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diff --git a/76650-0.txt b/76650-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4513085 --- /dev/null +++ b/76650-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11876 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 76650 *** + +------------------------------------------------------------------------ + + Transcriber’s Note: + +This version of the text cannot represent certain typographical effects. +The many instances of italic text are delimited with the ‘_’ character +as _italic_. Title page use of blackletter text uses the ‘=’ as a +delimiter. + +Marginal sidenotes, which served as section and topic aids, were often +repeated on each page. The repetitive notes have been removed. + +Minor errors, attributable to the printer, have been corrected. Please +see the transcriber’s note at the end of this text for details regarding +the handling of any textual issues encountered during its preparation. + + THE + ENGLISH WORKS + OF + THOMAS HOBBES. + +------------------------------------------------------------------------ + + + THE + + ENGLISH WORKS + + OF + + THOMAS HOBBES + + OF MALMESBURY; + + NOW FIRST COLLECTED AND EDITED + + BY + + SIR WILLIAM MOLESWORTH, BART. + + --- + + VOL. V. + + --- + + + + + LONDON: + JOHN BOHN, + HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN. + + --- + + MDCCCXLI. + + + LONDON: + C. RICHARDS, PRINTER, ST. MARTIN’S LANE. + + THE + + QUESTIONS CONCERNING + + LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE, + + CLEARLY STATED AND DEBATED + + BETWEEN + + DR. BRAMHALL, + BISHOP OF DERRY, + + AND + + THOMAS HOBBES + OF MALMESBURY. + + + + + TO THE READER. + + + ------- + + +You shall find in this little volume the questions concerning +_necessity_, _freedom_, and _chance_, which in all ages have perplexed +the minds of curious men, largely and clearly discussed, and the +arguments on all sides, drawn from the authority of Scripture, from the +doctrine of the Schools, from natural reason, and from the consequences +pertaining to common life, truly alleged and severally weighed between +two persons, who both maintain that men are free to _do_ as they _will_ +and to _forbear_ as they _will_. The things they dissent in are, that +the one holdeth, that it is not in a man’s power now to choose the will +he shall have anon; that chance produceth nothing; that all events and +actions have their necessary causes; that the will of God makes the +necessity of all things. The other on the contrary maintaineth, that not +only the _man_ is free to choose what he will _do_, but the _will_ also +to choose what it shall _will_; that when a man willeth a good action, +God’s will concurreth with his, else not; that the will may choose +whether it will _will_, or not; that many things come to pass without +necessity, by chance; that though God foreknow a thing shall be, yet it +is not necessary that that thing shall be, inasmuch as God seeth not the +future as in its causes, but as present. In sum, they adhere both of +them to the Scripture; but one of them is a learned School-divine, the +other a man that doth not much admire that kind of learning. + +This is enough to acquaint you withal in the beginning; which also shall +be more particularly explained by and by in the stating of the question, +and dividing of the arguments into their several heads. The rest you +shall understand from the persons themselves, when they enter. Fare ye +well. + + T. H. + + + + + ------- + + + + + THE QUESTIONS + + CONCERNING + + LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE. + + +Whether whatsoever comes to pass proceed from _necessity_, or some +things from _chance_, has been a question disputed amongst the old +philosophers long time before the incarnation of our Saviour, without +drawing into argument on either side the almighty power of the Deity. +But the third way of bringing things to pass, distinct from _necessity_ +and _chance_, namely, _freewill_, is a thing that never was mentioned +amongst them, nor by the Christians in the beginning of Christianity. +For St. Paul, that disputes that question largely and purposely, never +useth the term of _freewill_; nor did he hold any doctrine equivalent to +that which is now called the doctrine of freewill; but deriveth all +actions from the irresistible will of God, and nothing from the will of +him that _runneth or willeth_. But for some ages past, the doctors of +the Roman Church have exempted from this dominion of God’s will the will +of man; and brought in a doctrine, that not only man, but also his will +is free, and determined to this or that action, not by the will of God, +nor necessary causes, but by the power of the will itself. And though by +the reformed Churches instructed by Luther, Calvin, and others, this +opinion was cast out, yet not many years since it began again to be +reduced by Arminius and his followers, and became the readiest way to +ecclesiastical promotion; and by discontenting those that held the +contrary, was in some part the cause of the following troubles; which +troubles were the occasion of my meeting with the Bishop of Derry at +Paris, where we discoursed together of the argument now in hand; from +which discourse we carried away each of us his own opinion, and for +aught I remember, without any offensive words, as blasphemous, +atheistical, or the like, passing between us; either for that the Bishop +was not then in passion, or suppressed his passion, being then in the +presence of my Lord of Newcastle. + +But afterwards the Bishop sent to his Lordship his opinion concerning +the question in writing, and desired him to persuade me to send an +answer thereunto likewise in writing. There were some reasons for which +I thought it might be inconvenient to let my answer go abroad; yet the +many obligations wherein I was obliged to him, prevailed with me to +write this answer, which was afterwards not only without my knowledge, +but also against my will, published by one that found means to get a +copy of it surreptitiously. And thus you have the occasion of this +controversy. + + + ------- + + + THE STATE OF THE QUESTION. + +The question in general is stated by the Bishop himself, (towards the +end of No. III.), in these words: “Whether all events, natural, civil, +moral, (for we speak not now of the conversion of a sinner, that +concerns not this question), be predetermined extrinsically and +inevitably, without their own concurrence; so as all the actions and +events which either are or shall be, cannot but be, nor can be otherwise +after any other manner or in any other place, time, number, measure, +order, nor to any other end than they are. And all this in respect of +the supreme cause, or a concourse of extrinsical causes, determining +them to one.” + +Which though drawn up to his advantage, with as much caution as he would +do a lease, yet (excepting that which is not intelligible) I am content +to admit. Not intelligible is, first, “that the conversion of a sinner +concerns not the question.” If he mean, that the conversion of a sinner +is from necessity, and predetermined, then he is, for so much as the +question concerns religion, of the same mind that I am; and what he can +mean else by that exception, I cannot guess. Secondly, these words, +“without their own concurrence,” are insignificant, unless he mean that +the events themselves should concur to their production: as that fire +doth not necessarily burn without the concurrence of burning, as the +words properly import: or at least without concurrence of the fuel. +Those two clauses left out, I agree with him in the state of the +question as it is put universally. But when the question is put of the +necessity of any particular event, as of the will to write, or the like, +then it is the stating of that particular question: but it is decided in +the decision of the question universal. + +He states the same question again in another place thus: “This is the +very question where the water sticks between us, whether there be such a +liberty free from necessitation and extrinsical determination to one, or +not.” And I allow it also for well stated so. + +Again he says, “In a word, so great difference there is between natural +and moral efficacy, as there is between his opinion and mine in this +question.” So that the state of the question is reduced to this, +“Whether there be a moral efficacy which is not natural?” I say there is +not: he says there is. + +Again he writes thus: “And therefore as it were ridiculous to say, that +the object of sight is the cause of seeing; so it is to say, that the +proposing of the object by the understanding to the will, is the cause +of willing.” Here also the question is brought to this issue, “Whether +the object of sight be the cause that it is seen?” But for these words, +“proposing of the object by the understanding to the will,” I understand +them not. + +Again, he often useth such words as these: “The will willeth; the will +suspendeth its act, (_Rid est_, the will willeth not); the understanding +proposeth; the understanding understandeth.” Herein also lyeth the whole +question. If they be true, I, if false, he is in error. + +Again, the whole question is decided, when this is decided, “Whether he +that willingly permitteth a thing to be done, when without labour, +danger, or diversion of mind, he might have hindered it, do not will the +doing of it?” + +Again the whole question of free-will is included in this, “Whether the +will determine itself?” + +Again, it is included in this, “Whether there be an universal grace, +which particular men can take without a particular grace to take it?” + +Lastly, there be two questions; one, “Whether a man be free in such +things as are within his power, to do what he will;” another, “Whether +he be free to will.” Which is as much as to say (because will is +appetite), it is one question, whether he be free to eat that has an +appetite, and another, whether he be free to have an appetite? In the +former, “whether a man be free to do what he will,” I agree with the +Bishop. In the latter, “whether he be free to will,” I dissent from him. +And, therefore, all the places of Scripture that he allegeth to prove +that a man hath liberty to do what he will, are impertinent to the +question. If he has not been able to distinguish between these two +questions, he has not done well to meddle with either: if he has +understood them, to bring arguments to prove that a man is free to do if +he will, is to deal uningenuously and fraudulently with his readers. And +thus much for the state of the question. + + + ------- + + + THE FOUNTAINS OF ARGUMENT IN THIS QUESTION. + +The arguments by which this question is disputed, are drawn from four +fountains. 1. From _authorities_. 2. From _the inconveniences consequent +to either opinion_. 3. From _the attributes of God_. 4. From _natural +reason_. + +The _authorities_ are of two sorts, _divine_ and _human_. _Divine_ are +those which are taken from the holy Scriptures. _Human_ also are of two +sorts; one, the authorities of those men that are generally esteemed to +have been learned, especially in this question, as the Fathers, +Schoolmen, and old Philosophers: the other, are the vulgar and most +commonly received opinions in the world. + +His reasons and places of Scripture I will answer the best I am able; +but his human authorities I shall admit and receive as far as to +Scripture and reason they be consonant, and no further. + +And for the arguments derived from the attributes of God, so far forth +as those attributes are argumentative, that is, so far forth as their +significations be conceivable, I admit them for arguments; but where +they are given for honour only, and signify nothing but an intention and +endeavour to praise and magnify as much as we can Almighty God, there I +hold them not for arguments, but for oblations; not for the language, +but (as the Scripture calls them) for the calves of our lips; which +signify not true nor false, nor any opinion of our brain, but the +reverence and devotion of our hearts; and therefore they are no +sufficient premises to infer truth or convince falsehood. + +The places of Scripture that make for me are these. First, (Gen. xlv. +5): Joseph saith to his brethren that had sold him, _Be not grieved nor +angry with yourselves, that ye sold me hither: for God did send me +before you to preserve life._ And again (verse 8), _So now it was not +you that sent me hither, but God._ + +And concerning Pharaoh, God saith, (Exod. vii. 3): _I will harden +Pharaoh’s heart._ And concerning Sihon King of Heshbon, Moses saith, +(Deut. ii. 30): _The Lord thy God hardened his spirit, and made his +heart obstinate._ + +And of Shimei that did curse David, David himself saith, (2 Sam. xvi. +10): _Let him curse, because the Lord hath said unto him, curse David._ +And (1 Kings, xii. 15): _The King hearkened not to the people, for the +curse was from the Lord._ + +And Job, disputing this very question, saith, (Job xii. 14): _God +shutteth man, and there can be no opening_: and verse 16: _The deceived +and the deceiver are his_: and verse 17: _He maketh the Judges fools_: +and verse 24: _He taketh away the heart of the chief of the people of +the earth, and causeth them to wander in a wilderness where there is no +way_: and verse 25: _He maketh them to stagger like a drunken man._ + +And of the King of Assyria, God saith, _I will give him a charge to take +the spoil, and to take the prey, and to tread them down like the mire of +the streets._ (Isaiah x. 6.) + +And Jeremiah saith, (Jer. x. 23): _O Lord, I know that the way of man is +not in himself, it is not in man that walketh to direct his steps._ + +And to Ezekiel, whom God sent as a watchman to the house of Israel, God +saith thus: _When a righteous man doth turn from his righteousness, and +commit iniquity, and I lay a stumbling block before him, he shall die; +because thou hast not given him warning, he shall die in his sin._ +(Ezek. iii. 20.) Note here, God lays the stumbling block, yet he that +falleth dieth in his sin: which shows that God’s justice in killing +dependeth not on the sin only. + +And our Saviour saith, (John vi. 44): _No man can come to me, except the +Father which hath sent me draw him._ + +And St. Peter, concerning the delivering of Christ to the Jews, saith +thus, (Acts ii. 23): _Him being delivered by the determinate counsel and +foreknowledge of God, ye have taken_, &c. + +And again, those Christians to whom Peter and John resorted after they +were freed from their troubles about the miracle of curing the lame man, +praising God for the same, say thus: _Of a truth against the holy child +Jesus whom thou hast anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the +Gentiles and the people of Israel, were gathered together for to do +whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done._ (Acts +iv. 27, 28.) + +And St. Paul, Rom. ix. 16: _It is not of him that willeth, nor of him +that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy_: and verse 18, 19, 20: +_Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he +hardeneth. Thou wilt say unto me, why doth he yet find fault; for who +hath resisted his will? Nay but, O man, who art thou that disputest +against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, why hast +thou made me thus?_ + +And again, (1 Cor. iv 7): _Who maketh thee differ from another? and what +hast thou that thou hast not received?_ and 1 Cor. xii. 6: _There are +diversities of operations, but it is the same God that worketh all in +all_: and Eph. ii. 10: _We are his workmanship created in Jesus Christ +unto good works, which God hath before ordained that we should walk in +them_: and Philip. ii. 13: _It is God that worketh in you both to will +and to do, of his good pleasure._ + +To these places may be added all the places that make God the giver of +all graces, that is to say, of all good habits and inclinations; and all +the places wherein men are said to be dead in sin. For by all these it +is manifest, that although a man may live holily if he _will_, yet _to +will_ is the work of God, and not eligible by man. + +A second sort of places there be, that make equally for the Bishop and +me; and they be such as say that a man hath election, and may do many +things _if he will_, and also _if he will_ he may leave them undone; but +not that God Almighty naturally or supernaturally worketh in us every +act of the will, as in my opinion; nor that he worketh it not, as in the +Bishop’s opinion; though he use those places as arguments on his side. + +The places are such as these, (Deut. xxx. 19): _I call heaven and earth +to record this day against you, that I have set before you life and +death, blessing and cursing. Therefore choose life, that both thou and +thy seed may live_: and (Ecclesiasticus xv. 14): _God in the beginning +made man, and left him in the hand of his counsel_: and verse 16, 17: +_He hath set fire and water before thee, stretch forth thy hand to +whither thou wilt. Before man is life and death, and whether him liketh +shall be given him._ + +And those places which the Bishop citeth: _If a wife make a vow, it is +left to her husband’s choice, either to establish it, or to make it +void_, (Numb. xxx. 13): and (Josh. xxiv. 15): _Chuse ye this day whom +you will serve_, &c. _But I and my house will serve the Lord_: and (2 +Sam. xxiv. 12): _I offer thee three things, choose which of them I shall +do_: and (Isaiah vii. 16): _before the child shall know to refuse the +evil and choose the good_. And besides these very many other places to +the same effect. + +The third sort of texts are those which seem to make against me. As +Isaiah v. 4: _What could have been done more to my vineyard, that I have +not done in it?_ + +And Jeremiah xix. 5: _They have also built the high places of Baal, to +burn their sons with fire for burnt offerings unto Baal; which I +commanded not, nor spake it, neither came it into my mind._ + +And Hosea xiii. 9: _O Israel, thy destruction is from thyself, but in me +is thy help._ + +And 1 Tim. ii. 4: _Who will have all men to be saved, and to come to the +knowledge of truth._ + +And Eccl. xv. 11, 12: _Say not thou, it is through the Lord I fell away; +for thou oughtest not to do the things that he hateth. Say not thou, he +hath caused me to err; for he hath no need of thee, sinful man._ And +many other places to the like purpose. + +You see how great the apparent contradiction is between the first and +the third sort of texts, which being both Scripture, may and must be +reconciled and made to stand together; which unless the rigour of the +letter be on one or both sides with intelligible and reasonable +interpretations mollified, is impossible. + +The Schoolmen, to keep the literal sense of the third sort of texts, +interpret the first sort thus; the words of Joseph, _It was not you that +sent me hither, but God_; they interpret in this manner: _It was you +that sold me into Egypt, God did but permit it; it was God that sent me +and not you_; as if the _selling_ were not the _sending_. This is +Suarez; of whom and the Bishop I would know, whether the _selling_ of +Joseph did infallibly and inevitably follow that permission. If it did, +then that _selling_ was necessitated beforehand by an eternal +permission. If it did not, how can there be attributed to God a +foreknowledge of it, when by the _liberty of human will_ it might have +been frustrated? I would know also whether the _selling_ of Joseph into +Egypt were a sin? If it were, why doth Joseph say, _Be not grieved nor +angry with yourselves that ye sold me hither_? Ought not a man to be +grieved and angry with himself for sinning? If it were no sin, then +treachery and fratricide is no sin. + +Again, seeing the _selling_ of him consisted in these acts, _binding_, +_speaking_, _delivering_, which are all corporeal motions, did God +_will_ they should not be, how then could they be done? Or doth he +permit barely, and neither _will_ nor _nill_ corporeal and local +motions? How then is God the first mover and cause of all local motion? +Did he cause the motion, and _will_ the law against it, but not the +irregularity? How can that be, seeing the motion and law being existent, +the contrariety of the motion and law is necessarily coexistent? + +So these places, _He hardened Pharaoh’s heart_, _he made Sihon’s heart +obstinate_, they interpret thus: “He permitted them to make their own +hearts obstinate.” But seeing that man’s heart without the grace of God, +is uninclinable to good, the _necessity_ of the hardness of heart, both +in Pharaoh and in Sihon, is as easily derived from God’s _permission_, +that is, from his withholding his grace, as from his _positive decree_. +And whereas they say, He _wills_ godly and free actions conditionally +and consequently, that is, if the man _will_ them, then God _wills_ +them, else not; and _wills_ not evil actions, but _permits_ them; they +ascribe to God nothing at all in the causation of any action either good +or bad. + +Now to the third sort of places, that seem to contradict the former, let +us see if they may not be reconciled with a more intelligible and +reasonable interpretation, than that wherewith the Schoolmen interpret +the first. + +It is no extraordinary kind of language, to call the commandments and +exhortations and other significations of the _will_, by the name of +_will_; though the _will_ be an internal act of the soul, and commands +are but words and signs external of that internal act. So that the +_will_ and the _word_ are diverse things; and differ as the _thing +signified_, and the _sign_. And hence it comes to pass, that the Word +and Commandment of God, namely, the holy Scripture, is usually called by +Christians God’s will, but his revealed will; acknowledging the very +will of God, which they call his counsel and decree, to be another +thing. For the revealed will of God to Abraham was, that Isaac should be +sacrificed; but it was his will he should not. And his revealed will to +Jonas, that Nineveh should be destroyed within forty days; but not his +decree and purpose. His decree and purpose cannot be known beforehand, +but may afterwards by the event; for from the event we may infer his +will. But his revealed will, which is his word, must be foreknown, +because it ought to be the rule of our actions. + +Therefore, where it is said that _God will have all men to be saved_, it +is not meant of his will internal, but of his commandments or will +revealed; as if it had been said, “God hath given commandments, by +following of which all men may be saved.” So where God says, _O Israel, +how often would I have gathered thee_, &c., _as a hen doth her chickens, +but thou wouldest not_, it is thus to be understood: “How oft have I by +my prophets given thee such counsel, as, being followed, thou hadst been +gathered,” &c. And the like interpretations are to be given to the like +places. For it is not Christian to think, if God had the purpose to save +all men, that any man could be damned; because it were a sign of want of +power to effect what he would. So these words, _What could have been +done more to my vineyard, that I have not done_: if by them be meant the +Almighty power, might receive this answer: “Men might have been kept by +it from sinning.” But when we are to measure God by his revealed will, +it is as if he had said, “What directions, what laws, what threatenings +could have been used more, that I have not used?” God doth not will and +command us to inquire what his will and purpose is, and accordingly to +do it; for we shall do that, whether we will or not; but to look into +his commandments, that is, as to the Jews, the law of Moses; and as to +other people, the laws of their country. + +_O Israel, thy destruction is from thyself, but in me is thy help_: or +as some English translations have it, _O Israel, thou hast destroyed +thyself_, &c., is literally true, but maketh nothing against me; for the +man that sins willingly, whatsoever be the cause of his will, if he be +not forgiven, hath destroyed himself, as being his own act. + +Where it is said, _They have offered their sons unto Baal, which I +commanded not, nor spake it, nor came it into my mind_; these words, +_nor came it into my mind_, are by some much insisted on, as if they had +done it without the will of God. For whatsoever is done comes into God’s +mind, that is, into his knowledge, which implies a certainty of the +future action, and that certainty an antecedent purpose of God to bring +it to pass. It cannot therefore be meant God did not will it, but that +he had not the will to command it. But by the way it is to be noted, +that when God speaks to men concerning his will and other attributes, he +speaks of them as if they were like to those of men, to the end he may +be understood. And therefore to the order of his work, the world, +wherein one thing follows another so aptly as no man could order it by +design, he gives the name of will and purpose. For that which we call +design, which is reasoning, and thought after thought, cannot be +properly attributed to God; in whose thoughts there is no _fore_ nor +_after_. + +But what shall we answer to the words in Ecclesiasticus: _Say not thou, +it is through the Lord I fell away; say not thou, he hath caused me to +err_. If it had not been, _say not thou_, but “think not thou,” I should +have answered that Ecclesiasticus is Apocrypha, and merely human +authority. But it is very true that such words as these are not to be +said; first, because St. Paul forbids it: _Shall the thing formed_, +saith he, _say to him that formed it, why hast thou made me so?_ Yet +true it is, that he did so make him. Secondly, because we ought to +attribute nothing to God but what we conceive to be honourable, and we +judge nothing honourable but what we count so amongst ourselves; and +because accusation of man is not honourable, therefore such words are +not to be used concerning God Almighty. And for the same cause it is not +lawful to say that any action can be done, which God hath purposed shall +not be done; for it is a token of want of the power to hinder it. +Therefore neither of them is to be said, though one of them must needs +be true. Thus you see how disputing of God’s nature which is +incomprehensible, driveth men upon one of these two rocks. And this was +the cause I was unwilling to have my answer to the Bishop’s doctrine of +liberty published. + +And thus much for comparison of our two opinions with the Scriptures; +which whether it favour more his or mine, I leave to be judged by the +reader. And now I come to compare them again by _the inconveniences +which may be thought to follow them_. + +First, the bishop says, that this very persuasion, that all things come +to pass by _necessity_, is able to overthrow all societies and +commonwealths in the world. The laws, saith he, are unjust which +prohibit that which a man cannot possibly shun. + +Secondly, that it maketh superfluous and foolish all consultations, +arts, arms, books, instruments, teachers, and medicines, and which is +worst, piety and all other acts of devotion. For if the event be +necessary, it will come to pass whatsoever we do, and whether we sleep +or wake. + +This inference, if there were not as well a necessity of the means as +there is of the event, might be allowed for true. But according to my +opinion, both the event and means are equally necessitated. But +supposing the inference true, it makes as much against him that denies +as against him that holds this necessity. For I believe the Bishop holds +for as certain a truth, _what shall be, shall be_, as _what is, is_, or +_what has been, has been_. And then the ratiocination of the sick man, +“If I shall recover, what need I this unsavoury potion? if I shall not +recover, what good will it do me?” is a good ratiocination. But the +Bishop holds, that it is necessary he shall recover or not recover. +Therefore it follows from an opinion of the Bishop’s, as well as from +mine, that medicine is superfluous. But as medicine is to health, so is +piety, consultation, arts, arms, books, instruments, and teachers, every +one to its several end. Out of the Bishop’s opinion it follows as well +as from mine, that medicine is superfluous to health. Therefore from his +opinion as well as from mine, it followeth, (if such ratiocination were +not unsound), that piety, consultation, &c. are also superfluous to +their respective ends. And for the superfluity of laws, whatsoever be +the truth of the question between us, they are not superfluous, because +by the punishing of one, or of a few unjust men, they are the cause of +justice in a great many. + +But the greatest inconvenience of all that the Bishop pretends may be +drawn from this opinion, is, “that God in justice cannot punish a man +with eternal torments for doing that which it was never in his power to +leave undone.” It is true, that seeing the name of punishment hath +relation to the name of crime, there can be no punishment but for crimes +that might have been left undone; but instead of _punishment_ if he had +said _affliction_, may not I say that God may afflict, and not for sin? +Doth he not afflict those creatures that cannot sin? And sometimes those +that can sin, and yet not for sin, as Job, and the man in the gospel +that was born blind, for the manifestation of his power which he hath +over his creature, no less but more than hath the potter over his clay +to make of it what he please? But though God have power to afflict a man +and not for sin without injustice, shall we think God so cruel as to +afflict a man, and not for sin, with extreme and endless torment? Is it +not cruelty? No more than to do the same for sin, when he that so +afflicteth might without trouble have kept him from sinning. But what +infallible evidence hath the Bishop, that a man shall be after this life +eternally in torments and never die? Or how is it certain there is no +second death, when the Scripture saith there is? Or where doth the +Scripture say that a second death is an endless life? Or do the Doctors +only say it? Then perhaps they do but say so, and for reasons best known +to themselves. There is no injustice nor cruelty in him that giveth +life, to give with it sickness, pain, torments, and death; nor in him +that giveth life twice, to give the same miseries twice also. And thus +much in answer to the inconveniences that are pretended to follow the +doctrine of necessity. + +On the other side from this position, that a man is free to will, it +followeth that the prescience of God is quite taken away. For how can it +be known beforehand what man shall have a will to, if that will of his +proceed not from necessary causes, but that he have in his power to will +or not will? So also those things which are called future contingents, +if they come not to pass with certainty, that is to say, from necessary +causes, can never be foreknown; so that God’s foreknowing shall +sometimes be of things that shall not come to pass, which is as much to +say, that his foreknowledge is none; which is a great dishonour to the +all-knowing power. + +Though this be all the inconvenient doctrine that followeth _free-will_, +forasmuch as I can now remember; yet the defending of this opinion hath +drawn the Bishop and other patrons of it into many inconvenient and +absurd conclusions, and made them make use of an infinite number of +insignificant words; whereof one conclusion is in Suarez, that God doth +so concur with the will of man, that _if man will, then God concurs_; +which is to subject not the will of man to God, but the will of God to +man. Other inconvenient conclusions I shall then mark out, when I come +to my observations upon the Bishop’s reply. And thus far concerning the +inconveniences that follow both opinions. + +The attribute of God which he draweth into argument is his _justice_, as +that God cannot be just in punishing any man for that which he was +necessitated to do. To which I have answered before, as being one of the +inconveniences pretended to follow upon the doctrine of necessity. On +the contrary, from another of God’s attributes, which is his +_foreknowledge_, I shall evidently derive, that all actions whatsoever, +whether they proceed from the will or from fortune, were necessary from +eternity. For whatsoever God foreknoweth shall come to pass, cannot but +come to pass, that is, it is impossible it should not come to pass, or +otherwise come to pass than it was foreknown. But whatsoever was +impossible should be otherwise, was necessary; for the definition of +_necessary_ is, that which cannot possibly be otherwise. And whereas +they that distinguish between God’s _prescience_ and his _decree_, say +the foreknowledge maketh not the necessity without the decree; it is +little to the purpose. It sufficeth me, that whatsoever was foreknown by +God, was necessary: but all things were foreknown by God, and therefore +all things were necessary. And as for the distinction of foreknowledge +from decree in God Almighty, I comprehend it not. They are acts +co-eternal, and therefore one. + +And as for the arguments drawn from natural reason they are set down at +large in the end of my discourse to which the Bishop maketh his reply; +which how well he hath answered, shall appear in due time. For the +present, the actions which he thinketh proceed from liberty of will, +must either be necessitated, or proceed from fortune, without any other +cause; for certainly to _will_ is impossible without thinking on what he +willeth. But it is in no man’s election what he shall at any named time +hereafter think on. And this I take to be enough to clear the +understanding of the reader, that he may be the better able to judge of +the following disputation. I find in those that write of this argument, +especially in the Schoolmen and their followers, so many words strangers +to our language, and such confusion and inanity in the ranging of them, +as that a man’s mind in the reading of them distinguisheth nothing. And +as things were in the beginning before the Spirit of God was moved upon +the abyss, _tohu_ and _bohu_, that is to say, confusion and emptiness; +so are their discourses. + + + + + ------- + + + “TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE + MARQUIS OF NEWCASTLE, + ETC. + + “SIR,-- + +“If I pretended to compose a complete treatise upon this subject, I +should not refuse those large recruits of reasons and authorities which +offer themselves to serve in this cause, for God and man, religion and +policy, Church and Commonwealth, (_a_) against the blasphemous, +desperate, and destructive opinion of fatal destiny. But as (_b_) mine +aim, in the first discourse, was only to press home those things in +writing, which had been agitated between us by word of mouth, (a course +much to be preferred before verbal conferences, as being freer from +passions and tergiversations, less subject to mistakes and misrelations, +wherein paralogisms are more quickly detected, impertinences discovered, +and confusion avoided), so my present intention is only to vindicate +that discourse, and together with it, (_c_) those lights of the Schools, +who were never slighted but where they were not understood. How far I +have performed it, I leave to the judicious and impartial reader, +resting for mine own part well contented with this, that I have +satisfied myself. + + Your Lordship’s most obliged, + to love and serve you, + “J. D.” + + + ANIMADVERSIONS UPON + THE BISHOP’S EPISTLE TO MY LORD OF NEWCASTLE. + + +(_a_) “Against the blasphemous, desperate, and destructive opinion of +fatal destiny.” + +This is but choler, such as ordinarily happeneth unto them who contend +against greater difficulties than they expected. + +(_b_) “My aim in the first discourse was only to press home those things +in writing, which had been agitated between us by word of mouth: a +course much to be preferred before verbal conferences, as being freer +from passions, &c.” + +He is here, I think, mistaken; for in our verbal conference there was +not one passionate word, nor any objecting of blasphemy or atheism, nor +any other uncivil word; of which in his writing there are abundance. + +(_c_) “Those lights of the Schools, who were never slighted but where +they were not understood.” + +I confess I am not apt to admire every thing I understand not, nor yet +to slight it. And though the Bishop slight not the Schoolmen so much as +I do, yet I dare say he understands their writings as little as I do. +For they are in most places unintelligible. + + + ------- + + + TO THE READER. + +“Christian reader, this ensuing treatise was (_a_) neither penned nor +intended for the press, but privately undertaken, that by the +ventilation of the question truth might be cleared from mistakes. The +same was Mr. Hobbes’ desire at that time, as appeareth by four passages +in his book, wherein he requesteth and beseecheth that it may be kept +private. But either through forgetfulness or change of judgment, he hath +now caused or permitted it to be printed in England, without either +adjoining my first discourse, to which he wrote that answer, or so much +as mentioning this reply, which he hath had in his hands now these eight +years. So wide is the date of his letter, in the year 1652, from the +truth, and his manner of dealing with me in this particular from +ingenuity, (if the edition were with his own consent). Howsoever, here +is all that passed between us upon this subject, without any addition, +or the least variation from the original. + +“Concerning the nameless author of the preface, who takes upon him to +hang out an ivy-bush before this rare piece of sublimated stoicism to +invite passengers to purchase it, as I know not who he is, so I do not +much heed it, nor regard either his ignorant censures or hyperbolical +expressions. The Church of England is as much above his detraction, as +he is beneath this question. Let him lick up the spittle of Dionysius by +himself, as his servile flatterers did, and protest that it is more +sweet than nectar; we envy him not; much good may it do him. His very +frontispiece is a sufficient confutation of his whole preface, wherein +he tells the world, as falsely and ignorantly as confidently, that ‘all +controversy concerning predestination, election, free-will, grace, +merits, reprobation, &c., is fully decided and cleared.’ Thus he +accustometh his pen to run over beyond all limits of truth and +discretion, to let us see that his knowledge in theological +controversies is none at all, and into what miserable times we are +fallen, when blind men will be the only judges of colours. _Quid tanto +dignum feret hic promissor hiatu._ + +“There is yet one thing more, whereof I desire to advertise the reader, +(_b_) Whereas Mr. Hobbes mentions my objections to his book _De Cive_, +it is true that ten years since I gave him about sixty exceptions, the +one-half of them political, the other half theological, to that book, +and every exception justified by a number of reasons, to which he never +yet vouchsafed any answer. Nor do I now desire it, for since that, he +hath published his _Leviathan, Monstrum horrendum, informe, ingens, cui +lumen ademptum_, which affords much more matter of exception; and I am +informed that there are already two, the one of our own Church, the +other a stranger, who have shaken in pieces the whole fabric of his +city, that was but builded in the air, and resolved that huge mass of +his seeming Leviathan into a new nothing; and that their labours will +speedily be published. But if this information should not prove true, I +will not grudge upon his desire, God willing, to demonstrate, that his +principles are pernicious both to piety and policy, and destructive to +all relations of mankind, between prince and subject, father and child, +master and servant, husband and wife; and that they who maintain them +obstinately, are fitter to live in hollow trees among wild beasts, than +in any Christian or political society. So God bless us.” + + + ------- + + + ANIMADVERSIONS UPON + THE BISHOP’S EPISTLE TO THE READER. + +(_a_) “Neither penned nor intended for the press, but privately +undertaken, that by the ventilation of the question truth might be +cleared. The same was Mr. Hobbes’ desire at that time, as appeareth by +four passages in his book, &c.” + +It is true that it was not my intention to publish any thing in this +question. And the Bishop might have perceived, by not leaving out those +four passages, that it was without my knowledge the book was printed; +but it pleased him better to take this little advantage to accuse me of +want of ingenuity. He might have perceived also, by the date of my +letter, 1652, which was written 1646, (which error could be no advantage +to me), that I knew nothing of the printing of it. I confess, that +before I received the bishop’s reply, a French gentleman of my +acquaintance in Paris, knowing that I had written something of this +subject, but not understanding the language, desired me to give him +leave to get it interpreted to him by an English young man that resorted +to him; which I yielded to. But this young man taking his opportunity, +and being a nimble writer, took a copy of it for himself, and printed it +here, all but the postscript, without my knowledge, and (as he knew) +against my will; for which he since hath asked me pardon. But that the +Bishop intended it not for the press, is not very probable, because he +saith he writ it to the end “that by the ventilation of the question, +truth might be cleared from mistakes;” which end he had not obtained by +keeping it private. + +(_b_) “Whereas Mr. Hobbes mentions my objections to his book _De Cive_: +it is true that ten years since, I gave him about sixty exceptions,” &c. + +I did indeed intend to have answered those exceptions as finding them +neither political nor theological, nor that he alleged any reasons by +which they were to be justified. But shortly after, intending to write +in English, and publish my thoughts concerning Civil Doctrine in that +book which I entitled _Leviathan_, I thought his objections would by the +clearness of my method fall off without an answer. Now this _Leviathan_ +he calleth “_Monstrum horrendum, informe, ingens, cui lumen ademptum_.” +Words not far fetched, nor more applicable to my _Leviathan_, than to +any other writing that should offend him. For allowing him the word +_monstrum_, (because it seems he takes it for a monstrous great fish), +he can neither say it is _informe_; for even they that approve not the +doctrine, allow the method. Nor that it is _ingens_; for it is a book of +no great bulk. Nor _cui lumen ademptum_; for he will find very few +readers that will not think it clearer than his scholastic jargon. And +whereas he saith there are two of our own Church (as he hears say) that +are answering it; and that “he himself,” if I desire it, “will +demonstrate that my principles are pernicious both to piety and policy, +and destructive to all relations,” &c.: my answer is, that _I_ desire +not that he or they should so misspend their time; but if they will +needs do it, I can give them a fit title for their book, _Behemoth +against Leviathan_. He ends his epistle with “so God bless us.” Which +words are good in themselves, but to no purpose here; but are a +buffoonly abusing of the name of God to calumny. + + + + + ------- + + + A + + VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY + + FROM + + ANTECEDENT AND EXTRINSICAL NECESSITY. + + + ------- + + +_J. D._ “Either I am free to write this discourse for liberty against +necessity, or I am not free. If I be free, I have obtained the cause, +and ought not to suffer for the truth. If I be not free, yet I ought not +to be blamed, since I do it not out of any voluntary election, but out +of an inevitable necessity.” + +_T. H._ Right Honourable, I had once resolved to answer J. D.’s +objections to my book _De Cive_ in the first place, as that which +concerns me most; and afterwards to examine this Discourse of Liberty +and Necessity, which, because I never had uttered my opinion of it, +concerned me the less. But seeing it was both your Lordship’s and J. +D.’s desire that I should begin with the latter, I was contented so to +do. And here I present and submit it to your Lordship’s judgment. + +_J. D._ “The first day that I did read over T. H.’s defence of the +necessity of all things, was April 20th, 1646. Which proceeded not out +of any disrespect to him; for if all his discourses had been geometrical +demonstrations, able not only to persuade, but also to compel assent, +all had been one to me, first my journey, and afterwards some other +trifles which we call business, having diverted me until then. And then +my occasions permitting me, and an advertisement from a friend awakening +me, I set myself to a serious examination of it. We commonly see those +who delight in paradoxes, if they have line enough, confute themselves; +and their speculatives and their practices familiarly interfere one with +another. (_b_) The very first words of T. H.’s defence trip up the heels +of his whole cause; ‘I had once resolved.’ To _resolve_ presupposeth +deliberation. But what deliberation can there be of that which is +inevitably determined by causes without ourselves, before we do +deliberate? Can a condemned man deliberate whether he should be executed +or not? It is even to as much purpose, as for a man to consult and +ponder with himself whether he should draw in his breath, or whether he +should increase in stature. Secondly, (_c_) to _resolve_ implies a man’s +dominion over his own actions, and his actual determination of himself. +But he who holds an absolute necessity of all things, hath quitted this +dominion over himself; and (which is worse) hath quitted it to the +second extrinsical causes, in which he makes all his actions to be +determined. One may as well call again yesterday, as _resolve_ or newly +determine that which is determined to his hand already. (_d_) I have +perused this treatise, weighed T. H.’s answers, considered his reasons, +and conclude that he hath missed, and misled the question, that the +answers are evasions, that his arguments are paralogisms, that the +opinion of absolute and universal necessity is but a result of some +groundless and ill-chosen principles, and that the defect is not in +himself, but that his cause will admit no better defence; and therefore, +by his favour, I am resolved to adhere to my first opinion. Perhaps +another man reading this discourse with other eyes, judgeth it to be +pertinent and well-founded. How comes this to pass? The treatise is the +same, the exterior causes are the same; yet the resolution is contrary. +Do the second causes play fast and loose? Do they necessitate me to +condemn, and necessitate him to maintain? What is it then? The +difference must be in ourselves, either in our intellectuals, because +the one sees clearer than the other; or in our affections, which betray +our understandings, and produce an implicit adherence in the one more +than in the other. Howsoever it be, the difference is in ourselves. The +outward causes alone do not chain me to the one resolution, nor him to +the other resolution. But T. H. may say, that our several and respective +deliberations and affections are in part the causes of our contrary +resolutions, and do concur with the outward causes to make up one total +and adequate cause to the necessary production of this effect. If it be +so, he hath spun a fair thread, to make all this stir for such a +necessity as no man ever denied or doubted of. When all the causes have +actually determined themselves, then the effect is in being; for though +there be a priority in nature between the cause and the effect, yet they +are together in time. And the old rule is, (_e_) ‘whatsoever is, when it +is, is necessarily so as it is.’ This is no absolute necessity, but only +upon supposition, that a man hath determined his own liberty. When we +question whether all occurrences be necessary, we do not question +whether they be necessary when they are, nor whether they be necessary +_in sensu composito_, after we have resolved and finally determined what +to do; but whether they were necessary before they were determined by +ourselves, by or in the precedent causes before ourselves, or in the +exterior causes without ourselves. It is not inconsistent with true +liberty to determine itself, but it is inconsistent with true liberty to +be determined by another without itself. + +“T. H. saith further ‘that upon your Lordship’s desire and mine, he was +contented to begin with this discourse of Liberty and Necessity,’ that +is, to change his former resolution. (_f_) If the chain of necessity be +no stronger, but that it may be snapped so easily insunder; if his will +was no otherwise determined without himself, but only by the +signification of your Lordship’s desire and my modest entreaty, then we +may easily conclude that human affairs are not always governed by +absolute necessity; that a man is lord of his own actions, if not in +chief, yet in mean, subordinate to the Lord paramount of heaven and +earth; and that all things are not so absolutely determined in the +outward and precedent causes, but that fair entreaties and moral +persuasions may work upon a good nature so far, as to prevent that which +otherwise had been, and to produce that which otherwise had not been. He +that can reconcile this with an antecedent necessity of all things, and +a physical or natural determination of all causes, shall be great Apollo +to me. + +“Whereas T. H. saith that he had never uttered his opinion of this +question, I suppose he intends in writing; my conversation with him hath +not been frequent, yet I remember well that when this question was +agitated between us two in your Lordship’s chamber by your command, he +did then declare himself in words, both for the absolute necessity of +all events, and for the ground of this necessity, the flux or +concatenation of the second causes.” + + ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. I. + +(_a_) “The first day that I did read over T. H.’s defence of necessity,” +&c. + +His deferring the reading of my defence of necessity, he will not, he +saith, should be interpreted for disrespect. ’Tis well; though I cannot +imagine why he should fear to be thought to disrespect me. “He was +diverted,” he saith, “by trifles called business.” It seems then he +acknowledgeth that the will can be diverted by business. Which, though +said on the _by_, is contrary I think to the main, that the will is +free; for free it is not, if anything but itself can divert it. + +(_b_) “The very first words of T. H.’s defence, trip up the heels of his +whole cause, &c.” + +How so? “I had once,” saith he, “resolved. To resolve presupposeth +deliberation. But what deliberation can there be of that which is +inevitably determined without ourselves?” There is no man doubts but a +man may deliberate of what himself shall do, whether the thing be +impossible or not, in case he know not of the impossibility; though he +cannot deliberate of what another shall do to him. Therefore his +examples of the man condemned, of the man that breatheth, and of him +that groweth, because the question is not what they shall do, but what +they shall suffer, are impertinent. This is so evident, that I wonder +how he that was before so witty as to say, my first words tripped up the +heels of my cause, and that having line enough I would confute myself, +could presently be so dull as not to see his argument was too weak to +support so triumphant a language. And whereas he seemeth to be offended +with paradoxes, let him thank the Schoolmen, whose senseless writings +have made the greatest number of important truths seem paradox. + +(_c_) This argument that followeth is no better. “To resolve,” saith he, +“implies a man’s dominion over his actions, and his actual determination +of himself,” &c. + +If he understand what it is _to resolve_, he knows that it signifies no +more than after deliberation _to will_. He thinks, therefore, _to will_ +is to have dominion over his own actions, and actually to determine his +own will. But no man can determine his own will, for the will is +appetite; nor can a man more determine his will than any other appetite, +that is, more than he can determine when he shall be hungry and when +not. When a man is hungry, it is in his choice to eat or not eat; this +is the liberty of the man; but to be hungry or not hungry, which is that +which I hold to proceed from necessity, is not in his choice. Besides +these words, “dominion over his own actions,” and “determination of +himself,” so far as they are significant, make against him. For over +whatsoever things there is dominion, those things are not free, and +therefore a man’s actions are not free; and if a man determine himself, +the question will still remain, what determined him to determine himself +in that manner. + +(_d_) “I have perused this treatise, weighed T. H.’s answers, considered +his reasons,” &c. + +This and that which followeth, is talking to himself at random, till he +come to allege that which he calleth an old rule, which is this: (_e_) +“Whatsoever is, when it is, is necessarily so as it is. This is no +absolute necessity, but only upon supposition that a man hath determined +his own liberty,” &c. + +If the bishop think that I hold no other necessity than that which is +expressed in that old foolish rule, he neither understandeth me, nor +what the word _necessary_ signifieth. _Necessary_ is that which is +impossible to be otherwise, or that which cannot possibly otherwise come +to pass. Therefore _necessary_, _possible_, and _impossible_ have no +signification in reference to time past or time present, but only time +to come. His _necessary_, and his _in sensu composito_, signify nothing; +my _necessary_ is a necessary from all eternity; and yet not +inconsistent with true liberty, which doth not consist in determining +itself, but in doing what the will is determined unto. This “dominion +over itself,” and this _sensus compositus_, and this, “determining +itself,” and this, “necessarily is when it is,” are confused and empty +words. + +(_f_) “If the chain of necessity be no stronger but that it may be +snapped so easily asunder, &c. by the signification of your lordship’s +desire, and my modest entreaty, then we may safely conclude that human +affairs,” &c. + +Whether my Lord’s desire and the Bishop’s modest entreaty were enough to +produce a _will_ in me to write an answer to his treatise, without other +concurrent causes, I am not sure. Obedience to his Lordship did much, +and my civility to the Bishop did somewhat, and perhaps there were other +imaginations of mine own that contributed their part. But this I am sure +of, that altogether they were sufficient to frame my will thereto; and +whatsoever is sufficient to produce any thing, produceth it as +necessarily as the fire necessarily burneth the fuel that is cast into +it. And though the Bishop’s modest entreaty had been no part of the +cause of my yielding to it, yet certainly it would have been cause +enough to some civil man, to have requited me with fairer language than +he hath done throughout this reply. + + NO. II. + +_T. H._ And first I assure your Lordship, I find in it no new argument, +neither from Scripture nor from reason, that I have not often heard +before, which is as much as to say, that I am not surprised. + +_J. D._ (_a_) “Though I be so unhappy that I can present no novelty to +T. H., yet I have this comfort, that if he be not surprised, then in +reason I may expect a more mature answer from him; and where he fails, I +may ascribe it to the weakness of his cause, not to want of preparation. +But in this cause I like Epictetus’s counsel well, that (_b_) the sheep +should not brag how much they have eaten, or what an excellent pasture +they do go in, but shew it in their lamb and wool. Opposite answers and +downright arguments advantage a cause. To tell what we have heard or +seen is to no purpose. When a respondent leaves many things untouched, +as if they were too hot for his fingers, and declines the weight of +other things, and alters the true state of the question, it is a shrewd +sign either that he hath not weighed all things maturely, or else that +he maintains a desperate cause.” + + ANIMADVERSIONS UPON HIS REPLY NO. II. + +(_a_) “Though I be so unhappy that I can present no novelty to T. H. yet +I have this comfort, that if he be not surprised, then in reason I may +expect a more mature answer from him,” &c. + +Though I were not surprised, yet I do not see the reason for which he +saith he may expect a more mature answer from me; or any further answer +at all. For seeing I wrote this at his modest request, it is no modest +expectation to look for as many answers as he shall be pleased to exact. + +(_b_) “The sheep should not brag how much they have eaten, but shew it +in their lamb and wool.” + +It is no great bragging, to say I was not surprised; for whosoever +chanceth to read Suarez’s _Opuscula_, where he writeth of free-will and +of the concourse of God with man’s will, shall find the greatest part, +if not all, that the Bishop hath urged in this question. But that which +the Bishop hath said of the reasons and authorities which he saith in +his epistle do offer themselves to serve in this cause, and many other +passages of his book, I shall, I think, before I have done with him, +make appear to be very bragging, and nothing else. And though he say it +be Epictetus’s counsel, that sheep should shew what they eat in their +lamb and wool, it is not likely that Epictetus should take a metaphor +from lamb and wool; for it could not easily come into the mind of men +that were not acquainted with the paying of tithes. Or if it had, he +would have said lambs in the plural, as laymen use to speak. That which +follows of my leaving things untouched, and altering the state of the +question; I remember no such thing, unless he require that I should +answer, not to his arguments only, but also to his syllables. + + NO. III. + +_T. H._ The preface is a handsome one, but it appears even in that, that +he hath mistaken the question; for whereas he says thus, “if I be free +to write this discourse, I have obtained the cause,” I deny that to be +true. For it is not enough to his freedom of writing that he had not +written it, unless he would himself; if he will obtain the cause, he +must prove that, before he wrote it, it was not necessary he should +write it afterwards. It may be he thinks it all one to say, “I was free +to write it,” and “it was not necessary I should write it.” But I think +otherwise; for he is free to do a thing, that may do it if he have the +will to do it, and may forbear if he have the will to forbear. And yet +if there be a necessity that he shall have the will to do it, the action +is necessarily to follow; and if there be a necessity that he shall have +the will to forbear, the forbearing also will be necessary. The +question, therefore, is not whether a man be a free agent, that is to +say, whether he can write or forbear, speak or be silent, according to +his will; but whether the will to write, and the will to forbear, come +upon him according to his will, or according to any thing else in his +own power. I acknowledge this liberty, that I can do if I will: but to +say, I can will if I will, I take to be an absurd speech. Wherefore I +cannot grant him the cause upon this preface. + +[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] + +_J. D._ “Tacitus speaks of a close kind of adversaries, which evermore +begin with a man’s praise. The crisis or the catastrophe of their +discourse is when they come to their _but_; as, he is a good natured +man, _but_ he hath a naughty quality; or, he is a wise man, _but_ he +hath committed one of the greatest follies; so here, ‘the preface is a +handsome one, but it appears even in this that he hath mistaken the +question.’ This is to give an inch, that one may take away an ell +without suspicion; to praise the handsomeness of the porch, that he may +gain credit to the vilifying of the house. Whether of us hath mistaken +the question, I refer to the judicious reader. (_a_) Thus much I will +maintain, that that is no true necessity, which he calls necessity; nor +that liberty, which he calls liberty; nor that the question, which he +makes the question. + +“First for liberty, that which he calls liberty, is no true liberty. + +“For the clearing whereof, it behoveth us to know the difference between +these three, _necessity_, _spontaneity_, and _liberty_. + +“Necessity and spontaneity may sometimes meet together; so may +spontaneity and liberty; but real necessity and true liberty can never +meet together. Some things are necessary and not voluntary or +spontaneous; some things are both necessary and voluntary; some things +are voluntary and not free; some things are both voluntary and free; but +those things which are truly necessary can never be free, and those +things which are truly free can never be necessary. Necessity consists +in an antecedent determination to one; spontaneity consists in a +conformity of the appetite, either intellectual or sensitive, to the +object; true liberty consists in the elective power of the rational +will; that which is determined without my concurrence, may nevertheless +agree well enough with my fancy or desires, and obtain my subsequent +consent; but that which is determined without my concurrence or consent, +cannot be the object of mine election. I may like that which is +inevitably imposed upon me by another, but if it be inevitably imposed +upon me by extrinsical causes, it is both folly for me to deliberate, +and impossible for me to choose, whether I shall undergo it or not. +Reason is the root, the fountain, the original of true liberty, which +judgeth and representeth to the will, whether this or that be +convenient, whether this or that be more convenient. Judge then what a +pretty kind of liberty it is which is maintained by T. H., such a +liberty as is in little children before they have the use of reason, +before they can consult or deliberate of any thing. Is not this a +childish liberty; and such a liberty as is in brute beasts, as bees and +spiders, which do not learn their faculties as we do our trades, by +experience and consideration? This is a brutish liberty, such a liberty +as a bird hath to fly when her wings are clipped, or to use his own +comparison, such a liberty as a lame man, who hath lost the use of his +limbs, hath to walk. Is not this a ridiculous liberty? Lastly, (which is +worse than all these), such a liberty as a river hath to descend down +the channel. What! will he ascribe liberty to inanimate creatures also, +which have neither reason, nor spontaneity, nor so much as sensitive +appetite? Such is T. H.’s liberty. + +(_b_) “His necessity is just such another, a necessity upon supposition, +arising from the concourse of all the causes, including the last dictate +of the understanding in reasonable creatures. The adequate cause and the +effect are together in time, and when all the concurrent causes are +determined, the effect is determined also, and is become so necessary +that it is actually in being; but there is a great difference between +determining, and being determined. If all the collateral causes +concurring to the production of an effect, were antecedently determined +what they must of necessity produce, and when they must produce it, then +there is no doubt but the effect is necessary. (_c_) But if these causes +did operate freely or contingently; if they might have suspended or +denied their concurrence, or have concurred after another manner, then +the effect was not truly and antecedently necessary, but either free or +contingent. This will be yet clearer by considering his own instance of +_casting ambs-ace_, though it partake more of contingency than of +freedom. Supposing the positure of the parties’ hand who did throw the +dice, supposing the figure of the table and of the dice themselves, +supposing the measure of force applied, and supposing all other things +which did concur to the production of that cast, to be the very same +they were, there is no doubt but in this case the cast is necessary. But +still this is but a necessity of supposition; for if all these +concurrent causes, or some of them, were contingent or free, then the +cast was not absolutely necessary. To begin with the caster, he might +have denied his concurrence, and not have cast at all; he might have +suspended his concurrence, and not have cast so soon; he might have +doubled or diminished his force in casting, if it had pleased him; he +might have thrown the dice into the other table. In all these cases what +becomes of his _ambs-ace_? The like uncertainties offer themselves for +the maker of the tables, and for the maker of the dice, and for the +keeper of the tables, and for the kind of wood, and I know not how many +other circumstances. In such a mass of contingencies, it is impossible +that the effect should be antecedently necessary. T. H. appeals to every +man’s experience. I am contented. Let every one reflect upon himself, +and he shall find no convincing, much less constraining reason, to +necessitate him to any one of these particular acts more than another, +but only his own will or arbitrary determination. So T. H.’s necessity +is no absolute, no antecedent, extrinsical necessity, but merely a +necessity upon supposition. + +(_d_) “Thirdly, that which T. H. makes the question, is not the +question. ‘The question is not,’ saith he, ‘whether a man may write if +he will, and forbear if he will, but whether the will to write or the +will to forbear come upon him according to his will, or according to any +thing else in his own power.’ Here is a distinction without a +difference. If his will do not come upon him according to his will, then +he is not a free, nor yet so much as a voluntary agent, which is T. H.’s +liberty. Certainly all the freedom of the agent is from the freedom of +the will. If the will have no power over itself, the agent is no more +free than a staff in a man’s hand. Secondly, he makes but an empty show +of a power in the will, either to write or not to write. (_e_) If it be +precisely and inevitably determined in all occurrences whatsoever, what +a man shall will, and what he shall not will, what he shall write, and +what he shall not write, to what purpose is this power? God and nature +never made any thing in vain; but vain and frustraneous is that power +which never was and never shall be deduced into act. Either the agent is +determined before he acteth, what he shall will, and what he shall not +will, what he shall act, and what he shall not act, and then he is no +more free to act than he is to will; or else he is not determined, and +then there is no necessity. No effect can exceed the virtue of its +cause; if the action be free to write or to forbear, the power or +faculty to will or nill, must of necessity be more free. _Quod efficit +tale, illud magis est tale._ If the will be determined, the writing or +not writing is likewise determined, and then he should not say, ‘he may +write or he may forbear,’ but he must write or he must forbear. Thirdly, +this answer contradicts the sense of all the world, that the will of man +is determined without his will, or without any thing in his power. Why +do we ask men whether they will do such a thing or not? Why do we +represent reasons to them? Why do we pray them? Why do we entreat them? +Why do we blame them, if their will come not upon them according to +their will. _Wilt thou be made clean?_ said our Saviour to the paralytic +person (John v. 6); to what purpose, if his will was extrinsically +determined? Christ complains, (Matth. xi. 17): _We have piped unto you, +and ye have not danced._ How could they help it, if their wills were +determined without their wills to forbear? And (Matth. xxiii. 37): _I +would have gathered your children together as the hen gathereth her +chickens under her wings, but ye would not._ How easily might they +answer, according to T. H.’s doctrine, ‘Alas! blame not us; our wills +are not in our own power or disposition; if they were, we would +thankfully embrace so great a favour.’ Most truly said St. Austin, ‘Our +will should not be a will at all, if it were not in our power.’ (_f_) +This is the belief of all mankind, which we have not learned from our +tutors, but is imprinted in our hearts by nature; we need not turn over +any obscure books to find out this truth. The poets chaunt it in the +theatres, the shepherds in the mountains, the pastors teach it in their +churches, the doctors in the universities, the common people in the +markets, and all mankind in the whole world do assent unto it, except an +handful of men who have poisoned their intellectuals with paradoxical +principles. Fourthly, this necessity which T. H. hath devised, which is +grounded upon the necessitation of a man’s will without his will, is the +worst of all others, and is so far from lessening those difficulties and +absurdities which flow from the fatal destiny of the Stoics, that it +increaseth them, and rendereth them unanswerable. (_g_) No man blameth +fire for burning whole cities; no man taxeth poison for destroying men; +but those persons who apply them to such wicked ends. If the will of man +be not in his own disposition, he is no more a free agent than the fire +or the poison. Three things are required to make an act or omission +culpable. First, that it be in our power to perform it or forbear it; +secondly, that we be obliged to perform it, or forbear it, respectively; +thirdly, that we omit that which we ought to have done, or do that which +we ought to have omitted. (_h_) No man sins in doing those things which +he could not shun, or forbearing those things which never were in his +power. T. H. may say, that besides the power, men have also an appetite +to evil objects, which renders them culpable. It is true; but if this +appetite be determined by another, not by themselves, or if they have +not the use of reason to curb or restrain their appetites, they sin no +more than a stone descending downward, according to its natural +appetite, or the brute beasts who commit voluntary errors in following +their sensitive appetites, yet sin not. + +(_i_) The question then is not whether a man be necessitated to will or +nill, yet free to act or forbear. But saving the ambiguous acception of +the word _free_, the question is plainly this, whether all agents, and +all events natural, civil, moral, (for we speak not now of the +conversion of a sinner, that concerns not this question), be +predetermined extrinsically and inevitably without their own concurrence +in the determination; so as all actions and events which either are or +shall be, cannot but be, nor can be otherwise, after any other manner, +or in any other place, time, number, measure, order, nor to any other +end, than they are. And all this in respect of the supreme cause, or a +concourse of extrinsical causes determining them to one. + +(_k_) “So my preface remains yet unanswered. Either I was extrinsically +and inevitably predetermined to write this discourse, without any +concurrence of mine in the determination, and without any power in me to +change or oppose it, or I was not so predetermined. If I was, then I +ought not to be blamed, for no man is justly blamed for doing that which +never was in his power to shun. If I was not so predetermined, then mine +actions and my will to act, are neither compelled nor necessitated by +any extrinsical causes, but I elect and choose, either to write or to +forbear, according to mine own will and by mine own power. And when I +have resolved and elected, it is but a necessity of supposition, which +may and doth consist with true liberty, not a real antecedent necessity. +The two horns of this dilemma are so straight, that no mean can be +given, nor room to pass between them. And the two consequences are so +evident, that instead of answering he is forced to decline them. + + ANIMADVERSIONS UPON HIS REPLY NO. III. + +(_a_) “Thus much I will maintain, that this is no true necessity, which +he calleth necessity; nor that liberty which he calleth liberty; nor +that the question, which he makes the question,” &c. “For the clearing +whereof, it behoveth us to know the difference between these three, +_necessity_, _spontaneity_, and _liberty_.” + +I did expect, that for the knowing of the difference between +_necessity_, _spontaneity_, and _liberty_, he would have set down their +definitions. For without these, their difference cannot possibly appear. +For how can a man know how things differ, unless he first know what they +are? which he offers not to shew. He tells us that _necessity_ and +_spontaneity_ may meet together, and _spontaneity_ and _liberty_; but +_necessity_ and _liberty_ never; and many other things impertinent to +the purpose. For which, because of the length, I refer the reader to the +place. I note only this, that _spontaneity_ is a word not used in common +English; and they that understand Latin, know it means no more than +_appetite_, or _will_, and is not found but in living creatures. And +seeing, he saith, that _necessity_ and _spontaneity_ may stand together, +I may say also, that _necessity_ and _will_ may stand together, and then +is not the will free, as he would have it, from necessitation. There are +many other things in that which followeth, which I had rather the reader +would consider in his own words, to which I refer him, than that I +should give him greater trouble in reciting them again. For I do not +fear it will be thought too hot for my fingers, to shew the vanity of +such words as these, _intellectual appetite_, _conformity of the +appetite to the object_, _rational will_, _elective power of the +rational will_; nor understand I how reason can be the root of true +liberty, if the Bishop, as he saith in the beginning, had the liberty to +write this discourse. I understand how objects, and the conveniences and +the inconveniences of them may be represented to a man, by the help of +his senses; but how reason representeth anything to the will, I +understand no more than the Bishop understands how there may be liberty +in children, in beasts, and inanimate creatures. For he seemeth to +wonder how children may be left at liberty; how beasts in prison may be +set at liberty; and how a river may have a free course; and saith, +“What! will he ascribe liberty to inanimate creatures, also?” And thus +he thinks he hath made it clear how _necessity_, _spontaneity_, and +_liberty_ differ from one another. If the reader find it so, I am +contented. + +(_b_) “His necessity is just such another; a necessity upon supposition, +arising from the concourse of all the causes, including the last dictate +of the understanding in reasonable creatures,” &c. + +The Bishop might easily have seen, that the necessity I hold, is the +same necessity that he denies; namely, a necessity of things future, +that is, an antecedent necessity derived from the very beginning of +time; and that I put necessity for an impossibility of not being, and +that impossibility as well as possibility are never truly said but of +the future. I know as well as he that the cause, when it is adequate, as +he calleth it, or entire, as I call it, is together in time with the +effect. But for all that, the necessity may be and is before the effect, +as much as any necessity can be. And though he call it a necessity of +supposition, it is no more so than all other necessity is. The fire +burneth necessarily; but not without supposition that there is fuel put +to it. And it burneth the fuel, when it is put to it, necessarily; but +it is by supposition, that the ordinary course of nature is not +hindered; for the fire burnt not the three children in the furnace. + +(_c_) “But if these causes did operate freely or contingently, if they +might have suspended or denied their concurrence, or have concurred +after another manner, then the effect was not truly and antecedently +necessary, but either free or contingent.” + +It seems by this he understands not what these words, _free_ and +_contingent_, mean. A little before, he wondered I should attribute +liberty to inanimate creatures, and now he puts causes amongst those +things that operate freely. By these causes it seems he understandeth +only men, whereas I shewed before that liberty is usually ascribed to +whatsoever agent is not hindered. And when a man doth any thing freely, +there be many other agents immediate, that concur to the effect he +intendeth, which work not freely, but necessarily; as when the man +moveth the sword _freely_, the sword woundeth necessarily, nor can +suspend or deny its concurrence; and consequently if the man move not +himself, the man cannot deny his concurrence. To which he cannot reply, +unless he say a man originally can move himself; for which he will be +able to find no authority of any that have but tasted of the knowledge +of motion. Then for _contingent_, he understandeth not what it meaneth. +For it is all one to say it is _contingent_, and simply to say _it is_; +saving that when they say simply _it is_, they consider not how or by +what means; but in saying it is _contingent_, they tell us they know not +whether necessarily or not. But the Bishop thinking contingent to be +that which is not necessary, instead of arguing against our knowledge of +the necessity of things to come, argueth against the necessity itself. +Again, he supposeth that free and contingent causes might have suspended +or denied their concurrence. From which it followeth, that free causes, +and contingent causes, are not causes of themselves, but concurrent with +other causes, and therefore can produce nothing but as they are guided +by those causes with which they concur. For it is strange he should say, +they might have concurred after another manner; for I conceive not how, +when this runneth one way, and that another, that they can be said to +concur, that is, run together. And this his concurrence of causes +contingent, maketh, he saith, the cast of _ambs-ace_ not to have been +absolutely necessary. Which cannot be conceived, unless it had hindered +it; and then it had made some other cast necessary, perhaps _deux-ace_, +which serveth me as well. For that which he saith of suspending his +concurrence, of casting sooner or later, of altering the caster’s force, +and the like accidents, serve not to take away the necessity of +_ambs-ace_, otherwise than by making a necessity of _deux-ace_, or other +cast that shall be thrown. + +(_d_) “Thirdly, that which T. H. makes the question, is not the +question,” &c. + +He hath very little reason to say this. He requested me to tell him my +opinion in writing concerning free-will. Which I did, and did let him +know a man was free, in those things that were in his power, to follow +his will; but that he was not free to will, that is, that his will did +not follow his will. Which I expressed in these words: “The question is, +whether the will to write, or the will to forbear, come upon a man +according to his will, or according to any thing else in his own power.” +He that cannot understand the difference between _free to do if he +will_, and _free to will_, is not fit, as I have said in the stating of +the question, to hear this controversy disputed, much less to be a +writer in it. His consequence, “if a man be not free to will, he is not +a free nor a voluntary agent,” and his saying, “the freedom of the agent +is from the freedom of the will,” is put here without proof; nor is +there any considerable proof of it through the whole book hereafter +offered. For why? He never before had heard, I believe, of any +distinction between free to do and free to will; which makes him also +say, “if the will have not power over itself, the agent is no more free, +than a staff in a man’s hand.” As if it were not freedom enough for a +man to do what he will, unless his will also have power over his will, +and that his will be not the power itself, but must have another power +within it to do all voluntary acts. + +(_e_) “If it be precisely and inevitably determined in all occurrences +whatsoever, what a man shall will, and what he shall not will, and what +he shall write, and what he shall not write, to what purpose is this +power?” &c. + +It is to this purpose, that all those things may be brought to pass, +which God hath from eternity predetermined. It is therefore to no +purpose here to say, that God and nature hath made nothing in vain. But +see what weak arguments he brings next, which, though answered in that +which is gone before, yet, if I answer not again, he will say they are +too hot for my fingers. One is: “If the agent be determined what he +shall will, and what he shall act, then he is no more free to act than +he is to will;” as if the will being necessitated, the doing of what we +will were not liberty. Another is: “If a man be free to act, he is much +more free to will; because _quod efficit tale, illud magis est tale_;” +as if he should say, “if I make him angry, then I am more angry; because +_quod efficit_,” &c. The third is: “If the will be determined, then the +writing is determined, and he ought not to say he _may_ write, but he +_must_ write.” It is true, it followeth that he must write, but it doth +not follow I ought to say he must write, unless he would have me say +more than I know, as himself doth often in this reply. + +After his arguments come his difficult questions. “If the will of man be +determined without his will, or without any thing in his power, why do +we ask men whether they will do such a thing or not?” I answer, because +we desire to know, and cannot know but by their telling, nor then +neither, for the most part. “Why do we represent reasons to them? Why do +we pray them? Why do we entreat them?” I answer, because thereby we +think to make them have the will they have not. “Why do we blame them?” +I answer, because they please us not. I might ask him, whether blaming +be any thing else but saying the thing blamed is ill or imperfect? May +we not say a horse is lame, though his lameness came from necessity? or +that a man is a fool or a knave, if he be so, though he could not help +it? “To what purpose did our Saviour say to the paralytic person, _wilt +thou be made clean_, if his will were extrinsically determined?” I +answer, that it was not because he would know, for he knew it before; +but because he would draw from him a confession of his want. “_We have +piped unto you, and ye have not danced_; how could they help it?” I +answer they could not help it. “_I would have gathered your children as +the hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, but ye would not._ How +easily might they answer, according to T. H.’s doctrine, Alas! blame not +us, our wills are not in our own power?” I answer, they are to be blamed +though their wills be not in their own power. Is not good good, and evil +evil, though they be not in our power? and shall not I call them so? and +is not that praise and blame? But it seems the Bishop takes blame, not +for the dispraise of a thing, but for a pretext and colour of malice and +revenge against him he blameth. And where he says our wills are in our +power, he sees not that he speaks absurdly; for he ought to say, the +will is the power; and through ignorance detecteth the same fault in St. +Austin, who saith, “our will should not be a will at all, if it were not +in our power;” that is to say, if it were not in our will. + +(_f_) “This is the belief of all mankind, which we have not learned from +our tutors, but is imprinted in our hearts by nature,” &c. + +This piece of eloquence is used by Cicero in his defence of Milo, to +prove it lawful for a man to resist force with force, or to keep himself +from killing; which the Bishop, thinking himself able to make that which +proves one thing prove any thing, hath translated into English, and +brought into this place to prove free-will. It is true, very few have +learned from tutors, that a man is not free to will; nor do they find it +much in books. That they find in books, that which the poets chant in +their theatres and the shepherds in the mountains, that which the +pastors teach in the churches and the doctors in the universities, and +that which the common people in the markets, and all mankind in the +whole world do assent unto, is the same that I assent unto, namely, that +a man hath freedom to do if he will; but whether he hath freedom to +will, is a question which it seems neither the Bishop nor they ever +thought on. + +(_g_) “No man blameth fire for burning cities, nor taxeth poison for +destroying men,” &c. + +Here again he is upon his arguments from blame, which I have answered +before; and we do as much blame them as we do men. For we say fire hath +done hurt, and the poison hath killed a man, as well as we say the man +hath done unjustly; but we do not seek to be revenged of the fire and of +poison, because we cannot make them ask forgiveness, as we would make +men to do when they hurt us. So that the blaming of the one and the +other, that is, the declaring of the hurt or evil action done by them, +is the same in both; but the malice of man is only against man. + +(_h_) “No man sins in doing those things which he could not shun.” + +He may as well say, no man halts which cannot choose but halt; or +stumbles, that cannot choose but stumble. For what is sin, but halting +or stumbling in the way of God’s commandments? + +(_i_) “The question then is not, whether a man be necessitated to will +or nill, yet free to act or forbear. But, saving the ambiguous +acceptions of the word _free_, the question is plainly this,” &c. + +This question, which the Bishop stateth in this place, I have before set +down verbatim and allowed: and it is the same with mine, though he +perceive it not. But seeing I did nothing, but at his request set down +my opinion, there can be no other question between us in this +controversy, but whether my opinion be the truth or not. + +(_k_) “So my preface remains yet unanswered. Either I was extrinsically +and inevitably predetermined to write this discourse,” &c. + +That which he saith in the preface is, “that if he be not free to write +this discourse, he ought not to be blamed; but if he be free, he hath +obtained the cause.” + +The first consequence I should have granted him, if he had written it +rationally and civilly; the latter I deny, and have shown that he ought +to have proved that a man is free to will. For that which he says, any +thing else whatsoever would think, if it knew it were moved, and did not +know what moved it. A wooden top that is lashed by the boys, and runs +about sometimes to one wall, sometimes to another, sometimes spinning, +sometimes hitting men on the shins, if it were sensible of its own +motion, would think it proceeded from its own will, unless it felt what +lashed it. And is a man any wiser, when he runs to one place for a +benefice, to another for a bargain, and troubles the world with writing +errors and requiring answers, because he thinks he doth it without other +cause than his own will, and seeth not what are the lashings that cause +his will? + + NO. IV. + +[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] + +_J. D._ “And so to fall in hand with the question without any further +proems or prefaces, by _liberty_, I do neither understand a liberty from +sin, nor a liberty from misery, nor a liberty from servitude, nor a +liberty from violence, but I understand a liberty from necessity, or +rather from necessitation; that is, an universal immunity from all +inevitability and determination to one; whether it be of _exercise_ +only, which the Schools call a liberty of _contradiction_, and is found +in God and in the good and bad angels, that is, not a liberty to do both +good and evil, but a liberty to do or not to do this or that good, this +or that evil, respectively; or whether it be a liberty of _specification +and exercise_ also, which the Schools call liberty of _contrariety_, and +is found in men endowed with reason and understanding, that is, a +liberty to do and not to do good and evil, this or that. Thus the coast +being cleared,” &c. + +_T. H._ In the next place he maketh certain distinctions of liberty, and +says, he means not liberty from sin, nor from servitude, nor from +violence, but from necessity, necessitation, inevitability, and +determination to one. It had been better to define liberty, than thus to +distinguish; for I understand never the more what he means by liberty. +And though he says he means liberty from necessitation, yet I understand +not how such a liberty can be, and it is a taking of the question +without proof. For what else is the question between us, but whether +such a liberty be possible or not? There are in the same place other +distinctions, as a liberty of exercise only, which he calls a liberty of +contradiction, namely, of doing not good or evil simply, but of doing +this or that good, or this or that evil, respectively: and a liberty of +specification and exercise also, which he calls a liberty of +contrariety, namely, a liberty not only to do or not to do good or evil, +but also to do or not to do this or that good or evil. And with these +distinctions, he says, he clears the coast, whereas in truth he +darkeneth his meaning, not only with the jargon of exercise only, +specification also, contradiction, contrariety, but also with pretending +distinction where none is. For how is it possible for the liberty of +doing or not doing this or that good or evil, to consist, as he saith it +doth in God and Angels, without a liberty of doing or not doing good or +evil? + +_J. D._ (_a_) “It is a rule in art, that words which are homonymous, of +various and ambiguous significations, ought ever in the first place to +be distinguished. No men delight in confused generalities, but either +sophisters or bunglers. _Vir dolosus versatur in generalibus_, deceitful +men do not love to descend to particulars; and when bad archers shoot, +the safest way is to run to the mark. Liberty is sometimes opposed to +the slavery of sin and vicious habits, as (Romans vi. 22): _Now being +made free from sin_. Sometimes to misery and oppression, (Isaiah lviii. +6): _To let the oppressed go free_. Sometimes to servitude, as +(Leviticus xxv. 10): _In the year of jubilee ye shall proclaim liberty +throughout the land_. Sometimes to violence, as (Psalms cv. 20): _The +prince of his people let him go free_. Yet none of all these is the +liberty now in question, but a liberty from necessity, that is, a +determination to one, or rather from necessitation, that is, a necessity +imposed by another, or an extrinsical determination. These distinctions +do virtually imply a description of true liberty, which comes nearer the +essence of it, than T. H.’s roving definition, as we shall see in due +place. And though he say that ‘he understands never the more what I mean +by liberty,’ yet it is plain, by his own ingenuous confession, both that +he doth understand it, and that this is the very question where the +water sticks between us, whether there be such a liberty free from all +necessitation and extrinsical determination to one. Which being but the +stating of the question, he calls it amiss ‘the taking of the question.’ +It were too much weakness to beg this question, which is so copious and +demonstrable. (_b_) It is strange to see with what confidence, +now-a-days, particular men slight all the Schoolmen, and Philosophers, +and classic authors of former ages, as if they were not worthy to +unloose the shoe-strings of some modern author, or did sit in darkness +and in the shadow of death, until some third Cato dropped down from +heaven, to whom all men must repair, as to the altar of Prometheus, to +light their torches. I did never wonder to hear a raw divine out of the +pulpit declare against School Divinity to his equally ignorant auditors. +It is but as the fox in the fable, who, having lost his own tail by a +mischance, would have persuaded all his followers to cut off theirs, and +throw them away as unprofitable burthens. But it troubles me to see a +scholar, one who hath been long admitted into the innermost closet of +nature, and seen the hidden secrets of more subtle learning, so far to +forget himself as to style School-learning no better than a plain +jargon, that is, a senseless gibberish, or a fustian language, like the +chattering noise of sabots. Suppose they did sometimes too much cut +truth into shreds, or delight in abstruse expressions, yet certainly +this distinction of liberty into liberty of _contrariety_ and liberty of +_contradiction_, or which is all one, of _exercise only_, or _exercise +and specification jointly_, which T. H. rejects with so much scorn, is +so true, so necessary, so generally received, that there is scarce that +writer of note, either divine or philosopher, who did ever treat upon +this subject, but he useth it. + +“Good and evil are contraries, or opposite kinds of things. Therefore to +be able to choose both good and evil, is a liberty of contrariety, or of +specification. To choose this, and not to choose this, are +contradictory, or which is all one, an exercise or suspension of power. +Therefore to be able to do or forbear to do the same action, or to +choose or not choose the same object, without varying of the kind, is a +liberty of contradiction, or of exercise only. Now a man is not only +able to do or forbear to do good only, or evil only, but he is able both +to do and to forbear to do both good and evil. So he hath not only a +liberty of the action, but also a liberty of contrary objects; not only +a liberty of exercise, but also of specification; not only a liberty of +contradiction, but also of contrariety. On the other side, God and the +good angels can do or not do this or that good; but they cannot do and +not do both good and evil. So they have only a liberty of exercise or +contradiction, but not a liberty of specification or contrariety. It +appears then plainly, that the liberty of man is more large in the +extension of the object, which is both good and evil, than the liberty +of God and the good angels, whose object is only good. But withal the +liberty of man comes short in the intention of the power. Man is not so +free in respect of good only, as God or the good angels, because (not to +speak of God, whose liberty is quite of another nature) the +understandings of the angels are clearer, their power and dominion over +their actions is greater, they have no sensitive appetites to distract +them, no organs to be disturbed. We see, then, this distinction is +cleared from all darkness. + +“And where T. H. demands, how it is possible for the liberty of doing or +not doing this or that good or evil, to consist in God and angels, +without a liberty of doing or not doing good or evil? the answer is +obvious and easy, _referendo singula singulis_, rendering every act to +its right object respectively. God and good angels have a power to do or +not to do this or that good, bad angels have a power to do or not to do +this or that evil; so both, jointly considered, have power respectively +to do good or evil. And yet, according to the words of my discourse, God +and good and bad angels, being singly considered, have no power to do +good or evil, that is, indifferently, as man hath.” + + ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. IV. + +He intendeth here to make good the distinctions of liberty of +_exercise_, and liberty of _contradiction_; liberty of _contrariety_, +and liberty of _specification and exercise_. And he begins thus: + +(_a_) “It is a rule in art, that words which are homonymous, or of +various and ambiguous significations, ought ever in the first place to +be distinguished,” &c. + +I know not what art it is that giveth this rule. I am sure it is not the +art of reason, which men call logic. For reason teacheth, and the +example of those who only reason methodically, (which are the +mathematicians), that a man, when he will demonstrate the truth of what +he is to say, must in the first place determine what he will have to be +understood by his words; which determination is called definition; +whereby the significations of his words are so clearly set down, that +there can creep in no ambiguity. And therefore there will be no need of +distinctions; and consequently his rule of art, is a rash precept of +some ignorant man, whom he and others have followed. + +The Bishop tells us that liberty is sometimes opposed to sin, to +oppression, to servitude; which is to tell us, that they whom he hath +read in this point, are inconsistent in the meaning of their own words; +and, therefore, they are little beholden to him. And this diversity of +significations he calls distinctions. Do men that by the same word in +one place mean one thing, and in another another, and never tell us so, +distinguish? I think they rather confound. And yet he says, that “these +distinctions do virtually imply a description of true liberty, which +cometh nearer the essence of it, than T. H.’s roving definition;” which +definition of mine was this: “liberty is when there is no external +impediment.” So that in his opinion a man shall sooner understand +liberty by reading these words, (Romans vi. 22): _Being made free from +sin_; or these words, (Isaiah lviii. 6): _To let the oppressed go free_; +or by these words, (Leviticus xxv. 10): _You shall proclaim liberty +throughout the land_, than by these words of mine: “liberty is the +absence of external impediments to motion.” Also he will face me down, +that I understand what he means by his distinctions of liberty of +_contrariety_, of _contradiction_, of _exercise only_, of _exercise and +specification jointly_. If he mean I understand his meaning, in one +sense it is true. For by them he means to shift off the discredit of +being able to say nothing to the question; as they do that, pretending +to know the cause of every thing, give for the cause of why the +load-stone draweth to it iron, sympathy, and occult quality; making +_they cannot tell_, (turned now into occult), to stand for the real +cause of that most admirable effect. But that those words signify +distinction, I constantly deny. It is not enough for a distinction to be +forked; it ought to signify a distinct conception. There is great +difference between duade distinctions and cloven feet. + +(_b_) “It is strange to see with what confidence now-a-days particular +men slight all the Schoolmen, and philosophers, and classic authors of +former ages,” &c. + +This word, _particular men_, is put here, in my opinion, with little +judgment, especially by a man that pretendeth to be learned. Does the +Bishop think that he himself is, or that there is any universal man? It +may be he means a private man. Does he then think there is any man not +private, besides him that is endued with sovereign power? But it is most +likely he calls me a particular man, because I have not had the +authority he has had, to teach what doctrine I think fit. But now, I am +no more particular than he; and may with as good a grace despise the +Schoolmen and some of the old Philosophers, as he can despise me, unless +he can shew that it is more likely that he should be better able to look +into these questions sufficiently, which require meditation and +reflection upon a man’s own thoughts, he that hath been obliged most of +his time to preach unto the people, and to that end to read those +authors that can best furnish him with what he has to say, and to study +for the rhetoric of his expressions, and of the spare time (which to a +good pastor is very little) hath spent no little part in seeking +preferment and increasing of riches; than I, that have done almost +nothing else, nor have had much else to do but to meditate upon this and +other natural questions. It troubles him much that I style +School-learning jargon. I do not call all School-learning so, but such +as is so; that is, that which they say in defending of untruths, and +especially in the maintenance of free-will, when they talk of _liberty +of exercise, specification, contrariety, contradiction, acts elicite and +exercite_ and the like; which, though he go over again in this place, +endeavouring to explain them, are still both here and there but jargon, +or that (if he like it better) which the Scripture in the first chaos +calleth _Tohu_ and _Bohu_. + +But because he takes it so heinously, that a private man should so +hardly censure School-divinity, I would be glad to know with what +patience he can hear Martin Luther and Philip Melancthon speaking of the +same? Martin Luther, that was the first beginner of our deliverance from +the servitude of the Romish clergy, had these three articles censured by +the University of Paris. The first of which was: “School-theology is a +false interpretation of the Scripture, and Sacraments, which hath +banished from us true and sincere theology.” The second is: “At what +time School-theology, that is, mock-theology, came up, at the same time +the theology of Christ’s Cross went down.” The third is: “It is now +almost three hundred years since the Church has endured the +licentiousness of School-Doctors in corrupting of the Scriptures.” +Moreover, the same Luther in another place of his work saith thus; +“School-theology is nothing else but ignorance of the truth, and a block +to stumble at laid before the Scriptures.” And of Thomas Aquinas in +particular he saith, that “it was he that did set up the kingdom of +Aristotle, the destroyer of godly doctrine.” And of the philosophy +whereof St. Paul biddeth us beware, he saith it is School-theology. And +Melancthon, a divine once much esteemed in our Church, saith of it thus: +“It is known that that profane scholastic learning, which they will have +to be called Divinity, began at Paris; which being admitted, nothing is +left sound in the Church, the Gospel is obscured, faith extinguished, +the doctrine of works received, and instead of Christ’s people, we are +become not so much as the people of the law, but the people of +Aristotle’s ethics These were no raw divines, such as he saith preached +to their equally ignorant auditors. I could add to these the slighting +of School-divinity by Calvin and other learned Protestant Doctors; yet +were they all but private men, who, it seems to the Bishop, had forgot +themselves as well as I. + + NO. V. + +_J. D._ “Thus the coast being cleared, the next thing to be done, is to +draw out our forces against the enemy; and because they are divided into +two squadrons, the one of Christians, the other of heathen philosophers, +it will be best to dispose ours also into two bodies, the former drawn +from Scripture, the latter from reason.” + +_T. H._ The next thing he doth, after the clearing of the coast, is the +dividing of his forces, as he calls them, into two squadrons, one of +places of Scripture, the other of reasons, which allegory he useth, I +suppose, because he addresses the discourse to your Lordship, who is a +military man. All that I have to say touching this, is, that I observe a +great part of those his forces do look and march another way, and some +of them do fight among themselves. + +_J. D._ “If T. H. could divide my forces, and commit them together among +themselves, it were his only way to conquer them. But he will find that +those imaginary contradictions, which he thinks he hath espied in my +discourse, are but fancies, and my supposed impertinences will prove his +own real mistakings.” + +In this fifth number there is nothing of his or mine, pertinent to the +question, therefore nothing necessary to be repeated. + + + PROOFS OF LIBERTY OUT OF SCRIPTURE.--NO. VI. + +[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] + +_J. D._ “First, whosoever have power of election, have true liberty; for +the proper act of liberty is election. A spontaneity may consist with +determination to one, as we see in children, fools, madmen, brute +beasts, whose fancies are determined to those things which they act +spontaneously, as the bees make honey, the spiders webs. But none of +these have a liberty of election, which is an act of judgment and +understanding, and cannot possibly consist with a determination to one. +He that is determined by something before himself or without himself, +cannot be said to choose or elect, unless it be as the junior of the +mess chooseth in Cambridge, whether he will have the least part or +nothing. And scarcely so much. + +“But men have liberty of election. This is plain, (Numbers xxx. 13): _If +a wife make a vow it is left to her husband’s choice, either to +establish it or to make it void_. And (Joshua xxiv. 15): _Choose you +this day whom you will serve_, &c. _But I and my house will serve the +Lord._ He makes his own choice, and leaves them to the liberty of their +election. And (2 Samuel xxiv. 12): _I offer thee three things, choose +thee which of them I shall do_. If one of these three things was +necessarily determined, and the other two impossible, how was it left to +him to choose what should be done? Therefore we have true liberty.” + +_T. H._ And the first place of Scripture taken from Numbers xxx. 13, is +one of them that look another way. The words are, _If a wife make a vow +it is left to her husband’s choice, either to establish it or make it +void_. For it proves no more but that the husband is a free or voluntary +agent, but not that his choice therein is not necessitated or not +determined to what he shall choose by precedent necessary causes. + +_J. D._ “My first argument from Scripture is thus formed. + +“Whosoever have a liberty or power of election, are not determined to +one by precedent necessary causes. + +“But men have liberty of election. + +“The assumption or _minor_ proposition is proved by three places of +Scripture, (Numbers xxx. 13; Joshua xxiv. 15; 2 Samuel xxiv. 12.) I need +not insist upon these, because T. H. acknowledgeth ‘that it is clearly +proved that there is election in man.’ + +“But he denieth the _major_ proposition, because, saith he, ‘man is +necessitated or determined to what he shall choose by precedent +necessary causes.’ I take away this answer three ways. + +“First, by reason. Election is evermore either of things possible, or at +least of things conceived to be possible, that is, efficacious election, +when a man hopeth or thinketh of obtaining the object. Whatsoever the +will chooseth, it chooseth under the notion of good, either honest, or +delightful, or profitable. But there can be no real goodness apprehended +in that which is known to be impossible. It is true, there may be some +wandering pendulous wishes of known impossibilities, as a man also that +hath committed an offence may wish he had not committed it. But to +choose efficaciously an impossibility, is as impossible as an +impossibility itself. No man can think to obtain that which he knows +impossible to be obtained; but he who knows that all things are +antecedently determined by necessary causes, knows that it is impossible +for anything to be otherwise than it is; therefore to ascribe unto him a +power of election to choose this or that indifferently, is to make the +same thing to be determined to one, and to be not determined to one, +which are contradictories. Again, whosoever hath an elective power, or a +liberty to choose, hath also a liberty or power to refuse; (Isaiah vii. +16): _Before the child shall know to refuse the evil and choose the +good_. He who chooseth this rather than that, refuseth that rather than +this. As Moses (Hebrews xi. 25), choosing to suffer affliction with the +people of God, did thereby refuse the pleasures of sin. But no man hath +any power to refuse that which is necessarily predetermined to be, +unless it be as the fox refused the grapes which were beyond his reach. +When one thing of two or three is absolutely determined, the others are +made thereby simply impossible. + +(_a_) “Secondly, I prove it by instances, and by that universal notion +which the world hath of election. What is the difference between an +elective and hereditary kingdom, but that in an elective kingdom, they +have power or liberty to choose this or that man indifferently; but in +an hereditary kingdom, they have no such power nor liberty? Where the +law makes a certain heir, there is a necessitation to one; where the law +doth not name a certain heir, there is no necessitation to one, and +there they have power or liberty to choose. An hereditary prince may be +as grateful and acceptable to his subjects, and as willingly received by +them (according to that liberty which is opposed to compulsion or +violence), as he who is chosen: yet he is not therefore an elective +prince. In Germany all the nobility and commons may assent to the choice +of the emperor, or be well pleased with it when it is concluded; yet +none of them elect or choose the emperor, but only those six princes who +have a consultative, deliberative, and determinative power in his +election; and if their votes or suffrages be equally divided, three to +three, then the King of Bohemia hath the casting voice. So likewise in +corporations or commonwealths, sometimes the people, sometimes the +common-council, have power to name so many persons for such an office, +and the supreme magistrate, or senate, or lesser council respectively, +to choose one of those. And all this is done with that caution and +secresy, by billets or other means, that no man knows which way any man +gave his vote, or with whom to be offended. If it were necessarily and +inevitably predetermined, that this individual person, and no other, +shall and must be chosen, what needed all this circuit and caution, to +do that which is not possible to be done otherwise, which one may do as +well as a thousand, and for doing of which no rational man can be +offended, if the electors were necessarily predetermined to elect this +man and no other. And though T. H. was pleased to pass by my University +instance, yet I may not, until I see what he is able to say unto it. The +junior of the mess in Cambridge divides the meat in four parts; the +senior chooseth first, then the second and third in their order. The +junior is determined to one, and hath no choice left, unless it be to +choose whether he will take that part which the rest have refused, or +none at all. It may be this part is more agreeable to his mind than any +of the others would have been; but for all that he cannot be said to +choose it, because he is determined to this one. Even such a liberty of +election is that which is established by T. H.; or rather much worse in +two respects. The junior hath yet a liberty of contradiction left, to +choose whether he will take that part, or not take any part; but he who +is precisely predetermined to the choice of this object, hath no liberty +to refuse it. Secondly, the junior, by dividing carefully, may preserve +to himself an equal share; but he who is wholly determined by +extrinsical causes, is left altogether to the mercy and disposition of +another. + +“Thirdly, I prove it by the texts alleged. (Numb. xxx. 13): _If a wife +make a vow, it is left to her husband’s choice, either to establish it +or make it void_. But if it be predetermined that he shall establish it, +it is not in his power to make it void. If it be predetermined that he +shall make it void, it is not in his power to establish it. And +howsoever it be determined, yet being determined, it is not in his power +indifferently, either to establish it, or to make it void at his +pleasure. So (Joshua xxiv. 15): _Choose you this day whom ye will serve: +but I and my house will serve the Lord_. It is too late to choose that +_this day_, which was determined otherwise yesterday. _Whom ye will +serve, whether the Gods whom your fathers served, or the Gods of the +Amorites._ Where there is an election of this or that, these Gods, or +those Gods, there must needs be either an indifferency to both objects, +or at least a possibility to either. _I and my house will serve the +Lord._ If he were extrinsically predetermined, he should not say I +_will_ serve, but I _must_ serve. And (2 Samuel xxiv. 12): _I offer thee +three things, choose thee which of them I shall do_. How doth God offer +three things to David’s choice, if he had predetermined him to one of +the three by a concourse of necessary extrinsical causes? If a sovereign +prince should descend so far as to offer a delinquent his choice, +whether he would be fined, or imprisoned, or banished, and had underhand +signed the sentence of his banishment, what were it else but plain +drollery or mockery? This is the argument which in T. H.’s opinion looks +another way. If it do, it is as the Parthians used to fight, flying. His +reason follows next to be considered.” + + ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. VI. + +In this number he hath brought three places of Scripture to prove +_freewill_. The first is, _If a wife make a vow, it is left to her +husband’s choice either to establish it or to make it void_. And, +_Choose you this day whom ye will serve, &c. But I and my house will +serve the Lord._ And, _I offer thee three things, choose thee which of +them I shall do_. Which in the reply he endeavoureth to make good; but +needed not, seeing they prove nothing but that a man is free to do if he +will, which I deny not. He ought to prove he is free to will, which I +deny. + +(_a_) Secondly, “I prove it by instances, and by that universal notion +which the world hath of election.” + +His instances are, first, the difference between an hereditary kingdom +and an elective; and then the difference between the senior and junior +of the mess taking their commons; both which prove the liberty of doing +what they will, but not a liberty to will. For in the first case, the +electors are free to name whom they will, but not to will; and in the +second, the senior having an appetite, chooseth what he hath an appetite +to; but chooseth not his appetite. + + NO. VII. + +_T. H._ For if there came into the husband’s mind greater good by +establishing than abrogating such a vow, the establishing will follow +necessarily. And if the evil that will follow thereon in the husband’s +opinion outweigh the good, the contrary must needs follow. And yet in +this following of one’s hopes and fears consisteth the nature of +election. So that a man may both choose this, and cannot but choose +this. And consequently choosing and necessity are joined together. + +[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] + +_J. D._ (_a_) “There is nothing said with more show of reason in this +cause by the patrons of necessity and adversaries of true liberty than +this, that the will doth perpetually and infallibly follow the last +dictate of the understanding, or the last judgment of right reason. And +in this, and this only, I confess T. H. hath good seconds. Yet the +common and approved opinion is contrary, and justly. + +“For first, this very act of the understanding is an effect of the will, +and a testimony of its power and liberty. It is the will, which +affecting some particular good, doth engage and command the +understanding to consult and deliberate what means are convenient for +attaining that end. And though the will itself be blind, yet its object +is good in general, which is the end of all human actions. Therefore it +belongs to the will, as to the general of an army, to move the other +powers of the soul to their acts, and among the rest the understanding +also, by applying it and reducing its power into act. So as whatsoever +obligation the understanding doth put upon the will, is by the consent +of the will, and derived from the power of the will, which was not +necessitated to move the understanding to consult. So the will is the +lady and mistress of human actions; the understanding is her trusty +counsellor, which gives no advice but when it is required by the will. +And if the first consultation or deliberation be not sufficient, the +will may move a review, and require the understanding to inform itself +better and take advice of others, from whence many times the judgment of +the understanding doth receive alteration. + +“Secondly, for the manner how the understanding doth determine the will, +it is not naturally but morally. The will is moved by the understanding, +not as by an efficient having a causal influence into the effect, but +only by proposing and representing the object. And therefore, as it were +ridiculous to say that the object of the sight is the cause of seeing, +so it is to say that the proposing of the object by the understanding to +the will is the cause of willing; and therefore the understanding hath +no place in that concourse of causes, which according to T. H. do +necessitate the will. + +“Thirdly, the judgment of the understanding is not always _practice +practicum_, nor of such a nature in itself as to oblige and determine +the will to one. Sometimes, the understanding proposeth two or three +means equally available to the attaining of one and the same end. +Sometimes, it dictateth that this or that particular good is eligible or +fit to be chosen, but not that it is necessarily eligible or that it +must be chosen. It may judge this or that to be a fit means, but not the +only means to attain the desired end. In these cases no man can doubt +but that the will may choose, or not choose, this or that indifferently. +Yea, though the understanding shall judge one of these means to be more +expedient than another, yet forasmuch as in the less expedient there is +found the reason of good, the will in respect of that dominion which it +hath over itself, may accept that which the understanding judgeth to be +less expedient, and refuse that which it judgeth to be more expedient. + +“Fourthly, sometimes the will doth not will the end so efficaciously, +but that it may be, and often is deterred from the prosecution of it by +the difficulty of the means; and notwithstanding the judgment of the +understanding, the will may still suspend its own act. + +“Fifthly, supposing, but not granting, that the will did necessarily +follow the last dictate of the understanding, yet this proves no +antecedent necessity, but coexistent with the act; no extrinsical +necessity, the will and the understanding being but two faculties of the +same soul; no absolute necessity, but merely upon supposition. And +therefore the same authors who maintain that the judgment of the +understanding doth necessarily determine the will, do yet much more +earnestly oppugn T. H.’s absolute necessity of all occurrences. Suppose +the will shall apply the understanding to deliberate and not require a +review. Suppose the dictate of the understanding shall be absolute, not +this or that indifferently, nor this rather than that comparatively, but +this positively; nor this freely, but this necessarily. And suppose the +will do will efficaciously, and do not suspend its own act. Then here is +a necessity indeed, but neither absolute nor extrinsical, nor +antecedent, flowing from a concourse of causes without ourselves, but a +necessity upon supposition, which we do readily grant. So far T. H. is +wide from the truth, whilst he maintains, either that the apprehension +of a greater good doth necessitate the will, or that this is an absolute +necessity. + +(_b_) “Lastly, whereas he saith, that ‘the nature of election doth +consist in following our hopes and fears,’ I cannot but observe that +there is not one word of art in this whole treatise which he useth in +the right sense; I hope it doth not proceed out of an affectation of +singularity, nor out of a contempt of former writers, nor out of a +desire to take in sunder the whole frame of learning and new mould it +after his own mind. It were to be wished that at least he would give us +a new dictionary, that we might understand his sense. But because this +is but touched here sparingly, and upon the by, I will forbear it until +I meet with it again in its proper place. And for the present it shall +suffice to say, that hopes and fears are common to brute beasts, but +election is a rational act, and is proper only to man, who is _sanctius +his animal, mentisque capacius altæ_. + +_T. H._ The second place of Scripture is Joshua xxiv. 15; the third is 2 +Samuel xxiv. 12; whereby it is clearly proved, that there is election in +man, but not proved that such election was not necessitated by the +hopes, and fears, and considerations of good and bad to follow, which +depend not on the will nor are subject to election. And therefore one +answer serves all such places, if they were a thousand. + +_J. D._ “This answer being the very same with the former, word for word, +which hath already sufficiently been shaken in pieces, doth require no +new reply. + + ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. VII. + +(_a_) “There is nothing said with more show of reason in this cause by +the patrons of necessity than this, ‘that the will doth perpetually and +infallibly follow the last dictate of the understanding, or the last +judgment of right reason,’ &c. Yet the common and approved opinion is +contrary, and justly; for, first, this very act of the understanding is +an effect of the will, &c.” + +I note here, first, that the Bishop is mistaken in saying that I or any +other patron of necessity, are of opinion that the will follows always +the last judgment of right reason. For it followeth as well the judgment +of an erroneous as of a true reasoning; and the truth in general is that +it followeth the last opinion of the goodness or evilness of the object, +be the opinion true or false. + +Secondly, I note, that in making the understanding to be an effect of +the will, he thinketh a man may have a will to that which he not so much +as thinks on. And in saying, that “it is the will which, affecting some +particular good, doth engage and command the understanding to consult,” +&c, that he not only thinketh the will affecteth a particular good, +before the man understands it to be good; but also he thinketh that +these words “doth command the understanding,” and these, “for it belongs +to the will as to the general of an army, to move the other powers of +the soul to their acts,” and a great many more that follow, are sense, +which they are not, but mere confusion and emptiness: as, for example, +“the understanding doth determine the will, not naturally, but morally,” +and “the will is moved by the understanding,” is unintelligible. “Moved +not as by an efficient,” is nonsense. And where he saith, that “it is +ridiculous to say the object of the sight is the cause of seeing,” he +showeth so clearly that he understandeth nothing at all of natural +philosophy, that I am sorry I had the ill fortune to be engaged with him +in a dispute of this kind. There is nothing that the simplest countryman +could say so absurdly concerning the understanding, as this of the +Bishop, “the judgment of the understanding is not always _practice +practicum_.” A countryman will acknowledge there is judgment in men, but +will as soon say the judgment of the judgment, as the judgment of the +understanding. And if _practice practicum_ had been sense, he might have +made a shift to put it into English. Much more followeth of this stuff. + +(_b_) “Lastly, whereas he saith, ‘that the nature of election doth +consist in following our hopes and fears,’ I cannot but observe that +there is not one word of art in this whole treatise which he useth in +the right sense. I hope it doth not proceed out of an affectation of +singularity, nor out of a contempt of former writers,” &c. + +He might have said, there is not a word of jargon nor nonsense; and that +it proceedeth from an affectation of truth, and contempt of metaphysical +writers, and a desire to reduce into frame the learning which they have +confounded and disordered. + + NO. VIII. + +_T. H._ Supposing, it seems, I might answer as I have done, that +necessity and election might stand together, and instance in the actions +of children, fools, and brute beasts, whose fancies, I might say, are +necessitated and determined to one: before these his proofs out of +Scripture, he desires to prevent that instance, and therefore says, that +the actions of children, fools, madmen, and beasts, are indeed +determined, but that they proceed not from election, nor from free, but +from spontaneous agents. As for example, that the bee, when it maketh +honey, does it spontaneously; and when the spider makes his web, he does +it spontaneously, and not by election. Though I never meant to ground +any answer upon the experience of what children, fools, madmen, and +beasts do, yet that your Lordship may understand what can be meant by +spontaneous, and how it differs from voluntary, I will answer that +distinction, and show that it fighteth against its fellow arguments. +Your Lordship therefore is to consider, that all voluntary actions, +where the thing that induceth the will is not fear, are called also +spontaneous, and said to be done by a man’s own accord. As when a man +giveth money voluntarily to another for merchandise, or out of +affection, he is said to do it of his own accord, which in Latin is +_sponte_, and therefore the action is spontaneous; though to give one’s +money willingly to a thief to avoid killing, or throw it into the sea to +avoid drowning, where the motive is fear, be not called spontaneous. But +every spontaneous action is not therefore voluntary; for voluntary +presupposes some precedent deliberation, that is to say, some +consideration and meditation of what is likely to follow, both upon the +doing and abstaining from the action deliberated of; whereas many +actions are done of our own accord, and are therefore spontaneous; of +which nevertheless, as he thinks, we never consulted nor deliberated in +ourselves, as when making no question nor any the least doubt in the +world but that the thing we are about is good, we eat, or walk, or in +anger strike or revile, which he thinks spontaneous, but not voluntary +nor elective actions. And with such kind of actions he says +necessitation may stand, but not with such as are voluntary, and proceed +upon election and deliberation. Now if I make it appear to you that even +these actions which he says proceed from spontaneity, and which he +ascribes only to fools, children, madmen, and beasts, proceed from +deliberation and election, and that actions inconsiderate, rash and +spontaneous, are ordinarily found in those that are, by themselves and +many more, thought as wise or wiser than ordinary men are; then his +argument concludeth, that necessity and election may stand together, +which is contrary to that which he intendeth by all the rest of his +arguments to prove. And first, your Lordship’s own experience furnishes +you with proof enough, that horses, dogs, and other brute beasts, do +demur oftentimes upon the way they are to take: the horse, retiring from +some strange figure he sees, and coming on again to avoid the spur. And +what else doth man that deliberateth, but one while proceed toward +action, another while retire from it, as the hope of greater good draws +him, or the fear of greater evil drives him? A child may be so young as +to do all which it does without all deliberation, but that is but till +it chance to be hurt by doing somewhat, or till it be of age to +understand the rod; for the actions wherein he hath once a check, shall +be deliberated on a second time. Fools and madmen manifestly deliberate +no less than the wisest men, though they make not so good a choice, the +images of things being by diseases altered. For bees and spiders, if he +had so little to do as to be a spectator of their actions, he would have +confessed not only election, but also art, prudence, and policy in them, +very near equal to that of mankind. Of bees Aristotle says, their life +is civil. He is deceived, if he think any spontaneous action, after once +being checked in it, differs from an action voluntary and elective, for +even the setting of a man’s foot in the posture of walking, and the +action of ordinary eating, was once deliberated, how and when it should +be done; and though it afterwards became easy and habitual, so as to be +done without fore-thought, yet that does not hinder but that the act is +voluntary and proceeds from election. So also are the rashest actions of +choleric persons voluntary and upon deliberation. For who is there, but +very young children, that has not considered when and how far he ought, +or safely may, strike or revile. Seeing then he agrees with me that such +actions are necessitated, and the fancy of those that do them is +determined to the actions they do, it follows out of his own doctrine, +that the liberty of election does not take away the necessity of +electing this or that individual thing. And thus one of his arguments +fights against another. + +[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] + +_J. D._ “We have partly seen before how T. H. hath coined a new kind of +liberty, a new kind of necessity, a new kind of election; and now in +this section a new kind of spontaneity, and a new kind of voluntary +actions. Although he say that here is nothing new to him, yet I begin to +suspect that either here are many things new to him, or otherwise his +election is not the result of a serious mature deliberation. (_a_) The +first thing that I offer, is, how often he mistakes my meaning in this +one section. First, I make voluntary and spontaneous actions to be one +and the same; he saith, I distinguish them, so as spontaneous actions +may be necessary, but voluntary actions cannot. Secondly, (_b_) I +distinguish between free acts and voluntary acts. The former are always +deliberate, the latter may be indeliberate; all free acts are voluntary, +but all voluntary acts are not free. But he saith I confound them and +make them the same. (_c_) Thirdly, he saith, I ascribe spontaneity only +to fools, children, madmen, and beasts; but I acknowledge spontaneity +hath place in rational men, both as it is comprehended in liberty, and +as it is distinguished from liberty. + +(_d_) “Yet I have no reason to be offended at it; for he deals no +otherwise with me than he doth with himself. Here he tells us that +‘voluntary presupposeth deliberation.’ But (No. XXV.) he tells us +contrary, ‘that whatsoever followeth the last appetite is voluntary, and +where there is but one appetite, that is the last:’ and that ‘no action +of a man can be said to be without deliberation, though never so +sudden.’ So (No. XXXIII.) he tells us, that ‘by spontaneity is meant +inconsiderate proceeding, or else nothing is meant by it:’ yet here he +tells us, that ‘all voluntary actions which proceed not from fear, are +spontaneous,’ whereof many are deliberate, as that wherein he instanceth +himself, ‘to give money for merchandise.’ Thirdly, when I said that +children, before they have the use of reason, act spontaneously, as when +they suck the breast, but do not act freely, because they have not +judgment to deliberate or elect, here T. H. undertakes to prove that +they do deliberate and elect; and yet presently after confesseth again, +that ‘a child may be so young, as to do what it doth without all +deliberation.’ + +“Besides these mistakes and contradictions, he hath other errors also in +this section. As this, that no actions proceeding from fear are +spontaneous. He who throws his goods into the sea to avoid drowning, +doth it not only _spontaneously_, but even _freely_. He that wills the +end, wills the means conducing to that end. It is true that if the +action be considered nakedly without all circumstances, no man willingly +or spontaneously casts his goods into the sea. But if we take the +action, as in this particular case, invested with all the circumstances, +and in order to the end, that is, the saving of his own life, it is not +only voluntary and spontaneous, but elective and chosen by him, as the +most probable means for his own preservation. As there is an antecedent +and a subsequent will, so there is an antecedent and a subsequent +spontaneity. His grammatical argument, grounded upon the derivation of +spontaneous from _sponte_, weighs nothing; we have learned in the +rudiments of logic, that conjugates are sometimes in name only, and not +in deed. He who casts his goods into the sea, may do it of his own +accord in order to the end. Secondly, he errs in this also, that nothing +is opposed to spontaneity but only fear. Invincible and antecedent +ignorance doth destroy the nature of spontaneity or voluntariness, by +removing that knowledge which should and would have prohibited the +action. As a man thinking to shoot a wild beast in a bush, shoots his +friend, which if he had known, he would not have shot. This man did not +kill his friend of his own accord. + +“For the clearer understanding of these things, and to know what +spontaneity is, let us consult awhile with the Schools about the +distinct order of voluntary or involuntary actions. Some acts proceed +wholly from an extrinsical cause; as the throwing of a stone upwards, a +rape, or the drawing of a Christian by plain force to the idol’s temple; +these are called violent acts. Secondly, some proceed from an +intrinsical cause, but without any manner of knowledge of the end, as +the falling of a stone downwards; these are called natural acts. +Thirdly, some proceed from an internal principle, with an imperfect +knowledge of the end, where there is an appetite to the object, but no +deliberation nor election; as the acts of fools, children, beasts, and +the inconsiderate acts of men of judgment. These are called voluntary or +spontaneous acts. Fourthly, some proceed from an intrinsical cause, with +a more perfect knowledge of the end, which are elected upon +deliberation. These are called free acts. So then the formal reason of +liberty is election. The necessary requisite to election is +deliberation. Deliberation implyeth the actual use of reason. But +deliberation and election cannot possibly subsist with an extrinsical +predetermination to one. How should a man deliberate or choose which way +to go, who knows that all ways are shut against him and made impossible +to him, but only one? This is the genuine sense of these words +_voluntary_ and _spontaneous_ in this question. Though they were taken +twenty other ways vulgarly or metaphorically, as we say _spontaneous +ulcers_, where there is no appetite at all, yet it were nothing to this +controversy, which is not about words, but about things; not what the +words voluntary or free do or may signify, but whether all things be +extrinsically predetermined to one. + +“These grounds being laid for clearing the true sense of the words, the +next thing to be examined is, that contradiction which he hath espied in +my discourse, or how this argument fights against his fellows. ‘If I,’ +saith T. H., ‘make it appear, that the spontaneous actions of fools, +children, madmen, and beasts, do proceed from election and deliberation, +and that inconsiderate and indeliberate actions are found in the wisest +men, then this argument concludes that necessity and election may stand +together, which is contrary to his assertion.’ If this could be made +appear as easily as it is spoken, it would concern himself much, who, +when he should prove that rational men are not free from necessity, goes +about to prove that brute beasts do deliberate and elect, that is as +much as to say, are free from necessity. But it concerns not me at all; +it is neither my assertion nor my opinion, that necessity and election +may not meet together in the same subject; violent, natural, +spontaneous, and deliberate or elective acts may all meet together in +the same subject. But this I say, that necessity and election cannot +consist together in the same act. He who is determined to one, is not +free to choose out of more than one. To begin with his latter +supposition, ‘that wise men may do inconsiderate and indeliberate +actions,’ I do readily admit it. But where did he learn to infer a +general conclusion from particular premises; as thus, because wise men +do some indeliberate acts, therefore no act they do is free or elective? +Secondly, for his former supposition, ‘that fools, children, madmen, and +beasts, do deliberate and elect,’ if he could make it good, it is not I +who contradict myself, nor fight against mine own assertion, but it is +he who endeavours to prove that which I altogether deny. He may well +find a contradiction between him and me; otherwise to what end is this +dispute? But he shall not be able to find a difference between me and +myself. But the truth is, he is not able to prove any such thing; and +that brings me to my sixth consideration, that neither horses, nor bees, +nor spiders, nor children, nor fools, nor madmen do deliberate or elect. + +“His first instance is in the horse, or dog, but more especially the +horse. He told me that I divided my argument into squadrons, to apply +myself to your Lordship, being a military man; and I apprehend that for +the same reason he gives his first instance of the horse, with a +submission to your own experience. So far well, but otherwise very +disadvantageously to his cause. Men used to say of a dull fellow, that +he hath no more brains than a horse. And the Prophet David saith, (Psalm +xxxii. 9): _Be not like the horse and mule, which have no +understanding_. How do they deliberate without understanding? And (Psalm +xlix. 20), he saith the same of all brute beasts: _Man being in honour +had no understanding, but became like unto the beasts that perish_. The +horse ‘demurs upon his way.’ Why not? Outward objects, or inward +fancies, may produce a stay in his course, though he have no judgment +either to deliberate or elect. ‘He retires from some strange figure +which he sees, and comes on again to avoid the spur.’ So he may; and yet +be far enough from deliberation. All this proceeds from the sensitive +passion of fear, which is a perturbation arising from the expectation of +some imminent evil. But he urgeth, ‘what else doth a man that +deliberateth?’ Yes, very much. The horse feareth some outward object, +but deliberation is a comparing of several means conducing to the same +end. Fear is commonly of one, deliberation of more than one; fear is of +those things which are not in our power, deliberation of those things +which are in our power; fear ariseth many times out of natural +antipathies, but in these disconveniences of nature deliberation hath no +place at all. In a word, fear is an enemy to deliberation, and betrayeth +the succours of the soul. If the horse did deliberate, he should consult +with reason, whether it were more expedient for him to go that way or +not; he would represent to himself all the dangers both of going and +staying, and compare the one with the other, and elect that which is +less evil; he should consider whether it were not better to endure a +little hazard, than ungratefully and dishonestly to fail in his duty +towards his master, who did breed him and doth feed him. This the horse +doth not; neither is it possible for him to do it. Secondly, for +children, T. H. confesseth that they may be so young that they do not +deliberate at all; afterwards, as they attain to the use of reason by +degrees, so by degrees they become free agents. Then they do deliberate; +before they do not deliberate. The rod may be a means to make them use +their reason, when they have power to exercise it, but the rod cannot +produce the power before they have it. Thirdly, for fools and madmen, it +is not to be understood of such madmen as have their _lucida +intervalla_, who are mad and discreet by fits; when they have the use of +reason, they are no madmen, but may deliberate as well as others; nor +yet of such fools as are only comparative fools, that is, less wise than +others. Such may deliberate, though not so clearly, nor so judiciously +as others; but of mere madmen, and mere natural fools, to say that they, +who have not the use of reason, do deliberate or use reason, implies a +contradiction. But his chiefest confidence is in his bees and spiders, +‘of whose actions,’ he saith, ‘if I had been a spectator, I would have +confessed, not only election, but also art, prudence, policy, very near +equal to that of mankind, whose life, as Aristotle saith, is civil.’ +Truly I have contemplated their actions many times, and have been much +taken with their curious works; yet my thoughts did not reflect so much +upon them, as upon their Maker, who is _sic magnus in magnis_, that he +is not _minor in parvis_; so great in great things, that he is not less +in small things. Yes, I have seen those silliest of creatures, and +seeing their rare works I have seen enough to confute all the bold-faced +atheists of this age, and their hellish blasphemies. I saw them, but I +praised the marvellous works of God, and admired that great and first +intellect, who hath both adapted their organs, and determined their +fancies to these particular works. I was not so simple as to ascribe +those rarities to their own invention, which I knew to proceed from a +mere instinct of nature. In all other things they are the dullest of +creatures. Naturalists write of bees, that their fancy is imperfect, not +distinct from their common-sense, spread over their whole body, and only +perceiving things present. When Aristotle calls them political or +sociable creatures, he did not intend it really that they lived a civil +life, but according to an analogy, because they do such things by +instinct as truly political creatures do out of judgment. Nor when I +read in St. Ambrose of their hexagons or sexangular cells, did I +therefore conclude that they were mathematicians. Nor when I read in +Crespet, that they invoke God to their aid when they go out of their +hives, bending their thighs in form of a cross, and bowing themselves; +did I therefore think that this was an act of religious piety, or that +they were capable of theological virtues, whom I see in all other things +in which their fancies are not determined, to be the silliest of +creatures, strangers not only to right reason, but to all resemblances +of it. + +“Seventhly, concerning those actions which are done upon precedent and +passed deliberations; they are not only spontaneous, but free acts. +Habits contracted by use and experience, do help the will to act with +more facility and more determinately, as the hand of the artificer is +helped by his tools. And precedent deliberations, if they were sad and +serious, and proved by experience to be profitable, do save the labour +of subsequent consultations; _frustra fit per plura, quod fieri potest +per pauciora_. Yet nevertheless the actions which are done by virtue of +these formerly acquired habits, are no less free, than if the +deliberation were coexistent with this particular action. He that hath +gained an habit and skill to play such a lesson, needs not a new +deliberation how to play every time that he plays it over and over. Yet +I am far from giving credit to him in this, that walking or eating +universally considered, are free actions, or proceed from true liberty; +not so much because they want a particular deliberation before every +individual act, as because they are animal motions and need no +deliberation of reason, as we see in brute beasts. And nevertheless the +same actions, as they are considered individually, and invested with +their due circumstances, may be and often are free actions subjected to +the liberty of the agent. + +“Lastly, whereas T. H. compareth the first motions or rash attempts of +choleric persons with such acquired habits, it is a great mistake. Those +rash attempts are voluntary actions, and may be facilitated sometimes by +acquired habits. But yet for as much as actions are often altered and +varied by the circumstances of time, place, and person, so as that act +which at one time is morally good, at another time may be morally evil; +and for as much as a general precedent deliberation how to do this kind +of action, is not sufficient to make this or that particular action good +or expedient, which being in itself good, yet particular circumstances +may render inconvenient or unprofitable to some persons, at some times, +in some places: therefore a precedent general deliberation how to do any +act, as for instance, how to write, is not sufficient to make a +particular act, as my writing this individual reply, to be freely done, +without a particular and subsequent deliberation. A man learns French +advisedly; that is a free act. The same man in his choler and passion +reviles his friend in French, without any deliberation; this is a +spontaneous act, but it is not a free act. If he had taken time to +advise, he would not have reviled his friend. Yet as it is not free, so +neither is it so necessary as the bees making honey, whose fancy is not +only inclined, but determined, by nature to that act. So every way he +fails. And his conclusion, that the liberty of election doth not take +away the necessity of electing this or that individual thing, is no +consequent from my doctrine, but from his own. Neither do my arguments +fight one against another, but his private opinions fight both against +me and against an undoubted truth. A free agent endowed with liberty of +election, or with an elective power, may nevertheless be necessitated in +some individual acts, but those acts wherein he is necessitated, do not +flow from his elective power, neither are those acts which flow from his +elective power necessitated.” + + ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. VIII. + +(_a_) “The first thing that I offer is, how often he mistakes my meaning +in this one section. First, I make voluntary and spontaneous actions to +be one and the same. He saith, I distinguish them,” &c. + +It is very possible I may have mistaken him; for neither he nor I +understand him. If they be one, why did he without need bring in this +strange word, spontaneous? Or rather, why did the Schoolmen bring it in, +if not merely to shift off the difficulty of maintaining their tenet of +free-will? + +(_b_) “Secondly, he saith I distinguish between free acts and voluntary +acts; but he saith, I confound them and make them the same.” + +In his reply No. II, he saith, that for the clearing of the question, we +are to know the difference between these three, necessity, spontaneity, +and liberty; and because I thought he knew that it could not be cleared +without understanding what is will, I had reason to think that +spontaneity was his new word for will. And presently after, “some things +are necessary, and not voluntary or spontaneous; some things are both +necessary and voluntary.” These words, voluntary and spontaneous, so put +together, would make any man believe spontaneous were put as explicative +of voluntary; for it is no wonder in the eloquence of the Schoolmen. +Therefore, presently after, these words, “spontaneity consists in a +conformity of the appetite, either intellectual or sensitive,” signify +that spontaneity is a conformity or likeness of the appetite to the +object; which to me soundeth as if he had said, that the appetite is +like the object; which is as proper as if he had said, the hunger is +like the meat. If this be the bishop’s meaning, as it is the meaning of +the words, he is a very fine philosopher. But hereafter I will venture +no more to say his meaning is this or that, especially where he useth +terms of art. + +(_c_) “Thirdly, he saith, I ascribe spontaneity only to fools, children, +madmen, and beasts. But I acknowledge spontaneity hath place in rational +men,” &c. + +I resolve to have no more to do with spontaneity. But I desire the +reader to take notice, that the common people, on whose arbitration +dependeth the signification of words in common use, among the Latins and +Greeks did call all actions and motions whereof they did perceive no +cause, spontaneous and αυτοματα: I say, not those actions which had no +causes; for all actions have their causes; but those actions whose +causes they did not perceive. So that spontaneous, as a general name, +comprehended many actions and motions of inanimate creatures; as the +falling of heavy things downwards, which they thought spontaneous, and +that if they were not hindered, they would descend of their _own +accord_. It comprehended also all animal motion, as beginning from the +will or appetite; because the causes of the will and appetite being not +perceived, they supposed, as the Bishop doth, that they were the causes +of themselves. So that which in general is called spontaneous, being +applied to men and beasts in special, is called voluntary. Yet the will +and appetite, though the very same thing, use to be distinguished in +certain occasions. For in the public conversation of men, where they are +to judge of one another’s will, and of the regularity and irregularity +of one another’s actions, not every appetite, but the last is esteemed +in the public judgment for the will: nor every action proceeding from +appetite, but that only to which there had preceded or ought to have +preceded some deliberation. And this I say is so, when one man is to +judge of another’s will. For every man in himself knoweth that what he +desireth or hath an appetite to, the same he hath a will to, though his +will may be changed before he hath obtained his desire. The Bishop, +understanding nothing of this, might, if it had pleased him, have called +it jargon. But he had rather pick out of it some contradictions of +myself. And therefore saith: + +(_d_) “Yet I have no reason to be offended at it, (meaning such +contradictions), for he dealeth no otherwise with me than he doth with +himself.” + +It is a contradiction, he saith, that having said that “voluntary +presupposeth deliberation,” I say in another place, “that whatsoever +followeth the last appetite, is voluntary, and where there is but one +appetite, that is the last.” Not observing that _voluntary_ presupposeth +_deliberation_, when the judgment, whether the action be voluntary or +not, is not in the actor, but in the judge; who regardeth not the will +of the actor, where there is nothing to be accused in the action of +deliberate malice; yet knoweth that though there be but one appetite, +the same is truly will for the time, and the action, if it follow, a +voluntary action. + +This also he saith is a contradiction, that having said, “no action of a +man can be said to be without deliberation, though never so sudden,” I +say afterward that “by spontaneity is meant inconsiderate proceeding.” + +Again he observes not, that the action of a man that is not a child, in +public judgment how rash, inconsiderate, and sudden soever it be, it is +to be taken for deliberation; because it is supposed, he ought to have +considered and compared his intended action with the law; when, +nevertheless, that sudden and indeliberate action was truly voluntary. + +Another contradiction which he finds is this, that having undertaken to +prove “that children before they have the use of reason do deliberate +and elect,” I say by and by after a “child may be so young as to do what +he doth without all deliberation.” I yet see no contradiction here; for +a child may be so young, as that the appetite thereof is its first +appetite, but afterward and often before it come to have the use of +reason, may elect one thing and refuse another, and consider the +consequences of what it is about to do. And why not as well as beasts, +which never have the use of reason; for they deliberate, as men do? For +though men and beasts do differ in many things very much, yet they +differ not in the nature of their deliberation. A man can reckon by +words of general signification, make propositions, and syllogisms, and +compute in numbers, magnitudes, proportions, and other things +computable; which being done by the advantage of language, and words of +general significations, a beast that hath not language cannot do, nor a +man that hath language, if he misplace the words, that are his counters. +From hence to the end of this number, he discourseth again of +spontaneity, and how it is in children, madmen, and beasts; which, as I +before resolved, I will not meddle with; let the reader think and judge +of it as he pleaseth. + + NO. IX. + +[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] + +_J. D._ “Secondly, (_a_) they who might have done, and may do, many +things which they leave undone; and they who leave undone many things +which they might do, are neither compelled nor necessitated to do what +they do, but have true liberty. But we might do many things which we do +not, and we do many things which we might leave undone, as is plain, (1 +Kings iii. 11): _Because thou hast asked this thing, and hast not asked +for thyself long life, neither hast asked riches for thyself, nor hast +asked the life of thine enemies_ &c. God gave Solomon his choice. He +might have asked riches, but then he had not asked wisdom, which he did +ask. He did ask wisdom, but he might have asked riches, which yet he did +not ask. And (Acts v. 4): _After it was sold, was it not in thine own +power?_ It was in his own power to give it, and it was in his own power +to retain it. Yet if he did give it, he could not retain it; and if he +did retain it, he could not give it. Therefore we may do, what we do +not. And we do not, what we might do. That is, we have true liberty from +necessity.” + +_T. H._ The second argument from Scripture consisteth in histories of +men that did one thing, when, if they would, they might have done +another. The places are two; one is in 1 Kings iii. 11, where the +history says, God was pleased that Solomon, who might, if he would, have +asked riches or revenge, did nevertheless ask wisdom at God’s hands. The +other is the words of St. Peter to Ananias, (Acts v. 4): _After it was +sold, was it not in thine own power?_ + +To which the answer is the same with that I answered to the former +places: that they prove that there is election, but do not disprove the +necessity which I maintain of what they so elect. + +“We have had the very same answer twice before. It seemeth that he is +well-pleased with it, or else he would not draw it in again so suddenly +by head and shoulders to no purpose, if he did not conceive it to be a +panchreston, a salve for all sores, or _dictamnum_, sovereign dittany, +to make all his adversaries’ weapons to drop out of the wounds of his +cause, only by chewing it, without any application to the sore. I will +not waste the time to show any further, how the members of his +distinction do cross one another, and one take away another. To make +every election to be of one thing imposed by necessity, and of another +thing which is absolutely impossible, is to make election to be no +election at all. But I forbear to press that at present. If I may be +bold to use his own phrase, his answer looks quite another way from mine +argument. My second reason was this: ‘They who may do, and might have +done many things which they leave undone, and who leave undone many +things which they might do, are not necessitated, nor precisely and +antecedently determined to what they do.’ + +“But we might do many things which we do not, and we do many things +which we might leave undone, as appears evidently by the texts alleged. +Therefore we are not antecedently and precisely determined, nor +necessitated to do all things which we do. What is here of _election_ in +this argument? To what proposition, to what term doth T. H. apply his +answer? He neither affirms, nor denieth, nor distinguisheth of any thing +contained in my argument. Here I must be bold to call upon him for a +more pertinent answer.” + + ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. IX. + +The Bishop, for the proving of free-will, had alleged this text: +_Because thou hast asked this thing, and hast not asked for thyself long +life_, &c. And another, (Acts v. 4): _After it was sold, was it not in +thine own power?_ Out of which he infers, there was no necessity that +Solomon should ask wisdom rather than long life, nor that Ananias should +tell a lie concerning the price for which he sold his land: and my +answer, that they prove election, but disprove not the necessity of +election, satisfieth him not; because, saith he, (_a_) “they who might +have done what they left undone, and left undone what they might have +done, are not necessitated.” + +But how doth he know (understanding power properly taken) that Solomon +had a real power to ask long life? No doubt Solomon knew nothing to the +contrary; but yet it was possible that God might have hindered him. For +though God gave Solomon his choice, that is, the thing which he should +choose, it doth not follow, that he did not also give him the act of +election. And for the other text, where it is said, that the price of +the land was in Ananias’s power, the word _power_ signifieth no more +than the word right, that is, the right to do with his own what he +pleased, which is not a real and natural power, but a civil power made +by covenant. And therefore the former answer is sufficient, that though +such places are clear enough to prove election, they have no strength at +all to take away necessity. + + NO. X. + +[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] + +_J. D._ “Thirdly, if there be no true liberty, but all things come to +pass by inevitable necessity, then what are all those interrogations, +and objurgations, and reprehensions, and expostulations, which we find +so frequently in holy Scriptures, (be it spoken with all due respect), +but feigned and hypocritical exaggerations? _Hast thou eaten of the +tree, whereof I commanded that thou shouldst not eat?_ (Gen. iii. 11.) +And (verse 13) he saith to Eve, _Why hast thou done this?_ And (Gen. iv. +6) to Cain, _Why art thou wroth, and why is thy countenance cast down?_ +And, (Ezech. xviii. 31): _Why will ye die, O house of Israel?_ Doth God +command openly not to eat, and yet secretly by himself or by the second +causes necessitate him to eat? Doth he reprehend him for doing that, +which he hath antecedently determined that he must do? Doth he propose +things under impossible conditions? Or were not this plain mockery and +derision? Doth a loving master chide his servant because he doth not +come at his call, and yet knows that the poor servant is chained and +fettered, so as he cannot move, by the master’s own order, without the +servant’s default or consent? They who talk here of a twofold will of +God, _secret_ and _revealed_, and the one opposite to the other, +understand not what they say. These two wills concern several persons. +The secret will of God, is what he will do himself; the revealed will of +God, is what he would have us to do; it may be the secret will of God to +take away the life of the father, yet it is God’s revealed will that his +son should wish his life and pray for his life. Here is no +contradiction, where the agents are distinct. But for the same person to +command one thing, and yet to necessitate him that is commanded to do +another thing; to chide a man for doing that, which he hath determined +inevitably and irresistibly that he must do; this were (I am afraid to +utter what they are not afraid to assert) the highest dissimulation. +God’s chiding proves man’s liberty.” + +_T. H._ To the third and fifth arguments, I shall make but one answer. + +_J. D._ (_a_) “Certainly distinct arguments, as the third and fifth are, +the one drawn from the truth of God, the other from the justice of God, +the one from his objurgations and reprehensions, the other from his +judgments after life, did require distinct answers. But the plain truth +is, that neither here, nor in his answer to the fifth argument, nor in +this whole treatise, is there one word of solution or satisfaction to +this argument, or to any part of it. All that looks like an answer is +contained, No. XII: ‘That which he does is made just by his doing; just, +I say, in him, not always just in us by the example; for a man that +shall command a thing openly, and plot secretly the hinderance of the +same, if he punish him whom he commanded so for not doing it, is +unjust.’ (_b_) I dare not insist upon it, I hope his meaning is not so +bad as the words intimate and as I apprehend, that is, to impute +falsehood to Him that is truth itself, and to justify feigning and +dissimulation in God, as he doth tyranny, by the infiniteness of his +power and the absoluteness of his dominion. And therefore, by his leave, +I must once again tender him a new summons for a full and clear answer +to this argument also. He tells us, that he was not surprised. Whether +he were or not, is more than I know. But this I see plainly, that either +he is not provided, or that his cause admits no choice of answers. The +Jews dealt ingeniously, when they met with a difficult knot which they +could not untie, to put it upon Elias: _Elias will answer it when he +comes_. + + ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. X. + +The Bishop argued thus: “Thirdly, if there be no true liberty, but all +things come to pass by inevitable necessity, then what are those +interrogations we find so frequently in holy Scriptures, (be it spoken +with all due respect), but feigned and hypocritical exaggerations?” Here +putting together two repugnant suppositions, either craftily or (be it +spoken with all due respect) ignorantly, he would have men believe, +because I hold necessity, that I deny liberty, I hold as much that there +is true liberty as he doth, and more, for I hold it as from necessity, +and that there must of necessity be liberty; but he holds it not from +necessity, and so makes it possible there may be none. His +expostulations were, first, _Hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I +commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat?_ Secondly, _Why hast thou +done this?_ Thirdly, _Why art thou wroth, and why is thy countenance +cast down?_ Fourthly, _Why will ye die, O house of Israel?_ These +arguments requiring the same answer which some other do, I thought fit +to remit them to their fellows. But the Bishop will not allow me that. +For he saith, + +(_a_) “Certainly, distinct arguments, as the third and fifth are, &c. +did require distinct answers.” + +I am therefore to give an account of the meaning of the aforesaid +objurgations and expostulations; not of the end for which God said, +_Hast thou eaten of the tree, &c._, but how those words may be taken +without repugnance to the doctrine of necessity. These words, _Hast thou +eaten of the tree whereof I commanded that thou shouldst not eat_, +convince Adam that, notwithstanding God had placed in the garden a means +to keep him perpetually from dying in case he should accommodate his +will to obedience of God’s commandment concerning the tree of knowledge +of good and evil, yet Adam was not so much master of his own will as to +do it. Whereby is signified, that a mortal man, though invited by the +promise of immortality, cannot govern his own will, though his will +govern his actions; which dependence of the actions on the will, is that +which properly and truly is called _liberty_. And the like may be said +of the words to Eve, _Why hast thou done this?_ and of those to Cain, +_Why art thou wroth? &c._ and to Israel, _Why will ye die, O house of +Israel?_ But the Bishop here will say _die_ signifieth not _die_, but +live eternally in torments; for by such interpretations any man may +answer anything. And whereas he asketh, “Doth God reprehend him for +doing that which he hath antecedently determined him that he must do?” I +answer, no; but he convinceth and instructeth him, that though +immortality was so easy to obtain, as it might be had for the abstinence +from the fruit of one only tree, yet he could not obtain it but by +pardon, and by the sacrifice of Jesus Christ: nor is there here any +punishment, but only a reducing of Adam and Eve to their original +mortality, where death was no punishment but a gift of God. In which +mortality he lived near a thousand years, and had a numerous issue, and +lived without misery, and I believe shall at the resurrection obtain the +immortality which then he lost. Nor in all this is there any plotting +secretly, or any mockery or derision, which the Bishop would make men +believe there is. And whereas he saith, that “they who talk here of a +twofold will of God, secret and revealed, and the one opposite to the +other, understand not what they say:” the Protestant doctors, both of +our and other Churches, did use to distinguish between the secret and +revealed will of God; the former they called _voluntas bene placiti_, +which signifieth absolutely his will, the other _voluntas signi_, that +is, the signification of his will, in the same sense that I call the one +his _will_, the other his _commandment_, which may sometimes differ. For +God’s commandment to Abraham was, that he should sacrifice Isaac, but +his will was, that he should not do it. God’s denunciation to Nineveh +was, that it should be destroyed within forty days, but his will was, +that it should not. + +(_b_) “I dare not insist upon it, I hope his meaning is not so bad, as +the words intimate, and as I apprehend; that is, to impute falsehood to +Him that is truth itself,” &c. + +What damned rhetoric and subtle calumny is this? God, I said, might +command a thing openly, and yet hinder the doing of it, without +injustice; but if a man should command a thing to be done, and then plot +secretly the hinderance of the same, and punish for the not doing it, it +were injustice. This it is which the Bishop apprehends as an imputation +of falsehood to God Almighty. And perhaps if the death of a sinner were, +as he thinks, an eternal life in extreme misery, a man might as far as +Job hath done, expostulate with God Almighty; not accusing him of +injustice, because whatsoever he doth is therefore just because done by +him; but of little tenderness and love to mankind. And this +expostulation will be equally just or unjust, whether the necessity of +all things be granted or denied. For it is manifest that God could have +made man impeccable, and can now preserve him from sin, or forgive him +if he please; and therefore, if he please not, the expostulation is as +reasonable in the cases of _liberty_ as of _necessity_. + + NO. XI. + +[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] + +_J. D._ “Fourthly, if either the decree of God, or the foreknowledge of +God, or the influence of the stars, or the concatenation of causes, or +the physical or moral efficacy of objects, or the last dictate of the +understanding, do take away true liberty, then Adam before his fall had +no true liberty. For he was subjected to the same decrees, the same +prescience, the same constellations, the same causes, the same objects, +the same dictates of the understanding. But, _quicquid ostendes mihi +sic, incredulus odi_; the greatest opposers of our liberty, are as +earnest maintainers of the liberty of Adam. Therefore none of these +supposed impediments take away true liberty.” + +_T. H._ The fourth argument is to this effect: “If the decree of God, or +his foreknowledge, or the influence of the stars, or the concatenation +of causes, or the physical or moral efficacy of causes, or the last +dictate of the understanding, or whatsoever it be, do take away true +liberty, then Adam before his fall had no true liberty. _Quicquid +ostendes mihi sic, incredulus odi._” That which I say necessitateth and +determineth every action, (that he may no longer doubt of my meaning), +is the sum of all those things, which being now existent, conduce and +concur to the production of that action hereafter, whereof if any one +thing now were wanting, the effect could not be produced. This concourse +of causes, whereof every one is determined to be such as it is by a like +concourse of former causes, may well be called (in respect they were all +set and ordered by the eternal cause of all things, God Almighty) the +decree of God. + +But that the foreknowledge of God should be a cause of any thing, cannot +be truly said; seeing foreknowledge is knowledge, and knowledge +dependeth on the existence of the things known, and not they on it. + +The influence of the stars is but a small part of the whole cause, +consisting of the concourse of all agents. + +Nor doth the concourse of all causes make one simple chain or +concatenation, but an innumerable number of chains joined together, not +in all parts, but in the first link, God Almighty; and consequently the +whole cause of an event does not always depend upon one single chain, +but on many together. + +Natural efficacy of objects does determine voluntary agents, and +necessitates the will, and consequently the action; but for moral +efficacy, I understand not what he means by it. The last dictate of the +judgment concerning the good or bad that may follow on any action, is +not properly the whole cause, but the last part of it; and yet may be +said to produce the effect necessarily, in such manner as the last +feather may be said to break an horse’s back, when there were so many +laid on before as there wanted but that to do it. + +Now for his argument, that if the concourse of all the causes +necessitate the effect, that then it follows, Adam had no true liberty. +I deny the consequence; for I make not only the effect, but also the +election of that particular effect to be necessary, inasmuch as the will +itself, and each propension of a man during his deliberation, is as much +necessitated, and depends on a sufficient cause, as any thing else +whatsoever. As for example, it is no more necessary that fire should +burn, than that a man, or other creature, whose limbs be moved by fancy, +should have election, that is, liberty to do what he has a fancy to, +though it be not in his will or power to choose his fancy, or choose his +election or will. + +This doctrine, because he says he hates, I doubt had better been +suppressed; as it should have been, if both your Lordship and he had not +pressed me to an answer. + +_J. D._ (_a_) “This argument was sent forth only as an espy to make a +more full discovery, what were the true grounds of T. H.’s supposed +necessity. Which errand being done, and the foundation whereupon he +builds being found out, which is, as I called it, a concatenation of +causes, and, as he calls it, a concourse of necessary causes; it would +now be a superfluous and impertinent work in me to undertake the +refutation of all those other opinions, which he doth not undertake to +defend. And therefore I shall waive them at the present, with these +short animadversions. + +(_b_) “Concerning the eternal decree of God, he confounds the decree +itself with the execution of his decree. And concerning the +foreknowledge of God, he confounds that speculative knowledge, which is +called _the knowledge of vision_, (which doth not produce the +intellective objects, no more than the sensitive vision doth produce the +sensible objects), with that other knowledge of God, which is called the +_knowledge of approbation_, or _a practical knowledge_, that is, +knowledge joined with an act of the will, of which divines do truly say, +that it is the cause of things, as the knowledge of the artist is the +cause of his work. John i.: _God made all things by his word_; that is, +by his wisdom. Concerning the influence of the stars, I wish he had +expressed himself more clearly. For as I do willingly grant, that those +heavenly bodies do act upon these sublunary things, not only by their +motion and light, but also by an occult virtue, which we call influence, +as we see by manifold experience in the loadstone and shell-fish, &c.: +so if he intend that by these influences they do naturally or physically +determine the will, or have any direct dominion over human counsels, +either in whole or in part, either more or less, he is in an error. +Concerning the concatenation of causes, whereas he makes not one chain, +but an innumerable number of chains, (I hope he speaks hyperbolically, +and doth not intend that they are actually infinite), the difference is +not material whether one or many, so long as they are all joined +together, both in the first link, and likewise in the effect. It serves +to no end but to shew what a shadow of liberty T. H. doth fancy, or +rather what a dream of a shadow. As if one chain were not sufficient to +load poor man, but he must be clogged with innumerable chains. This is +just such another freedom as the Turkish galley-slaves do enjoy. But I +admire that T. H., who is so versed in this question, should here +confess that he understands not the difference between physical or +natural, and moral efficacy: and much more that he should affirm, that +outward objects do determine voluntary agents by a natural efficacy. No +object, no second agent, angel or devil, can determine the will of man +naturally, but God alone, in respect of his supreme dominion over all +things. Then the will is determined naturally, when God Almighty, +besides his general influence, whereupon all second causes do depend, as +well for their being as for their acting, doth moreover at some times, +when it pleases him in cases extraordinary, concur by a special +influence, and infuse something into the will, in the nature of an act, +or an habit, whereby the will is moved and excited, and applied to will +or choose this or that. Then the will is determined morally, when some +object is proposed to it with persuasive reasons and arguments to induce +it to will. Where the determination is natural, the liberty to suspend +its act is taken away from the will, but not so where the determination +is moral. In the former case, the will is determined extrinsically, in +the latter case intrinsically; the former produceth an absolute +necessity, the latter only a necessity of supposition. If the will do +not suspend, but assent, then the act is necessary; but because the will +may suspend, and not assent, therefore it is not absolutely necessary. +In the former case, the will is moved necessarily and determinately; in +the latter, freely and indeterminately. The former excitation is +immediate; the latter is mediate _mediante intellectu_, and requires the +help of the understanding. In a word, so great a difference there is +between natural and moral efficacy, as there is between his opinion and +mine in this question. + +“There remains only the last dictate of the understanding, which he +maketh to be the last cause that concurreth to the determination of the +will, and to the necessary production of the act, ‘as the last feather +may be said to break an horse’s back, when there were so many laid on +before that there wanted but that to do it.’ I have shewed (No. VII.) +that the last dictate of the understanding is not always absolute in +itself, nor conclusive to the will; and when it is conclusive, yet it +produceth no antecedent nor extrinsical necessity. I shall only add one +thing more at present, that by making the last judgment of right reason +to be of no more weight than a single feather, he wrongs the +understanding as well as he doth the will; and endeavours to deprive the +will of its supreme power of application, and to deprive the +understanding of its supreme power of judicature and definition. Neither +corporeal agents and objects, nor yet the sensitive appetite itself, +being an inferior faculty and affixed to the organ of the body, have any +direct or immediate dominion or command over the rational will. It is +without the sphere of their activity. All the access which they have +unto the will, is by the means of the understanding, sometimes clear and +sometimes disturbed, and of reason, either right or misinformed. Without +the help of the understanding, all his second causes were not able of +themselves to load the horse’s back with so much weight as the least of +all his feathers doth amount unto. But we shall meet with his horseload +of feathers again, No. XXIII. + +“These things being thus briefly touched, he proceeds to his answer. My +argument was this: if any of these or all these causes formerly recited, +do take away true liberty, (that is, still intended from necessity), +then Adam before his fall had no true liberty. + +“But Adam before his fall had true liberty. + +“He mis-recites the argument, and denies the consequence, which is so +clearly proved, that no man living can doubt of it. Because Adam was +subjected to all the same causes as well as we, the same decree, the +same prescience, the same influences, the same concourse of causes, the +same efficacy of objects, the same dictates of reason. But it is only a +mistake; for it appears plainly by his following discourse, that he +intended to deny, not the consequence, but the assumption. For he makes +Adam to have had no liberty from necessity before his fall, yea, he +proceeds so far as to affirm that all human wills, his and ours, and +each propension of our wills, even during our deliberation, are as much +necessitated as anything else whatsoever; that we have no more power to +forbear those actions which we do, than the fire hath power not to burn. +Though I honour T. H. for his person and for his learning, yet I must +confess ingenuously, I hate this doctrine from my heart. And I believe +both I have reason so to do, and all others who shall seriously ponder +the horrid consequences which flow from it. It destroys liberty, and +dishonours the nature of man. It makes the second causes and outward +objects to be the rackets, and men to be but the tennis-balls of +destiny. It makes the first cause, that is, God Almighty, to be the +introducer of all evil and sin into the world, as much as man, yea, more +than man, by as much as the motion of the watch is more from the +artificer, who did make it and wind it up, than either from the spring, +or the wheels, or the thread, if God, by his special influence into the +second causes, did necessitate them to operate as they did. And if they, +being thus determined, did necessitate Adam inevitably, irresistibly, +not by an accidental, but by an essential subordination of causes to +whatsoever he did, then one of these two absurdities must needs follow: +either that Adam did not sin, and that there is no such thing as sin in +the world, because it proceeds naturally, necessarily, and essentially +from God; or that God is more guilty of it, and more the cause of evil +than man, because man is extrinsically, inevitably determined, but so is +not God. And in causes essentially subordinate, the cause of the cause +is always the cause of the effect. What tyrant did ever impose laws that +were impossible for those to keep, upon whom they were imposed, and +punish them for breaking those laws, which he himself had necessitated +them to break, which it was no more in their power not to break, than it +is in the power of the fire not to burn? Excuse me if I hate this +doctrine with a perfect hatred, which is so dishonourable both to God +and man; which makes men to blaspheme of necessity, to steal of +necessity, to be hanged of necessity, and to be damned of necessity. And +therefore I must say and say again, _quicquid ostendes mihi sic, +incredulus odi_. It were better to be an atheist, to believe no God; or +to be a Manichee, to believe two Gods, a God of good and a God of evil; +or with the heathens, to believe thirty thousand Gods: than thus to +charge the true God to be the proper cause and the true author of all +the sins and evils which are in the world.” + + ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. XI. + +(_a_) “This argument was sent forth only as an espy, to make a more full +discovery, what were the true grounds of T. H.’s supposed necessity.” + +The argument which he sendeth forth as an espy, is this: “If either the +decree of God, or the foreknowledge of God, or the influence of the +stars, or the concatenation (which he says falsely I call a concourse) +of causes, of the physical or moral efficacy of objects, or the last +dictate of the understanding, do take away true liberty, then Adam +before his fall had no true liberty.” In answer whereunto I said, that +all the things now existent were necessary to the production of the +effect to come; that the _foreknowledge_ of God causeth nothing, though +the _will_ do; that the influence of the stars is but a small part of +that cause which maketh the necessity; and that this consequence, “if +the concourse of all the causes necessitate the effect, then Adam had no +true liberty,” was false. But in his words, if these do take away true +liberty, then Adam before his fall had no true liberty, the consequence +is good; but then I deny that necessity takes away liberty; the reason +whereof, which is this, _liberty is to choose what we will, not to +choose our will_, no inculcation is sufficient to make the Bishop take +notice of, notwithstanding he be otherwhere so witty, and here so +crafty, as to send out arguments for spies. The cause why I denied the +consequence was, that I thought the force thereof consisted in this, +that necessity in the Bishop’s opinion destroyed liberty. + +(_b_) “Concerning the eternal decree of God,” &c. + +Here begins his reply. From which if we take these words; “knowledge of +approbation;” “practical knowledge;” “heavenly bodies act upon sublunary +things, not only by their motion, but also by an occult virtue, which we +call influence;” “moral efficacy;” “general influence;” “special +influence;” “infuse something into the will;” “the will is moved;” “the +will is induced to will;” “the will suspends its own act;” which are all +nonsense, unworthy of a man, nay, and if a beast could speak, unworthy +of a beast, and can befal no creature whose nature is not depraved by +doctrine; nothing at all remaineth to be answered. Perhaps the word, +_occult virtue_, is not to be taxed as unintelligible. But then I may +tax therein the want of ingenuity in him that had rather say, that +heavenly bodies _do work by an occult virtue_, than that they _work he +knoweth not how_; which he would not confess, but endeavours to make +_occult_ be taken for a _cause_. The rest of this reply is one of those +consequences, which I have answered in the beginning, where I compare +the inconveniences of both opinions, that is, “that either Adam did not +sin, or his sin proceeded necessarily from God;” which is no stronger a +consequence than if out of this, “that a man is lame necessarily,” one +should infer, that _either he is not lame_, or that _his lameness +proceeded necessarily from the will of God_. To the end of this number +there is nothing more of argument. The place is filled up with wondering +and railing. + + NO. XII. + +[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] + +_J. D._ “Fifthly, if there be no liberty, there shall be no day of doom, +no last judgment, no rewards nor punishments after death. A man can +never make himself a criminal, if he be not left at liberty to commit a +crime. No man can be justly punished for doing that which was not in his +power to shun. To take away liberty hazards heaven, but undoubtedly it +leaves no hell.” + +_T. H._ The arguments of greatest consequence are the third and fifth, +and fall both into one: namely, if there be a necessity of all events, +that it will follow that praise and reprehension, reward and punishment, +are all vain and unjust: and that if God should openly forbid, and +secretly necessitate the same action, punishing men for what they could +not avoid, there would be no belief among them of heaven or hell. + +To oppose hereunto, I must borrow an answer from St. Paul (Rom. ix.), +from the eleventh verse of the chapter to the eighteenth, is laid down +the very same objection in these words: _When they_ (meaning Esau and +Jacob) _were yet unborn, and had done neither good nor evil, that the +purpose of God according to election, not by works, but by him that +calleth, might remain firm, it was said to her_ (viz. to Rebecca) _that +the elder shall serve the younger. And what then shall we say, is there +injustice with God? God forbid. It is not therefore in him that willeth, +nor in him that runneth, but in God that showeth mercy. For the +Scripture saith to Pharaoh, I have stirred thee up, that I may show my +power in thee, and that my name may be set forth in all the earth. +Therefore whom God willeth he hath mercy on, and whom he willeth he +hardeneth._ Thus, you see, the case put by St. Paul is the same with +that of J. D., and the same objection in these words following (verse +19): _Thou wilt ask me then, why will God yet complain; for who hath +resisted his will?_ To this therefore the apostle answers, not by +denying it was God’s will, or that the decree of God concerning Esau was +not before he had sinned, or that Esau was not necessitated to do what +he did; but thus (verse 20, 21): _Who art thou, O man, that +interrogatest God? Shall the work say to the workman, why hast thou made +me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same stuff to +make one vessel to honour, another to dishonour?_ According therefore to +this answer of St. Paul, I answer J. D.’s objection, and say, the power +of God alone, without other help, is sufficient justification of any +action he doth. That which men make among themselves here by pacts and +covenants, and call by the name of justice, and according whereunto men +are counted and termed rightly just and unjust, is not that by which God +Almighty’s actions are to be measured or called just, no more than his +counsels are to be measured by human wisdom. That which he does is made +just by his doing; just I say in him, not always just in us by the +example; for a man that shall command a thing openly, and plot secretly +the hindrance of the same, if he punish him he so commanded for not +doing it, is unjust. So also his counsels, they be therefore not in +vain, because they be his, whether we see the use of them or not. When +God afflicted Job, he did object no sin to him, but justified that +afflicting him by telling him of his power. _Hast thou_ (says God) _an +arm like mine? Where wast thou, when I laid the foundations of the +earth?_ and the like. So our Saviour, concerning the man that was born +blind, said, it was not for his sin, nor his parents’ sin, but that the +power of God might be shown in him. Beasts are subject to death and +torment, yet they cannot sin. It was God’s will it should be so. Power +irresistible justified all actions really and properly, in whomsoever it +be found. Less power does not. And because such power is in God only, he +must needs be just in all his actions. And we, that not comprehending +his counsels, call him to the bar, commit injustice in it. + +I am not ignorant of the usual reply to this answer, by distinguishing +between will and permission. As, that God Almighty does indeed permit +sin sometimes, and that he also foreknoweth that the sin he permitteth +shall be committed; but does not will it, nor necessitate it. I know +also they distinguish the action from the sin of the action, saying, God +Almighty doth indeed cause the action, whatsoever action it be, but not +the sinfulness or irregularity of it, that is, the discordance between +the action and the law. Such distinctions as these dazzle my +understanding. I find no difference between the will to have a thing +done, and the permission to do it, when he that permitteth it can hinder +it, and knows it will be done unless he hinder it. Nor find I any +difference between an action that is against the law, and the sin of +that action. As for example, between the killing of Uriah, and the sin +of David in killing Uriah. Nor when one is cause both of the action and +of the law, how another can be cause of the disagreement between them, +no more than how one man making a longer and shorter garment, another +can make the inequality that is between them. This I know, God cannot +sin, because his doing a thing makes it just, and consequently no sin: +and because whatsoever can sin is subject to another’s law, which God is +not. And therefore it is blasphemy to say, God can sin. But to say, that +God can so order the world as a sin may be necessarily caused thereby in +a man, I do not see how it is any dishonour to him. Howsoever, if such +or other distinctions can make it clear that St. Paul did not think +Esau’s or Pharaoh’s actions proceeded from the will and purpose of God, +or that proceeding from his will could not therefore without injustice +be blamed or punished, I will, as soon as I understand them, turn unto +J. D.’s opinion. For I now hold nothing in all this question between us, +but what seemeth to me not obscurely, but most expressly said in this +place by St. Paul. And thus much in answer to his places of Scripture. + +_J. D._ T. H. thinks to kill two birds with one stone, and satisfy two +arguments with one answer, whereas in truth he satisfieth neither. +First, for my third reason. (_a_) Though all he say here were as true as +an oracle; though punishment were an act of dominion, not of justice in +God; yet this is no sufficient cause why God should deny his own act, or +why he should chide or expostulate with men, why they did that which he +himself did necessitate them to do, and whereof he was the actor more +than they, they being but as the stone, but he the hand that threw it. +Notwithstanding anything which is pleaded here, this stoical opinion +doth stick hypocrisy and dissimulation close to God, who is truth +itself. + +“And to my fifth argument, which he changeth and relateth amiss, as by +comparing mine with his may appear, his chiefest answer is to oppose a +difficult place of St. Paul (Rom. ix. 11.) Hath he never heard, that to +propose a doubt is not to answer an argument: _nec bene respondet qui +litem lite resolvit_? But I will not pay him in his own coin. Wherefore +to this place alleged by him, I answer, the case is not the same. The +question moved there is, how God did keep his promise made to Abraham, +_to be the God of him and of his seed_, if the Jews who were the +legitimate progeny of Abraham were deserted. To which the apostle +answers (vers. 6, 7, 8), that that promise was not made to the carnal +seed of Abraham, that is, the Jews, but to his spiritual sons, which +were the heirs of his faith, that is, to the believing Christians; which +answer he explicateth, first by the allegory of Isaac and Ishmael, and +after in the place cited of Esau and Jacob. Yet neither does he speak +there so much of their persons as of their posterities. And though some +words may be accommodated to God’s predestination, which are there +uttered, yet it is not the scope of that text, to treat of the +reprobation of any man to hell fire. All the posterity of Esau were not +eternally reprobated, as holy Job and many others. But this question +which is now agitated between us, is quite of another nature, how a man +can be a criminal who doth nothing but that which he is extrinsically +necessitated to do, or how God in justice can punish a man with eternal +torments for doing that which it was never in his power to leave undone; +or why he who did imprint the motion in the heart of man, should punish +man, who did only receive the impression from him. So his answer _looks +another way_. + +“But because he grounds so much upon this text, that if it can be +cleared he is ready to change his opinion, I will examine all those +passages which may seem to favour his cause. First, these words (ver. +11): _being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil_, upon +which the whole weight of his argument doth depend, have no reference at +all to those words (verse 13), _Jacob have I loved, and Esau have I +hated_; for those words were first uttered by the prophet Malachi, many +ages after Jacob and Esau were dead (Mal. i. 2, 3), and intended of the +posterity of Esau, who were not redeemed from captivity as the +Israelites were. But they are referred to those other words (verse 12), +_the elder shall serve the younger_, which indeed were spoken before +Jacob or Esau were born. (Gen. xxv. 23.) And though those words of +Malachi had been used of Jacob and Esau before they were born, yet it +had advantaged his cause nothing: for hatred in that text doth not +signify any reprobation to the flames of hell, much less the execution +of that decree, or the actual imposition of punishment, nor any act +contrary to love. God saw all that he had made, and it was very good. +Goodness itself cannot hate that which is good. But hatred there +signifies comparative hatred, or a less degree of love, or at the most a +negation of love. As (Gen. xxix. 31), _when the Lord saw that Leah was +hated_, we may not conclude thence that Jacob hated his wife; the +precedent verse doth fully expound the sense (verse 30): _Jacob loved +Rachel more than Leah_. So (Matth. vi. 24), _No man can serve two +masters, for either he will hate the one and love the other_. So (Luke +xiv. 26), _If any man hate not his father and mother, &c. he cannot be +my disciple_. St. Matthew (x. 37) tells us the sense of it: _He that +loveth father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me_. + +“Secondly, those words (ver. 15) _I will have mercy on whom I will have +mercy_, do prove no more but this, that the preferring of Jacob before +Esau, and of the Christians before the Jews, was not a debt from God +either to the one or to the other, but a work of mercy. And what of +this? All men confess that God’s mercies do exceed man’s deserts, but +God’s punishments do never exceed man’s misdeeds. As we see in the +parable of the labourers (Matth. xx. 13-15): _Friend, I do thee no +wrong. Did not I agree with thee for a penny? Is it not lawful for me to +do with mine own as I will? Is thy eye evil, because I am good?_ Acts of +mercy are free, but acts of justice are due. + +“That which follows (verse 17) comes something nearer the cause. _The +Scripture saith unto Pharaoh, for this same purpose I have raised thee +up_, (that is, I have made thee a king, or I have preserved thee), _that +I might show my power in thee_. But this particle, _that_, doth not +always signify the main end of an action, but sometimes only a +consequent of it, as Matth. ii. 15: _He departed into Egypt_, that _it +might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophet, out of Egypt have I +called my son_. Without doubt Joseph’s aim or end of his journey was not +to fulfil prophecies, but to save the life of the child. Yet because the +fulfilling of the prophecy was a consequent of Joseph’s journey, he +saith, _that it might be fulfilled_. So here, _I have raised thee up, +that I might show my power_. Again, though it should be granted that +this particle _that_, did denote the intention of God to destroy Pharaoh +in the Red Sea, yet it was not the antecedent intention of God, which +evermore respects the good and benefit of the creature, but God’s +consequent intention upon the prevision of Pharaoh’s obstinacy, that +since he would not glorify God in obeying his word, he should glorify +God undergoing his judgments. Hitherto we find no eternal punishments, +nor no temporal punishment without just deserts. + +“It follows, (ver. 18), _whom he will he hardeneth_. Indeed hardness of +heart is the greatest judgment that God lays upon a sinner in this life, +worse than all the plagues of Egypt. But how doth God harden the heart? +Not by a natural influence of any evil act or habit into the will, nor +by inducing the will with persuasive motives to obstinacy and rebellion +(James i. 13, 14): _For God tempteth no man, but every man is tempted +when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed_. Then God is said to +harden the heart three ways; first, negatively, and not positively; not +by imparting wickedness, but by not imparting grace; as the sun +descending to the tropic of Capricorn, is said with us to be the cause +of winter, that is, not by imparting cold, but by not imparting heat. It +is an act of mercy in God to give his grace freely, but to detain it is +no act of injustice. So the apostle opposeth hardening to shewing of +mercy. To harden is as much as not to shew mercy. + +“Secondly, God is said to harden the heart occasionally and not +causally, by doing good, (which incorrigible sinners make an occasion of +growing worse and worse), and doing evil; as a master by often +correcting of an untoward scholar, doth accidentally and occasionally +harden his heart, and render him more obdurate, insomuch as he grows +even to despise the rod. Or as an indulgent parent by his patience and +gentleness doth encourage an obstinate son to become more rebellious. +So, whether we look upon God’s frequent judgments upon Pharaoh, or God’s +iterated favours in removing and withdrawing those judgments upon +Pharaoh’s request, both of them in their several kinds were occasions of +hardening Pharaoh’s heart, the one making him more presumptuous, the +other more desperately rebellious. So that which was good in it was +God’s; that which was evil was Pharaoh’s. God gave the occasion, but +Pharaoh was the true cause of his own obduration. This is clearly +confirmed, Exodus viii. 15: _When Pharaoh saw that there was respite, he +hardened his heart_. And Exodus ix. 34: _When Pharaoh saw that the rain +and the hail and the thunders were ceased, he sinned yet more, and +hardened his heart, he and his servants_. So Psalm cv. 25: _He turned +their hearts, so that they hated his people, and dealt subtly with +them_. That is, God blessed the children of Israel, whereupon the +Egyptians did take occasion to hate them, as is plain, Exodus i. 7, 8, +9, 10. So God hardened Pharaoh’s heart, and Pharaoh hardened his own +heart. God hardened it by not shewing mercy to Pharaoh, as he did to +Nebuchadnezzar, who was as great a sinner as he, or God hardened it +occasionally; but still Pharaoh was the true cause of his own +obduration, by determining his own will to evil, and confirming himself +in his obstinacy. So are all presumptuous sinners, (Psalm xcv. 8): +_Harden not your hearts as in the provocation, or as in the day of +temptation in the wilderness_. + +“Thirdly, God is said to harden the heart permissively, but not +operatively, nor effectively, as he who only lets loose a greyhound out +of the slip, is said to hound him at the hare. Will you see plainly what +St. Paul intends by hardening? Read Rom. ix. 22, 23: _What if God, +willing to shew his wrath and to make his power known_ (that is, by a +consequent will, which in order of nature follows the prevision of sin), +_endured with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to +destruction. And that he might make known the riches of his glory on the +vessels of mercy_, &c. There is much difference between _enduring_ and +_impelling_, or inciting the vessels of wrath. He saith of the vessels +of mercy, that _God prepared them unto glory_. But of the vessels of +wrath, he saith only that they were _fitted to destruction_, that is, +not by God, but by themselves. St. Paul saith, that God doth _endure the +vessels of wrath with much long-suffering_. T. H. saith, that God wills +and effects by the second causes all their actions good and bad, that he +necessitateth them, and determineth them irresistibly to do those acts +which he condemneth as evil, and for which he punisheth them. If _doing +willingly_, and _enduring_, if _much long-suffering_, and +_necessitating_, imply not a contrariety one to another, _reddat mihi +minam Diogenes_, let him that taught me logic, give me my money again. + +“But T. H. saith, that this distinction between the _operative_ and +_permissive_ will of God, and that other between the action and the +irregularity, do dazzle his understanding. Though he can find no +difference between these two, yet others do; St. Paul himself did (Acts +xiii. 18): _About the time of forty years suffered he their manners in +the wilderness_. And (Acts xiv. 16): _Who in times past suffered all +nations to walk in their own ways._ T. H. would make suffering to be +inciting, their manners to be God’s manners, their ways to be God’s +ways. And (Acts xvii. 30): _The times of this ignorance God winked at_. +It was never heard that one was said to wink or connive at that which +was his own act. And (1 Cor. x. 13): _God is faithful, who will not +suffer you to be tempted above that you are able_. To tempt is the +devil’s act; therefore he is called the _tempter_. God tempts no man to +sin, but he suffers them to be tempted. And so suffers, that he could +hinder Satan, if he would. But by T. H.’s doctrine, to tempt to sin, and +to suffer one to be tempted to sin when it is in his power to hinder it, +is all one. And so he transforms God (I write it with horror) into the +devil, and makes tempting to be God’s own work, and the devil to be but +his instrument. And in that noted place, (Rom. ii. 4, 5): _Despisest +thou the riches of his goodness and forbearance and long-suffering, not +knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance; but after +thy hardness and impenitent heart treasurest up unto thyself wrath +against the day of wrath, and revelation of the righteous judgment of +God?_ Here are as many convincing arguments in this one text against the +opinion of T. H. almost as there are words. Here we learn that God is +_rich in goodness_, and will not punish his creatures for that which is +his own act; secondly, that he _suffers_ and _forbears sinners long_, +and doth not snatch them away by sudden death as they deserve. Thirdly, +that the reason of God’s forbearance is to _bring men to repentance_. +Fourthly, that _hardness of heart and impenitency_ is not causally from +God, but from ourselves. Fifthly, that it is not the insufficient +proposal of the means of their conversion on God’s part, which is the +cause of men’s perdition, but their own contempt and despising of these +means. Sixthly, that punishment is not an act of absolute dominion, but +an act of righteous judgment, whereby God renders to every man according +to his own deeds, wrath to them and only to them who _treasure up wrath +unto themselves_, and eternal life to those who _continue patiently in +well-doing_. If they deserve such punishment who only neglect the +goodness and long-suffering of God, what do they who utterly deny it, +and make God’s doing and his suffering to be all one? I do beseech T. H. +to consider what a degree of wilfulness it is, out of one obscure text +wholly misunderstood to contradict the clear current of the whole +Scripture. Of the same mind with St. Paul was St. Peter, (1 Peter iii. +20): _The long-suffering of God waited once in the days of Noah_. And 2 +Peter iii. 15: _Account that the long-suffering of the Lord is +salvation_. This is the name God gives himself, (Exod. xxxiv. 6): _The +Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering_, &c. + +(_b_) “Yet I do acknowledge that which T. H. saith to be commonly true, +that he who doth permit any thing to be done, which it is in his power +to hinder, knowing that if he do not hinder it, it will be done, doth in +some sort will it. I say in some sort, that is, either by an antecedent +will, or by a consequent will, either by an operative will, or by a +permissive will, or he is willing to let it be done, but not willing to +do it. Sometimes an antecedent engagement doth cause a man to suffer +that to be done, which otherwise he would not suffer. So Darius suffered +Daniel to be cast into the lion’s den, to make good his rash decree; so +Herod suffered John Baptist to be beheaded, to make good his rash oath. +How much more may the immutable rule of justice in God, and his fidelity +in keeping his word, draw from him the punishment of obstinate sinners, +though antecedently he willeth their conversion? He loveth all his +creatures well, but his own justice better. Again, sometimes a man +suffereth that to be done, which he doth not will directly in itself, +but indirectly for some other end, or for the producing of some greater +good; as a man willeth that a putrid member be cut off from his body, to +save the life of the whole. Or as a judge, being desirous to save a +malefactor’s life, and having power to reprieve him, doth yet condemn +him for example’s sake, that by the death of one he may save the lives +of many. Marvel not then if God suffer some creatures to take such +courses as tend to their own ruin, so long as their sufferings do make +for the greater manifestation of his glory, and for the greater benefit +of his faithful servants. This is a most certain truth, that God would +not suffer evil to be in the world unless he knew how to draw good out +of evil. Yet this ought not to be understood, as if we made any priority +or posteriority of time in the acts of God, but only of nature. Nor do +we make the antecedent and consequent will to be contrary one to +another; because the one respects man pure and uncorrupted, the other +respects him as he is lapsed. The objects are the same, but considered +after a diverse manner. Nor yet do we make these wills to be distinct in +God; for they are the same with the divine essence, which is one. But +the distinction is in order to the objects or things willed. Nor, +lastly, do we make this permission to be a naked or a mere permission. +God causeth all good, permitteth all evil, disposeth all things, both +good and evil. + +(_c_) “T. H. demands how God should be the cause of the action and yet +not be the cause of the irregularity of the action. I answer, because he +concurs to the doing of evil by a general, but not by a special +influence. As the earth gives nourishment to all kinds of plants, as +well to hemlock as to wheat; but the reason why the one yields food to +our sustenance, the other poison to our destruction, is not from the +general nourishment of the earth, but from the special quality of the +root. Even so the general power to act is from God. _In him we live, and +move, and have our being._ This is good. But the specification, and +determination of this general power to the doing of any evil, is from +ourselves, and proceeds from the free-will of man. This is bad. And to +speak properly, the free-will of man is not the efficient cause of sin, +as the root of the hemlock is of poison, sin having no true entity or +being in it, as poison hath; but rather the deficient cause. Now no +defect can flow from him who is the highest perfection. (_d_) Wherefore +T. H. is mightily mistaken, to make the particular and determinate act +of killing Uriah to be from God. The general power to act is from God, +but the specification of this general and good power to murder, or to +any particular evil, is not from God, but from the free-will of man. So +T. H. may see clearly if he will, how one may be the cause of the law, +and likewise of the action in some sort, that is, by general influence; +and yet another cause concurring, by special influence and determining +this general and good power, may make itself the true cause of the anomy +or the irregularity. And therefore he may keep his longer and shorter +garments for some other occasion. Certainly, they will not fit this +subject, unless he could make general and special influence to be all +one. + +“But T. H. presseth yet further, that the case is the same, and the +objection used by the Jews, (verse 19): _Why doth he yet find fault; who +hath resisted his will?_ is the very same with my argument; and St. +Paul’s answer, (verse 20:) _O man, who art thou that repliest against +God? Shall the thing formed say unto him that formed it, why hast thou +made me thus? Hath not the potter power over his clay?_ &c., is the very +same with his answer in this place, drawn from the irresistible power +and absolute dominion of God, which justifieth all his actions. And that +the apostle in his answer doth not deny that it was God’s will, nor that +God’s decree was before Esau’s sin. + +“To which I reply, first, that the case is not at all the same, but +quite different, as may appear by these particulars; first, those words, +_before they had done either good or evil_, are not, cannot be referred +to those other words, _Esau have I hated_. Secondly, if they could, yet +it is less than nothing, because before Esau had actually sinned, his +future sins were known to God. Thirdly, by the potter’s clay, here is +not to be understood the pure mass, but the corrupted mass of mankind. +Fourthly, the hating here mentioned is only a comparative hatred, that +is, a less degree of love. Fifthly, the hardening which St. Paul speaks +of, is not a positive, but a negative obduration, or a not imparting of +grace. Sixthly, St. Paul speaketh not of any positive reprobation to +eternal punishment, much less doth he speak of the actual inflicting of +punishment without sin, which is the question between us, and wherein T. +H. differs from all that I remember to have read, who do all acknowledge +that punishment is never actually inflicted but for sin. If the question +be put, why God doth good to one more than to another, or why God +imparteth more grace to one than to another, as it is there, the answer +is just and fit, because it is his pleasure, and it is sauciness in a +creature in this case to reply, (Matthew xx. 15): _May not God do what +he will with his own?_ No man doubteth but God imparteth grace beyond +man’s desert. (_e_) But if the case be put, why God doth punish one more +than another, or why he throws one into hell-fire, and not another, +which is the present case agitated between us; to say with T. H., that +it is because God is omnipotent, or because his power is irresistible, +or merely because it is his pleasure, is not only not warranted, but is +plainly condemned by St. Paul in this place. So many differences there +are between those two cases. It is not therefore against God that I +reply, but against T. H. I do not call my Creator to the bar, but my +fellow-creature; I ask no account of God’s counsels, but of man’s +presumptions. It is the mode of these times to father their own fancies +upon God, and when they cannot justify them by reason, to plead his +omnipotence, or to cry, _O altitudo_, that the ways of God are +unsearchable. If they may justify their drowsy dreams, because God’s +power and dominion is absolute; much more may we reject such +phantastical devices which are inconsistent with the truth and goodness +and justice of God, and make him to be a tyrant, who is the Father of +Mercies and the God of all consolation. The unsearchableness of God’s +ways should be a bridle to restrain presumption, and not a sanctuary for +spirits of error. + +“Secondly, this objection contained ver. 19, to which the apostle +answers ver. 20, is not made in the person of Esau or Pharaoh, as T. H. +supposeth, but of the unbelieving Jews, who thought much at that grace +and favour which God was pleased to vouchsafe unto the Gentiles, to +acknowledge them for his people, which honour they would have +appropriated to the posterity of Abraham. And the apostle’s answer is +not only drawn from the sovereign dominion of God, to impart his grace +to whom he pleaseth, as hath been shewed already, but also from the +obstinacy and proper fault of the Jews, as appeareth verse 22: _What if +God, willing_ (that is, by a consequent will) _to shew his wrath, and to +make his power known, endureth with much long-suffering the vessels of +wrath fitted to destruction_. They acted, God endured; they were +tolerated by God, but fitted to destruction by themselves; for their +much wrong-doing, here is God’s _much long-suffering_. And more plainly, +verse 31, 32: _Israel hath not attained to the law of righteousness. +Wherefore? Because they sought it not by faith, but as it were by the +works of the law._ This reason is set down yet more emphatically in the +next chapter (Rom. x. 3): _They_ (that is, the Israelites) _being +ignorant of God’s righteousness_, (that is, by faith in Christ), _and +going about to establish their own righteousness_, (that is, by the +works of the law), _have not submitted themselves unto the righteousness +of God_. And yet most expressly (chap. xi. 20): _Because of unbelief +they were broken off, but thou standest by faith_. Neither was there any +precedent binding decree of God, to necessitate them to unbelief, and +consequently to punishment. It was in their own power by their +concurrence with God’s grace to prevent these judgments, and to recover +their former estate; verse 23: _If they_ (that is, the unbelieving Jews) +_abide not still in unbelief they shall be grafted in_. The crown and +the sword are immovable, (to use St. Anselm’s comparison), but it is we +that move and change places. Sometimes the Jews were under the crown, +and the Gentiles under the sword; sometimes the Jews under the sword, +and the Gentiles under the crown. + +“Thirdly, though I confess that human pacts are not the measure of God’s +justice, but his justice is his own immutable will, whereby he is ready +to give every man that which is his own, as rewards to the good, +punishments to the bad; so nevertheless God may oblige himself freely to +his creature. He made the covenant of works with mankind in Adam; and +therefore he punisheth not man contrary to his own covenant, but for the +transgression of his duty. And divine justice is not measured by +omnipotence or by irresistible power, but by God’s will. God can do many +things according to his absolute power, which he doth not. He could +raise up children to Abraham of stones, but he never did so. It is a +rule in theology, that God cannot do anything which argues any +wickedness or imperfection: as God cannot deny himself (2 Timothy ii. +13); he cannot lie (Titus i. 2). These and the like are the fruits of +impotence, not of power. So God cannot destroy the righteous with the +wicked (Genesis xviii. 25.) He could not destroy Sodom whilst Lot was in +it, (Genesis xix. 22); not for want of dominion or power, but because it +was not agreeable to his justice, nor to that law which himself had +constituted. The apostle saith (Hebrews vi. 10), _God is not unrighteous +to forget your work_. As it is a good consequence to say, this is from +God, therefore it is righteous; so is this also, this thing is +unrighteous, therefore it cannot proceed from God. We see how all +creatures by instinct of nature do love their young, as the hen her +chickens; how they will expose themselves to death for them. And yet all +these are but shadows of that love which is in God towards his +creatures. How impious is it then to conceive, that God did create so +many millions of souls to be tormented eternally in hell, without any +fault of theirs except such as he himself did necessitate them unto, +merely to shew his dominion, and because his power is irresistible? The +same privilege which T. H. appropriates here to power absolutely +irresistible, a friend of his, in his book _De Cive_, cap. VI., ascribes +to power respectively irresistible, or to sovereign magistrates, whose +power he makes to be as absolute as a man’s power is over himself; not +to be limited by any thing, but only by their strength. The greatest +propugners of sovereign power think it enough for princes to challenge +an immunity from coercive power, but acknowledge that the law hath a +directive power over them. But T. H. will have no limits but their +strength. Whatsoever they do by power, they do justly. + +“But, saith he, God objected no sin to Job, but justified his afflicting +him by his power. First, this is an argument from authority negatively, +that is to say, worth nothing. Secondly, the afflictions of Job were no +vindicatory punishments to take vengeance of his sins, (whereof we +dispute), but probatory chastisements to make trial of his graces. +Thirdly, Job was not so pure, but that God might justly have laid +greater punishments upon him, than those afflictions which he suffered. +Witness his impatience, even to the cursing of the day of his nativity +(Job iii. 3). Indeed God said to Job, (Job xxxviii. 4): _Where wast +thou, when I laid the foundations of the earth?_ that is, how canst thou +judge of the things that were done before thou wast born, or comprehend +the secret causes of my judgments? And (Job xl. 9): _Hast thou an arm +like God?_ As if he should say, why art thou impatient; dost thou think +thyself able to strive with God? But that God should punish Job without +desert, here is not a word. + +“Concerning the blind man mentioned John ix, his blindness was rather a +blessing to him than a punishment, being the means to raise his soul +illuminated, and to bring him to see the face of God in Jesus Christ. +The sight of the body is common to us with ants and flies, but the sight +of the soul with the blessed angels. We read of some who have put out +their bodily eyes, because they thought they were an impediment to the +eye of the soul. Again, neither he nor his parents were innocent, being +conceived and born in sin and iniquity (Psalm li. 5). And in many things +we offend all (James iii. 2). But our Saviour’s meaning is evident by +the disciples’ question, John ix. 2. They had not so sinned, that he +should be born blind; or they were not more grievous sinners than other +men, to deserve an exemplary judgment more than they; but this corporal +blindness befel him principally by the extraordinary providence of God, +for the manifestation of his own glory in restoring him to his sight. So +his instance halts on both sides; neither was this a punishment, nor the +blind man free from sin. His third instance of the death and torments of +beasts, is of no more weight than the two former. The death of brute +beasts is not a punishment of sin, but a debt of nature. And though they +be often slaughtered for the use of man, yet there is a vast difference +between those light and momentary pangs, and the unsufferable and +endless pains of hell; between the mere depriving of a creature of +temporal life, and the subjecting of it to eternal death. I know the +philosophical speculations of some, who affirm, that entity is better +than non-entity, that it is better to be miserable and suffer the +torments of the damned, than to be annihilated and cease to be +altogether. This entity which they speak of, is a metaphysical entity +abstracted from the matter, which is better than non-entity, in respect +of some goodness, not moral nor natural, but transcendental, which +accompanies every being. But in the concrete it is far otherwise, where +that saying of our Saviour often takes place, (Matthew xxvi. 24): _Woe +unto that man by whom the Son of Man is betrayed. It had been good for +that man, that he had not been born._ I add, that there is an analogical +justice and mercy due even to the brute beasts. _Thou shalt not muzzle +the mouth of the ox that treadeth out the corn._ And, _a just man is +merciful to his beast_. + +(_f_) “But his greatest error is that which I touched before, to make +justice to be the proper result of power. Power doth not measure and +regulate justice, but justice measures and regulates power. The will of +God, and the eternal law which is in God himself, is properly the rule +and measure of justice. As all goodness, whether natural or moral, is a +participation of divine goodness, and all created rectitude is but a +participation of divine rectitude, so all laws are but participations of +the eternal law from whence they derive their power. The rule of justice +then is the same both in God and us: but it is in God, as in him that +doth regulate and measure; in us, as in those who are regulated and +measured. As the will of God is immutable, always willing what is just +and right and good; so his justice likewise is immutable. And that +individual action which is justly punished as sinful in us, cannot +possibly proceed from the special influence and determinative power of a +just cause. See then how grossly T. H. doth understand that old and true +principle, that the will of God is the rule of justice; as if by willing +things in themselves unjust, he did render them just by reason of his +absolute dominion and irresistible power, as fire doth assimilate other +things to itself, and convert them into the nature of fire. This were to +make the eternal law a Lesbian rule. Sin is defined to be that which is +done, or said, or thought, contrary to the eternal law. But by this +doctrine nothing is done, nor said, nor thought, contrary to the will of +God. St. Anselm said most truly, ‘then the will of man is good, and +just, and right, when he wills that which God would have him to will.’ +But according to this doctrine, every man always wills that which God +would have him to will. If this be true, we need not pray, _Thy will be +done in earth as it is in heaven_. T. H. hath devised a new kind of +heaven upon earth. The worst is, it is an heaven without justice. +Justice is a constant and perpetual act of the will, to give every one +his own; but to inflict punishment for those things which the judge +himself did determine and necessitate to be done, is not to give every +one his own; right punitive justice is a relation of equality and +proportion between the demerit and the punishment. But supposing this +opinion of absolute and universal necessity, there is no demerit in the +world. We use to say, that right springs from law and fact; as in this +syllogism, every thief ought to be punished, there is the law; but such +an one is a thief, there is the fact; therefore he ought to be punished, +there is the right. But this opinion of T. H. grounds the right to be +punished, neither upon law, nor upon fact, but upon the irresistible +power of God. Yea, it overturneth, as much as in it lies, all law; +first, the eternal law, which is the ordination of divine wisdom, by +which all creatures are directed to that end which is convenient for +them, that is, not to necessitate them to eternal flames; then the law +participated, which is the ordination of right reason, instituted for +the common good, to show unto man what he ought to do, and what he ought +not to do. To what purpose is it, to show the right way to him who is +drawn and haled a contrary way by adamantine bonds of inevitable +necessity? + +(_g_) “Lastly, howsoever T. H. cries out, that God cannot sin, yet in +truth he makes him to be the principal and most proper cause of all sin. +For he makes him to be the cause, not only of the law and of the action, +but even of the irregularity itself, and the difference between the +action and the law, wherein the very essence of sin doth consist. He +makes God to determine David’s will, and necessitate him to kill Uriah. +In causes physically and essentially subordinate, the cause of the cause +is evermore the cause of the effect. These are those deadly fruits which +spring from the poisonous root of the absolute necessity of all things; +which T. H. seeing, and that neither the sins of Esau, nor Pharaoh, nor +any wicked person do proceed from the operative, but from the permissive +will of God, and that punishment is an act of justice, not of dominion +only, I hope that according to his promise he will change his opinion. + + ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. XII. + +The Bishop had argued in this manner: “If there be no liberty, there +shall be no last judgment, no rewards nor punishments after death.” To +this I answered, that though God cannot sin, because what he doth, his +doing maketh just, and because he is not subject to another’s law, and +that therefore it is blasphemy to say that God can sin; yet to say, that +God hath so ordered the world that sin may be necessarily committed, is +not blasphemy. And I can also further say, though God be the cause of +all motion and of all actions, and therefore unless sin be no motion nor +action, it must derive a necessity from the first mover; nevertheless it +cannot be said that God is the author of sin, because not he that +necessitateth an action, but he that doth command and warrant it, is the +author. And if God own an action, though otherwise it were a sin, it is +now no sin. The act of the Israelites in robbing the Egyptians of their +jewels, without God’s warrant had been theft. But it was neither theft, +cozenage, nor sin; supposing they knew the warrant was from God. The +rest of my answer to that inconvenience, was an opposing to his +inconveniences the manifest texts of St. Paul, Rom. ix. The substance of +his reply to my answer is this. + +(_a_) “Though punishment were an act of dominion, not of justice, in +God; yet this is no sufficient cause why God should deny his own act, or +why he should chide or expostulate with men, why they did that which he +himself did necessitate them to do.” + +I never said that God denied his act, but that he may expostulate with +men; and this may be (I shall never say directly, it is) the reason of +that his expostulation, viz. to convince them that their wills were not +independent, but were his mere gift; and that to do, or not to do, is +not in him that willeth, but in God that hath mercy on, or hardeneth +whom he will. But the Bishop interpreteth _hardening_ to be a permission +of God. Which is to attribute to God in such actions no more than he +might have attributed to any of Pharaoh’s servants, the not persuading +their master to let the people go. And whereas he compares this +permission to the indulgence of a parent, that by his patience +encourageth his son to become more rebellious, which indulgence is a +sin; he maketh God to be like a sinful man. And indeed it seemeth that +all they that hold this freedom of the will, conceive of God no +otherwise than the common sort of Jews did, that God was like a man, +that he had been seen by Moses, and after by the seventy elders (Exod. +xxiv. 10); expounding that and other places literally. Again he saith, +that God is said to harden the heart _permissively_, but not +_operatively_; which is the same distinction with his first, namely +_negatively_, not _positively_, and with his second, _occasionally_, and +not _causally_. So that all his three ways how God hardens the heart of +wicked men, come to this one of _permission_; which is as much as to +say, God sees, looks on, and does nothing, nor ever did anything, in the +business. Thus you see how the Bishop expoundeth St. Paul. Therefore I +will leave the rest of his commentary upon Rom. ix. to the judgment of +the reader, to think of the same as he pleaseth. + +(_b_) “Yet I do acknowledge that which T. H. saith, ‘that he who doth +permit anything to be done, which it is in his power to hinder, knowing +that if he do not hinder it, it will be done, doth in some sort will +it;’ I say in some sort, that is either by an antecedent will, or by a +consequent will; either by an operative will, or by a permissive will; +or he is willing to let it be done, but not willing to do it.” + +Whether it be called antecedent, or consequent, or operative, or +permissive, it is enough for the necessity of the thing that the heart +of Pharaoh should be hardened; and if God were not willing to do it, I +cannot conceive how it could be done without him. + +(_c_) “T. H. demands how God should be the cause of the action, and yet +not be the cause of the irregularity of the action? I answer, because he +concurs to the doing of evil by a general, but not by a special, +influence.” + +I had thought to pass over this place, because of the nonsense of +general and special influence. Seeing he saith that God concurs to the +doing of evil, I desire the reader would take notice, that if he blame +me for speaking of God as of a necessitating cause, and as it were a +principal agent in the causing of all actions, he may with as good +reason blame himself for making him by concurrence an accessory to the +same. And indeed, let men hold what they will contrary to the truth, if +they write much, the truth will fall into their pens. But he thinks he +hath a similitude, which will make this permissive will a very clear +business. “The earth,” saith he, “gives nourishment to all kinds of +plants, as well to hemlock as to wheat; but the reason why the one +yields food to our sustenance, the other poison to our destruction, is +not from the general nourishment of the earth, but from the special +quality of the root.” It seemeth by this similitude, he thinketh, that +God doth, not operatively, but permissively will that the root of +hemlock should poison the man that eateth it, but that wheat should +nourish him he willeth operatively; which is very absurd; or else he +must confess that the venomous effects of wicked men are willed +operatively. + +(_d_) “Wherefore T. H. is mightily mistaken, to make the particular and +determinate act of killing Uriah to be from God. The general power to +act, is from God; but the specification of this general and good power, +to murder, or to any particular evil, is not from God, but from the free +will of man.” + +But why am I so mightily mistaken? Did not God foreknow that Uriah in +particular, should be murdered by David in particular? And what God +foreknoweth shall come to pass, can that possibly not come so to pass? +And that which cannot possibly not come to pass, doth not that +necessarily come to pass? And is not all necessity from God? I cannot +see this great mistake. “The general power,” saith he, “to act is from +God, but the specification to do this act upon Uriah, is not from God, +but from free-will.” Very learnedly. As if there were a power that were +not the power to do some particular act; or a power to kill, and yet to +kill nobody in particular. If the power be to kill, it is to kill that +which shall be by that power killed, whether it be Uriah or any other; +and the giving of that power, is the application of it to the act; nor +doth power signify anything actually, but those motions and present acts +from which the act that is not now, but shall be hereafter, necessarily +proceedeth. And therefore this argument is much like that which used +heretofore to be brought for the defence of the divine right of the +bishops to the ordination of ministers. They derive not, say they, the +right of ordination from the civil sovereign, but from Christ +immediately. And yet they acknowledge that it is unlawful for them to +ordain, if the civil power do forbid them. But how have they right to +ordain, when they cannot do it lawfully? Their answer is, they have the +right, though they may not exercise it; as if the right to ordain, and +the right to exercise ordination, were not the same thing. And as they +answer concerning right, which is legal power, so the Bishop answereth +concerning natural power, that David had a general power to kill Uriah +from God, but not a power of applying this power in special to the +killing of Uriah from God, but from his own free will; that is, he had a +power to kill Uriah, but not to exercise it upon Uriah, that is to say, +he had a power to kill him, but not to kill him, which is absurd. + +(_e_) “But if the case be put why God doth punish one more than another, +or why he throws one into hell fire, and not another, which is the +present case between us; to say with T. H., that it is because God is +omnipotent, or because his power is irresistible, or merely because it +is his pleasure, is not only not warranted, but is plainly condemned by +St. Paul in this place.” + +I note first, that he hath no reason to say, the case agitated between +us is, whether the cause why God punisheth one man more than another, be +his irresistible power, or man’s sin. The case agitated between us is, +whether a man can now choose what shall be his _will_ anon, or at any +time hereafter. Again, it is not true that he says, it is my opinion +that the irresistible power of God is the cause why he punisheth one +more than another. I say only that when he doth so, the irresistible +power is enough to make it not unjust. But that the cause why God +punisheth one more than another, is many times the will he hath to show +his power, is affirmed in this place by St. Paul, _Shall the thing +formed, say to him that formed it_, &c. And by our Saviour in the case +of him that was born blind, where he saith, _Neither hath this man +sinned nor his parents; but that the works of God may be made manifest_. +And by the expostulation of God with Job. This endeavour of his to bring +the text of St. Paul to his purpose, is not only frustrate, but the +cause of many insignificant phrases in his discourse; as this: “It was +in their own power, by their concurrence with God’s grace, to prevent +these judgments, and to recover their former estates,” which is as good +sense, as if he should say, that it is in his own power, with the +concurrence of the sovereign power of England, to be what he will. And +this, that “God may oblige himself freely to his creature.” For he that +can oblige, can also, when he will, release; and he that can release +himself when he will, is not obliged. Besides this, he is driven to +words ill-becoming him that is to speak of God Almighty; for he makes +him unable to do that which hath been within the ordinary power of men +to do. “God,” he saith, “cannot destroy the righteous with the wicked;” +which nevertheless is a thing ordinarily done by armies: and “He could +not destroy Sodom while Lot was in it;” which he interpreteth, as if he +could not do it lawfully. One text is Genesis xviii. 23, 24, 25. There +is not a word that God could not destroy the righteous with the wicked. +Only Abraham saith (as a man): _Shall not the Judge of all the earth do +right?_ Another is Genesis 22): _Haste thee, escape thither; for I +cannot do any thing till thou be come thither_. Which is an ordinary +phrase, in such a case where God had determined to burn the city and +save a particular man, and signifieth not any obligation to save Lot +more than the rest. Likewise concerning Job, who, expostulating with +God, was answered only with the explication of the infinite power of +God, the Bishop answereth, that there is never a word of Job’s being +punished without desert; which answer is impertinent. For I say not that +he was punished without desert, but that it was not for his desert that +he was afflicted; for punished, he was not at all. + +And concerning the blind man, (John ix.), who was born blind, that the +power of God might be shewn in him; he answers that it was not a +punishment, but a blessing. I did not say it was a punishment; certainly +it was an affliction. How then doth he call it a blessing? Reasonably +enough: “because,” saith he, “it was the means to raise his soul +illuminated, and to bring him to see the face of God in Jesus Christ. +The sight of the body is common to us with ants and flies, but the sight +of the soul, with the blessed angels.” This is very well said; for no +man doubts but some afflictions may be blessings; but I doubt whether +the Bishop, that says he reads of some who have put out their bodily +eyes, because they thought they were an impediment to the eye of the +soul, think that they did well. To that where I say that brute beasts +are afflicted which cannot sin, he answereth, that “there is a vast +difference between those light and momentary pangs, and the unsufferable +and endless pains of hell.” As if the length or the greatness of the +pain, made any difference in the justice or injustice of the inflicting +it. + +(_f_) “But his greatest error is that which I touched before, to make +justice to be the proper result of power.” + +He would make men believe, I hold all things to be just, that are done +by them who have power enough to avoid the punishment. This is one of +his pretty little policies, by which I find him in many occasions to +take the measure of his own wisdom. I said no more, but that the power, +which is absolutely irresistible, makes him that hath it above all law, +so that nothing he doth can be unjust. But this power can be no other +than the power divine. Therefore let him preach what he will upon his +mistaken text, I shall leave it to the reader to consider of it, without +any further answer. + +(_g_) “Lastly, howsoever T. H. cries out that God cannot sin, yet in +truth he makes him to be the principal and most proper cause of all sin. +For he makes him to be the cause not only of the law, and of the action, +but even of the irregularity itself, &c. wherein the very essence of sin +doth consist.” + +I think there is no man but understands, no, not the Bishop himself, but +that where two things are compared, the similitude or dissimilitude, +regularity or irregularity, that is between them, is made in and by the +making of the things themselves that are compared. The Bishop, +therefore, that denies God to be the cause of the irregularity, denies +him to be the cause both of the law and of the action. So that by his +doctrine, there shall be a good law whereof God shall be no cause, and +an action, that is, a local motion that shall depend upon another first +mover that is not God. The rest of this number is but railing. + + PROOFS OF LIBERTY DRAWN FROM REASON. NO. XIII. + +[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] + +_J. D._ “The first argument is _Herculeum_ or _baculinum_, drawn from +that pleasant passage between Zeno and his man. The servant had +committed some petty larceny, and the master was cudgelling him well for +it. The servant thinks to creep under his master’s blind side, and +pleads for himself that ‘the necessity of destiny did compel him to +steal.’ The master answers, ‘the same necessity of destiny compels me to +beat thee.’ He that denies liberty, is fitter to be refuted with rods +than with arguments, until he confess that it is free for him that beats +him, either to continue striking, or to give over, that is, to have true +liberty.” + +_T. H._ Of the arguments from reason, the first is that which he saith +is drawn from Zeno’s beating of his man, which is therefore called +_argumentum baculinum_, that is to say, a wooden argument. The story is +this. Zeno held that all actions were necessary. His man therefore, +being for some fault beaten, excused himself upon the necessity of it. +To avoid this excuse, his master pleaded likewise the necessity of +beating him. So that not he that maintained, but he that derided the +necessity of things, was beaten; contrary to that he would infer; and +the argument was rather withdrawn, than drawn, from the story. + +_J. D._ “Whether the argument be withdrawn from the story, or the answer +withdrawn from the argument, let the reader judge. T. H. mistakes the +scope of the reason, the strength whereof doth not lie, neither in the +authority of Zeno, a rigid Stoic, which is not worth a button in this +cause; nor in the servant’s being an adversary to stoical necessity. For +it appears not out of the story, that the servant did deride necessity, +but rather that he pleaded it in good earnest for his own justification. +Now in the success of the fray, we were told even now, that no power +doth justify an action, but only that which is irresistible. Such was +not Zeno’s. And therefore it advantageth neither of their causes, +neither that of Zeno, nor this of T. H. What if the servant had taken +the staff out of his master’s hand, and beaten him soundly, would not +the same argument have served the man as well as it did the master, that +the necessity of destiny did compel him to strike again? Had not Zeno +smarted justly for his paradox? And might not the spectators well have +taken up the judge’s apothegm, concerning the dispute between Corax and +his scholar, ‘an ill egg of an ill bird’? But the strength of this +argument lies _partly_ in the ignorance of Zeno, that great champion of +necessity, and the beggarliness of his cause, which admitted no defence +but with a cudgel. No man, saith the servant, ought to be beaten for +doing that which he is compelled inevitably to do: but I am compelled +inevitably to steal. The major is so evident, that it cannot be denied. +If a strong man shall take a weak man’s hand per force, and do violence +with it to a third person, he whose hand is forced, is innocent, and he +only culpable who compelled him. The minor was Zeno’s own doctrine; what +answer made the great patron of destiny to his servant? very learnedly +he denied the conclusion, and cudgelled his servant; telling him in +effect, that though there was no reason why he should be beaten, yet +there was a necessity why he must be beaten. And _partly_ in the evident +absurdity of such an opinion, which deserves not to be confuted with +reasons, but with rods. There are four things, said the philosopher, +which ought not to be called into question. First, such things whereof +it is wickedness to doubt; as whether the soul be immortal, whether +there be a God, such an one should not be confuted with reasons, but +cast into the sea with a mill-stone about his neck, as unworthy to +breathe the air, or to behold the light. Secondly, such things as are +above the capacity of reason; as among Christians, the mystery of the +Holy Trinity. Thirdly, such principles as are evidently true; as that +two and two are four, in arithmetic; that the whole is greater than the +part, in logic. Fourthly, such things as are obvious to the senses; as +whether the snow be white. He who denied the heat of the fire, was +justly sentenced to be scorched with fire; and he that denied motion, to +be beaten until he recanted. So he who denies all liberty from +necessitation, should be scourged until he become an humble suppliant to +him that whips him, and confess that he hath power, either to strike, or +to hold his hand.” + +_T. H._ In this Number XIII. which is about Zeno and his man, there is +contained nothing necessary to the instruction of the reader. Therefore +I pass it over. + + NO. XIV. + +[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] + +_J. D._ “Secondly, this very persuasion that there is no true liberty, +is able to overthrow all societies and commonwealths in the world. The +laws are unjust, which prohibit that which a man cannot possibly shun. +All consultations are vain, if every thing be either necessary or +impossible. Who ever deliberated whether the sun should rise to-morrow, +or whether he should sail over mountains? It is to no more purpose to +admonish men of understanding than fools, children, or madmen, if all +things be necessary. Praises and dispraises, rewards and punishments, +are as vain as they are undeserved, if there be no liberty. All +counsels, arts, arms, books, instruments, are superfluous and foolish, +if there be no liberty. In vain we labour, in vain we study, in vain we +take physic, in vain we have tutors to instruct us, if all things come +to pass alike, whether we sleep or wake, whether we be idle or +industrious, by unalterable necessity. But it is said, that though +future events be certain, yet they are unknown to us: and therefore we +prohibit, deliberate, admonish, praise, dispraise, reward, punish, +study, labour, and use means. Alas! how should our not knowing of the +event, be a sufficient motive to us to use the means, so long as we +believe the event is already certainly determined, and can no more be +changed by all our endeavours, than we can stay the course of heaven +with our finger, or add a cubit to our stature? Suppose it be unknown, +yet it is certain. We cannot hope to alter the course of things by our +labours; let the necessary causes do their work, we have no remedy but +patience, and shrug up the shoulders. Either allow liberty, or destroy +all societies.” + +_T. H._ The second argument is taken from certain inconveniences which +he thinks would follow such an opinion. It is true that ill use may be +made of it, and therefore your Lordship and J. D. ought, at my request, +to keep private that I say here of it. But the inconveniences are indeed +none; and what use soever be made of truth, yet truth is truth; and now +the question is, not what is fit to be preached, but what is true. The +first inconvenience he says is this, that laws which prohibit any action +are then unjust. The second, that all consultations are vain. The third, +that admonitions to men of understanding, are of no more use than to +fools, children, and madmen. The fourth, that praise, dispraise, reward, +and punishment, are in vain. The fifth, that counsels, arts, arms, +books, instruments, study, tutors, medicines, are in vain. To which +argument, expecting I should answer by saying, that the ignorance of the +event were enough to make us use means, he adds (as it were a reply to +my answer foreseen) these words: “Alas, how should our not knowing of +the event be a sufficient motive to make us use the means?” Wherein he +saith right; but my answer is not that which he expecteth. I answer, + +First, that the necessity of an action doth not make the law which +prohibits it unjust. To let pass, that not the necessity, but the will +to break the law, maketh the action unjust, because the law regardeth +the will, and no other precedent causes of action; and to let pass, that +no law can be possibly unjust, in as much as every man makes, by his +consent, the law he is bound to keep, and which, consequently, must be +just, unless a man can be unjust to himself: I say, what necessary cause +soever precedes an action, yet, if the action be forbidden, he that doth +it willingly, may justly be punished. For instance, suppose the law on +pain of death prohibit stealing, and there be a man who by the strength +of temptation is necessitated to steal, and is thereupon put to death: +does not this punishment deter others from theft? Is it not a cause that +others steal not? Doth it not frame and make their will to justice? To +make the law is therefore to make a cause of justice, and to necessitate +justice; and consequently it is no injustice to make such a law. + +The institution of the law is not to grieve the delinquent for that +which is passed and not to be undone; but to make him and others just, +that else would not be so: and respecteth not the evil act past, but the +good to come. Insomuch as without this good intention of future, no past +act of a delinquent could justify his killing in the sight of God. But, +you will say, how is it just to kill one man to amend another, if what +was done were necessary? To this I answer, that men are justly killed, +not for that their actions are not necessitated, but that they are +spared and preserved, because they are not noxious; for where there is +no law, there no killing, nor any thing else can be unjust. And by the +right of nature we destroy, without being unjust, all that is noxious, +both beasts and men. And for beasts, we kill them justly, when we do it +in order to our own preservation. And yet J. D. confesseth, that their +actions, as being only spontaneous and not free, are all necessitated +and determined to that one thing which they shall do. For men, when we +make societies or commonwealths, we lay down our right to kill, +excepting in certain cases, as murder, theft, or other offensive +actions. So that the right which the commonwealth hath, to put a man to +death for crimes, is not created by the law, but remains from the first +right of nature, which every man hath to preserve himself; for the law +doth not take that right away, in case of criminals, who were by law +excepted. Men are not therefore put to death or punished, for that their +theft proceedeth from election; but because it was noxious and contrary +to men’s preservation, and the punishment conducing to the preservation +of the rest: inasmuch as to punish those that do voluntary hurt, and +none else, frameth and maketh men’s wills, such as men would have them. +And thus it is plain, that from the necessity of a voluntary action +cannot be inferred the injustice of the law that forbiddeth it, or of +the magistrate that punisheth it. + +Secondly, I deny that it makes consultations to be in vain; it is the +consultation that causeth a man, and necessitateth him, to choose to do +one thing rather than another. So that unless a man say that cause to be +in vain, which necessitateth the effect, he cannot infer the +superfluousness of consultation out of the necessity of the election +proceeding from it. But it seems he reasons thus: If I must needs do +this rather than that, then I shall do this rather than that, though I +consult not at all; which is a false proposition, a false consequence, +and no better than this: If I shall live till to-morrow, I shall live +till to-morrow, though I run myself through with a sword to-day. If +there be a necessity that an action shall be done, or that any effect +shall be brought to pass, it does not therefore follow that there is +nothing necessarily required as a means to bring it to pass. And +therefore, when it is determined that one thing shall be chosen before +another, it is determined also for what cause it shall be chosen; which +cause, for the most part, is deliberation or consultation. And therefore +consultation is not in vain; and indeed the less in vain, by how much +the election is more necessitated. + +The same answer is to be given to the third supposed inconvenience; +namely, that admonitions are in vain; for admonitions are parts of +consultations; the admonitor being a counsellor, for the time, to him +that is admonished. + +The fourth pretended inconvenience is, that praise and dispraise, reward +and punishment, will be in vain. To which I answer, that for praise and +dispraise, they depend not at all on the necessity of the action praised +or dispraised. For, what is it else to praise, but to say a thing is +good? Good, I say, for me, or for somebody else, or for the state and +commonwealth. And what is it to say an action is good, but to say, it is +as I would wish, or as another would have it, or according to the will +of the state, that is to say, according to law? Does J. D. think, that +no action can please me or him, or the commonwealth, that should proceed +from necessity? + +Things may be therefore necessary and yet praiseworthy, as also +necessary and yet dispraised, and neither of both in vain; because +praise and dispraise, and likewise reward and punishment, do by example +make and conform the will to good or evil. It was a very great praise, +in my opinion, that Velleius Paterculus gives Cato, where he says, he +was good by nature, _et quia aliter esse non potuit_. + +To his fifth and sixth inconvenience, that counsels, arts, arms, books, +instruments, study, medicines, and the like, would be superfluous, the +same answer serves that to the former; that is to say, that this +consequence, if the effect shall necessarily come to pass, then it shall +come to pass without its cause, is a false one. And those things named, +counsels, arts, arms, &c., are the causes of those effects. + +_J. D._ “Nothing is more familiar with T. H. than to decline an +argument. But I will put it into form for him. (_a_) The first +inconvenience is thus pressed. Those laws are unjust and tyrannical, +which do prescribe things absolutely impossible in themselves to be +done, and punish men for not doing of them. But supposing T. H’s opinion +of the necessity of all things to be true, all laws do prescribe +absolute impossibilities to be done, and punish men for not doing of +them. The former proposition is so clear that it cannot be denied. Just +laws are the ordinances of right reason; but those laws which prescribe +absolute impossibilities, are not the ordinances of right reason. Just +laws are instituted for the public good; but those laws which prescribe +absolute impossibilities, are not instituted for the public good. Just +laws do show unto a man what is to be done, and what is to be shunned; +but those laws which prescribe impossibilities, do not direct a man what +he is to do, and what he is to shun. The minor is as evident. For if his +opinion be true, all actions, all transgressions are determined +antecedently inevitably to be done by a natural and necessary flux of +extrinsical causes. Yea, even the will of man, and the reason itself is +thus determined. And therefore whatsoever laws do prescribe any thing to +be done, which is not done, or to be left undone which is done, do +prescribe absolute impossibilities, and punish men for not doing of +impossibilities. In all his answer there is not one word to this +argument, but only to the conclusion. He saith, that ‘not the necessity, +but the will to break the law makes the action unjust.’ I ask what makes +the will to break the law; is it not his necessity? What gets he by +this? A perverse will causeth injustice, and necessity causeth a +perverse will. He saith, ‘the law regardeth the will, but not the +precedent causes of action.’ To what proposition, to what term is this +answer? He neither denies nor distinguisheth. First, the question here +is not what makes actions to be unjust, but what makes laws to be +unjust. So his answer is impertinent. It is likewise untrue. For first, +that will which the law regards, is not such a will as T. H. imagineth. +It is a free will, not a determined necessitated will; a rational will, +not a brutish will. Secondly, the law doth look upon precedent causes, +as well as the voluntariness of the action. If a child, before he be +seven years old or have the use of reason, in some childish quarrel do +willingly stab another, whereof we have seen experience, yet the law +looks not upon it as an act of murder; because there wanted a power to +deliberate, and consequently true liberty. Manslaughter may be as +voluntary as murder, and commonly more voluntary; because being done in +hot blood there is the less reluctation. Yet the law considers, that the +former is done out of some sudden passion without serious deliberation, +and the other out of prepensed malice and desire of revenge; and +therefore condemns murder, as more wilful and more punishable than +manslaughter.” + +(_b_) “He saith, ‘that no law can possibly be unjust;’ and I say, that +this is to deny the conclusion, which deserves no reply. But to give him +satisfaction, I will follow him in this also, if he intended no more but +that unjust laws are not genuine laws, nor bind to active obedience, +because they are not the ordinations of right reason, not instituted for +the common good, nor prescribe that which ought to be done; he said +truly, but nothing at all to his purpose. But if he intend, as he doth, +that there are no laws _de facto_, which are the ordinances of reason +erring, instituted for the common hurt, and prescribing that which ought +not to be done, he is much mistaken. Pharaoh’s law, to drown the male +children of the Israelites (Exod. i. 22); Nebuchadnezzar’s law, that +whosoever did not fall down and worship the golden image which he had +set up, should be cast into the fiery furnace (Dan. iii. 4-6); Darius’s +law, that whosoever should ask a petition of any God or man for thirty +days, save of the king, should be cast into the den of lions (Dan. vi. +7); Ahasuerus’s law, to destroy the Jewish nation, root and branch +(Esther iii. 13); the Pharisees’ law, that whosoever confesseth Christ, +should be excommunicated (John ix. 22); were all unjust laws. + +(_c_) “The ground of this error is as great an error itself (such an art +he hath learned of repacking paradoxes); which is this, ‘that every man +makes by his consent the law which he is bound to keep.’ If this were +true, it would preserve them, if not from being unjust, yet from being +injurious. But it is not true. The positive law of God, contained in the +Old and New Testament; the law of nature, written in our hearts by the +finger of God; the laws of conquerors, who come in by the power of the +sword; the laws of our ancestors, which were made before we were born; +do all oblige us to the observation of them; yet to none of all these +did we give our actual consent. Over and above all these exceptions, he +builds upon a wrong foundation, that all magistrates at first were +elective. The first governors were fathers of families; and when those +petty princes could not afford competent protection and security to +their subjects, many of them did resign their several and respective +interests into the hands of one joint father of the country. + +“And though his ground had been true, that all first legislators were +elective, which is false; yet his superstructure fails: for it was done +in hope and trust that they would make just laws. If magistrates abuse +this trust, and deceive the hopes of the people by making tyrannical +laws, yet it is without their consent. A precedent trust doth not +justify the subsequent errors and abuses of a trustee. He who is duly +elected a legislator, may exercise his legislative power unduly. The +people’s implicit consent doth not render the tyrannical laws of their +legislators to be just. + +(_d_) “But his chiefest answer is, that ‘an action forbidden, though it +proceed from necessary causes, yet if it were done willingly, it may be +justly punished;’ which, according to his custom, he proves by an +instance. ‘A man necessitated to steal by the strength of temptation, +yet if he steal willingly, is justly put to death.’ Here are two things, +and both of them untrue. + +“First, he fails in his assertion. Indeed we suffer justly for those +necessities, which we ourselves have contracted by our own fault; but +not for extrinsical antecedent necessities, which were imposed upon us +without our fault. If that law do not oblige to punishment, which is not +intimated, because the subject is invincibly ignorant of it; how much +less that law which prescribes absolute impossibilities: unless perhaps +invincible necessity be not as strong a plea as invincible ignorance. +That which he adds, ‘if it were done willingly,’ though it be of great +moment, if it be rightly understood, yet in his sense, that is, if a +man’s ‘will be not in his own disposition,’ and ‘if his willing do not +come upon him according to his will, nor according to anything else in +his power,’ it weighs not half so much as the least feather in all his +horse-load. For if that law be unjust and tyrannical which commands a +man to do that which is impossible for him to do, then that law is +likewise unjust and tyrannical, which commands him to will that which is +impossible for him to will. + +“Secondly, his instance supposeth an untruth, and is a plain begging of +the question. No man is extrinsically, antecedently, and irresistibly +necessitated by temptation to steal. The devil may solicit us, but he +cannot necessitate us. He hath a faculty of persuading, but not a power +of compelling. _Nos ignem habemus, spiritus flammam ciet_; as Gregory +Nazianzen, he blows the coals, but the fire is our own. _Mordet duntaxat +sese in fauces illius objicientem_; as St. Austin, he bites not, until +we thrust ourselves into his mouth. He may propose, he may suggest, but +he cannot move the will effectively. _Resist the devil, and he will flee +from you_ (James iv. 7). By faith we are able _to quench all the fiery +darts of the wicked_ (Ephes. vi. 16). And if Satan, who can both propose +the object, and choose out the fittest times and places to work upon our +frailties, and can suggest reasons, yet cannot necessitate the will, +(which is most certain); then much less can outward objects do it alone. +They have no natural efficacy to determine the will. Well may they be +occasions, but they cannot be causes of evil. The sensitive appetite may +engender a proclivity to steal, but not a necessity to steal. And if it +should produce a kind of necessity, yet it is but moral, not natural; +hypothetical, not absolute; coexistent, not antecedent from ourselves, +nor extrinsical. This necessity, or rather proclivity, was free in its +causes; we ourselves by our own negligence in not opposing our passions +when we should and might, have freely given it a kind of dominion over +us. Admit that some sudden passions may and do extraordinarily surprise +us; and therefore we say, _motus primo primi_, the first motions are not +always in our power, neither are they free: yet this is but very rarely, +and it is our own fault that they do surprise us. Neither doth the law +punish the first motion to theft, but the advised act of stealing. The +intention makes the thief. But of this more largely No. XXV. + +(_e_) “He pleads moreover, ‘That the law is a cause of justice,’ that +‘it frames the wills of men to justice,’ and ‘that the punishment of one +doth conduce to the preservation of many.’ All this is most true of a +just law justly executed. But this is no God-a-mercy to T. H.’s opinion +of absolute necessity. If all actions and all events be predetermined +naturally, necessarily, extrinsically, how should the law frame men +morally to good actions? He leaves nothing for the law to do, but either +that which is done already, or that which is impossible to be done. If a +man be chained to every individual act which he doth, and from every act +which he doth not, by indissolvable bonds of inevitable necessity, how +should the law either deter him or frame him? If a dog be chained fast +to a post, the sight of a rod cannot draw him from it. Make a thousand +laws that the fire shall not burn, yet it will burn. And whatsoever men +do, according to T. H., they do it as necessarily as the fire burneth. +Hang up a thousand thieves, and if a man be determined inevitably to +steal, he must steal notwithstanding. + +(_f_) “He adds, that ‘the sufferings imposed by the law upon +delinquents, respect not the evil act passed, but the good to come, and +that the putting of a delinquent to death by the magistrate for any +crime whatsoever, cannot be justified before God, except there be a real +intention to benefit others by his example.’ The truth is, the punishing +of delinquents by law, respecteth both the evil act passed and the good +to come. The ground of it, is the evil act passed, the scope or end of +it, is the good to come. The end without the ground cannot justify the +act. A bad intention may make a good action bad; but a good intention +cannot make a bad action good. It is not lawful to do evil that good may +come of it, nor to punish an innocent person for the admonition of +others; that is to fall into a certain crime for fear of an uncertain. +Again, though there were no other end of penalties inflicted, neither +probatory, nor castigatory, nor exemplary, but only vindicatory, to +satisfy the law out of a zeal of justice by giving to every one his own, +yet the action is just and warrantable. Killing, as it is considered in +itself, without all undue circumstances, was never prohibited to the +lawful magistrate, who is the vice-gerent or lieutenant of God, from +whom he derives his power of life and death. + +“T. H. hath one plea more. As a drowning man catcheth at every bulrush, +so he lays hold on every pretence to save a desperate cause. But first, +it is worth our observation to see how oft he changeth shapes in this +one particular. (_g_) First, he told us, that it was the irresistible +power of God that justifies all his actions, though he command one thing +openly, and plot another thing secretly, though he be the cause not only +of the action, but also of the irregularity; though he both give man +power to act, and determine this power to evil as well as good; though +he punish the creatures, for doing that which he himself did necessitate +them to do. But being pressed with reason, that this is tyrannical, +first to necessitate a man to do his will, and then to punish him for +doing of it, he leaves this pretence in the plain field, and flies to a +second; that therefore a man is justly punished for that which he was +necessitated to do, because the act was voluntary on his part. This hath +more show of reason than the former, if he did make the will of man to +be in his own disposition; but maintaining that the will is irresistibly +determined to will whatsoever it doth will, the injustice and absurdity +is the same, first to necessitate a man to will, and then to punish him +for willing. The dog only bites the stone which is thrown at him with a +strange hand, but they make the first cause to punish the instrument for +that which is his own proper act. Wherefore not being satisfied with +this, he casts it off and flies to his third shift. ‘Men are not +punished,’ saith he, ‘therefore, because their theft proceeded from +election,’ (that is, because it was willingly done, for to elect and +will, saith he, are both one; is not this to blow hot and cold with the +same breath?) ‘but because it was noxious and contrary to men’s +preservation.’ Thus far he saith true, that every creature by the +instinct of nature seeks to preserve itself: cast water into a dusty +place, and it contracts itself into little globes, that is to preserve +itself. And those who are noxious in the eye of the law, are justly +punished by them to whom the execution of the law is committed; but the +law accounts no persons noxious, but those who are noxious by their own +fault. It punisheth not a thorn for pricking, because it is the nature +of the thorn, and it can do no otherwise, nor a child, before it have +the use of reason. If one should take my hand perforce and give another +a box on the ear with it, my hand is noxious, but the law punisheth the +other who is faulty. And therefore he hath reason to propose the +question, ‘how it is just to kill one man to amend another, if he who +killed did nothing but what he was necessitated to do.’ He might as well +demand, how it is lawful to murder a company of innocent infants, to +make a bath of their lukewarm blood for curing the leprosy. It had been +a more rational way, first to have demonstrated that it is so, and then +to have questioned why it is so. His assertion itself is but a dream, +and the reason which he gives of it why it is so, is a dream of a dream. + +“The sum of it is this; ‘that where there is no law, there no killing or +any thing else can be unjust; that before the constitution of +commonwealths, every man had power to kill another, if he conceived him +to be hurtful to him; that at the constitution of commonwealths, +particular men lay down this right in part, and in part reserve it to +themselves, as in case of theft or murder; that the right which the +commonwealth hath to put a malefactor to death, is not created by the +law, but remaineth from the first right of nature which every man hath +to preserve himself; that the killing of men in this case is as the +killing of beasts in order to our own preservation.’ This may well be +called stringing of paradoxes. + +“But first, (_h_) there never was any such time when mankind was without +governors and laws, and societies. Paternal government was in the world +from the beginning, and the law of nature. There might be sometimes a +root of such barbarous thievish brigands, in some rocks or deserts, or +odd corners of the world; but it was an abuse and a degeneration from +the nature of man, who is a political creature. This savage opinion +reflects too much upon the honour of mankind. + +“Secondly, there never was a time when it was lawful, ordinarily, for +private men to kill one another for their own preservation. If God would +have had men live like wild beasts, as lions, bears, or tigers, he would +have armed them with horns, or tusks, or talons, or pricks; but of all +creatures man is born most naked, without any weapon to defend himself, +because God had provided a better means of security for him, that is, +the magistrate. + +“Thirdly, that right which private men have to preserve themselves, +though it be with the killing of another, when they are set upon to be +murdered or robbed, is not a remainder or a reserve of some greater +power which they have resigned, but a privilege which God hath given +them, in case of extreme danger and invincible necessity, that when they +cannot possibly have recourse to the ordinary remedy, that is, the +magistrate, every man becomes a magistrate to himself. + +“Fourthly, nothing can give that which it never had. The people, whilst +they were a dispersed rabble, (which in some odd cases might happen to +be), never had justly the power of life and death, and therefore they +could not give it by their election. All that they do is to prepare the +matter, but it is God Almighty that infuseth the soul of power. + +“Fifthly and lastly, I am sorry to hear a man of reason and parts to +compare the murdering of men with the slaughtering of brute beasts. The +elements are for the plants, the plants for the brute beasts, the brute +beasts for man. When God enlarged his former grant to man, and gave him +liberty to eat the flesh of his creatures for his sustenance, (Gen. ix. +3), yet man is expressly excepted (verse 6): _Whoso sheddeth man’s +blood, by man shall his blood be shed_. And the reason is assigned, _for +in the image of God made he man_. Before sin entered into the world, or +before any creatures were hurtful or noxious to man, he had dominion +over them as their lord and master. And though the possession of this +sovereignty be lost in part, for the sin of man, which made not only the +creatures to rebel, but also the inferior faculties to rebel against the +superior, from whence it comes that one man is hurtful to another; yet +the dominion still remains. Wherein we may observe how sweetly the +providence of God doth temper this cross; that though the strongest +creatures have withdrawn their obedience, as lions and bears, to shew +that man hath lost the excellency of his dominion, and the weakest +creatures, as flies and gnats, to shew into what a degree of contempt he +is fallen; yet still the most profitable and useful creatures, as sheep +and oxen, do in some degree retain their obedience. + +(_i_) “The next branch of his answer concerns consultations, ‘which,’ +saith he, ‘are not superfluous, though all things come to pass +necessarily, because they are the cause which doth necessitate the +effect, and the means to bring it to pass.’ We were told (No. XI.) ‘that +the last dictate of right reason was but as the last feather which +breaks the horse’s back. It is well yet, that reason hath gained some +command again, and is become at least a quarter-master. Certainly if any +thing under God have power to determine the will, it is right reason. +But I have shewed sufficiently, that reason doth not determine the will +physically, nor absolutely, much less extrinsically, and antecedently; +and therefore it makes nothing for that necessity which T. H. hath +undertaken to prove. + +(_k_) “He adds further, that ‘as the end is necessary, so are the means; +and when it is determined that one thing shall be chosen before another, +it is determined also for what cause it shall be so chosen.’ All which +is truth, but not the whole truth; for as God ordains means for all +ends, so he adapts and fits the means to their respective ends, free +means to free ends, contingent means to contingent ends, necessary means +to necessary ends, whereas T. H. would have all means, all ends, to be +necessary. If God hath so ordered the world, that a man ought to use, +and may freely use, those means of God, which he doth neglect, not by +virtue of God’s decree, but by his own fault; if a man use those means +of evil, which he ought not to use, and which by God’s decree he had +power to forbear; if God have left to man in part the free managery of +human affairs, and to that purpose hath endowed him with understanding: +then consultations are of use, then provident care is needful, then it +concerns him to use the means. But if God have so ordered this world, +that a man cannot, if he would, neglect any means of good, which by +virtue of God’s decree it is possible for him to use, and that he cannot +possibly use any means of evil, but those which are irresistibly and +inevitably imposed upon him by an antecedent decree; then not only +consultations are vain, but that noble faculty of reason itself is vain. +Do we think that we can help God Almighty to do his proper work? In vain +we trouble ourselves, in vain we take care to use those means, which are +not in our power to use, or not to use. And this is that which was +contained in my prolepsis or prevention of his answer, though he be +pleased both to disorder it, and to silence it. We cannot hope by our +labours, to alter the course of things set down by God; let him perform +his decree, let the necessary causes do their work. If we be those +causes, yet we are not in our own disposition; we must do what we are +ordained to do, and more we cannot do. Man hath no remedy but patience, +and to shrug up the shoulders. This is the doctrine that flows from this +opinion of absolute necessity. Let us suppose the great wheel of the +clock which sets all the little wheels going, to be as the decree of +God, and that the motion of it were perpetually infallible from an +intrinsical principle, even as God’s decree is infallible, eternal, +all-sufficient. Let us suppose the lesser wheels to be the second +causes, and that they do as certainly follow the motion of the great +wheel, without missing or swerving in the least degree, as the second +causes do pursue the determination of the first cause. I desire to know +in this case, what cause there is to call a council of smiths, to +consult and order the motion of that which was ordered and determined +before to their hands? Are men wiser than God? Yet all men know, that +the motion of the lesser wheels is a necessary means to make the clock +strike. + +(_l_) “But he tells me in great sadness, that ‘my argument is just like +this other; if I shall live till to-morrow, I shall live till to-morrow, +though I run myself through with a sword to-day; which, saith he, is a +false consequence, and a false proposition.’ Truly, if by running +through, he understands killing, it is a false, or rather a foolish +proposition, and implies a contradiction. To live till to-morrow, and to +die to-day, are inconsistent. But by his favour, this is not my +consequence, but this is his own opinion. He would persuade us, that it +is absolutely necessary that a man shall live till to-morrow, and yet +that it is possible that he may kill himself to-day. My argument is +this: if there be a liberty and possibility for a man to kill himself +to-day, then it is not absolutely necessary that he shall live till +to-morrow; but there is such a liberty, therefore no such necessity. And +the consequence which I make here, is this: if it be absolutely +necessary, that a man shall live till to-morrow, then it is vain and +superfluous for him to consult and deliberate whether he should die +to-day, or not. And this is a true consequence. The ground of his +mistake is this, that though it be true, that a man may kill himself +to-day, yet upon the supposition of his absolute necessity, it is +impossible. Such heterogeneous arguments and instances he produceth, +which are half builded upon our true grounds, and the other half upon +his false grounds. + +(_m_) “The next branch of my argument concerns admonitions, to which he +gives no new answer, and therefore I need not make any new reply, saving +only to tell him, that he mistakes my argument. I say not only, if all +things be necessary, then admonitions are in vain; but if all things be +necessary, then it is to no more purpose to admonish men of +understanding than fools, children, or madmen. That they do admonish the +one and not the other, is confessedly true; and no reason under heaven +can be given for it but this, that the former have the use of reason and +true liberty, with a dominion over their own actions, which children, +fools, and madmen have not. + +“Concerning praise and dispraise, he enlargeth himself. The scope of his +discourse is, that ‘things necessary may be praiseworthy.’ There is no +doubt of it; but withal their praise reflects upon the free agent, as +the praise of a statue reflects upon the workman who made it. ‘To praise +a thing,’ saith he, ‘is to say it is good.’ (_n_) True, but this +goodness is not a metaphysical goodness; so the worst of things, and +whatsoever hath a being, is good: nor a natural goodness; the praise of +it passeth wholly to the Author of nature; _God saw all that he had +made, and it was very good_: but a moral goodness, or a goodness of +actions rather than of things. The moral goodness of an action is the +conformity of it with right reason. The moral evil of an action is the +deformity of it, and the alienation of it from right reason. It is moral +praise and dispraise which we speak of here. To praise anything morally, +is to say, it is morally good, that is, conformable to right reason. The +moral dispraise of a thing is to say, it is morally bad, or disagreeing +from the rule of right reason. So moral praise is from the good use of +liberty, moral dispraise from the bad use of liberty; but if all things +be necessary, then moral liberty is quite taken away, and with it all +true praise and dispraise. Whereas T. H. adds, that ‘to say a thing is +good, is to say, it is as I would wish, or as another would wish, or as +the state would have it, or according to the law of the land;’ he +mistakes infinitely. He, and another, and the state, may all wish that +which is not really good, but only in appearance. We do often wish what +is profitable or delightful, without regarding so much as we ought what +is honest. And though the will of the state where we live, or the law of +the land, do deserve great consideration, yet it is no infallible rule +of moral goodness. And therefore to his question, ‘whether nothing that +proceeds from necessity can please me,’ I answer, yes. The burning of +the fire pleaseth me, when I am cold; and I say, it is good fire, or a +creature created by God for my use and for my good. Yet I do not mean to +attribute any moral goodness to the fire, nor give any moral praise to +it, as if it were in the power of the fire itself either to communicate +its heat or to suspend it; but I praise first the Creator of the fire, +and then him who provided it. As for the praise which Velleius +Paterculus gives Cato, that he was good by nature, _et quia aliter esse +non potuit_; it hath more of the orator, than either of the theologian +or philosopher in it. Man in the state of innocency did fall and become +evil; what privilege hath Cato more than he? No, by his leave. _Narratur +et divi Catonis sæpe mero caluisse virtus._ But the true meaning is, +that he was naturally of a good temper, not so prone to some kinds of +vice as others were. This is to praise a thing, not an action, +naturally, not morally. Socrates was not of so good a natural temper, +yet proved as good a man; the more his praise, by how much the +difficulty was the more to conform his disorderly appetite to right +reason. + +“Concerning reward and punishment, he saith not a word, but only that +they frame and conform the will to good, which hath been sufficiently +answered. They do so indeed; but if his opinion were true, they could +not do so. But because my aim is not only to answer T. H., but also to +satisfy myself, (_o_) though it be not urged by him, yet I do +acknowledge that I find some improper and analogical rewards and +punishments used to brute beasts, as the hunter rewards his dog, the +master of the decoy-duck whips her when she returns without company. And +if it be true, which he affirmeth a little before that I have confessed, +‘that the actions of brute beasts are all necessitated and determined to +that one thing which they shall do,’ the difficulty is increased. + +“But first, my saying is misalleged. I said, that some kinds of actions +which are most excellent in brute beasts, and make the greatest show of +reason, as the bees working their honey, and the spiders weaving their +webs, are yet done without any consultation or deliberation, by a mere +instinct of nature, and by a determination of their fancies to these +only kinds of works. But I did never say, I could not say, that all +their individual actions are necessary, and antecedently determined in +their causes, as what days the bees shall fly abroad, and what days and +hours each bee shall keep in the hive, how often they shall fetch in +thyme on a day, and from whence. These actions and the like, though they +be not free, because brute beasts want reason to deliberate, yet they +are contingent, and therefore not necessary. + +“Secondly, I do acknowledge, that as the fancies of some brute creatures +are determined by nature to some rare and exquisite works; so in others, +where it finds a natural propension, art, which is the imitator of +nature, may frame and form them according to the will of the artist to +some particular actions and ends, as we see in setting-dogs, and +coy-ducks, and parrots; and the principal means whereby they effect +this, is by their backs or by their bellies, by the rod or by the +morsel, which have indeed a shadow or resemblance of rewards and +punishments. But we take the word here properly, not as it is used by +vulgar people, but as it is used by divines and philosophers, for that +recompense which is due to honest and dishonest actions. Where there is +no moral liberty, there is neither honesty nor dishonesty, neither true +reward nor punishment. + +“Thirdly, (_p_) when brute creatures do learn any such qualities, it is +not out of judgment, or deliberation, or discourse, by inferring or +concluding one thing from another, which they are not capable of. +Neither are they able to conceive a reason of what they do, but merely +out of memory or out of a sensitive fear or hope. They remember that +when they did after one manner, they were beaten; and when they did +after another manner, they were cherished; and accordingly they apply +themselves. But if their individual actions were absolutely necessary, +fear or hope could not alter them. Most certainly, if there be any +desert in it, or any praise due unto it, it is to them who did instruct +them. + +Lastly, concerning arts, arms, books, instruments, study, physic, and +the like, he answereth not a word more than what is already satisfied. +And therefore I am silent. + + ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. XIV. + +(_a_) “The first inconvenience is thus pressed. Those laws are unjust +and tyrannical, which do prescribe things absolutely impossible in +themselves to be done, and punish men for not doing of them.” + +I have already, in the beginning, where I recite the inconveniences that +follow the doctrine of necessity, made clear that the same +inconveniences follow not the doctrine of necessity, any more than they +follow this truth, _whatsoever shall be, shall be_, which all men must +confess; the same also followeth upon this, that _whatsoever God +foreknows, cannot but come to pass in such time and manner as he hath +foreknown it_. It is therefore evident that these inconveniences are not +rationally deduced from those tenets. Again, it is a truth manifest to +all men, that it is not in a man’s power to-day, to choose what will he +shall have to-morrow, or an hour, or any time after. Intervening +occasions, business, which the Bishop calls trifles, (trifles of which +the Bishop maketh here a great business), do change the will. No man can +say what he will do to-morrow, unless he foreknow, which no man can, +what shall happen before to-morrow. And this being the substance of my +opinion, it must needs be that when he deduceth from it, that counsels, +arts, arms, medicines, teachers, praise, prayer, and piety, are in vain, +that his deduction is false, and his ratiocination fallacy. And though I +need make no other answer to all that he can object against me, yet I +shall here mark out the causes of his several paralogisms. + +“Those laws,” he saith, “are unjust and tyrannical, which do prescribe +things absolutely impossible to be done, and punish men for not doing of +them.” In which words this is one absurdity, that _a law can be unjust_; +for all laws are divine or civil, neither of which can be unjust. Of the +first there is no doubt. And as for civil laws, they are made by every +man that is subject to them; because every one of them consenteth to the +placing of the legislative power. Another is this, in the same words, +that he supposeth there may be laws that are tyrannical; for if he that +maketh them have the sovereign power, they may be regal, but not +tyrannical; if tyrant signify not King, as he thinks it doth not. +Another is in the same words, “that a law may prescribe things +absolutely impossible in themselves to be done.” When he says +_impossible in themselves_, he understands not what himself means. +_Impossible in themselves_ are contradictions only, as to be and not to +be at the same time, which the divines say is not possible to God. All +other things are possible at least in themselves. Raising from the dead, +changing the course of nature, making of a new heaven, and a new earth, +are things possible in themselves; for there is nothing in their nature +able to resist the will of God. And if laws do not prescribe such +things, why should I believe they prescribe other things that are more +impossible. Did he ever read in Suarez of any tyrant that made a law +commanding any man to do and not to do the same action, or to be and not +to be at the same place in one and the same moment of time. But out of +the doctrine of necessity, it followeth he says, that “all laws do +prescribe absolute impossibilities to be done.” Here he has left out _in +themselves_, which is a wilful fallacy. + +He further says that “just laws are the ordinances of right reason;” +which is an error that hath cost many thousands of men their lives. Was +there ever a King, that made a law which in right reason had been better +unmade? And shall those laws therefore not be obeyed? Shall we rather +rebel? I think not, though I am not so great a divine as he. I think +rather that the reason of him that hath the sovereign authority, and by +whose sword we look to be protected both against war from abroad and +injuries at home, whether it be right or erroneous in itself, ought to +stand for right to us that have submitted ourselves thereunto by +receiving the protection. + +But the Bishop putteth his greatest confidence in this, that whether the +things be impossible in themselves, or made impossible by some unseen +accident, yet there is no reason that men should be _punished for not +doing them_. It seems he taketh punishment for a kind of revenge, and +can never therefore agree with me, that take it for nothing else but for +a correction, or for an example, which hath for end the _framing_ and +_necessitating of the will_ to virtue; and that he is no good man, that +upon any provocation useth his power, though a power lawfully obtained, +to afflict another man without this end, to reform the will of him or +others. Nor can I comprehend, as having only humane ideas, that that +punishment which neither intendeth the correction of the offender, nor +the correction of others by example, doth proceed from God. + +(_b_) “He saith that no law can possibly be unjust,” &c. + +Against this he replies that the law of Pharaoh, to drown the male +children of the Israelites; and of Nebuchadnezzar, to worship the golden +image; and of Darius, against praying to any but him in thirty days; and +of Ahasuerus, to destroy the Jews; and of the Pharisees, to +excommunicate the confessors of Christ; were all unjust laws. The laws +of these kings, as they were laws, have relation only to the men that +were their subjects; and the _making_ of them, which was the action of +every one of those kings, who were subjects to another king, namely, to +God Almighty, had relation to the law of God. In the first relation, +there could be no injustice in them; because all laws made by him to +whom the people had given the legislative power, are the acts of every +one of that people; and no man can do injustice to himself. But in +relation to God, if God have by a law forbidden it, the making of such +laws is injustice. Which law of God was to those heathen princes no +other but _salus populi_, that is to say, the properest use of their +natural reason for the preservation of their subjects. If therefore +those laws were ordained out of wantonness, or cruelty, or envy, or for +the pleasing of a favourite, or out of any other sinister end, as it +seems they were, the making of those laws was unjust. But if in right +reason they were necessary for the preservation of those people of whom +they had undertaken the charge, then was it not unjust. And for the +Pharisees, who had the same written law of God that we have, their +excommunication of the Christians, proceeding, as it did, from envy, was +an act of malicious injustice. If it had proceeded from +misinterpretation of their own Scriptures, it had been a sin of +ignorance. Nevertheless, as it was a law to their subjects (in case they +had the legislative power, which I doubt of), the law was not unjust. +But the making of it was an unjust action, of which they were to give +account to none but God. I fear the Bishop will think this discourse too +subtile; but the judgment is the reader’s. + +(_c_) “The ground of this error,” &c., “is this: that every man makes by +his consent the law which he is bound to keep,” &c. + +The reason why he thinketh this an error, is because the positive law of +God, contained in the Bible, is a law without our assent; the law of +nature was written in our hearts by the finger of God without our +assent; the laws of conquerors, who come in by the power of the sword, +were made without our assent; and so were the laws of our ancestors, +which were made before we were born. It is a strange thing that he that +understands the nonsense of the Schoolmen, should not be able to +perceive so easy a truth as this which he denieth. The Bible is a law. +To whom? To all the world? He knows it is not. How came it then to be a +law to us? Did God speak it _viva voce_ to us? Have we then any other +warrant for it than the word of the prophets? Have we seen the miracles? +Have we any other assurance of their certainty than the authority of the +Church? And is the authority of the Church any other than the authority +of the commonwealth, or that of the commonwealth any other than that of +the head of the commonwealth, or hath the head of the commonwealth any +other authority than that which hath been given him by the members? +Else, why should not the Bible be canonical as well in Constantinople as +in any other place? They that have the legislative power make nothing +canon, which they make not law, nor law, which they make not canon. And +because the legislative power is from the assent of the subjects, the +Bible is made law by the assent of the subjects. It was not the Bishop +of Rome that made the Scripture law without his own temporal dominions; +nor is it the clergy that make it law in their dioceses and rectories. +Nor can it be a law of itself without special and supernatural +revelation. The Bishop thinks because the Bible is law, and he is +appointed to teach it to the people in his diocese, that therefore it is +law to whomsoever he teach it; which is somewhat gross, but not so gross +as to say that conquerors who come in by the power of the sword, make +their laws also without our assent. He thinks, belike, that if a +conqueror can kill me if he please, I am presently obliged without more +ado to obey all his laws. May not I rather die, if I think fit? The +conqueror makes no law over the conquered by virtue of his power; but by +virtue of their assent, that promised obedience for the saving of their +lives. But how then is the assent of the children obtained to the laws +of their ancestors? This also is from the desire of preserving their +lives, which first the parents might take away, where the parents be +free from all subjection; and where they are not, there the civil power +might do the same, if they doubted of their obedience. The children +therefore, when they be grown up to strength enough to do mischief, and +to judgment enough to know that other men are kept from doing mischief +to them by fear of the sword that protecteth them, in that very act of +receiving that protection, and not renouncing it openly, do oblige +themselves to obey the laws of their protectors; to which, in receiving +such protection, they have assented. And whereas he saith, the law of +nature is a law without our assent, it is absurd; for the law of nature +is the assent itself that all men give to the means of their own +preservation. + +(_d_) “But his chiefest answer is, that an action forbidden, though it +proceed from necessary causes, yet if it were done willingly, may be +justly punished,” &c. + +This the Bishop also understandeth not, and therefore denies it. He +would have the judge condemn no man for a crime, if it were +necessitated; as if the judge could know what acts are necessary, unless +he knew all that hath anteceded, both visible and invisible, and what +both every thing in itself, and altogether, can effect. It is enough to +the judge, that the act he condemneth be voluntary. The punishment +whereof may, if not capital, reform the will of the offender; if +capital, the will of others by example. For heat in one body doth not +more create heat in another, than the terror of an example createth fear +in another, who otherwise were inclined to commit injustice. + +Some few lines before, he hath said that I built upon a wrong +foundation, namely, “that all magistrates were at first elective;” I had +forgot to tell you, that I never said nor thought it. And therefore his +reply, as to that point, is impertinent. + +Not many lines after, for a reason why a man may not be justly punished +when his crime is voluntary, he offereth this: “that law is unjust and +tyrannical, which commands a man to will that which is impossible for +him to will.” Whereby it appears, he is of opinion that a law may be +made to command the will. The style of a law is _do this_, or _do not +this_; or, _if thou do this, thou shalt suffer this_; but no law runs +thus, _will this_, or _will not this_; or, _if thou have a will to this, +thou shalt suffer this_. He objecteth further, that I beg the question, +because no man’s will is necessitated. Wherein he mistakes; for I say no +more in that place, but that he that doth evil willingly, whether he be +necessarily willing, or not necessarily, may be justly punished. And +upon this mistake he runneth over again his former and already answered +nonsense, saying, “we ourselves, by our own negligence in not opposing +our passions when we should and might, have freely given them a kind of +dominion over us;” and again, _motus primo primi_, the first motions are +not always in our power. Which _motus primo primi_, signifies nothing; +and “our negligence in not opposing our passions,” is the same with “our +want of will to oppose our will,” which is absurd; and “that we have +given them a kind of dominion over us,” either signifies nothing, or +that we have a dominion over our wills, or our wills a dominion over us, +and consequently either we or our wills are not free. + +(_e_) “He pleads moreover that the law is a cause of justice,” &c. “All +this is most true, of a just law justly executed.” + +But I have shown that all laws are just, as laws, and therefore not to +be accused of injustice by those that owe subjection to them; and a just +law is always justly executed. Seeing then that he confesseth that all +that he replieth to here is true, it followeth that the reply itself, +where it contradicteth me, is false. + +(_f_) “He addeth that the sufferings imposed by the law upon +delinquents, respect not the evil act passed, but the good to come; and +that the putting of a delinquent to death by the magistrate for any +crime whatsoever, cannot be justified before God, except there be a real +intention to benefit others by his example.” + +This he neither confirmeth nor denieth, and yet forbeareth not to +discourse upon it to little purpose; and therefore I pass it over. + +(_g_) “First he told us, that it was the irresistible power of God that +justifies all his actions; though he command one thing openly, and plot +another thing secretly; though he be the cause not only of the action, +but also of the irregularity, &c.” + +To all this, which hath been pressed before, I have answered before; but +that he says I say, “having commanded one thing openly, he plots another +thing secretly,” it is not mine, but one of his own ugly phrases. And +the force it hath, proceeded out of an apprehension he hath, that +affliction is not God’s correction, but his revenge upon the creatures +of his own making; and from a reasoning he useth, “because it is not +just in a man to kill one man for the amendment of another, therefore +neither is it so in God;” not remembering that God hath, or shall have +killed all the men in the world, both nocent and innocent. + +My assertion, he saith, “is a dream, and the sum of it this; that where +there is no law, there no killing or anything else can be unjust; that +before the constitution of commonwealths, every man had power to kill +another,” &c., and adds, that “this may well be called stringing of +paradoxes.” To these my words he replies: + +(_h_) “There was never any time when mankind was without governors, +laws, and societies.” + +It is very likely to be true, that since the creation there never was a +time in which mankind was totally without society. If a part of it were +without laws and governors, some other parts might be commonwealths. He +saw there was paternal government in Adam; which he might do easily, as +being no deep consideration. But in those places where there is a civil +war at any time, at the same time there is neither laws, nor +commonwealth, nor society, but only a temporal league, which every +discontented soldier may depart from when he pleases, as being entered +into by each man for his private interest, without any obligation of +conscience: there are therefore almost at all times multitudes of +lawless men. But this was a little too remote from his understanding to +perceive. Again, he denies, that ever there was a time when one private +man might lawfully kill another for his own preservation; and has +forgotten that these words of his (No. II.), “this is the belief of all +mankind, which we have not learned from our tutors, but is imprinted in +our hearts by nature; we need not turn over any obscure books to find +out this truth,” &c.; which are the words of Cicero in the defence of +Milo, and translated by the Bishop to the defence of free-will, were +used by Cicero to prove this very thing, that it is and hath been always +lawful for one private man to kill another for his own preservation. But +where he saith it is not lawful _ordinarily_, he should have shown some +particular case wherein it is unlawful. For seeing it is a “belief +imprinted in our hearts,” not only I, but many more are apt to think it +is the law of nature, and consequently universal and eternal. And where +he saith, this right of defence where it is, “is not a remainder of some +greater power which they have resigned, but a privilege which God hath +given them in case of extreme danger and invincible necessity,” &c.; I +also say it is a privilege which God hath given them, but we differ in +the manner how; which to me seems this, that God doth not account such +killing sin. But the Bishop it seems would have it thus: God sends a +bishop into the pulpit to tell the people it is lawful for a man to kill +another man when it is necessary for the preservation of his own life; +of which necessity, that is, whether it be _invincible_, or whether the +danger be _extreme_, the bishop shall be the judge after the man is +killed, as being a case of conscience. Against the resigning of this our +general power of killing our enemies, he argues thus: “Nothing can give +that which it never had; the people whilst they were a dispersed rabble, +which in some odd cases might happen to be, never had justly the power +of life and death, and therefore they could not give it by their +election,” &c. Needs there much acuteness to understand, what number of +men soever there be, though not united into government, that every one +of them in particular having a right to destroy whatsoever he thinketh +can annoy him, may not resign the same right, and give it to whom he +please, when he thinks it conducible to his preservation? And yet it +seems he has not understood it. + +He takes it ill that I compare the “murdering of men with the +slaughtering of brute beasts:” as also a little before, he says, “my +opinion reflects too much upon the honour of mankind: the elements are +for the plants, the plants for the brute beasts, and the brute beasts +for man.” I pray, when a lion eats a man, and a man eats an ox, why is +the ox more made for the man, than the man for the lion? “Yes,” he +saith, “God gave man liberty (Gen. ix. 3) to eat the flesh of the +creatures for his sustenance.” True, but the lion had the liberty to eat +the flesh of man long before. But he will say, no; pretending that no +man of any nation, or at any time, could lawfully eat flesh, unless he +had this licence of holy Scripture, which it was impossible for most men +to have. But how would he have been offended, if I had said of man as +Pliny doth: “_quo nullum est animal neque miserius, neque superbius_?” +The truth is, that man is a creature of greater power than other living +creatures are, but his advantages do consist especially in two things: +whereof one is the use of speech, by which men communicate one with +another, and join their forces together, and by which also they register +their thoughts that they perish not, but be reserved, and afterwards +joined with other thoughts, to produce general rules for the direction +of their actions. There be beasts that see better, others that hear +better, and others that exceed mankind in other senses. Man excelleth +beasts only in making of rules to himself, that is to say, in +remembering, and in reasoning aright upon that which he remembereth. +They which do so, deserve an honour above brute beasts. But they which +mistaking the use of words, deceive themselves and others, introducing +error, and seducing men from the truth, are so much less to be honoured +than brute beasts, as error is more vile than ignorance. So that it is +not merely the nature of man, that makes him worthier than other living +creatures, but the knowledge that he acquires by meditation, and by the +right use of reason in making good rules of his future actions. The +other advantage a man hath, is the use of his hands for the making of +those things which are instrumental to his well-being. But this +advantage is not a matter of so great honour, but that a man may speak +negligently of it without offence. And for the dominion that a man hath +over beasts, he saith, “it is lost in part for the sin of man, because +the strongest creatures, as lions and bears, have withdrawn their +obedience; but the most profitable and useful creatures, as sheep and +oxen, do in some degree retain their obedience.” I would ask the Bishop, +in what consisteth the dominion of man over a lion or a bear. Is it in +an obligation of promise, or of debt? That cannot be; for they have no +sense of debt or duty. And I think he will not say, that they have +received a command to obey him from authority. It resteth therefore that +the dominion of man consists in this, that men are too hard for lions +and bears, because, though a lion or a bear be stronger than a man, yet +the strength, and art, and especially the leaguing and societies of men, +are a greater power than the ungoverned strength of unruly beasts. In +this it is that consisteth this dominion of man. And for the same reason +when a hungry lion meeteth an unarmed man in a desert, the lion hath the +dominion over the man, if that of man over lions, or over sheep and +oxen, may be called dominion, which properly it cannot; nor can it be +said that sheep and oxen do otherwise obey us, than they would do a +lion. And if we have dominion over sheep and oxen, we exercise it not as +dominion, but as hostility; for we keep them only to labour, and to be +killed and devoured by us; so that lions and bears would be as good +masters to them as we are. By this short passage of his concerning +_dominion_ and _obedience_, I have no reason to expect a very shrewd +answer from him to my _Leviathan_. + +(_i_) “The next branch of his answer concerns consultations, which, +saith he, ‘are not superfluous, though all things come to pass +necessarily; because they are the cause which doth necessitate the +effect, and the means to bring it to pass.’” + +His reply to this is, that he hath “showed sufficiently, that reason +doth not determine the will physically,” &c. If not physically, how +then? As he hath told us in another place, _morally_. But what it is to +determine a thing morally, no man living understands. I doubt not but he +had therefore the will to write this reply, _because_ I had answered his +treatise concerning true liberty. My answer therefore was, at least in +part, the _cause_ of his writing; yet that is the cause of the nimble +local motion of his fingers. Is not the cause of local motion physical? +His will therefore was physically, and extrinsically, and antecedently, +and not morally caused by my writing. + +(_k_) “He adds further that ‘as the end is necessary, so are the means, +and when it is determined that one thing shall be chosen before another, +it is determined also for what cause it shall be so chosen.’ All which +is truth, but not the whole truth,” &c. + +Is it not enough that it is truth? Must I put all the truth I know into +two or three lines? No. I should have added, that God doth adapt and fit +the means to their respective ends, free means to free ends, contingent +means to contingent ends, necessary means to necessary ends. It may be I +would have done so, but for shame. _Free_, _contingent_ and _necessary_ +are not words that can be joined to _means_ or _ends_, but to _agents_ +and _actions_; that is to say, to things that move or are moved: a _free +agent_ being that whose motion or action is not hindered or stopped, and +a _free action_, that which is produced by a free agent. A _contingent +agent_ is the same with an _agent_ simply. But, because men for the most +part think those things are produced without cause, whereof they do not +see the cause, they use to call both the agent and the action +contingent, as attributing it to fortune. And therefore, when the causes +are necessary, if they perceive not the necessity, they call those +necessary agents and actions, in things that have appetite, _free_; and +in things inanimate, _contingent_. The rest of his reply to this point +is very little of it applied to my answer. I note only that where he +says, “but if God have so ordered the world, that a man cannot, _if he +would_, neglect any means of good, &c.;” he would fraudulently insinuate +that it is my opinion, that a man is not _free to do if he will, and to +abstain if he will_. Whereas from the beginning I have often declared +that it is none of my opinion; and that my opinion is only this, that he +is not _free to will_, or which is all one, he is not master of his +future will. After much unorderly discourse he comes in with “this is +the doctrine that flows from this opinion of absolute necessity;” which +is impertinent; seeing nothing flows from it more than may be drawn from +the confession of an eternal prescience. + +(_l_) “But he tells me in great sadness, that ‘my argument is no better +than this; if I shall live till to-morrow, I shall live till to-morrow, +though I run myself through with a sword to-day; which, saith he, is a +false consequence, and a false proposition.’ Truly, if by running +through, he understand killing, it is a false or rather a foolish +proposition.” He saith right. Let us therefore see how it is not like to +his. He says, “if it be absolutely necessary that a man shall live till +to-morrow, then it is vain and superfluous for him to consult whether he +should die to-day or not.” “And this,” he says, “is a true consequence.” +I cannot perceive how it is a better consequence than the former; for if +it be absolutely necessary that a man should live till to-morrow, and in +health, which may also be supposed, why should he not, if he have the +curiosity, have his head cut off to try what pain it is. But the +consequence is false; for if there be a necessity of his living, it is +necessary also that he shall not have so foolish a curiosity. But he +cannot yet distinguish between a seen and an unseen necessity, and that +is the cause he believeth his consequence to be good. + +(_m_) “The next branch of my argument concerns admonitions,” &c. + +Which he says is this: “If all things be necessary, then it is to no +more purpose to admonish men of understanding, than fools, children, or +madmen; but that they do admonish the one and not the other, is +confessedly true; and no reason under heaven can be given for it but +this, that the former have the use of reason and true liberty, with a +dominion over their own actions, which children, fools, and madmen have +not.” + +The true reason why we admonish men and not children, &c., is because +admonition is nothing else but telling a man the good and evil +consequences of his actions. They who have experience of good and evil, +can better perceive the reasonableness of such admonition, than they +that have not; and such as have like passions to those of the admonitor, +do more easily conceive that to be good or bad which the admonitor saith +is so, than they who have great passions, and such as are contrary to +his. The first, which is want of experience, maketh children and fools +unapt; and the second, which is strength of passion, maketh madmen +unwilling to receive admonition; for children are ignorant, and madmen +in an error, concerning what is good or evil for themselves. This is not +to say children and madmen want true liberty, that is, the liberty to do +as they will, nor to say that men of judgment, or the admonitor himself +hath a dominion over his own actions, more than children or madmen, (for +their actions are also voluntary), or that when he admonisheth he hath +always the use of reason, though he have the use of deliberation, which +children, fools, madmen, and beasts also have. There be, therefore, +reasons under heaven which the Bishop knows not of. + +Whereas I had said, that things necessary may be praiseworthy, and to +praise a thing is to say it is good, he distinguisheth and saith: + +(_n_) “True, but this goodness is not a metaphysical goodness; so +whatsoever hath a being is good; nor a natural goodness; the praise of +it passeth wholly to the Author of nature, &c.; but a moral goodness, or +a goodness of actions, rather than of things. The moral goodness of an +action is the conformity of it to right reason,” &c. + +There hath been in the Schools derived from _Aristotle’s Metaphysics_, +an old proverb rather than an axiom: _ens, bonum, et verum +convertuntur_. From hence the Bishop hath taken this notion of a +metaphysical goodness, and his doctrine that whatsoever hath a being is +good; and by this interpreteth the words of Gen. i. 31: _God saw all +that he had made, and it was very good_. But the reason of those words +is, that _good_ is relative to those that are pleased with it, and not +of absolute signification to all men. God therefore saith, that all that +he had made was very good, because he was pleased with the creatures of +his own making. But if all things were absolutely good, we should be all +pleased with their _being_, which we are not, when the actions that +depend upon their being are hurtful to us. And therefore, to speak +properly, nothing is good or evil but in regard of the action that +proceedeth from it, and also of the person to whom it doth good or hurt. +Satan is evil to us, because he seeketh our destruction, but good to +God, because he executeth his commandments. And so his _metaphysical +goodness_ is but an idle term, and not the member of a distinction. And +as for natural goodness and evilness, that also is but the goodness and +evilness of actions; as some herbs are good because they nourish, others +evil because they poison us; and one horse is good because he is gentle, +strong, and carrieth a man easily; another bad, because he resisteth, +goeth hard, or otherwise displeaseth us; and that quality of gentleness, +if there were no more laws amongst men than there is amongst beasts, +would be as much a moral good in a horse or other beast as in a man. It +is the law from whence proceeds the difference between the moral and the +natural goodness: so that it is well enough said by him, that “moral +goodness is the conformity of an action with right reason”; and better +said than meant; for this _right reason_, which is the law, is no +otherwise certainly right than by our making it so by our approbation of +it and voluntary subjection to it. For the law-makers are men, and may +err, and think that law, which they make, is for the good of the people +sometimes when it is not. And yet the actions of subjects, if they be +conformable to the law, are morally good, and yet cease not to be +naturally good; and the praise of them passeth to the Author of nature, +as well as of any other good whatsoever. From whence it appears that +moral praise is not, as he says, from the good use of liberty, but from +obedience to the laws; nor moral dispraise from the bad use of liberty, +but from disobedience to the laws. And for his consequence, “if all +things be necessary, then moral liberty is quite taken away, and with it +all true praise and dispraise”, there is neither truth in it, nor +argument offered for it; for there is nothing more necessary than the +consequence of _voluntary_ actions to the _will_. And whereas I had +said, that to say a thing is good, is to say it is as I or another would +wish, or as the state would have it, or according to the law of the +land, he answers, that “I mistake infinitely”. And his reason is, +because “we often wish what is profitable or delightful, without +regarding as we ought what is honest”. There is no man living that seeth +all the consequences of an action from the beginning to the end, whereby +to weigh the whole sum of the good with the whole sum of the evil +consequence. We choose no further than we can weigh. That is good to +every man, which is so far good as he can see. All the real good, which +we call honest and morally virtuous, is that which is not repugnant to +the law, civil or natural; for the law is all the right reason we have, +and, (though he, as often as it disagreeth with his own reason, deny +it), is the infallible rule of moral goodness. The reason whereof is +this, that because neither mine nor the Bishop’s reason is right reason +fit to be a rule of our moral actions, we have therefore set up over +ourselves a sovereign governor, and agreed that his laws shall be unto +us, whatsoever they be, in the place of right reason, to dictate to us +what is really good. In the same manner as men in playing turn up trump, +and as in playing their game their morality consisteth in not +renouncing, so in our civil conversation our morality is all contained +in not disobeying of the laws. + +To my question, “whether nothing could please him, that proceeded from +necessity”, he answers: “yes; the fire pleaseth him when he is cold, and +he says it is good fire, but does not praise it morally”. He praiseth, +he says, first the Creator of the fire, and then him who provided it. He +does well; yet he praiseth the fire when he saith it is good, though not +morally. He does not say it is a just fire, or a wise, or a +well-mannered fire, obedient to the laws; but these attributes it seems +he gives to God, as if justice were not of his nature, but of his +manners. And in praising morally him that provided it, he seems to say, +he would not say the fire was good, if he were not morally good that did +provide it. + +To that which I had answered concerning reward and punishment, he hath +replied, he says, sufficiently before, and that that which he +discourseth here, is not only to answer me, but also to satisfy himself, +and saith: + +(_o_) “Though it be not urged by him, yet I do acknowledge that I find +some improper and analogical rewards and punishments, used to brute +beasts, as the hunter rewards his dog,” &c. + +For my part, I am too dull to perceive the difference between those +rewards used to brute beasts, and those that are used to men. If they be +not properly called rewards and punishments, let him give them their +proper name. It may be he will say, he has done it in calling them +_analogical_; yet for any thing that can be understood thereby, he might +have called them _paragogical_, or _typical_, or _topical_, if he had +pleased. He adds further, that whereas he had said that the actions of +bees and spiders were done without consultation, by mere instinct of +nature, and by a determination of their fancies, I misallege him, and +say he made their individual actions necessary. I have only this to +answer, that, seeing he says that by instinct of nature their fancies +were determined to special kinds of works, I might justly infer they +were determined every one of them to some work; and every work is an +individual action; for _a kind of work_ in the general, is no work. But +these their individual actions, he saith, “are contingent, and therefore +not necessary”; which is no good consequence: for if he mean by +_contingent_, that which has no cause, he speaketh not as a Christian, +but maketh a Deity of fortune; which I verily think he doth not. But if +he mean by it, that whereof he knoweth not the cause, the consequence is +nought. + +The means whereby setting-dogs, and coy-ducks, and parrots, are taught +to do what they do, “is by their backs, by their bellies, by the rod, or +by the morsel, which have indeed a shadow or resemblance of rewards and +punishments: but we take the word here properly, not as it is used by +vulgar people, but as it is used by divines and philosophers,” &c. Does +not the Bishop know that the belly hath taught poets, and historians, +and divines, and philosophers, and artificers, their several arts, as +well as parrots? Do not men do their duty with regard to their backs, to +their necks, and to their morsels, as well as setting-dogs, coy-ducks, +and parrots? Why then are these things to us the substance, and to them +but the _shadow_ or _resemblance_ of rewards or punishments? + +(_p_) “When brute creatures do learn any such qualities, it is not out +of judgment or deliberation or discourse, by inferring or concluding one +thing from another, which they are not capable of; neither are they able +to conceive a reason of what they do,” &c.: but “they remember that when +they did after one manner, they were beaten, and when they did after +another manner, they were cherished; and accordingly they apply +themselves.” + +If the Bishop had considered the cogitations of his own mind, not then +when he disputeth, but then when he followed those businesses which he +calleth trifles, he would have found them the very same which he here +mentioneth; saving instead of _beating_, (because he is exempt from +that), he is to put _in damage_. For, setting aside the discourse of the +tongue in words of general signification, the ideas of our minds are the +same with those of other living creatures, created from visible, +audible, and other sensible objects to the eyes and other organs of +sense, as their’s are. For as the objects of sense are all individual, +that is, singular, so are all the fancies proceeding from their +operations; and men reason not but in words of universal signification, +uttered or tacitly thought on. But perhaps he thinketh remembrance of +words to be the ideas of those things which the words signify; and that +all fancies are not effected by the operation of objects upon the organs +of our senses. But to rectify him in those points is greater labour +(unless he had better principles) than I am willing, or have at this +time leisure, to undergo. + +Lastly, whereas he says, “if their individual actions were absolutely +necessary, fear or hope could not alter them”: that is true. For it is +fear and hope, that makes them necessarily what they are. + + NO. XV. + +[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] + +_J. D._ “Thirdly, let this opinion be once radicated in the minds of +men, that there is no true liberty, and that all things come to pass +inevitably, and it will utterly destroy the study of piety. Who will +bewail his sins with tears? What will become of that grief, that zeal, +that indignation, that holy revenge, which the Apostle speaks of, if men +be once thoroughly persuaded that they could not shun what they did? A +man may grieve for that which he could not help; but he will never be +brought to bewail that as his own fault, which flowed not from his own +error, but from antecedent necessity. Who will be careful or solicitous +to perform obedience, that believeth there are inevitable bounds and +limits set to all his devotions, which he can neither go beyond, nor +come short of? To what end shall he pray God to avert those evils which +are inevitable, or to confer those favours which are impossible? We +indeed know not what good or evil shall happen to us: but this we know, +that if all things be necessary, our devotions and endeavours cannot +alter that which must be. In a word, the only reason why those persons, +who tread in this path of fatal destiny, do sometimes pray, or repent, +or serve God, is because the light of nature, and the strength of +reason, and the evidence of Scripture, do for that present transport +them from their ill-chosen grounds, and expel those stoical fancies out +of their heads. A complete Stoic can neither pray, nor repent, nor serve +God to any purpose. Either allow liberty, or destroy Church as well as +commonwealth, religion as well as policy.” + +_T. H._ His third argument consisteth in other inconveniences which he +saith will follow, namely, impiety and negligence of religious duties, +repentance and zeal to God’s service. To which I answer, as to the rest, +that they follow not. I must confess, if we consider the far greatest +part of mankind, not as they should be, but as they are, that is, as men +whom either the study of acquiring wealth or preferments, or whom the +appetite of sensual delights, or the impatience of meditating, or the +rash embracing of wrong principles, have made unapt to discuss the truth +of things, that the dispute of this question will rather hurt than help +their piety. And therefore, if he had not desired this answer, I would +not have written it. Nor do I write it, but in hope your Lordship and he +will keep it private. Nevertheless, in very truth, the necessity of +events does not of itself draw with it any impiety at all. For piety +consisteth only in two things; one, that we honour God in our hearts, +which is, that we think of his power as highly as we can: for to honour +any thing, is nothing else but to think it to be of great power. The +other, that we signify that honour and esteem by our words and actions, +which is called _cultus_ or worship of God. He therefore, that thinketh +that all things proceed from God’s eternal will, and consequently are +necessary, does he not think God omnipotent? does he not esteem of his +power as highly as is possible; which is to honour God as much as can be +in his heart? Again, he that thinketh so, is he not more apt by external +acts and words to acknowledge it, than he that thinketh otherwise? Yet +is this external acknowledgment the same thing which we call worship. So +this opinion fortifieth piety in both kinds, externally and internally, +and therefore is far from destroying it. And for repentance, which is +nothing but a glad returning into the right way after the grief of being +out of the way, though the cause that made him go astray were necessary, +yet there is no reason why he should not grieve; and again, though the +cause why he returned into the way were necessary, there remain still +the causes of joy. So that the necessity of the actions taketh away +neither of those parts of repentance, grief for the error, nor joy for +the returning. And for prayer, whereas he saith that the necessity of +things destroys prayer, I deny it. For though prayer be none of the +causes that move God’s will, his will being unchangeable, yet since we +find in God’s word, he will not give his blessings but to those that ask +them, the motive to prayer is the same. Prayer is the gift of God, no +less than the blessings. And the prayer is decreed together in the same +decree wherein the blessing is decreed. It is manifest, that +thanksgiving is no cause of the blessing passed; and that which is +passed, is sure and necessary. Yet even amongst men, thanks are in use +as an acknowledgment of the benefit past, though we should expect no new +benefit for our gratitude. And prayer to God Almighty is but +thanksgiving for his blessings in general; and though it precede the +particular thing we ask, yet it is not a cause or means of it, but a +signification that we expect nothing but from God, in such manner as He, +not as we will. And our Saviour by word of mouth bids us pray, “thy +will, not our will be done”; and by example teaches us the same; for he +prayed thus: _Father, if it be thy will, let this cup pass_, &c. The end +of prayer, as of thanksgiving, is not to move, but to honour God +Almighty, in acknowledging that what we ask can be effected by Him only. + +_J. D._ “I hope T. H. will be persuaded in time, that it is not the +coveteousness, or ambition, or sensuality, or sloth, or prejudice of his +readers, which render this doctrine of absolute necessity dangerous, but +that it is, in its own nature, destructive to true godliness; (_a_) and +though his answer consist more of oppositions than of solutions, yet I +will not willingly leave one grain of his matter unweighed. (_b_) First, +he errs in making inward piety to consist merely in the estimation of +the judgment. If this were so, what hinders but that the devils should +have as much inward piety as the best Christians? For they esteem God’s +power to be infinite, and tremble. Though inward piety do suppose the +act of the understanding, yet it consisteth properly in the act of the +will, being that branch of justice which gives to God the honour which +is due unto him. Is there no love due to God, no faith, no hope? (_c_) +Secondly, he errs in making inward piety to ascribe no glory to God, but +only the glory of his power or omnipotence. What shall become of all +other the Divine attributes, and particularly of his goodness, of his +truth, of his justice, of his mercy, which beget a more true and sincere +honour in the heart than greatness itself? _Magnos facile laudamus, +bonos lubenter._ (_d_) Thirdly, this opinion of absolute necessity +destroys the truth of God, making him to command one thing openly, and +to necessitate another privately; to chide a man for doing that which he +hath determined him to do; to profess one thing, and to intend another. +It destroys the goodness of God, making him to be a hater of mankind, +and to delight in the torments of his creatures; whereas the very dogs +licked the sores of Lazarus, in pity and commiseration of him. It +destroys the justice of God, making him to punish the creatures for that +which was his own act, which they had no more power to shun, than the +fire hath power not to burn. It destroys the very power of God, making +him to be the true author of all the defects and evils which are in the +world. These are the fruits of impotence, not of omnipotence. He who is +the effective cause of sin, either in himself or in the creature, is not +almighty. There needs no other devil in the world to raise jealousies +and suspicions between God and his creatures, or to poison mankind with +an apprehension that God doth not love them, but only this opinion, +which was the office of the serpent (Gen. iii. 5). Fourthly, for the +outward worship of God; (_e_) how shall a man praise God for his +goodness, who believes him to be a greater tyrant than ever was in the +world; who creates millions to burn eternally, without their fault, to +express his power? How shall a man hear the word of God with that +reverence, and devotion, and faith, which is requisite, who believeth +that God causeth his gospel to be preached to the much greater part of +Christians, not with any intention that they should be converted and +saved, but merely to harden their hearts, and to make them inexcusable? +How shall a man receive the blessed sacrament with comfort and +confidence, as a seal of God’s love in Christ, who believeth that so +many millions are positively excluded from all fruit and benefit of the +passions of Christ, before they had done either good or evil? How shall +he prepare himself with care and conscience, who apprehendeth that +eating and drinking unworthily is not the cause of damnation, but, +because God would damn a man, therefor he necessitates him to eat and +drink unworthily? How shall a man make a free vow to God without gross +ridiculous hypocrisy, who thinks he is able to perform nothing but as he +is extrinsically necessitated? Fifthly, for repentance, how shall a man +condemn and accuse himself for his sins, who thinks himself to be like a +watch which is wound up by God, and that he can go neither longer nor +shorter, faster nor slower, truer nor falser, than he is ordered by God? +If God sets him right, he goes right; if God sets him wrong, he goes +wrong. How can a man be said to return into the right way, who never was +in any other way but that which God himself had chalked out for him? +What is his purpose to amend, who is destitute of all power, but as if a +man should purpose to fly without wings, or a beggar who hath not a +groat in his purse, purpose to build hospitals? + +“We use to say, admit one absurdity, and a thousand will follow. To +maintain this unreasonable opinion of absolute necessity, he is +necessitated (but it is hypothetically, he might change his opinion if +he would) to deal with all ancient writers as the Goths did with the +Romans, who destroyed all their magnificent works, that there might +remain no monument of their greatness upon the face of the earth. +Therefore he will not leave so much as one of their opinions, nor one of +their definitions, nay, not one of their terms of art standing. (_f_) +Observe what a description he hath given us here of repentance: ‘it is a +glad returning into the right way, after the grief of being out of the +way’. It amazed me to find _gladness_ to be the first word in the +description of repentance. His repentance is not that repentance, nor +his piety that piety, nor his prayer that kind of prayer, which the +Church of God in all ages hath acknowledged. Fasting, and sackcloth, and +ashes, and tears, and _humicubations_, used to be companions of +repentance. Joy may be a consequent of it, not a part of it. (_g_) It is +a _returning_: but whose act is this returning? Is it God’s alone, or +doth the penitent person concur also freely with the grace of God? If it +be God’s alone, then it is his repentance, not man’s repentance. What +need the penitent person trouble himself about it? God will take care of +his own work. The Scriptures teach us otherwise, that God expects our +concurrence (Revel. iii. 19, 20): _Be zealous and repent: behold I stand +at the door and knock; if any man hear my voice, and open the door, I +will come in to him_. It is a ‘glad returning into the right way’. Why +dare any man call that a wrong way, which God himself hath determined? +He that willeth and doth that which God would have him to will and to +do, is never out of his right way. It follows in his description, _after +the grief_, &c. It is true, a man may grieve for that which is +necessarily imposed upon him; but he cannot grieve for it as a fault of +his own, if it never was in his power to shun it. Suppose a +writingmaster shall hold his scholar’s hand in his, and write with it; +the scholar’s part is only to hold still his hand, whether the master +write well or ill; the scholar hath no ground either of joy or sorrow, +as for himself; no man will interpret it to be his act, but his +master’s. It is no fault to be out of the right way, if a man had not +liberty to have kept himself in the way. + +“And so from _repentance_ he skips quite over _new obedience_ to come to +_prayer_, which is the last religious duty insisted upon by me here. But +according to his use, without either answering or mentioning what I say; +which would have showed him plainly what kind of prayer I intend, not +contemplative prayer in general, as it includes thanksgiving, but that +most proper kind of prayer which we call _petition_, which used to be +thus defined, to be an act of religion by which we desire of God +something which we have not, and hope that we shall obtain it by him; +quite contrary to this, T. H. tells us, (_h_) that prayer ‘is not a +cause nor a means of God’s blessing, but only a signification that we +expect it from him’. If he had told us only, that prayer is not a +meritorious cause of God’s blessings, as the poor man by begging an alms +doth not deserve it, I should have gone along with him. But to tell us, +that it is not so much as a means to procure God’s blessing, and yet +with the same breath, that ‘God will not give his blessings but to those +who pray’, who shall reconcile him to himself? The Scriptures teach us +otherwise, (John xvi. 23): _Whatsoever ye shall ask the Father in my +name, he will give it you_: (Matth. vii. 7): _Ask, and it shall be given +you, seek, and ye shal find, knock, and it shall be opened unto you_. +St. Paul tells the Corinthians (2 Cor. i. 11), that he was _helped by +their prayers_: that is not all; that _the gift was bestowed upon him by +their means_. So prayer is a means. And St. James saith (chap. v. 16): +_The effectual fervent prayer of a righteous man availeth much_. If it +be _effectual_, then it is a cause. To show this efficacy of prayer, our +Saviour useth the comparison of a father towards his child, of a +neighbour towards his neighbour; yea, of an unjust judge, to shame those +who think that God hath not more compassion than a wicked man. This was +signified by Jacob’s wrestling and prevailing with God. Prayer is like +the tradesman’s tools, wherewithal he gets his living for himself and +his family. But, saith he, ‘God’s will is unchangeable’. What then? He +might as well use this against study, physic, and all second causes, as +against prayer. He shows even in this, how little they attribute to the +endeavours of men. There is a great difference between these two: +_mutare voluntatem_, to change the will; (which God never doth, in whom +there is not the least shadow of turning by change; his will to love and +hate was the same from eternity, which it now is and ever shall be; his +love and hatred are immovable, but we are removed; _non tellus cymbam, +tellurem cymba reliquit_); and _velle mutationem_, to will a change; +which God often doth. To change the will, argues a change in the agent; +but to will a change, only argues a change in the object. It is no +inconstancy in a man to love or to hate as the object is changed. +_Præsta mihi omnia eadem, et idem sum._ Prayer works not upon God, but +us; it renders not him more propitious in himself, but us more capable +of mercy. He saith this, ‘that God doth not bless us, except we pray, is +a motive to prayer’. Why talks he of motives, who acknowledgeth no +liberty, nor admits any cause but absolutely necessary? He saith, +‘prayer is the gift of God, no less than the blessing which we pray for, +and contained in the same decree with the blessing’. It is true, the +spirit of prayer is the gift of God. Will he conclude from thence, that +the good employment of one talent, or of one gift of God, may not +procure another? Our Saviour teacheth us otherwise: _Come thou good and +faithful servant, thou hast been faithful in little, I will make thee +ruler over much_. Too much light is an enemy to the sight, and too much +law is an enemy to justice. I could wish we wrangled less about God’s +decrees, until we understood them better. But, saith he, ‘thanksgiving +is no cause of the blessing past, and prayer is but a thanksgiving’. He +might even as well tell me, that when a beggar craves an alms, and when +he gives thanks for it, it is all one. Every thanksgiving is a kind of +prayer, but every prayer, and namely petition, is not a thanksgiving. In +the last place he urgeth, that ‘in our prayers we are bound to submit +our wills to God’s will.’ Who ever made any doubt of this? We must +submit to the preceptive will of God, or his commandments; we must +submit to the effective will of God, when he declares his good pleasure +by the event or otherwise. But we deny, and deny again, either that God +wills things _ad extra_, without himself, necessarily, or that it is his +pleasure that all second causes should act necessarily at all times; +which is the question, and that which he allegeth to the contrary comes +not near it. + + ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. XV. + +(_a_) “And though his answer consist more of oppositions than of +solutions, yet I will not willingly leave one grain of his matter +unweighed.” + +It is a promise of great exactness, and like to that which is in his +Epistle to the Reader: “Here is all that passed between us upon this +subject, without any addition or the least variation from the original,” +&c.: which promises were both needless, and made out of gallantry; and +therefore he is the less pardonable in case they be not very rigidly +observed. I would therefore have the reader to consider, whether these +words of mine: “our Saviour bids us pray, _thy will_, not _our_ will, +_be done_, and by example teaches us the same; for he prayed thus: +_Father, if it be thy will let this cup pass_,” &c.: which seem at least +to imply that our prayers cannot change the will of God, nor divert him +from his eternal decree: have been weighed by him to a grain, according +to his promise. Nor hath he kept his other promise any better; for (No. +VIII.) replying to these words of mine, “if he had so little to do as to +be a spectator of the actions of bees and spiders, he would have +confessed not only election, but also art, prudence, and policy in +them,” &c., he saith, “yes, I have seen those silliest of creatures, and +seeing their rare works I have seen enough to confute all the bold-faced +atheists of this age, and their hellish blasphemies”. This passage is +added to that which passed between us upon this subject; for it is not +in the copy which I have had by me, as himself confesseth, these eight +years; nor is it in the body of the copy he sent to the press, but only +in the margin, that is to say, added out of anger against me, whom he +would have men think to be one of the bold-faced atheists of this age. + +In the rest of this reply he endeavoureth to prove, that it followeth +from my opinion, that there is no use of piety. My opinion is no more +than this, that a man cannot so determine to-day, the will which he +shall have to the doing of any action to-morrow, as that it may not be +changed by some external accident or other, as there shall appear more +or less advantage to make him persevere in the will to the same action, +or to will it no more. When a man intendeth to pay a debt at a certain +time, if he see that the detaining of the money for a little longer may +advantage himself, and seeth no other disadvantage equivalent likely to +follow upon the detention, he hath his will changed by the advantage, +and therefore had not determined his will himself; but when he foreseeth +discredit or perhaps imprisonment, then his will remaineth the same, and +is determined by the thoughts he hath of his creditor, who is therefore +an external cause of the determination of the debtor’s will. This is so +evident to all men living, though they never studied school-divinity, +that it will be very strange if he draw from it the great impiety he +pretends to do. Again, my opinion is only this: that whatsoever God +foreknows shall come to pass, it cannot possibly be that that shall not +come to pass; but that which cannot possibly not come to pass, that is +said by all men to come to pass necessarily; therefore all events that +God foreknows shall come to pass, shall come to pass necessarily. If +therefore the Bishop draw impiety from this, he falleth into the impiety +of denying God’s prescience. Let us see now how he reasoneth. + +(_b_) “First, he errs in making inward piety to consist merely in the +estimation of the judgment. If this were so, what hinders but that the +devils should have as much inward piety as the best Christians; for they +esteem God’s power to be infinite, and tremble?” + +I said, that two things concurred to _piety_; one, to esteem his power +as highly as is possible; the other, that we signify that estimation by +our words and actions, that is to say, that we worship him. This latter +part of piety he leaveth out; and then, it is much more easy to conclude +as he doth, that the devils may have inward piety. But neither so doth +the conclusion follow. For goodness is one of God’s powers, namely, that +power by which he worketh in men the hope they have in him; and is +relative; and therefore, unless the devil think that God will be good to +him, he cannot esteem him for his goodness. It does not therefore follow +from any opinion of mine, that the devil may have as much inward piety +as a Christian. But how does the Bishop know how the devils esteem God’s +power; and what devils does he mean? There are in the Scripture two +sorts of things, which are in English translated devils. One, is that +which is called Satan, Diabolus, and Abaddon, which signifies in +English, an _enemy_, an _accuser_, and a _destroyer_ of the Church of +God. In which sense, the devils are but wicked men. How then is he sure +that they esteem God’s power to be infinite? For, _trembling_ infers no +more than that they apprehend it to be greater than their own. The other +sort of devils are called in the Scripture _dæmonia_, which are the +feigned Gods of the heathen, and are neither bodies nor spiritual +substances, but mere fancies, and fictions of terrified hearts, feigned +by the Greeks and other heathen people, and which St. Paul calleth +_nothings_; for an idol, saith he, is nothing. Does the Bishop mean, +that these nothings esteem God’s power to be infinite and tremble? There +is nothing that has a real being, but God, and the world, and the parts +of the world; nor has anything a feigned being, but the fictions of +men’s brains. The world and the parts thereof are corporeal, endued with +the dimensions of quantity, and with figure. I should be glad to know, +in what classes of entities which is a word that schoolmen use, the +Bishop ranketh these devils, that so much esteem God’s power, and yet +not love him nor hope in him, if he place them not in the rank of those +men who are enemies to the people of God, as the Jews did. + +(_c_) “Secondly, he errs in making inward piety to ascribe no glory to +God, but only the glory of his power or omnipotence. What shall become +of all other the Divine attributes, and particularly of his goodness, of +his truth, of his justice, of his mercy,” &c. + +He speaketh of God’s goodness and mercy, as if they were no part of his +power. Is not goodness, in him that is good, the power to make himself +beloved, and is not mercy goodness? Are not, therefore, these attributes +contained in the attribute of his omnipotence? And justice in God, is it +anything else, but the power he hath, and exerciseth in distributing +blessings and afflictions? Justice is not in God as in man, the +observation of the laws made by his superiors. Nor is wisdom in God, a +logical examination of the means by the end, as it is in men; but an +incomprehensible attribute given to an incomprehensible nature, for to +honour him. It is the Bishop that errs, in thinking nothing to be power +but riches and high place, wherein to domineer and please himself, and +vex those that submit not to his opinions. + +(_d_) “Thirdly, this opinion of absolute necessity destroys the truth of +God, making him to command one thing openly, and to necessitate another +privately, &c. It destroys the goodness of God, making him to be a hater +of mankind, &c. It destroys the justice of God, making him to punish the +creatures for that which was his own act, &c. It destroys the very power +of God, making him to be the true author of all the defects and evils +which are in the world.” + +If the opinion of absolute necessity do all this, then the opinion of +God’s prescience does the same; for God foreknoweth nothing, that can +possibly not come to pass; but that which cannot possibly not come to +pass, cometh to pass of necessity. But how doth necessity destroy the +truth of God, by commanding and hindering what he commandeth? Truth +consisteth in affirmation and negation, not in commanding and hindering; +it does not therefore follow, if all things be necessary that come to +pass, that therefore God hath spoken an untruth; nor that he professeth +one thing, and intendeth another. The Scripture, which is his word, is +not the profession of what he intendeth, but an indication of what those +men shall necessarily intend, whom he hath chosen to salvation, and whom +he hath determined to destruction. But on the other side, from the +negation of necessity, there followeth necessarily the negation of God’s +prescience; which is in the Bishop, if not ignorance, impiety. Or how +“destroyeth it the goodness of God, or maketh him to be a hater of +mankind, and to delight in the torments of his creatures, whereas the +very dogs licked the sores of Lazarus in pity and commiseration of him”? +I cannot imagine, when living creatures of all sorts are often in +torments as well as men, that God can be displeased with it: without his +will, they neither are nor could be at all tormented. Nor yet is he +delighted with it; but health, sickness, ease, torments, life and death, +are without all passion in him dispensed by him; and he putteth an end +to them then when they end, and a beginning when they begin, according +to his eternal purpose, which cannot be resisted. That the necessity +argueth a delight of God in the torments of his creatures, is even as +true, as that it was pity and commiseration in the dogs that made them +lick the sores of Lazarus. Or how doth the opinion of necessity “destroy +the justice of God, or make him to punish the creatures for that which +was his own act”? If all afflictions be punishments, for whose act are +all other creatures punished which cannot sin? Why may not God make the +affliction, both of those men that he hath elected, and also of those +whom he hath reprobated, the necessary causes of the conversion of those +he hath elected; their own afflictions serving therein as chastisements, +and the afflictions of the rest as examples? But he may perhaps think it +no injustice to punish the creatures that cannot sin with temporary +punishments, when nevertheless it would be injustice to torment the same +creatures eternally. This may be somewhat to meekness and cruelty, but +nothing at all to justice and injustice: for in punishing the innocent, +the injustice is equal, though the punishments be unequal. And what +cruelty can be greater than that which may be inferred from this opinion +of the Bishop; that God doth torment eternally, and with the extremest +degree of torment, all those men which have sinned, that is to say, all +mankind from the creation to the end of the world which have not +believed in Jesus Christ, whereof very few, in respect of the multitude +of others, have so much as heard of his name; and this, when faith in +Christ is the gift of God himself, and the hearts of all men in his +hands to frame them to the belief of whatsoever he will have them to +believe? He hath no reason therefore, for his part, to tax any opinion, +for ascribing to God either cruelty or injustice. Or how doth it +“destroy the power of God, or make him to be the author of all the +defects and evils which are in the world”? First, he seemeth not to +understand what _author_ signifies. _Author_, is he which owneth an +action, or giveth a warrant to do it. Do I say, that any man hath in the +Scripture, which is all the warrant we have from God for any action +whatsoever, a warrant to commit theft, murder, or any other sin? Does +the opinion of necessity infer that there is such a warrant in the +Scripture? Perhaps he will say, no, but that this opinion makes him the +cause of sin. But does not the Bishop think him the cause of all +actions? And are not sins of commission actions? Is murder no action? +And does not God himself say, _non est malum in civitate quod ego non +feci_; and was murder not one of those evils? Whether it were or not, I +say no more but that God is the cause, not the author, of all actions +and motions. Whether sin be the action, or the defect, or the +irregularity, I mean not to dispute. Nevertheless I am of opinion, that +the distinction of _causes_ into _efficient_ and _deficient_ is _bohu_, +and signifies nothing. + +(_e_) “How shall a man praise God for his goodness, who believes him to +be a greater tyrant than ever was in the world; who creates millions to +burn eternally without their fault, to express his power?” + +If _tyrant_ signify, as it did when it came first in use, a king, it is +no dishonour to believe that God is a greater tyrant than ever was in +the world; for he is the King of all kings, emperors, and commonwealths. +But if we take the word, as it is now used, to signify those kings only, +which they that call them tyrants, are displeased with, that is, that +govern not as they would have them, the Bishop is nearer the calling him +a tyrant, than I am; making that to be tyranny, which is but the +exercise of an absolute power; for he holdeth, though he see it not, by +consequence, in withdrawing the will of man from God’s dominion, that +every man is a king of himself. And if a man cannot praise God for his +goodness, who creates millions to burn eternally without their fault; +how can the Bishop praise God for his goodness, who thinks he hath +created millions of millions to burn eternally, when he could have kept +them so easily from committing any fault? And to his “how shall a man +hear the word of God with that reverence, and devotion, and faith, which +is requisite, who believeth that God causeth his gospel to be preached +to the much greater part of Christians, not with any intention that they +should be converted and saved,” &c.; I answer, that those men who so +believe, have faith in Jesus Christ, or they have not faith in him. If +they have, then shall they, by that faith, hear the word of God with +that reverence, and devotion, and faith, which is requisite to +salvation. And for them that have no faith, I do not think he asketh how +they shall hear the word of God with that reverence, and devotion, and +faith, which is requisite; for he knows they shall not, until such time +as God shall have given them faith. Also he mistakes, if he think that I +or any other Christian believe, that God intendeth, by hardening any +man’s heart, to make that man inexcusable, but to make his elect the +more careful. + +Likewise to his question, “how shall a man receive the sacrament with +comfort, who believeth that so many millions are positively excluded +from the benefit of Christ’s passion, before they had done either good +or evil”; I answer as before, _by faith_, if he be of God’s elect; if +not, he shall not receive the sacrament with comfort. I may answer also, +that the faithful man shall receive the sacrament with comfort, by the +same way that the bishop receiveth it with comfort. For he also +believeth that many millions are excluded from the benefit of Christ’s +passion, (whether positively or not positively is nothing to the +purpose, nor doth positively signify any thing in this place); and that, +so long before they had either done good or evil, as it was known to God +before they were born that they were so excluded. + +To his “how shall he prepare himself with care and conscience, who +apprehendeth that eating and drinking unworthily is not the cause of +damnation, but because God would damn a man, therefore he necessitates +him”: I answer, that he that eateth and drinketh unworthily, does not +believe that God necessitates him to eat and drink unworthily, because +he would damn him; for neither does he think he eats and drinks +unworthily, nor that God intends to damn him; for he believeth no such +damnation, nor intendeth any preparation. The belief of damnation is an +article of Christian faith; so is also preparation to the sacrament. It +is therefore a vain question, how he that hath no faith shall prepare +himself with care and conscience to the receiving of the sacrament. But +to the question, how they shall prepare themselves, that shall at all +prepare themselves; I answer, it shall be by faith, when God shall give +it them. + +To his “how shall a man make a free vow to God, who thinks himself able +to perform nothing, but as he is extrinsically necessitated”: I answer, +that if he make a vow, it is a free vow, or else it is no vow; and yet +he may know, when he hath made that vow, though not before, that it was +extrinsically necessitated; for the necessity of vowing before he vowed, +hindered not the _freedom_ of his vow, but made it. + +Lastly, to “how shall a man condemn and accuse himself for his sins, who +thinks himself to be like a watch which is wound up by God,” &c.: I +answer, though he think himself necessitated to what he shall do, yet, +if he do not think himself necessitated and wound up to impenitence, +there will follow upon his opinion of necessity no impediment to his +repentance. The Bishop disputeth not against me, but against somebody +that holds a man may repent, that believes at the same time he cannot +repent. + +(_f_) “Observe what a description he has given us here of repentance: +‘It is a glad returning into the right way, after the grief of being out +of the way.’ It amazed me to find _gladness_ to be the first word in the +description of repentance.” + +I could never be of opinion that Christian repentance could be ascribed +to them, that had as yet no intention to forsake their sins and to lead +a new life. He that grieves for the evil that hath happened to him for +his sins, but hath not a resolution to obey God’s commandments better +for the time to come, grieveth for his sufferings, but not for his +doings; which no divine, I think, will call Christian repentance. But he +that resolveth upon amendment of life, knoweth that there is forgiveness +for him in Christ Jesus; whereof a Christian cannot possibly be but +glad. Before this gladness there was a grief preparative to repentance, +but the repentance itself was not Christian repentance till this +conversion, till this glad conversion. Therefore I see no reason why it +should amaze him to find gladness to be the first word in the +description of repentance, saving that the light amazeth such as have +been long in darkness. And “for the fasting, sackcloth, and ashes”, they +were never parts of repentance perfected, but signs of the beginning of +it. They are external things; repentance is internal. This doctrine +pertaineth to the establishing of Romish penance; and being found to +conduce to the power of the clergy, was by them wished to be restored. + +(_g_) “It is a returning; but whose act is this returning? If it be +God’s alone, then it is his repentance, not man’s repentance; what need +the penitent person trouble himself about it?” + +This is ill argued; for why is it God’s repentance, when he gives man +repentance, more than it is God’s faith, when he gives man faith. But he +labours to bring in a concurrence of man’s will with God’s will; and a +power in God to give repentance, if man will take it; but not the power +to make him take it. This concurrence he thinks is proved by Revel. iii. +19, 20: “Be zealous, and repent. Behold, I stand at the door, and knock. +If any man hear my voice, and open the door, I will come in to him”. +Here is nothing of concurrence, nor of anything equivalent to it, nor +mention at all of the will or purpose, but of the calling or voice by +the minister. And as God giveth to the minister a power of persuading, +so he giveth also many times a concurrence of the auditor with the +minister in being persuaded. Here is therefore somewhat equivalent to a +concurrence with the minister, that is, of man with man; but nothing of +the concurrence of man, whose will God frameth as he pleaseth, with God +that frameth it. And I wonder how any man can conceive, when God giveth +a man a will to do anything whatsoever, how that will, when it is not, +can concur with God’s will to make itself be. + +The next thing he excepteth against is this, that I hold, (_h_) “that +prayer is not a cause, nor a means of God’s blessing, but only a +signification that we expect it from him.” + +First, instead of my words, “a signification that we expect nothing but +from him,” he hath put “a signification that we expect it from him”. +There is much difference between my words and his, in the sense and +meaning; for in the one, there is honour ascribed to God, and humility +in him that prayeth; but in the other, presumption in him that prayeth, +and a detraction from the honour of God. When I say, prayer is not a +cause nor a means, I take _cause_ and _means_ in one and the same sense; +affirming that God is not moved by any thing that we do, but has always +one and the same eternal purpose, to do the same things that from +eternity he hath foreknown shall be done; and methinks there can be no +doubt made thereof. But the Bishop allegeth (2 Cor. i. 11): that “St. +Paul was helped by their prayers, and that the gift was bestowed upon +them by their means;” and (James v. 16): “The effectual and fervent +prayer of a righteous man availeth much”. In which places, the words +_means_, _effectual_, _availeth_, do not signify any causation; for no +man nor creature living can work any effect upon God, in whom there is +nothing, that hath not been in him eternally heretofore, nor that shall +not be in him eternally hereafter; but do signify the order in which God +hath placed men’s prayers and his own blessings. And not much after, the +Bishop himself saith, “prayer works not upon God, but us”. Therefore, it +is no cause of God’s will, in giving us his blessings, but is properly a +sign, not a procuration of his favour. + +The next thing he replieth to is, that I make prayer to be a kind of +thanksgiving; to which he replies, “he might even as well tell me, that +when a beggar craves an alms, and when he gives thanks for it, it is all +one.” Why so? Does not a beggar move a man by his prayer, and sometime +worketh in him a compassion not without pain, and as the Scripture calls +it, a yearning of the bowels; which is not so in God, when we pray to +him? Our prayer to God is a duty; it is not so to man. Therefore, though +our prayers to man be distinguished from our thanks, it is not necessary +it should be so in our prayers and thanks to God Almighty. + +To the rest of his reply, in this No. XV, there needs no further answer. + + NO. XVI. + +[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] + +_J. D._ “Fourthly, the order, beauty, and perfection of the world doth +require that in the universe should be agents of all sorts, some +necessary, some free, some contingent. He that shall make, either all +things necessary, guided by destiny; or all things free, governed by +election; or all things contingent, happening by chance: doth overthrow +the beauty and the perfection of the world.” + +_T. H._ The fourth argument from reason, is this. The order, beauty, and +perfection of the world requireth that in the universe there should be +agents of all sorts, some necessary, some free, some contingent. He that +shall make all things necessary, or all things free, or all things +contingent, doth overthrow the beauty and perfection of the world. + +In which argument I observe, first, a contradiction. For seeing he that +maketh anything, in that he maketh it, he maketh it to be necessary, it +followeth, that he that maketh all things, maketh all things necessary +to be. As if a workman make a garment, the garment must necessarily be. +So if God make every thing, every thing must necessarily be. Perhaps the +beauty of the world requireth, though we know it not, that some agents +should work without deliberation, which he calls necessary agents; and +some agents with deliberation, and those both he and I call free agents; +and that some agents should work, and we not know how; and those effects +we both call contingent. But this hinders not, but that he that +electeth, may have his election necessarily determined to one by former +causes; and that which is contingent, and imputed to fortune, be +nevertheless necessary, and depend on precedent necessary causes. For by +contingent, men do not mean that which hath no cause, but which hath not +for cause any thing which we perceive. As for example; when a traveller +meets with a shower, the journey had a cause, and the rain had a cause, +sufficient enough to produce it; but because the journey caused not the +rain, nor the rain the journey, we say, they were contingent one to +another. And thus you see, though there be three sorts of events, +necessary, contingent, and free, yet they may be all necessary, without +the destruction of the beauty or perfection of the universe. + +_J. D._ “The first thing he observes in mine argument, is contradiction, +as he calls it; but in truth, it is but a deception of the sight, as one +candle sometimes seems to be two, or a rod in the water shows to be two +rods; _quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis_. But what is +this contradiction? Because I say, he who maketh all things, doth not +make them necessary. What! a contradiction and but one proposition! That +were strange. I say, God hath not made all agents necessary; he saith, +God hath made all agents necessary. Here is a contradiction indeed; but +it is between him and me, not between me and myself. But though it be +not a formal contradiction, yet perhaps it may imply a contradiction _in +adjecto_. Wherefore to clear the matter, and dispel the mist which he +hath raised, it is true, that everything when it is made, it is +necessary that it be made so as it is, that is, by a necessity of +infallibility, or supposition, supposing that it be so made; but this is +not that absolute, antecedent necessity, whereof the question is between +him and me. As to use his own instance: before the garment be made, the +tailor is free to make it either of the Italian, Spanish, or French +fashion indifferently; but after it is made, it is necessary that it be +of that fashion whereof he hath made it, that is, by a necessity of +supposition. But this doth neither hinder the cause from being a free +cause, nor the effect from being a free effect; but the one did produce +freely, and the other was freely produced. So the contradiction is +vanished.” + +“In the second part of his answer, (_a_) he grants; that there are some +free agents, and some contingent agents, and that perhaps the beauty of +the world doth require it; but like a shrewd cow, which after she hath +given her milk casts it down with her foot, in the conclusion he tells +us, that nevertheless they are all necessary. This part of his answer is +a mere logomachy, as a great part of the controversies in the world are, +or a contention about words. What is the meaning of necessary, and free, +and contingent actions? I have showed before what free and necessary do +properly signify; but he misrecites it. He saith, I make all agents +which want deliberation, to be necessary; but I acknowledge that many of +them are contingent. (_b_) Neither do I approve his definition of +contingents, though he say I concur with him, that they are ‘such agents +as work we know not how’. For, according to this description, many +necessary actions should be contingent, and many contingent actions +should be necessary. The loadstone draweth iron, the jet chaff, we know +not how; and yet the effect is necessary; and so it is in all sympathies +and antipathies or occult qualities. Again, a man walking in the +streets, a tile falls down from a house, and breaks his head. We know +all the causes, we know how this came to pass. The man walked that way, +the pin failed, the tile fell just when he was under it; and yet this is +a contingent effect: the man might not have walked that way, and then +the tile had not fallen upon him. Neither yet do I understand here in +this place by contingents, such events as happen beside the scope or +intention of the agents; as when a man digging to make a grave, finds a +treasure; though the word be sometimes so taken. But by contingents, I +understand all things which may be done and may not be done, may happen +or may not happen, by reason of the indetermination or accidental +concurrence of the causes. And those same things which are absolutely +contingent, are yet hypothetically necessary. As supposing the passenger +did walk just that way, just at that time, and that the pin did fail +just then, and the tile fall; it was necessary that it should fall upon +the passenger’s head. The same defence will keep out his shower of rain. +But we shall meet with his shower of rain again, No. XXXIV; whither I +refer the further explication of this point.” + + ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. XVI. + +In this number he would prove that there must be free agents and +contingent agents, as well as necessary agents, from the order, beauty, +and perfection of the world. I that thought that the order, beauty, and +perfection of the world required that which was in the world, and not +that which the Bishop had need of for his argument, could see no force +of consequence to infer that which he calls free and contingent. That +which is in the world, is the order, beauty, and perfection which God +hath given the world; and yet there are no agents in the world, but such +as work a seen necessity, or an unseen necessity; and when they work an +unseen necessity in creatures inanimate, then are those creatures said +to be wrought upon contingently, and to work contingently; and when the +necessity unseen is of the actions of men, then it is commonly called +free, and might be so in other living creatures; for free and voluntary +are the same thing. But the Bishop in his reply hath insisted most upon +this, that I make it a contradiction to say that “he that maketh a +thing, doth not make it necessary”, and wonders how a contradiction can +be in one proposition, and yet within two or three lines after found it +might be. And therefore, to clear the matter, he saith that such +necessity is not _antecedent_, but a necessity _of supposition_: which, +nevertheless, is the same kind of necessity which he attributeth to the +burning of the fire, where there is a necessity that the thing thrown +into it shall be burned; though yet it be but burning, or but departing +from the hand that throws it in; and, therefore, the necessity is +antecedent. The like is in making a garment; the necessity begins from +the first motion towards it, which is from eternity, though the tailor +and the Bishop are equally insensible of it. If they saw the whole order +and conjunction of causes, they would say it were as necessary as any +thing else can possibly be; and therefore God that sees that order and +conjunction, knows it is necessary. + +The rest of his reply is to argue a contradiction in me; for he says, + +(_a_) “I grant that there are some free agents, and some contingent +agents, and that perhaps the beauty of the world doth require it; but +like a shrewd cow, which, after she hath given her milk, casts it down +with her foot, in the conclusion I tell him, that nevertheless they are +all necessary.” + +It is true that I say some are free agents, and some contingent; +nevertheless they may be all necessary. For according to the +significations of the words necessary, free, and contingent, the +distinction is no more but this. Of agents, some are necessary, some are +contingent, and some are free agents; and of agents, some are living +creatures, and some are inanimate; which words are improper, but the +meaning of them is this. Men call necessary agents, such as they know to +be necessary, and contingent agents, such inanimate things as they know +not whether they work necessarily or no, and free agents, men whom they +know not whether they work necessarily or no. All which confusion +ariseth from that presumptuous men take for granted, that that _is_ not, +which they _know_ not. + +(_b_) “Neither do I approve his definition of contingents; that they are +such agents as work we know not how.” + +The reason is, because it would follow that many necessary actions +should be contingent, and many contingent actions necessary. But that +which followeth from it really is no more but this: that many necessary +actions would be such as we know not to be necessary, and many actions +which we know not to be necessary, may yet be necessary; which is a +truth. But the Bishop defineth contingents thus: “all things which may +be done and may not be done, may happen or may not happen, by reason of +the indetermination or accidental concurrence of the causes”. By which +definition, contingent is nothing, or it is the same that I say it is. +For there is nothing can be done and not be done, nothing can happen and +not happen, by reason of the indetermination or accidental concurrence +of the causes. It may be done or not done for aught he knows, and happen +or not happen for any determination he perceiveth; and that is my +definition. But that the indetermination can make it happen or not +happen, is absurd; for indetermination maketh it equally to happen or +not to happen, and therefore both; which is a contradiction. Therefore +indetermination doth nothing; and whatsoever causes do, is necessary. + + NO. XVII. + +[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] + +_J. D._ “Fifthly, take away liberty, and you take away the very nature +of evil, and the formal reason of sin. If the hand of the painter were +the law of painting, or the hand of the writer the law of writing, +whatsoever the one did write, or the other paint, must infallibly be +good. Seeing therefore that the first cause is the rule and law of +goodness, if it do necessitate the will or the person to evil, either by +itself immediately, or mediately by necessary flux of second causes, it +will no longer be evil. The essence of sin consists in this, that one +commit that which he might avoid. If there be no liberty to produce sin, +there is no such thing as sin in the world. Therefore it appears, both +from Scripture and reason, that there is true liberty.” + +_T. H._ To the fifth argument from reason, which is, that if liberty be +taken away, the nature and formal reason of sin is taken away, I answer +by denying the consequence. The nature of sin consisteth in this, that +the action done proceed from our will, and be against the law. A judge, +in judging whether it be sin or not which is done against the law, looks +at no higher cause of the action than the will of the doer. Now when I +say the action was necessary, I do not say it was done against the will +of the doer, but with his will, and so necessarily; because man’s will, +that is, every act of the will, and purpose of man had a sufficient, and +therefore a necessary cause, and consequently every voluntary action was +necessitated. An action therefore may be voluntary and a sin, and +nevertheless be necessary. And God may afflict by right derived from his +omnipotency, though sin were not. And the example of punishment on +voluntary sinners, is the cause that produceth justice, and maketh sin +less frequent; for God to punish such sinners, as I have shewed before, +is no injustice. And thus you have my answer to his objections, both out +of Scripture and reason. + +[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] + +_J. D._ “_Scis tu simulare cupressum._ _Quid hoc?_” It was shrewd +counsel which Alcibiades gave to Themistocles, when he was busy about +his accounts to the state; that he should rather study how to make no +accounts. So it seems T. H. thinks it a more compendious way, to baulk +an argument, than to satisfy it. And if he can produce a Rowland against +an Oliver, if he can urge a reason against a reason, he thinks he hath +quitted himself fairly. But it will not serve his turn. And that he may +not complain of misunderstanding it, as those who have a politic +deafness to hear nothing but what liketh them, I will first reduce mine +argument into form, and then weigh what he saith in answer, or rather in +opposition to it. (_a_) That opinion which takes away the formal reason +of sin, and by consequence, sin itself, is not to be approved; this is +clear, because both reason and religion, nature and Scripture, do prove, +and the whole world confesseth, that there is sin. But this opinion, of +the necessity of all things by reason of a conflux of second causes, +ordered and determined by the first cause, doth take away the very +formal reason of sin. This is proved thus. That which makes sin itself +to be good, and just, and lawful, takes away the formal cause, and +destroys the essence of sin; for if sin be good, and just, and lawful, +it is no more evil, it is no sin, no anomy. But this opinion of the +necessity of all things, makes sin to be very good, and just, and +lawful; for nothing can flow essentially by way of physical +determination from the first cause, which is the law and rule of +goodness and justice, but that which is good, and just, and lawful. But +this opinion makes sin to proceed essentially by way of physical +determination from the first cause, as appears in T. H.’s whole +discourse. Neither is it material at all whether it proceed immediately +from the first cause, or mediately, so as it be by a necessary flux of +second and determinate causes, which produce it inevitably. To these +proofs he answers nothing, but only by denying the first consequence, as +he calls it, and then sings over his old song, ‘that the nature of sin +consisteth in this, that the action proceed from our will, and be +against the law’, which, in our sense, is most true, if he understand a +just law, and a free rational will. (_b_) But supposing, as he doth, +that the law enjoins things impossible in themselves to be done, then it +is an unjust and tyrannical law; and the transgression of it is no sin, +not to do that which never was in our power to do. And supposing, +likewise as he doth, that the will is inevitably determined by special +influence from the first cause, then it is not man’s will, but God’s +will, and flows essentially from the law of goodness. + +(_c_) “That which he adds of a judge, is altogether impertinent as to +his defence. Neither is a civil judge the proper judge, nor the law of +the land the proper rule of sin. But it makes strongly against him; for +the judge goes upon a good ground; and even this which he confesseth, +that ‘the judge looks at no higher cause than the will of the doer’, +proves that the will of the doer did determine itself freely, and that +the malefactor had liberty to have kept the law, if he would. Certainly, +a judge ought to look at all material circumstances, and much more at +all essential causes. Whether every sufficient cause be a necessary +cause, will come to be examined more properly, No. XXXI. For the present +it shall suffice to say, that liberty flows from the sufficiency, and +contingency from the debility of the cause. (_d_) Nature never intends +the generation of a monster. If all the causes concur sufficiently, a +perfect creature is produced; but by reason of the insufficiency, or +debility, or contingent aberration of some of the causes, sometimes a +monster is produced. Yet the causes of a monster were sufficient for the +production of that which was produced, that is a monster: otherwise a +monster had not been produced. What is it then? A monster is not +produced by virtue of that order which is set in nature, but by the +contingent aberration of some of the natural causes in their +concurrence. The order set in nature is, that every like should beget +its like. But supposing the concurrence of the causes to be such as it +is in the generation of a monster, the generation of a monster is +necessary; as all the events in the world are when they are, that is, by +an hypothetical necessity. (_e_) Then he betakes himself to his old +help, that God may punish by right of omnipotence, though there were no +sin. The question is not now what God may do, but what God will do, +according to that covenant which he hath made with man, _fac hoc et +vives_, _do this and thou shalt live_. Neither doth God punish any man +contrary to this covenant (Hosea xiii. 9): _O Israel, thy destruction is +from thyself; but in me is thy help_. He that wills not the death of a +sinner, doth much less will the death of an innocent creature. By +_death_ or _destruction_ in this discourse the only separation of soul +and body is not intended, which is a debt of nature, and which God, as +Lord of life and death, may justly do, and make it not a punishment, but +a blessing to the party; but we understand, the subjecting of the +creature to eternal torments. Lastly, he tells of that benefit which +redounds to others from exemplary justice; which is most true, but not +according to his own grounds. For neither is it justice to punish a man +for doing that which it was impossible always for him not to do; neither +is it lawful to punish an innocent person, that good may come of it. And +if his opinion of absolute necessity of all things were true, the +destinies of men could not be altered, either by examples or fear of +punishment.” + + ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. XVII. + +Whereas he had in his first discourse made this consequence: “if you +take away liberty, you take away the very nature of evil, and the formal +reason of sin”: I denied that consequence. It is true, he who taketh +away the liberty of doing, according to the will, taketh away the nature +of sin; but he that denieth the liberty to will, does not so. But he +supposing I understood him not, will needs reduce his argument into +form, in this manner. (_a_) “That opinion which takes away the formal +reason of sin, and by consequence, sin itself, is not to be approved.” +This is granted. “But the opinion of necessity doth this.” This I deny; +he proves it thus: “this opinion makes sin to proceed essentially, by +way of physical determination from the first cause. But whatsoever +proceeds essentially by way of physical determination from the first +cause, is good, and just, and lawful. Therefore this opinion of +necessity maketh sin to be very good, just, and lawful.” He might as +well have concluded, whatsoever man hath been made by God, is a good and +just man. He observeth not that sin is not a thing really made. Those +things which at first were actions, were not then sins, though actions +of the same nature with those which were afterwards sins; nor was then +the will to anything a sin, though it were a will to the same thing, +which in willing now, we should sin. Actions became sins then first, +when the commandment came; for, as St. Paul saith, _without the law sin +is dead_; and sin being but a _transgression of the law_, there can be +no action made sin but by the law. Therefore this opinion, though it +derive actions essentially from God, it derives not sins essentially +from him, but relatively and by the commandment. And consequently the +opinion of necessity taketh not away the nature of sin, but +necessitateth that action which the law hath made sin. And whereas I +said the nature of sin consisteth in this, that ‘it is an action +proceeding from our will and against the law’, he alloweth it for true; +and therefore he must allow also, that the formal reason of sin lieth +not in the liberty or necessity of willing, but in the will itself, +necessary or unnecessary, in relation to the law. And whereas he limits +this truth which he allowed, to this, that _the law be just_, and _the +will a free rational will_, it serves to no purpose; for I have shown +before, that no law can be unjust. And it seemeth to me that a rational +will, if it be not meant of a will after deliberation, whether he that +deliberateth reasoneth aright or not, signifieth nothing. A _rational +man_ is rightly said; but a _rational will_, in other sense than I have +mentioned, is insignificant. + +(_b_) “But supposing, as he doth, that the law enjoins things impossible +in themselves to be done, then it is an unjust and tyrannical law, and +the transgression of it no sin,” &c. “And supposing likewise, as he +doth, that the will is inevitably determined by special influence from +the first cause, then it is not man’s will, but God’s will.” He mistakes +me in this. For I say not the law enjoins things impossible in +themselves; for so I should say it enjoined contradictories. But I say +the law sometimes, the law-makers not knowing the secret necessities of +things to come, enjoins things made impossible by secret and extrinsical +causes from all eternity. From this his error he infers, that the laws +must be unjust and tyrannical, and the transgression of them no sin. But +he who holds that laws can be unjust and tyrannical, will easily find +pretence enough, under any government in the world, to deny obedience to +the laws, unless they be such as he himself maketh, or adviseth to be +made. He says also, that I suppose the will is inevitably determined by +special influence from the first cause. It is true; saving that +senseless word _influence_, which I never used. But his consequence, +“then it is not man’s will, but God’s will”, is not true; for it may be +the will both of the one and of the other, and yet not by concurrence, +as in a league, but by subjection of the will of man to the will of God. + +(_c_) “That which he adds of a judge, is altogether impertinent as to +his defence. Neither is a civil judge the proper judge, nor the law of +the land a proper rule of sin.” A judge is to judge of voluntary crimes. +He has no commission to look into the secret causes that make them +voluntary. And because the Bishop had said the law cannot justly punish +a crime that proceedeth from necessity, it was no impertinent answer to +say, “the judge looks at no higher cause than the will of the doer”. And +even this, as he saith, is enough to prove, that “the will of the doer +did determine itself freely, and that the malefactor had liberty to have +kept the law if he would”. To which I answer, that it proves indeed that +the malefactor had liberty to have kept the law if he would; but it +proveth not that he had the liberty to have a will to keep the law. Nor +doth it prove that the will of the doer did determine itself freely; +for, nothing can prove nonsense. But here you see what the Bishop +pursueth in this whole reply, namely, to prove that a man hath liberty +to do if he will, which I deny not; and thinks when he hath done that, +he hath proved a man hath liberty to will, which he calls the will’s +determining of itself freely. And whereas he adds, “a judge ought to +look at all essential causes”; it is answer enough to say, he is bound +to look at no more than he thinks he can see. + +(_d_) “Nature never intends the generation of a monster. If all the +causes concur sufficiently, a perfect creature is produced; but by +reason of the insufficiency, or debility, or contingent aberration of +some of the causes, sometimes a monster is produced.” He had no sooner +said this, but finding his error he retracteth it, and confesseth that +“the causes of a monster were sufficient for the production of that +which was produced, that is, of a monster; otherwise a monster had not +been produced;” which is all that I intended by sufficiency of the +cause. But whether every sufficient cause be a necessary cause or not, +he meaneth to examine in No. XXXI. In the meantime he saith only, that +liberty flows from the sufficiency, and contingency from the debility of +the cause; and leaves out necessity, as if it came from neither. I must +note also, that where he says nature never intends the generation of a +monster, I understand not whether by nature he means the Author of +nature, in which meaning he derogates from God; or nature itself, as the +universal work of God; and then it is absurd; for the universe, as one +aggregate of things natural, hath no intention. His doctrine that +followeth concerning the generation of monsters, is not worth +consideration; therefore I leave it wholly to the judgment of the +reader. + +(_e_) “Then he betakes himself to his old help, that God may punish by +right of omnipotence, though there were no sin. The question is not, now +what God may do, but what God will do, according to that covenant which +he hath made with man, _Fac hoc et vives_, _do this and thou shalt +live_.” It is plain (to let pass that he puts punishment where I put +affliction, making a true sentence false) that if a man do this he shall +live, and he may do this if he will. In this the Bishop and I disagree +not. This therefore is not the question; but whether the will to do +this, or not to do this, be in a man’s own election. Whereas he adds, +‘he that wills not the death of a sinner, doth much less will the death +of an innocent creature’; he had forgot for awhile, that both good and +evil men are by the will of God all mortal; but presently corrects +himself, and says, he means by death, eternal torments, that is to say, +eternal life, but in torments; to which I have answered once before in +this book, and spoken much more amply in another book, to which the +Bishop hath inclination to make an answer, as appeareth by his epistle +to the reader. That which followeth to the end of this number, hath been +urged and answered already divers times; I therefore pass it over. + + NO. XVIII. + +[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] + +_J. D._ “But the patrons of necessity being driven out of the plain +field with reason, have certain retreats or distinctions which they fly +unto for refuge. First, they distinguish between Stoical necessity and +Christian necessity, between which they make a threefold difference. + +“First, say they, the Stoics did subject Jupiter to destiny, but we +subject destiny to God. I answer, that the Stoical and Christian destiny +are one and the same; _Fatum, quasi effatum Jovis_. Hear Seneca: +_Destiny is the necessity of all things and actions depending upon the +disposition of Jupiter_, &c. I add, that the Stoics left a greater +liberty to Jupiter over destiny, than these stoical Christians do to God +over his decrees, either for the beginnings of things, as Euripides, or +for the progress of them, as Chrysippus, or at least of the +circumstances of time and place, as all of them generally. So Virgil: +_Sed trahere et moras ducere_, &c. So Osyris in Apuleius, promiseth him +to prolong his life, _ultra fato constituta tempora_, beyond the times +set down by the destinies. + +“Next, they say, that the Stoics did hold an eternal flux and necessary +connexion of causes; but they believed that God doth act _præter et +contra naturam_, _besides and against nature_. I answer, that it is not +much material whether they attribute necessity to God, or to the stars, +or to a connexion of causes, so as they establish necessity. The former +reasons do not only condemn the ground or foundation of necessity, but +much more necessity itself upon what ground soever. Either they must run +into this absurdity, that the effect is determined, the cause remaining +undetermined; or else hold such a necessary connexion of causes as the +Stoics did. + +“Lastly, they say, the Stoics did take away liberty and contingence, but +they admit it. I answer, what liberty or contingence was it they admit +but a titular liberty and an empty shadow of contingence, who do profess +stiffly that all actions and events, which either are or shall be, +cannot but be, nor can be otherwise, after any other manner, in any +other place, time, number, order, measure, nor to any other end, than +they are; and that in respect of God determining them to one. What a +poor ridiculous liberty or contingency is this! + +“Secondly, they distinguish between the first cause, and the second +causes; they say, that in respect of the second causes many things are +free, but in respect of the first cause all things are necessary. This +answer may be taken away two ways. + +“First, so contraries shall be true together; the same thing at the same +time shall be determined to one, and not determined to one; the same +thing at the same time must necessarily be, and yet may not be. Perhaps +they will say, not in the same respect. But that which strikes at the +root of this question is this, if all the causes were only collateral, +this exception might have some colour: but where all the causes being +joined together, and subordinate one to another, do make but one total +cause, if any one cause (much more the first) in the whole series or +subordination of causes be necessary, it determines the rest, and +without doubt makes the effect necessary. Necessity or liberty is not to +be esteemed from one cause, but from all the causes joined together. If +one link in a chain be fast, it fastens all the rest. + +“Secondly, I would have them tell me whether the second causes be +predetermined by the first cause, or not. If it be determined, then the +effect is necessary, even in respect of the second causes. If the second +cause be not determined, how is the effect determined, the second cause +remaining undetermined? Nothing can give that to another which it hath +not itself. But say they, nevertheless the power or faculty remaineth +free. True, but not in order to the act, if it be once determined. It is +free, _in sensu diviso_, but not _in sensu composito_. When a man holds +a bird fast in his hand, is she therefore free to fly where she will, +because she hath wings? Or a man imprisoned or fettered, is he therefore +free to walk where he will, because he hath feet and a locomotive +faculty? Judge without prejudice, what a miserable subterfuge is this +which many men confide so much in. + + CERTAIN DISTINCTIONS WHICH HE SUPPOSING MAY BE BROUGHT TO HIS ARGUMENTS, + ARE BY HIM REMOVED. + +_T. H._ He saith, “a man may perhaps answer, that the necessity of +things held by him is not a Stoical necessity, but a Christian +necessity,” &c., but this distinction I have not used, nor indeed have +ever heard before. Nor do I think any man could make Stoical and +Christian two kinds of necessities, though they may be two kinds of +doctrine. Nor have I drawn my answer to his arguments from the authority +of any sect, but from the nature of the things themselves. + +But here I must take notice of certain words of his in this place, as +making against his own tenet. “Where all the causes”, saith he, “being +joined together, and subordinate one to another, do make but one total +cause, if any one cause, much more the first, in the whole series of +subordination of causes be necessary, it determines the rest, and +without doubt maketh the effect necessary.” For that which I call the +necessary cause of any effect, is the joining together of all causes +subordinate to the first, into one total cause. If any one of those, +saith he, especially the first, produce its effect necessarily, then all +the rest are determined, and the effect also necessary. Now, it is +manifest, that the first cause is a necessary cause of all the effects +that are next and immediate to it; and therefore by his own reason, all +effects are necessary. Nor is that distinction of necessary in respect +of the first cause, and necessary in respect of second causes, mine; it +does, as he well noteth, imply a contradiction. + +_J. D._ “Because T. H. disavows these two distinctions, I have joined +them together in one paragraph. He likes not the distinction of +necessity, or destiny, into Stoical and Christian; no more do I. We +agree in the conclusion, but our motives are diverse. My reason is, +because I acknowledge no such necessity either as the one or as the +other; and because I conceive that those Christian writers, who do +justly detest the naked destiny of the Stoics, as fearing to fall into +those gross absurdities and pernicious consequences which flow from +thence, do yet privily, though perhaps unwittingly, under another form +of expression introduce it again at the back-door, after they had openly +cast it out at the fore-door. But T. H. rusheth boldly without +distinctions, which he accounts but jargon, and without foresight, upon +the grossest destiny of all others, that is, that of the Stoics. He +confesseth, that “they may be two kinds of doctrine.” May be? Nay, they +are; without all peradventure. And he himself is the first who bears the +name of a Christian, that I have read, that hath raised this sleeping +ghost out of its grave, and set it out in its true colours. But yet he +likes not the names of Stoical and Christian destiny. I do not blame +him, though he would not willingly be accounted a Stoic. To admit the +thing, and quarrel about the name, is to make ourselves ridiculous. Why +might not I first call that kind of destiny which is maintained by +Christians, Christian destiny: and that other maintained by Stoics, +Stoical destiny? But I am not the inventor of the term. If he had been +as careful in reading other men’s opinions, as he is confident in +setting down his own, he might have found not only the thing, but the +name itself often used. But if the name of _fatum Christianum_ do offend +him, let him call it with Lipsius, _fatum verum_; who divides destiny +into four kinds: 1. mathematical or astrological destiny: 2. natural +destiny: 3. Stoical or violent destiny: and 4. true destiny; which he +calls, ordinarily, _nostrum_, our destiny, that is, of Christians; and +_fatum pium_, that is, godly destiny; and defines it just as T. H. doth +his destiny, to be (_a_) a series or order of causes depending upon the +divine counsel (_De Constantia_, lib. 1. cap. xvii. xviii. xix). Though +he be more cautelous than T. H. to decline those rocks which some others +have made shipwreck upon, yet the divines thought he came too near them; +as appears by his Epistle to the Reader in a later edition, and by that +note in the margin of his twentieth chapter, ‘Whatsoever I dispute here, +I submit to the judgment of the wise, and being admonished I will +convert it; one may convince me of error, but not of obstinacy.’ So +fearful was he to over-shoot himself; and yet he maintained both true +liberty and true contingency. T. H. saith, ‘he hath not sucked his +answer from any sect’; and I say, so much the worse. It is better to be +the disciple of an old sect, than the ring-leader of a new. + +(_b_) “Concerning the other distinction, of liberty in respect of the +first cause, and liberty in respect of the second causes; though he will +not see that which it concerned him to answer, like those old _Lamiæ_, +which could put out their eyes when they list; as, namely, that the +faculty of willing, when it is determined in order to the act, (which is +all the freedom that he acknowledgeth), is but like the freedom of a +bird when she is first in a man’s hand, &c.: yet he hath espied another +thing wherein I contradict myself, because I affirm, that if any one +cause in the whole series of causes, much more the first cause, be +necessary, it determineth the rest. But, saith he, ‘it is manifest that +the first cause is a necessary cause of all the effects that are next’. +I am glad; yet it is not I who contradict myself, but it is some of his +_manifest truths_ which I contradict; that ‘the first cause is a +necessary cause of all effects’; which I say is a manifest falsehood. +Those things which God wills without himself, he wills freely, not +necessarily. Whatsoever cause acts or works necessarily, doth act or +work all that it can do, or all that is in its power. But it is evident +that God doth not all things without himself, which he can do, or which +he hath power to do. He could have raised up children unto Abraham of +the very stones which were upon the banks of Jordan (Luke iii. 8); but +he did not. He could have sent twelve legions of angels to the succour +of Christ, (Matth. xxvi. 53); but he did not. God can make T. H. live +the years of Methuselah; but it is not necessary that he shall do so, +nor probable that he will do so. The productive power of God is +infinite, but the whole created world is finite. And, therefore God +might still produce more, if it pleased him. But thus it is, when men go +on in a confused way, and will admit no distinctions. If T. H. had +considered the difference between a necessary being, and a necessary +cause, or between those actions of God which are immanent within +himself, and the transient works of God which are extrinsical without +himself; he would never have proposed such an evident error for a +manifest truth. _Qui pauca considerat, facile pronuntiat._” + + ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. XVIII. + +The Bishop, supposing I had taken my opinion from the authority of the +Stoic philosophers, not from my own meditation, falleth into dispute +against the Stoics: whereof I might, if I pleased, take no notice, but +pass over to No. XIX. But that he may know I have considered their +doctrine concerning fate, I think fit to say thus much, that their error +consisteth not in the opinion of fate, but in feigning of a false God. +When therefore they say, _fatum est effatum Jovis_, they say no more but +that _fate is the word of Jupiter_. If they had said it had been the +word of the true God, I should not have perceived anything in it to +contradict; because I hold, as most Christians do, that the whole world +was made, and is now governed by the word of God, which bringeth a +necessity of all things and actions to depend upon the Divine +disposition. Nor do I see cause to find fault with that, as he does, +which is said by Lipsius, that (_a_) fate is a _series or order of +causes depending upon the Divine counsel_; though the divines thought he +came too near the rocks, as he thinks I do now. And the reason why he +was cautelous, was, because being a member of the Romish Church he had +little confidence in the judgment and lenity of the Romish clergy; and +not because he thought he had over-shot himself. + +(_b_) “Concerning the other distinction, of liberty in respect of the +first cause, and liberty in respect of the second causes, though he will +not see that which it concerned him to answer, &c.”, “as, namely, that +the faculty of willing, &c.” I answer, that distinction he allegeth, not +to be mine, but the Stoics’; and therefore I had no reason to take +notice of it; for he disputeth not against me, but others. And whereas +he says, _it concerned me to make_ that answer which he hath set down in +the words following; I cannot conceive how it concerneth me (whatsoever +it may do somebody else) to speak absurdly. + +I said that the first cause is a necessary cause of all the effects that +are next and immediate to it; which cannot be doubted, and though he +deny it, he does not disprove it. For when he says, “those things which +God wills without himself, he wills freely and not necessarily”; he says +rashly, and untruly. Rashly, because there is nothing without God, who +is _infinite_, in whom _are all things_, and in whom _we live, move, and +have our being_; and untruly, because whatsoever God foreknew from +eternity, he willed from eternity, and therefore necessarily. But +against this he argueth thus: “Whatsoever cause acts or works +necessarily, doth work or act all that it can do, or all that is in its +power; but it is evident that God doth not all things which he can do,” +&c. In things inanimate, the action is always according to the extent of +its power; not taking in the power of willing, because they have it not. +But in those things that have will, the action is according to the whole +power, will and all. It is true, that God doth not all things that he +can do if he will; but that he can _will_ that which he hath not +_willed_ from all eternity, I deny; unless that he can not only _will a +change_, but also _change his will_, which all divines say is immutable; +and then they must needs be necessary effects, that proceed from God. +And his texts, _God could have raised up children unto Abraham_, &c.; +and _sent twelve legions of angels_, &c., make nothing against the +necessity of those actions, which from the first cause proceed +_immediately_. + + NO. XIX. + +[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] + +_J. D._ “Thirdly, they distinguish between liberty from compulsion, and +liberty from necessitation. The will, say they, is free from compulsion, +but not free from necessitation. And this they fortify with two reasons. +First, because it is granted by all divines, that hypothetical +necessity, or necessity upon a supposition, may consist with liberty. +Secondly, because God and the good angels do good necessarily, and yet +are more free than we. To the first reason, I confess that necessity +upon a supposition may sometimes consist with true liberty, as when it +signifies only an infallible certitude of the understanding in that +which it knows to be, or that it shall be. But if the supposition be not +in the agent’s power, nor depend upon anything that is in his power; if +there be an exterior antecedent cause which doth necessitate the effect; +to call this free, is to be mad with reason. + +“To the second reason, I confess that God and the good angels are more +free than we are, that is, intensively in the degree of freedom, but not +extensively in the latitude of the object; according to a liberty of +exercise, but not of specification. A liberty of exercise, that is, to +do or not to do, may consist well with a necessity of specification, or +a determination to the doing of good. But a liberty of exercise, and a +necessity of exercise, a liberty of specification, and a necessity of +specification, are not compatible, nor can consist together. He that is +antecedently necessitated to do evil, is not free to do good. So this +instance is nothing at all to the purpose.” + +_T. H._ But the distinction of free, into free from compulsion, and free +from necessitation, I acknowledge. For to be free from compulsion, is to +do a thing so as terror be not the cause of his will to do it. For a man +is then only said to be compelled, when fear makes him willing to it; as +when a man willingly throws his goods into the sea to save himself, or +submits to his enemy for fear of being killed. Thus all men that do +anything from love, or revenge, or lust, are free from compulsion; and +yet their actions may be as necessary as those which are done upon +compulsion. For sometimes other passions work as forcibly as fear; but +free from necessitation I say nothing can be. And it is that which he +undertook to disprove. This distinction, he says, useth to be fortified +by two reasons. But they are not mine. The first, he says, is, “that it +is granted by all divines, that an hypothetical necessity, or necessity +upon supposition, may stand with liberty”. That you may understand this, +I will give you an example of hypothetical necessity. _If I shall live, +I shall eat_; this is an hypothetical necessity. Indeed, it is a +necessary proposition; that is to say, it is necessary that that +proposition should be true, whensoever uttered; but it is not the +necessity of the thing, nor is it therefore necessary, that the man +shall live, or that the man shall eat. I do not use to fortify my +distinctions with such reasons. Let him confute them as he will, it +contents me. But I would have your Lordship take notice hereby, how an +easy and plain thing, but withal false, may be, with the grave usage of +such words as _hypothetical necessity_, and _necessity upon +supposition_, and such like terms of Schoolmen, obscured and made to +seem profound learning. + +The second reason that may confirm the distinction of free from +compulsion, and free from necessitation, he says, is that ‘God and good +angels do good necessarily, and yet are more free than we’. This reason, +though I had no need of it, yet I think it so far forth good, as it is +true that God and good angels do good necessarily, and yet are free. But +because I find not in the articles of our faith, nor in the decrees of +our Church, set down in what manner I am to conceive God and good angels +to work by necessity, or in what sense they work freely, I suspend my +sentence in that point; and am content that there may be a freedom from +compulsion, and yet no freedom from necessitation, as hath been proved +in that, that a man may be necessitated to some actions without threats +and without fear of danger. But how he can avoid the consisting together +of freedom and necessity, supposing God and good angels are freer than +men and yet do good necessarily, that we must now examine. + +“I confess,” saith he, “that God and good angels are more free than we, +that is, intensively in degree of freedom, not extensively in the +latitude of the object, according to a liberty of exercise, not of +specification.” Again we have here two distinctions that are no +distinctions, but made to seem so by terms invented, by I know not whom, +to cover ignorance, and blind the understanding of the reader. For it +cannot be conceived that there is any liberty greater than for a man to +do what he will, and to forbear what he will. One heat may be more +intensive than another, but not one liberty than another. He that can do +what he will, hath all liberty possible; and he that cannot, has none at +all. Also liberty (as he says the Schools call it) of exercise, which +is, as I have said before, a liberty to do or not to do, cannot be +without a liberty, which they call of specification; that is to say, a +liberty to do or not to do this or that in particular. For how can a man +conceive, that he has liberty to do any thing, that hath not liberty to +do this, or that, or somewhat in particular? If a man be forbidden in +Lent to eat this, and that, and every other particular kind of flesh, +how can he be understood to have a liberty to eat flesh, more than he +that hath no license at all? + +You may by this again see the vanity of distinctions used in the +Schools; and I do not doubt but that the imposing of them by authority +of doctors in the Church, hath been a great cause that men have +laboured, though by sedition and evil courses, to shake them off; for, +nothing is more apt to beget hatred, than the tyrannising over man’s +reason and understanding, especially when it is done, not by the +Scripture, but by pretence of learning, and more judgment than that of +other men. + +_J. D._ “He who will speak with some of our great undertakers about the +grounds of learning, had need either to speak by an interpreter, or to +learn a new language (I dare not call it jargon or canting) lately +devised, not to set forth the truth, but to conceal falsehood. He must +learn a new liberty, a new necessity, a new contingency, a new +sufficiency, a new spontaneity, a new kind of deliberation, a new kind +of election, a new eternity, a new compulsion, and in conclusion, a new +nothing. (_a_) This proposition, _the will is free_, may be understood +in two senses; either that the will is not compelled, or that the will +is not always necessitated; for if it be ordinarily, or at any time free +from necessitation, my assertion is true, that there is freedom from +necessity. The former sense, that the will is not compelled, is +acknowledged by all the world as a truth undeniable: _voluntas non +cogitur_. For if the will may be compelled, then it may both will and +not will the same thing at the same time, under the same notion; but +this implies a contradiction. Yet this author, like the good woman whom +her husband sought up the stream when she was drowned upon pretence that +when she was living she used to go contrary courses to all other people, +holds, that true compulsion and fear may make a man will that which he +doth not will, that is, in his sense may compel the will: “as when a man +willingly throws his goods into the sea to save himself, or submits to +his enemy for fear of being killed”. I answer, that T. H. mistakes +sundry ways in this discourse. + +(_b_) “First, he erreth in this, to think that actions proceeding from +fear are properly compulsory actions: which in truth are not only +voluntary, but free actions; neither compelled, nor so much as +physically necessitated. Another man, at the same time, in the same +ship, in the same storm, may choose, and the same individual man +otherwise advised might choose not, to throw his goods overboard. It is +the man himself, who chooseth freely this means to preserve his life. It +is true, that if he were not in such a condition, or if he were freed +from the grounds of his present fears, he would not choose neither the +casting of his goods into the sea, nor the submitting to his enemy. But +considering the present exigence of his affairs, reason dictates to him, +that of two inconveniences the less is to be chosen, as a comparative +good. Neither doth he will this course as the end or direct object of +his desires, but as the means to attain his end. And what fear doth in +these cases, love, hope, hatred, &c. may do in other cases; that is, may +occasion a man to elect those means to obtain his willed end, which +otherwise he would not elect. As Jacob, to serve seven years more, +rather than not to enjoy his beloved Rachel. The merchant, to hazard +himself upon the rough seas in hope of profit. Passions may be so +violent, that they may necessitate the will, that is, when they prevent +deliberations; but this is rarely, and then the will is not free. But +they never properly compel it. That which is compelled, is against the +will; and that which is against the will, is not willed. + +(_c_) “Secondly, T. H. errs in this also, where he saith, that ‘a man is +then only said to be compelled, when fear makes him willing to an +action’: as if force were not more prevalent with a man, than fear. We +must know therefore, that this word _compelled_ is taken two ways: +sometimes improperly, that is, when a man is moved or occasioned by +threats or fear, or any passion, to do that which he would not have +done, if those threats or that passion had not been. Sometimes it is +taken properly; when we do any thing against our own inclination, moved +by an external cause, the will not consenting nor concurring, but +resisting as much as it can. As in a rape, or when a Christian is drawn +or carried by violence to the idol’s temple. Or as in the case of St. +Peter (John xxi. 18): _Another shall gird thee, and carry thee whither +thou wouldest not_. This is that compulsion, which is understood when we +say, the will may be letted, or changed, or necessitated, or that the +imperate actions of the will, that is the actions of the inferior +faculties which are ordinarily moved by the will, may be compelled: but +that the immanent actions of the will, that is, to will, to choose, +cannot be compelled; because it is the nature of an action properly +compelled, to be done by an extrinsical cause, without the concurrence +of the will. + +(_d_) “Thirdly, the question is not, whether all the actions of a man be +free, but whether they be ordinarily free. Suppose some passions are so +sudden and violent, that they surprise a man, and betray the succours of +the soul, and prevent deliberation; as we see in some _motus primo +primi_, or antipathies, how some men will run upon the most dangerous +objects, upon the first view of a loathed creature, without any power to +contain themselves. Such actions as these, as they are not ordinary, so +they are not free; because there is no deliberation nor election. But +where deliberation and election are, as when a man throws his goods +overboard to save the ship, or submits to his enemy to save his life, +there is always true liberty. + +“Though T. H. slight the two reasons which I produce in favour of his +cause, yet they who urged them deserved not to be slighted, unless it +were because they were School-men. The former reason is thus framed: a +necessity of supposition may consist with true liberty. But that +necessity which flows from the natural and extrinsical determination of +the will, is a necessity of supposition. To this, my answer is in +effect, that (_e_) a necessity of supposition is of two kinds. Sometimes +the thing supposed is in the power of the agent to do, or not to do. As +for a Romish priest to vow continence, upon supposition that he be a +Romish priest, is necessary; but because it was in his power to be a +priest or not to be a priest, therefore his vow is a free act. So +supposing a man to have taken physic, it is necessary that he keep at +home; yet because it was in his power to take a medicine or not to take +it, therefore his keeping at home is free. Again, sometimes the thing +supposed is not in the power of the agent to do, or not to do. Supposing +a man to be extremely sick, it is necessary that he keep at home; or +supposing that a man hath a natural antipathy against a cat, he runs +necessarily away so soon as he sees her: because this antipathy, and +this sickness, are not in the power of the party affected, therefore +these acts are not free. Jacob blessed his sons, Balaam blessed Israel; +these two acts being done, are both necessary upon supposition. But it +was in Jacob’s power, not to have blessed his sons; so was it not in +Balaam’s power, not to have blessed Israel (Numb. xxii. 38). Jacob’s +will was determined by himself; Balaam’s will was physically determined +by God. Therefore Jacob’s benediction proceeded from his own free +election; and Balaam’s from God’s determination. So was Caiphas’ +prophecy (John xi. 51): therefore the text saith, _he spake not of +himself_. To this T. H. saith nothing; but only declareth by an +impertinent instance, what _hypothetical_ signifies; and then adviseth +your Lordship, to take notice how errors and ignorance may be cloaked +under grave scholastic terms. And I do likewise intreat your Lordship to +take notice, that the greatest fraud and cheating lurks commonly under +the pretence of plain dealing. We see jugglers commonly strip up their +sleeves, and promise extraordinary fair dealing, before they begin to +play their tricks. + +“Concerning the second argument drawn from the liberty of God and the +good angels; as I cannot but approve his modesty, in ‘suspending his +judgment concerning the manner how God and the good angels do work +necessarily or freely, because he finds it not set down in the Articles +of our faith, or the decrees of our Church’, especially in this age, +which is so full of atheism, and of those scoffers which St. Peter +prophesied of, (2 Pet. iii. 3), who neither believe that there is God or +angels, or that they have a soul, but only as salt, to keep their bodies +from putrifaction; so I can by no means assent unto him in that which +follows, that is to say, that he hath proved that liberty and necessity +of the same kind may consist together, that is, a liberty of exercise +with a necessity of exercise, or a liberty of specification with a +necessity of specification. Those actions which he saith are +necessitated by passion, are for the most part dictated by reason, +either truly or apparently right, and resolved by the will itself. But +it troubles him, that I say that God and the good angels are more free +than men, intensively in the degree of freedom, but not extensively in +the latitude of the object, according to a liberty of exercise, but not +of specification: which he saith are no distinctions, but terms invented +to cover ignorance. Good words. Doth he only see? Are all other men +stark blind? By his favour, they are true and necessary distinctions; +and if he alone do not conceive them, it is because distinctions, as all +other things, have their fates, according to the capacities or +prejudices of their readers. But he urgeth two reasons. ‘One heat,’ +saith he, ‘may be more intensive than another, but not one liberty than +another.’ Why not, I wonder? Nothing is more proper to a man than +reason; yet a man is more rational than a child, and one man more +rational than another, that is, in respect of the use and exercise of +reason. As there are degrees of understanding, so there are of liberty. +The good angels have clearer understandings than we, and they are not +hindered with passions as we, and by consequence they have more use of +liberty than we. (_f_) His second reason is: ‘he that can do what he +will, hath all liberty, and he that cannot do what he will, hath no +liberty’. If this be true, then there are no degrees of liberty indeed. +But this which he calls liberty, is rather an omnipotence than a liberty +to do whatsoever he will. A man is free to shoot, or not to shoot, +although he cannot hit the white whensoever he would. We do good freely, +but with more difficulty and reluctance than the good spirits. The more +rational, and the less sensual the will is, the greater is the degree of +liberty. His other exception against liberty of exercise, and liberty of +specification, is a mere mistake, which grows merely from not rightly +understanding what liberty of specification, or contrariety is. A +liberty of specification, saith he, is a liberty to do or not to do this +or that in particular. Upon better advice he will find, that this which +he calls a liberty of specification, is a liberty of contradiction, and +not of specification, nor of contrariety. To be free to do or not to do +this or that particular good, is a liberty of contradiction; so +likewise, to be free to do or not to do this or that particular evil. +But to be free to do both good and evil, is a liberty of contrariety, +which extends to contrary objects or to diverse kind of things. So his +reason to prove that a liberty of exercise cannot be without a liberty +of specification, falls flat to the ground: and he may lay aside his +lenten licence for another occasion. I am ashamed to insist upon these +things, which are so evident that no man can question them who doth +understand them. + +(_g_) “And here he falls into another invective against distinctions and +scholastical expressions, and the ‘doctors of the Church, who by this +means tyrannized over the understandings of other men.’ What a +presumption is this, for one private man, who will not allow human +liberty to others, to assume to himself such a licence to control so +magistrally, and to censure of gross ignorance and tyrannising over +men’s judgments, yea, as causes of the troubles and tumults which are in +the world, the doctors of the Church in general, who have flourished in +all ages and all places, only for a few necessary and innocent +distinctions. Truly, said Plutarch, that a sore eye is offended with the +light of the sun. (_h_) What then, must the logicians lay aside their +first and second intentions, their abstracts and concretes, their +subjects and predicates, their modes and figures, their method synthetic +and analytic, their fallacies of composition and division, &c.? Must the +moral philosopher quit his means and extremes, his _principia congenita +et acquisita_, his liberty of contradiction and contrariety, his +necessity absolute and hypothetical, &c.? Must the natural philosopher +give over his intentional species, his understanding agent and patient, +his receptive and eductive power of the matter, his qualities _infusæ_ +or _influxæ_, _symbolæ_ or _dissymbolæ_, his temperament _ad pondus_ and +_ad justitiam_, his parts homogeneous and heterogeneous, his sympathies +and antipathies, his antiperistasis, &c.? Must the astrologer and the +geographer leave their _apogæum_ and _perigæum_, their artic and +antartic poles, their equator, zodiac, zenith, meridian, horizon, zones, +&c.? Must the mathematician, the metaphysician, and the divine, +relinquish all their terms of art and proper idiotisms, because they do +not relish with T. H.’s palate? But he will say, they are obscure +expressions. What marvel is it, when the things themselves are more +obscure? Let him put them into as plain English as he can, and they +shall be never a whit the better understood by those who want all +grounds of learning. Nothing is clearer than mathematical demonstration: +yet let one who is altogether ignorant in mathematics hear it, and he +will hold it to be as T. H. terms these distinctions, plain fustian or +jargon. Every art or profession hath its proper mysteries and +expressions, which are well known to the sons of art, not so to +strangers. Let him consult with military men, with physicians, with +navigators; and he shall find this true by experience. Let him go on +shipboard, and the mariners will not leave their _starboard_ and +_larboard_, because they please not him, or because he accounts it +gibberish. No, no: it is not the School divines, but innovators and +seditious orators, who are the true causes of the present troubles of +Europe. (_i_) T. H. hath forgotten what he said in his book, _De Cive_, +cap. XII.: ‘_that it is a seditious opinion, to teach that the knowledge +of good and evil belongs to private persons_’: and cap. XVII. ‘that in +questions of faith, the civil magistrates ought to consult with +ecclesiastical doctors, to whom God’s blessing is derived by imposition +of hands so as not to be deceived in necessary truths, to whom our +Saviour hath promised infallibility.’ These are the very men whom he +traduceth here. There he ascribes infallibility to them; here he +accuseth them of gross superstitious ignorance. There he attributes too +much to them; here he attributes too little. Both there and here he +takes too much upon him; (1 Cor. xiv. 32): _The spirits of the prophets +are subject to the prophets_.” + + ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. XIX. + +(_a_) “This proposition, _the will is free_, may be understood in two +senses; either that the will is not compelled, or that the will is not +always necessitated, &c. The former sense, that the will is not +compelled, is acknowledged by all the world as a truth undeniable.” I +never said the will is _compelled_, but do agree with the rest of the +world in granting that it is _not compelled_. It is an absurd speech to +say it is compelled, but not to say it is necessitated, or a necessary +effect of some cause. When the fire heateth, it doth not compel heat; so +likewise when some cause maketh the will to anything, it doth not compel +it. Many things may compel a man to do an action, in producing the will; +but that is not a compelling of the _will_, but of the _man_. That which +I call necessitation, is the effecting and creating of that will which +was not before, not a compelling of a will already existent. The +necessitation or creation of the will, is the same thing with the +compulsion of the man, saving that we commonly use the word compulsion, +in those actions which proceed from terror. And therefore this +distinction is of no use; and that raving which followeth immediately +after it, is nothing to the question, _whether the will be free_, though +it be to the question, _whether the man be free_. + +(_b_) “First he erreth in this, to think that actions proceeding from +fear are properly compulsory actions; which in truth are not only +voluntary, but free actions.” I never said nor doubted, but such actions +were both voluntary and free; for he that doth any thing for fear, +though he say truly he was compelled to it, yet we deny not that he had +election to do or not to do, and consequently that he was a voluntary +and free agent. But this hinders not, but that the terror might be a +necessary cause of his election of that which otherwise he would not +have elected, unless some other potent cause made it necessary he should +elect the contrary. And therefore, in the same ship, in the same storm, +one man may be necessitated to throw his goods overboard, and another +man to keep them within the ship; and the same man in a like storm be +otherwise advised, if all the causes be not like. But that the same +individual man, as the Bishop says, that chose to throw his goods +overboard, might chose not to throw his goods overboard, I cannot +conceive; unless a man can choose to throw overboard and not to throw +overboard, or be so advised and otherwise advised, all at once. + +(_c_) “Secondly, T. H. errs in this also, where he saith, that ‘a man is +then only said to be compelled, when fear makes him willing to an +action.’ As if force were not more prevalent with a man than fear,” &c. +When I said _fear_, I think no man can doubt but the fear of force was +understood. I cannot see therefore what quarrel he could justly take, at +saying that a man is compelled by fear only; unless he think it may be +called compulsion when a man by force, seizing on another man’s limbs, +moveth them as himself, not as the other man pleaseth. But this is not +the meaning of compulsion: neither is the action so done, the action of +him that suffereth, but of him that useth the force. But this, as if it +were a question of the propriety of the English tongue, the Bishop +denies; and says when a man is moved by fear, it is _improperly_ said he +is compelled. But when a man is moved by an external cause, the will +resisting as much as it can, then he says, he is _properly_ said to be +compelled; as in a rape, or when a Christian is drawn or carried by +violence to the idol’s temple. Insomuch as by this distinction it were +very proper English to say, that a stone were compelled when it is +thrown, or a man when he is carried in a cart. For my part, I understand +compulsion to be used rightly of living creatures only, which are moved +only by their own animal motion, in such manner as they would not be +moved without the fear. But of this dispute the English and well-bred +reader is the proper judge. + +(_d_) “Thirdly, the question is not, whether all the actions of a man be +free, but whether they be ordinarily free.” Is it impossible for the +Bishop to remember the question, which is _whether a man be free to +will?_ Did I ever say, that no actions of a man are free? On the +contrary, I say that all his voluntary actions are free, even those also +to which he is compelled by fear. But it does not therefore follow but +that the will, from whence those actions and their election proceed, may +have necessary causes, against which he hath never yet said anything. +That which followeth immediately, is not offered as a proof, but as +explication, how the passions of a man surprise him; therefore I let it +pass, noting only that he expoundeth _motus primo primi_, which I +understood not before, by the word _antipathy_. + +(_e_) “A necessity of supposition is of two kinds; sometimes a thing +supposed, is in the power of the agent to do or not to do, &c.; +sometimes a thing supposed, is not in the power of the agent to do or +not to do,” &c. + +When the necessity is of the former kind of supposition, then, he says, +freedom may consist with this necessity, in the latter sense that it +cannot. And to use his own instances, to vow continence in a Romish +priest, upon supposition that he is a Romish priest, is a necessary act, +because it was in his power to be a priest or not. On the other side, +supposing a man having a natural antipathy against a cat; because this +antipathy is not in the power of the party affected, therefore the +running away from the cat is no free act. + +I deny not but that it is a free act of the Romish priest to vow +continence, not upon the supposition that he was a Romish priest, but +because he had not done it unless he would; if he had not been a Romish +priest, it had been all one to the freedom of his act. Nor is his +priesthood anything to the necessity of his vow, saving that if he would +not have vowed he should not have been made a priest. There was an +antecedent necessity in the causes extrinsical; first, that he should +have the will to be a priest, and then consequently that he should have +the will to vow. Against this he allegeth nothing. Then for his cat, the +man’s running from it is a free act, as being voluntary, and arising +from a false apprehension (which nevertheless he cannot help) of some +hurt or other the cat may do him. And therefore the act is as free as +the act of him that throweth his goods into the sea. So likewise the act +of Jacob in blessing his sons, and the act of Balaam in blessing Israel, +are equally free and equally voluntary, yet equally determined by God, +who is the author of all blessings, and framed the will of both of them +to bless, and whose will, as St. Paul saith, cannot be resisted. +Therefore both their actions were necessitated equally; and, because +they were voluntary, equally free. As for Caiphas’ his prophecy, which +the text saith _he spake not of himself_, it was necessary; first, +because it was by the supernatural gift of God to the high-priests, as +sovereigns of the commonwealth of the Jews, to speak to the people as +from the mouth of God, that is to say, to prophecy; and secondly, +whensoever he did speak not as from God, but as from himself, it was +nevertheless necessary he should do so, not that he might not have been +silent if he would, but because his will to speak was antecedently +determined to what he should speak from all eternity, which he hath yet +brought no argument to contradict. + +He approveth my modesty in suspending my judgment concerning the manner +how the good angels do work, necessarily or freely, because I find it +not set down in the articles of our faith, nor in the decrees of our +Church. But he useth not the same modesty himself. For whereas he can +apprehend neither the nature of God nor of angels, nor conceive what +kind of thing it is which in them he calleth will, he nevertheless takes +upon him to attribute to them _liberty of exercise_, and to deny them _a +liberty of specification_; to grant them a _more intensive_ liberty than +we have, but not a _more extensive_; using, not incongruously, in the +incomprehensibility of the subject incomprehensible terms, as _liberty +of exercise_ and _liberty of specification_, and degrees of intension in +liberty; as if one liberty, like heat, might be more intensive than +another. It is true that there is greater liberty in a large than in a +straight prison, but one of those liberties is not more intense than the +other. + +(_f_) “His second reason is, _he that can do what he will, hath all +liberty, and he that cannot do what he will, hath no liberty_. If this +be true, then there are no degrees of liberty indeed. But this which he +calls liberty, is rather an omnipotence than a liberty.” It is one thing +to say a man hath liberty to do what he will, and another thing to say +he hath power to do what he will. A man that is bound, would say readily +he hath not the liberty to walk; but he will not say he wants the power. +But the sick man will say he wants the power to walk, but not the +liberty. This is, as I conceive, to speak the English tongue: and +consequently an Englishman will not say, the liberty to do what he will, +but the power to do what he will, is omnipotence. And therefore either I +or the Bishop understand not English. Whereas he adds that I mistake the +meaning of the words _liberty of specification_, I am sure that in that +way wherein I expound them, there is no absurdity. But if he say, I +understand not what the Schoolmen mean by it, I will not contend with +him; for I think they know not what they mean themselves. + +(_g_) “And here he falls into another invective against distinctions and +scholastical expressions, and the doctors of the Church, who by this +means tyrannized over the understanding of other men. What a presumption +is this, for one private man,” &c. That he may know I am no enemy to +intelligible distinctions, I also will use a distinction in the defence +of myself against this his accusation. I say therefore that some +distinctions are _scholastical_ only, and some are _scholastical_ and +_sapiential_ also. Against those that are _scholastical_ only, I do and +may inveigh. But against those that are _scholastical_ and _sapiential_ +also, I do not inveigh. Likewise some doctors of the Church, as Suarez, +Johannes à Duns, and their imitators, to breed in men such opinions as +the Church of Rome thought suitable to their interest, did write such +things as neither other men nor themselves understood. These I confess I +have a little slighted. Other doctors of the Church, as Martin Luther, +Philip Melancthon, John Calvin, William Perkins, and others, that did +write their sense clearly, I never slighted, but always very much +reverenced and admired. Wherein, then, lieth my presumption? If it be +because I am a private man, let the Bishop also take heed he contradict +not some of those whom the world worthily esteems, lest he also (for he +is a private man) be taxed of presumption. + +(_h_) “What then, must the logicians lay aside their first and second +intentions, their abstracts and concretes &c.: must the moral +philosopher quit his means and extremes, his _principia congenita et +acquisita_, his liberty of contradiction and contrariety, his necessity +absolute and hypothetical, &c.: must the natural philosopher give over +his intentional species, &c.: because they do not relish with T. H.’s +palate?” I confess that among the logicians, Barbara, Celarent, Darii, +Ferio, &c. are terms of art. But if the Bishop think that words of +_first and second intention_, that _abstract_ and _concrete_, that +_subjects_ and _predicates_, _moods_ and _figures_, _method synthetic_ +and _analytic_, _fallacies_ of _composition_ and _division_, be terms of +art, I am not of his opinion. For these are no more terms of art in +logic, than _lines_, _figures_, _squares_, _triangles_, &c. in the +mathematics. Barbara, Celarent, and the rest that follow, are terms of +art, invented for the easier apprehension of young men, and are by young +men understood. But the terms of the School with which I have found +fault, have been invented to blind the understanding, and cannot be +understood by those that intend to learn divinity. And to his question +whether the moral philosopher must quit his means and extremes, I +answer, that though they are not terms of art, he ought to quit them +when they cannot be understood; and when they can, to use them rightly. +And therefore, though _means_ and _extremes_ be terms intelligible, yet +I would have them quit the placing of virtue in the one, and of vice in +the other. But for his _liberty of contradiction_ and _contrariety_, his +_necessity absolute_ and _hypothetical_, if any moral philosopher ever +used them, then away with them; they serve for nothing but to seduce +young students. In like manner, let the natural philosopher no more +mention his _intentional species_, his _understanding agent and +patient_, his _receptive and eductive power of the matter_, his +_qualities infusæ_ or _influxæ_, _symbolæ_ or _dissymbolæ_, his +_temperament ad pondus_ and _ad justitiam_. He may keep his _parts +homogeneous_ and _heterogeneous_; but his _sympathies_ and +_antipathies_, his _antiperistasis_ and the like names of excuses rather +than of causes, I would have him fling away. And for the astrologer, +(unless he means astronomer), I would have him throw away his whole +trade. But if he mean astronomer, then the terms of _apogæum_ and +_perigæum_, artic, antartic, equator, zodiac, zenith, meridian, horizon, +zones, &c. are no more terms of art in astronomy, than a saw or a +hatchet in the art of a carpenter. He cites no terms of art for +geometry; I was afraid he would have put _lines_, or perhaps _equality_ +or _inequality_, for terms of art. So that now I know not what be those +terms he thinks I would cast away in geometry. And lastly, for his +metaphysician, I would have him quit both his terms and his profession, +as being in truth (as Plutarch saith in the beginning of the life of +Alexander the Great) not at all profitable to learning, but made only +for an essay to the learner; and the divine to use no word in preaching +but such as his auditors, nor in writing but such as a common reader, +may understand. And all this, not for the pleasing of my palate, but for +the promotion of truth. + +(_i_) “T. H. hath forgotten what he said in his book, _De Cive_, cap. +XII., that it is ‘a seditious opinion to teach that the knowledge of +good and evil belongs to private persons’: and cap. XVII, that ‘in +questions of faith the civil magistrates ought to consult with the +ecclesiastical doctors, to whom God’s blessing is derived by imposition +of hands, so as not to be deceived in necessary truths,’ &c. There he +attributes too much to them, here he attributeth too little; both there +and here he takes too much upon him. _The spirits of the prophets are +subject to the prophets._” He thinks he hath a great advantage against +me from my own words in my book _De Cive_, which he would not have +thought if he had understood them. The knowledge of good and evil is +judicature, which in Latin is _cognitio causarum_, not _scientia_. Every +private man may do his best to attain a knowledge of what is good and +evil in the action he is to do; but to judge of what is good and evil in +others, belongs not to him, but to those whom the sovereign power +appointeth thereunto. But the Bishop not understanding, or forgetting, +that _cognoscere_ is to judge, as Adam did of God’s commandment, hath +cited this place to little purpose. And for the infallibility of the +ecclesiastical doctors by me attributed to them, it is not that they +cannot be deceived, but that a subject cannot be deceived in obeying +them when they are our lawfully constituted doctors. For the supreme +ecclesiastical doctor, is he that hath the supreme power: and in obeying +him no subject can be deceived, because they are by God himself +commanded to obey him. And what the ecclesiastical doctors, lawfully +constituted, do tell us to be necessary in point of religion, the same +is told us by the sovereign power. And therefore, though we may be +deceived by them in the belief of an opinion, we cannot be deceived by +them in the duty of our actions. And this is all that I ascribe to the +ecclesiastical doctors. If they think it too much, let them take upon +them less. Too little they cannot say it is, who take it, as it is, for +a burthen. And for them who seek it as a worldly preferment, it is too +much. I take, he says, too much upon me. Why so? Because _the spirits of +the prophets are subject to the prophets_. This is it that he finds +fault with in me, when he says that I am a private man, that is to say, +no prophet, that is to say, no bishop. By which it is manifest, that the +Bishop subjecteth not his spirit but to the Convocation of bishops. I +admit that every man ought to subject his spirit to the prophets. But a +prophet is he that speaketh unto us from God; which I acknowledge none +to do, but him that hath due authority so to do. And no man hath due +authority so to do immediately, but he that hath the supreme authority +of the commonwealth; nor mediately, but they that speak such things to +the people, as he that hath the supreme authority alloweth of. And as it +is true in this sense, that _the spirits of the prophets are subject to +the prophets_; so it is also true that _we ought not to believe every +spirit, but to try the spirits, whether they are of God; because many +false prophets are gone out into the world_ (1 John iv. 1). Therefore I +that am a private man, may examine the prophets; which to do, I have no +other means but to examine whether their doctrine be agreeable to the +law; which theirs is not, who divide the commonwealth into two +commonwealths, civil and ecclesiastical. + + NO. XX. + +[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] + +_J. D._ “Now to the distinction itself, I say, first, that the proper +act of liberty is election, and election is opposed, not only to +coaction, but also to coarctation, or determination to one. +Necessitation or determination to one, may consist with spontaneity, but +not with election or liberty; as hath been showed. The very Stoics did +acknowledge a spontaneity. So our adversaries are not yet gone out of +the confines of the Stoics. + +“Secondly, to rip up the bottom of this business, this I take to be the +clear resolution of the Schools. There is a double act of the will: the +one more remote, called _imperatus_, that is, in truth the act of some +inferior faculty, subject to the command of the will, as to open or shut +one’s eyes; without doubt these actions may be compelled. The other act +is nearer, called _actus elicitus_, an act drawn out of the will, as to +will, to choose, to elect. This may be stopped or hindered by the +intervening impediment of the understanding, as a stone lying on a table +is kept from its natural motion; otherwise the will should have a kind +of omnipotence. But the will cannot be compelled to an act repugnant to +its inclination, as when a stone is thrown upwards into the air; for +that is both to incline and not to incline to the same object at the +same time, which implies a contradiction. Therefore to say the will is +necessitated, is to say, the will is compelled so far as the will is +capable of compulsion. If a strong man holding the hand of a weaker, +should therewith kill a third person, _hæc quidem vis est_, this is +violence; the weaker did not willingly perpetrate the fact, because he +was compelled. But now suppose this strong man had the will of the +weaker in his power as well as the hand, and should not only incline, +but determine it secretly and insensibly to commit this act: is not the +case the same? Whether one ravish Lucretia by force, as Tarquin, or by +amatory potions and magical incantations not only allure her, but +necessitate her to satisfy his lust, and incline her effectually, and +draw her inevitably and irresistibly, to follow him spontaneously, +Lucretia in both these conditions is to be pitied. But the latter person +is more guilty, and deserves greater punishment, who endeavours also, so +much as in him lies, to make Lucretia irresistibly partake of his crime. +I dare not apply it, but thus only: take heed how we defend those secret +and invincible necessitations to evil, though spontaneous and free from +coaction. + +“These are their fastnesses.” + +_T. H._ In the next place, he bringeth two arguments against +distinguishing between being free from compulsion, and free from +necessitation. The first is, that election is opposite, not only to +coaction or compulsion, but also to necessitation or determination to +one. This is it he was to prove from the beginning, and therefore +bringeth no new argument to prove it. And to those brought formerly, I +have already answered; and in this place I deny again, that election is +opposite to either. For when a man is compelled, for example, to subject +himself to an enemy or to die, he hath still election left in him, and a +deliberation to bethink which of these two he can better endure; and he +that is led to prison by force, hath election, and may deliberate, +whether he will be haled and trained on the ground, or make use of his +feet. + +Likewise when there is no compulsion, but the strength of temptation to +do an evil action, being greater than the motives to abstain, +necessarily determines him to the doing of it, yet he deliberates whilst +sometimes the motives to do, sometimes the motives to forbear, are +working on him, and consequently he electeth which he will. But +commonly, when we see and know the strength that moves us, we +acknowledge necessity; but when we see not, or mark not the force that +moves us, we then think there is none, and that it is not causes, but +liberty that produceth the action. Hence it is that they think he does +not choose this, that of necessity chooseth it; but they might as well +say fire does not burn, because it burns of necessity. The second +argument is not so much an argument, as a distinction, to show in what +sense it may be said that voluntary actions are necessitated, and in +what sense not. And therefore he allegeth, as from the authority of the +Schools and that which “rippeth up the bottom of the question”, that +there is a double act of the will. The one, he says, is _actus +imperatus_, an act done at the command of the will by some inferior +faculty of the soul, as to open or shut one’s eyes: and this act may be +compelled. The other, he says, is _actus elicitus_, an act allured, or +an act drawn forth by allurement out of the will, as to will, to choose, +to elect: this, he says, cannot be compelled. Wherein letting pass that +metaphorical speech of attributing command and subjection to the +faculties of the soul, as if they made a commonwealth or family among +themselves, and could speak one to another, which is very improper in +searching the truth of the question: you may observe first, that to +compel a voluntary act is nothing else but to will it. For it is all one +to say, my will commands the shutting of mine eyes or the doing of any +other action, and to say, I have the will to shut mine eyes. So that +_actus imperatus_ here, might as easily have been said in English, _a +voluntary action_, but that they that invented the term understood not +any thing it signified. Secondly you may observe, that _actus elicitus_ +is exemplified by these words, to will, to elect, to choose, which are +all one; and so to will is here made an act of the will; and indeed, as +the will is a faculty or power of a man’s soul, so to will is an act of +it according to that power. But as it is absurdly said, that to dance is +an act allured or drawn by fair means out of the ability to dance; so it +is also to say, that to will is an act allured or drawn out of the power +to will, which power is commonly called the will. Howsoever it be, the +sum of his distinction is, that a voluntary act may be done on +compulsion, that is to say, by foul means; but to will that or any act +cannot be but by allurement or fair means. Now, seeing fair means, +allurements, and enticements, produce the action which they do produce +as necessarily as threatening and foul means, it follows, that to will +may be made as necessary as any thing that is done by compulsion. So +that the distinction of _actus imperatus_, and _actus elicitus_, are but +words, and of no effect against necessity. + +_J. D._ “In the next place follow two reasons of mine own against the +same distinction, the one taken from the former grounds, that election +cannot consist with determination to one. To this, he saith, he hath +answered already. No; truth is founded upon a rock. He hath been so far +from prevailing against it, that he hath not been able to shake it. +(_a_) Now again he tells us, that ‘election is not opposite to either’, +necessitation or compulsion. He might even as well tell us, that a stone +thrown upwards moves naturally; or that a woman can be ravished with her +own will. Consent takes away the rape. This is the strangest liberty +that ever was heard of, that a man is compelled to do what he would not, +and yet is free to do what he will. And this he tells us upon the old +score, that ‘he who submits to his enemy for fear of death, chooseth to +submit’. But we have seen formerly, that this which he calls compulsion, +is not compulsion properly, nor that natural determination of the will +to one, which is opposite to true liberty. He who submits to an enemy +for saving his life, doth either only counterfeit, and then there is no +will to submit; (this disguise is no more than a stepping aside to avoid +a present blow); or else he doth sincerely will a submission, and then +the will is changed. There is a vast difference between compelling and +changing the will. Either God or man may change the will of man, either +by varying the condition of things, or by informing the party otherwise: +but compelled it cannot be, that is, it cannot both will this and not +will this, as it is invested with the same circumstances; though, if the +act were otherwise circumstantiated, it might nill that freely which now +it wills freely. (_b_) Wherefore this kind of actions are called mixed +actions, that is partly voluntary, partly involuntary. That which is +compelled in a man’s present condition or distress, that is not +voluntary nor chosen. That which is chosen, as the remedy of its +distress, that is voluntary. So hypothetically, supposing a man were not +in that distress, they are involuntary; but absolutely without any +supposition at all, taking the case as it is, they are voluntary. (_c_) +His other instance of ‘a man forced to prison, that he may choose +whether he will be haled thither upon the ground, or walk upon his +feet,’ is not true. By his leave, that is not as he pleaseth, but as it +pleaseth them who have him in their power. If they will drag him, he is +not free to walk; and if they give him leave to walk, he is not forced +to be dragged. (_d_) Having laid this foundation, he begins to build +upon it, that ‘other passions do necessitate as much as fear’. But he +errs doubly; first, in his foundation. Fear doth not determine the +rational will naturally and necessarily. The last and greatest of the +five terrible things is death; yet the fear of death cannot necessitate +a resolved mind to do a dishonest action, which is worse than death. The +fear of the fiery furnace could not compel the three children to worship +an idol, nor the fear of the lions necessitate Daniel to omit his duty +to God. It is our frailty, that we are more afraid of empty shadows than +of substantial dangers, because they are nearer our senses; as little +children fear a mouse or a visard more than fire or weather. But as a +fit of the stone takes away the sense of the gout for the present, so +the greater passion doth extinguish the less. The fear of God’s wrath +and eternal torments doth expel corporeal fear: _fear not them who kill +the body, but fear him who is able to cast both body and soul into hell_ +(Luke xii. 4). (_e_) _Da veniam imperator; tu carcerem, ille gehennam +minatur._--_Excuse me, O emperor, thou threatenest men with prison, but +he threatens me with hell._ (_f_) Secondly, he errs in his +superstruction also. There is a great difference, as to this case of +justifying, or not justifying an action, between force and fear, and +other passions. Force doth not only lessen the sin, but takes it quite +away. He who forced a betrothed damsel was to die; ‘but unto the +damsel,’ saith he, ‘thou shalt do nothing, there is in her no fault +worthy of death’ (Deut. xxii. 26). Tamar’s beauty, or Ammon’s love, did +not render him innocent; but Ammon’s force rendered Tamar innocent. But +fear is not so prevalent as force. Indeed if fear be great and justly +grounded, such as may fall upon a constant man, though it do not +dispense with the transgression of the negative precepts of God or +nature, because they bind to all times, yet it diminisheth the offence +even against them, and pleads for pardon. But it dispenseth in many +cases with the transgression of the positive law, either divine or +human; because it is not probable that God or the law would oblige man +to the observation of all positive precepts, with so great damage as the +loss of his life. The omission of circumcision was no sin, whilst the +Israelites were travelling through the wilderness. By T. H.’s +permission, (_g_) I will propose a case to him. A gentleman sends his +servant with money to buy a dinner; some Russians meet him by the way, +and take it from him by force; the servant cried for help, and did what +he could to defend himself, but all would not serve. The servant is +innocent, if he were to be tried before a court of Areopagites. Or +suppose the Russians did not take it from him by force, but drew their +swords and threatened to kill him except he delivered it himself; no +wise man will conceive, that it was either the master’s intention or the +servant’s duty to hazard his life or limbs for saving of such a trifling +sum. But on the other side, suppose this servant, passing by some +cabaret or tennis-court where his comrades were drinking or playing, +should stay with them, and drink or play away his money, and afterwards +plead, as T. H. doth here, that he was overcome by the mere strength of +temptation. I trow, neither T. H. nor any man else would admit of this +excuse, but punish him for it: because neither was he necessitated by +the temptation, and what strength it had was by his own fault, in +respect of that vicious habit which he had contracted of drinking or +gaming: (James i. 14): _Every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of +his own lust and enticed_. Disordered passions of anger, hatred, lust, +if they be consequent (as the case is here put by T. H.) and flow from +deliberation and election, they do not only not diminish the fault, but +they aggravate it, and render it much greater. + +(_h_) “He talks much of the ‘motives to do and motives to forbear, how +they work upon and determine a man’; as if a reasonable man were no more +than a tennis-ball, to be tossed to and fro by the rackets of the second +causes; as if the will had no power to move itself, but were merely +passive, like an artificial popingay removed hither and thither by the +bolts of the archers, who shoot on this side and on that. What are +motives, but reasons or discourses framed by the understanding, and +freely moved by the will? What are the will and the understanding, but +faculties of the same soul? And what is liberty but a power resulting +from them both? To say that the will is determined by these motives, is +as much as to say that the agent is determined by himself. If there be +no necessitation before the judgment of right reason doth dictate to the +will, then there is no antecedent, no extrinsical necessitation at all. +(_i_) All the world knows, that when the agent is determined by himself, +then the effect is determined likewise in its cause. But if he +determined himself freely, then the effect is free. Motives determine +not naturally, but morally; which kind of determination may consist with +true liberty. But if T. H.’s opinion were true, that the will were +naturally determined by the physical and special influence of +extrinsical causes, not only motives were vain, but reason itself and +deliberation were vain. No, saith he, they are not vain, because they +are the means. Yes, if the means be superfluous, they are vain. What +needed such a circuit of deliberation to advise what is fit to be done, +when it is already determined extrinsically what must be done? + +(_k_) “He saith, ‘that the ignorance of the true causes and their power, +is the reason why we ascribe the effect to liberty; but when we +seriously consider the causes of things, we acknowledge a necessity’. No +such thing, but just the contrary. The more we consider, and the clearer +we understand, the greater is the liberty, and the more the knowledge of +our own liberty. The less we consider, and the more incapable that the +understanding is, the lesser is the liberty, and the knowledge of it. +And where there is no consideration nor use of reason, there is no +liberty at all, there is neither moral good nor evil. Some men, by +reason that their exterior senses are not totally bound, have a trick to +walk in their sleep. Suppose such a one in that case should cast himself +down a pair of stairs or from a bridge, and break his neck or drown +himself; it were a mad jury that would find this man accessary to his +own death. Why? Because it was not freely done, he had not then the use +of reason. + +(_l_) “Lastly, he tells us, that ‘the will doth choose of necessity, as +well as the fire burns of necessity’. If he intend no more but this, +that election is the proper and natural act of the will as burning is of +the fire, or that the elective power is as necessarily in a man as +visibility, he speaks truly, but most impertinently; for, the question +is not now of the elective power, _in actu primo_, whether it be an +essential faculty of the soul, but whether the act of electing this or +that particular object, be free and undetermined by any antecedent and +extrinsical causes. But if he intend it in this other sense, that as the +fire hath no power to suspend its burning, nor to distinguish between +those combustible matters which are put unto it, but burns that which is +put unto it necessarily, if it be combustible; so the will hath no power +to refuse that which it wills, nor to suspend its own appetite: he errs +grossly. The will hath power either to will or nill, or to suspend, that +is, neither to will nor nill the same object. Yet even the burning of +the fire, if it be considered as it is invested with all particular +circumstances, is not otherwise so necessary an action as T. H. +imagineth. (_m_) Two things are required to make an effect necessary. +First, that it be produced by a necessary cause, such as fire is; +secondly, that it be necessarily produced. Protagoras, an atheist, began +his book thus: ‘Concerning the Gods, I have nothing to say, whether they +be or they be not’: for which his book was condemned by the Athenians to +be burned. The fire was a necessary agent, but the sentence or the +application of the fire to the book was a free act; and therefore the +burning of his book was free. Much more the rational will is free, which +is both a voluntary agent, and acts voluntarily. + +(_n_) “My second reason against this distinction, of liberty from +compulsion but not from necessitation, is new, and demonstrates clearly +that to necessitate the will by a physical necessity, is to compel the +will so far as the will is capable of compulsion; and that he who doth +necessitate the will to evil after that manner, is the true cause of +evil, and ought rather to be blamed than the will itself. But T. H., for +all he saith he is not surprised, can be contented upon better advise to +steal by all this in silence. And to hide this tergiversation from the +eyes of the reader, he makes an empty shew of braving against that +famous and most necessary distinction, between the _elicite_ and +_imperate_ acts of the will; first, because the terms are _improper_; +secondly, because they are _obscure_. What trivial and grammatical +objections are these, to be used against the universal current of +divines and philosophers. _Verborum ut nummorum_, it is in words as it +is in money: use makes them proper and current. A _tyrant_ at first +signified a lawful and just prince; now, use hath quite changed the +sense of it, to denote either a usurper or an oppressor. The word +_præmunire_ is now grown a good word in our English laws, by use and +tract of time; and yet at first it was merely mistaken for a +_præmonere_. The names of Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, were derived at first +from those heathenish deities, the Sun, the Moon, and the warlike god of +the Germans. Now we use them for distinction sake only, without any +relation to their first original. He is too froward, that will refuse a +piece of coin that is current throughout the world, because it is not +stamped after his own fancy. So is he that rejects a good word, because +he understands not the derivation of it. We see foreign words are daily +naturalized and made free denizens in every country. But why are the +terms improper? ‘Because,’ saith he, ‘it attributes command, and +subjection to the faculties of the soul, as if they made a commonwealth +or family among themselves, and could speak one to another.’ Therefore, +he saith, (_o_) they who invented this term of _actus imperatus_, +understood not anything what it signified. No; why not? It seemeth to +me, they understood it better than those who except against it. They +knew there are _mental terms_, which are only conceived in the mind, as +well as _vocal terms_, which are expressed with the tongue. They knew, +that howsoever a superior do intimate a direction to his inferior, it is +still a command. Tarquin commanded his son by only striking off the tops +of the poppies, and was by him both understood and obeyed. Though there +be no formal commonwealth or family either in the body or in the soul of +man, yet there is a subordination in the body, of the inferior members +to the head; there is a subordination in the soul, of the inferior +faculties to the rational will. Far be it from a reasonable man so far +to dishonour his own nature, as to equal fancy with understanding, or +the sensitive appetite with the reasonable will. A power of command +there is, without all question; though there be some doubt in what +faculty this command doth principally reside, whether in the will or in +the understanding. The true resolution is, that the directive command or +counsel is in the understanding; and the applicative command, or empire +for putting in execution of what is directed, is in the will. The same +answer serves for his second impropriety, about the word _elicite_. For +saith he, ‘as it is absurdly said, that to dance is an act allured, or +drawn by fair means, out of the ability to dance; so is it absurdly +said, that to will or choose, is an act drawn out of the power to will’. +His objection is yet more improper than the expression. The art of +dancing rather resembles the understanding than the will. That drawing +which the Schools intend, is clear of another nature from that which he +conceives. By _elicitation_, he understands a persuading or enticing +with flattering words, or sweet alluring insinuations, to choose this or +that. But that _elicitation_ which the Schools intend, is a deducing of +the power of the will into act; that drawing which they mention, is +merely from the appetibility of the object, or of the end. As a man +draws a child after him with the sight of a fair apple, or a shepherd +draws his sheep after him with the sight of a green bough: so the end +draws the will to it by a metaphorical motion. What he understands here +by an ability to dance, is more than I know, or any man else, until he +express himself in more proper terms; whether he understand the +locomotive faculty alone, or the art or acquired habit of dancing alone, +or both of these jointly. It may be said aptly without any absurdity, +that the act of dancing is drawn out (_elicitur_) of the locomotive +faculty helped by the acquired habit. He who is so scrupulous about the +received phrases of the Schools, should not have let so many improper +expressions have dropt from his pen; as in this very passage, he +confounds the _compelling_ of a voluntary action, with the _commanding_ +of a voluntary action, and _willing_ with _electing_, which, he saith, +‘are all one’. Yet _to will_ properly respects the end, _to elect_ the +means. + +(_p_) “His other objection against this distinction of the acts of the +will into _elicite_ and _imperate_, is obscurity. ‘Might it not,’ saith +he, ‘have been as easily said in English, a voluntary action.’ Yes, it +might have been said as easily, but not as truly, nor properly. +Whatsoever hath its original from the will, whether immediately or +mediately, whether it be a proper act of the will itself, as to elect, +or an act of the understanding, as to deliberate, or an act of the +inferior faculties or of the members, is a voluntary action: but neither +the act of reason, nor of the senses, nor of the sensitive appetite, nor +of the members, are the proper acts of the will, nor drawn immediately +out of the will itself; but the members and faculties are applied to +their proper and respective acts by the power of the will. + +“And so he comes to cast up the total sum of my second reason with the +same faith that the unjust steward did make his accounts (Luke xvi). +‘The sum of J. D.’s distinction is,’ saith he, ‘that a voluntary act may +be done on compulsion,’ (just contrary to what I have maintained), ‘that +is to say, by foul means: but to will that or any act, cannot be but by +allurement or fair means.’ I confess the distinction is mine, because I +use it; as the sun is mine, or the air is mine, that is common to me +with all who treat of this subject. (_q_) But his mistakes are so thick, +both in relating my mind and his own, that the reader may conclude he is +wandered out of his known way. I will do my duty to show him the right +way. First, no acts which are properly said to be compelled, are +voluntary. Secondly, acts of terror, (which he calls foul means), which +are sometimes in a large improper sense called compulsory actions, may +be, and for the most part are, consistent with true liberty. Thirdly, +actions proceeding from blandishments or sweet persuasions, (which he +calls fair means), if they be indeliberated, as in children who want the +use of reason, are not presently free actions. Lastly, the strength of +consequent and deliberated desires doth neither diminish guilt, nor +excuse from punishment, as just fears of extreme and imminent dangers +threatened by extrinsical agents often do; because the strength of the +former proceeds from our own fault, and was freely elected in the causes +of it; but neither desires nor fears, which are consequent and +deliberated, do absolutely necessitate the will. + + ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. XX. + +(_a_) “Now again he tells us, that election is not opposite to either +necessitation or compulsion. He might even as well tell us, that a stone +thrown upwards moves naturally, or that a woman can be ravished with her +own will. Consent takes away the rape,” &c. If that which I have told +him again, be false, why shows he not why it is false? Here is not one +word of argument against it. To say, I might have said as well that a +stone thrown upwards moves naturally, is no refutation, but a denial. I +will not dispute with him, whether a stone thrown up move naturally or +not. I shall only say to those readers whose judgments are not defaced +with the abuse of words, that as a stone moveth not upwards of itself, +but by the power of the external agent who giveth it a beginning of that +motion; so also when the stone falleth, it is moved downward by the +power of some other agent, which, though it be imperceptible to the eye, +is not imperceptible to reason. But because this is not proper discourse +for the Bishop, and because I have elsewhere discoursed thereof +expressly, I shall say nothing of it here. And whereas he says, ‘consent +takes away the rape’; it may perhaps be true, and I think it is; but +here it not only inferreth nothing, but was also needless, and therefore +in a public writing is an indecent instance, though sometimes not +unnecessary in a spiritual court. In the next place, he wonders how “a +man is compelled, and yet free to do what he will”; that is to say, how +a man is made to will, and yet free to do what he will. If he had said, +he wondered how a man can be compelled to will, and yet be free to do +that which he would have done if he had not been compelled, it had been +somewhat; as it is, it is nothing. Again he says, “he who submits to an +enemy for saving his life, doth either only counterfeit, or else his +will is changed,” &c.: all which is true. But when he says he doth +counterfeit, he doth not insinuate that he may counterfeit lawfully; for +that would prejudice him hereafter, in case he should have need of +quarter. But how this maketh for him, or against me, I perceive not. +“There is a vast difference,” saith he, “between compelling and changing +the will. Either God or man may change the will of man, either by +varying the condition of things, or by informing the party otherwise; +but compelled it cannot be,” &c. I say the same; the will cannot be +compelled; but the man may be, and is then compelled, when his will is +changed by the fear of force, punishment, or other hurt from God or man. +And when his will is changed, there is a new will formed, (whether it be +by God or man), and that necessarily; and consequently the actions that +flow from that will, are both voluntary, free, and necessary, +notwithstanding that he was compelled to do them. Which maketh not for +the Bishop, but for me. + +(_b_) “Wherefore this kind of actions are called mixed actions, that is +partly voluntary, partly involuntary, &c. So supposing a man were not in +that distress, they are involuntary.” That some actions are partly +voluntary, partly involuntary, is not a new, but a false opinion. For +one and the same action can never be both voluntary and involuntary. If +therefore parts of an action be actions, he says no more but that some +actions are voluntary, some involuntary; or that one multitude of +actions may be partly voluntary, partly involuntary. But that one action +should be partly voluntary, partly involuntary, is absurd. And it is the +absurdity of those authors which he unwarily gave credit to. But to say, +supposing the man had not been in distress, that then the action had +been involuntary, is to say, that the throwing of a man’s goods into the +sea, supposing he had not been in a storm, had been an involuntary +action; which is also an absurdity; for he would not have done it, and +therefore it had been no action at all. And this absurdity is his own. + +(_c_) “His other instance of a man forced to prison, that he may choose +whether he will be haled thither upon the ground or walk upon his feet, +is not true. By his leave, that is not as he pleaseth, but as it +pleaseth them who have him in their power.” It is enough for the use I +make of that instance, that a man when in the necessity of going to +prison, though he cannot elect nor deliberate of being prisoner in the +jail, may nevertheless deliberate sometimes, whether he shall walk or be +haled thither. + +(_d_) “Having laid this foundation, he begins to build upon it, that +other passions do necessitate as much as fear. But he errs doubly,” &c. +First, he says, I err in this, that I say that fear determines the +rational will naturally and necessarily. And first, I answer, that I +never used that term of rational will. There is nothing rational but +God, angels, and men. The will is none of these. I would not have +excepted against this expression, but that every where he speaketh of +the will and other faculties as of men, or spirits in men’s bellies. +Secondly, he offereth nothing to prove the contrary. For that which +followeth: “the last and greatest of five terrible things is death; yet +the fear of death cannot necessitate a resolved mind to a dishonest +action; the fear of the fiery furnace could not compel the three +children to worship an idol, nor the fear of the lions necessitate +Daniel to omit his duty to God,” &c.: I grant him that the greatest of +five (or of fifteen, for he had no more reason for five than fifteen) +terrible things doth not always necessitate a man to do a dishonest +action, and that the fear of the fiery furnace could not compel the +three children, nor the lions Daniel, to omit their duty; for somewhat +else, namely, their confidence in God, did necessitate them to do their +duty. That the fear of God’s wrath doth expel corporeal fear, is well +said, and according to the text he citeth: and proveth strongly, that +fear of the greater evil may necessitate in a man a courage to endure +the lesser evil. + +(_e_) “_Da veniam imperator; tu carcerem, ille gehennam +minatur_:--Excuse me, O Emperor; thou threatenest men with prison, but +God threatens me with hell.” This sentence, and that which he saith No. +XVII, that neither the civil judge is the proper judge, nor the law of +the land is the proper rule of sin, and divers other sayings of his to +the same effect, make it impossible for any nation in the world to +preserve themselves from civil wars. For all men living equally +acknowledging, that the High and Omnipotent God is to be obeyed before +the greatest emperors; every one may pretend the commandment of God to +justify his disobedience. And if one man pretendeth that God commands +one thing, and another man that he commands the contrary, what equity is +there to allow the pretence of one more than of another? Or what peace +can there be, if they be all allowed alike? There will therefore +necessarily arise discord and civil war, unless there be a judge agreed +upon, with authority given to him by every one of them, to show them and +interpret to them the Word of God; which interpreter is always the +emperor, king, or other sovereign person, who therefore ought to be +obeyed. But the Bishop thinks that to shew us and interpret to us the +Word of God, belongeth to the clergy; wherein I cannot consent unto him. +Excuse me, O Bishop, you threaten me with that you cannot do; but the +emperor threateneth me with death, and is able to do what he +threateneth. + +(_f_) “Secondly, he errs in his superstruction also. There is a great +difference, as to this case of justifying or not justifying an action, +between force and fear, &c. Force doth not only lessen the sin, but +takes it quite away, &c.” I know not to what point of my answer this +reply of his is to be applied. I had said, the actions of men compelled +are, nevertheless, voluntary. It seems that he calleth _compulsion_ +force; but I call it a fear of force, or of damage to be done by force, +by which fear a man’s will is framed to somewhat to which he had no will +before. Force taketh away the sin, because the action is not his that is +forced, but his that forceth. It is not always so in compulsion; +because, in this case, a man electeth the _less evil_ under the notion +of _good_. But his instances of the betrothed damsel that was forced, +and of Tamar, may, for anything there appeareth in the text, be +instances of compulsion, and yet the damsel and Tamar be both innocent. +In that which immediately followeth, concerning how far fear may +extenuate a sin, there is nothing to be answered. I perceive in it he +hath some glimmering of the truth, but not of the grounds thereof. It is +true, that just fear dispenseth not with the precepts of God or nature; +for they are not dispensable; but it extenuateth the fault, not by +diminishing anything in the action, but by being no transgression. For +if the fear be allowed, the action it produceth is allowed also. Nor +doth it dispense in any case with the law positive, but by making the +action itself lawful; for the breaking of a law is always sin. And it is +certain that men are obliged to the observation of all positive +precepts, though with the loss of their lives, unless the right that a +man hath to preserve himself make it, in case of a just fear, to be no +law. “The omission of circumcision was no sin,” he says, “whilst the +Israelites were travelling through the wilderness.” It is very true, but +this has nothing to do with compulsion. And the cause why it was no sin, +was this: they were ready to obey it, whensoever God should give them +leisure and rest from travel, whereby they might be cured; or at least +when God, that daily spake to their conductor in the desert, should +appoint him to renew that sacrament. + +(_g_) “I will propose a case to him,” &c. The case is this. A servant is +robbed of his master’s money by the highway, but is acquitted because he +was forced. Another servant spends his master’s money in a tavern. Why +is he not acquitted also, seeing he was necessitated? “Would,” saith he, +“T. H. admit of this excuse?” I answer, no: but I would do that to him, +which should necessitate him to behave himself better another time, or +at least necessitate another to behave himself better by his example. + +(_h_) “He talks much of _the motives to do, and the motives to forbear_, +how they work upon and determine a man; as if a reasonable man were no +more than a tennis-ball, to be tossed to and fro by the rackets of the +second causes,” &c. May not great things be produced by second causes, +as well as little; and a foot-ball as well as a tennis-ball? But the +Bishop can never be driven from this, that the will hath power to move +itself; but says it is all one to say, that “an agent can determine +itself,” and that “the will is determined by motives extrinsical”. He +adds, that “if there be no necessitation before the judgment of right +reason doth dictate to the will, then there is no antecedent nor +extrinsical necessitation at all”. I say indeed, the effect is not +produced before the last dictate of the understanding; but I say not, +that the necessity was not before; he knows I say, it is from eternity. +When a cannon is planted against a wall, though the battery be not made +till the bullet arrive, yet the necessity was present all the while the +bullet was going to it, if the wall stood still: and if it slipped away, +the hitting of somewhat else was necessary, and that antecedently. + +(_i_) “All the world knows, that when the agent is determined by +himself, then the effect is determined likewise in its cause.” Yes, when +the agent is determined by himself, then the effect is determined +likewise in its cause; and so anything else is what he will have it. But +nothing is determined by itself, nor is there any man in the world that +hath any conception answerable to those words. But “motives,” he says, +“determine not naturally, but morally”. This also is insignificant; for +all motion is natural or supernatural. Moral motion is a mere word, +without any imagination of the mind correspondent to it. I have heard +men talk of a motion in a court of justice; perhaps this is it which he +means by moral motion. But certainly, when the tongue of the judge and +the hands of the clerks are thereby moved, the motion is natural, and +proceeds from natural causes; which causes also were natural motions of +the tongue of the advocate. And whereas he adds, that if this were true, +then “not only motives, but reason itself and deliberation were vain”; +it hath been sufficiently answered before, that therefore they are not +vain, because by them is produced the effect. I must also note, that +oftentimes in citing my opinion he puts in instead of mine, those terms +of his own, which upon all occasions I complain of for absurdity; as +here he makes me to say, that which I did never say, “special influence +of extrinsical causes”. + +(_k_) “He saith, that ‘the ignorance of the true causes and their power, +is the reason why we ascribe the effect to liberty; but when we +seriously consider the causes of things, we acknowledge a necessity.’ No +such thing, but just the contrary.” If he understand the authors which +he readeth upon this point, no better than he understands what I have +here written, it is no wonder he understandeth not the truth of the +question. I said not, that when we consider the causes of things, but +when we see and know the strength that moves us, we acknowledge +necessity. “No such thing,” says the Bishop, “but just the contrary; the +more we consider, and the clearer we understand, the greater is the +liberty,” &c. Is there any doubt, if a man could foreknow, as God +foreknows, that which is hereafter to come to pass, but that he would +also see and know the causes which shall bring it to pass, and how they +work, and make the effect necessary? For necessary it is, whatsoever God +foreknoweth. But we that foresee them not, may consider as much as we +will, and understand as clearly as we will, but are never the nearer to +the knowledge of their necessity; and that, I said, was the cause why we +impute those events to liberty, and not to causes. + +(_l_) “Lastly, he tells us, that _the will doth choose of necessity, as +well as the fire burns of necessity_. If he intend no more but this, +that election is the proper and natural act of the will, as burning is +of the fire &c., he speaks truly, but most impertinently; for the +question is not now of the elective power, _in actu primo_, &c.” Here +again he makes me to speak nonsense. I said, “the man chooseth of +necessity”; he says I say, “the will chooseth of necessity”. And why: +but because he thinks I ought to speak as he does, and say as he does +here, that “election is the act of the will”. No: election is the act of +a man, as power to elect is the power of a man. Election and will are +all one act of a man; and the power to elect, and the power to will, one +and the same power of a man. But the Bishop is confounded by the use of +calling by the name of will, the power of willing in the future; as they +also were confounded, that first brought in this senseless term of +_actus primus_. My meaning is, that the election I shall have of +anything hereafter, is now as necessary, as that the fire, that now is +and continueth, shall burn any combustible matter thrown into it +hereafter: or to use his own terms, the will hath no more power to +suspend its willing, than the burning of the fire to suspend its +burning: or rather more properly, the man hath no more power to suspend +his will, than the fire to suspend its burning. Which is contrary to +that which he would have, namely, that a man should have power to refuse +what he wills, and to suspend his own appetite. For to refuse what one +willeth, implieth a contradiction; the which also is made much more +absurd by his expression. For he saith, the will hath power to refuse +what it wills, and to suspend its own appetite: whereas _the will_, and +_the willing_, and _the appetite_ is the same thing. He adds that “even +the burning of the fire, if it be considered as it is invested with all +particular circumstances, is not so necessary an action as T. H. +imagineth”. He doth not sufficiently understand what I imagine. For I +imagine, that of the fire which shall burn five hundred years hence, I +may truly say now, it shall burn necessarily; and of that which shall +not burn then, (for fire may sometimes not burn the combustible matter +thrown into it, as in the case of the three children), that it is +necessary it shall not burn. + +(_m_) “Two things are required to make an effect necessary: first that +it be produced by a necessary cause, &c.: secondly, that it be +necessarily produced, &c.” To this I say nothing, but that I understand +not how a cause can be necessary, and the effect not be necessarily +produced. + +(_n_) “My second reason against this distinction of liberty from +compulsion, but not from necessitation, is new, and demonstrates +clearly, that to necessitate the will by a physical necessity, is to +compel the will, so far as the will is capable of compulsion; and that +he who doth necessitate the will to evil after that manner, is the true +cause of evil, &c.” By this second reason, which he says _is new, and +demonstrates_, &c, I cannot find what reason he means. For there are but +two, whereof the latter is in these words: “Secondly, to rip up the +bottom of this business, this I take to be the clear resolution of the +Schools; there is a double act of the will; the one more remote, called +_imperatus_, &c.; the other act is nearer, called _actus elicitus_,” &c. +But I doubt whether this be it he means, or no. For this being the +resolution of the Schools, is not new; and being a distinction only, is +no demonstration; though perhaps he may use the word demonstration, as +every unlearned man now-a-days does, to signify any argument of his own. +As for the distinction itself, because the terms are Latin, and never +used by any author of the Latin tongue, to shew their impertinence I +expounded them in English, and left them to the reader’s judgment to +find the absurdity of them himself. And the Bishop in this part of his +reply endeavours to defend them. And first, he calls it a trivial and +grammatical objection, to say they are _improper_ and _obscure_. Is +there anything less beseeming a _divine_ or a _philosopher_, than to +speak _improperly_ and _obscurely_, where the truth is in question? +Perhaps it may be tolerable in one that divineth, but not in him that +pretendeth to demonstrate. It is not the universal current of divines +and philosophers, that giveth words their authority, but the generality +of them who acknowledge that they understand them. _Tyrant_ and +_præmunire_, though their signification be changed, yet they are +understood; and so are the names of the days, Sunday, Monday, Tuesday. +And when English readers not engaged in School divinity, shall find +_imperate_ and _elicit acts_ as intelligible as those, I will confess I +had no reason to find fault. + +But my braving against that famous and most necessary distinction, +between the elicit and imperate acts of the will, he says was only to +hide from the eyes of the reader a tergiversation in not answering this +argument of his; ‘he who doth necessitate the will to evil, is the true +cause of evil; but God is not the cause of evil; therefore he does not +necessitate the will to evil’. This argument is not to be found in this +No. XX., to which I here answered; nor had I ever said that the will was +compelled. But he, taking all necessitation for compulsion, doth now in +this place, from necessitation simply, bring in this inference +concerning the cause of evil, and thinks he shall force me to say that +God is the cause of sin. I shall say only what is said in the Scripture, +_non est malum, quod ego non feci_. I shall say what Micaiah saith to +Ahab, (1 Kings xxii. 23): _Behold, the Lord hath put a lying spirit into +the mouth of all these thy prophets_. I shall say that that is true, +which the prophet David saith (2 Sam. xvi. 10): _Let him curse; because +the Lord hath said unto him, curse David_. But that which God himself +saith of himself (1 Kings xii. 15): _The king hearkened not to the +people, for the cause was from the Lord_: I will not say, least the +Bishop exclaim against me; but leave it to be interpreted by those that +have authority to interpret the Scriptures. I say further, that to cause +sin is not always sin, nor can be sin in him that is not subject to some +higher power; but to use so unseemly a phrase, as to say that God is the +cause of sin, because it soundeth so like to saying that God sinneth, I +can never be forced by so weak an argument as this of his. Luther says, +_we act necessarily; necessarily by necessity of immutability, not by +necessity of constraint_: that is in plain English, necessarily, but not +against our wills. Zanchius says, (_Tract. Theol._ cap. VI. Thes. I.): +_The freedom of our will doth not consist in this, that there is no +necessity of our sinning; but in this, that there is no constraint_. +Bucer (_Lib. de Concordia_): _Whereas the Catholics say, man has free +will, we must understand it of freedom from constraint, and not freedom +from necessity_. Calvin (_Inst._ cap. II. sec. VI.): _And thus shall man +be said to have free will, not because he hath equal freedom to do good +and evil, but because he does the evil he does, not by constraint, but +willingly_. Monsr. du Moulin, in his _Buckler of the Faith_ (art. IX): +_The necessity of sinning is not repugnant to the freedom of the will. +Witness the devils, who are necessarily wicked, and yet sin freely +without constraint._ And the Synod of Dort: _Liberty is not opposite to +all kinds of necessity and determination. It is indeed opposite to the +necessity of constraint: but standeth well enough with the necessity of +infallibility._ I could add more: for all the famous doctors of the +Reformed Churches, and with them St. Augustin, are of the same opinion. +None of these denied that God is the cause of all motion and action, or +that God is the cause of all laws; and yet they were never forced to +say, that God is the cause of sin. + +(_o_) “‘They who invented this term of _actus imperatus_, understood +not’, he saith, ‘any thing what it signified.’ No? Why not? It seemeth +to me, they understood it better than those who except against it. They +knew there are _mental terms_, which are only conceived in the mind, as +well as _vocal terms_, which are expressed with the tongue, &c.” In this +place the Bishop hath discovered the ground of all his errors in +philosophy, which is this; that he thinketh, when he repeateth the words +of a proposition in his mind, that is, when he fancieth the words +without speaking them, that then he conceiveth the things which the +words signify: and this is the most general cause of false opinions. For +men can never be deceived in the conceptions of things, though they may +be, and are most often deceived by giving unto them wrong terms or +appellations, different from those which are commonly used and +constituted to signify their conceptions. And therefore they that study +to attain the certain knowledge of the truth, do use to set down +beforehand all the terms they are to express themselves by, and declare +in what sense they shall use them constantly. And by this means, the +reader having an idea of every thing there named, cannot conceive amiss. +But when a man from the hearing of a word hath no idea of the thing +signified, but only of the sound and of the letters whereof the word is +made, which is that he here calleth _mental terms_, it is impossible he +should conceive aright, or bring forth any thing but absurdity; as he +doth here, when he says, “that when Tarquin delivered his commands to +his son by only striking off the tops of the poppies, he did it by +_mental terms_”; as if to strike off the head of a poppy, were a mental +term. It is the sound and the letters, that maketh him think _elicitus_ +and _imperatus_ somewhat. And it is the same thing that makes him say, +for think it he cannot, that to will or choose, is drawn, or allured, or +fetched out of the power to will. For drawing cannot be imagined but of +bodies; and therefore to will, to speak, to write, to dance, to leap, or +any way to be moved, cannot be said intelligibly to be _drawn_, much +less to be drawn out of a power, that is to say, out of an ability; for +whatsoever is drawn out, is drawn out of one place into another. He that +can discourse in this manner in philosophy, cannot probably be thought +able to discourse rationally in any thing. + +(_p_) “His other objection against this distinction of the acts of the +will into _elicit_ and _imperate_, is obscurity. ‘Might it not,’ saith +he, ‘have been as easily said in English, _a voluntary action_?’ Yes it +might have been said as easily, but not as truly, nor as properly.” He +says, _actus imperatus_ is when a man opens or shuts his eyes at the +command of the will. I say, when a man opens and shuts his eyes +according to his will, that it is a voluntary action; and I believe we +mean one and the same thing. Whether of us speak more properly or more +truly, let the reader judge. + +(_q_) “But his mistakes are so thick, &c., I will do my duty to shew him +the right way. First, no acts which are properly said to be compelled, +are voluntary. Secondly, acts of terror, &c.” This is nothing but Tohu +and Bohu. + + NO. XXI. + +[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] + +_J. D._ “The rest are umbrages quickly dispelled. First, the astrologer +steps up, and subjects liberty to the motions of heaven, to the aspects +and ascensions of the stars: + + ----Plus etenim fati valet hora benigni, + Quam si nos Veneris commendet epistola Marti. + +“I stand not much upon them, who cannot see the fishes swimming beside +them in the rivers, yet believe they see those which are in heaven; who +promise great treasures to others, and beg a groat for themselves. The +stars at the most do but incline, they cannot necessitate. + +“Secondly, the physician subjects liberty to the complexion and +temperature of the body. But yet this comes not home to a necessity. +Socrates, and many others, by assiduous care have corrected the +pernicious propensions, which flowed from their temperatures.” + +_T. H._ In the rest of his discourse he reckoneth up the opinions of +certain professions of men, touching the causes wherein the necessity of +things, which they maintain, consisteth. And first, he saith, the +astrologer deriveth his necessity from the stars. Secondly, that the +physician attributeth it to the temper of the body. For my part, I am +not of their opinion; because neither the stars alone, nor the +temperature of the patient alone is able to produce any effect without +the concurrence of all other agents. For there is hardly any one action, +how casual soever it seem, to the causing whereof concur not whatsoever +is _in rerum natura_. Which, because it is a great paradox, and depends +on many antecedent speculations, I do not press in this place. + +_J. D._ “Towards the latter end of my discourse, I answered some +specious pretences against liberty. The two first were of the astrologer +and the physician: the one subjecting liberty to the motions and +influences of the heavenly bodies; the other to the complexions of men. +(_a_) The sum of my answer was, that the stars and complexions do +incline, but not at all necessitate the will: to which all judicious +astronomers and physicians do assent. And T. H. himself doth not dissent +from it. So as to this part, there needs no reply. + +(_b_) “But whereas he mentions a ‘great paradox of his own, that there +is hardly any one action to the causing of which concurs not whatsoever +is _in rerum natura_’; I can but smile to see with what ambition our +great undertakers do affect to be accounted the first founders of +strange opinions, as if the devising of an ill-grounded paradox were as +great an honour as the invention of the needle, or the discovery of the +new world. And as to this paradox in particular, I meddle not with +natural actions, because the subject of my discourse is moral liberty. +But if he intend not only the kinds of things, but every individual +creature, and not only in natural but voluntary actions, I desire to +know how Prester John, or the great Mogul, or the king of China, or any +one of so many millions of their subjects, do concur to my writing of +this reply. If they do not, among his other speculations concerning this +matter I hope he will give us some restrictions. It were hard to make +all the negroes accessary to all the murders that are committed in +Europe.” + + ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. XXI. + +There is not much in this part of his reply that needeth animadversion. +But I must observe, where he saith, (_a_) “the sum of my answer was, +that the stars and complexions do incline, but not at all necessitate +the will:” he answereth nothing at all to me, who attribute not the +necessitation of the will to the stars and complexions, but to the +aggregate of all things together that are in motion. I do not say, that +the stars or complexions of themselves do incline men to will; but when +men are inclined, I must say that that inclination was necessitated by +some causes or other. + +(_b_) “But whereas he mentions ‘a great paradox of his own; that there +is hardly any one action, to the causing of which concurs not whatsoever +is _in rerum natura_’; I can but smile to see with what ambition our +great undertakers do affect to be accounted the first founders of +strange opinions, &c.” The Bishop speaks often of paradoxes with such +scorn or detestation, that a simple reader would take a paradox either +for felony or some other heinous crime, or else for some ridiculous +turpitude; whereas perhaps a judicious reader knows what the word +signifies; and that a paradox, is an opinion not yet generally received. +Christian religion was once a paradox; and a great many other opinions +which the Bishop now holdeth, were formerly paradoxes. Insomuch as when +a man calleth an opinion a paradox, he doth not say it is untrue, but +signifieth his own ignorance; for if he understood it, he would call it +either a truth or an error. He observes not, that but for paradoxes we +should be now in that savage ignorance, which those men are in that have +not, or have not long had laws and commonwealth, from whence proceedeth +science and civility. There was not long since a scholar that +maintained, that if the least thing that had weight should be laid down +upon the hardest body that could be, supposing it an anvil of diamant, +it would at the first access make it yield. This I thought, and much +more the Bishop would have thought, a paradox. But when he told me, that +either that would do it, or all the weight of the world would not do it, +because if the whole weight did it, every the least part thereof would +do its part, I saw no reason to dissent. In like manner when I say, +‘there is hardly any one action to the causing of which concurs not +whatsoever is _in rerum natura_;’ it seems to the Bishop a great +paradox; and if I should say that all action is the effect of motion, +and that there cannot be a motion in one part of the world, but the same +must also be communicated to all the rest of the world, he would say +that this were no less a paradox. But yet if I should say, that if a +lesser body, as a concave sphere or tun, were filled with air, or other +liquid matter, and that any one little particle thereof were moved, all +the rest would be moved also, he would conceive it to be true, or if not +he, a judicious reader would. It is not the greatness of the tun that +altereth the case; and therefore the same would be true also, if the +whole world were the tun; for it is the greatness of this tun that the +Bishop comprehendeth not. But the truth is comprehensible enough, and +may be said without ambition of being the founder of strange opinions. +And though a grave man may smile at it, he that is both grave and wise +will not. + + NO. XXII. + +[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] + +_J. D._ “Thirdly, the moral philosopher tells us how we are haled hither +and thither with outward objects. To this I answer, “First, that the +power which outward objects have over us, is for the most part by our +own default, because of those vicious habits which we have contracted. +Therefore though the actions seem to have a kind of violence in them, +yet they were free and voluntary in their first originals. As a +paralytic man, to use Aristotle’s comparison, shedding the liquor +deserves to be punished, for though his act be unwilling, yet his +intemperance was willing, whereby he contracted this infirmity. + +“Secondly I answer, that concupiscence, and custom, and bad company, and +outward objects do indeed make a proclivity, but not a necessity. By +prayers, tears, meditations, vows, watchings, fastings, humi-cubations, +a man may get a contrary habit, and gain the victory, not only over +outward objects, but also over his own corruptions, and become the king +of the little world of himself. + + Si metuis, si prava cupis, si duceris irâ, + Servitii patiere jugum, tolerabis iniquas + Interius leges. Tunc omnia jure tenebis, + Cum poteris rex esse tui. + +“Thirdly, a resolved mind, which weighs all things judiciously and +provides for all occurrences, is not so easily surprised with outward +objects. Only Ulysses wept not at the meeting with his wife and son. I +would beat thee, said the philosopher, but that I am angry. One spake +lowest, when he was most moved. Another poured out the water, when he +was thirsty. Another made a covenant with his eyes. Neither opportunity +nor enticement could prevail with Joseph. Nor the music nor the fire, +with the three children. It is not the strength of the wind, but the +lightness of the chaff, which causeth it to be blown away. Outward +objects do not impose a moral, much less a physical necessity; they may +be dangerous, but cannot be destructive to true liberty.” + +_T. H._ Thirdly, he disputeth against the opinion of them that say, +external objects presented to men of such and such temperatures, do make +their actions necessary; and says, the power, that such objects have +over us, proceeds from our own fault. But that is nothing to the +purpose, if such fault of ours proceedeth from causes not in our own +power. And therefore that opinion may hold true, for all this answer. +Further, he saith, prayer, fasting, &c., may alter our habits. It is +true: but when they do so, they are causes of the contrary habit, and +make it necessary; as the former habit had been necessary, if prayer, +fasting, &c., had not been. Besides we are not moved, nor disposed to +prayer or any other action, but by outward objects, as pious company, +godly preachers, or something equivalent. In the next place he saith, a +resolved mind is not easily surprised. As the mind of Ulysses, who, when +others wept, he alone wept not. And of the philosopher that abstained +from striking, because he found himself angry. And of him that poured +out the water, when he was thirsty; and the like. Such things I confess +have, or may have been done; and do prove only that it was not necessary +for Ulysses then to weep, nor for the philosopher to strike, nor for +that other man to drink: but it does not prove that it was not necessary +for Ulysses then to abstain, as he did, from weeping; nor the +philosopher to abstain, as he did, from striking; nor the other man to +forbear drinking. And yet that was the thing he ought to have proved. + +Lastly, he confesseth that the disposition of objects may be dangerous +to liberty, but cannot be destructive. To which I answer, it is +impossible; for liberty is never in any other danger than to be lost. +And if it cannot be lost, which he confesseth, I may infer it can be in +no danger at all. + +_J. D._ (_a_) “The third pretence was out of moral philosophy +misunderstood, that outward objects do necessitate the will. I shall not +need to repeat what he hath omitted, but only to satisfy his exceptions. +(_b_) The first is, that ‘it is not material, ’though the power of +outward objects do proceed from our own faults, if such faults of ours +proceed not from causes in our own power’. Well, but what if they do +proceed from causes that are in our own power, as in truth they do? Then +his answer is a mere subterfuge. If our faults proceed from causes that +are not, and were not in our own power, then they are not our faults at +all. It is not a fault in us, not to do those things which never were in +our power to do: but they are the faults of these causes from whence +they do proceed. (_c_) Next he confesseth, that it is in our power, by +good endeavours, to alter those vicious habits which we had contracted, +and to get the contrary habit. ‘True,’ saith he, ‘but then the contrary +habit doth necessitate the one way, as well as the former habit did the +other way.’ By which very consideration it appears, that that which he +calls a necessity, is no more but a proclivity. If it were a true +necessity, it could not be avoided nor altered by our endeavours. The +truth is, acquired habits do help and assist the faculty; but they do +not necessitate the faculty. He who hath gotten to himself an habit of +temperance, may yet upon occasion commit an intemperate act. And so on +the contrary. Acts are not opposed to habits, but other habits. (_d_) He +adds, ‘that we are not moved to prayer or any other action, but by +outward objects, as pious company, godly preachers, or something +equivalent’. Wherein are two other mistakes: first, to make godly +preachers and pious company to be outward objects; which are outward +agents: secondly, to affirm that the will is not moved but by outward +objects. The will is moved by itself, by the understanding, by the +sensitive passions, by angels good and bad, by men; and most effectually +by acts or habits infused by God, whereby the will is excited +extraordinarily indeed, but efficaciously and determinately. This is +more than equivalent with outward objects. + +“Another branch of mine answer was, that a resolved and prepared mind is +able to resist both the appetibility of objects, and the unruliness of +passions: as I showed by example. (_e_) He answers, that I prove Ulysses +was not necessitated to weep, nor the philosopher to strike; but I do +not prove that they were not necessitated to forbear. He saith true. I +am not now proving, but answering. Yet my answer doth sufficiently prove +that which I intend; that the rational will hath power, both to slight +the most appetible objects, and to control the most unruly passions. +When he hath given a clear solution to those proofs which I have +produced, then it will be time for him to cry for more work. + +“Lastly, whereas I say, that outward objects may be dangerous, but +cannot be destructive to true liberty; he catcheth at it, (_f_) and +objects, that ‘liberty is in no danger but to be lost; but I say it +cannot be lost, therefore’, he infers that, ‘it is in no danger at all.’ +I answer, first, that liberty is in more danger to be abused, than to be +lost. Many more men do abuse their wits, than lose them. Secondly, +liberty is in danger likewise to be weakened or diminished; as when it +is clogged by vicious habits contracted by ourselves, and yet it is not +totally lost. Thirdly, though liberty cannot be totally lost out of the +world, yet it may be totally lost to this or that particular man, as to +the exercise of it. Reason is the root of liberty; and though nothing be +more natural to a man than reason, yet many by excess of study, or by +continual gormandizing, or by some extravagant passion which they have +cherished in themselves, or by doting too much upon some affected +object, do become very sots, and deprive themselves of the use of +reason, and consequently of liberty. And when the benefit of liberty is +not thus universally lost, yet it may be lost respectively to this or +that particular occasion. As he who makes choice of a bad wife, hath +lost his former liberty to choose a good one.” + + ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. XXII. + +(_a_) “The third pretence was out of moral philosophy misunderstood, +that outward objects do necessitate the will.” I cannot imagine how the +question, whether outward objects do necessitate or not necessitate the +will, can any way be referred to moral philosophy. The principles of +moral philosophy are the laws; wherewith outward objects have little to +do, as being for the most part inanimate, and which follow always the +force of nature without respect to moral laws. Nor can I conceive what +purpose he had to bring this into his reply to my answer, wherein I +attribute nothing in the action of outward objects to morality. + +(_b_) “His first exception is, that ‘it is not material that the power +of outward objects do proceed from our own faults, if such faults of +ours proceed not from causes in our own power’. Well, but what if they +do proceed from causes that are in our own power, as in truth they do? +Then his answer is a mere subterfuge.” But how proves he that in truth +they do? ‘Because else,’ saith he, ‘they are not our faults at all.’ +Very well reasoned. A horse is lame from a cause that was not in his +power: therefore the lameness is no fault in the horse. But his meaning +is, it is no injustice unless the causes were in his own power. As if it +were not injustice, whatsoever is willingly done against the law; +whatsoever it be, that is the cause of the will to do it. + +(_c_) “Next he confesseth, that it is in our power by good endeavours to +alter those vicious habits which we had contracted, and to get the +contrary habits.” There is no such confession in my answer. I said, +prayer, fasting, &c., may alter our habits. But I never said that the +will to pray, fast, &c. is in our own power. “‘True,’ saith he, ‘but +then the contrary habit doth necessitate the one way, as well as the +former habit did the other way.’ By which very consideration it appears, +that that which he calls a necessity, is no more but a proclivity. If it +were a true necessity, it could not be avoided, nor altered by our +endeavours.” Again he mistakes: for I said that prayer, fasting, &c. +when they alter our habits, do necessarily cause the contrary habits; +which is not to say, that the habit necessitates, but is necessitated. +But this is common with him, to make me say that which out of reading, +not out of meditation, he useth to say himself. But how doth it appear, +that prayer and fasting, &c. make but a proclivity in men to do what +they do? For if it were but a proclivity, then what they do they do not. +Therefore they either necessitate the will, or the will followeth not. I +contend for the truth of this only, that when the will followeth them, +they necessitate the will; and when a proclivity followeth, they +necessitate the proclivity. But the Bishop thinks I maintain, that that +also is produced necessarily, which is not produced at all. + +(_d_) “He adds, ‘that we are not moved to prayer or any other action, +but by outward objects, as pious company, and godly preachers, or +something equivalent’. Wherein are two other mistakes: first, to make +godly preachers and pious company to be outward objects, which are +outward agents; secondly, to affirm that the will is not moved but by +outward objects. The will is moved by itself, &c”. The first mistake, he +urgeth that I call preachers and company objects. Is not the preacher to +the hearer the object of his hearing? No, perhaps he will say, it is the +voice which is the object; and that we hear not the preacher, but his +voice; as before he said, the object of sight was not the cause of +sight. I must therefore once more make him smile with a great paradox, +which is this; that in all the senses, the object is the agent; and that +it is, when we hear a preacher, the preacher that we hear; and that his +voice is the same thing with the hearing and a fancy in the hearer, +though the motion of the lips and other organs of speech be his that +speaketh. But of this I have written more largely in a more proper +place. + +My second mistake, in affirming that the will is not moved but by +outward objects, is a mistake of his own. For I said not, the will is +not moved, but we are not moved: for I always avoid attributing motion +to any thing but body. The will is produced, generated, formed, and +created in such sort as accidents are effected in a corporeal subject; +but moved it cannot be, because it goeth not from place to place. And +whereas he saith, “the will is moved by itself,” if he had spoken +properly as he ought to do, and said, the will is made or created by +itself, he would presently have acknowledged that it was impossible. So +that it is not without cause men use improper language, when they mean +to keep their errors from being detected. And because nothing can move +that is not itself moved, it is untruly said that either the will or any +thing else is moved by itself, by the understanding, by the sensitive +passions, or by acts or habits; or that acts or habits are infused by +God. For infusion is motion, and nothing is moved but bodies. + +(_e_) “He answers, that I prove Ulysses was not necessitated to weep, +nor the philosopher to strike, but I do not prove that they were not +necessitated to forbear. He saith true; I am not now proving, but +answering.” By his favour, though he be answering now, he was proving +then. And what he answers now, maketh nothing more toward a proof than +was before. For these words, “the rational will hath power to slight the +most appetible objects, and to control the most unruly passions,” are no +more, being reduced into proper terms, than this: the appetite hath +power to be without appetite towards most appetible objects, and to will +contrary to the most unruly will; which is jargon. + +(_f_) “He objects that ‘liberty is in no danger, but to be lost; but I +say it cannot be lost; therefore’, he infers, ‘that it is in no danger +at all.’ I answer, first, that liberty is in more danger to be abused, +than lost, &c.; secondly, liberty is in danger likewise to be weakened +by vicious habits; thirdly, it may be totally lost.” It is true that a +man hath more liberty one time than another, and in one place than +another; which is a difference of liberty as to the body. But as to the +liberty of doing what we will, in those things we are able to do it +cannot be greater one time than another. Consequently outward objects +can no ways endanger liberty, further than it destroyeth it. And his +answer, that liberty is in more danger to be abused than lost, is not to +the question, but a mere shift to be thought not silenced. And whereas +he says liberty is diminished by vicious habits, it cannot be understood +otherwise than that vicious habits make a man the less free to do +vicious actions; which I believe is not his meaning. And lastly, whereas +he says that “liberty is lost, when reason is lost; and that they who by +excess of study, or by continual gormandising, or by extravagant +passion, &c., do become sots, have consequently lost their liberty”: it +requireth proof. For, for any thing that I can observe, mad men and +fools have the same liberty that other men have, in those things that +are in their power to do. + + NO. XXIII. + +[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] + +_J. D._ “Fourthly, the natural philosopher doth teach, that the will +doth necessarily follow the last dictate of the understanding. It is +true indeed the will should follow the direction of the understanding; +but I am not satisfied that it doth evermore follow it. Sometimes this +saying hath place: _video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor_. As that +great Roman said of two suitors, that the one produced the better +reasons, but the other must have the office. So reason often lies +dejected at the feet of affection. Things nearer to the senses move more +powerfully. Do what a man can, he shall sorrow more for the death of his +child, than for the sin of his soul; yet appreciatively in the +estimation of judgment, he accounts the offence of God a greater evil +than any temporal loss. + +“Next, I do not believe that a man is bound to weigh the expedience or +inexpedience of every ordinary trivial action to the least grain in the +balance of his understanding; or to run up into his watch-tower with his +perspective to take notice of every jackdaw that flies by, for fear of +some hidden danger. This seems to me to be a prostitution of reason to +petit observations as concerning every rag that a man wears, each drop +of drink, each morsel of bread that he eats, each pace that he walks. +Thus many steps must he go, not one more nor one less, under pain of +mortal sin. What is this but a rack and a gibbet to the conscience? But +God leaves many things indifferent: though man may be so curious, he +will not. A good architect will be sure to provide sufficient materials +for his building; but what particular number of stones or trees, he +troubles not his head. And suppose he _should_ weigh each action thus, +yet he _doth_ not; so still there is liberty. Thirdly, I conceive it is +possible in this mist and weakness of human apprehension, for two +actions to be so equally circumstantiated, that no discernible +difference can appear between them upon discussion. As suppose a +chirurgeon should give two plaisters to his patient, and bid him apply +either of them to his wound; what can induce his reason more to the one +than to the other, but that he may refer it to chance whether he will +use? + +But leaving these probable speculations, which I submit to better +judgments, I answer the philosopher briefly thus: admitting that the +will did necessarily follow the last dictate of the understanding, as +certainly in many things it doth: yet, first, this is no extrinsical +determination from without, and a man’s own resolution is not +destructive to his own liberty, but depends upon it. So the person is +still free. + +“Secondly, this determination is not antecedent, but joined with the +action. The understanding and the will, are not different agents, but +distinct faculties of the same soul. Here is an infallibility, or an +hypothetical necessity as we say, _quicquid est, quando est, necesse est +esse_: a necessity of consequence, but not a necessity of consequent. +Though an agent have certainly determined, and so the action be become +infallible, yet if the agent did determine freely, the action likewise +is free.” + +_T. H._ The fourth opinion which he rejecteth, is of them that make the +will necessarily to follow the last dictate of the understanding; but it +seems he understands that tenet in another sense than I do. For he +speaketh as if they that held it, did suppose men must dispute the +sequel of every action they do, great and small, to the least grain; +which is a thing that he thinks with reason to be untrue. But I +understand it to signify, that the will follows the last opinion or +judgment, immediately preceding the action, concerning whether it be +good to do it or not; whether he hath weighed it long before, or not at +all. And that I take to be the meaning of them that hold it. As for +example: when a man strikes, his will to strike follows necessarily that +thought he had of the sequel of his stroke, immediately before the +lifting of his hand. Now if it be understood in that sense, the last +dictate of the understanding does certainly necessitate the action, +though not as the whole cause, yet as the last cause: as the last +feather necessitates the breaking of a horse’s back, when there are so +many laid on before, as there needeth but the addition of that one to +make the weight sufficient. That which he allegeth against this, is +first, out of a poet, who in the person of Medea says, _video meliora +proboque, deteriora sequor_. But the saying, as pretty as it is, is not +true. For though Medea saw many reasons to forbear killing her children, +yet the last dictate of her judgment was that the present revenge on her +husband outweighed them all; and thereupon the wicked action followed +necessarily. Then the story of the Roman, that of two competitors said +one had the better reasons, but the other must have the office: this +also maketh against him. For the last dictate of his judgment that had +the bestowing of the office, was this; that it was better to take a +great bribe, than reward a great merit. Thirdly, he objects, that things +nearer the senses move more powerfully than reason. What followeth +thence but this; that the sense of the present good is commonly more +immediate to the action, than the foresight of the evil consequents to +come? Fourthly, whereas he says, that do what a man can, he shall sorrow +more for the death of his son, than for the sin of his soul: it makes +nothing to the last dictate of the understanding; but it argues plainly, +that sorrow for sin is not voluntary. And by consequence, repentance +proceedeth from causes. + +_J. D._ “The fourth pretence alleged against liberty was, that the will +doth necessarily follow the last dictate of the understanding. This +objection is largely answered before in several places of this reply, +and particularly No. VII. In my former discourse I gave two answers to +it: the one certain and undoubted, that (_a_) supposing the last dictate +of the understanding did always determine the will, yet this +determination being not antecedent in time, nor proceeding from +extrinsical causes, but from the proper resolution of the agent, who had +now freely determined himself, it makes no absolute necessity, but only +hypothetical, upon supposition that the agent hath determined his own +will after this or that manner. Which being the main answer, T. H. is so +far from taking it away, that he takes no notice of it. The other part +of mine answer was probable; that it is not always certain that the will +doth always actually follow the last dictate of the understanding, +though it always ought to follow it. (_b_) Of which I gave then three +reasons. One was, that actions may be so equally circumstantiated, or +the case so intricate, that reason cannot give a positive sentence, but +leaves the election to liberty or chance. To this he answers not a word. +Another of my reasons was, because reason doth not weigh, nor is bound +to weigh the convenience or inconvenience of every individual action to +the uttermost grain in the balance of true judgment. The truth of this +reason is confessed by T. H.; though he might have had more abetters in +this than in the most part of his discourse, that nothing is +indifferent; that a man cannot stroke his beard on one side, but it was +either necessary to do it, or sinful to omit it. From which confession +of his it follows, that in all those actions wherein reason doth not +define what is most convenient, there the will is free from the +determination of the understanding; and by consequence the last feather +is wanting to break the horse’s back. A third reason was, because +passions and affections sometimes prevail against judgment: as I proved +by the example of Medea and Cæsar, by the nearness of the objects to the +senses, and by the estimation of a temporal loss more than sin. Against +this reason his whole answer is addressed. And first, (_c_) he +explaineth the sense of the assertion by the comparison of the last +feather; wherewith he seems to be delighted, seeing he useth it now the +second time. But let him like it as he will, it is improper, for three +reasons. First, the determination of the judgment is no part of the +weight, but is the sentence of the trier. The understanding weigheth all +things, objects, means, circumstances, convenience, inconvenience; but +itself is not weighed. Secondly, the sensitive passion, in some +extraordinary cases, may give a counterfeit weight to the object, if it +can detain or divert reason from the balance: but ordinarily the means, +circumstances, and causes concurrent, they have their whole weight from +the understanding; so as they do not press the horse’s back at all, +until reason lay them on. Thirdly, he conceives that as each feather has +a certain natural weight, whereby it concurs not arbitrarily, but +necessarily towards the overcharging of the horse; so all objects and +causes have a natural efficiency, whereby they do physically determine +the will; which is a great mistake. His objects, his agents, his +motives, his passions, and all his concurrent causes, ordinarily do only +move the will morally, not determine it naturally. So as it hath in all +ordinary actions a free dominion over itself. + +“His other example, of a man that strikes, ‘whose will to strike +followeth necessarily that thought he had of the sequel of his stroke, +immediately before the lifting up of his hand’: as it confounds +passionate, indeliberate thoughts, with the dictates of right reason, so +it is very uncertain; for between the cup and the lip, between the +lifting up of the hand and the blow, the will may alter, and the +judgment also. And lastly, it is impertinent; for that necessity of +striking proceeds from the free determination of the agent, and not from +the special influence of any outward determining causes. And so it is +only a necessity upon supposition. + +“Concerning Medea’s choice, the strength of the argument doth not lie +either in the fact of Medea, which is but a fiction, or in the authority +of the poet, who writes things rather to be admired than believed, but +in the experience of all men: who find it to be true in themselves, that +sometimes reason doth shew unto a man the exorbitancy of his passion, +that what he desires is but a pleasant good, that what he loseth by such +a choice is an honest good, that that which is honest is to be preferred +before that which is pleasant; yet the will pursues that which is +pleasant, and neglects that which is honest. St. Paul (Rom. vii. 15) +saith as much in earnest, as is feigned of Medea: that _he approved not +that which he did_, and that _he did that which he hated_. The Roman +story is mistaken: there was no bribe in the case but affection. Whereas +I urge, that those things which are nearer to the senses do move more +powerfully, he lays hold on it; and without answering to that for which +I produced it, infers, ‘that the sense of present good, is more +immediate to the action than the foresight of evil consequents’: which +is true; but it is not absolutely true by any antecedent necessity. Let +a man do what he may do, and what he ought to do, and sensitive objects +will lose that power which they have by his own fault and neglect. +Antecedent or indeliberate concupiscence doth sometimes, but rarely, +surprise a man, and render the action not free. But consequent and +deliberated concupiscence, which proceeds from the rational will, doth +render the action more free, not less free, and introduceth only a +necessity upon supposition. + +“Lastly, he saith, that ‘a man’s mourning more for the loss of his child +than for his sin, makes nothing to the last dictates of the +understanding’. Yes, very much. Reason dictates that a sin committed is +a greater evil than the loss of a child, and ought more to be lamented +for: yet we see daily how affection prevails against the dictate of +reason. That which he infers from hence, that ‘sorrow for sin is not +voluntary, and by consequence that repentance proceedeth from causes’; +is true as to the latter part of it, but not in his sense. The causes +from whence repentance doth proceed, are God’s grace preventing, and +man’s will concurring. God prevents freely, man concurs freely. Those +inferior agents, which sometimes do concur as subordinate to the grace +of God, do not, cannot, determine the will naturally. And therefore the +former part of his inference, that sorrow for sin is not voluntary, is +untrue, and altogether groundless. That is much more truly and much more +properly said to be voluntary, which proceeds from judgment and from the +rational will, than that which proceeds from passion and from the +sensitive will. One of the main grounds of all T. H.’s errors in this +question is, that he acknowledgeth no efficacy but that which is +natural. Hence is this wild consequence; ‘repentance hath causes’, and +therefore ‘it is not voluntary’. Free effects have free causes, +necessary effects necessary causes: voluntary effects have sometimes +free, sometimes necessary causes.” + + ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. XXIII. + +(_a_) “Supposing the last dictate of the understanding did always +determine the will, yet this determination, being not antecedent in +time, nor proceeding from extrinsical causes, but from the proper +resolution of the agent, who had now freely determined himself, makes no +absolute necessity, but only hypothetical, &c.” This is the Bishop’s +answer to the necessity inferred from that, that the will necessarily +followeth the last dictate of the understanding; which answer he thinks +is not sufficiently taken away, because the last act of the +understanding is in time together with the will itself, and therefore +not antecedent. It is true, that the will is not produced but in the +same instant with the last dictate of the understanding; but the +necessity of the will, and the necessity of the last dictate of the +understanding, may have been antecedent. For that last dictate of the +understanding was produced by causes antecedent, and was then necessary +though not yet produced; as when a stone is falling, the necessity of +touching the earth is antecedent to the touch itself. For all motion +through any determined space, necessarily makes a motion through the +next space, unless it be hindered by some contrary external motion; and +then the stop is as necessary, as the proceeding would have been. The +argument therefore from the last dictate of the understanding, +sufficiently inferreth an antecedent necessity, as great as the +necessity that a stone shall fall when it is already falling. As for his +other answer, that “the will does not certainly follow the last dictate +of the understanding, though it always ought to follow it”, he himself +says it is but probable; but any man that speaks not by rote, but thinks +of what he says, will presently find it false; and that it is impossible +to will anything that appears not first in his understanding to be good +for him. And whereas he says the will ought to follow the last dictate +of the understanding, unless he mean that the man ought to follow it, it +is an insignificant speech; for duties are the man’s not the will’s +duties: and if he means so, then it is false; for a man ought not to +follow the dictate of the understanding, when it is erroneous. + +(_b_) “Of which I gave then three reasons. One was, that actions may be +so equally circumstantiated, that reason cannot give a positive +sentence, but leaves the election to liberty or chance. To this he +answers not a word.” There was no need of answer: for he hath very often +in this discourse contradicted it himself, in that he maketh “reason to +be the true root of liberty, and men to have more or less liberty, as +they have more or less reason”. How then can a man leave that to +liberty, when his reason can give no sentence? And for his leaving it to +chance; if by chance he mean that which hath no causes, he destroyeth +Providence; and if he mean that which hath causes, but unknown to us, he +leaveth it to necessity. Besides, it is false that “actions may be so +equally circumstantiated, that reason cannot give a positive sentence”. +For though in the things to be elected there may be an exact equality: +yet there may be circumstances in him that is to elect, to make him +resolve upon that of the two which he considereth for the present; and +to break off all further deliberation for this cause, that he must not +(to use his own instance) by spending time in vain, apply neither of the +plaisters, which the chirurgeon gives him, to his wound. “Another of his +reasons was, because reason doth not weigh every individual action to +the uttermost grain.” True; but does it therefore follow, a man gives no +sentence? The will therefore may follow the dictate of the judgment, +whether the man weigh or not weigh all that might be weighed. “His third +reason was, because passions and affections sometimes prevail against +judgment.” I confess they prevail often against _wisdom_, which is it he +means here by _judgment_. But they prevail not against the _dictate of +the understanding_, which he knows is the meaning of _judgment_ in this +place. And the will of a passionate and peevish fool doth no less follow +the dictate of that little understanding he hath, than the will of the +wisest man followeth his wisdom. + +(_c_) “He explaineth the sense of the assertion by the comparison of the +last feather: wherewith he seems to be delighted, seeing he useth it now +the second time. But let him like it as he will, it is improper, for +three reasons.” To me this comparison seemeth very proper; and therefore +I made no scruple (though not much delighted with it, as being no new +comparison) to use it again, when there was need again. For in the +examination of truth, I search rather for perspicuity than elegance. But +the Bishop with his School-terms is far from perspicuity. How near he is +to elegance, I shall not forget to examine in due time. But why is this +comparison improper? “First, because the determination of the judgment +is no part of the weight: for the understanding weigheth all things, +objects, means, circumstances, convenience, inconvenience; but itself is +not weighed.” In this comparison, the objects, means, &c, are the +weights, the man is the scale, the understanding of a convenience or +inconvenience is the pressure of those weights, which incline him now +one way, now another; and that inclination is the will. Again, the +objects, means, &c, are the feathers that press the horse, the feeling +of that pressure is understanding, and his patience or impatience the +will to bear them, if not too many, or if too many, to lie down under +them. It is therefore to little purpose that he saith, the understanding +is not weighed. “Secondly”, he says the comparison is improper, “because +ordinarily, the means, circumstances, and causes concurrent, have their +whole weight from the understanding; so as they do not press the horse’s +back at all, until reason lay them on.” This, and that which followeth, +“that my objects, agents, motives, passions, and all my concurrent +causes, ordinarily do only move the will _morally_, not determine it +naturally, so as it hath in all ordinary actions a free dominion over +itself,” is all nonsense. For no man can understand, that the +understanding maketh any alteration in the object in _weight_ or +_lightness_; nor that _reason lays on objects upon the understanding_; +nor that the will _is moved_, nor that any motion _is moral_; nor that +these words, _the will hath a free dominion over itself_, signify +anything. With the rest of this reply I shall trust the reader; and only +note the last words, where he makes me say, _repentance hath causes_, +and therefore _it is not voluntary_. But I said, repentance hath causes, +_and that_ it is not voluntary; he chops in, _and therefore_, and makes +an absurd consequence, which he would have the reader believe was mine, +and then confutes it with these senseless words: “Free effects have free +causes, necessary effects necessary causes; voluntary effects have +sometimes free, sometimes necessary causes”. Can any man but a Schoolman +think the will is voluntary? But yet the will is the cause of voluntary +actions. + + NO. XXIV. + +[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] + +_J. D._ “Fifthly and lastly, the divine labours to find out a way how +liberty may consist with the prescience and decrees of God. But of this +I had not very long since occasion to write a full discourse, in answer +to a treatise against the prescience of things contingent. I shall for +the present only repeat these two things. First, we ought not to desert +a certain truth, because we are not able to comprehend the certain +manner. God should be but a poor God, if we were able perfectly to +comprehend all his actions and attributes. Secondly, in my poor +judgment, which I ever do and ever shall submit to better, the readiest +way to reconcile contingence and liberty with the decrees and prescience +of God, and most remote from the altercations of these times, is to +subject future contingents to the aspect of God, according to that +presentiality which they have in eternity. Not that things future, which +are not yet existent, are co-existent with God: but because the infinite +knowledge of God, incircling all times in the point of eternity, doth +attain to their future being, from whence proceeds their objective and +intelligible being. The main impediment which keeps men from subscribing +to this way, is because they conceive eternity to be an everlasting +succession, and not one indivisible point. But if they consider, that +whatsoever is in God is God; that there are no accidents in him, (for +that which is infinitely perfect cannot be further perfected); that as +God is not wise, but wisdom itself, not just, but justice itself, so he +is not eternal, but eternity itself: they must needs conclude, that +therefore this eternity is indivisible, because God is indivisible; and +therefore not successive, but altogether an infinite point, +comprehending all times within itself.” + +_T. H._ The last part of this discourse containeth his opinion about +reconciling liberty with the prescience and decrees of God, otherwise +than some divines have done; against whom he had formerly written a +treatise, out of which he only repeateth two things. One is, that “we +ought not to desert a certain truth, for not being able to comprehend +the certain manner of it”. And I say the same; as for example, that he +ought not to desert this certain truth: that there are certain and +necessary causes, which make every man to will what he willeth, though +he do not yet conceive in what manner the will of man is caused. And yet +I think the manner of it is not very hard to conceive: seeing that we +see daily, that praise, dispraise, reward, punishment, good and evil +sequels of men’s actions retained in memory, do frame and make us to the +election of whatsoever it be that we elect; and that the memory of such +things proceeds from the senses, and sense from the operation of the +objects of sense, which are external to us, and governed only by God +Almighty; and by consequence, all actions, even of free and voluntary +agents, are necessary. + +The other thing he repeateth is, that “the best way to reconcile +contingency and liberty with the prescience and decrees of God, is to +subject future contingents to the aspect of God”. The same is also my +opinion, but contrary to what he hath all this while laboured to prove. +For hitherto he held liberty and necessity, that is to say, liberty and +the decrees of God, irreconcilable; unless the aspect of God (which word +appeareth now the first time in this discourse) signify somewhat else +besides God’s will and decree, which I cannot understand. But he adds, +that we must subject them “according to that presentiality which they +have in eternity”; which he says cannot be done by them that conceive +eternity to be an everlasting succession, but only by them that conceive +it an indivisible point. To this I answer, that as soon as I can +conceive eternity to be an indivisible point, or any thing but an +everlasting succession, I will renounce all I have written on this +subject. I know St. Thomas Aquinas calls eternity _nunc stans_, an _ever +abiding now_; which is easy enough to say, but though I fain would, I +never could conceive it; they that can, are more happy than I. But in +the mean time he alloweth hereby all men to be of my opinion, save only +those that conceive in their minds a _nunc stans_; which I think are +none. I understand as little, how it can be true that “God is not just, +but justice itself, not wise but wisdom itself, not eternal but eternity +itself”: nor how he concludes thence that “eternity is a point +indivisible, and not a succession”: nor in what sense it can be said, +that an “infinite point,” &c, wherein is no succession, can “comprehend +all times,” though time be successive. + +These phrases I find not in the Scripture. I wonder therefore what was +the design of the Schoolmen to bring them up; unless they thought a man +could not be a true Christian, unless his understanding be first +strangled with such hard sayings. + +And thus much in answer to his discourse; wherein I think not only his +squadrons, but also his reserves of distinctions are defeated. And now +your Lordship shall have my doctrine concerning the same question, with +my reasons for it, positively and briefly as I can, without any terms of +art, in plain English. + +_J. D._ (_a_) “That poor discourse which I mention, was not written +against any divines, but in way of examination of a French treatise, +which your Lordship’s brother did me the honour to show me at York. +(_b_) My assertion is most true, that we ought not to desert a certain +truth because we are not able to comprehend the certain manner. Such a +truth is that which I maintain, that the will of man in ordinary actions +is free from extrinsical determination: a truth demonstrable in reason, +received and believed by all the world. And therefore, though I be not +able to comprehend or express exactly the certain manner how it consists +together with God’s eternal prescience and decrees, which exceed my weak +capacity, yet I ought to adhere to that truth which is manifest. But T. +H.’s opinion, of the absolute necessity of all events by reason of their +antecedent determination in their extrinsical and necessary causes, is +no such certain truth, but an innovation, a strange paradox, without +probable grounds, rejected by all authors, yea, by all the world. +Neither is the manner how the second causes do operate, so obscure, or +so transcendent above the reach of reason, as the eternal decrees of God +are. And therefore in both these respects, he cannot challenge the same +privilege. I am in possession of an old truth, derived by inheritance or +succession from mine ancestors. And therefore, though I were not able to +clear every quirk in law, yet I might justly hold my possession until a +better title were showed for another. He is no old possessor, but a new +pretender, and is bound to make good his claim by evident proofs: not by +weak and inconsequent suppositions or inducements, such as those are +which he useth here, of ‘praises, dispraises, rewards, punishments, the +memory of good and evil sequels and events’; which may incline the will, +but neither can nor do necessitate the will: nor by uncertain and +accidental inferences, such as this; ‘the memory of praises, dispraises, +rewards, punishments, good and evil sequels, do make us’ (he should say, +_dispose_ us) ‘to elect what we elect; but the memory of these things is +from the sense, and the sense from the operation of the external +objects, and the agency of external objects is only from God; therefore +all actions, even of free and voluntary agents, are necessary’. (_c_) To +pass by all the other great imperfections which are to be found in this +sorite, it is just like that old sophistical piece: He that drinks well +sleeps well, he that sleeps well thinks no hurt, he that thinks no hurt +lives well; therefore he that drinks well lives well. + +(_d_) “In the very last passage of my discourse I proposed mine own +private opinion, how it might be made appear, that the eternal +prescience and decrees of God are consistent with true liberty and +contingency. And this I set down in as plain terms as I could, or as so +profound a speculation would permit: which is almost wholly +misunderstood by T. H., and many of my words wrested to a wrong sense. +As first, where I speak of the aspect of God, that is, his view, his +knowledge, by which the most free and contingent actions were manifest +to him from eternity, (Heb. iv. 13, _all things are naked and open to +his eyes_), and this not discursively, but intuitively, not by external +species, but by his internal essence; he confounds this with the will +and the decrees of God; though he found not the word _aspect_ before in +this discourse, he might have found prescience. (_e_) Secondly, he +chargeth me, that hitherto I have maintained that ‘liberty and the +decrees of God are irreconcilable.’ If I have said any such thing, my +heart never went along with my pen. No, but his reason why he chargeth +me on this manner is, because I have maintained that ‘liberty and the +absolute necessity of all things’ are irreconcilable. That is true +indeed. What then? ‘Why,’ saith he, ‘necessity and God’s decrees are all +one.’ How all one? That were strange indeed. Necessity may be a +consequent of God’s decrees; it cannot be the decree itself. (_f_) But +to cut his argument short: God hath decreed all effects which come to +pass in time; yet not all after the same manner, but according to the +distinct natures, capacities, and conditions of his creatures, which he +doth not destroy by his decree; some he acteth, with some he +co-operateth by special influence, and some he only permitteth. Yet this +is no idle or bare permission; seeing he doth concur both by way of +general influence, giving power to act; and also by disposing all events +necessary, free, and contingent to his own glory. (_g_) Thirdly, he +chargeth me, that I ‘allow all men to be of his opinion, save only those +that conceive in their minds a _nunc stans_, or how eternity is an +indivisible point, rather than an everlasting succession’. But I have +given no such allowance. I know there are many other ways proposed by +divines, for reconciling the eternal prescience and decrees of God with +the liberty and contingency of second causes; some of which may please +other judgments better than this of mine. Howsoever, though a man could +comprehend none of all these ways, yet remember what I said, that a +certain truth ought not to be rejected, because we are not able, in +respect of our weakness, to understand the certain manner or reason of +it. I know the loadstone hath an attractive power to draw the iron to +it; and yet I know not how it comes to have such a power. + +“But the chiefest difficulty which offers itself in this section is, +whether eternity be an indivisible point, as I maintain it; or an +everlasting succession, as he would have it. According to his constant +use, he gives no answer to what was urged by me, but pleads against it +from his own incapacity. ‘I never could conceive,’ saith he, ‘how +eternity should be an indivisible point.’ I believe, that neither we nor +any man else can comprehend it so clearly as we do these inferior +things. The nearer that anything comes to the essence of God, the more +remote it is from our apprehension. But shall we therefore make +potentialities, and successive duration, and former and later, or a part +without a part, as they say, to be in God? Because we are not able to +understand clearly the divine perfection, we must not therefore +attribute any imperfection to him. + +(_h_) “He saith moreover, that ‘he understands as little how it can be +true which I say, that God is not just but justice itself, not eternal +but eternity itself.’ It seems, howsoever he be versed in this question, +that he hath not troubled his head overmuch with reading School-divines +or metaphysicians, if he make faculties or qualities to be in God really +distinct from his essence. God is a most simple or pure act, which can +admit no composition of substance and accidents. Doth he think, that the +most perfect essence of God cannot act sufficiently without faculties +and qualities? The infinite perfection of the Divine essence excludes +all passive or receptive powers, and cannot be perfected more than it is +by any accidents. The attributes of God are not divers virtues or +qualities in him, as they are in the creatures; but really one and the +same with the Divine essence, and among themselves. They are attributed +to God to supply the defect of our capacity, who are not able to +understand that which is to be known of God under one name, or one act +of the understanding. + +“Furthermore he saith, that ‘he understands not how I conclude from +hence, that eternity is an indivisable point, and not a succession’. +(_i_) I will help him. The Divine substance is indivisible; but eternity +is the Divine substance. The major is evident, because God is _actus +simplicissimus_, a most simple act; wherein there is no manner of +composition, neither of matter and form, nor of subject and accidents, +nor of parts, &c; and by consequence no divisibility. The minor hath +been clearly demonstrated in mine answer to his last doubt, and is +confessed by all men that whatsoever is in God, is God. + +“Lastly, he saith, he conceives not ‘how it can be said, that an +infinite point, wherein is no succession, can comprehend all time which +is successive’. I answer, that it doth not comprehend it formally, as +time is successive; but eminently and virtually, as eternity is +infinite. To-day all eternity is co-existent with this day: to-morrow +all eternity will be co-existent with to-morrow: and so in like manner +with all the parts of time, being itself without parts. He saith, ‘he +finds not these phrases in the Scripture’. No, but he may find the thing +in the Scripture, that God is infinite in all his attributes, and not +capable of any imperfection. + +“And so to show his antipathy against the Schoolmen, that he hath no +liberty or power to contain himself when he meets with any of their +phrases or tenets, he falls into another paroxism or fit of inveighing +against them; and so concludes his answer with a _plaudite_ to himself, +because he had defeated both my squadrons of arguments and reserves of +distinctions + + Dicite Io pæan, et Io bis dicite pæan. + +“But because his eyesight was weak, and their backs were towards him, he +quite mistook the matter. Those whom he saw routed and running away, +were his own scattered forces.” + + ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY, NO. XXIV. + +(_a_) “That poor discourse which I mention, was not written against any +divines, but in way of examination of a French treatise, &c”. This is in +reply to those words of mine, “this discourse containeth his opinion +about reconciling liberty with the prescience and decrees of God, +otherwise than some divines have done, against whom he had formerly +written a treatise”. If the French treatise were according to his mind, +what need was there that the examination should be written? If it were +not to his mind, it was in confutation of him, that is to say, written +against the author of it: unless perhaps the Bishop thinks that he +writes not against a man, unless he charge him with blasphemy and +atheism, as he does me. + +(_b_) “My assertion is most true, that we ought not to desert a certain +truth, because we are not able to comprehend the certain manner.” To +this I answered, that it was true; and as he alleged it for a reason why +he should not be of my opinion, so I alleged it for a reason why I +should not be of his. But now in his reply he saith, that his opinion is +“a truth demonstrable in reason, received and believed by all the world. +And therefore, though he be not able to comprehend or express exactly +the certain manner how this liberty of will consists with God’s eternal +prescience and decrees, yet he ought to adhere to that truth which is +manifest.” But why should he adhere to it, unless it be manifest to +himself? And if it be manifest to himself, why does he deny that he is +able to comprehend it? And if he be not able to comprehend it, how knows +he that it is demonstrable? Or why says he that so confidently, which he +does not know? Methinks that which I have said, namely, that “that which +God foreknows shall be hereafter, cannot but be hereafter, and at the +same time that he foreknew it should be; but that which cannot but be, +is necessary; therefore what God foreknows, shall be necessarily, and at +the time foreknown”: this I say looketh somewhat liker to a +demonstration, than any thing that he hath hitherto brought to prove +free will. Another reason why I should be of his opinion, is that he is +“in possession of an old truth derived to him by inheritance or +succession from his ancestors”. To which I answer, first, that I am in +possession of a truth derived to me from the light of reason. Secondly, +that whereas he knoweth not whether it be the truth that he possesseth, +or not; because he confesseth he knows not how it can consist with God’s +prescience and decrees; I have sufficiently shewn that my opinion of +necessity not only agrees with, but necessarily followeth from the +eternal prescience and decrees of God. Besides, it is an unhandsome +thing for a man to derive his opinion concerning truth by succession +from his ancestors; for our ancestors, the first Christians, derived not +therefore their truth from the Gentiles, because they were their +ancestors. + +(_c_) “To pass by all the other great imperfections which are to be +found in this sorite, it is just like an old philosophical piece: he +that drinks well, sleeps well; he that sleeps well, thinks no hurt; he +that thinks no hurt, lives well; therefore he that drinks well, lives +well.” My argument was thus: “election is always from the memory of good +and evil sequels; memory is always from the sense; and sense always from +the action of external bodies; and all action from God; therefore all +actions, even of free and voluntary agents, are from God, and +consequently necessary”. Let the Bishop compare now his scurrilous +argumentation with this of mine; and tell me, whether he that sleeps +well, doth all his lifetime think no hurt. + +(_d_) “In the very last passage of my discourse I proposed my own +private opinion, how it might be made appear that the eternal prescience +and decrees of God are consistent with true liberty and contingency, +&c.” If he had meant by liberty, as other men do, the liberty of action, +that is, of things which are in his power to do which he will, it had +been an easy matter to reconcile it with the prescience and decrees of +God; but meaning the liberty of will, it was impossible. So likewise, if +by contingency he had meant simply coming to pass, it had been +reconcilable with the decrees of God; but meaning coming to pass without +necessity, it was impossible. And therefore though it be true he says, +that “he set it down in as plain terms as he could”, yet it was +impossible to set it down in plain terms. Nor ought he to charge me with +misunderstanding him, and wresting his words to a wrong sense. For the +truth is, I did not understand them at all, nor thought he understood +them himself; but was willing to give them the best interpretation they +would bear; which he calls wresting them to a wrong sense. And first, I +understood not what he meant by the aspect of God. For if he had meant +his foreknowledge, which word he had often used before; what needed he +in this one place only to call it _aspect_? Or what need he here call it +his _view_? Or say that all things are open to the eyes of God not +_discursively_, but _intuitively_; which is to expound _eyes_ in that +text, Hebr. iv. 13, not figuratively but literally, nevertheless +excluding _external species_, which the Schoolmen say are the cause of +seeing? But it was well done to exclude such insignificant speeches, +upon every occasion whatsoever. And though I do not hold the +foreknowledge of God to consist in _discourse_; yet I shall be never +driven to say it is by _intuition_, as long as I know that even a man +hath foreknowledge of all those things which he intendeth himself to do, +not by discourse, but by knowing his own purpose; saving that man hath a +superior power over him, that can change his purpose; which God hath +not. And whereas he says, I confound this aspect with the will and +decrees of God, he accuseth me wrongfully. For how could I so confound +it, when I understood not what it meant? + +(_e_) “Secondly, he chargeth me, that hitherto I have maintained that +‘liberty and the decrees of God are irreconcileable’”. And the reason +why I do so is, because he maintained that liberty and the absolute +necessity of all things are irreconcileable. If liberty cannot stand +with necessity, it cannot stand with the decrees of God, of which +decrees necessity is a consequent. I needed not to say, nor did say, +that necessity and God’s decrees are all one: though if I had said it, +it had not been without authority of learned men, in whose writings are +often found this sentence, _voluntas Dei, necessitas rerum_. + +(_f_) “But to cut his argument short: God hath decreed all effects which +come to pass in time, yet not all after the same manner, but according +to the distinct natures, capacities, and conditions of his creatures; +which he doth not destroy by his decree: some he acteth.” Hitherto true. +Then he addeth: “with some he co-operateth by special influence; and +some he only permitteth; yet this is no idle or bare permission”. This +is false. For nothing operateth by its own original power, but God +himself. Man operateth not but by special power, (I say special power, +not special influence), derived from God. Nor is it by God’s permission +only, as I have often already shown, and as the Bishop here +contradicting his former words confesseth. For _to permit only_, and +_barely to permit_, signify the same thing. And that which he says, that +God _concurs by way of general influence_, is jargon. For every +concurrence is one singular and individual concurrence; and nothing in +the world is general, but the signification of words and other signs. + +(_g_) “Thirdly, he chargeth me, that ‘I allow all men to be of his +opinion, save only those that conceive in their minds a _nunc stans_, or +how eternity is an indivisible point, rather than an everlasting +succession.’ But I have given no such allowance.” Surely if the reason +wherefore my opinion is false, proceed from this, that I conceive not +eternity to be _nunc stans_, but an everlasting succession, I am allowed +to hold my opinion till I can conceive eternity otherwise: at least he +allows men not till then to be of his opinion. For he hath said, “that +the main impediment which keeps men from subscribing to that way of his, +is because they conceive eternity to be an everlasting succession, and +not one indivisible point”. As for the many other ways which he says are +“proposed by divines for reconciling the eternal prescience and decrees +of God with the liberty and contingency of second causes”, if they mean +such liberty and contingency as the Bishop meaneth, they are proposed in +vain; for truth and error can never be reconciled. But “however,” saith +he, “though a man could comprehend none of all these ways, yet we must +remember that a certain truth ought not to be rejected, because we are +not able to understand the reason of it.” For “he knows,” he says, “the +loadstone hath an attractive power to draw the iron to it, and yet he +knoweth not how it cometh to have such a power.” I know the load-stone +hath no such attractive power; and yet I know that the iron cometh to +it, or it to the iron; and therefore wonder not, that the Bishop knoweth +not how it cometh to have that power. In the next place he saith, I +bring nothing to prove that eternity is not an indivisible point, but my +own incapacity “that I cannot conceive it”. The truth is, I cannot +dispute neither for nor against (as he can do) the positions I +understand not. Nor do I understand what derogation it can be to the +divine perfection, to attribute to it potentiality, that is (in English) +power, and successive duration; for such attributes are often given to +it in the Scripture. + +(_h_) “He saith moreover, that ‘he understands as little how it can be +true which I say, that God is not just, but justice itself, nor eternal, +but eternity itself’. It seems, howsoever he be versed in this question, +that he hath not troubled his head over-much with reading +School-divines, or metaphysicians.” They are unseemly words to be said +of God: I will not say, blasphemous and atheistical, which are the +attributes he gives to my opinions, because I do not think them spoken +out of an evil mind, but out of error: they are, I say, unseemly words +to be said of God, that he is not just, that he is not eternal, and (as +he also said) that he is not wise; and cannot be excused by any +following _but_, especially when the _but_ is followed by that which is +not to be understood. Can any man understand how justice is just, or +wisdom wise? and whereas justice is an accident, one of the moral +virtues, and wisdom another; how God is an accident or moral virtue? It +is more than the Schoolmen or metaphysicians can understand; whose +writings have troubled my head more than they should have done, if I had +known that amongst so many senseless disputes, there had been so few +lucid intervals. But I have considered since, where men will undertake +to reason out of natural philosophy of the incomprehensible nature of +God, that it is impossible they should speak intelligibly, or in other +language than metaphysic, wherein they may contradict themselves, and +not perceive it; as he does here, when he says, “the attributes of God +are not diverse virtues or qualities in him, as they are in the +creatures, but really one and the same with the divine essence and +amongst themselves, and attributed to God to supply the defect of our +capacity”. Attributes are names; and therefore it is a contradiction, to +say they are really one and the same with the divine essence. But if he +mean the virtues signified by the attributes, as justice, wisdom, +eternity, divinity, &c; so also they are virtues, and not one virtue, +(which is still a contradiction); and we give those attributes to God, +not to shew that we apprehend how they are in him, but to signify how we +think it best to honour him. + +(_i_) “‘In the next place he will help me to understand,’ he says, ‘how +eternity is an indivisible point.’ The divine substance is indivisible; +but eternity is the divine substance. The major is evident, because God +is _actus simplicissimus_; the minor hath been clearly demonstrated in +my answer to his last doubt, and is confessed by all men, that +whatsoever is attributed to God is God.” The major is so far from being +evident, that _actus simplicissimus_ signifieth nothing. The minor is +said by some men, thought by no man; for whatsoever is thought, is +understood. And all that he hath elsewhere and here dilated upon it, is +as perfect nonsense, as any man ever writ on purpose to make merry with. +And so is that whereby he answers to my objection, that a point cannot +comprehend all time, which is successive; namely, his distinction, that +“a point doth not comprehend all time _formally_, as time is successive; +but _eminently_ and _virtually_, as eternity is infinite”. And this, +“to-day all eternity is co-existent with this day, and to-morrow all +eternity will be co-existent with to-morrow”. It is well that his +eternity is now come from a _nunc stans_ to be a _nunc fluens_, flowing +from this day to the next, and so on. This kind of language is never +found in the Scripture. No, but the thing, saith he, is found there, +namely, that God is infinite in all his attributes. I would he could +shew me the place where God is said to be infinite in all his +attributes. There be places enough to shew that God is infinite in +power, in wisdom, mercy, &c: but neither is he said to be infinite in +names (which is the English of attributes), nor that he is an +indivisible point, nor that a point doth comprehend time eminently and +virtually; nor that to-day all eternity is co-existent with to-day, &c. +And thus much in answer to his reply upon my answer. That which +remaineth, is my reply upon his answer to my positive doctrine on this +subject. + + MY OPINION ABOUT LIBERTY AND NECESSITY NO. XXV. + +_T. H._ First, I conceive that when it cometh into a man’s mind to do or +not to do some certain action, if he have no time to deliberate, the +doing or abstaining necessarily followeth the present thought he had of +the good or evil consequence thereof to himself. As for example, in +sudden anger the action shall follow the thought of revenge, in sudden +fear the thought of escape. Also when a man hath time to deliberate, but +deliberates not, because never anything appeared that could make him +doubt of the consequence, the action follows his opinion of the goodness +or harm of it. These actions I call voluntary. He, if I understand him +aright, calls them spontaneous. I call them voluntary, because those +actions that follow immediately the last appetite, are voluntary. And +here, where there is one only appetite, that one is the last. + +Besides, I see it is reasonable to punish a rash action; which could not +be justly done by man, unless the same were voluntary. For no action of +a man can be said to be without deliberation, though never so sudden; +because it is supposed he had time to deliberate all the precedent time +of his life, whether he should do that kind of action or not. And hence +it is, that he that killeth in a sudden passion of anger, shall +nevertheless be justly put to death: because all the time wherein he was +able to consider whether to kill were good or evil, shall be held for +one continual deliberation; and consequently the killing shall be judged +to proceed from election. + +[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] + +J. D. “This part of T. H.’s discourse hangs together like a sick man’s +dreams. (_a_) Even now he tells us, that ‘a man may have time to +deliberate, yet not deliberate’. By and by he saith, that ‘no action of +a man, though never so sudden, can be said to be without deliberation’. +He tells us, No. XXXIII., that ‘the scope of this section is to show +what is spontaneous’. Howbeit he showeth only what is voluntary; (_b_) +so making voluntary and spontaneous to be all one; whereas before he had +told us, that ‘every spontaneous action is not voluntary, because +indeliberate; nor every voluntary action spontaneous, if it proceed from +fear.’ (_c_) Now he tells us, that ‘those actions which follow the last +appetite, are voluntary; and where there is one only appetite, that is +the last’. But before he told us, that ‘voluntary presupposeth some +precedent deliberation and meditation of what is likely to follow, both +upon the doing and abstaining from the action’. (_d_) He defines +liberty, No. XXIX., to be ‘the absence of all extrinsical impediments to +action’. And yet in his whole discourse he laboureth to make good, that +whatsoever is not done, is therefore not done, because the agent was +necessitated by extrinsical causes not to do it. Are not extrinsical +causes, which determine him not to do it, extrinsical impediments to +action? So no man shall be free to do any thing but that which he doth +actually. He defines a free agent to be ‘him who hath not made an end of +deliberating’ (No. XXVIII.). And yet defines liberty to be ‘an absence +of outward impediments’. There may be outward impediments, even whilst +he is deliberating. As a man deliberates whether he shall play at +tennis: and at the same time the door of the tennis-court is fast locked +against him. And after a man hath ceased to deliberate, there may be no +outward impediments: as when a man resolves not to play at tennis, +because he finds himself ill-disposed, or because he will not hazard his +money. So the same person, at the same time, should be free and not +free, not free and free. And as he is not firm to his own grounds, so he +confounds all things, the mind and the will, the estimative faculty and +the understanding, imagination with deliberation, the end with the +means, human will with the sensitive appetite, rational hope or fear +with irrational passions, inclinations with intentions, a beginning of +being with a beginning of working, sufficiency with efficiency. So as +the greatest difficulty is to find out what he aims at. So as I had once +resolved not to answer this part of his discourse; yet upon better +advice I will take a brief survey of it also; and show how far I assent +unto, or dissent from that which I conceive to be his meaning. + +“And first, concerning sudden passions, as anger or the like. (_e_) That +which he saith, that ‘the action doth necessarily follow the thought’, +is thus far true; that those actions which are altogether undeliberated +and do proceed from sudden and violent passions, or _motus primo primi_, +which surprise a man, and give him no time to advise with reason, are +not properly and actually in themselves free, but rather necessary +actions; as when a man runs away from a cat or a custard out of a secret +antipathy. + +(_f_) “Secondly, as for those actions ‘wherein actual deliberation seems +not necessary, because never anything appeared that could make a man +doubt of the consequence’: I do confess, that actions done by virtue of +a precedent deliberation, without any actual deliberation in the +present, when the act is done, may notwithstanding be truly both +voluntary and free acts, yea, in some cases and in some sense, more free +than if they were actually deliberated of in present. As one who hath +acquired by former deliberation and experience a habit to play upon the +virginals, needs not deliberate what man or what jack he must touch, nor +what finger of his hand he must move to play such a lesson; yea, if his +mind should be fixed, or intent to every motion of his hand, or every +touch of a string, it would hinder his play, and render the action more +troublesome to him. Wherefore I believe, that not only his playing in +general, but every motion of his hand, though it be not presently +deliberated of, is a free act, by reason of his precedent deliberation. +So then (saving improprieties of speech, as calling that voluntary which +is free, and limiting the will to the last appetite; and other mistakes, +as that no act can be said to be without deliberation) we agree also for +the greater part in this second observation. + +(_g_) “Thirdly, whereas he saith, that ‘some sudden acts proceeding from +violent passions, which surprise a man, are justly punished’; I grant +they are so sometimes; but not for his reason, because they have been +formerly actually deliberated of; but because they were virtually +deliberated of, or because it is our fault that they were not actually +deliberated of, whether it was a fault of pure negation, that is, of not +doing our duty only, or a fault of bad disposition also, by reason of +some vicious habit which we had contracted by our former actions. To do +a necessary act is never a fault, nor justly punishable, when the +necessity is inevitably imposed upon us by extrinsical causes. As if a +child, before he had the use of reason, shall kill a man in his passion; +yet because he wanted malice to incite him to it, and reason to restrain +him from it, he shall not die for it in the strict rules of particular +justice, unless there be some mixture of public justice in the case. + +(_h_) “But if the necessity be contracted by ourselves, and by our own +faults, it is justly punishable. As he who by his wanton thoughts in the +day-time doth procure his own nocturnal pollution: a man cannot +deliberate in his sleep, yet it is accounted a sinful act, and +consequently, a free act, that is, not actually free in itself, but +virtually free in its causes; and though it be not expressly willed and +chosen, yet it is tacitly and implicitly willed and chosen, when that is +willed and chosen from whence it was necessarily produced. By the +Levitical law, if a man digged a pit and left it uncovered, so that his +neighbour’s ox or his ass did fall into it, he was bound to make +reparation; not because he did choose to leave it uncovered on purpose +that such a mischance might happen, but because he did freely omit that +which he ought to have done, from whence this damage proceeded to his +neighbour. Lastly, there is great difference between the first motions, +which sometimes are not in our power, and subsequent acts of killing or +stealing, or the like, which always are in our power if we have the use +of reason, or else it is our own fault that they are not in our power. +Yet to such hasty acts done in hot blood the law is not so severe, as to +those which are done upon long deliberation and prepensed malice, +unless, as I said, there be some mixture of public justice in it. He +that steals a horse deliberately, may be more punishable by the law than +he that kills the owner by chance-medley: yet the death of the owner was +more noxious, (to use his phrase), and more damageable to the family, +than the stealth of the horse. So far was T. H. mistaken in that also, +that the right to kill men doth proceed merely from their being noxious +(No. XIV).” + + ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S ANSWER TO MY OPINION ABOUT LIBERTY AND + NECESSITY NO. XXV. + +(_a_) “Even now he tells us, that ‘a man may have time to deliberate, +yet not deliberate’. By and by he saith, that ‘no action of a man, +though never so sudden, can be said to be without deliberation’.” He +thinks he hath here caught me in a contradiction; but he is mistaken; +and the cause is, that he observed not that there may be a difference +between deliberation and that which shall be construed for deliberation +by a judge. For a man may do a rash act suddenly without deliberation; +yet because he ought to have deliberated, and had time enough to +deliberate whether the action were lawful or not, it shall not be said +by the judge that it was without deliberation, who supposeth that after +the law known, all the time following was time of deliberation. It is +therefore no contradiction, to say a man deliberates not, and that he +shall be said to deliberate by him that is the judge of voluntary +actions. + +(_b_) “Again, where he says, ‘he maketh voluntary and spontaneous +actions to be all one’, whereas before he had told us that ‘every +spontaneous action is not voluntary, because indeliberate; nor every +voluntary action spontaneous, if it proceed from fear’.” He thinks he +hath espied another contradiction. It is no wonder if speaking of +spontaneous, which signifieth nothing else in Latin (for English it is +not) but that which is done deliberately or indeliberately without +compulsion, I seem to the Bishop, who hath never given any definition of +that word, not to use it as he would have me. And it is easy for him to +give it any signification he please, as the occasion shall serve to +charge me with contradiction. In what sense I have used that word once, +in the same I have used it always, calling that spontaneous which is +without co-action or compulsion by terror. + +(_c_) “Now he tells us, that ‘those actions which follow the last +appetite are voluntary, and where there is one only appetite, that is +the last’. But before he told us, that ‘voluntary presupposeth some +precedent deliberation and meditation of what is likely to follow, both +upon the doing and abstaining from the _action_’.” This is a third +contradiction he supposeth he hath found, but is again mistaken. For +when men are to judge of actions, whether they be voluntary or not, they +cannot call that action voluntary, which followed not the last appetite. +But the same men, though there were no deliberation, shall judge there +was, because it ought to have been, and that from the time that the law +was known to the time of the action itself. And therefore both are true, +that voluntary may be without, and yet presupposed in the law not to be +without deliberation. + +(_d_) “He defines liberty (No. XXIX.) to be ‘the absence of all +extrinsical impediments to action’. And yet in his whole discourse he +laboureth to make good, that whatsoever is not done, is therefore not +done, because the agent was necessitated by extrinsical causes not to do +it. Are not extrinsical causes which determine him not to do it, +extrinsical impediments to action?” This definition of liberty, that it +is “the absence of all extrinsical impediments to action”, he thinks he +hath sufficiently confuted by asking whether the extrinsical causes, +which determine a man not to do an action, be not extrinsical +impediments to action. It seems by his question he makes no doubt but +they are; but is deceived by a too shallow consideration of what the +word _impediment_ signifieth. For impediment or hinderance signifieth an +opposition to endeavour. And therefore if a man be necessitated by +extrinsical causes not to endeavour an action, those causes do not +oppose his endeavour to do it, because he has no such endeavour to be +opposed; and consequently extrinsical causes that take away endeavour, +are not to be called impediments; nor can any man be said to be hindered +from doing that, which he had no purpose at all to do. So that this +objection of his proceedeth only from this, that he understandeth not +sufficiently the English tongue. From the same proceedeth also that he +thinketh it a contradiction, to call a free agent him that hath not yet +made an end of deliberating, and to call liberty an absence of outward +impediments. “For,” saith he, “there may be outward impediments, even +while he is deliberating.” Wherein he is deceived. For though he may +deliberate of that which is impossible for him to do; as in the example +he allegeth of him that deliberateth whether he shall play at tennis, +not knowing that the door of the tennis-court is shut against him; yet +it is no impediment to him that the door is shut, till he have a will to +play; which be hath not till he hath done deliberating whether he shall +play or not. That which followeth of my confounding mind and will; the +estimative faculty and the understanding; the imagination and +deliberation; the end and the means; the human will and the sensitive +appetite; rational hope or fear, and irrational passions; inclinations +and intentions; a beginning of being and a beginning of working; +sufficiency and efficiency: I do not find in anything that I have +written, any impropriety in the use of these or any other English words; +nor do I doubt but an English reader, who hath not lost himself in +School-divinity, will very easily conceive what I have said. But this I +am sure, that I never confounded beginning of being with beginning of +working, nor sufficiency with efficiency; nor ever used these words, +sensitive appetite, rational hope, or rational fear, or irrational +passions. It is therefore impossible I should confound them. But the +Bishop is either mistaken, or else he makes no scruple to say that which +he knows to be false, when he thinks it will serve his turn. + +(_e_) “That which he saith, that ‘the action doth necessarily follow the +thought’, is thus far true; that those actions which are altogether +undeliberated, and do proceed from violent passions, &c, are not +properly, and actually in themselves free, but rather necessary actions, +as when a man runs away from a cat or a custard.” Thus far he says is +true. But when he calls sudden passions _motus primo primi_, I cannot +tell whether he says true or not, because I do not understand him; nor +find how he makes his meaning ever the clearer by his example of a cat +and a custard, because I know not what he means by a secret antipathy. +For what that antipathy is he explaineth not by calling it secret, but +rather confesseth he knows not how to explain it. And because he saith, +it is _thus far true_, I expect he should tell me also how far it is +false. + +(_f_) “Secondly, as for those actions wherein actual deliberation seems +not necessary, ‘because never anything appeared that could make a man +doubt of the consequence’; I do confess that actions done by virtue of a +precedent deliberation, without any actual deliberation for the present, +may notwithstanding be truly voluntary and free acts.” In this he agrees +with me. But where he adds, “yea, in some cases, and in some sense more +free, than if they were actually deliberated of in present”, I do not +agree with him. And for the instance he bringeth to prove it, in the man +that playeth on an instrument with his hand it maketh nothing for him. +For it proveth only, that the habit maketh the motion of his hand more +ready and quick; but it proveth not that it maketh it more voluntary, +but rather less; because the rest of the motions follow the first by an +easiness acquired from long custom; in which motion the will doth not +accompany all the strokes of the hand, but gives a beginning to them +only in the first. Here is nothing, as I expected, of how far that which +I had said, namely, that the action doth necessarily follow the thought, +is false; unless it be “improprieties of speech, as calling that +voluntary which is free, and limiting the will to the last appetite; and +other mistakes, as that no act can be said to be without deliberation”. +For improprieties of speech, I will not contend with one that can use +_motus primo primi_, _practice practicum_, _actus elicitus_, and many +other phrases of the same kind. But to say that free actions are +voluntary; and that the will which causeth a voluntary action, is the +last appetite; and that that appetite was immediately followed by the +action; and that no action of a man can be said in the judgment of the +law, to be without deliberation: are no mistakes, for anything that he +hath proved to the contrary. + +(_g_) “Thirdly, whereas he saith, that ‘some sudden acts, proceeding +from violent passions which surprise a man, are justly punished’; I +grant they are so sometimes, but not for his reason, &c.” My reason was, +“because he had time to deliberate from the instant that he knew the +law, to the instant of his action, and ought to have deliberated”, that +therefore he may be justly punished. The Bishop grants they are justly +punished, and his reason is, “because they were virtually deliberated +of”, or, “because it is our fault they were not actually deliberated +of”. How a man does deliberate, and yet not actually deliberate, I +understand not. If virtual deliberation be not actual deliberation, it +is no deliberation. But he calleth virtual deliberation, that which +ought to have been, and was not; and says the same that he condemns in +me. And his other reason, namely, because it is our fault that we +deliberated not, is the same that I said, that we ought to have +deliberated, and did not. So that his reprehension here, is a +reprehension of himself, proceeding from that the custom of +School-language hath made him forget the language of his country. And to +that which he adds, “that a necessary act is never a fault, nor justly +punishable, when the necessity is inevitably imposed upon us by +extrinsical causes”, I have sufficiently answered before in diverse +places; shewing that a fault may be necessary from extrinsical causes, +and yet voluntary; and that voluntary faults are justly punishable. + +(_h_) “But if the necessity be contracted by ourselves, it is justly +punishable. As he who by his wanton thoughts in the day time, doth +procure his own nocturnal pollution.” This instance, because it maketh +not against anything I have held, and partly also because it is a +stinking passage, (for surely if, as he that ascribes eyes to the +understanding, allows me to say it hath a nose, it stinketh to the nose +of the understanding); this sentence I pass over, observing only the +canting terms, _not actually free in itself_, but _virtually free in its +causes_. In the rest of his answer to this No. XXV, I find nothing +alleged in confutation of anything I have said, saving that his last +words are, that “T. H. is mistaken in that also, that the right to kill +men doth proceed merely from their being noxious” (No. XIV.). But to +that I have in the same No. XIV. already answered. I must not pass over, +that a little before he hath these words: “If a child, before he have +the use of reason, shall kill a man in his passion, yet because he +wanted malice to incite him to it, and reason to restrain him from it, +he shall not die for it, in the strict rules of particular justice, +unless there be some mixture of public justice in the case”. The Bishop +would make but an ill judge of innocent children, for such are they +that, for want of age, have not use enough of reason to abstain from +killing. For the want of reason proceeding from want of age, does +therefore take away the punishment, because it taketh away the crime, +and makes them innocent. But he introduceth another justice, which he +calleth _public_; whereas he called the other _particular_. And by this +public justice, he saith, the child though innocent may be put to death. +I hope we shall never have the administration of public justice in such +hands as his, or in the hands of such as shall take counsel from him. +But the distinction he makes is not by himself understood. There are +public causes, and private causes. Private are those, where the parties +to the cause are both private men. Public are those, where one of the +parties is the commonwealth, or the person that representeth it, and the +cause criminal. But there is no distinction of justice into public and +private. We may read of men that, having sovereign power, did sometimes +put an innocent to death, either upon a vow; as Jepthah did in +sacrificing his daughter; or when it hath been thought fit that an +innocent person should be put to death to save a great number of people. +But to put to death a child, not for reason of state, which he +improperly calls public justice, but for killing a man, and at the same +time to acknowledge such killing to be no crime, I think was never heard +of. + + NO. XXVI. + +_T. H._ Secondly, I conceive when a man deliberates whether he shall do +a thing or not do a thing, that he does nothing else but consider +whether it be better for himself to do it or not to do it. And to +consider an action, is to imagine the consequences of it, both good and +evil. From whence is to be inferred, that deliberation is nothing but +alternate imagination of the good and evil sequels of an action, or +(which is the same thing) alternate hope and fear, or alternate appetite +to do or acquit the action of which he deliberateth. + +[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] + +_J. D._ (_a_) “If I did not know what deliberation was, I should be +little relieved in my knowledge by this description. Sometimes he makes +it to be a consideration, or an act of the understanding; sometimes an +imagination, or an act of the fancy; sometimes he makes it to be an +alternation of passions, hope and fear. Sometimes he makes it concern +the end, sometimes to concern the means. So he makes it I know not what. +The truth is this in brief: ‘Deliberation is an inquiry made by reason, +whether this or that, definitely considered, be a good and fit means, +or, indefinitely, what are good and fit means to be chosen for attaining +some wished end.’” + + ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXVI. + +(_a_) “If I did not know what deliberation was, I should be little +relieved in my knowledge by this description. Sometimes he makes it to +be a consideration, or an act of the understanding, sometimes an +imagination, or an act of the fancy, &c. So he makes it I know not +what.” If the Bishop had observed what he does himself, when he +deliberates, reasons, understands, or imagines, he would have known what +to make of all that I have said in this Number. He would have known that +consideration, understanding, reason, and all the passions of the mind, +are imaginations. That to consider a thing, is to imagine it; that to +understand a thing, is to imagine it; that to hope and fear, are to +imagine the things hoped for and feared. The difference between them is, +that when we imagine the consequence of anything, we are said to +consider that thing; and when we have imagined anything from a sign, and +especially from those signs we call names, we are said to understand his +meaning that maketh the sign; and when we reason, we imagine the +consequence of affirmations and negations joined together; and when we +hope or fear, we imagine things good or hurtful to ourselves: insomuch +as all these are but imaginations diversely named from different +circumstances: as any man may perceive as easily as he can look into his +own thoughts. But to him that thinketh not himself upon the things +whereof, but upon the words wherewith he speaketh, and taketh those +words on trust from puzzled Schoolmen, it is not only hard, but +impossible to be known. And this is the reason that maketh him say, I +make deliberation he knows not what. But how is deliberation defined by +him? “It is”, saith he, “an inquiry made by reason, whether this or that +definitely considered, be a good and fit means; or indefinitely, what +are good and fit means to be chosen for attaining some wished end.” If +it were not his custom to say, the understanding understandeth, the will +willeth, and so of the rest of the faculties, I should have believed +that when he says deliberation is an inquiry made by reason, he meaneth +an inquiry made by the man that reasoneth; for so it will be sense. But +the reason which a man useth in deliberation, being the same thing that +is called deliberation, his definition that deliberation is an inquiry +made by reason, is no more than if he had said, deliberation is an +inquiry made by deliberation; a definition good enough to be made by a +Schoolman. Nor is the rest of the definition altogether as it should be; +for there is no such thing as an “indefinite consideration of what are +good and fit means”; but a man imagining first one thing, then another, +considereth them successively and singly each one, whether it conduceth +to his ends or not. + + NO. XXVII. + +_T. H._ Thirdly, I conceive, that in all deliberations, that is to say, +in all alternate succession of contrary appetites, the last is that +which we call the will, and is immediately before the doing of the +action, or next before the doing of it become impossible. All other +appetites to do and to quit, that come upon a man during his +deliberation, are usually called intentions and inclinations, but not +wills; there being but one will, which also in this case may be called +last will, though the intention change often. + +[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] + +_J. D._ (_a_) “Still here is nothing but confusion; he confounds the +faculty of the will with the act of volition; he makes the will to be +the last part of deliberation; he makes the intention, which is a most +proper and elicit act of the will, or a willing of the end, as it is to +be attained by certain means, to be no willing at all, but only some +antecedaneous _inclination_ or propension. He might as well say, that +the uncertain agitation of the needle hither and thither to find out the +pole, and the resting or fixing of itself directly towards the pole, +were both the same thing. But the grossest mistake is, that he will +acknowledge no act of man’s will, to be his will, but only the last act, +which he calls the last will. If the first were no will, how comes this +to be the last will? According to his doctrine, the will of a man should +be as unchangeable as the will of God, at least so long as there is a +possibility to effect it. (_b_) According to this doctrine, +concupiscence with consent should be no sin; for that which is not truly +willed is not a sin; or rather should not be at all, unless either the +act followed, or were rendered impossible by some intervening +circumstances. According to this doctrine no man can say, this is my +will, because he knows not yet whether it shall be his last appeal. The +truth is, there be many acts of the will, both in respect of the means +and of the end. But that act which makes a man’s actions to be truly +free, is election; which is the deliberate choosing or refusing of this +or that means, or the acceptation of one means before another, where +divers are represented by the understanding. + + ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXVII. + +(_a_) “Still here is nothing but confusion; he confounds the faculty of +the will with the act of volition; he makes the will to be the last part +of deliberation; he makes the intention, which is a most proper and +elicit act of the will, to be no willing at all, but only some +antecedaneous (he might as well have said, antecedent) inclination.” To +confound the faculty of the will with the will, were to confound a +_will_ with _no will_; for the faculty of the will is no will; the act +only which he calls _volition_, is the will. As a man that sleepeth hath +the _power_ of _seeing_, and _seeth not_, nor hath for that time any +_sight_; so also he hath the _power_ of willing, but _willeth nothing_, +nor hath for that time any _will_. I must therefore have departed very +much from my own principles, if I have confounded the _faculty_ of the +_will_ with the _act_ of _volition_. He should have done well to have +shown where I confounded them. It is true, I make the will to be the +last part of deliberation; but it is that will which maketh the action +voluntary, and therefore needs must be the last. But for the preceding +variations of the will to do and not to do, though they be so many +several wills, contrary to and destroying one another, they usually are +called _intentions_; and therefore they are nothing to the will, of +which we dispute, that maketh an action voluntary. And though a man have +in every long deliberation a great many _wills_ and _nills_, they use to +be called inclinations, and the last only _will_ which is immediately +followed by the voluntary action. But nevertheless, both he that hath +those intentions, and God that seeth them, reckoneth them for so many +wills. + +(_b_) “According to this doctrine, concupiscence with consent should be +no sin; for that which is not truly willed, is not a sin.” This is no +consequent to my doctrine: for I hold that they are, in the sight of +God, so many consents, so many willings, which would have been followed +by actions, if the actions had been in their power. It had been fitter +for a man in whom is required gravity and sanctity more than ordinary, +to have chosen some other kind of instance. But what meaneth he by +_concupiscence with consent_? Can there be concupiscence without +consent? It is the consent itself. There may be also a lawful +concupiscence with consent. For concupiscence makes not the sin, but the +unlawfulness of satisfying such concupiscence; and not the consent, but +the will and design to prosecute that which a man knoweth to be +unlawful. An appetite to another man’s bread, is concupiscence; and +though it be with consent to eat, it is no sin; but the design to take +it from the other, notwithstanding that he may fail in his design, that +is the sin. And this instance might have served his turn as well as the +other; and for consent, if he had understood the truth, he might have +put design. + + NO. XXVIII. + +_T. H._ Fourthly, that those actions which man is said to do upon +deliberation, are said to be voluntary, and done upon choice and +election. So that voluntary action, and action proceeding from election, +is the same thing. And that of a voluntary agent, it is all one to say +he is free, and to say he hath not made an end of deliberating. + +[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] + +_J. D._ (_a_) “This short section might pass without an animadversion, +but for two things. The one is, that he confounds a voluntary act with a +free act. A free act is only that which proceeds from the free election +of the rational will after deliberation; but every act that proceeds +from the sensitive appetite of man or beast, without deliberation or +election, is truly voluntary. (_b_) The other thing observable is his +conclusion, that ‘it is all one to say a man is free, and to say he hath +not made an end of deliberating’; which confession of his overturns his +whole structure of absolute necessity. For if every agent be +necessitated to act what he doth act by a necessary and natural flux of +extrinsical causes, then he is no more free before he deliberates, or +whilst he deliberates, than he is after; but by T. H.’s confession here, +he is more free whilst he deliberates, than he is after. And so after +all his flourishes, for an absolute or extrinsical necessity, he is glad +to set himself down, and rest contented with an hypothetical necessity, +which no man ever denied or doubted of; ascribing the necessitation of a +man in free acts to his own deliberation, and in indeliberate acts to +his last thought, No. XXV. What is this to a natural and special +influence of extrinsical causes? (_c_) “Again, ‘liberty’, saith he, ‘is +an absence of extrinsical impediments’; but deliberation doth produce no +new extrinsical impediment; therefore let him choose which part he will, +either he is free after deliberation, by his own doctrine, or he was not +free before. Our own deliberation, and the direction of our own +understanding, and the election of our own will, do produce an +hypothetical necessity, that the event be such as the understanding hath +directed, and the will elected. But for as much as the understanding +might have directed otherwise, and the will have elected otherwise, this +is far from an absolute necessity. Neither doth liberty respect only +future acts, but present acts also. Otherwise God did not freely create +the world. In the same instant wherein the will elects, it is free, +according to a priority of nature, though not of time, to elect +otherwise. And so in a divided sense, the will is free, even whilst it +acts; though in a compounded sense it be not free. Certainly, +deliberation doth constitute, not destroy liberty. + + ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXVIII. + +(_a_) “This short section might pass, but for two things; one is, that +he confounds a voluntary act with a free act.” I do indeed take all +voluntary acts to be free, and all free acts to be voluntary; but withal +that all acts, whether free or voluntary, if they be acts, were +necessary before they were acts. But where is the error? ‘A free act’, +saith he, ‘is only that which proceeds from the free election of the +rational will, after deliberation; but every act that proceeds from the +sensitive appetite of man or beast, without deliberation or election, is +truly voluntary.’ So that my error lies in this, that I distinguish not +between a rational will and a sensitive appetite in the same man. As if +the appetite and will in man or beast were not the same thing, or that +sensual men and beasts did not deliberate, and choose one thing before +another, in the same manner that wise men do. Nor can it be said of +wills, that one is rational, the other sensitive; but of men. And if it +be granted that deliberation is always (as it is not) rational, there +were no cause to call men rational more than beasts. For it is manifest +by continual experience, that beasts do deliberate. + +(_b_) “The other thing observable is his conclusion, that ‘it is all one +to say, a man is free, and to say, he hath not made an end of +deliberating’: which confession of his overturns his whole structure of +absolute necessity.” Why so? ‘Because’, saith he, ‘if every agent be +necessitated to act what he doth act by extrinsical causes, then he is +no more free before he deliberates, or whilst he deliberates, than he is +after’. But this is a false consequence; he should have inferred +thus:--“then he is no less necessitated before he deliberates than he is +after”; which is true, and yet nevertheless he is more free. But taking +necessity to be inconsistent with liberty, which is the question between +us: instead of _necessitated_ he puts in _not free_. And therefore to +say ‘a man is free till he hath made an end of deliberating’, is no +contradiction to absolute and antecedent necessity. And whereas he adds +presently after, that I ascribe the necessitation of a man in free acts +to his own deliberation, and in indeliberate acts to his last thoughts: +he mistakes the matter. For I ascribe all necessity to the universal +series or order of causes, depending on the first cause eternal: which +the Bishop understandeth, as if I had said in his phrase, to a special +influence of extrinsical causes; that is, understandeth it not at all. + +(_c_) “Again, ‘liberty,’ saith he, ‘is an absence of extrinsical +impediments’: but deliberation doth produce no new extrinsical +impediment; therefore either he is free after deliberation, or he was +not free before.” I cannot perceive in these words any more force of +inference, than of so many other words whatsoever put together at +adventure. But be his meaning what he will, I say not that deliberation +produceth any impediments: for there are no impediments but to the +action, whilst we are endeavouring to do it, which is not till we have +done deliberating. But during the deliberation there arise thoughts in +him that deliberateth, concerning the consequence of the action whereof +he deliberateth, which cause the action following; which are not +impediments to that action which was not done, but the causes of that +which was done. That which followeth in this Number is not intelligible, +by reason of the insignificance of these words, “understanding +directeth; will electeth; hypothetical necessity”; which are but jargon, +and his “divided sense” and “compounded sense”, nonsense. And this also, +“liberty respecteth not future acts only, but present acts also”, is +unintelligible. For how can a man have liberty to do or not to do that +which is at the same instant already done. For where he addeth, +“otherwise God did not freely create the world”, it proves nothing; +because he had the liberty to create it, before it was created. Besides, +it is a profaning of the name of God, to make instances of his +incomprehensible working in a question as this is, merely natural. + + NO. XXIX. + +_T. H._ Fifthly, I conceive liberty to be rightly defined in this +manner:--Liberty is the absence of all the impediments to action, that +are not contained in the nature, and in the intrinsical quality of the +agent. As for example, the water is said to descend freely, or to have +liberty to descend by the channel of the river, because there is no +impediment that way; but not across, because the banks are impediments. +And though water cannot ascend, yet men never say it wants the liberty +to ascend, but the faculty or power; because the impediment is in the +nature of the water and intrinsical. So also we say, he that is tied +wants the liberty to go, because the impediment is not in him, but in +his bonds; whereas we say not so of him that is sick or lame, because +the impediment is in himself. + +[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] + +_J. D._ (_a_) “How that should be a right definition of liberty, which +comprehends neither the genus nor the difference, neither the matter nor +form of liberty, which doth not so much as accidentally describe liberty +by its marks and tokens; how a real faculty or the elective power should +be defined by a negation, or by an absence, is past my understanding, +and contrary to all the rules of right reason which I have learned. +Negatives cannot explicate the nature of things defined. By this +definition, a stone hath liberty to ascend into the air, because there +is no outward impediment to hinder it; and so a violent act may be a +free act. Just like his definition are his instances of the liberty of +the water to descend down the channel, and a sick or lame man’s liberty +to go. The latter is an impotence, and not a power or a liberty. The +former is so far from being a free act, that it is scarce a natural act. +Certainly the proper natural motion of water, as of all heavy bodies, is +to descend directly downwards towards the centre; as we see in rain, +which falls down perpendicularly. Though this be far from a free act, +which proceeds from a rational appetite; yet it is a natural act, and +proceeds from a natural appetite, and hath its reason within itself. So +hath not the current of the river in its channel, which must not be +ascribed to the proper nature of the water, but either to the general +order of the universe, for the better being and preservation of the +creatures: (otherwise the waters should not move in seas and rivers as +they do, but cover the face of the earth, and possess their proper place +between the air and the earth, according to the degree of their +gravity): or to an extrinsical principle, whilst one particle of water +thrusteth and forceth forward another, and so comes a current, or at +least so comes the current to be more impetuous; to which motion the +position of the earth doth contribute much, both by restraining that +fluid body with its banks from dispersing itself, and also by affording +way for a fair and easy descent by its proclivity. He tells us sadly, +that “the water wants liberty to go over the banks, because there is an +extrinsical impediment; but to ascend up the channel, it wants not +liberty, but power”. Why? Liberty is a power; if it want power to +ascend, it wants liberty to ascend. But he makes the reason why the +water ascends not up the channel, to be intrinsical, and the reason why +it ascends not over the banks, to be extrinsical; as if there were not a +rising of the ground up the channel, as well as up the banks, though it +be not so discernible, nor always so sudden. The natural appetite of the +water is as much against the ascending over the banks, as the ascending +up the channel. And the extrinsical impediment is as great, ascending up +the channel, as over the banks; or rather greater, because there it must +move, not only against the rising soil, but also against the succeeding +waters, which press forward the former. Either the river wants liberty +for both, or else it wants liberty for neither. + +But to leave his metaphorical faculties, and his catachrestical liberty: +how far is his discourse wide from the true moral liberty; which is the +question between us? His former description of a free agent, that is, +‘he who hath not made an end of deliberating’, though it was wide from +the mark, yet it came much nearer the truth than this definition of +liberty; unless perhaps he think that the water hath done deliberating +whether it will go over the banks, but hath not done deliberating +whether it will go up the channel”. + + ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXIX. + +(_a_) “How that should be a right definition of liberty, which +comprehends neither the genus nor the difference, neither the matter nor +the form of liberty, &c: how a real faculty or the elective power, +should be defined by a negation or by an absence: is past my +understanding, and contrary to all the rules of right reason which I +have learned.” A right definition is that which determineth the +signification of the word defined, to the end that in the discourse +where it is used, the meaning of it may be constant and without +equivocation. This is the measure of a definition, and intelligible to +an English reader. But the Bishop, that measures it by the genus and the +difference, thinks, it seems, though he write English, he writes not to +an English reader unless he also be a Schoolman. I confess the rule is +good, that we ought to define, when it can be done, by using first some +more general term, and then by restraining the signification of that +general term, till it be the same with that of the word defined. And +this general term the School calls _genus_, and the restraint +_difference_. This, I say, is a good rule where it can be done; for some +words are so general, that they cannot admit a more general in their +definition. But why this ought to be a law of definition, I doubt it +would trouble him to find the reason; and therefore I refer him (he +shall give me leave sometimes to cite, as well as he,) to the fourteenth +and fifteenth articles of the sixth chapter of my book _De Corpore_. But +it is to little purpose that he requires in a definition so exactly the +genus and the difference, seeing he does not know them when they are +there. For in this my definition of liberty, the genus is absence of +impediments to action; and the difference or restriction is that they be +not contained in the nature of the agent. The Bishop therefore, though +he talk of genus and difference, understands not what they are, but +requires the matter and form of the thing in the definition. Matter is +body, that is to say, corporeal substance, and subject to dimension, +such as are the elements, and the things compounded of the elements. But +it is impossible that matter should be part of a definition, whose parts +are only words; or to put the name of matter into the definition of +liberty, which is immaterial. “How a real faculty can be defined by an +absence, is”, saith he, “past my understanding.” Unless he mean by _real +faculty_ a _very faculty_, I know not how a faculty is real. If he mean +so, then a very absence is as real as a very faculty. And if the word +defined signify an absence or negation, I hope he would not have me +define it by a presence or affirmation. Such a word is liberty; for it +signifieth freedom from impediments, which is all one with the absence +of impediments, as I have defined it. And if this be contrary to all the +rules of right reason, that is to say, of logic, that he hath learned, I +should advise him to read some other logic than he hath yet read, or +consider better those he did read when he was a young man and could less +understand them. He adds, that “by this definition, a stone hath liberty +to ascend into the air, because there is no outward impediment to hinder +it”. How knows he whether there be impediments to hinder it or not? +Certainly if a stone were thrown upwards, it would either go upwards +eternally, or it must be stopped by some outward impediment, or it must +stop itself. He hath confessed, that nothing can move itself; I doubt +not therefore that he will confess also, that it cannot stop itself. But +stopped we see it is; it is therefore stopped by impediments external. +He hath in this part of his answer ventured a little too far in speaking +of definition, and of impediments, and motion; and bewrayed too much his +ignorance in logic and philosophy; and talked so absurdly of the current +of rivers, and of the motion of the seas, and of the weight of water, +that it cannot be corrected otherwise than by blotting it all out. + + NO. XXX. + +_T. H._ Sixthly, I conceive nothing taketh beginning from itself, but +from the action of some other immediate agent without itself: and that +therefore when first a man had an appetite or will to something, to +which immediately before he had no appetite nor will, the cause of his +will is not the will itself, but something else not in his own +disposing. So that, whereas it is out of controversy that of voluntary +actions the will is a necessary cause; and by this which is said, the +will is also caused by other things whereof it disposeth not; it +followeth that voluntary actions have all of them necessary causes, and +therefore are necessitated. + +[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] + +_J. D._ “This sixth point doth not consist in explicating of terms, as +the former; but in two proofs, that voluntary actions are necessitated. +The former proof stands thus: ‘Nothing takes beginning from itself, but +from some agent without itself, which is not in its own disposing +therefore, &c’. _Concedo omnia_; (_a_) I grant all he saith. The will +doth not take beginning from itself. Whether he understand by _will_ the +faculty of the will, which is a power of the reasonable soul, it takes +not beginning from itself, but from God, who created and infused the +soul into man, and endowed it with this power: or whether he understand +by _will_ the act of willing, it takes not beginning from itself, but +from the faculty or from the power of willing, which is in the soul. +This is certain; finite and participated things cannot be from +themselves, nor be produced by themselves. What would he conclude from +hence? That therefore the act of willing takes not its beginning from +the faculty of the will? Or that the faculty is always determined +antecedently, extrinsically, to will that which it doth will? He may as +soon draw water out of a pumice, as draw any such conclusion out of +these premises. Secondly, for his “taking a beginning”, either he +understands _a beginning of being_, or a _beginning of working and +acting_. If he understand a beginning of being, he saith most truly, +that nothing hath a beginning of being in time from itself. But this is +nothing to his purpose: the question is not between us, whether the soul +of man or the will of man be eternal. But if he understand _a beginning +of working or moving actually_, it is a gross error. All men know that +when a stone descends, or fire ascends, or when water, that hath been +heated, returns to its former temper; the beginning or reason is +intrinsical, and one and the same thing doth move and is moved in a +diverse respect. It moves in respect of the form, and it is moved in +respect of the matter. Much more man, who hath a perfect knowledge and +prenotion of the end, is most properly said to move himself. Yet I do +not deny but that there are other beginnings of human actions, which do +concur with the will: some outward, as the first cause by general +influence, which is evermore requisite, angels or men by persuading, +evil spirits by tempting, the object or end by its appetibility, the +understanding by directing. So passions and acquired habits. But I deny +that any of these do necessitate or can necessitate the will of man by +determining it physically to one, except God alone, who doth it rarely, +in extraordinary cases. And where there is no antecedent determination +to one, there is no absolute necessity, but true liberty. + +(_b_) “His second argument is _ex concessis_: ‘It is out of +controversy’, saith he, ‘that of voluntary actions the will is a +necessary cause’. The argument may be thus reduced: necessary causes +produce necessary effects; but the will is a necessary cause of +voluntary actions. I might deny his major. Necessary causes do not +always produce necessary effects, except they be also necessarily +produced; as I have shewed before in the burning of Protagoras’s book. +But I answer clearly to the minor, that the will is not a necessary +cause of what it wills in particular actions. It is without +_controversy_ indeed, for it is without all probability. That it wills +when it wills, is necessary; but that it wills this or that, now or +then, is free. More expressly, the act of the will may be considered +three ways; either in respect of its nature, or in respect of its +exercise, or in respect of its object. First, for the nature of the act: +that which the will wills, is necessarily voluntary, because the will +cannot be compelled. And in this sense, ‘it is out of controversy, that +the will is a necessary cause of voluntary actions’. Secondly, for the +exercise of its acts, that is not necessary: the will may either will or +suspend its act. Thirdly, for the object, that is not necessary, but +free: the will is not extrinsically determined to its objects. As for +example: the cardinals meet in the conclave to choose a Pope; whom they +choose, he is necessarily Pope. But it is not necessary that they shall +choose this or that day. Before they were assembled, they might defer +their assembling; when they are assembled, they may suspend their +election for a day or a week. Lastly, for the person whom they will +choose, it is freely in their own power; otherwise if the election were +not free, it were void, and no election at all. So that which takes its +beginning from the will, is necessarily voluntary; but it is not +necessary that the will shall will this or that in particular, as it was +necessary that the person freely elected should be Pope: but it was not +necessary either that the election should be at this time, or that this +man should be elected. And therefore voluntary acts in particular have +not necessary causes, that is, they are not necessitated.” + + ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXX. + +I had said, that nothing taketh beginning from itself, and that the +cause of the will is not the will itself, but something else which it +disposeth not of. Answering to this, he endeavours to shew us the cause +of the _will_. + +(_a_) “I grant”, saith he, “that the will doth not take beginning from +itself, for that the faculty of the will takes beginning from God, who +created the soul, and poured it into man, and endowed it with this +power; and for that the act of willing takes not beginning from itself, +but from the faculty or from the power of willing, which is in the soul. +This is certain; finite and participated things cannot be from +themselves, nor be produced by themselves. What would he conclude from +hence? That therefore the act of willing takes not its beginning from +the faculty of the will?” It is well that he grants finite things (as +for his _participated_, it signifies nothing here) cannot be produced by +themselves. For out of this I can conclude that the act of willing is +not produced by the faculty of willing. He that hath the faculty of +willing, hath the faculty of willing something in particular. And at the +same time he hath the faculty of nilling the same. If therefore the +faculty of willing be the cause he willeth anything whatsoever, for the +same reason the faculty of nilling will be the cause at the same time of +nilling it: and so he shall will and nill the same thing at the same +time, which is absurd. It seems the Bishop had forgot, that _matter_ and +_power_ are indifferent to contrary _forms_ and contrary _acts_. It is +somewhat besides the matter, that determineth it to a certain form; and +somewhat besides the power, that produceth a certain act: and thence it +is, that is inferred this that he granteth, that nothing can be produced +by itself; which nevertheless he presently contradicteth, in saying, +that “all men know when a stone descends, the beginning is intrinsical”, +and that “the stone moves in respect of the form”. Which is as much as +to say, that the form moveth the matter, or that the stone moveth +itself; which before he denied. When a stone ascends, the beginning of +the stone’s motion was in itself, that is to say, intrinsical, because +it is not the stone’s motion, till the stone begins to be moved; but the +motion that caused it to begin to ascend, was a precedent and +extrinsical motion of the hand or other engine that threw it upward. And +so when it descends, the beginning of the stone’s motion is in the +stone; but nevertheless, there is a former motion in the ambient body, +air or water, that causeth it to descend. But because no man can see it, +most men think there is none; though reason, wherewith the Bishop (as +relying only upon the authority of books) troubleth not himself, +convince that there is. + +(_b_) “His second argument is, _ex concessis_: ‘It is out of +controversy, that of voluntary actions the will is a necessary cause’. +The argument may be thus reduced: necessary causes produce necessary +effects; but the will is a necessary cause of voluntary actions. I might +deny his major; necessary causes do not always produce necessary +effects, except they be also necessarily produced.” He has reduced the +argument to nonsense, by saying necessary causes produce not necessary +effects. For necessary effects, unless he mean such effects as shall +necessarily be produced, is insignificant. Let him consider therefore +with what grace he can say, necessary causes do not always produce their +effects, except those effects be also necessarily produced. But his +answer is chiefly to the minor, and denies that the will is not a +necessary cause of what it wills in particular actions. That it wills +when it wills, saith he, is necessary; but that it wills this or that, +is free. Is it possible for any man to conceive, that he that willeth, +can will anything but this or that particular thing? It is therefore +manifest, that either the will is a necessary cause of this or that or +any other particular action, or not the necessary cause of any voluntary +action at all. For universal actions there be none. In that which +followeth, he undertaketh to make his doctrine more expressly understood +by considering the act of the will three ways: “in respect of its +nature, in respect of its exercise, and in respect of its object”. For +the nature of the act, he saith, that “that which the will wills, is +necessarily voluntary”, and that in this sense he grants it is out of +controversy, that the will is a necessary cause of voluntary actions. +Instead of “that which the will wills”, to make it sense, read that +which the man wills; and then if the man’s will be, as he confesseth, a +necessary cause of voluntary actions, it is no less a necessary cause +that they are actions, than that they are voluntary. For the exercise of +the act, he saith that “the will may either will, or suspend its act”. +This is the old canting, which hath already been sufficiently detected. +But to make it somewhat, let us read it thus: the man that willeth, may +either will or suspend his will: and thus it is intelligible, but false; +for how can he that willeth, at the same time suspend his will? And for +the object he says, that “it is not necessary but free”, &c. His reason +is, because, he says, it was not necessary, for example, in choosing a +Pope, to choose him this or that day, or to choose this or that man. I +would be glad to know, by what argument he can prove the election not to +have been necessitated: for it is not enough for him to say, I perceive +no necessity in it; nor to say, they might have chosen another, because +he knows not whether they might or not; nor to say if he had not been +freely elected, the election had been void or none. For though that be +true, it does not follow that the election was not necessary; for there +is no repugnance to necessity, either in election or in freedom. And +whereas he concludeth, “therefore voluntary acts in particular, are not +necessitated”; I would have been glad he had set down what voluntary +acts there are, not particular, which by his restricting of voluntary +acts he grants to be necessitated. + + NO. XXXI. + +_T. H._ Seventhly, I hold that to be a sufficient cause, to which +nothing is wanting that is needful to the producing of the effect. The +same is also a necessary cause: for if it be possible that a sufficient +cause shall not bring forth the effect, then there wanted somewhat which +was needful to the producing of it; and so the cause was not sufficient. +But if it be impossible that a sufficient cause should not produce the +effect, then is a sufficient cause a necessary cause: for that is said +to produce an effect necessarily, that cannot but produce it. Hence it +is manifest, that whatsoever is produced, is produced necessarily: for +whatsoever is produced, hath had a sufficient cause to produce it, or +else it had not been. And therefore also voluntary actions are +necessitated. + +[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] + +_J. D._ “This section contains a third argument to prove that all +effects are necessary; for clearing whereof, it is needful to consider +how a cause may be said to be sufficient or insufficient. + +“First, several causes singly considered may be insufficient, and the +same taken conjointly be sufficient to produce an effect. As (_a_) two +horses jointly are sufficient to draw a coach, which either of them +singly is insufficient to do. Now to make the effect, that is, the +drawing of the coach necessary, it is not only required that the two +horses be sufficient to draw it, but also that their conjunction be +necessary, and their habitude such as they may draw it. If the owner of +one of these horses will not suffer him to draw; if the smith have shod +the other in the quick, and lamed him; if the horse have cast a shoe, or +be a resty jade, and will not draw but when he list; then the effect is +not necessarily produced, but contingently more or less, as the +concurrence of the causes is more or less contingent. + +(_b_) “Secondly, a cause may be said to be sufficient, either because it +produceth that effect which is intended, as in the generation of a man; +or else, because it is sufficient to produce that which is produced, as +in the generation of a monster. The former is properly called a +sufficient cause, the latter a weak and insufficient cause. Now, if the +debility of the cause be not necessary, but contingent, then the effect +is not necessary, but contingent. It is a rule in logic, that the +conclusion always follows the weaker part. If the premises be but +probable, the conclusion cannot be demonstrative. It holds as well in +causes as in propositions. No effect can exceed the virtue of its cause. +If the ability or debility of the causes be contingent, the effect +cannot be necessary. + +“Thirdly, that which concerns this question of liberty from necessity +most nearly, is that (_c_) a cause is said to be sufficient in respect +of the ability of it to act, not in respect of its will to act. The +concurrence of the will is needful to the production of a free effect. +But the cause may be sufficient, though the will do not concur. As God +is sufficient to produce a thousand worlds; but it doth not follow from +thence, either that he hath produced them, or that he will produce them. +The blood of Christ is a sufficient ransom for all mankind; but it doth +not follow therefore, that all mankind shall be actually saved by virtue +of his blood. A man may be a sufficient tutor, though he will not teach +every scholar, and a sufficient physician, though he will not administer +to every patient. For as much therefore as the concurrence of the will +is needful to the production of every free effect, and yet the cause may +be sufficient _in sensu diviso_, although the will do not concur; it +follows evidently, that the cause may be sufficient, and yet something +which is needful to the production of the effect, may be wanting; and +that every sufficient cause is not a necessary cause. + +“Lastly, if any man be disposed to wrangle against so clear light, and +say, that though the free agent be sufficient _in sensu diviso_, yet he +is not sufficient _in sensu composito_, to produce effect without the +concurrence of the will, he saith true: but first, he bewrays the +weakness and the fallacy of the former argument, which is a mere +trifling between sufficiency in a divided sense, and sufficiency in a +compounded sense. And seeing the concurrence of the will is not +predetermined, there is no antecedent necessity before it do concur; and +when it hath concurred, the necessity is but hypothetical, which may +consist with liberty.” + + ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXXI. + +In this place he disputeth against my definition of _a sufficient +cause_, namely, that cause to which nothing is wanting needful to the +producing of the effect. I thought this definition could have been +misliked by no man that had English enough to know that _a sufficient +cause_, _and cause enough_, signifieth the same thing. And no man will +say that that is _cause enough_ to produce an effect, to which any thing +is wanting needful to the producing of it. But the Bishop thinks, if he +set down what he understands by _sufficient_, it would serve to confute +my definition: and therefore says: (_a_) “Two horses jointly are +sufficient to draw a coach, which either of them singly is insufficient +to do. Now to make the effect, that is, the drawing of the coach +necessary, it is not only required that the two horses be sufficient to +draw it, but also that it be necessary they shall be joined, and that +the owner of the horses will let them draw, and that the smith hath not +lamed them, and they be not resty, and list not to draw but when they +list: otherwise the effect is contingent”. It seems the Bishop thinks +two horses may be sufficient to draw a coach, though they will not draw, +or though they be lame, or though they be never put to draw; and I think +they can never produce the effect of drawing, without those needful +circumstances of being strong, obedient, and having the coach some way +or other fastened to them. He calls it a sufficient cause of drawing, +that they be coach horses, though they be lame or will not draw. But I +say they are not sufficient absolutely, but conditionally, if they be +not lame nor resty. Let the reader judge, whether my sufficient cause or +his, may properly be called cause enough. + +(_b_) “Secondly, a cause may be said to be sufficient, either because it +produceth that effect which is intended, as in the generation of a man; +or else, because it is sufficient to produce that which is produced, as +in the generation of a monster: the former is properly called a +sufficient cause, the latter a weak and insufficient cause.” In these +few lines he hath said the cause of the generation of a monster is +sufficient to produce a monster, and that it is insufficient to produce +a monster. How soon may a man forget his words, that doth not understand +them. This term of _insufficient_ cause, which also the School calls +_deficient_, that they may rhyme to _efficient_, is not intelligible, +but a word devised like _hocus pocus_, to juggle a difficulty out of +sight. That which is sufficient to produce a monster, is not therefore +to be called an insufficient cause to produce a man; no more than that +which is sufficient to produce a man, is to be called an insufficient +cause to produce a monster. + +(_c_) “Thirdly, a cause is said to be sufficient in respect to the +ability of it to act, not in respect of its will to act, &c. As God is +sufficient to produce a thousand worlds.” He understands little, when +men say, God is sufficient to produce many worlds, if he understand not +the meaning to be, that he is sufficient to produce them if he will. +Without this supposition, _if he will_, a man is not sufficient to +produce any voluntary action, not so much as to walk, though he be in +health and at liberty. The will is as much a sufficient cause without +the strength to do, as the strength without the will. To that which he +adds, that my definition is “a mere trifling between a sufficiency in a +divided sense, and a sufficiency in a compounded sense”, I can make no +answer; because I understand no more what he means by sufficiency in a +divided sense, and sufficiency in a compounded sense, than if he had +said sufficiency in a divided nonsense, and sufficiency in a compounded +nonsense. + + NO. XXXII. + +_T. H._ Lastly, I hold that the ordinary definition of a free agent, +namely, that a free agent is that, which when all things are present +which are needful to produce the effect, can nevertheless not produce +it, implies a contradiction, and is nonsense; being as much as to say, +the cause may be sufficient, that is, necessary, and yet the effect not +follow. + +[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] + +_J. D._ “This last point is but a corollary, or an inference from the +former doctrine, that ‘every sufficient cause produceth its effect +necessarily’; which pillar being taken away the superstructure must +needs fall to the ground, having nothing left to support it. ‘Lastly, I +hold’, saith he. What he is able to prove, is something: so much reason, +so much trust. But what he holds, concerns himself, not others. But what +holds he? ‘I hold’, saith he, ‘that the ordinary definition of a free +agent implies a contradiction, and is nonsense.’ That which he calls the +‘ordinary definition’ of liberty, is the very definition which is given +by the much greater part of Philosophers and Schoolmen. And doth he +think that all these spake nonsense: or had no more judgment than to +contradict themselves in a definition? He might much better suspect +himself, than censure so many. Let us see the definition itself: ‘A free +agent is that, which when all things are present that are needful to +produce the effect, can nevertheless not produce it.’ I acknowledge the +old definition of liberty, with little variation. But I cannot see this +nonsense, nor discover this contradiction. For (_a_) in these words, +‘all things needful’, or ‘all things requisite’, the actual +determination of the will is not included. But by all things needful or +requisite, all necessary power either operative or elective, all +necessary instruments and adjuments extrinsical and intrinsical, and all +conditions are intended. As he that hath pen, and ink, and paper, a +table, a desk, and leisure, the art of writing, and the free use of his +hand, hath all things requisite to write if he will; and yet he may +forbear if he will. Or as he that hath men, and money, and arms, and +munition, and ships, and a just cause, hath all things requisite for +war; yet he may make peace if he will. Or as the king proclaimed in the +gospel (Matth. xxii. 4): _I have prepared my dinner, my oxen and my +fatlings are killed, all things are ready; come unto the marriage_. +According to T. H.’s doctrine, the guests might have told him that he +said not truly, for their own wills were not ready. (_b_) And indeed if +the will were (as he conceives it is) necessitated extrinsically to +every act of willing, if it had no power to forbear willing what it doth +will, nor to will what it doth not will; then if the will were wanting, +something requisite to the producing of the effect was wanting. But now +when science and conscience, reason and religion, our own and other +men’s experience doth teach us, that the will hath a dominion over its +own acts to will or nill without extrinsical necessitation, if the power +to will be present _in actu primo_, determinable by ourselves, then +there is no necessary power wanting in this respect to the producing of +the effect. + +“Secondly, these words, ‘to act or not to act, to work or not to work, +to produce or not to produce’, have reference to the effect, not as a +thing which is already done or doing, but as a thing to be done. They +imply not the actual production, but the producibility of the effect. +But when once the will hath actually concurred with all other causes and +conditions and circumstances, then the effect is no more possible nor +producible, but it is in being, and actually produced. Thus he takes +away the subject of the question. The question is, whether effects +producible be free from necessity. He shuffles out ‘effects producible’, +and thrusts in their places ‘effects produced’, or which are in the act +of production. Wherefore I conclude, that it is neither nonsense nor +contradiction to say that a free agent, when all things requisite to +produce the effect are present, may nevertheless not produce it. + + ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXXII. + +The question is here whether these words ‘a free agent is that, which +when all things needful to the production of the effect are present, can +nevertheless not produce it’, imply a contradiction; as I say it does. +To make it appear no contradiction, he saith: (_a_) “In these words, +‘all things needful’, or ‘all things requisite’, the actual +determination of the will is not included”: as if the will were not +needful nor requisite to the producing of a voluntary action. For to the +production of any act whatsoever, there is needful, not only those +things which proceed from the agent, but also those that consist in the +disposition of the patient. And to use his own instance, it is necessary +to writing, not only that there be pen, ink, paper, &c.; but also a will +to write. He that hath the former, hath all things requisite to write if +he will, but not all things necessary to writing. And so in his other +instances, he that hath men and money, &c. (without that which he +putteth in for a requisite), hath all things requisite to make war if he +will, but not simply to make war. And he in the Gospel that had prepared +his dinner, had all things requisite for his guests if they came, but +not all things requisite to make them come. And therefore “all things +requisite”, is a term ill defined by him. + +(_b_) “And indeed if the will were (as he conceives it is) necessitated +extrinsically to every act of willing; if it had no power to forbear +willing what it doth will, nor to will what it does not will; then if +the will were wanting, something requisite to the producing of the +effect were wanting. But now when science and conscience, reason and +religion, our own and other men’s experience doth teach us, that the +will hath a dominion over its own acts to will or nill without +extrinsical necessitation, if the power to will be present _in actu +primo_, determinable by ourselves, then there is no necessary power +wanting in this respect to the producing of the effect.” These words, +“the will hath power to forbear willing what it doth will”; and these, +“the will hath a dominion over its own acts”; and these, “the power to +will is present _in actu primo_, determinable by ourselves”; are as wild +as ever were any spoken within the walls of Bedlam: and if science, +conscience, reason, and religion teach us to speak thus, they make us +mad. And that which followeth is false: “to act or not to act, to work +or not to work, to produce or not to produce, have reference to the +effect, not as a thing which is already done or doing, but as a thing to +be done”. For to act, to work, to produce, are the same thing with to be +doing. It is not the act, but the power that hath reference to the +future: for act and power differ in nothing but in this, that the former +signifieth the time present, the latter the time to come. And whereas he +adds, that I shuffle out effects producible, and thrust into their +places effects produced; I must take it for an untruth, till he cite the +place wherein I have done so. + + NO. XXXIII. + +_T. H._ For my first five points; where it is explicated, first, what +spontaneity is; secondly, what deliberation is; thirdly, what will, +propension, and appetite is; fourthly, what a free agent is; fifthly, +what liberty is: there can be no other proof offered but every man’s own +experience, by reflecting on himself, and remembering what he useth to +have in his mind, that is, what he himself meaneth, when he saith, an +action is spontaneous, a man deliberates, such is his will, that agent +or that action is free. Now, he that so reflecteth on himself, cannot +but be satisfied, that _deliberation_ is the considering of the good and +evil sequels of the action to come; that by _spontaneity_ is meant +inconsiderate proceeding; for else nothing is meant by it; that _will_ +is the last act of our deliberation; that a _free agent_, is he that can +do if he will and forbear if he will; and that _liberty_ is the absence +of external impediments. But to those that out of custom speak not what +they conceive, but what they hear, and are not able or will not take the +pains to consider what they think, when they hear such words, no +argument can be sufficient; because experience and matter of fact is not +verified by other men’s arguments, but by every man’s own sense and +memory. For example, how can it be proved, that to love a thing and to +think it good are all one, to a man that does not mark his own meaning +by those words? Or how can it be proved that eternity is not _nunc +stans_, to a man that says these words by custom, and never considers +how he can conceive the thing itself in his mind? Also the sixth point, +that a man cannot imagine any thing to begin without a cause, can no +other way be made known but by trying how he can imagine it. But if he +try, he shall find as much reason, if there be no cause of the thing, to +conceive it should begin at one time as another, that is, he hath equal +reason to think it should begin at all times, which is impossible. And +therefore he must think there was some special cause, why it began then +rather than sooner or later; or else, that it began never, but was +eternal. + +[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] + +_J. D._ “Now at length he comes to his main proofs; he that hath so +confidently censured the whole current of Schoolmen and Philosophers of +_nonsense_, had need to produce strong evidence for himself. So he calls +his reasons, No. XXXVI., _demonstrative proofs_. All demonstrations are +either from the cause or the effect, not from private notions and +conceptions which we have in our minds. That which he calls a +demonstration, deserves not the name of an intimation. He argues thus: +‘that which a man conceives in his mind by these words, spontaneity, +deliberation, &c.; that they are’. This is his proposition, which I +deny. (_a_) The true natures of things are not to be judged by the +private _ideas_, or conceptions of men, but by their causes and formal +reasons. Ask an ordinary person what _upwards_ signifies, and whether +our antipodes have their heads upwards or downwards; and he will not +stick to tell you, that if his head be upwards, theirs must needs be +downwards. And this is because he knows not the formal reason thereof; +that the heavens encircle the earth, and what is towards heaven is +upwards. This same erroneous notion of _upwards_ and _downwards_, before +the true reason was fully discovered, abused more than ordinary +capacities; as appears by their arguments of _penduli homines_, and +_pendulæ arbores_. Again, what do men conceive ordinarily by this word +_empty_, as when they say an empty vessel, or by this word _body_, as +when they say, there is no body in that room? They intend not to exclude +the air, either out of the vessel or out of the room: yet reason tells +us, that the vessel is not truly empty, and that the air is a true body. +I might give a hundred such like instances. He who leaves the conduct of +his understanding to follow vulgar notions, shall plunge himself into a +thousand errors; like him who leaves a certain guide to follow an _ignus +fatuus_, or a will-with-the-wisp. So his proposition is false. (_b_) His +reason, ‘that matter of fact is not verified by other men’s arguments, +but by every man’s own sense and memory’, is likewise maimed on both +sides. Whether we hear such words or not, is matter of fact; and sense +is the proper judge of it: but what these words do, or ought truly to +signify, is not to be judged by sense but by reason. Secondly, reason +may, and doth oftentimes correct sense, even about its proper object. +Sense tells us that the sun is no bigger than a good ball; but reason +demonstrates, that it is many times greater than the whole globe of the +earth. As to his instance: ‘how can it be proved, that to love a thing +and to think it good is all one, to a man that doth not mark his own +meaning by these words’, I confess it cannot be proved; for it is not +true. Beauty, and likeness, and love, do conciliate love as much as +goodness, _cos amoris amor_. Love is a passion of the will; but to judge +of goodness is an act of the understanding. A father may love an +ungracious child, and yet not esteem him good. A man loves his own house +better than another man’s; yet he cannot but esteem many others better +than his own. His other instance, ‘how can it be proved that eternity is +not _nunc stans_, to a man that says these words by custom, and never +considers how he can conceive the thing itself in his mind’, is just +like the former, not to be proved by reason, but by fancy, which is the +way he takes. And it is not unlike the counsel which one gave to a +novice about the choice of his wife, to advise with the bells: as he +fancied so they sounded, either take her or leave her. + +(_c_) “Then for his assumption, it is as defective as his proposition, +that by those words spontaneity, &c, men do understand as he conceives. +No rational man doth conceive a _spontaneous_ action and an +_indeliberate_ action to be all one. Every _indeliberate_ action is not +_spontaneous_; the fire considers not whether it should burn, yet the +burning of it is not _spontaneous_. Neither is every _spontaneous_ +action _indeliberate_; a man may deliberate what he will eat, and yet +eat it _spontaneously_. (_d_) Neither doth _deliberation_ properly +signify, the considering of the good and evil sequels of an action to +come, but the considering whether this be a good and fit means, or the +best and fittest means for obtaining such an end. The physician doth not +deliberate whether he should cure his patient, but by what means he +should cure him. Deliberation is of the means, not of the end. (_e_) +Much less doth any man conceive with T. H. that deliberation is an +_imagination_, or an act of fancy not of reason, common to men of +discretion with madmen, and natural fools, and children, and brute +beasts. (_f_) Thirdly, neither doth any understanding man conceive, or +can conceive, that ‘the will is an act of our deliberation’; (the +understanding and the will are two distinct faculties); or that ‘only +the last appetite is to be called our will’. So no man should be able to +say, this is my will, because he knows not whether he shall persevere in +it or not. (_g_) Concerning the fourth point we agree, that ‘he is a +free agent that can do if he will, and forbear if he will’. But I wonder +how this dropped from his pen. What is now become of his absolute +necessity of all things, if a man be free to do and to forbear anything? +Will he make himself guilty of the _nonsense_ of the Schoolmen, and run +with them into contradictions for company? It may be he will say, he can +do if he will, and forbear if he will, but he cannot will if he will. +This will not serve his turn; for if the cause of a free action, that +is, the will to do it be determined, then the effect, or the action +itself is likewise determined; a determined cause cannot produce an +undetermined effect; either the agent can will and forbear to will, or +else he cannot do and forbear to do. (_h_) But we differ wholly about +the fifth point. He who conceives _liberty_ aright, conceives both a +_liberty in the subject_ to will or not to will, and a _liberty to the +object_ to will this or that, and a _liberty from impediments_. T. H. by +a new way of his own cuts off the _liberty of the subject_; as if a +stone was free to ascend or descend, because it hath no outward +impediment: and the _liberty towards the object_; as if the needle +touched with the loadstone were free to point either towards the north +or towards the south, because there is not a barricado in its way to +hinder it. Yea, he cuts off the _liberty from inward impediments_ also; +as if a hawk were at liberty to fly when her wings are plucked, but not +when they are tied. And so he makes _liberty from extrinsical +impediments_ to be complete liberty; so he ascribes _liberty_ to brute +beasts, and _liberty_ to rivers, and by consequence makes beasts and +rivers to be capable of sin and punishment. Assuredly Xerxes, who caused +the Hellespont to be beaten with so many stripes, was of this opinion. +Lastly, T. H.’s reason, that ‘it is custom, or want of ability, or +negligence, which makes a man conceive otherwise’, is but a begging of +that which he should prove. Other men consider as seriously as himself, +with as much judgment as himself, with less prejudice than himself, and +yet they can apprehend no such sense of these words. Would he have other +men feign they see fiery dragons in the air, because he affirms +confidently that he sees them, and wonders why others are so blind as +not to see them? + +(_i_) “The reason for the sixth point is like the former, a fantastical +or imaginative reason. ‘How can a man imagine anything to begin without +a cause, or if it should begin without a cause, why it should begin at +this time rather than at that time?’ He saith truly, nothing can _begin_ +without a cause, that is, _to be_; but it may _begin to act_ of itself +without any other cause. Nothing can begin without a cause; but many +things may begin, and do begin without necessary causes. A free cause +may as well choose his time when he will begin, as a necessary cause be +determined extrinsically when it must begin. And although free effects +cannot be foretold, because they are not certainly predetermined in +their causes; yet when the free causes do determine themselves, they are +of as great certainty as the other. As when I see a bell ringing, I can +conceive the cause of it as well why it rings now, as I know the +interposition of the earth to be the cause of the eclipse of the moon, +or the most certain occurrent in the nature of things. + +(_k_) “And now that I have answered T. H.’s arguments drawn from the +private conceptions of men concerning the sense of words, I desire him +seriously without prejudice to examine himself, and those natural +notions which he finds in himself, (not of words, but of things; these +are from nature, those are by imposition), whether he doth not find by +experience, that he doth many things which he might have left undone if +he would, and omits many things which he might have done if he would; +whether he doth not some things out of mere animosity and will, without +either regard to the direction of right reason or serious respect of +what is honest or profitable, only to show that he will have a dominion +over his own actions; as we see ordinarily in children, and wise men +find at some times in themselves by experience; (and I apprehend this +very defence of necessity against liberty to be partly of that kind); +whether he is not angry with those who draw him from his study, or cross +him in his desires; (if they be necessitated to do it, why should he be +angry with them, any more than he is angry with a sharp winter, or a +rainy day that keeps him at home against his antecedent will?); whether +he doth not sometimes blame himself, and say, ‘O what a fool was I to do +thus and thus’, or wish to himself, ‘O that I had been wise’, or, ‘O +that I had not done such an act’. If he have no dominion over his +actions, if he be irresistibly necessitated to all things that he doth, +he might as well wish, ‘O that I had not breathed,’ or blame himself for +growing old, ‘O what a fool was I to grow old’.” + + ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXXIII. + +I have said in the beginning of this number, that to define what +spontaneity is, what deliberation is, what will, propension, appetite, a +free agent, and liberty is, and to prove they are well defined, there +can be no other proof offered, but every man’s own experience and memory +of what he meaneth by such words. For definitions being the beginning of +all demonstration, cannot themselves be demonstrated, that is, proved to +another man; all that can be done, is either to put him in mind what +those words signify commonly in the matter whereof they treat, or if the +words be unusual, to make the definitions of them true by mutual consent +in their signification. And though this be manifestly true, yet there is +nothing of it amongst the Schoolmen, who use to argue not by rule, but +as fencers teach to handle weapons, by quickness only of the hand and +eye. The Bishop therefore boggles at this kind of proof; and says, (_a_) +“the true natures of things are not to be judged by the private ideas or +conceptions of men, but by their causes and formal reasons. Ask an +ordinary person what upwards signifies,” &c. But what will he answer, if +I should ask him, how he will judge of the causes of things, whereof he +hath no idea or conception in his own mind? It is therefore impossible +to give a true definition of any word without the idea of the thing +which that word signifieth, or not according to that idea or conception. +Here again he discovereth the true cause why he and other Schoolmen so +often speak absurdly. For they speak without conception of the things, +and by rote, one receiving what he saith from another by tradition, from +some puzzled divine or philosopher, that to decline a difficulty speaks +in such manner as not to be understood. And where he bids us ask an +ordinary person what upwards signifieth, I dare answer for that ordinary +person he will tell us as significantly as any scholar, and say it is +towards heaven; and as soon as he knows the earth is round, makes no +scruple to believe there are antipodes, being wiser in that point than +were those which he saith to have been of more than ordinary capacities. +Again, ordinary men understand not, he saith, the words _empty_ and +_body_; yes, but they do, just as well as learned men. When they hear +named an empty vessel, the learned as well as the unlearned mean and +understand the same thing, namely, that there is nothing in it that can +be seen; and whether it be truly empty, the ploughman and the Schoolman +know alike. “I might give”, he says, “a hundred such like instances.” +That is true; a man may give a thousand foolish and impertinent +instances of men ignorant in such questions of philosophy concerning +emptiness, body, upwards, and downwards, and the like. But the question +is not whether such and such tenets be true, but whether such and such +words can be well defined without thinking upon the things they +signified; as the Bishop thinks they may, when he concludeth with these +words, “so his proposition is false”. + +(_b_) “His reason, ‘that matter of fact is not verified by other men’s +arguments, but by every man’s own sense and memory’, is likewise maimed +on both sides. Whether we hear such words or not, is matter of fact, and +sense is the proper judge of it; but what these words do, or ought truly +to signify, is not to be judged by sense, but by reason.” A man is born +with a capacity after due time and experience to reason truly; to which +capacity of nature, if there be added no discipline at all, yet as far +as he reasoneth he will reason truly; though by a right discipline he +may reason truly in more numerous and various matters. But he that hath +lighted on deceiving or deceived masters, that teach for truth all that +hath been dictated to them by their own interest, or hath been cried up +by other such teachers before them, have for the most part their natural +reason, as far as concerneth the truth of doctrine, quite defaced or +very much weakened, becoming changelings through the enchantments of +words not understood. This cometh into my mind from this saying of the +Bishop, that matter of fact is not verified by sense and memory, but by +arguments. How is it possible that, without discipline, a man should +come to think that the testimony of a witness, which is the only +verifier of matter of fact, should consist not in sense and memory, so +as he may say he saw and remembers the thing done, but in arguments or +syllogisms? Or how can an unlearned man be brought to think the words he +speaks, ought to signify, when he speaks sincerely, anything else but +that which himself meant by them? Or how can any man without learning +take the question, “whether the sun be no bigger than a ball, or bigger +than the earth”, to be a question of fact? Nor do I think that any man +is so simple, as not to find that to be good which he loveth; good, I +say, so far forth, as it maketh him to love it. Or is there any +unlearned man so stupid, as to think eternity is this present instant of +time standing still, and the same eternity to be the very next instant +after; and consequently that there be so many eternities as there can be +instants of time supposed? No, there is scholastic learning required in +some measure to make one mad. + +(_c_) “Then for his assumption, it is as defective as his proposition, +that by these words, spontaneity, &c. men do understand as he conceives, +&c. No rational man doth conceive a spontaneous action and an +indeliberate action to be all one; every indeliberate action is not +spontaneous, &c.” Not every _spontaneous_ action _indeliberate_? This I +get by striving to make sense of that which he strives to make nonsense. +I never thought the word _spontaneity_ English. Yet because he used it, +I make such meaning of it as it would bear, and said it “meant +inconsiderate proceeding, or nothing”. And for this my too much +officiousness, I receive the reward of being thought by him not to be a +rational man. I know that in the Latin of all authors but Schoolmen, +_actio spontanea_ signifies that action, whereof there is no apparent +cause derived further than from the agent itself; and is in all things +that have sense the same with voluntary, whether deliberated or not +deliberated. And therefore where he distinguished it from voluntary, I +thought he might mean indeliberate. But let it signify what it will, +provided it be intelligible, it would make against him. + +(_d_) “Neither doth deliberation properly signify ‘the considering of +the good and evil sequels of an action to come’; but the considering +whether this be a good and fit means, or the best and fittest means, for +obtaining such an end.” If the Bishop’s words proceeded not from hearing +and reading of others, but from his own thoughts, he could never have +reprehended this definition of deliberation, especially in the manner he +doth it; for he says, it is the considering whether this or that be a +good and fit means for obtaining such an end; as if considering whether +a means be good or not, were not all one with considering whether the +sequel of using those means be good or evil. + +(_e_) “Much less doth any man conceive with T. H. that ‘deliberation is +an act of fancy’, not of reason, common to men of discretion with +madmen, natural fools, children, and brute beasts”. I do indeed conceive +that deliberation is an act of imagination or fancy; nay more, that +reason and understanding also are acts of the imagination, that is to +say, they are imaginations. I find it so by considering my own +ratiocination; and he might find it so in his, if he did consider his +own thoughts, and not speak as he does by rote; by rote I say, when he +disputes; not by rote, when he is about those trifles he calleth +business; then when he speaks, he thinks of, that is to say, he +imagines, his business; but here he thinks only upon the words of other +men that have gone before him in this question, transcribing their +conclusions and arguments, not his own thoughts. + +(_f_) “Thirdly, neither doth any understanding man conceive, or can +conceive, either ‘that the will is an act of our deliberation’ (the +understanding and the will are two distinct faculties); or ‘that only +the last appetite is to be called our will’.” Though the understanding +and the will were two distinct faculties, yet followeth it not that the +will and the deliberation are two distinct faculties. For the whole +deliberation is nothing else but so many wills alternatively changed, +according as a man understandeth or fancieth the good and evil sequels +of the thing concerning which he deliberateth whether he shall pursue +it, or of the means whether they conduce or not to that end, whatsoever +it be, he seeketh to obtain. So that in deliberation there be many +wills, whereof not any is the cause of a voluntary action but the last; +as I have said before, answering this objection in another place. + +(_g_) “Concerning the fourth point we agree, that ‘he is a free agent, +that can do if he will and forbear if he will’. But I wonder how this +dropped from his pen? &c. It may be he will say he can do if he will and +forbear if he will, but he cannot will if he will.” He has no reason to +wonder how this dropped from my pen. He found it in my answer No. III, +and has been all this while about to confute it, so long indeed that he +had forgot I said it; and now again brings another argument to prove a +man is free to will, which is this: “Either the agent can will and +forbear to will, or else he cannot do and forbear to do”. There is no +doubt a man can will one thing or other, and forbear to will it. For +men, if they be awake, are always willing one thing or other. But put +the case, a man has a will to-day to do a certain action to-morrow; is +he sure to have the same will to-morrow, when he is to do it? Is he free +to-day, to choose to-morrow’s will? This is it that is now in question, +and this argument maketh nothing for the affirmative or negative. + +(_h_) “But we differ wholly about the fifth point. He who conceives +liberty aright, conceives both a ‘liberty in the subject’, to will or +not to will, and a ‘liberty to the object’ to will this or that, and a +‘liberty from impediments’. T. H., by a new way of his own, cuts off the +‘liberty of the subject’, as if a stone were free to ascend or descend +because it hath no outward impediment; and the ‘liberty towards the +object’, as if the needle touched with the loadstone were free to point +either towards the north or towards the south, because there is not a +barricado in its way.” How does it appear, that he who conceives liberty +aright, conceives a liberty in the subject to will or not to will; +unless he mean liberty to do if he will, or not to do if he will not, +which was never denied? Or how does it follow, that a stone is as free +to ascend as descend, unless he prove there is no outward impediment to +its ascent; which cannot be proved, for the contrary is true? Or how +proveth he, that there is no outward impediment to keep that point of +the loadstone, which placeth itself towards the north, from turning to +the south? His ignorance of the causes external is not a sufficient +argument that there are none. And whereas he saith, that according to my +definition of liberty, “a hawk were at liberty to fly when her wings are +plucked, but not when they are tied”; I answer that she is not at +liberty to fly when her wings are tied; but to say, when her wings are +plucked that she wanted the liberty to fly, were to speak improperly and +absurdly; for in that case, men that speak English use to say she cannot +fly. And for his reprehension of my attributing liberty to brute beasts +and rivers; I would be glad to know whether it be improper language, to +say a bird or beast may be set at liberty from the cage wherein they +were imprisoned or to say that a river, which was stopped, hath +recovered its free course; and how it follows, that a beast or river +recovering this freedom must needs therefore “be capable of sin and +punishment”? + +(_i_) “The reason for the sixth point is like the former, a phantastical +or imaginative reason: ‘How can a man imagine anything to begin without +a cause; or if it should begin without a cause, why it should begin at +this time, rather than at that time?’ He saith truly, nothing can +_begin_ without a cause, that is _to be_; but it may _begin to act_ of +itself without any other cause. Nothing can _begin_ without a cause; but +many things may _begin_ without a necessary cause.” He granteth nothing +can _begin_ without a cause; and he hath granted formerly that nothing +can cause itself. And now he saith, it may begin _to act_ of itself. The +action therefore _begins to be_ without any cause, which he said nothing +could do, contradicting what he had said but in the line before. And for +that that he saith, that “many things may begin not without a cause, but +without a necessary cause”; it hath been argued before; and all causes +have been proved, if entire and sufficient causes, to be necessary. And +that which he repeateth here, namely, that “a free cause may choose his +time when he will begin to work”; and that “although free effects cannot +be foretold, because they are not certainly predetermined in their +causes, yet when the free causes do determine themselves, they are of as +great certainty as the other”; it has been made appear sufficiently +before that it is but jargon, the words _free cause_ and _determining +themselves_ being insignificant, and having nothing in the mind of man +answerable to them. + +(_k_) “And now that I have answered T. H.’s arguments, drawn from the +private conceptions of men concerning the sense of words, I desire him +seriously to examine himself, &c.” One of his interrogatories is this, +“whether I find not by experience, that I do many things which I might +have left undone if I would”. This question was needless, because all +the way I have granted him that men have liberty to do many things if +they will, which they left undone because they had not the will to do +them. Another interrogatory is this, “whether I do not some things +without regard to the direction of right reason, or serious respect of +what is honest or profitable”. This question was in vain, unless he +think himself my confessor. Another is, “whether I writ not this defence +against liberty, only to show I will have a dominion over my own +actions”. To this I answer, no: but to show I have no dominion over my +will, and this also at his request. But all these questions serve in +this place for nothing else, but to deliver him of a jest he was in +labour withal: and therefore his last question is, “whether I do not +sometimes say, ‘Oh, what a fool was I to do thus and thus!’ or, ‘Oh, +that I had been wise!’ or, ‘Oh, what a fool was I to grow old!’” Subtle +questions, and full of episcopal gravity! I would he had left out +charging me with _blasphemous, desperate, destructive, and atheistical_ +opinions. I should then have pardoned him his calling me _fool_; both +because I do many things foolishly, and because, in this question +disputed between us, I think he will appear a greater fool than I. + + NO. XXXIV. + +_T. H._ For the seventh point, that all events have necessary causes, it +is there proved in that they have sufficient causes. Further, let us in +this place also suppose any event never so casual, as for example, the +throwing ambs-ace upon a pair of dice; and see if it must not have been +necessary before it was thrown. For, seeing it was thrown, it had a +beginning, and consequently a sufficient cause to produce it; consisting +partly in the dice, partly in the outward things, as the posture of the +party’s hand, the measure of force applied by the caster, the posture of +the parts of the table, and the like. In sum, there was nothing wanting +that was necessarily requisite to the producing of that particular cast; +and consequently, that cast was necessarily thrown. For if it had not +been thrown, there had wanted somewhat requisite to the throwing of it; +and so the cause had not been sufficient. In the like manner it may be +proved that every other accident, how contingent soever it seem, or how +voluntary soever it be, is produced necessarily; which is that J. D. +disputes against. The same also may be proved in this manner. Let the +case be put for example, of the weather. _It is necessary, that +to-morrow it shall rain or not rain._ If therefore it be not necessary +it shall rain, it is necessary it shall not rain. Otherwise it is not +necessary that the proposition, _it shall rain or it shall not rain_, +should be true. I know there are some that say, it may necessarily be +true, that one of the two shall come to pass, but not singly, that it +shall rain or it shall not rain. Which is as much as to say, one of them +is necessary, yet neither of them is necessary. And therefore, to seem +to avoid that absurdity, they make a distinction, that neither of them +is true _determinate_, but _indeterminate_. Which distinction either +signifies no more than this: one of them is true, but we know not which, +and so the necessity remains, though we know it not: or if the meaning +of the distinction be not that, it has no meaning. And they might as +well have said, one of them is true _tytyrice_, but neither of them +_tupatulice_. + +[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] + +_J. D._ (_a_) “His former proof, that all sufficient causes are +necessary causes, is answered before (No. XXXI). (_b_) And his two +instances of casting ambs-ace, and raining to-morrow, are altogether +impertinent to the question now agitated between us, for two reasons. +First, our present controversy is concerning free actions, which proceed +from the liberty of man’s will: both his instances are of contingent +actions, which proceed from the indetermination or contingent +concurrence of natural causes. First, that there are free actions which +proceed merely from election, without any outward necessitation, is a +truth so evident as that there is a sun in the heavens; and he that +doubteth of it, may as well doubt whether there be a shell without the +nut, or a stone within the olive. A man proportions his time each day, +and allots so much to his devotions, so much to his study, so much to +his diet, so much to his recreations, so much to necessary or civil +visits, so much to his rest; he who will seek for I know not what causes +of all this without himself, except that good God who hath given him a +reasonable soul, may as well seek for a cause of the Egyptian pyramids +among the crocodiles of Nilus. (_c_) Secondly, for mixed actions which +proceed from the concurrence of free and natural agents, though they be +not free, yet they are not necessary. As, to keep my former instance, a +man walking through a street of a city to do his occasions, a tile falls +from a house and breaks his head. The breaking of his head was not +necessary, for he did freely choose to go that way without any +necessitation; neither was it free, for he did not deliberate of that +accident; therefore it was contingent, and by undoubted consequence, +there are contingent actions in the world which are not free. Most +certainly by the concurrence of free causes, as God, the good and bad +angels, and men, with natural agents, sometimes on purpose and sometimes +by accident, many events happen, which otherwise had never happened; +many effects are produced, which otherwise had never been produced. And +admitting such things to be contingent, not necessary, all their +consequent effects, not only immediate, but mediate, must likewise be +contingent, that is to say, such as do not proceed from a continued +connexion and succession of necessary causes; which is directly contrary +to T. H.’s opinion. + +(_d_) “Thirdly, for the actions of brute beasts, though they be not +free, though they have not the use of reason to restrain their appetites +from that which is sensitively good by the consideration of what is +rationally good, or what is honest, and though their fancies be +determined by nature to some kinds of work; yet to think that every +individual action of theirs, and each animal motion of theirs, even to +the least murmur or gesture, is bound by the chain of unalterable +necessity to the extrinsical causes or objects, I see no ground for it. +Christ saith, _one of these sparrows doth not fall to the ground without +your heavenly Father_, that is, without an influence of power from him, +or exempted from his disposition; he doth not say, which your heavenly +Father casteth not down. Lastly, for the natural actions of inanimate +creatures, wherein there is not the least concurrence of any free or +voluntary agents, the question is yet more doubtful. For many things are +called contingent in respect of us, because we know not the cause of +them, which really and in themselves are not contingent, but necessary. +Also many things are contingent in respect of one single cause, either +actually hindered, or in possibility to be hindered, which are necessary +in respect of the joint concurrence of all collateral causes. (_e_) But +whether there be a necessary connexion of all natural causes from the +beginning, so as they must all have concurred as they have done, and in +the same degree of power, and have been deficient as they have been in +all events whatsoever, would require a further examination, if it were +pertinent to this question of liberty; but it is not. It is sufficient +to my purpose, to have showed that all elective actions are free from +absolute necessity: and moreover, that the concurrence of voluntary and +free agents with natural causes, both upon purpose and accidentally, +hath helped them to produce many effects, which otherwise they had not +produced, and hindered them from producing many effects, which otherwise +they had produced: and that if this intervention of voluntary and free +agents had been more frequent than it hath been, as without doubt it +might have been, many natural events had been otherwise than they are. +And therefore he might have spared his instance of casting ambs-ace and +raining to-morrow. And first, for his casting ambs-ace: if it be thrown +by a fair gamester with indifferent dice, it is a mixed action; the +casting of the dice is free, but the casting of ambs-ace is contingent. +A man may deliberate whether he will cast the dice or not; but it were +folly to deliberate whether he will cast ambs-ace or not, because it is +not in his power, unless he be a cheater that can cog the dice, or the +dice be false dice; and then the contingency, or degree of contingency, +ceaseth accordingly as the caster hath more or less cunning, or as the +figure or making of the dice doth incline them to ambs-ace more than to +another cast, or necessitate them to this cast and no other. Howsoever, +so far as the cast is free or contingent, so far it is not necessary: +and where necessity begins, there liberty and contingency do cease to +be. Likewise his other instance of raining or not raining to-morrow, is +not of a free elective act, nor always of a contingent act. In some +countries, as they have their _stati venti_, their certain winds at set +seasons; so they have their certain and set rains. The Ethiopian rains +are supposed to be the cause of the certain inundation of Nilus. In some +eastern countries they have rain only twice a year, and those constant; +which the Scriptures call _the former and the later rain_. In such +places not only the causes do act determinately and necessarily, but +also the determination or necessity of the event is foreknown to the +inhabitants. In our climate, the natural causes celestial and sublunary +do not produce rain so necessarily at set times; neither can we say so +certainly and infallibly, it will rain to-morrow, or it will not rain +to-morrow. Nevertheless, it may so happen that the causes are so +disposed and determined, even in our climate, that this proposition, it +will rain to-morrow or it will not rain to-morrow, may be necessary in +itself; and the prognostics, or tokens, may be such in the sky, in our +own bodies, in the creatures, animate and inanimate, as weather glasses, +&c., that it may become probably true to us that it will rain to-morrow, +or it will not rain to-morrow. But ordinarily, it is a contingent +proposition to us; whether it be contingent also in itself, that is, +whether the concurrence of the causes were absolutely necessary, whether +the vapours or matter of the rain may not yet be dispersed, or otherwise +consumed, or driven beyond our coast, is a speculation which no way +concerns this question. So we see one reason why his two instances are +altogether impertinent; because they are of actions which are not free, +nor elective, nor such as proceed from the liberty of man’s will. + +“Secondly, our dispute is about absolute necessity; his proofs extend +only to hypothetical necessity. Our question is, whether the concurrence +and determination of the causes were necessary before they did concur, +or were determined. He proves that the effect is necessary after the +causes have concurred, and are determined. The freest actions of God or +man are necessary, by such a necessity of supposition, and the most +contingent events that are, as I have showed plainly, No. III, where his +instance of ambs-ace is more fully answered. So his proof looks another +way from his proposition. His proposition is, ‘that the casting of +ambs-ace was necessary before it was thrown’. His proof is, that it was +necessary when it was thrown. Examine all his causes over and over, and +they will not afford him one grain of antecedent necessity. The first +cause is in the dice: true, if they be false dice there may be something +in it; but then his contingency is destroyed: if they be square dice, +they have no more inclination to ambs-ace, than to cinque and quatre, or +any other cast. His second cause is ‘the posture of the party’s hand’: +but what necessity was there that he should put his hands into such a +posture? None at all. The third cause is ‘the measure of the force +applied by the caster’. Now for the credit of his cause let him but +name, I will not say a convincing reason nor so much as a probable +reason, but even any pretence of reason, how the caster was necessitated +from without himself to apply just so much force, and neither more nor +less. If he cannot, his cause is desperate, and he may hold his peace +for ever. His last cause is the posture of the table. But tell us in +good earnest, what necessity there was why the caster must throw into +that table rather than the other, or that the dice must fall just upon +that part of the table, before the cast was thrown: he that makes these +to be necessary causes, I do not wonder if he make all effects necessary +effects. If any one of these causes be contingent, it is sufficient to +render the cast contingent; and now that they are all so contingent, yet +he will needs have the effect to be necessary. And so it is when the +cast is thrown; but not before the cast was thrown, which he undertook +to prove. Who can blame him for being so angry with the Schoolmen, and +their distinctions of necessity into absolute and hypothetical, seeing +they touch his freehold so nearly? + +“But though his instance of raining to-morrow be impertinent, as being +no free action, yet because he triumphs so much in his argument, I will +not stick to go a little out of my way to meet a friend. For I confess +the validity of the reason had been the same, if he had made it of a +free action, as thus: _either I shall finish this reply to-morrow, or I +shall not finish this reply to-morrow_, is a necessary proposition. But +because he shall not complain of any disadvantage in the alteration of +his terms, I will for once adventure upon his shower of rain. And first, +I readily admit his major, that this proposition, _either it will rain +to-morrow or it will not rain to-morrow_, is necessarily true: for of +two contradictory propositions, the one must of necessity be true, +because no third can be given. But his minor, that ‘it could not be +necessarily true, except one of the members were necessarily true’, is +most false. And so is his proof likewise, that ‘if neither the one nor +the other of the members be necessarily true, it cannot be affirmed that +either the one or the other is true’. A conjunct proposition may have +both parts false, and yet the proposition be true; as, _if the sun shine +it is day_, is a true proposition at midnight. And T. H. confesseth as +much, No. XIX. ‘_If I shall live I shall eat_, is a necessary +proposition, that is to say, it is necessary that that proposition +should be true whensoever uttered. But it is not the necessity of the +thing, nor is it therefore necessary that the man shall live or that the +man shall eat’. And so T. H. proceeds: ‘I do not use to fortify my +distinctions with such reasons’. But it seemeth he hath forgotten +himself, and is contented with such poor fortifications. And though both +parts of a disjunctive proposition cannot be false; because if it be a +right disjunction, the members are repugnant, whereof one part is +infallibly true; yet vary but the proposition a little to abate the edge +of the disjunctions, and you shall find in that which T. H. saith to be +true, that it is not the necessity of the thing which makes the +proposition to be true. As for example, vary it thus: _I know that +either it will rain to-morrow or that it will not rain to-morrow_, is a +true proposition: but it is not true that I know it will rain to-morrow, +neither is it true that I know it will not rain to-morrow; wherefore the +certain truth of the proposition doth not prove that either of the +members is determinately true in present. Truth is a conformity of the +understanding to the thing known, whereof speech is an interpreter. If +the understanding agree not with the thing, it is an error; if the words +agree not with the understanding, it is a lie. Now the thing known, is +known either in itself or in its causes. If it be known in itself as it +is, then we express our apprehension of it in words of the present +tense; as _the sun is risen_. If it be known in its cause, we express +ourselves in words of the future tense; as _to-morrow will be an eclipse +of the moon_. But if we neither know it in itself, nor in its causes, +then there may be a foundation of truth, but there is no such +determinate truth of it that we can reduce it into a true proposition. +We cannot say it doth rain to-morrow, or it doth not rain to-morrow; +that were not only false but absurd. We cannot positively say it will +rain to-morrow, because we do not know it in its causes, either how they +are determined or that they are determined. Wherefore the certitude and +evidence of the disjunctive proposition is neither founded upon that +which will be actually to-morrow, for it is granted that we do not know +that; nor yet upon the determination of the causes, for then we would +not say indifferently either it will rain or it will not rain, but +positively it will rain, or positively it will not rain. But it is +grounded upon an undeniable principle, that of two contradictory +propositions the one must necessarily be true. (_f_) And therefore to +say, _either this or that will infallibly be, but it is not yet +determined whether this or that shall be_, is no such senseless +assertion that it deserved a _tytyrice tupatulice_, but an evident truth +which no man that hath his eyes in his head can doubt of. + +(_g_) “If all this will not satisfy him, I will give one of his own kind +of proofs; that is, an instance. That which necessitates all things, +according to T. H. (No. XI), is the decree of God, or that order which +is set to all things by the eternal cause. Now God himself, who made +this necessitating decree, was not subjected to it in the making +thereof; neither was there any former order to oblige the first cause +necessarily to make such a decree; therefore this decree being an act +_ad extra_, was freely made by God without any necessitation. Yet +nevertheless this disjunctive proposition is necessarily true: _either +God did make each a decree, or he did not make such a decree_. Again, +though T. H.’s opinion were true, that all events are necessary, and +that the whole Christian world are deceived who believe that some events +are free from necessity; yet he will not deny, but if it had been the +good pleasure of God, he might have made some causes free from +necessity; seeing that it neither argues any imperfection, nor implies +any contradiction. Supposing therefore that God had made some second +causes free from any such antecedent determination to one; yet the +former disjunction would be necessarily true: either this free +undetermined cause will act after this manner, or it will not act after +this manner. Wherefore the necessary truth of such a disjunctive +proposition doth not prove that either of the members of the disjunction +singly considered, is determinately true in present; but only that the +one of them will be determinately true to-morrow. + + ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXXIV. + +(_a_) “His former proof, that all sufficient causes are necessary +causes, is answered before (No. XXXI).” When he shall have read my +animadversions upon that answer of his, he will think otherwise, +whatsoever he will confess. + +(_b_) “And his two instances of casting ambs-ace, and of raining +to-morrow, are altogether impertinent to the question, for two reasons.” +His first reason is, “because”, saith he, “our present controversy is +concerning free actions, which proceed from the liberty of man’s will; +and both his instances are of contingent actions, which proceed from the +indetermination, or contingent concurrence of natural causes”. He knows +that this part of my discourse, which beginneth at No. XXV, is no +dispute with him at all, but a bare setting down of my opinion +concerning the natural necessity of all things; which is opposite, not +only to the liberty of will, but also to all contingence that is not +necessary. And therefore these instances were not impertinent to my +purpose; and if they be impertinent to his opinion of the liberty of +man’s will, he does impertinently to meddle with them. And yet for all +he pretends here, that the question is only about liberty of the will; +yet in his first discourse (No. XVI), he maintains that “the order, +beauty, and perfection of the world doth require that in the universe +should be agents of all sorts, some necessary, some free, some +contingent”. And my purpose here is to show by those instances, that +those things which we esteem most contingent are nevertheless necessary. +Besides, the controversy is not whether free actions which proceed from +the liberty of man’s will, be necessary or not; for I know no action +which proceedeth from the liberty of man’s will. But the question is, +whether those actions which proceed from the man’s will, be necessary. +The man’s will is something, but the liberty of his will is nothing. +Again, the question is not whether contingent actions which proceed from +the indetermination or contingent concurrence of natural causes, (for +there is nothing that can proceed from indetermination), but whether +contingent actions be necessary before they be done; or whether the +concurrence of natural causes, when they happen to concur, were not +necessitated so to happen; or whether whatsoever chanceth, be not +necessitated so to chance. And that they are so necessitated, I have +proved already with such arguments as the Bishop, for aught I see, +cannot answer. For to say, as he doth, that “there are free actions +which proceed merely from election, without any outward necessitation, +is a truth so evident as that there is a sun in the heavens”, is no +proof. It is indeed as clear as the sun, that there are free actions +proceeding from election; but that there is election without any outward +necessitation, is dark enough. + +(_c_) “Secondly, for mixed actions, which proceed from the concurrence +of free and natural agents, though they be not free, yet they are not +necessary, &c.” For proof of this he instanceth in a tile, that falling +from a house breaks a man’s head, neither necessarily nor freely, and +therefore contingently. Not necessarily, “for”, saith he, “he did freely +choose to go that way without any necessitation”. Which is as much as +taking the question itself for a proof. For what is else the question, +but whether a man be necessitated to choose what he chooseth? “Again”, +saith he, “it was not free, because he did not deliberate whether his +head should be broken or not”; and concludes “therefore it was +contingent; and by undoubted consequence, there are contingent actions +in the world which are not free”. This is true, and denied by none; but +he should have proved, that such contingent actions are not antecedently +necessary by a concurrence of natural causes; though a little before he +granteth they are. For whatsoever is produced by a concurrence of +natural causes, was antecedently determined in the cause of such +concurrence, though, as he calls it, contingent concurrence; not +perceiving that concurrence and contingent concurrence are all one, and +suppose a continued connection and succession of causes which make the +effect necessarily future. So that hitherto he hath proved no other +contingence than that which is necessary. + +(_d_) “Thirdly, for the actions of brute beasts, &c, to think each +animal motion of theirs is bound by the chain of unalterable necessity, +I see no ground for it.” It maketh nothing against the truth, that he +sees no ground for it. I have pointed out the ground in my former +discourse, and am not bound to find him eyes. He himself immediately +citeth a place of Scripture that proveth it, where Christ saith, _one of +these sparrows doth not fall to the ground without your heavenly +Father_; which place, if there were no more, were a sufficient ground +for the assertion of the necessity of all those changes of animal motion +in birds and other living creatures, which seem to us so uncertain. But +when a man is dizzy with _influence of power_, _elicit acts_, +_permissive will_, _hypothetical necessity_, and the like unintelligible +terms, the ground goes from him. By and by after he confesseth that +“many things are called contingent in respect of us, because we know not +the cause of them, which really and in themselves are not contingent, +but necessary”; and errs therein the other way; for he says in effect, +that many things are, which are not; for it is all one to say, they are +not contingent, and they are not. He should have said, there be many +things, the necessity of whose contingence we cannot or do not know. + +(_e_) “But whether there be a necessary connexion of all natural causes +from the beginning, so as they must all have concurred as they have +done, &c, would require a further examination, if it were pertinent to +this question of liberty; but it is not. It is sufficient to my purpose +to have showed, &c.” If there be a necessary connexion of all natural +causes from the beginning, then there is no doubt but that all things +happen necessarily, which is that that I have all this while maintained. +But whether there be or no, he says, it requires a further examination. +Hitherto therefore he knows not whether it be true or no, and +consequently all his arguments hitherto have been of no effect, nor hath +he showed anything to prove, what he purposed, that elective actions are +not necessitated. And whereas a little before he says, that to my +arguments to prove that sufficient causes are necessary, he hath already +answered; it seemeth he distrusteth his own answer, and answers again to +the two instances of _casting ambs-ace_, and _raining or not raining +to-morrow_; but brings no other argument to prove the cast thrown not to +be necessarily thrown, but this, that he does not deliberate whether he +shall throw that cast or not. Which argument may perhaps prove that the +casting of it proceedeth not from free will, but proves not anything +against the antecedent necessity of it. And to prove that it is not +necessary that it should rain or not rain to-morrow; after telling us +that the Ethiopian rains cause the inundation of Nilus: that in some +eastern countries they have rain only twice a year, which the Scripture, +he saith, calleth _the former and the latter rain_; (I thought he had +known it by the experience of some travellers, but I see he only +gathereth it from that phrase in Scripture of _former and latter rain_); +I say, after he has told us this, to prove that it is not necessary it +should rain or not rain to-morrow he saith that “in our climate the +natural causes, celestial and sublunary, do not produce rain so +necessarily at set times, as in the eastern countries; neither can we +say so certainly and infallibly, it will rain to-morrow, or it will not +rain to-morrow”. By this argument a man may take the height of the +Bishop’s logic. “In our climate the natural causes do not produce rain +so necessarily at set times, as in some eastern countries. Therefore +they do not produce rain necessarily in our climate, then when they do +produce it”. And again, “we cannot say so certainly and infallibly, it +will rain to-morrow or it will not rain to-morrow; therefore it is not +necessary either that it should rain, or that it should not rain +to-morrow”: as if nothing were necessary the necessity whereof we know +not. Another reason, he saith, why my instances are impertinent, is +because “they extend only to an hypothetical necessity”, that is, that +the necessity is not in the antecedent causes; and thereupon challengeth +me for the credit of my cause to name some reason, “how the caster was +necessitated from without himself to apply just so much force to the +cast, and neither more nor less; or what necessity there was why the +caster must throw into that table rather than the other, or that the +dice must fall just upon that part of the table, before the cast was +thrown”. Here again, from our ignorance of the particular causes that +concurring make the necessity he inferreth, that there was no such +necessity at all; which indeed is that which hath in all this question +deceived him, and all other men that attribute events to fortune. But I +suppose he will not deny that event to be necessary, where all the +causes of the cast, and their concurrence, and the cause of that +concurrence are foreknown, and might be told him, though I cannot tell +him. Seeing therefore God foreknows them all, the cast was necessary; +and that from antecedent causes from eternity; which is no hypothetical +necessity. + +And whereas to my argument to prove, that ‘raining to-morrow if it shall +then rain, and not raining to-morrow if it shall then not rain’, was +therefore necessary, because ‘otherwise this disjunctive proposition, it +shall rain or not rain to-morrow, is not necessary’, he answereth that +“a conjunct proposition may have both parts false, and yet the +proposition be true; as, if the sun shine it is day, is a true +proposition at midnight”: what has a conjunct proposition to do with +this in question, which is disjunctive? Or what be the parts of this +proposition, _if the sun shine, it is day_? It is not made of two +propositions, as a disjunctive is; but is one simple proposition, +namely, this, _the shining of the sun is day_. Either he has no logic at +all, or thinks they have no reason at all that are his readers. But he +has a trick, he saith, to abate the edge of the disjunction, by varying +ther proposition thus, “I know that _it will rain to-morrow_, or _that +it will not rain to-morrow_, is a true proposition”; and yet saith he, +“it is neither true that I know it will rain to-morrow, neither is it +true that I know it will not rain to-morrow”. What childish deceit, or +childish ignorance is this; when he is to prove that neither of the +members is determinately true in a disjunctive proposition, to bring for +instance a proposition not disjunctive? It had been disjunctive if it +had gone thus, _I know that it will rain to-morrow, or I know that it +will not rain to-morrow_; but then he had certainly known determinately +one of the two. + +(_f_) “And therefore to say, either this or that will infallibly be, but +it is not yet determined whether this or that shall be, is no such +senseless assertion that it deserved a _tytyrice tupatulice_”. But it is +a senseless assertion, whatsoever it deserve, to say that this +proposition, it shall rain or not rain, is true _indeterminedly_, and +neither of them true _determinedly_; and little better, as he hath now +qualified it, “that it will infallibly be, though it be not yet +determined whether it shall be or no”. + +(_g_) “If all this will not satisfy him, I will give him one of his own +kinds of proof, that is, an instance. That which necessitates all +things, according to T. H. is the decree of God, &c.” His instance is, +“that God himself made this necessitating decree, and therefore this +decree, being an act _ad extra_, was freely made by God, without any +necessitation”. I do believe the Bishop himself believeth that all the +decrees of God have been from all eternity, and therefore he will not +stand to this, that God’s decrees were ever made; for whatsoever hath +been made, hath had a beginning. Besides, God’s decree is his will; and +the Bishop hath said formerly, that the will of God is God, the justice +of God, God, &c. If therefore God made a decree, according to the +Bishop’s opinion God made himself. By which we may see, what fine stuff +it is that proceedeth from disputing of incomprehensibles. Again he +says, “if it had been the good pleasure of God, he might have made some +causes free from necessity; seeing that it neither argues any +imperfection, nor implies any contradiction”. If God had made either +causes or effects free from necessity, he had made them free from his +own prescience; which had been imperfection. Perhaps he will say, that +in these words of his, _the decree, being an act ad extra, was freely +made by God_, I take no notice of that _act ad extra_, as being too hot +for my fingers. Therefore now I take notice of it, and say that it is +neither Latin, nor English, nor sense. + + NO. XXXV. + +_T. H._ The last thing, in which also consisteth the whole controversy, +namely, that there is no such thing as an agent, which, when all things +requisite to action are present, can nevertheless forbear to produce it, +or (which is all one) that there is no such thing as freedom from +necessity; is easily inferred from that which hath been before alleged. +For if it be an agent, it can work; and if it work, there is nothing +wanting of what is requisite to produce the action; and consequently the +cause of the action is sufficient; and if sufficient, then also +necessary, as hath been proved before. + +[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] + +_J. D._ “I wonder that T. H. should confess, that the whole weight of +this controversy doth rest upon this proposition: ‘that there is no such +thing as an agent, which, when all things requisite to action are +present, can nevertheless forbear to act’; and yet bring nothing but +such poor bullrushes to support it. (_a_) ‘If it be an agent’, saith he, +‘it can work’; what of this? _A posse ad esse non valet argumentum_: +from _can work_ to _will work_, is a weak inference. And from _will +work_ to _doth work upon absolute necessity_, is another gross +inconsequence. He proceeds thus: ‘if it work, there is nothing wanting +of what is requisite to produce the action’. True, there wants nothing +to produce that which is produced; but there may want much to produce +that which was intended. One horse may pull his heart out, and yet not +draw the coach whither it should be, if he want the help or concurrence +of his fellows. ‘And consequently’, saith he, ‘the cause of the action +is sufficient’. Yes, sufficient to do what it doth, though perhaps with +much prejudice to itself; but not always sufficient to do what it should +do, or what it would do. As he that begets a monster, should beget a +man, and would beget a man if he could. The last link of his argument +follows: (_b_) ‘and if sufficient, then also necessary’. Stay there; by +his leave, there is no necessary connexion between sufficiency and +efficiency; otherwise God himself should not be all-sufficient. Thus his +argument is vanished. But I will deal more favourably with him, and +grant him all that which he labours so much in vain to prove, that every +effect in the world hath sufficient causes; yea more, that supposing the +determination of the free and contingent causes, every effect in the +world is necessary. (_c_) But all this will not advantage his cause the +black of a bean: for still it amounts but to an hypothetical necessity, +and differs as much from that absolute necessity, which he maintains, as +a gentleman who travels for his pleasure, differs from a banished man, +or a free subject from a slave.” + + ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXXV. + +(_a_) “‘If it be an agent,’ saith he, ‘it can work’. What of this? _A +posse ad esse non valet argumentum_; from _can work_ to _will work_, is +a weak inference. And from _will work_ to _doth work upon absolute +necessity_, is another gross inconsequence.” Here he has gotten a just +advantage; for I should have said, if it be an agent it worketh, not it +can work. But it is an advantage which profiteth little to his cause. +For if I repeat my argument again in this manner: that which is an +agent, worketh; that which worketh, wanteth nothing requisite to produce +the action or the effect it produceth, and consequently is thereof a +sufficient cause; and if a sufficient cause, then also a necessary +cause: his answer will be nothing to the purpose. For whereas to these +words, ‘that which worketh, wanteth nothing requisite to produce the +action or the effect it produceth,’ he answereth, “it is true, but there +may want much to produce that which was intended”, it is not contrary to +any thing that I have said. For I never maintained, that whatsoever a +man intendeth, is necessarily performed; but this, whatsoever a man +performeth, is necessarily performed, and what he intendeth, necessarily +intended, and that from causes antecedent. And therefore to say, as he +doth, that the cause is sufficient to do what it doth, but not always +sufficient to do what a man should or would do, is to say the same that +I do. For I say not, that the cause that bringeth forth a monster, is +sufficient to bring forth a man; but that every cause is sufficient to +produce only the effect it produceth; and if sufficient, then also +necessary. + +(_b_) “‘And if sufficient, then also necessary’. Stay there; by his +leave, there is no necessary connexion between sufficiency and +efficiency; otherwise God himself should not be all-sufficient.” +All-sufficiency signifieth no more, when it is attributed to God, than +omnipotence; and omnipotence signifieth no more, than the power to do +all things that he will. But to the production of any thing that is +produced, the will of God is as requisite as the rest of his power and +sufficiency. And consequently, his all-sufficiency signifieth not a +sufficiency or power to do those things he will not. But he will deal, +he says, so favourably with me, as to grant me all this, which I labour, +he saith, so much in vain to prove: and adds, (_c_) “But all this will +not advantage his cause the black of a bean; for still it amounts but to +an hypothetical necessity”. If it prove no more, it proves no necessity +at all; for by hypothetical necessity he means the necessity of this +proposition, _the effect is, then when it is_; whereas necessity is only +said truly of somewhat in future. For _necessary_ is that which cannot +possibly be otherwise; and _possibility_ is always understood of some +future time. But seeing he granteth so favourably that sufficient causes +are necessary causes, I shall easily conclude from it, that whatsoever +those causes do cause, are necessary antecedently. For if the necessity +of the thing produced, when produced, be in the same instant of time +with the existence of its immediate cause; then also that immediate +cause was in the same instant with the cause by which it was immediately +produced; the same may be said of the cause of this cause, and so +backward eternally. From whence it will follow, that all the connexion +of the causes of any effect from the beginning of the world, were +altogether existent in one and the same instant; and consequently, all +the time from the beginning of the world, or from eternity to this day, +is but one instant, or a _nunc stans_; which he knows by this time is +not so. + + NO. XXXVI. + +_T. H._ And thus you see how the inconveniences, which he objecteth must +follow upon the holding of necessity, are avoided, and the necessity +itself demonstratively proved. To which I could add, if I thought it +good logic, the inconvenience of denying necessity; as that it destroys +both the decrees and prescience of God Almighty. For whatsoever God hath +purposed to bring to pass by man as an instrument, or foreseeth shall +come to pass, a man, if he have liberty, such as he affirmeth from +necessitation, might frustrate and make not to come to pass: and God +should either not foreknow it and not decree it, or he should foreknow +such things shall be as shall never be, and decree that which shall +never come to pass. + +[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] + +_J. D._ “Thus he hath laboured in vain to satisfy my reasons, and to +prove his own assertion. But for demonstration, there is nothing like it +among his arguments. Now he saith, (_a_) he could add other arguments, +if he thought it good logic. There is no impediment in logic, why a man +may not press his adversary with those absurdities which flow from his +opinion; _argumentum ducens ad impossibile_ or _ad absurdum_, is a good +form of reasoning. But there is another reason of his forbearance, +though he be loath to express it. _Hæret lateri læthalis arundo._ The +arguments drawn from the attributes of God do stick so close in the +sides of his cause, that he hath no mind to treat of that subject. By +the way, take notice of his own confession, that ‘he could add other +reasons, if he thought it good logic’. If it were predetermined in the +outward causes, that he must make this very defence and no other, how +could it be in his power to add or subtract any thing: just as if a +blind man should say in earnest, _I could see if I had mine eyes_? Truth +often breaks out whilst men seek to smother it. (_b_) But let us view +his argument: ‘if a man have liberty from necessitation, he may +frustrate the decrees of God, and make his prescience false’. First, for +the decrees of God, this is his decree that man should be a free agent; +if he did consider God as a most simple act, without priority or +posteriority of time, or any composition; he would not conceive of his +decrees, as of the laws of the Medes and Persians, long since enacted +and passed before we were born, but as coexistent with ourselves, and +with the acts which we do by virtue of those decrees. Decrees and +attributes are but notions to help the weakness of our understanding to +conceive of God. The decrees of God are God himself, and therefore +justly said to be before the foundation of the world was laid: and yet +coexistent with ourselves, because of the infinite and eternal being of +God. The sum is this, the decree of God, or God himself eternally, +constitutes or ordains all effects which come to pass in time, according +to the distinct natures or capacities of his creatures. An eternal +ordination is neither past nor to come, but always present. So free +actions do proceed as well from the eternal decree of God, as necessary; +and from that order which he hath set in the world. + +“As the decree of God is eternal, so is his knowledge. And therefore to +speak truly and properly, there is neither fore-knowledge nor +after-knowledge in him. The knowledge of God comprehends all times in a +point, by reason of the eminence and virtue of its infinite perfection. +And yet I confess, that this is called fore-knowledge in respect of us. +But this fore-knowledge doth produce no absolute necessity. Things are +not therefore, because they are foreknown; but therefore they are +foreknown, because they shall come to pass. If any thing should come to +pass otherwise than it doth, yet God’s knowledge could not be irritated +by it; for then he did not know that it should come to pass, as now it +doth. Because every knowledge of vision necessarily presupposeth its +object, God did know that Judas should betray Christ; but Judas was not +necessitated to be a traitor by God’s knowledge. If Judas had not +betrayed Christ, then God had not fore-known that Judas should betray +him. The case is this: a watchman standing on the steeple’s-top, as it +is the use in Germany, gives notice to them below, who see no such +things, that company are coming, and how many; his prediction is most +certain, for he sees them. What a vain correction were it for one below +to say, what if they did not come, then a certain prediction may fail. +It may be urged, that there is a difference between these two cases. In +this case, the coming is present to the watchman; but that which God +fore-knows, is future. God knows what shall be; the watchman only knows +what is. I answer, that this makes no difference at all in the case, by +reason of that disparity which is between God’s knowledge and ours. As +that coming is present to the watchman, which is future to them who are +below: so all those things which are future to us, are present to God, +because his infinite and eternal knowledge doth reach to the future +being of all agents and events. Thus much is plainly acknowledged by T. +H. No. XI: that ‘fore-knowledge is knowledge, and knowledge depends on +the existence of the things known, and not they on it’. To conclude, the +prescience of God doth not make things more necessary than the +production of the things themselves; but if the agents were free agents, +the production of the things doth not make the events to be absolutely +necessary, but only upon supposition that the causes were so determined. +God’s prescience proveth a necessity of infallibility, but not of +antecedent extrinsical determination to one. If any event should not +come to pass, God did never foreknow that it would come to pass. For +every knowledge necessarily presupposeth its object. + + ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXXVI. + +(_a_) “‘He could add’, he saith, ‘other arguments, if he thought it good +logic,’ &c. There is no impediment in logic, why a man may not press his +adversary with those absurdities which flow from his opinion.” Here he +misrecites my words; which are, ‘I could add, if I thought it good +logic, the inconvenience of denying necessity; as that it destroys both +the decrees and prescience of God Almighty’. But he makes me say I could +add other arguments; then infers, that there is no impediment in logic, +why a man may not press his adversary with the absurdities that flow +from his opinion, because _argumentum ducens ad impossibile_ is a good +form of reasoning; making no difference between _absurdities_, which are +impossibilities, and _inconveniences_, which are not only possible but +frequent. And though it be a good form of reasoning to argue from +absurdities, yet it is no good form of reasoning to argue from +inconveniences; for inconvenience may stand well enough with truth. + +(_b_) “But let us view his argument: ‘If a man have liberty from +necessitation, he may frustrate the decrees of God, and make his +prescience false’. This is his decree, that man should be a free agent. +If he did consider God as a most simple act, without priority or +posteriority of time, or any composition, he would not conceive of his +decrees as long since enacted, but as coexistent with ourselves”. Here +again he would have me conceive eternity to be _nunc stans_, that is, an +instant of time, and that instant of time to be God; which neither he +nor I can conceive, nor can without impiety say, as he doth here, that +the decrees of God are God. In which consisteth all the rest of his +answer to this Number, saving that he putteth in sometimes, that “the +foreknowledge of God produceth not necessity”, which is granted him; but +that anything can be foreknown which shall not necessarily come to pass, +which was not granted, he proveth no otherwise than by his assertion, +“that every instant of time is God”; which is denied him. + + NO. XXXVII. + +_T. H._ This is all that hath come into my mind touching this question, +since I last considered it. And I humbly beseech your Lordship to +communicate it only to J. D. And so praying God to prosper your Lordship +in all your designs, I take leave, and am, my most noble and obliging +Lord, + + Your most humble servant, + T. H. + +[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] + +_J. D._ “He is very careful to have this discourse kept secret, as +appears in this section, and in the XIVth and XVth sections. If his +answer had been kept private, I had saved the labour of a reply. But +hearing that it was communicated, I thought myself obliged to vindicate +both the truth and myself. I do not blame him to be cautious; for in +truth, this assertion is of desperate consequence, and destructive to +piety, policy, and morality. (_a_) If he had desired to have it kept +secret, the way had been to have kept it secret himself. It will not +suffice to say, as No. XIV, that ‘truth is truth’: This is the common +plea of all men. Neither is it sufficient for him to say, as No. XV, +that ‘it was desired by me’, long before that he had discovered his +opinion by word of mouth. And my desire was to let some of my noble +friends see the weakness of his grounds, and the pernicious consequences +of that opinion. (_b_) But if he think that this ventilation of the +question between us two may do hurt, truly I hope not. The edge of his +discourse is so abated, that it cannot easily hurt any rational man, who +is not too much possessed with prejudice.” + + ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXXVII. + +In this place I said nothing, but that I would have my Lord of Newcastle +to communicate it only to the Bishop. And in his answer he says, (_a_) +“if I had desired to have it kept secret, the way had been to have kept +it secret myself”. My desire was, it should not be communicated by my +Lord of Newcastle to all men indifferently. But I barred not myself from +showing it privately to my friends; though to publish it was never my +intention, till now provoked by the uncivil triumphing of the Bishop in +his own errors to my disadvantage. + +(_b_) “But if he think that this ventilation of the question may do +hurt, truly I hope not. The edge of his discourse is so abated, that it +cannot easily hurt any rational man, who is not too much possessed with +prejudice.” It is confidently said; but not very pertinently to the hurt +I thought might proceed from a discourse of this nature. For I never +thought it could do hurt to a rational man, but only to such men as +cannot reason in those points which are of difficult contemplation. For +a rational man will say with himself, _they whom God will bring to a +blessed and happy end, those he will put into an humble, pious, and +righteous way; and of those whom he will destroy, he will harden the +hearts_: and thereupon examining himself whether he be in such a way or +not, the examination itself would, if elected, be a necessary cause of +working out his salvation with fear and trembling. But the men who I +thought might take hurt thereby, are such as reason erroneously, saying +with themselves, _if I shall be saved, I shall be saved whether I walk +uprightly or no_: and consequently thereunto, shall behave themselves +negligently, and pursue the pleasant way of the sins they are in love +with. Which inconvenience is not abated by this discourse of the Bishop; +because they understand not the grounds he goeth on, of _nunc stans_, +_motus primo primi_, _elicit acts_, _imperate acts_, and a great many +other such unintelligible words. + + NO. XXXVIII. + +_T. H._ Postscript. Arguments seldom work on men of wit and learning, +when they have once engaged themselves in a contrary opinion. If +anything do it, it is the shewing of them the causes of their errors, +which is this. Pious men attribute to God Almighty, for honour sake, +whatsoever they see is honourable in the world, as seeing, hearing, +willing, knowing, justice, wisdom, &c.: but deny him such poor things as +eyes, ears, brains, and other organs, without which we worms neither +have nor can conceive such faculties to be: and so far they do well. But +when they dispute of God’s actions philosophically, then they consider +them again as if he had such faculties, and in that manner as we have +them. This is not well; and thence it is they fall into so many +difficulties. We ought not to dispute of God’s nature; he is no fit +subject of our philosophy. True religion consisteth in obedience to +Christ’s lieutenants, and in giving God such honour, both in attributes +and actions, as they in their several lieutenancies shall ordain. + +[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] + +_J. D._ “Though sophistical captions do seldom work on men of wit and +learning, because _by constant use they have their senses exercised to +discern both good and evil_ (Heb. v. 14), yet (_a_) solid and +substantial reasons work sooner upon them than upon weaker judgments. +The more exact the balance is, the sooner it discovers the real weight +that is put into it; especially if the proofs be proposed without +passion or opposition. Let sophisters and seditious orators apply +themselves to the many-headed multitude, because they despair of success +with men of wit and learning. Those whose gold is true, are not afraid +to have it tried by the touch. Since the former way hath not succeeded, +T. H. hath another to shew as the causes of our errors, which he hopes +will prove more successful. When he sees he can do no good by sight, he +seeks to circumvent us under colour of courtesy: _Fistula dulce canit, +volucrem dum decipit auceps_. As they who behold themselves in a glass, +take the right hand for the left, and the left for the right (T. H. +knows the comparison); so we take our own errors to be truths, and other +men’s truths to be errors, (_b_) If we be in an error in this, it is +such an error as we sucked from nature itself, such an error as is +confirmed in us by reason and experience, such an error as God himself +in his sacred Word hath revealed, such an error as the Fathers and +Doctors of the Church in all ages have delivered, such an error wherein +we have the concurrence of all the best philosophers, both natural and +moral, such an error as bringeth to God the glory of justice, and +wisdom, and goodness, and truth, such an error as renders men more +devout, more pious, more industrious, more humble, more penitent for +their sins. Would he have us resign up all these advantages, to dance +blindfold after his pipe? No, he persuades us too much to our loss. But +let us see what is the imaginary cause of our imaginary error. Forsooth, +because ‘we attribute to God whatsoever is honourable in the world, as +seeing, hearing, willing, knowing, justice, wisdom; but deny him such +poor things as eyes, ears, brains’; and so far, he saith ‘we do well.’ +He hath reason, for since we are not able to conceive of God as he is, +the readiest way we have, is by removing all that imperfection from God, +which is in the creatures; so we call him infinite, immortal, +independent: or by attributing to him all those perfections which are in +the creatures, after a most eminent manner; so we call him best, +greatest, most wise, most just, most holy. (_c_) But saith he, ‘When +they dispute of God’s actions philosophically, then they consider them +again, as if he had such faculties, and in that manner as we have them’. + +“And is this the cause of our error? That were strange indeed; for they +who dispute philosophically of God, do neither ascribe faculties to him +in that manner that we have them, nor yet do they attribute any proper +faculties at all to God. God’s understanding and his will is his very +essence, which, for the eminency of its infinite perfection, doth +perform all those things alone in a most transcendant manner, which +reasonable creatures do perform imperfectly by distinct faculties. Thus +to dispute of God with modesty and reverence, and to clear the Deity +from the imputation of tyranny, injustice, and dissimulation, which none +do throw upon God with more presumption than those who are the patrons +of absolute necessity, is both comely and Christian. + +“It is not the desire to discover the original of a supposed error, +which draws them ordinarily into these exclamations against those who +dispute of the Deity. For some of themselves dare anatomize God, and +publish his eternal decrees with as much confidence, as if they had been +all their lives of his cabinet council. But it is for fear lest those +pernicious consequences which flow from that doctrine essentially, and +reflect in so high a degree upon the supreme goodness, should be laid +open to the view of the world; just as the Turks do first establish a +false religion of their own devising, and then forbid all men upon pain +of death to dispute upon religion; or as the priests of Moloch, the +abomination of the Ammonites, did make a noise with their timbrels all +the while the poor infants were passing through the fire in Tophet, to +keep their pitiful cries from the ears of their parents. So (_d_) they +make a noise with their declamations against those who dare dispute of +the nature of God, that is, who dare set forth his justice, and his +goodness, and his truth, and his philanthropy, only to deaf the ears and +dim the eyes of the Christian world, lest they should hear the +lamentable ejulations and howlings, or see that rueful spectacle of +millions of souls tormented for evermore (_e_) in the flames of the true +Tophet, that is, hell, only for that which, according to T. H.’s +doctrine, was never in their power to shun, but which they were ordered +and inevitably necessitated to do, only to express the omnipotence and +dominion, and to satisfy the pleasure of Him, who is in truth the Father +of all mercies, and the God of all consolation. (_f_) _This is life +eternal_ (saith our Saviour), _to know the only true God, and Jesus +Christ whom he hath sent_ (John xvii. 3.). _Pure religion, and undefiled +before God and the Father, is this, to visit the fatherless and widows +in their affliction, and to keep himself unspotted from the world_, +saith St. James (James i. 27.). _Fear God and keep his commandments; for +this is the whole duty of man_, saith Solomon (Eccles. xii. 13.). But T. +H. hath found out a more compendious way to heaven: ‘True religion’, +saith he, ‘consisteth in obedience to Christ’s lieutenants, and giving +God such honour, both in attributes and actions, as they in their +several lieutenancies shall ordain’. That is to say, _be of the religion +of every Christian country where you come_. To make the civil magistrate +to be Christ’s lieutenant upon earth, for matters of religion, and to +make him to be supreme judge in all controversies, whom all must obey, +is a doctrine so strange, and such an uncouth phrase to Christian ears, +that I should have missed his meaning, but that I consulted with his +book, _De Cive_, c. XV. sect. 16, and c. XVII. sect. 28. What if the +magistrate shall be no Christian himself? What if he shall command +contrary to the law of God or nature? _Must we obey him rather than +God?_ (Acts iv. 19.) Is the civil magistrate become now the only ground +and pillar of truth? I demand then, why T. H. is of a different mind +from his sovereign, and from the laws of the land, concerning the +attributes of God and his decrees? This is a new paradox, and concerns +not this question of liberty and necessity. Wherefore I forbear to +prosecute it further, and so conclude my reply with the words of the +Christian poet, + + Jussum est Cæsaris ore Galieni, + Quod princeps colit ut colamus omnes. + Æternum colo Principem, dierum + Factorem, Dominumque Galieni.[A] + +----- + +Footnote A: + + Prudentius. περι στεφανων. Hymn. vi. + +----- + + ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO THE POSTSCRIPT NO. XXXVIII. + +He taketh it ill that I say that arguments do seldom work on men of wit +and learning, when they have once engaged themselves in a contrary +opinion. Nevertheless it is not only certain by experience, but also +there is reason for it, and that grounded upon the natural disposition +of mankind. For it is natural to all men to defend those opinions, which +they have once publicly engaged themselves to maintain; because to have +that detected for error, which they have publicly maintained for truth, +is never without some dishonour, more or less; and to find in themselves +that they have spent a great deal of time and labour in deceiving +themselves, is so uncomfortable a thing, as it is no wonder if they +employ their wit and learning, if they have any, to make good their +errors. And, therefore, where he saith, (_a_) “solid and substantial +reasons work sooner upon them, than upon weaker judgments; and that the +more exact the balance is, the sooner it discovers the real weight that +is put into it”: I confess, the more solid a man’s wit is, the better +will solid reasons work upon him. But if he add to it that which he +calls learning, that is to say, much reading of other men’s doctrines +without weighing them with his own thoughts, then their judgments become +weaker, and the balance less exact. And whereas he saith, “that they +whose gold is true, are not afraid to have it tried by the touch”; he +speaketh as if I had been afraid to have my doctrine tried by the touch +of men of wit and learning; wherein he is not much mistaken, meaning by +men of learning (as I said before) such as had read other men, but not +themselves. For by reading others, men commonly obstruct the way to +their own exact and natural judgment, and use their wit both to deceive +themselves with fallacies, and to requite those, who endeavour at their +own entreaty to instruct them, with revilings. + +(_b_) “If we be in an error, it is such an error as is sucked from +nature; as is confirmed by reason, by experience, and by Scripture; as +the Fathers and Doctors of the Church of all ages have delivered; an +error, wherein we have the concurrence of all the best philosophers, an +error that bringeth to God the glory of justice, &c.; that renders men +more devout, more pious, more humble, more industrious, more penitent +for their sins.” All this is but said; and what heretofore hath been +offered in proof for it, hath been sufficiently refuted, and the +contrary proved; namely, that it is an error contrary to the nature of +the will; repugnant to reason and experience; repugnant to the +Scripture; repugnant to the doctrine of St. Paul, (and ’tis pity the +Fathers and Doctors of the Church have not followed St. Paul therein); +an error not maintained by the best philosophers, (for they are not the +best philosophers, which the Bishop thinketh so); an error that taketh +from God the glory of his prescience, nor bringeth to him the glory of +his other attributes; an error that maketh men, by imagining they can +repent when they will, neglect their duties; and that maketh men +unthankful for God’s graces, by thinking them to proceed from the +natural ability of their own will. + +(_c_) “‘But,’ saith he, ‘when they dispute of God’s actions +philosophically, then they consider them again as if he had such +faculties, and in such manner as we have them.’ And is this the cause of +our error? That were strange indeed; for they who dispute +philosophically of God, do neither ascribe faculties to him, in that +manner that we have them, nor yet do they attribute any proper faculties +at all to God. God’s understanding and his will is his very essence, +&c.” Methinks he should have known at these years, that to dispute +philosophically is to dispute by natural reason, and from principles +evident by the light of nature, and to dispute of the faculties and +proprieties of the subject whereof they treat. It is therefore +unskilfully said by him, that they who dispute philosophically of God, +ascribe unto him no proper faculties. If no proper faculties, I would +fain know of him what improper faculties he ascribes to God. I guess he +will make the understanding and the will, and his other attributes, to +be in God improper faculties, because he cannot properly call them +faculties; that is to say, he knows not how to make it good that they +are faculties, and yet he will have these words, “God’s understanding +and his will are his very essence”, to pass for an axiom of philosophy. +And whereas I had said, we ought not to dispute of God’s nature, and +that He is no fit subject of our philosophy, he denies it not, but says +I say it. + +(_d_) “With a purpose to make a noise with declaiming against those who +dare dispute of the nature of God, that is, who dare set forth his +justice and his goodness, &c.” The Bishop will have much ado to make +good, that to dispute of the nature of God, is all one with setting +forth his justice and his goodness. He taketh no notice of these words +of mine, ‘pious men attribute to God Almighty for honour’s sake, +whatsoever they see is honourable in the world’; and yet this is setting +forth God’s justice, goodness, &c, without disputing of God’s nature. + +(_e_) “In the flames of the true Tophet, that is hell.” The true Tophet +was a place not far from the walls of Jerusalem, and consequently on the +earth. I cannot imagine what he will say to this in his answer to my +_Leviathan_, if there he find the same, unless he say, that in this +place by the _true_ Tophet, he meant a _not true_ Tophet. + +(_f_) “_This is life eternal_ (saith our Saviour) _to know the only true +God, and Jesus Christ_, &c.” This which followeth to the end of his +answer and of the book, is a reprehension of me, for saying that ‘true +religion consisteth in obedience to Christ’s lieutenants’. If it be +lawful for Christians to institute amongst themselves a commonwealth and +magistrates, whereby they may be able to live in peace one with another, +and unite themselves in defence against a foreign enemy; it will +certainly be necessary to make to themselves some supreme judge in all +controversies, to whom they ought all to give obedience. And this is no +such strange doctrine, nor so uncouth a phrase to Christian ears, as the +Bishop makes it, whatsoever it be to them that would make themselves +judges of the Supreme Judge himself. No; but, saith he, Christ is the +Supreme Judge, and we are not to obey men rather than God. Is there any +Christian man that does not acknowledge that we are to be judged by +Christ, or that we ought not to obey him rather than any man that shall +be his lieutenant upon earth? The question therefore is, not of who is +to be obeyed, but of what be his commands. If the Scripture contain his +commands, then may every Christian know by them what they are. And what +has the Bishop to do with what God says to me when I read them, more +than I have to do with what God says to him when he reads them, unless +he have authority given him by him whom Christ hath constituted his +lieutenant? This lieutenant upon earth, I say, is the supreme civil +magistrate, to whom belongeth the care and charge of seeing that no +doctrine may be taught the people, but such as may consist with the +general peace of them all, and with the obedience that is due to the +civil sovereign. In whom would the Bishop have the authority reside of +prohibiting seditious opinions, when they are taught (as they are often) +in divinity books and from the pulpit? I could hardly guess, but that I +remember that there have been books written to entitle the bishops to a +_divine right_, underived from the civil sovereign. But because he +maketh it so heinous a matter, that the supreme civil magistrate should +be Christ’s lieutenant upon earth, let us suppose that a bishop, or a +synod of bishops, should be set up (which I hope never shall) for our +civil sovereign; then that which he objecteth here, I could object in +the same words against himself. For I could say in his own words, _This +is life eternal, to know the only true God, and Jesus Christ_ (John +xvii. 3.). _Pure religion, and undefiled before God is this, to visit +the fatherless_, &c. (James i. 27.) _Fear God and keep his commandments_ +(Eccles. xii. 13.). But the Bishop hath found a more compendious way to +heaven, namely, that true religion consisteth in obedience to Christ’s +lieutenants; that is (now by supposition), to the bishops. That is to +say, that every Christian of what nation soever, coming into the country +which the bishops govern, should be of their religion. He would make the +civil magistrate to be Christ’s lieutenant upon earth for matters of +religion, and supreme judge in all controversies, and say they ought to +be obeyed by all; how strange soever and uncouth it seem to him now, the +sovereignty being in others. And I may say to him, what if the +magistrate himself (I mean by supposition the bishops) should be wicked +men; what if they should command as much contrary to the law of God or +nature, as ever any Christian king did, (which is very possible); must +we obey them rather than God? Is the civil magistrate become now the +only ground and pillar of truth? No: + + Synedri jussum est voce episcoporum, + Ipsum quod colit ut colamus omnes. + Æternum colo Principem, dierum + Factorem, Dominumque episcoporum. + +And thus the Bishop may see, there is little difference between his Ode +and my Parode to it; and that both of them are of equal force to +conclude nothing. + +The Bishop knows that the kings of England, since the time of Henry +VIII, have been declared by act of Parliament supreme governors of the +Church of England, in all causes both civil and ecclesiastical, that is +to say, in all matters both ecclesiastical and civil, and consequently +of this Church supreme head on earth; though perhaps he will not allow +that name of _head_. I should wonder therefore, whom the Bishop would +have to be Christ’s lieutenant here in England for matters of religion, +if not the supreme governor and head of the Church of England, whether +man or woman whosoever he be, that hath the sovereign power, but that I +know he challenges it to the Bishops, and thinks that King Henry VIII. +took the ecclesiastical power away from the Pope, to settle it not in +himself, but them. But he ought to have known, that what jurisdiction, +or power of ordaining ministers, the Popes had here in the time of the +king’s predecessors till Henry VIII, they derived it all from the king’s +power, though they did not acknowledge it; and the kings connived at it, +either not knowing their own right, or not daring to challenge it; till +such time as the behaviour of the Roman clergy had undeceived the +people, which otherwise would have sided with them. Nor was it unlawful +for the king to take from them the authority he had given them, as being +Pope enough in his own kingdom without depending on a foreign one: nor +is it to be called schism, unless it be schism also in the head of a +family to discharge, as often as he shall see cause, the school-masters +he entertaineth to teach his children. If the Bishop and Dr. Hammond, +when they did write in the defence of the Church of England against +imputation of schism, quitting their own pretences of jurisdiction and +_jus divinum_, had gone upon these principles of mine, they had not been +so shrewdly handled as they have been, by an English Papist that wrote +against them. + +And now I have done answering to his arguments, I shall here, in the end +of all, take that liberty of censuring his whole book, which he hath +taken in the beginning, of censuring mine. ‘I have’, saith he, (No. I.) +‘perused T. H.’s answers, considered his reasons, and conclude he hath +missed and mislaid the question; that his answers are evasions, that his +arguments are paralogisms, and that the opinion of absolute and +universal necessity is but a result of some groundless and ill chosen +principles.’ And now it is my turn to censure. And first, for the +strength of his discourse and knowledge of the point in question, I +think it much inferior to that which might have been written by any man +living, that had no other learning besides the ability to write his +mind; but as well perhaps as the same man would have done it if to the +ability of writing his mind he had added the study of School-divinity. +Secondly, for the manners of it, (for to a public writing there +belongeth good manners), it consisteth in railing and exclaiming and +scurrilous jesting, with now and then an unclean and mean instance. And +lastly, for his elocution, the virtue whereof lieth not in the flux of +words, but in perspicuity, it is the same language with that of the +kingdom of darkness. One shall find in it, especially where he should +speak most closely to the question, such words as these: divided sense, +compounded sense, hypothetical necessity, liberty of exercise, liberty +of specification, liberty of contradiction, liberty of contrariety, +knowledge of approbation, practical knowledge, general influence, +special influence, instinct, qualities infused, efficacious election, +moral efficacy, moral motion, metaphorical motion, _practice practicum_, +_motus primo primi_, _actus eliciti_, _actus imperati_, permissive will, +consequent will, negative obduration, deficient cause, simple act, _nunc +stans_; and other like words of nonsense divided: besides many +propositions such as these: the will is the mistress of human actions, +the understanding is her counsellor, the will chooseth, the will +willeth, the will suspends its own act, the understanding understandeth, +(I wonder how he missed saying, the understanding suspendeth its own +act,) the will applies the understanding to deliberate; the will +requires of the understanding a review; the will determines itself; a +change may be willed without changing of the will; man concurs with God +in causing his own will; the will causeth willing; motives determine the +will not naturally, but morally; the same action may be both future and +not future; God is not just but justice, not eternal but eternity; +eternity is _nunc stans_; eternity is an infinite point which +comprehendeth all time, not formally, but eminently; all eternity is +co-existent with to-day, and the same co-existent with to-morrow: and +many other like speeches of nonsense compounded, which the truth can +never stand in need of. Perhaps the Bishop will say, these terms and +phrases are intelligible enough; for he hath said in his reply to No. +XXIV, that his opinion is demonstrable in reason, though he be not able +to comprehend, how it consisteth together with God’s eternal prescience; +and though it exceed his weak capacity, yet he ought to adhere to that +truth which is manifest. So that to him that truth is manifest, and +demonstrable by reason, which is beyond his capacity; so that words +beyond capacity are with him intelligible enough. + +But the reader is to be judge of that. I could add many other passages +that discover, both his little logic, as taking the insignificant words +above recited, for terms of art; and his no philosophy in distinguishing +between moral and natural motion, and by calling some motions +metaphorical, and by his blunders at the causes of sight and of the +descent of heavy bodies, and his talk of the inclination of the +load-stone, and divers other places in his book. + +But to make an end, I shall briefly draw up the sum of what we have both +said. That which I have maintained is, that no man hath his future will +in his own present power. That it may be changed by others, and by the +change of things without him; and when it is changed, it is not changed +nor determined to any thing by itself; and that when it is undetermined, +it is no will; because every one that willeth, willeth something in +particular. That deliberation is common to men with beasts, as being +alternate appetite, and not ratiocination; and the last act or appetite +therein, and which is immediately followed by the action, is the only +will that can be taken notice of by others, and which only maketh an +action in public judgment voluntary. That to be free is no more than to +do if a man will, and if he will to forbear; and consequently that this +freedom is the freedom of the man, and not of the will. That the will is +not free, but subject to change by the operation of external causes. +That all external causes depend necessarily on the first eternal cause, +God Almighty, who worketh in us both to will and to do, by the mediation +of second causes. That seeing neither man nor any thing else can work +upon itself, it is impossible that any man in the framing of his own +will should concur with God, either as an actor or as an instrument. +That there is nothing brought to pass by fortune as by a cause, nor any +thing without a cause, or concurrence of causes, sufficient to bring it +so to pass; and that every such cause, and their concurrence, do proceed +from the providence, good pleasure, and working of God; and +consequently, though I do with others call many events _contingent_, and +say they _happen_, yet because they had every of them their several +sufficient causes, and those causes again their former causes, I say +they _happen_ necessarily. And though we perceive not what they are, yet +there are of the most contingent events as necessary causes as of those +events whose causes we perceive; or else they could not possibly be +foreknown, as they are by him that foreknoweth all things. On the +contrary, the Bishop maintaineth: that the will is free from +necessitation; and in order thereto that the judgment of the +understanding is not always _practice practicum_, nor of such a nature +in itself as to oblige and determine the will to one, though it be true +that spontaneity and determination to one may consist together. That the +will determineth itself, and that external things, when they change the +will, do work upon it not naturally, but morally, not by natural motion, +but by moral and metaphorical motion. That when the will is determined +naturally, it is not by God’s general influence, whereon depend all +second causes, but by special influence, God concurring and pouring +something into the will. That the will when it suspends not its act, +makes the act necessary; but because it may suspend and not assent, it +is not absolutely necessary. That sinful acts proceed not from God’s +will, but are willed by him by a _permissive_ will, not an _operative_ +will, and that he hardeneth the heart of man by a negative obduration. +That man’s will is in his own power, but his _motus primo primi_ not in +his own power, nor necessary save only by a hypothetical necessity. That +the will to change, is not always a change of will. That not all things +which are produced, are produced from _sufficient_, but some things from +_deficient_ causes. That if the power of the will be present _in actu +primo_, then there is nothing wanting to the production of the effect. +That a cause may be sufficient for the production of an effect, though +it want something necessary to the production thereof; because the will +may be wanting. That a necessary cause doth not always necessarily +produce its effect, but only then when the effect is necessarily +produced. He proveth also, that the will is free, by that universal +notion which the world hath of election: for when of the six Electors +the votes are divided equally, the King of Bohemia hath a casting voice. +That the prescience of God supposeth no necessity of the future +existence of the things foreknown, because God is not eternal but +eternity, and eternity is a _standing now_, without succession of time; +and therefore God foresees all things intuitively by the presentiality +they have in _nunc stans_, which comprehendeth in it all time past, +present, and to come, not formally, but eminently and virtually. That +the will is free even then when it acteth, but that is in a compounded, +not in a divided sense. That to be made, and to be eternal, do consist +together, because God’s decrees are made, and are nevertheless eternal. +That the order, beauty, and perfection of the world doth require that in +the universe there should be agents of all sorts, some necessary, some +free, some contingent. That though it be true, that to-morrow it shall +rain or not rain, yet neither of them is true _determinate_. That the +doctrine of necessity is a blasphemous, desperate, and destructive +doctrine. That it were better to be an Atheist, than to hold it; and he +that maintaineth it, is fitter to be refuted with rods than with +arguments. And now whether this his doctrine or mine be the more +intelligible, more rational, or more conformable to God’s word, I leave +it to the judgment of the reader. + +But whatsoever be the truth of the disputed question, the reader may +peradventure think I have not used the Bishop with that respect I ought, +or without disadvantage of my cause I might have done; for which I am to +make a short apology. A little before the last parliament of the late +king, when every man spake freely against the then present government, I +thought it worth my study to consider the grounds and consequences of +such behaviour, and whether it were conformable or contrary to reason +and to the Word of God. And after some time I did put in order and +publish my thoughts thereof, first in Latin, and then again the same in +English; where I endeavoured to prove both by reason and Scripture, that +they who have once submitted themselves to any sovereign governor, +either by express acknowledgment of his power, or by receiving +protection from his laws, are obliged to be true and faithful to him, +and to acknowledge no other supreme power but him in any matter or +question whatsoever, either civil or ecclesiastical. In which books of +mine, I pursued my subject without taking notice of any particular man +that held any opinion contrary to that which I then wrote; only in +general I maintained that the office of the clergy, in respect of the +supreme civil power, was not magisterial, but ministerial; and that +their teaching of the people was founded upon no other authority than +that of the civil sovereign; and all this without any word tending to +the disgrace either of episcopacy or of presbytery. Nevertheless I find +since, that divers of them, whereof the Bishop of Derry is one, have +taken offence especially at two things; one, that I make the supremacy +in matters of religion to reside in the civil sovereign; the other, that +being no clergyman, I deliver doctrines, and ground them upon words of +the Scripture, which doctrines they, being by profession divines, have +never taught. And in this their displeasure, divers of them in their +books and sermons, without answering any of my arguments, have not only +exclaimed against my doctrine, but reviled me, and endeavoured to make +me hateful for those things, for which (if they knew their own and the +public good) they ought to have given me thanks. There is also one of +them, that taking offence at me for blaming in part the discipline +instituted heretofore, and regulated by the authority of the Pope, in +the universities, not only ranks me amongst those men that would have +the revenue of the universities diminished, and says plainly I have no +religion, but also thinks me so simple and ignorant of the world as to +believe that our universities maintain Popery. And this is the author of +the book called _Vindiciæ Academiarum_. If either of the universities +had thought itself injured, I believe it could have authorised or +appointed some member of theirs, whereof there be many abler men than +he, to have made their vindication. But this Vindex, (as little dogs to +please their masters use to bark, in token of their sedulity, +indifferently at strangers, till they be rated off), unprovoked by me +hath fallen upon me without bidding. I have been publicly injured by +many of whom I took no notice, supposing that that humour would spend +itself; but seeing it last, and grow higher in this writing I now +answer, I thought it necessary at last to make of some of them, and +first of this Bishop, an example. + + END OF VOL. V. + +------------------------------------------------------------------------ + + Transcriber’s Note + +There were two kinds of sidenote in this volumn. At the top of each +page, the section number, along with either “Animadversions upon the +Bishop’s reply” or “The Bishop’s Reply”, is repeated. The former have +been removed as they are redundant with the section title. The “Bishop’s +Reply” notes are positioned before each paragraph beginning “J. D” to +mark where the “Bishop’s” voice resumes. + +The sidenote on p. 81 mistakenly referred to “Animadversions...” rather +than the expected “The Bishop’s reply.” + +Other errors deemed most likely to be the printer’s have been corrected, +and are noted here. The references are to the page and line in the +original. + + 5.11 to do what he will,[”] Added. + + 10.13 O Israel, thy de[s]truction Restored. + + 25.8 So God bless us.[”] Added. + + 33.8 of the second causes.[”] Added. + + 38.17 [t]hat one may take away an ell Restored. + + 62.25 between [l/d]uade distinctions cloven feet. Restored + (probable). + + 85.26 [“/‘]that wise men may do Replaced. + + 85.27 actions,[”/’] Replaced. + + 85.33 [“/‘]that fools, children, Replaced. + + 85.34 and elect,[”/’] Replaced. + + 126.34 but his own justice better[.] Restored. + + 137.3 would have him to will.[’] Added. + + 142.1 [“]Wherefore T. H. is mightily mistaken Added. + + 145.1 Another is Genesis xix. 22[)]: Removed. + + 151.14 that all consult[a]tions are vain. Restored. + + 155.33 for the public good[,/.] Replaced. + + 185.7 when it is necess[s]ary Removed. + + 229.23 _Quid hoc?_[”] Added. + + 310.17 choose a good one.[”] Added. + + 316.30 and so the[ the] action be become Removed. + + 324.11 and if he[ ]means so Inserted. + + 336.5 [“]But because his eyesight was weak Added. + + 405.28 was I to grow old!’[”] Added. + + 425.6 forbear to act[”/’]; Replaced. + + 434.15 not too much possessed with prejudice.[”] Added. + + 437.24 such poor things as eyes, ears, brains[’] Added. + + 439.33 the religion of every Ch[r]istian country Inserted. + + 447.30 per[s]used T. H.’s answers Removed. + + 454.9 whereof the[ the Bishop of Derry is one Removed. + + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 76650 *** |