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diff --git a/76629-0.txt b/76629-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3b1e12b --- /dev/null +++ b/76629-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,957 @@ + +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 76629 *** + + + + + + GALLIO + OR + THE TYRANNY + OF + SCIENCE + + + + + GALLIO + OR + The Tyranny of Science + + BY + J. W. N. SULLIVAN + + + [Illustration] + + + E. P. DUTTON & CO. :: NEW YORK + + + + + GALLIO, OR THE TYRANNY OF SCIENCE + COPYRIGHT 1928 BY E. P. DUTTON & COMPANY + ALL RIGHTS RESERVED :: PRINTED IN U.S.A. + + + + + GALLIO + + + + + GALLIO + OR + THE TYRANNY OF SCIENCE + + + + + 1 + + +There can be no doubt that the prestige of science has greatly +increased of recent times. In the days when Dickens wrote _The Mudfog +Papers_ the man of science, to the general reading public, was a purely +comic figure. After the man of science had knocked the bottom out of +the Victorian universe with his theory of Natural Selection he inspired +the respect we accord to whatever is both powerful and sinister. He was +observed, warily and acutely, as an enemy. This reaction was perfectly +justified, for science, as expounded to the populace by such men as +Huxley and Tyndall, deprived life of all that had hitherto made it +worth living. The gravamen of their offence was not that they made man +an integral part of the animal kingdom, but that they presented him +with a universe that was entirely purposeless. Such a doctrine would +probably come as a shock even to a disillusioned and emaciated Eastern +Sage, but to the men of the Victorian age, almost every one of them +brought up in an orthodox Christian household and filled with that +belief in a wise Providence that comes of great material prosperity, +it was nothing short of an outrage. Even the men of science themselves +found their great discovery more than a little disconcerting. Nobody +who reads them can fail to detect something strained, something +occasionally almost frenzied, in their insistence on the duty of +intellectual honesty. These men are, half the time, shouting aloud +in order to hearten themselves. They were quite consciously martyrs +to the truth. This is true, at any rate, of such men as Huxley and +Clifford. There were many men of science, of course, who were not +sufficiently alive to live in a universe of any description. Outside, +their laboratories they had no perceptible existence. Many of them died +simple Christians. But to all interested in such matters it became +evident that the goal of science was the detailed explanation of man +as the accidental outcome of “matter and motion”. Since the arguments +of the man of science could not be met (for only science can cast out +science) the only thing left was to abuse him. This was magnificently +done by Nietzsche, and rather less magnificently by Dostoevsky and +Tolstoi. Nietzsche pointed out that the man of science was not a +human being. He was merely an instrument, the most costly, the most +exquisite, the most easily tarnished of instruments. He was incapable +of love; he was incapable of hate. His one purpose was to “reflect” +such things as he was tuned to receive. The philosophy evolved by such +a creature would be expressive of nothing but his own limitations. He +would be incapable of understanding the problems that concerned a man. +This was also the line taken, more or less, by Dostoevsky and Tolstoi, +and it became very popular with artists of all kinds. Wordsworth’s +scorn for the botanist became the general attitude towards all men +of science. It must be admitted that, judging from biographies of +scientific men, there is much to be said for this view. Their favourite +authors appear to be Shakespeare and Ella Wheeler Wilcox: they are +kind fathers and faithful husbands; in their social relations they +are simple-minded snobs; and they are really amused by “lecture-room +humour”. It seems unlikely that such people know much of the fierce +vitality that sent Saints to rot on pillars and in dungeons, that sent +martyrs to the stake, or even that weaker form of vitality that causes +our Divorce Court judges to be overworked. That they can understand +the universe, when it is obvious they do not understand Clapham, does +not seem likely. That, briefly, was the case of the artist against the +man of science. The artist was conscious of more things in heaven and +earth, staring him in the face, than he believed the man of science had +ever dreamt of in his philosophy. + +It is evident that the position to-day is rather different. It has +become different since the War. It is probable, as we shall see +later, that the War itself is partly responsible for the increased +attention paid by the artist to science. But the influence was not +direct. The artist was not transported with admiration for the men +who could make poison-gas,[1] although he may have been more inclined +to believe their philosophy that existence is meaningless. No, the +change was, I believe, due to Einstein: in this respect he must be +likened to Newton and Darwin. The fact that his theory is completely +unintelligible to the enormous majority of those who take an interest +in it is not at all to its disadvantage. Rather the contrary. The +artist is attracted by the theory, and respectful to it, not in the +least because he understands it, but because he feels it is the result +of a most unusual and most powerful _imaginative_ effort. It gives +him a new conception of the power of the human consciousness. This +theory, he is convinced, has come from the heights. It is probable, +as a matter of fact, he thinks this because he believes the theory +to be about that mathematical platitude, a fourth dimension. The +fourth dimension is a phrase to which imaginative people respond with +quite extraordinary intensity. Its popularity is like that of giant +telescopes, as was proved when a thousand pounds was recently offered +for a simple explanation of it. It seems to be the phrase which, to +the non-mathematician, is most pregnant with the vast and liberating +unknown. If its meaning is ever generally understood, we may anticipate +that interest in Einstein’s theory will decline. This will be a pity, +because the popular reaction to Einstein’s theory is perfectly +justified. It _is_ the most profound and original scientific theory +that has ever been invented, and it displays a kind of imagination +almost[2] unprecedented in the history of science. The feeling of the +artist about it is right――it is vastly important to him. + + [1] He ought to have been. See _Callinicus_, by J. B. S. Haldane. + +Being convinced that the mathematician, at any rate, might be a +poet, the respect of imaginative people for science in general has +greatly increased. Many of them have decided that science is worth +looking into. Unfortunately mathematical physics, the master science +of the present day and the one which has furnished ideals for the +other sciences, is hopelessly technical. It is agreed that a modern +intelligent man, conscious of his responsibilities as an inhabitant +of the twentieth century, should be familiar with “the scientific +outlook”. But to acquire this outlook by brooding over the teachings +and implications of modern physics is not easy. Thus although it is the +recent astonishing development in physics which is responsible for the +renewed public interest in science, it is other sciences that reap the +benefit. We have poets and painters who study anthropology and literary +critics who read books on the nervous system. The result appears to +have been disastrous. At a time when the physicists are abandoning +materialism the artists are accepting it. They are accepting, as the +last word of science, a picture of the world that belongs to the early +bad manner of physics. Again we hear, but this time from our literary +men, that slightly hysterical insistence on the duty of intellectual +honesty. It must be admitted that they have been predisposed to accept +this view by the War. It is a curious but indisputable psychological +fact, perhaps first noted by Tolstoi, that the sight of a large number +of naked human bodies makes it difficult to believe that they are +animated by immortal spirits possessing an eternal destiny. The sight +of the “wastage” that occurred during the War, for those who saw any of +it, produced the same curious effect. Also, a psychological fact that +cannot be denied, it was difficult to preserve belief in the essential +nobility of man when listening to patriotic non-combatants. There can +be no doubt that the War, for a large number of those connected with +it, has made the acceptance of materialism easier. Even the creative +artists, at one time great champions of the spiritual nature of +man, are now sufficiently dubious about his nature to be reduced to +impotence. + + [2] I say “almost” because there was Bernhard Riemann and his disciple + W. K. Clifford. + + + + + 2 + + +The notion that we live in a purposeless universe is so opposed to the +mental habits we have inherited that it is a matter of the greatest +difficulty to bear it constantly in mind. Most of the people who +hold this belief to-day would not do so but for three reasons: the +disillusionment caused by the War, their respect for science, and +their belief that science preaches materialism. As for the War, that +is an experience to which we must accommodate ourselves as best we +may. It is consistent with the belief that man is a developing spirit, +but it is certainly a proof that he is not very far developed. The +respect for science is, I believe, on the whole rather overdone. The +respect is a little excessive even when it relates to mathematical +physics, but it becomes almost absurd when it relates to some other +branches of science. I believe, for instance, that Freud’s form of +psycho-analysis, some forms of behaviourism, and many of the statements +of the eugenists really are as silly as they look. All that they +have in common with such first-class mental activities as physics and +chemistry is the name “science.” It is this name that secures for them +such attention as they get from intelligent people who are not cranks. +But even physics is a more provisional and more human thing than some +romantic references to it would lead one to suppose. Even the tower of +the mathematician, which Mr Bernard Shaw imagines to have been always +unshaken, has been seriously disturbed on more than one occasion. The +student of the history of science will not be too confident even of the +“indubitable certainties” of physics when he reflects on the universal +passion of belief that attached to the notion of a mechanical ether, +for whose present absence from the universe some men of science are +still inconsolable, and when he reflects on the fate that has overtaken +that “most perfect and perfectly established law”, Newton’s law of +gravitation. There are no indubitable certainties in science, a fact +that we who are contemporary with the destruction of the Newtonian +system are not likely to forget. There are only provisional hypotheses. +It may even be, as Mr J. B. S. Haldane prophesies, that physiology +will one day invade and destroy mathematical physics, by which somewhat +dark saying I suppose phenomena mathematically may be given up. Whether +he means that or not, it is a possibility, as Professor Eddington has +hinted. The scientific practitioner usually treats his hypotheses as +tools, but to the layman they become dogmas. One is led to believe +this by seeing that many of those who accept materialism on what they +suppose to be scientific evidence are rendered acutely unhappy by their +belief. A truer knowledge of the status of scientific theories would +render this agony unnecessary. There are people with a natural leaning +towards materialism, and science, preferably somewhat old-fashioned +science, will give them quite sufficient grounds to indulge their +propensity with complete intellectual honesty. But science does not, +and never has, brought forward sufficient evidence to justify a man +turning materialist against his will. And perhaps no man has ever done +so. Perhaps one can take the agonies of modern poets too seriously. +Many artists, not only small ones, have no real indwelling force +such as a man like Beethoven obviously possessed. They are merely +very impressionable and _adopt_ an attitude towards life, and this +attitude is accepted and maintained, not because they really think it +is true, but because they derive strength from it. It gives them a +centre from which they can work; it gives them a feeling of strength +and completeness. The maintenance of their attitude towards life may +become the condition that they exist and function as artists at all. +Nevertheless, the attitude is maintained only by a constant effort of +will, although, since the motive is self-preservation, the artist will +nearly always think himself perfectly sincere. But I shall, without +going into these refinements, take the unhappiness of our modern +literary men at its face-value, those, that is, who believe that the +universe is purposeless and think this belief is founded on scientific +evidence. + +The point of view has been well put recently by Mr I. A. Richards,[3] +a literary critic who thinks it possible that poetry may be destroyed +by science. He speaks of the “neutralization of nature” which has been +effected by science, and contrasts this with the “magical view” of the +world that has hitherto been accepted by artists. What he means by +this is that science reveals to us a universe quite indifferent to all +human aspirations, whereas artists have hitherto assumed that man is +of cosmic significance. The poet must learn to accept the scientific +universe and give up believing in things like “inspiration”, “a reality +deeper than the reality of science”, and so on. “Experience”, says Mr +Richards, “is its own justification”, by which he appears to mean that +experience just happens to be what it is by some kind of accident. It +points to nothing beyond itself. The ground for this belief is not, +in Mr Richards’ case, old-fashioned materialism. “It is not what the +universe is made of but how it works, the law it follows, which makes +knowledge of it incapable of spurring on our emotional responses.” This +reminds one of the “iron laws” of the Victorian age, which many people +found so depressing, although the logical connection between existence +having conditions and existence being purposeless is a little hard to +follow. But although the particular iron laws of the Victorians have +gone, Mr Richards finds the theory of relativity no more cheering. “A +god voluntarily or involuntarily subject to Einstein’s General Theory +of Relativity does not make an emotional appeal and physics does not +find it necessary to mention him.” Apparently it is the existence of +any law at all that is resented: the poet can feel happy only in a +world of pure miracle. I strongly doubt the correctness of Mr Richards’ +diagnosis.[4] I am certain that not all poets have been as childish +as that. No――the essential element in this general outlook is not +that phenomena occur in an orderly way, but that man’s existence is +not regarded as forming part of some universal purpose. The essential +element is the same as in old-fashioned materialism, the “accidental +collocations of atoms” theory. The emphasis was on the “accidental” +not on the “atoms”. This becomes clear when Mr Richards describes the +appropriate emotional reaction to his view. “A sense of desolation +and uncertainty, of futility, of the baselessness of aspirations, of +the vanity of endeavour, and a thirst for a life-giving water which +seems suddenly to have failed, are the signs in consciousness of this +necessary reorganization of our lives.” It is difficult to believe +that this state of mind can be produced by the recognition of such +facts as that unsupported stones always fall to the ground. But if Mr +Richards is right, I suggest that the poets who are so depressed by +law and order should study, besides the theory of relativity, Quantum +Theory. They will find there much that is, at present, agreeably +miraculous. But one need not fly to miracles to get rid of the bug-bear +of “unalterable law”. It is only necessary to understand the true +status of the unalterable laws, and this is just what relativity theory +enables us to do. + + [3] _Science and Poetry_, 1926. + + [4] But possibly Mr Richards means that the scientific description + does not include values. See Section 5 of this essay. + + + + + 3 + + +The idea that there is a conflict between science and art, which is at +bottom the idea that there is a conflict between science and mysticism, +rests, I have suggested, upon an old-fashioned conception of the +status of physics. The first duty of a man who bases his conclusions +on science is to make sure that his science is up-to-date. The science +that leads to the depressing conclusions I have just sketched is not +up-to-date. Until a few years ago the physicist thought that the +material universe he dealt with was a real, objectively existing +universe in the sense that, in the absence of consciousness, it would +be very much the same as it appeared to be. This universe was subject +to laws, and these laws might conceivably have been different. There +was no _a priori_ reason, for instance, why the force of gravitation +should not vary as the inverse cube of the distance. There was no _a +priori_ reason why matter and energy should be conserved. These were +laws of governance of the material universe; their discovery had +required much effort and the rejection of alternatives. Man was in no +sense responsible for them: he happened to live in a universe governed +by them. These were the iron laws of the Victorians and are the laws, +apparently, that depress modern poets. One of the great discoveries of +relativity theory is that these laws need be no more depressing than +the laws of Euclidean geometry. No artist has felt his aspirations +baseless because he cannot draw a circle whose circumference is six +times its radius. He has no more right to despair because there +is an inexorable law of gravitation. This has been made clear by +Professor Eddington, whose mathematical development of relativity +theory is of great philosophical importance, and would, in a more +adequately educated community, be given more newspaper headlines than +Tutankhamen. The real universe, according to relativity theory, is a +four-dimensional world of point-events. Of the nature of point-events +we know nothing. All that we require to know, for the purposes of +physics, is that it takes four numbers to specify a point-event +uniquely, and that some kind of structure――a minimum amount of +structure――may be postulated of the world of point-events. We then +find, purely by mathematical processes, that certain characteristics of +this world will have the quality of permanence. The mind, faced with +this world of evanescent point-events, selects those characteristics +that are permanent as being of special interest. This is merely because +the mind happens to be that kind of thing. As a consequence of this +predilection of the mind there arises space and time, matter, and the +laws of nature. There arises, in fact, the “objective universe”. The +real world of point-events has many other characteristics to which the +mind pays no attention. A different principle of selection, exercised +on the same total world of point-events, would result in an utterly +different universe, a universe that is, for us, quite unimaginable. And +the universe that the mind has selected and constructed from the world +of point-events does not in the least depend on what the point-events +_are_. All that is necessary is that a certain minimum amount of +structure should be attributed to the world of point-events. It is from +the relations between the point-events, quite independent of their +substance, that the mind has created the material universe and its +laws. These laws, it must be emphasized, are _necessary_ consequences +of the mind’s selective action. They are necessary in the same sense +that the sum of the three interior angles of a Euclidean triangle must +be two right angles. Of the underlying reality deduced by physics we +can say almost nothing. It may be what Newton called the “sensorium” +of God, and the point-events may be his thoughts. They do not succeed +one another in time for, at this stage of analysis, space and time are +“merged in one”. This perfectly gratuitous hypothesis may appeal to +some mystics, for our thoughts, considered as belonging to the world +of point-events, would be part of the thoughts of God. It would be +indeed true that in him we lived and moved and had our being. We see, +then, the limitations of physics. All that depends on the _structure_ +of reality belongs to physics, including other universes than ours. +All that depends upon the _substance_ of reality for ever lies outside +physics. As to the actual universe we live in, why we should regard +it as actual is a problem for psychology. The difference between the +actual and the non-actual is a distinction conferred by our minds. It +is very probable that the whole movement of the universe in time is +also contributed by our minds. It seems to be true that events do not +take place――we come across them. Why we do not know the future is again +a question of psychology. Ignorance of the future, like the existence +of the material universe, is a clue to the constitution of our minds. +This has a bearing on the question of “purpose” in the universe. The +conception of purpose seems to suppose a process in time, and therefore +may be a totally irrelevant idea when applied to reality. + +The philosophical implications of relativity theory will doubtless +take a long time to work out. The four-dimensional universe of +point-events is something that can be argued about but it is, to use an +old-fashioned phrase, “inconceivable”. Mankind, excepting professional +logicians, never remains content with the inconceivable. A purely +logical conclusion is not enough; it has to be grasped imaginatively, +by which I do not necessarily mean that it has to be pictured. To +become familiar with a theory does not merely mean that one is able, as +a form of mental wire-walking, to slip nimbly back and forth over the +logical connections of the structure. It means taking it into oneself +in some indefinable manner――becoming “intimate” with it. Only when a +theory is “realized”, as we say, do we feel that we truly understand +it. Ideas, points of view, that we were able to see only in flashes, +become part of our normal intellectual equipment. The process may +well be called a growth of consciousness. There are ideas which our +consciousness, when it first approaches them is, as it were, too flabby +to grasp. We first have to exercise our mental muscles. Every student +of a line of thought such as mathematics, which is rather outside +our normal preoccupations, becomes aware of an actual change in his +mental powers. Notions so abstract that at first they seemed almost +meaningless gradually become perfectly clear and permanent additions to +one’s mental resources. Students of musical composition find that their +capacity for mentally hearing a number of parts rapidly increases. In +some cases it is almost as if a new faculty of the mind were born and +developed. + +The physics of recent years has made heavy demands upon our capacity +for realization. The electron theory, with its analysis of matter into +“disembodied charges of electricity” required, for its understanding, +the breaking up of old habits of thought. To young students the idea +was, at first, extremely baffling――almost nonsense. To realize it one +had to make more abstract one’s idea of matter until the notion of +“substance” was replaced by the notion of “behaviour”. Anything that +behaved in the way characteristic of matter was matter. The central +idea of the restricted principle of relativity, the idea of different +time-systems, was still more difficult to grasp. In this case we had to +become convinced that our ordinary idea of simultaneity, an idea which +seemed perfectly clear, was really a bogus idea. The attacks on the +theory of relativity show, for the most part, merely that their authors +are unable to abandon old habits of thought. With the complete theory +of relativity, as we have it now, the task of adjustment has become +enormous. There cannot be, even now, more than very few scientific men +who naturally approach a problem from the point of view of relativity +theory. In most cases a conscious effort of mental preparation is +required, such as occurs when a novelist, sitting down to continue +his work, deliberately thinks himself into the appropriate frame of +mind. Yet doubtless the next generation or so will think in terms of +relativity theory as naturally as we thought in terms of the Newtonian +system. I would not hold it as impossible that the human mind may come +to realize, imaginatively as well as logically, the four-dimensional +space-time continuum. But it seems that the mind of the physicist, at +any rate, will have to do more than become familiar with relativity +theory. It will have to accommodate itself somehow to the quantum +theory for, although we can write down the laws which govern sub-atomic +phenomena and make deductions from them, these laws are, at present, +unintelligible. An electron behaves as if it had foreknowledge of +what it was about to do and could make the mathematical calculations +necessary to achieve its end. We cannot admit this to be possible, and +we can only suppose that the difficulty arises from the way we think +about things. We must learn to think in a different way, and what the +consequences of that new way of thinking will be no one can say. We +know very little of the possibilities of the development of the human +consciousness. + +The proper attitude to-day in which the problem of man’s place in +nature should be approached is one of bewilderment and humility. Both +the material universe and the mind of man are very mysterious things. +At the present time it is only an inadequate mind which is confident +that it knows what is impossible. There was never a time when hearty +dogmatism and loud confidence were more out of place. We must think as +best we can, of course. The next step upward in the development of the +human consciousness will not be achieved by either slovenly credulity +or slovenly scepticism, but only by a terrifying mental travail. I +see a human mind as some multiple plant, here in full flower, there +still in the bud. Different minds have flowered in different ways. +Beethoven’s _Heiliger Dankgesang eines Genesenen an die Gottheit_ +points to the complete development in him of something which those +of us who understand him have only in embryo. In those who do not +understand him it is non-existent. And the great mystics ought at least +to make us doubt whether it is we who are not deficient rather than +they who are mad. It is rash to dismiss our exceptional moods, our +strange flashes of what seems like insight, as mere whimsies without +significance. They may be faint stirrings of the next thing that is +destined to become fully alive. All that we can say is that the mind +lives in a universe largely of its own creation, and that the universe, +together with the mind, will change in ways we cannot foresee. + + + + + 4 + + +We have seen that the philosophy that regards man as a meaningless +accident in an alien universe receives no support from modern physics. +The true ground of that philosophy is now, as it always has been, the +apparently meaningless misery that forms part of life. It is not by +mistaking matter for an ultimate reality or by pondering on the fact +that laws of nature exist that we can conclude that man is of no cosmic +significance. That conclusion can be reached logically only on the +basis of arbitrary assumptions. But the conclusion is not, in fact, +reached in that way: it is reached through feeling. And it cannot +be transcended by a logical process, but only in virtue of a mystic +experience. + +The old materialistic outlook, although it no longer has any scientific +justification, is still active in many branches of science. It has made +popular certain types of explanation and is the cause of the direction +pursued by certain researches. In particular it has led to a great +deal of useless or misleading work being done in the attempt to reduce +qualitative to quantitative differences. + +A good deal of what passes for scientific work amongst eugenists +and psychologists consists of attempts to match things which are +qualitatively different. This is the favourite procedure of that kind +of psycho-analysis which reduces everything to sex. Discrimination +is fatiguing; also, it makes appeal to sensibilities which many +earnest “scientific workers” do not possess. It is much easier to make +measurements than to know exactly what you are measuring. + +To give up the ideal of measurability would be equivalent, to many +people, to abandoning “science” altogether. “Science is measurement”, +we are informed. This ideal is borrowed from physics, the science +whose aim it is to give mathematical descriptions of phenomena. But +we may have branches of knowledge that may fairly be called science +although they are not mathematical. We may find it necessary to use +concepts that cannot be mathematically defined. It may not be mere +lack of knowledge which prevents biology, for instance, from being a +mathematical science. It may be impossible in the nature of things ever +to give the equation to a chicken. But the bias towards measurability +is very strong and has led to measurements being made, particularly in +psychology, where we really have no clear idea at all as to what is +being measured. When, for instance, Professor Karl Pearson compares +fraternal resemblances in such things as stature and arm-length with +fraternal resemblances in intelligence and conscientiousness, what +exactly is he doing? A great deal of what is called experimental +psychology impresses one as being nothing but the application of +an inappropriate technique by exceptionally innocent and unworldly +“scientists”. The methods found so successful in physics are applied +to everything under the sun. It is pretty obvious that this is not due +to some mystic, Pythagorean conviction that number is the principle of +all things, but merely to mental inertia. Many “intelligence tests” +and many of the statistical results obtained by the eugenists impress +the ordinary person as being laughably superficial. In their eagerness +to “measure” something our researcher seem to lose their ordinary +common sense, whereas their subject really requires the subtlety and +sympathy of a very good novelist. It is amazing the number of dull, +unimaginative people who find a congenial life work in prosecuting +researches in pseudo-science. The ordinary public, unfortunately, +does not discriminate between one kind of science and another, with +the result that the contempt they rightly feel for some so-called men +of science is apt to be extended to all scientific men. Thus Mr G. +K. Chesterton, having heard that some “scientists” explain the shape +of a church spire as symbolical of phallic worship, begins to doubt +the whole Royal Society. It must be remembered that in science real +insight and imagination are as rare as in any other human activity. In +the clear-cut sciences, such as physics and chemistry, where the right +way of attacking problems is known and where an elaborate technique +has been built up, there is plenty of room for valuable routine work. +All the difficult preliminary work of getting right conceptions and +principles has been done. The routine worker can measure the electric +capacities of different condensers because the difficult notion of +electric capacity has been made clear by his masters. But the routine +worker in psychology who measures “intelligence” is not doing anything +definite at all. His subject is not yet ripe for the application of +such exact methods. In this way the prestige of physics has exerted +a harmful influence on the study of psychology. It is true that some +experimental psychologists are becoming aware of the fact that they do +not always know what they are measuring. There are controversies as to +what a given set of measurements has measured, and some measurements +seem to be undertaken on the off-chance that a meaning will some day be +found for them. It is not suggested that all experimental psychology is +of this kind, but it is certainly true that many psychological papers, +complete with correlation coefficients and “curves” of all kinds, wear +an air of precision to which they have no real claim. + +A more definitely materialistic bias is observable in the attempts to +explain psychological happenings in terms of physiology. The result +is that learned and acute men, caught in the jungle of neurology, +painfully fight their way out with some such epoch-making discovery +as that one learns a subject more rapidly if one is interested in +it. This result, which is supposed to be incompatible with the +purely physiological theory of the mind, owes all its difficulty to +that in compatibility. Otherwise it is a perfectly obvious fact of +experience. If it were not for the prestige achieved by materialism +in the Victorian age it is probable that psychology would be very +much further advanced than it is. But the side-tracking influence of +that philosophy has meant that psychologists have had painfully to +discover the obvious. But if materialism, in small doses, delays the +recognition of the obvious, it does, when fully developed, deny the +obvious. This is what the behaviourists do. They deny that we think or +that we can form images in our minds. The only possible answer to this +theory is a satire, as when Voltaire answered the theory that in this +world everything is for the best in the best of all possible worlds +by writing _Candide_. But in this queer modern world behaviourism, +instead of being greeted with laughter, is answered carefully and +politely, apparently in the spirit in which Monsieur Bergeret shook +hands with the _vers libriste_ poet, “for fear of wronging beauty in +disguise”. The position of the ordinary man in face of these theories +is, nevertheless, a difficult one. Behaviourism may sound to him +nonsense, but so does non-Euclidean geometry. His natural reaction +would be to class both of them with the theory that the English +are descended from the lost ten tribes of Israel. Nevertheless, +non-Euclidean geometry is not nonsense. In these circumstances it is +probably fortunate that there are people patient enough to prepare +careful and reasoned refutations of any whimsy that anybody cares to +put forth. The extraordinary predisposition of the learned towards +concocting merely silly theories must always be borne in mind. Studious +persons often have a very small range of experience of life; they have +nothing like so broadly based a sense of probability as the ordinary +man of the world possesses, which is why so many of them seem curiously +innocent and gullible. The beaming and genial professor expounding +his theory often seems curiously like a child playing with toys. The +mixture of amusement and respect with which the world watches him is, +on the whole, the correct reaction. As long as he is dealing with +the incomprehensible one may grant him authority. Nobody dreams of +questioning astronomical pronouncements about forthcoming eclipses. But +when he is talking about the very stuff of our ordinary experience, +as in psychology, we do wrong to accept the obviously absurd for +fear that it cannot be as silly as it looks. A great deal of what is +called psycho-analysis, for instance, is merely silly. Only people +singularly deficient in common-sense and completely lacking in a sense +of humour could have invented anything so preposterous. Undoubtedly +some pathological states are of sexual origin, but the lengths to +which the theory has been carried and the kind of interpretations +that are given make the development of psycho-analysis one of the +greatest psychological curiosities of our time. Whole-hearted belief in +psycho-analysis certainly points to the existence of a complex. As with +any other complex, it is defended by arguments to which none except +those who are similarly afflicted can attach the slightest validity. +The complex is strongly materialistic, not in the sense that everything +is reduced to “matter and motion”, but in the sense that the lowest +human activities are made explanatory of all the rest. One often finds, +associated with a belief in materialism, a desire to deny any form +of spiritual excellence. The ostensible motive is simplification, as +when material substances are reduced to a small number of chemical +elements; but it is usually obvious, from the forced explanations that +are attempted, that the real motive is something very different. Much, +of course, must be attributed to insensitiveness, as we see when we +turn to psycho-analytic explanations of works of art. The extraordinary +force of the psycho-analysts’ complex is well shown by the sort of +arguments they find convincing. Thus they may profess to show that +artistic tastes never exist without suppressed sexual desires. Their +way of establishing this fact, which is chiefly by asserting it, is +comparatively rational. But they then proceed to the statement that a +taste for art is merely a disguised form of sexual desire. They might +as well say that it is a disguised form of hunger, since artists are +quite as notorious for being hungry as for being erotic, and artistic +tastes are never found to exist in a man who takes no nourishment. + +Not only much modern psychology, but some other modern sciences such as +comparative religion, are prone to a certain fallacy that may be called +the fallacy of “explanation by origins”. This kind of explanation has +been made popular by the theory of evolution, and the fallacy consists +in supposing that to give the historical antecedents of a thing is to +give an analysis of that thing. Thus, some authorities suppose that by +showing that religion has developed from primitive magic rites, they +have thereby proved that religion is nothing but a disguised form of +magic. One might as well say that an oak-tree is a disguised form of an +acorn, or that a man is a disguised form of an amoeba. But this error +is too glaring to be committed by more than a small percentage of our +modern “thinkers”. A much more insidious danger is that this type of +explanation leads one to under-estimate the complexity of the thing +to be explained. There is a tendency to neglect those factors in the +final product which cannot be traced in its historical antecedents. +This is one form of the widespread error of undue simplification. No +human mind can deal exhaustively with concrete facts. Every natural +entity, whether it be a flower or a nation, contains far too many +factors for thought to grasp it completely. The art of human thinking +is to make useful abstractions. Any man is a very complicated creature. +All the artists and scientists of the world could not describe him +exhaustively. But for the purposes of war every man under a certain +military rank was regarded as a physical structure supporting weapons +and a stomach on two legs. This abstraction was useful for the purposes +for which it was invented. A somewhat different abstraction is required +when a man is considered as a voter. When a man is considered as +a “hand” or a “worker” it is found that slightly more complicated +abstractions are required. In fact, the great fault of economic theory +has been that its “economic man” was too simple an abstraction. The +economist left out certain factors in his conception of man, with the +result that his plans, when applied to real men, do not work. I am +suggesting that the sciences which ape physics suffer, amongst other +things, from inadequate abstractions. This is not surprising, for +there is every reason to suppose that the extraordinary difficulties +experienced by physics itself, at the present day, are due to the same +cause. An analysis of this position will show us the direction of the +probable future development of science and help us to see in what +consists the importance of the arts. + + + + + 5 + + +Many people, including some scientific men, take science too seriously. +They think that science gives a far more comprehensive picture of +reality than it really does. There have been philosophers who have +gone so far as to suppose that those factors of experience that +science does not find it necessary to talk about do not really exist. +This is the basis of the belief that colours, sounds, and scents have +no “objective” existence; they exist only in the mind, whereas such +qualities as mass and extension are supposed to exist independently of +the mind. It is true that science does not find it necessary to refer +to colours, sounds, and scents in giving its description of nature, +whereas it does find it necessary to refer to mass and extension. But +that does not prove that the former qualities are not as real as the +latter, are not as indubitably part of the universe. The scientific +concepts have by no means proved themselves adequate to account for +the whole of experience. Nearly everything of real importance to +man lies at present outside science. The fact is that science was +undertaken as an intellectual adventure: it was an attempt to find +out how far nature could be described in mathematical terms. Certain +primary conceptions――time, space, mass, force, and so on――all of which +can be defined mathematically, were adopted, and it became a highly +absorbing game to find out how much of what goes on around us could be +described, mathematically, in terms of these conceptions. The success +of this effort has been so astonishing that some scientific men have +forgotten to be astonished. They have come to take it for granted that +a complete mathematical description of the world should be possible. +This assumption is not a rational one: it is a pure act of faith. The +great founders of the scheme made no such mistake: they were quite +aware of the precarious nature of their enterprise. Thus, Newton, the +greatest and most successful of them all, says that, if they find the +mathematical method does not work, they must try a different method. +The mathematical method, which is the very essence of modern science, +has, however, worked splendidly. From the time of its origination in +the seventeenth century until the present day it has had no serious +rival. The ancient æsthetic principle, which led to the conclusion that +the planets moved in circles because the circle is the only perfect +figure, is still used by theosophists, but not by men of science. +Similarly the old moralistic principle, which explained the fact +of water rising in a pump by saying that nature abhorred a vacuum, +possibly lingers on only in such superstitions as that sunlight puts +the fire out. In more modern times the only notorious rival of the +Newtonian method was the dialectic method of Hegel, who evolved the +laws of the universe from his inner consciousness. But the best-known +result of this method, that there could not be more planets than were +known to exist, happened to be published on the very day that a new +planet was discovered. The mathematical method, then, is at the present +day without a rival. But, although we cannot at present imagine what +could replace the mathematical method, we must be careful not to +exaggerate the significance of the results that have been achieved by +it. For these results depend not only on the method, but also on the +material the method has to work with. And there is good reason to +suppose, in the present state of physics, that the material with which +science has worked hitherto is turning out to be not quite satisfactory. + +This material is chiefly the Newtonian set of abstractions. Newton +postulated, as the fundamental constituents out of which the perceived +universe is built up, Space, Time, and Matter. Space and time he +regarded as absolute and as quite independent of matter. Matter was an +enduring substance that simply inhabited space and time. The analysis +of these conceptions has resulted in the Einstein theory, in which +neither space, time, nor matter are fundamental. The interesting +thing about this analysis, from our present point of view, is that it +shows clearly what arbitrary elements are present in the scientific +description of the universe. For we must remember that moral and +æsthetic elements were ruled out of the real universe simply because +science did not find it necessary to mention them. The foundation +stones of the scientific edifice, namely space, time, and matter, +were supposed to be the only realities. Everything else was a sort +of illusion. Men who must have been theory-mad soberly maintained +that little particles of matter wandering about purposelessly in +space and time produced our minds, our hopes, and fears, the scent of +the rose, the colours of the sunset, the songs of the birds, and our +knowledge of the little particles themselves. The sole realities were +the little wandering particles and the space and time they wandered +in. The existence of everything else depended on the mind, and was +inconceivable without the mind. It is interesting, therefore, that +science has now reached a position where space, time, and matter also +depend on the mind. In giving a scientific description of the universe +Einstein does not find it necessary to begin with space, time, and +matter. These entities become “derivative”. The universe becomes more +spectral than ever if we are going to adopt the materialist principle +that what depends on the mind does not really exist. Even the universe +of wandering particles is comparatively cosy compared with this modern +universe of undefinable “point-events”. But if we do not adopt the +materialist principle we may assert that moral and æsthetic values +are as much a part of the real universe as anything else, and that +the reason why science does not find it necessary to mention them is +not because they are not there but because science is a game played +according to certain rules, and those rules have excluded these values +from the outset. The life-insurance actuary may, for his purposes, +neglect many things about men, and yet calculate, quite correctly, +what percentage of them will die at forty. But he has not proved that +the qualities he has neglected do not exist simply because they do not +come in to upset his calculations. A politician finds that he has to +base his calculations on quite different aspects of mankind from those +found satisfactory by the actuary. In the same way, a mountain is a +different thing to a poet from what it is to a man of science. For the +kind of understanding of the universe that the man of science is after, +the mountain is merely a heap of certain kinds of matter weighing so +many millions of tons. The poet, who is after a different kind of +vision, finds it necessary to take into account quite other factors +which enter into his total experience of the mountain. The scientist +may also experience emotions of awe and reverence in the presence of +the mountain, but for the purposes of his science these factors of his +experience may be neglected. He _abstracts_ from the total concrete +fact of his experience of the mountain. The mountain, as he describes +it in the scientific paper he proceeds to write, is a mere pale +shadow of the real mountain; he probably leaves it indistinguishable +from any other mountain that happens to weigh the same, just as to +the life-insurance actuary all men of forty are exactly alike. If we +believe that the factors in experience that the scientific man neglects +are quite as real as those he takes into account, it becomes a matter +for wonder that science is possible. How is it that science forms a +closed system――that nothing from the worlds it neglects ever comes in +to disturb it? + +It is one of the great services of relativity theory to philosophy that +it provides an answer to this question. The answer is that the entities +discussed by physics are defined in terms of one another. The three +hundred years of building up exact science really amounts, in the last +analysis, to doing what the dictionary compiler did when he defined a +violin as a small violoncello and a violoncello as a large violin. Of +course, if this statement were literally true, science would give us +no information about the universe at all. Nevertheless, the statement +is true about the actual procedure of science, and it is in virtue of +this procedure that science forms a closed system. But what is left out +of this description is the scientist himself. The mysterious process +which is not taken into account in this description of the scientific +method is the process by which the consciousness of the scientist makes +contact with the entities he is talking about. In deducting the world +from “point-events”, for instance, we begin by talking about something +we have no direct cognisance of, namely point-events. From point-events +we deduce “potentials”――again a mere word. But from potentials we +deduce “matter”, and here we are talking of something of which we +have direct knowledge. Similarly, the circular definition of violin +and violoncello tells us nothing as it stands. But to a man who can +identify one of these entities, to a man who has ever seen a violin, it +gives genuine information. + +We need not be surprised, therefore, that nothing from the outside +ever seems to disturb the equanimity that reigns within the closed +system of physics. The abstractions with which it begins are all it +ever has to deal with. There are no subsequent fresh contacts with +reality. If the region covered by relativity theory embraced the whole +of physics it would seem that, so far as physical science is concerned, +we knew all that there is to be known. But it is notorious that, of +recent years, an entirely new set of phenomena has been discovered in +physical science. These phenomena arise when we consider, not matter +in bulk but matter in its smallest particles. These phenomena are, +at present, strictly incomprehensible. The celebrated quantum theory +provides us with rules for dealing with some of them, but does not +make them intelligible. It seems that science has here reached its +limits. Professor Eddington has even hinted that these phenomena may +indicate that the universe is finally irrational, that is, that the +attempt to describe nature mathematically will have to be given up. +This is a possibility that Newton foresaw. But it seems more likely +that our present state of bewilderment has a different cause. That +cause, we shall probably find, is the insufficiency of the abstractions +hitherto used in science. We have to go back to the concrete facts of +experience and build up a richer, fuller set of abstractions. Physics +is now paying the penalty of inadequate abstraction. In particular, it +must revise its notions of space, time, and substance. This revision +is quite independent of the Einstein theory, and is made necessary, +not by that theory but by the quantum theory. A first attempt at +this revision has been made by that great mathematical philosopher, +Professor Whitehead.[5] We need not deal with his investigation, which +is at present in a highly technical state. The space and time of the +new theory are interconnected and do not consist of independent volumes +and instants. Every volume of space has reference to the whole of +space, and every moment of time refers both to the past and the future. +Hence both memory and expectation are given a rational basis. On the +old view, as Hume pointed out, there is no reason whatever to suppose +that the order of nature should continue. Why do we expect that the +force of gravity will be in existence to-morrow? There was no _reason_ +at all for this expectation or for any other. That is to say, the whole +of science itself was based on blind faith. The new foundations of +science make science itself a rational activity. As for the notion of +“substance”, Professor Whitehead proposes to replace it by the notion +of “organism”. We may imagine an electron, for instance, as a repeated +pattern of events. One of the great difficulties of the quantum +phenomena is that an electron seems to pass from one place to another +without passing through the intervening space. On the basis of the new +abstractions this difficulty can be overcome. We have to imagine an +electron as requiring a certain time to manifest itself――just as a tune +does. + + [5] _Science and the Modern World._ + +From our present point of view, however, the chief interest attaching +to these new foundations for science is the place occupied in them +by the intuitions of the poets. Mr Richards, literary critic, tells +us that the poets must learn from science; Professor Whitehead, +mathematician and physicist, tells us that science must learn from the +poets. Instead of the poet having to realize that his intuitions are +illusory and belong to a childish, _démodé_ view of the world, it is +the scientific man who must realize that his abstractions are too thin +and narrow to be any longer useful, and that the poet makes closer +contact with reality. When Wordsworth says: + + “Ye Presences of Nature in the sky + And on the earth! Ye Visions of the hills! + And Souls of lonely places! can I think + A vulgar hope was yours when ye employed + Such ministry, when ye through many a year + Haunting me thus among my boyish sports, + On caves and trees, upon the woods and hills, + Impressed upon all forms the characters + Of danger or desire; and thus did make + The surface of the universal earth + With triumph and delight, with hope and fear + Work like a sea?...” + +he is not, according to Professor Whitehead, expressing fantasies that +the strong-minded realist can afford to neglect: he is describing +the actual concrete facts of experience, facts which, says Professor +Whitehead, “are distorted in the scientific analysis”. It is the artist +not the scientist who deals most adequately with reality. It is the man +of science, taking his pale abstractions for the only realities, who +dwells in dream-land. + +So far as we can see at present, however, science cannot abandon its +method. It cannot deal with the whole concrete fact: it must continue +to make abstractions. But the present _impasse_ in scientific theory +is an indication that it must go back to the beginning and include more +factors of the concrete fact in its abstractions. It seems likely that, +in doing so, it will have to presuppose a philosophy very different +from the materialism hitherto current amongst scientific men. The world +will have to be regarded as an evolutionary process, where “patterns +of value” emerge. It will have to be regarded as an interconnected +whole, and the separation of mind from matter, and mind from mind, will +have to be replaced by a conception which regards these distinctions, +in their present form, as unreal. One very desirable result of this +transformation will be that the arts will be taken seriously. The +old outlook did not regard values as inherent in reality. They were +merely expressive of the accidental human constitution, but had no +cosmic significance. Art existed to provide a unique thrill, called +the “æsthetic emotion”. On the new outlook the function of the arts +is to communicate knowledge and, moreover, the most valuable kind of +knowledge. Art, much more than science, expresses the concrete facts +of experience in their actuality. Music, in particular, finds its +highest function in revealing to us the possibilities of the spirit +of man himself. The music of such a man as Beethoven is a revelation +of existence from the vantage point of a higher consciousness. It is, +we may hope, prophetic of the future development of the race. Not +only art, but morals, acquire vastly greater importance on the new +outlook. Morals are no longer a purely private concern, expressive of a +particular human constitution in an alien, strictly non-moral universe. +Men are no longer justified in believing that their only duty is to +preserve their self-respect and to make the most of their opportunities. + +Science, in view of our increased knowledge of its aims and powers, +can no longer be presented to us as a tyrant. Science assumes certain +fundamental principles and entities, and there is an arbitrary element +in these assumptions. What science does not assume does not thereby not +exist. It gives, and it appears that it must forever give, a _partial_ +description of the universe. The fact that the elements of reality it +leaves out do not come in to disturb it is no presumption against the +existence of these elements. For science forms a closed system simply +because it employs the device of cyclic definition. The teachings of +science, so far as the spiritual problems of men are concerned, need no +longer be regarded as stultifying: they are merely irrelevant. + + + * * * * * + + + Transcriber’s Notes: + + ――Text in italics is enclosed by underscores (_italics_). + + ――Punctuation and spelling inaccuracies were silently corrected. + + ――Archaic and variable spelling has been preserved. + + + + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 76629 *** |