical, antecedent of the concrete religions. The +latter appeared as the corruption of the natural and simple order of +things—a corruption produced by superstition, by the wily exploitation +of human credulity and human needs, by the scheming machinations +of the founders of religions and of priests, by human delight +in the marvellous, by the falsification of the natural moral sentiments, +and by the stirring into life of fanatical passions. We know +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_333">[333]</span>to-day that this so-called natural religion is nothing more than a +product of late abstraction and reflection; that the motives and +selfish interests above cited have been abundantly at work in religious +history, but are nevertheless unable to explain the internal +motive force and tremendous vitality of these spiritual products. +We know to-day that religions spring with the same necessity and +in conformity with similar laws from the depths of the human mind +as language and art, and that they form an integral constituent part +of the structure of civilisation and an important weapon of humanity +in the struggle for existence. In symbolical form they embody the +highest treasures and highest ideals of national existence; in its +gods humanity beholds the imaginative perfection and explanation +of its view of the world; and in its religious practices, in its worship, +in prayer, it strives to realise the wishes and aspirations which +seem to lie beyond the reach of its powers.</p> + +<p>Many a riddle still remains to be solved, as is natural in a domain +that extends into the most hidden recesses of the human soul, +and whose obscurity is augmented by the fact that in the majority +of cases the most important and significant elements must be collected +with infinite pains from the rubbish of fantastic traditions. +But upon the whole the active labors of a century which calls itself +with pride “the historical century,” have borne their fruits. With +respect to the intrinsic character and the significance of religion for +civilisation, there is now every reason why a unity of opinion should +prevail among all who take their stand on the common ground of +modern scientific research, whether they be friends or opponents of +religion.</p> + +<p>But how does a knowledge of what religion has been in the +past affect our estimate of it in the present? Do we approve of an +institution or phenomenon, because we understand how it was once +possible, nay, must have existed, and what it signified? We understand +to-day the Roman law, the Ptolemaic astronomy, the scholastic +philosophy, feudalism, and absolute monarchy, thoroughly; +we know the conditions which gave rise to them, the necessity of +their appearance, and the measure of their performances; but does +it occur to us, for these reasons, to perpetuate and make them immortal +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_334">[334]</span>because they had once an historical significance? What an +institution in its essence is, what in past times it has accomplished, +is an inquiry that must be conducted with quite different means +from that whether it is applicable to a definite present set of relations +and necessities. The historian can render this task more easy +by teaching us to understand the general laws and necessities of national +life from the analogies of the past; but as a prophet he will +always be one that looks backwards, and it is ever to be feared that +he, too, will see the present in the light of the past. For to him +alone does the past lift its obscuring veil, who, forgetful of self and +unmindful of sacrifices, can listen to the voices of remote times and +peoples, who with a mind of Protean cast has the power to transform +his intellectual being into that to which, solely by description, +he seeks to give new life and form. The past becomes a part of +him; he loves it, he admires it. And from the reanimation of the +past in historical pictures to the attempt of a renewal of it in life is +but a single step.</p> + +<p>Innumerable are those who have succumbed to this temptation. +The entire religious tendency of the nineteenth century exhibits this +process on a grand scale. This tendency is based on profound antiquarian +studies of the past—on that newly awakened historical +interest, which aims not only to criticise but to understand religion +and ecclesiastical institutions. Much that in the previous century +seemed dead or destined to perish, had been restored to life by it. +The whole historical structure of the Christian religion, which at +the close of the age of rationalism only existed, it would seem, as +an artificially preserved ruin, has received, through the instrumentality +of these methods of thought, new supports, and has again +been made habitable for the human mind. Unmindful of the complaints +of churchmen, the future historian of civilisation will have +to characterise the second half of the nineteenth century as a period +of religious renaissance. And it is no accident, but a symptom of +deep import, that this century has completed almost all the great +cathedrals which were left unfinished and in partial ruins by the +middle ages, and placed them in their colossal grandeur before the +world as lasting monuments of its habits and tendencies of thought.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_335">[335]</span></p> + +<p>Yet the spirit of science has also not been inactive. Political +progress has freed it from the despotic police supervision which +even in the eighteenth century heavily oppressed it. In principle +at least, freedom of thought and inquiry are to-day acknowledged by +all governments, with the single exception of the Roman curia, although +in practice there are by no means few efforts made, by influencing +its representatives, to have that proclaimed which it is +desired should be proclaimed. Infinitely great has the number of +workers grown, the instruments of inquiry, the confidence of the +human mind in itself, and our power generally. And if formerly +people could conceive of no other science than such as stood in the +service of the church, to-day science claims it most emphatically +and confidently as its privilege and duty to search and test the logical +truth of the most sacred traditions, and thus to base the thought +of future generations, not on the naïve faith of their fathers, but on +the demonstrable truths of actual present knowledge.</p> + +<h4>II.</h4> + +<p>Between the two groups of modern humanity, of which the one +seeks to retain the Christian religion in its historical form as the +precious, heritage of the past, and the other to supplant it by a new +Idealism formed in harmony with the spirit of science, a third class +stands, which plays the part of a mediator. This class concedes +that the traditional forms of religion are in great part unadapted to +the modern mind, and that historical Christianity is in need of improvement, +but contends that religion is an ineradicable constituent +of all higher civilisation, and must remain so, and, particularly, that +Christianity is the absolute religion, that is to say, that in Christianity +as rightly understood and naturally developed all the necessary +elements of the true religion of the future are contained.</p> + +<p>I should like, in the following pages, to subject the contentions +of this mediatory group to a critical examination, and to discuss the +question whether it is at all possible for one who resolutely takes +his stand on the ground of modern scientific thought, logically to +have religion in the historical sense at all.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_336">[336]</span></p> + +<p>In effecting a mediation between the religious and scientific +views of the world,—views which appear to be separated from each +other by a profound intellectual abyss,—two ways may, generally +speaking, be pursued. Both have been frequently trodden since the +days of rationalism. I shall discuss each separately.</p> + +<p>The attempt may be made to resume, in a form more adapted +to modern times, the work of the reformers of the sixteenth century; +to go back even more thoroughly than they did to the original and +simplest forms of Christianity, to remove <i>in toto</i> the superstructure +which has been reared upon it in the course of time, and to exhibit +to humanity “the pure doctrine of Christ” as the source from which +to-day, as a thousand years ago, true comfort may proceed, as the +simplest, purest, and most exalted expression of the divine and human +that has ever yet been discovered. Many of the most erudite +workers in the field of critical theology which this century can show +have placed themselves in the service of this idea, which is preached +with particular enthusiasm by the so-called “free-religious” and +Unitarian confessions, and which at times has also exhibited a noble +and conciliatory activity in the homiletical work of some mild-minded +and liberal clergymen in the evangelical churches. But our special +inquiry here must be concerning the logical and scientific foundation +of this modernised primitive Christianity, and on this point it must +be frankly stated that the more faithfully such a Christianity reflects +the biblical character, the remoter it is from our modern thought, +and the more it is dominated by modern ways of thinking, the more +unhistorical and hence the more unchristian it becomes.</p> + +<p>The “pure doctrine of Christ,” the genuine, primitive form of +Christianity, is a Utopia of biblical criticism. What we actually +possess, in the form of historical documents, is that conception of +the doctrines and life of Christ which was put in writing several +generations after his death, and which, from amid a much greater +number of contemporaneous attempts, met by preference with the +approbation of the church. It is a hopeless task to attempt from +these late records, which betray the most various intellectual influences, +to derive the authentic doctrines of the oldest form of Christianity. +No method, subjective prepossession only, can here render +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_337">[337]</span>a verdict. The things that appear especially consistent and homogeneous +to individual theologians and critics are stamped as the +genuine utterances of the Master. As every time has done, so ours +also constructs its picture of Christ to conform with its wishes and +wants.</p> + +<p>But granting even that there is nothing objectionable in this, +and that this procedure is perfectly justified, a number of difficulties +still stand in the way of this movement which have stamped the procedure +of even the most ingenious of its representatives as the outcome +of pure subjective caprice. All the written sources which we +possess of the life and teachings of Christ contain much that is in +the highest degree repugnant to the modern mind. I refer particularly +to the miracles. The difficulties which they present may be +disposed of in various ways; as, to give an example, by the method +of the early rationalistic thinkers, who accepted the miracles as facts, +but sought to give them a rational explanation, or by that of Strauss, +who held that they were the mythical and poetical raiment of religious +ideas and sentiments. Yet no art of interpretation will banish +from the world that fact which the poet expressed in the words:</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">“<i>Das Wunder ist des Glaubens liebstes Kind.</i>”</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class="noindent">The fact that the entire cast of thought and sentiment of early Christianity +is saturated with the belief in the marvellous, and with the +expectations, nay, with the actual need of miracles, and that this is +not an adscititious ornament which can be doffed at pleasure, like a +dress which we have outgrown, but is of the very essence of Christianity. +Here is rooted that childlike and simple belief in the limitless +and God-coercing power of prayer, for which no natural laws +nor force of necessity exists, which is omnipotent as the Godhead +itself, and as all-powerful as desire. Here is rooted that ardent conviction +of the near collapse of the entire world, of the coming kingdom +of perfection which shall proceed, not from deeds and thought, +but from faith and grace, and shall crown all human desires with +glory. And intimately connected with all this stands the idea, visible +in the background of all the moral prescripts of the gospels, and +painted in the strongest colors, of a system of punishments and rewards +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_338">[338]</span>in the world beyond; which makes of a God of love, a pitiless, +infuriate God of vengeance.</p> + +<p>These things are so intimately interwoven with the modes of +thought of the synoptic writers that it is impossible to separate them +therefrom without doing violence to the internal connection of their +doctrines. They who seek after a more spiritual conception may, +it is true, find it in the gospel of John. But this book is so completely +dominated by the metaphysical-religious speculation of the +second century, and by the effort to bring the history of the life and +doctrines of the Nazarene in the service of the Logos idea, that the +modern mind can only with great difficulty find a common ground +of understanding with it.</p> + +<p>The task of the modern reformers is, for these reasons, a very +difficult one. They cannot but concede that Christianity, even in +its purely evangelical form, contains much that is foreign to us, and +that the elements of which it is composed must in part be excised +and in part improved by criticism and interpretation.</p> + +<p>But the more the critical sense which is brought to bear upon +this task is developed in the spirit of modern scientific thought, the +more will historical Christianity shrink to the form of a mere colorless +abstraction, and ultimately nothing remains of its exuberant yet +visionary mental world but the picture of a philanthropic life joined +to a strongly developed consciousness of God, which proclaims a +popular morality in commandments and parables. But even this +latter is inevitably exposed to the same fate as the other ideas. It +is dominated throughout by the extremest notions of rewards and +punishments, which the expectation of the doom of the world places +in the very immediate future. It is impossible to take the system as +a whole, and it must be made the subject of violent interpretation +to acquire any fitness for the needs of modern life. Its principles are +systematically turned and twisted till they have acquired in some +direction practical utility. And who at this day can forget, that this +system of morality, wherever and whenever attempts have been +made literally and faithfully to imitate it in practical life, has led +only to wretched caricatures? Moreover, it is again and again freely +remodelled in the spirit of modern ethics, its offensive elements charitably +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_339">[339]</span>cloaked, its useful ones developed to the utmost, and finally +here too a complete set of wholly modern ideas consecrated by the +borrowed authority of a venerable antiquity.</p> + +<p>And therefore I repeat my contention, that the modern reformation, +this modern, pure, and scriptural Christianity, will, the honester +it is, all the more surely lead its adherents away from Scripture +and from Christianity and ultimately bring them to the adoption of +a popularly expounded, but philosophically established, ethical +system.</p> + +<p>I shall now take up the second of the two methods above mentioned. +That which we have just considered was known and affected +even by the eighteenth century. The discovery of the second is a +merit of the present time. The honor belongs in a pre-eminent degree +to the speculative philosophy of Germany, and to the intimate +relations with theology which this philosophy, especially in the +school of Hegel and Schleiermacher, entered into in the first half of +the century. (Kant’s philosophy was not put to similar use until +later.) All these movements, whose rich literary ramifications and +development may be followed to the present day in Otto Pfleiderer’s +excellent and erudite work, “The History of Protestant Theology +in Germany Since Kant,”⁠<a id="FNanchor_60" href="#Footnote_60" class="fnanchor">[60]</a> have also begun in recent times, through +Green, Caird, A. Seth, J. Martineau, R. Flint, and F. Robertson, +to exert an influence on Anglo-American intellectual life.</p> + +<p>The common fundamental feature of this second movement is, +that it proposes to accept as pure Christianity, not only the most +ancient forms of Christian doctrine accessible to us, but also the +entire system of dogmatic thoughts which in the course of the centuries +primitive Christianity has produced. Christianity, these men +say, has historically existed and acted in these maturer notions. It +is not permissible arbitrarily to separate them from it, and to reverse +by any authoritative edicts the real historical development. On the +contrary, we now may and must continue the process which, by the +tenor of dogmatic history, is the process which has continued for +centuries, and give to the dogmas the form which best accords with +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_340">[340]</span>modern spiritual needs. To-day as in the days of incipient Christianity, +we see by the side of the naïve literal belief, which takes no +offence at incomprehensible things if they only suit the needs of its +heart, a gnosis arise which strives to reconcile faith and knowledge, +religion and intellectual culture; a gnosis which to the unbelieving +sceptic quotes the words of the poet:</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">“<i>Die Geisterwelt ist nicht verschlossen;</i></div> + <div class="verse indent0"><i>Dein Sinn ist zu; dein Herz ist todt!</i></div> + <div class="verse indent0"><i>Auf! bade, Schüler, unverdrossen</i></div> + <div class="verse indent0"><i>Die ird’sche Brust im Morgenroth!</i>”</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p>It is perhaps even more difficult to give a succinct and comprehensive +notion of the ideas of this speculative theology, than of the +results of the New Testament exegesis of which we spoke above. +All gradations are here represented, from tender, conservative regard +for the traditional beliefs of the sects and the needs of the pious heart +to the boldest speculative interpretations and critical restrictions of +dogma, which utterly discard the historical form and hold fast only +to a central germinal truth. The present inquiry will restrict itself +to those representatives of this gnosis, who as a matter of principle +grant the greatest field of action to the rational development of +dogma, and represent its philosophical elaboration in its finest and +most complicated form. I shall attempt to signalise the ideas which +may to-day be designated as the most spiritualised expression of the +Christian view of the world.</p> + +<p>And first let us hear a greater mind speak. In Ludwig Feuerbach’s +essays on the nature of religion and Christianity the following +sentences occur:</p> + +<p>“The Christian religion is the revealed inwardness, the objectively +expressed self of man; the contents of his highest aspirations; +the essence of man purified and freed from the limitations +of individuality; yet all subjectivised, that is intuited, known, and +worshipped as a separate, independent entity, wholly distinct from +himself. Religion is essentially dramatical. God himself is a +dramatical creation, that is to say, a personal being opposed to +man. He who takes from religion this idea, takes from it the gist +of its being, and holds but the <i>caput mortuum</i> in his hands.”</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_341">[341]</span></p> + +<p>These sentences of Feuerbach express with the greatest generality +and precision the innermost nature of the Christian view of +the world. They characterise excellently the point that cannot be +given up without destroying the religious view as such. What I refer +to is dualism, the dualism of the divine and the human, of the world +beyond, and the world that is, of holiness and sin; dualism conceived +not merely as a mode of view and of conceptual distinction, +as a working contrariety in things that by their nature are one, but +as a metaphysical difference, an actual contraposition of two worlds, +of two kingdoms of existence, which are totally separate, no matter +how extensive the relations of the one to the other may be. Only +on such a supposition is that possible which Feuerbach, with inimitable +aptness, called “the dramatic element” of religion. The history +of humanity, the history of its religious life particularly, is no +monologue of humanity with itself into which life and advancement +enter solely through the multitude of the ideas created by individuals +within the race itself. It is an action or process in a higher sense, +an interactivity between two worlds, in which, it is true, humanity, +to a certain extent, shapes its own fortunes and destiny, but at the +same time is also constantly exposed to the interferences of a power +which stands beyond and above it and to which it has to accommodate +itself. And whatever artifices and care many of the representatives +of the modern gnosis may employ to conceal this fundamental +assumption, and to substitute for it the point of view of the immanence +of this power in the world, still any radical breach with it is +impossible without endangering the very foundations of the religious +sense of humanity itself.</p> + +<p>The indispensability of this dualistic opposition and separation +is equally well exhibited whether we take as our starting-point the +existence of the world at large or the individual consciousness of +man. The religious mode of view knows of no other way of asserting +the rights and activity of the mind in the All than by making +all existence assume a personal life in an infinite, self-conscious, and +ethically perfect being. The emotions and experiences of one’s +heart, its vacillations between humility and exaltation, remorse at +the consciousness of one’s own imperfections, the inspired flight of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_342">[342]</span>the soul to higher realms of existence, appear as the intercourse of +man with some extraneous power, allied to man and yet above him, +in which the sum of all excellence to which thought and experience +have ever led man, has its eternal source.</p> + +<p>These ideas constitute the point of view which is decisive of the +history of humanity, particularly in what concerns religion. The +history of religion is, in accordance with these ideas, conceived as a +continuous self-revelation of God in the world of man. True, this +view seems to be contradicted by the fact that the self-revelation of +this infinitely good power is effected in the case of by far the greater +part of mankind in a very insufficient manner—in the form, namely, +of crude and superstitious notions which stand in need of constant +purification by reason. But the explanation of this fact is sought +in the idea of a divine pedagogical training of the human race, and +in the theory that religion is not an immediate self-revelation of the +absolute, but passes through the medium of the human mind and +consequently must be conditioned by its character.</p> + +<p>Christianity, now, especially appears as the highest form of this +self-revelation of God in humanity, that is to say as the absolute religion, +which, in its historical forms, it is true, is as little free from +adscititious ornaments and transient obscurations as other religions, +yet in its essence can be as little improved as it can be discarded. +This innermost essence of Christianity the majority of the representatives +of this modern gnosis declare to be the conviction that all +men are from the beginning children of God. In this idea two things +are contained: submission to the will of God who is conceived as a +kind parent and who in pity and love does everything for the best; +and the imitation in our own thought and conduct of the ethical +perfection conceived incarnate in God. The entering of man into +this relation is designated the kingdom of God—a notion which constitutes +the ideal goal of history. The condition of mind on which +the kingdom of God rests is prefigured in a typical manner in the +founder of the Christian religion. His person and his life are a +guarantee of the possibility of this ideal, and exhibit at the same +time the means of its accomplishment: namely, the helping love of +God, which has infused into this one individual the whole plenitude +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_343">[343]</span>of its being, so far as this is at all possible with human capacities, +that humanity may have in it a direct living picture of the highest +fulfilment of its religious and moral destiny. The historical Christ +is the ideal of humanity, supported and ensouled by the spirit of +God.</p> + +<p>The modern gnosis here goes back to the Paulinian interpretation +of the Christ-idea. The consideration of the speculative difficulties +of the idea of the Trinity is thus rendered superfluous for it. +This notion is treated by the majority of its representatives simply +as a dogmatic antiquity; its place is taken by the modern ideas of +a distinction between the person of Jesus and the principle or spirit +of Christianity, which is synonymous with the contrast of the idea +and its revelation, the eternal and the temporal, of the inward essence +and its historical realisation. That it employs the notions of idea, +principle, and essence wholly in a Platonic sense, as the highest +metaphysical realities, is self-evident.</p> + +<p>More distant still is the attitude which this speculative theology +assumes towards another idea which proceeded from the Rabbinical +school of thought of Paul: the notion of salvation or redemption in +its connection with the expiatory death of Christ. From these conceptions +of punitive suffering, of a vicarious atonement of God in +his own person—conceptions of such juristical refinement as to be +wholly unacceptable to modern modes of thought—the modern +gnosis has upon the whole resolutely turned away and taken refuge +in that more spiritual and more profound idea which in early Christian +times the author of the gospel of St. John promulgated. The +death of Christ is redemptive only in the sense in which Christ’s +total history is redemptive, as the direct and prefigurative incarnation +of the true religious relation between God and man. This is, +it is true, applicable in a quite special sense to the Death; for it +was by this that the eternal truth was manifested, that not only does +all salvation accrue to man from the sacrifice of his own self in +duteous and patient love, but that all the life of God is an emanation +of this self-surrendering excellence, of this bliss of self-sacrifice. +Still, there is one thing that is common to all the representatives of +this movement as distinguished from the former, and that is this: +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_344">[344]</span>they do not content themselves with picturing the activity of Jesus +Christ in general outlines solely as one which is blessed and significant +by example and doctrine for humanity, but they assume a continuous +and active presence of the Christian principle in humanity, +by means of which the moral discord in individuals is overcome, and +in the personal spiritual life of individuals divine and human nature +are united. This is the most speculative interpretation we have of +the old dogmatic notion of redemption, which from its original character +as a single isolated phenomenon of history has here become +the constant activity of a Christian principle, and an ever-living +precedent of Christian life.</p> + +<p>It would be a prolix and wearisome task to go through in this +way the whole dogmatism of this speculative theology. The fundamental +ideas which we have discussed will suffice to show the manner +in which, on the one hand, it spiritualised the allegorical notions +of popular Christianity, but on the other left untouched the +gist of the religious view and the dramatical or dualistic opposition +of the divine and human. The notions of grace and sanctification, +the notion of the church as a living, organised instrument of salvation, +spring directly and logically from these fundamental ideas.</p> + +<p>In the province of ethics this movement has a much easier task +than the churches based on the New Testament. As it seeks to establish, +not a primitive Christianity, but a modernised Christianity +developed in the spirit of recent times, there is no necessity of its +being incommoded by the ethical crudenesses of early Christianity, +but it is in the same position to work these crudenesses over critically +as it did the asperities of the old dogmas. It can assimilate +most of what it needs from modern philosophical ethics, and content +itself with giving to what it has thus borrowed a metaphysically religious +background derived from dogmatic traditions.</p> + +<p>That this modern gnosis is in a constant state of vacillation with +respect to the practical things of life, is a necessary consequence of +its fundamental assumptions and of its position towards the doctrines +of the church. Its foremost representatives acknowledge +without any reserve that the true source from which religious emotions +and sentiments flow is the symbolic or imaginative faculty of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_345">[345]</span>man. The grandly simple pictures in which the ancient Christian +faith found satisfaction are now in the course of time inevitably disintegrated +by the critical reason. The speculative theology itself +proclaims that its vocation is one of coöperation towards this end. +But it maintains nevertheless that the fruits of this work, the speculative +interpretation of the dogmas, their exaltation into the sphere +of the Idea, are fit only for initiated minds, and are caviare for the +general. The general, the people, want and will use religion in the +form which its fancy has created, and it cannot be revealed to it in +any other. Progressive in its theories, this gnosis is in its ecclesiastical +practice thoroughly conservative. It thinks two kinds of +thought, and speaks two kinds of languages, according as it finds +itself in the pulpit or in the professorial chair. And it is in just this +procedure that it assumes a position which it is very difficult to attack. +He, who working for a sound and progressive popular enlightenment +on the ground of a unitary view of the world, opposes +the further use of the antiquated and effete allegories of the old religions, +is told that he is behind the times, and that religion, nurtured +by the spirit of modern science, has become something different +from what it formerly was. In very strict ecclesiastical quarters +this gnosis is looked at askance, and accused of insincerity, nay, of +secret alliance with unbelief; but the movement never allowed itself +to be led astray by these accusations, and has never failed to +assert its right of coöperation in the common work of the Christian +church. For though it pretends to be in the hands of the thinking +theologian a means of bringing into harmony the faith which he +must confess and the thought which he cannot abandon, it yet admits, +that with the majority of mankind the allegory will always remain +an essential element of religion, and that therefore the task of +scientific theology can never be to destroy these vessels of religion, +but only to exercise a watchful care, that with the form the spirit +also may not be lost.</p> + +<h4>III.</h4> + +<p>The question now arises,—and this brings us back to the considerations +of the first part of this essay,—Does this rationalised +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_346">[346]</span>Christianity of to-day really meet the demands of science, and if it +does not, is it in the power of the modern scientific world-conception +to furnish from its own resources some substitute for the religious +views of the past?</p> + +<p>My answer to this question will be short and concise; for the +existence of <i>The Monist</i>, the fundamental idea of its management, +and the total character of the efforts which it has hitherto made, +speak with sufficient emphasis. And we may, therefore, with the +greatest respect for the scientific zeal and the personal ability of +many of the representatives of this mediatory theology, say, without +further ado: This rationalised Christianity of yours also is myth and +symbol; it still adheres to that “dramatic” division of the world +which our imaginations produced, and to the metaphysical dualism +of God and man; it cannot lift itself to a rigorous conception of the +All in One, for which God is in the same sense a simple function of +human thought as thought is a function of the human organism. +The God on whom all depends in religion, the God whose name is +“Father,” the God of love and goodness, the God from whom all +great thoughts and all grand resolves spring, the God who sanctifies +us and lifts us above the earth—to displace this God from the world +in which he has no place, into the inward being of humanity seems +at this day so strange, nay, inconceivable, only because we have accustomed +ourselves (and down to the times of Mill and Feuerbach, +even strict monistic thinkers like Spinoza fell victims to this illusion) +to mingle together in the idea of God two wholly distinct ideas—the +ideas, namely, of nature and of an ethical ideal. To preserve this +latter inviolate, and to secure it from all encroachments of human +caprice, one thing alone seemed to the naïve dramatic modes of +thought of early times a competent safeguard: the ideal must in +some locality be real; the highest to which human thought and aspiration +can exalt itself must be sought and must exist in some superhuman +reality. And what reality could be better adapted to this +than one on which even nature was conceived to be dependent? +The entire history of the development of the idea of God in the +Græco-Roman and Hebrew worlds, the confluence of these two +streams of thought in Christian speculation, exhibit in the clearest +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_347">[347]</span>possible manner these motives, which here I can only lightly touch +upon.</p> + +<p>But this combination of the law of nature and the law of ethics +in the idea of God, although solving some of the difficulties of humanity, +has plunged it into incomparably greater ones. Through +all the centuries of Christian thought a succession of desperate attempts +may be traced to establish a theodicy, that is to say, attempts +to demonstrate the existence in nature and in history of a God which +harmonises with the ethical ideal. Even Kant could undertake to +demonstrate the “necessary failure of all attempts at a theodicy,” +and whoever might still have entertained any doubt as to the correctness +of this demonstration, such a one must surely have been +convinced of it by the scientific development of the past century. +That which was indissolubly welded together in the Christian idea +of God is to-day disintegrated into its component elements. The +Lord <i>above</i> nature, the Spirit <i>behind</i> nature, have been rendered inconceivable +by the modern notions of the conformity to law of all +natural occurrences and of the unity of all existence. The spirit immanent +in the All no thinker will deny, for this spirit manifests itself +in an indisputable manner in the fact that this All is a cosmos, +not a chaos, that not only the caprice of chance but also the laws of +necessity rule in it, and that the personal self-conscious mind springs +from its midst. But from this recognition of mind in the All, there +is no bridge that leads to the old idea of God. We cannot worship +the All as a moral ideal. We involve ourselves in absurd complications +when we attempt to derive the actions of natural events and +their conformity to law from ethical categories, and it is no less a +desperate undertaking to imagine that we can draw impulses for our +moral thought and conduct from nature. The adaptation of means +to ends, the teleology, that rules in the All, is veiled for us in the +deepest obscurity. All that we can unravel of it has no resemblance +to that which, according to our notions, is ethical:</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">“<i>Denn unfühlend ist die Natur</i>,”</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class="noindent">she does not know what love or mercy is; she knows only the omnipotent +power of universal laws; she knows only the rights of the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_348">[348]</span>whole, to which she sacrifices with unconcern the individual; she +revels in the double pleasure of unceasing creation and unceasing +destruction; she arms unpityingly the strong against the weak; in +crises of annihilation she restores the disturbed equilibrium of things; +but the palm of peace no one has ever seen in her hand. And we? +We stand amazed at her might and greatness, at the plentitude of +her powers of creation, at her myriad play of forces, at the inexhaustible +wealth of the relations with which she binds being to +being, creates and mediates contrarieties, and amidst the most varied +change and alternation, ever remains one and the same! But our +prototype, our God, she can never be. To him we must look up; +but on nature, despite her might, despite her stupendous grandeur, +we look down. She did not whisper in our ears that in us which is +best and highest. That did not come to us from heaven; <i>we ourselves</i> +won it by hard struggles, by terribly severe, self-imposed discipline. +It is not <i>of</i> nature; it is <i>above</i> nature. Through <i>us</i> something +has come into the world that before us did not exist—something +that the most exuberant creative magic, or nature’s grandest +mechanical dreams, could never replace. The day on which first a +human being pressed his weaker fellow-man to his breast and said, +“Brother, not mine, but thy will be done; I will give up my desires +that thou also mayst be glad”; the day on which man first lifted up +his head and said, “Let us make the world <i>good</i> in the likeness of the +picture that has become living in us, just as it should be”; this is +the great and sanctified day in the history of our race on earth, the +Christmas day on which God was born. But not as the religious +fancy has expressed it, the day on which God became man, but the +day on which man began to become God, that is the day on which +he began to feel spiritual powers in his breast that transcended his +animal impulses—powers to which the majority of humanity was +still as remote as heaven from earth.</p> + +<p>This strict anthropological conception of God as the ideal which +is always newly creating itself in the struggles of humanity, which +is no Being but a Becoming, solves the innumerable difficulties +which the idea of God has hitherto placed in the way of rigorous +scientific knowledge and the construction of a unitary conception of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_349">[349]</span>the world. This God has nothing to do with the All. We need +not seek him in the All or behind the All, and need not fear that +any progress of our knowledge will make his existence a matter of +doubt with us. Concerning the real validity of this idea we need +not bother ourselves with more or less weak and insufficient demonstrations: +the whole history of humanity is evidence of it if we but +know how to rightly interpret it, and the stumbling block of the old +theological idea of God has become the corner-stone upon which +the new scientific conception is built.</p> + +<p>Nature and human history the work of an omnipotent and all-kind +being that is mediately and immediately active in all events, +nay, sacrificed himself in his own person that he might realise in +this world his purposes! Compare the principle, the active force +of this world-drama, pictured by the religious fancy as the highest +power, the highest wisdom, and all-merciful love, with the real +spectacle of the world! Is there anywhere a more pronounced contradiction, +an obscurer riddle, a more inconceivable contrast between +purpose and accomplishment? This world of cruelty and woe, in +which one creature feeds on the heart-blood of another, in which here +and there from seas of mud and dirt a form of light springs up, in +which every nobler production must be bought with torrents of blood +and tears; this revelation and self-manifestation of God in humanity, +which everywhere appears joined to definite historical suppositions, +which lacks all the conditions of true universality and of indisputable +evidence, so that instead of forming a means of union it has +become the source of dreadful contentions; this work of salvation +and sanctification which is so restricted in its effects that “the kingdom +of God” is still a dreamy vision of humanity, so restricted that +we still see the majority of men, despite the most extraordinary supernatural +dispositions, still remain far behind the simple ideals of +natural ethical commandments, that hate and dissension, cruelty +and selfishness, perform their unhallowed work—is this the work of +infinite power and infinite wisdom? What claims theodicy makes +on human thought! And how different the picture is, the moment +we abandon the false theocentric point of view and assume the anthropocentric! +Instead of a belief which all facts contradict—an +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_350">[350]</span>idea which elucidates them all. No one can say how we are to interpret +facts as the work of a holy and absolutely perfect being; but +it can be shown, step by step, how in this, our human world, more +perfect things spring from imperfect things, moral and mental laws +from the blind play of natural forces and powers, the conscious energy +of will from blind and unreasonable impulse, law and love of man +from the selfishness and warring of all against all, and the notion of +the unity of the race from infinite disruption and disunion. We must +not allow ourselves to be led astray or discouraged here by the changing +undulations and tremendous crises of this battle for the good. +The ideal springs out of a dark abyss. The roots of our being are +deep laid in nature, yet we struggle to exalt ourselves above it. No +wonder, therefore, that time and again it draws us back.</p> + +<p>The greatest and sublimest spectacle! A tragical one, one filled +with struggle and suffering, and yet one infinitely full of hope. For +it shows us the inexhaustible grandeur of the human mind; it shows +us the good, the ideal, as a tremendous real power, a power eternally +becoming, surely forming itself out of an infinitude of individual +deeds, a power fully incarnate in no one person, yet active and living +in humanity. Not a tangible activity, and yet one of the realest of +facts. A supersensuous, nay, if you will, a supernatural realm of +thought; not the faded reflection or shadow of a grandeur and power +beyond us, but the fruit of the noblest activities and powers of this +given, existing world, antagonised in life, but grand and powerful +in thought; imperfect even in its boldest flights, but bearing within +it the germ of greater things to come.</p> + +<p>Here is the true point of union for Christian dogma and science. +Here is the God in which science also may, nay, must, believe. Not +humanity in its empirical reality, but the ideal world developed +within the human realm of things—the spirit of humanity. This is +the only true object of worship. Before it we are humiliated, and +by it we feel ourselves exalted. From it we receive all the good that +life bestows upon us; it gives us light and peace and lucid thought. +And what higher, nobler thing can a life produce than the feeling +that it has not been unworthy of this great ancestry, that it has +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_351">[351]</span>helped to keep alive this holy fire, that it has helped, perhaps, to +fan by its own life this living flame to greater heights?</p> + +<p>Here is the true source of the ideas of accountability and of salvation. +We are not responsible to a being outside and above us, +but to our own selves and to humanity, from which we have received +the best that it had to give, and for which we must return what we +ourselves have produced. This consciousness of being thrown utterly +on the resources of one’s own self, on one’s own powers, was +first created in the human mind by science and the technical arts, +(as that most venerable and most sacred of all myths, the legend of +Prometheus, so profoundly indicates,) and this consciousness will, +by the progress of knowledge and power, be made more and more +the dominating one of humanity. This is not a consciousness of +omnipotence; it does not exclude the subjection of man to the inexorable +laws of the universe; but it demands the enlistment of all +the powers of the race: for nature does not give us more than we +wrest from her by arduous toil.</p> + +<p>And as humanity is accountable only to itself, so do the means +of its salvation lie only in itself. Not in any one individual, but in +the spirit in it which ever works onward and upward. Yet this +spirit is not an unpersonal existence; it must be possessed again and +ever again by living men. And no one can serve humanity or augment +its spiritual treasures or reincarnate in himself its holiest possessions +without first having and feeling within himself the blessing +of what he has done. And thus the profoundest significance of human +life on earth may be formulated and embraced in that saying +of the poet which was throughout conceived in the spirit of our +times, and would have been wholly incomprehensible to the mind +of those who gave us our faith—in the words:</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">“<i>Erlösung dem Erlöser.</i>”</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">F. Jodl.</span></p> + +<div class="footnotes"> + +<h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_59" href="#FNanchor_59" class="label">[59]</a> <i>Wesen des Christenthums.</i> First edition. 1841. Pp. 288-289.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_60" href="#FNanchor_60" class="label">[60]</a> Translation published by Swan, Sonnenschein & Co., London, 1891.</p></div> + +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_352">[352]</span></p> + +<h3 class="nobreak" id="THE_RELIGION_OF_SCIENCE">THE RELIGION OF SCIENCE.</h3> + +</div> + +<p>Are religion and science indeed as contrary as they are often +represented to be, and is the proposition to reconcile them +a hopeless and futile undertaking? Professor Jodl, in his article +“Religion and Modern Science,” (pp. 329-351 of this number,) +says:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“That civilised humanity to-day is separated into two groups which no longer +understand each other, which do not speak the same language, and which live in +totally different worlds of thought and sentiment.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>There are those who cling to the old religions and those who +supplant it by a new idealism. Between both, he adds:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“A third class stands which plays the part of a mediator.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>Professor Jodl does not approve of reconciling the historical +forms of religion with science. He rightly says:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“The ‘pure doctrine of Christ,’ the genuine, primitive form of Christianity, is +a Utopia of biblical criticism.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>We heartily agree with him in his remarks concerning the part +which the miraculous and supernatural play in the Gospels:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“These things are so intimately interwoven with the modes of thought of the +synoptic writers that it is impossible to separate them therefrom without doing violence +to the internal connection of their doctrines.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>We also concur upon the whole with Professor Jodl in his criticism +of the methods of Speculative Theology. No compromising +with traditional errors, no covering or extenuating of the results of +historical criticism is allowable merely for the love of tradition and +for the preservation of errors that have become dear to a large number +of people.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_353">[353]</span></p> + +<p>We do not condemn the work of any mediator; on the contrary, +we rather encourage it. We observe with pleasure in the +latest phases of the religious evolution of Speculative Theology the +prevalence of a more modern spirit, and we follow with a keen interest +also the progress of biblical critique in its truly valuable +labors: but we do not expect that either the one or the other will +accomplish any regeneration of religion.</p> + +<p>Professor Jodl knows very well that the editors of <i>The Monist</i> +and <i>The Open Court</i> have not undertaken any work of compromising +between the errors of the past and the ideal of the future. Our +idea of a reconciliation between religion and science is of a different +nature. We are not blind to the errors of the old religions, and we +do not mean to gloss them over, or to make old-fashioned views +acceptable by presenting them in a new garment. We do not even +stop to bury the dead, for we have better things to do than to +trouble with problems that have been definitely settled. We keep +our hands to the plough to accomplish the work needed to-day.</p> + +<p>While we are not blind to the errors of the old religions, we +recognise at the same time that they contain in the language of +parables some great truths which will remain forever. These truths +constitute the backbone of religion, and we regard it as a very important +duty of ours to preserve them. These truths must be preserved, +not because they were believed in by our fathers, nor from +any respect for tradition, nor from any regard for our sentiments, but +simply because they are truths, because they can be proved to be +true according to the methods of scientific inquiry.</p> + +<p>What is religion? Religion consists of all those ideas which +regulate our conduct. In the savage these ideas are very crude and +superstitious, and often self-contradictory. The higher a man rises, +the clearer, the more scientific and consistent do these ideas become, +until they develop into a systematic world-conception. Every scientific +idea that changes our world-conception will change also our religion +and with it our rules of conduct. Thus, for example, the idea +of evolution has become to us an eminently religious idea.</p> + +<p>In order to indicate that the criterion of truth for religion is the +very same thing as the criterion of truth for science, we have proposed +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_354">[354]</span>to call the religion we advocate, “The Religion of Science.” +(For details see the editorial of Vol. VII, No. 1, of <i>The Open Court</i>.)</p> + +<p>Our procedure appears to many as an annihilation of religion +in favor of science. But it is not. And why not?</p> + +<p>We have learned many truths first from religion, long before +science could ever think of proving them. In several respects science +took the lead, and religion remained at a long distance behind, awkwardly, +very slowly, and unwillingly limping onward on the road of +progress. Instances are, the acceptance of the Copernican system +and of the evolution theory. But in other respects religion took the +lead, and science was unable to follow its ingenious flight. As instances +of this we cite such moral truths as the love of enemies, which +were not preached by scientists as scientific truths, but by religious +teachers, by Confucius, Buddha, and Christ. There are scientists +even to-day who regard what we would call “moral truths” as maxims +that are contrary to the established views of science. Professor +Huxley, for instance, is very emphatic in his declaration that the +facts of nature do not teach morality.⁠<a id="FNanchor_61" href="#Footnote_61" class="fnanchor">[61]</a></p> + +<p>This leads us to a point in which we disagree with Professor +Jodl. He speaks of the illusion “of mingling together in the idea of +God two wholly distinct ideas—the ideas namely of nature and of +an ethical ideal”—an illusion to which “even strict monistic thinkers +like Spinoza fell victims.”</p> + +<p>Professor Jodl’s position reminds us of John Stuart Mill’s +“Essay on Nature,” in which he exposes the old doctrine <i>naturam +sequi</i> in all its absurd meanings and carefully avoids a discussion of +the only rational conception of the precept. Thus his tirades appear +most convincing, and to be sure they are quite correct—so far +as they go. Says Mill:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“In sober truth, nearly all the things which men are hanged or imprisoned for +doing to one another, are nature’s every-day performances. Killing, the most criminal +act recognised by human laws, Nature does once to every being that lives....</p> + +<p>“Nature impales men, breaks them as if on the wheel, casts them to be devoured +by wild beasts, burns them to death, crushes them with stones like the first +Christian martyr, starves them with hunger, freezes them with cold, poisons them +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_355">[355]</span>by the quick or slow venom of her exhalations, and has hundreds of other hideous +deaths in reserve, such as the ingenious cruelty of a Nabis or a Domitian never +surpassed.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>Mill must indeed have felt the need of beginning these sentences +with the words “In sober truth”; otherwise he might be +suspected of humor.</p> + +<p>Similarly comical is Mill’s proposition to regard every voluntary +action of man as a direct infringement upon nature. Man’s +reason in that case would be the most unnatural phenomenon in the +world, and the term “nature” would be confined to the lowest +realms of existence exclusively. If the usage of reason were indeed +an infringement upon nature, man’s appearance upon earth would +mark the beginning of a supernatural realm; and Professor Jodl +seems to accept this consequence when he says:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“It is not <i>of</i> nature, it is <i>above</i> nature.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>If man’s rationality and his ethics were not born of nature, if +their conditions were not founded in the very existence of nature, if +they were not the natural product of evolution, then indeed I see no +escape from a dualistic world-conception, in which a supernatural +God introduces the spark of divinity which appears in the soul of +man from spheres beyond.</p> + +<p>We have devoted to these vagaries of John Stuart Mill an +elaborate discussion in another place and do not feel the need of repeating +our arguments in this connection.⁠<a id="FNanchor_62" href="#Footnote_62" class="fnanchor">[62]</a></p> + +<p>We agree with Professor Jodl that no rationalising of old dogmas +will help us in the establishment of “a new idealism, formed +in harmony with the spirit of science.” We must build our religion +anew (as every generation had to build its religion anew) out of the +best materials which are furnished by the maturest and most reliable +knowledge of to-day. Says Professor Jodl:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“Through <i>us</i> something has come into the world that before us did not exist—something +that the most exuberant creative magic, or nature’s grandest mechanical +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_356">[356]</span>dreams, could never replace. The day on which first a human being pressed his +weaker fellow-man to his breast and said, “Brother, not mine, but thy will be +done; I will give up my desires that thou also mayst be glad”; the day upon which +man first lifted up his head and said, “Let us make the world <i>good</i> in the likeness +of the picture that has become living in us, just as it should be”; this is the great +and sanctified day in the history of our race on earth, the Christmas day on which +God was born.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>Certainly the origin of man on earth, and again the evolution +of the moral man, is something quite new, which before did not +exist. But did humanity originate out of nothing, as sometimes the +imaginations of a poet are supposed to be created, or is there a prototype +in whose image man has been created? Man’s reason, his +ethics, and his humanity are something that did not exist before, +but there is a feature in existence which makes it possible that rational +and moral beings develop. Should there be sentient beings +on other planets, and we have little reason to doubt it, we can be +sure that they also will develop rational minds, and that they also +will learn, perhaps as we did, through many bitter experiences, the +same truths which constitute our main maxims of morality,⁠<a id="FNanchor_63" href="#Footnote_63" class="fnanchor">[63]</a> including +such precepts as the love of enemies. And why are we sure +that on other planets not only reason, but also the fundamental +rules of ethics will be the same as with us here on earth? Simply +because we know that there is a certain feature in reality which +creates rational beings and moral beings as naturally as it creates +rocks and seas on the surface of planets. Man’s reason and also +man’s morality are not original inventions of his, but the result of +many experiences which he had to learn. And the world in which +he lives is such that he can acquire reason and morality, and if a +being should acquire a wrong kind of reason or a wrong kind of +morality, it will by and by be blotted out of existence. Accordingly +there is a prototype of reason and of morality, and this prototype +of the humanity of man is exactly that which in the language +of the old religions has received the name “God.”</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_357">[357]</span></p> + +<p>We must make a distinction between ideals and dreams. Those +creations of our fancy which are woven without any regard to reality +are dreams. They have no value beyond whiling away a leisure hour +or pleasing our imagination. But those creations of our mind which +construct realisable formations such as machines or clocks or higher +conditions of human society, are not mere dreams, they are ideals. +What, then, is the difference between a dream and an ideal? A +dream is a useless ebullition of an idle brain composed of ideas to +which there is no correspondent reality; but an ideal is a potent +factor in the living presence to shape the future: it is a combination +of ideas which are correct descriptions of actual realities. The +moral aspirations of mankind are not empty dreams, they are true +and veritable ideals. There are certain qualities in nature which +make their realisation possible and these qualities constitute the +Divinity of nature.</p> + +<p>Professor Jodl speaks of the origin of morality as of the birth +of God on earth. Truly that is the meaning of Christianity. But +this birth of God into the world of human evolution as “the Son of +Man” is possible only because of the existence of the God in nature +whom Christian mythology so beautifully calls God the Father. The +appearance of the Son of Man upon earth, the birth of morality, is +a revelation of the divinity of nature.</p> + +<p>True enough, as Professor Jodl says, that we ourselves won the +best and highest we have by hard struggles, by terribly severe, self-imposed +discipline. As Prometheus says:</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">“<i>Hast du nicht alles selbst vollendet,</i></div> + <div class="verse indent0"><i>Heilig glühend Herz!</i>”</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class="noindent">That, too, is part of the divinity of nature, that every creature has to +work out its very being itself, and that man must search for the way +of salvation with great anxiety, under bitter tribulations and through +extreme afflictions. But he cannot invent a new way of salvation, +he has to find it, and there is but one that is the right one. The +nature of morality is such as it is, and no other morality could be invented +to replace it. And this feature of existence which makes +morality quite a determined thing is a real presence in the world, it +is an actual quality of the universe.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_358">[358]</span></p> + +<p>Some of our liberal friends, foremost among them Professor +Haeckel, deny the existence of a personal God and then proceed to +declare that the God of science is nothing but matter and energy. +We agree with Professor Haeckel in his rejection of anthropotheism; +God is no supernatural being nor is he a huge world-ego. But +we cannot accept his view of God as being only matter and energy. +The idea of God is and always has been a moral idea. Thus we +have come to regard all those features of nature as divine which +condition the origin and existence of morality and we define God as +the authority of moral conduct. This authority is not a person, not +a sentient being, let alone a sentimental philanthropist; but it is, +nevertheless, a reality, and, indeed, a stern reality.</p> + +<p>Such is the God of science. God is that quality of existence +through which we originated as feeling, thinking, and aspiring beings. +He is the prototype of the human soul, and the condition under +which develop man’s reason and morality. Obedience to him is indispensable +for a continued existence, for further progress and a +higher evolution of the human soul. That these features of reality +can by a great number of keen and fearless modern thinkers be supposed +to be a non-entity is difficult to understand. This negation +of the reality of qualities of existence which are not individual things +but intrinsically inherent in all the individual things, it appears to +us, is an old heirloom of nominalism. The nominalistic philosophy +represented by Roscellinus was suppressed at the council at Soissons +1092, only to rise more powerfully in the fourteenth century in William +of Occam, and finally to exterminate realism with all its rubbish +of errors together with the truth contained in these errors. Kant +marks in many respects the culmination of the victorious movement +of nominalism. With all the benefits modern thought derived from +the philosophical work of nominalism, a reaction is needed against +its purely negative spirit. There is a truth in the old realism which +cannot be neglected with impunity.⁠<a id="FNanchor_64" href="#Footnote_64" class="fnanchor">[64]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_359">[359]</span></p> + +<p>God (viz., the name of God) is, as Kant said, a noumenon, a +thing of thought, an abstraction. God is not a thing, a concrete object, +or an individual person. All the views of God which regard +him as an individual being of some kind, or as a person only of infinite +dimensions, are, closely considered, pagan notions which belittle +God. But the name of God as a noumenon, a thought, an +abstract idea, has a meaning. Abstract ideas are not nonentities, +they represent some real features, some actual qualities, or properties, +or relations; otherwise they would not be ideas, but unmeaning +sounds.</p> + +<p>Some of our abstract ideas are of a very delicate fibre, so that +the coarse mental vision of the average Philistine is unable to see +them in their reality and potency. But it so happens that exactly +they are of a more important, more powerful, and inevitable presence +than the simple generalisations of things that visibly and corporeally +surround us. This, their peculiar nature, makes such ideas mysterious +to those who instinctively feel their reality without being +able to point it out and understand it. And the most subtle, imponderous, +and sublimated of all ideas is the idea of God.</p> + +<p>We have defined God as the ultimate authority of conduct, as +the condition of our existence as rational and moral beings, as the +all-power that enforces obedience, etc.; but we cannot in any one of +our definitions exhaust the significance of the idea. We would by +no means exclude from the idea of God anything without which reality +would cease to be real. The qualities of matter and energy constitute +that element in the God-idea which justify the old religions +in speaking of him as omnipotent and everlasting. Thus they ought +not to be excluded. But these qualities alone are insufficient to +characterise his being. The sum-total of matter and energy as such +and as such alone does not constitute any moral authority. Nature +in her immeasurable greatness and oppressive vastness affects us +with awe; but, after all, we look down upon her massive sublimity. +Man is more than the biggest heap of crude matter and unintelligently +operating energy. Says Professor Jodl:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“We stand amazed at her might and greatness, at the plentitude of her powers +of creation, at her myriad play of forces, at the inexhaustible wealth of the relations +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_360">[360]</span>with which she binds being to being, creates and mediates contrarieties, and amidst +the most varied change and alternation, ever remains one and the same! But our +prototype, our God, she can never be.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>This grandeur of nature is part of her divinity, but it alone does +not constitute the character of God. Yet, observe that throughout +nature there is an imponderable quality present which makes every +atom move in a definite way, so that the whirl of gaseous masses, +apparently a chaos, will be recognised as a cosmic whole developing +in a certain way and describable in what is generally called natural +laws. This subtle quality is the condition of the regularities which are +found in all the infinite varieties and innumerable particularities, +and all these regularities conceived in their systematic unity are +called the order of the universe.</p> + +<p>Man exists as a thinking being only because the immeasurable +universe of which he is a part possesses this quality of order, and +his reason is closely considered only a copy of it. Man’s reason was +shaped into the image of the cosmic order, and suppose—a supposition +which is very difficult to make and regarded by many as impossible +or inconceivable—yet suppose that the world-order were radically +different from what it actually is, man’s reason would accordingly +be different too. Further, suppose that the whole frame and +fundamental interrelations of the particles of reality were different +from what they are, would not correspondingly the basic rules of +conduct be changed too?</p> + +<p>The author of this article, in the eyes of the so-called orthodox +Christian, is most certainly an atheist. And if theism means the belief +in a personal or extramundane God he is an atheist indeed. If there is +any opprobrium in the name atheism we are willing to accept it; +and certainly, we do not reject the label of atheism in order to escape +any odium attached to that name. We do reject atheism simply because +we see a great and potent truth in the idea of God which is +but too often disregarded.</p> + +<p>With Professor Haeckel and Professor Jodl we reject the conception +of an anthropomorphic Deity. The anthropomorphic idol +is doomed before the tribunal of science. But we see a deeper meaning +in the idea of God which has formed through millenniums the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_361">[361]</span>very centre of the greatest religions on earth. Science has to recognise +the reality of an all-presence in existence which is analogous to +that which in a religious language is called God.</p> + +<p>Considering the fact that humanity owes many great truths to +religion, let us not be hasty in condemning the religions of the past +as pure superstition. There are valuable seeds in the chaff. If we +discard the wheat together with the tares, we shall have to rediscover +them, for it is little probable that humanity can for any length +of time be satisfied with beautiful phrases or live in its moral aspirations +in a realm of mere dreams.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">Editor.</span></p> + +<div class="footnotes"> + +<h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_61" href="#FNanchor_61" class="label">[61]</a> For a discussion of this point see <i>Fundamental Problems</i>, pp. 219-226.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_62" href="#FNanchor_62" class="label">[62]</a> See the article in Nos. 239, 241, and 242 of <i>The Open Court: Nature and +Morality</i>. An Examination of the Ethical Views of John Stuart Mill. I. The +Meaning of Basing Ethics Upon Nature. II. The Ethics Taught by Nature. III. +Intelligent Action and Moral Action. IV. The Anthropomorphic Standpoint of +Mill.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_63" href="#FNanchor_63" class="label">[63]</a> I purposely do not say <i>all</i> maxims of conduct, because we can very well +imagine that different conditions may produce some very important variations in the +rules of conduct; but the main foundation of morality would be the same.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_64" href="#FNanchor_64" class="label">[64]</a> There are two men at present who boldly fly the flag of the old realism again, +both having our full sympathy in their aspirations, although we cannot agree with +many of their teachings. The one is Mr. Charles S. Peirce, the other Dr. Francis +E. Abbot.</p></div> + +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_362">[362]</span></p> + +<h3 class="nobreak" id="THE_SUPERSTITION_OF_NECESSITY">THE SUPERSTITION OF NECESSITY.⁠<a id="FNanchor_65" href="#Footnote_65" class="fnanchor">[65]</a></h3> + +</div> + +<p>Lest my title give such offense as to prejudice unduly my contention, +I may say that I use the term in the way indicated by +its etymology: as a standing-still on the part of thought; a clinging +to old ideas after those ideas have lost their use, and hence, like +all superstitions, have become obstructions. For I shall try to show +that the doctrine of necessity is a survival; that it holds over from +an earlier and undeveloped period of knowledge; that as a means of +getting out of and beyond that stage it had a certain value, but, +having done its work, loses its significance. Halting judgment +may, indeed, at one time have helped itself out of the slough of uncertainty, +vagueness, and inadequacy on to ground of more solid +and complete fact, by the use of necessity as a crutch; once upon +the ground, the crutch makes progress slower and, preventing the +full exercise of the natural means of locomotion, tends to paralyse +science. The former support has become a burden, almost an intolerable +one.</p> + +<p>The beginning of wisdom in the matter of necessity is, I conceive, +in realising that it is a term which has bearing or relevancy only +with reference to the development of judgment, not with reference to +objective things or events. I do not mean by this that necessity refers +to the compelling force with which we are driven to make a given +affirmation: I mean that it refers to the content of that affirmation, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_363">[363]</span>expressing the degree of coherence between its constituent factors. +When we say something or other <i>must</i> be so and so, the “must” +does not indicate anything in the nature of the fact itself, but a trait +in our <i>judgment</i> of that fact; it indicates the degree with which we +have succeeded in making a whole out of the various elements which +have to be taken into account in forming the judgment. More specifically, +it indicates a half-way stage. At one extreme we have +two separate judgments, which, so far as consciousness is concerned, +have nothing to do with each other; and at the other extreme we +have one judgment into which the contents of the two former judgments +have been so thoroughly organised as to lose all semblance of +separateness. Necessity, as the middle term, is the midwife which, +from the dying isolation of judgments, delivers the unified judgment +just coming into life—it being understood that the separateness of the +original judgments is not as yet quite negated, nor the unity of the +coming judgment quite attained. The judgment of necessity, in +other words, is exactly and solely the transition in our knowledge +from unconnected judgments to a more comprehensive synthesis. +Its value is just the value of this transition; as negating the old +partial and isolated judgments—in its backward look—necessity has +meaning; in its forward look—with reference to the resulting completely +organised subject-matter—it is itself as false as the isolated +judgments which it replaces. Its value is in what it rids judgment +of. When it has succeeded, its value is nil. Like any go-between, +its service consists in rendering itself uncalled for.</p> + +<p>All science can ultimately do is to report or describe, to completely +state, the reality. So far as we reach this standpoint regarding +any fact or group of facts, we do not say that the fact <i>must</i> be +such and such, but simply that it <i>is</i> such and such. There is no +necessity attaching to the fact either as whole or as parts. <i>Qua</i> +whole, the fact simply is what it is; while the parts, instead of being +necessitated either by one another or by the whole, are the analysed +factors constituting, in their complete circuit, the whole. In +stating the whole, we, as of course, state all that enters into it; if +we speak of the various elements as <i>making</i> the whole, it is only in +the sense of making it <i>up</i>, not of causing it. The fallacy of the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_364">[364]</span>necessitarian theory consists in transforming the determinate in the +sense of the wholly defined, into the determined in the sense of +something externally made to be what it is.</p> + +<p>The whole, although first in the order of reality, is last in the +order of knowledge. The complete statement of the whole is the +goal, not the beginning of wisdom. We begin, therefore, with fragments, +which are taken for wholes; and it is only by piecing together +these fragments, and by the transformation of them involved +in this combination, that we arrive at the real fact. There comes a +stage at which the recognition of the unity begins to dawn upon us, +and yet, the tradition of the many distinct wholes survives; judgment +has to combine these two contradictory conceptions; it does +so by the theory that the dawning unity is an effect necessarily produced +by the interaction of the former wholes. Only as the consciousness +of the unity grows still more is it seen that instead of a +group of independent facts, held together by “necessary” ties, there +is one reality, of which we have been apprehending various fragments +in succession and attributing to them a spurious wholeness and independence. +We learn (but only at the end) that instead of discovering +and then connecting together a number of separate realities, we +have been engaged in the progressive definition of one fact.</p> + +<p>There are certain points upon which there is now <i>practical</i> agreement +among all schools. What one school has got at by a logical +analysis of science, another school has arrived at by the road of a +psychological analysis of experience. What one school calls the +unity of thought and reality, another school calls the relativity of +knowledge. The metaphysical interpretation further given to these +respective statements may be quite different, but, so far as they go, +they come to the same thing: that objects, <i>as known</i>, are not independent +of the process of knowing, but are the content of our judgments. +One school, indeed, may conceive of judgment as a mere +associative or habitual grouping of sensations, the other as the correlative +diversification and synthesis of the self; but the practical +outcome, that the “object” (anyway as known) is a form of judgment, +is the same. This point being held in common, both schools +must agree that <i>the progress of judgment is equivalent to a change in +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_365">[365]</span>the value of objects</i>—that objects as they are for us, as known, change +with the development of our judgments. If this be so, truth, however +it be metaphysically defined, must attach to late rather than +to early judgments.</p> + +<p>I am fortunate in being able to quote from authors, who may +be taken as typical of the two schools. Says Professor Caird in his +article upon “Metaphysic,” (lately reprinted, “Essays in Philosophy +and Literature,”):</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“Our first consciousness of things is not an immovable foundation upon which +science may build, but rather a hypothetical and self-contradictory starting-point of +investigation, which becomes changed and transformed as we advance.” (“Essays,” +Vol. II, p. 398.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>On the other hand, Mr. Venn writes (in the first chapter of his +“Empirical Logic”):</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“Select what object we please—the most apparently simple in itself, and the +most definitely parted off from others that we can discover—yet we shall find ourselves +constrained to admit that a considerable mental process has been passed +through before that object could be recognised as being an object, that is, as possessing +some degree of unity and as requiring to be distinguished from other such +unities.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>He goes on to illustrate by such an apparently fixed and given +object as the sun, pointing out how its unity as a persistent thing +involves a continued synthesis of elements very diverse in time and +space, and an analysis, a selection, from other elements in very close +physical juxtaposition. He goes on to raise the question whether a +dog, for example, may be said to “see” a rainbow at all, because +of the complex analysis and synthesis involved in such an object. +The “mental whole” (to use Mr. Venn’s words, the “ideal unity” +as others might term it) is so extensive and intricate that</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“One might almost as reasonably expect the dog to ‘see’ the progress of democracy +in the place where he lives, of which course of events the ultimate sensible +constituents are accessible to his observation precisely as they are to ours.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>As Mr. Venn is not discussing just the same point which I have +raised, he does not refer to the partial and tentative character of our +first judgments—our first objects. It is clear enough, however, that +there will be all degrees between total failure to analyse and combine +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_366">[366]</span>(as, say, in the case of the dog and rainbow) and fairly adequate +grouping. The difference between the savage whose synthesis is so +limited in scope that he sets up a new sun every day and the scientific +man whose object is a unity comprehending differences through +thousands of years of time and interactions going on through millions +of miles of space is a case in point. The distinction between +the respective objects is not simply a superimposition of new qualities +upon an old object, that old object remaining the same; it is +not getting new objects; it is a continual qualitative reconstruction +of the object itself. This fact, which is the matter under consideration, +is well stated by Mr. Venn, when he goes on to say:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“The act of predication, in its two-fold aspect of affirmation and denial, really +is a process by which we are not only enabled to add to our information <i>about</i> objects, +<i>but is also the process by the continued performance of which the objects had +been originally acquired, or rather produced</i>” (italics are mine).</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>This statement cannot be admitted at all without recognising +that the first judgments do not make the object once for all, but that +the continued process of judging is a continued process of “producing” +the object.</p> + +<p>Of course the confused and hypothetical character of our first +objects does not force itself upon us when we are still engaged in +constructing them. On the contrary, it is only when the original +subject-matter has been overloaded with various and opposing predicates +that we think of doubting the correctness of our first judgments, +of putting our first objects under suspicion. At the start, +these objects assert themselves as the baldest and solidest of hard +facts. The dogmatic and naïve quality of the original judgment is +in exact proportion to its crudeness and inadequacy. The objects +which are the content of these judgments thus come to be identified +with reality <i>par excellence</i>; they are <i>facts</i>, however doubtful everything +else. They hang on obstinately. New judgments, instead of +being regarded as better definitions of the actual fact and hence as +displacing the prior object, are tacked on to the old as best they +may be. Unless the contradiction is too flagrant, the new predicates +are set side by side with the old as simply additional information; +they do not react into the former qualities. If the contradiction is +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_367">[367]</span>too obvious to be overlooked the new predicate is used, if possible, +to constitute another object, independent of the former. So the +savage, having to deal with the apparently incompatible predicates +of light and darkness, makes two objects; two suns, for two successive +days. Once the Ptolemaic conception is well rooted, cycles and +epicycles, almost without end, are superadded, rather than reconstruct +the original object. Here, then, is our starting point: +when qualities arise so incompatible with the object already formed +that they cannot be referred to that object, it is easier to form a new +object on their basis than it is to doubt the correctness of the old, +involving as that does the surrender of the <i>object</i> (the fact, seemingly) +and the formation of another object.</p> + +<p>It is easier, I say, for there is no doubt that the reluctance of +the mind to give up an object once made lies deep in its economies. +I shall have occasion hereafter to point out the teleological character +of the notions of necessity and chance, but I wish here to call +attention to the fact that the forming of a number of distinct objects +has its origin in practical needs of our nature. The analysis and +synthesis which is first made is that of most practical importance; +what is abstracted from the complex net-work of reality is some net +outcome, some result which is of value for life. As Venn says:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“What the savage mostly wants to do is to produce something or to avert something, +not to account for a thing which has already happened. What interests him +is to know how to kill somebody, not to know how somebody has been killed.” (P. +62 of “Empirical Logic.”)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>And again:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“What not only the savage, but also the practical man mostly wants, is a <i>general</i> +result, say the death of his enemy. It does not matter whether the symptoms, +i. e., the qualifying circumstances, are those attendant on poison, or a blow from a +club, or on incantation, provided the death is brought about. But they do desire +<i>certainty</i> in respect of this general result.” (P. 64.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>Now it is this “general result,” the net outcome for practical +purposes, which is <i>the</i> fact, <i>the</i> object at first. Anything else is useless +subtlety. That the man is dead—that is the fact; anything +further is at most external circumstances which happen to accompany +the fact. That the death is only a bare fraction of a fact; that +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_368">[368]</span>the attendant “circumstances” are as much constituent factors of +the real fact as the mere “death” itself (probably more so from the +scientific point of view)—all this is foreign to conception. We pluck +the fruit, and that fruit is the fact. Only when practical experience +forces upon us the recognition that we cannot get the fruit without +heeding certain other “conditions” do we consent to return upon +our assumed object, put it under suspicion and question whether it +is really what we took it to be. It is, we may presume, the savage +who in order to get his living, has to regulate his conduct for long +periods, through changes of seasons, in some continuous mode, who +first makes the synthesis of one sun going through a recurring cycle +of changes—the year.</p> + +<p>As time goes on, the series of independent and isolated objects +passes through a gradual change. Just as the recognition of incompatible +qualities has led to setting up of separate things, so the +growing recognition of similar qualities in these disparate objects +begins to pull them together again. Some relation between the two +objects is perceived; it is seen that neither object is just what it is +in its isolation, but owes some of its meaning to the other objects. +While in reality, (as I hope later to point out,) this “relationship” +and mutual dependence means membership in a common whole, +contribution to one and the same activity, a midway stage intervenes +before this one fact, including as parts of itself the hitherto separate +objects, comes to consciousness. The tradition of isolation is too +strong to give way at the first suggestion of community. This +passage-way from isolation to unity, denying the former but not admitting +the latter, is necessity or determinism. The wall of partition +between the two separate “objects” cannot be broken at one +attack; they have to be worn away by the attrition arising from +their slow movement into one another. It is the “necessary” influence +which one exerts upon the other that finally rubs away the +separateness and leaves them revealed as elements of one unified +whole. This done, the determining influence has gone too.</p> + +<p>The process may be symbolised as follows: <i>M</i> is the object, the +original synthesis of the elements seen to be of practical importance; +<i>a</i>, <i>b</i>, <i>c</i>, etc., to <i>h</i> are predicates of constantly growing incompatibility. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_369">[369]</span>When the quality <i>i</i> is discovered, it is so manifestly incompatible +with <i>a</i> that all attempt to refer it to the same subject <i>M</i> is +resisted. Two alternatives are now logically open. The subject-matter +<i>M</i>, as the synthesis of the qualities <i>a</i>-<i>h</i>, may be taken up; +it may be asked whether the object is really <i>M</i> with these qualities; +whether it is not rather Σ, having instead of the predicates <i>a</i>, <i>b</i>, +etc., the qualities ρα, ρβ, with which the new quality <i>i</i> is quite +compatible. But this process goes against the practical grain of +our knowledge; it means not only that we do not know what we +thought we knew; it means that we did not <i>do</i> what we thought we +did. Such unsettling of action is hardly to be borne. It is easier +to erect a new object <i>N</i>, to which the more incompatible predicates +are referred. Finally, it is discovered that both <i>M</i> and <i>N</i> have the +same predicates <i>r</i> and <i>s</i>; that in virtue of this community of qualities +there is a certain like element even in the qualities previously +considered disparate. This mutual attraction continues until it becomes +so marked a feature of the case that there is no alternative but +to suppose that the <i>r</i> and <i>s</i> of one produces these qualities in the +other, and thereby influences all the qualities of the other. This +drawing together continues until we have the one reconstructed object +Σ, with the traits ρα, ρβρ, etc. It is found that there is one somewhat +comprehensive synthesis which includes within itself the several +separate objects so far produced; and it is found that this inclusion +in the larger whole reacts into the meaning of the several +constituting parts—as parts of one whole, they lose traits which +they seemed to possess in their isolation, and gain new traits, because +of their membership in the same whole.</p> + +<p>We have now to consider, more in detail, how the intermediate +idea of necessity grows up and how it gives away upon the discovery +of the one inclusive whole. Let us continue the illustration of +the killing. The “general result,” the death of the hated enemy, +is at first the fact; all else is mere accidental circumstance. Indeed, +the other circumstances at first are hardly that; they do not +attract attention, having no importance. Not only the savage, but +also the common-sense man of to-day, I conceive, would say that +any attempt to extend the definition of the “fact” beyond the mere +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_370">[370]</span>occurrence of the death is metaphysical refinement; that the <i>fact</i> is +the killing, the death, and that that “fact” remains quite the same, +however it is brought about. What has been done, in other words, +is to abstract part of the real fact, part of <i>this</i> death, and set up the +trait or universal thus abstracted as itself <i>fact</i>, and not only as fact, +but as <i>the</i> fact, <i>par excellence</i>, with reference to which all the factors +which constitute the reality, the concrete fact, of <i>this</i> death, are +circumstantial and “accidental.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_66" href="#Footnote_66" class="fnanchor">[66]</a></p> + +<p>A fragment of the whole reality, of the actual fact individualised +and specified with all kind of minute detail, having been thus hypostatised +into an object, the idea of necessity is in fair way to arise. +These deaths in general do not occur. Although the mere death of +the man, his removal from the face of the earth, is the <i>fact</i>, none +the less all <i>actual</i> deaths have a certain amount of detail in them. +The savage has to hit his enemy with a club or spear, or perform a +magic incantation, before he can attain that all-important end of +getting rid of him. Moreover, a man with a coat of armor on will +not die just the same way as the man who is defenseless. These +circumstances have to be taken into account. Now, if the “fact” +had not been so rigidly identified with the bare practical outcome, +the removal of the hated one, a coherent interpretation of the need +for these further incidents would be open. It could be admitted that +the original death was a highly complex affair, involving a synthesis +of a very large number of different factors; furthermore, the new +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_371">[371]</span>cases of murder could be employed to reconstruct the original analysis-synthesis; +to eliminate supposed factors which were not relevant, +and to show the presence of factors at first not suspected. In +other words, the real fact would be under constant process of definition, +of “production.” But the stiff-necked identification of the fragment, +which happened to have practical importance with the real object, +effectually prevents any such reaction and reconstruction. What +is to be done, however, with these conditions of spear, of stone, of +armor, which so obviously have something <i>to do</i> with the real fact, +although, as it would seem, they are not the fact? They are considered +as circumstances, <i>accidental</i>, so far as death in general is concerned; +<i>necessary</i>, so far as <i>this</i> death is concerned. That is, wanting +simply to get the net result of the removal of my enemy, so that he +will no longer blight the fair face of nature, it is accidental how I do +it; but having, after all, to kill a man of certain characteristics and +surroundings in life, having to choose time and place, etc., it becomes +necessary, <i>if</i> I am to succeed, that I kill him in a certain way, +say, with poison, or a dynamite bomb. Thus we get our concrete, +individual fact again.</p> + +<p>Consider, then, that tortuous path from reality to reality, <i>via</i> a circuit +of unreality, which calls the thought of necessity into existence. +We first mutilate the actual fact by selecting some portion that appeals +to our needs; we falsify, by erecting this fragment into the +whole fact. Having the rest of the fact thus left on our hands for +disposal, when we have no need of the concrete fact we consider it +accidental, merely circumstantial; but we consider it necessary +whenever we have occasion to descend from the outcome which we +have abstracted back to the real fact, in all its individuality. Necessity +is a device by which we both conceal from ourselves the unreal +character of what we have called real, and also get rid of the practical +evil consequences of hypostatising a fragment into an independent +whole.</p> + +<p>If the purely teleological character of necessity is not yet evident, +I think the following considerations will serve to bring it out. +The practical value, the fruit from the tree, we pick out and set up +for the entire fact so far as our past action is concerned. But so far +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_372">[372]</span>as our <i>future</i> action is concerned, this value is a result <i>to be</i> reached; +it is an end to be attained. Other factors, in reality all the time +bound up in the one concrete fact or individual whole, have now to +be brought in as means to get this end. Although after our desire +has been met they have been eliminated as accidental, as irrelevant, +yet when the experience is again desired their integral membership +in the real fact has to be recognised. This is done under the guise +of considering them as means which are necessary to bring about the +end. Thus the idea of the circumstances as external to the “fact” +is retained, while we get all the practical benefit of their being not +external but elements of one and the same whole. Contingent and +necessary are thus the correlative aspects of one and the same fact; +conditions are accidental so far as we have abstracted a fragment +and set it up as the whole; they are necessary the moment it is required +to pass from this abstraction back to the concrete fact. Both +are teleological in character—contingency referring to the separation +of means from end, due to the fact that the end having been already +reached the means have lost their value for us; necessity being the +reference of means to an end <i>which has still to be got</i>. Necessary +means <i>needed</i>; contingency means no longer required—because already +enjoyed.</p> + +<p>Note that the necessity of the means has reference to an end still +to be attained, and in so far itself hypothetical or contingent, while the +contingent circumstances are no longer needed precisely because +they have resulted in a definite outcome (which, accordingly, is now +a fact, and, in that sense, necessary) and we begin to see how completely +necessity and chance are bound up with each other.</p> + +<p>Their correlation may thus be stated: <i>If</i> we are to reach an end +we <i>must</i> take certain means; while so far as we want an undefined +end, an end in general, conditions which accompany it are mere +accidents. Whichever way the relationship be stated, the underlying +truth is that we are dealing with only partial phases of fact, +which, having been unduly separated from each other through their +erection into distinct wholes, have now to be brought back into their +real unity.</p> + +<p>In the first place, then, <i>if</i> I am to reach an end, certain means +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_373">[373]</span><i>must</i> be used. Here the end is obviously postulated; save as it is +begged (presupposed), the necessity of the means has no sense. +If, when starving, I am to live I must steal a dinner, but, having +stolen, the logical but unsympathetic judge may question the relevancy +(that is, the necessity) of my end, and thus cut the ground +out from under the necessity of my means. My end requires <i>its</i> +justification, the establishing of its validity, before the necessity of +the means is anything more than hypothetical. The proximate end +must be referred to a more ultimate and inclusive end to get any +solid ground. Here we have our choice: we may deny the existence +of any organic whole in life and keep chasing in a never-ending series, +the <i>progressus ad infinitum</i>, after an end valid in itself. In this +case we never get beyond a hypothetical necessity—something is +necessary <i>if</i> we are to have something else, the necessity being relative +to the implied doubt. Or, being convinced that life is a whole +and not a series merely, we may say there is one comprehensive end +which gives its own validity to the lesser ends in so far as they constitute +it. While, on the other alternative, we reach only a hypothetical +necessity, on this we reach none at all. The comprehensive +end is no end at all in the sense of something by itself to be reached +by means external to it. Any such end would be simply one in the +infinite series and would be itself hypothetical. Whenever minor +ends cease to be in turn means to further ends it is because they +have become parts, constituent elements, of the higher end and thus +ceased to be steps towards an end and beyond and outside of themselves. +Given a final (i. e., inclusive) end, eating and drinking, study +and gossip, play and business, cease to be means <i>towards</i> an end +and become its concrete definition, its analytic content. The minor +activities state the supreme activity in its specific factors.</p> + +<p>Our dilemma is the choice between an end which itself has no +existence save upon presupposition of another end, (is contingent,) +and an end which as an end in itself simply <i>is</i>.</p> + +<p>The externality of means to end is merely a symptom of lack +of specification or concreteness in the end itself. <i>If</i> I am going to +invent some improvement in a type-writer, the necessity of going +through certain preliminary steps is exactly proportionate to the indefiniteness +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_374">[374]</span>of my conception of what the improvement is to be; +when the end is realised, the operations which enter into the realisation +cease to be means necessary to an end and become the specific +<i>content</i> of that end. The improvement is a <i>fact</i>, having such +and such elements defining it. If I simply want, in general, to get +my mail I <i>must</i> take this path (there being but one road); but if my +end is not thus general, if it is individualised with concrete filling, +the walk to the office may become a part of the end, a part of the +actual fact. In so far, of course, it loses all aspect of necessitation. +It simply <i>is</i>. And in general, so far as my end is vague, or abstract, +so far as it is not specified as to its details, so far the filling up of +its empty schema to give it particularity (and thus make it fact) appears +as a means necessary to reach an end outside itself. The +growth in concreteness of the end itself is transformed into ways of +effecting an end already presupposed. Or, to state it in yet one other +way, determination in the sense of definition in consciousness is +hypostatised into determination in the sense of a physical making.</p> + +<p>The point may come out more clearly if we consider it with the +emphasis on chance instead of upon necessity. The usual statement +that chance is relative to ignorance seems to me to convey the truth +though not in the sense generally intended—viz., that if we knew +more about the occurrence we should see it necessitated by its conditions. +Chance is relative to ignorance in the sense rather that it +refers to an indefiniteness in our conception of what we are doing. +In our consciousness of our end (our acts) we are always making +impossible abstractions; we break off certain phases of the act which +are of chief interest to us, without any regard to whether the concrete +conditions of action—that is, the deed in its whole definition—permits +any such division. Then, when in our actual doing the +circumstances to which we have not attended thrust themselves into +consciousness—when, that is to say, the act appears in more of its +own specific nature—we dispose of those events, foreign to our conscious +purpose, as accidental; we did not want them or intend them—what +more proof of their accidental character is needed? The +falling of a stone upon a man’s head as he walks under a window is +“chance,” for it has nothing to do with what the man proposed to +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_375">[375]</span>do, it is no part of his conception of that walk. To an enemy who +takes that means of killing him, it is anything but an accident, being +involved in <i>his</i> conscious purpose. It is “chance” when we throw +a two and a six; for the concreteness of the act falls outside of the +content of our intention. We intended <i>a</i> throw, some throw, and +in so far the result is not accidental, but this special result, being +irrelevant to our conception of what we were to do, in so far is contingent. +The vagueness or lack of determinateness in our end, the +irrelevancy of actual end to conscious intent, chance, are all names +for the same thing. And if I am asked whether a gambler who has +a hundred dollars upon the outcome does not <i>intend</i> to throw double +sixes, I reply that he has no such intention—unless the dice are +loaded. He may <i>hope</i> to make that throw, but he cannot intend it +save as he can define that act—tell how to do it, tell, that is, just +<i>what</i> the act is. Or, once more, if I intend to get my mail and there +are four paths open to me it is chance which I take, just in proportion +to the abstractness of my end. If I have not defined it beyond +the mere “general result” of getting mail, anything else is extraneous +and in so far contingent. If the end is individualised to the +extent, say, of getting the mail in the shortest possible time, or with +the maximum of pleasant surroundings, or with the maximum of +healthy exercise, the indifferency of the “means,” and with it their +contingency, disappears. This or that path is no longer a mere +means which <i>may</i> be taken to get a result foreign to its own value; +the path is an intrinsic part of the end.</p> + +<p>In so far as a man presents to himself an end in general, he sets +up an abstraction so far lacking in detail as (taken <i>per se</i>) to exclude +the possibility of realisation. In order to exist as concrete or individual +(and of course, nothing can exist except as individual or concrete) +it must be defined or particularised. But so far as consciousness +is concerned the original vague end is <i>the</i> reality; it is all that +the man cares about and hence constitutes his act. The further particularisation +of the end, therefore, instead of appearing as what it +really is, viz., the discovery of the actual reality, presents itself as +something outside that end. This externality to the end previously +realised in consciousness is, taken as mere externality, contingency, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_376">[376]</span>or accident; taken as none the less so bound up with the desired end +that it must be gone through before reaching that end, it is necessary. +Chance, in other words, stands for the irrelevancy as the matter +at first presents itself to consciousness; necessity is the required, +but partial, negation of this irrelevancy. Let it be complete, instead +of partial, and we have the one real activity defined throughout. +With reference to this reality, conditions are neither accidental +nor necessary, but simply constituting elements—they neither may +be nor must be, but just are. What is irrelevant is now not simply +indifferent; it is excluded, eliminated. What is relevant is no longer +something required in order to get a result beyond itself; it is incorporated +into the result, it is integral.</p> + +<p>It now remains to connect the two parts of our discussion, the +logical and the practical consideration of necessity, and show that, +as suggested, logical necessity rests upon teleological—that, indeed, +it is the teleological read backwards. The logical process of discovering +and stating the reality of some event simply reverses the +process which the mind goes through in setting up and realising +an end. Instead of the killing of an enemy as something to be +accomplished, we have the fact of a murder to be accounted for. +Just as on the practical side, the end, as it first arises in consciousness, +is an end in general and thus contrasts with the concrete +end which is individualised; so the fact, as at first realised in consciousness, +is a <i>bare</i> fact, and thus contrasts with the actual event +with its complete particularisation. The actual fact, the murder as +it really took place, is one thing; the fact as it stands in consciousness, +the phases of the actual event which are picked out and put +together, is another thing. The fact of knowledge, it is safe to say, +is no <i>fact</i> at all; that is, if there had been in reality no more particularisation, +no more of detail, than there is consciousness, the +murder would never have happened. But just as, practically, we +take the end in general to be the real thing, (since it is the only thing +of any direct interest,) so in knowledge we take the bare fact as abstracted +from the actual whole, as <i>the</i> fact. Just as the end of the +savage is merely to kill his enemy, so the “fact” is merely the dead +body with the weapon sticking in it. The fact, as it stands in consciousness, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_377">[377]</span>is indeterminate and partial, but, since it is in consciousness +by itself, it is taken as a whole and as the certain thing. But +as the abstractness of the “end in general” is confessed in the fact +that means are required in order to make it real—to give it existence—so +the unreal character of the “fact” is revealed in the statement +that the causes which produced it are unknown and have to be +discovered. The bare fact thus becomes a result to be accounted +for: in this conception the two sides are combined; the “fact” is +at once given a certain reality of its own while at the same time the +lack of concreteness is recognised in the reference to external causes.</p> + +<p>The gradual introduction of further factors, under the guise of +causes accounting for the effect, defines the original vague “fact,” +until, at last, when it is accounted for, we have before us the one +and only concrete reality. This done, we no longer have an effect +to be accounted for, and causes which produce it, but one fact +whose statement or description is such and such. But intermediate +between the isolation and the integration is the stage when +necessity appears. We have advanced, we will suppose, from +the bare fact of the murder to the discovery of a large amount of +“circumstantial” evidence regarding that fact. We hear of a man +who had a quarrel with the deceased; he cannot account for himself +at the time when the murder <i>must</i> have been committed; he is +found to have had a weapon like that with which the murder <i>must</i> +have been committed. Finally we conclude he <i>must</i> have been the +murderer. What do these “musts” (the “must” of the time, weapon, +and murderer) mean? Are they not obviously the gradual filling-in +of the previously empty judgment, through bringing things at +first unconnected into relation with each other? The existence of +the man M. N. is wholly isolated from the “fact” of the murder till +it is learned that he had a grudge against the murdered man; this +third fact, also distinct <i>per se</i>, brought into connection with the +others (the “fact” of the murder and of the existence of M. N.) +compels them to move together; the result is at first the possibility, +later, as the points of connection get more and more marked and +numerous, the “necessity,” that M. N. is the murderer. Further, it +is clear that this “must” marks not a greater certainty or actuality +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_378">[378]</span>than a mere “is” would indicate, but rather a doubt, a surmise or +guess gradually gaining in certainty. When the fact is really made +out to our satisfaction, we drop the “must” and fall back on the +simple <i>is</i>. Only so long as there is room for doubt, and thus for +argument do we state that the time and weapon must have been +such and such. So when we finally conclude that the murderer +must have been M. N., it means that we have woven a large number +of facts, previously discrete, into such a state of inter-relationship +that we do not see how to avoid denying their discreteness and incorporating +them all into one concrete whole, or individual fact. +That we still say “must” shows, however, that we have not quite +succeeded in overcoming the partial and indefinite character of the +original “fact.” Had we succeeded in getting the whole fact before +us the judgment would take this form: The murder <i>is</i> a fact of +such and such definite nature, having as its content such and such +precise elements. In this comprehensive whole all distinction of +effect to be accounted for and causes which produce clean disappears. +The idea of necessity, in a word, comes in only while we are +still engaged in correcting our original error, but have not surrendered +it root and branch; this error being that the fragment of reality +which we grasp is concrete enough to warrant the appellation +“fact.”</p> + +<p>A great deal of attention has been directed to the category of +cause and effect. One striking feature of the ordinary consideration +is, that it takes for granted the matter most needing investigation +and aims the inquiry at the dependent member of the firm. +The effect seems to be so clearly <i>there</i>, while the cause is so obviously +something to be searched for that the category of effect is +assumed, and it is supposed that only the idea of causation is in +need of examination. And yet this abstraction of certain phases of +fact, the erection of the parts thus abstracted into distinct entities, +which, though distinct, are still dependent in their mode of existence, +is precisely the point needing examination. It is but another +instance of the supreme importance of our practical interests. The +effect is the end, the practical outcome, which interests us; the +search for causes is but the search for the means which would produce +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_379">[379]</span>the result. We call it “means and end” when we set up a +result to be reached in the future and set ourselves upon finding the +causes which put the desired end in our hands; we call it “cause +and effect” when the “result” is given, and the search for means is +a regressive one. In either case the separation of one side from the +other, of cause from effect, of means from end, has the same origin: +a partial and vague idea of the whole fact, together with the habit +of taking this part (because of its superior practical importance) for +a whole, for a fact.</p> + +<p>I hope now to have made good my original thesis: that the +idea of necessity marks a certain stage in the development of judgment; +that it refers to a residuum, in our judgments and thus in +our objects, of indeterminateness or vagueness, which it replaces +without wholly negating; that it is thus relative to “chance” or +contingency; that its value consists wholly in the impulse given +judgment towards the <i>is</i>, or the concrete reality defined throughout. +The analysis has been long; the reader may have found it not only +tedious, but seemingly superfluous, since, as he may be saying to +himself, no one nowadays regards necessity as anything but a name +for fixed uniformities in nature, and of this view of the case nothing +has been said. I hope, however, that when we come to a consideration +of necessity as equivalent to uniformity, it will be found that +the course of this discussion has not been irrelevant, but the sure +basis for going further.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">John Dewey.</span></p> + +<div class="footnotes"> + +<h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_65" href="#FNanchor_65" class="label">[65]</a> This article, as the title may indicate, was suggested by Mr. Peirce’s article +upon “The Doctrine of Necessity Examined.” As, however, my thought takes +finally a different turn, I have deemed it better to let it run its own course from the +start, and so have not referred, except indirectly, to Mr. Peirce’s argument. I +hope this will not be taken as a desire to slur over my indebtedness to him.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_66" href="#FNanchor_66" class="label">[66]</a> The reason of this abstraction is in practical nature, as already indicated. +For all the savage <i>cares</i> about it, the death in general, <i>is</i> the real fact. It is all that +interests him. It is hardly worth while to attempt to persuade the savage; indeed, +if he were not only a savage, but also a philosopher, he might boldly challenge the +objector to present <i>any</i> definition of object which should not refer objectivity to +man’s practical activity; although he might, as a shrewd savage, admit that some +one activity (or self) to which the object is referred has more content than another. +In this case, I, for one, should not care about entering the lists against the savage. +But when the common-sense philosopher, who resists all attempts to reconstruct +the original object on the ground that a fact is a fact and all beyond that is metaphysics, +is also a case-hardened nominalist (as he generally is), it is time to protest. +It might be true that the real object is always relative to the value of some action; +but to erect this pure universal into the object, and then pride one’s self on enlightenment +in rejecting the “scholastic figment” of the reality of universals is a little +too much.</p></div> + +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_380">[380]</span></p> + +<h3 class="nobreak" id="THE_ISSUES_OF_SYNECHISM">THE ISSUES OF “SYNECHISM.”</h3> + +</div> + +<p>In a late number of <i>The Monist</i>, (Vol. II, No. 4,) there appears a +singularly acute and profound article, from the pen of one of +the ablest of American logicians and mathematicians, Mr. Charles +S. Peirce. Its subject is “The Law of Mind”—the idea of continuity. +The writer tells us, (p. 534,) “the tendency to regard continuity, +in the sense in which I shall define it, as an idea of prime +importance in philosophy, may conveniently be termed <i>Synechism</i>.” +With this <i>synechistic</i> philosophy, as applied to mind, the +paper is occupied, to the exclusion, for the nonce, of Mr. Peirce’s +companion doctrine of <i>Tychism</i>,⁠<a id="FNanchor_67" href="#Footnote_67" class="fnanchor">[67]</a> which was dealt with, by him, in +the January, 1891, and April, 1892, issues of <i>The Monist</i>. These +conceptions are, both of them, to be viewed as essential to philosophy +as a whole, but the latter is; for the present, allowed to drop +out of sight, in order to allow of the due elaboration of the former.⁠<a id="FNanchor_68" href="#Footnote_68" class="fnanchor">[68]</a></p> + +<h4>THE FORMULA OF SYNECHISM.</h4> + +<p>The formula of Synechism, with which the article begins, is as +follows:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“Logical analysis applied to mental phenomena shows that there is but one +law of mind, namely, that ideas tend to spread continuously, and to affect certain +others which stand to them in a peculiar relation of affectibility. In this spreading +they lose intensity, and especially the power of affecting others, but gain generality, +and become welded with other ideas.” (Vol. II, No. 4, p. 534.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>The individuality and continuity of ideas are, then, shown respectively +to involve no contradiction; an idea once past—in the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_381">[381]</span>sense of an event in an individual consciousness—is not wholly past, +it is only going—“infinitesimally past, less past than any assignable +past date.” Thus the conclusion is reached that “the present is +connected with the past by a series of real, infinitesimal steps.” +Again, “We are forced to say that we are immediately conscious +through an infinitesimal interval of time. This is all that is requisite.” +(<i>Ibid.</i>, pp. 535-536.)</p> + +<p>All that it is necessary to say at the outset is, that this view is +supported by an elaborate inquiry into the nature of infinity and +continuity in general, into which, for the purpose of the present paper, +it is not needful to enter. And this for two reasons: (1) The +synechistic philosophy, by itself, does not profess to be monistic. Its +expounder does not, even if his Tychism were not in reserve, profess +to carry it beyond the realm of mind, with all that is implied in +such a reservation. Now, it is the bearing of Mr. Peirce’s Synechism +upon a monistic solution of the universe with which the present +article is concerned. And (2) Mr. Peirce’s method of treatment, +though precise and logical in the direction of its own path, is too +purely technical to be summarised for the general reader’s benefit. +But withal, Synechism is far too fertile, not so much in respect of +what it makes clear, as suggestively, and, if the expression may be +allowed, <i>obliquely</i>, to be passed over without comment. Its excogitator +is eminently frank; he does not conceal the difficulties which, +ever and anon, occur in his statement. Sometimes his theory seems +a trifle too wide for the facts encountered, sometimes rather too +scanty to contain them. Such phrases as the following: “No, I +think we can only hold”—p. 552; “we are driven to perceive”—p. +555; “this obliges me to say”—p. 557; “the principle with +which I set out requires me to maintain”—p. 558; “the only answer +that I can, at present, make is”—p. 559, etc., etc., do every +credit to the writer’s candor, but they would scarcely occur in an +exposition, which, in the mind of its author, made the rough places +altogether plain. Synechism, even with Tychism in the background, +probably does not, in Mr. Peirce’s own mind, completely solve the +world-riddle, at least, as yet. Still these very pauses themselves, +on the part of a thinker of such ability, are eminently suggestive. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_382">[382]</span>To use his own words: “the present paper is intended to show what +Synechism is, and what it leads to.” Let us emphasise this latter +clause, as likely to be more fruitful than the former.</p> + +<h4>MR. PEIRCE’S POSITIVISM.</h4> + +<p>Mr. Peirce, in spite of his theory of chance, is, in his Synechism, +almost severely a positivist;⁠<a id="FNanchor_69" href="#Footnote_69" class="fnanchor">[69]</a> but his positivism, like most of that +current nowadays, does not go deep enough. He is positivist, <i>after</i> he +has got externality—fertile in excitations—comfortably disposed +around his subject; and vibrations, undulations, attractions, etc., +ready to play upon the thousand-stringed harp, <i>but not before</i>. For, +“we must not tax introspection,” he tells us, p. 548, “to make a phenomenon +manifest, which essentially involves externality,” when the +real problem at issue is: Is there externality, in the vulgar sense, at +all, or is it only that <i>rationalised externality</i> which <i>circumspection</i>, within +the limits of egoity, reveals? Now, upon this a good deal hinges. +At all events the difference in question, or, rather, that there <i>is</i> a +difference, has been mooted, to say the least. And, this being the +case, it is a little tedious, when the really vital point of the spatial +extension of feelings is being debated, to have this illustration +brought in, (p. 548,): “Moreover, our own feelings are focused in +attention to such a degree, that we are not aware that ideas are not +brought to an absolute unity. Just as nobody, not instructed by +special experiment, has any idea how very, very little of the field of +vision is distinct.” Why, that is reasoning in a circle, if some systems +are true; and it is a begging of the question, if they are the +reverse.</p> + +<p>If the system of so-called objective reality were, at sight, wholly +veracious, if everything existed just as it seems, this positivism of +Mr. Peirce’s might be workable. Then no one would seek to go +beneath the process of the apparent, the actually visible, for a <i>rationale</i>. +But modern science teaches, in its very primer, that many +things are, and act, quite otherwise than as they seem to be, and +do. Appearances <i>rationalised</i> are alone to be accepted. The sun +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_383">[383]</span>does not “rise” and “set,” as it seems to do. The earth is not, as +it appears to be, an immovable plane, and so on. And, this once +allowed, where is the principle to end? If the superficial judgment +may be thus corrected, or reversed, it is liable to revision or +reversal <i>ad infinitum</i>, unless reason be shown to the contrary. It +may thus be disputed whether our author is quite in order in writing, +as he does, and using the statement to support his theory—“Precisely +how primary sensations, as colors and tones, are excited, +we cannot tell, in the present state of psychology.... As far +as sight and hearing are in question, we know that they are only +excited by vibrations of inconceivable complexity; and the chemical +senses are probably not more simple.” (P. 557.)</p> + +<p>To argue, we cannot tell precisely <i>how</i> they are excited, but we +know that they <i>are</i> excited, is somewhat feminine; seeing that the +said “excitement” is not patent on the surface of ordinary perception. +And, this being the case, the excitement, or its mode rather, not +being given immediately, but only mentally annexed, Mr. Peirce is +not consistently positivist. It is equally open to an opponent to “annex” +something else of his own to the “given” thing, or altogether +to deny the necessity of anything whatever being thus annexed. In +any case that (if anything) which is sought to be annexed must +stand the test of positivism; we must know <i>if</i> such a thing is, and +<i>what</i> it is precisely. And this is just what Mr. Peirce cannot do +for us. He cannot tell us exactly what the “excitant” of feelings +<i>is</i>; he can only guess what it is “<i>something like</i>,” viz.: the feelings +themselves. Hence the following:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“The principle with which I set out [that of continuity] requires me to maintain +that these feelings are communicated to the nerves by continuity, <i>so that there +must be something like them in the excitants themselves</i>. If this seems extravagant, +it is to be remembered that it is the sole possible way of reaching any explanation +of sensation, which otherwise must be pronounced a general fact absolutely inexplicable +and ultimate. Now absolute inexplicability is a hypothesis which sound +logic refuses, under any circumstances, to justify.” (P. 558.—The italics are not +in the original.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>There must be something like the feelings in the excitants of +the feelings. Now, this point is worthy of the closest attention. +Note that “the excitant” <i>alone</i> is mentioned. <i>Vibrations</i> excite sight +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_384">[384]</span>and hearing. Yet, from what follows, it is plain that Synechism is +not inconsistent with belief in a fixed objective. “Even the least +psychical of peripheral sensations, that of pressure, has, in its excitation, +conditions which, though apparently simple, are seen to +be complicated enough when we consider <i>the molecules and their attractions</i>,” +pp. 557-558. Can there, then, be any doubt that we have +here three distinct things: (1) a subjective, (2) an “excitant,” and +(3) an objective; the middle term being a vehicle of communication +between the first and third? It does not affect this presentation of +Mr. Peirce’s position that, at an earlier stage of his argument, he +speaks of matter—synonymous, presumably, with the objective—as +being “not completely dead, but merely mind, hide-bound with +habits,” as “partially deadened” or “effete,” mind; or that the +editor of <i>The Monist</i> says that, with Mr. Peirce, “mind is the beginning +of all.” (<i>The Monist</i>, Vol. III, No. 1, p. 95.) The question, +at present, is not regarding origins, but regarding co-existences. +So that there is a distinct <i>hiatus</i> here, arising from the confusion of +the stimulant, or excitant, of sensation with the objective itself.⁠<a id="FNanchor_70" href="#Footnote_70" class="fnanchor">[70]</a> +Now, the stimulant of sensation is never the object perceived. +Hence, once an objective is admitted, a trinity of entities is unavoidable, +since still less can the “stimulant” be the subject. This special +difficulty, in the present writer’s opinion, is inseparable from +dualism in every form. How it besets Mr. Peirce’s theory is evident +from his hazarded suggestion: “There must be <i>something like</i> +the feelings in the excitants.” He thus uses only two of his cosmical +terms, and gives the third the go-by! All dualism halts, but surely +there is here a palpable stumble.</p> + +<p>In a recent article in <i>The Open Court</i>⁠<a id="FNanchor_71" href="#Footnote_71" class="fnanchor">[71]</a> I have pointed out the +vanity of introducing a vehicle of communication between object +and subject, especially emphasising the fact that, once this intermediate +term is brought in, the veritable objective disappears. +“Once you bring in vibrations,” I remarked, “you practically provide +a <i>second</i> object, which is really a part of the subject, and, in +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_385">[385]</span>order to do this, you have taken from the original objective all that +composed it.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_72" href="#Footnote_72" class="fnanchor">[72]</a> (<i>The Open Court</i>, p. 3361.)</p> + +<p>Is it any wonder, then, that Mr. Peirce should suppose the excitants +to be “something like” the excited feelings? Since he, practically, +surrenders the objective, what could more closely resemble +the subjective than the subjective itself? If he had adopted the position +of Hume, and made impressions and ideas all-in-all, his principle +of continuity might hold. But this he does not do, since (1) +he implicitly admits the objective element, and (2) even if he did +not do this, there must be something other than the idea or feeling +in his system, since, otherwise, there could be no ground for the +charge of seeming “extravagance,” which, he admits, may be leveled +against, at least one of, his conclusions.</p> + +<h4>FEELINGS SPATIALLY EXTENDED.</h4> + +<p>This leads us to Mr. Peirce’s conclusions regarding subjective +spatial extension—the spatial extension of feelings—as the result of +observation of irritated protoplasm. Our attention is directed to an +excited mass of protoplasm,—an amœba, or a slime-mould,—which +“does not differ in any radical way from the contents of a nerve-cell, +though its functions may be less specialised.” (P. 547.) The +irritation is induced when, say, the amœba is “quiescent and rigid,” +and we note its behaviour under it. That feeling passes from one +part of this amorphous continuum of protoplasm to another, we are +led to believe. And this conclusion follows: “Whatever there is +in the whole phenomenon to make us think there is feeling in such +a mass of protoplasm,—<i>feeling</i>, but plainly no <i>personality</i>,—goes +logically to show that that feeling has a subjective, or substantial, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_386">[386]</span>spatial extension, as the excited state has.” This is a chain of reasoning. +Let us examine its links. We have:</p> + +<p>(1) The behaviour of the amœba under immediate, mechanical +irritation—the spread, or spatial extension, of the state of irritation.</p> + +<p>(2) We are asked to identify this spread-out irritation, this field +of excitation, with “feeling” on the part of the amœba, because +there is “no doubt that it feels when it is excited.”</p> + +<p>(3) From the spatial extension of the irritation, thus identified +with feeling, we are asked to conclude that the feeling, in the +amœba, has a subjective, spatial extension as the excited state has, +and, finally, passing from the feeling of the amœba to our own feelings, +by inference, we are asked to admit:</p> + +<p>(4) Not that we have necessarily a feeling of bigness, but that +“the feeling [inferentially arrived at from the spread-out irritation +on the part of the amœba] as a subject of inhesion is big.” (P. 548.)</p> + +<p>After this, we are disposed to agree with Mr. Peirce when he +says: “This is, no doubt, a difficult idea to seize”; not, as he goes +on to say, “for the reason that it is a subjective, not an objective, +extension,” but on the ground that the reasoning involves, plainly, +not only the subjective and objective, but what Clifford calls the +“ejective,” as well, and this assumption, <i>inter alia</i>, that the last-named +lies on the same plane as the former. Never, surely, was +the conclusion that feelings have spatial extension more easily +reached. It is only when we find that in (1) we are dealing with +the objective pure and simple, observed phenomena; that in (2) the +connection between irritation or excitation, and feeling is assumed, +in the object, because feeling, subjectively, is found to accompany +irritation; that (3) as the irritation, in the amœba, is spread out, so +is the feeling to be viewed; and (4) that, as the feeling of the +amœba, so is our feeling to be considered, viz.: that the feeling, “as +a subject of inhesion, is big,” we are led to say after all this, that, +by such a process, anything, or everything, could be demonstrated,—the +<i>field</i> of spatial extension, for example, having no more claim to +be assumed than the <i>point</i> at which the irritation admittedly begins. +Why should the <i>middle</i> stage of the irritation be selected in preference +to the <i>initial</i> and <i>final</i> ones? The irritation originates in a +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_387">[387]</span>point, spreads, and then dies out. Thus our feeling, (we purposely +use Mr. Peirce’s nomenclature,) or idea, of an elephant, is unquestionably, +as a subject of inhesion, “big.” <i>But only for a time, and +not at first.</i> Really, our idea, or feeling—in Synechism—of an elephant, +must logically commence as a minute speck, and return to +this vanishing-point again. There is no other way out of it. For +must not the analogy of the irritated amœba be followed throughout, +and if not, why not?</p> + +<h4>DUALISM AND THE WAY OUT.</h4> + +<p>The <i>crux</i> of philosophy, from the time of Hume to the present +day, has been, what may be summarised as, the consciousness of +succession <i>as</i> succession. The hours pass over the mental dial, but, +though one succeeds the other, something is needed besides the +succession of the terms of the series to give consciousness of the series +<i>as a series</i>, to give the synthesis of the day made up of hours. +Hume virtually gave up the problem in eviscerating the subjective. +Prof. T. H. Green only missed the point at issue when he placed +his eternal consciousness, which was to “have and to hold” the +terms of the cosmical series, as it were in solution, for the human +organism, <i>out of time altogether</i>. Mr. Peirce puts the matter boldly +when he says: “An idea once past is gone forever, [in the sense of an +event in an individual consciousness,] and any supposed recurrence +of it is another idea.” (P. 534.) In order, then, that an idea past +may be present really, and not vicariously, the notion that consciousness +necessarily occupies an interval of (finite) time must be +given up; since, to put it briefly, a second past is as much past as +a year. According to Mr. Peirce then, and his contention is supported +by an elaborate inquiry into the nature of infinity and continuity +generally, “we are immediately conscious through an infinitesimal +interval of time.” For the complete <i>rationale</i>, reference +must necessarily be made to the article itself.</p> + +<p>Even the above outline, however, is sufficient to show that, here +as elsewhere, Mr. Peirce’s dualism is his snare. Nothing but this +could lead to a disintegration so complete as the following:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“In this infinitesimal interval, not only is consciousness continuous in a subjective +sense, that is, considered as a subject, or substance, having the attribute of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_388">[388]</span>duration; but also, because it is immediate consciousness, its object is <i>ipso facto</i> +continuous.” (P. 536.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>This is to admit, practically, that there is something in consciousness +other than the consciousness itself. And this is evident, +because at one and the same time, (whether an interval of finite +time, or an infinitesimal interval,—whether an “instant” or a “moment,”—does +not matter,) these two entities are different. For:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“This mediate perception is objectively, or as to the object represented, spread +over the four instants; but subjectively, or as itself the subject of duration, it is +completely embraced in the second moment.” (<i>Ibid.</i>)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>But this “mediate” and “immediate” cannot simultaneously +exist, unless there is something else <i>to which</i> they do so exist. It is +only paltering with us in a double sense to speak of “instant” and +“moment” in this connection. The one may pass into the other, +but there is “a time when” (it matters not whether the interval be +finite or infinitesimal) they do not coexist. Hence, they are not the +same, but different.</p> + +<p>According to Mr. Peirce’s notation, for all ordinary purposes +we may write, if <i>a</i> is a finite quantity, and <i>i</i> an infinitesimal, <i>a</i> + <i>i</i> = <i>a</i>. +“That is to say, this is so for all purposes of measurement.” Be it +so; the infinitesimal may be neglected for purposes of calculation. +But such a formula can only be experimental. The theory which +embodies it cannot avail for a world-scheme; to admit it would be +to grant that a thing is, and is not, at one and the same time. +Surely the most superficial reader will see that, to put it popularly, +a world-scheme admits of no alternative subject to accept, or to +reject, a neglectable quantity.</p> + +<p>And this is not the only instance of dualism in Mr. Peirce’s +world-scheme as a totality. For have we not Synechism and Tychism +as well? With the latter Mr. Peirce does not deal in the paper now +under consideration. He must, however, be credited, or debited, +with it, as held in reserve. For our present purpose it is not necessary +to examine Tychism in detail. Its alleged existence is sufficient. +For, and here let the significance of what follows be noted, in Mr. +Peirce’s view, as opposed to determinism, Tychism exists as a principle. +It <i>is</i>, otherwise it could not be expounded as operative. But +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_389">[389]</span>it also exists as an idea, first, it may be, in our author’s mind, and +subsequently in the minds of his disciples. Thus it falls into the +synechistic province: “As an idea it can only be affected by an +idea, by anything but an idea it cannot be affected at all.” (“The +Law of Mind,” p. 557.) Yet to affirm Tychism thus impotent, because +unaffectible, outside the synechistic sphere, is to contradict +Mr. Peirce’s conclusions, for if Tychism is nothing outside the ideal +realm, it is altogether inside it. Hence Synechism is everything +practically, and Tychism nothing. But that Mr. Peirce will not +have. He has a two-fold Tychism, that is the fact; actual and +operative on the one hand, ideal on the other. And this is dualism +confessed.</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce’s method is quite fertile in duplication of the subjective +entity. His latest paper, “Man’s Glassy Essence,” (<i>The +Monist</i>, Vol. III, No. 1,) contains some typical instances.</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“Viewing a thing from the outside, considering its relations of action and reaction +with other things, it appears as matter. Viewing it from the inside, looking +at its immediate character as feeling, it appears as consciousness.” (P. 20.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>This is the strictly empirical view. And it may be possibly +defended with the contention that all problems, to be duly examined, +must, in the first place, be viewed from that standpoint. But +it must be plainly manifest to any unprejudiced thinker that, even +granted a total cosmical problem made up of separate problems of +an individual nature, the same method of solving the sum cannot be +employed which is used in solving its constituents. In the above instance, +considering matter in its totality, and consciousness in its +totality, what is left to view them indifferently from “outside,” or +“inside”? Plainly nothing. Still more transparent an example is +the following:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“The consciousness of a habit involves a general idea. In each action of that +habit certain atoms get thrown out of their orbit, and replaced by others. Upon +all the different occasions it is different atoms that are thrown off, but they are +analogous from a physical point of view, and there is an inward sense of their being +analogous. Every time one of the associated feelings recurs, there is a more or less +vague sense that there are others, that it has a general character, and of about what +this general character is.” (P. 20.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_390">[390]</span></p> + +<p>This is part of the answer to the query: How do general ideas +appear in the molecular theory of protoplasm? Now, without discussing +the value of this <i>rationale</i>, as affecting Mr. Peirce’s own +theories, it is not difficult to see what its acceptance would “lead +to.” Certain atoms of a molecule get thrown out and are replaced +by <i>others</i>. This happens repeatedly. On different occasions <i>different +atoms</i> come and go. Yet they are “analogous,” and there is “an +inward sense” of this. Upon whose shoulders is the burden of +proving the analogy placed, or of experiencing it even? With whom +or what is there “an inward sense”? Perhaps it is better not to answer +otherwise than to say that if this faculty be not present in the +ever changing molecule to begin with, it cannot be logically reached +by any process of multiplying it.</p> + +<h4>THE MONISTIC SOLUTION.</h4> + +<p>Monism, as a unitary system of the universe, does not necessarily +commend itself to acceptance simply <i>as</i> monism. To say, +this is dualism, <i>therefore</i> it cannot be a correct <i>rationale</i> of the universe, +since the only true one must be monistic, is to start with +an unphilosophical prepossession. The true solution may be two-fold, +or it may be manifold. But it is not too much to say, perhaps, +on the other hand, that, even as causes may not be multiplied +without necessity, even so phenomena must not logically be divided +into independent groupings without sufficient reason given. Preference +should be accorded to a monistic, rather than to a dualistic, +system, not on the ground alone of the simplicity of the former, but +on the ground that a theory which has one explanation for one set +of phenomena and another explanation for a second set, must first +demonstrate that a unitary conception of the universe is, at least, +improbable, otherwise it will always be hinted that the dualism in +question has not gone deep enough to find a synthetic bond wherewith +to unite the apparently diverse. Mr. Peirce, throughout his +article on Synechism, constantly touches, despite his latent dualism, +the margin of a truth so great as to merit the title of transcendent. +As often he misses it. And his concluding words are, in this connection, +almost wistful: “The facts that stand before our face and +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_391">[391]</span>eyes and stare us in the face, are far from being, in all cases, the +ones most easily discerned. That has been remarked from time +immemorial.” (P. 559.) But though thus “remarked,” the maxim +has, as immemorially, been neglected in practice. To none can +this remark be more fitly applied than to the excogitator of Synechism, +himself seeing that, having arrived at the point of asserting that +“there must be <i>something like</i> the feelings in the excitants themselves,” +he does not see that the excitant and the feeling are one and +the same; and that there is no second or third term in the cosmical +equation.</p> + +<p>Does this seem “extravagant”? If so, the reply must be <i>not</i> +that it is the only escape from an otherwise inexplicable difficulty, +but that there is really no difficulty at all. What Mr. Peirce’s own +Synechism “<i>leads to</i>” is that the past, the present, and the to-come, +alike of matter and idea, are not reconciled by “time and its flow,” +or even by the logic of infinitesimals, subtle though that may be, +but that the contents of each and all, with all their apparently infinite +variety, resolve into a consistent unity.</p> + +<h4>THE “MISSING LINK.”</h4> + +<p>Pushed to a logical conclusion, the excitants and the feelings +owe their apparent variety to their assigned position in a series, the +correspondence or relation between them being <i>only another link in +the self-same chain</i>. Vulgar realism never fathoms this explanation. +It always harps upon the one string that idealism, and more especially +idealistic monism, fails to account for variety or difference; +forgetting, or rather never seeing, that difference or variety which is +its essence, is only one more added perception on the same plane +with ordinary perceptions; so that given <i>a</i>, <i>b</i>, <i>c</i>, <i>d</i>,—sundry perceptions,—their +essential variety may be stated as <i>e</i>. Or this may be +stated numerically; variety, as a whole, being nothing more than +the sum of differences, which is always something other than the +terms differentiated, but always on the same level with them—the +difference between any continuous number, above unity, and another +number being a third number, which is different from either. Variety +in numbers cannot be expressed otherwise than numerically. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_392">[392]</span>So, in the last recess, the variety of colors is only colorable, of tones +audible, and so on. The “vibrations of inconceivable complexity” +which, according to Mr. Peirce, “excite sight and hearing,” can be +approximately stated numerically, so that the difference between +red and, say, yellow, is a number corresponding to another color, +which may be orange or not; it being part of the present scientific +theory of light that any specific number of ethereal undulations +happening between the colors of the ocular spectrum, corresponds +to a possible color, although the retinal expanse may be insensible +to these particular rates of tremor. To Mr. Peirce it may appear +“extravagant,” but the difference between any two colors and tones +is another color, another tone; just as the difference between any two +numbers is a third number. This is the logical outcome of his own +Synechism; <i>this</i>, in part, is what it “leads to.”</p> + +<h4>TIME AND ITS “FLOW” RATIONALISED.</h4> + +<p>Excitants and feelings being unified, and the element of variety, +hitherto supposed to be the exclusive copyright of vulgar realism, +shown to be nothing but another term added to the series, or, numerically, +a concurrent series—so that should <i>a</i>, <i>b</i>, <i>c</i>, <i>d</i> ... be a series, +the variety of the series may be expressed as <i>e</i>, or the individual +differences as <i>f</i>, <i>g</i>, <i>h</i> ...—it only needs an examination of what Mr. +Peirce terms “time and its flow,” to render his system a completely +monistic one, and this although true monism is much more than the +negation of determinism, synechistically expressed.</p> + +<p>In Mr. Peirce’s article under examination, “The Law of Mind,” +the notation of infinitesimals, which forms the keystone of Synechism, +is only introduced after a lament over the incapacity, or unworkableness +rather, of finite time, when the duration of consciousness +is involved. If <i>finite</i> time is to come in as a factor—“an idea once +past [in the sense of an event in an individual consciousness] is +gone forever, and any supposed recurrence of it is another idea” +(p. 534). And the problem which Mr. Peirce sets himself to solve +is how in effect to bring <i>back</i> this past idea—not vicariously—but in +all its pristine freshness, into the now-time. This is sought to be +accomplished by the explanation that the past idea is “not wholly +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_393">[393]</span>past, it is only going, less past than any assignable past date”—and +so on through the intricacies of Mr. Peirce’s infinitesimal theory, +into which we need not enter at present. But the statement of the, +supposed, difficulty which finite time presents in this connection,—the +past idea really past and gone, and the recurrence of it another +idea,—if put in a slightly different form, hints a solution, in continuity +with the foregoing pages, without the aid of the infinitesimal at +all. <i>That an idea is once past and gone</i>, any occurrence, or recurrence, +of this idea, <i>is another idea</i>.⁠<a id="FNanchor_73" href="#Footnote_73" class="fnanchor">[73]</a></p> + +<p>But, in the meantime, let us see what Mr. Peirce has to say regarding +“time and its flow”:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“One of the most marked features about the law of mind is, that it makes time +to have a definite direction of flow from past to future. The relation of past to future +is, in reference to the law of mind, different from the relation of future to past. +This makes one of the great contrasts between the law of mind and the law of physical +force, where there is no more distinction between the two opposite directions in +time than between moving northward, and moving southward” (p. 546).</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>This for once is not very clear. It is difficult to see how “the +law of physical force” can be spoken of as “in time,” to the exclusion +of mind; not easy, also, to understand the distinction further +insisted upon. But the intention is evident, viz., to perpetuate, if +not to originate, a cosmical duality. Time, it would seem, marches +indifferently in at least two directions, though it is not very clear +how this is accomplished. And then the old fiction follows, that +“Time, as the universal form of change, cannot exist unless there +is something to undergo change, etc.” (p. 547.)</p> + +<p>The same notation suits in this case as in the foregoing. Time +is only another term in the series. If <i>a</i>, <i>b</i>, <i>c</i>, <i>d</i> be a series, <i>e</i> is the +variety, <i>f</i> the whole time involved, and <i>g</i> the individual intervals. +Of course all this is not a simple series, it is an infinitely complicated +one; the above arrangement is only intended to show that difference, +variety, time, etc., are no mysterious entities pervading events, +acting as their “form” or carrying them in their “flow,” but simply +percepts, or concepts, on a level with others.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_394">[394]</span></p> + +<p>This is not patent on the surface, it may be. Time has the appearance +of a current in which events float. But this is an illusion +dispelled by examination. Events cannot be submerged in time. +Time cannot be the vehicle of events. It is impossible to conceive +time as existing simultaneously with an event. It always follows it. +What to Mr. Peirce appears as a “flow,” arises from the foregoing. +Take events, percepts, or concepts, as a hypothetical series, <i>a</i>, <i>b</i>, <i>c</i>, +<i>d</i> ... and their times as <i>a´</i>, <i>b´</i>, <i>c´</i>, <i>d´</i> ... the first series contains +the event <i>per se</i>, or as happening; the “time when” is contained in +the second series, practically inseparable from the first, but the time +when necessarily follows—consequently if the first be <i>a</i>, the second +must be, at least <i>a</i>. But no concept or percept is abstract, except +the concept time itself, which, being unconnected, <i>seems</i> anywhere, +and, like its fellow-abstract space, is spread out, to us, tri-dimensionally, +as past, present, and to come. And, as in space the position +is simply spectral,⁠<a id="FNanchor_74" href="#Footnote_74" class="fnanchor">[74]</a> a question of perspective or adjustment, so, +in time, the timal series is adjusted to the substantive idea. But +this two-fold spectral succession breeds by comparative intensity +(which is another complex series) the sense of a flow, where there is +none, but only the idea of a flowing, which is another matter. Thus, +the so-called “veil of the future” is no more a veil than it is a brickbat. +It is simply the indeterminateness of an unconnected adjective—as +if one should say, white—and the query arises, <i>What</i> is it that +is white? When the noun is supplied you have something definite. +Just so, when the future lapses into the present.</p> + +<p>Thus there is never anything without, at least, these three additions: +first, variety or difference; second, time; third, relation, +spatial or otherwise. These are all terms in a series, or set of concurrent +series. Nothing can be, practically, isolated, for everything +runs in a series. But this is a much broader theory of continuity +than that which Synechism affords.⁠<a id="FNanchor_75" href="#Footnote_75" class="fnanchor">[75]</a> All apparent perplexities vanish. +The difficulty no longer exists that to perceive a series we must +hold it, as it were, in solution. Since other than series nothing is. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_395">[395]</span>Hence the cosmos is an illimitable series or complex of series. But +inasmuch as the timal element (as also the spatial) occurs through +the series having time-term and space-term resident within it, all +difficulty in apprehending it as a series vanishes. The impracticability, +if any, would be in viewing any term as isolated.</p> + +<h4>THE RESULT <i>RE</i> TYCHISM.</h4> + +<p>What a flood of light does such a system shed indirectly upon +Tychism, since the controversy between the latter and determinism +mainly hinges upon the “must be,” the imperative, as it were, of +the series! It has been very ably pointed out by Dr. Carus in his +article <i>re</i> Mr. Peirce’s “Onslaught on the Doctrine of Necessity” +(<i>The Monist</i>, Vol. II, No. 4, pp. 573-4.) that the formula adopted +by Mr. Peirce in his Tychism, “chance is first, law is second, the +tendency of habits is third,” involves its author in the admission of +a law in a system professing to be, in its inception at all events, +chanceful and <i>lawless</i>. Mr. Peirce’s “Synechism” professes to be +the law of mind. Parenthetically, however, it may be remarked, +that the distinction as to law, and lawlessness or “chance,” narrows +itself to the plane of one term more or less in a series, or <i>even to less +than that subordinate place</i>. For, although, for convenience sake, +and for facility of contrast, we have followed Mr. Peirce’s figure of +a series, to show more clearly also to what his theory leads, it is +nevertheless plain, that time and its accompanying relations being +placed on their proper level, that of integral percepts and concepts, +the figure of a series is simply a matter of convenience of arrangement. +Certainly as the “time when” is necessarily annexed to every +percept and concept the timal element may be said to follow, not to +precede, its fellow-term. Really, however, they may be said to be +simultaneous, since the timal refinements of finite, infinite, past, +present, and future are each of them contained in a percept of its +own.</p> + +<h4>EXTERNALITY A SERIAL TERM.</h4> + +<p>But if the timal element be independent as a separate percept, +the spatial as another, and so on, it follows that, although the terms +of the series may, as it were, <i>run</i>, though we cannot conceive them +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_396">[396]</span>separated, or as, in practice, otherwise than as continuous in their +flow, still, theoretically, a series or complex of series it <i>is</i>, and a +series may be interrupted at any term. Thus externality itself being +a spatial relation, is but <i>one term more</i>, non-essential in theory, to +the term preceding. So that when the Neo-Kantians speak of the +“constitution of the objective” it ought to be added that it is not +only the content of the objective which is thus constituted by consciousness, +but that externality, all that goes to make up what is +termed “out-sidedness,” is constituted by consciousness also.</p> + +<h4>THE NOW-TIME.</h4> + +<p>“<i>The present is half past, and half to come</i>,” (p. 546) like the color +of a curved boundary line on a particolored surface; i. e. “betwixt +and between” the two. It is here that the theory of Synechism shows +its chief defect. Up to this stage we have been dealing with ideas, +feelings, <i>a</i>, <i>b</i>, <i>c</i>, <i>d</i> ... successively passing through a point of consciousness +<i>e</i>. And the infinitesimal notation suits the required process +fairly well. It is complicated enough, but it is ingenious, and at least +plausible. Nothing up to this stage would lead us to suppose that +any additional element was to be imported into the <i>rationale</i> which +Mr. Peirce presents. As we have seen, finite time would not serve +his purpose. By however minute a <i>finite</i> interval have <i>a</i>, <i>b</i>, <i>c</i> or <i>d</i> +passed the point <i>e</i>, all chance of their recovery is hopeless. Well, +we have recourse to infinitesimals, and find (to put it popularly, and +not in Mr. Peirce’s technical terms) that <i>a</i> past the point of consciousness +by an infinitesimal interval heralds <i>b</i>. So that <i>e</i> is simultaneously +confronted with the disappearing form of the first and the +appearing form of the second, and the same with <i>b</i>, and <i>c</i>, in turn, +and so on. Thus the present, in the sense of ideas successively +passing through consciousness, is half <i>a</i> and half <i>b</i>, then half <i>b</i> and +half <i>c</i>, this infinitesimal gradation ultimately ensuring the presence +of the whole series in the last “moment.”</p> + +<p>But this will not avail with the concept time itself as distinguished +from timed succession. That these two are separate with +Mr. Peirce it is impossible to doubt. He says, e. g., “Time with +its continuity logically involves some other kind of continuity than +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_397">[397]</span>its own,” (p. 547) and speaks of “time and its flow,” and of “time +as the universal form of change.” And it is confusing, to say the +least, when we are shifted without warning from what is practically +the perceptual to the conceptual region. Granted the ideas, the +feelings, or what not, “gliding almost imperceptibly” (as did the +late Mr. Bardell to another sphere) past the central point of consciousness, +yet not wholly past, only going, less past than any assignable +past date, granted this, the assertion is not consequently +warranted that time itself, the <i>present</i>, as time, not as involving the +succession of ideas, is “half past and half to come.” The ideas, the +feelings, of which Mr. Peirce writes, successively pass through the +stage of being thus half past and half to come, but that is by no +means the same thing as saying that the present is half past, half to +come, as Synechism avers. With our theory, as presented in the foregoing +pages there is indeed no such difficulty, but Mr. Peirce, on +the other hand, has elected to stand by infinitesimally measuring +time, as applied to ideas etc., as separate from conceptual time, and +must take the consequences of his decision. He says <i>the present, +not the present idea</i>.</p> + +<p>Now, in the concept time as a whole, in its entire range, a definite +point may be selected—to the exclusion of other points—a point +having position but not extension, as <i>the present</i>. Is it, then,—the +present,—half past, half to come, as a timed idea is? Certainly not. +There is nothing of the flow of a series in it. Further, this selection +of the “now,” as a point, does not interfere with its permanence. +“Nowness” may persist. And the moment it partook, even infinitesimally, +of the character of the past or of the future, it would cease +to be the present. In the case of a series of ideas in time the difficulty +is to get them all in present solution, as it were, without detriment +to their evident continuity, but the definition of the present as +a point in time presents no such difficulty. The conditions are quite +distinct. Yet regarding this time point—the present—Mr. Peirce +assures us that it is “half past, half to come,” which is just that of +which it is the precise negation, if words are to have any meaning.</p> + +<p>Again, Mr. Peirce’s <i>rationale</i> shows, upon the face of it, that +there is (1) finitely divisible time and, (2) time divided infinitesimally, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_398">[398]</span>for what finite time could not do, in that it had limitations, +the infinitesimal notation readily accomplishes. In its ulterior consequences, +this is somewhat unfortunate for Synechism, inasmuch as +the consciousness of ideas in continuity being confined to the infinitesimal +theory, where, it may be asked, is the place, in consciousness, +for the succession of finite intervals? Consciousness must be +practically doubled, so to speak, if it is to hold both of these together. +This is what comes of making one’s world-scheme hang +upon a mathematical subtlety—the subtlety in question partaking +as a rule, more or less of the nature of an escape from the difficulties +of the vulgar notation, the vulgar notation remains to be reckoned +with, and both have to be credited to consciousness. As an instance +of this take the following from Mr. Peirce’s late article,⁠<a id="FNanchor_76" href="#Footnote_76" class="fnanchor">[76]</a> “Man’s +Glassy Essence”—p. 15:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“In order that a sub-molecule of food may be thoroughly and firmly assimilated +into a broken molecule of protoplasm, it is necessary not only that it should have +precisely the right chemical composition, but also that it should be at precisely the +right spot <i>at the right time</i> and should be moving in precisely the right direction +with precisely the right velocity. If all these conditions are not fulfilled, ... it +will be in special danger of being thrown out again” (The italics are not in the +original).</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>Now here is a “time when” which can be exactly specified in +accordance with the conditions. Certain results follow unless it is +kept to. This is what Mr. Peirce would doubtless consider as a +timed physical event, part and parcel of the regularity of matter, +and yet an event which, in its own time and way, goes to account +for both feeling and habit-taking—capable, therefore, of being stated +in terms of finite time, as happening at a given instant, and neither +before nor after it. But when this same molecule is, by virtue of +keeping its appointment punctually, safely installed in feeling protoplasm, +the succession of ideas, or feelings, of which, as subject, it +is capable, obeys another rule—a given <i>instant</i> obtains no longer; it +is the <i>moment</i> which is everything⁠<a id="FNanchor_77" href="#Footnote_77" class="fnanchor">[77]</a>—a moment half its predecessor, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_399">[399]</span>half its successor. Even granted the function of the infinitesimal, +this looks very much like a reduction to absurdity. For, if the above +mentioned timed coalescence of the sub-molecule with the broken +molecule were <i>also</i> a matter of subjective feeling, passed as process +through a consciousness, the conclusion follows that the juncture of +the molecules happens at two different times! There is no escape +from this. Given the <i>instant</i> in the one case, the <i>moment</i> in the other, +these two cannot possibly be the same point in time. The moment +partakes, however insensibly, of the preceding and succeeding stages, +the instant does not. Hence they are not the same but different +times.</p> + +<h4>OTHERNESS.</h4> + +<p>The foregoing has a distinct bearing upon the question of “other +selves” of which Mr. Peirce writes as follows:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“The recognition by one person of another’s personality takes place by means +to some extent identical with the means by which he is conscious of his own personality. +The idea of the second personality, which is as much as to say that second +personality itself, enters within the field of direct consciousness of the first person, +and is as immediately perceived as his ego, though less strongly. At the same time, +the opposition between the two persons is perceived, so that the externality of the +second is recognised.” (“The Law of Mind,” p. 558.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>This is the scheme of “otherness” which, in the case of the +Neo-Kantians, particularly the French section, represented by M. +Pillon, M. Renouvier, and others, has proved such a snare. To +these thinkers, (as indeed to the late Prof. T. H. Green, of Oxford, +though in a less degree,) the so-called external world lies in “other” +thinking subjects—in “foreign centres of representations.” The +free-trade doctrine has verily penetrated to the philosophic region—the +wholesale admission of foreign wares to the detriment of +home products. Why should I place the content of that so-called +external world, which, external or internal, is my very own inalienably, +in a centre of representation other than my own, thus making +my cognition of it rest entirely upon the “ejective” plane? It is +only when I discover, as I must sooner or later, that there is nothing +in the report of an “outsider” (or in any number of them) beyond +what I credit him or her with in my own consciousness; and +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_400">[400]</span>that the outsider is on the same plane as other objects, it is only +then that the mystification is cleared up. I do <i>not</i> cognise, or recognise, +the external at second-hand. The “note” of otherness is +simply another term more or less in the cosmical series.</p> + +<p>It is, however, not only with the familiar “other selves” of +ordinary life that we are confronted in Synechism. In the creed of +animism</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">“Millions of spiritual creatures walk the earth,”</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class="noindent">and Mr. Peirce speaks of “spiritual influences” (p. 559) as having +at least no hindrance presented to them by his doctrine. But he +has some other shadowy personalities at command, which, it must +be confessed, are well calculated to give us pause. “There should +be something like⁠<a id="FNanchor_78" href="#Footnote_78" class="fnanchor">[78]</a> personal consciousness in bodies of men who +are in intimate and intensely sympathetic communion.... None of +us can fully realise which the minds of corporations are.... But +the law of mind clearly points to the existence of such personalities.” +It is probably true that the “minds of corporations,” must ever +present an insoluble riddle of perversity to the suburban dweller, +vexed with the mockery of paving and lighting. But we need not +linger over this speculation, for there are other shades behind.</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“If such a fact is capable of being made out anywhere it should be in the +Church.... Surely a personality ought to have developed in that Church, in that +‘bride of Christ,’ as they call it.” (“Man’s Glassy Essence,” pp. 21-22.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<h4>A PERSONAL CREATOR.</h4> + +<p>Bearing our ecclesiastical divisions in mind, it is difficult to +conceive the unity of a “corporate personality” of this kind, but, +to let that pass, it may be remarked that, when any one begins to +imagine that there are others in the universe besides himself, he is +not, as a rule, content with two or three companions of his solitude. +They come in battalions. Thus, behind the other selves, corporate +personalities and spiritual influences of Synechism, there looms a +transcendent personality. “A genuine evolutionary philosophy,” +we are told, “... is so far from being antagonistic to the idea of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_401">[401]</span>a personal Creator, that it is really inseparable from that idea.” +And a philosophy of pseudo-evolutionism is “hostile to all hopes +of personal relations to God.” (“The Law of Mind,” p. 557.)</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce thus assigns to his first cause a place in the <i>continuum</i> +of ideas, and says that if there is a personal God we must +have a direct perception of that person and “indeed be in personal +communication with him.” The difficulty, he admits, is that if this +be so, how is it possible that the existence of this being should ever +have been doubted by anybody. And the only answer he can at +present make is, that “facts that stand before our face and eyes, +and stare us in the face, are far from being in all cases the ones +most easily discerned. That,” he adds, “has been remarked from +time immemorial.” (“The Law of Mind,” pp. 558-559.)</p> + +<p>One of the ablest of living philosophical writers, Professor +Veitch, of Glasgow University, puts it somewhat similarly, though +with his own realistic coloring, when he says:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“God, if at all, must rise above the line of finite regress; He cannot be a cause +in that; He cannot be a cause dependent on another cause; He must be somewhere, +or at some point, in the line of an otherwise endless scientific regress, there, above +it, yet related to it, and in it; otherwise He is nothing for us.” (“Knowing and +Being,” p. 320.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>The parallelism is worth noting. Those views embody what +has been the contention of the present writer throughout this paper, +<i>with this most notable difference</i>: that no term of a series may thus +transcend the series, or be other than on a level with the other +terms, being itself only a term, a link, in the series itself. And with +this falls forever the idea of a cause uncaused.</p> + +<p>Yet am <i>I</i> not <i>in</i> the series? For all that is in the series is mine +every percept, every concept; so that, “extravagant” as it may appear, +it is <i>I who am the series</i>. In other words, the ego is the universe-synthesis, +and the universe-synthesis the ego.</p> + +<p>Is Mr. Peirce prepared to take the consequences of that which +his Synechism leads to?</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">G. M. McCrie.</span></p> + +<div class="footnotes"> + +<h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_67" href="#FNanchor_67" class="label">[67]</a> From τύχη, chance.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_68" href="#FNanchor_68" class="label">[68]</a> <i>Tychism</i> again comes to the front in the succeeding number of <i>The Monist</i>, +(Vol. III, No. 1,) in an article by Mr. Peirce, entitled “Man’s Glassy Essence.”</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_69" href="#FNanchor_69" class="label">[69]</a> Dr. Carus, in his review of Mr. Peirce’s doctrines, (<i>The Monist</i>, Vol. II, No. +4, p. 575,) notes this positivistic-constructionism.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_70" href="#FNanchor_70" class="label">[70]</a> Cf. T. H. Green, <i>Prolegomena to Ethics</i>, Ch. II, p. 63.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_71" href="#FNanchor_71" class="label">[71]</a> Nos. 258, 59, 61, August, 1892. <i>Miss Naden’s World-Scheme.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_72" href="#FNanchor_72" class="label">[72]</a> In a note to this passage was appended a quotation from a pamphlet by Dr. +E. Cobham Brewer as a practical instance of the objective being, on the antiquated +subject-object plane, actually superseded. Suppose a very remote star to become +extinct, the “vibrations” would continue to “travel” towards a spectator situated +on our planet for years, it may be for centuries. So that the spectator, ultimately, +“sees” that which does not even exist. Dr. Brewer’s comment, which cannot be +considered any contribution to a satisfactory <i>rationale</i>, is: “the objects, however, +must have existed, or no messenger could have been sent from their courts.” Evidently, +in this case, that which is sent is, at least, as good as the sender—is, in fact, +the self-same thing. Only, in that case, what of the extinct object?</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_73" href="#FNanchor_73" class="label">[73]</a> Or to put it in another form, any one idea, and the timing of this idea are +really two ideas, although, as we shall see later, they may be inseparable in practice.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_74" href="#FNanchor_74" class="label">[74]</a> Cf., in this connection, the results of experiments by Cheselden, as far back as +1727 on congenitally blind persons, couched for double cataract.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_75" href="#FNanchor_75" class="label">[75]</a> Much more inclusive, also, than the Relational Theory of the Neo-Kantians.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_76" href="#FNanchor_76" class="label">[76]</a> <i>The Monist</i>, Vol. III, No. 1.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_77" href="#FNanchor_77" class="label">[77]</a> Mr. Peirce uses the word “instant” to mean a point of time, and “moment” +to mean an infinitesimal duration.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_78" href="#FNanchor_78" class="label">[78]</a> The phrase, “something like,” is significant, when we remember, (see <i>ante</i>,) +that with Mr. Peirce the excitants were “something like” the excited feelings.</p></div> + +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_402">[402]</span></p> + +<h3 class="nobreak" id="THE_FOURTH_DIMENSION">THE FOURTH DIMENSION.<br> +<span class="smaller">MATHEMATICAL AND SPIRITUALISTIC.</span></h3> + +</div> + +<h4>INTRODUCTORY.</h4> + +<p>The tendency to generalise long ago led mathematicians to +extend the notion of three-dimensional space, which is the +space of sensible representation, and to define aggregates of points, or +spaces, of more than three dimensions, with the view of employing +these definitions as useful means of investigation. They had no +idea of requiring people to imagine four-dimensional things and +worlds, and they were even still less remote from requiring of them +to believe in the real existence of a four-dimensioned space. In +the hands of mathematicians this extension of the notion of space +was a mere means devised for the discovery and expression, by +shorter and more convenient ways, of truths applicable to common +geometry and to algebra operating with more than three unknown +quantities. At this stage, however, the spiritualists came in, +and coolly took possession of this private property of the mathematicians. +They were in great perplexity as to where they should put +the spirits of the dead. To give them a place in the world accessible +to our senses was not exactly practicable. They were compelled, +therefore, to look around after some <i>terra incognita</i>, which +should oppose to the spirit of research inborn in humanity an insuperable +barrier. The residence of the spirits had to be a place inaccessible +to our senses and full of mystery to the mind. This property +the four-dimensioned space of the mathematicians possessed. +With an intellectual perversity which science has no idea of, these +spiritualists boldly asserted, first, that the whole world was so situated +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_403">[403]</span>in a four-dimensioned space as a plane might be situated in +the space familiar to us, secondly, that the spirits of the dead lived +in such a four-dimensioned space, thirdly, that these spirits could +accordingly act upon the world and, consequently, upon the human +beings resident in it, exactly as we three-dimensioned creatures can +produce effects upon things that are two-dimensional; for example, +such effects as that produced when we shatter a lamina of ice, and +so influence some possibly existing two-dimensioned <i>ice</i>-world.</p> + +<p>Since spiritualism, under the leadership of the Leipsic Professor +Zöllner, thus proclaimed the existence of a four-dimensioned space, +this notion, which the mathematicians are thoroughly master of,—for +in all their operations with it, though they have forsaken the +path of actual representability, they have never left that of the truth,—this +notion has also passed into the heads of lay persons who have +used it as a catchword, ordinarily without having any clear idea of +what they or any one else mean by it. To clear up such ideas and +to correct the wrong impressions of cultured people who have not a +technical mathematical training, is the purpose of the following +pages. A similar elucidation was aimed at in the tracts which +Schlegel (Riemann, Berlin, 1888) and Cranz (Virchow-Holtzendorff’s +Sammlung, Nos. 112 and 113) have published on the so-called fourth +dimension. Both treatises possess indubitable merits, but their +methods of presentation are in many respects too concise to give a +lay mind any profound comprehension of the subject. The author, +accordingly, has been able to add to the reflections which these excellent +treatises offer, a great deal that appears to him necessary for +a thorough explanation in the minds of non-mathematicians of the +notion of the fourth dimension.</p> + +<h4>I.<br> +THE CONCEPT OF DIMENSION.</h4> + +<p>Many text-books of stereometry begin with the words: “Every +body has three dimensions, length, breadth, and thickness.” If we +should ask the author of a book of this description to tell us the +length, breadth, and thickness of an apple, of a sponge, or of a cloud +of tobacco smoke, he would be somewhat perplexed and would probably +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_404">[404]</span>say, that the definition in question referred to something different. +A cubical box, or some similar structure, whose angles are +all right angles and whose bounding surfaces are consequently all +rectangles is the only body of which it can at all be unmistakably +asserted that there are three principal directions distinguishable in +it, of which any one can be called the length, any other the breadth, +and any third the thickness. We thus see that the notions of length, +breadth, and thickness are not sufficiently clear and universal to +enable us to derive from them any idea of what is meant when it is +said that every body possesses three dimensions, or that the space +of the world is three-dimensional.</p> + +<p>This distinction may be made sharper and more evident by the +following considerations: We have, let us suppose, a straight line +on which a point is situated, and the problem is proposed to determine +the position of the point on the line in an unequivocal manner. +The simplest way to solve this is, to state how far the point is removed +in the one or the other direction from some given fixed point; +just as in a thermometer the position of the surface of the mercury +is given by a statement of its distance in the direction of cold or heat +from a predetermined fixed point—the point of freezing water. To +state, therefore, the position of a point on a straight line, the sole +datum necessary is a single number, for beforehand we have fixed +upon some standard line, like the centimetre, and some definite point +to which we give the value zero, and have also previously decided +in what direction from the zero-point, points must be situated whose +position is expressed by positive numbers, and also in what direction +those must lie whose position is expressed by negative numbers. +This last mentioned fact, that a <i>single</i> number is sufficient to determine +the place of a point in a straight line, is the real reason why +we attribute to the straight line or to any part of it a single dimension.</p> + +<p>More generally, we call every totality or system, of infinitely +numerous things, <i>one</i>-dimensional, in which <i>one</i> number is all that +is requisite to determine and distinguish any particular one of these +things amidst the entire totality. Thus, time is one-dimensional. +We, as inhabitants of the earth, have naturally chosen as our unit +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_405">[405]</span>of time, the period of the rotation of the earth about its axis, namely, +the day, or a definite portion of a day. The zero-point of time is regarded +in Christian countries as the year of the birth of Christ, and +the positive direction of time is the time <i>subsequent</i> to the birth of +Christ. These data fixed, all that is necessary to establish and distinguish +any definite point of time amid the infinite totality of all +the points of time, <i>is a single number</i>. Of course this number need +not be a whole number, but may be made up of the sum of a whole +number and a fraction in whose numerator and denominator we may +have numbers as great as we please. We may, therefore, also say +that the totality of all conceivable numerical magnitudes, or of only +such as are greater than one definite number and smaller than some +other definite number, is one-dimensional.</p> + +<p>We shall add here a few additional examples of one-dimensioned +magnitudes presented by geometry. First, the circumference of a +circle is a one-dimensional magnitude, as is every curved line, +whether it returns into itself or not. Further, the totality of all equilateral +triangles which stand on the same base is one-dimensional, +or the totality of all circles that can be described through two fixed +points. Also, the totality of all conceivable cubes will be seen to +be one-dimensional, provided they are distinguished, not with respect +to position, but with respect to magnitude.</p> + +<p>In conformity with the fundamental ideas by which we define +the notion of a one-dimensional manifoldness, it will be seen that the +attribute <i>two</i>-dimensional must be applied to all totalities of things +in which <i>two</i> numbers are necessary (and sufficient) to distinguish +any determinate individual thing amid the totality. The simplest +two-dimensioned complex which we know of is the plane. To determine +accurately the position of a point in a plane, the simplest +way is to take two axes at right angles to each other, that is, fixed +straight lines, and then to specify the distances by which the point +in question is removed from each of these axes.</p> + +<p>This method of determining the position of a point in a plane +suggested to the celebrated philosopher and mathematician Descartes +the fundamental idea of analytical geometry, a branch of mathematics +in which by the simple artifice of ascribing to every point in +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_406">[406]</span>a plane two numerical values, determined by its distances from the +two axes above referred to, planimetrical considerations are transformed +into algebraical. So, too, all kinds of curves that graphically +represent the dependence of things on time, make use of the +fact that the totality of the points in a plane is two-dimensional. +For example, to represent in a graphical form the increase of the +population of a city, we take a horizontal axis to represent the time, +and a perpendicular one to represent the numbers which are the +measures of the population. Any two lines, then, whose lengths +practical considerations determine, are taken as the unit of time, +which we may say is a year, and as the unit of population, which +we will say is one thousand. Some definite year, say 1850, is fixed +upon as the zero point. Then, from all the equally distant points +on the horizontal axis, which points stand for the years, we proceed +in directions parallel to the other axis, that is, in the perpendicular +direction, just so much upwards as the numbers which stand for the +population of that year require. The terminal points so reached, or +the curve which runs through these terminal points, will then present +a graphic picture of the rates of increase of the population of the +town in the different years. The rectangular axes of Descartes are +employed in a similar way for the construction of barometer curves, +which specify for the different localities of a country the amount of +variation of the atmospheric pressure during any period of time. +Immediately next to the plane the surface of the earth will be recognised +as a two-dimensional aggregate of points. In this case geographical +latitude and longitude supply the two numbers that are +requisite accurately to determine the position of a point. Also, the +totality of all the possible straight lines that can be drawn through +any point in space is two-dimensional, as we shall best understand if +we picture to ourselves a plane which is cut in a point by each of +these straight lines and then remember that by such a construction +every point on the plane will belong to some one line and, <i>vice versa</i>, +a line to every point, whence it follows that the totality of all the +straight lines which pass through the point assigned are of the same +dimensions as the totality of the points of the imagined plane.</p> + +<p>The question might be asked, In what way and to what extent +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_407">[407]</span>in this case is the specification of <i>two</i> numbers requisite and sufficient +to determine amid all the rays which pass through the specified +point a definite individual ray? To get a clear idea of the problem +here involved, let us imagine the ray produced far into the heavens, +where some quite definite point will correspond to it. Now, the position +of a point in the heavens depends, as does the position of a +point on all spherical surfaces, on two numbers. In the heavens +these two numbers are ordinarily supplied by the two angles called +altitude, or the distance above the plane of the horizon, and azimuth, +or the angular distance between the circle on which the altitude is +measured and the meridian of the observer. It will be seen thus +that the totality of all the luminous rays that an eye, conceived as a +point, can receive from the outer world is two-dimensional, and also +that a luminous point emits a two-dimensional group of luminous +rays. It will also be observed, in connection with this example, that +the two-dimensional totality of all the rays that can be drawn through +a point in space is something different from the totality of the rays +that pass through a point but are required to lie in a given plane. +Such a group of objects as the last-named one, is a one-dimensional +totality.</p> + +<p>Now that we have sufficiently discussed the attributes that are +characteristic of one and two-dimensional aggregates, we may, without +any further investigation of the subject, propose the following +definition, that, generally, <i>an n-dimensional totality of infinitely numerous +things is such, with respect to which the specification of n numbers is +necessary and sufficient to indicate a definite individual amid the totality +of all the infinitely numerous individuals of the group</i>.</p> + +<p>Accordingly, the point-aggregate made up of the world-space +which we inhabit, is a three-dimensional totality. To get true bearings +in this space and to define any determinate point in it, we have +therefore to lay through any point which we take as our zero-point +three axes at right angles to each other, one running from right to +left, one backwards and forwards, and one upwards and downwards. +We then join each two of these axes by a plane and are enabled thus +to specify the position of every point in space by the three perpendicular +distances by which the point in question is removed in a +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_408">[408]</span>positive or negative sense from these three planes. It is customary +to denote the numbers which are the measures of these three distances +by <i>x</i>, <i>y</i>, and <i>z</i>, the positive <i>x</i>, positive <i>y</i>, and positive <i>z</i> ordinarily +being reckoned in the right hand, the forward, and the upward +directions from the origin. If now, with direct reference to +this fundamental axial system, any particular specification of <i>x</i>, <i>y</i>, +and <i>z</i> be made, there will, by such an operation, be cut out and isolated +from the three-dimensional manifoldness of all the points of +space a totality of less dimensions. If, for example, <i>z</i> is equal to +seven units or measures, this is equivalent to a statement that only +the two-dimensional totality of the points is meant, which constitute +the plane that can be laid at right angles to the upward-passing +<i>z</i>-axis at a distance of seven measures from the zero-point. Consequently, +every imaginable equation between <i>x</i>, <i>y</i>, and <i>z</i> isolates and +defines a two-dimensional aggregate of points. If two different equations +obtain between <i>x</i>, <i>y</i>, and <i>z</i>, two such two-dimensional totalities +will be isolated from among all the points of space. But as these +last must have some one-dimensional totality in common, we may +say that the co-existence of two equations between <i>x</i>, <i>y</i>, and <i>z</i> defines +a one-dimensional totality of points, that is to say a straight line, a +line curved in a plane, or even, perhaps, one curved in space. It +is evident from this that the introduction of the three axes of reference +forms a bridge between the theory of space and the theory of +equations involving three variable quantities, <i>x</i>, <i>y</i>, <i>z</i>. The reason that +the theory of space cannot thus be brought into connection with +algebra in general, that is, with the theory of indefinitely numerous +equations, but only with the algebra of three quantities, <i>x</i>, <i>y</i>, <i>z</i>, is +simply to be sought in the fact that space, as we picture it, can only +have three dimensions.</p> + +<p>We have now only to supply a few additional examples of <i>n</i>-dimensional +totalities. All particles of air are four-dimensional in +magnitude when in addition to their position in space we also consider +the variable densities which they assume, as they are expressed +by the different heights of the barometer in the different parts of the +atmosphere. Similarly, all conceivable spheres in space are four-dimensional +magnitudes, for their centres form a three-dimensional +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_409">[409]</span>point-aggregate, and around each centre there may be additionally +conceived a one-dimensional totality of spheres, the radii of which +can be expressed by every numerical magnitude from zero to infinity. +Further, if we imagine a measuring stick of invariable length to assume +every conceivable position in space, the positions so obtained +will constitute a five-dimensional aggregate. For, in the first place, +one of the extremities of the measuring stick may be conceived to +assume a position at every point of space, and this determines for +one extremity alone of the stick a three-dimensional totality of positions; +and secondly, as we have seen above, there proceeds from +every such position of this extremity a two-dimensional totality of +directions, and by conceiving the measuring-stick to be placed lengthwise +in every one of these directions we shall obtain all the conceivable +positions which the second extremity can assume, and consequently, +the dimensions must be 3 plus 2 or 5. Finally, to find out +how many dimensions the totality of all the possible positions of a +square, invariable in magnitude, possesses, we first give one of its +corners all conceivable positions in space, and we thus obtain three +dimensions. One definite point in space now being fixed for the position +of one corner of the square, we imagine drawn through this +point all possible lines, and on each we lay off the length of the side +of the square and thus obtain two additional dimensions. Through +the point obtained for the position of the second corner of the square +we must now conceive all the possible directions drawn that are perpendicular +to the line thus fixed, and we must lay off once more on +each of these directions the side of the square. By this last determination +the dimensions are only increased by one, for only one one-dimensional +totality of perpendicular directions is possible to one +straight line in one of its points. Three corners of the square are now +fixed and therewith the position of the fourth also is uniquely determined. +Accordingly, the totality of all equal squares which only +differ from one another by their position in space, constitutes a manifoldness +of six dimensions.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_410">[410]</span></p> + +<h4>II.<br> +THE INTRODUCTION OF THE NOTION OF FOUR-DIMENSIONAL POINT-AGGREGATES, +PERMISSIBLE.</h4> + +<p>In the preceding section it was shown that we can conceive not +only of manifoldnesses of one, two, and three dimensions, but also +of manifoldnesses of <i>any</i> number of dimensions. But it was at the +same time indicated that our world-space, that is, the totality of all +conceivable <i>points</i> that differ only in respect of position, cannot in +agreement with our notions of things possess more than three dimensions. +But the question now arises, whether, if the progress of +science tends in such a direction, it is permissible to extend the notion +of space by the introduction of point-aggregates of more than +three dimensions, and to engage in the study of the properties of +such creations, although we know that notwithstanding the fact that +we may conceptually establish and explore such aggregates of points, +yet we cannot picture to ourselves these creations as we do the spatial +magnitudes which surround us, that is, the regular three-dimensional +aggregates of points.</p> + +<p>To show the reader clearly that this question must be answered +in the affirmative, that the extension of our notion of space is permissible, +although it leads to things which we cannot perceive by +our senses, I may call the reader’s attention to the fact that in arithmetic +we are accustomed from our youth upwards to extensions of +ideas, which, accurately viewed, as little admit of graphic conception +as a four-dimensional space, that is, a point-aggregate of four +dimensions. By his senses man first reaches only the idea of whole +numbers—the results of counting. The observation of primitive +peoples⁠<a id="FNanchor_79" href="#Footnote_79" class="fnanchor">[79]</a> and of children clearly proves that the essential decisive +factors of counting are these three: First, we abstract, in the counting +of things, completely from the individual and characteristic attributes +of these things, that is, we consider them as homogeneous. +Second, we associate individually with the things which we count +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_411">[411]</span>other homogeneous things. These other things are even now, among +uncivilised peoples, the ten fingers of the two hands. They may, +however, be simple strokes, or, as in the case of dice and dominoes, +black points on a white background. Third, we substitute for the +result of this association some concise symbol or word; for example, +the Romans substituted for three things counted, three strokes placed +side by side, namely: III; but for greater numbers of things they +employed abbreviated signs. The Aztecs, the original inhabitants +of Mexico, had time enough, it seems, to express all the numbers +up to nineteen by equal circles placed side by side. They had abbreviated +signs only for the numbers 20, 400, 8000, and so forth. +In speaking, some one same sound might be associated with the +things counted; but this method of counting is nowadays employed +only by clocks: the languages of men since prehistoric times have +fashioned concise words for the results of the association in question. +From the notion of number, thus fixed as the result of counting, man +reached the notion of the addition of two numbers, and thence the +notion that is the inverse of the last process, the notion of subtraction. +But at this point it clearly appears that not every problem +which may be propounded is soluble; for there is no number which +can express the result of the subtraction of a number from one which +is equally large or from one which is smaller than itself. The primary +school pupil who says that 8 from 5 “won’t go” is perfectly +right from his point of view. For there really does not exist any result +of counting which added to eight will give five.</p> + +<p>If humanity had abided by this point of view and had rested +content with the opinion that the problem “5 minus 8” is not solvable, +the science of arithmetic would never have received its full +development, and humanity would not have advanced as far in civilisation +as it has. Fortunately, men said to themselves at this +crisis: “If 5 minus 8 won’t go, we’ll <i>make it go</i>; if 5 minus 8 does +not possess an intelligible meaning, we will simply give it one.” As +a fact, things which have not a meaning always afford men a pleasing +opportunity of investing them with one. The question is, then, +what significance is the problem “5 minus 8” to be invested with?</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_412">[412]</span></p> + +<p>The most natural and, therefore, the most advantageous solution +undoubtedly is to abide by the original notion of subtraction as +the inverse of addition, and to make the significance of 5 minus 8 +such, that for 5 minus 8 plus 8 we shall get our original minuend 5. +By such a method all the rules of computation which apply to real +differences will also hold good for unreal differences, such as 5 minus +8. But it then clearly appears that all forms expressive of differences +in which the number that stands before the minus direction is +less by an equal amount than that which follows it may be regarded +as equal; so that the simplest course seems to be to introduce as +the common characteristic of all equal differential forms of this description +a common sign, which will indicate at the same time the +difference of the two numbers thus associated. Thus it came about, +that for 5 minus 8, as well as for every differential form which can +be regarded as equal thereto the sign “-3” was introduced. But in +calling differential forms of this description numbers, the notion of +number was extended and a new domain was opened up, namely, +the domain of negative numbers.</p> + +<p>In the further development of the science of arithmetic, through +the operation of division viewed as the inverse of multiplication, a +second extension of the idea of number was reached, namely, the +notion of fractional numbers as the outcome of divisions that had +led to numbers hitherto undefined. We find, thus, that the science +of arithmetic throughout its whole development has strictly adhered +to the principle of conformity and consistency and has invested every +association of two numbers, which before had no significance, by the +introduction of new numbers, with a real significance, such that similar +operations in conformity with exactly the same rules could be +performed with the new numbers, viewed as the results of this association, +as with the numbers which were before known and perfectly +defined. Thus the science proceeded further on its way and reached +the notions of irrational, imaginary, and complex numbers.</p> + +<p>The point in all this, which the reader must carefully note, is, +that all the numbers of arithmetic, with the exception of the positive +whole numbers, are artificial products of human thought, invented +to make the language of arithmetic more flexible, and to accelerate +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_413">[413]</span>the progress of science. All these numbers lack the attributes +of representability.</p> + +<p>No man in the world can picture to himself “minus three +trees.” It is possible, of course, to know that when three trees of a +garden have been cut down and carried away, that three are missing, +and by substituting for “missing” the inverse notion of “added,” +we may say, perhaps, that “minus three trees” are added. But +this is quite different from the feat of imagining a negative number +of trees. We can only picture to ourselves a number of trees that +results from actual counting, that is, a positive whole number. Yet, +notwithstanding all this, people had not the slightest hesitation in +extending the notion of number. Exactly so must it be permitted +us in geometry to extend the notion of space, even though such an +extension can only be mentally defined and can never be brought +within the range of human powers of representation.</p> + +<p>In mathematics, in fact, the extension of any notion is admissible, +provided such extension does not lead to contradictions with +itself or with results which are well established. Whether such +extensions are necessary, justifiable, or important for the advancement +of science is a different question. It must be admitted, therefore, +that the mathematician is justified in the extension of the notion +of space as a point-aggregate of three dimensions, and in the +introduction of space or point-aggregates of more than three dimensions, +and in the employment of them as means of research. Other +sciences also operate with things which they do not know exist, and +which, though they are sufficiently defined, cannot be perceived by +our senses. For example, the physicist employs the ether as a +means of investigation, though he can have no sensory knowledge +of it. The ether is nothing more than a means which enables us to +comprehend mechanically the effects known as action at a distance +and to bring them within the range of a common point of view. +Without the assumption of a material which penetrates everything, +and by means of whose undulations impulses are transmitted to the +remotest parts of space, the phenomena of light, of heat, of gravitation, +and of electricity would be a jumble of isolated and unconnected +mysteries. The assumption of an ether, however, comprises +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_414">[414]</span>in a systematic scheme all these isolated events, facilitates our mental +control of the phenomena of nature, and enables us to produce +these phenomena at will. But it must not be forgotten in such reflections +that the ether itself is even a greater problem for man, and +that the ether-hypothesis does not solve the difficulties of phenomena, +but only puts them in a unitary conceptual shape. Notwithstanding +all this, physicists have never had the least hesitation in employing +the ether as a means of investigation. And as little do reasons +exist why the mathematicians should hesitate to investigate +the properties of a four-dimensioned point-aggregate, with the view +of acquiring thus a convenient means of research.</p> + +<h4>III.<br> +THE INTRODUCTION OF THE IDEA OF FOUR-DIMENSIONED POINT-AGGREGATES +OF SERVICE TO RESEARCH.</h4> + +<p>From the concession that the mathematician has the right to +define and investigate the properties of point-aggregates of more +than three dimensions, it does not necessarily follow that the introduction +of an idea of this description is of value to science. Thus, +for example, in arithmetic, the introduction of operations which +spring from involution, as involution and its two inverse operations +proceed from multiplication, is undoubtedly permitted. Just as for +“<i>a</i> times <i>a</i> times <i>a</i>” we write the abbreviated symbol “<i>a</i>³,” (which +we read, <i>a</i> to the third power,) and investigate in detail the operation +of involution thus defined, so we might also introduce some +shorthand symbol for “<i>a</i> to the <i>a</i>ᵗʰ power to the <i>a</i>ᵗʰ power” and thus +reach an operation of the fourth degree, which would regard <i>a</i> as a +passive number and the number 3, or any higher number, as the +active number, that is, as the number which indicates how often <i>a</i> +is taken as the base of a power whose exponent may be <i>a</i>, or “<i>a</i> to +the <i>a</i>ᵗʰ,” or “<i>a</i> to the <i>a</i>ᵗʰ to the <i>a</i>ᵗʰ power.”</p> + +<p>But the introduction of such an operation of the fourth degree +has proved itself to be of no especial value to mathematics. And +the reason is that in the operation of involution the law of commutation +does not hold good. In addition, the numbers to be added may +be interchanged and the introduction of multiplication is therefore +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_415">[415]</span>of great value. So, also, in multiplication the numbers which are +combined, that is, the factors, may be changed about in any way, +and thus the introduction of involution is of value. But in involution +the base and the exponent cannot be interchanged, and consequently +the introduction of any higher operation is almost valueless.</p> + +<p>But with the introduction of the idea of point-aggregates of +multiple dimensions the case is wholly different. The innovation in +question has proved itself to be not only of great importance to research, +but the progress of science has irresistibly forced investigators +to the introduction of this idea, as we shall now set forth in +detail.</p> + +<p>In the first place, algebra, especially the algebraical theory of +systems of equations, derives much advantage from the notion of +multiple dimensioned spaces. If we have only three unknown quantities, +<i>x</i>, <i>y</i>, <i>z</i>, the algebraical questions which arise from the possible +problems of this class admit, as we have above seen, of geometrical +representation to the eye. Owing to this possibility of geometrical +representation, some certain simple geometrical ideas like “moving,” +“lying in,” “intersecting,” and so forth, may be translated into +algebraical events. Now, no reason exists why algebra should stop +at three variable quantities; it must in fact take into consideration +any number of variable quantities.</p> + +<p>For purposes of brevity and greater evidentness, therefore, it is +quite natural to employ geometrical forms of speech in the consideration +of more than three variables. But when we do this, we assume, +perhaps without really intending to do so, the idea of a space +of more than three dimensions. If we have four variable quantities, +<i>x</i>, <i>y</i>, <i>z</i>, <i>u</i>, we arrive, by conceiving attributed to each of these four +quantities every possible numerical magnitude, at a four-dimensioned +manifoldness of numerical quantities, which we may just as well regard +as a four-dimensioned aggregate of points. Two equations +which exist on this supposition between <i>x</i>, <i>y</i>, <i>z</i>, and <i>u</i>, define two +three-dimensioned aggregates of points, which intersect, as we may +briefly say, in a two-dimensioned aggregate of points, that is, in a +surface; and so on. In a somewhat different manner the determination +of the contents of a square or a cube by the involution of a +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_416">[416]</span>number which stands for the length of its sides, leads to the notion +of four-dimensioned structures, and, consequently, to the notion of +a four-dimensioned point-space. When we note that <i>a</i>² stands for +the contents of a square, and <i>a</i>³ for the contents of a cube, we naturally +inquire after the contents of a structure which is produced +from the cube as the cube is produced from the square and which +also will have the contents <i>a</i>⁴. We cannot, it is true, clearly picture +to ourselves a structure of this description, but we can, nevertheless, +establish its properties with mathematical exactness.⁠<a id="FNanchor_80" href="#Footnote_80" class="fnanchor">[80]</a> It is bounded +by 8 cubes just as the cube is bounded by 6 squares; it has 16 corners, +24 squares, and 32 edges, so that from every corner 4 edges, 6 +squares, and 4 cubes proceed, and from every edge 3 squares and 3 +cubes.</p> + +<p>Yet despite the great service to algebra of this idea of multiple-dimensioned +space, it must be conceded that the conception although +convenient is yet not indispensable. It is true, algebra is in need +of the idea of multiple dimensions, but it is not so absolutely in need +of the idea of <i>point</i>-aggregates of multiple dimensions.</p> + +<p>This notion is, however, necessary and serviceable for a profound +comprehension of geometry. The system of geometrical knowledge +which Euclid of Alexandria created about three hundred years +before Christ, supplied during a period of more than two thousand +years a brilliant example of a body of conclusions and truths which +were mutually consistent and logical. Up to the present century +the idea of elementary geometry was indissolubly bound up with +the name of Euclid, so that in England where people adhered longest +to the rigid deductive system of the Grecian mathematician, the +task of “learning geometry” and “reading Euclid” were until a +few years ago identical. Every proposition of this Euclidian system +rests on other propositions, as one building-stone in a house rests +upon another. Only the very lowest stones, the foundations, were +without supports. These are the axioms or fundamental propositions, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_417">[417]</span>truths on which all other truths are, directly or indirectly, +founded, but which themselves are assumed without demonstration +as self-evident.</p> + +<p>But the spirit of mathematical research grew in time more and +more critical, and finally asked, whether these axioms might not possibly +admit of demonstration. Especially was a rigid proof sought +for the eleventh axiom of Euclid, which treats of parallels.</p> + +<p>After centuries of fruitless attempts to prove Euclid’s eleventh +axiom, Gauss, and with him Bolyai and Lobatschewsky, Riemann +and Helmholtz, finally stated the decisive reasons why any attempt +to prove the axiom of the parallels must necessarily be futile. These +reasons consist of the fact that though this axiom holds good enough +in the world-space such as we do and can conceive it, yet three-dimensioned +spaces are ideally conceivable though not capable of +mental representation, where the axiom does not hold good. The +axiom was thus shown to be a mere fact of <i>observation</i>, and from that +time on there could no longer be any thought of a deductive demonstration +of it. In view of the intimate connection, which both in an +historical and epistemological point of view exists between the extension +of the concept of space and the critical examination of the +axioms of Euclid, we must enter at somewhat greater length into +the discussion of the last mentioned propositions.</p> + +<p>Of the axioms which Euclid premises to his geometry, only the +following three are really geometrical axioms:</p> + +<p><i>Eighth axiom</i>: Magnitudes which coincide with one another are +equal to one another.</p> + +<p><i>Eleventh axiom</i>: If a straight line meet two straight lines so as +to make the two interior angles on the same side of it taken together +less than two right angles, these straight lines, being continually +produced, shall at length meet on that side on which are the angles +which are less than two right angles.</p> + +<p><i>Twelfth axiom</i>: Two straight lines cannot inclose a [finite] +space.</p> + +<p>The numerous proofs which in the course of time were adduced +in demonstration of these axioms, especially of the eleventh, all turn +out on close examination to be pseudo-proofs. Legendre drew attention +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_418">[418]</span>to the fact that either of the following axioms might be +substituted for the eleventh:</p> + +<p><i>a</i>) Through a point there can be drawn to a straight line, within +the plane which joins the point with the line, one and one line only +which shall not intersect the first (parallels) however far the two lines +may be produced;</p> + +<p><i>b</i>) If two parallel lines are cut by a third straight line, the interior +alternate angles will be equal.</p> + +<p><i>c</i>) The sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right +angles, that is, to the angle of a straight line or 180°.</p> + +<p>By the aid of any one of these three assertions, the eleventh +axiom of Euclid may be proved, and, <i>vice versa</i>, by the aid of the +latter each of the three assertions may be proved, of course with +the help of the other two axioms, eight and twelve. The perception +that the eleventh axiom does not admit of demonstration without +the employment of one of the foregoing substitutes may best be +gained from the consideration of congruent figures. Every reader +will remember from his first instruction in geometry that the congruence +of two triangles is demonstrated by the superposition of one +triangle on the other and by then ascertaining whether the two completely +coincide, no assumptions being made in the determination +except those above mentioned.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp100" id="fourth-dimension-figure-1" style="max-width: 43.75em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/fourth-dimension-figure-1.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption> + <p>Fig. 1.</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>In the case of triangles which are congruent as are I and II in +the preceding cut, this coincidence may be effected by the simple <i>displacement</i> +of one of the triangles; so that even a two-dimensional +being, supposed to be endowed with powers of reasoning, but only +capable of picturing to itself motions within a plane, also might +convince itself that the two triangles I and II could be made to +coincide. But a being of this description could not convince itself +in like manner of the congruence of triangles I and III. It would +discover the equality of the three sides and the three angles, but it +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_419">[419]</span>could never succeed in so superposing the two triangles on each +other as to make them coincide. A three-dimensioned being, however, +can do this very easily. It has simply to turn triangle I about +one of its sides and to shove the triangle, thus brought into the position +of its reflection in a mirror, into the position of triangle III. +Similarly, triangles II and III may be made to coincide by moving +either out of the plane of the paper around one of its sides as axis +and turning it until it again falls in the plane of the paper. The +triangle thus turned over can then be brought into the position of +the other.</p> + +<p>Later on we shall revert to these two kinds of congruence: +“congruence by displacement” and “congruence by circumversion.” +For the present we will start from the fact that it is always possible +within the limits of a plane to take a triangle out of one position and +bring it into another without altering its sides and angles. The +question is, whether this is only possible in the plane, or whether it +can also be done on other surfaces.</p> + +<p>We find that there are certain surfaces in which this is possible, +and certain others in which it is not. For instance, it is impossible +to move the triangle drawn on the surface of an egg into some other +position on the egg’s surface without a distension or contraction of +some of the triangle’s parts. On the other hand, it is quite possible +to move the triangle drawn on the surface of a sphere into any other +position on the sphere’s surface without a distension or contraction +of its parts. The mathematical reason of this fact is, that the surface +of a sphere, like the plane, has everywhere the same curvature, +but that the surface of an egg at different places has different curvatures. +Of a plane we say that it has everywhere the curvature zero; +of the surface of a sphere we say it has everywhere a positive curvature, +which is greater in proportion as the radius is smaller. There +are surfaces also which have a constant negative curvature; these +surfaces exhibit at every point in directions proceeding from the +same side a partly concave and a partly convex structure, somewhat +like the centre of a saddle. There is no necessity of our entering in +any detail into the character and structure of the last-mentioned +surfaces.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_420">[420]</span></p> + +<p>Intimately related with the plane, however, are all those surfaces, +which, like the plane, have the curvature zero; in this category +belong especially cylindrical surfaces and conical surfaces. A +sheet of paper of the form of the sector of a circle may, for example, +be readily bent into the shape of a conical surface. If two congruent +triangles, now, be drawn on the sheet of paper, which may by displacement +be translated the one into the other, these triangles will, +it is plain, also remain congruent on the conical surface; that is, on +the conical surface also we may displace the one into the other; for +though a bending of the figures will take place, there will be no distension +or contraction. Similarly, there are surfaces which, like the +sphere, have everywhere a constant positive curvature. On such +surfaces also every figure can be transferred into some other position +without distension or contraction of its parts. Accordingly, on all +surfaces thus related to the plane or sphere, the assumption which +underlies the eighth axiom of Euclid, that it is possible to transfer +into any new position any figure drawn on such surfaces without +distortion, holds good.</p> + +<p>The eleventh axiom in its turn also holds good on all surfaces +of constant curvature, whether the curvature be zero or positive; +only in such instances instead of “straight” line we must say +“shortest” line. On the surface of a sphere, namely, two shortest +lines, that is, arcs of two great circles, always intersect, no matter +whether they are produced in the direction of the side at which the +third arc of a great circle makes with them angles less than two +right angles, or, in the direction of the other side, where this arc +makes with them angles of more than two right angles. On the +plane, however, two straight lines intersect only on the side where a +third straight line that meets them makes with them interior angles +less than two right angles.</p> + +<p>The twelfth axiom of Euclid, finally, only holds good on the +plane and on the surfaces related to it, but not on the sphere or other +surfaces which, like the sphere, have a constant positive curvature. +This also accounts for the fact that one of the three postulates +which we regarded as substitutes for the eleventh axiom, though +valid for the plane, is not true for the surface of a sphere; namely, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_421">[421]</span>the postulate that defines the sum of the angles of a triangle. This +sum in a plane triangle is two right angles; in a spherical triangle +it is more than two right angles, the spherical triangle being +greater, the greater the excess the sum of its angles is above +two right angles. It will be seen, from these considerations, that +in geometries in which curved surfaces and not fixed planes are +studied, the axioms of Euclid are either all or partially false.</p> + +<p>The axioms of geometry thus having been revealed as facts of +experience, the question suggested itself whether in the same way +in which it was shown that different two-dimensional geometries +were possible, also different three-dimensional systems of geometry +might not be developed; and consequently what the relations were +in which these might stand to the geometry of the space given by +our senses and representable to our mind. As a fact, a three-dimensional +geometry can be developed, which like the geometry of the +surface of an egg will exclude the axiom that a figure or body can +be transferred from any one part of space to any other and yet remain +congruent to itself. Of a three-dimensional space in which +such a geometry can be developed we say, that it has no constant +measure of curvature.</p> + +<p>The space which is representable to us, and which we shall +henceforth call the <i>space of experience</i>, possesses, as our experiences +without exception confirm, the especial property that every bodily +thing can be transferred from any one part of it to any other without +suffering in the transference any distension or any contraction. +The space of experience, therefore, has a constant measure of curvature. +The question, however, whether this measure of curvature +is zero or positive, that is, whether the space of experience possesses +the properties which in two-dimensioned structures a plane possesses, +or whether it is the three-dimensioned analogon of the surface +of a sphere is one which future experience alone can answer. If the +space of experience has a constant positive measure of curvature +which is different from zero, be the difference ever so slight, a point +which should move forever onward in a straight line, or, more accurately +expressed, in a shortest line, would sometime, though perhaps +after having traversed a distance which to us is inconceivable, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_422">[422]</span>ultimately have to arrive from the opposite direction at the place +from which it set out, just as a point which moves forever onward +in the same direction on the surface of a sphere must ultimately arrive +at its starting point, the distance it traverses being longer the +greater the radius of the sphere or the smaller its curvature.</p> + +<p>It will seem, at first blush, almost incredible, that the space of +experience even <i>can</i> have this property. But an example, which is +the historical analogon of this modern transformation of our conceptions, +will render the idea less marvellous. Let us transport ourselves +back to the age of Homer. At that time people believed that +the earth was a great disc surrounded on all sides by oceans which +were conceived to be in all directions infinitely great. Indeed, for +the primitive man, who has never journeyed far from the place of +his birth, this is the most natural conception. But imagine now that +some scholar had come, and had informed the Homeric hero Ulysses +that if he would travel forever on the earth in the same direction he +would ultimately come back to the point from which he started; +surely Ulysses would have gazed with as much astonishment upon +this scholar as we now look upon the mathematician who tells us +that it is possible that a point which moves forever onward in space +in the same direction may ultimately arrive at the place from which +it started. But despite the fact that Ulysses would have regarded +the assertion of the scholar as false because contradictory to his +familiar conceptions, that scholar, nevertheless, would have been +right; for the earth is not a plane but a spherical surface. So also +the mathematician might be right who bases this more recent strange +view on the possible fact that the space of experience may have a +measure of curvature which is not exactly zero but slightly greater +than zero. If this were really the case, the <i>volume</i> of the space of +experience, though very large, would, nevertheless, be finite; just +as the real spherical surface of the earth as contrasted with the +Homeric plane surface is finite, having so and so many square miles. +When the objection is here made that a finiteness of space is totally +at variance with our modes of thought and conceptions, two ideas, +“infinitely great” and “unlimited,” are confounded. All that is at +variance with our practical conceptions is that space can anywhere +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_423">[423]</span>have a limit; not that it may possibly be of tremendous but finite +magnitude.</p> + +<p>It will now be asked if we cannot determine by actual observation +whether the measure of curvature of experiential space is exactly +zero or slightly different therefrom. The theorem of the sum +of the angles of a triangle and the conclusions which follow from this +theorem do indeed supply us with a means of ascertaining this fact. +And the results of observation have been, that <i>the measure of curvature +of space is in all probability exactly equal to zero or if it is slightly +different from zero it is so little so that the technical means of observation +at our command and especially our telescopes are not competent to determine +the amount of the deviation</i>. More, we cannot with any certainty +say.</p> + +<p>All these reflections, to which the criticism of the hypotheses +that underlie geometry long ago led investigators, compel us to institute +a comparison between the space of experience and other +three-dimensioned aggregates of points (spaces), which we cannot +mentally represent but can in thought and word accurately define +and investigate. As soon, however, as we are fully involved in the +task of accurately investigating the properties of three-dimensional +aggregates of points, we similarly find ourselves forced to regard +such aggregates as the component elements of a manifoldness of +more than three dimensions. In this way the exact criticism of +even ordinary geometry leads us to the abstract assumption of a +space of more than three dimensions. And as the extension of every +idea gives a clearer and more translucent form to the idea as it originally +stood, here too the idea of multiple-dimensioned aggregates +of points and the investigation of their properties has thrown a new +light on the truths of ordinary geometry and placed its properties in +clearer relief. Amid the numerous examples which show how the +notion of a space of multiple-dimensions has been of great service +to science in the investigation of three-dimensioned space, we shall +give one a place here which is within the comprehension of non-mathematicians.</p> + +<p>Imagine in a plane two triangles whose angles are denoted +by pairs of numbers—namely, by 1-2, 1-3, 1-4, and 2-5, 3-5, 4-5. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_424">[424]</span>(See Fig. 2.) Let the two triangles so lie that the three lines which +join the angles 1-2 and 2-5, 1-3 and 3-5, and 1-4 and 4-5 intersect at +a point, which we will call 1-5. If now we cause the sides of the +triangles which are opposite to these angles to intersect, it will be +found that the points of intersection so obtained possess the peculiar +property of lying all in one and the same straight line. The point +of intersection of the connection 1-3 and 1-4 with the connection 4-5 +and 3-5 may appropriately be called 3-4. Similarly, the point of intersection +2-4 is produced +by the meeting of 4-5, 2-5 +and 1-2, 1-4; and the point +of intersection 2-3, by the +meeting of 1-3, 1-2 and +3-5, 2-5. The statement, +that the three points of +intersection 3-4, 2-4, 2-3, +thus obtained, lie in one +straight line, can be +proved by the principles +of plane geometry only +with difficulty and great +circumstantiality. But by +resorting to the three-dimensional +space of experience, +in which the plane of the drawing lies, the proposition may +be rendered almost self-evident.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp71" id="fourth-dimension-figure-2" style="max-width: 31.25em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/fourth-dimension-figure-2.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption> + <p>Fig. 2.</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>To begin with, imagine any five points in space which may be +denoted by the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5; then imagine all the possible +ten straight lines of junction drawn between each two of these points, +namely, 1-2, 1-3 ... 4-5; and finally, also, all the ten planes of +junction of every three points described, namely, the plane 1-2-3, +1-2-4, ... 3-4-5. A spatial figure will thus be obtained, whose ten +straight lines will meet some interposed plane in ten points whose +relative positions are exactly those of the ten points above described. +Thus, for example, on this plane the points 1-2, 1-3, and 2-3 will lie in +a straight line, for through the three spatial points 1, 2, 3, a plane can +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_425">[425]</span>be drawn which will cut the plane of a drawing in a straight line. +The reason, therefore, that the three points 3-4, 2-4, 2-3, also must +ultimately lie in a straight line, consists in the simple fact that the +plane of the three points 2, 3, 4, must cut the plane of the drawing +in a straight line. The figure here considered consists of ten points +of which sets of three so lie ten times in a straight line that conversely +from every point also three straight lines proceed.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp100" id="fourth-dimension-figure-3" style="max-width: 43.75em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/fourth-dimension-figure-3.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption> + <p>Fig. 3.</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>Now, just as this figure is a section of a complete three-dimensional +pentagon, so another remarkable figure, of similar properties, +may be obtained by the section of a figure of four-dimensioned +space. Imagine, namely, six points, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, situated in +this four-dimensioned space, and every three of them connected by +a plane, and every four of them by a three-dimensioned space. We +shall obtain thus twenty planes and fifteen three-dimensioned spaces +which will cut the plane in which the figure is to be produced in +twenty points and fifteen rays which so lie that each point sends out +three rays and every ray contains four points. (See Fig. 3.) Figures +of this description, which are so composed of points and rays +that an equal number of rays proceed from every point and an equal +number of points lie in every ray, are called <i>configurations</i>. Other +configurations may, of course, be produced, by taking a different +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_426">[426]</span>number of points and by assuming that the points taken lie in a +space of different or even higher dimensions. The author of this +article was the first to draw attention to configurations derived from +spaces of higher dimensions. As we see, then, the notion of a space +of more than three dimensions has performed important work in the +investigations of common plane geometry.</p> + +<p>In conclusion, I should like to add a remark which Cranz makes +regarding the application of the idea of multiple-dimensioned space +to theoretical chemistry. (See the treatise before cited.) In chemistry, +the molecules of a compound body are said to consist of the +atoms of the elements which are contained in the body, and these are +supposed to be situated at certain distances from one another, and +to be held in their relative positions by certain forces. At first, the +centres of the atoms were conceived to lie in one and the same +plane. But Wislicenus was led by researches in paralactic acid +to explain the differences of isomeric molecules of the same structural +formulæ by the different positions of the atoms in <i>space</i>. (Compare +“La chimie dans l’espace” by van’t Hoff, 1875, preface by J. +Wislicenus). In fact four points can always be so arranged in space +that every two of them may have any distance from each other; and +the change of one of the six distances does not necessarily involve +the alteration of any other.</p> + +<p>But suppose our molecule consists of five atoms? Four of these +may be so placed that the distance between any two of them can be +made what we please. But it is no longer possible to give the fifth +atom a position such that each of the four distances by which it is +separated from the other atoms may be what we please. Quite the +contrary, the fourth distance is dependent on the three remaining +distances; for the space of experience has only three dimensions. +If, therefore, I have a molecule which consists of five atoms I cannot +alter the distance between two of them without at least altering +some second distance. But if we imagine the centres of the atoms +placed in a four-dimensioned space, this can be done; all the ten +distances which may be conceived to exist between the five points +will then be independent of one another. To reach the same result +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_427">[427]</span>in the case of six atoms we must assume a five-dimensional space; +and so on.</p> + +<p>Now, if the independence of all the possible distances between +the atoms of a molecule is absolutely required by theoretical chemical +research, the science is really compelled, if it deals with molecules +of more than four atoms, to make use of the idea of a space of +more than three dimensions. This idea is, in this case, simply an +instrument of research, just as are, also, the ideas of molecules and +atoms—means designed to embrace in an obvious and systematic +form the phenomena of chemistry and to discover the conditions +under which new phenomena can be evoked. Whether a four-dimensioned +space really exists is a question whose insolubility cannot +prevent research from making use of the idea, exactly as chemistry +has not been prevented from making use of the notion of atom, +although no one really knows whether the things we call atoms exist +or not.</p> + +<h4>IV.<br> +REFUTATION OF THE ARGUMENTS ADDUCED TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF A +FOUR-DIMENSIONED SPACE INCLUSIVE OF THE VISIBLE WORLD.</h4> + +<p>The considerations of the preceding section will have convinced +the cultured non-mathematician of the service which the theory of +multiple-dimensioned spaces has done, and bids fair to do, for geometrical +research. In addition thereto is the consideration that every +extension of one branch of mathematical science is a constant source +of beneficial and helpful influence to the other branches. The knowledge, +however, that mathematicians can employ the notion of four-dimensioned +space with good results in their researches, would never +have been sufficient to procure it its present popularity; for every +man of intelligence has now heard of it, and, in jest or in earnest, +often speaks of it. The knowledge of a four-dimensioned space did +not reach the ears of cultured non-mathematicians until the consequences +which the spiritualists fancied it was permissible to draw +from this mathematical notion were publicly known. But it is a tremendous +step from the four-dimensioned space of the mathematicians +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_428">[428]</span>to the space from which the spirit-friends of the spiritualistic +mediums entertain us with rappings, knockings, and bad English. +Before taking this step we will first discuss the question of the real +existence of a four-dimensional space, not judging the question +whether this space, if it really does exist, is inhabited by reasonable +beings who consciously act upon the world in which we exist.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp100" id="fourth-dimension-figure-4" style="max-width: 31.25em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/fourth-dimension-figure-4.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption> + <p>Fig. 4.</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>Among the reasons which are put forward to prove the existence +of a four-dimensional space containing the world, the least reprehensible +are those which are based on the existence of symmetry. +We spoke above of two triangles in the same plane which have all +their sides and angles congruent, but which cannot be made to coincide +by simple displacement within the plane; but we saw that this +coincidence could be effected by holding fast one side of one triangle +and moving it out of its plane until it had been so far turned round +that it fell back into its plane. Now something similar to this exists +in space. Cut two figures, exactly like that of Fig. 4., out of +a piece of paper, and turn the triangle <i>ABF</i> about the side <i>AB</i>, +<i>ACE</i> about the side <i>AC</i>, <i>BCD</i> about the side <i>BC</i>, and in one figure +above and in the other below; then in both cases the points <i>D</i>, +<i>E</i>, <i>F</i> will meet at a point, because <i>AE</i> is equal to <i>AF</i>, <i>BF</i> is equal +to <i>BD</i>, <i>CD</i> is equal to <i>CE</i>. In this manner we obtain two pyramids +which in all lengths and all angles are congruent, yet which +cannot, no matter how we try, be made to coincide, that is, be so +fitted the one into the other that they shall both stand as one pyramid. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_429">[429]</span>But the <i>reflected</i> image of the one could be brought into coincidence +with the other. Two spatial structures whose sides and angles +are thus equal to each other, and of which each may be viewed +as the reflected image of the other, are called <i>symmetrical</i>. For instance, +the right and the left hand are symmetrical; or, a right and +a left glove. Now just as in two dimensions it is impossible by +simple displacement to bring into congruence triangles which like +those above mentioned can only be made to coincide by circumversion, +so also in three dimensions it is impossible to bring into congruence +two symmetrical pyramids. Careful mathematical reflection, +however, declares, that this could be effected if it were possible, +while holding one of the surfaces, to move the pyramid out of the +space of experience, and to turn it round through a four-dimensioned +space until it reached a point at which it would return again +into our experiential space. This process would simply be the four-dimensional +analogon of the three-dimensional circumversion in the +above-mentioned case of the two triangles. Further, the interior +surfaces in this process would be converted into exterior surfaces, +and <i>vice versa</i>, exactly as in the circumversion of a triangle the anterior +and posterior sides are interchanged. If the structure which +is to be converted into its symmetrical counterpart is made of a +flexible material, the interchange mentioned of the interior and +exterior surfaces may be effected by simply turning the structure inside +out; for example, a right glove may thus be converted into a +left glove.</p> + +<p>Now from this truth, that every structure can be converted by +means of a four-dimensional space inclusive of the world, into a +structure symmetrical with it, it has been sought to establish the +probability of the real existence of a four-dimensioned space. Yet +it will be evident, from the discussions of the preceding section, that +the only inference which we can here make is, that the idea of a +four-dimensioned space is competent, from a mathematical point of +view, to throw some light upon the phenomena of symmetry. To +conclude from these facts that a space of this kind really exists, +would be as daring as to conclude from the fact that the uniform +angular velocity of the apparent motions of the fixed stars is explicable +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_430">[430]</span>from the assumption of an axial motion of the firmament, that +the fixed stars are really rigidly placed in a celestial sphere rotating +about its axis. It must not be forgotten that our comprehension of +the phenomena of the real world consists of two elements: first, of +that which the things really are; and, second, of that by which we +rationally apprehend the things. This latter element is partly dependent +on the sum of the experiences which we have before acquired, +and partly on the necessity, due to the imperfection of reason, +of our embracing the multitudinous isolated phenomena of the +world into categories which we ourselves have formed, and which, +therefore, are not wholly derived from the phenomena themselves, +but to a great extent are dependent on us.</p> + +<p>Besides geometrical reasons, Zöllner has also adduced cosmological +reasons to prove the existence of a four-dimensional space. +To these reasons belong especially the questions whether the number +of the fixed stars is infinitely great, whether the world is finite +or infinite in extension, whether the world had a beginning or will +have an end, whether the world is not hastening towards a condition +of equilibrium or dead level by the universal distribution of its matter +and energy; the problems, also, of gravitation and action at a distance; +and finally, the questions concerning the relations between +the phenomena in the world of sense-perception to the unknown +things-in-themselves. All these questions which can be decided in +no definite sense, led Zöllner and his followers to the assumption +that a four-dimensioned space inclusive of the space of experience +must really exist. But more careful reflection will show that this +assumption does not dispose of the difficulties but simply displaces +them into another realm. Furthermore, even if four-dimensioned +space did unravel and make clear all the cosmological problems +which have bothered the human mind, still, its existence would not +be proved thereby; it would yet remain a mere hypothesis, designed +to render more intelligible to a being who can only make experiences +in a three-dimensional space, the phenomena therein which are full +of mystery to it. A four-dimensioned space would in such case possess +for the metaphysician a value similar to that which the ether +possesses for the physicist. Still more convincing than these cosmological +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_431">[431]</span>reasons to the majority of men is the physio-psychological +reason drawn from the phenomena of vision which Zöllner adduces. +Into this main argument we will enter in more detail.</p> + +<p>When we “see” an object, as we all know, the light which proceeds +or is reflected therefrom produces an image on the retina of +our eye; this image is conducted to our consciousness by means of +the optical nerve, and our reason draws therefrom an inference respecting +the object. When, now, we look at a square whose sides +are a decimetre in length, and whose centre is situated at the distance +of a metre from the pupil of our eye, an image is produced on the +retina. But exactly the same image will be produced there if we +look at a square whose sides are parallel to the sides of the first +square but two decimetres in length, and whose centre is situated +at a distance of two metres from the pupil of the eye. Proceeding +thus further, we readily discover that an eye can perceive in any +length or line only the ratio of its magnitude to the distance at which +it is situated from it, and that generally a three-dimensional world +must appear to the eye two-dimensional, because all points which +lie behind each other in the direction outwards from the eye produce +on the retina only one image. This is due to the fact that the +retinal images are themselves two-dimensional; for which reason, +Zöllner says, the world must appear to a child as two-dimensional, +if it be supposed to live in a primitive condition of unconscious mental +activity. To such a child two objects which are moving the one +behind the other, must appear as suffering displacement on a surface, +which we conceive behind the objects, and on which the latter +are projected. In all these apparent displacements, coincidences +and changes of form also are effected. All these things must appear +puzzling to a human being in the first stages of its development, +and the mind thus finds itself, as Zöllner further argues, in the first +years of childhood forced to adopt a hypothesis concerning the constitution +of space and to assume that the world is three-dimensional, +although the eye can really perceive it as only two-dimensional. +Zöllner then further says, that in the explanation of the effects of +the external world, man constantly finds this hypothesis of his childish +years confirmed, and that in this way it has become in his mind +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_432">[432]</span>so profound a conviction that it is no longer possible for him to +think it away. Consonant with this argumentation, also, is Zöllner’s +remark, that the same phenomenon has presented itself in +astronomical methods of knowledge. To explain the movements of +the planets, which appear to describe regular paths on the surface +of a celestial sphere, we were compelled in the solution of the riddles +which these motions presented, to assume in the structure of the +heavens a dimension of “depth,” and the complicated motions in +the two-dimensioned firmament were converted into very simple +motions in three-dimensioned space. Zöllner also contends that our +conception of the entire visible world as possessed of three dimensions +is a product of our reason, which the mind was driven to form +by the contradictions which would be presented to it on the assumption +of only two dimensions by the perspective distortions, coincidences, +and changes of magnitude of objects. When a child moves +its hand before its eyes, turns it, brings it nearer, or pushes it farther +away, this child successively receives the most various impressions +on the surface of its retina of one and the same object of whose +identity and constancy its feelings offer it a perfect assurance. If +the child regarded the changeable projection of the hand on the surface +of the retina as the real object, and not the hand which lies beyond +it, the child would constantly be met with contradictions in its +experience, and to avoid this it makes the hypothesis that the space +of experience is three-dimensional. Zöllner’s contention is, therefore, +that man originally had only a two-dimensional intuition of +space, but was forced by experience to represent to himself the objects +which on the retinal surface appeared two-dimensional, as +three-dimensional, and thus to transform his two-dimensional space-intuition +into a three-dimensional one. Now, in exactly the same +way, according to Zöllner’s notion, will man, by the advancement +and increasing exactness of his knowledge of the phenomena of the +outer world, also be compelled to conceive of the material world as +a “shadow cast by a more real four-dimensional world,” so that +these conceptions will be just as trivial for the people of the twentieth +century as since Copernicus’s time the explanation of the motions +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_433">[433]</span>of the heavenly bodies by means of a three-dimensional motion +has been.</p> + +<p>Zöllner’s arguments from the phenomena of vision may be refuted +as follows: In the first place it is incorrect to say that we see +the things of the external world by means of two-dimensional retinal +images. The light which penetrates the eye causes an irritation of +the optical nerves, and any such effect which, though it be not +powerful, is, nevertheless, a mechanical one, can only take place on +things which are material. But material things are always three-dimensional. +The effect of light on the sensitive plates of photography +can with just as little justice be regarded as two-dimensional. +Our senses can have perception of nothing but three-dimensional +things, and this perception is effected by forces which in their turn +act on three-dimensional things, namely, our sensory nerves. It is +wrong to call an image two-dimensional, for it is only by abstraction +that we can conceive of a thickness so growing constantly smaller +and smaller as to admit of our regarding a three-dimensional picture +as two-dimensional, by giving it in mind a vanishingly small thickness. +It is also wrong to say, as Zöllner says, that when we see the +shadow of a hand which is cast upon a wall we see something two-dimensional. +What we really perceive is that no light falls upon +our eye from the region included by the shadow, while from the entire +surrounding region light does fall on our eye. But this light is +reflected from the material particles which form the surface of the +wall, that is, from three-dimensional particles of matter. We must +always remember that our eye communicates to us only three-dimensional +knowledge, and that for the comprehension of anything which +has two, one, or no dimensions, <i>a purely intellectual act of abstraction +must be added to the act of perception</i>. When we imagine we have +made a lead-pencil mark on paper, we have, exactly viewed, simply +heaped along side of each other little particles of graphite in such a +manner that there are by far fewer graphite particles in the lateral +and upward directions than there are in the longitudinal direction, +and thus our reason arrives by abstraction at the notion of a straight +line. When we look at an object, say a cube of wood, we recognise +the object as three-dimensional, and it is only by abstraction that we +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_434">[434]</span>can conceive of its two-dimensional surfaces, of its twelve one-dimensional +edges, and of its eight no-dimensional corners. For +we reach the perception of its surface, for example, solely by reason +of the fact that the material particles which form the cube prevent +the transmission of light, and reflect it, whereby a part of the light +reflected from every material particle strikes our eye. Now, by +thinking exclusively of those material particles which are reflected, +in contrariety to the empty space without and the hidden and therefore +non-reflected particles within, we form the notion of a surface.</p> + +<p>It is evident from this, that all that we perceive is three-dimensional, +that we cannot come at anything two-dimensional without an +intellectual abstraction, and that, therefore, we cannot conceive of +anything two-dimensional exerting effects upon material things. But +this fact is a refutation of the retinal argument of Zöllner. If vision +consisted wholly and exclusively in the creation of a two-dimensioned +image, the things which take place in the world could never +come into our consciousness. The child, therefore, does not originally +apprehend the world, as Zöllner says, as two-dimensional; +on the contrary, it apprehends it either not at all, or it apprehends +it as three-dimensional. Of course the child must first “learn how” +to see. It is found from the observation of children during the first +months of their lives, and of the congenitally blind, who have suddenly +acquired the power of vision by some successful operation, +that seeing does not consist alone in the irritations which arise in +the optic nerves, but also in the correct interpretation of these irritations +by reason. This correct interpretation, however, can be accomplished +only by the accumulation of a considerable stock of experience. +Especially must the recognition of the distance of the +object seen, be gradually learned. In this, two things are especially +helpful; first, the fact that we have two eyes and, consequently, that +we must feel two irritations of the optic nerves which are not wholly +alike; and secondly, the fact that we are enabled by our power of +motion and our sense of touch to convince ourselves of the distance +and form of the bodies seen. The question now arises, what sort of +an intuition of space would a creature have that had only one eye, +that could neither move itself nor its eye, and also possessed no +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_435">[435]</span>peripheral nerves. According to Zöllner’s view, this creature could, +owing to its two-dimensional retinal images, only have a two-dimensional +intuition of space. The author’s opinion, however, is, that +such a creature could not see at all, as it has no possibility of collecting +experiences which are adapted in any way to interpreting the +effects of things on its retina. The light which proceeded from the +objects roundabout and fell on the retina could produce no other +effect on the being than that of a wholly intelligible irritation, or, +perhaps, even pain.</p> + +<p>The reflections presented sufficiently show that neither the phenomena +of symmetry nor the retinal images of the objects of vision +necessarily force upon us the assumption of a four-dimensioned space. +If the material world should ever present problems which could not +in the progress of knowledge be solved in a natural way, the assumption +that a four-dimensional space containing the world exists would +also be incompetent to resolve the difficulties presented; it would +simply convert these difficulties into others, and not dispose of the +problems but simply displace them to another world. Yet the question +might be asked, Is the existence of a four-dimensional space +really <i>impossible</i>? To answer this question, we must first clearly +know what we mean by “exist.” If existence means that the intellectual +<i>idea</i> of a thing can be formed and that this idea shall not lead +to contradictions with other well-established ideas and with experience, +we have only to say that four-dimensioned space does exist, +as the arguments adduced in sections II and III have rendered +plain. If, namely, the space of four dimensions did not exist as a +clear idea in the minds of mathematicians, mathematicians could +certainly not have been led by this idea to results which are recognised +by the senses as true, and which really take place in our own +representable space. But if existence means “material actuality” +we must say that we neither now nor in the future can know anything +about it. For we know material actuality only as three-dimensional, +our senses can only make three-dimensional experiences, +and the inferences of our reason, although they can well abstract +from material things, can never ascend to the point of explaining a +four-dimensional materiality. Just as little, therefore, as we can +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_436">[436]</span>locally fix the idea of a two-dimensional material world, as little +can we substantiate the notion of a four-dimensioned material +existence.</p> + +<h4>V.<br> +EXAMINATION OF THE HYPOTHESIS CONCERNING THE EXISTENCE OF +FOUR-DIMENSIONAL SPIRITS.</h4> + +<p>In connection with the belief that the visible world is contained +in a four-dimensioned space, Zöllner and his adherents further hold +that this higher space is inhabited by intelligent beings who can +act consciously and at will on the human beings who live in experiential +space. To invest this opinion with greater strength Zöllner +appealed to the fact that the greatest thinkers of antiquity and of +modern times were either wholly of this opinion or at least held +views from which his contentions might be immediately derived. +Plato’s dialogue between Socrates and Glaukon in the seventh book +of the Republic, is evidence, says Zöllner, that this greatest philosopher +of antiquity possessed some presentiment of this extension of +the notion of space. Yet any one who has connectedly studied and +understood Plato’s system of philosophy must concede that the so-called +“ideas” of the Platonic system denote something wholly different +from what Zöllner sees in them or pretends to see. Zöllner +says that these Platonic ideas are spatial objects of more than three +dimensions and represent “real existence” in the same sense that +the material world, as contrasted with the images on the retina, represents +it. Zöllner similarly deals with the Kantian “thing-in-itself,” +which is also regarded as an object of higher dimensions.</p> + +<p>To show Kant in the light of a predecessor, Zöllner quotes the +following passage from the former’s “Träume eines Geistersehers, +erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik” (1766, Collected Works, +Vol. VII, page 32 et seqq.): “I confess that I am very much inclined +to assert the existence of immaterial beings in the world, +and to rank my own soul as one of such a class. It appears, there +is a spiritual essence existent which is intimately bound up with +matter but which does not act on those forces of the elements by +which the latter are connected, but upon some internal principle +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_437">[437]</span>of its own condition. It will, in the time to come—I know not +when or where—be proved, that the human soul, even in this life, +exists in a state of uninterrupted connection with all the immaterial +natures of the spiritual world; that it alternately acts on +them and receives impressions from them, of which, as a human +soul, it is not, in the normal state of things, conscious. It would +be a great thing, if some such systematic constitution of the spiritual +world, as we conceive it, could be deduced, not exclusively +from our general notion of spiritual nature, which is altogether too +hypothetical, but from some real and universally admitted observations,—or, +for that matter, if it could even be shown to be probable.”</p> + +<p>What Kant really asserts here is, first, the partly independent +and partly dependent existence of the soul, and of spiritual beings +generally, on matter, and, second, that spiritual beings have some +common connection with and mutually influence one another. This +contention, which is that of very many thinkers, does not, however, +entail the consequence that the “transcendental subject of +Kant” must be four-dimensional, as Zöllner asserts it does. Kant +never even hinted at the theory that the psychical features of the +world owe their connection with the material features to the fact +that they are four-dimensional and, therefore, include the three-dimensional. +Is it a necessary conclusion that if a thing exists and +is not three-dimensional, as is the case with the soul, that it is therefore +four-dimensional? Can it not in fact be so constituted that it is +wholly meaningless to speak of dimensions at all in connection +with it?</p> + +<p>Yet still more strongly than the words of Plato and Kant do +certain utterances of the mathematicians Gauss and Riemann speak +in favor of Zöllner’s hypothesis. S. v. Waltershausen relates of +Gauss in his “Gruss zum Gedächtnis,” (Leipsic, 1856,) that Gauss +had often remarked that the three dimensions of space were only +a specific peculiarity of the human mind. We can think ourselves, +he said, into beings who are only conscious of two dimensions; +similarly, perhaps, beings who are above and outside our world may +look down upon us; and there were, he continued, in a jesting tone, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_438">[438]</span>a number of problems which he had here indefinitely laid aside, but +hoped to treat in a superior state by superior geometrical methods. +Leaving aside this jest, which quite naturally suggested itself, the +remarks of Gauss are quite correct. We possess the power to abstract +and can think, therefore, what kind of geometry a being that +is only acquainted with a two-dimensional world would have; for +instance, we can imagine that such a being could not conceive of +the possibility of making two triangles coincide which were congruent +in the sense above explained, and so on. So, also, we can +understand that a being who has control of four dimensions can only +conceive of a geometry of four-dimensional space, yet may have the +capacity of thinking itself into spaces of other dimensions. But it +does not follow from this that a four-dimensional space exists, let +alone that it is inhabited by reasonable beings.</p> + +<p>Riemann, on the other hand, speaks directly of a world of spirits. +In his “Neue mathematische Principien der Naturphilosophie” +he puts forth the hypothesis that the space of the world is filled with +a material that is constantly pouring into the ponderable atoms, +there to disappear from the phenomenal world. In every ponderable +atom, he says, at every moment of time, there enters and appears a +determinate amount of matter, proportional to the force of gravitation. +The ponderable bodies, according to this theory, are the +place at which the spiritual world enters and acts on the material +world. Riemann’s world of spirits, the sole office of which is to explain +the phenomenon of gravitation as a force governing matter, is, +though, essentially different from the spiritual world of Zöllner, the +function of which is to explain supposed supersensuous phenomena +which stand in the most glaring contradiction with the established +known laws of the material world.</p> + +<p>Besides this appeal to the testimony of eminent men like Plato, +Kant, Gauss, and Riemann, the scientific prophet of modern spiritualism +also bases his theory on the belief, which has obtained at all +times and appeared in various forms among all peoples, that there +exist in the world forces which at times are competent to evoke +phenomena that are exempt from the ordinary laws of nature. We +have but to think of the phenomena of table-turning which once excited +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_439">[439]</span>the Chinese as much as it has aroused, during the last few +decades, the European and American worlds; or of the divining-rod, +by whose help our forefathers sought for water, in fact, as we +do now in parts of Europe and America.</p> + +<p>Cranz, in his essay on the subject, divides spiritualistic phenomena +into physical and intellectual. Of the first class he enumerates +the following: the moving of chairs and tables; the animation +of walking-sticks, slippers, and broomsticks; the miraculous throwing +of objects; spirit-rappings (Luther heard a sound in the Wartburg, +“as if three score casks were hurled down the stairs”); the +ecstatic suspension of persons above the floor; the diminution of +the forces of gravity; the ordeals of witches; the fetching of wished-for +objects; the declination of the magnetic needle by persons at a +distance; the untying of knots in a closed string; insensibility to +injury and exemption therefrom when tortured, as in handling red-hot +coals, carrying hot irons, etc.; the music of invisible spirits; +the materialisations of spirits or of individual parts of spirits (the +footprints in the experiments of Slade, photographed by Zöllner); +the double appearance of the same person; the penetration of matter +(of closed doors, windows, and so forth). As numerous also is +the selection presented by Cranz of intellectual phenomena, namely: +spirit-writing (Have’s instrument for the facilitation of intercourse +with spirits), the clairvoyance and divination of somnambulists, of +visionary, ecstatic, and hypnotised persons, prompted or controlled +by narcotic medicines, by sleeping in temples, by music and dancing, +by ascetic modes of life and residence in barren localities, by the exudations +of the soil and of water, by the contemplation of jewels, +mirrors, and crystal-pure water, and by anointing the finger-nails +with consecrated oil. Also the following additional intellectual phenomena +are cited: increased eloquence or suddenly acquired power +of speaking in foreign languages; spirit-effects at a distance; inability +to move, transferences of the will, and so forth.</p> + +<p>All these phenomena, presented with the aspect of truth, and +associated more or less with trickery, self-deception, and humbug, +are adduced by the spiritualists to substantiate the belief in a world +of spirits which consciously and purposely take part in the events +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_440">[440]</span>of the material world, and that these phenomena may be sufficiently +and consistently explained by the effects of the activity of such a +world. It is impossible for us to discuss and put to the test here +the explanations of all these supersensuous phenomena. Anything +and everything can be explained by spirits who act at will upon the +world. There are only a few of these phenomena, namely, clairvoyance +and Slade’s experiments, whose explanations are so intimately +connected with our main theme, the so-called fourth dimension, +that they cannot be passed over.</p> + +<p>First, with respect to clairvoyance, the American visionary Davis +describes the experiences which he claims to have made in this +condition, induced by “magnetic sleep,” as follows:⁠<a id="FNanchor_81" href="#Footnote_81" class="fnanchor">[81]</a> “The sphere +of my vision now began to expand. At first, I could only clearly +discern the walls of the house. At the start they seemed to me dark +and gloomy; but they soon became brighter and finally transparent. +I could now see the objects, the utensils, and the persons in the adjoining +house as easily as those in the room in which I sat. But my +perceptions extended further still; before my wandering glance, +which seemed to control a great semi-circle, the broad surface of +the earth, for hundreds of miles about me, grew as transparent as +water, and I saw the brains, the entrails, and the entire anatomy of +the beasts that wandered about in the forests of the eastern hemisphere, +hundreds and thousands of miles from the room in which I +sat.” The belief in the possibility of such states of clairvoyance is +by no means new. Alexander Dumas made use of it, for example, +in his “Mémoires d’un médicin,” in which Count Balsamo, afterwards +called Cagliostro, is said to possess the power of transforming +suitable persons into this wonderful condition and thus to find out +what other persons at distant places are doing. Zöllner explains +clairvoyance by means of the fourth dimension thus:</p> + +<p>A man who is accustomed to viewing things on a plain is supposed +to ascend to a considerable height in a balloon. He will +there enjoy a much more extended prospect than if he had remained +on the plain below, and will also be able to signal to greater distances. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_441">[441]</span>The plain, that is, the two-dimensioned space, is accordingly +viewed by him from points outside of the plain as “open” in +all directions. Exactly so, in Zöllner’s theory, must three-dimensioned +spaces appear, when viewed from points in four-dimensioned +space, namely, as “open”; and the more so in proportion as the +point in question is situated at a greater distance from the place of +our body, or in proportion as the soul ascends to a greater height in +this fourth dimension. Zöllner thus explains clairvoyance as a condition +in which the soul has displaced itself out of its three-dimensioned +space and reached a point which with respect to this space is +four-dimensionally situated and whence it is able to contemplate the +three-dimensional world without the interference of intervening obstacles.</p> + +<p>The following remark is to be made to this explanation. The +reason why we have a better and more extended view from a balloon +than from places on the earth is simply this, that between the +suspended balloon and the objects seen at a distance nothing intervenes +but the air, and air allows the transmission of light, whereas, +at the places below on the earth there are all kinds of material +things about the observer which prevent the transmission of light +and either render difficult or absolutely impossible the sight of +things which lie far away. In the same way, also, from a point in +four-dimensioned space, a three-dimensional object will be visible +only provided there are no obstacles intervening. If, therefore, this +awareness of a distant object is a real, actual vision by means of a +luminous ray which strikes the eye, there is contained in the explanation +of Zöllner the tacit assumption that the medium with +which the four-dimensional world is filled is also pervious to light +exactly as the atmosphere is.</p> + +<p>The theory that there are four-dimensional spirits who produce +the phenomena cited by the spiritualists received special support +from the experiments which the prestidigitateur Slade, who claimed +he was a spiritualistic medium, performed before Zöllner. Of these +experiments we will speak of the two most important, the experiment +with the glass sphere and the experiment with the knots. To +explain the connection of the glass sphere experiment with the fourth +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_442">[442]</span>dimension, we must first conceive of two-dimensional reasoning beings, +or, let us say, two-dimensional worms, living and moving in a +plane. For a creature of this kind it will be self-evident that there +are no other paths between two points of its plane than such as lie +within the plane. It must, accordingly, be beyond the range of +conception of this worm, how any two-dimensional object which lies +within a circle in its space can be brought to any other position in +its space outside the circle without the object passing through the +barriers formed by the circle’s circumference. But if this worm +could procure the services of a three-dimensional being, the transportation +of the object from a position within the circle to any position +outside it could be effected by the three-dimensional being simply +taking the object <i>out of</i> the plane and placing it at the desired +point. This object, therefore, would, in an inexplicable manner, +suddenly disappear before the eyes of the worms who were assembled +as spectators, and after the lapse of an interval of time would +again appear outside the circle without having passed at any point +through the circle’s circumference. If now we add another dimension, +we shall derive from this trick, which is wholly removed from +the sense-perception of the flattened worms, the following experiment, +which is wholly beyond the perception of us human beings. +Inside a glass sphere, which is closed all around, a grain of corn is +placed; the problem is to transport the corn to some place outside +the sphere without passing through the glass surface. Now we +should be able to perform this trick if some four-dimensional being +would render us the same aid that we before rendered the two-dimensional +worm. For the four-dimensional being could take the +grain of corn into his four-dimensional space and then replace it in +our space in the desired spot outside of the glass sphere. Slade +performed this trick before Zöllner. Its mere performance sufficed +to convince this latter investigator that Slade had here made use of +a four-dimensional agent, who, in respect of power of motion, controlled +his four-dimensional space as we do our three-dimensional +space. It never occurred to Zöllner that this experiment was the +cleverly executed trick of a prestidigitateur, or, as it would at once +occur to us, that the whole thing was a sensory illusion. The fact +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_443">[443]</span>that we cannot explain a trick easily and naturally does not irrevocably +prove that it is accomplished by other means than those which +the world of matter presents.</p> + +<p>Still better known than this last performance is Slade’s experiments +with knots. To explain this in connection with the fourth +dimension, we must resort again to the plane and the flat worm inhabiting +it. To two parallel lines in a plane let the two ends of a +third line, which has a double point, that is, intersects itself once, +be attached. Our flat worm would not be able to untie the loop +formed by the doubled third line, which we will call a string, because +it cannot execute motions in three dimensions. If, therefore, +a two-dimensional prestidigitateur should appear and accomplish +the trick of untying this loop without removing the two ends of the +string from the parallel lines, he will have accomplished for our flat +worm a supersensuous experiment. A human being engaged in the +service of the prestidigitateur could execute for him the experiment +by simply lifting the string a little out of the plane, pulling it taut, +and placing it back again. This suggests the following analogous +experiment for three-dimensional beings. The two ends of a string +in which a common knot has been made are sealed to the opposite +walls of a room. The problem is to untie this knot without breaking +the seals at the two ends of the string. Everybody knows that +this problem is not soluble, but it may be calculated mathematically +that the knot in the string can be untied as easily by motions in a +fourth dimension of space as in the experiment above described the +knot in the two-dimensional string was untied by a three-dimensional +motion. Now as Slade untied the knot before Zöllner’s eyes without +apparently making any use of the ends fastened in the walls, Zöllner +was still more strongly confirmed in the view that Slade had power +over spirits who performed the experiments for him.</p> + +<p>Still more far-reaching is the theory of Carl du Prel concerning +the relations of the material and the four-dimensional world. (Compare +his numerous essays in the spiritualistic magazine <i>Sphinx</i>.) +Just as the shadows of three-dimensional objects cast on a wall are +controlled in their movements by the things whose projections they +are, in the same way it is claimed does there exist back of everything +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_444">[444]</span>of this sense-perceptible world a real transcendental and four-dimensional +“thing-in itself” whose projection in the space of experience +is what we falsely regard as the independent thing. Thus +every man besides existing in his terrestrial self also exists in a spiritual +or astral self which constantly accompanies him in his walks +through life and whose existence is especially proclaimed in states +of profound sleep, of somnambulism, and in the conditions of mediums. +In this way Du Prel explains the wonderful feats of somnambulists, +and the aerial journeys of sorcerers and witches. Whereas, +ordinarily the separation of the material body from the astral body +is only effected at the moment of death; in the case of somnambulists +this separation may take place at any time, or, as Du Prel says: +“the threshold of feeling may be permanently displaced.”</p> + +<p>In view of the natural relations of such theories to the dogmas +of Christianity it is explainable that theologians also have raised +their voices for or against spiritualism. While the <i>Protestant Church +Times</i> beheld in the “repulsive thaumaturgic performances which +these coryphæi of modern science offer, a lack of comprehension of +real philosophy,” the magazine <i>The Proof of Faith</i>, expresses its delight +at the discovery of spiritualism in the following manner: +“Every Christian will surely rejoice at the deep and perhaps mortal +wound which these new discoveries have in all probability administered +to modern materialism.”</p> + +<p>We shall pass by the childish opinion that the Bible also speaks +of four dimensions, as both in Job (xi, 8-9) and in the Epistle to the +Ephesians (iii, 18) only breadth, length, depth, and height, that +is, four directions of extension, are mentioned. Yet we will still add, +as Cranz has done, the reflections which Zöllner, as the most prominent +representative of modern spiritualism, has put forward respecting +its relation to the doctrines of Christianity (<i>Wissensch. Abhandl.</i>, +Vol. III). By the foundation of transcendental physics on the +basis of spiritualistic phenomena, the “new light” has arisen which +is spoken of in the New Testament. The rending of the veil of the +Temple on the crucifixion of Christ, the resurrection, the ascension, +the transfiguration, the speaking with many tongues on the giving +out of the Holy Ghost, all these are in Zöllner’s view spiritualistic +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_445">[445]</span>phenomena. Similarly, he sees a reference to the four-dimensional +world of spirits in all those sayings of Christ in which the latter +speaks to his Apostles of the impossibility of their having any image +or notion of the place to which when he disappeared he would go +and whence he would return. (Gospel of St. John, xiii, 33, 36; xiv, +2, 3, 28; xvi, 5, 13).</p> + +<p>Ulrici, however, goes furthest in the mingling of spiritualistic +and Christian beliefs; for he sees in the doctrine of spiritualism a +means of strengthening belief in a supreme moral world-order and +in the immortality of the soul. In answer to Ulrici’s tract “Spiritualism +So-called, a Question of Science” (1889) Wundt wrote an +annihilating reply bearing the title “Spiritualism, a Question of +Science So-called.” Wundt criticises the future condition of our +souls according to spiritualistic hypotheses in the following sarcastic +yet pertinent words, which Cranz also quotes: “(1) Physically, the +souls of the dead come into the thraldom of certain living beings +who are called mediums. These mediums are, for the present, at +least, a not widely diffused class and they appear to be almost exclusively +Americans. At the command of these mediums, departed +souls perform mechanical feats which possess throughout the character +of absolute aimlessness. They rap, they lift tables and chairs, +they move beds, they play on the harmonica, and do other similar +things. (2) Intellectually, the souls of the dead enter a condition +which, if we are to judge from the productions which they deposit +on the slates of the mediums, must be termed a very lamentable +one. These slate-writings belong throughout in the category of +imbecility; they are totally bereft of any contents. (3) The most +favored, apparently, is the moral condition of the soul. According +to the testimony which we have, its character cannot be said to be +anything else than that of utter harmlessness. From brutal performances, +such, for instance, as the destruction of bed-canopies, +the spirits most politely refrain.” Wundt then laments the demoralising +effect which spiritualism exercises on people who have +hitherto devoted their powers to some serious pursuit or even to the +service of science. In fact it is a presumptuous and flagrant procedure +to forsake the path of exact research, which slow as it is, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_446">[446]</span>yet always leads to a sure extension of knowledge, in the hope that +some aimless, foolhardy venture into the realm of uncertainty will +carry us further than the path of slow toil, and that we can ever thus +easily lift the veil which hides from man the problems of the world +that are yet unsolved.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>Now that we have presented the opinions of others respecting +the existence of a four-dimensional world of spirits, the author would +like to develop one or two ideas of his own on the subject. In the +preceding section it was stated that everything that we perceive by +our senses is three-dimensional and that everything that possesses +four or more dimensions can only be regarded as abstractions or fictions +which our reason forms in its constant efforts after an extension +and generalisation of knowledge. To speak of a two-dimensional +matter is as self-contradictory as the notion of four-dimensional +matter. But a two or a four-dimensional world might exist in some +other manner than a material manner, and for all we know in one +which to us does not admit of representation. But in such a case, +if it were without the power of affecting the material world, we should +never be able to acquire any knowledge concerning its existence, +and it would be totally indifferent to the people of the three-dimensional +world, whether such a world existed or not. Just as an artist +during his lifetime produces a number of different works of art, so +also the Creator might have created a number of different-dimensioned +worlds which in no wise interfere with one another. In such +a case, any one world would not be able to know anything of any +other, and we must consequently regard the question whether a +four-dimensional world exists which is incapable of affecting ours, +as insoluble. We have only to examine, therefore, the question +whether the phenomenal world perhaps is a single individual in a +great layer of worlds of which every successive one has one more +dimension than the preceding and which are so connected with one +another that each successive world contains and includes the preceding +world, and, therefore, can produce effects in it. For our +reason, which draws its inferences from the phenomena of this world, +tells us, that if outside the three-dimensional world there exists a +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_447">[447]</span>second four-dimensional world, containing ours, there is no reason +why worlds of more or less dimensions should not, with the same +right, also exist. But if now, as Zöllner and his adherents maintain, +four-dimensional spirits exist which can act by the mere efforts +of their own wills on our world, there is surely no reason why we +three-dimensional beings should not also be able to produce effects +on some two-dimensional animated world. Whether we have, generally, +any such influence we do not know, but we certainly do know +that we do not act purposely and consciously on a two-dimensional +world. If, therefore, Zöllner were right, the plan of creation +would possess the wonderful feature that four-dimensional beings +are capable of arbitrarily affecting the three-dimensional world, but +that three-dimensional beings have no right in their turn consciously +to affect a two dimensional world.</p> + +<p>The supporters of Zöllner’s hypothesis will perhaps reply to +the objection just made, that the plan of creation might, after all, +possibly possess this wonderful peculiarity, that we human beings +perhaps, in some higher condition of culture, will be able to act consciously +on two-dimensional worlds, and that at any rate it is simply +an inference by analogy to conclude from the non-existence of a relation +between three and two dimensions that the same relation is also +wanting in the case of four and three dimensions. As a matter of fact, +the objection above made is not intended to refute Zöllner’s hypothesis, +but only to stamp it as very improbable. But despite this improbability +Zöllner would still be right if the phenomena of the material +world actually made his hypothesis necessary. That, however, +is by no means the case. Although most of the phenomena to which +the spiritualists appeal are probably founded on sense-illusions, +humbug, and self-deception, it cannot be denied that there possibly +do exist phenomena which cannot be brought into harmony with +the natural laws now known. There always have been mysterious +phenomena, and there always will be. Yet, as we have often seen +that the progress of science has again and again revealed as natural +what former generations held to be supernatural, it is certainly +wholly wrong to bring in for the explanation of phenomena which +now seem mysterious an hypothesis like that of Zöllner’s, by which +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_448">[448]</span>everything in the world can be explained. If we adopt a point of +view which regards it as natural for spirits arbitrarily to interfere in +the workings of the world, all scientific investigation will cease, for +we could never more trust or rely upon any chemical or physical experiment, +or any botanical or zoölogical culture. If the spirits are +the authors of the phenomena that are mysterious to us, why should +they also not have control of the phenomena which are not mysterious? +The existence of mysterious phenomena justifies in no manner +or form the assumption that spirits exist which produce them. +Would it not be much simpler, if we <i>must</i> have supernatural influences, +to adopt the naïve religious point of view, according to +which everything that happens is traceable to the direct, actual, and +personal interference of a single being which we call God? Things +which formerly stood beyond the sphere of our knowledge and were +regarded as marvellous events, as a storm, for example, now stand +in the most intimate connection with known natural laws. Things +that formerly were mysterious are so no longer. If one hundred and +fifty years ago some scientists were in the possession of our present +knowledge of inductional electricity and had connected Paris and +Berlin with a wire by whose aid one could clearly interpret in +Berlin what another person had at that very moment said in Paris, +people would have regarded this phenomenon as supernatural and +assumed that the originator of this long-distance speaking was in +league with spirits.</p> + +<p>We recognise, thus, that the things which are termed supernatural +depend to a great extent on the stage of culture which humanity +has reached. Things which now appear to us mysterious, +may, in a very few decades, be recognised as quite natural. This +knowledge, however, is not to be obtained by the lazy assumption +of bands of spirits as the authors of mysterious phenomena, but by +performing what in physics and chemistry is called experiment. +But the first and essential condition of all scientific experimenting +is that the experimenter shall be absolutely master of the conditions +under which the experiment is or is not to succeed. Now, this criterion +of scientific experimenting is totally lacking in all spiritualistic +experiments. We can never assign in their case the conditions under +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_449">[449]</span>which they will or will not succeed. When all the preparations +in a spiritualistic séance have been properly made, but nothing takes +place, the beautiful excuse is always forthcoming that the “spirits +were not willing,” that there were “too many incredulous persons +present,” and so forth. Fortunately, in physical experiments these +pretexts are not necessary. By the path of experiment, and not by +that of transcendental speculation, physics has thus made incredible +progress and has piled new knowledge strata on strata upon the +old. Accordingly, the prospect is left that the mysteries which the +conditions and properties of the human soul still present can be +solved more and more by the methods of scientific experiment. To +this end, however, it is especially necessary that the physio-psychological +experiments in question should only be performed by men +who possess the critical eye of inquiry, who are free from the dangers +of self-illusion, and who are competent to keep apart from their +experiments all superstition and deception. The history of natural +science clearly teaches that it is only by this road that man can arrive +at certain and well-established knowledge. If, therefore, there +really is behind such phenomena as mind-reading, telepathy, and +similar psychical phenomena something besides humbug and self-illusion, +what we have to do is to study privately and carefully by +serious experiments the success or non-success of such phenomena, +and not allow ourselves to be influenced by the public and dramatic +performances of psychical artists, like Cumberland and his ilk.</p> + +<p>The high eminence on which the knowledge and civilisation of +humanity now stands was not reached by the thoughtless employment +of fanciful ideas, nor by recourse to four-dimensional worlds, but by +hard, serious labor and slow, unceasing research. Let all men of +science, therefore, band themselves together and oppose a solid +front to methods that explain everything that is now mysterious to +us by the interference of independent spirits. For these methods, +owing to the fact that they can explain everything, explain nothing, +and thus oppose dangerous obstacles to the progress of real research, +to which we owe the beautiful temple of modern knowledge.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">Hermann Schubert.</span></p> + +<div class="footnotes"> + +<h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_79" href="#FNanchor_79" class="label">[79]</a> This is discussed at greater length in my tract <i>Zahl und Zählen</i> in Virchow-Holtzendorff’s +collection of popular essays, J. F. Richter, 1887.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_80" href="#FNanchor_80" class="label">[80]</a> Victor Schlegel, indeed, has made models of the three-dimensional nets of all +the six structures which correspond in four-dimensioned space to the five regular +bodies of our space, in an analogous manner to that by which we draw in a plane +the nets of five regular bodies. Schlegel’s models are made by Brill of Darmstadt.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_81" href="#FNanchor_81" class="label">[81]</a> Quoted by Cranz.</p></div> + +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_450">[450]</span></p> + +<h3 class="nobreak" id="CORRESPONDENCE">CORRESPONDENCE.</h3> + +</div> + +<h4 class="nobreak" id="FRANCE_III_I">I.<br> +<span class="smaller">THE RELIGIOUS OUTLOOK IN FRANCE.</span></h4> + +<p>The return of Mme. Hyacinthe Loyson to France after her +American tour, undertaken, I understand, in order to obtain +new support for the Gallican church, suggests the writing of this +article, which will be a brief survey, from the point of view of an +American layman, of the present religious situation in France.</p> + +<p>As Père Hyacinthe’s reform has been made the peg on which +to hang this article, perhaps I cannot do better than begin by an +examination of the noble but fruitless labors of the eloquent ex-Carmelite. +While one cannot help being carried away by the oratory +of Hyacinthe Loyson and charmed with his personality, so full +of wit, kindliness, and gentility; while one must admire the devotedness +and earnestness of Mme. Loyson and feel much sympathy for +their studious and promising son Paul, one is convinced in spite of +one’s self that this latter-day Gallicanism is doomed to failure if indeed +it has not already failed. You have simply to visit the poor +little church in the Rue d’Arras, in this city, to see what a mere +handful of followers Père Hyacinthe has been able to collect in this +great centre of two million people, after years of work and after +preaching hundreds of magnificent sermons that would fill to overflowing +the largest edifice in America, Sunday after Sunday, if delivered +with similar eloquence by a divine of no matter what denomination +or of no denomination at all. To the practical layman of +this practical age no further demonstration is necessary in order to +prove that Père Hyacinthe’s mission is, as the French say, <i>un coup +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_451">[451]</span>dans l’eau</i>, that is, an effort which produces no result. Whenever +I leave this humble church and am well out in the narrow, shabby +street in which it is situated and am away from the influence of the +preacher’s fascination, I cannot help exclaiming, What a waste of +power, What a casting of pearls before swine! And all of Mme. +Loyson’s enthusiastic conversation in private, her accounts of the +encouraging letters received by the Père, furtively of course, from +discontented priests, and her statements concerning the warm words +of sympathy and support from the churchmen of foreign lands, cannot +remove that abiding feeling that this rejuvenated Gallican church +movement is other than a dismal failure; more than ever one exclaims: +<i>C’est un coup dans l’eau</i>.</p> + +<p>Père Hyacinthe has always received, in France as abroad, his +greatest support from the Protestants. But Protestantism here in +France is a sickly growth when compared, for instance, with its +rich and sturdy brother in the United States. It has, at most, only +a small band of followers, nearly lost to view in the vast army of +Catholicism and Freethought. Furthermore, the Liberal wing is +losing ground and the Orthodox wing gaining slightly, not an encouraging +sign in these days to those who hope for the final triumph +of faith over the growing tendency towards infidelity. The real truth +is that about the only strength left in French Protestantism to-day +lies in the fact that there is a certain <i>éclat</i> associated, in the eyes of +the upper classes, with the being a Protestant, much as is the case +in America and England, in the same rank, about being a Roman +Catholic. It distinguishes you from the multitude, and in these +democratic times human nature, especially when it is that of the +“upper ten,” is very keen for elimination from “the vulgar throng.” +It is difficult for an American to comprehend this peculiar little streak +of innocent vanity running through certain French circles which +shows itself in this wish to be known as Protestants. It is not too +much to say that to the impartial outside observer this phase of the +French Protestantism of to-day is the one that first strikes the eye; +which goes to prove in a peculiar but significant manner the weak +hold, on the one hand, which the doctrine of Luther and Calvin +now has on the French nation, and, on the other hand, how universal +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_452">[452]</span>must be scepticism, freethought, and utter indifference to +church and religion of every kind.</p> + +<p>If native French Protestantism exerts so little influence on the +nation, it is easy to imagine the excessive futility of the work of the +foreign missionary. There is a great deal said in American and religious +circles about the labors in France of the Salvation Army, the +McAll Mission, the Young Men’s Christian Association, etc. I have +received more than one letter from would-be subscribers in the +United States asking me if these and other similar organisations +were really accomplishing all that they pretend. My reply is invariably +that if you regard their labors as charity work some good is +being done, but if money is asked for because of the religious results +which have been accomplished, the demand should be considered +to be arrant humbug. If Père Hyacinthe, a Frenchman and +a Catholic, after forty years of labor, has accomplished next to nothing, +it is easy to imagine how this nation, so reserved in its relations +with the foreigner when he attempts to penetrate into its inner life, +would treat Scotch and Yankee missionaries. From a religious +standpoint, therefore, American money and sympathy is absolutely +thrown away when it is sent to France. If it be answered that much +misery and physical suffering is relieved by these foreign missions, +the French might well ask if charity does not begin at home. The +French are a peculiarly thrifty people. Few are poor, beggars are +scarce and charitable institutions are rich and numerous. Hence +devoting American dollars to the relief of French distress is much +like sending coals to Newcastle, if it is not a piece of sheer impertinence, +like our protesting to the Czar against his Siberian convict +system when we have one quite as cruel in full swing in some of our +Southern states.</p> + +<p>And now, finally, a few paragraphs about the great Roman +Catholic church of France, the only religious institution of any real +first-rate importance in this country.</p> + +<p>While it is true that the Catholic Church, at least as a church, +still has a strong hold on the French nation, it is also quite true +that indifference, infidelity, free thought, and atheism are on the increase. +Matthew Arnold says, in his essay on Tolstoi, written in +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_453">[453]</span>1887: “Between the age of twenty and that of thirty-five he [Tolstoi] +had lost, he tells us, the Christian belief in which he had been +brought up, a loss of which examples nowadays abound certainly +everywhere, but which in Russia, as in France, is among all young +men of the upper and cultivated classes more a matter of course, +perhaps, more universal, more avowed, than it is with us.” Arnold +might have enlarged, at least in the case of France, his limits and +stated that in the cities the middle and lower classes, too, particularly +the male portion, have abandoned Rome. One has only to +visit a Paris church to be convinced of the contempt which men feel +for the priesthood and religion: you can count ten female devotees +for one of the masculine gender. In the village church, far away +from the great centres, the priest may still have the large majority +of the population, men and women alike, as faithful attendants upon +service. But even here, for one man who confesses, a dozen or +score of women will kneel at the chair. Then again, this more +general participation in religious ceremonies by the rural population +is due in a large measure to the fact that these Sunday masses +and vespers are almost the only break and variety in a very dead +and monotonous existence. The church is a sort of meeting place, +where whole families, babies, children, and adults, congregate. The +hum of idle conversation, the crying of infants, and the ardent exhortations +of the priest are often mingled in a manner that would +astonish and shock a pious Protestant, accustomed to the highly +proper atmosphere of an Episcopalian or Presbyterian Church in +the United States.</p> + +<p>Another sign of the disfavor in which French Catholicism finds +itself to-day is seen in the quality of its future priests. You have +simply to look into the faces of the seminarists as they pass by you +in procession in the streets of Paris to be convinced of the well-known +fact that these young men are, for the most part, the faint-hearted +and dull-headed sons of the peasantry, eager to escape the +drudgery of farm life and not intelligent enough for business or the +petty employments offered by the State.</p> + +<p>“Anybody can make a priest,” is often heard in France. The +result is that just as the English army is the receptacle for the riff-raff—the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_454">[454]</span>Tommy Atkinses of Rudyard Kipling’s “Barrack-room +Ballads”—of the cities, so the French priesthood draws most of its +recruits from the scum of the farming districts. This fact contrasts +strongly, by the way, with the manner in which the Protestants fill +their pulpits. The young man who becomes a pastor is not looked +upon by his friends and companions as a failure and a numskull. +Quite the contrary; he is immediately classed among those taking a +high moral stand. Some of the best families of France are descended +from, or have relatives who are, clergymen, and they are +quite proud of the fact; another example of that sentiment of halo +surrounding French Protestantism to which reference has already +been made.</p> + +<p>Another cause of this boycotting of the cloth as a profession by +the youth of the élite is due to the Church having got on the wrong +side during the struggle for the foundation of the present Republic. +The Catholics supported the Monarchists and Bonapartists and took +an active part in the attempt to prevent the advent of republican +institutions and to overthrow these institutions when they had been +accepted by a majority of the nation. This unpatriotic course brought +the Church into bad odor among republicans, so that the having a +son in orders, for example, would be apt to be an impediment to a +father aspiring to political preferment, especially if the latter belonged +to the Radical or Socialist wing of the Republican army. +The result is that a whole great political party is, in its general tendency, +opposed to the Catholic Church.</p> + +<p>Nor is the harm occasioned thereby limited to lowering the +quality of the seminarists. It makes a vast number of intelligent +and influential citizens sworn enemies of religion. Thus, when +Gambetta attended funerals, he would not enter the church, but +wait outside in the porch. When Louis Blanc was buried neither +church nor priest participated in the pageant. On the death of +Henri Martin, a free-thinking Protestant clergyman officiated at the +burial service. Hundreds of other prominent Republicans, who +have died or been buried since 1870, never entered a church, perhaps, +except when their bodies were borne there by their families, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_455">[455]</span>acting under the influence of its female members, or out of respect +for public sentiment.</p> + +<p>One of the shrewdest acts of Leo XIII. is his recent declaration +in favor of the French Republic. He not only accepts the situation, +but has ordered the faithful, both ecclesiastical and lay, in +France to do likewise. But this demand has not been complied +with without a murmur. More than one priest and noble has shown +himself more ultramontane than the Pope. The important fact remains +true, however, that officially the Vatican recognises the political +change in France, and, though the Republicans, particularly +those of the Radical camp, are wary of these new converts and still +believe with Gambetta, that “<i>le clericalisme, voilà l’ennemi</i>,” yet the +mere fact that the Vatican lays down its arms means a great deal, +even if the hatchet may not be definitively buried. Moderate Republicans, +those who go to church even if they do not believe what +is said there, think they see in this action of the Holy Father a new +source of strength for the Republic. And it seems to me that they +are right, and that this view is the soundest. If the priesthood +ceases its attacks on the political powers that be, and if these latter +keep a sharp watch, which will be done while the Radical and Socialist +elements are so strong in Chamber and Senate, the clerical +party can be held in check, and the Republic will have so many less +enemies, even if these quondam enemies are but lukewarm friends.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">Theodore Stanton.</span></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_456">[456]</span></p> + +<h4 class="nobreak" id="FRANCE_III_II">II.<br> +<span class="smaller">NEW FRENCH BOOKS.</span></h4> + +<p>I am happy to have the opportunity in my present letter to +speak of a book of real importance, <i>La pathologie des emotions, Études +physiologiques et cliniques</i>, by <span class="smcap">M. Ch. Féré</span>. The name of this learned +physician of the Bicêtre is sufficiently well known to dispense me +from the necessity of speaking of his personality, so that I can devote +all that I have to say to his work. Its great merit is not so +much the novelty of the psychological theory which is laid at its +foundation, as the wealth of facts presented and the sureness of the +methods pursued. M. Féré’s mind is of a distinctly positive cast, +and he possesses in a high degree the ability to draw from the thesis +which he illustrates and confirms, the various consequences which +from a medical and social point of view this thesis involves.</p> + +<p>States of intellectual consciousness, he writes, citing Spencer, +cannot be dissociated from emotional states. The emotions are the +products of our mental representations of agreeable states or painful +states, and are the stronger according as they contain a greater number +of present or nascent sensations competent to recall these states. +The emotions, accordingly, being simply representations of states +of consciousness provoked by external excitations, it is to be presumed +that the physiological conditions of emotions (of central or +cerebral origin) present a striking analogy, if not an absolute resemblance, +to the physiological conditions of sensations (of peripheral +origin, either internal or external); and this relation should be as +prominently marked in pathological as in normal states. The upshot +of all this is, continues M. Féré, that physical agents capable of +modifying a state of consciousness of peripheral origin (sensations), +are also capable of modifying states of consciousness of central origin +(emotions). “The external signs of these different states of +consciousness can be studied by the same methods. Psychology is +only specialised physiology; mental medicine only a specialisation +of general medicine, from which it must borrow its methods of research +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_457">[457]</span>and action—all purely physical. The demonstration of these +relations is the object of the present work.”</p> + +<p>The work, which contains almost six hundred pages, presents +no divisions but that of chapters. But it would not be difficult to +group its contents under the four general titles: (1) physiological +and pathological effects of physical agents on man; (2) physiological +conditions and pathological and curative effects of emotions; +(3) psychopathy and morbid emotivity; (4) the consequences to individuals +and society of morbid emotivity, its medical treatment, +prophylaxis and legislation. The entire demonstration of M. Féré, +I might add, is essentially aimed at the two following propositions: +the first, that all the symptoms of emotions possess a certain resemblance +to those of fatigue or physical pain; the other, that the original +source of morbid emotivities and their resultant disorders is a +state of depression congenital or acquired.</p> + +<p>M. Féré reverts constantly to these fundamental ideas. After +having exhibited, for example, the reciprocal influences of the emotions, +or disorders of the imagination, and of disorders which are +of physical origin, he concludes that “physical disease and moral +disease have the same basis.” It is thus only in appearance, he +writes, that the mind has any influence on the functions of the body; +the phenomena of mind are, quite the reverse, the necessary effect +of certain modifications of the body, and it is by the intermediary +action of the manifestations of the body that the representations of +the mind act. It is found convenient to regard the gray matter of +the brain as the central organ of the emotions, and the great sympathetic +as the peripheral organ that presides over their “exteriorisation”; +but we have no right to think of the emotions without +their external signs, and we are thus led to the conclusion that +“emotion is essentially a generalised reflex phenomenon the centrifugal +path of which is principally the great sympathetic system.”</p> + +<p>A psychological question much debated since M. Ribot took it +up, the question of <i>attention</i>, is also treated here, in an incidental +yet very interesting manner (Chapter III). M. Féré connects attention +with the study of the physiological conditions of physical +action, and thus takes sides, it will be seen, with the motory theory +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_458">[458]</span>of attention. James Sully, and others, have denied the existence +of muscular phenomena accompanying attention. But physiology +is in a position to disclose the existence of these movements; it can +study their qualities, their energy, their form, their precision, and +their rapidity. We will find in M. Féré’s book a number of new +experimental facts establishing the thesis that “muscular tension +constitutes the physiological condition of attention.” “The mistake +of many psychologists (M. Hirth, for example) has been, that +they have confounded rest with willed immobility, which from a +mechanical point of view is very far removed from the former; for +immobility of will is precisely the result of very intense muscular +activities, and can only be produced by a general tension of the +muscular system, which throws the subject in a state such that it +can react the most quickly and most energetically on any excitation, +whencesoever it may proceed.” Willed, or voluntary, immobility +is attention itself; to produce this state, well-enervated and well-nourished +muscles are necessary. “We may say,” declares M. Féré, +“that the practice of immobility is the most favorable exercise for +the development of the mind: a system of education which should +neglect this exercise would suppress attention, it would be a regressive +education.”</p> + +<p>“It is lack of attention,” he tells us further on, “that is the +cause of the insensibility of hysterical patients, and it is instability +of attention that is the cause of the variability of their sensory and +motory disorders.” It is all due to the want of sufficient energy to +bring simultaneously into a state of tension the muscular settings of +all of the sensory organs. Hysterical anæsthesia according to him—and +how perfectly right he is!—is nothing but a mental and psychical +disease, which may be cured by <i>suggestion</i>; it is an organic +malady, which cannot be cured without the restoration of the proper +organic state.</p> + +<p>Worthy of notice are a few pages on the existence of electrical +phenomena, “which are exaggerated in certain subjects, but which +appear to exist in a more feeble degree in the normal states.” The +facts here involved might furnish us with a key to the phenomena +of transmission, polarisation, elective sensibility, and certain actions +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_459">[459]</span>at a distance, whose solution still presents great difficulties. Also to +be noted are a number of corrections of inductions made by Darwin, +whom ignorance of physiology often involved in mistakes concerning +the true nature of phenomena: thus Darwin was often led to attribute +an intentional character to actions which are throughout reflex.</p> + +<p>Basing his views on the inevitable correlation of these two orders +of phenomena, the physical and the psychical, M. Féré stands +in a position of direct hostility to the metaphysics (of course, unconscious) +of the great body of alienists. He selects the characteristic +disorder of insanity, namely hallucination, and sets about to +show the existence of physical phenomena concomitant with hallucination. +Chapter XIII is one of the most instructive of his work +and well worth thoughtful perusal. Let us add on this point that +M. Féré stoutly combats the doctrine, held by Magnan in particular, +that all forms of phobia, that is to say, of morbid emotive states, +are the brands of degeneration. He admits, however, that a great +number are connected with permanent constitutional states, congenital +or acquired.</p> + +<p>M. Féré accepts the pathological and degenerative theory of +crime. But he rejects in a measure Lombroso’s thesis of the assimilation +of genius to insanity. Genius and talent, he says, are by no +means devoid of intellectual and emotional anomalies, but it is not +true that neuropathic states are the indispensable concomitants of +genius, although susceptibility to impressions is, when not developed +to excess, one of the physiological conditions of genius.</p> + +<p>With respect to the social consequences involved, I will simply +quote his concise statement that “physiology is quite in accord with +political economy in condemning the intemperate generosity which +favors the development and multiplication of emotive personalities.” +With regard, finally, to the question of responsibility, M. Féré’s +position differs, so far as I can see, in no respect from my own, which +I have expounded at sufficient length in a former number of <i>The +Monist</i>, to dispense me from the necessity of reverting to it here.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>Our next book is also a remarkable one—<i>Les transformations du +droit</i>, by <span class="smcap">M. G. Tarde</span>, a small volume of some two hundred and +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_460">[460]</span>twelve pages. M. Tarde has again and again declared himself the +avowed adversary of Spencerianism, and of evolution generally, at +least in so far as the idea of evolution is indiscriminately and unreflectingly +employed, as is the case, he maintains, in a great class of +social questions which make up the criminal and civil law. Everywhere +in these domains, despite apparent uniformity, which is the +simple effect of a perspective that effaces the differences of remote +times, is found diversity. The serial stages of development professedly +disclosed, he rejects as absolutely incompetent in the explanation +of criminal law, procedure, the status of persons and things, +and obligations.</p> + +<p>In criminal law, for example, we ordinarily regard the system +of pecuniary composition as the origin of penal justice, and the idea +of vengeance as necessarily antecedent to the idea of culpability. A +mistake, says M. Tarde. And he offers on this subject a distinction +which is quite curious. He sees the defensive reaction made against +criminal acts originally splitting up into two distinct forms of quite +unequal scope: the one moral, the joint product of indignation and +compassion; the other vindictive, malevolent, and ruthless. The +first, according to him, is exercised within the family and between +members of the same social group; the second is displayed towards +the foreigner and the enemy. Of these two sources of penality, the +domestic moral punishment is the most important; the blow-for-blow +policy, or vengeance, although more apparent, is a secondary +source. I fully admit that the instinct of sympathy, the primitive +condition of all social aggregation, has never been wholly absent +from human relations, and it might be that the distinction perceived +by M. Tarde is well founded, although the two sources appear to +have become so confounded in the justice of the tribunals that it is +difficult to trace them to that point. But M. Tarde seems to me to +be too much disposed to flatter the portrait of the primitive man +and to make as “mild as lambs” these prehistoric creatures whom +we have pictured as “cruel as tigers,” and to be too much preoccupied +with the ideas of penality and moral responsibility, which he +thinks the new theories have compromised.</p> + +<p>With respect to the status of persons, he denies the existence of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_461">[461]</span>the well-known order of development by which promiscuity, matriarchy, +and patriarchy are said to succeed each other. The tribe +could only have arisen, he tells us, from the federation of families, +and the strong family, the one capable of development, could only +have been patriarchal. It is wrong, he adds, to regard uterine filiation, +that is, the custom of considering a child the son of its mother +and not the son of its father, as a vestige of a pre-existent matriarchy. +“In a patriarchal society, polygamy—which is the very reverse of +matriarchy—ought in the very necessity of things to give predominance +to the custom referred to, so that children born of the same +mother could be distinguished from one another.” This, indeed, +was the idea of the Greek tragedians. The maxim, which occurs so +often in Euripides, that it is not good that a man should have several +wives, is always disclosed as the anxiety of assuring the legitimacy +of children; Æschylus charges Minerva to defend the “cause +of her father”; it is one of the aspects of the reaction against the +customs of Asia. The primitive family, says M. Tarde, in summing +up, was quite different in its original forms; it was here monogamic, +there polygamic, and in other places polyandrous, at one time exogamic +and at another endogamic, and so forth. “Marriage, therefore, +did not spring from a single typical form, nor does it, in its various +forms, make towards such.”</p> + +<p>His criticisms are of equal strength with regard to the status of +things and the presumed priority of collective property. Contrary +to the views of M. de Laveleye, he is of opinion that the community +of the village could only have arisen on an enlarged model of the community +of the family, “just as the vestal fire of the city could only +have been lighted in imitation of the fire of the domestic hearth”: +The certain effect of the first must in its origin have been to encroach +upon, not to produce, the second. Excessively preoccupied in finding +in the present the vestiges of a state of things that is past, the +evolutionists involve themselves, regardless of consequences, in many +naïve and wonderful theories, which M. Tarde, in his keen and +pointed style, has not hesitated to expose. There is much point +and a profusion of the <i>granum salis</i> in these instructive pages.</p> + +<p>With respect to obligations, he makes a distinction, as in criminal +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_462">[462]</span>law, between internal and external relations. Also, after having +asserted with Sir Henry Sumner Maine, the non-fusion of the law of +nature and the law of nations, he remarks that here also there exists +two sources whose waters have not subsequently flowed together: +the <i>jus naturæ</i> is conceived to be the generalisation of a type of relations +abstracted from the internal relations of the members of the +primitive social group; the <i>jus gentium</i> to be the outcome of relations +between men that belong to different groups.</p> + +<p>Is, then, this disordered succession of the social data mere +chance? The reader will bethink himself of a number of facts which +go to disprove this conclusion, and it is a difficulty moreover which +M. Tarde has also felt. He replies by making a distinction of “two +kinds of laws, the laws of causation and the supposed laws of evolution.” +The first, which in his theory are analogous to the laws of +celestial mechanics, whose formulæ remain constant no matter what +the history of the solar systems distributed throughout the heavens +may be, are the psychological laws; the second are merely arbitrary +formulæ, which, when we come to define them accurately, do not +admit of adaptation even to the majority of cases. The psychological +laws of which M. Tarde here speaks are reducible to <i>imitation</i>⁠<a id="FNanchor_82" href="#Footnote_82" class="fnanchor">[82]</a>—consequently +to <i>invention</i>—and to <i>logic</i>. I certainly do not propose +to question the importance of these factors. In a short tract +published several years ago I pointed out myself that the influences +of contact are more efficient than the influences of race or even of +climate, and this implicitly involves the idea of imitation. Yet the +character of the psychological factor does not, it seems to me, exclude +a tendency towards a certain arrangement of the data of society, +despite their possible and actual diversity. “With respect +to the facts of society,” I wrote, “we point out their changes but +do not succeed in disclosing the laws of their evolution; the most +we have done is to note amid the totality certain features which appear +to predominate.” To extricate these features is a task not +unworthy of the historian. M. Tarde himself admits that results of +this character have already been reached, and he especially points +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_463">[463]</span>to “the splendid and commendable movement in advance, which +though not generally noticed⁠<a id="FNanchor_83" href="#Footnote_83" class="fnanchor">[83]</a> has, nevertheless, accompanied all +juridical evolutions”—namely, the constant enlargement of the relations +of law as the result of a growing sympathy and sociability.</p> + +<p>To sum up, the point of view which M. Tarde has taken does +not exclude a class of researches different from his. Nothing can +be better than to formulate the laws of the psychological agent, and +M. Tarde, original mind that he is, has done this with a superiority +and penetration to which I yield my unqualified admiration. At +bottom, does not the view of Auguste Comte, despite his contempt +for psychology, involve the preliminary study of the biological individual +and the social agent? Psychological laws and physical laws +undoubtedly meet in the same group of “laws of causation”; still, +it should not be forgotten that in the social order of things man is +the creator of the facts and that his creations react upon him in the +proportion in which they are realised. At any rate, a tangible relation +exists between the creations of the agent and the variations +of the results, and it is not forbidden to inquire if there does not +also exist a certain order in these creations, the effect of which would +be to produce a recognisable serial succession in the results, a medial +line about which the events of our life oscillate. A difficult investigation—and +one in which M. Tarde has shown himself to be +too speedily satisfied, and in which we should strenuously guard +against hasty generalisations. It is unpleasant, we admit, to turn +topsy-turvy a house in which we have long lived in comfort; but +our contentment returns in an increased measure when we have replaced +our things in their proper places, and swept out the dusty +corners.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p><span class="smcap">M. M. Aguiléra</span> has just published a work entitled, <i>L’idée du +Droit en Allemagne</i>. His book is a history of the different schools +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_464">[464]</span>of law which have arisen in Germany and lays especial emphasis on +the fact that no nation has advanced as far as this in seeking in philosophical +ideas the motives and the justification of its acts, and he +sets about showing how the existence of Germany’s special conception +of law may be explained. Germany, he writes in his conclusion, +everywhere starts from the idea of force. Its peculiar characteristic +is to bow before victorious force. And to this must be added, if we +wish to comprehend its aggressive character, the sentiment of vanity, +which has led it to proclaim “that incredible formula: the ideal of +Germany is the ideal of humanity.”</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">M. George Lyon</span> gives us a learned historical study, <i>La philosophie +de Hobbes</i>. He points out how everything is interrelated in +the work of this philosopher—his conception of the state to his theories +of ethics, his ethical doctrines to his psychological theories, +and the latter to general principles concerning nature, thought, and +their laws. But he also presents with much force the objections to +Hobbism. He condemns its final consequence, which is submission +to force. He points out finally the inevitable ambiguity which permeates +this system in consequence of the struggle “between individual +inspiration, which is purely ontological, and the action of an +intellectual environment which is eminently empirical. Hobbes was +the metaphysician of empiricism as Bacon was its poet.” I dismiss +for the present all discussion of these subjects; an occasion +will present itself later of dealing with them.</p> + +<p>In <i>Les races et les langues</i> <span class="smcap">M. André Lefèvre</span> sums up the state +of the science of language. The distinguishing characteristic of his +work is the non-separation of language from the organism which has +produced it, and the simultaneous presentation of languages with +the ethnical groups which speak them. M. Lefèvre accepts, let us +note at once, the well-known stages of the linguistic school—monosyllabism, +agglutination, inflection, and analysis, which M. Tarde, +if he should unexpectedly become a philologist would stigmatise as +gratuitous. Of the races, of the places of origin, and of the migrations +of the ancient peoples he tells a great many stories which are +somewhat of the fairy-tale order, but this reservation does not affect +in the least the value of his special linguistic researches.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_465">[465]</span></p> + +<p>In conclusion I shall mention <i>Le problème de la mort, ses solutions +imaginaires et la science positive</i>, by <span class="smcap">M. L. Bourdeau</span>, and <i>Platon, +sa philosophie, précédé d’un aperçu de sa vie et de ses écrits</i>, by +<span class="smcap">M. Ch. Bénard</span>, a new volume in the series of historical studies +by this venerable professor.⁠<a id="FNanchor_84" href="#Footnote_84" class="fnanchor">[84]</a></p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">Lucien Arréat.</span></p> + +<div class="footnotes"> + +<h5>FOOTNOTES:</h5> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_82" href="#FNanchor_82" class="label">[82]</a> See his work <i>Les lois de l’imitation</i> (Alcan, Paris).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_83" href="#FNanchor_83" class="label">[83]</a> I have called attention to this in a less definite manner in several passages of my +book <i>La morale dans le drame, l’épopée et le roman</i>, in which I shall have to incorporate +the corrections which the splendid studies of M. Tarde have suggested. For +the citation given a few lines above I ask permission to refer the reader to my +<i>Journal d’un philosophe</i> (Alcan, Paris).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_84" href="#FNanchor_84" class="label">[84]</a> All the works mentioned are published by F. Alcan.</p></div> + +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_466">[466]</span></p> + +<h3 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_REVIEWS_III">BOOK REVIEWS.</h3> + +</div> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">Einleitung in die Philosophie.</span> By <i>Prof. Friedrich Paulsen</i>. Berlin: Wilhelm +Hertz. 1892.</h4> + +<p>Friedrich Paulsen, professor at the University of Berlin, writes this “Introduction” +not so much for connoisseurs as for students, whom it may serve as a +guide. He discusses in general outlines the various fundamental problems of philosophy, +at the same time indicating his own position, which, in more than one respect, +is very similar to the philosophy presented in the columns of <i>The Monist</i>.</p> + +<p>His own view, which, as he trusts, is the general tendency of modern philosophical +thought, he calls “idealistic monism.” It is opposed, on the one hand, to +supernatural dualism, and on the other hand to atomistic materialism; the former +being the traditional doctrine of the schoolmen and of ecclesiasticism, separating +body and soul, nature and God, etc., each into two distinct realities, which are accidentally +combined, the latter being an attempt, having its beginning in the eighteenth +century, to explain all natural phenomena in a purely mechanical way. +Paulsen adds: “The whole history of modern philosophy can be said to be a continuous +attempt to overcome this opposition.... The principle of natural science +is the <i>Natur-Gesetzmässigkeit</i> of all events.... Modern materialism derives from +this a kind of metaphysics, represents all reality as a system of blindly operating +physical forces.... Philosophy undertakes to dispel the opposition of these two +doctrines; its proposition is—and we may say that this is the main-spring of the +entire evolution of modern philosophy—<i>to reconcile the religious world-conception +with that of natural science</i>. There are many who regard this aspiration as a sort +of squaring of the circle, and we grant that some similitude between the two may +exist, for here as well as there we can attain only to approximations, here as well +as there we can never solve the problem finally and forever. At any rate, we +must recognise the fact that the whole philosophical thought of the last three +centuries has been directed towards this goal.”</p> + +<p>Professor Paulsen classes the various philosophies of the present time as follows: +(1) The phenomenalistic-positivistic philosophy which denies any absolute +cognition of reality, least of all in physics; the world of objects is a world of phenomena. +(2) The idealistic monistic philosophy. To define the nature of reality +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_467">[467]</span>as it is in itself, we must rely upon the data of our inner experience. The intellectual-historical +world is to us the most comprehensible dénouement of reality—in +fact, the only comprehensible one. The ultimate idea to which we are led in tracing +out facts, is this: Reality, which presents itself to our senses in the objective +world as a unitary system of motions, is the appearance of a spiritual all-being, +which must be conceived as the evolution of some unitary idea. In this respect +idealistic monism agrees upon the whole with speculative philosophy, or rather with +all idealism since Plato.</p> + +<p>The philosophy of the present time is, further on, characterised (3) as passing +from intellectualism to voluntaryism; namely, it allows the will to have its legitimate +influence in the construction of a world-view. It is (4) evolutionistic-theological, +which latter tendency meets half way the above-mentioned idealistic monism. +Both are beginning to permeate ethics, sociology, jurisprudence, and politics. The +old formalistic methods are dropped and teleological considerations prevail. Purpose +is recognised to rule in life. Lastly (5) the philosophy of to-day is historical. +The older philosophy is mathematical-naturalistic or abstract-rationalistic. Speculative +philosophy precedes the construction of an intellectual-historical world; it +then attempts also to construct nature historically, at least in a logico-genetic schematism. +Natural science has already pursued this course in its cosmical and biological +theories of evolution. It is apparent how these tendencies follow the old tradition +of harmonising the physical and the intellectual-historical worlds into one unitary +conception of the whole.</p> + +<p>The book is divided into two parts, with an introduction and conclusion. The +introduction defines the relation of philosophy to mythology and to the sciences. +Philosophy cannot be separated from the sciences. Says Paulsen: “Figuratively +speaking, reality is a great riddle proposed to man; all the various sciences determine +some parts of it, and the attempt to solve the <i>whole</i>, to find the key to +the <i>mysterium magnum</i> of being, is called philosophy.”</p> + +<p>The first book treats, in two chapters, of the problems of metaphysics, viz.: +the ontological problem and the cosmo-theological problem. In the former chapter +materialism, panpsychism, and the nature of the soul are discussed, while the second +chapter is devoted to atomism and teleological theism, implying such subjects +as the theory of evolution, causality, pantheism. The second part reviews, in +the first chapter, the problems of the theory of cognition, viz.: the idealistic arguments, +the realistic views, and our knowledge of the outer world. The second +chapter presents an exposé of the problems regarding the origin of cognition as +viewed by rationalism and empiricism, paying special attention to Kant’s formalistic +realism. The conclusion is a brief treatment of some ethical problems.</p> + +<p>It is impossible to discuss all the details of the 444 pages of Paulsen’s book, but +a few specimen quotations from the chapter “Pantheism and World-soul” may be +welcome to our readers. Our author asks: Considering all the tendencies of yearning +and willing that appear in the innumerable forms of reality, is there a unity of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_468">[468]</span>inner life corresponding to the unity of the physical world in its universal interaction? +The affirmation of this question constitutes the idealistic pantheism.</p> + +<p>Idealistic pantheism is to Professor Paulsen the simplest and most obvious +construction of the world possible. To other world-views, the existence of the soul +is a problem; it has even been called an “absolute problem.” “I believe,” he +adds, with great truth, “that there can be no stronger argument against any world-view +than that it regards the existence of soul as something absolutely mysterious.” +There is a power of conviction in idealistic pantheism verified by the +astonishing agreement of the testimonies of many various thinkers in the Orient as +well as in the Occident, in antiquity no less than in modern times. (P. 243.)</p> + +<p>Says Professor Paulsen: “The dayfly may imagine when the sun sinks that +all is at an end; light vanishes forever and the whole world is swallowed up in +darkness and death. But man who sees so many suns sink and rise should have +learned that in the infinite there are many possibilities which he cannot see at +present [p. 241]. The conception of a world-soul, of a spiritual all-being, of a +<i>mundus intelligibilis</i> appears to our physicists and physiologists in the same light +as the conception of anthropomorphic deities—as a childish dream. They have no +need of this hypothesis [pp. 243-244]. Du Bois-Reymond declares that a naturalist +before admitting the assumption of a world-soul should demand, ‘that we +ought to find somewhere in the world neuroglia embedded in warm arterial blood +under the proper pressure and provided with appropriate sense-organs, ganglions, +and fibres, corresponding to the intellectual capacities of such a soul.’ An animal,” +says Paulsen, “needs as a matter of course legs to stand upon and to move +with, a stomach, teeth, eyes, and a central nervous system, but the All is not in +need of this; it needs no legs to stand upon and to move with, no stomach for alimentary +purposes, no eyes, no ears, for there is nothing to be seen or heard outside +of it, and so it can also dispense with a nervous system and a brain.”</p> + +<p>Quoting two passages, one from Fechner, the other from Nägeli, to the effect +that the system of fixed stars might be regarded as a group of molecules in an infinitely +larger whole which we should have to conceive of as a unitary organism, +Paulsen says: “Indeed, there is no objection to regarding a planet as a ganglion of +the world-brain. Is it too large? No. Why should not the world-brain have +bigger cells than an animal brain. Or is its composition inappropriate? Why? +We find in it the same materials, carbon, oxygen, nitrogen, iron, phosphorus, and +so forth, and also innumerable interactions similar for all we know to those that +take place in a ganglion. Who knows how striking would be the resemblance of +their structures, if we could but see a ganglion under a sufficiently powerful magnifying +glass.”</p> + +<p>These ideas are mere possibilities and are presented as such, but we cannot attribute +to them any philosophical, scientific, or religious importance. Our idea of +“a world-soul” or, better, of God, is different and we avoid purposely anything +that can be constructed upon the basis of a vague hypothesis.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_469">[469]</span></p> + +<p>We ourselves reject pantheism, the view which identifies God and the All for +reasons which we need not repeat here. We call our view of God entheism, and in +forming our idea of God we purposely avoid such fantastical assumptions as considering +the possibility of solar systems being molecules in the organism of a huge +world-animal. Granted the truth of this view, the mere possibility of which we cannot +deny, this extraordinary creature or world-animal would not be God, its will +would not be our moral authority; it would not be the eternal, the immutable, the +ground of all being, the ultimate rule of action, and the omnipotent universal law of +existence: it would merely be a creature like ourselves, only immeasurably bigger, +evolving like other animals and subject to the same or analogous or perhaps similar +wants, disappointments, sufferings, and joys as ourselves. What a miserable God +such a world-being would be; we know nothing of him and he knows nothing of +us. His will and aspirations would have even less influence upon our aspirations, +than, for instance, the hopes of a man upon the molecular groupings in his tissues, +we being only the parasites upon the crust of an atom of his tissues. We have presented +our view of the subject in Vol. III, No. 2, pp. 249-257, of <i>The Monist</i>, in the +third part of the article “Panpsychism and Panbiotism,” with reference to a similar +hypothesis incidentally touched upon as a possibility of monistic theism by Professor +Romanes.</p> + +<p>We simply state the difference between our position and that of Professor Paulsen +concerning the nature of a world-soul without intending to make more of it +than he does himself; for, if we are not mistaken, it is with him a mere suggestion.</p> + +<p>We conclude our review with a passage which shows Professor Paulsen’s attitude +toward Christianity, which more than anything else proves the general agreement +of his work with ours. He says:</p> + +<p>“The Christian faith is not a philosophical system, not a theological dogma +and still less the residue of an old superstition, but the immediate and living certainty +of the heart concerning the nature of the good and its importance in real +life. This faith can be to-day the same as it was in Luther’s, or St. Augustine’s, +or the apostles’ time who saw Jesus with their own eyes bodily. If Christianity, +did indeed consist of a number of doctrines and opinions, it would certainly be +true, as some claim, that it has been dead a long time, for doctrines and opinions +are not long-lived. If Christianity really did consist of the belief in the creation +of the world five thousand years ago out of nothing, the rib story of Eve, the story +of Eden and the fall, etc., etc., ... then indeed it would be impossible for a +thinking man of to-day to be a Christian. But all that is not the faith of Christianity, +it is not the religion of Jesus. And if all the leaders of all the confessions +declare that this is the Christian faith and that he who does not believe all these +things can have no part in Christ, their proposition must be rejected as untrue. +No one can be saved by believing these things; while the request of the church +to believe in certain opinions set forth by men has expelled many an honest man.... +In the life and death of Jesus I have learned to understand the meaning of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_470">[470]</span>life and I call God and the revelation of God that which makes my life possible +and explains to me the significance of my life.... Is such a faith compatible +with the above-mentioned monistic world-conception? My answer is, By all +means.”</p> + +<p>This is Professor Paulsen’s solution of the problem of a reconciliation of +science and religion—and we add that it is ours too.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">P. C.</span></p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">First Steps in Philosophy.</span> By <i>William Mackintire Salter</i>. Chicago: C. H. +Kerr & Co. 1892. Price, $1.00. Pages, 155.</h4> + +<p>This little book is divided into two parts: (1) Physical, (2) Ethical. In the +first, Mr. Salter discusses the conception of matter; in the second, that of duty. +Mr. Salter’s philosophical position is epitomised in a sentence which he quotes from +Herbert Spencer. This sentence states, that, “what we are conscious of as properties +of matter, even down to its weight and resistance, are but subjective affections +produced by objective agencies which are unknown and unknowable.” Mr. Salter’s +philosophical position, accordingly, is, first, Idealism, and, second, Agnosticism.</p> + +<p>In ethics, Mr. Salter’s view embraces Utilitarianism, or Hedonism, and Intuitionism, +both of which, he says, are incomplete in themselves, and must be supplemented +by other elements. Utilitarianism makes happiness the ultimate end; Intuitionism, +virtue; and Mr. Salter adds, such an end must embrace the “realisation +of <i>all</i> our capacities.” Mr. Salter’s ethical position has been before discussed +in our journals.</p> + +<p>If we study Mr. Salter’s philosophical views, we shall find that his theory is +a reproduction of Berkeley’s analysis of the data of knowledge, embellished by +the results of modern physiological psychology. Yet Mr. Salter’s theory, although +it everywhere shows the traces of a close study of Berkeley’s views, presents the +strange historical anomaly of undoing Berkeley’s work. Berkeley’s undoubted +aim was to place knowledge on a basis of fact and refute, in a philosophical +manner, the agnosticism, metaphysicism, and transcendentalism prevalent in his +day. But Mr. Salter adds to Berkeley’s results the very things that Berkeley +sought to overthrow, and thus renders the latter’s analysis (and consequently his +own) in need of an equivalent analysis.</p> + +<p>Take, for instance, the above-quoted sentence from Herbert Spencer, to which +Mr. Salter assents. “Objective agencies,” “unknown and unknowable”! Is this consistent? +All knowledge is a knowledge of sensations, a knowledge <i>of</i> and <i>in</i> the mind, +says the idealist, and we cannot, by any process of ratiocination, arrive at things +“outside” the mind. Yet he himself, it seems, arrives at a knowledge of “objective +agencies” outside the mind (pp. 65, 69), and, what is more wonderful, at +agencies that are “unknown” and “unknowable.” Surely, this is not abiding by +an analysis of the facts of sensation (Berkeley). It is as unrational a procedure to +infer metaphysical objective agencies, as it is to infer a metaphysical substratum +“matter,” which last is the error of the realist.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_471">[471]</span></p> + +<p>Again, take the notion of cause. Here, also, the same unwarrantable abandonment +of the facts of sensation, i. e. of <i>all that is</i>, is evident.</p> + +<p>At the end of an analysis, in which he shows that “all the choir of Heaven +and the furniture of the earth,” and “all which it inhabit,” retreat and vanish in +mind, Mr. Salter asks: “But is there absolutely nothing real and objective left? +So far as sensible phenomena are concerned, we must answer, No, absolutely +nothing is left; the whole sensible (material) world is but an effect upon ourselves. +But,” he adds, “it would be a hasty inference,” on these grounds, “to say that +nothing whatever is left.” And when asked “what is left,” he answers, “all +that causes sensation.” We can never know scientifically what these causes are, +but “we have an inextinguishable faith” <i>that</i> they are, “there being no particular +thing we are more sure of than that for every event (and every sensible phenomenon +is an event, viz., in ourselves) there is some kind of explanation or cause.” +To sum up: The theory of “sensible or physical idealism”⁠<a id="FNanchor_85" href="#Footnote_85" class="fnanchor">[85]</a> implies a “supersensible +or metaphysical realism.” In the theory of sensible idealism things only +exist as sensations; “only exist, that is, <i>save in their supersensible or transcendental +causes</i>”—which, says the author, we must always add.</p> + +<p>What is a cause? Cause is an abstraction. An abstraction from what? from +a real, physical world, or from a metaphysical, transcendental world? Plainly, +from our real world, from Mr. Salter’s world of “sensible reality.” By what philosophical +warrant, then, is this concept applied to a world from which it has not +been derived and to which it surely cannot apply! It is wrong to speak of a cause +of the All. The All has no cause, just as it has no weight.</p> + +<p>All these difficulties arise from the notion that there are two kinds of knowledge +and two kinds of existences. Idealism, to be consistent, must be absolute; Mr. +Salter’s idealism is not absolute. This is exactly the criticism that the reading of +his book at once forces on one. All knowledge is knowledge of sensations, i. e. +of reality; things not accessible to sensation are not real, they do not exist; consequently, +all entities transcendental, metaphysical, and supersensible do not exist. +This is the conclusion to which any philosophy, idealism, realism, or what not +<i>must</i> lead.</p> + +<p>Nowadays, few people dispute the fundamental thesis of idealism (of course, +expressed in different terms from those of Mr. Spencer’s sentence). In a sense, it +is established. Its only drawback is, that its “establishment” accomplishes nothing. +It leaves the problem of philosophy where it found it.⁠<a id="FNanchor_86" href="#Footnote_86" class="fnanchor">[86]</a> Reality is still reality. +The same difficulties and perplexities exist. The universe still mocks us. And +foremost among the riddles that the world opposes to man, stands that eternal +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_472">[472]</span>query: “What is mind?” Mr. Salter’s views of this question will show us what +contributions his theory is likely to make to philosophy.</p> + +<p>Mr. Salter defines mind as “that which experiences sensations and thoughts, +or, more simply, that which feels and thinks.” It is not feeling, not thinking, but +<i>that which</i> feels and thinks. It is thus an agent, a subject. It is difficult to understand +how this notion of mind is come at, without self-contradiction. In their +origin, all notions of mind-subjects, mind-essences, mind-agencies, and so forth, are +materialistic. They must be volatilised and stripped of their substantial attributes, +if they are to take a place in an idealistic philosophy, and then, as they “cannot be +ranged along with the sensible phenomena of which the mind takes cognisance,” +there is but one realm left to exist in, which is the transcendentalistic.</p> + +<p>All this comes from carrying the abstraction by which “mind” is reached, to +mathematically infinite limits. In this abstraction the world retreats and fades +away into nothingness. And what is left? Not a single idea or fact by which we +can fix our abstraction. Mind is all, and mind is nothing. It is not matter, not +time, not space—not even a mathematical point, which we expect it to become in +its infinitely contracting perspective. It has no attributes, no qualities; it is +nothing and nowhere. This conception of mind, Mr. Salter says, is only mysterious +as we <i>make</i> it so, by careless and inaccurate thinking. And Mr. Salter is +right. It would require much careless thinking to make such a conception mysterious. +A thing or notion that cannot be defined, placed, or brought into connection +with any other thing or notion in the world, is not <i>mysterious</i>, but simply does +not exist. In that respect, it is as plain as day.</p> + +<p>The same confusion exists in the discussion which disposes of the query, +“<i>Where</i> is mind?” The idealist, in Mr. Salter’s sense, does not admit that the +mind is in, or in anywise spatially connected with, the brain. The question, <i>where</i> +is mind? he says, has no meaning, any more than the question, what is the color of +a pleasure? This is true. Mind is an abstraction. In this sense it has no spatial +existence. But the phenomena from which this abstraction has produced itself, +<i>are</i> linked with phenomena which have spatial existence, and in this sense the mental +processes are not mysterious nothings and nowheres. When I lose that group +of sensations called my leg, I know that, generally, I have lost the feeling of my leg. +So, also, when a certain part of that group of sensations called my brain is destroyed, +I know that I shall then have lost my power of memory or of speech or of motion. +I may also experiment with other groups of sensations called dogs and cats, which +I know have mental powers. In the light of these facts it is not correct, either in +philosophy or common sense, to say that mental processes are absolutely independent +of locality. I know that my thoughts are not connected with the group of sensations +I call the moon, and I know they are not connected with that group of sensations +that I call Mr. Smith. I am always aware of them as connected with that +group of sensations which I call “myself.”</p> + +<p>Mr. Salter, in fact, half recognises this. He says, “The mind <i>is</i> dependent on +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_473">[473]</span>the body in the sense that our general power of sensation and thought is connected +with those sensations we call our body.” Yet, “why this should be so is mysterious.” +Indeed! One is inclined to ask Mr. Salter here, what species of explanation +or knowledge he wishes of this phenomenon. Is explanation, or knowledge, +something more than the recognition and seeing of a plain connection between the +groups of sensations that constitute reality? In Mr. Salter’s analysis, all the facts of +the world are mysterious. Why a thing is as it is and is not other than it is, is mysterious. +He utterly fails to understand why the power of perceiving colors is linked +with the particular group of sensations he calls his eye, and why it should not just +as well be linked with some other group or no group at all.</p> + +<p>Why do I see with my eye? Why do I not see with my hand or with the +hairs of my head, or why do I not eat with my elbow, instead of my mouth? Why +do not stones fall upwards? Why do not magnets point towards the East? Why do +not the planets move about Jupiter or Saturn? Mr. Salter’s question makes a jumble +of the whole universe.</p> + +<p>It is not the object of science or philosophy to find out why things are not what +they are, but to find out what they are. In this inquiry the why and wherefore, +properly understood, will evolve themselves.</p> + +<p>Science simply concerns itself with the connection of the groups of sensations +which the idealist, and for that matter every one else, calls reality. It cannot concern +itself with anything else. All other things are artificial and self-made existences. +Nothing exists but reality and the connections of reality. To seek for any +other connections than those that exist is absurd and futile. And to seek for any +other causes or cause of relations than such as really are is also futile. Before we +speak of the knowledge of a thing we must analyse and define our notion of knowledge, +and before we speak of the cause of a thing we must analyse and define our +notion of cause. In our view, the relation which Mr. Salter doubts, is so intimately +and inextricably one, that the causal relation disappears. Neither is the cause of +the other. We may, for the purposes of inquiry, start from either as our general +concept, but we should never go so far as utterly to expel from reality the other. +True science and philosophy are neither idealistic nor materialistic, but <i>real</i>. The +two positions are extreme positions, and each is useful only as a safeguard against +the errors of the others. Reality is reality; that is the main thing. Whether it is +idealistic or materialistic is of minor consequence. Besides reality there is nothing; +its negation is non-existence.</p> + +<p>We do not wish in these criticisms to repudiate all that is in Mr. Salter’s book. +A great many of its reflections are helpful and suggestive. We may refer, for example, +to the passages in which the body is regarded as a gradually decreasing wall +of separation between that part of reality which is known subjectively and that part +which is known objectively. This is really a unitary view. We believe, however, +that if Mr. Salter would carefully analyse the notions of knowledge, explanation, +cause, effect, and, therefore, the notion of reality, he would not push his philosophy +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_474">[474]</span>to the mysterious extreme at which it finally arrives, and he would absolutely reject +such unscientific conceptions as supersensible realism, metaphysical realism, and +supersensible or transcendental causes. These render the reading of his book as a +philosophical help unsatisfactory, and leave the mind even more confused and perplexed +than it was before. However, all discussions of this sort have their value, +and Mr. Salter’s book possesses a virtue which few other philosophical productions +can boast of: it is very short. The author’s pleasant style will also add to the +pleasure of its perusal, and if read critically the book will evoke much helpful +thought.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">T. J. McCormack.</span></p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">A Review of The Systems of Ethics Founded on the Theory of Evolution.</span> +By <i>C. M. Williams</i>. New York and London: Macmillan & Co. 1893.</h4> + +<p>This is a book, the perusal of which will leave the earnest student of moral +science full of disappointment. Not at all that it manifests any lack of ability or +information. On the contrary, it is at once clearly and entertainingly written, and +at the same time packed with notes and comments that are full of interest and instruction.</p> + +<p>The course of the book may be briefly stated. The first part, comprising nearly +half of its six hundred pages, is devoted to the statement of the ethical doctrines +maintained by thirteen prominent writers, whose views have been formed more or +less under the influence of the theory of evolution, viz.: Darwin, Wallace, Haeckel, +Spencer, Fiske, Rolph, Baratt, Stephen, Carneri, Höffding, Gizycki, Alexander, +and Paul Ree. The rest of the book is the review of our author. This review is +conducted under the topical heads: The Concepts of Evolution; Intelligence and +End; The Will; Thought, Feeling, and Will in Evolution; Egoism and Altruism +in Evolution; Conscience; Moral Progress in History; The Results of Ethical Inquiry +on an Evolutional Basis; and The Ideal and the Way of Its Attainment.</p> + +<p>These are all topics of great interest and importance, and the author has brought +to the consideration of them a mind fully stored and entirely competent. But we +look in vain for that discourse and criticism which above all other matters relating +to moral science those who are interested in human welfare crave from those who +tender their reflections upon ethical topics.</p> + +<p>The great need of moral science is the discovery and certification of its basis. +It is a need that far transcends the scope of mere moral science, for upon its right +determination depends the right determination of a multitude of questions that +deeply involve the welfare of humanity. It is a need that is not merely crying to +be supplied. It is absolutely wailing. Could it only be rightly determined, mankind +would fast enough orient itself in the course of evolution and with undissipated +energy work out its best possible development. But undiscovered or uncertified it +balks all process, save only that mechanical, halting, stumbling process that has +hitherto obtained; a process that is, as all may observe, one that has little if any +inward coördination, but is full of inability and cross-purposes. Since it was the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_475">[475]</span>professed purpose of our author to review a number of the more prominent systems +of ethics, which he esteems to be founded on the theory of evolution, his failure to +notice and to comment upon so conspicuous a feature of moral science would naturally +lead a reader, unversed in the works noticed, to suppose that those works had +altogether slighted this topic. Such is, however, not the case. With the exception +of perhaps Darwin and Wallace, all the writers reviewed by our author have given +more or less attention to this matter, and they have left us in no doubt as to the +positions which they severally hold. Most of them are Hedonists of one sort or +another. Haeckel, Carneri, Rolph, and Alexander are, we believe, the only exceptions.</p> + +<p>But a more serious criticism upon the work under notice is suggested by its +very title. That title as much as says that the various works which are reviewed +by our author are “founded” upon the theory of evolution, at least in so far as their +ethical doctrines are concerned.</p> + +<p>Now, what is the theory of evolution? What is its essential nature? Does not +its very form consist in the affirmation of an eternal secular mutation, in which +there is no discontinuity whatever? It says that existence in sum and in every detail +is eternal and continuous process. It uncompromisingly forbids all suppositions +of any absolute beginning, or of any absolute end, or of any absolutely final adjustment. +Hence, no system of ethics can with truth be said to be “founded” upon +the theory of evolution that ignores or forgets this essential character of it. Now, +when we turn to the consideration of the various “systems” which our author supposes +to be “founded” upon the theory of evolution, we find them, one and all, +occupied more or less with suppositions of ends. All are forecasting some “ideal” +condition, which, being attained, all chances of retrogression will be foreclosed and +all possibilities of betterment will be exhausted. In other words, they suppose an +attainment of death, or rather an attainment of a death-in-life more utterly horrible +than any actual death can possibly be. The very first condition for an ethics that +will be truly evolutional must be the fit and full recognition of a boundless horizon +to evolution in morals as well as in all else. Emerson perceived the truth when +he said in “The Sphynx”:</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">“Profounder, profounder</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Man’s spirit must dive;</div> + <div class="verse indent0">To his aye rolling orb</div> + <div class="verse indent0">No goal will arrive.</div> + <div class="verse indent0">The heavens that now draw him</div> + <div class="verse indent0">With sweetness untold,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Once found; for <i>new</i> heavens</div> + <div class="verse indent0">He spurneth the old.”</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p>And at present, the most serious efforts to establish a truly clear-sighted ethics +of evolution, with an unequivocal disavowal of any and all Hedonism, is made by +the editors of <i>The Monist</i>. It, indeed, is the key-note of the missionary work that +characterises all the publications of The Open Court Publishing Co.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_476">[476]</span></p> + +<p>Any truly evolutional ethics must show itself a doctrine that applies just as +well to regress as to progress. Evolution is too often confounded with progress, +but degeneration is just as truly evolutional as is the contrary movement, and, looking +the facts of existence in the face, mankind has no assurance of any unchangeable +course of betterment. The principles of morals are, however, not dependent +upon the benign action of nature. When the earth’s stock of fuel shall become exhausted, +or when the ice age returns, or when the sun grows cold, there will be no +alteration thereby in the moral law. Good and evil must and will be the same under +all circumstances, and no system of ethics is nor can be anything but a temporary +makeshift, that does not as well fit the <i>diastoles</i> as it does the <i>systoles</i> of existence. +We must look for a doctrine that shall inform the conduct of men not only +for the fore part of the day, when all is jubilant and bounding and man asks only +for some good task to do, but also for the evening and night, when man grows weary +and craves for rest; for not only youth and maturity, but for waning strength, old +age, and death; for not only the progressive era of cosmic history, but for the periods +when natural conditions may disfavor mankind, when, say, man may gradually +be so reduced in resources that the same will barely suffice for simple life-preservation; +when under the stress of natural conditions the human intellect, in the course +of generations, becomes step by step eliminated; when indeed humanity itself tends +perhaps slowly, but with certainty, towards permanent extinction.</p> + +<p>They who complacently protest that the theory of evolution leaves the domain +of moral science substantially unaffected are surely in great default either in their +comprehension of the nature and implications of that theory, or in their powers of +circumspection, while those who suppose that moral science becomes evolutional +simply because of a little application of that theory to some of the subordinate questions +that are involved, show themselves in a plight as bad as the others if not +worse.</p> + +<p>Our author notices without dissent, and even with seeming concurrence, the +various remarks made by many of the writers reviewed by him in discredit of teleology.</p> + +<p>Since as we have before protested the theory of evolution forbids all suppositions +of any ends that are absolutely final, it of course follows that teleology is in +the strictness of its meaning inadmissible, even in ethics. But in dismissing teleology, +let us not pour out the child with the bath. However it ought to be with the +interpretation of the order of nature as a speculative exercise, something that is +analogous to teleology is an absolute necessity if ethics is to be anything more than +a curious study of human practise. The universe may manifest no purpose, design +or secular tendency, but man is and can be nothing but a miserable estray on the +ocean of existence unless he sails on a course, instead of merely drifting. To do +this he must take something by which to steer, and any plausible stability is better +than no bearings whatever. At any rate man is insuperably drawn to thus mark out +his course. If the theory of evolution forbids him to suppose any ends that are absolutely +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_477">[477]</span>final, it does not prevent him from ascertaining directions. Indeed evolution +affords him data of the very first importance for that behoof. Instead of ends +we have aims and if ethics is to become that counsel and guide to humanity, which +we yearn for so anxiously, it must ascertain and certify that single paramount aim +to which all other tendencies are naturally subsidiary. Teleology, or rather the +determination of the aim of evolution, must prepare the foundation before any evolutional +ethics that is worthy the name can be established.</p> + +<p>Again our author with considerable debate notices the remarks of the writers +reviewed by him on the old question of free will and necessity,—but like the positing +of some end or aim to be subserved, free will is one of the presuppositions of ethics. +When man begins to debate the possibility of rightly ascertaining the true end or +aim for his pursuit, or when he begins to moot the question of free will, he is debating +not any question of ethics proper, but only whether such a science is possible. +Unless conditions and events are functions, as well of man’s personality as of his +environment; unless persons count for something in the variations of the course of +nature, it is altogether vain and idle to be troubled with questions of morality.</p> + +<p>Free will and somewhat to be achieved are principles which whether well or +ill founded, ethics proper must take for granted before it has or can have any <i>raison +d’être</i>. As for free will, however the metaphysicians may have stumbled over their +own feet, the common sense of mankind has never wavered. As a practical question +(and ethics is pre-eminently a matter of practice) this question is not an open +one.</p> + +<p>But on the question of what is the true paramount aim for man to pursue, the +decision that shall finally satisfy man is yet to be made. The best proof that no +satisfactory answer has yet been made is the fact that we are still seeking an answer. +As with regard to the needful prime condition for a truly evolutional ethics we +found wisdom in the poetical insight, so again in this exigency we personally find the +most profound ethical philosophy in that same insight.</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">“’Tis Life of which our nerves are scant.</div> + <div class="verse indent0">’Tis Life, not death for which we pant,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">More Life, and fuller that we want.”</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">Francis C. Russell.</span></p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">Der Pessimismus im Lichte einer höheren Weltauffassung.</span> By <i>Dr. J. Friedländer</i> +and <i>Dr. M. Berendt</i>. Berlin W.: S. Gerstmann. 1893.</h4> + +<p>The authors’ aim is the refutation of pessimism and the foundation of a higher +world-conception. This latter is a pantheism spiritualised by moral ideals and contrasted +to Darwinism and materialism. Natural science is said to be the surrounding +walls of the new view, furnishing (1) negative truths of criticism and (2) a +knowledge of the positive features of nature. The negative truths are: the impossibility +of the existence of a personal God, of the efficiency of prayer, of miracles, +of the immortality of the soul, of the separate existence of souls without bodies. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_478">[478]</span>The positive results of natural science are the unity of nature, the indestructibility +of nature, the harmony of the All, the indivisibility of nature, the irrefragable necessity +of natural processes according to immutable laws, and the freedom or independence +of nature, as having its cause in itself, uncreated and uninfluenced by +any extramundane being.</p> + +<p>Natural science alone, according to the authors, is not sufficient to constitute +the new world-conception. A one-sided view of natural science together with the +obsolete conceptions of theism are exactly what has brought forth the philosophical +pessimism of our time. Natural science, accordingly, is not to be regarded as +the sole source of truth; it is to be corrected by pantheism. The former teaches +us “to regard matter and its motion, so to say, as a dead inert substance to which +motion is attached; it treats matter as an immediate reality. Pantheism, however, +teaches that matter is to be conceived as the interrelation of the innumerable live +acts of will appearing successively in time and side by side in space,” etc. The +authors point out that the necessity of law which regulates the mechanical processes +of nature does not exclude freedom; for “freedom is not arbitrariness but is +controlled by an immanent <i>Gesetzmässigkeit</i>.”</p> + +<p>This summary is sufficient to characterise the ideas of the Drs. Friedländer and +Berendt. We cannot say that they admit of no criticism, (e. g. their conception of +natural science must be pronounced as too narrow if not actually erroneous, nor +should the law of the survival of the fittest be interpreted in the sense that strength +means brutal force,) but we can, nevertheless, express our sympathy with the aim +of the authors as well as with the spirit in which they pursue it.</p> + +<p class="right">κρς.</p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">Die Philosophie und die sociale Frage.</span> By <i>Gustav Engel</i>. Leipsic: C. E. M. +Pfeffer. 1892.</h4> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">Acht Abhandlungen, Herrn Professor Dr. Karl Ludwig Michelet zum 90. +Geburtstag als Festgruss dargereicht von Mitgliedern der philosophischen +Gesellschaft.</span> Leipsic: C. E. M. Pfeffer. 1892.</h4> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">Wie steht es jetzt mit der Philosophie, und was haben wir von ihr zu hoffen?</span> +By <i>Dr. Wilhelm Paszkowski</i>. Halle a. S.: F. Beyer, 1892.</h4> + +<p>This lecture by the well-known writer on the science of statistics and its related +subjects was read before the Philosophical Society of Berlin on the 31st of +May, 1890. It discusses the problem of socialism, or rather the aspirations of the +German social democracy from the philosophical point of view of the lecturer, +which is a modernised Hegelianism. This lecture drew forth on the evening of its +delivery considerable discussion, which was participated in by Herr Kahle, a socialist, +and Herr Runze. The discussions of these gentlemen, together with Mr. Engel’s +reply, are embodied in the pamphlet.</p> + +<p>The second of these two pamphlets is also a publication of the Philosophical +Society of Berlin. It consists of eight treatises, essays, or lectures, which were presented +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_479">[479]</span>by the members of the society to Prof. Karl Ludwig Michelet as a festival +gift on his ninetieth natal day. The authors of these eight essays are: Adolf Lasson, +August Cieszkowski, Gustav Engel, Friedrich Kirchner, Wilhelm Paszkowski, +Max Runze, Georg Ulrich, and F. Zelle. They deal with philosophical subjects, +chiefly such as pertain to the Hegelian philosophy. Appended to the pamphlet is +a bibliography of the writings of this Nestor of the Philosophical Society by F. +Ascherson.</p> + +<p>The author of the third pamphlet complains about the decay of philosophy: +“Metaphysics, the inner fane in the temple of science, stands desolate,” and the +last disciples of Hegel can no longer prevent the deluge which sweeps away the +idealism of their grand old master.</p> + +<p class="right">κρς.</p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">Der Materialismus, eine Verirrung des menschlichen Geistes, widerlegt +durch eine zeitgemässe Weltanschauung.</span> By <i>Dr. Eugen Dreher</i>. Berlin: +S. Gerstmann. 1892.</h4> + +<p>The author of this pamphlet, at present a docent at the University of Halle, +feels somewhat oppressed by the materialistic tendencies of our times. His desire +is to establish in the world a province of the ideal, and this domain of idealistic +aspirations and hopes, he says, must and can be based upon a scientific foundation. +To reach this goal, the author propounds a philosophy which is confessedly dualistic, +and which must be made a kind of religion. Descartes’s <i>Cogito, ergo sum</i>, +is to him the beginning of all philosophy. The existence of the All is devoid of +sense, unless there is an ego to think it. This dualism, if made a religion, will +throw light upon the problems of the labyrinth of life.</p> + +<p>The aspirations of the author are serious and noble. We cannot, however, +agree with the results of his reasonings. He does not seem to have considered +Kant’s objections to the fallacy of the <i>cogito, ergo “ego” sum</i>. Nor is he familiar +with Lichtenberg’s famous remark, that “we should say by rights ‘it thinks,’ exactly +as we say ‘it rains.’” The same moral conclusions at which the author arrives +may be reached, the same province for ideal aspirations in the world may be +gained, the same religious comfort may be found, without any surrender of the +monistic view of the world. Materialism is an error of human thought. But the +error cannot be cured by dualism.</p> + +<p class="right">κρς.</p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">Ueber die Grundformen der Vorstellungsverbindung.</span> Psychologische Studie. +By <i>Max Offner</i>. Marburg: R. Friedrich. 1892.</h4> + +<p>This little brochure is a carefully worked out study of the phenomena of association. +The author’s view is summed up in the following statement: “The attempt +to reduce the phenomena of association, in conformity with their real nature, +to one single ultimate process cannot be regarded as successful, and we shall +have to control our aspirations after a unitary conception and rest satisfied with +reducing the various phenomena of association to two processes which are closely +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_480">[480]</span>related, namely: (1) to an association of simultaneity; and (2) to an association of +immediate succession.” There is much that is suggestive in the sixty-seven pages +of this pamphlet.</p> + +<p class="right">κρς.</p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">Finite Homogeneous Strain, Flow, and Rupture of Rocks.</span> Bulletin of the +Geological Society of America. By <i>George F. Becker</i>. Rochester: Published +by the Society. 1893.</h4> + +<p>This is a purely technical research, concerning the causes and form of the discontinuity +of rock masses. The studies presented are the outgrowth of field-work +in the Sierra Nevada of California. This range is so intersected by false joints, +schistose and slaty cleavages, that on a scale of one mile to the inch their average +separation would be for the most part microscopic. The dynamic manifestations in +these regions are very systematic. Some of the strains which have produced this +phenomenon have been infinitesimal, and others have been finite. Only the latter +are here treated. Finite strain, the relations of stress to strain, the nature of finite +shear, viscosity, flow, plasticity, ductility, and rupture, the relation of plastic solids +to fluids, the spacing of fissures formed by inclined pressures, jointing, and slaty +cleavage, are the chief subjects discussed. The most important result of the investigation +is that jointing, schistosity, and slaty cleavage all imply relative movement +and are thus as truly orogenic as falls of notable throw. “In the light of this conclusion,” +says the author, “it appears that if one could reproduce the orogeny of +the Sierra in a moderate interval of time on a model made to a scale of one mile +to the inch, it would seem to yield to external and bodily forces much like a mass +of lard of the same dimensions.”</p> + +<p>This pamphlet is neatly got up, and reflects credit upon the author and publisher.</p> + +<p class="right">μκρκ.</p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">Der echte und der Xenophontische Sokrates.</span> By <i>Karl Joël</i>. Volume I. Berlin: +R. Gaertner. 1893.</h4> + +<p>There are two sources from which we have derived the main bulk of our knowledge +concerning Socrates; namely, the writings of Plato and Xenophon. The former +is generally regarded as an idealiser, and the latter as an historical biographer; +for Plato simply uses the impressive figure of Socrates to expound his own philosophy, +while Xenophon, the general, the politician, the historian, is supposed to give +in the “Memorabilia” a simple and faithful account of what appeared to him worthy +of being preserved. As Xenophon was not a philosopher himself, it is tacitly assumed +that he had no reason to alter, to suppress, or to add his own personal views +to the historical account of the great master whom he bore in grateful remembrance +as a faithful disciple. There are some other sources; but they are less rich than +those of Plato and Xenophon. Among them must be mentioned several passages in +Aristotle, especially in “Magna Moralia” I, p. 1182, a 15. Our author urges with +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_481">[481]</span>good reason that the Xenophontic Socrates is radically different from and even +opposed to the real Socrates, and that we ought to rely more on Aristotle than on +Xenophon. Xenophon’s “Memorabilia,” Karl Joël declares, is not an historical +writing but a <i>Tendenzschrift</i>, and we have to be on our guard wherever Xenophon’s +special tendency comes in.</p> + +<p>Socrates is the representative of the philosophical spirit of Attica, and the character +of his teachings may in a word be described as a noble and sublimated subjectivism. +Socrates is a rationalist and as such he opposes the mysticism of the +soothsayer and mantic. He goes so far in his rationalism as to identify knowledge +and virtue. He cannot understand, from his point of view, (which regards the soul +as a rational being only and leaves out of sight the existence of impulses,) that a man +can knowingly neglect to choose the better thing and choose the worse. Plato, in +order to avoid the error of Socrates, invented the distinction between the rational +and irrational part of the soul and Aristotle criticises Socrates saying τὰς γὰρ ἀρετὰς +ἐπιστήμας ἐποίει.</p> + +<p>The subjectivism of Socrates appears in his trust in the δαιμόνιον, the divine +voice within his soul, his rationalism in his constant request to gather information +before beginning to act. He exhibits in his talks great irony; for instance, when +telling a politician that as a shoemaker must know his trade before making shoes, so +he, the politician, ought to know <i>his</i> business before undertaking to manage affairs +of state. Again and again he satirises the bungling levity of men who imagine that +in the greatest and gravest things of life they can act without any information. Both +the subjectivism and rationalism of Socrates appear in his constant inculcation of +the Delphian motto “know thyself.”</p> + +<p>What a different character is Xenophon! He was a convinced believer in manticism. +There are more than a hundred passages in his writings in which not rational +forethought but the art of the soothsayer is left to decide the most important +questions of practical life. When the courageous ten thousand offered him the +leadership in their dangerous retreat, his ambition urged him to accept, but he first +asks the God, and the omens being unfavorable, he refuses. He did not accept the offer +until he had received another more auspicious omen. In the same way Xenophon +acts throughout. All important decisions which prudence would urge, are made +dependent upon sacrifices, dreams, or the flight of birds, and more than once the +safety of the army is greatly endangered by a fatal passivity caused through unfavorable +omens which prevent Xenophon’s acting with decision at the right moment. +It is no exaggeration to say that these ten thousand Greek soldiers escaped only by +good luck the fate of the Athenian army in Sicily under Nikias. And this man, a +zealous believer in manticism, should be an impartial and reliable historian of the +doctrines of Socrates? The δαιμόνιον of Socrates is changed into a mystic power, a +kind of <i>spiritus familiaris</i>. It has ceased to be the divinity of man’s inner self as +which it appears in Plato’s account, and is represented by Xenophon as some peculiarity +of Socrates which was given him as a special favor by the gods. Socrates +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_482">[482]</span>dethroned the old fate that was supposed to rule the affairs of men and pointed out +the importance of knowledge, for through knowledge we can learn to regulate our +fate ourselves. The philosopher who thought little of well-being, of εὐτυχία, and +demanded above all a well-doing, an εὐ πράττειν (“Memorabilia,” III, 9, 14, 15,) +did not recommend asking soothsayers questions where we should better ask ourselves, +although it is probable that he recommended the Athenians to apply to the +Delphic oracle instead of relying upon omens not so much because he believed in +prophesies, but because he thought that they would be influenced by the authority +of this venerable institution whose wisdom and conservative spirit were beyond question, +so that good advice could be expected from it. Karl Joël, accordingly, advises +us to read the “Memorabilia” with an inversion of the points, viz., to convert the +sentences qualified by “although” and “to be sure” into the main sentences and +<i>vice versa</i>. In this way we shall be able to distinguish between the pagan orthodoxy +of Xenophon and the rationalism of Socrates. Why does Xenophon not state directly +and simply (1) Socrates advised his friend to ask the oracles in all cases of +uncertainty, (2) manticism is indispensable in the economy of a household as well as +of a state, and (3) the gods have not granted us any real knowledge as to a final +success and reveal it through special revelations. Why must he add long sentences +introduced by “although”? He adds to (1) that everybody ought to act solely according +to his own conviction, to (2) that all the trades up to the highest professions had +to be learned before practiced, and to (3) that those who inquired at the oracles for +things which could be learned and studied in the usual way are crazy and even blasphemers.</p> + +<p>This sketch may suffice to characterise the book which is much better than +could be anticipated after a perusal of the preface, which almost induced us to lay +it aside unread. It is not the modesty of the author which produces a prejudice but +the random talk concerning things which neither a reader nor a reviewer will care +to know. The author has apparently no talent for writing prefaces, and he would +be wise to omit them in the future entirely. The book might be very much condensed, +repetitions avoided, and an alphabetical index certainly should have been +added.</p> + +<p>It contains <i>five hundred and fifty-four</i> pages; and the author says he is preparing +a <i>second</i> volume. We think it would have been better for his views if he had +expressed them in a pamphlet.</p> + +<p class="right">κρς.</p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">A Perplexed Philosopher.</span> Being an examination of Mr. Herbert Spencer’s various +utterances on the land question, with some incidental reference to his synthetic +philosophy. By <i>Henry George</i>. New York: Charles L. Webster & +Company. 320 pp.</h4> + +<p>The “Perplexed Philosopher” herein described is Mr. Herbert Spencer, and +persons who like ginger in their ale will enjoy this book; for its eloquent invective, +hot from the heart, cheers us like that stimulating drink. Because of this fiery and +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_483">[483]</span>revengeful attack on Herbert Spencer much dignified reproof has been aimed at +Mr. George by those excellent people who religiously forgive the injuries done to +others, and allow only to themselves the luxury of retaliation; but when we consider +the provocation given by Mr. Spencer, this counter-blow of Mr. George is +mild. Mr. Spencer had a critic’s right severely or tenderly to condemn the doctrines +of Mr. George; and had he kept himself within his privilege Mr. George in +reply would not have had any right to assail the personal character and motives of +Mr. Spencer; but the older philosopher chose to treat the younger with supercilious +disdain, and this was a personal affront that fully justified a retort personal. Scorn +is an ignoble argument, lawful only in return for scorn.</p> + +<p>Apart from the truth or error they contain, the writings of Mr. George have +achieved a phenomenal popularity; their influence on social opinion has been in +some directions almost revolutionary; they are to-day the political creed of many +men in different parts of the world, and especially of many thousands in America, +Great Britain, and Australia. They are bold in theories, attractive in illustration, +and admirable in their literary form. Their approval of “Social Statics” was an +advertisement that multiplied by hundreds the readers of that book, and there is no +philosopher great enough to affect ignorance of Mr. George’s writings, or to dismiss +them with a sneer. More copies of “Progress and Poverty” have been sold than +of any other book on social economics that ever has been written, and when Mr. +Spencer spoke of that book as “a work which I closed after a few minutes on finding +how visionary were its ideas,” he put on airs of aggravating superiority which +naturally provoked the resentment of Mr. George.</p> + +<p>After not reading the book Mr. Spencer condemned its heresies and said:</p> + +<p>“There is the movement for land nationalisation pressed by Mr. George and +his friends with avowed disregard for the just claims of existing owners....</p> + +<p>“And now this doctrine (that society as a whole has an absolute right over the +possessions of each member) is being openly proclaimed. Mr. George and his +friends, Mr. Hyndman and his friends, are putting their theory to its logical issue.”</p> + +<p>To that Mr. George replies as follows:</p> + +<p>“In nothing I have ever written or spoken is there any justification for such a +characterisation. I am not even a land nationalisationist as the English and +German and American nationalisationists well know.... I have been a staunch +denier of the assumption of the right of society to the possessions of each member, +and a clearer and more resolute upholder of the rights of property than Mr. Spencer +has been.”</p> + +<p>Without waiting to inquire whether Mr. George includes within the “rights +of property” the right to property in land, it is enough to say that here at least Mr. +Spencer is at a disadvantage. He disarmed himself before going into battle by refusing +to read Mr. George’s writings, and scorning to examine them he accused +them of communism, confiscation, and land-nationalisation. Mr. Spencer cannot +now strike back for he has thrown his weapons away. He is a prisoner in the hands +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_484">[484]</span>of Mr. George, who couples him with Parson Wilbur denouncing a print called the +<i>Liberator</i>, “whose heresies,” he said, “I take every opportunity of combating, and +of which, I thank God, I have never read a single line.” The parallel is well drawn; +and the lesson of it is this, never challenge a man and then treat him with contempt; +if you think he is not a foeman worthy of your steel, let him alone.</p> + +<p>Had Mr. Spencer studied the works of Mr. Henry George, he would have found +in them some doctrines having a manifest family likeness to communism, confiscation, +and land-nationalisation; but they avail Mr. Spencer nothing, because he +would not condescend to read the chapters where those revolutionary principles are. +If he would bend his brow a moment and examine them he might find that in this +controversy there are two perplexed philosophers instead of one. In the book before +us Mr. George remarks:</p> + +<p>“It is this confusion of Mr. Spencer as to rent and value that has led him into +confusion as to the right of property; and that, at first, at least prevented him +from seeing that to secure the equal rights of men to land, <i>it is not necessary that +society should take formal possession of land, and let it out</i>, and consequently, that +the difficulties he anticipated in taking possession of improved land were imaginary.”</p> + +<p>But, in “Progress and Poverty,” Chapter II, he said:</p> + +<p>“We should satisfy the law of justice, we should meet all economic requirements, +by at one stroke abolishing all private titles, declaring all land public +property, and <i>letting it out to the highest bidders in lots to suit</i>, under such conditions +as would safely guard the right to improvements.”</p> + +<p>The italics are ours, directing the attention to apparent contradictions which it +is for Mr. George to reconcile. And, if English words have any meaning, “abolishing +all private titles” means confiscation; and “declaring all land public property +and letting it out to the highest bidders,” is land-nationalisation; at least, the +ordinary reader may innocently think so, yet Mr. George declares that he is not a +land-nationalisationist.</p> + +<p>As a personal defense and explanation Mr. George has a right to say that he is +not a land-nationalisationist, or a communist, or an “ist” of any other kind, and +we are bound to take his word for it, but in this dispute that matter is wholly immaterial. +The question before the meeting is this, Is Mr. George’s book a land-nationalisationist +or is it not? Is it a confiscationist or not? In “Progress and +Poverty” Mr. George explains his meaning thus:</p> + +<p>“I do not propose either to purchase or to confiscate property in land. The +first would be unjust, the second needless. Let the individuals who now hold it +still retain, if they want to, possession of what they are pleased to call <i>their</i> land. +Let them continue to call it <i>their</i> land. Let them buy and sell and bequeath and +devise it. We may safely leave them the shell if we take the kernel. <i>It is not +necessary to confiscate land; it is only necessary to confiscate rent.</i>”</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_485">[485]</span></p> + +<p>The italics are by Mr. George; and a little farther on, he says;</p> + +<p>“That is the first step upon which the practical struggle must be made. When +the hare is once caught and killed, cooking him will follow as a matter of course.”</p> + +<p>And several years afterwards, in “Protection or Free Trade,” page 302, Mr. +George describes the artful mechanism of the snare by which the hare is to be +caught and killed:</p> + +<p>“Now it is evident that, in order to take for the use of the government the +whole income arising from land just as effectively as it could be taken by formally +appropriating and letting out the land, it is only necessary to abolish, one after +another, all taxes now levied, and to increase the tax on land values till it reaches +as near as may be the full annual value of the land.”</p> + +<p>In that paragraph “government” is merely another word for “nation,” and the +taking away from private owners all the lands of the country “for the use of the +government” is land-nationalisation, whether the taking be done boldly by imperial +decree, or furtively by taxing it up to its “full value” and out of the hands of its +owners.</p> + +<p>The discrimination above made must apply to Herbert Spencer as well as to +Henry George. Mr. Spencer has a right to qualify and explain as much as he +pleases; he may properly say what he thinks now about the right of land-ownership, +but the question at issue is this, What are the opinions of “Social Statics” upon the +land question? Are they not in principle, and very nearly in expression the opinions +of “Progress and Poverty”?</p> + +<p>It is not to be denied that “Progress and Poverty” found moral support in +“Social Statics.” In fact, the disciples of Henry George, whenever their doctrines +were assailed, brought Herbert Spencer into the field as a reinforcement. This, +at last, gave Mr. Spencer great annoyance, and in a moment of irritation he determined +even by a qualified recantation to withdraw the reserve brigade on which +“Progress and Poverty” had so long depended for assistance. Hence, his letters +to the <i>Times</i> and the <i>St. James’s Gazette</i>, and the modification of his views which +appears in “Justice.” He tried to do this by dropping Mr. George to the ground, +while endeavoring to stand on consistent feet himself; and this it is that inspires the +vehement criticism of Mr. George.</p> + +<p>With a scalpel most logically keen Mr. George has dissected Mr. Spencer’s +philosophy of land, and with almost Indian exultation he exposes its eccentricities +and contradictions. As was inevitable, for we cannot get along without it, the old +familiar Galileo moral is brought in by Mr. George to prove that “still it moves.” +He is right; for if it is ethically and politically true, as declared by Mr. Spencer in +1850, “that equity does not permit property in land,” it will be true forever, and +no extremity of recantation can make it false. The attempt of Mr. Spencer to show +by duplicate metaphysics that his later opinions concerning land are not inconsistent +with the occult meaning of “Social Statics,” is a failure. It cannot stand a moment +before the searching analysis and legible comparisons of Mr. George.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_486">[486]</span></p> + +<p>The attempt to resolve a concrete subject, such as government ownership of +land, into abstract terms of justice limited or expanded by the right of some private +person to the house on the land, and the barn, and the well, and the fences, and +the apple-trees, and other appurtenances, corporeal and incorporeal, has involved +Mr. George himself, as well as Mr. Spencer, in some confusion of thought, and has +entangled both of them in varieties of statement not easy to reconcile. This might +be due to obscure definitions and multiplied explanations, or to changes of opinion, +but Mr. George asserts that Mr. Spencer’s inconsistencies are the result of moral +and intellectual dishonesty, prompting him to explain away his principles to propitiate +the landlords and other aristocratic persons who admitted him into their +high society after he became eminent, and before they knew that his philosophy denied +the right of private property in land.</p> + +<p>In his letter to the <i>Times</i>, apologising for “Social Statics,” Mr. Spencer said:</p> + +<p>“The work referred to—“Social Statics”—was intended to be a system of +Political Ethics—absolute political ethics, or that which ought to be, as distinguished +from relative political ethics, or that which is at present the nearest practical +approach to it.”</p> + +<p>And then the philosopher becomes a politician and frames for the landed and +the landless a moral code, ambidextrous and elastic as a party platform. Duty, +justice, right, and truth, lose all their absolute qualities, and become relative to expediency +and our own convenience. He teaches us to oppose wrongs until they +become vested rights and then defend them. He makes ethics changeable as our +coats, and the man who can afford two suits of clothes may have two suits of ethics, +an “absolute” suit for Sundays and a “relative” suit for every day; an “abstract” +suit for wearing about the house, and a “practical” suit for business purposes. He +may wear a suit of “pure” ethics when buying, and a suit of “applied” ethics +when selling; and so, at last, by those harlequin morals, it happens that what we +ought to do has no relation at all to “that which ought to be.” Those pure subtleties +and applied subterfuges make Mr. Spencer an easy mark for the indignant sarcasm +of Mr. George, who shows what Mr. Spencer thought of absolute and relative +ethics when he said in “Social Statics”:</p> + +<p>“When a man admits that an act is ‘theoretically just,’ he admits it to be +that which, in strict duty, should be done. By ‘true to principle’ he means in +harmony with the conduct decreed for us. The course which he calls ‘abstractedly +right,’ he believes to be the appointed way to human happiness. There is no +escape. The expressions mean this or they mean nothing.”</p> + +<p>The book is written in an angry vein, and the nicknames “traitor,” “juggler,” +“apostate,” and the like, add nothing to the value of its argument; they only give +bitterness to the censure. They are not to be commended, although they ought to +be excused, for they sprang out of “a tempest of provocation.” Mr. George has +been fighting under the banner of Herbert Spencer, and he feels like a soldier +whose general deserts him in the battle and then disowns him altogether.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_487">[487]</span></p> + +<p>The only rational explanation of Mr. Spencer’s letters to the <i>Times</i> and the <i>St. +James’s Gazette</i> is that he has radically changed his opinions about the private +ownership of land: and his timid, uncertain, and equivocal way of saying so makes +him look very much like the “perplexed philosopher” that Mr. George describes. +At the same time it must be noticed that Mr. George himself is not so radical in +this last book as he was in “Progress and Poverty.” His principles appear to be the +same, but in the application of remedies he is milder than he was about fourteen +years ago. When he reaches Mr. Spencer’s age he may be just as conservative and +“perplexed” as that philosopher is now.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">M. M. Trumbull.</span></p> + +<div class="footnotes"> + +<h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_85" href="#FNanchor_85" class="label">[85]</a> Mr. Salter’s name for his theory.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_86" href="#FNanchor_86" class="label">[86]</a> Says Mr. Salter: “Idealism (as here stated) is not, however, itself a solution, being only a +clear statement of what the problem is; and for all that such idealism can say, the problem may +be insoluble.”</p></div> + +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_488">[488]</span></p> + +<h3 class="nobreak" id="PERIODICALS_III">PERIODICALS.</h3> + +</div> + +<h4>ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE.</h4> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. IV. Nos. 4 and 5.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Die Grundempfindungen in normalen und anomalen Farbensystemen und +ihre Itensitätsverteilung im Spektrum.</span> By <i>Arthur König and Conrad +Dieterici</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Ist eine cerebrale Entstehung von Schwebungen Möglich?</span> By <i>Karl L. +Schaefer</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Ueber einige neuere Fortschritte in der Anatomie und Physiologie der +Arthropodenaugen.</span> By <i>Sigmund Fuchs</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Litteraturbericht.</span></p> + +</blockquote> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. IV. No. 6.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Das Tapetum lucidum bei Durchleuchtung des Auges.</span> By <i>Ziem</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Berichtigung zu Professor Münsterbergs Beiträgen zur experimentellen +Psychologie, Heft 4.</span> By <i>G. E. Müller</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Litteraturbericht.</span> (Hamburg and Leipsic: Leopold Voss.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<h4>PHILOSOPHISCHE MONATSHEFTE.</h4> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. XXIX. No. 3 and 4.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Die älteste Fassung von Melanchthons Ethik.</span> By <i>H. Heineck</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Die moderne Energetik in ihrer Bedeutung für die Erkenntnisskritik, +II.</span> By <i>K. Lasswitz</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Die sittliche Frage eine sociale Frage, II.</span> By <i>F. Staudinger</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Johann Eduard Erdmann.</span> By <i>B. Erdmann</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Litteraturbericht.</span> (Berlin: Dr. R. Salinger.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<h4>VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE.</h4> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. XVI. No. 4.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Die statischen Functionen des Ohrlabyrinthes und ihre Beziehungen +zu den Raumempfindungen.</span> (Part I.) By <i>R. Wlassak</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Ueber Verschmelzung und Analyse.</span> Eine psychologische Studie. (Part I.) +By <i>H. Cornelius</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Die Wichtigkeit der Reproductionsgefühle für die Entwicklung und +Bildung des Menschen.</span> By <i>J. Zahlfleisch</i>.</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_489">[489]</span></p> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. XVII. No. 1.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaft bei Galilei.</span> By <i>A. Riehl</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Die statischen Functionen des Ohrlabyrinthes und ihre Beziehungen +zu den Raumempfindungen.</span> (Concluded.) By <i>R. Wlassak</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Ueber Verschmelzung und Analyse.</span> Eine psychologische Studie. (Concluded.) +By <i>H. Cornelius</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Werththeorie und Ethik.</span> (Part I.) By <i>Chr. Ehrenfels</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">A. Voigt’s “elementare Logik” und meine Darlegungen zur Logik des +logischen Calculs.</span> By <i>E. G. Husserl</i>. (Leipsic: O. R. Reisland.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<h4>ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PHILOSOPHIE UND PHILOSOPHISCHE KRITIK.</h4> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. CI. No. 2.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Doxographisches zur Lehre vom τέλος.</span> By <i>A. Döring</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Ernst Platner’s und Kant’s Erkenntnisstheorie mit besonderer Berücksichtigung +von Tetens und Aenesidemus.</span> By <i>Dr. Arthur Wreschner</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Jahresbericht über Erscheinungen der philosophischen Litteratur in +französischer Sprache aus den Jahren 1889 und 1890.</span> By <i>Adolph Lasson</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Recensionen.</span> (Leipsic: C. E. M. Pfeffer.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<h4>THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY.</h4> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. V. No. 2.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">On the Development of Voluntary Motor Ability.</span> By <i>Wm. L. Bryan</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Training of Animals.</span> By <i>James E. LeRossignol</i>, Ph. D.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">On the Judgment of Angles and Positions of Lines.</span> By <i>Joseph Jastrow</i>, +Ph. D.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Statistics of “Unconscious Cerebration.”</span> By <i>Charles M. Child</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Experimental Psychology at Wellesley College.</span> By <i>Mary Whiton +Calkins</i>. (Worcester: J. H. Orpha.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<h4>INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS.</h4> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. III. No. 2.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Ethics of Social Progress.</span> <i>Prof. Franklin H. Giddings.</i></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Did the Romans Degenerate?</span> By <i>Mary Emily Case</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Political Economy and Practical Life.</span> By <i>Prof. William Cunningham</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">German Character as Reflected in the National Life and Literature.</span> +By <i>Richard M. Meyer</i>, Ph. D.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Book Reviews.</span> (Philadelphia: <i>International Journal of Ethics</i>, 118 South +Twelfth Street.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<h4>THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.</h4> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. II. No. 1.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Philosophy of Religion.</span> By <i>Prof. Otto Pfleiderer</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">An Ancient Pessimist.</span> By <i>Prof. J. Clark Murray</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Concept of Law in Ethics.</span> By <i>Prof. F. C. French</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">J. H. Lambert.</span> By <i>Harold Griffing</i>.</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_490">[490]</span></p> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. II. No. 2.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Kant’s Critical Problem.</span> By <i>J. G. Schurman</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Epistemology in Locke and Kant.</span> By <i>Prof. Andrew Seth</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Anthropometry and Experimental Psychology.</span> By <i>Prof. E. B. Titchener</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Discussions</span>: Reality and Idealism. By <i>David G. Ritchie</i> and <i>F. C. S. Schiller</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Book Reviews.</span> (Boston, New York, Chicago: Ginn & Company.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<h4>THE NEW WORLD.</h4> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. II. No. 5.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Place of the Fourth Gospel in the New Testament Literature.</span> +By <i>Orello Cone</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Folk-Song of Israel in the Mouth of the Prophets.</span> By <i>Karl Budde</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Cosmopolitan Religion.</span> By <i>C. A. Bartol</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Alleged Socialism of the Prophets.</span> By <i>A. W. Benn</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Whittier’s Spiritual Career.</span> By <i>John W. Chadwick</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Personal Factor in Biblical Inspiration.</span> By <i>Marvin R. Vincent</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Israel in Egypt.</span> By <i>C. H. Toy</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Briggs Heresy Trial.</span> By <i>C. R. Gillett</i>. (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin +& Co.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<h4>REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE.</h4> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. XVII. No. 12.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Le mouvement philosophique en Russie: II. La philosophie de Hegel et +les cercles philosophiques.</span> By <i>E. Lannes</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">La composition musicale et les lois générales de la psychologie.</span> By <i>M. +Paulhan</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">La psychologie de W. James</span> (2nd article). By <i>L. Marillier</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Analyses et comptes rendus.</span></p> + +</blockquote> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. XVIII. No. 1.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">La psychologie de W. James</span> (3d article). By <i>L. Marillier</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">La Croyance métaphysique.</span> By <i>J. Gourd</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">La Beauté plastique.</span> By <i>L. Couturat</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Analyses et comptes rendus.</span></p> + +</blockquote> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. XVIII. No. 2.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">L’Unité de la philosophie.</span> By <i>P. Janet</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">L’Expression objective en musique d’après le langage instinctif.</span> By <i>J. +Combarieu</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">La Psychologie de W. James.</span> (Concluded.) By <i>L. Marillier</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Revue des périodiques étrangers.</span> (Paris: Félix Alcan.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. XVIII. No. 3.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Recherches sur la succession des phénomènes psychologiques.</span> By <i>B. +Bourdon</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">L’amour est-il un état pathologique?</span> By <i>G. Danville</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Sur un effet particulier de l’attention appliquée aux images.</span> By <i>André +Lalande</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Beauté organique et beauté plastique.</span> By <i>A. Naville</i>.</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_491">[491]</span></p> + +<h4>REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE.</h4> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. I. No. 1.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Métaphysique et morale.</span> By <i>Félix Ravaisson</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Le continu mathématique.</span> By <i>H. Poincaré</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Essai sur quelques problèmes de philosophie première.</span> By <i>F. Rauh</i>. +(Paris: Librairie Hachette et Cie.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<h4>VOPROSUI FILOSOFII I PSICHOLOGII.⁠<a id="FNanchor_87" href="#Footnote_87" class="fnanchor">[87]</a></h4> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. III. No. 15.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Aim of Human Life.</span> By <i>W. Rosanoff</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Problem of Judgment.</span> By <i>F. Charitonoff</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Positivism of Kant.</span> By <i>A. Kozloff</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Basis of the Moral Duty.</span> By <i>N. Grote</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">A Criticism of Moral Altruism.</span> By <i>W. Preobrajensky</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Sense of Love.</span> By <i>W. Solowoff</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Founder of Transcendental Monism.</span> By <i>A. Wedensky</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Second International Congress of Experimental Psychology in +London.</span> By <i>W. Chige</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Question of Zoöpsychology.</span> By <i>W. Wagner</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Law of Perception.</span> By <i>N. Lange</i>. (Moscow, 1892.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<h4>PHILOSOPHISCHES JAHRBUCH.</h4> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. VI. No. 1.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Ueber die actuale Bestimmtheit des unendlich Kleinen.</span> By <i>Pohle</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Gassendi’s Skepticismus und seine Stellung zum Materialismus.</span> By <i>Kiefl</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Der Begriff des “Wahren.”</span> By <i>Franz Schmid</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Der Begriff des Unbewussten in psychologischer und erkenntnisstheoretischer +Hinsicht bei Ed. v. Hartmann.</span> By <i>Achelis</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Der Substanzbegriff bei Cartesius im Zusammenhang mit der scholastischen +und neueren Philosophie.</span> (Continued.) By <i>Carl Ludewig</i>, S. J. +(Fulda, 1893.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<h4>SPHINX.</h4> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. XV. No. 84.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Nirwana.</span> By <i>Menetos</i>.—<span class="smcap">Die Wiederverkörperungslehre im Drama.</span> By <i>Ludwig +Deinhard</i>.—<span class="smcap">Die Gnade.</span> By <i>Maria Janitschek</i>.—<span class="smcap">Das Fernsehen als Funktion +des transscendentalen Subjekts.</span> By <i>Carl du Prel</i>, Ph. D. (Concluded.)—<span class="smcap">An +Carl du Prel.</span> By <i>Martin Greif</i>.—<span class="smcap">Sehen und Wahrträumen.</span> +By <i>Hermann Haug</i>.—<span class="smcap">Ueber die spiritistischen Phänomene vom physikalischen +Standpunkt.</span> By <i>Dr. Anton Lampa</i>.—<span class="smcap">Schuld und Sühne.</span> Ein Beitrag +zur Frage der Telepathie. By <i>M. Const. Hoch</i>. (Concluded.)—<span class="smcap">Die Göttin +des Genusses.</span> Eine Traumphantasie. By <i>Karl Friedr. Jordan</i>.—<span class="smcap">Fegfeuer.</span> +Nach François Coppée. By <i>Rudolf Geering</i>.—<span class="smcap">Gerettet!</span> By <i>Raphael +von Koeber</i>, Ph. D.—<span class="smcap">Melancholie.</span> By <i>Carl Vanselow</i>.—<span class="smcap">Die sechs Schwäne.</span> +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_492">[492]</span>Ein Beitrag zum Nachweis des Esoterismus im Volksbewusstsein. By <i>Gottschalk +Thorsten</i>.—<span class="smcap">Geheimniss.</span> By <i>Adolf K. W. Hochenegg</i>.—<span class="smcap">Eine Geisterstimme.</span> +By <i>Hugo Gozdawa</i>.—<span class="smcap">Der Begriff des Absoluten.</span> By <i>O. Plümacher</i>.</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. XVI, No. 85.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Lebe deinem höchsten Ideal getreu!—A-u-m.</span> By <i>Menetos</i>.—<span class="smcap">Psalmen.</span> By +<i>Franz Evers</i>.—<span class="smcap">Meister der Mystik.</span> By <i>Wilhelm von Saintgeorge</i>.—<span class="smcap">Aegyptens +grosse Pyramide.</span> Ein Tempel der Einweihung in die Mysterien. By +<i>Eduard Maitland</i>.—<span class="smcap">Die deutsche Gesellschaft für ethische Kultur und +Herr von Egidy.</span> By <i>Hugo von Gizycki</i>.—<span class="smcap">Die Mystik des Islam.</span> By <i>Adolf +Engelbach</i>.—<span class="smcap">Ein echter Diener Gottes.</span> By <i>Dr. Raphael von Koeber</i>.—<span class="smcap">Ein +Gegner des Spiritismus.</span> By <i>Carl du Prel</i>.—<span class="smcap">Die Wissenschaft der Magier.</span> +By <i>Ludwig Deinhard</i>.—<span class="smcap">Hebe dich weg von mir, Satan!</span> By <i>H. v. M.</i>—<span class="smcap">Anna +Henle.</span> Ein Erlebnis. By <i>Hübbe-Schleiden</i>.—<span class="smcap">Der Stern der Sintflut.</span> By +<i>Arthur Stentzel</i>.—<span class="smcap">Selige Gegenwart.</span> By <i>Maria Janitschek</i>.—<span class="smcap">Sehnsucht.</span> +By <i>Carl Vanselow</i>.—<span class="smcap">Das Elflein, das ausging, den König zu suchen.</span> By +<i>Bernhard Fabler</i>.—<span class="smcap">Der blinde Passagier.</span> By <i>Ludwig Ganghofer</i>.—<span class="smcap">Frühlings +Erwachen.</span> Für Väter und Erzieher. By <i>O. Plümacher</i>.—<span class="smcap">Drei Knospen.</span> +By <i>Hans von Mosch</i>. (Brunswick: C. A. Schwetschke & Son.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>We cannot be accused of having any penchant for Theosophy or Spiritualism +and find little occasion to praise their productions, which are usually crude and +illiterate. But we must confess that Hübbe-Schleiden’s review, the <i>Sphinx</i>, is +greatly superior to anything in this field we have ever seen. There is artistic taste +about it; there is, so far as its position admits of, a certain contact with positive +science; there is an attractive popularity without shallowness. All these means +are skilfully employed by the editor to impress his ideas, erroneous though they may +be, upon his public. If the magazine appeared in English, instead of German, it +would at once become the recognised leader in its field.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"> + +<h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_87" href="#FNanchor_87" class="label">[87]</a> <i>Questions of Philosophy and Psychology.</i></p></div> + +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_493">[493]</span></p> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="masthead"> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Vol. III.</span> +<span class="smcap spacer">July, 1893.</span> +<span class="smcap">No. 4.</span></p> + +<h2>THE MONIST.</h2> + +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h3 class="nobreak" id="NATIONALISATION_OF_EDUCATION">NATIONALISATION OF EDUCATION AND THE UNIVERSITIES.⁠<a id="FNanchor_88" href="#Footnote_88" class="fnanchor">[88]</a></h3> + +</div> + +<p>A little more than a century ago it was universally believed +that, in the nature of things, the vitality of a republic and its +size stand in an inverse ratio. The inadaptability of a republican +system of government to a state of vast territorial expanse and with +a very numerous population was considered an almost axiomatic, +i. e. self-evident, truth. When the thirteen English colonies in North +America had taken the bold resolution to transform themselves into +the United States of America, many an ardent patriot often asked +himself, not free from anxious foreboding, whether the Union was +within the limits laid down by irreversible political laws, as the +utmost extent of republics fit to endure. If it had not been for the +size of the country, the doubts as to whether the republican experiment +was likely to prove a success, would never have assumed a +character, which gave sufficient color to the charge of monarchical +tendencies, to make them appear well-founded in the eyes of so +many people. When afterwards a new empire was to be added to +the Union by the Louisiana purchase, the doubt, as to whether the +republican system of government would be equal to the strain put +upon it by such an immense enlargement of the area of the United +States, played a not unimportant part among the objections of the +opposition. That experience has definitively disposed of these ideas, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_494">[494]</span>by proving the apprehensions to be unfounded, is no reason to think +meanly of the political discernment of those who entertained them. +It will not be universally admitted, that experience has thus far +proved them to be wholly unfounded also as to consolidated republics. +And how can it be wondered at, that at that time the essential +difference was not fully realised and understood, which exists between +a federal and a consolidated republic with regard to the peculiar +dangers and evils apt to arise from this specific cause. Though +republican federations had been known to the world for two thousand +years, no instruction was to be derived from their history on this +head. As to the extent of territory, the consolidated Roman republic, +which had consumed its vitality with its growth, could alone be +compared with the United States; and as to many of the essential +features of their political structure, neither modern nor ancient history +furnished an analogy. In the soil of the New World, the germs +of European institutions had—adapting themselves to the new conditions—developed +into a new type of commonwealth.</p> + +<p>It is conceded on all sides that, next to the capacity of the +American people for self-government, the United States owe it primarily +to the happy blending of the principles of National Union +and State Independence that, taking all in all, hitherto their history +has been the most striking and convincing vindication of republican +institutions; and it is hardly questioned that, but for the happy +blending of these two principles, a republic comprising half the +North American continent and possessed of all the requisites of vitality +never would nor could have existed. Upon their being “an +indestructible Union of indestructible States,” the vitality of the +United States absolutely depends. That, with this principle as the +foundation, the domain of a republic <i>can</i> be almost indefinitely +extended, without thereby destroying its vital energies, has been irrefutably +demonstrated. But does that mean, that the United States +have definitively solved the problem of keeping the vital forces of a +republic covering a vast area unimpaired? By no means. Only +the preliminary question has been settled by them for all time to +come, what the indispensable prerequisite of its solution is, and +they have thus far succeeded in preserving their vitality. But even +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_495">[495]</span>as to themselves, the solution of the problem itself has to be repeated +over and over again, not only by generation after generation, but +every year and every day. The hour never will, never can come, +when the American people can, with impunity, say: the task is accomplished; +let us rest and enjoy the fruits. It never can come, +because the problem itself is in a continuous state of transformation. +Though the changes be so slow, that they are imperceptible to the +keenest eye trying to follow them up from year to year, they are +none the less real, and if they are not duly heeded, the penalty will +have to be paid some time in one way or another. While the fundamental +principle, the blending of National Union and State Independence, +is irreversible, the attempt to make its application immutable, +would be fatal. I say the attempt, for actually to do it, is, +in the nature of things, impossible. The American people are not +only constitutionally a nation. The civil war did not result in the +permanent disruption of the Union, but in welding it more indissolubly +together, because, with the single exception of slavery, the +facts coincided with the law. In spite of the tremendous sectionalising +influence exercised by slavery, the nationalisation in feeling, +thinking, and interests had made such progress under the operation +and protection of the law of the land, that it could stand as severe +a test, as any consolidated State can boast of having stood. The +causes, to which it was due, that the facts were in conformity with +the law, have been ever since unremittingly at work,—the counter-tendencies +have disappeared with the abolishment of slavery,—and, +independent of that, those causes are every year acquiring a greater +force. The actual nationalisation, therefore, goes steadily on, +whether we like it or not, and though the constitutional nationalisation +be allowed to remain unchanged. While the legal status under +the Constitution may not be altered for ever so long, we are confronted +by constantly changing conditions. If we do not conform +in what we do and leave undone to the irrepressible changes of this +evolutionary process, the maintenance of the principle of blending +National Union and State Independence will avail us but little. The +vital energies will dry up and ebb away, for while we have kept the +form, we have become strangers to the spirit which renders it a +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_496">[496]</span>magic force. Nor ought the dividing line between political parties to +run, as in days of yore, on the question of State rights and consolidation. +All discriminating patriots must be as well State rights men +as consolidationists, respectively conscious supporters and promoters +of further nationalisation. Where and how ought State independence +to be strengthened, so as to prevent an over-consolidation by the +silent working of those nationalising causes, which it is impossible +to stem? and: Where and how ought consolidation, respectively +nationalisation, to be promoted, in order to make the working of +those nationalising causes conducive to the true interests of the +people and to the invigorating of republican institutions? These +are the two questions which the American people have constantly +to ask themselves. On the discretion and discernment displayed in +trying to find the correct answers must it depend, whether the federative +principle will work as well in the future, as it has done in the +past.</p> + +<p>If these propositions must be admitted, it can be proved that +in no respect is conscious and systematic nationalisation more imperatively +needed than in regard to education. At first sight this +assertion may seem worse than extravagant. I am, however, not +afraid to submit my case to the jury of the American people, if I am +but conceded the legal right of every criminal, to be heard ere I am +judged.</p> + +<p>Education is the bed-rock on which this republic rests. However +excellent its political institutions be, its decay and ultimate +downfall is inevitable, if the people fail to do their full duty by themselves +in this respect. For, in a democratic republic, political institutions +are live forces only so far as the people have the mental +and moral requirements for working them well, and these mental +and moral requirements can be attained only by education. It is, +therefore, in the strictest sense of the word, a <i>vital</i> question for the +republic that every one of its sons and daughters receive not only +some schooling, but that the education of all be proper and adequate. +That is a tremendous task. It constantly grows in scope +and intricacy, and at the same time, it becomes of more and more +import that it be well accomplished. With the people rests the ultimate +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_497">[497]</span>decision in everything, and the problems confronting the commonwealth +are assuming more and more a character, taxing the +highest statesmanship to the utmost. Thus the claims upon the intelligence +and the moral soundness of the people are fast being +strained far beyond anything ever known by any former generation +in this or any other country. And lack of the required intelligence +and moral soundness in any one State necessarily affects the whole +Union. A State that is derelict to its duty in the education of its +people, wrongs not only itself, but also the nation. By its share in +the federal government, every State is directly instrumental in laying +down the law for the whole country. All the States are thereby made +to participate in the payment of the penalty for its intellectual and +moral deficiencies. This is, however, by no means the only way in +which they are made to suffer by them. What the law does with regard +to everything rendered federal by the Constitution; commerce, travel, +and interchange of population do in other respects. They are unremittingly +and with ever increasing intensity at work, multiplying +and rendering more close the organic relations between all the parts +of the vast domain, every water-way, railroad-track, and telegraph +line performing the functions of the veins in the animal organism. +If the blood be poisoned in one limb, the virus cannot be prevented +from working its way into the whole system.</p> + +<p>To admit that education is in the highest degree a national <i>interest</i>, +and to deny its being a national <i>concern</i>, is, however, a self-contradiction. +To contest either the right or the duty of a nation +to acknowledge every national interest a national concern, and to +deal with it accordingly, is a palpable absurdity. Not as to the +Whether, but only as to the How, can the people be restricted by +the Constitution. A constitution imposing upon the people an injunction +to minister to the needs of the commonwealth, would be as +great a political monstrosity as a constitution providing for the dissolution +of the state.</p> + +<p>This doctrine will not be allowed to pass unchallenged. I shall +be asked whether I set myself against the universally accepted fundamental +principle of American constitutional law, that the federal +government has no powers but those granted to it by the Constitution. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_498">[498]</span>I do not. “Where, then,” my interlocutor will go on, “do +you find the express grant or the implied power?” Nowhere. “Then +you advocate a constitutional amendment to the effect indicated by +you?” I do not. I know that such an amendment could not get the +vote of a single state, and if there were a possibility of its being +adopted by the constitutional number of states, I should be found, +to the last, among those fighting it tooth and nail. I can hardly +conceive of a more suicidal measure than the adoption of such an +amendment. Just because education is the bed-rock on which the +republic rests, is it of vital importance that it does not become a +federal affair. Self-reliance and responsibility are the main pillars +supporting a democratic commonwealth. Kill, in the people of a +state and the population of its subdivisions, the habit of self-reliance +and the sense of responsibility in regard to the substratum of the +whole political and social structure, and they will wither and shrivel +up in regard to everything else. The compulsion to tax themselves +directly for the establishment and maintenance of schools and the +being in close touch with those entrusted with the direction of the +educational work are an inestimable boon to the people.</p> + +<p>Even if it were economically possible to do without direct taxes, +political reasons would peremptorily forbid their abolishment. On +account of their moral effect, no state could dispense with them, and +least of all a democracy. All indirect taxes are paid more or less +unconsciously; the people, however, must be kept conscious that +the public purse means their own pockets. The more they lose +sight of this, the wider the door is opened to paternalism, and paternalism +is a more deadly enemy of liberty than despotism and +tyranny. These, if any vitality be left in the people, ultimately +kindle the desire for liberty, while paternalism acts upon it as an +opiate and ends by killing it through the systematic enervation of +self-government. If this is to be kept alive not only in form, but +also in essence and in spirit, the people must constantly be held to +teach themselves in illustrating by their own acts the irrefutable +truth, that not the rights, but the self-imposed duties are the vital +principle of true democracy. Nothing, however, is more apt to +drive this all-important fact irresistibly home, implanting it ineradicably +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_499">[499]</span>in their whole feeling and in their conscious thinking, than the +necessity to vote, as directly as possible, out of their own pockets +the money required for preserving intact and in vigor the prerequisite +of <i>all</i> that is needed for the preservation of the nation’s vitality. +If it be not deemed irreverent, I should say that every dollar a man +voluntarily votes out of his pocket to provide for the educational +needs of the community, preaches to him a political “Sermon on +the Mount.” “Liberty and self-government,” it says, “must be +paid for;—state and society are in their very essence ethical conceptions;—they +must totter, fall, and crumble to pieces, unless they +rest on an ethical foundation;—to preserve, broaden, and deepen +this foundation, by providing for the required intellectual and moral +equipment of the generations in whose hands the future destinies of +the commonwealth will lie, is the paramount duty of the people;—no +one has the right to exempt himself from doing his share in the +fulfilment of this duty, for the heirloom of the past, enjoyed by the +present, is but a trust to be left, with accrued interest, to the future;—the +fulfilment of this duty ought to be considered rather a privilege +than a sacrifice, for every farthing paid for the maintenance of +the humblest village school is an integral part of the nation’s life-insurance +premium;—glory in this responsibility to the whole country, +for it constitutes you, with the wealthiest and mightiest, a joint +builder of its greatness;—glory in thus bearing witness by the fruit +of the sweat of your brow, that you, too, are sworn in on the creed +that man does not live by bread alone;—glory in and render thanks +for being thus held to keep ablaze in your own bosom and help +kindle in the bosom of the lowliest child of the community, the +sacred fire of idealism.”</p> + +<p>That by many, perhaps by most people, this appeal is not heard +in distinct words, I do not contest. But that is no reason to make +light of it. Utterly lost it never is. Something of it sinks into the +mind even of the dullest and most hard-hearted, though it be but in +the form of a faint and vague feeling. To make them lose this, is +to deprive them of the best they have. Democracy is not a mill-pond, +on which a fragile boat can outride the wildest tempest. It +is the open sea, on which the proudest and stoutest craft is sure to +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_500">[500]</span>be swamped, sooner or later, if it be not properly ballasted. True +idealism, however, never was a more essential part of the ballast, +than in these times and in this country. It stands more in need of +it than any other state, because its unparalleled opportunities are +appallingly powerful incentives to plunge headlong into the materialistic +tendencies of the age. Therefore, it is ruthless to lay hands +on anything tending to keep alive and foster true idealism in the +people. For this reason it would be, in my opinion,—not in intention, +but in effect,—a dastardly crime, under any plea whatever, to +release the people from the obligation to provide in their local organisations +for the education of their youths.</p> + +<p>Therefore, I even deem it upon the whole more beneficial than +detrimental that many of the higher and most of the highest educational +institutions of the country are the free gift of high-minded +men and women to the people. I have never agreed with those who +have contended in this country that the duty of the commonwealth +does not extend beyond providing for primary and, at the most, to +some extent for secondary education, and that it would not be fair +and proper to tax all for the establishment and maintenance of colleges +and universities, which, in the nature of the case, only a small +minority can frequent. It would be hard to name a more promising +sign of the times, than that this doctrine has of late lost so much of +its former hold upon public opinion, that one would have to search +long for an advocate of it in its original rigor. It is eminently +in the interest of all, that there be an ample number of men and +women who have received the highest education. Therefore, it +is evidently not only justified, but imperative, that the commonwealth +furnish the means for supplying its want. But if the views +held in this respect on the continent of Europe had prevailed in the +United States, the American people would have been the poorer of +one of the vastest and most grateful fields for manifesting idealistic +public-spiritedness. An inestimable loss, for idealistic public-spiritedness +is not the least of the causes to which it is due that American +democracy has stood the test; and idealistic public-spiritedness, +like every virtue, grows stronger and more fruitful by being practised. +Every donation for educational purposes prompts others to +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_501">[501]</span>follow suit, and is, apart from its direct beneficent effects, a most +valuable object-lesson to the whole nation. With equal impressiveness, +the rich and the poor are reminded of the treasures which +“neither moth nor rust doth corrupt.” On every educational institution +brought into existence in such a way are indelibly inscribed +the two magic words to which this country owes it greatness: Help +yourself, and Public Spirit; every one of them is a living protest, +as well against paternalism—whether it present itself in the socialistic +or in any other garb—as against the setting up of the golden calf +as the idol of the republic. Therefore, everything tending to seriously +check these manifestations of idealism and public spirit in regard +to higher education would be deplorable, even if it were in +itself commendable, for paternalism and materialism are too rampant +to leave anything undone that is calculated to keep them down.</p> + +<p>To contend that the existing decentralisation in regard to education +must be done away with, would, for these reasons, be a truly +Quixotic charge upon windmills: the venture must result in broken +bones. It cannot, and, if it could, ought not to be done, for this +decentralisation is the natural outgrowth of the whole historical development +of the commonwealth and in perfect accordance with the +underlying principle of its political and social structure. But it +would be strange logic to conclude from this that it can have worked +no harm, or that the evil consequences it may have had cannot be +remedied. Can it be denied that, apart from the primary schools, +it sounds almost like mockery to speak of an American system of +education? If we look at the schools of a higher grade, we are confronted +by a bewildering chaos, and the nearer the top, the worse +the confusion becomes. That the effects of this are not altogether +good, will be universally admitted, though opinions will differ as to +the weight that ought to be attached to the bad consequences in the +aggregate and severally. To me, some of them seem to be of a very +serious character, and I hold that they must from year to year become +of more consequence. To say that somebody has been through +a “high school,” does not convey sufficiently definite information as +to either the kind or the amount of instruction he has received. To +know that somebody is a graduate of an “academy,” a “college,” +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_502">[502]</span>a “university,” means to know next to nothing as to his mental +equipment. To gauge our man, we must inquire, What academy, +what college, what university? Having learned that, we are in hundreds +of cases not a whit wiser than before. We have to ask for +the calendar of the institution, and, after having read that, we shall +often be still pretty much at sea, for, as the Germans say, “paper is +patient,” and the printing of a first-class programme implies by no +means of necessity first-class instruction. This may be considered +by some of little or no moment, because the degrees confer no rights +whatever. But they are, nevertheless, not senseless gewgaws. If +they be deemed such, their abolishment must be insisted upon, for +then they are as much out of place in this country as orders or other +meaningless titles. They are intended to be certificates of knowledge +and mental training. If they lose this character, they are +nothing, or worse than nothing. It is, however, self-evident that +they must be deprived of this character, exactly to the extent that +the educational institutions bearing the same name and conferring +the same degrees differ from each other. Do you not think it more +than likely that, if a law were passed making it obligatory to add to +the letters indicating a degree the name of the institution by which +it was conferred, an astounding number of ornamental tails to names +would be cut off forever?</p> + +<p>This would not be done, if the degrees merely failed to be definite +and reliable certificates of knowledge and mental training. +They do positive harm, because the institutions conferring them +have little more in common than the name, their educational standard +differing in the extremes, as much as the crippled shrub and +the sturdy oak. While the public do not know what value to attach +to the degree, a large percentage of the recipients are betrayed +into offensive and pernicious self-deception. Upon the official averment +of their <i>alma mater</i>, they lay the flattering unction to their soul +that they have received a much better intellectual outfit than they +really possess. These institutions practically reverse the precept of +the Greek sage: not “know thyself,” but “deceive thyself” is the +maxim imprinted on their diplomas. And this self-deception is a +subtle, contagious virus. It is at least doubtful, whether more will +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_503">[503]</span>take warning by looking through the false pretense, or be lured by +it into the same mistaken notions as to the requirements of genuine +higher education. To have practically no fixed standards for the +different grades of higher education must as inevitably have mischievous +effects upon the intellectual life of a people, as its economic +life must be demoralised by allowing everybody to coin money of +the same outward appearance, but of any alloy he pleases. Not +that harm has been done by the almost unlimited freedom enjoyed +by the educational institutions owing their existence to private +munificence, is to be wondered at; it is astonishing that the deleterious +effects have not been much worse. A premium is offered for +sailing under a false flag. If a college may be called a university, +and an academy a college, it would be more than surprising if the +grander name were not frequently preferred, for it flatters alike the +vanity of the donors, the instructors, and the pupils, and will—with +more or less reason—be expected to work as a bait. With the name +goes the right to confer degrees, and the exercising of this privilege +is to serve the same purposes. But the name renders it necessary +to keep up appearances, and that is an expensive pleasure. The +masquerading in a pretentious guise cuts down the allowance of +wholesome food. Worthless universities instead of good colleges, +inferior colleges instead of satisfactory academies and fitting schools, +are but too often the result. No name will deprive the rose of its +sweet scent; but the buttercup cannot, with impunity, call itself +a rose.</p> + +<p>The worst, however, is, that even the best institutions of the +higher order are made to pay a heavy penalty for the shortcomings +of those of the lower rank. Not getting the proper material, they +do not turn out as good work as they in themselves might do. Much +valuable time, which ought to be devoted to going on with the +building, must be spent in mending and strengthening the deficient +foundation, which, after all, does not acquire the requisite solidity, +because mending is necessarily patchwork. Nor is the damage confined +to the pupils that have been sent up from inefficient schools. +These act as a drag upon those who have come adequately prepared. +To render matters worse, the deficiencies are neither the same with +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_504">[504]</span>all, nor is it known beforehand where they will be found and how +far they will extend. Neither are the curricula the same, nor is +there any guaranty that the same curriculum means the same work +done. Here so many things have been taught, that everything has +suffered in regard to thoroughness. There, specialisation has commenced +so early, that the basis is too narrow and too shallow. +Training for a special purpose has encroached upon education. All +these difficulties greatly hamper the institution. But they do more. +They exercise a strong pressure upon it to stray from the right path, +for they are powerful incentives to yield to the evil tendency, more +to measure, than to weigh the work done. This is, in my opinion, +the most deplorable of all the bad consequences which the lack of a +uniform system, resulting from the decentralisation of education, has +thus far had; and it is all the more dangerous, because the measuring +principle is so well fitted to be clad in the seductive garb of a lucid +and clear-cut system.</p> + +<p>I do not expect that every one of my propositions will be universally +assented to. But can any unprejudiced observer dispute +that there is enough truth in what I have said to prompt the people +seriously to ponder the question, where this is going to end? If no +conscious, energetic, and concerted effort be made to counteract the +evil effects of decentralisation, the very fact of higher education +having assumed such a kaleidoscopic character renders inevitable +its becoming more and more kaleidoscopic. The founders, boards +of trustees, presidents, and faculties of new institutions are almost +compelled to give their individual notions on higher education, to a +dangerous extent, free scope. Having a hundred different patterns +presented to their consideration, the temptation is well-nigh irresistible +not to adopt any one of them, but to devise a new one. A +new experimenting laboratory is set up. That its experiments will +be, positively or negatively, of some value, is to be supposed. In +most cases, however, the public interest would have been better +served by a good factory, renouncing the risky ambition of dabbling +with new inventions.</p> + +<p>A European is struck with wonderment that, considering the +extent to which decentralisation in higher education has been carried, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_505">[505]</span>not infinitely more harm has been done, and that the harm it +does, seems to impress the Americans comparatively so little. Neither +can be understood, unless one fully realises to what a degree the +American commonwealth is still in its formative period, and what an +astounding educational power there is in American life. To the +former it is principally due, that the deleterious effects mentioned +are here in fact of much less consequence, than they would be, where +the advantages of an historical development, counting by more than +centuries, are paid for by the rigidity of age; and the latter supplements +and corrects the work of the schools so effectively, that it is +not surprising to find even many a keen-sighted and highly accomplished +American more or less blindfolded as to this. Because the +ultimate results are satisfactory, it is taken for granted, that the +educational conditions of the country must be all right, while a +searching critical examination irresistibly forces upon one the question, +whether a good deal is not achieved in spite of them. If this +be so, failure to promptly attend to what is defective in them will +surely be punished, for thanks to the rapidity with which the United +States are being filled up, their formative period is fast drawing to +a close, and with its close, the educational power of American life +will be, in some important respects, very sensibly diminished. The +peculiar advantages, they have thus far enjoyed, are steadily growing +weaker, while intellectually and morally, the difficulties confronting +the whole civilised world, and difficulties peculiar to them, are as +steadily making greater demands upon the people. Growth of population +and development of economical life, with all its attending circumstances, +constantly working at the further nationalisation of the +American people, and the problems to be solved growing more and +more intricate, disaster must become inevitable, if education does not +keep abreast of this double movement; and this it cannot do, if we +do not energetically and systematically go to work to nationalise +education without consolidating it. Nor have we any time to lose, +for the task is by no means easy. Every inch of ground gained will +be the price of an arduous and protracted struggle.</p> + +<p>From the Federal Government no direct assistance is to be derived, +for the question is not within the province of its constitutional +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_506">[506]</span>powers, and if it were, we ought not to ask its interference, because, +as I said, to nationalise education without consolidating it, is to be +the aim. Public opinion, unaided by law, must effect the reform. +Public opinion, however, is in this country even more powerful than +the law. It is sure finally to overcome not only all active, but even +all passive resistance, which is always much harder to overcome. +But is there any possibility of ever inducing public opinion to take +the question up in full earnest? I am confident there is, and at all +events it must be tried. The difficulty of the task is no excuse for +not undertaking it. It only admonishes us, not to waste time, +strength, and enthusiasm in vain attempts to carry the fortress by +assault. The works are so extended and so strong that only a methodical +siege requiring a great deal of skill, patience, and determination, +offers any chance of success. Two preliminary questions +must, therefore, be answered, ere operations can be commenced: +who is to conduct the campaign, and by what tactics can the approaches +be pushed on the fastest?</p> + +<p>The answer to be given to the first question is plain. The instructors +are to be considered the experts, if anybody can claim the +title. Upon them, therefore, devolves the duty to take the lead. +This they have already commenced to do. The very existence of a +National Educational (Teacher’s) Association is in itself irrefutable +proof that the opinions advanced by me, have, in some way and to +some extent, asserted themselves for some time. How this has been +done and what has been effected, I do not feel called upon to discuss. +I merely state that while I appreciate what it has done and +expect from it still more in the future, I am firmly convinced that +the goal can never be reached if we are to content ourselves with +what this organisation is capable of achieving. This will be deemed +the less disparaging, if I furthermore state that, in my opinion, the +end could no more be attained by any other organisation acting +singlehanded. Hunting for any one device which will as certainly +effect a cure as patent medicines claim to cure bodily ailments, is +but to waste time. The evil has to be attacked from many points +and in many ways, if sanitation is to set in.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_507">[507]</span></p> + +<p>While I am fully persuaded of this, I am, however, on the other +hand as firmly convinced that nothing will be of avail if the Universities +do not step forward, heading the column of attack and adding +compulsion to suasion. The reform has to be worked from the top +downward. At present the law is, to a great extent, dictated by the +schools of the lower grade to those of the higher. This must be reversed. +The Universities must insist upon getting the proper material +for doing what in their judgment is the proper work. They +must cease fitting themselves to what the schools are pleased to send +them. By closing their doors against all applicants whom they do +not really deem adequately prepared, they must compel the schools, +either to take down from their portals the inscription “fitting school,” +or to mend their ways and furnish their pupils the kind and the +amount of instruction they ought. A University that meekly submits +to travel on whatever roads some hundreds of schools, which +all more or less follow their own notions, happen to think good +enough, never can be a University except in name. No institution +has a moral right to the proud name of University that does not, +consciously and determinately, do all that is in its power to direct its +educational policy solely by what the civilisation of the age and the +true interests of the nation require.</p> + +<p>I wish the old maxim <i>ultra posse nemo obligatur</i> did not compel +me to say “to do all that is in its power,” for I am but too well +aware how deplorably little that is in many cases. State Universities +are subject to another will, and this other will is apt to have +very much its own notions as to how much a University may be +allowed to cost, and to determine the standard of the University +entirely by the local standard of schools. Other Universities, though +legally their own masters, are practically restrained as much or even +more by implacable facts. No University can entirely dispense with +students, and the endowment of more than one University forbids +its making light of the number of students it can secure. Being to +some extent dependent upon the students for their maintenance, +they cannot afford to be very fastidious in regard to the standard of +schools they try to enlist into their constituency. But there is also +a goodly number of Universities whose position is in absolutely every +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_508">[508]</span>respect so strong that they can enter the lists without any risk whatever +to themselves. Whether they stop growing for a while or even +decline in numbers for some years does not affect their future in the +least. They are so much in quest by students that the fitting schools +are sure to make haste to meet their requirements, if these rise above +their curriculum. To move on in wild leaps would, of course, be +foolish. But so long as these Universities do not do that they never +need to look backward in their onward march; their whole constituency +of schools must follow close upon their heels, because they +cannot afford to bolt and drop out. The more the leading Universities +proceed upon a concerted plan, the larger the circle would +grow, within which their joint pressure would be irresistible: the +strength of each would be doubled by pressing on, shoulder to shoulder +with the others, on the same lines. At the same time it will +make it correspondingly easier for the weaker ones to follow in their +wake. How could it fail to make an impression upon those on whom +they depend, if they can back their pleas by urging the practical +unanimity of all the foremost institutions of the country as to the +right course to take? The more the leading Universities are united, +not only as to the scope and method of their own work, but also as +to what is to be considered the proper preparation for University +work, the more will deviations from the rules laid down by them +come to imply to public opinion inferiority of standard; and if there +is a whip under which American communities smart, it is this. As +to this would be added the missionary influences of the alumni sent +from the leading Universities into all parts of the republic, it would +be strange indeed, if the idea were not constantly to spread and to +cast deeper root, that to adequately provide for the educational needs +of the country, it is necessary consciously to create and systematically +to foster a tendency, by the free action of public opinion, more and +more to harmonise education, in developing it everywhere and in all +its ramifications into a thoroughly organic structure.</p> + +<p>I am prepared to hear the opinions I have ventured to advance +strenuously contested and, perhaps, even mercilessly ridiculed by +many. The open antagonists, however, cause me but little uneasiness. +I fear only one thing, i. e. that those who more or less endorse +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_509">[509]</span>my criticisms and agree with me as to what is desirable, will be induced +by the arduousness of the work to persuade themselves that +it is impossible to bring about such a reform. To them I should +say: Where there is a will, there is a way, and the American people +<i>must</i> be brought to will this reform, because every year a portentous +word is becoming more true and of greater import: “the age of +perils is past, but the age of difficulties has set it.”</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">H. von Holst.</span></p> + +<div class="footnotes"> + +<h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_88" href="#FNanchor_88" class="label">[88]</a> Commencement address at the Nebraska State University, June 7, 1893.</p></div> + +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_510">[510]</span></p> + +<h3 class="nobreak" id="MEANING_AND_METAPHOR">MEANING AND METAPHOR.</h3> + +</div> + +<p>Professor Huxley supposes⁠<a id="FNanchor_89" href="#Footnote_89" class="fnanchor">[89]</a> “that so long as the human +mind exists, it will not escape its deep-seated instinct to personify +its intellectual conceptions.” He finds that “the science of +the present day is as full of this particular form of intellectual +shadow-worship as is the nescience of ignorant ages.” The difference +he sees is “that the philosopher who is worthy of the name +knows that his personified hypotheses, such as law, and force, and +ether, and the like, are merely useful symbols, while the ignorant +and the careless take them for adequate expressions of reality.” He +then goes on to warn us against dealing with symbols as though +they were “real existences.”</p> + +<p>Few indeed are free from reproach in this matter, so far as reproach +is deserved at all in the general unconsciousness of what +constitutes the danger. Few see the question to be vital or the +danger to be urgent; and even those who do are apt to deny that the +search for a remedy can be a crusade worth attempting; the very +idea seems Utopian or pedantic. On the one hand, teachers as a +rule do not take their own analogies and metaphors seriously. Both +the literary and scientific, as well as the philosophic and historical +instinct tell against their doing so. In their eyes figures have either +faded into indifferent abstractions, or they are obviously pictorial +and merely rhetorical. But the average reader is apt to take them +at the foot of the letter. He is usually unaware both of the extent +to which he literalises and of the curious inconsistencies which his +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_511">[511]</span>literalising involves. So he makes his inferences with alight heart, +and wonders, perhaps, at the resulting confusion without suspecting +its true cause.</p> + +<p>Would that the real state of the case and its practical consequences +could be pressed home to all with such force, that whatever +be our line of work or thought or expression we should strive +in earnest to mend matters. At least, we might begin by learning +better what part symbolism plays in the rituals of expression, and +ask ourselves what else is language itself but symbolism, and what +it symbolises. We should then examine anew the relations of the +“symbolic” to the “real”; of image, figure, metaphor, to what we +call literal or actual. For this concerns us all. Imagery runs in +and out, so to speak, from the symbolic to the real world and back +again. As matters stand, we never know where we are because we +know so little where our phrases or our words are; indeed, perhaps +they and we are “neither here nor there.” Or, if we do know +where we are, we cannot be sure that our hearer or reader knows +where he is. He, too, is probably “neither here nor there.” He +often praises or agrees with us in the wrong place or the wrong +manner. That is worse than being complained of or differed from; +it is difficult to repudiate approval. Nor can we take refuge in +lucidity and fancy that the clear must be the true. In the long run +and in the cases which <i>signify</i> most, there is no escape through +merely lucid style or method. The “luminous” speaker or writer, +the “forcible” orator or essayist, the moment he tries to convey to +the public mind a thought which is really new, will find himself +hampered by his very clearness itself. His ideas are controverted +on assumptions not really his; or he himself is misled in subtle ways +by what he assumes in others.</p> + +<p>Thus, by an instructive paradox, the clearest writer is often the +most controversial; and he wonders at our perverseness as, while +we admire his power and his “style,” we wonder at the perverseness +in him. We possibly agree with him in ways we do not suspect; +he possibly agrees with us in senses he ignores. Such a writer +may pride himself on a chary use of metaphor, or on a carefully +sharp distinction between “image” and “thing” or “object.” But +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_512">[512]</span>he is liable to forget the danger dogging him even here. One is +tempted to say that there is only one term more figurative as well +as more ambiguous than “metaphorical,” and that is “literal.” +Most certainly much that is called “literal” is tinged with the figurative +in varying degrees, not always easy to distinguish, even with +the help of context. The word “literal” itself is indeed a case in +point. It has rarely, if ever, any reference to writing.</p> + +<p>The question is, whether this state of things is quite so inevitable +as most of us seem to think. Certainly, so long as we are content +to live in the fool’s paradise of supposing that only the perverse, +the prejudiced, the stupid, or the ignorant can possibly mistake our +meaning, and that our misreadings of others are simply due to their +“obscurity,” or “quibbling,” or literary incapacity, we shall ourselves +contribute to the hopelessness of the situation. But this is a +subject which cannot be dealt with in an incidental way; it is rather +a hope for the future, that one of the most practically serviceable of +subjects—that of Meaning, its conditions and its changes—shall be +seriously taken up. Then, indeed, we may get back to the first of +all questions, and that which is most pregnant of helpful answers; +that which needs asking more than any other if good work is to be +done in this day of universal “unsettlement”:—What do we really +mean? On all sides dead calms are stirred and ruffled, dead levels +upheaved or depressed; nothing (happily) can hope to escape the +wave of quickening force. So before long we may well be asking +this question in good earnest; and when we do we can but be the +better, even if we must needs submit in some cases where we may +have been prematurely positive, to be content (for the moment) +with the answer: We do not really know.</p> + +<p>The fact is, that we have been postulating an absolute Plain +Meaning to be thought of, as it were, in capital letters. We have +been virtually assuming that our hearers and readers all share the +same mental background and atmosphere. We have practically +supposed that they all look through the same inferential eyes, that +their attention waxes and wanes at the same points, that their associations, +their halos of memory and circumstance, their congenital +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_513">[513]</span>tendencies to symbolise or picture, are all on one pattern. Verily, +we need a “Critique of Plain Meaning”!</p> + +<p>Again we <i>quote</i> on the same assumption. Unless the language +of our author is obviously archaic; unless his allusions unmistakably +betray a different life-context, a different social “milieu,” in short, +a different mental world, we claim him or we repudiate him on the +same principle. We take his words, we take his phrases, we fill +them out with the same content as our own, we make him mean +precisely what we ourselves mean. And be it noted that it is always +what we mean <i>now</i>. That this in any way varies from what we +meant at some time when, e. g., our attention was differently focussed, +rarely enters our heads.</p> + +<p>We shall, I suppose, admit that until lately there was one very +good reason for this state of things. Only the exceptional mind (if +any); only the mind which could not make itself fully understood +by its contemporaries, and would risk being reckoned crazy or criminal +if it spoke “plainly,” had any suspicion that this way of looking +at things was being gradually invalidated by the general extension +of the critical domain. The history of language, its relation to +thought; the scope of expression and representation, the function +of the figurative and symbolic; the growth of all means of mental +communion from the simplest rudiments of gesture or cry to the +highest point of intellectual complexity,—all this was either ignored +or taken for granted on radically insecure bases.</p> + +<p>Again, while the underlying conditions of language must be +looked for in the domain of psycho-physics, that science had not yet +come into existence. Even now it is but feeling its way and putting +forth tentative hypotheses, warning us, as it does, so that they are +liable to be constantly modified and occasionally revolutionised. +And what does it realise, first and foremost? That our difficulties +on the very threshold of the inquiry are, as usual, largely those of +language. On all sides we have to use, as best we may, modes of +expression that inevitably convey ambiguous meanings even to the +thoughtful, even to the trained mind, which cannot but carry with +them a background of outgrown or disproved premises, vitiating +more or less every conclusion that we draw from them. The very +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_514">[514]</span>phrases which are our only shorthand for the vast oratory of nature +and experience betray us in the using. We have taken them as +though they were like numerals invariable in meaning, thus supposing +them subject to a permanent uniformity. We have taken them as +though they were without a history, merely fortuitous labels or symbols +of unanimous consent; the accepted sense, we think, being +easily ascertainable, always persistent, and wholly sufficient for +practical purposes. In any case we strangely assume that we may +safely play upon all the chords of imagery, reserving without difficulty +for serious use a body of terms which are direct expressions of +“fact.”</p> + +<p>But the suggestion now made is that this is precisely one of the +most dangerous of presuppositions. It is not the man who has mystified +himself, or who wishes to mystify others; it is not the man +who confounds the reality of the logical with that of the actual; it +is not the man who takes emotion for proof and notion for fact; it is +none of these, but the man who is clear on such points and sees +that they must be drawn out into clues and followed up to the uttermost, +if we would know where we are—who is beginning to see that +the paramount need of the moment is the “torpedo-shock” of the +question, What do we really mean? He knows that the off-hand +vagueness and ready-made confusion, which too often from sheer +ignorance usurp the name of common-sense, are in the long run its +most deadly enemies.</p> + +<p>We may look forward then with a new hope to the rise of a +systematic inquiry on the subject of meaning and its changes. This +would entail the much-needed work of classifying metaphor, and +might even be found to point to the existence of a third value, +neither wholly literal, nor wholly figurative, as that of a large proportion +of ordinary expression. From this and like causes, in this +age of rapid changes due mainly to scientific conquest, we can all +readily put to each other questions to which either a “yes” or a +“no” must be equally misleading. And men of science have specially +realised this, since many a time they have been unjustly credited +with evasion, or with untenable or immoral views, because they +either answered to a “plain question”: “In one sense, yes; in +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_515">[515]</span>another, no,” or else gave an answer which could not fail to be misunderstood +by a mind which was governed by unconscious survivals. +So far as we are in touch with modern culture, we no longer mean +what we must have meant in the days before Copernicus, when we +say, for instance, “the sun rises.” When we speak of infection, +we no longer mean what we used to mean before microbes had been +heard of. When we talk of “heat,” we no longer mean what we +used to mean even fifty years ago. And when a man says that he +believes in the sun, the planets, the cosmos, in the heavens and the +earth, in mind and matter, in soul and body, in spirit and flesh, he +cannot, if he would, mean just what his forefathers meant, or indeed +anything at all absolutely and finally. Whether we will or no, the +meaning of such terms is changing on our very tongues, and ever +swaying between the extremes which we call literal and metaphorical; +“heaven,” e. g., ranging in value from sky to human destiny; +“earth,” from soil to the visible Home of Man. We may appeal, +and are right to appeal to “hard, dry” facts; but we perforce put +something out of ourselves even into these. They become “facts” +under the quickening touch of “mind,” while that emerges from a +dim world of prepossession, bequeathing us many a primitive legacy +from pre-intelligent sentience, and perhaps from little-suspected +sources lying yet further back. For instance, primitive terror in its +“superstitious” forms tended to represent man as inferior to and +dependent on powers of some sort;—and this was true to natural +order in the fact that his very world was not self-centred and was +dependent for its best boons upon a greater than itself. As language +advanced, he began quite naturally to express his meaning in “appropriate +metaphors”; to use, e. g., the figures of light and then of +sight to describe what he had, as we now say, “in his mind,” or +what sense-messages, as we now say, had “put into his head.” For +“something told him” that light, as it had been the first pleasure, +was also the great means of life.⁠<a id="FNanchor_90" href="#Footnote_90" class="fnanchor">[90]</a> And he “saw,” in however grotesque +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_516">[516]</span>a guise, the unbroken continuity of the organic and the inorganic, +and perhaps even more clearly than most of us yet do, that +of so-called “matter” and so-called “mind.” Perhaps in some +cases, therefore, he chose his imagery better than (after long ages +of dualism carried to the splitting-point) we generally do now.</p> + +<p>He knew again that the senses after all, stern masters though +they were while life was so hard to live, had very narrow limits; and +that the world was in some sense fuller and richer of life than it had +seemed to be as known directly through them.⁠<a id="FNanchor_91" href="#Footnote_91" class="fnanchor">[91]</a> And then he wondered,—and +began to ask. He was the first Questioner. As Prof. +Max Müller says,⁠<a id="FNanchor_92" href="#Footnote_92" class="fnanchor">[92]</a> “the greater the savagery, the dullness, the stupidity +with which <i>Homo sapiens</i> began, the greater the marvel at what +must have been from the first, though undeveloped, in him, and +made him in the end what we find him to be in the men of light and +leading of our own age.” The mere fact of the question is the riddle +to be solved. For certainly the beasts had not taught him either to +wonder or to ask. And not merely insatiable questioning but something +more here rises to challenge our attention and to demand reflection. +Man is the first critic because he is the first idealist; the +first to be discontented, to protest, to see life as a “ravelled end,” +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_517">[517]</span>as something which is incomplete and speaks of something more. +Surely in any case the step of all steps, the deepest yet the narrowest +line to cross is the step from something noticed or found, from something +which happens or appears, from something which somehow +affects us, excites us, to its significance.</p> + +<p>Of course in one sense it is impossible to fix any definite moment +as that of the advent of this “significance.” Animals interpret +each other’s aspect and gestures, often indeed with a subtle precision +which to some extent we have lost. But interpretation in the +intellectual sense becomes, from our present point of view, that +which makes us really human. Our progress, our ascent, is mainly +marked in this. The root-question to ask in gauging levels of humanity +is, how much can a given man interpret or translate, of a +world that teems with meaning? How much can he truly classify +and relate, how much can he rightly infer and conclude, how much +can he account for, explain, and fruitfully apply? For after all, results +must be our tests. Claims and credentials are nothing, unless +they can show this warrant; whereas truth which can use all facts +alike is the very means of survival. Man begins by doing, by acting +out impulse; then he learns to “think” little by little, observing, +questioning, pondering, testing his way onward and upward. And +throughout his patient, often painful journey, he is himself perpetually +challenged. Nature’s stimulating appeals rain upon him ceaselessly +from every side; she orders him to master all her meanings. +He responds:—at first again, “blindly,” but ever rising to higher +grades of answer. Both deficiency and error are no doubt more or +less present in all mental response to actual fact—that is, in all experience. +But the essence of sanity from the first lies in corrective +power. Everywhere there is either absence of notice, absence +of response, or there is experimental activity (broadly speaking) +corrected at once; automatically or by the combined effect of the +related organic activities. For instance, in health, if in using the +hand, one finger accidentally goes astray, the coördinating muscles +promptly recall it to a “sense of duty.” We know how the same +rule works in speech and writing. Therefore, unless “voluntary” +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_518">[518]</span>and “capricious” (or “willing” and “wilful”) are synonyms, the +advent of volition ought not to mean the abrogation of this rule.</p> + +<p>It is, however, obvious that “natural selection” can only operate +in cases where death or sterility is the consequence of failure in +adaptation and appropriate reaction, or segregation the consequence +of excessive variation. But the point here is, why does not a tendency +to correction, thus established, survive automatically in incipient +imagination and therefore in language? It seems almost +a burlesque of popular notions of “free will” to suppose that the +moment the death-penalty is taken off, the new-born intelligence, +unique in adapting power, should go astray persistently without let +or hindrance. Many now merely formal or even jocular customs +still prevailing⁠<a id="FNanchor_93" href="#Footnote_93" class="fnanchor">[93]</a> testify, as legacies from a remote time of danger +needing to be averted, to the strength of tendencies organised during +myriads of generations under the pressure of the struggle for life. +Why does not this apply to language?</p> + +<p>But sight gives us here perhaps the most suggestive lesson; for +therein the ascending series seems especially gradual and unbroken. +The eye, unlike the other organs of sense is an outgrowth of the +very brain itself; “the retina ... is in reality a part of the brain.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_94" href="#Footnote_94" class="fnanchor">[94]</a> +We may well therefore connect its functions specially with the +thought of significance; it is the main out-post of our central means +of interpretation.</p> + +<p>Taking the stages in the evolution of the eye, and using a short +summary of these as a convenient means of testing the value of a +conspicuous group of metaphors, we find (1) a mere dint; (2) this +dint deepening into a pit which (3) gradually narrows. Hitherto +we have had only light and darkness; now we have an image, though +but a dim one. (4) The pit is closed by a transparent membrane; +this is protection, not obstacle. (5) The lens is formed by deposit +of cuticle. Gain; increased distinctness and increased brightness. +The lens can focus a larger pencil of rays from each part of the object +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_519">[519]</span>to each part of the retina (corresponding point). Finally, iris +and eyelid protect the perfected eye more completely, and enable it +both to bear more light and to discern more detail.</p> + +<p>If mental development were in any way comparable to this +physiological development, we should expect to find (1) something +which would naturally be described as a vague or dim “impression”; +gradually deepening, becoming more distinctly localised as +the stimulus became more definitely “impressive.” (2) We should +begin to find “reality” and the “unreal”; “fact” and “fancy”; +“truth” and “falsehood”; knowledge and ignorance,—contrasted as +“light” and “darkness.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_95" href="#Footnote_95" class="fnanchor">[95]</a> + And this is what actually happens.⁠<a id="FNanchor_96" href="#Footnote_96" class="fnanchor">[96]</a></p> + +<p>(3) Still our mental “impression” would not as yet afford us an +image; “imagination” only now comes upon the scene and begins to +work (though as yet “dimly”) upon the objects which more and more +“incisively” “impress” us. (4) Our deep “impression” is closed +in one sense from direct contact with the outward; mental vision +becomes more delicately differentiated from the emotional “touch,” +however this may be specialised and intensified. But what secludes +this is transparent; it is protection, not obstacle. We rightly speak +of mental penetration; of “seeing through” a superficial limit. The +mental “lens” is formed from that “continuum” on which the original +“impression” was made. The gain now is increased distinctness +and brightness. More rays of “light,” of reality, of fact, of +truth, of knowledge, can now be focussed from each part of a given +object (or group of objects) of mental attention and interest; to each +part of the responsive “sensitive plate” of the mind. Finally we +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_520">[520]</span>have, so to speak, increased protective growth. The function of +what are called academic culture and scientific method, with their +fastidious standards of fitness and accuracy, may perhaps represent +something not unlike that of iris and eyelid, enabling the developing +mind safely to bear intenser illumination and also to discern more +subtle detail.</p> + +<p>It must be admitted that so far as it goes this is a significant +psychological parable. However slender its right to the position +even of a working clue to early stages of mind, it has at least better +credentials than many accepted analogies can claim. And throughout +its course what most “impresses” itself upon one’s mind is the steady +maintenance of invariable reaction to excitation, and of protection +from unfavorable stimulus.</p> + +<p>“Mind,” as Mr. Shadworth Hodgson tells us,⁠<a id="FNanchor_97" href="#Footnote_97" class="fnanchor">[97]</a> “is a fiction of +the fancy.” Of course this is open to the retort that so is fancy a +fiction of the mind, or fiction a fancy of the mind.</p> + +<p>Psychology is full of these see-saws of paradox, depending on +vicissitudes of linguistic usage or context. But mind is indeed a fiction +of the fancy when we endow it with a fanciful freedom from all +ties with what we call physical reality. For this, however plainly +we may recognise its genesis in our own sequences of sense-impression, +does practically through them rule us with an undeviating severity +which neither fiction nor fancy can tamper with. Therefore, +if we think it absurd to suppose that there may possibly be an undiscovered +vein of authentic and really indicative symbol or metaphor +running through the arbitrary meshes of fanciful custom or mythical +term, we are in fact implying that all clues from the original interactions +of physical energy were entirely lost when what we call +“mind” issued first in language. But at all events we may be sure +that links between the “physical” and the “psychical” are everywhere +drawing closer and emerging clearer, however buried as yet +in a mass of the fantastic or the arbitrary.</p> + +<p>It will probably be objected that we can never hope to find +these. No doubt such an attempt must mean the patient work of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_521">[521]</span>many lifetimes, and at best we could not hope to lay bare the ultimate +point of “origin.” But yet it seems worth trying. For after +all, even the results which may appear so scanty in the tracing back +of language, are already rich far beyond what could have been hoped +for a few generations back. And if it were once realised that such +a line of work might have practical and far-reaching issues; if we +really saw that thus some barren disputes and speculations might +cease to bar the way or to waste some precious energies, we should +be more than rewarded. In his “Dialogues of Plato”⁠<a id="FNanchor_98" href="#Footnote_98" class="fnanchor">[98]</a> Professor +Jowett warned us twenty years ago of our linguistic dangers, repeating +his warning with greater emphasis and in fresh forms in the admirable +essays added in the edition just published. He urges that +the “greatest lesson which the philosophical analysis of language +teaches us is, that we should be above language, making words our +servants and not allowing them to be our masters.” “Words,” he +tells us, “appear to be isolated but they are really the parts of an +organism which is always being reproduced. They are refined by +civilisation, harmonised by poetry, emphasised by literature, technically +applied in philosophy and art; they are used as symbols on +the border-ground of human knowledge; they receive a fresh impress +from individual genius, and come with a new force and association +to every lively-minded person. They are fixed by the simultaneous +utterance of millions and yet are always imperceptibly +changing:—not the inventors of language, but writing and speaking, +and particularly great writers, or works which pass into the hearts +of nations, Homer, Shakespeare, Dante, the German or English +Bible, Kant and Hegel, are the makers of them in later ages. They +carry with them the faded recollection of their own past history; the +use of a word in a striking and familiar passage, gives a complexion +to its use everywhere else, and the new use of an old and familiar +phrase has also a peculiar power over us.” Then he reminds us of +what we too often forget; that “language is an aspect of man, of +nature, and of nations, the transfiguration of the world in thought, +the meeting-point of the physical and mental sciences, and also the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_522">[522]</span>mirror in which they are reflected, an effect and partly a cause of +our common humanity, present at every moment to the individual +and yet having a sort of eternal or universal nature.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_99" href="#Footnote_99" class="fnanchor">[99]</a></p> + +<p>Nowadays, when we feel most scathingly superior, we often announce +that we fail to see and have yet to learn something which, +bringing us, it may be, a really fresh idea, unpleasantly stirs misgiving. +Let us go on with our greeting, meaning it in good earnest. +For when we honestly and without reservation consent to learn and +succeed in seeing some things now waiting for our study we may +find more than we look for, within reach. After all it may be that +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_523">[523]</span>we have really failed to see and have really yet to learn the part that +meaning—whether of language or of conduct—and its change or +variations (successive or simultaneous) have had throughout the +mental history of man. It may be that while the ordinary modern +metaphor like the ordinary modern analogy is a mere rhetorical device, +some few images may be found to hail from an altogether +deeper and more authentic source. Many, however ancient, are not +of course any the more valid for their antiquity. On the contrary it +is obvious that such a figure for instance as “foundation” or “basis” +to express an ultimate necessity, is a survival from days in which +the earth was supposed to require and to possess such fixed and immutable +base, while the analogies, e. g. between the human and the +inorganic orders are now reversed. We import the idea of mechanism +and invariable sequence into the former instead of exporting +conscious intention into the latter; we level down where our forefathers +levelled up. And we have to beware of the subtle atmosphere +of fallacy thus introduced.</p> + +<p>But on the other hand it is conceivable that some may be found +to belong to that as yet mysterious energy on which natural selection +plays and of which variation is the outcome or the sign. +What we find in language may thus be, as it were, not merely the +“scarred and weather-worn” remnant of geogenic strata but sometimes +the meteorite, the calcined fragment of earlier worlds of correspondence, +ultra-earthly, cosmical. We have no right to do more +than ask and seek and knock at the gates of fact in such a matter as +this. But until that has been done; until at least we have tried the +experiment; have looked for grades of validity in metaphor and +analogy in the light of modern science, and still more, have recognised +clearly the powerful though hidden effects upon us of organised +mental picture brought in surreptitiously with verbal imagery, or by +comparison; we cannot know whether such an effort is worth while +or no, or what harvest it may yield. For after all, whether we like +it or no, we <i>are</i> heliocentric; the world and all that is in it is cosmically +generated. As far as science—and experience—are concerned, +anything which says “I don’t admit that origin; I claim to +have produced myself or to have been originated by and on the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_524">[524]</span>earth in a final sense,” must make good its geocentric or self-creating +pretensions with overwhelming cogency and rigorous proof. We +appeal to the “light” of science, of reason, of experience, against +the “darkness” of superstition, myth, and mysticism. And we are +thus appealing not to the supersensuous or supernatural but to the +ultra-satellitic. Not only beyond the earth and touch but beyond +the atmosphere and hearing is the home of the light that lightens +our small world, calling forth in us the answer of sight. And the +manifold revelations through this sense—in its mental as well as +bodily character—press upon us, with greater and greater insistence, +the wealth of our relations with the universe.</p> + +<p>In any case, <i>meaning</i>—in the widest sense of the word—is +the only value of whatever “fact” presents itself to us. Without +this, to observe and record appearances or occurrences would become +a worse than wasteful task. Significance is the one value of +all that consciousness brings, or that intelligence deals with; the +one value of life itself. But perhaps for this very reason we have +taken it too much for granted. It may need a more definite place +in psychological inquiries. It may have unsuspected bearings.</p> + +<p>When we have realised better what manner of gift this is, we +may find answers of which we have prematurely despaired; answers +coming not from the “mystical” point of the horizon of experience, +but rather from the neural. And let us beware here of repeating +the pre-scientific error of postulating, for figurative purposes, a flat +earth on which whatever lies beyond “horizons” never meets! But, +it may be said, why not? Why should it signify? Why, but because +Man is the one not merely who thinks, or speaks, or writes, or looks +upwards, but the one who <i>means</i>, the one who <i>is</i> the meaning of +much, and makes the meaning of all; the one who will not tolerate +the unmeaning anywhere in experience. Nothing remains but that +he should interpret rightly; that he should apprehend nature and +experience in their true sense. It is the glory of science that she +puts this aim in the forefront of her labors. She tells us that nothing +can be done without assumption and hypothesis as to the meaning +of things. But that significance belongs to the very spring to +which we owe her dauntless energy and her accumulating triumphs.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_525">[525]</span></p> + +<p>Why should it signify? The very term answers us. To “signify” +is the one test of the important. The significant is alone worth +notice. We inherit a mode of thinking which we are at last becoming +able to criticise in the light of knowledge gained by observation +and experiment. But if we persist in using, without warning to +hearer or reader, imagery which has no longer either sense or relevance, +or which tends to call up a false mental picture or to perpetuate +an else decaying error, we shall to that extent forfeit the +very gifts which science brings us, and must not complain of the +obstinate persistence of ideas which needlessly divide us. At least, +let us try to realise more clearly what we are losing in this way. +The danger even thus must needs be lessened; detected bogies become +powerless for mischief; but we need not leave their ancient +home empty, swept, and garnished; stores of verified analogy are +waiting to replace them. The figurative must not indeed be pressed, +still less literalised. But we may see that it conveys a true, rather +than a false impression; and harmonises with, instead of contradicting +that which we most surely know.⁠<a id="FNanchor_100" href="#Footnote_100" class="fnanchor">[100]</a></p> + +<p>It may be said in a true sense that the function of the hero, the +saint, the poet, is to bring the world to <i>life</i>. But the function of +the devoted servant of science, the critical scholar, the true philosopher, +is to bring the world to <i>truth</i>, in a sense only now becoming +possible. Through the last discipline alone, in its most thorough +applications, can we hope fully to master the scope of all significance +and the laws of all its workings. Then, indeed, we may further +hope to read with a fresh eye the Significance of Life.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">Victoria Welby.</span></p> + +<div class="footnotes"> + +<h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_89" href="#FNanchor_89" class="label">[89]</a> <i>The Nineteenth Century</i>, April, 1886. (Reprinted in <i>Essays on Controverted +Questions</i>.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_90" href="#FNanchor_90" class="label">[90]</a> “Light affects the new-born infant at an early stage, although in this as in +other respects individual differences immediately assert themselves. The child +seems to take pleasure in an excitation of light and tries (even on the second day +after birth) to turn towards it in order to retain it.” (<i>Outlines of Psychology</i>, H. +Höffding, p. 4.)</p> + +<p>“Under the influence of light the conversion of inorganic matter into more +complex organic matter takes place, more particularly in the green cells of plants.” +(<i>Ibid.</i>, p. 315.)</p> + +<p>“It is certainly necessary to look further back than the visual sensations to +understand the great influence of light on all creatures that have sensuous perception.... +Light is thus one of the most elementary conditions of life.” (<i>Ibid.</i>, p. 229.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_91" href="#FNanchor_91" class="label">[91]</a> It must be borne in mind that I am using psychological terms in a merely +general sense. Among many examples of such use I may quote Sachs (<i>Physiology +of Plants</i>, p. 200) and F. Darwin (<i>Address to Biological Section</i>, Brit. Assoc, August +1891), who speaks of the plant as “perceiving” external change, as “recognising” +the vertical line, “knowing” where the centre of the earth is, “translating” stimulus, +etc. See also Darwin’s <i>Forms of Flowers</i>, p. 90.</p> + +<p>Again Prof. M. Foster uses the word “will” in the same general (rather than +metaphorical) sense. (<i>Text Book of Phys.</i>, Part 3, pp. 1059, 1062, 1063.) Modes +of reaction are thus verbally linked with consciousness, and we must remember that +all our terms for the “mental” belong first to the “physical,” and that many are +reciprocally used in the two spheres.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_92" href="#FNanchor_92" class="label">[92]</a> <i>Natural Religion</i>, p. 243.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_93" href="#FNanchor_93" class="label">[93]</a> See Dr. Tylor’s <i>Primitive Culture</i>, Vol. I, pp. 74-121; <i>Ibid.</i>, Vol. II, pp. +297-298, 404-428.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_94" href="#FNanchor_94" class="label">[94]</a> Dr. M. Foster’s <i>Text-Book of Physiology</i>, Part 4, p. 1142.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_95" href="#FNanchor_95" class="label">[95]</a> I am of course merely directing attention to the relative aptness of metaphors +of mental process familiarly in use in our own language. It is obvious that before +any inference could be made from them as to the value of unconscious analogies of +imagery, we should have to make appeal to comparative philology and embark on a +wide inquiry, for which the English-speaking races must wait for Dr. Murray’s +epoch-making Dictionary.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_96" href="#FNanchor_96" class="label">[96]</a> It must be borne in mind that the whole process presupposes the other senses +or at least the temperature-sense, the “muscular sense” and that of touch; that is, +we should have “felt” simple stimuli “emotionally” before we “saw” things intellectually. +And hearing is not now in question, though in that, too, we should find the +same character of development, i. e. the same prominence of the protective and discriminative +factors.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_97" href="#FNanchor_97" class="label">[97]</a> <i>Brain</i>, June, 1891. P. 13.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_98" href="#FNanchor_98" class="label">[98]</a> Vol. I, pp. 285-286, 293.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_99" href="#FNanchor_99" class="label">[99]</a> The following, among many pregnant passages between which it is difficult to +choose, may be further quoted:</p> + +<p>“The famous dispute between Nominalists and Realists would never have +been heard of, if, instead of transferring the Platonic ideas into a crude Latin +phraseology, the spirit of Plato had been truly understood and appreciated. Upon +the term substance at least two celebrated theological controversies appear to +hinge, which would not have existed, or at least not in their present form, if we had +‘interrogated’ the word substance, as Plato has the notions of Unity and Being. +Those weeds of philosophy have struck their roots deep into the soil, and are always +tending to reappear, sometimes in new-fangled forms; while similar words, such as +development, evolution, law, and the like, are constantly put in the place of facts, +even by writers who profess to base truth entirely upon fact. In an unmetaphysical +age there is probably more metaphysics in the common sense (i. e. more <i>a priori</i> +assumption) than in any other, because there is more complete unconsciousness that +we are resting on our own ideas, while we please ourselves with the conviction that +we are resting on facts. We do not consider how much metaphysics are required +to place us above metaphysics, or how difficult it is to prevent the forms of expression +which are ready made for our use from outrunning actual observation and experiment.” +(Vol. IV, p. 39-40.)</p> + +<p>“To have the true use of words we must compare them with things; in using +them we acknowledge that they seldom give a perfect representation of our meaning. +In like manner when we interrogate our ideas we find that we are not using them +always in the sense which we supposed. (<i>Ibid.</i>, p. 41.)</p> + +<p>“Many erroneous conceptions of the mind derived from former philosophies +have found their way into language, and we with difficulty disengage ourselves from +them. Mere figures of speech have unconsciously influenced the minds of great +thinkers. Also there are some distinctions, as, for example, that of the will and of +reason, and of the moral and intellectual faculties, which are carried further than +is justified by experience. Any separation of things which we cannot see or exactly +define, though it may be necessary, is a fertile source of error. The division of the +mind into faculties or powers or virtues is too deeply rooted in language to be got +rid of, but it gives a false impression. For if we reflect on ourselves we see that all +our faculties easily pass into one another, and are bound together in a single mind +or consciousness; but this mental unity is apt to be concealed from us by the distinctions +of language.” (<i>Ibid.</i>, p. 155.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_100" href="#FNanchor_100" class="label">[100]</a> I would gladly forward to any reader interested in a question of such practical +bearings, a small collection of <i>Witnesses to Ambiguity</i> gathered from representative +sources, and a pamphlet which was circulated at the International Congress of +Experimental Psychology, held in London, August, 1892, giving examples of the +mischievous confusions suggested by the use, even among writers of the first rank, +of the metaphor, <i>Inner and Outer</i>. Prof. H. Sidgwick, the president, in his opening +address, expressed the opinion that very important work of this kind remained +to be done, and added, “I have much sympathy with the view urged in a pamphlet +that I have received for distribution among members of the Congress, which illustrates +forcibly the confusion caused by one established antithesis of terms.” Professor +Sully and others have expressed themselves strongly in the same sense.</p></div> + +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_526">[526]</span></p> + +<h3 class="nobreak" id="REPLY_TO_THE_NECESSITARIANS">REPLY TO THE NECESSITARIANS.<br> +<span class="smaller">REJOINDER TO DR. CARUS.</span></h3> + +</div> + +<p>§ 1. In <i>The Monist</i> for January, 1891, and in the number for +April, 1892, I attacked the doctrine that every event is precisely determined +by law. Like everybody else, I admit that there is regularity: +I go further; I maintain the existence of law as something +<i>real and general</i>. But I hold there is no reason to think that there +are general formulæ to which the phenomena of nature <i>always</i> conform, +or to which they <i>precisely</i> conform. At the end of my second +paper, the partisans of the doctrine of necessity were courteously +challenged and besought to attempt to answer my arguments. This, +so far as I can learn, Dr. Carus alone, in <i>The Monist</i> of July and +October, 1892, has publicly vouchsafed to do. For this I owe him +my particular thanks and a careful rejoinder.</p> + +<p>§ 2. I number the paragraphs of his papers consecutively. The +following index shows the pages on which those paragraphs commence, +and the numbered sections of this rejoinder in which they +are noticed.</p> + +<table> + <tr> + <th colspan="3">DR. CARUS</th> + <th colspan="3">REJOINDER</th> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Vol. II,</td> + <td class="tdr">p.</td> + <td class="tdr">560</td> + <td class="tdr">¶</td> + <td class="tdr">1</td> + <td class="tdr"></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">2</td> + <td>§28</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">3</td> + <td>29</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">561</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">4</td> + <td>23.27</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">5</td> + <td>21</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">6</td> + <td>18</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">7</td> + <td>18</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">562</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">8</td> + <td>18 <i>bis.</i></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">9</td> + <td>21</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">10</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">563</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">11</td> + <td>12.21.22</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">12</td> + <td>19</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">13</td> + <td>19</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">564</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">14</td> + <td>3.12 <i>bis.</i> 22</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">15</td> + <td>8 <i>ter</i>, 16</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">565</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">16</td> + <td>21</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">17</td> + <td>3</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">18</td> + <td>3</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">19</td> + <td>13 note</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">566</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">20</td> + <td>14</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">21</td> + <td>13, 14</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">22</td> + <td>3.12.22</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">23</td> + <td>12</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">24</td> + <td>3.13.14</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">567</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">25</td> + <td>8</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">26</td> + <td>8</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">27</td> + <td>8.22</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">28</td> + <td>20.22</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">29</td> + <td>12</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">568</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">30</td> + <td>22</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">31</td> + <td>22 <i>bis</i></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">32</td> + <td>22</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">569</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">33</td> + <td>22</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">34</td> + <td>22</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">35</td> + <td>8</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">36</td> + <td>29</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">37</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">570</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">38</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">39</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">40</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">571</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">41</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">42</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">43</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">572</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">44</td> + <td>23</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">45</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">46</td> + <td>5.23</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">573</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">47</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">48</td> + <td>7</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">49</td> + <td>7</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">50</td> + <td>7</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">574</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">51</td> + <td>7.25</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">52</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">53</td> + <td>25</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">54</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">55</td> + <td>25 <i>bis</i></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">575</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">56</td> + <td>17</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">57</td> + <td>17 <i>bis</i></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">58</td> + <td>17.25</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">59</td> + <td>17</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">60</td> + <td>17<span class="pagenum" id="Page_527">[527]</span></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">576</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">61</td> + <td>7.17.25 <i>bis</i></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">62</td> + <td>17.21</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">63</td> + <td>17</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">577</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">64</td> + <td>17 <i>bis</i></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">65</td> + <td>26</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">66</td> + <td>25</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">67</td> + <td>25 <i>bis</i></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">578</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">68</td> + <td>6.7</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">69</td> + <td>17</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">579</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">70</td> + <td>6</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">71</td> + <td>3</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">580</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">72</td> + <td>3</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">73</td> + <td>3</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">74</td> + <td>3</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">75</td> + <td>3</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">581</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">76</td> + <td>3</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">77</td> + <td>3.11</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">78</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">79</td> + <td>21</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">582</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">80</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">81</td> + <td>29</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">82</td> + <td>29</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">83</td> + <td>29</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>Vol. III,</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">68</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">84</td> + <td>5</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">85</td> + <td>27</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">86</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">69</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">87</td> + <td>12</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">88</td> + <td>5.15 <i>bis</i></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">89</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">90</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">91</td> + <td>5</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">92</td> + <td>5</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">70</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">93</td> + <td>5</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">94</td> + <td>5</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">95</td> + <td>3</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">96</td> + <td>4.11</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">71</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">97</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">98</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">99</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">100</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">72</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">101</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">102</td> + <td>11</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">103</td> + <td>6</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">104</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">105</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">73</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">106</td> + <td>11</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">107</td> + <td>6</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">108</td> + <td>6</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">109</td> + <td>6</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">110</td> + <td>6</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">111</td> + <td>6</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">74</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">112</td> + <td>6</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">113</td> + <td>6.11</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">114</td> + <td>6</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">115</td> + <td>6</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">75</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">116</td> + <td>6.7</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">117</td> + <td>6</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">76</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">118</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">119</td> + <td>9</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">120</td> + <td>6.16</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">121</td> + <td>14</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">122</td> + <td>11</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">77</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">123</td> + <td>3</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">124</td> + <td>10</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">125</td> + <td>7</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">78</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">126</td> + <td>8</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">127</td> + <td>8</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">128</td> + <td>29</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">79</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">129</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">130</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">131</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">132</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">133</td> + <td>27</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">134</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">80</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">135</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">136</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">137</td> + <td>15</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">138</td> + <td>15</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">139</td> + <td>5.15</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">81</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">140</td> + <td>15</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">141</td> + <td>15</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">142</td> + <td>15.25</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">143</td> + <td>15.24</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">144</td> + <td>15 <i>bis</i></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">145</td> + <td>15 <i>bis</i></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">146</td> + <td>15 <i>bis</i></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">147</td> + <td>15 <i>ter</i></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">82</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">148</td> + <td>15</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">149</td> + <td>12.15</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">150</td> + <td>15 <i>bis.</i> 25</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">83</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">151</td> + <td>15.24</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">152</td> + <td>15.24</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">153</td> + <td>15.24</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">154</td> + <td>15.24</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">155</td> + <td>15.24</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">84</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">156</td> + <td>15 <i>bis</i></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">157</td> + <td>15</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">158</td> + <td>15.24</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">85</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">159</td> + <td>15.24</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">160</td> + <td>15.24</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">86</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">161</td> + <td>15 <i>bis</i></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">162</td> + <td>15</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">163</td> + <td>5.14</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">164</td> + <td>14</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">87</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">165</td> + <td>4.14</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">166</td> + <td>14</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">167</td> + <td>14</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">168</td> + <td>27</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">169</td> + <td>27</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">88</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">170</td> + <td>27</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">171</td> + <td>27</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">172</td> + <td>27</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">173</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">174</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">89</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">175</td> + <td>27</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">176</td> + <td>27 <i>bis</i></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">177</td> + <td>27</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">178</td> + <td>27</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">179</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">180</td> + <td>30</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">181</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">182</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">90</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">183</td> + <td>30</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">184</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">185</td> + <td>27</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">186</td> + <td>27</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">91</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">187</td> + <td>27</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">188</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">189</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">190</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">92</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">191</td> + <td>4</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">192</td> + <td>27 <i>bis</i></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">193</td> + <td>20.27 <i>bis</i></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">93</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">194</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">195</td> + <td>8</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">196</td> + <td>8</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">94</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">197</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">198</td> + <td>6</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">199</td> + <td>30</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">200</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">201</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">95</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">202</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">203</td> + <td>20.29</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">204</td> + <td>29</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">96</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">205</td> + <td>20</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">206</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="c">”</td> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr">207</td> + <td></td> + </tr> +</table> + +<p>§ 3. Dr. Carus’s philosophy is hard to understand. Some +phrases which he frequently uses lead the reader to imagine that he +is listening to an old-fashioned Königsberg Kantian. What, then, +is our surprise when we find (¶ 14) that he sneers at the Kantian, +Sir William Hamilton (whom he calls Mr. Hamilton) as having +“no adequate conception of the <i>a priori</i>.” In his “Ursache, Grund +und Zweck” (1883), an admirably clear and systematic exposition +of much of his thought, he takes a Schleiermacherian view of the +<i>a priori</i>. He admits it to be founded in the universal conditions of +cognition; but he thinks it is among the objective rather than the +subjective conditions. This is an opinion to which Hamilton is also +at times inclined. It is a weak conception, unless the whole distinction +between the inward and the outward world be reformed in +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_528">[528]</span>the light of agapastic and synechistic ontology. For to deny that +the <i>a priori</i> is subjective is to remove its essential character; and to +make it both subjective and objective (otherwise than in the sense +in which Kant himself makes it objective) is uncalled for, and is cut +off by Ockham’s razor. But when synechism has united the two +worlds, this view gains new life.</p> + +<p>Another thing which has astonished me is Dr. Carus’s extravagant +laudation (¶ 17) of Venn’s highly enlightened and remarkably +bright-thinking, yet blundering little book, “The Logic of Chance.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_101" href="#Footnote_101" class="fnanchor">[101]</a> +This is the way he speaks of it: “This admirable work, we will +make bold to say, marks a new epoch in the study of logic.” He +adds that it “paves the way which Mr. Peirce has actually followed.” +But the question of the nature of probability had long before that +publication engaged the attention of some of the most powerful intellects +in England; and my opinion concerning it was fully made +up before I saw the book. I do not think I learned anything from +that except a classification of the philosophies of probability. However, +after all his eulogy, Dr. Carus only uses the book to quote from +it Mill’s rewording of Kant’s definition of causation, which he would +better have quoted direct.</p> + +<p>Let me say, not to Dr. Carus, but to the younger generation of +readers, that if they imagine that Hamilton, because he is antiquated, +is not worth reading, they are much mistaken. The Scotistic elements +of his philosophy, and his method in the notes on Reid are +especially worthy of attention. As for Mill, though his philosophy +was not profound, it is, at least in his “Examination of Hamilton,” +admirably set forth. Whoever wishes to appeal to the American +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_529">[529]</span>philosophical mind needs to be quite familiar with the writings of +these two men.</p> + +<p>Dr. Carus himself accepts all that I hold for erroneous in Kant’s +definition of causation as universal and necessary sequence. Mill +merely substitutes the exacter words <i>invariable</i> for “universal,” and +<i>unconditional</i> for “necessary.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_102" href="#Footnote_102" class="fnanchor">[102]</a> In giving his form of the definition, +Mill shows why it is not applicable to the sequence of day and +night, namely, that that is not necessary. Yet Dr. Carus writes +(¶ 18) of this very same sequence as if it came under Mill’s definition!⁠<a id="FNanchor_103" href="#Footnote_103" class="fnanchor">[103]</a></p> + +<p>Again, why should he make it “the immortal merit of the great +Scotchman” (¶ 22), that is, of Hume, that he admitted the truth of +Leibniz’s principle?</p> + +<p>The famed puzzle of causation is peculiarly understood by Dr. +Carus. The difficulties which the perusal of Hume suggested to +the mind of Kant,⁠<a id="FNanchor_104" href="#Footnote_104" class="fnanchor">[104]</a> were such as belonged to all categories, or general +conceptions of the understanding. The precritical Kant inherited +a very decided nominalism from Leibniz and Wolf; and the +puzzle for him was simply the usual difficulty that plagues nominalism +when it finds itself confronted with a reality which has an element +of generality. Necessity is, I need hardly say, but a particular +variety of universality. But Dr. Carus (¶ 24) passes over this, +to dwell upon an entirely different objection to causation, namely, +that it seems to be a creation out of nothing, and a miracle.</p> + +<p>I find myself equally at cross-purposes with him, when in +¶¶ 71-77, he speaks of the prevalent views of logicians concerning +<i>comprehension</i>. This word, in logic, measures the amount of predicates +or marks attached to a conception; but Dr. Carus’s criticisms +seem to be based upon the idea that by comprehension is meant +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_530">[530]</span>logical breadth, or the amount of subjects to which the conception +is applicable.</p> + +<p>I am simply gravelled by his remarks (¶ 95) concerning sundry +English words.</p> + +<p>No more do I know what to make of his praise (¶ 123) of the +German translation of a French phrase used in the theory of functions, +meaning <i>univocally determined</i>.</p> + +<p>§ 4. One habit which goes far to obscure Dr. Carus’s meaning +is that whenever he finds his opinion at variance with a familiar +saying, instead of rejecting that formula, he retains it and changes +the meaning. This is calculated to throw the whole discussion into +confusion. Thus, nothing is more certain than that the so-called +“law of identity,” or <i>A</i> is <i>A</i>, was intended to express the fact that +every term is predicable of itself. But Dr. Carus, simply because +he finds that “meaningless and useless” (¶ 96), thinks himself +authorised to confuse the terminology of logic by making this formula, +<i>A</i> = <i>A</i>, under the same old name, mean that things to which +the same name is applicable are for some purpose equivalent.</p> + +<p>In like manner, he changes the meaning of the word <i>freedom</i> +(¶ 165), so that the distinction between those who maintain and +those who oppose the freedom of the will may, in words, disappear. +It seems scarcely defensible for a thoroughgoing necessitarian, such +as he is, to fly the flag of Free Will.</p> + +<p>He, also, changes the meaning of <i>spontaneity</i> so far that, according +to him, “masses gravitate spontaneously” (¶ 191), and so pretends +that his doctrine does not suppress the spontaneity of nature!</p> + +<p>§ 5. There are other questions of terminology in which I am +unable to agree with Dr. Carus. Thus, when I define necessitarianism +as “the theory that the will is subject to the general mechanical +law of cause and effect,” Dr. Carus (¶ 139) wishes to delete +“mechanical.” But the result would be to define a doctrine to +which the advocates of free will would generally subscribe, as readily +as their opponents. In order properly to limit the definition, it is +quite requisite to exclude “free causation.” By “mechanical” +causation, I mean a causation entirely determinative, like that of +dynamics, but not necessarily operating upon matter.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_531">[531]</span></p> + +<p>Dr. Carus mentions (¶ 84) that there are several different ideas +to which the term necessity is applied. It seems to me that what +lies at the bottom of all of them is the experience of reaction against +one’s will. In the simplest form, this gives the sense of reality. +Dr. Carus himself admits (¶ 46) that reality involves the idea of inevitable +fate. Yet philosophical necessity is a special case of universality. +But the universality, or better, the generality, of a pure +form involves no necessity. It is only when the form is materialised +that the distinction between necessity and freedom makes itself +plain. These ideas are, therefore, as it seems to me, of a mixed +nature. Dr. Carus (¶¶ 91-94) insists that by the necessary, he +wishes to be understood to mean in all cases the <i>inevitable</i>. This is +the idea of <i>fate</i>, and is not the conception which determinists +usually attach to the term necessity. Yet he does not appear to be +quite consistent. At one time (¶ 88), he carefully distinguishes +necessity from fate. At another time (¶ 163), every element of compulsion +is to be excluded from the conception of necessity.</p> + +<p>§ 6. One important key to Dr. Carus’s opinions is the recognition +of the fact that, like many other philosophers, he is a nominalist +tinctured with realistic opinions.</p> + +<p>He says (¶ 103), that “there is no need of discussing the truism +that, properly speaking, there is no absolute sameness.” Now, upon +the nominalistic theory, there is not only no absolute or numerical +identity, but there are not even any real agreements or likenesses +between individuals; for likeness consists merely in the calling of +several individuals by one name, or (in some systems) in their exciting +one idea. On the other hand, upon the realistic theory, the fact +that identity is a relation of reason does not in the least prevent it +from being real. On that theory, it is real unless it is <i>false</i> that anything +is itself. Thus, upon either theory, identity is just as real as +similarity. But Dr. Carus, being a nominalist leaning toward realism, +is inclined to make dynamical relations real, and second-intentional +ones unreal. This opinion, I think, is a transitional one.</p> + +<p>The declaration (¶ 198) that “natural laws are simply a description +of nature as nature is,” and that “the facts of nature express +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_532">[532]</span>the character of nature,” are nominalistic. But in another +place (¶¶ 107-116), he says distinctly that uniformities are real.</p> + +<p>He says (¶ 70), “Mr. Peirce attempts to explain natural laws as +if they were concrete and <i>single facts</i>.” This is eminently nominalistic. +The nominalist alone makes this sharp distinction between +the abstract and the concrete,⁠<a id="FNanchor_105" href="#Footnote_105" class="fnanchor">[105]</a> which must not be confounded with +Hegel’s distinction for which the same words are used. The nominalist +alone falls into the absurdity of talking of “single facts,” or +<i>individual generals</i>. Yet Dr. Carus says (¶ 68) that natural laws describe +the facts of nature <i>sub specie aeternitatis</i>. Now I understand +Spinoza to be a realist. In ¶117 he considers it “settled” “that +there are samenesses.” This is realistic. But in ¶ 120, he holds +“the whole business of science to be to systematise the samenesses +of experience,” which is nominalistic.</p> + +<p>§ 7. Dr. Carus seems to be in some doubt as to how far evolutionism +ought to be carried. In ¶¶ 48-51, he seems to side with +my contention that it should be thoroughgoing. In ¶116, he makes +intellect an evolution from feeling. Yet he is sometimes (¶ 125) +“inclined” to say the world never was a chaos; he sometimes +(¶ 61) thinks it weak to suppose that real chance begets order; and +he sometimes (¶ 68) goes so far as to pronounce eternity to be the +<i>conditio sine qua non</i> of natural law.</p> + +<p>§ 8. Every reader of <i>The Monist</i> knows that our good editor’s +great word is “formal law.” The clearest statement he has ever +made of this doctrine I find in the following two sentences (¶ 127):</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“The <i>a priori</i> systems of thought are ... constructions raised out of the +recognition of the formal, i. e. relational samenesses that appear in experience. +All possibilities of a certain class of relations can be exhausted and formulated in +theorems.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_106" href="#Footnote_106" class="fnanchor">[106]</a></p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>This is perspicuous. For example, of pairs, we can easily show +that there are but two forms <i>A</i>:<i>A</i> and <i>A</i>:<i>B</i>. This proposition,—theorem +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_533">[533]</span>if you will,—exhausts the possibilities. If we make believe +there is no danger of falling into error in mathematical reasoning,—and +one danger, though not, perhaps, a very serious one, <i>is</i> +eliminated,—then this proposition is absolutely certain. But I will +say, at once, that such a proposition is not, in a proper sense, synthetic. +It is a mere corollary from the definition of a pair. Moreover, +its application to experience, or to possible experience, opens +the door to probability, and shuts out absolute necessity and certainty, +<i>in toto</i>.</p> + +<p>Concerning points like this, Dr. Carus, in company with the +general body of thinkers, is laboring under a great disadvantage +from not understanding the logic of relatives. It is a subject I have +been studying for a great many years, and I feel and know that I +have an important report that I ought to make upon it. This branch +of logic is, however, so abstruse, that I have never been able to find +the leisure to translate my conclusions into a form in which their +significance would be manifest even to a powerful thinker whose +thoughts had not long been turned in that direction. I shall succeed +in doing so, whenever I can find myself in a situation where I +need think of nothing else for months, and not before. That may +not be for thirty years; but I believe it is the intention of providence +that it should be. Meantime, I will testify, and the reader +can take my testimony for what he thinks it is worth, that all deductive +reasoning, except that kind which is so childishly simple +that acute minds have doubted whether there was any reasoning +there,—I mean non-relative syllogism,—requires an act of choice; +because from a given premise, several conclusions,—in some cases +an infinite number,—can be drawn. Hence, Dr. Carus is altogether +too hasty in his confidence (¶¶ 195, 196) that general thinking machines +“are not impossibilities.” An act of original and arbitrary +determination would be required; and it seems almost evident that +no machine could perform such an act except within narrow limits, +thought out beforehand and embodied in its construction. Moreover, +positive observation is called for in all inference, even the +simplest,—though in deduction it is only observation of an object of +imagination. Moreover, a peculiar act which may properly be called +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_534">[534]</span><i>abstraction</i>⁠<a id="FNanchor_107" href="#Footnote_107" class="fnanchor">[107]</a> + is usually required, consisting in seizing evanescent elements +of thought and holding them before the mind as “substantive” +objects, to borrow a phrase from William James. At the same time, +the process I am describing, that is, relative deduction, is perfectly +general and demonstrative, and depends upon the truth of the assumed +premises, and not, like inductive reasoning, upon the manner +in which those premises present themselves.</p> + +<p>But the application of the logic of relatives shows that the +propositions of arithmetic, which Dr. Carus usually adduces as examples +of formal law (¶ 15), are, in fact, only corollaries from definitions. +They are certain only as applied to ideal constructions, +and in such application, they are merely analytical.</p> + +<p>The truth is our ideas about the distinction between analytical +and synthetical judgments is much modified by the logic of relatives, +and by the logic of probable inference. An analytical proposition +is a definition or a proposition <i>deducible</i> from definitions; a synthetical +proposition is a proposition not analytical. Deduction, or analytical +reasoning, is, as I have shown in my “Theory of Probable +Reasoning,” a reasoning in which the conclusion follows (necessarily, +or probably) from the state of things expressed in the premises, +in contradistinction to scientific, or synthetical, reasoning, which +is a reasoning in which the conclusion follows probably and approximately +from the premises, owing to the conditions under which the +latter have been observed, or otherwise ascertained. The two classes +of reasoning present, besides, some other contrasts that need not be +insisted upon in this place. They also present some significant resemblances. +Deduction is really a matter of perception and of experimentation, +just as induction and hypothetic inference are; only, +the perception and experimentation are concerned with imaginary +objects instead of with real ones. The operations of perception and +of experimentation are subject to error, and therefore it is only in a +Pickwickian sense that mathematical reasoning can be said to be +perfectly certain. It is so, only under the condition that no error +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_535">[535]</span>creeps into it: yet, after all, it is susceptible of attaining a practical +certainty. So, for that matter, is scientific reasoning; but not so +readily. Again, mathematics brings to light results as truly occult⁠<a id="FNanchor_108" href="#Footnote_108" class="fnanchor">[108]</a> +and unexpected as those of chemistry; only they are results dependent +upon the action of reason in the depths of our own consciousness, +instead of being dependent, like those of chemistry, upon the action +of Cosmical Reason, or Law. Or, stating the matter under another +aspect, analytical reasoning depends upon associations of similarity, +synthetical reasoning upon associations of contiguity. The logic of +relatives, which justifies these assertions, shows accordingly that +deductive reasoning is really quite different from what it was supposed +by Kant to be; and this explains how it is that he and others +have taken various mathematical propositions to be synthetical which +in their ideal sense, as propositions of pure mathematics, are in truth +only analytical.</p> + +<p>Descending from things I can demonstrate to things of which +various facts, in the light of those demonstrations, fully persuade +me, I will say that in my opinion there are many synthetical propositions +which, if not <i>a priori</i> in Dr. Carus’s sense, are, at least, innate +(notwithstanding his frequent denials of this, as in ¶ 15) though +he is quite right in saying that their abstract and distinct formulation +comes very late (¶ 126). But turn the facts as I will, I cannot +see that they afford the slightest reason for thinking that such propositions +are ever absolutely universal, exact, or necessary in their +truth. On the contrary, the principles of probable inference show +this to be impossible.</p> + +<p>Dr. Carus adduces the instance of a geometrical proposition, +namely, “that two congruent regular tetrahedrons, when put together, +will form a hexahedron.” (¶ 25.) This, he says, seems to +be “a very wonderful thing”; for why should not a larger tetrahedron +be formed, just as two heaps of flour make a large heap of +flour? Yet, he continues, the probability that the two tetrahedrons +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_536">[536]</span>do always make a hexahedron is 1, “which means certainty” (¶ 27). +But as it happens, the proposition, in the form stated is quite +erroneous. What is true is this. If two tetrahedra are so placed +that one face of each is coincident with one face of the other, while +all the other faces are inclined to one another, and if of the 8 faces, +the 2 that are coincident are not counted, there remain to be counted +8-2=6 faces. But there is nothing more wonderful about this +than that 8-2=6, which is an easy corollary from definitions. +Very few propositions in mathematics that appear “marvellous” +will hold water; and those few excite our astonishment only because +the real complexity of the conditions are masked in an intuitional +presentation of them.</p> + +<p>Dr. Carus holds (¶ 15) that formal knowledge is absolutely universal, +exact, and necessary. In some cases, as where he says that, +given the number of dimensions of space, the entire geometry could +be deduced (¶ 35), the boasted infallibility will prove on examination +to be downright error. In all other cases, the propositions only +relate to ideal constructions, and their applicability to the real world +is at the best doubtful, and, as I think, false; while in their ideal +purity, they are not synthetical.</p> + +<p>Thus, my good friend and antagonist holds that the combination +of oxygen and hydrogen to produce water is not “different in +principle” from that of the tetrahedra to produce a hexahedron +(¶ 26). There is all the difference between the ideal and the real; +which to my Scotistic mind is very important. But this is not the +only passage in which he speaks as if form were the principle of individuation.</p> + +<p>§ 9. Dr. Carus’s position is even weaker than that of Kant, who +makes space, for example, a necessary form of thought (in a broad +sense of that term). But Dr. Carus appears to consider space as an +absolute reality. For he says (¶ 119) that “every single point of +space has its special and individual qualities.” Here again form is +made the principle of individuation; whence the queer phrase, “individual +qualities.”</p> + +<p>§ 10. Dr. Carus argues that whatever is unequivocally determinate +is necessary. (¶ 124.) Were the determination spoken of real +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_537">[537]</span>dynamic determination, this would be a mere truism. But the expression +used, <i>eindeutig bestimmt</i>, merely expresses a mathematical +determination, and therefore no real necessity ensues. The equation</p> + +<p class="center"><i>x</i>² - 23<i>x</i> + 132¼ = 0</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp100" id="formula09" style="max-width: 15.625em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/formula09.jpg" alt=""> +</figure> + +<p class="noindent">determines <i>x</i> to be either 11·477 or 11·523. In this sense, <i>x</i> has +necessarily one value or the other. The equation</p> + +<p class="center"><i>x</i>² - 12<i>x</i> + 6 = 0</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp100" id="formula10" style="max-width: 10.9375em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/formula10.jpg" alt=""> +</figure> + +<p class="noindent">determines <i>x</i> to be either 11·477 or 0·523. Together, the two equations +uniquely determine <i>x</i> to be 11·477. This shows how much +that argument amounts to.</p> + +<p>§ 11. By “sameness,” Dr. Carus means equivalence for a given +purpose. (¶¶ 102, 106.) By the “idea of sameness,” he means +(¶¶ 77, 96) the principle that things having a common character are +for some purpose equivalent. This, he says, “has a solid basis in +the facts of experience.” By a “world of sameness” (¶ 113), he +seems to mean one in which any two given concrete things are in +some respect equivalent. He argues (¶ 122) that a “world of sameness +is a world in which necessity rules.” I do not see this. It +seems to me so bald a <i>non sequitur</i>, that I cannot but suppose the +thought escapes my apprehension. If there were anything in the +argument, it would seem to be a marvellously expeditious way of +settling the whole dispute; and therefore it would have been worth +the trouble of stating, so as to bring it within the purview of minds +like mine.</p> + +<p>§ 12. My candid opponent sometimes endorses emphatically +the Leibnizian principle. “Necessitarianism must be founded on +something other than observation. Observation is <i>a posteriori</i>; it +has reference to single facts, to particulars; yet the doctrine of necessity +... is of universal application. The doctrine of necessity ... +is of an <i>a priori</i> nature.” (¶ 11.) “Millions of single experiences ... +cannot establish a solid belief in necessity.” (¶ 14.) “No amount +of experience is sufficient to constitute causation by a mere synthesis +of sequences.” (¶ 22.) “Millions of millions of cases” constitute +“no proof” that a proposition “is always so.” (¶ 29.)</p> + +<p>Nevertheless, he holds that the law of “the conservation of +matter and energy” so conclusively proves necessary causation, that +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_538">[538]</span>the obstinacy of Hume, himself, could not have withstood the argument. +(¶ 23.) One wonders, then, what is supposed to prove this +“law of the conservation of matter and energy,” if no amount of +experience can prove it.</p> + +<p>But the <i>a priori</i> itself can “be based on the firm ground of experience.” +(¶ 14.) In that case, it is not prior to experience, after +all! “The idea of necessity is based upon the conception of sameness, +and ... the existence of sameness is a fact of experience.” +(¶ 87.) If absolute necessity can be irrefragably demonstrated from +the fact that two things are alike, it is a pity Dr. Carus should not +state this demonstration in a form, that I, and men like me, can understand. +That would be more to the purpose than merely saying +it can be proved. Absolute chance is rejected as “involving a violation +of laws well established by <i>positive evidence</i>.” (¶ 149.)</p> + +<p>All these <i>denials</i> that absolute necessity can be established and +absolute chance refuted by experiential evidence, mixed with as +clear <i>assertions</i> of the same things, when taken together, have the +appearance of an attempt, as the politicians say, to “straddle” the +question.</p> + +<p>§13. But the ingenious Doctor seeks to bolster up necessity by +introducing the confused notion of “causation.”</p> + +<p>I do not know where the idea originated that a cause is an instantaneous +state of things, perfectly determinative of every subsequent +state. It seems to be at the bottom of Kant’s discourse on +the subject; yet it accords neither with the original conception of a +cause, nor with the principles of mechanics. The original idea of +an efficient cause is that of an agent, more or less like a man. It is +prior to the effect, in the sense of having come into being before the +latter; but it is not transformed into the effect. In this sense, it +may happen that an event is a cause of a subsequent event; seldom, +however, is it the principal cause. Far less are events the only causes. +The modern mechanical conception, on the other hand, is that the relative +positions of particles determine their accelerations at the instants +when they occupy those positions. In other words, if the positions +of all the particles are given at <i>two</i> instants (together with the law +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_539">[539]</span>of force), then the positions at all other instants may be deduced.⁠<a id="FNanchor_109" href="#Footnote_109" class="fnanchor">[109]</a> +This doctrine conflicts with Kant’s second analogy of experience, +as interpreted by him, in no less than four essential particulars. In +the first place, far from involving any principle that could properly +be termed generation, or <i>Erzeugung</i>, which is Kant’s word for the +sequence of effect from cause, the modern mechanical doctrine is a +doctrine of persistence, and, as I have repeatedly explained, positively +prohibits any real growth. In the second place, one state of +things (i. e. one configuration of the system) is not sufficient to determine +a second, it is two that determine a third. To whomsoever +may think that this is an inconsiderable divergence of opinions, +let me say, study the logic of relatives, and you will think so no +longer. In the third place, the two determining configurations, according +to mechanics, may be taken at almost any two instants, and +the determined configuration be taken at any third instant we like. +<i>There is no mechanical truth in saying that the past determines the future, +rather than the future the past.</i> We habitually follow tradition +in continuing to use that form of expression, but every mathematician +knows that it is nothing but a form of expression. We continue, +for convenience, to talk of mechanical phenomena as if they were +regulated, in the same manner in which our intentions regulate our +actions (which is essentially a determination of the future by the +past), although we are quite aware that it is not really so. Remark +how Kant reasons:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“If it is a necessary law of our sensibility, and consequently a <i>formal condition</i> +of all perceptions, that the preceding time determines the following, (since I can +only come to the following through the preceding,) then is it also an indispensable +<i>law of the empirical representation</i> of the time-series that the appearances of the +preceding time determine every occurrence in the following.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>What this leads to is a causality like that of mental phenomena, +where it <i>is</i> the past which determines the future, and <i>not</i> (in +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_540">[540]</span>the same sense) the reverse; but the doctrine of the conservation of +energy consists precisely in the denial that anything like this occurs +in the domain of physics. Had Kant studied the psychological phenomena +more attentively and generalised them more broadly, he +would have seen that in the mind causation is not absolute, but follows +such a curve as is traced in my essay towards “The Law of +Mind” (<i>The Monist</i>, Vol. II, 550). Does our judicious editor deem it +ungracious to find fault with Kant for not doing so much more than +he did, considering what that hero-like achievement was? We must +seem to carp, as long as thinkers can hold that achievement for sufficient. +In the fourth place, Kant’s “Analogy” ignores that continuity +which is the life-blood of mathematical thought. He deals with +those awkward chunks of phenomenon, called “events.” He represents +one such “event” as determined by certain others, definitely, +while the rest have nothing to do with it. It is impossible to cement +such thought as this into hermetic continuity with the refined conceptions +of modern dynamics. The statement that every instantaneous +state of things determines precisely all subsequent states, and +not at all any previous states, could, I rather think, be shown to involve +a contradiction.</p> + +<p>The notion which Dr. Carus holds of a cause seems to be that +it is a state, embracing all the positions and velocities of all the +masses at one instant, the effect being a similar state for any subsequent +instant. (¶¶ 21, 24.) This breaks at once with common parlance, +with dynamics, and with philosophical logic. In common +parlance, we do not say that the position and upward velocity of a +missile is the cause of its being at a subsequent instant lower down +and moving with a greater downward velocity.⁠<a id="FNanchor_110" href="#Footnote_110" class="fnanchor">[110]</a> In dynamics, it is +the fixed force, gravitation, or whatever else, together with those relative +positions of the bodies that determine the intensity and direction +of the forces, that is regarded as the cause. But these causes +are not previous to, but simultaneous with, their effects, which are +the instantaneous accelerations. Finally, logic opposes our calling +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_541">[541]</span>one of two states which equally determine one another (as any two +states of a system do, if the velocities are taken to be included in +these states) <i>the</i> determinator, or cause, simply because of the circumstance +that it precedes the other in time,—a circumstance that +is upon the principles of dynamics plainly insignificant and irrelevant.</p> + +<p>Everybody will make slips in the use of words that have been +on his lips from before the time when he learned to think; but the +practice which I endeavor to follow in regard to the word <i>cause</i>, is +to use it in the Aristotelian sense of an <i>efficient cause</i>, in all its crudeness. +In short, I refuse to use it at all as a philosophical word. When +my conception is of a dynamical character, I endeavor to employ +the accepted terminology of dynamics;⁠<a id="FNanchor_111" href="#Footnote_111" class="fnanchor">[111]</a> and when my idea is a +more general and logical one, I prefer to speak of the <i>explanation</i>.</p> + +<p>§ 14. Dr. Carus thinks the element of necessity in causation +can be demonstrated by considering the process as a transformation. +“It is a sequence of two states which belong together as an initial +and final aspect of one and the same event.” (¶ 21. Compare ¶¶ 20, +24.) He neglects to explain how he brings under this formula the +inward causation of the will and character, as set forth by him in +¶¶ 163-167.</p> + +<p>It is unnecessary for me to reply, at length, to an argument so +manifestly inconclusive. On the one hand, it conflicts with the +principle that absolute necessity cannot be proved from experience; +and on the other hand, it leaves room for an imperfect necessity.</p> + +<p>Professor Tait has done an ill office to thought in countenancing +the idea that the conservation of energy is of the same nature as the +“conservation,” or rather perduration, of matter. Dr. Carus says +(¶ 121) that</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“The law of the conservation of matter and energy rests upon the experience +(corroborated by experiments) that causation is transformation. It states that the +total amount of matter and the total amount of energy remain constant. There +is no creation out of nothing and no conversion of something into nothing.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_542">[542]</span></p> + +<p>The historical part of this statement contains only a small grain +of truth; but that I will not stop to criticise. The point I wish to +make is that the law of the conservation of energy is here represented +under a false aspect. The true substance of the law is that +the accelerations, or rates of change, of the motions of the particles +at any instant depend solely on their relative positions at those instants. +The equation which expresses the law under this form is a +differential equation of the second order; that is, it involves the +rates of change of the rates of change of positions, together with the +positions themselves. Now, because of the purely analytic proposition +of the differential calculus that</p> + +<p class="center"><i>Dₜ</i>²<i>s</i> = ½<i>Dₛ</i>(<i>Dₜs</i>)²,</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp100" id="formula11" style="max-width: 15.625em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/formula11.jpg" alt=""> +</figure> + +<p class="noindent">the first integral of the differential equation of the second order, that +is, the differential equation of the first order which expresses the +same state of things, equates half the sum of the masses, each multiplied +by the square of its velocity, to a function of the relative positions +of the particles <i>plus</i> an arbitrary constant.⁠<a id="FNanchor_112" href="#Footnote_112" class="fnanchor">[112]</a> In order to fix +our ideas, let us take a very simple example, that of a single particle +accelerated towards an infinite plane, at a rate proportional to +the <i>n</i>ᵗʰ power of its distance from the plane. In this case, if <i>s</i> be +the distance, the second differential equation will be</p> + +<p class="center"><i>Dₜ</i>²<i>s</i> = -<i>asⁿ</i>,</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp100" id="formula12" style="max-width: 12.5em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/formula12.jpg" alt=""> +</figure> + +<p class="noindent">and the first integral of it will be</p> + +<p class="center">(<i>Dₜs</i>)² = -(²<i>ᵃ</i>⁄<i>ₙ</i>₊₁)<i>sⁿ</i>⁺¹ + <i>C</i>.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp100" id="formula13" style="max-width: 21.875em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/formula13.jpg" alt=""> +</figure> + +<p class="noindent">By the first law of motion, and the Pythagorean proposition, the +part of the velocity-square depending on the horizontal component +is also constant.</p> + +<p>The arbitrary constant, <i>C</i>, plainly has its genesis in the fact +that forces do not determine velocities, but only accelerations. Its +value will be fixed as soon as the velocity at any instant is known. +This quantity would exist, just the same, and be independent of the +time, and would therefore be “conserved” whether the forces were +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_543">[543]</span>“conservative,” that is, simply positional, or not. Now, this constant +is the energy; or rather, the energy is composed of this constant +increased by another which is absolutely indeterminable, being +merely supposed large enough to make the sum positive.</p> + +<p>Thus, the law of energy does not prescribe that the total amount +of energy shall remain constant; for this would be so in any case +by virtue of the second law of motion; but what it prescribes is that +the total energy diminished by the living force shall give a remainder +which depends upon the relative positions of the particles and +not upon the time or the velocities. It is also to be noticed that +the energy has no particular magnitude, or quantity. Furthermore, +in transformations of kinetical energy into positional energy, and +the reverse, the different portions of energy do not retain their identity, +any more than, in book-keeping, the identity of the amounts of +different items is preserved. In short, the conservation of energy, +(I do not mean the <i>law</i> of conservation,) is a mere result of algebra. +Very different is it with the “conservation” of matter. For, in the +first place, the total mass is a perfectly definite quantity; and, in +the second place, in all its transformations, not only is the <i>total</i> +amount constant, but all the different parts preserve their identity. +To speak, therefore, of “the conservation of matter and energy,” is +to assimilate facts of essentially contrary natures; and to say that +the law of the conservation of energy makes the total amount of +energy constant is to attribute to this law a phenomenon really due +to another law, and to overlook what this law really does determine, +namely, <i>that the total energy less the kinetic energy gives a remainder +which is exclusively positional</i>.</p> + +<p>§ 15. Dr. Carus does not make it clear what he means by +<i>chance</i>. He does, indeed, say (¶¶ 145, 146):</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“What is chance?</p> + +<p>“Chance is any event not especially intended, either not calculated, or, with a +given and limited stock of knowledge, incalculable.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>This defines what he means by a chance event, in the concrete; +what he understands by probability, we are left to conjecture. But +from what he says in ¶ 147, I infer that he regards it as dependent +upon the state of our ignorance, and therefore nothing real.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_544">[544]</span></p> + +<p>I am, therefore, much puzzled when I find him expressing a +conviction (¶¶ 88, 156) that chance plays an important part in the +real world. He explains very distinctly that “when we call a throw +of the dice pure chance, we mean that the incidents which condition +the turning up of these or those special faces of the dice have not +been, or cannot be, calculated.” (¶ 147.) This is the commonest, +because the shallowest, philosophy of chance. Even Venn might +teach him better than that. However, according to that view, when +he writes of “the important part that chance plays in the world,—not +absolute chance ... but that same chance of which the throw +of the die is a typical instance” (¶ 88), he can be understood to +mean no more than that many things happen which we are not in +condition to calculate or predict. This is not playing a part <i>in the +world</i>, one would say—at least, not in the natural world; it is only +playing a part in our ignorance.</p> + +<p>Dr. Carus frequently uses phrases which make us suspect he +penetrates deeper. Thus, he says, “we do not believe in absolute +chance, but we believe in chance” (¶ 144); and again, “Every man +is the architect of his own fortune—but not entirely. There are +sometimes coincidences determining the fates of men.” (¶ 161.) +But when we remark the consecution of ¶¶ 137-162, we feel pretty +sure he really sees no further. To do so would have been to perceive +that indefinitely varied specificalness <i>is</i> chance.</p> + +<p>For a long time, I myself strove to make chance that diversity +in the universe which laws leave room for, instead of a violation of +law, or lawlessness. That was truly believing in chance that was +not absolute chance. It was recognising that chance does play a +part in the real world, apart from what we may know or be ignorant +of. But it was a transitional belief which I have passed through, +while Dr. Carus seems not to have reached it.</p> + +<p>As for absolute chance, Dr. Carus makes the momentous admission +that it is “not unimaginable” (¶ 150). If so, its negation, +or absolute necessity, cannot be a formal principle.</p> + +<p>§ 16. But it is time for me to leave the consideration of Dr. +Carus’s system and to take up his strictures upon mine. His philosophy +is one eminently enlightened by modern ideas, which it +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_545">[545]</span>synthetises to an unusual extent. It is distinguished for its freedom +from the vice of one-sidedness, and displays every facet of the gem +of philosophical inquiry, except the one on which it rests, the question +of absolute law. Its prominent faults, which I feel sure must +have struck every competent reader, are that it shows little trace of +meditation upon the thoughts of the great idealists, and that there +is a certain want of congruity between different elements of it. How +strangely it sounds, for instance, to find an apriorian, and one who +is dinging “formal laws” so perpetually into our ears, one who holds +that “in order to weave the woof of the <i>a posteriori</i> elements into +coherent cloth, we want the warp of the <i>a priori</i>” (¶ 15), to find +this man declaring for a positivism “which accepts no doctrine, +theory, or law, unless it be a formulation of facts,” and proclaiming +that “the whole business of science is to systematise the samenesses +of experience, and to present them in convenient formulas” (¶ 120). +Now there is just one way of bringing such warring elements into +harmony, and curing the greatest defect of the system,—and it is a +way which would also bring the whole into far better concordance +with natural science. It is to lop off the heads of all absolute propositions +Whose subject is not the Absolute, and reduce them to the +level of probable and approximate statements. Were that defalcation +performed, Dr. Carus’s philosophy would, in its general features, +offer no violent opposition to my opinions. Moreover, the Doctor +has at heart the conciliation of religion and science. I confess such +serious concern makes me smile; for I think the atonement he desires +is a thing which will come to pass of itself when time is ripe, +and that our efforts to hasten it have just that slight effect that our +efforts to hasten the ripening of apples on a tree may have. Besides, +natural ripening is the best. Let science and religion each +have stout faith in itself, and refuse to compromise with alien and +secondary purposes, but push the development of its own thought +on its own line; and then, when reconcilement comes,—as come it +surely will,—it will have a positive value, and be an unmixed good. +But since our accomplished editor thinks himself called upon to assist +in this birth of time, let me ask him whether of all the conditions +of such peace, the first is not that religious thought should abandon +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_546">[546]</span>that extravagant absoluteness of assertion which is proper to the state +of intellectual infancy, but which it has so long been too timid to +let go? This pragmatical and unneeded absoluteness it is which is +most deeply contrary to the method, the results, and the whole +spirit of science; and no error can be greater than to fancy that +science, or scientific men, rest upon it or readily tolerate it.</p> + +<p>§ 17. Dr. Carus (¶¶ 56-64) condemns my method of investigation +as contrary to that by which science has been advanced; and +holds that a radically different, and thoroughly positivistic method +is requisite,—a method so intensely positivistic as to exclude all +originality. I suppose he will not object to my forming an opinion +concerning the methods of science. I was brought up in an atmosphere +of scientific inquiry, and have all my life chiefly lived among +scientific men. For the last thirty years, the study which has constantly +been before my mind has been upon the nature, strength, +and history of methods of scientific thought. I have no space here +to argue the question. In its logical aspect, I have partly considered +it in various publications; and in its historical aspect, I have long +been engaged upon a treatise about it. My critic says (¶ 57) that +1 am “very positivistic in my logic of science.” This is a singular +misapprehension. Few of the great scientific minds with whom I +have come into personal contact, and from whom I endeavored to +learn were disposed to contemn originality or the ideal part of the +mind’s work in investigation; and those few, it was easy to see, +really breathed an atmosphere of ideas which were so incessantly +present that they were unconscious of them. Were I to name those +of my teachers who were most positivistic in theory, a smile would +be excited. My own historical studies, which have been somewhat +minutely critical, have, on the whole confirmed the views of Whewell, +the only man of philosophical power conjoined with scientific +training who had made a comprehensive survey of the whole course +of science, that progress in science depends upon the observation of +the right facts by minds <i>furnished with appropriate ideas</i>. Finally, +my long investigation of the logical process, of scientific reasoning +led me many years ago to the conclusion that science is nothing but +a development of our natural instincts. So much for my <i>theory</i> of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_547">[547]</span>scientific logic. It is as totally opposed as anything can be to Dr. +Carus’s theory (¶ 69, note; and “Ursache, Grund und Zweck,” p. +2) that originality is out of place in science.</p> + +<p>But in my <i>practice</i> of scientific reasoning, Dr. Carus accuses me +of being what he calls a “constructionist”; that is, a theoriser unguided +by indications from observation or accepted facts. To a +mind upon whom that celebrated and splendid chapter of Kant upon +the architectonical method failed to make a deep impression, I may +appear so; but <i>travesty</i> is in truth hardly too strong a word to describe +the account of my method by Dr. Carus.</p> + +<p>Perhaps exaggeration is not without its value. If so, let me +sum up the method Dr. Carus recommends. Eschew originality, is +its pious formula; do not think for yourself, nor countenance results +obtained by original minds. Distrust them; they are not safe +men. Leave originality to mathematicians and their breed, to poets, +and to all those who seek the sad notoriety of having unsettled belief.⁠<a id="FNanchor_113" href="#Footnote_113" class="fnanchor">[113]</a> +Flee all philosophies which smack of this aberrant nineteenth +century.⁠<a id="FNanchor_114" href="#Footnote_114" class="fnanchor">[114]</a> This theory of Dr. Carus condemns itself; for it is highly +original, and soars into the free ether untrammelled by historic facts.</p> + +<p>Keppler comes very close to realising my ideal of the scientific +method; and he is one of the few thinkers who have taken their +readers fully into their confidence as to what their method really +has been.⁠<a id="FNanchor_115" href="#Footnote_115" class="fnanchor">[115]</a> I should not feel justified in inflicting upon mine an +autobiographical account of my own course of thought; but some +things Dr. Carus’s accusation forces me to mention. My method of +attacking all problems has ever been to begin with an historical and +rational inquiry into the special method adapted to the special problem. +This is the essence of my architectonical proceeding upon +which Dr. Carus has commented very severely. To look an inch +before one’s nose involves originality: therefore, it is wrong to have +a conscious method. But further, in regard to philosophy, not only +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_548">[548]</span>the methods, but the elementary ideas which are to enter into those +methods, should be subjected to careful preliminary examination. +This, especially, Dr. Carus finds very unscientific. (¶ 64, and elsewhere.) +It is, undoubtedly, the most characteristic feature of my +procedure. Certainly it was not a notion hastily or irreflectively +caught up; but is the maturest fruit of a lifetime of reflection upon +the methods of science, including those of philosophy; and if it +shall be found that one contribution to thought on my part has +proved of permanent service, that, I expect, will be the one. This +method in no wise teaches that the method and materials for thought +are not to be modified in the course of the study of the subject-matter. +But instead of taking ideas at haphazard, or being satisfied +with those that have been handed down from the good old times, as +a mind keenly alive to the dangers of originality would have done, +I have undertaken to make a systematic survey of human knowledge +(a very slight sketch of which composed the substance of my paper +on the “Architecture of Theories,”) in order to find what ideas have, +as a fact, proved most fruitful, and to observe the special utilities +they have severally fulfilled. A subsidiary object of this survey was +to note what the great obstacles are to-day in the way of the further +advance of the different branches of science. In my “Architecture +of Theories,” I never professed to do more than make a slight sketch +of a small portion of my preliminary studies, devoting thirteen lines +to some hints as to the nature of the results. In the four following +papers I have given a selection of a few of these results. Among +those which remain to be reported are some of much more immediate +importance than any of those hitherto set forth. If anybody +has been surprised to find my subsequent papers developing thoughts +which they were unable to foresee from my first, it is only what I +warned people from the outset that they would find to happen. Nor +have the greatest of these surprises yet been reached.⁠<a id="FNanchor_116" href="#Footnote_116" class="fnanchor">[116]</a></p> + +<p>The next series of facts reviewed was that of the history of philosophy. +I waded right into this fearful slough of “originality,” in +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_549">[549]</span>order to gather what seemed to throw a light upon the subject. +Finally, I reviewed the general facts of the universe.</p> + +<p>I now found myself forced by a great many different indications +to the conclusion that an evolutionary philosophy of some kind must +be accepted,—including among such philosophies systems like those +of Aristotle and of Hegel. From this point the reasoning was more +rapid. Evolution had been a prominent study for half a generation; +and much light had been thrown upon the conditions for a fruitful +evolutionary philosophy. The first question was, how far shall this +evolution go back? What shall we suppose <i>not</i> to be a product of +growth? I fancy it is this cautious reflectiveness of my procedure +which especially displeases Dr. Carus. It is not positivistic: it is +architectonic. But the answer to the question was not far to seek. +If an evolutionary explanation is to be adopted, philosophy, logic, +and the economy of research all dictate that in the first essay, at +least, that style of explanation be carried as far back as explanation +is called for. What elements of the universe require no explanation? +This was a simple question, capable of being decided by logic +with as much facility and certainty as a suitable problem is solved +by differential calculus. Being, and the uniformity in which being +consists, require to be explained. The only thing that does not require +it is non-existent spontaneity. This was soon seen to mean +absolute chance. The conclusion so reached was clinched by a +careful reëxamination of the office of chance in science generally, +and especially in the doctrines of evolution. Arrived at this point, +the next question was, what is the principle by which the development +is to proceed? It was a difficult inquiry, and involved researches +from different points of view.</p> + +<p>But I will not trouble the reader with further autobiographical +details. I have given enough to show that my method has neither +been in theory purely empirical, nor in practice mere brain-spinning; +and that, in short, my friend Dr. Carus’s account of it has +been as incorrect as can be.</p> + +<p>§ 18. The learned doctor (¶¶ 6, 7, 8) pronounces me to be an +imitator of David Hume, or, at least, classes my opinions as closely +allied to his. Yet be it known that never, during the thirty years in +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_550">[550]</span>which I have been writing on philosophical questions, have I failed +in my allegiance to realistic opinions and to certain Scotistic ideas; +while all that Hume has to say is said at the instance and in the interest +of the extremest nominalism. Moreover, instead of being a +purely negative critic, like Hume, seeking to annul a fundamental +conception generally admitted, I am a positive critic, pleading for +the admission to a place in our scheme of the universe for an idea +generally rejected. In the first paper of this series, in which I gave +a preliminary sketch of such of my ideas as could be so presented, +I carefully recorded my opposition to all philosophies which deny +the reality of the Absolute, and asserted that “the one intelligible +theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is +effete mind.” This is as much as to say that I am a Schellingian, of +some stripe; so that, on the whole, I do not think Dr. Carus has +made a very happy hit in likening me to Hume, to whose whole +method and style of philosophising I have always been perhaps too +intensely averse. Yet, notwithstanding my present disclaimer, I +have little doubt apriorians will continue to describe me as belonging +to the sceptical school. They have their wonderful ways of arriving +at truth, without stooping to confront their conclusions with +facts; and it is amusing to see how sincerely they are convinced +that nobody can have science at heart, without denying all they uphold.⁠<a id="FNanchor_117" href="#Footnote_117" class="fnanchor">[117]</a></p> + +<p>My opponent has a habit of throwing out surprising opinions +without the least attempt to illuminate them with the effulgence of +reason. Thus he says (¶ 8): “If Kant’s answer to Hume had been +satisfactory, Mr. Peirce would probably not have renewed the attack.” +What attack? All that Hume attacked I defend, namely, law +as a reality. How could a defence of that which I defend as essential +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_551">[551]</span>to my position, cause me to surrender that position, namely, +that real regularity is imperfect? In any sense in which Hume could +have admitted the possibility of law, it must be precisely followed; +since its existence could consist only in the conformity of facts unto +it. But perhaps Dr. Carus means that if one question had been +completely settled, I should probably have confined myself to talking +about that, instead of broaching a new one.</p> + +<p>§ 19. Another misunderstanding of my position on the part of +Dr. Carus (¶¶ 12, 13) is simply due to “boldly” having been twice +printed where the reading should have been “baldly,” in my paper +on “The Doctrine of Necessity.” (<i>The Monist</i>, Vol. II, p. 336, lines +20 and 25.) I wish printers would learn that I never use the word +<i>bold</i>. I have so little of the quality, that I don’t know what it +means. As I read the “revise,” as usual, it was presumably my +fault that the <i>erratum</i> occurred. At any rate, had my meaning +been clearly expressed, the proof-reader would not have been misled +by my defective chirography. What I was trying to say was, in +substance, this: Absolute chance is a hypothesis; and, like every +hypothesis, can only be defended as explaining certain phenomena.⁠<a id="FNanchor_118" href="#Footnote_118" class="fnanchor">[118]</a> +Yet to suppose that an event is brought about by absolute chance is +utterly illogical, since as a hypothesis it could only be admitted on +the ground of its explaining observed facts; now from mere non-law +nothing necessarily follows, and therefore nothing can be explained; +for to explain a fact is to show that it is a necessary, or, at +least, a probable, result from another fact, known or supposed. +Why is not this a complete refutation of the theory of absolute +chance? <i>Answer</i>: because the <i>existence</i> of absolute chance, as well +as many of its characters, are not themselves absolute chances, or +sporadic events, unsubject to general law. On the contrary, these +things <i>are</i> general laws. Everybody is familiar with the fact that +chance has laws, and that statistical results follow therefrom. Very +well: I do not propose to explain anything as due to the action of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_552">[552]</span>chance, that is, as being lawless. I do not countenance the idea +that Bible stories, for instance, show that nature’s laws were violated;—though +they may help to show that nature’s laws are not so +mechanical as we are accustomed to think. But I only propose to +explain the regularities of nature as consequences of the only uniformity, +or general fact, there was in the chaos, namely, the general +absence of any, determinate law.⁠<a id="FNanchor_119" href="#Footnote_119" class="fnanchor">[119]</a> In fact, after the first step is taken, +I only use <i>chance</i> to give room for the development of law by means +of the law of habits.</p> + +<p>§ 20. In ¶ 28, I read: “Mr. Peirce does not object to necessity +in certain cases; he objects to necessity being a universal feature of +the world.” This is correctly stated, and so it is in ¶ 203. I object +to necessity being universal, as well as to its ever being exact. In +short, I object to absolute universality, absolute exactitude, absolute +necessity, being attributed to any proposition that does not deal +with the Α and the Ω, in the which I do not include any object of +ordinary knowledge. But it is careless to write (¶ 193) that I “describe +the domain of mind as the absence of law.” Is not one of +my papers entitled “The Law of Mind”? It is true that I make the +law of mind essentially different in its mode of action from the law +of mechanics, inasmuch as it requires its own violation; but it is +law, not chance uncontrolled. That it is not “an undetermined +and indeterminable sporting” should have been obvious from my +expressly stating that its ultimate result must be the entire elimination +of chance from the universe. That directly negatives the adjective +“indeterminable,” and hence also the adjective “undetermined.” +Still more unwarranted is the statement (¶ 205) that I deny +“that there are samenesses in this world.” If the slightest excuse +for such an accusation can be found in all my writings I shall be +mightily surprised.</p> + +<p>§ 21. Dr. Carus fully admits (¶ 9) the justice of my first reply +to the argument that necessity is postulated in all scientific reasoning, +which reply is that to postulate necessity does not make it true. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_553">[553]</span>As this reply, if correct is complete, Dr. Carus was bound after that +admission to drop the postulate-argument in favor of necessity.⁠<a id="FNanchor_120" href="#Footnote_120" class="fnanchor">[120]</a> +But he takes no notice, at all, of my four-page argument to show +that scientific reasoning does <i>not</i> postulate absolute universality, +exactitude, or necessity (<i>The Monist</i>, Vol. II, pp. 324-327); but +calmly asserts, four or five times over (¶¶ 5, 11, 16, 62, 79), without +one scintilla of argumentation, that that postulate <i>is</i> made, and +uses this as an argument in favor of necessity.</p> + +<p>§ 22. He also fully admits (¶¶ 11, 14, 22) the justice of my +argument that the absoluteness of universality, exactitude, and necessity, +cannot be proved, nor rendered probable, by arguments +from observation. That argument consisted in assuming that all +arguments from observation are probable arguments, and in showing +that probable inferences are always affected with probable errors.</p> + +<p>Had I deemed it requisite, I might easily have fortified that +argument by a more profound analysis of scientific reasoning. Such +an analysis I had formerly given in my “Theory of Probable Inference” +(in “Studies in Logic,” Boston: Little and Brown).</p> + +<p>But, notwithstanding his admissions, Dr. Carus sets up his +<i>ipse dixit</i> against my argumentation. “We deny most positively,” +says the editorial Elohim, “that the calculus of probabilities is applicable +to the order of the world, as to whether it may or may not +be universal.” (¶¶ 27, 31.)</p> + +<p>To support this, he cites (¶¶ 31-34) four passages from articles +written by me sixteen years ago. I hope my mind has not been +stationary during all these years; yet there is little in those old articles +which I now think positively erroneous, and nothing in the +passages cited. My present views had, at that time, already begun +to urge themselves on my mind; but they were not ripe for public +avowal. In the first of the passages cited, I express the opinion, +which I first uttered in my earlier lectures before the Lowell Institute, +in 1866, afterwards in the <i>Popular Science Monthly</i> in 1877, in +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_554">[554]</span>still fuller elaboration in my “Theory of Probable Inference” in +1882, and maintain now as strongly as ever, that no definite probability +can be assigned to any general arrangement of nature. To +speak of an <i>antecedent</i> probability would imply that there was a statistical +science of different universes; and a <i>deduced</i> probability requires +an antecedent probability for one of its data.⁠<a id="FNanchor_121" href="#Footnote_121" class="fnanchor">[121]</a> This consideration +only goes to fortify my present position, that we cannot conclude +from observed facts with any degree of probability, and therefore +<i>a fortiori</i> not with certainty, that any proposition is absolutely +universal, exact, or necessary. In the absence of any weight of +probability in favor of any particular exact statement, the formal +presumption is altogether against any one out of innumerable possible +statements of that kind.</p> + +<p>The second passage cited is one in which I argue that the universe +is not a chaos, or chance-medley. Now Dr. Carus admits +(¶ 28) that I do not to-day maintain that it is a chance-medley.</p> + +<p>The third passage cited is this: “A contradiction is involved +in the very idea of a chance-world.” This is in entire harmony with +my present position that “a chaos ... being without connection +or regularity would properly be without existence.” (“Architecture +of Theories,” <i>The Monist</i>, Vol. I, p. 176.)</p> + +<p>The fourth passage is to the effect that “the interest which the +uniformities of nature have for an animal measures his place in the +scale of intelligence.” This I still believe.</p> + +<p>So much for my supposed contradictions. If I am not mistaken, +our amiable editor, whose admirable editorship springs so +largely out of his amiability, in copying out these passages was really +not half so much intent on showing me to be wrong at present, as +on showing me to have been right formerly. However hard he hits, +he contrives to honey his sockdologers, and sincerely cares more to +make the reader admire his antagonist when he is right than to condemn +him when he is wrong. There is a touch of art in this that +proclaims the born editor, and which I can hardly hope to imitate.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_555">[555]</span></p> + +<p>Though Dr. Carus admits over and over again that necessity +cannot be based on observation, he often slips back to the idea that +it can be so based. He says, (¶ 30) that “form is a quality of this +world, not of some samples of it, but throughout, so far as we know +of existence in even the most superficial way.” But does he not see +that all we <i>do</i> know, and all we <i>shall</i> to-morrow, or at any date know, +is nothing but a sample of our possible experience,—nay, is but a +sample of what we are in the future to have already experienced? +I have characterised inductive inference as reasoning from samples; +but the most usual way of sampling a class is by examining <i>all</i> the +instances of it that have come under our observation, or which we +can at once collect.</p> + +<p>§ 23. Dr. Carus (¶¶ 44, 46) holds that from my social theory +of reality, namely, that the real is the idea in which the community +ultimately settles down, the existence of something inevitable is to +be inferred. I confess I never anticipated that anybody would urge +that. I thought just the reverse might be objected, namely, that all +absoluteness was removed from reality by that theory, and it was +many years ago that, in my “Theory of Probable Inference,” I admitted +the obvious justice, as it seemed to me, of that objection. +We cannot be quite sure that the community ever will settle down +to an unalterable conclusion upon any given question. Even if they +do so for the most part, we have no reason to think the unanimity +will be quite complete, nor can we rationally presume any overwhelming +<i>consensus</i> of opinion will be reached upon every question. +All that we are entitled to assume is in the form of a <i>hope</i> that such +conclusion may be substantially reached concerning the particular +questions with which our inquiries are busied.</p> + +<p>Such, at least, are the results to which the consideration of the +doctrine of probability brings my mind irresistibly. So that, the +social theory of reality, far from being incompatible with tychism, +inevitably leads up to that form of philosophy. Socialistic, or as I +prefer to term it, agapastic ontology seems to me likely to find favor +with many minds at an early day, because it is a natural path by +which the nominalist may be led into the realistic ways of thought, +ways toward which many facts and inward forces impel him. It is +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_556">[556]</span>well, therefore, to call attention to the circumstances that the realism +to which it leads is a doctrine which declares general truths to +be real,—independent of the opinions of any particular collection of +minds,—but not to be destined, in a strictly universal, exact, and +sure acceptation, to be so settled, and established. Now to assert +that general truths are objectively real, but to deny that they are +strictly universal, exact, and certain, is to embrace the doctrine of +absolute chance. Thus it is that the agapastic ontologist who endeavors +to escape tychism will find himself “led into” that “inextricable +confusion” which Dr. Carus (¶ 4) has taken a contract to +show that I am led into.</p> + +<p>§ 24. Conservatism is wholesome and necessary; the most convinced +radical must admit the wisdom of it, in the abstract; and a +conservative will be in no haste to espouse the doctrine of absolute +chance. I, myself, pondered over it for long years before doing so. +But I am persuaded, at length, that mankind will before very long +take up with it; and I do not believe philosophers will be found +tagging on to the tail of the general procession.</p> + +<p>My little dialogue between the tychist and the necessitarian +(<i>The Monist</i>, Vol. II, pp. 331-333) seems to have represented pretty +fairly the views of the latter; for Dr. Carus, in ¶¶ 151-155, does +little more than reiterate them, without much, if at all, reinforcing +them. His ¶¶ 158-160 merely work out, in a form perhaps not quite +clear, what is manifest from the elementary principles of dynamics, +and was considered in my dialogue.</p> + +<p>His arguments in this connection, apart from those already noticed, +are that absolute chance is something which if it existed would +require explanation, that the manifold specificalness of nature is explained +by law without any aid from chance, and that absolute chance +if it existed, in the sense in which it is supposed to exist in my +chaos, could not possibly breed law as supposed by me. To the +consideration of these arguments I proceed to apply myself.</p> + +<p>§ 25. One of the architectonic—and, therefore, I suppose, by +Dr. Carus considered as highly reprehensible—features of my theory, +is that, instead of saying off-hand what elements strike me as requiring +explanation and what as not doing so, which seems to be his +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_557">[557]</span>way, I have devoted a long time to the study of the whole logical +doctrine of explanation, and of the history of explanations, and have +based upon the general principles so ascertained my conclusions as +to what things do and what do not require to be explained.</p> + +<p>Dr. Carus (¶ 67) defines <i>explanation</i> as a description of a special +process of nature in such a way that the process is recognised +as a transformation. This I cannot quite grant. First, I cannot +admit that “special processes of nature” are the only things to be +explained. For instance, if I were to meet a gentleman who seemed +to conform scrupulously to all the usages of good society, except +that he wore to an evening party an emerald satin vest, that would +be a fact calling for explanation, although it would not be a “special +process of nature.” Second, I cannot admit that an explanation +is a description of the fact explained. It is true that in the setting +forth of some explanations, it is convenient to restate the fact explained, +so as to set it under another aspect; but even in these +cases, the statement of <i>other</i> facts is essential. In all cases, it is +<i>other facts</i>, usually hypothetical, which constitute the explanation; +and the process of explaining is a process by which from those other +facts the fact to be explained is shown to follow as a consequence, +by virtue of a general principle, or otherwise. Thus, a “special +process of nature” calling for explanation is the circumstance that +the planet Mars, while moving in a general way from west to east +among the fixed stars, yet retrogrades a part of the time, so as to +describe loops in the heavens. The explanation is that Mars revolves +in one approximate circle and we in another. Again, it has +been stated that a warm spring in Europe is usually followed by a +cool autumn, and the explanation has been offered that so many +more icebergs than usual are liberated during a warm spring, that +they subsequently lower sensibly the temperature of Europe. I care +little whether the fact and the explanation are correct or no. The +case illustrates, at any rate, my point that an explanation is a special +fact, supposed or known, from which the fact to be explained +follows as a consequence. Third, I cannot admit that every description +which recognises the fact described as a transformation is an +explanation; far less that “it is complete and exhaustive” (¶ 67). +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_558">[558]</span>A magician transforms a watch into a dove. Recognise it as a +transformation and the trick is explained, is it? This is delightfully +facile. Describe the change from a caterpillar to a butterfly as a +transformation, and does that explain it? Fourth, I cannot admit +that every explanation recognises the fact explained as a transformation. +The explanation of the loops in the motion of Mars is not +of that nature. But I willingly recognise in Dr. Carus’s definition +an attempt,—more or less successful,—to formulate one of the great +offices of scientific inquiry, that of bridging over the gap between +the familiar and the unfamiliar.</p> + +<p><i>Explanation</i>, however, properly speaking, is the replacement of +a complex predicate, or one which seems improbable or extraordinary, +by a simple predicate from which the complex predicate +follows on known principles. In like manner, a <i>reason</i>, in one sense, +is the replacement of a multiple subject of an observational proposition +by a general subject, which by the very conditions of the special +experience is predicable of the multiple subject.⁠<a id="FNanchor_122" href="#Footnote_122" class="fnanchor">[122]</a> Such a reason +may be called an explanation in a loose sense.</p> + +<p>Accordingly, that which alone requires an explanation is a coincidence.</p> + +<p>Hence, I say that a uniformity, or law, is <i>par excellence</i>, the +thing that requires explanation. And Dr. Carus (¶ 51) admits that +this “is perfectly true.”</p> + +<p>But I cannot imagine anything further from the truth than his +statement (¶ 66) that “the only thing in the world of which we cannot +and need not give account is the existence of facts itself.” I +should say, on the contrary, that the existence of facts is the only +thing of which we need give account. Forms may indulge in whatever +eccentricities they please in the world of dreams, without responsibility; +but when they attempt that kind of thing in the world +of real existence, they must expect to have their conduct inquired +into. But should Dr. Carus reply that I mistake his meaning, that +it is only “being in general” (¶ 66) that he holds unaccountable, I +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_559">[559]</span>reply that this is simply expressing scepticism as to the possibility +and need of philosophy. In a certain sense, my theory of reality, +namely that reality is the dynamical reaction of certain forms upon +the mind of the community, is a proposed explanation of being in +general; and be it remarked that the mind of the community, itself, +is the thing the nature of whose being this explanation first of all +puts upon an idealistic footing.</p> + +<p>Chance, according to me, or irregularity,—that is, the absence +of any coincidence,—calls for no explanation. If <i>law</i> calls for a particular +explanation, as Dr. Carus admits it does, surely the mere +absence of law calls for no further explanation than is afforded by +the mere absence of any particular circumstance necessitating the +result. An explanation is the conception of a fact as a necessary +result, thereby accounting for the coincidence it presents. It would +be highly absurd to say that the absence of any definite character, +must be accounted for, as if it were a peculiar phenomenon, simply +because the imperfection of language leads us so to talk of it. Quite +unfounded, therefore, is Dr. Carus’s opinion that “chance needs +exactly as much explanation as anything else” (¶ 53);—an opinion +which, so far as I can see, rests on no defensible principle.</p> + +<p>Equally hasty is his oft repeated objection (¶ 55, 58, 61) that +my absolute chance is something ultimate and inexplicable. I go +back to a chaos so irregular that in strictness the word existence is +not applicable to its merely germinal state of being; and here I +reach a region in which the objection to ultimate causes loses its +force. But I do not stop there. Even this nothingness, though it +antecedes the infinitely distant absolute beginning of time, is traced +back to a nothingness more rudimentary still, in which there is no +variety, but only an indefinite specificability, which is nothing but a +tendency to the diversification of the nothing, while leaving it as +nothing as it was before. What objectionable ultimacy is here? The +objection to an ultimate consists in its raising a barrier across the +path of inquiry, in its specifying a phenomenon at which questions +must stop, contrary to the postulate, or hope, of logic. But what +question to which any meaning can be attached am I forbidding by +my absolute chance? If what is demanded is a theological backing, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_560">[560]</span>or rational antecedent, to the chaos, that my theory fully supplies. +The chaos is a state of intensest feeling, although, memory and habit +being totally absent, it is sheer nothing still. Feeling has existence +only so far as it is welded into feeling. Now the welding of this +feeling to the great whole of feeling is accomplished only by the reflection +of a later date. In itself, therefore, it is nothing; but in its +relation to the end, it is everything.</p> + +<p>More unreasonable yet is Dr. Carus’s pretension, that the manifold +specificalness, which is what I mean by chance, is capable of +explanation (¶¶ 142, 143) by his own philosophic method. He may +explain one particularity by another, of course; but to explain specificalness +itself, would be to show that a specific predicate is a necessary +consequence of a generic one, or that a whole is without +ambiguity a part of its part. Remark, reader, at this point, that +chance, whether it be absolute or not, is not the mere creature of +our ignorance. It is that diversity and variety of things and events +which law does not prevent. Such is that real chance upon which +the kinetical theory of gases, and the doctrines of political economy, +depend. To say that it is not absolute is to say that it,—this diversity, +this specificalness,—can be explained as a consequence of +law. But this, as we have seen, is logically absurd.</p> + +<p>Dr. Carus admits that absolute chance is “not unimaginable” +(¶ 150). Chance itself pours in at every avenue of sense: it is of +all, things the most obtrusive. That it is absolute, is the most manifest +of all intellectual perceptions. That it is a being, living and +conscious, is what all the dullness that belongs to ratiocination’s self +can scarce muster hardihood to deny.</p> + +<p>Almost as unthinking is the objection (¶ 61) that absolute chance +could never beget order. I have noticed elsewhere the historic +oblivescence of this objection. Must I once again repeat that the +tendency to take habits, being itself a habit, has <i>eo ipso</i> a tendency +to grow; so that only a slightest germ is needed? A realist, such +as I am, can find no difficulty in the production of that first infinitesimal +germ of habit-taking by chance, provided he thinks chance +could act at all. This seems, at first blush, to be explaining something +as a chance-result. But exact analysis will show it is not so.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_561">[561]</span></p> + +<p>In like manner, when the eminent thinker who does me the +honor to notice my speculation, objects that I do not, after all, escape +making law absolute, since the tendency to take habits which I propose +to make universal is itself a law, I confess I can find only words +without ideas in the objection. Law is a word found convenient, I +grant, in describing that tendency; but is there no difference between +a law the essence of which is to be inviolable (which is the nominalistic +conception of mechanical law, whose being, they say, lies in +its action) and that mental law the violation of which is so included +in its essence that unless it were violated it would cease to exist? +In my essay, “The Law of Mind,” I have so described that law. +In so describing it, I make it a law, but not an absolute law; and +thus I clearly escape the contradiction attributed to me.</p> + +<p>§ 26. In my attack on “The Doctrine of Necessity,” I offered +four positive arguments for believing in real chance. They were as +follows:</p> + +<p>1. The general prevalence of growth, which seems to be opposed +to the conservation of energy.</p> + +<p>2. The variety of the universe, which is chance, and is manifestly +inexplicable.</p> + +<p>3. Law, which requires to be explained, and like everything +which is to be explained must be explained by something else, that +is, by non-law or real chance.</p> + +<p>4. Feeling, for which room cannot be found if the conservation +of energy is maintained.</p> + +<p>In a brief conversation I had with him, my friend remarked +(and it was an inconsiderate concession, I certainly do not wish +to hold him to it) that while the theory of tychism had some attractive +features, its weakness consisted in the absence of any positive +reasons in its favor. I infer from this that I did not properly state +the above four arguments. I therefore desire once more to call attention +to them, especially in their relations to one another.</p> + +<p>Mathematicians are familiar with the theorem that if a system +of particles is subject only to positional forces, it is such that if at +any instant the velocities were all suddenly reversed, without being +altered in quantity, the whole previous history of the system would +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_562">[562]</span>be repeated in inverse succession. Hence, when physicists find +themselves confronted with a phenomenon which takes place only +in one order of succession and never in the reverse order,—of which +no better illustration could be found than the phenomena of growth, +for nobody ever heard of an animal growing back into an egg,—they +always take refuge in the laws of probability as preventive of +the velocities ever getting so reversed. To understand my argument +number 1, it is necessary to make this method of escape from apparent +violations of the law of energy quite familiar to oneself. For +example, according to the law of energy, it seems to follow (and by +the aid of the accepted theory of light it does follow) that if a prism, +or a grating, disperses white light into a spectrum, then the colors +of the spectrum falling upon the prism or grating at the same angles, +and in the same proportions, will be recombined into white light; +and, everybody knows that this does in fact happen. Nevertheless, +the usual and prevalent effect of prisms and gratings is to produce +colored spectra. Why? Evidently, because, by the principles of +probability, it will rarely happen that colored lights converging from +different directions will fall at just the right angles and in just the +right proportions to be recombined into white light. So, when +physicists meet with the phenomena of frictional and viscous resistance +to a body in motion, although, according to their doctrine, if the +molecules were to move with the same velocities in opposite directions +the moving body would be accelerated, yet they say that the +laws of probability, applied to the trillions of molecules concerned, +render this practically certain not to occur. I do no more, then, +than follow the usual method of the physicists, in calling in chance +to explain the apparent violation of the law of energy which is presented +by the phenomena of growth: only instead of chance as they +understand it, I call in absolute chance. For many months, I endeavored +to satisfy the data of the case with ordinary <i>quasi</i> chance; +but it would not do. I believe that in a broad view of the universe, +a simulation of a given elementary mode of action can hardly be explained +except by supposing the genuine mode of action somewhere +has place. If it is improbable that colored lights should fall together +in just such a way as to give a white ray, is it not an equally +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_563">[563]</span>extraordinary thing that they should all be generated in such a way +as to produce a white ray? If it is incredible that trillions of molecules +in a fluid should strike a solid body moving through it so as +to accelerate it, is it not marvellous that trillions of trillions of molecules +all alike should ever have got so segregated as to create a +state of things in which they should be practically certain to retard +the body? It is far from easy to understand how mere positional +forces could ever have brought about those vast congregations of +similar atoms which we suppose to exist in every mass of gas, and +by which we account for the apparent violations of the law of energy +in the phenomena of the viscosity of the gas. There is no difficulty +in seeing how sulphuric acid acting on marble may produce an aggregation +of molecules of carbonic anhydride, because there are similar +aggregations in the acid and in the marble, but how were such +aggregations brought about in the first place? I will not go so far +as to say that such a result is manifestly impossible with positional +forces alone; but I do say that we cannot help suspecting that the +simulated violation of the law of energy has a real violation of the +same law as its ultimate explanation. Now, growth <i>appears</i> to violate +the law of energy. To explain it, we must, at least, suppose a +simulated, or <i>quasi</i>, chance, such as Darwin calls in to produce his +fortuitous variations from strict heredity. It may be there is no real +violation of the law, and no real chance; but even if there be nothing +of the sort in the immediate phenomenon, can the conditions +upon which the phenomenon depends have been brought about except +by real chance? It is conceivable, again, that the law of the +conservation of forces is not strictly accurate, and that, nevertheless, +there is no absolute chance. But I think so much has been +done to put the law of the conservation of forces upon the level of +the other mechanical laws, that when one is led to entertain a serious +doubt of the exactitude of that, one will be inclined to question the +others.</p> + +<p>Besides, few psychologists will deny the very intimate connection +which seems to subsist between the law, or <i>quasi</i>-law, of +growth and the law of habit, which is the principal, if not (as I hold +it to be) the sole, law of mental action. Now, this law of habit +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_564">[564]</span>seems to be quite radically different in its general form from mechanical +law, inasmuch as it would at once cease to operate if it were +rigidly obeyed; since in that case all habits would at once become +so fixed as to give room for no further formation of habits. In this +point of view, then, growth seems to indicate a positive violation of +law.</p> + +<p>Let us now consider argument number 3: and remark how it +fortifies number 1. Physical laws that appear to be radically different +yet present some striking analogies. Electrical force appears to +be polar. Its polarity is explained away by Franklin’s one-fluid +theory, but in that view the force is a repulsion. Now, gravitation +is an attraction, and is, therefore, essentially different from electricity. +Yet both vary inversely as the square of this distance. Radiation, +likewise follows the same formula. In this last case, the formula, +in one aspect of it, follows from the conservation of energy. In +another aspect of it, it results from the principle of probability, and +does not hold good, in a certain sense, when the light is concentrated +by a lens free from spherical aberration. But neither the +conservation of energy nor the principle of probability seems to +afford any possible explanation of the application of this theory to +gravitation nor to electricity. How, then, are such analogies to be +explained? The law of the conservation of energy and that of the +perduration of matter present so striking an analogy that it has +blinded some powerful intellects to their radically different nature. +The law of action and reaction, again, has often been stated as the +law of the conservation of momentum. Yet it is not only an independent +law, but is even of a contrary nature, inasmuch as it is only +the algebraical sum of opposite momenta that is “conserved.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_123" href="#Footnote_123" class="fnanchor">[123]</a> +How is this striking analogy between three fundamental laws to be +explained? Consider the still more obvious analogy between space +and time. Newton argues that the laws of mechanics prove space +and time to be absolute entities. Leibniz, on the other hand, takes +them as laws of nature. Either view calls for an explanation of the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_565">[565]</span>analogy between them, which no such reflection as the impossibility +of motion without that analogy can supply. Kant’s theory seems to +hint at the possibility of an explanation from both being derived +from the nature of the same mind. Any three orthogonal directions⁠<a id="FNanchor_124" href="#Footnote_124" class="fnanchor">[124]</a> +in space are exactly alike, yet are dynamically independent.</p> + +<p>These things call for explanation; yet no explanation of them +can be given, if the laws are fundamentally original and absolute.</p> + +<p>Moreover, law itself calls for explanation. But how is it to be +explained if it is as fundamentally original and absolute as it is commonly +supposed to be? Yet if it is not so absolute, there is such a +phenomenon as absolute chance.</p> + +<p>Thus, the chance which growth calls for is now seen to be absolute, +not <i>quasi</i> chance.</p> + +<p>Now consider argument number 2. The variety of the universe +so far as it consists of unlikenesses between things calls for no explanation. +But so far as it is a general character, it ought to be +explained. The manifold diversity or specificalness, in general, +which we see whenever and wherever we open our eyes, constitutes +its liveliness, or vivacity. The perception of it is a direct, though +darkling, perception of God. Further explanation in that direction +is uncalled for. But the question is, whether this manifold specificalness +was put into the universe at the outset, whether God created +the universe in the infinitely distant past and has left it to its own +machinery ever since, or whether there is an incessant influx of specificalness. +Some of us are evolutionists; that is, we are so impressed +with the pervasiveness of growth, whose course seems only +here and there to be interrupted, that it seems to us that the universe +as a whole, so far as anything can possibly be conceived or +logically opined of the whole, should be conceived as growing. But +others say, though parts of the universe simulate growth at intervals, +yet there really is no growth on the whole,—no passage from a simpler +to a more complex state of things, no increasing diversity.</p> + +<p>Now, my argument is that, according to the principles of logic, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_566">[566]</span>we never have a right to conclude that anything is absolutely inexplicable +or unaccountable. For such a conclusion goes beyond what +can be directly observed, and we have no right to conclude what +goes beyond what we observe, except so far as it explains or accounts +for what we observe. But it is no explanation or account of a fact +to pronounce it inexplicable or unaccountable, or to pronounce any +other fact so. Now, to say no process of diversification takes place +in nature leaves the infinite diversity of nature unaccounted for; +while to say the diversity is the result of a general tendency to diversification +is a perfectly logical probable inference. Suppose there +be a general tendency to diversification; what would be the consequence? +Evidently, a high degree of diversity. But this is just +what we find in nature. It does not answer the purpose to say there +is diversity because God made it so, for we cannot tell what God +would do, nor penetrate his counsels. We see what He <i>does</i> do, +and nothing more. For the same reason one cannot logically infer +the existence of God; one can only know Him by direct perception.</p> + +<p>It is to be noted that a general tendency to diversification +does not explain diversity in its specific characters; nor is this called +for. Neither can such a tendency explain any specific fact. Any +attempt to make use of the principle in that manner would be utterly +illogical. But it can be used to explain universal facts, just as quasi-chance +is used to explain statistical facts. Now, the diversity of +nature is a universal fact.</p> + +<p>To explain diversity is to go behind the chaos, to the original +undiversified nothing. Diversificacity was the first germ.</p> + +<p>Argument No. 4 was, upon its negative side, sufficiently well +presented in my “Doctrine of Necessity Examined.” Mechanical +causation, if absolute, leaves nothing for consciousness to do in the +world of matter; and if the world of mind is merely a transcript of +that of matter, there is nothing for consciousness to do even in the +mental realm. The account of matters would be better, if it could +be left out of account. But the positive part of the argument, showing +what can be done to reinstate consciousness as a factor of the +universe when once tychism is admitted, is reinforced in the later +papers. This ought to commend itself to Dr. Carus, who shows +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_567">[567]</span>himself fully alive to the importance of that part of the task of science +which consists in bridging gaps. But consciousness, for the +reason just stated, is not to be so reinstated without tychism; nor can +the work be accomplished by assigning to the mind an occult power, +as in two theories to be considered in the section following this. As +might be anticipated, (and a presumption of this kind is rarely falsified +in metaphysics,) to bridge the gap synechism is required. Supposing +matter to be but mind under the slavery of inveterate habit, +the law of mind still applies to it. According to that law, consciousness +subsides as habit becomes established, and is excited again at +the breaking up of habit. But the highest quality of mind involves +a great readiness to take habits, and a great readiness to lose them; +and this implies a degree of feeling neither very intense nor very +feeble.</p> + +<p>I have noticed above (§ 7) Dr. Carus’s dubious attitude toward +the first argument. I considered in the last section his attempted +reply to the second. To the third argument, he replies (¶ 65) that +law ought to be accounted for by the principle of sufficient reason. +But, of course, that principle cannot recommend itself to me, a +realist; for it is nothing but the lame attempt of a nominalist to +wriggle out of his difficulties. Reasons explain nothing, except upon +some theistic hypothesis which may be pardoned to the yearning +heart of man, but which must appear doubtful in the eyes of philosophy, +since it comes to this, that Tom, Dick, and Harry are competent +to pry into the counsels of the Most High, and can invite in +their cousins and sweethearts and sweethearts’ cousins to look over +the original designs of the Ancient of Days.</p> + +<p>§ 27. My fourth argument it is which seems to have made most +impression upon Dr. Carus’s mind (¶ 85), and his reply is rather +elaborate.</p> + +<p>While embracing unequivocally the necessitarian dogma, equally +for mind and for matter (¶ 193), Dr. Carus wishes utterly to repudiate +materialism and the mechanical philosophy (¶ 133). To facilitate +his, thus, walking the slack-rope, he makes (¶ 168) a division +of events into “(1) mechanical, (2) physical, (3) chemical, (4) physiological, +and (5) psychical events.” The first three (¶¶ 169-171) +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_568">[568]</span>are merely distinguished by the magnitude of the moving masses, +so that, for philosophical purposes, they do not differ at all. As for +physiological events, though he devotes a paragraph (¶ 172) to their +definition, he utterly fails to distinguish them from the mechanical +(including the physical and chemical) on the one hand, or from the +psychical on the other. Dr. Carus seems to think (¶ 176) that by this +division he has separated himself entirely from the materialists; but +this is an illusion, for nobody denies the existence of feelings.</p> + +<p>The truth is, he distinctly enrolls himself in the mechanical +army when he asserts that mental laws are of the same necessitarian +character as mechanical laws (¶ 193). The only question that remains +as to his position is whether he is a materialist or not. He +instances (¶ 185) the case of a general receiving a written dispatch +and being stimulated into great activity by its perusal, and causing +great motions to be made and missiles to be sped in consequence. +Now, the dilemma is this. Will Dr. Carus, on the one hand, say +that the motion of those missiles was determined by mechanical laws +alone, in which case, it would only be necessary to state all the positions +and velocities of particles concerned, a hundred years before, +to determine just how those bullets would move and, consequently, +whether the guns were to be fired or not, and this would constitute +him a materialist, or will he say that the laws of motion do not suffice +to determine motions of matter, in which case, since they formally +certainly do so suffice, they must be <i>violated</i>, and he will be +giving to mind a direct dynamical power which is open to every objection +that can be urged against tychism?</p> + +<p>Now admire the decision with which he cuts the Gordian knot!</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“<span class="smcap">There are no purely mechanical phenomena.</span>” (¶ 175.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>That is,</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“<i>The laws of motion <span class="smcap">are</span> applicable to and will explain all motions</i>.” (¶ 177.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>But hold!</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“The mechanical philosopher ... feels warranted in the hope that ... the +actions of man ... can be explained by the laws of motion .... We may anticipate +that this conclusion will prove <span class="smcap">erroneous</span>. <i>And so it is.</i>” (¶ 176.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>At the same time,</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“<span class="smcap">No objection can be made</span> <i>to the possibility of explaining the delicate motions +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_569">[569]</span>in the nervous substance of the brain by the laws of molar or molecular mechanics</i>.” +(¶ 178.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>Yet,</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“<i>The simplest</i> psychical reflexes, including those <i>physiological reflexes</i> which +we must suppose to have originated by conscious adaptation ... <span class="smcap">cannot</span> <i>be explained +from mechanical</i> or physical <i>laws</i> alone.” (¶ 186.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>However,</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“<i>We do <span class="smcap">not</span> say that there are motions</i> ... in the brain ... <i>which form exceptions +to the laws of mechanics</i>.” (¶ 187.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>Nevertheless,</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“The brain-atoms are possessed of the same spontaneity as the atoms of a +gravitating stone. Yet there is present an additional feature; there are present +states of awareness.... Neither states of awareness nor their meanings can be +weighed on any scales, be they ever so delicate, nor are they determinable in foot-pounds.” +(¶ 192.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>Clearness is the first merit of a philosopher; and what ¶ 192 +comes to is crystal-clear. Dr. Carus wants to have the three laws +of motion always obeyed; but he wishes the forces between the molecules +to be varied according to the momentary states of awareness. +All right: he is entitled to suppose whatever he likes, so long as the +supposition is self-consistent, as this supposition is. It conflicts +with the law of energy, it is true; for that law is that the forces depend +on the situations of the particles alone, and not on the time. +It is liable to give rise to perpetual motion. It was intended, no +doubt, to be an improvement on my molecular theory of protoplasm, +earlier in the same number. It escapes materialism. It supposes a +direct dynamical action between mind and matter, such as has not +been supposed by any eminent philosopher that I know of for centuries. +I am sorry to say that it shows a dangerous leaning toward +originality. The argument for thus rejecting the law of the conservation +of energy, I leave to others to be weighed. It seems to suppose +a much larger falsification of that law than my doctrine; but it is a +pretty clever attempt to escape my conclusions. It rejects what has +to be rejected, the law of the conservation of energy; and is far +more intelligent than the theory of those (like Oliver and Lodge) +who wish to give to mind a power of deflecting atoms, which would +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_570">[570]</span>satisfy the conservation of energy while violating the law of action +and reaction. If it can have due consideration, I doubt not it will +accelerate the acceptance of my views. Meantime, I do not see +where that “inextricable confusion” into which I was to be led is +to come in. (¶ 4.)</p> + +<p>§ 28. Little more requires to be noticed in Dr. Carus’s articles. +He admits (¶ 2) that indeterminism is the more natural belief, which +is no slight argument in its favor.</p> + +<p>§ 29. The remarks upon the theological bearings of the theories, +if they are found somewhat wide of the mark, are explained by the +haste of the editor to show just what all the affiliations of my views +were, before I had had time to explain what those views are. The +remarks to which I refer will be found in ¶¶ 3, 36, 81, 82, 83, 128, +203, 204. They are worth putting together.</p> + +<p>§ 30. The doctrine of symbolism, to which Dr. Carus has recourse, +seems to be similar to that of my essay “Some Consequences +of Four Incapacities” (<i>Journal of Speculative Philosophy</i>, II.) (¶¶ 180, +183, 199.) On this head, I can only approve of his ideas.</p> + +<p>§ 31. It is true that I wrote many definitions for one of the “encyclopedic +lexicons.” But they were necessarily rather vaguely expressed, +in order to include the popular use of terms, and in some +cases were modified by proof-readers or editors; and for reasons not +needful here to explain, they are hardly such as I should give in a +Philosophical Dictionary proper.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">C. S. Peirce.</span></p> + +<div class="footnotes"> + +<h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_101" href="#FNanchor_101" class="label">[101]</a> J. S. Mill had in the first edition of his <i>Logic</i> decisively taken an objective +conception of chance and probability; but in his second edition he had become +puzzled and had retracted, leaving that chapter, and with it his whole logic, a melancholy +wreck, over which the qualified reader sighs, “And this once seemed intelligible!” +Venn in the first edition of his book set forth the same objective conception +with great clearness, and for that he was entitled to high praise, notwithstanding +his manifest inadequacy to the problems treated. But in his second edition, he too +has fallen away from his first and correct view, and has adopted a theory which I +shall some day show to be untenable. Venn’s whole method in logic, as well as his +system, is in my opinion of the weakest.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_102" href="#FNanchor_102" class="label">[102]</a> Mill often did good service in substituting precise terms for ambiguous ones; +as when in speaking of mathematical conclusions he prefers to say they are legitimate +deductions rather than that they are necessary.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_103" href="#FNanchor_103" class="label">[103]</a> In his <i>Ursache, Grund and Zweck</i>, Dr. Carus alludes to this passage. But +he prefers the treatment of the question by Reid, whom he calls Mill’s opponent +(<i>Gegner</i>).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_104" href="#FNanchor_104" class="label">[104]</a> It is of comparatively little consequence what Hume really meant. The main +interest is in what Kant thought he meant.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_105" href="#FNanchor_105" class="label">[105]</a> Along with the distinction, I would of course do away with this use of the +words <i>abstract</i> and <i>concrete</i> to which no clear idea can be attached, as far as I can +see.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_106" href="#FNanchor_106" class="label">[106]</a> I cannot but disapprove of this use of the word “construction” to mean a +studied theory, because the word is imperatively required in the theory of cognition +to denote a mathematical diagram framed according to a general precept.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_107" href="#FNanchor_107" class="label">[107]</a> I apply this term because it is essentially like the passage from the concrete +“virtuous” to the abstract “virtue,” or from the concrete “white” (adjective) to +the abstract “whiteness,” or “white” (substantive).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_108" href="#FNanchor_108" class="label">[108]</a> I can never use this word without thinking of the explanation of it given by +Petrus Peregrinus in his <i>Epistole de Magnete</i>. He says that physical properties are +occult in the sense that they are only brought out by experimentation, and are not +to be deduced from admixtures of <i>hot</i> and <i>cold</i>, <i>moist</i> and <i>dry</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_109" href="#FNanchor_109" class="label">[109]</a> It follows as a corollary from this that if the positions of the particles at any +one instant, together with the velocities at that instant, and the law of force, are +given, the positions at all instants can be calculated. Of course, to give the positions +and velocities at one instant, is a special case of the giving of the positions at +two instants. The two instants may be such that there will be more than one solution +of the problem; but this is an insignificant detail.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_110" href="#FNanchor_110" class="label">[110]</a> It would seem to follow from his notion that in uniform motion each minute’s +motion is the cause of that of the next. Yet he says (¶ 19) “there is no cause that +is equal to its effect.”</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_111" href="#FNanchor_111" class="label">[111]</a> But, as I have elsewhere said, I should like to persuade mathematicians to +speak of “positional energy” as <i>Kinetic potency</i>, the <i>vis viva</i> as <i>Kinetic energy</i>, and +the total “energy” as the <i>Kinetic entelechy</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_112" href="#FNanchor_112" class="label">[112]</a> The differential equation being an ordinary, not a partial one, this is an absolute +constant, determined by initial (or final, or any instantaneous) conditions.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_113" href="#FNanchor_113" class="label">[113]</a> Dr. Carus calls attention to the connection between my doctrine of the fixation +of opinion and his anti-originalism.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_114" href="#FNanchor_114" class="label">[114]</a> Dr. Carus passes a sweeping judgment on Post-Kantian philosophy, as being +original.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_115" href="#FNanchor_115" class="label">[115]</a> This was a remark of my father’s.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_116" href="#FNanchor_116" class="label">[116]</a> A person in the last <i>Monist</i>, breaks in upon my series of articles to foretell +what the “issues of synechism” will be. Were he able to do so, it would certainly +be the height of ill-manners thus to take the words out of my mouth.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_117" href="#FNanchor_117" class="label">[117]</a> As I am writing, I am shown a letter, in which the writer says: “Peirce +with all his materialistic ideas, yet,” etc I never promulgated a materialistic idea +in my life. The writer simply assumes that science is materialistic. As I am correcting +the proofs, I notice that Mr. B. C. Burt, in his new <i>History of Modern Philosophy</i>, +sets me down as sceptical, though doubtfully. There are a good many inaccuracies +in the work. This was inevitable in a first edition. But the ingenious +plan of the book admirably adapts it to the wants of just that class of students who +cannot understand that no repertory of facts ever can be trusted implicitly.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_118" href="#FNanchor_118" class="label">[118]</a> Its being hypothetical will not prevent its being established with a very high +degree of certainty. Thus, all history is of the nature of hypothesis; since its facts +cannot be directly observed, but are only supposed to be true to account for the +characters of the monuments and other documents.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_119" href="#FNanchor_119" class="label">[119]</a> Somebody may notice that I here admit a proposition as absolutely true. +Undoubtedly; because it relates to the Absolute.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_120" href="#FNanchor_120" class="label">[120]</a> Indeed, to admit that reply is all but to admit the non-absolute grade of necessity.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_121" href="#FNanchor_121" class="label">[121]</a> I rightly go somewhat further in my <i>Theory of Probable Inference</i>; but that +has no bearing on the present discussion.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_122" href="#FNanchor_122" class="label">[122]</a> Dr. Carus, in his <i>Ursache, Grund und Zweck</i>, well says that <i>reasons</i> are discovered +by induction, in the strict sense. It is often admitted that <i>causes</i> can only +be inferred by hypothetic reasoning.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_123" href="#FNanchor_123" class="label">[123]</a> The conservation of a vortex, which consists of the preservation of a certain +character of motion by the same particles, though derived from the coöperation of +other laws, is, in form, quite different.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_124" href="#FNanchor_124" class="label">[124]</a> In speaking of directions, we assume the Euclidean hypothesis that the angles +of a triangle are equal to two right angles.</p></div> + +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_571">[571]</span></p> + +<h3 class="nobreak" id="THE_FOUNDER_OF_TYCHISM">THE FOUNDER OF TYCHISM, HIS METHODS, PHILOSOPHY, AND CRITICISMS.<br> +<span class="smaller">IN REPLY TO MR. CHARLES S. PEIRCE.</span></h3> + +</div> + +<h4>INTRODUCTORY AND PERSONAL.</h4> + +<p>Soon after I had received Mr. Peirce’s manuscript he wrote me +in a private letter as follows:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“You have not found, I trust, that in my rejoinder I have anywhere overstepped +the limit of amiable disputation. If anything of that kind did, unconsciously to me, +in the heat of composition, slip from my pen, I am most anxious to have it pointed +out to me, so that there may be no feeling in the matter of a disagreeable kind. For +if you should not mention it, I should at some future time discover it, and it would +be a source of real unhappiness to me.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>This is a very amiable disposition of mind. Mr. Peirce presses +me very hard in the struggle for truth: he does not hesitate to take +advantage of even the smallest weak point which he espies or rather +which he believes he espies. He does not shrink from using plain +terms, such as “absurd,” “unthinking,” “weak,” “hasty,” “irrational.” +Yet he preserves in the heat of the controversy a friendly +spirit towards his antagonist, which I cannot but appreciate and wish +publicly to acknowledge. But I would not have him change a word +or soften the language of his article in the least, <i>for my sake</i>. If Mr. +Peirce is wrong, I will take care of myself; if he is right, let the +truth come out.</p> + +<p>We are both, as it were, by profession champions of truth; so +we need not mind an occasional fling if in the end the cause of truth +be promoted. Especially, in the present case, I need not mind the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_572">[572]</span>hard blows which Mr. Peirce deals with such assurance, for all the +points at which he strikes are well protected. The fiercer the onslaught, +the better the test. I feel satisfied that his severe scrutiny +only serves to prove the strength of the position which I defend.</p> + +<p>I shall speak my mind as freely and unreservedly as does Mr. +Peirce, and hope he in his turn will resent plain words as little as I +do. As offense is not intended, so offense should not be taken.</p> + +<p>Let me add here in these introductory remarks that I am always +open to conviction. The views which I uphold have been well considered +and thought out in their most important consequences. +They are consistent and well guarded in spite of Mr. Peirce’s thinking +the contrary, so that I feel no need of changing them. But +should some unforeseen difficulty arise which would oblige me to revise +the whole system of my ideas, I shall not hesitate publicly to +confess it and allow myself to be lead by truth whithersoever it be.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>The issue of our controversy is the problem of chance—not of +chance as it occurs, for instance, in the throw of dice, but of “absolute +chance,” or perfect lawlessness. Mr. Peirce makes absolute +chance the corner-stone of his philosophy; he propounds a radical +and sweeping indeterminism, while I reject the idea, not of chance, +but of absolute chance as incompatible with the philosophy of science.</p> + +<h4>I. DIFFERENCES OF METHOD.</h4> + +<p>Mr. Peirce calls himself a Scotist and professes to represent mediæval +Realism, speaking at the same time of me as a Nominalist. +We find, however, that the inverse statement would be nearer the +truth.</p> + +<p>Before discussing Mr. Peirce’s philosophy itself, we must examine +his methods. Difference of method will produce important +divergencies of opinion.</p> + +<h5>1. ATTENTION TO DETAIL.</h5> + +<p>Mr. Peirce takes up in his rejoinder many incidental points, +which have little or no bearing upon the main issues between us. +On the one hand, things of no consequence, such as my granting +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_573">[573]</span>that “absolute chance” like the impossibilities of fairy tales, is not +unimaginable, and my saying that tychism is attractive but weak for +lack of arguments, are adduced as “momentous admissions,” and +“inconsiderate concessions.” On the other hand, Mr. Peirce catches +at straws to prove a lack of information on my part. He cannot forbear +calling attention to the little breach of etiquette committed in +not giving an English baronet his proper title.</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce shows on all these and other occasions a love of the +incidental, and if I were to allow myself to follow his example the +battle would soon be broken up into innumerable skirmishes.</p> + +<p>It is noteworthy that Mr. Peirce’s procedure appears to be a nominalistic +tradition. Nominalists, regarding universals as mere names +of many particular things, have always showed a great preference +for the single, the incidental, the scattered; while realists viewing +universals as real things were in the habit of laying perhaps too +much stress upon universalities and generalities to the neglect of the +particular and individual.</p> + +<p>Indeed, Mr. Peirce’s favorite idea, which is a belief in absolute +chance, is in my opinion the most nominalistic and anti-realistic +proposition I have ever met with. Regularity, or natural law, is to +him the product of evolution. Thus he demolishes the eternity of +the universal, and eternity is only universality in time. Now suppose +that eternity (i. e. universality in time) could be proved an error; +then, the universality of the universal in space also will become illusory. +If those abiding features of nature which we call natural laws +have indeed originated from a general sporting, from chance, from a +chaotic lawlessness, by a gradual habit taking, who can assure us +that nature has not taken different habits in other parts of the universe?</p> + +<p>I look upon Mr. Peirce as an extreme nominalist, or, if he prefers +it, as a nominal realist soaked with nominalistic opinions. He +professes to be a realist, but he rescinds the foundation of realism.</p> + +<p>Like the bear of the hermit Mr. Peirce throws the stone at the +fly of necessary connection, and in doing so kills the philosophy of +realism itself.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_574">[574]</span></p> + +<h5>2. ORIGINALITY.</h5> + +<p>Originality, wherever we find it, is pleasing; but a hankering +after originality is dangerous. Experience teaches us to regard a +thinker’s love of originality as one of the main causes of his going +astray. Let the poet be original, but not the scientist, not the philosopher, +not the searcher for truth. The conceit of being original +flatters our vanity, and original ideas in philosophy are tantamount +to original errors.</p> + +<p>I do not deny the value of originality, but I do deny that it is +a criterion of truth.</p> + +<p>Originality consists in the free exercise of our imagination, and +a vivid imagination is very valuable to the thinker. But it so happens +that every dreamer cherishes with a mother’s love the children +of his fancy. And it is, therefore, necessary to be especially critical +with the offspring of one’s own brain.</p> + +<p>Kepler (“who,” Mr. Peirce says, “comes very close to realising +my ideal of the scientific method”) was endowed with an extraordinarily +vivid imagination. He invented an extremely original +scheme of explanation for the solar system, and expounded it with +great poetical fervor in his “Mysterium Cosmographicum.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_125" href="#Footnote_125" class="fnanchor">[125]</a></p> + +<p>Kepler at once became famous by his “Mysterium Cosmographicum” +and was generally admired for his originality. But his +bent for hatching original ideas did not alone make Kepler what he +is to us now in the history of science. A greater quality than his +poetical fervor and original imagination was his rigorous self-criticism. +He took notice of every little fact that did not agree with his +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_575">[575]</span>theories, and for the sake of truth, of objectively provable truth, that +is, the agreement of his views with positive facts, he sternly slew +all those creatures of his fancy which he foresaw could not survive.</p> + +<p>Having myself a good deal of imagination, and having tried +myself many original ideas, I can appreciate the self-denial and discipline +of Kepler. I have come to the conclusion that originality is +only an important means of attaining truth. Our ways of reaching +the truth, our methods of finding it, may deserve the praise of originality, +but truth itself is never original; for truth is the faithfulness +of a copy which in our representations we make of reality, and to +praise ideas as original is certainly no argument that they are true.</p> + +<p>There is no need of showing that Mr. Peirce is not just in his +statement of my view of originality, by maintaining that I have advised +people “think not for yourself.” Confessedly he exaggerates, +but in truth he misrepresents.</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce does not relish what I have to say on the subject, +and, to pacify his mind, he does not tire of praising originality as +the high-water mark of genius.</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce’s love of originality is a nominalistic feature of his +mind. A nominalist who denies the existence of universals cannot +understand that everything in science must be sacrificed to truthfulness. +The question, Does this idea correctly represent its respective +reality? has no sense to a nominalist. The nominalist is only interested +in what a thinker makes of things. The subjective conception, +in his opinion, exhausts the subject. I can understand that a +nominalist should be greatly pleased with originality, but a realist +should not allow himself to be seduced by its charms.</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce’s penchant for, and my distrust of, originality, have +a direct influence upon our respective methods of thought. It naturally +makes him bolder and me more cautious.⁠<a id="FNanchor_126" href="#Footnote_126" class="fnanchor">[126]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_576">[576]</span></p> + +<h5>3. A MODERN PROCRUSTES.</h5> + +<p>There was a man in ancient Greece named Procrustes, who had +two beds; one long, the other short. He used to lay his tall guests +upon the short bed, and his short guests upon the long bed, cutting +off the limbs of the former and stretching out the bodies of the latter, +until they fitted the size of their unpleasant resting places. In the +same way Mr. Peirce treats philosophical views.</p> + +<p>There is the bed of the materialist and, as all processes to the +materialist are purely mechanical, necessitarianism is stretched in the +materialist’s bed to mechanicalism. I plead, since ideas and feelings +are not motions, that mental processes cannot be explained by the +laws of motion, but can, for that reason, be none the less determined; +but I plead in vain. That view of necessitarianism does not suit the +bed upon which my Procrustes places me. Other views, however, +are cut down without further ado because they are said to be nominalistic. +Anything that does not appeal to Mr. Peirce’s realistic +mind is dismissed with a shrug.</p> + +<p>I am neither a realist nor a nominalist, or rather, I am both +realist and nominalist. I am convinced that to some extent both +sides were right and both sides were wrong, and regard it as our duty +to sift their propositions and accept the truth whether it be nominalistic +or realistic.</p> + +<p>We must follow the principle of hearing both sides, and not +consider at all whether a statement agrees or disagrees with certain +party principles.⁠<a id="FNanchor_127" href="#Footnote_127" class="fnanchor">[127]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_577">[577]</span></p> + +<h5>4. OCCAM’S RAZOR.</h5> + +<p>The most brilliant disciple of Duns Scotus was William of Occam, +whose fame almost rivalled that of his master. Occam became +an adversary of realism; he became a nominalist, and after him +was named a method known as Occam’s razor, especially useful to +nominalists in their warfare against realists.</p> + +<p>Occam’s razor is expressed in the sentence: “<i>Entia non sunt +multiplicanda præter necessitatem</i>,” which means: Only in cases of +extremest necessity are we allowed to assume the existence of hypothetical +facts. If assumed facts are not absolutely indispensable, +cut them off!</p> + +<p>Occam’s razor was invented for a special purpose, that of cutting +off the realistic hypostatisation of abstract ideas.</p> + +<p>I do not know which is more startling, that a realist in name, +such as Mr. Peirce, should use a weapon forged by nominalists +against realism, or that he whom in other respects we found in such +a close contact with nominalistic methods, should not understand +how to handle a nominalistic weapon.</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce censures me for making the statement that the formal +is subjective as well as objective. This, he says, is cut off by Occam’s +razor.</p> + +<p>The formal is subjective, for our sensation is possessed of form +and our mind is in possession of formal thought. It is objective, for +reality is not void of form and the things are such as they are by +virtue of their peculiar shape.</p> + +<p>The proposition that the formal is objective and subjective at +the same time is as little cut off by Occam’s razor as, for instance, +the proposition that there is air inside and outside of us, viz. in our +lungs and in the surrounding atmosphere.</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce’s usage of the beds of Procrustes is cruel, but his +usage of Occam’s razor is inconsiderate. He should be careful in +handling such a sharp knife, lest he do himself harm.</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce uses Occam’s razor to cut off statements and facts +which make his pet theories dispensable; but he forgets that Occam’s +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_578">[578]</span>razor cuts off ideas only, and when it comes in contact with +facts its edge is turned.</p> + +<p>Occam’s razor is an excellent instrument to dispose of such +hypotheses as absolute chance, for it declares that if their assumption +is not quite indispensable, we must cut them off.</p> + +<p>Now it either is or is not a fact that the formal is objective and +subjective at once. It cannot be untrue in my philosophy while it +is true in Mr. Peirce’s system. My proposition of the formal being +at once objective and subjective is, according to Mr. Peirce, “cut off +by Occam’s razor.” “But,” adds he, “when synechism has united +the two worlds this view gains new life.” So long as I say so, it is +wrong; but should I adopt Mr. Peirce’s system, it will pass as right.</p> + +<h5>5. THE APPLICATION OF LEARNING.</h5> + +<p>Philosophers should make it a rule not to encumber their +thoughts unnecessarily with learning. The great problems of philosophy +are, in my opinion, much simpler than they are generally +supposed to be. The art mainly consists in stating them in the simplest +possible manner.</p> + +<p>It is indispensable for a philosopher to be familiar, at least in a +general way, with all the most important sciences, especially with +psychology, physiology, logic, physics, mathematics, and mechanics. +But he should not for that reason introduce any more than he can +help their complicated details into his expositions.</p> + +<p>Every specialist is inclined to look at things through the spectacles +of his own speciality. But the philosopher who takes a higher +standpoint should be on his guard. He should always endeavor to +simplify matters and avoid introducing into philosophy issues which +belong to a special field, and derive their peculiarities from special +conditions. To confound the methods of the various sciences, or to +generalise without sufficient discrimination, will throw everything +into confusion.</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce, as we well know, has greatly distinguished himself +in logic by valuable discoveries and independent investigations. +We have repeatedly taken occasion to pronounce unreservedly our +admiration of his achievements in this field. But we cannot approve +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_579">[579]</span>of his application of certain methods of his speciality to philosophy +in general. Mr. Peirce is inclined to look at the world +through the spectacles of that new and extremely specialised branch +of logic which he is at present about to invent.</p> + +<p>One hindrance to properly appreciating his doctrines, says Mr. +Peirce, lies in my “laboring under the great disadvantage of not +understanding the logic of relatives,” which, he adds (p. 533):</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“Is a subject I have been studying for a great many years, and I feel and +know that I have an important report that I ought to make upon it. This branch +of logic is, however, so abstruse that I have never been able to find the leisure to +translate my conclusions into a form in which their significance would be manifest +even to powerful thinkers, whose thoughts had not long been turned in that direction.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>I shall be glad to sit at Mr. Peirce’s feet as an attentive student, +as soon as he has worked out his logic of relatives, or any other subject. +But I cannot now accept any of his theories on the credit of +some half-developed science, be it ever so profound or intricate, +until I see plainly its connection with the present issues.</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce trusts that his favorite ideas will find support in his +peculiar conception of the logic of relatives. Judging from the +quiddities which he now so confidently propounds as weighty arguments, +we cannot share his sanguine hopes. His arguments, to be +derived from the logic of relatives, are like promises to pay out of +the returns of a gold-mine, just discovered and boomed by the owners. +There may be gold in the mine, but I do not as yet take any +stock in it.</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce promises to prove by the logic of relatives what, if +it were true, he should be able to demonstrate in plain language.</p> + +<p>I have an idea that the logic of relatives can be worked out into +as clear a science as is mathematics or algebra. But what shall we +say when told that the logic of relatives is really abstruse, and that +he who labors under the disadvantage of not understanding this abstruse +science is not prepared to grasp Mr. Peirce’s philosophy? +The abstrusity, in my mind, counts against Mr. Peirce’s philosophy, +as much as against his logic of relatives.</p> + +<p>In my childhood I was much plagued with Latin, but as soon +as I had acquired a smattering of it, I began to talk Latin to the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_580">[580]</span>servants, and when they did not understand me I thought that they +were “laboring under the great disadvantage” of not speaking Latin. +Since then I have learned to translate my Latin into the language of +the people with whom I have to deal.</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce seems to rely on his learning in proportion to its abstrusity; +he likes to walk on stilts.</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce is scholarly to excess. He has a special talent of +rendering issues involved. Not even his references to my articles +in <i>The Monist</i> are made directly by quoting the pages on which they +appear. That method would be too common. He invents a ponderous +system, necessitating the reader to look twice when he wishes to +find a passage,—a scheme which is original and very dignified in +appearance, but makes quotation unnecessarily complicated.</p> + +<p>Learning is a virtue, but even virtues should be used with discretion.</p> + +<h5>6. THE PRINCIPLE OF POSITIVISM.</h5> + +<p>Says Mr. Peirce in confirmation of Whewell (p. 546):</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“Progress in science depends upon the observation of the right facts by minds +<i>furnished with appropriate ideas</i>.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>To rely on the observation of facts is, in my opinion, a principle +of positivism. That facts must be observed “by minds furnished +with appropriate ideas” is undeniable, but ideas, in order to +be appropriate, must be true; they must be representations of facts.</p> + +<p>Because he relies on facts I have characterised Mr. Peirce’s +method as positivistic. But he indignantly repudiates “the charge” +as “totally unfounded.”</p> + +<p>Positivism (which I have always carefully distinguished from +Comtism, the latter being a special kind of positivism⁠<a id="FNanchor_128" href="#Footnote_128" class="fnanchor">[128]</a>) is not a peculiar +philosophy, but a most important principle of science.</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce seems to use the term positivism in a different sense +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_581">[581]</span>from that in which I use it. Be it so. I shall not nominalistically +quarrel about words so long as there are more urgent subjects under +discussion. Noticing that Mr. Peirce does not state that all ideas +should be ultimately reducible to facts, he is to be acquitted.</p> + +<h5>7. LOPPING OFF THE ABSOLUTE.</h5> + +<p>Mr. Peirce thinks that an agreement between us could be arrived +at. He says (p. 545):</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“Dr. Carus’s philosophy would, in its general features, offer no violent opposition +to my opinions” (§ 16).</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>But the condition is (p. 545):</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“To lop off the heads of all absolute propositions whose subject is not the Absolute.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>As a matter of fact I have lopped off all absolutes. If Mr. Peirce +were more familiar with my views he would have known that. Thus, +on my part, I had done all I could to come to an agreement with +him long before he asked me to do it. But I fear that having also +lopped off the Absolute itself, I did too much of a good thing, for +Mr. Peirce carefully records his opposition to all philosophies which +deny the reality of the Absolute. (See § 18.)</p> + +<p>I wish to improve this occasion for conciliation, by turning the +tables. Mr. Peirce’s views would, upon the whole, offer no violent +opposition to my opinions if he would only consent to lop off the absolute-property +of his absolute chance. I would even swallow his +Absolute if he would promise to designate by that name some real +quality of the world, or the world itself as a whole, or something that +is thinkable without making one’s head swim.⁠<a id="FNanchor_129" href="#Footnote_129" class="fnanchor">[129]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_582">[582]</span></p> + +<p>Every predication of absolute, changes a real and useful idea +into its caricature. To, say that a complicated calculation is “absolutely +true,” that is, true without stipulating the condition that the +methods are right, and that the execution is made without any mistake, +is ridiculous; and thus the phrase “in a Pickwickian sense” +(which we gratefully borrow from Mr. Peirce) would always form a +drastic but adequate substitute for the term absolute. “Absolutely +true” is “true in a Pickwickian sense” only. There are no absolute +truths which are in this sense unconditionally true. In the +same way, “absolute chance” is different from that real chance +known to us in experience and instanced by the throw of the dice. +Absolute chance is “chance in a Pickwickian sense.”</p> + +<p>Strange Mr. Peirce speaks of real chance when he means an +imaginary absolute chance. He apparently uses the word “real” +in this connection not to denote something that is a fact of experience +but to express the idea of its being perfect or complete. Thus we +may speak of a “real” perpetual motion, stating at the same time +that it is neither real nor realisable.</p> + +<h5>8. THE THEORY OF PROBABLE INFERENCE.</h5> + +<p>Mr. Peirce applies his theory of probable inference to everything; +also to those cases which are unequivocally determined. He +granted in a private conversation that 2 × 2 = 4 admits of no exception. +But of other purely formal statements which are in the same +predicament, for instance, that the sum of the angles of a triangle +in a plane measures 180°, he states as probable that they are either +somewhat less or somewhat more than 180°, adding, “that they are +exactly that amount is what nobody can ever be justified in concluding.” +To determine the sum of the angles of a plane triangle by +measuring the parallaxes of stars rests upon a fundamental misconception +of the principles of formal sciences. It would be consistent +for Mr. Peirce to say, that 2 × 2 = 4 is true only according to the +definitions or axioms of arithmetic. But in order to know whether +2 × 2 = 4 in reality, we ought to apply the theory of probable inference. +Until we had verified the statement 2 × 2 = 4 by applying +this formula to the farthest solar systems, we should not be justified +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_583">[583]</span>in concluding that it is exactly true. The theory of probable inferences +is supposed to help us out of this perplexity, “and within another +century our grandchildren will surely know whether the three +angles of a triangle are greater or less than 180°.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_130" href="#Footnote_130" class="fnanchor">[130]</a></p> + +<p>There is always danger in the application of abstract ratiocination; +and the theory of probable inference forms no exception to the +rule. On the contrary, it is especially liable to lead one astray. +There is the case of the doctor who said to his patient: “I am sure +you will be cured, for I had ninety-nine patients who died during the +operation, and statistics prove beyond doubt that one among a hundred +will survive it. You are the hundredth.”</p> + +<p>The theory of probable inferences is often misapplied, but +can it be worse misapplied than by introducing it into the province +of that which is certain? There is no sense in applying the +theory of probabilities to what is certain. We may doubt whether +the rays of light travel in exactly straight lines, but we cannot doubt +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_584">[584]</span>the straightness of lines in plane geometry. We cannot doubt that +all the radii in a circle are equal, or that the sum of the angles of a +Euclidean triangle are 180°.</p> + +<h5>9. ZWEIDEUTIG BESTIMMT.</h5> + +<p>Mr. Peirce very kindly informs me that the term <i>eindeutig bestimmt</i> +is a translation of a French phrase. Very well, I do not +deny it. I know very well that the phrase has a long history, but I +do not consider myself bound to present the whole pedigree of every +term I use.</p> + +<p>Does Mr. Peirce perhaps suppose that the French phrase is the +original? If we have to go back to the original beginning at all, why +does he not tell us that the French <i>univoque</i> is a translation from the +mediæval Latin <i>univoce</i>, which was coined and used by the schoolmen +in opposition to <i>æquivoce</i>. Neither the term <i>eindeutig</i>, as Mr. +Peirce asserts, nor its scholastic original <i>univoce</i>, is an exclusively +mathematical expression.</p> + +<p>Although the term <i>eindeutig</i> is a translation of the French <i>univoque</i>, +there is after all a great difference between the French term +and the German term, and I have a good reason to prefer the German +expression. The French term is nominalistic or even vocalistic, +the German one is realistic. <i>Univoque</i> and <i>univocal</i> mean that +there is only one name or one <i>vox</i>, while <i>eindeutig</i> lays no stress on +the name but on the meaning of the name, denoting that which admits +of but one interpretation. This is a sufficient reason for me to +prefer it, and it ought to appeal to Mr. Peirce’s realistic mind.⁠<a id="FNanchor_131" href="#Footnote_131" class="fnanchor">[131]</a></p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce, maintaining that <i>eindeutig bestimmt</i> is only a mathematical +term, adduces two equations, each one of which, taken singly, +admits, he says, of two possible determinations.⁠<a id="FNanchor_132" href="#Footnote_132" class="fnanchor">[132]</a> Mr. Peirce uses +these equations as an argument against my application of the term, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_585">[585]</span>adding, sarcastically: “This shows how much that argument amounts +to.” But his example proves at best only that there are incomplete +determinations; some problems allow of several solutions. In a German +township in which blue hussars are garrisoned, children used to +propose to another this profound problem: “It lies under a plum-tree +and is blue; what is it?” If the child questioned argues, “It is +a plum,” he is corrected “No, it is a hussar.” But if he argues, +“It is a hussar,” he is corrected, “No, it is a plum.” So he has no +chance of guessing right. The result of Mr. Peirce’s first equation, +which may be either 11·477 or 11·523, is like the conundrum of the +plum-tree: it amounts to the same, viz. to nothing, and proves only +that there are determinations which are <i>zweideutig bestimmt</i>.</p> + +<h5>10. EXPLANATION.</h5> + +<p>The differences of method become very serious when we disagree +on the very meaning of “explanation” itself. How can two debaters +accept or reject one another’s arguments, if their ideas of explanation +are radically different?</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce’s definition of the term “explanation” appears to +me very unsatisfactory. He says (p. 57):</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“I cannot admit that explanation is description of the fact explained. It is +true that in the setting forth of some explanations it is convenient to restate the fact +explained so as to set it under another aspect, but even in these cases the statement +of other facts is essential. (!) In all cases it is <i>other facts</i>, (!) usually hypothetical, +which constitute the explanation; (!) and the process of explaining is a process by +which from those other facts the fact to be explained is shown to follow as a consequence +by virtue of a general principle or otherwise.”</p> + +<p>“To explain a fact is to show that it is a necessary or at least a probable result +from another fact (!) known or supposed.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>My definition of “explanation,” as a description in which the +process described is recognised as a transformation is sneered at. +Says Mr. Peirce (p. 558):</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“A magician transforms a watch into a dove. Recognise it as a transformation +and the trick is explained, is it? This is delightfully facile.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>Indeed, the magician’s trick is explained as soon as we know +all the changes that have taken place. Take the whole number of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_586">[586]</span>objects handled by the magician, those which he shows and those +which he conceals. Let us observe how he hides the watch and +how he produces the dove, and the trick is explained. Is it not?</p> + +<p>Explanation is, as the word suggests, a making plain, so that +we can look over the whole field before us, and leave nothing hidden +from sight. This whole field, the survey of which is needed for the +recognition of the transformation, is called the system of the explanation. +After we have seen how the changes take place, and after we +have described in exact formulas their modes of action, our desire for +explanation is completely satisfied.</p> + +<p>The instances adduced by Mr. Peirce prove plainly that his +objections cannot be maintained. Every one of them is an instance +of transformation (with the exception of the emerald vest, which, +however, is not stated with sufficient completeness). Take, for instance, +the following example adduced by Mr. Peirce (p. 557):</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“A ‘special process of nature,’ calling for explanation, is the circumstance +that the planet Mars, while moving in a general way from west to east among the +fixed stars, yet retrogrades a part of the time, so as to describe loops in the heavens. +The explanation is, that Mars revolves in one approximate circle and we in +another.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>Can any one deny that this explanation is a description? We +draw the two orbits as correctly as possible for the required demonstration +and combine the points representing the earth with those +representing Mars at their successive positions. Considering the fact +that we do not perceive the motion of the earth, we have to construct +a diagram in which the directions of these lines are described as +viewed from a stationary point. This is a description of changes +that take place. It is a portrayal of the transpositions of two bodies, +and the appearance which the change of this relation presents to +one of them.</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce has neither the grace nor good-will to, understand my +proposition, that <i>explanation is always a tracing of form</i>. He says +(p. 558):</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“Forms may indulge in whatever eccentricities they please, in the world of +dreams, without responsibility.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>In the world of dreams, yes! But not in the world of reality. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_587">[587]</span>And even the irresponsible eccentricities of dreams take place according +to law.</p> + +<p>Feeling that he mistakes my position, Mr. Peirce adds:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“Should Dr. Carus reply that I mistake his meaning, that it is only ‘being in +general’ (§ 66), that he holds unaccountable, I reply that this is simply expressing +scepticism as to the possibility and need of philosophy.” (P. 558.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>Of course, I mean “being in general.” As to the scepticism +imputed to me, I answer, that any attempt at explaining how matter +and energy, which I take to be eternal, came into being, is a wrongly +formulated problem. Mr. Peirce might as well call me a sceptic, +because I recognise that we cannot square the circle. (Compare +“Fundamental Problems,” 2d ed., pp. 283-285 and 291.)</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce’s gravest mistake is his belief that</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“In all cases it is <i>other facts</i> which constitute the explanation.” (P. 557.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>The practical application of this mistake becomes fatal to his +philosophy.</p> + +<p>It is by no means necessary to pass beyond that system of facts +which contains the phenomenon to be explained. We must, as a +matter of course, keep completing the facts of a phenomenon until +we have acquired a survey of what we call the whole system of the +facts, but we have never to resort to other facts.</p> + +<p>We are confronted every day with hundreds of facts of which +we never see the whole system to which they belong, but we readily +supply these deficiencies from the stock of our experience. We +refer the unknown to the known. The single case under observation +is referred to something with which we are familiar. Those +systems of explanation which are known to us serve as patterns for +others that are only partially known, and we fill out, with their assistance, +the gaps of our observation.</p> + +<p>The readiness and reliability of our explanation thus depends +upon the stock of knowledge we have. The more we know, the +easier shall we conquer the unknown; the more incomplete our +knowledge is, the greater the number of hypothetical facts that will +have to be introduced; and this always weakens the reliability of +our explanations. Hypothetical facts should be introduced only in +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_588">[588]</span>cases of urgent necessity. However, if they are admitted at all, they +have to be thought of as parts of the system under investigation, for +they have been invented only because we are compelled to assume +that without them it would be incomplete.</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce adduces the following example to prove that “other +facts” are required in an explanation:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“It has been stated that a warm spring in Europe is usually followed by a cool +autumn, and the explanation has been offered that so many more icebergs than usual +are liberated during a warm spring, that they subsequently lower sensibly the temperature +of Europe. I care little whether the fact and the explanation are correct +or no. The case illustrates, at any rate, my point that an explanation is a special +fact, supposed or known, from which the fact to be explained follows as a consequence.” +(P. 557.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>When, as in this instance, we recognise that one fact is the +necessary result of another fact, we view them both as parts of one +set or system of facts in which a transformation is taking place, and, +unless we see the connection of the two facts as constituting one +process of transformation, we cannot say that the problem is explained. +When we observe changes which are the results of transformations +taking place beyond the horizon of our knowledge, we +are, as a matter of course, unable to give an explanation.</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce had perhaps in mind a special and more complex +kind of explanation, which we define as “comprehension.” He +says (p. 557):</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“The fact to be explained is shown to follow as a consequence, by virtue of a +general principle or otherwise.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>Take as an instance the law of gravitation. There are the facts +of falling stones and the motions of celestial bodies. Both sets of +facts are explained, according to Mr. Peirce, “by virtue of a general +principle,” i. e. gravitation, while we say, both sets of facts +are comprehended under a common formula. Mr. Peirce’s conception +of “explanation” rests on the antiquated view that gravitation +is a principle behind the gravitating masses which compels the stone +to fall. Gravitation, however, is not “another fact” foreign to the +facts under consideration. It is not a principle called in from the +outside. On the contrary, it is the essence and extract of the very +facts that are to be explained.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_589">[589]</span></p> + +<p>Principles which have not been derived either from the facts to +be explained, or from the additional facts which belong to their system, +do not and cannot explain the phenomena.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>Comprehension is, as it were, an explanation of a higher degree. +The term means a grasping together, and it actually consists in +viewing two or several facts in such a way as to recognise their common +features. Comprehension is a reduction of our patterns of explanation; +it unites two or several of them in one formula.</p> + +<p>For instance, it has been observed that certain objects float in +water while others sink to the bottom. The observations do not +seem to agree, they present two incoherent facts. When we find +out that the weight of a floating body is equal to the weight of water +which it displaces, we understand at once why bodies whose specific +gravity is greater than water sink while those of a lighter specific +gravity float. Comprehension, in this as in every other case, is the +description of a process which comprises all the facts that belong to +a special class in a common formula. The description must be +applicable to all single cases however different they may be.</p> + +<p>This conception of comprehension has a great advantage over +Mr. Peirce’s view. While he has to bring in some “other fact” from +the outside, we need not introduce any foreign element. Comprehension, +as we understand it, can rise from the statement of particular +facts to more and more general formulations, until finally we +arrive at universal laws. All the laws thus formulated to satisfy our +cravings for comprehension, are found to belong to one great system +of laws, and our scientists are constantly engaged not only in widening +the range of our experience by new discoveries, but also in revising +our statements of the uniformities of nature and, where they +appear to be in collision, in bringing them into harmony.</p> + +<p>This conception of comprehension is monistic, Mr. Peirce’s is +dualistic. We need not, in order to explain the facts of existence, +go beyond them into a supernatural realm. Mr. Peirce must go outside +of the world into non-existence when he attempts to understand +the world by the principles of his philosophy. It is very doubtful +whether explanations, the “essential” nature of which is to consist +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_590">[590]</span>of “other facts usually hypothetical,” will be satisfactory to anybody +except himself.</p> + +<p>Otherness makes any fact unfit to serve as a factor of an explanation +and indeed I cannot think of any instance, real or imaginary, +in which the explanatory facts, be they real or hypothetical, +do not form parts of the system under consideration.</p> + +<p>There is only one instance to which Mr. Peirce’s method of explanation +has been applied, and I am under the impression that it +has been invented solely for this purpose. Mr. Peirce’s philosophy +is too original to be explained by the usual methods; it must have +an original method of its own. In order to explain “law” Mr. +Peirce calls in “chance.” His explanation must be an “other fact” +and the only fact different from law is not-law, lawlessness, or absolute +chance. According to my idea of explanation, law can never be +explained by chance. According to Mr. Peirce, it is the only possible +thing that can be called in as that “<i>other</i> fact” which is supposed +to be the essential constituent of an explanation.</p> + +<p>If Mr. Peirce’s method of explanation were sound, we should +have to explain order from chaos, possibility from impossibility, and +sense from nonsense.</p> + +<h4>II. MR. PEIRCE’S PHILOSOPHY.</h4> + +<p>Mr. Peirce’s constant references to scholastic philosophy remind +me of happy years long past when I was extremely interested +in the theories of such men as Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Occam, +Abelard, Tauler, and others. Together with my chum, now a sober +Professor of physics at a German University, I freely indulged in +the construction of various world-theories, which, alas! were quickly +overthrown one after another by the slightest puff of wind. I have not +lost my interest in the schoolmen, but it is considerably weakened.</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce’s repeated praise of scholastic realism and his condemnation +of any theory that he brands as nominalistic, seems to me +like the method of some of our politicians who, eager to revive toryism, +should censure all evils of the politics of to-day as whiggish. This +comparison is not exaggerated, for there are a few Hamiltonians who +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_591">[591]</span>miss the refining influence of an aristocratic class and regret that the +historical tradition of toryism has been so completely broken. I +would not deny that there is some truth in it, and there is some +truth, too, in mediæval realism, which has been neglected by the, +first violently suppressed and then triumphant, nominalism. But +in reviving realism the Scotists should be very careful to avoid a +resurrection of its errors.</p> + +<h5>1. DUNS SCOTUS AS A PHILOSOPHICAL PATRON SAINT.</h5> + +<p>Johannes Duns Scotus, a Franciscan, honored since his successful +defense of the Blessed Virgin’s Immaculate Conception by the +title Doctor Subtilis, and the very same man after whom, on account +of the narrowness of his later disciples during the time of the Reformation, +a blockhead is to-day called a dunce, was one of the most +characteristic figures of scholastic philosophy. He lived at the end +of the thirteenth Century when the authority of the philosophy of +Thomas Aquinas who had died March 7th, 1274, was all but universally +recognised. Scotus appeared as the most powerful opponent +of Thomas. Ingenious, original, bold, and buoyant in his attacks +he had a short but brilliant career and died comparatively young at +Cologne, in November, 1308.</p> + +<p>While Thomas, surnamed Dr. Universalis, or Dr. Angelicus, is +regarded by his order, the Dominicans, as the greatest authority in +philosophical matters, Scotus succeeded in impressing his mode of +thought upon the Franciscans; yet Thomas is universally regarded +in the Roman church and also among Protestant theologians as the +more orthodox Christian.</p> + +<p>Almost all the ideas of Scotus were set forth in opposition to +the views of others and mainly of Thomas. Thomas was a determinist, +Scotus an outspoken indeterminist. Thomas says that man’s +action is necessarily determined by what he thinks is best. Scotus +avers that man thinks in a certain way because he wills in a certain +way. Man’s ideas are fashioned to suit his character. His motto is, +“<i>voluntas superior est intellectu</i>” and his idea of will is identified +with the indetermined arbitrariness of a perfect <i>liberum arbitrium</i>. +According to Thomas, God commands us to do the good because it +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_592">[592]</span>is good. Scotus calls good that which God commands simply because +God commands it. The will of God, like the will of man is, +in Scotus’s opinion, undetermined, it is arbitrary. Thus God created +the world not because his will was determined by some motive, but +because it so pleased him; and Christ’s passion and death were not +really an atonement; they simply were accepted as such by God.</p> + +<p>Without entering into this controversy of <i>anno olim</i> we might +say that we side neither with Thomas nor with Scotus, but would +modify the statement of the former by the criticism of the latter. +Thomas goes too far when he says that whatever is recognised as +the best will of necessity be done. He overlooks the power of +passions. Thomas’s statement would be right, if every passion were +regarded as a will which has its own and independent but mistaken +ideas about good. A soul whose passions are more powerful than +rational considerations will necessarily be inclined to obey its irrational +impulses. There is something in Scotus’s criticism, but his +view is no improvement. In speaking of will as superior to the intellect, +did he ever ask himself the question, What his own will +would be independent of his intellect? Further, when God is said +to command the good because it is good, Thomas separates in a logical +consideration two ideas which are identical. Scotus is right in +defining good as the will of God. From our standpoint we should +say, the will of God, viz., the moral order of the universe, is of a +definite kind which can be ascertained by experience. To speak of +the will of God as good is an anthropomorphic expression. Good is +that which agrees with the will of God; bad, that which opposes it. +Suppose the moral order of the universe were different, goodness +and badness would change with it.</p> + +<p>We have sketched the views of Scotus only to show the points +of contact between him and Mr. Peirce. Mr. Peirce is also an outspoken +indeterminist. He identifies feeling with chance, and his +free will is a <i>liberum arbitrium</i>. Mr. Peirce, like Scotus, also separates +theology, and, with it, religion, from philosophy.⁠<a id="FNanchor_133" href="#Footnote_133" class="fnanchor">[133]</a> Scotus +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_593">[593]</span>ridicules those who confound both, clearly indicating that he is aiming +at Thomas, to whose fervent faith their conciliation was a matter of +momentous and all important consequence. Scotus goes so far as +to aver that something might be true in philosophy which is wrong +in theology (see Ed. “Wadding” Fol. 4, p. 848)—a statement that +to an honest searcher for truth must almost appear as frivolous.⁠<a id="FNanchor_134" href="#Footnote_134" class="fnanchor">[134]</a></p> + +<p>How much more imbued with true religiosity was his great +namesake John Scotus Erigena the venerable founder of scholasticism +when saying: “<i>Non est alia philosophia, i. e. sapientiae stadium, +et alia religio</i>.”</p> + +<h5>2. MR. PEIRCE’S ORIGINAL THEORIES.</h5> + +<p>Mr. Peirce as a controversalist and critic is like Scotus, brilliant, +versatile, and powerful. But he is more; he is also constructive.</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce’s style of architecture reminds us of neo-Platonism, +and this is quite in harmony with Scotism, for Scotus, through +Avicebron, derived many of his ideas from the Neo-Platonists. Mr. +Peirce proposes a modern view of emanation, which starts the world +from that βῦθος of nothingness which at the same time is the womb +of all existence. The primeval state of being, says Mr. Peirce, “Was +mere nothing from a physical aspect,” but, if it was not really nothing, +what, then, was it?</p> + +<p>It was chance.</p> + +<p>Here lies the essential difference between Mr. Peirce and the +neo-Platonists. The neo-Platonists (whose speculations, if they are +treated not as philosophy, but as poetical effusions, are very profound +and thoughtful) look to the Logos, or world-reason, as the beginning +of the world emanation, while Mr. Peirce shows a certain contempt +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_594">[594]</span>for reason. To the neo-Platonist, reasons <i>are</i> explanations, while to +our modern Scotist, reasons explain nothing. He says:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“Reasons explain nothing, except upon some theistic hypothesis which may be +pardoned to the yearning heart of man, but must be doubtful in the eyes of philosophy....” +(P. 567.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>Mr. Peirce goes so far as to speak of “the dullness of ratiocination’s +self.”</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce’s gospel would deviate in the very first verse from +that of St. John, for it would read</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ἡ τυχή.—In the Beginning was Chance!</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>And this chance which was in the beginning actually is, to Mr. Peirce, +God, a personal God, an anthropomorphic deity endowed with consciousness. +He says:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“That primeval chaos in which there was no regularity was mere nothing from +a physical aspect. Yet it was not a blank zero; for there was an intensity of consciousness +there, in comparison with which all that we ever feel is but as the struggling +of a molecule or two to throw off a little of the force of law to an endless and innumerable +diversity of chance utterly unlimited.” (<i>The Monist</i>, Vol. III, No. 1, p. 19.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>And in another passage he says of chance:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“That it is a being living and conscious is what all the dullness that belongs to +ratiocination’s self can scarce muster hardihood to deny.” (P. 560.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>Mr. Peirce’s argument that all the dullness that belongs to ratiocination’s +self can scarcely muster hardihood to deny his proposition, +sounds strange in the mouth of a scientist. But it is not strange; +for I have found that enthusiastic defenders of improbable theories +always fill the holes of their argumentation with abuse of those who +dare to discover these holes. Call a person who doubts the truth +of your statements dull, and you will frighten many a weak mind +into a patient acceptance of your view.</p> + +<p>We may rest assured that whenever a philosopher scolds he is +at his wit’s end. For why should he lose patience if he can prove +his proposition? Thus diatribes are always symptoms that there is +some flaw in one’s logic and the louder one chides the sorer is the +spot.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_595">[595]</span></p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce is serious in the statement that chance is a conscious +being. He actually identifies chance and feeling. He says:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“Chance is but the outward aspect of that which within itself is feeling.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>The primordial chance, the existence of which, according to +Mr. Peirce, “calls for no explanation,” has “a primordial habit-taking +tendency.” Whence this tendency gets into the universe of +absolute chance, Mr. Peirce is unable to disclose. The deviations +from the mechanical order in the present course of things, which, +by the by, are by no means proved, suggest to him and justify, in +his opinion, this assumption. Thus, assumes he, primordial chance +ceased to be chance; it changed by a gradual habit-taking into regularities. +Consciousness ceased to be consciousness and became crystallised +into natural laws. Mind ceased to be an arbitrary sporting, +and by becoming effete it begot, through a summation of minute +effects, this material universe of ours. Accordingly, real existence +or thing-ness consists merely in the regularities thus produced, and +“physical events are but the degraded ... forms of psychical events.”</p> + +<p>This is in brief Mr. Peirce’s cosmogony, which, as the prophet +of Tychism, he reveals to us in axiomatic aphorisms.</p> + +<p>By gradual habit-taking, Mr. Peirce declares (<i>The Monist</i>, Vol. +I, No. 2, p. 176), mind will at last be “crystallised in the infinitely +distant future.” This rather sad outlook is, in another passage, +modified by a counter-oracle, which announces that “an element of +pure chance survives.” Why, he does not say. Irregularities, not +being entirely suppressed, can increase again, and as such they are +“undeveloped forms of psychical events.” Says Mr. Peirce (<i>The +Monist</i>, Vol. III, No. 1, p. 18):</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“There are almost insensible fortuitous departures from regularity; these will +produce, in general, equally minute effects.... Protoplasm is in an excessively unstable +condition.... In the protoplasm these habits are to some slight extent broken +up, so that, according to the law of mind, ... feeling becomes intensified.</p> + +<p>“This breaking up of habit and renewed fortuitous spontaneity will, according +to the law of mind, be accompanied by an intensification of feeling.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>This is the gist of Mr. Peirce’s mental philosophy, which proclaims +that “consciousness is not to be reinstated without tychism.” +The reappearance of chance is said to explain the origin of mind!</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_596">[596]</span></p> + +<p>Our conception of mind is different. We see mind develop out +of sentiency by the recognition of the regularities of the surrounding +world. Reason is almost a synonym of man’s ability to form +generalisations, of his having and operating with concepts, of his +thinking ideas. Not the arbitrariness of a wilful mind is the properly +mental of man’s soul, but his reason; and man’s reason originates +under the influence of the uniformities of the surrounding +world, which impress themselves, in what we call experience, upon +his existence. The more a creature recognises the regularities of +existence, and the more its soul becomes an image of this world-order, +which is the prototype of his reason, of the divine Logos, the +higher it rises in the scale of evolution.</p> + +<p>If chance, as Mr. Peirce declares, is but the outward aspect of +that which within is feeling, we should henceforth have to look upon +the roulette and dice as sentient beings.</p> + +<h5>3. THE FOUR POSITIVE ARGUMENTS OF TYCHISM INSUFFICIENT.</h5> + +<p>Mr. Peirce adduces four positive arguments for believing in absolute +chance. They are: (1) the prevalence of growth; (2) the variety +of the universe; (3) the necessity of explaining law; and (4) +the existence of feeling.</p> + +<p>By growth, Mr. Peirce does not understand the growth of crystals, +or trees, or organisms. That kind of growth is a mere transformation. +Mr. Peirce’s idea of “real” growth is “opposed to +the conservation of energy.” It is not an increase of the thing +growing through the assimilation of substances taken from the surrounding +world; it is an actual increase of energy, not a mere +change; it is a growth of the universe itself. Granted the possibility +of this so-called “real” growth, and we can easily explain the +evolution of the world out of the tiniest beginning. But, of course, +one thing has to go: either the conservation of energy or “real +growth.” Mr. Peirce lets go the former, I the latter.⁠<a id="FNanchor_135" href="#Footnote_135" class="fnanchor">[135]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_597">[597]</span></p> + +<p>The variety of the universe is, in my world-conception, sufficiently +explained by the variety of forms, for form is indeed the +<i>principium individuationis</i>; a doctrine, which, but for Mr. Peirce’s +philosophy, I should regard as almost universally accepted. Among +its advocates we find also Mr. Peirce’s great master, Duns Scotus, +and Scotus’s teacher, Avicebron. In so far as various formations +are possible, (exactly as the die can show six different surfaces,) +chance plays an important part in the diversification of nature, but +this chance is not to be thought of as a violation of the law, but +appears to be a special case only, and a true manifestation of the +law under complicated conditions.</p> + +<p>Chance and probability are not mere subjective ideas, creatures +of our ignorance, playing a rôle simply in our limited knowledge of +the world. The words signify a certain condition of objective existence.</p> + +<p>For instance, the probability of throwing 1 with one die is 1/6. +This means, the die is so constructed that it can show six different +positions, one among them being 1; and these six possibilities are +as real a quality of the die, as its weight or its color.</p> + +<p>The die has six possible positions. Now I take a die and throw +3. Are we not entitled to believe that the throw was sufficiently determined +by all the innumerable conditions which accompany the +act? We confidently think so, and feel no need of assuming any +absolute chance. Now I throw again. What is now the probability +of throwing 1? We answer again, 1/6. And, lo! there it is! It +came at the second throw, and we ask, was our statement of the +probabilities wrong? We say, no! it was not wrong, for it remains +true even now. The statement does not mean that we shall throw a +1 at each sixth throw, but that (supposing the die to be perfect) 1/6 +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_598">[598]</span>among all the possible throws will be 1, so that supposing all the +possible throws realised in an infinite series of throws, the average +number of 1’s among them will be the one-sixth part of the whole.</p> + +<p>The enormous importance of chance (viz., of that real chance +which is no violation of the law) has been recognised since Democritus +and has received a fresh illustration from the investigations of Darwin, +which I need not here recapitulate.</p> + +<p>The theory of probabilities teaches, that whatever can happen +in the long course of an infinite number of events, actually will happen, +and that whatever, according to the nature of things, has a +greater probability, will in an infinite number of cases occur with +proportionately greater frequency.</p> + +<p>The lesson which we have to draw from this statement is, that +that which we wish not to happen, should be made impossible. And +this can be done, perhaps not perfectly, but approximately. According +to Mr. Peirce, the evolution of mind is due to the reappearance +of chance; we say that the evolution of mind is marked by man’s +increasing power in the restriction of chance.</p> + +<p>The identification of chance with feeling, or even with mind, is +to me an idea so grotesque, that I am inclined to regard it as a relic +of gnostic speculations.</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce, instead of attempting to comprehend laws, as we +do, seeks to trace their origin. He tries to explain their existence +by growth, as if they were beings that evolve like the forms of planetary +systems or the organisms of living creatures. Considering the +fact that Mr. Peirce is a realist only in name, and that his philosophy +is soaked with nominalistic traditions, we should say (and Mr. +Peirce will pardon me that I quote the expression from him) that:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“The puzzle for him is simply the usual difficulty that plagues nominalism +when it finds itself confronted with a reality which has an element of generality.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>The assumption of absolute chance might be used to account +for any otherwise inexplicable event, but Mr. Peirce does not countenance +this idea. He warns us to be cautious in its use, like the +druggist who labels his poisons “handle with care”; “I only use +chance,” he says, “to give room for the development of law.” Having +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_599">[599]</span>used absolute chance to start the world with, he dismisses it. So +Fiesco discharges his negro after he has done his work: “<i>Der Mohr +hat seine Schuldigkeit gethan, der Mohr kann gehen</i>.”</p> + +<p>In my criticism of Mr. Peirce’s theory I said (<i>The Monist</i>, II, +p. 574):</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“How little, after all, we can escape the determinism of law as being a feature +of the world, will be seen from the fact that the explanation for the evolution of +law is presented by Mr. Peirce as being itself a law, i. e., a formula describing a +regularity supposed to obtain in facts.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>Mr. Peirce replies:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“Is there no difference between a law, the essence of which is to be inviolable +... and <i>that mental law, the violation of which is so included in the essence +that unless it were violated, it would cease to exist</i>?... Thus I clearly escape the +contradiction attributed to me.” (P. 561.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>Mr. Peirce’s escape is like the disappearance of a medium from +a room without doors. He must have got out through the fourth +dimension. The argument is so subtle that I cannot see it, and I +feel tempted to retort in a sentence quoted from my profound adversary:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“I confess, I can find only words without ideas in the objection.” (P. 561.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>Mr. Peirce speaks of law as having developed out of chance, +but he himself, in fact, after a fashion, explains the origin of those +laws of nature which represent its present uniformities by a law of +habit-taking.</p> + +<p>That the conservation of energy should leave no room for feeling +is to me an obscure proposition. The law of the conservation +of energy declares only that the sum of all energy in the world, potential +as well as kinetic, remains constant. If a living and feeling +being renews its waste and stores up new energy in its tissues, +it must take it out of the general storehouse of nature; it must +transform it, and cannot produce it out of nothing. Why should +feeling become impossible, if the conservation of energy is true?</p> + +<p>The identification of chance with feeling is, to my mind, a vagary. +It is true that feeling develops mind; mind makes deliberation +possible, and deliberation implies choice. But choice is not +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_600">[600]</span>chance. The choice which a man makes is determined by his character. +There is more resemblance between logical identity and a +pun, than between feeling and chance.</p> + +<h5>4. THE NEGATIVE ARGUMENT A LOGICAL FALLACY.</h5> + +<p>The four positive arguments for believing in absolute chance +are untenable. But Mr. Peirce, knowing that he had to weather +a storm of criticisms, has taken along a sheet-anchor, consisting of +a negative argument, which, if it were true, would make the four +positive arguments redundant.</p> + +<p>What shall we say to the statement, that chance need not be +explained? Mr. Peirce says:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“Chance, according to me, or irregularity—that is, the absence of any coincidence,—calls +for no explanation. If <i>law</i> calls for explanation, as Dr. Carus admits +it does, surely the mere absence of law calls for no further explanation than is +afforded by the mere absence of any particular circumstance necessitating the result.” +(P. 559.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>Mr. Peirce is a great logician, but the logical arguments of his +philosophy are not sound. If the absence of law, of coincidences, of +regularities, did not require explanation, the scientist would (as is +but right) still have to explain the uniformities of nature, but the +miracle monger would have a good time; for he could tell us boldly +that, according to the rules of modern logic he is not bound to give +any explanation.</p> + +<p>It is true that while everything must be explained, the absence +of everything (i. e. nothing) need not be explained; but we cannot +use this pattern as a schedule which can be filled out at our pleasure. +The ideas “absence of,” “no,” “no one,” and “nothing” +play a part in logic analogous to that of zero in mathematics. I +need hardly remind the reader of the puzzling demonstration, that +since one cat has one tail more than <i>no</i> cat, and since no cat has eight +tails, one cat must have nine tails. Operations with zero act like +death in the realm of human conventionalities. Death makes the +beggar equal to the king. Multiply any equation that is wrong with +zero, and it will be correct. Operations with zero render the impossible +possible.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_601">[601]</span></p> + +<p>But let us look closer at Mr. Peirce’s proposition. He avers +that “the mere absence of any particular circumstance necessitating +the result calls for no explanation.”</p> + +<p>Should it ever happen that the absence of any particular circumstance +necessitates the result, I do not see why this absence +should remain unexplained. Say for instance, a certain stronghold +is taken because the enemy discovers the absence of guards in a +certain part of the walls. If this absence of guards be counted as +an important circumstance helpful in the conquest of the citadel +(and there is no reason why we should not count it as such) can we +say that while the presence of guards on all other spots of the wall +has to be and can be explained as an endeavor to secure the place +against a <i>coup de main</i>, the mere absence of guards calls for no explanation? +The absence of guards in a particular spot of the Capitol +during the siege by the Gauls, was accounted for by the steepness +of the place. This particular spot was regarded as safe on +account of its inaccessibility. Similarly, the absence of guards in +the citadel of the Messenians is explained by the idea that the Spartans +would make no attack because in that particularly stormy night +a cloudburst seemed to prevent all approach.</p> + +<p>Obviously the necessity of explaining a rule, does not confer the +privilege of neglecting to explain its exceptions.</p> + +<p>It goes without saying that Mr. Peirce’s argument (even if it +were formally faultless) can have no force with a necessitarian. Such +a one, after having explained and proved to his satisfaction that <i>Gesetzmässigkeit</i> +(or regularity such as can be formulated in laws) is a characteristic +feature of the universe, is not only asked to believe that +there are after all exceptions to law, but is even told that according +to some paragraph in Mr. Peirce’s unwritten logic of relatives no +further argument is needed to prove the non-existence of law. Only +Mr. Peirce’s extreme love of his pet theories can make him blind to +such palpable fallacies. But such are the foundations of his philosophical +architecture.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_602">[602]</span></p> + +<h4>III. MR. PEIRCE AS A CRITIC.</h4> + +<p>A good general, who has to mask the weak points of his position, +uses the strategem of making demonstrative sallies upon his enemy. +Mr. Peirce, although apparently quite unconscious of the fact that his +basic doctrines are untenable, instinctively imitates this maxim of +warfare. His defence is mostly aggressive. Instead of replying to +my arguments he endeavors to represent my views as incohesive and +contradictory.</p> + +<p>The present issue is not whether my views are tenable, but +whether Mr. Peirce’s are. However, I am glad to have the benefit of +the searching criticism of so subtle a thinker as Mr. Peirce. Therefore, +I willingly appear before his tribunal to expurgate myself of +his charges.</p> + +<h5>1. THE A PRIORI AND POSITIVISM.</h5> + +<p>Mr. Peirce is greatly puzzled with my position. He quotes +several statements of mine which appear to him contradictory. I +said: (1) that millions of <i>single</i> experiences cannot establish a belief +in necessity, (2) that necessitarianism must be founded upon the +<i>a priori</i>, and (3) that the <i>a priori</i> must be founded upon experience.⁠<a id="FNanchor_136" href="#Footnote_136" class="fnanchor">[136]</a> +To him who overlooks the here italicised word “single” this may, +indeed, seem to be a vicious circle.</p> + +<p>All knowledge begins with experience. We define experience +as the effects of events upon sentient beings, and these effects are +sense-impressions of certain forms and interrelations. At an advanced +stage of evolution, the formal and relational are first unconsciously, +as, for instance, in counting, and then consciously, with +scientific deliberation, abstracted from the sensory. Systems of pure +forms are constructed out of the purely formal elements, thus gained +from experience by abstraction, such as our system of numbers and +the logical categories. Now the laws of these forms of thought are +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_603">[603]</span>applicable to all formal and relational conditions of reality. The +formal and relational of reality are known to us even in those regions +of the universe and in those provinces of scientific investigation +which have not as yet been explored. The scientist knows them +<i>a priori</i>, even before he investigates objects which he never saw before. +He is acquainted with certain of their qualities, viz., with the +laws of their formal and relational conditions.</p> + +<p>Thus the <i>a priori</i>, or, as I prefer to call it, formal thought, is a +product of experience, and is again applicable to experience.</p> + +<p>Single experiences, isolated observations, innumerable particular +cases cannot directly yield or reveal the laws of formal thought. +So long as they remain single and isolated they will never develop +into mental factors; but such is the nature of reality that the single +experiences will be built up and arranged in feeling substance as +systematically as, for instance, the formation of crystals or the harmonious +growth of cells in organisms? When sentient creatures +become conscious not only of the sensory element of their experience, +but also of this system of their soul, of the formal of their +psychical existence, they become rational beings; and the formal +which grows with their sentiency is not an exclusive and peculiar +quality of theirs; it is not purely subjective, but it has been imparted +to them, piecemeal, together with the single data of their experience. +It constitutes a part of their <i>Anschauung</i>; it is found in the objective +world and is a general feature of reality.</p> + +<p>Out of the formal elements of our <i>Anschauungen</i>, of the facts of +experience, that organ of cognition is developed which Kant calls +“pure reason.”</p> + +<p>Experience is often used to denote sense-experience only; thus +Kant contrasts experience or sense-perception, which he calls <i>a posteriori</i>, +with pure reason and formal thought, which he calls <i>a priori</i>. +We use experience in the sense defined above, <i>so as to include the +formal element</i>.</p> + +<p>I am unable to form a clear conception of Mr. Peirce’s view of +the <i>a priori</i>. Those systems of formal thought which I regard as +constructions he regards as products of analysis. He says, “They +are results dependent upon the action of reason in the depths of our +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_604">[604]</span>own consciousness.” He only grants that “their abstract and distinct +formulation comes very late.” He still holds that the <i>a priori</i> +is innate.</p> + +<p>In my conception, mathematical ideas, like that of the contrivance +of logarithms, are inventions; and they are constructions as +much as the invention of the steam-engine by James Watt.</p> + +<p>There is one peculiarity about the purely formal which is not +found in the sensory elements of experience. Our knowledge of the +various spheres of the purely formal is of a general nature; it applies +to any form of the same kind. This gives system to our formal conceptions, +and enables us to make statements which are rigidly and +unequivocally determined. It is this quality which makes them +available as an organ of cognition when dealing with facts of experience. +They furnish us with methods, schedules of reference, and +plans which like blanks have to be filled out.</p> + +<p>Science begins with the application of formal thought, viz., +with counting, measuring, and classifying. Only with the assistance +of the formal sciences can we master the material of the sensory data +of experience; and thus it happens that the formal is the condition, +not of any kind of experience, but of every systematic experience.</p> + +<p>The formal sciences are the tools of cognition. That to which +they cannot be applied remains unexplained, and this is the ultimate +reason why processes of nature can be regarded as explained only +when recognised as processes of transformation. Cognition is the +tracing of form. We can understand a change only if it is a change +of form. We cannot understand how anything real can disappear +into, or originate out of, nothing. We have no explanation for any +actual increase or decrease either of matter or energy. Whenever +we see something entirely new we regard it as a new combination, the +elements of which existed before.</p> + +<p>If there were processes in the universe which could positively +be proved not to be transformations we should be confronted with an +unfathomable mystery; and it is a matter of course that we must not +be duped so easily by the appearance of problems which cannot be +solved at first sight. The advance of science which has resolved so +many mysterious phenomena into plain instances of transformation +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_605">[605]</span>gives us confidence that this method is the only reliable maxim of +inquiry. It has helped us so far, and it will help us in the future.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>I call my views positivism, because like the French positivists +and also like Locke and his school I maintain that all knowledge is +to be derived from the positive facts of experience. But my positivism +is not of the old kind; it is neither sensationalism nor materialism +nor Comtism. It is a new positivism broadened by a +study of Kantian philosophy and Kant’s problem of the <i>a priori</i>; +and this new positivism, I hope, deserves the attention of the thinkers +of mankind.</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce calls it a “straddling of the question,” by which he +means that a man is “on both sides of the fence,” and has learned +so to formulate the issues, “that both parties can readily subscribe +to his propositions.”</p> + +<h5>2. DETERMINISM AND FATALISM.</h5> + +<p>Fatalism and determinism must not be confounded. We define +determinism as that view, according to which every event is determined +by its conditions. The decision of a man whose liberty is +not curtailed by any compulsion, so that he can act as he pleases +exactly in agreement with his character, is determined objectively +by the motive and subjectively by his character. A man of a certain +character in a given situation will act in a way that is perfectly +determinable.</p> + +<p>Determinism, as I take it, does not exclude free-will. Nor does +it exclude such chance as is, for instance, the incidental turning up +of the various faces of a die.</p> + +<p>Determinism is the basis of science, and also of ethics as a +science. If the decision of a free will were merely the result of chance, +why should our teachers and preachers take so much trouble to form +character?</p> + +<p>While determinism is a sound doctrine, fatalism is a superstition. +Fatalism excludes the idea of free will. We define fatalism +as that view which regards the fate of a man, whatsoever he may +do, as fixed. For instance, we call the orthodox Mohammedan a +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_606">[606]</span>fatalist; he looks at the flame without quenching it, because he +argues, “if it is Allah’s will that my house burn down, it will burn +down, whatever I may do.”</p> + +<p>In my reply to Mr. Peirce (<i>The Monist</i>, Vol. II, p. 572) I approvingly +quoted from him a passage containing the word “fate,” adding +that here “the word ‘fate’ must be understood as Mr. Peirce understands +it.” In spite of this warning, Mr. Peirce employs this +quotation made from <i>his</i> writings as if it were mine, and calls attention +to the inconsistency involved in the different application of the +word. This charge of inconsistency is neither judicious nor fair!</p> + +<p>We define “necessary” as “that which is determined.”</p> + +<p>Determined means describable. Necessity is that feature of +things which makes it possible that we can, in proportion to our +knowledge, describe beforehand or predict the course of events.</p> + +<p>Kant’s definition of “necessary,” as given in his “Critique of +Pure Reason,” is narrower. He says:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“That the coherence of which with the real is determined according to universal +conditions of experience is necessary, or exists necessarily.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>This means in our phraseology, “that feature of the real which +is determined by the laws of form.”</p> + +<p>The word “determinism” has been inappropriately used in the +sense of fatalism, in which sense it has to be condemned as a superstition. +The term is needed, however, to denote a basic principle +of great value. “Determinism,” if used in the sense which the word +literally indicates, means “that view which regards all events as +determined by its conditions.” Determinism does not mean that +everything is decreed by some fate, that some Deity or other power +has determined the course of events. It means that definite conditions +produce definite results, and that the results can be ascertained +and described, if <i>all</i> the conditions are known.</p> + +<p>Fatalism is a peculiar kind of determinism, and, indeed, an obviously +erroneous one. Fatalism rests upon a dualistic conception, +regarding necessity as a foreign force residing outside and above +things and compelling them to act in a special way. It is the Moira +of the ancients and the Kismet of the Mohammedans. The monistic +view knows nothing of a foreign force or supermundane <i>fatum</i> enacting +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_607">[607]</span>a special course of affairs. Necessity, in the monistic conception, +simply denotes the determinedness of results by its conditions; +it signifies that <i>Gesetzmässigkeit</i>, or regularity according to +law, is a feature of reality. We need not repeat again that the monistic +view of determinism excludes neither chance nor free-will. It +only excludes “absolute” chance and that indeterminable arbitrariness +which is sometimes said to be free-will.</p> + +<p>If events were not determined, if under the very same conditions +the same causes could bring about different results, so that no +regularities formulable in laws existed, the world would be a chaos +and no cosmos, absolute chance would prevail, and science would +be impossible.</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce not only confounds fate and necessity, but he also +identifies them with resistance, and with reality. My idea of necessity +has as little to do with the experience of, reaction as, for instance, +with the idea of density, or with pleasure and pain. To confound +such heterogeneous concepts must be productive of confusion. No +wonder that Mr. Peirce makes the confession that these ideas seem +to him “of a mixed nature.”</p> + +<p>That my presentation of the case of Determinism <i>versus</i> Free-will +results in “a doctrine to which the advocates of free-will will +generally subscribe as readily as their opponents,” is used as a reproach; +but I do not take it as such, for my intention is not to side +with one party, but to bring out the truth of both views.</p> + +<h5>3. NATURAL LAWS, DESCRIPTIONS.</h5> + +<p>Mr. Peirce makes the following allegation of inconsistency. +He says of me:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“The declaration (§ 198) that ‘natural laws are simply a description of nature +as nature is,’ and that ‘the facts of nature express the character of nature,’ are +nominalistic. But in another place (107-116) he says distinctly that uniformities +are real.” (P. 531.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>I am unable to detect any inconsistency in these expressions. +The gist of these three statements is this: the formulas usually +called natural laws describe certain uniformities of reality.</p> + +<p>The expression “description of nature” is by no means nominalistic. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_608">[608]</span>If law is said to be a description, it is not a mere name, +but presupposes the existence of some objective reality for the description +of which it has been formulated.</p> + +<h5>4. CAUSATION.</h5> + +<p>Mr. Peirce’s usage of the word “cause” is very unsettled. He +says (p. 538):</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“The original idea of an efficient cause is that of an agent, more or less like +man.”</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>The original idea of “cause” is the struggle of reaching an +end or bringing about a certain state of things. The Latin <i>causa</i> +means “a lawsuit.”</p> + +<p>In a similar way, the German <i>Ursache</i> does not mean the original +thing, but a “seeking.” <i>Sache</i> is the English <i>sake</i> and Gothic +<i>sakjô</i>, meaning “struggle,” or “quarrel.” It is derived from the +same root as the verb “to seek.”</p> + +<p>Like <i>causa</i>, the word <i>Ursache</i> was used as a legal term.</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce further states:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“The modern mechanical conception, on the other hand, is that the relative +positions of particles determine their accelerations at the instants when they occupy +those positions.” (P. 538.)</p> + +<p>“In dynamics, it is the fixed force, gravitation, or whatever else, together with +those relative positions of the bodies that determine the intensity and direction of +the forces, that is regarded as the cause.” (P. 540.)</p> + +<p>“The practice which I endeavor to follow in regard to the word <i>cause</i> is, to +use it in the Aristotelian sense of an <i>efficient cause</i> in all its crudeness.” (P. 541.)</p> + +<p>“When my idea is a more general and logical one, I prefer to speak of the +explanation.” (P. 541.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>No wonder that some causes are prior to their effects, others +simultaneous, and that effects may even be prior to their causes! +Using the word in various senses, Mr. Peirce becomes so entangled +about causation, that in mustering the ideas force, position, reason, +law, cause, and explanation, he no longer knows which is which.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>Mr. Peirce being unable to bring any consistency into the usage +of the term “cause,” drops it entirely as a philosophical word. This +is Dr. Ironbeard’s method, who kills his patient to save him pain.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_609">[609]</span></p> + +<p>There was a time when I felt inclined to follow that plan of dealing +with words in this predicament. But I found out very soon that +there is not one difficult word in philosophical language which is not +or was not at some time or other almost universally maltreated by +the professional thinkers of mankind. What, then, is to be done? +Shall we eradicate all old terms that are erroneously used and create +a philosophical Volapük, which will have the advantage of being +unincumbered with the errors of a long historical inheritance, but +the disadvantage of being nowhere spoken and nowhere understood, +except by its inventors?</p> + +<p>Dr. Ironbeard’s method of dealing with terms is radical. It +imitates the method of the social reformers who, on finding something +wrong in society generally, propose to tear down the entire +social structure, and begin the world over again from its beginning.</p> + +<p>Most of the terms which have been in use for centuries and +even millenniums, I have found to correspond to a special want +of expressing some definite reality or constant group of realities or +important relation among realities. The misuse of different words +almost invariably has its origin in a consideration of the name +alone, to the neglect of the reality denoted by the name. And misuses +can be mended only by carefully investigating the realities +themselves for the denotation of which the words have been invented. +If we were to make a clean sweep of the “superstitions,” +soul, God, cause, natural law, etc., because in many minds there +are superstitious notions connected with these ideas, we should soon +have to invent new terms for the realities which necessitated the +formation of the old ones. The great bulk of religious and philosophical +words originated because in each case there was an actual +want of a phrase to denote some specific reality. The errors of the +various terms arise because our ideas concerning the nature of these +realities have not as yet been matured, and it is the office of the +philosopher to contribute his mite toward their clarification.</p> + +<p>Causation, in my conception, is transformation. Take any +system of conditions and let it somehow be changed. The event +which starts the change is called the cause, the new configuration +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_610">[610]</span>produced, the effect. The various factors of the system are the +conditions or circumstances.</p> + +<p>Taking this view, I <i>do not say</i> that the effect is the cause transformed. +The total effect is the cause plus all the circumstances +transformed. The effect is something radically different from the +cause. The cause is always an event, that is a motion of some kind; +the effect, a new arrangement, a new formation, a new state of +things, or perhaps the dissolution of an old state of things.</p> + +<p>While cause and effect are different, the whole process of causation, +including cause, circumstances, and effect, is to be viewed as +one fact, or, rather, as one system of facts; and a process of causation +is explained, (as we have seen above) as soon as it is so described +that we recognise it as a transformation.⁠<a id="FNanchor_137" href="#Footnote_137" class="fnanchor">[137]</a></p> + +<p>There is a popular usage which calls the cause of the falling +stone gravitation. This kind of cause is not an event, not a motion, +but a law of nature, and I prefer to call it “the reason” for +the stone’s fall.</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce defines a reason as follows:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“A reason, in one sense, is the replacement of a multiple-subject of an observational +proposition by a general subject, which by the very conditions of the special +experience is predicable of the multiple subject.” (P. 558.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_611">[611]</span></p> + +<p>This somewhat stilted definition seems upon the whole to +agree with what I also call “a reason.” All the reasons by which +we comprehend nature are formulated in statements which describe +those general features of reality which we call “laws of nature.”</p> + +<p>Who does not see that causes (i. e., events which produce effects) +and reasons (i. e., the formulas by which we comprehend the +uniformities of nature) are two radically different ideas, and who +can deny that the denotation of these two radically different ideas, +by one and the same term, must and actually does bring about +lamentable confusion in the minds of philosophers! Accordingly, +let us call them by different names; never mind what we call them, +but let us distinguish them. I regard the usage stated here as the +most appropriate. We call “the cause” of the stone’s fall that event +which removed its support; but when we inquire after the reason +why the stone falls, we want to know the law of nature which describes +in a general formula that quality of stones which makes +them fall.</p> + +<h5>5. THE FUTURE IN MENTAL CAUSATION.</h5> + +<p>It seems as if some evil genius had caused Mr. Peirce to cross +my position everywhere, even where I should expect to find him in +perfect agreement.</p> + +<p>Concerning mental and mechanical causation he first startles +me with an italicised proposition which declares:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“<i>There is no mechanical truth in saying that the past determines the future rather +than the future the past.</i>” (P. 539.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>Mr. Peirce apparently intends to discredit the belief that the +past determines the future. He adds:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“We continue, for convenience, to talk of mechanical phenomena as if they +were regulated, in the same manner in which our intentions regulate our actions, +(which is essentially a determination of the future by the past,) although we are +quite aware that it is not really so.” (P. 539.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>In other words, Mr. Peirce contends that our view of mechanical +causation is based upon an analogy with mental causation; the +latter being a determination of the future by the past, we conclude +that the former is regulated in the same manner.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_612">[612]</span></p> + +<p>This is an old error which rests on the supposition that cognition +begins with introspection or self-knowledge. The truth is that +all cognition begins with objective observation.</p> + +<p>We have to say, (1) that man’s view of mechanical causation has +not been fashioned after the model of mental causation, and (2) that +the future actually enters as a factor in mental causation. We do +not believe that the future determines the past, but it does determine +the present.</p> + +<p>Should we judge of the causation of mechanical motions from +our own mental experience, we should certainly reach other conclusions +than we do, for the most characteristic feature of mental +causation, that which essentially distinguishes it from mechanical +causation, is the fact that the future actually enters into it as the +main factor.</p> + +<p>We as rational beings, and the lower animals also on a smaller +scale, do know to some extent the future. We know by experience +the effects of certain actions. This fact of the future’s being partly +known, makes it possible for the future to enter as a factor in mental +causation. I go so far as to maintain that there is no mental causation +except some consideration of the future be contained in the motive +cause. The presence of a plan, of an end kept in view, of an +aim to be reached in the future, is exactly what distinguishes the +purposive action of thinking beings from mechanical events.</p> + +<h5>6. MENTAL CAUSATION.</h5> + +<p>Mr. Peirce has discovered in my expositions of mechanical and +mental action what he believes to be a flagrant contradiction, and, +as if it were the exhibition of my scalp, displays it triumphantly +(§ 27) in capitals and italics. “No objection can be made,” I said, +“to the possibility of explaining the motions ... of the brain by +the laws of molar and molecular mechanics.” And “yet the simplest +psychical reflexes cannot be explained from mechanical or +physical laws alone.”</p> + +<p>Is this really a contradiction, or is it Mr. Peirce’s inability to +discover the agreement between the two statements? Let us see.</p> + +<p>Take a little toy fish of tin with a small iron rod in its snout, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_613">[613]</span>floating in the water, and push the fish so that it shoots forward +with a certain velocity in a straight line. Now take a magnet and +hold it at a short distance from the prolonged path of the fish. The +fish at once changes its course; it now describes a curve which according +to the laws of mechanics is determined (omitting any other +possible modifying circumstances) by the momentum of the push, +the velocity of which is gradually diminished by the friction of the +water, and the attraction of the magnet. These are the data, and +from these data the motion of the fish is unequivocally determined +by the laws of mechanics.</p> + +<p>Now, when we speak of the motion of the fish, we mean the +motion, and not the iron rod, or the qualities of the iron rod, in its +snout. While speaking of motion or the laws of motion, and while +calculating the curve of a motion, our ideas move in a perfectly defined +sphere of abstraction from which all other things and considerations +are excluded. This method of abstraction which is the essence +of human thought and also of that special kind of human +thought called science, is the way by which alone we are enabled +to arrive at clear distinctions and lucid explanations. We have to +keep our various abstractions stored in an orderly manner in our +mind, each one in a special box. If we do not distinguish the different +spheres of abstraction and their limits, we shall soon confound +all issues in a hopeless chaos.</p> + +<p>But we find, on further examination, that in this limitation of the +description to the abstract sphere of pure motion only a part of the +process before us is described. The description explains fully, exhaustively, +and satisfactorily the mechanical aspect of the case, but +it does not explain why the magnet attracts iron. The attraction +of the magnet consists in the definite qualities of (1) the magnet, +(2) the iron, and (3) the medium between them. When we inquire +after an explanation of the physical qualities of things, we enter into +another sphere of abstraction, viz., that of physics. That physics +will have to be explained as a domain of molecular mechanics may +be mentioned incidentally.</p> + +<p>Take another and simpler instance: the fall of a stone. The +motion of the stone, its increasing velocity during the fall can be +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_614">[614]</span>explained according to the laws of mechanics; but that quality of +the stone called gravity, which is the reason of its fall, cannot be deduced +from the laws of mechanics. The gravity of a mass is treated +in mechanics as the given fact or datum, an investigation into the +nature of which is excluded from the sphere of mechanics. He +who demands of mechanics an explanation of gravity searches in the +wrong box.</p> + +<p>When we come to the investigation of psychical phenomena, +we strike a feature which is entirely absent in mechanics, physics, +and chemistry. It is the appearance of feeling. Feelings vary according +to the various impressions made by surrounding objects. +The same objects making the same impressions, special kinds of +feelings come to stand for or to represent their respective kinds of +objects, and thus feelings acquire meaning, feelings become ideas. +This peculiarity of sentiency, that it has acquired meaning, is the +characteristic feature of “mind.”</p> + +<p>When speaking of mind I refer to all those phenomena of +meaning-freighted feelings which ensoul thinking beings; and the +domain of psychology is thus again quite a distinct domain of abstraction.</p> + +<p>Now let us return to the contradiction of which Mr. Peirce accuses +me.</p> + +<p>An idea which physiologically considered is a special brain-structure +or combination of brain-structures, reacts upon a given +stimulus, which, let us say, is the sound of a certain word. The +word is a sound-symbol and the word possesses a certain meaning. +The word spoken having the same meaning as a special idea that +is thought, while its brain-structure is agitated, possesses a quality +comparable to chemical affinities. This peculiar word will serve as +a stimulus for this peculiar idea. It will not (at least not directly) +stimulate other ideas—as little as a chemical that has no affinity for +the ingredients of another chemical will cause a reaction. Why the +motion takes place calls for a psychical explanation, but the motion +itself takes place in strict accord with the laws of mechanics.</p> + +<p>But are not the laws of mechanics annulled by the laws of +physics, and those of physiology by the laws of psychology?</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_615">[615]</span></p> + +<p>No, they are not annulled, but modified.</p> + +<p>A piece of iron that falls to the ground with the same velocity +as a stone of equal weight will be held up by a magnet strong +enough to hold it. This is not an annulment of the gravity of the +iron; it is not a reversion of the law of gravitation; gravitation +holds in this case as good as in any other. It is only a modification +and a complication. We must remember that the law of gravity does +not say, the non-supported piece of iron or stone will drop, it says +that all bodies are attracted by the earth with a definite force depending +upon their mass and position. And this attraction takes +place in our example; the iron supported by the magnet retains all +its inherent gravity, which is constantly asserting itself, although +counteracted by the force of the attraction of the magnet.</p> + +<p>Since the mechanical, chemical, psychical, etc. qualities represent +reality in various abstract aspects, we should know that there +are no purely mechanical, no purely chemical, no purely psychical +phenomena. Every real phenomenon, i. e. the original whole from +which the abstractions have been made, presents a complex state +of things of which many various aspects can and must be taken.</p> + +<p>I repeat now without fear of contradiction or miscomprehension, +that brain-motions are perfectly explainable by the laws of +molar and molecular mechanics, while psychical reflexes, not being +purely mechanical processes, cannot be explained by mechanical +laws. The properly psychical and the properly mental are other +elements of an entirely different nature from the mechanical and the +physical. They belong to a radically different sphere of abstraction. +He who tries to explain the psychical by the mechanical, +looks for his explanation in the wrong box. And he who regards +the proposition that the mechanical laws hold good for all motions +without any exception, but that they cannot be called upon to explain +that which is not motion, as a contradiction, has not as yet +learned practically to apply the method of abstraction.</p> + +<p>It is strange that we have to give this little lesson in the elements +of abstraction lore to so prominent a logician as Mr. Peirce. +We feel inclined to exclaim: “Art thou a master of Israel and +knowest not these things?”</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_616">[616]</span></p> + +<h4>STRAY SHOTS.</h4> + +<p>There are a number of incidental comments aimed at scattered +points of my position. I call them “stray shots”; they have exploded +without harm. While going over the battle-field I shall pick +them up and will throw some of them back into Mr. Peirce’s camp, +whence they came.</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce is in the habit of calling every approach to his views +“deep,” while divergencies are branded as “shallow.”—</p> + +<p>Hume’s scepticism is called Leibnitz’s principle, by which latter +Mr. Peirce apparently means that innumerable single cases of experience +alone do not constitute certainty. Why Mr. Peirce demands +that Hume’s conclusion which Leibnitz never would have countenanced, +should be identified with Leibnitz’s principle from which +it is derived is not apparent.—</p> + +<p>How easily Mr. Peirce changes his opinion! Venn’s “Logic +of Chance,” which Mr. Peirce so much admired formerly, has become +“a blundering little book.”—</p> + +<p>Synechism and agapasticism, viz., the principle of continuity +and the idea of love as main factors of evolution are nothing +new. I have always defended them, although not in the peculiar +way that Mr. Peirce does.⁠<a id="FNanchor_138" href="#Footnote_138" class="fnanchor">[138]</a> In his article “Evolutionary Love” he +appears to me unjust toward Darwin. I do not think that I should +improve my propositions, which are in their way synechistic as well +as agapastic, by adopting either Mr. Peirce’s terms or his presentation +of these principles.—</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce says, he does not doubt that my idea of mental causation +was intended to be an improvement on his molecular theory of +protoplasm. I can assure Mr. Peirce that I had no such intentions. +I held my view long before I ever had a chance of knowing Mr. +Peirce’s molecular theory of protoplasm. Moreover, I am unable +to discover any similarity between his views and mine.—</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_617">[617]</span></p> + +<p>I took pains to explain that, if we disregard the notion of form, +every transformation, that is, every case of causation, will appear as +a most miraculous and inexplicable event. To illustrate my view +I said that “<i>supposing we had no idea of the laws of form or only an incoherent +and fragmentary knowledge of them</i>,” it would be “a very +wonderful thing” that two congruent regular tetrahedrons when +put together will form a hexahedron—a body which is something +new. And I added to this statement, “<i>but the laws of form do perfectly +and satisfactorily explain it</i>.” How great was my astonishment +to see Mr. Peirce with great complacency take up the problem and +explain it! Indeed, it is true. That the combination of two congruent +regular tetrahedrons will make a hexahedron, is wonderful <i>only</i> to +him who does not understand the laws of form. Otherwise, it is not +wonderful. I was amused at Mr. Peirce’s ingenuity to prove to me +that it is a case of 8-2=6.—</p> + +<p>There is a difference between the combination of two tetrahedrons +and of the atoms <i>H₂O</i>. Mr. Peirce tells me, that the one is +ideal, the other real—“a difference which to his Scotistic mind is +very important.” Did Mr. Peirce think, indeed, that I was not +aware of this difference, or does he mean to establish a rule never +to compare the relations as developed in the sciences of pure forms +to the relations that obtain in reality?—</p> + +<p>Says Mr. Peirce in one passage, there is a difference between +the ideal and the real, which to his Scotistic mind is very important. +In another passage he declares that “the nominalist alone makes a +sharp distinction between the abstract and the concrete.”—</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce smiles at the endeavor of reconciling religion with +science. For he thinks:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>“It is a thing which will come to pass of itself when time is ripe, and that our +efforts to hasten it have just that slight effect that our efforts to hasten the ripening +of apples on a tree may have.” (P. 545.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>Mr. Peirce forgets that the religious fruits of the conciliation +between religion and science are our own sentiments. He who says +that man should be indifferent about working out the truth, on the +plea that truth will take care of itself, is comparable to the apple-tree, +that refuses to work out the ripening of the apples. The proposition +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_618">[618]</span>to let religion and science work out their destinies, one of which +is their mutual agreement, of themselves, is irreligious and also unscientific. +Truth will not take care of itself if we do not strain all +our efforts to find truth; and the kingdom of heaven will never come +unless (as Christ taught, Matt. 11, 12) “it suffereth violence, and +the violent take it by force.”—</p> + +<p>The same Mr. Peirce who says that our efforts to hasten the +conciliation of religion with science are useless, believes in miracles +and proposes a theory that prayer can work miracles.—</p> + +<p>Several philosophers, such as Locke and Hegel, have complained +of the uselessness of the logical law of identity <i>A</i> = <i>A</i>, and +also of its barrenness for any practical purpose. The law of identity +has been invented nevertheless, because there is a want for it; and +this want, in my opinion, was felt because the statement of sameness +(as set forth in <i>The Monist</i>, Vol. III, p. 70, et seqq.) is one of +the most elementary and important forms of reasoning, being indispensable, +for instance, in mathematics where it appears as equations. +We may simply laugh at the old logicians</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">“Who whirl in narrow circling trails,</div> + <div class="verse indent0">Like kittens playing with their tails.”</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class="noindent">We may impatiently discard the whole proceeding as empty talk, +yet I submit that we had better try to understand the meaning of +their unprofitable exertions and the drift of their apparently meaningless +argumentations. If we regard the principle of absolute +identity as the formula of sameness (in the sense explained in the +quoted passage, <i>The Monist</i>, Vol. III, No. 1, p. 70, et seqq.) emptied +of its contents we shall understand why logicians wasted so +much energy on an entirely barren subject. We shall readily condone +their mistakes in consideration of the importance of the subject. It +is difficult to say how much we have profited by their blunders.—</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce uses the terms analytical and synthetical in a new +sense for reasons which he explains at greater length in his “Theory +of Probable Inferences.” He says, “analytical reasoning depends +upon associations of similarity; synthetical reasoning upon associations +of contiguity.” I willingly grant to the scientist and the philosopher the +liberty to change the historical meaning of terms if the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_619">[619]</span>traditional usage is not helpful in our dealings with the facts which +they were invented to describe. However, we must not change a term +without good and sufficient reasons. In the present case, I still prefer +the traditional usage of the terms “analytical” and “synthetic.”—</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce takes the liberty of changing terms for himself, but +he resents it in others.—</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce disapproves of the usage of the word “construction” +in the sense of systems of formal thought, such as the decimal system, +etc., etc. “Because,” he says, “the word is imperatively required +in the theory of cognition to denote a mathematical diagram +framed according to a general precept.” On the strength of this +argument we might as well disapprove of calling churches, mosques, +houses, cottages, or any kind of edifice, “building,” because the +word “building” is imperatively required to denote business-buildings.—</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce says that according to my statement (in ¶ 163) +“every element of compulsion is to be excluded from the conception +of necessity.” Having never made such a statement, I looked +up the passage, which is the last but one paragraph in <i>The Monist</i>, +Vol. III, No. 1, page 86, and find that Mr. Peirce must have misread +the sentence, “compulsion excludes free will, and necessity +does not,” which, of course, has an entirely different meaning.—</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce identifies evolution with real growth, regarding it +as opposed to the law of the conservation of energy. He regards +everything as a product of such growth, or <i>Erzeugung</i>, and adds, “I +fancy it is this cautious reflectiveness of my procedure which especially +displeases Dr. Carus.” Mr. Peirce does not use the word +“bold.” He says, “cautious reflectiveness.”—</p> + +<p>I did not say that causation is to be explained from the law of +the conservation of matter and energy. I said (<i>The Monist</i>, Vol. +II, No. 4, p. 566) that the law of the conservation of matter and +energy throws light upon the problem of causation. The law of +the conservation of matter and energy and the law of causation describe +the same thing under two different aspects. If we understand +the one, it will help us to understand the other.—</p> + +<p>Kant’s chapter on the Architectonic of Pure Reason is well +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_620">[620]</span>known to me, but I think that Kant was possessed of a peculiar +love of architectonic which has contributed not a little to rendering +the system of his philosophy unnecessarily labyrinthine.—</p> + +<p>It is surprising to find a man whom I always regarded as a +Kant scholar of first degree saying that “Kant makes space a necessary +form of thought.” Now, as a matter of fact, Kant does not +make space a form of <i>thought</i>, but of <i>Anschauung</i> or intuition. We +cannot understand Kant unless we understand this distinction.⁠<a id="FNanchor_139" href="#Footnote_139" class="fnanchor">[139]</a>—</p> + +<p>Kant conceives of causation as a necessary sequence. Mill, +who objects to the idea of necessity, replaces Kant’s words “universal” +and “necessary” by “invariable” and “unconditioned,” a +substitution which was made with the outspoken intention of radically +changing the meaning of the phrase. Mill’s terms are <i>not</i> +“more exact,” as Mr. Peirce says, but different. They are worse +than less exact to a Kantian, and can appear more exact only to +those who take Mill’s view, which is nominalistic. And this substitution +of Mill’s is regarded by realistic Mr. Peirce as a mere “rewording +of Kant’s definition”!—</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce makes too much of the idea of “<i>Erzeugung</i>, which,” +as he correctly says, “is Kant’s word for the sequence of effect +from cause.” Yet Kant’s idea of <i>Erzeugung</i> does not conflict with +“the modern mechanical doctrine.” Kant says in that very same +chapter, “<i>Aller Wechsel (Succession) der Erscheinungen ist nur Veränderung</i>,” +i. e., “All change (succession) of phenomena is only transformation.” +(!) Does not Mr. Peirce know that Kant calls every +world-conception that stands in contradiction to the mechanical +principle “a philosophy of indolence,” or “<i>faule Weltweisheit</i>”?—</p> + +<p>The same Kant who proposed a mechanical explanation of the +evolution of the starry heavens, objected very strongly to that kind +of explanations “which derive all order from chance”; and speaking +of Epicurus’s “absolute chance”(!) he adds: “Epicurus was +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_621">[621]</span>even so reckless (<i>so unverschämt</i>) as to demand that the atoms should +deviate from their straight course without any cause.” Mr. Peirce +has either overlooked in Kant these passages, or, if he has read +them, he has never taken them to heart.—</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce objects to my statement that according to his philosophy +the domain of mind is characterised by absence of law. He +argues: “Is not one of my papers entitled ‘The Law of Mind?’” +Yet this law of mind, he states two lines further on, “requires its +own violation.” (P. 552.)—</p> + +<p>The “sporting” of the primeval chance, Mr. Peirce says on +page 552 of this number, is “not undetermined and indeterminable,” +because “its ultimate result must be an entire elimination of +chance from the universe.” Shall we understand that the “arbitrary +sporting” of the primeval chaos, with which Mr. Peirce (according +to <i>The Monist</i>, Vol. I, No. 2, p. 175) begins his cosmogony, +was determined? If absolute chance is determined, why not call +such a philosophy “determined Indeterminism”? We try hard to +understand Mr. Peirce, but sometimes we really have to give it up.—</p> + +<p>Physiology teaches that memory alone changes feeling into consciousness, +but the consciousness of Mr. Peirce’s original Chance is +without memory and habit.—</p> + +<p>Chance, a being living and conscious, has, according to Mr. +Peirce, created the world, but the ultimate result of evolution must +be an entire elimination of Chance from the universe. Thus it appears +that the creation of the world is an act of divine suicide. The +world-process is a slow degeneration of God, finally ending in his +complete annihilation.</p> + +<h4>RETROSPECT.</h4> + +<p>In summing up the result of the whole battle, we find that +there is not a single question on which we have to yield or even +modify our position. Our position remains the same, while Mr. +Peirce’s position has become glaringly untenable. There is one +point, however, in which justice demands that we should recognise +that he is right. I should not have called Hamilton “Mr.,” but +“Sir William.” I can, however, assure Mr. Peirce that this mistake +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_622">[622]</span>of mine (which in all my allusions to Hamilton occurs only once) +was a mere slip of the pen; it was not ignorance on my part and +still less was it any disregard of the rules of politeness.</p> + +<p>We are obliged to reject the favorite ideas of Mr. Peirce, and +have only to add that our esteem for him has not been lessened, in +spite of all disagreements, and notwithstanding the flaws we have +detected in his reasoning. On the contrary, our admiration for him +as a dialectitian has been greatly increased, for, in truth, we have +never before seen propositions so untenable in their nature, so odd +and almost bizarre, as those of “absolute chance,” of “matter as +effete mind,” of “feeling as being the inner aspect of chance,” and +of “real growth as opposed to the conservation of energy,” defended +with greater adroitness.</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce is unusually familiar with certain branches of learning, +of which he has made a specialty, and also with general philosophy; +but he has original ideas, and he prizes them too highly. +Where he makes no use of his originality, he does extraordinarily +good Work. Thus, most of his papers on logic, published in sundry +magazines, are, in their critical as well as constructive parts, strictly +scientific and almost free from apocryphal speculations. Only slight +hints in them have been a puzzle to me and other readers of his essays. +Of late, however, Mr. Peirce has come out more explicitly with his +peculiar philosophy, and we regret to say that the more he allows +his original ideas to enter into his thoughts, the more warped are +his theories.</p> + +<p>While we regard Mr. Peirce’s original ideas as erroneous, we +must say that they are nevertheless highly interesting and stimulating. +His propositions are presented so vigorously, so attractively, +so brilliantly, that while perusing his articles, we find them remarkably +suggestive; we enjoy them as we do poetry. They read like +a romance of the origin of the world or a fairy-tale of metaphysics.</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce’s views should receive the consideration of all +earnest students of philosophy; for he goes to the root of its main +problems, and his very errors are instructive.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">Editor.</span></p> + +<div class="footnotes"> + +<h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_125" href="#FNanchor_125" class="label">[125]</a> Kepler’s scheme is, that all the regular solids, icosahedron, dodecahedron, +octohedron, tetrahedron, and cube should be placed one within the other at such +distances that spheres could be described between them so as to touch the corners of +each respective interior and the planes of each respective exterior solid. He found, +by placing the sun in the centre and allowing the planets to move in great circles +on the spheres, (making the circle between the icosahedron and dodecahedron equal +to the orbit of the earth,) that then the distances between the planets would, upon +the whole, agree with astronomical observations.</p> + +<p>This theory is as ingenious, as fascinating, and as original as Mr. Peirce’s +propositions. It has only one little fault; it does not agree with facts. And Kepler +afterwards abandoned his original theory.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_126" href="#FNanchor_126" class="label">[126]</a> Like Mr. Peirce, Kepler had, in his days, too, thought of the possibility of +making the world evolve from chance. When, in 1604, a new and brilliant fixed +star suddenly appeared in Ophiuchos, he took up the problem of star-evolution. +We will let Kepler tell the story in his own words as it appears in his treatise on the +new star:</p> + +<p>“Yesterday, while pondering over the problem, I was called to dinner, and my +young wife served the salad. ‘Do you think,’ I asked her, ‘if since the origin of +creation, pewter platters, salad leaves, oil and vinegar, and also hard-boiled eggs had +been flying in a chaotic mixture through space that <i>Chance</i> would have been able to +collect them to-day in a salad?’ ‘Certainly not in such a good mixture as this is,’ +was the reply of my beautiful wife.”</p> + +<p>Kepler rejected the idea that the world could have evolved by chance.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_127" href="#FNanchor_127" class="label">[127]</a> The philosophical articles of the <i>Century Dictionary</i> do not seem to be free of +party spirit. An extraordinary amount of praise is given to the mediæval realists +which, considering the vagaries of their propositions, they do not deserve. On the +other hand, the blame for the discredit into which scholasticism has fallen is heaped +upon the nominalists.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_128" href="#FNanchor_128" class="label">[128]</a> I said in <i>Fundamental Problems</i>, page 142, “The introduction of the word +positivism into philosophy is the merit of M. Auguste Comte. Although we cannot +accept much of M. Comte’s conception of positivism we gratefully adopt the name.” +There are plenty of other passages in which my usage of the term positivism, as distinguished +from the French positivism, is set forth, so that there could be little danger +of being misunderstood.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_129" href="#FNanchor_129" class="label">[129]</a> My main objection to the term Absolute is to forestall any hypostatising of a +vague abstract notion which can only serve the purpose of mystification. I suffer +the term Absolute in a loose sense when it is understood that it is used loosely. I +do not say, as Mr. Peirce seems to believe, “absolutely universal” or “absolutely +necessary.” The words universal and necessary are sufficiently significant to me +without any additional emphasis.</p> + +<p>Reality is relative throughout. Absolute existences are, if the term is taken +seriously, nonentities; and the expression “The Absolute” for the whole of existence +or for those features of existence which are universal and necessary is, to say the +least, misleading. These are my reasons for rejecting the Absolute as a philosophical +term. There is, of course, no objection to the term in chemistry, physics, +mathematics, and other sciences, where it has acquired technical meanings.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_130" href="#FNanchor_130" class="label">[130]</a> Mr. Peirce correctly says that the axioms of geometry are now exploded. +This, however, does not overthrow the reliability of formal mathematics; on the +contrary, it places it on a safer basis than that of unprovable assumptions, which +must be taken for granted.</p> + +<p>We look upon the whole system of geometry as a <i>product of mental operations</i>. +We perform some operations and note what their products are. We do something +and mind the consequences of what we do. The problem of modern geometry is +to invent a method by which we can construct in the simplest manner possible a +straight line and a plane. Euclid still presupposes the existence of the plane and +assumes it to be such that parallel lines do not meet. When we are able to construct +the plane of Euclidean geometry, we can dispense with the axiom of parallels, for, +in that case, the plane will possess the qualities it has by construction. We can +very well execute other constructions in which parallel lines possess other qualities, +and we shall on the basis of such an altered plan of operation be able to produce +entirely different systems of geometry.</p> + +<p>We must distinguish between the space of our mathematicians and real space. +Experience teaches us that real space has three dimensions which means that from +a given point every other point is determinable by three magnitudes. We might +doubt (although I think there is little occasion to do so) whether the real space of our +experience is truly three-dimensional, but we cannot doubt that the truths developed +in the one-dimensional system of numbers, in the two-dimensional system of plane +geometry, in the three-dimensional system of solid geometry, and also in <i>n</i>-dimensional +systems each in their respective domain are perfectly reliable, for they are +unequivocally determined, they are <i>eindeutig bestimmt</i>. There is no application of +the theory of probabilities in a field where the products are not due to chance but +result with certainty.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_131" href="#FNanchor_131" class="label">[131]</a> I wonder why the <i>Century Dictionary</i> does not mention the scholastic usage +of the word <i>univocus</i> as the root of univocal. Similarly we are not told that the +word <i>incompossibilitas</i> is an invention of the schoolmen. Duns Scotus, Mr. Peirce’s +favorite philosopher, uses the terms <i>univoce</i> and <i>incompossibilitas</i> freely.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_132" href="#FNanchor_132" class="label">[132]</a> We accept in this argument Mr. Peirce’s solutions, which, however, are his +own. A simpler example would have been more appropriate.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_133" href="#FNanchor_133" class="label">[133]</a> The belief in a duality of truth appears quite rational from the dualistic standpoint +of the middle ages, and the arguments of Scotus are cleverly devised, being +based upon the supposition that the fall of man had changed the entire order of the +world, so that the laws of nature prior to the Fall were different to those which obtain +now.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_134" href="#FNanchor_134" class="label">[134]</a> Duns Scotus was a very zealous advocate of ecclesiastical supremacy, even +advising, for instance, the prosecution of the Jews in order to convert them. It is a +strange irony of fate that the author of the <i>Fons vitæ</i>, upon whose authority Scotus +so largely depends and from whom he derived some of his most important ideas was +an Israelite. Scotus did not know that Avicebron was a pseudonym of the Spanish +Jew Salomon ben Gebirol.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_135" href="#FNanchor_135" class="label">[135]</a> I omit here a discussion as to whether or not the conservation of energy is +true or not. I need not mention that the views of our physicists, such men as +Helmholtz, Mach, Maxwell, Tait, and others differ widely from Mr. Peirce’s presentation +of the subject. Mr. Peirce rejects the law of the conservation of energy, +but retains the conservation, or (as he prefers to say) perduration of matter. I waive +the question, whether this is consistent, and call attention only to another, most +flagrant contradiction. Mr. Peirce states that, “not only the total amount [of matter] +remains constant, but all the different parts preserve their identity”; and yet he +says that “matter is effete mind.” Thus when mind becomes effete, the amount of +matter increases; however, when the habits of matter are broken up, mind originates, +and the amount of matter decreases. This, it seems, would make any perduration +of matter and of the identity of its different parts impossible.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_136" href="#FNanchor_136" class="label">[136]</a> That my view of the <i>a priori</i>, as Mr. Peirce claims, is “Schleiermacherian” +is new to me.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_137" href="#FNanchor_137" class="label">[137]</a> It is a matter of course that frequently several events coöperate to bring +about an effect. In that case we have our choice, either to speak of several causes, +or to treat the coöperation of all of them as <i>the</i> cause, or to select one of them to +be called the cause, while the others may be counted among the conditions.</p> + +<p>The limitation of a system of causation depends entirely upon the purpose of +our inquiry, and we must here, as in many other things, use discretion.</p> + +<p>Mr. Peirce concludes, that according to my view of causation we can, in a +relatively uniform motion, such as the flight of a cannon ball, regard the motion of +every moment as the cause for the motion of the next moment. I say “relatively,” +for absolutely uniform motion does not exist. I grant this, but I do not grant what +Mr. Peirce regards as a contradiction of mine, that in that case the cause would be +equal to the effect. A man who knows the artifices of the hair-splitting Eleates and +the other conundrums of logic, should know that every second of time is different +from every other second; 12 o’clock is different from 1 second past 12. He who denies +this, has only to miss a train in order to be converted. And how much more +different than the moments of time are the various moments of real motion, for in +every moment the moving body is in another place, with changed relations; and if +that does not constitute a difference, we should have to deny the existence of motion.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_138" href="#FNanchor_138" class="label">[138]</a> See my article on “The Continuity of Evolution” in <i>The Monist</i>, Vol. II, +No 1; and also “Monism and Meliorism,” p. 73, where “the struggle for the +ideal” is contrasted with “the struggle for life.”</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_139" href="#FNanchor_139" class="label">[139]</a> For details see, in <i>The Monist</i>, Vol. II, No. 4, page 518, et seqq., and 527, et +seqq., my articles, “Mr. Spencer on the Ethics of Kant,” heading iv, and “What +Does Anschauung Mean?”</p> + +<p>I now forgive Mr. Spencer; for if a Kant scholar like Mr. Peirce can fall into +this unpardonable mistake, why should not Mr. Spencer, whose knowledge of Kant’s +writings is, as he confesses himself, extremely limited, have the same privilege?</p></div> + +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_623">[623]</span></p> + +<h3 class="nobreak" id="THE_FOUNDATIONS_OF_THEISM">THE FOUNDATIONS OF THEISM.</h3> + +</div> + +<h4>I. THE REALISM OF THEISM.</h4> + +<p>It is commonly alleged that there is deeply seated in the human +mind a belief in the existence of a supreme being, and that the +prevalence of such belief is evidence that it has a basis in supernatural +revelation. It is urged in reply to this assertion, that this belief is +not universal, and that in any case its presence cannot be regarded as +satisfactory evidence that is well founded. It is known that the disposition +to worship is aroused by grand and beautiful objects; and +as Darwin well remarks in one of his letters, the natural sentiments +of the sublime and the beautiful easily assume a personal direction. +Scientific explanations, moreover, push a personal source of things +ever further from us, and it is becoming apparently more easy to +doubt or deny any such source whatever.</p> + +<p>Prevalent human instincts and intuitions are, however, the result +of experience imperfectly or perfectly digested, as the case may be. +In most instances they yield to analysis something of value. A more +plausible explanation of the theistic instinct is the anthropomorphic +one. Man knows that he originates many movements, both of his +own body and of other material things, and he knows of no other +real source of such movements. He therefore, in his primitive state, +before scientific explanations are attained, naturally refers motions +in nature to an original personal source. This, it may be supposed, +is the natural habit of the unsophisticated mind, and is at the bottom +of theistic belief, whether as unexplained in consciousness, and +therefore an instinct, or as a distinctly formulated belief. The phenomena +of nature must have originated somehow, and there is no +other conceivable source of motion than a personal one.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_624">[624]</span></p> + +<p>Facts developed by scientific research tend to weaken this anthropomorphism. +The indestructibility of matter means that it +has never been created. The conservation of energy states that +matter has always been in motion. The law of organic evolution is +supposed to do away with the necessity for creative intervention in +the origination of plants and animals. Finally, the observed facts +of the evolution of mind show that this, the light of the world, grew +like the organic beings which it inhabits. Nothing higher than man +has been found, and there seems to be no ground for suspecting the +existence of any higher mind. And man himself dies and undergoes +dissolution, like other organic bodies. The result of this use of the +facts of science is agnosticism, at least. We know of nothing beyond +what they teach, and some agnostics go so far as to say, “ignorabimus,” +we shall never know. Agnostics, however, have their +faces set in different directions. Some rest in it as a relief from +mental toil, as persons more theologically inclined join a church. +Others, believers in the progressive evolution of knowledge as of +other phenomena, set themselves to explore the unknown country, +believing that our opportunities in this direction are practically unlimited.</p> + +<p>Let us look again at this anthropomorphism which is so deeply +seated and so widely spread. Its essence is the fact that we control +our own bodies in a great degree and that our material organs obey +the behests of our mind. We do things for, to us, satisfactory reasons, +and for satisfactory reasons we leave many things undone, +which we could readily do. What has science done towards explaining +this most ordinary phenomenon? We may truthfully say, +absolutely nothing. It remains a fact that a majority, if not all animals, +move their bodies in their entirety or in part, because they +have sensations. In the lower animals these sensations are merely +either sense-impressions from without, or they are from within, being +produced by their physical condition. We rise but little in the +scale, when effects of memory are evident, for we find that many +actions are due to experience of the result of former actions. With +still higher development, mental organisation becomes more apparent, +and the reasoning and emotional states have more and more +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_625">[625]</span>distinct outcome in intelligent acts. But the mechanism by which +the act is called forth by the mental state, has never been explained.</p> + +<p>The difficulty lies here. A sensation, or a state of mind, weighs +nothing. A material body, let it be a cell or a mass of cells, as a +muscle, weighs something. How then can the former move the +latter? From a mechanical point of view, it cannot be done. For +that which has no weight to set in motion anything which has +weight, is to violate the law of the conservation and correlation of +energy. And this law is not only an <i>a priori</i> necessity, but it has +been demonstrated <i>a posteriori</i> in so many cases that exceptions cannot +be thought of. So a school of physiologists say that <i>it is not +done</i>. No animal eats because it is hungry, or drinks because it is +thirsty. The man does not direct the muscle of his arm when he +writes, nor those of his tongue when he speaks. But it is easy to see +why such a school of physiologists includes but an infinitesimal +part of mankind.</p> + +<p>There is a school of evolutionists who account for the whole +matter in harmony with the views of the physiologists above mentioned. +I refer to the Post-Darwinians, who account for evolution +by natural selection exclusively. That is, animals originally moved +aimlessly in all directions. Those whose movements were beneficial +to them, survived, while those whose movements were not beneficial, +or which were injurious, perished. As frequent motions in a +given direction lead to habits, so were inaugurated movements +which were habitually beneficial to the actors, which have therefore +persisted and multiplied. Thus were established the multifarious +habits of animals and men. Consciousness had nothing to do with +the process. It merely acted the part of the onlooker, being simply +aware of what went on. “Like the locomotive whistle,” says Huxley, +“it made considerable noise, but did none of the work.”</p> + +<p>To a person familiar with the facts of the evolution of the structures +of animals, this seems like a most inadequate theory. It is a +commonplace that no kind of selection, either artificial or natural, +ever originated anything. Selection simply selects between existing +alternatives. The fundamental question of evolution is, What is +the origin of things? What is the fate of things originated? is a secondary +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_626">[626]</span>question. To this first question the Post-Darwinian reply +must be, that everything possible has originated no one knows yet +how, so that what has survived was necessarily to be found in this +<i>embarras de richesse</i>. This is an enormous assumption, and one to +which the history of the life of past and present ages lends no support. +No such multifarious and promiscuous variation is known to +have occurred in living or in extinct organic beings. But if the +variations have not been infinite, then the chance of the existing one +having been hit upon becomes greatly reduced, and the chance of +its having occurred at the same time in individuals of opposite sex +is still smaller. Finally, the chance of its not being immediately +bred out by the overwhelming numbers of individuals not possessing +it, is indeed infinitesimal. In fact, it is evident that variations of +structure must have appeared in numbers of individuals of a species +at the same time, in order to secure survival. This indicates a common +cause of general application. That such causes have existed +and been effective at all periods of past and present time is amply +proved by the facts of geology and paleontology. The most influential +in effecting change of form and structure has been the motion +of the body and of its parts necessary to secure its food, to defend +or protect itself from dangers, and to reproduce its kind. The direct +mechanical effects of these motions on all the materials of the +body may be traced in the successive stages of the forms of past +ages to those of the present time.</p> + +<p>The objections above made to the theory of multifarious variation +of organic forms, apply with equal force to the theory of multifarious +movements of organic beings as furnishing the source of intelligent +habits. An additional and especial objection to the latter +hypothesis is the fact that it does not recognise the well-known +adaptability of animals to new situations and circumstances. If the +events of life were a routine moving with mathematical precision, +the theory of origin from multifarious variations would have a better +foundation; but this is not the case. Food, friends, and enemies +do not appear in stated periods, quantities, or qualities. Emergencies +are common, and variation of circumstance is the rule. +Without sensation, uniform habits would but lead to destruction. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_627">[627]</span>Everything which should not be presented in the habitual form and +at the habitual time would be neglected. Food and drink would be +refused, or not obtained; defense and reproduction would not be +attempted under the proper conditions. In fact, the conduct of +living beings would be no more intelligent than that of inorganic +matter in motion, were sensation to have no share in the process. +But as soon as we believe that the habits of animals are due to hunger, +thirst, and the perception of temperature, resistance, etc., their +acts become intelligible, and the formation of habits becomes a +necessary consequence of memory or the faculty of subsequent recognition +of sensations experienced at a previous time.</p> + +<p>It is, in this connection, of great interest to recall the diverse +effects on our mental history of sense-impressions, as compared +with the effect of thought. Sense-impressions are not remembered +in the proper sense of the term. The repetition in memory is always +vastly more indistinct than the original state of consciousness; +so much so as to be a very different thing. Thought, on the contrary, +when remembered at all, is an exact repetition in quality of +its first presence. The presentative consciousness has one quality; +the representative and re-representative have another quality. This +shows us that the structural arrangement of brain substance concerned +in the latter forms of consciousness have a far more permanent +quality than that due to the former. They thus constitute +more permanent acquisitions, and this being the case, must have a +most important bearing on evolution.⁠<a id="FNanchor_140" href="#Footnote_140" class="fnanchor">[140]</a> This is because it is a representative +state which determines action. The process of determination +may become so rapid as to be almost instantaneous; but it had +to be learned and the representation was what gave the act its +character and which organised the machinery of the automatic or +reflex act.</p> + +<p>I here refer to the low degrees of consciousness sometimes +called subconsciousness, and the expression, “the subliminal consciousness,” +introduced by F. Meyer. All shades of consciousness +intervene between the most distinct forms and the unconsciousness +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_628">[628]</span>of the reflex state. Intelligent subconsciousness is a low stage in +this evanescent series. Stages on the passage to and from sleep, +and other forms of unconsciousness due to physical causes, are properly +termed subconscious. There are reflexes which are due to +mechanisms which we inherit from our animal and human ancestors, +which are sometimes accompanied by consciousness. The amount +of intelligence displayed will depend on the function involved. Experiments +on vertebrate animals show that intelligent adaptation of +the movements of the body have been transferred forwards in the +brain during the course of evolution. Thus, a fish which retains the +medulla only, will guide itself through the water so as to avoid danger. +If the cerebellum and thalami are left to a reptile, it will avoid +destructive acts. But if a mammal is deprived of its hemispheres, +its actions are without design, and it is incapable of self-preservation.</p> + +<p>It may be that in the temporary absence of the higher consciousness, +the lower forms which once existed in our ancestors may +be revived, as in some of the elements of our dreams, and in some +forms of cerebral disease, when much of the blood is withdrawn +from the cortex or parts of it. The amount of consciousness +necessary to the performance of intelligent acts depends on the +novelty of the situation. Many of the theories on this subject, however, +take it for granted that intelligent acts arise in primarily unconscious +states. This is only credible on the supposition that such +acts have arisen by natural selection only, a view which I have combated +on a previous page. Some authors use expressions which can +only imply unconscious consciousness. This is of course absurd and +self-contradictory. No source but sensation can be found for intelligent +acts.</p> + +<p>It is true that there are some movements of organic bodies +which have an intelligent appearance, to which we cannot ascribe +consciousness. Such are those of the spermatozoöids and of the +leucocytes. Some of the lowest animals and plants cannot be yet +proved to be conscious. We cannot now explain the nature of the +movements which these forms exhibit, but they will probably yield +to research. Enough it is for our present purpose to know that the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_629">[629]</span>majority of animals are conscious for a large part of their lives. And +we have abundant evidence to show that movements inaugurated in +conscious states may be performed, so soon as learned, in unconsciousness, +and become part of the mental furniture of the animal.</p> + +<p>It seems, then, that the control of ponderable matter by mental +states is not the exclusive prerogative of man, but is a phenomenon +of common observation in the animal kingdom. The facts +indicate that it is characteristic of mind to move resistant and tri-dimensional +matter under suitable conditions. These conditions are +rigid, but within the limits which they define, the sequence is definite. +It is difficult to believe in anything which is in direct violation +of mechanical necessity, and a mere hypothesis to that effect +would not deserve a moment’s consideration. But the belief that +the body, or parts of it, are moved in direct obedience to mental +states is founded on more numerous observations than are most of +those beliefs which we hold to be true. In fact there is no scientific +doctrine better supported by observation and experience than this +one. On this ground alone, then, we are compelled to believe in +something in the universe which is supermechanical, or extramechanical. +We may call this supernaturalism, or occultism, or +what we like, but the fact remains. We have in it the germ of +theism, anthropomorphic, if you will, but one which grows in importance +as we come to examine further into the characteristics of +mental action.</p> + +<p>Before going into this part of the subject, I will refer to the part +played by mind in evolution. From what has gone before, it is evident +that this part has been an important one. If structures are +produced by motions, it is clear that habits produce structures, and +<i>vice versa</i>; and that under the law of natural selection only the useful +and harmless ones have survived. It follows, then, that progressive +evolution of form is secured by the presence of consciousness, +and must, sooner or later, fail without it. With development of intelligence +the progress must become more continuous and rapid. +The facts of paleontology confirm such a hypothesis; since the more +intelligent animals (Mammalia) have generally supplanted the less +intelligent, (Reptilia and Batrachia), whenever brought into conflict +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_630">[630]</span>with them. The supremacy of the intelligent over the unintelligent +Mammalia is also clearly shown by research into their past history. +The modification of type, or evolution, has also become more and +more rapid as time has advanced and intelligence developed.</p> + +<p>There is another reason why the intervention of supermechanics +into the process has been necessary to secure such results as we observe +in the evolution of life. The law of inorganic evolution is, as +Spencer epitomises it, “the integration of matter and the dissipation +of energy.” Natural chemical reactions when not interfered with by +human intelligence, produce solids and give out heat. In other +words, they result in death and not in life. To produce life something +different from chemical energy has been necessary. And as +the case is a parallel one to the evolution of the types of life, we +may suspect that the agency at work has been a related one. It is +some form of energy of the vital class which is able to overcome the +bonds which hold dead matter in their adamantine grasp; and it is +evident that such an energy could have been organised only in some +region where mechanics of a superchemical order prevail. If we +take a large view of the universe the alternatives of life and death +present themselves clearly before us. The law of the latter is the +integration of matter and dissipation of energy. The law of the +former is the converse; the loosing of the bonds of matter, and the +production of mechanism for the raising of the type of energy. The +first is catagenesis, the latter is anagenesis. The end of catagenesis +is the extinction of all mind and all life. Anagenesis sustains both. +The best foundation for our belief in anagenesis is that it exists. +Catagenesis has not destroyed it, and this fact must lead us to suspect +that it is the product of an agency which is superchemical; and +the only such that we know is consciousness.</p> + +<p>In the presence of such a far-reaching hypothesis we are called +upon to consider more particularly the relations of mind to its physical +basis. The essential condition of the existence of mind as we +know it, is metabolism. The substance⁠<a id="FNanchor_141" href="#Footnote_141" class="fnanchor">[141]</a> of the nervous cells must be +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_631">[631]</span>in a state of decomposition and recomposition; old material loosing +its chemical bonds and giving forth energy, and new material arriving +to undergo the same process. The energy thus produced +displays the phenomena of mind, and as such differs widely from the +inorganic energies of heat, light, etc. The extent to which it displays +habits depends on the part of the nervous structure where it +is produced. In the spinal cord it is strictly automatic, and as we +approach the hemispheres the so-called voluntary element becomes +more apparent, until a region is reached where conception, deliberation, +and judgment have their seat. In this region energy is purely +mental in its attributes, and it unlocks the executive mechanism of +the body, and puts it in action in accordance with the needs of consciousness. +So far, mechanical laws explain the order of events. The +supermechanical resides in the mental content and its effects on the +outgoing energy. No quantitative relation can be shown to exist +between the results of the mental processes of classification, conception, +judgment, etc, and the amount of incoming or outgoing +energy. Indeed it is plain that none can exist, if the statement +already made be true, viz., that thoughts are without weight. This +part of the subject requires critical treatment, but the general result +is included in the above statement, which is sufficient for our present +purpose.</p> + +<p>Since consciousness possesses such extraordinary relations to +matter we may well suspect that it has a wider distribution than +comes within the purview of our present limited ken. Why should +it not protect and nourish itself under conditions different from those +which prevail in our planet? The one condition necessary to it is +metabolism—which means free energy. The kind of physical basis +cannot be important, provided it be capable of exhibiting this kind +of non-automatic energy. Automatism and all its reflex consequences +are the death of consciousness, as every one knows. From such a +type of energy all the fixed types of energy must have been derived, +and with them the types of both mental and physical structures. In +its freest form it should have as a physical basis a form of matter +which should be without habits, but always ready to undergo a catagenetic +change into routine energy and ultimate unconsciousness. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_632">[632]</span>Such a medium should be unspecialised matter, and the consciousness +inhabiting it would be a creator. Such consciousness would be +readily transmitted wherever the physical basis should be suitable, +and one such substance is our protoplasm. The probable inferiority +of protoplasm as a physical basis is indicated by the long and tedious +education which has been necessary to enable beings made of it +to attain a high order of intelligence. In such a basis anagenesis is +slow, and catagenesis is easy. Other bases might be imagined where +the reverse would be the case. No assumption can be made as to a +constant and limited amount of consciousness in the universe. That +such is the case is supposable; but it is also supposable that the +amount of suitable physical basis may be increased by a process of +assimilation of non-conscious matter, as is done by animals in digestion +and reproduction. This process might continue until all +matter should be brought into that generalised condition which is +necessary to the continuance of consciousness. The entire universe +would then be conscious, and a maximum limit would be reached. +In the primitive consciousness, whatever its extent in space in the +Universe, we have the Supreme Being or Person.</p> + +<h4>II. THE IDEALISM OF THEISM.</h4> + +<p>What I mean by the above expression is the theism which is +supposed to be demonstrated by idealistic metaphysics. There are +two forms of this alleged demonstration, both of which have for their +starting-point the basis of the idealistic philosophy. This basis is +the fact that we know nothing of matter excepting as sense-impressions. +From this it is inferred that were conscious beings to become +extinct, matter would no longer exist. It is also a consequence of +this belief that what we observe of the conduct of matter, which we +call by the name of natural law, is of purely mental origin.</p> + +<p>If now the universe consist wholly of mind, the totality of it, +either as reduced to a body of general laws, or to a single comprehensive +generalisation, or concept, is one form of idealistic God. +The other demonstration is as follows. Since matter exists as mental +states, and since these mental states are common to mankind, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_633">[633]</span>who are mortal; since these mental states reproduce themselves +from generation to generation, it is inferred that a permanent mental +state exists, which possesses the permanent sensations we call matter. +And this common mind of humanity is God.</p> + +<p>The difference between these deities is this. In the first case +he is an abstraction of the human mind and therefore not a person +apart from such men as are capable of the generalisations of which +he consists. In the second case he is a person apart from humanity. +The validity of either demonstration to the thinker depends on +his point of view. To every one but the idealist, the first proposition +is atheism. The evidence for the second is metaphysical anthropomorphism, +and would be a demonstration, were the theory of +idealism well founded.</p> + +<p>The fact that we only know matter as sense-impressions does +not, in the opinion of realists, prove that it does not exist as the resistant +and extended. Resistance of each part to the movements of +other parts (energy), and extension in space, are conditions about +which we have a great deal of information. Our lives are spent in +overcoming the one, and in getting round the other. Our methods +of dealing with it represent the antithesis of those employed in +thought-processes. The latter are best performed in the absence +of the muscular exertion which is so necessary in dealing with the +former. I have referred to the well-known difference in consciousness +between sense-impressions and the representation and re-representation +of them. The difference certainly implies a difference +in the immediate sources of the respective kinds of consciousness. +The one is produced by something different from that which produces +the other. In short, the one is produced by the contact of +matter external to our physical basis, and the other is produced by +a modification of brain-structure; and in the first place by that +simplest form of it which is the cause of memory. The effect of +such observation is the conviction that matter exists as something +outside of consciousness or mind, in spite of the fact that we only +know it in consciousness. In a word, consciousness and knowledge +imply the existence rather than the non-existence of something which +is known.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_634">[634]</span></p> + +<p>The fundamental actualities are, then, subject and object; or, +in popular language, mind and matter. Philosophy includes the +sciences which embrace the knowledge of both subject and object; +but the practical philosophy is the science of the mutual relations +of the two. It may be said that subject and object are opposite +sides of the same reality, but this form of expression appears to me +to be no more accurate than the statement that energy and matter +are opposite sides of the same thing. As energy is the motion of +matter, mind is the intelligence of matter; and both may be called +properties of matter with equal propriety, since both are impossible +without a physical basis. Mind, however, differs from energy in +possessing some intrinsic qualities which are in essence independent +of the qualities of the physical basis; and these intrinsic qualities +are the forms of logic. These are, however, but a part of the totality +of mind, although they underlie or penetrate all its representative +activities.</p> + +<p>While mind then cannot exist without a physical basis, it remains +to be considered whether any other objective world is necessary +to its existence. It is sometimes alleged that consciousness +could not exist without an objective, exterior to its physical basis. +If, however, consciousness is a necessary attribute of free energy, +the latter purely metaphysical speculation has no foundation. The +“intuition of Being” (Rosmini) would exist, albeit not much specialised, +in the absence of multifarious objects; but the forms of logic +would characterise it nevertheless.</p> + +<p>It is alleged that we can never know matter as it is, because our +observation is restricted to the mutual relations of its component +parts. In this assertion our intelligence necessarily concurs, but this +need not cause us to relax our exertions in the pursuit of knowledge. +The practical philosophy is, as already remarked, the knowledge of +the relations subsisting between mind and matter, so that our most +valuable acquisition will be in the end the laws of a relation. We +may well postpone our endeavors after the absolute, even if we can +ever attain a knowledge of it. The realist is content to believe that +if we do not know “things as they are in themselves,” it is because, +of the imperfection of our senses. But we are constantly discovering +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_635">[635]</span>new aids to research, and we can put no limit to our power in +this direction.</p> + +<p>The research into the relations of subject and object, means to +theology, an investigation as to the existence and nature of Deity, +and as to an existence for conscious beings in other than terrestrial +life. The pure idealist reaches an affirmative answer to these problems +by a short and easy route, based on a study of the intrinsic nature +of mind alone. The pure realist reaches a negative conclusion +by an equally short cut, by considering the properties of matter +alone. Not a few thinkers entertain both doctrines at one and the +same time, although they are mutually exclusive and contradictory. +No wonder that they reach what Montgomery well terms “the +puzzle of puzzles.” But the rational conclusion from this deadlock +must be, that there is something wrong with the methods of both sides. +To the practical mind it seems that the vice in both methods is the +failure to harmonise properly with their own, the facts adduced by +the opposite side in the discussion. And it is indeed evident that that +cannot be the final philosophy which restricts itself to a consideration +of mind alone; or that which restricts itself to a consideration of +matter alone. That men should pursue different lines of research is +natural. Those whose minds are capable in the fields of conception +naturally prefer idealistic studies; while those whose especial genius +lies in the direction of mechanics, easily pursue-materialistic research. +What is needed is a combination of the two fields of ability +in the same mind.</p> + +<p>A considerable class of serious people, observing the diversities +between the schools of philosophy, regard such studies as useless. +Since they have not the disposition or ability to solve the question +for themselves, they find it best to rest in uncertainty, which has +optimistic or pessimistic tendencies according to temperament and +education. The optimist has faith that all is, and all will be, well; +while the pessimist takes the opposite view. Both are sustained in +their position by those teachers who teach the impotence of our +faculties and the uselessness of knowledge. Such appeal in support +of their position to the facts already cited; the imperfection of our +senses; the relativity of knowledge; the inscrutable nature of mind +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_636">[636]</span>and matter, etc. This position is, however, a plea of avoidance, +and it will be time enough to listen to it when the avenues of the increase +of human knowledge are permanently closed. This they are +not at present.</p> + +<p>The key to the position is the doctrine of evolution. Here we +behold the interaction of subject and object, both in our own persons +and in the inferior beings which are with us, and which have +preceded us on earth. That mind has not sprung full-fledged upon +this planet, is clear; and that it has made wonderful progress in +power, is equally clear. Why did it not appear with all its powers +“in the beginning”? The answer obviously is, “the intractability +of matter.” Why has it progressed in face of this obstacle? The +answer is, the tractability of matter. Mind, through its intrinsic +quality, has coërced matter, in ever increasing degree, and the limit +of its capacity in this direction plainly has not yet been reached. Its +most important conquest has been that of its own physical basis, +and next to it is the conquest of the world of objects by which it is +surrounded. Its last conquest will be the knowledge of its destiny, +as a projection of its known past. To this end the knowledge of its +own constitution is essential, but this is not all, as the pure idealist +would have us believe. The knowledge of external relations is +also essential, for we can in no state of being escape them. Psychic +life is an “internal adjustment to external relations,” quite as much +as is the physical life, as it is defined by Spencer in the phrase just +quoted.</p> + +<p>The Deity of evolution indicated in the first section of this paper, +will not satisfy the pure idealist. He is not an absolute, since +He is compelled to respect relations. But we find Him to be just, +which he evidently is not if absolute. He is anthropomorphic, and +not an abstraction of the human mind. And yet as the seat of rationality, +and as the director of free energy, He possesses the function +of creator of whatever is possible. The evolution of independent +human minds has been only possible through education, and here +as elsewhere, teachable students have met with greater success than +the stolid.</p> + +<p>It has been already pointed out that the process of evolution +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_637">[637]</span>may be either progressive (Anagenesis) or retrogressive (Catagenesis). +This is well known to be the case with organic types, where +degenerate phyla are common. It seems, indeed, that in the order +of things degeneracy has occurred wherever it has been possible; +that is, under circumstances which permitted vegetative life through +lack of stimuli to energetic motion. There has always been “room +at the top”; but only when all the lower fields of existence have been +for the time being filled, has there been room at the top only. The +history of mental evolution has accompanied that of general structural +evolution, and for similar reasons. It is well illustrated in +human society to-day. These facts suggest that this has been the +history of all evolution, since they harmonise with the order of evolution +observed in our solar system, in which the inorganic has preceded +the organic, or Catagenesis has preceded Anagenesis. If the +forms of non-vital energy represent a result of Catagenesis, we are +not bound to look on minerals as in any sense living, as has been +suggested by Haeckel and others. Most, if not all, forms of chemical +energy have sunk below the vital level, and certainly far below +the possibility of displaying consciousness. We are here looking +over unexplored territory, and one whose elucidation is entirely in +the future, but we may put our ideas in order, if we do nothing +more.</p> + +<p>Besides his relations to the impersonal materials that surround +him, man has essential relations to his fellow-man. The laws of +these relations are ethics. Much is written and spoken against the +utilitarian or evolutionary theory of ethics. I cannot, however, +escape the conviction that this theory offers the true explanation of +the rise of the ethical sentiment in mankind. But to understand it +aright, we must include the growth of the social sentiment, as well +as that of the rational element, in the evolution of justice or right. +The opponents of this view sometimes commit the error common to +all those who do not understand the nature of mental evolution. +Some of them imagine that it is necessary to suppose that, in harmony +with this theory, every man decides his every act solely in +accordance with what appears to him at the time to subserve the +lowest form of selfishness of which he is capable. The doctrine, on +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_638">[638]</span>the contrary, maintains that habits of honesty and justice are the +result of the education of the ages, and that men obey such motives +according to their developmental status; that is, in accordance with +the evolution of the habit of preferring the higher to the lower forms +of utility. The further question of what it is that has raised the +standard of utility, is answered by what we see going on around us. +The fear of the law; the love of the approbation of our fellows; the +sympathy with our fellow-men; the fear of their indignation; all +these are educators of great potency, which have always been active. +These motives, organised as character, are compulsory, and it would +be strange if they have not been effective in producing results.</p> + +<p>Practical ethics has to do with material beings and their material +possessions, i. e. with person and property. Without the objective, +the content of ethics is purely ideal, consisting of love and +hate, and the justice and injustice of opinion which might be the outcome +of those sentiments. These sentiments are realities of the +subjective, representing the affections, as the form of thought constitutes +the rational faculties. But if we endeavor in thought to deprive +love and hate, justice and injustice, of all material consequences +and implications, we deprive those sentiments of much of +their value if we do not abolish their occasions altogether. It appears +to me at least doubtful whether hate and injustice could exist +in a society consisting of disembodied minds, if such beings could be +imagined; a supposition which I cannot entertain.</p> + +<p>If ethics cannot exist without material expression, it is clear +that, on the other hand, they cannot exist without a subjective foundation. +Thus ethics is the highest expression of the relation between +mind and matter. Ethics is the practical application of the mental +powers to human relations, and the more complete the evolution of +mind, the more perfect is the ethical practice. Thus the evolution +of the mind is the guarantee of ethical progress, and the more intelligent +the mind, the more easy will the evolution be. As in all +education, the laggards experience the severities of compulsion, +while pains and penalties are avoided by those who perceive their +approach and do not await their arrival. Here we have the utilitarian +ground of our numerous ethical and religious organisations. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_639">[639]</span>They invite men to <i>a priori</i> subjective theory, and objective practice, +so as to preserve society from the evils of inferior and painful +methods of compulsion, which lie at the basis of ethical evolution. +It is the dread of this method which rouses a natural repugnance in +the minds of many men to the doctrine which teaches of it. But it +must be remembered that the instruments of evolution change with +the thing that is evolving, and the conditions of progressive ethics +are the stages of progress of the mind. What is necessary for the +education of the lower mind is no longer necessary for the higher. +This is not only a truth of philosophy, but the fact may be discerned +in the religions which men have made for themselves. They describe +the ethical state of their authors, and prescribe the treatment appropriate +to it.</p> + +<p>Our knowledge of some parts of evolutionary history is meagre, +and on some of its chapters we are absolutely in the dark. This is +especially true of the causes of the appearance of life and consciousness +on the earth. Spontaneous generation has not been proven, +and the immediate source of sensation is unknown. The conclusions +enumerated in the preceding pages are derived from evidence presented +in more or less complete fragments. But the thesis remains +true that mind possesses a limited control over its physical basis, +but one which is sufficient to account for the main direction of the +evolution of those organic forms which possess it. And it is also +true that the essential forms of the rational mind are not due to corresponding +qualities of the physical basis. These forms are: the +principles of identity, of abstraction, and of generalisation or conception. +These characteristics constitute the idealistic essence of +Theism. But we look to the realistic element of Theism for the +demonstration of the distinct personality of God.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">E. D. Cope.</span></p> + +<div class="footnotes"> + +<h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_140" href="#FNanchor_140" class="label">[140]</a> <i>Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society</i>, 1889, p. 495</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_141" href="#FNanchor_141" class="label">[141]</a> Recent experiments conducted in the laboratory of the Johns Hopkins University +show that the cytoplasm of cells, which are exhausted by labor, is vacuolated.</p></div> + +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_640">[640]</span></p> + +<h3 class="nobreak" id="LITERARY_CORRESPONDENCE_IV">LITERARY CORRESPONDENCE.</h3> + +</div> + +<h4 class="nobreak" id="GERMANY_IV">GERMANY.</h4> + +<p>The name of Cesare Lombroso is now more and more mentioned +in Germany, not only in psychiatrical, juridical, and +sociological works, written for the learned public, but also in the +newspapers and magazines. By the side of occasional recognition +of his doctrine of the born criminal and genius, we meet—and these +are the majority of the cases—with violent attacks on it, which not +seldom exhibit real ignorance of the views of the celebrated Italian +investigator. Lombroso himself is partly to blame for this unfortunate +circumstance, for his writings, with their mountains of undigested +material, are so lacking in unity and perspicuity that misconceptions +are very apt to arise.</p> + +<p>The German translator of Lombroso, <span class="smcap">Dr. H. Kurella</span>, psychiatrist +in Kreuzburg, in Silesia, has recently given to the world a +synoptical exposition of Lombroso’s theory of the born criminal, +under the title <i>Cesare Lombroso und die Naturgeschichte des Verbrechers</i>, +Hamburg, 1892, Richter. The author not only expounds +the doctrines of Lombroso, but also deals critically with them, and, +although upon the whole his sympathies are with the views of the +Italian scientist, he nevertheless believes that the existence of a +fixed type of the <i>delinquente nato</i>, embracing all special forms of +criminality, is yet a question of doubt. On the other hand, <span class="smcap">Max +Nordau</span>, a widely-read author of ours, gives unqualified recognition +to the theories of Lombroso, fully accepting the idea of “degeneration,” +first introduced by Morel into science and further developed +by Lombroso, and, in completion of the work of his master, extending +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_641">[641]</span>this idea to art and literature. In his work, <i>Entartung</i>, the first +volume of which was recently published by Carl Duncker, of Berlin, +and is dedicated to Lombroso, “his dear, admired master,” he says: +“Degenerate types are not always criminals, prostitutes, anarchists, +and idiots. They are often writers and artists, and these exhibit +the same mental, and frequently also the same physical, traits as +those members of the same anthropological family that satisfy their +diseased instincts by means of the murderer’s knife or the cartridge +of the dynamitard, instead of with pen and pencil.”</p> + +<p>People who are acquainted with Nordau’s previous works will +perhaps imagine that this latest book of his is simply a mass of +journalistic ebullitions which can lay no claim to <i>scientific</i> value. +This, however, is wrong. Nordau is not only well acquainted with +the patho-psychological literature of this province—especially with +the French—but he also turns his knowledge to scientific account, +which psychiatrists like Pelman and others have publicly admitted. +Taking it as a whole, Nordau has presented in this first volume of +his work a good psychology of mysticism—good, that is, for all who +accept the association psychology. Nordau’s expositions embrace +all the psychological theories which belong in this province, with +their applications to individuals and to the tendencies of modern +literature and art. With respect to the first point, the author is right +in saying that he does not offer here anything new to the professional +psychologist, but he is wrong in his theory that psychologists will +read this chapter with impatience, for his exposition is unquestioniably +elegantly written. Of much greater interest is the second part, +in which a diagnosis of imbecility is rendered upon the English pre-Raphaelites, +the French symbolists, the Tolstois, and Richard +Wagners. The chapter on Richard Wagner will especially attract +attention for its severity. Nordau closes it with the words, “of all +the aberrations of the present time, Wagnerism is the most widely +diffused and the most important. The playhouse at Bayreuth, the +<i>Bayreuther Blätter</i>, the Parisian <i>Revue Wagnerienne</i>, are lasting +monuments by which the future will measure in wonderment the +dimensions of this degeneration and hysteria of our day.”</p> + +<p>Nordau throws light upon numerous mooted phenomena of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_642">[642]</span>modern art and literature, pointing out their diseased features. One +is really surprised at the extent of his work. All in all, it may be +foreseen that Koch’s doctrine of the “psychopathical minor factors”—or +those psychical factors which constitute the border-line +between mental health and disease—will clear up much more extensive +fields than they have, when applied in the direction indicated +by Nordau. <span class="smcap">Koch</span> has now published the third part of his work, +(which I have repeatedly mentioned in <i>The Monist</i>) and thus completed +it. He concludes his last volume with these words: “The +domain of the ‘psychopathical minor factors’ is a wide and very interesting +one. Whosoever enters profoundly into it will learn to +look at much in life with different eyes from those with which he +began, will understand many men and many human acts, which before +he did not understand. There are yet many scientific treasures +to be unearthed in this field, and I hope that I shall win many +a coadjutor. I hope, also, that qualified men will make this theory +of the psychopathical minor factors fruitful in wider fields and for +greater problems.”</p> + +<p>It is a common belief that it is pre-eminently in our time that +psychical disorders and psychical minor factors play so great a rôle. +But that in the sense of Nordau they are not of so recent origin a +careful reader will learn from a new work of <span class="smcap">Ludwig Geiger</span>, the +well-known historian of literature and civilisation (Paetel, Berlin). +Its title is: <i>Berlin, 1688-1840: Geschichte des geistigen Lebens der +preussischen Hauptstadt</i>. As yet, only the first volume has appeared, +which extends to the death of Frederick the Great. The reader, +however, would obtain an entirely wrong impression of the work if +he were to believe that psychiatrical points of view are expressly +dwelt upon in this book. To find them he must read between the +lines. The book is an extraordinarily painstaking history of the +civilisation of Berlin, taken from the sources, and giving especial +prominence to intellectual factors. We shall reserve the detailed +discussion of this important work for another occasion, perhaps until +it is fully completed.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">Christian Ufer.</span></p> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_643">[643]</span></p> + +<h3 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_REVIEWS_IV">BOOK REVIEWS.</h3> + +</div> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">Hand-Commentar zum neuen Testament. iv. Evangelium, Briefl und Offenbarung +des Johannes.</span> Bearbeitet von <i>H. J. Holtzmann</i>. Zweite verbesserte +und vermehrte Auflage. (Freiburg I. B. and Leipsic: 1893. J. C. B. +Mohr.)</h4> + +<p>The fourth gospel, of all the sacred writings of the New Testament, has always +been the reviewer’s favorite book. Its profundity, its wealth of philosophical ideas, +the fervor of its author’s religious sentiment, and the spiritual grace that pervades the +whole book, exercised an unspeakable charm on my mind. This gospel was the first +to rouse my doubts in the belief of literal inspiration, and it was again the one, +which, after the severest storms of infidelity had blown over, reconciled me to +the spirit of Christianity. Thus the perusal of Professor Holtzmann’s commentary +again arouses the recollections of former struggles, and I find that even to-day the +first chapter of the fourth gospel has lost none of its fascination. It is a wonderful +book, and its author is a man whom I always longed to meet and shake hands with, +over a span of almost two millenniums and a world-wide abyss of difference of +opinion.</p> + +<p>Only those who are familiar with the difficulties of the St. John literature of +the New Testament can really appreciate this latest work of Prof. H. J. Holtzmann. +He presents in a most clear and concise manner the problems involved, together +with their various solutions, critically arranged. He carefully avoids obtruding on +the reader his own views. He stands before us as a faithful compiler only. I say +“only,” but this “only” means a great deal. It does not mean that he suppresses +or conceals his own views, it means that he states the facts with scrupulous impartiality. +If there is any partiality apparent in his treatment of the sacred writings, +it is the reverent attitude he preserves whenever love of truth obliges him to accept +the negative result of critical investigations. And where is there a theological +scholar to-day, who is orthodox enough to dare to accept the theory that the gospel +of St. John was written by the apostle? Holtzmann carries his impartiality to the +extent of not rejecting this old traditional idea, concerning the authorship of the +fourth gospel, but the evidence against it is overwhelmingly sufficient to satisfy the +most narrowminded believer. Holtzmann teaches us at the same time to understand +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_644">[644]</span>the spirit of the first and second century of our era, and thus excludes from +the beginning the old prejudice, that if the author were not the man whom he impersonated +his work must be regarded as a fraud. The historical value of the book +lies in the revelations it gives us concerning the religious demands of the times in +which it was written. The fourth gospel originated when the Jewish religiosity of +growing Christianity began to expand into cosmic universality. The author was +undoubtedly a Jew-Christian, whose home most likely was Ephesus. Ephesus was the +place where we find the first beginnings of Christian Alexandrianism. Here the Logos-idea +was introduced into Christian thought. Philo, the Alexandrian Jew, had already +represented Moses as the incarnation of the divine Logos. Should not now +a Christian familiar with Philo’s philosophy apply the same method to Jesus of +Nazareth? Some work adapted to satisfy the wants of the time and especially the +religious yearnings for knowledge as a means of edification was needed. The Christ-idea +had taken a definite shape in the imagination of the Christian congregations of +Asia Minor, consisting of diaspora Jews and Gentiles, and their Christ-idea found a +worthy expression in the picture of Jesus of Nazareth as we have it in the fourth +gospel.</p> + +<p>The fact that the author of the fourth gospel was a Jew-Christian, appears from +his readiness to explain Jewish customs. He knows Judaism, and is familiar with +Jerusalem as it appeared after the destruction of the temple. The probability is +that he wrote his gospel between 120 and 140. He is comparable to Matthew in so +far as both are greatly interested in the controversy between Gentiles <i>versus</i> Jews, +yet Matthew’s Israel has grown into the world-wide cosmos. The frequent occurrence +of the very word “cosmos” in the fourth gospel is remarkable. In the same +way the Greek term γιγνώσκειν (to know) appears besides the older term πιστεύειν (to +believe), which latter is a translation of a Jewish conception, still employed so vigorously +by St. Paul. The author of the fourth gospel is not familiar with Galilee +and does not seem to care for consistency in the details of his accounts, for he frequently +contradicts his own statements. The most important differences between +his and the three synoptic gospels are the accounts as to the main field of Jesus’s +activity, which according to St. John was Judea, according to the synoptic gospels +Galilee, and the day of Jesus’s death, which according to St. John is the 14th of +Nisan, according to the synoptic gospels the 15th of Nisan, so that if we follow the +latter, Jesus would have been tried and condemned, against all Jewish customs, on +one of the greatest festival days. Holtzmann rightly warns the reader, that whatever +may speak in favor of the synoptic gospels as being, in general, historically more +correct, the author of the fourth gospel might have had some special source for this +particular fact.—</p> + +<p>The Revelation of St. John has given more trouble to the Christian exegesis +than any other book, and light was not shed upon its plan and construction, until it +was found to be one instance only of a whole class of literary productions. When +we consider the Revelation of St. John in the same line with other apocalyptic +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_645">[645]</span>works, and when we understand the mental disposition of the pious Jews shortly +before and after Christ, we have a clew to the enigmatic visions which are unrolled +before our eyes.</p> + +<p>The expectations of the Jews in the times of the Maccabees were disappointed +again and again. The great events of the world did not justify the national hopes, +and God did not seem to care about fulfilling his promises. The last prophet, who +called himself Malachi, or “the messenger of God,” proclaimed the message of the +Lord, “Yet I loved Jacob,” and he comforts the faithful who still endure in all +their tribulations, that “a book of remembrance is written before him for them +that feared the Lord and that thought upon His name.” After Malachi, a number +of revelations appeared, which, to the satisfaction of the Messianic expectations, +explained the events of the world, and prophesied that those only who should persevere +until the end would be called upon to rule, together with the “Son of Man,” +who is to come to smite the heathens and to rule them with an iron rod. The first +apocalyptic author, who wrote in 164 B. C., impersonated Daniel, the prophet, who +had lived about 400 B. C. The powerful nations of the world are represented as +beasts, the fourth and last beast being the Macedonian empire. It has ten horns, +that is, rulers, the last one being Antiochus Epiphanes. As soon as his power is +broken, the power over the earth will be given to Israel, which is called the Son of +Man. The power of the tenth horn was broken, indeed, yet the Messianic hopes +remained unfulfilled, and thus new prophecies were wanted, which should again +explain the plans of the Almighty, so that the faithful would still endure and hope. +Thus, Henoch was written, and after Henoch the Assumption of Moses, the book +of Baruch, and other revelations.</p> + +<p>The apocalyptic literature is characterised by Messianic expectations and +eschatological reflections. The end of the present course of affairs is said to be near +at hand and a new order will be established in which the faithful shall rule for a +whole millennium and the wicked be tormented.</p> + +<p>The Revelation of St. John represents this spirit of apocalyptic hopes among the +early Christians of Asia Minor. It throws much light upon the conditions and the +conceptions of a period concerning which we have very little information. We here +see Christianity in its beginnings. The coloring of the Revelation is still Jewish. Its +author stands in a conscious contrast to the Greek spirit which is about to change +the properly Jewish character of the new doctrine. The author of the St. John revelation +is a Jew to the backbone still; he denounces the antinomistic Christianity of +the Gentiles as represented by Nocolaitanes whom, we are told, God hateth. He +does not directly mention the apostle St. Paul, but there is little doubt that he is +alluded to in Chap. II, 2, as one of them “which say they are apostles and are not.”</p> + +<p>The more powerful the Greek spirit grew in the church, the weaker became +these original features inherited from the diaspora Jews until they were dropped forever +through the efforts of Origenes who made a decided and successful opposition +to the belief in the millennium. Yet it took some time for the traditional view of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_646">[646]</span>the Messiah to change into the purer and more spiritual Christ-ideal There were +two parties in the early church who spoke two radically different idioms; the one +still cherished the old chiliasm, dreaming of the establishment of a millennium on +earth. Their terminology moved always in the same allegories: they spoke of green +and fat fields and of sulphurous abysses, of white horses and terrible beasts, of trees +of life, of golden cities and of war and bloodshed, while the other party spoke of +Logos, of the eternal Son through whom the world had been made, of “the dispensation +of the fulness of the times in which God might gather together in one all +things in Christ, both which are in heaven and which are on earth,” of the pleroma +and of aeons.</p> + +<p>The Revelation of St. John is an expression of the former party and it was natural +that after a complete victory of the latter party, Christian teachers knew not +what to make of this book which shows Christian views by the side of an irreconcilable +Judaism, and a worldly empire in Jerusalem, the beloved city with twenty-four +Jewish elders representing the twelve tribes of Israel. The rest of Jerusalem is to +be finally converted while there is no hope for paganism. The difference between +Israelites and Gentiles remains a radical one even in the Holy City when the new +heaven and the new earth has been created. The Gentile-Christians appear as citizens +of a lower order. The Israelites alone live in the city while the Gentiles only +walk in the light thereof, and they shall bring the glory and honor of the nations +into it.</p> + +<p>We have given a few glimpses of the problems of the St. John literature only. +It is impossible to go over the whole field. Nor is it necessary to do so. Professor +Holtzmann has given us so complete a presentation that we need but refer to his +work which is indispensable to all interested in the literature of the New Testament. +It will be the more valuable and welcome as it is furnished with an index, a feature +rarely found in German books.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">P. C.</span></p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">Die Willensfreiheit und ihre Gegner.</span> By <i>Dr. Constantin Gutberlet</i>. Fulda: +Fuldaer Actiendruckerei. 1893.</h4> + +<p>Dr. Constantin Gutberlet regards the doctrine of free-will as a cardinal doctrine +of Christianity. In the present booklet he endeavors to show that all attacks +made upon it by unchristian savants have failed. He criticises Höffding, Lombroso, +Wundt, Münsterberg, Lotze, P. Ree, and Schopenhauer, and establishes as his own +view a theory of free-will which he calls “freedom of choice.” He says: “There +is no decision without <i>sufficient</i> reason, but there may be without <i>rational</i> reason. +The sufficient reason is that a greater good may be recognised as possessing ‘blind’ +sides, that we can do without it and even reject it for the sake of these ‘blind’ +sides. On the other hand, a lesser good may be given as an object of willing, and +our willing by its own energy conditions the free decision of the will” (p. 25). Freedom +of will is not a reversal of causation, which latter, according to Gutberlet, is +“an absolutely necessary law” (p. 8 and <i>passim</i>).</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_647">[647]</span></p> + +<p>It is difficult to understand how Gutberlet, taking this view, can class himself +among the indeterminists. From his premises, we should expect him to take the +view which we have defended, that freedom of will is not contradictory to determinism. +If freedom of will means freedom of choice, in which “we ourselves, as the +contents of our ideas, feelings, and dispositions, are the cause not only of our activities, +but also of our free decision” (p. 19), then our decisions are most certainly determined +by our character. Gutberlet’s criticism of Wundt (pp. 167-171), who defends +freedom of will and determinism, is wide of the mark, and it seems that Gutberlet +is either not clear on this point himself or he does not draw the consequences +of his own standpoint. Says Gutberlet: “Only on the supposition that there is +no other than ‘mechanical’ causation of natural forces, can the determinist maintain +that freedom abolishes the principle of causation. In the application of the +principle of Causation ‘what happens has a cause’ to natural forces, the principle +can be inverted thus: ‘when all sufficient causes are given, the effect follows with +necessity.’ Yet if there are spiritual agents which stand above the mechanical +causation of nature and natural forces, we cannot <i>a priori</i> declare that their effects +follow with the same necessity from their character as is the case with nature. +Accordingly, unless we assume the questionable theory that free causation is impossible, +we cannot invert here the principle of causation and use it against free +decision” (p. 168).</p> + +<p>How does this sentence agree with Mr. Gutberlet’s statements that causation is +an absolutely necessary law and that “we ourselves ... are the cause of our free +decision.” Our decisions are determined by “our ideas, feelings, and dispositions,” +and yet a sufficient cause determines its effect only if the causation is mechanical, +not if it is spiritual. Gutberlet explains the difficulty as follows: “Certainly, if we +did not reduce the free decision <i>once made</i> (die <i>eingetretene</i> freie Entscheidung), to +an adequate cause, we should sin against logic and psychology. But we understand by +‘adequate cause of a decision’ not only the influence of motives, but +also the energy of a free will.” Very well then, Mr. Gutberlet would be a determinist +as much as Wundt. Decisions are determined by two factors: (1) by the +motives (i. e. the objects which act as stimuli upon the will) and (2) by the character +of the agent. Not everybody is affected by the same stimulus in the same way. One +chooses this and another that motive, and his character determines the choice; and +a man of a certain character, under definitely given conditions, will freely and yet +necessarily choose a certain motive. Dr. Gutberlet, it appears to us, says yes and +no in one breath.</p> + +<p>Dr. Gutberlet is the editor of the <i>Philosophisches Jahrbuch</i>, a Roman Catholic +periodical. He belongs to that class of men who by partisans of free thought are regarded +as especially dangerous. He is not as narrow as the common type of <i>defensores +fidei</i>. He studies the works of modern savants “whose intellectual superiority,” as he +confesses, he “admires in many respects.” He is broader than most of his <i>confreres</i>, +and thus he makes the creed of his church appear broader than it practically is. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_648">[648]</span>We can see no danger in the appearance of such men. It is true, he will make converts +among the educated, or at least, he will keep some wavering elements within +the pale of the church; for the Roman church is, upon the whole, still very hostile +to progress. But, on the other hand, such a man is in his circles a missionary of +science; he will help to broaden the views of his brethren. He is learning, and +they will learn from him.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">P. C.</span></p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie.</span> By <i>Wilhelm Wundt</i>. Leipsic: +Wilhelm Engelmann. 1893.</h4> + +<p>Wundt’s “Physiological Psychology” is perhaps justly regarded as his best and +most valuable work. We have just received the first part of the fourth edition and may +expect that the second part will soon appear. We intend to review the whole work +as soon as completed, and will state here only that this new edition contains, among +many emendations and additions, an explicit account of the modern methods of +psychological investigations, with descriptions and illustrations of the most important +instruments invented for that purpose.</p> + +<p class="right">κρς.</p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">Vergleichend-entwickelungsgeschichtliche und anatomische Studien im Bereiche +der Hirnanatomie.</span> 3. <span class="smcap">Riechapparat und Ammonshorn.</span> Abdruck +aus <i>Anatomischer Anzeiger</i>. By <i>Dr. L. Edinger</i>. (Jena: 1893. Gustav +Fischer.)</h4> + +<p>Dr. Edinger proves in this essay that in the cerebral evolution of animals the +cortex makes its first appearance in the formation of the cornu ammonis. This +convolution being the centre of smell, it is more than merely probable that smell +sensations, or something analogous to smell sensations, were phylogenetically the first +psychical functions.</p> + +<p class="right">κρς.</p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">État mental des hystériques les stigmates mentaux.</span> By <i>Pierre Janet</i>. Paris: +Rueff & Co. 1892.</h4> + +<p>M. Pierre Janet, one of the most prominent disciples of Professor Charcot, +presents in this little volume of two hundred and thirty-three pages a summary of +the results of modern psychical research as it is understood at the Salpétrière. +Charcot himself recommends the book to the medical profession. Janet investigates +anæsthesia (Chap. I), amnesia, abulia, the diseases of motion, and the modifications +of character. The author proposes to “describe the phenomena and endeavors +to establish a rigorous determinism of their relations. The moral view of a +diseased person,” he says, “ought to constitute a part of the clinical diagnosis +while the psychical state must be closely investigated in its connection with physiological +facts. This is the only way in which the physician can gain a knowledge +of the entire man and understand the diseases which affect his organism.”</p> + +<p>Professor Charcot states that Professor Janet’s researches on the mental state of +hysterical persons were begun long ago and completed under his supervision; that +they were expounded by M. Janet in the Spring of 1892 in a few lectures at the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_649">[649]</span>Salpétrière; that they tend to confirm the idea, often expressed in his own teachings, +that hysteria is upon the whole a mental disease.</p> + +<p>Hypnotism has long enough been regarded not only as harmless but even as a +panacea for almost all the ailments of mankind. It would be well to heed Charcot’s +warning, as hysterical diseases may be treated with better success, if the mystery that +still surrounds them disappears before calm and scientific investigation.</p> + +<p class="right">ς.</p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">L’école d’anthropologie criminelle.</span> By <i>l’Abbé Maurice de Baets</i>. Gand: +P. van Fleteren. 1893.</h4> + +<p>Dr. de Baets, Professor of Philosophy of the Gregorian University of Rome, +Italy, and Secretary to the Bishop of Ghent, criticises in this elegantly printed little +volume the modern school of criminal anthropology. He believes with Herbert +Spencer that, if a great number of people accept certain errors, these errors must +contain a kernel of truth. Professor de Baets says that he does not deny crime to +be an outgrowth of the organism, to be inherited, to be closely connected with insanity, +etc., but he cannot approve of criminal unaccountableness. The denial of +responsibility, he says, is the denial of the wrong, and the denial of the wrong is +the denial of morality. He sums up his view in italics on page 48: “Man is responsible +for his acts in the measure that his acts depend on a free will.”</p> + +<p class="right">κρς.</p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">Against Dogma and Free-Will.</span> By <i>H. Croft Hiller</i>. London: Williams and +<span class="smcap">Norgate</span>. 1892.</h4> + +<p>The author has much to say against ecclesiasticism and sacerdotalism, and while +he repudiates such men as Wundt and Ribot, he “begs to thank Drs. Weismann, +Luys, and Ferrier from whose labors the views expressed in this treatise derive that +scientific authentication without which they would be worthless.” The book is apparently +a first venture into the stormy ocean of literary pursuits.</p> + +<p class="right">ς.</p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">The Philosophy of Individuality, or the One and the Many.</span> By <i>Antoinette +Brown Blackwell</i>. New York and London: G. P. Putnam’s Sons. 1893.</h4> + +<p>The author trusts that she has “<i>demonstrated</i> a conscious immortality.” In a +former book of hers entitled “The Physical Basis of Immortality,” 1876, she propounded +“the theory of persistent mind-matter individuals” which are to be conceived +as ultimate atoms. The present volume of five hundred and nineteen pages +is written to show that “this conception of the ultimate atoms could consistently +explain and harmonise mental and material phenomena and by coördinated interpretations +of the most diverse processes simplify and unify nature and her manifestations.” +The theory of the correlation of matter and mind is accepted; “Nature,” +the author says, “is nothing if not mathematical,” and there are many passages to +which no monistic thinker would take exception. Along with them we find statements, +e. g. on the rhythmic motion of atoms, etc., which it will be difficult to +prove. Her peculiar view is characterised in the following sentence: “All ultimate +individualities <i>may</i> be identical in kind, but no obvious necessity decides that they +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_650">[650]</span><i>must</i> be, and in an order of things where other varieties are prevalent, the weight +of evidence for the present is on the side of varieties, even in the ultimate units.” +The author’s theory (if we rightly understand her) has been tried before. Some +suggestions of Goethe’s seem to indicate that he believed in soul-monads, and the +German psychologist Herbart erected on the assumption of material soul-atoms his +system of a mathematical psychology in which sound science was curiously mingled +with improbable vagaries. The author of “The Philosophy of Individuality,” although +apparently quite well informed otherwise, has, strange enough, not taken +notice either of Goethe or of Herbart. Perhaps she would have abandoned her +theory if she had been fully familiar with Herbartism and the critique which it has +received; for Herbart’s soul-atoms are to-day regarded as a thing of the past.</p> + +<p class="right">κρς.</p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">Die Grundbegriffe der Gegenwart.</span> By <i>Prof. Rudolf Eucken</i>. Leipsic: Veit +& Co. 1893.</h4> + +<p>Prof. Rudolf Eucken discusses in this volume such topics as “Subjective—Objective”; +“A priori—A posteriori”; “Monism—Dualism”; “Idealism, Realism, +and Naturalism”; “Theoretical—Practical,” and so forth. It seems to us that +Eucken has not yet fully succeeded in reconciling his philosophy with natural science. +We are glad to notice that he has a critical eye for the shortcomings of naturalists +under whose methods of classification and mechanical conceptions the +properly spiritual of man would be eliminated. He is judicious in his exposition of +the various problems, but we miss a final solution, such as would clearly state and +recognise the truth in both. Nevertheless the book is sound, full of valuable information, +and its perusal is to be recommended to every student of philosophy.</p> + +<p class="right">κρς.</p> + +<h4 class="book"><span class="smcap">The Æsthetic Element in Morality.</span> By <i>Frank Chapman Sharp, Ph.D.</i> New +York: Macmillan & Co. 1893.</h4> + +<p>The book contains chapters on: (1) the theory of altruism; (2) the intrinsic +worth of character; (3) an analysis of moral beauty; (4) an examination of the æsthetic +method of ethics; and (5) the idea of obligation in æsthetics and ethics. The +author’s knowledge of ethical theories appears to be limited. Duns Scotus, the +Realist, is called a thoroughgoing Nominalist. In spite of such defects, we find +much that is good in the book. In the end of his discussion the author says with +truth: “When the element of the <i>good</i>, or that which is capable of clothing itself +in the form of an ideal, is taken out of the conception of obligation, this latter +degenerates into what is nothing more than mere submission to an arbitrary imperative....Prometheus, +chained to the rocks for bringing the gift of fire to the +wretched barbarous inhabitants of the earth, in defiance of the will of the ‘Father +of gods and men,’ is one of the grandest productions of the human imagination, +and were the Supreme Being such a one as Augustine and Calvin imagined him, +we should despise the wretched slaves that licked the dust at his feet.”</p> + +<p class="right">κρς.</p> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_651">[651]</span></p> + +<h3 class="nobreak" id="PERIODICALS_IV">PERIODICALS.</h3> + +</div> + +<h4>ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE.</h4> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. V. Nos. 1 and 2.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Die Stabilität der Raumwerte auf der Netzhaut.</span> By <i>Franz Hillebrand</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Ueber ein optisches Paradoxon.</span> (Second Article.) By <i>Franz Brentano</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Litteraturbericht.</span> (Hamburg and Leipsic: Leopold Voss.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p>This second article, “On an Optical Paradox,” is a rejoinder of Franz Brentano +of Vienna to Th. Lipps. We gave an account of this interesting discussion in <i>The +Monist</i>, Vol. III, No. 1, p. 153 et seqq. Professor Brentano insists on explaining +the optical illusion concerning distances between two points, as seen in <a href="#brentano-figure-01">Fig. 1-3</a>, by +an overestimation of small and an underestimation of large angles. He complains +of being misunderstood by Professor Lipps who substitutes “acute” for “small” +and “obtuse” for “large”; for, says he, in comparisons both angles may be obtuse +or both may be acute. Professor Brentano adds some more puzzling figures to +prove his case; and, as in his first article, his propositions are ingenious and thought-stimulating; +but his arguments do not suffice to convince us of the validity of his +theory. We do not exactly intend to deny the general rule as to the overestimation +of large and underestimation of small angles, but are inclined to believe that it will +not serve as a sufficient explanation. We reproduce the most important figures +devised by Brentano, and take the liberty of adding a few remarks and additional +figures of our own.</p> + +<div class="figcenter"> + +<figure class="figmulti" id="brentano-figure-01" style="max-width: 15.625em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/brentano-figure-01.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption> + <p>Fig. 1.</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<figure class="figmulti" id="brentano-figure-02" style="max-width: 15.625em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/brentano-figure-02.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption> + <p>Fig. 2.</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_652">[652]</span></p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp100" id="brentano-figure-03" style="max-width: 50.0em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/brentano-figure-03.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption> + <p>Fig. 3.</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p><a href="#brentano-figure-04">Fig. 4</a> represents two right angles, one of which is divided into nine angles of +10° each. Brentano claims that we so overestimate the nine small angles as to take +the undivided right angle as an acute one. I can only say that however much I have +tried, I am not subject to the illusion.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp100" id="brentano-figure-04" style="max-width: 31.25em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/brentano-figure-04.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption> + <p>Fig. 4.</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>In <a href="#brentano-figure-05">Fig. 5</a> we have on the straight line <i>AB</i> a series of stations which are connected +with a common centre. The line <i>AB</i> is not a curve, but this figure reminds +us of a perspective view of the sector of a circle. The drawing appears as the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_653">[653]</span>diagrammatic picture of a shield, the buckle of which is in <i>C</i>. Thus <i>AB</i> is conceived +as representing a curve. It does not seem that a comparison of the angles +has anything to do with the illusion.</p> + +<p>How much perspective interferes with the optical illusions under discussion, +impresses itself upon my mind, when I think of <a href="#brentano-figure-05">figure 5</a> as the diagram of a mountain, +rising above the plane <i>AB</i>. If I imagine I stand below the plane, which may +be a high table-land, the line <i>AB</i> appears to my eye straight. But when I imagine +I am looking down upon the plane, the curvature of <i>AB</i> becomes very strongly +marked.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp34" id="brentano-figure-05" style="max-width: 17.1875em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/brentano-figure-05.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption> + <p>Fig. 5.</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>In <a href="#brentano-figure-06">Fig. 6</a> we can detect no optical illusion. The line <i>AB</i> appears straight to us. +The drawing reminds us of a sunrise on the ocean.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp81" id="brentano-figure-06" style="max-width: 37.5em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/brentano-figure-06.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption> + <p>Fig. 6.</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_654">[654]</span></p> + +<p>The same must be said about <a href="#brentano-figure-07">Figure 7</a>. Brentano, in agreement with Lipps, +claims that we are inclined to regard the distance between the ends of the two lines +as larger than between the points. If there is any illusion at all, it seems to me, +that on the contrary, the distance between the ends of the lines appears shorter. +And why? We measure the distance +by allowing our eyes to run from one +point to the other and then comparing +the measurements. This comparison is +geometrically effected by combining +the respective starting points, and +thus judging as to the parallelism of +these two lines mentally constructed. +Whether or not the dots appear equidistant, +depends upon the execution of +all these operations. While directly +measuring the distances between the +points, we have an easier measurement +where the lines are attached. The lines +give to the points a certain vim; they +almost appear to move with a velocity +indicated by the length of the little lines, while the isolated dots present a very +phlegmatic appearance.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp54" id="brentano-figure-07" style="max-width: 12.5em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/brentano-figure-07.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption> + <p>Fig. 7.</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>In order to see what effects +other positions of the +lines produce, let us compare +in <a href="#brentano-figure-09">Fig. 9</a> the several relations +by covering the rest. If there +is any illusion as to <i>a</i> and <i>b</i>, +we should say that the points +of <i>a</i> appear at a greater distance; +as to <i>b</i> and <i>c</i>, we see +the greater distance in <i>c</i>, as +to <i>c</i> and <i>d</i>, we feel doubtful, +while any comparison with <i>e</i>, +tends strongly to convince us +of their equal distance. The +reason is obvious. The lines in <i>e</i> assist us in drawing the parallels, which we consciously +or unconsciously construct in order to compare the distances.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp75" id="brentano-figure-08" style="max-width: 18.75em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/brentano-figure-08.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption> + <p>Fig. 8.</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp100" id="brentano-figure-09" style="max-width: 37.5em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/brentano-figure-09.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption> + <p>Fig. 9.</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_655">[655]</span></p> + +<p>A comparison like that of α and β in <a href="#brentano-figure-08">Fig. 8</a>, where the equal length of the combining +lines is very apparent, induced Brentano to regard the illusion which is observed +in <a href="#brentano-figure-01">Figures 1-3</a> as due to the angles. In our opinion he is mistaken. For the +illusion actually takes place in α and β; only it is quickly corrected with the help of +the parallels, which, as in ε, assist the imagination in making an exact comparison. +When we place α and β either at a sufficient distance, or are somehow prevented +from making use of the parallel lines, we shall have the same illusion as appears in +<a href="#brentano-figure-01">Figures 1, 2, 3</a>. To prove this, we have but to bring the figure α in a slanting +position, as is shown in λ, and the illusion is so strong that many will find it difficult +to believe that λ is an electrotyped duplicate of α.</p> + +<p>The mooted illusions are not sense-illusions, but illusions of judgment; and we +believe that the explanation of these curious phenomena must be sought in the elements +which unconsciously enter into the make-up of our judgments.</p> + +<p>Lipps says that lines are felt to be movements. If a line is continued, albeit +with a slight declination, the motion appears “free and victorious,” aspiring beyond +itself; while, if confined in the corner of an acute angle, it seems cut off and +impeded. The victoriously progressive motion is overestimated; the checked motion +is underestimated.</p> + +<p>Brentano, in order to meet Lipps’s objections, proposes a few additional figures, +of which we reproduce the most important ones in <a href="#brentano-figure-10">Fig. 10-14</a>.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="brentano-figure-10" style="max-width: 25.0em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/brentano-figure-10.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption> + <p>Fig. 10.</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp100" id="brentano-figure-11" style="max-width: 31.25em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/brentano-figure-11.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption> + <p>Fig. 11.</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<div class="figcenter"> + +<figure class="figmulti" id="brentano-figure-12" style="max-width: 6.25em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/brentano-figure-12.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption> + <p>Fig. 12.</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<figure class="figmulti" id="brentano-figure-13" style="max-width: 6.25em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/brentano-figure-13.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption> + <p>Fig. 13.</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<figure class="figmulti" id="brentano-figure-14" style="max-width: 6.25em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/brentano-figure-14.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption> + <p>Fig. 14.</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +</div> + +<p>It seems to us that the main part which the angles play in these or any other +similar figures, consists in leading our imagination astray. The parallel lines which +we attempt to construct for our comparison, switch slightly off with an inclination +toward the angles.</p> + +<p>But that is not all; there are other elements that affect our judgment at the +very outset. In measuring a distance we do something, and in looking at a diagram +we think something. The diagram is suggestive of some reality to which we compare +it. All these ideas, be they conscious, subconscious, or even unconscious, +affect our judgment and are sometimes apt to lead it astray.</p> + +<p>In addition we have to mention two things, the influence of which upon our +verdict cannot be doubted; the one is the size of the entire figure, the other the +vacuity of the distance to be measured: both tend to make the distance appear +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_656">[656]</span>longer than it really is. To illustrate this, we add the three <a href="#brentano-figure-15">Figures 15, 16, 17</a> +which contain no angles and yet show the same illusions.</p> + +<div class="figcenter"> + +<figure class="figmulti" id="brentano-figure-15" style="max-width: 9.375em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/brentano-figure-15.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption> + <p>Fig. 15.</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<figure class="figmulti" id="brentano-figure-16" style="max-width: 12.5em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/brentano-figure-16.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption> + <p>Fig. 16.</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<figure class="figmulti" id="brentano-figure-17" style="max-width: 15.625em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/brentano-figure-17.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption> + <p>Fig. 17.</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +</div> + +<p>The distance between the points in <a href="#brentano-figure-17">Figure 17</a> appears longer than in <a href="#brentano-figure-16">Figure 16</a>, +and in <a href="#brentano-figure-16">Figure 16</a> again longer than in <a href="#brentano-figure-15">Figure 15</a>. The fact is, that before starting +on our measurement-journey, we have in <a href="#brentano-figure-17">Figure 17</a> already traversed a good distance +after having noted the extraordinarily lengthened boundary marks. The town +<i>A</i> may be exactly as far as the town <i>B</i>, yet the journey to <i>A</i> will appear longer, if +I have to ride an hour before I reach the station, while I may live opposite the +terminus of the railroad to <i>B</i>.</p> + +<p>When our eyes glide down from one point to the other, we pass in one case +through an empty desert the dreariness of which is not interrupted. We almost lose +our way and become lonesome in its monotony. If our way, however, is full of +variations, we are pleasantly entertained and regard our journey as so much shorter. +The contrast is most obvious in <a href="#brentano-figure-10">figure 10</a>. The time-illusions as to the swiftness of +hours of work or amusement and the slowness of moments of <i>ennui</i> have become +proverbial among all nations. The more dreariness, the more marked is the lengthening +of the distance, while even a partial accompaniment shortens the traversed +road.</p> + +<p class="right">κρς.</p> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. V. Nos. 3 and 4.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Theorie des Farbensehens.</span> By <i>H. Ebbinghaus</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Ueber den Muskelsinn bei Blinden.</span> By <i>Paul Hocheisen</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Litteraturbericht.</span> (Hamburg and Leipsic: Leopold Voss.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<h4>VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE.</h4> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. XVII. No. 2.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Einiges zur Grundlegung der Sittenlehre.</span> (First Article.) By <i>J. Petzoldt</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Kritik der Grundanschauungen der Sociologie H. Spencer’s.</span> By <i>P. Barth</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Werththeorie und Ethik.</span> (Second Article.) By <i>Chr. Ehrenfels</i>. (Leipsic: +O. R. Reisland.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_657">[657]</span></p> + +<h4>THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY.</h4> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. V. No. 3.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">On Errors of Observation.</span> By <i>Prof. James McKeen Cattell</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Minor Studies from the Psychological Laboratory of Clark University.</span></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">On the Discrimination of Groups of Rapid Clicks.</span> By <i>Thaddeus L. Bolton</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Statistics of Dreams.</span> By <i>Mary Whiton Calkins</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">On the Pressure Sense of the Drum of the Ear and “Facial Vision.”</span> +By <i>F. B. Dresslar</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">On Reaction-Times When the Stimulus Is Applied to the Reacting Hand.</span> +By <i>J. F. Reigart and Edmund C. Sanford</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Experiments upon Physiological Memory by Means of the Interference +of Associations.</span> By <i>John A. Bergström</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">A New Instrument for Weber’s Law; With Indications of a Law of Sense +Memory.</span> By <i>James H. Leuba</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">A New Pendulum Chronograph.</span> By <i>Edmund C. Sanford, Ph. D.</i></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Laboratory Course in Physiological Psychology.</span> (Fourth Paper.) By +<i>Edmund C. Sanford, Ph. D.</i> (Worcester, Mass.: J. H. Orpha.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<h4>THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.</h4> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. II. No. 3.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">German Kantian Bibliography.</span> By <i>Dr. Erich Adickes</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Epistemology of Neo-Kantism.</span> By <i>Prof. Andrew Seth</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Mental Measurement.</span> By <i>Prof. J. McK. Cattell</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Book Reviews.</span> (Boston, New York, Chicago: Ginn & CO.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<h4>REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE.</h4> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. XVIII. No. 5.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Psychologie du musicien.</span> 1. <span class="smcap">L’evolution des aptitudes musicales.</span> By +<i>L. Dauriac</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">La sociabilité et la morale chez les animaux.</span> By <i>Houssay</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Sur les idées générales.</span> By <i>Marchesini</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Questionnaire sur l’audition colorée, figurée et illuminée.</span> By <i>Gruber</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">L’attention et les images.</span> By <i>F. Paulhan</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Une illusion d’optique.</span> By <i>B. Bourdon</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Science et socialisme.</span> <i>G. Sorel</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Analyses et comptes rendus.</span> (Paris: Félix Alcan.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. XVIII. No. 6.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">La nouvelle théorie de l’hérédité de Weismann.</span> By <i>Y. Delage</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Un calculateur du type visuel.</span> By <i>J.-M. Charcot and A. Binet</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Psychologie du musicien.</span>—II. <span class="smcap">L’oreille musicale.</span> By <i>L. Dauriac</i>.</p> + +</blockquote> + +<h4>REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE.</h4> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. I. No. 2.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Le mouvement et les arguments de Zénon d’Élée.</span> By <i>G. Noël</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Le problème moral dans la philosophie de Spinoza.</span> By <i>V. Delbos</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_658">[658]</span></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Le concept du nombre chez les Pythagoriciens.</span> By <i>G. Milhaud</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Le dialogue dans l’enseignement de la philosophie.</span> By <i>C. Mélinand</i>. +(Paris: Librairie Hachette et Cie.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. I. No. 3.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Les prétendus sophismes de zénon d’élée.</span> By <i>V. Brochard</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Spir et sa doctrine.</span> By <i>A. Penjon</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Essai sur le caractère général de la connaissance.</span> By <i>G. Remacle</i>.</p> + +</blockquote> + +<h4>PHILOSOPHISCHES JAHRBUCH.</h4> + +<p class="center">CONTENTS: Vol. VI. No. 2.</p> + +<blockquote class="contents"> + +<p><span class="smcap">Begriff der Philosophie.</span> By <i>Uebinger</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Die Objectivität und die Sicherheit des Erkennens.</span> By <i>Isenkrahe</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Der Begriff des “Warren.”</span> (Concluded.) By <i>Franz Schmid</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Der Grundplan der menschlichen Wissenschaft.</span> By <i>Bahlmann, S. J.</i></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Handschriftliches zu den Werken des Alanus.</span> By <i>Bäumker</i>. (Fulda, 1893.)</p> + +</blockquote> + +<div style='text-align:center'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 76881 ***</div> +</body> +</html> + diff --git a/76881-h/images/brentano-figure-01.jpg b/76881-h/images/brentano-figure-01.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..f0fea81 --- /dev/null +++ b/76881-h/images/brentano-figure-01.jpg diff --git a/76881-h/images/brentano-figure-02.jpg b/76881-h/images/brentano-figure-02.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..d9752cb --- /dev/null +++ b/76881-h/images/brentano-figure-02.jpg diff --git a/76881-h/images/brentano-figure-03.jpg b/76881-h/images/brentano-figure-03.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..739feff --- /dev/null +++ b/76881-h/images/brentano-figure-03.jpg diff --git a/76881-h/images/brentano-figure-04.jpg b/76881-h/images/brentano-figure-04.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..d79330e --- /dev/null +++ b/76881-h/images/brentano-figure-04.jpg diff 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