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border-bottom: 2px solid black; + border-left:none; border-right:none; } + hr.long { margin: auto; width: 30%; height: 5px; border-top: 1px solid black; + border-bottom: 2px solid black; border-left:none; border-right:none; + width: 25%; } + .inline { display: inline-block; text-align: center; vertical-align: middle; + font-size:70% } + .sidenote, .sni { font-weight: normal; float:right; max-width: 7em; min-width: 7em; + clear:right; margin-left:1em; margin-right:0em; } + .column-container { margin: auto; clear: both; } + .left { display: inline-block; text-align: left; vertical-align: bottom; + width:49%; } + .right { display: inline-block; text-align: right; vertical-align: top; width:49%; + } + ins.correction { text-decoration:none; border-bottom: thin dotted gray; } + .quote { font-size: 95%; margin-top: 1.0em; margin-bottom: 1.0em; } + .linegroup .group { margin: 0em auto; } + </style> + </head> + <body> +<div style='text-align:center'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 76650 ***</div> + +<div class='pbb'> + <hr class='pb c000'> +</div> +<div class='tnotes'> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> + <div class='nf-center'> + <div>Transcriber’s Note:</div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c001'>Marginal sidenotes, which served as section and topic aids, +were often repeated on each page. The repetitive notes have +been removed.</p> + +<p class='c001'>Minor errors, attributable to the printer, have been corrected. Please +see the transcriber’s <a href='#endnote'>note</a> at the end of this text +for details regarding the handling of any textual issues encountered +during its preparation.</p> + +<p class='c001'>The cover had no text, so the basic details of the title page +have been added, and, as so enhanced, is placed in the public domain.</p> + +<div class='htmlonly'> + +<p class='c001'>Any corrections are indicated using an <ins class='correction' title='original'>underline</ins> +highlight. Placing the cursor over the correction will produce the +original text in a small popup.</p> +<div class='figcenter id001'> +<img src='images/cover.jpg' alt='' class='ig001'> +</div> + +</div> +<div class='epubonly'> + +<p class='c001'>Any corrections are indicated as hyperlinks, which will navigate the +reader to the corresponding entry in the corrections table in the +note at the end of the text.</p> + +</div> + +</div> + +<div> + <h1 class='c002'><span class='small'>THE</span> <br> <span class='large'>ENGLISH WORKS</span> <br> <span class='small'>OF</span> <br> <span class='large'>THOMAS HOBBES.</span></h1> +</div> + +<div class='pbb'> + <hr class='pb c000'> +</div> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c003'> + <div>THE</div> + <div class='c000'><span class='large'>ENGLISH WORKS</span></div> + <div class='c000'>OF</div> + <div class='c000'><span class='xlarge'>THOMAS HOBBES</span></div> + <div class='c000'>OF MALMESBURY;</div> + <div class='c000'>NOW FIRST COLLECTED AND EDITED</div> + <div class='c000'>BY</div> + <div class='c000'>SIR WILLIAM MOLESWORTH, BART.</div> + </div> +</div> + +<hr class='c004'> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> + <div class='nf-center'> + <div>VOL. V.</div> + </div> +</div> + +<hr class='c004'> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c005'> + <div>LONDON:</div> + <div>JOHN BOHN,</div> + <div>HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN.</div> + </div> +</div> + +<hr class='c004'> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> + <div class='nf-center'> + <div>MDCCCXLI.</div> + </div> +</div> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c003'> + <div><span class='small'>LONDON:</span></div> + <div><span class='small'>C. RICHARDS, PRINTER, ST. MARTIN’S LANE.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<div class='chapter'> + <h2 class='c006'>THE <br> <br> QUESTIONS CONCERNING <br> <br><span class='large'>LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE,</span></h2> +</div> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c003'> + <div>CLEARLY STATED AND DEBATED</div> + <div class='c000'><span class='small'>BETWEEN</span></div> + <div class='c000'>DR. BRAMHALL,</div> + <div><span class='small'>BISHOP OF DERRY,</span></div> + <div class='c000'>AND</div> + <div class='c000'>THOMAS HOBBES</div> + <div><span class='small'>OF MALMESBURY.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<div class='chapter'> + <h2 class='c006'>TO THE READER.</h2> +</div> + +<div class='c003'></div> +<hr class='dbl'> + +<p class='c001'>You shall find in this little volume the questions +concerning <em>necessity</em>, <em>freedom</em>, and <em>chance</em>, which in +all ages have perplexed the minds of curious men, +largely and clearly discussed, and the arguments on +all sides, drawn from the authority of Scripture, from +the doctrine of the Schools, from natural reason, and +from the consequences pertaining to common life, +truly alleged and severally weighed between two +persons, who both maintain that men are free to <em>do</em> +as they <em>will</em> and to <em>forbear</em> as they <em>will</em>. The things +they dissent in are, that the one holdeth, that it is +not in a man’s power now to choose the will he shall +have anon; that chance produceth nothing; that all +events and actions have their necessary causes; that +the will of God makes the necessity of all things. +The other on the contrary maintaineth, that not only +the <em>man</em> is free to choose what he will <em>do</em>, but the +<em>will</em> also to choose what it shall <em>will</em>; that when a +man willeth a good action, God’s will concurreth +with his, else not; that the will may choose whether +it will <em>will</em>, or not; that many things come to pass +without necessity, by chance; that though God foreknow +a thing shall be, yet it is not necessary that +that thing shall be, inasmuch as God seeth not the +future as in its causes, but as present. In sum, they +adhere both of them to the Scripture; but one of +them is a learned School-divine, the other a man +that doth not much admire that kind of learning.</p> + +<p class='c001'>This is enough to acquaint you withal in the +beginning; which also shall be more particularly explained +by and by in the stating of the question, +and dividing of the arguments into their several +heads. The rest you shall understand from the +persons themselves, when they enter. Fare ye well.</p> + +<div class='c007'>T. H.</div> + +<div class='c005'></div> +<hr class='dbl'> + +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_1'>1</span> + <h2 class='c006'>THE QUESTIONS <br> <br> <span class='small'>CONCERNING</span> <br> <br> LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE.</h2> +</div> + +<p class='c008'>Whether whatsoever comes to pass proceed from +<em>necessity</em>, or some things from <em>chance</em>, has been a +question disputed amongst the old philosophers +long time before the incarnation of our Saviour, +without drawing into argument on either side the +almighty power of the Deity. But the third way +of bringing things to pass, distinct from <em>necessity</em> +and <em>chance</em>, namely, <em>freewill</em>, is a thing that never +was mentioned amongst them, nor by the Christians +in the beginning of Christianity. For St. +Paul, that disputes that question largely and purposely, +never useth the term of <em>freewill</em>; nor did +he hold any doctrine equivalent to that which is +now called the doctrine of freewill; but deriveth +all actions from the irresistible will of God, and +nothing from the will of him that <em>runneth or willeth</em>. +But for some ages past, the doctors of the +Roman Church have exempted from this dominion +of God’s will the will of man; and brought in a +doctrine, that not only man, but also his will is free, +and determined to this or that action, not by the +will of God, nor necessary causes, but by the power +of the will itself. And though by the reformed +Churches instructed by Luther, Calvin, and others, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_2'>2</span>this opinion was cast out, yet not many years since +it began again to be reduced by Arminius and his +followers, and became the readiest way to ecclesiastical +promotion; and by discontenting those that +held the contrary, was in some part the cause of +the following troubles; which troubles were the +occasion of my meeting with the Bishop of Derry +at Paris, where we discoursed together of the argument +now in hand; from which discourse we +carried away each of us his own opinion, and for +aught I remember, without any offensive words, as +blasphemous, atheistical, or the like, passing between +us; either for that the Bishop was not then +in passion, or suppressed his passion, being then in +the presence of my Lord of Newcastle.</p> + +<p class='c001'>But afterwards the Bishop sent to his Lordship +his opinion concerning the question in writing, and +desired him to persuade me to send an answer +thereunto likewise in writing. There were some +reasons for which I thought it might be inconvenient +to let my answer go abroad; yet the many +obligations wherein I was obliged to him, prevailed +with me to write this answer, which was afterwards +not only without my knowledge, but also +against my will, published by one that found means +to get a copy of it surreptitiously. And thus you +have the occasion of this controversy.</p> + +<hr class='dbl'> + +<h3 class='c009'>THE STATE OF THE QUESTION.</h3> + +<p class='c010'>The question in general is stated by the Bishop +himself, (towards the end of No. <span class='fss'>III.</span>), in these +words: “Whether all events, natural, civil, moral, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_3'>3</span>(for we speak not now of the conversion of a sinner, +that concerns not this question), be predetermined +extrinsically and inevitably, without +their own concurrence; so as all the actions and +events which either are or shall be, cannot but be, +nor can be otherwise after any other manner or +in any other place, time, number, measure, order, +nor to any other end than they are. And all this +in respect of the supreme cause, or a concourse of +extrinsical causes, determining them to one.”</p> + +<p class='c001'>Which though drawn up to his advantage, with +as much caution as he would do a lease, yet (excepting +that which is not intelligible) I am content +to admit. Not intelligible is, first, “that the conversion +of a sinner concerns not the question.” If +he mean, that the conversion of a sinner is from necessity, +and predetermined, then he is, for so much +as the question concerns religion, of the same mind +that I am; and what he can mean else by that exception, +I cannot guess. Secondly, these words, +“without their own concurrence,” are insignificant, +unless he mean that the events themselves should +concur to their production: as that fire doth not +necessarily burn without the concurrence of burning, +as the words properly import: or at least +without concurrence of the fuel. Those two clauses +left out, I agree with him in the state of the question +as it is put universally. But when the question +is put of the necessity of any particular event, +as of the will to write, or the like, then it is the +stating of that particular question: but it is decided +in the decision of the question universal.</p> + +<p class='c001'>He states the same question again in another +place thus: “This is the very question where the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_4'>4</span>water sticks between us, whether there be such +a liberty free from necessitation and extrinsical +determination to one, or not.” And I allow it also +for well stated so.</p> + +<p class='c001'>Again he says, “In a word, so great difference +there is between natural and moral efficacy, as +there is between his opinion and mine in this question.” +So that the state of the question is reduced +to this, “Whether there be a moral efficacy which +is not natural?” I say there is not: he says there +is.</p> + +<p class='c001'>Again he writes thus: “And therefore as it were +ridiculous to say, that the object of sight is the +cause of seeing; so it is to say, that the proposing +of the object by the understanding to the will, is +the cause of willing.” Here also the question is +brought to this issue, “Whether the object of sight +be the cause that it is seen?” But for these words, +“proposing of the object by the understanding to +the will,” I understand them not.</p> + +<p class='c001'>Again, he often useth such words as these: “The +will willeth; the will suspendeth its act, (<span lang="la"><i>Rid est</i></span>, the +will willeth not); the understanding proposeth; +the understanding understandeth.” Herein also +lyeth the whole question. If they be true, I, if +false, he is in error.</p> + +<p class='c001'>Again, the whole question is decided, when this +is decided, “Whether he that willingly permitteth +a thing to be done, when without labour, danger, +or diversion of mind, he might have hindered it, do +not will the doing of it?”</p> + +<p class='c001'>Again the whole question of free-will is included +in this, “Whether the will determine itself?”</p> + +<p class='c001'>Again, it is included in this, “Whether there be +<span class='pageno' id='Page_5'>5</span>an universal grace, which particular men can take +without a particular grace to take it?”</p> + +<p class='c001'>Lastly, there be two questions; one, “Whether a +man be free in such things as are within his power, +to do what he will;” another, “Whether he be +free to will.” Which is as much as to say (because +will is appetite), it is one question, whether he be +free to eat that has an appetite, and another, +whether he be free to have an appetite? In the +former, “whether a man be free to do what he +<a id='corr5.11'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='will,'>will,”</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_5.11'><ins class='correction' title='will,'>will,”</ins></a></span> I agree with the Bishop. In the latter, +“whether he be free to will,” I dissent from him. +And, therefore, all the places of Scripture that he +allegeth to prove that a man hath liberty to do +what he will, are impertinent to the question. If +he has not been able to distinguish between these +two questions, he has not done well to meddle with +either: if he has understood them, to bring arguments +to prove that a man is free to do if he will, +is to deal uningenuously and fraudulently with his +readers. And thus much for the state of the question.</p> + +<hr class='dbl'> + +<h3 class='c009'>THE FOUNTAINS OF ARGUMENT IN THIS QUESTION.</h3> + +<p class='c010'>The arguments by which this question is disputed, +are drawn from four fountains. 1. From <em>authorities</em>. +2. From <em>the inconveniences consequent to +either opinion</em>. 3. From <em>the attributes of God</em>. +4. From <em>natural reason</em>.</p> + +<p class='c001'>The <em>authorities</em> are of two sorts, <em>divine</em> and <em>human</em>. +<em>Divine</em> are those which are taken from the +holy Scriptures. <em>Human</em> also are of two sorts; +one, the authorities of those men that are generally +<span class='pageno' id='Page_6'>6</span>esteemed to have been learned, especially in this +question, as the Fathers, Schoolmen, and old Philosophers: +the other, are the vulgar and most commonly +received opinions in the world.</p> + +<p class='c001'>His reasons and places of Scripture I will answer +the best I am able; but his human authorities +I shall admit and receive as far as to Scripture +and reason they be consonant, and no further.</p> + +<p class='c001'>And for the arguments derived from the attributes +of God, so far forth as those attributes are +argumentative, that is, so far forth as their significations +be conceivable, I admit them for arguments; +but where they are given for honour only, and signify +nothing but an intention and endeavour to +praise and magnify as much as we can Almighty +God, there I hold them not for arguments, but for +oblations; not for the language, but (as the Scripture +calls them) for the calves of our lips; which +signify not true nor false, nor any opinion of our +brain, but the reverence and devotion of our hearts; +and therefore they are no sufficient premises to infer +truth or convince falsehood.</p> + +<p class='c001'>The places of Scripture that make for me are +these. First, (Gen. xlv. 5): Joseph saith to his +brethren that had sold him, <em>Be not grieved nor +angry with yourselves, that ye sold me hither: +for God did send me before you to preserve life.</em> +And again (verse 8), <em>So now it was not you that +sent me hither, but God.</em></p> + +<p class='c001'>And concerning Pharaoh, God saith, (Exod. vii. +3): <em>I will harden Pharaoh’s heart.</em> And concerning +Sihon King of Heshbon, Moses saith, (Deut. +ii. 30): <em>The Lord thy God hardened his spirit, +and made his heart obstinate.</em></p> + +<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_7'>7</span>And of Shimei that did curse David, David himself +saith, (2 Sam. xvi. 10): <em>Let him curse, because +the Lord hath said unto him, curse David.</em> +And (1 Kings, xii. 15): <em>The King hearkened not +to the people, for the curse was from the Lord.</em></p> + +<p class='c001'>And Job, disputing this very question, saith, +(Job xii. 14): <em>God shutteth man, and there can +be no opening</em>: and verse 16: <em>The deceived and +the deceiver are his</em>: and verse 17: <em>He maketh the +Judges fools</em>: and verse 24: <em>He taketh away the +heart of the chief of the people of the earth, and +causeth them to wander in a wilderness where +there is no way</em>: and verse 25: <em>He maketh them +to stagger like a drunken man.</em></p> + +<p class='c001'>And of the King of Assyria, God saith, <em>I will +give him a charge to take the spoil, and to take +the prey, and to tread them down like the mire +of the streets.</em> (Isaiah x. 6.)</p> + +<p class='c001'>And Jeremiah saith, (Jer. x. 23): <em>O Lord, I know +that the way of man is not in himself, it is not in +man that walketh to direct his steps.</em></p> + +<p class='c001'>And to Ezekiel, whom God sent as a watchman +to the house of Israel, God saith thus: <em>When a +righteous man doth turn from his righteousness, +and commit iniquity, and I lay a stumbling block +before him, he shall die; because thou hast not +given him warning, he shall die in his sin.</em> (Ezek. +iii. 20.) Note here, God lays the stumbling block, +yet he that falleth dieth in his sin: which shows +that God’s justice in killing dependeth not on the +sin only.</p> + +<p class='c001'>And our Saviour saith, (John vi. 44): <em>No man +can come to me, except the Father which hath +sent me draw him.</em></p> + +<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_8'>8</span>And St. Peter, concerning the delivering of +Christ to the Jews, saith thus, (Acts ii. 23): <em>Him +being delivered by the determinate counsel and +foreknowledge of God, ye have taken</em>, &c.</p> + +<p class='c001'>And again, those Christians to whom Peter and +John resorted after they were freed from their +troubles about the miracle of curing the lame man, +praising God for the same, say thus: <em>Of a truth +against the holy child Jesus whom thou hast +anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the +Gentiles and the people of Israel, were gathered +together for to do whatsoever thy hand and thy +counsel determined before to be done.</em> (Acts iv. +27, 28.)</p> + +<p class='c001'>And St. Paul, Rom. ix. 16: <em>It is not of him that +willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that +sheweth mercy</em>: and verse 18, 19, 20: <em>Therefore +hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and +whom he will he hardeneth. Thou wilt say unto +me, why doth he yet find fault; for who hath +resisted his will? Nay but, O man, who art +thou that disputest against God? Shall the thing +formed say to him that formed it, why hast thou +made me thus?</em></p> + +<p class='c001'>And again, (1 Cor. iv 7): <em>Who maketh thee differ +from another? and what hast thou that thou +hast not received?</em> and 1 Cor. xii. 6: <em>There are +diversities of operations, but it is the same God +that worketh all in all</em>: and Eph. ii. 10: <em>We are +his workmanship created in Jesus Christ unto +good works, which God hath before ordained that +we should walk in them</em>: and Philip. ii. 13: <em>It is +God that worketh in you both to will and to do, +of his good pleasure.</em></p> + +<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_9'>9</span>To these places may be added all the places that +make God the giver of all graces, that is to say, of +all good habits and inclinations; and all the places +wherein men are said to be dead in sin. For by all +these it is manifest, that although a man may live +holily if he <em>will</em>, yet <em>to will</em> is the work of God, and +not eligible by man.</p> + +<p class='c001'>A second sort of places there be, that make +equally for the Bishop and me; and they be such +as say that a man hath election, and may do many +things <em>if he will</em>, and also <em>if he will</em> he may leave +them undone; but not that God Almighty naturally +or supernaturally worketh in us every act of the +will, as in my opinion; nor that he worketh it not, +as in the Bishop’s opinion; though he use those +places as arguments on his side.</p> + +<p class='c001'>The places are such as these, (Deut. xxx. 19): <em>I +call heaven and earth to record this day against +you, that I have set before you life and death, +blessing and cursing. Therefore choose life, that +both thou and thy seed may live</em>: and (Ecclesiasticus +xv. 14): <em>God in the beginning made man, and +left him in the hand of his counsel</em>: and verse 16, +17: <em>He hath set fire and water before thee, stretch +forth thy hand to whither thou wilt. Before man +is life and death, and whether him liketh shall be +given him.</em></p> + +<p class='c001'>And those places which the Bishop citeth: <em>If a +wife make a vow, it is left to her husband’s choice, +either to establish it, or to make it void</em>, (Numb. +xxx. 13): and (Josh. xxiv. 15): <em>Chuse ye this day +whom you will serve</em>, &c. <em>But I and my house +will serve the Lord</em>: and (2 Sam. xxiv. 12): <em>I +offer thee three things, choose which of them I +<span class='pageno' id='Page_10'>10</span>shall do</em>: and (Isaiah vii. 16): <em>before the child +shall know to refuse the evil and choose the good</em>. +And besides these very many other places to the +same effect.</p> + +<p class='c001'>The third sort of texts are those which seem to +make against me. As Isaiah v. 4: <em>What could +have been done more to my vineyard, that I have +not done in it?</em></p> + +<p class='c001'>And Jeremiah xix. 5: <em>They have also built the +high places of Baal, to burn their sons with fire for +burnt offerings unto Baal; which I commanded +not, nor spake it, neither came it into my mind.</em></p> + +<p class='c001'>And Hosea xiii. 9: <i>O Israel, thy <a id='corr10.13'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='de truction'>destruction</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_10.13'><ins class='correction' title='de truction'>destruction</ins></a></span> is +from thyself, but in me is thy help.</i></p> + +<p class='c001'>And 1 Tim. ii. 4: <em>Who will have all men to be +saved, and to come to the knowledge of truth.</em></p> + +<p class='c001'>And Eccl. xv. 11, 12: <em>Say not thou, it is through +the Lord I fell away; for thou oughtest not to do +the things that he hateth. Say not thou, he hath +caused me to err; for he hath no need of thee, +sinful man.</em> And many other places to the like +purpose.</p> + +<p class='c001'>You see how great the apparent contradiction is +between the first and the third sort of texts, which +being both Scripture, may and must be reconciled +and made to stand together; which unless the +rigour of the letter be on one or both sides with +intelligible and reasonable interpretations mollified, +is impossible.</p> + +<p class='c001'>The Schoolmen, to keep the literal sense of the +third sort of texts, interpret the first sort thus; +the words of Joseph, <em>It was not you that sent me +hither, but God</em>; they interpret in this manner: +<em>It was you that sold me into Egypt, God did but +<span class='pageno' id='Page_11'>11</span>permit it; it was God that sent me and not you</em>; +as if the <em>selling</em> were not the <em>sending</em>. This is +Suarez; of whom and the Bishop I would know, +whether the <em>selling</em> of Joseph did infallibly and +inevitably follow that permission. If it did, then +that <em>selling</em> was necessitated beforehand by an +eternal permission. If it did not, how can there +be attributed to God a foreknowledge of it, when +by the <em>liberty of human will</em> it might have been +frustrated? I would know also whether the <em>selling</em> +of Joseph into Egypt were a sin? If it were, why +doth Joseph say, <em>Be not grieved nor angry with +yourselves that ye sold me hither</em>? Ought not a +man to be grieved and angry with himself for sinning? +If it were no sin, then treachery and fratricide +is no sin.</p> + +<p class='c001'>Again, seeing the <em>selling</em> of him consisted in +these acts, <em>binding</em>, <em>speaking</em>, <em>delivering</em>, which +are all corporeal motions, did God <em>will</em> they should +not be, how then could they be done? Or doth he +permit barely, and neither <em>will</em> nor <em>nill</em> corporeal +and local motions? How then is God the first +mover and cause of all local motion? Did he cause +the motion, and <em>will</em> the law against it, but not the +irregularity? How can that be, seeing the motion +and law being existent, the contrariety of the motion +and law is necessarily coexistent?</p> + +<p class='c001'>So these places, <em>He hardened Pharaoh’s heart</em>, +<em>he made Sihon’s heart obstinate</em>, they interpret +thus: “He permitted them to make their own +hearts obstinate.” But seeing that man’s heart without +the grace of God, is uninclinable to good, the +<em>necessity</em> of the hardness of heart, both in Pharaoh +and in Sihon, is as easily derived from God’s <em>permission</em>, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_12'>12</span>that is, from his withholding his grace, as +from his <em>positive decree</em>. And whereas they say, +He <em>wills</em> godly and free actions conditionally and +consequently, that is, if the man <em>will</em> them, then +God <em>wills</em> them, else not; and <em>wills</em> not evil actions, +but <em>permits</em> them; they ascribe to God +nothing at all in the causation of any action either +good or bad.</p> + +<p class='c001'>Now to the third sort of places, that seem to +contradict the former, let us see if they may not +be reconciled with a more intelligible and reasonable +interpretation, than that wherewith the Schoolmen +interpret the first.</p> + +<p class='c001'>It is no extraordinary kind of language, to call +the commandments and exhortations and other +significations of the <em>will</em>, by the name of <em>will</em>; +though the <em>will</em> be an internal act of the soul, and +commands are but words and signs external of +that internal act. So that the <em>will</em> and the <em>word</em> +are diverse things; and differ as the <em>thing signified</em>, +and the <em>sign</em>. And hence it comes to pass, +that the Word and Commandment of God, namely, +the holy Scripture, is usually called by Christians +God’s will, but his revealed will; acknowledging +the very will of God, which they call his counsel +and decree, to be another thing. For the revealed +will of God to Abraham was, that Isaac should be +sacrificed; but it was his will he should not. And +his revealed will to Jonas, that Nineveh should be +destroyed within forty days; but not his decree +and purpose. His decree and purpose cannot be +known beforehand, but may afterwards by the +event; for from the event we may infer his will. +But his revealed will, which is his word, must be +<span class='pageno' id='Page_13'>13</span>foreknown, because it ought to be the rule of our +actions.</p> + +<p class='c001'>Therefore, where it is said that <em>God will have +all men to be saved</em>, it is not meant of his will internal, +but of his commandments or will revealed; +as if it had been said, “God hath given commandments, +by following of which all men may be +saved.” So where God says, <em>O Israel, how often +would I have gathered thee</em>, &c., <em>as a hen doth +her chickens, but thou wouldest not</em>, it is thus to +be understood: “How oft have I by my prophets +given thee such counsel, as, being followed, thou +hadst been gathered,” &c. And the like interpretations +are to be given to the like places. For it +is not Christian to think, if God had the purpose +to save all men, that any man could be damned; +because it were a sign of want of power to effect +what he would. So these words, <em>What could have +been done more to my vineyard, that I have not +done</em>: if by them be meant the Almighty power, +might receive this answer: “Men might have been +kept by it from sinning.” But when we are to +measure God by his revealed will, it is as if he had +said, “What directions, what laws, what threatenings +could have been used more, that I have not +used?” God doth not will and command us to inquire +what his will and purpose is, and accordingly +to do it; for we shall do that, whether we will or +not; but to look into his commandments, that is, +as to the Jews, the law of Moses; and as to other +people, the laws of their country.</p> + +<p class='c001'><em>O Israel, thy destruction is from thyself, but in +me is thy help</em>: or as some English translations +have it, <em>O Israel, thou hast destroyed thyself</em>, &c., +<span class='pageno' id='Page_14'>14</span>is literally true, but maketh nothing against me; +for the man that sins willingly, whatsoever be the +cause of his will, if he be not forgiven, hath destroyed +himself, as being his own act.</p> + +<p class='c001'>Where it is said, <em>They have offered their sons +unto Baal, which I commanded not, nor spake it, +nor came it into my mind</em>; these words, <em>nor came +it into my mind</em>, are by some much insisted on, as +if they had done it without the will of God. For +whatsoever is done comes into God’s mind, that is, +into his knowledge, which implies a certainty of +the future action, and that certainty an antecedent +purpose of God to bring it to pass. It cannot +therefore be meant God did not will it, but that +he had not the will to command it. But by the +way it is to be noted, that when God speaks to +men concerning his will and other attributes, he +speaks of them as if they were like to those of +men, to the end he may be understood. And +therefore to the order of his work, the world, +wherein one thing follows another so aptly as no +man could order it by design, he gives the name of +will and purpose. For that which we call design, +which is reasoning, and thought after thought, +cannot be properly attributed to God; in whose +thoughts there is no <em>fore</em> nor <em>after</em>.</p> + +<p class='c001'>But what shall we answer to the words in Ecclesiasticus: +<em>Say not thou, it is through the Lord I +fell away; say not thou, he hath caused me to err</em>. +If it had not been, <em>say not thou</em>, but “think not +thou,” I should have answered that Ecclesiasticus is +Apocrypha, and merely human authority. But it is +very true that such words as these are not to be +said; first, because St. Paul forbids it: <em>Shall the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_15'>15</span>thing formed</em>, saith he, <em>say to him that formed it, +why hast thou made me so?</em> Yet true it is, that he +did so make him. Secondly, because we ought to +attribute nothing to God but what we conceive to +be honourable, and we judge nothing honourable +but what we count so amongst ourselves; and because +accusation of man is not honourable, therefore +such words are not to be used concerning God +Almighty. And for the same cause it is not lawful +to say that any action can be done, which God +hath purposed shall not be done; for it is a token +of want of the power to hinder it. Therefore +neither of them is to be said, though one of them +must needs be true. Thus you see how disputing +of God’s nature which is incomprehensible, driveth +men upon one of these two rocks. And this was +the cause I was unwilling to have my answer to +the Bishop’s doctrine of liberty published.</p> + +<p class='c001'>And thus much for comparison of our two +opinions with the Scriptures; which whether it +favour more his or mine, I leave to be judged by +the reader. And now I come to compare them +again by <em>the inconveniences which may be thought +to follow them</em>.</p> + +<p class='c001'>First, the bishop says, that this very persuasion, +that all things come to pass by <em>necessity</em>, is able to +overthrow all societies and commonwealths in the +world. The laws, saith he, are unjust which prohibit +that which a man cannot possibly shun.</p> + +<p class='c001'>Secondly, that it maketh superfluous and foolish +all consultations, arts, arms, books, instruments, +teachers, and medicines, and which is worst, piety +and all other acts of devotion. For if the event +be necessary, it will come to pass whatsoever we +do, and whether we sleep or wake.</p> + +<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_16'>16</span>This inference, if there were not as well a necessity +of the means as there is of the event, might +be allowed for true. But according to my opinion, +both the event and means are equally necessitated. +But supposing the inference true, it makes as much +against him that denies as against him that holds +this necessity. For I believe the Bishop holds for +as certain a truth, <em>what shall be, shall be</em>, as <em>what +is, is</em>, or <em>what has been, has been</em>. And then the +ratiocination of the sick man, “If I shall recover, +what need I this unsavoury potion? if I shall not +recover, what good will it do me?” is a good ratiocination. +But the Bishop holds, that it is necessary +he shall recover or not recover. Therefore it follows +from an opinion of the Bishop’s, as well as +from mine, that medicine is superfluous. But as +medicine is to health, so is piety, consultation, +arts, arms, books, instruments, and teachers, +every one to its several end. Out of the Bishop’s +opinion it follows as well as from mine, that medicine +is superfluous to health. Therefore from his +opinion as well as from mine, it followeth, (if such +ratiocination were not unsound), that piety, consultation, +&c. are also superfluous to their respective +ends. And for the superfluity of laws, whatsoever +be the truth of the question between us, +they are not superfluous, because by the punishing +of one, or of a few unjust men, they are the +cause of justice in a great many.</p> + +<p class='c001'>But the greatest inconvenience of all that the +Bishop pretends may be drawn from this opinion, +is, “that God in justice cannot punish a man with +eternal torments for doing that which it was never +in his power to leave undone.” It is true, that +<span class='pageno' id='Page_17'>17</span>seeing the name of punishment hath relation to +the name of crime, there can be no punishment +but for crimes that might have been left undone; +but instead of <em>punishment</em> if he had said <em>affliction</em>, +may not I say that God may afflict, and not for sin? +Doth he not afflict those creatures that cannot sin? +And sometimes those that can sin, and yet not for +sin, as Job, and the man in the gospel that was +born blind, for the manifestation of his power +which he hath over his creature, no less but more +than hath the potter over his clay to make of it +what he please? But though God have power to +afflict a man and not for sin without injustice, shall +we think God so cruel as to afflict a man, and not +for sin, with extreme and endless torment? Is it +not cruelty? No more than to do the same for +sin, when he that so afflicteth might without trouble +have kept him from sinning. But what infallible +evidence hath the Bishop, that a man shall be +after this life eternally in torments and never die? +Or how is it certain there is no second death, +when the Scripture saith there is? Or where doth +the Scripture say that a second death is an endless +life? Or do the Doctors only say it? Then perhaps +they do but say so, and for reasons best +known to themselves. There is no injustice nor +cruelty in him that giveth life, to give with it sickness, +pain, torments, and death; nor in him that +giveth life twice, to give the same miseries twice +also. And thus much in answer to the inconveniences +that are pretended to follow the doctrine +of necessity.</p> + +<p class='c001'>On the other side from this position, that a man +is free to will, it followeth that the prescience of +<span class='pageno' id='Page_18'>18</span>God is quite taken away. For how can it be known +beforehand what man shall have a will to, if that +will of his proceed not from necessary causes, but +that he have in his power to will or not will? So +also those things which are called future contingents, +if they come not to pass with certainty, +that is to say, from necessary causes, can never be +foreknown; so that God’s foreknowing shall sometimes +be of things that shall not come to pass, +which is as much to say, that his foreknowledge is +none; which is a great dishonour to the all-knowing +power.</p> + +<p class='c001'>Though this be all the inconvenient doctrine +that followeth <em>free-will</em>, forasmuch as I can now +remember; yet the defending of this opinion hath +drawn the Bishop and other patrons of it into many +inconvenient and absurd conclusions, and made +them make use of an infinite number of insignificant +words; whereof one conclusion is in Suarez, +that God doth so concur with the will of man, +that <em>if man will, then God concurs</em>; which is to +subject not the will of man to God, but the will of +God to man. Other inconvenient conclusions I +shall then mark out, when I come to my observations +upon the Bishop’s reply. And thus far concerning +the inconveniences that follow both opinions.</p> + +<p class='c001'>The attribute of God which he draweth into +argument is his <em>justice</em>, as that God cannot be just +in punishing any man for that which he was necessitated +to do. To which I have answered before, +as being one of the inconveniences pretended +to follow upon the doctrine of necessity. On the +contrary, from another of God’s attributes, which +<span class='pageno' id='Page_19'>19</span>is his <em>foreknowledge</em>, I shall evidently derive, that +all actions whatsoever, whether they proceed from +the will or from fortune, were necessary from eternity. +For whatsoever God foreknoweth shall come +to pass, cannot but come to pass, that is, it is impossible +it should not come to pass, or otherwise +come to pass than it was foreknown. But whatsoever +was impossible should be otherwise, was +necessary; for the definition of <em>necessary</em> is, that +which cannot possibly be otherwise. And whereas +they that distinguish between God’s <em>prescience</em> and +his <em>decree</em>, say the foreknowledge maketh not the +necessity without the decree; it is little to the purpose. +It sufficeth me, that whatsoever was foreknown +by God, was necessary: but all things were +foreknown by God, and therefore all things were +necessary. And as for the distinction of foreknowledge +from decree in God Almighty, I comprehend +it not. They are acts co-eternal, and therefore one.</p> + +<p class='c001'>And as for the arguments drawn from natural +reason they are set down at large in the end of +my discourse to which the Bishop maketh his +reply; which how well he hath answered, shall +appear in due time. For the present, the actions +which he thinketh proceed from liberty of will, +must either be necessitated, or proceed from fortune, +without any other cause; for certainly to <em>will</em> +is impossible without thinking on what he willeth. +But it is in no man’s election what he shall at any +named time hereafter think on. And this I take to +be enough to clear the understanding of the reader, +that he may be the better able to judge of the following +disputation. I find in those that write of this +argument, especially in the Schoolmen and their followers, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_20'>20</span>so many words strangers to our language, +and such confusion and inanity in the ranging of +them, as that a man’s mind in the reading of them +distinguisheth nothing. And as things were in the +beginning before the Spirit of God was moved +upon the abyss, <em>tohu</em> and <em>bohu</em>, that is to say, +confusion and emptiness; so are their discourses.</p> +<div class='c005'></div> +<hr class='dbl'> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c003'> + <div><span class='pageno' id='Page_21'>21</span><span class='small'>“TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE</span></div> + <div>MARQUIS OF NEWCASTLE,</div> + <div><span class='small'>ETC.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c011'>“<span class='sc'>Sir</span>,--</p> + +<p class='c001'>“If I pretended to compose a complete treatise +upon this subject, I should not refuse those large +recruits of reasons and authorities which offer +themselves to serve in this cause, for God and +man, religion and policy, Church and Commonwealth, +(<i>a</i>) against the blasphemous, desperate, +and destructive opinion of fatal destiny. But as (<i>b</i>) +mine aim, in the first discourse, was only to press +home those things in writing, which had been +agitated between us by word of mouth, (a course +much to be preferred before verbal conferences, +as being freer from passions and tergiversations, +less subject to mistakes and misrelations, wherein +paralogisms are more quickly detected, impertinences +discovered, and confusion avoided), so my +present intention is only to vindicate that discourse, +and together with it, (<i>c</i>) those lights of +the Schools, who were never slighted but where +they were not understood. How far I have performed +it, I leave to the judicious and impartial +reader, resting for mine own part well contented +with this, that I have satisfied myself.</p> + +<div class='lg-container-r c012'> + <div class='linegroup'> + <div class='group'> + <div class='line'>Your Lordship’s most obliged,</div> + <div class='line in8'>to love and serve you,</div> + <div class='line in28'>“J. D.”</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c003'> + <div><span class='pageno' id='Page_22'>22</span>ANIMADVERSIONS UPON</div> + <div>THE BISHOP’S EPISTLE TO MY LORD OF NEWCASTLE.</div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c013'>(<i>a</i>) “Against the blasphemous, desperate, and +destructive opinion of fatal destiny.”</p> + +<p class='c001'>This is but choler, such as ordinarily happeneth +unto them who contend against greater difficulties +than they expected.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “My aim in the first discourse was only to +press home those things in writing, which had been +agitated between us by word of mouth: a course +much to be preferred before verbal conferences, +as being freer from passions, &c.”</p> + +<p class='c001'>He is here, I think, mistaken; for in our verbal +conference there was not one passionate word, nor +any objecting of blasphemy or atheism, nor any +other uncivil word; of which in his writing there +are abundance.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>c</i>) “Those lights of the Schools, who were +never slighted but where they were not understood.”</p> + +<p class='c001'>I confess I am not apt to admire every thing I +understand not, nor yet to slight it. And though +the Bishop slight not the Schoolmen so much as +I do, yet I dare say he understands their writings +as little as I do. For they are in most places unintelligible.</p> + +<div class='c003'></div> +<hr class='dbl'> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> + <div class='nf-center'> + <div><span class='pageno' id='Page_23'>23</span><span class='large'>TO THE READER.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c014'>“Christian reader, this ensuing treatise was (<i>a</i>) +neither penned nor intended for the press, but +privately undertaken, that by the ventilation of +the question truth might be cleared from mistakes. +The same was Mr. Hobbes’ desire at that +time, as appeareth by four passages in his book, +wherein he requesteth and beseecheth that it may +be kept private. But either through forgetfulness +or change of judgment, he hath now caused or +permitted it to be printed in England, without +either adjoining my first discourse, to which he +wrote that answer, or so much as mentioning this +reply, which he hath had in his hands now these +eight years. So wide is the date of his letter, in +the year 1652, from the truth, and his manner of +dealing with me in this particular from ingenuity, +(if the edition were with his own consent). Howsoever, +here is all that passed between us upon this +subject, without any addition, or the least variation +from the original.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Concerning the nameless author of the preface, +who takes upon him to hang out an ivy-bush +before this rare piece of sublimated stoicism to +invite passengers to purchase it, as I know not +who he is, so I do not much heed it, nor regard +either his ignorant censures or hyperbolical expressions. +The Church of England is as much +above his detraction, as he is beneath this question. +Let him lick up the spittle of Dionysius by +<span class='pageno' id='Page_24'>24</span>himself, as his servile flatterers did, and protest +that it is more sweet than nectar; we envy him +not; much good may it do him. His very frontispiece +is a sufficient confutation of his whole preface, +wherein he tells the world, as falsely and ignorantly +as confidently, that ‘all controversy concerning +predestination, election, free-will, grace, +merits, reprobation, &c., is fully decided and cleared.’ +Thus he accustometh his pen to run over +beyond all limits of truth and discretion, to let us +see that his knowledge in theological controversies +is none at all, and into what miserable times we +are fallen, when blind men will be the only judges +of colours. <span lang="la"><i>Quid tanto dignum feret hic promissor +hiatu.</i></span></p> + +<p class='c001'>“There is yet one thing more, whereof I desire +to advertise the reader, (<i>b</i>) Whereas Mr. Hobbes +mentions my objections to his book <span lang="la"><cite>De Cive</cite></span>, it is +true that ten years since I gave him about sixty +exceptions, the one-half of them political, the other +half theological, to that book, and every exception +justified by a number of reasons, to which he +never yet vouchsafed any answer. Nor do I now +desire it, for since that, he hath published his +<span lang="la"><i>Leviathan, Monstrum horrendum, informe, ingens, +cui lumen ademptum</i></span>, which affords much more +matter of exception; and I am informed that there +are already two, the one of our own Church, the +other a stranger, who have shaken in pieces the +whole fabric of his city, that was but builded in +the air, and resolved that huge mass of his seeming +Leviathan into a new nothing; and that their labours +will speedily be published. But if this information +should not prove true, I will not grudge +<span class='pageno' id='Page_25'>25</span>upon his desire, God willing, to demonstrate, that +his principles are pernicious both to piety and +policy, and destructive to all relations of mankind, +between prince and subject, father and child, master +and servant, husband and wife; and that they +who maintain them obstinately, are fitter to live in +hollow trees among wild beasts, than in any Christian +or political society. So God bless <a id='corr25.8'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='us.'>us.”</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_25.8'><ins class='correction' title='us.'>us.”</ins></a></span></p> + +<hr class='dbl'> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> + <div class='nf-center'> + <div><span class='fss'>ANIMADVERSIONS UPON</span></div> + <div><span class='fss'>THE BISHOP’S EPISTLE TO THE READER.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c014'>(<i>a</i>) “Neither penned nor intended for the press, +but privately undertaken, that by the ventilation of +the question truth might be cleared. The same +was Mr. Hobbes’ desire at that time, as appeareth +by four passages in his book, &c.”</p> + +<p class='c001'>It is true that it was not my intention to publish +any thing in this question. And the Bishop +might have perceived, by not leaving out those four +passages, that it was without my knowledge the +book was printed; but it pleased him better to take +this little advantage to accuse me of want of ingenuity. +He might have perceived also, by the date +of my letter, 1652, which was written 1646, (which +error could be no advantage to me), that I knew +nothing of the printing of it. I confess, that before +I received the bishop’s reply, a French gentleman +of my acquaintance in Paris, knowing that I +had written something of this subject, but not understanding +the language, desired me to give him +leave to get it interpreted to him by an English +young man that resorted to him; which I yielded +to. But this young man taking his opportunity, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_26'>26</span>and being a nimble writer, took a copy of it for +himself, and printed it here, all but the postscript, +without my knowledge, and (as he knew) against +my will; for which he since hath asked me pardon. +But that the Bishop intended it not for the +press, is not very probable, because he saith he +writ it to the end “that by the ventilation of the +question, truth might be cleared from mistakes;” +which end he had not obtained by keeping it private.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “Whereas Mr. Hobbes mentions my objections +to his book <span lang="la"><cite>De Cive</cite></span>: it is true that ten years +since, I gave him about sixty exceptions,” &c.</p> + +<p class='c001'>I did indeed intend to have answered those exceptions +as finding them neither political nor theological, +nor that he alleged any reasons by which +they were to be justified. But shortly after, intending +to write in English, and publish my +thoughts concerning Civil Doctrine in that book +which I entitled <cite>Leviathan</cite>, I thought his objections +would by the clearness of my method fall off +without an answer. Now this <cite>Leviathan</cite> he calleth +“<span lang="la"><i>Monstrum horrendum, informe, ingens, cui +lumen ademptum</i></span>.” Words not far fetched, nor +more applicable to my <cite>Leviathan</cite>, than to any +other writing that should offend him. For allowing +him the word <span lang="la"><i>monstrum</i></span>, (because it seems he +takes it for a monstrous great fish), he can neither +say it is <span lang="la"><i>informe</i></span>; for even they that approve not +the doctrine, allow the method. Nor that it is +<span lang="la"><i>ingens</i></span>; for it is a book of no great bulk. Nor +<span lang="la"><i>cui lumen ademptum</i></span>; for he will find very few +readers that will not think it clearer than his +scholastic jargon. And whereas he saith there are +<span class='pageno' id='Page_27'>27</span>two of our own Church (as he hears say) that are +answering it; and that “he himself,” if I desire it, +“will demonstrate that my principles are pernicious +both to piety and policy, and destructive to +all relations,” &c.: my answer is, that <em>I</em> desire +not that he or they should so misspend their time; +but if they will needs do it, I can give them a fit +title for their book, <cite>Behemoth against Leviathan</cite>. +He ends his epistle with “so God bless us.” Which +words are good in themselves, but to no purpose +here; but are a buffoonly abusing of the name of +God to calumny.</p> +<div class='c005'></div> +<hr class='dbl'> + +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_29'>29</span> + <h2 class='c006'><span class='small'>A</span> <br> <br> <span class='large'>VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY</span> <br> <br><span class='small'>FROM</span> <br> <br> ANTECEDENT AND EXTRINSICAL NECESSITY.</h2> +</div> + +<div class='c003'></div> +<hr class='dbl'> + +<p class='c013'><a id='I'></a><i>J. D.</i> “Either I am free to write this discourse +for liberty against necessity, or I am not free. If +I be free, I have obtained the cause, and ought not +to suffer for the truth. If I be not free, yet I +ought not to be blamed, since I do it not out of +any voluntary election, but out of an inevitable +necessity.”</p> + +<p class='c001'><i>T. H.</i> Right Honourable, I had once resolved +to answer J. D.’s objections to my book <span lang="la"><cite>De Cive</cite></span> in +the first place, as that which concerns me most; +and afterwards to examine this Discourse of Liberty +and Necessity, which, because I never had uttered +my opinion of it, concerned me the less. But +seeing it was both your Lordship’s and J. D.’s desire +that I should begin with the latter, I was contented +so to do. And here I present and submit it +to your Lordship’s judgment.</p> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “The first day that I did read over T. H.’s +defence of the necessity of all things, was April +20th, 1646. Which proceeded not out of any disrespect +to him; for if all his discourses had been +geometrical demonstrations, able not only to persuade, +but also to compel assent, all had been one +to me, first my journey, and afterwards some other +<span class='pageno' id='Page_30'>30</span>trifles which we call business, having diverted me +until then. And then my occasions permitting me, +and an advertisement from a friend awakening me, +I set myself to a serious examination of it. We +commonly see those who delight in paradoxes, if +they have line enough, confute themselves; and +their speculatives and their practices familiarly interfere +one with another. (<i>b</i>) The very first words +of T. H.’s defence trip up the heels of his whole +cause; ‘I had once resolved.’ To <em>resolve</em> presupposeth +deliberation. But what deliberation can +there be of that which is inevitably determined by +causes without ourselves, before we do deliberate? +Can a condemned man deliberate whether he should +be executed or not? It is even to as much purpose, +as for a man to consult and ponder with +himself whether he should draw in his breath, or +whether he should increase in stature. Secondly, +(<i>c</i>) to <em>resolve</em> implies a man’s dominion over his +own actions, and his actual determination of himself. +But he who holds an absolute necessity of all +things, hath quitted this dominion over himself; +and (which is worse) hath quitted it to the second +extrinsical causes, in which he makes all his actions +to be determined. One may as well call again +yesterday, as <em>resolve</em> or newly determine that +which is determined to his hand already. (<i>d</i>) I +have perused this treatise, weighed T. H.’s answers, +considered his reasons, and conclude that +he hath missed, and misled the question, that the +answers are evasions, that his arguments are paralogisms, +that the opinion of absolute and universal +necessity is but a result of some groundless and +ill-chosen principles, and that the defect is not in +<span class='pageno' id='Page_31'>31</span>himself, but that his cause will admit no better +defence; and therefore, by his favour, I am resolved +to adhere to my first opinion. Perhaps +another man reading this discourse with other +eyes, judgeth it to be pertinent and well-founded. +How comes this to pass? The treatise is the same, +the exterior causes are the same; yet the resolution +is contrary. Do the second causes play fast and +loose? Do they necessitate me to condemn, and +necessitate him to maintain? What is it then? The +difference must be in ourselves, either in our intellectuals, +because the one sees clearer than the +other; or in our affections, which betray our understandings, +and produce an implicit adherence in +the one more than in the other. Howsoever it be, +the difference is in ourselves. The outward causes +alone do not chain me to the one resolution, nor +him to the other resolution. But T. H. may say, +that our several and respective deliberations and +affections are in part the causes of our contrary +resolutions, and do concur with the outward causes +to make up one total and adequate cause to the +necessary production of this effect. If it be so, +he hath spun a fair thread, to make all this stir for +such a necessity as no man ever denied or doubted +of. When all the causes have actually determined +themselves, then the effect is in being; for though +there be a priority in nature between the cause +and the effect, yet they are together in time. And +the old rule is, (<i>e</i>) ‘whatsoever is, when it is, is +necessarily so as it is.’ This is no absolute necessity, +but only upon supposition, that a man hath +determined his own liberty. When we question +whether all occurrences be necessary, we do not +<span class='pageno' id='Page_32'>32</span>question whether they be necessary when they are, +nor whether they be necessary <span lang="la"><i>in sensu composito</i></span>, +after we have resolved and finally determined what +to do; but whether they were necessary before they +were determined by ourselves, by or in the precedent +causes before ourselves, or in the exterior +causes without ourselves. It is not inconsistent +with true liberty to determine itself, but it is inconsistent +with true liberty to be determined by +another without itself.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“T. H. saith further ‘that upon your Lordship’s +desire and mine, he was contented to begin with +this discourse of Liberty and Necessity,’ that is, to +change his former resolution. (<i>f</i>) If the chain of +necessity be no stronger, but that it may be snapped +so easily insunder; if his will was no otherwise +determined without himself, but only by the +signification of your Lordship’s desire and my modest +entreaty, then we may easily conclude that +human affairs are not always governed by absolute +necessity; that a man is lord of his own actions, if +not in chief, yet in mean, subordinate to the Lord +paramount of heaven and earth; and that all +things are not so absolutely determined in the +outward and precedent causes, but that fair entreaties +and moral persuasions may work upon a +good nature so far, as to prevent that which otherwise +had been, and to produce that which otherwise +had not been. He that can reconcile this with +an antecedent necessity of all things, and a physical +or natural determination of all causes, shall be +great Apollo to me.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Whereas T. H. saith that he had never uttered +his opinion of this question, I suppose he intends +<span class='pageno' id='Page_33'>33</span>in writing; my conversation with him hath not +been frequent, yet I remember well that when +this question was agitated between us two in your +Lordship’s chamber by your command, he did +then declare himself in words, both for the absolute +necessity of all events, and for the ground of +this necessity, the flux or concatenation of the +second <a id='corr33.8'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='causes.'>causes.”</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_33.8'><ins class='correction' title='causes.'>causes.”</ins></a></span></p> + +<h3 class='c002'><span class='fss'>ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. I.</span></h3> + +<p class='c010'>(<i>a</i>) “The first day that I did read over T. H.’s +defence of necessity,” &c.</p> + +<p class='c001'>His deferring the reading of my defence of necessity, +he will not, he saith, should be interpreted +for disrespect. ’Tis well; though I cannot imagine +why he should fear to be thought to disrespect +me. “He was diverted,” he saith, “by +trifles called business.” It seems then he acknowledgeth +that the will can be diverted by business. +Which, though said on the <em>by</em>, is contrary +I think to the main, that the will is free; for free +it is not, if anything but itself can divert it.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “The very first words of T. H.’s defence, +trip up the heels of his whole cause, &c.”</p> + +<p class='c001'>How so? “I had once,” saith he, “resolved. To +resolve presupposeth deliberation. But what deliberation +can there be of that which is inevitably +determined without ourselves?” There is no man +doubts but a man may deliberate of what himself +shall do, whether the thing be impossible or not, +in case he know not of the impossibility; though +he cannot deliberate of what another shall do to +him. Therefore his examples of the man condemned, +of the man that breatheth, and of him +<span class='pageno' id='Page_34'>34</span>that groweth, because the question is not what +they shall do, but what they shall suffer, are impertinent. +This is so evident, that I wonder how +he that was before so witty as to say, my first +words tripped up the heels of my cause, and that +having line enough I would confute myself, could +presently be so dull as not to see his argument was +too weak to support so triumphant a language. And +whereas he seemeth to be offended with paradoxes, +let him thank the Schoolmen, whose senseless writings +have made the greatest number of important +truths seem paradox.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>c</i>) This argument that followeth is no better. +“To resolve,” saith he, “implies a man’s dominion +over his actions, and his actual determination of +himself,” &c.</p> + +<p class='c001'>If he understand what it is <em>to resolve</em>, he knows +that it signifies no more than after deliberation +<em>to will</em>. He thinks, therefore, <em>to will</em> is to have +dominion over his own actions, and actually to determine +his own will. But no man can determine +his own will, for the will is appetite; nor can a +man more determine his will than any other appetite, +that is, more than he can determine when he +shall be hungry and when not. When a man is +hungry, it is in his choice to eat or not eat; this +is the liberty of the man; but to be hungry or not +hungry, which is that which I hold to proceed +from necessity, is not in his choice. Besides these +words, “dominion over his own actions,” and +“determination of himself,” so far as they are significant, +make against him. For over whatsoever +things there is dominion, those things are not free, +and therefore a man’s actions are not free; and if a +<span class='pageno' id='Page_35'>35</span>man determine himself, the question will still +remain, what determined him to determine himself +in that manner.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>d</i>) “I have perused this treatise, weighed T. H.’s +answers, considered his reasons,” &c.</p> + +<p class='c001'>This and that which followeth, is talking to +himself at random, till he come to allege that +which he calleth an old rule, which is this: +(<i>e</i>) “Whatsoever is, when it is, is necessarily so as +it is. This is no absolute necessity, but only upon +supposition that a man hath determined his own +liberty,” &c.</p> + +<p class='c001'>If the bishop think that I hold no other necessity +than that which is expressed in that old foolish +rule, he neither understandeth me, nor what the +word <em>necessary</em> signifieth. <em>Necessary</em> is that which +is impossible to be otherwise, or that which cannot +possibly otherwise come to pass. Therefore <em>necessary</em>, +<em>possible</em>, and <em>impossible</em> have no signification +in reference to time past or time present, but +only time to come. His <em>necessary</em>, and his <span lang="la"><i>in +sensu composito</i></span>, signify nothing; my <em>necessary</em> is +a necessary from all eternity; and yet not inconsistent +with true liberty, which doth not consist in +determining itself, but in doing what the will is +determined unto. This “dominion over itself,” and +this <span lang="la"><i>sensus compositus</i></span>, and this, “determining itself,” +and this, “necessarily is when it is,” are confused +and empty words.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>f</i>) “If the chain of necessity be no stronger but +that it may be snapped so easily asunder, &c. by +the signification of your lordship’s desire, and my +modest entreaty, then we may safely conclude that +human affairs,” &c.</p> + +<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_36'>36</span>Whether my Lord’s desire and the Bishop’s +modest entreaty were enough to produce a <em>will</em> in +me to write an answer to his treatise, without +other concurrent causes, I am not sure. Obedience +to his Lordship did much, and my civility to +the Bishop did somewhat, and perhaps there were +other imaginations of mine own that contributed +their part. But this I am sure of, that altogether +they were sufficient to frame my will thereto; and +whatsoever is sufficient to produce any thing, produceth +it as necessarily as the fire necessarily +burneth the fuel that is cast into it. And though +the Bishop’s modest entreaty had been no part of +the cause of my yielding to it, yet certainly it would +have been cause enough to some civil man, to have +requited me with fairer language than he hath +done throughout this reply.</p> + +<h3 id='II' class='c002'>NO. II.</h3> + +<p class='c010'><i>T. H.</i> And first I assure your Lordship, I find in it +no new argument, neither from Scripture nor from +reason, that I have not often heard before, which +is as much as to say, that I am not surprised.</p> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> (<i>a</i>) “Though I be so unhappy that I can +present no novelty to T. H., yet I have this comfort, +that if he be not surprised, then in reason I +may expect a more mature answer from him; and +where he fails, I may ascribe it to the weakness of +his cause, not to want of preparation. But in this +cause I like Epictetus’s counsel well, that (<i>b</i>) the +sheep should not brag how much they have eaten, +or what an excellent pasture they do go in, but +shew it in their lamb and wool. Opposite answers +and downright arguments advantage a cause. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_37'>37</span>To tell what we have heard or seen is to no purpose. +When a respondent leaves many things untouched, +as if they were too hot for his fingers, and +declines the weight of other things, and alters the +true state of the question, it is a shrewd sign either +that he hath not weighed all things maturely, or +else that he maintains a desperate cause.”</p> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c000'> + <div><span class='fss'>ANIMADVERSIONS UPON HIS REPLY NO. II.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>a</i>) “Though I be so unhappy that I can present +no novelty to T. H. yet I have this comfort, that if +he be not surprised, then in reason I may expect a +more mature answer from him,” &c.</p> + +<p class='c001'>Though I were not surprised, yet I do not see the +reason for which he saith he may expect a more +mature answer from me; or any further answer +at all. For seeing I wrote this at his modest request, +it is no modest expectation to look for as +many answers as he shall be pleased to exact.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “The sheep should not brag how much they +have eaten, but shew it in their lamb and wool.”</p> + +<p class='c001'>It is no great bragging, to say I was not surprised; +for whosoever chanceth to read Suarez’s +<span lang="la"><cite>Opuscula</cite></span>, where he writeth of free-will and of +the concourse of God with man’s will, shall find +the greatest part, if not all, that the Bishop hath +urged in this question. But that which the Bishop +hath said of the reasons and authorities which he +saith in his epistle do offer themselves to serve in +this cause, and many other passages of his book, +I shall, I think, before I have done with him, make +appear to be very bragging, and nothing else. +And though he say it be Epictetus’s counsel, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_38'>38</span>that sheep should shew what they eat in their +lamb and wool, it is not likely that Epictetus +should take a metaphor from lamb and wool; for +it could not easily come into the mind of men that +were not acquainted with the paying of tithes. Or +if it had, he would have said lambs in the plural, +as laymen use to speak. That which follows of +my leaving things untouched, and altering the +state of the question; I remember no such thing, +unless he require that I should answer, not to his +arguments only, but also to his syllables.</p> + +<h3 id='III' class='c002'>NO. III.</h3> + +<p class='c010'><i>T. H.</i> The preface is a handsome one, but it +appears even in that, that he hath mistaken the +question; for whereas he says thus, “if I be free to +write this discourse, I have obtained the cause,” I +deny that to be true. For it is not enough to his +freedom of writing that he had not written it, unless +he would himself; if he will obtain the cause, +he must prove that, before he wrote it, it was not +necessary he should write it afterwards. It may be +he thinks it all one to say, “I was free to write it,” +and “it was not necessary I should write it.” But I +think otherwise; for he is free to do a thing, that +may do it if he have the will to do it, and may forbear +if he have the will to forbear. And yet if +there be a necessity that he shall have the will to +do it, the action is necessarily to follow; and if +there be a necessity that he shall have the will to +forbear, the forbearing also will be necessary. The +question, therefore, is not whether a man be a +free agent, that is to say, whether he can write or +forbear, speak or be silent, according to his will; +<span class='pageno' id='Page_39'>39</span>but whether the will to write, and the will to forbear, +come upon him according to his will, or according +to any thing else in his own power. I acknowledge +this liberty, that I can do if I will: but +to say, I can will if I will, I take to be an absurd +speech. Wherefore I cannot grant him the cause +upon this preface.</p> + +<div class='sidenote'>The Bishop’s reply.</div> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “Tacitus speaks of a close kind of adversaries, +which evermore begin with a man’s praise. +The crisis or the catastrophe of their discourse is +when they come to their <em>but</em>; as, he is a good natured +man, <em>but</em> he hath a naughty quality; or, he +is a wise man, <em>but</em> he hath committed one of the +greatest follies; so here, ‘the preface is a handsome +one, but it appears even in this that he hath +mistaken the question.’ This is to give an inch, +<a id='corr38.17'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='hat'>that</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_38.17'><ins class='correction' title='hat'>that</ins></a></span> one may take away an ell without suspicion; +to praise the handsomeness of the porch, that he +may gain credit to the vilifying of the house. +Whether of us hath mistaken the question, I refer +to the judicious reader. (<i>a</i>) Thus much I will +maintain, that that is no true necessity, which he +calls necessity; nor that liberty, which he calls +liberty; nor that the question, which he makes the +question.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“First for liberty, that which he calls liberty, is +no true liberty.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“For the clearing whereof, it behoveth us to +know the difference between these three, <em>necessity</em>, +<em>spontaneity</em>, and <em>liberty</em>.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Necessity and spontaneity may sometimes meet +together; so may spontaneity and liberty; but +real necessity and true liberty can never meet together. +Some things are necessary and not voluntary +<span class='pageno' id='Page_40'>40</span>or spontaneous; some things are both necessary +and voluntary; some things are voluntary and +not free; some things are both voluntary and free; +but those things which are truly necessary can +never be free, and those things which are truly +free can never be necessary. Necessity consists +in an antecedent determination to one; spontaneity +consists in a conformity of the appetite, +either intellectual or sensitive, to the object; true +liberty consists in the elective power of the rational +will; that which is determined without my +concurrence, may nevertheless agree well enough +with my fancy or desires, and obtain my subsequent +consent; but that which is determined without +my concurrence or consent, cannot be the object +of mine election. I may like that which is +inevitably imposed upon me by another, but if it +be inevitably imposed upon me by extrinsical +causes, it is both folly for me to deliberate, and +impossible for me to choose, whether I shall undergo +it or not. Reason is the root, the fountain, +the original of true liberty, which judgeth and +representeth to the will, whether this or that be +convenient, whether this or that be more convenient. +Judge then what a pretty kind of liberty +it is which is maintained by T. H., such a liberty as +is in little children before they have the use of +reason, before they can consult or deliberate of +any thing. Is not this a childish liberty; and +such a liberty as is in brute beasts, as bees and +spiders, which do not learn their faculties as we do +our trades, by experience and consideration? This +is a brutish liberty, such a liberty as a bird hath to +fly when her wings are clipped, or to use his own +<span class='pageno' id='Page_41'>41</span>comparison, such a liberty as a lame man, who +hath lost the use of his limbs, hath to walk. Is +not this a ridiculous liberty? Lastly, (which is +worse than all these), such a liberty as a river hath +to descend down the channel. What! will he +ascribe liberty to inanimate creatures also, which +have neither reason, nor spontaneity, nor so much +as sensitive appetite? Such is T. H.’s liberty.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “His necessity is just such another, a necessity +upon supposition, arising from the concourse +of all the causes, including the last dictate of the +understanding in reasonable creatures. The adequate +cause and the effect are together in time, +and when all the concurrent causes are determined, +the effect is determined also, and is become so +necessary that it is actually in being; but there is +a great difference between determining, and being +determined. If all the collateral causes concurring +to the production of an effect, were antecedently +determined what they must of necessity produce, +and when they must produce it, then there is no +doubt but the effect is necessary. (<i>c</i>) But if these +causes did operate freely or contingently; if they +might have suspended or denied their concurrence, +or have concurred after another manner, +then the effect was not truly and antecedently necessary, +but either free or contingent. This will +be yet clearer by considering his own instance of +<em>casting ambs-ace</em>, though it partake more of contingency +than of freedom. Supposing the positure +of the parties’ hand who did throw the dice, supposing +the figure of the table and of the dice themselves, +supposing the measure of force applied, and +supposing all other things which did concur to the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_42'>42</span>production of that cast, to be the very same they +were, there is no doubt but in this case the cast +is necessary. But still this is but a necessity of +supposition; for if all these concurrent causes, +or some of them, were contingent or free, then +the cast was not absolutely necessary. To begin +with the caster, he might have denied his concurrence, +and not have cast at all; he might have suspended +his concurrence, and not have cast so +soon; he might have doubled or diminished his +force in casting, if it had pleased him; he might +have thrown the dice into the other table. In all +these cases what becomes of his <em>ambs-ace</em>? The +like uncertainties offer themselves for the maker of +the tables, and for the maker of the dice, and for +the keeper of the tables, and for the kind of wood, +and I know not how many other circumstances. +In such a mass of contingencies, it is impossible +that the effect should be antecedently necessary. +T. H. appeals to every man’s experience. I am +contented. Let every one reflect upon himself, +and he shall find no convincing, much less constraining +reason, to necessitate him to any one of +these particular acts more than another, but only +his own will or arbitrary determination. So T. +H.’s necessity is no absolute, no antecedent, extrinsical +necessity, but merely a necessity upon +supposition.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>d</i>) “Thirdly, that which T. H. makes the question, +is not the question. ‘The question is not,’ +saith he, ‘whether a man may write if he will, +and forbear if he will, but whether the will to +write or the will to forbear come upon him according +to his will, or according to any thing else +<span class='pageno' id='Page_43'>43</span>in his own power.’ Here is a distinction without +a difference. If his will do not come upon him +according to his will, then he is not a free, nor yet +so much as a voluntary agent, which is T. H.’s +liberty. Certainly all the freedom of the agent is +from the freedom of the will. If the will have no +power over itself, the agent is no more free than a +staff in a man’s hand. Secondly, he makes but an +empty show of a power in the will, either to write +or not to write. (<i>e</i>) If it be precisely and inevitably +determined in all occurrences whatsoever, what +a man shall will, and what he shall not will, what +he shall write, and what he shall not write, to +what purpose is this power? God and nature +never made any thing in vain; but vain and frustraneous +is that power which never was and never +shall be deduced into act. Either the agent is determined +before he acteth, what he shall will, and +what he shall not will, what he shall act, and what +he shall not act, and then he is no more free to act +than he is to will; or else he is not determined, +and then there is no necessity. No effect can exceed +the virtue of its cause; if the action be free +to write or to forbear, the power or faculty to will +or nill, must of necessity be more free. <span lang="la"><i>Quod +efficit tale, illud magis est tale.</i></span> If the will be determined, +the writing or not writing is likewise +determined, and then he should not say, ‘he may +write or he may forbear,’ but he must write or he +must forbear. Thirdly, this answer contradicts +the sense of all the world, that the will of man is +determined without his will, or without any thing +in his power. Why do we ask men whether they +will do such a thing or not? Why do we represent +<span class='pageno' id='Page_44'>44</span>reasons to them? Why do we pray them? Why +do we entreat them? Why do we blame them, if +their will come not upon them according to their +will. <em>Wilt thou be made clean?</em> said our Saviour +to the paralytic person (John v. 6); to what purpose, +if his will was extrinsically determined? +Christ complains, (Matth. xi. 17): <em>We have piped +unto you, and ye have not danced.</em> How could +they help it, if their wills were determined without +their wills to forbear? And (Matth. xxiii. 37): +<em>I would have gathered your children together as +the hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, +but ye would not.</em> How easily might they answer, +according to T. H.’s doctrine, ‘Alas! blame not +us; our wills are not in our own power or disposition; +if they were, we would thankfully embrace so +great a favour.’ Most truly said St. Austin, ‘Our +will should not be a will at all, if it were not in our +power.’ (<i>f</i>) This is the belief of all mankind, which +we have not learned from our tutors, but is imprinted +in our hearts by nature; we need not turn +over any obscure books to find out this truth. +The poets chaunt it in the theatres, the shepherds +in the mountains, the pastors teach it in their +churches, the doctors in the universities, the common +people in the markets, and all mankind in the +whole world do assent unto it, except an handful +of men who have poisoned their intellectuals with +paradoxical principles. Fourthly, this necessity +which T. H. hath devised, which is grounded upon +the necessitation of a man’s will without his will, +is the worst of all others, and is so far from lessening +those difficulties and absurdities which flow +from the fatal destiny of the Stoics, that it increaseth +<span class='pageno' id='Page_45'>45</span>them, and rendereth them unanswerable. +(<i>g</i>) No man blameth fire for burning whole cities; +no man taxeth poison for destroying men; but +those persons who apply them to such wicked +ends. If the will of man be not in his own disposition, +he is no more a free agent than the fire or +the poison. Three things are required to make an +act or omission culpable. First, that it be in our +power to perform it or forbear it; secondly, that +we be obliged to perform it, or forbear it, respectively; +thirdly, that we omit that which we ought +to have done, or do that which we ought to have +omitted. (<i>h</i>) No man sins in doing those things +which he could not shun, or forbearing those +things which never were in his power. T. H. may +say, that besides the power, men have also an appetite +to evil objects, which renders them culpable. +It is true; but if this appetite be determined by +another, not by themselves, or if they have not the +use of reason to curb or restrain their appetites, +they sin no more than a stone descending downward, +according to its natural appetite, or the +brute beasts who commit voluntary errors in following +their sensitive appetites, yet sin not.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>i</i>) The question then is not whether a man be +necessitated to will or nill, yet free to act or forbear. +But saving the ambiguous acception of the +word <em>free</em>, the question is plainly this, whether all +agents, and all events natural, civil, moral, (for we +speak not now of the conversion of a sinner, that +concerns not this question), be predetermined extrinsically +and inevitably without their own concurrence +in the determination; so as all actions and +events which either are or shall be, cannot but be, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_46'>46</span>nor can be otherwise, after any other manner, or +in any other place, time, number, measure, order, +nor to any other end, than they are. And all +this in respect of the supreme cause, or a concourse +of extrinsical causes determining them to +one.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>k</i>) “So my preface remains yet unanswered. +Either I was extrinsically and inevitably predetermined +to write this discourse, without any concurrence +of mine in the determination, and without +any power in me to change or oppose it, or I was +not so predetermined. If I was, then I ought not +to be blamed, for no man is justly blamed for doing +that which never was in his power to shun. If +I was not so predetermined, then mine actions and +my will to act, are neither compelled nor necessitated +by any extrinsical causes, but I elect and +choose, either to write or to forbear, according to +mine own will and by mine own power. And +when I have resolved and elected, it is but a necessity +of supposition, which may and doth consist +with true liberty, not a real antecedent necessity. +The two horns of this dilemma are so straight, +that no mean can be given, nor room to pass between +them. And the two consequences are so +evident, that instead of answering he is forced to +decline them.</p> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c000'> + <div><span class='fss'>ANIMADVERSIONS UPON HIS REPLY NO. III.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>a</i>) “Thus much I will maintain, that this is no +true necessity, which he calleth necessity; nor +that liberty which he calleth liberty; nor that the +question, which he makes the question,” &c. “For +the clearing whereof, it behoveth us to know the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_47'>47</span>difference between these three, <em>necessity</em>, <em>spontaneity</em>, +and <em>liberty</em>.”</p> + +<p class='c001'>I did expect, that for the knowing of the difference +between <em>necessity</em>, <em>spontaneity</em>, and <em>liberty</em>, +he would have set down their definitions. For +without these, their difference cannot possibly appear. +For how can a man know how things differ, +unless he first know what they are? which he +offers not to shew. He tells us that <em>necessity</em> and +<em>spontaneity</em> may meet together, and <em>spontaneity</em> +and <em>liberty</em>; but <em>necessity</em> and <em>liberty</em> never; and +many other things impertinent to the purpose. For +which, because of the length, I refer the reader to +the place. I note only this, that <em>spontaneity</em> is a +word not used in common English; and they that +understand Latin, know it means no more than +<em>appetite</em>, or <em>will</em>, and is not found but in living +creatures. And seeing, he saith, that <em>necessity</em> +and <em>spontaneity</em> may stand together, I may say +also, that <em>necessity</em> and <em>will</em> may stand together, +and then is not the will free, as he would have it, +from necessitation. There are many other things +in that which followeth, which I had rather the +reader would consider in his own words, to which +I refer him, than that I should give him greater +trouble in reciting them again. For I do not fear +it will be thought too hot for my fingers, to shew +the vanity of such words as these, <em>intellectual +appetite</em>, <em>conformity of the appetite to the object</em>, +<em>rational will</em>, <em>elective power of the rational will</em>; +nor understand I how reason can be the root of +true liberty, if the Bishop, as he saith in the beginning, +had the liberty to write this discourse. I +understand how objects, and the conveniences and +<span class='pageno' id='Page_48'>48</span>the inconveniences of them may be represented to +a man, by the help of his senses; but how reason +representeth anything to the will, I understand no +more than the Bishop understands how there may be +liberty in children, in beasts, and inanimate creatures. +For he seemeth to wonder how children +may be left at liberty; how beasts in prison may +be set at liberty; and how a river may have a +free course; and saith, “What! will he ascribe +liberty to inanimate creatures, also?” And thus +he thinks he hath made it clear how <em>necessity</em>, +<em>spontaneity</em>, and <em>liberty</em> differ from one another. +If the reader find it so, I am contented.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “His necessity is just such another; a necessity +upon supposition, arising from the concourse +of all the causes, including the last dictate +of the understanding in reasonable creatures,” &c.</p> + +<p class='c001'>The Bishop might easily have seen, that the +necessity I hold, is the same necessity that he denies; +namely, a necessity of things future, that is, +an antecedent necessity derived from the very beginning +of time; and that I put necessity for an +impossibility of not being, and that impossibility +as well as possibility are never truly said but of +the future. I know as well as he that the cause, +when it is adequate, as he calleth it, or entire, as I +call it, is together in time with the effect. But for +all that, the necessity may be and is before the +effect, as much as any necessity can be. And +though he call it a necessity of supposition, it is +no more so than all other necessity is. The fire +burneth necessarily; but not without supposition +that there is fuel put to it. And it burneth the +fuel, when it is put to it, necessarily; but it is by +<span class='pageno' id='Page_49'>49</span>supposition, that the ordinary course of nature is +not hindered; for the fire burnt not the three children +in the furnace.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>c</i>) “But if these causes did operate freely or +contingently, if they might have suspended or denied +their concurrence, or have concurred after +another manner, then the effect was not truly and +antecedently necessary, but either free or contingent.”</p> + +<p class='c001'>It seems by this he understands not what these +words, <em>free</em> and <em>contingent</em>, mean. A little before, +he wondered I should attribute liberty to inanimate +creatures, and now he puts causes amongst +those things that operate freely. By these causes +it seems he understandeth only men, whereas I +shewed before that liberty is usually ascribed to +whatsoever agent is not hindered. And when a man +doth any thing freely, there be many other agents +immediate, that concur to the effect he intendeth, +which work not freely, but necessarily; as when +the man moveth the sword <em>freely</em>, the sword +woundeth necessarily, nor can suspend or deny +its concurrence; and consequently if the man +move not himself, the man cannot deny his concurrence. +To which he cannot reply, unless he +say a man originally can move himself; for which +he will be able to find no authority of any that +have but tasted of the knowledge of motion. +Then for <em>contingent</em>, he understandeth not what +it meaneth. For it is all one to say it is <em>contingent</em>, +and simply to say <em>it is</em>; saving that when they say +simply <em>it is</em>, they consider not how or by what +means; but in saying it is <em>contingent</em>, they tell us +they know not whether necessarily or not. But +<span class='pageno' id='Page_50'>50</span>the Bishop thinking contingent to be that which +is not necessary, instead of arguing against our +knowledge of the necessity of things to come, argueth +against the necessity itself. Again, he supposeth +that free and contingent causes might have +suspended or denied their concurrence. From +which it followeth, that free causes, and contingent +causes, are not causes of themselves, but concurrent +with other causes, and therefore can produce +nothing but as they are guided by those causes +with which they concur. For it is strange he +should say, they might have concurred after another +manner; for I conceive not how, when this +runneth one way, and that another, that they can +be said to concur, that is, run together. And this +his concurrence of causes contingent, maketh, he +saith, the cast of <span lang="fr"><i>ambs-ace</i></span> not to have been absolutely +necessary. Which cannot be conceived, unless +it had hindered it; and then it had made some +other cast necessary, perhaps <span lang="fr"><i>deux-ace</i></span>, which +serveth me as well. For that which he saith of +suspending his concurrence, of casting sooner or +later, of altering the caster’s force, and the like +accidents, serve not to take away the necessity of +<span lang="fr"><i>ambs-ace</i></span>, otherwise than by making a necessity +of <span lang="fr"><i>deux-ace</i></span>, or other cast that shall be thrown.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>d</i>) “Thirdly, that which T. H. makes the question, +is not the question,” &c.</p> + +<p class='c001'>He hath very little reason to say this. He requested +me to tell him my opinion in writing concerning +free-will. Which I did, and did let him +know a man was free, in those things that were in +his power, to follow his will; but that he was not +free to will, that is, that his will did not follow his +<span class='pageno' id='Page_51'>51</span>will. Which I expressed in these words: “The +question is, whether the will to write, or the will +to forbear, come upon a man according to his will, +or according to any thing else in his own power.” +He that cannot understand the difference between +<i>free to do if he will</i>, and <i>free to will</i>, is not fit, as +I have said in the stating of the question, to hear +this controversy disputed, much less to be a writer +in it. His consequence, “if a man be not free to +will, he is not a free nor a voluntary agent,” and +his saying, “the freedom of the agent is from the +freedom of the will,” is put here without proof; +nor is there any considerable proof of it through +the whole book hereafter offered. For why? He +never before had heard, I believe, of any distinction +between free to do and free to will; which +makes him also say, “if the will have not power +over itself, the agent is no more free, than a staff +in a man’s hand.” As if it were not freedom +enough for a man to do what he will, unless his +will also have power over his will, and that his +will be not the power itself, but must have another +power within it to do all voluntary acts.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>e</i>) “If it be precisely and inevitably determined +in all occurrences whatsoever, what a man shall +will, and what he shall not will, and what he shall +write, and what he shall not write, to what purpose +is this power?” &c.</p> + +<p class='c001'>It is to this purpose, that all those things may +be brought to pass, which God hath from eternity +predetermined. It is therefore to no purpose here +to say, that God and nature hath made nothing in +vain. But see what weak arguments he brings next, +which, though answered in that which is gone before, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_52'>52</span>yet, if I answer not again, he will say they are +too hot for my fingers. One is: “If the agent be +determined what he shall will, and what he shall +act, then he is no more free to act than he is to +will;” as if the will being necessitated, the doing +of what we will were not liberty. Another is: “If +a man be free to act, he is much more free to will; +because <span lang="la"><i>quod efficit tale, illud magis est tale</i></span>;” as +if he should say, “if I make him angry, then I am +more angry; because <span lang="la"><i>quod efficit</i></span>,” &c. The third +is: “If the will be determined, then the writing is +determined, and he ought not to say he <em>may</em> write, +but he <em>must</em> write.” It is true, it followeth that he +must write, but it doth not follow I ought to say +he must write, unless he would have me say more +than I know, as himself doth often in this reply.</p> + +<p class='c001'>After his arguments come his difficult questions. +“If the will of man be determined without his will, +or without any thing in his power, why do we ask +men whether they will do such a thing or not?” I +answer, because we desire to know, and cannot +know but by their telling, nor then neither, +for the most part. “Why do we represent reasons +to them? Why do we pray them? Why do we +entreat them?” I answer, because thereby we +think to make them have the will they have not. +“Why do we blame them?” I answer, because +they please us not. I might ask him, whether +blaming be any thing else but saying the thing +blamed is ill or imperfect? May we not say a +horse is lame, though his lameness came from necessity? +or that a man is a fool or a knave, if he +be so, though he could not help it? “To what +purpose did our Saviour say to the paralytic person, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_53'>53</span><em>wilt thou be made clean</em>, if his will were extrinsically +determined?” I answer, that it was not because +he would know, for he knew it before; but +because he would draw from him a confession of +his want. “<em>We have piped unto you, and ye +have not danced</em>; how could they help it?” I +answer they could not help it. “<em>I would have +gathered your children as the hen gathereth her +chickens under her wings, but ye would not.</em> How +easily might they answer, according to T. H.’s +doctrine, Alas! blame not us, our wills are not in +our own power?” I answer, they are to be blamed +though their wills be not in their own power. Is +not good good, and evil evil, though they be not in +our power? and shall not I call them so? and is +not that praise and blame? But it seems the +Bishop takes blame, not for the dispraise of a thing, +but for a pretext and colour of malice and revenge +against him he blameth. And where he says our +wills are in our power, he sees not that he speaks +absurdly; for he ought to say, the will is the +power; and through ignorance detecteth the same +fault in St. Austin, who saith, “our will should +not be a will at all, if it were not in our power;” +that is to say, if it were not in our will.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>f</i>) “This is the belief of all mankind, which we +have not learned from our tutors, but is imprinted +in our hearts by nature,” &c.</p> + +<p class='c001'>This piece of eloquence is used by Cicero in his +defence of Milo, to prove it lawful for a man to +resist force with force, or to keep himself from +killing; which the Bishop, thinking himself able +to make that which proves one thing prove any +thing, hath translated into English, and brought +<span class='pageno' id='Page_54'>54</span>into this place to prove free-will. It is true, very +few have learned from tutors, that a man is not +free to will; nor do they find it much in books. +That they find in books, that which the poets +chant in their theatres and the shepherds in the +mountains, that which the pastors teach in the +churches and the doctors in the universities, and +that which the common people in the markets, and +all mankind in the whole world do assent unto, is +the same that I assent unto, namely, that a man +hath freedom to do if he will; but whether he hath +freedom to will, is a question which it seems neither +the Bishop nor they ever thought on.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>g</i>) “No man blameth fire for burning cities, +nor taxeth poison for destroying men,” &c.</p> + +<p class='c001'>Here again he is upon his arguments from blame, +which I have answered before; and we do as +much blame them as we do men. For we say fire +hath done hurt, and the poison hath killed a man, +as well as we say the man hath done unjustly; but +we do not seek to be revenged of the fire and of +poison, because we cannot make them ask forgiveness, +as we would make men to do when they +hurt us. So that the blaming of the one and the +other, that is, the declaring of the hurt or evil action +done by them, is the same in both; but the +malice of man is only against man.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>h</i>) “No man sins in doing those things which +he could not shun.”</p> + +<p class='c001'>He may as well say, no man halts which cannot +choose but halt; or stumbles, that cannot choose +but stumble. For what is sin, but halting or stumbling +in the way of God’s commandments?</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>i</i>) “The question then is not, whether a man +<span class='pageno' id='Page_55'>55</span>be necessitated to will or nill, yet free to act or +forbear. But, saving the ambiguous acceptions of +the word <em>free</em>, the question is plainly this,” &c.</p> + +<p class='c001'>This question, which the Bishop stateth in this +place, I have before set down verbatim and allowed: +and it is the same with mine, though he perceive +it not. But seeing I did nothing, but at his +request set down my opinion, there can be no +other question between us in this controversy, but +whether my opinion be the truth or not.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>k</i>) “So my preface remains yet unanswered. +Either I was extrinsically and inevitably predetermined +to write this discourse,” &c.</p> + +<p class='c001'>That which he saith in the preface is, “that if +he be not free to write this discourse, he ought not +to be blamed; but if he be free, he hath obtained +the cause.”</p> + +<p class='c001'>The first consequence I should have granted +him, if he had written it rationally and civilly; +the latter I deny, and have shown that he ought to +have proved that a man is free to will. For that +which he says, any thing else whatsoever would +think, if it knew it were moved, and did not know +what moved it. A wooden top that is lashed by +the boys, and runs about sometimes to one wall, +sometimes to another, sometimes spinning, sometimes +hitting men on the shins, if it were sensible +of its own motion, would think it proceeded from +its own will, unless it felt what lashed it. And is +a man any wiser, when he runs to one place for a +benefice, to another for a bargain, and troubles the +world with writing errors and requiring answers, +because he thinks he doth it without other cause +than his own will, and seeth not what are the lashings +that cause his will?</p> + +<div> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_56'>56</span> + <h3 class='c002'>NO. IV.</h3> +</div> + +<div class='c000'></div> +<div class='sidenote'>The Bishop’s reply.</div> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “And so to fall in hand with the question +without any further proems or prefaces, by +<em>liberty</em>, I do neither understand a liberty from sin, +nor a liberty from misery, nor a liberty from servitude, +nor a liberty from violence, but I understand +a liberty from necessity, or rather from necessitation; +that is, an universal immunity from all inevitability +and determination to one; whether it be of +<em>exercise</em> only, which the Schools call a liberty of +<em>contradiction</em>, and is found in God and in the +good and bad angels, that is, not a liberty to do +both good and evil, but a liberty to do or not to do +this or that good, this or that evil, respectively; or +whether it be a liberty of <em>specification and exercise</em> +also, which the Schools call liberty of <em>contrariety</em>, +and is found in men endowed with reason +and understanding, that is, a liberty to do and not +to do good and evil, this or that. Thus the coast +being cleared,” &c.</p> + +<p class='c001'><i>T. H.</i> In the next place he maketh certain distinctions +of liberty, and says, he means not liberty +from sin, nor from servitude, nor from violence, +but from necessity, necessitation, inevitability, and +determination to one. It had been better to define +liberty, than thus to distinguish; for I understand +never the more what he means by liberty. And +though he says he means liberty from necessitation, +yet I understand not how such a liberty can +be, and it is a taking of the question without proof. +For what else is the question between us, but whether +such a liberty be possible or not? There are +in the same place other distinctions, as a liberty of +<span class='pageno' id='Page_57'>57</span>exercise only, which he calls a liberty of contradiction, +namely, of doing not good or evil simply, +but of doing this or that good, or this or that evil, +respectively: and a liberty of specification and +exercise also, which he calls a liberty of contrariety, +namely, a liberty not only to do or not to +do good or evil, but also to do or not to do this +or that good or evil. And with these distinctions, +he says, he clears the coast, whereas in truth he +darkeneth his meaning, not only with the jargon of +exercise only, specification also, contradiction, contrariety, +but also with pretending distinction where +none is. For how is it possible for the liberty of +doing or not doing this or that good or evil, to +consist, as he saith it doth in God and Angels, +without a liberty of doing or not doing good or +evil?</p> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> (<i>a</i>) “It is a rule in art, that words which +are homonymous, of various and ambiguous significations, +ought ever in the first place to be distinguished. +No men delight in confused generalities, +but either sophisters or bunglers. <span lang="la"><i>Vir dolosus +versatur in generalibus</i></span>, deceitful men do not love +to descend to particulars; and when bad archers +shoot, the safest way is to run to the mark. Liberty +is sometimes opposed to the slavery of sin +and vicious habits, as (Romans vi. 22): <em>Now being +made free from sin</em>. Sometimes to misery and +oppression, (Isaiah lviii. 6): <em>To let the oppressed +go free</em>. Sometimes to servitude, as (Leviticus +xxv. 10): <em>In the year of jubilee ye shall proclaim +liberty throughout the land</em>. Sometimes to violence, +as (Psalms cv. 20): <em>The prince of his people +let him go free</em>. Yet none of all these is the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_58'>58</span>liberty now in question, but a liberty from necessity, +that is, a determination to one, or rather from +necessitation, that is, a necessity imposed by another, +or an extrinsical determination. These distinctions +do virtually imply a description of true +liberty, which comes nearer the essence of it, than +T. H.’s roving definition, as we shall see in due +place. And though he say that ‘he understands +never the more what I mean by liberty,’ yet it is +plain, by his own ingenuous confession, both that +he doth understand it, and that this is the very +question where the water sticks between us, whether +there be such a liberty free from all necessitation +and extrinsical determination to one. Which +being but the stating of the question, he calls it +amiss ‘the taking of the question.’ It were too +much weakness to beg this question, which is so +copious and demonstrable. (<i>b</i>) It is strange to see +with what confidence, now-a-days, particular men +slight all the Schoolmen, and Philosophers, and +classic authors of former ages, as if they were not +worthy to unloose the shoe-strings of some modern +author, or did sit in darkness and in the shadow +of death, until some third Cato dropped down from +heaven, to whom all men must repair, as to the +altar of Prometheus, to light their torches. I did +never wonder to hear a raw divine out of the pulpit +declare against School Divinity to his equally +ignorant auditors. It is but as the fox in the fable, +who, having lost his own tail by a mischance, would +have persuaded all his followers to cut off theirs, +and throw them away as unprofitable burthens. +But it troubles me to see a scholar, one who hath +been long admitted into the innermost closet of +<span class='pageno' id='Page_59'>59</span>nature, and seen the hidden secrets of more subtle +learning, so far to forget himself as to style School-learning +no better than a plain jargon, that is, a +senseless gibberish, or a fustian language, like the +chattering noise of sabots. Suppose they did +sometimes too much cut truth into shreds, or +delight in abstruse expressions, yet certainly this +distinction of liberty into liberty of <em>contrariety</em> +and liberty of <em>contradiction</em>, or which is all one, +of <em>exercise only</em>, or <em>exercise and specification +jointly</em>, which T. H. rejects with so much scorn, is +so true, so necessary, so generally received, that +there is scarce that writer of note, either divine or +philosopher, who did ever treat upon this subject, +but he useth it.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Good and evil are contraries, or opposite kinds +of things. Therefore to be able to choose both good +and evil, is a liberty of contrariety, or of specification. +To choose this, and not to choose this, are +contradictory, or which is all one, an exercise or +suspension of power. Therefore to be able to do or +forbear to do the same action, or to choose or not +choose the same object, without varying of the +kind, is a liberty of contradiction, or of exercise +only. Now a man is not only able to do or forbear +to do good only, or evil only, but he is able +both to do and to forbear to do both good and +evil. So he hath not only a liberty of the action, +but also a liberty of contrary objects; not only a +liberty of exercise, but also of specification; not +only a liberty of contradiction, but also of contrariety. +On the other side, God and the good angels +can do or not do this or that good; but they +cannot do and not do both good and evil. So +<span class='pageno' id='Page_60'>60</span>they have only a liberty of exercise or contradiction, +but not a liberty of specification or contrariety. +It appears then plainly, that the liberty of +man is more large in the extension of the object, +which is both good and evil, than the liberty of +God and the good angels, whose object is only +good. But withal the liberty of man comes +short in the intention of the power. Man is not +so free in respect of good only, as God or the +good angels, because (not to speak of God, whose +liberty is quite of another nature) the understandings +of the angels are clearer, their power and +dominion over their actions is greater, they have +no sensitive appetites to distract them, no organs +to be disturbed. We see, then, this distinction is +cleared from all darkness.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“And where T. H. demands, how it is possible +for the liberty of doing or not doing this or that +good or evil, to consist in God and angels, without +a liberty of doing or not doing good or evil? the +answer is obvious and easy, <span lang="la"><i>referendo singula +singulis</i></span>, rendering every act to its right object respectively. +God and good angels have a power to +do or not to do this or that good, bad angels have +a power to do or not to do this or that evil; so +both, jointly considered, have power respectively +to do good or evil. And yet, according to the +words of my discourse, God and good and bad +angels, being singly considered, have no power to +do good or evil, that is, indifferently, as man hath.”</p> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c000'> + <div><span class='fss'>ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. IV.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c001'>He intendeth here to make good the distinctions +of liberty of <em>exercise</em>, and liberty of <em>contradiction</em>; +<span class='pageno' id='Page_61'>61</span>liberty of <em>contrariety</em>, and liberty of <em>specification +and exercise</em>. And he begins thus:</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>a</i>) “It is a rule in art, that words which are +homonymous, or of various and ambiguous significations, +ought ever in the first place to be distinguished,” +&c.</p> + +<p class='c001'>I know not what art it is that giveth this rule. +I am sure it is not the art of reason, which men +call logic. For reason teacheth, and the example +of those who only reason methodically, (which are +the mathematicians), that a man, when he will +demonstrate the truth of what he is to say, must +in the first place determine what he will have to +be understood by his words; which determination +is called definition; whereby the significations of +his words are so clearly set down, that there can +creep in no ambiguity. And therefore there will +be no need of distinctions; and consequently his +rule of art, is a rash precept of some ignorant +man, whom he and others have followed.</p> + +<p class='c001'>The Bishop tells us that liberty is sometimes +opposed to sin, to oppression, to servitude; which +is to tell us, that they whom he hath read in this +point, are inconsistent in the meaning of their +own words; and, therefore, they are little beholden +to him. And this diversity of significations he +calls distinctions. Do men that by the same word +in one place mean one thing, and in another another, +and never tell us so, distinguish? I think +they rather confound. And yet he says, that +“these distinctions do virtually imply a description +of true liberty, which cometh nearer the +essence of it, than T. H.’s roving definition;” +which definition of mine was this: “liberty is +<span class='pageno' id='Page_62'>62</span>when there is no external impediment.” So that in +his opinion a man shall sooner understand liberty +by reading these words, (Romans vi. 22): <em>Being +made free from sin</em>; or these words, (Isaiah +lviii. 6): <em>To let the oppressed go free</em>; or by these +words, (Leviticus xxv. 10): <em>You shall proclaim +liberty throughout the land</em>, than by these words +of mine: “liberty is the absence of external impediments +to motion.” Also he will face me down, +that I understand what he means by his distinctions +of liberty of <em>contrariety</em>, of <em>contradiction</em>, +of <em>exercise only</em>, of <em>exercise and specification +jointly</em>. If he mean I understand his meaning, in +one sense it is true. For by them he means to +shift off the discredit of being able to say nothing +to the question; as they do that, pretending to +know the cause of every thing, give for the cause +of why the load-stone draweth to it iron, sympathy, +and occult quality; making <em>they cannot tell</em>, +(turned now into occult), to stand for the real +cause of that most admirable effect. But that +those words signify distinction, I constantly deny. +It is not enough for a distinction to be forked; it +ought to signify a distinct conception. There is +great difference between <a id='corr62.25'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='luade'>duade</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_62.25'><ins class='correction' title='luade'>duade</ins></a></span> distinctions and +cloven feet.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “It is strange to see with what confidence +now-a-days particular men slight all the Schoolmen, +and philosophers, and classic authors of former +ages,” &c.</p> + +<p class='c001'>This word, <em>particular men</em>, is put here, in my +opinion, with little judgment, especially by a man +that pretendeth to be learned. Does the Bishop +think that he himself is, or that there is any universal +<span class='pageno' id='Page_63'>63</span>man? It may be he means a private man. +Does he then think there is any man not private, besides +him that is endued with sovereign power? But +it is most likely he calls me a particular man, because +I have not had the authority he has had, to teach +what doctrine I think fit. But now, I am no more +particular than he; and may with as good a grace +despise the Schoolmen and some of the old Philosophers, +as he can despise me, unless he can shew +that it is more likely that he should be better able +to look into these questions sufficiently, which require +meditation and reflection upon a man’s own +thoughts, he that hath been obliged most of his +time to preach unto the people, and to that end to +read those authors that can best furnish him with +what he has to say, and to study for the rhetoric +of his expressions, and of the spare time (which to +a good pastor is very little) hath spent no little +part in seeking preferment and increasing of +riches; than I, that have done almost nothing else, +nor have had much else to do but to meditate upon +this and other natural questions. It troubles +him much that I style School-learning jargon. I +do not call all School-learning so, but such as is +so; that is, that which they say in defending of +untruths, and especially in the maintenance of +free-will, when they talk of <em>liberty of exercise, +specification, contrariety, contradiction, acts elicite +and exercite</em> and the like; which, though he +go over again in this place, endeavouring to explain +them, are still both here and there but jargon, +or that (if he like it better) which the Scripture +in the first chaos calleth <span lang="la"><i>Tohu</i></span> and <span lang="la"><i>Bohu</i></span>.</p> + +<p class='c001'>But because he takes it so heinously, that a private +<span class='pageno' id='Page_64'>64</span>man should so hardly censure School-divinity, +I would be glad to know with what patience he +can hear Martin Luther and Philip Melancthon +speaking of the same? Martin Luther, that was +the first beginner of our deliverance from the servitude +of the Romish clergy, had these three articles +censured by the University of Paris. The +first of which was: “School-theology is a +false interpretation of the Scripture, and Sacraments, +which hath banished from us true and sincere +theology.” The second is: “At what time +School-theology, that is, mock-theology, came up, +at the same time the theology of Christ’s Cross +went down.” The third is: “It is now almost +three hundred years since the Church has endured +the licentiousness of School-Doctors in corrupting +of the Scriptures.” Moreover, the same Luther in +another place of his work saith thus; “School-theology +is nothing else but ignorance of the +truth, and a block to stumble at laid before the +Scriptures.” And of Thomas Aquinas in particular +he saith, that “it was he that did set up the +kingdom of Aristotle, the destroyer of godly doctrine.” +And of the philosophy whereof St. Paul +biddeth us beware, he saith it is School-theology. +And Melancthon, a divine once much esteemed in +our Church, saith of it thus: “It is known that that +profane scholastic learning, which they will have +to be called Divinity, began at Paris; which being +admitted, nothing is left sound in the Church, the +Gospel is obscured, faith extinguished, the doctrine +of works received, and instead of Christ’s +people, we are become not so much as the people +of the law, but the people of Aristotle’s ethics +<span class='pageno' id='Page_65'>65</span>These were no raw divines, such as he saith +preached to their equally ignorant auditors. I +could add to these the slighting of School-divinity +by Calvin and other learned Protestant +Doctors; yet were they all but private men, who, +it seems to the Bishop, had forgot themselves as +well as I.</p> + +<h3 id='V' class='c002'>NO. V.</h3> + +<p class='c010'><i>J. D.</i> “Thus the coast being cleared, the next +thing to be done, is to draw out our forces against +the enemy; and because they are divided into two +squadrons, the one of Christians, the other of +heathen philosophers, it will be best to dispose +ours also into two bodies, the former drawn from +Scripture, the latter from reason.”</p> + +<p class='c001'><i>T. H.</i> The next thing he doth, after the clearing +of the coast, is the dividing of his forces, as +he calls them, into two squadrons, one of places of +Scripture, the other of reasons, which allegory he +useth, I suppose, because he addresses the discourse +to your Lordship, who is a military man. +All that I have to say touching this, is, that I observe +a great part of those his forces do look and +march another way, and some of them do fight +among themselves.</p> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “If T. H. could divide my forces, and +commit them together among themselves, it were +his only way to conquer them. But he will find +that those imaginary contradictions, which he +thinks he hath espied in my discourse, are but +fancies, and my supposed impertinences will prove +his own real mistakings.”</p> + +<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_66'>66</span>In this fifth number there is nothing of his or +mine, pertinent to the question, therefore nothing +necessary to be repeated.</p> + +<h3 id='VI' class='c009'><span class='fss'>PROOFS OF LIBERTY OUT OF SCRIPTURE.--NO. VI.</span></h3> + +<div class='c000'></div> +<div class='sidenote'>The Bishop’s reply.</div> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “First, whosoever have power of election, +have true liberty; for the proper act of liberty +is election. A spontaneity may consist with determination +to one, as we see in children, fools, madmen, +brute beasts, whose fancies are determined to +those things which they act spontaneously, as the +bees make honey, the spiders webs. But none of +these have a liberty of election, which is an act of +judgment and understanding, and cannot possibly +consist with a determination to one. He that is +determined by something before himself or without +himself, cannot be said to choose or elect, unless +it be as the junior of the mess chooseth in +Cambridge, whether he will have the least part or +nothing. And scarcely so much.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“But men have liberty of election. This is +plain, (Numbers xxx. 13): <em>If a wife make a vow +it is left to her husband’s choice, either to establish +it or to make it void</em>. And (Joshua xxiv. +15): <em>Choose you this day whom you will serve</em>, +&c. <em>But I and my house will serve the Lord.</em> +He makes his own choice, and leaves them to the +liberty of their election. And (2 Samuel xxiv. 12): +<em>I offer thee three things, choose thee which of +them I shall do</em>. If one of these three things was +necessarily determined, and the other two impossible, +how was it left to him to choose what should +be done? Therefore we have true liberty.”</p> + +<p class='c001'><i>T. H.</i> And the first place of Scripture taken +<span class='pageno' id='Page_67'>67</span>from Numbers xxx. 13, is one of them that look +another way. The words are, <em>If a wife make a +vow it is left to her husband’s choice, either to +establish it or make it void</em>. For it proves no more +but that the husband is a free or voluntary agent, +but not that his choice therein is not necessitated +or not determined to what he shall choose by precedent +necessary causes.</p> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “My first argument from Scripture is +thus formed.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Whosoever have a liberty or power of election, +are not determined to one by precedent necessary +causes.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“But men have liberty of election.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“The assumption or <em>minor</em> proposition is proved +by three places of Scripture, (Numbers xxx. 13; +Joshua xxiv. 15; 2 Samuel xxiv. 12.) I need not insist +upon these, because T. H. acknowledgeth ‘that +it is clearly proved that there is election in man.’</p> + +<p class='c001'>“But he denieth the <em>major</em> proposition, because, +saith he, ‘man is necessitated or determined to +what he shall choose by precedent necessary +causes.’ I take away this answer three ways.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“First, by reason. Election is evermore either +of things possible, or at least of things conceived +to be possible, that is, efficacious election, when +a man hopeth or thinketh of obtaining the object. +Whatsoever the will chooseth, it chooseth under +the notion of good, either honest, or delightful, +or profitable. But there can be no real goodness +apprehended in that which is known to be impossible. +It is true, there may be some wandering +pendulous wishes of known impossibilities, as a +man also that hath committed an offence may +<span class='pageno' id='Page_68'>68</span>wish he had not committed it. But to choose efficaciously +an impossibility, is as impossible as an +impossibility itself. No man can think to obtain +that which he knows impossible to be obtained; +but he who knows that all things are antecedently +determined by necessary causes, knows that it is +impossible for anything to be otherwise than it is; +therefore to ascribe unto him a power of election +to choose this or that indifferently, is to make the +same thing to be determined to one, and to be +not determined to one, which are contradictories. +Again, whosoever hath an elective power, or a +liberty to choose, hath also a liberty or power to +refuse; (Isaiah vii. 16): <em>Before the child shall +know to refuse the evil and choose the good</em>. He +who chooseth this rather than that, refuseth that +rather than this. As Moses (Hebrews xi. 25), +choosing to suffer affliction with the people of +God, did thereby refuse the pleasures of sin. But +no man hath any power to refuse that which is +necessarily predetermined to be, unless it be as +the fox refused the grapes which were beyond his +reach. When one thing of two or three is absolutely +determined, the others are made thereby +simply impossible.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>a</i>) “Secondly, I prove it by instances, and by +that universal notion which the world hath of election. +What is the difference between an elective +and hereditary kingdom, but that in an elective +kingdom, they have power or liberty to choose this +or that man indifferently; but in an hereditary +kingdom, they have no such power nor liberty? +Where the law makes a certain heir, there is a necessitation +to one; where the law doth not name +a certain heir, there is no necessitation to one, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_69'>69</span>and there they have power or liberty to choose. +An hereditary prince may be as grateful and acceptable +to his subjects, and as willingly received +by them (according to that liberty which is opposed +to compulsion or violence), as he who is +chosen: yet he is not therefore an elective prince. +In Germany all the nobility and commons may assent +to the choice of the emperor, or be well +pleased with it when it is concluded; yet none of +them elect or choose the emperor, but only those +six princes who have a consultative, deliberative, +and determinative power in his election; and if +their votes or suffrages be equally divided, three +to three, then the King of Bohemia hath the casting +voice. So likewise in corporations or commonwealths, +sometimes the people, sometimes the +common-council, have power to name so many +persons for such an office, and the supreme magistrate, +or senate, or lesser council respectively, to +choose one of those. And all this is done with +that caution and secresy, by billets or other means, +that no man knows which way any man gave his +vote, or with whom to be offended. If it were +necessarily and inevitably predetermined, that this +individual person, and no other, shall and must be +chosen, what needed all this circuit and caution, to +do that which is not possible to be done otherwise, +which one may do as well as a thousand, and for +doing of which no rational man can be offended, +if the electors were necessarily predetermined to +elect this man and no other. And though T. H. +was pleased to pass by my University instance, yet +I may not, until I see what he is able to say unto it. +The junior of the mess in Cambridge divides the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_70'>70</span>meat in four parts; the senior chooseth first, then +the second and third in their order. The junior +is determined to one, and hath no choice left, unless +it be to choose whether he will take that part +which the rest have refused, or none at all. It +may be this part is more agreeable to his mind +than any of the others would have been; but for +all that he cannot be said to choose it, because he +is determined to this one. Even such a liberty of +election is that which is established by T. H.; or +rather much worse in two respects. The junior +hath yet a liberty of contradiction left, to choose +whether he will take that part, or not take any +part; but he who is precisely predetermined to the +choice of this object, hath no liberty to refuse it. +Secondly, the junior, by dividing carefully, may +preserve to himself an equal share; but he who is +wholly determined by extrinsical causes, is left altogether +to the mercy and disposition of another.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Thirdly, I prove it by the texts alleged. (Numb. +xxx. 13): <em>If a wife make a vow, it is left to her +husband’s choice, either to establish it or make +it void</em>. But if it be predetermined that he shall +establish it, it is not in his power to make it void. +If it be predetermined that he shall make it void, +it is not in his power to establish it. And howsoever +it be determined, yet being determined, it is +not in his power indifferently, either to establish +it, or to make it void at his pleasure. So (Joshua +xxiv. 15): <em>Choose you this day whom ye will +serve: but I and my house will serve the Lord</em>. +It is too late to choose that <em>this day</em>, which was +determined otherwise yesterday. <em>Whom ye will +serve, whether the Gods whom your fathers +<span class='pageno' id='Page_71'>71</span>served, or the Gods of the Amorites.</em> Where there +is an election of this or that, these Gods, or those +Gods, there must needs be either an indifferency +to both objects, or at least a possibility to either. +<em>I and my house will serve the Lord.</em> If he were +extrinsically predetermined, he should not say I +<em>will</em> serve, but I <em>must</em> serve. And (2 Samuel xxiv. +12): <em>I offer thee three things, choose thee which +of them I shall do</em>. How doth God offer three +things to David’s choice, if he had predetermined +him to one of the three by a concourse of necessary +extrinsical causes? If a sovereign prince +should descend so far as to offer a delinquent his +choice, whether he would be fined, or imprisoned, +or banished, and had underhand signed the sentence +of his banishment, what were it else but +plain drollery or mockery? This is the argument +which in T. H.’s opinion looks another way. If it +do, it is as the Parthians used to fight, flying. His +reason follows next to be considered.”</p> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c000'> + <div><span class='fss'>ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. VI.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c001'>In this number he hath brought three places of +Scripture to prove <em>freewill</em>. The first is, <em>If a +wife make a vow, it is left to her husband’s choice +either to establish it or to make it void</em>. And, +<em>Choose you this day whom ye will serve, &c. But +I and my house will serve the Lord.</em> And, <em>I offer +thee three things, choose thee which of them I +shall do</em>. Which in the reply he endeavoureth to +make good; but needed not, seeing they prove +nothing but that a man is free to do if he will, +which I deny not. He ought to prove he is free +to will, which I deny.</p> + +<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_72'>72</span>(<i>a</i>) Secondly, “I prove it by instances, and by +that universal notion which the world hath of +election.”</p> + +<p class='c001'>His instances are, first, the difference between +an hereditary kingdom and an elective; and then +the difference between the senior and junior of +the mess taking their commons; both which prove +the liberty of doing what they will, but not a liberty +to will. For in the first case, the electors are +free to name whom they will, but not to will; +and in the second, the senior having an appetite, +chooseth what he hath an appetite to; but chooseth +not his appetite.</p> + +<h3 id='VII' class='c002'>NO. VII.</h3> + +<p class='c010'><i>T. H.</i> For if there came into the husband’s +mind greater good by establishing than abrogating +such a vow, the establishing will follow necessarily. +And if the evil that will follow thereon in +the husband’s opinion outweigh the good, the contrary +must needs follow. And yet in this following +of one’s hopes and fears consisteth the nature +of election. So that a man may both choose this, +and cannot but choose this. And consequently +choosing and necessity are joined together.</p> + +<div class='sidenote'>The Bishop’s reply.</div> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> (<i>a</i>) “There is nothing said with more +show of reason in this cause by the patrons of +necessity and adversaries of true liberty than +this, that the will doth perpetually and infallibly +follow the last dictate of the understanding, or +the last judgment of right reason. And in this, +and this only, I confess T. H. hath good seconds. +Yet the common and approved opinion is contrary, +and justly.</p> + +<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_73'>73</span>“For first, this very act of the understanding is an +effect of the will, and a testimony of its power and +liberty. It is the will, which affecting some particular +good, doth engage and command the understanding +to consult and deliberate what means +are convenient for attaining that end. And though +the will itself be blind, yet its object is good in +general, which is the end of all human actions. +Therefore it belongs to the will, as to the general +of an army, to move the other powers of the soul +to their acts, and among the rest the understanding +also, by applying it and reducing its power into +act. So as whatsoever obligation the understanding +doth put upon the will, is by the consent of +the will, and derived from the power of the will, +which was not necessitated to move the understanding +to consult. So the will is the lady and +mistress of human actions; the understanding is +her trusty counsellor, which gives no advice but +when it is required by the will. And if the first +consultation or deliberation be not sufficient, the +will may move a review, and require the understanding +to inform itself better and take advice +of others, from whence many times the judgment +of the understanding doth receive alteration.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Secondly, for the manner how the understanding +doth determine the will, it is not naturally but +morally. The will is moved by the understanding, +not as by an efficient having a causal influence +into the effect, but only by proposing and representing +the object. And therefore, as it were ridiculous +to say that the object of the sight is the +cause of seeing, so it is to say that the proposing +of the object by the understanding to the will is +<span class='pageno' id='Page_74'>74</span>the cause of willing; and therefore the understanding +hath no place in that concourse of causes, +which according to T. H. do necessitate the will.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Thirdly, the judgment of the understanding +is not always <span lang="la"><i>practice practicum</i></span>, nor of such a +nature in itself as to oblige and determine the +will to one. Sometimes, the understanding proposeth +two or three means equally available to the +attaining of one and the same end. Sometimes, it +dictateth that this or that particular good is eligible +or fit to be chosen, but not that it is necessarily +eligible or that it must be chosen. It +may judge this or that to be a fit means, but +not the only means to attain the desired end. In +these cases no man can doubt but that the will +may choose, or not choose, this or that indifferently. +Yea, though the understanding shall judge +one of these means to be more expedient than +another, yet forasmuch as in the less expedient +there is found the reason of good, the will in respect +of that dominion which it hath over itself, +may accept that which the understanding judgeth +to be less expedient, and refuse that which it +judgeth to be more expedient.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Fourthly, sometimes the will doth not will the +end so efficaciously, but that it may be, and often +is deterred from the prosecution of it by the difficulty +of the means; and notwithstanding the +judgment of the understanding, the will may still +suspend its own act.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Fifthly, supposing, but not granting, that the +will did necessarily follow the last dictate of the +understanding, yet this proves no antecedent necessity, +but coexistent with the act; no extrinsical +<span class='pageno' id='Page_75'>75</span>necessity, the will and the understanding being but +two faculties of the same soul; no absolute necessity, +but merely upon supposition. And therefore +the same authors who maintain that the judgment +of the understanding doth necessarily determine +the will, do yet much more earnestly oppugn T. H.’s +absolute necessity of all occurrences. Suppose +the will shall apply the understanding to deliberate +and not require a review. Suppose the dictate +of the understanding shall be absolute, not +this or that indifferently, nor this rather than that +comparatively, but this positively; nor this freely, +but this necessarily. And suppose the will do +will efficaciously, and do not suspend its own act. +Then here is a necessity indeed, but neither absolute +nor extrinsical, nor antecedent, flowing from +a concourse of causes without ourselves, but a +necessity upon supposition, which we do readily +grant. So far T. H. is wide from the truth, whilst +he maintains, either that the apprehension of a +greater good doth necessitate the will, or that +this is an absolute necessity.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “Lastly, whereas he saith, that ‘the nature +of election doth consist in following our hopes and +fears,’ I cannot but observe that there is not one +word of art in this whole treatise which he useth +in the right sense; I hope it doth not proceed out +of an affectation of singularity, nor out of a contempt +of former writers, nor out of a desire to +take in sunder the whole frame of learning and +new mould it after his own mind. It were to be +wished that at least he would give us a new dictionary, +that we might understand his sense. But +because this is but touched here sparingly, and +<span class='pageno' id='Page_76'>76</span>upon the by, I will forbear it until I meet with +it again in its proper place. And for the present +it shall suffice to say, that hopes and fears are +common to brute beasts, but election is a rational +act, and is proper only to man, who is <span lang="la"><i>sanctius +his animal, mentisque capacius altæ</i></span>.</p> + +<p class='c001'><i>T. H.</i> The second place of Scripture is Joshua +xxiv. 15; the third is 2 Samuel xxiv. 12; whereby +it is clearly proved, that there is election in man, +but not proved that such election was not necessitated +by the hopes, and fears, and considerations +of good and bad to follow, which depend not on +the will nor are subject to election. And therefore +one answer serves all such places, if they +were a thousand.</p> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “This answer being the very same with +the former, word for word, which hath already +sufficiently been shaken in pieces, doth require no +new reply.</p> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c000'> + <div><span class='fss'>ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. VII.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>a</i>) “There is nothing said with more show of +reason in this cause by the patrons of necessity +than this, ‘that the will doth perpetually and infallibly +follow the last dictate of the understanding, +or the last judgment of right reason,’ &c. Yet +the common and approved opinion is contrary, +and justly; for, first, this very act of the understanding +is an effect of the will, &c.”</p> + +<p class='c001'>I note here, first, that the Bishop is mistaken in +saying that I or any other patron of necessity, are +of opinion that the will follows always the last +judgment of right reason. For it followeth as +well the judgment of an erroneous as of a true +<span class='pageno' id='Page_77'>77</span>reasoning; and the truth in general is that it followeth +the last opinion of the goodness or evilness +of the object, be the opinion true or false.</p> + +<p class='c001'>Secondly, I note, that in making the understanding +to be an effect of the will, he thinketh a +man may have a will to that which he not so +much as thinks on. And in saying, that “it is the +will which, affecting some particular good, doth +engage and command the understanding to consult,” +&c, that he not only thinketh the will affecteth +a particular good, before the man understands +it to be good; but also he thinketh that these words +“doth command the understanding,” and these, +“for it belongs to the will as to the general of an +army, to move the other powers of the soul to +their acts,” and a great many more that follow, are +sense, which they are not, but mere confusion and +emptiness: as, for example, “the understanding +doth determine the will, not naturally, but morally,” +and “the will is moved by the understanding,” is +unintelligible. “Moved not as by an efficient,” is +nonsense. And where he saith, that “it is ridiculous +to say the object of the sight is the cause of seeing,” +he showeth so clearly that he understandeth +nothing at all of natural philosophy, that I am sorry +I had the ill fortune to be engaged with him in a +dispute of this kind. There is nothing that the +simplest countryman could say so absurdly concerning +the understanding, as this of the Bishop, +“the judgment of the understanding is not always +<span lang="la"><i>practice practicum</i></span>.” A countryman will acknowledge +there is judgment in men, but will as soon +say the judgment of the judgment, as the judgment +<span class='pageno' id='Page_78'>78</span>of the understanding. And if <span lang="la"><i>practice practicum</i></span> +had been sense, he might have made a shift +to put it into English. Much more followeth of +this stuff.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “Lastly, whereas he saith, ‘that the nature +of election doth consist in following our hopes and +fears,’ I cannot but observe that there is not one +word of art in this whole treatise which he useth +in the right sense. I hope it doth not proceed out +of an affectation of singularity, nor out of a contempt +of former writers,” &c.</p> + +<p class='c001'>He might have said, there is not a word of jargon +nor nonsense; and that it proceedeth from an +affectation of truth, and contempt of metaphysical +writers, and a desire to reduce into frame the +learning which they have confounded and disordered.</p> + +<h3 id='VIII' class='c002'>NO. VIII.</h3> + +<p class='c010'><i>T. H.</i> Supposing, it seems, I might answer as I +have done, that necessity and election might stand +together, and instance in the actions of children, +fools, and brute beasts, whose fancies, I might say, +are necessitated and determined to one: before +these his proofs out of Scripture, he desires to prevent +that instance, and therefore says, that the +actions of children, fools, madmen, and beasts, +are indeed determined, but that they proceed not +from election, nor from free, but from spontaneous +agents. As for example, that the bee, when it +maketh honey, does it spontaneously; and when +the spider makes his web, he does it spontaneously, +and not by election. Though I never +meant to ground any answer upon the experience +<span class='pageno' id='Page_79'>79</span>of what children, fools, madmen, and beasts do, +yet that your Lordship may understand what can +be meant by spontaneous, and how it differs from +voluntary, I will answer that distinction, and show +that it fighteth against its fellow arguments. Your +Lordship therefore is to consider, that all voluntary +actions, where the thing that induceth the +will is not fear, are called also spontaneous, and +said to be done by a man’s own accord. As when a +man giveth money voluntarily to another for merchandise, +or out of affection, he is said to do it of +his own accord, which in Latin is <span lang="la"><i>sponte</i></span>, and +therefore the action is spontaneous; though to +give one’s money willingly to a thief to avoid killing, +or throw it into the sea to avoid drowning, +where the motive is fear, be not called spontaneous. +But every spontaneous action is not therefore +voluntary; for voluntary presupposes some +precedent deliberation, that is to say, some consideration +and meditation of what is likely to follow, +both upon the doing and abstaining from the +action deliberated of; whereas many actions are +done of our own accord, and are therefore spontaneous; +of which nevertheless, as he thinks, we +never consulted nor deliberated in ourselves, as +when making no question nor any the least doubt +in the world but that the thing we are about is +good, we eat, or walk, or in anger strike or revile, +which he thinks spontaneous, but not voluntary +nor elective actions. And with such kind of actions +he says necessitation may stand, but not with +such as are voluntary, and proceed upon election +and deliberation. Now if I make it appear to you +that even these actions which he says proceed from +<span class='pageno' id='Page_80'>80</span>spontaneity, and which he ascribes only to fools, +children, madmen, and beasts, proceed from deliberation +and election, and that actions inconsiderate, +rash and spontaneous, are ordinarily found +in those that are, by themselves and many more, +thought as wise or wiser than ordinary men are; +then his argument concludeth, that necessity and +election may stand together, which is contrary to +that which he intendeth by all the rest of his arguments +to prove. And first, your Lordship’s own +experience furnishes you with proof enough, that +horses, dogs, and other brute beasts, do demur +oftentimes upon the way they are to take: the +horse, retiring from some strange figure he sees, +and coming on again to avoid the spur. And what +else doth man that deliberateth, but one while proceed +toward action, another while retire from it, +as the hope of greater good draws him, or the fear +of greater evil drives him? A child may be so +young as to do all which it does without all deliberation, +but that is but till it chance to be hurt +by doing somewhat, or till it be of age to understand +the rod; for the actions wherein he hath +once a check, shall be deliberated on a second +time. Fools and madmen manifestly deliberate +no less than the wisest men, though they make not +so good a choice, the images of things being by +diseases altered. For bees and spiders, if he had so +little to do as to be a spectator of their actions, he +would have confessed not only election, but also +art, prudence, and policy in them, very near equal +to that of mankind. Of bees Aristotle says, their +life is civil. He is deceived, if he think any spontaneous +action, after once being checked in it, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_81'>81</span>differs from an action voluntary and elective, for +even the setting of a man’s foot in the posture of +walking, and the action of ordinary eating, was +once deliberated, how and when it should be +done; and though it afterwards became easy and +habitual, so as to be done without fore-thought, +yet that does not hinder but that the act is voluntary +and proceeds from election. So also are the +rashest actions of choleric persons voluntary and +upon deliberation. For who is there, but very +young children, that has not considered when and +how far he ought, or safely may, strike or revile. +Seeing then he agrees with me that such actions +are necessitated, and the fancy of those that do +them is determined to the actions they do, it follows +out of his own doctrine, that the liberty of +election does not take away the necessity of electing +this or that individual thing. And thus one of +his arguments fights against another.</p> + +<div class='sidenote'><a id='corr81.4'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='Animadversions upon the Bishop.'>The Bishop’s reply.</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_81.4'><ins class='correction' title='Animadversions upon the Bishop.'>The Bishop’s reply.</ins></a></span></div> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “We have partly seen before how T. H. +hath coined a new kind of liberty, a new kind of +necessity, a new kind of election; and now in this +section a new kind of spontaneity, and a new kind +of voluntary actions. Although he say that here is +nothing new to him, yet I begin to suspect that +either here are many things new to him, or otherwise +his election is not the result of a serious mature +deliberation. (<i>a</i>) The first thing that I offer, +is, how often he mistakes my meaning in this one +section. First, I make voluntary and spontaneous +actions to be one and the same; he saith, I distinguish +them, so as spontaneous actions may be +necessary, but voluntary actions cannot. Secondly, +(<i>b</i>) I distinguish between free acts and voluntary +<span class='pageno' id='Page_82'>82</span>acts. The former are always deliberate, the latter +may be indeliberate; all free acts are voluntary, +but all voluntary acts are not free. But he saith +I confound them and make them the same. +(<i>c</i>) Thirdly, he saith, I ascribe spontaneity only to +fools, children, madmen, and beasts; but I acknowledge +spontaneity hath place in rational men, both +as it is comprehended in liberty, and as it is distinguished +from liberty.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>d</i>) “Yet I have no reason to be offended at it; +for he deals no otherwise with me than he doth +with himself. Here he tells us that ‘voluntary +presupposeth deliberation.’ But (No. <span class='fss'>XXV.</span>) he tells +us contrary, ‘that whatsoever followeth the last +appetite is voluntary, and where there is but one +appetite, that is the last:’ and that ‘no action +of a man can be said to be without deliberation, +though never so sudden.’ So (No. <span class='fss'>XXXIII.</span>) he tells +us, that ‘by spontaneity is meant inconsiderate proceeding, +or else nothing is meant by it:’ yet here +he tells us, that ‘all voluntary actions which proceed +not from fear, are spontaneous,’ whereof +many are deliberate, as that wherein he instanceth +himself, ‘to give money for merchandise.’ Thirdly, +when I said that children, before they have the +use of reason, act spontaneously, as when they +suck the breast, but do not act freely, because +they have not judgment to deliberate or elect, here +T. H. undertakes to prove that they do deliberate +and elect; and yet presently after confesseth +again, that ‘a child may be so young, as to do +what it doth without all deliberation.’</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Besides these mistakes and contradictions, he +hath other errors also in this section. As this, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_83'>83</span>that no actions proceeding from fear are spontaneous. +He who throws his goods into the sea to +avoid drowning, doth it not only <em>spontaneously</em>, +but even <em>freely</em>. He that wills the end, wills the +means conducing to that end. It is true that if +the action be considered nakedly without all circumstances, +no man willingly or spontaneously +casts his goods into the sea. But if we take the +action, as in this particular case, invested with all +the circumstances, and in order to the end, that +is, the saving of his own life, it is not only voluntary +and spontaneous, but elective and chosen by +him, as the most probable means for his own preservation. +As there is an antecedent and a subsequent +will, so there is an antecedent and a subsequent +spontaneity. His grammatical argument, +grounded upon the derivation of spontaneous from +<span lang="la"><i>sponte</i></span>, weighs nothing; we have learned in the +rudiments of logic, that conjugates are sometimes +in name only, and not in deed. He who casts his +goods into the sea, may do it of his own accord in +order to the end. Secondly, he errs in this also, +that nothing is opposed to spontaneity but only +fear. Invincible and antecedent ignorance doth +destroy the nature of spontaneity or voluntariness, +by removing that knowledge which should and +would have prohibited the action. As a man +thinking to shoot a wild beast in a bush, shoots +his friend, which if he had known, he would not +have shot. This man did not kill his friend of his +own accord.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“For the clearer understanding of these things, +and to know what spontaneity is, let us consult +awhile with the Schools about the distinct order +<span class='pageno' id='Page_84'>84</span>of voluntary or involuntary actions. Some acts +proceed wholly from an extrinsical cause; as the +throwing of a stone upwards, a rape, or the drawing +of a Christian by plain force to the idol’s temple; +these are called violent acts. Secondly, some +proceed from an intrinsical cause, but without any +manner of knowledge of the end, as the falling of +a stone downwards; these are called natural acts. +Thirdly, some proceed from an internal principle, +with an imperfect knowledge of the end, where +there is an appetite to the object, but no deliberation +nor election; as the acts of fools, children, +beasts, and the inconsiderate acts of men of judgment. +These are called voluntary or spontaneous +acts. Fourthly, some proceed from an intrinsical +cause, with a more perfect knowledge of the end, +which are elected upon deliberation. These are +called free acts. So then the formal reason of +liberty is election. The necessary requisite to +election is deliberation. Deliberation implyeth the +actual use of reason. But deliberation and election +cannot possibly subsist with an extrinsical +predetermination to one. How should a man +deliberate or choose which way to go, who knows +that all ways are shut against him and made +impossible to him, but only one? This is the +genuine sense of these words <em>voluntary</em> and <em>spontaneous</em> +in this question. Though they were taken +twenty other ways vulgarly or metaphorically, as +we say <em>spontaneous ulcers</em>, where there is no appetite +at all, yet it were nothing to this controversy, +which is not about words, but about things; +not what the words voluntary or free do or may +signify, but whether all things be extrinsically predetermined +to one.</p> + +<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_85'>85</span>“These grounds being laid for clearing the true +sense of the words, the next thing to be examined +is, that contradiction which he hath espied in my +discourse, or how this argument fights against his +fellows. ‘If I,’ saith T. H., ‘make it appear, that +the spontaneous actions of fools, children, madmen, +and beasts, do proceed from election and +deliberation, and that inconsiderate and indeliberate +actions are found in the wisest men, then this +argument concludes that necessity and election +may stand together, which is contrary to his assertion.’ +If this could be made appear as easily as +it is spoken, it would concern himself much, who, +when he should prove that rational men are not +free from necessity, goes about to prove that brute +beasts do deliberate and elect, that is as much as +to say, are free from necessity. But it concerns +not me at all; it is neither my assertion nor my +opinion, that necessity and election may not meet +together in the same subject; violent, natural, +spontaneous, and deliberate or elective acts may +all meet together in the same subject. But this I +say, that necessity and election cannot consist together +in the same act. He who is determined to +one, is not free to choose out of more than one. +To begin with his latter supposition, <a id='corr85.26'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='“that'>‘that</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_85.26'><ins class='correction' title='“that'>‘that</ins></a></span> wise men +may do inconsiderate and indeliberate <a id='corr85.27'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='actions,”'>actions,’</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_85.27'><ins class='correction' title='actions,”'>actions,’</ins></a></span> I +do readily admit it. But where did he learn to +infer a general conclusion from particular premises; +as thus, because wise men do some indeliberate +acts, therefore no act they do is free or +elective? Secondly, for his former supposition, +<a id='corr85.33'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='“that'>‘that</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_85.33'><ins class='correction' title='“that'>‘that</ins></a></span> fools, children, madmen, and beasts, do deliberate +and <a id='corr85.34'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='elect,”'>elect,’</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_85.34'><ins class='correction' title='elect,”'>elect,’</ins></a></span> if he could make it good, it is +<span class='pageno' id='Page_86'>86</span>not I who contradict myself, nor fight against +mine own assertion, but it is he who endeavours to +prove that which I altogether deny. He may well +find a contradiction between him and me; otherwise +to what end is this dispute? But he shall +not be able to find a difference between me and +myself. But the truth is, he is not able to prove +any such thing; and that brings me to my sixth +consideration, that neither horses, nor bees, nor +spiders, nor children, nor fools, nor madmen do +deliberate or elect.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“His first instance is in the horse, or dog, +but more especially the horse. He told me that I +divided my argument into squadrons, to apply myself +to your Lordship, being a military man; and +I apprehend that for the same reason he gives his +first instance of the horse, with a submission to +your own experience. So far well, but otherwise +very disadvantageously to his cause. Men used to +say of a dull fellow, that he hath no more brains +than a horse. And the Prophet David saith, +(Psalm xxxii. 9): <em>Be not like the horse and +mule, which have no understanding</em>. How do they +deliberate without understanding? And (Psalm +xlix. 20), he saith the same of all brute beasts: +<em>Man being in honour had no understanding, but +became like unto the beasts that perish</em>. The +horse ‘demurs upon his way.’ Why not? Outward +objects, or inward fancies, may produce a +stay in his course, though he have no judgment +either to deliberate or elect. ‘He retires from +some strange figure which he sees, and comes on +again to avoid the spur.’ So he may; and yet be +far enough from deliberation. All this proceeds +<span class='pageno' id='Page_87'>87</span>from the sensitive passion of fear, which is a perturbation +arising from the expectation of some imminent +evil. But he urgeth, ‘what else doth a +man that deliberateth?’ Yes, very much. The +horse feareth some outward object, but deliberation +is a comparing of several means conducing to +the same end. Fear is commonly of one, deliberation +of more than one; fear is of those things +which are not in our power, deliberation of those +things which are in our power; fear ariseth many +times out of natural antipathies, but in these disconveniences +of nature deliberation hath no place +at all. In a word, fear is an enemy to deliberation, +and betrayeth the succours of the soul. If the +horse did deliberate, he should consult with reason, +whether it were more expedient for him to go that +way or not; he would represent to himself all the +dangers both of going and staying, and compare +the one with the other, and elect that which is less +evil; he should consider whether it were not better +to endure a little hazard, than ungratefully and +dishonestly to fail in his duty towards his master, +who did breed him and doth feed him. This the +horse doth not; neither is it possible for him to do +it. Secondly, for children, T. H. confesseth that +they may be so young that they do not deliberate +at all; afterwards, as they attain to the use of +reason by degrees, so by degrees they become free +agents. Then they do deliberate; before they do +not deliberate. The rod may be a means to make +them use their reason, when they have power to +exercise it, but the rod cannot produce the power +before they have it. Thirdly, for fools and madmen, +it is not to be understood of such madmen +<span class='pageno' id='Page_88'>88</span>as have their <span lang="la"><i>lucida intervalla</i></span>, who are mad and +discreet by fits; when they have the use of reason, +they are no madmen, but may deliberate as well +as others; nor yet of such fools as are only comparative +fools, that is, less wise than others. Such +may deliberate, though not so clearly, nor so judiciously +as others; but of mere madmen, and mere +natural fools, to say that they, who have not the +use of reason, do deliberate or use reason, implies +a contradiction. But his chiefest confidence is in +his bees and spiders, ‘of whose actions,’ he saith, +‘if I had been a spectator, I would have confessed, +not only election, but also art, prudence, policy, +very near equal to that of mankind, whose life, as +Aristotle saith, is civil.’ Truly I have contemplated +their actions many times, and have been much +taken with their curious works; yet my thoughts +did not reflect so much upon them, as upon their +Maker, who is <span lang="la"><i>sic magnus in magnis</i></span>, that he is +not <span lang="la"><i>minor in parvis</i></span>; so great in great things, that +he is not less in small things. Yes, I have seen +those silliest of creatures, and seeing their rare +works I have seen enough to confute all the bold-faced +atheists of this age, and their hellish blasphemies. +I saw them, but I praised the marvellous +works of God, and admired that great and first intellect, +who hath both adapted their organs, and +determined their fancies to these particular works. +I was not so simple as to ascribe those rarities to +their own invention, which I knew to proceed from +a mere instinct of nature. In all other things they +are the dullest of creatures. Naturalists write of +bees, that their fancy is imperfect, not distinct from +their common-sense, spread over their whole body, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_89'>89</span>and only perceiving things present. When Aristotle +calls them political or sociable creatures, he did +not intend it really that they lived a civil life, but +according to an analogy, because they do such +things by instinct as truly political creatures do +out of judgment. Nor when I read in St. Ambrose +of their hexagons or sexangular cells, did I therefore +conclude that they were mathematicians. Nor +when I read in Crespet, that they invoke God to +their aid when they go out of their hives, bending +their thighs in form of a cross, and bowing themselves; +did I therefore think that this was an act +of religious piety, or that they were capable of +theological virtues, whom I see in all other things +in which their fancies are not determined, to be +the silliest of creatures, strangers not only to right +reason, but to all resemblances of it.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Seventhly, concerning those actions which are +done upon precedent and passed deliberations; +they are not only spontaneous, but free acts. +Habits contracted by use and experience, do help +the will to act with more facility and more determinately, +as the hand of the artificer is helped by +his tools. And precedent deliberations, if they +were sad and serious, and proved by experience to +be profitable, do save the labour of subsequent consultations; +<span lang="la"><i>frustra fit per plura, quod fieri potest +per pauciora</i></span>. Yet nevertheless the actions +which are done by virtue of these formerly acquired +habits, are no less free, than if the deliberation +were coexistent with this particular action. +He that hath gained an habit and skill to play such +a lesson, needs not a new deliberation how to play +every time that he plays it over and over. Yet I +<span class='pageno' id='Page_90'>90</span>am far from giving credit to him in this, that +walking or eating universally considered, are free +actions, or proceed from true liberty; not so much +because they want a particular deliberation before +every individual act, as because they are animal +motions and need no deliberation of reason, as we +see in brute beasts. And nevertheless the same +actions, as they are considered individually, and +invested with their due circumstances, may be and +often are free actions subjected to the liberty of +the agent.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Lastly, whereas T. H. compareth the first motions +or rash attempts of choleric persons with +such acquired habits, it is a great mistake. Those +rash attempts are voluntary actions, and may be +facilitated sometimes by acquired habits. But yet +for as much as actions are often altered and varied +by the circumstances of time, place, and person, so +as that act which at one time is morally good, at +another time may be morally evil; and for as +much as a general precedent deliberation how to +do this kind of action, is not sufficient to make +this or that particular action good or expedient, +which being in itself good, yet particular circumstances +may render inconvenient or unprofitable +to some persons, at some times, in some places: +therefore a precedent general deliberation how to +do any act, as for instance, how to write, is not +sufficient to make a particular act, as my writing +this individual reply, to be freely done, without a +particular and subsequent deliberation. A man +learns French advisedly; that is a free act. The +same man in his choler and passion reviles his +friend in French, without any deliberation; this is +<span class='pageno' id='Page_91'>91</span>a spontaneous act, but it is not a free act. If he +had taken time to advise, he would not have reviled +his friend. Yet as it is not free, so neither is it so +necessary as the bees making honey, whose fancy +is not only inclined, but determined, by nature to +that act. So every way he fails. And his conclusion, +that the liberty of election doth not take away +the necessity of electing this or that individual +thing, is no consequent from my doctrine, but from +his own. Neither do my arguments fight one +against another, but his private opinions fight both +against me and against an undoubted truth. A +free agent endowed with liberty of election, or +with an elective power, may nevertheless be necessitated +in some individual acts, but those acts +wherein he is necessitated, do not flow from his +elective power, neither are those acts which flow +from his elective power necessitated.”</p> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c000'> + <div><span class='fss'>ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. VIII.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>a</i>) “The first thing that I offer is, how often he +mistakes my meaning in this one section. First, I +make voluntary and spontaneous actions to be one +and the same. He saith, I distinguish them,” &c.</p> + +<p class='c001'>It is very possible I may have mistaken him; +for neither he nor I understand him. If they be +one, why did he without need bring in this strange +word, spontaneous? Or rather, why did the Schoolmen +bring it in, if not merely to shift off the difficulty +of maintaining their tenet of free-will?</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “Secondly, he saith I distinguish between +free acts and voluntary acts; but he saith, I confound +them and make them the same.”</p> + +<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_92'>92</span>In his reply No. <span class='fss'>II</span>, he saith, that for the clearing +of the question, we are to know the difference +between these three, necessity, spontaneity, and +liberty; and because I thought he knew that it +could not be cleared without understanding what is +will, I had reason to think that spontaneity was his +new word for will. And presently after, “some +things are necessary, and not voluntary or spontaneous; +some things are both necessary and voluntary.” +These words, voluntary and spontaneous, so +put together, would make any man believe spontaneous +were put as explicative of voluntary; for it +is no wonder in the eloquence of the Schoolmen. +Therefore, presently after, these words, “spontaneity +consists in a conformity of the appetite, either +intellectual or sensitive,” signify that spontaneity is +a conformity or likeness of the appetite to the object; +which to me soundeth as if he had said, that +the appetite is like the object; which is as proper +as if he had said, the hunger is like the meat. If +this be the bishop’s meaning, as it is the meaning +of the words, he is a very fine philosopher. But +hereafter I will venture no more to say his meaning +is this or that, especially where he useth terms of +art.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>c</i>) “Thirdly, he saith, I ascribe spontaneity only +to fools, children, madmen, and beasts. But I acknowledge +spontaneity hath place in rational men,” +&c.</p> + +<p class='c001'>I resolve to have no more to do with spontaneity. +But I desire the reader to take notice, that the +common people, on whose arbitration dependeth +the signification of words in common use, among +the Latins and Greeks did call all actions and motions +<span class='pageno' id='Page_93'>93</span>whereof they did perceive no cause, spontaneous +and αυτοματα: I say, not those actions which +had no causes; for all actions have their causes; +but those actions whose causes they did not perceive. +So that spontaneous, as a general name, +comprehended many actions and motions of inanimate +creatures; as the falling of heavy things +downwards, which they thought spontaneous, and +that if they were not hindered, they would descend +of their <em>own accord</em>. It comprehended also all +animal motion, as beginning from the will or appetite; +because the causes of the will and appetite +being not perceived, they supposed, as the Bishop +doth, that they were the causes of themselves. So +that which in general is called spontaneous, being +applied to men and beasts in special, is called +voluntary. Yet the will and appetite, though the +very same thing, use to be distinguished in certain +occasions. For in the public conversation of men, +where they are to judge of one another’s will, and +of the regularity and irregularity of one another’s +actions, not every appetite, but the last is esteemed +in the public judgment for the will: nor every +action proceeding from appetite, but that only to +which there had preceded or ought to have preceded +some deliberation. And this I say is so, +when one man is to judge of another’s will. For +every man in himself knoweth that what he desireth +or hath an appetite to, the same he hath a +will to, though his will may be changed before he +hath obtained his desire. The Bishop, understanding +nothing of this, might, if it had pleased him, +have called it jargon. But he had rather pick out +of it some contradictions of myself. And therefore +saith:</p> + +<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_94'>94</span>(<i>d</i>) “Yet I have no reason to be offended at it, +(meaning such contradictions), for he dealeth no +otherwise with me than he doth with himself.”</p> + +<p class='c001'>It is a contradiction, he saith, that having said +that “voluntary presupposeth deliberation,” I say +in another place, “that whatsoever followeth the +last appetite, is voluntary, and where there is but +one appetite, that is the last.” Not observing that +<em>voluntary</em> presupposeth <em>deliberation</em>, when the +judgment, whether the action be voluntary or not, +is not in the actor, but in the judge; who regardeth +not the will of the actor, where there is nothing to +be accused in the action of deliberate malice; yet +knoweth that though there be but one appetite, the +same is truly will for the time, and the action, if it +follow, a voluntary action.</p> + +<p class='c001'>This also he saith is a contradiction, that having +said, “no action of a man can be said to be without +deliberation, though never so sudden,” I say +afterward that “by spontaneity is meant inconsiderate +proceeding.”</p> + +<p class='c001'>Again he observes not, that the action of a man +that is not a child, in public judgment how rash, +inconsiderate, and sudden soever it be, it is to be +taken for deliberation; because it is supposed, he +ought to have considered and compared his intended +action with the law; when, nevertheless, that sudden +and indeliberate action was truly voluntary.</p> + +<p class='c001'>Another contradiction which he finds is this, that +having undertaken to prove “that children before +they have the use of reason do deliberate and elect,” +I say by and by after a “child may be so young +as to do what he doth without all deliberation.” I +yet see no contradiction here; for a child may be +so young, as that the appetite thereof is its first +<span class='pageno' id='Page_95'>95</span>appetite, but afterward and often before it come to +have the use of reason, may elect one thing and +refuse another, and consider the consequences of +what it is about to do. And why not as well as +beasts, which never have the use of reason; for +they deliberate, as men do? For though men and +beasts do differ in many things very much, yet they +differ not in the nature of their deliberation. A +man can reckon by words of general signification, +make propositions, and syllogisms, and compute in +numbers, magnitudes, proportions, and other things +computable; which being done by the advantage +of language, and words of general significations, a +beast that hath not language cannot do, nor a man +that hath language, if he misplace the words, that +are his counters. From hence to the end of this +number, he discourseth again of spontaneity, and +how it is in children, madmen, and beasts; which, +as I before resolved, I will not meddle with; let +the reader think and judge of it as he pleaseth.</p> + +<h3 id='IX' class='c002'>NO. IX.</h3> + +<div class='c000'></div> +<div class='sidenote'>The Bishop’s reply.</div> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “Secondly, (<i>a</i>) they who might have +done, and may do, many things which they leave +undone; and they who leave undone many things +which they might do, are neither compelled nor +necessitated to do what they do, but have true +liberty. But we might do many things which we +do not, and we do many things which we might +leave undone, as is plain, (1 Kings iii. 11): <em>Because +thou hast asked this thing, and hast not +asked for thyself long life, neither hast asked +riches for thyself, nor hast asked the life of thine +enemies</em> &c. God gave Solomon his choice. He +might have asked riches, but then he had not asked +<span class='pageno' id='Page_96'>96</span>wisdom, which he did ask. He did ask wisdom, +but he might have asked riches, which yet he did +not ask. And (Acts v. 4): <em>After it was sold, +was it not in thine own power?</em> It was in his +own power to give it, and it was in his own power +to retain it. Yet if he did give it, he could not +retain it; and if he did retain it, he could not give +it. Therefore we may do, what we do not. And +we do not, what we might do. That is, we have +true liberty from necessity.”</p> + +<p class='c001'><i>T. H.</i> The second argument from Scripture +consisteth in histories of men that did one thing, +when, if they would, they might have done another. +The places are two; one is in 1 Kings iii. 11, +where the history says, God was pleased that +Solomon, who might, if he would, have asked +riches or revenge, did nevertheless ask wisdom at +God’s hands. The other is the words of St. Peter +to Ananias, (Acts v. 4): <em>After it was sold, was it +not in thine own power?</em></p> + +<p class='c001'>To which the answer is the same with that I +answered to the former places: that they prove +that there is election, but do not disprove the necessity +which I maintain of what they so elect.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“We have had the very same answer twice +before. It seemeth that he is well-pleased with +it, or else he would not draw it in again so suddenly +by head and shoulders to no purpose, if +he did not conceive it to be a panchreston, a salve +for all sores, or <span lang="la"><i>dictamnum</i></span>, sovereign dittany, to +make all his adversaries’ weapons to drop out of +the wounds of his cause, only by chewing it, without +any application to the sore. I will not waste +the time to show any further, how the members of +<span class='pageno' id='Page_97'>97</span>his distinction do cross one another, and one take +away another. To make every election to be of +one thing imposed by necessity, and of another +thing which is absolutely impossible, is to make +election to be no election at all. But I forbear to +press that at present. If I may be bold to use his +own phrase, his answer looks quite another way +from mine argument. My second reason was this: +‘They who may do, and might have done many +things which they leave undone, and who leave undone +many things which they might do, are not +necessitated, nor precisely and antecedently determined +to what they do.’</p> + +<p class='c001'>“But we might do many things which we do +not, and we do many things which we might leave +undone, as appears evidently by the texts alleged. +Therefore we are not antecedently and precisely +determined, nor necessitated to do all things which +we do. What is here of <em>election</em> in this argument? +To what proposition, to what term doth T. H. apply +his answer? He neither affirms, nor denieth, +nor distinguisheth of any thing contained in my +argument. Here I must be bold to call upon him +for a more pertinent answer.”</p> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c000'> + <div><span class='fss'>ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. IX.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c001'>The Bishop, for the proving of free-will, had +alleged this text: <em>Because thou hast asked this +thing, and hast not asked for thyself long life</em>, &c. +And another, (Acts v. 4): <em>After it was sold, was it +not in thine own power?</em> Out of which he infers, +there was no necessity that Solomon should ask +wisdom rather than long life, nor that Ananias +should tell a lie concerning the price for which he +<span class='pageno' id='Page_98'>98</span>sold his land: and my answer, that they prove +election, but disprove not the necessity of election, +satisfieth him not; because, saith he, (<i>a</i>) “they +who might have done what they left undone, and +left undone what they might have done, are not +necessitated.”</p> + +<p class='c001'>But how doth he know (understanding power +properly taken) that Solomon had a real power to +ask long life? No doubt Solomon knew nothing +to the contrary; but yet it was possible that God +might have hindered him. For though God gave +Solomon his choice, that is, the thing which he +should choose, it doth not follow, that he did not +also give him the act of election. And for the +other text, where it is said, that the price of the +land was in Ananias’s power, the word <em>power</em> +signifieth no more than the word right, that is, +the right to do with his own what he pleased, +which is not a real and natural power, but a civil +power made by covenant. And therefore the +former answer is sufficient, that though such +places are clear enough to prove election, they +have no strength at all to take away necessity.</p> + +<h3 id='X' class='c002'>NO. X.</h3> + +<div class='c000'></div> +<div class='sidenote'>The Bishop’s reply.</div> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “Thirdly, if there be no true liberty, but +all things come to pass by inevitable necessity, +then what are all those interrogations, and objurgations, +and reprehensions, and expostulations, +which we find so frequently in holy Scriptures, (be +it spoken with all due respect), but feigned and +hypocritical exaggerations? <em>Hast thou eaten of +the tree, whereof I commanded that thou shouldst +not eat?</em> (Gen. iii. 11.) And (verse 13) he saith +<span class='pageno' id='Page_99'>99</span>to Eve, <em>Why hast thou done this?</em> And (Gen. +iv. 6) to Cain, <em>Why art thou wroth, and why +is thy countenance cast down?</em> And, (Ezech. +xviii. 31): <em>Why will ye die, O house of Israel?</em> +Doth God command openly not to eat, and +yet secretly by himself or by the second causes +necessitate him to eat? Doth he reprehend +him for doing that, which he hath antecedently +determined that he must do? Doth he propose +things under impossible conditions? Or +were not this plain mockery and derision? Doth +a loving master chide his servant because he doth +not come at his call, and yet knows that the poor +servant is chained and fettered, so as he cannot +move, by the master’s own order, without the servant’s +default or consent? They who talk here +of a twofold will of God, <em>secret</em> and <em>revealed</em>, and +the one opposite to the other, understand not +what they say. These two wills concern several +persons. The secret will of God, is what he will +do himself; the revealed will of God, is what he +would have us to do; it may be the secret will of +God to take away the life of the father, yet it is +God’s revealed will that his son should wish his +life and pray for his life. Here is no contradiction, +where the agents are distinct. But for the +same person to command one thing, and yet to +necessitate him that is commanded to do another +thing; to chide a man for doing that, which he +hath determined inevitably and irresistibly that he +must do; this were (I am afraid to utter what they +are not afraid to assert) the highest dissimulation. +God’s chiding proves man’s liberty.”</p> + +<p class='c001'><i>T. H.</i> To the third and fifth arguments, I shall +make but one answer.</p> + +<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_100'>100</span><i>J. D.</i> (<i>a</i>) “Certainly distinct arguments, as the +third and fifth are, the one drawn from the truth +of God, the other from the justice of God, the one +from his objurgations and reprehensions, the other +from his judgments after life, did require distinct +answers. But the plain truth is, that neither +here, nor in his answer to the fifth argument, nor +in this whole treatise, is there one word of solution +or satisfaction to this argument, or to any +part of it. All that looks like an answer is contained, +No. <span class='fss'>XII</span>: ‘That which he does is made +just by his doing; just, I say, in him, not always +just in us by the example; for a man that shall +command a thing openly, and plot secretly the +hinderance of the same, if he punish him whom +he commanded so for not doing it, is unjust.’ +(<i>b</i>) I dare not insist upon it, I hope his meaning is +not so bad as the words intimate and as I apprehend, +that is, to impute falsehood to Him that is +truth itself, and to justify feigning and dissimulation +in God, as he doth tyranny, by the infiniteness +of his power and the absoluteness of his +dominion. And therefore, by his leave, I must +once again tender him a new summons for a full +and clear answer to this argument also. He tells +us, that he was not surprised. Whether he were +or not, is more than I know. But this I see plainly, +that either he is not provided, or that his cause +admits no choice of answers. The Jews dealt ingeniously, +when they met with a difficult knot +which they could not untie, to put it upon Elias: +<em>Elias will answer it when he comes</em>.</p> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c000'> + <div><span class='pageno' id='Page_101'>101</span><span class='fss'>ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. X.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c001'>The Bishop argued thus: “Thirdly, if there be +no true liberty, but all things come to pass by +inevitable necessity, then what are those interrogations +we find so frequently in holy Scriptures, +(be it spoken with all due respect), but feigned +and hypocritical exaggerations?” Here putting together +two repugnant suppositions, either craftily +or (be it spoken with all due respect) ignorantly, +he would have men believe, because I hold necessity, +that I deny liberty, I hold as much that there +is true liberty as he doth, and more, for I hold it +as from necessity, and that there must of necessity +be liberty; but he holds it not from necessity, and +so makes it possible there may be none. His expostulations +were, first, <em>Hast thou eaten of the +tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldst +not eat?</em> Secondly, <em>Why hast thou done this?</em> +Thirdly, <em>Why art thou wroth, and why is thy +countenance cast down?</em> Fourthly, <em>Why will ye +die, O house of Israel?</em> These arguments requiring +the same answer which some other do, +I thought fit to remit them to their fellows. But +the Bishop will not allow me that. For he saith,</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>a</i>) “Certainly, distinct arguments, as the third +and fifth are, &c. did require distinct answers.”</p> + +<p class='c001'>I am therefore to give an account of the meaning +of the aforesaid objurgations and expostulations; +not of the end for which God said, <em>Hast +thou eaten of the tree, &c.</em>, but how those words +may be taken without repugnance to the doctrine +<span class='pageno' id='Page_102'>102</span>of necessity. These words, <em>Hast thou eaten of +the tree whereof I commanded that thou shouldst +not eat</em>, convince Adam that, notwithstanding God +had placed in the garden a means to keep him perpetually +from dying in case he should accommodate +his will to obedience of God’s commandment +concerning the tree of knowledge of good and +evil, yet Adam was not so much master of his +own will as to do it. Whereby is signified, that a +mortal man, though invited by the promise of immortality, +cannot govern his own will, though his +will govern his actions; which dependence of the +actions on the will, is that which properly and +truly is called <em>liberty</em>. And the like may be said +of the words to Eve, <em>Why hast thou done this?</em> +and of those to Cain, <em>Why art thou wroth? &c.</em> +and to Israel, <em>Why will ye die, O house of Israel?</em> +But the Bishop here will say <em>die</em> signifieth not +<em>die</em>, but live eternally in torments; for by such +interpretations any man may answer anything. +And whereas he asketh, “Doth God reprehend +him for doing that which he hath antecedently +determined him that he must do?” I answer, no; +but he convinceth and instructeth him, that though +immortality was so easy to obtain, as it might be +had for the abstinence from the fruit of one only +tree, yet he could not obtain it but by pardon, +and by the sacrifice of Jesus Christ: nor is there +here any punishment, but only a reducing of Adam +and Eve to their original mortality, where death +was no punishment but a gift of God. In which +mortality he lived near a thousand years, and had +a numerous issue, and lived without misery, and +I believe shall at the resurrection obtain the immortality +<span class='pageno' id='Page_103'>103</span>which then he lost. Nor in all this is +there any plotting secretly, or any mockery or +derision, which the Bishop would make men believe +there is. And whereas he saith, that “they +who talk here of a twofold will of God, secret and +revealed, and the one opposite to the other, understand +not what they say:” the Protestant +doctors, both of our and other Churches, did use +to distinguish between the secret and revealed +will of God; the former they called <span lang="la"><i>voluntas bene +placiti</i></span>, which signifieth absolutely his will, the +other <span lang="la"><i>voluntas signi</i></span>, that is, the signification of +his will, in the same sense that I call the one +his <em>will</em>, the other his <em>commandment</em>, which may +sometimes differ. For God’s commandment to +Abraham was, that he should sacrifice Isaac, but +his will was, that he should not do it. God’s +denunciation to Nineveh was, that it should be +destroyed within forty days, but his will was, +that it should not.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “I dare not insist upon it, I hope his meaning +is not so bad, as the words intimate, and as I +apprehend; that is, to impute falsehood to Him +that is truth itself,” &c.</p> + +<p class='c001'>What damned rhetoric and subtle calumny is +this? God, I said, might command a thing openly, +and yet hinder the doing of it, without injustice; +but if a man should command a thing to be done, +and then plot secretly the hinderance of the same, +and punish for the not doing it, it were injustice. +This it is which the Bishop apprehends as an imputation +of falsehood to God Almighty. And perhaps +if the death of a sinner were, as he thinks, +an eternal life in extreme misery, a man might as far +<span class='pageno' id='Page_104'>104</span>as Job hath done, expostulate with God Almighty; +not accusing him of injustice, because whatsoever +he doth is therefore just because done by him; but +of little tenderness and love to mankind. And this +expostulation will be equally just or unjust, whether +the necessity of all things be granted or denied. +For it is manifest that God could have made man +impeccable, and can now preserve him from sin, or +forgive him if he please; and therefore, if he +please not, the expostulation is as reasonable in +the cases of <em>liberty</em> as of <em>necessity</em>.</p> + +<h3 id='XI' class='c002'>NO. XI.</h3> + +<div class='c000'></div> +<div class='sidenote'>The Bishop’s reply.</div> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “Fourthly, if either the decree of God, or +the foreknowledge of God, or the influence of the +stars, or the concatenation of causes, or the physical +or moral efficacy of objects, or the last dictate +of the understanding, do take away true liberty, +then Adam before his fall had no true liberty. For +he was subjected to the same decrees, the same +prescience, the same constellations, the same causes, +the same objects, the same dictates of the understanding. +But, <span lang="la"><i>quicquid ostendes mihi sic, incredulus +odi</i></span>; the greatest opposers of our liberty, +are as earnest maintainers of the liberty of Adam. +Therefore none of these supposed impediments +take away true liberty.”</p> + +<p class='c001'><i>T. H.</i> The fourth argument is to this effect: “If +the decree of God, or his foreknowledge, or the +influence of the stars, or the concatenation of +causes, or the physical or moral efficacy of causes, +or the last dictate of the understanding, or whatsoever +it be, do take away true liberty, then Adam +before his fall had no true liberty. <span lang="la"><i>Quicquid ostendes +<span class='pageno' id='Page_105'>105</span>mihi sic, incredulus odi.</i></span>” That which I say +necessitateth and determineth every action, (that +he may no longer doubt of my meaning), is the +sum of all those things, which being now existent, +conduce and concur to the production of that action +hereafter, whereof if any one thing now were +wanting, the effect could not be produced. This +concourse of causes, whereof every one is determined +to be such as it is by a like concourse of +former causes, may well be called (in respect they +were all set and ordered by the eternal cause of all +things, God Almighty) the decree of God.</p> + +<p class='c001'>But that the foreknowledge of God should be a +cause of any thing, cannot be truly said; seeing +foreknowledge is knowledge, and knowledge dependeth +on the existence of the things known, and +not they on it.</p> + +<p class='c001'>The influence of the stars is but a small part of +the whole cause, consisting of the concourse of all +agents.</p> + +<p class='c001'>Nor doth the concourse of all causes make one +simple chain or concatenation, but an innumerable +number of chains joined together, not in all parts, +but in the first link, God Almighty; and consequently +the whole cause of an event does not +always depend upon one single chain, but on many +together.</p> + +<p class='c001'>Natural efficacy of objects does determine voluntary +agents, and necessitates the will, and consequently +the action; but for moral efficacy, I +understand not what he means by it. The last +dictate of the judgment concerning the good or +bad that may follow on any action, is not properly +the whole cause, but the last part of it; and yet +<span class='pageno' id='Page_106'>106</span>may be said to produce the effect necessarily, in +such manner as the last feather may be said to +break an horse’s back, when there were so many +laid on before as there wanted but that to do it.</p> + +<p class='c001'>Now for his argument, that if the concourse of +all the causes necessitate the effect, that then it +follows, Adam had no true liberty. I deny the +consequence; for I make not only the effect, but +also the election of that particular effect to be necessary, +inasmuch as the will itself, and each propension +of a man during his deliberation, is as +much necessitated, and depends on a sufficient +cause, as any thing else whatsoever. As for example, +it is no more necessary that fire should burn, +than that a man, or other creature, whose limbs be +moved by fancy, should have election, that is, +liberty to do what he has a fancy to, though it be +not in his will or power to choose his fancy, or +choose his election or will.</p> + +<p class='c001'>This doctrine, because he says he hates, I doubt +had better been suppressed; as it should have been, +if both your Lordship and he had not pressed me +to an answer.</p> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> (<i>a</i>) “This argument was sent forth only as +an espy to make a more full discovery, what were the +true grounds of T. H.’s supposed necessity. Which +errand being done, and the foundation whereupon +he builds being found out, which is, as I called it, a +concatenation of causes, and, as he calls it, a concourse +of necessary causes; it would now be a superfluous +and impertinent work in me to undertake +the refutation of all those other opinions, which +he doth not undertake to defend. And therefore I +shall waive them at the present, with these short +animadversions.</p> + +<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_107'>107</span>(<i>b</i>) “Concerning the eternal decree of God, +he confounds the decree itself with the execution +of his decree. And concerning the foreknowledge +of God, he confounds that speculative knowledge, +which is called <em>the knowledge of vision</em>, (which +doth not produce the intellective objects, no more +than the sensitive vision doth produce the sensible +objects), with that other knowledge of God, which +is called the <em>knowledge of approbation</em>, or <em>a practical +knowledge</em>, that is, knowledge joined with an +act of the will, of which divines do truly say, that +it is the cause of things, as the knowledge of the +artist is the cause of his work. John i.: <em>God +made all things by his word</em>; that is, by his wisdom. +Concerning the influence of the stars, I +wish he had expressed himself more clearly. For as +I do willingly grant, that those heavenly bodies do +act upon these sublunary things, not only by their +motion and light, but also by an occult virtue, +which we call influence, as we see by manifold experience +in the loadstone and shell-fish, &c.: so if +he intend that by these influences they do naturally +or physically determine the will, or have any +direct dominion over human counsels, either in +whole or in part, either more or less, he is in an +error. Concerning the concatenation of causes, +whereas he makes not one chain, but an innumerable +number of chains, (I hope he speaks hyperbolically, +and doth not intend that they are actually +infinite), the difference is not material whether one +or many, so long as they are all joined together, +both in the first link, and likewise in the effect. It +serves to no end but to shew what a shadow of +liberty T. H. doth fancy, or rather what a dream +<span class='pageno' id='Page_108'>108</span>of a shadow. As if one chain were not sufficient +to load poor man, but he must be clogged with +innumerable chains. This is just such another +freedom as the Turkish galley-slaves do enjoy. +But I admire that T. H., who is so versed in this +question, should here confess that he understands +not the difference between physical or natural, and +moral efficacy: and much more that he should +affirm, that outward objects do determine voluntary +agents by a natural efficacy. No object, no +second agent, angel or devil, can determine the +will of man naturally, but God alone, in respect of +his supreme dominion over all things. Then the +will is determined naturally, when God Almighty, +besides his general influence, whereupon all second +causes do depend, as well for their being as for +their acting, doth moreover at some times, when it +pleases him in cases extraordinary, concur by a +special influence, and infuse something into the +will, in the nature of an act, or an habit, whereby +the will is moved and excited, and applied to will +or choose this or that. Then the will is determined +morally, when some object is proposed to it with +persuasive reasons and arguments to induce it to +will. Where the determination is natural, the +liberty to suspend its act is taken away from the +will, but not so where the determination is moral. +In the former case, the will is determined extrinsically, +in the latter case intrinsically; the former +produceth an absolute necessity, the latter only a +necessity of supposition. If the will do not suspend, +but assent, then the act is necessary; but +because the will may suspend, and not assent, +therefore it is not absolutely necessary. In the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_109'>109</span>former case, the will is moved necessarily and determinately; +in the latter, freely and indeterminately. +The former excitation is immediate; the +latter is mediate <span lang="la"><i>mediante intellectu</i></span>, and requires +the help of the understanding. In a word, so +great a difference there is between natural and +moral efficacy, as there is between his opinion and +mine in this question.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“There remains only the last dictate of the understanding, +which he maketh to be the last cause +that concurreth to the determination of the will, +and to the necessary production of the act, ‘as +the last feather may be said to break an horse’s +back, when there were so many laid on before +that there wanted but that to do it.’ I have shewed +(No. <a href='#VII'><span class='fss'>VII.</span></a>) that the last dictate of the understanding +is not always absolute in itself, nor conclusive to +the will; and when it is conclusive, yet it produceth +no antecedent nor extrinsical necessity. I shall +only add one thing more at present, that by +making the last judgment of right reason to be of +no more weight than a single feather, he wrongs +the understanding as well as he doth the will; and +endeavours to deprive the will of its supreme power +of application, and to deprive the understanding +of its supreme power of judicature and definition. +Neither corporeal agents and objects, nor yet the +sensitive appetite itself, being an inferior faculty +and affixed to the organ of the body, have any direct +or immediate dominion or command over the +rational will. It is without the sphere of their +activity. All the access which they have unto the +will, is by the means of the understanding, sometimes +clear and sometimes disturbed, and of reason, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_110'>110</span>either right or misinformed. Without the help of +the understanding, all his second causes were not +able of themselves to load the horse’s back with +so much weight as the least of all his feathers doth +amount unto. But we shall meet with his horseload +of feathers again, No. <a href='#XXIII'><span class='fss'>XXIII.</span></a></p> + +<p class='c001'>“These things being thus briefly touched, he +proceeds to his answer. My argument was this: +if any of these or all these causes formerly recited, +do take away true liberty, (that is, still intended +from necessity), then Adam before his fall had no +true liberty.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“But Adam before his fall had true liberty.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“He mis-recites the argument, and denies the +consequence, which is so clearly proved, that no +man living can doubt of it. Because Adam was +subjected to all the same causes as well as we, the +same decree, the same prescience, the same influences, +the same concourse of causes, the same +efficacy of objects, the same dictates of reason. +But it is only a mistake; for it appears plainly by +his following discourse, that he intended to deny, +not the consequence, but the assumption. For he +makes Adam to have had no liberty from necessity +before his fall, yea, he proceeds so far as to affirm +that all human wills, his and ours, and each propension +of our wills, even during our deliberation, +are as much necessitated as anything else whatsoever; +that we have no more power to forbear those +actions which we do, than the fire hath power not +to burn. Though I honour T. H. for his person +and for his learning, yet I must confess ingenuously, +I hate this doctrine from my heart. And I believe +both I have reason so to do, and all others who shall +<span class='pageno' id='Page_111'>111</span>seriously ponder the horrid consequences which +flow from it. It destroys liberty, and dishonours +the nature of man. It makes the second causes +and outward objects to be the rackets, and men to +be but the tennis-balls of destiny. It makes the +first cause, that is, God Almighty, to be the introducer +of all evil and sin into the world, as much as +man, yea, more than man, by as much as the motion +of the watch is more from the artificer, who +did make it and wind it up, than either from the +spring, or the wheels, or the thread, if God, by his +special influence into the second causes, did necessitate +them to operate as they did. And if they, +being thus determined, did necessitate Adam inevitably, +irresistibly, not by an accidental, but by an +essential subordination of causes to whatsoever he +did, then one of these two absurdities must needs +follow: either that Adam did not sin, and that +there is no such thing as sin in the world, because +it proceeds naturally, necessarily, and essentially +from God; or that God is more guilty of it, and +more the cause of evil than man, because man is +extrinsically, inevitably determined, but so is not +God. And in causes essentially subordinate, the +cause of the cause is always the cause of the effect. +What tyrant did ever impose laws that were impossible +for those to keep, upon whom they were +imposed, and punish them for breaking those laws, +which he himself had necessitated them to break, +which it was no more in their power not to break, +than it is in the power of the fire not to burn? +Excuse me if I hate this doctrine with a perfect +hatred, which is so dishonourable both to God and +man; which makes men to blaspheme of necessity, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_112'>112</span>to steal of necessity, to be hanged of necessity, and +to be damned of necessity. And therefore I must +say and say again, <span lang="la"><i>quicquid ostendes mihi sic, incredulus +odi</i></span>. It were better to be an atheist, to +believe no God; or to be a Manichee, to believe +two Gods, a God of good and a God of evil; or +with the heathens, to believe thirty thousand Gods: +than thus to charge the true God to be the proper +cause and the true author of all the sins and evils +which are in the world.”</p> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c000'> + <div><span class='fss'>ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. XI.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>a</i>) “This argument was sent forth only as an +espy, to make a more full discovery, what were +the true grounds of T. H.’s supposed necessity.”</p> + +<p class='c001'>The argument which he sendeth forth as an espy, +is this: “If either the decree of God, or the foreknowledge +of God, or the influence of the stars, +or the concatenation (which he says falsely I call a +concourse) of causes, of the physical or moral efficacy +of objects, or the last dictate of the understanding, +do take away true liberty, then Adam +before his fall had no true liberty.” In answer +whereunto I said, that all the things now existent +were necessary to the production of the effect to +come; that the <em>foreknowledge</em> of God causeth nothing, +though the <em>will</em> do; that the influence of the +stars is but a small part of that cause which +maketh the necessity; and that this consequence, +“if the concourse of all the causes necessitate the +effect, then Adam had no true liberty,” was false. +But in his words, if these do take away true liberty, +then Adam before his fall had no true liberty, +the consequence is good; but then I deny that necessity +<span class='pageno' id='Page_113'>113</span>takes away liberty; the reason whereof, +which is this, <em>liberty is to choose what we will, +not to choose our will</em>, no inculcation is sufficient +to make the Bishop take notice of, notwithstanding +he be otherwhere so witty, and here so crafty, as +to send out arguments for spies. The cause why +I denied the consequence was, that I thought the +force thereof consisted in this, that necessity in +the Bishop’s opinion destroyed liberty.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “Concerning the eternal decree of God,” &c.</p> + +<p class='c001'>Here begins his reply. From which if we take +these words; “knowledge of approbation;” “practical +knowledge;” “heavenly bodies act upon sublunary +things, not only by their motion, but also +by an occult virtue, which we call influence;” +“moral efficacy;” “general influence;” “special +influence;” “infuse something into the will;” “the +will is moved;” “the will is induced to will;” +“the will suspends its own act;” which are all +nonsense, unworthy of a man, nay, and if a beast +could speak, unworthy of a beast, and can befal +no creature whose nature is not depraved by doctrine; +nothing at all remaineth to be answered. +Perhaps the word, <em>occult virtue</em>, is not to be taxed +as unintelligible. But then I may tax therein +the want of ingenuity in him that had rather +say, that heavenly bodies <em>do work by an occult +virtue</em>, than that they <em>work he knoweth not how</em>; +which he would not confess, but endeavours to +make <em>occult</em> be taken for a <em>cause</em>. The rest of +this reply is one of those consequences, which I +have answered in the beginning, where I compare +the inconveniences of both opinions, that is, “that +either Adam did not sin, or his sin proceeded necessarily +<span class='pageno' id='Page_114'>114</span>from God;” which is no stronger a consequence +than if out of this, “that a man is lame +necessarily,” one should infer, that <em>either he is not +lame</em>, or that <em>his lameness proceeded necessarily +from the will of God</em>. To the end of this number +there is nothing more of argument. The place +is filled up with wondering and railing.</p> + +<h3 id='XII' class='c002'>NO. XII.</h3> + +<div class='c000'></div> +<div class='sidenote'>The Bishop’s reply.</div> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “Fifthly, if there be no liberty, there +shall be no day of doom, no last judgment, no rewards +nor punishments after death. A man can +never make himself a criminal, if he be not left at +liberty to commit a crime. No man can be justly +punished for doing that which was not in his +power to shun. To take away liberty hazards +heaven, but undoubtedly it leaves no hell.”</p> + +<p class='c001'><i>T. H.</i> The arguments of greatest consequence +are the third and fifth, and fall both into one: +namely, if there be a necessity of all events, that +it will follow that praise and reprehension, reward +and punishment, are all vain and unjust: and +that if God should openly forbid, and secretly necessitate +the same action, punishing men for what +they could not avoid, there would be no belief +among them of heaven or hell.</p> + +<p class='c001'>To oppose hereunto, I must borrow an answer +from St. Paul (Rom. ix.), from the eleventh +verse of the chapter to the eighteenth, is laid +down the very same objection in these words: +<em>When they</em> (meaning Esau and Jacob) <em>were yet +unborn, and had done neither good nor evil, that +the purpose of God according to election, not by +works, but by him that calleth, might remain +firm, it was said to her</em> (viz. to Rebecca) <em>that the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_115'>115</span>elder shall serve the younger. And what then +shall we say, is there injustice with God? God +forbid. It is not therefore in him that willeth, +nor in him that runneth, but in God that showeth +mercy. For the Scripture saith to Pharaoh, I +have stirred thee up, that I may show my power +in thee, and that my name may be set forth in +all the earth. Therefore whom God willeth he +hath mercy on, and whom he willeth he hardeneth.</em> +Thus, you see, the case put by St. Paul is the +same with that of J. D., and the same objection in +these words following (verse 19): <em>Thou wilt ask me +then, why will God yet complain; for who hath +resisted his will?</em> To this therefore the apostle +answers, not by denying it was God’s will, or that +the decree of God concerning Esau was not before +he had sinned, or that Esau was not necessitated to +do what he did; but thus (verse 20, 21): <em>Who art +thou, O man, that interrogatest God? Shall the +work say to the workman, why hast thou made me +thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay, +of the same stuff to make one vessel to honour, +another to dishonour?</em> According therefore to +this answer of St. Paul, I answer J. D.’s objection, +and say, the power of God alone, without other +help, is sufficient justification of any action he +doth. That which men make among themselves +here by pacts and covenants, and call by the +name of justice, and according whereunto men are +counted and termed rightly just and unjust, is not +that by which God Almighty’s actions are to be +measured or called just, no more than his counsels +are to be measured by human wisdom. That +which he does is made just by his doing; just +<span class='pageno' id='Page_116'>116</span>I say in him, not always just in us by the example; +for a man that shall command a thing openly, +and plot secretly the hindrance of the same, if he +punish him he so commanded for not doing it, is +unjust. So also his counsels, they be therefore +not in vain, because they be his, whether we see +the use of them or not. When God afflicted Job, +he did object no sin to him, but justified that afflicting +him by telling him of his power. <em>Hast +thou</em> (says God) <em>an arm like mine? Where wast +thou, when I laid the foundations of the earth?</em> +and the like. So our Saviour, concerning the man +that was born blind, said, it was not for his sin, +nor his parents’ sin, but that the power of God +might be shown in him. Beasts are subject to +death and torment, yet they cannot sin. It was +God’s will it should be so. Power irresistible justified +all actions really and properly, in whomsoever +it be found. Less power does not. And +because such power is in God only, he must needs +be just in all his actions. And we, that not comprehending +his counsels, call him to the bar, commit +injustice in it.</p> + +<p class='c001'>I am not ignorant of the usual reply to this +answer, by distinguishing between will and permission. +As, that God Almighty does indeed +permit sin sometimes, and that he also foreknoweth +that the sin he permitteth shall be committed; +but does not will it, nor necessitate it. I know +also they distinguish the action from the sin of +the action, saying, God Almighty doth indeed +cause the action, whatsoever action it be, but not +the sinfulness or irregularity of it, that is, the discordance +between the action and the law. Such +distinctions as these dazzle my understanding. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_117'>117</span>I find no difference between the will to have a +thing done, and the permission to do it, when +he that permitteth it can hinder it, and knows it +will be done unless he hinder it. Nor find I any +difference between an action that is against the +law, and the sin of that action. As for example, +between the killing of Uriah, and the sin of David +in killing Uriah. Nor when one is cause both of +the action and of the law, how another can be +cause of the disagreement between them, no more +than how one man making a longer and shorter +garment, another can make the inequality that is +between them. This I know, God cannot sin, +because his doing a thing makes it just, and consequently +no sin: and because whatsoever can +sin is subject to another’s law, which God is not. +And therefore it is blasphemy to say, God can sin. +But to say, that God can so order the world as a +sin may be necessarily caused thereby in a man, +I do not see how it is any dishonour to him. Howsoever, +if such or other distinctions can make it +clear that St. Paul did not think Esau’s or Pharaoh’s +actions proceeded from the will and purpose +of God, or that proceeding from his will could not +therefore without injustice be blamed or punished, +I will, as soon as I understand them, turn unto +J. D.’s opinion. For I now hold nothing in all +this question between us, but what seemeth to me +not obscurely, but most expressly said in this +place by St. Paul. And thus much in answer to +his places of Scripture.</p> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> T. H. thinks to kill two birds with one +stone, and satisfy two arguments with one answer, +whereas in truth he satisfieth neither. First, for +<span class='pageno' id='Page_118'>118</span>my third reason. (<i>a</i>) Though all he say here were +as true as an oracle; though punishment were an +act of dominion, not of justice in God; yet this is +no sufficient cause why God should deny his own +act, or why he should chide or expostulate with +men, why they did that which he himself did necessitate +them to do, and whereof he was the +actor more than they, they being but as the stone, +but he the hand that threw it. Notwithstanding +anything which is pleaded here, this stoical +opinion doth stick hypocrisy and dissimulation +close to God, who is truth itself.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“And to my fifth argument, which he changeth +and relateth amiss, as by comparing mine with +his may appear, his chiefest answer is to oppose +a difficult place of St. Paul (Rom. ix. 11.) Hath +he never heard, that to propose a doubt is not to +answer an argument: <span lang="la"><i>nec bene respondet qui litem +lite resolvit</i></span>? But I will not pay him in his +own coin. Wherefore to this place alleged by him, +I answer, the case is not the same. The question +moved there is, how God did keep his promise +made to Abraham, <em>to be the God of him and of +his seed</em>, if the Jews who were the legitimate progeny +of Abraham were deserted. To which the +apostle answers (vers. 6, 7, 8), that that promise +was not made to the carnal seed of Abraham, that +is, the Jews, but to his spiritual sons, which were +the heirs of his faith, that is, to the believing +Christians; which answer he explicateth, first by +the allegory of Isaac and Ishmael, and after in the +place cited of Esau and Jacob. Yet neither does +he speak there so much of their persons as of their +posterities. And though some words may be accommodated +<span class='pageno' id='Page_119'>119</span>to God’s predestination, which are +there uttered, yet it is not the scope of that text, +to treat of the reprobation of any man to hell fire. +All the posterity of Esau were not eternally reprobated, +as holy Job and many others. But this +question which is now agitated between us, is +quite of another nature, how a man can be a +criminal who doth nothing but that which he is +extrinsically necessitated to do, or how God in +justice can punish a man with eternal torments +for doing that which it was never in his power to +leave undone; or why he who did imprint the motion +in the heart of man, should punish man, who +did only receive the impression from him. So his +answer <em>looks another way</em>.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“But because he grounds so much upon this text, +that if it can be cleared he is ready to change his +opinion, I will examine all those passages which +may seem to favour his cause. First, these words +(ver. 11): <em>being not yet born, neither having done +any good or evil</em>, upon which the whole weight +of his argument doth depend, have no reference +at all to those words (verse 13), <em>Jacob have I loved, +and Esau have I hated</em>; for those words were first +uttered by the prophet Malachi, many ages after +Jacob and Esau were dead (Mal. i. 2, 3), and intended +of the posterity of Esau, who were not +redeemed from captivity as the Israelites were. +But they are referred to those other words (verse +12), <em>the elder shall serve the younger</em>, which indeed +were spoken before Jacob or Esau were born. +(Gen. xxv. 23.) And though those words of Malachi +had been used of Jacob and Esau before they were +born, yet it had advantaged his cause nothing: for +<span class='pageno' id='Page_120'>120</span>hatred in that text doth not signify any reprobation +to the flames of hell, much less the execution +of that decree, or the actual imposition of +punishment, nor any act contrary to love. God +saw all that he had made, and it was very good. +Goodness itself cannot hate that which is good. +But hatred there signifies comparative hatred, or +a less degree of love, or at the most a negation of +love. As (Gen. xxix. 31), <em>when the Lord saw that +Leah was hated</em>, we may not conclude thence that +Jacob hated his wife; the precedent verse doth +fully expound the sense (verse 30): <em>Jacob loved +Rachel more than Leah</em>. So (Matth. vi. 24), <em>No +man can serve two masters, for either he will +hate the one and love the other</em>. So (Luke xiv. +26), <em>If any man hate not his father and mother, +&c. he cannot be my disciple</em>. St. Matthew +(x. 37) tells us the sense of it: <em>He that loveth +father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me</em>.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Secondly, those words (ver. 15) <em>I will have +mercy on whom I will have mercy</em>, do prove no +more but this, that the preferring of Jacob before +Esau, and of the Christians before the Jews, was +not a debt from God either to the one or to the +other, but a work of mercy. And what of this? +All men confess that God’s mercies do exceed +man’s deserts, but God’s punishments do never exceed +man’s misdeeds. As we see in the parable of +the labourers (Matth. xx. 13-15): <em>Friend, I do thee +no wrong. Did not I agree with thee for a penny? +Is it not lawful for me to do with mine own as +I will? Is thy eye evil, because I am good?</em> +Acts of mercy are free, but acts of justice are due.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“That which follows (verse 17) comes something +<span class='pageno' id='Page_121'>121</span>nearer the cause. <em>The Scripture saith unto +Pharaoh, for this same purpose I have raised +thee up</em>, (that is, I have made thee a king, or I +have preserved thee), <em>that I might show my power +in thee</em>. But this particle, <em>that</em>, doth not always +signify the main end of an action, but sometimes +only a consequent of it, as Matth. ii. 15: <em>He departed +into Egypt</em>, that <em>it might be fulfilled +which was spoken by the prophet, out of Egypt +have I called my son</em>. Without doubt Joseph’s +aim or end of his journey was not to fulfil prophecies, +but to save the life of the child. Yet +because the fulfilling of the prophecy was a consequent +of Joseph’s journey, he saith, <em>that it might +be fulfilled</em>. So here, <em>I have raised thee up, that +I might show my power</em>. Again, though it should +be granted that this particle <em>that</em>, did denote the +intention of God to destroy Pharaoh in the Red +Sea, yet it was not the antecedent intention of +God, which evermore respects the good and benefit +of the creature, but God’s consequent intention +upon the prevision of Pharaoh’s obstinacy, +that since he would not glorify God in obeying his +word, he should glorify God undergoing his judgments. +Hitherto we find no eternal punishments, +nor no temporal punishment without just deserts.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“It follows, (ver. 18), <em>whom he will he hardeneth</em>. +Indeed hardness of heart is the greatest judgment +that God lays upon a sinner in this life, worse than +all the plagues of Egypt. But how doth God +harden the heart? Not by a natural influence of +any evil act or habit into the will, nor by inducing +the will with persuasive motives to obstinacy and +rebellion (James i. 13, 14): <em>For God tempteth no +<span class='pageno' id='Page_122'>122</span>man, but every man is tempted when he is drawn +away of his own lust and enticed</em>. Then God is +said to harden the heart three ways; first, negatively, +and not positively; not by imparting wickedness, +but by not imparting grace; as the sun descending +to the tropic of Capricorn, is said with +us to be the cause of winter, that is, not by imparting +cold, but by not imparting heat. It is an +act of mercy in God to give his grace freely, but +to detain it is no act of injustice. So the apostle +opposeth hardening to shewing of mercy. To +harden is as much as not to shew mercy.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Secondly, God is said to harden the heart +occasionally and not causally, by doing good, +(which incorrigible sinners make an occasion of +growing worse and worse), and doing evil; as a +master by often correcting of an untoward scholar, +doth accidentally and occasionally harden his +heart, and render him more obdurate, insomuch as +he grows even to despise the rod. Or as an indulgent +parent by his patience and gentleness doth +encourage an obstinate son to become more rebellious. +So, whether we look upon God’s frequent +judgments upon Pharaoh, or God’s iterated favours +in removing and withdrawing those judgments upon +Pharaoh’s request, both of them in their several +kinds were occasions of hardening Pharaoh’s heart, +the one making him more presumptuous, the other +more desperately rebellious. So that which was +good in it was God’s; that which was evil was +Pharaoh’s. God gave the occasion, but Pharaoh +was the true cause of his own obduration. This +is clearly confirmed, Exodus viii. 15: <em>When Pharaoh +saw that there was respite, he hardened +<span class='pageno' id='Page_123'>123</span>his heart</em>. And Exodus ix. 34: <em>When Pharaoh +saw that the rain and the hail and the thunders +were ceased, he sinned yet more, and hardened +his heart, he and his servants</em>. So Psalm cv. 25: +<em>He turned their hearts, so that they hated his +people, and dealt subtly with them</em>. That is, +God blessed the children of Israel, whereupon the +Egyptians did take occasion to hate them, as is +plain, Exodus i. 7, 8, 9, 10. So God hardened +Pharaoh’s heart, and Pharaoh hardened his own +heart. God hardened it by not shewing mercy to +Pharaoh, as he did to Nebuchadnezzar, who was +as great a sinner as he, or God hardened it occasionally; +but still Pharaoh was the true cause of +his own obduration, by determining his own will +to evil, and confirming himself in his obstinacy. +So are all presumptuous sinners, (Psalm xcv. 8): +<em>Harden not your hearts as in the provocation, or +as in the day of temptation in the wilderness</em>.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Thirdly, God is said to harden the heart permissively, +but not operatively, nor effectively, as he +who only lets loose a greyhound out of the slip, is +said to hound him at the hare. Will you see +plainly what St. Paul intends by hardening? Read +Rom. ix. 22, 23: <em>What if God, willing to shew his +wrath and to make his power known</em> (that is, by a +consequent will, which in order of nature follows the +prevision of sin), <em>endured with much long-suffering +the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction. And +that he might make known the riches of his glory +on the vessels of mercy</em>, &c. There is much difference +between <em>enduring</em> and <em>impelling</em>, or inciting +the vessels of wrath. He saith of the vessels +of mercy, that <em>God prepared them unto glory</em>. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_124'>124</span>But of the vessels of wrath, he saith only that +they were <em>fitted to destruction</em>, that is, not by God, +but by themselves. St. Paul saith, that God doth +<em>endure the vessels of wrath with much long-suffering</em>. +T. H. saith, that God wills and effects by +the second causes all their actions good and bad, +that he necessitateth them, and determineth them +irresistibly to do those acts which he condemneth +as evil, and for which he punisheth them. If +<em>doing willingly</em>, and <em>enduring</em>, if <em>much long-suffering</em>, +and <em>necessitating</em>, imply not a contrariety +one to another, <span lang="la"><i>reddat mihi minam Diogenes</i></span>, let +him that taught me logic, give me my money +again.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“But T. H. saith, that this distinction between +the <em>operative</em> and <em>permissive</em> will of God, and that +other between the action and the irregularity, do +dazzle his understanding. Though he can find no +difference between these two, yet others do; St. +Paul himself did (Acts xiii. 18): <em>About the time +of forty years suffered he their manners in the +wilderness</em>. And (Acts xiv. 16): <em>Who in times +past suffered all nations to walk in their own +ways.</em> T. H. would make suffering to be inciting, +their manners to be God’s manners, their ways to +be God’s ways. And (Acts xvii. 30): <em>The times +of this ignorance God winked at</em>. It was never +heard that one was said to wink or connive at +that which was his own act. And (1 Cor. x. +13): <em>God is faithful, who will not suffer you to +be tempted above that you are able</em>. To tempt is +the devil’s act; therefore he is called the <em>tempter</em>. +God tempts no man to sin, but he suffers them to +be tempted. And so suffers, that he could hinder +<span class='pageno' id='Page_125'>125</span>Satan, if he would. But by T. H.’s doctrine, to +tempt to sin, and to suffer one to be tempted to sin +when it is in his power to hinder it, is all one. +And so he transforms God (I write it with horror) +into the devil, and makes tempting to be God’s +own work, and the devil to be but his instrument. +And in that noted place, (Rom. ii. 4, 5): <em>Despisest +thou the riches of his goodness and forbearance +and long-suffering, not knowing that +the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance; +but after thy hardness and impenitent heart +treasurest up unto thyself wrath against the +day of wrath, and revelation of the righteous +judgment of God?</em> Here are as many convincing +arguments in this one text against the opinion of +T. H. almost as there are words. Here we learn +that God is <em>rich in goodness</em>, and will not punish +his creatures for that which is his own act; secondly, +that he <em>suffers</em> and <em>forbears sinners long</em>, +and doth not snatch them away by sudden death +as they deserve. Thirdly, that the reason of God’s +forbearance is to <em>bring men to repentance</em>. Fourthly, +that <em>hardness of heart and impenitency</em> is not +causally from God, but from ourselves. Fifthly, +that it is not the insufficient proposal of the means +of their conversion on God’s part, which is the +cause of men’s perdition, but their own contempt +and despising of these means. Sixthly, that punishment +is not an act of absolute dominion, but an +act of righteous judgment, whereby God renders +to every man according to his own deeds, wrath +to them and only to them who <em>treasure up wrath +unto themselves</em>, and eternal life to those who <em>continue +patiently in well-doing</em>. If they deserve +<span class='pageno' id='Page_126'>126</span>such punishment who only neglect the goodness +and long-suffering of God, what do they who utterly +deny it, and make God’s doing and his suffering +to be all one? I do beseech T. H. to consider +what a degree of wilfulness it is, out of one obscure +text wholly misunderstood to contradict the +clear current of the whole Scripture. Of the same +mind with St. Paul was St. Peter, (1 Peter iii. 20): +<em>The long-suffering of God waited once in the +days of Noah</em>. And 2 Peter iii. 15: <em>Account that +the long-suffering of the Lord is salvation</em>. This +is the name God gives himself, (Exod. xxxiv. 6): +<em>The Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious, +long-suffering</em>, &c.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “Yet I do acknowledge that which T. H. +saith to be commonly true, that he who doth permit +any thing to be done, which it is in his power +to hinder, knowing that if he do not hinder it, it +will be done, doth in some sort will it. I say in +some sort, that is, either by an antecedent will, or +by a consequent will, either by an operative will, +or by a permissive will, or he is willing to let it be +done, but not willing to do it. Sometimes an antecedent +engagement doth cause a man to suffer +that to be done, which otherwise he would not suffer. +So Darius suffered Daniel to be cast into the +lion’s den, to make good his rash decree; so +Herod suffered John Baptist to be beheaded, to +make good his rash oath. How much more may +the immutable rule of justice in God, and his +fidelity in keeping his word, draw from him the +punishment of obstinate sinners, though antecedently +he willeth their conversion? He loveth +all his creatures well, but his own justice <a id='corr126.34'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='better'>better.</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_126.34'><ins class='correction' title='better'>better.</ins></a></span> +<span class='pageno' id='Page_127'>127</span>Again, sometimes a man suffereth that to be done, +which he doth not will directly in itself, but indirectly +for some other end, or for the producing of +some greater good; as a man willeth that a putrid +member be cut off from his body, to save the life +of the whole. Or as a judge, being desirous to +save a malefactor’s life, and having power to reprieve +him, doth yet condemn him for example’s +sake, that by the death of one he may save the +lives of many. Marvel not then if God suffer some +creatures to take such courses as tend to their own +ruin, so long as their sufferings do make for the +greater manifestation of his glory, and for the +greater benefit of his faithful servants. This is a +most certain truth, that God would not suffer evil +to be in the world unless he knew how to draw +good out of evil. Yet this ought not to be understood, +as if we made any priority or posteriority +of time in the acts of God, but only of nature. +Nor do we make the antecedent and consequent +will to be contrary one to another; because +the one respects man pure and uncorrupted, +the other respects him as he is lapsed. +The objects are the same, but considered after a +diverse manner. Nor yet do we make these wills +to be distinct in God; for they are the same with +the divine essence, which is one. But the distinction +is in order to the objects or things willed. +Nor, lastly, do we make this permission to be a +naked or a mere permission. God causeth all good, +permitteth all evil, disposeth all things, both good +and evil.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>c</i>) “T. H. demands how God should be the +cause of the action and yet not be the cause of +<span class='pageno' id='Page_128'>128</span>the irregularity of the action. I answer, because +he concurs to the doing of evil by a general, but +not by a special influence. As the earth gives +nourishment to all kinds of plants, as well to hemlock +as to wheat; but the reason why the one yields +food to our sustenance, the other poison to our destruction, +is not from the general nourishment of +the earth, but from the special quality of the root. +Even so the general power to act is from God. <em>In +him we live, and move, and have our being.</em> This +is good. But the specification, and determination +of this general power to the doing of any evil, is +from ourselves, and proceeds from the free-will of +man. This is bad. And to speak properly, the +free-will of man is not the efficient cause of sin, +as the root of the hemlock is of poison, sin having +no true entity or being in it, as poison hath; but +rather the deficient cause. Now no defect can +flow from him who is the highest perfection. +(<i>d</i>) Wherefore T. H. is mightily mistaken, to make +the particular and determinate act of killing Uriah +to be from God. The general power to act is +from God, but the specification of this general and +good power to murder, or to any particular evil, is +not from God, but from the free-will of man. So +T. H. may see clearly if he will, how one may be +the cause of the law, and likewise of the action in +some sort, that is, by general influence; and yet +another cause concurring, by special influence and +determining this general and good power, may +make itself the true cause of the anomy or the +irregularity. And therefore he may keep his longer +and shorter garments for some other occasion. +Certainly, they will not fit this subject, unless he +<span class='pageno' id='Page_129'>129</span>could make general and special influence to be all +one.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“But T. H. presseth yet further, that the case +is the same, and the objection used by the Jews, +(verse 19): <em>Why doth he yet find fault; who hath +resisted his will?</em> is the very same with my argument; +and St. Paul’s answer, (verse 20:) <em>O man, who +art thou that repliest against God? Shall the +thing formed say unto him that formed it, why +hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter +power over his clay?</em> &c., is the very same with +his answer in this place, drawn from the irresistible +power and absolute dominion of God, which +justifieth all his actions. And that the apostle in +his answer doth not deny that it was God’s will, +nor that God’s decree was before Esau’s sin.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“To which I reply, first, that the case is not at +all the same, but quite different, as may appear by +these particulars; first, those words, <em>before they had +done either good or evil</em>, are not, cannot be referred +to those other words, <em>Esau have I hated</em>. Secondly, +if they could, yet it is less than nothing, because before +Esau had actually sinned, his future sins were +known to God. Thirdly, by the potter’s clay, here +is not to be understood the pure mass, but the corrupted +mass of mankind. Fourthly, the hating +here mentioned is only a comparative hatred, that +is, a less degree of love. Fifthly, the hardening +which St. Paul speaks of, is not a positive, but a +negative obduration, or a not imparting of grace. +Sixthly, St. Paul speaketh not of any positive reprobation +to eternal punishment, much less doth +he speak of the actual inflicting of punishment +<span class='pageno' id='Page_130'>130</span>without sin, which is the question between us, and +wherein T. H. differs from all that I remember to +have read, who do all acknowledge that punishment +is never actually inflicted but for sin. If the +question be put, why God doth good to one more +than to another, or why God imparteth more grace +to one than to another, as it is there, the answer is +just and fit, because it is his pleasure, and it is sauciness +in a creature in this case to reply, (Matthew +xx. 15): <em>May not God do what he will with his +own?</em> No man doubteth but God imparteth grace +beyond man’s desert. (<i>e</i>) But if the case be put, +why God doth punish one more than another, or +why he throws one into hell-fire, and not another, +which is the present case agitated between us; to +say with T. H., that it is because God is omnipotent, +or because his power is irresistible, or merely +because it is his pleasure, is not only not warranted, +but is plainly condemned by St. Paul in this place. +So many differences there are between those two +cases. It is not therefore against God that I reply, +but against T. H. I do not call my Creator to the +bar, but my fellow-creature; I ask no account of +God’s counsels, but of man’s presumptions. It is +the mode of these times to father their own fancies +upon God, and when they cannot justify them +by reason, to plead his omnipotence, or to cry, <span lang="la"><i>O +altitudo</i></span>, that the ways of God are unsearchable. +If they may justify their drowsy dreams, because +God’s power and dominion is absolute; much more +may we reject such phantastical devices which are +inconsistent with the truth and goodness and justice +of God, and make him to be a tyrant, who +is the Father of Mercies and the God of all consolation. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_131'>131</span>The unsearchableness of God’s ways +should be a bridle to restrain presumption, and +not a sanctuary for spirits of error.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Secondly, this objection contained ver. 19, to +which the apostle answers ver. 20, is not made in +the person of Esau or Pharaoh, as T. H. supposeth, +but of the unbelieving Jews, who thought much at +that grace and favour which God was pleased to +vouchsafe unto the Gentiles, to acknowledge them +for his people, which honour they would have appropriated +to the posterity of Abraham. And the +apostle’s answer is not only drawn from the sovereign +dominion of God, to impart his grace to +whom he pleaseth, as hath been shewed already, +but also from the obstinacy and proper fault of the +Jews, as appeareth verse 22: <em>What if God, willing</em> +(that is, by a consequent will) <em>to shew his wrath, +and to make his power known, endureth with much +long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction</em>. +They acted, God endured; they were +tolerated by God, but fitted to destruction by themselves; +for their much wrong-doing, here is God’s +<em>much long-suffering</em>. And more plainly, verse 31, +32: <em>Israel hath not attained to the law of righteousness. +Wherefore? Because they sought it not +by faith, but as it were by the works of the law.</em> +This reason is set down yet more emphatically in +the next chapter (Rom. x. 3): <em>They</em> (that is, the +Israelites) <em>being ignorant of God’s righteousness</em>, +(that is, by faith in Christ), <em>and going about to establish +their own righteousness</em>, (that is, by the +works of the law), <em>have not submitted themselves +unto the righteousness of God</em>. And yet most expressly +(chap. xi. 20): <em>Because of unbelief they were +<span class='pageno' id='Page_132'>132</span>broken off, but thou standest by faith</em>. Neither +was there any precedent binding decree of God, to +necessitate them to unbelief, and consequently to +punishment. It was in their own power by their +concurrence with God’s grace to prevent these +judgments, and to recover their former estate; +verse 23: <em>If they</em> (that is, the unbelieving Jews) +<em>abide not still in unbelief they shall be grafted +in</em>. The crown and the sword are immovable, (to +use St. Anselm’s comparison), but it is we that +move and change places. Sometimes the Jews +were under the crown, and the Gentiles under the +sword; sometimes the Jews under the sword, and +the Gentiles under the crown.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Thirdly, though I confess that human pacts +are not the measure of God’s justice, but his justice +is his own immutable will, whereby he is ready +to give every man that which is his own, as rewards +to the good, punishments to the bad; so +nevertheless God may oblige himself freely to his +creature. He made the covenant of works with +mankind in Adam; and therefore he punisheth not +man contrary to his own covenant, but for the +transgression of his duty. And divine justice is +not measured by omnipotence or by irresistible +power, but by God’s will. God can do many things +according to his absolute power, which he doth not. +He could raise up children to Abraham of stones, +but he never did so. It is a rule in theology, that +God cannot do anything which argues any wickedness +or imperfection: as God cannot deny himself +(2 Timothy ii. 13); he cannot lie (Titus i. 2). +These and the like are the fruits of impotence, not +of power. So God cannot destroy the righteous +<span class='pageno' id='Page_133'>133</span>with the wicked (Genesis xviii. 25.) He could +not destroy Sodom whilst Lot was in it, (Genesis +xix. 22); not for want of dominion or power, but +because it was not agreeable to his justice, nor to +that law which himself had constituted. The +apostle saith (Hebrews vi. 10), <em>God is not unrighteous +to forget your work</em>. As it is a good +consequence to say, this is from God, therefore it +is righteous; so is this also, this thing is unrighteous, +therefore it cannot proceed from God. We +see how all creatures by instinct of nature do love +their young, as the hen her chickens; how they +will expose themselves to death for them. And +yet all these are but shadows of that love which +is in God towards his creatures. How impious is +it then to conceive, that God did create so many +millions of souls to be tormented eternally in hell, +without any fault of theirs except such as he himself +did necessitate them unto, merely to shew his +dominion, and because his power is irresistible? +The same privilege which T. H. appropriates here +to power absolutely irresistible, a friend of his, +in his book <span lang="la"><cite>De Cive</cite></span>, cap. <span class='fss'>VI.</span>, ascribes to power +respectively irresistible, or to sovereign magistrates, +whose power he makes to be as absolute as a man’s +power is over himself; not to be limited by any +thing, but only by their strength. The greatest +propugners of sovereign power think it enough for +princes to challenge an immunity from coercive +power, but acknowledge that the law hath a directive +power over them. But T. H. will have +no limits but their strength. Whatsoever they do +by power, they do justly.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“But, saith he, God objected no sin to Job, but +<span class='pageno' id='Page_134'>134</span>justified his afflicting him by his power. First, +this is an argument from authority negatively, that +is to say, worth nothing. Secondly, the afflictions +of Job were no vindicatory punishments to take +vengeance of his sins, (whereof we dispute), but +probatory chastisements to make trial of his graces. +Thirdly, Job was not so pure, but that God might +justly have laid greater punishments upon him, +than those afflictions which he suffered. Witness +his impatience, even to the cursing of the day of +his nativity (Job iii. 3). Indeed God said to Job, +(Job xxxviii. 4): <em>Where wast thou, when I laid +the foundations of the earth?</em> that is, how canst +thou judge of the things that were done before +thou wast born, or comprehend the secret causes +of my judgments? And (Job xl. 9): <em>Hast thou +an arm like God?</em> As if he should say, why art +thou impatient; dost thou think thyself able to +strive with God? But that God should punish Job +without desert, here is not a word.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Concerning the blind man mentioned John ix, +his blindness was rather a blessing to him than +a punishment, being the means to raise his soul +illuminated, and to bring him to see the face of +God in Jesus Christ. The sight of the body is +common to us with ants and flies, but the sight of +the soul with the blessed angels. We read of +some who have put out their bodily eyes, because +they thought they were an impediment to the eye +of the soul. Again, neither he nor his parents +were innocent, being conceived and born in sin +and iniquity (Psalm li. 5). And in many things +we offend all (James iii. 2). But our Saviour’s +meaning is evident by the disciples’ question, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_135'>135</span>John ix. 2. They had not so sinned, that he should +be born blind; or they were not more grievous +sinners than other men, to deserve an exemplary +judgment more than they; but this corporal blindness +befel him principally by the extraordinary +providence of God, for the manifestation of his +own glory in restoring him to his sight. So his +instance halts on both sides; neither was this a +punishment, nor the blind man free from sin. His +third instance of the death and torments of beasts, +is of no more weight than the two former. The +death of brute beasts is not a punishment of sin, +but a debt of nature. And though they be often +slaughtered for the use of man, yet there is a vast +difference between those light and momentary +pangs, and the unsufferable and endless pains of +hell; between the mere depriving of a creature of +temporal life, and the subjecting of it to eternal +death. I know the philosophical speculations of +some, who affirm, that entity is better than non-entity, +that it is better to be miserable and suffer +the torments of the damned, than to be annihilated +and cease to be altogether. This entity which +they speak of, is a metaphysical entity abstracted +from the matter, which is better than non-entity, +in respect of some goodness, not moral nor natural, +but transcendental, which accompanies every being. +But in the concrete it is far otherwise, where that +saying of our Saviour often takes place, (Matthew +xxvi. 24): <em>Woe unto that man by whom the Son of +Man is betrayed. It had been good for that man, +that he had not been born.</em> I add, that there is +an analogical justice and mercy due even to the +brute beasts. <em>Thou shalt not muzzle the mouth of +<span class='pageno' id='Page_136'>136</span>the ox that treadeth out the corn.</em> And, <em>a just man +is merciful to his beast</em>.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>f</i>) “But his greatest error is that which I +touched before, to make justice to be the proper +result of power. Power doth not measure and regulate +justice, but justice measures and regulates +power. The will of God, and the eternal law +which is in God himself, is properly the rule and +measure of justice. As all goodness, whether natural +or moral, is a participation of divine goodness, +and all created rectitude is but a participation +of divine rectitude, so all laws are but participations +of the eternal law from whence they derive +their power. The rule of justice then is the same +both in God and us: but it is in God, as in him +that doth regulate and measure; in us, as in those +who are regulated and measured. As the will of +God is immutable, always willing what is just and +right and good; so his justice likewise is immutable. +And that individual action which is justly +punished as sinful in us, cannot possibly proceed +from the special influence and determinative power +of a just cause. See then how grossly T. H. doth +understand that old and true principle, that the +will of God is the rule of justice; as if by willing +things in themselves unjust, he did render them +just by reason of his absolute dominion and irresistible +power, as fire doth assimilate other things +to itself, and convert them into the nature of fire. +This were to make the eternal law a Lesbian rule. +Sin is defined to be that which is done, or said, +or thought, contrary to the eternal law. But by +this doctrine nothing is done, nor said, nor thought, +contrary to the will of God. St. Anselm said most +<span class='pageno' id='Page_137'>137</span>truly, ‘then the will of man is good, and just, and +right, when he wills that which God would have +him to <a id='corr137.3'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='will.'>will.’</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_137.3'><ins class='correction' title='will.'>will.’</ins></a></span> But according to this doctrine, every +man always wills that which God would have him +to will. If this be true, we need not pray, <em>Thy +will be done in earth as it is in heaven</em>. T. H. +hath devised a new kind of heaven upon earth. +The worst is, it is an heaven without justice. Justice +is a constant and perpetual act of the will, +to give every one his own; but to inflict punishment +for those things which the judge himself did +determine and necessitate to be done, is not to +give every one his own; right punitive justice is a +relation of equality and proportion between the +demerit and the punishment. But supposing this +opinion of absolute and universal necessity, there +is no demerit in the world. We use to say, that +right springs from law and fact; as in this syllogism, +every thief ought to be punished, there is +the law; but such an one is a thief, there is the +fact; therefore he ought to be punished, there is +the right. But this opinion of T. H. grounds the +right to be punished, neither upon law, nor upon +fact, but upon the irresistible power of God. Yea, +it overturneth, as much as in it lies, all law; first, +the eternal law, which is the ordination of divine +wisdom, by which all creatures are directed to +that end which is convenient for them, that is, +not to necessitate them to eternal flames; then +the law participated, which is the ordination of +right reason, instituted for the common good, to +show unto man what he ought to do, and what he +ought not to do. To what purpose is it, to show +the right way to him who is drawn and haled a +<span class='pageno' id='Page_138'>138</span>contrary way by adamantine bonds of inevitable +necessity?</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>g</i>) “Lastly, howsoever T. H. cries out, that +God cannot sin, yet in truth he makes him to be +the principal and most proper cause of all sin. +For he makes him to be the cause, not only of the +law and of the action, but even of the irregularity +itself, and the difference between the action +and the law, wherein the very essence of sin doth +consist. He makes God to determine David’s will, +and necessitate him to kill Uriah. In causes physically +and essentially subordinate, the cause of +the cause is evermore the cause of the effect. +These are those deadly fruits which spring from +the poisonous root of the absolute necessity of all +things; which T. H. seeing, and that neither the +sins of Esau, nor Pharaoh, nor any wicked person +do proceed from the operative, but from the permissive +will of God, and that punishment is an act +of justice, not of dominion only, I hope that according +to his promise he will change his opinion.</p> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c000'> + <div><span class='fss'>ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. XII.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c001'>The Bishop had argued in this manner: “If there +be no liberty, there shall be no last judgment, no +rewards nor punishments after death.” To this +I answered, that though God cannot sin, because +what he doth, his doing maketh just, and because +he is not subject to another’s law, and that therefore +it is blasphemy to say that God can sin; yet +to say, that God hath so ordered the world that sin +may be necessarily committed, is not blasphemy. +And I can also further say, though God be the +cause of all motion and of all actions, and therefore +<span class='pageno' id='Page_139'>139</span>unless sin be no motion nor action, it must derive a +necessity from the first mover; nevertheless it cannot +be said that God is the author of sin, because +not he that necessitateth an action, but he that +doth command and warrant it, is the author. And +if God own an action, though otherwise it were a +sin, it is now no sin. The act of the Israelites +in robbing the Egyptians of their jewels, without +God’s warrant had been theft. But it was neither +theft, cozenage, nor sin; supposing they knew the +warrant was from God. The rest of my answer to +that inconvenience, was an opposing to his inconveniences +the manifest texts of St. Paul, Rom. ix. +The substance of his reply to my answer is this.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>a</i>) “Though punishment were an act of dominion, +not of justice, in God; yet this is no sufficient +cause why God should deny his own act, or +why he should chide or expostulate with men, +why they did that which he himself did necessitate +them to do.”</p> + +<p class='c001'>I never said that God denied his act, but that +he may expostulate with men; and this may be +(I shall never say directly, it is) the reason of that +his expostulation, viz. to convince them that their +wills were not independent, but were his mere +gift; and that to do, or not to do, is not in him +that willeth, but in God that hath mercy on, or +hardeneth whom he will. But the Bishop interpreteth +<em>hardening</em> to be a permission of God. +Which is to attribute to God in such actions no +more than he might have attributed to any of +Pharaoh’s servants, the not persuading their master +to let the people go. And whereas he compares +this permission to the indulgence of a parent, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_140'>140</span>that by his patience encourageth his son to +become more rebellious, which indulgence is a +sin; he maketh God to be like a sinful man. And +indeed it seemeth that all they that hold this +freedom of the will, conceive of God no otherwise +than the common sort of Jews did, that God was +like a man, that he had been seen by Moses, and +after by the seventy elders (Exod. xxiv. 10); expounding +that and other places literally. Again +he saith, that God is said to harden the heart <em>permissively</em>, +but not <em>operatively</em>; which is the same +distinction with his first, namely <em>negatively</em>, not +<em>positively</em>, and with his second, <em>occasionally</em>, and +not <em>causally</em>. So that all his three ways how God +hardens the heart of wicked men, come to this +one of <em>permission</em>; which is as much as to say, +God sees, looks on, and does nothing, nor ever +did anything, in the business. Thus you see how +the Bishop expoundeth St. Paul. Therefore I will +leave the rest of his commentary upon Rom. ix. +to the judgment of the reader, to think of the +same as he pleaseth.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “Yet I do acknowledge that which T. H. +saith, ‘that he who doth permit anything to be +done, which it is in his power to hinder, knowing +that if he do not hinder it, it will be done, doth in +some sort will it;’ I say in some sort, that is either +by an antecedent will, or by a consequent will; +either by an operative will, or by a permissive +will; or he is willing to let it be done, but not +willing to do it.”</p> + +<p class='c001'>Whether it be called antecedent, or consequent, +or operative, or permissive, it is enough for the +necessity of the thing that the heart of Pharaoh +<span class='pageno' id='Page_141'>141</span>should be hardened; and if God were not willing +to do it, I cannot conceive how it could be done +without him.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>c</i>) “T. H. demands how God should be the +cause of the action, and yet not be the cause of +the irregularity of the action? I answer, because +he concurs to the doing of evil by a general, but +not by a special, influence.”</p> + +<p class='c001'>I had thought to pass over this place, because +of the nonsense of general and special influence. +Seeing he saith that God concurs to the doing of +evil, I desire the reader would take notice, that +if he blame me for speaking of God as of a necessitating +cause, and as it were a principal agent in +the causing of all actions, he may with as good +reason blame himself for making him by concurrence +an accessory to the same. And indeed, let +men hold what they will contrary to the truth, +if they write much, the truth will fall into their +pens. But he thinks he hath a similitude, which +will make this permissive will a very clear business. +“The earth,” saith he, “gives nourishment +to all kinds of plants, as well to hemlock as to +wheat; but the reason why the one yields food to +our sustenance, the other poison to our destruction, +is not from the general nourishment of the earth, +but from the special quality of the root.” It seemeth +by this similitude, he thinketh, that God doth, +not operatively, but permissively will that the root +of hemlock should poison the man that eateth +it, but that wheat should nourish him he willeth +operatively; which is very absurd; or else he must +confess that the venomous effects of wicked men +are willed operatively.</p> + +<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_142'>142</span>(<i>d</i>) <a id='corr142.1'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='Wherefore'>“Wherefore</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_142.1'><ins class='correction' title='Wherefore'>“Wherefore</ins></a></span> T. H. is mightily mistaken, to +make the particular and determinate act of killing +Uriah to be from God. The general power to act, +is from God; but the specification of this general +and good power, to murder, or to any particular +evil, is not from God, but from the free will of +man.”</p> + +<p class='c001'>But why am I so mightily mistaken? Did not +God foreknow that Uriah in particular, should be +murdered by David in particular? And what God +foreknoweth shall come to pass, can that possibly +not come so to pass? And that which cannot possibly +not come to pass, doth not that necessarily +come to pass? And is not all necessity from God? +I cannot see this great mistake. “The general +power,” saith he, “to act is from God, but the +specification to do this act upon Uriah, is not from +God, but from free-will.” Very learnedly. As if +there were a power that were not the power to do +some particular act; or a power to kill, and yet to +kill nobody in particular. If the power be to kill, +it is to kill that which shall be by that power +killed, whether it be Uriah or any other; and the +giving of that power, is the application of it to the +act; nor doth power signify anything actually, but +those motions and present acts from which the act +that is not now, but shall be hereafter, necessarily +proceedeth. And therefore this argument is much +like that which used heretofore to be brought for +the defence of the divine right of the bishops to +the ordination of ministers. They derive not, say +they, the right of ordination from the civil sovereign, +but from Christ immediately. And yet they +acknowledge that it is unlawful for them to ordain, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_143'>143</span>if the civil power do forbid them. But how +have they right to ordain, when they cannot do it +lawfully? Their answer is, they have the right, +though they may not exercise it; as if the right +to ordain, and the right to exercise ordination, +were not the same thing. And as they answer +concerning right, which is legal power, so the +Bishop answereth concerning natural power, that +David had a general power to kill Uriah from +God, but not a power of applying this power in +special to the killing of Uriah from God, but from +his own free will; that is, he had a power to kill +Uriah, but not to exercise it upon Uriah, that is to +say, he had a power to kill him, but not to kill +him, which is absurd.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>e</i>) “But if the case be put why God doth punish +one more than another, or why he throws one +into hell fire, and not another, which is the present +case between us; to say with T. H., that it is +because God is omnipotent, or because his power +is irresistible, or merely because it is his pleasure, +is not only not warranted, but is plainly condemned +by St. Paul in this place.”</p> + +<p class='c001'>I note first, that he hath no reason to say, the +case agitated between us is, whether the cause +why God punisheth one man more than another, be +his irresistible power, or man’s sin. The case +agitated between us is, whether a man can now +choose what shall be his <em>will</em> anon, or at any time +hereafter. Again, it is not true that he says, it is +my opinion that the irresistible power of God is +the cause why he punisheth one more than another. +I say only that when he doth so, the irresistible +power is enough to make it not unjust. But that +<span class='pageno' id='Page_144'>144</span>the cause why God punisheth one more than another, +is many times the will he hath to show his +power, is affirmed in this place by St. Paul, <em>Shall +the thing formed, say to him that formed it</em>, &c. +And by our Saviour in the case of him that was +born blind, where he saith, <em>Neither hath this man +sinned nor his parents; but that the works of +God may be made manifest</em>. And by the expostulation +of God with Job. This endeavour of his to +bring the text of St. Paul to his purpose, is not +only frustrate, but the cause of many insignificant +phrases in his discourse; as this: “It was in their +own power, by their concurrence with God’s grace, +to prevent these judgments, and to recover their +former estates,” which is as good sense, as if he +should say, that it is in his own power, with the +concurrence of the sovereign power of England, +to be what he will. And this, that “God may +oblige himself freely to his creature.” For he that +can oblige, can also, when he will, release; and he +that can release himself when he will, is not +obliged. Besides this, he is driven to words ill-becoming +him that is to speak of God Almighty; for +he makes him unable to do that which hath been +within the ordinary power of men to do. “God,” +he saith, “cannot destroy the righteous with the +wicked;” which nevertheless is a thing ordinarily +done by armies: and “He could not destroy Sodom +while Lot was in it;” which he interpreteth, as if +he could not do it lawfully. One text is Genesis +xviii. 23, 24, 25. There is not a word that God +could not destroy the righteous with the wicked. +Only Abraham saith (as a man): <em>Shall not the Judge +of all the earth do right?</em> Another is Genesis +<span class='pageno' id='Page_145'>145</span><a id='corr145.1'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='xix.'>22)</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_145.1'><ins class='correction' title='xix.'>22)</ins></a></span>: <em>Haste thee, escape thither; for I +cannot do any thing till thou be come thither</em>. +Which is an ordinary phrase, in such a case where +God had determined to burn the city and save a +particular man, and signifieth not any obligation to +save Lot more than the rest. Likewise concerning +Job, who, expostulating with God, was answered +only with the explication of the infinite +power of God, the Bishop answereth, that there is +never a word of Job’s being punished without desert; +which answer is impertinent. For I say not +that he was punished without desert, but that it +was not for his desert that he was afflicted; for +punished, he was not at all.</p> + +<p class='c001'>And concerning the blind man, (John ix.), who +was born blind, that the power of God might be +shewn in him; he answers that it was not a punishment, +but a blessing. I did not say it was a +punishment; certainly it was an affliction. How +then doth he call it a blessing? Reasonably enough: +“because,” saith he, “it was the means to raise his +soul illuminated, and to bring him to see the face +of God in Jesus Christ. The sight of the body is +common to us with ants and flies, but the sight of +the soul, with the blessed angels.” This is very +well said; for no man doubts but some afflictions +may be blessings; but I doubt whether the Bishop, +that says he reads of some who have put out their +bodily eyes, because they thought they were an impediment +to the eye of the soul, think that they +did well. To that where I say that brute beasts +are afflicted which cannot sin, he answereth, that +“there is a vast difference between those light and +momentary pangs, and the unsufferable and endless +<span class='pageno' id='Page_146'>146</span>pains of hell.” As if the length or the greatness +of the pain, made any difference in the justice or +injustice of the inflicting it.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>f</i>) “But his greatest error is that which I +touched before, to make justice to be the proper +result of power.”</p> + +<p class='c001'>He would make men believe, I hold all things to +be just, that are done by them who have power +enough to avoid the punishment. This is one of +his pretty little policies, by which I find him in +many occasions to take the measure of his own +wisdom. I said no more, but that the power, which +is absolutely irresistible, makes him that hath it +above all law, so that nothing he doth can be unjust. +But this power can be no other than the +power divine. Therefore let him preach what he +will upon his mistaken text, I shall leave it to the +reader to consider of it, without any further answer.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>g</i>) “Lastly, howsoever T. H. cries out that +God cannot sin, yet in truth he makes him to be +the principal and most proper cause of all sin. For +he makes him to be the cause not only of the +law, and of the action, but even of the irregularity +itself, &c. wherein the very essence of sin doth +consist.”</p> + +<p class='c001'>I think there is no man but understands, no, +not the Bishop himself, but that where two things +are compared, the similitude or dissimilitude, regularity +or irregularity, that is between them, is made +in and by the making of the things themselves that +are compared. The Bishop, therefore, that denies +God to be the cause of the irregularity, denies him +to be the cause both of the law and of the action. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_147'>147</span>So that by his doctrine, there shall be a good law +whereof God shall be no cause, and an action, that +is, a local motion that shall depend upon another +first mover that is not God. The rest of this +number is but railing.</p> + +<h3 id='XIII' class='c002'><span class='fss'>PROOFS OF LIBERTY DRAWN FROM REASON. NO. XIII.</span></h3> + +<div class='c000'></div> +<div class='sidenote'>The Bishop’s reply.</div> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “The first argument is <span lang="la"><i>Herculeum</i></span> or +<span lang="la"><i>baculinum</i></span>, drawn from that pleasant passage between +Zeno and his man. The servant had committed +some petty larceny, and the master was +cudgelling him well for it. The servant thinks to +creep under his master’s blind side, and pleads for +himself that ‘the necessity of destiny did compel +him to steal.’ The master answers, ‘the same +necessity of destiny compels me to beat thee.’ +He that denies liberty, is fitter to be refuted with +rods than with arguments, until he confess that it +is free for him that beats him, either to continue +striking, or to give over, that is, to have true +liberty.”</p> + +<p class='c001'><i>T. H.</i> Of the arguments from reason, the first +is that which he saith is drawn from Zeno’s beating +of his man, which is therefore called <span lang="la"><i>argumentum +baculinum</i></span>, that is to say, a wooden argument. +The story is this. Zeno held that all +actions were necessary. His man therefore, being +for some fault beaten, excused himself upon +the necessity of it. To avoid this excuse, his master +pleaded likewise the necessity of beating him. +So that not he that maintained, but he that derided +the necessity of things, was beaten; contrary +to that he would infer; and the argument was +rather withdrawn, than drawn, from the story.</p> + +<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_148'>148</span><i>J. D.</i> “Whether the argument be withdrawn +from the story, or the answer withdrawn from the +argument, let the reader judge. T. H. mistakes +the scope of the reason, the strength whereof doth +not lie, neither in the authority of Zeno, a rigid +Stoic, which is not worth a button in this cause; +nor in the servant’s being an adversary to stoical +necessity. For it appears not out of the story, +that the servant did deride necessity, but rather +that he pleaded it in good earnest for his own +justification. Now in the success of the fray, we +were told even now, that no power doth justify an +action, but only that which is irresistible. Such +was not Zeno’s. And therefore it advantageth +neither of their causes, neither that of Zeno, nor +this of T. H. What if the servant had taken the +staff out of his master’s hand, and beaten him +soundly, would not the same argument have served +the man as well as it did the master, that the necessity +of destiny did compel him to strike again? +Had not Zeno smarted justly for his paradox? +And might not the spectators well have taken up +the judge’s apothegm, concerning the dispute between +Corax and his scholar, ‘an ill egg of an ill +bird’? But the strength of this argument lies +<em>partly</em> in the ignorance of Zeno, that great champion +of necessity, and the beggarliness of his +cause, which admitted no defence but with a +cudgel. No man, saith the servant, ought to be +beaten for doing that which he is compelled inevitably +to do: but I am compelled inevitably to steal. +The major is so evident, that it cannot be denied. +If a strong man shall take a weak man’s hand per +force, and do violence with it to a third person, he +whose hand is forced, is innocent, and he only culpable +<span class='pageno' id='Page_149'>149</span>who compelled him. The minor was Zeno’s +own doctrine; what answer made the great patron +of destiny to his servant? very learnedly he denied +the conclusion, and cudgelled his servant; +telling him in effect, that though there was no +reason why he should be beaten, yet there was a +necessity why he must be beaten. And <em>partly</em> in +the evident absurdity of such an opinion, which +deserves not to be confuted with reasons, but with +rods. There are four things, said the philosopher, +which ought not to be called into question. First, +such things whereof it is wickedness to doubt; as +whether the soul be immortal, whether there be a +God, such an one should not be confuted with +reasons, but cast into the sea with a mill-stone +about his neck, as unworthy to breathe the air, or +to behold the light. Secondly, such things as are +above the capacity of reason; as among Christians, +the mystery of the Holy Trinity. Thirdly, such +principles as are evidently true; as that two and +two are four, in arithmetic; that the whole is +greater than the part, in logic. Fourthly, such +things as are obvious to the senses; as whether +the snow be white. He who denied the heat of +the fire, was justly sentenced to be scorched with +fire; and he that denied motion, to be beaten until +he recanted. So he who denies all liberty from +necessitation, should be scourged until he become +an humble suppliant to him that whips him, and +confess that he hath power, either to strike, or to +hold his hand.”</p> + +<p class='c001'><i>T. H.</i> In this Number <span class='fss'>XIII.</span> which is about Zeno +and his man, there is contained nothing necessary +to the instruction of the reader. Therefore I pass +it over.</p> + +<div> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_150'>150</span> + <h3 id='XIV' class='c002'>NO. XIV.</h3> +</div> + +<div class='c000'></div> +<div class='sidenote'>The Bishop’s reply.</div> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “Secondly, this very persuasion that there +is no true liberty, is able to overthrow all societies +and commonwealths in the world. The laws are +unjust, which prohibit that which a man cannot +possibly shun. All consultations are vain, if every +thing be either necessary or impossible. Who +ever deliberated whether the sun should rise to-morrow, +or whether he should sail over mountains? +It is to no more purpose to admonish men +of understanding than fools, children, or madmen, +if all things be necessary. Praises and dispraises, +rewards and punishments, are as vain as they are +undeserved, if there be no liberty. All counsels, +arts, arms, books, instruments, are superfluous and +foolish, if there be no liberty. In vain we labour, +in vain we study, in vain we take physic, in vain +we have tutors to instruct us, if all things come to +pass alike, whether we sleep or wake, whether we +be idle or industrious, by unalterable necessity. +But it is said, that though future events be certain, +yet they are unknown to us: and therefore we +prohibit, deliberate, admonish, praise, dispraise, reward, +punish, study, labour, and use means. Alas! +how should our not knowing of the event, be a sufficient +motive to us to use the means, so long as we +believe the event is already certainly determined, +and can no more be changed by all our endeavours, +than we can stay the course of heaven with +our finger, or add a cubit to our stature? Suppose +it be unknown, yet it is certain. We cannot +hope to alter the course of things by our labours; +let the necessary causes do their work, we have no +<span class='pageno' id='Page_151'>151</span>remedy but patience, and shrug up the shoulders. +Either allow liberty, or destroy all societies.”</p> + +<p class='c001'><i>T. H.</i> The second argument is taken from certain +inconveniences which he thinks would follow +such an opinion. It is true that ill use may be +made of it, and therefore your Lordship and J. D. +ought, at my request, to keep private that I say +here of it. But the inconveniences are indeed +none; and what use soever be made of truth, yet +truth is truth; and now the question is, not what +is fit to be preached, but what is true. The first +inconvenience he says is this, that laws which prohibit +any action are then unjust. The second, that +all <a id='corr151.14'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='consult tions'>consultations</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_151.14'><ins class='correction' title='consult tions'>consultations</ins></a></span> are vain. The third, that admonitions +to men of understanding, are of no more use +than to fools, children, and madmen. The fourth, +that praise, dispraise, reward, and punishment, are +in vain. The fifth, that counsels, arts, arms, +books, instruments, study, tutors, medicines, are +in vain. To which argument, expecting I should +answer by saying, that the ignorance of the event +were enough to make us use means, he adds (as it +were a reply to my answer foreseen) these words: +“Alas, how should our not knowing of the event be +a sufficient motive to make us use the means?” +Wherein he saith right; but my answer is not that +which he expecteth. I answer,</p> + +<p class='c001'>First, that the necessity of an action doth not +make the law which prohibits it unjust. To let +pass, that not the necessity, but the will to break +the law, maketh the action unjust, because the law +regardeth the will, and no other precedent causes +of action; and to let pass, that no law can be +possibly unjust, in as much as every man makes, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_152'>152</span>by his consent, the law he is bound to keep, and +which, consequently, must be just, unless a man +can be unjust to himself: I say, what necessary +cause soever precedes an action, yet, if the action +be forbidden, he that doth it willingly, may +justly be punished. For instance, suppose the +law on pain of death prohibit stealing, and there +be a man who by the strength of temptation +is necessitated to steal, and is thereupon put +to death: does not this punishment deter others +from theft? Is it not a cause that others steal +not? Doth it not frame and make their will to +justice? To make the law is therefore to make +a cause of justice, and to necessitate justice; and +consequently it is no injustice to make such a law.</p> + +<p class='c001'>The institution of the law is not to grieve the +delinquent for that which is passed and not to be +undone; but to make him and others just, that else +would not be so: and respecteth not the evil act +past, but the good to come. Insomuch as without +this good intention of future, no past act of a +delinquent could justify his killing in the sight of +God. But, you will say, how is it just to kill one +man to amend another, if what was done were +necessary? To this I answer, that men are +justly killed, not for that their actions are not +necessitated, but that they are spared and preserved, +because they are not noxious; for where +there is no law, there no killing, nor any thing else +can be unjust. And by the right of nature we +destroy, without being unjust, all that is noxious, +both beasts and men. And for beasts, we kill them +justly, when we do it in order to our own preservation. +And yet J. D. confesseth, that their +<span class='pageno' id='Page_153'>153</span>actions, as being only spontaneous and not free, +are all necessitated and determined to that one +thing which they shall do. For men, when we +make societies or commonwealths, we lay down +our right to kill, excepting in certain cases, as +murder, theft, or other offensive actions. So that +the right which the commonwealth hath, to put a +man to death for crimes, is not created by the +law, but remains from the first right of nature, +which every man hath to preserve himself; for +the law doth not take that right away, in case of +criminals, who were by law excepted. Men are +not therefore put to death or punished, for that +their theft proceedeth from election; but because +it was noxious and contrary to men’s preservation, +and the punishment conducing to the preservation +of the rest: inasmuch as to punish those that +do voluntary hurt, and none else, frameth and +maketh men’s wills, such as men would have them. +And thus it is plain, that from the necessity of a +voluntary action cannot be inferred the injustice +of the law that forbiddeth it, or of the magistrate +that punisheth it.</p> + +<p class='c001'>Secondly, I deny that it makes consultations to +be in vain; it is the consultation that causeth a +man, and necessitateth him, to choose to do one +thing rather than another. So that unless a man +say that cause to be in vain, which necessitateth +the effect, he cannot infer the superfluousness of +consultation out of the necessity of the election +proceeding from it. But it seems he reasons thus: +If I must needs do this rather than that, then I +shall do this rather than that, though I consult not +at all; which is a false proposition, a false consequence, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_154'>154</span>and no better than this: If I shall live till +to-morrow, I shall live till to-morrow, though I +run myself through with a sword to-day. If +there be a necessity that an action shall be +done, or that any effect shall be brought to pass, +it does not therefore follow that there is nothing +necessarily required as a means to bring it to +pass. And therefore, when it is determined that +one thing shall be chosen before another, it is +determined also for what cause it shall be chosen; +which cause, for the most part, is deliberation or +consultation. And therefore consultation is not +in vain; and indeed the less in vain, by how much +the election is more necessitated.</p> + +<p class='c001'>The same answer is to be given to the third +supposed inconvenience; namely, that admonitions +are in vain; for admonitions are parts of consultations; +the admonitor being a counsellor, for the +time, to him that is admonished.</p> + +<p class='c001'>The fourth pretended inconvenience is, that +praise and dispraise, reward and punishment, will +be in vain. To which I answer, that for praise +and dispraise, they depend not at all on the necessity +of the action praised or dispraised. For, what +is it else to praise, but to say a thing is good? +Good, I say, for me, or for somebody else, or for +the state and commonwealth. And what is it to +say an action is good, but to say, it is as I would +wish, or as another would have it, or according to +the will of the state, that is to say, according to +law? Does J. D. think, that no action can please +me or him, or the commonwealth, that should +proceed from necessity?</p> + +<p class='c001'>Things may be therefore necessary and yet +<span class='pageno' id='Page_155'>155</span>praiseworthy, as also necessary and yet dispraised, +and neither of both in vain; because praise and +dispraise, and likewise reward and punishment, do +by example make and conform the will to good or +evil. It was a very great praise, in my opinion, that +Velleius Paterculus gives Cato, where he says, he +was good by nature, <span lang="la"><i>et quia aliter esse non potuit</i></span>.</p> + +<p class='c001'>To his fifth and sixth inconvenience, that counsels, +arts, arms, books, instruments, study, medicines, +and the like, would be superfluous, the same +answer serves that to the former; that is to say, +that this consequence, if the effect shall necessarily +come to pass, then it shall come to pass without +its cause, is a false one. And those things named, +counsels, arts, arms, &c., are the causes of those +effects.</p> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “Nothing is more familiar with T. H. +than to decline an argument. But I will put it +into form for him. (<i>a</i>) The first inconvenience +is thus pressed. Those laws are unjust and tyrannical, +which do prescribe things absolutely impossible +in themselves to be done, and punish men for +not doing of them. But supposing T. H’s opinion +of the necessity of all things to be true, all laws do +prescribe absolute impossibilities to be done, and +punish men for not doing of them. The former +proposition is so clear that it cannot be denied. +Just laws are the ordinances of right reason; +but those laws which prescribe absolute impossibilities, +are not the ordinances of right reason. +Just laws are instituted for the public good; but +those laws which prescribe absolute impossibilities, +are not instituted for the public <a id='corr155.33'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='good,'>good.</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_155.33'><ins class='correction' title='good,'>good.</ins></a></span> Just laws +do show unto a man what is to be done, and what +<span class='pageno' id='Page_156'>156</span>is to be shunned; but those laws which prescribe +impossibilities, do not direct a man what he is to +do, and what he is to shun. The minor is as evident. +For if his opinion be true, all actions, all +transgressions are determined antecedently inevitably +to be done by a natural and necessary flux of +extrinsical causes. Yea, even the will of man, +and the reason itself is thus determined. And +therefore whatsoever laws do prescribe any thing +to be done, which is not done, or to be left undone +which is done, do prescribe absolute impossibilities, +and punish men for not doing of impossibilities. +In all his answer there is not one word to this +argument, but only to the conclusion. He saith, +that ‘not the necessity, but the will to break the +law makes the action unjust.’ I ask what makes +the will to break the law; is it not his necessity? +What gets he by this? A perverse will causeth +injustice, and necessity causeth a perverse will. +He saith, ‘the law regardeth the will, but not the +precedent causes of action.’ To what proposition, +to what term is this answer? He neither denies nor +distinguisheth. First, the question here is not +what makes actions to be unjust, but what makes +laws to be unjust. So his answer is impertinent. +It is likewise untrue. For first, that will which the +law regards, is not such a will as T. H. imagineth. +It is a free will, not a determined necessitated +will; a rational will, not a brutish will. Secondly, +the law doth look upon precedent causes, as well +as the voluntariness of the action. If a child, +before he be seven years old or have the use of +reason, in some childish quarrel do willingly stab +another, whereof we have seen experience, yet the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_157'>157</span>law looks not upon it as an act of murder; because +there wanted a power to deliberate, and consequently +true liberty. Manslaughter may be as +voluntary as murder, and commonly more voluntary; +because being done in hot blood there is the +less reluctation. Yet the law considers, that the +former is done out of some sudden passion without +serious deliberation, and the other out of prepensed +malice and desire of revenge; and therefore condemns +murder, as more wilful and more punishable +than manslaughter.”</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “He saith, ‘that no law can possibly be unjust;’ +and I say, that this is to deny the conclusion, +which deserves no reply. But to give him +satisfaction, I will follow him in this also, if he +intended no more but that unjust laws are not +genuine laws, nor bind to active obedience, because +they are not the ordinations of right reason, +not instituted for the common good, nor prescribe +that which ought to be done; he said truly, but +nothing at all to his purpose. But if he intend, +as he doth, that there are no laws <span lang="la"><i>de facto</i></span>, which +are the ordinances of reason erring, instituted for +the common hurt, and prescribing that which +ought not to be done, he is much mistaken. Pharaoh’s +law, to drown the male children of the +Israelites (Exod. i. 22); Nebuchadnezzar’s law, +that whosoever did not fall down and worship the +golden image which he had set up, should be cast +into the fiery furnace (Dan. iii. 4-6); Darius’s law, +that whosoever should ask a petition of any God +or man for thirty days, save of the king, should +be cast into the den of lions (Dan. vi. 7); Ahasuerus’s +law, to destroy the Jewish nation, root and +<span class='pageno' id='Page_158'>158</span>branch (Esther iii. 13); the Pharisees’ law, that +whosoever confesseth Christ, should be excommunicated +(John ix. 22); were all unjust laws.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>c</i>) “The ground of this error is as great an +error itself (such an art he hath learned of repacking +paradoxes); which is this, ‘that every man +makes by his consent the law which he is bound +to keep.’ If this were true, it would preserve +them, if not from being unjust, yet from being +injurious. But it is not true. The positive law of +God, contained in the Old and New Testament; +the law of nature, written in our hearts by the +finger of God; the laws of conquerors, who come +in by the power of the sword; the laws of our +ancestors, which were made before we were born; +do all oblige us to the observation of them; yet to +none of all these did we give our actual consent. +Over and above all these exceptions, he builds +upon a wrong foundation, that all magistrates at +first were elective. The first governors were fathers +of families; and when those petty princes +could not afford competent protection and security +to their subjects, many of them did resign +their several and respective interests into the +hands of one joint father of the country.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“And though his ground had been true, that +all first legislators were elective, which is false; +yet his superstructure fails: for it was done in +hope and trust that they would make just laws. +If magistrates abuse this trust, and deceive the +hopes of the people by making tyrannical laws, +yet it is without their consent. A precedent trust +doth not justify the subsequent errors and abuses +of a trustee. He who is duly elected a legislator, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_159'>159</span>may exercise his legislative power unduly. The +people’s implicit consent doth not render the tyrannical +laws of their legislators to be just.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>d</i>) “But his chiefest answer is, that ‘an action +forbidden, though it proceed from necessary +causes, yet if it were done willingly, it may be +justly punished;’ which, according to his custom, +he proves by an instance. ‘A man necessitated +to steal by the strength of temptation, yet if he +steal willingly, is justly put to death.’ Here are +two things, and both of them untrue.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“First, he fails in his assertion. Indeed we +suffer justly for those necessities, which we ourselves +have contracted by our own fault; but not +for extrinsical antecedent necessities, which were +imposed upon us without our fault. If that law +do not oblige to punishment, which is not intimated, +because the subject is invincibly ignorant +of it; how much less that law which prescribes +absolute impossibilities: unless perhaps invincible +necessity be not as strong a plea as invincible ignorance. +That which he adds, ‘if it were done +willingly,’ though it be of great moment, if it be +rightly understood, yet in his sense, that is, if a +man’s ‘will be not in his own disposition,’ and +‘if his willing do not come upon him according to +his will, nor according to anything else in his +power,’ it weighs not half so much as the least +feather in all his horse-load. For if that law be +unjust and tyrannical which commands a man to +do that which is impossible for him to do, then +that law is likewise unjust and tyrannical, which +commands him to will that which is impossible for +him to will.</p> + +<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_160'>160</span>“Secondly, his instance supposeth an untruth, +and is a plain begging of the question. No man +is extrinsically, antecedently, and irresistibly necessitated +by temptation to steal. The devil may +solicit us, but he cannot necessitate us. He hath +a faculty of persuading, but not a power of compelling. +<span lang="la"><i>Nos ignem habemus, spiritus flammam ciet</i></span>; +as Gregory Nazianzen, he blows the coals, but the +fire is our own. <span lang="la"><i>Mordet duntaxat sese in fauces +illius objicientem</i></span>; as St. Austin, he bites not, until +we thrust ourselves into his mouth. He may propose, +he may suggest, but he cannot move the +will effectively. <em>Resist the devil, and he will flee +from you</em> (James iv. 7). By faith we are able <em>to +quench all the fiery darts of the wicked</em> (Ephes. +vi. 16). And if Satan, who can both propose the +object, and choose out the fittest times and places +to work upon our frailties, and can suggest reasons, +yet cannot necessitate the will, (which is +most certain); then much less can outward objects +do it alone. They have no natural efficacy to determine +the will. Well may they be occasions, +but they cannot be causes of evil. The sensitive +appetite may engender a proclivity to steal, but +not a necessity to steal. And if it should produce +a kind of necessity, yet it is but moral, not natural; +hypothetical, not absolute; coexistent, not +antecedent from ourselves, nor extrinsical. This +necessity, or rather proclivity, was free in its +causes; we ourselves by our own negligence in not +opposing our passions when we should and might, +have freely given it a kind of dominion over us. +Admit that some sudden passions may and do extraordinarily +surprise us; and therefore we say, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_161'>161</span><span lang="la"><i>motus primo primi</i></span>, the first motions are not always +in our power, neither are they free: yet this +is but very rarely, and it is our own fault that +they do surprise us. Neither doth the law punish +the first motion to theft, but the advised act of +stealing. The intention makes the thief. But of +this more largely No. <a href='#XXV'><span class='fss'>XXV.</span></a></p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>e</i>) “He pleads moreover, ‘That the law is a +cause of justice,’ that ‘it frames the wills of men +to justice,’ and ‘that the punishment of one doth +conduce to the preservation of many.’ All this +is most true of a just law justly executed. But +this is no God-a-mercy to T. H.’s opinion of absolute +necessity. If all actions and all events +be predetermined naturally, necessarily, extrinsically, +how should the law frame men morally to +good actions? He leaves nothing for the law to +do, but either that which is done already, or that +which is impossible to be done. If a man be +chained to every individual act which he doth, +and from every act which he doth not, by indissolvable +bonds of inevitable necessity, how +should the law either deter him or frame him? If +a dog be chained fast to a post, the sight of a rod +cannot draw him from it. Make a thousand laws +that the fire shall not burn, yet it will burn. And +whatsoever men do, according to T. H., they do +it as necessarily as the fire burneth. Hang up a +thousand thieves, and if a man be determined +inevitably to steal, he must steal notwithstanding.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>f</i>) “He adds, that ‘the sufferings imposed by +the law upon delinquents, respect not the evil act +passed, but the good to come, and that the putting +of a delinquent to death by the magistrate for any +<span class='pageno' id='Page_162'>162</span>crime whatsoever, cannot be justified before God, +except there be a real intention to benefit others +by his example.’ The truth is, the punishing +of delinquents by law, respecteth both the evil +act passed and the good to come. The ground of +it, is the evil act passed, the scope or end of it, is +the good to come. The end without the ground +cannot justify the act. A bad intention may make +a good action bad; but a good intention cannot +make a bad action good. It is not lawful to do +evil that good may come of it, nor to punish an +innocent person for the admonition of others; that +is to fall into a certain crime for fear of an uncertain. +Again, though there were no other end of +penalties inflicted, neither probatory, nor castigatory, +nor exemplary, but only vindicatory, to +satisfy the law out of a zeal of justice by giving +to every one his own, yet the action is just and +warrantable. Killing, as it is considered in itself, +without all undue circumstances, was never prohibited +to the lawful magistrate, who is the vice-gerent +or lieutenant of God, from whom he derives +his power of life and death.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“T. H. hath one plea more. As a drowning +man catcheth at every bulrush, so he lays hold on +every pretence to save a desperate cause. But +first, it is worth our observation to see how oft he +changeth shapes in this one particular. (<i>g</i>) First, +he told us, that it was the irresistible power of God +that justifies all his actions, though he command +one thing openly, and plot another thing secretly, +though he be the cause not only of the action, but +also of the irregularity; though he both give man +power to act, and determine this power to evil as +<span class='pageno' id='Page_163'>163</span>well as good; though he punish the creatures, for +doing that which he himself did necessitate them +to do. But being pressed with reason, that this is +tyrannical, first to necessitate a man to do his will, +and then to punish him for doing of it, he leaves +this pretence in the plain field, and flies to a second; +that therefore a man is justly punished for that +which he was necessitated to do, because the act +was voluntary on his part. This hath more show of +reason than the former, if he did make the will of +man to be in his own disposition; but maintaining +that the will is irresistibly determined to will whatsoever +it doth will, the injustice and absurdity is the +same, first to necessitate a man to will, and then +to punish him for willing. The dog only bites the +stone which is thrown at him with a strange hand, +but they make the first cause to punish the instrument +for that which is his own proper act. Wherefore +not being satisfied with this, he casts it off +and flies to his third shift. ‘Men are not punished,’ +saith he, ‘therefore, because their theft proceeded +from election,’ (that is, because it was willingly +done, for to elect and will, saith he, are both one; +is not this to blow hot and cold with the same +breath?) ‘but because it was noxious and contrary +to men’s preservation.’ Thus far he saith true, that +every creature by the instinct of nature seeks to +preserve itself: cast water into a dusty place, and +it contracts itself into little globes, that is to preserve +itself. And those who are noxious in the +eye of the law, are justly punished by them to +whom the execution of the law is committed; +but the law accounts no persons noxious, but those +who are noxious by their own fault. It punisheth +<span class='pageno' id='Page_164'>164</span>not a thorn for pricking, because it is the nature +of the thorn, and it can do no otherwise, nor a +child, before it have the use of reason. If one should +take my hand perforce and give another a box on +the ear with it, my hand is noxious, but the law +punisheth the other who is faulty. And therefore +he hath reason to propose the question, ‘how it is +just to kill one man to amend another, if he who +killed did nothing but what he was necessitated to +do.’ He might as well demand, how it is lawful to +murder a company of innocent infants, to make a +bath of their lukewarm blood for curing the leprosy. +It had been a more rational way, first to +have demonstrated that it is so, and then to have +questioned why it is so. His assertion itself is but +a dream, and the reason which he gives of it why +it is so, is a dream of a dream.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“The sum of it is this; ‘that where there is no +law, there no killing or any thing else can be unjust; +that before the constitution of commonwealths, +every man had power to kill another, if +he conceived him to be hurtful to him; that at +the constitution of commonwealths, particular +men lay down this right in part, and in part reserve +it to themselves, as in case of theft or murder; +that the right which the commonwealth +hath to put a malefactor to death, is not created +by the law, but remaineth from the first right of +nature which every man hath to preserve himself; +that the killing of men in this case is as the +killing of beasts in order to our own preservation.’ +This may well be called stringing of paradoxes.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“But first, (<i>h</i>) there never was any such time +when mankind was without governors and laws, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_165'>165</span>and societies. Paternal government was in the +world from the beginning, and the law of nature. +There might be sometimes a root of such barbarous +thievish brigands, in some rocks or deserts, +or odd corners of the world; but it was an abuse +and a degeneration from the nature of man, who +is a political creature. This savage opinion reflects +too much upon the honour of mankind.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Secondly, there never was a time when it +was lawful, ordinarily, for private men to kill one +another for their own preservation. If God would +have had men live like wild beasts, as lions, bears, +or tigers, he would have armed them with horns, or +tusks, or talons, or pricks; but of all creatures +man is born most naked, without any weapon to +defend himself, because God had provided a +better means of security for him, that is, the +magistrate.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Thirdly, that right which private men have to +preserve themselves, though it be with the killing +of another, when they are set upon to be murdered +or robbed, is not a remainder or a reserve of some +greater power which they have resigned, but a +privilege which God hath given them, in case of +extreme danger and invincible necessity, that +when they cannot possibly have recourse to the +ordinary remedy, that is, the magistrate, every +man becomes a magistrate to himself.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Fourthly, nothing can give that which it never +had. The people, whilst they were a dispersed +rabble, (which in some odd cases might happen to +be), never had justly the power of life and death, +and therefore they could not give it by their +election. All that they do is to prepare the matter, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_166'>166</span>but it is God Almighty that infuseth the soul +of power.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Fifthly and lastly, I am sorry to hear a man +of reason and parts to compare the murdering of +men with the slaughtering of brute beasts. The +elements are for the plants, the plants for the +brute beasts, the brute beasts for man. When God +enlarged his former grant to man, and gave him +liberty to eat the flesh of his creatures for his sustenance, +(Gen. ix. 3), yet man is expressly excepted +(verse 6): <em>Whoso sheddeth man’s blood, +by man shall his blood be shed</em>. And the reason +is assigned, <em>for in the image of God made he man</em>. +Before sin entered into the world, or before any +creatures were hurtful or noxious to man, he had +dominion over them as their lord and master. +And though the possession of this sovereignty be +lost in part, for the sin of man, which made not +only the creatures to rebel, but also the inferior +faculties to rebel against the superior, from +whence it comes that one man is hurtful to +another; yet the dominion still remains. Wherein +we may observe how sweetly the providence of +God doth temper this cross; that though the +strongest creatures have withdrawn their obedience, +as lions and bears, to shew that man hath +lost the excellency of his dominion, and the +weakest creatures, as flies and gnats, to shew into +what a degree of contempt he is fallen; yet still +the most profitable and useful creatures, as sheep +and oxen, do in some degree retain their obedience.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>i</i>) “The next branch of his answer concerns +consultations, ‘which,’ saith he, ‘are not superfluous, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_167'>167</span>though all things come to pass necessarily, +because they are the cause which doth necessitate +the effect, and the means to bring it to pass.’ We +were told (No. <a href='#XI'><span class='fss'>XI.</span></a>) ‘that the last dictate of +right reason was but as the last feather which +breaks the horse’s back. It is well yet, that +reason hath gained some command again, and is +become at least a quarter-master. Certainly if +any thing under God have power to determine +the will, it is right reason. But I have shewed +sufficiently, that reason doth not determine the +will physically, nor absolutely, much less extrinsically, +and antecedently; and therefore it makes +nothing for that necessity which T. H. hath undertaken +to prove.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>k</i>) “He adds further, that ‘as the end is necessary, +so are the means; and when it is determined +that one thing shall be chosen before +another, it is determined also for what cause it +shall be so chosen.’ All which is truth, but not the +whole truth; for as God ordains means for all +ends, so he adapts and fits the means to their respective +ends, free means to free ends, contingent +means to contingent ends, necessary means to necessary +ends, whereas T. H. would have all means, +all ends, to be necessary. If God hath so ordered +the world, that a man ought to use, and may freely +use, those means of God, which he doth neglect, +not by virtue of God’s decree, but by his own +fault; if a man use those means of evil, which he +ought not to use, and which by God’s decree he +had power to forbear; if God have left to man in +part the free managery of human affairs, and to +that purpose hath endowed him with understanding: +<span class='pageno' id='Page_168'>168</span>then consultations are of use, then provident +care is needful, then it concerns him to use the +means. But if God have so ordered this world, +that a man cannot, if he would, neglect any means +of good, which by virtue of God’s decree it is possible +for him to use, and that he cannot possibly +use any means of evil, but those which are irresistibly +and inevitably imposed upon him by an +antecedent decree; then not only consultations are +vain, but that noble faculty of reason itself is vain. +Do we think that we can help God Almighty to do +his proper work? In vain we trouble ourselves, +in vain we take care to use those means, which +are not in our power to use, or not to use. And +this is that which was contained in my prolepsis +or prevention of his answer, though he be pleased +both to disorder it, and to silence it. We cannot +hope by our labours, to alter the course of things +set down by God; let him perform his decree, let +the necessary causes do their work. If we be +those causes, yet we are not in our own disposition; +we must do what we are ordained to do, and +more we cannot do. Man hath no remedy but +patience, and to shrug up the shoulders. This is +the doctrine that flows from this opinion of absolute +necessity. Let us suppose the great wheel of +the clock which sets all the little wheels going, +to be as the decree of God, and that the motion of +it were perpetually infallible from an intrinsical +principle, even as God’s decree is infallible, eternal, +all-sufficient. Let us suppose the lesser wheels +to be the second causes, and that they do as certainly +follow the motion of the great wheel, without +missing or swerving in the least degree, as the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_169'>169</span>second causes do pursue the determination of the +first cause. I desire to know in this case, what +cause there is to call a council of smiths, to consult +and order the motion of that which was ordered +and determined before to their hands? Are +men wiser than God? Yet all men know, that the +motion of the lesser wheels is a necessary means +to make the clock strike.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>l</i>) “But he tells me in great sadness, that ‘my +argument is just like this other; if I shall live till +to-morrow, I shall live till to-morrow, though I +run myself through with a sword to-day; which, +saith he, is a false consequence, and a false proposition.’ +Truly, if by running through, he understands +killing, it is a false, or rather a foolish +proposition, and implies a contradiction. To live +till to-morrow, and to die to-day, are inconsistent. +But by his favour, this is not my consequence, but +this is his own opinion. He would persuade us, +that it is absolutely necessary that a man shall live +till to-morrow, and yet that it is possible that he +may kill himself to-day. My argument is this: +if there be a liberty and possibility for a man to +kill himself to-day, then it is not absolutely necessary +that he shall live till to-morrow; but there is +such a liberty, therefore no such necessity. And +the consequence which I make here, is this: if it +be absolutely necessary, that a man shall live till +to-morrow, then it is vain and superfluous for him +to consult and deliberate whether he should die +to-day, or not. And this is a true consequence. +The ground of his mistake is this, that though it +be true, that a man may kill himself to-day, yet +upon the supposition of his absolute necessity, it is +<span class='pageno' id='Page_170'>170</span>impossible. Such heterogeneous arguments and +instances he produceth, which are half builded +upon our true grounds, and the other half upon +his false grounds.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>m</i>) “The next branch of my argument concerns +admonitions, to which he gives no new +answer, and therefore I need not make any new +reply, saving only to tell him, that he mistakes my +argument. I say not only, if all things be necessary, +then admonitions are in vain; but if all +things be necessary, then it is to no more purpose +to admonish men of understanding than fools, +children, or madmen. That they do admonish +the one and not the other, is confessedly true; +and no reason under heaven can be given for it +but this, that the former have the use of reason +and true liberty, with a dominion over their own +actions, which children, fools, and madmen have +not.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Concerning praise and dispraise, he enlargeth +himself. The scope of his discourse is, that ‘things +necessary may be praiseworthy.’ There is no doubt +of it; but withal their praise reflects upon the free +agent, as the praise of a statue reflects upon the +workman who made it. ‘To praise a thing,’ saith +he, ‘is to say it is good.’ (<i>n</i>) True, but this goodness +is not a metaphysical goodness; so the worst +of things, and whatsoever hath a being, is good: +nor a natural goodness; the praise of it passeth +wholly to the Author of nature; <em>God saw all that +he had made, and it was very good</em>: but a moral +goodness, or a goodness of actions rather than of +things. The moral goodness of an action is the +conformity of it with right reason. The moral +<span class='pageno' id='Page_171'>171</span>evil of an action is the deformity of it, and the +alienation of it from right reason. It is moral +praise and dispraise which we speak of here. To +praise anything morally, is to say, it is morally +good, that is, conformable to right reason. The +moral dispraise of a thing is to say, it is morally +bad, or disagreeing from the rule of right reason. +So moral praise is from the good use of liberty, +moral dispraise from the bad use of liberty; but +if all things be necessary, then moral liberty is +quite taken away, and with it all true praise and +dispraise. Whereas T. H. adds, that ‘to say a +thing is good, is to say, it is as I would wish, or +as another would wish, or as the state would have +it, or according to the law of the land;’ he mistakes +infinitely. He, and another, and the state, +may all wish that which is not really good, but +only in appearance. We do often wish what is +profitable or delightful, without regarding so much +as we ought what is honest. And though the will +of the state where we live, or the law of the land, +do deserve great consideration, yet it is no infallible +rule of moral goodness. And therefore to his +question, ‘whether nothing that proceeds from +necessity can please me,’ I answer, yes. The +burning of the fire pleaseth me, when I am cold; +and I say, it is good fire, or a creature created by +God for my use and for my good. Yet I do not +mean to attribute any moral goodness to the fire, +nor give any moral praise to it, as if it were in +the power of the fire itself either to communicate +its heat or to suspend it; but I praise first the +Creator of the fire, and then him who provided it. +As for the praise which Velleius Paterculus gives +<span class='pageno' id='Page_172'>172</span>Cato, that he was good by nature, <span lang="la"><i>et quia aliter +esse non potuit</i></span>; it hath more of the orator, than +either of the theologian or philosopher in it. Man +in the state of innocency did fall and become evil; +what privilege hath Cato more than he? No, by +his leave. <span lang="la"><i>Narratur et divi Catonis sæpe mero +caluisse virtus.</i></span> But the true meaning is, that he +was naturally of a good temper, not so prone to +some kinds of vice as others were. This is to +praise a thing, not an action, naturally, not morally. +Socrates was not of so good a natural temper, +yet proved as good a man; the more his +praise, by how much the difficulty was the more +to conform his disorderly appetite to right reason.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Concerning reward and punishment, he saith +not a word, but only that they frame and conform +the will to good, which hath been sufficiently answered. +They do so indeed; but if his opinion +were true, they could not do so. But because my +aim is not only to answer T. H., but also to satisfy +myself, (<i>o</i>) though it be not urged by him, yet I +do acknowledge that I find some improper and +analogical rewards and punishments used to brute +beasts, as the hunter rewards his dog, the master +of the decoy-duck whips her when she returns +without company. And if it be true, which he +affirmeth a little before that I have confessed, +‘that the actions of brute beasts are all necessitated +and determined to that one thing which they +shall do,’ the difficulty is increased.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“But first, my saying is misalleged. I said, +that some kinds of actions which are most excellent +in brute beasts, and make the greatest show +of reason, as the bees working their honey, and the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_173'>173</span>spiders weaving their webs, are yet done without +any consultation or deliberation, by a mere instinct +of nature, and by a determination of their fancies +to these only kinds of works. But I did never +say, I could not say, that all their individual +actions are necessary, and antecedently determined +in their causes, as what days the bees shall fly +abroad, and what days and hours each bee shall +keep in the hive, how often they shall fetch in +thyme on a day, and from whence. These actions +and the like, though they be not free, because +brute beasts want reason to deliberate, yet they are +contingent, and therefore not necessary.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Secondly, I do acknowledge, that as the fancies +of some brute creatures are determined by nature +to some rare and exquisite works; so in others, +where it finds a natural propension, art, which +is the imitator of nature, may frame and form them +according to the will of the artist to some particular +actions and ends, as we see in setting-dogs, +and coy-ducks, and parrots; and the principal +means whereby they effect this, is by their backs +or by their bellies, by the rod or by the morsel, +which have indeed a shadow or resemblance of +rewards and punishments. But we take the word +here properly, not as it is used by vulgar people, +but as it is used by divines and philosophers, for +that recompense which is due to honest and dishonest +actions. Where there is no moral liberty, +there is neither honesty nor dishonesty, neither +true reward nor punishment.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Thirdly, (<i>p</i>) when brute creatures do learn +any such qualities, it is not out of judgment, or deliberation, +or discourse, by inferring or concluding +<span class='pageno' id='Page_174'>174</span>one thing from another, which they are not capable +of. Neither are they able to conceive a reason +of what they do, but merely out of memory or out +of a sensitive fear or hope. They remember that +when they did after one manner, they were +beaten; and when they did after another manner, +they were cherished; and accordingly they apply +themselves. But if their individual actions were +absolutely necessary, fear or hope could not alter +them. Most certainly, if there be any desert in it, +or any praise due unto it, it is to them who did instruct +them.</p> + +<p class='c001'>Lastly, concerning arts, arms, books, instruments, +study, physic, and the like, he answereth +not a word more than what is already satisfied. +And therefore I am silent.</p> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c000'> + <div><span class='fss'>ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. XIV.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>a</i>) “The first inconvenience is thus pressed. +Those laws are unjust and tyrannical, which do +prescribe things absolutely impossible in themselves +to be done, and punish men for not doing of +them.”</p> + +<p class='c001'>I have already, in the beginning, where I recite +the inconveniences that follow the doctrine of necessity, +made clear that the same inconveniences +follow not the doctrine of necessity, any more than +they follow this truth, <em>whatsoever shall be, shall +be</em>, which all men must confess; the same also followeth +upon this, that <em>whatsoever God foreknows, +cannot but come to pass in such time and manner +as he hath foreknown it</em>. It is therefore evident +that these inconveniences are not rationally deduced +from those tenets. Again, it is a truth +<span class='pageno' id='Page_175'>175</span>manifest to all men, that it is not in a man’s power +to-day, to choose what will he shall have to-morrow, +or an hour, or any time after. Intervening occasions, +business, which the Bishop calls trifles, (trifles +of which the Bishop maketh here a great business), +do change the will. No man can say what he will +do to-morrow, unless he foreknow, which no man +can, what shall happen before to-morrow. And +this being the substance of my opinion, it must +needs be that when he deduceth from it, that +counsels, arts, arms, medicines, teachers, praise, +prayer, and piety, are in vain, that his deduction is +false, and his ratiocination fallacy. And though I +need make no other answer to all that he can +object against me, yet I shall here mark out the +causes of his several paralogisms.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Those laws,” he saith, “are unjust and tyrannical, +which do prescribe things absolutely impossible +to be done, and punish men for not doing of +them.” In which words this is one absurdity, +that <em>a law can be unjust</em>; for all laws are divine +or civil, neither of which can be unjust. Of +the first there is no doubt. And as for civil laws, +they are made by every man that is subject to +them; because every one of them consenteth to +the placing of the legislative power. Another is +this, in the same words, that he supposeth there +may be laws that are tyrannical; for if he that +maketh them have the sovereign power, they may +be regal, but not tyrannical; if tyrant signify not +King, as he thinks it doth not. Another is in +the same words, “that a law may prescribe things +absolutely impossible in themselves to be done.” +When he says <em>impossible in themselves</em>, he understands +<span class='pageno' id='Page_176'>176</span>not what himself means. <em>Impossible in +themselves</em> are contradictions only, as to be and +not to be at the same time, which the divines say +is not possible to God. All other things are possible +at least in themselves. Raising from the +dead, changing the course of nature, making of a +new heaven, and a new earth, are things possible +in themselves; for there is nothing in their nature +able to resist the will of God. And if laws do not +prescribe such things, why should I believe they +prescribe other things that are more impossible. +Did he ever read in Suarez of any tyrant that made +a law commanding any man to do and not to do +the same action, or to be and not to be at the same +place in one and the same moment of time. But +out of the doctrine of necessity, it followeth he +says, that “all laws do prescribe absolute impossibilities +to be done.” Here he has left out <em>in +themselves</em>, which is a wilful fallacy.</p> + +<p class='c001'>He further says that “just laws are the ordinances +of right reason;” which is an error that +hath cost many thousands of men their lives. Was +there ever a King, that made a law which in right +reason had been better unmade? And shall those +laws therefore not be obeyed? Shall we rather +rebel? I think not, though I am not so great a +divine as he. I think rather that the reason of him +that hath the sovereign authority, and by whose +sword we look to be protected both against war +from abroad and injuries at home, whether it be +right or erroneous in itself, ought to stand for +right to us that have submitted ourselves thereunto +by receiving the protection.</p> + +<p class='c001'>But the Bishop putteth his greatest confidence +<span class='pageno' id='Page_177'>177</span>in this, that whether the things be impossible in +themselves, or made impossible by some unseen accident, +yet there is no reason that men should be +<em>punished for not doing them</em>. It seems he taketh +punishment for a kind of revenge, and can never +therefore agree with me, that take it for nothing +else but for a correction, or for an example, which +hath for end the <em>framing</em> and <em>necessitating of the +will</em> to virtue; and that he is no good man, that +upon any provocation useth his power, though a +power lawfully obtained, to afflict another man +without this end, to reform the will of him or others. +Nor can I comprehend, as having only humane +ideas, that that punishment which neither intendeth +the correction of the offender, nor the correction +of others by example, doth proceed from God.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “He saith that no law can possibly be unjust,” +&c.</p> + +<p class='c001'>Against this he replies that the law of Pharaoh, +to drown the male children of the Israelites; and +of Nebuchadnezzar, to worship the golden image; +and of Darius, against praying to any but him +in thirty days; and of Ahasuerus, to destroy the +Jews; and of the Pharisees, to excommunicate the +confessors of Christ; were all unjust laws. The +laws of these kings, as they were laws, have relation +only to the men that were their subjects; and +the <em>making</em> of them, which was the action of every +one of those kings, who were subjects to another +king, namely, to God Almighty, had relation to the +law of God. In the first relation, there could be +no injustice in them; because all laws made by +him to whom the people had given the legislative +power, are the acts of every one of that people; +<span class='pageno' id='Page_178'>178</span>and no man can do injustice to himself. But in +relation to God, if God have by a law forbidden it, +the making of such laws is injustice. Which law +of God was to those heathen princes no other but +<span lang="la"><i>salus populi</i></span>, that is to say, the properest use of +their natural reason for the preservation of their +subjects. If therefore those laws were ordained +out of wantonness, or cruelty, or envy, or for the +pleasing of a favourite, or out of any other sinister +end, as it seems they were, the making of those +laws was unjust. But if in right reason they were +necessary for the preservation of those people of +whom they had undertaken the charge, then was +it not unjust. And for the Pharisees, who had +the same written law of God that we have, their +excommunication of the Christians, proceeding, as +it did, from envy, was an act of malicious injustice. +If it had proceeded from misinterpretation +of their own Scriptures, it had been a sin of ignorance. +Nevertheless, as it was a law to their subjects +(in case they had the legislative power, which +I doubt of), the law was not unjust. But the +making of it was an unjust action, of which they +were to give account to none but God. I fear the +Bishop will think this discourse too subtile; but +the judgment is the reader’s.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>c</i>) “The ground of this error,” &c., “is this: +that every man makes by his consent the law +which he is bound to keep,” &c.</p> + +<p class='c001'>The reason why he thinketh this an error, is because +the positive law of God, contained in the +Bible, is a law without our assent; the law of nature +was written in our hearts by the finger of +God without our assent; the laws of conquerors, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_179'>179</span>who come in by the power of the sword, were +made without our assent; and so were the laws of +our ancestors, which were made before we were +born. It is a strange thing that he that understands +the nonsense of the Schoolmen, should not +be able to perceive so easy a truth as this which +he denieth. The Bible is a law. To whom? To +all the world? He knows it is not. How came it +then to be a law to us? Did God speak it <span lang="la"><i>viva +voce</i></span> to us? Have we then any other warrant for +it than the word of the prophets? Have we seen +the miracles? Have we any other assurance of +their certainty than the authority of the Church? +And is the authority of the Church any other than +the authority of the commonwealth, or that of the +commonwealth any other than that of the head of +the commonwealth, or hath the head of the commonwealth +any other authority than that which +hath been given him by the members? Else, why +should not the Bible be canonical as well in Constantinople +as in any other place? They that have +the legislative power make nothing canon, which +they make not law, nor law, which they make not +canon. And because the legislative power is from +the assent of the subjects, the Bible is made law +by the assent of the subjects. It was not the +Bishop of Rome that made the Scripture law +without his own temporal dominions; nor is it the +clergy that make it law in their dioceses and rectories. +Nor can it be a law of itself without +special and supernatural revelation. The Bishop +thinks because the Bible is law, and he is appointed +to teach it to the people in his diocese, +that therefore it is law to whomsoever he teach +<span class='pageno' id='Page_180'>180</span>it; which is somewhat gross, but not so gross as +to say that conquerors who come in by the power +of the sword, make their laws also without our +assent. He thinks, belike, that if a conqueror can +kill me if he please, I am presently obliged without +more ado to obey all his laws. May not I +rather die, if I think fit? The conqueror makes +no law over the conquered by virtue of his power; +but by virtue of their assent, that promised obedience +for the saving of their lives. But how then +is the assent of the children obtained to the laws +of their ancestors? This also is from the desire +of preserving their lives, which first the parents +might take away, where the parents be free from +all subjection; and where they are not, there the +civil power might do the same, if they doubted of +their obedience. The children therefore, when +they be grown up to strength enough to do mischief, +and to judgment enough to know that other +men are kept from doing mischief to them by fear +of the sword that protecteth them, in that very +act of receiving that protection, and not renouncing +it openly, do oblige themselves to obey +the laws of their protectors; to which, in receiving +such protection, they have assented. And +whereas he saith, the law of nature is a law without +our assent, it is absurd; for the law of nature +is the assent itself that all men give to the means +of their own preservation.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>d</i>) “But his chiefest answer is, that an action +forbidden, though it proceed from necessary causes, +yet if it were done willingly, may be justly punished,” +&c.</p> + +<p class='c001'>This the Bishop also understandeth not, and +<span class='pageno' id='Page_181'>181</span>therefore denies it. He would have the judge +condemn no man for a crime, if it were necessitated; +as if the judge could know what acts +are necessary, unless he knew all that hath anteceded, +both visible and invisible, and what both +every thing in itself, and altogether, can effect. +It is enough to the judge, that the act he condemneth +be voluntary. The punishment whereof +may, if not capital, reform the will of the +offender; if capital, the will of others by example. +For heat in one body doth not more create heat +in another, than the terror of an example createth +fear in another, who otherwise were inclined to +commit injustice.</p> + +<p class='c001'>Some few lines before, he hath said that I built +upon a wrong foundation, namely, “that all magistrates +were at first elective;” I had forgot to +tell you, that I never said nor thought it. And +therefore his reply, as to that point, is impertinent.</p> + +<p class='c001'>Not many lines after, for a reason why a man +may not be justly punished when his crime is +voluntary, he offereth this: “that law is unjust +and tyrannical, which commands a man to will +that which is impossible for him to will.” Whereby +it appears, he is of opinion that a law may be +made to command the will. The style of a law is +<em>do this</em>, or <em>do not this</em>; or, <em>if thou do this, thou +shalt suffer this</em>; but no law runs thus, <em>will this</em>, +or <em>will not this</em>; or, <em>if thou have a will to this, +thou shalt suffer this</em>. He objecteth further, that +I beg the question, because no man’s will is necessitated. +Wherein he mistakes; for I say no more +in that place, but that he that doth evil willingly, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_182'>182</span>whether he be necessarily willing, or not necessarily, +may be justly punished. And upon this mistake +he runneth over again his former and already +answered nonsense, saying, “we ourselves, by our +own negligence in not opposing our passions when +we should and might, have freely given them a +kind of dominion over us;” and again, <span lang="la"><i>motus primo +primi</i></span>, the first motions are not always in our +power. Which <span lang="la"><i>motus primo primi</i></span>, signifies nothing; +and “our negligence in not opposing our +passions,” is the same with “our want of will to +oppose our will,” which is absurd; and “that we +have given them a kind of dominion over us,” +either signifies nothing, or that we have a dominion +over our wills, or our wills a dominion +over us, and consequently either we or our wills +are not free.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>e</i>) “He pleads moreover that the law is a +cause of justice,” &c. “All this is most true, of +a just law justly executed.”</p> + +<p class='c001'>But I have shown that all laws are just, as laws, +and therefore not to be accused of injustice by +those that owe subjection to them; and a just law +is always justly executed. Seeing then that he +confesseth that all that he replieth to here is true, +it followeth that the reply itself, where it contradicteth +me, is false.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>f</i>) “He addeth that the sufferings imposed by +the law upon delinquents, respect not the evil act +passed, but the good to come; and that the putting +of a delinquent to death by the magistrate for any +crime whatsoever, cannot be justified before God, +except there be a real intention to benefit others +by his example.”</p> + +<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_183'>183</span>This he neither confirmeth nor denieth, and yet +forbeareth not to discourse upon it to little purpose; +and therefore I pass it over.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>g</i>) “First he told us, that it was the irresistible +power of God that justifies all his actions; +though he command one thing openly, and plot +another thing secretly; though he be the cause not +only of the action, but also of the irregularity, &c.”</p> + +<p class='c001'>To all this, which hath been pressed before, I +have answered before; but that he says I say, +“having commanded one thing openly, he plots +another thing secretly,” it is not mine, but one of +his own ugly phrases. And the force it hath, proceeded +out of an apprehension he hath, that affliction +is not God’s correction, but his revenge +upon the creatures of his own making; and from +a reasoning he useth, “because it is not just in a +man to kill one man for the amendment of another, +therefore neither is it so in God;” not remembering +that God hath, or shall have killed all the men +in the world, both nocent and innocent.</p> + +<p class='c001'>My assertion, he saith, “is a dream, and the +sum of it this; that where there is no law, there +no killing or anything else can be unjust; that +before the constitution of commonwealths, every +man had power to kill another,” &c., and adds, that +“this may well be called stringing of paradoxes.” +To these my words he replies:</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>h</i>) “There was never any time when mankind +was without governors, laws, and societies.”</p> + +<p class='c001'>It is very likely to be true, that since the creation +there never was a time in which mankind was +totally without society. If a part of it were without +laws and governors, some other parts might +<span class='pageno' id='Page_184'>184</span>be commonwealths. He saw there was paternal +government in Adam; which he might do easily, as +being no deep consideration. But in those places +where there is a civil war at any time, at the same +time there is neither laws, nor commonwealth, nor +society, but only a temporal league, which every +discontented soldier may depart from when he +pleases, as being entered into by each man for +his private interest, without any obligation of conscience: +there are therefore almost at all times +multitudes of lawless men. But this was a little too +remote from his understanding to perceive. Again, +he denies, that ever there was a time when one private +man might lawfully kill another for his own +preservation; and has forgotten that these words +of his (No. <a href='#II'><span class='fss'>II.</span></a>), “this is the belief of all mankind, +which we have not learned from our tutors, but is +imprinted in our hearts by nature; we need not +turn over any obscure books to find out this truth,” +&c.; which are the words of Cicero in the defence +of Milo, and translated by the Bishop to the defence +of free-will, were used by Cicero to prove this +very thing, that it is and hath been always lawful +for one private man to kill another for his own +preservation. But where he saith it is not lawful +<em>ordinarily</em>, he should have shown some particular +case wherein it is unlawful. For seeing it is a +“belief imprinted in our hearts,” not only I, but +many more are apt to think it is the law of nature, +and consequently universal and eternal. And where +he saith, this right of defence where it is, “is not a +remainder of some greater power which they have +resigned, but a privilege which God hath given +them in case of extreme danger and invincible +<span class='pageno' id='Page_185'>185</span>necessity,” &c.; I also say it is a privilege which +God hath given them, but we differ in the manner +how; which to me seems this, that God doth not +account such killing sin. But the Bishop it seems +would have it thus: God sends a bishop into the +pulpit to tell the people it is lawful for a man to +kill another man when it is <a id='corr185.7'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='necesssary'>necessary</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_185.7'><ins class='correction' title='necesssary'>necessary</ins></a></span> for the +preservation of his own life; of which necessity, +that is, whether it be <em>invincible</em>, or whether the +danger be <em>extreme</em>, the bishop shall be the judge +after the man is killed, as being a case of conscience. +Against the resigning of this our general +power of killing our enemies, he argues thus: +“Nothing can give that which it never had; the +people whilst they were a dispersed rabble, which +in some odd cases might happen to be, never had +justly the power of life and death, and therefore +they could not give it by their election,” &c. +Needs there much acuteness to understand, what +number of men soever there be, though not united +into government, that every one of them in particular +having a right to destroy whatsoever he +thinketh can annoy him, may not resign the same +right, and give it to whom he please, when he +thinks it conducible to his preservation? And yet +it seems he has not understood it.</p> + +<p class='c001'>He takes it ill that I compare the “murdering +of men with the slaughtering of brute beasts:” as +also a little before, he says, “my opinion reflects +too much upon the honour of mankind: the elements +are for the plants, the plants for the brute +beasts, and the brute beasts for man.” I pray, +when a lion eats a man, and a man eats an ox, +why is the ox more made for the man, than the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_186'>186</span>man for the lion? “Yes,” he saith, “God gave +man liberty (Gen. ix. 3) to eat the flesh of the +creatures for his sustenance.” True, but the lion +had the liberty to eat the flesh of man long before. +But he will say, no; pretending that no man of +any nation, or at any time, could lawfully eat flesh, +unless he had this licence of holy Scripture, which +it was impossible for most men to have. But how +would he have been offended, if I had said of man +as Pliny doth: “<span lang="la"><i>quo nullum est animal neque +miserius, neque superbius</i></span>?” The truth is, that +man is a creature of greater power than other +living creatures are, but his advantages do consist +especially in two things: whereof one is the +use of speech, by which men communicate one +with another, and join their forces together, and +by which also they register their thoughts that +they perish not, but be reserved, and afterwards +joined with other thoughts, to produce general +rules for the direction of their actions. There be +beasts that see better, others that hear better, and +others that exceed mankind in other senses. Man +excelleth beasts only in making of rules to himself, +that is to say, in remembering, and in reasoning +aright upon that which he remembereth. They +which do so, deserve an honour above brute beasts. +But they which mistaking the use of words, deceive +themselves and others, introducing error, +and seducing men from the truth, are so much +less to be honoured than brute beasts, as error is +more vile than ignorance. So that it is not merely +the nature of man, that makes him worthier than +other living creatures, but the knowledge that he +acquires by meditation, and by the right use of reason +<span class='pageno' id='Page_187'>187</span>in making good rules of his future actions. +The other advantage a man hath, is the use of his +hands for the making of those things which are +instrumental to his well-being. But this advantage +is not a matter of so great honour, but that +a man may speak negligently of it without offence. +And for the dominion that a man hath over beasts, +he saith, “it is lost in part for the sin of man, because +the strongest creatures, as lions and bears, +have withdrawn their obedience; but the most +profitable and useful creatures, as sheep and oxen, +do in some degree retain their obedience.” I would +ask the Bishop, in what consisteth the dominion +of man over a lion or a bear. Is it in an obligation +of promise, or of debt? That cannot be; for +they have no sense of debt or duty. And I think +he will not say, that they have received a command +to obey him from authority. It resteth +therefore that the dominion of man consists in +this, that men are too hard for lions and bears, +because, though a lion or a bear be stronger than +a man, yet the strength, and art, and especially +the leaguing and societies of men, are a greater +power than the ungoverned strength of unruly +beasts. In this it is that consisteth this dominion +of man. And for the same reason when a hungry +lion meeteth an unarmed man in a desert, the lion +hath the dominion over the man, if that of man +over lions, or over sheep and oxen, may be called +dominion, which properly it cannot; nor can it be +said that sheep and oxen do otherwise obey us, +than they would do a lion. And if we have dominion +over sheep and oxen, we exercise it not as +dominion, but as hostility; for we keep them only +<span class='pageno' id='Page_188'>188</span>to labour, and to be killed and devoured by us; +so that lions and bears would be as good masters +to them as we are. By this short passage of his +concerning <em>dominion</em> and <em>obedience</em>, I have no +reason to expect a very shrewd answer from him +to my <cite>Leviathan</cite>.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>i</i>) “The next branch of his answer concerns +consultations, which, saith he, ‘are not superfluous, +though all things come to pass necessarily; +because they are the cause which doth necessitate +the effect, and the means to bring it to pass.’”</p> + +<p class='c001'>His reply to this is, that he hath “showed sufficiently, +that reason doth not determine the will +physically,” &c. If not physically, how then? As +he hath told us in another place, <em>morally</em>. But +what it is to determine a thing morally, no man +living understands. I doubt not but he had therefore +the will to write this reply, <em>because</em> I had +answered his treatise concerning true liberty. My +answer therefore was, at least in part, the <em>cause</em> +of his writing; yet that is the cause of the nimble +local motion of his fingers. Is not the cause of +local motion physical? His will therefore was +physically, and extrinsically, and antecedently, and +not morally caused by my writing.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>k</i>) “He adds further that ‘as the end is necessary, +so are the means, and when it is determined +that one thing shall be chosen before another, it is +determined also for what cause it shall be so chosen.’ +All which is truth, but not the whole truth,” &c.</p> + +<p class='c001'>Is it not enough that it is truth? Must I put all +the truth I know into two or three lines? No. +I should have added, that God doth adapt and fit +the means to their respective ends, free means to +<span class='pageno' id='Page_189'>189</span>free ends, contingent means to contingent ends, +necessary means to necessary ends. It may be I +would have done so, but for shame. <em>Free</em>, <em>contingent</em> +and <em>necessary</em> are not words that can be +joined to <em>means</em> or <em>ends</em>, but to <em>agents</em> and <em>actions</em>; +that is to say, to things that move or are moved: +a <em>free agent</em> being that whose motion or action +is not hindered or stopped, and a <em>free action</em>, that +which is produced by a free agent. A <em>contingent +agent</em> is the same with an <em>agent</em> simply. But, because +men for the most part think those things +are produced without cause, whereof they do not +see the cause, they use to call both the agent and +the action contingent, as attributing it to fortune. +And therefore, when the causes are necessary, if +they perceive not the necessity, they call those +necessary agents and actions, in things that have +appetite, <em>free</em>; and in things inanimate, <em>contingent</em>. +The rest of his reply to this point is very little of +it applied to my answer. I note only that where +he says, “but if God have so ordered the world, +that a man cannot, <em>if he would</em>, neglect any means +of good, &c.;” he would fraudulently insinuate +that it is my opinion, that a man is not <em>free to do +if he will, and to abstain if he will</em>. Whereas +from the beginning I have often declared that it is +none of my opinion; and that my opinion is only +this, that he is not <em>free to will</em>, or which is all one, +he is not master of his future will. After much +unorderly discourse he comes in with “this is the +doctrine that flows from this opinion of absolute +necessity;” which is impertinent; seeing nothing +flows from it more than may be drawn from the +confession of an eternal prescience.</p> + +<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_190'>190</span>(<i>l</i>) “But he tells me in great sadness, that ‘my +argument is no better than this; if I shall live till +to-morrow, I shall live till to-morrow, though I +run myself through with a sword to-day; which, +saith he, is a false consequence, and a false proposition.’ +Truly, if by running through, he understand +killing, it is a false or rather a foolish proposition.” +He saith right. Let us therefore see +how it is not like to his. He says, “if it be absolutely +necessary that a man shall live till to-morrow, +then it is vain and superfluous for him +to consult whether he should die to-day or not.” +“And this,” he says, “is a true consequence.” I +cannot perceive how it is a better consequence +than the former; for if it be absolutely necessary +that a man should live till to-morrow, and in +health, which may also be supposed, why should +he not, if he have the curiosity, have his head cut +off to try what pain it is. But the consequence is +false; for if there be a necessity of his living, it is +necessary also that he shall not have so foolish a +curiosity. But he cannot yet distinguish between a +seen and an unseen necessity, and that is the cause +he believeth his consequence to be good.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>m</i>) “The next branch of my argument concerns +admonitions,” &c.</p> + +<p class='c001'>Which he says is this: “If all things be necessary, +then it is to no more purpose to admonish +men of understanding, than fools, children, or +madmen; but that they do admonish the one and +not the other, is confessedly true; and no reason +under heaven can be given for it but this, that the +former have the use of reason and true liberty, +with a dominion over their own actions, which +children, fools, and madmen have not.”</p> + +<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_191'>191</span>The true reason why we admonish men and not +children, &c., is because admonition is nothing +else but telling a man the good and evil consequences +of his actions. They who have experience +of good and evil, can better perceive the reasonableness +of such admonition, than they that have +not; and such as have like passions to those of the +admonitor, do more easily conceive that to be +good or bad which the admonitor saith is so, +than they who have great passions, and such as +are contrary to his. The first, which is want of +experience, maketh children and fools unapt; and +the second, which is strength of passion, maketh +madmen unwilling to receive admonition; for +children are ignorant, and madmen in an error, +concerning what is good or evil for themselves. +This is not to say children and madmen want true +liberty, that is, the liberty to do as they will, nor +to say that men of judgment, or the admonitor +himself hath a dominion over his own actions, +more than children or madmen, (for their actions +are also voluntary), or that when he admonisheth +he hath always the use of reason, though he have +the use of deliberation, which children, fools, madmen, +and beasts also have. There be, therefore, +reasons under heaven which the Bishop knows +not of.</p> + +<p class='c001'>Whereas I had said, that things necessary may be +praiseworthy, and to praise a thing is to say it is +good, he distinguisheth and saith:</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>n</i>) “True, but this goodness is not a metaphysical +goodness; so whatsoever hath a being is good; +nor a natural goodness; the praise of it passeth +wholly to the Author of nature, &c.; but a moral +<span class='pageno' id='Page_192'>192</span>goodness, or a goodness of actions, rather than of +things. The moral goodness of an action is the +conformity of it to right reason,” &c.</p> + +<p class='c001'>There hath been in the Schools derived from +<cite>Aristotle’s Metaphysics</cite>, an old proverb rather +than an axiom: <span lang="la"><i>ens, bonum, et verum convertuntur</i></span>. +From hence the Bishop hath taken this notion of +a metaphysical goodness, and his doctrine that +whatsoever hath a being is good; and by this interpreteth +the words of Gen. i. 31: <em>God saw all +that he had made, and it was very good</em>. But the +reason of those words is, that <em>good</em> is relative to +those that are pleased with it, and not of absolute +signification to all men. God therefore saith, +that all that he had made was very good, because +he was pleased with the creatures of his own +making. But if all things were absolutely good, +we should be all pleased with their <em>being</em>, which +we are not, when the actions that depend upon +their being are hurtful to us. And therefore, to +speak properly, nothing is good or evil but in regard +of the action that proceedeth from it, and +also of the person to whom it doth good or hurt. +Satan is evil to us, because he seeketh our destruction, +but good to God, because he executeth his +commandments. And so his <em>metaphysical goodness</em> +is but an idle term, and not the member of a +distinction. And as for natural goodness and +evilness, that also is but the goodness and evilness +of actions; as some herbs are good because +they nourish, others evil because they poison us; +and one horse is good because he is gentle, strong, +and carrieth a man easily; another bad, because he +resisteth, goeth hard, or otherwise displeaseth us; +<span class='pageno' id='Page_193'>193</span>and that quality of gentleness, if there were no +more laws amongst men than there is amongst +beasts, would be as much a moral good in a horse +or other beast as in a man. It is the law from +whence proceeds the difference between the moral +and the natural goodness: so that it is well enough +said by him, that “moral goodness is the conformity +of an action with right reason”; and better +said than meant; for this <em>right reason</em>, which is +the law, is no otherwise certainly right than by +our making it so by our approbation of it and +voluntary subjection to it. For the law-makers +are men, and may err, and think that law, which +they make, is for the good of the people sometimes +when it is not. And yet the actions of +subjects, if they be conformable to the law, are +morally good, and yet cease not to be naturally +good; and the praise of them passeth to the Author +of nature, as well as of any other good whatsoever. +From whence it appears that moral praise +is not, as he says, from the good use of liberty, +but from obedience to the laws; nor moral dispraise +from the bad use of liberty, but from disobedience +to the laws. And for his consequence, +“if all things be necessary, then moral liberty is +quite taken away, and with it all true praise and +dispraise”, there is neither truth in it, nor argument +offered for it; for there is nothing more necessary +than the consequence of <em>voluntary</em> actions to the +<em>will</em>. And whereas I had said, that to say a thing +is good, is to say it is as I or another would wish, +or as the state would have it, or according to the +law of the land, he answers, that “I mistake infinitely”. +And his reason is, because “we often +<span class='pageno' id='Page_194'>194</span>wish what is profitable or delightful, without regarding +as we ought what is honest”. There is no +man living that seeth all the consequences of an +action from the beginning to the end, whereby to +weigh the whole sum of the good with the whole +sum of the evil consequence. We choose no +further than we can weigh. That is good to +every man, which is so far good as he can see. +All the real good, which we call honest and morally +virtuous, is that which is not repugnant to +the law, civil or natural; for the law is all the right +reason we have, and, (though he, as often as it disagreeth +with his own reason, deny it), is the infallible +rule of moral goodness. The reason whereof +is this, that because neither mine nor the Bishop’s +reason is right reason fit to be a rule of our +moral actions, we have therefore set up over ourselves +a sovereign governor, and agreed that his +laws shall be unto us, whatsoever they be, in the +place of right reason, to dictate to us what is really +good. In the same manner as men in playing turn +up trump, and as in playing their game their +morality consisteth in not renouncing, so in our +civil conversation our morality is all contained in +not disobeying of the laws.</p> + +<p class='c001'>To my question, “whether nothing could please +him, that proceeded from necessity”, he answers: +“yes; the fire pleaseth him when he is cold, and +he says it is good fire, but does not praise it +morally”. He praiseth, he says, first the Creator +of the fire, and then him who provided it. He +does well; yet he praiseth the fire when he saith +it is good, though not morally. He does not say +it is a just fire, or a wise, or a well-mannered fire, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_195'>195</span>obedient to the laws; but these attributes it seems +he gives to God, as if justice were not of his nature, +but of his manners. And in praising morally +him that provided it, he seems to say, he would +not say the fire was good, if he were not morally +good that did provide it.</p> + +<p class='c001'>To that which I had answered concerning reward +and punishment, he hath replied, he says, +sufficiently before, and that that which he discourseth +here, is not only to answer me, but also +to satisfy himself, and saith:</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>o</i>) “Though it be not urged by him, yet I do +acknowledge that I find some improper and analogical +rewards and punishments, used to brute +beasts, as the hunter rewards his dog,” &c.</p> + +<p class='c001'>For my part, I am too dull to perceive the difference +between those rewards used to brute +beasts, and those that are used to men. If they +be not properly called rewards and punishments, +let him give them their proper name. It may be +he will say, he has done it in calling them <em>analogical</em>; +yet for any thing that can be understood +thereby, he might have called them <em>paragogical</em>, +or <em>typical</em>, or <em>topical</em>, if he had pleased. He adds +further, that whereas he had said that the actions +of bees and spiders were done without consultation, +by mere instinct of nature, and by a determination +of their fancies, I misallege him, and say +he made their individual actions necessary. I have +only this to answer, that, seeing he says that by +instinct of nature their fancies were determined +to special kinds of works, I might justly infer they +were determined every one of them to some work; +and every work is an individual action; for <em>a kind +<span class='pageno' id='Page_196'>196</span>of work</em> in the general, is no work. But these +their individual actions, he saith, “are contingent, +and therefore not necessary”; which is no good +consequence: for if he mean by <em>contingent</em>, that +which has no cause, he speaketh not as a Christian, +but maketh a Deity of fortune; which I verily +think he doth not. But if he mean by it, that +whereof he knoweth not the cause, the consequence +is nought.</p> + +<p class='c001'>The means whereby setting-dogs, and coy-ducks, +and parrots, are taught to do what they do, +“is by their backs, by their bellies, by the rod, or +by the morsel, which have indeed a shadow or +resemblance of rewards and punishments: but +we take the word here properly, not as it is used +by vulgar people, but as it is used by divines and +philosophers,” &c. Does not the Bishop know +that the belly hath taught poets, and historians, +and divines, and philosophers, and artificers, their +several arts, as well as parrots? Do not men do +their duty with regard to their backs, to their +necks, and to their morsels, as well as setting-dogs, +coy-ducks, and parrots? Why then are +these things to us the substance, and to them but +the <em>shadow</em> or <em>resemblance</em> of rewards or punishments?</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>p</i>) “When brute creatures do learn any such +qualities, it is not out of judgment or deliberation +or discourse, by inferring or concluding one thing +from another, which they are not capable of; +neither are they able to conceive a reason of what +they do,” &c.: but “they remember that when +they did after one manner, they were beaten, +and when they did after another manner, they +<span class='pageno' id='Page_197'>197</span>were cherished; and accordingly they apply themselves.”</p> + +<p class='c001'>If the Bishop had considered the cogitations +of his own mind, not then when he disputeth, but +then when he followed those businesses which he +calleth trifles, he would have found them the very +same which he here mentioneth; saving instead of +<em>beating</em>, (because he is exempt from that), he is to +put <em>in damage</em>. For, setting aside the discourse +of the tongue in words of general signification, +the ideas of our minds are the same with those of +other living creatures, created from visible, audible, +and other sensible objects to the eyes and +other organs of sense, as their’s are. For as the +objects of sense are all individual, that is, singular, +so are all the fancies proceeding from their operations; +and men reason not but in words of universal +signification, uttered or tacitly thought on. +But perhaps he thinketh remembrance of words to +be the ideas of those things which the words signify; +and that all fancies are not effected by the +operation of objects upon the organs of our senses. +But to rectify him in those points is greater labour +(unless he had better principles) than I am willing, +or have at this time leisure, to undergo.</p> + +<p class='c001'>Lastly, whereas he says, “if their individual actions +were absolutely necessary, fear or hope could +not alter them”: that is true. For it is fear +and hope, that makes them necessarily what they +are.</p> + +<h3 id='XV' class='c002'>NO. XV.</h3> + +<div class='c000'></div> +<div class='sidenote'>The Bishop’s reply.</div> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “Thirdly, let this opinion be once radicated +in the minds of men, that there is no true +<span class='pageno' id='Page_198'>198</span>liberty, and that all things come to pass inevitably, +and it will utterly destroy the study of piety. +Who will bewail his sins with tears? What will +become of that grief, that zeal, that indignation, +that holy revenge, which the Apostle speaks of, if +men be once thoroughly persuaded that they could +not shun what they did? A man may grieve for +that which he could not help; but he will never +be brought to bewail that as his own fault, which +flowed not from his own error, but from antecedent +necessity. Who will be careful or solicitous +to perform obedience, that believeth there are inevitable +bounds and limits set to all his devotions, +which he can neither go beyond, nor come short +of? To what end shall he pray God to avert +those evils which are inevitable, or to confer +those favours which are impossible? We indeed +know not what good or evil shall happen to us: +but this we know, that if all things be necessary, +our devotions and endeavours cannot alter that +which must be. In a word, the only reason why +those persons, who tread in this path of fatal +destiny, do sometimes pray, or repent, or serve +God, is because the light of nature, and the +strength of reason, and the evidence of Scripture, +do for that present transport them from their ill-chosen +grounds, and expel those stoical fancies +out of their heads. A complete Stoic can neither +pray, nor repent, nor serve God to any purpose. +Either allow liberty, or destroy Church as well as +commonwealth, religion as well as policy.”</p> + +<p class='c001'><i>T. H.</i> His third argument consisteth in other inconveniences +which he saith will follow, namely, +impiety and negligence of religious duties, repentance +<span class='pageno' id='Page_199'>199</span>and zeal to God’s service. To which I +answer, as to the rest, that they follow not. I +must confess, if we consider the far greatest part +of mankind, not as they should be, but as they +are, that is, as men whom either the study of +acquiring wealth or preferments, or whom the +appetite of sensual delights, or the impatience of +meditating, or the rash embracing of wrong principles, +have made unapt to discuss the truth of +things, that the dispute of this question will rather +hurt than help their piety. And therefore, if he +had not desired this answer, I would not have +written it. Nor do I write it, but in hope your +Lordship and he will keep it private. Nevertheless, +in very truth, the necessity of events does +not of itself draw with it any impiety at all. For +piety consisteth only in two things; one, that we +honour God in our hearts, which is, that we think +of his power as highly as we can: for to honour +any thing, is nothing else but to think it to be of +great power. The other, that we signify that +honour and esteem by our words and actions, +which is called <em>cultus</em> or worship of God. He +therefore, that thinketh that all things proceed +from God’s eternal will, and consequently are +necessary, does he not think God omnipotent? +does he not esteem of his power as highly as is +possible; which is to honour God as much as can +be in his heart? Again, he that thinketh so, is he +not more apt by external acts and words to acknowledge +it, than he that thinketh otherwise? +Yet is this external acknowledgment the same +thing which we call worship. So this opinion +fortifieth piety in both kinds, externally and internally, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_200'>200</span>and therefore is far from destroying it. +And for repentance, which is nothing but a glad +returning into the right way after the grief of being +out of the way, though the cause that made him +go astray were necessary, yet there is no reason +why he should not grieve; and again, though the +cause why he returned into the way were necessary, +there remain still the causes of joy. So +that the necessity of the actions taketh away +neither of those parts of repentance, grief for the +error, nor joy for the returning. And for prayer, +whereas he saith that the necessity of things destroys +prayer, I deny it. For though prayer be +none of the causes that move God’s will, his will +being unchangeable, yet since we find in God’s +word, he will not give his blessings but to those +that ask them, the motive to prayer is the same. +Prayer is the gift of God, no less than the blessings. +And the prayer is decreed together in the +same decree wherein the blessing is decreed. It +is manifest, that thanksgiving is no cause of the +blessing passed; and that which is passed, is sure +and necessary. Yet even amongst men, thanks are +in use as an acknowledgment of the benefit past, +though we should expect no new benefit for our +gratitude. And prayer to God Almighty is but +thanksgiving for his blessings in general; and +though it precede the particular thing we ask, yet +it is not a cause or means of it, but a signification +that we expect nothing but from God, in such +manner as He, not as we will. And our Saviour +by word of mouth bids us pray, “thy will, not our +will be done”; and by example teaches us the same; +for he prayed thus: <em>Father, if it be thy will, let +<span class='pageno' id='Page_201'>201</span>this cup pass</em>, &c. The end of prayer, as of +thanksgiving, is not to move, but to honour God +Almighty, in acknowledging that what we ask can +be effected by Him only.</p> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “I hope T. H. will be persuaded in time, +that it is not the coveteousness, or ambition, or sensuality, +or sloth, or prejudice of his readers, which +render this doctrine of absolute necessity dangerous, +but that it is, in its own nature, destructive to +true godliness; (<i>a</i>) and though his answer consist +more of oppositions than of solutions, yet I will not +willingly leave one grain of his matter unweighed. +(<i>b</i>) First, he errs in making inward piety to consist +merely in the estimation of the judgment. If +this were so, what hinders but that the devils should +have as much inward piety as the best Christians? +For they esteem God’s power to be infinite, and +tremble. Though inward piety do suppose the +act of the understanding, yet it consisteth properly +in the act of the will, being that branch of justice +which gives to God the honour which is due unto +him. Is there no love due to God, no faith, no +hope? (<i>c</i>) Secondly, he errs in making inward piety +to ascribe no glory to God, but only the glory of +his power or omnipotence. What shall become +of all other the Divine attributes, and particularly +of his goodness, of his truth, of his justice, of his +mercy, which beget a more true and sincere +honour in the heart than greatness itself? <span lang="la"><i>Magnos +facile laudamus, bonos lubenter.</i></span> (<i>d</i>) Thirdly, +this opinion of absolute necessity destroys the +truth of God, making him to command one thing +openly, and to necessitate another privately; to +chide a man for doing that which he hath determined +<span class='pageno' id='Page_202'>202</span>him to do; to profess one thing, and to +intend another. It destroys the goodness of God, +making him to be a hater of mankind, and to delight +in the torments of his creatures; whereas +the very dogs licked the sores of Lazarus, in pity +and commiseration of him. It destroys the justice +of God, making him to punish the creatures +for that which was his own act, which they had no +more power to shun, than the fire hath power not +to burn. It destroys the very power of God, +making him to be the true author of all the defects +and evils which are in the world. These are the +fruits of impotence, not of omnipotence. He who +is the effective cause of sin, either in himself or in +the creature, is not almighty. There needs no +other devil in the world to raise jealousies and suspicions +between God and his creatures, or to poison +mankind with an apprehension that God doth +not love them, but only this opinion, which was +the office of the serpent (Gen. iii. 5). Fourthly, +for the outward worship of God; (<i>e</i>) how shall +a man praise God for his goodness, who believes +him to be a greater tyrant than ever was in the +world; who creates millions to burn eternally, +without their fault, to express his power? How +shall a man hear the word of God with that reverence, +and devotion, and faith, which is requisite, +who believeth that God causeth his gospel to be +preached to the much greater part of Christians, +not with any intention that they should be converted +and saved, but merely to harden their +hearts, and to make them inexcusable? How shall +a man receive the blessed sacrament with comfort +and confidence, as a seal of God’s love in Christ, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_203'>203</span>who believeth that so many millions are positively +excluded from all fruit and benefit of the passions +of Christ, before they had done either good or evil? +How shall he prepare himself with care and conscience, +who apprehendeth that eating and drinking +unworthily is not the cause of damnation, but, +because God would damn a man, therefor he +necessitates him to eat and drink unworthily? +How shall a man make a free vow to God without +gross ridiculous hypocrisy, who thinks he is able +to perform nothing but as he is extrinsically necessitated? +Fifthly, for repentance, how shall a +man condemn and accuse himself for his sins, who +thinks himself to be like a watch which is wound +up by God, and that he can go neither longer nor +shorter, faster nor slower, truer nor falser, than he +is ordered by God? If God sets him right, he +goes right; if God sets him wrong, he goes wrong. +How can a man be said to return into the right +way, who never was in any other way but that +which God himself had chalked out for him? +What is his purpose to amend, who is destitute +of all power, but as if a man should purpose +to fly without wings, or a beggar who hath +not a groat in his purse, purpose to build hospitals?</p> + +<p class='c001'>“We use to say, admit one absurdity, and a +thousand will follow. To maintain this unreasonable +opinion of absolute necessity, he is necessitated +(but it is hypothetically, he might change his +opinion if he would) to deal with all ancient writers +as the Goths did with the Romans, who destroyed +all their magnificent works, that there might remain +no monument of their greatness upon the face of the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_204'>204</span>earth. Therefore he will not leave so much as one +of their opinions, nor one of their definitions, nay, +not one of their terms of art standing. (<i>f</i>) Observe +what a description he hath given us here of +repentance: ‘it is a glad returning into the right +way, after the grief of being out of the way’. It +amazed me to find <span lang="la"><i>gladness</i></span> to be the first word in +the description of repentance. His repentance is +not that repentance, nor his piety that piety, nor +his prayer that kind of prayer, which the Church +of God in all ages hath acknowledged. Fasting, +and sackcloth, and ashes, and tears, and <span lang="la"><i>humicubations</i></span>, +used to be companions of repentance. +Joy may be a consequent of it, not a part of it. +(<i>g</i>) It is a <span lang="la"><i>returning</i></span>: but whose act is this returning? +Is it God’s alone, or doth the penitent person +concur also freely with the grace of God? If it be +God’s alone, then it is his repentance, not man’s repentance. +What need the penitent person trouble +himself about it? God will take care of his own work. +The Scriptures teach us otherwise, that God expects +our concurrence (Revel. iii. 19, 20): <i>Be zealous and +repent: behold I stand at the door and knock; if +any man hear my voice, and open the door, I will +come in to him</i>. It is a ‘glad returning into the +right way’. Why dare any man call that a wrong +way, which God himself hath determined? He +that willeth and doth that which God would have +him to will and to do, is never out of his right +way. It follows in his description, <em>after the grief</em>, +&c. It is true, a man may grieve for that which +is necessarily imposed upon him; but he cannot +grieve for it as a fault of his own, if it never +was in his power to shun it. Suppose a writingmaster +<span class='pageno' id='Page_205'>205</span>shall hold his scholar’s hand in his, and +write with it; the scholar’s part is only to hold still +his hand, whether the master write well or ill; the +scholar hath no ground either of joy or sorrow, as +for himself; no man will interpret it to be his act, +but his master’s. It is no fault to be out of the +right way, if a man had not liberty to have kept +himself in the way.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“And so from <em>repentance</em> he skips quite over +<em>new obedience</em> to come to <em>prayer</em>, which is the last +religious duty insisted upon by me here. But according +to his use, without either answering or +mentioning what I say; which would have showed +him plainly what kind of prayer I intend, not contemplative +prayer in general, as it includes thanksgiving, +but that most proper kind of prayer which +we call <em>petition</em>, which used to be thus defined, +to be an act of religion by which we desire of God +something which we have not, and hope that we +shall obtain it by him; quite contrary to this, +T. H. tells us, (<i>h</i>) that prayer ‘is not a cause nor +a means of God’s blessing, but only a signification +that we expect it from him’. If he had told us +only, that prayer is not a meritorious cause of +God’s blessings, as the poor man by begging an +alms doth not deserve it, I should have gone along +with him. But to tell us, that it is not so much as +a means to procure God’s blessing, and yet with +the same breath, that ‘God will not give his blessings +but to those who pray’, who shall reconcile him +to himself? The Scriptures teach us otherwise, +(John xvi. 23): <em>Whatsoever ye shall ask the Father +in my name, he will give it you</em>: (Matth. vii. 7): +<em>Ask, and it shall be given you, seek, and ye shal +<span class='pageno' id='Page_206'>206</span>find, knock, and it shall be opened unto you</em>. +St. Paul tells the Corinthians (2 Cor. i. 11), that +he was <em>helped by their prayers</em>: that is not all; +that <em>the gift was bestowed upon him by their +means</em>. So prayer is a means. And St. James +saith (chap. v. 16): <em>The effectual fervent prayer +of a righteous man availeth much</em>. If it be <em>effectual</em>, +then it is a cause. To show this efficacy of +prayer, our Saviour useth the comparison of a +father towards his child, of a neighbour towards +his neighbour; yea, of an unjust judge, to shame +those who think that God hath not more compassion +than a wicked man. This was signified by +Jacob’s wrestling and prevailing with God. Prayer +is like the tradesman’s tools, wherewithal he gets +his living for himself and his family. But, saith +he, ‘God’s will is unchangeable’. What then? He +might as well use this against study, physic, and +all second causes, as against prayer. He shows +even in this, how little they attribute to the endeavours +of men. There is a great difference between +these two: <span lang="la"><i>mutare voluntatem</i></span>, to change +the will; (which God never doth, in whom there is +not the least shadow of turning by change; his +will to love and hate was the same from eternity, +which it now is and ever shall be; his love and +hatred are immovable, but we are removed; <span lang="la"><i>non +tellus cymbam, tellurem cymba reliquit</i></span>); and <span lang="la"><i>velle +mutationem</i></span>, to will a change; which God often +doth. To change the will, argues a change in the +agent; but to will a change, only argues a change +in the object. It is no inconstancy in a man to +love or to hate as the object is changed. <span lang="la"><i>Præsta +mihi omnia eadem, et idem sum.</i></span> Prayer works not +<span class='pageno' id='Page_207'>207</span>upon God, but us; it renders not him more propitious +in himself, but us more capable of mercy. +He saith this, ‘that God doth not bless us, except +we pray, is a motive to prayer’. Why talks he of +motives, who acknowledgeth no liberty, nor admits +any cause but absolutely necessary? He saith, +‘prayer is the gift of God, no less than the blessing +which we pray for, and contained in the same +decree with the blessing’. It is true, the spirit of +prayer is the gift of God. Will he conclude from +thence, that the good employment of one talent, +or of one gift of God, may not procure another? +Our Saviour teacheth us otherwise: <em>Come thou +good and faithful servant, thou hast been faithful +in little, I will make thee ruler over much</em>. +Too much light is an enemy to the sight, and too +much law is an enemy to justice. I could wish +we wrangled less about God’s decrees, until we +understood them better. But, saith he, ‘thanksgiving +is no cause of the blessing past, and prayer +is but a thanksgiving’. He might even as well tell +me, that when a beggar craves an alms, and when +he gives thanks for it, it is all one. Every thanksgiving +is a kind of prayer, but every prayer, and +namely petition, is not a thanksgiving. In the +last place he urgeth, that ‘in our prayers we are +bound to submit our wills to God’s will.’ Who ever +made any doubt of this? We must submit to the +preceptive will of God, or his commandments; we +must submit to the effective will of God, when he +declares his good pleasure by the event or otherwise. +But we deny, and deny again, either that +God wills things <span lang="la"><i>ad extra</i></span>, without himself, necessarily, +or that it is his pleasure that all second +<span class='pageno' id='Page_208'>208</span>causes should act necessarily at all times; which is +the question, and that which he allegeth to the +contrary comes not near it.</p> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c000'> + <div><span class='fss'>ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. XV.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>a</i>) “And though his answer consist more of +oppositions than of solutions, yet I will not willingly +leave one grain of his matter unweighed.”</p> + +<p class='c001'>It is a promise of great exactness, and like to +that which is in his Epistle to the Reader: “Here +is all that passed between us upon this subject, +without any addition or the least variation from +the original,” &c.: which promises were both needless, +and made out of gallantry; and therefore he +is the less pardonable in case they be not very +rigidly observed. I would therefore have the +reader to consider, whether these words of mine: +“our Saviour bids us pray, <em>thy will</em>, not <em>our</em> will, +<em>be done</em>, and by example teaches us the same; for +he prayed thus: <em>Father, if it be thy will let this +cup pass</em>,” &c.: which seem at least to imply that +our prayers cannot change the will of God, nor +divert him from his eternal decree: have been +weighed by him to a grain, according to his promise. +Nor hath he kept his other promise any +better; for (No. <span class='fss'>VIII.</span>) replying to these words +of mine, “if he had so little to do as to be a spectator +of the actions of bees and spiders, he would +have confessed not only election, but also art, prudence, +and policy in them,” &c., he saith, “yes, +I have seen those silliest of creatures, and seeing +their rare works I have seen enough to confute all +the bold-faced atheists of this age, and their hellish +blasphemies”. This passage is added to that +<span class='pageno' id='Page_209'>209</span>which passed between us upon this subject; for +it is not in the copy which I have had by me, as +himself confesseth, these eight years; nor is it +in the body of the copy he sent to the press, but +only in the margin, that is to say, added out of +anger against me, whom he would have men think +to be one of the bold-faced atheists of this age.</p> + +<p class='c001'>In the rest of this reply he endeavoureth to +prove, that it followeth from my opinion, that +there is no use of piety. My opinion is no more +than this, that a man cannot so determine to-day, +the will which he shall have to the doing of any +action to-morrow, as that it may not be changed +by some external accident or other, as there shall +appear more or less advantage to make him persevere +in the will to the same action, or to will it +no more. When a man intendeth to pay a debt +at a certain time, if he see that the detaining of +the money for a little longer may advantage himself, +and seeth no other disadvantage equivalent +likely to follow upon the detention, he hath his will +changed by the advantage, and therefore had not +determined his will himself; but when he foreseeth +discredit or perhaps imprisonment, then his +will remaineth the same, and is determined by the +thoughts he hath of his creditor, who is therefore +an external cause of the determination of the +debtor’s will. This is so evident to all men living, +though they never studied school-divinity, that it +will be very strange if he draw from it the great +impiety he pretends to do. Again, my opinion is +only this: that whatsoever God foreknows shall +come to pass, it cannot possibly be that that shall +not come to pass; but that which cannot possibly +<span class='pageno' id='Page_210'>210</span>not come to pass, that is said by all men to +come to pass necessarily; therefore all events that +God foreknows shall come to pass, shall come to +pass necessarily. If therefore the Bishop draw +impiety from this, he falleth into the impiety of +denying God’s prescience. Let us see now how +he reasoneth.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “First, he errs in making inward piety to +consist merely in the estimation of the judgment. +If this were so, what hinders but that the devils +should have as much inward piety as the best +Christians; for they esteem God’s power to be infinite, +and tremble?”</p> + +<p class='c001'>I said, that two things concurred to <em>piety</em>; one, +to esteem his power as highly as is possible; the +other, that we signify that estimation by our +words and actions, that is to say, that we worship +him. This latter part of piety he leaveth out; +and then, it is much more easy to conclude as he +doth, that the devils may have inward piety. But +neither so doth the conclusion follow. For goodness +is one of God’s powers, namely, that power +by which he worketh in men the hope they have +in him; and is relative; and therefore, unless +the devil think that God will be good to him, he +cannot esteem him for his goodness. It does not +therefore follow from any opinion of mine, that +the devil may have as much inward piety as a +Christian. But how does the Bishop know how +the devils esteem God’s power; and what devils +does he mean? There are in the Scripture two +sorts of things, which are in English translated +devils. One, is that which is called Satan, Diabolus, +and Abaddon, which signifies in English, an +<span class='pageno' id='Page_211'>211</span><em>enemy</em>, an <em>accuser</em>, and a <em>destroyer</em> of the Church +of God. In which sense, the devils are but +wicked men. How then is he sure that they +esteem God’s power to be infinite? For, <em>trembling</em> +infers no more than that they apprehend it to be +greater than their own. The other sort of devils +are called in the Scripture <span lang="la"><i>dæmonia</i></span>, which are +the feigned Gods of the heathen, and are neither +bodies nor spiritual substances, but mere fancies, +and fictions of terrified hearts, feigned by the +Greeks and other heathen people, and which St. +Paul calleth <em>nothings</em>; for an idol, saith he, is +nothing. Does the Bishop mean, that these nothings +esteem God’s power to be infinite and +tremble? There is nothing that has a real being, +but God, and the world, and the parts of the +world; nor has anything a feigned being, but the +fictions of men’s brains. The world and the +parts thereof are corporeal, endued with the dimensions +of quantity, and with figure. I should +be glad to know, in what classes of entities which +is a word that schoolmen use, the Bishop ranketh +these devils, that so much esteem God’s power, +and yet not love him nor hope in him, if he +place them not in the rank of those men who +are enemies to the people of God, as the Jews did.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>c</i>) “Secondly, he errs in making inward piety +to ascribe no glory to God, but only the glory of +his power or omnipotence. What shall become +of all other the Divine attributes, and particularly +of his goodness, of his truth, of his justice, of his +mercy,” &c.</p> + +<p class='c001'>He speaketh of God’s goodness and mercy, as if +they were no part of his power. Is not goodness, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_212'>212</span>in him that is good, the power to make himself +beloved, and is not mercy goodness? Are not, +therefore, these attributes contained in the attribute +of his omnipotence? And justice in God, is +it anything else, but the power he hath, and exerciseth +in distributing blessings and afflictions? +Justice is not in God as in man, the observation of +the laws made by his superiors. Nor is wisdom +in God, a logical examination of the means by the +end, as it is in men; but an incomprehensible attribute +given to an incomprehensible nature, for +to honour him. It is the Bishop that errs, in +thinking nothing to be power but riches and +high place, wherein to domineer and please himself, +and vex those that submit not to his opinions.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>d</i>) “Thirdly, this opinion of absolute necessity +destroys the truth of God, making him to +command one thing openly, and to necessitate +another privately, &c. It destroys the goodness +of God, making him to be a hater of mankind, +&c. It destroys the justice of God, making +him to punish the creatures for that which was +his own act, &c. It destroys the very power +of God, making him to be the true author of all +the defects and evils which are in the world.”</p> + +<p class='c001'>If the opinion of absolute necessity do all this, +then the opinion of God’s prescience does the +same; for God foreknoweth nothing, that can possibly +not come to pass; but that which cannot possibly +not come to pass, cometh to pass of necessity. +But how doth necessity destroy the truth of God, +by commanding and hindering what he commandeth? +Truth consisteth in affirmation and +<span class='pageno' id='Page_213'>213</span>negation, not in commanding and hindering; it +does not therefore follow, if all things be necessary +that come to pass, that therefore God hath +spoken an untruth; nor that he professeth one +thing, and intendeth another. The Scripture, +which is his word, is not the profession of what he +intendeth, but an indication of what those men +shall necessarily intend, whom he hath chosen to +salvation, and whom he hath determined to destruction. +But on the other side, from the negation +of necessity, there followeth necessarily the +negation of God’s prescience; which is in the +Bishop, if not ignorance, impiety. Or how “destroyeth +it the goodness of God, or maketh him +to be a hater of mankind, and to delight in the +torments of his creatures, whereas the very dogs +licked the sores of Lazarus in pity and commiseration +of him”? I cannot imagine, when living +creatures of all sorts are often in torments as well +as men, that God can be displeased with it: without +his will, they neither are nor could be at all +tormented. Nor yet is he delighted with it; but +health, sickness, ease, torments, life and death, +are without all passion in him dispensed by him; +and he putteth an end to them then when they +end, and a beginning when they begin, according +to his eternal purpose, which cannot be resisted. +That the necessity argueth a delight of God in the +torments of his creatures, is even as true, as that it +was pity and commiseration in the dogs that +made them lick the sores of Lazarus. Or how +doth the opinion of necessity “destroy the justice +of God, or make him to punish the creatures for +that which was his own act”? If all afflictions be +<span class='pageno' id='Page_214'>214</span>punishments, for whose act are all other creatures +punished which cannot sin? Why may not God +make the affliction, both of those men that he hath +elected, and also of those whom he hath reprobated, +the necessary causes of the conversion of +those he hath elected; their own afflictions serving +therein as chastisements, and the afflictions of +the rest as examples? But he may perhaps think +it no injustice to punish the creatures that cannot +sin with temporary punishments, when nevertheless +it would be injustice to torment the same +creatures eternally. This may be somewhat to +meekness and cruelty, but nothing at all to justice +and injustice: for in punishing the innocent, +the injustice is equal, though the punishments +be unequal. And what cruelty can be greater +than that which may be inferred from this opinion +of the Bishop; that God doth torment eternally, +and with the extremest degree of torment, +all those men which have sinned, that is to say, +all mankind from the creation to the end of +the world which have not believed in Jesus Christ, +whereof very few, in respect of the multitude of +others, have so much as heard of his name; and +this, when faith in Christ is the gift of God himself, +and the hearts of all men in his hands to frame +them to the belief of whatsoever he will have them +to believe? He hath no reason therefore, for his +part, to tax any opinion, for ascribing to God either +cruelty or injustice. Or how doth it “destroy the +power of God, or make him to be the author of all +the defects and evils which are in the world”? +First, he seemeth not to understand what <em>author</em> +signifies. <em>Author</em>, is he which owneth an action, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_215'>215</span>or giveth a warrant to do it. Do I say, that any +man hath in the Scripture, which is all the warrant +we have from God for any action whatsoever, +a warrant to commit theft, murder, or any other +sin? Does the opinion of necessity infer that +there is such a warrant in the Scripture? Perhaps +he will say, no, but that this opinion makes him +the cause of sin. But does not the Bishop think +him the cause of all actions? And are not sins of +commission actions? Is murder no action? And +does not God himself say, <span lang="la"><i>non est malum in civitate +quod ego non feci</i></span>; and was murder not +one of those evils? Whether it were or not, I say +no more but that God is the cause, not the author, +of all actions and motions. Whether sin be the +action, or the defect, or the irregularity, I mean +not to dispute. Nevertheless I am of opinion, that +the distinction of <em>causes</em> into <em>efficient</em> and <em>deficient</em> +is <em>bohu</em>, and signifies nothing.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>e</i>) “How shall a man praise God for his goodness, +who believes him to be a greater tyrant than +ever was in the world; who creates millions to +burn eternally without their fault, to express his +power?”</p> + +<p class='c001'>If <i>tyrant</i> signify, as it did when it came first in +use, a king, it is no dishonour to believe that God is +a greater tyrant than ever was in the world; for +he is the King of all kings, emperors, and commonwealths. +But if we take the word, as it is now +used, to signify those kings only, which they that +call them tyrants, are displeased with, that is, +that govern not as they would have them, the +Bishop is nearer the calling him a tyrant, than I +am; making that to be tyranny, which is but the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_216'>216</span>exercise of an absolute power; for he holdeth, +though he see it not, by consequence, in withdrawing +the will of man from God’s dominion, that +every man is a king of himself. And if a man cannot +praise God for his goodness, who creates millions +to burn eternally without their fault; how +can the Bishop praise God for his goodness, who +thinks he hath created millions of millions to burn +eternally, when he could have kept them so easily +from committing any fault? And to his “how shall +a man hear the word of God with that reverence, +and devotion, and faith, which is requisite, who believeth +that God causeth his gospel to be preached to +the much greater part of Christians, not with any +intention that they should be converted and saved,” +&c.; I answer, that those men who so believe, have +faith in Jesus Christ, or they have not faith in him. +If they have, then shall they, by that faith, hear +the word of God with that reverence, and devotion, +and faith, which is requisite to salvation. +And for them that have no faith, I do not think he +asketh how they shall hear the word of God with +that reverence, and devotion, and faith, which is +requisite; for he knows they shall not, until such +time as God shall have given them faith. Also he +mistakes, if he think that I or any other Christian +believe, that God intendeth, by hardening any +man’s heart, to make that man inexcusable, but to +make his elect the more careful.</p> + +<p class='c001'>Likewise to his question, “how shall a man receive +the sacrament with comfort, who believeth +that so many millions are positively excluded from +the benefit of Christ’s passion, before they had done +either good or evil”; I answer as before, <i>by faith</i>, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_217'>217</span>if he be of God’s elect; if not, he shall not receive +the sacrament with comfort. I may answer also, +that the faithful man shall receive the sacrament +with comfort, by the same way that the bishop +receiveth it with comfort. For he also believeth +that many millions are excluded from the benefit +of Christ’s passion, (whether positively or not positively +is nothing to the purpose, nor doth positively +signify any thing in this place); and that, so long +before they had either done good or evil, as it +was known to God before they were born that +they were so excluded.</p> + +<p class='c001'>To his “how shall he prepare himself with care +and conscience, who apprehendeth that eating and +drinking unworthily is not the cause of damnation, +but because God would damn a man, therefore +he necessitates him”: I answer, that he that +eateth and drinketh unworthily, does not believe +that God necessitates him to eat and drink unworthily, +because he would damn him; for neither +does he think he eats and drinks unworthily, +nor that God intends to damn him; for he believeth +no such damnation, nor intendeth any preparation. +The belief of damnation is an article of +Christian faith; so is also preparation to the sacrament. +It is therefore a vain question, how he +that hath no faith shall prepare himself with care +and conscience to the receiving of the sacrament. +But to the question, how they shall prepare themselves, +that shall at all prepare themselves; I answer, +it shall be by faith, when God shall give it +them.</p> + +<p class='c001'>To his “how shall a man make a free vow to +God, who thinks himself able to perform nothing, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_218'>218</span>but as he is extrinsically necessitated”: I answer, +that if he make a vow, it is a free vow, or else +it is no vow; and yet he may know, when he hath +made that vow, though not before, that it was extrinsically +necessitated; for the necessity of vowing +before he vowed, hindered not the <i>freedom</i> +of his vow, but made it.</p> + +<p class='c001'>Lastly, to “how shall a man condemn and accuse +himself for his sins, who thinks himself to be +like a watch which is wound up by God,” &c.: I +answer, though he think himself necessitated to +what he shall do, yet, if he do not think himself +necessitated and wound up to impenitence, +there will follow upon his opinion of necessity no +impediment to his repentance. The Bishop disputeth +not against me, but against somebody that +holds a man may repent, that believes at the same +time he cannot repent.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>f</i>) “Observe what a description he has given +us here of repentance: ‘It is a glad returning +into the right way, after the grief of being out of +the way.’ It amazed me to find <i>gladness</i> to be +the first word in the description of repentance.”</p> + +<p class='c001'>I could never be of opinion that Christian repentance +could be ascribed to them, that had as +yet no intention to forsake their sins and to lead a +new life. He that grieves for the evil that hath +happened to him for his sins, but hath not a resolution +to obey God’s commandments better for the +time to come, grieveth for his sufferings, but not +for his doings; which no divine, I think, will call +Christian repentance. But he that resolveth upon +amendment of life, knoweth that there is forgiveness +for him in Christ Jesus; whereof a Christian +<span class='pageno' id='Page_219'>219</span>cannot possibly be but glad. Before this gladness +there was a grief preparative to repentance, but the +repentance itself was not Christian repentance till +this conversion, till this glad conversion. Therefore +I see no reason why it should amaze him to +find gladness to be the first word in the description +of repentance, saving that the light amazeth +such as have been long in darkness. And “for the +fasting, sackcloth, and ashes”, they were never +parts of repentance perfected, but signs of the +beginning of it. They are external things; repentance +is internal. This doctrine pertaineth to +the establishing of Romish penance; and being +found to conduce to the power of the clergy, was +by them wished to be restored.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>g</i>) “It is a returning; but whose act is this +returning? If it be God’s alone, then it is his repentance, +not man’s repentance; what need the +penitent person trouble himself about it?”</p> + +<p class='c001'>This is ill argued; for why is it God’s repentance, +when he gives man repentance, more than it is +God’s faith, when he gives man faith. But he +labours to bring in a concurrence of man’s will with +God’s will; and a power in God to give repentance, +if man will take it; but not the power to +make him take it. This concurrence he thinks is +proved by Revel. iii. 19, 20: “Be zealous, and repent. +Behold, I stand at the door, and knock. If +any man hear my voice, and open the door, I will +come in to him”. Here is nothing of concurrence, +nor of anything equivalent to it, nor mention at all +of the will or purpose, but of the calling or voice by +the minister. And as God giveth to the minister +a power of persuading, so he giveth also many +<span class='pageno' id='Page_220'>220</span>times a concurrence of the auditor with the minister +in being persuaded. Here is therefore somewhat +equivalent to a concurrence with the minister, +that is, of man with man; but nothing of the concurrence +of man, whose will God frameth as he +pleaseth, with God that frameth it. And I wonder +how any man can conceive, when God giveth a man +a will to do anything whatsoever, how that will, +when it is not, can concur with God’s will to make +itself be.</p> + +<p class='c001'>The next thing he excepteth against is this, that +I hold, (<i>h</i>) “that prayer is not a cause, nor a means +of God’s blessing, but only a signification that we +expect it from him.”</p> + +<p class='c001'>First, instead of my words, “a signification that +we expect nothing but from him,” he hath put “a +signification that we expect it from him”. There is +much difference between my words and his, in the +sense and meaning; for in the one, there is honour +ascribed to God, and humility in him that prayeth; +but in the other, presumption in him that prayeth, +and a detraction from the honour of God. When +I say, prayer is not a cause nor a means, I take +<i>cause</i> and <em>means</em> in one and the same sense; +affirming that God is not moved by any thing that +we do, but has always one and the same eternal +purpose, to do the same things that from eternity +he hath foreknown shall be done; and methinks +there can be no doubt made thereof. But the +Bishop allegeth (2 Cor. i. 11): that “St. Paul was +helped by their prayers, and that the gift was +bestowed upon them by their means;” and (James +v. 16): “The effectual and fervent prayer of a +righteous man availeth much”. In which places, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_221'>221</span>the words <em>means</em>, <em>effectual</em>, <em>availeth</em>, do not signify +any causation; for no man nor creature living +can work any effect upon God, in whom there is +nothing, that hath not been in him eternally heretofore, +nor that shall not be in him eternally hereafter; +but do signify the order in which God hath +placed men’s prayers and his own blessings. And +not much after, the Bishop himself saith, “prayer +works not upon God, but us”. Therefore, it is no +cause of God’s will, in giving us his blessings, but +is properly a sign, not a procuration of his favour.</p> + +<p class='c001'>The next thing he replieth to is, that I make +prayer to be a kind of thanksgiving; to which he +replies, “he might even as well tell me, that when +a beggar craves an alms, and when he gives thanks +for it, it is all one.” Why so? Does not a beggar +move a man by his prayer, and sometime worketh +in him a compassion not without pain, and as the +Scripture calls it, a yearning of the bowels; which +is not so in God, when we pray to him? Our prayer +to God is a duty; it is not so to man. Therefore, +though our prayers to man be distinguished from +our thanks, it is not necessary it should be so in +our prayers and thanks to God Almighty.</p> + +<p class='c001'>To the rest of his reply, in this No. <span class='fss'>XV</span>, there +needs no further answer.</p> + +<h3 id='XVI' class='c002'>NO. XVI.</h3> + +<div class='c000'></div> +<div class='sidenote'>The Bishop’s reply.</div> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “Fourthly, the order, beauty, and perfection +of the world doth require that in the universe +should be agents of all sorts, some necessary, some +free, some contingent. He that shall make, either +all things necessary, guided by destiny; or all +things free, governed by election; or all things +<span class='pageno' id='Page_222'>222</span>contingent, happening by chance: doth overthrow +the beauty and the perfection of the world.”</p> + +<p class='c001'><i>T. H.</i> The fourth argument from reason, is this. +The order, beauty, and perfection of the world requireth +that in the universe there should be agents +of all sorts, some necessary, some free, some contingent. +He that shall make all things necessary, +or all things free, or all things contingent, doth +overthrow the beauty and perfection of the world.</p> + +<p class='c001'>In which argument I observe, first, a contradiction. +For seeing he that maketh anything, in that +he maketh it, he maketh it to be necessary, it followeth, +that he that maketh all things, maketh all +things necessary to be. As if a workman make a +garment, the garment must necessarily be. So if +God make every thing, every thing must necessarily +be. Perhaps the beauty of the world requireth, +though we know it not, that some agents should +work without deliberation, which he calls necessary +agents; and some agents with deliberation, and +those both he and I call free agents; and that +some agents should work, and we not know how; +and those effects we both call contingent. But this +hinders not, but that he that electeth, may have +his election necessarily determined to one by former +causes; and that which is contingent, and +imputed to fortune, be nevertheless necessary, and +depend on precedent necessary causes. For by +contingent, men do not mean that which hath no +cause, but which hath not for cause any thing +which we perceive. As for example; when a traveller +meets with a shower, the journey had a cause, +and the rain had a cause, sufficient enough to produce +it; but because the journey caused not the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_223'>223</span>rain, nor the rain the journey, we say, they were +contingent one to another. And thus you see, +though there be three sorts of events, necessary, +contingent, and free, yet they may be all necessary, +without the destruction of the beauty or perfection +of the universe.</p> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “The first thing he observes in mine argument, +is contradiction, as he calls it; but in truth, +it is but a deception of the sight, as one candle +sometimes seems to be two, or a rod in the water +shows to be two rods; <span lang="la"><i>quicquid recipitur, recipitur +ad modum recipientis</i></span>. But what is this contradiction? +Because I say, he who maketh all +things, doth not make them necessary. What! +a contradiction and but one proposition! That +were strange. I say, God hath not made all agents +necessary; he saith, God hath made all agents necessary. +Here is a contradiction indeed; but it is +between him and me, not between me and myself. +But though it be not a formal contradiction, +yet perhaps it may imply a contradiction <span lang="la"><i>in adjecto</i></span>. +Wherefore to clear the matter, and dispel +the mist which he hath raised, it is true, that +everything when it is made, it is necessary that +it be made so as it is, that is, by a necessity of +infallibility, or supposition, supposing that it be so +made; but this is not that absolute, antecedent necessity, +whereof the question is between him and +me. As to use his own instance: before the garment +be made, the tailor is free to make it either +of the Italian, Spanish, or French fashion indifferently; +but after it is made, it is necessary that +it be of that fashion whereof he hath made it, that +is, by a necessity of supposition. But this doth +<span class='pageno' id='Page_224'>224</span>neither hinder the cause from being a free cause, +nor the effect from being a free effect; but the +one did produce freely, and the other was freely +produced. So the contradiction is vanished.”</p> + +<p class='c001'>“In the second part of his answer, (<i>a</i>) he grants; +that there are some free agents, and some contingent +agents, and that perhaps the beauty of the +world doth require it; but like a shrewd cow, +which after she hath given her milk casts it down +with her foot, in the conclusion he tells us, that +nevertheless they are all necessary. This part of +his answer is a mere logomachy, as a great part of +the controversies in the world are, or a contention +about words. What is the meaning of necessary, +and free, and contingent actions? I have showed +before what free and necessary do properly signify; +but he misrecites it. He saith, I make all +agents which want deliberation, to be necessary; +but I acknowledge that many of them are contingent. +(<i>b</i>) Neither do I approve his definition of +contingents, though he say I concur with him, that +they are ‘such agents as work we know not how’. +For, according to this description, many necessary +actions should be contingent, and many contingent +actions should be necessary. The loadstone draweth +iron, the jet chaff, we know not how; and yet +the effect is necessary; and so it is in all sympathies +and antipathies or occult qualities. Again, a +man walking in the streets, a tile falls down from +a house, and breaks his head. We know all the +causes, we know how this came to pass. The man +walked that way, the pin failed, the tile fell just +when he was under it; and yet this is a contingent +effect: the man might not have walked that +<span class='pageno' id='Page_225'>225</span>way, and then the tile had not fallen upon him. +Neither yet do I understand here in this place by +contingents, such events as happen beside the +scope or intention of the agents; as when a man +digging to make a grave, finds a treasure; though +the word be sometimes so taken. But by contingents, +I understand all things which may be done +and may not be done, may happen or may not +happen, by reason of the indetermination or accidental +concurrence of the causes. And those same +things which are absolutely contingent, are yet +hypothetically necessary. As supposing the passenger +did walk just that way, just at that time, +and that the pin did fail just then, and the tile fall; +it was necessary that it should fall upon the passenger’s +head. The same defence will keep out +his shower of rain. But we shall meet with his +shower of rain again, No. <a href='#XXXIV'><span class='fss'>XXXIV</span></a>; whither I refer +the further explication of this point.”</p> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c000'> + <div><span class='fss'>ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. XVI.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c001'>In this number he would prove that there must +be free agents and contingent agents, as well as +necessary agents, from the order, beauty, and perfection +of the world. I that thought that the order, +beauty, and perfection of the world required +that which was in the world, and not that which +the Bishop had need of for his argument, could +see no force of consequence to infer that which he +calls free and contingent. That which is in the +world, is the order, beauty, and perfection which +God hath given the world; and yet there are no +agents in the world, but such as work a seen +necessity, or an unseen necessity; and when they +<span class='pageno' id='Page_226'>226</span>work an unseen necessity in creatures inanimate, +then are those creatures said to be wrought upon +contingently, and to work contingently; and +when the necessity unseen is of the actions of +men, then it is commonly called free, and might +be so in other living creatures; for free and +voluntary are the same thing. But the Bishop in +his reply hath insisted most upon this, that I make +it a contradiction to say that “he that maketh a +thing, doth not make it necessary”, and wonders +how a contradiction can be in one proposition, and +yet within two or three lines after found it might +be. And therefore, to clear the matter, he saith +that such necessity is not <em>antecedent</em>, but a necessity +<em>of supposition</em>: which, nevertheless, is the +same kind of necessity which he attributeth to the +burning of the fire, where there is a necessity that +the thing thrown into it shall be burned; though +yet it be but burning, or but departing from the +hand that throws it in; and, therefore, the necessity +is antecedent. The like is in making a garment; +the necessity begins from the first motion +towards it, which is from eternity, though the tailor +and the Bishop are equally insensible of it. If +they saw the whole order and conjunction of +causes, they would say it were as necessary as any +thing else can possibly be; and therefore God +that sees that order and conjunction, knows it is +necessary.</p> + +<p class='c001'>The rest of his reply is to argue a contradiction +in me; for he says,</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>a</i>) “I grant that there are some free agents, +and some contingent agents, and that perhaps the +beauty of the world doth require it; but like a +<span class='pageno' id='Page_227'>227</span>shrewd cow, which, after she hath given her milk, +casts it down with her foot, in the conclusion I +tell him, that nevertheless they are all necessary.”</p> + +<p class='c001'>It is true that I say some are free agents, and +some contingent; nevertheless they may be all +necessary. For according to the significations of +the words necessary, free, and contingent, the distinction +is no more but this. Of agents, some are +necessary, some are contingent, and some are free +agents; and of agents, some are living creatures, +and some are inanimate; which words are improper, +but the meaning of them is this. Men call necessary +agents, such as they know to be necessary, +and contingent agents, such inanimate things as +they know not whether they work necessarily or no, +and free agents, men whom they know not whether +they work necessarily or no. All which confusion +ariseth from that presumptuous men take for +granted, that that <em>is</em> not, which they <em>know</em> not.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “Neither do I approve his definition of contingents; +that they are such agents as work we +know not how.”</p> + +<p class='c001'>The reason is, because it would follow that many +necessary actions should be contingent, and many +contingent actions necessary. But that which followeth +from it really is no more but this: that +many necessary actions would be such as we know +not to be necessary, and many actions which we +know not to be necessary, may yet be necessary; +which is a truth. But the Bishop defineth contingents +thus: “all things which may be done +and may not be done, may happen or may not +happen, by reason of the indetermination or accidental +concurrence of the causes”. By which definition, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_228'>228</span>contingent is nothing, or it is the same that +I say it is. For there is nothing can be done and +not be done, nothing can happen and not happen, +by reason of the indetermination or accidental +concurrence of the causes. It may be done or +not done for aught he knows, and happen or not +happen for any determination he perceiveth; and +that is my definition. But that the indetermination +can make it happen or not happen, is absurd; +for indetermination maketh it equally to happen +or not to happen, and therefore both; which is +a contradiction. Therefore indetermination doth +nothing; and whatsoever causes do, is necessary.</p> + +<h3 id='XVII' class='c002'>NO. XVII.</h3> + +<div class='c000'></div> +<div class='sidenote'>The Bishop’s reply.</div> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “Fifthly, take away liberty, and you take +away the very nature of evil, and the formal reason +of sin. If the hand of the painter were the +law of painting, or the hand of the writer the +law of writing, whatsoever the one did write, or +the other paint, must infallibly be good. Seeing +therefore that the first cause is the rule and law +of goodness, if it do necessitate the will or the +person to evil, either by itself immediately, or +mediately by necessary flux of second causes, it +will no longer be evil. The essence of sin consists +in this, that one commit that which he might +avoid. If there be no liberty to produce sin, there +is no such thing as sin in the world. Therefore it +appears, both from Scripture and reason, that +there is true liberty.”</p> + +<p class='c001'><i>T. H.</i> To the fifth argument from reason, which +is, that if liberty be taken away, the nature and +formal reason of sin is taken away, I answer by +<span class='pageno' id='Page_229'>229</span>denying the consequence. The nature of sin consisteth +in this, that the action done proceed from +our will, and be against the law. A judge, in +judging whether it be sin or not which is done +against the law, looks at no higher cause of the +action than the will of the doer. Now when I +say the action was necessary, I do not say it was +done against the will of the doer, but with his will, +and so necessarily; because man’s will, that is, +every act of the will, and purpose of man had a +sufficient, and therefore a necessary cause, and +consequently every voluntary action was necessitated. +An action therefore may be voluntary +and a sin, and nevertheless be necessary. And +God may afflict by right derived from his omnipotency, +though sin were not. And the example +of punishment on voluntary sinners, is the +cause that produceth justice, and maketh sin less +frequent; for God to punish such sinners, as I +have shewed before, is no injustice. And thus you +have my answer to his objections, both out of +Scripture and reason.</p> + +<div class='sidenote'>The Bishop’s reply.</div> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “<span lang="la"><i>Scis tu simulare cupressum.</i></span> <span lang="la"><a id='corr229.23'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='<i>Quid hoc?</i>'><i>Quid hoc?</i>”</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_229.23'><ins class='correction' title='<i>Quid hoc?</i>'><i>Quid hoc?</i>”</ins></a></span></span> +It was shrewd counsel which Alcibiades gave to +Themistocles, when he was busy about his accounts +to the state; that he should rather study how to +make no accounts. So it seems T. H. thinks it a +more compendious way, to baulk an argument, +than to satisfy it. And if he can produce a Rowland +against an Oliver, if he can urge a reason +against a reason, he thinks he hath quitted himself +fairly. But it will not serve his turn. And that +he may not complain of misunderstanding it, as +those who have a politic deafness to hear nothing +<span class='pageno' id='Page_230'>230</span>but what liketh them, I will first reduce mine +argument into form, and then weigh what he saith +in answer, or rather in opposition to it. (<i>a</i>) That +opinion which takes away the formal reason of +sin, and by consequence, sin itself, is not to be +approved; this is clear, because both reason and +religion, nature and Scripture, do prove, and the +whole world confesseth, that there is sin. But +this opinion, of the necessity of all things by reason +of a conflux of second causes, ordered and determined +by the first cause, doth take away the +very formal reason of sin. This is proved thus. +That which makes sin itself to be good, and just, +and lawful, takes away the formal cause, and destroys +the essence of sin; for if sin be good, and +just, and lawful, it is no more evil, it is no sin, no +anomy. But this opinion of the necessity of all +things, makes sin to be very good, and just, and +lawful; for nothing can flow essentially by way +of physical determination from the first cause, +which is the law and rule of goodness and justice, +but that which is good, and just, and lawful. But +this opinion makes sin to proceed essentially by +way of physical determination from the first cause, +as appears in T. H.’s whole discourse. Neither is +it material at all whether it proceed immediately +from the first cause, or mediately, so as it be by a +necessary flux of second and determinate causes, +which produce it inevitably. To these proofs he +answers nothing, but only by denying the first +consequence, as he calls it, and then sings over his +old song, ‘that the nature of sin consisteth in this, +that the action proceed from our will, and be +against the law’, which, in our sense, is most true, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_231'>231</span>if he understand a just law, and a free rational +will. (<i>b</i>) But supposing, as he doth, that the law +enjoins things impossible in themselves to be done, +then it is an unjust and tyrannical law; and the +transgression of it is no sin, not to do that which +never was in our power to do. And supposing, +likewise as he doth, that the will is inevitably determined +by special influence from the first cause, +then it is not man’s will, but God’s will, and flows +essentially from the law of goodness.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>c</i>) “That which he adds of a judge, is altogether +impertinent as to his defence. Neither is a +civil judge the proper judge, nor the law of the +land the proper rule of sin. But it makes strongly +against him; for the judge goes upon a good +ground; and even this which he confesseth, that +‘the judge looks at no higher cause than the will +of the doer’, proves that the will of the doer +did determine itself freely, and that the malefactor +had liberty to have kept the law, if he would. +Certainly, a judge ought to look at all material circumstances, +and much more at all essential causes. +Whether every sufficient cause be a necessary cause, +will come to be examined more properly, No. <a href='#XXXI'><span class='fss'>XXXI.</span></a> +For the present it shall suffice to say, that liberty +flows from the sufficiency, and contingency from +the debility of the cause. (<i>d</i>) Nature never intends +the generation of a monster. If all the +causes concur sufficiently, a perfect creature is +produced; but by reason of the insufficiency, or +debility, or contingent aberration of some of the +causes, sometimes a monster is produced. Yet the +causes of a monster were sufficient for the production +of that which was produced, that is a monster: +<span class='pageno' id='Page_232'>232</span>otherwise a monster had not been produced. +What is it then? A monster is not produced +by virtue of that order which is set in nature, +but by the contingent aberration of some of the +natural causes in their concurrence. The order +set in nature is, that every like should beget its +like. But supposing the concurrence of the causes +to be such as it is in the generation of a monster, +the generation of a monster is necessary; as all +the events in the world are when they are, that is, +by an hypothetical necessity. (<i>e</i>) Then he betakes +himself to his old help, that God may punish by +right of omnipotence, though there were no sin. +The question is not now what God may do, but +what God will do, according to that covenant which +he hath made with man, <span lang="la"><i>fac hoc et vives</i></span>, <em>do this +and thou shalt live</em>. Neither doth God punish +any man contrary to this covenant (Hosea xiii. 9): +<em>O Israel, thy destruction is from thyself; but in +me is thy help</em>. He that wills not the death of a +sinner, doth much less will the death of an innocent +creature. By <em>death</em> or <em>destruction</em> in this discourse +the only separation of soul and body is not +intended, which is a debt of nature, and which +God, as Lord of life and death, may justly do, and +make it not a punishment, but a blessing to the +party; but we understand, the subjecting of the +creature to eternal torments. Lastly, he tells of +that benefit which redounds to others from exemplary +justice; which is most true, but not according +to his own grounds. For neither is it justice to +punish a man for doing that which it was impossible +always for him not to do; neither is it lawful to +punish an innocent person, that good may come of +<span class='pageno' id='Page_233'>233</span>it. And if his opinion of absolute necessity of all +things were true, the destinies of men could not be +altered, either by examples or fear of punishment.”</p> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c000'> + <div><span class='fss'>ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. XVII.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c001'>Whereas he had in his first discourse made this +consequence: “if you take away liberty, you take +away the very nature of evil, and the formal reason +of sin”: I denied that consequence. It is true, +he who taketh away the liberty of doing, according +to the will, taketh away the nature of sin; but he +that denieth the liberty to will, does not so. But +he supposing I understood him not, will needs +reduce his argument into form, in this manner. +(<i>a</i>) “That opinion which takes away the formal +reason of sin, and by consequence, sin itself, is not +to be approved.” This is granted. “But the opinion +of necessity doth this.” This I deny; he proves it +thus: “this opinion makes sin to proceed essentially, +by way of physical determination from the first +cause. But whatsoever proceeds essentially by way +of physical determination from the first cause, is +good, and just, and lawful. Therefore this opinion +of necessity maketh sin to be very good, just, and +lawful.” He might as well have concluded, whatsoever +man hath been made by God, is a good and +just man. He observeth not that sin is not a thing +really made. Those things which at first were actions, +were not then sins, though actions of the +same nature with those which were afterwards +sins; nor was then the will to anything a sin, +though it were a will to the same thing, which in +willing now, we should sin. Actions became sins +then first, when the commandment came; for, as +<span class='pageno' id='Page_234'>234</span>St. Paul saith, <em>without the law sin is dead</em>; and +sin being but a <em>transgression of the law</em>, there +can be no action made sin but by the law. Therefore +this opinion, though it derive actions essentially +from God, it derives not sins essentially from +him, but relatively and by the commandment. +And consequently the opinion of necessity taketh +not away the nature of sin, but necessitateth that +action which the law hath made sin. And whereas +I said the nature of sin consisteth in this, that +‘it is an action proceeding from our will and +against the law’, he alloweth it for true; and +therefore he must allow also, that the formal reason +of sin lieth not in the liberty or necessity of +willing, but in the will itself, necessary or unnecessary, +in relation to the law. And whereas he +limits this truth which he allowed, to this, that <em>the +law be just</em>, and <em>the will a free rational will</em>, it +serves to no purpose; for I have shown before, +that no law can be unjust. And it seemeth to me +that a rational will, if it be not meant of a will +after deliberation, whether he that deliberateth +reasoneth aright or not, signifieth nothing. A <em>rational +man</em> is rightly said; but a <em>rational will</em>, in +other sense than I have mentioned, is insignificant.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “But supposing, as he doth, that the law +enjoins things impossible in themselves to be done, +then it is an unjust and tyrannical law, and the +transgression of it no sin,” &c. “And supposing +likewise, as he doth, that the will is inevitably determined +by special influence from the first cause, +then it is not man’s will, but God’s will.” He mistakes +me in this. For I say not the law enjoins +<span class='pageno' id='Page_235'>235</span>things impossible in themselves; for so I should +say it enjoined contradictories. But I say the law +sometimes, the law-makers not knowing the secret +necessities of things to come, enjoins things made +impossible by secret and extrinsical causes from all +eternity. From this his error he infers, that the +laws must be unjust and tyrannical, and the transgression +of them no sin. But he who holds that +laws can be unjust and tyrannical, will easily find +pretence enough, under any government in the +world, to deny obedience to the laws, unless they +be such as he himself maketh, or adviseth to be +made. He says also, that I suppose the will is +inevitably determined by special influence from +the first cause. It is true; saving that senseless +word <em>influence</em>, which I never used. But his consequence, +“then it is not man’s will, but God’s +will”, is not true; for it may be the will both of +the one and of the other, and yet not by concurrence, +as in a league, but by subjection of the will +of man to the will of God.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>c</i>) “That which he adds of a judge, is altogether +impertinent as to his defence. Neither is +a civil judge the proper judge, nor the law of the +land a proper rule of sin.” A judge is to judge of +voluntary crimes. He has no commission to look into +the secret causes that make them voluntary. And +because the Bishop had said the law cannot justly +punish a crime that proceedeth from necessity, it +was no impertinent answer to say, “the judge +looks at no higher cause than the will of the +doer”. And even this, as he saith, is enough to +prove, that “the will of the doer did determine +itself freely, and that the malefactor had liberty +<span class='pageno' id='Page_236'>236</span>to have kept the law if he would”. To which I +answer, that it proves indeed that the malefactor +had liberty to have kept the law if he would; but +it proveth not that he had the liberty to have a +will to keep the law. Nor doth it prove that the +will of the doer did determine itself freely; for, +nothing can prove nonsense. But here you see +what the Bishop pursueth in this whole reply, +namely, to prove that a man hath liberty to do if +he will, which I deny not; and thinks when he hath +done that, he hath proved a man hath liberty to +will, which he calls the will’s determining of itself +freely. And whereas he adds, “a judge ought to +look at all essential causes”; it is answer enough to +say, he is bound to look at no more than he thinks +he can see.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>d</i>) “Nature never intends the generation of a +monster. If all the causes concur sufficiently, a +perfect creature is produced; but by reason of +the insufficiency, or debility, or contingent aberration +of some of the causes, sometimes a monster is +produced.” He had no sooner said this, but finding +his error he retracteth it, and confesseth that +“the causes of a monster were sufficient for the +production of that which was produced, that is, of +a monster; otherwise a monster had not been +produced;” which is all that I intended by sufficiency +of the cause. But whether every sufficient +cause be a necessary cause or not, he meaneth to +examine in No. <a href='#XXXI'><span class='fss'>XXXI.</span></a> In the meantime he +saith only, that liberty flows from the sufficiency, +and contingency from the debility of the cause; +and leaves out necessity, as if it came from neither. +I must note also, that where he says nature never +<span class='pageno' id='Page_237'>237</span>intends the generation of a monster, I understand +not whether by nature he means the Author of +nature, in which meaning he derogates from God; +or nature itself, as the universal work of God; +and then it is absurd; for the universe, as one +aggregate of things natural, hath no intention. +His doctrine that followeth concerning the generation +of monsters, is not worth consideration; +therefore I leave it wholly to the judgment of the +reader.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>e</i>) “Then he betakes himself to his old help, +that God may punish by right of omnipotence, +though there were no sin. The question is not, +now what God may do, but what God will do, +according to that covenant which he hath made +with man, <span lang="la"><i>Fac hoc et vives</i></span>, <em>do this and thou +shalt live</em>.” It is plain (to let pass that he puts +punishment where I put affliction, making a true +sentence false) that if a man do this he shall live, +and he may do this if he will. In this the Bishop +and I disagree not. This therefore is not the +question; but whether the will to do this, or not +to do this, be in a man’s own election. Whereas +he adds, ‘he that wills not the death of a sinner, +doth much less will the death of an innocent creature’; +he had forgot for awhile, that both good +and evil men are by the will of God all mortal; +but presently corrects himself, and says, he means +by death, eternal torments, that is to say, eternal +life, but in torments; to which I have answered +once before in this book, and spoken much more +amply in another book, to which the Bishop hath +inclination to make an answer, as appeareth by his +epistle to the reader. That which followeth to the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_238'>238</span>end of this number, hath been urged and answered +already divers times; I therefore pass it over.</p> + +<h3 id='XVIII' class='c002'>NO. XVIII.</h3> + +<div class='c000'></div> +<div class='sidenote'>The Bishop’s reply.</div> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “But the patrons of necessity being +driven out of the plain field with reason, have certain +retreats or distinctions which they fly unto +for refuge. First, they distinguish between Stoical +necessity and Christian necessity, between which +they make a threefold difference.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“First, say they, the Stoics did subject Jupiter to +destiny, but we subject destiny to God. I answer, +that the Stoical and Christian destiny are one and +the same; <span lang="la"><i>Fatum, quasi effatum Jovis</i></span>. Hear +Seneca: <em>Destiny is the necessity of all things +and actions depending upon the disposition of +Jupiter</em>, &c. I add, that the Stoics left a greater +liberty to Jupiter over destiny, than these stoical +Christians do to God over his decrees, either for +the beginnings of things, as Euripides, or for the +progress of them, as Chrysippus, or at least of the +circumstances of time and place, as all of them +generally. So Virgil: <span lang="la"><i>Sed trahere et moras ducere</i></span>, +&c. So Osyris in Apuleius, promiseth him to +prolong his life, <span lang="la"><i>ultra fato constituta tempora</i></span>, +beyond the times set down by the destinies.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Next, they say, that the Stoics did hold an +eternal flux and necessary connexion of causes; +but they believed that God doth act <span lang="la"><i>præter et +contra naturam</i></span>, <em>besides and against nature</em>. +I answer, that it is not much material whether +they attribute necessity to God, or to the stars, +or to a connexion of causes, so as they establish +necessity. The former reasons do not only condemn +<span class='pageno' id='Page_239'>239</span>the ground or foundation of necessity, but +much more necessity itself upon what ground soever. +Either they must run into this absurdity, +that the effect is determined, the cause remaining +undetermined; or else hold such a necessary connexion +of causes as the Stoics did.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Lastly, they say, the Stoics did take away +liberty and contingence, but they admit it. I answer, +what liberty or contingence was it they admit +but a titular liberty and an empty shadow of +contingence, who do profess stiffly that all actions +and events, which either are or shall be, cannot +but be, nor can be otherwise, after any other +manner, in any other place, time, number, order, +measure, nor to any other end, than they are; and +that in respect of God determining them to one. +What a poor ridiculous liberty or contingency is +this!</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Secondly, they distinguish between the first +cause, and the second causes; they say, that in +respect of the second causes many things are free, +but in respect of the first cause all things are +necessary. This answer may be taken away two +ways.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“First, so contraries shall be true together; the +same thing at the same time shall be determined +to one, and not determined to one; the same +thing at the same time must necessarily be, and +yet may not be. Perhaps they will say, not in the +same respect. But that which strikes at the root +of this question is this, if all the causes were only +collateral, this exception might have some colour: +but where all the causes being joined together, +and subordinate one to another, do make but one +<span class='pageno' id='Page_240'>240</span>total cause, if any one cause (much more the first) +in the whole series or subordination of causes be +necessary, it determines the rest, and without +doubt makes the effect necessary. Necessity or +liberty is not to be esteemed from one cause, but +from all the causes joined together. If one link +in a chain be fast, it fastens all the rest.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Secondly, I would have them tell me whether +the second causes be predetermined by the first +cause, or not. If it be determined, then the effect +is necessary, even in respect of the second causes. +If the second cause be not determined, how is the +effect determined, the second cause remaining undetermined? +Nothing can give that to another +which it hath not itself. But say they, nevertheless +the power or faculty remaineth free. True, +but not in order to the act, if it be once determined. +It is free, <span lang="la"><i>in sensu diviso</i></span>, but not <span lang="la"><i>in +sensu composito</i></span>. When a man holds a bird fast +in his hand, is she therefore free to fly where she +will, because she hath wings? Or a man imprisoned +or fettered, is he therefore free to walk +where he will, because he hath feet and a locomotive +faculty? Judge without prejudice, what +a miserable subterfuge is this which many men +confide so much in.</p> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> + <div class='nf-center'> + <div><span class='small'>CERTAIN DISTINCTIONS WHICH HE SUPPOSING MAY BE BROUGHT TO HIS ARGUMENTS, ARE BY HIM REMOVED.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c001'><i>T. H.</i> He saith, “a man may perhaps answer, +that the necessity of things held by him is not a +Stoical necessity, but a Christian necessity,” &c., +but this distinction I have not used, nor indeed +have ever heard before. Nor do I think any man +<span class='pageno' id='Page_241'>241</span>could make Stoical and Christian two kinds of +necessities, though they may be two kinds of doctrine. +Nor have I drawn my answer to his arguments +from the authority of any sect, but from +the nature of the things themselves.</p> + +<p class='c001'>But here I must take notice of certain words of +his in this place, as making against his own tenet. +“Where all the causes”, saith he, “being joined +together, and subordinate one to another, do make +but one total cause, if any one cause, much more +the first, in the whole series of subordination of +causes be necessary, it determines the rest, and +without doubt maketh the effect necessary.” For +that which I call the necessary cause of any effect, +is the joining together of all causes subordinate +to the first, into one total cause. If any one of +those, saith he, especially the first, produce its +effect necessarily, then all the rest are determined, +and the effect also necessary. Now, it is manifest, +that the first cause is a necessary cause of +all the effects that are next and immediate to it; +and therefore by his own reason, all effects are +necessary. Nor is that distinction of necessary +in respect of the first cause, and necessary in respect +of second causes, mine; it does, as he well +noteth, imply a contradiction.</p> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “Because T. H. disavows these two distinctions, +I have joined them together in one paragraph. +He likes not the distinction of necessity, +or destiny, into Stoical and Christian; no more do +I. We agree in the conclusion, but our motives +are diverse. My reason is, because I acknowledge +no such necessity either as the one or as the +other; and because I conceive that those Christian +<span class='pageno' id='Page_242'>242</span>writers, who do justly detest the naked destiny of +the Stoics, as fearing to fall into those gross absurdities +and pernicious consequences which flow +from thence, do yet privily, though perhaps unwittingly, +under another form of expression introduce +it again at the back-door, after they had +openly cast it out at the fore-door. But T. H. +rusheth boldly without distinctions, which he accounts +but jargon, and without foresight, upon +the grossest destiny of all others, that is, that of +the Stoics. He confesseth, that “they may be +two kinds of doctrine.” May be? Nay, they are; +without all peradventure. And he himself is the +first who bears the name of a Christian, that I +have read, that hath raised this sleeping ghost +out of its grave, and set it out in its true colours. +But yet he likes not the names of Stoical and +Christian destiny. I do not blame him, though he +would not willingly be accounted a Stoic. To admit +the thing, and quarrel about the name, is to +make ourselves ridiculous. Why might not I first +call that kind of destiny which is maintained by +Christians, Christian destiny: and that other maintained +by Stoics, Stoical destiny? But I am not +the inventor of the term. If he had been as careful +in reading other men’s opinions, as he is confident +in setting down his own, he might have found +not only the thing, but the name itself often used. +But if the name of <span lang="la"><i>fatum Christianum</i></span> do offend +him, let him call it with Lipsius, <span lang="la"><i>fatum verum</i></span>; +who divides destiny into four kinds: 1. mathematical +or astrological destiny: 2. natural destiny: +3. Stoical or violent destiny: and 4. true +destiny; which he calls, ordinarily, <span lang="la"><i>nostrum</i></span>, our +<span class='pageno' id='Page_243'>243</span>destiny, that is, of Christians; and <span lang="la"><i>fatum pium</i></span>, +that is, godly destiny; and defines it just as T. H. +doth his destiny, to be (<i>a</i>) a series or order of causes +depending upon the divine counsel (<span lang="la"><cite>De Constantia</cite></span>, +lib. 1. cap. xvii. xviii. xix). Though he be more cautelous +than T. H. to decline those rocks which some +others have made shipwreck upon, yet the divines +thought he came too near them; as appears by his +Epistle to the Reader in a later edition, and by +that note in the margin of his twentieth chapter, +‘Whatsoever I dispute here, I submit to the judgment +of the wise, and being admonished I will +convert it; one may convince me of error, but +not of obstinacy.’ So fearful was he to over-shoot +himself; and yet he maintained both true liberty +and true contingency. T. H. saith, ‘he hath not +sucked his answer from any sect’; and I say, so +much the worse. It is better to be the disciple of +an old sect, than the ring-leader of a new.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “Concerning the other distinction, of liberty +in respect of the first cause, and liberty in respect +of the second causes; though he will not +see that which it concerned him to answer, like +those old <span lang="la"><i>Lamiæ</i></span>, which could put out their eyes +when they list; as, namely, that the faculty of +willing, when it is determined in order to the act, +(which is all the freedom that he acknowledgeth), +is but like the freedom of a bird when she is first +in a man’s hand, &c.: yet he hath espied another +thing wherein I contradict myself, because I affirm, +that if any one cause in the whole series of causes, +much more the first cause, be necessary, it determineth +the rest. But, saith he, ‘it is manifest that +the first cause is a necessary cause of all the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_244'>244</span>effects that are next’. I am glad; yet it is not I +who contradict myself, but it is some of his <em>manifest +truths</em> which I contradict; that ‘the first +cause is a necessary cause of all effects’; which I +say is a manifest falsehood. Those things which +God wills without himself, he wills freely, not necessarily. +Whatsoever cause acts or works necessarily, +doth act or work all that it can do, or all +that is in its power. But it is evident that God +doth not all things without himself, which he can +do, or which he hath power to do. He could have +raised up children unto Abraham of the very +stones which were upon the banks of Jordan +(Luke iii. 8); but he did not. He could have sent +twelve legions of angels to the succour of Christ, +(Matth. xxvi. 53); but he did not. God can make +T. H. live the years of Methuselah; but it is not +necessary that he shall do so, nor probable that he +will do so. The productive power of God is infinite, +but the whole created world is finite. And, +therefore God might still produce more, if it +pleased him. But thus it is, when men go on in a +confused way, and will admit no distinctions. If +T. H. had considered the difference between a necessary +being, and a necessary cause, or between +those actions of God which are immanent within +himself, and the transient works of God which +are extrinsical without himself; he would never +have proposed such an evident error for a manifest +truth. <span lang="la"><i>Qui pauca considerat, facile pronuntiat.</i></span>”</p> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c000'> + <div><span class='fss'>ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. XVIII.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c001'>The Bishop, supposing I had taken my opinion +from the authority of the Stoic philosophers, not +<span class='pageno' id='Page_245'>245</span>from my own meditation, falleth into dispute against +the Stoics: whereof I might, if I pleased, take no +notice, but pass over to No. <a href='#XIX'><span class='fss'>XIX.</span></a> But that he +may know I have considered their doctrine concerning +fate, I think fit to say thus much, that +their error consisteth not in the opinion of fate, +but in feigning of a false God. When therefore +they say, <span lang="la"><i>fatum est effatum Jovis</i></span>, they say no +more but that <em>fate is the word of Jupiter</em>. If +they had said it had been the word of the true +God, I should not have perceived anything in it to +contradict; because I hold, as most Christians do, +that the whole world was made, and is now +governed by the word of God, which bringeth a +necessity of all things and actions to depend upon +the Divine disposition. Nor do I see cause to find +fault with that, as he does, which is said by Lipsius, +that (<i>a</i>) fate is a <em>series or order of causes +depending upon the Divine counsel</em>; though the +divines thought he came too near the rocks, as he +thinks I do now. And the reason why he was +cautelous, was, because being a member of the +Romish Church he had little confidence in the +judgment and lenity of the Romish clergy; and +not because he thought he had over-shot himself.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “Concerning the other distinction, of liberty +in respect of the first cause, and liberty in respect +of the second causes, though he will not +see that which it concerned him to answer, &c.”, +“as, namely, that the faculty of willing, &c.” I +answer, that distinction he allegeth, not to be +mine, but the Stoics’; and therefore I had no +reason to take notice of it; for he disputeth not +against me, but others. And whereas he says, <em>it +concerned me to make</em> that answer which he hath +<span class='pageno' id='Page_246'>246</span>set down in the words following; I cannot conceive +how it concerneth me (whatsoever it may do somebody +else) to speak absurdly.</p> + +<p class='c001'>I said that the first cause is a necessary cause of +all the effects that are next and immediate to it; +which cannot be doubted, and though he deny it, +he does not disprove it. For when he says, “those +things which God wills without himself, he wills +freely and not necessarily”; he says rashly, and +untruly. Rashly, because there is nothing without +God, who is <em>infinite</em>, in whom <em>are all things</em>, +and in whom <em>we live, move, and have our being</em>; +and untruly, because whatsoever God foreknew +from eternity, he willed from eternity, and +therefore necessarily. But against this he argueth +thus: “Whatsoever cause acts or works necessarily, +doth work or act all that it can do, or all that +is in its power; but it is evident that God doth +not all things which he can do,” &c. In things +inanimate, the action is always according to the +extent of its power; not taking in the power of +willing, because they have it not. But in those +things that have will, the action is according to +the whole power, will and all. It is true, that God +doth not all things that he can do if he will; but that +he can <em>will</em> that which he hath not <em>willed</em> from all +eternity, I deny; unless that he can not only <em>will a +change</em>, but also <em>change his will</em>, which all divines +say is immutable; and then they must needs be +necessary effects, that proceed from God. And +his texts, <em>God could have raised up children unto +Abraham</em>, &c.; and <em>sent twelve legions of angels</em>, +&c., make nothing against the necessity of +those actions, which from the first cause proceed +<em>immediately</em>.</p> + +<div> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_247'>247</span> + <h3 id='XIX' class='c002'>NO. XIX.</h3> +</div> + +<div class='c000'></div> +<div class='sidenote'>The Bishop’s reply.</div> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “Thirdly, they distinguish between liberty +from compulsion, and liberty from necessitation. +The will, say they, is free from compulsion, +but not free from necessitation. And this they +fortify with two reasons. First, because it is +granted by all divines, that hypothetical necessity, +or necessity upon a supposition, may consist +with liberty. Secondly, because God and the +good angels do good necessarily, and yet are +more free than we. To the first reason, I confess +that necessity upon a supposition may sometimes +consist with true liberty, as when it signifies only +an infallible certitude of the understanding in +that which it knows to be, or that it shall be. +But if the supposition be not in the agent’s power, +nor depend upon anything that is in his power; if +there be an exterior antecedent cause which doth +necessitate the effect; to call this free, is to be mad +with reason.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“To the second reason, I confess that God and +the good angels are more free than we are, that is, +intensively in the degree of freedom, but not extensively +in the latitude of the object; according to +a liberty of exercise, but not of specification. A +liberty of exercise, that is, to do or not to do, may +consist well with a necessity of specification, or a +determination to the doing of good. But a liberty +of exercise, and a necessity of exercise, a liberty +of specification, and a necessity of specification, +are not compatible, nor can consist together. He +that is antecedently necessitated to do evil, is not +free to do good. So this instance is nothing at all +to the purpose.”</p> + +<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_248'>248</span><i>T. H.</i> But the distinction of free, into free from +compulsion, and free from necessitation, I acknowledge. +For to be free from compulsion, is to do a +thing so as terror be not the cause of his will to +do it. For a man is then only said to be compelled, +when fear makes him willing to it; as when +a man willingly throws his goods into the sea to +save himself, or submits to his enemy for fear of +being killed. Thus all men that do anything from +love, or revenge, or lust, are free from compulsion; +and yet their actions may be as necessary as those +which are done upon compulsion. For sometimes +other passions work as forcibly as fear; but free +from necessitation I say nothing can be. And it +is that which he undertook to disprove. This +distinction, he says, useth to be fortified by two +reasons. But they are not mine. The first, he +says, is, “that it is granted by all divines, that an +hypothetical necessity, or necessity upon supposition, +may stand with liberty”. That you may understand +this, I will give you an example of hypothetical +necessity. <em>If I shall live, I shall eat</em>; this +is an hypothetical necessity. Indeed, it is a necessary +proposition; that is to say, it is necessary +that that proposition should be true, whensoever +uttered; but it is not the necessity of the thing, +nor is it therefore necessary, that the man shall +live, or that the man shall eat. I do not use +to fortify my distinctions with such reasons. Let +him confute them as he will, it contents me. But +I would have your Lordship take notice hereby, +how an easy and plain thing, but withal false, may +be, with the grave usage of such words as <em>hypothetical +necessity</em>, and <em>necessity upon supposition</em>, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_249'>249</span>and such like terms of Schoolmen, obscured and +made to seem profound learning.</p> + +<p class='c001'>The second reason that may confirm the distinction +of free from compulsion, and free from necessitation, +he says, is that ‘God and good angels do +good necessarily, and yet are more free than we’. +This reason, though I had no need of it, yet I +think it so far forth good, as it is true that God +and good angels do good necessarily, and yet are +free. But because I find not in the articles of our +faith, nor in the decrees of our Church, set down +in what manner I am to conceive God and good +angels to work by necessity, or in what sense they +work freely, I suspend my sentence in that point; +and am content that there may be a freedom from +compulsion, and yet no freedom from necessitation, +as hath been proved in that, that a man may +be necessitated to some actions without threats +and without fear of danger. But how he can +avoid the consisting together of freedom and necessity, +supposing God and good angels are freer +than men and yet do good necessarily, that we +must now examine.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“I confess,” saith he, “that God and good angels +are more free than we, that is, intensively in +degree of freedom, not extensively in the latitude +of the object, according to a liberty of exercise, +not of specification.” Again we have here two +distinctions that are no distinctions, but made to +seem so by terms invented, by I know not whom, +to cover ignorance, and blind the understanding +of the reader. For it cannot be conceived that +there is any liberty greater than for a man to do +what he will, and to forbear what he will. One +<span class='pageno' id='Page_250'>250</span>heat may be more intensive than another, but not +one liberty than another. He that can do what +he will, hath all liberty possible; and he that cannot, +has none at all. Also liberty (as he says the +Schools call it) of exercise, which is, as I have +said before, a liberty to do or not to do, cannot be +without a liberty, which they call of specification; +that is to say, a liberty to do or not to do this or +that in particular. For how can a man conceive, +that he has liberty to do any thing, that hath not +liberty to do this, or that, or somewhat in particular? +If a man be forbidden in Lent to eat this, +and that, and every other particular kind of flesh, +how can he be understood to have a liberty to eat +flesh, more than he that hath no license at all?</p> + +<p class='c001'>You may by this again see the vanity of distinctions +used in the Schools; and I do not doubt +but that the imposing of them by authority of +doctors in the Church, hath been a great cause +that men have laboured, though by sedition and +evil courses, to shake them off; for, nothing is +more apt to beget hatred, than the tyrannising +over man’s reason and understanding, especially +when it is done, not by the Scripture, but by pretence +of learning, and more judgment than that +of other men.</p> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “He who will speak with some of our +great undertakers about the grounds of learning, +had need either to speak by an interpreter, or to +learn a new language (I dare not call it jargon or +canting) lately devised, not to set forth the truth, +but to conceal falsehood. He must learn a new +liberty, a new necessity, a new contingency, a new +sufficiency, a new spontaneity, a new kind of deliberation, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_251'>251</span>a new kind of election, a new eternity, a +new compulsion, and in conclusion, a new nothing. +(<i>a</i>) This proposition, <em>the will is free</em>, may be understood +in two senses; either that the will is not +compelled, or that the will is not always necessitated; +for if it be ordinarily, or at any time free +from necessitation, my assertion is true, that there +is freedom from necessity. The former sense, that +the will is not compelled, is acknowledged by all +the world as a truth undeniable: <span lang="la"><i>voluntas non +cogitur</i></span>. For if the will may be compelled, then +it may both will and not will the same thing at the +same time, under the same notion; but this implies +a contradiction. Yet this author, like the +good woman whom her husband sought up the +stream when she was drowned upon pretence that +when she was living she used to go contrary +courses to all other people, holds, that true compulsion +and fear may make a man will that which +he doth not will, that is, in his sense may compel +the will: “as when a man willingly throws his +goods into the sea to save himself, or submits +to his enemy for fear of being killed”. I answer, +that T. H. mistakes sundry ways in this discourse.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “First, he erreth in this, to think that +actions proceeding from fear are properly compulsory +actions: which in truth are not only voluntary, +but free actions; neither compelled, nor so +much as physically necessitated. Another man, +at the same time, in the same ship, in the same +storm, may choose, and the same individual man +otherwise advised might choose not, to throw his +goods overboard. It is the man himself, who +chooseth freely this means to preserve his life. It +<span class='pageno' id='Page_252'>252</span>is true, that if he were not in such a condition, or +if he were freed from the grounds of his present +fears, he would not choose neither the casting of +his goods into the sea, nor the submitting to his +enemy. But considering the present exigence of +his affairs, reason dictates to him, that of two +inconveniences the less is to be chosen, as a comparative +good. Neither doth he will this course +as the end or direct object of his desires, but as the +means to attain his end. And what fear doth in +these cases, love, hope, hatred, &c. may do in +other cases; that is, may occasion a man to elect +those means to obtain his willed end, which otherwise +he would not elect. As Jacob, to serve seven +years more, rather than not to enjoy his beloved +Rachel. The merchant, to hazard himself upon +the rough seas in hope of profit. Passions may be +so violent, that they may necessitate the will, that +is, when they prevent deliberations; but this is +rarely, and then the will is not free. But they +never properly compel it. That which is compelled, +is against the will; and that which is +against the will, is not willed.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>c</i>) “Secondly, T. H. errs in this also, where he +saith, that ‘a man is then only said to be compelled, +when fear makes him willing to an action’: +as if force were not more prevalent with a man, +than fear. We must know therefore, that this +word <em>compelled</em> is taken two ways: sometimes +improperly, that is, when a man is moved or occasioned +by threats or fear, or any passion, to do +that which he would not have done, if those threats +or that passion had not been. Sometimes it is +taken properly; when we do any thing against +<span class='pageno' id='Page_253'>253</span>our own inclination, moved by an external cause, +the will not consenting nor concurring, but resisting +as much as it can. As in a rape, or when +a Christian is drawn or carried by violence to the +idol’s temple. Or as in the case of St. Peter (John +xxi. 18): <em>Another shall gird thee, and carry +thee whither thou wouldest not</em>. This is that compulsion, +which is understood when we say, the will +may be letted, or changed, or necessitated, or that +the imperate actions of the will, that is the actions +of the inferior faculties which are ordinarily +moved by the will, may be compelled: but that +the immanent actions of the will, that is, to will, +to choose, cannot be compelled; because it is the +nature of an action properly compelled, to be done +by an extrinsical cause, without the concurrence +of the will.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>d</i>) “Thirdly, the question is not, whether all +the actions of a man be free, but whether they be +ordinarily free. Suppose some passions are so +sudden and violent, that they surprise a man, +and betray the succours of the soul, and prevent +deliberation; as we see in some <span lang="la"><i>motus primo primi</i></span>, +or antipathies, how some men will run upon the +most dangerous objects, upon the first view of a +loathed creature, without any power to contain +themselves. Such actions as these, as they are +not ordinary, so they are not free; because there is +no deliberation nor election. But where deliberation +and election are, as when a man throws his +goods overboard to save the ship, or submits to +his enemy to save his life, there is always true +liberty.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Though T. H. slight the two reasons which I +<span class='pageno' id='Page_254'>254</span>produce in favour of his cause, yet they who urged +them deserved not to be slighted, unless it were +because they were School-men. The former reason +is thus framed: a necessity of supposition +may consist with true liberty. But that necessity +which flows from the natural and extrinsical determination +of the will, is a necessity of supposition. +To this, my answer is in effect, that (<i>e</i>) a necessity +of supposition is of two kinds. Sometimes the +thing supposed is in the power of the agent to do, +or not to do. As for a Romish priest to vow continence, +upon supposition that he be a Romish +priest, is necessary; but because it was in his +power to be a priest or not to be a priest, therefore +his vow is a free act. So supposing a man to +have taken physic, it is necessary that he keep at +home; yet because it was in his power to take a +medicine or not to take it, therefore his keeping at +home is free. Again, sometimes the thing supposed +is not in the power of the agent to do, or +not to do. Supposing a man to be extremely sick, +it is necessary that he keep at home; or supposing +that a man hath a natural antipathy against a +cat, he runs necessarily away so soon as he sees +her: because this antipathy, and this sickness, are +not in the power of the party affected, therefore +these acts are not free. Jacob blessed his sons, +Balaam blessed Israel; these two acts being done, +are both necessary upon supposition. But it was +in Jacob’s power, not to have blessed his sons; so +was it not in Balaam’s power, not to have blessed +Israel (Numb. xxii. 38). Jacob’s will was determined +by himself; Balaam’s will was physically determined +by God. Therefore Jacob’s benediction +<span class='pageno' id='Page_255'>255</span>proceeded from his own free election; and Balaam’s +from God’s determination. So was Caiphas’ +prophecy (John xi. 51): therefore the text saith, +<em>he spake not of himself</em>. To this T. H. saith +nothing; but only declareth by an impertinent +instance, what <em>hypothetical</em> signifies; and then +adviseth your Lordship, to take notice how errors +and ignorance may be cloaked under grave scholastic +terms. And I do likewise intreat your Lordship +to take notice, that the greatest fraud and +cheating lurks commonly under the pretence of +plain dealing. We see jugglers commonly strip up +their sleeves, and promise extraordinary fair dealing, +before they begin to play their tricks.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Concerning the second argument drawn from +the liberty of God and the good angels; as I cannot +but approve his modesty, in ‘suspending his +judgment concerning the manner how God and the +good angels do work necessarily or freely, because +he finds it not set down in the Articles of our +faith, or the decrees of our Church’, especially in +this age, which is so full of atheism, and of those +scoffers which St. Peter prophesied of, (2 Pet. iii. 3), +who neither believe that there is God or angels, or +that they have a soul, but only as salt, to keep +their bodies from putrifaction; so I can by no +means assent unto him in that which follows, that +is to say, that he hath proved that liberty and necessity +of the same kind may consist together, that +is, a liberty of exercise with a necessity of exercise, +or a liberty of specification with a necessity +of specification. Those actions which he saith are +necessitated by passion, are for the most part dictated +by reason, either truly or apparently right, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_256'>256</span>and resolved by the will itself. But it troubles +him, that I say that God and the good angels are +more free than men, intensively in the degree of +freedom, but not extensively in the latitude of the +object, according to a liberty of exercise, but not +of specification: which he saith are no distinctions, +but terms invented to cover ignorance. Good +words. Doth he only see? Are all other men stark +blind? By his favour, they are true and necessary +distinctions; and if he alone do not conceive them, +it is because distinctions, as all other things, have +their fates, according to the capacities or prejudices +of their readers. But he urgeth two reasons. +‘One heat,’ saith he, ‘may be more intensive than +another, but not one liberty than another.’ Why +not, I wonder? Nothing is more proper to a man +than reason; yet a man is more rational than a +child, and one man more rational than another, +that is, in respect of the use and exercise of reason. +As there are degrees of understanding, so +there are of liberty. The good angels have clearer +understandings than we, and they are not hindered +with passions as we, and by consequence they have +more use of liberty than we. (<i>f</i>) His second +reason is: ‘he that can do what he will, hath all +liberty, and he that cannot do what he will, hath +no liberty’. If this be true, then there are no degrees +of liberty indeed. But this which he calls +liberty, is rather an omnipotence than a liberty to +do whatsoever he will. A man is free to shoot, or +not to shoot, although he cannot hit the white +whensoever he would. We do good freely, but +with more difficulty and reluctance than the good +spirits. The more rational, and the less sensual +<span class='pageno' id='Page_257'>257</span>the will is, the greater is the degree of liberty. +His other exception against liberty of exercise, and +liberty of specification, is a mere mistake, which +grows merely from not rightly understanding what +liberty of specification, or contrariety is. A liberty +of specification, saith he, is a liberty to do or not +to do this or that in particular. Upon better +advice he will find, that this which he calls a liberty +of specification, is a liberty of contradiction, and +not of specification, nor of contrariety. To be +free to do or not to do this or that particular +good, is a liberty of contradiction; so likewise, to +be free to do or not to do this or that particular +evil. But to be free to do both good and evil, is +a liberty of contrariety, which extends to contrary +objects or to diverse kind of things. So his reason +to prove that a liberty of exercise cannot be +without a liberty of specification, falls flat to the +ground: and he may lay aside his lenten licence +for another occasion. I am ashamed to insist +upon these things, which are so evident that no +man can question them who doth understand +them.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>g</i>) “And here he falls into another invective +against distinctions and scholastical expressions, +and the ‘doctors of the Church, who by this means +tyrannized over the understandings of other men.’ +What a presumption is this, for one private man, +who will not allow human liberty to others, to assume +to himself such a licence to control so magistrally, +and to censure of gross ignorance and +tyrannising over men’s judgments, yea, as causes +of the troubles and tumults which are in the world, +the doctors of the Church in general, who have +<span class='pageno' id='Page_258'>258</span>flourished in all ages and all places, only for a few +necessary and innocent distinctions. Truly, said +Plutarch, that a sore eye is offended with the light +of the sun. (<i>h</i>) What then, must the logicians lay +aside their first and second intentions, their abstracts +and concretes, their subjects and predicates, +their modes and figures, their method synthetic +and analytic, their fallacies of composition and +division, &c.? Must the moral philosopher quit +his means and extremes, his <span lang="la"><i>principia congenita et +acquisita</i></span>, his liberty of contradiction and contrariety, +his necessity absolute and hypothetical, &c.? +Must the natural philosopher give over his intentional +species, his understanding agent and patient, +his receptive and eductive power of the matter, +his qualities <span lang="la"><i>infusæ</i></span> or <span lang="la"><i>influxæ</i></span>, <span lang="la"><i>symbolæ</i></span> or <span lang="la"><i>dissymbolæ</i></span>, +his temperament <span lang="la"><i>ad pondus</i></span> and <span lang="la"><i>ad justitiam</i></span>, +his parts homogeneous and heterogeneous, his sympathies +and antipathies, his antiperistasis, &c.? +Must the astrologer and the geographer leave their +<span lang="la"><i>apogæum</i></span> and <span lang="la"><i>perigæum</i></span>, their artic and antartic +poles, their equator, zodiac, zenith, meridian, horizon, +zones, &c.? Must the mathematician, the metaphysician, +and the divine, relinquish all their terms +of art and proper idiotisms, because they do not relish +with T. H.’s palate? But he will say, they are +obscure expressions. What marvel is it, when the +things themselves are more obscure? Let him put +them into as plain English as he can, and they shall +be never a whit the better understood by those +who want all grounds of learning. Nothing is +clearer than mathematical demonstration: yet let +one who is altogether ignorant in mathematics +hear it, and he will hold it to be as T. H. terms +<span class='pageno' id='Page_259'>259</span>these distinctions, plain fustian or jargon. Every +art or profession hath its proper mysteries and +expressions, which are well known to the sons of +art, not so to strangers. Let him consult with +military men, with physicians, with navigators; and +he shall find this true by experience. Let him go +on shipboard, and the mariners will not leave their +<em>starboard</em> and <em>larboard</em>, because they please not +him, or because he accounts it gibberish. No, no: +it is not the School divines, but innovators and seditious +orators, who are the true causes of the present +troubles of Europe. (<i>i</i>) T. H. hath forgotten +what he said in his book, <span lang="la"><cite>De Cive</cite></span>, cap. <span class='fss'>XII.</span>: ‘<em>that +it is a seditious opinion, to teach that the knowledge +of good and evil belongs to private persons</em>’: +and cap. <span class='fss'>XVII.</span> ‘that in questions of faith, the civil +magistrates ought to consult with ecclesiastical +doctors, to whom God’s blessing is derived by imposition +of hands so as not to be deceived in necessary +truths, to whom our Saviour hath promised +infallibility.’ These are the very men whom he +traduceth here. There he ascribes infallibility to +them; here he accuseth them of gross superstitious +ignorance. There he attributes too much to them; +here he attributes too little. Both there and here +he takes too much upon him; (1 Cor. xiv. 32): +<em>The spirits of the prophets are subject to the +prophets</em>.”</p> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c000'> + <div><span class='fss'>ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. XIX.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>a</i>) “This proposition, <em>the will is free</em>, may +be understood in two senses; either that the will is +not compelled, or that the will is not always necessitated, +&c. The former sense, that the will is not +<span class='pageno' id='Page_260'>260</span>compelled, is acknowledged by all the world as a +truth undeniable.” I never said the will is <em>compelled</em>, +but do agree with the rest of the world +in granting that it is <em>not compelled</em>. It is an absurd +speech to say it is compelled, but not to +say it is necessitated, or a necessary effect of some +cause. When the fire heateth, it doth not compel +heat; so likewise when some cause maketh the will +to anything, it doth not compel it. Many things +may compel a man to do an action, in producing +the will; but that is not a compelling of the <em>will</em>, +but of the <em>man</em>. That which I call necessitation, +is the effecting and creating of that will which was +not before, not a compelling of a will already existent. +The necessitation or creation of the will, is the +same thing with the compulsion of the man, saving +that we commonly use the word compulsion, in those +actions which proceed from terror. And therefore +this distinction is of no use; and that raving which +followeth immediately after it, is nothing to the +question, <em>whether the will be free</em>, though it be to +the question, <em>whether the man be free</em>.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “First he erreth in this, to think that actions +proceeding from fear are properly compulsory +actions; which in truth are not only voluntary, +but free actions.” I never said nor doubted, but +such actions were both voluntary and free; for +he that doth any thing for fear, though he say +truly he was compelled to it, yet we deny not that +he had election to do or not to do, and consequently +that he was a voluntary and free agent. +But this hinders not, but that the terror might be +a necessary cause of his election of that which +otherwise he would not have elected, unless some +<span class='pageno' id='Page_261'>261</span>other potent cause made it necessary he should +elect the contrary. And therefore, in the same +ship, in the same storm, one man may be necessitated +to throw his goods overboard, and another +man to keep them within the ship; and the same +man in a like storm be otherwise advised, if all the +causes be not like. But that the same individual +man, as the Bishop says, that chose to throw his +goods overboard, might chose not to throw his +goods overboard, I cannot conceive; unless a man +can choose to throw overboard and not to throw +overboard, or be so advised and otherwise advised, +all at once.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>c</i>) “Secondly, T. H. errs in this also, where he +saith, that ‘a man is then only said to be compelled, +when fear makes him willing to an action.’ +As if force were not more prevalent with a man +than fear,” &c. When I said <em>fear</em>, I think no man +can doubt but the fear of force was understood. I +cannot see therefore what quarrel he could justly +take, at saying that a man is compelled by fear +only; unless he think it may be called compulsion +when a man by force, seizing on another man’s +limbs, moveth them as himself, not as the other +man pleaseth. But this is not the meaning of compulsion: +neither is the action so done, the action +of him that suffereth, but of him that useth the +force. But this, as if it were a question of the +propriety of the English tongue, the Bishop denies; +and says when a man is moved by fear, it is +<em>improperly</em> said he is compelled. But when a +man is moved by an external cause, the will resisting +as much as it can, then he says, he is <em>properly</em> +said to be compelled; as in a rape, or when a +<span class='pageno' id='Page_262'>262</span>Christian is drawn or carried by violence to the +idol’s temple. Insomuch as by this distinction it +were very proper English to say, that a stone were +compelled when it is thrown, or a man when he +is carried in a cart. For my part, I understand +compulsion to be used rightly of living creatures +only, which are moved only by their own animal +motion, in such manner as they would not be +moved without the fear. But of this dispute the +English and well-bred reader is the proper judge.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>d</i>) “Thirdly, the question is not, whether all +the actions of a man be free, but whether they be +ordinarily free.” Is it impossible for the Bishop +to remember the question, which is <em>whether a +man be free to will?</em> Did I ever say, that no actions +of a man are free? On the contrary, I say +that all his voluntary actions are free, even those +also to which he is compelled by fear. But it +does not therefore follow but that the will, from +whence those actions and their election proceed, +may have necessary causes, against which he hath +never yet said anything. That which followeth +immediately, is not offered as a proof, but as explication, +how the passions of a man surprise him; +therefore I let it pass, noting only that he expoundeth +<span lang="la"><i>motus primo primi</i></span>, which I understood +not before, by the word <em>antipathy</em>.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>e</i>) “A necessity of supposition is of two kinds; +sometimes a thing supposed, is in the power of the +agent to do or not to do, &c.; sometimes a thing +supposed, is not in the power of the agent to do or +not to do,” &c.</p> + +<p class='c001'>When the necessity is of the former kind of supposition, +then, he says, freedom may consist with +<span class='pageno' id='Page_263'>263</span>this necessity, in the latter sense that it cannot. +And to use his own instances, to vow continence +in a Romish priest, upon supposition that he is a +Romish priest, is a necessary act, because it was in +his power to be a priest or not. On the other +side, supposing a man having a natural antipathy +against a cat; because this antipathy is not in the +power of the party affected, therefore the running +away from the cat is no free act.</p> + +<p class='c001'>I deny not but that it is a free act of the Romish +priest to vow continence, not upon the supposition +that he was a Romish priest, but because he had +not done it unless he would; if he had not been a +Romish priest, it had been all one to the freedom +of his act. Nor is his priesthood anything to the +necessity of his vow, saving that if he would not +have vowed he should not have been made a +priest. There was an antecedent necessity in the +causes extrinsical; first, that he should have the +will to be a priest, and then consequently that he +should have the will to vow. Against this he +allegeth nothing. Then for his cat, the man’s +running from it is a free act, as being voluntary, +and arising from a false apprehension (which +nevertheless he cannot help) of some hurt or +other the cat may do him. And therefore the +act is as free as the act of him that throweth his +goods into the sea. So likewise the act of Jacob +in blessing his sons, and the act of Balaam in +blessing Israel, are equally free and equally voluntary, +yet equally determined by God, who is +the author of all blessings, and framed the will of +both of them to bless, and whose will, as St. Paul +saith, cannot be resisted. Therefore both their +<span class='pageno' id='Page_264'>264</span>actions were necessitated equally; and, because +they were voluntary, equally free. As for Caiphas’ +his prophecy, which the text saith <em>he spake not of +himself</em>, it was necessary; first, because it was by +the supernatural gift of God to the high-priests, as +sovereigns of the commonwealth of the Jews, to +speak to the people as from the mouth of God, +that is to say, to prophecy; and secondly, whensoever +he did speak not as from God, but as from +himself, it was nevertheless necessary he should +do so, not that he might not have been silent if he +would, but because his will to speak was antecedently +determined to what he should speak from +all eternity, which he hath yet brought no argument +to contradict.</p> + +<p class='c001'>He approveth my modesty in suspending my +judgment concerning the manner how the good +angels do work, necessarily or freely, because I +find it not set down in the articles of our faith, +nor in the decrees of our Church. But he useth +not the same modesty himself. For whereas he +can apprehend neither the nature of God nor of +angels, nor conceive what kind of thing it is +which in them he calleth will, he nevertheless +takes upon him to attribute to them <em>liberty of exercise</em>, +and to deny them <em>a liberty of specification</em>; +to grant them a <em>more intensive</em> liberty than +we have, but not a <em>more extensive</em>; using, not incongruously, +in the incomprehensibility of the subject +incomprehensible terms, as <em>liberty of exercise</em> +and <em>liberty of specification</em>, and degrees of +intension in liberty; as if one liberty, like heat, +might be more intensive than another. It is true +that there is greater liberty in a large than in a +<span class='pageno' id='Page_265'>265</span>straight prison, but one of those liberties is not +more intense than the other.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>f</i>) “His second reason is, <em>he that can do +what he will, hath all liberty, and he that +cannot do what he will, hath no liberty</em>. If +this be true, then there are no degrees of liberty +indeed. But this which he calls liberty, is rather +an omnipotence than a liberty.” It is one +thing to say a man hath liberty to do what he will, +and another thing to say he hath power to do +what he will. A man that is bound, would say +readily he hath not the liberty to walk; but he will +not say he wants the power. But the sick man +will say he wants the power to walk, but not the +liberty. This is, as I conceive, to speak the English +tongue: and consequently an Englishman +will not say, the liberty to do what he will, but the +power to do what he will, is omnipotence. And +therefore either I or the Bishop understand not +English. Whereas he adds that I mistake the +meaning of the words <em>liberty of specification</em>, I am +sure that in that way wherein I expound them, +there is no absurdity. But if he say, I understand +not what the Schoolmen mean by it, I will not +contend with him; for I think they know not +what they mean themselves.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>g</i>) “And here he falls into another invective +against distinctions and scholastical expressions, +and the doctors of the Church, who by this means +tyrannized over the understanding of other men. +What a presumption is this, for one private man,” +&c. That he may know I am no enemy to intelligible +distinctions, I also will use a distinction in +the defence of myself against this his accusation. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_266'>266</span>I say therefore that some distinctions are <em>scholastical</em> +only, and some are <em>scholastical</em> and <em>sapiential</em> +also. Against those that are <em>scholastical</em> +only, I do and may inveigh. But against those +that are <em>scholastical</em> and <em>sapiential</em> also, I do not +inveigh. Likewise some doctors of the Church, +as Suarez, Johannes à Duns, and their imitators, +to breed in men such opinions as the Church of +Rome thought suitable to their interest, did write +such things as neither other men nor themselves +understood. These I confess I have a little slighted. +Other doctors of the Church, as Martin +Luther, Philip Melancthon, John Calvin, William +Perkins, and others, that did write their sense +clearly, I never slighted, but always very much +reverenced and admired. Wherein, then, lieth +my presumption? If it be because I am a private +man, let the Bishop also take heed he contradict +not some of those whom the world worthily +esteems, lest he also (for he is a private man) be +taxed of presumption.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>h</i>) “What then, must the logicians lay aside +their first and second intentions, their abstracts +and concretes &c.: must the moral philosopher +quit his means and extremes, his <span lang="la"><i>principia congenita +et acquisita</i></span>, his liberty of contradiction and +contrariety, his necessity absolute and hypothetical, +&c.: must the natural philosopher give +over his intentional species, &c.: because they +do not relish with T. H.’s palate?” I confess +that among the logicians, Barbara, Celarent, Darii, +Ferio, &c. are terms of art. But if the Bishop +think that words of <em>first and second intention</em>, +that <em>abstract</em> and <em>concrete</em>, that <em>subjects</em> and +<span class='pageno' id='Page_267'>267</span><em>predicates</em>, <em>moods</em> and <em>figures</em>, <em>method synthetic</em> +and <em>analytic</em>, <em>fallacies</em> of <em>composition</em> and <em>division</em>, +be terms of art, I am not of his opinion. For +these are no more terms of art in logic, than <em>lines</em>, +<em>figures</em>, <em>squares</em>, <em>triangles</em>, &c. in the mathematics. +Barbara, Celarent, and the rest that follow, are +terms of art, invented for the easier apprehension +of young men, and are by young men understood. +But the terms of the School with which I have +found fault, have been invented to blind the understanding, +and cannot be understood by those +that intend to learn divinity. And to his question +whether the moral philosopher must quit his means +and extremes, I answer, that though they are not +terms of art, he ought to quit them when they +cannot be understood; and when they can, to use +them rightly. And therefore, though <em>means</em> and +<em>extremes</em> be terms intelligible, yet I would have +them quit the placing of virtue in the one, and of +vice in the other. But for his <em>liberty of contradiction</em> +and <em>contrariety</em>, his <em>necessity absolute</em> and +<em>hypothetical</em>, if any moral philosopher ever used +them, then away with them; they serve for nothing +but to seduce young students. In like manner, +let the natural philosopher no more mention +his <em>intentional species</em>, his <em>understanding agent +and patient</em>, his <em>receptive and eductive power of +the matter</em>, his <span lang="la"><i>qualities infusæ</i></span> or <span lang="la"><i>influxæ</i></span>, <span lang="la"><i>symbolæ</i></span> +or <span lang="la"><i>dissymbolæ</i></span>, his <span lang="la"><i>temperament ad pondus</i></span> +and <span lang="la"><i>ad justitiam</i></span>. He may keep his <span lang="la"><i>parts homogeneous</i></span> +and <span lang="la"><i>heterogeneous</i></span>; but his <span lang="la"><i>sympathies</i></span> +and <span lang="la"><i>antipathies</i></span>, his <span lang="la"><i>antiperistasis</i></span> and the like +names of excuses rather than of causes, I would +have him fling away. And for the astrologer, (unless +<span class='pageno' id='Page_268'>268</span>he means astronomer), I would have him throw +away his whole trade. But if he mean astronomer, +then the terms of <span lang="la"><i>apogæum</i></span> and <span lang="la"><i>perigæum</i></span>, artic, +antartic, equator, zodiac, zenith, meridian, horizon, +zones, &c. are no more terms of art in astronomy, +than a saw or a hatchet in the art of a +carpenter. He cites no terms of art for geometry; +I was afraid he would have put <em>lines</em>, or perhaps +<em>equality</em> or <em>inequality</em>, for terms of art. So that +now I know not what be those terms he thinks I +would cast away in geometry. And lastly, for his +metaphysician, I would have him quit both his +terms and his profession, as being in truth (as +Plutarch saith in the beginning of the life of Alexander +the Great) not at all profitable to learning, +but made only for an essay to the learner; and +the divine to use no word in preaching but such +as his auditors, nor in writing but such as a common +reader, may understand. And all this, not +for the pleasing of my palate, but for the promotion +of truth.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>i</i>) “T. H. hath forgotten what he said in his +book, <span lang="la"><cite>De Cive</cite></span>, cap. <span class='fss'>XII.</span>, that it is ‘a seditious +opinion to teach that the knowledge of good and +evil belongs to private persons’: and cap. <span class='fss'>XVII</span>, +that ‘in questions of faith the civil magistrates +ought to consult with the ecclesiastical doctors, +to whom God’s blessing is derived by imposition +of hands, so as not to be deceived in necessary +truths,’ &c. There he attributes too much to +them, here he attributeth too little; both there and +here he takes too much upon him. <em>The spirits of +the prophets are subject to the prophets.</em>” He +thinks he hath a great advantage against me from +<span class='pageno' id='Page_269'>269</span>my own words in my book <span lang="la"><cite>De Cive</cite></span>, which he +would not have thought if he had understood +them. The knowledge of good and evil is judicature, +which in Latin is <span lang="la"><i>cognitio causarum</i></span>, not +<span lang="la"><i>scientia</i></span>. Every private man may do his best to +attain a knowledge of what is good and evil in +the action he is to do; but to judge of what is +good and evil in others, belongs not to him, but +to those whom the sovereign power appointeth +thereunto. But the Bishop not understanding, or +forgetting, that <span lang="la"><i>cognoscere</i></span> is to judge, as Adam +did of God’s commandment, hath cited this place +to little purpose. And for the infallibility of the +ecclesiastical doctors by me attributed to them, it +is not that they cannot be deceived, but that a +subject cannot be deceived in obeying them when +they are our lawfully constituted doctors. For +the supreme ecclesiastical doctor, is he that hath +the supreme power: and in obeying him no subject +can be deceived, because they are by God +himself commanded to obey him. And what the +ecclesiastical doctors, lawfully constituted, do tell +us to be necessary in point of religion, the same +is told us by the sovereign power. And therefore, +though we may be deceived by them in the belief +of an opinion, we cannot be deceived by them in +the duty of our actions. And this is all that I ascribe +to the ecclesiastical doctors. If they think +it too much, let them take upon them less. Too +little they cannot say it is, who take it, as it is, +for a burthen. And for them who seek it as a +worldly preferment, it is too much. I take, he +says, too much upon me. Why so? Because <em>the +spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets</em>. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_270'>270</span>This is it that he finds fault with in me, +when he says that I am a private man, that is +to say, no prophet, that is to say, no bishop. By +which it is manifest, that the Bishop subjecteth +not his spirit but to the Convocation of bishops. +I admit that every man ought to subject his spirit +to the prophets. But a prophet is he that speaketh +unto us from God; which I acknowledge none to +do, but him that hath due authority so to do. +And no man hath due authority so to do immediately, +but he that hath the supreme authority +of the commonwealth; nor mediately, but they +that speak such things to the people, as he that +hath the supreme authority alloweth of. And as +it is true in this sense, that <em>the spirits of the +prophets are subject to the prophets</em>; so it is also +true that <em>we ought not to believe every spirit, +but to try the spirits, whether they are of God; +because many false prophets are gone out into +the world</em> (1 John iv. 1). Therefore I that am a +private man, may examine the prophets; which to +do, I have no other means but to examine whether +their doctrine be agreeable to the law; which theirs +is not, who divide the commonwealth into two +commonwealths, civil and ecclesiastical.</p> + +<h3 id='XX' class='c002'>NO. XX.</h3> + +<div class='c000'></div> +<div class='sidenote'>The Bishop’s reply.</div> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “Now to the distinction itself, I say, first, +that the proper act of liberty is election, and election +is opposed, not only to coaction, but also to +coarctation, or determination to one. Necessitation +or determination to one, may consist with +spontaneity, but not with election or liberty; as +hath been showed. The very Stoics did acknowledge +<span class='pageno' id='Page_271'>271</span>a spontaneity. So our adversaries are not +yet gone out of the confines of the Stoics.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Secondly, to rip up the bottom of this business, +this I take to be the clear resolution of the +Schools. There is a double act of the will: the one +more remote, called <span lang="la"><i>imperatus</i></span>, that is, in truth +the act of some inferior faculty, subject to the +command of the will, as to open or shut one’s eyes; +without doubt these actions may be compelled. +The other act is nearer, called <span lang="la"><i>actus elicitus</i></span>, an +act drawn out of the will, as to will, to choose, +to elect. This may be stopped or hindered by the +intervening impediment of the understanding, as +a stone lying on a table is kept from its natural +motion; otherwise the will should have a kind of +omnipotence. But the will cannot be compelled to +an act repugnant to its inclination, as when a stone +is thrown upwards into the air; for that is both +to incline and not to incline to the same object +at the same time, which implies a contradiction. +Therefore to say the will is necessitated, is to say, +the will is compelled so far as the will is capable +of compulsion. If a strong man holding the hand +of a weaker, should therewith kill a third person, +<span lang="la"><i>hæc quidem vis est</i></span>, this is violence; the weaker did +not willingly perpetrate the fact, because he was +compelled. But now suppose this strong man had +the will of the weaker in his power as well as the +hand, and should not only incline, but determine +it secretly and insensibly to commit this act: is not +the case the same? Whether one ravish Lucretia +by force, as Tarquin, or by amatory potions and +magical incantations not only allure her, but necessitate +her to satisfy his lust, and incline her +<span class='pageno' id='Page_272'>272</span>effectually, and draw her inevitably and irresistibly, +to follow him spontaneously, Lucretia in both these +conditions is to be pitied. But the latter person is +more guilty, and deserves greater punishment, +who endeavours also, so much as in him lies, to +make Lucretia irresistibly partake of his crime. I +dare not apply it, but thus only: take heed how +we defend those secret and invincible necessitations +to evil, though spontaneous and free from +coaction.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“These are their fastnesses.”</p> + +<p class='c001'><i>T. H.</i> In the next place, he bringeth two arguments +against distinguishing between being free +from compulsion, and free from necessitation. +The first is, that election is opposite, not only to +coaction or compulsion, but also to necessitation +or determination to one. This is it he was to +prove from the beginning, and therefore bringeth +no new argument to prove it. And to those +brought formerly, I have already answered; and +in this place I deny again, that election is opposite +to either. For when a man is compelled, for example, +to subject himself to an enemy or to die, he +hath still election left in him, and a deliberation +to bethink which of these two he can better +endure; and he that is led to prison by force, hath +election, and may deliberate, whether he will be +haled and trained on the ground, or make use of +his feet.</p> + +<p class='c001'>Likewise when there is no compulsion, but the +strength of temptation to do an evil action, being +greater than the motives to abstain, necessarily +determines him to the doing of it, yet he deliberates +whilst sometimes the motives to do, sometimes the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_273'>273</span>motives to forbear, are working on him, and consequently +he electeth which he will. But commonly, +when we see and know the strength that +moves us, we acknowledge necessity; but when +we see not, or mark not the force that moves us, we +then think there is none, and that it is not causes, +but liberty that produceth the action. Hence it +is that they think he does not choose this, that of +necessity chooseth it; but they might as well say +fire does not burn, because it burns of necessity. +The second argument is not so much an argument, +as a distinction, to show in what sense it may be +said that voluntary actions are necessitated, and in +what sense not. And therefore he allegeth, as +from the authority of the Schools and that which +“rippeth up the bottom of the question”, that +there is a double act of the will. The one, he +says, is <span lang="la"><i>actus imperatus</i></span>, an act done at the command +of the will by some inferior faculty of the +soul, as to open or shut one’s eyes: and this act may +be compelled. The other, he says, is <span lang="la"><i>actus elicitus</i></span>, +an act allured, or an act drawn forth by allurement +out of the will, as to will, to choose, to +elect: this, he says, cannot be compelled. Wherein +letting pass that metaphorical speech of attributing +command and subjection to the faculties of the +soul, as if they made a commonwealth or family +among themselves, and could speak one to another, +which is very improper in searching the +truth of the question: you may observe first, +that to compel a voluntary act is nothing else but +to will it. For it is all one to say, my will +commands the shutting of mine eyes or the doing +of any other action, and to say, I have the will to +<span class='pageno' id='Page_274'>274</span>shut mine eyes. So that <span lang="la"><i>actus imperatus</i></span> here, +might as easily have been said in English, <em>a +voluntary action</em>, but that they that invented the +term understood not any thing it signified. Secondly +you may observe, that <span lang="la"><i>actus elicitus</i></span> is +exemplified by these words, to will, to elect, to +choose, which are all one; and so to will is here +made an act of the will; and indeed, as the will is +a faculty or power of a man’s soul, so to will is +an act of it according to that power. But as it is +absurdly said, that to dance is an act allured or +drawn by fair means out of the ability to dance; +so it is also to say, that to will is an act allured +or drawn out of the power to will, which power is +commonly called the will. Howsoever it be, the +sum of his distinction is, that a voluntary act may +be done on compulsion, that is to say, by foul +means; but to will that or any act cannot be but +by allurement or fair means. Now, seeing fair +means, allurements, and enticements, produce the +action which they do produce as necessarily as +threatening and foul means, it follows, that to will +may be made as necessary as any thing that is +done by compulsion. So that the distinction of +<span lang="la"><i>actus imperatus</i></span>, and <span lang="la"><i>actus elicitus</i></span>, are but +words, and of no effect against necessity.</p> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “In the next place follow two reasons of +mine own against the same distinction, the one +taken from the former grounds, that election +cannot consist with determination to one. To +this, he saith, he hath answered already. No; +truth is founded upon a rock. He hath been so +far from prevailing against it, that he hath not +been able to shake it. (<i>a</i>) Now again he tells us, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_275'>275</span>that ‘election is not opposite to either’, necessitation +or compulsion. He might even as well tell +us, that a stone thrown upwards moves naturally; +or that a woman can be ravished with her own +will. Consent takes away the rape. This is the +strangest liberty that ever was heard of, that +a man is compelled to do what he would not, and +yet is free to do what he will. And this he tells +us upon the old score, that ‘he who submits to his +enemy for fear of death, chooseth to submit’. +But we have seen formerly, that this which he +calls compulsion, is not compulsion properly, nor +that natural determination of the will to one, +which is opposite to true liberty. He who submits +to an enemy for saving his life, doth either only +counterfeit, and then there is no will to submit; (this +disguise is no more than a stepping aside to avoid a +present blow); or else he doth sincerely will a submission, +and then the will is changed. There is a +vast difference between compelling and changing +the will. Either God or man may change the will +of man, either by varying the condition of things, +or by informing the party otherwise: but compelled +it cannot be, that is, it cannot both will +this and not will this, as it is invested with the +same circumstances; though, if the act were otherwise +circumstantiated, it might nill that freely +which now it wills freely. (<i>b</i>) Wherefore this kind +of actions are called mixed actions, that is partly +voluntary, partly involuntary. That which is +compelled in a man’s present condition or distress, +that is not voluntary nor chosen. That which is +chosen, as the remedy of its distress, that is voluntary. +So hypothetically, supposing a man were +<span class='pageno' id='Page_276'>276</span>not in that distress, they are involuntary; but absolutely +without any supposition at all, taking the +case as it is, they are voluntary. (<i>c</i>) His other instance +of ‘a man forced to prison, that he may +choose whether he will be haled thither upon the +ground, or walk upon his feet,’ is not true. By +his leave, that is not as he pleaseth, but as it +pleaseth them who have him in their power. If +they will drag him, he is not free to walk; and if +they give him leave to walk, he is not forced to be +dragged. (<i>d</i>) Having laid this foundation, he +begins to build upon it, that ‘other passions do +necessitate as much as fear’. But he errs doubly; +first, in his foundation. Fear doth not determine +the rational will naturally and necessarily. The +last and greatest of the five terrible things is death; +yet the fear of death cannot necessitate a resolved +mind to do a dishonest action, which is worse than +death. The fear of the fiery furnace could not +compel the three children to worship an idol, nor +the fear of the lions necessitate Daniel to omit his +duty to God. It is our frailty, that we are more +afraid of empty shadows than of substantial dangers, +because they are nearer our senses; as little +children fear a mouse or a visard more than fire or +weather. But as a fit of the stone takes away the +sense of the gout for the present, so the greater +passion doth extinguish the less. The fear of +God’s wrath and eternal torments doth expel corporeal +fear: <em>fear not them who kill the body, but +fear him who is able to cast both body and soul +into hell</em> (Luke xii. 4). (<i>e</i>) <span lang="la"><i>Da veniam imperator; +tu carcerem, ille gehennam minatur.</i></span>--<em>Excuse me, +O emperor, thou threatenest men with prison, but +<span class='pageno' id='Page_277'>277</span>he threatens me with hell.</em> (<i>f</i>) Secondly, he errs +in his superstruction also. There is a great difference, +as to this case of justifying, or not justifying +an action, between force and fear, and other +passions. Force doth not only lessen the sin, but +takes it quite away. He who forced a betrothed +damsel was to die; ‘but unto the damsel,’ saith +he, ‘thou shalt do nothing, there is in her no +fault worthy of death’ (Deut. xxii. 26). Tamar’s +beauty, or Ammon’s love, did not render him innocent; +but Ammon’s force rendered Tamar innocent. +But fear is not so prevalent as force. Indeed if +fear be great and justly grounded, such as may +fall upon a constant man, though it do not dispense +with the transgression of the negative precepts +of God or nature, because they bind to all +times, yet it diminisheth the offence even against +them, and pleads for pardon. But it dispenseth +in many cases with the transgression of the positive +law, either divine or human; because it is not +probable that God or the law would oblige man to +the observation of all positive precepts, with so +great damage as the loss of his life. The omission +of circumcision was no sin, whilst the Israelites +were travelling through the wilderness. By T. H.’s +permission, (<i>g</i>) I will propose a case to him. A +gentleman sends his servant with money to buy +a dinner; some Russians meet him by the way, and +take it from him by force; the servant cried for +help, and did what he could to defend himself, but +all would not serve. The servant is innocent, if he +were to be tried before a court of Areopagites. Or +suppose the Russians did not take it from him by +force, but drew their swords and threatened to +<span class='pageno' id='Page_278'>278</span>kill him except he delivered it himself; no wise +man will conceive, that it was either the master’s +intention or the servant’s duty to hazard his life +or limbs for saving of such a trifling sum. But on +the other side, suppose this servant, passing by +some cabaret or tennis-court where his comrades +were drinking or playing, should stay with them, +and drink or play away his money, and afterwards +plead, as T. H. doth here, that he was overcome by +the mere strength of temptation. I trow, neither +T. H. nor any man else would admit of this excuse, +but punish him for it: because neither was he necessitated +by the temptation, and what strength it had +was by his own fault, in respect of that vicious habit +which he had contracted of drinking or gaming: +(James i. 14): <em>Every man is tempted, when he is +drawn away of his own lust and enticed</em>. Disordered +passions of anger, hatred, lust, if they be consequent +(as the case is here put by T. H.) and flow +from deliberation and election, they do not only +not diminish the fault, but they aggravate it, and +render it much greater.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>h</i>) “He talks much of the ‘motives to do and +motives to forbear, how they work upon and determine +a man’; as if a reasonable man were no +more than a tennis-ball, to be tossed to and fro by +the rackets of the second causes; as if the will had +no power to move itself, but were merely passive, +like an artificial popingay removed hither and +thither by the bolts of the archers, who shoot on +this side and on that. What are motives, but reasons +or discourses framed by the understanding, +and freely moved by the will? What are the will +and the understanding, but faculties of the same +<span class='pageno' id='Page_279'>279</span>soul? And what is liberty but a power resulting +from them both? To say that the will is determined +by these motives, is as much as to say that +the agent is determined by himself. If there be no +necessitation before the judgment of right reason +doth dictate to the will, then there is no antecedent, +no extrinsical necessitation at all. (<i>i</i>) All +the world knows, that when the agent is determined +by himself, then the effect is determined +likewise in its cause. But if he determined himself +freely, then the effect is free. Motives determine +not naturally, but morally; which kind of +determination may consist with true liberty. But +if T. H.’s opinion were true, that the will were naturally +determined by the physical and special influence +of extrinsical causes, not only motives were +vain, but reason itself and deliberation were vain. +No, saith he, they are not vain, because they are the +means. Yes, if the means be superfluous, they are +vain. What needed such a circuit of deliberation +to advise what is fit to be done, when it is already +determined extrinsically what must be done?</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>k</i>) “He saith, ‘that the ignorance of the true +causes and their power, is the reason why we ascribe +the effect to liberty; but when we seriously +consider the causes of things, we acknowledge a +necessity’. No such thing, but just the contrary. +The more we consider, and the clearer we understand, +the greater is the liberty, and the more the +knowledge of our own liberty. The less we consider, +and the more incapable that the understanding +is, the lesser is the liberty, and the knowledge +of it. And where there is no consideration nor +use of reason, there is no liberty at all, there is +<span class='pageno' id='Page_280'>280</span>neither moral good nor evil. Some men, by reason +that their exterior senses are not totally bound, +have a trick to walk in their sleep. Suppose such +a one in that case should cast himself down a +pair of stairs or from a bridge, and break his neck +or drown himself; it were a mad jury that would +find this man accessary to his own death. Why? +Because it was not freely done, he had not then the +use of reason.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>l</i>) “Lastly, he tells us, that ‘the will doth +choose of necessity, as well as the fire burns of +necessity’. If he intend no more but this, that +election is the proper and natural act of the will +as burning is of the fire, or that the elective power +is as necessarily in a man as visibility, he speaks +truly, but most impertinently; for, the question is +not now of the elective power, <span lang="la"><i>in actu primo</i></span>, +whether it be an essential faculty of the soul, but +whether the act of electing this or that particular +object, be free and undetermined by any antecedent +and extrinsical causes. But if he intend it +in this other sense, that as the fire hath no power +to suspend its burning, nor to distinguish between +those combustible matters which are put unto it, +but burns that which is put unto it necessarily, if +it be combustible; so the will hath no power to +refuse that which it wills, nor to suspend its own +appetite: he errs grossly. The will hath power +either to will or nill, or to suspend, that is, neither +to will nor nill the same object. Yet even the +burning of the fire, if it be considered as it is invested +with all particular circumstances, is not +otherwise so necessary an action as T. H. imagineth. +(<i>m</i>) Two things are required to make an +<span class='pageno' id='Page_281'>281</span>effect necessary. First, that it be produced by a +necessary cause, such as fire is; secondly, that it +be necessarily produced. Protagoras, an atheist, +began his book thus: ‘Concerning the Gods, I have +nothing to say, whether they be or they be not’: +for which his book was condemned by the Athenians +to be burned. The fire was a necessary +agent, but the sentence or the application of the +fire to the book was a free act; and therefore +the burning of his book was free. Much more the +rational will is free, which is both a voluntary +agent, and acts voluntarily.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>n</i>) “My second reason against this distinction, +of liberty from compulsion but not from necessitation, +is new, and demonstrates clearly that to +necessitate the will by a physical necessity, is to +compel the will so far as the will is capable of +compulsion; and that he who doth necessitate the +will to evil after that manner, is the true cause of +evil, and ought rather to be blamed than the will +itself. But T. H., for all he saith he is not surprised, +can be contented upon better advise to +steal by all this in silence. And to hide this tergiversation +from the eyes of the reader, he makes +an empty shew of braving against that famous and +most necessary distinction, between the <span lang="la"><i>elicite</i></span> and +<span lang="la"><i>imperate</i></span> acts of the will; first, because the terms +are <em>improper</em>; secondly, because they are <em>obscure</em>. +What trivial and grammatical objections are these, +to be used against the universal current of divines +and philosophers. <span lang="la"><i>Verborum ut nummorum</i></span>, it is in +words as it is in money: use makes them proper +and current. A <em>tyrant</em> at first signified a lawful +and just prince; now, use hath quite changed the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_282'>282</span>sense of it, to denote either a usurper or an oppressor. +The word <span lang="la"><i>præmunire</i></span> is now grown a +good word in our English laws, by use and tract of +time; and yet at first it was merely mistaken for +a <span lang="la"><i>præmonere</i></span>. The names of Sunday, Monday, +Tuesday, were derived at first from those heathenish +deities, the Sun, the Moon, and the warlike god +of the Germans. Now we use them for distinction +sake only, without any relation to their first +original. He is too froward, that will refuse a +piece of coin that is current throughout the world, +because it is not stamped after his own fancy. So +is he that rejects a good word, because he understands +not the derivation of it. We see foreign +words are daily naturalized and made free denizens +in every country. But why are the terms +improper? ‘Because,’ saith he, ‘it attributes command, +and subjection to the faculties of the soul, +as if they made a commonwealth or family among +themselves, and could speak one to another.’ +Therefore, he saith, (<i>o</i>) they who invented this +term of <span lang="la"><i>actus imperatus</i></span>, understood not anything +what it signified. No; why not? It seemeth to +me, they understood it better than those who except +against it. They knew there are <em>mental terms</em>, +which are only conceived in the mind, as well as +<em>vocal terms</em>, which are expressed with the tongue. +They knew, that howsoever a superior do intimate +a direction to his inferior, it is still a command. +Tarquin commanded his son by only striking off +the tops of the poppies, and was by him both understood +and obeyed. Though there be no formal +commonwealth or family either in the body or in +the soul of man, yet there is a subordination in +<span class='pageno' id='Page_283'>283</span>the body, of the inferior members to the head; +there is a subordination in the soul, of the inferior +faculties to the rational will. Far be it from a +reasonable man so far to dishonour his own nature, +as to equal fancy with understanding, or the +sensitive appetite with the reasonable will. A +power of command there is, without all question; +though there be some doubt in what faculty this +command doth principally reside, whether in the +will or in the understanding. The true resolution +is, that the directive command or counsel is in +the understanding; and the applicative command, +or empire for putting in execution of what is +directed, is in the will. The same answer serves +for his second impropriety, about the word <span lang="la"><i>elicite</i></span>. +For saith he, ‘as it is absurdly said, that to dance +is an act allured, or drawn by fair means, out of the +ability to dance; so is it absurdly said, that to will +or choose, is an act drawn out of the power to +will’. His objection is yet more improper than +the expression. The art of dancing rather resembles +the understanding than the will. That +drawing which the Schools intend, is clear of +another nature from that which he conceives. By +<em>elicitation</em>, he understands a persuading or enticing +with flattering words, or sweet alluring insinuations, +to choose this or that. But that <em>elicitation</em> +which the Schools intend, is a deducing of the power +of the will into act; that drawing which they +mention, is merely from the appetibility of the +object, or of the end. As a man draws a child after +him with the sight of a fair apple, or a shepherd +draws his sheep after him with the sight of a green +bough: so the end draws the will to it by a metaphorical +<span class='pageno' id='Page_284'>284</span>motion. What he understands here by +an ability to dance, is more than I know, or any +man else, until he express himself in more proper +terms; whether he understand the locomotive faculty +alone, or the art or acquired habit of dancing +alone, or both of these jointly. It may be said +aptly without any absurdity, that the act of dancing +is drawn out (<span lang="la"><i>elicitur</i></span>) of the locomotive faculty +helped by the acquired habit. He who is so scrupulous +about the received phrases of the Schools, +should not have let so many improper expressions +have dropt from his pen; as in this very passage, he +confounds the <em>compelling</em> of a voluntary action, +with the <em>commanding</em> of a voluntary action, and +<em>willing</em> with <em>electing</em>, which, he saith, ‘are all one’. +Yet <em>to will</em> properly respects the end, <em>to elect</em> the +means.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>p</i>) “His other objection against this distinction +of the acts of the will into <span lang="la"><i>elicite</i></span> and <span lang="la"><i>imperate</i></span>, +is obscurity. ‘Might it not,’ saith he, ‘have been +as easily said in English, a voluntary action.’ Yes, +it might have been said as easily, but not as truly, +nor properly. Whatsoever hath its original from +the will, whether immediately or mediately, whether +it be a proper act of the will itself, as to +elect, or an act of the understanding, as to deliberate, +or an act of the inferior faculties or of the +members, is a voluntary action: but neither the +act of reason, nor of the senses, nor of the sensitive +appetite, nor of the members, are the proper acts +of the will, nor drawn immediately out of the will +itself; but the members and faculties are applied +to their proper and respective acts by the power of +the will.</p> + +<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_285'>285</span>“And so he comes to cast up the total sum of +my second reason with the same faith that the +unjust steward did make his accounts (Luke xvi). +‘The sum of J. D.’s distinction is,’ saith he, +‘that a voluntary act may be done on compulsion,’ +(just contrary to what I have maintained), ‘that is +to say, by foul means: but to will that or any +act, cannot be but by allurement or fair means.’ I +confess the distinction is mine, because I use it; as +the sun is mine, or the air is mine, that is common +to me with all who treat of this subject. (<i>q</i>) But +his mistakes are so thick, both in relating my +mind and his own, that the reader may conclude +he is wandered out of his known way. I will +do my duty to show him the right way. First, +no acts which are properly said to be compelled, +are voluntary. Secondly, acts of terror, (which he +calls foul means), which are sometimes in a large +improper sense called compulsory actions, may be, +and for the most part are, consistent with true +liberty. Thirdly, actions proceeding from blandishments +or sweet persuasions, (which he calls fair +means), if they be indeliberated, as in children +who want the use of reason, are not presently free +actions. Lastly, the strength of consequent and +deliberated desires doth neither diminish guilt, nor +excuse from punishment, as just fears of extreme +and imminent dangers threatened by extrinsical +agents often do; because the strength of the former +proceeds from our own fault, and was freely +elected in the causes of it; but neither desires nor +fears, which are consequent and deliberated, do +absolutely necessitate the will.</p> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c000'> + <div><span class='pageno' id='Page_286'>286</span><span class='fss'>ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. XX.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>a</i>) “Now again he tells us, that election is not +opposite to either necessitation or compulsion. He +might even as well tell us, that a stone thrown +upwards moves naturally, or that a woman can be +ravished with her own will. Consent takes away +the rape,” &c. If that which I have told him +again, be false, why shows he not why it is false? +Here is not one word of argument against it. To +say, I might have said as well that a stone thrown +upwards moves naturally, is no refutation, but a +denial. I will not dispute with him, whether a +stone thrown up move naturally or not. I shall +only say to those readers whose judgments are not +defaced with the abuse of words, that as a stone +moveth not upwards of itself, but by the power of +the external agent who giveth it a beginning of +that motion; so also when the stone falleth, it is +moved downward by the power of some other +agent, which, though it be imperceptible to the +eye, is not imperceptible to reason. But because +this is not proper discourse for the Bishop, and +because I have elsewhere discoursed thereof expressly, +I shall say nothing of it here. And +whereas he says, ‘consent takes away the rape’; +it may perhaps be true, and I think it is; but here +it not only inferreth nothing, but was also needless, +and therefore in a public writing is an indecent +instance, though sometimes not unnecessary +in a spiritual court. In the next place, he wonders +how “a man is compelled, and yet free to do +what he will”; that is to say, how a man is made +<span class='pageno' id='Page_287'>287</span>to will, and yet free to do what he will. If he +had said, he wondered how a man can be compelled +to will, and yet be free to do that which he would +have done if he had not been compelled, it had +been somewhat; as it is, it is nothing. Again he +says, “he who submits to an enemy for saving +his life, doth either only counterfeit, or else his will +is changed,” &c.: all which is true. But when +he says he doth counterfeit, he doth not insinuate +that he may counterfeit lawfully; for that +would prejudice him hereafter, in case he should +have need of quarter. But how this maketh for +him, or against me, I perceive not. “There is a +vast difference,” saith he, “between compelling +and changing the will. Either God or man may +change the will of man, either by varying the condition +of things, or by informing the party otherwise; +but compelled it cannot be,” &c. I say the +same; the will cannot be compelled; but the man +may be, and is then compelled, when his will is +changed by the fear of force, punishment, or other +hurt from God or man. And when his will is +changed, there is a new will formed, (whether it +be by God or man), and that necessarily; and consequently +the actions that flow from that will, are +both voluntary, free, and necessary, notwithstanding +that he was compelled to do them. Which +maketh not for the Bishop, but for me.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “Wherefore this kind of actions are called +mixed actions, that is partly voluntary, partly involuntary, +&c. So supposing a man were not in +that distress, they are involuntary.” That some +actions are partly voluntary, partly involuntary, is +not a new, but a false opinion. For one and the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_288'>288</span>same action can never be both voluntary and involuntary. +If therefore parts of an action be actions, +he says no more but that some actions are +voluntary, some involuntary; or that one multitude +of actions may be partly voluntary, partly involuntary. +But that one action should be partly voluntary, +partly involuntary, is absurd. And it is the +absurdity of those authors which he unwarily gave +credit to. But to say, supposing the man had +not been in distress, that then the action had been +involuntary, is to say, that the throwing of a +man’s goods into the sea, supposing he had not +been in a storm, had been an involuntary action; +which is also an absurdity; for he would not have +done it, and therefore it had been no action at all. +And this absurdity is his own.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>c</i>) “His other instance of a man forced to +prison, that he may choose whether he will be +haled thither upon the ground or walk upon his +feet, is not true. By his leave, that is not as he +pleaseth, but as it pleaseth them who have him +in their power.” It is enough for the use I +make of that instance, that a man when in the necessity +of going to prison, though he cannot elect +nor deliberate of being prisoner in the jail, may +nevertheless deliberate sometimes, whether he shall +walk or be haled thither.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>d</i>) “Having laid this foundation, he begins to +build upon it, that other passions do necessitate as +much as fear. But he errs doubly,” &c. First, he +says, I err in this, that I say that fear determines +the rational will naturally and necessarily. And +first, I answer, that I never used that term of +rational will. There is nothing rational but God, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_289'>289</span>angels, and men. The will is none of these. I +would not have excepted against this expression, +but that every where he speaketh of the will +and other faculties as of men, or spirits in men’s +bellies. Secondly, he offereth nothing to prove +the contrary. For that which followeth: “the last +and greatest of five terrible things is death; yet +the fear of death cannot necessitate a resolved +mind to a dishonest action; the fear of the fiery +furnace could not compel the three children to +worship an idol, nor the fear of the lions necessitate +Daniel to omit his duty to God,” &c.: I grant +him that the greatest of five (or of fifteen, for he +had no more reason for five than fifteen) terrible +things doth not always necessitate a man to do a +dishonest action, and that the fear of the fiery furnace +could not compel the three children, nor the +lions Daniel, to omit their duty; for somewhat else, +namely, their confidence in God, did necessitate +them to do their duty. That the fear of God’s +wrath doth expel corporeal fear, is well said, and +according to the text he citeth: and proveth +strongly, that fear of the greater evil may necessitate +in a man a courage to endure the lesser +evil.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>e</i>) “<span lang="la"><i>Da veniam imperator; tu carcerem, ille +gehennam minatur</i></span>:--Excuse me, O Emperor; thou +threatenest men with prison, but God threatens me +with hell.” This sentence, and that which he saith +No. <a href='#XVII'><span class='fss'>XVII</span></a>, that neither the civil judge is the proper +judge, nor the law of the land is the proper rule of +sin, and divers other sayings of his to the same effect, +make it impossible for any nation in the world to +preserve themselves from civil wars. For all men +<span class='pageno' id='Page_290'>290</span>living equally acknowledging, that the High and +Omnipotent God is to be obeyed before the greatest +emperors; every one may pretend the commandment +of God to justify his disobedience. And +if one man pretendeth that God commands one +thing, and another man that he commands the +contrary, what equity is there to allow the pretence +of one more than of another? Or what +peace can there be, if they be all allowed alike? +There will therefore necessarily arise discord and +civil war, unless there be a judge agreed upon, with +authority given to him by every one of them, to +show them and interpret to them the Word of +God; which interpreter is always the emperor, +king, or other sovereign person, who therefore +ought to be obeyed. But the Bishop thinks that +to shew us and interpret to us the Word of God, +belongeth to the clergy; wherein I cannot consent +unto him. Excuse me, O Bishop, you threaten me +with that you cannot do; but the emperor threateneth +me with death, and is able to do what he +threateneth.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>f</i>) “Secondly, he errs in his superstruction +also. There is a great difference, as to this case of +justifying or not justifying an action, between +force and fear, &c. Force doth not only lessen +the sin, but takes it quite away, &c.” I know not +to what point of my answer this reply of his is to +be applied. I had said, the actions of men compelled +are, nevertheless, voluntary. It seems that +he calleth <em>compulsion</em> force; but I call it a fear of +force, or of damage to be done by force, by which +fear a man’s will is framed to somewhat to which +he had no will before. Force taketh away the sin, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_291'>291</span>because the action is not his that is forced, but his +that forceth. It is not always so in compulsion; +because, in this case, a man electeth the <em>less +evil</em> under the notion of <em>good</em>. But his instances +of the betrothed damsel that was forced, and of +Tamar, may, for anything there appeareth in the +text, be instances of compulsion, and yet the damsel +and Tamar be both innocent. In that which +immediately followeth, concerning how far fear +may extenuate a sin, there is nothing to be answered. +I perceive in it he hath some glimmering +of the truth, but not of the grounds thereof. It +is true, that just fear dispenseth not with the precepts +of God or nature; for they are not dispensable; +but it extenuateth the fault, not by diminishing +anything in the action, but by being no transgression. +For if the fear be allowed, the action +it produceth is allowed also. Nor doth it dispense +in any case with the law positive, but by making +the action itself lawful; for the breaking of a law +is always sin. And it is certain that men are +obliged to the observation of all positive precepts, +though with the loss of their lives, unless the right +that a man hath to preserve himself make it, in +case of a just fear, to be no law. “The omission +of circumcision was no sin,” he says, “whilst the +Israelites were travelling through the wilderness.” +It is very true, but this has nothing to do with +compulsion. And the cause why it was no sin, +was this: they were ready to obey it, whensoever +God should give them leisure and rest from travel, +whereby they might be cured; or at least when +God, that daily spake to their conductor in the +desert, should appoint him to renew that sacrament.</p> + +<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_292'>292</span>(<i>g</i>) “I will propose a case to him,” &c. The +case is this. A servant is robbed of his master’s +money by the highway, but is acquitted because he +was forced. Another servant spends his master’s +money in a tavern. Why is he not acquitted also, +seeing he was necessitated? “Would,” saith he, +“T. H. admit of this excuse?” I answer, no: but +I would do that to him, which should necessitate +him to behave himself better another time, or at +least necessitate another to behave himself better +by his example.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>h</i>) “He talks much of <em>the motives to do, and +the motives to forbear</em>, how they work upon and +determine a man; as if a reasonable man were no +more than a tennis-ball, to be tossed to and fro by +the rackets of the second causes,” &c. May not +great things be produced by second causes, as well +as little; and a foot-ball as well as a tennis-ball? +But the Bishop can never be driven from this, that +the will hath power to move itself; but says it is all +one to say, that “an agent can determine itself,” +and that “the will is determined by motives extrinsical”. +He adds, that “if there be no necessitation +before the judgment of right reason doth +dictate to the will, then there is no antecedent nor +extrinsical necessitation at all”. I say indeed, the +effect is not produced before the last dictate of the +understanding; but I say not, that the necessity +was not before; he knows I say, it is from eternity. +When a cannon is planted against a wall, +though the battery be not made till the bullet +arrive, yet the necessity was present all the while +the bullet was going to it, if the wall stood still: +and if it slipped away, the hitting of somewhat +else was necessary, and that antecedently.</p> + +<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_293'>293</span>(<i>i</i>) “All the world knows, that when the agent +is determined by himself, then the effect is determined +likewise in its cause.” Yes, when the +agent is determined by himself, then the effect is +determined likewise in its cause; and so anything +else is what he will have it. But nothing is determined +by itself, nor is there any man in the +world that hath any conception answerable to +those words. But “motives,” he says, “determine +not naturally, but morally”. This also is insignificant; +for all motion is natural or supernatural. +Moral motion is a mere word, without any imagination +of the mind correspondent to it. I have +heard men talk of a motion in a court of justice; +perhaps this is it which he means by moral motion. +But certainly, when the tongue of the +judge and the hands of the clerks are thereby +moved, the motion is natural, and proceeds from +natural causes; which causes also were natural +motions of the tongue of the advocate. And +whereas he adds, that if this were true, then “not +only motives, but reason itself and deliberation +were vain”; it hath been sufficiently answered before, +that therefore they are not vain, because by +them is produced the effect. I must also note, +that oftentimes in citing my opinion he puts in +instead of mine, those terms of his own, which +upon all occasions I complain of for absurdity; as +here he makes me to say, that which I did never +say, “special influence of extrinsical causes”.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>k</i>) “He saith, that ‘the ignorance of the true +causes and their power, is the reason why we +ascribe the effect to liberty; but when we seriously +consider the causes of things, we acknowledge +<span class='pageno' id='Page_294'>294</span>a necessity.’ No such thing, but just the +contrary.” If he understand the authors which +he readeth upon this point, no better than he understands +what I have here written, it is no wonder +he understandeth not the truth of the question. I +said not, that when we consider the causes of +things, but when we see and know the strength +that moves us, we acknowledge necessity. “No +such thing,” says the Bishop, “but just the contrary; +the more we consider, and the clearer we +understand, the greater is the liberty,” &c. Is +there any doubt, if a man could foreknow, as God +foreknows, that which is hereafter to come to pass, +but that he would also see and know the causes +which shall bring it to pass, and how they work, +and make the effect necessary? For necessary it is, +whatsoever God foreknoweth. But we that foresee +them not, may consider as much as we will, +and understand as clearly as we will, but are never +the nearer to the knowledge of their necessity; +and that, I said, was the cause why we impute those +events to liberty, and not to causes.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>l</i>) “Lastly, he tells us, that <em>the will doth +choose of necessity, as well as the fire burns of +necessity</em>. If he intend no more but this, that +election is the proper and natural act of the will, +as burning is of the fire &c., he speaks truly, +but most impertinently; for the question is not +now of the elective power, <span lang="la"><i>in actu primo</i></span>, &c.” +Here again he makes me to speak nonsense. I +said, “the man chooseth of necessity”; he says I +say, “the will chooseth of necessity”. And why: +but because he thinks I ought to speak as he does, +and say as he does here, that “election is the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_295'>295</span>act of the will”. No: election is the act of a man, +as power to elect is the power of a man. Election +and will are all one act of a man; and the power +to elect, and the power to will, one and the same +power of a man. But the Bishop is confounded +by the use of calling by the name of will, the +power of willing in the future; as they also were +confounded, that first brought in this senseless +term of <span lang="la"><i>actus primus</i></span>. My meaning is, that the +election I shall have of anything hereafter, is now +as necessary, as that the fire, that now is and continueth, +shall burn any combustible matter thrown +into it hereafter: or to use his own terms, the +will hath no more power to suspend its willing, +than the burning of the fire to suspend its burning: +or rather more properly, the man hath no +more power to suspend his will, than the fire to +suspend its burning. Which is contrary to that +which he would have, namely, that a man should +have power to refuse what he wills, and to suspend +his own appetite. For to refuse what one +willeth, implieth a contradiction; the which also is +made much more absurd by his expression. For he +saith, the will hath power to refuse what it wills, +and to suspend its own appetite: whereas <em>the will</em>, +and <em>the willing</em>, and <em>the appetite</em> is the same +thing. He adds that “even the burning of the +fire, if it be considered as it is invested with all +particular circumstances, is not so necessary an +action as T. H. imagineth”. He doth not sufficiently +understand what I imagine. For I imagine, +that of the fire which shall burn five hundred +years hence, I may truly say now, it shall burn necessarily; +and of that which shall not burn then, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_296'>296</span>(for fire may sometimes not burn the combustible +matter thrown into it, as in the case of the three +children), that it is necessary it shall not burn.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>m</i>) “Two things are required to make an effect +necessary: first that it be produced by a necessary +cause, &c.: secondly, that it be necessarily +produced, &c.” To this I say nothing, but that +I understand not how a cause can be necessary, +and the effect not be necessarily produced.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>n</i>) “My second reason against this distinction +of liberty from compulsion, but not from necessitation, +is new, and demonstrates clearly, that to +necessitate the will by a physical necessity, is to +compel the will, so far as the will is capable of compulsion; +and that he who doth necessitate the will +to evil after that manner, is the true cause of evil, +&c.” By this second reason, which he says <em>is new, +and demonstrates</em>, &c, I cannot find what reason +he means. For there are but two, whereof the latter +is in these words: “Secondly, to rip up the bottom +of this business, this I take to be the clear resolution +of the Schools; there is a double act of the +will; the one more remote, called <span lang="la"><i>imperatus</i></span>, &c.; +the other act is nearer, called <span lang="la"><i>actus elicitus</i></span>,” &c. +But I doubt whether this be it he means, or no. +For this being the resolution of the Schools, is not +new; and being a distinction only, is no demonstration; +though perhaps he may use the word +demonstration, as every unlearned man now-a-days +does, to signify any argument of his own. +As for the distinction itself, because the terms are +Latin, and never used by any author of the Latin +tongue, to shew their impertinence I expounded +them in English, and left them to the reader’s judgment +<span class='pageno' id='Page_297'>297</span>to find the absurdity of them himself. And +the Bishop in this part of his reply endeavours to +defend them. And first, he calls it a trivial and grammatical +objection, to say they are <em>improper</em> and +<em>obscure</em>. Is there anything less beseeming a <em>divine</em> +or a <em>philosopher</em>, than to speak <em>improperly</em> +and <em>obscurely</em>, where the truth is in question? +Perhaps it may be tolerable in one that divineth, +but not in him that pretendeth to demonstrate. It +is not the universal current of divines and philosophers, +that giveth words their authority, but the +generality of them who acknowledge that they understand +them. <em>Tyrant</em> and <span lang="la"><i>præmunire</i></span>, though +their signification be changed, yet they are understood; +and so are the names of the days, Sunday, +Monday, Tuesday. And when English readers not +engaged in School divinity, shall find <span lang="la"><i>imperate</i></span> and +<em>elicit acts</em> as intelligible as those, I will confess +I had no reason to find fault.</p> + +<p class='c001'>But my braving against that famous and most necessary +distinction, between the elicit and imperate +acts of the will, he says was only to hide from the +eyes of the reader a tergiversation in not answering +this argument of his; ‘he who doth necessitate the +will to evil, is the true cause of evil; but God is not +the cause of evil; therefore he does not necessitate +the will to evil’. This argument is not to be found +in this No. <a href='#XX'><span class='fss'>XX.</span></a>, to which I here answered; nor had +I ever said that the will was compelled. But he, +taking all necessitation for compulsion, doth now +in this place, from necessitation simply, bring in +this inference concerning the cause of evil, and +thinks he shall force me to say that God is the +cause of sin. I shall say only what is said in the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_298'>298</span>Scripture, <span lang="la"><i>non est malum, quod ego non feci</i></span>. I shall +say what Micaiah saith to Ahab, (1 Kings xxii. 23): +<em>Behold, the Lord hath put a lying spirit into the +mouth of all these thy prophets</em>. I shall say that +that is true, which the prophet David saith (2 Sam. +xvi. 10): <em>Let him curse; because the Lord hath +said unto him, curse David</em>. But that which God +himself saith of himself (1 Kings xii. 15): <em>The +king hearkened not to the people, for the cause was +from the Lord</em>: I will not say, least the Bishop exclaim +against me; but leave it to be interpreted +by those that have authority to interpret the +Scriptures. I say further, that to cause sin is +not always sin, nor can be sin in him that is not +subject to some higher power; but to use so unseemly +a phrase, as to say that God is the cause of +sin, because it soundeth so like to saying that God +sinneth, I can never be forced by so weak an argument +as this of his. Luther says, <em>we act necessarily; +necessarily by necessity of immutability, +not by necessity of constraint</em>: that is in plain +English, necessarily, but not against our wills. +Zanchius says, (<span lang="la"><cite>Tract. Theol.</cite></span> cap. <span class='fss'>VI.</span> Thes. <span class='fss'>I.</span>): +<em>The freedom of our will doth not consist in this, +that there is no necessity of our sinning; but +in this, that there is no constraint</em>. Bucer (<span lang="la"><cite>Lib. +de Concordia</cite></span>): <em>Whereas the Catholics say, man +has free will, we must understand it of freedom +from constraint, and not freedom from necessity</em>. +Calvin (<span lang="la"><cite>Inst.</cite></span> cap. <span class='fss'>II.</span> sec. <span class='fss'>VI.</span>): <em>And thus +shall man be said to have free will, not because +he hath equal freedom to do good and evil, +but because he does the evil he does, not by +constraint, but willingly</em>. Monsr. du Moulin, in +<span class='pageno' id='Page_299'>299</span>his <cite>Buckler of the Faith</cite> (art. <span class='fss'>IX</span>): <i>The necessity +of sinning is not repugnant to the freedom of the +will. Witness the devils, who are necessarily +wicked, and yet sin freely without constraint.</i> And +the Synod of Dort: <i>Liberty is not opposite to all +kinds of necessity and determination. It is indeed +opposite to the necessity of constraint: but +standeth well enough with the necessity of infallibility.</i> +I could add more: for all the famous +doctors of the Reformed Churches, and with them +St. Augustin, are of the same opinion. None of +these denied that God is the cause of all motion +and action, or that God is the cause of all laws; +and yet they were never forced to say, that God is +the cause of sin.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>o</i>) “‘They who invented this term of <span lang="la"><i>actus imperatus</i></span>, +understood not’, he saith, ‘any thing what +it signified.’ No? Why not? It seemeth to me, +they understood it better than those who except +against it. They knew there are <em>mental terms</em>, +which are only conceived in the mind, as well as +<em>vocal terms</em>, which are expressed with the tongue, +&c.” In this place the Bishop hath discovered the +ground of all his errors in philosophy, which is +this; that he thinketh, when he repeateth the +words of a proposition in his mind, that is, when he +fancieth the words without speaking them, that +then he conceiveth the things which the words signify: +and this is the most general cause of false +opinions. For men can never be deceived in the +conceptions of things, though they may be, and are +most often deceived by giving unto them wrong +terms or appellations, different from those which +are commonly used and constituted to signify their +<span class='pageno' id='Page_300'>300</span>conceptions. And therefore they that study to +attain the certain knowledge of the truth, do use +to set down beforehand all the terms they are to +express themselves by, and declare in what sense +they shall use them constantly. And by this means, +the reader having an idea of every thing there +named, cannot conceive amiss. But when a man +from the hearing of a word hath no idea of the +thing signified, but only of the sound and of the +letters whereof the word is made, which is that he +here calleth <em>mental terms</em>, it is impossible he should +conceive aright, or bring forth any thing but absurdity; +as he doth here, when he says, “that +when Tarquin delivered his commands to his son +by only striking off the tops of the poppies, he did +it by <em>mental terms</em>”; as if to strike off the head of +a poppy, were a mental term. It is the sound and +the letters, that maketh him think <span lang="la"><i>elicitus</i></span> and <span lang="la"><i>imperatus</i></span> +somewhat. And it is the same thing that +makes him say, for think it he cannot, that to will +or choose, is drawn, or allured, or fetched out of +the power to will. For drawing cannot be imagined +but of bodies; and therefore to will, to +speak, to write, to dance, to leap, or any way to +be moved, cannot be said intelligibly to be <em>drawn</em>, +much less to be drawn out of a power, that is to +say, out of an ability; for whatsoever is drawn +out, is drawn out of one place into another. He +that can discourse in this manner in philosophy, +cannot probably be thought able to discourse rationally +in any thing.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>p</i>) “His other objection against this distinction +of the acts of the will into <em>elicit</em> and <span lang="la"><i>imperate</i></span>, +is obscurity. ‘Might it not,’ saith he, ‘have +<span class='pageno' id='Page_301'>301</span>been as easily said in English, <em>a voluntary action</em>?’ +Yes it might have been said as easily, but not as +truly, nor as properly.” He says, <span lang="la"><i>actus imperatus</i></span> +is when a man opens or shuts his eyes at the +command of the will. I say, when a man opens +and shuts his eyes according to his will, that it is a +voluntary action; and I believe we mean one and +the same thing. Whether of us speak more properly +or more truly, let the reader judge.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>q</i>) “But his mistakes are so thick, &c., I will +do my duty to shew him the right way. First, no +acts which are properly said to be compelled, are +voluntary. Secondly, acts of terror, &c.” This is +nothing but Tohu and Bohu.</p> + +<h3 id='XXI' class='c002'>NO. XXI.</h3> + +<div class='c000'></div> +<div class='sidenote'>The Bishop’s reply.</div> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “The rest are umbrages quickly dispelled. +First, the astrologer steps up, and subjects liberty +to the motions of heaven, to the aspects and ascensions +of the stars:</p> + +<div class='lg-container-b c015'> + <div class='linegroup'> + <div class='group'> + <div class='line'><span lang="la">----Plus etenim fati valet hora benigni,</span></div> + <div class='line'><span lang="la">Quam si nos Veneris commendet epistola Marti.</span></div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c010'>“I stand not much upon them, who cannot see +the fishes swimming beside them in the rivers, yet +believe they see those which are in heaven; who +promise great treasures to others, and beg a groat +for themselves. The stars at the most do but incline, +they cannot necessitate.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Secondly, the physician subjects liberty to the +complexion and temperature of the body. But +yet this comes not home to a necessity. Socrates, +and many others, by assiduous care have corrected +the pernicious propensions, which flowed from +their temperatures.”</p> + +<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_302'>302</span><i>T. H.</i> In the rest of his discourse he reckoneth +up the opinions of certain professions of men, +touching the causes wherein the necessity of +things, which they maintain, consisteth. And +first, he saith, the astrologer deriveth his necessity +from the stars. Secondly, that the physician attributeth +it to the temper of the body. For my part, +I am not of their opinion; because neither the +stars alone, nor the temperature of the patient +alone is able to produce any effect without the +concurrence of all other agents. For there is +hardly any one action, how casual soever it seem, +to the causing whereof concur not whatsoever is +<span lang="la"><i>in rerum natura</i></span>. Which, because it is a great +paradox, and depends on many antecedent speculations, +I do not press in this place.</p> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “Towards the latter end of my discourse, +I answered some specious pretences against liberty. +The two first were of the astrologer and the physician: +the one subjecting liberty to the motions +and influences of the heavenly bodies; the other +to the complexions of men. (<i>a</i>) The sum of my +answer was, that the stars and complexions do incline, +but not at all necessitate the will: to which +all judicious astronomers and physicians do assent. +And T. H. himself doth not dissent from it. So +as to this part, there needs no reply.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “But whereas he mentions a ‘great paradox +of his own, that there is hardly any one action +to the causing of which concurs not whatsoever +is <span lang="la"><i>in rerum natura</i></span>’; I can but smile to see +with what ambition our great undertakers do +affect to be accounted the first founders of strange +opinions, as if the devising of an ill-grounded +<span class='pageno' id='Page_303'>303</span>paradox were as great an honour as the invention +of the needle, or the discovery of the new world. +And as to this paradox in particular, I meddle not +with natural actions, because the subject of my +discourse is moral liberty. But if he intend not +only the kinds of things, but every individual +creature, and not only in natural but voluntary +actions, I desire to know how Prester John, or the +great Mogul, or the king of China, or any one of +so many millions of their subjects, do concur to +my writing of this reply. If they do not, among +his other speculations concerning this matter I +hope he will give us some restrictions. It were +hard to make all the negroes accessary to all the +murders that are committed in Europe.”</p> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c000'> + <div><span class='fss'>ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. XXI.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c001'>There is not much in this part of his reply that +needeth animadversion. But I must observe, where +he saith, (<i>a</i>) “the sum of my answer was, that the +stars and complexions do incline, but not at all necessitate +the will:” he answereth nothing at all +to me, who attribute not the necessitation of the +will to the stars and complexions, but to the +aggregate of all things together that are in motion. +I do not say, that the stars or complexions +of themselves do incline men to will; but when +men are inclined, I must say that that inclination +was necessitated by some causes or other.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “But whereas he mentions ‘a great paradox +of his own; that there is hardly any one action, +to the causing of which concurs not whatsoever +is <span lang="la"><i>in rerum natura</i></span>’; I can but smile to see +<span class='pageno' id='Page_304'>304</span>with what ambition our great undertakers do affect +to be accounted the first founders of strange opinions, +&c.” The Bishop speaks often of paradoxes +with such scorn or detestation, that a simple reader +would take a paradox either for felony or some +other heinous crime, or else for some ridiculous +turpitude; whereas perhaps a judicious reader +knows what the word signifies; and that a paradox, +is an opinion not yet generally received. +Christian religion was once a paradox; and a +great many other opinions which the Bishop now +holdeth, were formerly paradoxes. Insomuch as +when a man calleth an opinion a paradox, he doth +not say it is untrue, but signifieth his own ignorance; +for if he understood it, he would call it +either a truth or an error. He observes not, that +but for paradoxes we should be now in that savage +ignorance, which those men are in that have not, +or have not long had laws and commonwealth, from +whence proceedeth science and civility. There was +not long since a scholar that maintained, that if the +least thing that had weight should be laid down +upon the hardest body that could be, supposing it +an anvil of diamant, it would at the first access +make it yield. This I thought, and much more +the Bishop would have thought, a paradox. But +when he told me, that either that would do it, or +all the weight of the world would not do it, because +if the whole weight did it, every the least +part thereof would do its part, I saw no reason to +dissent. In like manner when I say, ‘there is +hardly any one action to the causing of which +concurs not whatsoever is <span lang="la"><i>in rerum natura</i></span>;’ it +seems to the Bishop a great paradox; and if I +<span class='pageno' id='Page_305'>305</span>should say that all action is the effect of motion, +and that there cannot be a motion in one part of +the world, but the same must also be communicated +to all the rest of the world, he would say that +this were no less a paradox. But yet if I should +say, that if a lesser body, as a concave sphere or +tun, were filled with air, or other liquid matter, +and that any one little particle thereof were moved, +all the rest would be moved also, he would conceive +it to be true, or if not he, a judicious reader would. +It is not the greatness of the tun that altereth the +case; and therefore the same would be true also, +if the whole world were the tun; for it is the +greatness of this tun that the Bishop comprehendeth +not. But the truth is comprehensible enough, +and may be said without ambition of being the +founder of strange opinions. And though a grave +man may smile at it, he that is both grave and wise +will not.</p> + +<h3 id='XXII' class='c002'>NO. XXII.</h3> + +<div class='c000'></div> +<div class='sidenote'>The Bishop’s reply.</div> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “Thirdly, the moral philosopher tells us +how we are haled hither and thither with outward +objects. To this I answer, “First, that the power +which outward objects have over us, is for the +most part by our own default, because of those +vicious habits which we have contracted. Therefore +though the actions seem to have a kind of +violence in them, yet they were free and voluntary +in their first originals. As a paralytic man, to use +Aristotle’s comparison, shedding the liquor deserves +to be punished, for though his act be unwilling, yet +his intemperance was willing, whereby he contracted +this infirmity.</p> + +<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_306'>306</span>“Secondly I answer, that concupiscence, and +custom, and bad company, and outward objects do +indeed make a proclivity, but not a necessity. By +prayers, tears, meditations, vows, watchings, fastings, +humi-cubations, a man may get a contrary +habit, and gain the victory, not only over outward +objects, but also over his own corruptions, and become +the king of the little world of himself.</p> + +<div class='lg-container-b c015'> + <div class='linegroup'> + <div class='group'> + <div class='line'><span lang="la">Si metuis, si prava cupis, si duceris irâ,</span></div> + <div class='line'><span lang="la">Servitii patiere jugum, tolerabis iniquas</span></div> + <div class='line'><span lang="la">Interius leges. Tunc omnia jure tenebis,</span></div> + <div class='line'><span lang="la">Cum poteris rex esse tui.</span></div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c010'>“Thirdly, a resolved mind, which weighs all +things judiciously and provides for all occurrences, +is not so easily surprised with outward objects. +Only Ulysses wept not at the meeting with his wife +and son. I would beat thee, said the philosopher, +but that I am angry. One spake lowest, when he +was most moved. Another poured out the water, +when he was thirsty. Another made a covenant +with his eyes. Neither opportunity nor enticement +could prevail with Joseph. Nor the music nor the +fire, with the three children. It is not the strength +of the wind, but the lightness of the chaff, which +causeth it to be blown away. Outward objects do +not impose a moral, much less a physical necessity; +they may be dangerous, but cannot be destructive +to true liberty.”</p> + +<p class='c001'><i>T. H.</i> Thirdly, he disputeth against the opinion +of them that say, external objects presented to +men of such and such temperatures, do make their +actions necessary; and says, the power, that such +objects have over us, proceeds from our own fault. +But that is nothing to the purpose, if such fault +<span class='pageno' id='Page_307'>307</span>of ours proceedeth from causes not in our own +power. And therefore that opinion may hold true, +for all this answer. Further, he saith, prayer, +fasting, &c., may alter our habits. It is true: but +when they do so, they are causes of the contrary +habit, and make it necessary; as the former habit +had been necessary, if prayer, fasting, &c., had not +been. Besides we are not moved, nor disposed to +prayer or any other action, but by outward objects, +as pious company, godly preachers, or something +equivalent. In the next place he saith, a resolved +mind is not easily surprised. As the mind +of Ulysses, who, when others wept, he alone wept +not. And of the philosopher that abstained from +striking, because he found himself angry. And +of him that poured out the water, when he was +thirsty; and the like. Such things I confess have, +or may have been done; and do prove only that it +was not necessary for Ulysses then to weep, nor +for the philosopher to strike, nor for that other +man to drink: but it does not prove that it was +not necessary for Ulysses then to abstain, as he did, +from weeping; nor the philosopher to abstain, as +he did, from striking; nor the other man to forbear +drinking. And yet that was the thing he ought +to have proved.</p> + +<p class='c001'>Lastly, he confesseth that the disposition of objects +may be dangerous to liberty, but cannot be +destructive. To which I answer, it is impossible; +for liberty is never in any other danger than to be +lost. And if it cannot be lost, which he confesseth, +I may infer it can be in no danger at all.</p> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> (<i>a</i>) “The third pretence was out of moral +philosophy misunderstood, that outward objects do +<span class='pageno' id='Page_308'>308</span>necessitate the will. I shall not need to repeat +what he hath omitted, but only to satisfy his exceptions. +(<i>b</i>) The first is, that ‘it is not material, +’though the power of outward objects do proceed +from our own faults, if such faults of ours proceed +not from causes in our own power’. Well, but +what if they do proceed from causes that are in +our own power, as in truth they do? Then his +answer is a mere subterfuge. If our faults proceed +from causes that are not, and were not in our +own power, then they are not our faults at all. It +is not a fault in us, not to do those things which +never were in our power to do: but they are the +faults of these causes from whence they do proceed. +(<i>c</i>) Next he confesseth, that it is in our +power, by good endeavours, to alter those vicious +habits which we had contracted, and to get the +contrary habit. ‘True,’ saith he, ‘but then the +contrary habit doth necessitate the one way, as +well as the former habit did the other way.’ By +which very consideration it appears, that that +which he calls a necessity, is no more but a +proclivity. If it were a true necessity, it could +not be avoided nor altered by our endeavours. +The truth is, acquired habits do help and assist the +faculty; but they do not necessitate the faculty. +He who hath gotten to himself an habit of temperance, +may yet upon occasion commit an intemperate +act. And so on the contrary. Acts are not +opposed to habits, but other habits. (<i>d</i>) He adds, +‘that we are not moved to prayer or any other action, +but by outward objects, as pious company, +godly preachers, or something equivalent’. Wherein +are two other mistakes: first, to make godly preachers +<span class='pageno' id='Page_309'>309</span>and pious company to be outward objects; +which are outward agents: secondly, to affirm +that the will is not moved but by outward objects. +The will is moved by itself, by the understanding, +by the sensitive passions, by angels good and bad, +by men; and most effectually by acts or habits infused +by God, whereby the will is excited extraordinarily +indeed, but efficaciously and determinately. +This is more than equivalent with outward objects.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Another branch of mine answer was, that a +resolved and prepared mind is able to resist both +the appetibility of objects, and the unruliness of +passions: as I showed by example. (<i>e</i>) He answers, +that I prove Ulysses was not necessitated +to weep, nor the philosopher to strike; but I +do not prove that they were not necessitated to +forbear. He saith true. I am not now proving, +but answering. Yet my answer doth sufficiently +prove that which I intend; that the rational will +hath power, both to slight the most appetible objects, +and to control the most unruly passions. When +he hath given a clear solution to those proofs +which I have produced, then it will be time for +him to cry for more work.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Lastly, whereas I say, that outward objects +may be dangerous, but cannot be destructive to +true liberty; he catcheth at it, (<i>f</i>) and objects, +that ‘liberty is in no danger but to be lost; but I +say it cannot be lost, therefore’, he infers that, ‘it is +in no danger at all.’ I answer, first, that liberty +is in more danger to be abused, than to be lost. +Many more men do abuse their wits, than lose +them. Secondly, liberty is in danger likewise to +be weakened or diminished; as when it is clogged +<span class='pageno' id='Page_310'>310</span>by vicious habits contracted by ourselves, and yet +it is not totally lost. Thirdly, though liberty cannot +be totally lost out of the world, yet it may be +totally lost to this or that particular man, as to the +exercise of it. Reason is the root of liberty; and +though nothing be more natural to a man than +reason, yet many by excess of study, or by continual +gormandizing, or by some extravagant passion +which they have cherished in themselves, +or by doting too much upon some affected object, +do become very sots, and deprive themselves of +the use of reason, and consequently of liberty. +And when the benefit of liberty is not thus universally +lost, yet it may be lost respectively to this +or that particular occasion. As he who makes +choice of a bad wife, hath lost his former liberty +to choose a good <a id='corr310.17'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='one.'>one.”</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_310.17'><ins class='correction' title='one.'>one.”</ins></a></span></p> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c000'> + <div><span class='fss'>ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. XXII.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>a</i>) “The third pretence was out of moral philosophy +misunderstood, that outward objects do +necessitate the will.” I cannot imagine how the +question, whether outward objects do necessitate +or not necessitate the will, can any way be referred +to moral philosophy. The principles of moral philosophy +are the laws; wherewith outward objects +have little to do, as being for the most part inanimate, +and which follow always the force of nature +without respect to moral laws. Nor can I conceive +what purpose he had to bring this into his +reply to my answer, wherein I attribute nothing in +the action of outward objects to morality.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “His first exception is, that ‘it is not material +that the power of outward objects do proceed +<span class='pageno' id='Page_311'>311</span>from our own faults, if such faults of ours proceed +not from causes in our own power’. Well, but +what if they do proceed from causes that are in +our own power, as in truth they do? Then his answer +is a mere subterfuge.” But how proves he +that in truth they do? ‘Because else,’ saith he, +‘they are not our faults at all.’ Very well reasoned. +A horse is lame from a cause that was not +in his power: therefore the lameness is no fault in +the horse. But his meaning is, it is no injustice +unless the causes were in his own power. As if it +were not injustice, whatsoever is willingly done +against the law; whatsoever it be, that is the cause +of the will to do it.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>c</i>) “Next he confesseth, that it is in our power +by good endeavours to alter those vicious habits +which we had contracted, and to get the contrary +habits.” There is no such confession in my +answer. I said, prayer, fasting, &c., may alter +our habits. But I never said that the will to +pray, fast, &c. is in our own power. “‘True,’ saith +he, ‘but then the contrary habit doth necessitate +the one way, as well as the former habit did the +other way.’ By which very consideration it appears, +that that which he calls a necessity, is no +more but a proclivity. If it were a true necessity, +it could not be avoided, nor altered by our endeavours.” +Again he mistakes: for I said that prayer, +fasting, &c. when they alter our habits, do necessarily +cause the contrary habits; which is not to say, +that the habit necessitates, but is necessitated. +But this is common with him, to make me say that +which out of reading, not out of meditation, he +useth to say himself. But how doth it appear, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_312'>312</span>that prayer and fasting, &c. make but a proclivity +in men to do what they do? For if it were but a +proclivity, then what they do they do not. Therefore +they either necessitate the will, or the will +followeth not. I contend for the truth of this +only, that when the will followeth them, they necessitate +the will; and when a proclivity followeth, +they necessitate the proclivity. But the +Bishop thinks I maintain, that that also is produced +necessarily, which is not produced at all.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>d</i>) “He adds, ‘that we are not moved to prayer +or any other action, but by outward objects, as +pious company, and godly preachers, or something +equivalent’. Wherein are two other mistakes: +first, to make godly preachers and pious company +to be outward objects, which are outward agents; +secondly, to affirm that the will is not moved but +by outward objects. The will is moved by itself, +&c”. The first mistake, he urgeth that I call +preachers and company objects. Is not the +preacher to the hearer the object of his hearing? +No, perhaps he will say, it is the voice which is the +object; and that we hear not the preacher, but his +voice; as before he said, the object of sight was +not the cause of sight. I must therefore once +more make him smile with a great paradox, which +is this; that in all the senses, the object is the +agent; and that it is, when we hear a preacher, the +preacher that we hear; and that his voice is the +same thing with the hearing and a fancy in the +hearer, though the motion of the lips and other +organs of speech be his that speaketh. But of this +I have written more largely in a more proper +place.</p> + +<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_313'>313</span>My second mistake, in affirming that the will is not +moved but by outward objects, is a mistake of his +own. For I said not, the will is not moved, but +we are not moved: for I always avoid attributing +motion to any thing but body. The will is produced, +generated, formed, and created in such sort as accidents +are effected in a corporeal subject; but +moved it cannot be, because it goeth not from +place to place. And whereas he saith, “the will +is moved by itself,” if he had spoken properly as +he ought to do, and said, the will is made or created +by itself, he would presently have acknowledged +that it was impossible. So that it is not +without cause men use improper language, when +they mean to keep their errors from being detected. +And because nothing can move that is not itself +moved, it is untruly said that either the will or +any thing else is moved by itself, by the understanding, +by the sensitive passions, or by acts or +habits; or that acts or habits are infused by God. +For infusion is motion, and nothing is moved but +bodies.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>e</i>) “He answers, that I prove Ulysses was +not necessitated to weep, nor the philosopher to +strike, but I do not prove that they were not necessitated +to forbear. He saith true; I am not +now proving, but answering.” By his favour, +though he be answering now, he was proving then. +And what he answers now, maketh nothing more +toward a proof than was before. For these words, +“the rational will hath power to slight the most appetible +objects, and to control the most unruly +passions,” are no more, being reduced into proper +terms, than this: the appetite hath power to be +<span class='pageno' id='Page_314'>314</span>without appetite towards most appetible objects, +and to will contrary to the most unruly will; +which is jargon.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>f</i>) “He objects that ‘liberty is in no danger, +but to be lost; but I say it cannot be lost; therefore’, +he infers, ‘that it is in no danger at all.’ I +answer, first, that liberty is in more danger to be +abused, than lost, &c.; secondly, liberty is in danger +likewise to be weakened by vicious habits; +thirdly, it may be totally lost.” It is true that a +man hath more liberty one time than another, and +in one place than another; which is a difference of +liberty as to the body. But as to the liberty of +doing what we will, in those things we are able to +do it cannot be greater one time than another. +Consequently outward objects can no ways endanger +liberty, further than it destroyeth it. And his +answer, that liberty is in more danger to be abused +than lost, is not to the question, but a mere shift +to be thought not silenced. And whereas he says +liberty is diminished by vicious habits, it cannot +be understood otherwise than that vicious habits +make a man the less free to do vicious actions; +which I believe is not his meaning. And lastly, +whereas he says that “liberty is lost, when reason +is lost; and that they who by excess of study, or +by continual gormandising, or by extravagant +passion, &c., do become sots, have consequently +lost their liberty”: it requireth proof. For, for any +thing that I can observe, mad men and fools have +the same liberty that other men have, in those +things that are in their power to do.</p> + +<div> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_315'>315</span> + <h3 id='XXIII' class='c002'>NO. XXIII.</h3> +</div> + +<div class='c000'></div> +<div class='sidenote'>The Bishop’s reply.</div> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “Fourthly, the natural philosopher doth +teach, that the will doth necessarily follow the last +dictate of the understanding. It is true indeed +the will should follow the direction of the understanding; +but I am not satisfied that it doth evermore +follow it. Sometimes this saying hath place: +<span lang="la"><i>video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor</i></span>. As +that great Roman said of two suitors, that the one +produced the better reasons, but the other must +have the office. So reason often lies dejected at +the feet of affection. Things nearer to the senses +move more powerfully. Do what a man can, he +shall sorrow more for the death of his child, than +for the sin of his soul; yet appreciatively in the +estimation of judgment, he accounts the offence of +God a greater evil than any temporal loss.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Next, I do not believe that a man is bound to +weigh the expedience or inexpedience of every +ordinary trivial action to the least grain in the +balance of his understanding; or to run up into his +watch-tower with his perspective to take notice of +every jackdaw that flies by, for fear of some hidden +danger. This seems to me to be a prostitution +of reason to petit observations as concerning every +rag that a man wears, each drop of drink, each +morsel of bread that he eats, each pace that he +walks. Thus many steps must he go, not one +more nor one less, under pain of mortal sin. What +is this but a rack and a gibbet to the conscience? +But God leaves many things indifferent: though +man may be so curious, he will not. A good architect +will be sure to provide sufficient materials for +<span class='pageno' id='Page_316'>316</span>his building; but what particular number of stones +or trees, he troubles not his head. And suppose he +<em>should</em> weigh each action thus, yet he <em>doth</em> not; +so still there is liberty. Thirdly, I conceive it +is possible in this mist and weakness of human +apprehension, for two actions to be so equally circumstantiated, +that no discernible difference can +appear between them upon discussion. As suppose +a chirurgeon should give two plaisters to his +patient, and bid him apply either of them to his +wound; what can induce his reason more to the one +than to the other, but that he may refer it to +chance whether he will use?</p> + +<p class='c001'>But leaving these probable speculations, which +I submit to better judgments, I answer the philosopher +briefly thus: admitting that the will did +necessarily follow the last dictate of the understanding, +as certainly in many things it doth: yet, +first, this is no extrinsical determination from +without, and a man’s own resolution is not destructive +to his own liberty, but depends upon it. +So the person is still free.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Secondly, this determination is not antecedent, +but joined with the action. The understanding +and the will, are not different agents, but distinct +faculties of the same soul. Here is an infallibility, +or an hypothetical necessity as we say, <span lang="la"><i>quicquid est, +quando est, necesse est esse</i></span>: a necessity of consequence, +but not a necessity of consequent. Though +an agent have certainly determined, and so <a id='corr316.30'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='the the'>the</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_316.30'><ins class='correction' title='the the'>the</ins></a></span> +action be become infallible, yet if the agent did +determine freely, the action likewise is free.”</p> + +<p class='c001'><i>T. H.</i> The fourth opinion which he rejecteth, +is of them that make the will necessarily to follow +<span class='pageno' id='Page_317'>317</span>the last dictate of the understanding; but it seems +he understands that tenet in another sense than I +do. For he speaketh as if they that held it, did +suppose men must dispute the sequel of every action +they do, great and small, to the least grain; +which is a thing that he thinks with reason to be +untrue. But I understand it to signify, that the +will follows the last opinion or judgment, immediately +preceding the action, concerning whether it +be good to do it or not; whether he hath weighed it +long before, or not at all. And that I take to be the +meaning of them that hold it. As for example: +when a man strikes, his will to strike follows necessarily +that thought he had of the sequel of his +stroke, immediately before the lifting of his hand. +Now if it be understood in that sense, the last dictate +of the understanding does certainly necessitate +the action, though not as the whole cause, yet +as the last cause: as the last feather necessitates +the breaking of a horse’s back, when there are so +many laid on before, as there needeth but the addition +of that one to make the weight sufficient. +That which he allegeth against this, is first, out of +a poet, who in the person of Medea says, <span lang="la"><i>video +meliora proboque, deteriora sequor</i></span>. But the +saying, as pretty as it is, is not true. For though +Medea saw many reasons to forbear killing her +children, yet the last dictate of her judgment was +that the present revenge on her husband outweighed +them all; and thereupon the wicked action +followed necessarily. Then the story of the +Roman, that of two competitors said one had +the better reasons, but the other must have the +office: this also maketh against him. For the last +<span class='pageno' id='Page_318'>318</span>dictate of his judgment that had the bestowing +of the office, was this; that it was better to take a +great bribe, than reward a great merit. Thirdly, +he objects, that things nearer the senses move more +powerfully than reason. What followeth thence +but this; that the sense of the present good is commonly +more immediate to the action, than the +foresight of the evil consequents to come? Fourthly, +whereas he says, that do what a man can, he shall +sorrow more for the death of his son, than for the +sin of his soul: it makes nothing to the last dictate +of the understanding; but it argues plainly, +that sorrow for sin is not voluntary. And by consequence, +repentance proceedeth from causes.</p> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “The fourth pretence alleged against liberty +was, that the will doth necessarily follow +the last dictate of the understanding. This objection +is largely answered before in several places of +this reply, and particularly No. <a href='#VII'><span class='fss'>VII.</span></a> In my former +discourse I gave two answers to it: the one +certain and undoubted, that (<i>a</i>) supposing the last +dictate of the understanding did always determine +the will, yet this determination being not antecedent +in time, nor proceeding from extrinsical causes, +but from the proper resolution of the agent, who +had now freely determined himself, it makes no +absolute necessity, but only hypothetical, upon +supposition that the agent hath determined his +own will after this or that manner. Which being +the main answer, T. H. is so far from taking it +away, that he takes no notice of it. The other +part of mine answer was probable; that it is not +always certain that the will doth always actually +follow the last dictate of the understanding, though +<span class='pageno' id='Page_319'>319</span>it always ought to follow it. (<i>b</i>) Of which I gave +then three reasons. One was, that actions may be +so equally circumstantiated, or the case so intricate, +that reason cannot give a positive sentence, +but leaves the election to liberty or chance. To +this he answers not a word. Another of my reasons +was, because reason doth not weigh, nor is +bound to weigh the convenience or inconvenience +of every individual action to the uttermost grain +in the balance of true judgment. The truth of +this reason is confessed by T. H.; though he might +have had more abetters in this than in the most +part of his discourse, that nothing is indifferent; +that a man cannot stroke his beard on one side, +but it was either necessary to do it, or sinful to +omit it. From which confession of his it follows, +that in all those actions wherein reason doth not +define what is most convenient, there the will is +free from the determination of the understanding; +and by consequence the last feather is wanting to +break the horse’s back. A third reason was, because +passions and affections sometimes prevail +against judgment: as I proved by the example of +Medea and Cæsar, by the nearness of the objects +to the senses, and by the estimation of a temporal +loss more than sin. Against this reason his whole +answer is addressed. And first, (<i>c</i>) he explaineth +the sense of the assertion by the comparison of the +last feather; wherewith he seems to be delighted, +seeing he useth it now the second time. But let +him like it as he will, it is improper, for three reasons. +First, the determination of the judgment is +no part of the weight, but is the sentence of the +trier. The understanding weigheth all things, objects, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_320'>320</span>means, circumstances, convenience, inconvenience; +but itself is not weighed. Secondly, the +sensitive passion, in some extraordinary cases, may +give a counterfeit weight to the object, if it can +detain or divert reason from the balance: but ordinarily +the means, circumstances, and causes +concurrent, they have their whole weight from +the understanding; so as they do not press the +horse’s back at all, until reason lay them on. +Thirdly, he conceives that as each feather has a +certain natural weight, whereby it concurs not +arbitrarily, but necessarily towards the overcharging +of the horse; so all objects and causes have a +natural efficiency, whereby they do physically determine +the will; which is a great mistake. His +objects, his agents, his motives, his passions, and +all his concurrent causes, ordinarily do only move +the will morally, not determine it naturally. So +as it hath in all ordinary actions a free dominion +over itself.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“His other example, of a man that strikes, +‘whose will to strike followeth necessarily that +thought he had of the sequel of his stroke, immediately +before the lifting up of his hand’: as it confounds +passionate, indeliberate thoughts, with the +dictates of right reason, so it is very uncertain; +for between the cup and the lip, between the lifting +up of the hand and the blow, the will may +alter, and the judgment also. And lastly, it is impertinent; +for that necessity of striking proceeds +from the free determination of the agent, and not +from the special influence of any outward determining +causes. And so it is only a necessity upon +supposition.</p> + +<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_321'>321</span>“Concerning Medea’s choice, the strength of the +argument doth not lie either in the fact of Medea, +which is but a fiction, or in the authority of the +poet, who writes things rather to be admired than +believed, but in the experience of all men: who +find it to be true in themselves, that sometimes +reason doth shew unto a man the exorbitancy of +his passion, that what he desires is but a pleasant +good, that what he loseth by such a choice is an +honest good, that that which is honest is to be +preferred before that which is pleasant; yet the will +pursues that which is pleasant, and neglects that +which is honest. St. Paul (Rom. vii. 15) saith as +much in earnest, as is feigned of Medea: that <em>he +approved not that which he did</em>, and that <em>he did +that which he hated</em>. The Roman story is mistaken: +there was no bribe in the case but affection. +Whereas I urge, that those things which are +nearer to the senses do move more powerfully, he +lays hold on it; and without answering to that for +which I produced it, infers, ‘that the sense of present +good, is more immediate to the action than +the foresight of evil consequents’: which is true; +but it is not absolutely true by any antecedent +necessity. Let a man do what he may do, and +what he ought to do, and sensitive objects will +lose that power which they have by his own fault +and neglect. Antecedent or indeliberate concupiscence +doth sometimes, but rarely, surprise a +man, and render the action not free. But consequent +and deliberated concupiscence, which proceeds +from the rational will, doth render the action +more free, not less free, and introduceth only a necessity +upon supposition.</p> + +<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_322'>322</span>“Lastly, he saith, that ‘a man’s mourning more +for the loss of his child than for his sin, makes +nothing to the last dictates of the understanding’. +Yes, very much. Reason dictates that a sin committed +is a greater evil than the loss of a child, +and ought more to be lamented for: yet we see +daily how affection prevails against the dictate of +reason. That which he infers from hence, that +‘sorrow for sin is not voluntary, and by consequence +that repentance proceedeth from causes’; +is true as to the latter part of it, but not in his +sense. The causes from whence repentance doth +proceed, are God’s grace preventing, and man’s +will concurring. God prevents freely, man concurs +freely. Those inferior agents, which sometimes do +concur as subordinate to the grace of God, do not, +cannot, determine the will naturally. And therefore +the former part of his inference, that sorrow +for sin is not voluntary, is untrue, and altogether +groundless. That is much more truly and much +more properly said to be voluntary, which proceeds +from judgment and from the rational will, +than that which proceeds from passion and from +the sensitive will. One of the main grounds of all +T. H.’s errors in this question is, that he acknowledgeth +no efficacy but that which is natural. +Hence is this wild consequence; ‘repentance hath +causes’, and therefore ‘it is not voluntary’. Free +effects have free causes, necessary effects necessary +causes: voluntary effects have sometimes free, +sometimes necessary causes.”</p> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c000'> + <div><span class='pageno' id='Page_323'>323</span><span class='fss'>ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. XXIII.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>a</i>) “Supposing the last dictate of the understanding +did always determine the will, yet this +determination, being not antecedent in time, nor +proceeding from extrinsical causes, but from the +proper resolution of the agent, who had now freely +determined himself, makes no absolute necessity, +but only hypothetical, &c.” This is the Bishop’s +answer to the necessity inferred from that, that +the will necessarily followeth the last dictate of +the understanding; which answer he thinks is not +sufficiently taken away, because the last act of the +understanding is in time together with the will itself, +and therefore not antecedent. It is true, that +the will is not produced but in the same instant +with the last dictate of the understanding; but +the necessity of the will, and the necessity of the +last dictate of the understanding, may have been +antecedent. For that last dictate of the understanding +was produced by causes antecedent, and +was then necessary though not yet produced; as +when a stone is falling, the necessity of touching +the earth is antecedent to the touch itself. For +all motion through any determined space, necessarily +makes a motion through the next space, unless +it be hindered by some contrary external motion; +and then the stop is as necessary, as the proceeding +would have been. The argument therefore +from the last dictate of the understanding, sufficiently +inferreth an antecedent necessity, as great +as the necessity that a stone shall fall when it is +already falling. As for his other answer, that +“the will does not certainly follow the last dictate +<span class='pageno' id='Page_324'>324</span>of the understanding, though it always ought to +follow it”, he himself says it is but probable; but +any man that speaks not by rote, but thinks of +what he says, will presently find it false; and that +it is impossible to will anything that appears not +first in his understanding to be good for him. +And whereas he says the will ought to follow the +last dictate of the understanding, unless he mean +that the man ought to follow it, it is an insignificant +speech; for duties are the man’s not the will’s +duties: and if <a id='corr324.11'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='hemeans'>he means</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_324.11'><ins class='correction' title='hemeans'>he means</ins></a></span> so, then it is false; for a +man ought not to follow the dictate of the understanding, +when it is erroneous.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “Of which I gave then three reasons. One +was, that actions may be so equally circumstantiated, +that reason cannot give a positive sentence, +but leaves the election to liberty or chance. To +this he answers not a word.” There was no need +of answer: for he hath very often in this discourse +contradicted it himself, in that he maketh “reason +to be the true root of liberty, and men to have +more or less liberty, as they have more or less +reason”. How then can a man leave that to liberty, +when his reason can give no sentence? And +for his leaving it to chance; if by chance he mean +that which hath no causes, he destroyeth Providence; +and if he mean that which hath causes, but +unknown to us, he leaveth it to necessity. Besides, +it is false that “actions may be so equally circumstantiated, +that reason cannot give a positive sentence”. +For though in the things to be elected +there may be an exact equality: yet there may be +circumstances in him that is to elect, to make him +resolve upon that of the two which he considereth +<span class='pageno' id='Page_325'>325</span>for the present; and to break off all further deliberation +for this cause, that he must not (to use his +own instance) by spending time in vain, apply +neither of the plaisters, which the chirurgeon gives +him, to his wound. “Another of his reasons was, +because reason doth not weigh every individual +action to the uttermost grain.” True; but does it +therefore follow, a man gives no sentence? The +will therefore may follow the dictate of the judgment, +whether the man weigh or not weigh all +that might be weighed. “His third reason was, +because passions and affections sometimes prevail +against judgment.” I confess they prevail +often against <em>wisdom</em>, which is it he means here +by <em>judgment</em>. But they prevail not against the +<em>dictate of the understanding</em>, which he knows is +the meaning of <em>judgment</em> in this place. And the +will of a passionate and peevish fool doth no less +follow the dictate of that little understanding he +hath, than the will of the wisest man followeth his +wisdom.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>c</i>) “He explaineth the sense of the assertion +by the comparison of the last feather: wherewith +he seems to be delighted, seeing he useth it now +the second time. But let him like it as he will, it +is improper, for three reasons.” To me this comparison +seemeth very proper; and therefore I made +no scruple (though not much delighted with it, as +being no new comparison) to use it again, when +there was need again. For in the examination of +truth, I search rather for perspicuity than elegance. +But the Bishop with his School-terms is far from +perspicuity. How near he is to elegance, I shall +not forget to examine in due time. But why is +<span class='pageno' id='Page_326'>326</span>this comparison improper? “First, because the +determination of the judgment is no part of the +weight: for the understanding weigheth all things, +objects, means, circumstances, convenience, inconvenience; +but itself is not weighed.” In this comparison, +the objects, means, &c, are the weights, +the man is the scale, the understanding of a convenience +or inconvenience is the pressure of those +weights, which incline him now one way, now +another; and that inclination is the will. Again, +the objects, means, &c, are the feathers that press +the horse, the feeling of that pressure is understanding, +and his patience or impatience the will +to bear them, if not too many, or if too many, to +lie down under them. It is therefore to little +purpose that he saith, the understanding is not +weighed. “Secondly”, he says the comparison is improper, +“because ordinarily, the means, circumstances, +and causes concurrent, have their whole +weight from the understanding; so as they do not +press the horse’s back at all, until reason lay them +on.” This, and that which followeth, “that my +objects, agents, motives, passions, and all my concurrent +causes, ordinarily do only move the will +<em>morally</em>, not determine it naturally, so as it hath +in all ordinary actions a free dominion over itself,” +is all nonsense. For no man can understand, that +the understanding maketh any alteration in the +object in <em>weight</em> or <em>lightness</em>; nor that <em>reason +lays on objects upon the understanding</em>; nor that +the will <em>is moved</em>, nor that any motion <em>is moral</em>; +nor that these words, <em>the will hath a free dominion +over itself</em>, signify anything. With the rest +of this reply I shall trust the reader; and only +<span class='pageno' id='Page_327'>327</span>note the last words, where he makes me say, +<em>repentance hath causes</em>, and therefore <em>it is not +voluntary</em>. But I said, repentance hath causes, +<em>and that</em> it is not voluntary; he chops in, <em>and +therefore</em>, and makes an absurd consequence, +which he would have the reader believe was mine, +and then confutes it with these senseless words: +“Free effects have free causes, necessary effects +necessary causes; voluntary effects have sometimes +free, sometimes necessary causes”. Can any man +but a Schoolman think the will is voluntary? But +yet the will is the cause of voluntary actions.</p> + +<h3 id='XXIV' class='c002'>NO. XXIV.</h3> + +<div class='c000'></div> +<div class='sidenote'>The Bishop’s reply.</div> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “Fifthly and lastly, the divine labours to +find out a way how liberty may consist with the +prescience and decrees of God. But of this I had +not very long since occasion to write a full discourse, +in answer to a treatise against the prescience +of things contingent. I shall for the present only +repeat these two things. First, we ought not to +desert a certain truth, because we are not able to +comprehend the certain manner. God should be +but a poor God, if we were able perfectly to +comprehend all his actions and attributes. Secondly, +in my poor judgment, which I ever do +and ever shall submit to better, the readiest way +to reconcile contingence and liberty with the decrees +and prescience of God, and most remote +from the altercations of these times, is to subject +future contingents to the aspect of God, according +to that presentiality which they have in eternity. +Not that things future, which are not yet existent, +are co-existent with God: but because the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_328'>328</span>infinite knowledge of God, incircling all times in +the point of eternity, doth attain to their future +being, from whence proceeds their objective and +intelligible being. The main impediment which +keeps men from subscribing to this way, is because +they conceive eternity to be an everlasting succession, +and not one indivisible point. But if they +consider, that whatsoever is in God is God; that +there are no accidents in him, (for that which is +infinitely perfect cannot be further perfected); that +as God is not wise, but wisdom itself, not just, but +justice itself, so he is not eternal, but eternity itself: +they must needs conclude, that therefore this eternity +is indivisible, because God is indivisible; and +therefore not successive, but altogether an infinite +point, comprehending all times within itself.”</p> + +<p class='c001'><i>T. H.</i> The last part of this discourse containeth +his opinion about reconciling liberty with the +prescience and decrees of God, otherwise than +some divines have done; against whom he had formerly +written a treatise, out of which he only repeateth +two things. One is, that “we ought not to +desert a certain truth, for not being able to comprehend +the certain manner of it”. And I say the same; +as for example, that he ought not to desert this certain +truth: that there are certain and necessary +causes, which make every man to will what he +willeth, though he do not yet conceive in what +manner the will of man is caused. And yet I +think the manner of it is not very hard to conceive: +seeing that we see daily, that praise, dispraise, reward, +punishment, good and evil sequels of men’s +actions retained in memory, do frame and make us +to the election of whatsoever it be that we elect; +<span class='pageno' id='Page_329'>329</span>and that the memory of such things proceeds from +the senses, and sense from the operation of the objects +of sense, which are external to us, and governed +only by God Almighty; and by consequence, +all actions, even of free and voluntary +agents, are necessary.</p> + +<p class='c001'>The other thing he repeateth is, that “the best +way to reconcile contingency and liberty with the +prescience and decrees of God, is to subject future +contingents to the aspect of God”. The same is +also my opinion, but contrary to what he hath all +this while laboured to prove. For hitherto he +held liberty and necessity, that is to say, liberty +and the decrees of God, irreconcilable; unless the +aspect of God (which word appeareth now the first +time in this discourse) signify somewhat else besides +God’s will and decree, which I cannot understand. +But he adds, that we must subject them +“according to that presentiality which they have in +eternity”; which he says cannot be done by them +that conceive eternity to be an everlasting succession, +but only by them that conceive it an indivisible +point. To this I answer, that as soon as I can conceive +eternity to be an indivisible point, or any thing +but an everlasting succession, I will renounce all I +have written on this subject. I know St. Thomas +Aquinas calls eternity <span lang="la"><i>nunc stans</i></span>, an <em>ever abiding +now</em>; which is easy enough to say, but though I +fain would, I never could conceive it; they that +can, are more happy than I. But in the mean time +he alloweth hereby all men to be of my opinion, +save only those that conceive in their minds a +<span lang="la"><i>nunc stans</i></span>; which I think are none. I understand +as little, how it can be true that “God is not just, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_330'>330</span>but justice itself, not wise but wisdom itself, not +eternal but eternity itself”: nor how he concludes +thence that “eternity is a point indivisible, and not +a succession”: nor in what sense it can be said, +that an “infinite point,” &c, wherein is no succession, +can “comprehend all times,” though time be +successive.</p> + +<p class='c001'>These phrases I find not in the Scripture. I +wonder therefore what was the design of the +Schoolmen to bring them up; unless they thought +a man could not be a true Christian, unless his understanding +be first strangled with such hard +sayings.</p> + +<p class='c001'>And thus much in answer to his discourse; +wherein I think not only his squadrons, but also +his reserves of distinctions are defeated. And now +your Lordship shall have my doctrine concerning +the same question, with my reasons for it, positively +and briefly as I can, without any terms of +art, in plain English.</p> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> (<i>a</i>) “That poor discourse which I mention, +was not written against any divines, but in +way of examination of a French treatise, which +your Lordship’s brother did me the honour to show +me at York. (<i>b</i>) My assertion is most true, that +we ought not to desert a certain truth because we +are not able to comprehend the certain manner. +Such a truth is that which I maintain, that the +will of man in ordinary actions is free from extrinsical +determination: a truth demonstrable in +reason, received and believed by all the world. +And therefore, though I be not able to comprehend +or express exactly the certain manner how it consists +together with God’s eternal prescience and +<span class='pageno' id='Page_331'>331</span>decrees, which exceed my weak capacity, yet I +ought to adhere to that truth which is manifest. +But T. H.’s opinion, of the absolute necessity of +all events by reason of their antecedent determination +in their extrinsical and necessary causes, is +no such certain truth, but an innovation, a strange +paradox, without probable grounds, rejected by all +authors, yea, by all the world. Neither is the +manner how the second causes do operate, so obscure, +or so transcendent above the reach of reason, +as the eternal decrees of God are. And therefore +in both these respects, he cannot challenge the +same privilege. I am in possession of an old truth, +derived by inheritance or succession from mine ancestors. +And therefore, though I were not able to +clear every quirk in law, yet I might justly hold my +possession until a better title were showed for another. +He is no old possessor, but a new pretender, +and is bound to make good his claim by evident +proofs: not by weak and inconsequent suppositions +or inducements, such as those are which he useth +here, of ‘praises, dispraises, rewards, punishments, +the memory of good and evil sequels and events’; +which may incline the will, but neither can nor do +necessitate the will: nor by uncertain and accidental +inferences, such as this; ‘the memory of +praises, dispraises, rewards, punishments, good and +evil sequels, do make us’ (he should say, <i>dispose</i> us) +‘to elect what we elect; but the memory of these +things is from the sense, and the sense from the +operation of the external objects, and the agency +of external objects is only from God; therefore all +actions, even of free and voluntary agents, are necessary’. +(<i>c</i>) To pass by all the other great imperfections +<span class='pageno' id='Page_332'>332</span>which are to be found in this sorite, +it is just like that old sophistical piece: He that +drinks well sleeps well, he that sleeps well thinks +no hurt, he that thinks no hurt lives well; therefore +he that drinks well lives well.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>d</i>) “In the very last passage of my discourse I +proposed mine own private opinion, how it might +be made appear, that the eternal prescience and +decrees of God are consistent with true liberty +and contingency. And this I set down in as plain +terms as I could, or as so profound a speculation +would permit: which is almost wholly misunderstood +by T. H., and many of my words wrested to +a wrong sense. As first, where I speak of the +aspect of God, that is, his view, his knowledge, by +which the most free and contingent actions were +manifest to him from eternity, (Heb. iv. 13, <i>all +things are naked and open to his eyes</i>), and this +not discursively, but intuitively, not by external +species, but by his internal essence; he confounds +this with the will and the decrees of God; though +he found not the word <i>aspect</i> before in this discourse, +he might have found prescience. (<i>e</i>) Secondly, +he chargeth me, that hitherto I have maintained +that ‘liberty and the decrees of God are +irreconcilable.’ If I have said any such thing, my +heart never went along with my pen. No, but his +reason why he chargeth me on this manner is, because +I have maintained that ‘liberty and the absolute +necessity of all things’ are irreconcilable. That +is true indeed. What then? ‘Why,’ saith he, ‘necessity +and God’s decrees are all one.’ How all +one? That were strange indeed. Necessity may be +a consequent of God’s decrees; it cannot be the decree +<span class='pageno' id='Page_333'>333</span>itself. (<i>f</i>) But to cut his argument short: God +hath decreed all effects which come to pass in time; +yet not all after the same manner, but according to +the distinct natures, capacities, and conditions of +his creatures, which he doth not destroy by his decree; +some he acteth, with some he co-operateth +by special influence, and some he only permitteth. +Yet this is no idle or bare permission; seeing he +doth concur both by way of general influence, +giving power to act; and also by disposing all +events necessary, free, and contingent to his own +glory. (<i>g</i>) Thirdly, he chargeth me, that I ‘allow +all men to be of his opinion, save only those that +conceive in their minds a <span lang="la"><i>nunc stans</i></span>, or how eternity +is an indivisible point, rather than an everlasting +succession’. But I have given no such +allowance. I know there are many other ways +proposed by divines, for reconciling the eternal +prescience and decrees of God with the liberty +and contingency of second causes; some of which +may please other judgments better than this of +mine. Howsoever, though a man could comprehend +none of all these ways, yet remember what +I said, that a certain truth ought not to be rejected, +because we are not able, in respect of our +weakness, to understand the certain manner or +reason of it. I know the loadstone hath an attractive +power to draw the iron to it; and yet I +know not how it comes to have such a power.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“But the chiefest difficulty which offers itself in +this section is, whether eternity be an indivisible +point, as I maintain it; or an everlasting succession, +as he would have it. According to his constant +use, he gives no answer to what was urged by me, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_334'>334</span>but pleads against it from his own incapacity. ‘I +never could conceive,’ saith he, ‘how eternity +should be an indivisible point.’ I believe, that +neither we nor any man else can comprehend it so +clearly as we do these inferior things. The nearer +that anything comes to the essence of God, the +more remote it is from our apprehension. But +shall we therefore make potentialities, and successive +duration, and former and later, or a part without +a part, as they say, to be in God? Because +we are not able to understand clearly the divine +perfection, we must not therefore attribute any +imperfection to him.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>h</i>) “He saith moreover, that ‘he understands +as little how it can be true which I say, that God +is not just but justice itself, not eternal but eternity +itself.’ It seems, howsoever he be versed in +this question, that he hath not troubled his head +overmuch with reading School-divines or metaphysicians, +if he make faculties or qualities to be in +God really distinct from his essence. God is a +most simple or pure act, which can admit no +composition of substance and accidents. Doth he +think, that the most perfect essence of God cannot +act sufficiently without faculties and qualities? +The infinite perfection of the Divine essence excludes +all passive or receptive powers, and cannot +be perfected more than it is by any accidents. +The attributes of God are not divers virtues or +qualities in him, as they are in the creatures; but +really one and the same with the Divine essence, +and among themselves. They are attributed to +God to supply the defect of our capacity, who are +not able to understand that which is to be known +<span class='pageno' id='Page_335'>335</span>of God under one name, or one act of the understanding.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Furthermore he saith, that ‘he understands +not how I conclude from hence, that eternity is +an indivisable point, and not a succession’. (<i>i</i>) I +will help him. The Divine substance is indivisible; +but eternity is the Divine substance. The major +is evident, because God is <span lang="la"><i>actus simplicissimus</i></span>, a +most simple act; wherein there is no manner of +composition, neither of matter and form, nor of +subject and accidents, nor of parts, &c; and by +consequence no divisibility. The minor hath been +clearly demonstrated in mine answer to his last +doubt, and is confessed by all men that whatsoever +is in God, is God.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Lastly, he saith, he conceives not ‘how it can +be said, that an infinite point, wherein is no succession, +can comprehend all time which is successive’. +I answer, that it doth not comprehend it +formally, as time is successive; but eminently and +virtually, as eternity is infinite. To-day all eternity +is co-existent with this day: to-morrow all +eternity will be co-existent with to-morrow: and +so in like manner with all the parts of time, being +itself without parts. He saith, ‘he finds not these +phrases in the Scripture’. No, but he may find +the thing in the Scripture, that God is infinite in +all his attributes, and not capable of any imperfection.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“And so to show his antipathy against the Schoolmen, +that he hath no liberty or power to contain +himself when he meets with any of their phrases +or tenets, he falls into another paroxism or fit of +inveighing against them; and so concludes his +<span class='pageno' id='Page_336'>336</span>answer with a <span lang="la"><i>plaudite</i></span> to himself, because he had +defeated both my squadrons of arguments and +reserves of distinctions</p> + +<div class='lg-container-b c015'> + <div class='linegroup'> + <div class='group'> + <div class='line'><span lang="la">Dicite Io pæan, et Io bis dicite pæan.</span></div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c010'><a id='corr336.5'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='But'>“But</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_336.5'><ins class='correction' title='But'>“But</ins></a></span> because his eyesight was weak, and their +backs were towards him, he quite mistook the +matter. Those whom he saw routed and running +away, were his own scattered forces.”</p> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c000'> + <div><span class='fss'>ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY, NO. XXIV.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>a</i>) “That poor discourse which I mention, was +not written against any divines, but in way of examination +of a French treatise, &c”. This is in reply +to those words of mine, “this discourse containeth +his opinion about reconciling liberty with the prescience +and decrees of God, otherwise than some +divines have done, against whom he had formerly +written a treatise”. If the French treatise +were according to his mind, what need was there +that the examination should be written? If it +were not to his mind, it was in confutation of him, +that is to say, written against the author of it: unless +perhaps the Bishop thinks that he writes not +against a man, unless he charge him with blasphemy +and atheism, as he does me.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “My assertion is most true, that we ought +not to desert a certain truth, because we are not +able to comprehend the certain manner.” To this +I answered, that it was true; and as he alleged it +for a reason why he should not be of my opinion, +so I alleged it for a reason why I should not be of +his. But now in his reply he saith, that his opinion +is “a truth demonstrable in reason, received and +<span class='pageno' id='Page_337'>337</span>believed by all the world. And therefore, though he +be not able to comprehend or express exactly the +certain manner how this liberty of will consists with +God’s eternal prescience and decrees, yet he ought +to adhere to that truth which is manifest.” But +why should he adhere to it, unless it be manifest to +himself? And if it be manifest to himself, why does he +deny that he is able to comprehend it? And if he +be not able to comprehend it, how knows he that it is +demonstrable? Or why says he that so confidently, +which he does not know? Methinks that which I +have said, namely, that “that which God foreknows +shall be hereafter, cannot but be hereafter, +and at the same time that he foreknew it should be; +but that which cannot but be, is necessary; therefore +what God foreknows, shall be necessarily, and +at the time foreknown”: this I say looketh somewhat +liker to a demonstration, than any thing that +he hath hitherto brought to prove free will. +Another reason why I should be of his opinion, +is that he is “in possession of an old truth derived +to him by inheritance or succession from his +ancestors”. To which I answer, first, that I am +in possession of a truth derived to me from the +light of reason. Secondly, that whereas he knoweth +not whether it be the truth that he possesseth, +or not; because he confesseth he knows not how +it can consist with God’s prescience and decrees; +I have sufficiently shewn that my opinion of necessity +not only agrees with, but necessarily followeth +from the eternal prescience and decrees of God. +Besides, it is an unhandsome thing for a man to +derive his opinion concerning truth by succession +from his ancestors; for our ancestors, the first Christians, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_338'>338</span>derived not therefore their truth from the +Gentiles, because they were their ancestors.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>c</i>) “To pass by all the other great imperfections +which are to be found in this sorite, it is +just like an old philosophical piece: he that drinks +well, sleeps well; he that sleeps well, thinks no +hurt; he that thinks no hurt, lives well; therefore +he that drinks well, lives well.” My argument was +thus: “election is always from the memory of good +and evil sequels; memory is always from the sense; +and sense always from the action of external +bodies; and all action from God; therefore all +actions, even of free and voluntary agents, are from +God, and consequently necessary”. Let the Bishop +compare now his scurrilous argumentation with +this of mine; and tell me, whether he that sleeps +well, doth all his lifetime think no hurt.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>d</i>) “In the very last passage of my discourse +I proposed my own private opinion, how it might +be made appear that the eternal prescience and +decrees of God are consistent with true liberty +and contingency, &c.” If he had meant by liberty, +as other men do, the liberty of action, that is, of +things which are in his power to do which he will, +it had been an easy matter to reconcile it with the +prescience and decrees of God; but meaning the +liberty of will, it was impossible. So likewise, if +by contingency he had meant simply coming to +pass, it had been reconcilable with the decrees of +God; but meaning coming to pass without necessity, +it was impossible. And therefore though it +be true he says, that “he set it down in as plain +terms as he could”, yet it was impossible to set +it down in plain terms. Nor ought he to charge +<span class='pageno' id='Page_339'>339</span>me with misunderstanding him, and wresting his +words to a wrong sense. For the truth is, I did +not understand them at all, nor thought he understood +them himself; but was willing to give them +the best interpretation they would bear; which he +calls wresting them to a wrong sense. And first, +I understood not what he meant by the aspect of +God. For if he had meant his foreknowledge, which +word he had often used before; what needed he in +this one place only to call it <em>aspect</em>? Or what need +he here call it his <em>view</em>? Or say that all things +are open to the eyes of God not <em>discursively</em>, +but <em>intuitively</em>; which is to expound <em>eyes</em> in that +text, Hebr. iv. 13, not figuratively but literally, +nevertheless excluding <em>external species</em>, which the +Schoolmen say are the cause of seeing? But it was +well done to exclude such insignificant speeches, +upon every occasion whatsoever. And though I +do not hold the foreknowledge of God to consist in +<em>discourse</em>; yet I shall be never driven to say it is +by <em>intuition</em>, as long as I know that even a man +hath foreknowledge of all those things which he +intendeth himself to do, not by discourse, but by +knowing his own purpose; saving that man hath a +superior power over him, that can change his purpose; +which God hath not. And whereas he says, +I confound this aspect with the will and decrees of +God, he accuseth me wrongfully. For how could +I so confound it, when I understood not what it +meant?</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>e</i>) “Secondly, he chargeth me, that hitherto I +have maintained that ‘liberty and the decrees of +God are irreconcileable’”. And the reason why I +do so is, because he maintained that liberty and the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_340'>340</span>absolute necessity of all things are irreconcileable. +If liberty cannot stand with necessity, it cannot +stand with the decrees of God, of which decrees +necessity is a consequent. I needed not to say, nor +did say, that necessity and God’s decrees are all +one: though if I had said it, it had not been without +authority of learned men, in whose writings +are often found this sentence, <span lang="la"><i>voluntas Dei, necessitas +rerum</i></span>.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>f</i>) “But to cut his argument short: God hath +decreed all effects which come to pass in time, yet +not all after the same manner, but according to +the distinct natures, capacities, and conditions of +his creatures; which he doth not destroy by his +decree: some he acteth.” Hitherto true. Then +he addeth: “with some he co-operateth by special +influence; and some he only permitteth; yet this +is no idle or bare permission”. This is false. For +nothing operateth by its own original power, but +God himself. Man operateth not but by special +power, (I say special power, not special influence), +derived from God. Nor is it by God’s permission +only, as I have often already shown, and as the +Bishop here contradicting his former words confesseth. +For <em>to permit only</em>, and <em>barely to permit</em>, +signify the same thing. And that which he says, +that God <em>concurs by way of general influence</em>, is +jargon. For every concurrence is one singular and +individual concurrence; and nothing in the world +is general, but the signification of words and other +signs.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>g</i>) “Thirdly, he chargeth me, that ‘I allow all +men to be of his opinion, save only those that +conceive in their minds a <span lang="la"><i>nunc stans</i></span>, or how eternity +<span class='pageno' id='Page_341'>341</span>is an indivisible point, rather than an everlasting +succession.’ But I have given no such allowance.” +Surely if the reason wherefore my opinion +is false, proceed from this, that I conceive not +eternity to be <span lang="la"><i>nunc stans</i></span>, but an everlasting succession, +I am allowed to hold my opinion till I can +conceive eternity otherwise: at least he allows men +not till then to be of his opinion. For he hath said, +“that the main impediment which keeps men from +subscribing to that way of his, is because they conceive +eternity to be an everlasting succession, and +not one indivisible point”. As for the many other +ways which he says are “proposed by divines for +reconciling the eternal prescience and decrees of +God with the liberty and contingency of second +causes”, if they mean such liberty and contingency +as the Bishop meaneth, they are proposed in vain; +for truth and error can never be reconciled. But +“however,” saith he, “though a man could comprehend +none of all these ways, yet we must remember +that a certain truth ought not to be rejected, +because we are not able to understand the +reason of it.” For “he knows,” he says, “the loadstone +hath an attractive power to draw the iron to +it, and yet he knoweth not how it cometh to have +such a power.” I know the load-stone hath no +such attractive power; and yet I know that the +iron cometh to it, or it to the iron; and therefore +wonder not, that the Bishop knoweth not how it +cometh to have that power. In the next place he +saith, I bring nothing to prove that eternity is not +an indivisible point, but my own incapacity “that +I cannot conceive it”. The truth is, I cannot dispute +neither for nor against (as he can do) the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_342'>342</span>positions I understand not. Nor do I understand +what derogation it can be to the divine perfection, +to attribute to it potentiality, that is (in English) +power, and successive duration; for such attributes +are often given to it in the Scripture.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>h</i>) “He saith moreover, that ‘he understands +as little how it can be true which I say, that +God is not just, but justice itself, nor eternal, +but eternity itself’. It seems, howsoever he be +versed in this question, that he hath not troubled +his head over-much with reading School-divines, +or metaphysicians.” They are unseemly words to +be said of God: I will not say, blasphemous and +atheistical, which are the attributes he gives to my +opinions, because I do not think them spoken out +of an evil mind, but out of error: they are, I say, +unseemly words to be said of God, that he is not +just, that he is not eternal, and (as he also said) +that he is not wise; and cannot be excused by any +following <em>but</em>, especially when the <em>but</em> is followed +by that which is not to be understood. Can any +man understand how justice is just, or wisdom +wise? and whereas justice is an accident, one of +the moral virtues, and wisdom another; how God +is an accident or moral virtue? It is more than +the Schoolmen or metaphysicians can understand; +whose writings have troubled my head more than +they should have done, if I had known that amongst +so many senseless disputes, there had been so few +lucid intervals. But I have considered since, where +men will undertake to reason out of natural philosophy +of the incomprehensible nature of God, that +it is impossible they should speak intelligibly, or in +other language than metaphysic, wherein they may +<span class='pageno' id='Page_343'>343</span>contradict themselves, and not perceive it; as he +does here, when he says, “the attributes of God +are not diverse virtues or qualities in him, as they +are in the creatures, but really one and the same +with the divine essence and amongst themselves, +and attributed to God to supply the defect of our +capacity”. Attributes are names; and therefore it +is a contradiction, to say they are really one and +the same with the divine essence. But if he mean +the virtues signified by the attributes, as justice, +wisdom, eternity, divinity, &c; so also they are virtues, +and not one virtue, (which is still a contradiction); +and we give those attributes to God, not +to shew that we apprehend how they are in him, +but to signify how we think it best to honour +him.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>i</i>) “‘In the next place he will help me to understand,’ +he says, ‘how eternity is an indivisible +point.’ The divine substance is indivisible; but +eternity is the divine substance. The major is +evident, because God is <span lang="la"><i>actus simplicissimus</i></span>; the +minor hath been clearly demonstrated in my answer +to his last doubt, and is confessed by all men, +that whatsoever is attributed to God is God.” The +major is so far from being evident, that <span lang="la"><i>actus simplicissimus</i></span> +signifieth nothing. The minor is said +by some men, thought by no man; for whatsoever +is thought, is understood. And all that he hath +elsewhere and here dilated upon it, is as perfect +nonsense, as any man ever writ on purpose to +make merry with. And so is that whereby he +answers to my objection, that a point cannot comprehend +all time, which is successive; namely, +his distinction, that “a point doth not comprehend +<span class='pageno' id='Page_344'>344</span>all time <em>formally</em>, as time is successive; but <em>eminently</em> +and <em>virtually</em>, as eternity is infinite”. And +this, “to-day all eternity is co-existent with this +day, and to-morrow all eternity will be co-existent +with to-morrow”. It is well that his eternity is +now come from a <span lang="la"><i>nunc stans</i></span> to be a <span lang="la"><i>nunc fluens</i></span>, +flowing from this day to the next, and so on. This +kind of language is never found in the Scripture. +No, but the thing, saith he, is found there, namely, +that God is infinite in all his attributes. I would +he could shew me the place where God is said to +be infinite in all his attributes. There be places +enough to shew that God is infinite in power, in +wisdom, mercy, &c: but neither is he said to be infinite +in names (which is the English of attributes), +nor that he is an indivisible point, nor that a point +doth comprehend time eminently and virtually; +nor that to-day all eternity is co-existent with to-day, +&c. And thus much in answer to his reply +upon my answer. That which remaineth, is my +reply upon his answer to my positive doctrine on +this subject.</p> + +<h3 id='XXV' class='c002'>MY OPINION ABOUT LIBERTY AND NECESSITY NO. XXV.</h3> + +<p class='c010'><i>T. H.</i> First, I conceive that when it cometh +into a man’s mind to do or not to do some certain +action, if he have no time to deliberate, the doing +or abstaining necessarily followeth the present +thought he had of the good or evil consequence +thereof to himself. As for example, in sudden +anger the action shall follow the thought of revenge, +in sudden fear the thought of escape. Also +when a man hath time to deliberate, but deliberates +not, because never anything appeared that +<span class='pageno' id='Page_345'>345</span>could make him doubt of the consequence, the +action follows his opinion of the goodness or harm +of it. These actions I call voluntary. He, if I +understand him aright, calls them spontaneous. I +call them voluntary, because those actions that +follow immediately the last appetite, are voluntary. +And here, where there is one only appetite, that +one is the last.</p> + +<p class='c001'>Besides, I see it is reasonable to punish a rash +action; which could not be justly done by man, +unless the same were voluntary. For no action of +a man can be said to be without deliberation, +though never so sudden; because it is supposed he +had time to deliberate all the precedent time of his +life, whether he should do that kind of action or +not. And hence it is, that he that killeth in a +sudden passion of anger, shall nevertheless be +justly put to death: because all the time wherein +he was able to consider whether to kill were good +or evil, shall be held for one continual deliberation; +and consequently the killing shall be judged to proceed +from election.</p> + +<div class='sidenote'>The Bishop’s reply.</div> + +<p class='c001'>J. D. “This part of T. H.’s discourse hangs together +like a sick man’s dreams. (<i>a</i>) Even now +he tells us, that ‘a man may have time to deliberate, +yet not deliberate’. By and by he saith, that +‘no action of a man, though never so sudden, can +be said to be without deliberation’. He tells us, +No. <a href='#XXXIII'><span class='fss'>XXXIII.</span></a>, that ‘the scope of this section is to +show what is spontaneous’. Howbeit he showeth +only what is voluntary; (<i>b</i>) so making voluntary +and spontaneous to be all one; whereas before +he had told us, that ‘every spontaneous action is +not voluntary, because indeliberate; nor every +<span class='pageno' id='Page_346'>346</span>voluntary action spontaneous, if it proceed from +fear.’ (<i>c</i>) Now he tells us, that ‘those actions +which follow the last appetite, are voluntary; and +where there is one only appetite, that is the last’. +But before he told us, that ‘voluntary presupposeth +some precedent deliberation and meditation of +what is likely to follow, both upon the doing and +abstaining from the action’. (<i>d</i>) He defines liberty, +No. <a href='#XXIX'><span class='fss'>XXIX.</span></a>, to be ‘the absence of all extrinsical impediments +to action’. And yet in his whole discourse +he laboureth to make good, that whatsoever +is not done, is therefore not done, because the +agent was necessitated by extrinsical causes not to +do it. Are not extrinsical causes, which determine +him not to do it, extrinsical impediments to action? +So no man shall be free to do any thing but that +which he doth actually. He defines a free agent +to be ‘him who hath not made an end of deliberating’ +(No. <a href='#XXVIII'><span class='fss'>XXVIII.</span></a>). And yet defines liberty to be +‘an absence of outward impediments’. There may +be outward impediments, even whilst he is deliberating. +As a man deliberates whether he shall play +at tennis: and at the same time the door of the +tennis-court is fast locked against him. And after a +man hath ceased to deliberate, there may be no outward +impediments: as when a man resolves not to +play at tennis, because he finds himself ill-disposed, +or because he will not hazard his money. So the +same person, at the same time, should be free and +not free, not free and free. And as he is not firm +to his own grounds, so he confounds all things, the +mind and the will, the estimative faculty and the +understanding, imagination with deliberation, the +end with the means, human will with the sensitive +<span class='pageno' id='Page_347'>347</span>appetite, rational hope or fear with irrational passions, +inclinations with intentions, a beginning +of being with a beginning of working, sufficiency +with efficiency. So as the greatest difficulty is to +find out what he aims at. So as I had once +resolved not to answer this part of his discourse; +yet upon better advice I will take a brief survey of +it also; and show how far I assent unto, or dissent +from that which I conceive to be his meaning.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“And first, concerning sudden passions, as anger +or the like. (<i>e</i>) That which he saith, that ‘the action +doth necessarily follow the thought’, is thus far +true; that those actions which are altogether undeliberated +and do proceed from sudden and violent +passions, or <span lang="la"><i>motus primo primi</i></span>, which surprise a +man, and give him no time to advise with reason, +are not properly and actually in themselves free, +but rather necessary actions; as when a man runs +away from a cat or a custard out of a secret antipathy.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>f</i>) “Secondly, as for those actions ‘wherein +actual deliberation seems not necessary, because +never anything appeared that could make a man +doubt of the consequence’: I do confess, that actions +done by virtue of a precedent deliberation, +without any actual deliberation in the present, +when the act is done, may notwithstanding be +truly both voluntary and free acts, yea, in some +cases and in some sense, more free than if they +were actually deliberated of in present. As one +who hath acquired by former deliberation and experience +a habit to play upon the virginals, needs +not deliberate what man or what jack he must +touch, nor what finger of his hand he must move +<span class='pageno' id='Page_348'>348</span>to play such a lesson; yea, if his mind should be +fixed, or intent to every motion of his hand, or +every touch of a string, it would hinder his play, +and render the action more troublesome to him. +Wherefore I believe, that not only his playing in +general, but every motion of his hand, though it +be not presently deliberated of, is a free act, by +reason of his precedent deliberation. So then +(saving improprieties of speech, as calling that +voluntary which is free, and limiting the will to +the last appetite; and other mistakes, as that no +act can be said to be without deliberation) we +agree also for the greater part in this second observation.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>g</i>) “Thirdly, whereas he saith, that ‘some sudden +acts proceeding from violent passions, which +surprise a man, are justly punished’; I grant they +are so sometimes; but not for his reason, because +they have been formerly actually deliberated of; +but because they were virtually deliberated of, or +because it is our fault that they were not actually +deliberated of, whether it was a fault of pure negation, +that is, of not doing our duty only, or a +fault of bad disposition also, by reason of some +vicious habit which we had contracted by our former +actions. To do a necessary act is never a +fault, nor justly punishable, when the necessity is +inevitably imposed upon us by extrinsical causes. +As if a child, before he had the use of reason, shall +kill a man in his passion; yet because he wanted +malice to incite him to it, and reason to restrain +him from it, he shall not die for it in the strict +rules of particular justice, unless there be some +mixture of public justice in the case.</p> + +<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_349'>349</span>(<i>h</i>) “But if the necessity be contracted by ourselves, +and by our own faults, it is justly punishable. +As he who by his wanton thoughts in the +day-time doth procure his own nocturnal pollution: +a man cannot deliberate in his sleep, yet it is accounted +a sinful act, and consequently, a free act, +that is, not actually free in itself, but virtually free +in its causes; and though it be not expressly willed +and chosen, yet it is tacitly and implicitly willed and +chosen, when that is willed and chosen from whence +it was necessarily produced. By the Levitical law, +if a man digged a pit and left it uncovered, so that +his neighbour’s ox or his ass did fall into it, he +was bound to make reparation; not because he did +choose to leave it uncovered on purpose that +such a mischance might happen, but because he +did freely omit that which he ought to have done, +from whence this damage proceeded to his neighbour. +Lastly, there is great difference between +the first motions, which sometimes are not in our +power, and subsequent acts of killing or stealing, +or the like, which always are in our power if we +have the use of reason, or else it is our own fault +that they are not in our power. Yet to such +hasty acts done in hot blood the law is not so severe, +as to those which are done upon long deliberation +and prepensed malice, unless, as I said, +there be some mixture of public justice in it. He +that steals a horse deliberately, may be more +punishable by the law than he that kills the owner +by chance-medley: yet the death of the owner was +more noxious, (to use his phrase), and more +damageable to the family, than the stealth of the +horse. So far was T. H. mistaken in that also, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_350'>350</span>that the right to kill men doth proceed merely +from their being noxious (No. <a href='#XIV'><span class='fss'>XIV</span></a>).”</p> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c000'> + <div><span class='fss'>ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S ANSWER TO MY OPINION ABOUT LIBERTY AND NECESSITY NO. XXV.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>a</i>) “Even now he tells us, that ‘a man may +have time to deliberate, yet not deliberate’. By +and by he saith, that ‘no action of a man, though +never so sudden, can be said to be without deliberation’.” +He thinks he hath here caught me in a +contradiction; but he is mistaken; and the cause +is, that he observed not that there may be a difference +between deliberation and that which shall be +construed for deliberation by a judge. For a man +may do a rash act suddenly without deliberation; +yet because he ought to have deliberated, and had +time enough to deliberate whether the action were +lawful or not, it shall not be said by the judge that +it was without deliberation, who supposeth that +after the law known, all the time following was +time of deliberation. It is therefore no contradiction, +to say a man deliberates not, and that he +shall be said to deliberate by him that is the judge +of voluntary actions.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “Again, where he says, ‘he maketh voluntary +and spontaneous actions to be all one’, whereas +before he had told us that ‘every spontaneous action +is not voluntary, because indeliberate; nor +every voluntary action spontaneous, if it proceed +from fear’.” He thinks he hath espied another +contradiction. It is no wonder if speaking of +spontaneous, which signifieth nothing else in Latin +(for English it is not) but that which is done deliberately +or indeliberately without compulsion, I +<span class='pageno' id='Page_351'>351</span>seem to the Bishop, who hath never given any definition +of that word, not to use it as he would +have me. And it is easy for him to give it any +signification he please, as the occasion shall serve +to charge me with contradiction. In what sense +I have used that word once, in the same I have +used it always, calling that spontaneous which is +without co-action or compulsion by terror.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>c</i>) “Now he tells us, that ‘those actions which +follow the last appetite are voluntary, and where +there is one only appetite, that is the last’. But +before he told us, that ‘voluntary presupposeth +some precedent deliberation and meditation of +what is likely to follow, both upon the doing and +abstaining from the <em>action</em>’.” This is a third contradiction +he supposeth he hath found, but is again +mistaken. For when men are to judge of actions, +whether they be voluntary or not, they cannot call +that action voluntary, which followed not the last +appetite. But the same men, though there were +no deliberation, shall judge there was, because it +ought to have been, and that from the time that +the law was known to the time of the action itself. +And therefore both are true, that voluntary may +be without, and yet presupposed in the law not to +be without deliberation.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>d</i>) “He defines liberty (No. <a href='#XXIX'><span class='fss'>XXIX.</span></a>) to be ‘the +absence of all extrinsical impediments to action’. +And yet in his whole discourse he laboureth to +make good, that whatsoever is not done, is therefore +not done, because the agent was necessitated +by extrinsical causes not to do it. Are not extrinsical +causes which determine him not to do it, +extrinsical impediments to action?” This definition +<span class='pageno' id='Page_352'>352</span>of liberty, that it is “the absence of all extrinsical +impediments to action”, he thinks he hath +sufficiently confuted by asking whether the extrinsical +causes, which determine a man not to do an +action, be not extrinsical impediments to action. +It seems by his question he makes no doubt but +they are; but is deceived by a too shallow consideration +of what the word <em>impediment</em> signifieth. +For impediment or hinderance signifieth an opposition +to endeavour. And therefore if a man +be necessitated by extrinsical causes not to endeavour +an action, those causes do not oppose his +endeavour to do it, because he has no such endeavour +to be opposed; and consequently extrinsical +causes that take away endeavour, are not to be +called impediments; nor can any man be said to +be hindered from doing that, which he had no purpose +at all to do. So that this objection of his +proceedeth only from this, that he understandeth +not sufficiently the English tongue. From the +same proceedeth also that he thinketh it a contradiction, +to call a free agent him that hath not +yet made an end of deliberating, and to call liberty +an absence of outward impediments. “For,” +saith he, “there may be outward impediments, +even while he is deliberating.” Wherein he is deceived. +For though he may deliberate of that +which is impossible for him to do; as in the example +he allegeth of him that deliberateth whether +he shall play at tennis, not knowing that the door +of the tennis-court is shut against him; yet it is +no impediment to him that the door is shut, till he +have a will to play; which be hath not till he hath +done deliberating whether he shall play or not. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_353'>353</span>That which followeth of my confounding mind +and will; the estimative faculty and the understanding; +the imagination and deliberation; the +end and the means; the human will and the +sensitive appetite; rational hope or fear, and irrational +passions; inclinations and intentions; a +beginning of being and a beginning of working; +sufficiency and efficiency: I do not find in anything +that I have written, any impropriety in the +use of these or any other English words; nor do +I doubt but an English reader, who hath not lost +himself in School-divinity, will very easily conceive +what I have said. But this I am sure, that +I never confounded beginning of being with beginning +of working, nor sufficiency with efficiency; +nor ever used these words, sensitive appetite, rational +hope, or rational fear, or irrational passions. +It is therefore impossible I should confound them. +But the Bishop is either mistaken, or else he makes +no scruple to say that which he knows to be false, +when he thinks it will serve his turn.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>e</i>) “That which he saith, that ‘the action doth +necessarily follow the thought’, is thus far true; +that those actions which are altogether undeliberated, +and do proceed from violent passions, &c, +are not properly, and actually in themselves free, +but rather necessary actions, as when a man runs +away from a cat or a custard.” Thus far he says +is true. But when he calls sudden passions <span lang="la"><i>motus +primo primi</i></span>, I cannot tell whether he says true or +not, because I do not understand him; nor find +how he makes his meaning ever the clearer by his +example of a cat and a custard, because I know +not what he means by a secret antipathy. For +<span class='pageno' id='Page_354'>354</span>what that antipathy is he explaineth not by calling +it secret, but rather confesseth he knows not how +to explain it. And because he saith, it is <i>thus far +true</i>, I expect he should tell me also how far it is +false.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>f</i>) “Secondly, as for those actions wherein +actual deliberation seems not necessary, ‘because +never anything appeared that could make a man +doubt of the consequence’; I do confess that actions +done by virtue of a precedent deliberation, +without any actual deliberation for the present, +may notwithstanding be truly voluntary and free +acts.” In this he agrees with me. But where he +adds, “yea, in some cases, and in some sense more +free, than if they were actually deliberated of in +present”, I do not agree with him. And for the +instance he bringeth to prove it, in the man that +playeth on an instrument with his hand it maketh +nothing for him. For it proveth only, that the +habit maketh the motion of his hand more ready +and quick; but it proveth not that it maketh it +more voluntary, but rather less; because the rest of +the motions follow the first by an easiness acquired +from long custom; in which motion the +will doth not accompany all the strokes of the +hand, but gives a beginning to them only in the +first. Here is nothing, as I expected, of how far +that which I had said, namely, that the action +doth necessarily follow the thought, is false; unless +it be “improprieties of speech, as calling that +voluntary which is free, and limiting the will to +the last appetite; and other mistakes, as that no +act can be said to be without deliberation”. For +improprieties of speech, I will not contend with +<span class='pageno' id='Page_355'>355</span>one that can use <span lang="la"><i>motus primo primi</i></span>, <span lang="la"><i>practice +practicum</i></span>, <span lang="la"><i>actus elicitus</i></span>, and many other phrases +of the same kind. But to say that free actions are +voluntary; and that the will which causeth a voluntary +action, is the last appetite; and that that appetite +was immediately followed by the action; and +that no action of a man can be said in the judgment +of the law, to be without deliberation: are +no mistakes, for anything that he hath proved to +the contrary.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>g</i>) “Thirdly, whereas he saith, that ‘some +sudden acts, proceeding from violent passions +which surprise a man, are justly punished’; I grant +they are so sometimes, but not for his reason, &c.” +My reason was, “because he had time to deliberate +from the instant that he knew the law, to the instant +of his action, and ought to have deliberated”, +that therefore he may be justly punished. The +Bishop grants they are justly punished, and his +reason is, “because they were virtually deliberated +of”, or, “because it is our fault they were not actually +deliberated of”. How a man does deliberate, +and yet not actually deliberate, I understand +not. If virtual deliberation be not actual deliberation, +it is no deliberation. But he calleth virtual +deliberation, that which ought to have been, and +was not; and says the same that he condemns in +me. And his other reason, namely, because it is +our fault that we deliberated not, is the same that +I said, that we ought to have deliberated, and did +not. So that his reprehension here, is a reprehension +of himself, proceeding from that the custom +of School-language hath made him forget the +language of his country. And to that which he +<span class='pageno' id='Page_356'>356</span>adds, “that a necessary act is never a fault, nor +justly punishable, when the necessity is inevitably +imposed upon us by extrinsical causes”, I have +sufficiently answered before in diverse places; shewing +that a fault may be necessary from extrinsical +causes, and yet voluntary; and that voluntary +faults are justly punishable.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>h</i>) “But if the necessity be contracted by ourselves, +it is justly punishable. As he who by his +wanton thoughts in the day time, doth procure his +own nocturnal pollution.” This instance, because +it maketh not against anything I have held, and +partly also because it is a stinking passage, (for +surely if, as he that ascribes eyes to the understanding, +allows me to say it hath a nose, it stinketh +to the nose of the understanding); this sentence +I pass over, observing only the canting +terms, <em>not actually free in itself</em>, but <em>virtually +free in its causes</em>. In the rest of his answer to +this No. <span class='fss'><a href='#XXV'>XXV</a></span>, I find nothing alleged in confutation +of anything I have said, saving that his last words +are, that “T. H. is mistaken in that also, that the +right to kill men doth proceed merely from their +being noxious” (No. <a href='#XIV'><span class='fss'>XIV.</span></a>). But to that I have in +the same No. <a href='#XIV'><span class='fss'>XIV.</span></a> already answered. I must not +pass over, that a little before he hath these words: +“If a child, before he have the use of reason, shall kill +a man in his passion, yet because he wanted malice +to incite him to it, and reason to restrain him from +it, he shall not die for it, in the strict rules of particular +justice, unless there be some mixture of +public justice in the case”. The Bishop would +make but an ill judge of innocent children, for +such are they that, for want of age, have not use +enough of reason to abstain from killing. For the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_357'>357</span>want of reason proceeding from want of age, does +therefore take away the punishment, because it +taketh away the crime, and makes them innocent. +But he introduceth another justice, which he calleth +<em>public</em>; whereas he called the other <em>particular</em>. +And by this public justice, he saith, the child though +innocent may be put to death. I hope we shall +never have the administration of public justice in +such hands as his, or in the hands of such as shall +take counsel from him. But the distinction he +makes is not by himself understood. There are +public causes, and private causes. Private are +those, where the parties to the cause are both private +men. Public are those, where one of the parties +is the commonwealth, or the person that representeth +it, and the cause criminal. But there +is no distinction of justice into public and private. +We may read of men that, having sovereign power, +did sometimes put an innocent to death, either upon +a vow; as Jepthah did in sacrificing his daughter; +or when it hath been thought fit that an innocent +person should be put to death to save a great +number of people. But to put to death a child, not +for reason of state, which he improperly calls public +justice, but for killing a man, and at the same +time to acknowledge such killing to be no crime, I +think was never heard of.</p> + +<h3 id='XXVI' class='c002'>NO. XXVI.</h3> + +<p class='c010'><i>T. H.</i> Secondly, I conceive when a man deliberates +whether he shall do a thing or not do a thing, +that he does nothing else but consider whether it +be better for himself to do it or not to do it. And +to consider an action, is to imagine the consequences +<span class='pageno' id='Page_358'>358</span>of it, both good and evil. From whence is +to be inferred, that deliberation is nothing but +alternate imagination of the good and evil sequels +of an action, or (which is the same thing) alternate +hope and fear, or alternate appetite to do or acquit +the action of which he deliberateth.</p> + +<div class='sidenote'>The Bishop’s reply.</div> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> (<i>a</i>) “If I did not know what deliberation +was, I should be little relieved in my knowledge by +this description. Sometimes he makes it to be a +consideration, or an act of the understanding; sometimes +an imagination, or an act of the fancy; sometimes +he makes it to be an alternation of passions, +hope and fear. Sometimes he makes it concern +the end, sometimes to concern the means. So he +makes it I know not what. The truth is this in +brief: ‘Deliberation is an inquiry made by reason, +whether this or that, definitely considered, be a +good and fit means, or, indefinitely, what are good +and fit means to be chosen for attaining some +wished end.’”</p> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c000'> + <div><span class='fss'>ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXVI.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>a</i>) “If I did not know what deliberation was, +I should be little relieved in my knowledge by this +description. Sometimes he makes it to be a consideration, +or an act of the understanding, sometimes +an imagination, or an act of the fancy, &c. +So he makes it I know not what.” If the Bishop +had observed what he does himself, when he deliberates, +reasons, understands, or imagines, he +would have known what to make of all that I have +said in this Number. He would have known that +consideration, understanding, reason, and all the +passions of the mind, are imaginations. That to +<span class='pageno' id='Page_359'>359</span>consider a thing, is to imagine it; that to understand +a thing, is to imagine it; that to hope and +fear, are to imagine the things hoped for and +feared. The difference between them is, that +when we imagine the consequence of anything, we +are said to consider that thing; and when we have +imagined anything from a sign, and especially from +those signs we call names, we are said to understand +his meaning that maketh the sign; and when +we reason, we imagine the consequence of affirmations +and negations joined together; and when we +hope or fear, we imagine things good or hurtful to +ourselves: insomuch as all these are but imaginations +diversely named from different circumstances: +as any man may perceive as easily as he can look +into his own thoughts. But to him that thinketh +not himself upon the things whereof, but upon the +words wherewith he speaketh, and taketh those +words on trust from puzzled Schoolmen, it is not +only hard, but impossible to be known. And this +is the reason that maketh him say, I make deliberation +he knows not what. But how is deliberation +defined by him? “It is”, saith he, “an inquiry +made by reason, whether this or that definitely +considered, be a good and fit means; or indefinitely, +what are good and fit means to be chosen +for attaining some wished end.” If it were not +his custom to say, the understanding understandeth, +the will willeth, and so of the rest of the +faculties, I should have believed that when he says +deliberation is an inquiry made by reason, he +meaneth an inquiry made by the man that reasoneth; +for so it will be sense. But the reason which +a man useth in deliberation, being the same thing +<span class='pageno' id='Page_360'>360</span>that is called deliberation, his definition that deliberation +is an inquiry made by reason, is no more +than if he had said, deliberation is an inquiry made +by deliberation; a definition good enough to be +made by a Schoolman. Nor is the rest of the definition +altogether as it should be; for there is no +such thing as an “indefinite consideration of what +are good and fit means”; but a man imagining +first one thing, then another, considereth them +successively and singly each one, whether it conduceth +to his ends or not.</p> + +<h3 id='XXVII' class='c002'>NO. XXVII.</h3> + +<p class='c010'><i>T. H.</i> Thirdly, I conceive, that in all deliberations, +that is to say, in all alternate succession of +contrary appetites, the last is that which we call the +will, and is immediately before the doing of the +action, or next before the doing of it become impossible. +All other appetites to do and to quit, +that come upon a man during his deliberation, are +usually called intentions and inclinations, but not +wills; there being but one will, which also in this +case may be called last will, though the intention +change often.</p> + +<div class='sidenote'>The Bishop’s reply.</div> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> (<i>a</i>) “Still here is nothing but confusion; he +confounds the faculty of the will with the act of +volition; he makes the will to be the last part of +deliberation; he makes the intention, which is a +most proper and elicit act of the will, or a willing +of the end, as it is to be attained by certain means, +to be no willing at all, but only some antecedaneous +<em>inclination</em> or propension. He might as +well say, that the uncertain agitation of the needle +hither and thither to find out the pole, and the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_361'>361</span>resting or fixing of itself directly towards the +pole, were both the same thing. But the grossest +mistake is, that he will acknowledge no act of +man’s will, to be his will, but only the last act, +which he calls the last will. If the first were no +will, how comes this to be the last will? According +to his doctrine, the will of a man should be as +unchangeable as the will of God, at least so long +as there is a possibility to effect it. (<i>b</i>) According +to this doctrine, concupiscence with consent should +be no sin; for that which is not truly willed is not +a sin; or rather should not be at all, unless either +the act followed, or were rendered impossible by +some intervening circumstances. According to +this doctrine no man can say, this is my will, because +he knows not yet whether it shall be his +last appeal. The truth is, there be many acts of +the will, both in respect of the means and of the +end. But that act which makes a man’s actions +to be truly free, is election; which is the deliberate +choosing or refusing of this or that means, +or the acceptation of one means before another, +where divers are represented by the understanding.</p> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c000'> + <div><span class='fss'>ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXVII.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>a</i>) “Still here is nothing but confusion; he confounds +the faculty of the will with the act of volition; +he makes the will to be the last part of deliberation; +he makes the intention, which is a most +proper and elicit act of the will, to be no willing at +all, but only some antecedaneous (he might as well +have said, antecedent) inclination.” To confound +the faculty of the will with the will, were to confound +a <em>will</em> with <em>no will</em>; for the faculty of the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_362'>362</span>will is no will; the act only which he calls <em>volition</em>, +is the will. As a man that sleepeth hath the +<em>power</em> of <em>seeing</em>, and <em>seeth not</em>, nor hath for that +time any <em>sight</em>; so also he hath the <em>power</em> of willing, +but <em>willeth nothing</em>, nor hath for that time +any <em>will</em>. I must therefore have departed very +much from my own principles, if I have confounded +the <em>faculty</em> of the <em>will</em> with the <em>act</em> of <em>volition</em>. +He should have done well to have shown where I +confounded them. It is true, I make the will to +be the last part of deliberation; but it is that will +which maketh the action voluntary, and therefore +needs must be the last. But for the preceding variations +of the will to do and not to do, though +they be so many several wills, contrary to and +destroying one another, they usually are called +<em>intentions</em>; and therefore they are nothing to the +will, of which we dispute, that maketh an action +voluntary. And though a man have in every long +deliberation a great many <em>wills</em> and <em>nills</em>, they +use to be called inclinations, and the last only <em>will</em> +which is immediately followed by the voluntary +action. But nevertheless, both he that hath those +intentions, and God that seeth them, reckoneth +them for so many wills.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “According to this doctrine, concupiscence +with consent should be no sin; for that which is +not truly willed, is not a sin.” This is no consequent +to my doctrine: for I hold that they are, in +the sight of God, so many consents, so many willings, +which would have been followed by actions, +if the actions had been in their power. It had +been fitter for a man in whom is required gravity +and sanctity more than ordinary, to have chosen +<span class='pageno' id='Page_363'>363</span>some other kind of instance. But what meaneth +he by <em>concupiscence with consent</em>? Can there be +concupiscence without consent? It is the consent +itself. There may be also a lawful concupiscence +with consent. For concupiscence makes not the +sin, but the unlawfulness of satisfying such concupiscence; +and not the consent, but the will and +design to prosecute that which a man knoweth to +be unlawful. An appetite to another man’s bread, +is concupiscence; and though it be with consent +to eat, it is no sin; but the design to take it from +the other, notwithstanding that he may fail in his +design, that is the sin. And this instance might +have served his turn as well as the other; and +for consent, if he had understood the truth, he +might have put design.</p> + +<h3 id='XXVIII' class='c002'>NO. XXVIII.</h3> + +<p class='c010'><i>T. H.</i> Fourthly, that those actions which man +is said to do upon deliberation, are said to be voluntary, +and done upon choice and election. So +that voluntary action, and action proceeding from +election, is the same thing. And that of a voluntary +agent, it is all one to say he is free, and to say +he hath not made an end of deliberating.</p> + +<div class='sidenote'>The Bishop’s reply.</div> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> (<i>a</i>) “This short section might pass without +an animadversion, but for two things. The one is, +that he confounds a voluntary act with a free act. +A free act is only that which proceeds from the +free election of the rational will after deliberation; +but every act that proceeds from the sensitive +appetite of man or beast, without deliberation or +election, is truly voluntary. (<i>b</i>) The other thing +observable is his conclusion, that ‘it is all one to +<span class='pageno' id='Page_364'>364</span>say a man is free, and to say he hath not made +an end of deliberating’; which confession of +his overturns his whole structure of absolute +necessity. For if every agent be necessitated to +act what he doth act by a necessary and natural +flux of extrinsical causes, then he is no more +free before he deliberates, or whilst he deliberates, +than he is after; but by T. H.’s confession here, +he is more free whilst he deliberates, than he is +after. And so after all his flourishes, for an absolute +or extrinsical necessity, he is glad to set himself +down, and rest contented with an hypothetical +necessity, which no man ever denied or doubted +of; ascribing the necessitation of a man in free +acts to his own deliberation, and in indeliberate +acts to his last thought, No. <span class='fss'><a href='#XXV'>XXV</a></span>. What is this to +a natural and special influence of extrinsical causes? +(<i>c</i>) “Again, ‘liberty’, saith he, ‘is an absence of +extrinsical impediments’; but deliberation doth +produce no new extrinsical impediment; therefore +let him choose which part he will, either he is free +after deliberation, by his own doctrine, or he was +not free before. Our own deliberation, and the +direction of our own understanding, and the election +of our own will, do produce an hypothetical +necessity, that the event be such as the understanding +hath directed, and the will elected. But for +as much as the understanding might have directed +otherwise, and the will have elected otherwise, +this is far from an absolute necessity. Neither +doth liberty respect only future acts, but present +acts also. Otherwise God did not freely create the +world. In the same instant wherein the will elects, +it is free, according to a priority of nature, though +<span class='pageno' id='Page_365'>365</span>not of time, to elect otherwise. And so in a divided +sense, the will is free, even whilst it acts; +though in a compounded sense it be not free. +Certainly, deliberation doth constitute, not destroy +liberty.</p> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c000'> + <div><span class='fss'>ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXVIII.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>a</i>) “This short section might pass, but for +two things; one is, that he confounds a voluntary +act with a free act.” I do indeed take all voluntary +acts to be free, and all free acts to be voluntary; +but withal that all acts, whether free or +voluntary, if they be acts, were necessary before +they were acts. But where is the error? ‘A +free act’, saith he, ‘is only that which proceeds +from the free election of the rational will, after deliberation; +but every act that proceeds from the +sensitive appetite of man or beast, without deliberation +or election, is truly voluntary.’ So that my +error lies in this, that I distinguish not between a +rational will and a sensitive appetite in the same +man. As if the appetite and will in man or beast +were not the same thing, or that sensual men and +beasts did not deliberate, and choose one thing +before another, in the same manner that wise men +do. Nor can it be said of wills, that one is +rational, the other sensitive; but of men. And if +it be granted that deliberation is always (as it is +not) rational, there were no cause to call men +rational more than beasts. For it is manifest by +continual experience, that beasts do deliberate.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “The other thing observable is his conclusion, +that ‘it is all one to say, a man is free, and +to say, he hath not made an end of deliberating’: +<span class='pageno' id='Page_366'>366</span>which confession of his overturns his whole structure +of absolute necessity.” Why so? ‘Because’, +saith he, ‘if every agent be necessitated to act +what he doth act by extrinsical causes, then he is +no more free before he deliberates, or whilst he +deliberates, than he is after’. But this is a false +consequence; he should have inferred thus:--“then +he is no less necessitated before he deliberates +than he is after”; which is true, and yet +nevertheless he is more free. But taking necessity +to be inconsistent with liberty, which is the +question between us: instead of <em>necessitated</em> he +puts in <em>not free</em>. And therefore to say ‘a man is +free till he hath made an end of deliberating’, is +no contradiction to absolute and antecedent necessity. +And whereas he adds presently after, +that I ascribe the necessitation of a man in free +acts to his own deliberation, and in indeliberate +acts to his last thoughts: he mistakes the matter. +For I ascribe all necessity to the universal series +or order of causes, depending on the first cause +eternal: which the Bishop understandeth, as if I +had said in his phrase, to a special influence of extrinsical +causes; that is, understandeth it not at all.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>c</i>) “Again, ‘liberty,’ saith he, ‘is an absence +of extrinsical impediments’: but deliberation doth +produce no new extrinsical impediment; therefore +either he is free after deliberation, or he was not +free before.” I cannot perceive in these words +any more force of inference, than of so many other +words whatsoever put together at adventure. But +be his meaning what he will, I say not that deliberation +produceth any impediments: for there are +no impediments but to the action, whilst we are +<span class='pageno' id='Page_367'>367</span>endeavouring to do it, which is not till we have +done deliberating. But during the deliberation +there arise thoughts in him that deliberateth, concerning +the consequence of the action whereof he deliberateth, +which cause the action following; which +are not impediments to that action which was not +done, but the causes of that which was done. +That which followeth in this Number is not intelligible, +by reason of the insignificance of these +words, “understanding directeth; will electeth; +hypothetical necessity”; which are but jargon, and +his “divided sense” and “compounded sense”, +nonsense. And this also, “liberty respecteth not +future acts only, but present acts also”, is unintelligible. +For how can a man have liberty to do or +not to do that which is at the same instant already +done. For where he addeth, “otherwise God did +not freely create the world”, it proves nothing; +because he had the liberty to create it, before it was +created. Besides, it is a profaning of the name of +God, to make instances of his incomprehensible +working in a question as this is, merely natural.</p> + +<h3 id='XXIX' class='c002'>NO. XXIX.</h3> + +<p class='c010'><i>T. H.</i> Fifthly, I conceive liberty to be rightly +defined in this manner:--Liberty is the absence of +all the impediments to action, that are not contained +in the nature, and in the intrinsical quality +of the agent. As for example, the water is said to +descend freely, or to have liberty to descend by +the channel of the river, because there is no impediment +that way; but not across, because the banks +are impediments. And though water cannot ascend, +yet men never say it wants the liberty to +<span class='pageno' id='Page_368'>368</span>ascend, but the faculty or power; because the impediment +is in the nature of the water and intrinsical. +So also we say, he that is tied wants the +liberty to go, because the impediment is not in +him, but in his bonds; whereas we say not so of +him that is sick or lame, because the impediment +is in himself.</p> + +<div class='sidenote'>The Bishop’s reply.</div> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> (<i>a</i>) “How that should be a right definition +of liberty, which comprehends neither the +genus nor the difference, neither the matter nor +form of liberty, which doth not so much as accidentally +describe liberty by its marks and tokens; +how a real faculty or the elective power should be +defined by a negation, or by an absence, is past +my understanding, and contrary to all the rules of +right reason which I have learned. Negatives +cannot explicate the nature of things defined. By +this definition, a stone hath liberty to ascend into +the air, because there is no outward impediment +to hinder it; and so a violent act may be a free +act. Just like his definition are his instances of +the liberty of the water to descend down the +channel, and a sick or lame man’s liberty to go. +The latter is an impotence, and not a power or a +liberty. The former is so far from being a free +act, that it is scarce a natural act. Certainly the +proper natural motion of water, as of all heavy +bodies, is to descend directly downwards towards +the centre; as we see in rain, which falls down +perpendicularly. Though this be far from a free +act, which proceeds from a rational appetite; yet +it is a natural act, and proceeds from a natural +appetite, and hath its reason within itself. So +hath not the current of the river in its channel, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_369'>369</span>which must not be ascribed to the proper nature +of the water, but either to the general order of the +universe, for the better being and preservation of +the creatures: (otherwise the waters should not +move in seas and rivers as they do, but cover the +face of the earth, and possess their proper place +between the air and the earth, according to the +degree of their gravity): or to an extrinsical +principle, whilst one particle of water thrusteth +and forceth forward another, and so comes a +current, or at least so comes the current to be +more impetuous; to which motion the position of +the earth doth contribute much, both by restraining +that fluid body with its banks from dispersing +itself, and also by affording way for a fair and +easy descent by its proclivity. He tells us sadly, +that “the water wants liberty to go over the +banks, because there is an extrinsical impediment; +but to ascend up the channel, it wants not liberty, +but power”. Why? Liberty is a power; if it +want power to ascend, it wants liberty to ascend. +But he makes the reason why the water ascends +not up the channel, to be intrinsical, and the +reason why it ascends not over the banks, to be +extrinsical; as if there were not a rising of the +ground up the channel, as well as up the banks, +though it be not so discernible, nor always so +sudden. The natural appetite of the water is as +much against the ascending over the banks, as +the ascending up the channel. And the extrinsical +impediment is as great, ascending up the channel, +as over the banks; or rather greater, because there +it must move, not only against the rising soil, but +also against the succeeding waters, which press +<span class='pageno' id='Page_370'>370</span>forward the former. Either the river wants liberty +for both, or else it wants liberty for neither.</p> + +<p class='c001'>But to leave his metaphorical faculties, and his +catachrestical liberty: how far is his discourse +wide from the true moral liberty; which is the +question between us? His former description of a +free agent, that is, ‘he who hath not made an end +of deliberating’, though it was wide from the mark, +yet it came much nearer the truth than this definition +of liberty; unless perhaps he think that the +water hath done deliberating whether it will go +over the banks, but hath not done deliberating +whether it will go up the channel”.</p> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c000'> + <div><span class='fss'>ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXIX.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>a</i>) “How that should be a right definition of +liberty, which comprehends neither the genus nor +the difference, neither the matter nor the form of +liberty, &c: how a real faculty or the elective +power, should be defined by a negation or by an +absence: is past my understanding, and contrary to +all the rules of right reason which I have learned.” +A right definition is that which determineth the +signification of the word defined, to the end that +in the discourse where it is used, the meaning +of it may be constant and without equivocation. +This is the measure of a definition, and intelligible +to an English reader. But the Bishop, that measures +it by the genus and the difference, thinks, it +seems, though he write English, he writes not to +an English reader unless he also be a Schoolman. +I confess the rule is good, that we ought to define, +when it can be done, by using first some more +general term, and then by restraining the signification +<span class='pageno' id='Page_371'>371</span>of that general term, till it be the same +with that of the word defined. And this general +term the School calls <em>genus</em>, and the restraint <em>difference</em>. +This, I say, is a good rule where it can +be done; for some words are so general, that they +cannot admit a more general in their definition. +But why this ought to be a law of definition, I +doubt it would trouble him to find the reason; +and therefore I refer him (he shall give me leave +sometimes to cite, as well as he,) to the fourteenth +and fifteenth articles of the sixth chapter of my +book <span lang="la"><cite>De Corpore</cite></span>. But it is to little purpose that +he requires in a definition so exactly the genus +and the difference, seeing he does not know them +when they are there. For in this my definition of +liberty, the genus is absence of impediments to +action; and the difference or restriction is that +they be not contained in the nature of the agent. +The Bishop therefore, though he talk of genus and +difference, understands not what they are, but requires +the matter and form of the thing in the +definition. Matter is body, that is to say, corporeal +substance, and subject to dimension, such as +are the elements, and the things compounded of +the elements. But it is impossible that matter +should be part of a definition, whose parts are +only words; or to put the name of matter into the +definition of liberty, which is immaterial. “How +a real faculty can be defined by an absence, is”, +saith he, “past my understanding.” Unless he +mean by <em>real faculty</em> a <em>very faculty</em>, I know not +how a faculty is real. If he mean so, then a very +absence is as real as a very faculty. And if the +word defined signify an absence or negation, I +<span class='pageno' id='Page_372'>372</span>hope he would not have me define it by a presence +or affirmation. Such a word is liberty; for +it signifieth freedom from impediments, which is +all one with the absence of impediments, as I have +defined it. And if this be contrary to all the rules +of right reason, that is to say, of logic, that he +hath learned, I should advise him to read some +other logic than he hath yet read, or consider +better those he did read when he was a young +man and could less understand them. He adds, +that “by this definition, a stone hath liberty to +ascend into the air, because there is no outward +impediment to hinder it”. How knows he whether +there be impediments to hinder it or not? Certainly +if a stone were thrown upwards, it would +either go upwards eternally, or it must be stopped +by some outward impediment, or it must stop +itself. He hath confessed, that nothing can move +itself; I doubt not therefore that he will confess +also, that it cannot stop itself. But stopped we +see it is; it is therefore stopped by impediments +external. He hath in this part of his answer ventured +a little too far in speaking of definition, +and of impediments, and motion; and bewrayed +too much his ignorance in logic and philosophy; +and talked so absurdly of the current of rivers, +and of the motion of the seas, and of the weight +of water, that it cannot be corrected otherwise +than by blotting it all out.</p> + +<h3 id='XXX' class='c002'>NO. XXX.</h3> + +<p class='c010'><i>T. H.</i> Sixthly, I conceive nothing taketh beginning +from itself, but from the action of some +other immediate agent without itself: and that +<span class='pageno' id='Page_373'>373</span>therefore when first a man had an appetite or will +to something, to which immediately before he had +no appetite nor will, the cause of his will is not +the will itself, but something else not in his own +disposing. So that, whereas it is out of controversy +that of voluntary actions the will is a necessary +cause; and by this which is said, the will is +also caused by other things whereof it disposeth +not; it followeth that voluntary actions have all of +them necessary causes, and therefore are necessitated.</p> + +<div class='sidenote'>The Bishop’s reply.</div> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “This sixth point doth not consist in explicating +of terms, as the former; but in two proofs, +that voluntary actions are necessitated. The former +proof stands thus: ‘Nothing takes beginning from +itself, but from some agent without itself, which is +not in its own disposing therefore, &c’. <span lang="la"><i>Concedo +omnia</i></span>; (<i>a</i>) I grant all he saith. The will doth +not take beginning from itself. Whether he understand +by <em>will</em> the faculty of the will, which is +a power of the reasonable soul, it takes not beginning +from itself, but from God, who created and +infused the soul into man, and endowed it with +this power: or whether he understand by <em>will</em> the +act of willing, it takes not beginning from itself, +but from the faculty or from the power of willing, +which is in the soul. This is certain; finite and +participated things cannot be from themselves, nor +be produced by themselves. What would he conclude +from hence? That therefore the act of willing +takes not its beginning from the faculty of the +will? Or that the faculty is always determined +antecedently, extrinsically, to will that which it +doth will? He may as soon draw water out of a +<span class='pageno' id='Page_374'>374</span>pumice, as draw any such conclusion out of these +premises. Secondly, for his “taking a beginning”, +either he understands <em>a beginning of being</em>, or a +<em>beginning of working and acting</em>. If he understand +a beginning of being, he saith most truly, +that nothing hath a beginning of being in time +from itself. But this is nothing to his purpose: +the question is not between us, whether the soul +of man or the will of man be eternal. But if he +understand <em>a beginning of working or moving actually</em>, +it is a gross error. All men know that +when a stone descends, or fire ascends, or when +water, that hath been heated, returns to its former +temper; the beginning or reason is intrinsical, and +one and the same thing doth move and is moved +in a diverse respect. It moves in respect of the +form, and it is moved in respect of the matter. +Much more man, who hath a perfect knowledge +and prenotion of the end, is most properly said to +move himself. Yet I do not deny but that there +are other beginnings of human actions, which do +concur with the will: some outward, as the first +cause by general influence, which is evermore requisite, +angels or men by persuading, evil spirits +by tempting, the object or end by its appetibility, +the understanding by directing. So passions and +acquired habits. But I deny that any of these do +necessitate or can necessitate the will of man by +determining it physically to one, except God alone, +who doth it rarely, in extraordinary cases. And +where there is no antecedent determination to one, +there is no absolute necessity, but true liberty.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “His second argument is <span lang="la"><i>ex concessis</i></span>: ‘It +is out of controversy’, saith he, ‘that of voluntary +<span class='pageno' id='Page_375'>375</span>actions the will is a necessary cause’. The argument +may be thus reduced: necessary causes produce +necessary effects; but the will is a necessary +cause of voluntary actions. I might deny his +major. Necessary causes do not always produce +necessary effects, except they be also necessarily +produced; as I have shewed before in the burning +of Protagoras’s book. But I answer clearly to the +minor, that the will is not a necessary cause of +what it wills in particular actions. It is without +<em>controversy</em> indeed, for it is without all probability. +That it wills when it wills, is necessary; but that +it wills this or that, now or then, is free. More +expressly, the act of the will may be considered +three ways; either in respect of its nature, or in +respect of its exercise, or in respect of its object. +First, for the nature of the act: that which the +will wills, is necessarily voluntary, because the will +cannot be compelled. And in this sense, ‘it is out +of controversy, that the will is a necessary cause of +voluntary actions’. Secondly, for the exercise of +its acts, that is not necessary: the will may either +will or suspend its act. Thirdly, for the object, +that is not necessary, but free: the will is not extrinsically +determined to its objects. As for example: +the cardinals meet in the conclave to +choose a Pope; whom they choose, he is necessarily +Pope. But it is not necessary that they shall choose +this or that day. Before they were assembled, they +might defer their assembling; when they are assembled, +they may suspend their election for a day +or a week. Lastly, for the person whom they will +choose, it is freely in their own power; otherwise if +the election were not free, it were void, and no +<span class='pageno' id='Page_376'>376</span>election at all. So that which takes its beginning +from the will, is necessarily voluntary; but it is not +necessary that the will shall will this or that in +particular, as it was necessary that the person +freely elected should be Pope: but it was not necessary +either that the election should be at this +time, or that this man should be elected. And +therefore voluntary acts in particular have not +necessary causes, that is, they are not necessitated.”</p> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c000'> + <div><span class='fss'>ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXX.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c001'>I had said, that nothing taketh beginning from +itself, and that the cause of the will is not the will +itself, but something else which it disposeth not of. +Answering to this, he endeavours to shew us the +cause of the <em>will</em>.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>a</i>) “I grant”, saith he, “that the will doth not +take beginning from itself, for that the faculty of +the will takes beginning from God, who created +the soul, and poured it into man, and endowed it +with this power; and for that the act of willing +takes not beginning from itself, but from the +faculty or from the power of willing, which is in +the soul. This is certain; finite and participated +things cannot be from themselves, nor be produced +by themselves. What would he conclude from +hence? That therefore the act of willing takes +not its beginning from the faculty of the will?” +It is well that he grants finite things (as for his +<em>participated</em>, it signifies nothing here) cannot be +produced by themselves. For out of this I can +conclude that the act of willing is not produced by +the faculty of willing. He that hath the faculty +<span class='pageno' id='Page_377'>377</span>of willing, hath the faculty of willing something +in particular. And at the same time he hath the +faculty of nilling the same. If therefore the faculty +of willing be the cause he willeth anything whatsoever, +for the same reason the faculty of nilling +will be the cause at the same time of nilling it: and +so he shall will and nill the same thing at the same +time, which is absurd. It seems the Bishop had +forgot, that <em>matter</em> and <em>power</em> are indifferent to +contrary <em>forms</em> and contrary <em>acts</em>. It is somewhat +besides the matter, that determineth it to a certain +form; and somewhat besides the power, that produceth +a certain act: and thence it is, that is inferred +this that he granteth, that nothing can be +produced by itself; which nevertheless he presently +contradicteth, in saying, that “all men know when +a stone descends, the beginning is intrinsical”, and +that “the stone moves in respect of the form”. +Which is as much as to say, that the form moveth +the matter, or that the stone moveth itself; which +before he denied. When a stone ascends, the beginning +of the stone’s motion was in itself, that is +to say, intrinsical, because it is not the stone’s motion, +till the stone begins to be moved; but the +motion that caused it to begin to ascend, was a +precedent and extrinsical motion of the hand or +other engine that threw it upward. And so when +it descends, the beginning of the stone’s motion is +in the stone; but nevertheless, there is a former +motion in the ambient body, air or water, that +causeth it to descend. But because no man can +see it, most men think there is none; though reason, +wherewith the Bishop (as relying only upon +the authority of books) troubleth not himself, convince +that there is.</p> + +<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_378'>378</span>(<i>b</i>) “His second argument is, <span lang="la"><i>ex concessis</i></span>: ‘It +is out of controversy, that of voluntary actions +the will is a necessary cause’. The argument may +be thus reduced: necessary causes produce necessary +effects; but the will is a necessary cause +of voluntary actions. I might deny his major; +necessary causes do not always produce necessary +effects, except they be also necessarily produced.” +He has reduced the argument to nonsense, by saying +necessary causes produce not necessary effects. +For necessary effects, unless he mean such effects +as shall necessarily be produced, is insignificant. +Let him consider therefore with what grace he can +say, necessary causes do not always produce their +effects, except those effects be also necessarily produced. +But his answer is chiefly to the minor, and +denies that the will is not a necessary cause of what +it wills in particular actions. That it wills when +it wills, saith he, is necessary; but that it wills +this or that, is free. Is it possible for any man to +conceive, that he that willeth, can will anything +but this or that particular thing? It is therefore +manifest, that either the will is a necessary cause +of this or that or any other particular action, or +not the necessary cause of any voluntary action at +all. For universal actions there be none. In that +which followeth, he undertaketh to make his doctrine +more expressly understood by considering +the act of the will three ways: “in respect of its +nature, in respect of its exercise, and in respect +of its object”. For the nature of the act, he saith, +that “that which the will wills, is necessarily voluntary”, +and that in this sense he grants it is out +of controversy, that the will is a necessary cause +<span class='pageno' id='Page_379'>379</span>of voluntary actions. Instead of “that which the +will wills”, to make it sense, read that which the +man wills; and then if the man’s will be, as he confesseth, +a necessary cause of voluntary actions, it is +no less a necessary cause that they are actions, than +that they are voluntary. For the exercise of the +act, he saith that “the will may either will, or suspend +its act”. This is the old canting, which hath +already been sufficiently detected. But to make it +somewhat, let us read it thus: the man that willeth, +may either will or suspend his will: and thus it is +intelligible, but false; for how can he that willeth, +at the same time suspend his will? And for the +object he says, that “it is not necessary but free”, +&c. His reason is, because, he says, it was not necessary, +for example, in choosing a Pope, to choose +him this or that day, or to choose this or that man. +I would be glad to know, by what argument he can +prove the election not to have been necessitated: for +it is not enough for him to say, I perceive no necessity +in it; nor to say, they might have chosen +another, because he knows not whether they might +or not; nor to say if he had not been freely elected, +the election had been void or none. For though that +be true, it does not follow that the election was not +necessary; for there is no repugnance to necessity, +either in election or in freedom. And whereas he +concludeth, “therefore voluntary acts in particular, +are not necessitated”; I would have been glad he +had set down what voluntary acts there are, not +particular, which by his restricting of voluntary +acts he grants to be necessitated.</p> + +<div> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_380'>380</span> + <h3 id='XXXI' class='c002'>NO. XXXI.</h3> +</div> + +<p class='c010'><i>T. H.</i> Seventhly, I hold that to be a sufficient +cause, to which nothing is wanting that is needful +to the producing of the effect. The same is also a +necessary cause: for if it be possible that a sufficient +cause shall not bring forth the effect, then +there wanted somewhat which was needful to the +producing of it; and so the cause was not sufficient. +But if it be impossible that a sufficient cause should +not produce the effect, then is a sufficient cause a +necessary cause: for that is said to produce an +effect necessarily, that cannot but produce it. +Hence it is manifest, that whatsoever is produced, +is produced necessarily: for whatsoever is produced, +hath had a sufficient cause to produce it, or +else it had not been. And therefore also voluntary +actions are necessitated.</p> + +<div class='sidenote'>The Bishop’s reply.</div> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “This section contains a third argument +to prove that all effects are necessary; for clearing +whereof, it is needful to consider how a cause +may be said to be sufficient or insufficient.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“First, several causes singly considered may be +insufficient, and the same taken conjointly be sufficient +to produce an effect. As (<i>a</i>) two horses +jointly are sufficient to draw a coach, which either +of them singly is insufficient to do. Now to make +the effect, that is, the drawing of the coach necessary, +it is not only required that the two horses +be sufficient to draw it, but also that their conjunction +be necessary, and their habitude such as they +may draw it. If the owner of one of these horses +will not suffer him to draw; if the smith have shod +the other in the quick, and lamed him; if the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_381'>381</span>horse have cast a shoe, or be a resty jade, and will +not draw but when he list; then the effect is not +necessarily produced, but contingently more or less, +as the concurrence of the causes is more or less +contingent.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “Secondly, a cause may be said to be sufficient, +either because it produceth that effect which +is intended, as in the generation of a man; or else, +because it is sufficient to produce that which is +produced, as in the generation of a monster. The +former is properly called a sufficient cause, the +latter a weak and insufficient cause. Now, if the +debility of the cause be not necessary, but contingent, +then the effect is not necessary, but contingent. +It is a rule in logic, that the conclusion +always follows the weaker part. If the premises +be but probable, the conclusion cannot be demonstrative. +It holds as well in causes as in propositions. +No effect can exceed the virtue of its cause. +If the ability or debility of the causes be contingent, +the effect cannot be necessary.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Thirdly, that which concerns this question of +liberty from necessity most nearly, is that (<i>c</i>) a +cause is said to be sufficient in respect of the ability +of it to act, not in respect of its will to act. The +concurrence of the will is needful to the production +of a free effect. But the cause may be sufficient, +though the will do not concur. As God +is sufficient to produce a thousand worlds; but it +doth not follow from thence, either that he hath +produced them, or that he will produce them. The +blood of Christ is a sufficient ransom for all mankind; +but it doth not follow therefore, that all +mankind shall be actually saved by virtue of his +<span class='pageno' id='Page_382'>382</span>blood. A man may be a sufficient tutor, though +he will not teach every scholar, and a sufficient +physician, though he will not administer to every +patient. For as much therefore as the concurrence +of the will is needful to the production of +every free effect, and yet the cause may be sufficient +<span lang="la"><i>in sensu diviso</i></span>, although the will do not concur; it +follows evidently, that the cause may be sufficient, +and yet something which is needful to the production +of the effect, may be wanting; and that every +sufficient cause is not a necessary cause.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Lastly, if any man be disposed to wrangle against +so clear light, and say, that though the free agent +be sufficient <span lang="la"><i>in sensu diviso</i></span>, yet he is not sufficient +<span lang="la"><i>in sensu composito</i></span>, to produce effect without the +concurrence of the will, he saith true: but first, he +bewrays the weakness and the fallacy of the former +argument, which is a mere trifling between +sufficiency in a divided sense, and sufficiency in a +compounded sense. And seeing the concurrence +of the will is not predetermined, there is no antecedent +necessity before it do concur; and when it +hath concurred, the necessity is but hypothetical, +which may consist with liberty.”</p> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c000'> + <div><span class='fss'>ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXXI.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c001'>In this place he disputeth against my definition +of <em>a sufficient cause</em>, namely, that cause to which +nothing is wanting needful to the producing of +the effect. I thought this definition could have +been misliked by no man that had English enough +to know that <em>a sufficient cause</em>, <em>and cause enough</em>, +signifieth the same thing. And no man will say +that that is <em>cause enough</em> to produce an effect, to +<span class='pageno' id='Page_383'>383</span>which any thing is wanting needful to the producing +of it. But the Bishop thinks, if he set down +what he understands by <em>sufficient</em>, it would serve +to confute my definition: and therefore says: +(<i>a</i>) “Two horses jointly are sufficient to draw a +coach, which either of them singly is insufficient to +do. Now to make the effect, that is, the drawing +of the coach necessary, it is not only required +that the two horses be sufficient to draw it, but +also that it be necessary they shall be joined, and +that the owner of the horses will let them draw, +and that the smith hath not lamed them, and they be +not resty, and list not to draw but when they list: +otherwise the effect is contingent”. It seems the +Bishop thinks two horses may be sufficient to draw +a coach, though they will not draw, or though they +be lame, or though they be never put to draw; and +I think they can never produce the effect of drawing, +without those needful circumstances of being +strong, obedient, and having the coach some way +or other fastened to them. He calls it a sufficient +cause of drawing, that they be coach horses, though +they be lame or will not draw. But I say they +are not sufficient absolutely, but conditionally, if +they be not lame nor resty. Let the reader judge, +whether my sufficient cause or his, may properly +be called cause enough.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “Secondly, a cause may be said to be sufficient, +either because it produceth that effect which +is intended, as in the generation of a man; or else, +because it is sufficient to produce that which is +produced, as in the generation of a monster: the +former is properly called a sufficient cause, the +latter a weak and insufficient cause.” In these +<span class='pageno' id='Page_384'>384</span>few lines he hath said the cause of the generation +of a monster is sufficient to produce a monster, +and that it is insufficient to produce a monster. +How soon may a man forget his words, that doth +not understand them. This term of <em>insufficient</em> +cause, which also the School calls <em>deficient</em>, that +they may rhyme to <em>efficient</em>, is not intelligible, but +a word devised like <em>hocus pocus</em>, to juggle a difficulty +out of sight. That which is sufficient to +produce a monster, is not therefore to be called an +insufficient cause to produce a man; no more than +that which is sufficient to produce a man, is to be +called an insufficient cause to produce a monster.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>c</i>) “Thirdly, a cause is said to be sufficient in +respect to the ability of it to act, not in respect of +its will to act, &c. As God is sufficient to produce +a thousand worlds.” He understands little, when +men say, God is sufficient to produce many worlds, +if he understand not the meaning to be, that he is +sufficient to produce them if he will. Without +this supposition, <em>if he will</em>, a man is not sufficient +to produce any voluntary action, not so much as +to walk, though he be in health and at liberty. +The will is as much a sufficient cause without the +strength to do, as the strength without the will. +To that which he adds, that my definition is “a +mere trifling between a sufficiency in a divided +sense, and a sufficiency in a compounded sense”, +I can make no answer; because I understand no +more what he means by sufficiency in a divided +sense, and sufficiency in a compounded sense, than +if he had said sufficiency in a divided nonsense, +and sufficiency in a compounded nonsense.</p> + +<div> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_385'>385</span> + <h3 id='XXXII' class='c002'>NO. XXXII.</h3> +</div> + +<p class='c010'><i>T. H.</i> Lastly, I hold that the ordinary definition +of a free agent, namely, that a free agent is that, +which when all things are present which are +needful to produce the effect, can nevertheless not +produce it, implies a contradiction, and is nonsense; +being as much as to say, the cause may be +sufficient, that is, necessary, and yet the effect not +follow.</p> + +<div class='sidenote'>The Bishop’s reply.</div> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “This last point is but a corollary, or an +inference from the former doctrine, that ‘every +sufficient cause produceth its effect necessarily’; +which pillar being taken away the superstructure +must needs fall to the ground, having nothing left +to support it. ‘Lastly, I hold’, saith he. What he +is able to prove, is something: so much reason, +so much trust. But what he holds, concerns himself, +not others. But what holds he? ‘I hold’, +saith he, ‘that the ordinary definition of a free +agent implies a contradiction, and is nonsense.’ +That which he calls the ‘ordinary definition’ of +liberty, is the very definition which is given +by the much greater part of Philosophers and +Schoolmen. And doth he think that all these +spake nonsense: or had no more judgment than +to contradict themselves in a definition? He +might much better suspect himself, than censure +so many. Let us see the definition itself: ‘A free +agent is that, which when all things are present +that are needful to produce the effect, can nevertheless +not produce it.’ I acknowledge the old +definition of liberty, with little variation. But I +cannot see this nonsense, nor discover this contradiction. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_386'>386</span>For (<i>a</i>) in these words, ‘all things needful’, +or ‘all things requisite’, the actual determination +of the will is not included. But by all things +needful or requisite, all necessary power either +operative or elective, all necessary instruments and +adjuments extrinsical and intrinsical, and all conditions +are intended. As he that hath pen, and +ink, and paper, a table, a desk, and leisure, the art +of writing, and the free use of his hand, hath all +things requisite to write if he will; and yet he may +forbear if he will. Or as he that hath men, and +money, and arms, and munition, and ships, and a +just cause, hath all things requisite for war; yet he +may make peace if he will. Or as the king proclaimed +in the gospel (Matth. xxii. 4): <em>I have prepared +my dinner, my oxen and my fatlings are +killed, all things are ready; come unto the marriage</em>. +According to T. H.’s doctrine, the guests +might have told him that he said not truly, for +their own wills were not ready. (<i>b</i>) And indeed +if the will were (as he conceives it is) necessitated +extrinsically to every act of willing, if it had no +power to forbear willing what it doth will, nor to +will what it doth not will; then if the will were +wanting, something requisite to the producing of +the effect was wanting. But now when science +and conscience, reason and religion, our own and +other men’s experience doth teach us, that the will +hath a dominion over its own acts to will or nill +without extrinsical necessitation, if the power to +will be present <span lang="la"><i>in actu primo</i></span>, determinable by +ourselves, then there is no necessary power wanting +in this respect to the producing of the effect.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Secondly, these words, ‘to act or not to act, to +<span class='pageno' id='Page_387'>387</span>work or not to work, to produce or not to produce’, +have reference to the effect, not as a thing +which is already done or doing, but as a thing to +be done. They imply not the actual production, +but the producibility of the effect. But when once +the will hath actually concurred with all other +causes and conditions and circumstances, then the +effect is no more possible nor producible, but it is +in being, and actually produced. Thus he takes +away the subject of the question. The question is, +whether effects producible be free from necessity. +He shuffles out ‘effects producible’, and thrusts in +their places ‘effects produced’, or which are in the +act of production. Wherefore I conclude, that it is +neither nonsense nor contradiction to say that a +free agent, when all things requisite to produce +the effect are present, may nevertheless not produce +it.</p> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c000'> + <div><span class='fss'>ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXXII.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c001'>The question is here whether these words ‘a +free agent is that, which when all things needful +to the production of the effect are present, can nevertheless +not produce it’, imply a contradiction; +as I say it does. To make it appear no contradiction, +he saith: (<i>a</i>) “In these words, ‘all things needful’, +or ‘all things requisite’, the actual determination of +the will is not included”: as if the will were not +needful nor requisite to the producing of a voluntary +action. For to the production of any act +whatsoever, there is needful, not only those things +which proceed from the agent, but also those that +consist in the disposition of the patient. And to +<span class='pageno' id='Page_388'>388</span>use his own instance, it is necessary to writing, +not only that there be pen, ink, paper, &c.; but +also a will to write. He that hath the former, hath +all things requisite to write if he will, but not all +things necessary to writing. And so in his other +instances, he that hath men and money, &c. (without +that which he putteth in for a requisite), hath +all things requisite to make war if he will, but not +simply to make war. And he in the Gospel that +had prepared his dinner, had all things requisite +for his guests if they came, but not all things requisite +to make them come. And therefore “all +things requisite”, is a term ill defined by him.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “And indeed if the will were (as he conceives +it is) necessitated extrinsically to every act +of willing; if it had no power to forbear willing +what it doth will, nor to will what it does not will; +then if the will were wanting, something requisite +to the producing of the effect were wanting. But +now when science and conscience, reason and religion, +our own and other men’s experience doth +teach us, that the will hath a dominion over its +own acts to will or nill without extrinsical necessitation, +if the power to will be present <span lang="la"><i>in actu +primo</i></span>, determinable by ourselves, then there is no +necessary power wanting in this respect to the +producing of the effect.” These words, “the will +hath power to forbear willing what it doth will”; +and these, “the will hath a dominion over its own +acts”; and these, “the power to will is present +<span lang="la"><i>in actu primo</i></span>, determinable by ourselves”; are as +wild as ever were any spoken within the walls of +Bedlam: and if science, conscience, reason, and +religion teach us to speak thus, they make us mad. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_389'>389</span>And that which followeth is false: “to act or not +to act, to work or not to work, to produce or not +to produce, have reference to the effect, not as a +thing which is already done or doing, but as a +thing to be done”. For to act, to work, to produce, +are the same thing with to be doing. It is +not the act, but the power that hath reference to +the future: for act and power differ in nothing but +in this, that the former signifieth the time present, +the latter the time to come. And whereas he adds, +that I shuffle out effects producible, and thrust +into their places effects produced; I must take it +for an untruth, till he cite the place wherein I have +done so.</p> + +<h3 id='XXXIII' class='c002'>NO. XXXIII.</h3> + +<p class='c010'><i>T. H.</i> For my first five points; where it is explicated, +first, what spontaneity is; secondly, what deliberation +is; thirdly, what will, propension, and appetite +is; fourthly, what a free agent is; fifthly, what +liberty is: there can be no other proof offered but +every man’s own experience, by reflecting on himself, +and remembering what he useth to have in his +mind, that is, what he himself meaneth, when he +saith, an action is spontaneous, a man deliberates, +such is his will, that agent or that action is free. +Now, he that so reflecteth on himself, cannot but be +satisfied, that <em>deliberation</em> is the considering of the +good and evil sequels of the action to come; that +by <em>spontaneity</em> is meant inconsiderate proceeding; +for else nothing is meant by it; that <em>will</em> is the +last act of our deliberation; that a <em>free agent</em>, is +he that can do if he will and forbear if he will; +and that <em>liberty</em> is the absence of external impediments. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_390'>390</span>But to those that out of custom speak +not what they conceive, but what they hear, and are +not able or will not take the pains to consider +what they think, when they hear such words, no +argument can be sufficient; because experience and +matter of fact is not verified by other men’s arguments, +but by every man’s own sense and memory. +For example, how can it be proved, that to love a +thing and to think it good are all one, to a man +that does not mark his own meaning by those +words? Or how can it be proved that eternity is +not <span lang="la"><i>nunc stans</i></span>, to a man that says these words by +custom, and never considers how he can conceive +the thing itself in his mind? Also the sixth point, +that a man cannot imagine any thing to begin +without a cause, can no other way be made known +but by trying how he can imagine it. But if he +try, he shall find as much reason, if there be no +cause of the thing, to conceive it should begin at +one time as another, that is, he hath equal reason +to think it should begin at all times, which is impossible. +And therefore he must think there was +some special cause, why it began then rather than +sooner or later; or else, that it began never, but +was eternal.</p> + +<div class='sidenote'>The Bishop’s reply.</div> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “Now at length he comes to his main +proofs; he that hath so confidently censured the +whole current of Schoolmen and Philosophers of +<em>nonsense</em>, had need to produce strong evidence for +himself. So he calls his reasons, No. <a href='#XXXVI'><span class='fss'>XXXVI.</span></a>, <em>demonstrative +proofs</em>. All demonstrations are either +from the cause or the effect, not from private notions +and conceptions which we have in our minds. +That which he calls a demonstration, deserves +<span class='pageno' id='Page_391'>391</span>not the name of an intimation. He argues thus: +‘that which a man conceives in his mind by these +words, spontaneity, deliberation, &c.; that they are’. +This is his proposition, which I deny. (<i>a</i>) The +true natures of things are not to be judged by the +private <em>ideas</em>, or conceptions of men, but by their +causes and formal reasons. Ask an ordinary person +what <em>upwards</em> signifies, and whether our antipodes +have their heads upwards or downwards; and he +will not stick to tell you, that if his head be upwards, +theirs must needs be downwards. And this +is because he knows not the formal reason thereof; +that the heavens encircle the earth, and what is +towards heaven is upwards. This same erroneous +notion of <em>upwards</em> and <em>downwards</em>, before the true +reason was fully discovered, abused more than ordinary +capacities; as appears by their arguments of +<span lang="la"><i>penduli homines</i></span>, and <span lang="la"><i>pendulæ arbores</i></span>. Again, +what do men conceive ordinarily by this word +<em>empty</em>, as when they say an empty vessel, or by +this word <em>body</em>, as when they say, there is no body +in that room? They intend not to exclude the air, +either out of the vessel or out of the room: yet +reason tells us, that the vessel is not truly empty, +and that the air is a true body. I might give a +hundred such like instances. He who leaves the +conduct of his understanding to follow vulgar notions, +shall plunge himself into a thousand errors; +like him who leaves a certain guide to follow an +<span lang="la"><i>ignus fatuus</i></span>, or a will-with-the-wisp. So his proposition +is false. (<i>b</i>) His reason, ‘that matter +of fact is not verified by other men’s arguments, +but by every man’s own sense and memory’, is +likewise maimed on both sides. Whether we hear +<span class='pageno' id='Page_392'>392</span>such words or not, is matter of fact; and sense is +the proper judge of it: but what these words +do, or ought truly to signify, is not to be judged +by sense but by reason. Secondly, reason may, +and doth oftentimes correct sense, even about its +proper object. Sense tells us that the sun is no +bigger than a good ball; but reason demonstrates, +that it is many times greater than the whole globe +of the earth. As to his instance: ‘how can it be +proved, that to love a thing and to think it good +is all one, to a man that doth not mark his own +meaning by these words’, I confess it cannot be +proved; for it is not true. Beauty, and likeness, +and love, do conciliate love as much as goodness, +<span lang="la"><i>cos amoris amor</i></span>. Love is a passion of the will; +but to judge of goodness is an act of the understanding. +A father may love an ungracious child, +and yet not esteem him good. A man loves his +own house better than another man’s; yet he cannot +but esteem many others better than his own. +His other instance, ‘how can it be proved that +eternity is not <span lang="la"><i>nunc stans</i></span>, to a man that says these +words by custom, and never considers how he can +conceive the thing itself in his mind’, is just like +the former, not to be proved by reason, but by +fancy, which is the way he takes. And it is not +unlike the counsel which one gave to a novice +about the choice of his wife, to advise with the +bells: as he fancied so they sounded, either take +her or leave her.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>c</i>) “Then for his assumption, it is as defective +as his proposition, that by those words spontaneity, +&c, men do understand as he conceives. No +rational man doth conceive a <em>spontaneous</em> action +<span class='pageno' id='Page_393'>393</span>and an <em>indeliberate</em> action to be all one. Every +<em>indeliberate</em> action is not <em>spontaneous</em>; the fire +considers not whether it should burn, yet the +burning of it is not <em>spontaneous</em>. Neither is every +<em>spontaneous</em> action <em>indeliberate</em>; a man may deliberate +what he will eat, and yet eat it <em>spontaneously</em>. +(<i>d</i>) Neither doth <em>deliberation</em> properly +signify, the considering of the good and evil sequels +of an action to come, but the considering whether +this be a good and fit means, or the best and fittest +means for obtaining such an end. The physician +doth not deliberate whether he should cure his +patient, but by what means he should cure him. +Deliberation is of the means, not of the end. +(<i>e</i>) Much less doth any man conceive with T. H. +that deliberation is an <em>imagination</em>, or an act of +fancy not of reason, common to men of discretion +with madmen, and natural fools, and children, +and brute beasts. (<i>f</i>) Thirdly, neither doth any +understanding man conceive, or can conceive, that +‘the will is an act of our deliberation’; (the understanding +and the will are two distinct faculties); +or that ‘only the last appetite is to be called our +will’. So no man should be able to say, this is +my will, because he knows not whether he shall +persevere in it or not. (<i>g</i>) Concerning the fourth +point we agree, that ‘he is a free agent that can +do if he will, and forbear if he will’. But I wonder +how this dropped from his pen. What is now +become of his absolute necessity of all things, if +a man be free to do and to forbear anything? +Will he make himself guilty of the <em>nonsense</em> of the +Schoolmen, and run with them into contradictions +for company? It may be he will say, he can +<span class='pageno' id='Page_394'>394</span>do if he will, and forbear if he will, but he cannot +will if he will. This will not serve his turn; for if +the cause of a free action, that is, the will to do it be +determined, then the effect, or the action itself is +likewise determined; a determined cause cannot produce +an undetermined effect; either the agent can +will and forbear to will, or else he cannot do and +forbear to do. (<i>h</i>) But we differ wholly about the +fifth point. He who conceives <em>liberty</em> aright, conceives +both a <em>liberty in the subject</em> to will or not +to will, and a <em>liberty to the object</em> to will this or +that, and a <em>liberty from impediments</em>. T. H. by +a new way of his own cuts off the <em>liberty of the +subject</em>; as if a stone was free to ascend or descend, +because it hath no outward impediment: and +the <em>liberty towards the object</em>; as if the needle +touched with the loadstone were free to point +either towards the north or towards the south, +because there is not a barricado in its way to +hinder it. Yea, he cuts off the <em>liberty from inward +impediments</em> also; as if a hawk were at liberty to +fly when her wings are plucked, but not when they +are tied. And so he makes <em>liberty from extrinsical +impediments</em> to be complete liberty; so he +ascribes <em>liberty</em> to brute beasts, and <em>liberty</em> to +rivers, and by consequence makes beasts and rivers +to be capable of sin and punishment. Assuredly +Xerxes, who caused the Hellespont to be beaten +with so many stripes, was of this opinion. Lastly, +T. H.’s reason, that ‘it is custom, or want of ability, +or negligence, which makes a man conceive +otherwise’, is but a begging of that which he should +prove. Other men consider as seriously as himself, +with as much judgment as himself, with less prejudice +<span class='pageno' id='Page_395'>395</span>than himself, and yet they can apprehend no +such sense of these words. Would he have other +men feign they see fiery dragons in the air, because +he affirms confidently that he sees them, and +wonders why others are so blind as not to see +them?</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>i</i>) “The reason for the sixth point is like the +former, a fantastical or imaginative reason. ‘How +can a man imagine anything to begin without a +cause, or if it should begin without a cause, why +it should begin at this time rather than at that +time?’ He saith truly, nothing can <em>begin</em> without +a cause, that is, <em>to be</em>; but it may <em>begin to act</em> of +itself without any other cause. Nothing can begin +without a cause; but many things may begin, and +do begin without necessary causes. A free cause +may as well choose his time when he will begin, +as a necessary cause be determined extrinsically +when it must begin. And although free effects +cannot be foretold, because they are not certainly +predetermined in their causes; yet when the free +causes do determine themselves, they are of as +great certainty as the other. As when I see a bell +ringing, I can conceive the cause of it as well why +it rings now, as I know the interposition of the +earth to be the cause of the eclipse of the moon, +or the most certain occurrent in the nature of +things.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>k</i>) “And now that I have answered T. H.’s arguments +drawn from the private conceptions of +men concerning the sense of words, I desire him +seriously without prejudice to examine himself, +and those natural notions which he finds in himself, +(not of words, but of things; these are from +<span class='pageno' id='Page_396'>396</span>nature, those are by imposition), whether he doth +not find by experience, that he doth many things +which he might have left undone if he would, +and omits many things which he might have done +if he would; whether he doth not some things +out of mere animosity and will, without either regard +to the direction of right reason or serious +respect of what is honest or profitable, only to +show that he will have a dominion over his own +actions; as we see ordinarily in children, and wise +men find at some times in themselves by experience; +(and I apprehend this very defence of +necessity against liberty to be partly of that kind); +whether he is not angry with those who draw +him from his study, or cross him in his desires; +(if they be necessitated to do it, why should he be +angry with them, any more than he is angry with +a sharp winter, or a rainy day that keeps him at +home against his antecedent will?); whether he +doth not sometimes blame himself, and say, ‘O +what a fool was I to do thus and thus’, or wish to +himself, ‘O that I had been wise’, or, ‘O that I +had not done such an act’. If he have no dominion +over his actions, if he be irresistibly necessitated +to all things that he doth, he might as well +wish, ‘O that I had not breathed,’ or blame himself +for growing old, ‘O what a fool was I to grow +old’.”</p> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c000'> + <div><span class='fss'>ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXXIII.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c001'>I have said in the beginning of this number, +that to define what spontaneity is, what deliberation +is, what will, propension, appetite, a free +agent, and liberty is, and to prove they are well +<span class='pageno' id='Page_397'>397</span>defined, there can be no other proof offered, but +every man’s own experience and memory of what +he meaneth by such words. For definitions being +the beginning of all demonstration, cannot themselves +be demonstrated, that is, proved to another +man; all that can be done, is either to put him in +mind what those words signify commonly in the +matter whereof they treat, or if the words be unusual, +to make the definitions of them true by +mutual consent in their signification. And though +this be manifestly true, yet there is nothing of it +amongst the Schoolmen, who use to argue not by +rule, but as fencers teach to handle weapons, by +quickness only of the hand and eye. The Bishop +therefore boggles at this kind of proof; and says, +(<i>a</i>) “the true natures of things are not to be +judged by the private ideas or conceptions of men, +but by their causes and formal reasons. Ask an +ordinary person what upwards signifies,” &c. But +what will he answer, if I should ask him, how he +will judge of the causes of things, whereof he hath +no idea or conception in his own mind? It is +therefore impossible to give a true definition of +any word without the idea of the thing which that +word signifieth, or not according to that idea or +conception. Here again he discovereth the true +cause why he and other Schoolmen so often speak +absurdly. For they speak without conception of +the things, and by rote, one receiving what he +saith from another by tradition, from some puzzled +divine or philosopher, that to decline a difficulty +speaks in such manner as not to be understood. +And where he bids us ask an ordinary +person what upwards signifieth, I dare answer for +<span class='pageno' id='Page_398'>398</span>that ordinary person he will tell us as significantly +as any scholar, and say it is towards heaven; and +as soon as he knows the earth is round, makes no +scruple to believe there are antipodes, being wiser +in that point than were those which he saith to have +been of more than ordinary capacities. Again, +ordinary men understand not, he saith, the words +<em>empty</em> and <em>body</em>; yes, but they do, just as well +as learned men. When they hear named an empty +vessel, the learned as well as the unlearned mean +and understand the same thing, namely, that there +is nothing in it that can be seen; and whether it +be truly empty, the ploughman and the Schoolman +know alike. “I might give”, he says, “a hundred +such like instances.” That is true; a man may +give a thousand foolish and impertinent instances +of men ignorant in such questions of philosophy +concerning emptiness, body, upwards, and downwards, +and the like. But the question is not whether +such and such tenets be true, but whether such and +such words can be well defined without thinking +upon the things they signified; as the Bishop +thinks they may, when he concludeth with these +words, “so his proposition is false”.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “His reason, ‘that matter of fact is not verified +by other men’s arguments, but by every +man’s own sense and memory’, is likewise maimed +on both sides. Whether we hear such words or +not, is matter of fact, and sense is the proper +judge of it; but what these words do, or ought +truly to signify, is not to be judged by sense, but +by reason.” A man is born with a capacity after +due time and experience to reason truly; to which +capacity of nature, if there be added no discipline +<span class='pageno' id='Page_399'>399</span>at all, yet as far as he reasoneth he will reason +truly; though by a right discipline he may reason +truly in more numerous and various matters. But +he that hath lighted on deceiving or deceived masters, +that teach for truth all that hath been dictated +to them by their own interest, or hath been +cried up by other such teachers before them, have +for the most part their natural reason, as far as +concerneth the truth of doctrine, quite defaced +or very much weakened, becoming changelings +through the enchantments of words not understood. +This cometh into my mind from this saying +of the Bishop, that matter of fact is not +verified by sense and memory, but by arguments. +How is it possible that, without discipline, a man +should come to think that the testimony of a witness, +which is the only verifier of matter of fact, +should consist not in sense and memory, so as he +may say he saw and remembers the thing done, +but in arguments or syllogisms? Or how can an +unlearned man be brought to think the words he +speaks, ought to signify, when he speaks sincerely, +anything else but that which himself meant by +them? Or how can any man without learning take +the question, “whether the sun be no bigger than +a ball, or bigger than the earth”, to be a question +of fact? Nor do I think that any man is so +simple, as not to find that to be good which he +loveth; good, I say, so far forth, as it maketh him +to love it. Or is there any unlearned man so stupid, +as to think eternity is this present instant of +time standing still, and the same eternity to be the +very next instant after; and consequently that +there be so many eternities as there can be instants +<span class='pageno' id='Page_400'>400</span>of time supposed? No, there is scholastic learning +required in some measure to make one mad.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>c</i>) “Then for his assumption, it is as defective +as his proposition, that by these words, spontaneity, +&c. men do understand as he conceives, &c. +No rational man doth conceive a spontaneous action +and an indeliberate action to be all one; +every indeliberate action is not spontaneous, &c.” +Not every <em>spontaneous</em> action <em>indeliberate</em>? This +I get by striving to make sense of that which he +strives to make nonsense. I never thought the +word <em>spontaneity</em> English. Yet because he used it, +I make such meaning of it as it would bear, and said +it “meant inconsiderate proceeding, or nothing”. +And for this my too much officiousness, I receive +the reward of being thought by him not to be a +rational man. I know that in the Latin of all authors +but Schoolmen, <span lang="la"><i>actio spontanea</i></span> signifies that +action, whereof there is no apparent cause derived +further than from the agent itself; and is in all +things that have sense the same with voluntary, +whether deliberated or not deliberated. And therefore +where he distinguished it from voluntary, I +thought he might mean indeliberate. But let it +signify what it will, provided it be intelligible, it +would make against him.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>d</i>) “Neither doth deliberation properly signify +‘the considering of the good and evil sequels of +an action to come’; but the considering whether +this be a good and fit means, or the best and fittest +means, for obtaining such an end.” If the Bishop’s +words proceeded not from hearing and reading of +others, but from his own thoughts, he could never +have reprehended this definition of deliberation, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_401'>401</span>especially in the manner he doth it; for he says, it +is the considering whether this or that be a good +and fit means for obtaining such an end; as if +considering whether a means be good or not, were +not all one with considering whether the sequel of +using those means be good or evil.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>e</i>) “Much less doth any man conceive with +T. H. that ‘deliberation is an act of fancy’, not of +reason, common to men of discretion with madmen, +natural fools, children, and brute beasts”. I +do indeed conceive that deliberation is an act of +imagination or fancy; nay more, that reason and +understanding also are acts of the imagination, +that is to say, they are imaginations. I find it so +by considering my own ratiocination; and he +might find it so in his, if he did consider his own +thoughts, and not speak as he does by rote; by +rote I say, when he disputes; not by rote, when he +is about those trifles he calleth business; then +when he speaks, he thinks of, that is to say, he +imagines, his business; but here he thinks only +upon the words of other men that have gone before +him in this question, transcribing their conclusions +and arguments, not his own thoughts.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>f</i>) “Thirdly, neither doth any understanding +man conceive, or can conceive, either ‘that the +will is an act of our deliberation’ (the understanding +and the will are two distinct faculties); or ‘that +only the last appetite is to be called our will’.” +Though the understanding and the will were two +distinct faculties, yet followeth it not that the +will and the deliberation are two distinct faculties. +For the whole deliberation is nothing else but so +many wills alternatively changed, according as a +<span class='pageno' id='Page_402'>402</span>man understandeth or fancieth the good and evil +sequels of the thing concerning which he deliberateth +whether he shall pursue it, or of the means +whether they conduce or not to that end, whatsoever +it be, he seeketh to obtain. So that in deliberation +there be many wills, whereof not any is +the cause of a voluntary action but the last; as I +have said before, answering this objection in another +place.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>g</i>) “Concerning the fourth point we agree, that +‘he is a free agent, that can do if he will and forbear +if he will’. But I wonder how this dropped +from his pen? &c. It may be he will say he can +do if he will and forbear if he will, but he cannot +will if he will.” He has no reason to wonder how +this dropped from my pen. He found it in my +answer No. <a href='#III'><span class='fss'>III</span></a>, and has been all this while about +to confute it, so long indeed that he had forgot I +said it; and now again brings another argument +to prove a man is free to will, which is this: +“Either the agent can will and forbear to will, or +else he cannot do and forbear to do”. There is no +doubt a man can will one thing or other, and forbear +to will it. For men, if they be awake, are always +willing one thing or other. But put the case, +a man has a will to-day to do a certain action to-morrow; +is he sure to have the same will to-morrow, +when he is to do it? Is he free to-day, to +choose to-morrow’s will? This is it that is now +in question, and this argument maketh nothing +for the affirmative or negative.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>h</i>) “But we differ wholly about the fifth point. +He who conceives liberty aright, conceives both a +‘liberty in the subject’, to will or not to will, and +<span class='pageno' id='Page_403'>403</span>a ‘liberty to the object’ to will this or that, and a +‘liberty from impediments’. T. H., by a new way +of his own, cuts off the ‘liberty of the subject’, as +if a stone were free to ascend or descend because +it hath no outward impediment; and the ‘liberty +towards the object’, as if the needle touched with +the loadstone were free to point either towards +the north or towards the south, because there +is not a barricado in its way.” How does it appear, +that he who conceives liberty aright, conceives +a liberty in the subject to will or not to will; +unless he mean liberty to do if he will, or not to +do if he will not, which was never denied? Or +how does it follow, that a stone is as free to ascend +as descend, unless he prove there is no outward +impediment to its ascent; which cannot be proved, +for the contrary is true? Or how proveth he, that +there is no outward impediment to keep that point +of the loadstone, which placeth itself towards the +north, from turning to the south? His ignorance +of the causes external is not a sufficient +argument that there are none. And whereas he +saith, that according to my definition of liberty, +“a hawk were at liberty to fly when her wings are +plucked, but not when they are tied”; I answer +that she is not at liberty to fly when her wings are +tied; but to say, when her wings are plucked that +she wanted the liberty to fly, were to speak improperly +and absurdly; for in that case, men that +speak English use to say she cannot fly. And for +his reprehension of my attributing liberty to brute +beasts and rivers; I would be glad to know whether +it be improper language, to say a bird or +beast may be set at liberty from the cage wherein +<span class='pageno' id='Page_404'>404</span>they were imprisoned or to say that a river, which +was stopped, hath recovered its free course; and +how it follows, that a beast or river recovering this +freedom must needs therefore “be capable of sin +and punishment”?</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>i</i>) “The reason for the sixth point is like the +former, a phantastical or imaginative reason: +‘How can a man imagine anything to begin without +a cause; or if it should begin without a cause, +why it should begin at this time, rather than at +that time?’ He saith truly, nothing can <em>begin</em> +without a cause, that is <em>to be</em>; but it may <em>begin to +act</em> of itself without any other cause. Nothing +can <em>begin</em> without a cause; but many things may +<em>begin</em> without a necessary cause.” He granteth +nothing can <em>begin</em> without a cause; and he hath +granted formerly that nothing can cause itself. +And now he saith, it may begin <em>to act</em> of itself. +The action therefore <em>begins to be</em> without any +cause, which he said nothing could do, contradicting +what he had said but in the line before. And +for that that he saith, that “many things may begin +not without a cause, but without a necessary +cause”; it hath been argued before; and all +causes have been proved, if entire and sufficient +causes, to be necessary. And that which he repeateth +here, namely, that “a free cause may choose +his time when he will begin to work”; and that +“although free effects cannot be foretold, because +they are not certainly predetermined in their +causes, yet when the free causes do determine +themselves, they are of as great certainty as the +other”; it has been made appear sufficiently before +that it is but jargon, the words <em>free cause</em> and <em>determining +themselves</em> being insignificant, and having +<span class='pageno' id='Page_405'>405</span>nothing in the mind of man answerable to +them.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>k</i>) “And now that I have answered T. H.’s arguments, +drawn from the private conceptions of +men concerning the sense of words, I desire him +seriously to examine himself, &c.” One of his interrogatories +is this, “whether I find not by experience, +that I do many things which I might have +left undone if I would”. This question was needless, +because all the way I have granted him that +men have liberty to do many things if they will, +which they left undone because they had not the +will to do them. Another interrogatory is this, +“whether I do not some things without regard to +the direction of right reason, or serious respect of +what is honest or profitable”. This question was +in vain, unless he think himself my confessor. +Another is, “whether I writ not this defence +against liberty, only to show I will have a dominion +over my own actions”. To this I answer, +no: but to show I have no dominion over my will, +and this also at his request. But all these questions +serve in this place for nothing else, but to +deliver him of a jest he was in labour withal: and +therefore his last question is, “whether I do not +sometimes say, ‘Oh, what a fool was I to do thus +and thus!’ or, ‘Oh, that I had been wise!’ or, +‘Oh, what a fool was I to grow <a id='corr405.28'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='old!’'>old!’”</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_405.28'><ins class='correction' title='old!’'>old!’”</ins></a></span> Subtle +questions, and full of episcopal gravity! I would he +had left out charging me with <em>blasphemous, desperate, +destructive, and atheistical</em> opinions. I +should then have pardoned him his calling me +<em>fool</em>; both because I do many things foolishly, and +because, in this question disputed between us, I +think he will appear a greater fool than I.</p> + +<div> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_406'>406</span> + <h3 id='XXXIV' class='c002'>NO. XXXIV.</h3> +</div> + +<p class='c010'><i>T. H.</i> For the seventh point, that all events +have necessary causes, it is there proved in that +they have sufficient causes. Further, let us in this +place also suppose any event never so casual, as for +example, the throwing ambs-ace upon a pair of +dice; and see if it must not have been necessary +before it was thrown. For, seeing it was thrown, it +had a beginning, and consequently a sufficient +cause to produce it; consisting partly in the dice, +partly in the outward things, as the posture of the +party’s hand, the measure of force applied by the +caster, the posture of the parts of the table, and +the like. In sum, there was nothing wanting that +was necessarily requisite to the producing of that +particular cast; and consequently, that cast was +necessarily thrown. For if it had not been thrown, +there had wanted somewhat requisite to the throwing +of it; and so the cause had not been sufficient. +In the like manner it may be proved that every +other accident, how contingent soever it seem, or +how voluntary soever it be, is produced necessarily; +which is that J. D. disputes against. The same +also may be proved in this manner. Let the case +be put for example, of the weather. <em>It is necessary, +that to-morrow it shall rain or not rain.</em> +If therefore it be not necessary it shall rain, it is +necessary it shall not rain. Otherwise it is not +necessary that the proposition, <em>it shall rain or it +shall not rain</em>, should be true. I know there are +some that say, it may necessarily be true, that one +of the two shall come to pass, but not singly, that +it shall rain or it shall not rain. Which is as +<span class='pageno' id='Page_407'>407</span>much as to say, one of them is necessary, yet +neither of them is necessary. And therefore, to +seem to avoid that absurdity, they make a distinction, +that neither of them is true <em>determinate</em>, but +<em>indeterminate</em>. Which distinction either signifies +no more than this: one of them is true, but we +know not which, and so the necessity remains, +though we know it not: or if the meaning of the +distinction be not that, it has no meaning. And +they might as well have said, one of them is true +<span lang="la"><i>tytyrice</i></span>, but neither of them <span lang="la"><i>tupatulice</i></span>.</p> + +<div class='sidenote'>The Bishop’s reply.</div> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> (<i>a</i>) “His former proof, that all sufficient +causes are necessary causes, is answered before +(No. <a href='#XXXI'><span class='fss'>XXXI</span></a>). (<i>b</i>) And his two instances of casting +ambs-ace, and raining to-morrow, are altogether +impertinent to the question now agitated between +us, for two reasons. First, our present controversy +is concerning free actions, which proceed from +the liberty of man’s will: both his instances are of +contingent actions, which proceed from the indetermination +or contingent concurrence of natural +causes. First, that there are free actions which +proceed merely from election, without any outward +necessitation, is a truth so evident as that +there is a sun in the heavens; and he that doubteth +of it, may as well doubt whether there be a shell +without the nut, or a stone within the olive. A +man proportions his time each day, and allots so +much to his devotions, so much to his study, so +much to his diet, so much to his recreations, so +much to necessary or civil visits, so much to his +rest; he who will seek for I know not what causes +of all this without himself, except that good God +who hath given him a reasonable soul, may as +<span class='pageno' id='Page_408'>408</span>well seek for a cause of the Egyptian pyramids +among the crocodiles of Nilus. (<i>c</i>) Secondly, for +mixed actions which proceed from the concurrence +of free and natural agents, though they be not +free, yet they are not necessary. As, to keep my +former instance, a man walking through a street +of a city to do his occasions, a tile falls from a +house and breaks his head. The breaking of his +head was not necessary, for he did freely choose +to go that way without any necessitation; neither +was it free, for he did not deliberate of that accident; +therefore it was contingent, and by undoubted +consequence, there are contingent actions +in the world which are not free. Most certainly +by the concurrence of free causes, as God, the +good and bad angels, and men, with natural +agents, sometimes on purpose and sometimes by +accident, many events happen, which otherwise +had never happened; many effects are produced, +which otherwise had never been produced. And +admitting such things to be contingent, not necessary, +all their consequent effects, not only immediate, +but mediate, must likewise be contingent, +that is to say, such as do not proceed from a continued +connexion and succession of necessary +causes; which is directly contrary to T. H.’s opinion.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>d</i>) “Thirdly, for the actions of brute beasts, +though they be not free, though they have not the +use of reason to restrain their appetites from that +which is sensitively good by the consideration of +what is rationally good, or what is honest, and +though their fancies be determined by nature to +some kinds of work; yet to think that every individual +<span class='pageno' id='Page_409'>409</span>action of theirs, and each animal motion of +theirs, even to the least murmur or gesture, is +bound by the chain of unalterable necessity to the +extrinsical causes or objects, I see no ground for +it. Christ saith, <em>one of these sparrows doth not fall +to the ground without your heavenly Father</em>, that +is, without an influence of power from him, or exempted +from his disposition; he doth not say, which +your heavenly Father casteth not down. Lastly, +for the natural actions of inanimate creatures, +wherein there is not the least concurrence of any +free or voluntary agents, the question is yet more +doubtful. For many things are called contingent in +respect of us, because we know not the cause of +them, which really and in themselves are not contingent, +but necessary. Also many things are +contingent in respect of one single cause, either +actually hindered, or in possibility to be hindered, +which are necessary in respect of the joint concurrence +of all collateral causes. (<i>e</i>) But whether +there be a necessary connexion of all natural causes +from the beginning, so as they must all have concurred +as they have done, and in the same degree +of power, and have been deficient as they have +been in all events whatsoever, would require a further +examination, if it were pertinent to this question +of liberty; but it is not. It is sufficient to +my purpose, to have showed that all elective actions +are free from absolute necessity: and moreover, +that the concurrence of voluntary and free agents +with natural causes, both upon purpose and accidentally, +hath helped them to produce many effects, +which otherwise they had not produced, and hindered +them from producing many effects, which +<span class='pageno' id='Page_410'>410</span>otherwise they had produced: and that if this intervention +of voluntary and free agents had been +more frequent than it hath been, as without doubt +it might have been, many natural events had been +otherwise than they are. And therefore he might +have spared his instance of casting ambs-ace and +raining to-morrow. And first, for his casting +ambs-ace: if it be thrown by a fair gamester with +indifferent dice, it is a mixed action; the casting +of the dice is free, but the casting of ambs-ace is +contingent. A man may deliberate whether he +will cast the dice or not; but it were folly to deliberate +whether he will cast ambs-ace or not, because +it is not in his power, unless he be a cheater that +can cog the dice, or the dice be false dice; and then +the contingency, or degree of contingency, ceaseth +accordingly as the caster hath more or less cunning, +or as the figure or making of the dice doth +incline them to ambs-ace more than to another cast, +or necessitate them to this cast and no other. +Howsoever, so far as the cast is free or contingent, +so far it is not necessary: and where necessity +begins, there liberty and contingency do cease to be. +Likewise his other instance of raining or not raining +to-morrow, is not of a free elective act, nor always +of a contingent act. In some countries, as they have +their <span lang="la"><i>stati venti</i></span>, their certain winds at set seasons; +so they have their certain and set rains. The +Ethiopian rains are supposed to be the cause of +the certain inundation of Nilus. In some eastern +countries they have rain only twice a year, and +those constant; which the Scriptures call <em>the former +and the later rain</em>. In such places not only +the causes do act determinately and necessarily, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_411'>411</span>but also the determination or necessity of the event +is foreknown to the inhabitants. In our climate, the +natural causes celestial and sublunary do not produce +rain so necessarily at set times; neither can we +say so certainly and infallibly, it will rain to-morrow, +or it will not rain to-morrow. Nevertheless, it +may so happen that the causes are so disposed and +determined, even in our climate, that this proposition, +it will rain to-morrow or it will not rain +to-morrow, may be necessary in itself; and the +prognostics, or tokens, may be such in the sky, in +our own bodies, in the creatures, animate and inanimate, +as weather glasses, &c., that it may become +probably true to us that it will rain to-morrow, +or it will not rain to-morrow. But ordinarily, +it is a contingent proposition to us; whether it +be contingent also in itself, that is, whether the +concurrence of the causes were absolutely necessary, +whether the vapours or matter of the rain +may not yet be dispersed, or otherwise consumed, +or driven beyond our coast, is a speculation which +no way concerns this question. So we see one +reason why his two instances are altogether impertinent; +because they are of actions which are +not free, nor elective, nor such as proceed from +the liberty of man’s will.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“Secondly, our dispute is about absolute necessity; +his proofs extend only to hypothetical necessity. +Our question is, whether the concurrence +and determination of the causes were necessary +before they did concur, or were determined. He +proves that the effect is necessary after the causes +have concurred, and are determined. The freest +actions of God or man are necessary, by such a +<span class='pageno' id='Page_412'>412</span>necessity of supposition, and the most contingent +events that are, as I have showed plainly, No. <a href='#III'><span class='fss'>III</span></a>, +where his instance of ambs-ace is more fully answered. +So his proof looks another way from +his proposition. His proposition is, ‘that the +casting of ambs-ace was necessary before it was +thrown’. His proof is, that it was necessary when +it was thrown. Examine all his causes over and +over, and they will not afford him one grain of antecedent +necessity. The first cause is in the dice: +true, if they be false dice there may be something +in it; but then his contingency is destroyed: if they +be square dice, they have no more inclination to +ambs-ace, than to cinque and quatre, or any other +cast. His second cause is ‘the posture of the +party’s hand’: but what necessity was there that +he should put his hands into such a posture? None +at all. The third cause is ‘the measure of the +force applied by the caster’. Now for the credit of +his cause let him but name, I will not say a convincing +reason nor so much as a probable reason, +but even any pretence of reason, how the caster +was necessitated from without himself to apply +just so much force, and neither more nor less. If +he cannot, his cause is desperate, and he may hold +his peace for ever. His last cause is the posture +of the table. But tell us in good earnest, what +necessity there was why the caster must throw +into that table rather than the other, or that the +dice must fall just upon that part of the table, before +the cast was thrown: he that makes these to +be necessary causes, I do not wonder if he make +all effects necessary effects. If any one of these +causes be contingent, it is sufficient to render +<span class='pageno' id='Page_413'>413</span>the cast contingent; and now that they are all so +contingent, yet he will needs have the effect to be +necessary. And so it is when the cast is thrown; +but not before the cast was thrown, which he undertook +to prove. Who can blame him for being +so angry with the Schoolmen, and their distinctions +of necessity into absolute and hypothetical, seeing +they touch his freehold so nearly?</p> + +<p class='c001'>“But though his instance of raining to-morrow +be impertinent, as being no free action, yet because +he triumphs so much in his argument, I will not +stick to go a little out of my way to meet a friend. +For I confess the validity of the reason had been +the same, if he had made it of a free action, as +thus: <em>either I shall finish this reply to-morrow, +or I shall not finish this reply to-morrow</em>, is a necessary +proposition. But because he shall not +complain of any disadvantage in the alteration of +his terms, I will for once adventure upon his shower +of rain. And first, I readily admit his major, that +this proposition, <em>either it will rain to-morrow or it +will not rain to-morrow</em>, is necessarily true: for of +two contradictory propositions, the one must of +necessity be true, because no third can be given. +But his minor, that ‘it could not be necessarily +true, except one of the members were necessarily +true’, is most false. And so is his proof likewise, +that ‘if neither the one nor the other of the members +be necessarily true, it cannot be affirmed that +either the one or the other is true’. A conjunct +proposition may have both parts false, and yet the +proposition be true; as, <em>if the sun shine it is day</em>, is +a true proposition at midnight. And T. H. confesseth +as much, No. <a href='#XIX'><span class='fss'>XIX.</span></a> ‘<em>If I shall live I shall +<span class='pageno' id='Page_414'>414</span>eat</em>, is a necessary proposition, that is to say, it is +necessary that that proposition should be true +whensoever uttered. But it is not the necessity +of the thing, nor is it therefore necessary that the +man shall live or that the man shall eat’. And so +T. H. proceeds: ‘I do not use to fortify my distinctions +with such reasons’. But it seemeth he hath +forgotten himself, and is contented with such poor +fortifications. And though both parts of a disjunctive +proposition cannot be false; because if it be a +right disjunction, the members are repugnant, +whereof one part is infallibly true; yet vary but the +proposition a little to abate the edge of the disjunctions, +and you shall find in that which T. H. saith +to be true, that it is not the necessity of the thing +which makes the proposition to be true. As for example, +vary it thus: <em>I know that either it will rain +to-morrow or that it will not rain to-morrow</em>, is a +true proposition: but it is not true that I know it +will rain to-morrow, neither is it true that I know +it will not rain to-morrow; wherefore the certain +truth of the proposition doth not prove that either +of the members is determinately true in present. +Truth is a conformity of the understanding to the +thing known, whereof speech is an interpreter. +If the understanding agree not with the thing, it is +an error; if the words agree not with the understanding, +it is a lie. Now the thing known, is +known either in itself or in its causes. If it be +known in itself as it is, then we express our apprehension +of it in words of the present tense; as +<em>the sun is risen</em>. If it be known in its cause, we +express ourselves in words of the future tense; as +<em>to-morrow will be an eclipse of the moon</em>. But if +<span class='pageno' id='Page_415'>415</span>we neither know it in itself, nor in its causes, then +there may be a foundation of truth, but there is no +such determinate truth of it that we can reduce it +into a true proposition. We cannot say it doth rain +to-morrow, or it doth not rain to-morrow; that +were not only false but absurd. We cannot positively +say it will rain to-morrow, because we do +not know it in its causes, either how they are determined +or that they are determined. Wherefore +the certitude and evidence of the disjunctive proposition +is neither founded upon that which will +be actually to-morrow, for it is granted that we do +not know that; nor yet upon the determination of +the causes, for then we would not say indifferently +either it will rain or it will not rain, but positively +it will rain, or positively it will not rain. +But it is grounded upon an undeniable principle, +that of two contradictory propositions the one +must necessarily be true. (<i>f</i>) And therefore to +say, <em>either this or that will infallibly be, but it is +not yet determined whether this or that shall be</em>, +is no such senseless assertion that it deserved a +<span lang="la"><i>tytyrice tupatulice</i></span>, but an evident truth which no +man that hath his eyes in his head can doubt of.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>g</i>) “If all this will not satisfy him, I will give +one of his own kind of proofs; that is, an instance. +That which necessitates all things, according to +T. H. (No. <a href='#XI'><span class='fss'>XI</span></a>), is the decree of God, or that order +which is set to all things by the eternal cause. Now +God himself, who made this necessitating decree, +was not subjected to it in the making thereof; neither +was there any former order to oblige the first +cause necessarily to make such a decree; therefore +this decree being an act <span lang="la"><i>ad extra</i></span>, was freely +<span class='pageno' id='Page_416'>416</span>made by God without any necessitation. Yet +nevertheless this disjunctive proposition is necessarily +true: <em>either God did make each a decree, +or he did not make such a decree</em>. Again, though +T. H.’s opinion were true, that all events are necessary, +and that the whole Christian world are +deceived who believe that some events are free +from necessity; yet he will not deny, but if it had +been the good pleasure of God, he might have +made some causes free from necessity; seeing that +it neither argues any imperfection, nor implies any +contradiction. Supposing therefore that God had +made some second causes free from any such antecedent +determination to one; yet the former disjunction +would be necessarily true: either this +free undetermined cause will act after this manner, +or it will not act after this manner. Wherefore +the necessary truth of such a disjunctive proposition +doth not prove that either of the members of +the disjunction singly considered, is determinately +true in present; but only that the one of them will +be determinately true to-morrow.</p> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c000'> + <div><span class='fss'>ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXXIV.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>a</i>) “His former proof, that all sufficient causes +are necessary causes, is answered before (No. +<a href='#XXXI'><span class='fss'>XXXI</span></a>).” When he shall have read my animadversions +upon that answer of his, he will think otherwise, +whatsoever he will confess.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “And his two instances of casting ambs-ace, +and of raining to-morrow, are altogether impertinent +to the question, for two reasons.” His first +reason is, “because”, saith he, “our present controversy +is concerning free actions, which proceed +<span class='pageno' id='Page_417'>417</span>from the liberty of man’s will; and both his +instances are of contingent actions, which proceed +from the indetermination, or contingent concurrence +of natural causes”. He knows that this +part of my discourse, which beginneth at No. <a href='#XXV'><span class='fss'>XXV</span></a>, +is no dispute with him at all, but a bare setting +down of my opinion concerning the natural necessity +of all things; which is opposite, not only to +the liberty of will, but also to all contingence that +is not necessary. And therefore these instances +were not impertinent to my purpose; and if they +be impertinent to his opinion of the liberty of +man’s will, he does impertinently to meddle with +them. And yet for all he pretends here, that the +question is only about liberty of the will; yet in +his first discourse (No. <a href='#XVI'><span class='fss'>XVI</span></a>), he maintains that +“the order, beauty, and perfection of the world +doth require that in the universe should be agents +of all sorts, some necessary, some free, some contingent”. +And my purpose here is to show by +those instances, that those things which we esteem +most contingent are nevertheless necessary. Besides, +the controversy is not whether free actions +which proceed from the liberty of man’s will, be +necessary or not; for I know no action which proceedeth +from the liberty of man’s will. But the +question is, whether those actions which proceed +from the man’s will, be necessary. The man’s will +is something, but the liberty of his will is nothing. +Again, the question is not whether contingent actions +which proceed from the indetermination or +contingent concurrence of natural causes, (for there +is nothing that can proceed from indetermination), +but whether contingent actions be necessary before +<span class='pageno' id='Page_418'>418</span>they be done; or whether the concurrence of +natural causes, when they happen to concur, were +not necessitated so to happen; or whether whatsoever +chanceth, be not necessitated so to chance. +And that they are so necessitated, I have proved +already with such arguments as the Bishop, for +aught I see, cannot answer. For to say, as +he doth, that “there are free actions which proceed +merely from election, without any outward +necessitation, is a truth so evident as that there is +a sun in the heavens”, is no proof. It is indeed as +clear as the sun, that there are free actions proceeding +from election; but that there is election +without any outward necessitation, is dark enough.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>c</i>) “Secondly, for mixed actions, which proceed +from the concurrence of free and natural +agents, though they be not free, yet they are not +necessary, &c.” For proof of this he instanceth in +a tile, that falling from a house breaks a man’s +head, neither necessarily nor freely, and therefore +contingently. Not necessarily, “for”, saith he, +“he did freely choose to go that way without any +necessitation”. Which is as much as taking the +question itself for a proof. For what is else the +question, but whether a man be necessitated to +choose what he chooseth? “Again”, saith he, “it +was not free, because he did not deliberate whether +his head should be broken or not”; and concludes +“therefore it was contingent; and by undoubted +consequence, there are contingent actions +in the world which are not free”. This is true, +and denied by none; but he should have proved, +that such contingent actions are not antecedently +necessary by a concurrence of natural causes; +<span class='pageno' id='Page_419'>419</span>though a little before he granteth they are. For +whatsoever is produced by a concurrence of natural +causes, was antecedently determined in the cause +of such concurrence, though, as he calls it, contingent +concurrence; not perceiving that concurrence +and contingent concurrence are all one, and suppose +a continued connection and succession of +causes which make the effect necessarily future. +So that hitherto he hath proved no other contingence +than that which is necessary.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>d</i>) “Thirdly, for the actions of brute beasts, +&c, to think each animal motion of theirs is +bound by the chain of unalterable necessity, I see +no ground for it.” It maketh nothing against the +truth, that he sees no ground for it. I have pointed +out the ground in my former discourse, and am +not bound to find him eyes. He himself immediately +citeth a place of Scripture that proveth it, +where Christ saith, <em>one of these sparrows doth not +fall to the ground without your heavenly Father</em>; +which place, if there were no more, were a sufficient +ground for the assertion of the necessity of +all those changes of animal motion in birds and +other living creatures, which seem to us so uncertain. +But when a man is dizzy with <em>influence +of power</em>, <em>elicit acts</em>, <em>permissive will</em>, <em>hypothetical +necessity</em>, and the like unintelligible terms, the +ground goes from him. By and by after he confesseth +that “many things are called contingent +in respect of us, because we know not the cause of +them, which really and in themselves are not contingent, +but necessary”; and errs therein the other +way; for he says in effect, that many things are, +which are not; for it is all one to say, they are not +<span class='pageno' id='Page_420'>420</span>contingent, and they are not. He should have +said, there be many things, the necessity of whose +contingence we cannot or do not know.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>e</i>) “But whether there be a necessary connexion +of all natural causes from the beginning, so as +they must all have concurred as they have done, +&c, would require a further examination, if it were +pertinent to this question of liberty; but it is not. +It is sufficient to my purpose to have showed, &c.” +If there be a necessary connexion of all natural +causes from the beginning, then there is no doubt +but that all things happen necessarily, which is +that that I have all this while maintained. But +whether there be or no, he says, it requires a +further examination. Hitherto therefore he knows +not whether it be true or no, and consequently all +his arguments hitherto have been of no effect, nor +hath he showed anything to prove, what he purposed, +that elective actions are not necessitated. +And whereas a little before he says, that to my arguments +to prove that sufficient causes are necessary, +he hath already answered; it seemeth he distrusteth +his own answer, and answers again to the +two instances of <em>casting ambs-ace</em>, and <em>raining or +not raining to-morrow</em>; but brings no other argument +to prove the cast thrown not to be necessarily +thrown, but this, that he does not deliberate +whether he shall throw that cast or not. Which +argument may perhaps prove that the casting of it +proceedeth not from free will, but proves not anything +against the antecedent necessity of it. And +to prove that it is not necessary that it should rain +or not rain to-morrow; after telling us that the +Ethiopian rains cause the inundation of Nilus: +<span class='pageno' id='Page_421'>421</span>that in some eastern countries they have rain +only twice a year, which the Scripture, he saith, +calleth <em>the former and the latter rain</em>; (I thought +he had known it by the experience of some travellers, +but I see he only gathereth it from that +phrase in Scripture of <em>former and latter rain</em>); I +say, after he has told us this, to prove that it is not +necessary it should rain or not rain to-morrow he +saith that “in our climate the natural causes, +celestial and sublunary, do not produce rain so necessarily +at set times, as in the eastern countries; +neither can we say so certainly and infallibly, it +will rain to-morrow, or it will not rain to-morrow”. +By this argument a man may take the +height of the Bishop’s logic. “In our climate the +natural causes do not produce rain so necessarily +at set times, as in some eastern countries. Therefore +they do not produce rain necessarily in our +climate, then when they do produce it”. And +again, “we cannot say so certainly and infallibly, +it will rain to-morrow or it will not rain to-morrow; +therefore it is not necessary either that it +should rain, or that it should not rain to-morrow”: +as if nothing were necessary the necessity whereof +we know not. Another reason, he saith, why my +instances are impertinent, is because “they extend +only to an hypothetical necessity”, that is, that the +necessity is not in the antecedent causes; and +thereupon challengeth me for the credit of my +cause to name some reason, “how the caster was +necessitated from without himself to apply just so +much force to the cast, and neither more nor less; +or what necessity there was why the caster must +throw into that table rather than the other, or +<span class='pageno' id='Page_422'>422</span>that the dice must fall just upon that part of the +table, before the cast was thrown”. Here again, +from our ignorance of the particular causes that +concurring make the necessity he inferreth, that +there was no such necessity at all; which indeed +is that which hath in all this question deceived +him, and all other men that attribute events to +fortune. But I suppose he will not deny that +event to be necessary, where all the causes of the +cast, and their concurrence, and the cause of that +concurrence are foreknown, and might be told +him, though I cannot tell him. Seeing therefore +God foreknows them all, the cast was necessary; +and that from antecedent causes from eternity; +which is no hypothetical necessity.</p> + +<p class='c001'>And whereas to my argument to prove, that +‘raining to-morrow if it shall then rain, and not +raining to-morrow if it shall then not rain’, was +therefore necessary, because ‘otherwise this disjunctive +proposition, it shall rain or not rain to-morrow, +is not necessary’, he answereth that “a +conjunct proposition may have both parts false, and +yet the proposition be true; as, if the sun shine it +is day, is a true proposition at midnight”: what +has a conjunct proposition to do with this in question, +which is disjunctive? Or what be the parts +of this proposition, <em>if the sun shine, it is day</em>? +It is not made of two propositions, as a disjunctive +is; but is one simple proposition, namely, this, <em>the +shining of the sun is day</em>. Either he has no logic +at all, or thinks they have no reason at all that +are his readers. But he has a trick, he saith, to +abate the edge of the disjunction, by varying ther +proposition thus, “I know that <em>it will rain to-morrow</em>, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_423'>423</span>or <em>that it will not rain to-morrow</em>, is a true +proposition”; and yet saith he, “it is neither true +that I know it will rain to-morrow, neither is it +true that I know it will not rain to-morrow”. +What childish deceit, or childish ignorance is this; +when he is to prove that neither of the members +is determinately true in a disjunctive proposition, +to bring for instance a proposition not disjunctive? +It had been disjunctive if it had gone thus, +<em>I know that it will rain to-morrow, or I know that +it will not rain to-morrow</em>; but then he had certainly +known determinately one of the two.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>f</i>) “And therefore to say, either this or that +will infallibly be, but it is not yet determined +whether this or that shall be, is no such senseless +assertion that it deserved a <span lang="la"><i>tytyrice tupatulice</i></span>”. +But it is a senseless assertion, whatsoever it deserve, +to say that this proposition, it shall rain or +not rain, is true <em>indeterminedly</em>, and neither of +them true <em>determinedly</em>; and little better, as he +hath now qualified it, “that it will infallibly be, +though it be not yet determined whether it shall +be or no”.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>g</i>) “If all this will not satisfy him, I will give +him one of his own kinds of proof, that is, an instance. +That which necessitates all things, according +to T. H. is the decree of God, &c.” His instance +is, “that God himself made this necessitating +decree, and therefore this decree, being an act +<span lang="la"><i>ad extra</i></span>, was freely made by God, without any +necessitation”. I do believe the Bishop himself +believeth that all the decrees of God have been +from all eternity, and therefore he will not stand +to this, that God’s decrees were ever made; for +<span class='pageno' id='Page_424'>424</span>whatsoever hath been made, hath had a beginning. +Besides, God’s decree is his will; and the Bishop +hath said formerly, that the will of God is God, the +justice of God, God, &c. If therefore God made a +decree, according to the Bishop’s opinion God +made himself. By which we may see, what fine +stuff it is that proceedeth from disputing of +incomprehensibles. Again he says, “if it had +been the good pleasure of God, he might have +made some causes free from necessity; seeing that +it neither argues any imperfection, nor implies any +contradiction”. If God had made either causes or +effects free from necessity, he had made them free +from his own prescience; which had been imperfection. +Perhaps he will say, that in these words of +his, <em>the decree, being an act ad extra, was freely +made by God</em>, I take no notice of that <span lang="la"><i>act ad +extra</i></span>, as being too hot for my fingers. Therefore +now I take notice of it, and say that it is neither +Latin, nor English, nor sense.</p> + +<h3 id='XXXV' class='c002'>NO. XXXV.</h3> + +<p class='c010'><i>T. H.</i> The last thing, in which also consisteth the +whole controversy, namely, that there is no such +thing as an agent, which, when all things requisite +to action are present, can nevertheless forbear to +produce it, or (which is all one) that there is no +such thing as freedom from necessity; is easily inferred +from that which hath been before alleged. +For if it be an agent, it can work; and if it work, +there is nothing wanting of what is requisite to +produce the action; and consequently the cause of +the action is sufficient; and if sufficient, then also +necessary, as hath been proved before.</p> + +<div class='sidenote'>The Bishop’s reply.</div> + +<p class='c001'><span class='pageno' id='Page_425'>425</span><i>J. D.</i> “I wonder that T. H. should confess, +that the whole weight of this controversy doth +rest upon this proposition: ‘that there is no such +thing as an agent, which, when all things requisite +to action are present, can nevertheless forbear to +<a id='corr425.6'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='act”'>act’</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_425.6'><ins class='correction' title='act”'>act’</ins></a></span>; and yet bring nothing but such poor bullrushes +to support it. (<i>a</i>) ‘If it be an agent’, saith +he, ‘it can work’; what of this? <span lang="la"><i>A posse ad +esse non valet argumentum</i></span>: from <em>can work</em> to <em>will +work</em>, is a weak inference. And from <em>will work</em> +to <em>doth work upon absolute necessity</em>, is another +gross inconsequence. He proceeds thus: ‘if it +work, there is nothing wanting of what is requisite +to produce the action’. True, there wants +nothing to produce that which is produced; but +there may want much to produce that which was +intended. One horse may pull his heart out, and +yet not draw the coach whither it should be, if he +want the help or concurrence of his fellows. ‘And +consequently’, saith he, ‘the cause of the action is +sufficient’. Yes, sufficient to do what it doth, +though perhaps with much prejudice to itself; but +not always sufficient to do what it should do, or +what it would do. As he that begets a monster, +should beget a man, and would beget a man if he +could. The last link of his argument follows: +(<i>b</i>) ‘and if sufficient, then also necessary’. Stay +there; by his leave, there is no necessary connexion +between sufficiency and efficiency; otherwise God +himself should not be all-sufficient. Thus his argument +is vanished. But I will deal more favourably +with him, and grant him all that which he +labours so much in vain to prove, that every effect +in the world hath sufficient causes; yea more, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_426'>426</span>that supposing the determination of the free and +contingent causes, every effect in the world is necessary. +(<i>c</i>) But all this will not advantage his +cause the black of a bean: for still it amounts but +to an hypothetical necessity, and differs as much +from that absolute necessity, which he maintains, +as a gentleman who travels for his pleasure, differs +from a banished man, or a free subject from a +slave.”</p> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c000'> + <div><span class='fss'>ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXXV.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>a</i>) “‘If it be an agent,’ saith he, ‘it can work’. +What of this? <span lang="la"><i>A posse ad esse non valet argumentum</i></span>; +from <em>can work</em> to <em>will work</em>, is a weak +inference. And from <em>will work</em> to <em>doth work +upon absolute necessity</em>, is another gross inconsequence.” +Here he has gotten a just advantage; +for I should have said, if it be an agent it worketh, +not it can work. But it is an advantage which +profiteth little to his cause. For if I repeat my +argument again in this manner: that which is +an agent, worketh; that which worketh, wanteth +nothing requisite to produce the action or the +effect it produceth, and consequently is thereof a +sufficient cause; and if a sufficient cause, then also +a necessary cause: his answer will be nothing to +the purpose. For whereas to these words, ‘that +which worketh, wanteth nothing requisite to produce +the action or the effect it produceth,’ he answereth, +“it is true, but there may want much to +produce that which was intended”, it is not contrary +to any thing that I have said. For I never +maintained, that whatsoever a man intendeth, is necessarily +performed; but this, whatsoever a man +<span class='pageno' id='Page_427'>427</span>performeth, is necessarily performed, and what he +intendeth, necessarily intended, and that from +causes antecedent. And therefore to say, as he +doth, that the cause is sufficient to do what it doth, +but not always sufficient to do what a man should +or would do, is to say the same that I do. For I +say not, that the cause that bringeth forth a monster, +is sufficient to bring forth a man; but that +every cause is sufficient to produce only the effect +it produceth; and if sufficient, then also necessary.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “‘And if sufficient, then also necessary’. +Stay there; by his leave, there is no necessary connexion +between sufficiency and efficiency; otherwise +God himself should not be all-sufficient.” All-sufficiency +signifieth no more, when it is attributed +to God, than omnipotence; and omnipotence +signifieth no more, than the power to do all +things that he will. But to the production of +any thing that is produced, the will of God is +as requisite as the rest of his power and sufficiency. +And consequently, his all-sufficiency signifieth +not a sufficiency or power to do those +things he will not. But he will deal, he says, so +favourably with me, as to grant me all this, which +I labour, he saith, so much in vain to prove: and +adds, (<i>c</i>) “But all this will not advantage his cause +the black of a bean; for still it amounts but to an +hypothetical necessity”. If it prove no more, it +proves no necessity at all; for by hypothetical necessity +he means the necessity of this proposition, +<em>the effect is, then when it is</em>; whereas necessity is +only said truly of somewhat in future. For <em>necessary</em> +is that which cannot possibly be otherwise; +<span class='pageno' id='Page_428'>428</span>and <em>possibility</em> is always understood of some +future time. But seeing he granteth so favourably +that sufficient causes are necessary causes, I shall +easily conclude from it, that whatsoever those +causes do cause, are necessary antecedently. For +if the necessity of the thing produced, when produced, +be in the same instant of time with the existence +of its immediate cause; then also that +immediate cause was in the same instant with +the cause by which it was immediately produced; +the same may be said of the cause of this cause, +and so backward eternally. From whence it will +follow, that all the connexion of the causes of +any effect from the beginning of the world, were +altogether existent in one and the same instant; +and consequently, all the time from the beginning +of the world, or from eternity to this day, is but +one instant, or a <span lang="la"><i>nunc stans</i></span>; which he knows by +this time is not so.</p> + +<h3 id='XXXVI' class='c002'>NO. XXXVI.</h3> + +<p class='c010'><i>T. H.</i> And thus you see how the inconveniences, +which he objecteth must follow upon the holding +of necessity, are avoided, and the necessity +itself demonstratively proved. To which I could +add, if I thought it good logic, the inconvenience +of denying necessity; as that it destroys both the +decrees and prescience of God Almighty. For whatsoever +God hath purposed to bring to pass by man +as an instrument, or foreseeth shall come to pass, +a man, if he have liberty, such as he affirmeth from +necessitation, might frustrate and make not to +come to pass: and God should either not foreknow +it and not decree it, or he should foreknow +<span class='pageno' id='Page_429'>429</span>such things shall be as shall never be, and decree +that which shall never come to pass.</p> + +<div class='sidenote'>The Bishop’s reply.</div> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “Thus he hath laboured in vain to satisfy +my reasons, and to prove his own assertion. +But for demonstration, there is nothing like it +among his arguments. Now he saith, (<i>a</i>) he could +add other arguments, if he thought it good logic. +There is no impediment in logic, why a man may +not press his adversary with those absurdities +which flow from his opinion; <span lang="la"><i>argumentum ducens +ad impossibile</i></span> or <span lang="la"><i>ad absurdum</i></span>, is a good form of +reasoning. But there is another reason of his +forbearance, though he be loath to express it. +<span lang="la"><i>Hæret lateri læthalis arundo.</i></span> The arguments +drawn from the attributes of God do stick so close +in the sides of his cause, that he hath no mind to +treat of that subject. By the way, take notice of +his own confession, that ‘he could add other reasons, +if he thought it good logic’. If it were predetermined +in the outward causes, that he must +make this very defence and no other, how could it +be in his power to add or subtract any thing: just +as if a blind man should say in earnest, <em>I could see +if I had mine eyes</em>? Truth often breaks out whilst +men seek to smother it. (<i>b</i>) But let us view his argument: +‘if a man have liberty from necessitation, +he may frustrate the decrees of God, and make his +prescience false’. First, for the decrees of God, +this is his decree that man should be a free agent; +if he did consider God as a most simple act, +without priority or posteriority of time, or any +composition; he would not conceive of his decrees, +as of the laws of the Medes and Persians, long +since enacted and passed before we were born, but +<span class='pageno' id='Page_430'>430</span>as coexistent with ourselves, and with the acts +which we do by virtue of those decrees. Decrees +and attributes are but notions to help the weakness +of our understanding to conceive of God. The +decrees of God are God himself, and therefore +justly said to be before the foundation of the world +was laid: and yet coexistent with ourselves, because +of the infinite and eternal being of God. The +sum is this, the decree of God, or God himself +eternally, constitutes or ordains all effects which +come to pass in time, according to the distinct +natures or capacities of his creatures. An eternal +ordination is neither past nor to come, but +always present. So free actions do proceed as +well from the eternal decree of God, as necessary; +and from that order which he hath set in the +world.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“As the decree of God is eternal, so is his +knowledge. And therefore to speak truly and +properly, there is neither fore-knowledge nor after-knowledge +in him. The knowledge of God comprehends +all times in a point, by reason of the eminence +and virtue of its infinite perfection. And yet +I confess, that this is called fore-knowledge in respect +of us. But this fore-knowledge doth produce +no absolute necessity. Things are not therefore, +because they are foreknown; but therefore they are +foreknown, because they shall come to pass. If any +thing should come to pass otherwise than it doth, +yet God’s knowledge could not be irritated by it; +for then he did not know that it should come to +pass, as now it doth. Because every knowledge +of vision necessarily presupposeth its object, God +did know that Judas should betray Christ; but +<span class='pageno' id='Page_431'>431</span>Judas was not necessitated to be a traitor by God’s +knowledge. If Judas had not betrayed Christ, +then God had not fore-known that Judas should +betray him. The case is this: a watchman standing +on the steeple’s-top, as it is the use in Germany, +gives notice to them below, who see no such +things, that company are coming, and how many; +his prediction is most certain, for he sees them. +What a vain correction were it for one below to say, +what if they did not come, then a certain prediction +may fail. It may be urged, that there is a +difference between these two cases. In this case, the +coming is present to the watchman; but that which +God fore-knows, is future. God knows what shall +be; the watchman only knows what is. I answer, +that this makes no difference at all in the case, by +reason of that disparity which is between God’s +knowledge and ours. As that coming is present +to the watchman, which is future to them who are +below: so all those things which are future to us, +are present to God, because his infinite and eternal +knowledge doth reach to the future being of all +agents and events. Thus much is plainly acknowledged +by T. H. No. <a href='#XI'><span class='fss'>XI</span></a>: that ‘fore-knowledge is +knowledge, and knowledge depends on the existence +of the things known, and not they on it’. To +conclude, the prescience of God doth not make +things more necessary than the production of the +things themselves; but if the agents were free +agents, the production of the things doth not make +the events to be absolutely necessary, but only upon +supposition that the causes were so determined. +God’s prescience proveth a necessity of infallibility, +but not of antecedent extrinsical determination to +<span class='pageno' id='Page_432'>432</span>one. If any event should not come to pass, God +did never foreknow that it would come to pass. +For every knowledge necessarily presupposeth its +object.</p> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c000'> + <div><span class='fss'>ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXXVI.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>a</i>) “‘He could add’, he saith, ‘other arguments, +if he thought it good logic,’ &c. There is no impediment +in logic, why a man may not press his +adversary with those absurdities which flow from +his opinion.” Here he misrecites my words; +which are, ‘I could add, if I thought it good +logic, the inconvenience of denying necessity; as +that it destroys both the decrees and prescience +of God Almighty’. But he makes me say I could +add other arguments; then infers, that there is no +impediment in logic, why a man may not press his +adversary with the absurdities that flow from his +opinion, because <span lang="la"><i>argumentum ducens ad impossibile</i></span> +is a good form of reasoning; making no difference +between <em>absurdities</em>, which are impossibilities, +and <em>inconveniences</em>, which are not only possible +but frequent. And though it be a good form of +reasoning to argue from absurdities, yet it is no +good form of reasoning to argue from inconveniences; +for inconvenience may stand well enough +with truth.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “But let us view his argument: ‘If a man +have liberty from necessitation, he may frustrate +the decrees of God, and make his prescience false’. +This is his decree, that man should be a free agent. +If he did consider God as a most simple act, without +priority or posteriority of time, or any composition, +he would not conceive of his decrees as +<span class='pageno' id='Page_433'>433</span>long since enacted, but as coexistent with ourselves”. +Here again he would have me conceive +eternity to be <span lang="la"><i>nunc stans</i></span>, that is, an instant of +time, and that instant of time to be God; which +neither he nor I can conceive, nor can without +impiety say, as he doth here, that the decrees of +God are God. In which consisteth all the rest of +his answer to this Number, saving that he putteth +in sometimes, that “the foreknowledge of God +produceth not necessity”, which is granted him; +but that anything can be foreknown which shall +not necessarily come to pass, which was not granted, +he proveth no otherwise than by his assertion, +“that every instant of time is God”; which is +denied him.</p> + +<h3 id='XXXVII' class='c002'>NO. XXXVII.</h3> + +<p class='c010'><i>T. H.</i> This is all that hath come into my mind +touching this question, since I last considered it. +And I humbly beseech your Lordship to communicate +it only to J. D. And so praying God to +prosper your Lordship in all your designs, I take +leave, and am, my most noble and obliging Lord,</p> + +<div class='lg-container-r c012'> + <div class='linegroup'> + <div class='group'> + <div class='line'>Your most humble servant,</div> + <div class='line in25'>T. H.</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<div class='sidenote'>The Bishop’s reply.</div> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “He is very careful to have this discourse +kept secret, as appears in this section, and in the +<a href='#XIV'><span class='fss'>XIV</span></a>th and <a href='#XV'><span class='fss'>XV</span></a>th sections. If his answer had been +kept private, I had saved the labour of a reply. +But hearing that it was communicated, I thought +myself obliged to vindicate both the truth and myself. +I do not blame him to be cautious; for in +truth, this assertion is of desperate consequence, +and destructive to piety, policy, and morality. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_434'>434</span>(<i>a</i>) If he had desired to have it kept secret, the +way had been to have kept it secret himself. It +will not suffice to say, as No. <a href='#XIV'><span class='fss'>XIV</span></a>, that ‘truth is +truth’: This is the common plea of all men. +Neither is it sufficient for him to say, as No. <a href='#XV'><span class='fss'>XV</span></a>, +that ‘it was desired by me’, long before that he +had discovered his opinion by word of mouth. +And my desire was to let some of my noble friends +see the weakness of his grounds, and the pernicious +consequences of that opinion. (<i>b</i>) But if he +think that this ventilation of the question between +us two may do hurt, truly I hope not. The edge +of his discourse is so abated, that it cannot easily +hurt any rational man, who is not too much possessed +with <a id='corr434.15'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='prejudice.'>prejudice.”</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_434.15'><ins class='correction' title='prejudice.'>prejudice.”</ins></a></span></p> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> +<div class='nf-center c000'> + <div><span class='fss'>ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXXVII.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c001'>In this place I said nothing, but that I would +have my Lord of Newcastle to communicate it +only to the Bishop. And in his answer he says, +(<i>a</i>) “if I had desired to have it kept secret, the +way had been to have kept it secret myself”. My +desire was, it should not be communicated by my +Lord of Newcastle to all men indifferently. But I +barred not myself from showing it privately to my +friends; though to publish it was never my intention, +till now provoked by the uncivil triumphing +of the Bishop in his own errors to my disadvantage.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “But if he think that this ventilation of the +question may do hurt, truly I hope not. The edge +of his discourse is so abated, that it cannot easily +hurt any rational man, who is not too much possessed +with prejudice.” It is confidently said; but +<span class='pageno' id='Page_435'>435</span>not very pertinently to the hurt I thought might +proceed from a discourse of this nature. For I +never thought it could do hurt to a rational man, +but only to such men as cannot reason in those +points which are of difficult contemplation. For a +rational man will say with himself, <em>they whom +God will bring to a blessed and happy end, those +he will put into an humble, pious, and righteous +way; and of those whom he will destroy, he will +harden the hearts</em>: and thereupon examining himself +whether he be in such a way or not, the +examination itself would, if elected, be a necessary +cause of working out his salvation with fear and +trembling. But the men who I thought might +take hurt thereby, are such as reason erroneously, +saying with themselves, <i>if I shall be saved, I shall +be saved whether I walk uprightly or no</i>: and +consequently thereunto, shall behave themselves +negligently, and pursue the pleasant way of the +sins they are in love with. Which inconvenience +is not abated by this discourse of the Bishop; because +they understand not the grounds he goeth +on, of <em>nunc stans</em>, <em>motus primo primi</em>, <i>elicit acts</i>, +<i>imperate acts</i>, and a great many other such unintelligible +words.</p> + +<h3 id='XXXVIII' class='c002'>NO. XXXVIII.</h3> + +<p class='c010'><i>T. H.</i> Postscript. Arguments seldom work on +men of wit and learning, when they have once engaged +themselves in a contrary opinion. If anything +do it, it is the shewing of them the causes of +their errors, which is this. Pious men attribute to +God Almighty, for honour sake, whatsoever they see +is honourable in the world, as seeing, hearing, willing, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_436'>436</span>knowing, justice, wisdom, &c.: but deny him +such poor things as eyes, ears, brains, and other +organs, without which we worms neither have nor +can conceive such faculties to be: and so far they +do well. But when they dispute of God’s actions +philosophically, then they consider them again as +if he had such faculties, and in that manner as we +have them. This is not well; and thence it is they +fall into so many difficulties. We ought not to dispute +of God’s nature; he is no fit subject of our +philosophy. True religion consisteth in obedience +to Christ’s lieutenants, and in giving God such +honour, both in attributes and actions, as they in +their several lieutenancies shall ordain.</p> + +<div class='sidenote'>The Bishop’s reply.</div> + +<p class='c001'><i>J. D.</i> “Though sophistical captions do seldom +work on men of wit and learning, because <i>by constant +use they have their senses exercised to discern +both good and evil</i> (Heb. v. 14), yet (<i>a</i>) +solid and substantial reasons work sooner upon +them than upon weaker judgments. The more +exact the balance is, the sooner it discovers the +real weight that is put into it; especially if the +proofs be proposed without passion or opposition. +Let sophisters and seditious orators apply themselves +to the many-headed multitude, because they +despair of success with men of wit and learning. +Those whose gold is true, are not afraid to have it +tried by the touch. Since the former way hath +not succeeded, T. H. hath another to shew as the +causes of our errors, which he hopes will prove +more successful. When he sees he can do no +good by sight, he seeks to circumvent us under +colour of courtesy: <span lang="la"><i>Fistula dulce canit, volucrem +dum decipit auceps</i></span>. As they who behold themselves +<span class='pageno' id='Page_437'>437</span>in a glass, take the right hand for the left, +and the left for the right (T. H. knows the comparison); +so we take our own errors to be truths, +and other men’s truths to be errors, (<i>b</i>) If we be +in an error in this, it is such an error as we sucked +from nature itself, such an error as is confirmed in +us by reason and experience, such an error as God +himself in his sacred Word hath revealed, such an +error as the Fathers and Doctors of the Church in +all ages have delivered, such an error wherein we +have the concurrence of all the best philosophers, +both natural and moral, such an error as bringeth +to God the glory of justice, and wisdom, and goodness, +and truth, such an error as renders men more +devout, more pious, more industrious, more humble, +more penitent for their sins. Would he have +us resign up all these advantages, to dance blindfold +after his pipe? No, he persuades us too much +to our loss. But let us see what is the imaginary +cause of our imaginary error. Forsooth, because +‘we attribute to God whatsoever is honourable in +the world, as seeing, hearing, willing, knowing, +justice, wisdom; but deny him such poor things as +eyes, ears, <a id='corr437.24'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='brains'>brains’</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_437.24'><ins class='correction' title='brains'>brains’</ins></a></span>; and so far, he saith ‘we do well.’ +He hath reason, for since we are not able to conceive +of God as he is, the readiest way we have, is +by removing all that imperfection from God, which +is in the creatures; so we call him infinite, immortal, +independent: or by attributing to him all +those perfections which are in the creatures, after +a most eminent manner; so we call him best, +greatest, most wise, most just, most holy. (<i>c</i>) But +saith he, ‘When they dispute of God’s actions +philosophically, then they consider them again, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_438'>438</span>as if he had such faculties, and in that manner as +we have them’.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“And is this the cause of our error? That +were strange indeed; for they who dispute philosophically +of God, do neither ascribe faculties to him +in that manner that we have them, nor yet do they +attribute any proper faculties at all to God. God’s +understanding and his will is his very essence, +which, for the eminency of its infinite perfection, +doth perform all those things alone in a most +transcendant manner, which reasonable creatures +do perform imperfectly by distinct faculties. Thus +to dispute of God with modesty and reverence, +and to clear the Deity from the imputation of tyranny, +injustice, and dissimulation, which none do +throw upon God with more presumption than +those who are the patrons of absolute necessity, is +both comely and Christian.</p> + +<p class='c001'>“It is not the desire to discover the original of a +supposed error, which draws them ordinarily into +these exclamations against those who dispute of +the Deity. For some of themselves dare anatomize +God, and publish his eternal decrees with as +much confidence, as if they had been all their lives +of his cabinet council. But it is for fear lest those +pernicious consequences which flow from that doctrine +essentially, and reflect in so high a degree +upon the supreme goodness, should be laid open to +the view of the world; just as the Turks do first +establish a false religion of their own devising, and +then forbid all men upon pain of death to dispute +upon religion; or as the priests of Moloch, the +abomination of the Ammonites, did make a noise +with their timbrels all the while the poor infants +<span class='pageno' id='Page_439'>439</span>were passing through the fire in Tophet, to keep +their pitiful cries from the ears of their parents. +So (<i>d</i>) they make a noise with their declamations +against those who dare dispute of the nature of +God, that is, who dare set forth his justice, and his +goodness, and his truth, and his philanthropy, +only to deaf the ears and dim the eyes of the +Christian world, lest they should hear the lamentable +ejulations and howlings, or see that rueful +spectacle of millions of souls tormented for evermore +(<i>e</i>) in the flames of the true Tophet, that is, +hell, only for that which, according to T. H.’s +doctrine, was never in their power to shun, but +which they were ordered and inevitably necessitated +to do, only to express the omnipotence and +dominion, and to satisfy the pleasure of Him, who +is in truth the Father of all mercies, and the God of +all consolation. (<i>f</i>) <em>This is life eternal</em> (saith +our Saviour), <em>to know the only true God, and +Jesus Christ whom he hath sent</em> (John xvii. 3.). +<em>Pure religion, and undefiled before God and the +Father, is this, to visit the fatherless and widows +in their affliction, and to keep himself unspotted +from the world</em>, saith St. James (James i. 27.). +<em>Fear God and keep his commandments; for this is +the whole duty of man</em>, saith Solomon (Eccles. +xii. 13.). But T. H. hath found out a more compendious +way to heaven: ‘True religion’, saith he, +‘consisteth in obedience to Christ’s lieutenants, and +giving God such honour, both in attributes and +actions, as they in their several lieutenancies shall +ordain’. That is to say, <em>be of the religion of every +<a id='corr439.33'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='Chistian'>Christian</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_439.33'><ins class='correction' title='Chistian'>Christian</ins></a></span> country where you come</em>. To make the +civil magistrate to be Christ’s lieutenant upon +<span class='pageno' id='Page_440'>440</span>earth, for matters of religion, and to make him to +be supreme judge in all controversies, whom all +must obey, is a doctrine so strange, and such an +uncouth phrase to Christian ears, that I should +have missed his meaning, but that I consulted with +his book, <span lang="la"><cite>De Cive</cite></span>, c. <span class='fss'>XV.</span> sect. 16, and c. <span class='fss'>XVII.</span> sect. +28. What if the magistrate shall be no Christian +himself? What if he shall command contrary to +the law of God or nature? <em>Must we obey him +rather than God?</em> (Acts iv. 19.) Is the civil magistrate +become now the only ground and pillar of +truth? I demand then, why T. H. is of a different +mind from his sovereign, and from the laws +of the land, concerning the attributes of God and +his decrees? This is a new paradox, and concerns +not this question of liberty and necessity. Wherefore +I forbear to prosecute it further, and so conclude +my reply with the words of the Christian +poet,</p> + +<div class='lg-container-b c015'> + <div class='linegroup'> + <div class='group'> + <div class='line'><span lang="la">Jussum est Cæsaris ore Galieni,</span></div> + <div class='line'><span lang="la">Quod princeps colit ut colamus omnes.</span></div> + <div class='line'><span lang="la">Æternum colo Principem, dierum</span></div> + <div class='line'><span lang="la">Factorem, Dominumque Galieni.</span><a id='rA'></a><a href='#fA' class='c016'><sup>[A]</sup></a></div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<hr class='c017'> +<div class='footnote' id='fA'> +<p class='c001'><a href='#rA'>A</a>. Prudentius. περι στεφανων. Hymn. vi.</p> +</div> +<hr class='c017'> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> + <div class='nf-center'> + <div><span class='fss'>ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO THE POSTSCRIPT NO. XXXVIII.</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c001'>He taketh it ill that I say that arguments do +seldom work on men of wit and learning, when +they have once engaged themselves in a contrary +opinion. Nevertheless it is not only certain by +experience, but also there is reason for it, and +that grounded upon the natural disposition of mankind. +For it is natural to all men to defend those +opinions, which they have once publicly engaged +<span class='pageno' id='Page_441'>441</span>themselves to maintain; because to have that detected +for error, which they have publicly maintained +for truth, is never without some dishonour, +more or less; and to find in themselves that they +have spent a great deal of time and labour in deceiving +themselves, is so uncomfortable a thing, as +it is no wonder if they employ their wit and learning, +if they have any, to make good their errors. +And, therefore, where he saith, (<i>a</i>) “solid and +substantial reasons work sooner upon them, than +upon weaker judgments; and that the more exact +the balance is, the sooner it discovers the real +weight that is put into it”: I confess, the more +solid a man’s wit is, the better will solid reasons +work upon him. But if he add to it that which +he calls learning, that is to say, much reading +of other men’s doctrines without weighing them +with his own thoughts, then their judgments become +weaker, and the balance less exact. And +whereas he saith, “that they whose gold is true, +are not afraid to have it tried by the touch”; he +speaketh as if I had been afraid to have my doctrine +tried by the touch of men of wit and learning; +wherein he is not much mistaken, meaning +by men of learning (as I said before) such as had +read other men, but not themselves. For by reading +others, men commonly obstruct the way to their +own exact and natural judgment, and use their +wit both to deceive themselves with fallacies, and +to requite those, who endeavour at their own entreaty +to instruct them, with revilings.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>b</i>) “If we be in an error, it is such an error as +is sucked from nature; as is confirmed by reason, +by experience, and by Scripture; as the Fathers +<span class='pageno' id='Page_442'>442</span>and Doctors of the Church of all ages have delivered; +an error, wherein we have the concurrence +of all the best philosophers, an error that +bringeth to God the glory of justice, &c.; that +renders men more devout, more pious, more humble, +more industrious, more penitent for their sins.” +All this is but said; and what heretofore hath +been offered in proof for it, hath been sufficiently +refuted, and the contrary proved; namely, that it +is an error contrary to the nature of the will; repugnant +to reason and experience; repugnant to +the Scripture; repugnant to the doctrine of St. +Paul, (and ’tis pity the Fathers and Doctors of the +Church have not followed St. Paul therein); an +error not maintained by the best philosophers, +(for they are not the best philosophers, which +the Bishop thinketh so); an error that taketh from +God the glory of his prescience, nor bringeth to +him the glory of his other attributes; an error +that maketh men, by imagining they can repent +when they will, neglect their duties; and that +maketh men unthankful for God’s graces, by thinking +them to proceed from the natural ability of +their own will.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>c</i>) “‘But,’ saith he, ‘when they dispute of God’s +actions philosophically, then they consider them +again as if he had such faculties, and in such manner +as we have them.’ And is this the cause of +our error? That were strange indeed; for they +who dispute philosophically of God, do neither +ascribe faculties to him, in that manner that we +have them, nor yet do they attribute any proper +faculties at all to God. God’s understanding and +his will is his very essence, &c.” Methinks he +<span class='pageno' id='Page_443'>443</span>should have known at these years, that to dispute +philosophically is to dispute by natural reason, and +from principles evident by the light of nature, and +to dispute of the faculties and proprieties of the +subject whereof they treat. It is therefore unskilfully +said by him, that they who dispute philosophically +of God, ascribe unto him no proper faculties. +If no proper faculties, I would fain know of +him what improper faculties he ascribes to God. I +guess he will make the understanding and the will, +and his other attributes, to be in God improper faculties, +because he cannot properly call them faculties; +that is to say, he knows not how to make it +good that they are faculties, and yet he will have +these words, “God’s understanding and his will +are his very essence”, to pass for an axiom of philosophy. +And whereas I had said, we ought not +to dispute of God’s nature, and that He is no fit +subject of our philosophy, he denies it not, but +says I say it.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>d</i>) “With a purpose to make a noise with declaiming +against those who dare dispute of the +nature of God, that is, who dare set forth his justice +and his goodness, &c.” The Bishop will have +much ado to make good, that to dispute of the nature +of God, is all one with setting forth his justice +and his goodness. He taketh no notice of these +words of mine, ‘pious men attribute to God Almighty +for honour’s sake, whatsoever they see is +honourable in the world’; and yet this is setting +forth God’s justice, goodness, &c, without disputing +of God’s nature.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>e</i>) “In the flames of the true Tophet, that is +hell.” The true Tophet was a place not far from +<span class='pageno' id='Page_444'>444</span>the walls of Jerusalem, and consequently on the +earth. I cannot imagine what he will say to this +in his answer to my <cite>Leviathan</cite>, if there he find the +same, unless he say, that in this place by the <em>true</em> +Tophet, he meant a <em>not true</em> Tophet.</p> + +<p class='c001'>(<i>f</i>) “<em>This is life eternal</em> (saith our Saviour) <em>to +know the only true God, and Jesus Christ</em>, &c.” +This which followeth to the end of his answer +and of the book, is a reprehension of me, for saying +that ‘true religion consisteth in obedience to +Christ’s lieutenants’. If it be lawful for Christians +to institute amongst themselves a commonwealth +and magistrates, whereby they may be able to live +in peace one with another, and unite themselves +in defence against a foreign enemy; it will certainly +be necessary to make to themselves some +supreme judge in all controversies, to whom they +ought all to give obedience. And this is no such +strange doctrine, nor so uncouth a phrase to +Christian ears, as the Bishop makes it, whatsoever +it be to them that would make themselves judges +of the Supreme Judge himself. No; but, saith +he, Christ is the Supreme Judge, and we are not to +obey men rather than God. Is there any Christian +man that does not acknowledge that we are to be +judged by Christ, or that we ought not to obey +him rather than any man that shall be his lieutenant +upon earth? The question therefore is, not +of who is to be obeyed, but of what be his commands. +If the Scripture contain his commands, +then may every Christian know by them what they +are. And what has the Bishop to do with what +God says to me when I read them, more than I +have to do with what God says to him when he +<span class='pageno' id='Page_445'>445</span>reads them, unless he have authority given him by +him whom Christ hath constituted his lieutenant? +This lieutenant upon earth, I say, is the supreme +civil magistrate, to whom belongeth the care and +charge of seeing that no doctrine may be taught +the people, but such as may consist with the general +peace of them all, and with the obedience that +is due to the civil sovereign. In whom would the +Bishop have the authority reside of prohibiting +seditious opinions, when they are taught (as they +are often) in divinity books and from the pulpit? +I could hardly guess, but that I remember that +there have been books written to entitle the +bishops to a <em>divine right</em>, underived from the civil +sovereign. But because he maketh it so heinous a +matter, that the supreme civil magistrate should +be Christ’s lieutenant upon earth, let us suppose +that a bishop, or a synod of bishops, should be set +up (which I hope never shall) for our civil sovereign; +then that which he objecteth here, I could +object in the same words against himself. For I +could say in his own words, <em>This is life eternal, to +know the only true God, and Jesus Christ</em> (John +xvii. 3.). <em>Pure religion, and undefiled before +God is this, to visit the fatherless</em>, &c. (James i. +27.) <em>Fear God and keep his commandments</em> +(Eccles. xii. 13.). But the Bishop hath found a +more compendious way to heaven, namely, that +true religion consisteth in obedience to Christ’s +lieutenants; that is (now by supposition), to the +bishops. That is to say, that every Christian of +what nation soever, coming into the country which +the bishops govern, should be of their religion. +He would make the civil magistrate to be Christ’s +<span class='pageno' id='Page_446'>446</span>lieutenant upon earth for matters of religion, and +supreme judge in all controversies, and say they +ought to be obeyed by all; how strange soever and +uncouth it seem to him now, the sovereignty being +in others. And I may say to him, what if the magistrate +himself (I mean by supposition the bishops) +should be wicked men; what if they should command +as much contrary to the law of God or nature, +as ever any Christian king did, (which is very possible); +must we obey them rather than God? Is +the civil magistrate become now the only ground +and pillar of truth? No:</p> + +<div class='lg-container-b c015'> + <div class='linegroup'> + <div class='group'> + <div class='line'><span lang="la">Synedri jussum est voce episcoporum,</span></div> + <div class='line'><span lang="la">Ipsum quod colit ut colamus omnes.</span></div> + <div class='line'><span lang="la">Æternum colo Principem, dierum</span></div> + <div class='line'><span lang="la">Factorem, Dominumque episcoporum.</span></div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c010'>And thus the Bishop may see, there is little difference +between his Ode and my Parode to it; and +that both of them are of equal force to conclude +nothing.</p> + +<p class='c001'>The Bishop knows that the kings of England, +since the time of Henry VIII, have been declared +by act of Parliament supreme governors of the +Church of England, in all causes both civil and +ecclesiastical, that is to say, in all matters both ecclesiastical +and civil, and consequently of this +Church supreme head on earth; though perhaps +he will not allow that name of <em>head</em>. I should +wonder therefore, whom the Bishop would have to +be Christ’s lieutenant here in England for matters +of religion, if not the supreme governor and head +of the Church of England, whether man or woman +whosoever he be, that hath the sovereign power, but +that I know he challenges it to the Bishops, and +<span class='pageno' id='Page_447'>447</span>thinks that King Henry VIII. took the ecclesiastical +power away from the Pope, to settle it not in himself, +but them. But he ought to have known, that what +jurisdiction, or power of ordaining ministers, the +Popes had here in the time of the king’s predecessors +till Henry VIII, they derived it all from the king’s +power, though they did not acknowledge it; and +the kings connived at it, either not knowing their +own right, or not daring to challenge it; till such +time as the behaviour of the Roman clergy had undeceived +the people, which otherwise would have +sided with them. Nor was it unlawful for the king +to take from them the authority he had given +them, as being Pope enough in his own kingdom +without depending on a foreign one: nor is it to be +called schism, unless it be schism also in the head +of a family to discharge, as often as he shall see +cause, the school-masters he entertaineth to teach +his children. If the Bishop and Dr. Hammond, +when they did write in the defence of the Church +of England against imputation of schism, quitting +their own pretences of jurisdiction and <span lang="la"><i>jus divinum</i></span>, +had gone upon these principles of mine, they had +not been so shrewdly handled as they have been, +by an English Papist that wrote against them.</p> + +<p class='c001'>And now I have done answering to his arguments, +I shall here, in the end of all, take that liberty of +censuring his whole book, which he hath taken in +the beginning, of censuring mine. ‘I have’, saith +he, (No. <a href='#I'><span class='fss'>I.</span></a>) ‘<a id='corr447.30'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='persused'>perused</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_447.30'><ins class='correction' title='persused'>perused</ins></a></span> T. H.’s answers, considered +his reasons, and conclude he hath missed and mislaid +the question; that his answers are evasions, +that his arguments are paralogisms, and that the +opinion of absolute and universal necessity is but a +<span class='pageno' id='Page_448'>448</span>result of some groundless and ill chosen principles.’ +And now it is my turn to censure. And first, for +the strength of his discourse and knowledge of the +point in question, I think it much inferior to that +which might have been written by any man living, +that had no other learning besides the ability to +write his mind; but as well perhaps as the same +man would have done it if to the ability of writing +his mind he had added the study of School-divinity. +Secondly, for the manners of it, (for to a +public writing there belongeth good manners), it +consisteth in railing and exclaiming and scurrilous +jesting, with now and then an unclean and mean +instance. And lastly, for his elocution, the virtue +whereof lieth not in the flux of words, but in perspicuity, +it is the same language with that of the +kingdom of darkness. One shall find in it, especially +where he should speak most closely to the +question, such words as these: divided sense, compounded +sense, hypothetical necessity, liberty of +exercise, liberty of specification, liberty of contradiction, +liberty of contrariety, knowledge of approbation, +practical knowledge, general influence, special +influence, instinct, qualities infused, efficacious +election, moral efficacy, moral motion, metaphorical +motion, <span lang="la"><i>practice practicum</i></span>, <span lang="la"><i>motus primo primi</i></span>, +<span lang="la"><i>actus eliciti</i></span>, <span lang="la"><i>actus imperati</i></span>, permissive will, consequent +will, negative obduration, deficient cause, +simple act, <span lang="la"><i>nunc stans</i></span>; and other like words of nonsense +divided: besides many propositions such as +these: the will is the mistress of human actions, +the understanding is her counsellor, the will +chooseth, the will willeth, the will suspends its own +act, the understanding understandeth, (I wonder +<span class='pageno' id='Page_449'>449</span>how he missed saying, the understanding suspendeth +its own act,) the will applies the understanding to +deliberate; the will requires of the understanding +a review; the will determines itself; a change may +be willed without changing of the will; man concurs +with God in causing his own will; the will +causeth willing; motives determine the will not +naturally, but morally; the same action may be +both future and not future; God is not just but justice, +not eternal but eternity; eternity is <span lang="la"><i>nunc stans</i></span>; +eternity is an infinite point which comprehendeth +all time, not formally, but eminently; all eternity +is co-existent with to-day, and the same co-existent +with to-morrow: and many other like speeches of +nonsense compounded, which the truth can never +stand in need of. Perhaps the Bishop will say, +these terms and phrases are intelligible enough; +for he hath said in his reply to No. <a href='#XXIV'><span class='fss'>XXIV</span></a>, that his +opinion is demonstrable in reason, though he be +not able to comprehend, how it consisteth together +with God’s eternal prescience; and though it exceed +his weak capacity, yet he ought to adhere to +that truth which is manifest. So that to him that +truth is manifest, and demonstrable by reason, +which is beyond his capacity; so that words beyond +capacity are with him intelligible enough.</p> + +<p class='c001'>But the reader is to be judge of that. I could +add many other passages that discover, both his +little logic, as taking the insignificant words above +recited, for terms of art; and his no philosophy in +distinguishing between moral and natural motion, +and by calling some motions metaphorical, and +by his blunders at the causes of sight and of the +descent of heavy bodies, and his talk of the inclination +<span class='pageno' id='Page_450'>450</span>of the load-stone, and divers other places in +his book.</p> + +<p class='c001'>But to make an end, I shall briefly draw up the +sum of what we have both said. That which I have +maintained is, that no man hath his future will in +his own present power. That it may be changed +by others, and by the change of things without +him; and when it is changed, it is not changed +nor determined to any thing by itself; and that +when it is undetermined, it is no will; because +every one that willeth, willeth something in particular. +That deliberation is common to men with +beasts, as being alternate appetite, and not ratiocination; +and the last act or appetite therein, and +which is immediately followed by the action, is the +only will that can be taken notice of by others, +and which only maketh an action in public judgment +voluntary. That to be free is no more than +to do if a man will, and if he will to forbear; and +consequently that this freedom is the freedom of +the man, and not of the will. That the will is not +free, but subject to change by the operation of +external causes. That all external causes depend +necessarily on the first eternal cause, God Almighty, +who worketh in us both to will and to do, by the +mediation of second causes. That seeing neither +man nor any thing else can work upon itself, +it is impossible that any man in the framing of +his own will should concur with God, either as +an actor or as an instrument. That there is nothing +brought to pass by fortune as by a cause, +nor any thing without a cause, or concurrence of +causes, sufficient to bring it so to pass; and that +every such cause, and their concurrence, do proceed +<span class='pageno' id='Page_451'>451</span>from the providence, good pleasure, and +working of God; and consequently, though I do +with others call many events <em>contingent</em>, and +say they <em>happen</em>, yet because they had every of +them their several sufficient causes, and those +causes again their former causes, I say they <em>happen</em> +necessarily. And though we perceive not +what they are, yet there are of the most contingent +events as necessary causes as of those events +whose causes we perceive; or else they could not +possibly be foreknown, as they are by him that +foreknoweth all things. On the contrary, the +Bishop maintaineth: that the will is free from necessitation; +and in order thereto that the judgment +of the understanding is not always <span lang="la"><i>practice +practicum</i></span>, nor of such a nature in itself as to +oblige and determine the will to one, though it be +true that spontaneity and determination to one +may consist together. That the will determineth +itself, and that external things, when they change +the will, do work upon it not naturally, but morally, +not by natural motion, but by moral and +metaphorical motion. That when the will is +determined naturally, it is not by God’s general +influence, whereon depend all second causes, but +by special influence, God concurring and pouring +something into the will. That the will when it +suspends not its act, makes the act necessary; but +because it may suspend and not assent, it is not +absolutely necessary. That sinful acts proceed not +from God’s will, but are willed by him by a <em>permissive</em> +will, not an <em>operative</em> will, and that he hardeneth +the heart of man by a negative obduration. +That man’s will is in his own power, but his <span lang="la"><i>motus +<span class='pageno' id='Page_452'>452</span>primo primi</i></span> not in his own power, nor necessary +save only by a hypothetical necessity. That the +will to change, is not always a change of will. That +not all things which are produced, are produced +from <em>sufficient</em>, but some things from <em>deficient</em> +causes. That if the power of the will be present +<span lang="la"><i>in actu primo</i></span>, then there is nothing wanting to +the production of the effect. That a cause may +be sufficient for the production of an effect, though +it want something necessary to the production +thereof; because the will may be wanting. That a +necessary cause doth not always necessarily produce +its effect, but only then when the effect is +necessarily produced. He proveth also, that the +will is free, by that universal notion which the +world hath of election: for when of the six Electors +the votes are divided equally, the King of Bohemia +hath a casting voice. That the prescience of +God supposeth no necessity of the future existence +of the things foreknown, because God is not eternal +but eternity, and eternity is a <em>standing now</em>, +without succession of time; and therefore God +foresees all things intuitively by the presentiality +they have in <span lang="la"><i>nunc stans</i></span>, which comprehendeth in +it all time past, present, and to come, not formally, +but eminently and virtually. That the will is free +even then when it acteth, but that is in a compounded, +not in a divided sense. That to be +made, and to be eternal, do consist together, because +God’s decrees are made, and are nevertheless +eternal. That the order, beauty, and perfection +of the world doth require that in the universe +there should be agents of all sorts, some necessary, +some free, some contingent. That though it +<span class='pageno' id='Page_453'>453</span>be true, that to-morrow it shall rain or not rain, +yet neither of them is true <em>determinate</em>. That the +doctrine of necessity is a blasphemous, desperate, +and destructive doctrine. That it were better to be +an Atheist, than to hold it; and he that maintaineth +it, is fitter to be refuted with rods than with arguments. +And now whether this his doctrine or +mine be the more intelligible, more rational, or +more conformable to God’s word, I leave it to the +judgment of the reader.</p> + +<p class='c001'>But whatsoever be the truth of the disputed question, +the reader may peradventure think I have +not used the Bishop with that respect I ought, +or without disadvantage of my cause I might +have done; for which I am to make a short apology. +A little before the last parliament of the +late king, when every man spake freely against +the then present government, I thought it worth +my study to consider the grounds and consequences +of such behaviour, and whether it were +conformable or contrary to reason and to the +Word of God. And after some time I did put in +order and publish my thoughts thereof, first in +Latin, and then again the same in English; where +I endeavoured to prove both by reason and Scripture, +that they who have once submitted themselves +to any sovereign governor, either by express +acknowledgment of his power, or by receiving protection +from his laws, are obliged to be true and +faithful to him, and to acknowledge no other supreme +power but him in any matter or question +whatsoever, either civil or ecclesiastical. In which +books of mine, I pursued my subject without taking +notice of any particular man that held any opinion +<span class='pageno' id='Page_454'>454</span>contrary to that which I then wrote; only in +general I maintained that the office of the clergy, +in respect of the supreme civil power, was not +magisterial, but ministerial; and that their teaching +of the people was founded upon no other +authority than that of the civil sovereign; and all +this without any word tending to the disgrace +either of episcopacy or of presbytery. Nevertheless +I find since, that divers of them, whereof <a id='corr454.9'></a><span class='htmlonly'><ins class='correction' title='the the'>the</ins></span><span class='epubonly'><a href='#c_454.9'><ins class='correction' title='the the'>the</ins></a></span> +Bishop of Derry is one, have taken offence +especially at two things; one, that I make the +supremacy in matters of religion to reside in the +civil sovereign; the other, that being no clergyman, +I deliver doctrines, and ground them upon words +of the Scripture, which doctrines they, being by +profession divines, have never taught. And in this +their displeasure, divers of them in their books and +sermons, without answering any of my arguments, +have not only exclaimed against my doctrine, but +reviled me, and endeavoured to make me hateful +for those things, for which (if they knew their own +and the public good) they ought to have given me +thanks. There is also one of them, that taking +offence at me for blaming in part the discipline +instituted heretofore, and regulated by the authority +of the Pope, in the universities, not only ranks +me amongst those men that would have the revenue +of the universities diminished, and says plainly I +have no religion, but also thinks me so simple and +ignorant of the world as to believe that our universities +maintain Popery. And this is the author of +the book called <span lang="la"><cite>Vindiciæ Academiarum</cite></span>. If either +of the universities had thought itself injured, I believe +it could have authorised or appointed some +<span class='pageno' id='Page_455'>455</span>member of theirs, whereof there be many abler +men than he, to have made their vindication. But +this Vindex, (as little dogs to please their masters +use to bark, in token of their sedulity, indifferently +at strangers, till they be rated off), unprovoked +by me hath fallen upon me without bidding. +I have been publicly injured by many of whom I +took no notice, supposing that that humour would +spend itself; but seeing it last, and grow higher +in this writing I now answer, I thought it necessary +at last to make of some of them, and first of +this Bishop, an example.</p> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> + <div class='nf-center'> + <div>END OF VOL. V.</div> + </div> +</div> + +<div class='pbb'> + <hr class='pb c000'> +</div> +<p class='c001'><a id='endnote'></a></p> +<div class='tnotes'> + +<div class='nf-center-c0'> + <div class='nf-center'> + <div><span class='large'>Transcriber’s Note</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c001'>There were two kinds of sidenote in this volumn. +At the top of each page, the section number, along with +either “Animadversions upon the Bishop’s reply” or +“The Bishop’s Reply”, is repeated. The former have been removed +as they are redundant with the section title. The “Bishop’s Reply” +notes are positioned before each paragraph beginning “J. D” +to mark where the “Bishop’s” voice resumes.</p> + +<p class='c001'>Internal references to specific articles in this text are linked +for ease of navigation.</p> + +<div class='htmlonly'> + +<p class='c001'>There was no Table of Contents, but each section may be addressed +using the Roman numeral in the its title.</p> + +</div> + +<p class='c001'><a id='c_81.4'></a>The sidenote on <a href='#corr81.4'>p. 81</a> mistakenly referred to “Animadversions...” +rather than the expected “The Bishop’s reply.”</p> + +<p class='c001'>Other errors deemed most likely to be the printer’s have been corrected, and +are noted here. The references are to the page and line in the original.</p> + +<table class='table0'> +<colgroup> +<col class='colwidth12'> +<col class='colwidth69'> +<col class='colwidth18'> +</colgroup> + <tr> + <td class='c018'><a id='c_5.11'></a><a href='#corr5.11'>5.11</a></td> + <td class='c018'>to do what he will,[”]</td> + <td class='c019'>Added.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class='c018'><a id='c_10.13'></a><a href='#corr10.13'>10.13</a></td> + <td class='c018'>O Israel, thy de[s]truction</td> + <td class='c019'>Restored.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class='c018'><a id='c_25.8'></a><a href='#corr25.8'>25.8</a></td> + <td class='c018'>So God bless us.[”]</td> + <td class='c019'>Added.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class='c018'><a id='c_33.8'></a><a href='#corr33.8'>33.8</a></td> + <td class='c018'>of the second causes.[”]</td> + <td class='c019'>Added.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class='c018'><a id='c_38.17'></a><a href='#corr38.17'>38.17</a></td> + <td class='c018'>[t]hat one may take away an ell</td> + <td class='c019'>Restored.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class='c018'><a id='c_62.25'></a><a href='#corr62.25'>62.25</a></td> + <td class='c018'>between [l/d]uade distinctions cloven feet.</td> + <td class='c019'>Restored (probable).</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class='c018'><a id='c_85.26'></a><a href='#corr85.26'>85.26</a></td> + <td class='c018'>[“/‘]that wise men may do</td> + <td class='c019'>Replaced.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class='c018'><a id='c_85.27'></a><a href='#corr85.27'>85.27</a></td> + <td class='c018'>actions,[”/’]</td> + <td class='c019'>Replaced.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class='c018'><a id='c_85.33'></a><a href='#corr85.33'>85.33</a></td> + <td class='c018'>[“/‘]that fools, children,</td> + <td class='c019'>Replaced.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class='c018'><a id='c_85.34'></a><a href='#corr85.34'>85.34</a></td> + <td class='c018'>and elect,[”/’]</td> + <td class='c019'>Replaced.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class='c018'><a id='c_126.34'></a><a href='#corr126.34'>126.34</a></td> + <td class='c018'>but his own justice better[.]</td> + <td class='c019'>Restored.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class='c018'><a id='c_137.3'></a><a href='#corr137.3'>137.3</a></td> + <td class='c018'>would have him to will.[’]</td> + <td class='c019'>Added.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class='c018'><a id='c_142.1'></a><a href='#corr142.1'>142.1</a></td> + <td class='c018'>[“]Wherefore T. H. is mightily mistaken</td> + <td class='c019'>Added.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class='c018'><a id='c_145.1'></a><a href='#corr145.1'>145.1</a></td> + <td class='c018'>Another is Genesis xix. 22[)]:</td> + <td class='c019'>Removed.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class='c018'><a id='c_151.14'></a><a href='#corr151.14'>151.14</a></td> + <td class='c018'>that all consult[a]tions are vain.</td> + <td class='c019'>Restored.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class='c018'><a id='c_155.33'></a><a href='#corr155.33'>155.33</a></td> + <td class='c018'>for the public good[,/.]</td> + <td class='c019'>Replaced.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class='c018'><a id='c_185.7'></a><a href='#corr185.7'>185.7</a></td> + <td class='c018'>when it is necess[s]ary</td> + <td class='c019'>Removed.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class='c018'><a id='c_229.23'></a><a href='#corr229.23'>229.23</a></td> + <td class='c018'><i>Quid hoc?</i>[”]</td> + <td class='c019'>Added.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class='c018'><a id='c_310.17'></a><a href='#corr310.17'>310.17</a></td> + <td class='c018'>choose a good one.[”]</td> + <td class='c019'>Added.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class='c018'><a id='c_316.30'></a><a href='#corr316.30'>316.30</a></td> + <td class='c018'>and so the[ the] action be become</td> + <td class='c019'>Removed.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class='c018'><a id='c_324.11'></a><a href='#corr324.11'>324.11</a></td> + <td class='c018'>and if he[ ]means so</td> + <td class='c019'>Inserted.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class='c018'><a id='c_336.5'></a><a href='#corr336.5'>336.5</a></td> + <td class='c018'>[“]But because his eyesight was weak</td> + <td class='c019'>Added.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class='c018'><a id='c_405.28'></a><a href='#corr405.28'>405.28</a></td> + <td class='c018'>was I to grow old!’[”]</td> + <td class='c019'>Added.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class='c018'><a id='c_425.6'></a><a href='#corr425.6'>425.6</a></td> + <td class='c018'>forbear to act[”/’];</td> + <td class='c019'>Replaced.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class='c018'><a id='c_434.15'></a><a href='#corr434.15'>434.15</a></td> + <td class='c018'>not too much possessed with prejudice.[”]</td> + <td class='c019'>Added.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class='c018'><a id='c_437.24'></a><a href='#corr437.24'>437.24</a></td> + <td class='c018'>such poor things as eyes, ears, brains[’]</td> + <td class='c019'>Added.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class='c018'><a id='c_439.33'></a><a href='#corr439.33'>439.33</a></td> + <td class='c018'>the religion of every Ch[r]istian country</td> + <td class='c019'>Inserted.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class='c018'><a id='c_447.30'></a><a href='#corr447.30'>447.30</a></td> + <td class='c018'>per[s]used T. H.’s answers</td> + <td class='c019'>Removed.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class='c018'><a id='c_454.9'></a><a href='#corr454.9'>454.9</a></td> + <td class='c018'>whereof the[ the Bishop of Derry is one</td> + <td class='c019'>Removed.</td> + </tr> +</table> + +</div> + +<div style='text-align:center'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 76650 ***</div> + </body> + <!-- created with ppgen.py 3.57e on 2025-08-07 17:44:03 GMT --> +</html> diff --git a/76650-h/images/cover.jpg b/76650-h/images/cover.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..643c5b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/76650-h/images/cover.jpg |
