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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 76284 ***






PAUL

AND

HIS INTERPRETERS

A CRITICAL HISTORY

BY

ALBERT SCHWEITZER

PRIVATDOZENT IN NEW TESTAMENT STUDIES IN THE UNIVERSITY OF STRASSBURG

AUTHOR OF “THE QUEST OF THE HISTORICAL JESUS”

TRANSLATED BY

W. MONTGOMERY, BA., BD.

LONDON

ADAM AND CHARLES BLACK

1912




[pg v]

PREFACE


THE present work forms the continuation of my History of the Critical
Study of the Life of Jesus, which appeared in 1906 under the title
“Von Reimarus zu Wrede.”_(_1_)_

Any one who deals with the teaching and the life and work of Jesus,
and offers any kind of new reading of it, ought not to stop there, but
must be held under obligation to trace, from the stand-point at which
he has arrived, the pathway leading to the history of dogma. Only in
this way can it be clearly shown what his discovery is worth.

The great and still undischarged task which confronts those engaged in
the historical study of primitive Christianity is to explain how the
teaching of Jesus developed into the early Greek theology, in the form
in which it appears in the works of Ignatius, Justin, Tertullian and
Irenaeus. How could the doctrinal system of Paul arise on the basis of
the life and work of Jesus and the beliefs of the primitive community;
and how did the early Greek theology arise out of Paulinism?

Strauss and Renan recognised the obligation, and each endeavoured in a
series of works to trace the path leading from Jesus to the history of
dogma. Since their time no one who has dealt with the life of Jesus
has attempted to follow this course.

Meanwhile the history of dogma, on its part, has come to place the
teaching of Jesus, as well as that of Paul, outside the scope of its
investigations and to regard its own task as [pg vi] beginning at the
point where the undisputed and general Hellenisation of Christianity
sets in. It describes therefore the growth of Greek theology, but not
of Christian theology as a whole. And because it leaves the transition
from Jesus to Paul, and from Paul to Justin and Ignatius, unexplained,
and therefore fails to arrive at any intelligible and consistent
conception of Christian dogma as a whole, the edifice which it erects
has no secure basis. Any one who knows and admires Harnack’s “History
of Dogma” is aware that the solid mason-work only begins in the Greek
period; what precedes is not placed on firm foundations but only
supported on piles.

Paulinism is an integral part of the history of dogma; for the history
of dogma begins immediately upon the death of Jesus.

Critical theology, in dividing up the history of the development of
thought in primitive Christianity into the separate departments, Life
of Jesus, Apostolic Age, History of Dogma, and clinging to this
division as if it were something more than a mere convention of the
academic syllabus, makes a confession of incompetence and resigns all
hope of putting the history of dogma on a secure basis. Moreover, the
separate departments thus left isolated are liable to fall into all
kinds of confusions and errors, and it becomes a necessity of
existence to them not to be compelled to follow their theories beyond
the cunningly placed boundaries, or to be prepared to show at any
moment how their view accords with the preceding and following stages
in the development of thought.

This independence and autonomy of the different departments of study
begins with the downfall of the edifice constructed by Baur. He was
the last who dared to conceive, and to deal with, the history of dogma
in the large and general sense as the scientific study of the
development of the teaching of Jesus into the early Greek theology.
After him begins, with Ritschl, the narrower and more convenient
conception of the subject, which resigns its imperial authority over
the departments of study dealing with the Life of Jesus, [pg vii]
Primitive Christianity and Paulinism, and allows these to become
independent. In the works of Ritschl himself this new departure is not
clearly apparent, because he still formally includes the teaching of
Jesus, of Paul, and of primitive Christianity within the sphere of the
history of dogma. But instead of explaining the differences between
the various types of belief and doctrine, he glosses them over in such
a way that he practically denies the development of the thoughts, and
makes it impossible for a really scientific study of the teaching of
Jesus and of Paulinism to fit into the ready-made frame which he
provides.

Ritschl shares with Baur the presupposition that primitive dogma arose
out of the teaching of Jesus by an organic and logical process. The
separate disciplines which began after them have shown that this
assumption is false. Of a “development” in the ordinary sense there
can be no question, because closer investigation has not confirmed the
existence of the natural lines of connexion which might à priori have
been supposed to be self-evident, but reveals instead unintelligible
gaps. This is the real reason why the different departments of study
maintain their independence.

The system of the Apostle of the Gentiles stands over against the
teaching of Jesus as something of an entirely different character, and
does not create the impression of having arisen out of it. But how is
such a new creation of Christian ideas—and that within a bare two or
three decades after the death of Jesus—at all conceivable?

From Paulinism, again, there are no visible lines of connexion leading
to early Greek theology. Ignatius and Justin do not take over his
ideas, but create, in their turn, something new.

According to the assumption which in itself appears most natural, one
would be prepared to see in the teaching of Jesus a mountain-mass,
continued by the lofty summits of the Pauline range, and from these
gradually falling away to the lower levels of the early Catholic
theology. In reality the teaching of Jesus and that of the great
Apostle are like two separate ranges of hills, lying irregularly
disposed in [pg viii] front of the later “Gospel.” Even the relation
which each severally bears to primitive Christianity remains
uncertain.

This want of connexion must have some explanation. The task of
historical science is to understand why these two systems of teaching
are necessarily independent, and at the same time to point out the
geological fault and dislocation of the strata, and enable us to
recognise the essential continuity of these formations and the process
by which they have taken their present shape.

The edifice constructed by Baur has fallen; but his large and
comprehensive conception of the history of dogma ought not to be given
up. It is wholly wrong to ignore the problem at which he laboured and
so create the false impression that it has been solved. Present day
criticism is far from having explained how Paulinism and Greek
theology have arisen out of the teaching of Jesus. All it has really
done is to have gained some insight into the difficulties, and to have
made it increasingly evident that the question of the Hellenisation of
Christianity is the fundamental problem of the history of dogma.

It could not really hope to find a solution, because it is still
working away with the presuppositions of Baur, Ritschl, and Renan, and
has already tried three or four times over all the experiments which
are possible on this basis, without ever attaining to a real insight
into the course of the development. It has approached this or that
problem differently, has given a new version—not to say in some cases
a perversion—of it; but it has not succeeded in giving a satisfactory
answer to the question when and how the Gospel was Hellenised.

It has not even attained to clearness in regard to the condition in
which the Gospel existed prior to its Hellenisation. It has not
ventured to mark off with perfect distinctness the two worlds of
thought with which the process is concerned, and to formulate the
problem as being that of explaining how the Gospel, which was
originally purely Jewish and eschatological, became Greek in form and
content. That this could really have come about, it takes to be à
priori [pg ix] impossible. It therefore seeks to soften down the
antitheses as much as possible, to find in the teaching of Jesus
thoughts which force their way out of the frame of the Jewish
eschatological conceptions and have the character of universal
religion, and in the teaching of Paul to discover a “genuinely
Christian,” and also a Hellenic element, alongside of the Rabbinic
material.

Theological science has in fact been dominated by the desire to
minimise as much as possible the element of Jewish Apocalyptic in
Jesus and Paul, and so far as possible to represent the Hellenisation
of the Gospel as having been prepared for by them. It thinks it has
gained something when in formulating the problem it has done its best
to soften down the antitheses to the utmost with a view to providing
every facility for conceiving the transition of the Gospel from one
world of thought to the other.

In following this method Baur and Renan proceed with a simple
confidence which is no longer possible to present day theology. But in
spite of that it must still continue to follow the same lines, because
it has still to work with the old presuppositions and the weakening
down of the problem which they imply. The result is in every respect
unsatisfactory. The solution remains as impossible as it was before,
and the simplifications which were supposed to be provided in the
statement of the problem have only created new difficulties.

The thoroughgoing application of Jewish eschatology to the
interpretation of the teaching and work of Jesus has created a new
fact upon which to base the history of dogma. If the view developed at
the close of my “Quest of the Historical Jesus” is sound, the teaching
of Jesus does not in any of its aspects go outside the Jewish world of
thought and project itself into a non-Jewish world, but represents a
deeply ethical and perfected version of the contemporary Apocalyptic.

Therefore the Gospel is at its starting-point exclusively
Jewish-eschatological. The sharply antithetic formulation of the
problem of the Hellenisation of Christianity, which it was always
hoped to avoid, is proved by the facts recorded in the Synoptists to
be the only admissible one. Accordingly, [pg x] the history of dogma
has to show how what was originally purely Jewish-eschatological has
developed into something that is Greek. The expedients and evasions
hitherto current have been dismissed from circulation.

The primary task is to define the position of Paul. Is he the first
stage of the Hellenising process, or is his system of thought, like
that of primitive Christianity, to be conceived as purely
Jewish-eschatological? Usually the former is taken for granted,
because he detached Christianity from Judaism, and because otherwise
his thoughts do not seem to be easily explicable. Besides, it was
feared that if the teaching of the Apostle of the Gentiles, as well as
primitive Christianity, were regarded as purely Jewish-eschatological,
the problem of the Hellenisation of the Gospel would become so acute
as to make the possibility of solving it more remote than ever.

Moreover, the theological study of history is apt, even though
unconsciously, to give ear to practical considerations. At bottom, it
is guided by the instinct that whatever in the primitive Gospel is
capable of being Hellenised may also be considered capable of being
modernised. It therefore seeks to discern in Paul’s teaching—as also
in that of Jesus—as much as possible that “transcends Judaism,” that
has the character of “universal religion” and “essential
Christianity.” It is haunted by the apprehension that the significance
of Christianity, and its adaptation to our times, is dependent on
justifying the modernisation of it on the lines hitherto followed and
in accordance with the historical views hitherto current.

Those who have faced the recognition that the teaching of Jesus is
eschatologically conditioned cannot be brought by considerations of
this kind, scientific or unscientific, to entertain any doubt as to
the task which awaits them. That is, to apply this new view to the
explanation of the transition to the history of dogma, and as the
first step in that direction, to undertake a new formulation of the
problem of Paulinism. They will naturally endeavour to find out how
far the exclusively eschatological conception of the [pg xi] Gospel
manifests its influence in the thoughts of the Apostle of the
Gentiles, and will take into account the possibility that his system,
strange as this may at first sight appear, may have developed wholly
and solely out of that conception.

As in the case of the study of the life of Jesus, the problem and the
way to its solution will be developed by means of a survey of what has
hitherto been done. At the same time this method of presentation will
serve to promote the knowledge of the past periods of the science.
Since it is impossible for students, and indeed for the younger
teachers, to read for themselves all the works of earlier times, the
danger arises that on the one hand the names will remain mere empty
names, and on the other that, from ignorance, solutions will be tried
over again which have already been advanced and have proved untenable.
An attempt has therefore been made in this book to give a sufficient
insight into what has been done so far, and to provide a substitute
for the reading of such works as are not either of classical
importance or still generally accessible.

For practical reasons the method adopted in my former book, of
attaching the statement of the new view to the history of earlier
views, has not been followed here. This view will be developed and
defended in a separate work bearing the title “The Pauline Mysticism”
(“Die Mystik des Apostels Paulus”), which will appear at an early
date.

The English and American literature of the subject has not been
included in this study, since the works in question were not in all
cases accessible to me, and an insufficient acquaintance with the
language raised a barrier.

Nor have I aimed at giving, even with this limitation, a complete
enumeration of all the studies of Paul’s teaching. I have only desired
to cite works which either played a part of some value in the
development of Pauline study, or were in some way typical. The fact
that a work has been left unmentioned does not by any means
necessarily imply that it has not been examined.

ALBERT SCHWEITZER.

19_th Sept_. 1911.




[pg xiii]

Contents


CHAPTER I

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD . . . [1]

CHAPTER II

BAUR AND HIS CRITICS . . . [12]

CHAPTER III

FROM BAUR TO HOLTZMANN . . . [22]

CHAPTER IV

H. J. HOLTZMANN . . . [100]

CHAPTER V

CRITICAL QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES . . . [117]

CHAPTER VI

THE POSITION AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY . . . [151]

CHAPTER VII

PAULINISM AND COMPARATIVE RELIGION . . . [179]

CHAPTER VIII

SUMMING-UP AND FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM . . . [237]

INDEX . . . 251

ENDNOTES




PAUL AND HIS INTERPRETERS




[pg 001]

I


THE BEGINNINGS OF THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD


_Hugo Grotius._ Annotationes in Novum Testamentum. 1641-1646.

_Johann Jakob Rambach._ Institutiones hermeneuticae sacrae. 1723.

_Siegmund Jakob Baumgarten._ Unterricht der Auslegung der heiligen
Schrift. (Instructions in the art of Expounding Holy Scripture.) 1742.

_Johann Christoph Wolf._ Curae philologicae et criticae. 1741.

_Johann August Ernesti._ Institutio interpretis Novi Testamenti. 1762.
(Eng. Trans., Biblical Interpretation of the New Testament, Edinburgh,
1832-1833.)

_Johann Salomo Semler._ Vorbereitung zur theologischen Hermeneutic.
(Introduction to Theological Hermeneutic.) 1760-1769.

Abhandlung von freier Untersuchung des Canons. (Essay on the free
Investigation of the Canon.) 1771-1775.

Neuer Versuch die gemeinnützige Auslegung und Anwendung des Neuen
Testaments zu befördern. (A New Attempt to Promote a Generally
Profitable Exposition and Application of the New Testament.) 1786.

Latin Paraphrases of the Epistles to the Romans (1769) and Corinthians
(1770, 1776).

_Johann David Michaelis._ Einleitung in die göttlichen Schriften des
Neuen Bundes. (Introduction to the Divine Scriptures of the New
Covenant.) 1750. (Eng. Trans. by H. Marsh, Cambridge, 1793.)

Übersetzung des Neuen Testaments. (Translation of the New Testament.)
1790.

Anmerkungen für Ungelehrte zu seiner Übersetzung des Neuen Testaments.
(Notes for Unlearned Readers on his Translation of the New Testament.)
1790-1792.

_Friedrich Ernst David Schleiermacher._ Über den sogenannten ersten
Brief des Paulus an den Timotheus. (On the so-called First Epistle of
Paul to Timothy.) 1807.

_Johann Gottfried Eichhorn._ Historisch-kritische Einleitung in das
Neue Testament. (Historical and Critical Introduction to the New
Testament.) 3 vols. 1814.

[pg 002]

_Gottlob Wilhelm Meyer._ Entwicklung des paulinischen Lehrbegriffs.
(The Development of the Pauline System of Doctrine.) 1801.

_Leonhard Usteri._ Entwicklung des paulinischen Lehrbegriffs. (The
Development of the Pauline System of Doctrine.) 1824.

_August Ferdinand Dähne._ Entwicklung des paulinischen Lehrbegriffs.
(The Development of the Pauline System of Doctrine.) 1835.

_Karl Schrader._ Der Apostel Paulus. 1830-1836.

_J. A. W. Neander._ Geschichte der Pflanzung und Leitung der
christlichen Kirche durch die Apostel. (History of the Planting and
Guidance of the Christian Church by the Apostles.) 1832. (Eng. Trans.
by J. E. Ryland, 1851.)

_W. M. Leberecht De Wette._ Erklärung der Briefe an die Römer,
Korinther, Galater und Thessalonicher. (Exposition of the Epistles to
the Romans (2nd ed., 1838), Corinthians, etc. (1841).)

_H. E. G. Paulus._ Des Apostels Paulus Lehrbriefe an die Galater- und
Römer-Christen. (The Apostle Paul’s Doctrinal Epistles to the Galatian
and Roman Christians.) 1831.


THE Reformation fought and conquered in the name of Paul. Consequently
the teaching of the Apostle of the Gentiles took a prominent place in
Protestant study. Nevertheless the labour expended upon it did not, to
begin with, advance the historical understanding of his system of
thought. What men looked for in Paul’s writings was proof-texts for
Lutheran or Reformed theology; and that was what they found.
Reformation exegesis reads its own ideas into Paul, in order to
receive them back again clothed with Apostolic authority.

Before this could be altered, the spell which dogma had laid upon
exegesis needed to be broken. A very promising beginning in this
direction was made by Hugo Grotius, who in his _Annotationes in Novum
Testamentum__(_2_)_ rises superior to the limitations of
ecclesiastical dogma. This work appeared in 1641-1646. The Pauline
Epistles are treated with especial gusto. The great Netherlander makes
it his business to bring out by patient study the simple literal
meaning, and besides referring to patristic exegesis, cites parallels
from Greek and Roman literature. He does not, however, show any
special insight into the peculiar character of the Pauline world of
thought.

[pg 003]

In the ensuing period the principle gradually became established that
exegesis ought to be independent of dogma. Pietism and Rationalism had
an equal interest in promoting this result. The accepted formula was
that Scripture must be interpreted by Scripture. This thought is
common ground to the two famous works on exegesis which belong to the
first half of the eighteenth century, the _Institutiones hermeneuticae
sacrae__(_3_)_ of Johann Jakob Rambach, which is written from the
stand-point of a moderate pietism, and Siegmund Jakob Baumgarten’s
rationalistically inclined “Instruction in the art of expounding Holy
Scripture.”_(_4_)_

On the soil thus prepared by pietism and rationalism it was possible
for a philologically sound exegesis to thrive. One of the most
important attempts in this direction is Johann Christoph Wolf’s _Curae
philologicae et criticae.__(_5_)_ This was regarded as authoritative
for several decades, and even later is frequently drawn on by
exegetes, either with or without acknowledgment. The merit of having
gained the widest recognition for the principles of philological
exegesis belongs to Johann August Ernesti, the reformer of the St.
Thomas’s School at Leipzig and the determined opponent of its famous
“Preceptor,” Johann Sebastian Bach. His _Institutio interpretis Novi
Testamenti_ appeared in 1762._(_6_)_ It is on the plan of the
“Hermeneutics” of Rambach and Baumgarten, and deals with grammar,
manuscripts, editions, translations, patristic exegesis, history and
geography as sciences ancillary to exegesis.

But Ernesti’s work suffices to show that the undogmatic philological
method did not in itself lead to any [pg 004] result. Its author is in
reality by no means free from dogmatic prepossessions, but he
skilfully avoids those questions which would bring him into conflict
with Church doctrine. In fact the use he makes of philology is more or
less formal. He does not venture to treat the books of the New
Testament without prepossession as witnesses from the literature of a
distant period, and to show the peculiar mould in which Christian
ideas are there cast in comparison with subsequent periods and with
the period for which he writes. He did not realise that the
undogmatic, philological method of exegesis must logically lead to a
method in which philology is the handmaid of historical criticism.

His great contemporary, Johann Salomo Semler, ventures to give
expression to this truth, and so becomes the creator of historical
theology. In his theoretical works on the Scriptures and on
exegesis—“Introduction to theological Hermeneutics”
(1760-1769),_(_7_)_ “Essay on the free Investigation of the Canon”
(1771-1775),_(_8_)_ “A new attempt to promote a generally profitable
Exposition and Application of the New Testament” (1786)_(_9_)_—the
Halle professor explains again and again what is to be understood by a
“historical” method of exegesis. He demands that the New Testament
shall be regarded as a temporally conditioned expression of Christian
thought, and examined with an unprejudiced eye. In making this claim
he does not speak as a [pg 005] disinterested representative of
historical science, but makes it in the name of religion. If religion
is to develop progressively and purify itself into an ethical belief,
the special embodiments which it has received in the past must not lay
the embargo of a false authority upon its progress. We must
acknowledge to ourselves that many conceptions and arguments, not only
of the Old Testament but also of the New, have not the same
significance for us as they had for the early days of Christianity. In
his work of 1786, Semler even demands that “for present day Christians
there should be made a generally useful selection from the discourses
of Jesus and the writings of the Apostles, in which the local
reference to contemporary readers shall be distinguished or
eliminated.”

This theory of historical exegesis is carried out in dealing with the
great Pauline Epistles. Semler points the way to the critical
investigation of the Apostle’s thought. He gives paraphrases of the
Epistle to the Romans and the Epistles to the Corinthians, and
attempts to make clear the content and the connection of thought by a
paraphrastic and expanded rendering of each individual verse._(_10_)_
Exegesis is no longer to be encumbered with a panoply of erudition; it
is no longer to be interpenetrated with homiletic and dogmatic
considerations, and to defer to the authority of the old Greek
expositors, who, “when it is a question of historical arguments, had
no better or clearer knowledge than we have ourselves.” It must let
the Scriptural [pg 006] phrases say openly and freely what they mean
in their literal sense, and devote itself simply to that
dispassionate, objective study of facts which has hitherto been too
much neglected.

The importance of the paraphrases does not however consist, as might
be supposed, in their exhibiting the distinctive character of the
Pauline trains of thought in comparison with the views of the other
New Testament writers. By his use of a paraphrastic rendering of the
text Semler puts an obstacle in the way of his gaining an insight into
the specifically Pauline reasoning, and unconsciously imports his own
logic into the Apostle’s arguments.

On the other hand, his brilliant powers of observation enable him to
call attention to some fundamental problems of literary criticism. He
is the first to point out that we do not possess the Pauline Epistles
in their original form, but only in the form in which they were read
in the churches. The canonical Epistle is therefore not, as a matter
of _a priori_ certainty, identical with the historical letter. It is
quite possible, he argues, that the letters as read in the churches
were produced by joining together, or working up together, different
letters, and also that written directions and messages, which
originally existed in a separate form, were attached in later copies
to the Epistles in order that no part of the heritage left by the
Apostle might be lost.

On the basis of considerations of this kind Semler arrives at the
result that the fifteenth and sixteenth chapters of Romans did not
belong to the original Epistle. The sixteenth is, in his view, a
series of greetings which Paul—who, it is assumed, was writing from
Ephesus—gave to the bearers of the Epistle to be conveyed to the
churches which they would visit on their way through Macedonia and
Achaia. In the ninth chapter of 2 Corinthians there is preserved, he
thinks, a writing intended for another city in Achaia, which was only
later welded into the Epistle to the Corinthians. From the [pg 007]
fourteenth verse of the twelfth chapter of 2 Corinthians to the close
of the thirteenth chapter we have to assume the presence of a separate
writing, of later date than the original Second Epistle to the
Corinthians. Thus Semler takes the first steps upon the road of
literary hypothesis. Theology at first took little notice of these
investigations. In the third edition of his “New Testament
Introduction” (1777),_(_11_)_ the great Göttingen philologist and
theologian J. D. Michaelis treats the letters of the Apostle in a
quite uncritical spirit, and does not enter at all into the literary
problems; in his “Translation” and “Exposition” of the New
Testament_(_12_)_ he follows the old tracks and makes no attempt to
carry out the task which Semler had assigned to historical exegesis.
In general the eighteenth century, after Semler, contributed very
little to the investigation of Paulinism. Schleiermacher was the first
to take a step forward, when, in a letter to Gass, he expressed his
doubts as to the genuineness of I Timothy._(_13_)_

Shortly before the battle of Jena—so he recounts in the preface—he had
communicated his doubts to his friend, but had not got the length of
setting them forth in a reasoned argument. “The battle—though indeed
it ended all too quickly—the consequent unrest in the town, and even
in the house, the confused hurrying to and fro, the sight of the
French soldiers, which was interesting in so many ways . . . the still
incomprehensible blow which struck our University even before you
left, and the sad sight of the students saying their farewells and
taking their departure,—these were certainly not the surroundings [pg
008] in which to set up a critical judgment-seat. Although, on the
other hand, you would perhaps have been more ready then, when all
seemed lost, to give up a New Testament book, than you are now.” The
verbal promise then given but not fulfilled is now discharged in
writing.

Schleiermacher bases his argument against I Timothy upon 2 Timothy and
Titus. While the same general conceptions are present in the longer
letter as in the two shorter ones, they are not there found in the
natural connections in which they occur in the others. It makes the
impression of being a composite structure, and in its vocabulary, too,
shows remarkable differences from the remaining letters taken as a
whole.

Strictly speaking it was not Schleiermacher the critic, but
Schleiermacher the aesthete who had come to have doubts about 2
Timothy. The letter does not suit his taste. He fails to perceive
that, so far as the language goes, the two other letters diverge from
the rest of the Pauline Epistles in the same way as I Timothy, and
that they also show the same looseness and disconnectedness; only
that, in consequence of their smaller extent, it is not so striking.
And, most important of all, it escapes him that as regards their ideas
all three letters agree in diverging from the remainder of the Pauline
Epistles.

Schleiermacher’s omissions are supplied by Eichhorn in his well-known
Introduction._(_14_)_ He lays it down that the three Epistles are all
by the same author, and are all spurious. His criticism deals first
with the language and thought of the letters, which he shows to be
un-Pauline; then he argues that the implied historical situations
cannot be fitted into the life of the Apostle, as known to us from the
remaining letters and the Acts of the Apostles; finally, he points to
the unnaturalness of the relation [pg 009] between Paul and his
helpers as it is represented by these Epistles.

The Apostle, he points out, gives them in writing exhortations and
directions which on the assumption of a real personal acquaintance and
a long period of joint work with them are in any case unnecessary, and
become much more so from the fact that the letters look forward to an
early meeting. From this Eichhorn concludes that “some one else has
put himself in Paul’s place,” and he sees no possibility of the
success of any attempt to defend the genuineness of the Epistles
against the arguments which he has brought forward. In particular he
gives a warning against the seductive attempt to save the genuineness
of 2 Timothy by the assumption of a second imprisonment. No
hypothesis, he declares, can in any way help the Pastorals, since they
must be pronounced from internal evidence—because of their divergence
from the remaining Epistles—not to be by the Apostle. This was a long
step forward. The circle of writings which have come down under the
name of Paul had undergone a restriction which made it possible to
give an account of his system of thought without being obliged to find
a place in it for ideas which already have a quite early-Catholic
ring.

Ten years after Eichhorn’s literary achievement, in the year 1824, the
Swiss theologian Leonhard Usteri, a pupil of Schleiermacher’s,
published his “Development of the Pauline System of Doctrine,”_(_15_)_
which is generally regarded as the starting-point of the purely
historical study of Paulinism, the first attempt to give effect to the
demands of Semler._(_16_)_

Usteri wishes to show the subjective imprint and [pg 010] enrichment
which ordinary Christianity received at the hands of the Apostle, and
he sees in the Epistle to the Galatians the outline of his whole
doctrine. He does not, however, venture to give full recognition to
the idea of a real antithesis between the Pauline conceptions and
those of the primitive Apostles, and consequently is led to soften
down the peculiarities of the former so far as possible. The spirit of
Schleiermacher, which tended to level down everything of a historical
character, influences the book more than the author is aware._(_17_)_
A peculiar interlude in the investigation of Paulinism was due to the
Heidelberger H. E. G. Paulus._(_18_)_ He published, in the year 1831,
a study of the Epistles to the Galatians and Romans, which was in
reality an essay on the Apostle’s system of doctrine. The work is
undertaken entirely in the interests of a rationalism bent on opposing
the reaction to orthodoxy.

According to the arguments of Paulus it is not the case that the
letters speak of expiatory suffering and imputed righteousness. Paul
cannot have upheld “legality” as against “morality” and have
maintained an “unpurified conception of religion.” The “chief
sayings,” the characteristic terms, are to be given a purely moral
interpretation. The Apostle means that “faith in Jesus” must become in
us “the faith of Jesus,” and the narrower conception of righteousness
must be enlarged into the [pg 011] conception of “the righteousness of
God.” The “righteousness of God” betokens righteousness such as it
exists in God, and is demanded by Him in man’s spirit as its “true
good,” “the only real atonement which brings us into harmony with the
Deity.” Thus a proper interpretation enables us to discover in these
writings “the agreement between the Gospel and a rational faith.”

The book appeared two or three decades too late. The rationalism which
it represents had had its day. But there is something imposing in this
determined wresting of the Apostle’s views. It is parallel to that
which was practised by the Reformation. The latter interpreted the
whole of Paulinism by the passages on the atoning death, and ignored
the other thoughts in the Epistles. The Heidelberg rationalist starts
from the conceptions connected with the “new creature,” which were
later to be described as the ethical system of the Apostle, and
interprets everything else by them.

The fact that the two views—the only ones which endeavoured to grasp
Paulinism as a complete, articulated system—thus stand over against
each other antithetically is significant for the future. Critical
study in the course of its investigations was to come to a point where
it would have to recognise both views as justified, and to point out
the existence in Paul of a twofold system of doctrine—a juridical
system based on the idea of justification, and an ethical system
dominated by the conception of sanctification—without at first being
able to show how the two are interrelated and together form a unity.




[pg 012]

II


BAUR AND HIS CRITICS


_Ferdinand Christian Baur._ Die Christuspartei in der korinthischen
Gemeinde. (The Christ-party in the Corinthian Church.) Appeared in the
_Tübinger Zeitschrift für Theologie,_ 1831 and 1836. Über Zweck u.
Veranlassung des Römerbriefs (Purpose and occasion of Rom.), ib. 1836.
Die sogenannten Pastoralbriefe. (The so-called Pastoral Epistles.)
1835.

Paulus der Apostel Jesu Christi (1st ed., 1845; 2nd ed., 1866-67).
(Eng. Trans. by “A. P.” and A. Menzies, 1873-75.)

Beiträge zu den Briefen an die Korinther, Thessalonicher und Römer.
(Contributions to the elucidation of the Epistles to the Corinthians,
Thessalonians and Romans.) _Tübinger Jahrbücher für Theologie._
1850-57.

Vorlesungen über neutestamentliche Theologie. 1864. (Lectures on
New-Testament Theology.)

Vorlesungen über die christliche Dogmengeschichte. (Lectures on the
History of Dogma.) Vol. i., 1865.

_Albert Schwegler._ Das nachapostolische Zeitalter. 1846. (The
Post-Apostolic Age.)

_Carl Wieseler._ Chronologie des apostolischen Zeitalters. 1848. (The
Chronology of the Apostolic Age.) On the Pauline Epp., 225-278.

_Albrecht Ritschl._ Die Entstehung der altkatholischen Kirche. (The
Origin of the Early Catholic Church.) 1st ed., 1850; 2nd ed., 1857.

_Gotthard Viktor Lechler._ Das apostolische und nachapostolische
Zeitalter. (The Apostolic and Post-Apostolic Age.) 1852. (Eng. Trans.
by A. J. K. Davidson, Edinburgh, 1886.)

_Richard Adalbert Lipsius._ Die paulinische Rechtfertigungslehre. (The
Pauline Doctrine of Justification.) 1853.


IN the fourth number of the _Tübinger Zeitschrift für Theologie_ for
the year 1831, F. C. Baur gave to the study of Paulinism a new
direction, by advancing the opinion that the Apostle had developed his
doctrine in complete opposition to that of the primitive Christian
community, and that only when this is recognised can we expect to
grasp the peculiar character of the Pauline ideas.

[pg 013]

The great merit of the Tübingen critic was that he allowed the texts
to speak for themselves, to mean what they said. On the ground of the
striking difference between Acts and Galatians regarding Paul’s
relation to the original Apostles, and in view of the divisions and
contentions which reveal themselves in the Epistles to the
Corinthians, Baur concludes that in the early days of Christianity two
parties—a Petrine party or party of the original Apostles, and a
Pauline party—stood opposed to one another, holding divergent views on
the subject of the redemption wrought by Christ.

In the gradual adjustment of these differences he sees the development
which led up to the formation of the early Catholic Church, and he
traces the evidence for this process in the literature. He thinks he
can show that the two parties gradually approached each other, making
concessions on the one side and the other, and finally, under the
pressure of a movement which was equally inimical to both of them—the
Gnosticism of the early part of the second century—they coalesced into
a single united Church.

The recognition of the character and significance of Gnosticism makes
it possible for Baur to introduce a new kind of criticism. Before him
it was only possible to arrive at the negative result that a writing
was not by the author to whom it was traditionally ascribed. Now,
according to him, it is possible to determine to what period it
belongs. It is only necessary to show what position it occupies in the
process of reconciliation of the two parties, and, especially, whether
it deals with speculative error. This Baur calls “positive” criticism.

He applies it in the first place to the Pastoral Epistles, and argues
that the heretics combated in them do not belong to primitive
Christianity but are representatives of the Gnostic movement of the
second century. By the “myths and genealogies” here mentioned are
meant the great speculative systems which are known from Church
history. The description given of the heretics is [pg 014]
intentionally couched in terms which are neither too general nor too
special, in order to sustain the fiction that the false doctrine
arising at this later period only revives a movement which had already
been attacked and defeated by Paul.

That neither the assumption of a second imprisonment, nor any other
possible or impossible hypothesis, can restore to the Pastorals their
lost genuineness is as firm a conviction with Baur as it was with
Eichhorn.

In the course of his study of the Pastoral Epistles the Tübingen
master had expressed the opinion that the criticism of the Pauline
writings would probably not “come to a halt” with these Epistles. The
results of his further study were offered ten years later (1845) in
the brilliantly written work, “Paul the Apostle of Jesus Christ.” He
here treats first the life and work, then the letters, and lastly the
system of doctrine. The result arrived at in his investigation of the
documents is that only the Epistles to the Galatians, Corinthians, and
Romans can be confidently used as sources. Compared with these four,
all the others must be classed as “anti-legomena,” “which does not at
all imply the assertion that they are not genuine, but only indicates
the opposition to which their claim to genuineness is in some cases
already exposed, in others, may be exposed in the future, since there
is not a single one of the smaller Pauline epistles against which, if
the four main epistles are taken as the standard, there cannot be
raised some objection or other.” There are strong grounds for
questioning the Epistles to the Ephesians and Colossians; those to the
Thessalonians and Philippians are to be suspected because of the small
amount of dogma they contain. Baur’s reason for taking up such a
critical attitude towards the “smaller epistles” is that he is bound
to see in the heritage which has come down to us from the Apostle,
writings “which belong to the history of the party which based itself
on his name, and refer to the relations of the various parties,” and
show us how Gentile Christianity [pg 015] softens down its principles
and its peculiarities in order to meet the Jewish Christianity, which
on its part was going through a similar process, in the unity of the
early Catholic Church.

This radical view was attacked on all sides. It gave rise to a kind of
reaction even within the sphere of scientific theology, and led to the
calling in question of results which the labours of Eichhorn had
brought into general acceptance. Thus Carl Wieseler prefaces his
detailed study on the date of composition of the Pauline letters with
the remark that he held all the thirteen letters which are attributed
to the Apostle in the Canon to be authentic.

The Apostle’s system of doctrine culminates, according to Baur’s
representation, in the doctrine of the Spirit. In the brilliant
disquisitions of this section it is not so much the historian who
speaks as the pupil of Hegel. Paulinism is in its own way an
announcement of the unity of the subjective spirit with the objective
spirit. It is only from this point of view that a consciousness of
freedom such as is found in the Apostle of the Gentiles can exist. His
doctrine is concerned with union with Christ and with God by faith,
from which comes Spirit. “Righteousness” is “the proper relation
towards God, to place men in which is the highest duty of all
religion.”

Baur does not enter into the details of the Pauline doctrine of
justification. Detail is in fact somewhat neglected in his treatment.
Strictly speaking, he only includes that which can be in some way or
other expressed in Hegelian thought-forms, and that in which Paulinism
may be exhibited as representing absolute religion. Everything else is
thrown into the background, and receives only a partial
appreciation—or depreciation—in a separate chapter entitled “A special
discussion of some subsidiary dogmatic questions.” The characteristic
stamp of the Pauline doctrine is largely obliterated. In particular,
Paul’s views about the “last things” and the angels are not allowed to
become disturbingly prominent. Baur does not, indeed, hesitate
practically to eliminate [pg 016] them. The angelology he dismisses
with the following remark: “Of the angels the Apostle says little in
the letters which we have here to take into consideration, and that
little not dogmatically, but only metaphorically and in current
popular phraseology.”

The Tübingen scholar, in fact, uses the language of Paul in order to
set forth an imposing philosophy of religion instinct with Hegelian
influence. He gives no authentic account of the Apostle’s thought.
Nevertheless this book breathes the spirit of Paul the prophet of
freedom more fully than almost any other which has been devoted to
him. That is what gives it its remarkable attractiveness.

A year after the appearance of Baur’s “Paulus”—in 1846—Albert
Schwegler published his work on the post-apostolic age._(_19_)_ The
founder of the Tübingen School had hitherto only, so to speak, hinted
at the phases of development by which the early Church grew up out of
the controversy between the two parties. Schwegler undertakes a more
detailed description, and in doing so draws the lines so sharply that,
along with the greatness of the construction, its faults become
obvious. He has no deeper knowledge of Paulinism to impart.

Schwegler’s work had made it apparent from what side the Tübingen
position was open to attack, and on this side Albrecht Ritschl
proceeded to attack it in his well-known work on the origin of the
early Catholic Church._(_20_)_ The first edition (1850) is primarily
directed against Schwegler only; in the second (1857) he develops his
opposition of [pg 017] principle to Baur. He offers proof that the
earliest literature is not dominated by the negotiations for a
compromise between the two parties which was postulated by the
Tübingen School, and at the same time he attacks the basis of the
whole hypothetical construction. Baur, he urges, must have formed a
false conception of Jewish Christianity and Gentile Christianity,
since, on his view, it cannot be explained what was the common element
that held the two together. Had they only, as the Tübingen School was
obliged to assume, had the external bond of profession of faith in
Christ, it would never be possible to explain why both parties felt
the need of approaching one another by mutual concessions until
finally they coalesced in a single united Church.

The extent of the doctrinal material common to both must, Ritschl
argues, have been much greater than Baur represents. He has not
discharged the first duty of a historian of the Apostolic age, for
this requires “that the points should be clearly shown in which Jewish
Christianity and Paulinism coincide.” Baur had only given a negative
description of the Apostle’s doctrine, because he never gives any hint
“that Paul in very essential points held views which were common also
to Jewish Christianity.”

The problem regarding the nature of the unity between Paulinism and
primitive Christianity is thus recognised and formulated.

But it was not so easy for Ritschl to say exactly what constituted the
common element of doctrine, the existence of which he postulated. That
is especially evident in the second edition of “The Origin of the
Early Catholic Church.” He is then only willing to admit an
“opposition of practice” between Paul and the original apostles; the
area of this opposition is so restricted that “the essential agreement
in the leading ideas laid down by Christ will be only the more clearly
evident.” But since in Paulinism little enough is to be found of the
“leading [pg 018] ideas laid down by Christ” the proof of the
“essential agreement” remains a pious aspiration.

The only solid fact which Ritschl is able to adduce is the expectation
of the parousia. He assumes that it formed a very important part of
the common doctrinal material, and inclines to believe that Paulinism
and Jewish Christianity agreed in an ideal-real expectation of the
Second Coming in order to make common cause against Chiliasm, though
the latter in its coarser form only appeared later.

But in thus recognising eschatology Ritschl did not take the matter
very seriously. He uses the eschatology, in fact, only in order to
score a dialectical point against Baur, who had taken too little
account of it. In Ritschl’s “Justification and Reconciliation,” where
he later on had occasion to give a positive description of Paulinism,
he avoided the faintest hint of any eschatological colouring of the
Apostle’s ideas.

Another work which is occupied with the question of the unity between
Paulinism and primitive Christianity is Lechler’s “Apostolic and
Post-Apostolic Age.”_(_21_)_ The work is a prize essay in answer to
the problem proposed by the Teylerian Society in Holland, as to what
constituted “the absolute difference between the doctrine and attitude
of the Apostle Paul and that of the other Apostles,” by which the
“so-called Tübingen School endeavours to justify its hostile treatment
of Christianity.” Lechler opposes his teacher, but is not able to make
any advance upon Ritschl in producing evidence of the common elements
in the two doctrinal systems.

[pg 019]

Among the works which controverted the Tübingen view of Paulinism a
prominent place belongs to an early work of Richard Adalbert Lipsius
on “the Pauline doctrine of justification.”_(_22_)_ Along with his
scientific purpose the author also pursues a practical aim. He puts
himself at the service of the anti-rationalistic reaction which aimed
at restoring the old evangelical ideas to a position of honour, but in
doing so did not grasp hands with the orthodoxy of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, but took as its starting-point the ideas which
it finds present in the New Testament. In giving an objective
presentation of the central Pauline doctrine of justification he
believes that he is offering to the Protestantism of his time a view
which it can adopt as its own.

For the Apostle of the Gentiles, he argues, justification is not a
purely legal, forensic act, but also an ethical experience. Faith is
an ethical attitude which produces an inward righteousness. What is
really effectual in redemption is the fellowship with Christ in life
and death. It is brought about by the Spirit of God and of Christ, who
unites himself with the believer and transforms his personality.

Lipsius is the first to recognise the two trains of thought in
Paulinism, and to remark that the one is based upon the juridical idea
of justification, while the other has its starting-point in the
conception of sanctification—of the real ethical new creation by the
Spirit. He does not, as had always previously been done, make
everything of the one and nothing of the other, but aims at showing
how they are brought together in the Apostle’s thought.

The importance of the eschatological passages does not escape him. He
assumes that the thought of the parousia gives an inner unity to the
Apostle’s ideas.

It is true that Lipsius did not succeed in fully discharging the task
which he laid upon himself. He weakens down one set of ideas in the
interests of the other, [pg 020] and solders the two together
externally by the use of skilfully chosen expressions; but it remains
his great merit that he was the first to recognise this duality in
Paul’s thought. Had he not been pursuing a dogmatic interest alongside
of his scientific investigations he would doubtless have come to still
closer quarters with the problem.

While his critics were at work Baur had not been idle. From 1850
onwards he published in the _Tübinger Jahrbücher für Theologie,_ which
had superseded the _Tübinger Zeitschrift für Theologie,_ a series of
separate investigations of the Pauline Epistles._(_23_)_ He had
resolved that the final results of his study of the Apostle of the
Gentiles, with which he had begun his work, and which throughout his
whole lifetime had been his favourite study, should be set forth in a
new edition of his Paulus. This was to be the crown of his work.

But it was not to be. Death snatched him away from his task when he
had only just cast the first part into its new shape. The second and
most important, which was to treat the “system of doctrine,” he did
not reach._(_24_)_

To a certain extent a substitute for what was thus lost was furnished
by the “Lectures on New Testament Theology,” published by the master’s
son in 1864._(_25_)_ The chapter on Paulinism is very striking in its
brevity and clearness, and shows a great advance on the work of 1845.
At that time Baur had examined and interpreted Paul’s [pg 021]
teaching by the light of the Hegelian Intellectualism. Now he tries to
grasp his ideas historically and empirically, and to describe them
accordingly.

He discusses successively the Pauline views on sin and flesh; law and
sin; faith in the death of Christ; law and promise; law and freedom;
the righteousness of faith; faith and works; faith and predestination;
Christology; baptism and the Lord’s Supper; the parousia of Christ.

Eschatology, which in the first edition was quite overlooked, receives
here abundant recognition. Baur admits that the Apostle fully shared
the faith of the primitive community in the nearness of the parousia,
and was at one with it in all the conceptions referring to the End.

The Pauline theology as thus empirically apprehended has no longer the
bold effectiveness of the speculatively constructed system of the year
1845. It becomes apparent in Baur, and increasingly evident in the
work of subsequent investigators, that the self-consistency and
logical concatenation of the system become obscured and disturbed in
proportion as progress is made in the exact apprehension of the
individual concepts and ideas.




[pg 022]

III


FROM BAUR TO HOLTZMANN


MONOGRAPHS UPON PAUL

_Adolf Hausrath._ Der Apostel Paulus (1865, 172 pp.; biographical. 2nd
ed., 1872, 503 pp.).

_Ernest Renan._ St. Paul (1869, 570 pp.; biographical and
theological).

_Auguste Sabatier._ L’Apôtre Paul (1870, theological). (E.T. by A. M.
Hellier, 1891.)

_Otto Pfleiderer._ Der Paulinismus (1873; 2nd ed., 1890; theological).
(E.T. by E. Peters, 1877.)

_Carl Holsten._ Das Evangelium des Paulus (1st pt., 1880; 2nd pt.,
1898).

NEW TESTAMENT INTRODUCTIONS

_Eduard Reuse._ Geschichte der heiligen Schriften Neuen Testamentes
(5th ed., 1874). (E.T. History of the Sacred Scriptures of the New
Testament, by E. L. Houghton. Edin. 1884.)

_Christian Karl von Hofmann._ Pt, ix. of “Die Heilige Schrift.” 1881.

_Heinrich Julius Holtzmann._ Einleitung in das Neue Testament. 1885.

_Bernhard Weiss._ (Same title.) 1886. (E.T. by A. J. K. Davidson,
1887).

_Frédéric Godet._ Introduction au Nouveau Testament. 1893.

_Adolf Jülicher._ Einleitung in das Neue Testament. 1894. (E.T. by J.
P. Ward, 1904.)

_Theodor Zahn._ (Same title.) 1897. (E.T. of 3rd ed. 1909).

WORKS ON NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY

_Eduard Reuss._ Histoire de la théologie chrétienne au siècle
apostolique. 3rd ed., 1864. (E.T. by A. Harwood, 1872.)

_Bernhard Weiss._ Lehrbuch der biblischen Theologie des Neuen
Testaments. 1st ed., 1868; 6th ed., 1895. (E.T. Edin. 1882.)

_Christian Karl von Hofmann._ Pt. xi. of “Die Heilige Schrift.” 1886.

_Willibald Beyschlag._ Neutestamentliche Theologie. 1891. 2nd ed.,
1896. (E.T. Edin. 1895.)

[pg 023]

GENERAL WORKS ON PRIMITIVE CHRISTIANITY

_Ernest Havet._ Le Christianisme et ses origines (4 vols., 1884).

_Karl von Weizsäcker._ Das apostolische Zeitalter. 1886. (E.T. The
Apostolic Age, 1894.)

_Otto Pfleiderer._ Das Urchristentum. 1887. (E.T. of 2nd. altered ed.,
see later.)

STUDIES ON SPECIAL POINTS

_Carl Holsten._ Zum Evangelium des Paulus und Petrus. 1868.

_Fr. Th. L. Ernesti._ Die Ethik des Apostels Paulus. 1868.

_Emmanuel Friedrich Kautzsch._ De Veteris Testamenti locis a Paulo
apostolo allegatis. 1869.

_Franz Delitzsch._ Paulus des Apostels Brief an die Römer in das
Hebräische übersetzt und aus Talmud und Midrasch erläutert. 1870. (The
Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Romans translated into Hebrew and
illustrated from Talmud and Midrash.)

_Hermann Lüdemann._ Die Anthropologie des Apostels Paulus. 1872.

_Albrecht Ritschl._ Die christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und
Versöhnung, vol. ii., 1874. (The Christian Doctrine of Justification
and Reconciliation.) (E.T. of vols. i. and iii. only).

_H. H. Wendt._ Die Begriffe Fleisch und Geist bei Paulus. 1878. (The
Meaning of the Terms Flesh and Spirit in Paul’s Writings.)

_Louis Eugène Ménégoz._ Le Péché et la redemption d’après St Paul.
1882.

_Eduard Grafe._ Die paulinische Lehre vom Gesetz. 1884. (The Pauline
Teaching about the Law.)

_Gustav Volkmar._ Paulus von Damaskus zum Galaterbrief. 1887. (Paul,
from Damascus to Galatians). A biographical study, with a critical
comparison between the data of Galatians and Acts.

_Alfred Resch._ Agrapha. Ausserkanonische Evangelienfragmente. 1888.
On the Question whether Sayings of Jesus have been preserved in Paul’s
Writings.

_Otto Everling._ Die paulinische Angelologie und Dämonologie. 1888.

_Johann Gloël._ Der Heilige Geist in der Heilsverkündigung des Paulus.
1888. (The Holy Spirit in Paul’s Preaching of Salvation.)

_Hermann Gunkel._ Die Wirkungen des Heiligen Geistes nach der
populären Anschauung der apostolischen Zeit und nach der Lehre des
Apostels Paulus. 1888. (The Manifestations of the Holy Spirit
according to the Popular View of the Apostolic Age and according to
the Teaching of Paul.)

_Eduard Grafe._ Das Verhältnis der paulinischen Schriften zur
Sapientia Salamonis. 1892. (The Relation of the Pauline Writings to
the Book of Wisdom.)

_Adolf Deissmann._ Die neutestamentliche Formel “in Christo Jesu.”
1892. (The New Testament Formula “in Christ Jesus.”)

_Richard Kabisch._ Die Eschatologie des Paulus in ihren Zusammenhängen
mit dem Gesamtbegriff des Paulinismus. 1893. (Paul’s Eschatology in
Relation to his General System.)

[pg 024]

_W. Brandt._ Die evangelische Geschichte und der Ursprung des
Christentums. 1893. (The Gospel History and the Origin of
Christianity.)

_Ernst Curtius._ Paulus in Athen. 1894.

_E. Bruston._ La Vie future d’après St Paul. 1894.

_Hans Vollmer._ Die alttestamentlichen Zitate bei Paulus. 1895.

_Ernst Teichmann._ Die paulinischen Vorstellungen von Auferstehung und
Gericht und ihre Beziehung zur jüdischen Apokalyptik. 1896. (The
Pauline Views of Resurrection and Judgment and their Relation to the
Jewish Apocalyptic.)

_Theodor Simon._ Die Psychologie des Apostels Paulus. 1897.

_Paul Wernle._ Der Christ und die Sünde bei Paulus. (The Christian and
Sin in Paul’s Writings.) 1897.

CRITICISM AND EXEGESIS

_Bruno Bauer._ Kritik der paulinischen Briefe. 1850-1851-1852.

_Christian Hermann Weisse._ Beiträge zur Kritik der paulinischen
Briefe. 1867. (Contributions to the Criticism of the Pauline
Epistles.)

_H. J. Holtzmann._ Kritik der Epheser und Kolosserbriefe. 1872. Die
Pastoralbriefe. 1880.

_Eduard Reuss._ Les Épîtres pauliniennes (“La Bible,” pt. iii.). 1878.

_Georg Heinrici._ Das erste Sendschreiben des Apostels Paulus an die
Korinther. 1880. Das zweite, etc. 1887.

_P. W. Schmiedel._ Auslegung der Briefe an die Thessalonicher und
Korinther in Holtzmann’s “Handkommentar.” 1891. (Exposition of the
Epistles to the Thessalonians and Corinthians in Holtzmann’s
“Handkommentar.”)

_R. A. Lipsius._ Auslegung der Briefe an die Galater, Römer und
Philipper in Holtzmann’s “Handkommentar.” 1891.

WORKS OF A GENERAL CHARACTER, OR DEALING WITH COGNATE SUBJECTS

_Emil Schürer._ Neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte. 1873. From the 2nd
ed. (1886) onwards the work bears the title: Geschichte des jüdischen
Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi. (E.T. History of the Jewish People
in the time of Jesus Christ. Edin. 1885.)

_Karl Siegfried._ Philo von Alexandrien als Ausleger des alten
Testaments an sich selbst und nach seinem geschichtlichen Einfluss
betrachtet. 1875. (Philo of Alexandria as an Expositor of the Old
Testament, considered both in himself and in regard to his historical
influence.)

_Ferdinand Weber._ System der altsynagogalen palästinenschen
Theologie. 1880. The second edition (1897) bears the title Jüdische
Theologie auf Grund des Talmud und verwandter Schriften. (Jewish
Theology exhibited on the basis of the Talmud and allied writings.)

_W. Gass._ Geschichte der christlichen Ethik. 1881.

_Theobald Ziegler._ Geschichte der christlichen Ethik. 1886.

[pg 025]

_Edwin Hatch._ The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the
Christian Church (Hibbert Lectures for 1888).

_Theodor Zahn._ Der Stoiker Epiktet und sein Verhältnis zum
Christentum. 1894.

_Adolf Harnack._ Dogmengeschichte, 3rd ed., 1894. (E.T. History of
Dogma, 1894-1899). Die Chronologie der altchristlichen Literatur bis
Eusebius. Vol. i., 1897.


PROBLEMS many and various confronted theological science when it
attempted to carry forward Pauline studies from the position in which
they had been left by Baur.

It was needful to clear up once for all the questions of literary
criticism, to examine in detail the individual conceptions and trains
of thought, to make clear the unity and inner connexion of the system,
to show what rôle Paulinism had played in the development of early
Catholic theology, and how far it was at one with primitive
Christianity, and to solve the question whether the material employed
in its construction was of purely Jewish, or in part of Greek origin.

In regard to the literary question a certain measure of agreement was
in course of time attained. Baur had distinguished three classes of
Epistles. In the first he placed, as beyond doubt genuine, Galatians,
Corinthians, and Romans; Ephesians, Colossians, Philippians,
Thessalonians, and Philemon formed the second class, being considered
uncertain; the Pastoral Epistles formed the third class, and were
regarded as proved to be spurious.

The views of the Tübingen master regarding the first class and the
third were adopted by the majority of scholars of the next generation.
No doubts were raised against the great Epistles; the Pastoral
Epistles were rejected. Holtzmann, in his work on the Letters to
Timothy and Titus,_(_26_)_ supplied a detailed argument in favour of
this conclusion.

[pg 026]

Of the letters of the intermediate class, the first to the
Thessalonians and that to the Philippians were by many rehabilitated
as Pauline. The second to the Thessalonians was rejected with
increasing confidence. A special problem was presented by the letters
to the Colossians and Ephesians, both because of their evident mutual
relationship and particularly in regard to certain parts of the
Epistle to the Colossians which made a strong impression of
genuineness. Holtzmann offered a solution which gave general
satisfaction. He adopted the hypothesis that Colossians was based upon
a genuine Pauline letter which had been worked over by a later
hand._(_27_)_ The redactor he identified with the author of the
Epistle to the Ephesians.

While there was this general consensus in the critical camp, which was
ratified in Holtzmann’s “Introduction,”_(_28_)_ the most diverse
opinions on special points are found. Some attempts were made to save
the [pg 027] genuineness of the second Epistle to the Thessalonians.
For some, the Epistles to the Colossians and Ephesians are genuine
throughout and represent a later phase of the Pauline theology. Nor
were there lacking attempts of all kinds to rehabilitate the Pastoral
Epistles. Those who did not venture to defend them as wholes make a
point of retaining at least the “personal references.”

The presentation of the Pauline teaching was, however, hardly affected
by the literary divergences. Not even the most conservative of the
critics had the boldness to place all the letters which have come down
under the name of Paul on a footing of equality. Even those who
regarded the Epistles to the Ephesians and Colossians as genuine did
not fuse ideas of these Epistles with the system extracted from the
four main Epistles, but presented them separately; and any who were
not converted to the rejection of the Pastorals at all events took the
precaution to give a separate chapter to the Pauline theology of these
writings._(_29_)_ If only the personal references might be saved,
these Epistles were as completely excluded from the presentation of
the Pauline system as if they had been pronounced wholly spurious.

Thus it continued to be the case, as it had been with Baur, that,
generally speaking, only the four main epistles were taken into
account in describing the Pauline system. The only significant change
was that the epistle to the Philippians began to be put on the same
footing, and, with a few exceptions, scholars no longer hesitated to
regard as Pauline the conception of the pre-existence of Christ which
is expressed in the section on the incarnation and obedience unto
death. It was realised that the main epistles also presuppose this
view, even if they do not state it so explicitly.

There were, of course, as time went on, attempts to [pg 028] explain
the composition of the four main epistles and Philippians as arising
by the working up together in each single epistle of two or more
originals, but these were not of any real importance for the study of
the Pauline doctrine. It was only a carrying out of the task suggested
by Semler, when he pointed out that we have not got the letters in
their original form but only as prepared for public reading by the
early Church. But the constitution of the Pauline material is scarcely
affected by the attempts to reconstruct these originals. They have a
purely literary interest.

Theology, so far as it was occupied with the study of the Pauline
system, did not allow itself to be at all disquieted by the rejection
of the whole of the Epistles proposed by Bruno Bauer in his “Criticism
of the Pauline Letters.”_(_30_)_ Nor was its confidence shaken by the
hypothesis that the letters have been worked over to a very large
extent and in a very thoroughgoing fashion. Christian Hermann Weisse’s
“Contributions to the Criticism of the Pauline Epistles,”_(_31_)_
which appeared in 1867, where he sets forth the justification and the
principles of this method, scarcely attracted any attention, as was
indeed the case with almost all the theological work of this writer.

The elucidation of the details of the Pauline doctrine is vigorously
pursued. An empirical definition is attempted of the terms sin, law,
conscience, justification, redemption, election, and freedom. A
special interest attaches to the study of the terms flesh and spirit.
After Holsten had endeavoured to trace the significance of the word
flesh, Lüdemann—in a brilliant work published in 1872—endeavoured to
arrive at a clear idea of the Apostle’s anthropology and its place in
his doctrine of salvation.

There are, so runs his thesis, two conceptions of [pg 029] “flesh” in
Paul. The one agrees with the naive, simple Jewish linguistic usage,
and means only the natural being of man. The other is much more
precise and belongs to a dualistic system of thought. In it the flesh
is defined as the necessary cause of sin and corruption and as the
absolute antithesis to spirit. On close examination it appears that
not merely two conceptions of “the flesh” existing side by side, but
two different doctrines of man’s nature, and consequently two
different conceptions of redemption, are found in Paul.

According to the system which connects itself with the simpler,
broader conception of the flesh, sin springs from the freedom of the
will; the law is assumed to be inherently possible of fulfilment;
redemption consists in a judgment of acquittal pronounced by God which
has its ground solely in His mercy; righteousness is imputed; the act
which brings redemption consists in faith. This circle of ideas, which
forms a self-consistent whole, is described by Lüdemann as the
“Jewish-religious,” the “juridical-subjective,” doctrine of
redemption. It has its source in reflection on the death of Jesus.

The other system of ideas is defined as the “ethico-dualistic.” In
contradistinction to the former it makes use of an “objectively real”
conception of redemption. It presupposes the more precise, narrower
conception of “the flesh,” and regards sin as proceeding from it by a
natural necessity. The law is the ferment of sin; death the natural
outcome of the flesh. Redemption can therefore only consist in the
abolition of the flesh. It is based on the communication of the
Spirit, which produces in the man a new creature and a real
righteousness. The redemptive act takes place in baptism. The ideas of
this second system are based on the Lord’s resurrection.

The coexistence of a juridical and an ethical system of thought in
Paul had been held by others before Lüdemann. What he did, however,
was to follow out each separately into its details, and to endeavour
to prove that all the contradictions and obscurities which are to be
observed [pg 030] in the conceptions and statements of the Pauline
theology find their ultimate explanation in the coexistence of two
different doctrines of man’s nature and two different doctrines of
redemption.

Hitherto the doctrine of redemption which appears alongside of the
juridical had been described as “ethical.” He remarks that it is
conceived not merely ethically, but actually physically, and therefore
defines it as ethico-physical. Further, he is of opinion that the two
theories are not co-equal in importance. He holds that in the
ethico-physical “the real view of the Apostle” is set forth, which
only tolerates the other alongside of it, and more and more tends to
push it aside wherever in the discussion Paul can count upon a
thorough understanding of the real essence of the matter.

In the Epistles the development, he thinks, takes the following
course. The Letter to the Galatians knows only the primitive Jewish
system of thought with reference to Christ’s vicarious suffering and
righteousness by faith; it does not advance to the bolder realistic
doctrine of righteousness.

In the Epistles to the Corinthians, according to Lüdemann, the Apostle
does not make much use of dogma. “The less advanced position of the
church there may have been one cause of this.” But the fundamental
conceptions of the ethico-physical series of ideas begin to appear in
them. Later on they attain to “constitutive importance” and “force
their way into the leading dogmatic statements.” In the first four
chapters of Romans the old view still finds expression. From the fifth
onwards the new tenets are developed fully and clearly.

This second series of ideas is not Jewish but Greek. Lüdemann’s view
is that Paul, “in the attempt to give dogmatic fixity to the doctrine
of salvation, presses on beyond the horizon of the Old Testament
consciousness and is carried in the direction of Hellenism.”_(_32_)_
The latter [pg 031] offered him a clearly-thought-out doctrine of man,
in which the dominant idea was the antithesis of flesh and spirit, and
made it necessary for him to think out a physically real doctrine of
redemption.

Pfleiderer_(_33_)_ also works out the two series of ideas, separating
them scarcely less sharply than Lüdemann does. But he prefers to
describe the series which runs parallel to the juridical, not as
physico-ethical, but as mystico-ethical. Moreover, he does not admit
that the ethical series expresses Paul’s view more adequately than the
other. He is of opinion also that the two sets of conceptions held an
equal place in the consciousness of the Apostle from the first. By
logically thinking out the Jewish idea of the atoning death, Paul was
led—according to Pfleiderer—to the anti-Jewish conclusion that
redemption is for all mankind, and that the law is consequently
invalidated. With this view there is united another, the source of
which lies in the Hellenistic anthropology. This is that redemption
consists in the influence exercised by the Holy Spirit upon the
fleshly creatureliness, in consequence of which sin and death are
abolished. The beginning of this process is to be sought in the
resurrection of Jesus Christ. In the close connexion of the Pharisaic
and Hellenistic elements “lies the characteristic peculiarity of the
genuine Pauline theology, which can only be rightly understood when
these two sides of it both receive equal attention.”

That in Paulinism two lines of thought go side by side is recognised
by almost all the investigators of this period. But in the importance
assigned to each of them great divergences appear. Reuss makes the
juridical ideas entirely subordinate to the ethical; in Ménégoz the
former are more strongly emphasised than the latter. No one except
Pfleiderer holds them to be on an exactly equal [pg 032] footing. In
general the ethical set of ideas is regarded as the original creation
of the Apostle, and is assumed to represent the deepest stratum in his
thought. Accordingly, it is generally also held that the doctrine of
the abolition of the flesh by the Spirit comes to its full development
later than the other, which is based upon the atonement and imputed
righteousness. Lüdemann’s theory of a development within the Pauline
doctrine is adopted by the majority, though only in a less pronounced
form.

It should be mentioned that the first important attempt to prove the
existence of different phases in the thought and life of Paul was made
by Sabatier._(_34_)_ His work _L’Apotre Paul_ appeared in 1870, two
years before Lüdemann’s study. At first the Apostle held, according to
the French scholar, a simple doctrine which can be psychologically
explained from his rabbinic training and his conversion. At the time
of his great controversies he was compelled to work out for himself a
philosophy of history which would enable him to prove that the law was
only a passing episode in the history of salvation, and that
justification by faith had always lain in the purpose of God. This
doctrine takes a dominant position in the Epistles to the Galatians,
Corinthians, and Romans. In the letters written during his
imprisonment the Apostle advances to a speculative, gnostic
development of his ideas. The coexistence of the juridical and ethical
series of ideas does not receive the same prominence in Sabatier as in
the later writers, who were influenced by Lüdemann and Pfleiderer.

When all is said and done, there is in the works of this period much
assertion and little proof regarding the development within Paulinism.
One almost gets the impression that the assumption of different stages
of thought was chiefly useful as a way of escaping the difficulty
about the inner unity of the system. This [pg 033] problem is,
however, rather instinctively felt than clearly grasped. The scholars
of this period do not feel it incumbent upon them to trace out the
connexion in which these disparate sets of ideas must have stood in
the view of Paul. They show no surprise at his passing so easily from
the one to the other and arguing from each alternately, and they do
not ask themselves how he conceived the most general ultimate fact of
redemption which underlies both of them. They do not seek to arrive at
a really fundamental view of the essence of Paulinism.

Their method of procedure in their presentation of the doctrine is
itself significant. They do not trace its development from one
fundamental conception, but treat it under dogmatic _loci,_ as Baur
had done in his New Testament Theology. The scheme is more or less
closely based on that of Reformation dogmatics. It is therefore
assumed _a priori_ that the Pauline theology can be divided into
practically the same individual doctrines as that of Luther, Zwingli,
and Calvin. Really, however, a preliminary question arises whether
this arrangement of the material does not introduce a wrong grouping
and orientation into the Apostle’s system, and whether it does not
destroy the natural order and relative importance of the thoughts,
falsify the perspective, tear asunder what ought not to be disjoined,
and render impossible the discovery of the fundamental idea in which
all the utterances find their point of union. This procedure is
innocently supposed to be scientific; as a matter of fact it leads to
the result that the study of the subject continues to be embarrassed
by a considerable remnant of the prepossessions with which the
interpretation of Paul’s doctrine was approached in the days of the
Reformation.

It is not less prejudicial when others, as for example
Holsten,_(_35_)_ adopt an arrangement of the material suggested by
modern dogmatics. As the Pauline theology has, if possible, less
affinity with the latter than with the Reformation theology, the error
is almost more serious.

[pg 034]

In general these scholars are quite unconscious of the decisive
importance which attaches to the arrangement and articulation of the
material. It has, indeed, always been weakness of theological
scholarship to talk much about method and possess little of it.

Otto Pfleiderer, alone, is not entirely in this state of innocence. He
has an inkling that the usual way of approaching the subject is not
wholly free from objection. In the first edition of his Paulinism
(1873)_(_36_)_ he raises the question whether the “genetic method” is
not demanded by the task of tracing out the organic progress of the
development of dogma in its Pauline beginnings. Practical
considerations, however, determine him “to arrange the matter very
much according to the customary dogmatic _loci,”_ while, however, at
the same time giving as much attention as possible to the position of
the dogma in the Pauline system.” He fears that the carrying out of
the genetic principle would lead to many repetitions, and would make
it more difficult to get a general view of “the way in which the
separate doctrines were connected with their bases.”

In order to salve his conscience he gives at the beginning, “by way of
an introductory outline,” a sketch of the “organic development of the
Pauline gnosis from its single root.” This general view—it occupies
twenty-seven pages—is the most important part of the whole book. The
succeeding chapters treat of sin, flesh, character of the law, aim of
the law, Christ’s atoning death, Christ’s death as a means of
liberation from the dominion of sin, the resurrection of Christ, the
Person of Jesus Christ, the Son of David, the Son of God and heavenly
Christ, the appearing of Christ in the flesh, faith, justification,
sonship, the beginning and the progress of the new life, the Christian
Church, the Lord’s Supper, the election of grace, the parousia, and
the end of the world.

Lüdemann was prevented by the task which he had set himself from
adopting the division according to _loci._ [pg 035] His object was
only to investigate Paul’s conception of the fleshly man in its
relation to his doctrine as a whole. In this way he was led to arrange
the ideas in their natural order and, without strictly intending to do
so, to give a general account of Paulinism, which is almost entirely
free from the defective arrangement of other works, permits something
of the logical articulation of the Apostle’s circle of ideas to
appear, and certainly penetrates more deeply than the rest into the
Apostle’s world of thought.

As the works of Reuss, Weiss, Pfleiderer, Holsten, Renan, Sabatier,
Ménégoz, Weizsäcker, do not aim at understanding and showing the
development of this doctrine from a single fundamental thought, there
are no real divergences in the general view which they take of the
system. The differences of opinion with their predecessors which the
authors express in their text and notes relate, in point of fact, only
to details and minutiae, surprising as this may at first sight appear.
The plan and design of the system are in general everywhere the same;
the differences regard only the mixing and application of the colours,
and the question how far Greek influences are to be recognised.

In going through these works one after another, one is surprised to
observe how great is their fundamental resemblance. At the same time
there is something curiously “elusive” about them. At a given point
one might be inclined to think that one of the authors was formulating
a thought more clearly, or giving it more exclusive importance than
the others; and one is just about to note this as a special
characteristic of his view. A few pages later, however, or in a
following chapter, one finds additions or reservations which show that
he does not really think differently from the rest. The differences
lie not so much in the actual conception as in the literary
presentation, and in the manner in which the material, which is
essentially a whole, is parcelled out among the different _loci._
There is thus nothing to be [pg 036] gained by analysing the various
conceptions one by one and comparing them with one another. Since
there is no real difference of fundamental view, the comparison would
lose itself in endless and unessential detail.

To the general impression of monotony is to be added that of
complexity. At the end of each of these works one is inclined to
inquire whether the author really means to ask the reader to regard
what is here offered as representing a system of thought which once
existed in the brain of a man belonging to early Christianity, and was
capable of being understood by his contemporaries. All the arts of
literary presentation are employed to subtilise the conceptions, to
describe the thoughts with exactitude, and to bring connexion and
order into the chaos of ideas. But the result gives no satisfaction.
No real elucidation and explanation of Paulinism is attained. The
resulting impression is of something quite artificial.

The welcome which these authors’ works received from their
contemporaries shows that the latter saw in them an advance in the
knowledge of Paulinism. They felt them to be satisfactory. That only
means that the readers’ presuppositions and requirements lay within
the same limitations as those of the authors.

What had been the result arrived at? A description of the Pauline
doctrine, a remarkably detailed description, but nothing more. That
doubtless implied a certain progress. It did not, however, extend so
far as the authors and their readers assumed. Both innocently supposed
that in the description they possessed at the same time an
explanation—as though the descriptive anatomy of this organism
sufficed to explain its physiology. They were unconscious that they
had so far only looked at Pauline thought from without, and had never
gained any insight into the inner essence of the system.

In these works the Apostle’s statements are quoted one after another,
and developed in his own words. The authors think they have discharged
their task when they [pg 037] have so arranged the course of the
investigation that all important passages can be respectably housed.

The odd thing is that they write as if they understood what they were
writing about. They do not feel compelled to admit that Paul’s
statements taken by themselves are unintelligible, consist of pure
paradoxes, and that the point that calls for examination is how far
they are thought of by their author as having a real meaning, and
could be understood in this light by his readers. They never call
attention to the fact that the Apostle always becomes unintelligible
just at the moment when he begins to explain something; never give a
hint that while we hear the sound of his words the tune of his logic
escapes us.

What is his meaning when he asserts that the law is abolished by the
death of Jesus—according to other passages, by His resurrection? How
does he represent to himself the process by which, through union with
the death and resurrection of the Lord a new creaturehood is produced
in a man, in virtue of which he is released from the conditions of
fleshly existence, from sin and death? How far is a union possible
between the natural man, alive in this present world, and the
glorified Christ who dwells in heaven; and one, moreover, of such a
kind that it has a retrospective reference to His death? The authors
we have named do not raise questions of this kind. They feel no need
to trace out the realities which lie behind these paradoxical
assertions. They take it for granted that Paul has himself explained
his statements up to a certain point—so far, in fact, as this is
possible in the world of feeling to which religion belongs.

This self-deception is made the more easy for them by the fact that
they are accustomed to clothe their own religious views in Pauline
phraseology, and consequently they come to treat as the authentic
logic of Paul, arguments which they have unconsciously imported into
their account of his teaching. They fail to reckon with the
possibility that the original significance of his utterances [pg 038]
may rest on presuppositions which are not present to our apprehension
and conception. For the same reason they all more or less hold the
opinion that what they have to do with is mainly a psychological
problem. They assume that the Pauline system has arisen out of a
series of reflexions and conclusions, and would be as a whole clear
and intelligible to any one who could succeed in really thinking
himself into the psychology of the rabbinic zealot who was overpowered
by the vision of Christ on the road to Damascus.

The writer who goes furthest in this direction is Holsten. In his work
on the “Gospel of Paul and of Peter”_(_37_)_ he describes how Paul,
while he was persecuting the new faith, was, as a Jewish thinker,
occupied with the thought of the offence of the cross and the alleged
resurrection. While still a fanatical zealot “he constantly carried
with him in his consciousness the elements of the Messianic faith,
even though as negative and negated.” By the keenness of his
theological dialectic he was compelled to imagine what the alleged
facts would really signify if the belief of the disciples were
justified. The “principle of the Messianic faith” was, in him, “alive
in greater definiteness than even in the consciousness of the
followers of the Messiah whom he persecuted.” The Messiahship of Jesus
could not for him take its place as a hope and faith within the Jewish
system of thought and religious life, [pg 039] but necessarily implied
the destruction of what he had hitherto held to be true. Thus the
persecutor had in principle thought out for himself to its ultimate
consequences the revolution which would result from the acceptance of
the Messiahship of Jesus. And this he translated into word and deed
after he had experienced the vision on the Damascus road.

Other writers take as the starting-point for their psychological
arguments the passage in Romans vii., where Paul depicts the despair
of the man who recognises that the law, although it is spiritual and
was given with a view to life, can only in the fleshly man produce
sin, condemnation, and death. What we there read concerning the
struggle between the natural, powerful will of the flesh and the law,
is, they think, written from the point of view of the pre-Christian
consciousness of the Apostle. He had experienced this agony of soul,
and it was by this that the Jewish religious attitude had been broken
down in him. Therefore in his Gospel he does not desire to retain
anything from the faith of his fathers.

These two main lines of psychological theory are followed for a longer
or shorter distance in all the works of this period. Hand in hand with
this psychologising goes a tendency to modernisation. The scholars of
this period spiritualise Paul’s thought. The transformation varies in
extent for the different ideas. The statements about the atonement and
imputed righteousness are the least affected by it. What is
unintelligible in these is put down to the account of the Jewish
Rabbinic mode of thought in which Paul is supposed to be held
prisoner. On the other hand, the conceptions regarding union with
Christ in his death and passion, and the new life in Him through the
Spirit, are subjected to paraphrase and explanation until nothing of
the realistic sense is left remaining. The question is not faced why
Paul, if he wanted to say anything so “spiritual” and general as this,
should have adopted so exaggerated, paradoxical, and materialistic a
method of expression.

[pg 040]

Whatever remains unexplained after the psychologising, the
depotentiation, and modernisation, is referred to the peculiar
character of the religious experience which the Apostle is supposed to
have undergone in the vision on the Damascus road. What essential
difference there was between this appearance of the Lord and those
experienced by the other disciples is nowhere clearly worked out, not
even by Holsten, who makes the most extensive use of this vision. It
is simply taken for granted by them all that in the vision itself is
to be found the explanation, not only of Paul’s conversion, but also
in some way or other of his call to be a missionary to the Gentiles
and of the peculiar character of his doctrine.

All these accounts of his teaching agree in assuming that Paul’s
system of doctrine was in the main a purely personal creation of his
own, and is in some way to be explained by the special character of
his religious experience. The question whether in this way his
integral connexion with primitive Christianity is sufficiently
preserved receives but little attention. In none of these works is the
investigation of the doctrinal material common to Paul and his
opponents seriously taken in hand. The writers are content with the
affirmation that both parties took as their starting-point the fact of
the death and resurrection of Jesus, without entering into any
consideration of the question how far Paul’s reasonings, which they
refer back to his inner personal experience, reproduce generally
current ideas of primitive Christianity and simply carry them out to
their logical issue.

The question which Ritschl had formerly forced on the consideration of
Baur has therefore not been faced or solved. It is true the author of
“Justification and Reconciliation”_(_38_)_ thinks that he has not only
raised the question but also answered it. He undertakes to explain all
the Pauline doctrinal passages on the basis of [pg 041] Old Testament
conceptions. In this way he hopes to work out the Apostle’s real
conception of the atoning death of Jesus, and of “righteousness,” and
believes that these will then, since they have been gained from the
Old Testament, coincide with the primitive Christian views in all
essential points.

Speaking generally, Ritschl’s tendency is to make the differences
between Paulinism and primitive Christianity as small as possible, and
to find them, as he had already done in the “Origin of the early
Catholic Church,” not so much in his doctrine proper as in his
attitude to certain practical questions. Ritschl employs the
dialectical skill with which nature had richly endowed him to
transform and shade off the doctrine of the Apostle of the Gentiles
until it harmonises with the fundamental Christian teaching which he
assumes for the earliest period and finds necessary for his dogmatics.

He entirely depotentiates the juridical series of ideas. Moreover, he
refuses to admit that Paulinism constitutes a speculative system. He
assumes that the Apostle moved in a free, untrammelled fashion among
the various sets of ideas and felt no real need to combine them into a
unity.

In addition to Ritschl, Bernhard Weiss_(_39_)_ and Willibald
Beyschlag,_(_40_)_ in their New Testament Theologies, endeavour to
make clear the relations between Paul and primitive Christianity from
the stand-point of critical conservatism. In order to secure a broad
basis for the primitive form of apostolic doctrine, they pronounce I
Peter and the Epistle of James to be documents of the pre-Pauline
period.

The writer who makes things easiest for himself is Von
Hofmann._(_41_)_ For him there is no “Pauline system [pg 042] of
doctrine.” The Apostle never uttered anything that did not belong to
the common doctrine of Christianity, but “according to the difference
of the occasion” brought into prominence this or that aspect of the
saving acts of God or of the condition of salvation, and what he thus
brought forward, now under one designation now under another, he sets
forth now in this relation and now in that one. Therefore this writer,
who was vaunted by the orthodox as a brilliant opponent of Tübingen
errors, has no scruple in working up together the Pauline ideas along
with those of the other New Testament Epistles into a single whole,
which he offers as apostolic doctrine.

Another problem which is hardly apprehended in its full difficulty by
the scholars of this period is that of the total neglect in the
Pauline gospel of the proclamation of the kingdom of God and His
righteousness which Jesus committed to His followers. They seem to
feel no surprise at the fact that the Apostle, even where it would be
the most natural thing in the world, never appeals to the sayings and
commands of the Master. Many of them never touch on this question at
all.

Resch, however, in his collection of extra-canonical Gospel-fragments,
even undertakes to show that in the Pauline letters a whole series of
otherwise unrecorded sayings of Jesus are embodied, and defends the
hypothesis that the Apostle had taken them from a pre-canonical Gospel
which ranked for him as an authority of equal value with the Old
Testament. The enigma of the untraced quotation, “What eye hath not
seen, neither hath ear heard,” etc., in I Cor. ii. 9 ff., is solved by
referring the “as it is written” to the written Gospel on which Paul
draws._(_42_)_

It is curious that most of these authors believe that they reduce the
acuteness of the problem by pointing [pg 043] out in the Epistles as
many reminiscences of Synoptic sayings as possible. That, of course,
only makes the matter more complicated. If so many utterances of Jesus
are hovering before Paul’s mind, how comes it that he always merely
paraphrases them, instead of quoting them as sayings of Jesus, and
thus sheltering himself behind their authority?

As for those who have some inkling of the problem, their one thought
is to dispose of it as rapidly as possible, instead of first exposing
it in its full extent. Among them is Ritschl, who here employs all the
arts and artifices of his exegesis and dialectic. That Jesus and Paul
did not at bottom teach the same thing is to this undogmatic dogmatist
unthinkable.

In general the writers of this period are involved in the most curious
confusions regarding the problem of “Jesus and Paul.” They fail to
perceive that these two magnitudes are not directly comparable with
one another because they think of Paul in complete isolation, and not
as a feature of primitive Christianity. The differences and
oppositions which reveal themselves between the teaching of Jesus and
that of Paul exist also as between the teaching of Jesus and that of
primitive Christianity itself. The momentous development did not arise
first with Paul, but earlier, in the community of the first disciples.
Their “religion” is not identical with the “teaching of Jesus,” and
did not simply grow out of it; it is founded upon His death and
resurrection. The “new element” was not brought into Christianity by
Paul; he found it there before him, and what he did was to think it
out in its logical implications. The difference of teaching between
Paul and Jesus is not a difference between individuals, it is—in
almost its whole extent—due to the fact that the Apostle belongs to
primitive Christianity.

In its false statement of the problem of Jesus and Paul the
scholarship of the period after Baur shows that it has not yet
succeeded in understanding the Apostle of [pg 044] the Gentiles as a
phenomenon, an aspect, of primitive Christianity.

There is frequent mention, in all these studies, of the Jewish roots
of the Pauline thought. They attempt to explain his views, so far as
possible, from the materials given in the Law and the Prophets. Some
authors had been inclined to assume that in regard to his conception
of the Law he did not stand wholly upon Old Testament ground, in the
sense that he sometimes means by it a narrower ceremonial code of
temporary validity, and sometimes a universal ethical law which has
not been invalidated by the death of Christ. These confusions were put
an end to by a study of Edward Grafe._(_43_)_ He shows that Paul when
he speaks of the law, alike when he uses the article or does not use
it, always has in mind the whole legal code, and never varies from the
conviction that this has been set aside by the death and resurrection
of Christ.

That in Galatians the ritual aspect of the law, in Romans the ethical,
is the more prominent, does not alter this fact. Nor is the
consistency of the Apostle’s view annulled by the fact that in many
places he formulates the negative judgment quite definitely, while in
others he softens it by an admission of the historical and ethical
significance of the law.

That Paul’s thinking follows the lines of Old Testament conceptions is
self-evident. The only question is whether the motive forces which
make their appearance in his gospel are derived in some way or other
from the Old Testament Scriptures.

That is not the case. In working up the primitive Christian views he
does not have recourse to the ideas of the ancient Judaism. Nowhere
does Paul attach himself to these. He takes no ideas from the Old
Testament with a view to giving them a new development, [pg 045] but
uses only what he can take from it ready formed. His new discovery
rests on a different basis. The Law and the Prophets serve only to
supply him with the Scriptural arguments, positive and negative, of
which he stands in need.

On the essential nature of the distinctively Pauline world of thought
the Old Testament therefore throws no light. This negative result is
not, indeed, everywhere clearly formulated. There are some students of
Paulinism who simply ignore it. Heinrici, in the preface to his study
of 2 Corinthians (1887), ventures on the assertion that in Paul the
“spirit of Old Testament prophecy” triumphs over contemporary Judaism.

And he is not the only one who clings to the illusion that much help
is to be gained from the Old Testament for the understanding of the
Apostle’s world of thought. By way of proof they cite every possible
parallel, even the most remote. But the disproportion between the
amount of the material offered and the smallness of the result
established tells against them.

That Paul is a child of late Judaism only began to be generally taken
into account when its world of thought was made known to theology by
Schürer’s “History of New Testament Times,”_(_44_)_ and Weber’s
“System of Palestinian Theology in the Early Synagogues.”_(_45_)_ But
even after this most scholars shared a certain disinclination to
recognise a real connexion between the Apostle’s world of thought and
that of late Judaism. Heinrici, who in [pg 046] his study in the
Corinthian Epistles gives great attention to the question regarding
the source of his ideas, definitely denies that “the intellectual and
religious forces of Late Judaism exercised a dominant influence” on
the Apostle. He holds, like many others, that Paul, passing over his
own time, grasped hands with the classical Judaism of the prophets,
and that one source of his strength is to be found in this fact. This
prejudice is to be explained by the low estimation in which late
Judaism had always been held by theologians. It was identified,
without examination, on the one hand with “fantastic apocalyptic
views,” and on the other with a “soulless Rabbinism.”

The admission, however, that Paul in the principles of his exegesis
was in agreement with Rabbinism was made by theologians with
comparative readiness. This did not carry with it the surrender of
anything that had been much valued, since the verbal comparison and
contrast of passages which he practises, and the illogical and
fantastic reasoning which appears in his arguments, had always been
distasteful to theological science. It was therefore rather welcome to
it than otherwise, to find, in consequence of the increased knowledge
of parallel products of late Judaism, an explanation of a weakness
which did not properly harmonise with the greatness of this heroic
spirit, in the influences to which he had been subjected by reason of
his theological education._(_46_)_

Along with this was accepted the fact that, in common with his
contemporaries, he naively treats the Haggadic embellishments of Old
Testament stories as on the same footing with the Scripture itself.
His assumption that the Law was given by the angels (Gal. iii. 19),
and his reference to the rock that followed the children of Israel in
the wilderness and poured out water (I Cor. x. 4), are to be explained
from passages in the Rabbinic literature. [pg 047] No thoroughgoing
investigation was undertaken with a view to determining whether the
Rabbinic principles suffice to explain Paul’s method of scriptural
argument. In general the view prevails that his “typological” and
“spiritualising” _(pneumatisch)_ interpretation goes beyond what can
elsewhere be shown in Palestinian theology. It is true these two
methods of exegesis, going beyond the simple literal sense, are not
wholly unknown, but they only came to their full development in
contemporary Alexandrian Biblical scholarship. For this reason it is
proposed to assume that Paul had also received an influence from this
side.

As examples of Alexandrian exegesis are quoted the interpretation of
Hagar and Sarah as representing the earthly and the heavenly Jerusalem
(Gal. iv. 22 f.), that of the water-giving rock as representing Christ
(I Cor. x. 4), and the argument from the threshing oxen to the
preachers of the gospel (I Cor. ix. 9 ff.).

One of the greatest problems of the Pauline use of Scripture is not
mentioned in these works. It is assumed that the Apostle attached
special importance to proving the Messiahship of the crucified Jesus.
How then can we explain the fact that he never makes any use of the
passage about the Suffering Servant of the Lord in Isaiah liii? This
fact is the more surprising because it may be taken as certain that
the apologetic of the primitive Christian community gave this passage
a most prominent place in its plan of operations.

A scientific attempt to adduce from the Rabbinic literature
explanatory parallels to Pauline thought was made by Franz Delitzsch
in 1870 in connexion with his Hebrew translation of the Epistle to the
Romans._(_47_)_ The [pg 048] net result is not great. The parallels
adduced are so uncharacteristic that they throw no new light on the
Apostle’s ideas.

No further considerable attempts were made in this direction. Nor did
Weber’s “Theology of the Early Synagogue” lead to any other important
works being undertaken in that department. On the contrary, his sketch
of the Rabbinic world of ideas makes it apparent that Pauline thought
does not become any more intelligible by its aid than it is in itself,
even though one parallel or another may be unearthed. Moreover, it is
to be remarked that the discovery of such parallels would only become
of importance if proof could be given that they really date from the
beginning of the first century. Such proof is, however, quite
impossible.

Of the “Rabbinism” of Paul’s day we know practically nothing. Even the
earliest strata of the literature which is at our disposal were not
formed before the beginning of the third century A.D._(_48_)_ It
consists of a codification of tradition carried out by the later
Rabbinic scholasticism. How far it offers us a faithful representation
of the ideas and character of Rabbinic thought at the beginning of the
first century must remain an open question.

Even if Paul, in virtue of his dialectic and certain external
characteristics, belongs to the world which this literature reveals to
us, in regard to the content of his ideas and his creative force as a
thinker he is not to be understood by its aid. To register this fact
is, however, by no means to deny that he has his roots in the Jewish
theology of his time, but only to say that he shows no affinity as
regards the inner essence of his problems and [pg 049] ideas with what
a later age offers us as the Rabbinism of the first century. It is
possible, indeed it is in the highest degree probable, that many of
his ideas for which no “Rabbinic” parallels can be adduced,
nevertheless have their origin in the Jewish theology of his time. Who
is to guarantee that the later scholasticism has faithfully preserved
for us the Jewish theology which was contemporary with Christianity?
It may well have been more living in thought and more profound than
the men of the after-time could understand, or their tradition
preserve. The picture which they draw for us shows only a sun-scorched
plain, but this yellow, wilted grass was green and fresh once. What
did the meadows look like then?

It is to be remembered that the Apocalypse of Ezra, which shows in its
own way such depth, while it is derived from the Scribal theology of
the first century, is as little to be explained from what on the basis
of the later literature we think of as the Rabbinism of the period as
are the Pauline Epistles. Had this writing not been preserved, it
would never have occurred to anyone that at that time men belonging to
the circle of the Scribes had been tormented in this way by the
primary problems of religion, and had brought the questions arising
out of them into such close relations with eschatology.

Further, it is to be taken into account that Palestinian Scribism,
even though it was an independent entity, did not, at the time when it
has to be considered in connexion with Paul, exist in absolute
exclusiveness, but maintained relations with Jewish Hellenism. The
latter worked on a basis of ideas which it had in large measure taken
over from Rabbinism and held in common with the latter. This
relationship becomes in the case of Philo clearly apparent. With him
one can never tell where the “Rabbinist” ends and the Hellenist
begins. But if the theology of the Scribes stood in any kind of
relation with Jewish Hellenism, it cannot have been so poor in ideas
and unspiritual as it appears in the later tradition.

[pg 050]

Even the discourses of Jesus, in spite of the polemical picture which
they give of it, create the impression that He had to do with a
Rabbinism which was interested in really religious questions, even
though it showed itself incapable of rising to the height of the
simple piety to which His preaching of the Kingdom of God and the
repentance necessary thereto made its appeal.

It seems therefore probable that the Epistles of Paul and the
Apocalypse of Ezra, along with its satellite the Apocalypse of Baruch,
are witnesses to a Rabbinism, or a movement within its sphere, of
which the Rabbinic tradition which later became fixed in written form
gives us no information.

What should we know of the moving forces of the Reformation as they
manifest themselves in Luther’s works of the year 1521, if we were
dependent for our information on the Lutheran scholasticism of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries? How would we think of the
Reformation as a whole if we possessed only these witnesses? With all
due respect to the vaunted faithfulness of Rabbinic tradition, which
after all we are not in a position to check, was it capable of
preserving the record of a period of living thought? Is an oral
tradition ever capable of doing so?

The historical examples in which we are able to test the tradition of
later generations by the reality which has subsequently come to light,
are calculated to shake our faith in the assumption that it can do so.
What did Beethoven’s time know of the achievements of the period of
Bach? Mention is made of the elaborate fugues which had their origin
at that time; but that the eighteenth century had produced choral
works of deep feeling and an elevation secure against change of
fashion, was entirely unknown to the second generation after Bach,
although there had been nothing to interrupt tradition.

Moreover, it ought not to be forgotten that we possess the history of
Judaism only in fragments. As regards the political events of the
first century we are [pg 051] comparatively well informed, but of the
religious movements we know little, and what does come to our
knowledge is so disconnected and self-contradictory that it cannot be
combined into a single picture. The Baptist, Jesus, Philo, Paul,
Josephus, and the authors of the Apocalypses of Ezra and Baruch cover
together about two generations. They are at first sight as entirely
different as if they belonged to widely separated periods.

The destruction of Jerusalem interrupts the continuity of development
of the Jewish people and of its thought. Its life is extinguished.
Hellenism dies out. There arises a Rabbinism which is no longer borne
on the tide of great national and spiritual movements. It becomes
ossified, and confines itself to mere unproductive commentating upon
the law. From the past its tradition takes only what lies within the
field of its own narrow interests. The problems and ideas which moved
the earlier, many-sided period no longer come into view, but fall into
as complete oblivion as if they had never occupied Jewish religious
thought.

The scholarship of the period after Baur is indeed far enough from
embarking on reflexions of this kind. It takes scarcely any notice of
what remains of the Late-Jewish non-Hellenistic literature. Even the
commentators make scarcely any use of the parallels to Pauline ideas
and conceptions which are found in Enoch, the Apocalypse of Baruch,
the Apocalypse of Ezra, and here and there in the Testaments of the
Twelve Patriarchs.

It is nothing less than astonishing that the close affinities with the
Apocalypse of Ezra do not receive any recognition. In this work there
are elaborate discussions of the problems of sin, the Fall of our
first parents, Election, the wrath, long-suffering, and mercy of God,
the prerogative of Israel, the significance of the law, the temporal
and the eternal Jerusalem, of the prospect of dying or surviving to
the Parousia, the tribulation of the times of the End, and the
Judgment. The close affinity between this writer and Paul strikes the
eye at once. [pg 052] Writers on Paulinism are, however, so obsessed
by the idea that the teaching of Paul is a “personal creation” that
they cannot bring themselves to accept the view that the religious
problems which struggle for solution in his letters had also occupied
his Jewish contemporaries or at least a section of them._(_49_)_

The claims of Late Judaism on Paul were therefore taken to be
discharged when his Rabbinic dialectic and exegesis, and to a certain
extent his eschatology also, had been ascribed to it.

The chapter on the future-hope which connected Paul on the one hand
with Judaism and on the other with primitive Christianity, is never
omitted in any account of his teaching given by the scholars of the
post-Baur period. In it is collected all that the Epistles have to say
regarding the parousia, the resurrection, the judgment, and the
Kingdom of the Last Times. The treatment, however, is by no means
thorough. Scarcely anywhere is there an attempt to arrange the
scattered notices in an orderly way and bring them into relation with
one another. It is taken for granted that they are inconsistent with
one another, as a necessary consequence of the fantastic character of
the material. That Paul may have had a clear plan of the events of the
End in which all his statements can find a place, is not taken into
account. These writers therefore set no limit to the admission of
inconsistencies, and draw a picture which is, to put it plainly,
meaningless.

So far, it occurs to no one that the want of connexion may perhaps
result from the fact that the separate [pg 053] statements have not
been carefully examined in regard to what they actually mean, and to
their mutual relations. It is taken as quite certain that the “simple”
eschatology of I Thessalonians is superseded by the more complicated
view of the Corinthian letters; and these in turn are not the last
stage in this “development” of the Apostle’s thought. No attempt is
made to get a clear idea in what order he thinks of the judgment and
the resurrection of the dead, or as to whether he holds that there is
one resurrection and one judgment, or a resurrection of the
“righteous,” and another besides, and whether he assumes this to be
accompanied by one judgment or two.

The authors regard with a certain amount of self-satisfaction the way
in which they have emphasised the importance given to the eschatology
by Paul. In the chapter devoted to it they have certainly emphasised
again and again, “with the utmost energy,” the fact that he really
“shared” the eschatological expectations of his time and admitted them
to an important place in his creed. The chapter in question, however,
only gets its turn after the whole “system of doctrine” has been
safely housed in the earlier chapters without seeking any aid from the
eschatology or even saying a word about it. As in the Church prayers
of to-day, one catches an echo of it only at the end. This means that,
when all is said and done, these writers regard it only as a kind of
annexe to the main edifice of Pauline doctrine. That is a fact which
their brave words about the importance attributed to it in their
account do not alter in the slightest. None of these students of
Paulinism asks himself whether there is an organic connexion between
the eschatological expectations and the system as such, and whether
the fundamental conceptions and concatenation of ideas are not somehow
or other conditioned by the hope of the final consummation. It is
simply taken as self-evident that eschatology can only form an
incidental chapter in Paul’s teaching.

[pg 054]

The most natural course to follow in the investigation would have been
to begin with the eschatology as the most general and
“primitive-Christian” element, and then to have tried to find a path
leading from here to the central doctrine of the new life in union
with the dying and resurrection of Christ. This course is nowhere
followed.

That is the more surprising as it is generally assumed that the
“missionary preaching” of the Apostle took an almost purely
eschatological form, and was scarcely distinguishable from the
primitive-Christian preaching of repentance, the judgment, and the
parousia. The point to examine would therefore have been precisely how
the “Pauline theology” grew out of the eschatology which Paul shared
with primitive Christianity. Instead of that, these writers begin with
the “doctrinal system,” and attach to that by way of appendix an
account of the eschatology. It here first becomes fully apparent what
a misfortune it was for Pauline study in the post-Baur period that it
kept to the method of presentation under _loci,_ and consequently
accorded eschatology, in principle, no greater importance for
Paulinism than it had had for Reformation theology.

Bernard Weiss, agreeing in this with Havet, lays strong emphasis on
the eschatology, and makes a beginning in the direction of an
intelligent presentation of Paulinism. Instead of beginning, like the
others, with the “doctrine of man,” or with “sin and the law,” he
first sets forth “the earliest preaching of Paul as Apostle of the
Gentiles,” which he makes to consist of nothing but the proclamation
of the judgment and the parousia. But having got this length, he does
not feel any need to point out the paths which lead from here to the
“teaching of the four great doctrinal and polemical epistles.” He
simply puts the two sections side by side, and even falls into the
inconsistency of devoting another chapter to the eschatology at a
later point. The doctrine of Paul consists therefore for these
scholars of a theology of the [pg 055] present and a theology of the
future which have no inner connexion with one another. It is indeed
cited as an achievement on his part that he turned the eye of faith
from the exclusive contemplation of the “hereafter” to take in the
present also. How he came to do so—he alone of this first Christian
generation—to point to present “blessings of salvation” in addition to
those of the future, is not explained. The co-existence of the two is
simply noted as a fact.

How far the scholars of this period were from taking the Pauline
eschatology seriously, is evident from the fact that they neglected to
enquire into its connexion with that of Late Judaism. Otto Everling,
who in 1888 took in hand to give an account of one of its main
features, its angelology and demonology, was not able to refer to any
previous work in this department._(_50_)_ A theologian to whom he
spoke of his design answered that “one ought not to examine the
birth-marks of a genius like the Apostle.”

Everling brings forward the passages which speak of Satan, the angels,
and the demons, one after another, and adduces parallels from Enoch,
the Ascension of Isaiah, the Wisdom of Solomon, the Book of Jubilees,
the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, and the Apocalypse of Baruch.
His review of the material shows in what a step-motherly fashion it
had been treated by previous commentators of all shades of opinion.

In the result it appears that the Pauline statements about angelology
and demonology have not sprung from his own imagination, but all have
their earlier analogues in the Late-Jewish theology, or at any rate
can be understood as inferences from the conceptions there laid down.
It further appears that his statements stand in systematic connexion
and mutually supplement one another.

In its main lines the Pauline doctrine of the angels shows us the
following picture. Spiritual beings who, in accordance with the
hierarchic arrangement adopted in [pg 056] Late-Jewish theology, are
divided into various classes, played a prominent part at the giving of
the law. From that time forward they acted as overseers of the chosen
people, and also as the real powers behind the gods of the heathen. By
the death and resurrection of Christ their power has been in principle
abolished, although it continues to be still in some way exercised
upon those who offer sacrifices to idols or submit themselves to the
law.

Believers in Christ, however, stand over against them as a class of
men who are liberated from their sway, and who possess a wisdom which
understands better than their own the great events in which the
history of the world is about to close.

These angelic existences feel that their domination is threatened, and
fight with all the weapons at their command. It is at their
instigation that the attempt is made to corrupt the Gospel by
legalism; all the difficulties which the Apostle encounters, all the
corporeal sufferings which he has to bear, are to be attributed to
them. It is on their account that women must be veiled when attending
the services of the Church, since otherwise they run the risk of
becoming the victims of their lust, as of old their mother Eve was
seduced by the devil. Most dangerous of all is their skill in
deception: Satan can disguise himself as an angel of light.

With the appearance of the Lord begins the decisive struggle which is
to lead to the destruction of these powers. They are to be delivered
up to judgment, to receive their sentence at the mouth of the saints,
whom, until the parousia, they have still the power to harass with
cunning and cruelty, though not to destroy.

“In its proper historical surroundings Christianity shows up in its
true majesty,” said Richard Rothe once. Everling drew from these
words, which he placed at the beginning of his book, courage to make a
thorough investigation of matters which had previously been timidly
avoided because of their strangeness.

How wide-reaching was the significance of his synthetic [pg 057] study
he had hardly realised. His intention was to depict clearly and in
vivid colours the imposingly fantastic Late-Jewish background of
Pauline theology. The theology of his time took the same view. It
accepted the offered gift somewhat constrainedly, but on the whole
gratefully enough. If it had the impression that the background as
thus restored, while no doubt “interesting,” was somewhat too glaring
and obtrusive, it remained confident that the “doctrinal system” which
it throws into relief is not otherwise affected by it. The
appendix-chapter on eschatology grows in size and acquires a certain
connectedness. But there seemed no reason to fear that it might grow
so vigorously as to overpower those into which the Pauline theology
proper is neatly parcelled out.

In reality, however, there was quite sufficient reason for anxiety.
Everling had shown that angelology and demonology were, as a matter of
fact, component parts of Paul’s cosmology. That they consequently also
entered into his fundamental conception of redemption was a point
which he had not especially emphasised. But the fact was written in
giant characters across his work. From the moment when Paul’s
statements regarding God, the devil, the angels, and the world are
apprehended in their organic connexion, it becomes abundantly evident
that for him redemption, in its primary and fundamental sense,
consists in a deliverance from the powers which have their abode
between heaven and earth. It is therefore essentially a future good,
dependent on a cosmic event of universal scope.

It at once becomes evident that the investigation of Paulinism must
take as its starting-point these ideas as being of the most general
character, and endeavour to show how the other statements regarding
redemption are derived from them. Theological science was thus forced
into the road which it had hitherto sedulously avoided. The deceptive
character of the division of Paulinism under _loci,_ by which it had
long been kept in [pg 058] an unhappy state of subservience to
Reformation and modern prejudices, now became apparent. But for all
that theology held to the old way and was determined to cast out
anyone who set foot upon the new. That is the explanation of the fate
which befel Richard Kabisch’s “Eschatology of Paul.”_(_51_)_ Kabisch
had been considering the plan of a work on the Pauline Ethic, and in
doing so had become aware that it was to a large extent conditioned by
the eschatological expectations. Thereupon he resolved to begin with a
preliminary study of the eschatology._(_52_)_

“Salvation,” so runs his argument, is thought of by Paul as
“deliverance” from judgment and destruction. “Justification” and
“reconciliation” are subservient to this deliverance and do not
describe a state of salvation independent of it. The spiritual goods
which are characterised by many theologians as the object of the
Apostle’s wrestling and striving are in reality only the anticipatory
first-fruits of the blessedness which the future has in store. This
blessedness consists in the believer’s being freed at the parousia
from the fleshly body in order to put on the heavenly robe of glory.
Thus eschatology is the foundation both of the dogmatics and ethics of
the Apostle.

Life and death are for him physical conceptions. Spiritual death and
spiritual life in the modern religious sense are unknown to him. Even
where, as in Rom. vi., he speaks of a dying and rising again which are
not accompanied by any change in the outward and visible existence of
the individual, he does not mean a spiritual dying and rising again
but, inconceivable as it may [pg 059] appear, a physical occurrence.
Everything spiritual goes back to something corporeal. That is true
also as regards the ethics. It is not from the consciousness of the
“ideal possession of eternal life” that he infers the duty of walking
in newness of life, but from the fact that one who shares the death of
Christ must also share His resurrection. Both events have reference to
the present. It is “a simple logical consequence” that we should walk
in accordance with this physical newness of life in order to show that
the fleshly, _sarkic,_ body has been put off.

The new life of which Paul speaks as a present spirit is therefore
based on the “repetition” of Christ’s bodily resurrection, which is
rendered possible by the _unio mystica_ with him. It guarantees to the
individual his indestructibility even though the corruptible world, to
which his fleshly corporeity belongs, falls a prey to destruction. The
believer will then have a part in the new world-substance.

Paul’s soul is therefore thrilled with the eager desire for life,
shaken with the dread of destruction. His faith, hope, and fear all
revolve about one centre—the abolition of corruption and the bestowal
of incorruption. His religion is a “will-to-live” in a large elemental
sense. He yearns for redemption from the creaturehood which is under
the sway of Satan and his powers, and from the body which they hold in
thrall. The moment in which the relative positions of the world of
spirits and the world of men are to be reversed, and a great final
renewal of all things is to be brought in—that moment cannot come
quickly enough for him. Therefore he seeks in some way to antedate it.

The future condition of existence is that of “glory.” It is
anticipated in the present life by the possession of the “Spirit”
which belongs essentially to the heavenly light substance.

Thus Kabisch endeavours to explain the Pauline doctrine of the Spirit
purely on the ground of the Late-Jewish metaphysic. A super-earthly
substance enters [pg 060] into the corporeity of those who in virtue
of the _unio mystica_ with Christ have entered into the experience of
His death and resurrection. It produces in them a new being, and gives
them a claim to the future perfected glory, and this while their
fleshly existence still continues to the outward eye unaltered.

The great paradoxes of Paulinism are here for the first time clearly
pointed out and so described that their real eschatological essence
appears._(_53_)_ But Kabisch did not succeed in explaining them. In
what sense is a “repetition” in the believer of the dying and rising
again of Christ possible? How can it produce a reconstitution of their
creaturely being while their fleshly existence continues outwardly as
before? To these questions Kabisch gives no answer.

In the account of the eschatological events and their issue it is
shown that the blessings and anticipations referred to by Paul are
also present in the Late-Jewish theology. That the Apostle expresses
his views about the future world in disconnected fragments, apparently
distributed fortuitously through the text, does not show that it was
not clear and consistent in his own mind, but exactly the opposite.
The eschatological remarks come in so naturally and without appearing
to need [pg 061] explanation just because this whole set of
conceptions was to the Apostle so long familiar and self-explanatory,
that he can draw on it whenever he wishes as easily as an educated
European uses the multiplication table.

Strangely, however, Kabisch does not succeed in giving a clear and
simple picture of the order and relation of the final events
presupposed in the letters. He gets confused over the various
resurrections and judgments, and finds the sole way of escape in
attributing to the Apostle a resurrection of the righteous only, and
not a general resurrection in addition. In consequence he is forced to
the conclusion that the righteous enter the Kingdom without passing
through a judgment, and that what is meant by the judgment is always
the destruction of the wicked at the parousia.

That is to make the Apostle contradict not only Jewish apocalyptic,
but his own utterances, since it is certain that the Epistles
frequently make mention of believers appearing at the judgment.

The difficulties which Kabisch here encounters are significant. They
show that it is not possible to understand the Pauline statements
simply by the light of the Late-Jewish eschatology. What for the
Apostle composed a simple picture remains for the writer who
endeavours to describe his apocalyptic full of obscurities and
contradictions. It is as if one or two conceptions were lacking which
would have enabled him to “get out” his game of patience
satisfactorily.

It is true Kabisch has not done everything possible in order to attain
clearness. He has neglected to adduce for comparison the eschatology
of the Baptist and of Jesus, and to examine how far the Pauline
simplification of apocalyptic is here prefigured. He thus falls into
the universal but none the less unintelligible error of failing to
call the two most important witnesses to the Late-Jewish
eschatological expectations. Are they the less so because they belong
to the New Testament? Further, he neglects, as do all the other
writers, to consider what [pg 062] are the primary questions which the
theory of the events of the End had to answer.

What happens at the parousia to the non-elect? And what to the elect
who have not become believers because the Gospel message has not
reached them? The ultimate fate of these two classes of men can surely
not be the same? Do those who at the parousia do not enter into glory
suffer “death” or “destruction”? What is the relation between these
two conceptions?

According to I Cor. xv. 26, death is only to be vanquished at the end
of the Messianic kingdom. Is a general resurrection before that
conceivable? Does it follow as a consequence of this triumph over
death?

Since Kabisch does not raise these and similar questions, he does not
find the path which alone can lead to the understanding of the logic
of the events of the End. Undoubtedly, in the eschatology of a thinker
like Paul, all these problems must have been considered and thought
out. They form the implicit presuppositions which guarantee and make
clear the inner logic of his scattered and seemingly disconnected
statements.

Although he has not explained the paradoxes of the Pauline mysticism,
nor succeeded in making clear the ground-plan of his eschatology,
Kabisch’s book is one of the most striking achievements, not only in
the department of Pauline study, but in historical theology as a
whole. For the first time since Lüdemann’s investigation of the
Apostle’s doctrine of man, in 1872, the problem of the Pauline
doctrine of redemption receives a new formulation.

The two works show a curious analogy. Their authors have a
consciousness of the fact that the theology of the Apostle is a living
organism, and are preserved by some good genius from splitting it up
into Reformation or modern _loci._ They endeavour to grasp the
thoughts and connecting links of the doctrine of redemption from a
single point of view. Lüdemann makes the “anthropology” his
starting-point, Kabisch the eschatology. [pg 063] Both are led, almost
contrary to their intention, to give a general account of Paulinism.
Both see in the paradoxical statements about the abolition of the
flesh in the union with the death and resurrection of Christ the
centre of his doctrine; both arrive at the result that what is in view
is a really physical redemption.

In the explanation of the facts which they agree in observing they
diverge widely. Lüdemann claims the Pauline doctrine of redemption as
Hellenistic; Kabisch endeavours to understand it on the basis of Late
Judaism. Theological science cast out the innovator and held to the
conviction that the Apostle’s system of thought was Greek. It was
acknowledged that he had made the eschatology of the Apostle
intelligible; but in the attempt to pass from the eschatology to the
centre of the Apostle’s system of doctrine, contemporary scholarship
saw only an extreme onesidedness for which there was no justification
in the documents, which deserved neither examination nor refutation,
but simply rejection.

On what lines had theology developed and defended the theory of Greek
elements in Paulinism? In the first place, it is to be remarked that
in regard to the extent and importance of the influence which is
supposed to have been exercised, various groupings are to be observed
among the different writers. Pfleiderer, Holsten, Heinrici,_(_54_)_
Havet, and others see in Paulinism the actual first step in the
Hellenisation of Christianity. They assume, as Baur also had taken for
granted before them, that the ethical series of ideas, the series
dominated by the antithesis of flesh and spirit, is derived from Greek
influences.

Schmiedel,_(_55_)_ in his commentaries, and Harnack_(_56_)_ express
[pg 064] themselves with more reserve. According to the latter,
Hellenism, no doubt, “had its share” in Paul. The Apostle of the
Gentiles “prepared the way for the projection of the Gospel upon the
Graeco-Roman world of thought,” but he never gave to Greek ideas “any
influence upon his doctrine of salvation.” Lipsius,_(_57_)_ Bernhard
Weiss, and Weizsäcker do not take much account of borrowings from
Greek sources, but are concerned to explain Paul from and by himself
so far as possible.

It is not so easy as might be supposed to determine the attitude of
the various authors towards the problem of the Hellenic influence in
Paul. This is partly due to want of accuracy in the terminology.
“Hellenistic” is used to mean both Jewish-Hellenistic and Greek in the
strict sense. The authors frequently express themselves in such a way
that it is not obvious whether they mean the one, or the other, or
both together. Attempts to establish an accurate terminology, to
confine “Hellenistic” to the meaning “Jewish-Hellenistic,” and to use
Hellenic for Greek in the full sense, have not succeeded.

But the want of clearness is not wholly to be put down to the account
of the language; it is partly due to the mental attitude of the
writers. The problem really includes two questions. First, Was Paul
under the influence of Jewish Hellenism? Secondly, Did Greek thought
in itself, apart from the alliance into which it had entered with
Judaism, exercise any influence upon his views? Instead of keeping
these questions separate these writers constantly confuse them, and
assume that they have proved the existence of Greek ideas in the [pg
065] Apostle’s system of doctrine when they have only discussed his
relations with Jewish-Hellenism.

Sometimes one actually gets the impression that in this difficult
question they intentionally make their discussions a little obscure
and inconsistent, and are more concerned to conceal than to reveal
their views, in order not to lay themselves open to attack.

The discovery and the grouping of their opinions is therefore
associated with difficulties, and can never be carried out in a way
entirely free from objection. Fortunately the discussion and decision
of the question does not depend on drawing them up in three divisions,
each under the banner of its particular view, and so putting them
through their facings.

It suffices to note the fact that in the study of the subject from
Baur onward the greatly predominating opinion is that Paul was not
only influenced by Jewish Hellenism but also derived some of his ideas
directly from Greek thought. It is also safe to assert that of all the
writers in question—even though some of them take up an attitude of
reserve to Pfleiderer’s more thoroughgoing views, none of them denies
the influence of Jewish Hellenism on Paul. The difference between them
consists rather in the fact that some assume in addition to this what
may be called “free” Greek influence, while others are sceptical on
this point and think that the facts can be explained without this
assumption.

It is to be expressly remarked that the latter do not try to arrive at
an understanding of the essence of Paul’s thought by a different
method, but only to clothe the usual explanations in different words.
This is the case with Weizsäcker.

The well-known account of Paulinism in his “Apostolic Age”_(_58_)_
neither offers any new idea nor raises any new problem. Though he is
in some respects more cautious than Pfleiderer, because he feels the
difficulty of proving Greek influence more strongly than the latter,
in other [pg 066] respects he is less exacting than Pfleiderer with
his logical development of Baur’s ideas, since he is content with
explanations which do not satisfy Pfleiderer.

That Bernard Weiss in dealing with Pauline theology dispenses with the
assumption of Greek influence is due to the fact that his
investigation holds strictly to the lines of “Biblical theology,” and
on principle takes no account of anything beyond the borders of the
Canon.

It is interesting to note that both Weiss and Weizsäcker deliberately
avoid a discussion of Greek and Hellenistic influence on Paul, and
confine themselves to an objective account of Paul’s doctrine. Indeed,
it may be remarked that in the study of the subject between Baur and
Holtzmann the problem is never thoroughly discussed.

The question how far the alleged influences are proved or provable may
be held over for the present, and in the first place we may
interrogate Holsten, Pfleiderer and their followers as to what their
view really means, and what they think they can explain by means of
it.

At bottom the question turns on the antithesis of flesh and spirit. In
the clearly defined form in which this antithesis presents itself in
Paul, it is held that it must be regarded as Greek. This view had been
expressed by Lüdemann, who was the first to develop it clearly.
Independently of him, Holsten_(_59_)_ and Pfleiderer brought it into
general currency.

It is universally taken for granted that the dualism is derived from
Platonism. Whether Paul took it direct from Greek sources or from
Jewish Hellenism is not clearly explained. Lüdemann seems to assume
the former, Holsten to imply the latter; Pfleiderer is doubtless to be
understood in the sense that both possibilities have to be taken into
account, separately and in combination.

The psychological process is differently conceived by [pg 067] Holsten
and by Pfleiderer. The former holds that Greek ideas were already in
his pre-Christian period present to the mind of the Apostle, who had
been in touch with Jewish Hellenism, but they had as yet played no
part in his thinking. By his religious experience at the vision of
Christ on the Damascus road they were called into activity and helped
him to give form to his new knowledge. In this way Holsten thinks it
possible to understand Paulinism as both a personal creation of the
Apostle and at the same time a product of the influence of Greek
ideas. The emphasis lies, however, on the personal creation; the
influence of the Greek ideas is thought of as subsidiary.

For Pfleiderer the process was more largely determined from without.
Paul’s conversion creates as it were a void in his Jewish
consciousness. The thought-forms which he has hitherto used prove
incapable of dealing satisfactorily with the implications of his new
faith. So the Apostle is driven to have recourse to another system of
ideas. He no longer remains indifferent to the ideas which stream in
upon him from Jewish Hellenism and Greek thought. They become
significant to him; he allows them to exercise their influence upon
him. In this way there arises a remarkable duality in his thought.
Pharisaic and Hellenistic trains of ideas form two streams “which in
Paulinism meet in one bed without really coalescing.” By way of
conjecture Pfleiderer several times advances the suggestion that
Apollos the Alexandrian may have introduced the Apostle to the
Alexandrian Platonism.

Heinrici, again, in his commentaries on the Corinthian Epistles
suggests that the Apostle’s doctrine is a synthesis of elements taken
on the one hand from the Jewish prophets and on the other from Greek
thought._(_60_)_ Paul, he thinks, reached back beyond Late Judaism to
join hands with the ancient prophetism, and similarly rose [pg 068]
superior to Alexandrianism and drew direct from Greek thought. In both
cases what he seeks is an ethical force. That he possessed the insight
and the power to find this in the thought of the ancient world and to
apply it to the formation of a Christian system of thought was a great
spiritual achievement, pregnant with consequences for the future
development of Christianity.

One might have expected that these various views would be worked out
in detail. That is not the case. In the last resort none of these
writers gets beyond the general and simple assertion that the
antithesis of flesh and spirit is Greek. But even this is not further
explained by means of parallels from Greek literature. There is no
attempt to show in what sense Paul’s utterances become more
intelligible in the light of these analogies than they are in
themselves.

“The Greek dualism,” writes Holsten, “underlies all the decisive
elements of his thought, and makes itself apparent in a series of
individual traits.” Any one who goes through his work in the
expectation of finding evidence adduced in support of this statement
will be disappointed. It is as though the author had forgotten as he
went on writing what he had set out to do.

It is also matter for astonishment that no serious attempt is made to
extend the range of the Greek elements beyond the single antithesis of
flesh and spirit. The suggestion is no doubt met with that the
pessimism, the longing for death, and the ethical teaching of the
Apostle, belong essentially to the tone of thought prevalent in the
Hellenic world. But these remain mere _obiter dicta_ which are not
worked out in any way.

It is as though these writers one and all had an instinctive feeling
that their thesis, so long as it is kept quite general, has an
admirable air of credibility and admits of being nicely formulated,
but that when any attempt is made to follow it out into detail it
yields little in the way of tangible results. Paulinism is deceptive.
Its outward appearance is such that the assertion that [pg 069] here
Greek influences have been at work seems the most self-evident
possible, but when this has to be shown in detail it leaves the
investigator whom it has drawn on by its specious appearance
completely in the lurch.

The curious thing is that Holsten, Pfleiderer, and their followers do
not venture to formulate the unwelcome admission which may be read
between their lines, but keep up the game with one another as if
everything was going as well as heart could wish. They overdo their
air of unconcern, as though from an uncomfortable sense that they
might in the end lose confidence in their assertion, and so find
themselves unable to explain how Paul arrived at his dualistic
antithesis between flesh and spirit.

For this is what it all ultimately comes to. The assertion of Greek
influence is a kind of pillared portico behind which they construct
the edifice of Paulinism as they understand it. The style, however, is
only maintained as regards the front. What lies behind that is
styleless, neither Greek nor Jewish, without plan, without character,
without proportion. Those writers who wholly or partially dissent from
the assumption of Greek influences carry out the same plan with the
same materials, and with the same unconcern as regards the style. The
only difference is that they do not conceal it by building a special
façade in front of it, whether it be that, like Harnack, they have a
fuller sense of the difficulties, or, like Weiss and Weizsäcker,
persuade themselves that Paulinism, according to their construction of
it, looks sufficiently well as it is.

There is, however, one point on which Pfleiderer and his followers
think that they can point to definite results of the influence of
Greek ideas. They maintain that the Apostle’s eschatological
expectations have been transformed by them. This has reference to the
passage in 2 Cor. v. I ff. in which Paul gives expression to his
desire not to be “unclothed” but to be “clothed upon.” The natural
interpretation which is given by Bernard Weiss and others understands
the Apostle as speaking [pg 070] of his eager desire to experience the
parousia while still alive in the body, in order to share that
transformation in which “what is mortal will be swallowed up by life,”
and not to have to pass through a time of waiting in an intermediate
state of non-being or death.

Pfleiderer in his “Primitive Christianity” does not accept this
explanation, but maintains that this passage and two others—Phil. i.
21 f. and iii. 8 f._(_61_)_—imply a departure from the Pharisaic
eschatological hope in which the Apostle’s thought elsewhere moves. In
this later period of his life, represented by 2 Corinthians and
Philippians, he turns away—so runs the theory—from the primitive view
of an intermediate state of death, followed by a subsequent
resurrection, and comes to hold that his soul, immediately after his
departure, will pass into the presence of Christ in order to dwell
with Him. And Paul is more and more driven to adopt this view in
proportion as his life is daily exposed to greater danger, and he has
to reckon with the possibility of dying before the parousia takes
place. Under the pressure of this inward anxiety, guided by
Platonising Alexandrianism, illuminated by the Greek spirit, he
creates—we are still following Pfleiderer—a spiritualising hope of
future blessedness, which in the sequel becomes of the utmost value to
Gentile Christianity by enabling it to reconcile itself to the delay
of the parousia.

[pg 071]

Pfleiderer believes also that he can show the course of the
development by which the new conception was arrived at. In I
Thessalonians, he thinks, the Apostle still rested unquestioningly in
that notion of a corporeal resurrection which primitive Christianity
shared with Judaism. But in the explanations in I Cor. xv. the
influence of the Greek ideas becomes observable, while in 2
Corinthians and Philippians it becomes dominant.

This construction of the course of events is defended by Pfleiderer
and his followers—Holsten here stands apart—with fanatical energy, as
though they wished to make noise enough to distract attention from the
fact that they have so very little else to point to in the shape of
positive evidence of Greek influence in Paul.

What are the difficulties which are raised by the assumption of Greek
ideas in Paul’s doctrine? They are many and various, and they grow
greater in proportion as the new element in Paul is more strongly
emphasised. Take the problem of explaining the dualism of flesh and
spirit. It is assumed that this has been done when it has been
declared to be Greek. But in doing so a duality has been introduced
into Paul himself which creates many more difficulties than the
dualism it was invoked to solve.

The Apostle is made to think Judaically with one-half of his mind and
Hellenically with the other, and nevertheless is supposed to be
capable of being conceived as a single integral personality. In the
writings of Lüdemann and Holsten the difficulty does not yet appear in
its full magnitude. They understand by the Jewish element especially
the juridical series of ideas referring to the atonement and imputed
righteousness. Holsten is, moreover, in a specially favourable
position, because in the last resort he ascribes the origin of the
system not so much to the influence of Greek ideas as to the inward
experience on the Damascus road, which of course eludes analysis. If
they are thus referred exclusively to the separate but coexistent
juridical and mystical sets of [pg 072] ideas, a Jewish and a Greek
element can at need be thought of as in some way or other combined in
a single consciousness.

But for Pfleiderer the conception of the Jewish element has become
much more comprehensive and vital, because he appreciates the
significance of the eschatological ideas. The result of that is to
make the opposition which has to be recognised much more acute. And,
nevertheless, it must continue to be asserted that Paul was
unconscious of the inconsistencies!

If the difficulty could be got over by pointing to an opposition of
which the Apostle was conscious, and which he had made an effort to
reconcile, the position of the theory would be much more favourable.
But for that it would be a necessary condition that he should
somewhere have expressed the consciousness that he bore two souls
within his breast,_(_62_)_ and that the marks of compromise should
appear in his work as they do, for example, in that of Philo. That,
however, is not the case. He is conscious of no opposition, and steps
unconcernedly from the one world into the other, turns back again to
the first, and keeps on doing this over and over again. Where,
according to Pfleiderer’s view, he is venturing a leap over the abyss,
he has all the air of putting one foot calmly before the other on a
level road. We must, therefore, take it to be the case that he had not
the slightest inkling of the opposition.

This conclusion seems to negate psychology and render a historical
comprehension of the Apostle impossible, but Pfleiderer hardens his
heart and boldly accepts it. There remains, he says, “no alternative
but to admit that Paul kept the two different kinds of conceptions in
his consciousness side by side but unrelated, and jumped from one to
the other without being aware of the opposition between them.”

There is, however, a further complication in the [pg 073] question.
Pfleiderer holds that in 2nd Corinthians and Philippians a Greek
spiritualising future-hope has displaced the Jewish Pharisaic hope. In
the last period of his life, he maintains, the Apostle no longer
believes in a corporeal resurrection, but in a presence of the soul
with Christ which begins immediately after death.

But the new conception does not in fact displace the old, although it
is diametrically opposed to it. Pfleiderer has to admit that Paul,
even in the writings of the latest period, advances without misgiving
the doctrine of the “awakening of the whole man from the sleep of
death,” just as if the new doctrine of “the presence with the Lord
beginning immediately after death” were not in existence, although it
is the outcome of long years of mental struggle.

Pfleiderer, however, is prepared to accept even this portentous fact
also, and to go on contentedly believing that Paul lived in a kind of
mental twilight which is at once Jewish-eschatological and
Greek-spiritualistic. He expresses this euphemistically by speaking of
the Pauline eschatology as “hovering between the Pharisaic hope of the
here and the Greek hope of the hereafter.” The way to a scientific
understanding of Paulinism lies, therefore, for Pfleiderer through a
_credo quia absurdum._

By his assertions about 2 Cor. v. I ff. he had brought the assumption
of Hellenistic ideas in Paul into a dangerous position. Previously
when a student of the subject had stated it to be his view that the
sharp antithesis of flesh and spirit was Greek, there was no way in
which this belief could be countered. If he was, further, convinced
that the Apostle’s brain was so organised that he could at the same
time think consistently along two separate lines, Greek-spiritualistic
and Jewish-eschatological, without noticing their divergence and
without ever mingling the two sets of ideas, a mind accustomed to work
by the methods of historical criticism was similarly powerless against
views arrived at as if by revelation.

Pfleiderer, however, makes the mistake of referring [pg 074] to a
matter of fact when he asserts that the Apostle’s conception of a life
after death became Hellenised. Thereupon controversy about the Greek
element in Paul rages furiously over 2 Cor. v. I ff.—it was only now
that controversy had become possible. The simple wording of the
passage is against Pfleiderer, for its subject is not the soul’s being
“at home with Christ,” but the Apostle’s longing for the parousia.
Pfleiderer himself would never have arrived at his exposition had it
not been for the laudable desire to produce at last some tangible
example of the influence of Greek thought upon the Apostle’s ideas.

The point which Pfleiderer raised here was after all only a particular
case in relation to the general question whether a Hellenistic
influence is to be recognised in the Apostle’s conceptions of the
final state and the times of the End. It was in this wider aspect that
Kabisch dealt with the problem in his work on the Pauline eschatology.
His decision is in the negative. The much-discussed “development” of
the views of I Thessalonians into those of I Corinthians xv., and of
these again into those of 2 Corinthians and Philippians, is, he
maintains, a delusion. The conception of the things of the End is a
unity, and remains the same throughout.

To oppose this view Teichmann entered the lists._(_63_)_ In his
over-confident zeal he plays the part of Polos in Plato’s Gorgias.

He goes much further than Pfleiderer, and seeks to show that Greek
ideas actually superseded the whole Jewish Eschatology of Paul. In
consequence of the [pg 075] influx of new thoughts one antinomy after
another arises in the Apostle’s conception of the things of the End.
To trace out and exhibit these in detail is the goal of Teichmann’s
endeavour.

He arrives at the following conclusions:—In I Thessalonians Paul still
assumes that Christians will enter the kingdom of heaven with their
_earthly_ bodies. Not before I Corinthians xv. does he introduce the
idea of a “transformation.” He is then led to do so by the development
of the Greek doctrine of flesh and spirit. In the second Epistle to
the Corinthians he carries out this new conception to its logical
issue. “The compromise which he had attempted in I Cor. is abandoned,
and the result is that the conception of the resurrection of the dead
is set aside.” Along with the resurrection of the dead the Apostle
also strikes out from his programme of the future the parousia. “For
the expectation of the descent of Christ to earth he substitutes the
entry of the believer into the heavenly world. A resurrection of the
dead, a descent of Christ to earth, was now no longer necessary.”

Not only so, but the conception of the judgment is also abolished. In
the first place, Paul draws this inference “at least so far as
Christians are concerned.” That subsequently, in following out his
ideas, “he should also arrive at the conception of universal
blessedness, can in view of his universalism cause no surprise.” “As
all men were included in Christ at His resurrection, so all must
receive the Spirit, they must all be made alive.” The End does not,
therefore, mean blessedness for some and destruction for others, but
eternal life for all. But since eternal life depends on the possession
of the Spirit, it must be assumed that those who are not believers at
their death “come to faith in Christ in the period between the
parousia and the delivery of all authority into the hands of God, and
in consequence of this the Spirit is given to them.”

Teichmann professes to have demonstrated the [pg 076] Hellenisation of
the Pauline eschatology. What he actually shows is what it would have
become if it had really undergone Greek influence.

Not one of his “results” can be proved from the Apostle’s letters.
Where is there a single word to suggest that the Apostle abandoned the
conception of the judgment and that of predestination to life or to
damnation? Where does he ever speak of universal blessedness? Where
does he hint at the possibility that mankind as a whole is to be
converted to belief in Christ between the parousia and the delivery of
all authority into the hands of God, and will thereupon receive the
Spirit? What grounds are there for supposing that he gives up the idea
of the parousia as superfluous? In his zeal to discover antinomies and
trace developments, Teichmann forgets to take account of the most
elementary facts. He asserts, for instance, that in I Thessalonians
those who arise from the dead enter the kingdom of God in their
earthly bodies. But from the Jewish Apocalyptic and from the teaching
of Jesus it clearly appears that the resurrection included within
itself a transformation of this creaturely corporeity into a glorified
corporeity. It would not do for Teichmann to remember this. He is
bound, even where he represents the Apostle as still wholly under the
sway of Jewish conceptions, to bring him into an inconceivable
opposition to these in order that the transformation which is taught
in I Corinthians xv.—entirely in accordance with Jewish
eschatology—may be represented as derived from the Greek doctrine of
the Spirit.

Without intending it, he thus supplies the most brilliant refutation
of the theory of the Hellenisation of the Pauline eschatology. He
engaged battle on ground on which Pfleiderer and his school had
incautiously ventured forth in the heat of action, and he has to find
by experience that he is unable to make good a single position. A
Hellenisation of the eschatology is quite impossible to prove. Kabisch
turns out to have been right. The [pg 077] Apostle holds on this point
too vigorous and too clear a language.

But if that be so, the theory that the doctrine of flesh and spirit is
Greek is itself most seriously imperilled. Teichmann felt, and therein
he was more logical and consistent than the rest, that if there were
any Hellenistic ideas in Paulinism they must necessarily have attacked
and displaced the Jewish eschatology. Pfleiderer’s view that the two
could have subsisted side by side without—except in the case of 2
Corinthians v. I ff.—influencing and interpenetrating one another is
an untenable theoretical hypothesis. From the whole range of the
history of thought no analogy could be produced for this harmonious
coexistence of two different worlds of thought.

A further difficulty of the theory of the Hellenisation of Paulinism
arises from the fact that the Apostle’s views have to be more and more
spiritualised in proportion as the Greek element is emphasised.
Lüdemann, overpowered by the impression of the documents, had
expressly characterised the doctrine of redemption which is bound up
with the dualism of flesh and spirit as not ethical but physical.
Holsten and Pfleiderer do not venture to follow him in that. The
Platonism which they seek to discover in Paulinism cannot be brought
into connexion with a physical doctrine of redemption, but is thought
of as the antithesis of the “crude Jewish ideas.” The whole of the
mystical teaching about dying and rising again with Christ, about the
new creature and the influence of the Spirit, has therefore to be
spiritualised.

This brings them into conflict with the natural, literal meaning of
the Apostle’s statements, in which the materialistic character of his
conceptions maintains itself against all the arts of exegesis. The
interpretation given by Pfleiderer and his school deprives them of
their original meaning to an even greater extent than the modern
interpretation in general does.

Most unfortunately for those who seek to spiritualise Paul, his
doctrine of the Spirit in particular shows no [pg 078] trace of Greek
influence. As though from an apprehension that they might be deprived
of one of their most indispensable illusions, for thirty years after
Baur the students of Paulinism had neglected to deal with this
subject. At last in the year 1888 Gunkel undertook the task._(_64_)_
He investigates the influence of the Holy Spirit as conceived by the
popular view of the Apostolic age, and according to the doctrine of
the Apostle, and is obliged to come to the conclusion that a Greek
element in the latter is not to be assumed.

The Apostle, according to Gunkel’s exposition, takes over the
primitive Christian view and accepts it in all points. His own
doctrine merely represents an elevation, a development of what he
found already present. He introduces—I Cor. xii.-xiv.—an ethical
judgment and valuation of spiritual gifts, which was new to the
Christian community. While the latter had regarded “speaking with
tongues” as the highest manifestation of supernatural power, he puts
all the _charismata_ on a lower footing than love. He gives a further
development to the primitive Christian doctrine by attributing to the
influence of the Spirit a large number of the characteristics of the
Christian life which were not so regarded by the primitive community.
Love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, kindness, faithfulness,
meekness, chastity are, according to Gal. v. 22, fruits of His power.
He generalises, therefore, in such a way that all Christian willing,
feeling, knowledge, hope, and action proceed from the _pneuma_, which
for the common view was only thought of in connexion with revelations
and miracles.

[pg 079]

There is a further point in which, according to Gunkel, Paul raises to
a higher level the view which he took over. By the possession of the
Spirit the primitive Church was made certain that the end of the
present age was at hand and the new age was about to dawn. For the
Apostle the temporal relation becomes an inner one. The Spirit is for
him the earnest of the coming kingdom of God. Already in the present
he calls into being the future life in believers and gives them the
certainty, and to some extent even the reality, of the life which is
about to dawn for them.

The Pauline doctrine of the Spirit is therefore simply a development
of the primitive Christian doctrine. That it was so long regarded as
Greek is due, according to Gunkel, to the fact that scholars never
examined it as a whole, but always confined themselves to the
discussion of the dualism of spirit and flesh. This prevents the
relation of the doctrine to the views of the primitive community, and
especially its relation to the doctrine of the future age, from
becoming apparent.

One very weighty theoretic objection to the admission of Greek
elements in Paulinism is passed over by its defenders in complete
silence. If the thoughts developed by the Apostle of the Gentiles had
grown up upon the soil of Hellenism, the original apostles and those
closely associated with them would certainly have been aware of this
and attacked them on that ground. From the records, however, as we
have them in the letters, it appears certain that they only reproached
him with his attitude towards the law, and found no other point to
object to in his teaching. The primitive Christian community at
Jerusalem accused him of keeping back something from his churches; it
did not discover anything new and essentially foreign in his thought.
In spite of the keenness of the struggle, it was never made a charge
against him that he had “heathenised” the Gospel. That shows how
completely out of the question the assumption of Greek influences was
for his [pg 080] opponents. But the fact that his contemporaries
discovered nothing of the kind in him forms a strong presumption
against any such theory when brought forward in later times.

The objection which arises from the side of the history of dogma tends
to the same result. Those who hold the theory of Greek elements in
Paul must, if they are to be consistent, assert that he pioneered a
path for the Gospel into the Hellenic world and prepared the way for
the early Greek theology. And they do so most emphatically. Pfleiderer
explains_(_65_)_ that the Greek Church-theology arose by the expulsion
from Paulinism of its specifically Jewish elements, and by the free
development of its “universally intelligible Hellenistic side.” The
noble Platonic idealism had a place in the doctrinal system of the
Apostle of the Gentiles, “and conferred on it its capacity to win the
Graeco-Roman world for Christianity.” “The understanding of Paulinism
is therefore a fundamental condition for the understanding of the
Early Church.” And all the adherents of the theory, whatever their
precise shade of opinion, express themselves to the same effect.

But the history of dogma holds a different language. It has to record
the fact, inconceivable as it may appear, that on the generations in
which Greek dogma was taking shape Paul exercised no influence
whatever. Even the external literary influence is very slight. If one
sets aside the Epistles to the Ephesians and Colossians it is not even
possible to speak of a deutero-Pauline literature. The Pastoral
Epistles and the second letter to the Thessalonians profess to be
written by the Apostle, but contain not a single thought which is
characteristic of his teaching. In the Epistle to the Hebrews, in 1
Clement, in the Epistle of Barnabas, in the writings of Ignatius, in
the works of Justin, expressions occur which show acquaintance with
the Epistles of Paul, and may have [pg 081] been influenced by him in
respect to their wording; but beyond that they show no trace of his
conceptions or his spirit.

The remarkable point, therefore, is that the post-Apostolic writers,
though they are acquainted with the works of the Apostle of the
Gentiles, make no real use of them. His ideas remain foreign,
lifeless, so far as they are concerned.

That is also shown by the fact that early Greek Church-theology is
quite independent of him. It is concerned with the incarnation and
resurrection of Christ and with regeneration; Paul’s speculations deal
with the death and resurrection of the Lord, and he never speaks of
regeneration. The underlying logic is in the two cases so different
that the representatives of Greek theology, even if they wished to do
so, could not appeal to the Apostle. No community of thought between
him and Justin is to be discovered.

Even Baur had to learn how little Greek theology attached itself to
Paul,_(_66_)_ although he wished to derive it from a compromise
between the Pauline and the Petrine Gospel. So long as he is carrying
out his theory on the lines of the history of the Church and its
literature, the mistake does not become so apparent, because the
universalism and freedom from the law which gradually establish
themselves are set down as Graeco-Pauline. In treating the history of
dogma, however, where he is dealing exclusively with the development
of the Greek conception of the Person of Christ and of the redemption
effected through Him, he can, as a matter of fact, make nothing of
Paul. He hardly mentions him.

What Baur was unwilling to acknowledge to himself, Harnack has
irrefutably proved._(_67_)_ According to his [pg 082] showing there is
no bridge leading from the Pauline Gospel to the doctrine of the Early
Greek Church. The “history of dogma,” strange as it may appear, only
begins after Paul. The forces which are there at work have not been
set in motion by him.

The same result is arrived at by Edwin Hatch in his work on Hellenism
and Christianity._(_68_)_ A trained philological scholar possessing
great knowledge of and insight into the late Greek and early Christian
literatures, he endeavours to describe in detail the process by which
Christianity became Hellenised. In doing so he does not find it
necessary to deal with Paul. For the points of contact which he finds
to exist between the two worlds no examples are to be discovered in
the letters of the Apostle of the Gentiles. Hatch’s observations lead
him to make the process of Hellenisation only begin with the second
century.

The history of dogma cannot, therefore, accept the suggestion that
Paul recast the Gospel in the moulds of Greek thought. The process
began later, and of its own motion. It did not derive its impulse from
a single great personality, but began gradually and on all sides. It
was the Greek popular mind as represented by the members of the
Gentile churches which Hellenised the Gospel for itself. Men like
Ignatius and Justin bring this work to a provisional completeness by
combining the current ideas into a primitive but in its own fashion
impressively clear and living system, and creating a connexion between
Christology, the conception of redemption and the doctrine of the
sacraments; the [pg 083] Fourth Evangelist carries this system of
doctrine back into the preaching of the historic Jesus. These men
received no kind of impulse from Paul. Of the work which he did they
make no use. They know it, but it seems as if it were impossible for
them to use it.

The recognition of the true state of the case begins when one gets rid
of the seemingly so natural but in reality unjustified assumption that
the universalism_(_69_)_ and freedom from the law for which Paul
fought his battles, imply a Hellenisation of Christianity and form the
Greek element in his doctrine.

Ritschl and Harnack, in opposing this assumption of Baur and his
successors, went to the other extreme. They maintained that
universalism and freedom from the law were purely practical and
separable views, which had, properly speaking, nothing to do with the
fundamental ideas of the doctrine of redemption. In this way they
succeeded, no doubt, in liberating the history of dogma from the
prejudices of the Tübingen school; but they did less justice to the
Apostle’s statements than those whom they were attacking, since on
every page of his writings he implies an actual connexion between his
doctrines and the practical views which he is defending. It is to be
noted that Ritschl and Harnack never clearly explain why Paul holds a
different view on these points from that of the primitive community.

Truth here appears as the synthesis of a thesis and antithesis.
Universalism and freedom from the law do in fact belong to the history
of dogma, but not in the way Baur thought. And they are in themselves
practical views, but at the same time they claim to be logically
derived from the system of doctrine. The presuppositions on which they
are based have nothing to do with Greek thought; it was purely by
systematically thinking out to its conclusions the primitive Christian
doctrine that Paul was led to his theories of the universal [pg 084]
destination of the Gospel and of emancipation from the law.

These are the facts as they lie clearly before us in the letters. But
to register them is not to explain them. How, exactly, do these
conclusions result from the logic of the primitive Christian belief as
rightly worked out in the Apostle’s mind? That is the form which the
question takes as the next stage, after Baur, Ritschl, and Harnack.

The negative result that the Pauline attitude in regard to these
points is not Greek is in any case established. And so too is the
other result that the creators of Greek dogma did not take him as
their starting-point, and cannot therefore have discovered anything
Hellenic in him. They had no consciousness that he had already
quarried and shaped the material which they needed for their edifice.

But if they did not recognise in him one who had made a beginning in
their direction, it is more than questionable whether modern
historical criticism is right in professing to find Greek elements in
him. If so, it must be supposed to have a better instinct for what is
Hellenic than the men who Hellenised Christianity.

In any case it has no right to talk at large about the significance of
Paulinism for Greek Christianity, as though the history of dogma was
not there to prove the contrary.

How do the Debit and Credit of the theory stand at this point? For the
credit side, it claims that the dualism of flesh and spirit is of
Greek origin, but it does not get beyond the general assertion. No
serious attempt has been made to demonstrate the existence of Greek
conceptions in the particular aspects of the doctrine, and to explain
the pessimism, the desire for death, and the ethical teaching of the
Apostle as derived from the non-Jewish world of thought. That the
Pauline universalism and doctrine of freedom from the law are directly
inspired by the Greek spirit it no longer has the right to assert.

[pg 085]

In a single instance its defenders venture to point to the influence
of Greek religious thought on the Apostle’s views. They seek to show
that his Jewish, eschatological conception of the future life and his
view of the events of the End were in time entirely transformed by it,
if not actually cancelled. But the attempt to prove this from the
documents has not been successful.

Meanwhile the following difficulties appear. The theory is obliged to
assume a dualism between Jewish and Greek elements in Paul, and to
assert that on the one hand he never allowed the two systems of
thought to coalesce, while on the other he never became conscious of
their disparity; it has to attribute to him a capacity for combining
contradictions, which allows him to maintain alongside of one another
a spiritualistic doctrine of immortality and a crudely materialistic
notion of resurrection without becoming aware of their
incompatibility; it is logically forced to the conclusion that he set
aside the Jewish eschatology, with its conceptions of judgment and
condemnation, in favour of a doctrine of universal blessedness,
whereas there is in the Epistles not a single hint pointing in this
direction; it is forced, in order to make his statements appear
“Platonic,” so to spiritualise them that the natural sense of the
words disappears; it must ignore the proved fact that his doctrine of
the spirit, when taken in its full compass and not confined to the
antithesis of spirit and flesh, is most naturally explained as a mere
development of the primitive Christian view; it must meet the
objection—which it never can do—that the original apostles never
discovered anything of an essentially foreign, Greek character in
Paul’s views; it must, when confronted with the history of dogma, bend
itself with what grace it may to the admission that Paulinism
exercised no influence upon the formation of early Greek theology, and
cannot therefore have been felt by the men who were concerned in that
process as itself representing a first stage in the Hellenisation of
Christianity.

[pg 086]

The theory therefore explains nothing, but creates difficulty upon
difficulty.

In view of this relation of its assets to its liabilities it would
have no alternative but to declare itself bankrupt, had it not
astutely refrained from keeping any accounts.

And so far we have considered the mere for and against. Even if the
balance had here inclined in favour of the theory, that would not have
proved anything. The ideas in question ought not to be considered as
Greek until it had been shown that they actually were so. But this
would require it to be shown that exactly corresponding ideas were to
be found in the preceding or contemporary Greek literature, and that
Paul betrayed some kind of acquaintance with this literature. The
possibility that it was a mere case of analogy would have to be
systematically excluded, so far as that is possible.

But such a method of proof has never been seriously contemplated by
the adherents of the theory. In going through their works one is
astonished to see how lightly they have treated their task. They have
never properly collected the material; it is much if here and there a
point is thoroughly considered.

The assumption of Greek elements in Paulinism appeared something so
self-evident, and indeed, if one desired to arrive at any
understanding of him, so necessary, that from the first it came
forward with an assurance which secured credit for it everywhere
without its needing to produce adequate guarantees.

When Lüdemann in the year 1872 worked out clearly the dualism of flesh
and spirit, he added, as a thing to be taken for granted, that it was
Greek in character. His successors show a similar absence of
misgiving.

In order to bring the question once for all to an issue, let us gather
up and put to the test, along with the poor fragments of attempted
proof, every consideration that can be cited in favour of the
assumption of Greek elements in Paulinism.

The Apostle was born and grew up in Tarsus, the [pg 087] “Athens of
Asia Minor” as Ernest Curtius has called it._(_70_)_ In his native
city, as Heinrici expresses himself, “rhetoric and Stoic philosophy
were to be met with in the market-place.”_(_71_)_

No limits are set to the estimate of what the child of the Diaspora
may have absorbed, retained, and laid up in his mind from the
intellectual life by which he was surrounded.

But just as large a place might be claimed for the contrary argument,
which would lay stress upon the exclusiveness of strictly Jewish
circles of the Diaspora in regard to the Greek culture by which they
were surrounded.

Neither argument proves anything. A thousand possibilities on the one
side do not produce a certainty any more than on the other.

The greater probability, however, is on the side of the assumption of
exclusiveness. Although he lived in the middle of Hellenism, it is
possible that Paul absorbed no more of it than a Catholic parish
priest of the twentieth century does of the critical theology, and
knew no more about it than an Evangelical pastor knows of theosophy.

The decision lies solely with his works.

The case is similar as regards the argument from his language. It is
inconceivable, so writers like Heinrici and Curtius urge, that a
language like Greek could be familiar to a man like Paul without
causing a flood of ancient conceptions and ideas to stream in upon
him. Heinrici, indeed, is prepared to decide the question on this
ground alone, and concludes his exposition of the Corinthian Epistles
with a close analysis of their vocabulary. This shows, he thinks, that
Greek concepts and expressions far outweigh in number and importance
the “specifically Christian” and those which show the influence of the
Old Testament or the language of the synagogue. [pg 088] But in
opposition to this, Schmiedel,_(_72_)_ a not less thorough
commentator, expresses himself as follows: “We must be on our guard
against concluding too hastily from the predominantly Hellenistic
character of Paul’s language to a Hellenistic mode of thought. With a
language of which one learns colloquially the current use, one does
not by any means necessarily assimilate all the thought-forms of which
it contains, so to speak, the geological record.”

Here too, therefore, one argument is balanced by another.

A fact which seems to carry us a little further is the Apostle’s
exclusive use of the Greek version of the Old Testament. In a detailed
study, of the year 1869, Kautzsch_(_73_)_ showed that out of
eighty-four quotations which occur in the Epistles thirty-four agree
exactly with the Septuagint, thirty-six show small deviations, and ten
depart from it more widely. Two others show a considerable difference,
without, however, throwing doubt upon the author’s acquaintance with
the wording of the ordinary translation; two others, again, from Job,
differ from it entirely.

This investigation was carried further by Hans Vollmer_(_74_)_ and
brought to a provisional conclusion. According to him the deviations
are to be explained by the fact that Paul did not use a single
complete recension of the LXX, but had recourse to different editions
for different books. In Job he had before him a version which shows
affinity with the later Jewish translations. To explain the remaining
peculiarities Vollmer brings forward a hypothesis. He is inclined to
assume that the Apostle used Greek Scriptural anthologies in which [pg
089] separate passages were collocated, or freely combined with one
another. In such collections—their existence is not
demonstrable—various versions were, he thinks, used promiscuously.
Perhaps the passage quoted as Scripture in I Corinthians ii. 9, which
is not traceable in the Old Testament,—“As it is written, what eye
hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart
of man, hath God prepared for them that love Him”—may be derived from
an anthology of this kind.

It is in any case certain that the Apostle always makes use of Greek
translations; and it is further certain that he argues from
peculiarities in their wording which for one who knew Hebrew, as he
also certainly did, must have been recognisable as mistranslations. He
therefore goes so far as to ignore the original.

Nevertheless these facts do not warrant us in drawing conclusions of a
too far-reaching character. If he wrote in Greek at all he could not
do otherwise than use the Greek translations which were familiar to
him, and in the synagogues of the Diaspora were regarded as
“authentic,” as the Vulgate is for the Latin Church according to the
decrees of the Council of Trent. That being so, it was out of the
question for him, in making quotations, to introduce renderings of his
own from the original.

In all historical cases of theological bilingualism the same fact is
to be observed. Scripture is never “personally” translated, but always
cited in accordance with a recognised version._(_75_)_

That Paul should turn to account the mistakes of the version need not,
in view of his exegetical principles, cause us any surprise. Whether
he forces his thought [pg 090] directly upon the original, or gets it
expressed by the Greek version, comes to much the same thing. The fact
that he adopts the errors of the LXX and finds his account in them
does not make him a Greek. It only shows that he belongs to the Jewish
Diaspora. But does this imply that he has his place in the
Jewish-Hellenistic movement?

This assumption is often taken as so self-evident that any examination
of it appears superfluous. The defenders of the theory of Greek
influence in Paul, therefore, feel themselves dispensed from this duty
and act accordingly.

Even those who, like Harnack, do not admit a more far-reaching direct
influence of Greek ideas upon the Apostle, do not feel any doubt about
his relations with Jewish Hellenism.

But the sceptics of the self-evident, with whom science can never
dispense, must dare to be tactless enough to put the question here
also, “What is really proved?” As we have to do with a characteristic
literature which lies before us with some measure of completeness, the
verdict cannot be difficult to arrive at.

Pfleiderer and his followers had all along asserted that Paul in his
eschatology and anthropology showed dependence on the Wisdom of
Solomon, which doubtless dates from the first century before Christ.
Others denied this. In an essay which appeared in 1892, Grafe sought
to sift the material and decide the question._(_76_)_

As “crucial” instances for the relationship he thinks the following
may safely be taken: Romans ix. shows affinity with Wisdom xii. and
xv. in regard to what is said of the Divine omnipotence and mercy; in
their references to heathen idolatry the two authors coincide in a
remarkable way; the views regarding the relationship of body and soul
which are implied in 2 Cor. v. I ff. find a parallel in Wisd. ix. 15,
where there is a reference to [pg 091] the earthly tabernacle which
weighs down the thinking soul. The facts do not, according to Grafe,
justify the conclusion that Paul is dependent on the pseudo-Salamonian
Book of Wisdom, but he does regard it as having been made highly
probable that the Apostle knew and had read the book.

It is not a clear “yes” that one hears in Grafe’s essay. When it is
quoted, however, by writers on Paulinism it gets a push towards the
positive side which makes it say exactly what Grafe did not venture to
assert.

Scarcely more productive is Vollmer’s cast of his net into the works
of Philo._(_77_)_ He thinks that, in view of the affinities pointed
out by him, “the acquaintance of the Apostle with the works of the
Alexandrian writer will have become less improbable to others besides
himself.”

But that is not the point at all. That Paul, a scholar of the
Diaspora, would have been aware of the existence of so important a
work as the Wisdom of Solomon, and would not have been wholly ignorant
of its contents, is really self-evident. And is it likely that none of
the writings of his older Alexandrian contemporary—Philo died probably
about the beginning of the forties—would have come to his knowledge?
On the contrary, the most probable assumption is that he was
acquainted with the whole of the earlier and later Hellenistic
literature. Whether this can be more or less clearly proved by certain
real or supposed parallels does not really matter.

The important point is that he does not use the ideas which are here
offered to him. Jewish-Hellenistic theology is so characteristic a
product that it can never [pg 092] be overlooked even where it is only
a subsidiary element. But in Paul no trace of it can be shown. Its
problems, its speculations regarding the Logos, Spirit, and Wisdom,
its ethics, do not interest him; he makes no use of its theories. On
the other hand he is concerned with eschatology and with the person of
the Messiah, which for it seem to have no existence.

The characteristic mark of Jewish Hellenism is that it brings the
different ideas into an external juxtaposition without effecting their
interpenetration. Whether it is a question of philosophical or other
writings, of problems of ethics, or of the doctrine of God and the
Divine administration of the world, the Greek element always shows up
plainly in contrast with the Jewish, and can be clearly recognised as
Platonic or Stoic. It is a case of mosaic work, better or worse
executed as the case may be.

Any one who proposes to show that Paul was influenced by Jewish
Hellenism ought, therefore, to begin by recognising that the union of
the two worlds of thought which is supposed to have taken place in him
is of an entirely different order from that found in other cases,
inasmuch as a real synthesis is effected, and the problems involved
are such as do not elsewhere occupy Jewish Hellenism, while on the
other hand those which interest it are here left out of account. How
much is left then by way of a common element?

Paul’s attitude towards Jewish Hellenism is one of indifference. From
his letters, written as they are in Greek, we should never learn that
in his time there existed a literature in which the old Jewish
theology, using the universal language of the period, entered into
discussion with Greek philosophy and religious thought, and formed an
external combination with them.

All the proofs which are offered of his acquaintance with this
literature only serve to render more unintelligible the fact that he
is not in the slightest degree influenced by it.

The phrase-making by which theologians of the [pg 093] post-Baur
period disposed of Paul’s independence in regard to Jewish
Hellenism—so far as they became aware of it—is quite inept. Heinrici,
as we have seen, maintained that he had risen superior to
Alexandrianism.

It is to be remarked that the theoretic question whether he was never
influenced by this movement, or whether the influence only ceased when
he became a Christian, must remain open. In the latter case he must
have put off along with what was specifically Jewish also what was
Jewish-Hellenistic. It would then belong to the things which,
according to Philippians, were formerly gain to him, but which now he
counted dross, and had cast aside in order to gain Christ.

This latter view is inherently possible if one is prepared to take
literally what the Apostle says about that radical breach with the
past to which we can apply no standard of measurement, and which we
are unable to conceive. But the other alternative—that he had never
been influenced by it—is the more probable.

Practically both come to much the same thing. We know only the
Christian Paul, and we find it to be a fact that in his letters no
specifically Jewish-Hellenistic conceptions are to be found.

The “self-evident” is therefore once more negated by the facts.

We may call attention to a curious parallel. _A priori_ the assumption
might appear justified that the Apostle of the Gentiles would have
taken from Jewish Hellenism material wherewith to Hellenise
Christianity. In reality he did not do so. _A priori_ it was to be
expected that the creators of Greek theology would have taken from
Paulinism material for the construction of their doctrines. In reality
they did not do so. The three points which it seemed would allow
themselves to be joined to form a triangle, lie, in reality, in
different planes, belong to different systems, and have no natural
relation to one another.

If Paul stands solitary, without receiving or exercising [pg 094]
influence, between these two factors in which Greek characteristics
are manifest, it follows that he does not exhibit their common
element. If he did not adopt Platonism and Stoicism in the convenient
compound which Jewish Hellenism had mixed ready for him, it is
antecedently little probable that he made use of the uncompounded
substances in the form in which they are to be met with in Greek life
and literature.

What are the possibilities of direct influences which have to be taken
into account?

It is to be remarked that Paul never gives the slightest hint that he
is making use of something which is familiar to and valued by the
Greeks in his churches. The Acts of the Apostles indeed pictures him
as a preacher who in the Areopagus at Athens takes as his
starting-point an inscription upon an altar, and quotes from the Greek
poet Aratus the pantheistic saying that men are of the Divine race
(Acts xvii. 28). But for this Paul, the author of Acts, must take, all
responsibility._(_78_)_

The Apostle of the Gentiles who is made known to us by the Epistles
wears a different aspect. In this sense he never became a Greek to the
Greeks. We find in him no trace of any high estimation of heathenism
and its thought. It is for him idolatry, nothing less nor more. His
estimate is purely negative.

He can therefore hardly have intentionally taken over anything from
Greek thought. It is possible, however, that he did so unconsciously.

The most obvious suggestion is to assume that this was the case in
regard to ethics. What he says in Rom. ii. about conscience, which in
the heathen takes the place of the law, might be based on ideas
derived from Greek rationalism. But on close examination what we find
here is not so much a positive valuation of natural ethical feeling,
but rather the creation for dialectic purposes of something to serve
as an analogue to the law. Paul’s [pg 095] purpose is to prove that
Jew and Greek are alike delivered over to sin; consequently the
position in the two cases, if an injustice on the part of God is not
to be suggested, must be made as similar as possible.

The assumption of Greek ideas here is rendered improbable by the fact
that Paul’s ethic as a whole is not to be explained as Hellenic.
Neither Gass nor Ziegler in their works on the history of Christian
ethics have ventured any attempt in this direction._(_79_)_ In general
the Pauline ethic has been little treated by the students of Paulinism
of the post-Baur period. The only monograph dedicated to the subject
took a form that was purely biblico-theological and without
interest._(_80_)_ It is interesting to note that Kabisch, when he
planned to work up the ethical material, found it necessary first to
deal with the eschatology. That does not suggest the presence of
Hellenic influences.

It has also been maintained with a certain confidence that the
pessimism of the Apostle is Greek, because it recalls the view of the
world which we find in the writings of Seneca and Epictetus.

Seneca was his contemporary. That the Apostle knew the works of this
writer is not held by any one to be proved._(_81_)_ Epictetus worked
at the end of the first century, [pg 096] was himself acquainted with
Christianity, and was doubtless influenced by it, even if
unconsciously._(_82_)_

All that could come into question, even as a possibility, is that the
Apostle might have adopted the same generally current ideas of his
period which are expressed by these two writers.

The expressions which are quoted as parallel have only an external
resemblance. They are not really analogous. The roots from which the
pessimism springs are entirely different in the two cases.

In the philosophers it is purely a result of reflection on the
conditions of the present life. Existence appears to Seneca a burden
which one may at any time cast off—by suicide. For Paul the present
world is evil because it is sinful, lies under the dominion of the
angel powers, and is subject to corruption. He judges it, not in
itself, but with reference to a new and perfect world which is soon to
appear. The idea of suicide does not enter into his thoughts, indeed
he dreads that he might be released from the present earthly existence
before the parousia occurs.

Seneca’s religion is resignation, Paul’s is enthusiasm. The two may
show verbal similarities, but no affinity of thought exists between
them.

Further, the anthropology and psychology_(_83_)_ of the Apostle are
claimed as Greek. Pfleiderer lays great stress upon this point. He
does not, however, offer any proofs.

What Paul has to say about man rests in the first place [pg 097] on
ordinary observation and is of a self-evident character. The special
features of his view which go beyond this are to be explained from
eschatology and not from Greek thought. Anthropology and psychology,
in the development which he gives them, have reference not to the
natural man but to the redeemed man, who is risen with Christ, endowed
with the Spirit, and already living in a supernatural condition. His
conception of the natural condition of man is determined by reference
to its actual abolition, and therefore has quite a different
orientation from that of the Greek thinkers.

How do matters stand in regard to the assertion that his system
contains Platonic elements?

What comes into question is not Platonism proper, but the religious
modification and popularisation of it which later on, in the third
century, came to completion in Neo-Platonism. What this philosophy has
in common with Paul is the general desire for deliverance from
corporeity. When it is more closely considered, however,
characteristic differences appear.

Platonism as a religion has to do with the deliverance of the soul
from its imprisonment in the body, Paul looks for the deliverance of
the whole human personality. In the one case the antithesis is between
soul and body, in the other between the supernatural body and the
corruptible flesh. Platonic religious feeling desires release from all
corporeity, what Paul hopes for is a different kind of materiality. He
believes in a resurrection, Platonism in mere immortality. For him the
fate of the individual is so bound up with cosmical, eschatological
events that the new state of existence can only result from a cosmical
revolution. Platonism knows nothing of a temporally conditioned
redemption of this kind, but represents it as coming to pass
immediately after death.

The materialism which is implicate in eschatology thus opposes a
barrier to the Platonising of Paul’s religious thought.

For his conception of spirit a parallel might be sought [pg 098] in
Stoicism, which teaches that a spiritual substance proceeding from God
permeates the universe, including corporeal organisms, and manifests
itself in man as the rational soul. Common to this philosophy and to
Paul is the material conception of spirit. But the differences which
it exhibits are of such a kind that there can be no question of the
Apostle’s dependence upon it. In the Stoic philosophy the spirit is
identical with the rational soul; in Paul it is introduced as
something new alongside of the latter, and ends by displacing it.

According to the philosophic conception it is active in the world from
all eternity; according to the doctrine of the Apostle it first
appears in the times of the End, and is only bestowed upon a limited
section of mankind. The one view is a pantheistic monism, the other is
a theistic dualism.

The Book of Wisdom and Philo are Stoic in their mode of thought, but
Paul is not so.

It is inconceivable how the Stoic _heimarmene_ can have been brought
into connexion with the Pauline doctrine of predestination.

The philosophic conception of fate thinks of the world-process as an
unbroken chain of cause and effect in which also the actions of living
beings have their place. Pauline foreordination is a pure will-act of
God, non-rational and non-moral, and has to do with the ultimate
issues of existence, not with the vicissitudes of life. To see a
connexion between the two doctrines of predestination is as
unjustifiable as it would be to identify the cosmic conflagration of
the Pauline eschatology with that of the Stoic theory.

Paulinism has, in general, a different spirit from that of the Stoa.
Its author is moved by the fear of death and corruption and yearns for
a new being. To the Stoic such ideas are, as “passion,” contemptible.
He reckons—as you may read in Marcus Aurelius—with the present world
as the only one there is, and with the present life as the only one
which he has to live.

[pg 099]

Whatever views and conceptions are brought up for comparison, the
result is always the same—that Paulinism and Greek thought have
nothing, absolutely nothing, in common. Their relation is not even one
of indifference, they stand opposed to one another. Had the Apostle
been influenced by Hellenism in any shape or form, he could never have
conceived his system in the way he did.

Nevertheless it is possible to understand how theology came to class
his doctrine as Greek. The mysticism which enters into it bears a
certain analogy to that which springs from Greek religious thought and
feeling. Since Judaism, itself guileless of any mysticism, produced
nothing of the kind, could not create out of itself anything of the
kind, the only possible alternative seemed to be to explain it as due
to Greek influences, and to explain the essential character of
Paulinism in accordance with this hypothesis.

But this road leads to an impasse. In this way it is possible only to
misinterpret the mysticism of the Apostle, not to understand it.
Critical theology is confronted with the at first apparently
inexplicable fact that there has arisen on Jewish-Christian soil a
system of thought which externally has all the air of being a twin
formation to that of Greek religious mysticism, but inwardly has
nothing whatever to do with it.

The actual result of the study of Paulinism in the post-Baur period is
therefore wholly negative, and it must become evident that it is so
the moment any one attempts to substitute references and proofs for
mere assertions. This the scholars of that period avoided doing; they
were prevented from making the attempt by the scientific instinct of
self-preservation.




[pg 100]

IV


H. J. HOLTZMANN


_Heinrich Julius Holtzmann._ Lehrbuch der Neutestamentlichen
Theologie. 1897. Vol. ii., 532 pp. On Paulinism, 1-225.

_William Wrede._ Über Aufgabe und Methode der sogenannten
Neutestamentlichen Theologie. (1897.) (On the Task and the Method of
the so-called New Testament Theology.)


HOLTZMANN’S “New Testament Theology” was eagerly awaited on all sides.
It was hoped that it would bring about a clearing of ideas such as had
been produced in regard to questions of criticism by his
“Introduction.”

In the new work the author follows the method which seemed to him to
have proved its usefulness in the former work. He lets every writer
who has dealt with the subject have his say at the appropriate place,
even though he runs the risk of not making his own opinion distinctly
heard amid the strife of tongues._(_84_)_

While in the “Introduction” the advantages of the method predominate,
in the “Theology” its disadvantages are conspicuous. The former work
dealt with a series of questions which are already formulated and can
be answered with a clear yes or no. There is therefore some sense in
taking the suffrages of the writers, living and dead. It leads up to a
verdict which in a certain sense [pg 101] may be given forth as the
objective result of the period under survey.

But when it is a question of the content of thought in the New
Testament writings, the questions are not so clearly formulated. The
continual hearing of opinions has not the same usefulness. On the
contrary, the account of the subject becomes thereby only the more
complicated and confused.

Here the result of Holtzmann’s threading his own view through those of
others is that neither the one nor the other stands out with any
clearness. Undoubtedly, he knows the literature as no one else does,
and has absorbed into his own mind and worked up all that it has to
offer. But a clear view of the state of opinion is what he does not in
the end succeed in conveying, since he intentionally omits to give a
sketch and criticism of the works cited and contents himself with
quoting passages from them.

This unfortunate atomistic method does not even allow the individual
problems to appear as clearly as would be desirable. In the post-Baur
study of Paulinism, various questions had come up one after another
which, taken together, form its fundamental problem. The most natural
procedure for one who intended to make critical use of the work
already done would have been to sketch these in their full extent and
then formulate them more exactly and exhibit their inner connexions.

But that is not the kind of treatment which Holtzmann aims at. He has
the feeling that this is no longer necessary, and agrees with
contemporary scholars in thinking that assured results have been
attained in sufficient number to admit of a simple positive account of
the system. In accordance with this view he feels it to be his duty to
act as a critical camera, focussing the views on his lens and
combining them into a picture.

One looks, therefore, in vain in his work for a fundamental statement
and solution of the problems. They are mentioned where they happen to
come up, and are [pg 102] there discussed in a fragmentary fashion. In
addition to this the author’s peculiarly subtle and delicately shaded
method of exposition has to be reckoned with. Any one who is not
familiar with it runs the risk of passing too lightly over these
passages and failing to appreciate the significance which Holtzmann
himself attaches to his remarks. What he intends to give is a
General-staff map of the results of investigation. The heights and
hollows are not shown as such, but represented by curves which are
only later to be carried out in relief.

Holtzmann does not stand above the post-Baur study of the subject, but
within it.

That is immediately evident from the fact that, speaking generally, he
takes as the plan of his exposition the scheme, partially
“Reformation,” partially modern, which the head of the Tübingen school
had used in his theology and left as a legacy to his successors. After
dealing with the doctrine of man, law, sin, and corruption, he
describes the “revolution” (conversion). Then follow Christology, the
work of redemption, and the Divine righteousness. The close is formed
by the chapters on the “ethical” material, the “mystical,” and
“eschatology.”

The difficulties and errors which are involved in this division of the
subject have not been escaped by Holtzmann any more than by others. At
every step it is evident how unnatural is an arrangement of the
material which leaves out of account the connexions inherent in the
system. How much art is expended on breaking off the thread at a given
moment, in order to take it up again in a later chapter! How many
unnecessarily fragmentary representations! How many annoying
repetitions! How many references forward and backward! Thus, for
example, what Paul has to say of redemption is not developed
connectedly but split up among a number of chapters. And the same
thing happens with regard to the doctrine of the death and
resurrection of Christ.

The division which he has taken over leads Holtzmann [pg 103] to
regard the Pauline teaching on redemption from the stand-point of the
Reformation doctrine. Involuntarily he always thinks either of the
individual man, or humanity, instead of the entity always present to
the mind of the Apostle, the group of the elect of the last
generation, who have been subjected to the influence of the death and
resurrection of Christ. He quotes the acute remark of
Schmiedel_(_85_)_ that “the men who had sought (and found) in Jesus
before His death forgiveness and peace of soul” are left out of
account by the Apostle, but he does not go further into the problem
which this suggests. The temporally conditioned character and the
general point of view of the Pauline doctrine of redemption is, owing
to the faulty division, practically overlooked.

Not less unfortunate is the plan on which the significance of the
death and resurrection of Christ is dealt with. Having begun with the
psychology of the natural man, and the man in process of conversion,
Holtzmann endeavours to explain the facts by which redemption is
conditioned from this starting-point. He asks what these two events,
the death and resurrection, signified for Jesus and what they
signified for the believers. Jesus is thereby proved to be the
Messiah; the influence upon believers is described on the basis of the
classical passages in the Epistles. But the inner connexion of the two
effects is not clear, and it is equally unintelligible wherein the
saving significance of the death and resurrection consists.

Holtzmann is, in fact, still straitly confined to the Reformation and
modern point of view, from which the twofold event of the death and
resurrection of Christ is considered by itself, in isolation, and an
attempt is made to get behind it by psychologising, and thus to
discover how, according to the statements of Paul, it produced a
complete change in God and man, and effected justification and
reconciliation. This attempt overlooks the fact that on the Apostle’s
view it is primarily a cosmic [pg 104] event which alters the
condition of the whole creation and introduces a new Age, and that
everything else is only a consequence of this fundamental effect.

As Holtzmann, like his predecessors, has thus omitted to consider the
most fundamental aspect of redemption as conceived by Paul, he is not
concerned to trace out the most general conception of the effect of
the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. That is as much as to say
that he, like the rest, is condemned to a mere descriptive treatment,
using Pauline phraseology, and is practically unable to give any
explanation.

This unfortunate result becomes apparent in regard to the question of
the Law. He is unable to make it in any way intelligible how Paul was
necessarily led, as a matter of reasoning, to the conviction that it
was no longer valid. In the last resort he can only appeal to the
unique character of the vision on the Damascus road. He assumes that
this “brought to an issue in the zealous Pharisee not only a
theoretic, but also an ethical crisis, terminating that painful
condition of inner division which Paul pictures out of his own inmost
consciousness when he speaks of the experiences which are associated
with subjection to the law.” “Previously,” he continues, “the Pharisee
had anxiously sought to conceal from himself, or to argue away, the
fact that the law was impossible of fulfilment, and was therefore no
way of salvation, but rather the contrary. There now rose upon this
melancholy scene, strewn with the shattered fragments of attempts to
gain righteousness, a new light streaming from the Christ, whom the
legalists had delivered to death, whereas His being raised again by
God guaranteed the actual presence of another way of salvation. Not
only did his former legal service appear to him a life of sin, his
Pharisaic rabbinism as foolishness, his attack upon the Messianic
community as enmity to God, but even in his inmost being a crisis had
taken place in consequence of which a tension, under which he had
hitherto groaned, had suddenly been relaxed.”

[pg 105]

How do we know that Paul when he was still a persecutor of the
Christians was suffering inward distress from his experiences of the
powerlessness of the law? How did the vision of Christ bring about the
resolution of this tension? How, exactly, did it reveal a way of
salvation by which the abolition of the law was implied?

In themselves the vision of Christ, and the law, have nothing to do
with one another. What Paul received in that moment was the conviction
of the Messiahship of Jesus. While other believers were content simply
to adopt this conviction, he proceeds to draw from it in some way or
other the conclusion that the law was henceforth invalidated. Whether
he did that at the moment or only later, we do not know. What is
certain is only that he does draw this conclusion, though it is not
contemplated either in the thoughts of Jesus or in those of the
primitive community.

How he came to draw it is not explained by Holtzmann, any more than by
the scholars of the post-Baur period generally. The assumption that
the Apostle experienced along with the vision an ethical crisis which
set him free from the law, is a psychological hypothesis about which
the letters have nothing whatever to say. It does not even prove what
it professes to prove. Exactly how the abrogation of the law is
supposed to be effected by the death and resurrection of Christ is not
obvious. It is to be remarked, too, that Paul always treats the
abolition of the law as a logical conclusion, not as a psychological
experience.

In other connexions, too, Holtzmann often has recourse to Holsten’s
expedient of taking what is unintelligible in the Apostle’s statements
as accounted for by the Damascus vision.

In this way the doctrine of the “new creature” is made to go back to a
“personal experience,” and “a perception so keen as to be apprehended
by the senses, of the destruction of the law of sin in the members.”

“The complex of new ethical powers, motives, duties, [pg 106] and aims
. . . which formed itself in him has as its centre the risen Christ
who had appeared to him in that moment as light, to be henceforth the
vital centre and the guiding star of his individual life. . . . Hence
the ‘new creation.’ It is a simple generalisation and application of
this personal experience to cover all analogous cases, since now all
baptized persons appear as, on the negative side, dead to sin, on the
positive side as walking in a ‘newness of life’ corresponding to the
resurrection.”

So Holtzmann. Paul, however, never speaks of his theory of the new
creature as if he were expressing by it the generalisation and
objectivation of an inner experience, but represents it as being
logically and actually involved in the death and resurrection of the
Lord for those who believe in him, and regards his own renewal as only
a special case of the general law which operates in all the believing
elect.

That is just the characteristic and unintelligible thing about
Paulinism, that its creator does not seem to have the faintest
consciousness of holding up his personal experiences as something to
be imitated, but presents his whole system as something that
immediately and objectively grows out of the facts, something which
can be examined by the higher, but in its own way logical
understanding from which “gnosis” is derived.

To treat his Damascus “experience” as a source of theoretic knowledge,
as is done by modern theology, in order to be dispensed from rendering
any account to ordinary or philosophic thought, would have been out of
the question for an unsophisticated mind such as his, and indeed for
the mental attitude of antiquity in general.

Of Paul’s objective statements Holtzmann always, in order to be able
to interpret them, makes something subjective.

This error in method—which he shares with scholars of the post-Baur
period generally—runs through the whole of his undertaking.

He frequently takes occasion to point to the element of [pg 107]
“gnosis” in the Apostle’s doctrine. At bottom, however, he is afraid
that his doctrine may be too much considered as an intellectual
construction. For that reason he provides a special section on “the
religious character of the doctrine.” “Paul’s world of thought,” he
there tells us, “is, to put it in a word, not merely a product of
intellection, it is antecedently to that a product of experience also;
in this it differs fundamentally from any of the artificially
excogitated gospels of Gnosticism proper. . . . The first condition
for any understanding of Paulinism is that we should not obscure the
volcanic character of its origin by any method which implies the
gradual addition of one grain of sand to another. The whole system of
doctrine means nothing more nor less than the way in which the Apostle
objectified to himself the fundamental decisive experience of his life
and theoretically explained its presuppositions and consequences. The
doctrine fits the experience with a theory.”

How, then, does Holtzmann know that Paul is not after all a Gnostic
pure and simple? The whole character of his system makes him appear
so. He himself claims to be one,_(_86_)_ and is quite unaware that his
doctrine is nothing more than the form given by the constructive
imagination to a personal experience.

He knows no distinction between “gnostic” and “religious.” What is
religious is for him gnostic, and what is gnostic, religious. Any one
who strictly distinguishes the two in him is modernising.

His mission to the Gentiles and his universalism are also, according
to Holtzmann, to be explained directly from the vision at his
conversion. The Christ who has won through to triumph by way of death,
so Holtzmann explains, implies for the Apostle the purification of the
Messianic idea from all the carnal elements which in Judaism still
cling to it. In the exalted Christ he sees [pg 108] also the head of
the Church gathered out from both Jews and Gentiles.

How, exactly, does the vision at the conversion carry with it the
elimination of the carnal elements which in Judaism cleave to the
Messianic idea? Paul, it is true, sees a glorified Person; but the
Jewish Son-of-Man Messiah also belongs to the supernatural world.
Further, universalism is provided for in the eschatology of Late
Judaism, and in that preached by Jesus, since it is assumed that among
those elected to the Kingdom of God others will be revealed who do not
belong to the people of Israel. Universalism is therefore involved in
the Jewish conception of the Messiah. Whereas, however, Late Judaism
and Jesus only represent it as realised in the coming supernatural
Age, Paul antedates it and affirms that distinctions are already
abolished in consequence of the death and resurrection of Jesus, and
infers from this the justification and the duty of preaching to the
heathen. The problem has therefore nothing to do with the
“purification of the Messianic idea,” and consists simply in the fact
that the Apostle assumes this universalism to be already applicable to
the present natural era, just as he also asserts that believers are
already in a condition of resurrection life.

Holtzmann is not much concerned to show the connexion of the Pauline
statements with Jewish theology and eschatology in order to arrive in
this way at a new formulation of the problems. In fact he clearly
betrays the tendency to make as little use as possible of eschatology
in explaining the Pauline system of doctrine.

Kabisch’s work is in the highest degree distasteful to him. He refers
to it only occasionally, and with reserve. It is true he cannot avoid
acknowledging that, “with all the exaggerations, monstrosities, and
inconsistencies which may be pointed out” in its emphasising of the
physical character of the conceptions and ideas associated with the
dualism of flesh and spirit, the work embodies a sound idea. But he
never so much as mentions that this [pg 109] insistance on the
“physical” is ultimately due to the fact that all the conceptions and
ideas are traced back to eschatology. Any one who is not already
acquainted with Kabisch’s fundamental idea will not learn it from
Holtzmann.

True to the Baur and post-Baur tradition, Holtzmann postpones the
chapter on eschatology to the end. That this arrangement does not
contribute to a satisfactory treatment of the ethics is not
surprising. The eschatological roots of the conception of
predestination discussed in this chapter, or of the designation of
believers as “saints” are hardly visible. That the most general
ethical maxims of the Apostle are conditioned by the expectation of
the nearness of the parousia, and that the ethical implications of the
mystical dying and rising again with Christ have also in the last
resort an eschatological orientation, is never fairly recognised.
Holtzmann finds himself, therefore, rather helpless when he has to
deal with points in which the eschatological character of Paul’s ethic
comes most clearly to light. In the directions given in I Corinthians
vii. about married and unmarried persons, about marrying or remaining
single, he finds a certain “hesitation.” In a quite general way, he is
willing to assume that “the so closely bounded view of the future
explains why in this and other departments there was no complete
development of the ethics.”

This halting estimate of the ethical significance of eschatology shows
that Holtzmann regards the Pauline ethical teaching from the modern
point of view.

He is bound to take this course with regard to eschatology because he
agrees with Pfleiderer and the rest in admitting a comprehensive
influence of Greek ideas upon Paul, and is well aware that a man
cannot serve two masters.

Even in the Apostle’s doctrine of man he finds a Hellenistic factor
alongside of the Jewish, and asserts that the “emphasis rests on the
former.” Wherever reference is made to the antithesis of flesh and
spirit [pg 110] he thinks that the influence of the Greek element is
manifest. By regarding sin as implicate in the empirical nature of man
“Paul abandons in principle the ultimate basis of the Jewish
philosophy and ethic.”

Greek, or to speak more precisely, Alexandrian, is the metaphysical
background of his conception of Christ. According to Holtzmann, Paul
never really goes back expressly to Daniel or the Apocalyptic Messiah.
His own special view grew up, Holtzmann thinks, out of speculations
allied to those of Philo about the two accounts of the creation and
the heavenly and earthly Adam. The primary point for him is “the
metaphysical hypothesis of the two classes of mankind” which stand
opposed to each other as the “psychic” and the “pneumatic” creation.

That the “subjective,” ethical interpretation of the work of
redemption is based on Hellenistic ideas is for Holtzmann
self-evident. It is not less certain for him that the idea of
predestination is “borrowed” from the Book of Wisdom, and consequently
“in one of the most conspicuous points of the Pauline world of thought
its Hellenistic origin” must be regarded as proved. That the idea of
predestination is inherent in eschatology, and that Jesus Himself
makes use of it, is not taken into account.

The doctrine of baptism “comes to base itself entirely on the
Hellenistic side of Paul’s theology.” In general, he transformed the
two sacred ceremonies of primitive Christianity after the analogy of
the Greek mystery-cults, and thus “opened up for the early Catholic
Church a way” into which it was forced by the natural progress of
events.

Holtzmann sees in Paul’s system of thought the first, but at the same
time a far-reaching Hellenisation of Christianity. The Apostle, so
runs his verdict, “by bringing Hellenistic forms of thought to bear
for the first time upon Christian conceptions, prepared the way for
the passing over of the latter from the Semitic to the Hellenic world,
and beyond this again to the modern world.”

[pg 111]

The influx of Greek ideas is thought of, as by Pfleiderer, as coming
through the intermediary channel of Jewish Hellenism. The question
whether any literary relationship to the latter can be detected in
Paul is dismissed in a few lines. Holtzmann admits that “no tangible
influence” of Philo’s writings is to be recognised. He is, however, of
opinion that Grafe has proved “with all the greater certainty” the
Apostle’s dependence on the Alexandrian Book of Wisdom.

Instead of giving a regular proof he confines himself, as his
predecessors had done, entirely to general considerations, which he
sums up in the following sentences “In any case Paul was by birth and
parentage a son of the Diaspora, and from his youth up breathed at any
rate at times a Greek atmosphere. His letters show, in regard to
vocabulary and rhetoric, sometimes even as regards tone of feeling and
mental attitude, not a few surprising affinities with Greek thought.
Some kind of communication from this side, and that not merely
occasional or accidental, one must certainly assume. The only question
which remains is in regard to the extent and intensity of this
Hellenistic, or even it may be Hellenic, admixture, which became
amalgamated with his Jewish scholasticism. This is certainly the point
on which depend all the problems which Pauline study is called on at
the present day to face. . . .”

With this the matter is disposed of—on the third page of the work!
Gunkel’s and Kabisch’s arguments to show that the doctrine of the
Spirit is intelligible apart from Greek influences, are left out of
account; that Hatch in his “Influence of Greek Ideas” had nothing to
say about any Hellenisation of the Gospel on the part of Paul is not
mentioned. On the contrary there follows a profession of faith in
Pfleiderer’s doctrine that Paul in the course of his career even
advanced to the Hellenisation of his eschatology. Holtzmann cheerfully
and courageously defends this theory to its ultimate consequences, and
holds that in Paul’s dread of being found unclothed [pg 112] (2 Cor.
v. 3) his national mode of feeling and a Greek mode of thought “are
combined in a fashion which no one would have dreamed of inventing.”

The usually so cautious scholar goes in this case unhesitatingly
forward. The difficulties which arise out of the assumed collocation
and opposition of Jewish and Greek ideas fascinate instead of alarming
him.

Here, as in some other points, Holtzmann betrays Kantian tendencies
and instincts, and is inclined to exhibit the problems as antinomies.
Paul’s system of teaching, as it had shaped itself in the course of
the study of the subject since Baur, appears to him a unique
formation, since in it are combined two worlds of thought and two
different sets of religious ideas which are supposed to hold each
other in equipoise and mutually interpenetrate one another. He takes
it to be his task to lay bare this remarkable construction in its
minutest details, and to show how the most diverse thoughts sometimes
conflict, sometimes stand in a state of tension, sometimes mutually
limit, and sometimes supplement each other. If he succeeds in making
clear the position and relation of the various strata of thought, the
system, he believes, will become intelligible.

This idea runs through his whole treatment of the subject, and gives
him courage to take over all the contradictions and compromises which
scholars from Baur onwards have discovered, and even to add new ones
in addition. He is especially interested in the questions regarding
the juridical and ethical sets of ideas, the relation of the “popular”
missionary preaching to the “system of doctrine,” the antithesis
between “theory” and “practice” in the ethics, and the inconsistencies
of the eschatology.

In these discussions there is much penetrating observation. The
picture, however, does not become clearer, but rather more confused.

His predecessors had done their best in their treatment of the subject
to conceal its fragmentary character, and [pg 113] when all was said
and done had been content to put in the foreground only a few leading
ideas, which could be brought under a single point of view. They
worked with perspective, light and shade. Holtzmann brings all the
detail into one line and places it under the same illumination. The
fact that the system becomes in this way much more complicated than it
had already been made by the scholarship of the period awakes in him
no misgivings, but increases his confidence, since he sees in it one
of those offences which needs must come.

Even the objection that so complicated a system of doctrine could not
have been understood in primitive Christian times does not alarm him.
He anticipates it by declaring that the actual contemporaries and
adherents of the Apostle could neither understand nor imitate him,
even if they had wished to do so. How, indeed, could they possibly
have done so! The whole of Paulinism is a “systematisation of the
Christ-vision” and a “generalisation” of that which the Apostle had
experienced in his own soul, and consequently ascribed to all who walk
in the same way as an experience which they must necessarily undergo.
“What this man with his unique spiritual endowment had experienced,
felt, and thought amid influences and surroundings which could only
once have arisen, could never be exactly in the same way experienced,
felt, and thought by any other man.”

Holtzmann, therefore, like Harnack, accepts the saying that no one
ever understood Paul, with the sole exception of Marcion . . . who
misunderstood him! It is not enough for him to regard the system, as
had been usual among scholars since Baur, as a personal creation of
the Apostle; he goes the whole way with Holsten in maintaining that
the personal creation was nothing else than the interpretation of a
unique personal experience.

But that is to admit that no connecting links between Paulinism and
primitive Christianity can be discovered; and does not that really
imply an abandonment of all attempt to explain the Apostle’s doctrine?
Is it [pg 114] understood at all if it is not understood in relation
to primitive Christianity?

What right has any one to assert that it was unintelligible to his
contemporaries? Paul confidently ascribes to them an understanding of
it. And how are we to explain the success which is evidenced by the
establishment of the Pauline churches and the victorious struggle for
freedom from the law? Can the least understood of all early Christians
have exercised the greatest influence? These fundamental questions are
not asked by Holtzmann. His confidence in the results already attained
left no room for them.

What he aimed at he has successfully accomplished. He has worked up
into one great symphony the themes and motifs of the Pauline
scholarship of the post-Baur period, a symphony such as he alone, at
once critic and artist, could have written. Even one who does not
allow himself to be carried away by it will again and again take up
the score with its subtle counterpoint and skilful instrumentation,
and always find in it new beauties.

Never was Holtzmann so impressive—this was to be observed even in his
lectures—as in his treatment of Paulinism. Here he could grip his
hearers, because he wished to do so—he who usually showed a certain
dread of allowing the feeling, the enthusiasm, which glowed in him, to
become perceptible when he was dealing with matters of scholarship.
The system as modelled by him lives because he has breathed his own
life into it. But it is not historic.

He thinks to sift out and preserve what is of permanent value in the
heritage left by Baur and his pupils, of whom he was proud to count
himself spiritually one. In reality he leads up to a declaration of
bankruptcy, and that especially in the powerful closing chapter
entitled “Retrospect and Prospect.”

Here he endeavours forcibly to combine into one whole the results of
Pfleiderer, Holsten, and Harnack.

From Pfleiderer he takes over the view of the [pg 115] wide-reaching
Greek influence in Paulinism, and from Holsten he takes the theory
that the system had its birth in the unique experience of the vision
of Christ on the way to Damascus.

Now these two views might at need be combined, though it is not quite
easy to show—and this difficulty is constantly coming to light in
Holtzmann—how what is in one aspect a purely subjective experience,
never exactly to be repeated by any other, appears in another aspect,
by a kind of miracle, as Greek religious thought, and thus becomes
universally intelligible.

But into this synthesis Holtzmann tries to introduce in addition
Harnack’s recognition that Paulinism had no part in the formation of
early Greek theology.

Now Holsten and Harnack again, on their part, might be combined. The
Pauline teaching, if it is referred to a unique personal experience,
might well remain for the Apostle’s contemporaries and successors a
book with seven seals.

But Pfleiderer and Holsten and Harnack cannot all be brought together.
If Paulinism was largely Greek, it must have had some influence. How
is it conceivable that Greeks should not have recognised and
understood the Greek spirit? The triumvirate planned by Holtzmann
cannot, therefore, be brought to pass, even if Holtzmann is regarded
as the connecting-link between Harnack and Pfleiderer. In defiance of
all the facts of the history of dogma the last-named must assert an
influence of the Pauline system upon the growth of Greek dogma, since
he sees in Paul the first step in the Hellenisation of Christianity.

Any one who shares his premisses must also draw his conclusions, and
Holtzmann is not bold enough to do that. He agrees with him in
asserting the Hellenic character of Pauline doctrine, in other
respects he bows to the facts of the history of dogma. But this means
that, however he may wrap it up in qualifying clauses, he is asserting
the impossible, namely, that Christianity [pg 116] as Hellenised by
Paul remained uninteresting and unintelligible to the Greeks.

The edifice which he constructs, therefore, breaks down from within,
even though he may be able for a time to maintain it in outward
appearance intact.

Thus there met in this universal critical spirit, which examined all
things and desired to do justice to all, Baur and the history of dogma
which took its rise from Ritschl and was opposed to Baur, and held a
new settlement of accounts. Once more it was made manifest that the
question of Paul’s relation to primitive Christianity on the one hand,
to early Greek dogma on the other, had not been solved, and that his
teaching therefore had not been understood.




[pg 117]

V


CRITICAL QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES


_Edward Evanson._ The Dissonance of the four generally received
Evangelists. (1792.)

_Bruno Bauer._ Kritik der Apostelgeschichte (1850). Kritik der
paulinischen Briefe (Galatians, 1850; I Corinthians, 1851; remaining
Epistles, 1852). Christus und die Cäsaren. Der Ursprung des
Christentums aus dem römischen Griechentum (1877). (Christ and the
Caesars. How Christianity arose out of the Graeco-Roman Civilisation.)

_Albert Kalthoff._ Die Entstehung des Christentums. 1904. (E.T. by J.
McCabe, The Rise of Christianity, 1907.)

__Allard Pierson.__ De Bergrede en andere synoptische Fragmenten. (The
Sermon on the Mount and other Synoptic Fragments.) 1878.

_A. Pierson and S. A. Naber._ Verisimilia. 1886.

_A. D. Loman._ Quaestiones Paulinae. (Theol. Tijdschrift, 1882; 1883;
1886—written in Dutch.)

_Rudolf Steck._ Der Galaterbrief. 1888.

_W. C. van Manen._ Paulus, 3 vols. Vol. i. deals with the Acts of the
Apostles (1890); vol. ii. with the Epistle to the Romans (1891); vol.
iii. with the Epistles to the Corinthians (1896). The criticism of the
Epistle to the Romans has been translated into German under the title
“Die Unechtheit des Römerbriefs,” by G. Schläger. 1906.

_M. Friedländer._ Das Judentum in der vorchristlichen griechischen
Welt. (Judaism in the pre-Christian Greek World.) 1897.

_J. Friedrich (Maehliss)._ Die Unechtheit des Galaterbriefs. (The
Spuriousness of the Epistle to the Galatians.) 1891.

_J. H. Scholten._ Historisch-kritische Bijdragen. (Contributions to
Historical Criticism.) 1882.

_G. Heinrici._ Die Forschungen über die paulinischen Briefe; ihr
gegenwärtiger Stand und ihre Aufgaben. (The Critical Study of the
Pauline Letters; its Present Position, and the Tasks which await it.)
1886.

_J. M. S. Baljon._ Exegetisch-kritische Verhandeling over den Brief
van Paulus aan de Galatiërs. (Exegetic and Critical Essay on the
Epistle of Paul to the Galatians.) 1889.

[pg 118]

_Wilhelm Brückner._ Die chronologische Reihenfolge, in welcher die
Briefe des Neuen Testaments verfasst sind. (The Chronological Order in
which the Epistles of the New Testament were written.) 1890.

_Carl Clemen._ Die Chronologie der paulinischen Briefe. 1893. Die
Einheitlichkeit der paulinischen Briefe. (The Integrity of the Pauline
Epistles.) 1894. Paulus, 2 vols., 1904.

_Christian Hermann Weisse._ Philosophische Dogmatik (3 vols., 1855;
1860; 1862). Beiträge zur Kritik der paulinischen Briefe.
(Contributions to the Criticism of the Pauline Epistles.) Brought out
by Sulze in 1867.

_J. M. S. Baljon._ De Text der Breven van Paulus. 1884.

_Daniel Völter._ Die Composition der paulinischen Hauptbriefe. (The
Composition of the chief Pauline Epistles.) 1890. Paulus und seine
Briefe. 1905.

_Friedrich Spitta._ Untersuchung über den Brief des Paulus an die
Römer. (Examination of the Epistle of Paul to the Romans—in his work,
Zur Geschichte und Literatur des Urchristentums, vol. iii., 1st half,
1901.)


THOSE critics who reject the Pauline letters as a whole profess to
have derived the impulse thereto from Ferdinand Christian Baur, to be
his true because logically consistent disciples, and to bear the same
relation to him as Schopenhauer did to Kant. This profession, which
has always filled the “legitimate” Tübingen school with indignation,
is in many points well founded.

Baur’s criticism was occupied with the _Corpus Paulinum_ which
remained after the exclusion of the Pastoral epistles. In the ten
remaining Epistles, which show a large degree of inner homogeneity, he
professed to discover differences on the basis of which some were to
be assigned to the Apostle, others to the school which took its rise
from him.

Once the rights of such a criticism are admitted, nothing can prevent
it from working itself out to its limit, and seeking to explain all
the Epistles as products of a school which went under Paul’s name.

The Tübingen master held that the Epistles to the Corinthians and that
to the Ephesians could not both be from the same hand. But the
differences between the former and the Epistle to the Galatians are in
their own way scarcely less great, if one considers that the violent
[pg 119] controversy about the law with which the latter is filled is
never mentioned in the others.

The letters to the Romans and to the Galatians, on the other hand,
deal partly with the same subjects, since they both treat of sin, law,
and justification by faith. Nevertheless they are far from coinciding.
For all their agreement in fundamental views they show remarkable
differences in detail. Is it, if this line of argument be followed,
after all so indubitably certain that the four main epistles are from
the same pen?

Is it certain that they are by Paul? Strictly examined, Baur’s
assumption that they are so rests only on tradition, which in respect
of the other letters he impugns. Has he then the right to rely on it
so confidently as regards the main epistles? In conformity with his
own principles he ought to have felt himself obliged to exercise
“positive criticism” here also, and would only have had the right to
regard them as Pauline after it had been proved that they really
belong to primitive Christian times and have the historical Apostle of
the Gentiles as their author.

The assumption of the genuineness of the four main epistles is by no
means so self-evident as it may seem to us in our simplicity. The Acts
of the Apostles know nothing of any literary activity of Paul. It is
only from Clement of Rome, Ignatius, and the Gnostics that we first
hear of his Epistles. Justin and the remainder of early Christian
literature are silent in regard to his writings. Supposing that the
first Epistle of Clement does not belong to the first century, the
earliest evidence for the Epistles comes from the second century. If
the Ignatian letters are not genuine, Marcion, about the middle of the
second century, is the first witness to an actual _Corpus paulinum_!

For any one who has to defend the ordinary view, the position is very
far from being favourable. So far as outward evidence goes it is
hardly more difficult to defend the theory that the letters originated
in an inner circle [pg 120] of Gnosticism and were gradually given out
under the name of Paul.

Moreover, Baur made larger concessions than he realised to the opinion
which jeopardised his position, when he maintained that Paulinism
represents a Hellenisation of the Gospel.

Is it probable that a single individual belonging to the primitive
Christian community, immediately after the death of Jesus, by himself
achieved this result? Historical analogy is uniformly in favour of the
view that developments of that kind have a gradual beginning, and are
only accomplished in the course of two or three generations. It would
therefore be inherently much more probable that Paulinism should be
the work of a school which sought to reconcile Christianity with
Hellenism. In any case a writer who regards it as Greek ought to face
the difficulty of explaining it as at the same time belonging to
primitive Christianity, and ought not to regard this hypothesis as
self-evident, but as standing in need of proof.

These theoretic considerations regarding the basis of the views of
Baur and his successors are so obvious that they were bound to come up
sooner or later. The fact was that in one particular point the
Tübingen master had held back from unprejudiced criticism and had
foisted upon critical science the traditional belief. In doing so he
had obeyed an instinct of caution. Those who proceeded further along
the path of questioning and investigation arrived, some with
satisfaction and some with dismay, at the result of declaring all the
epistles to be spurious.

It was Bruno Bauer who about the middle of the nineteenth century
opened the ball with his criticism of the Pauline letters._(_87_)_

[pg 121]

This work is not on the same level as his criticism of the
Gospels._(_88_)_ The objections which have to be brought against F. C.
Baur’s views are not clearly developed nor completely stated. In what
sense Paulinism is to be considered the work of a school with Greek
sympathies within Christianity is not explained.

In addition to this, Bruno Bauer complicates his task by regarding not
merely the doctrine of the Apostle of the Gentiles, but Christianity
in general, as a creation of the Greek mind. It was not, however,
until twenty-five years after the appearance of his criticism of the
Pauline letters that he attempted to prove this in the confused work
on “Christ and the Caesars.”_(_89_)_

It was not Palestine, according to his thesis, but Rome and Alexandria
which cradled Christianity. Palestine merely supplied the background
for the picture which the first Evangelist undertook to create of the
beginnings of a movement which really originated with Seneca and [pg
122] his adherents. Whether there ever was a Jesus or a Paul may be
left an open question. It is in any case certain that the one did not
utter the sayings which the Gospels put into his mouth, and that the
other is not to be regarded as the author of the letters.

The Christian “community” arose among the oppressed, the slaves and
Jews, of the great city. They formed associations and fostered in one
another a yearning for the End of the Age, developed the
Platonico-Stoic thoughts of Seneca into the sayings of the Sermon on
the Mount, and invented for themselves their hero, Christ. The spirit
of the new creation came from the West; its framework was furnished by
Judaism.

Judaism brought with it a tendency towards legalism. In the Flavian
period the Greek ethical philosophy struck up an alliance with the
law. This movement was opposed by the freedom-loving Gnosis. In the
last years of Hadrian and the first half of the reign of Marcus
Aurelius matters came to an issue. So far as the struggle took a
literary form we have the evidences of it in the Pauline letters and
the Acts of the Apostles. Galatians is the last of the letters, issued
at the crisis of the struggle, and was directed against Acts, which
appeared at the same time.

“The figure of this champion of a universal Church and freedom from
the law of ordinances” must have been already known to the Church.
What was new was the association with his name of an epistolary
literature, the production of which occupied a series of earnest and
able men for some forty years.

In the Acts of the Apostles Paul is co-ordinated with or subordinated
to Peter, the representative of the Judaeo-Roman hierarchic tendency.
That reflects the issue of the struggle. The freedom-loving party was
defeated; in the last quarter of the second century Catholicism became
supreme in the Church.

No attention was paid to Bauer, and in part he himself was responsible
for the neglect. The bitterness and the [pg 123] carelessness of his
writing, the contradictions in which he becomes involved, the
fantastic imagination which he allows to run riot, made it impossible
for the few who read him to regard him seriously.

Nevertheless, in detached observations, and in some of the incidental
ideas, he displays a critical acumen which has something great about
it.

After dismissing him with a few sharp words, the Tübingen school and
their successors enjoyed a respite of thirty years, so far as radical
scepticism was concerned. At the end of that time Bauer reappeared,
like a _Nero Redivivus,_ in peaceful Holland._(_90_)_

In a critical introduction to his study of the Sermon on the Mount,
Allard Pierson examined the earliest witnesses for the existence of
Christianity, and in doing so threw out the question whether the
historicity of the main Pauline epistles was so completely raised
above all doubt that they could be treated with perfect confidence as
archives from the earliest period of the new faith._(_91_)_

In the year 1886 he published, in association with the philological
scholar, Samuel Adrian Naber, the _Verisimilia._ The book was not
adapted to make a deep impression. It was too much the ingenious essay
for that.

The two friends combined their efforts in order to show New Testament
exegetes how much they had left unexplained in the Epistles to the
Thessalonians, Galatians, Corinthians, and Romans, and how many
problems, incoherencies, and contradictions appear when one reads
these writings with an open mind._(_92_)_

[pg 124]

But instead of making a thorough examination of the problems and
laboriously arguing the case with the other students of Paulinism, the
authors at once proceed to suggest what appears to them a possible
solution. They claim to have discovered that the inconsistencies are
due in the main to the presence of two strata of thought which have
been worked together. The one is of a sharply anti-Jewish character;
the other consists of milder and more conciliatory ideas.

If it be assumed, so runs their argument, that Christianity was in its
real origin a Jewish sect which had liberal ideas in regard to the law
and directed its expectation towards the Messiah, the antinomian
sections of the Epistles represent documents of that period.

The present form of the letters is due to the fact that a later
“Churchman”—the authors call him _Paulus episcopus,_ and think that he
may have served as model for the Paul of Acts—worked into them the
second, milder set of ideas.

At the time when Pierson and Naber launched this hypothesis, A. D.
Loman had just finished the series of “Quaestiones Paulinae” which he
threw out in the [pg 125] _Theologisch Tijdschrift_ of
1882-1886._(_93_)_ The battle began in earnest.

Loman confines himself to dealing with the external arguments, and
only proposes to examine how far the assumption that these letters
were written by the Apostle in primitive Christian times can or cannot
be proved from the early witnesses. His decision is negative.

But his calmly written yet wonderfully living study shook two other
thinkers out of their security, and compelled them to carry on the
work of destruction to a further point.

Steck_(_94_)_ and van Manen_(_95_)_ undertook the task of
supplementing the external arguments, of presenting the internal
arguments by means of an analysis of the letters, and of offering a
detailed hypothesis regarding the origin of the Pauline literature.

[pg 126]

In respect of external arguments the three scholars combine to urge
the following considerations:—

Acts, they argue, knows nothing of any literary activity of Paul; and
it tells us nothing of the conflicts which these letters, if we are to
believe their own evidence, called forth.

When the Tübingen school set up the axiom that Acts is less
trustworthy than the Epistles, they made things easy for themselves.
There are weighty arguments to support the opposite opinion.

That the moment a mission to the heathen was undertaken the question
of the observance of the law must come up is clear. The most natural
thing to happen would be that it should come up for discussion on
purely practical lines and should take the form: how much must the
Gentile Christians take over of the Commandments in order that the
Jewish believers might have table-fellowship and social intercourse
with them?

This is the form of the problem which Acts presupposes, and it gives
us in the account of the so-called Apostolic Council a decision in
accordance therewith.

The Epistle to the Galatians, on the other hand, asserts that the
question of the validity of the law as such was raised at that time,
and that Paul and the original apostles agreed to divide the spheres
of their mission work into Gentile and Jewish. About the most pressing
need, the establishment of a _modus vivendi_ in mixed churches,
nothing was done. This representation is much less natural than the
other.

Nor is the case different in regard to the picture of Paul which these
two sources give us. In Acts everything is clear and simple. The
Apostle appears at first rather as an assistant to Barnabas, but
afterwards makes himself independent, and maintains his position in
relation to the original apostles by the force of his personality, in
a free but not a hostile fashion.

In the letters, on the other hand, everything is unintelligible.
Stress is laid on the fact that the Apostle of [pg 127] the Gentiles
after his conversion has no intercourse with the original apostles and
the Church, receives nothing whatever of the doctrinal tradition about
Jesus, and draws his gospel entirely from revelation.

The statements regarding the external facts of his life are extremely
confused. After his conversion he is said to have first spent three
years in “Arabia” and then to have gone to Damascus, and from there,
three years after his conversion, to have paid his “visit of ceremony”
to the Church at Jerusalem, during which, however, he says that he saw
only Peter, and James the Lord’s brother. After that he spent fourteen
years in Syria and Cilicia.

Who can form a clear picture of the journeys implied in the letters,
or of the relation of Paul to his churches?

Who can understand the character here presented? Sometimes the Apostle
is radical, sometimes conservative, sometimes bold, sometimes
despairing; in small things firm, in great things weakly yielding; now
violent, then again mild; in all ways full of uncertainties and
contradictions.

Far from arousing belief, the statements of the letters about the
Apostle create difficulty upon difficulty and doubt upon doubt, if
once one ventures to read them with an open mind. On the one side it
seems as if a certain tendency to bring him into opposition with the
original apostles made itself felt throughout, while on the other hand
the traits are thrown together without any reference to an integral
psychologically intelligible picture.

The most natural view is, therefore, that Acts represents what is
historically most authentic, while in the letters an imaginary picture
is drawn, exhibiting throughout the same tendency, but composed by
various hands.

The external attestation in the early literature of a Pauline
collection of letters, which is in any case not too brilliant, is
further reduced by the radicals. The Ignatian letters are held—as they
also are by the Tübingen [pg 128] school—to be spurious; and they
endeavour to bring down the first epistle of Clement from the time of
Domitian to the middle of the second century._(_96_)_ If all this is
admitted, the first attestation of the letters is that of Marcion.
What, then, is there to oppose to the view that they had their origin
in Gnostic circles and were only later forced upon the Church?

With this agrees, too, the fact that the Second Epistle of Peter,
which alone in the New Testament makes mention of Paul’s literary
activity,_(_97_)_ and which itself certainly belongs to the period of
the struggle with Gnosticism, treats it as something in the nature of
a “gift from the Greeks.”_(_98_)_

In any case, in view of the silence of Justin, the _Shepherd_ of
Hermas, the _Didache,_ and the _Epistle of Barnabas,_ the attestation
of the Pauline letters is no better than that of the Johannine
literature._(_99_)_

Great stress is laid on the fact that among the Gnostics the Epistles
existed in a shorter form than in the Church, as appears from the
reckoning which Tertullian holds with Marcion._(_100_)_ If this
shorter text can be reconstructed [pg 129] and proves to be the
better, this would show that the Epistles passed from the hands of the
Gnostics into that of the Church, and underwent in the process an
expansion of a certain “tendency.”

In the hope of showing this, van Manen in the year 1887 reconstructed
the Marcionite text of the Epistle to the Galatians._(_101_)_ In
regard to the other Epistles he does not attempt this, as Tertullian’s
indications are insufficient.

The examination of the internal arguments takes the following form.
These “Ultra-Tübingen” critics analyse the letters and point out all
the difficulties which come to light in the course of exegetical
study. They triumphantly establish the fact that there are many seams
and divisions between the various verses and sections, that an
ethico-mystical doctrine is found alongside of the juridical doctrine
of justification, that the view of the law is subject to remarkable
vacillations, and that it is not possible to weld together the
different parts of the Epistles to the Romans and Corinthians, to
determine the proper address of the Epistle to the Galatians, whether
to the district or the province, to decide whether Romans presupposes
Jewish-Christian or Gentile-Christian readers, and various questions
of that kind.

The next point is to discover, if possible, some kind of system in the
difficulties, inconsistencies, and contradictions. Steck and van Manen
profess to be able to show that there is such a system.

What the letters tell us regarding the conversion, the life and work
of Paul is not, according to them, to be considered earlier and more
authentic than Acts, but is [pg 130] based on information which either
coincides with the reports there given or points to an earlier common
source. The material supplied by Acts is worked up in the letters
under the influence of a tendency.

The existence of a written Gospel is also implied. All the passages in
the Epistles which recall sayings of the Lord, and what the Epistles
to the Corinthians in particular have to tell us about the institution
of the Lord’s Supper and the resurrection of Jesus, make, they think,
the impression of having been drawn from Luke, or an earlier Gospel
which is one of his sources. Steck and van Manen are even inclined to
hold that in Rom. ii. 16 and xvi. 25 the words “my Gospel” refer to a
written Gospel, as indeed the Church Fathers also thought.

That the four main Epistles cannot all be from the same hand is, they
think, manifest from the differences between them. Further, the order
in which they were written can, these writers think, be recognised.
This order does not agree with that generally accepted, since the
Epistle to the Galatians is not placed before Corinthians and Romans,
but concludes the series. Steck endeavours to give a detailed proof
that it was written after Romans and presupposes the latter. Wherever
in Galatians there appear gaps and obscurities, a glance at Romans
always, he affirms, gives the desired explanation. The more strongly
the opposition to the law comes to expression, the later is the
writing in question to be placed in the series of the Pauline
writings, in which a development is traceable.

Another point to which the “Ultra-Tübingen” critics attach importance
is to discover criteria by which various strata can be distinguished
in the main Epistles themselves. They propose to regard the Epistles
to the Corinthians as fragments of Pauline literature which have
gradually been worked up together into letters. In regard to the
letter to the Romans, van Manen holds that it originally consisted,
roughly speaking, of chapters [pg 131] i.-viii., and was only
gradually extended to its present form._(_102_)_

It is also, these critics consider, certain that a number of hands
have been at work on the letters, and that the increasingly
anti-Jewish tendency shows us the direction followed by the efforts of
the Pauline school.

Steck and van Manen assume that the teaching represented in the
Epistles is of a Greek character. They think they can show that the
Pauline school were influenced by Philo and Seneca, and seek to
explain Paulinism as an “attempt to spiritualise primitive
Christianity.”

Essentially, they think, it belongs to Gnosticism, since it sets aside
the “authority of tradition” and derives all knowledge, without
historical mediation, from the revelation of the Spirit, and conceives
of this knowledge as a system. The deification of Jesus Christ which
is represented in the letters is also to be regarded as Greek and
Gnostic.

By these observations Steck and van Manen are inevitably led to the
decisive consideration regarding “time and space.”

Could a Christology of this kind come into being a few years only
after the death of the historical Jesus? Is an intense anti-Judaism in
primitive Christian times intelligible? Can Greek, Gnostical ideas be
assumed to have existed in the first generation?

Steck and van Manen deny that this is possible and demand a longer
period for the transformation of which the evidence lies before us.
Therefore the historic Paul, [pg 132] if there ever was such a man, as
is almost certainly the case, was not the creator of the Paulinism
represented by the Epistles.

How, then, is the origin of the letters and the doctrine to be
explained?

On the basis of the facts which they observe in the documents, and the
consideration regarding the necessity of time and space, the
“Ultra-Tübingen” critics throw out the following hypothesis.

Christianity, they hold, remained at first Jewish. But as time went
on, and as it spread beyond Palestine, two different tendencies
manifested themselves within it. One, as the result of contact with
Gentiles, and no doubt in consequence of the destruction of the Jewish
State, moved in the direction of attaching less and less importance to
the law, while the other maintained the older stand-point.

In general the development, due to the influence of Graeco-Roman
ideas, proceeded without a struggle. Its goal was a “catholicism” such
as meets us in Justin.

Within this “Gnostic” party, however, there appeared a school which
put the question of the relation to Judaism and the law in its most
trenchant form, as a question of principle, and sought to bring it to
a decisive issue.

Somewhere or other—perhaps in the Roman Church, perhaps in several
places at the same time—where Gnostics and representatives of the
older view were at odds, an open conflict broke out. The former party
fought with literary weapons, dating back the controversy by means of
an epistolary literature specially created for the purpose into
primitive Christian times.

In the course of the struggle the antithesis became more and more
acute. The climax is marked by the Epistle to the Galatians. Here a
“Gnostic” endeavours, with the aid of the already existing Pauline
literature, and depending more particularly on Romans, to defend the
stand-point of liberal Gentile Christianity against a “Jewish
Christianity” which, as it seems, was “making [pg 133] headway.” “With
all the force of his intellectual superiority” he scourges the
tendencies of a period which was endeavouring to make Christianity
once more Jewish.

The form of a letter to the Galatians was given to the work, according
to Steck’s hypothesis, “because the literary _genre_ of Apostolic
letters held an established position; and since the churches at Rome
and Corinth already had their Epistles, the Galatian province,
familiar in connexion with the first missionary journey in Acts,
suggested itself as the appropriate scene of the struggle, since it
was there that the Apostle had first had to suffer from the
persecutions of the Jews. As the Epistle to the Galatians followed on
the three other main epistles, and the Epistle to the Romans had
already selected as its time and place the last visit of the Apostle
to Corinth, shortly before his arrest at Jerusalem, the time of the
Roman imprisonment suggested itself as the situation of the writer to
be implied in the Epistle. During his imprisonment Paul receives news
of the threatened, and in part already accomplished, falling away of
the Galatian churches from his Gospel, and feeling himself about to
take leave of the world he directs to the wavering churches this
letter as the purest and most intense expression of his heart and
mind.”

The main Epistles originated about the years 120-140. The elements
from which they are worked up may be ten or twenty years earlier. A
final redaction may have taken place even subsequently to 140.

Why, exactly, the school of thought which created this literature took
Paul as its patron, it is, according to van Manen, impossible to
explain. He holds that the historic Apostle had as little to do with
Paulinism as John the Apostle with the theology of the Fourth Gospel.
Steck, on the other hand, is inclined to admit the historical
justification of this connexion. For him, it is to be held as certain
that Paul was the first to “open the door of the Christian salvation
freely to the Gentiles.” The doctrine [pg 134] of justification by
faith must therefore already in some shape or other have formed part
of his preaching. Only the strictly systematic and sharply anti-Jewish
development of the doctrine was supplied by the later school.

Steck is therefore here, as on some other points, more conservative
and less “critical” than van Manen. Nevertheless the differences are
not very noticeable in comparison with the extent of the views which
they share.

Theology of the post-Baur period generally had ignored Bruno Bauer; it
would willingly have treated in the same way those who took up his
work again. Since this was not possible, and references to “wild
hypotheses” and “rash, wrong-headed critics” did not completely
suffice to dispose of them, the authorities great and small had
necessarily to undertake a refutation, which they prudently confined
to the most pressing and the easiest points.

The discussions were for the most part carried on in periodicals. A
work on the other side of an importance at all corresponding to those
of Loman, Steck, and van Manen was not forthcoming._(_103_)_

[pg 135]

How far is it possible to refute their view?

In the domain of the external arguments, the main strength of the
revolutionaries, the position is not so favourable to them as Loman
wished to represent it. The transference of the first Epistle of
Clement to the middle of the second century is not possible._(_104_)_
The fact that Justin knew and used Paul’s writings, while he does not
name him, is not explained by the hypothesis that they did not rank
for him as Church writings._(_105_)_

The Marcionite text of Galatians reconstructed by van Manen is not
better but worse than the canonical text._(_106_)_ If the Ignatian
letters, as is now generally held, are genuine, the attestation of the
Pauline Epistles is in much better case than was formerly supposed.
That Acts says nothing about the literary activity of the Apostle has
at most the value of an _argumentum e silentio._ It is not otherwise
in regard to the fact that Acts has nothing to say of the conflicts
between him and his churches. In regard to the question of priority as
between its narrative and that of Galatians there is at least nothing
certain to be said.

The position of matters is therefore that the Epistles to the Romans
and Corinthians are witnessed to by the first Epistle of Clement at
the end of the first century, but that neither the legitimate nor the
illegitimate [pg 136] representatives of the Tübingen tradition can
explain why Justin and the remaining writers of the beginning of the
second century are not under the influence of these Epistles, and,
with the exception of Clement, do not even mention them.

The hypothesis brought forward by Steck and van Manen in regard to
different strata within the Epistles and the development which
culminates in the antinomianism of the Epistle to the Galatians cannot
be proved from the texts; the evidence is read into them by the
exercise of great ingenuity.

But the negative observation which formed their starting-point holds
its ground. Ordinary exegesis has not succeeded in getting rid of the
illogical transitions and contradictions and making Paul’s arguments
really intelligible. The impression of a certain disconnectedness is
not to be denied. But Steck and van Manen have not succeeded in
discovering the law and order which ought to prevail in it, and
showing how the chaos arose in connexion with the creation of this
literature.

Against the hypothesis of the origin of Paulinism in the second
century there lies the objection that it is built on purely arbitrary
assumptions. Whence do Steck and van Manen know anything about
anti-Jewish conflicts taking place at that time? There is no evidence
of any such thing in the contemporary literature; and the writings of
the apostolic Fathers make quite in the contrary direction.

On the other hand, the general considerations which led them to adopt
this hypothesis have not been in any way invalidated. The illegitimate
Tübingen critics share with the legitimate school the presupposition
that Paulinism signifies a Hellenisation of the Gospel; they are also
at one with their adversaries in regarding this unproved and
unprovable assumption as proved. The difference is that they do not
follow the others in their second exhibition of naïveté—that of
regarding this Greek religious faith as being coincident with
primitive [pg 137] Christianity, but demand space and time for a
development of this character. But the two wrestlers have the same
chain about their feet; whichever of them throws the other into the
water must drown along with him.

That they are both involved in the same fundamental view of Paulinism
sometimes comes to the consciousness of the post-Baur theology and its
radical opponents. In a momentary aberration of this kind Heinrici
ventures to praise Bruno Bauer for having discovered the relationship
of Paul to the religious life of the ancient world, and is prepared to
see his weakness only in the inferences which he draws from this
discovery._(_107_)_

Steck, on his part, praises Heinrici’s commentary on the Epistles to
the Corinthians, in which the Hellenistic element is so excellently
traced, and expresses the hope that the exegete and his party will
consider carefully whether the composition of this work “does not
stand in an even much closer relationship to Hellenism than had
previously been supposed.”

The more the theologians who derive from Baur emphasise the Greek
element in Paulinism the more helpless they are against the
“Ultra-Tübingen” critics. For it is after all merely a matter of
clearness and courage of thought whether they venture to raise the
question about space and time. The moment they take this step they are
lost. Nevermore can they find the way which leads back through the
green pastures of sound common-sense theology, but are condemned to
wander about with the revolutionaries in the wilderness of flat
unreason. Wearied with problems, they come at last, like Steck and van
Manen, to a condition of mind in which the wildest hypothesis appeals
to them more than rational knowledge, if the latter demands the
suppression of questioning.

How is it conceivable that a man of the primitive Christian period
could, in consequence of a purely practical controversy regarding the
observance or non-observance of the law by Gentile believers, go on,
as Baur and [pg 138] his successors represent—to reject the law on
principle? How could it be possible that, at that time, doctrine
should take a frankly Gnostic shape, and in deliberate contempt of the
tradition of the historic Jesus, should, under the eyes of the men who
had been His companions, appeal only to revelation?

That is the element of greatness in the “Ultra-Tübingen” critics, that
they did not forget the duty of asking questions, when it had fallen
out of fashion among other theologians. To show that their hypothesis
is untenable is by no means to get rid of it, as accredited theology
wished to persuade itself. A few squadrons of cavalry which were
skirmishing in the open have been cut off; the fortress has not been
taken, indeed the siege has not even been laid.

The chronicle of the discussion between contemporary theology and the
revolutionaries is quite without interest. As soon as the refutation
on points of detail was finished, and the fundamental questions
regarding time and place came on the scene, there remained nothing for
it to do but to stammer, with an embarrassed smile, something about
tradition, intuition, an unmistakable impression, the stamp of
genuineness, and the like, and to break off the conversation as
quickly as might be.

What it could or could not refute, and what the other party could or
could not prove, followed necessary from the form which the problem
had assumed. The construction of the illegitimate Tübingen critics
answers, in reverse, to that of the legitimate school, like the
reflection in a mirror to the object reflected. The presuppositions
and the difficulties are the same in the two cases; the two solutions
correspond except that they go in opposite directions. Both recognise
that not only a conflict of practice, but one involving theory and
principle, for and against the law, is fought out in the letters. The
legitimate school place it in primitive Christian times, but cannot
show how it was possible at that period, and how it could break off so
suddenly that in the post-Pauline [pg 139] literature there is not an
echo of it, and it seems as though it had never been.

The illegitimate school represent the struggle as having occurred in
the course of the second century, but can cite no evidence for this
from the remaining literature, can point to no traces of the gradual
growth of the opposition, or show how a struggle of that kind could
break out at that time.

Both explanations labour in vain at the problem of the inexplicable
neglect of Paulinism in the post-Apostolic literature.

Both parties assume as a datum that the doctrine of the letters is to
be considered as a Hellenised Christianity. The one party represents
the process which leads to this result as taking place in primitive
Christian times, without being able to show how such a thing is
possible, or how the Greek and the Jewish-eschatological elements
mutually tolerated and united with one another.

According to the other party, the Hellenisation came about in the
course of a long development. But they cannot explain why Paulinism
shows an entirely different character from that of the Greek
Christianity which appears elsewhere in the literature of the second
century. They assert that it belongs to Gnosticism; and are right in
this so far as regards the form of the system. On the other hand they
cannot allow themselves to consider seriously the difference between
the doctrine of the letters and the fundamental views of the known
Gnostic schools, or the hypothesis flies in pieces. The Gnostics were
real spiritualists, opposed to eschatology, and denying a corporeal
resurrection; Paul is an eschatologist, looking for the parousia and
the transformation of the body. Therefore the “Ultra-Tübingen” critics
must either explain the Jewish eschatological element in the system in
such a way as to spiritualise it, or else drop it out of sight.

And as a matter of fact the ominous word eschatology is, one might
almost say, never mentioned in their works.

[pg 140]

The parallel between what the one and the other construction can and
cannot make intelligible goes through to the last detail. For both it
is true that the ostensible solution in each case introduces openly or
otherwise a new problem which arises out of the solution itself. The
sum of what is explained and unexplained is the same for both.

At first sight the position of the legitimate successors of the
Tübingen school is more favourable than that of the other party. They
have tradition and natural impression on their side, and are able to
regard the situation implied in the Epistles as historic, whereas
their opponents are bound to show that it is fictitious. When
subjected to critical examination, however, they are no better off,
for they cannot give any proof that the main epistles can belong to
primitive Christianity and to it only. When they declared again and
again that the attacks of the radicals had served a useful purpose in
inciting them to examine anew their results, and to make corrections
where necessary, that was the mere cant of criticism. If they had
dared to make an effort to understand the objection which Loman,
Steck, and van Manen constantly repeated, and to consider whether they
could really prove the Pauline origin of the main epistles, or whether
they did not really by their conception of the doctrine make it
improbable, they would have been bound to perceive that nothing could
be done by revising and correcting; it was a case of mutually
exclusive alternatives.

As matters stood, they had to choose between being consistent but
irrational, or rational but inconsistent. They chose the latter form
of the dilemma and left the other to the radicals.

The Ultra-Tübingen critics on their part cannot escape the blame of
raising the question in a one-sided purely literary form, and not
concerning themselves with the thought contained in the Epistles,
because they felt that herein lay the weak point of their undertaking.
Instead of analysing the system, they made play with the [pg 141]
catchwords Greek and Gnostic, and thought to have got rid in that way
of the question regarding the essential character of Paulinism. If
contemporary theology did not grasp the problem which was presented to
it in its full significance, that was partly due to the pettifogging
way in which it was formulated. The representatives of radical
criticism were like criminals who cannot rise to the height of their
crime!

For a time it almost looked as if a _modus vivendi_ had been found
between the successors of Baur’s school and the radicals. Steck, who
stood on the right wing of the revolutionaries, refused to give up the
belief that the historic Paul had in some way or other fought a battle
for freedom from the law, and might be indirectly claimed as the
starting-point of the theology which reaches its full development in
the Epistles. From this it was only a short step to the hypothesis
that the Epistles were not wholly spurious but combined thoughts of
the Apostle with later views.

A criticism based on the distinction of original and interpolated
elements did not need to be now for the first time called into being.
It already existed, and had indeed made its appearance
contemporaneously with Bruno Bauer’s. Like the latter it had been
either talked down or left to die of neglect.

In the first volume of his “Philosophic Dogmatic” (1855), when
speaking of the documentary sources of our knowledge of Christianity,
Christian Hermann Weisse defines his attitude towards the Pauline
Epistles and offers the results of a study extending over many years,
which he had undertaken in opposition to the conservatives on the one
side and the Tübingen school on the other._(_108_)_

His method he himself describes as criticism based on style. A man
like Paul, he argues, has so characteristic a literary style that it
will serve one who has made himself [pg 142] thoroughly familiar with
it as an unfailing criterion of what is genuine and what is not. Such
a method of criticism must of course be prepared to be accused of
arbitrariness and subjectivity. But that is no great matter. The
fruits will vouch for the goodness of the tree.

The standard of indubitably genuine Pauline style is furnished,
according to Weisse, by the First Epistle to the Corinthians. It bears
in all its parts the stamp of the most complete integrity and
genuineness. The eye which has acquired due fineness of perception by
the study of this writing discovers that only the Second Epistle to
the Corinthians, the First to the Thessalonians, and that to Philemon,
“can boast of preserving in the same purity the original apostolic
text.” The Epistles to the Romans, Galatians, Philippians, and
Colossians “have interwoven in them a regular series of
interpolations, which so far efface the genuine apostolic character of
the style in many places as to render it unrecognisable, and have
given rise to that difficulty of disentangling the meaning which has
made Romans especially a _crux interpretum,_ and by the forced
artificiality, intrinsic falsity, and unnaturalness of these
interpretations has made this Epistle the bane of theological study;
of which, in virtue of the character of its fundamental ideas, it was
fitted to be the most precious treasure.”_(_109_)_

The whole of these interpolations are, he thinks, from one and the
same hand, and go back to a time previous to the ecclesiastical use of
the writings. The redactor cherished withal the most respectful awe of
the Apostle’s words, and has hardly deleted a single one of them.

What remains after the elimination of the secondary stratum in the
Epistles to the Romans and Philippians [pg 143] does not prove to be
an integral whole. The latter consists of two letters to this church,
the second beginning with iii. 3. With the former there has been
worked up a letter to a church in Asia Minor, consisting of ix.-xi.
and xvi. 1-20._(_110_)_

Weisse did not get the length of publishing the reconstructed text of
the Epistles. When his pupil Sulze carried it through after his
death,_(_111_)_ the prophecy which the author had put on record in his
“Dogmatics” regarding his undertaking was fulfilled. It met with
“universal disbelief.”

In part the cause of this ill-success lay in the one-sidedness of the
principle maintained by the author. Weisse confines himself entirely
to “stylistic criticism.” While he recognises the possibility of a
distinction between genuine and spurious based on the contents, the
trains of thought, of the letters, he will have nothing to do with it.

With the controversy about the genuineness of the main Epistles there
began a new era of “interpolation criticism.” Daniel Völter, rendered
confident by the professedly “assured results” of the criticism of the
Apocalypse in regard to the distinction of sources, thinks to find in
a similar procedure the solution of the Pauline problem, and hopes
that it will be possible by “careful criticism” to separate the
genuine from the spurious._(_112_)_

He differs entirely from Weisse in seeking the criterion for the
distinction of what is genuine from what is spurious in the
subject-matter. What is simple and “plain”—the [pg 144] latter
expression recurs again and again—is to be regarded as
primitive-Christian and Pauline, but anything which has the appearance
of being complicated or having the character of a speculative system
is to be regarded as of later origin.

Thus wherever we find a highly developed Christology, speculations
regarding the Spirit, and eschatology, strongly predestinarian views,
and an advanced estimate of baptism and the Lord’s Supper, we are,
according to Völter, in the presence of interpolations. A further mark
by which these may be recognised is an advanced antinomianism.

The doctrine of the historic Paul includes, according to this author,
the following points: The central point in it is the death of Christ,
regarded as an atoning death appointed by God and ratified by the
resurrection. Man becomes partaker of its fruits by faith, and thus
obtains justification by the forgiveness of sins, of which he is given
assurance by the testimony of the Holy Spirit. Faith also includes
within it, however, a “mystico-ethical partaking in the death of
Christ.” Therefore in the act of faith there takes place at the same
time an inner conversion to a life well-pleasing to God, which causes
the believer “to appear blameless on the day of Christ and makes him a
partaker in the resurrection.”

As regards the relation of the Epistle to the Galatians to Acts Völter
takes over the conclusions, unfavourable to the former, of the radical
critics. Consequently this work is spurious throughout. It only
reproduces the ideas of the interpolators of the letters to the Romans
and Corinthians, and pushes to an extreme the antinomianism there
represented. It dates from near the end of the first century.

[pg 145]

In the Epistles to the Corinthians—we are still following Völter—the
interpolations are not very extensive. The most important is the
correction applied to the original Pauline doctrine of resurrection,
in 2 Corinthians 4 and 5, where the redactor has worked in his
Platonico-Stoic doctrine of immortality.

The Epistle to the Romans has been very extensively
interpolated._(_113_)_ The original writing was addressed to Gentile
readers. The interpolator, on the other hand, has in view readers “who
occupy an Old Testament stand-point.” That is connected with the
far-reaching development which began at Rome after the Neronian
persecution. At that time, as is proved, Völter thinks, by the Epistle
to the Hebrews and the Epistle of Barnabas, together with the first
Epistle of Clement and the _Shepherd_ of Hermas, the Church at Rome
“fell back upon a religious stand-point determined by Old Testament
ideas.” It is this “reduction of Christianity to Jewish Old Testament
religion, modified by Christianity,” that the interpolator is
concerned to combat. In doing so he is forced to enter upon general
speculations regarding the flesh, sin, and the law; in order “to
defend the independence and superiority of Christianity” he develops
an antinomianism, according to which the law had as its sole purpose,
“by intensifying the misery of sin, to prepare men for deliverance
from sin and the law, by the redemption which is in Jesus
Christ.”_(_114_)_

Völter’s work is one of the adroitest performances in the whole field
of Pauline study. It is not only that it represents what is in its own
way a brilliant synthesis between Weisse and the radicals; its main
significance [pg 146] lies in the fact that it breaks off the barren
literary-critical logomachy, and directs attention once more to the
subject-matter.

Steck and van Manen had failed, once they went beyond the simple
registration of inconcinnities in the text; Völter lets the
theological problems have something to say for themselves. He observes
more clearly than any one had stated it before exactly wherein the
complexity of the question of the law consists, and rightly refers it
to the fact that some passages take for granted its observance by the
Jews as unquestionably right and proper, and only seek to maintain the
freedom of the Gentiles in regard to it, whereas others reject it in
principle, in such a way that Paul would be obliged to maintain also
the emancipation of the Jews . . . if the rules of logical inference
are to be applied. As it is, however, there is a want of congruence
between the negative theory and the limitation of the practical
demand.

In an equally thoroughgoing fashion Völter deals with the problems of
Christology and of the doctrine of the Spirit, and eschatology.

His solution is ingenious and elegant. Of the hypothesis which places
the controversies about the law in the post-apostolic period only so
much is taken over as is absolutely necessary. The connexion between
Paulinism and Gnosticism is made as loose as possible. The eschatology
has a certain importance given to it. Hellenic elements are not
assumed to be present in the primitive doctrine; on the other hand, a
knowledge of the Book of Wisdom, Philo, Seneca and the Graeco-Roman
philosophy in general is ascribed to the interpolators.

The criterion by which to distinguish what is genuine from what is not
is ingeniously chosen. It is not particularly difficult to separate in
the letters the parts which are mainly plain and practical from those
which relate to an antinomian speculative system. The resulting
division between original text and interpolations has a [pg 147] more
natural and simple air than is the case in any of the other attempts
to draw the line between them.

Nevertheless, it was scarcely possible that this work should
contribute anything to the solution of the Pauline problem. It is
built upon sand, for the argument on which everything is based is
unsound.

Völter asserts that “simplicity” is the mark of what is genuinely
apostolic and Pauline. Since when? How does he know this? How, if it
were just the other way round, and the strange, the abstruse, the
systematic, the antinomian, the predestinarian represented the
original element, and what is simple came in later!

What he describes as the doctrine of the historic Paul has not a very
convincing look. It has not the ring of what we find elsewhere in
early Christian literature, but has a suspicious resemblance to the
Good Friday and Easter-day meditations of the _Christliche
Welt.__(_115_)_

What does not strike the modern man and his theology as distinctly
peculiar is gathered together and receives the stamp of approval as
historic Paulinism! Völter, like every one else, has failed to
consider, or to grasp, that fundamental question as to what is
primitive-Christian in the Apostle’s teaching, which, since the
encounter between Baur and Ritschl, had tacitly dominated the
discussion and had been again forced on the theological centre-party
by the radicals. Otherwise it would have been impossible that he,
after promising a “cautious criticism,” should have so incautiously
decided that what is simple is what is primitive-Christian.

Apart from Völter, the criticism which claims to distinguish various
sources and detect interpolations is of a more innocent and guileless
description. It does not plunge into the depths of the Pauline
problems in the attempt to reach the firm ground that has never yet
been reached, but amuses itself by determining what and how many
original writings of the Apostle may have been worked up into the
canonical Epistles to the [pg 148] Corinthians, Romans, and
Philippians. This work, at which Semler had already made a beginning,
is in itself necessary and interesting. The results, however, prove to
be uncertain and contradictory, because the criteria by which the
deletions, dissections, and combinations are determined, are always
derived from subjective impression.

The one consolation in regard to them is that any importance which
attaches to these results concerns almost exclusively the
pre-canonical literary history of the Epistles and does not affect our
knowledge of the Pauline system. The supposed interpolations are of a
subsidiary character. The text as a whole is hardly seriously affected
by them. The sense is scarcely altered by the dislocations and
conflations by which one critic or another restores the original
letters and releases the present-day reader from the tutelage of the
so inconceivably astute redactor.

It remains to remark that most of the scholars who have occupied
themselves with this work do not trouble themselves very much about
the meaning and the connexion of Paul’s statements, but are like
surgeons who think more of their skill in handling the knife than of
being quite sure about the diagnosis which is to direct the incision,
and therefore not seldom fall victims to the temptation of having
recourse to an operation in cases where it turns out to have been
unnecessary or even injurious._(_116_)_

As a work which stands much above the average of [pg 149] the usual
cutting-up hypotheses we may mention Spitta’s work on Romans._(_117_)_

He distinguishes in the canonical Epistle two writings, a longer one
consisting of, in the main—allowing for incidental
interpolations—chapters i.-xi. with fragments from xv. and xvi., and a
shorter writing which is made up of chapters xii., xiii. and xiv.,
with fragments of xv. and xvi. The longer one, which is the older, is
supposed to have been preserved entire, the shorter is of later
origin, and it lacks the introduction.

The problem of the composite character of the main epistle in
connexion with the address and similar questions, is solved by
supposing that it is a working up of an earlier general treatise
intended for Jewish Christians into a letter addressed to the Roman
Gentile Christians.

The controversy about the much-discussed series of greetings in Rom.
xvi. is disposed of by attaching this to the shorter epistle, which is
held to have been written between the first and second imprisonment.
It is true this solution can only find favour with those who have made
up their minds to take upon them the burdensome hypothesis of the
second imprisonment along with the complete or partial acceptance of
the genuineness of the Pastoral epistles.

In working them up, the redactor is supposed to have followed the
method of bringing in the arguments of the second letter in those
places in the first where they seemed most appropriate. That he showed
no remarkable address in this process is credited to him as a proof of
his historical existence.

Holtzmann has nothing very complimentary to say about the
representatives of the dissection and interpolation criticism. In his
New Testament Theology he reproaches them with “straining out the
gnat,” and indulging in critical vivisection, instead of studying the
[pg 150] currents and undercurrents of Jewish and Hellenistic thought
which run side by side through Paul’s work, and so becoming cured of
their mania.

In connexion with this, it is, however, curious that he himself, when
he was asked why he never lectured on the Epistle to the Romans, used
to say that the composition of Romans was, in his opinion, too
problematical for him to venture to deal with the Epistle, so long as
he was not obliged to do so.




[pg 151]

VI


THE POSITION AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY


1899. _Paul Feine._ Das gesetzesfreie Evangelium des Paulus nach
seinem Werdegange dargestellt. (Paul’s Gospel of Freedom from the Law:
a Study of its Growth.)

_Paul Wernle._ Paulus als Heidenmissionar. (Paul as a Missionary to
the Gentiles.)

_Heinrich Weinel._ Paulus als kirchlicher Organisator. (Paul as a
Church Organiser.)

_Hermann Jakoby._ Neutestamentliche Ethik. (New Testament Ethics.)

1900. _Arthur Titius._ Der Paulinismus unter dem Gesichtspunkt der
Seligkeit. (Paulinism with Special Reference to Final Salvation.)

_A. Drescher._ Das Leben Jesu bei Paulus. (The Life of Jesus in Paul’s
Writings.)

_Karl Dick._ Der schriftstellerische Plural bei Paulus. (The Literary
Use of the First Person Plural in Paul’s Writings.)

_Adolf Harnack._ Das Wesen des Christentums. (Translated under the
title “What is Christianity?”)

1901. _Paul Wernle._ Die Anfänge unserer Religion. (Translated under
the title “The Beginnings of Christianity.”)

1902. _Otto Pfleiderer._ Das Urchristentum, seine Schriften und
Lehren. (Primitive Christianity, its Documents and Doctrines.) Second,
revised and extended edition. (Translated, 4 vols., London,
1906-1911.)

_Paul Feine._ Jesus Christus und Paulus.

_G. F. Heinrici._ Das Urchristentum. (Primitive Christianity.)

1903. _Georg Hollmann._ Urchristentum in Corinth. (Primitive
Christianity in Corinth.)

_Emil Sokolowski._ Die Begriffe Geist und Leben bei Paulus in ihrer
Beziehung zu einander. (The Conceptions of “Spirit” and “Life” in
Paul, in their Relations to one another.)

_Wilhelm Bousset._ Die Religion des Judentums im neutestamentlichen
Zeitalter. (The Religion of Judaism in New Testament Times.) Die
jüdische Apokalyptik, ihre religionsgeschichtliche Herkunft und ihre
Bedeutung für das Neue Testament. (Jewish Apocalyptic: its Origin as
indicated by Comparative Religion, and its Significance for the New
Testament.)

[pg 152]

_Paul Volz._ Jüdische Eschatologie von Daniel bis Akiba. (Jewish
Eschatology from Daniel to Akiba.)

_W. Heitmüller._ Taufe und Abendmahl bei Paulus. (Baptism and the
Lord’s Supper in Paul’s Teaching.)

_Martin Brückner._ Die Entstehung der paulinischen Christologie. (How
the Pauline Christology arose.)

1904. _Heinrich Weinel._ Paulus. (E. T. St. Paul: The Man and his
Work, 1906.)

_Ernst von Dobschütz._ Die Probleme des apostolischen Zeitalters. (The
Problems of the Apostolic Age.)

_Maurice Goguel._ L’Apôtre Paul et Jésus-Christ.

_Alfred Juncker._ Die Ethik des Apostels Paulus.

_William Wrede._ Paulus. (E. T. by E. Lummis, 1907.)

1905. _Hugo Gressmann._ Der Ursprung der israelitisch-jüdischen
Eschatologie. (The Origin of the Israelitish-Jewish Eschatology.)

1906. _Paul Feine._ Paulus als Theologe. (Paul as a Theologian.)

_P. Kölbing._ Die geistige Einwirkung der Person Jesu auf Paulus. (The
Spiritual Influence of the Person of Jesus upon Paul.)

_Eberhard Vischer._ Die Paulusbriefe. (The Pauline Epistles.)

_Wilhelm Karl._ Beiträge zum Verständnis der soteriologischen
Erfahrungen und Spekulationen des Apostels Paulus. (Contributions
towards the Understanding of the Soteriological Experiences and
Speculations of the Apostle Paul.)

_W. Bousset._ Der Apostel Paulus.

1907. _Adolf Jülicher._ Paulus und Jesus.

_Arnold Meyer._ Wer hat das Christentum gegründet, Jesus oder Paulus?
(Who founded Christianity, Jesus or Paul?)

_A. Schettler._ Die paulinische Formel “Durch Christus.” (The Pauline
Formula “through Christ.”)

_J. Wellhausen._ Israelitische und jüdische Geschichte (6th ed.).

1908. _Carl Munzinger._ Paulus in Corinth.

_Hans Windisch._ Die Entsündigung des Christen nach Paulus. (The
Purification of the Christian from Sin in Paul’s Teaching.)

_Reinhold Seeberg._ Dogmengeschichte. (History of Dogma.) 2nd edition.

_Wilhelm Walther._ Pauli Christentum, Jesu Evangelium.

1909. _Adolf Harnack._ Dogmengeschichte. 4th edition.

_Martin Dibelius._ Die Geisterwelt im Glauben des Paulus. (The World
of Spirits according to Paul’s Belief.)

_Johannes Weiss._ Paulus und Jesus. (E. T. by H. T. Chaytor, 1909.)
Christus: Die Anfänge des Dogmas. (Christ: The Beginning of Dogma. E.
T. by V. D. Davis, 1911.)

_Johann Haussleiter._ Paulus.

_R. Knopf._ Paulus.

_W. Olschewski._ Die Wurzeln der paulinischen Christologie. (The Roots
of Pauline Christologie.)

1910. _A. Schlatter._ Neutestamentliche Theologie.

[pg 153]

_R. Drescher._ Das Leben Jesu bei Paulus.

_Eberhard Vischer._ Der Apostel Paulus und sein Werk.

_Julius Schniewind._ Die Begriffe Wort und Evangelium bei Paulus (The
Meaning of the Terms “Word” and “Gospel” in Paul’s Writings.)

1911. _Adolf Deissmann._ Paulus, eine kultur- und
religionsgeschichtliche Skizze. (Paul, A Sketch with a Background of
Ancient Civilisation and Religion.)

_Johannes Müller._ Die Entstehung des persönlichen Christentums der
paulinischen Gemeinden. (How the personal Christianity of the Pauline
Churches arose.)


THE dawn of the twentieth century found Pauline scholarship in a
peculiar frame of mind. The criticism of the Ultra-Tübingen critics
had not succeeded in disquieting it, nor Holtzmann in reassuring it.

That the problems by which Loman, Steck, and van Manen were tormented
were mere cobwebs of the imagination was so completely taken for
granted that in dealing with the Pauline teaching no further attention
was paid to them. On the other hand, however, the problems previously
recognised by critical scholarship had not been so completely solved
by Holtzmann that they could be considered as done with.

The disquisitions in which in his “New Testament Theology” he resumed
the results of the whole study of the subject since Baur, did not have
the effect which he had expected. They were much discussed and much
praised; the massive learning and wide reading, the art of the
literary treatment and the subtlety of the dialectic compelled
admiration. But behind all this chorus of appreciation, a certain
sense of depression made itself felt. People were dismayed to find
that Paulinism was so complicated, and that the web of Paul’s thought
must be so delicately and cautiously handled if it was to be
disentangled. Was the doctrine of the Apostle of the Gentiles really a
product of such extremely intricate mental processes as it was here
represented to be?

The process of disillusionment did not go so far as to lead to the
calling in question of the fundamental view there offered. But results
were not put forward with [pg 154] the same confidence as before;
effort was directed rather to strengthen them by revision and
correction.

It was in this frame of mind that Pfleiderer prepared the second
edition of his “Primitive Christianity.”_(_118_)_ Whereas he had
formerly taken for granted the influence of the Greek world upon Paul,
as being something self-evident, he now feels obliged to offer proof
of it, in a newly inserted chapter upon Hellenism, Stoicism, and
Seneca, in order to arrive at the result . . . that his Greek
education was in any case “a problematical possibility.” While he had
previously held that the combination of the Alexandrian Platonic
doctrine of immortality with eschatology was the great work
accomplished by the Apostle of the Gentiles, he now is inclined to see
a spiritualisation of the future-hope already prepared for in Judaism,
and quotes the Apocalypse of Ezra and Jewish Hellenistic literature in
testimony of this._(_119_)_

Fate willed that about the same time theology should be seized by the
impulse of popularisation, and now found itself in the position of
being obliged to offer assured, absolutely assured, results in
reference to Paulinism. The most important works of this character are
Paul Wernle’s “Beginnings of Christianity” and Heinrich Weinel’s
“Paul.”_(_120_)_

[pg 155]

The efforts of these writers are directed to bring the author and his
thoughts into close relations with our time. It is not his theology in
its subtleties and its contradictions that they seek to grasp and to
portray, but his religion—what lies behind the system and the formula.
In this way they hope to escape many difficulties over which Holtzmann
had laboured, and to be able to bring out the fundamental and
intelligible elements which in him had been rather to seek.

Wernle makes Paul discourse in the character of the great missionary
apologist; Weinel draws him as the preacher of the religion of
inwardness, who as “Pharisee,” “Seeker after God,” “prophet,”
“apostle,” “founder of the Church,” “theologian,” and “man,” was all
things in one.

The lively portraiture, quite different from the conventional works on
the subject, found a ready welcome, and incited others to imitation.

In consistently emphasising the apologetic aspect of Paul’s teaching
Wernle brought up many ingenious ideas for discussion. Weinel, on his
part, brought again to the consciousness of both theologians and
laymen the poetic and emotional element in the Apostle’s world of
ideas.

But they found no new way of grasping and understanding him.

They walk in a shady path which runs parallel to the main road. But
its pleasantness is associated with certain dangers, which they
themselves, and those who followed them, have not always escaped.

When earlier writers on the subject modernised, they did so
unconsciously. Wernle and Weinel, however, do [pg 156] so on
principle, and have no scruple about throwing light on what is obscure
in Paulinism by the use of more or less appropriate catchwords of the
most modern theology.

Not seldom they imagine they are explaining something when they are in
reality only talking round the subject. In this way there enters into
their treatment a kind of forced ingenuity, one might almost say
flimsiness.

Their love of graphic description also sometimes becomes a temptation
to them. They do not always remember to keep it within bounds, and
sometimes allow themselves to fall into a kind of artificial naïveté.
Wernle in particular delights to wield a pre-Raphaelite brush. He
pictures the Apostle, for instance, in the evening at his inn,
receiving visitors, exhorting and consoling them, weaving tent-cloth,
busy with a letter, all at the same time. “Sometimes stones would come
flying into the room as he was dictating—the Jews had set on the city
mob to attack him. Many an abrupt transition in his letters may have
had its origin in a violent interruption of this kind.”_(_121_)_

Feine and Titius begin with a critical examination of previous views.
They are not in this wholly disinterested, being in search of a
Paulinism which has more to offer to modern religion, as they apprehend
it, than the one-sidedly historical post-Baur liberalism. The result
is that while they show themselves free from many of the
presuppositions and prejudices which are common to the others, they
are at the same time not in a position to put Paulinism on a new
historical basis. They agree [pg 157] in opposing the separation of
Paulinism from Primitive Christianity which is practised by Holsten
and Holtzmann. They refuse to be converted to the unsatisfactory view
that Paulinism, as being a so unique personal creation, must have
remained unintelligible even to Paul’s contemporaries. Before making
up their minds to derive the whole of Paul’s doctrine from the vision
at his conversion and the influence of Greek ideas, they propose to
examine it in reference to the conceptions which connect it with
Jesus, with primitive Christianity, and with Judaism.

Consequently they are loth to admit Greek elements and the resulting
duality in the Apostle’s thought. Feine maintains that in the
Apostle’s mind before his conversion, Greek ideas were only present in
so far as they had already been adopted by Pharisaism. Titius “will
not deny that there is a touch of Hellenism in the great Apostle,” but
is far from seeking to explain the doctrine of flesh and spirit and
the mysticism connected with the “new creation” purely from this point
of view. On the other hand both of them assign a large part in the
formation of Paul’s doctrine to his Jewish consciousness, and
consequently are led to a comprehensive recognition of eschatology.

In his examination of the individual views Titius always takes the
future-hope as his starting-point—indeed his book begins with chapters
on God and eschatology. He shows that redemption, in the most general
conception of it, is a liberation from the present evil world and a
deliverance looking to the world which is to come, and that
justification was originally bound up with the thought of the judgment
at the parousia. Instead, however, of systematically carrying out the
analysis in this fashion, he breaks off and begins to work up the
historical material which he has brought to light on the lines of the
problems, definitions, and distinctions of modern theology, because,
as the very title of his book shows, he undertakes his investigation
with a view [pg 158] to showing the significance of New Testament
teaching for the present day. In order to portray the “religious life”
he makes it a principle “not to hesitate to turn aside from the
highway, to which the technical terms serve as sign-posts.” Thus he
comes finally to discover everywhere that Paul clarified the doctrines
which he took over and transformed them into ethico-religious teaching
and subjective experience. From “the edifice of
eschatologico-enthusiastic thought, most closely connected with it but
unmistakable in its distinctive character,” he sees, to his
satisfaction, “the spiritual life of the new religion” showing forth.

Here also, therefore, as with Wernle and Weinel, there is conscious
and intentional modernisation, in order to discover the religion of
Paul behind his theology.

One difference there is, however. The others brought to this
undertaking a certain naïveté and enthusiasm which enabled them to see
the modern and the historical the one in the other. Titius is an
observer with a keen eye for the really historical. He holds past and
present side by side but separate, and must apply a mighty effort of
will and understanding and do violence to his feelings in order to
bring them into connexion. Out of these inner pangs a book has come to
the birth which in matters of detail is full of just and suggestive
remarks, but as a whole is unsatisfactory.

The problem of the relation of Paul to Jesus stands for Titius and
Feine as the foreground of the interest. Both hold the view that the
connexion is a much closer one than criticism had hitherto been
prepared to admit. The indifference which the Apostle professes
regarding “Christ after the flesh” is not to be understood in the
sense that he had no concern with His teaching. In his detailed
monograph Feine endeavours to prove that Paul shows himself familiar
with the words and thoughts of the historic Jesus, and in his
eschatology, doctrine of redemption, ethics, attitude towards the law,
and conception of baptism and the Lord’s Supper, only carries to a
further [pg 159] point of development what is already present or
fore-shadowed in the teaching of Jesus. Titius set himself the same
task, and believes himself to have proved “to how great an extent the
Apostle bases his views on the thoughts of Jesus, attaches himself to
them, and further develops them.”_(_122_)_

This result is opposed by Maurice Goguel,_(_123_)_ who offers a
thoroughgoing defence of the usual view. He is prepared to admit that
Paul knew more of the life and teaching of Jesus than his Epistles
show; but a fundamental difference in doctrine is, he thinks, not to
be denied, and he finds that it consists in the fact that the one
preaches “salvation,” the other the way of obtaining it. In his
utterances about redemption through the death and resurrection of
Christ, the parousia, Christology, Church and sacraments, Paul
expresses, according to Goguel, views which go much beyond the horizon
of the historical Jesus. A point of contact is only to be found in the
simple ethical teaching. In reference to the law, Jesus prepared the
way for what the Apostle of the Gentiles accomplished, without fully
measuring the far-reaching consequences of his attitude.

The problem which theology since the time of Baur had always avoided
now therefore came at last to discussion. Goguel’s essay did not
indeed greatly elucidate the matter. That the thesis of Feine and
Titius goes far beyond what the material warrants was not difficult to
prove. On the other hand, it had, in justice, to be conceded to them
that they had shown that there was [pg 160] something in common
between the fundamental conceptions of Jesus and Paul on which
sufficient stress had not previously been laid.

Goguel’s sharp antitheses are at first sight more convincing than the
somewhat involved argument of Feine, because he has the direct
evidence of the text on his side. The difficulty, however, immediately
makes itself felt when he endeavours to make it intelligible exactly
why Paul was forced to create new conceptions. He cannot point to any
objective factors to account for this development, and is consequently
reduced to explaining everything psychologically.

From this exceedingly complicated controversy one thing results with
certainty, namely, that the problem, in the form in which it is
stated, is an unreal one. The statement of the problem which is here
presupposed leaves out of account the middle term, primitive
Christianity.

The credit of having expressed this clearly, and thus put an end to
the unprofitable wrangling about “Jesus and Paul” and “Jesus or Paul,”
belongs to Harnack._(_124_)_ If, he writes in the 1909 edition of his
“History of Dogma,” even in the first generation the religion of Jesus
underwent a change, it must be said that it was not Paul who was
responsible for this but the primitive Christian community. He is not,
however, able to explain why the Apostle of the Gentiles goes still
further than the primitive community.

The question of the peculiarly inconsistent attitude of the Apostle
towards the law is not elucidated by Titius and Feine.

The ethics are treated in monographs by Jakoby and Juncker._(_125_)_
The former gives a detailed description. [pg 161] The latter tries to
discover the fundamental principle, and naturally finds himself
obliged to deal with the whole doctrine of redemption. In the method
which he applies he recalls Titius. With historical insight he
recognises, in his fine chapter upon the origin of the new life, that
all the ethical conceptions of Paul are in one way or another of an
eschatological and “physical” character. Later on he falls a victim to
the temptation to modernise.

Thus he tries, for instance, to show that Paul did not think of the
influence of the Spirit in man as analogous to a physical process,
but, on the contrary, “regarded the feeling of thankful love towards
God and Christ as the subjective root of the new way of life.” So that
we find here, too, the dread of recognising anything objective in the
Apostle’s views and the tendency, not indeed to fall into the
“one-sidedly intellectual view,” but to bring into the foreground the
“specifically religious estimate of the Apostle’s person and gospel.”

It is no accident that the scholars of this period are so anxious to
distinguish between theology and religion. This expedient covers
dismay and apprehension.

Meanwhile the study of Late Judaism had been going its own way. The
further it advanced the more evident it became that this was the soil
on which the theology of Paul had grown up. Holtzmann’s New Testament
Theology had not availed to render theological science proof against
the assaults which it was to experience in the next few years from
this direction. The impression was too strong to be escaped. And when
the results [pg 162] of the study were presented, with a certain
provisional completeness, in Bousset’s powerful book on “Jewish
Religious Life in New Testament Times,” it became certain that the
apprehension had not been unfounded._(_126_)_

The naïve spiritualisation of the theology as practised by Holsten,
Pfleiderer, and Holtzmann—by the latter no longer quite naïvely,—was
over and done with._(_127_)_ The recognition of a “physical”_(_128_)_
aspect in Paul’s expectations of the future was no longer sufficient.
It had to be [pg 163] admitted that his doctrine of redemption as a
whole bore this character, and that the fundamental strain in his
mysticism was not ethical but physical, as Lüdemann had declared as
long ago as 1872 without suspecting the far-reaching consequences of
his observation.

The only question now was how much had to be conceded to this alien
system of thought which was endeavouring to draw Paul within its
borders, and how much could be saved from it.

In this quandary theologians had recourse to the expedient of applying
the distinction between “theoretical” (theological) and “religious” to
the doctrine of the Apostle, as Holtzmann had already tried to do when
he could no longer refuse to recognise its Gnostic, intellectualistic
character.

The position became especially critical in view of the concessions
which had to be made regarding the Pauline conception of baptism and
the Lord’s Supper. Up to this time, that chapter had given little
trouble to theological science. It had been taken for granted that at
bottom it could only be a question of symbolism. The doctrine of
redemption on its ethical side found, it was thought, in the sacred
ceremonies its cultual expression.

Holtzmann, too, in the section on “Mystical Conceptions”_(_129_)_
_(Mysteriöses)_ had still to all intents and purposes taken the same
ground. Baptism and the Lord’s Supper are, he explains, in the first
place, acts of confession by which the death of the Lord is
proclaimed. To this has to be added, in the case of the Lord’s Supper,
the significance of a communion meal, and in the case of baptism the
value of a symbolic act. It creates, according to Romans vi., a
mystical fellowship with the buried and risen Christ. “The outward
symbol of complete immersion signifies and represents the
disappearance of the old, fleshly man, the coming forth out of the
water represents the forthgoing of a new, spiritual man.”

Paul, Holtzmann thinks, puts the content of his [pg 164] “experience”
into this ceremonial act, and thereby cuts it loose from the earlier
view which had arisen from its connexion with John the Baptist.
Strictly speaking, he transforms both the cultus-acts, by bringing his
new conception of Christianity into connexion with them in order to
give it cultual expression.

Probably—we are still following Holtzmann—he did this under the
guidance of analogies which he found in the Mystery-religions of the
period. The expressions which he uses at any rate remind us sometimes
of the language which is associated with them. This, then, was the
point from which the later transformation began. “It was, in fact,
Paul who from an outlying, one might almost say a remote point of his
system of thought, opened up for the early Catholic Church a road
which it would, indeed, most probably have followed even without this
precedent, which was given, as it were, merely incidentally and
casually.”

It is interesting to observe precisely what views are intended to be
excluded by these guarded explanations. Holtzmann is concerned to
emphasise the view that baptism and the Lord’s Supper have in the
Apostle’s doctrine a rather subordinate importance, and that they are
not real sacraments but quasi-sacramental acts. He deliberately avoids
the plain issue, on which after all everything really depends, whether
baptism and the Supper effect redemption or only represent it.

But those who came after him were obliged to raise this question, and
so far as they were willing to respect the documents were obliged to
answer that the sacraments not only represent but effect redemption.
Wernle remarks regretfully that the cultus-acts have in Paul a much
greater importance than one would be inclined to expect, and that in
certain passages he tolerates or even suggests “pagan” views. Weinel
is obliged to admit that alongside of the religion of inwardness which
he has discovered in the Apostle’s teaching, a sacramental religion,
which is inherently opposed to it, from time to [pg 165] time appears.
“Sometimes,” he writes, “it is faith that brings the Spirit, sometimes
baptism, sometimes it is faith that unites with Christ, sometimes the
Lord’s Supper.” Titius feels himself obliged to give up the symbolical
interpretation of Romans vi., which for Holtzmann still forms a fixed
datum, and admits that the atmosphere of this chapter is
“supranaturalistic,” and that the baptism there referred to is a real
baptism into the death of Christ and an equally real partaking in His
resurrection. Feine, in _Jesus Christus and Paulus,_ insists that the
sacramental character of the cultus-acts described by Paul should be
universally acknowledged.

Heitmüller, in his work on “Baptism and the Lord’s Supper in Paul’s
Writings,”_(_130_)_ gives the old and the new view side by side, and
shows that it is the latter which alone is justified by the documents.
The mystical connexion which in baptism and the Lord’s Supper is set
up between the believer and Christ is a “physico-hyperphysical one,”
and has as its consequence that the believer shares _realiter_ in the
death and resurrection of Christ.

For the liberal conception of Paulinism this was a blow at the heart.
If redemption is effected through the sacraments, these are no longer
an “outlying point” in the Apostle’s doctrine, but lie at its centre.
And at the same time the distinction between “theoretical”
(theological) and “religious” is rendered impossible. A doctrine of
redemption which is thus bound up with Mysteries which work in a
physico-hyperphysical way is in its essence purely
supernaturalistic._(_131_)_

[pg 166]

The courage of theological thinkers was put to a severe test. When
Baur and his followers made their profession of faith in unbiassed
free investigation they could have had no inkling that it would become
so difficult for a later generation to remain true to this principle.

To give up the distinction between “theoretical” and religious and to
follow a purely historical method meant, as things stood at the
beginning of the twentieth century, to be left with an entirely
temporally conditioned Paulinism, of which modern ways of thought
could make nothing, and to trace out a system which for our religion
is dead.

At this crisis theology encountered in William Wrede a candid friend
who sought to keep it in the path of sincerity. His _Paulus,_ short
and written in such a way as to be universally intelligible, appeared
in the year 1904._(_132_)_

The “theology,” he writes, is in Paul not to be separated from the
“religion.” His religion is through and through theological; his
theology is his religion.

The theory which Holtzmann introduced in his “New Testament Theology,”
and which Wernle, Weinel, Heitmüller, Titius, and the rest had
developed, thus came to an untimely end before it had left its nonage.
It survived only seven years.

And then the second expedient—that Paul had thought out no system, but
just put down his thoughts in any kind of fortuitous order—is set
aside. The framework of the doctrine of redemption, Wrede declares, is
very closely articulated. Further, it is not really complicated, but
is at bottom quite simple, if once we take account of the
thought-material out of which it is constructed and take the most
general conceptions as the starting-point.

Redemption—this is, according to Wrede, Paul’s train [pg 167] of
thought—is not something which takes place in the individual as such,
as the later Christian view was, but signifies a universal event in
which the individual has a part.

It consists in the deliverance of mankind from the dominion of the
powers which hold sway over this world. These powers have been
destroyed by the death and resurrection of Jesus, as will become
manifest at the parousia. Thus redemption is essentially an insurance
for this future.

But it is even in the present real, though not visible. Christ is the
representative of the human race. What happened to Him, happened to
all.

“All men are therefore from the moment of His death set free, as He is
Himself, from the hostile powers; and all are by His resurrection
transferred into a condition of indestructible life.” The proof of
this change is given by the Spirit. He represents in the redeemed the
super-earthly life, as a “gift of the last times in which the powers
of the world to come already exercise an influence upon the present
existence.”

This wholly “objective” conception of redemption is, Wrede admits, for
our modern modes of thought rather impersonal and cold. “It takes
place in a way which is wholly external to the individual man, and the
events seem, as it were, to be only enacted in Christ.”

Redemption is effected in the sacraments. “The ‘physical’
transformation is effected by physical processes.” Paul’s thought
moves, therefore, among crude, unsubtilised conceptions.

His statements about justification by faith and about the law are
based upon this fundamental view, and represent merely the
“controversial teaching” to which he was forced in order to maintain
the cause of freedom from the law.

The material of his world of thought was, therefore, Jewish. What was
the transformation by which it became Christian?

[pg 168]

Paul’s conception of the Christ_(_133_)_ was fully formed before he
came to believe in Jesus. At his conversion, by the vision on the road
to Damascus, the only new element that he took up into his conception
was that this heavenly being had temporarily assumed a human form of
existence in order by His death and resurrection to redeem mankind and
to bring in the new order of things. An influence of the teaching of
Jesus upon the theology of the Apostle to the Gentiles is not to be
recognised. Wrede makes the gap between the two as wide as possible,
and insists that Paul’s gospel must be considered as independent of,
and essentially different in character from, that of Jesus.

The Apostle’s adoption of the view that the end of the law had come,
is, according to Wrede, partly due to his experiences at his
conversion, partly to the exigencies of the mission to the Gentiles.

Of the value and the remarkable literary beauty of the book it is
impossible to say too much. It belongs, not to theology, but to the
literature of the world.

But one must not, in one’s admiration, forget justice. What is here
set forth is not absolutely new. A view of a similar character, and
more closely reasoned, had been put forward by
Kabisch—Kabisch,_(_134_)_ whom theologians had passed over in complete
silence, because they did not know what to make of him. Wrede does
nothing else than to give to the presentation of the latter’s
discoveries the advantage of his literary skill, while at the same
time showing that the separation of “theory” (theology) and “religion”
which had barred the way to their acceptance is not tenable. There is
one thing which is to be regretted in Wrede’s book, and that is that
the terse popular method of presentation forbids any detailed
discussion of the problems. If the author had worked [pg 169] out his
arguments thoroughly, and replied to his opponents and predecessors,
he would have been obliged to face many questions which, as it was,
did not force themselves upon him.

What are the points that remain obscure?

Wrede proposes to conceive the possibility of redemption in such a way
that “mankind,” in view of Christ’s solidarity with the race by virtue
of His earthly life, has a part in His death and resurrection. This
view is, in this form, untenable. In Paul, salvation has not reference
to mankind as a whole, but only to the elect. It is also questionable
whether the idea of racial solidarity suffices to explain how the
death and resurrection of Jesus can realise themselves in other men.

What is the basis of the mystical union with Christ? To this question
Wrede has given no answer.

Then, too, the inconsistent attitude of Paul towards the law was not
explained by him. He does not even succeed in showing how the Apostle
arrived at the idea that the law was no longer valid. The suggestion
that it was in part through his experience at his conversion, in part
through the exigencies of the mission to the Gentiles, is a mere
expedient. Unless it is possible to explain Paul’s attitude, with all
its inner contradictions, as a logical and necessary conclusion from
his system as a whole, it remains for us practically
unexplained._(_135_)_

Again, Wrede gives no scheme of the events of the End, although such a
scheme obviously belongs to the “system.”

It is not explained, either, how the death of Jesus can be interpreted
at the same time as taking place for the forgiveness of sins. In
general, the relation between the essential theology, as laid down in
the mystical doctrine of redemption, and the “controversial doctrines”
is not clear.

[pg 170]

In regard to the question of the relation of Paul to Jesus, Wrede
holds that they lived in two wholly different worlds of thought. This
is connected with his view that the Galilaean Master made no claim to
the Messiahship, but was first raised to Messianic dignity after His
death, and that this claim was then projected back into the Gospels in
the form that Jesus had made His rank known to His disciples only, and
had enjoined upon them to keep silence until after His death._(_136_)_
His preaching was, above all things, ethical. So far as concerns
eschatology and the meaning to be attached to His death, the Apostle
of the Gentiles received no impulse of a theological character from
Him.

Paul, therefore, created something essentially new, which has, one
might almost say, nothing to do with the thought of Jesus, and also
goes far beyond the conceptions of primitive Christianity._(_137_)_

Thus for Wrede, as for Holsten and Holtzmann, the doctrine of Paul is
an isolated entity without connexion in the past or influence upon the
future. And he, too, finds himself unable to explain why the system
thus remained without influence. That the “controversial theology,”
with its insistence on the atoning death, lost its significance when
the question of the law ceased to be actual may appear plausible. But
why did the mystical doctrine of redemption get pushed aside instead
of being further developed? Its presuppositions—if Wrede’s account of
[pg 171] matters is correct—could hardly have been much altered in the
next generation.

A valuable supplement in many respects to Wrede’s views is offered by
Martin Brückner’s study of the origin of the Pauline
Christology._(_138_)_

The author offers a detailed proof that the Pauline Christology arose
by the insertion of the earthly episode of the incarnation, dying and
rising again into the already present conception of a pre-existent
heavenly Personality._(_139_)_ Incidentally he gives an admirably
clear account of the Jewish eschatology and its formation._(_140_)_

He shows that the Jewish eschatology itself, in the Apocalypses of
Ezra and Baruch, distinguished between the temporally limited
Messianic Kingdom and the subsequent complete renewal of the world,
and that, in conformity with this, two resurrections have to be
recognised. One, in which only a limited number have a part, takes
place at the appearance of the Messiah; the other, the general
resurrection, only follows at the end of the intervening Kingdom. The
scene of the latter was pictured, he thinks, by Paul, as by his Jewish
predecessors, as the land of Palestine, with the New Jerusalem as its
centre.

It is interesting to notice how Wrede and Brückner, without themselves
remarking it, have refuted one of the weightiest objections of the
Ultra-Tübingen critics. [pg 172] The latter had asserted that it was
impossible that the process of deification of the Person of Jesus
could have reached its completion within a few years, and had claimed
for it at least two generations. Now, however, it is shown that it is
not this process at all, but another, which could take place in a
moment, which has to be considered, since it is only a question of the
taking up of the episode of the incarnation, death, and resurrection
into the already present and living conception of the Messiah.

The immediate effect of Wrede’s presentation of matters was that
writers ventured more confidently to accept the “physical” view of the
Pauline doctrine of redemption, and that the distinction between
“theory” (theology) and religion, where writers could not make up
their minds to do without it, was applied with moderation._(_141_)_

[pg 173]

But he did not succeed in forcing on a thorough revision of previous
views. Harnack, for instance, in the 1909 edition of the “History of
Dogma” stands by his account of 1893, unshaken._(_142_)_

Reinhold Seeberg_(_143_)_ undertook in 1908 a very interesting attempt
to walk in new paths, but does not deal with Wrede and his problems.
He holds to the view that the Apostle did not create “a unified
system,” but that his thought moved amid a number of different sets of
ideas, which for him were held together by “religion as an
experience.”

This neglect of Wrede’s work does not mean anything; it was simply
that the history of dogma could make nothing of his view. It is
significant, however, that among those who accepted his view in
substance, no one made the attempt to carry it to victory by a
comprehensive presentation of it on an adequate scale.

The cause of this lies in the peculiar difficulties which lie
concealed in the scheme which he sketched out.

The fact is that the “physical” element which is to be recognised in
Paul’s doctrine is neither all of one piece nor wholly to be explained
from Late Judaism. Strictly [pg 174] speaking, it takes three
different forms, of which one is peculiar to the eschatology, another
to the mystical doctrine of redemption, and the third to the
sacraments.

The “materialism” of the conception of redemption which is directed
towards the future has to do with super-earthly powers, with judgment,
bodily resurrection and transformation.

Somewhat different is the “realism” of the mystical doctrine of the
new creation, which asserts that believers here and now experience
death and resurrection in fellowship with Christ, and so put on,
beneath the earthly exterior which conceals it, a nature essentially
immune from corruption.

Different from this conception again is the sacramental, inasmuch as
it represents in some inexplicable fashion an externalisation of it.
What, according to the mystical doctrine, seemed to take place by
itself without being connected with an external act, is here to be
thought of as the effect of eating and drinking, and cleansing with
water. The sacramental conception is a magical conception.

Of these three varieties of the “physical,” only the first can be
immediately explained from Late Judaism. For the two others it offers
no analogy. Late Judaism remained true to its Judaic character in
knowing nothing of either mysticism or sacraments.

On the other hand, these three varieties of the “physical” in Paul’s
doctrine of redemption do not stand side by side unrelated, but seem
to be somehow connected in such a way that the eschatological element
dominates and supplies the basis of the other two. The most obvious
procedure would have been to attempt to derive the mystical and
sacramental conceptions from the eschatological, as being the
root-conception.

A beginning in this direction had been made by Kabisch when he
attempted to exhibit the connexion between eschatology and the
mystical doctrine of the real dying and rising again with
Christ._(_144_)_

[pg 175]

But in doing so he did not take into account the sacraments. It was
just these, however, which seemed to make it _a priori_ impossible to
explain Paulinism exclusively on the basis of Late Judaism. Therefore
Wrede and his followers seek other sources. They try to explain the
system, not solely from the side of eschatology, but from that of
“Comparative Religion,” and hold that it betrays the influence not
only of Late-Jewish but also of Oriental ideas generally, such as are
found in the Mystery-religions.

No doubt the first question which here arises is whether the methods
of Comparative Religion are essentially applicable to the explanation
of Paulinism.

To apply the methods of Comparative Religion means to study the
individual religions, not in isolation, but with the purpose of
investigating the mutual influences which they have openly or covertly
exercised on one another.

At bottom, therefore, it is a necessary outcome of the application of
scientific methods generally, and it only received a special name
because theological scholarship so long shut its doors against it.

Under this distinctive name the method attained to influence and
honour in connexion with the critical study of the Old Testament and
the Graeco-Oriental cults. In the former department of study it made
an end of the prepossession that Judaism had developed entirely by its
own inner impulses, and showed how much material of a generally
Oriental character it had adopted. In particular it showed that
Late-Jewish Apocalyptic is full of conceptions from the Babylonian and
the Irano-Zarathustrian religions, and represents a combination of
universal cosmological speculations with the future-hope of the
ancient Jewish prophetism._(_145_)_

In the comparative study of the heathen religions it became apparent
that the Mystery-religions, which [pg 176] entered on their conquering
progress westwards about the same time as Christian Gnosticism,
combined Greek religious feeling and a Greek cosmogony with Oriental
cultus-ideas.

In both these cases it is a question of contacts and influences which
were due to political and cultural relations, and produced their
effect in the course of extended periods of time and under favourable
historical circumstances. The method cannot simply be applied without
more ado to the explanation of the ideas of an individual man, since
most of its presuppositions would not here be valid. In the case of
religions, syncretism can work its way in and develop; in the case of
individuals it can only be recognised in a very limited degree. The
taking over and remoulding of foreign conceptions is a process
requiring numbers and time. The individual comes into question only so
far as he is organically united with a community which is active in
this way, and allows its instincts to influence him.

Paul belongs to Late Judaism. Whatever he received in the way of
influences such as Comparative Religion takes account of came to him
mainly through this channel. The suggestion that apart from this he
might be personally and directly affected by “Oriental” influences
calls for very cautious consideration. In particular we ought to be
very careful to guard against raising this possibility to a certainty
by general considerations regarding all that the child of the Diaspora
might have seen, heard, and read. The question can only be decided by
what we actually find in the Epistles.

It is further to be remarked that Late Judaism was no longer in his
time so open to external influences that any and every kind of
religious conception which was floating about anywhere in the Orient
could necessarily impose itself on Paul’s mind through this medium.
The period of assimilation was, speaking generally, at an end. The new
material had been—before Paul’s day—worked up along with the old into
a set of Apocalyptic conceptions, [pg 177] which, in spite of the
elbow-room which the heterogeneous ideas necessarily claimed for
themselves, did form a system, and appeared from without as relatively
complete and self-sufficing. The Oriental material has been poured
into Jewish moulds and received a Jewish impress.

A still further point is that any one whose thought moves in the
Apocalyptic system created by the books of Daniel and Enoch is not so
much exposed to, as withdrawn from, the action of free Oriental
influence. He is already saturated with those elements in regard to
receptivity which the Jewish mind possesses and the tendency to
assimilation, and possesses it not as something foreign to himself but
as Jewish. Apocalyptic tends to produce in him immunisation as against
further syncretistic infection.

This assertion is susceptible of historical proof. Late Judaism
stands, even before the beginning of our era, apart from the Oriental
religious movements. And it continues unaffected by them. Not one of
its representatives was concerned in the syncretistic movement. Philo
seeks to rationalise Judaism by the aid of Platonico-Stoic philosophy,
but he gives no place to the religious and cultural ideas by which he
was surrounded in Egypt. It is as though they had no existence for
him.

To apply the comparative method to Paul would, therefore, generally
speaking, mean nothing more or less than to explain him on the basis
of Late Judaism. Those who give due weight to the eschatological
character of his doctrine and to the problems and ideas which connect
it with works like the Apocalypse of Ezra are the true exponents of
“Comparative Religion,” even though they may make no claim to this
title. Any one who goes beyond this and tries to bring Paul into
direct connexion with the Orient as such commits himself to the
perilous path of scientific adventure.

Considerations of that kind were not taken into account by Wrede and
his followers. But even if they had become conscious of the
difficulties in the way of the application of the method to Paul, they
could not have acted otherwise. [pg 178] In spite of all theoretical
warnings this path had to be followed.

If once the mystical doctrine of the dying and rising again with
Christ is recognised to be “physical,” and the view of baptism and the
Supper to be sacramental, and if it is a further datum of the question
that Late Judaism knows nothing of mysticism or sacraments; and if one
is not content to assume that the Apostle has created or invented this
non-Jewish element out of his inner consciousness; there is at first
sight no alternative but to make the attempt to explain it from
conceptions and suggestions which are supposed to have come into it
from without, from some form or other of Oriental syncretism.




[pg 179]

VII


PAULINISM AND COMPARATIVE RELIGION


_Gustav Anrich._ Das antike Mysterienwesen in seinem Einfluss auf das
Christentum. (The Ancient Mysteries in their Influence on
Christianity.) 1894.

_Martin Brückner._ Der sterbende und auferstehende Gottheiland in den
orientalischen Religionen und ihr Verhältnis zum Christentum. (The
Saviour-God who dies and rises again in the Oriental Religions; and
their Relation to Christianity.) 1908.

_Karl Clemen._ Religionsgeschichtliche Erklärung des Neuen Testaments.
(An Explanation of the New Testament on the basis of Comparative
Religion.) 1909.

_Franz Cumont._ Les Mystères de Mithra. 1899. (E. T. by T. J.
McCormack, 1903.) Les Religions orientales dans le paganisme romain.
1906.

_Adolf Deissmann._ Licht vom Osten. 1908. (E. T. by L. R. M. Strachan,
“Light from the Ancient East,” 1910.) Die Urgeschichte des
Christentums im Lichte der Sprachforschung. (The Early History of
Christianity in the Light of Linguistic Research.) 1910.

_Albrecht Dieterich._ Abraxas. 1891. Nekyia. 1893. Eine
Mithrasliturgie. 1903.

_Arthur Drews._ Die Christusmythe. 1909. (E. T. by C. D. Burns.)

_Albert Eichhorn._ Das Abendmahl im Neuen Testament. (The Lord’s
Supper in the New Testament.) 1898.

_Johannes Geffken._ Aus der Werdezeit des Christentums. (From the
Formative Period of Christianity), 2nd ed., 1909.

_P. Gennrich._ Die Lehre von der Wiedergeburt . . in der
dogmengeschichtlichen und religionsgeschichtlichen Betrachtung. (The
Doctrine of Regeneration . . . from the point of view of the History
of Dogma and of Comparative Religion.) 1907.

_Otto Gruppe._ Die griechischen Kulte und Mythen in ihrer Beziehung zu
den orientalischen Religionen. (The Greek Cults and Myths in their
Relation to the Oriental Religions), vol. i., 1887. Griechische
Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte. (Greek Mythology and Comparative
Religion), 2 vols., 1906.

_Hermann Gunkel._ Zum religionsgeschichtlichen Verständnis des Neuen
Testaments. (Contributions to the Understanding of the New Testament
from the point of view of Comparative Religion.) 1903.

[pg 180]

_Adolf Harnack._ Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums in den
ersten drei Jahrhunderten, vol. i., 1906. (E. T. by J. Moffatt, “The
Mission and Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries,”
2nd ed., 1908.)

_Hugo Hepding._ Attis, seine Mythen und sein Kult. (Attis, his Myths
and Cultus.) 1903.

_W. Heitmüller._ Taufe und Abendmahl bei Paulus. (Baptism and the
Lord’s Supper in Paul’s Teaching.) 1903.

Im Namen Jesu. Eine sprach- und religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung
zum neuen Testament, speziell zur altchristlichen Taufe. 1903. (In the
Name of Jesus. A Study of the New Testament from the point of view of
the History of Language and of Comparative Religion, with Special
Reference to Early Christian Baptism.)

_Adolf Jacoby._ Die antiken Mysterienreligionen und das Christentum.
(The Ancient Mystery-religions and Christianity.) 1910.

_Georg Mau._ Die Religionsphilosophie Kaiser Julians in seinen Reden
auf König Helios und die Göttermutter. (The Emperor Julian’s
Philosophy of Religion as shown in his Orations on King Helios and the
Dea Mater.) 1908.

_Max Maurenbrecher._ Von Jerusalem nach Rom. (From Jerusalem to Rome.)
1910.

_Salomon Reinach._ Cultes, mythes et religions. (1905-1906-1908.)

Richard Reitzenstein. Poimandres. 1904.

Die hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen. Ihre Grundgedanken und
Wirkungen. (The Hellenistic Mystery-Religions. Their fundamental Ideas
and their Influence.) 1910.

_E. Rohde._ Psyche. 1894. 3rd ed. 1903, 2 vols.

_H. R. Roscher._ Lexikon der griechisch-römischen Mythologie. (Lexicon
of Graeco-Roman Mythology.) 3 vols. 1884-1909.

_Ernst Eduard Schwartz._ Paulus. Charakterköpfe aus der antiken
Literatur. (Character Sketches from Ancient Literature.) 1910.

W. B. Smith. Der vorchristliche Jesus nebst weiteren Vorstudien zur
Entstehungsgeschichte des Urchristentums. (The pre-Christian Jesus,
with other Preliminary Studies for a History of the Origin and Growth
of Christianity.)

_Wilhelm Soltau._ Das Fortleben des Heidentums in der altchristlichen
Kirche. (The Survival of Paganism in the Early Christian Church.)
1906.

_Hermann Usener._ Religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen. (Studies in
Comparative Religion.) 1889; 1899.

_Paul Wendland._ Die hellenistisch-römische Kultur in ihren
Beziehungen zu Judentum und Christentum. (Hellenistic-Roman
Civilisation in Relation to Judaism and Christianity.) 1907.

_Paul Wernle._ Die Anfänge unserer Religion. 1901. (E. T. by G. A.
Bienemann, “The Beginnings of Christianity,” 1903.)

_Georg Wobbermin._ Religionsgeschichtliche Studien zur Frage der
Beeinflussung des Urchristentums durch das antike Mysterienwesen.
(Studies in Comparative Religion with reference to the Question of the
Influence of the Ancient Mysteries on Primitive Christianity.) 1896.

[pg 181]


TO the Bonn philologist Hermann Usener belongs the credit of having
been the first to bring the Comparative Study of the pagan religions
as they existed at the beginning of the Christian era into contact
with theological science._(_146_)_ In E. Rohde’s _Psyche_ the Greek
and late-Greek conceptions regarding ghost-worship and immortality
were introduced to a wider circle of readers.

A generally intelligible survey of the cults which come into question
is offered by Franz Cumont in his work on the Oriental religions in
Roman paganism._(_147_)_

It was Phrygia in Asia Minor which gave to the world the worship of
Attis and the Dea Mater; from Egypt came that of Isis and Serapis;
Syria supplied the great sun-god whom Heliogabalus and Aurelian, for
reasons of [pg 182] state, proclaimed as the supreme divinity. The
religion of Mithra is of Persian origin.

Of these cults, ancient literature, both pagan and Christian, has
preserved some records, but it is only since discoveries of
inscriptions and papyri have supplemented this information_(_148_)_
that any real understanding of the character and history of these
religions has become possible.

The myth on which the worship of Cybele and Attis is based has been
handed down in various and conflicting versions.

So much, however, is certain, that Attis, the beloved of the Dea
Mater, was represented as having been killed by a boar sent by Zeus,
or by the jealous goddess herself. Every year in the spring-time there
took place at Pessinus the great orgiastic lamentation for him, which,
however, ended with a joyful festival. It seems, therefore, as if a
resurrection of the slain Attis was assumed to have taken place,
although the myth had nothing to say about that, but only in some of
the versions related that he was changed into an evergreen fir tree.

At bottom it is a form of nature-worship, which shows a close
relationship with that of the Thracian Dionysus-Sabazios and with that
of Adonis as worshipped at Byblos in Syria, and it has in some
respects undergone modification due to contact with these. The primary
idea underlying both myth and cultus is the decay and revival of
vegetable life.

The worship of Cybele and Attis penetrated to Rome as early as the
year 204 B.C. In the previous year the Sibylline books had given the
oracle that Hannibal would not be driven out of Italy until the sacred
stone from Pessinus was brought to Rome. This was done; [pg 183] and
the Carthaginians vacated the country. The foreign divinities had a
temple assigned to them on the Palatine. But when the Senate came to
know of the orgiastic feast which was associated with their worship,
it forbade the citizens to take part in it and placed the cult under
strict control. Thus, in spite of its official recognition, it led a
somewhat obscure existence until Claudius, by the public festival
which he established for it—which lasted from the 15th to the 27th
March—gave it a high position in public esteem.

In the deepening of its religious character which it underwent in
becoming associated with Greek religious feeling of the decadence
period, the worship of Attis was brought into connexion with the
thought of immortality. In the “Agape,” in which the partakers were
handed food in the “tympanon” and drink in the “cymbalon,” they were
initiated as “mystae” of Attis and thereby became partakers of a
higher life.

Mysteries were also celebrated in which a dying and rising again was
symbolised; and there were others based upon the thought of a union
with the divinity in the bridal chamber.

From the middle of the second century onward the “taurobolium” appears
in connexion with the service of Cybele and Attis. This is a kind of
blood-baptism. The “mystes” lies down in a pit, which is covered with
boards. Through the interstices there trickles down on him the blood
of a bull offered in sacrifice. The lamentation for the dead Attis
sounds forth; the “mystes” applies it to himself. Then when the hymn
of jubilation follows, he rises out of the grave as one who is now
initiate and deified._(_149_)_

The process by which the worship of Attis was transformed into a
mystery-religion which gave guarantees of immortality remains for the
most part shrouded in obscurity. In view of the scantiness of our
information [pg 184] we are thrown back upon hypothetical
reconstruction for the details of the development and the significance
of the mysteries._(_150_)_

The worship of Serapis was a creation of Ptolemy Soter, who desired to
unite the Greek and Egyptian populations of his empire by the bond of
a common worship. The derivation of the word Serapis is uncertain.
Whether it arose from Osiris-Apis or from the Chaldaean Sar-Apsî is a
debated point. The cultus language was Greek. Serapis was doubled with
Osiris. The new cult went forth into the world as the religion of
Serapis and Isis. In Rome it was vehemently opposed as being immoral;
the temples of Isis, who was identified with Venus, justified this
reputation. It was not officially recognised until the time of
Caligula. By this time it was, however, widely diffused wherever the
Greek language was spoken. Its adherents were found chiefly among the
slaves and freedmen. From the third century onwards it is
over-shadowed by the worship of Mithra.

The myth, which was represented annually, makes the mourning Isis seek
out the scattered fragments of the corpse of Osiris and raise a lament
over it. Then the limbs are laid together and wound round with
bandages, whereupon Thoth and Horus raise the slain Osiris to life
again, and this is announced amid jubilant outcries.

In the service of Osiris-Serapis the worshipper gains assurance of
eternal life. Therein consisted the attraction of this religion.

The early Egyptian doctrine was simple enough. After his resurrection
Osiris became lord of the world [pg 185] and at the same time judge of
the dead. Those who at their trial before him are not approved fall a
prey to destruction; others have eternal life with him in a realm
below the earth.

Life—and this was the tremendously serious feature of this
religion—was therefore regarded as a preparation for death. This is
the thought reflected in the mysteries, no doubt modelled on those of
Eleusis,_(_151_)_ which were attached to the Egyptian cultus after the
worship of Serapis-Osiris had been ordained by authority. They
represent the esoteric element. By means of the tests which he
undergoes in the Serapeum, of the ecstasy which he experiences and the
ceremonies of initiation in which he takes part the believer wins his
way, along with Osiris, from death to life, and acquires the assurance
of eternal being.

Distinct from these mysteries is the exoteric religion with its daily
acts of worship. These consist in the unveiling, awaking, clothing,
and feeding of the statues of the gods. The “liturgy,” which was
everywhere punctiliously followed, is derived from the primitive
Egyptian religion. Speaking generally, the exoteric form of the
worship of Osiris could come to terms with any, even the lowest, forms
of paganism.

The Syrian Baal-cults had no doubt from the second century onwards
become widely diffused, and in the third century enjoyed the favour of
the Emperors. For the development of popular religion, however, they
were of less significance than the religions of Attis and Osiris,
because they were not capable of becoming ennobled and deepened by the
religious yearnings of the Greek spirit.

Mithra was the father of the sun-god._(_152_)_ The origin of [pg 186]
the cult is obscure. It first became known through the pirates who
were taken prisoners by Pompey. It spread through the Roman armies
which in the first century advanced towards the Euphrates; they took
it over from their opponents. Thus Mithra was primarily a soldiers’
god. With the legions he penetrated to the utmost bounds of the Roman
Empire. He therefore passed direct from the barbarians into the Roman
world without previously becoming at home in the Greek world. From the
middle of the third century onwards the new cult spread so vigorously
that it was regarded as the strongest rival of Christianity.

In the intervening period, from the first century onward, it adopted
in growing measure elements from all the other cults, and in this way
became the universal “worship.”

Regarding the myth, little is known; and in the cultus it played no
special part. As the “slayer of the bull” Mithra doubtless belongs to
the class of star-gods, and represents the supreme sun-god.

The characteristic feature of this religion is its dualism. Mithra, as
the supreme, good god, is opposed by the powers of the evil
under-world. Hence the earnest character of its ethic, which is not
contemplative as in the Osiris cult, but active.

The secret of the power of this new faith lies indeed mainly in the
impulse to action which essentially belongs to it, and in the large
and simple ethical life to which this conception of the divinity gives
rise. The Mithra-religion, differing in this from the Egyptian cults,
places the scene of eternal life in an upper realm of light and not in
the under-world. The supreme divinity himself guides the souls of
departed believers through the seven planetary spheres to the land of
the blessed, and thus becomes their “Redeemer.”

As Mysteries there are observed here, as in other cults, sacred meals
and baptismal rites. Above these again there was, according to
Dieterich, a supreme initiation, [pg 187] which represented a progress
to the throne of Mithra. The actions and the formulae used in this
ceremony are, he thinks, preserved almost complete in the great
Parisian “magic” papyrus. Dieterich, who is opposed on this point by
Cumont and Reitzenstein, denominates this document a “Mithra-liturgy,”
and supposes the prayers to be used in the course of the ascent which
conducts the “mystes” from the world of the four elements through the
stars to the realm of the gods, where, under the guidance of the
sun-god, he passes through the heaven of the fixed stars and attains
to the presence of the highest god._(_153_)_

This process he conceives as having been represented, as part of the
cultus, in the Mithra-grottos, which is rendered not improbable by the
discoveries of objects which might have to do with a _mise en scène_
corresponding to this conception. In any case there was some
sacramental representation of the heavenward journey of the soul
towards the attainment of immortality. It remains questionable
whether, as the supreme mystery which the religion possessed, it was
“experienced” by the believers only once, or had its regular place in
the cultus.

The prayers extol in lofty language re-birth from the mortal to the
immortal life. The invocation with which the “mystes” approaches
Mithra is highly impressive. “Hail to thee, lord, ruler of the water;
hail to thee, stablisher of the earth; hail to thee, disposer of the
spirit. Lord, I that am born again take my departure, being exalted on
high, and since I am exalted, I die; born by the birth which engenders
life, I am redeemed unto death, [pg 188] and go the way which thou
hast appointed, as thou hast made for a law and created the sacrament
. . .”_(_154_)_ Here the text breaks off. Perhaps later on the return
of the initiate to earth was described. Dieterich, however, thinks
this improbable.

According to Dieterich the liturgy arose in the second century, and
belongs to the Graeco-Egyptian Mithra-cult; about 200 A.D. it was
annexed by the “magians” and from that time forward was preserved
among them; about 300 it was embodied in the Paris manuscript which
has come down to us.

A valuable insight into the feelings and impressions associated with
the Mysteries is given by the Hermetic writings, preserved mainly in
“Poimandres.”_(_155_)_ They profess to be derived from Hermes, who in
the thought of later times became the god of revelation, and in the
prominence which they give to the philosophico-religious element they
mark a stage in the development of Greek religious thought from the
Mystery-religions to Neo-Platonism. In their present form the
documents of this later Hermetic religion, which is marked by a
certain profundity, doubtless belong to about the third century; but
the original form dates, perhaps, from before the beginning of the
second century.

These are the cults and religions which have to be taken into account.
They are parallel to Christianity in so far that they, like it—though
in general doubtless somewhat later—make their appearance in the
ancient world as religions of redemption. Certain analogies are not to
be denied. The only question is how far these go, and how far the
Mystery-religions really exercised an influence upon the views and the
[pg 189] cultus-forms of the early, and especially of the primitive,
church._(_156_)_

The first to examine the facts with any closeness was Anrich in his
work, “The Ancient Mysteries and their Influence on
Christianity.”_(_157_)_

He comes to the conclusion that both the Pauline and the Johannine
views of Christianity “are to be understood as in the main original
creations of the Christian spirit on the basis of genuine Judaism,”
and if they show the influence of Greek thought, it is at most in a
secondary fashion. There is, he asserts, “no apparent reason to refer
the views on baptism and the communion-meal which meet us in the two
cases to influences of the latter character.” It is only at a later
time that a real influence comes into question.

[pg 190]

This negative conclusion has since been much disputed. That the
author, in accordance with the position of Pauline scholarship at that
period, did not sufficiently take into account the “physical” element
in the mystical doctrine of redemption and in the conception of
baptism and the Lord’s Supper, and consequently does not give
sufficient weight to the analogy between the religion of the Apostle
of the Gentiles and that of the Mysteries, is certain. But it ought to
be recognised as equally certain that to many points he has given the
prominence which they deserved, and that the students of Comparative
Religion would have in many respects done better if they had allowed
their bold advance to be somewhat checked by his prudent warnings, and
had learned something from him in regard to the formulation of the
problems.

A point which ought to be more clearly grasped than it has hitherto
been, in the investigation of Paul’s relation to the
Mystery-religions, is that for purposes of comparison Paulinism must
be regarded as a distinct entity; very often Paul’s doctrine has been
included in the “Religion of the New Testament” or taken together with
the Johannine and the Early Greek theology. On this method only false
results can be looked for. Paulinism, and therein lies the special
problem which it offers to scholarship, is an original phenomenon
which is wholly distinct from Greek theology.

This implies, too, that only the literal sense of the language of the
Epistles must be considered, and that it is not permissible to
interpret it through the Johannine theology, as is almost always done.
It is nothing less than incredible that, to take the most flagrant
example, philologists like Dieterich and others in discussing
Paulinism, always calmly talk about “Re-birth,” although in the
Epistles which rank as certainly genuine, this word and the
corresponding verb never occur._(_158_)_ That [pg 191] many
theologians fall into the same confusion is no excuse._(_159_)_

The surprising thing is precisely that Paul, when he is speaking of
the transformation of the man into a new creature, always makes use of
the two words death and resurrection, and describes the new thing that
comes about as an already experienced resurrection, without ever
introducing the conception of re-birth which seems to lie so near at
hand. In this limitation lies his as yet unexplained peculiarity, and
therewith the problem of his relation to Greek theology and, in
general, to everything that can be called Greek religious life.

The Johannine doctrine, that of the earlier Greek Fathers, and the
Mystery-religions, have this in common, that they make use of the
conception of re-birth. In that, they show themselves to be growths of
the same soil, and stand together over against Paulinism. Any one who
interprets the language of the Apostle of the Gentiles in accordance
with the conception of re-birth, has, by the aid of the Johannine
theology, first conformed it to the Mystery-religions, and has himself
introduced the conception which forms the common basis.

The same procedure has been followed in regard to other points also.
The Paulinism which the students of Comparative Religion have in view
is mainly an artificial product which has been previously treated with
the acids and reagents of Greek theology.

Another point which calls for close attention is the chronological
question in connexion with the history of the Mystery-religions. It is
from the beginning of the [pg 192] second century onwards that these
cults become widely extended in the Roman empire. It is only at this
period—the worship of Serapis as an artificial Graeco-Egyptian
creation is perhaps an exception—that they come under the influence of
late Greek religious thought and feeling, which developed with the
decline of the Stoa, and become transformed from imported cults into
universal Mystery-religions. The dates and the inner course of this
development are for us obscure. So much, however, is certain, that
Paul cannot have known the mystery-religions in the form in which they
are known to us, because in this fully-developed form they did not yet
exist. Assuming the most favourable case, that from his youth up he
had had open eyes and ears for the heathen religions by which he was
surrounded, he can only have known the cults as they were in their
uncompounded state, not as what they passed into when they became
filled with the Greek yearning for redemption, and mutually influenced
one another.

Considerations of this kind lead an authority like Cumont to insist
again and again upon the difficulties which stand in the way of
assuming an influence of the Mystery-cults on the earliest
Christianity._(_160_)_ Especially does he hold it to be quite
impossible that the Mithra-religion should have had any point of
contact with Paul.

Another point which should be mentioned is that those who are engaged
in making these comparisons are rather apt to give the
Mystery-religions a greater definiteness and articulation of thought
than they really possess, and do not always give sufficient prominence
to the distinction between their own hypothetical reconstruction and
the medley of statements on which it is based. Almost all the popular
writings fall into this kind of inaccuracy. They manufacture out of
the various fragments of information a kind of universal [pg 193]
Mystery-religion which never actually existed, least of all in Paul’s
day._(_161_)_

In particular, these works aim at getting hold of the idea of a “Greek
Redeemer-god” who might serve as an analogue to Jesus Christ. No
figure deserving of this designation occurs in any myth or in any
Mystery-religion; it is created by a process of generalisation,
abstraction, and reconstruction. Before using the phrase Redeemer-God,
one should remember that it means a God who for the sake of men came
into the world, died and rose again. Having realised that, one may
then try how far the Mystery-religions supply anything corresponding
to this—the only adequate—definition._(_162_)_

[pg 194]

It is also to be remarked that, on the other hand, there is no
“Redeemer-god” in Primitive Christianity. Jesus is, it cannot be
sufficiently emphasised, not thought of as a god, but only as a
heavenly being, who is entrusted with the mission of bringing in the
new world. It was only later in the Greek and Gnostic theology that He
was deified. For Paul he is “Son of God” in the simple, Old-Testament
and Apocalyptic sense.

We may further recall Cumont’s warning that analogies do not
necessarily imply dependence. “Resemblances,” he writes in the preface
to his _Religions orientales,_ “do not always imply imitation, and the
resemblance of views or usages must often be explained by community of
origin, not by any kind of borrowing.” In the same essay he points out
that analogies are sometimes exaggerated, if not actually created, by
the use of language chosen by the critic.

And Dieterich expresses himself in the following terms against this
mania for finding analogies. “It is,” he writes, in his edition of the
“Mithra-liturgy,” “one of the worst faults of the science of
Comparative Religion, which is at present becoming constantly less
cautious, to overlook the most natural explanations, not to say ignore
and avoid them, in order to have recourse to the most far-fetched,
and, by the most eccentric methods, to drag out analogies which, to
the unsophisticated eye, are absolutely invisible.”

These are the principles by which it has to be decided, whether
Comparative Religion has hunted down its game according to fair
forest-law, or whether its “bag” is poached.

The chief point to which research was at first directed was the
discovery of relationships between the two sets of sacramental views.

It seemed so easy to discover common conceptions [pg 195] here, in
view of the fact that in both cases cultus-meals and lustrations
played a part and had a sacramental value. But, on closer examination,
it appears that it is very difficult to get beyond the simple fact of
resemblance of a very general character.

Dieterich, in his commentary on the “Mithra-liturgy,” is obliged to
admit that we have very little exact knowledge regarding the sacred
meals of the Mystery-religions._(_163_)_ That they were supposed to
convey supernatural powers is about the only thing that can be said
with safety. Regarding the special conceptions and actions which made
this eating and drinking sacramental no information has been
preserved. A comparison—not to speak of the establishment of a
relation of dependence—is therefore impossible.

As soon as the students of Comparative Religion attempt to bring
forward concrete facts, they are obliged to leave the domain of the
mystery-religions and draw their material from the primitive
Nature-religions. Here they find the primary conception—a man believes
that he unites himself with the divinity by eating portions of him,
or—this is a secondary stage of the conception—by consuming some
substance which has been marked out for this purpose as representative
of the divinity and has had his name attached to it.

The following series of examples recurs in all the books:—

The dead Pharaoh, when he enters heaven, causes his servants to seize,
bind, and slay the gods, and then devours them in order thus to absorb
into himself their strength and wisdom, and to become the strongest of
all.

In Egypt anyone who wishes to become truthful swallows a small image
of the goddess of truth.

In the Thracian orgiastic worship of Dionysos Sabazios [pg 196] the
sacrificial ox is torn to pieces by the participants while yet alive,
and swallowed raw.

A Bedouin tribe in the Sinai peninsula slaughters, amid chanting, a
camel bound upon the altar, and then eagerly drinks its blood and
immediately devours the still bloody flesh half raw.

The Aztecs, before sacrificing and eating their prisoners of war, give
them the name of the deity to whom the sacrifice is offered.

Now, by the round-about way of this primitive conception the connexion
between Paul’s cultus-feast and that of the Mystery-religions—which
cannot be directly shown—is supposed to be established.

It is suggested that this primitive conception of union with the god
in the cultus, by an act of eating performed with this special
purpose, after it had in the normal development of the various
religions been transformed or completely laid aside, came to life
again in the mysticism of the Mystery-religions and of Paulinism.
Mysticism, according to Dieterich’s view, draws its nourishment from
the lowest strata of religious ideas. The belief in the union of God
and man which, among the cultured classes, was no longer anything but
a metaphor, rises up again from below with irrepressible power.
“Rising from below, the old ideas acquire new power in the history of
religion. The revolution from beneath creates new religious life
within the primeval, indestructible forms.”_(_164_)_

That we have here a combination of two still unproved hypotheses is
not sufficiently emphasised. In the Mystery-religions ancient cults
certainly enter into direct union with higher religious conceptions,
so that the general presupposition on which this hypothesis of
Comparative Religion is based is to a certain extent admissible. But
whether precisely this primitive conception of the mystic fellowship
created by eating and drinking the god awakened to new life in them,
must remain an open question, since our information does not suffice
to prove [pg 197] it. Of an eating of the god there is nowhere any
mention. And the primitive Mysteries were not founded on this idea.
Rather, they consist essentially in the representation of the actions
performed by the divinity, and rest on the thought that the
reproduction of these events will create in the participant some kind
of corresponding reality. It is a symbolism which is charged with a
certain energy, a drama which becomes real.

This being so, the significance of the cultus-meal comes much less
into view than that of the pattern actions which had to be further
developed and interpreted. If we possess so few typical statements
about the Mystery-feasts, is it not partly because they had no very
remarkable features and did not take a very exalted position in the
hierarchy of cultus-acts? If in the Paris Magic-papyrus we really
possess a Mithra-liturgy, and if the inferences and explanations which
Dieterich has attached to it are sound, then we have proof that in
this developed cultus of the second century the highest sacrament was
a pictorial mystery in which the “mystes” believed that he in some way
experienced the heavenly journey of the soul which he, along with
others, enacted.

In any case, the assertion that in the Mystery-religions the ancient
cultus-conception of a union with the divinity effected by a meal,
came to life again, goes far beyond what can be proved. That union is,
even in its secondary forms, always closely connected with a
sacrificial feast, and cannot properly be detached from it. The
sacrificial feast, however, is not a feature in the Mystery-religions,
and so far as we can get a glimpse of their beginnings never had any
supreme importance in them. The interpretation of these cults on the
analogy of the primitive religions of various races, ancient or
modern, who devoured oxen, camels, or prisoners of war as substitutes
for the divinity, cannot therefore be established.

The vestiges of this ancient conception are to be found, not in the
Mystery-religions, but in the ordinary heathen sacrificial worship, in
cases where the sacrificial [pg 198] feast has been retained in
connexion with it. Here there certainly exists in some form or other
the conception of a fellowship with the god set up by eating. It is to
be noted that Paul in I Cor. x. draws a parallel between the Lord’s
Supper, which unites us to Christ, and these feasts. How expositors
have arrived at the idea of making him refer here to the cultus-meal
of the Mystery-religions is quite inexplicable.

The hypothesis that the earliest Christian conception of the Lord’s
Supper in some way represented the surviving influence of an ancient
cultus idea, is at first sight much more plausible than the
corresponding hypothesis in the case of the Mystery-religions. At any
rate the existence of the desiderated fact is here proved. The
conception of the sacramental eating stands in the centre of the
belief; by this act, fellowship with a divine Being who has died and
risen again is maintained; and what is eaten and drunk is brought into
relation to the person of Christ, inasmuch as it is called, in some
sense or other, His body and blood.

Nevertheless in the decisive point the alleged facts break down.

Paul knows nothing of an eating and drinking of the body and blood of
the Lord. When Dieterich gives it as the Apostle’s view that “Christ
is eaten and drunk by the believers and is thereby in them,” and adds
that nothing further need be said about the matter, what he has done
is, instead of taking Paul’s words as they stand, to interpret Paul
through John—and through a misunderstanding of John at that.

It is not of an eating and drinking the body and blood of Christ that
Paul speaks in the First Epistle to the Corinthians; he always speaks
only of eating and drinking the bread and the cup. He assumes, no
doubt, that this somehow or other maintains a communion with the body
and blood of Christ (I Cor. x. 16-17), and that anyone who partakes
unworthily sins against the body and blood of the Lord (I Cor. xi.
27). He quotes, too, the words [pg 199] in which the Lord, on the
historic night, after the Supper, speaks of bread and wine as His body
and His blood. But the conception which seems inevitably to arise out
of this, that the participant partakes of the body and blood of the
Lord, is not found in him.

The recognition of this fact does not make his sacramental doctrine
any clearer. It is a question of fulfilling the demand of sound
scholarship that we should respect the text, and not interpret it on
the basis of inferences which the Apostle neither drew nor could draw.
His fundamental view that the feast effects or maintains fellowship
with the exalted Christ is perfectly clear. What is not clear is how
he brought this view into relation with the historic words of Jesus
about the bread and wine as being His body and blood, and interpreted
it in accordance therewith. Did it arise out of these words, or did he
receive it from some other quarter and afterwards make use of it for
the interpretation of the historic words?

The difficulty lies in the fact that for Paul the body and blood of
the historic Christ no longer exist, and that, on the other hand,
while the glorified Christ has, indeed, a body, it is not a body
through which blood flows and which is capable of being consumed on
earth. To speak of the body and blood of Christ is, from the
stand-point of the Apostle’s doctrine, an absurdity. He cannot in his
doctrine of the Supper bring the historic words into harmony with his
Christology, and yet is obliged to do so. The compromise remains for
us obscure.

It is certain, however, that neither he nor the primitive Christian
community held that the body and blood of Christ was partaken of in
the Supper. That is evident from the fact that the historic words of
Jesus did not form part of the service, and this is the case down to a
later date. No kind of consecration of the elements as the body and
blood of the Lord occurred in the liturgy.

If there is anything which may be considered as a definite result of
recent research, it is that the view of primitive and early
Christianity regarding the Lord’s [pg 200] Supper was not arrived at
by way of inference from the words of Jesus about bread and wine and
flesh and blood, but, strange as it may appear, arose from a different
quarter. The Church’s celebration was not shaped by the “words of
institution” at the historic Supper; it was the latter, on the
contrary, which were explained in accordance with the significance of
the celebration.

It is a no less serious error when Dieterich asserts that the Gospel
of John in chapter vi. proclaims the Pauline doctrine “only in a still
more corporeal fashion.”

In the Evangelist, bread and wine are—as is evident to anyone who will
take the trouble to acquaint himself with his presuppositions in the
spiritually related works of Ignatius, Justin, and Tertullian—not the
body and blood of Christ, but the flesh and blood of the Son of Man.
In this change in the expression lies the logic of the thought. The
elements of the Lord’s Supper perpetuate the appearance of the Son of
Man in the world inasmuch as they, as being the flesh and blood of
that historic Personality, possess the capacity of being vehicles of
the Spirit. As a combination of matter and Spirit which can be
communicated to the corporeity of men, they execute judgment. The
elect can in the sacrament become partakers of that spiritual
substance, and can thus be prepared for the resurrection; others who
are not from above, and are not capable of receiving the Spirit,
receive simply earthly food and drink, and fall a prey to corruption.
Therefore the Evangelist makes the Lord close His discourse about the
eating and drinking of the flesh and blood of the Son of Man with the
words, “It is the spirit that giveth life.”

This is the language of the early Greek theology, which explains the
working of the sacraments by the combination of the Spirit with matter
which takes place therein. The Fourth Evangelist projects this later
view back into the discourses of the historic Jesus, and makes Him
prophetically announce that after His exaltation a time will come when
the Spirit which is now in Him will unite itself [pg 201] with the
bread which, by the miracle of the loaves, has just been raised in a
significant way out of the category of simple earthly elements, and
will subsequently manifest its power in preparing men for the
resurrection.

In this sense, as vehicles of the Spirit, the elements carry on the
manifestation of the Son of Man; in this sense it is possible to speak
of eating and drinking His flesh and blood, and to regard this as
necessary to life. But all this is not thought of “corporeally” in the
naïve sense of an eating and drinking of the body and blood of Jesus,
but can only be understood on the basis of the doctrine of the working
of the Spirit in the sacraments. Apart from the Spirit, there is in
the Supper no body and no blood of Christ.

That is for the Fourth Evangelist so much a fixed datum that he is
obliged to omit the account of the historic Last Supper of Jesus with
His disciples. That the Lord could have so designated the bread which
was eaten and the wine which was drunk on that occasion, is for him
unthinkable. As long as He Himself is alive there is certainly no
Spirit; it is only on His exaltation that the Spirit is liberated from
the historic personality of the Son of Man and becomes separated from
the Logos as the Holy Spirit, in order in the sacraments to lead a new
existence—and this time an existence capable of being communicated to
others. From this moment onwards bread and wine become, in the
Church’s celebration of the sacrament, the flesh and blood of the Son
of Man in the sense explained above. Previously this had by no means
been the case, any more than there had been a Christian baptism which
effected regeneration. The Spirit who associates Himself with the
water and produces this effect, did not as yet exist in this form of
being. Jesus cannot, therefore, on this view, have baptized, any more
than He can celebrate the Supper with His disciples. Therefore, the
Fourth Evangelist, in order to guard against possible
misunderstandings, definitely asserts that even if the disciples did
baptize—a mere baptism with water [pg 202] which is incapable of
working regeneration—the Master Himself made no use of water in this
fashion._(_165_)_ His task consisted only in marking out water for
this use by the miracle at Cana of Galilee, and, by His discourses
about the water of life and regeneration by water and the Spirit,
pointing men’s minds to the thought that in the future, water, in
association with the Spirit, would be necessary to life and
blessedness. In that day “out of his body shall flow rivers of living
water” because the Spirit will be present (John vii. 37-39).

The students of Comparative Religion are so far in the right as
against ordinary theology that they make an end of the unintelligent
spiritualising of the Johannine doctrine, and try to give due weight
to the “physical” element in its conception of redemption. They are
mistaken, however, in regarding this “physical” element as something
primitive, and in thinking to explain it by analogies drawn from the
primitive nature-religions.

The Fourth Gospel represents the views of a speculative religious
materialism which concerns itself with the problem of matter and
spirit, and the permeation of matter by Spirit, and endeavours to
interpret the manifestation and the personality of Jesus, the action
of the sacraments and the possibility of the resurrection of the
elect, all on the basis of one and the same fundamental conception.

According to this theory, Christ came into the world in order to
accomplish in His own Person the as yet non-existent union of the
Spirit with the fleshly substance of humanity. In consequence of this
act the elect among mankind can in the future become partakers of the
Spirit. Jesus Himself, however, cannot as yet impart this to them
either as the Spirit of knowledge—that is why the disciples are
portrayed as so “unintelligent”—or as the Spirit of life. The Spirit
always needs, in the world of sense, to [pg 203] be connected with
material vehicles. He cannot work directly, in the sense of
communicating Himself from Jesus to believers. He must, therefore, in
order to enter into the elect, be received by them in combination with
some material element. The material media chosen for this purpose are
made known by Jesus by means of miracles and by references to the
future.

The naïve—and unhistorical—conception that Jesus instituted the
sacraments is not recognised by the Johannine gnosis. According to it
He did not establish them, but created and predicted them.

By His incarnation the possibility of the union of humanity and Spirit
upon which the working of the sacraments depends, is provided. By His
action in regard to the food and wine and the words He spoke in
connexion therewith, He pointed to a mystery which was to be revealed
in connexion with these substances; by His death, resurrection, and
exaltation He abolished His earthly mode of existence and set the
Spirit free for the new method of working, in virtue of which He was
able to prepare men for the resurrection. Jesus, according to this
view, came into the world to introduce the era of effectual
sacraments. It was thus that He became the Redeemer.

The teaching of the Johannine theology, therefore, rests upon the two
principles, that the Spirit can only work upon men in combination with
matter, and that it only becomes present in this state as a
consequence of the exaltation of the Lord. Anyone who has once
recognised these presuppositions will give up once for all the search
for a primitive element which is to be explained from the
nature-religions. On the other hand, it is certain that Christianity
here presents itself as the most highly developed Greek
Mystery-religion which it is possible to conceive.

Now for Paul again. Anyone who ascribes to him the conception of a
sacramental eating and drinking of the body and blood of Christ does
violence to his words. [pg 204] But admitting that he really thought
in this way, that would prove nothing. It would first need to be shown
that it really was a cultus-conception drawn from the primitive
nature-religions which came to life again in him. Now, for the
Mystery-religions the necessary presuppositions might appear to be
present, since they arise out of ancient cults which sprouted and grew
up again in later times. Paul, however, is a Jew, and even as a
believer in Christ he stands, in spite of his polemic against the law,
wholly and solely on the basis of the absolute, transcendent Jewish
conception of God. Any relation on his part to the nature-cults cannot
be proved and ought not to be assumed. By what wind were the seeds of
this primitive conception wafted to his mind? And how could they
suddenly sprout and grow in the stony soil of a Jewish heart? The
Apostle would certainly be the first and the only Jewish theologian to
fall under the spell of the primitive conception of eating the god!
And where was such a conception at that time to be found?

But what matter such prosaic considerations when it is a question of
great ideas, of ideas, moreover, fathered by Comparative Religion?

When Heitmüller in the spring of 1903 appeared before the members of
the Clergy Theological Society_(_166_)_ in Hanover to give them the
latest information about baptism and the Lord’s Supper, he led them
abroad, after an introduction on the “physico-hyperphysical” in Paul,
first to the Aztecs, then in the clouds of night, by the torch’s
gleam, to the Thracian mountain sides, and thence to Sinai._(_167_)_
And when they had assisted at the slaughtering and devouring of the
prisoners of war, the ox, and the camel, he expressed himself to the
following effect: “Little as the _δεῖπνον κυριακόν_ of Paul might seem
to have in common with these . . . proceedings, and [pg 205] loth as
we at first are even to name the Lord’s Supper in the same breath with
them, as little is it to me a matter of doubt that, when looked at
from the point of view of Comparative Religion, the Lord’s Supper of
primitive Christianity has the closest connexion with them. Those
pictures supply the background from which the Lord’s Supper stands
out; they show us the world of ideas to which the Lord’s Supper
belongs in its most primitive, and therefore perspicuous, form.”

Entering more into detail, this “Hylic”_(_168_)_ of the Comparative
method explains that the primeval concrete and sensuous conception of
the _communio_ established by partaking of the flesh and blood of the
animal in which the divinity itself dwelt, comes to light again in the
primitive Christian Lord’s Supper, at the highest stage of the
development of religion, and under this new form acquires a new
life._(_169_)_ It would be precarious, he further observes, in view of
the fragmentary condition of the sources to attempt to prove a direct
dependence on definite phenomena—on the cultus feast of the
Mithra-mysteries, for example: “It will be safer to point to the
general characteristics of the time, which abounded with ideas of that
kind. The infant Christianity lived in an atmosphere which, if I may
be allowed the expression, was impregnated with Mystery-bacilli, and
grew up on a soil which had been fertilised and made friable by the
decay and intermixture of the most various religions, and [pg 206] was
specially adapted to favour the upgrowth of seeds and spores which had
been long in the ground.”

Now, there is no such thing as an atmosphere impregnated with
bacteria. Medical science has long since shown that this conception
rests on an error, the air being practically free from germs. In
theology it is more difficult to get rid of fantastic imaginations,
since historical proofs are only available for those who are capable
of thinking historically.

It must not be overlooked that the eating and drinking which
establishes communion with Christ is only one side of the Pauline
conception of the Supper. Alongside of it there exists the other,
which sees in the feast a confession of faith in the death and the
parousia of the Lord, and is quite as significant as the former. It
is—in I Cor. xi.—developed in connexion with the repetition of the
historic words of Jesus; on it is based the argument that a careless
partaking is a transgression against the body of the Lord. And on the
basis of this conception, cases of illness and death in the church are
to be understood as a warning chastisement pointing to the Last
Judgment. This conception must be somehow or other eschatologically
conditioned.

The communion which is established in the Lord’s Supper is a communion
of the eagerly-waiting man with the coming Lord of Glory. The only
thing which remains obscure is how this is brought about. The
confession of faith in the death and parousia which is combined with
the act of eating and drinking does not suffice to explain this
further effect. Further, it remains inherently obscure how by eating
and drinking the dying and return of the Lord can be shown forth,
especially as the Early Christian celebration consisted only in a
common meal, and in no way reproduced, as present-day celebrations do,
the actions and words of Jesus at the Last Supper.

What are the results to which the students of Comparative Religion
have to point in regard to the Lord’s Supper? They are obliged at the
outset to give up the [pg 207] attempt to explain it from the
Mystery-religions, or even to point out in the latter any very close
analogies. In place of this they attempt to make intelligible both the
meal which formed part of the mystery-cults, and that of Pauline
Christianity, as growths which, from scattered seeds of ancient
conceptions of the cultus-eating of the divinity, spring up from the
soil of syncretism in two different places at the same time. Neither
in the one case nor the other, however, can they render this even
approximately probable. Up to the present, therefore, neither a direct
nor an indirect connexion between the cultus-meal of Paul and those of
the Mystery-religions has been shown. The only thing which is certain
is that in both cases a cultus-meal existed. About that of the
Mysteries we know almost nothing; about that which Paul presupposes we
have more information, but not such as to enable us at once to
understand it.

The question regarding baptism took from the first a simpler form,
since the hypothesis of a renascence of primitive cultus-conceptions
has not to be considered.

Both Paul and the Mystery-religions attach a religious significance to
washings. That, however, does not suffice to establish a peculiarity
which would connect them together, since the attachment of this
significance to lustration is bound up with the elemental symbolism of
cleansing and is found more or less in all religions.

The real question is whether Paulinism and the Mystery-religions, when
they go beyond the most general notions, and advance from the symbolic
to the effectively sacramental, follow the same lines and present the
same views.

Once again, Paul’s view is the more fully, that of the
Mystery-religions the less fully known. Developed baptismal doctrines
and rites seem only to have been present in the Egyptian cults. These
distinguish between the bath of purification and baptism, the latter
consisting [pg 208] in a sprinkling with a few drops of a consecrated
and consecrating fluid._(_170_)_

The advance beyond the idea of purification, where it is to be
observed, moves in the direction of the idea of Re-birth,
Regeneration. A clear formulation of this developed view—comparable in
definiteness with the Early Christian reference to the “bath of
regeneration” _(_171_)_ —does not occur. The thought remains hovering
between purification and renewal.

That is as much as to say that, so far as our information goes, no
typical points of contact with Paulinism present themselves.

The Apostle implies a baptism in the name of a divine person. Of a
baptism performed in the name of Osiris, Attis, or Mithra we know
nothing, though no doubt the assumption naturally suggests itself that
the lustrations and baptisms practised in these cults were considered
to be at the same time acts of confession of faith in the divinity
with whose worship they were associated. But this character was by no
means so distinctly stamped on them as was the case in Christian
baptism—as is, indeed, readily intelligible. In the Mystery-religions
the confession of the god is naturally implied; in Christianity there
is the special confession of faith in the Messiahship of Jesus. To
this there was nothing analogous.

As regards the utterance of the name of the divinity and the magical
efficacy attaching thereto according to ancient conceptions, many
illustrations can be adduced from Comparative Religion. But the really
important point, the association of the utterance of the name with a
baptismal rite, cannot be directly shown to have existed in the
Mystery-religions._(_172_)_

[pg 209]

In order to arrive at his sacramental view Paul does not follow the
natural method of advancing by way of the thought of purification to
that of renewal by regeneration, but follows a different route, which
leads him to an estimate of it that has nothing to do with the
fundamental conception of purification, and therefore remains without
analogy in the Mystery-religions. This is a fact of great
significance.

The Mystery-religions speak, as Paul also does, of the _pneuma_ and
its workings, but the possession of the _pneuma_ is never represented
as an immediate and inevitable consequence of baptism.

With the Mystery-religions are associated speculations about the
renewal of man’s being, represented as taking place in regeneration,
which they bring into some kind of relation, closer or more remote,
with baptism. But when Paul speaks of the new creature which comes
into being in the sacrament, the thought of regeneration does not for
him come into view, for he makes no use of it at all. Instead of that
he asserts in Rom. vi. that in baptism there is an experience of death
and resurrection in fellowship with Christ, from which results newness
of life and the new ethic associated therewith. How the act and the
result are logically connected he does not explain. He is content to
place them side by side.

[pg 210]

So far as we know, there exists in the Mystery-religions no analogue
to this dying and rising again effected solely by the use of water. To
interpret Rom. vi., as Dieterich does, as referring to a spiritual
death and “new birth” is not permissible, since the text says not a
word about that. The post-Pauline theology, that is the Johannine and
Early Greek theology, explain baptism as regeneration, and seek to
find a logical basis for this effect in the doctrine that the Spirit
unites with the water as the generating power. Paul has nothing of all
this.

Nor does he show any knowledge of the idea that Christian baptism
arose out of the baptism of Jesus as an imitative reproduction of it.
He never, in fact, mentions the baptism of Jesus. Nowhere does he
suggest that in baptism the new man, the “Child of God,” is born in
the believer, as Jesus was in this act raised to His Messianic office.

There is in fact no evidence from the earlier literature which
suggests the existence of views of that kind regarding the origin and
significance of Christian baptism. In early Christianity it is as far
from being an imitative reproduction of the baptism of Jesus as the
Church’s Lord’s Supper was from being an imitative reproduction of the
historic Last Supper. The conception of an “imitative reproduction”
was first introduced by modern theology.

To cite the _taurobolium_ as an analogue of Paul’s baptism, with the
death and resurrection which it effects, is not admissible. In the
first place, the _taurobolium_ is a baptism of blood; in the next
place it is closely connected with a sacrifice; in the third place,
the burial and rising again are actually represented. The sacramental
significance is thus derived from the many-sided symbolism. In Paul
there is no trace of all this. “Plain water” effects everything.

One point in regard to which great hopes had been placed on the
Mystery-religions was the solution of the enigma of I Cor. xv. 29.
Wernle regarded it as self-evident that the Apostle in permitting and
approving [pg 211] baptism for the dead had allowed himself to become
infected by the heathen superstition of his Corinthian converts, and
took him to task for this lapse in his book on the “Beginnings of
Christianity.” In his zeal he forgot to enquire whether the heathen
had any superstition of the kind._(_173_)_

Those who tried to supply this omission did not meet with much
success. The heathen showed themselves better than their reputation
and less “superstitious” than the Christians! Of a baptism for the
dead, or anything at all of this nature, they show no trace.

Failing more relevant evidence, some have quoted Plato, who in the
_Republic_ (ii. 364-5) makes Adeimantos say, appealing in confirmation
to the Orphic writings, that by means of offerings and festivals,
atonement and purification for past misdeeds is effected for whole
towns as well as for single individuals, for the living and also for
the dead.

This passage, however, does not refer at all to personal dedications
with a view to “renewal,” such as the baptism practised in the
Mystery-religions and in Christianity, but to expiatory sacrifices in
the ancient Greek sense._(_174_)_

In the _Taurobolia_, representation of one living person by another is
supposed to have been possible, but there is no mention of a
representation of the dead._(_175_)_

[pg 212]

The baptism _of_ the dead which is attested by a papyrus is not a
baptism _for_ the dead._(_176_)_

That living persons went through the ceremonies of initiation for the
dead is not known.

Thus baptism for the dead has not, so far at least, proved susceptible
of explanation from heathen sources, but must be regarded as a
peculiarity of Christianity!

The outcome of the study of the sacraments from the point of view of
Comparative Religion is a very curious one. The Apostle thinks
sacramentally; in fact his doctrine is much more “mysterious” than
that of the Mystery-religions. But the nature of the sacramental
conception is quite different in him from what it is in them; it is as
if they had grown up on different soils.

The difference relates both to the conception of the supernatural
working of the sacraments, and also to the position which the
sacramental element takes in the doctrine as a whole.

In the Mystery-religions the sacramental idea arises by way of an
intensification and materialisation of the symbolic. The act effects
what it represents. The result can in a sense be logically understood
when once the thought is grasped that the world of appearance and the
world of reality stand in mysterious connexion with one another.

In Paul we have an unmediated and naked notion of sacrament such as is
nowhere else to be met with. Symbolism is no doubt involved in the
most general significance of the act. In this sense baptism is a
“cleansing” and a “consecration,”_(_177_)_ and the sacred feast
establishes [pg 213] fellowship among the partakers. But the
assertions which go beyond this show not the faintest connexion with
the outward significance of the rite. Contact with the water is
supposed to effect a dying and rising again with Christ, a partaking
in His mystical body, and the possession of the Spirit. The eating and
drinking at the Lord’s Supper is a confession of faith in the death
and the parousia of Christ, and is also fellowship with Him.

The sacramental is therefore non-rational. The act and its effect are
not bound together by religious logic, but laid one upon the other and
nailed together.

With that is connected the fact that in Paul we find the most prosaic
conception imaginable of the _opus operatum._ In the Mystery-religions
there is a mysterious procedure surrounded by imposing accessories.
The impressive appeal of symbolism is brought to bear in every part.
Every detail is significant, and lays hold upon the attention.

In Paul everything is flat and colourless. While some of his
references might suggest the impression that his conception of
Christianity bore some kind of analogy to the Mystery-religions, yet
as a whole it entirely lacks the corresponding atmosphere. There is
nothing of the effective _mise en scène_ characteristic of the Greek
sacramental beliefs. How lacking in solemnity must have been the
method of celebrating the Lord’s Supper, when it could degenerate into
an ugly and disorderly exhibition of gluttony! How little does the
Apostle think of the external act of baptism, when he founds a church
in Corinth and himself performs the rite only in the case of one or
two individuals!_(_178_)_ He preaches sacraments, but does not feel
himself to be a mystagogue; rather, he retains the simplicity in
regard to forms of worship which belongs to the Jewish spirit.

There were no long preparations for the cultus ceremonies, and nothing
is known of a distinction between higher and lower grades of
initiation, such as form an [pg 214] essential part of the
Mystery-religions. The first ceremony of initiation confers at once
final perfection. Among those who are admitted there prevails the most
complete equality. The conception of the “mystes” does not exist.

In the Mystery-religions everything centres in the sacred ceremonies.
They dominate thought, feeling, and will. If they are removed the
whole religion collapses.

In Paulinism it is otherwise. The doctrine of redemption is no doubt
closely connected with the sacraments, but the latter are not its
be-all and end-all. If baptism and the Lord’s Supper are taken away
the doctrine is not destroyed, but stands unmoved. It looks as though
the weight of the building rested upon these two pillars, but in
reality it does not totter even if these supports are withdrawn.

The Johannine and the early Greek doctrine are conceived as real
Mystery-religions. The Fourth Evangelist and Ignatius know no other
redemption than that which is bound up with the sacraments. In Paul
the redemption can be thought of apart from them, since the whole
mystical doctrine of fellowship with Christ rests upon the single
conception of faith. Nevertheless he allows it to be closely bound up
with the external ceremonies, and seems to have no consciousness of
the fact that this connexion is unnecessary and illogical.

The remarkable duality in Paulinism lies, therefore, in the fact that
the sacramental idea is intensified to an extreme and unintelligible
degree, while at the same time the necessity of the sacred ceremonies
does not logically result from the system as a whole, as this would
lead us to expect.

The sacramental views of the Apostle have thus nothing primitive about
them, but are rather of a “theological” character. Paul connects his
mystical doctrine of redemption with ceremonies which are not
specially designed with reference to it. It is from that fact, and not
from a specially deep love for Mysteries, [pg 215] that the
exaggeratedly sacramental character of his view of baptism and the
Lord’s Supper results. It is in the last resort a question of
externalisation, not of intensification.

It is therefore useless to ransack the history of religions for
analogies to his conceptions. It has none to offer, for the case is
unique. The problem lies wholly within the sphere of early Christian
history, and represents only a particular aspect of the question of
Paul’s relation to primitive Christianity. The fact is, he did not
introduce the sacramental view into the sacred ceremonies, but found
already existing a baptism and a Lord’s Supper which guaranteed
salvation on grounds which were intelligible from early Christian
doctrine. He, however, transformed the primitive view of salvation
into the mystical doctrine of the dying and rising again in fellowship
with Christ. Since the connexion between redemption and the sacraments
was given _a priori_, he draws the inference that the sacraments
effect precisely that wherein, according to his gnosis, the inner
essence of redemption consists. How far they are appropriate to the
effect which, on the ground of his mystical doctrine, he holds to take
place, does not for him come into question.

In the sacraments the believer becomes partaker in salvation.
Therefore, he concludes, in them that happens which constitutes
redemption, namely, the dying and rising again with Christ.

Paul therefore takes the sacraments by storm. He does not theorise
about the ceremony, but ascribes to it without more ado the postulated
effect. That is not a procedure which could have been followed either
by a Greek or by a modern mind.

Paulinism is thus a theological system with sacraments, but not a
Mystery-religion.

This may be confirmed by a further observation. The Apostle occupies a
strongly predestinarian stand-point. Those who are “called” inevitably
receive salvation; those who are not, can never in any way obtain it.
There [pg 216] is no analogue to this in the Mystery-religions. They
can only conceive of election in the sense and to the extent of
holding that there is a calling and predestination to the receiving of
the initiation which confers immortality. And there are actually some
beginnings of such a conception._(_179_)_

But Pauline predestination is quite different. It is absolute, and
seems inevitably to abolish the necessity and meaning of the
sacraments. Anyone who belongs to the number of the elect becomes
_ipso facto_ partaker of the resurrection. At the end of all things a
great company from the generations of long-past times will arise to
life without ever having received baptism or partaken of the Lord’s
Supper. That being so, what becomes of the sacraments? In what respect
are they necessary?

A good deal of energy has been expended in seeking analogies from
other religions for the Corinthian baptism for the dead; it would
really have been much more to the point to enquire why baptism for the
dead was considered desirable. If the dead are among the elect, they
have no need of it; if not, they could not have inherited life, even
if they had received the sacrament during their sojourn on earth. To
what end, then, is this baptism for the dead?

The most important point to notice is that everywhere in the Pauline
sacraments the eschatological interest breaks through. They effect,
not re-birth, but resurrection. That which in the near future is to
become visible reality, they make in the present invisibly real by
anticipation. The Greek Mysteries are timeless. They reach back to
primitive antiquity, and they profess to be able to manifest their
power in all generations. In Paul the sacraments have temporal
boundaries. Their power is derived from the events of the last times.
They put believers in the same position as the Lord, in that they [pg
217] cause them to experience a resurrection a few world-moments
before the time, even though this does not in any way become manifest.
It is a precursory phenomenon of the approaching end of the world.

Separated from the eschatology, the Pauline sacraments would become
meaningless and ineffectual. They are confined to the time between the
resurrection of Jesus and His parousia, when the dead shall arise.
Their power depends on the present, and also on the future, fact. In
this sense they are “historically” conditioned.

While therefore in the Mystery-religions and in the Johannine theology
the sacraments work of themselves, in Paul they draw their energy from
a universal world-event, from which it is, as it were, transmitted.

It now becomes clear why the Apostle cannot describe as a “Re-birth”
the condition brought about by baptism. The renewal consists in the
fact that the coming resurrection-life is, for the short period which
remains of the present course of the world, received by anticipation.
Re-birth, on the other hand, implies an uneschatological system of
thought in which the individual reckons more or less on a normal span
of life, for which he seeks an inner divine being which shall subsist
alongside of or above the earthly. It is only at a period when
eschatology is falling into the background that the Greek conception
of re-birth, such as is associated with the Mysteries, can supersede
the old mystico-eschatological conception of the proleptic
resurrection. Accordingly it presently appears in Justin and the
Fourth Evangelist. From that point onwards baptism brings re-birth. In
Paul it produced only an antedated dying and rising again.

The sacramental conception of the Apostle is therefore derived from an
entirely different world of thought from that of the
Mystery-religions.

It is a different question, however, in what relation his
“physical”_(_180_)_ mysticism in itself, apart from the [pg 218]
sacraments, bears to the world of ideas associated with the Greek
Mystery-religions.

To this question Reitzenstein, the “pneumatic”_(_181_)_ among the
students of Comparative Religion, devotes a careful study. He avoids
conventional catchwords and rash conclusions, and endeavours to
discover the conceptions and ideas which are common to both, and to
follow them out in detail.

With this purpose he brings together everything which he can find in
the language of the Mysteries and the Hermetic literature relating to
such ideas as “service” and “military service” of God,
“justification,” “pre-existence,” “gnosis,” “spirit,” “revelation,”
“pneumatic,” “heavenly garment,” and “transformation.”

For the first time the material for a study of Paul from the point of
view of Comparative Religion is brought together with a certain
completeness, and the impression which it makes is very powerful. The
theologian who reads these passages with an open mind will be lifted
out of the ruts of conventional interpretation. It is as if a flood of
new thought had streamed into the channels of ordinary exegesis,
whether critical or otherwise, and swept away the accumulations of
rubble.

Whether all the explanations are sound, and whether many expressions,
such as _e.g._ “servant” and “prisoner” of Christ, and imagery—for
example, that taken from the military life—could not be just as well
explained directly as by the roundabout way of their use in the
Mystery-religions, may be left an open question. What is certain is,
that Reitzenstein has made an end of the cut-and-dried conception that
Paul simply translated his theology from Jewish thought into Greek
language, and proves that [pg 219] he knows the scope and exact
application of the words of the religious vocabulary, and along with
the terms and expressions has taken over suggestions for the
presentation of his ideas. Without the possibilities and
presuppositions supplied by the religious language of the Greek Orient
it would have been more difficult for him to create his mysticism. He
found in existence a tone-system in which the modulations necessary
for the development of his theme offered themselves for his
disposal._(_182_)_

Reitzenstein remarks with much justice that particular words and
phrases do not of themselves prove very much, but that what is really
of importance is the connexion of the passages. Are there sets of
ideas in Paul which are allied with those of the Mystery-religions?
What realities stand in the two cases behind the references to the
mystical doctrine of the miraculous new creation of the man while in
his living body?

The description and paraphrasing which commentaries and New Testament
theologies bestow upon the Apostle’s assertions do not suffice for
Reitzenstein. He wants to understand and come to grips with the
thought, and to arouse in others the same discontent.

The possibility that the Pauline mysticism might be capable of being
explained from within appears to him excluded. With all the reserve
which he imposes upon himself he nevertheless believes himself to have
proved that the central conception of “the deification and [pg 220]
transfiguration of the living man is derived from the Mysteries.” The
conviction of a miracle of transformation taking place in his own
person, is, he pronounces, not Jewish. Therefore he thinks that Paul
represents a kind of ancient Jewish prophetism modified by the
influence of the Hellenistic Mystery beliefs.

The “history of the development” of Paul’s thought he conceives as
follows: The influence of Greek mysticism, with which he had already a
literary acquaintance, helped to prepare the way for that momentous
inner experience which eventually caused a rupture between the Apostle
and his ancestral religion. “This influence,” he thinks, “increased in
the two years of solitary struggle for the working out of a new
religion.” A renewed study of Greek religious literature became
necessary “from the moment when the Apostle dedicated himself to, and
began to prepare for, his mission to the _Ἕλληνες_.”

By the method which he applies, Reitzenstein is necessarily driven to
adopt this far-reaching view. He makes no effort to take into the
field of his argument the Late-Jewish eschatology, as preserved in the
post-Danielic literature, in the discourses of Jesus, and the
Apocalypses of Baruch and Ezra. Whatever is not self-explanatory, and
cannot be explained from the Old Testament, is, according to him,
derived from the world of thought associated with the
Mystery-religions.

The proper procedure would really have been to examine the conceptions
drawn from apocalyptic thought and those from the Mystery-religions
independently, and then to decide which of them rendered possible the
better explanation. The best way would have been for Reitzenstein to
discuss the matter step by step with Kabisch, who had sought to derive
the fundamental conceptions of the Pauline mysticism from eschatology.

The total neglect of eschatology forces him to some curious
conclusions. After showing, in opposition to a canonised confusion of
thought, that there is not the slightest connexion between Paul’s
doctrine of the first [pg 221] and second Adam in I Cor. xv. 45-49 and
Philo’s theory about the two accounts of the creation in Genesis,
since in that case the pneumatic heavenly man would be the first, and
the psychic earthly man the second,_(_183_)_ he comes to the
conclusion that the view set forth in I Corinthians must have
underlying it “the belief in a god ‘Anthropos,’” who came to be
identified with Christ.

This hypothesis naturally suggests itself to Reitzenstein, because in
_Poimandres_ he believes himself to have discovered a myth about
Anthropos._(_184_)_ But is this, even if it were held to be proved, of
such a character that the Pauline conception of the first and second
Adam could without more ado be derived from it? Is the complicated
hypothesis necessary?

Paul’s conception can be explained without the least difficulty on
eschatological grounds. The first Adam brought mankind under the
dominion of death. Christ is the Second Adam because He by His
resurrection becomes the founder of a new race, which in virtue of
that which has taken place in Him becomes partaker of an imperishable
life, and acquires a claim to the future possession of the pneumatic
heavenly body which He already bears. The Second Man comes from heaven
because the pre-existent Christ, in order to become the founder of the
“humanity of the resurrection,” must appear upon earth and assume
fleshly corporeity. He is “life-giving spirit” because the _pneuma_
which goes forth from Him as the glorified Christ, works in believers
as the power of the resurrection. This being so, what purpose is
served by bringing in the very doubtful myths about the god Anthropos,
especially as Paul, though he certainly thinks of his Second Adam as a
heavenly being, never anywhere speaks of Him as God.

[pg 222]

This is typical of a series of similar cases._(_185_)_

On the other hand, it is just this one-sidedness which makes the charm
and the significance of the book. Reitzenstein shows, both positively
and negatively, how far the analogies from the Mystery-religions will
take us. Ordinary theologians—since Kabisch had remained without
influence—had simply designated as Greek everything which they could
not understand from Late Judaism, and described as Late-Jewish
whatever they could not understand as Greek. Reitzenstein,
the—unconscious?—antipodes of Kabisch, would like to make an end of
this simple game and compel people to choose one horn or other of the
dilemma. Instead of entering on theoretic discussions, full of “not
only, but also,” and “either . . . or,” he goes straight forward as
far as he thinks he can feel firm ground under his feet, and has thus
contributed, to an extraordinary degree, to the clearing up of the
situation.

Contrary to his intention and conviction, however, the outcome is not
positive but negative.

Like Dieterich and others, Reitzenstein takes it for granted that
Paulinism makes use of the conception of Re-birth, and he feels that
that is in itself a sufficient reason for not regarding it as a
product of Judaism._(_186_)_

The assumption being unsound, all the discussions and arguments based
on it fall to the ground. In particular, the fine parallels from the
Hermetic literature must be given up. Further, it is not legitimate to
treat the [pg 223] mysticism of the Mystery-religions and that of Paul
as directly corresponding to one another. The former is a
God-mysticism, the latter a Christ-mysticism. The resulting
differences are greater than at first sight appears. In the
Graeco-Oriental conception, what is in view is the “deification” of
the individual man. As the divinity of the particular Mystery which is
being celebrated is always thought of as the highest divinity, the
mortal enters into union with the being of God as such.

The Pauline Christ, however, even though He is called the Son of God,
is not God, but only a heavenly Being. The renewal which is effected
by fellowship with Him is not a deification—the word never occurs in
the Apostle’s writings—but only a transference into a state of
super-sensuous corporeity, which has to do with a coming new condition
of the world.

Greek thought is concerned with the simple antithesis of the divine
world and the earthly world. Paulinism makes out of this duality a
triplicity. It divides the super-earthly factor into two,
distinguishing between God and the divine super-earthly, which is
personified in Christ and made present in Him. God, and therein speaks
the voice of Judaism, is purely transcendent. A God-mysticism does not
exist for the Apostle—or, at least, does not yet exist. A time will
come no doubt in the future, after the termination of the Messianic
Kingdom, when God will be “all in all” (I Cor. xv. 28). Until then
there is only a Christ-mysticism, which has to do with the
anticipation of the super-earthly life of the Messianic Kingdom.

To treat Graeco-Oriental and Pauline mysticism as corresponding
factors, is to perform a piece in two-four time and a piece in
three-four time together, and to imagine that one hears an identical
rhythm in both.

Another point of difference is that Graeco-Oriental mysticism works
with permanent factors; the Pauline with temporal and changing ones.
The Messianic-Divine drives out the super-earthly angelic powers which
[pg 224] previously occupied a place between God and the world. It is
in the very act of coming. But in proportion as it advances, there
passes away not only the super-sensuous angelic element, but also the
earthly and sensuous. Christ-mysticism depends upon the movement of
these two worlds, one of them moving towards being, the other towards
not-being, and it continues only so long as they are in touch with one
another as they move past in opposite directions. The beginning of
this contact is marked by the resurrection of the Lord, the end by His
parousia. Before the former it is not yet possible to pass from one to
the other, after the latter it is no longer possible. A mysticism
which is thus bound up with temporal conditions can hardly be derived
from the Greek timeless conceptions.

The act, moreover, by which the individual becomes partaker in the new
being is in the two cases quite different. The Mystery-religions
represent the “transfiguration” of the living being as effected by his
receiving into himself a divine essence, by means of the gnosis and
the vision of God. It is thus a subjective act. According to Paul’s
teaching the “transfiguration” is not brought about by the gnosis and
vision of God. These are rather the consequence of the renewal, the
efficient cause of which is found, not in the act of the individual,
and not in the inherent efficacy of the sacrament, but in a
world-process. So soon as the individual enters by faith and baptism
into this new cosmic process he is immediately renewed in harmony
therewith, and now receives spirit, ecstasy, gnosis, and everything
that these imply. What according to the Greek view is the cause, is
for Paul the consequence. Thus, even though the conceptions show a
certain similarity, they do not correspond, because they are connected
with the central event of the mysticism in each case by chains which
run in opposite directions.

A figure which exactly illustrates one’s meaning may claim pardon even
for somewhat doubtful taste. In the Mystery-religions, individuals
climb up a staircase step [pg 225] by step towards deification; in
Paulinism they spring in a body into a lift which is already in motion
and which carries them into a new world. The staircase is open to all;
the lift can only be used by those for whom it is especially provided.

So far as Comparative Religion is concerned, therefore, the case is
exactly the same in regard to the “physical” element in the mystical
doctrine of redemption as it was in regard to that of the sacramental
doctrine. On close examination the historico-eschatological character
of the Pauline conception is in both cases so all-pervading that it
invalidates any parallel with the Mystery-religions, and leaves them
with nothing in common but the linguistic expression. The mystical and
sacramental aspects of the “physical” element in redemption do not for
him stand on the same footing with the eschatological, which is
immediately given with the conceptions of transformation and
resurrection, but must be in some way capable of being derived from
it. Only when that is done will the Pauline doctrine of redemption be
explained.

It is to be noted that Reitzenstein tries in vain to render
intelligible either the connexion of the soteriological mysticism with
the facts of the death and resurrection, or the fellowship which is
therein presupposed between the believer and the Lord. In his
exposition of Rom. vi. the parallels with the Mystery-religions force
him into a wrong line, and compel him to think of the objective
process as a subjective one. He assumes that everything becomes clear
and simple if once the Apostle is understood to speak of a _voluntary_
dying, which is neither purely physical nor merely metaphysical, but
is based upon the thought that we must not sin any more because we
have taken upon us Christ’s person and lot, and have crucified our
natural man.

But in Paul it is not a question of an act which the believer
accomplishes in himself; what happens is that in the moment when he
receives baptism, the dying and [pg 226] rising again of Christ takes
place in him without any cooperation, or exercise of will or thought,
on his part. It is like a mechanical process which is set in motion by
pressing a spring. The minute force employed in pressing the spring
bears no relation to that which thereon comes into play; only serves
to release a set of forces already in existence.

In the Mystery-religions the thought is: We desire not to sin any
more, therefore we will undergo initiation. Paul’s logic is the
converse of this, and takes the objective form: Christ’s death and
resurrection is effectually present in us; therefore, we are no longer
natural men and cannot sin any more.

The whole distinction lies in the fact that the mysticism of the
Apostle of the Gentiles is based on historico-eschatological events,
whereas the Mystery-religions are in their nature non-historical.
Where they make use of myths they use them in the last resort merely
as pictures of that which the “mystes” performs or undergoes, not as
events charged with a real energy, as the death and resurrection of
Jesus are for Paul.

But the fact of the far-reaching outward and inward resemblances of
language between the Graeco-Oriental and the Pauline mysticism are not
affected by that. As though by a pre-established harmony in the
history of religion, it came about that the mysticism which developed
out of eschatology was able to find complete representation in the
language of the Mystery-religions, and found there ready to its hand
conceptions and expressions which facilitated, suggested, and in some
cases were even indispensable to its fuller development.

Reitzenstein’s merit is that of having determined exactly and
unmistakably the meaning of Paul’s language, and having at the same
time shown that Jewish Hellenism and Greek philosophy had practically
no part in him.

Of course, it is not possible to decide how much of this [pg 227]
religious language Paul found already in existence, and how much he
created for his purpose. It must not be forgotten that the Oriental
Mystery-religions did not receive their complete development under
Greek influence until a considerable time after the appearance of the
Apostle of the Gentiles. Perhaps it would be more correct to say that
he and they found in existence the same Greek religious vocabulary,
laid hold of it, and perfected it.

One error of the students of Comparative Religion deserves particular
mention, for it is typical. In consequence of the parallelism which
they maintain between the Mystery-religions and Paulinism, they come
to ascribe to the Apostle the creation of a “religion.”_(_187_)_
Nothing of the kind ever entered into his purpose. For him there was
only one religion: that of Judaism. It was concerned with God, faith,
promise, hope and law. In consequence of the coming, the death, and
the resurrection of Jesus Christ, it became its duty to adjust its
teachings and demands to the new era thus introduced, and in the
process many things were moved from the shadow into the light and
others from the light into the shadow. “Christianity” is for Paul no
new religion, but simply Judaism with the centre of gravity shifted in
consequence of the new era. His own system of thought is certainly for
him no new religion. It is his belief, as fully known and worked out
in its implications, and it professes to be nothing else than the true
Jewish religion, in accord both with the time and with the Scriptures.

Another remark that has to be made is that the students of Comparative
Religion are inclined to make an illegitimate use of the word
eschatology when it suits their purpose. They think themselves
justified in applying it wherever in the Mystery-religions there is
mention of death, judgment, and life after death, but they forget that
in doing so they are using it in a much more general sense than that
which we have to reckon with in the Pauline [pg 228] doctrine. The
term eschatology ought only to be applied when reference is made to
the end of the world as expected in the immediate future, and the
events, hopes, and fears connected therewith. The use of the word to
designate the subjective future end of individuals, in connexion with
which no imminent catastrophe affecting all mankind is in question,
can only be misleading, since it creates the false impression—_exempla
docent_—that the Pauline eschatology can be paralleled and compared
with an eschatology belonging to the Mystery-religions. Of eschatology
in the late Jewish or early Christian sense there is not a single
trace to be found in any Graeco-Oriental doctrine._(_188_)_

Therefore, the Mystery-religions and Paulinism cannot in the last
resort be compared at all, as is indeed confirmed by the fact that the
real analogies both in the mysticism and the sacramental doctrine are
so surprisingly few. Reitzenstein’s attempt has not succeeded in
altering this result, but only in confirming it. What remains of his
material when the circle of ideas connected with the thought of
“re-birth” is eliminated, and the all-pervading eschatological
character of the fundamental ideas and underlying logic of Paulinism
are duly considered in making the comparison?

Finally, the question may be permitted, What would have been the
bearing of the result if Dieterich and Reitzenstein had really proved
the dependence of the Apostle’s doctrine upon the Mystery-religions?
The simple declaration of the result would have been only [pg 229] the
beginning of things, for immediately the problem whether, understood
in this way, the Apostle’s doctrine could still have belonged to
primitive Christianity would have arisen and called aloud for
solution. The theory that Paul personally transformed the Gospel on
the analogy of the Graeco-Oriental Mystery-religions is menaced by the
same difficulties which previously brought about the downfall of the
theory held by the Baur and post-Baur theology, that he Hellenised the
Gospel. The hypothesis advanced by the students of Comparative
Religion is only a special form of that general theory, and can do
nothing to minimise the _a priori_ difficulties, or those raised by
the history of dogma in connexion with it.

How does Paulinism as understood by Dieterich and Reitzenstein fit
into the history of the development of Christianity?

If the Apostle during the first generation had introduced such a
tremendous innovation as the Greek “physical” mysticism of redemption
and the sacraments into primitive Jewish Christianity, could the
latter have permitted this and continued to keep him in its midst? How
was it possible for it to admit without a struggle, indeed unnoticed,
something so entirely alien, and to raise no objections either to the
Christology or to the mysticism or to the sacramental doctrine of the
Apostle, but simply and solely to his attitude towards the law?

And how, on the other hand, could the later Hellenising theology pass
over in silence the man who had been its precursor in uniting the
conceptions of Graeco-Oriental religion with the Gospel? The
inexplicable fact that Paulinism played no part in the subsequent
development, but is left to lie unused and uncomprehended, becomes
still more inexplicable if Dieterich and Reitzenstein are right. They
assert that the Hellenising force did not issue from philosophy but
from the Graeco-Oriental religious movement, and found expression in
Paul not less than in the Johannine and early Greek theology. [pg 230]
Why, then, are the results so different in the two cases that they
have no kind of outer or inner relation to one another? If the same
force is applied at different times to the same object and in the same
line, can the resultant movement vary so much in direction? How is it
possible that Paul represents a Hellenisation of Christianity which is
so unique in character and so unnoticed by others? How could two
different types of Greek transformation of the Gospel come into
existence, and in such a way, moreover, that the second discovered
nothing Hellenic in the first?

According to the theory of Dieterich and Reitzenstein, Paulinism ought
to be detached from early Christianity and closely connected with
Greek theology. The contrary is the case. It stands in undisturbed
connexion with the former, whereas it shows no connexion whatever with
the latter.

Any one who thinks of the Apostle’s doctrine as in any sense a
Hellenisation of the Gospel, whether he owes allegiance to ordinary
theology or to Comparative Religion, has gone over to the radicalism
of the Ultra-Tübingen party, and must, like it, go forth with his Paul
out of primitive Christianity into a later period, unless, indeed, as
the Comparative method admits, he is prepared to consider the faith of
the early Church as Graeco-Oriental, or Paul as the founder of
Christianity.

In any case the hypothesis of a Hellenising of the Gospel in early
Christianity carried out by Paul as an individual is a historic
impossibility. From the dilemma, either early Christian or Greek,
there is no escape, however one may twist and turn.

If the students of Comparative Religion had been better acquainted
with the attempt of the Ultra-Tübingen critics, and had had a more
accurate understanding of the difference between Paulinism and the
Johannine and early Greek theology, they could hardly have retained
the open-mindedness necessary to the commencement of their
undertaking; for in that case they would have been [pg 231] forced to
reflect on the inconvenient consequences of their possible victory.

Since they did not enter on such considerations it was difficult for
them to do justice to Harnack. Here and there they took occasion to
accuse him of being behind the times and reproach him with having
given too much importance to the influence of philosophy in relation
to the Hellenising of Christianity, and too little to that of the
Mystery-religions. They are not wholly wrong in this. He does not give
sufficient recognition to the “physical” and sacramental elements in
Paulinism, and does not work out sufficiently fully the parallel
between the Mystery-religions and the Johannine and early Greek
theology. In laying the foundations of his history of dogma he is too
exclusively interested in the development of the Christology, instead
of starting from the curious complex of Christology, soteriology, and
sacramental doctrine which is characteristic of the Pauline as well as
of the Johannine and early Greek theology, and determines the course
of the history of dogma.

But this somewhat one-sided view of primitive and early Christianity
is far from affording the complete explanation of his attitude of
reserve in regard to the results arrived at by the students of
Comparative Religion. If he forms a low estimate of the influence of
the Mystery-religions upon Paul and the earliest period of
Christianity, he is led to that result by pressing considerations from
the history of dogma, by which the consequences of the theory put
forward by the students of Comparative Religion are made clear to him.
Like Anrich, he recognised from the beginning the weaknesses of the
theory, which remained hidden from the champions of the method.

It is not possible for any one who holds that Paulinism shows the
influence of the Mystery-religions to stop half-way; he has to carry
his conclusion back into primitive Christianity in general and to
explain even the genesis of the new faith as due to syncretism. The
latter [pg 232] stand-point is taken up by Hermann Gunkel_(_189_)_ and
Max Maurenbrecher._(_190_)_

They hold that the belief in a redeemer-god, such as was present in
Jewish Messianism, was also widely current in the Graeco-Oriental
religions, and that subsequently, in consequence of the historic
coming of Jesus, these two worlds of thought came into a contact which
generated a creative energy. From the process thus set in motion
primitive Christianity arose. This account of its genesis also
explains, they think, why it goes much beyond the “teaching of Jesus”
and the religious ideas which formed the content of Late Judaism, and
includes mystical and sacramental beliefs.

The historic Jesus did not, according to Gunkel and Maurenbrecher,
hold Himself to be the “Redeemer.” Therefore, the real origin of
Christianity does not lie with Him but with the disciples. They,
having been laid hold of by the power of His personality, and finding
themselves compelled to seek a solution of the problem of His death,
referred to Him the already existing myth of the Saviour-God, and
thereby gave to the set of ideas which had hitherto only existed as
such a point of historical attachment, both for Orientals and Jews.
From this time forward the religious ideas which attached themselves
in the one case and the other to the conception of a redeemer-god
flowed into a common bed and formed the stream which, as Christianity,
overflowed the world.

Maurenbrecher, who seeks to work out the hypothesis in rather fuller
detail, holds that in Galilee, which in view of its history had
certainly not always been a purely Jewish country, the Messianic idea
and the non-Jewish belief in redemption were already present and had
to some extent intermingled, and that it was, therefore, no accident
that the new religion which after the death of Jesus took [pg 233] its
rise in the revelation made to Peter should have gone forth from
Galilee. The advantage, he goes on to explain, which the young
Christianity possessed among a purely heathen population in comparison
with the other competing Oriental religions, arises from the Jewish
element, “which in consequence of the peculiar intermixture of which
Christianity was the outcome had entered into the universal Oriental
religion of redemption.” “Conversely, however, it was precisely the
non-Jewish element in the Christian faith which for the Jews made this
new religion a really new and higher stage of their religious life.”

This hypothesis is unable to recognise any unique character in Paul.
What Dieterich and Reitzenstein claim for him, it finds already
completely realised in the primitive community. The result is that
Maurenbrecher hardly knows what to make of him, and emphasises his
Jewish side much more strongly than his Graeco-Oriental aspect.

The solution of the problem worked out by Gunkel and Maurenbrecher is
not based purely on Comparative Religion, but, as the latter writer
justly points out, is a kind of synthesis between the views of liberal
theology and that of its opponents. The fundamental idea comes from
the latter; but in agreement with the former the existence of a
historical Jesus is retained.

The retention of this remnant of critical history is, however,
unnecessary and illogical. If the origin of Christianity essentially
depends on the intermixture of an Oriental belief in a redeemer with
the Jewish expectation of the Messiah, and, given a contact and
interpenetration between the two, must necessarily have arisen, it is
not obvious why the rôle of a historical Jesus should be—or whether it
can be—retained in connexion with it.

In Gunkel and Maurenbrecher it is only a stop-gap, which is brought
into a wholly external connexion with the growth of the new religion.
They retain His coming as the phenomenon by which the contact of the
two religious worlds is set up, but not as a fructifying element.

[pg 234]

There is no obvious reason for continuing to take into account this by
no means indispensable auxiliary force. If the Oriental belief in a
redeemer and the Jewish Messianic hope were inherently adapted to one
another, and destined to produce by their fruitful union a new
religion, then, after all, any kind of impulse, even a mere train of
thought, might have set the process in motion. The assumption of the
existence and the death of the Galilaean Rabbi becomes superfluous if
once it ceases to supply the efficient cause for the arising of
Christianity. Since Comparative Religion finds the latter in the
mutual interpenetration of Jewish and Graeco-Oriental elements, it can
get along just as well with myth as with the questionable history of
the Synoptists. Such is the teaching of William Benjamin
Smith,_(_191_)_ and Arthur Drews.

Both these writers make a rather extravagant use of the privilege of
standing outside the ranks of scientific theology. Their imagination
leaps with playful elegance over obstacles of fact and enables them to
discover everywhere the pre-Christian Jesus whom their soul desires,
even in places where an ordinary intelligence can find no trace of
him.

Smith takes it for granted that the “Naasenes, whose origin goes back
to the most remote antiquity, worshipped a Jesus as a divinity.” How
Christianity grew out of this cult he does not tell us, but consoles
us with the promise of later revelations. In the preface he betrays
the fact that he is now only publishing “the first quarter of the
evidence which he has collected,” and intends to go on quietly
collecting and arranging his material “until [pg 235] the whole
irresistible host can take the field together,” and further, that it
is not the—inevitable—victory which is his main concern, but the
stimulus imparted to others.

Drews_(_192_)_ does not play the amateur quite so completely, but
endeavours on the basis of his belief in the pre-Christian Jesus to
present a coherent picture of the way in which Christianity arose; and
he makes Paul its creator. “The Jesus-faith,” so runs his thesis, “had
long existed in numerous Mandaean sects in Western Asia, in many
respects distinct from one another, before the belief in the
Jesus-religion acquired a fixed form and its adherents became
conscious of their religious _differentia_ and their independence of
the official Jewish religion.” This ancient faith first meets us as a
new religion in the letters ascribed to Paul. The citizen of Tarsus,
trained as a Pharisee, heard of a sect-god named Jesus, and brought
this conception into connexion with the belief in the death and
resurrection of Adonis and the thought of the suffering “servant of
the Lord” in Isaiah liii., and thus arrived at the idea that a god had
appeared in human form, and had by his death and resurrection become
the Redeemer, and had enabled men “to become God.” This was the
birth-hour of Christianity. For a historic personality, “to serve, so
to speak, as the living model for the God-man,” there was no need in
order to produce this Jesus-religion, which then entered on its
world-wide career of victory.

Drews’ thesis is not merely a curiosity; it indicates the natural
limit at which the hypothesis advanced by the advocates of Comparative
Religion, when left to its own momentum, finally comes to rest.

Paulinism, in the judgment of the adherents of this much-vaunted
method, is to be regarded as a synthesis between primitive
Christianity and the conceptions current in the Mystery-religions. If
this be taken as the starting-point, it is necessary to proceed to the
conclusion—since the synthesis cannot be conceived as [pg 236]
accomplished by an individual—that Christianity itself is a product of
syncretism. And if the constitutive factor in the new faith is seen in
the combination of the Jewish Messianic expectation with a
Graeco-Oriental belief in a redeemer-god who dies and rises again, the
assumption of the existence of a historic Jesus who was not Himself
touched by Hellenic ideas becomes a worthless subsidiary hypothesis.
It becomes quite a natural step to leave it on one side and to regard
the synthesis as either developing gradually, by an impersonal
process, or as coming to birth in the brain of the author of the
Pauline Epistles, who thus becomes the creator of early Christianity.
Drews is justified in appealing to Gunkel, and asserting that he is
only offering his ideas with a logically necessary correction.

Of course, every further logical step in this direction involves
further sacrifice of historical understanding and an increasing
necessity to indulge in imaginary constructions. But all these
consequences are already present in germ in the mere assertion that
Paul is to be understood from the Mystery-religions, even though those
who maintain this view do not want to proceed any further than the
facts which have to be explained seem to them to warrant. As between
the students of Comparative Religion and Drews the relation is similar
to that between the legitimate and illegitimate Tübingen schools.
Here, too, the alternative lies between “scientific and inconsistent,
and consistent and unscientific.” That means that an absolute antinomy
appears between the logic of the attempted solution and that of the
data of fact; which is as much as to say that the problem has been
wrongly grasped, and that this way, whether it be followed for a
certain distance only, or right to the end, can never lead to the goal
of a satisfactory solution.




[pg 237]

VIII


SUMMING-UP AND FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM


THE study of Paulinism has nothing very brilliant to show for itself
in the way of scientific achievement. Learning has been lavishly
expended upon it, but thought and reflection have been to seek.

Writers went to work with an almost inconceivable absence of plan, and
wanted to offer solutions before they had made clear to themselves the
scope of the problem. Instead of seeking a definite diagnosis, they
treated the symptoms separately, with whatever means happened to come
to hand.

It was inevitable, therefore, that the study of the subject should
move along intricate and continually recrossing paths, and engage in
long and devious wanderings, only, in some cases, to arrive back again
at the point from which it started. That Paul’s doctrine of redemption
was thought out on the lines of a physical nature-process had been
asserted by Lüdemann as long ago as the year 1872. Nevertheless,
theology hit on the plan of “spiritualising” it, and took very nearly
thirty years to get back to this discovery.

The account which we have given of the history of the subject has
revealed the structure of the problem and given it room to develop
itself. The inner connexion of the questions determines in advance
what the individual solutions can and cannot effect, and at the same
time [pg 238] shows what must be provided for in any solution which
professes to offer a really historical explanation.

To neglect this structure, this schematism of the problem is not
permissible. It has not been independently invented and imposed from
without upon the past history of research, but represents its actual
results, and points the way for all subsequent attempts at a solution.

The problem consists in the two great questions: what Paul’s doctrine
has in common with primitive Christianity, and what it has in common
with Greek ideas.

It is complicated by the fact that our only information about the
beliefs of the primitive Church comes from Paul. His writings are the
first—and indeed the only—witnesses which we possess upon the point,
since the First Epistle of Peter and the Epistle of James give us
information at best about a non-Pauline, certainly not about a
pre-Pauline Christianity.

The standard by which the primitiveness of Paul’s Christianity has to
be measured and tested has, therefore, in the first place to be
arrived at by the method of arguing backward from itself.
Nevertheless, the difficulty is not so great as it appears when thus
theoretically stated. The most general features of the earliest dogma
can be found without difficulty in the Epistles. These consisted in
the belief in the Messiahship of the Jesus who had died and risen
again, and in the expectation of His parousia in the immediate future.

Moreover, the problem as a whole is simplified by the fact that the
second of the fundamental questions has been clearly answered by the
history of Pauline study. The answer is this: Paulinism and Hellenism
have in common their religious terminology, but, in respect of ideas,
nothing. The Apostle did not Hellenise Christianity. His conceptions
are equally distinct from those of Greek philosophy and from those of
the Mystery-religions.

The affinities and analogies which have been alleged cannot stand an
examination which takes account of their real essence and of the
different way in which the ideas [pg 239] are conditioned in the two
cases. Neither Baur nor the theology which owes allegiance to him, nor
the students of Comparative Religion, have succeeded in proving their
assertions. It is also interesting to observe that those who undertake
to explain Paul by the aid of the Graeco-Oriental Mystery-religions,
entirely deny the philosophic Hellenism which a more conventional
theological opinion has found in him; so that it is a case of Satan’s
being driven out by Beelzebub. On the other hand, the Comparative
study of Paulinism has the merit of having made an end of the
“spiritualising” and “psychologising” which were practised for a whole
generation.

The impossibility of anything in the nature of a Hellenic gospel being
present in Paul appears from the fact, that every view of this kind
when thought out in its logical implications must arrive at a point
where it has to do violence to historical tradition. It became
apparent that it is impossible for a Hellenised Paulinism to subsist
alongside of a primitive Christianity which shared the Jewish
eschatological expectations. One must either, as the Ultra-Tübingen
critics did, transplant the Epistles and the doctrine from the
primitive period to the second century, or, as some of the votaries of
Comparative Religion have endeavoured to do, explain primitive
Christianity as a product of Graeco-Oriental syncretism.

That only a very few investigators have drawn these inferences is not
due to the fact that they are not justified. It was want of courage,
of logical consistency, and of the necessary contempt for the rest of
the facts which prevented them from making the venture. So they
offered compromises, imposingly dressed out in words but inwardly
untenable, and talked themselves and others into believing the
impossible, namely, that a Hellenisation of the primitive Christian
belief effected by Paul as an individual is really conceivable.

The half-and-half theories which represent Paulinism as consisting
partly of Greek, partly of Jewish ideas, are [pg 240] in a still worse
case than those which more or less neglect the former element.
Encumbered with all the difficulties of the Hellenising theory they
become involved in the jungle of antinomies which they discover or
imagine, and there perish miserably.

The solution must, therefore, consist in leaving out of the question
Greek influence in every form and in every combination, and venturing
on the “one-sidedness” of endeavouring to understand the doctrine of
the Apostle of the Gentiles entirely on the basis of Jewish primitive
Christianity. That implies, in the first place, that the Pauline
eschatology must be maintained in its full compass, as required by the
utterances of the letters. But merely to emphasise it is not
everything. The next point is to explain it. What was the scheme of
the events of the End, and what answer was given by eschatological
expectation to the fundamental questions which could not be avoided?
Are there two resurrections or one; one judgment or two? Who are to
rise again at the parousia? Does a judgment take place then? On whom
is it held? What are its standards and its subject? Wherein do reward
and punishment consist? What happens to the men of the surviving
generation who are not destined to the Messianic kingdom? What is the
relation between judgment and election? What is the fate of believers
who are elect and baptised but who have fallen from grace by unworthy
conduct? Can they lose their final blessedness, or are they only
excluded from the Messianic kingdom? Does Paul recognise a general
resurrection? If so, when does it take place? Is it accompanied by a
judgment, or do only the elect rise again? When does the judgment take
place at which the elect judge the angels?

Not until Pauline eschatology gives an answer to all the “idle”
questions of this kind which can be asked will it be really understood
and explained. And it must be somehow possible, by the discovery of
its inner logic, to reconstruct it from the scattered statements in
the documents. [pg 241] We have no right to assume that for Paul there
existed in his expectation manifest obscurities, much less that he had
overlooked contradictions in it.

Is there, then, any possibility of explaining the mystical doctrine of
redemption and the sacramental teaching on the basis of the Jewish
eschatological element?

The attempt is by no means so hopeless as it might seem in view of the
general consideration that Judaism knew neither mysticism nor
sacraments. It is not really a question of Judaism as such, but of
apocalyptic thought, which is a separate and independent phenomenon
arising within Judaism, and has special presuppositions which are
entirely peculiar to it.

We saw in analysing the “physical” element in the doctrine of
redemption and the sacraments that the conceptions connected therewith
are conditioned by the underlying eschatology which everywhere shows
through._(_193_)_ It needs no special learning to make this discovery.
Any one who ventures to read the documents with an open mind and pays
attention to the primary links of connexion will soon arrive at this
conclusion. That Paul’s mystical doctrine of redemption and his
doctrine of the sacraments belong to eschatology is plain to be seen.
The only question is in what way, exactly, they have arisen out of it.
The future-hope, raised to the highest degree of intensity, must
somehow or other have possessed the power of producing them. If the
impulse, the pressing need to which they were the response, is once
recognised, then Paulinism is understood, since in its essence it can
be nothing else than an eschatological mysticism, expressing itself by
the aid of the Greek religious terminology.

Theoretically, too, it is possible to form an approximate idea how the
intensified expectation of the future might take a mystical form. In
apocalyptic thought sensuous and super-sensuous converge, in such a
manner that the former is thought of as passing away into the latter.
Thus [pg 242] there is present in it the most general presupposition
of all mysticism, since it is the object of the latter to abolish the
earthly in the super-earthly. The peculiarity of the mysticism which
arises out of Apocalyptic is that it does not bring the two worlds
into contact in the mind of the individual man, as Greek and medieval
mysticism did, but dovetails one into the other, and thus creates for
the moment at which the one passes over into the other an objective,
temporally conditioned mysticism. This, however, is only available for
those who by their destiny belong to both worlds. Eschatological
mysticism is predestinarian.

That a mysticism of this kind existed before Paul is not known. It may
be conjectured that the conditions under which it could develop were
not present until after the death and resurrection of Jesus.

But sacramental tendencies already make their appearance in the
future-hope which was to lead up to Christianity. The usual view is to
the effect that Paul was the first to introduce the mystical element
into baptism and the Lord’s Supper. There is nothing to prove that.
How can we possibly tell that these ceremonies were previously purely
symbolic acts? Any one who reads with an open mind the Synoptic
accounts of John’s baptism must recognise that it was not only a
symbol of purification on repentance, but is thought of as in some way
or other guaranteeing salvation._(_194_)_ A transaction, however,
which itself gives and effects such a result is to be regarded as a
sacrament.

The manner in which Paul speaks of early Christian baptism and of the
Lord’s Supper does not make the impression that he is asserting for
the first time the effectual working of the ceremony; it is rather as
if he took it for granted as something given and self-evident. This
would agree with the observation noted above that the baptism of John,
from which primitive Christian [pg 243] baptism was derived, was
already thought of as a sacrament.

Whether the Lord’s Supper in the intention of Jesus Himself directly
conveyed something to the partakers, or whether it only became a
sacrament in primitive Christian times, must be left undecided.

That the intensified eschatological expectation should go so far as to
produce sacramental conceptions is in itself intelligible. Those who
stood on the threshold of the coming glory must have been eagerly
anxious to gain an assurance that they themselves would be partakers
therein and to obtain tangible guarantees of “deliverance” from the
coming judgment. The conception of “marking out” and “sealing” plays
in apocalyptic thought a very important part. Similar provisions are a
characteristic product of any intense expectation of the future.

It is, therefore, highly probable that the Baptist, and primitive
Christianity, created eschatological sacraments which, as already
established and accredited, Paul had only to take over.

The bearing of these statements and considerations must be shown from
the Epistles. How far it is possible to trace the genesis of the
mysticism and the sacramental doctrine from the eschatological beliefs
of the Apostle cannot be determined _a priori_. The one thing certain
is that no other way of explanation is possible than that which leads
from the circumference of his future-hope to the central idea of his
“theology.” All other interpretations hang in the air.

Theology has heretofore found itself rather helpless in presence of
the votaries of Comparative Religion. It could not accept their
results as correct, but on the other hand it was not in a position to
explain Paul’s sacramental views, because it had never taken into
consideration the possibility that they might have arisen out of the
Jewish and primitive Christian future-hope. There was thus no course
open to it but to engage in an inglorious guerilla warfare with the
new science and skirmish with [pg 244] it over particular passages and
statements. It is only the acceptance of the fact that the Apostle’s
doctrine is integrally, simply and exclusively eschatological, which
puts it in a position to assume the offensive in a systematic way and
with good prospect of success.

The Apostle’s most general views must be taken as the starting point
from which to explain how he arrives at the paradox that the believer
is united with Christ, experiences along with Him death and
resurrection, and becomes a new creature, emancipated from fleshly
corporeity. The assertion that these statements are meant in a
“physical” sense does not carry us very far. The reason which explains
their “reality” must be shown. Simply in and by themselves they are
not explicable. What has been advanced regarding the solidarity of
Jesus with the human race is far from sufficing to make it in any
degree intelligible, especially as Paul has not in view Christ and
humanity, but Christ and the elect.

The mistake in the attempts at explanation hitherto made consists in
the fact that they seek to argue from the facts of the death and
resurrection of Jesus, simply as such, directly to that which takes
place in the believer. In reality, it can only be a question of a
general event, which in the time immediately preceding the End brings
about this dying and rising again in Jesus and believers as together
forming a single category of mankind, and thus antedates the future
into the present. For that which happens both to the Lord and to the
elect it must be possible to find some kind of common-denominator
which exactly contains the factors, the forces which are at work in
the two cases. Since those which produce their effect in Christ are
the first to become manifest, Paul can cast his theory into the form
that the believers have died and risen again with Him.

The general fact which comes into question must result from the
condition of the world between the death of Jesus and His parousia.
The Apostle asserts an overlapping of the still natural, and the
already supernatural, [pg 245] condition of the world, which becomes
real in the case of Christ and believers in the form of an open or
hidden working of the forces of death and resurrection—and becomes
real in them only. The doctrine of the death and resurrection of Jesus
and the mystical doctrine of redemption are alike cosmically
conditioned.

It is not sufficient, however, to explain the mystical doctrine and
the sacramental doctrine which is bound up with it. To the problem of
Paulinism belong other distinct questions which have not yet found a
solution. The primary questions are the relation of the Apostle to the
historical Jesus, his attitude towards universalism_(_195_)_ and
towards the law, and the nature of his compromise between
predestinarian and sacramental doctrine.

Will his views on these points, which it has hitherto been impossible
to grasp clearly, similarly admit of explanation on the basis of the
unique cosmic conditions obtaining between the death of Christ and the
parousia? It is to be noticed that the Apostle does not advance his
assertions with reference either to earlier or to subsequent times,
but simply and solely for this short intervening period. Their
explanation is therefore doubtless to be looked for here.

Paul must have had more knowledge about Jesus than he uses in his
teachings and polemics. His procedure is deliberate. He does not
appeal to the Master even where it might seem inevitable to do so, as
in regard to the ethics and the doctrine of the significance of His
death and resurrection; and in fact declares that as a matter of
principle he desires no longer to “know Christ after the flesh.”
Psychological considerations are quite inadequate to explain these
facts. It is as though he held that between the present world-period
and that in which Jesus lived and taught there exists no link of
connexion, and was convinced that since the death and resurrection of
the Lord conditions were present which [pg 246] were so wholly new
that they made His teaching inapplicable, and rendered necessary a new
basis for ethics and a deeper knowledge respecting His death and
resurrection.

The case lies similarly in regard to the Apostle’s views about
universalism and the law.

It was not by his experiences among the Gentiles that he was led to
universalism. And the thought is not simply that mission work among
the heathen ought to be _permitted._ He maintains the view that there
is a pressing necessity to carry the Gospel abroad. It is under the
impulsion of this thought that he becomes the Apostle of the Greeks.

The sole and sufficient reason for this view he finds in the peculiar
condition of the world between the death and the parousia of Christ.
To it are due the conditions in consequence of which a share in the
privileges of Israel is open to the Gentiles without their being
obliged, by taking upon them the law and its sign, to enter into union
with Israel. In saying this it is not the Apostle’s meaning that they
merely do not _need_ to do so; they _must not_ do so, on pain of
losing their salvation.

Since Ritschl, the representatives of the history of dogma have been
concerned to obscure the problem of the law in Paul and to turn
theology into paths of easiness. They assert that it was a purely
practical question, which did not touch doctrine in the strict sense.
This was the expedient by which they escaped from the difficulty when
it was raised by Baur. It is time that it should be given up.

When Paul proclaims that the Greeks do not need to submit to the law,
he is not led to do so by the experience that this was reasonable and
practical. He declares them free because the logical implications of
his doctrine compel him to do so. What Jesus thought about the matter
is just as indifferent to him as His opinion regarding the legitimacy
of preaching to the Gentiles. The peculiar conditions of the time
between His death and [pg 247] His parousia forbid any extension of
the law to believers outside of Israel. On the other hand, these
conditions require that believers belonging to the Chosen People must
continue to practise it as before. The assertion of the non-validity
of the law is never intended by Paul in a sense which would justify
the inference of its total abolition for all believers. It has
received its death-blow, but retains its position outwardly up to the
time of the parousia. For this limited period the watchword is: he who
is under the law shall continue to observe it; he who is free from it
shall on no account place himself under it. From one and the same fact
two diametrically opposite conclusions are drawn; for so the unique
character of the time demands.

What is the relation between predestination and the sacraments? Why do
the elect of the final generation need a provision which was not made
for those of earlier generations? This too must result from the unique
character of the time. The only logical assumption is that to this
special provision corresponds a special blessedness, going beyond the
ordinary blessedness involved in election as such, which is reserved
for the final generation and cannot be obtained otherwise than through
baptism and the Lord’s Supper. But wherein does it consist?

All these questions are, like the mystical doctrine, to be answered by
reference to the special conditions of the period between the death of
Jesus and the parousia. It must be possible to refer back the whole of
the teachings to one and the same fundamental fact. It follows that
there must be no more talking about the “uniqueness of the event at
Damascus” and psychologising about Paul’s “religious experience,” no
more spiritualising and modernising, no making play with the
distinction between religion and theology, or with the discovery or
concealment of contradictions and antinomies, or other similar
exercises of ingenuity.

All explanations which represent the system of doctrine [pg 248] as
something arising subjectively in the Apostle’s mind may be assumed _a
priori_ to be false. Only those which seek to derive it objectively
from the fundamental facts of the primitive eschatological belief are
to be taken into consideration. The only kind of interpretation which
can be considered historical is one which makes it clear how a man who
believed in the death and resurrection of Jesus and His imminent
parousia was, in virtue of that belief, in a position to understand
the thoughts of the Apostle of the Gentiles and to follow his
arguments, and was logically obliged to accept them.

And, finally, the solution must explain the enigmatic attitude which
subsequent generations take up in regard to the Apostle of the
Gentiles. They know him, but they owe no allegiance to him. He created
no school. The theology of an Ignatius or a Justin does not attach
itself to him. There is something more in this than a simple
oversight. If these theologians do not turn to him for aid, though he
stands like a giant among them, that must be due to the fact that it
is impossible to do so, and that in the course of the natural
development of things they have been led to follow quite other paths.

For some reason or other, the conditions under which he created his
system must be for them unimaginable. It is true they are still in the
period between the death and the parousia of Jesus, but they can no
longer interpret it in the same way as the Apostle did. Why are they
no longer able to bring into play the forces which he assumes to be in
operation when he refers everything to the dying and rising again of
Christ and the believer? Which of his presuppositions is for them
lacking? May it be that the intensity of the eschatological
expectation has so declined that the mysticism associated therewith
can no longer maintain its ground?

The Ultra-Tübingen critics demanded of theology proof that the
canonical Paul and his Epistles belonged to early Christianity; and
the demand was justified.

The question is not to be decided in the domain of [pg 249] literary
history, since the only thing we have to deal with is the self-witness
of the Epistles, which can neither be strengthened nor shaken by
indications drawn from elsewhere.

Argument and counter-argument must be drawn from the contents. The
theological scholarship which had to meet the attacks of Steck and van
Manen had no solid arguments to oppose to them. Its Paulinism was so
complicated, Hellenised and modernised, that it could at need find a
place in theological text-books, but not in primitive Christianity. On
the other hand, an explanation which shows that the Apostle’s system
is based on the most primitive eschatological premises, and at the
same time makes it intelligible why subsequent generations could not
continue to follow the road on which he started, thereby demonstrates
his primitive Christianity and, to this extent, also the genuineness
of his chief Epistles. The possibility that they might be
primitive-Christian, and yet not written by the historic Apostle of
the Gentiles, hardly calls for serious consideration.

Any one who works out this solution is the true pupil of Baur, however
widely he may diverge from him in his views and results. By
unequivocally determining the date of the writings in question on
internal grounds and excluding all other possibilities he is
exercising “positive criticism” in the sense intended by the Tübingen
master, and justifies him in the face of the adversaries against whom
he can no longer defend himself.

It may no doubt prove to be the case that this “positive” criticism
will appear distressingly negative to those who look for results which
can be immediately coined into dogmatic and homiletic currency.

Their opinion, however, is of small importance.

It is the fate of the “Little-faiths” of truth that they, true
followers of Peter, whether they be of the Roman or the Protestant
observance, cry out and sink in the sea of ideas, where the followers
of Paul, believing in the Spirit, walk secure and undismayed.




[pg 251]

INDEX


  Ammon, C. F. von, 3 n.
  Anrich, Gustav, 179, 189, 231
  Aratus, 94
  Aubertin, Charles, 95 n.
  Augustine, 95 n.
  Aurelian, 181

  Baljon, J. M. S., 117, 118, 125, 148 n.
  Bauer, Bruno, 24, 28, 117, 120 ff.
  Baumgarten, Michael, 96 n.
  Baumgarten, S. J., 1, 3
  Baur, F. C., 12 ff., 20 f., 25, 33, 81, 118 f.
  Baur, F. F., 20 n.
  Beyschlag, Willibald, 22, 26, 41
  Bousset, W., 48 n., 151, 152, 162
  Brandt, W., 24, 60 n.
  Brückner, Martin, 152, 171, 179, 193 n.
  Brückner, Wilhelm, 118, 134 n.
  Bruston, E., 24, 74 n.

  Caligula, 184
  Calvin, 33
  Claudius, 183
  Clemen, Karl, 118, 179, 189 n.
  Clement of Rome, 119, 128, 135
  Cumont, Franz, 179, 181, 183 n., 185 n., 192
  Curtius, Ernst, 24, 87, 94 n.

  Dähne, A. F., 2, 10 n.
  Deissmann, Adolf, 23, 60 n., 153, 172 n., 179, 189 n.
  De Jong, H. E., 181
  Delitzsch, Franz, 23, 47
  De Wette, W. M. L., 2, 10 n.
  Dibelius, Martin, 152, 162 n.
  Dick, Karl, 151, 155 n.
  Dieterich, Albrecht, 179, 186 ff., 190, 193 n., 194, 195, 228 n., 230
  Dobschütz, Ernst von, 152, 169
  Domitian, 128
  Drescher, A., 151, 153, 159 n.
  Drews, Arthur, 179, 234 f.

  Eichhorn, Albert, 179, 205
  Eichhorn, J. G., 1, 8 f., 15
  Epictetus, 95
  Ernesti, Fr. Th. L., 23, 95 n.
  Ernesti, J. A., 1, 3 f.
  Evanson, E., 117, 121 n.
  Everling, Otto, 23, 55 f.

  Feine, Paul, 151, 152, 156 ff., 165
  Fleury, Amédée, 95 n.
  Friedländer, M., 117, 124 n.
  Friedrich (Maehliss), 117, 135 n.

  Gass, J. C., 7
  Gass, W., 24, 95 n.
  Geffken, J., 179, 189 n.
  Gennrich, P., 179, 191 n.
  Gloël, J., 23, 78 n.
  Godet, F., 22, 26 n.
  Goguel, M., 152, 159 f.
  Grafe, E., 23, 44, 90 f., 111
  Gressmann, H., 152, 162 n.
  Grotius, Hugo, 1, 2
  Gruppe, Otto, 179, 181 n., 193 n.
  Gunkel, H., 23, 78 f., 111, 179, 189 n., 232 f., 236

  Hadrian, 122
  Harnack, Adolf, vi, 25, 63, 69, 81 f., 83, 84, 90, 113, 114 f., 151,
152, 160, 173, 180, 189 n., 231
  Hatch, Edwin, 25, 82
  Hausrath, Adolf, 22
  Haussleiter, J., 152, 172
  Havet, E., 23, 54, 63
  Hegel, 15, 16, 21
  Heinrici, G. F., 24, 45, 63 n., 67, 80 n., 87, 93, 117, 151, 162 n.
  Heitmüller, W., 152, 165, 180, 204 ff., 208 n.
  Heliogabalus, 181
  Hepding, H., 180, 182, 184
  Hilgenfeld, A., 129
  Hofmann, C. K. von, 22, 41
  Hollmann, G., 151, 211 n.

[pg 252]

  Holsten, K., 22, 23, 35, 38 f., 63, 66 ff., 105, 113, 114 f.
  Holtzmann, H. J., 22, 24, 25 f., 100, 116, 149 f., 153, 163 f., 221 n.

  Ignatius, v, vi, vii, 80, 82, 119, 127, 135, 200, 248

  Jacoby, Adolf, 180, 193 n.
  Jakoby, Hermann, 151, 160 f.
  Jerome, 95 n.
  Josephus, 51
  Julian, 181 n.
  Jülicher, Adolf, 22, 152, 170 n.
  Juncker, Alfred, 152, 160 f.
  Justin Martyr, v, vi, vii, 80, 82, 119, 128, 132, 135, 136, 200, 217,
248

  Kabisch, R., 23, 58 ff., 74, 76, 108, 111, 168, 174,222
  Kalthoff, A., 117, 123 n.
  Kant, 112, 118
  Karl, W., 81 n., 152
  Kautzsch, E. F., 23, 88
  Knopf, R., 152, 172 ff.
  Kölbing, P., 152, 170 ff.
  Kreyer, J., 95 n.

  Lechler, G. V., 12, 18
  Lightfoot, John, 48 n.
  Lipsius, R. A., 12, 19 f., 24, 64 n.
  Loman, A. D., 117, 124 f., 140, 153
  Loofs, F., 63 n., 173 n.
  Lüdemann, H., 23, 28 ff., 34 f., 62 f., 66, 71, 86, 163
  Luther, 33, 50

  Manen, W. C. van, 117, 125, 129 ff., 140, 153
  Marcion, 113, 128 f.
  Marcus Aurelius, 96 n., 98, 122
  Mau, Georg, 180, 181 n.
  Maurenbrecher, Max, 180, 232 f.
  Mehlhorn, Karl, 38 n.
  Ménégoz, L. E., 23, 31, 35
  Meuschen, J. G., 48 n.
  Meyer, Arnold, 152, 170 n.
  Meyer, G. W., 2, 9 n.
  Michaelis, J. D., 1, 5 n., 7
  Müller, Iwan, 181 n.
  Müller, J., 153, 172 n.
  Munzinger, Karl, 152, 154 n.

  Naber, S. A., 123
  Neander, J. A. W., 2, 10 n.
  Nork, J., 48 n.

  Olschewski, W., 152, 171 n.

  Paulus, H. E. G., 2, 10 f.
  Pfleiderer, Otto, 22, 23, 31, 34, 35, 63, 66 ff., 76, 80, 90, 111, 114
f., 151, 154
  Philo, 51, 91, 98, 110
  Pierson, Allard, 117, 123
  Plato, 211
  Preuschen, E., 82 n.
  Ptolemy Soter, 184

  Rambach, J. J., 1, 3
  Reinach, S., 180, 181 n.
  Reitzenstein, R., 180, 188 n., 208 n., 212 n., 216 n., 218 ff., 225,
230
  Renan, Ernest, 22, 35
  Resch, A., 23, 42 n.
  Reuss, E., 22, 24, 31, 35
  Ritschl, Albrecht, 12, 16 f., 23, 40 f., 43, 83, 84
  Rohde, E., 180, 181, 185 n.
  Roscher, H. R., 180
  Rothe, R., 56

  Sabatier, A., 22, 32, 35
  Schettler, A., 152, 172 n.
  Schläger, G., 117
  Schlatter, A., 152
  Schleiermacher, F. E. D., 1, 7 f.
  Schmidt, Ernst, 182 n.
  Schmiedel, P. W., 24, 63, 88, 103
  Schnedermann, G., 45 n.
  Schniewind, J., 153, 172 n.
  Scholten, J. H., 117, 134 n.
  Schopenhauer, 118
  Schöttgen, C., 48 n.
  Schrader, Karl, 2, 10 n.
  Schürer, Emil, 24, 45
  Schwartz, E. E., 180, 219
  Schwegler, A., 12, 16
  Schweitzer, A., 170
  Seeberg, R., 152, 173
  Semler, J. S., 1, 4 f., 148
  Seneca, 95 f., 122
  Siegfried, K., 24, 91 n.
  Simon, Theodor, 24, 96 n.
  Smith, W. B., 180, 234 f.
  Sokolowski, E., 151, 160 n.
  Soltau, W., 180, 189 n.
  Spiegelberg, W., 212 n.
  Spitta, F., 52 n., 118, 149
  Steck, Rudolf, 117, 125, 128 n., 129 ff., 140, 141, 153
  Sulze, E., 118, 143
  Surenhus (Surenhuys), W., 48 n.

  Teichmann, Ernst, 24, 74 ff.
  Tertullian, v, 95, 128, 129, 200
  Titius, Arthur, 151, 156 ff., 165

[pg 253]

  Usener, H., 180, 181
  Usteri, L., 2, 9 f.

  Vischer, E., 152, 153, 172 n.
  Volck, W., 26 n., 41 n.
  Volkmar, G., 23
  Vollmer, H., 24, 48 n., 88, 91
  Völter, Daniel, 118, 143 ff.
  Volz, Paul, 152, 162 n.

  Walther, W., 152, 170 n.
  Weber, F., 24, 45
  Weinel, Heinrich, 151, 154 f., 165 n.
  Weiss, Bernhard, 22, 27 n., 35, 41, 54, 64, 66, 69
  Weiss, Johannes, 152, 170 n.
  Weisse, C. H., 24, 28, 118, 141 f.
  Weizsäcker, Karl von, 23, 35, 64, 65 f., 69, 128 n.
  Wellhausen, J., 46 n., 152, 159 n.
  Wendland, P., 180, 189 n.
  Wendt, H. H., 23, 30 n.
  Wernle, P., 24, 60 n., 151, 154 f., 180, 210 f.
  Wieseler, K., 12, 15
  Windisch, H., 152, 161 n.
  Wobbermin, G., 180
  Wolf, J. C., 1, 3
  Wrede, William, 100, 152, 166 ff., 177
  Wünsch, R., 187 n.

  Zahn, Theodor, 22, 25, 96 n.
  Zeller, E., 20 n.
  Ziegler, Theobald, 24, 95 n.
  Zwingli, 33

THE END

_Printed by_ R. & R. Clark, Limited, _Edinburgh_.




FOOTNOTES

NOTES FOR PREFACE

1 Sub-title: _“Eine Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung.”_ English
translation “The Quest of the Historical Jesus.” London, A. & C.
Black, 1910, 2nd ed. 1911.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER I

2 In the Amsterdam edition of the whole in 1679, the _Annotationes_ on
the Pauline Epistles (1009 pp.), with those on the other Epistles and
the Apocalypse, form vol. iii.

3 1723, 822 pp.

4 1st ed. 1742; 2nd, 1745, 232 pp. (For title see head of chapter.)

5 Bâle, 1741. Five vols., covering the whole of the New Testament. The
Pauline Epistles are treated in the 3rd (820 pp.) and 4th (837 pp.).
The full title is: Curae philologicae et criticae . . . quibus
integritati contextus Graeci consulitur, sensus verborum ex praesidiis
philologicis illustratur, diversae Interpretum Sententiae summatim
enarrantur et modesto examini subjectae vel approbantur vel
repelluntur.

6 135 pp. Later editions 1765, 1774, 1792, 1809. The last two were
brought out under the care of Ammon.

7 Four parts. Parts i. and ii. form the first volume (424 pp.), part
iii. = vol. ii. (396 pp.), part iv. = vol. iii. (396 pp.). Part i. is
occupied with the general principles of exegesis, part ii. with the
text of the Old Testament, parts iii. and iv. with that of the New
Testament.

8 Four volumes. The first (in the reprint of 1776, 333 pp.): On the
natural conception of Scripture. The second (in the first edition,
1772, 608 pp.): On Inspiration and the Canon, Answers to criticisms
and attacks. Third (1st ed., 1773, 567 pp.): On the History of the
Canon, Answers to criticisms and attacks. The fourth (1775, 460 pp.)
is wholly occupied by an answer to the work of a certain Dr. Schubert.

This often mentioned but little read work does not therefore present
exactly the appearance that might be expected from its title. The
polemical replies occupy a much larger space than the original
arguments.

9 298 pp. A striking and brilliantly written work.

10 _Paraphrasis Epistolae ad Romanos . . . cum Dissertatione de
Appendice, capp._ xv. et xvi., 1769, 311 pp. (Dedicated to Johann
August Ernesti.)

_Paraphrasis in Primam Pauli ad Corinthios Epistolam,_ 1770, 540 pp.
(Dedicated to Johann David Michaelis.)

_Paraphrasis II. Epistolae ad Corinthios,_ 1776, 388 pp. Each of these
works contains a preface of some length on the principles of
historical exegesis. As a specimen of the paraphrase we may quote that
of Rom. vi. I: Jam si haec est Evangelii tam exoptata hominibusque
cunctis tam frugifera doctrina, num audebimus statuere, perseverare
nos tamen posse in ista peccandi consuetudine, ut quasi eo fiat
amplior gratiae divinae locus?

11 Johann David Michaelis, _Einleitung in die Schriften des Neuen
Bundes,_ 1st ed., 1750. In its successive editions this work dominates
the theology of all the latter half of the eighteenth century; at the
beginning of the nineteenth it is superseded by Eichhorn’s
Introduction. The third edition (1777) contains 1356 pp. The Pauline
Epistles occupy pp. 1001-1128.

12 _Übersetzung des Neuen Testaments,_ 1790, 566 pp. _Anmerkungen für
Ungelehrte zu seiner Übersetzung des Neuen Testaments,_ 4 vols.,
1790-92. The Pauline Epistles are treated in vols. iii. and iv.

13 Friedrich Ernst David Schleiermacher, _Über den sogenannten ersten
Brief des Paulus an den Timotheus. Ein kritisches Sendschreiben an
Joachim Christian Gass,_ 1807. In his complete works this is to be
found in the second volume of the first division, 1836, pp. 223-320.

14 Johann Gottfried Eichhorn, _Historisch-kritische Einleitung in das
Neue Testament,_ 1st ed., vol. iii., second half (1814), pp. 315-410.

Eichhorn points out that he had recognised the spuriousness of the
three Pastoral Epistles, and had expressed his conviction in his
University lectures before Schleiermacher published his criticisms of
the First Epistle of Timothy.

15 Leonhard Usteri, _Die Entwicklung des paulinischen Lehrbegriffs,_
1824, 191 pp. The editions of 1829, 1830, and 1832 were revised by the
author, who died in 1833. After his death two more appeared (1834,
1851). Reference may be made also to Usteri’s “Commentary on the
Epistle to the Galatians,” 1833, 252 pp.

16 The first work which undertook to give an account of the Apostle’s
system of thought as such is Gottlob Wilhelm Meyer’s _Entwicklung des
paulinischen Lehrbegriffs,_ 1801, 380 pp. The author has collected the
material well, but does not know in what direction Paul’s peculiarity
lies.

17 Of the works which criticise Usteri and mark an advance in Pauline
study the following may be named:—

Karl Schrader, _Der Apostel Paulus;_ vols. i., 1830 (264 pp.), and
ii., 1832 (373 pp.), deal with the life of the Apostle Paul; vol.
iii., 1833 (331 pp.), with the doctrine; vols. iv., 1835 (490 pp.),
and v., 1836 (574 pp.), contain the exposition of the Epistles.

August Ferdinand Dähne, _Entwicklung des paulinischen Lehrbegriffs,_
1835, 211 pp.

Mention may also be made of the chapter on Paulinism in J. A. W.
Neander’s _Geschichte der Pflanzung und Leitung der christlichen
Kirche durch die Apostel,_ 1st ed., 1832; 2nd ed., 1st vol., 1838 (433
pp.). Paul is treated in pp. 102-433; 4th ed., 1847; 5th, 1862. As
typical of the exegesis of the period prior to Baur may be mentioned
the Commentaries of W. M. L. de Wette on Romans (2nd ed.), 1838; 1 and
2 Corinthians, 1841; Galatians and Thessalonians, 1841.

18 H. E. G. Paulus, _Des Apostels Paulus Lehrbriefe an die Galater-
und Römer-Christen,_ 1831, 368 pp.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER II BAUR AND HIS CRITICS

19 Albert Schwegler, _Das nachapostolische Zeitalter in den
Hauptmomenten seiner Entwicklung_ (“The Post-Apostolic Age in the main
Features of its Development”), 1846, vol. i. 522 pp., vol. ii. 392 pp.
In the writings which mark the course of the development of Paulinism
three groups are distinguished. To the first, the apologetic group,
belongs the First Epistle of Peter; to the second, the conciliatory
writings, are to be reckoned the Gospel of Luke, the Acts of the
Apostles, the First Epistle of Clement, and the Epistle to the
Philippians; the third is represented by the catholicising writings,
the Pastorals, the Letter of Polycarp, and the Ignatian Letters.

20 Albrecht Ritschl, _Die Entstehung der altkatholischen Kirche, eine
kirchen- und dogmengeschichtliche Monographie,_ 1850, 622 pp.; 2nd
ed., 1857, 605 pp.

21 Gotthard Viktor Lechler, _Das apostolische und das nachapostolische
Zeitalter mit Rücksicht auf Unterschied und Einheit in Lehre und
Leben_ ( . . . with special reference to their difference and unity in
life and doctrine), 1st ed., 1852; 2nd ed., 1857, 536 pp. The portion
dealing with Paul is pp. 33-154; in the 3rd ed., 1885 (635 pp.) Paul
is treated on pp. 269-407.

In the first two editions the whole of the Pauline epistles are
regarded as genuine; in the third the author no longer ventures to
treat the Pastorals as on the same footing with the other Epistles.
The very clearly and comprehensively stated problem is printed at the
beginning.

22 _Die paulinische Rechtfertigungslehre,_ 1853, 219 pp.

23 In 1850, _Beiträge zur Erklärung der Korinthesbriefe,_ pp. 139-185.
Continued in 1852, pp. 1-40 and 535-574. In 1855, _Die beiden Briefe
an die Thessalonicher; ihre Achtheit und Bedeutung für die Lehre der
Parusie Christi, pp._ 141-168 ( . . . their genuineness and their
significance for the doctrine of the parousia of Christ). In 1857,
_Über Zweck und Gedankengang des Römerbriefs nebst der Erörterung
einiger paulinischen Begriffe,_ pp. 60-108 and 184-209 (“On the
Purpose and the Argument of Romans, with a Discussion of certain
Pauline Conceptions.”)

24 _Paulus der Apostel Jesu Christi,_ 2nd ed., edited by Zeller,
1866-1867, vol. i. 469 pp., revised by Baur; vol. ii. 376 pp. contains
a reprint of the chapter on Paul’s doctrine from the first edition.

25 _Vorlesungen über neutestamentliche Theologie._ Published by
Ferdinand Friedrich Baur, 1864, 407 pp. Pages 128-207 deal with the
doctrinal system of Paul.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER III FROM BAUR TO HOLTZMANN

26 _Die Pastoralbriefe kritisch und exegetisch behandelt,_ 1880, 504
pp. Adolf Harnack (in _Die Chronologie der altchristlichen Literatur
bis Eusebius,_ vol. i., 1897, 732 pp.—on Paul, 233-239) is disposed to
regard the personal notices of the Pastorals as genuine with the aid
of the hypothesis of the second imprisonment.

27 _Kritik der Epheser- und Kolosserbriefe,_ 1872, 338 pp.

28 _Einleitung in das Neue Testament,_ 1885; 2nd ed., 1886; 3rd ed.,
1892. Second Thessalonians, Ephesians, and the Pastoral Epistles,
spurious; Colossians, worked over. A similar critical stand-point is
occupied by Adolf Jülicher, _Einleitung in das Neue Testament,_ 1894,
404 pp. The Pauline Epistles are treated in pp. 19-128.

A mediating position is taken up by E. Reuss, _Geschichte der heiligen
Schriften Neuen Testaments_ (5th ed., 1874, 352 pp.; 6th ed., 1887).
All that can be said in favour of the genuineness of the Pastorals and
2 Thessalonians is set forth with the greatest completeness, since the
author is very reluctant to give up these writings. See the same
author’s _Histoire de la théologie chrétienne au siècle apostolique_
(1852; 2nd ed., 1860, 2 vols., i. 489 pp., ii. 629 pp. Paulinism is
treated in vol. ii., 3-262; 3rd ed., 1864). Mild polemic against Baur.
Another mediating work is Willibald Beyschlag’s _Neutestamentliche
Theologie,_ 1891; 2nd ed., 1896. Only the Pastorals spurious.

A conservative stand-point is occupied by Bernhard Weiss, _Einleitung
in das Neue Testament,_ 1886, 652 pp. Paul and his Epistles occupy pp.
112-332. The Pastoral Epistles are saved by the hypothesis of the
second imprisonment. 2 Thessalonians and Ephesians are held to be
genuine (3rd ed., 1897, 617 pp.). Conservative also is Theodor Zahn,
_Einleitung in das Neue Testament,_ 1st ed., 1897, vol. i., 489 pp.
Pauline Epistles, pp. 109-489. Ch. K. v. Hofmann in his _Einleitung_
(pt. ix. of “Die Heilige Schrift,” edited by Volck, 1881, 411 pp.
Pauline Epistles, 1-200) proposes by means of the hypothesis of a
liberation of the Apostle from his first imprisonment to make not only
the Pastorals, but also the Epistle to the Hebrews genuine. That 2
Thessalonians and Ephesians are genuine is for him self-evident.
Frédéric Godet too _(Introduction au Nouveau Testament,_ 1893, 737
pp.) regards all thirteen Epistles as genuine.

29 Typical in this respect is the procedure of Bernhard Weiss in his
_Neutestamentliche Theologie_ (1868). He treats the doctrine of the
Epistles of the imprisonment and that of the Pastorals by themselves
after he has developed that of the main Epistles, although he regards
them all as Pauline.

30 _Kritik der paulinischen Briefe,_ 3 pts., 1850, 74 pp.; 1851, 76
pp.; 1852, 129 pp.; _Christus und die Cäsaren,_ 1877, 387 pp.

31 _Beiträge zur Kritik der paulinischen Briefe an die Galater, Römer
Philipper und Kolosser._ Edited by E. Sulze, 1867, 65 pp.

32 Lüdemann was opposed by H. H. Wendt in his work _Die Begriffe
Fleisch und Geist im biblischen Sprachgebrauch,_ 1878, 219 pp.

At the suggestion of Ritschl he undertook to prove that the meaning of
these two words confined itself “within the boundaries set by Old
Testament usage,” and that therefore the assumption of Greek influence
was unnecessary.

33 Otto Pfleiderer, _Das Urchristentum,_ 1887.

34 Auguste Sabatier, _L’Apôtre Paul, esquisse d’une histoire de sa
pensée,_ 1870, 296 pp. (2nd ed., 1881; 3rd ed., 1897).

35 _Das Evangelium des Paulus,_ pt. 2 (edited by Mehlhorn), 1898, 172
pp.

36 P. 31.

37 _Zum Evangelium des Paulus und des Petrus,_ 1868, 447 pp. In this
work the author collects some of his earlier and later essays. The
following are its component parts, “Paul’s Vision of Christ” (1861),
“Peter’s Vision of the Messiah” (1868), “Contents and Argument of the
Epistle to the Galatians” (1859), “The Significance of the word _σάρξ_
(flesh) in Paul’s System of Doctrine” (1855). The collection is
dedicated to F. C. Baur, “who though dead yet lives.” In the first
part of the work _Das Evangelium des Paulus,_ 1880, 498 pp., Holsten
deals with the Epistle to the Galatians and the First to the
Corinthians. The second part was intended to give an exposition of
Romans and 2 Corinthians and to close with a systematic account of the
Pauline theology. At Holsten’s death only the closing section was
found to be ready for printing. It was published in 1898 under the
editorship of Carl Mehlhorn, and bears the title “Carl Holsten, Das
Evangelium des Paulus, part ii., Paulinische Theologie,” 173 pp. What
was thus published is based on a manuscript prepared for his lectures
in the winter session of 1893-1894, and on students’ notes.

38 Albrecht Ritschl, _Die christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und
Versöhnung,_ 1874, vol. ii. 377 pp. On Paul, pp. 215-259 and 300-369.

39 _Lehrbuch der biblischen Theologie des Neuen Testaments,_ 1st ed.
1868, 756 pp. On Paulinism, pp. 216-507; 6th ed. 1895, 677 pp. On
Paulinism, 201-463.

40 _Neutestamentliche Theologie,_ 1st ed. 1891; 2nd ed. 1896, vol. ii.
552 pp. On Paul, pp. 1-285.

41 Ch. K. v. Hofmann, _Biblische Theologie_ (vol. xi. of “Die heilige
Schrift Neuen Testaments”; edited by Volck), 1886, 328 pp.

42 _Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen
Kirche,_ vol. v., 1888, part iv. Alfred Resch, “Agrapha.
Ausserkanonische Evangelienfragmente gesammelt und untersucht,” 480
pp. The “logia” numbered 13-46 he holds, on the evidence of echoes in
the letters, to have been known to Paul. See pp. 152-243.

43 _Die paulinische Lehre vom Gesetz_ (“The Pauline Doctrine of the
Law”). Based on the four main Epistles, 1884, 26 pp. The second
edition (1893, 33 pp.) is a revision of the first, but in the results
arrived at both agree.

44 _Neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte._ In the second edition the work
bears the title _Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu
Christi_ (English Translation: “History of the Jewish People in the
Time of Jesus Christ,” Edinburgh, 1885). The second volume deals with
the literature and the various currents of thought. There have since
appeared a third and fourth edition.

45 _System der altsynagogalen palästinensischen Theologie aus Targum,
Midrasch und Talmud dargestellt,_ 399 pp. (Edited after the author’s
death by Delitzsch and Schnedermann.)

The second edition (1897, 427 pp.) bears the title _Jüdische Theologie
auf Grund des Talmud und verwandter Schriften_ (“Jewish Theology
described on the Basis of the Talmud and cognate Writings”).

The earlier literature is referred to in Hans Vollmer’s _Die
alttestamentlichen Zitate bei Paulus_ (1895), 81 pp.

46 A typical utterance is that of J. Wellhausen _(Israelitische und
jüdische Geschichte,_ 6th ed. 1907, 386 pp.), “Paul has not been able
to free himself from the Rabbinic methods of exegesis. He employs it
in his arguments, especially in connexion with justification by faith.
But the inner essence of his religious conviction was not affected by
it.”

47 _Paulus des Apostels Brief an die Römer in das Hebräische
übersetzt, und aus Talmud und Midrasch erläutert,_ 1870, 122 pp.

At the beginning the author gives an interesting review of previous
Hebrew translations of the whole New Testament or of single books. He
also refers to the Rabbinic reasoning in the apostle’s arguments. The
illustrations from the Rabbinic literature, pp. 73-100, follow the
translation.

He expects as a result of this translation that it will bring into
prominence the Old Testament, Rabbinic, and Hellenistic elements in
the early Christian modes of thought and expression.

Earlier attempts to point out Rabbinic parallels to Pauline ideas were
made by Lightfoot, Surenhus, Schöttgen, Meuschen, and Nork.
Information about this literature will be found in Hans Vollmer’s work
_(Die alttestamentlichen Zitate bei Paulus,_ 1895, pp. 80, 81).

48 A good general idea of the Rabbinic literature as a whole is given
by Bousset in his work _Die Religion des Judentums im
neutestamentlichen Zeitalter,_ 1903, 2nd ed., 1906, pp. 45-53.

49 Among the few scholars who stem the tide of conventional stupidity
Frederick Spitta deserves a foremost place. In his printed works, no
doubt—those in question are _Der zweite Brief des Petrus und der Brief
des Judas_ (1885, 544 pp.) and the studies _Zur Geschichte und
Literatur des Urchristentums_ (vol. i. 1893; vol. ii. 1896)—he is
chiefly engaged in maintaining the general thesis that the earliest
Christian literature shows much more dependence on the Late-Jewish
than is generally admitted. A detailed proof of this kind for the
Pauline letters has only been given in his exegetical lectures, which
have not been published. The stimulus which he gave to others is
clearly apparent in the literature of the nineties. Kabisch’s study of
the eschatology of Paul (1893) is partly based on the foundation which
he had prepared.

50 _Die paulinische Angelologie und Dämonologie,_ 1888, 126 pp.

51 _Die Eschatologie des Paulus in ihren Zusammenhängen mit dem
Gesamtbegriff des Paulinismus_ ( ... in its relations with the general
conception of Paulinism), 1893, 338 pp. The work is dedicated to
Friedrich Spitta. After a historical introduction, the principal
passages which come into question are examined. After that the
eschatology is developed according to its contents and motives, and in
the process its relations with the various doctrines of the Pauline
theology come up for discussion.

52 He did not, unfortunately, follow it up with the work on the
Ethics.

53 The eschatological character of the Pauline mysticism is also
pointed out by Paul Wernle in his suggestive study _Der Christ und die
Sünde bei Paulus_ (1897, 138 pp.), but he does not follow out the idea
in all its consequences.

A certain recognition of the “physical” character of the doctrine of
redemption is also arrived at by Adolf Deissmann. In his study, _Die
neutestamentliche Formel “in Christo Jesu”_ (1892, 136 pp.) he comes
to the conviction that Paul had created the formula on the analogy of
a linguistic usage already obtaining in non-biblical Greek, and
intended in using it to indicate the relation to Christ as an
existence within the pneumatic Christ which was to be locally
conceived. He does not, however, think of explaining it from
eschatology.

The old psychologising and spiritualising methods are in no way
departed from by W. Brandt. In his work, _Die evangelische Geschichte
und der Ursprung des Christentums_ (“The Gospel History and the Origin
of Christianity,” 1893, 591 pp.; on Paul, pp. 515-524), he maintains
that it was the visions of the disciples which first made Jesus into
the Messiah. Paul, he thinks, “in his profound reflexion over his
conversion, came to think of this revolution in his life as a dying
and rising again of his inner man.”

54 Georg Heinrici, _Auslegung der Korintherbriefe_ (I Cor., 1880, 574
pp.; 2 Cor., 1887, 606 pp.).

55 P. W. Schmiedel, “Auslegung der Briefe an die Thessalonicher und
Korinther,” in Holtzmann’s _Handkommentar,_ vol. ii. section i.; 1st
ed., 1891; 2nd ed., 1892.

56 _Dogmengeschichte,_ 3rd ed., 1894, vol. i. On Paul, pp. 83-95.
Friedrich Loofs in his _Dogmengeschichte_ (1890, 443 pp.) takes up no
definite attitude towards the Pauline problem. Reinhold Seeberg, too
_(Dogmengeschichte,_ first half, 1895, 332 pp.), does not go into the
doctrine of the Apostle.

57 R. A. Lipsius, “Auslegung der Briefe an die Galater, Römer und
Philipper,” in Holtzmann’s _Handkommentar,_ vol. ii. section i. 1st
ed., 1891; 2nd ed., 1892. This commentator’s position is indicated by
the following remarks: “The great antithesis between flesh and spirit
gradually forces out the Jewish conceptions one after another, though
it is not right to say that Hebrew ideas are driven out by Hellenic
ones. When Paul goes outside the circle of Old Testament views he does
so in consequence of a deeper ethical grasp of the originally Hebrew
antithesis between flesh and spirit, not by a borrowing of Greek
ideas.”

58 _Das apostolische Zeitalter,_ 1886, pp. 105-151.

59 It is most clearly developed by Holsten on pp. 37 and 38 of the
second part of his _Evangelium des Paulus,_ 1896.

60 Vol. i., 1880; vol. ii., 1887. See especially the Introduction and
the Epilogue to vol. ii.

61 In Phil. i. 21 f. the reference is to an inner struggle which the
Apostle experiences. He desires to depart and be with Christ, which,
indeed, would be much better, but he knows that to remain in the flesh
is more needful for the sake of his churches. From this conviction he
draws the confident conclusion that he will remain with them for their
progress and joy in the faith.

In Phil. iii. 8 he declares that he has counted all things but loss in
order to win Christ and be found in Him, to know Him and the power of
His resurrection and the fellowship of His sufferings, to be conformed
unto His death, if so be that he might attain (?) to the resurrection
of the dead.

Both passages are certainly obscure, and do not to a literal
interpretation yield any satisfactory meaning. One feels that the
logic of these close-packed assertions is not self-evident, but must
somehow depend on presuppositions of which the basis is not here
given. It cannot, however, be maintained that the assumption of a
spiritualising hope regarding the future makes all clear.

62 An allusion to the passage in _Faust,_ “Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach, in
meiner Brust.”—TRANSLATOR.

63 Ernst Teichmann, _Die paulinischen Vorstellungen von Auferstehung
und Gericht und ihre Beziehung zur jüdischen Apokalyptik_ (“The
Pauline Conceptions of Resurrection and Judgment and their relation to
Jewish Apocalyptic”), 1896, 125 pp. Akin to Teichmann’s study is that
of C. Bruston, “La Vie future d’après St Paul” in the _Revue de
Théologie et de Philosophie_ (Lausanne), 1894, pp. 506-530. The author
maintains that Paul had never really held the conceptions connected
with the resurrection of the dead at the parousia, but had always
thought “spiritually” and assumed a passing into glory immediately
after death. But while in his earlier writings he still used certain
expressions borrowed from the “Rabbinic eschatology,” later he quite
abandoned these.

64 Hermann Gunkel, _Die Wirkungen des Heiligen Geistes nach der
populären Anschauung der apostolischen Zeit und nach der Lehre des
Apostels Paulus_ (“The Manifestations of the Holy Spirit according to
the Popular View of the Apostolic Age and according to the Doctrine of
the Apostle Paul”), 1888, 110 pp. Shortly before that appeared the
purely biblico-theological treatment of it by Johannes Gloël, _Der
Heilige Geist in der Heilsverkündigung des Paulus_ (“The Holy Spirit
in Paul’s Preaching of Salvation”), 1888, 402 pp. It keeps entirely to
description and does not enter into the question regarding the origin
and innermost essence of the Pauline doctrine. Pfleiderer’s view is,
however, called in question.

65 _Urchristentum,_ 1887. Similarly Heinrici in his commentary on 2
Corinthians.

66 F. C. Baur, _Vorlesungen über die christliche Dogmengeschichte_
(“Lectures on the History of Dogma”), vol. i. From the apostolic
period to the synod of Nicaea, 1865 (edited by Ferdinand Friedrich
Baur).

67 _Dogmengeschichte,_ 1885, vol. i.; 3rd ed., 1894; 4th ed., 1909.
Wilhelm Karl, too, in his _Beiträge zum Verständnis der
soteriologischen Erfahrungen und Spekulationen des Apostels Paulus_
(“Contributions to the Understanding of the Soteriological Experiences
and Speculations of the Apostle Paul,” 1899, 116 pp.), does not feel
obliged to have recourse to Greek thought in order to explain the
Apostle’s doctrine. He offers a thorough and independent analysis of
the system which in many points is much superior to the ordinary view.

68 Edwin Hatch, Hibbert Lectures on “The Influence of Greek Ideas and
Usages upon the Christian Church.” The work was translated into German
by Erwin Preuschen in 1892. Its divisions are: (i.) Introductory,
(ii.) Greek culture, (iii.) Greek and Christian Exegesis, (iv.)
Rhetoric, (v.) Philosophy, (vi.) Ethics, (vii.-ix.) Theology, (x.)
Mysteries, (xi.) Corpus doctrinae, (xii.) The Transformation of the
basis of Christian Unity: Doctrine in the Place of Conduct.

69 _i.e._ as used in this connexion, here and later, the belief in the
universal destination of the Gospel, not in universal salvation.

70 _Paulus in Athen._ Collected Essays, vol. ii., 1894, pp. 527-543 In
this essay the author seeks to exhibit with some fulness the view,
which seems to him self-evident, that the Apostle was filled with the
Hellenic spirit.

71 Preface to his Exposition of 2 Corinthians, 1887.

72 Holtzmann’s _Handkommentar,_ 2nd ed. The Epistles to the
Corinthians, p. 92.

73 Emil Friedrich Kautzsch, _De veteris Testamenti locis a Paulo
Apostolo allegatis,_ 1869, 110 pp.

74 Hans Vollmer, _Die alttestamentlichen Zitate bei Paulus . . . nebst
einem Anhang über das Verhältnis des Apostels zu Philo,_ 1895, 103 pp.
(“The Old Testament quotations in Paul . . . with an Appendix on the
Apostle’s relation to Philo”).

75 The author has had occasion to observe this in Alsatian theologians
and in himself. One who is equally familiar with French and German
will never, either in preaching or in conversation, give his own
version of Biblical passages, but will without exception keep to the
traditional form in the language which he is using, and this even
where he would be capable of giving a more exact rendering. And in
preaching he will turn to account the peculiarities of the wording of
the version, if it lends itself to his thought, and will even perhaps
use an argument which goes against the sense of the original, which he
is supposed to be acquainted with—exactly as Paul does.

76 Eduard Grafe, _Das Verhältnis der paulinischen Schriften zur
Sapientia Salamonis_ (“The Relation of the Pauline Writings to the
Book of Wisdom”), in the Theological Essays dedicated to Carl von
Weizsäcker on his seventieth birthday, 1892, pp. 251-286.

77 _Über das Verhältnis des Apostels zu Philo,_ an appendix to his
work on _Die alttestamentlichen Zitate bei Paulus,_ 1895, pp. 80-98.
See also Carl Siegfried, _Philo von Alexandria als Ausleger des alten
Testaments an sich selbst und nach seinem geschichtlichen Einfluss
betrachtet_ (“Philo of Alexandria as an Expositor of Scripture,
considered both in Himself and in Regard to his Historical
Influence”), 1875, 418 pp. In pp. 304-10 thoughts and passages are
cited from Paul which are supposed to show affinity with Philo. The
resemblance is, however, so general and colourless that it cannot be
considered as proving anything. The author quotes the passages without
drawing any conclusion.

78 Ernst Curtius in the essay cited above defends the historicity of
Acts xvii.

79 W. Gass, _Geschichte der christlichen Ethik,_ 1881, vol. i. 457 pp.
On Paul, pp. 34-38. Theobald Ziegler, _Geschichte der christlichen
Ethik,_ 1886, 593 pp. On Paul, pp. 72-90.

80 Fr. Th. L. Ernesti, _Die Ethik des Apostels Paulus,_ 1868, 155 pp.;
3rd ed., 1880.

81 The Christian character of Seneca’s thought was remarked as early
as Tertullian, who in _de Anima,_ xx., when he quotes a phrase from
him, describes him as “saepe noster.” Augustine and Jerome know of a
correspondence between Seneca and the Apostle. From the literature we
may mention the following works: Amédée Fleury, _Saint Paul et
Sénèque. Recherches sur les rapports du philosophe avec l’apôtre et
sur l’infiltration du Christianisme naissant à travers le paganisme,_
2 vols., 1853, 404 and 383 pp. Seneca is supposed to have drawn on
Paul. At the end of the second part the correspondence between them is
printed. The work is uncritical in character. Johann Kreyher, L.
_Annaeus Seneca und seine Beziehungen zur Urchristentum_ ( . . . and
his relations with early Christianity), 1887, 198 pp. Seneca is
supposed to have had some relations with Christianity in Rome even
before the Apostle’s coming, and thenceforward to have entered into a
close relationship with him. Charles Aubertin, _Étude critique sur les
rapports supposés entre Sénèque et St Paul,_ 1857, 442 pp. All
connexion between Seneca and Christianity is denied. In the work of
Michael Baumgarten, _Lucius Annaeus Seneca und das Christentum_ (1895,
368 pp.) no connexion between Seneca and Paul is admitted.

82 See Theodor Zahn, _Der Stoiker Epiktet und sein Verhältnis zum
Christentum._ A Rectorial address at Erlangen, 1894, 27 pp. The
lecture offers proof that in spite of many resemblances of expression
and in spite of his acquaintance with Christianity, the teaching of
Epictetus contains nothing which really connects it with the new
religion.

Inconceivable as it may appear, even the _Meditations_ of Marcus
Aurelius—of the second half of the second century—have been sometimes
cited to prove the Greek character of Paul’s religious thought.

83 Theodor Simon, _Die Psychologie des Apostels Paulus,_ 1897, 118 pp.
A leisurely analysis of the material.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER IV H. J. HOLTZMANN

84 In connexion with the following remarks on questions of principle,
see also W. Wrede, _Über Aufgabe und Methode der sogenannten
Neutestamentlichen Theologie,_ 1897, 80 pp.

The essay discusses the plan and arrangement of Holtzmann’s work. On
p. 32 Wrede remarks: “The treatment is far too much influenced by the
desire to include all kinds of opinions from other writers. To a large
extent my objections have to do with these methodological questions.”

85 Holtzmann, p. 111.

86 Cf. 2 Cor. xi. 6, where Paul speaks of himself as “inexpert in
speech, but not in knowledge” (_τῇ γνώσει_). See also I Cor. i. 5,
viii. I; Phil. i. 9, etc. “Gnostic” is used above in the general sense
of one who lays stress on theoretic religious knowledge.—TRANSLATOR.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER V CRITICAL QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES

87 _Die Apostelgeschichte,_ 1850, 143 pp. Acts, it is argued, is a
work of “free reflexion” in which various hands have had a part.

_Kritik der paulinischen Briefe,_ part i., The Origin of Galatians
(1850, 74 pp.); part ii., The Origin of I Corinthians (1851, 76 pp.);
part iii., 2 Corinthians, Romans, the Pastoral Epistles,
Thessalonians, Ephesians, Colossians, and Philippians (1852, 129 pp.).
The greater part of the epistles were not written until after Acts.
Certainly Galatians is later. I Corinthians is earlier than Acts, and
is doubtless drawn from common sources.

The first to venture an attack on one of the main Epistles was Edward
Evanson, _The Dissonance of the four generally received Evangelists,
and the evidence of their respective authenticity examined_
(translated into Dutch, 1796), who holds Romans, as well as Hebrews,
Colossians, and Ephesians, to be spurious. Further information
regarding this, as it seems, rather rare book would be desirable.
Whether any great critical importance is to be attached to it remains
questionable. [Evanson (1731-1805), a Cambridge graduate, vicar of
Tewkesbury, adopted Unitarian views, and resigned his living in 1778.
His grounds for rejecting Romans are, the difficulty about the
existence of a church at Rome prior to Paul’s visit, the number of
greetings in chapter xvi., and supposed references to the destruction
of Jerusalem in xi. 12, 15, 21, 22. The treatment of the Epistles is
much slighter than that of the Gospels, where he shows some insight
into the difficulties of what is now known as the Synoptic problem.
The _Dissonance_ made some stir, and was answered by Joseph Priestley
in _Letters to a Young Man,_ 1792-93, and by T. Falconer, Bampton
Lecture, 1810.—TRANSLATOR.]

88 See A. Schweitzer, _Von Reimarus zu Wrede,_ pp. 137-159 (Eng.
trans., _The Quest of the Historical Jesus,_ pp. 137-160).

89 _Christus und die Cäsaren,_ 1877, 387 pp. What the diffusely told
story of the Roman court has to do with the origin of Christianity has
certainly never been quite clear to any reader. In attempting to
describe its contents one is never quite certain whether the author’s
meaning has been rightly represented.

90 A spiritual descendant of Bauer’s who writes on popular lines is
Albert Kalthoff _(Die Entstehung des Christentums,_ 1904, 155 pp.).
But neither as regards the problem nor its solution has he contributed
anything to Pauline scholarship.

91 Allard Pierson, _De Bergrede en andere synoptische Fragmenten,_
1878, 260 pp.; on Paul, 98-112. With his doubt of the Epistles the
author associates a doubt of the Gospels, and asks whether
Christianity as they represent it can have been founded by a
historical Jesus.

92 A. Pierson and S. A. Naber, _Verisimilia. Laceram conditionem Novi
Testamenti exemplis illustrarunt et ab origine repetierunt,_ 1886, 295
pp. The work gives a running analysis of the letters in the course of
which very interesting questions are thrown out. Why is nothing said
about the earthly life of Jesus? Why is no trace of the influence of
this Paul’s thought to be found in history? Do the various
characteristics and actions of his which are recorded show us a
character which is at all intelligible?

The authors assume that the Jewish movement which led up to
“Christianity” at first had only to do with the Messianic belief in
general. Only later, through the blending of Greek myths with Isaiah
liii., did the belief arise that the expected Messiah had already come
and had passed through death and resurrection.

The analysis of the Pauline Epistles is followed by essays upon the
Paul of Acts and some chapters on the Fourth Gospel. The close is
formed by an essay on the gradual origin of the conception of Christ
in the New Testament.

The theory that Christianity developed out of an already existing
Jewish movement is maintained also by M. Friedländer in his popular
and unimportant work, _Das Judentum in der vorchristlichen
griechischen Welt,_ a contribution towards explaining the origin of
Christianity (1897, 74 pp.). The opposition between a conservative and
a freer tendency as regards the law, which appear in the primitive
Church, are here held to have appeared previously in the Judaism from
which Christianity originated.

93 A. D. Loman, “Quaestiones Paulinae,” _Theol. Tijdschrift,_ 1882,
pp. 141-185, 302-328, 452-487; 1883, pp. 14-51. 1886, 42-113 (Dutch).
In the prologue he tells us about the first impression which Bauer’s
criticism of the Pauline epistles made upon him: “With an _Apage
Satana!_ I took leave of this antipathetic critic, firmly resolved to
take no further notice of him.” The order followed is to treat first
the relation of Acts to Galatians, then to discuss the “necessary
proofs” of the genuineness of this work, while the witnesses from the
literature, and the history of the Canon, are examined later, in the
second part, 1886.

94 Rudolf Steck, _Der Galaterbrief nach seiner Echtheit untersucht
nebst kritischen Bemerkungen zu den paulinischen Hauptbriefen_ (“The
Epistle to the Galatians examined with Reference to its Genuineness,
with critical Remarks on the main Pauline Epistles”), 1888, 386 pp.
The examination of Galatians goes only as far as p. 151; the remaining
chapters deal with the order of the main Epistles, the relation of
Paul to the Gospels, the quotations from the Old Testament found in
the Epistles, the affinities with Philo and Seneca, the marks of later
authorship, the external evidences from the New Testament and from
early Christian literature. In conclusion, a hypothesis of the origin
and development of Paulinism is sketched. The author tells in the
preface the story of his conversion to the Dutch heresy. At first he
dissented from Loman, but in the course of repeatedly treating the
Epistle to the Galatians in his lectures he found to his dismay that
he was gradually arriving at the theory of its spuriousness.

The views of Pierson, Loman, and Steck are critically examined by J.
M. S. Baljon in his _Exegetisch-kritische Verhandeling over den Brief
van Paulus an de Galatiërs,_ 1899, 424 pp.

95 W. C. van Manen, _Paulus,_ 3 vols. (see head of chapter for
particulars). The author describes on pp. 9-11 how he came to reject
the Pauline Epistles.

96 The first epistle of Clement mentions (xlvii. I) “the letter of the
blessed Paul” to the Corinthians, has a direct borrowing from Romans
(xxxv. 5 = the catalogue of vices in Rom. i. 29-32), and in other
respects also frequently shows dependence on the main epistles. For
the detailed attempt to place it at a later date see Steck, 294-310.

97 2 Peter iii. 15-17, “And count the long-suffering of the Lord as
salvation, as also our beloved brother Paul, according to the wisdom
given to him, wrote to you, as in all his Epistles when he mentions
these things, in which no doubt occur some things which are difficult
to understand, which the unlearned and unstedfast wrest, as they do
also the other Scriptures, to their own destruction.” (The German
follows Weizsäcker’s rendering.)

98 As in the present context this phrase might possibly be misleading,
it may be worth pointing out that it is simply an allusion to the
famous “timeo Danaos et dona ferentes,” _Aen._ ii. 49.—TRANSLATOR.

99 The puzzle in the case of Justin is that he uses Pauline phrases,
and therefore seems to know the Epistles, but never mentions their
author. According to Steck the explanation of this silence lies in the
fact that the Epistles are, for the author of the _Apology_ and the
_Dialogue,_ mere literary works and not as yet Church books. The
_Didache,_ the _Shepherd_ of Hermas, and the _Epistle of Barnabas_
show no certain evidence of acquaintance with the Pauline Epistles.

100 _Tertullian adversus Marcionem,_ bk. v., goes through the Epistles
of Paul as used by Marcion in those “Antitheses” which are now lost to
us.

101 _Theologisch Tijdschrift,_ 1887, pp. 382-533. “Marcions Brief van
Paulus aan de Galatiërs.” The text thus arrived at is given on pp.
528-533.

Van Manen is also inclined to hold that early Church witnesses may be
found for a shorter recension of Romans. See _Die Unechtheit des
Römerbriefs,_ 94-100.

A reconstruction of the Marcionite text of Galatians had already been
undertaken by Adolf Hilgenfeld, _Der Galaterbrief,_ 1852, 239 pp., pp.
218-234. He holds that it was not the original but a mutilated form.

102 Even the letter consisting of chapters i.-viii. is not, according
to van Manen, all of a piece, as is evident, he thinks, from the
complicated opening salutation, the vacillating use of “Jesus Christ”
and “Christ Jesus,” and other peculiarities of detail. One or more
treatises—on justification by faith, on the equal importance of the
Gospel for Jews and Gentiles, on the significance of the law, on the
sense in which believers are entitled to call Abraham their father
even if they are not by birth of his posterity—may have formed the
basis of the longer writing. Its close was probably formed by Rom. xv.
14-33. Later on, the essays which we have in chapters ix.-xi.,
xii.-xiv. and xv.-xvi. were worked in. The Epistle is supposed to have
undergone several successive redactions.

103 Steck in the introduction to his work gives references to the
articles which had appeared up to 1888. The chronicles of the
following years appear in van Manen. At the head of the
counter-movement among critics in Holland stood J. H. Scholten. His
work, _Historisch-critische Bijdragen naar Aanleiding van de nieuweste
Hypothese aangaande Jesus en den Paulus der vier Hoofdbrieven_
(“Contributions to Historical Criticism with Reference to the latest
Hypotheses regarding Jesus and the Paul of the four main Epistles”),
1882, 118 pp., is directed against Loman’s arguments.

From the German literature we may cite G. Heinrici, _Die Forschungen
über die paulinischen Briefe: ihr gegenwärtiger Stand und ihre
Aufgaben_ (“The Study of the Pauline Letters; its present Position,
and Task”). Lectures given before the theological conference at
Giessen, 1886, pp. 69-120. Wilhelm Brückner, _Die chronologische
Reihenfolge, in welcher die Briefe des Neuen Testaments verfasst sind_
(“The Chronological Order in which the Epistles of the New Testament
were written”), 1890, 306 pp. (An essay which received the prize
offered for the treatment of this question by the Teylerian Society of
Haarlem.) “On the Chronological Order of the Four main Epistles, pp.
174-203. Carl Clemen, _Die Chronologie der paulinischen Briefe,_ 1893,
292 pp. By the same writer, _Die Einheitlichkeit der paulinischen
Briefe_ (“The Integrity of the Pauline Epistles”), 1894, 183 pp.

In these writings Clemen makes some concessions to the Ultra-Tübingen
critics. Thus, for example, he is prepared to put Galatians after
Romans and Corinthians. The mediating views here offered, though
sometimes interesting, need nevertheless no longer occupy us, as
Clemen has in the meantime completely recovered his confidence and has
contradicted himself. In the first volume of his _Paulus_ (1904, 416
pp., examination of the sources) he pronounces that the four main
epistles are to be regarded as entirely genuine, if only we may divide
the second Epistle to the Corinthians into four. In addition to I
Thessalonians and Philippians, even Colossians and 2 Thessalonians are
to be regarded as from the Apostle’s pen.

In the preface the author begs that he may not be held accountable for
his views prior to his Damascus.

The second volume of the work, _Paulus. Sein Leben und Werken,_ 1904,
339 pp., is in biographical form, and does not enter further into the
problems of the doctrine.

A writer who takes the “Ultra-Tübingen” side is J. Friedrich
(Maehliss). In his work entitled _Die Unechtheit des Galaterbriefs_
(“The Spuriousness of Galatians”), 1891, 67 pp., he defends both the
rights of radical criticism and of a “simplified orthography.”

104 See p. 128, _sup_.

105 See p. 128, _sup_.

106 See p. 129, _sup_.

107 See pp. 114 and 115 of the work cited above, p. 134.

108 Christian Hermann Weisse, _Philosophische Dogmatik oder
Philosophie des Christentums,_ 3 vols., 1855, 60, 62; vol. i., 712 pp.
On the Pauline Epistles, pp. 144-147.

109 On Romans see also vol. iii. of the _Philosophische Dogmatik_
(1862, 736 pp.), pp. 263, 264.

The Epistle to the Ephesians, the Second to the Corinthians, and the
First to Timothy, Weisse holds to be “entirely unapostolic”; in the
Epistle to Titus and the Second to Timothy he is prepared to recognise
as a possibility the genuineness of the personal notices.

110 In 2 Corinthians, which shows no evidence of interpolation, three
different letters to this church are worked up together.

111 Christian Hermann Weisse, _Beiträge zur Kritik der paulinischen
Briefe an die Galater, Römer, Philipper und Kolosser_ (“Contributions
to the Criticism of the Pauline Epistles to the Galatians, Romans,
Philippians, and Colossians”). Edited by E. Sulze, 1867, 65 pp. By way
of introduction the pupil prefixes an essay on the principles of his
master’s “stylistic criticism.”

In the reconstructed texts it is apparent that the author had spent on
them, as he says in his Dogmatic, the “diligent work of many years.”
It is a piece of really skilled workmanship.

112 Daniel Völter, _Die Entstehung der Apokalypse,_ 1882, 72 pp. _Die
Komposition der paulinischen Hauptbriefe,_ 1890, 174 pp. The Epistles
examined are those to the Romans and Galatians. _Paulus und seine
Briefe. Kritische Untersuchungen zu einer neuen Grundlegung der
paulinischen Briefliteratur und ihrer Theologie,_ 1905, 331 pp. Here
he deals with Corinthians, Romans, Galatians, and Philippians. The
results arrived at in the previous book are, as a rule, taken over.
Völter rejects the genuineness of 1 Thessalonians, and sees in the
letters to the Colossians and Ephesians, and in the Pastorals, new
“phases in the development” of Paulinism.

113 In its original form it consisted, Völter thinks, of the following
sections: i. I, 5b-7, 8-17; v. I-12, 15-19, 21; vi. I-13, 6:16-23;
chapters xii. and xiii.; xiv. I-xv. 6; xv. 14-16, 23b-33, xvi 21-24.

114 Völter is also able to indicate additions which have taken place
subsequently to this redaction.

The interpolations in Philippians relate, according to him, chiefly to
Christology and eschatology. The author of these additions had before
him Romans and Corinthians in their interpolated form, and was also
doubtless acquainted with Galatians.

115 The well-known German religious journal.

116 The labour of making an inventory of what has been done in this
kind of criticism up to the year 1894 was undertaken by C. Clemen in
his work, _Die Einheitlichkeit der paulinischen Briefe an der Hand der
bisher mit Bezug auf sie aufgestellten Interpolations- und
Kompilationshypothesen_ (“The Integrity of the Pauline Epistles, with
Reference to the Hypotheses of Interpolation or Compilation which have
been applied to them”), 1894, 183 pp. He takes account also of all
contributions to the journals. This gives a special value to this
laborious and unselfish work.

A survey of previous work in conjectural criticism is given by J. M.
S. Baljon in _De Tekst der Brieven van Paulus aan de Romeinen, de
Corinthiërs en de Galatiërs,_ 1884, 189 pp.

117 Friedrich Spitta, _Untersuchungen über den Brief des Paulus an die
Römer_ (“A Study of the Epistle to the Romans”), 1901, 193 pp. In the
work _Zur Geschichte und Literatur des Urchristentums,_ vol. iii. part
i.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER VI THE POSITION AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY

118 Otto Pfleiderer, _Das Urchristentum, seine Schriften und Lehren,_
2nd ed., 1902, vol. i. 696 pp. On Paul, pp. 24-335. (Eng. trans.
“Primitive Christianity,” vol. i. pp. 33-471.)

119 On this point Pfleiderer follows suggestions given by Teichmann in
his work, _Die paulinischen Vorstellungen von Auferstehung und
Gericht_ (“The Pauline Conceptions of Resurrection and Judgment”),
1896, 125 pp. As a matter of fact he cannot any more than his
predecessors give any proof of this evolution.

120 Paul Wernle, _Die Anfänge unserer Religion,_ 1st ed., 1901, 410
pp. On Paul, pp. 95-220. By the same author, _Paulus als
Heidenmissionar_ (“Paul as a Missionary to the Gentiles”), Lecture,
1899, 36 pp. Heinrich Weinel, _Paulus,_ 1904, 316 pp. The book grew
out of essays which the author published in the _Christliche Welt._ By
the same author, _Paulus als kirchlicher Organisator._ (Inaugural
Lecture.) 1899, 30 pp.

Other works from this popular literature are: Adolf Harnack, _Das
Wesen des Christentums,_ 1900, 189 pp. On Paul, pp. 110-118. Georg
Hollmann, _Urchristentum in Corinth,_ 1903, 32 pp. Paul Feine, _Paulus
als Theologe,_ 1906, 80 pp. Carl Munzinger, _Paulus in Corinth. Neue
Wege zum Verständnis des Urchristentums_ (“Paul in Corinth. New Ways
of arriving at an Understanding of Early Christianity.”) 1908, 208 pp.
The author pictures the work of the Apostle in the Greek city in the
light of analogies offered by modern missionary practice. Whether the
new way really leads to a better understanding of primitive
Christianity remains open to question.

As a special investigation of a point of detail at this date we may
mention Karl Dick’s work, _Der schriftstellerische Plural bei Paulus_
(“The Author’s ‘We’ in Paul’s Writings.”) 1900, 169 pp. There are not
many of these studies at this period since the tendency among
theologians has been more to popularisation than to scientific
research.

121 _Paulus als Heidenmissionar,_ p. 36. Ernst von Dobschütz calls
attention to the dangers of this method, which easily becomes
unscientific in _Probleme des apostolischen Zeitalters._ (Five
Lectures, 1904, 138 pp. See p. 61.) Paul Feine, _Das gesetzesfreie
Evangelium des Paulus nach seinem Werdegange dargestellt,_ 1899, 232
pp. _Jesus Christus und Paulus,_ 1902, 309 pp. Arthur Titius, _Der
Paulinismus unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Seligkeit_ (2nd Part of the
work _Die neutestamentliche Lehre von der Seligkeit und ihre Bedeutung
für die Gegenwart_—“The New Testament Doctrine of Final Blessedness
and its Significance for the present Time”), 1900, 290 pp. A.
Schlatter, in his _NTle. Theologie_ (Pt. ii. The doctrine of the
Apostles, 1910, 592 pp. On Paul, 199-407), follows a conservative
biblico-theological method like that of B. Weiss.

122 R. Drescher, too “Das Leben Jesu bei Paulus” in _Festgruss an
Stade,_ 1900, pp. 101-161, is of opinion that the letters, rightly
understood, offer us “an imposing amount of material” on the life of
Jesus. The author thinks that wherever possible Paul referred to the
teaching of Jesus; and he fought his battle for freedom from the law
with such confidence “because he knew that he had Jesus on his side.”

It should be mentioned that J. Wellhausen takes up a similar
stand-point. He gives it as his opinion, _Israelitische und jüdische
Geschichte_ (6th ed., 1907, 386 pp.), that Paul “was really the man
who best understood the Master and carried on His work.”

123 _L’Apôtre Paul et Jésus-Christ,_ 1904, 393 pp.

124 Adolf Harnack, _Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte,_ 4th ed., 1909,
vol. i., 826 pp. See p. 107. To the same effect, Adolf Jülicher,
_Paulus und Jesus,_ 1907, 72 pp. See p. 34.

125 Hermann Jakoby. _Neutestamentliche Ethik,_ 1899, 480 pp. On Paul,
pp. 243-406. Alfred Juncker, _Die Ethik des Apostels Paulus,_ part i.,
1904, 288 pp.

Among other monographs we have to notice Emil Sokolowski’s _Die
Begriffe Geist und Leben bei Paulus in ihrer Beziehung zu einander,_
1903, 284 pp. The author ascribes little importance to Greek influence
in comparison with Jewish, and tries to explain what is peculiar and
vital in the Apostle’s views as due to his individual experience,
especially the vision on the Damascus road.

Hans Windisch, _Die Entsündigung des Christen nach Paulus,_ 1908, 132
pp. The difficulties raised for Paul by his mysticism are pointed out.
It is shown that this, strictly speaking, makes it impossible for him
to admit sin in the case of baptized persons. The eschatological
character of the sacramental-mystical theory of deliverance from sin
is strongly brought out. The author continues the investigation which
Paul Wernle, in his work _Der Christ und die Sünde bei Paulus_ (1897,
138 pp.), was the first to undertake. See p. 60 of the present work.

126 Wilhelm Bousset, _Die Religion des Judentums im neutestamentlichen
Zeitalter,_ 1903, 512 pp. Simultaneously appeared the same writer’s
work, _Die jüdische Apokalyptik, ihre religionsgeschichtliche Herkunft
und ihre Bedeutung für das neue Testament_ (“Jewish Apocalyptic, its
Origin in the Light of Comparative Religion and its Significance for
the New Testament.” A Lecture, 1903.)

Eschatology receives special attention in the fine work of Hugo
Gressmann, _Der Ursprung der israelitisch jüdischen Eschatologie_
(“The Origin of the Israelitish and Jewish Eschatology”), 1905, 378
pp. The author takes up an attitude of some reserve in regard to the
“religious-historical method,” and seeks to determine in the case of
every statement whether it can have arisen in Israel or must be
regarded as having been introduced from without.

Paul Volz, _Jüdische Eschatologie von Daniel bis Akiba,_ 1903, 412
pp., endeavours, somewhat unconvincingly, to give a sketch of Jewish
conceptions of the future age.

Everling’s investigations are continued, on modern lines, by a study
of Martin Dibelius, _Die Geisterwelt im Glauben des Paulus,_ 1909, 249
pp. (“The World of Spirits as conceived in Paul’s Belief”). In
addition to the Late Jewish passages the author cites also the
Rabbinical and those suggested by the Comparative Study of Religion.
The excursuses on the linguistic history of the subject are very
instructive (pp. 209-232). On Everling, see pp. 55-57 of the present
work.

127 G. F. Heinrici’s work, _Das Urchristentum,_ 1902, 142 pp., still
occupies the old stand-point. On Paul, pp. 71-101. For what he has to
say against the “physical” in the doctrine of redemption, see pp. 95,
96.

W. Bousset, _Der Apostel Paulus,_ 1906, holds that we shall never
completely understand the Apostle’s doctrine. We must make up our
minds to the fact . . that in his letters we have before us only
fragments of his spiritual life, the full wealth of which we can only
vaguely imagine. The individual arguments of Paul look to us like
erratic boulders; only toilsomely and partially can we reconstruct the
connexion of thought.

128 Rendering _naturhaft._ Dr. Schweitzer has favoured me with the
following note on this difficult concept, which from this point
becomes prominent in the discussions. After consultation with him, the
word has been rendered “physical,” but placed in quotation marks to
indicate the special use.—TRANSLATOR. “In the special sense in which
it is here used _naturhaft_ is intended to convey that it is not a
question of a purely spiritual redemption, but that the whole physical
and hyperphysical being of the man is thereby translated into a new
condition. Body and soul are redeemed together; and in such a way that
not only the elect portion of mankind, but the whole world is
completely transformed in a great catastrophic event.”

129 _Neutestamentliche Theologie,_ vol. ii., 1897, pp. 175-187.

130 W. Heitmüller, _Taufe und Abendmahl bei Paulus,_ 1903, 56 pp.

131 How unwilling theology was to draw this inevitable inference is to
be seen from the works of Weinel and Heitmüller. They refuse to go
beyond the statement that the sacraments stand in sharp opposition to
the real “religion” of Paul, and think that they have solved the
problem by asserting that the Apostle of the Gentiles did not notice
the contradiction. Weinel remarks, “Paul himself is quite unconscious
of the problem raised by the collision of the ‘physical’ doctrine of
redemption of the Mysteries with the ethical doctrine of
Christianity.” Heitmüller says, “These views of baptism and the Lord’s
Supper stand in unreconciled and unreconcilable opposition with the
central significance of faith for Pauline Christianity, that is to
say, with the purely spiritual, personal view of the religious
relation which stands in the foreground of Pauline religious life and
religious thought.”

132 William Wrede, _Paulus,_ 1904, 113 pp. (In the series entitled
“Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher.”)

133 In the sense of the Messiah.—TRANSLATOR.

134 How far Wrede was consciously influenced by Kabisch, and how far
he has the sense of creating something new, is not quite evident. He
reckons the book among the “very important studies on special points,”
to which he refers in the bibliography, but he does not quote it.

135 C. von Dobschütz, _Probleme des apostolischen Zeitalters_
(“Problems of the Apostolic Age,” 1904, 138 pp.), does not enter in
detail into the question regarding the genesis of the Pauline view of
the law, although he treats Jewish Christianity and Gentile
Christianity with some fulness.

136 See the present writer’s _Von Reimarus zu Wrede, eine Geschichte
der Leben-Jesu-Forschung_ (1906, 418 pp.). On Wrede, pp. 327-347.
(English translation, “The Quest of the Historical Jesus.” A. and C.
Black, London, 2nd ed., 1911. On Wrede, pp. 328-348.)

137 This thesis of Wrede’s called into being a new literature upon
Paul and Jesus which attacked Wrede chiefly on the score of his
one-sidedness.

P. Kölbing, _Die geistige Einwirkung der Person Jesu auf Paulus,_ 1906
(“The Spiritual Influence of the Person of Jesus on Paul”). Adolf
Jülicher, _Paulus und Jesus,_ 1907, 72 pp. Arnold Meyer, _Wer hat das
Christentum begründet, Jesus oder Paulus?_ 1907, 104 pp. (“Who founded
Christianity, Jesus or Paul?”) Wilhelm Walther, _Pauli Christentum,
Jesu Evangelium,_ 1908, 51 pp. Johannes Weiss, _Paulus und Jesus,_
1909, 72 pp. _Christus: Die Anfänge des Dogmas,_ 1909, 88 pp.
(“Christ: The Beginnings of Dogma”).

138 Martin Brückner, _Die Entstehung der paulinischen Christologie,_
1903, 237 pp.

The work appeared some months before Wrede’s _Paulus,_ but the author,
who had the opportunity of personal intercourse and the interchange of
ideas with him, was acquainted with his method and fundamental views.
As he is also an independent thinker, his work represents not only a
supplement but a real advance.

139 Viz. the Jewish conception of the Messiah.—TRANSLATOR.

140 William Olschewski replies to Wrede and Brückner in his thoughtful
but obscure and heavily written dissertation, _Die Wurzeln der
paulinischen Christologie_ (1909, 170 pp.) (“The Roots of the Pauline
Eschatology”). He thinks that the origin of Christianity which they
suggest does not explain the “characteristic and peculiar connexion of
Christology with Pneumatology,” and insists that in the Damascus
vision is to be found the sufficient reason for “the intimately
organic fusion” of the conception of Christ with that of the Spirit
which operates through Him. In any case he holds it to be “false in
principle and method to try to derive the roots of the Pauline
Christology from the Jewish Apocalyptic Christology.”

141 From the literature we may mention A. Schettler, _Die paulinische
Formel “Durch Christus”_ (“The Pauline Formula Through Christ”), 1907,
82 pp. J. Haussleiter, _Paulus,_ 1909, 96 pp. (Lectures, popular.) R.
Knopf, Paulus, 1909, 123 pp. Eberhard Vischer, _Der Apostel Paulus und
sein Werk,_ 1910, 143 pp. By the same author, _Die Paulusbriefe,_
1906, 80 pp. A remarkably good, clearly and simply written guide to
questions of “Introduction.” Julius Schniewind, _Die Begriffe Wort und
Evangelium bei Paulus_ (“The Meaning of the Terms ‘Word’ and ‘Gospel’
in Paul’s Writings”), 1910, 120 pp.

Johannes Müller, _Die Entstehung des persönlichen Christentums der
paulinischen Gemeinden,_ 1911, 306 pp. A good analysis of the general
contents of Paul’s gospel. The theological system and the mysticism of
the Apostle are not explained. The book is the second edition of a
study which appeared in 1898 under the title _Das persönliche
Christentum der paulinischen Gemeinden nach seiner Entstehung
untersucht_ (“An Investigation of the Origin of the Personal
Christianity of the Pauline Churches”).

Adolf Deissmann, _Paulus,_ 1911, 202 pp. The book grew out of
lectures. The author is opposed to the method of investigation which
aims at understanding the “System of Pauline Theology,” and thinks
that in following these “doctrinaire interests” it would go further
and further astray. For him Paul is primarily “a hero of the religious
life” for whom “theology is a secondary matter.” He holds that the
Apostle was more a man of prayer and testimony, a confessor and a
prophet, than a learned exegete and laborious dogmatist.

His aim is, with the aid of reminiscences of two journeys to the East,
to “place the man of Tarsus in the sunlight of his Anatolian home, and
in the clear air of the ancient Mediterranean lands,” and he believes
that when this is done “what previously tired our eyes, like a set of
faded and rubbed pencil sketches, becomes at once plastic and living
in its light and shadow.” This hope is by no means realised in his
work. It appears here, as was also noticeable in the writer’s earlier
_Licht vom Osten_ (“Light from the East”), that he has a high
appreciation of local colour and the memorials of ancient
civilisation, but when it comes really to explaining the ideas he is
not able to draw nearly so much profit from them as he expected. And
his contempt for “doctrinaire interests” revenges itself upon his
treatment. It is obscure and confused, and does not get at the essence
of the thoughts. In regard to Paul’s mysticism Deissmann has applied
new catchwords to old psychological considerations, but in nowise
contributes to the explanation of it. After Wrede’s _Paulus,_ his book
seems a kind of anachronism. It is, besides, not fitting that what
professes to be a new view should be presented in the inadequate form
of a collection of lectures.

142 Adolf Harnack, _Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte,_ 4th ed., vol. i.,
1909, 826 pp. On Paul, pp. 96-107 (3rd ed., 1893).

143 Reinhold Seeberg, _Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte,_ 2nd ed., vol
i., 1908, 570 pp. On Paul, 68-78. The first circle of ideas embraces
the thoughts regarding flesh and spirit, the power of grace and the
strength of sin, Christ and the new creation; the second consists of
the formulas which were created in opposition to Jewish Christianity;
the third has to do with the mystical body of Christ, in which the
natural distinctions between men are abolished. On points of detail
there are many discriminating observations. The first edition, of
1895, did not even contain any section on Paul.

The 4th ed. of Loofs’ _Dogmengeschichte_ (1906, vol. i., 576 pp.) does
not deal with the Apostle of the Gentiles, any more than the preceding
editions.

144 On Kabisch see above, pp. 58-63.

145 A sifting and a survey of results is offered in the closing
chapter, “Das religionsgeschichtliche Problem” (448-493) in Bousset’s
book, _Die Religion des Judentums im neutestamentlichen Zeitalter,_
1903 (“The Religion of Judaism in New Testament Times”).

NOTES FOR CHAPTER VII PAULINISM AND COMPARATIVE RELIGION

146 Hermann Usener, _Religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen: “Das
Weihnachtsfest”_ (1889, 337 pp.); _“Die Sintflutsagen”_ (1899, 276
pp.) (“Studies in Comparative Religion, ‘Christmas,’ 1889. ‘The
Flood-legends,’ 1899”). Other works which played an important part in
creating the new horizon were Albrecht Dieterich’s works on
Comparative Religion, _Abraxas_ (1891, 221 pp. On a Hellenistic myth
of the Creation, and Judaeo-Orphico-Gnostic cults) and _Nekyia,_
contributions to the explanation of the “Apocalypse of Peter” (1893,
238 pp.). The description of the torments of hell in the Akhmim
fragment is based, he thinks, not on Jewish eschatology, but on
conceptions which are found in the Orphic literature.

147 _Les Religions orientales dans le paganisme romain,_ 1st ed.,
1906; 2nd ed., 1909, 427 pp. Based on Lectures delivered in the year
1905 in the Collège de France.

We may note also some of the essays in Salomon Reinach’s _Cultes,
mythes et religions,_ 3 vols., 1905-1906-1908 (466, 466, and 537 pp.).

Otto Gruppe, _Die griechischen Kulte und Mythen in ihrer Beziehung zu
den orientalischen Religionen_ (“Greek cults and Myths in their
relation to the Oriental Religions”), vol. i., 1887, 706 pp.; and
_Griechische Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte_ (“Greek Mythology and
the History of Greek Religions”). In Iwan Müller’s _Handbuch der
klassischen Altertumswissenschaft_ (“Handbook of Classical
Antiquities”), 1906, 2 vols., embracing 1923 pp.

Georg Mau. _Die Religionsphilosophie Kaiser Julians in seinen Reden
auf König Helios und die Göttermutter_ (“The Emperor Julian’s
Philosophy of Religion in his Orations on King Helios and the Dea
Mater”), 1908, 169 pp. In the appendix there is a German translation
of both discourses.

Of a popular and unscientific character is H. E. de Jong’s _Das antike
Mysterienwesen in religionsgeschichtlicher, ethnologischer und
psychologischer Beleuchtung_ (“The Ancient Mystery-religions in the
Light of Comparative Religion, Ethnology, and Psychology”), 1909. 362
pp. The author is disposed to cite the modern occult “manifestations”
in relation to the astral body in order to explain certain
“appearances” in the ceremonies of initiation to the mysteries.

148 On what follows see Hugo Hepding, _Attis, seine Mythen und sein
Kult,_ 1903, 224 pp. First volume of the series of
“Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten,” edited by Dieterich
and Wünsch. Cf. also Ernst Schmidt, _Kultübertragungen_
(Cultus-Transferences: “Magna Mater,” “Asklepios,” “Sarapis”). In the
same series vol. viii., 1909.

149 On the original significance of the Taurobolium see Cumont, _Les
Religions orientales,_ pp. 101-103.

150 Note the admission of Hugo Hepding at the close of his chapter on
the Mysteries (p. 199):—“I am well aware that this account of the
Phrygian Mysteries is in its details mainly hypothetical. In view of
the paucity of the information which has come down to us, nothing else
is possible. In particular the association of the blood baptism with
the March festival cannot be shown from our documentary material.....”
He wants to distinguish between an earlier and a later form of the
taurobolium. The earlier form is not a ceremony of initiation but a
sacrifice. It was only the later which had in view the initiation of
the individual. “The first person whom we know by literary evidence to
have undergone the ceremony of the taurobolium is Heliogabalus.”

151 On the Eleusinian Mysteries see Rohde, _Psyche_ (3rd ed., 1909)
pp. 278-300. From his account it clearly appears how little we know
about these ceremonies of initiation. In any case they were quite
different from those of the later Mystery-religions. They belong to
early Greek religion.

152 Franz Cumont, _Les Mystères de Mithra_ (1st ed., 1899; 2nd ed.,
1902).

153 Albrecht Dieterich, _Eine Mithrasliturgie,_ 1st ed., 1903; 2nd
ed., 1910 (edited after the author’s death by Richard Wünsch), 248 pp.
The excursuses, pp. 92-212, really give a sketch of the fundamental
ideas of the Mystery-religions in general. Cumont refuses to regard
the document as a fragment belonging to a Mithras-liturgy because he
cannot find in it the specific characteristics of the Persian
eschatology and conception of heaven. On this controversy see the 2nd
edition of the Mithras-liturgy, pp. 225-228. It would certainly have
been better if Dieterich had not given the book the unnecessary and
contentious title.

154 From Dieterich, p. 15.

155 Richard Reitzenstein, _Poimandres._ Studies in Graeco-Egyptian and
Early Christian literature, 1904, 382 pp. The Poimandres “community”
[_Gemeinde,_ the word is in quotation marks in the German, perhaps to
recall its frequent use in speaking of the Early Christian Church] is
supposed to have been founded in Egypt about the time of the birth of
Christ. Its main characteristic is the mystical basis of the doctrine.
Later on, in the course of the third century (?) the Poimandres
community was gradually merged in the general Hermetic communities.

156 From the literature we may note: Hermann Gunkel, _Zum
religionsgeschichtlichen Verständnis des Neuen Testaments_
(“Contributions to the Understanding of the New Testament on the Basis
of Comparative Religion”), 1903, 96 pp.

Paul Wendland, _Die hellenistisch-römische Kultur in ihren Beziehungen
zu Judentum und Christentum_ (“The Hellenistic-Roman Civilisation in
Relation to Judaism and Christianity”), 1907, 190 pp.

Adolf Deissmann, _Licht vom Osten_ (“Light from the Ancient East”),
1908, 364 pp. This book, which is rather rhetorically written, treats
mainly the general literary side of the matter without entering
specially into the religious problems and the ideas of the
Mystery-religions. The same author has published a lecture, _Die
Urgeschichte des Christentums im Lichte der Sprachforschung_ (“The
History of Primitive Christianity in the Light of Linguistic
Research”), 1910, 48 pp.

Karl Clemen, _Religionsgeschichtliche Erklärung des Neuen Testaments_
(“Interpretation of the New Testament on the Basis of Comparative
Religion”), 1909, 301 pp.

Works which to a large extent deal with the same class of subject are:
Wilhelm Soltau, _Das Fortleben des Heidentums in der altchristlichen
Kirche_ (“The Survival of Paganism within the Early Christian
Church”), 1906, 307 pp. Adolf Harnack, _Mission und Ausbreitung des
Christentums in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten_ (“Mission and Expansion
of Christianity in the first three Centuries”), vol. i., 1906, 421 pp.

157 Gustav Anrich, _Das antike Mysterienwesen in seinem Einfluss auf
das Christentum,_ 1894, 237 pp. From the same stand-point, and in some
respects supplementing Anrich’s work, is Georg Wobbermin’s
_Religionsgeschichtliche Studien zur Frage der Beeinflussung des
Urchristentums durch das antike Mysterienwesen_ (“Studies from the
Point of View of Comparative Religion on the Question of the Influence
of the ancient Mysteries upon Christianity”), 1896, 190 pp.

Johannes Geffken in his popular work, _Aus der Werdezeit des
Christentums,_ 2nd ed., 1909, 126 pp. (“From the Formative Period of
Christianity”), does not hold that any very deep influence was
exercised by the Graeco-Roman Syncretism on early Christianity. He is,
however, of opinion that Paul “adopted all kinds of oriental views.”

158 See _e.g._ Dieterich, _Mithrasliturgie,_ 2nd ed., p. 110. Typical
also are pp. 176, 177, where he continually speaks of the “death and
re-birth” of believers as taught by Paul.

[_Wiedergeburt_ has been translated “re-birth” when the general sense
implied in the comparison with other religions is in view;
“regeneration” when the reference is primarily to the specific
Christian doctrine as such.]

159 P. Gennrich in his book, _Die Lehre von der Wiedergeburt . . in
dogmengeschichtlicher und religionsgeschichtlicher Beleuchtung_ (“The
Doctrine of Regeneration ... in the Light of the History of Dogma, and
of Comparative Religion”), 1907, 363 pp., notes that Paul speaks only
of the “new creature” and not of regeneration; but he does not
investigate the cause of this peculiarity, but hastens to give a
psychological explanation of his utterances as a “precipitate from his
personal experience.”

160 See the introduction to _Les Religions orientales dans le
paganisme romain,_ 2nd ed., 1909.

161 Typical in this respect is the work of Martin Brückner, _Der
sterbende und auferstehende Gottheiland in den orientalischen
Religionen und ihr Verhältnis zum Christentum_ (“The divine Saviour
who dies and rises again in the Oriental Religions; and their Relation
to Christianity”). In the series of _Religionsgeschichtliche
Volksbücher,_ 1908, 48 pp. “As in Christianity, so in many Oriental
religions, a belief in the death and resurrection of a Redeemer-God,
who was subordinated to the Supreme God (sometimes as His Son)
occupied a central place in the worship and cultus.” What manipulation
the myths and rites of the cults in question must have undergone
before this general statement could become possible! Where is there
anything about dying and resurrection in Mithra? It is instructive to
see how the author on p. 30 argues away the effect of this admission!

A popular treatment which is kept within due bounds is Adolf Jacoby’s
work, _Die antiken Mysterienreligionen und das Christentum_ (“The
ancient Mystery-religions and Christianity”), 1910, 44 pp., in the
series of _Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher._ The author deserves
special credit for offering his readers typical texts from which they
can form their own impression.

Dieterich remarks with great justice in the _Mithrasliturgie_ (2nd
ed., 207) how necessary it is to get beyond the catchword
“Syncretistic,” and point out in every case the source of particular
mythological statements and ideas.

162 O. Gruppe, too, is obliged to admit that the late Greek religious
thought never really had the conception of a “world-redeemer”
_(Griechische Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte),_ vol. ii., pp.
1488-1489. It cannot, in fact, be otherwise. The “world-redeemer” of
Jewish and Christian apocalyptic thought corresponds to the “new
world” which he is in some supernatural fashion to bring in, in order
to reign in it along with the elect. Graeco-oriental religions did not
look for a kingdom of that kind, and therefore the idea of the ruler
of such a kingdom was also undiscoverable and unattainable for them.
The Messiah is the World-redeemer or Lord of the coming age. He does
not make atonement for the guilt of mankind nor for that of
individuals, but suffers and dies vicariously for the elect, and in
order to set the events of the End in motion. His earthly fate is
nothing in itself, but falls wholly under the conception of the
“Messianic woes” which are thought of as the tribulation of the Times
of the End. How can it be proposed to find an analogue to a figure of
this kind in myths, the scene of which is laid in the dawn of the
world, and which have no sort of relation to its ultimate fate.

163 P. 102 ff. He has at this point a detailed discussion of the
relations between the cultus-meal in Paul and that of the
Mystery-religions.

On the sacraments see also K. Clemen, _Religionsgeschichtliche
Erklärung des Neuen Testaments,_ 1909, 301 pp. Baptism and the Supper,
165-207.

164 _Mithrasliturgie,_ 2nd ed. pp. 107, 108.

165 Therefore the statement that Jesus baptized in the Judaean country
(Jn iii. 22) is corrected to the effect that He Himself did not
baptize, but only the disciples (Jn iv. 2).

166 _Der wissenschaftliche Predigerverein._

167 W. Heitmüller, _Taufe und Abendmahl bei Paulus_ (“Baptism and the
Lord’s Supper in Paul’s teaching”). A description and an investigation
in the light of Comparative Religion, 1903, 56 pp. These journeyings
on pp. 40-42.

168 _i.e._ Materialist in his explanation, in contrast, as appears
later, with Reitzenstein, who is described as the “Pneumatic” of the
science.

169 Albert Eichhorn, _Das Abendmahl im Neuen Testament_ (“The Lord’s
Supper in the New Testament,” 1898, 31 pp.), similarly holds that in
Paul we have before us a sacramental eating and drinking of the body
and blood of Christ which can only be explained as based on Oriental
Gnostic presuppositions. He is, however, constrained to admit that we
have no knowledge of a “sacramental meal which could have served as
the model for the Lord’s Supper.” But this does not shake his faith in
his theory. He thinks that proof is only wanting because there is here
a gap in our historical knowledge. He has calculated out the position
of the planet; the mere fact that it cannot be discovered with the
telescope is wholly due to the inadequacy of the instrument.

170 See on this R. Reitzenstein, _Die hellenistischen
Mysterienreligionen_ (“The Hellenistic Mystery Religions”), p. 38.

171 Tit. iii. 5 (R. V. _marg._: laver of regeneration).

172 Wilhelm Heitmüller, _Im Namen Jesu. Eine Sprach- und
religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zum Neuen Testament, speciell zur
altchristlichen Taufe_ (“In the Name of Jesus. A New Testament Study
based on Linguistics and Comparative Religion, with special Reference
to Early Christian baptism”), 1903, 347 pp. In this thorough and
extremely interesting study the author arrives at the result that in
the employment of the name of Jesus it is taken for granted that the
name in some way or other represents a power. The Christian “belief in
the name,” he holds, stands on the same footing as Jewish and heathen
beliefs. “The solemn pronouncement of the name of Jesus at baptism is
not a merely symbolic form, having to do, for example, with the
confession of the Messiahship of Jesus, but is thought of as
associated with real mystical, mysterious effects; the effects must,
however, be similar, _mutatis mutandis,_ to those which are ascribed
to the use of the name in other cases: a being actually taken
possession of by the power which is designated by the ‘name’ of Jesus,
the expulsion of all hostile powers, consecration and inspiration.”
“Baptism in the name of Jesus represents, therefore, the combination
of two sacramental factors—water and the name.”

Unfortunately, Heitmüller has not emphasised the fact that the
Mystery-religions offer no typical analogies to this double sacrament.

It is also open to question whether the power of the name and of water
suffice, as he thinks, to explain the Pauline view of baptism.

173 Paul Wernle, _Die Anfänge unserer Religion,_ 1901, p. 129.

174 In order to preclude this misuse of it the passage may be quoted
here in full:—

_πείθοντες οὐ μόνον ίδιώτας ἀλλὰ καὶ πόλεις, ὡς ἄρα λύσεις τε καὶ
καθαρμοὶ άδικημάτων διὰ θυσιῶν καὶ παιδιᾶς ἡδονῶν εἰσὶ μέν ἔτι ζῶσιν,
εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ τετελευτήκασιν, ἃς δὴ τελετὰς καλοῦσιν, αἳ τῶ ἐκεῖ κακῶν
ἀπολύουσιν ὴμᾶς, μὴ θύσαντας δὲ δεινὰ περιμένει_.

. . . “And they persuade, not only individuals, but whole cities that
sacrifices and pleasureable amusements afford absolution and
purification from crimes committed, both for the living and also for
the dead; these they call Mysteries (initiations), and they free us
from the torments of the other world, whereas terrible things await
those who neglect to offer sacrifice.” On expiation see Rohde,
_Psyche,_ i. (1903), 259 ff.

175 Regarding the evidence which has a more remote bearing on the
question, see Hollmann, _Urchristentum in Korinth_ (“Primitive
Christianity in Corinth”), 1903, 32 pp., pp. 22-24.

176 R. Reitzenstein, _Die hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen,_ p. 84.
The dead man is, according to Spiegelberg, represented as standing
between two gods, who sprinkle the sacred fluid upon his head.

177 In I Cor. vi. 11, after saying that thieves, adulterers,
slanderers, and robbers cannot inherit the Kingdom of God, the Apostle
proceeds, “And such were some of you. But ye were cleansed, ye were
consecrated, ye were justified.” The passage is no doubt intended
sarcastically, ironically, with reference to the fact that, in spite
of their baptism, according to present appearances they have not
changed much. In regard to self-delusion on the ground of baptism see
also I Cor. x.

178 I Cor. i. 14-16.

179 See Reitzenstein, _Die hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen_
(1910), pp. 99, 100.

180 See above, p. 162, note 3.

181 In contrast with Heitmüller, who was described above as the
“hylic,” materialist (see p. 205).

R. Reitzenstein, _Die hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen. Ihre
Grundgedanken und Wirkungen_ (“The Hellenistic Mystery-religions.
Their fundamental Ideas and Influence”), 1910, 217 pp. The work is
composed out of a lecture delivered in the Clerical Theological
Society of Alsace-Lorraine (pp. 1-60), along with extensive notes and
excursuses (pp. 63-214).

182 Especially impressive are the investigations regarding the
_pneuma._ Reitzenstein believes himself to be able to show that all
the passages in Paul’s writings which refer to this subject “are
explicable from Hellenistic usage,” and leaves open the question
whether they “are all equally easy to understand on the basis of the
Hebraic use of _ruach_ or _nephesh,_ or the LXX. use of _πνεῦμα_.”

A detailed discussion is given of the following passages, Rom. vi.
1-14, xii. I ff.; I Cor. ii., xiii., xv. 34 ff.; 2 Cor. iii. 18, v.1
ff., v. 6 ff., x.-xiii., and some interesting light is thrown on the
Epistle to Philemon (pp. 81, 82).

It may also be mentioned that Eduard Schwartz in his essay “Paulus”
_(Charakterköpfe aus der antiken Literatur,_ 1910, 136 pp. pp.
107-136) estimates very highly the indirect influence of the
Hellenistic surroundings and language. In the second edition (1911,
142 pp.) he goes a little more fully into the individual problems of
the doctrine.

183 Even Holtzmann shares this confusion. “The Pauline doctrine,” he
pronounces in his New Testament Theology (ii. p. 56), “is not exactly
Philonian, but doubtless, like the closely allied Philonian doctrines
and the more widely divergent later views, grew out of the same stock
of Jewish reflection on the Creation-narratives. . . .”

184 _Poimandres,_ p. 81 ff.

185 Reitzenstein takes much pains to render intelligible, by a series
of examples from ancient and modern times, the “dual personality”
which often seems to manifest itself in Paul (pp. 53-57. 207, 208). He
overlooks the fact that in the form in which it occurs in Paul it is
taken for granted by eschatology, and appears in Jesus and the
disciples. It is much more primitive than anything found in
Hellenistic mysticism or in any form of romanticism, since the
distinction of outer appearance and inner being which occurs in Paul,
depends upon the contrast of the two worlds which are struggling
together for existence. The dual self-consciousness of Paul is, in
contradistinction to all other cases, not subjectively but objectively
conditioned. Besides, it depends on the temporal opposition of “then”
and “now,” as naturally results from the ardent eschatological
expectation. On the “doubling” of one’s own personality, such as is
possible for Greek sensibility, see Rohde, _Psyche,_ vol. ii. (1909),
pp. 413, 414.

186 See pp. 57, 58.

187 See _e.g._ Reitzenstein, p. 209.

188 That Greek “eschatology” and early Christian are mutually
exclusive appears clearly in Albrecht Dieterich’s _Nekyia_ (1893, 238
pp.). The fantastic torments of hell as portrayed in the Apocalypse of
Peter have nothing to do with the Jewish and primitive Christian
eschatology, since the latter are concerned with the in-coming of the
new world, and not with the special punishment of individuals.
Dieterich is quite right when he explains this detailed description of
torment as due to influences from the Orphic literature. Greek
religious feeling was concerned with the fate of individuals after
death. The thought of a coming world which dominates Jewish and
primitive Christian eschatology is alien to it, because its
“eschatology” was not created, like the former, by the
historico-ethical conceptions and aspirations of successive
generations of prophets.

189 Hermann Gunkel, _Zum religionsgeschichtlichen Verständnis des
Neuen Testaments,_ 1903, 96 pp.

190 Max Maurenbrecher, _Von Jerusalem nach Rom,_ 1910, 288 pp. This
work is the continuation of _Von Nazareth nach Golgatha,_ 1909, 274
pp.

191 W. B. Smith, _Der vorchristliche Jesus, nebst weiteren Vorstudien
zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Urchristentums,_ 243 pp. It was issued
in German in 1906 with a preface by P. W. Schmiedel. The author is
Professor of Mathematics in Tulane University, New Orleans. The book
consists of five somewhat disconnected essays: i. “The Pre-Christian
Jesus”; ii. “The Significance of the Nick-name, The Nazarene”; iii.
“Anastasis”; iv. “The Sower sows the Logos”; v. “Saeculi silentium.”
(Behind this title masquerades a study of the external arguments for
the historicity of the Pauline Epistles, in which Smith stammers out
confusedly what Steck and van Manen had clearly expressed before him.)

192 Arthur Drews, _Die Christusmythe,_ 1909, 190 pp.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER VIII SUMMING-UP AND FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM

193 See above, p. 173 f.

194 Hence John’s indignation at seeing the “viper’s brood” approaching
to take advantage of it?—TRANSLATOR.

195 For the sense of the term here, see above, p. 83, note.
—TRANSLATOR.

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES

This book is the first edition of the translation. No second edition
was published until 1948 which contained only a few minor changes
anyway. Consequently there are a lot of errors/inconsistencies in the
spelling and hyphenation. I have left almost all of these as is,
except for a few cases where line-end hyphens needed to be corrected
(line 2496 on p. 65: thoroughgoing/thorough-going; line 7492 on p.
217: Rebirth/Re-Birth). The special case of ‘primitive-Christian’ ❬-❭
‘primitive Christian’ was examined in detail. In only six cases does
it seem that ‘primitive-Christian’ is used as a compound word. All the
others seem to be legitimate as separate words. The inconsistent uses
of naive (1), naïve (3), naively (1), naïvely (1), naïveté (3) were
left as is. So was a priori (7), à priori (2) and L’Apôtre (4),
L’Apotre (1). Two un-paired quotation marks were also left as is:
up-paired " p. 34 line 1528 (wrong but left in)
un-paired " n. 103 p. 134 line 9638 (wrong but left in)

Because of the use of English, German, Dutch, and Latin there were
many different spellings of words flagged as errors which were due to
the same word being spelled differently in different languages.



*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 76284 ***