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diff --git a/76061-0.txt b/76061-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a4d0627 --- /dev/null +++ b/76061-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11469 @@ + +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 76061 *** + + + + +The Dale Memorial Lectures, 1922. + +CIVILIZATION AND ETHICS + +THE PHILOSOPHY OF CIVILIZATION + +PART II + +BY + +ALBERT SCHWEITZER + +D.THEOL.; D.PHIL.; D.MED. (STRASSBURG) + +_Second Edition_ + +TRANSLATED BY + +C. T. CAMPION + +M.A. (OXON.) + +A. & C. BLACK, LTD. + +4, 5 & 6 SOHO SQUARE, LONDON, W. 1 + +1929 + + + + + +_First Edition published November, 1923_ + +_Second Edition (revised), published in 1929_ + + + +To + +MY WIFE + +THE MOST LOYAL OF COMRADES + + +_Printed in Great Britain._ + + + + +PREFACE + +MY subject is the tragedy of the Western world-view._(_1_)_ + +While still a student I was surprised to find the history of thought +always written merely as a history of philosophical systems, never as +the history of man’s effort to arrive at a world-view. Later, when +reflecting on the current of civilization in which I found myself +living, I was struck by the strange and inexorable connexions which +exist between civilization and our view of the world as a whole. Next +I felt a still stronger compulsion to put to Western thought the +question what it has been aiming at, and what result it has reached in +the matter of world-view. What is there left of the achievements of +our philosophy when it is stripped of its tinsel of learning? What has +it to offer us when we demand from it those elemental ideas which we +need if we are to take our position in life as men who are growing in +character through the experience given by work? + +So I came to an unsparing reckoning up with Western thought. I +recognized and admitted that it has sought for that world-view from +which alone a deep and comprehensive civilization can come. It wanted +to reach a position [pg vi] of world- and life-affirmation and on that +foundation lay down that it is our duty to be active, to strive for +progress of all kinds, and to create values. It wanted to reach an +ethical system and on that foundation lay down that for the sake of +serviceable activity we have to place our life at the service of ideas +and of the other life around us. + +But it did not succeed in grounding its world- and life-affirming +ethical world-view convincingly and permanently in thought. Our +philosophy did nothing more than produce again and again unstable +fragments of the serviceable world-view which hovered before its +mind’s eye. Consequently our civilization also remained fragmentary +and insecure. + +It was a fatal mistake that Western thought never admitted to itself +the unsatisfying result of its search for a stable and serviceable +world-view. Our philosophizing became less and less elemental, losing +all connexion with the elementary questions which man must ask of life +and of the world. More and more it found satisfaction in the handling +of philosophic questions that were merely academic, and in an expert’s +mastery of philosophical technique. It became more and more the +captive of secondary things. Instead of real music it produced again +and again mere bandmaster’s music, often magnificent stuff of its +kind, but still only bandmaster’s music. + +Through this philosophy which did nothing but philosophize instead of +struggling for a world-view grounded in thought and serviceable for +life, we came to be without any world-view and therefore without any +civilization. + +Signs of an awakening of thought on this point are beginning to be +visible. It is admitted here and there that philosophy must again try +to offer a world-view. This is generally expressed by saying that +people are encouraging it to venture once more on “metaphysics,” that +is to put forward definitive views about the spiritual nature of the +world, whereas hitherto it has been occupied with the classification +of scientific facts and in cautious hypotheses. + +Not only in philosophy, but in thought generally this [pg vii] +awakening of the need for a world-view expresses itself as a need for +“metaphysics.” Fantastic systems of “metaphysics” are sought for and +offered. Individuals who believe that they have at their disposal +peculiar psychic experiences, and assert that with their aid they can +look behind the actual nature of phenomena, come forward as bringers +of a world-view. + +But neither the cautious academic, nor the much-claiming fantastic +“metaphysics,” can really give us a world-view. That the road to a +world-view leads through “metaphysics” is a fatal error which has +already enjoyed too long a span of life in our Western thought. It +would be tragic if we renewed its vigour just now, when we are faced +by the necessity of working our way out of that lack of world-view in +which our misery, both spiritual and material, is grounded. No further +wandering along the traditional roads that lead nowhere can save us, +whether we advance as the successors of our fathers or on adventurous +lines of our own. Only in a deep conception of and experience in the +problems of world-view is there for us any possibility of advance. + +That is why I am undertaking what has never been attempted in this way +before, viz. so to pose the problem of the Western world-view as to +make the Western search for a world-view come to a halt and take +account of itself. There are two points on which it must be clear +before it proceeds to further exertion. The first is the overwhelming +importance in the search for a world-view of the quality of the +world-view sought. What is it that we want? We want to find the world- +and life-affirmation and the ethical system which we need for that +serviceable activity which gives our life a meaning, based on such +thought about the world and life as finds a meaning in them also. If +our search for a world-view is once thoroughly permeated by the +recognition that everything turns upon these two fundamental +questions, it is thereby saved from betaking itself to by-paths, +thinking that by some happy disposition of fortune it can reach its +goal along them. It will then [pg viii] not search for a “metaphysic,” +thinking by means of it to reach a world-view, but it will search for +a world-view and accept with it anything “metaphysical” that may turn +up. From every point of view it will remain elemental. + +The second task which the conscious search for a world-view must not +shirk, is the consideration of what is the real and ultimate nature of +the process by which it has hitherto attempted to secure that +serviceable world-view which hovered before it. Reflexion on this is +necessary that it may make up its mind whether further advance along +the road it has hitherto followed gives any prospect of success. Our +philosophy ought to have been philosophizing long ago about the road +along which it was going in search of a world-view. It never did so, +and therefore was always running uselessly round and round in a +circle. + +The process by which Western thought has hitherto sought for a +world-view is doomed to be fruitless. It consisted simply in +interpreting the world in the sense of world- and life-affirmation, +that is, in attributing to the world a meaning which allowed it to +conceive the aims of mankind and of individual men as having a meaning +within it. This interpretation is acted upon by all Western +philosophy. A few thinkers who venture to be un-Western and resolutely +allow world- and life-negation and ethics to be made subjects of +discussion, are side-currents which do not affect the main course of +the river. + +That this process followed by Western thought consists in adopting an +optimistic-ethical interpretation of the world will not be clear +without further explanation, for it is, indeed, not always openly +followed. The optimistic-ethical interpretation is often to be found +imbedded in the results of investigations into the nature of +knowledge; it often appears beneath a veil of “metaphysics”; it is +often so delicately shaded that it produces none of its usual effects. +It is only when one has clearly grasped the fact that Western thought +has nothing else in mind than to establish for itself a world-view +based on world- and life-affirmation and ethical in character, that +one can realize [pg ix] how in its theory of knowledge, in its +metaphysics, and in all its movements generally in the game of life, +it is guided, consciously or unconsciously, by the effort to interpret +the world in some way or other and in some measure in the sense of +world- and life-affirmation and of ethics. Whether in this attempt it +goes to work openly or secretly, skilfully or unskilfully, honourably +or craftily, does not matter. Western thought needs this +interpretation that it may be able to give a meaning to human life. +Its view of life is to be a result of its view of the world. No other +course was ever taken into consideration by it. + +But this awakening of Western thought will not be complete until that +thought steps outside itself and comes to an understanding with the +search for a world-view as this manifests itself in the thought of +mankind as a whole. We have too long been occupied with the developing +series of our own philosophical systems, and have taken no notice of +the fact that there is a world-philosophy of which our Western +philosophy is only a part. If, however, one grasps philosophy as being +a struggle to reach a view of the world as a whole, and seeks out the +elementary convictions which are to deepen it and give it a sure +foundation, one cannot avoid setting our own thought face to face with +that of the Hindus and Chinese in the Far East. The latter looks +strange to us because much of it has remained even till now naïve and +embodied in myth, while in other parts again it has spontaneously +advanced to refinements of criticism and to artificialities. But this +does not matter. The essential thing is that it is a struggle for a +world-view: the form it takes is a secondary matter. Our Western +philosophy, if judged by its own latest pronouncements, is much naïver +than we admit to ourselves, and we fail to perceive it only because we +have acquired the art of expressing what is simple in a learned way. + +Among the Hindus we encounter the world-view which is based on world- +and life-negation, and the way in which it grounds itself in thought +is calculated to leave us not knowing what to make of our prejudice in +favour of world- [pg x] and life-affirmation, which, as Westerners, we +are inclined to assume as something more or less self-evident. + +The attraction and tension which in Hindu thought govern the relations +between world- and life-negation and ethics, afford us glimpses into +the problem of ethics for which Western thought offers us no +comparable opportunities. + +Nowhere, again, has the problem of world- and life-affirmation, both +in itself and in its relation to ethics, been felt in so elemental and +comprehensive a fashion as in Chinese thought. Lao-tse, Chwang-tse, +Kung-tse (Confucius), Meng-tse, Lie-tse, and the rest, are thinkers in +whom the problems of world-view with which our Western thought is +wrestling, encounter us in a form, strange indeed, but compelling our +attention. + +Discussing these problems with them means discussing them with +ourselves also. + +That is why I bade our search for a world-view seek to reach clear +ideas about itself, and come to a halt in order to fix its attention +on the thought of mankind as a whole. + +My solution of the problem is that we must make up our minds to +renounce completely the optimistic-ethical interpretation of the +world. If we take the world as it is, it is impossible to attribute to +it a meaning in which the aims and objects of mankind and of +individual men have a meaning also. Neither world- and +life-affirmation nor ethics can be grounded on what our knowledge of +the world can tell us about the world. In the world we can discover +nothing of any purposive evolution in which our activities can acquire +a meaning. Nor is the ethical to be discovered in any form in the +world-process. The only advance in knowledge that we can make is to +describe more and more minutely the phenomena which make up the world +and their course. To understand the meaning of the whole—and that is +what a world-view demands—is for us an impossibility. The last fact +which knowledge can discover is that the world is a manifestation in +every way puzzling, of the universal will-to-live. + +[pg xi] + +I believe I am the first among Western thinkers who has ventured to +recognize this crushing result of knowledge, and who is absolutely +sceptical about our knowledge of the world without at the same time +renouncing with it belief in world- and life-affirmation and ethics. +Resignation as to knowledge of the world is for me not a hopeless fall +into a scepticism which leaves us to drift about in life like a +derelict vessel. I see in it that effort of honesty which we must +venture to make in order to arrive at the serviceable world-view which +hovers within sight. Every world-view which does not start from +resignation in regard to knowledge, is artificial and a mere +fabrication, for it rests upon an inadmissible interpretation of the +world. + +When once thought has become clear to itself about the relation in +which world-view and life-view stand to each other, it is in a +position to reconcile resignation as to knowledge with adherence to +world- and life-affirmation and ethics. Our view of life is not +dependent on our view of the world in the way that uncritical thought +imagines it to be. It does not wither away if it cannot send its roots +down into a corresponding world-view, for it does not originate in +knowledge although it would like to base itself thereon. It can safely +depend upon itself alone, for it is rooted in our will-to-live. + +World- and life-affirmation and ethics are given in our will-to-live, +and they come to be clearly discerned in it in proportion as it learns +to think about itself and its relation to the world. The rational +thought of other times aimed at getting to know the world, and at +being able in that knowledge to conceive of the highest impulses of +our will-to-live as purposive in view of the universe and its +evolution. But that aim was unattainable. We are not meant to unite +the world and ourselves in such harmony with one another. We were +naïve enough to assume that our view of life must be contained in our +view of the world, but the facts do not justify this assumption. The +result is that our thought finds itself involved in a dualism with +which it can [pg xii] never finally settle. It is the dualism of +world-view and life-view, of knowing and willing. + +To this dualism all the problems with which human thought has busied +itself ultimately go back. Every fragment of the thought of mankind +which has any bearing on man’s view of the world—whether in the +world-religions or in philosophy—is an attempt to resolve this +dualism. It is sometimes softened down, but only to let a unitary, +monistic world-view be adopted in its place; at other times it is left +current, but is transformed into a drama with a monistic issue. + +Innumerable are the expedients which thought used in trying to get rid +of dualism. Everything it has undertaken commands respect, even the +staggering _naïvetés_ and the meaningless acts of violence to which it +committed itself, for it was always acting under the compulsion of an +inner necessity: it wanted to rescue a serviceable world-view from the +abyss of dualism. + +But from this continuous mishandling of the problem no solution could +issue capable of satisfying thought. We were to be taken over the +abyss on tottering bridges of snow. + +Instead of going on bridging this abyss with forced logic and +imaginative ideas, we must make up our minds to get to the root of the +problem and let it work upon us as it comes straight to meet us in the +facts. The solution is, not to try to get rid of dualism from the +world, but to realize it as something which can no longer do us any +harm. That is possible if we leave behind us all the arts and the +unveracities of thought and bow to the fact that, as we cannot +harmonize our life-view and our world-view, we must make up our minds +to put the former above the latter. The volition which is given in our +will-to-live reaches beyond our knowledge of the world. What is +decisive for our life-view is not our knowledge of the world but the +character of the volition which is given in our will-to-live. The +universal spirit meets us in nature as puzzling creative power. In our +will-to-live we experience [pg xiii] it within us as volition which is +both world- and life-affirming and ethical. + +Our relation to the world as it is given in the character of our +will-to-live, when this latter seeks to comprehend itself in thought: +that is our view of the world. World-view is a product of life-view, +not _vice versâ_. + +The rational thought of to-day, therefore, does not hunt the phantom +of getting to know the world. It leaves knowledge of the world on one +side as something unattainable by us, and tries to come to clear ideas +about the will-to-live which is within us. + +The problem of world-view, then, brought back to facts and tackled by +rational thought without assumptions being made, may be put thus: +“What is the relation of my will-to-live, when it learns to think, to +itself and to the world?” And the answer is: “From an inner compulsion +to be true to itself and to remain consistent with itself, our +will-to-live enters into relations with our own individual being and +with all manifestations of the will-to-live which surround it, that +are determined by the sentiment of reverence for life.” + +Reverence for life, _veneratio vitæ_, is the most direct and at the +same time the profoundest achievement of my will-to-live. + +In reverence for life my knowledge passes into experience. The +unsophisticated world- and life-affirmation which is within me just +because I am will-to-live has, therefore, no need to enter into +controversy with itself, if my will-to-live learns to think and yet +does not understand the meaning of the world. In spite of the negative +results of knowledge I have to hold fast to world- and +life-affirmation and deepen it. My life carries its own meaning in +itself. This meaning lies in my living out the highest idea which +shows itself in my will-to-live, viz. the idea of reverence for life. +With that for a starting-point I give value to my own life and to all +the will-to-live which surrounds me, I persevere in activity, and I +produce values. + +Ethics grow out of the same root as world- and [pg xiv] +life-affirmation, for ethics, too, are nothing but reverence for life. +That is what gives me the fundamental principle of morality, viz. that +good consists in maintaining, promoting, and enhancing life and that +destroying, injuring, and limiting life are evil. Affirmation of the +world, which means affirmation of the will-to-live that manifests +itself all round me, is only possible if I devote myself to other +life. From an inner necessity I exert myself in producing values and +practising ethics in the world and on the world even though not +understanding the meaning of the world. For in world- and +life-affirmation and in ethics I carry out the will of the universal +will-to-live which reveals itself in me. I live my life in God, in the +mysterious divine personality which I do not know as such in the +world, but only experience as a mysterious Will within myself. + +Rational thinking which is free from assumptions ends therefore in +mysticism. To relate oneself in the spirit of reverence for life to +the multiform manifestations of the will-to-live which together +constitute the world is ethical mysticism. All profound world-view is +mysticism, the essence of which is just this: that out of my +unsophisticated and naïve existence in the world there comes, as a +result of thought about self and the world, spiritual self-devotion to +the mysterious infinite Will which is continuously manifested in the +universe. + +This world-affirming, ethical, active mysticism has always been +hovering as a vision before Western thought, but the latter could +never adopt it because in its search for a world-view it always turned +into the wrong road of optimistic-ethical interpretation of the world, +instead of reflecting directly on the relation which man assumes to +the world under the inner compulsion of the deepest characterisation +of his will-to-live. + +From my youth onwards I have felt certain that all thought which +thinks itself out to an issue ends in mysticism. In the stillness of +the primæval forest in Africa I have been able to work out this +thought and give it expression. + +I come forward therefore with confidence as a restorer [pg xv] of that +rational thought which refuses to make assumptions. I know indeed that +our time will have absolutely no connexion with anything that is in +any way rationalistic, and would like to know it renounced as an +aberration of the eighteenth century. But the time will come when it +will be seen that we must start again where that century came to a +stop. What lies between that time and to-day is an intermezzo of +thought, an intermezzo with extraordinarily interesting and valuable +moments, but nevertheless an unhappy and fatal one. Its inevitable end +was our sinking into a condition in which we had neither world-view +nor civilization, and which contains in itself all that spiritual and +material misery in which we languish. + +The restoration of our world-view can come only as a result of +inexorably truth-loving and recklessly courageous thought. Such +thinking alone is mature enough to learn by experience how the +rational, when it thinks itself out to a conclusion, passes +necessarily over into the non-rational. World- and life-affirmation +and ethics are non-rational. They are not justified by any +corresponding knowledge of the nature of the world, but are the +disposition in which, through the inner compulsion of our +will-to-live, we determine our relation to the world. + +What the activity of this disposition of ours means in the evolution +of the world, we do not know. Nor can we regulate this activity from +outside; we must leave entirely to each individual its shaping and its +extension. From every point of view, then, world- and life-affirmation +and ethics are non-rational, and we must have the courage to admit it. + +If rational thought thinks itself out to a conclusion, it comes to +something non-rational which, nevertheless, is a necessity of thought. +This is the paradox which dominates our spiritual life. If we try to +come through without this non-rational, the result is views of the +world and of life which are without life and without value. + +All valuable conviction is non-rational and has an emotional +character, because it cannot be derived from [pg xvi] knowledge of the +world but arises out of the thinking experience of our will-to-live, +in which we stride out beyond all knowledge of the world. This fact it +is which the rational thought that thinks itself out to a conclusion +comprehends as the truth by which we must live. The way to true +mysticism leads up through rational thought to deep experience of the +world and of our will-to-live. We must all venture once more to be +“thinkers,” so as to reach mysticism, which is the only direct and the +only profound world-view. We must all wander in the field of knowledge +to the point where knowledge passes over into experience of the world. +We must all, through thought, become religious. + +This rational thought must become the prevailing force among us, for +all the valuable ideas that we need develop out of it. In no other +fire than that of the mysticism of reverence for life can the broken +sword of idealism be forged anew. + +In the disposition to reverence for life lies enclosed an elementary +conception of responsibility to which we must surrender ourselves; in +it there are forces at work which drive us to revision and ennoblement +of our individual social and political disposition. + +It is the disposition to reverence for life, too, which alone is +capable of creating a new consciousness of law. The misery prevailing +under our political and social condition consists to a great extent in +this, that neither jurists nor laity have in their minds a living and +direct conception of law. During the age of rational thought there was +a search made for such a conception, and effort was made to establish +fundamental laws which were held to be given in the nature of man, and +to get them generally recognized. Later on, however, this was given +up, and laws passed at definite dates displaced natural law. Finally +we got to the stage of being satisfied with purely technical law. This +was the intermezzo which followed the period of rational thought in +the sphere of law. + +We have entered on a period in which the feeling for [pg xvii] law is +hopelessly bereft of force, of soul, and of sense of moral obligation. +It is a period of lawlessness. Parliaments produce with easy readiness +statutes which contradict the idea of law. States deal arbitrarily +with their subjects without regard to the maintenance of any feeling +for law. Those, indeed, who fall into the power of a foreign nation +are outlaws. No respect is shown for their natural right to a +fatherland, or freedom, or dwelling-place, or property, or industry, +or food, or anything else. Belief in law is to-day an utter ruin. + +This state of things was in preparation from the moment when the +search for the natural conception of law, grounded on rational +thought, was given up. + +The only thing to be done, then, is to make a new connexion in the +sphere of law also, at the point where the thread of the rational +thought of the eighteenth century got broken. We must search for a +conception of law that is grounded in an idea which grows directly and +independently out of a world-view. We have to re-establish human +rights which cannot be infringed, human rights which guarantee to each +person the greatest possible freedom for his personality in his own +national body, human rights which protect his existence and his human +dignity against any foreign violence to which he may be subjected. + +Jurists have allowed law and the feeling for law to be ruined. They +could not help it, however, for there was no idea provided by the +thought of the time to which a living conception of law could have +anchored itself. In the complete absence of any world-view law +collapsed entirely, and it is only out of a new world-view that it can +be built up again. It is from a fundamental idea about our relation to +all that lives, as such, that it must flow in future, as from a spring +which can never dry up and never become a swamp. That spring is +reverence for life. + +Law and ethics spring up together from the same idea. Law is so much +of the principle of respect for life as can be embodied in an external +code; ethics are what cannot be so embodied. The foundation of law is +humanity. It is [pg xviii] folly to wish to put out of action the +links between law and world-view. + +In this way a world-view is the germ of all ideas and dispositions +which are determinative for the conduct of individuals and of society. + +Flying machines carry men to-day through the air over a world in which +hunger and brigandage have a place. It is not in China only that one +recognizes the grotesque character of such progress: it is almost +typical for mankind generally, and such grotesque progress cannot be +changed to the normal till a general disposition prevails which is +capable of bringing order again into the chaos of human life through +ethics. In the last resort the practical can be realized only through +the ethical + +What a remarkable circle! Rational thought which thinks itself out +arrives at something non-rational and subjective which is a necessity +of thought, viz. the ethical affirmation of world and life. On the +other hand, what for the purpose of moulding the conditions of +existence for individual men and mankind as a whole is rational, that +is to say, what is objectively practical in this regard, can only be +brought about by individuals perseveringly putting into action the +above-mentioned non-rational and subjective. The non-rational +principle underlying our activity, a principle which is provided for +us by rational thought, is the sole rational and practical principle +underlying all the happenings which are to be produced through human +action. Thus the rational and the non-rational, the objective and the +subjective proceed each from the other, and return each into the other +again. Only when the play of this mutual interchange is in full +activity do normal conditions of existence arise for men and mankind. +Let it be disturbed and the abnormal develops. + +I have, then, in this book written the tragedy of the search for a +world-view, and have myself trodden a new path to the same goal. +Whereas Western thought has not arrived at any goal because it would +not venture resolutely into the desert of scepticism about knowledge +of the world, [pg xix] I make my way through this desert with calm +confidence. It is, after all, only a narrow strip, and it lies in +front of the ever-green oasis of an elemental world-view which grows +out of thought about the will-to-live. In my attempt, however, to +reach a world-view by this new method, I am conscious of having done +no more than put together and think out to conclusions many gropings +after this new method which were made by other seekers during the +period covered. + +But I also put into this book my conviction that mankind must renew +itself in a new temper of mind, if it is not to be ruined. I entrust +to it, further, my belief that this revolution will come about, if +only we can make up our minds to become thinking men. + +A new Renaissance must come, and a much greater one than that in which +we stepped out of the Middle Ages; a great Renaissance in which +mankind discovers that the ethical is the highest truth and the +highest practicality, and experiences at the same time its liberation +from that miserable obsession by what it calls reality, in which it +has hitherto dragged itself along. + +I would be a humble pioneer of this Renaissance, and throw the belief +in a new humanity, like a torch, into our dark age. I make bold to do +this because I believe I have given to the disposition to humanity, +which hitherto has ranked only as a noble feeling, a firm foundation +in a world-view which is a product of elementary thinking and can be +made intelligible to everyone. Moreover, it has gained thereby a power +of attracting and convincing which it has not had hitherto; and is +capable now of coming to terms in energetic and consistent fashion +with our so-called reality, and of proving its full value within it. + +ALBERT SCHWEITZER. + +_July_, 1923. + +The two instalments of my Philosophy of Civilization which are now +ready—_The Decay and Restoration of [pg xx] Civilization_ and +_Civilization and Ethics_—will be followed by two others. In the next, +which will be entitled _The World-view of Reverence for Life_, I +elaborate this world-view, which so far I have only sketched for a +conclusion to my discussion of the search for a world-view, as carried +on down to the present day. The fourth and last will treat of the +Civilized State. + + * * * * * + +The translator offers his thanks to Mrs. C. E. B. Russell, now helping +at Lambarene, who kindly reviewed the whole work before it went to the +printers. Many of her criticisms and suggestions were adopted, and +have helped to secure a better translation. + + + + +CONTENTS + + +I. THE CRISIS IN CIVILIZATION AND ITS SPIRITUAL CAUSE [I] + + The material and spiritual elements in civilization [I] + Civilization and world-view [6] + +II. THE PROBLEM OF THE OPTIMISTIC WORLD-VIEW [11] + + The Western and the Indian conceptions of civilization[11] + The struggle for the optimistic world-view [12] + Optimism and pessimism [14] + Optimism, pessimism, and ethics [17] + +III. THE ETHICAL PROBLEM [19] + + The difficulties of ethical perception [19] + The importance of thought about ethics [21] + The search for a basic principle of morality [22] + Religious and philosophical ethics [24] + +IV. RELIGIOUS AND PHILOSOPHICAL WORLD-VIEWS [27] + + The world-views of the world-religions [27] + The world-views of the world religions and that of Western + thought [29] + +V. CIVILIZATION AND ETHICS IN THE GRÆCO-ROMAN PHILOSOPHY [32] + + The beginnings: Socrates [32] + Epicureanism and Stoicism. The ethic of resignation [35] + Plato’s abstract basic principle of the ethical. The ethic + of world-negation [40] + Aristotle. Instruction about virtue in place of ethics [42] + The ideal of the civilised State in Plato and Aristotle [47] + Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius [52] + The optimistic-ethical world-view of the later Stoicism [57] + +VI. OPTIMISTIC WORLD-VIEW AND ETHICS IN THE RENAISSANCE AND +POST-RENAISSANCE PERIODS [61] + + Belief in progress and ethics [61] + Christian and Stoic elements in modern ethics [64] + +VII. LAYING THE FOUNDATION OF ETHICS IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND +EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES [71] + + Hartley, Holbach. Devotion as enlightened egoism [71] + Hobbes, Locke, Helvetius, Bentham [75] + Altruism as a natural quality. Hume, Adam Smith [80] + The English ethic of self-perfecting [84] + Shaftesbury, An optimistic-ethical nature-philosophy [87] + +VIII. LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS OF CIVILIZATION IN THE AGE OF +RATIONALISM [90] + + The mentality and the achievements of the ethical belief + in progress [90] + Obstacles to the reform movement. The French Revolution [99] + The undermining of the rationalistic world-view [102] + +IX. THE OPTIMISTIC-ETHICAL WORLD-VIEW IN KANT [106] + + Kant’s ethics, deepened, but lacking content [106] + Kant’s attempt to reach an ethical world-view [110] + +X. NATURE-PHILOSOPHY AND WORLD-VIEW IN SPINOZA AND LEIBNIZ [116] + + Spinoza’s attempt to reach an optimistic-ethical + nature-philosophy [116] + Leibniz’s optimistic-ethical world-view side by side with + nature-philosophy [122] + +XI. J. G. FICHTE’S OPTIMISTIC-ETHICAL WORLD-VIEW [125] + + Speculative philosophy and Gnosticism [125] + Fichte’s speculative founding of an ethic and of optimism [126] + Fichte’s mysticism of activity incapable of being carried + through [131] + +XII. SCHILLER; GOETHE; SCHLEIERMACHER [136] + + Schiller’s ethical world-view: Goethe’s world-view based on + nature-philosophy [136] + Schleiermacher’s attempt at a nature-philosophy [138] + +XIII. HEGEL’S SUPRA-ETHICAL OPTIMISTIC WORLD-VIEW [141] + + Ethics in Hegel’s nature-philosophy, and in his philosophy of + history [141] + Hegel’s supra-ethical world-view. His belief in progress [145] + +XIV. THE LATER UTILITARIANISM, BIOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL +ETHICS [150] + + Beneke, Feuerbach, Laas, Auguste Comte, John Stuart Mill [150] + Darwin and Spencer [153] + The weak points in biological and sociological utilitarianism [156] + Sociological ethics and socialism. Mechanical belief in + progress [160] + +XV. SCHOPENHAUER AND NIETZSCHE [165] + + Schopenhauer. An ethic of world- and life-denial [165] + Absorption of ethics in world- and life-denial [171] + Nietzsche’s criticism of current ethics [174] + Nietzsche’s ethic of higher life-affirmation [177] + +XVI. THE ISSUE OF THE WESTERN STRUGGLE FOR A WORLD-VIEW [181] + + Academic thinkers: Sidgwick, Stephen, Alexander, Wundt, Paulsen, + Höffding [181] + The ethic of self-perfecting, Kant’s successors: Cohen, + Herrmann [183] + The ethic of self-perfecting: Martineau, Green, Bradley, Laurie, + Seth, and Royce [185] + Nature-philosophy and ethics. Fouillée, Guyau, Lange, Stern [186] + Nature-philosophy and ethics in Eduard von Hartmann [194] + Nature-philosophy and ethics in Bergson, Chamberlain, Keyserling, + Haeckel [198] + The death-agony of the optimistic-ethical world-view [202] + +XVII. THE NEW WAY [205] + + Why the optimistic-ethical world-view cannot be carried through to + the logical conclusion [205] + Life-view independent of world-view [208] + +XVIII. THE FOUNDATIONS OF OPTIMISM SECURED FROM THE WILL-TO-LIVE [212] + + The pessimistic result of knowledge [212] + The world- and life-affirmation of the will-to-live [216] + +XIX. THE PROBLEM OF ETHICS, STARTING FROM THE HISTORY OF ETHICS [221] + + An ethic of self-devotion, or an ethic of self-perfecting? [221] + Ethics and a theory of knowledge. Ethics and natural happenings. + The enthusiastic element in ethics [224] + The ethic of ethical personality, and the ethic of society [228] + The problem of a complete ethic [230] + +XX. THE ETHIC OF DEVOTION AND THE ETHIC OF SELF-PERFECTING [232] + + The widening of the ethic of self-devotion into a cosmic + ethic [232] + The ethic of self-perfecting and mysticism [235] + Abstract mysticism and the mysticism of reality. Supra-ethical and + ethical mysticism [241] + +XXI. THE ETHIC OF REVERENCE FOR LIFE [244] + + The basic principle of the moral [244] + The ethic of resignation. An ethic of veracity towards oneself, + and an activist ethic [251] + Ethics and thoughtlessness. Ethics and self-assertion [253] + Man and other living creatures [256] + The ethic of the relation of man to man [258] + Personal and supra-personal responsibility. Ethics and + humanity [262] + +XXII. The CIVILIZING POWER OF THE ETHIC OF REVERENCE FOR LIFE [269] + + Civilization as a product of reverence for life [269] + The four ideals of civilization. The struggle for a civilized + mankind in the machine age [271] + Church and State as historical entities, and as ideals of + civilization [278] + The moralizing of the religious and political community [280] + +FOOTNOTES +INDEX [287] + + + + +CIVILIZATION AND ETHICS + + + + +CHAPTER I + +THE CRISIS IN CIVILIZATION AND ITS SPIRITUAL CAUSE + + +The material and spiritual elements in civilization + +OUR civilization is going through a severe crisis. + +Most people think that the crisis was produced by the war, but that is +wrong. The war, with everything connected with it, is only a +phenomenon of the condition of un-civilization in which we find +ourselves. Even in States which took no part in the war, and on which +the war had no direct influence, civilization is shaken, only the fact +is not so clearly evident in them as in those which were hard hit by +the consequences of its peculiarly cruel spiritual and material +happenings. + +Yet is there any real, live thought going on among us about this +collapse of civilization, and about possible ways of working ourselves +up out of it? Scarcely! Clever men stumble about in seven-league boots +in the history of civilization and try to make us understand that +civilization is some kind of natural growth which blossoms out in +definite peoples at definite times and then of necessity withers, so +that new peoples with new civilizations must keep replacing the +worn-out ones. When they are called upon, indeed, to complete their +theory by telling us what peoples are destined to be our heirs, they +are somewhat embarrassed. There are, in fact, no peoples to be seen +whom one could imagine to be capable of even a portion of such a task. +All the peoples of the earth have been in large measure under the +influence both of our civilization [pg 002] and of our lack of it, so +that they share more or less our fate. Among none of them are to be +found thoughts which can lead to any considerable original movement of +civilization. + +Let us put on one side cleverness and interesting surveys of the +history of civilization, and busy ourselves in a practical way with +the problem of our endangered civilization. Of what character is this +degeneration in our civilization, and why has it come about? + +To begin with, there is one elementary fact which is quite obvious. +The disastrous feature of our civilization is that it is far more +developed materially than spiritually. Its balance is disturbed. +Through the discoveries which now place the forces of Nature at our +disposal in such an unprecedented way, the relations to each other of +individuals, of social groups, and of States have undergone a +revolutionary change. Our knowledge and our power have been enriched +and increased to an extent that no one would have thought possible. We +have thereby been enabled to make the conditions of human existence +incomparably more favourable in numerous respects, but in our +enthusiasm over our progress in knowledge and power, we have come to a +defective conception of what civilization is. We value too highly its +material achievements and no longer keep in mind as vividly as is +desirable the importance of the spiritual. Now the results are upon +us, and summon us to reflect. They tell us in terribly harsh language +that a civilization which develops only on its material side but not +in corresponding measure on its spiritual side, is like a ship which +with defective steering gear gets at a constantly accelerating pace +out of control, and thereby heads for a catastrophe. + +The essential nature of civilization does not lie in its material +achievements, but in the fact that individuals keep in mind the ideals +of the perfecting of man, and the improvement of the social and +political conditions of peoples, and of mankind as a whole, and that +their habit [pg 003] of thought is determined in living and constant +fashion by such ideals. Only when individuals work in this way as +spiritual forces on themselves and on society is the possibility given +of solving the problems which have been produced by the facts of life, +and of attaining to a general progress which is valuable in every +respect. Whether there is rather more or rather less of material +achievement to record is not what is decisive for civilization. Its +fate depends on whether or no thought keeps control over facts. The +issue of a voyage does not depend on whether the vessel’s pace is +somewhat quicker or somewhat slower, but on whether it steers a +correct course, and its steering gear keeps in good condition. + +Revolutions in the relations of life between individuals, society, and +peoples, as they follow in the train of our great material +achievements, make, if they are to show real progress in the sense of +valuable civilization, higher demands on the habit of thought of +civilized people, just as the increased speed of a ship presupposes +greater reliability in rudder and steering gear. Advances in knowledge +and power work out their effects on us almost as if they were natural +occurrences. It is not within our power so to direct them that they +influence favourably in every respect the relations in which we live, +but they produce for individuals, for society, and for nations, +difficult and still more difficult problems, and bring with them +dangers which it is quite impossible to estimate beforehand. +Paradoxical as it may seem, our advances in knowledge and power make +true civilization not easier but more difficult. One can even say +that, judging by the events of our own and the two preceding +generations, we are almost entitled to doubt whether in view of the +way in which these material achievements have been showered upon us, +true civilization is still possible. + +The most widespread danger which material achievements bring with them +for civilization consists in the fact that through the revolutions in +the conditions of life men [pg 004] become in greater numbers unfree, +instead of free. The type of man who once cultivated his own bit of +land becomes a worker who tends a machine in a factory; manual workers +and independent trades-people become employees. They lose the +elementary freedom of the man who lives in his own house and finds +himself in immediate connexion with Mother Earth. Further, they no +longer have the extensive and unbroken consciousness of responsibility +of those who live by their own independent labour. The conditions of +their existence are therefore unnatural. They no longer carry on the +struggle for existence in comparatively normal relations in which each +one can by his own ability make good his position whether against +Nature or against the competition of his fellows, but they see +themselves compelled to combine together and create a force which can +extort for itself better living conditions. They acquire thereby the +mentality of unfree men, in which ideals of civilization can no longer +be contemplated in the needful purity, but become distorted to +correspond with the surrounding atmosphere of struggle. + +To a certain extent we have all of us, under modern conditions, become +unfree men. In every rank of life we have from decade to decade, if +not from year to year, to carry on a harder struggle for existence. +Overwork, physical or mental or both, is our lot. We can no longer +find time to collect and order our thoughts. Our spiritual dependence +increases at the same pace as our material dependence. In every +direction we come to conditions of dependence which in former times +were never known in such universality and such strength. Economic, +social, and political organizations, which are steadily becoming more +and more complete, are getting us more and more into their power. The +State with its more and more rigid organization holds us under a +control which is growing more and more decided and inclusive. In every +respect, therefore, our individual being is depreciated. It is +becoming more and more difficult to be a personality. + +[pg 005] + +Thus it is that the progress of our external civilization brings with +it the result that individuals, in spite of all the advantages they +get, are in many respects injured both materially and spiritually in +their capacity for civilization through those very advantages. + +It is our progress in material civilization, too, which intensifies in +so disastrous a way our social and political problems. Through the +social ones we are involved in a class struggle which shakes and +throws into confusion economic and national relations. If we go down +to rock-bottom, it was machinery and world commerce which brought +about the world war, and the inventions which put into our hands such +mighty power of destruction made the war of such a devastating +character that conquered and conquerors alike are ruined for a period +of which no one can see the end. It was also our technical +achievements which put us in a position to kill at such a distance, +and to wipe out the enemy in such masses, that we sank so low as to +push aside any last impulse to humanity, and were mere blind wills +which made use of perfected lethal weapons of such destructive +capacity that we were unable to maintain the distinction between +combatants and non-combatants. + +Material achievements, then, are not civilisation, but become +civilization only so far as the mental habit of civilized peoples is +capable of allowing them to work towards the perfecting of the +individual and the community. Fooled, however, by our advances in +knowledge and power, we did not reflect on the danger to which we were +exposing ourselves by the diminished value we put on the spiritual +elements in civilization, and we surrendered completely to a naïve +satisfaction at our magnificent material achievements, and went astray +into an incredibly superficial conception of civilization. We believed +in a progress which was a matter of course, because contained in the +facts themselves. Instead of harbouring in our thought ideals approved +by reason, and undertaking to mould reality into accordance with them, +we were fooled [pg 006] by a vain feeling for reality, and wanted to +come through with lowered ideals which were borrowed from it. By +taking this course we lost all control over the facts. + +Accordingly, just when the spiritual element in culture was necessary +in extraordinary strength, we let it waste away. + +Civilization and World-View + +How could it come about that the spiritual element in civilization +became so lost to us? + +To understand that, we must go back to the time when it was at work +among us in a direct and living way, and the path thereto leads us +back into the eighteenth century. Among the Rationalists who approach +everything through reason, and would regulate everything in life by +rational considerations, we find expression given in elemental +strength to the conviction that the essential element in civilization +is a habit of thought. It is true that they are already impressed by +modern achievements in discovery and invention, and do allow to the +material side of civilization a corresponding importance. But they +nevertheless regard it as self-evident that the essential and valuable +element in civilization is the spiritual. That interest is focused +first of all on the spiritual progress of men and humanity, and in +that they believe with a mighty optimism. + +The greatness of these men of the period of the “Aufklärung” lies in +this, that they set up as ideals the perfecting of the individual, of +society, and of mankind, and devote themselves to these ideals with +enthusiasm. The force on which they count for the realizing of them is +the general habit of thought; they demand of the human spirit that it +shall transform men and the relations in which they live, and they +trust to it to prove itself stronger than the facts of life. + +But whence came the impulse to set up such high ideals of +civilization, and their confidence of being able to realise [pg 007] +them? It was from their view of the world (Weltanschauung). + +The Rationalist world-view is optimistic and ethical, its optimism +consisting in this, that it assumes as ruling in the world a general +purposive adaptation which is directed to the perfecting of the world, +and from this purposiveness the efforts of individual men and of +mankind to secure material and spiritual progress derive meaning and +importance and a guarantee of success. + +This world-view is ethical because it regards the ethical as something +in accordance with reason, and on that ground demands from man that, +putting egoistic interests behind him, he shall devote himself to all +ideals that are waiting for realization, taking the ethical as in +everything the standard by which to judge. A habit of humane thought +is for the Rationalists an ideal which they can be induced by no +consideration to resign. + +When at the close of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the +nineteenth the reaction against rationalism set in and criticism began +to play upon it, its optimism was reproached as being superficial and +its ethics as being sentimental. But the good it did, in spite of its +manifold imperfections, by inspiring men with ideals of civilization +grounded in reason, the spiritual movements which criticise it and +take its place cannot develop in the same way. The energy of thought +about civilization decreases imperceptibly but steadily. In proportion +as the world-view of rationalism is left behind, the feeling for +actuality makes its influence felt, until at last, from the middle of +the nineteenth century onwards, ideals are borrowed no longer from +reason but from actuality, and we therewith sink still further into a +state of uncivilization and lack of humanity. This is the clearest and +the most important of all the facts which can be established in the +history of our civilization. + +What has it to tell us? It tells us that there is a close connexion +between civilization and world-view. Civilization is the product of an +optimistic-ethical view of the world. [pg 008] Only in proportion as +the prevalent world-view is one which is world- and life-affirming and +at the same time ethical, do we find ideals of civilization put +forward and kept influential in the habits of thought of individuals, +and of society. + +That this inner relation between civilization and the world-view of +civilized peoples has never received the attention that it deserves, +is the result of there having been among us so little real meditation +on the essential nature of civilization. + +What is civilization? It is the sum total of all progress made by men +and mankind in every sphere of action and from every point of view, so +far as this progress helps towards the spiritual perfecting of +individuals as the progress of all progress. + +The impulse to strive for progress in all spheres of action and from +every point of view comes to men out of an optimistic world-view which +affirms the world and life to be something valuable in themselves, and +consequently bears within itself a compulsion to raise to its highest +possible value all that is, so far as it can be influenced by us. +Hence come will and hope, and effort directed to the improvement of +the condition of individuals and of society, of peoples and of +mankind. This leads to a lordship of the spirit over the powers of +Nature, to the completion of the religious, social, economic, and +practical grouping of men, and to the spiritual perfecting of +individuals and of the community. + +Just as the world- and life-affirming, that is, the optimistic +world-view is alone capable of stirring men to effort aimed at +promoting civilization, so in an ethical world-view alone is there +latent the power to make men, when putting aside and giving up +altogether their selfish interests, persevere in such effort for +civilization, and keep them always turned in the direction of the +spiritual and moral perfecting of the individual as the essential +object of civilization. Bound the one to the other, then, world- and +[pg 009] life-affirming world-view and ethics think out in harmony the +ideals of true, complete civilization and set to work at realizing +them. + +If civilization remains incomplete or its level falls, this rests in +the last resort on the fact that either the world- and +life-affirmation of the world-view, or its ethics, or both of them +have remained undeveloped or have gone backwards. And that is the case +with us. It is evident that the ethics required for civilization have +gone out of use. + +For decades we have been accustoming ourselves increasingly to measure +with relative ethical standards, and no longer to allow ethics to have +their say in all questions alike. This renunciation of consistent +ethical judgment we feel as an advance in practicality. + +But our world- and life-affirmation also have become shaky. The modern +man no longer feels under any compulsion to think about ideals of +progress and to will them. To a large extent he has come to terms with +actuality. He is much more resigned than he admits to himself, and in +one respect he is even outspokenly pessimistic. He does not really +believe any more in the spiritual and ethical progress of men and of +mankind, which is nevertheless the essential element in civilization. + +This stunting of our world- and life-affirmation and of our ethics has +its cause in the constitution of our world-view. In regard to this we +have since the middle of the nineteenth century been going through a +crisis. It is no longer possible for us to arrive at a conception of +the universe in which the meaning of the existence of men and of +mankind can be recognized, and in which, therefore, there are also +contained the ideals which flow from thoughtful world- and +life-affirmation and from ethical volition. We are falling more and +more into a condition of having no world-view at all, and from our +lack of that comes our lack of civilization. + +The great question for us is, therefore, whether we have to renounce +permanently the world-view which carries within it in all their +strength the ideals of the perfecting of men and of mankind, and of +ethical effort. If we succeed [pg 010] in establishing again a +world-view in which world- and life-affirmation is given in convincing +fashion, we shall become masters of the decay of civilization which is +in progress, and shall reach again a true and living civilization. +Otherwise we are condemned to see the wreck of all attempts to arrest +the degeneration. Only when the truth that renewal of civilization can +only come by a renewal of our world-view becomes a universal +conviction, and a new longing for a world-view sets in, shall we find +ourselves on the right path. But this is not yet in prospect. The +modern man is still without any correct feeling of the full +significance of the fact that he is living with an unsatisfactory +world-view, or without any at all. The unnatural and dangerous +character of this condition must first be brought home to his +consciousness, just as those persons who exhibit disturbances of the +stability of their nervous system have to be clearly told that their +vitality is threatened, although they feel no pain. Similarly, we have +to stir up the men of to-day to elementary meditation upon what man is +in the world, and what he wants to make of his life. Only when they +are impressed once more with the necessity of giving meaning and value +to their existence, and thus come once more to hunger and thirst for a +satisfying world-view, are the preliminaries given for a spiritual +condition in which we become again capable of civilization. + +But in order to learn the way to such a world-view we must see clearly +why the struggle undertaken by the European spirit to secure it was +for a time successful, but during the second half of the nineteenth +century came to an unfortunate end. + +Because our thinking is too little occupied with civilization it has +been insufficiently noticed that the most important part of the +history of philosophy is the history of man’s struggle for a +satisfactory world-view. Regarded in this light, the history unrolls +itself like a tragic drama. + + + + +[pg 011] + +CHAPTER II + +THE PROBLEM OF THE OPTIMISTIC WORLD-VIEW + + +The Western and the Indian conceptions of civilization + +FOR us Westerners civilization consists in this, that we work for the +perfecting of ourselves and of the world at the same time. + +But do the activities that are directed outwards and inwards +necessarily belong together? Cannot the spiritual and moral perfecting +of the individual, which is the ultimate aim of civilization, also be +secured if he works for himself only and leaves the world and its +circumstances to themselves? Who gives us any guarantee that the +course of the world can be influenced so as to promote the special aim +of civilization, viz., the perfecting of the individual? Who tells us +that it has any meaning at all which can be further developed? Is not +any action of mine which is directed on the world a diversion of what +could be directed on myself, though everything depends finally upon +the latter? + +Moved by these doubts the pessimism of the Hindus and that of +Schopenhauer refuse to allow any importance to the material and social +achievements, which form the outward and visible part of civilization. +About society, nation, mankind, the individual is not to trouble +himself; he is only to strive to experience in himself the sovereignty +of spirit over matter. + +This, too, is civilization, in that it pursues the final object of the +latter, viz., the spiritual and ethical perfecting of the individual. +If we Westerners pronounce it incomplete, we must not do so too +confidently. Do the outward progress of mankind and the inner +completion of the individual really belong together as we imagine them +to? Are we not, under an illusion, forcing together things which are +[pg 012] different in kind? Has the spirit in one kind of action +actually some gain for the other? + +What we set up as our ideal we have not realized. We lost ourselves in +outward progress, allowing the moralization and inward deepening of +the individual to come to a stop. So we have not been able to produce +practical proof of the correctness of our view of what civilization +is. We cannot, therefore, simply put aside that other narrower +conception, but must come to terms with it. + +There will come a time—it is already being prepared for—when +pessimistic and optimistic thought, which have hitherto talked past +each other almost as strangers, will have to meet for practical +discussion. World-philosophy is just dawning. It will shape itself in +a struggle as to whether its world-view shall be optimistic or +pessimistic. + +The struggle for the optimistic world-view + +The history of Western philosophy is the history of the struggle for +an optimistic world-view. If in antiquity and in modern times the +peoples of Europe have managed to produce a civilization, it is +because in their thought the optimistic world-view was dominant, and +held the pessimistic permanently in subjection, although it was not +able to suppress it altogether. + +The accessions of knowledge which have come in the course of our +philosophy have been nothing in themselves: they always stand in the +service of one world-view or the other, and attain only in it to their +real significance. + +But the characteristic thing about the way in which the settlement is +made on each occasion, is that it never is made openly. The two +world-views are never brought face to face and the case of each heard. +That the optimistic alone is in the right is a conviction which is +accepted as more or less self-evident. The only thing felt as a +problem is how to marshal all possible knowledge in the triumphal +procession of proof to defeat the other, and to knock on the head +anything that may still wish to rise in its defence. + +[pg 013] + +Since the pessimistic world-view has never made its presence properly +felt, Western thought manifests a lofty unwillingness to understand +it, though it has a splendid faculty for detecting it. Where it finds, +as in Spinoza, too little interest for activity directed upon the +world, it reacts immediately with rejection of it. Yet all objectively +thinking investigation of the reality of nature is disliked by it +because it may lead to the central position of the human spirit in the +world being insufficiently emphasised. It is because materialism seems +likely to be the last ally of pessimism that it carries on so +embittered a struggle against it. + +In the discussion of the problem of the theory of knowledge from +Descartes to Kant and beyond him it is really the cause of the +optimistic world-view which is being maintained. That is why the +theoretical possibility of a depreciation or a denial of the world of +sense is attacked with such obstinacy. By proving the ideality of +space and time Kant hopes to make finally secure the optimistic +world-view of rationalism with all its ideals and demands. Only so can +it be explained that the most acute examinations of the theory of +knowledge are carried through with the most naïve conclusions about +world-view. The great post-Kantian systems of thought, however much +they differ from one another in their subject-matter and the process +of the speculation with which they deal with it, are all united in +this, that they crown the optimistic world-view in their cloud-castles +as the ruler of the universe. + +To fit in the aims of mankind with those of the universe in a +logically convincing fashion, that is the endeavour in which European +philosophy serves the optimistic world-view. Anyone who does not help, +or who is indifferent about it, is an enemy. + +In its prejudice against scientific materialism philosophy was right. +Materialism has done much more to shake the position of the optimistic +world-view than Schopenhauer has, although it never proceeded against +it with outspoken hostility. When, after the collapse of the great +systems, [pg 014] it was allowed to seat itself at table with +philosophy, which had now become more modest, it even exerted itself +to find out in what sort of tone the latter would like the +conversation to be carried on. In dealing with Darwin and others, +philosophizing natural science made touchingly naïve attempts so to +extend and stretch out the history of zoological development which led +up to man, that mankind and with it the spiritual should appear again +as the goal of the world-process, as in the speculative systems. But +in spite of these well-meant efforts of the proletarian guest the +conversation could no longer be carried on in the old spirit. Of what +use was it for him to try to be better than his reputation? He brought +with him more respect for nature and facts than was consistent with +the convincing establishment of the optimistic world-view. He +therefore shook it, even when he did not intend to. + +To such a disregard of nature and science as was shown by the earlier +philosophy we can never return. Nor can we expect the return of a +system of thought which makes it possible to discover in any +convincing way in the universe the aims and objects of mankind, as was +allowed by the old methods. The optimistic world-view ceases, +therefore, to be self-evident to us, or to be demonstrable by the arts +of philosophy. It must give up the idea of finding for itself a solid +foundation. + +Optimism and Pessimism + +Confusion is caused by the fact that the optimistic and pessimistic +world-views seldom come forward in their purity in the history of +human thought. Their relations are usually such that the one is +predominant, while the other treats with it without being officially +recognized. In India a tolerated world- and life-affirmation maintains +for pessimism something of interest in the external civilization which +it nominally denies. With us pessimism slips in and gnaws at the +civilizing energies of the optimistic view, the result being that +belief in the spiritual progress of [pg 015] mankind has left us. From +it, too, comes the fact that we everywhere conduct the business of +life with lowered ideals. + +Pessimism is a lowered will-to-live, and is to be found wherever man +and society are no longer under the pressure of all those ideals of +progress which must be thought out by a will-to-live that is +consistent with itself, but have sunk to the level of letting +actuality be, over wide stretches of life, nothing but actuality. + +It is where pessimism is at work in this anonymous fashion, that it is +most dangerous to civilization. It attacks then the most valuable +ideas belonging to life-affirmation, leaving the less valuable ones +untouched. Like some concealed source of magnetic power it disturbs +the world-view’s compass, so that it takes, without suspecting it, a +wrong course. Thus the unavowed mixture of optimism and pessimism in +our thought has the result that we continue to approve the external +blessings given us by civilization, things which to thinking pessimism +are a matter of indifference, while we abandon that which alone it +holds to be valuable, the pursuit of inner perfection. The desire for +progress which is directed to objects of sense, goes on functioning +because it is nourished by actuality, while that which reaches after +the spiritual becomes exhausted, because it is thrown back upon the +inner stimulus which comes from the thinking will-to-live. As the tide +ebbs, objects which reach deep down are left stranded, while what is +just on the surface remains afloat. + +Our degeneration, then, traced back to our world-view and what +resulted from it, consists in true optimism having, without our +noticing it, disappeared from among us. We are by no means a race +weakened and decadent through excessive enjoyment of life, and needing +to pull ourselves together to show vigour and idealism amid the +thunderstorms of history. Although we have retained our vigour in most +departments of the direct activities of life, we are spiritually +stunted. Our conception of life with all that depends on it has been +lowered both for individuals and for the community. The higher forces +of volition and [pg 016] influence are impotent in us, because the +optimism from which they ought to draw their strength has become +imperceptibly permeated with pessimism. + +A characteristic feature of the presence at the same time of optimism +and pessimism as lodgers in “Thoughtless House” is that each goes +about in the other’s clothes, so that what is really pessimism gives +itself out among us as being optimism, and _vice versâ_. What passes +for optimism with the mass of people is the natural or acquired +faculty of seeing things in the best possible light. This illumination +of them is the result of a lowered conception of what ought to be now +and in the future. A person ill with consumption is brought by the +poison of the disease into the condition which is called Euphoria, so +that he experiences an imaginary feeling of health and strength. +Similarly there is an external optimism present in individuals and in +society just in proportion as they are, without realizing it, infected +with pessimism. + +True optimism has nothing to do with any sort of lenient judgement. It +consists in contemplating and willing the ideal in the light of a deep +and self-consistent affirmation of life and the world. Because the +spirit which is so directed proceeds with clear vision and impartial +judgement in the valuing of all that is given, it wears to ordinary +people the appearance of pessimism. That it wishes to pull down the +old temples in order to build them again more magnificently is by the +vulgar optimism put down to its discredit as sacrilege. + +The reason, then, why the only legitimate optimism, that of volition +inspired by imagination, has to carry on such a hard struggle with +pessimism is that it always has first to track the latter down in +vulgar optimism and unmask it. That is a task which optimism has never +finished, for so long as it allows the enemy to emerge in any shape +there is danger for civilization. When that happens, activity in +promoting the special aims of civilization always diminishes, even if +satisfaction with its material achievements remains as strong as +before. + +[pg 017] + +Optimism and pessimism, therefore, do not consist in counting with +more or less confidence on such or such a future for the existing +state of things, but in what the will desires to have as the future. +They are qualities not of the judgement, but of the will. The fact +that up to now that inadmissible definition of these qualities was +current side by side with the correct one, so that there were four +items to deal with instead of two, made the game easier for the +unthinking by deceiving us about what true optimism is. Pessimism of +the will they passed off as optimism of the judgement, and optimism of +the will they put aside as pessimism of the judgement. These false +cards must be taken from them, so that they may not continue to +deceive the world in such a fashion. + +Optimism, Pessimism, and Ethics + +In what relation do optimism and pessimism stand to ethics? + +That close and peculiar relations do exist between them is clear from +the fact that in the thought of mankind the two struggles, that for +optimistic or pessimistic world-view and that about ethics, are +usually involved in each other. It is the general belief that when one +is being fought out the other is being fought as well. + +This mutual connexion is very convenient for thought. When a +foundation for ethics is being laid, optimistic or pessimistic +arguments are unawares pressed into the service, and _vice versâ_ +ethical arguments when optimism or pessimism have to be established. +In this process Western thought lays most stress on justifying a +life-affirming ethical system, that is an activist one, and thinks +that merely by doing so it has proved the case for optimism in its +world-view. With Indian thought the most important thing is finding a +logical foundation for pessimism, and the justifying of a life-denying +ethical system, _i.e._ a passivist one, is rather a derivative from +that. + +The confusion which resulted from the two struggles for [pg 018] +optimism and pessimism and for ethics not being kept distinct, has +contributed almost more than anything else to prevent the thought of +mankind from attaining to clarity. + +It was an easy mistake to make. The question whether it is to be +affirmation or denial of life and the world, crops up in ethics in the +same way as in the dispute between optimism and pessimism. Things +which by their nature belong together feel themselves drawn together, +so that optimism naturally thinks it can support itself on an +affirmative ethical system, and pessimism thinks the same about a +negative one. Nevertheless, the result has hitherto always been that +neither of these two closely-related entities could stand firm, +because neither of them chose to depend on itself alone. + + + + +[pg 019] + +CHAPTER III + +THE ETHICAL PROBLEM + + +The difficulties of ethical perception + +HOW came mankind to think about morality and to make progress in that +sphere of thought? + +It is a picture of confusion that unrolls itself before the eyes of +anyone who undertakes a journey through the history of man’s search +for the ethical. The progress made in that sphere of thought is +inexplicably slow and uncertain. That the scientific view of the world +could be delayed in its rise and development is to a certain extent +intelligible, for its advance depended more or less on the chance of +there existing gifted observers, whose discoveries in the realm of the +exact sciences and the knowledge of nature was needed first, to +provide new horizons and to point out new paths for thought. + +But in ethics thought is thrown back entirely on itself: it has to do +only with man himself and his self-development, which goes on by a +process of causation from within. Why, then, does it not make better +progress? Just because man himself is the material which has to be +investigated and moulded. + +Ethics and æsthetics are the step-children of philosophy. They both +deal with a subject which is coy about submitting itself to reflexion, +for they both treat of spheres in which man exercises his purely +creative activities. In science man observes and describes the course +of nature, and tries to penetrate its mysteries. In practical matters +he uses and moulds it by applying what he has grasped of it outside +his own person. But in his moral and artistic activities he uses +knowledge and obeys impulses, [pg 020] perceptions, and laws which +originate in himself. To establish these firmly and to create ideals +from them is an undertaking which can be successful to a certain +extent only. Thought lags behind the material on which it exercises +itself. + +This is evident from the fact that the examples with which ethics and +æsthetics try to work upon reality are usually not quite consistent +and are often foolish. And how far from simple is whatever is laid +down in either this or that! How the assertions made contradict each +other! The guidance that an artist can get for his activities from the +best works on æsthetics is but small. Similarly, a business man who +seeks in a work on ethics advice as to how, in any given case, he is +to bring the demands of his business into harmony with those of +ethics, can seldom find any satisfactory information. + +The inadequacy in this respect of æsthetics is not of great importance +for the spiritual life of mankind. Artistic activity is always the +peculiar affair of individuals whose natural gifts develop more by the +actual production of works of art than by consideration of the +conclusions arrived at by æsthetic theorizing. + +With ethics, however, it is a matter of the creative activity of the +mass of men, an activity which is largely determined by the principles +which are current in the general thought of the time. The absence of +that progress which is still possible in ethics is something tragic. + +Ethics and æsthetics are not sciences. Science, as the description of +objective facts, the establishment of their connexion with one +another, and the drawing of inferences from them, is only possible +when there is a succession of similar facts to be dealt with, or a +single fact in a succession of phenomena, when, that is, there is a +subject matter which can be reduced to order under a recognized law. +But there is no science of human willing and doing, and there never +can be. Here there are only subjective and infinitely various facts to +be studied, and their mutual connexion lies within the mysterious +human ego. + +It is only the history of ethics that is scientific, and that [pg 021] +only so far as a history of man’s spiritual life is scientifically +possible. + +The importance of thought about ethics + +There is, therefore, no such thing as a scientific system of ethics; +there can only be a thinking one. Philosophy must give up the illusion +which it has cherished even down to the present day. As to what is +good and what is bad, and about the considerations in which we find +strength to do the one and avoid the other, no one can speak to his +neighbour as an expert. All that one can do is to impart to him so +much as one finds in oneself of that which ought to influence +everybody, though better thought out perhaps, and stronger and +clearer, so that noise has become a musical note. + +Is there, however, any sense in ploughing for the thousand and second +time a field which has already been ploughed a thousand and one times? +Has not everything which can be said about ethics already been said by +Lao-tse, Confucius, the Buddha, and Zarathustra; by Amos and Isaiah; +by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle; by Epicurus and the Stoics; by +Jesus and Paul; by the thinkers of the Renaissance, of the +“Aufklärung,” and of Rationalism; by Locke, Shaftesbury, and Hume; by +Spinoza and Kant; by Fichte and Hegel; by Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and +others? Is there a possibility of getting beyond all these so +materially contradictory convictions of the past to something new +which will have a stronger and more lasting influence? Can the ethical +kernel of the thoughts of all these men be collected into an idea of +the ethical, which will unite all the energies to which they appeal? +We must hope so, if we are not to despair of the fate of the human +race. + +Does thought about ethics bring more ethics into the world? The +confused picture offered us by the history of ethics is enough to make +one sceptical about it. On the other hand, it is clear that ethical +thinkers like Socrates, Kant, or Fichte had a moralizing influence on +many of their [pg 022] contemporaries. From every revival of ethical +reflexion there went forth ethical movements which made the +contemporary generation fitter for its tasks. If any age lacks the +minds which force it to reflect about the ethical, the level of its +morality sinks and with it its capacity for answering the questions +which present themselves to it. + +In the history of ethical thought we wander in the innermost circles +of world-history. Of all the forces which mould reality morality is +the first and foremost. It is the determining knowledge which we must +wring from thought. Everything else is more or less secondary. + +For this reason everyone who believes that he can contribute something +to help forward the ethical self-consciousness of society and of +individuals has the right to speak now, although it is political and +economic questions that the present day prescribes for study. For what +is inopportune is really opportune. We can accomplish something +lasting in the problems of political and economic life only if we +approach them as men who are trying to think ethically. All those who +help forward in any way our thought about ethics are working for the +coming of peace and prosperity to the world. They are engaged in the +higher politics, and the higher rational economics, and even if all +they can do is nothing more than to bring ethical thinking to the +fore, they have nevertheless done something valuable. All reflexion +about ethics has as one result a raising and rousing of the general +disposition to morality. + +The search for a basic principle of morality + +But however certain it is that every age lives by the energies which +have sprung from its thought about ethics, it is equally certain that +up to now the ethical thoughts which have become current have after a +longer or a shorter period lost their power of convincing. Why has the +establishment of an ethical system never met with more than a partial +and temporary success, and never been a permanency? Why is the history +of the ethical thinking of [pg 023] mankind the history of +inexplicable stoppages and fallings-back? Why has there been in this +sphere no organic progress which allows one period to build upon the +achievements of preceding ones? Why in the sphere of ethics do we live +in a town full of ruins, in which one generation builds for itself +here, and another there, what is absolutely necessary? + +“To preach morality is easy, to establish it is hard,” says +Schopenhauer, and that saying shows what the problem is. + +In every effort of thought about ethics there is to be seen, +distinctly or indistinctly, the search for a basic principle of +morality, which needs no support outside itself, and unites in itself +the sum total of all moral demands. But no one has ever succeeded in +really formulating this principle. Elements only of it were brought to +light and given out to be the whole, until the difficulties which +emerged destroyed the illusion. The tree, however finely it sprouted, +did not live to grow old, because it was unable to send its roots down +into the permanently nourishing and moisture-giving earth. + +The chaos of ethical views becomes to some extent intelligible as soon +as one sees that we are concerned with differing and mutually +contradictory views about fragments of the basic principle. The +contradiction has its foundation in their incompleteness. There is +ethical matter in what Kant objects to in the ethics of rationalism, +as also in what he puts in its place; in that part of Kant’s writings +where his conception of the moral is opposed by Schopenhauer, as also +in what is to take its place in the ethical system of the latter. +Schopenhauer is ethical in the points on which Nietzsche attacks him, +and Nietzsche is ethical in his opposition to Schopenhauer. What is +wanted is to find the fundamental chord in which the dissonances of +these varied and contradictory ethical ideas unite in producing +harmony. + +The ethical problem, then, is the problem of a basic principle of +morality, which is founded in thought. What is the common element of +good in the manifold goods which we feel to be such? Is there such a +universally valid [pg 024] conception of the good? If there is, in +what does it consist, and how far is it real and necessary for me? +What influence has it over my general disposition and my actions? Into +what relations with the world does it bring me? + +It is, then, on the basic principle of the moral that the attention of +thought has to be fixed. The mere giving of a list of virtues and +duties is like striking notes at random on the piano and thinking it +is music. And when we come to discuss the works of earlier moralists, +it is only the elements in them which can help the establishment of an +ethical system that will interest us, not the way in which any system +has been advocated. + +Otherwise there is no success for any attempt to bring order into +chaos. How utterly at sea Friedrich Jodl_(_2_)_ is in his history of +ethics, the most important existing work in this department, when he +tries to estimate the relative values of the various ethical +standpoints! Failing to judge them directly by their distance from an +initial basic principle of morality, he is unable to establish a +standard of comparison. He gives us, therefore, only a survey of +ethical views, and no history of the ethical problem. + +Religious and philosophical ethics + +When we come to look for the fundamental principle of morality, are we +concerned only with the direct attempts of philosophy to find it? No, +we are concerned with every kind, those of religion as well as others. +We must trace out the whole experience of mankind in its search for +the ethical. + +The raising of a dividing wall between philosophical ethics and +religious ethics is based on the mistaken idea that the former are +scientific and the latter non-scientific. But neither of them is +either: they are both alike merely thought; only one has freed itself +from acceptance of the traditional religious world-view, while the +other still maintains its connexion with it. + +[pg 025] + +The difference, however, is merely relative. Religious ethics appeal, +indeed, to a supernatural authority, but that is rather the form which +they assume. As a matter of fact, however high they rise, they still +seek to find an independent basic principle of morality. In every +religious genius there lives an ethical thinker, and every really deep +philosophical moralist is in some way or other religious. + +How indeterminate is the border-line is shown by Indian ethics. Are +they religious, or are they philosophical? Originating in the thought +of the priests, they claim to be a deeper exposition of the demands of +religion, but in essential nature they are philosophical. With the +Buddha and others, they venture to make the step from pantheism to +atheism, but without giving up their claim to be religious. Spinoza +and Kant, however, who are counted among philosophical moralists, do, +if we judge by the general direction of their thought, belong at the +same time to the religious ones. + +It all depends on a relative difference in methods of thought. The one +group works towards the basic principle of ethics by a more intuitive +process, the other by a process which is more analytical. It is the +depth, not the method of the thought, which decides the matter. The +more intuitive thinker produces his ethical thought like an artist who +with the production of an important work of art opens up new horizons. +In deep-reaching moral sayings like the beatitudes of Jesus the basic +principle of morality shines out. There comes progress in the +recognition of what is moral, even if the provision of a foundation +for it fails to advance in the same way. + +On the other hand, the searching for the basic principle of the moral +by the process of critical analysis may lead to an impoverished system +of ethics, because there runs through it the effort to take into +account only what is connected with the idea that seems to be what is +being sought for. That is why philosophical ethics are as a rule so +far behind practical ethics, and have so little direct influence. +While religious moralists in one mighty word can get down to the [pg +026] waters flowing far below the surface, philosophical ethics often +dig out nothing but a slight hollow in which a puddle forms. + +Nevertheless, it is rational thinking alone which is able to pursue +the search for the basic principle with perseverance and hope of +success. It must find it at last, if it only goes deep enough, and is +simple enough. + +The weakness of all ethics hitherto, whether philosophical or +religious, has lain in this, that they have not shown individuals how +to deal directly and naturally with reality. To a large extent they +merely talk “about it and about.” They do not touch a man’s daily +experience, and therefore they exert no permanent pressure upon him. +The result is lack of ethical thought, and mere platitudes about +ethics. + +The true basic principle of the ethical must be not only something +universally valid, but something absolutely elementary and inward, +which, once it has dawned upon a man, never lets him loose, which as a +matter of course runs like a thread through all his meditation, which +never lets itself be thrust aside, and which continually challenges +him to come to an understanding with reality. + +For centuries men who navigated the seas guided themselves by the +stars. In time they rose above this imperfect method through the +discovery of the magnetic needle, which by its natural principle of +activity pointed them to the north. Now they can tell where they are +in the darkest night on the most distant sea. That is the kind of +progress that we have to seek in ethics. So long as we have nothing +but an ethical system of ethical sayings, we direct our course by +stars, which, however brilliant their shining, give us only more or +less reliable guidance, and can be hidden from us by rising mist. +During a stormy night they leave mankind, as we know by recent +experiences, in the lurch. If, however, we have in our possession a +system of ethics as a principle which is a necessity of thought and +comes to clearness within ourselves, there begins a far-reaching +ethical deepening of individuals, and steady ethical progress in +mankind. + + + + +[pg 027] + +CHAPTER IV + +RELIGIOUS AND PHILOSOPHICAL WORLD-VIEWS + + +The world-views of the world-religions + +IN the world-religions we can see powerful attempts to establish an +ethical world-view. + +The religious thinkers of China, Lao-tse (born 604 B.C.), Kung-tse +(Confucius, 537-479 B.C.), Meng-tse (372-289 B.C.) and Chwang-tse +(fourth century B.C.), all try to ground the ethical in a world- and +life-affirming nature-philosophy. In so doing they arrive at a +world-view which, because it is optimistic-ethical, contains +incentives to inward and outward civilization. + +The religious thinkers of India also, the Brahmanic philosophers, the +Buddha (560-480 B.C.), and the Hindus, start, like the Chinese, from +thought about the existing world, _i.e._ from nature-philosophy. They +do not, however, take a world- and life-affirming view of it, but a +world- and life-denying one. Their world-view is pessimistic-ethical, +and contains, therefore, incentives to inward civilization only, not +to outward as well. + +Chinese religiousness, and Indian, recognize only a single +world-principle. They are monistic and pantheistic. Their world-view +has to solve the problem of how far we can recognize the original +source of the world as ethical, and how far, correspondingly, we +become ethical by the surrender to it of our will. + +In contrast to these monistic-pantheistic world-views we find +dualistic ones in the religion of Zarathustra (sixth century B.C.), in +that of the Jewish prophets (from the eighth century B.C. onwards), +and in those of Jesus and Mohammed, this last, however, showing itself +to be in [pg 028] all points unoriginal and decadent. These religious +thinkers do not start from an investigation of the existence which +manifests itself in the universe, but from a view of the ethical which +is quite independent of it. They put it in opposition to natural +happenings. Accordingly they assume the existence of two +world-principles, the natural and the ethical. The first is in the +world, and has to be overcome; the other is incorporated in an ethical +personality which is outside the world and has been given the final +authority in this sphere. + +If among the Chinese and the Hindus the basic principle of morality +was life in harmony with the world-will, so among dualists it is an +attempt to be something different from the world in harmony with an +ethical divine personality which is outside and above the world. + +The weakness of dualistic religions is that their world-view, because +it rejects every kind of nature-philosophy, is always naïve. Their +strength lies in the fact that they have the ethical within +themselves, directly present and with undiminished force. They have no +need to strain it and explain it, as monists have to, so as to be able +to conceive it as an effluence from the world-will which reveals +itself in nature. + +The world-views of the dualistic world-religions, taken as a whole, +are optimistic. They live in the confident belief that ethical force +will prove superior to natural, and so raise the world and mankind to +true perfection. Zarathustra and the older Jewish prophets represent +this process as a kind of world-reform. The optimistic element in +their world-view asserts itself in a quite natural way. They have the +will, and the hope of being able to transform human society and to +make the races of the world fit for their higher destiny. Progress in +any department of life means for them something gained, for they think +of inward and outward civilization together. + +With Jesus the value of the optimistic element in his world-view is +impaired by the fact that he looks forward to the perfected world as a +result of a catastrophic end to the natural one, and while with +Zarathustra and the older [pg 029] Jewish prophets the Divine +intervention is to a certain extent only the completion of the human +activities which have been directed to the perfecting of the world, it +is with Jesus the only thing which has to be taken into account. The +kingdom of God is to appear in a supernatural way; it is in no way +prepared for by any effort made by mankind to attain to civilization. + +The world-view of Jesus, because it is fundamentally optimistic, +accepts the ends aimed at by outward civilization. Being, however, +entangled in the expectation of the end of the world, it is +indifferent to all attempts made to improve the temporal, natural +world by a civilization which organizes itself on lines of outward +progress, and it busies itself only with the inward ethical perfecting +of individuals. + +Just in proportion, however, as the Christian world-view draws the +consequences of the world’s not coming to an end, and accepts the idea +that the kingdom of God must be established by a process of +development which transforms the natural world, it begins to +understand and be interested in the completing of social organization, +and in all such progress in outward civilization as contributes to it. +Then the optimistic element in the world-view can again work +unhindered side by side with the ethical. Thus we get an explanation +of the fact that Christianity, which in the ancient world showed +itself hostile to civilization, seeks in modern times with more or +less success to conduct itself as the world-view which is for progress +in every sphere of activity. + +The world-views of the world-religions and that of Western thought + +The questions which press for an answer from the world-religions in +their struggle to reach an ethical and an optimistic-ethical +world-view, are the same as those which present themselves to Western +philosophy also. The great problem is to think out a connexion between +the universe and ethics. + +[pg 030] + +The three types of world-view which show themselves in the +world-religions, recur also in Western philosophy. The latter, too, +attempts to find an ethical code either in a world- and +life-affirming, or in a world- and life-denying, nature-philosophy, or +it attempts, rejecting more or less completely all nature-philosophy, +to reach a world-view which is in itself ethical. Only, it at the same +time does its best to avoid acknowledging, and indeed to conceal, the +naïve and dualistic element which is inevitably encountered when this +last method of procedure is followed. + +The world-views, then, of the world-religions, and that of Western +philosophy, do not belong to different worlds, but stand in close +inward relations to one another. Further, the distinctions between a +religious world-view and a philosophical one is a quite superficial +one. The religious world-view which seeks to comprehend itself in +thought becomes philosophical, as is the case among the Chinese and +the Hindus. On the other hand a philosophical world-view which goes +really deep, assumes a religious character. + +Although Western thought does, in principle, approach the problem of +world-view without any presuppositions, it has not been able to keep +itself entirely from being influenced by religious world-views. From +Christianity it has received impulses of a decisive character, and the +attempt to convert the naïve-ethical world-view of Jesus into a +philosophical one has cost it more attention and effort than it admits +to itself. With Schopenhauer and his successors the pessimistic monism +of India finds expression, and it enriches their reflexion upon the +nature of the ethical. + +Thus the energies of all the great world-views stream into Western +thought, and through the co-operation of these varied forms of thought +and energy the latter is enabled to exalt into a universal conviction +the optimistic-ethical world-view which hovers before its mind, and +that too in a strength which it has never displayed in any previous +age or in any other part of the world. And that is why Western thought +has advanced farthest both in inward civilization and in outward. + +[pg 031] + +To give a real foundation to the optimistic-ethical world-view Western +thought is indeed as little able as any of the world-religions were, +and because the West experiences the problem of world-view in its most +universal and most pressing form it is the scene of the greatest +advances made by the civilized mind, but also of its greatest +catastrophes. It experiences portentous changes in its world-view, and +is familiar, too, with terrible periods when it has no world-view at +all. + +It is because our Western thought is so sensitive in both these +directions, that it reveals most clearly the questions and +difficulties amid which the search for an optimistic world-view moves. + +How far does the history of our thought give to us Westerners the +explanation of our fate? What road does it indicate to us as the best +for our future search after a world-view in which the individual can +find inwardness and strength, and mankind progress and peace? + + + + +[pg 032] + +CHAPTER V + +CIVILIZATION AND ETHICS IN THE GRÆCO-ROMAN PHILOSOPHY + + +The beginnings: Socrates. + +IN the seventh century before Christ the Greek spirit begins to free +itself from the world-view which underlay the traditional religion, +and undertakes the task of establishing another on a foundation of +knowledge and thought. + +First there comes a nature-philosophy, the result of investigation of +Being with reflexion upon what it really is. Then criticism begins its +work. Belief in the gods is found unsatisfying, not only because the +course of nature is not made intelligible by the rule of dwellers in +Olympus, but also because these personalities no longer answer to the +demands of feeling which is thoughtful and moral. These two elements, +nature-philosophy and criticism, are found united in Xenophanes and +Heraclitus in the sixth century B.C. + +In the course of the fifth century B.C. Sophists appear, and begin to +concern themselves critically with the accepted standards of value +current for social life and individual activities._(_3_)_ The result +is annihilating. The more moderate of these “Enlighteners” proclaim the +overwhelming majority of these standards which pass for moral to be +merely claims made by society on its members, leaving open thereby the +possibility that a small remainder may be able to prove themselves to +rational consideration as moral in [pg 033] themselves. But the +younger radical sophists maintain the position that all morality, like +all current law, has been invented by organized society in its own +interest. Hence the thinking man who is freeing himself from this +tutelage will make his own moral standards, and will follow in them +nothing but his own pleasure and interests. Thus Western philosophical +thought about the problem of ethics and civilisation starts with a +shrill dissonance. + +What was Socrates (470-399 B.C.) able to contribute, when he came +forward to oppose this tendency? + +In the place of the simply pleasurable he put the rationally +pleasurable. + +By rational consideration, he asserts, it is possible to establish a +standard of action in which the happiness of the individual, rightly +understood, is in harmony with the interests of society. Virtue +consists in right knowledge. + +That the rationally moral is that which procures for the agent true +pleasure, or, what means the same thing, true profit, Socrates draws +out into the most diverse applications in the simple everyday +discussions which Xenophon has transmitted to us in his +_Memorabilia_._(_4_)_ The dialogues of Plato show him going beyond +this primitive utilitarianism, and seeking a conception of the good +which has been made something inward and aims at the well-being of the +soul; which stands, too, in relationship with the beautiful._(_5_)_ +How much of these more advanced views are the Master’s own, and how +much of his own thoughts his pupil has in this way put into his mouth, +cannot now be decided. + +That Socrates spoke of an inner, mysterious voice, the “daimonion”, as +being the highest moral authority in man is indeed certain, for it is +mentioned in his indictment. His [pg 034] utilitarian rationalism is +therefore completed by a kind of mysticism. An empirical ethic, that +is, one established out of past experience and with a view to future +experience, and an intuitive ethic live in him side by side and +undistinguished from one another, to be separated later and developed +in contrast to one another in his pupils, the Cynics and Cyrenaics on +the one hand, and Plato on the other. + +Was Socrates at all conscious that with the bringing back of the moral +to that which is rationally pleasurable he builds the road only a +short way further, and stops exactly at the point where the real +difficulty makes its appearance, viz. that of defining the most +general content of the moral as given by reason? Or was he so simple +as to regard the general formula he had arrived at as the solution of +the difficulty? + +The confidence which he displays in all his public life leads us to +suppose the latter. In his unaffected simplicity lies his strength. In +that perilous hour when Western thought comes to the point of having +to philosophize about the moral in order to arrest the dissolution of +Greek society which has been begun by a body of unstable and +disputatious teachers, the wise man of Athens shatters all scepticism +by the mighty earnestness of his conviction that what is moral can be +determined by thought. Beyond that general statement he does not go, +but he is the source of that serious spirit in which antiquity after +his day busied itself with the problem. What would that ancient world +have become without him? + +Characteristic for this prologue to Western philosophizing about the +moral is the indifference with which Socrates stands outside the +philosophic efforts to reach a complete world-view. He troubles +himself neither about the results of natural science, nor about +inquiries into the nature of knowledge, but is busied simply with man +in his relation to himself and to society. Lao-tse, Confucius, the +Indian philosophers, the Jewish prophets, and Jesus seek to comprehend +ethics as somehow or other derived from, or [pg 035] forming part of, +a world-view. Socrates gives them no foundation but themselves. On +this stage, which has no scenery to form a background, there will +appear in succession to him the utilitarians of every age. + +And here a remarkable prospect opens to us. To all efforts to +determine the content of the moral more help is afforded by the ethic +which keeps clear of all connexion with a complete world-view than by +any other. Such an ethic is the most practical. And yet this isolation +is unnatural. The idea that ethics are rooted in a complete +world-view, or must find their completion in one—that is, the idea +that one’s relations to one’s fellow-men and to society are in the +last resort rooted in some relation to the world—never loses its +natural claim. Hence again and again—already in Plato, then in +Epicurus and in the Stoic philosophy—ethics feel the need of again +connecting themselves with world-view, and the same process continues +in modern thought. But the practical search for the content of the +ethical remains the prerogative of those who are busied with ethics in +themselves. + +In Socrates the ethical mysticism of devotion to the inner voice takes +the place of the complete world-view, which was in future to be the +foundation of the ethical determination of mankind. + +Epicureanism and Stoicism. The Ethic of Resignation + +Three tasks were left by Socrates to his successors: to determine more +exactly the content of the rationally useful; to give the world the +most universal general-notion of the good; and to think ethics into a +complete world-view. + +What conclusions are come to by those who concern themselves with the +first question, and seek to determine the rationally useful from a +corresponding experience of pleasure? + +As soon as the notion of pleasure is brought into connexion with +ethics it shows disturbances, as the magnetic [pg 036] needle does in +the neighbourhood of the poles. Immediate pleasure shows itself as +incapable in every respect of being reconciled with the demands of +ethics, and it is therefore given up. Lasting pleasure is called on to +take its place, but this retreat does not suffice. Lasting pleasure, +interpreted seriously, can be nothing but pleasure of the mind. Even +this position, however, is not tenable. Reflexion upon the ethic which +is to produce happiness sees itself compelled at last to give up the +positive notion of pleasure in any form. It has to reconcile itself to +the negative notion which conceives pleasure as somehow or other a +liberation from the need of pleasure. Thus the individualistic, +utilitarian ethic, also called Eudæmonism, destroys itself as soon as +it ventures to be consistent. This is the paradox which reveals itself +in the ethics of antiquity. + +Instead of coming to maturity in the following generations, the +ethically-rational life-ideal put forward by Socrates succumbs to an +incurable decline, because the notion of pleasure, which lives in it, +denies itself as soon as it makes any attempt to think itself out. + +Aristippus (_c._ 435-355 B.C.), the founder of the Cyrenaic school, +Democritus of Abdera (_c._ 450-360 B.C.), the author of the atomic +theory, and Epicurus (341-270 B.C.) seek to retain as much as possible +of the positive notion of pleasure. The Cynic school of Antisthenes +(born _c._ 440 B.C.), and the Stoicism which originated with Zeno, a +native of Kittium in Cyprus (_c._ 336-264 B.C.), keep from the very +beginning to the negative notion._(_6_)_ But the final result is the +same with both. Epicurus sees himself compelled at last to exalt the +[pg 037] absence of desire for pleasure as being itself the purest +pleasure, landing thereby on the shore of resignation where the Stoics +take their exercise. The fundamental difference between the two great +philosophical schools of antiquity does not lie in what they offer to +men as ethical. About what the “wise man” does and leaves undone, they +both frequently express themselves in the same way. What separates +them is the world-view with which their ethic is combined. +Epicureanism accepts the atomistic materialism of Democritus, is +atheistic, asserts that the soul perishes, and is in every respect +irreligious. Stoicism is pantheistic. + +With Epicurus and Zeno ethics no longer trust themselves, as with +Socrates, to maintain an independent existence. They see the necessity +of attaching themselves to some sort of world-view. Travelling along +this road, Epicurus is guided solely by the effort after veracity. He +leaves the talking to the purely scientific knowledge of the world, +not allowing ethics to join in the investigation of Being and +introduce into it what might be of advantage to itself. How poor, or +how rich, it will finally become is to him a matter of indifference. +The one thing he is concerned about is that the world-view be a true +one, and therein lies the greatness of Epicurus with its claim to our +respect. + +Stoicism seeks to satisfy the need for an inward, stable world-view; +like the Chinese monists it tries to find a meaning in the world. It +tries to widen out the ethical rationalism of Socrates into cosmic +rationalism. The moral is to show itself to be conduct agreeable to +the pronouncements of world-reason. + +Stoicism has a vision of an optimistic-ethical affirmation of life, +grounded in the nature of the cosmos, but it fails to reach it. It is +not untutored enough to acquiesce in the ethical simplicity of a +nature-philosophy such as can be seen in Lao-tse and in the older +philosophical Taoism. It is ever struggling to discover in +world-reason the notion of purposive activity, and is ever mercilessly +thrust back upon that of activity pure and simple. Hence the ethic +with which it is operating never has a sufficiently universalist [pg +038] character to let it form a natural connexion with world-reason. +As might be expected from its origin, it is dominated by the problem +of pleasure and not-pleasure, and therefore no longer possesses any +efficacious instinct for effort. Its horizons, because still +determined by the questions arising out of ancient citizenship and the +ancient city-state, are narrow. It is, therefore, not advanced enough +to engage in thought on nature-philosophic lines, concerned with both +the world and man, although it does feel the inner necessity for doing +so. + +The vacillation which is characteristic of Stoicism comes, then, from +the fact that the results it attains to do not match its aspirations, +but are much poorer than the latter. The spirit of antiquity tries to +find an optimistic-ethical life-affirmation in nature-philosophy, and +to find in it also the justification of those instincts for reliable +activity which it has possessed since the days when it was entirely +untutored, but it cannot do so. Whenever it acknowledges what has +happened it sees clearly that thinking about the universe leads only +to resignation, and that a life in harmony with the world means quiet +surrender to being carried along in the flood of world-happenings, +and, when the hour comes, sinking into it without a murmur. + +Stoicism talks, it is true, with deep earnestness of responsibility +and duty, but since it cannot draw either from nature-philosophy or +from ethics a well-established and living notion of activity, it shows +us in these words nothing but beautiful corpses. It is impotent to +command anything whatever that is bound up with voluntary activity +which is conscious of its aim. Again and again evidence breaks through +that its thinking has been pushed aside on to the track of passivity. +Nature-philosophy only provides the cosmic background for the +resignation to which ethics have come. The ideal which gives life to +Chinese Monism, of the perfecting of a world through ethical and +ethically organized mankind, is not really discerned, much less +securely grasped. + +One watches with dismay the shaping of the fate of [pg 039] ancient +ethics in Epicureanism and Stoicism. In place of the vigorous +life-affirming ethic which Socrates expects from rational thinking, +resignation steps in. An inconceivable impoverishment takes place in +the representation of the moral. The notion of action cannot be worked +out to completion. Even so much of it as, thanks to tradition, still +survives in the simple thought-methods of the Greek world in general, +is lost. + +The ancient Greek was more citizen than man. Active devotion to the +cause of the community was to him a matter of course. Socrates +presupposes it. In the conversations which Xenophon hands down to us +in the _Memorabilia_ he is ever insisting on it that the individual +must improve himself in order to become an active citizen. The natural +course would have been that the thought which originated with him +should deepen this mentality by setting before it the highest social +aims. It was, however, never at all in a position to maintain the +mentality as it received it. More and more it leads the individual to +withdraw himself from the world and from all that goes on in it. + +By a never-ceasing process of change the ethics of Greek thought +become in Epicureanism and Stoicism ethics of decadence. Not being +capable of producing ideals of progressive development for collective +bodies, they are also impotent to become really ethics of +civilization. In place of the ideal of the man who works for +civilization they set the ideal of the “wise man.” It is only the +inward individual civilization of refined and reflective +self-liberation from the world that now floats before its eyes, but +this in all its depth. + +It is true that there is power in the preaching of resignation which +ancient thought, now become knowing about life, allows to go forth to +mankind. Resignation is the lofty porch through which one enters upon +ethics. But Epicurus and the Stoics stop in this porch. Resignation +becomes for them an ethical world-view. Hence they are incapable of +leading ancient society from its untutored life- and world-affirmation +to one based on thought. + +[pg 040] + +The conception of the rationally pleasurable, which was the legacy of +Socrates, is not productive enough to keep a world alive. It is +impossible to develop out of it the ideas of a utilitarianism directed +to the welfare of the community, although he believed he found them in +it. Ethical thought remains confined within the circle of the +self-regarding. Every attempt to ennoble the rationally pleasurable +ends in life-affirmation changing into life-denial. On this logical +fact was wrecked the ancient West, which, after the critical awakening +of the Greek spirit, could have been saved only by means of a +reflective optimistic-ethical world-view. It was able to develop +seriously what Socrates gave it, but not to make it capable of +producing life and civilization. + +Plato’s abstract basic principle of the ethical. The ethic of +world-negation + +Plato, too (427-347 B.C.), and Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), the two great +independent thinkers of antiquity, are incapable of producing an ethic +of action, and so giving civilization a firm foundation. + +Plato seeks the general notion of the Good, but he abandons the path +which was pointed out, even if not followed to the end, by Socrates, +viz. the determination of it by a process of induction. He gives up +trying to arrive at the nature of the Good by considerations of the +kind, the object, and the results of action, that is to say, by its +content. He wants to establish it by a purely formal process, by +abstract logical thinking. + +In order to arrive at an ethic he uses a detour through the theory of +ideas. All similar phenomena, he says, are to be conceived of as +varying copies of an original—to express which he uses the word +“idea.” In trees there is to be seen the idea of tree, in horses, that +of horse. The idea does not come to us, as we are inclined to think, +by our abstracting from trees the idea of tree, and from horses that +of horse. We have it within us already. It originates, not in our [pg +041] experience of the empirical world but in the recollection which +our soul brought with it from the supra-sensuous, pure world of ideas, +when it began its existence in a body. In the same way we have brought +with us the idea of the Good. + +Thus in a tortured doctrine which is disfigured everywhere with +fancies and obscurities, Plato tries to found ethics on a theory about +the character of our knowledge of the world of sense, and he is +encouraged to this undertaking by the consideration that it is not +from reflexion that we obtain our conception of the Beautiful, which +is closely allied with that of the Good: we bring that conception also +with us, ready made. + +Plato is the first of all thinkers who feels that the presence of the +ethical idea in man is what it is: something profoundly puzzling. That +is his greatest distinction. Hence he cannot profess to be satisfied +with the attempt of the historic Socrates to explain the Good as that +which is rationally pleasure-giving. It is clear to him that it is +something unconditional, with a compelling force of its own, and to +preserve for it this character seems to him, as later to Kant, to be +the great task of thought. + +But what is the result of his undertaking? A fundamental principle for +ethics which is devoid of content. In order to secure its lofty +character it is allowed to be born of abstract considerations in the +country of the supra-sensuous. It can, therefore, never find itself at +home in reality and become familiar with it, nor can any rules for +concrete ethical conduct be developed from it. Thus Plato, when he +treats practically of ethics, is compelled to abide by the chief +virtues, as popularly conceived. In the _Republic_ he names four of +them: wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice, and he founds them not +on his general idea of the Good, but on his psychology. + +But the characteristic ethic of Plato has nothing whatever to do with +such virtues. If the conception of the Good is supra-sensible and the +immaterial world is the only real one, then it is only thought and +conduct which deal with the [pg 042] immaterial that can have any +ethical character. In the world of appearance there is nothing of +value to be made actual. Man is simply compelled to be an impotent +spectator of its shadow-play. All willing must be directed to enabling +oneself to turn away from this, and get sight of that true activity +which goes on in the light. + +The true ethic, then, is world-negation. To this view Plato was +committed the moment he allowed the ethical to find its home in the +world of pure Being. Thoughts of ascetic inactivity find expression in +him side by side with the Greek feeling for reality, and it is +confusing that he does not recognize the conflict between them, but +speaks now in one sense, now in the other. His ethic is a chaos, and +he himself an expert in inconsistency. + +Plato’s ethic of world-denial is not an original creation; he takes it +over in the Indian setting in which it is offered to him by Orphism +and Pythagoreanism. By what route there found its way into Greek +thought this pessimism which has been thought out to a system and +provided with the doctrine of re-incarnation, we do not know, and +shall probably never learn. The presence side by side in Greek thought +of an artless optimism and a mature pessimism will always remain for +us the great puzzle of Greek civilization. But if the pessimism had +not been there, Plato must have introduced it. The abstract basic +principle of morality which he adopts in order to preserve the +absolute character of morality which he was the first to pronounce to +be a necessity, precludes any other content than that of the denial of +the sensible world and of natural life. + +Aristotle. Instruction about virtue in place of ethics + +Plato’s fate alarms Aristotle. He refuses to soar to the heights where +Plato lost himself. How then does he fare? + +His object is the establishment of a serviceable ethic which is in +harmony both as to extent and content with reality. What he +accomplished lies before us in the [pg 043] so-called _Nicomachean +Ethics_, the comprehensive work which he composed for the benefit of +his son, Nicomachus. The general thought of Socrates, that ethics are +a striving after happiness, he acknowledges. But at the same time he +makes quite clear his opinion that the part played by activity in +ethics must be a much more important one than is given to it in Plato +or in the other post-Socratics. Aristotle feels that the crux of the +question is the conception of activity, and this he wants to save. He +therefore avoids Plato’s paths of abstract thinking, and rejects the +ethic of pleasure and not-pleasure over which the Cyrenaics and Cynics +work so hard. In his ethical thinking the vitality of the ancient +world tries to find expression. + +In magnificent fashion he lays down the pre-suppositions which are +necessary for the carrying through of his undertaking. He finds the +motive to activity in the conception of pleasure, a thing he can do +because his whole philosophy has indeed for its aim and object the +conceiving of Being as formative activity. Hence the essential element +in human nature also is activity. Happiness is to be defined as +activity in accordance with the law of excellence. Rational pleasure +is experience of the perfecting of one’s activity. + +Starting from the conception of pleasure which experiences itself as +activity, Aristotle is on the way to comprehend ethics as deepened +life-affirmation, and to attack the problem of leading the ancient +world up from a naïve and unreflecting world-affirmation to a thinking +one. But on the way he diverges from the high-road. + +When he has to ask the decisive question as to what make activity +moral, he shrinks from discussing the problem of the basic principle +of the moral. Ethics are not some sort of knowledge which gives a +content to activity, he says in opposition to Socrates. The content of +the will is already given. No reflexion and no knowledge can put +anything new into it, or alter it. + +Ethics consist, then, not in a guiding of the will by aims and objects +which knowledge puts before it, but in the will’s [pg 044] own +regulation of itself. The right thing to do is to establish the +correct balance between the different elements in the given contents +of the will. Left to itself, the latter rushes to extremes. Rational +reflexion keeps it in the correct middle path. Thus brought to a state +of harmony, human activity can be conceived as motived and ethical. +Virtue, therefore, is readiness to observe the correct mean which is +to be acquired by practice. + +Instead of creating an ethic, Aristotle contents himself with a +doctrine of virtue. This depreciation of the ethical is the price he +pays in order to reach an ethic which ends neither in the abstract nor +in resignation. While he shirks the problem of the basic principle of +the moral, he still remains able to establish an ethic of activity, +though the latter contains indeed no live forces, only dead ones. + +Aristotle’s ethic is therefore an æsthetic of the impulses of the +will. It consists in a catalogue of virtues and in the demonstration +that they are to be conceived as a mean. Thus courage lies between +rashness and cowardice, temperance between sensuality and +insensibility, truthfulness between boastfulness and irony,_(_7_)_ +liberality between prodigality and avarice, high-mindedness between +conceit and small-mindedness, gentleness between quarrelsomeness and +characterless good-nature. + +On this excursion through the field of the ethical, there open up many +interesting views. In an acute and living discussion Aristotle lets +his readers survey the questions of the relations of man to his +fellow-men and to society. How much that is deep and true there is in +the chapter on moral excellence and in that on friendship! How he +wrestles with the problem of justice! + +No one can fail to feel the charm of the _Nicomachean Ethics_. There +is revealed in them a noble personality with abundant experience of +life, depicted with a magnificent simplicity. But just in proportion +as the method followed [pg 045] is advantageous technically, it is +valueless in itself. The ethical is reconciled with reality without +having first tried to come to clear understanding of itself. It is in +this reconciliation that the understanding is to be found, so +Aristotle thinks, but he is mistaken. His mind is seduced through his +having observed that some virtues—but even these more or less under +compulsion—allow themselves to be conceived as real means between two +extremes, and he is misled into developing on these lines the whole of +his ethical system. + +But a more or less natural quality, which in ordinary speech is called +a virtue, is one thing, virtue in the really ethical sense is another. +The middle quality between prodigality and avarice is not the ethical +virtue of liberality, out the quality of rational economy. The middle +quality between rashness and cowardice is not the ethical virtue of +courage, but the quality of rational prudence. The combination of two +qualities only produces a single one. But virtue, in the ethical +sense, means a quality guiding itself by an ideal of self-perfection, +and being serviceable for some object which looks towards the +universal. Liberality as an ethical virtue means a process of spending +which serves some object recognized by the person practising it as +valuable in principle, and in such a way that any natural tendency to +prodigality, should there be such in the giver, plays no part, while +the tendency to avarice is paralysed. + +Devotion of one’s property or one’s life to an object which is +valuable in principle is under all circumstances ethical, while +prodigality and avarice, rashness and cowardice as simple qualities +not inspired by any higher aim have never any ethical character; they +are merely something natural. Whether the devotion of one’s property +or of one’s life for an object valuable in principle is made more +completely than need be or exactly to the extent required by the +circumstances, does not alter in any way the ethical character of the +decision and the action. Such excess or defect only shows how much or +how little the ethical will has allowed [pg 046] itself to be at the +same time influenced by considerations of prudence. + +Aristotle’s representation, then, rests on the fact that he allows +virtue in ordinary speech and virtue in the ethical sense to get mixed +up. He smuggles in the really ethical, and then offers it as the +resultant of two natural qualities, each of which is an extreme. + +In the chapter on temperance—_Ethics_, Bk. III., 10—he has to allow +that the theory which makes the ethical a mean between two extremes +cannot be carried through completely. The love of beauty, he says +plainly, however strong it becomes, remains what it is; there can +never be any question of excess. He throws out this admission without +seeing that he thereby undermines his feeble definition of the ethical +as the appropriate relative mean, and, like Socrates and Plato, +acknowledges that there can be something which its content allows to +be reckoned as good in itself. + +Aristotle is so firmly resolved not to let himself be entangled in the +problem of the basic principle of ethics, that he will allow nothing +to lead him to the discussion of it. He means to voyage along the +coast, keep to facts, and deal with ethics as if they were a branch of +natural science. Only he forgets that in science we can confine +ourselves to venturing from definite given happenings through +hypotheses to the nature of the Being which lies behind them, while in +ethics, on the contrary, we have to establish a basic principle +through the application of which we secure our happenings. + +It is because he misunderstands their nature that Aristotle cannot +help ethics forward. Plato rides off over the head of Socrates and +loses himself in abstractions. Aristotle, in order to maintain the +connexion with reality goes down below Socrates. He brings together +material for a monumental building, and runs up a wooden shack. Among +teachers of virtue he is one of the greatest. Nevertheless, the least +of those who venture on the search for the basic principle of the +ethical, is greater than he. + +[pg 047] + +Ethical theory is no more ethics than cartilage is bone. But how +strange is this inability to establish the basic principle of ethical +action which Socrates regarded as the certain, and from the very first +sure and certain, product of thoughtful reflexion on the ethical! Why +do all the ancient thinkers who in succession to Socrates search for +it, always miss it? Why does Aristotle cease to concern himself with +it, and so condemn himself to a doctrine of virtue in which, as a +matter of fact, there is hardly any more living ethical force than +there is in the abstract ethical system of Plato or in the ethics of +resignation of the rest? + +The Ideal of the Civilized State in Plato and Aristotle + +How little Plato and Aristotle are capable of establishing an ethic of +action can be seen from the way in which they sketch their ideal of +the civilized State. Plato develops his in the _Republic_, Aristotle +his in the _Politics_. At this very time, Mencius (Meng-tse) is +putting before the princes of China a doctrine of the civilized State. + +That the State must be something more than a union which regulates in +the most practical way the common life of a number of persons whom +natural conditions compel to depend upon one another, is quite clear +to both of them. They also agree in demanding that the State shall +promote the true prosperity of its citizens. This is, however, +unthinkable and impossible without virtue, and the State must +therefore develop into an ethical institution. “Honourable and +virtuous conduct is the object which the political community aims at,” +is the way Aristotle puts it. + +The State, which is given by history, is therefore to come under the +influence of a representation of its nature as a political body which +is both ethical and rational. In the _Republic_ Plato puts in the +mouth of Socrates the following sentiment: “Unless it happen that +either philosophers acquire the kingly power in States, or those who +are to-day called kings and potentates cultivate philosophy truly and +sufficiently, and thus political power and philosophy [pg 048] become +as one . . . there can be no deliverance from evil for States, nor +ever, so I think, for the human race” (Bk. V, 473, C and D). + +When, however, it comes to a more detailed carrying out of the ideal +of the civilized State, Plato and Aristotle betray remarkable +embarrassment. First of all, their vision of the State of the future +is not that of a community which embraces a whole nation, but is +always just a copy of the Greek city-republic with appropriate +improvements. That they think out their ideal within such narrow +limits is historically intelligible, but for the development of the +philosophical idea of the civilized State it is deplorable. + +One result of these narrow limits is that both are anxiously concerned +to provide that the well-being of the city-republic shall not be +endangered by the increase of the population. The number of the +inhabitants is to be kept as far as possible always near the same +figure. Aristotle is not frightened by the proposal that weakly +children shall be allowed to die of hunger, and that unborn children +shall be got rid of by intentional abortion. That the Spartan State, +on the contrary, regards the increase of the population as desirable, +and exempts a citizen from all imposts as soon as he has four +children, does not seem to him to be reasonable. + +Again, just as these two thinkers cannot work themselves up to a +general idea of a national State, so they are unable to reach the idea +of mankind. They make a strict line of division between the unfree on +the one side, and the free on the other. The former they regard merely +as creatures made for work, who are to maintain the material +well-being of the State. What becomes of them as human beings is to +them a matter of very little interest. Such beings as they are not +meant to have any share in the growth towards perfection which is to +be brought about by means of the civilized State. + +Slavery was, indeed, attacked now and again by the Sophists from their +point of view, not, however, on the [pg 049] ground of humanity but +from a desire to raise doubts about the accepted justification of +existing institutions. Aristotle defends it as a natural arrangement, +but recommends kindly treatment. + +Artisans, and in general all who earn their living by the labour of +their hands, are not to be allowed to be citizens. “One cannot +practise virtue, if one leads the life of an artisan, or of one who +labours for pay,” says Aristotle. An ethical valuation of labour as +such is still something unknown to him, even though he conceives of +happiness as “activity in accordance with the law of excellence.” +Plato and he are still entirely under the influence of the ancient +view that only the “free” man can have full value as a man. + +In details of the ideal of the State, however, the two part company, +and Aristotle argues against Plato, though, unfortunately, just those +parts of the _Politics_ in which he sketches his ideal State have not +come down to us complete. The main difference is that Aristotle keeps +closer than Plato to the historically given. He builds his State upon +the family; Plato makes the State into a family. In his _Republic_ the +free men live with property, wives, and children owned in common. They +are to possess nothing as their own, so that they may not by private +interests be held back from working for the general welfare. Moreover, +the general welfare allows the State to breed its citizens +systematically. He prescribes the connections which men and women are +to form, and permits only such as allow the expectation of a new +generation which is sound both in body and mind. The offspring of +unions not approved by the authorities are either to be killed before +birth, or got rid of by starvation. + +Aristotle contents himself with guaranteeing the quality of the +offspring by legal regulation of the age for marriage. Women may get +married at eighteen, men not till they are thirty-seven. Moreover, +marriages are to take place preferably in winter, and as far as +possible, when the wind is in the north. + +[pg 050] + +In what, then, does the good consist which is to be realized by this +civilized State? To this decisive question Aristotle and Plato have in +reality only the answer that it is meant to make it possible for a +number of its members, viz. the “free” men, to devote themselves +entirely to their own bodily and mental culture free from care about +material things, and to take the lead in public affairs. It is not +established with a view to the production of anything ethical in any +deeper sense, nor for the sake of an ideal of progress on lines which +could be described as in any sense great and noble. Nowhere do the +characteristic limitations of ancient ethics reveal themselves so +clearly as in the poverty of their ideal of the State. + +The ethical valuation of man as man has not yet been reached. Hence +the State has for its object, not the growth to perfection of all, but +only that of a particular class. + +The nation, too, is not yet recognized as a great entity both natural +and ethical, and therefore no consideration is given to the question +of uniting the various city communities for the joint pursuit of +higher objects. Each remains isolated. Plato thinks he has satisfied +the claims produced by membership of the same nation by requiring that +in wars waged by Greek States against one another the houses shall not +be destroyed nor the fields laid waste, as if the war were against +barbarians. + +The idea of humanity as a whole has not yet come in sight. It is, +therefore, not possible for Plato and Aristotle to make their State +work in co-operation with others to promote the general progress of +mankind. + +They therefore establish their civilized State on a type which is +hemmed in in every direction by narrow horizons. Moreover, the +political community which they adopt as the type is at the very time +when they are writing already a dying entity. While Aristotle is +writing his _Politics_, his pupil, Alexander the Great, is founding an +empire, and Rome is beginning to subject Italy to her rule. + +More important still than all external faults in their ideal [pg 051] +of the civilized State is the fact that these two thinkers are unable +to introduce into the community the energies which are needed for its +maintenance. The idea of the civilized State is present with the +vitality needed, only when the individual is by the impulse contained +in his world-view moved so far as to devote himself to organized +society with enthusiastic activity. Without civic idealism no +civilized State! But to assume anything of that kind in the members of +their State is impossible for Plato and Aristotle, since both have +already reached the ideal of the wise man who withdraws himself +prudently and gracefully from the world. + +Plato admits this. His wise citizens who are destined to be rulers +devote themselves to the service of the State only when their turn +comes, and are glad when they are set free and can again in retirement +busy themselves, as wise among wise, with the world of pure Being. + +Aristotle, when he raises in the _Politics_ the question whether the +contemplative life is not to be preferred to that of political +activity, decides in theory in favour of the latter. “It is a +mistake,” he says, “to value inactivity higher than activity, since +happiness consists in activity.” But in the doctrine of virtue in the +_Nicomachean Ethics_ there is nothing which could lead the individual +to place his life at the service of the community. + +Plato and Aristotle cherish undoubtedly the ancient conviction that +the individual ought to devote himself to the State, but they cannot +find a foundation for it in their world-view. Like Epicurus and the +adherents of the Porch, they are under the spell of an ethic in which +there is present no will to attempt a transformation of the world. + +How much greater than the two Greeks is Mencius, when he is thinking +out the ideal of the civilized State! He can make it as large as he +likes and take men into its service with their best thoughts, because +it results in the most natural way from a large-scale world-view of +ethical activity. + +Plato and Aristotle, lacking such a world-view, can do no more than +guess at the nature of a civilized State, and invent one for +themselves. Plato’s _Republic_ is a mere [pg 052] curiosity. +Aristotle’s _Politics_ is valuable, not on account of the theory of +the civilized State which is there presented, but only for his +magnificent practical analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of +the various State-constitutions, and of their economic problems. + +The decadence of antiquity does not begin, then, with the suppression +of the individual by the Empire, and its destruction of the normal +mutual relations between the individual and the community. It sets in +immediately after Socrates, because the ethical thinking which started +with him cannot really lead the individual beyond himself, and set him +as an effective force in the service of the moralization and the +perfecting of social relations. + +There is no middle term between the ethic of enthusiasm and that of +resignation. But an ethic of resignation cannot think out, much less +bring into existence, a system of social relations which can be called +really civilized. + +Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius + +“In imperial times Stoicism shrivels up into a moralizing popular +philosophy” is what we are usually told in treatises about ancient +philosophy. As a matter of fact what we have to deal with is by no +means a shrivelling up, but a serious struggle for a living ethic +which begins unexpectedly in the later period of Græco-Roman thought, +and leads to an optimistic-ethical nature-philosophy. + +The pillars of this movement are L. Annæus Seneca (4 B.C.—A.D. 65), +Nero’s teacher, who at the command of his pupil had to open his veins; +the Phrygian slave, Epictetus (born _c_. A.D. 50), who in A.D. 94 was +with all philosophers banished from Rome by Domitian; the Emperor +Marcus Aurelius (A.D. 121-180) who, brought up by pupils of Epictetus, +defends the Empire at a time of great danger, and writes his +philosophical _Meditations_ while in camp._(_8_)_ + +[pg 053] + +In their classical period Greek ethics offer us either egoistic +considerations of advantage, or cold doctrines of virtue, or ascetic +renunciation of the world, or resignation. In whichever direction they +turn, they never lead men out beyond themselves. + +In Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius, they lose this +self-regarding character. Renouncing the spirit of the earlier time +they develop to an ethic of universal brotherhood, and busy themselves +with the immediate, altruistic relations of man to man. + +Whence comes this understanding for humanity, which is never seen in +classical antiquity? + +The older Greek moralists are concerned with the State. Their interest +is absorbed in the maintenance of the organization of society which is +embodied in the city-republic, so that the free citizens can continue +to live the life of freedom. The type of complete manhood is to be +realized. All around there is the activity of men who receive no +consideration except so far as they are means to this end. + +But amid the mighty political and social revolutions which lead to the +creation of the Empire this mentality ceases to be accepted as a +matter of course. The fearful experiences it goes through cause +feeling to become more human, and the horizons of ethics are widened. +The city-republic, on which ethical thinking had been built up, has +disappeared, but an empire now crushes men down just in the same way. +Thus the individual man as such becomes the object of reflexion and of +ethics. The conception of the brotherhood of all men appears. A +disposition to humanity makes itself heard, and Seneca condemns the +gladiatorial shows. Nay more: even the [pg 054] inner relationship +between mankind and the animal world is recognized. + +So now when they have caught sight of mankind as a whole and man as +such, ethics reach such a depth and breadth as allows them to try to +comprehend themselves in a universal world-will. Henceforth +nature-philosophy and ethics can work together. Stoicism had from the +very beginning a vision of this, but had not been able to make it a +reality, since it had not at its disposal the needful living and +universalist ethic. + +But there is another reason why optimism and ethics can now in +nature-philosophy come into power. The old school of the Porch was +crushed down into resignation just in proportion as it submitted to +the necessity for critical thinking. But as time goes on, the +practical and religious instincts which were always present in its +world-view, gain in strength. The antiquity which is passing away is +no longer critical, but either sceptical or religious, and therefore +the later school of the Porch can let itself be guided by the ethical +demands of its world-view much more completely than the old one could. +It becomes at once deeper and more simple than the latter, and, like +Chinese ethical monism, rises to such freedom from limitations as to +be able to interpret the world-will as ethical. So now Stoics appear +who, like Confucius, like Mencius, and like Chwang-tse, and indeed, +like the Rationalists of the eighteenth century, preach ethics as +something grounded in the nature of the universe and of mankind. They +cannot prove the truth of this world-view any better than could Zeno +and his pupils, who also resorted to it, but they announce it with an +inner conviction which the former could not command, and produce their +results by means of an enthusiasm which was denied to their +predecessors. + +When the later school of the Porch reaches the stage of exalting the +world-principle more and more to become a personal and ethical god, it +is following laws which are at work also in Hinduism. + +[pg 055] + +Yet the world-view of resignation, which it has inherited from the +older school, it never succeeds in rendering entirely impotent. In +Seneca and Epictetus this is still strongly maintained side by side +with the ethical conception of the universe. It is only in Marcus +Aurelius that the optimistic motives sound victoriously through. + +Stoicism was from the beginning a multiform elemental philosophy, and +it is because it ventured to be this in such comprehensive measure +that the later Stoicism is so rich and so full of life. + +Moral Sayings of Seneca + +No man is nobler than his fellow, even if it happen that his spiritual +nature is better constituted and he is more capable of higher +learning. The world is the one mother of us all, and the ultimate +origin of each one of us can be traced back to her, whether the steps +in the ladder of descent be noble or humble. To no one is virtue +forbidden; she is accessible to all; she admits everyone, she invites +everyone in: free men and freedmen, slaves, kings, and exiles. She +regards neither birth nor fortune; the man alone is all she wants. + +It is a mistake to think that the status of a slave affects the whole +of a person’s nature; the nobler part of it is not touched thereby. + +Every single person, even if there is nothing else to recommend him, I +must hold in regard, because he bears the name of man. + +In the treatment of a slave we have to consider not how much we can do +to him without being liable to punishment, but how much the nature of +right and of justice allows us to, seeing that these bid us treat +gently even prisoners and purchased slaves. Although in the treatment +of a slave everything is allowed, there is nevertheless something +which through the common right of every living being is stigmatized as +not permissible in the treatment of a man, because he is of the same +nature as thyself. + +This, in fact, is the demand which is laid upon each man, viz. that he +works when possible, for the welfare of many; if that is +impracticable, that he works for the welfare of a few; failing that, +for the welfare of his neighbours, and if that is impossible, for his +own. + +It is through untiring benevolence that the bad are won over, and +there is no disposition so hard and so hostile to loving treatment ... +as to refuse love to the good people whom it will in the end have to +thank again for something more. “Not a word of thanks did I get! What +am I now to begin to do?” What the gods do, . . . who begin to shower +benefits on us before we are aware of it, and continue them even +though we do not thank them. + +Moral Sayings of Epictetus + +Nature is wonderful, and full of love for all creatures. + +Wait upon God, ye men. When He calls you, and releases you from [pg +056] service, then go to Him; but for the present remain quietly in +the position in which He has placed you. + +You carry a god about with you, and do not know it, unhappy one! You +have him within yourself, and do not notice it when you defile him +with unclean thoughts or foul deeds. + +Cultivate the will to satisfy yourself, and to stand right before God. +Strive to become pure, one with yourself and one with God. + +Think silence best; say only what is necessary, and say it shortly. +Above all, do not talk about thy fellow-men, either to praise them, or +to blame them, or to compare them with others. Do not swear; never, if +possible, or at any rate as seldom as possible. Your bodily +wants—food, drink, clothing, housing, service—satisfy in the simplest +way. Avoid unseemly joking, for there is always a danger of becoming +vulgar, and joking away the respect of your fellow-men. + +As you are careful when walking not to tread on a nail or to sprain +your ankle, so take care not to let your soul get hurt. + +Moral Sayings from the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius + +Everything that happens, happens right, and if you can observe things +carefully, you will recognize that it is so. I do not mean only in +accordance with the course of nature, but much more that they happen +in accordance with the law of righteousness, and as if controlled by a +Being who orders all things according to merit. + +If I am active, I am so with due regard to the general welfare. If +anything happens to me, I accept it and consider it in relation to the +gods and the universal source from which, in close connection, come +all our happenings. + +He who commits unrighteousness is godless, for universal nature +created rational beings for one another; to help each other where +there is need, but never to injure one another. + +Love mankind; obey the godhead. + +If thou art unwilling to get up in the morning, reflect thus: I am +waking in order to go and work as one of mankind. + +Seek all thy joy and contentment in advancing, mindful always of God, +from one generally useful deed to another. + +The best way to avenge oneself on anyone is to avoid returning evil +for evil. + +It is a privilege of man to love even those who do him wrong. One can +reach this level by reflecting that all men are of one family with +oneself; that their shortcomings are due to ignorance, and against +their will; that in a short time both of you will be dead. + +What is good is necessarily useful, and that is why the good and noble +man must be concerned about it. + +Nobody gets tired of seeking his own advantage. But doing so procures +us an activity which is natural. Never get tired, then, of seeking +thine own advantage, provided thou procurest thus the advantage of +others also. + +[pg 057] + +Treat as befits a man endowed with reason, that is magnanimously and +nobly, the animals which are not so endowed, and indeed all creatures +whatever that can feel but have no reason. But other men, since they +are endowed with reason, treat with friendly affection. + +Thou has existed till now as a fragment of the universe, and wilt some +day be absorbed in thy producer, or rather, thou wilt suffer a +transformation and reappear as a new germ of life. + +Many grains of incense are destined for the same altar. Some fall soon +into the flame, others later, but that makes no difference. + +The Optimistic-Ethical World-View of the later Stoicism + +In their optimistic-ethical world-view the later Stoics find those +impulses to effort which were not available for the ancient ethics of +the classical age. Marcus Aurelius is an enthusiastic utilitarian like +the Rationalists of the eighteenth century, because, like them, he is +convinced that nature itself has bound up together what is ethical and +what is advantageous to the individual and to the community. + +That being so, the classical question of ancient ethics whether the +thinking man is to busy himself with public affairs or not must again +be discussed. Epicurus taught that “the wise man has nothing to do +with State affairs unless exceptional circumstances arise.” Zeno’s +decision was that “he will take part in the business of the State +unless obstacles prevent it.” Both schools leave the retirement into +oneself to the decision of the Wise man, only one lets the grounds for +the decision be given somewhat earlier, the other somewhat later. The +thought of a devotion to the general good which is to be kept active +for its own sake and under all circumstances is outside the circle of +vision of their ethic. + +With the later Stoics it emerges, because the conception of “mankind” +has come in sight. Man, as Seneca works out in his treatise on Leisure +(_De Otio_), belongs to two republics. One is a large and universal +one, extends as far as the sun shines, and embraces both gods and men; +the other is that into which through the fate assigned us by our [pg +058] birth, we have been adopted as citizens. Circumstances may bring +it about that the wise man cannot dedicate himself to the service of +the State, but, to escape the storm, must “take refuge in the +harbour.” It may happen—and Seneca has in mind his own time—that not +one of existing States is of such a character as to put up with the +activity of the wise man. Nevertheless, the latter does not wholly +withdraw into himself, but he serves the great republic by working to +improve the general outlook of mankind, and to hasten the coming of a +new age. + +In Epictetus also this deepened and widened notion of duty is to be +found. Marcus Aurelius does not even consider any impossibility of +taking part in public life. In him there speaks the ruler who feels +himself to be the servant of the State. His ideal is the citizen who +“from one activity which makes his fellow-citizens happier goes on to +another, and undertakes with alacrity anything whatever that the State +lays upon him.” “Do what is needed, and what is bidden by the reason +of a being who is destined by nature to membership of a State, and do +it as it is bidden.” + +In the middle of the second century A.D. ancient thought arrives at an +optimistic-ethical world-view which holds within itself living ideals +of civilization, and therefore anticipates those which later on in the +eighteenth century will bring into activity so mighty and universal a +movement of civilization. But for the men of the Græco-Roman world it +comes too late. It does not permeate the masses, but remains the +private possession of an _élite_. + +It cannot permeate the masses, because there are forces at work among +them with which it cannot combine. It is true, indeed, that the ethic +of the later Stoicism is so near akin to the universal charity of the +Christian ethic, that by the tradition of later times Seneca is +declared to be a Christian, and that the Church father, Augustine, +holds up the life of the heathen emperor, Marcus Aurelius, as an +example for Christians. + +Yet the two movements cannot amalgamate, but have [pg 059] to fight +each other. Marcus Aurelius is responsible for most terrible +persecutions of Christians, and Christianity on its side declares war +to the knife against the Porch. + +Why this strange fatality? Because Christianity is dualistic and +pessimistic, the ethic of Stoicism is monistic and optimistic. +Christianity abandons the natural world as evil, the later Stoics +idealize it. It helps not at all that their ethical teaching is almost +identical. Each appears as part of a world-view which is +irreconcilable with that of the other. All contradictions in the world +may be concealed, but not that between two world-views, and the +struggle ends with the annihilation of the optimistic-ethical +world-view of the Stoics, which is defended by officers without an +army. The attempt that was undertaken as the ancient world was coming +to an end, to restore the Empire and make it an empire as wide as +mankind, was a failure. + +The horizons of the philosophy of the ancient world had remained +narrow too long. No ethical thinkers had appeared who at the right +time might have led that world to an ethical optimism about reality. +It was a calamity, too, that the natural sciences, which had started +in such a promising way, came to a standstill, partly through the +fault of fate, partly because philosophy turned away from them, before +mankind discovered the law of the uniformity of nature, and obtained +thereby control over it. Hence the men of antiquity never acquired +that self-consciousness which in their descendants of modern times has +kept alive, even through the darkest periods of history, the belief in +progress—even though it be sometimes progress of the most superficial +kind. This psychological factor is of great importance. + +It is true that artistic ability, which in the Greek spirit meets us +in such abundant measure, is also control over the material, but this +creative power was unable to draw the man of antiquity up to a higher +life-affirmation and to belief in progress. It served only to let him +express himself, in words and in form, in the antagonism between +primitive [pg 060] world- and life-affirmation, and thinking world- +and life-denial. It is the puzzling intermixture of serenity and +melancholy which produces the tragic charm of Greek art. + +From every point of view, then, a strong ethical world- and +life-affirmation is made difficult for the ancient world. It therefore +falls more and more a prey to pessimistic world-views, which draw its +thoughts away from reality, and celebrate the liberation of the +spiritual from its bondage to the material in a succession of cosmic +dramas. Gnosticism, Oriental and Christian, Neo-Pythagoreanism, which +arose as early as the first century B.C., the Neo-Platonism which +originated with Plotinus (A.D. 204-269), and the great +Mystery-religions, all come to meet the religious, world-shunning +disposition of the masses during the breaking-up of antiquity, and +offer it that deliverance from the world of which it is in search. In +this chaos of ideas Christianity emerges victorious because it is the +most robust religion of redemption, because as a community it +possesses the strongest organization, and because beneath its +pessimistic world-view it has at its disposal living ethical ideas. + +The optimistic-ethical monism of the later Stoics is like a sunbeam +breaking through in the evening of the long, gloomy day of antiquity +while the darkness of the middle ages is already drawing on, but it +has no power to waken any civilization to life. The time for that is +past. The spirit of antiquity, having failed to reach an ethical +nature-philosophy, has become the prey of a pessimistic dualism in +which no ethic of action is any longer possible; there can only be an +ethic of purification. + +The thoughts of Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius are the winter +seed of a coming civilization. + + + + +[pg 061] + +CHAPTER VI + +OPTIMISTIC WORLD-VIEW AND ETHICS IN THE +RENAISSANCE AND POST-RENAISSANCE PERIODS + + +Belief in Progress and Ethics + +THE essential characteristic of the modern age is this, that it thinks +and acts in the spirit of a world- and life-affirmation which has +never before shown itself with such active strength. + +This world-view breaks through in the Renaissance, first at the end of +the fourteenth century, and it arises as a protest against the +mediæval enslavement of the human spirit. The movement is helped to +victory by the increasing knowledge of Greek philosophy in its +original form which is the result of the migration to Italy about the +middle of the fifteenth century of learned Greeks from Constantinople. +Among the thinking men of that time there arises the belief that +philosophy must be something more elemental and more living than +Scholasticism made it. + +But the thought of antiquity would not have been sufficient by itself +to keep alive this new world- and life-affirmation which appealed to +it. It has not, in truth, the mentality required. But another kind of +fuel is in time brought for the fire. Taking refuge from book-learning +in nature, the men of that time discover the world. As seamen they +reach countries whose very existence was not suspected, and they +measure the size of the earth. As inquirers they press on into the +infinite and the secrets of the universe, and learn by experience that +forces governed by uniform laws are at work in it, and that man has +power to make them serviceable to himself. The knowledge and power won +by Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519), Copernicus [pg 062] (1473-1543), +Kepler (1571-1630), Galileo (1564-1642), and others are decisive for +the current world-view. + +As a movement which draws its life solely from spiritual forces, the +Renaissance passes its bloom-time comparatively quickly, and without +forming much fruit. With Paracelsus (1493-1541), Bernardino Telesio +(1508-1588), Giordano Bruno (1548-1600), and others, an enthusiastic +nature-philosophy announces itself. It does not, however, reach full +growth. The Renaissance has not strength enough to bring to birth a +world- and life-affirming philosophy corresponding to their spirit. +Here and there their thought surges for a time, like a rough sea, +against the world-denying world-view of the Church. Then all is still. +What we know definitely as the philosophy of modern times begins +almost without any reference to the Renaissance. It springs not from +any nature-philosophy, but from the problem of the theory of knowledge +which was raised by Descartes, and from that starting-point philosophy +has once more had laboriously to seek its way to a nature-philosophy. + +It is not, then, because it was enlarged during the Renaissance into a +fully thought out world-view that world- and life-affirmation made +good its position in the modern age. If it was able to hold out right +into the eighteenth century, when it triumphs against the world- and +life-denial which mediæval thought and Christianity kept working in +opposition to it, it owed this to the circumstance that progress in +knowledge and power never ceased. In them the new mentality had a +support which never gave way, but became continually stronger. Since +the new scientific knowledge cannot be suppressed nor its progress +arrested, belief in the power of truth becomes firmly established. +Since it becomes more and more evident that nature works with a +uniformity which never misses its aim, there grows up a confidence +that the circumstances of society and of mankind generally can be so +organized as to secure definite objects. Since man is ever obtaining +[pg 063] greater power over nature, he takes it more and more as +self-evident that the reaching of perfection in other spheres also is +only a question of a sufficiency of will-power and a correct way of +grappling with problems. + +Under the steadily working influence of the new mentality the +world-view of Christianity changes, and becomes leavened with the +leaven of world- and life-affirmation. It gradually begins to be +accepted as self-evident that the spirit of Jesus does not give up the +world in despair, but aims at transforming it. The early Christian +conception of the Kingdom of God, which was born of pessimism and, +thanks to Augustine, prevailed through the Middle Ages, is rendered +impotent, and its place is taken by one which is the offspring of +modern optimism. This new orientation of the Christian world-view, +which is accomplished by a slow and often interrupted process of +change between the fifteenth century and the end of the eighteenth, is +the decisive spiritual event of the modern age. During this period +Christianity takes no account of what is happening to itself. It +believes that it is remaining unchanged, whereas in reality, by this +change from pessimism to optimism, it is surrendering its original +character. + +The man of modern times, then, becomes optimistic, not because +deepened thought has made him understand the world in the sense of +world- and life-affirmation, but because discovery and invention have +given him power over it. This enhancement of his self-appreciation and +the consequent strengthening of his will and his hopes, determine his +will-to-live in a correspondingly pronounced and positive sense. + +In the ancient world man’s natural disposition to world- and +life-affirmation could not be worked out to a complete world-view of +the same, because at that time deep thought about the world and life +pressed resignation upon him as a necessity of thought. In the man of +the modern age the mentality produced by discovery and invention +unites with his natural disposition to world- and life-affirmation, +and establishes him in an optimistic world-view [pg 064] without +leading him to deeper thought about the world and life. + +The spirit of the modern age is not the work of any one great thinker. +It wins its way gradually by reason of the unbroken series of triumphs +won by discovery and invention. Hence it is not a result of chance +that an almost unphilosophic and moreover somewhat antiquated +personality like Francis Bacon, Lord Verulam (1561-1626), is the man +who drafts the programme of the modern world-view. He founds it upon +the sentence: “Knowledge is power.” His picture of the future he +develops in his _New Atlantis_, in which he describes how the +inhabitants of an island, through the practical application of all +known discoveries and inventions and all possible rational reflexion +on the purposive organization of society, find themselves in a +position to lead the happiest possible lives._(_9_)_ + +Christian and Stoic Elements in Modern Ethics + +What is the relation between ethics and the mentality of belief in +progress, and how were they influenced by it? + +When the ethical thought of antiquity wanted to come to clearness +about itself, it fell a victim to resignation, because it tried to +determine the moral as that which is rationally profitable and +pleasurable to the individual. It remained shut up within the circle +of the egoistic, and never reached the thought of social +utilitarianism. From such a fate modern ethics are protected in +advance. They have no need to produce from their own resources the +thought that the ethical is action directed to promoting the welfare +of others, for they find it as something already accepted as true. +That is the gift of Christianity. The thought of Jesus that the +ethical is the individual’s active self-devotion to others has won its +way to acceptance. Ethics, [pg 065] which are making themselves +independent of religion, keep, as a result of their passage through +Christianity, a pronouncedly active and altruistic mode of thought. +What they have to do now is to provide this possession with a rational +foundation. + +It is extraordinarily significant that to meet modern ethics there +comes in the Late Stoicism a philosophical ethical system in which +there appear, as the result of rational thinking, thoughts which run +side by side with Christian morality. There is now coming up for the +benefit of modern times the seed sown by Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus +Aurelius. Cicero, too, counts with modern times for so much, because +its thinkers find in his writings noble morality based upon thought. +The discovery of Late Stoicism’s ethic of humanity is for modern times +akin to their discovery of nature. They identify it with the real +Christian ethic, and contrast it with the scholastic, in which Jesus +is expounded according to Aristotle. It is through Late Stoicism that +modern times become aware that the moral is something direct. Because +Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius speak to such an extent just as +Jesus did, they help to spread the conviction that the truly rational +ethic and the ethic of the Gospels coincide with one another. + +When antiquity came to an end, Late Stoicism and Christianity, in +spite of the identity of their moral teaching, had torn each other to +pieces. In modern times they unite in order to produce together an +ethical world-view. Why is that now possible which before was +impossible? Because the chasm which lay between their respective +world-views has been bridged. Christianity now treats world- and +life-affirmation as valid. + +But how could this volte-face of Christianity be brought about? +Because of the fact that in spite of its pessimistic world-view it +upholds an ethic which, so far as it touches the relation of man to +man, is an activist ethic. The pessimistic world-view, if it thinks +itself out to a consistent conclusion, must end with a purely +world-denying ethic, [pg 066] divorced from action, as it has in +India. The peculiar character, however, of the world-view of Jesus +which is determined by the expectation of the end of the world and the +coming of a supernatural kingdom of God, together with the directness +of his ethical feeling, entail his proclaiming of an ethic of active +devotion to one’s fellow-Man in spite of his pessimistic attitude +towards the natural world. This activist ethic is what is wanted to +provide the cardinal-point of an evolution from a +Christian-pessimistic world-view to one of Christian optimism. The +modern age, following its instinct, assumes it as self-evident that an +ethic which deals with the active relations of man to man is +pre-supposed to be an ethic which assigns a positive value to action +as such, and, further, that such an ethic of action belongs to a +world-view which is optimistic and which wills and hopes for a +transformation of relationships. + +It is, then, the ethic of active self-devotion taught by Jesus which +makes it possible for Christianity to do what is suggested by the +spirit of the modern age, and modulate from the pessimistic to the +optimistic world-view. This result finds expression in the way the new +conception of Christianity, when it has to come to an understanding +with the old one, contrasts itself as “the religion of Jesus” with +“the Christianity of dogma.” + +A way is prepared, then, in Erasmus and individual representatives of +the Reformation, shyly at first but then more and more clearly, for an +interpretation of the teaching of Jesus which corresponds to the +spirit of modern times, an interpretation which conceives the teaching +as a religion of action in the world. Historically and in actual fact +this is a wrong interpretation, for the world-view of Jesus is, so far +as concerns the future of the natural world, thoroughly pessimistic. +His religion is not a religion of world-transforming effort, but the +religion of awaiting the end of the world. His ethic is characterised +by activity only so far as it commands men to practise unbounded +devotion to their fellow-men if they would attain to that inner +perfection [pg 067] which is needed for entrance into the supernatural +kingdom of God. An ethic of enthusiasm, and therefore presumably +focused upon an optimistic world-view, forms part of a pessimistic +world-view! That is the magnificent paradox in the teaching of Jesus. + +But the modern age was right in overlooking this paradox and in +assuming in Jesus an optimistic world-view which corresponded to an +ethic of enthusiasm and met with a welcome the spirit of Late Stoicism +and of modern times. For the progress of the spiritual life of Europe +this mistake was a necessity. What crises the latter must have gone +through, if it had not been able without embarrassment to place the +new world-view under the authority of the great personality of Jesus! + +The mistake was such a natural one that till the end of the nineteenth +century it was never seriously shaken. When historical criticism, at +the beginning of the twentieth century, proclaimed its discovery that +Jesus, in spite of his activist ethic, thought and acted under a +pessimistic world-view dominated by the expectation of the end of the +world, it aroused indignation. It was accused of degrading Jesus to a +mere enthusiast, while it after all only put an end to the false +modernising of his personality._(_10_)_ + +What we at the present time have to do is to go through the critical +experience of being obliged to think as modern men under a world-view +of world- and life-affirmation, and yet let the ethic of Jesus speak +to us from out of a pessimistic world-view. + +Of this problem which is disclosing itself to-day the early period of +the modern age suspects nothing. Jesus and the moralists of Late +Stoicism together are its authorities for an ethical world- and +life-affirmation. + +What the Late-Stoic ethic is for the modern age is shown by Erasmus of +Rotterdam (1466-1536), Michel de [pg 068] Montaigne (1533-1592), +Pierre Charron (1541-1603), Jean Bodin (1530-1596), and Hugo Grotius +(1583-1645), and that whether their ideas run predominantly on +Christian or on freethinking lines. To the Later Stoics Erasmus owes +it that he can understand the simple gospel of Jesus which was being +discovered behind the Church’s dogmas, as being the essence of all +ethical philosophizing. It is by finding support in them that +Montaigne in his _Essays_ (1580) is saved from falling into complete +ethical scepticism. Because he is inspired by the Later Stoics, Bodin +in his work _De la république_ (1577), puts forward an ethical ideal +of the State to combat the ideas of Machiavelli’s _Prince_ +(_Principe_) (1515). Because he draws from the same source, Pierre +Charron in his work _De la sagesse_ (1601), ventures to assert that +ethics are higher than traditional religion, and can maintain +themselves in an independent position in face of it without losing +anything of their essential nature or of their depth. Because the work +of Marcus Aurelius has preceded him, Hugo Grotius is able in his +famous work, _De jure belli ac pacis_ (1625) to lay so securely the +foundations of natural and international law, and thereby to champion +the claims of reason and humanity in the domain of jurisprudence. + +Other considerations apart, it would have been the first task of the +rising power of natural science to restore to currency the world-view +of Epicurus, and Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655)_(_11_)_ attempts it. He +fails, however, to accomplish his purpose. By its inward belief in +progress the mentality of the modern age is driven in elemental +fashion beyond scepticism and sceptical ethics. What is great in +Epicurus, viz. that in obedience to the deepest demands of truth he +tries to think ethically within a nature-philosophy which does not +interpret nature as embodying any purpose, can neither be comprehended +nor be put before his own age by the philosopher’s all too clever +modern prophet. + +[pg 069] + +For the weighty questions of absolute truth that time is by no means +ripe. Its capacity is only that of the uncritical. Typical for its +spirit is Isaac Newton (1643-1727), who in his investigation of nature +is purely empirical, and in his world-view remains simply Christian. + +Against the difficulties which crop up for ethics and world- and +life-affirmation out of a nature-philosophy which works without any +presuppositions, the Renaissance and the Post-Renaissance are secure. +The belief in progress which arises from the achievements of discovery +and invention, and the joy felt in action itself are their world-view. + +Thanks to belief in progress, new life streams into ethics. The inner +relations between ethics and world- and life-affirmation begin to have +their effect. The elementary impulses to activity which are embodied +in the Christian ethic are set free, and the belief in progress gives +them an aim and object: the transformation of the circumstances of +society and of mankind. + +It is not any really deeper ethical thinking that brings the modern +age in, but the influence exerted by the belief in progress, which +arose out of the achievements of discovery and invention, on the ethic +which drew its life from Stoic and Christian thought. The cart is +drawn by the belief in progress, and at first ethics have only to run +along beside it. But as the cart gets heavier and the road more +difficult to negotiate, so that ethics ought to lend their strength to +help, they refuse, because they have no strength of their own. The +cart begins to run backward, and carries belief in progress, and +ethics with it, down the hill. + +The task before philosophy was to change the world- and +life-affirmation which arose out of enthusiasm over the attainments in +discovery and invention into a deeper, inner one arising out of +thought about the universe and the life of man, and on that same +foundation to build up an ethical system. But philosophy could do +neither. + +About the middle of the nineteenth century, when it has become +perfectly clear that we are living with a world- and [pg 070] +life-affirmation which has its source merely in our confidence in +discovery and invention and not in any deeper thinking about the world +and life, our fate is sealed. The modern optimistic-ethical +world-view, though it has done so much for the material development of +civilization, proves to be like a building erected already to a +considerable height but on rotten foundations, and has to collapse. + + + + +[pg 071] + +CHAPTER VII + +LAYING THE FOUNDATION OF ETHICS IN THE +SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES + + +Hartley, Holbach. Devotion as Enlightened Egoism + +MODERN times find world- and life-affirmation so self-evident that +they feel no need to give them a sure foundation, and to deepen them, +by thought about the world and life. Pessimism they brush aside as +reactionary folly, without suspecting how deep down into thought it +has sent its roots. + +They do, however, see the necessity of establishing the nature of the +ethical. How do they proceed to do this? + +That the ethical means action directed to promoting the common good is +their firm belief from the first, and they are safe from the fate of +ancient thought, viz. sticking fast in the mud of resignation while +trying to give the ethical a proper foundation. Instead of that they +have to answer the question how the unegoistic makes it appearance +beside the egoistic, and in what inner relation they stand to each +other. + +A performance now begins like that which went on after the appearance +of Socrates, only the task is proposed this time not by an individual +but by the spirit of the time. Another attempt is made to consider the +ethical problem in isolation, as if it consisted in reflexions on the +relation of the individual to himself and to society, these having no +need to settle their position with regard to ultimate questions of the +meaning of the world and of life. The ethical problem seems, too, to +be a much easier one than it was then, because world-affirmation and +activity directed towards the general welfare no longer have to be +proved, but appear among the presuppositions which are taken for +granted. + +[pg 072] + +There are three ways in which the relations between the egoistic and +the altruistic can be made clear. Either one assumes that the egoistic +in the thought of the individual is automatically converted into the +altruistic by consistent meditation. Or one supposes the altruistic to +have its beginning in the thought of society and thence to pass over +into the convictions of the individual. Or one retires to the position +that egoism and altruism are both among the original endowments of +human nature. All three explanations are attempted, each with most +varied arguments. They are not always carried to a conclusion without +intermixture, and with many thinkers there is interplay of one with +another. + +The attempt to deduce devotion to the common welfare from egoism by +psychological considerations is made in the most systematic way by +David Hartley (1705-1757)_(_12_)_ and Dietrich von Holbach +(1723-1789)._(_13_)_ + +Hartley, a theologian who betook himself to the practice of medicine, +claims to see in altruism a purposive ennoblement of original +selfishness which comes into play under the influence of rational +thought. The much-reviled Holbach ascribes its origin to the fact that +the individual, if he rightly understands his own interest, will +always form his conception of it in connection with the interest of +society, and therefore direct his activities to the latter as well. + +Both attempt to carry up their building, so far as it goes, with +materialistic considerations and then to roof it with idealist ones. +But neither with the coarser nor with the finer considerations nor +with both together can the psychological derivation of altruism from +egoism produce any convincing result. + +The coarser ones do not carry us very far. It is acknowledged, [pg +073] of course, that the prosperity of society depends upon the moral +disposition of its members and that the better the moral condition of +society the better is the individual’s expectation of prosperity. But +it does not follow that the individual becomes more moral, the better +he understands his own interests. The mutual relation between him and +society is not of such a character that he derives benefit from the +latter just in proportion as he himself by his moral conduct helps to +establish its prosperity. If the majority of its members are with +short-sighted egoism intent only on their own good, then the man who +acts with wider outlook makes sacrifices from which there is no +prospect of gain for himself, even if the best happens and they are +not lost without benefiting the community. If, on the other hand, +through the moral conduct of the majority of its members the condition +of society is favourable, the individual profits by it even if he +fails to behave towards it as morality demands. By conduct which +disregards both past and future, he will carve for himself an unduly +big share of personal prosperity out of the prosperity of the +community, milking the cow which the rest feed. The influence of the +individual on the prosperity of the community and the reaction of +social prosperity on that of the individual do not stand in a simple +relation to each other which acts equally in both directions. The +consideration, therefore, that egoism, rightly understood, will oblige +the individual to resolve on activity which is directed to promoting +the common good, is a ship which sails well, but leaks. + +The psychological derivation of altruism from egoism must, then, in +some way or other, make an appeal to the self-sacrifice of the +individual. This it does by inducing him to consider that in happiness +there is a spiritual element as well as a material. Man needs (it is +said) not only external prosperity, but to be respected by others and +to be satisfied with himself, and he can have this double experience +only when he concerns himself about the [pg 074] prosperity of others. +Even Holbach, who tries to be inexorably matter-of-fact, lets these +considerations speak loudly. + +The attempt is made, therefore, above the prolonged bass note of the +conception of happiness derived from ordinary egoism, to modulate into +the spiritualized conception of it. + +The path which this attempt has to follow runs parallel to that which +led the successors of Socrates into the abyss of the paradoxical. In +order to get from egoism into altruism and so think out to a +conclusion the ethic of the rationally-pleasurable, the Epicureans +wished to use the same scale of values for spiritual and material +pleasure alike. The only result was that their ethic transformed +itself into resignation. Now again, in modern times, and again for the +sake of ethics, spiritual happiness is to be regarded as happiness in +the same way as material happiness is, and here again the result is a +paradox. + +Material and spiritual happiness are not so related that the one can +find its continuation in the other. If the second is for the sake of +ethics called in with the first, it does not strengthen the first, but +paralyses it. The man who does earnestly try to guide himself by the +light of spiritual as well as material happiness, ends by finding that +the recognition accorded him by his fellow-men, which at first seemed +to him to make almost the whole of spiritual happiness, becomes more +and more meaningless. It is to him a miserable lump of solder which +drops down between material and spiritual happiness without being able +to fasten them together. More and more exclusively he experiences +spiritual happiness as the condition in which he is at one with +himself and therefore can justifiably accord himself a certain amount +of self-appreciation. + +Spiritual happiness is sufficient unto itself. Either the man is led +to resolve on ethical conduct because he expects from it a moulding of +the outward circumstances of his being which will bring him profit and +pleasure; or he chooses it because he finds his happiness in obeying +his inner compulsion to ethical action. In the latter case he [pg 075] +has left far behind him all calculations about the interdependence of +his morality and his material happiness. The fact that he is a moral +man is in itself his happiness, even though it land him in the most +disadvantageous situations. + +But if spiritual happiness can never be welded into union with +material, it is useless trouble to try to depict altruism as an +ennobling of egoism. + +If the ordinary conception of pleasure, that it may be brought into +union with ethics, is submitted to a process of refining, it ends by +being refined away. In ancient ethics, in which the refining is done +under the influence of an ethical system which is definitely egoistic, +it transforms itself into the pleasure of being without pleasure, and +allows ethics to end in resignation. In modern ethics, in which the +pleasure to be refined is under the influence of altruism, it works +itself up into an irrational and immaterialistic enthusiasm. In both +cases there is the same paradoxical proceeding, only that in one case +it goes in the negative direction, in the other in the positive. + +Whenever, then, thought wishes to conceive ethics as springing from +pleasure or happiness, it arrives at resignation or enthusiasm, at +spiritualised egoistic or at spiritualised expansive conduct. + +There is no way in which natural pleasure can, in really deep +thinking, be brought into connexion with ethics. + +Hobbes, Locke, Helvetius, Bentham + +The explanation that altruism is a principle of action which the +individual takes over from society is to be found expressed in +characteristic ways by Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679),_(_14_)_ John Locke +(1632-1704),_(_15_)_ Adrien Helvetius (1715-1771)_(_16_)_ and Jeremy +Bentham (1748-1832)._(_17_)_ + +[pg 076] + +Hobbes represents the State as commissioned and empowered by the +majority of the individual citizens to engage the whole body in action +for the common advantage. In this way alone, he asserts, is it +possible to realise the common good in which the egoism of individuals +finds the highest possible degree of prosperity. Left to themselves, +men would never be able to get free from their short-sighted egoism, +and would, therefore, miss prosperity. Their only possible course, +then, is to join in setting up an authority which will drive them into +altruism. + +With external means only, however, organized society cannot engage the +individual in all the activities which are needed for the common good. +It must strive to ensure its power over him by means of spiritual +conviction as well. Locke takes this need into consideration. +According to him it is God and society together who force altruism +upon the individual by appealing at the same time to his egoism. These +two authorities have, that is to say (as our reason enables us to +recognize), so ordered the course of things that actions beneficial to +society are rewarded, and those injurious to it are punished. God has +at his disposal rewards and punishments of endless duration. Society +works in two different ways: through the power given to it by the +criminal law, and through the law of public opinion in which it uses +praise and blame as spiritual means of compulsion. Man being guided +both by pleasure and absence of it, he manages to accommodate himself +to those rules which defend the general good so effectually, and he +thereby becomes moral. + +In spite of all their differences on single points, Hobbes and Locke +agree in having this external conception of ethics. The essential +point of distinction between them is [pg 077] that with Hobbes society +alone plies the whip, while with Locke God and society handle it +together. + +Helvetius, who belonged to a family which had migrated from the +Palatinate into France, is more refined and more inward. In his life +as a farmer of taxes and a property-owner, he always tried, along with +his noble-minded wife, to act with kindness and justice as he explains +them in his book. It is clear to him that ethics means somehow or +other enthusiastic action, that is, action which springs out of +feeling._(_18_)_ Society cannot, therefore, force these virtues into +the individual; it can only educate him into them, and it does in fact +apply all the means and devices which are at its disposal to influence +his egoism in their direction. Above all it makes good use of his +striving to win recognition and fame. The praise which it pours on +that which is “good” in its own sense of the word is for the mass of +men the strongest inducement to take up work for its interests. +Helvetius would perhaps have offered a less external conception of how +ethical action is realized, if he had not, with the best intentions, +taken so much trouble to depict morality as something which can be +taught. + +In the view that morality is enthusiastic action to which the +individual is roused by society, Bentham agrees entirely with +Helvetius, but he carries it through in a much deeper way. Out of the +_Romanza_ he makes a hymn. + +The part played by society in bringing morality into existence cannot, +according to Bentham, be emphasized too strongly. In vehement words he +opposes the view that the human conscience can decide between good and +evil. Nothing can be left to subjective feeling. Man is truly moral +only when he receives his ethics at the hand of society and works them +out with ardour. + +But if society is to decide about ethics, it must first bring order +into its own ethical views, and therefore, says Bentham, must learn to +combine clear and definite notions [pg 078] with its presentation of +the general good. That done, it must make up its mind to apply this +principle with absolute consistency as a foundation for legislation +and the establishment of ethical standards, excluding all +considerations of a different character. A “moral arithmetic” should +be constructed which allows the calculating in correct utility values +of all decisions that have to be made. + +Dealing in a dry, practical way with all cases of penal legislation, +and of establishment of standards by the moral law, Bentham then shows +that the principle of the greatest good of the greatest number is +applicable in all of them, and guides us safely and accurately in +questions of good and evil. + +“Moral philosophy, in its general meaning, is the theory underlying +the art of so directing the actions of men that there is produced the +greatest possible amount of happiness.” + +It is legislation that decides what moral actions the community can +order to be performed, and if it is to exert an educative influence it +must be humane through and through. + +“But there are many actions which, though useful to the community, +legislation may not command. There are even many injurious actions +which it may not forbid, although moral philosophy does so. +Legislation is, in a word, a circle with the same centre as moral +philosophy, but its circumference is smaller.” + +When law ceases to be available, there is nothing that society can do +except be continually putting before the individual personally how +greatly he contributes to his own welfare by furthering that of +others. Bentham does not make it do this with educative guile as does +Helvetius. Society appeals to his feeling for truth. It throws itself +at his feet and entreats him for the sake of the general welfare to +listen to the voice of reason. Thus the dry way in which Bentham +writes about ethics has in it something peculiarly impressive, and +explains the powerful influence which this [pg 079] eccentric member +of the House which looks across the Park at Westminster has exercised +all over the world through the individuals who were inspired by him. + +The most influential parts of his work are those in which he +intensifies the seriousness of men and sharpens their outlook by +leading them to reflect not only on the immediate but also on the more +distant consequences of anything done or left undone, and, further, +not only on the material consequences but on the spiritual ones. It +does one good to note the courage with which this fanatic for utility +ventures to represent material blessings as the foundation of +spiritual ones. + +Bentham is one of the most powerful moralists who have ever appeared +in the world, but his mistakes are as great as his insight. The latter +is shown in this, that he conceives morality as a kind of enthusiasm. +His mistake is that he thinks he must guarantee the rightness of this +enthusiasm by making it nothing higher than a judgement of society +which is taken over by the individual. + +This compels us to rank Bentham with Hobbes, Locke, and Helvetius, +although in other respects he stands high above them. He, like them, +makes morality arise outside the individual. He, like them, in order +to find his explanation of the altruistic, puts out of action the +ethical personality which is in man, and, to compensate for this, +raises society to an ethical personality that he may then by a +transmission of energy connect individuals with this central +power-station. The difference is only that with the other commonplace +moralists the individual is a marionette directed by society on +ethical principles, whereas in Bentham he carries out with deep +conviction the movements suggested to him. + +Ethical thought falls from one paradox into another. If, as in +antiquity, it thinks out a system in which the activity that must be +directed to the common good is not sufficiently represented, it +arrives at ethics which are no longer ethics, and ends in resignation. +If it assumes and starts from such an activity directed to the common +good, [pg 080] it arrives at an ethic in which there is no ethical +personality. It is, strange to say, unable to mark out the middle +course and let an activity which is directed to the promotion of the +common good spring out of the ethical personality itself. + +Altruism as a natural quality. Hume, Adam Smith + +The explanations of altruism as an ennobling of egoism which has a +spontaneous origin through the activity of reason, or which is brought +into existence through the influence of society, are obviously +unsatisfying both psychologically and ethically. Utilitarianism must +therefore necessarily come to admit that altruism is somehow or other +given independently in human nature side by side with egoism. It is +true that it always appears there as the backward twin-brother who can +be reared only with the most careful nursing, and therefore the +upholders of the third alternative given above appeal to the +considerations used for the first two. They continually allow the +capacity for altruistic feeling to be exposed to the influence of +considerations which seem calculated to let egoism discharge its +waters into altruism. The two first views are taken into service as +wet-nurses for the third. David Hume (1711-1776)_(_19_)_ and Adam +Smith (1723-1790)_(_20_)_ must be named here. + +Hume agrees with the other utilitarians in allowing that the principle +of seeking to promote the common good must be accepted as the dominant +principle of morality. Whether actions are good or bad is decided +solely by whether they are directed towards the production of general +happiness [pg 081] or not. There is nothing which is in itself ethical +or unethical. + +To the idea that ethics can have as their object the self-perfecting +of the individual as little weight is given by Hume as by the other +utilitarians. Like them, he opposes asceticism and other life-denying +demands of Christian ethics, because he cannot discover in them +anything profitable for the general welfare. + +But what makes men decide to work together for the common good? +Consistent utilitarians answer: Reflexion about what the common good +means. Of this one-sidedness Hume is not guilty, because he does not +find it to be in accord with psychological facts. It is not out of +high-minded reflexion, he asserts, but out of direct sympathy that the +emotions and actions of benevolence arise. The virtues which serve the +common good have their origin in feeling. We can resolve on acts of +love only because there is in us an elementary feeling for the +happiness of men, and a dislike of seeing them in misery. We become +moral through sympathy. + +It would not have been a big step further to explain this sympathy as +a form of the egoistic need of happiness, more or less through the +assumption that in order to be really happy a man must see happiness +all round him. But Hume does not use such roads as that. He does not +aim at constructive thought but at stating facts, and it is enough for +him that direct sympathy with other men be proved to be a principle +inherent in human nature. We have to stop somewhere or other, he says +in one place, in our search for causes. In every science there are +certain general principles beyond which there is no more general +principle still for us to discover. + +Among the elements which are effective in developing moral feeling, +Hume attributes great importance to the love of fame. This keeps us +considering ourselves in the light in which we wish to appear in the +eyes of others, for the effort to secure the respect of others is a +potent educator in virtue. On this point he thinks like Frederick the +Great, from whom comes the sentence: “The love of fame [pg 082] is +innate in noble souls; you have only to arouse it and urge it on, and +men who till then merely vegetated, will seem to you, when explained +by this happy instinct, to be changed into demi-gods.”_(_21_)_ + +Adam Smith wishes to trace out the idea of sympathy in all its +manifestations, and in doing so he discovers that our capacity for +sympathy covers more than participation in the weal or woe of others. +It brings us, he says, to a community of thought with those who are +doing something. We feel ourselves directly attracted or repelled by +the actions of others and the motives at the back of them. Our ethics +are the product of these sympathetic experiences. We come in time to +take care that an impartial third party can justify and sympathise +with the mainspring and the tendency of our actions. Innate sympathy +not only with the actions but also with the experience of others is +thus the beneficent regulator of the behaviour of men to one another. +This feeling God has implanted in human nature that it may keep men +faithful to work for the common good. + +How far this somewhat artificial extension of the notion of sympathy +through the doctrine of the impartial third party really means a step +forward beyond Hume we may leave undiscussed. + +In his famous work, _An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the +Wealth of Nations_ (1776), Adam Smith founds this prosperity purely +upon the entirely free and intelligent activity of egoism. About the +part to be played by ethics in economic questions he says nothing. +Economic development he leaves to be determined by its own internal +laws, and is confident that, if these are left a free course, the +result will be favourable. Adam Smith, the moral philosopher, is also, +because he is endowed with a rationalistic optimism, the founder of +the _laissez-faire_ form of economic [pg 083] doctrine, that of the +Manchester school, as it is called. He led industry and commerce in +their struggle for liberation from the petty and injurious tutelage of +authority. To-day, when economic life among all peoples is again +delivered over to the most short-sighted ideas of authorities who +never think in terms of economics, we can measure the greatness of his +performance. + +Like Adam Smith, Bentham also is an adherent of the principle of +freedom in economic life. At the same time he has an ethical +conception of society, and demands from it that in a spirit of +progress it shall help to level out as far as possible the differences +between rich and poor. + +What, then, do Hume and Adam Smith mean for ethics? They introduce +into the treatment of them the element of empirical psychology. They +believe that through the value they give to the significance of +sympathy they are giving a natural foundation to utilitarianism, +though in reality this psychology begins to correct it and to +undermine its position. There hovers before the mind of utilitarianism +the great conception that ethics are a result of reflexion. It thinks +to make men moral by keeping their attention fixed on the deep nature +of ethics and the necessity of the ends at which it aims. + +This conception draws its life from the conviction that thought has +been given complete control over the will. The absolute rationality of +the ethical is the foundation on which it builds, and if it is not to +get quite bewildered about its own nature, it cannot allow itself to +recognize as presuppositions of the ethical, facts which are given it +by psychology and cannot be verified independently. + +With Hume and Adam Smith, who trace ethics back to something given in +human nature which resembles instinct, there crops up the problem how +ethics can be something natural, and at the same time something +subordinate to thought, for that they are subordinate to thought has +to be assumed even by the champions of this psychological +utilitarianism. If they were nothing but the exercise of an instinct, +they would not be capable of widening and [pg 084] deepening, nor +could they be imparted to all and sundry with convincing force. Yet +how is it conceivable that thought influences the sympathetic +instinct? What have the two in common that the work of one can be +carried further by the other? + +If Hume and Adam Smith had suspected the far-reaching character of +this great problem of ethics which they brought into the field of +discussion, they would have had to go on and settle the extent and the +depth of this sympathy which they adopted in their scheme, in order to +understand how it continues to function in the domain of thought. + +But they fail to notice the far-reaching character of what they lay +down, and believe they have done nothing but give by means of +psychology an explanation of altruism which is superior to these +currents. The spirit of the time, in its wonderful capacity for +holding various ideas side by side, takes possession of their view, +and the popular utilitarianism now confidently appeals to it as +declaring that altruism is to be conceived as a rational ennobling of +egoism, as a result of the influence of society, and in addition as a +manifestation of a natural instinct. + +It is, really, only in appearance that the psychological conception of +ethics imparts new life to utilitarianism. It is rather a consumption +germ which the latter absorbs. The establishment of a natural element +in ethics, when the consequences of it begin to make themselves felt, +can only end in its devouring rationalist utilitarianism, as becomes +evident in the nineteenth century when biological thought becomes +influential in ethics. The funeral procession of rationalist +utilitarianism begins to assemble with Hume and Adam Smith, though it +is a long time before the coffin is taken to the cemetery. + +The English ethic of self-perfecting + +Against the utilitarians, who would derive from the content of the +moral the essential nature of it, and the [pg 085] obligation to +morality, the “Intellectualists” and the “Intuitionists” enter the +lists. The empirical derivation of ethics seems to them to be an +endangering of the majesty of the moral. Morality—this is the thought +before their minds—is a striving after perfection, and this develops +itself in us because it is implanted in us by nature. Action for the +common advantage does not by any means constitute ethics; it is only a +manifestation of the struggle after self-perfecting. + +To this deeper and more comprehensive conception of ethics, however, +the Intellectualists and Intuitionists do not give correct expression. +For that they are still too much entangled in a lifeless and +semi-scholastic philosophizing. + +Their chief strength lies in their showing up of the weaknesses of the +foundation which Hobbes and Locke give to ethics, and to these they +principally devote themselves, bringing to their task a great deal +that is correct about the directly and absolutely binding character of +the moral law. That the meaning of the moral is not to be found merely +in the useful character of the actions inspired by it but also in the +self-perfecting of the agent which is effected by them, and that +morality presupposes a moral personality, is emphasized by them in +many happy turns of expression. + +When, however, the task before them is to describe exactly in what way +men carry in them the idea of the good as a force which works +effectively upon their character, the Intellectualists and the +Intuitionists land themselves in a psychologizing which is sometimes +ingenious, but often artificial and commonplace. They occupy +themselves with logical distinctions instead of investigating in a +practical fashion the nature of man. Instead of really developing the +problem in answer to the innovators, they work at it with data taken +from an out-of-date philosophy. They hark back largely to Plato, and +again they argue largely, anxiously or unconsciously, not as +philosophers, but as theologians. + +On individual points they diverge from each other, and [pg 086] attack +each other’s positions according as they would have the foundations of +the ethical more intellectualist, or more sentimental and mystical, or +more theological. + +The majority of these anti-utilitarians belong to the Cambridge +Platonizing school. We must name here Ralph Cudworth +(1617-1688),_(_22_)_ Henry More (1614-1687),_(_23_)_ the Rev. Samuel +Clarke (1675-1729),_(_24_)_ Bishop Richard Cumberland +(1632-1718),_(_25_)_ and William Wollaston (1659-1724)._(_26_)_ + +According to Cudworth the truths of morality are just as evident as +these of mathematics. For More the ethical is an intellectual power of +the soul meant for the control of natural impulses. Cumberland finds +the moral law given in the reason which has been bestowed upon man by +God. Clarke, living in the thought world of Isaac Newton, sees it as +the spiritual phenomenon which corresponds to the law of nature. +Wollaston defines it as that which is logically right. + +Pressed back to their fundamental meaning, these thinkers do nothing +but amplify the statement that the ethical is ethical. They assert +that the utilitarian view of ethics is pitched too low, but they do +not succeed in establishing, in contrast to it, a more exalted +principle in such a way that a higher and more comprehensive content +of ethics can be derived from it. As to content their ethic does not +really differ from that of the utilitarians. It merely lacks the great +enthusiastic driving-force which shows itself in the latter. To +establish a living ethic of self-perfecting is beyond the capacity of +the Intellectualists and the Intuitionists. + +What is the inner connexion between the struggle for self-perfecting +and action for the common advantage? That [pg 087] is the weighty +question of ethics which crops up in the settlement of differences +between the utilitarians and their conservative opponents. At first it +remains veiled, and it does not come to clear expression till we reach +Kant. + + * * * * * + +A peculiar position in the ethical thought of the eighteenth century +is held by Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury +(1671-1713)._(_27_)_ He opposes not only the utilitarians, but the +Intellectualists and the Intuitionists as well, and tries to secure a +mediating position between them. That the content of ethics is +utilitarian he openly admits, but he derives the ethical neither from +considerations of usefulness nor from the intellect; he places its +origin in feeling. At the same time he emphasizes, as does Adam Smith +also a few years later, its relationship to the æsthetic. + +But the important thing is that he puts forward a living philosophy of +nature which connects itself with ethics. He is convinced that harmony +reigns in the universe and that man is meant to experience this +harmony in himself. Æsthetic feeling and ethical thinking are for him +forms of a growing union with the divine life, which struggles to find +expression in the spiritual being of man as it does in nature. + +With Shaftesbury ethics descend from a rocky mountain range into a +luxuriant plain. The utilitarians know as yet nothing of a world. +Their ethic is contained in considerations about the relation of the +individual to society. The anti-utilitarians have some idea of a +world, but not a correct one. They elaborate ethics with a formal +theology and a formal philosophizing about the All, but Shaftesbury +plants ethical thought in the universe of reality, which he himself +contemplates through an idealising optimism, reaching thereby a direct +and universal notion of the moral. + +[pg 088] + +A mysticism based on a philosophy of nature begins to spin its magic +threads through European thought. The spirit of the Renaissance rules +again, no longer, however, like a raging storm, as in Giordano Bruno, +but as a gentle breeze. Shaftesbury thinks pantheistically, more +pantheistically than he confesses to himself, but his is not a +pantheism which throws his age into struggles about world-views, and +comes into conflict with theism. It is the pantheism which rules in +Hinduism and in Late Stoicism also; one which is not dangerous, and +raises no question of principle, desiring only to be regarded as a +vivifying of belief in God. + +Shaftesbury exerts also a liberating influence on the spiritual life +of his time by giving ethics a much freer attitude towards religion +than anyone had ventured to do up to that time. Religion, according to +him, has not to give decisions about ethics, but on the contrary must +test its own claims to be true by its relation to pure ethical ideas. +He even ventures to represent the Christian teaching about rewards and +punishment as not consistent with pure ethical considerations. +Morality, he says, is pure, only when good has been done simply +because it is good. + +His optimistic-ethical philosophy of nature is offered by Shaftesbury +only as a sketch. He throws out his ideas without proving that they +are well founded, and without feeling any necessity for thinking them +out to a conclusion. He steps with an easy stride across all problems. +What a difference between his philosophy of nature and Spinoza’s! Yet +his meets the needs of his time. He offers what is new to it, and what +inspires it: ethics bound up with a living world-view. + +The belief in progress now clothes itself in a living world-view which +really suits it. This is the process which, thanks to Shaftesbury, +began in the first decades of the eighteenth century and went on +developing till the end of it. Hence the appearance of his writings, +which were immediately spread abroad through the whole of Europe, [pg +089] is the great event for the spiritual life of the eighteenth +century. Voltaire, Diderot, Lessing, Condorcet, Moses Mendelssohn, +Wieland, Herder, and Goethe too, are under his influence, and he +dominates popular thought completely. Hardly ever has any man had so +direct and so powerful an influence on the formation of the world-view +of his time as the invalid whose life ended at Naples when he was only +forty-two. + +Direct continuators of Shaftesbury’s ethic are found in Francis +Hutcheson (1694-1747)_(_28_)_ and Bishop Joseph Butler +(1692-1752),_(_29_)_ but they take from it just that soft +indefiniteness which gives it its charm and its strength. Hutcheson, +who strongly emphasizes theology’s independence of ethics, the +relationship of the latter to the æsthetic, and their utilitarian +content, stands nearer to his teacher than does Butler, who does not +go as far in his welcome of utilitarianism, and also opposes, from the +Christian standpoint, the optimism of Shaftesbury’s world-view. + +But Shaftesbury’s true successor is J. G. Herder (1744-1803). In his +_Ideas on the Philosophy of Human History_ (4 vols., 1784-1791), he +carries the optimistic-ethical nature-philosophy on into a +corresponding philosophy of history. + + + + +[pg 090] + +CHAPTER VIII + +LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS OF CIVILIZATION IN THE AGE OF RATIONALISM + + +The Mentality and the Achievements of the Ethical Belief in Progress + +THANKS to the fully worked out optimistic-ethical world-view with +which the belief in progress surrounds itself in the course of the +eighteenth century, these generations prove capable of thinking out +the ideals of civilization and advancing towards their realization. +The fact that all attempts to give ethics a foundation in reason have +turned out on the whole unsatisfactory does not move them, if indeed +they give the point any consideration at all. By the conviction that +they have formed a rational conception of the world which gives it an +optimistic-ethical meaning, they are carried on over all the inner +problems of ethics. The alliance which belief-in-progress and ethics +have in the course of modern times contracted with one another is +sealed by means of their world-view, and now they set to work +together. Rational ideals are to be realized. + +The ethical and the optimistic come into power, therefore, in the +world-view of the eighteenth century, although they have not yet +received any real foundation. Scepticism and materialism range around +the fortress like hordes of unconquered enemies, though at first +without being dangerous; as a rule they have themselves absorbed no +small amount of belief-in-progress and of ethical enthusiasm. Voltaire +is an example of the sceptic who stands under the restraint exercised +by the prevalent optimistic and ethical thought. + +So far as its elements are concerned the world-view of rationalism +hides itself under the optimistic-ethical monism [pg 091] of Kungtse +(Confucius) and the Later Stoics, but the enthusiasm which supports it +is incomparably stronger than any felt by them. The circumstances, +too, amid which it appears are far more favourable, and so it becomes +an elemental power throughout a whole people. + +In a world-view which springs from a noble faith, but is remarkable +also for the extent of its knowledge, the men of the eighteenth +century begin to think out ideals of civilization and to realise them +in such measure that the greatest epoch in the history of human +civilization now dawns. + +The great feature of the mentality of this belief in progress which is +ever showing itself in works is its magnificent want of respect for +all existing things, whether belonging to the past or the present. +These are to it in all their various forms the imperfect, which is +destined to be replaced by a perfect. + +The eighteenth century is thoroughly unhistoric. In what is good as in +what is bad it cuts itself loose from whatever was or is, and is +confident of being able to put in its place something that is more +valuable, because more ethical or more in accordance with reason. In +this conviction the age feels itself so creative that it has no +understanding for creations of original genius. Gothic buildings, +early painting, J. S. Bach’s music, and the poetry of earlier ages, +are felt by these generations as art which was produced at a time when +taste had not yet been purified. Activity which follows rules in +accordance with right reason will, they think, introduce a new art +which will be superior in every respect to any that has preceded it. +Full of this self-confidence, a mediocre musician like Zelter in +Berlin works over the scores of Bach’s Cantatas. Full of this +self-confidence, honourable poetasters re-write the texts of the +wonderful old German chorales and replace the originals in the hymn +books with their own wretched productions. + +That they so naïvely push forward right into the sphere [pg 092] of +art the boundaries of the creative faculties with which nature endowed +them is a mistake made by these men for which they have often been +laughed at. But mockery cannot do them much harm. In those departments +of life in which the important matter is the shaping of things +according to ideals given by reason—and work done upon such things +means for the establishment of civilization very much more than any +work spent in the promotion of art—they are as creative as any +generation ever has been, and as scarcely any will be in the future. +They are frightened by nothing which has to be undertaken in this +sphere, and in every department they make the most astonishing +advance. + +They venture also to deal with religion. That religion should be split +up into various antagonistic confessional bodies is to them an offence +against reasonable reflexion. Only a relative, not any absolute +authority, they maintain, can be allowed to the belief which is handed +down in historical formulas. Finding expression in so many and such +varied forms it can, of course, be nothing but a more or less +imperfect embodiment of the ethical religion taught by reason, which +must be equally intelligible to all men. The right thing is, +therefore, to strive after the religion of reason, and to accept as +true only such parts of the various confessions as are in harmony with +it. + +The churches, naturally, put themselves on the defensive against this +spirit, but against the strong general convictions of the age they are +unable in the long run to hold out. Protestantism succumbs first, +because the elements already within it allow such considerations to +find easy access. It carries within itself impulses to rationalism, +inherited from Humanism, from Huldreich Zwingli (1484-1531) and from +the Italians Lælius (1525-1562) and Faustus Socinus (1539-1604), and +these impulses, hitherto suppressed, now find themselves set +free._(_30_)_ + +[pg 093] + +Catholicism shows itself more capable of resistance. Nothing in its +past makes it inclined to enlist under the banner of the spirit of the +age: its strong organization serves as a protection against this. Yet +it, too, has to yield considerably, and to allow its doctrines to +pass, so far as may be, for a symbolic expression of the religion of +reason. + +While utilitarian ethics are on the whole the product of the English +spirit, the whole of Europe takes part in the expounding of the +religion of reason. Herbert of Cherbury (1582-1648), John Toland +(1669-1722), Anthony Collins (1676-1729), Matthew Tindal (1655-1733), +David Hume (1711-1776), Pierre Bayle (1647-1706), Jean-Jacques +Rousseau (1712-1778), Voltaire (1694-1778), Denis Diderot (1713-1784), +Hermann Samuel Reimarus (1694-1768), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz +(1646-1716), Christian Wolff (1679-1754), Gotthold Ephraim Lessing +(1729-1781), Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786), and a host of others, +whether standing nearer to or further from the Church, and whether or +not going further than others in systematic criticism, all bring +stones for the erection of the great building in which the piety of +illuminated mankind is to live._(_31_)_ The researches in the history +of religion made by the Germans, like Johann Salomo Semler +(1725-1791), Johann David Michaelis (1717-1791), and Johann August +Ernesti (1707-1781), provide scientific data which throw light upon +the division between eternal truths and the time-conditioned +convictions of religion. + +The creed of the religion of reason is simply the optimistic-ethical +world-view reproduced in a Christian phraseology, that is in one +preserving within it the Christian theism, and the belief in +immortality. An all-wise and wholly benevolent Creator has produced +the world, and he upholds it in [pg 094] corresponding fashion. Men +are endowed with free will, and discover in their reason and their +heart the moral law which is meant to lead individuals and mankind to +perfection, and to accomplish in the world God’s highest purposes. +Every man has within him an indestructible soul, which feels his moral +life as the highest happiness, and after death enters a state of a +pure, spiritual existence. + +This belief in God, in virtue, and in immortality was held to have +been taught in its purest form in previous ages in the teaching of +Jesus, but it was acknowledged that elements of the same beliefs were +to be found in all the higher religions._(_32_)_ + +If the eighteenth century attained to an optimistic-ethical world-view +which preached itself so confidently and was so widely accepted, the +reason is that it was able to re-interpret Christianity—which had by +that time got rid of the world- and life-denial that was originally +inherent in it—in that sense. Jesus was to it a teacher who even in +his own age and then through all the intervening centuries had been +misunderstood, and was now first rightly accepted as a revealer of the +religion of reason. Let anyone read a rationalistic Life of Jesus, +such as those of Franz Volkmar Reinhard (1753-1812) or Karl Heinrich +Venturini (1768-1849)._(_33_)_ They hold Jesus up to admiration as the +champion of enlightenment and of blessings for the common people. This +transformation of the historical picture is made easier for them by +the fact that the chief component element of the Gospel narrative is +ethical teaching, while the late-Jewish pessimistic world-view which +it presupposes is hardly more than hinted at. + +[pg 095] + +As an immediate result of the wiping out of confessional differences +the middle of the eighteenth century sees the beginning of a period of +tolerance in place of the persecution of all rejecters of orthodoxy +which had been common till then. The last serious act of confessional +intolerance was expulsion of all evangelicals from the Salzburg +district by the Archbishop of that town, Count von Firmian, in the +years 1731 and 1732. + +About the middle of the century there begins also the movement of +opposition to the Jesuits, who were recognized as the enemies of +tolerance, and this led to the suppression of the order in 1773 by +Pope Clement XIV._(_34_)_ + +But the religion of reason fought superstition as well as intolerance. +In 1704 the philosopher and jurist of Halle, Christian Thomasius +(1655-1728), published his essays condemning trial for +witchcraft,_(_35_)_ and about the middle of the century the law courts +in most of the States of Europe refused to concern themselves any +longer with the crime of magic. The last death sentence on a witch was +passed in 1782 at Glarus, in Switzerland. + +About the end of the century it became good form to detest anything +which had even a remote connexion with superstitious convictions. + +Again, the will-to-progress of the eighteenth century deals with +nationalist prejudices in the same way as it deals with religious +ones. Above and beyond individual nations it points to mankind as the +great object towards which ideals are to be directed. Educated people +accustom themselves to see in the State not so much an organ of +national feeling as a mere organization for legal and economic +purposes. Cabinets may carry on war with each other, but in the +thought of the common people there grows up a recognition of the +brotherhood of nations. + +In the sphere of law, too, the will-to-progress acquires [pg 096] +strength. The ideas of Hugo Grotius get accepted. The law of reason is +exalted in the convictions of the men of the eighteenth century to a +position above all traditional maxims of jurisprudence. It alone is +allowed to have permanent authority, and legal decisions have to be in +harmony with it. Fundamental principles of law, but principles equally +indisputable everywhere, have to be deduced from human nature. To +protect these and to ensure to every human being a human value with an +inviolable measure of freedom of which he can never be robbed, is the +first task of the State. The proclamation of “the Rights of Man” by +the States of North America, and the French Revolution, do no more +than give recognition and sanction to what, in the convictions of the +time, had already been won. + +The first State in which torture was abolished was Prussia, and this +was secured by an administrative order of Frederick the Great’s in +1740. In France a certain amount of torture was practised down to the +Revolution— and somewhat later, for the thumb-screw was used under the +Directory during the examination which the royalist conspirators had +to undergo._(_36_)_ + +Side by side with the fight against absence of law and the existence +of inhuman laws, go efforts to adapt law to circumstances. Bentham +raises his voice against laws which tolerate usury, against senseless +customs duties, and against inhuman methods of colonization. + +There dawns an age in which the purposive and the moral are the ruling +authorities. Officialdom acquires during these generations familiarity +with the notions of duty and honour, which later become natural to it. +Far-reaching beneficial reforms are introduced into administration +without any outcry. + +The education of mankind in citizenship makes splendid progress. The +general good becomes the criterion of [pg 097] excellence both for the +commands of rulers and the obedience of their subjects, while at the +same time a beginning is made of securing that everyone shall be +educated in a manner corresponding to his human dignity and the needs +of his personal welfare. The war against ignorance is begun. + +The way is prepared, too, for a more rational method of living. Houses +are built so as to be more comfortable, and the land is better +cultivated. Even the pulpit uses its influence to promote improvements +of this kind. The theory that reason has been given to man to be used +consistently and in every department of life plays at this time an +important and beneficent part in the preaching of the Gospel, even if +the way in which this is done often makes queer demands on our belief. +Sermons, for example, often treated incidentally of the best methods +of manuring, irrigating, and draining the fields. That Jenner’s +discovery of vaccination was so readily adopted in many districts was +due to the enlightenment which was spread abroad by the clergy. + +Characteristic of the age of rationalism are the private societies +formed to promote the moral and utilitarian progress of mankind. In +1717 members of the higher ranks of society in London reorganize as +“The Order of Freemasons” the brotherhood which in earlier times had +been built up by the union in a single body of the members of the +mediæval building-lodges, but was now in a state of decay, and to this +new organization was assigned the duty of labouring to build up a new +humanity. About the middle of the century this order had spread all +over Europe, and reached the zenith of its success. Princes, +officials, and intellectuals alike joined it in great numbers, and +were inspired by it to the achievement of a huge amount of reform. + +Similar aims were pursued by the “Order of the Illuminate” (or +enlightened) which was founded in Bavaria in 1776, but was suppressed +in 1784 by the reactionary Bavarian Government, which was still under +the influence [pg 098] of the Jesuits. It is said to have been the +intellectual counterpart of the Jesuit order, on the model of whose +organization it was formed. + +That private societies aiming at the rational and moral perfecting of +mankind should work effectively seemed to the men of the eighteenth +century so much a matter of course that they assumed them to have +existed in earlier times. In a series of rationalist descriptions of +the life of Jesus it is assumed that the sect of the Essenes, near the +Dead Sea, of whom we learn from Josephus, the Jewish writer of the +first century A.D., was such an order, and that it was in touch with +similar brotherhoods in Egypt and India. Jesus, it is said, was +trained by them, and then helped by them to carry through the _rôle_ +of the Messiah, in order that with the authority given by a holy yet +popular personality he might work to spread true illumination. The +famous _Life of Jesus_ by Karl Venturini carries this assumption out +in complete detail. According to him, the miracles of Jesus were +staged by brothers of this secret association. + +Be that as it may, the fact that the will-to-progress of the +eighteenth century created for itself in these private societies +organizations which spread throughout Europe, contributed much to its +ability to influence the age. + +It must be admitted indeed that the men of the rationalistic period +were smaller than their achievements. True, they all possessed +personality, but it did not reach very deep. It was produced by the +enthusiasm which they found in the mentality of the time and which +they shared with all their contemporaries. The individual imbibed +personality through the taking over of a ready-made world-view, which +gave him firm standing-ground together with ideals. His own +contribution was really nothing more than the capacity for enthusiasm. +That is why the men of this age are so remarkably like one another. +They all graze side by side in the same nourishing pasture land. + +Nevertheless, the ideas of the purposive and the ethical [pg 099] have +never exercised so much influence over reality as they did among these +men of shallow optimism and sensitive morale. No book has been written +yet which fully describes their achievements, doing justice to their +origin, their character, their number, and their significance. We can +then only really comprehend what they accomplished when we recognize +the tragic fact that the most valuable part of it is lost to us, while +we do not feel in ourselves any ability to reproduce it. They were +masters of the facts of life to an extent which we are to-day quite +unable to realize. + +Only a world-view which accomplishes all that rationalism did has a +right to condemn rationalism. The greatness of that philosophy is that +its hands are blistered. + +Obstacles to the reform movement. The French Revolution + +The great work of reform is never completed, partly because external +circumstances arise which check it, but also because the world-view of +rationalism becomes convulsed from within. In its confidence in the +enlightening power of all that is in accordance with reason the +will-to-progress was inclined to underestimate the resisting power of +the traditional, and to wish to carry through reforms where minds had +not been sufficiently prepared for their reception. On these +unsuccessful advances followed reaction which permanently injured the +work. This was the case in south-eastern Europe. Joseph II. of +Austria, who was emperor from 1764 to 1790, is the type of the +reforming prince. He discontinued the use of torture, opposed the +infliction of the death penalty, abolished serfdom, gave the Jews full +civic rights, introduced a new method of legislation and a new system +of legal administration, took away all class privileges, contended for +the equality of all before the law, protected the oppressed, founded +schools and hospitals, guaranteed the freedom of the Press and freedom +of domicile, abolished all State monopolies, and promoted the +development of agriculture and industry. + +[pg 100] + +But he is a ruler in the wrong place. He decrees these reforms and +then similar shocks, one after another, in countries which, being in +spiritual things still wholly under the dominion of the Catholic +Church of that time, are not prepared for them, and moreover in other +things as well display a specially backward attitude, because they +belong to the zone in which the Europe of that day passed over into +Asia. The Emperor is therefore unable to count upon either any +willingness to make sacrifices in the classes which are to give up +their privileges, or upon any understanding of his ideas in the common +people. In his attempts to organize the monarchy as a unity and in an +effective way for practical purposes, he comes into conflict with the +nationalities themselves of which it is composed. The reduction in the +number of the religious houses, which he undertakes out of economic +considerations, with the introduction of the freedom of the Press and +of a system of State education, bring on him the hostility of the +Church. Finally, because he is a ruler in the wrong place, this noble +reforming emperor dies of a broken heart, while Europe, because the +will-to-progress in Austria can accomplish nothing even at the time of +its greatest strength, owing to unfavourable circumstances, is +condemned to a period of the deepest misery over the problems of that +huge State, which have in this way been rendered insoluble, and over +the portion of Asia beyond it along the southern Danube. + +In France, too, the wrong men are in control. There the spread of the +new ideas prepares the way splendidly for reform, but the reforms are +not undertaken, because its rulers cannot understand the signs of the +times, and allow the State to collapse in ruin. Consequently the +reform movement has to take the road of violence, whereby it slips +away from the guidance of the educated, and falls into the hands of +the mob, from which it is taken by the powerful genius of Napoleon. +Native of an island in which the Europe of that day passed over into +Africa, and lacking all [pg 101] deeper education, he is uninfluenced +by the valuable convictions of his time. Guided solely by the force of +his own personality, he decides what is to happen in Europe, and hurls +it into wars through which it sinks into misery. Thus from East and +from West alike disaster overtakes the work of the will-to-progress. + +The French Revolution is a snowstorm falling upon trees in blossom. A +transformation which promises great things is in progress, but +everywhere softly and slowly. Extraordinarily valuable results are +being prepared in the thoughts of men. Provided that circumstances +remain even tolerably near the normal, there stands before humanity in +Europe an extraordinarily desirable development. But in place of that +there sets in a chaotic period of history in which the +will-to-progress has to cease more or less completely from its work, +and becomes a bewildered spectator. The first stage of the advance of +reforming thought, thought bent with full consciousness of its aims on +securing the practical and the ethical, comes to a complete stop. + +An experience for which it was in no wise prepared now falls to the +lot of the will-to-progress. Up to this time it had always been a more +or less obsolescent reality with which it had had to come to terms. In +the French Revolution, however, and in the following period, it +becomes familiar with a reality which has at its disposal elemental +forces. Up to this time the only factor to be reckoned with had been +the force of originality exercised by rational thought. In Napoleon it +has to learn to recognize as power a personality with creative genius +of its own. + +By his reorganization of France, a magnificent work but concerned only +with the technical matters of administration, Napoleon creates a new +State. His work, too, has had the way prepared for it by the labour of +rationalism, so far as this upset the equilibrium of the old and made +current the idea of something new but necessary. But the new State +which now comes into existence is not the State [pg 102] which is +ethical and in harmony with reason, but merely the State which works +well. Its achievements compel our admiration. In the nursery garden +which the will-to-progress was laying out in order to plant it with +noble flowers an individual ploughs for himself a piece of ordinary +arable land which at once produces an excellent crop. With the +elemental creative forces of reality revealing their power in so +imposing a fashion, the noble but unoriginal spirit of the age, with +all its higher aims, finds itself in a state of instability from which +it never completely recovers. Hegel, who saw Napoleon ride past after +the Battle of Jena, tells us that he then saw the World-spirit on +horseback. In these words we can hear all the confused spiritual +experience of that time expressing itself. + +The undermining of the rationalistic world-view + +There now sets in a development which works against the spirit of the +times, and the hitherto unopposed authority of the rational ideal is +undermined. Forces in reality which are not guided by it, obtain +recognition. + +While the will-to-progress remains an amazed spectator of events, +respect for what is historical recovers itself, though it seemed to +have been banished for ever. In religion, in art, and in law, men +begin, though at first only quite shyly, to look again with other eyes +on the traditional. It is no longer reckoned as merely something which +is to be replaced, but men venture to admit to themselves that it +conceals within itself original values. The forces of reality, which +had been taken by surprise, now begin everywhere to act on the +defensive, and a guerilla warfare develops against the +will-to-progress. + +The various religious bodies revoke the abdications which they had +made before the religion of reason. The law which has grown up in the +course of time begins to set itself in opposition to the law laid down +by reason. In the atmosphere of passion produced by the Napoleonic +wars, [pg 103] national thought takes on a new character, directing on +itself, and beginning to absorb, the universal enthusiasm for ideals. +The struggles carried on no longer by chancelleries but by whole +nations are fatal to the ideals of cosmopolitanism and national +brotherhood, and by this awakening of national thought a whole series +of political problems affecting the whole of Europe are rendered +insoluble. Just as the organization of Austria as a unified modern +State has now become impossible, so also has the civilizing of Russia, +and the destiny of Europe, viz. to be shipwrecked over these +territories which are in it but not of it, begins to reveal itself. + +At the close of the Napoleonic era the whole of Europe is in a +condition of misery. Far-seeing ideas of reform can be neither thought +out nor worked out; only extemporized palliative measures suit the +time. The will-to-progress is therefore unable to recover its former +vigour. + +It is fatally affected, too, by the fact that everybody with any +capacity for independent thought feels himself attracted by this new +valuation of things and facts, and thereby drawn on to irritation at +the one-sided, doctrinaire character of the rationalist way of looking +at life. + +Nevertheless, the position of the will-to-progress is far from being a +critical one. The first attacks are made by Romanticism and the +feeling for reality, but are mere outpost-skirmishes, and for a long +time yet the will-to-progress remains master of the field. Bentham +remains still the great authority. Alexander II. of Russia, Tsar from +1801 to 1825, instructs the legislative commission which he sets up to +obtain on all doubtful points the opinion of the great Englishman. +Madame de Staël expresses the opinion that the fateful period she has +lived through will one day be called by posterity not the Napoleonic +age but the Benthamite._(_37_)_ + +The noblest men of the period still live in the unshaken [pg 104] +conviction that nothing can delay the speedy and conclusive victory of +the purposive and moral. The philosophically minded mathematician and +astronomer, the Marquis Marie Jean de Condorcet (1743-1794), though +put by the Jacobins upon the list of the proscribed, writes, while +living in concealment in Paris in a dismal room in the Rue des +Fossoyeurs, his _Historical Sketch of the Progress of the Human +Spirit_._(_38_)_ Then, having been betrayed, he wanders about the +Clamart quarries, is recognized by the labourers, in spite of his +disguise, as an aristocrat, and while confined in the prison of Bourg +la Reine, puts an end to his life by poison. The document in which he +gave his exposition of the ethical belief in progress concludes with a +forward glance at the time, now soon to appear, when reason, having +attained a position of permanent sovereignty, will put every human +being in possession of the rights which belong to man as man, and will +establish purposive and ethical relations in every department of life. + +There is one thing, it must be admitted, which Condorcet and those who +share his views overlook. Their belief that the final result will be +good might be considered justifiable if the will-to-progress had been +endangered only through unfavourable outward circumstances, the +revival, that is, of the higher estimation of reality, and the +romantic idealizing of the past. But it is threatened far more +seriously by something else than it is by them. The assurance +displayed by rationalism rests on the fact that it regards the +optimistic-ethical world-view as something proved to be correct. But +it is not that. It rests like the world-views of Confucius and the +Later Stoics on a naïve interpretation of the world. All deeper +thought, therefore, even if it is not directed against rationalism, or +even if it aims at strengthening its position, must in the long run +have a damaging effect upon it. Hence Kant and Spinoza mean doom to +it. Kant undermines it by his attempt to [pg 105] provide a deeper +foundation for the essence of the ethical. Spinoza, the thinker of +the seventeenth century, brings it to confusion when his +nature-philosophy begins, a hundred years after his death, to occupy +people’s attention. + +It is about the beginning of the new century, the nineteenth, just +when the pressure exerted by material and spiritual circumstances +alike begins to make itself felt, that the optimistic-ethical +world-view begins to suspect the existence of the serious problems +which are cropping up within it. + + + + +[pg 106] + +CHAPTER IX + +THE OPTIMISTIC-ETHICAL WORLD-VIEW IN KANT + + +Kant’s ethics, deepened, but lacking content + +SO far as the general tendency of his thought goes Immanuel Kant +(1724-1804) lives entirely in the optimistic-ethical world-view of +rationalism._(_39_)_ He has, however, a feeling that its foundations +are not deep and firm enough, and he regards it as his task to put +them on ground which is in every respect more secure. For this purpose +a deeper ethic, and a less naïve positiveness in assertions about +world-view which touch upon the supra-sensible, seem to him desirable. + +Like the English intellectualists and intuitionists, Kant is offended +by the idea that the ethic in which the modern age finds satisfaction +and its impulse to activity is rooted merely in considerations of the +universal advantage of morally good actions. Like them, he feels that +it is something more than this, and that in the ultimate analysis it +has its origin in the compulsion which men experience to strive for +self-perfecting. But while his predecessors stick fast in the matter +provided by semi-scholastic philosophy and theology, he attacks the +problem along the lines of pure ethical thought. It follows for him +that the fundamental origin and the exalted character of the moral can +be preserved only if we always consciously make it an end in itself, +and never merely a means to an end. Even if moral conduct prove itself +to be always advantageous and practical, our motive to it must +nevertheless always be a [pg 107] purely inward compulsion. The +utilitarian ethic must abdicate before that of immediate and sovereign +duty. That is the meaning of the doctrine of the categorical +imperative. + +The English anti-utilitarians had in common with the utilitarians the +thought that the moral law was related in its essence to empirical +natural law. Kant, however, asserts that it has nothing to do with the +order of nature, and has its origin in supra-natural impulses. He is +the first since Plato to feel, like him, that the ethical is the +mysterious fact within us. In powerful language he proves in the +_Critique of the Practical Reason_ that ethics are a volition which +raises us above ourselves, makes us free from the natural order of the +world, and attaches us to a higher world-order. That is his great +discovery. + +In the development of it, however, he is not happy. Whoever asserts +the absoluteness of moral duty, must also give the moral an absolute +and completely universal content. He must specify a principle of +conduct which shows itself as absolutely binding, and as lying at the +foundations of the most varied ethical duties. If he does not succeed +in doing this, his work is only a fragment. + +When Plato announces that ethics are something supra-natural and +puzzling, his world-view provides him with a basic principle of the +ethical which corresponds to these qualities, and also has a definite +content. He is in a position to define ethics as a process of becoming +pure and free from the world of sense. This, his own special ethic, he +develops in the passages where he is consistent with himself. Then, +when he cannot complete his argument without an active ethic, he has +recourse to the popular theory of virtue. + +Kant, however, as a child of the modern spirit, cannot let world- and +life-denial rank as an ethic. Therefore, since he can go only a part +of the way with Plato, he sees himself faced with the confusing task +of letting a purposive, activist ethic which is directed on the +empirical world originate in impulses which are not determined by any +adaptation to the empirical. + +[pg 108] + +He can find no solution of the problem thus set. In the form which he +gives it it is in fact insoluble. But he never even realises that he +has arrived at the problem of finding a basic principle of the moral +which is a necessity of thought. He is content with formally +characterizing ethical duty as absolutely binding. That duty, unless a +real content is at once given to it, remains an empty concept, he is +unwilling to admit. For the exalted character of his basic principle +of the moral he pays the price of having it devoid of all content. + +Beginnings of an attempt to establish a basic moral principle which +has a content are to be found in his treatise, _Prolegomena to a +Metaphysic of Morals_ (1785), and again later in _A Metaphysic of +Morals_ (1797). In the 1785 volume he arrives at the dictum: “Act in +such a way that you use every human being both in your own person and +in everyone else’s always as an end, never merely as a means.” But +instead of seeing how far the totality of ethical duties can be +developed out of this principle, he prefers in the 1797 treatise to +set before ethics two ends to be aimed at, viz. the perfecting of +oneself and the happiness of others, and to enlarge upon the virtues +which promote them. + +In his investigation of the ethic which aims at personal perfecting, +he drives his gallery with sure instinct towards the recognition that +all virtues which contribute thereto must be conceived of as +manifestations of sincerity and of reverence for one’s own spiritual +being. He does not, however, go the length of comprehending these two +as a unity, just as little does he concern himself to make clear the +inner connexion between self-perfecting and effort directed to the +common good, and in that way to dig down to the roots of the ethical +as such. + +How far Kant is from understanding the problem of finding a basic +moral principle which has a definite content can be seen from the fact +that he never gets beyond an utterly narrow conception of the ethical. +He persists obstinately in drawing the boundary of his ethic as close +[pg 109] as possible, making it concerned with no duties beyond those +of man to man. The relation of man to non-human existences he does not +draw within it. It is only indirectly that he includes in it the +prohibition of cruelty to animals, putting this among the duties of +man to himself. By inhuman treatment of animals, he says, sympathy +with their sufferings is blunted in us, and thereby “comes a weakening +of a natural disposition which is very helpful to our morality in +relation to other men, and it gradually dies out.” + +Again as to the vandalism of the destruction of what is beautiful, in +the form, that is, of natural objects which are viewed as entirely +without feeling, this is said to be unethical only because it violates +the duty of man to himself by undermining the desire—itself a support +to morality—of having something to love without regard to utility. + +If the sphere of the ethical is limited to the relations of man to +man, then all attempts to reach a basic principle of the moral with an +absolutely binding content are rendered hopeless beforehand. The +absolute demands the universal. If there really is a basic principle +for the moral, it must be concerned in some way or other with the +relations between man and life as such in all its manifestations. + +Kant, then, does not essay the task of developing an ethic which +corresponds to his deepened conception of the ethical. On the whole he +does nothing more than put the current utilitarian ethic under the +Protectorate of the Categorical Imperative. Behind a magnificent +façade he constructs a block of tenements. + +His influence on the ethics of his time is twofold. He furthers it by +challenging it to profounder reflection on the nature of the ethical +and the ethical destiny of man. At the same time he is a danger to it +in that he robs it of its simplicity. The strength of the ethic of the +age of reason lies in its naïve utilitarian enthusiasm. It directly +enlists men in its service by offering them good aims and objects. +Kant makes it insecure by bringing this directness in question and +calling for an ethic which is derived from much less elementary +considerations. Depth is gained at [pg 110] the cost of vitality, +because he fails to establish at the same time a basic moral principle +with a content, a principle which compels acceptance from deep and yet +elementary considerations. + +Several times Kant actually makes it his object to block the natural +sources of morality. He will not, for example, allow direct sympathy +to be regarded as ethical. The inner feeling for the suffering of +another as if it were one’s own is not to count as duty in the real +sense of the word, but only as a weakness by which the evil in the +world is doubled. All help to others must have its source in a +reasoned consideration of the duty of contributing to the happiness of +others. + +By taking from ethics their simplicity and directness, Kant also +loosens the connexion which they and the belief in progress had formed +with one another, and through which the two together had proved so +productive of good. The disastrous separation between them which later +on, in the course of the nineteenth century, became complete, was +partly due to him. + +In consequence of his wishing to drive out the naïve rationalistic +conception of the ethical in favour of a deepened one without at the +same time being in a position to establish a basic principle of it +which has been correspondingly deepened, has a definite content of its +own, and is directly convincing, Kant brings the ethics of his time +into danger. He labours at the provision of new foundations without +remembering that the house will develop cracks, if it is not propped +up sufficiently. + +Kant’s attempt to reach an ethical world-view + +Kant passes by the problem of finding a basic principle of the moral +with a definite content, because, while attempting to deepen the +concept of the ethical, he pursues an object which lies outside +ethics. He wishes to bring ethical idealism into connexion with an +idealistic representation of the world which has its source in a +theory of knowledge. But [pg 111] from that source he hopes there will +come an ethical world-view able to satisfy critical thought. + +Why has Kant with a rigorism which intentionally depreciates ordinary +moral experience ventured forward to the discovery that the moral law +has nothing to do with the natural world-order, but is something +super-sensible? Because he refuses, similarly, to let the sensible +world which is experienced by us in space and time be accepted as +anything more than a manifestation of something nonsensible which +makes up true reality. The concept of a moral which contains none but +inward and spiritual duties is for him the expanding ladder which he +draws out so as to reach by means of it the region of Being in itself. +He has no feeling of dizziness when in company with ethics, he mounts +above all empirical experience and all empirical aims and objects. He +is determined to go right up with her, and she can never be +sufficiently _a priori_ for him, because he sets up another ladder of +the same length, that of epistemological idealism, and tries to lean +one against the other, so that they may give each other mutual +support. + +How does it come about that the theoretical assumption that the world +of sensible phenomena has a non-sensible world of Being lying behind +it, has any importance for world-view? Because within the notion of +absolute duty which man experiences at work within himself there lies +a fact of the world-order of that same non-sensible world. Hence +arises the possibility, so Kant thinks, of raising to certainty by +means of ethics those great elements in the non-sensible world which +are of value for the optimistic-ethical world-view, viz. the ideas of +God, of the ethical freedom of the will, and of immortality, which +otherwise would always remain merely problematical. + +So far as rationalism affirms unhesitatingly from the standpoint of +theoretical knowledge the ideas of God, of the ethical freedom of the +will (_i.e._, of virtue), and of immortality, which make up its +optimistic-ethical world-view, it builds upon a foundation which +cannot bear the weight of critical thought. Kant wishes, therefore, to +erect the [pg 112] optimistic-ethical world-view as a lake-dwelling +upon piles rammed into place by ethics. These three ideas are to be +able to claim real existence for themselves as necessary postulates of +the ethical consciousness. + +This plan, however, of thus securing the position of the +optimistic-ethical world-view cannot be carried out. It is only the +idea of the ethical freedom of the will that can be made a postulate +of the moral consciousness. To establish the ideas of God and +immortality as equally “postulates,” Kant has to abandon all +honourable logic and argue with bold and ever bolder sophisms. + +There is no way of uniting epistemological and ethical idealism, +however enticing the undertaking looks at first sight. When they are +set side by side, the happenings which take place according to a law +of causation subordinate to freedom, and become conscious in man +through the moral law, become identified with the happenings which are +universal in the world of things in themselves. There ensues a +disastrous confusion of the ethical with the intellectual. If the +sensible world is only a manifestation of an immaterial world, then +all the happenings which come about in the space and time sphere of +causation produced by necessity are only parallel appearances of the +events which are brought about in the intellectual sphere of causation +produced by freedom. All happenings, therefore, human activity just as +much as natural happening, are, according to the point of view, at +once intellectual and free, and at once natural and necessary. If +ethical activity produced by freedom is represented as analogous with +the results of epistemological idealism, then either everything that +happens in the world, conceived as intellectual happening, is ethical, +or there is no such thing as an ethical happening. Because it has +chosen to put side by side these two things, human activity and +natural happening, Kant’s way of looking at the question has to +renounce all ability to maintain the difference between them. But the +very life of ethics depends on this difference being there and +effective. + +[pg 113] + +Epistemological idealism is a dangerous companion for the ethical. The +world-order of immaterial happening has a supra-ethical character. +From the setting side by side of ethical and epistemological idealism +there can never result an ethical world-view: it will always be a +supra-ethical one. + +From epistemological idealism, therefore, ethics have nothing to +expect, but everything to fear. By its depreciation of the reality of +the empirical world the ethical world-view is not helped: it is +injured. + +Ethics have materialist instincts. They want to concern themselves +with empirical happenings and transform the circumstances of the +empirical world. But if that world is only “appearance,” derived from +an intellectual world which functions within it or behind it, ethics +have nothing on which to act. To wish to influence a self-determined +play of appearances has no sense. Ethics can therefore allow validity +to the view that the empirical world is mere appearance only with the +limitation that activity exerted upon the appearance does at the same +time influence the reality lying behind it. But thereby they come into +conflict with all epistemological idealism. + +Kant is defeated by the same fate which rules in Stoic, Indian, and +Chinese monism alike. As soon as thought tries in any way to +comprehend ethics in connexion with the world-process, it falls at +once, whether it is conscious of it or not, into the supra-ethical +manner of regarding it. Fully to shape ethics to an ethical world-view +means letting them come to terms with nature-philosophy. Ethics are +thereupon, as a matter of fact, devoured in one way or another by that +philosophy, even if they are in word saved from that fate. The +coupling of ethical idealism with epistemological is only bringing +ethics and nature-philosophy into relation with one another in a +roundabout way by which it is hoped to outwit the logic of facts. But +this logic cannot be outwitted. The tragical result lies in the +identification which has been made of the ethical with the +intellectual. + +[pg 114] + +The ethical is not something irrational which becomes explicable when +we betake ourselves from the world of appearance to the region of +immaterial Being that lies behind it. Its intellectual character is of +a peculiar kind, and rests upon the fact that the world-process, as +such, comes in man into contradiction with itself. It follows that the +ethical will and ethical freedom of the will are not explicable by any +theory of knowledge, and cannot, moreover, serve as a support to any +such theory. + +As a result of conceiving the moral law and empirical obedience to +natural law as in absolute opposition to each other, Kant finds +himself on the road which leads to a dualistic world-view. Afterwards, +however, in order to satisfy the claims of the unitary and optimistic +world-view which the spirit of the age prescribes to him, he manages +with the stratagems which are provided for him by the combination of +ethical and epistemological idealism, to work himself back on to the +road which leads to the monistic point of view. + +Kant is great as an ethical thinker, great too with his theory of +knowledge, but as shaper of a world-view he is not in the first rank. +By his deepened conception of the nature of the ethical, a conception +which lands him in dualistic thought, the problem of the +optimistic-ethical world-view is unfolded in an entirely new way. +Difficulties reveal themselves which till then no one could have +imagined to exist. But he does not deal with them. He is blinded by +his ambition to be the Copernicus of the optimistic-ethical +world-view, believing that he can show the difficulties inherent in +that view to be misunderstandings which explain themselves away as +soon as, by means of his epistemological idealism, actual +circumstances and relations take the place of these which are apparent +but inexplicable. In reality he does nothing but replace the naïve +optimistic-ethical interpretation of the world which was the basis of +action for the rationalists by an artfully contrived one. + +He does not take the trouble to ask in what the optimistic [pg 115] +ethical world-view consists, to what final items of knowledge and +demands it leads, and how far these are confirmed by experience of the +moral law. He takes it over without examination in the formula: “God, +Freedom (or Virtue), and Immortality,” which was supplied to it by +rationalism, and wishes to raise it in this naïve form to a certainty. + +There is thus in Kant’s philosophy the most terrible want of thought +interwoven with the deepest thinking. New truths, weighty in their +novelty, make their appearance in it. But they get only half-way on +their journey. The absoluteness of ethical duty is grasped, but its +content is not investigated. Experience of the ethical is recognized +as the great secret by means of which we comprehend ourselves as +“other than the world”; but the dualistic thinking which goes with it +is not worked out any further. That the final items of our knowledge +of our world-view are assertions of the ethical will is admitted, but +the consequences of this supremacy of the will over knowledge are not +thought out to a conclusion. + +Kant stimulates powerfully the men of his time, but is unable to make +secure for them the optimistic-ethical world-view in which they have +lived. His mission is, although both he and they are content to +deceive themselves in the matter, to deepen it, and ... to let it +become less secure than before. + + + + +[pg 116] + +CHAPTER X + +NATURE-PHILOSOPHY AND WORLD-VIEW IN +SPINOZA AND LEIBNIZ + + +Spinoza’s attempt to reach an optimistic-ethical nature-philosophy + +JUST when Kant is beginning to influence men’s minds, the entirely +different ideas of a thinker who had now been dead for a century, +Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677),_(_40_)_ begin to interest those who are +searching for a world-view. The _Critique of Pure Reason_ appears in +1781. In 1785 F. H. Jacobi in his letters addressed to Moses +Mendelssohn, _Concerning the Teaching of Spinoza_, draws attention +once more to the philosopher whom hitherto everyone had attacked +without making any effort to understand him. + +Spinoza desires to obtain an ethic from a real nature-philosophy. He +makes no attempt to give an optimistic-ethical interpretation of the +universe, or to refashion it with any theory of knowledge. He accepts +it just as it is in every respect. His philosophy is therefore +elementary nature-philosophy, but his method of expounding it is by no +means elementary. Acquiescing in the way Descartes puts the problem +and the language he uses, he makes his own thought about the universe +proceed “in geometrical fashion” in a series of axioms, definitions, +precepts, and proofs. Nature-philosophy is embodied in his +philosophizing in a magnificent way, but it is as stiff as an +ice-bound landscape. + +His chief work—published after his death, because he could not venture +to publish it himself—he entitles _Ethics_. The [pg 117] title is +confusing, because the nature-philosophy in it is developed almost as +completely as the ethics. It is only when the reader has shaken +himself free of all naïve conceptions in his thought about the +universe that he can be permitted, according to Spinoza, to begin upon +ethics. The fact that ethics too are broken up into precepts which are +given as proved is very prejudicial to their exposition. + +In his attempt to found ethics upon nature-philosophy, Spinoza +proceeds as follows. Everything that exists, he says, is given in that +infinite Being, which may be called either God or Nature. For us, and +to us, it presents itself in two forms: as thought (spirit) and as +corporeity (matter). Within this divine nature everything, human +activity included, is determined by necessity. There is no such thing +as doing, there are only happenings. The meaning of human life, +therefore, cannot consist in action, but only in coming to an ever +clearer understanding of man’s relation to the universe. Man becomes +happy when besides belonging to the universe naturally, he also +surrenders himself to it consciously and willingly, and loses himself +spiritually within it. + +Spinoza demands therefore a higher experience of life. With the Stoics +and the thinkers of India and China, he belongs to the great family of +the monistic and pantheistic nature-philosophers. Like them, he +conceives of God merely as the sum-total of nature, and accepts as +valid only the notion of God which makes him in this way an +independent unity. The attempts, made in the interests of the ethical +world-view, to allow God to be at the same time an ethical personality +standing outside the universe, are to him an offence against thought. +Their only object is, of course, to obtain with the help of a +confessed or unconfessed dualism a starting-point for an +optimistic-ethical world-view. They are striving to reach along +naïve-religious by-roads the goal for which the rationalistic +optimistic-ethical interpretation of the universe is making along the +direct, but not less naïve, main-road. + +[pg 118] + +The tragic result of monistic thinking in the Stoic, the Indian, and +the Chinese philosophies is that nature-philosophy, when consistent, +arrives only at resignation, not at ethics. Has Spinoza escaped this +fate? + +Like Lao-tse, Chwang-tse, Lie-tse, and the Chinese thinkers as a body, +Spinoza champions an optimistic monism without suspecting that under a +far-away heaven and in a far-off age, he had such great +predecessors._(_41_)_ His resignation is of a world- and +life-affirming character. He conceives of infinite Being not as +something devoid of qualities, as the Indians do, but as life with a +full content. The self-perfecting, therefore, for which man is to +strive is not for him, as it is for them, in any way an anticipation +of a state of death, but a living out of life which is guided by deep +reflexion. An elegantly egoistic world- and life-affirmation speaks +through him, as through Chwang-tse. + +The efforts of the man who refuses to deceive himself about himself +are not directed, therefore, to any sort of action which is recognized +as serviceable, but are concerned with maintaining his own Being and +giving it the fullest possible experience of life. Whatever good he +does to others he never does for their sakes, but always for his own. + +Spinoza rejects the achievement of modern ethics as influenced by +Christianity, viz. the regarding of altruism as something that belongs +to the essence of ethics, and confines himself to the thought that in +the last resort all ethical action aims at our own interests, though +it may be at our highest spiritual ones. In order to avoid thinking +anything which is not a necessity of thought, he goes back of his own +free will into the captivity in which ancient ethics lived. + +If he could let himself go, he would, like Chwang-tse, conduct a +campaign against the morality of love and duty. But since he already +has as thoroughgoing opponents the [pg 119] authorities, the +theologians, whether Jewish or Christian, and almost every +philosopher, he has to speak cautiously and offer mankind without +attracting notice the life-view which advocates profound and thinking +egoism. + +Just as God, the totality of universal Being, acts not with any aim or +object but from an inner necessity, so also does the man who has +attained to insight. He does only what contributes to complete +experience of life, nothing else. Virtue is capacity for +self-maintenance at the highest level, and this self-maintenance is +attained to when reason is the highest motive to action, and efforts +after knowledge and freedom from passion take possession of the man +and make him free, that is, allow his conduct to be determined by +himself alone and on purely inward grounds. The ordinary man is +unstable, moved hither and thither in all sorts of ways by outward +causes, with no idea of his future fortune or his final fate, like a +ship that is tossed about, now here, now there, on a stormy sea. +Ethics, therefore, consists in living our life more in the form and +fashion given it by thought than in bodily actuality. + +Acting, therefore, with a deep, enlightened egoism and purely from +intellectual impulses, a man behaves nobly in every relation of life. +He strives to requite hatred, indignation, and contempt with love and +noble feeling, because he knows that hatred causes him discomfort. He +seeks at any price to create around him an atmosphere of peace. He +never acts deceitfully, but always straightforwardly. He has no need +to feel sympathy. Since he lives entirely under the guidance of +reason, he does good whenever the opportunity offers, on principle, +and therefore does not need to be roused to noble feeling by any +experience of discomfort. In fact he avoids sympathy. Again and again +he makes it clear to himself that everything that happens is brought +about by some necessity in the divine nature and in obedience to +eternal laws. Just as he finds nothing in the world which deserves +hatred, mockery, and contempt, so he finds in it nothing to evoke +sympathy. [pg 120] Man must be ever striving to be virtuous and happy, +and if he is conscious of having done good within the limits of what +is commanded him, he can with an easy mind leave his fellow-men and +the world to their fate. Beyond the possibilities of his own immediate +activities he need have nothing to do with them. + +The wise man who practises the higher life-affirmation possesses +power. He has power over himself, power over his fellow-men, and power +over circumstances. How very similar is the tone of Spinoza’s thought +to that of Lao-tse, Chwang-tse, and Lie-tse! + +Spinoza lives out his own ethic. In contented independence he passes +his life, till consumption brings it to an early close. He declines an +invitation to be lecturer in philosophy at Heidelberg University. He +is strict with himself, but his resignation is lighted up by a mild +trait of considered humanity and friendliness. The persecutions to +which he is exposed fail to embitter him. + +Intent though he is on thinking only in accordance with pure +nature-philosophy, Spinoza does not concern himself so exclusively +with the two natural entities, nature herself and the individual man, +as do many of his Chinese predecessors, but maintains an interest in +organized society. He is convinced that it betokens progress when men +change, from the “natural” stage of society to the “civic.” Being +formed for living with his fellows, man is freer if he settles by +general agreement what belongs to each, and what the relations are to +be between himself and society. The State must, therefore, have power +to issue general orders as to how people are to live, and to secure +respect for its laws by means of penalties. + +A real devotion of oneself to the common weal appears, however, to +Spinoza not to be called for. According to him the perfect human +society appears of itself just in proportion as its individual members +live according to reason. In contrast, therefore, to his contemporary, +Hobbes, Spinoza looks for the progress of society not to the [pg 121] +measures taken by the authorities, but to a growth towards perfection +in the dispositions of their subjects. The State is to educate its +citizens not to submissiveness, but to the right use of freedom. In no +way must it do any injury to their sincerity, and it must therefore +tolerate all religious views. + +Far as Spinoza goes to meet the spirit of the age, there is one point +on which he cannot agree with it, viz. that there are ethical aims and +objects, aims and objects practical and purposive, to be realized in +the world. + +Advancing far ahead of his contemporaries, he reaches a universal +notion of ethics, and recognizes that from the standpoint of +consistent thinking, every ethical relation is nothing but an +expression of the relation of the individual to the universe. When, +however, ethics have in this way become universal, they are faced by +the question how the relation of the individual to the universe is +conceivable as producing an effect upon the universe. On the answer to +this question it depends whether a real activist ethic can be +established, or whether the ethical is only so far present as +resignation can be explained as ethical. + +That is the reef which threatens danger to all nature-philosophy, and +whenever a thinker imagines that with clever seamanship and a +favourable wind he can sail round it without coming to grief upon it, +he is nevertheless finally driven upon it, as by submarine currents, +and suffers the same fate as his predecessors. Like Lao-tse and +Chwang-tse, like the Indians, the Stoics, and all self-consistent +thinkers before him, Spinoza is unable to furnish what ethics demand, +viz. that the relation of man to the universe shall be conceived of as +not merely a spiritual relation, but as active devotion to it in the +world of sense. The opponents of this solitary thinker are +instinctively conscious that with the re-establishment of an +independent nature-philosophy there appears something which means +danger to the optimism and the ethics of their world-view. Hence [pg +122] we find in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries everyone +uniting to suppress Spinoza’s philosophy. + +It is on behalf of optimism that the age is most troubled. The +terrible earthquake which in 1755 destroyed Lisbon, sets the mass of +men asking whether the world is really ruled by a wise and kindly +Creator. Voltaire, Kant, and many other thinkers of the age seize on +the occurrence as a topic for discussion, partly confessing their +perplexity, partly seeking new ways out of the difficulty for their +optimism. + +Leibniz’s optimistic-ethical world-view side by side with +nature-philosophy + +How little optimism and ethics have to expect from a real +nature-philosophy is shown not only in Spinoza, but also in Gottfried +Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716)._(_42_)_ In his _Theodicée_ (1710) he +tries to be fair to the optimistic world-view. He is helped in this by +the fact that his nature-philosophy is much more living and adaptable +than Spinoza’s. He is also determined to employ every possible device +to attach an optimistic meaning to reality. He nevertheless gets no +further than a laborious establishment of the conclusion that the +actually existing world is the best of all possible ones. + +Moreover, so much of optimism as he rescues is useless for his +world-view because it contains no energies which can be directed to +ethical action upon the world. When he is consistent with himself he +remains, like Spinoza, a prisoner within nature-philosophy. All the +difficulties for ethics which Spinoza’s deterministic +nature-philosophy contains within itself, are to be found also in his. +Owing to the fact that he does not put the union of thought (spirit) +and extension (matter) far away in the Absolute, but allows it to be +realized in countless tiny individualities [pg 123] which in their +totality constitute the universe—he calls them monads—his +nature-philosophy corresponds to the multiform character of reality +much better than Spinoza’s does. He anticipates to a considerable +extent the modern nature-philosophy which is based on the cell-theory +of matter. Yet he, too, remains under the spell of the way the problem +is put by Descartes. He does not allow the individualities in which +thought and extension are united, to enter into living relations with +each other, but limits their existence to being merely forces with +powers of conception. Their being consists in being conscious of the +universe, more clearly some, more confusedly others, but each +independent of the rest. + +In Spinoza there is a possibility of reaching an ethic, inasmuch as an +attempt can be made to give an ethical interpretation to the mystical +relation between man and the Absolute. Leibniz bars this path against +himself in that he does not recognize such an abstract Absolute as the +content of the universe. It is, therefore, not the result of chance +that he nowhere philosophizes searchingly about ethics. In no way can +an ethic be deduced from his nature-philosophy. + +Instead of admitting to himself this result and unfolding the problem +of the relation between ethics and nature-philosophy, he weaves into +his philosophy traditional dicta about ethics, and defines the Good as +love to God and man. + +In nature-philosophy Leibniz is greater than Spinoza, because he deals +with living reality more thoroughly than the latter does. In the +struggle for a correct world-view, however, he is far behind him, +because Spinoza, a man with a simpler mental endowment than his, +recognizes the reconciliation of ethics and nature-philosophy as the +central problem of world-view, and proceeds to deal with it. + +If Leibniz had remained consistent, he would have ended in atheism, as +does the Indian Samkhya philosophy, which similarly makes the world +consist of a multiplicity of [pg 124] eternal individualities. Instead +of that, he introduces into his nature-philosophy, in order to rescue +for himself a satisfactory world-view, a theistic notion of God, and +by giving it an optimistic, ethical, and theistic expression, he makes +it acceptable to the eighteenth century. His philosophy, popularized +till it is almost unrecognizable by Christian Wolff (1679-1754), helps +to lay the foundations of German rationalism. + +But in spite of the treason of which he is thus, though with the best +intentions, guilty against nature-philosophy, Leibniz cannot undo the +fact that thinking on nature-philosophy lines awoke at that time to +activity through him. Without wishing it, he too contributes to making +Spinoza an influence. + +But to let oneself be mixed up with nature-philosophy is for the +spirit of the time to step into the dangerous unknown. It therefore +resists as long as possible. At last, however, since Kant and Spinoza +together are undermining the optimistic-ethical world-view of +rationalism which has been built upon the real world and so +conveniently fitted up, it has to make up its mind to rebuild, and +attempt the process of arriving at a conception of optimism and ethics +by direct thinking on the essential nature of the world. For the +carrying out of this undertaking the German speculative philosophy +offers its services. + + + + +[pg 125] + +CHAPTER XI + +J. G. FICHTE’S OPTIMISTIC-ETHICAL WORLD-VIEW + + +Speculative philosophy and Gnosticism + +THE vision of an optimistic-ethical philosophy cast in one mould +hovers in front of speculative philosophy, which hopes to discover the +meaning of the world by the most direct route. It will have nothing to +do with analysing the phenomena of the universe in order to deduce its +nature from them. It proceeds deductively, not inductively. In pure +abstract thinking it hopes to learn for itself how the real world has +evolved out of the notion of Being. It is imaginative +nature-philosophy in a logical dress. + +The right to deal with the world in this fashion is derived by +speculative thought from the results of the theory of knowledge, +according to which the world as we observe it is more or less our own +representation of it. We have, somehow or other, a creative share in +its coming into existence. It follows that the logic which is the rule +with the finite ego is to be conceived as an emanation of that which +holds good with the Absolute. The individual is therefore entitled to +disclose in his own thinking the motives and the process of the +emanation of the empirical world out of the notion of Being. +Speculation, or in other words constructive logic, is the key to the +secret door into knowledge of the world. + +Generically, speculative German philosophy is essentially related to +the Græco-Oriental Gnosticism, which in the first centuries of the +Christian era advances its views concerning the emergence of the +sensible world from the world of pure Being._(_43_)_ The Gnostic +systems aim at establishing a world-view [pg 126] of redemption. They +concentrate on the question how the spiritual individualities which +find themselves in the material world came there, and how they can +return from it into the world of pure Being. Speculative German +philosophy on the other hand tries to obtain such a knowledge of the +world as shall give a meaning to the activities of the spiritual +individualities in the world. Speculative thinking at the beginning of +the Christian era is dualistic and pessimistic; that at the beginning +of the nineteenth is monistic and optimistic. In both cases, however, +the method of obtaining the world-view is the same. + +Among the representatives of the speculative philosophy the most +eminent are: Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), Friedrich Wilhelm +Joseph Schelling (1775-1854), and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel +(1770-1831). It is only Fichte and Hegel, however, who produce +world-views with a characteristic stamp of their own. Schelling gets +no further than a nature-philosophy, and stands almost completely +aside from the struggle for an optimistic-ethical world-view with +which his age is occupied. Kept in a perpetual state of flux, his +thinking makes use of all possible starting-points one after another +and is now more concerned with natural science, now more akin to +Spinoza’s thought, and now to Christian. He never makes a definite, +conscious attempt to found an ethic. + +Fichte’s speculative founding of an ethic and of optimism + +Fichte begins as the antipodes of Spinoza._(_44_)_ He aims at +extracting from the universe a confession that it is a purely [pg 127] +optimistic ethical one, by thinking Kant’s thoughts out to a +conclusion. + +Kant, according to him, made the mistake of not bringing his two +discoveries, viz. epistemological idealism and the ethic of the +categorical imperative into that inward connexion with one another in +which they really stand. + +What is the meaning of the fact that the moral law and the sensible +world both become actual in me? That is the starting-point of Fichte’s +philosophizing. + +Through the categorical imperative I experience that my particular ego +is a self-determined will to activity. Correspondingly, every “thing +in itself” which I assume to exist behind phenomena as the real on +which they are based, is similarly a self-determined will to activity. +The essential nature of infinite Being also can consist of nothing +else. The universe is, therefore, the phenomenal form of an infinite, +self-determined will to activity. + +Why does the absolute Ego appear as a phenomenon in a sensible world? +Why is Being revealed as Becoming? If I understand this, I have +comprehended the meaning of the world and of my own life. + +Now the absolute Ego, because it is infinite will to activity cannot +persist in being merely an Ego. It establishes a non-Ego to be a limit +to itself in order that it may again and again overcome it, and +thereby become conscious of itself as will to activity. This +proceeding takes place amid the multiplicity of finite rational +beings. In their power of intuition the sensible world becomes actual, +and in their overcoming of it they recognize a duty which makes itself +mysteriously felt within them and unites them with the world-spirit. +This is the meaning of the philosophy of the identity of Ego and +non-Ego. + +It is not only, then, that the world exists merely in my mental +creation of it: it is, further, only produced in me in order that I +may have something on which my will to fulfilment of duty can exercise +itself. The phenomena of becoming and disappearing which I project out +of myself [pg 128] exist only that I may through them comprehend +myself as an ethical being. In this way epistemological idealism and +the categorical imperative, when they act together and one climbs on +the shoulders of the other, can look behind the curtain which hides +the secret of the world. + +Kant protests against the idea that Fichte’s system is to be +considered the completion of his philosophy. As a matter of fact, +however, Fichte does with ingenious art continue the lines which were +begun in the _Critique of Pure Reason_ and the _Critique of the +Practical Reason_, and think out the ideas of the philosopher of +Königsberg to a self-contained world- and life-affirming ethical +world-view. He presents them in a generally intelligible form in _The +Destiny of Man_, published in 1800. This book is one of the most +powerful documents produced by the struggle for an ethical world-view. + +Fichte gives a content to the abstract, absolute duty of Kant, making +it consist in this, that man, as the instrument of the ever-active +absolute Ego, assigns to himself the destiny of working with the +latter “to bring the whole sensible world under the sovereignty of +reason.” + +Since his fundamental moral principle possesses a content, Fichte is +able to deduce particular demands from it, but that content is so +general and vague that the code of duty which is drawn out from it has +but little vital force. Nothing can really be got out of this +fundamental principle beyond the demand that man shall in every +situation of life fulfil the duties which from time to time fall to +him as a result of his destiny of having to help forward the +sovereignty of reason over nature. Fichte therefore distinguishes the +general duties which man, as such, has to fulfil, and the special ones +which are incumbent on him according to his natural gifts, his social +position, and his profession. The latter are emphasized as specially +important. + +By defining ethics as activity which aims at subjecting the sensible +world to reason, Fichte gives a cosmic formulation to the utilitarian +ethic of rationalism, and thus [pg 129] produces a comprehensive and +deep foundation for the ethical enthusiasm which was a discovery of +his time. In this matter also he carries through something which +hovered before the mind of Kant. + +Thereby he opposes the representatives of the popular philosophy of +the Illumination, and in a polemical pamphlet he criticizes very +severely Christoph Friedrich Nicolai. At bottom, however, the only +reproach he can level at them is that they wish to go on housing +ethics and belief in progress in the naïve world-view arrived at by +the healthy human reason instead of accepting both of them from the +world-view produced by the union of epistemological idealism and the +categorical imperative. To persist in imperfect rationalism when the +perfect has been made a reality by Kant and himself is, in his +opinion, a crime against truth. To him the beginning of wisdom is +insight into the paradox that “consciousness of the world of actuality +springs from our need of action and not, _vice versâ_, our need of +action from our consciousness of the world.” + +The spirit of Fichte’s world-view, then, is completely that of +rationalism, only that it believes it has found itself at home with +him in the real nature of Being, and now comes forward with still +stronger conviction and a still more burning enthusiasm. In Fichte’s +writings, men are positively driven with the lash to work for the +improvement of the world. With impressive pathos he teaches them to +obey the inner voice which urges them on to activity, and indicates to +them their definite duty whatever may be the special circumstances of +their existence, and to recognize in so doing that they are thus +fulfilling the highest, and indeed the only destiny of their lives. + +It is as the result of this inner urge to activity that we long for a +better world than the one which we see around us, and belief in that +better world is the food by which we live. Fichte makes confession of +unbounded optimism. “All those outbreaks of untamed force before which +human power is annihilated, those devastating hurricanes, [pg 130] +those earthquakes, those volcanic eruptions, can be nothing else than +the last wrestlings of the wild mass of nature against the uniformly +progressive, purposive, and life-promoting course to which, in +opposition to its own tendencies, it is being compelled.” . . . +“Nature is to become to us more and more transparent and capable of +examination even to its innermost secret, and enlightened human power, +armed with its own inventions, is destined to master it without +trouble, and then to exploit peacefully its once for all made +conquest.”_(_45_)_ Here Fichte gives us the triumphant pagan of the +belief in progress which the spirit of the modern age, that lives on +the achievements of its knowledge and power, has been composing since +the Renaissance. He is as thoroughly convinced as the staunchest +rationalist that nature is the buffalo which has remained refractory +so long, but will at last be brought beneath the yoke. + +That mankind will perfect itself and reach a condition of unbroken +peace, is to him as certain as the perfection that nature will one day +arrive at. At present, it is true, we are in a period of arrested +progress with temporary setbacks, but when this is past, and all +useful things which have been discovered at one end of the world, get +known to and distributed to all, then mankind, using its powers in +complete co-operation and marching forward in step, will raise itself +uninterruptedly, without arrest of progress or setback, to a culture +of which we can form no conception. + +To the State Fichte assigns in his early writings a not very important +_rôle_, but in his later ones a great one. In _The Foundations of the +Law of Nature_ (_Grundlage des Naturrechts_) (1796), it is for him +only the maintainer of law and order. In his work _The Complete +Commercial State_ (_Der geschlossene Handelsstaat_), which appeared in +1800, he allows it to organize industry and to take over social +duties. In his _Addresses to the German Nation_ (_Reden an die +deutsche Nation_, 1808), he makes it a moral educator and a protector +of the virtue of humanity. + +[pg 131] + +The man who, with the help of epistemological idealism, has made his +way through to the higher rationalism, is safe from losing his +optimism, even though he goes through the cruellest experiences. He +has grasped the fact that the sensible world is only the limit which +the infinitely active will has created on purpose to be overcome. This +lends him inward independence in the face of all happenings. He has no +need to understand them individually. He can let a large proportion of +them be put aside as puzzling to his finite spirit. What is essential +he knows: viz. that what is real in the world is not matter, but +spirit only. + +Partaking of the eternally active spirit, man is raised above the +world, and is eternal. The sufferings he meets with afflict nature +only “with which he is connected in a marvellous way,” but not +himself, the being who is exalted above the whole of nature. Of death +he has no fear. He does not die to himself, but merely to those who +survive him. . . . “All death in nature is birth. . . . Nature is +throughout nothing but life. It is not death which kills, but the +living life which, concealed behind the old one, now begins and +proceeds to develop. Death and birth are nothing but the struggle of +life with itself in an effort to reveal itself more and more clearly +and more and more like its real self.” It is in similar words that the +Chinese monist, Chwang-tse, announces that life is eternal and the +dying of an individual only means that one existence is being re-cast +to form another. . + +Fichte’s mysticism of activity incapable of being carried through + +Fichte’s philosophy of absolute activity is the expression of his own +strong ethical personality, which with impetuosity and self-sacrifice +takes problems in hand, and uses itself up in the strain involved. But +even he is unable to make a genuine combination of epistemological +idealism and ethical so as to produce an ethical world-view which is a +[pg 132] necessity of thought. The impossibility of the undertaking +reveals itself everywhere. + +In order to conceive ethics as a part of the normal course of +world-happenings, Fichte, like all others who make the same attempt, +gives up as hopeless any differentiation between human action and +world-happenings. The world-spirit’s impulse to activity, he says, +experiences itself in man as will to ethical action. But, indeed, the +whole world is filled with this will to activity which is for ever +surging against the limitations it has set up for itself. Everything +that happens is only an expression of it. What difference, then, is +there between natural happenings and ethical? Between activity in +itself and ethical activity? Purposive activity directed with +knowledge and intention to the subjection of the sensible world to +reason is ethical, decides Fichte. But what does that mean, when +closely examined? It means that the finite spirit becomes moral by +entering into and taking seriously the play of the infinite spirit +which aims at overcoming its own self-created limitations. Looking in +this way at Fichte’s thought, we see clearly that with the world-view +which results from the combination of ethical and epistemological +idealism, ethics have no longer any meaning. + +Again, what is the meaning of “bringing the whole of the sensible +world under the sovereignty of reason”? This conception of the ethical +is not only too wide, but fantastic also. To a limited extent man is +able to harness the forces of nature for his service, and with a +little stretching of language he can, with Fichte, describe such +action as not purposive merely, but also in the widest sense ethical. +Upon this terrestrial globe he has some “influence,” but upon the +world none. That he gives names to the mighty heavenly bodies and can +calculate the orbits of many of them, cannot mean that he brings them +under the sovereignty of reason. Upon deep-sea life, too, he exercises +no other influence than catching specimens of it and giving them +names. + +That he may be able to assert that there is such a thing [pg 133] as +an ethical purpose in the world, Fichte falsifies the world’s birth +certificate, and gives it the categorical imperative for father and +epistemological idealism for mother. But this is of no use. The +ethical purpose thus produced cannot satisfy ethical thought. + +By conceiving the infinite spirit, in which the finite spirit has a +share, as will to activity, Fichte tries to make possible a world-view +of ethical world- and life-affirmation. In reality, however, this +takes him no further than a more emphatic world- and life-affirmation, +into which, with the help of speculative thought, he smuggles the idea +of duty, thereupon proclaiming it to be ethical. It fares with him +just as with the Chinese philosophers, who similarly exert themselves +in vain to produce an ethic out of world- and life-affirmation. + +Absorption in the Absolute by means of action is, as Fichte thinks, +something prodigious, but, just like its counterpart, absorption in +the Absolute which is effected by an act of thought, it is not ethical +but supra-ethical. The element which is needed by the mysticism of +absorption in the Absolute to make it ethical cannot be secured either +by enhancing or by depreciating the will to activity. + +Fichte’s mysticism of activity in which man lets loose his energy in +the world is related to the ethic of deed, just as Spinoza’s mysticism +of knowledge in which man is absorbed in the world is related to that +of self-perfecting, but it is only very incompletely that either can +develop itself into a real ethic. + +The absorption in the Absolute which comes into actuality in an act of +thought lies nearer to nature-philosophy than that which completes +itself in an active deed. The Brahmans, the Buddha, Lao-tse, +Chwang-tse, Spinoza, and the mystics of every age, have experienced +the becoming one with the Absolute as a coming-to-rest in it. Fichte’s +mysticism of activity lies more in the path of dualistic thinking than +in that of real nature-philosophy. It is something which has been +extorted by enthusiasm, but Fichte [pg 134] is devoted to it, and +rightly, because he has a feeling that the interests of an active +ethic are better guarded by it than by the other. Since, however, he +thus once and for all decides for a nature-philosophy, he comes, +dominated though he is by the ideal of an active ethic, more and more +to the natural quietist consequences of a nature-philosophy. He goes +through a process of evolution which brings him nearer to Spinoza’s +world-view. In his _Instruction Concerning the Blessed Life_, which +appeared in 1806, six years later than _The Destiny of Man_, it is to +him no longer the ethical which in itself is the highest, but the +religious. The ultimate meaning of life, as he now recognizes, is not +to act in God, but to be merged in Him. “Self-annihilation is the +gateway into the higher life.” + +He believes, indeed, that he is thereby merely deepening his +world-view without diminishing its ethical energy, and he remains +himself, right to the end, the fiery spirit which consumes itself in +activity for promoting the progress of the world. But his thought has +bent under the weight of nature-philosophy. Without clearly admitting +it to himself, he recognizes that out of nature-philosophy there can +be drawn only an intellectual, not an ethical meaning for the world +and life. Spinoza observes with a smile how he retires upon the +thought beyond which a nature philosophy cannot advance. + +Fichte is the first philosopher to declare plainly that no world-view +is ethical which does not enable man to explain that an enthusiastic +active devotion to the universe is something grounded in the nature of +the world and of life. But the road he takes in order to develop this +thought leads him astray. Instead of going more deeply into the +question how ethical happenings, though coming from the world-spirit, +and directed upon the world, are nevertheless different from normal +world-happenings, and investigating the nature of this difference, he +employs the trick, which had been made possible by Kant, of declaring, +with the help of epistemological idealism, that the ethical world-view +is a necessity of thought. Many of his contemporaries [pg 135] believe +with him that it has thereby really reached a position of supremacy, +and even those who cannot go with him the whole length of the +philosophy of the Ego and Non-Ego, are gripped by the force of the +ethical personality which speaks from Fichte’s writings. + +The direct effect, then, of Fichte’s philosophy is that the +optimistic, ethical spirit of rationalism maintains its position and +becomes stronger and deeper. His philosophy is a source of inspiration +which produces a mighty impulse to ethics and civilization. But the +vessel in which, with a magnificent wind behind him, he starts with +his companions on a voyage over the sea of knowledge is a leaky one. A +catastrophe is only a question of time. + +Fichte’s belief that he has obtained from the nature of the universe +the living compulsion to ethical duty and ethical work which he feels +within himself, is an illusion. The manner, however, in which he +conceives the problem of the optimistic-ethical world-view, and +perceives that for its solution the ordinary processes of life afford +no help, so that more or less violent ones must be allowed to take +their turn, reveals him as a great thinker. + + + + +[pg 136] + +CHAPTER XII + +SCHILLER; GOETHE; SCHLEIERMACHER + + +Schiller’s ethical world-view; Goethe’s world-view based on +nature-philosophy + +VERY important is the fact that the deepened optimistic-ethical +world-view of Kant and Fichte finds a champion in Friedrich von +Schiller (1759-1805), who brings it to the mass of the people with the +force, added by poetical language. He is himself philosophically +gifted, and undertakes in addition to develop it further. He wishes to +broaden the foundation of the ethical by showing its relation to the +æsthetic. + +In his _Letters Concerning the Æsthetic Education of Mankind_ (1795), +he works out the idea that art and ethics belong together as far as +this, that man maintains with the sensible world a relation which is +free and creative. “The transition from the passive condition of +feeling to the active one of thinking and willing comes about in no +other way than through an intermediate condition of æsthetic freedom. +. . . There is no way of making the sentient man rational other than +first making him æsthetic.” In what way the capacity for freedom which +is built up in man by æsthetic practice really disposes him to +morality, Schiller does not work out in further detail. His treatise, +in spite of all the notice it attracted and deserves, is more +rhetorical than substantial. He has not gone to the bottom of the +problem of the relations between the æsthetic and the ethical. + +In contrast to Schiller, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832), +stands in almost as cold an attitude to the world-view of the deepened +rationalism as he does to that of ordinary rationalism. To him it is +impossible to share [pg 137] the confidence with which others, looking +around, regard optimistic and ethical convictions as well founded. +What separates him from Kant, and Fichte, and Schiller, is reverence +for the reality of nature. Nature is to him something in herself, not +merely something existing with a view to mankind. He does not require +from her that she shall fit herself completely into our +optimistic-ethical designs. He does no violence to her either through +epistemological and ethical idealism or through presumptuous +speculation, but lives in her as a human being who looks at existence +with wonder and does not know how to bring her relation to the +world-spirit within any formula. + +Descartes led modern philosophy astray by cutting the world up into +objects which have extension and objects which think, and by going on, +moreover, to refuse to each of them the possibility of influencing the +other. Following in his steps, thinkers rack their brains over the +problem of these two parallel kinds of existence, and try to embrace +the world in formulas. That the world is life, and that in life lies +the riddle of riddles, never enters their minds. Hence they overlook +in their philosophizing what is most important. Because Descartes +preceded them, the two great spirits who adhere to nature-philosophy, +Spinoza and Leibniz, cannot get further than a nature-philosophy which +is more or less dead. Being in the line of descent from Descartes, +Kant and Fichte renounce all philosophizing over the real world. + +Descartes and the ethical belief-in-progress, therefore, agree in a +common neglect of nature. Both alike overlook the fact that she is +living, and that she exists for her own sake, and it is because he +cannot join them in this that Goethe dares to confess that he +understands nothing about philosophy. His greatness is this: that in a +time of abstract and speculative thought he had the courage to remain +elemental. + +Overwhelmed by the mysterious individual life in nature, he persists +in maintaining a magnificently imperfect [pg 138] world-view. With the +spirit of an investigator he looks within into everything; in that of +an inquirer he looks around upon everything. He wants to think +optimistically. Shaftesbury’s thoughts exercise their charm upon him +also. But in the chorus of optimism which makes itself heard so loudly +around him, he cannot join. World- and life-affirmation is for him not +such a simple thing as it is for Fichte and Schiller. He strives to +reach an ethical world-view, but admits to himself that he cannot +carry it through, and he therefore does not venture to attribute a +meaning to nature. To life, however, he will attribute one. He seeks +it in serviceable activity. To make the world-view of activity at home +in nature-philosophy is to him an inner necessity. The conviction that +activity provides the only real satisfaction that is to be found in +life and that therein lies the mysterious meaning of existence is +shown by him in _Faust_ as something which he has laboriously gained +during his pilgrimage through existence and to which he will hold +fast, without being able to explain it completely. + +Goethe struggles to arrive at a conception of ethical activity, but +cannot reach one because nature-philosophy is unable to provide him +with any criterion of what is ethical. What that philosophy had to +refuse to the Chinese monists and to Spinoza, she cannot give to him +either. + +The range of this world-view of Goethe’s which deals thus with reality +remains hidden from his contemporaries. Its incompleteness alienates +their sympathies and irritates them. For knowledge of the world and of +life which cannot be reduced to a system, but sticks fast in facts, +they have no understanding. They hold to their optimism and their +ethic. + +Schleiermacher’s attempt at a nature-philosophy + +Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (1768-1834), stands apart both from the +ordinary and from the deepened rationalism because he cannot free +himself from the influence of [pg 139] Spinoza._(_46_)_ His life-work +is directed to preaching the Spinozan nature-philosophy as being, as +far as he can make it so, both an ethic and the Christian religion. +Hence he always dresses it up as one or the other of these. + +The accepted ethical code, in Schleiermacher’s opinion, makes man +merely run about the earth as an ethical individual bent on improving +the world. Living in this way, in a constant state of enthusiasm, he +becomes in danger of losing himself and becoming unpersonal. He +forgets that his primary duty is, first of all to be alone with +himself, to look within himself, and, instead of being a mere human +creature, to make himself into a personality. + +This renunciation of rationalism’s enthusiasm for activity is to be +found in the _Monologues_, those splendid introspective meditations +meant for the first New Year’s Day of the nineteenth century. One +seems to hear in them Lao-tse and Chwang-tse criticising the moralism +and the fanaticism for progress of Confucius. + +Man’s first task is, according to Schleiermacher, to realize his +oneness with the Infinite and in the Infinite to see the world. Only +that which results from this as action is really significant, and has +importance for morality. + +Spinoza’s ethic consisted in keeping oneself at the highest level and +living one’s life more after the fashion of a life of thought than +after that of a life of corporeal existence. Schleiermacher’s ethic +has the same objective except that he seeks to combine with it a more +comprehensive interest in the world than is to be found in Spinoza. He +is helped in this direction by his belief that progress is something +immanent. + +We have, he says, no other perfecting to bring about in things than +that which is inherent in them. Ethics, therefore, are not a setting +up of laws, but the recognition and the description of the tendencies +working for perfection which appear in the world itself, together with +behaviour [pg 140] in accord with their spirits. The moral law is not +distinct from the law of nature and pursues no other aims than the +latter does. It is only the law of nature arriving in man at the +consciousness of itself. + +Schleiermacher, therefore, feels that his task is not, as Fichte +conceived his to be, the bringing of the universe under the +sovereignty of reason; it consists solely in supporting the oneness of +nature and reason in the sphere of human action, which is ever +striving to realize itself within that universe. “All ethical +knowledge is the expression of the ever-beginning but never completed +efforts of reason to become nature.” Ethics are a contemplative +“science.” They revolve around the two poles of natural science and +human history. + +The ethic which results from this fundamental conception is, like +those of Lao-tse and Chwang-tse, so toned down that there is no longer +any real power in it. However completely Schleiermacher may try to +conceal this fact by his wonderful powers of description, it plays +only a subordinate _rôle_. What gives a meaning to human existence is +something which is independent of deeds; it is the oneness with the +Infinite which is experienced in feeling. + +With its clever dialectic, but not in reality, Schleiermacher’s ethic +shows itself finally to be superior to that of Spinoza. His world-view +is that of Spinoza, only enriched by his belief in the immanence of +the power of progress. Hence his ethic is iridescent with somewhat +more brilliant colours. + +Thus do a living nature-philosophy in Goethe and a Spinozan one in +Schleiermacher undermine the ground on which stand the men of the now +beginning nineteenth century, whose thinking is so enthusiastically +optimistic-ethical. The crowd pays no attention to their dangerous +proceedings. It gazes at the fireworks which Kant and Fichte let off, +while Schiller recites his poetry. And now there begin to rise bursts +of rockets which throw a peculiarly brilliant light. The past-master +in the art of firework display, Hegel, has come into action! + + + + +[pg 141] + +CHAPTER XIII + +HEGEL’S SUPRA-ETHICAL OPTIMISTIC WORLD-VIEW + + +Ethics in Hegel’s nature-philosophy, and in his philosophy of history + +IN his speculative philosophy Fichte’s first and chief interest was +ethical. Hegel, deeper and more objective than he, aims at truth +before everything._(_47_)_ While using any helpful considerations +which are provided by facts, his aim is to discover the meaning of +Being. He therefore cannot join Fichte in the violent procedure, +suggested by his ethic, of giving the world the categorical imperative +for father and epistemological idealism for mother. Before going so +far as to write out a birth-certificate for the world, he undertakes +some material investigations. He studies the laws which govern events, +as they are revealed in history. He then lays these as the foundation +for the constructive operations which are to explain the origin of the +world out of the notion of Being. His philosophy, therefore, is a +philosophy of history become cosmic. The building, so far as one can +measure it externally, is solidly constructed. That is why it is still +convincing even where its lines lose themselves in infinity. + +What, then, does Hegel discover to be the principle underlying the +course of events in history? He discovers that every process of +becoming advances with natural progress, and that this progress +realizes itself in the occurrence of a consecutive series of +contradictions which invariably issue in reconciliation! In thoughts +as in facts, [pg 142] every thesis evokes an antithesis. Then these +unite in a synthesis which preserves what is valuable in either of +them. Every synthesis that is reached becomes again a thesis for a new +antithesis. From these there results again a new synthesis, and so on +for ever. + +With the aid of this scheme Hegel can expound the course of history. +From it he is also able to develop the basic principles of logic. +Hence he is sure that from it it must be possible to make intelligible +how the notional world which can be logically developed out of the +notion of Being passes over into being the world of reality. He +carries this fancy through to its conclusion in such magnificent +fashion, that even we, who are proof against its charm, can understand +how it was possible to become intoxicated with it. + +While Fichte seeks to give an ethical meaning to the expansion of pure +Being into the world of reality, Hegel from the very outset takes his +stand upon the assertion that in its ultimate analysis the meaning of +the world can only be an intellectual one. The Absolute has no other +object in bringing a world into existence than to become conscious of +itself. It is infinitely creative spirit, but not, as in Fichte’s +thought, with the object of endlessly working, but with that of +returning into itself by the road of its own creations. + +In nature the Absolute comprehends itself only very dimly. It is first +in man that it really experiences itself, and that in three ascending +stages. In the man who is concerned merely with himself and nature it +is still subjective spirit. In the communal spirit of men who +cooperate for the legal and ethical organization of human society, it +expands to objective spirit and at the same time, on a basis of +notions provided within this spirit, shows itself capable of being +creative. In art, in religion, and in philosophy it becomes conscious +of itself as absolute spirit, existing in and for itself and having +overcome the contradictions of subject and object, thought and Being. +In art it contemplates itself as such; in religious devotion [pg 143] +it presents itself as such; in philosophy, which is pure thought, it +comprehends itself as such. With the world represented as thought, the +Absolute experiences itself. + +Before the destiny to which Spinoza submits with a smile, against +which Fichte and Schleiermacher rebel, Hegel bows in courageous +reverence for truth. His world-view is supra-ethical mysticism. The +ethical is to him only a phase in the development of intellectuality. +Civilization he conceives not as something ethical, but only as +something intellectual. + +For proof that the ethical is nothing in itself but only a phenomenon +of the intellectual, Hegel appeals to French usage. “The moral,” he +says, “must be taken in the wider sense in which it signifies not the +morally good alone. ‘Le moral’ is in French opposed to the physical +and means the spiritual, the intellectual, or the non-material in +general.”_(_48_)_ + +The notion of the ethical with which Hegel works is extraordinarily +wide. It consists in “the will having for its objects not subjective, +_i.e._, selfish, interests, but a universal content.”_(_49_)_ It is +the business of thought to define this universal content in particular +instances. + +If Hegel had fully explored the fact that the individual will comes to +assign itself universal objects, and had felt this fact to be the +mysterious one that it is, he could not have passed so lightly as he +does over the ethical problem. He would have had to admit to himself +that the spiritual element which manifests itself in it is unique in +character, and cannot be included in any higher one, or classified +under any other at all. The problem of the mutual relationship between +the spiritual and the moral would have been clearly posed. + +But Hegel is so anxious to find some sort of shelter for his +speculative optimistic world-view that he estimates the birth of the +ethical in man not by and for itself, but simply [pg 144] as a +phenomenon of the rise of the supra-individual spirit. Instead of +directing his thought to the question of how the individual spirit in +each several person can be at the same time supra-individual and +conscious of its oneness with the Absolute, Hegel sets out to make +intelligible the higher experience of the individual by means of the +mutual relations between it and the universal spirit of the collective +body to which it belongs. He says it is presumption for the individual +spirit as such to seek, as it does in Indian thought, to comprehend +its relation to the Absolute. Becoming one with the Absolute is an +experience of the universal spirit of collective humanity when it has +reached its loftiest height. Only when it stands in connection with +this, as a river with the waters of a lake through which it had +flowed, can the individual spirit obtain experience of the Absolute. +This is the fatal turning towards the general and supra-personal at +which the Hegelian philosophy makes itself superficial. + +Ethics, then, for Hegel have at bottom only the significance that they +make possible the growth of a society in the collective spirit of +which the absolute spirit can come to a consciousness of itself. Man +becomes moral by submitting voluntarily to the demands which society +recognizes as expedient with a view to the creation of the higher +spirituality. + +Hegel has no ethic for the individual. The deep problems of ethical +self-perfecting and of the relations between man and man do not +concern him. When he does come to talk about ethics his subject is the +family, society, and the State. + +With Bentham ethics complete law. Hegel works the two in together. It +is significant that he wrote no treatise on ethics. All that he does +publish about ethics is to be found in his philosophy of law. + +His first concern is to show that the State, correctly conceived, is +not merely a legal, but a legal-ethical body. Fichte had made it the +ethical educator of the individual. For Hegel it is the essential +element in all moral happenings, [pg 145] “the self-conscious moral +substance,” as he expresses it. What is most valuable in the moral +comes to actuality in it and through it. This overvaluing of the State +is a natural consequence of his low valuation of the spiritual +significance of individuality as such. + +Hegel’s supra-ethical world-view. His belief in progress + +With Fichte’s idea, which he found it impossible to work out +completely, of giving ethics a cosmic foundation in such a way that +its content might be the bringing of the world under the sovereignty +of reason, Hegel can have nothing to do. His feeling for the real +debars him from anything so fantastic. But that he altogether gives up +the cosmic notion of ethics is fatal. Instead of allowing ethics and +nature-philosophy to come to an understanding together in his +speculative thought, he makes a sacrifice of ethics from the start. He +refuses them the liberty (which they enjoyed with Spinoza, Fichte, and +Schleiermacher), of trying to get themselves conceived as the relation +of the individual to the universe. They are forbidden, further, to try +(as they can do with the Chinese monists), to get accepted as a +relation which forms part of the meaning of the universe. They are +restricted to being a standard for the regulation of the relations +between individuals and society. They may not be active as a formative +idea in the creation of a world-view upon a foundation of +nature-philosophy. They are simply built into the edifice as an +already shaped and dressed stone. + +In consequence of Hegel’s allowing ethics no significance beyond that +of a preparatory motive to realizing the spiritual meaning of the +world, his teaching becomes remarkably analogous to the Brahmanic. +Hegel and the Brahmans are akin because, as consistent thinkers, they +venture to admit that thought about the world and the Absolute which +lies behind it can reach only an intellectual, never an ethical +meaning in the union of the finite spirit [pg 146] with the infinite, +and therefore value ethics only as a preparatory motive thereto. With +the Brahmans ethics prepare the individual for the intellectual act in +which he experiences the Absolute in himself and himself dies in it. +With Hegel they help in the formation of society, in the communal +spirit of which the Absolute first becomes capable of experiencing +itself. + +It is only a relative difference between Hegel and the Brahmans that +the latter make their intellectualist mysticism individualist and +world- and life-denying, while Hegel carries his through as world- and +life-affirming, and makes the intellectual act take place only when a +society has produced the requisite spirituality. The inner similarity +in character of the two world-views is not affected thereby. One is +the complement of the other. Both give value to ethics only as a phase +of intellectuality. + +With Hegel, as with the Brahmans, ethics are indeed given a shelter, +but they are not shown to be necessary. For the production of the +consciousness of oneness with the Absolute the decisive element for +the Brahmans is, in the last resort, only a sufficient advance in +world- and life-denial, and depth of meditation. With Hegel, society, +which has to produce the spirituality in which the absolute spirit +experiences itself in the finite, could come into existence just as +well by means of law alone, as by means of ethics and law together. +His ethic is, in truth, only a species of law. + +With the Brahmans ethics are a colouring which their world- and +life-denial takes on for a certain distance; with Hegel they are a +similar mode of self-manifestation of his world- and life-affirmation. +Hegel’s world-view is in and by itself supra-ethical mysticism with +world- and life-affirmation, just as that of the Brahmans is +supra-ethical mysticism with world- and life-denial. + +That his world-view is this and nothing else Hegel admits in the fit +of brutal frankness under the influence of which he wrote on June +25th, 1820, the famous Preface to his _Philosophy of Law_. Our task +(he there explains,) is not to [pg 147] re-fashion reality in +accordance with ideals which have arisen in our spirit, but we have to +listen to the way in which the real world affirms itself, and us +within itself, in its own immanent impulse to progress. “What is +rational is real, and what is real is rational.” The eternal which is +present under the form of the temporal and transient and is developing +within this, it is worth our while to recognize and thereby to become +reconciled with reality. It is not for philosophy to set up ideas +about what is to be. Her task is to understand what is. She does not +produce any new age, but is only “her own age comprehended in +thought.” She always arrives too late to be an instructor as to what +the world ought to be, and she begins to speak only when reality has +completed its process of construction. “Minerva’s owl does not begin +her flight till darkness is closing in.” Beneficent peace will be +brought us by the sincere recognition of reality. + +Rationalism is an ethical belief in progress combined with an ethical +will-to-progress. It was as such that Kant and Fichte had undertaken +to deepen it. After passing through Hegel’s mind it is only a belief +in progress . . . belief in a progress which is immanent in things. It +is this alone that this powerful speculative thinker believes himself +able to place upon a cosmic foundation, and in this he is in contact +with Schleiermacher. On the whole, and reduced to the simplest +possible expression, his world-view and Schleiermacher’s lie not very +far apart. The secret feud in which the two thinkers lived with one +another had in reality no objective justification. + +The extent of the strategical retreat on which Hegel enters remains +hidden from his contemporaries. They rejoice unreservedly at the +magnificent energy which his system displays, and with the less +reservation because he himself only once, viz. in the Preface to his +_Philosophy of Law_, expresses himself freely about the final results +of his thinking. The fact that with him the moon of ethics is obscured +does not evoke the excitement that might [pg 148] normally have been +expected, because, in compensation, he allows the sun of the +cosmically founded belief in progress to shine all the brighter. Being +still under the influences of rationalism, the men of that time are so +accustomed to regard ethics and belief in progress as organically +connected that they look on the strengthening of optimism effected by +Hegel as being also a strengthening of ethics. + +Hegel’s formal assumption that progress comes about through a +succession of antitheses which are always finally reconciled in +valuable syntheses has kept optimism alive through most critical times +right on to the present day. Hegel is the creator of that confident +feeling for reality with which Europe staggered into the second half +of the nineteenth century without becoming aware that ethics have at +some point or other been left behind. And that being so, he is able to +hold his optimistic philosophy of history out of which his world-view +grows, only because he lives in a period when a general temper which +works with ethical energies of extraordinary strength is carrying +Humanity forward in an extraordinary way. Whence the progress comes, +which he experiences all around him, the great philosophic historian +does not recognize. He explains as produced through natural forces +what has originated from ethical ones. + +In Hegel’s world-view the connexion between ethics and belief in +progress, in which the spiritual energy of modern times has always +rested, is broken, and with the separation both are ruined. Ethics +languish, and the belief in progress, now left to itself, becomes +spiritless and powerless because it is now only a belief in immanent +progress, and no longer a belief in progress of all kinds which is +produced by enthusiasm. With Hegel there rises the spirit which +borrows its ideals empirically from reality and believes in the +progress of Humanity more than it labours to promote it. Hegel stands +on the bridge of an ocean liner and explains to the passengers the +wonders of the machinery in the vessel that is carrying them, and the +mysteries of the [pg 149] calculation of its course. But he gives no +thought to the necessary maintenance as before of the fires under the +boilers. Hence the speed gradually diminishes until the vessel comes +at last to a standstill. It no longer obeys the helm, and becomes a +plaything of storms. + + + + +[pg 150] + +CHAPTER XIV + +THE LATER UTILITARIANISM. BIOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL ETHICS + + +Beneke, Feuerbach, Laas, Auguste Comte, John Stuart Mill + +THE fact that speculative philosophy also is unable to establish the +optimistic-ethical world-view upon nature-philosophy is not felt with +all its weight in the intellectual life of Europe. In that philosophy +we have, indeed, a form of thought which flames out like a flash of +lightning and vanishes as quickly, but it is confined to Germany. The +rest of Europe takes hardly any notice of Fichte and Hegel, just as, +indeed, it paid scarcely any attention to Kant. It does not understand +that these adventurous advances in the struggle for the +optimistic-ethical world-view have been undertaken by leaders who see +clearly that the battle is not to be won on the usual lines. The +universal conviction is, of course, that the victory was won long +before, and can no longer be disputed. It is only later that people in +France and England see what Kant, Fichte, and Hegel aimed at, and what +their significance was in the struggle for world-view. + +For the intellectual life of Europe, then, the world-view of +rationalism still stands upright at a time when it has, in truth, +already collapsed. Generally speaking a generation lives, of course, +less by the world-view that has been produced within it than by that +of the previous age. The light of a star is still visible to us when +it has long ceased to exist. There is hardly anything in the world +that clings so toughly to life as a world-view does. + +It never becomes clear, then, to the popular utilitarian ethic that in +the course of the first half of the nineteenth century it is being +gradually robbed of its world-view by [pg 151] new modes of thought, +those of historical science, romanticism, nature-philosophy, and +natural science. Certain that it is still in favour with the healthy +human reason, it remains unmoved at its post, and still does a +considerable amount of work. Whenever, too, it considers its future +prospects, it assumes that if it should ever have to give up all +connexion with rationalism, it will be able to come to terms with +positivism, that world-view which has been sobered by exact sciences. +As a matter of fact, rationalism does merge imperceptibly into a kind +of popular positivism. The optimistic-ethical interpretation of the +universe is still relied on, but less unreservedly and less +enthusiastically than previously. In this weakened form rationalism +maintains itself till the end of the nineteenth century, and even till +somewhat later, always working to produce the temper that desires +civilization, whether independently or accompanied by popular +religiousness. + +While, then, Kant, Fichte, and Schleiermacher are struggling with the +ethical problem, Bentham supplies the world with an ethic. The +periodical entitled _The Utilitarian_ (_L’Utilitaire_) is started in +Paris in 1829 to propagate his views. In England the _Westminster +Review_ works for him. In 1830 Friedrich Eduard Beneke’s translation +of his _Principles of Civil and Criminal Legislation_ paved a way for +him in Germany. At his death—which occurred in 1832, a year after +Hegel’s—Bentham could take to the grave with him the conviction that, +thanks to him, an ethic which provided enlightenment both for the +reason and for the heart had proved victorious everywhere. + +All the earlier methods followed to establish utilitarianism continue +at work in the nineteenth century. Friedrich Eduard Beneke +(1798-1854),_(_50_)_ the translator of Bentham, [pg 152] and Ludwig +Andreas Feuerbach (1804-1872)_(_51_)_ take up with confidence the +attempts of David Hartley and Dietrich von Holbach to derive the +unegoistic directly from the egoistic, and try hard to complete them +in a deepened psychology. Beneke believes himself able to show how +through the continuous influence of reason on the feelings of pleasure +and non-pleasure, there builds itself up in man a capacity for moral +judgement which holds up before him as the highest goal for his +activity the all-round perfecting of human society. Feuerbach derives +altruism from the possession by man of an impulse to think himself +into the personality of others and to put himself in their place. +Thereby, he says, his impulse to seek happiness loses its original +independence, and suffers if the happiness of others is spoilt. At +last, under the influence of habit, man forgets altogether that his +relation of helpfulness with his fellows was originally meant to +satisfy the impulse to seek his own happiness, and he conceives his +own care for their welfare as duty. + +Ernest Laas (1837-1885),_(_52_)_ repeats the view that ethics consist +primarily in the individual’s acceptance of the rules laid down by +society, an acceptance which from being a matter of habit becomes at +last unconscious and automatic. + +In general, however, the utilitarianism of the nineteenth century +props itself up with the assumption which is first made by David Hume +and Adam Smith, that from the very beginning the non-egoistic is given +in human nature side by side with the egoistic. + +Auguste Comte (1798-1857)_(_53_)_ in his _Physiology of Society_ +praises as the greatest achievement of his time the then commencing +recognition of the fundamental social tendency in human nature. The +future of mankind depends in his opinion on intelligence working +correctly and perseveringly [pg 153] on this endowment, and so +rendering man’s natural benevolence capable of achieving the noblest +and most beneficial objects. If devotion to the universal good remains +at work in the multitude of individuals so as to provide the necessary +complement to their natural egoism, there will arise out of the +rational understanding between the two a society which is ever +bringing itself nearer to perfection in its economic and social +relations. + +A great defender and developer of utilitarianism in England was John +Stuart Mill (1806-1873),_(_54_)_ who in this followed in the footsteps +of his father, James Mill (1773-1836). + + +Darwin and Spencer + +Utilitarian ethics receive unexpected help from natural science. +Biology declares itself able to explain by reference to its origin the +devotion to others which thinkers had decided to accept as inherent in +man by the side of the egoistic, but not further derivable from it. +The unegoistic, so it teaches, does as a matter of fact grow out of +the egoistic, only it does not issue from it afresh on every occasion +as a result of conscious reflexion by the individual. The change has +taken place in the species by a long and slow process, and is now +revealed as an acquired faculty. The conviction that the welfare of +the individual is best secured if the whole body of individuals is +also active in promoting the common good has been established by +experience in the struggle for existence. Action on this principle has +thus become a characteristic of individuals which develops more and +more in the course of generations. We possess this devotion to others +as descendants of herds which maintained themselves in the struggle +for existence while others succumbed in it, because the social +impulses were developed in them the most strongly and the most +universally. + +[pg 154] + +This thought is developed by Charles Darwin (1869-1882)_(_55_)_ in his +_Descent of Man_, and by Herbert Spencer (1820-1903)_(_56_)_ in his +_Principles of Ethics_. Each of these thinkers refers to the other. + +Altruism is therefore now regarded as something natural and at the +same time as something which has come into existence through +reflexion, and the relation subsisting between it and egoism as having +admittedly become rational. On this judgement is founded at the same +time the conviction that the co-operation of these two impulses, as it +developed in the past, will allow itself also to be perfected in the +future. More and more will these two impulses show clearly their +mutual dependence on each other. From sporadic altruism, developing in +the animal kingdom for the production and maintenance of new +generations, we have advanced to a settled altruism which serves the +maintenance of the family and society. To bring this to completion +must now be our aim. We shall succeed if the compromise between egoism +and altruism continues to grow better adjusted and more purposive. We +must advance to the view which at first seems to be a paradox that (to +use Spencer’s language) the general prosperity can be reached mainly +through a corresponding struggle of all individuals for their own +prosperity and that of individuals, on the other hand, partly through +their struggle for the general prosperity. + +Comte’s _Physiology of Society_ is thus given a foundation in natural +science by Darwin and Spencer. + +Utilitarianism now continues on its way full of satisfaction at having +found itself conceived by modern biology and in the history of +evolution as something natural. But it has not thereby become either +fresher or more capable. It advances more and more slowly. Its breath +fails. What is the matter with it? Its ethical energy leaves it +because [pg 155] it has conceived itself to be something natural. The +fatal fact that ethics cease to be ethics in proportion as they are +brought into harmony with natural happenings, is fulfilled not only +when ethics are developed out of nature-philosophy but also when they +are explained by biology. + +Ethics consist in this: that natural happenings in man are seen, on +the basis of conscious reflexion, to carry within them an inner +contradiction. The more this contradiction is removed into the sphere +of that which goes back to instinct, the weaker do ethics become. + +The origin of ethics is assuredly this: that something which is +contained as instinct in our will-to-live is taken up through +conscious reflexion and further developed. The great question is, +however, what this last and most original element in the instinct of +solidarity is, this element which by thinking is developed far beyond +everything instinctive, and in what way this development is +accomplished. By proclaiming developed herd-mentality to be ethics, +Darwin and Spencer show that they have not gone to the root of the +problem of the relation between instinct and thinking reflexion in +ethics. If nature wishes to have a perfect herd, she does not appeal +to ethics, but gives the individuals, as in the ant- or the +bee-kingdom, instincts by the force of which they are wholly merged in +the society. + +But ethics are the putting into practice the principle of solidarity +on a basis of free reflexion, and this practice, moreover, directs +itself not only to individuals of the same species, but to everything +living in general. The ethics of Darwin and Spencer are a failure from +the first, because they are too narrow and do not leave the irrational +its rights. The social impulse which they put in the place of the +sympathy which is assumed by Hume and Adam Smith is set at a lower +pitch than the latter, and is correspondingly less calculated to +explain real ethics. + +The transition from egoism to altruism, then, it is equally impossible +to carry through if one transfers the proceeding from the individual +to the species. The fact that the process is thereby prolonged allows +numerous series of [pg 156] most delicate transitions to be taken into +account and their results to be summed up as inheritance of acquired +characters. Nevertheless, that does not explain truly ethical +devotion. The fruits of ethics are hung upon the bush of social +impulse, but the bush itself did not bear them. + +The weak points in biological and sociological utilitarianism + +The strength of utilitarianism lies in its simplicity. Bentham and +Adam Smith still show this quality. They have society in their minds +as the sum of a number of individuals, not as an organized body. Their +efforts are directed to inducing human beings to do as much good as +they can to each other. + +With John Stuart Mill this simplicity disappears. To him, and then in +still stronger measure to Spencer and others, it occurs that the ethic +of the conduct of an individual to his fellows cannot be carried +through as a matter of reasoning. Hence, they conclude, “scientific +ethics” has to do only with the relations between individuals and +organized society as such. + +Bentham’s simple utilitarianism puts before the individual an estimate +of the manifold ways in which society needs his devotion if it is to +see all its members prosperous, and appeals to his enthusiasm. The +utilitarianism which has become biological and sociological tries to +reckon up for the individual the correct balance between egoism and +devotion. It pretends to be social-science transformed to sentiment. + +Adam Smith keeps ethics and sociology still apart in such a way that +he is not a sociologist when he speaks as a moralist, and not a +moralist when he puts forward sociological theories. Now, however, the +two points of view are worked in together, and indeed in such a way +that ethics are merged in sociology. + +The ethic of the simple utilitarianism is concerned with actions +produced by enthusiasm, the biologico-sociological ethic with the +conscientious employment of the complicated [pg 157] machinery of +organized society. In the former an occasional piece of ineffective +action means at worst a waste of power, in the latter a disturbance of +the organism. Hence thorough-going utilitarianism comes to a +depreciatory estimate of the ethic of the individual which springs +from ethical convictions in the individual and does not think +biologically and sociologically. + +That in the sphere of individual ethics there are no more discoveries +to make, passes with the later utilitarians for admitted. They regard +them as an uninteresting hinterland, to advance into which is not +worth while. They therefore confine themselves to the fertile coast +land of social ethics. They see, no doubt, that the streams which +water this lower ground come from the hinterland of individual ethics. +But instead of following them up to their sources their only care is +to make the lower ground safe from occasional inundations which may be +caused by them. They therefore lead the streams into such deep-lying +channels that the land gets parched. + +Scientific ethics undertakes the impossible, viz. to regulate devotion +from outside. It tries to drive water-mills without any head of water, +and to shoot with a bow which is but half-bent. + +How tortured are Spencer’s disquisitions on absolute and relative +ethics! For the natural, ethical point of view absolute ethics +consists in this: that a man experiences directly in himself an +absolute ethical “must.” Because absolute ethics thinks of devotion +without limits and would lead straight to a self-sacrifice which would +in some way or other suspend life and activity, it has to come to an +understanding with reality and decide what measure of self-sacrifice +is to be made, and how far that minimum of compromise can be allowed +which is necessary to ensure a continuation of life and activity. In +this origin out of absolute ethics of applied, relative ethics the +scientific, biological point of view cannot acquiesce. Spencer +transforms the conception of absolute ethics and turns it into [pg +158] the conduct of the perfect man in the perfect society. We have no +need, he says, to picture to ourselves the ideal man except “as he +would exist in ideal social surroundings.” “According to the evolution +hypothesis the two mutually condition each other, and only where both +are to be found, is such ideal action also possible.” + +The ethic which thereby comes into consideration is produced, +therefore, from outside. It is determined by the relation in which +society and the individual stand to one another in their mutual state +of imperfection. Into the place of the living conception of absolute +ethic there steps a fiction. It is only relative standards, subject to +the changes produced by time and relations with others, that the ethic +of sociological utilitarianism provides for men. That means that it +can only feebly rouse his will to the ethical. It even reduces him to +a state of confusion because it takes from him the elementary +conviction that he has to exert himself without regard to what the +given relations are in a state of perfection, and must contend with +circumstances from an inward compulsion, even without the certainty of +any result at all. + +Spencer is more biologist than moralist. Ethics are to him merely the +setting in which the principle of utility comes to us after it has +been worked up in the brain-cells together with the experiences it has +produced, and after it has been passed on by heredity. Thus he gives +up all the inward forces by which ethics live. The urge to attain to a +perfecting of the personality which has to be reached through ethics +and the longing for a spiritual bliss which is to be experienced +within them, are deprived of their office. + +The ethic of Jesus and of the religious thinkers of India withdraws +itself completely from social to individual ethics. The utilitarianism +which has become scientific ethics gives up individual ethics in order +that social ethics may alone have currency. In the first case ethics +can survive because it keeps possession of the mother-country, and has +sacrificed only its foreign possessions. In the [pg 159] other it +wishes to exert its authority in the foreign possessions while the +mother-country belongs to it no more. Individual ethics without social +ethics are imperfect, but they can be very deep and living. Social +ethics without individual ethics are like a limb with a tourniquet +round it, into which life no longer flows from the body. They become +so impoverished that they really cease to be ethics any longer. + +The reduction to impotence of scientific, biological ethics shows +itself not only in the fact that it finally makes all ethical +standards merely relative. Such ethics can no longer uphold the duty +of humanity as they ought to. + +A sinister uniformity prevails in the evolution of ethics. The ethics +of antiquity began to teach humanity after they had lost in the Later +Stoicism their interest in organized society as they found it existing +in the ancient state. Modern utilitarianism, conversely, loses its +sensitiveness to the duty of humanity in proportion to the consistency +with which it develops into an ethic of organized society. It cannot +be otherwise. The essence of humanity consists in this: that +individuals never allow themselves to think impersonally in terms of +expediency as society does, or to sacrifice individual existences in +order to attain their object. The outlook which seeks the welfare of +organized society cannot do anything but compromise with the sacrifice +of individuals or groups of individuals. In Bentham, with whom +utilitarianism is still simple and concerns itself with the conduct of +individuals to the multitude of other individuals, the idea of +humanity has not been tampered with. Biological, sociological +utilitarianism is obliged to give it up as being sentimentality which +cannot maintain itself in the face of matter-of-fact ethical +reflexion. Thus sociological ethics contribute not a little to the +disappearance from the modern mind of any shrinking from inhumanity. +It allows individuals to adopt the mentality of society instead of +keeping them in a state of tension with regard to it. + +[pg 160] + +Society cannot exist without sacrifice. The ethics which start from +individuals try to distribute this in such a way that through the +devotion of individuals as many as possible are voluntary sacrifices, +and that the individuals who are most severely hit are relieved of +their burden as far as possible by others. This is the doctrine of +self-sacrifice. The sociological ethics which no longer reach back at +individual ethics can only lay it down that the progress of society +advances according to inexorable laws at the price of the freedom and +prosperity of individuals and groups of individuals. This is the +doctrine of being sacrificed by others. + +If followed out consistently, biological and sociological +utilitarianism arrives finally, even if with hesitation, at the +conviction that in reality it no longer has for its object the +greatest possible happiness of the greatest possible number. To this +object, which was thus formulated by Bentham, it must now assign, as +being sentimental, a place behind one which corresponds more exactly +to reality. What is to be realized in the ever more complete +development of the mutual relations between the individual and society +is not, if one dares to admit it, an increase in the welfare either of +the individual or of society but . . . the enhancing and perfecting of +life as such. However much it may struggle against it, utilitarianism, +as soon as it has become biological and sociological, undergoes a +change in its ethical character, and enters the service of +supra-ethical aims. Spencer still fights to keep it in the path of +natural ethical feeling. + +Developed utilitarianism, directed to the enhancing and perfecting of +life, can no longer regard the claims of humanity as absolutely +binding, but must make up its mind in certain cases to go outside +them. Biology has become its master. + +Sociological ethics and socialism. Mechanical belief in progress + +If it be granted that progress in the welfare of society depends on +the application of the conclusions of biology [pg 161] and scientific +sociology, it is not as a matter of course necessary to leave to the +good pleasure of the individual the corresponding conduct which is to +be ethical. It can be imposed upon him, if by economic measures and +measures of organization the relation between the individual and +society is determined in such a way that it automatically functions in +the most effective way. Thus by the side of social ethics socialism +makes its appearance. Henri de Saint-Simon (1760-1825),_(_57_)_ +Charles Fourier (1772-1837)_(_58_)_ and P. J. Proudhon +(1809-1865)_(_59_)_ in France, Robert Owen, the mill-owner +(1771-1858),_(_60_)_ in England, and Ferdinand Lassalle +(1825-64),_(_61_)_ and others in Germany, prelude its appearance. Karl +Marx (1818-1883)_(_62_)_ and Friedrich Engels (1820-1895) put forward +in _Das Kapital_ its consistent programme, demanding the abolition of +private property and the State-regulation both of labour and of the +reward of labour. + +_Das Kapital_ is a doctrinaire book which works with definitions and +tables, but never goes very deeply into questions of living and the +conditions of living. The great influence it exerts rests on the fact +that it preaches belief in a progress which is inherent in events, and +works itself out in them automatically. It undertakes to unveil the +mechanism of history, and to show how the succession of different +methods of social organization—slavery, feudalism, the bourgeois +wage-system—tend towards the final replacement of private production +by State-communistic [pg 162] production as the logical crown of +completed evolution. Through Marx, Hegel’s belief in inherent progress +becomes, if with a somewhat different interpretation, the conviction +of the masses. His optimistic feeling for reality takes the helm. + +Through the rise of socialism ethical utilitarianism loses in +importance. The hopes of the crowd begins to centre no longer on what +can be accomplished in the world by an ethical temper which is +steadily growing stronger, and working ever more and more effectively +in social matters, but on what is reached when free course is secured +for the laws of progress which are assumed to be inherent in things. + +It is true that ethical utilitarianism still maintains itself as an +influential reforming temper among the educated. In the competition +with socialism there even starts a strong movement which stirs +individuals, society, and the State alike into effective action +against social distress. One of its leaders is Friedrich Albert Lange +(1828-1875), the author of _The History of Materialism_ (1866). In his +work _The Labour Question in its Significance for the Present and the +Future_ (1866) he discusses the social tasks of the time and the +measures that will be effective for their accomplishment, and appeals +for ethical idealism without which, he says, nothing profitable can be +accomplished._(_63_)_ + +Christianity too supports the movement. In 1864 Bishop Ketteler, of +Mainz, comes forward, demanding in his book _The Labour Question and +Christianity_ the creation of a Christian-social temper._(_64_)_ + +In England it is the clergymen, Frederick Denison Maurice (1805-1872) +and Charles Kingsley (1819-1875), who bid Christendom adopt a social +temper. The latter’s [pg 163] famous sermon _The Message of the Church +to Working Men_ was preached in the evening of Sunday, June 22nd, +1851, before the workers who had come to London to see the first +International Exhibition. On account of the excitement it caused, the +Bishop of London inhibited him from preaching [in his +diocese]._(_65_)_ + +In Russia, Count Leo Tolstoi (1828-1910)_(_66_)_ lets loose the force +of the ethical thinking of Jesus. He does not, like others, interpret +his words as teaching a social idealism focused on the service of +systematic purposive effort, but allows them to be the commands to the +absolute, uncalculating devotion which their author meant them to be. +In his _Confessions_, which in the eighties were read throughout the +world, the lava of primitive Christianity pours itself into the +Christianity of modern times. + +The social-ethical movement produces most result in Germany, because +in that country the State welcomes it in the person of the +Hohenzollerns. In 1883 and 1884 the Reichstag passes, in spite of the +disapproving attitude of the Social Democratic Party, laws for the +protection of the worker which may be considered to be models of their +kind. + +In the bosom of socialism itself thoughtful spirits like Eduard +Bernstein (b. 1850),_(_67_)_ and others, come to see that even the +most effective measures taken for the social organization of society +cannot succeed unless there is a strong [pg 164] ethical idealism +behind them as their driving force. This is a return to the spirit of +Lassalle. + +There exists, then, an active social-ethical temper. But it is +nevertheless only a trickling stream of water in a big river-bed. That +the reforms called for under the guidance of ethics can be realized is +no longer a general conviction, as it was in the age of rationalism. +The ethical temper which wishes to work for the future of mankind +becomes less and less appreciated. In the victory, so fateful for the +development of civilized mankind, won by Marxian State-socialism over +the social ideas of Lassalle which allow much more natural play to the +forces of reality, we see an expression of the fact that in the +mentality of the masses the belief-in-progress has emancipated itself +from ethics and has become mechanical. Confusion in the conception of +civilization and ruin of the civilized temper are the consequence of +this disastrous separation. The spirit of the modern age renounces +thereby the very thing which really constituted its strength. + +How remarkable are the vicissitudes undergone by ethics! +Utilitarianism refuses all contact with nature-philosophy. It wishes +to be an ethic which is concerned only with the practical, but it does +not therefore escape its fate, which is to be wrecked upon +nature-philosophy. In its attempt to secure a basis for itself and to +think itself out completely, it changes into biological-sociological +utilitarianism. Next it loses its ethical character. Without becoming +aware of it, it has, of course, at the same time got entangled with +nature and natural happenings, and has given cosmic problems a place +within itself. Although it pretends to be only the practical ethic of +human society it has become a product of nature. It has been no good +removing all the distaffs: the Sleeping Beauty pricks her finger +nevertheless. No ethic can avoid coming to an understanding with +nature-philosophy. + + + + +[pg 165] + +CHAPTER XV + +SCHOPENHAUER AND NIETZSCHE + + +Schopenhauer. An ethic of world- and life-denial + +AS bad luck will have it, the two most important ethical thinkers who +speak to us in the second half of the nineteenth century, Schopenhauer +and Nietzsche, do not help the age in the search for what it needs, +viz., a social ethic which is also true ethics. Concerned only with an +individualist ethic out of which no social ethic can be developed, +they offer incitements which, however valuable in themselves, cannot +arrest the demoralisation in world-view which is in progress. + +Common to both is the fact that they are elemental moralists. They +pursue no abstract cosmic speculations. Ethics are for them an +experience of the will-to-live. They are therefore, from their very +core, cosmic. + +In Schopenhauer the will-to-live tries to become ethical by turning to +world- and life-denial; in Nietzsche by devoting itself to a deepened +world- and life-affirmation. + +From the standpoint of their own elemental ethics these two thinkers, +who stand in such deep contrast to each other, rise as judges of what +they find accepted as ethics in their time. + +Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) begins to publish at the beginning of +the century. His _The World as Will and Idea_ appears in 1819._(_68_)_ +But he first obtains a hearing about 1860 when the speculative +philosophy had definitely gone bankrupt, and the unsatisfactory nature +of the ethic of [pg 166] popular utilitarianism, as also of that of +Kant’s successors, was generally acknowledged. + +The most important among the earlier of these is Johann Friedrich +Herbart (1776-1841). His importance lies in the department of +psychological investigation. It is on a psychological foundation that +he tries to establish ethics in his _General Practical Philosophy_ +(1808). He traces the moral back to five direct and ultimate +judgments, which are not derivable from anything beyond themselves, +and which may be compared with æsthetic judgments. They are these: the +ideas of inward freedom, of perfection, of benevolence, of right, and +of equity. By submitting itself to this mode of outlook, which starts +from pure intuition and is confirmed as correct for human beings by +the course of their experience, the will becomes ethical. + +Instead, therefore, of seeking one basic principle only for the moral +Herbart accepts several ethical ideas which appear side by side. This +anæmic ethical theory possesses no convincing power. In his teaching, +however, about society and the State Herbart does produce something +solid. + +To the earlier successors of Kant there belongs also Immanuel Hermann +Fichte (1797-1879), a son of J. G. Fichte, the so-called Younger +Fichte, with his _System of Ethics_ (2 vols., 1850-1853), which in its +time enjoyed considerable repute. + +Schopenhauer is the first representative in Western thought of a +consistent world- and life-denying ethic. The suggestions which +brought him to it came to him from the philosophy of India, which +early in the nineteenth century began to be known in Europe._(_69_)_ +For the exposition of his world-view he starts, like Fichte, from +Kant’s epistemological idealism. Like Fichte he defines the essence of +things in themselves (which is to be accepted as underlying all +phenomena) to be Will, not, however, like [pg 167] Fichte as will to +action, but more directly and more correctly as will-to-live. The +world, he says, I can understand only by analogy with myself. Myself, +looked at from outside, I conceive as a sensible phenomenon in space +and time, but looked at from within, as will-to-live. Correspondingly, +everything which meets me in the phenomenal world is a manifestation +of the will-to-live. + +What is the meaning, then, of the world-process? Simply that countless +individualities which are rooted in the universal will-to-live are +continually seeking satisfaction in aims which they set before +themselves, in obedience to an inward impulse, and finding none. Again +and again they experience the disappointment that pleasure longed for, +not pleasure attained, is real pleasure; they have continually to +fight against hindrances; their own will-to-live continually comes +into conflict with other wills-to-live. The world is meaningless, and +all existence is suffering. The knowledge of this is attained to by +the will-to-live in the highest living creatures, who are gifted with +the power of remaining always conscious that the totality of what is +around them, outside themselves, is merely a world of appearances. +Surveying in this way the totality of existence, the will is then in a +position to reach clarity of thought about itself and about existence. + +That it must effect something in the world that is worth while is the +obsession with which the will-to-live has befooled itself in European +philosophy. When it has attained to knowledge of itself, it knows that +optimistic world-affirmation is of no benefit to it. It can only hurry +it on from unrest to unrest, from disappointment to disappointment. +What it must try to do is to step out from the terrible game in which, +bedazzled, it is taking part, and settle itself to rest in world- and +life-denial. + +For Spinoza the meaning of the world-process is that supreme +individualities arise, who find their experience within the Absolute; +for Fichte that the urge to activity of the Absolute comprehends +itself in supreme individualities as ethical; for Hegel that the +Absolute comes in supreme [pg 168] individualities to adequate +consciousness of itself; for Schopenhauer that in individualities the +Absolute attains to knowledge of itself, and finds deliverance from +the blind urge to life-affirmation which is within it. The meaning of +the world-process, therefore, is always found in this: that the Finite +and the Infinite blend their experiences of one another. Spinoza, +Fichte, and Hegel—and this is the weakness of their world-view—cannot +make it properly intelligible how far this experience in the Finite +can be said to have really a meaning for the Absolute. In +Schopenhauer, however, it has such a meaning. In man the universal +will-to-live begins to turn from the path of unrest and suffering into +that of peace. + +The transition from Being to nothingness is introduced. This +nothingness is nothingness, it is true, only to the will-to-live, +which is still filled with urge to life-affirmation and with its +conception of the world. What it is in itself, this Nirvana of the +Buddhists, cannot be defined with our conceptions, which come to us +through our senses. + +That Schopenhauer carries through his pessimistic-ethical world-view, +as Fichte does his optimistic-ethical, with the material provided by +epistemological idealism has not the importance that he himself +attributes to this fact. Indian predecessors have made this connexion +easier for him. In itself, pessimism can be developed just as well +without epistemological idealism. The drama of the tragical experience +of the will-to-live remains the same whatever the decorations and the +costumes with which it is played. + +Although, therefore, it makes its appearance in the dress of Kant’s +theory of knowledge, Schopenhauer’s philosophy is elemental +nature-philosophy. + +What then are the ethical elements in his ethic? + +Like that of the Indians it appears in a threefold shape: as an ethic +of resignation, as an ethic of universal pity, and as an ethic of +world-renunciation. + +About resignation Schopenhauer speaks in forcible words. In language +which rises to the level of poetry, he [pg 169] describes how the man +who is intent on his own self-perfecting does not meet the destinies +of his existence in childish resistance to what is hard, but feels +them as incitements to become free from the world. In the +disagreeables which poison existence for him, and in the misfortune +which threatens to crush him, he suddenly feels himself lifted out of +everything on which he sets value, and brought to the triumphant +feeling that nothing can any longer do him any harm. The field of +resignation, which the philosophical ethics of modern times had +allowed to lie fallow for generations, is replanted by Schopenhauer. + +Ethics are pity. All life is suffering. The will-to-live which has +attained to knowledge is therefore seized with deep pity for all +creatures. It experiences not only the woe of mankind, but that of all +creatures with it. What is called in ordinary ethics “love” is in its +real essence pity. In this powerful feeling of pity the will-to-live +is diverted from itself. Its purification begins. + +How anxious Kant and Hegel and others are in their ethics to deprive +direct pity of its rights, because it does not suit their theories! +Schopenhauer takes the gag out of its mouth and bids it speak. Those +who, like Fichte, Schleiermacher, and others, ground ethics on a +painfully thought out world-scheme, expect man to run every time to +the topmost attic of his reflexions to fetch down his motives to moral +action. According to the sociological utilitarians he should always +first sit down and calculate what is ethical. Schopenhauer bids him do +something never yet heard of in philosophical ethics—listen to his own +heart. The elemental ethical which has by the others been pushed into +the corner, can now, thanks to him, takes its proper place again. + +The others, in order not to get embarrassed with their theories, have +to limit ethics exclusively to the conduct of man to man. They +anxiously insist upon it that pity for animals is not ethical in +itself, but has importance only in view of the kindly disposition +which must ever be [pg 170] maintained among men. Schopenhauer tears +down these fences, and teaches love to the most insignificant being in +creation. + +The artificial and curious pleas, too, which the rest produce to put +man into an ethical relation to organised society disappear in +Schopenhauer. Fichte’s and Hegel’s ethical over-valuation of the State +makes him smile. He himself is left free from the necessity of +dragging into ethics things of the world which refuse to be fitted +into them. He can allow the conviction that ethics consist in being +different from the world to flame up in blinding clearness. He is +pledged to no concessions, since he does not, like the others, +represent an ethic which wishes to do something purposive in the +world. Because his world-view is world- and life-denying he can be an +elemental moralist when others have to renounce being such. Nor does +he need, like them, to sever all connexion with Jesus and religious +ethics. He can appeal as often as he likes to the fact that his +philosophy only establishes what has always been accepted by the piety +of Christianity and of the Indians as the essential element in the +moral. It is well-known that Schopenhauer judged Christianity to have +the Indian spirit, and to be probably, in some way or other, of Indian +origin._(_70_)_ + +Elemental ethics now obtain once more their right place in a thinking +world-view, and this explains the enthusiasm which Schopenhauer +arouses when he at last gets known. That it was possible to ignore for +nearly forty years the very significant matter which he gave to the +world remains one of the most remarkable events in the history of +European thought. The optimistic world-view passed at that time for so +self-evident that the man who laid hands upon it even in the directly +illuminating thoughts upon ethics to which Schopenhauer gave +utterance, could not obtain a hearing. At a later period also many +attach themselves to Schopenhauer only because of his ethical maxims +with their natural and interesting appeal, and refuse to accept [pg +171] his consistent world-view of world- and life-denial. It is a +right feeling which guides them. + +Absorption of ethics in world- and life-denial + +Schopenhauer’s world-view, like that of the Brahmans, because it +reveals itself as consistent world- and life-denial, is in the last +resort not ethical but supra-ethical. Even though through several +chapters of his ethics he can speak in more elemental fashion than +Spinoza, Fichte, Schleiermacher, and Hegel, he is nevertheless in +reality no more ethical than they are. He ends, as they do, in the +frozen sea of the supra-ethical point of view, only at the South Pole +instead of at the North. The price which he pays for being able to +outbid them in elemental ethics is his world view of world- and +life-denial. But the price is a ruinous one. + +With Schopenhauer, as with the Indians, ethics are only a phase of +world- and life-denial. They are nothing in themselves but merely what +they are in the frame provided by that world-view. And everywhere +there peeps through his ethically tinted world- and life-denial world- +and life-denial as such. Like a strange sun in the sky it devours +ethics, just as the real sun devours a cloud from which men are vainly +hoping to get a refreshing shower of rain. + +On the assumption of world- and life-denial all ethical action is +illusory. Schopenhauer’s pity is merely deliberative. Of pity which +brings help he can have no real knowledge any more than the Indian +thinkers can. Like all will-to-action in the world, such pity has no +meaning. It has no power to lighten the misery of the rest of +creation, since that misery lies in the will-to-live, which is +incurably full of suffering. The one thing, therefore, that pity can +do is to enlighten the will-to-live everywhere about the delusion in +which it is held captive, and bring it to the apathy and peace offered +by world- and life-denial. Schopenhauer’s pity, like that of the +Brahmans and the [pg 172] Buddha, is at bottom merely theoretical. It +can use as its own the words of the religion of love, but it stands at +a far lower level than the latter. Obstructing the way to any real +ethic of love it has before it, as the Indian thinkers also have, the +ideal of absolute inactivity. + +The ethic of self-perfecting also is present in Schopenhauer more in +word than in reality. The attainment of inward freedom from the world +is really ethical only if the personality is thereby enabled to work +as a more direct force in the world, but this thought is not to be +found either in Schopenhauer or in the Indians. World- and life-denial +is with them an end in itself, and it continues to assert itself when +its ethical character has ceased. Higher than ethics, says +Schopenhauer, stands asceticism. Everything which helps to deaden the +will-to-live, is to him significant. Men and women who renounce love +and the hope of offspring so that there may be less life in the world, +are to him in the right. Those who deliberately choose religious +suicide, and after employing every conceivable device for deadening +the will-to-live allow the lamp of life to be extinguished, as the +Brahmans do, by withholding all nourishment from the body, these +similarly act as truly enlightened. Only suicide as the outcome of +despair is to be rejected. That is, of course, not a result of the +true life-denial, but is, on the contrary, the act of a life-affirming +will, which is only discontented with the conditions in which it finds +itself._(_71_)_ + +With Schopenhauer, then, ethics reach only so far as world- and +life-denial has willed and is in a position to declare itself ethical. +They are only an introduction to, and a preparation for, liberation +from the world. It is, at bottom, by an intellectual act that the +suspension of the will-to-live is consummated. If I have won my way +through to the understanding that the whole phenomenal world is +delusion and misery, and that my will-to-live has no need to take +seriously the world and itself, then I am released. How far and to +what extent I then take part in [pg 173] the game of life with the +consciousness that I am but a player in it, has no importance. + +Schopenhauer does not think out the pessimistic world-view in the +great and calm manner of the wise men of India. He behaves under its +influence like a nervous and ailing European. While they, on the +ground of the liberating knowledge they have reached, advance with +majestic gait from the ethical to the supra-ethical, and leave behind +them good and evil as two things, over both of which they have equally +triumphed, he reveals himself as a miserable Western sceptic._(_72_)_ +Incapable of living out the world-view which he preaches, he clings to +life as to money, appreciates the pleasures of the table as well as +those of love, and has more contempt than pity for mankind. As though +to justify himself in this, he in _The World as Will and Idea_, where +he has just been speaking about the deadening of the will-to-live, +rebels against the notion that anyone who teaches a saintly course of +life must also live like a saint. “It is indeed,” so runs the famous +passage, “a strange demand to make of a moralist that he shall +recommend no other virtue than those which he himself possesses. To +sum up in a series of conceptions the whole essence of the world, in +abstract terms, in general terms, and with clearness, and to offer it +thus as a reflected copy in permanent rational conceptions which are +always ready to hand; that and nothing else is philosophy.”_(_73_)_ + +With these sentences Schopenhauer’s philosophy commits suicide. Hegel +has a right to say that philosophy is not imperative but only +reflective thinking, for his own philosophy does not claim to be +anything more. But _The World as Will and Idea_ protests with +illuminating language and in a tone of urgent entreaty against the +will-to-live. It ought therefore to be the life-creed of the man whose +voice it is. + +[pg 174] + +The fact that Schopenhauer can for a moment so far forget himself as +to express himself sceptically about ethics has its own deep-reaching +explanation. It belongs to the essence of world- and life-denial, +which he wishes to proclaim as ethics, that it cannot be thought out +consistently to a conclusion, and that it cannot be put consistently +into practice. Even with the Brahmans and the Buddha it keeps itself +alive by inadmissible concessions to world- and life-affirmation. But +with Schopenhauer it goes so far in that direction that he can no +longer make any attempt to bring theory and practice into harmony, but +must move about resolutely in an atmosphere of unveracity. + +Schopenhauer does succeed in letting the ethical appearance which +world- and life-denial can assume, shine out in brilliant colours. But +of really producing an ethic out of world- and life-denial he is as +little capable as the Indians. + +Nietzsche’s criticism of current ethics + +Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) in the early period of his activity is +under the spell of Schopenhauer._(_74_)_ One of his _Old-fashioned +Reflexions_ bears the title: “Schopenhauer as Educator.” Later on he +goes through a development which leads him to recognise as the ideal a +scientifically deepened Positivism and Utilitarianism. He is his real +self first when, starting with _Joyous Science_, he tries to establish +his world-view of the higher life-affirmation, and thereby becomes +anti-Schopenhauer, anti-Christian, and anti-Utilitarian. + +The criticism he passes upon the philosophical and religious ethics +which he finds accepted is passionate and spiteful. But it goes deep. +He casts at them two reproaches, viz. that they have made a pact with +unveracity, and that they do not allow men to become personalities. In +[pg 175] this he says only what had long been due. Sceptics had +already made public many such complaints. But he speaks as one who is +searching for the truth, and who is concerned about the spiritual +future of mankind, thus giving such complaints a new tone and a wider +range. Whereas the current philosophy believed that it had in the main +solved the ethical problem, and was united with biological and +sociological utilitarianism in the conviction that in the department +of individual ethics there were no more discoveries to be made, +Nietzsche turns the whole game upside down, and shows that all ethics +rest upon those of the individual. The question about the essential +nature of good and evil which was generally accepted as settled, he +puts forward again in elemental fashion. The truth that ethics in +their essential nature are a process of self-perfecting shines out in +him, as in Kant, although in a different light. Hence his place is in +the first rank of the ethical thinkers of mankind. Those who were torn +from their false certainty when his impassioned writings descended on +the lowlands of the thought of the outgoing nineteenth century, as the +south wind sweeps down from the high mountains in spring, can never +forget the gratitude they owe to this upheaver of thought, with his +preaching of veracity and personality. + +Accepted ethics are deficient in veracity, according to Nietzsche, +because the conceptions of good and evil which they make current do +not spring out of man’s reflexion on the meaning of his life, but have +been invented in order to keep individuals useful to the majority. The +weak proclaim that sympathy and love are good, because that is to +their advantage. Thus led astray, all men try to force themselves to +the opinion that they fulfil the highest destiny of their existence by +surrender of themselves and devotion to others. But this opinion never +becomes with them a real inward conviction. They live out their lives +without any thought of their own as to what makes their life valuable. +They join the crowd in praising the morality of humility and +self-sacrifice as the true morality, but they [pg 176] do not really +believe in it. They feel self-assertion to be what is natural, and act +accordingly without admitting the fact to themselves. The public +ethical respect paid to humility and self-sacrifice they do not +question; they help to maintain it, from fear that individuals +stronger than themselves might become dangerous to them, if this +method of taming men were abandoned. + +Current ethics, then, are something with which mankind as a whole is +deceived by means of traditional views, and with which individuals +deceive themselves. + +With indignant statements like these Nietzsche is so far in the right, +that the ethic of humility and self-sacrifice does as a matter of +principle avoid coming to a clear and practical understanding with +reality. It lives by leaving quite undetermined the degree of +life-denial which is involved in it. In theory it proclaims +life-denial; in practice, however, it allows a life-affirmation which +has thereby become unnatural and sickly to prevail. Stripped of all +its passion, then, Nietzsche’s criticism means that only that ethic +deserves to be accepted as current which springs from independent +reflexion on the meaning of life, and comes to a straightforward +understanding with reality. + +Individual ethics come before social ethics. Not what ethics mean for +society, but what they mean for the perfecting of the individual, is +the first question which has to be put to them. Do they allow a man to +become a personality or not? It is here, says Nietzsche, that current +ethics fail. They do not allow men to grow straight up, but trains +them like stunted trees on espaliers. They put humility and +self-surrender before men as the content of perfection, but to the +ethical, which consists in man being one with himself, and veracious +through and through, they contribute nothing. + +What does “noble” mean? shouts Nietzsche to his age with harsh words as +being the ethical question which has been forgotten. Those who, when +the question re-echoed everywhere, were touched by the truth which was +stirring, and by the anxiety which was trembling within it, [pg 177] +have received from that solitary thinker all that he had to give to +the world. + +If life-denial brings with it so much that is unnatural and fraught +with doubt, it cannot be ethics. Ethics, then, must consist of a +higher life-affirmation. + +Nietzsche’s ethic of higher life-affirmation + +But what is the higher life-affirmation? Fichte and the speculative +philosophers generally make it consist in this, that the will of man +conceives itself within the infinite will and in consequence of this +no longer belongs to the universe in merely natural fashion, but +surrenders itself knowingly and willingly to the latter as an energy +which acts in intelligent harmony with the infinite will. Nietzsche +sees clearly that in this way they have not arrived at any convincing +idea of the content of the higher life-affirmation, but are moving in +the region of the abstract. He himself means to remain at all costs +elemental, and he therefore avoids philosophizing about the universe, +showing himself thereby to be a true moralist like Socrates. He jeers +at those who, not content with belittling mankind, proceed further to +profane the reality of the world by declaring that it exists merely in +the human imagination. It is only on the essential nature of the +will-to-live and the way to use it most completely in experience, that +he himself wishes to reflect. + +His original belief was that he could conceive the higher +life-affirmation as the development to a higher spirituality of the +will-to-live. When, however, he attempted to carry this idea through, +it took on, without his being aware of it, another form. Higher +spirituality means, of course, the repressing of natural impulses and +natural claims on life, and is thereby connected in some way or other +with life-denial. Higher life-affirmation, therefore, can only consist +in the content of the will-to-live being raised to its highest +conceivable power. Man carries out the meaning of his life by +affirming with the clearest consciousness of [pg 178] himself +everything that is within him—even his impulses to secure power and +pleasure. + +But the opposition between the spiritual and the natural Nietzsche +cannot get rid of. Just in proportion as he emphasizes the natural +does the spiritual shrink back. Under the visible influence of the +mental disease which is threatening him the ideal man grows into the +“superman,” who asserts himself triumphantly against all fate, and +seeks his own ends without any consideration for the rest of mankind. + +From the very outset Nietzsche is condemned, in his thinking out of +what life-affirmation means, to arrive at the higher form of it by a +more or less meaningless living out of life to the full. He wants to +listen to the highest efforts of the will-to-live without putting it +in any relation to the universe. But the higher life-affirmation can +be a living thing only when life-affirmation tries to conceive itself +in world-affirmation. Life-affirmation in itself, in whichever +direction it turns, can only become enhanced life-affirmation, never a +higher form of it. It careers about in circles unable to take any +fixed course, like a ship with its steering apparatus tied firmly up. + +Nietzsche, however, instinctively shrinks from fitting +life-affirmation into world-affirmation, and bringing it by that +method to development into a higher and ethical life-affirmation. +Life-affirmation within world-affirmation means devotion to the world, +but with that there follows somehow or other life-denial within the +life-affirmation. But it is just this interplay of the two that +Nietzsche wants to get rid of, because it is there that ordinary +ethics come to grief. . . . + +Nietzsche was not the first to put forward in Western thought the +theory of living one’s own life to the full. Greek sophists and others +after them anticipated him by this. There is a great difference, +however, between him and his predecessors. They are for living a full +life because it brings them enjoyment. He, on the other hand brings to +the theory the much deeper thought that by living [pg 179] one’s own +life victoriously to the full life itself is honoured, and that by +raising life to a higher power the meaning of existence is brought +out. Men of genius and strong individuality, therefore, should be +intent only on allowing the greatness that is in them to become an +actuality._(_75_)_ + +Nietzsche’s true predecessors are unknown to him. They have their +home, like those of Spinoza, in China. In that country +life-affirmation made the attempt to come to clear ideas about itself. +In Lao-tse and his pupils it is still naïvely ethical. In Chwang-tse +it becomes cheerful resignation; in Lie-tse the will to secret power +over things; in Yang-tse it ends in an all-round living of life to the +full. Nietzsche is a synthesis, showing itself in a European +mentality, of Lie-tse and Yang-tse. It is only we Europeans who are +capable of producing the philosophy of brutality. + +Zarathustra is for Nietzsche the symbol of the thoughts which are +forming within him: Zarathustra as the hero of veracity who ventures +to value natural life as a good, and as the genius who is far removed +from the Judaeo-Christian mode of thought. + +Nietzsche is at bottom no more unethical than Schopenhauer. He is +misled by the ethical element which there is in life-affirmation into +giving the status of ethics to life-affirmation as such. Thereby he +falls into the absurdities which follows from an exclusive affirmation +of life, just as Schopenhauer falls into those of an exclusive denial +of life. Nietzsche’s will-to-power should cause no more offence than +Schopenhauer’s will-to-self-annihilation, as it is explained in the +passages in his works which deal with asceticism. It is interesting to +note that neither of the two men lives in accordance with his view of +life. Schopenhauer is no [pg 180] ascetic but a _bon vivant_, and +Nietzsche does not lord it over his fellow men but lives in seclusion. + +Life-affirmation and life-denial are both for a certain distance +ethical; pursued to a conclusion both are unethical. This result, +which was reached by the optimistic thought of China and the +pessimistic thought of India, makes its appearance in Europe in +Nietzsche and Schopenhauer because they are the only thinkers in this +continent who philosophise in elemental fashion about the +will-to-live, and venture to follow the paths of one-sidedness. Each +completing the other, they pronounce sentence on the ethics of +European philosophy by bringing into daylight again the elemental +ethical thoughts contained in life-denial as well as in +life-affirmation, thoughts which philosophy was keeping buried. +Arriving as they do at the non-ethical by thinking out to a +conclusion, one of them life-denial, the other life-affirmation, they +corroborate, if taken together, the statement that the ethical +consists neither of life-denial nor of life-affirmation, but is a +mysterious combination of the two. + + + + +[pg 181] + +CHAPTER XVI + +THE ISSUE OF THE WESTERN STRUGGLE FOR A WORLD-VIEW + + +Academic thinkers: Sidgwick, Stephen, Alexander, Wundt, Paulsen, +Höffding + +THE attempts of speculative philosophy to find a foundation for ethics +in knowledge of the nature of the world have come to grief. Ethics +based on science and sociology have shown themselves powerless. +Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, although they bring back into general +acceptance some elementary questions of ethics, are unable, +nevertheless, to establish a satisfying ethic. + +In the later decades of the nineteenth century, therefore, ethics find +themselves in an unenviable position. They remain of good courage, +however, being confident that they have at their disposal a +sufficiency of “scientifically” recognized results to guarantee them +an assured existence. + +This conviction is produced by a series of inter-related works—chiefly +academic manuals of ethics. Their authors are of the opinion that +ethics can be built, like the arch of a bridge, upon two piers. One of +their piers is the natural ethical disposition of man; the other they +allow themselves to find in those needs of society which influence the +spirit and temper of individuals. They consider their task to be the +bringing into actual existence of the arch (the possibility of +completing which they take for granted), with the solid material of +modern psychology, biology, and sociology, and the dividing of the +load in the best calculated way between the two piers. Fundamentally +they do nothing beyond restoring with new means the standpoint of +Hume. + +The following writers try to carry through this adjustment of the +ethics which start from the standpoint of [pg 182] ethical personality +and those which start from that of society: Henry Sidgwick +(1838-1900),_(_76_)_ Leslie Stephen (1832-1904),_(_77_)_ Samuel +Alexander (b. 1859),_(_78_)_ Wilhelm Wundt (b. 1832),_(_79_)_ +Friedrich Paulsen (1846-1908),_(_80_)_ Friedrich Jodl (b. +1849),_(_81_)_ Georg von Gizyki (1851-1895),_(_82_)_ Harald Höffding +(b. 1843),_(_83_)_ and others. Of these ethical writers who, in spite +of the variety of experience they bring to bear on the subject, are +essentially related to one another, the most original is Leslie +Stephen, the scientifically soundest is Wilhelm Wundt, the most +ethical is Harald Höffding. + +Höffding makes the ethical originate partly out of a consideration +which limits the sovereignty of the present minute. “An action (he +says) is good which preserves the totality of life and gives fulness +and life to its content; an action is bad which has a more or less +decided tendency to break into and narrow the totality of life and its +content.” Supporting this consideration come also instincts of +sympathy, which make us feel pleasure in the pleasure of others, and +pain at their pain. The aim of ethics is general prosperity. + +Of these ethical writers some put the chief emphasis on the ethical +disposition of the individual, while others hold that ethics are +constituted chiefly by their content, which aims at the good of +society. What is common to them all [pg 183] is that they try to +combine the ethic of ethical personality and the ethic of +utilitarianism without having inquired into their higher unity. That +is why the chapters in which they touch on the problem of the basic +principle of the moral are always the part of their works which is the +least clear and the least living. One is conscious of how happy they +feel when they have waded through this swamp, and can launch out into +consideration of the different ethical standpoints which have emerged +in history, or can face questions on single points in ethical +practice. And when they handle practical questions, it is obvious that +they are not in possession of any usable basic principle of the moral. +Their coming to terms with reality is a mere groping here and there. +The considerations on the strength of which they decide are set out +now in this sense, now in that. Hence these ethical writers frequently +offer very interesting discussions on ethical problems, but the +conception of the moral never gets from them any real explanation or +any deepening. The criterion of a real ethic is whether it allows +their full rights to the problems of personal morality and of the +relation of man to man, problems with which we are concerned every day +and every hour, and in which we must become ethical personalities. +These academical works do not do this. Therefore, although they may +arrive at results which deserve attention, they are not capable of +giving effective ethical impulses to the thought of their time. + +The ethic of self-perfecting. Kant’s successors: Cohen, Herrmann + +This mediating ethic is not left uncriticized. In Germany inheritors +of the Kantian spirit like Hermann Cohen (b. 1842)_(_84_)_ and Wilhelm +Herrmann (1846-1922)_(_85_)_ oppose [pg 184] it, and in +English-speaking countries successors of the Intuitionists like James +Martineau (1805-1900),_(_86_)_ F. H. Bradley (b. 1846),_(_87_)_ T. H. +Green (1836-1882),_(_88_)_ Simon Laurie (1829-1909),_(_89_)_ and James +Seth (b. 1860)._(_90_)_ + +In spite of wide differences in detail these thinkers agree in +refusing to derive ethics either from the ethical disposition of man +or from the claims of society. They represent them as produced +entirely through the ethical personality. To become ethical +personalities, however, (so they say) we step out of ourselves and +work for the good of the community. + +Cohen and Herrmann attempt to reach an ethic which is a consistent +unity by using logic to put a content into the empty categorical +imperative of Kant. They wish to make good what he missed in his +_Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten_ (Foundations for a Metaphysic +of Morals) and in his _Metaphysik der Sitten_ (A Metaphysic of +Morals). Cohen finds the origin of ethics in the pure Will thinking +out the idea of one’s fellow-man and that of the associating of men to +form a state, his ethical ego being brought into existence by this +logical operation. The ethic thus attained consists in honesty, +modesty, loyalty, justice, and humanity, and culminates in the +representation of the state as the highest creation of the moral +spirit. But that this ethic is only the offspring of mental ability is +betrayed by the whole story of its appearance. The “pure will” is an +abstraction which cannot start anything. + +Instead of obtaining an ethic by deduction, using abstract logical +methods, Wilhelm Herrmann opens for it the back-door of experience. He +does indeed make ethics consist in “the bowing of the individual +before the power [pg 185] of a something which is universally valid in +thought,” but that content of ethics which is a necessity of thought +we are to reach by seeing ourselves in each other as if in a mirror, +and deciding what kind of conduct makes us mutually “reliable.” The +thought of the unconditional claim originates, therefore, +spontaneously in us, but awakes to the fact that it is determined by +its content “through experience of human intercourse, and in the +relation of reliability.” + +Herrmann did not carry this philosophic ethic through to completion. +He sketches it as an introduction to a not less artificial theological +ethic. His conception is allied to Adam Smith’s theory of the +impartial third party (see page 82). + +Martineau, Green, Bradley, Laurie, Seth, and Royce + +Martineau, Green, Bradley, Laurie, and Seth try to reach an ethic +which is a consistent unity by making the whole of ethics originate in +the need of self-perfecting. Of these, Martineau goes more on the +lines of the moralists of the eighteenth century, known as the +Cambridge Platonists. Ethics consist for him in thinking ourselves +into the ideal of perfection, which God gave us with our life, and +letting ourselves be determined by it. T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley, +Simon Laurie, and James Seth show more or less the influence of J. G. +Fichte. The ethical is with them founded on the fact that man wishes +to live his life out in the deepest way as an effective personality, +and thereby attain to true union with the infinite spirit. This +thought is expounded best by T. H. Green. He is also led at the same +time to the relation between civilization and ethics, and lays it down +that all the achievements of human activity, especially the political +and social perfecting of society, are nothing in themselves, and have +a real meaning only so far as they render more thorough inward +perfecting attainable by individuals. A spiritualized conception of +civilization is therefore now struggling [pg 186] for acceptance. An +upholder on American soil of this ethic of self-perfecting is Josiah +Royce (1855-1916)._(_91_)_ + +In the effort to conceive of ethics as a whole as being an ethic of +self-perfecting, that is to say of conduct which springs from inward +necessity, these thinkers express thoughts which belong to a living +ethic. To be energetically concerned with the basic principle of the +moral, even though one be led in the direction of the universal and +apparently abstract, always brings with it results which are valuable +for practice, even if the solution of the problem itself is not +thereby advanced beyond a certain point. + +These thinkers go so far on these lines as to conceive of ethics as +higher life-affirmation, consisting in devoting ourselves to the +activity which the world-spirit wills for us. They represent the +mysticism of activity taught by J. G. Fichte, but without its +speculative foundation. + +They leave unsolved, however, nay, they do not even put the question, +how the higher life-affirmation comes to give itself a content which +stands in contradiction to the course of nature. They conceive of +higher life-affirmation as self-devotion, that is to say as +life-affirmation within which life-denial is active. But how does this +paradox come about? How far is this direction of the will, which +contradicts the natural will-to-live, a necessity of thought? Why must +men become different from the world in order to exist and work in the +world in true harmony with the world-spirit? And what meaning has this +conduct of his for the happenings which take place in the universe? + +Nature-philosophy and ethics. Fouillée, Guyau, Lange, Stern + +The thought of Alfred Fouillée (1838-1913)_(_92_)_ and Jean [pg 187] +Marie Guyau (1854-1888)_(_93_)_ also circles round the conception of +ethics as higher life-affirmation. They too conceive of the ethical as +devotion, that is to say, as life-affirmation within which life-denial +is present, but they dig deeper than the English and American +representatives of the ethic of self-perfecting, in that they seek to +conceive of ethics within a nature-philosophy. Hence questions come to +be discussed which remain unnoticed in the former. The problems of the +basic principle of the moral and that of the optimistic-ethical +world-view are once more opened up and, for the first time, in a +comprehensive and elemental way. + +Fouillée philosophises in a noble way about the will-to-live. The +ideas which arise in us, directed towards ethical ideals, are (he +says), like our ideas generally, not simply something produced by +thought, but are the expression of forces which press within us +towards making existence full and complete._(_94_)_ Speaking +generally, we must in this matter clearly understand that the +evolution which in the course of the world produces and maintains +existence is the work of re-presentative forces (_idées-forces_), and +is therefore to be explained in the last analysis as psychic. It +reaches its highest point in man’s ideas, which will their ends with +clear consciousness. In this highest being, man, reality gets so far +as to produce ideals which go out beyond reality, and by their means +to be led on beyond itself. Ethics are therefore a result of the +evolution of the world. The idea of self-perfecting through devotion, +which we experience as the puzzling element within us, is after all a +natural manifestation of the will-to-live. The ego which has reached +the farthest height of willing and representing enlarges itself by +overflowing upon other human existences. Devotion is, therefore, not a +surrender of the self, but a [pg 188] manifestation of its +expansion._(_95_)_ The man who analyses himself more deeply learns by +experience that the highest life-affirmation comes about, not by the +natural will-to-live simply rising into will-to-power, but by its +“expanding.” “Act towards others as if you became conscious of them at +the same time as you become conscious of yourself.”_(_96_)_ + +Jean Marie Guyau, a pupil and friend of Fouillée’s, in his _Sketch of +an Ethic without Obligation or Sanction_, tries to work out the +thought of this ethical life-affirmation through expansion. Ordinary +ethics, he says, stand helpless before this insoluble cleft between +the ego and other men, but living nature makes no stop at that point. +The individual life is expansive because it is life. As in the +physical sphere it carries within itself the impulse to produce fresh +life like itself, so in the spiritual sphere also it wishes to widen +its own existence by linking it on to other life like itself. Life +includes not feeding only, but also production and fruitfulness; real +living is not a taking in only, but a giving out of oneself as well. +Man is an organism which imparts itself to others; its perfection +consists in the most complete imparting of itself. In this +philosophizing, then, Hume’s notion of sympathy is given more profound +expression. + +Fouillée and Guyau, both of them invalids, lived together at Nice and +Mentone. Trying in one another’s company to realise the ethical higher +life-affirmation, they take their exercise on the very shore on which +Nietzsche that same year thought out his heightened life-affirmation +of _Beyond Good and Evil_. He knows their works, as they also know +his, but as men they remain personally unknown to each other._(_97_)_ + +[pg 189] + +Fouillée and Guyau, because they think deeply, are led to +nature-philosophy by their philosophizing about the way in which the +will-to-live is to become ethical. They wish to conceive ethics, +within a world- and life-affirming nature-philosophy, as a deepening, +which is a necessity of thought, of life-affirmation. They thus join +the procession of the Chinese monists. That which these, like Spinoza +and Fichte, attempted and failed to do, they attempt again in the +confidence that their nature-philosophy will be fairer to the +conception of living existence than that of the others was. + +Navigating the rushing stream of heightened life-affirmation, they try +with mighty efforts at the oars to reach the bank of the ethical. They +believe that they will be able to land there . . . but the waves carry +them past it, as they did all those who attempted the journey before +them. + +That life-affirmation in its highest form, by a paradox which lies in +the nature of things, becomes ethical devotion to others they cannot +show convincingly. This proposition, in which they would transform the +natural world-view into an ethical one, is truth only for the thought +which dares to make the same jump because it sees no possibility +otherwise of reaching land from the drifting boat. + +The ethic of Fouillée and Guyau, then, is an enthusiastic conception +of life to which man pulls himself up when coming to terms with +reality, in order to assert himself and exert himself in the universe +in accordance with a higher value which he feels in himself. + +Fouillée and Guyau are, therefore, elemental moralists like +Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. They are not, however, like the latter, +making a voyage with their rudder tightly lashed in the circle of +world- and life-denial or of world- and life-affirmation; they hold on +their course with sure feeling towards the mysterious union of +world-affirmation, life-affirmation, and life-denial which constitutes +ethical life-affirmation. . . . But this course takes them out over +the boundless ocean. They never reach land. + +[pg 190] + +In order to understand themselves as a direction of the will-to-live +which is a necessity of thought, and to think themselves out to an +ethical world-view, ethics must come to terms with nature-philosophy. +We find them, then, attempting—as did the Rationalists, and Kant, and +the speculative philosophers—to read into the world, in simple or in +detailed thought, an optimistic-ethical meaning, or at least, as with +Spinoza, to give an ethical character in some way or other to the +relation of the individual to the universe. These two men also, +Fouillée and Guyau, wrestle with nature-philosophy in order from it to +justify ethics and an ethical world-view as not without meaning. At +the same time, however, they dare—and this is the new element which +appears in them—to look straight in the face the possibility that it +will perhaps be impossible to carry their undertaking through. What +will then become of ethics and world-view? Although they ought really +to totter and fall, they do nevertheless remain standing—so Fouillée +and Guyau judge. + +Whether the idea of the good can finally claim any objective validity +cannot be asserted with complete confidence, says Fouillée in his +_Morale des Idées-forces_. Man must finally be content to force +himself to acceptance of the ethically expansive life-affirmation, +merely because he feels it to be the only thing which is capable of +making life valuable. Out of love for the ideal he triumphs over all +doubt, and sacrifices himself to it, untroubled about whether or no +anything results from his doing so. + +Guyau’s _Sketch of a Morality without Obligations or Sanctions_ ends +in similar thoughts. An inner force, he says, works upon us and drives +us forward. Do we go forward alone, or will the idea eventually win +for itself some influence upon nature? . . . Anyhow let us go forward! +. . . “Perhaps the earth, perhaps mankind, will one day reach some as +yet unknown goal which they themselves have created. There is no hand +leading us, no eye watching on our behalf; the rudder was broken long +ago, [pg 191] or rather there never was one at all; it has to be +provided. That is a big task, and it is our task.” . . . Ethical men +are crossing the ocean of events on a rudderless and mastless +derelict, so to say, hoping nevertheless that they will some day and +somewhere reach land. + +In these sentences there is announced from a distance the +disappearance of the optimistic-ethical interpretation of the world. +Because they venture on renouncing this, and proclaim in principle the +sovereign independence of ethics, Fouillée and Guyau belong to the +greatest thinkers who have had a share in shaping our world-view. + +They do not, however, follow to the end the path on which they have +stumbled. While they make ethics independent of whether its activity +can or cannot prove itself legitimate as significant and effective in +the totality of world-happenings, they assume the existence of a +conflict between world-view and life-view, which philosophy down to +their day had actually not noticed. But they do not investigate its +nature, and do not show how it is that life-view can venture to assert +itself in opposition to world-view, and even to exalt itself as the +more important. They are content to prophesy that ethics and ethical +world-view will grow green again as mighty oases, fed by subterranean +springs, even if the sand-storms of scepticism should have turned into +a desert the broad territory of the optimistic-ethical knowledge of +the world, in which we once wanted to make our home. At bottom, +however, they hope that nothing like this will happen, and their +confidence that a nature-philosophy which deals in the proper way with +the nature of Being will after all finally reach an ethic and a +world-view, is not completely overthrown. + +Since they at first claim only a hypothetical validity for their new +view, and do not carry it through as a matter of principle, Fouillée +and Guyau do not exercise upon the thought of the end of the +nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth the influence +which they ought to have. Their age was, indeed, not ready for that +[pg 192] renunciation of knowledge for which their writings were +preparing the way. + +A forerunner of their ethic is to be found in that which Friedrich +Albert Lange sketches as his own at the end of his _History of +Materialism_ (1866). Ethics, he says, are an imaginative creation on +which we determine, because we carry an ideal within ourselves. We +rise above the actual because we find no satisfaction in it. We are +ethical because our life thereby obtains a definite character such as +we long for. . . . Ethics mean becoming free from the world. + +Lange also, then, has already reached the view that from direct +philosophizing about the world and life an ethical world-view results, +not as a necessity of thought, but as a necessity for life. But like +the two French thinkers he just throws out the thought instead of +following it out into all its presuppositions and consequences. + +A peculiar supplement which completes the ethics of Fouillée, Guyau, +and Lange, without actually going back to them, is provided by the +Berlin physician, Wilhelm Stern, in an inquiry, which has attracted +far too little notice, into the evolutionary origin of ethics. The +essential nature of the moral, he says, is the impulse to maintenance +of life by the repelling of all injurious attacks upon it, an impulse +through which the individual being experiences a feeling of +relationship to all other animate beings in face of nature’s injurious +attacks upon them. How has this mentality arisen in us? Through the +fact that animate beings of the most varied kinds have been obliged +through countless generations to fight side by side for existence +against the forces of nature, and in their common distress have ceased +to be hostile to one another, so that they might attempt a common +resistance to the annihilation which threatened them, instead of +succumbing in a common ruin. This experience, which began with their +first and lowest stage of existence and has become through thousands +of millions of generations more and more [pg 193] pronounced, has +given its special character to the psychology of all living beings. +All ethics are an affirmation of life, the character of which is +determined by perception of the dangers to existence which living +beings experience in common. + +How much deeper Wilhelm Stern digs than Darwin did! According to +Darwin, experience of the never-ceasing, universal danger to existence +produces finally nothing but the herd-instinct, which holds together +creatures of the same species. According to Stern, there is developed +by the same experience a kind of solidarity with everything that +lives. The barriers fall. Man experiences sympathy with animals, as +they experience it, only less completely, with him. Ethics are not +only something peculiar to man, but something which, though in a less +developed form, is to be seen also in the animal world as such. +Self-devotion is an experience of the deepened impulse to +self-preservation. In the active as well as in the passive meaning of +the word the whole animate creation is to be included within the basic +principle of the moral. + +The fundamental commandment of ethics, then, is that we cause no +suffering to any living creature, not even the lowest, unless it is to +effect some necessary protection for ourselves, and that we be ready +to undertake, whenever we can, positive action for the benefit of +other creatures. + +In Fouillée, Guyau, and Lange ethics come to terms with +nature-philosophy, but without any advance towards making themselves +cosmic. They fall into the anachronism of regarding themselves still, +even at that date, as nothing beyond the regulating of the temper and +disposition of man towards his fellow-men, instead of widening +themselves out so as to deal with the conduct of man towards every +living creature and towards Being in general. In Stern they take this +obvious, further step. + +No ethic short of one that has made itself universal and cosmic is +capable of taking in hand the investigation of the basic principle of +the moral; only such an ethic can [pg 194] really come to terms in +intelligible fashion with nature-philosophy. + +Nature-philosophy and ethics in Eduard von Hartmann + +In Eduard von Hartmann (1842-1906)_(_98_)_ also, ethics try to +comprehend themselves within nature-philosophy. His _Philosophy of the +Unconscious_ is largely in line with the thoughts of Fouillée, but in +the matter of world-view he goes off in another direction. Instead of +allowing ethics, when they are coming to terms with nature-philosophy, +to experience their freedom from it, he compels them to base +themselves on such a philosophy. His nature-philosophy is pessimistic. +It confesses to being unable to discover any principle which contains +a meaning in the course of nature. Therefore (so Hartmann concludes, +as do the Indians and Schopenhauer), the world-process is something +which must come to a standstill. Everything that exists must gradually +enter on the blessed condition of will-lessness. Ethics are the +disposition which brings this development into action. + +In language obscure enough von Hartmann formulates at the end of his +_Phenomenology of the Moral Consciousness_ his pessimistic-ethical +world-view as follows: “Existence in the world of matter is the +Incarnation of the Godhead; the world-process is the history of the +Passion of the Incarnate God, and at the same time the way to the +Redemption of Him who is crucified in the flesh; but morality is +co-operation for the shortening of this road of suffering and +redemption.” + +Then, however, instead of unfolding what this ethic is, and how it is +to come into force, he undertakes to show that all ethical standpoints +which have ever made their appearance in any way in history have their +own justification. He wants to house them all within an evolution +which necessarily leads to a pessimistic ethic. + +[pg 195] + +Every moral principle which shows itself in history (von Hartmann +asserts) changes itself by starting on a search for the completion +which lies nearest to it. It lives itself out, and then makes way for +the higher moral principle which issues logically from it. That is how +the ethical consciousness in individuals and in mankind works itself +up from one moral principle to another till it reaches the highest +knowledge. From the primitive moral principle of aiming at individual +pleasure it travels past the authoritarian, the æsthetic, the +sentimental, and the intellectual moral systems, which are one and all +subjective, to the objective morality of care for the general +happiness. But still beyond this it is led to the evolutionary moral +principle of the development of civilisation, and here it learns to +think on supra-moral lines. It grasps the notion that for moral +consideration there is still something higher than the prosperity of +individuals and of society, namely “contest and struggle for the +maintenance and enhancing of civilization.” This according to usual +ideas unethical conception of ethics has to live itself out +completely, so that it may then be resolved into an ethic of world- +and life-denial. + +By this insight into the logic of the course of ethical evolution, von +Hartmann is saved from making any protest, as an ordinary ethical +thinker would, against the unethical civilization-ethics of the close +of the nineteenth century. He knows, on the contrary, that he is +helping the cause of rightly understood ethical progress, if he treats +them with respect as a necessary phenomenon, and urges that they be +allowed to live themselves out with the utmost completeness. We have +learnt (he therefore proclaims) to see through the ethic which aims at +making men and peoples happy as being a piece of sentimentality, and +we ought now to make up our minds to deal seriously with the +supra-ethical ethic of the enhancing of life and civilization. We must +learn to regard as good whatever is necessary for the development of +civilization, and we [pg 196] are no longer at liberty to condemn war +in the name of ethics. “The principle of the development of +civilization compels us to recognize all these protests as unsound, +since wars are the chief means of carrying on the struggle between +races, _i.e._, the process of natural selection within mankind, and +preparation for the effective waging of war has formed one of the most +important means of education and training for mankind in every phase +of the development of their civilization, as it will also, so far as +we can see, in the future.”_(_99_)_ Economic misery too, and the +struggles which arise from it, are seen by the ethical spirit which +looks further ahead to subserve a higher objective. The sufferings +under the wage system, which are far greater than those under slavery, +are necessary for the course of civilization. The struggle which they +evoke calls forces into being and has an educative result. The course +of civilization needs a favoured minority to serve as bearers of its +ideas. Beneficence and charity to the poor must therefore be practised +with moderation. The need which spurs men on to active work must not +be banished from the world. + +Another element in the course of civilization is the taking into +possession of the whole earth by the race with the highest +civilization, which must therefore increase its numbers as much as +possible. In order to make the female population keen about the task +which thus falls to them, women must be raised intellectually, _i.e._, +their patriotism and national feeling must be increased as much as +possible, their historical sense must be aroused, and they must be +filled with enthusiasm for the principle of civilization which +underlies evolution. “To effect this object, the history of +civilization must be made the foundation of all instruction in the +upper classes of girl-schools.”_(_100_)_ + +It is desirable, therefore, to make efforts to secure the “improvement +of the human type,” and the attainment [pg 197] of an enhancement of +civilization in which “the world-spirit becomes in increasing measure +conscious of itself.” + +In his nature-philosophy and his philosophy of history, then, Eduard +von Hartmann reaches a supra-ethical world-view in which Hegel and +Nietzsche drink to brotherhood, and the principles of inhumanity and +relativity, which underlie biologico-sociological ethics, sit at table +with garlands on their heads. + +How and when the supra-ethical ethic of enhanced world- and +life-affirmation passes over into the highest ethic of world- and +life-denial, and in what way this highest ethic, in which we function +as Redeemers of the Absolute, is to be carried out in practice, von +Hartmann is, however, unable to make clear. The abstruse modulations +with which, in the last chapters of his work, he tries to get from one +to the other provide us with ample proof of the unnatural character of +the undertaking. To produce a world-view with Hegel for body and +Schopenhauer for head, is an absurdity. By his resolve to attempt it, +von Hartmann admits his inability to make enhanced life-affirmation +become in a natural way ethical. + +Eduard von Hartmann prefers to the profession of moralist that of +philosopher of the history of morals. Instead of serving the world +with an ethical system of morals, he makes it happy with the discovery +of the principle of inherent progress in the history of morals, and +thus helps to befool completely the thought of his age, which is +living its life in an unethical and unspiritual optimism. + +From the history of ethics nothing is to be obtained except a certain +amount of clearness about the problem of ethics. Anyone who discovers +in it principles which promise automatic progress in the ethical +development of mankind has by his miserably faulty construction of +that history read these principles into the facts without any +justification. + +[pg 198] + +Nature-philosophy and ethics in Bergson, Chamberlain, Keyserling, +Haeckel + +Henri Bergson (b. 1860)_(_101_)_ renounces altogether the attempt to +bring together nature-philosophy and ethics. Houston Stewart +Chamberlain (b. 1855)_(_102_)_ and Count Hermann Keyserling (b. +1880)_(_103_)_ make the attempt but without reaching any result. + +In his philosophizing about nature, Bergson does not go beyond the +_rôle_ of the observing subject. He analyses in a masterly way the +nature of the process of knowledge. His investigations into the origin +of our conception of time and of the actions of our consciousness +which are bound up with it, have taught us how to comprehend the +course of nature in its living reality. Leading us on beyond the +science which consists in external affirming and calculating, Bergson +shows that the true knowledge of Being comes to us through a sort of +intuition. Philosophizing means experiencing our consciousness as an +emanation of the creative impulse which rules in the world. Bergson’s +nature-philosophy has therefore a close inward connexion with that of +Fouillée, but he does not find it necessary, as Fouillée does, to +produce from it a world- and life-view. He limits himself to depicting +it from the standpoint of the problem of the theory of knowledge. He +does not attempt any analysis of the ethical consciousness. Year after +year we have waited for him to complete his work, as he no doubt +himself intended, with an attempt at producing an ethic on the basis +of nature-philosophy. But he [pg 199] contented himself with +developing in ever-new forms his theories about our inner knowledge of +the real. He never comes to the recognition that all deepening of our +knowledge of the world acquires its real meaning only so far as it +teaches us to comprehend what we ought to aim at in life. He lets the +waves of events roll past us, as if we were seated on an island in the +stream, whereas we are in reality obliged to exert ourselves as +swimmers in the stream. + +During the war the German picture-houses were crammed. People went to +see the pictures in order to forget their hunger. Bergson’s philosophy +brings before us as living events the world which Kant depicted in +motionless wall-pictures. But to satisfy the hunger of to-day for +ethics he does nothing. He has no world-view to offer us in which we +can find a life-view. Over the whole of his philosophy there prevails +a quietistic, sceptical tone. + +Houston Stewart Chamberlain tries to find a world-view which is based +on nature-philosophy and is at the same time ethical. His work +entitled _Immanuel Kant_ (1905), which is really a journey through the +problems raised by philosophy with attempts to solve them, ends in the +thought that we have to combine Goethe’s nature-philosophy, which +conceives Becoming as an eternal Being, with Kant’s judgement about +the nature of duty, if we wish to reach a real civilization. He finds +himself unable, however, to carry through to completion such a +world-view. + +Roused by Chamberlain, Hermann Keyserling goes in the aims of his +thinking far beyond Bergson. He wants to reach clear ideas not only +about knowledge of the world, but also about life and work in the +world. From the pinnacle, however, to which he mounts, he sees only +the field of wisdom; that of ethics is veiled in mist. The highest +idea, so he declares at the conclusion of his work _The Structure of +the World_, is that of truth. We want to know, because knowledge, +“whether it visibly serves life at present or not, already implies in +itself a purposive reaction to the outer world.” In correct knowledge +the [pg 200] human spirit enters into reciprocal relations with the +universe. Life carries within itself its own purposive character. + +Keyserling finds it quite in order that the world-view of great men +should be superior to ordinary moral standards. One must not reproach +Leonardo da Vinci for working as willingly in the service of the +French king, Francis I., as he had done previously in that of the +Sforzas whom Francis expelled. “Almost every great spirit is a +complete egoist.” If any one has experience of life in its full extent +and depth and living force, and works in reciprocity with the +universe, interest in the human race is for him a kind of +specialization which is no longer incumbent on him. + +In the Preface to the second edition of _The Structure of the World_ +(1920), Keyserling admits that he has not reached a decision about the +ethical problem. In his _Philosophy as Art_ (1920), he declares it to +be the foremost duty of our time to “make the wise man a possible +type, to draw him out by education, and give him all necessary +publicity and scope for his activities.” + +The wise man is the one man who is capable of veracity, the man who +lets all the tones of life sound in him, and seeks to be in tune with +the fundamental bass-note which is given in him. He has no universally +valid world-view to impart to others. He has not even for himself one +that is definite and final; he has only one which is liable to +constant alteration for the better. He himself is unalterable only in +this, that he wants to live his life in its entirety and in the most +vital co-operation with the Universe, and at the same time ever +strives to be himself. Veracious and emphatic life-affirmation is +therefore the last word of this philosophizing about the world and +life. . . . + +Thus does nature-philosophy admit that it cannot produce an ethic. + +With the lesser spirits self-deception goes further. The ordinary +scientific monism, the greatness of which consists in its being an +elemental movement towards veracity in an [pg 201] age which is weary +of veracity, is still convinced that from its insight into the +essential nature of life, into the development of lower life into +higher, and into the inner connexion of the individual life with the +life of the universe, it can somehow or other arrive at an ethic. But +it is significant that its representatives take altogether different +roads in the search for an ethic. An incredible absence of thought and +of plan reigns in the ethical philosophizing of the ordinary +scientific nature-philosophy. Many of its representatives have before +their mind’s eye a conception of the moral as a becoming one with the +universe, a conception which is related to that of the Stoics and +Spinoza. Others, influenced by Nietzsche, entertain the thought that +true ethics are an enhanced and aristocratic life-affirmation, and +have nothing to do with the claims of the “democratic” social +ethics._(_104_)_ Others again, like Johannes Unold in his work _Monism +and its Ideals_ (1908), try to bring together nature-philosophy and +ethics just in such a way as to let them conceive of the human +activity which is directed to social ends as the final result of the +development of the organic world. There are also scientific +nature-philosophers who are content to put together out of what is +commonly regarded as moral an ethic which is universally accepted, and +to exalt it, so far as they can, into a product of nature-philosophy. +In Ernst Haeckel’s (1834-1919) work _The Riddle of the Universe_ +(1899), there is an ethic of that character built on to the palace of +nature-philosophy like an outside kitchen. The basic principle of +monistic ethical theory is (so it is here maintained) the equal +justification of Egoism and of Altruism, and then a balance between +them. Both are laws of nature. Egoism serves the preservation of the +individual, altruism that of the species. This “golden rule of +morality” is said to be of equal significance [pg 202] with the rule +which Jesus and other ethical thinkers before him are said to have +enunciated in the demand that we shall love our neighbour as +ourselves. Spencer and water is poured out under a Christian label. + +The death-agony of the optimistic-ethical world-view + +An inexorable development of thought, then, brings it about that the +philosophy of the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of +the twentieth, either advances to a supra-ethical world-view, or finds +itself living in an ethical ruin. What happens in the great German +speculative philosophy of the beginning of the nineteenth century is a +prelude to the _dénouement_ of the drama. In that philosophy an +ethical world-view tries to find itself a foundation in speculative +nature-philosophy, and in doing so becomes, as stands confessed in +Hegel, supra-ethical. Later, ethics believe themselves capable of +providing a “scientific” conception of themselves, thanks to the +results reached by psychology, biology, and sociology, but in +proportion as they effect this, their energy decreases. Later still, +when through the growth of science and the inward changes in thought a +nature-philosophy which is in harmony with scientific observation of +nature becomes the only possible philosophy, ethics have once more to +make a real attempt to found themselves in a nature-philosophy which +is directed upon the universe. There is nothing, however, but the +enhancement and perfecting of life which nature-philosophy can give as +the meaning of life. Hence ethics must struggle to conceive the +enhancement and perfecting of life as something which comes to pass +within the field of ethical ideas, and it is this that the most modern +thought is striving for, on lines of development which are often +apparently irreconcilable, without ever attaining its goal. + +Whenever ethics really rely in any way upon nature-philosophy for the +production of the convincing, ethical world-view which the age is +longing for, they get wrecked [pg 203] upon it in one way or another. +Either they actually attempt to give themselves out to be somehow a +natural enhancement of life and thereby so alter their character that +they cease to be really and truly ethics. Or they abdicate; perhaps, +as with Keyserling, leaving the field free to supra-ethical +world-view, perhaps, as with Bergson, leaving nature-philosophy and +ethical questions with it, to rest in peace. + +Thus the sun of ethics becomes darkened for our generation, +nature-philosophy pushing forward like a wall of cloud. Just as an +inundation overwhelms pastures and fields with its water-borne +_débris_, so do the supra-ethical and the unethical ways of thinking +break in upon our mentality. They bring about the most terrible +devastations without anyone having any clear idea of what the +catastrophe means, or indeed being conscious of anything wrong beyond +that the spirit of the time is rendering all ethical standards +powerless. + +Everywhere there grows up an unethical conception of civilization. The +masses reconcile themselves in an incomprehensible way to the theory +of the relativity of all ethical standards and to thoughts of +inhumanity. Freed from any obligation of ethical intention, the belief +in progress suffers a process of externalization which increases from +year to year, becoming finally nothing better than a wooden façade +which conceals the pessimism behind it. That we have lapsed into +pessimism is betrayed by the fact that the demand for the spiritual +advance of society and mankind is no longer seriously made among us. +We have now resigned ourselves, as if no explanation of it were +needed, to the fate of being obliged to smile at the high-flying hopes +of previous generations. There is no longer to be found among us the +true world- and life-affirmation which reaches down to the depths of +the spiritual nature of man. Unavowed pessimism has been consuming us +for decades. + +Delivered over to events in a temper and disposition which is +powerless because it is entirely without any true [pg 204] and ethical +ideals of progress, we are experiencing the collapse of material and +spiritual civilization alike. + +By its belief in an optimistic ethical world-view the modern age made +itself capable of a mighty advance towards civilization. Its thought, +however, has not been able to show this world-view to be founded in +the nature of things, and we have therefore sunk, consciously and +unconsciously, into a condition in which we have no world-view at all, +a condition of pessimism, too, and of absence of all ethical +conviction, so that we are on the point of complete shipwreck. + +The bankruptcy of the optimistic-ethical world-view was announced +beforehand as little as was the financial bankruptcy of the ruined +states of Europe. But just as the latter was gradually revealed as +having actually come about by the constantly diminishing value of the +paper-money that was issued, so is the former being gradually revealed +by the constantly diminishing power among us of the true and profound +ideals of civilization. + + + + +[pg 205] + +CHAPTER XVII + +THE NEW WAY + + +Why the optimistic-ethical world-view cannot be carried through to the +logical conclusion + +THE greatness of European philosophy consists in its having chosen the +optimistic-ethical world-view; its weakness in its having again and +again imagined that it was putting that world-view on a firm +foundation, instead of making clear to itself the difficulties of +doing so. The task before our generation is to strive with deepened +thought to reach a truer and more serviceable world-view, and thus to +bring to an end our living on and on without any world-view at all. + +Our age is striking out unmeaningly in every direction like a fallen +horse in the traces. It is trying with external measures and new +organisation to solve the problems with which it has to deal, but all +in vain. The horse cannot get on its feet again till it is unharnessed +and allowed to get its head up. Our world will not get upon its feet +again till it lets the truth come home to it that its cure is not to +be found in active measures but in new ways of thinking. + +But new ways of thinking can arise only if a true and serviceable +world-view draws individuals within its influence. + +The one serviceable world-view is the optimistic-ethical. Its renewal +is a duty incumbent on us. Can we prove it to be true? + +In the struggle of the thinkers who for centuries exerted themselves +to demonstrate the truth of the optimistic-ethical world-view, and +kept surrendering themselves comfortably to the illusion, always very +soon shattered, that [pg 206] they had succeeded, the problem with +which we are concerned reveals itself in outlines which become clearer +and clearer. We are now in a position to reckon up why those or those +paths, apparently so full of promise, have led to nothing, and can +lead to nothing. By the insight into the problem thus won we shall be +preserved from entering on impassable roads and forced to follow the +only one which is practicable. + +The most general result of the attempts made up to the present is +this: that the optimistic-ethical interpretation of the world, by +which it was hoped to put the optimistic-ethical world-view on a firm +foundation, cannot be carried through to a conclusion. Yet how logical +and natural it seemed to tune up the meaning of life and the meaning +of the world to the same note! How invitingly the path opened out of +explaining our own existence from the nature and significance of the +world! The path rises so naturally to the crest of the foothills that +one could only believe it led up to the highest point of knowledge. +But high up in the ascent it breaks off with chasms ahead. + +The reflexion that the meaning of human life must be conceivable +within the meaning of the world is such an obvious one to thought, +that the latter never lets itself be led from its path by the failure, +one after another, of all attempts in that direction. It merely +concludes that it has not tackled the problem in the right way. It +therefore has resort to the whisperings of the theory of knowledge, +and undertakes to impugn the reality of the world in order to deal +with it more successfully. In Kant, in the speculative philosophy, and +in much “spiritualistic” popular philosophy which has been current +almost down to our own day, it preserved its hope of reaching its goal +by some sort of combination of epistemological with ethical realism. +Hence the philosophy of academic manuals declaims against the +unprejudiced thinking which tries to reach a world-view without first +having been baptised by Kant with fire and the Holy Spirit. But this +too is a vain proceeding. The refined and underhand attempts to form a +[pg 207] conception of the world with an optimistic-ethical meaning +meet with no better success than the naïve ones. What our thinking +tries to proclaim as knowledge is never anything but an unjustifiable +interpretation of the world. + +Against the admission of this, thought guards itself with the courage +of despair, because it fears it will find itself in that case with no +idea of what to do in face of the problem of life. What meaning can we +give to human existence, if we must renounce all pretence of knowing +the meaning of the world? Nevertheless there remains only one thing +for thought to do, and that is to adapt itself to facts. + +The hopelessness of the attempt to find the meaning of life within the +meaning of the world is shown first of all by the fact that in the +course of nature there is no purposiveness to be seen in which the +working of men, and of mankind as a whole, could in any way intervene. +On one of the smaller among the millions of heavenly bodies there have +lived for a short space of time some human beings. For how long will +they continue so to live? Any lowering or raising of the temperature +of the earth, any change in the inclination of the axis of their +planet, a rise in the level of the ocean, or a change in the +composition of the atmosphere, could put an end to their existence. Or +the earth itself may fall, as so many other heavenly bodies have +fallen, a victim to some cosmic catastrophe. We are entirely ignorant +of what we mean for the earth. How much less then may we presume to +try to attribute to the infinite universe a meaning which has us for +its object, or which can be explained in terms of our existence! + +It is not, however, merely the huge disproportion between the universe +and human beings which makes it impossible for us to give the aims and +objects of mankind a logical place in those of the universe. Any such +attempt is made useless beforehand by the fact that we have not yet +succeeded in discovering any general purposiveness in the course of +nature. Whatever we do find of purposiveness in the world is never +anything but isolated instances of it. + +[pg 208] + +In the production and maintenance of some definite form of life nature +does sometimes act purposively in a magnificent way. But in no way +does she ever seem intent on uniting these instances of purposiveness +which are directed to single objects into a collective purpose. She +never undertakes to let life coalesce with life to form a collective +life. She is wonderfully creative force, and at the same time +senselessly destructive force. We face her, absolutely unable to form +any notion of what to do. What is full of meaning within the +meaningless, the meaningless within what is full of meaning: that is +the essential nature of the universe + +Life-view independent of world-view + +These elemental established conclusions European thought has tried to +ignore. It can do so no longer, and it is of no use to try. The facts +have silently produced their consequences. While the +optimistic-ethical world-view still maintains itself among us as a +dogma, we no longer possess the ethical world- and life-affirmation +with which it ought to provide us. Perplexity and pessimism have taken +possession of us without our admitting it. + +There remains, therefore, nothing for us to do but to admit that we +understand nothing of the world, and are surrounded by nothing but +enigmas. Our knowledge is becoming sceptical. + +Just as thought has hitherto allowed world-view and life-view to hang +together, mutually connected, so have we in consequence fallen +similarly into a sceptical conception of life. But is it really the +case that life-view is towed along by world-view, and that when the +latter can no longer be kept afloat life-view must sink with it into +the depths? Necessity bids us cut the tow-rope and try to let +life-view continue its voyage independently. + +This manœuvre is not such a surprising one as it seems. While people +acted as though their life-view were taken from their world-view, the +connexion between the two was really just the opposite, their +world-view was formed from [pg 209] their life-view. What they put +forward as their view of the world was an interpretation of the world +in the light of their life-view. + +The life-view held by European thought being optimistic-ethical, the +same character was attributed by everybody to their world-view in +defiance of facts. The will, without admitting it, overpowered +knowledge. Life-view prompted and world-view recited. The belief that +their life-view was derived from their world-view was therefore only a +fiction. + +In Kant this overpowering of knowledge, which had till then been just +naïvely allowed, was worked out systematically. His doctrine of the +“Postulates of the Practical Reason” means just this: that the will +claims for itself the decisive word in the last pronouncements of the +world-view. Only Kant manages to arrange the matter so cleverly that +the will never forces its supremacy on knowledge, but receives it from +the latter as a free gift, and then makes use of it in carefully +chosen parliamentary ways. It proceeds as if it had been invoked by +the theoretical reason to provide possible truths with reality +belonging to truths which are necessities of thought. + +In Fichte the will dictates to knowledge its world-view without any +regard at all for the arts of diplomacy. + +From the middle of the nineteenth century onward there can be +discerned a tendency in natural science no longer to claim that +world-view shall accommodate itself to scientifically established +facts. The valuable convictions of the traditional world-view are to +hold good, even if they cannot be brought into harmony with the +accepted knowledge of the world. After the publication of Du +Bois-Raymond’s (1818-1896) lectures “On the Limits of our Knowledge of +Nature” it begins with a certain school of natural science to be +considered almost a part of good manners to declare oneself +incompetent in questions of world-view. There grows up gradually what +one may call a modern doctrine of the two-fold nature of truth. To +this movement expression is given by the “Keplerbund,” which was [pg +210] founded in 1907 by representatives of natural science, and goes +so far as to declare acceptable to natural science the valuable +pronouncements of the current world-view, even when given in formulas +provided by ecclesiastical authority. This new doctrine of the +two-fold nature of truth is brought to philosophical expression by the +theory of the solidity of “value-judgments.” By means of this theory +Albrecht Ritschl (1822-1889) and his imitators try to uphold the +validity of a religious world-view side by side with a scientific one. +Almost the whole religious world, so far as it tries to remain a +thinking body, grasps at such expedients. Next, in William James’s +(1842-1910) philosophy of Pragmatism the will admits in half-naïve, +half-cynical fashion that all the knowledge professed by its +world-view has been produced by itself. + +That the valuable assertions made by the world-view are to be traced +back to the will which has been determined by valuable convictions is +therefore a fact, and since Kant’s day the fact has been admitted in +the most varied directions. The shock given to the feeling for +veracity, which accompanies this no longer naïve but half-conscious +and insidiously employed interpretation of the world, plays a fatal +part in the mentality of our time. + +But why go on with this want of candour? Why keep knowledge in +subservience to the will by means of a kind of infamous secret police? +Any world-view deduced therefrom must ever be a poor weak thing. Let +us allow the will and knowledge to come together in a relation which +is honourable to both. + +In what has hitherto been called world-view there are two things +united: view of the world and life-view. So long as it was possible to +cherish the illusion that the two were harmonious and each completed +the other, there was nothing to be said against this combination. Now, +however, when the divergence can no longer be concealed, the wider +conception of world-view which includes life-view organically within +itself, must be given up. It is no longer permissible to go on naïvely +believing that we get our life-view [pg 211] from our view of the +world, or furtively elevating in some way or other our life-view into +a view of the world. We are standing at a turning-point of thought. +Critical action which clears away all prevailing _naïvetés_ and +dishonesties has become necessary. We must make up our minds to leave +life-view and view of the world mutually independent of each other, +and see that a straightforward understanding between the two is +reached. We have to admit that because our life-view is made up of +convictions which are given in our will-to-live but are not confirmed +by knowledge of the world, we have allowed it to go beyond the varied +knowledge which makes up our view of the world. + +This renunciation of world-view in the old sense, that is of a unitary +world-view which is complete in itself, means a painful experience for +our thought. We come hereby to a dualism against which we at every +moment instinctively rebel. But we must surrender to facts. Our will +to live has to accommodate itself to the inconceivable fact that it is +unable with its own valuable convictions to discover itself again in +the manifold will-to-live which is seen manifested in the world. We +wanted to form a life-view for ourselves out of items of knowledge +gathered from the world. But it is our destiny to live by means of +convictions which an inward necessity makes a part of our thought. + +In the old rationalism reason undertook to investigate the world. In +the new it has to take as its task the attaining to clarity about the +will-to-live. Thus we return to an elemental philosophising which is +once more busied with questions of world- and life-view as they +directly affect men, and seeks to give a safe foundation to, and to +keep alive, the valuable ideas which we find in ourselves. It is in a +life-view which is dependent on itself alone, and has come in a +straightforward way to an understanding with world-knowledge, that we +hope to find once more power to attain to ethical world- and +life-affirmation. + + + + +[pg 212] + +CHAPTER XVIII + +THE FOUNDATIONS OF OPTIMISM SECURED FROM THE WILL-TO-LIVE + + +The pessimistic result of knowledge + +THERE are two things which thought has to do for us; it must lead us +up out of the naïve world- and life-affirmation to a deepened one, and +it must let us go on from mere ethical impulses to an ethic which is a +necessity of thought. + +Deepened world- and life-affirmation consists in this, that we have +the will to maintain our own life and every kind of existence that we +can in any way influence, and to bring them to their highest value. It +demands from us that we think out all ideals of the material and +spiritual perfecting of individual men, of society, and of mankind as +a whole, and let ourselves be determined by them to steady activity +and steady hope. It does not allow us to withdraw into ourselves, but +orders us to bring to bear a living and so far as possible an active +interest on everything which happens around us. To endure a state of +unrest through our relation to the world, when by withdrawing into +ourselves we might enjoy rest; that is the burden which deeper world- +and life-affirmation lays upon us. + +We begin our life-course in an unsophisticated world- and +life-affirmation. The will-to-live which is in us gives it to us as +something which is a matter of course. But later, when thought awakes, +the questions crop up which make a problem of what has hitherto been a +matter of course. What meaning will you give your life? What do you +mean to do in the world? When, along with these [pg 213] questions, we +begin trying to reconcile knowledge and will-to-live, facts get in the +way of this with confusing suggestions. Life attracts us, they say, +with a thousand expectations, and fulfils hardly one of them. And the +fulfilled expectation is almost a disappointment, for only anticipated +pleasure is really pleasure; in pleasure which is fulfilled its +opposite is already stirring. Unrest, disappointment, and pain are our +lot in the short span of time which lies between our entrance on life +and our departure from it. The spiritual is in a dreadful state of +dependence on the bodily. Our existence is at the mercy of meaningless +happenings and can be brought to an end by them at any moment. The +will-to-live gives me an impulse to action, but the action is just as +if I wanted to plough the sea, and to sow in the furrows. What did +those who worked before me effect? What significance in the endless +chain of world-happenings have their efforts had? With all its +illusive promises the will-to-live only means to mislead me into +prolonging my existence, and allowing to enter on existence, so that +the game may go on without interruption, other beings to whom the same +miserable lot has been assigned as to myself. + +The discoveries in the field of knowledge against which the +will-to-live knocks when it begins to think, are therefore altogether +pessimistic. It is not by accident that all religious world-views, +except the Chinese, have a more or less pessimistic tone and bid man +expect nothing from his existence here. + +Who will stop us from making use of the freedom we are allowed, and +casting existence from us? Every thinking human being makes +acquaintance with this thought. We let it take a deeper hold of us +than we suspect from one another, as indeed we are all more oppressed +by the riddles of existence than we allow others to notice. + +What determines us, so long as we are comparatively in our right mind, +to reject the thought of putting an end to our existence? An +instinctive feeling of repulsion from such a deed. The will-to-live is +stronger than pessimistic [pg 214] facts of knowledge. An instinctive +Reverence for Life is within us, for we are will-to-live. . . . + +Even the consistently pessimistic thought of Brahmanism makes to the +will-to-live the concession that voluntary death may only come about +when the individual has put behind him a considerable portion of life. +The Buddha goes still further, rejecting any violent exit from +existence and demanding only that we let the will-to-live within us +die out. + +All pessimism, then, is inconsistent. It does not push open the door +to freedom, but makes concessions to the obvious fact of existence. In +Indian thought, which tends to pessimism, it attempts to make these +concessions as small as possible, and to maintain the impossible +fiction that merely the bare life is being lived with complete +abstinence from any share in the happenings which are taking place +here, there, and everywhere about it. With us the concessions are +larger, since the conflict between the will-to-live and pessimistic +recognition of facts is to a certain extent damped down, and obscured +by the optimistic world-view which prevails in the general mode of +thought. There arises an unthinking will-to-live which lives out its +life trying to snatch possession of as much happiness as possible, and +meaning to do something active without having made clear to itself +what its intentions really are. + +Whether somewhat more or somewhat less of world- and life-affirmation +is retained matters little. Whenever the deepened world- and +life-affirmation is not reached there remains only a depreciated +will-to-live, which is not equal to the tasks of life. Thought usually +deprives the will-to-live of the force lent it by its freedom from +pre-conceptions, without being able to induce it to adopt a practice +of reflexion in which it would find new and higher force. Thus it +still possesses energy enough to continue in life, but not enough to +overcome pessimism. The stream becomes a swamp. + +That is the experience which determines the character [pg 215] of +men’s existence, without their confessing it to themselves. They +nourish themselves scantily on a little bit of happiness and many vain +thoughts, which life puts in their manger. It is only by the pressure +of necessity, exerted by elementary duties which throng upon them, +that they are kept in the path of life. + +Often their will-to-live is changed into a kind of intoxication. +Spring sunshine, trees in flower, passing clouds, fields of waving +corn provoke it. A will-to-live which announces itself in many forms +in magnificent phenomena all around them, carries their own +will-to-live along with it. Full of delight, they want to take part in +the mighty symphony which they hear. They find the world beautiful. . +. . But the transport passes. Horrid discords allow them once more to +hear only noise, where they thought they perceived music. The beauty +of nature is darkened for them by the suffering which they discover +everywhere within it. Now they see once more that they are drifting +like shipwrecked men over a waste of waters, only that their boat is +at one moment raised aloft on mountainous waves and the next sinks +into the valleys between them, and that now sunbeams, and now heavy +clouds, rest upon the heaving billows. + +Now they would like to persuade themselves that there is land in the +direction in which they are drifting. Their will-to-live befools their +thinking, so that it makes efforts to see the world as it would like +to see it. It compels it also to hand them a chart which confirms +their hopes of land. Once more they bend to the oars, till once more +their arms drop with fatigue, and their gaze wanders, disappointed, +from billow to billow. + +That is the voyage of the will-to-live which has abjured thought. + +Is there, then, nothing else that the will-to-live can do but drift +along without thought, or sink in pessimistic knowledge? Yes, there +is. It must indeed voyage across this boundless sea; but it can hoist +sails, and steer a definite course. + +[pg 216] + +The world- and life-affirmation of the will-to-live + +The will-to-live which tries to know the world is a shipwrecked +castaway; the will-to-live which gets to know itself is a bold +mariner. + +The will-to-live is not restricted to maintaining its existence on +what the ever unsatisfying knowledge of the world offers it; it can +feed on the life-forces which it finds in itself. The knowledge which +I acquire from my will-to-live is richer than that which I win by +observation of the world. There are given in it values and incitements +bearing on my relation to the world and to life which find no +justification in my reflexion upon the world and existence. Why then +tune down one’s will-to-live to the pitch of one’s knowledge of the +world, or undertake the meaningless task of tuning up one’s knowledge +of the world to the higher pitch of one’s will-to-live. The right and +obvious course is to let the ideas which are given in our will-to-live +be accepted as the higher and decisive kind of knowledge. + +My knowledge of the world is a knowledge from outside, and remains for +ever incomplete. The knowledge derived from my will-to-live is direct, +and takes me back to the mysterious movements of life as it is in +itself. + +The highest knowledge, then, is the knowing that I must be true to the +will-to-live. It is this knowledge that hands me the compass for the +voyage I have to make in the night without the aid of a chart. To live +out one’s life in the direction of its course, to raise it to a higher +power, and to ennoble it, is natural. Every depreciation of the +will-to-live is an act of unveracity towards myself, or a symptom of +unhealthiness. + +The essential nature of the will-to-live is determination to live +itself to the full. It carries within it the impulse to realise itself +in the highest possible perfection. In the flowering tree, in the +strange forms of the medusa, in the blade of grass, in the crystal; +everywhere it strives to reach the perfection with which it is +endowed. In everything [pg 217] that exists there is at work an +imaginative force, which is determined by ideals. In us, beings who +can move about freely and are capable of pre-considered, purposive +working, the impulse to perfection is given in such a way that we aim +at raising to their highest material and spiritual value both +ourselves and every existing thing which is open to our influence. + +How this striving originated within us, and how it has developed, we +do not know, but it is given with our existence. We must act upon it, +if we would not be unfaithful to the mysterious will-to-live which is +within us. + +When the will-to-live arrives at the critical point where its early +unsophisticated world- and life-affirmation has to be changed into a +reflective one, it is the part of thought to assist it by holding it +to the thinking out of all the ideas which are given within it and to +the surrender of itself to them. That the will-to-live within us +becomes true to itself and remains so; that it experiences no +degeneration but develops itself to complete vitality, that is what +decides the fate of our existence. + +When it comes to clearness about itself, the will-to-live knows that +it is dependent on itself alone. It is meant to attain to freedom from +the world. Its knowledge of the world can prove to it that its +striving to raise to their highest value its own life and every living +thing which can be influenced by it remains in the course of the +world-whole, something problematic. In this it has not been misled. +Its world- and life-affirmation carries its meaning in itself. It +follows from an inward necessity, and is sufficient for itself. By its +means my existence joins in pursuing the aims of the mysterious +universal will of which I am a manifestation. In my deepened world- +and life-affirmation, I manifest reverence for life. With +consciousness and with volition I devote myself to Being. I become of +service to the ideals which it thinks out in me; I become imaginative +force like that which works enigmatically in nature, and thus I give +my existence a meaning from within outwards. + +[pg 218] + +Reverence for life means to be in the grasp of the infinite, +inexplicable, forward-urging Will in which all Being is grounded. It +raises us above all knowledge of things and lets us become a tree +which is safe against drought, because it is planted among running +streams. All living piety flows from reverence for life and the +compulsion towards ideals which is given in it. In reverence for life +lies piety in its most elemental and deepest form, in which it has not +yet involved itself with any explanation of the world or no longer +does so, but is piety which comes simply from inward necessity, and +therefore asks no questions about ends to be pursued. + +The will-to-live, too, which has become reflective and has made its +way through to deeper world- and life-affirmation, tries to secure +happiness and success, for as will-to-live it is will to the realizing +of ideals. It does not, however, live on happiness and success. +Whatever of these it obtains is a strengthening of itself which it +thankfully accepts, though it is resolved on action, even if happiness +and success must be denied it. It sows as one who does not count on +living to reap the harvest. + +The will-to-live is not a flame which burns only when events provide +suitable fuel; it blazes up, and that with the purest light, when it +is forced to feed on what it derives from itself. Then, too, when +events seem to leave no future for it but suffering, it still holds +out as an active will. In deep reverence for life it makes the +existence which according to usual ideas is no longer in any way worth +living, precious, because even in such an existence it experiences its +own freedom from the world. Quiet and peace radiate from a being like +that upon others, and cause them also to be touched by the secret that +we must all, whether active or passive, preserve our freedom in order +truly to live. + +True resignation is not a becoming weary of the world but the quiet +triumph which the will-to-live celebrates at the hour of its greatest +need over the circumstances of life. [pg 219] It flourishes only in +the soil of deep world- and life-affirmation. + +In this way our life is a coming to an understanding between our +will-to-live and the world, along with which we have continually to be +on our guard against allowing any deterioration in our will-to-live. +The struggle between optimism and pessimism is never fought to a +finish within us. We are ever wandering on slipping rubble above the +abyss of pessimism. When that which we experience in our own existence +or learn from the history of mankind, falls oppressively upon our +will-to-live and robs us of our freshness and our power of +deliberation, we might lose hold, and be carried away with the moving +boulders into the abyss below. But knowing that what awaits us below +is death, we work our way up to the path again. . . . + +Or it may perhaps be that pessimism comes over us, like the bliss of +complete rest over those who, tired out, sit down in the snow. No +longer to be obliged to hope for and aim at what is commanded us by +the ideals which are forced upon us by the deepened will-to-live! No +longer to be in a state of unrest when by lessening our efforts we can +have rest! . . . Gently comes the appeal from knowledge to our will to +tune itself down to the facts. . . . + +That is the fatal state of complete rest in which men, and civilised +mankind as a whole, grow numb and die. + +And when we think that the enigmas by which we are surrounded can no +longer harm us, there once more rises up before us somewhere or other +the most terrifying of them all, the fact that the will-to-live can be +shattered in suffering or in spiritual night. This enigma, too, before +which our will-to-live shudders as before the most inexplicable of all +inexplicable things, we must learn to leave unsolved. + +Thus does pessimistic knowledge pursue us closely right on to our last +breath. That is why it is so profoundly significant that the +will-to-live rouses itself at last and once for all to insist on its +freedom from having to understand the world, and shows itself capable +of letting itself be [pg 220] determined solely by that which is given +within itself. With humility and courage it makes its way through the +endless chaos of enigmas, fulfilling its mysterious destiny, making a +reality of its union with the infinite will-to-live. + + + + +[pg 221] + +CHAPTER XIX + +THE PROBLEM OF ETHICS, STARTING FROM THE HISTORY OF ETHICS + + +An ethic of self-devotion, or an ethic of self-perfecting? + +THOUGHT, then, which reaches bottom, arrives at an unshakeable +world-and-life affirmation. Let it now try whether it can lead us to +an ethic. But that it may not proceed with us, as it so often does, +merely at random, it shall gather from the thought which has hitherto +been devoted to ethics all the guidance which is there to be found. + +What does the history of ethics teach? + +As a quite general principle we learn from it, that the object of all +ethical enquiry is the discovery of the universal basic principle of +the moral. + +The basic principle of the moral must show itself to be a necessity of +thought, and must bring man to an unceasing, living, and practical +conflict and understanding with reality. + +The principles of the moral which have hitherto been offered us are +absolutely unsatisfying. This is clear from the fact that they cannot +be thought out to a conclusion without leading to paradoxes, or losing +in ethical content. + +Classical thought tries to conceive of the ethical as that which +brings rational pleasure. It did not succeed, however, from that +starting-point in arriving at an ethic of active devotion. Shut up +within the egoistic-utilitarian, it ends in an ethically-coloured +resignation. + +The ethical thought of modern times is from the outset +social-utilitarian. It is to it a matter of course that the individual +must devote himself in every respect to his fellow-individuals, and to +society. But when it tries to [pg 222] give a firm foundation to this +ethic of devotion which seems to it so much a matter of course, and to +think it out to a conclusion, it is driven to the most remarkable +consequences, which are inconsistent with each other in the most +varied directions. At one time it explains devotion as a refined +egoism; at another as something which society forcibly imposes on +individuals; at another as something which it develops in him by +education; at another, as in Bentham, as something which he adopts as +one of his convictions on the ground of the urgent representations of +society; at another as an instinct which he obeys. The first +assumption cannot be carried through; the second, third, and fourth +are unsatisfying because they allow ethics to reach men from the +outside; the last leads to a _cul-de-sac_. If, for example, devotion +is an instinct, it must, of course, be made conceivable how thought +can work upon it, and raise it to the level of a considered, widely +inclusive, voluntary activity at which level it first becomes ethical. +This, which is its peculiar problem, utilitarianism does not +recognise, much less solve. It is always in too much of a hurry to +come to practical results. At last it gives its bond to biology and +social science, which bring it to conceiving itself as herd-mentality, +wonderfully developed and capable of still further development. It +thereby bring itself to a halt far below the level of real ethics. + +The ethic of devotion fails therefore most remarkably, although it +starts from what is most elementary and essential in ethics, to shape +itself in a way which satisfies thought. It is as if it had the true +basic principle of ethics within its reach, yet always grasped to +right or left of it. + +By the side of these two attempts to understand ethics as effort to +procure rational pleasure, or as devotion to one’s fellow-men and to +society, there is a third, which tries to explain ethics as effort +after self-perfecting. This attempt has in it something abstract and +venturesome. It disdains to start from a universally acknowledged +content of the ethical, as utilitarianism does, and in contrast to +that [pg 223] sets before thought the task of deriving the whole +content of ethics from the effort after self-perfecting. + +Plato, the first representative in the West of the ethics of +self-perfecting, and Schopenhauer try to solve the problem by setting +up, as do the Indians, world- and life-denial to be the basic +principle of the ethical. That, however, is no solution. World- and +life-denial, if consistently thought out and carried through, does not +produce an ethic but reduces ethics to impotence. + +Kant, the modern restorer of the ethic of self-perfecting, sets up the +conception of absolute duty, but without giving it any content. He +thereby admits his inability to derive the content of ethics from the +effort after self-perfecting. + +If the ethic of self-perfecting tries really to acquire a content, it +must allow that ethics consist either in world- and life-denial or in +higher world- and life-affirmation. The first need not be considered; +there remains, therefore, only the other. + +Spinoza conceives the higher world- and life-affirmation as a thinking +absorption in the universe. He does not, however, arrive thereby at a +real ethic, but only at an ethically-coloured resignation. +Schleiermacher uses much art to lend this ethical colouring a more +brilliant tone. Nietzsche avoids the paths of resignation, but reaches +thereby a world- and life-affirmation which is ethical only so far as +it feels itself to be an effort after self-perfecting. + +The only thinker who succeeds to some extent in giving to +self-perfecting within world- and life-affirmation an ethical content +is J. G. Fichte. The result, however, is valueless, because it +presupposes an optimistic-ethical view of the nature of the universe +and of the position of man within it, which is based upon inadmissible +speculation. + +The ethic of self-perfecting is therefore not capable of so +establishing the basic principle of the moral, that it has a content +which is ethically satisfying; the ethic of devotion, on the other +hand, starting from the content which it [pg 224] presupposes, cannot +reach a basic principle of ethics which is grounded in thought. The +attempt made by antiquity to conceive ethics as that which brings +rational pleasure we need no longer consider. It is only too clear +that it does not take sufficiently into account the enigma of +devotion, and can never solve it. There remain, therefore, for +consideration only the two undertakings, so strangely opposed to one +another, one of which starts from devotion as a generally accepted +content of the ethical in order to conceive it as belonging to the +self-perfecting of man, while the other starts from self-perfecting +and seeks to conceive devotion as an item in its content which is a +necessity of thought. + +Is there a synthesis of these two? In other words, do devotion and +self-perfecting belong together in such a way that the one is +contained in the other? + +If this inward unity has not been visible hitherto, may not the cause +be that reflexion, whether upon devotion or upon self-perfecting, did +not go deep enough and was not sufficiently inclusive? + +Ethics and a theory of knowledge. Ethics and natural happenings. The +enthusiastic element in ethics + +Before thought attempts to investigate more deeply and completely the +nature of devotion and that of self-perfecting, it must proceed +further to put clearly before itself what there is offered to it in +the way of different kinds of knowledge and other considerations on +its journey through the Western search for ethics. + +It may be accepted as something fully recognised that ethics have +nothing to expect from any theory of knowledge. Depreciation of the +reality of the sensible world brings them merely apparent profit. +Thought believes it can draw from the possibility of a spiritualising +of the world some advantage for the optimistic-ethical interpretation +of it. It has been, however, established by this [pg 225] time that +ethics can no more be derived from an ethical interpretation of the +world than world- and life-affirmation can be referred back to an +optimistic interpretation of it, and that they must instead of that +find their foundation in themselves in a world which is recognised as +absolutely enigmatic. At once and for ever, then, all attempts to +bring ethical and epistemological idealism into connexion with one +another have to be recognised as useless for ethics. Ethics can let +space and time go hang. + +In epistemological investigations into the nature of space and time +ethics feel a satisfaction which is strong but uninterested. They view +them as efforts after knowledge which must be made, but they know that +the results can never touch what is essential in any world- and +life-view. It suffices them to know that the whole world of sense is a +manifestation of forces, that is to say of an enigmatically manifold +will-to-live. In this their thought is spiritualistic. It is +materialistic, however, so far as it presupposes manifestation and +force to be connected in such a way that any effect produced upon the +former influences the force which lies behind it. Ethics feel that if +it were not thus possible for one will-to-live to produce through the +manifestation effects on another will-to-live, they would have no +reason for existing. But to investigate how this relation between +force and its manifestation is to be explained from the standpoint of +epistemology, and whether it can be explained at all, ethics can leave +undecided as being none of their business; they claim for themselves, +just as does natural science, the right to remain free from +preconceptions. + +In this connexion it is interesting to observe that it is among the +representatives of scientific materialism that enthusiastic ethical +idealism is often to be met with, while the adherents of +spiritualistic philosophy are usually moralists with an unemotional +temperament. + +With renunciation of all help from epistemological [pg 226] idealism, +it follows that ethics ask for nothing and expect nothing from +speculative philosophy. They declare they have nothing to do with any +kind of ethical interpretation of the world. + +Thought gathers, further, from the history of ethics that the latter +cannot be conceived as being merely a natural happening which +continues itself in man. In the ethical man natural happenings come +into contradiction with themselves. Nature knows only a blind +affirmation of life. The will-to-live which animates natural forces +and living beings is concerned to work itself out unhindered. But in +man this natural effort is in a state of tension with a mysterious +effort of a different kind. Life-affirmation exerts itself to take up +life-denial into itself in order to serve other living beings by +self-devotion, and to protect them, even eventually by self-sacrifice, +from injury or destruction. It is true that self-devotion plays a +certain _rôle_ in non-human living beings. As a temporary instinct it +rules in sexual love and in parental love; as a permanent instinct it +is found in certain individual members of animal species (_e.g._, +ants, bees) which, because sexless, are incomplete individualities. +These manifestations are in a certain way a prelude to the interplay +of life-affirmation and life-denial which is at work in the ethical +man. They do not, however, explain it. That which is active elsewhere +only as a temporary instinct, or as an instinct in incomplete +individualities and that, too, always within special relations of +solidarity with others, becomes now, in man, a steady, voluntary, +unlimited form of action, a result of thought, in which individuals +endeavour to realise the higher life-affirmation. How does this come +about? + +Here one is faced once more by the problem of the _rôle_ which thought +plays in the origin of ethics. It seizes on something of which a +preliminary form is seen in an instinct, in order to extend it and +bring it to perfection. It comprehends the content of an instinct, and +tries to give it practical application in new and consistent action. + +[pg 227] + +In some way or other the _rôle_ of thought lies in the fulfilment of +life-affirmation. It rouses the will-to-live to recognise as in +analogy with the life-affirmation which is in itself, the +life-affirmation which shows itself in the manifold life which is +everywhere around it, and to join in its experiences. On the +foundation of this world-affirmation life-denial takes its place as a +means of helping forward this affirmation of other life than its own. +It is not life-denial in itself that is ethical, but only such as +stands in the service of world-affirmation and becomes purposive +within it. + +Ethics are a mysterious chord in which life-affirmation and +world-affirmation are the ground-note and the fifth; life-denial is +the third. + +It is important, further, to know what is to be gathered from ethical +inquiry down to the present time about the intensity and the extension +of the life-denial which stands in the service of world-affirmation. +Again and again the attempt has been made to establish this +objectively. In vain! It belongs to the nature of devotion that it +must live itself out subjectively and without reservations. + +In the history of ethics there is downright fear of what cannot be +subjected to rules and regulations. Again and again thinkers have +undertaken to define devotion in such a way that it remains rational. +This, however, is never done except at the cost of the naturalness and +living character of ethics. Life-denial remains something irrational, +even when it places itself at the service of a purposive policy. A +universally applicable balance between life-affirmation and +life-denial cannot be established. They remain in a state of continual +tension. If any relaxation does take place, it is a sign that ethics +are collapsing, for in their real nature they are unbounded +enthusiasm. They originate indeed in thought, but they cannot be +carried through to a logical conclusion. Anyone who undertakes the +voyage to a true ethic must be prepared to be carried round and round +in the whirlpool of the irrational. + +[pg 228] + +The ethic of ethical personality, and the ethic of society + +Together with the subjectively enthusiastic nature of ethics goes the +fact that it never wishes to succeed in developing the ethic of +ethical personality into a serviceable ethic of society. It seems so +obvious, that from right individual ethics right social ethics should +result, the one continuing itself into the other like a town into its +suburbs. In reality, however, they cannot be so built that the streets +of the one continue as those of the other. The plans of each are drawn +on principles which take no account of that. + +The ethic of ethical personality is personal, incapable of regulation, +and absolute; that which is established by society for its own +prosperous existence is supra-personal, regulated, and relative. Hence +the ethical personality cannot surrender to it, but lives always in +continuous disputation with it, obliged again and again to oppose it +because it finds its focus too short. + +In the last analysis the antagonism between the two arises from their +differing valuations of humaneness. Humaneness consists in this—that +no human being is ever sacrificed to a purpose. The ethic of ethical +personality aims at preserving humaneness. That which is established +by society is impotent in that respect. + +When the individual is faced with the alternative of having to +sacrifice in some way or other the happiness or the existence of +another, or else to bear the loss himself, he is in a position to obey +the demands of ethics and to choose the latter. But society, thinking +impersonally and pursuing its aims impersonally, does not allow the +same weight to consideration for the happiness or existence of an +individual. In principle humaneness is not an item in its ethic. But +individuals come continually into the position of being in one way or +another executive organs of society, and then the conflict between the +two points of view becomes active. That this may always be decided in +its own favour, [pg 229] society exerts itself to limit as closely as +possible the authority of the ethic of personality, although inwardly +it has to acknowledge its superiority. It wants to have servants who +will never oppose it. + +Even a society the ethical standard of which is relatively high, is +dangerous to the ethics of its members. If those things which form +precisely the defects of a social ethic develop strongly, and society +exercises, further, an excessively strong spiritual influence on +individuals, then the ethic of ethical personality is ruined. This +happens in present-day society, the ethical conscience of which is +becoming fatally stunted by a biologico-sociological ethic and this, +moreover, finally corrupted by nationalism. + +The great mistake made by ethical thought down to the present time is +that it fails to admit the essential difference between the ethic of +ethical personality and that which is established from the standpoint +of society, and always thinks that it ought, and is able, to cast them +in one piece. The result is that the ethic of personality is +sacrificed to the ethic of society. An end must be put to this. What +matters is to recognise that the two are engaged in a conflict which +cannot be made less intense. Either the ethic of personality raises +the social ethic, so far as it can, to its own level, or it is dragged +down by the latter. + +But to get rid of the present unhealthy state of opinion it is not +enough to bring individuals to a consciousness that if they are not to +suffer spiritual harm they must be in a state of continual conflict +with the ethics of society. What matters is to establish a basic +principle of the moral, which will put the ethic of personality in a +position to come with consistency and success to discussion and +agreement with the ethic of society. Hitherto there has been no +possibility of putting this weapon into its hands. Ethics have, as we +know, always been regarded as the most thorough-going possible +devotion to society. + +The ethic of ethical personality, then, and the ethic [pg 230] which +is established from the standpoint of society cannot be traced back +the one to the other, and are not of equal value. The first only is a +real ethic; the other is improperly so called. Thought must aim at +finding the basic principle of absolute ethics, if it is to reach the +condition of being ethics at all, and it was because it was not clear +on this point that it made so little progress. Progress in ethics +consists in our making up our minds to think pessimistically of the +ethic of society. + +The ethic which is established from the standpoint of society +consists, in its essential nature, in this, that society appeals to +the moral disposition of the individual in order to secure from it +what cannot be forced upon it by compulsion and law. It only comes +nearer to real ethics when it comes to an agreement with the ethic of +personality and tries to bring its own demands on the individual into +harmony as far as possible with the latter’s. In proportion as society +takes on the character of an ethical personality, its ethic becomes an +ethic of ethical society. + +The problem of a complete ethic + +In general, thought should have busied itself with the question of +what is included in the whole field of ethics, and how the different +elements within it are connected with each other. + +In ethics are included the ethic of passive self-perfecting, which is +effected by inward self-liberation from the world (resignation); the +ethic of active self-perfecting effected by means of the mutual +relations between man and man; and the ethic of ethical society. +Ethics are thus an extensive gamut of notes. They start from the not +yet ethical, where the vibrations of resignation begin to make +themselves perceptible as notes of ethical resignation. With +increasingly rapid vibrations they pass from the ethic of resignation +into that of active self-perfecting. Rising still higher they emerge +into the notes of the ethic of [pg 231] society which are already +becoming more or less harsh and noisy, and they die away finally into +the legal commands of society which are never more than conditionally +ethical. + +Up to now all ethical systems have been thoroughly fragmentary. They +confine themselves to this or that octave of the gamut. The Indians +and, following in their train, Schopenhauer are, on the whole, +concerned only with the ethic of passive self-perfecting; Zarathustra, +the Jewish prophets, and the great moralists of China only with that +of active self-perfecting. The interest of modern Western philosophy +is fixed almost exclusively on the ethic of society. In consequence of +the starting-point which they chose, the thinkers of antiquity in the +West cannot get any further than an ethic of resignation. The deeper +thinkers among our moderns—Kant, J. G. Fichte, Nietzsche, and +others—have inklings of an ethic of active self-perfecting. + +European thought is characterised by almost always playing in the +upper octaves, and not in the lower ones. Its ethic has no bass +because the ethic of resignation plays no part in it. An ethic of +duty, that is an activist ethic, appears to it to be a complete one. +It is because he is a representative of the ethic of resignation that +Spinoza remains such a stranger to his own age. + +Inability to understand resignation and the relations prevailing +between ethics and resignation, is the fatal weakness of modern +European thought. + +In what, then, does a complete ethic consist? In an ethic of passive +self-perfecting, together with one of active self-perfecting. The +ethic which is established from the standpoint of society is a +supplementary one which has to be corrected by that of active +self-perfecting. + +In view of that fact, a complete ethic must be put forward in a shape +which compels it to seek to come to terms with the ethic of society. + + + + +[pg 232] + +CHAPTER XX + +THE ETHIC OF DEVOTION AND THE ETHIC OF SELF-PERFECTING + + +The widening of the ethic of self-devotion into a cosmic ethic + +BEING sufficiently informed about the questions which have called for +solution and the results attained in the search for an ethic down to +the present time, the ethic of self-devotion and that of +self-perfecting can now try to combine their ideas, with a view to +establishing together the true basic principle of the moral. + +Why do they not succeed in combining their ideas? + +On the side of the ethic of self-devotion the fault must somehow lie +in the fact that it is too narrow. As a matter of principle social +utilitarianism is concerned only with the relations of man to man and +to human society. The ethic of self-perfecting on the other hand is +something universal. It has to do with the relation of man to the +world. If the ethic of self-devotion, therefore, wishes to agree with +that of self-perfecting, it must become, like the latter, universal, +and let its devotion be directed not only towards man and society but +somehow or other towards all life whatever in the world. + +But ethics hitherto have been unwilling to take even the first step in +this universalizing of devotion. + +Just as the housewife who has scrubbed out the parlour, takes care +that the door is left shut so that the dog may not get in and spoil +the work she has done by the marks of his paws, so do European +thinkers watch carefully that no animals run about in the fields of +their ethics. The stupidities they are guilty of in trying to maintain +the traditional narrow-mindedness and to raise it to a principle [pg +233] border on the incredible. Either they leave out altogether all +sympathy for animals, or they take care that it shrinks to a mere +afterthought which means nothing. If they admit anything more than +that, they think themselves obliged to produce elaborate +justifications, or even excuses, for so doing. + +It seems as if Descartes with his dictum that animals are mere +machines had bewitched the whole of European philosophy. + +So important a thinker as Wilhelm Wundt mars his ethic with the +following sentences: “The only object for sympathy is man. . . . The +animals are for us fellow-creatures, an expression by which language +already hints at the fact that we acknowledge here a kind of +co-ordination with ourselves only with reference to the ultimate +ground of everything that happens, viz., creation. Towards animals +also, then, there can arise within us stirrings which are to a certain +extent related to sympathy, but as to true sympathy with them there is +always wanting the fundamental condition of the inner unity of our +will with theirs.” To crown this wisdom he ends with the assertion +that of rejoicing with animals there can at any rate be no question, +as if he had never seen a thirsty ox drink. + +Kant emphasises especially that ethics have to do only with duties of +man towards men. The “human” treatment of animals he thinks himself +obliged to justify by putting it forward as a practising of +sensibility which helps to improve our sympathetic relations with +other human beings. + +Bentham, too, defends kindness to animals chiefly as a means of +preventing the growth of heartless relations with other men, even +though he here and there recognises it as something obviously right. + +Darwin in his _Descent of Man_ notices that the feeling of sympathy +which is dominant in the social impulse, becomes at last so strong +that it comes to include all men, and indeed even animals. But he does +not pursue the problem and the [pg 234] significance of this fact any +further, and contents himself with establishing the ethics of the +human herd. + +Thus it ranks with European thought as a dogma that ethics have to do +properly only with a man’s relation to his fellows and to society. The +motives which emanate from Schopenhauer, Stern, and others, for +throwing down the antiquated line of circumvallation, are not +understood. + +This backward attitude is the more unintelligible seeing that both +Indian thought and Chinese, even when they have only scarcely begun to +develop, make ethics consist in a kindly relation to all creatures. +Moreover, they have come to this view quite independently of each +other. The subtle and far-reaching commands concerning regard for +animals in the popular Chinese ethics of the book _Kan Yin Pien_ +(_Concerning Rewards and Punishments_) cannot be referred back, as is +commonly supposed, to Buddhist influences._(_105_)_ They have no +connexion with metaphysical discussions about the mutual relationship +of all beings, such as became effective as the ethical horizon widened +in Indian thought, but originate in a living, ethical feeling which +dares to draw the consequences which seem to it to be natural. + +When European thought refuses to make self-devotion universal, the +reason is that its efforts are directed to reaching a rational ethic +which deals with universally valid judgments, and it sees a prospect +of that only when it can keep its feet upon the solid ground of +discussion of the interests of human society. But an ethic which +busies [pg 235] itself with the relations of man to the whole creation +forsakes it. Such an ethic is driven into discussions about existence +as such. Whether it will or not, it has to plunge into the adventure +of coming to terms with nature-philosophy, and the result of such an +adventure cannot be foreseen. + +This is a correct conclusion. But it has already been shown that the +ethic of society, which guides men from the outside, supposing it can +be drawn up in this way at all, is never a true ethic, but merely an +appendix to ethics. It has been established further that true ethics +are always subjective, that they have an irrational enthusiasm as +their very breath of life, and have to come to terms with +nature-philosophy. The ethic of self-devotion has, therefore, no +reason for shrinking from this in any case unavoidable adventure. Its +house has been burnt down. Let it go out into the world to seek its +fortune. + +Let it, then, venture to accept the thought that self-devotion has to +be practised not only towards men but towards all living creatures, +yes, towards all life whatever that exists in the world and is within +the reach of man. Let it rise to the conception that the relation of +men to each other is only an expression of that in which they all +stand to Being and to the world in general. Having thus become cosmic, +the ethic of devotion can hope to meet the ethic of self-perfecting, +which is fundamentally cosmic, and to unite itself with it. + +The ethic of self-perfecting and mysticism + +But in order that the ethic of self-perfecting may combine with that +of self-devotion, it must first become cosmic in the right way. + +It is indeed fundamentally cosmic, because self-perfecting can consist +of nothing but this, that man comes into his true relation to the +Being that is in him and outside him. His natural, outward connexion +with Being he means to [pg 236] change into a spiritual, inward +devotion to it, letting his passive and active relation to things be +determined by this devotion. + +In this effort, however, he has never yet got further than a passive +devotion to Being. He is always driven past active devotion to it. +This one-sidedness is what makes it impossible for the two ethics of +self-perfecting and of self-devotion to penetrate each other, and to +produce together the complete ethic of passive and active +self-perfecting. + +But what is the reason that the ethic of self-perfecting, in spite of +all its efforts, cannot get out of the circle of the passive? It is +that it allows the spiritual inward devotion to Being to be directed +to an abstract notion of Being instead of to real Being. Thus it +approaches nature-philosophy in a wrong way. + +Whence this error? It is a result of the difficulties which the ethic +of self-perfecting meets when it attempts to comprehend itself in +nature-philosophy. + +In a fashion which is deep, though it strikes us as unfamiliar, +Chinese thought undertakes to arrive at this agreement. It thinks that +it is somehow or other in the “impersonal” element of the world’s +activity that the secret of the truly ethical lies. It accordingly +makes spiritual devotion to Being consist in this, that we look away +from the subjective stirrings within ourselves, and relate ourselves +to the laws of objectivity which we discover in the course of nature. + +It is with this deep “becoming like the world” that the thought of +Lao-tse and that of Chwang-tse are concerned. The motifs of such an +ethic make themselves heard in a wonderful fashion in Lao-tse’s +_Taoteking_; but they cannot be made to produce a complete symphony. +The meaning of what happens in the world is a thing we cannot +investigate. What we do understand of it is that all life tries to +live itself out. The true ethic of life, therefore, “in the spirit of +what happens” would seem to be that of Yang-tse and Friedrich +Nietzsche. On the other hand the assumption [pg 237] of an +objectivity, dominant in the course of nature, which can be a pattern +for our activity is nothing else than an attempt, undertaken with the +palest of colours, to paint the world as ethical. Correspondingly, +this existence in the spirit of the world means with Lao-tse and +Chwang-tse an inward liberation from the rule of passion and from +outward occurrences, which is accompanied by marked depreciations of +all tendencies to activity. Whenever life in the spirit of the world +leads to a really activist ethic as with Confucius, Mo-Di, and others, +there has been a corresponding interpretation of the meaning of the +world. Whenever, in general, human thinking raises +being-like-the-world to an ethic, the ethical willing of mankind has +read somehow or other into the world-spirit an ethical character in +order to be able to find itself in it later. + +Since no motives to ethical activity are to be discovered in the +course of nature, the ethic of self-perfecting must allow both the +active and the passive ethic to originate side by side in the bare +fact of spiritual inward self-dedication to Being. It must derive them +both from the act as such, without any presupposition of any sort of +ethical quality in Being. Then first will thought have reached a +complete ethic without having been guilty of any sort of naïve or +tricky proceedings. + +That is the problem at which the ethical searching of all peoples and +all ages vainly toils, so far as it ventures to think in the spirit of +true nature philosophy. With the Chinese and the Indians, in Stoicism, +with Spinoza, Schleiermacher, Fichte, and Hegel, and in all mysticism +of union with the Absolute, it reaches only an ethic of resignation, +consisting of inward liberation from the world, never at the same time +an ethic of working in the world and upon the world. + +It is true that it only seldom ventures honestly to admit to itself +the unsatisfactory result. As a rule it seeks to widen it, and to +maintain in some measure an activist ethic in spite of it, letting +this ethic be combined in some form or other with the ethic of +resignation. The more [pg 238] consistent the thinkers, the more +modest is the space occupied by the piece thus hooked on. + +With Lao-tse and Chwang-tse, with the Brahmans and the Buddha, with +the Stoics of antiquity, with Spinoza, Schleiermacher, and Hegel, and +with the great monist mystics the activist ethic is reduced to little +more than nothing. With Confucius and Meng-tse, with the Hindoo +thinkers, with the representatives of the Later Stoicism, and with J. +G. Fichte it makes strenuous efforts to assert itself, but it can do +so only so far as it takes either naïve or sophisticated thought to +help it. + +Every world-and-life-view which is to satisfy thought is mysticism. It +must seek to give to the existence of man such a meaning as will +prevent him from being satisfied with being a part of the infinite +existence in merely natural fashion, but will make him determine to +belong to it inwardly and spiritually also, through an act of his +consciousness. + +The ethic of self-perfecting is in inmost connexion with mysticism. +Its own destiny is decided in that of mysticism. Thinking out the +ethic of self-perfecting means nothing else than seeking to found +ethics on mysticism. Mysticism, on its side, is a valuable +world-and-life-view only in proportion as it is ethical. + +And yet it finds it cannot succeed in being ethical. Experience of +becoming one with the Absolute, of existence within the world-spirit, +of ascent into God, or whatever one may choose to call the process, is +not in itself ethical; it is only spiritual. Of this deep distinction +Indian thought has become conscious. With the most varied phrasing it +proclaims the statement: “Spirituality is not ethics.” We Europeans +have remained naïve in matters of mysticism. What appears among us as +mysticism is usually mysticism with a more or less Christian, that is +to say ethical, colouring. Hence we are inclined to deceive ourselves +about the ethical content of mysticism. + +If one analyses the mysticism of all peoples and all ages to find out +its ethical content, we find that this is [pg 239] extraordinarily +small. Even the ethic of resignation, which seems after all to belong +naturally to mysticism, is in it more or less afflicted with +impotence. Through the absence of the activist ethic with which it +should normally be bound up, it to a certain extent loses its hold, +and pushes itself more and more into the region of no longer ethical +resignation. There then arises a mysticism that no longer helps the +effort for self-perfecting, which is the deeper work to which it is +called, but allows absorption into the Absolute to become an aim in +itself. The purer the mysticism, the further has this evolution +developed. Mysticism becomes then a world- and life-view of the merging +of the finite existence in the infinite, if indeed it does not get +reversed, as with the Brahmans, into the lofty mysticism of the +existence of infinite existence within the finite. The ethic of +self-perfecting, which should arise out of mysticism, is therefore +always in danger of perishing in mysticism. + +The tendency of mysticism to become supra-ethical is quite natural. As +a matter of fact its connexion with an Absolute which has neither +qualities nor needs has nothing more to do with self-perfecting. It +becomes a pure act of consciousness, and leads to a spirituality which +is just as bare of content as the pre-supposed Absolute. Feeling its +weakness, mysticism does all it can to be more ethical than it is, or +at any rate to appear so. Even the Indian form of it makes efforts in +this direction, although again, on the other hand, it has courage to +be veracious enough to rank the spiritual above the ethical. + +In order to judge what mysticism is worth ethically one must count +only what it contains in itself in the way of ethics, not what it does +or says beyond that. Then, however, the ethical content of even +Christian mysticism is terrifyingly small. Mysticism is not a friend +but a foe of ethics; it devours it. And yet the ethic which is to +satisfy thought must be born of mysticism. All deep philosophy, all +deep religion, are ultimately a struggle for ethical mysticism and +mystical ethics. + +[pg 240] + +Dominated by efforts to secure an activist ethical world- and +life-view, we Westerners do not allow mysticism to come into its own. +It leads among us a furtive, intermittent existence. We feel +instinctively that it stands in antagonism to activist ethics, and we +have therefore no inward relationship to it. + +Our great mistake, however, is thinking that we can reach without +mysticism an ethical world- and life-view, which shall satisfy thought. +Up to now we have done nothing but fabricate world- and life-views. +They are good because they keep men up to activist ethics, but they +are not true, and therefore they are always collapsing. Moreover they +are not deep. Hence European thought makes men ethical indeed, but +superficial, and the European, because he is surfeited with world-view +which has been fabricated with a view to activist ethics, has no +collectedness and no inward personality, nor indeed any feeling of +need for these things. + +It is indeed time for us to abandon this error. Depth and stability in +thinking come to the world- and life-view of activist ethics only when +this springs from mysticism. The question of what we are to make of +our life is not solved by our being driven out into the world with an +impulse to activity, and never being allowed to collect ourselves for +thought. It can be really answered only by a world- and life-view which +brings man into a spiritual inward relation to Being, out of which +there results of natural necessity an ethic both passive and active. + +The hitherto accepted mysticism cannot effect this because it is +supra-ethical. The struggle of thought has therefore to direct itself +upon ethical mysticism. We must rise to a spirituality which is +ethical, and to an ethic which includes within itself all +spirituality. Then only do we become profoundly qualified for life. + +Ethics must resolve to originate in mysticism. Mysticism, on its side, +must never think that it exists for its own sake. It is not a flower, +but only the calyx. Ethics are [pg 241] the flower. Mysticism which +exists for itself only is the salt which has lost its savour. + +The hitherto accepted mysticism leads into the supra-ethical because +it is abstract, and abstraction is the death of ethics, for ethics are +a living relation for a living life. We must therefore abandon +abstract mysticism, and turn to the mysticism which is alive. + +Abstract mysticism and the mysticism of reality. Supra-ethical, and +ethical mysticism + +The Essence of Being, the Absolute, the World-spirit, and all similar +expressions denote nothing actual, but something conceived in +abstractions which for that reason it is also absolutely impossible to +represent to the mind. The only reality is the Being which manifests +itself in phenomena. + +How does thought come to such a meaningless proceeding as making man +enter into a spiritual relation with an unreal creation of thought? By +yielding to temptation in two ways, one general, one particular. + +Thrown back upon the necessity of expressing itself in words thought +adopts as its own the abstractions and symbols which have been coined +by language. But this coinage should have no more currency than allows +it to represent things in an abbreviated way, instead of putting them +forward with all the detail in which they are given. But in time it +comes about that thought works with these abstractions and symbols as +if they represented something really existing. That is the general +temptation. + +The particular temptation lies in this case in this, that man’s +devotion to infinite Being, effected with the help of abstractions and +symbols, is thereby given expression in an enticingly simple way. It +is taken to consist of entrance into relation with the totality of +Being, that is to say, with its spiritual essence. + +That looks very well in words and in thought. Reality, [pg 242] +however, knows nothing about the individual being able to enter into +connexion with the totality of Being. As it knows of no Being except +that which manifests itself in the existence of individual beings, so +also it knows of no relations except these of one individual being to +another. If mysticism, then, means to be honest, there is nothing for +it to do but to cast from it the usual abstractions, and to admit to +itself that it can do nothing rational with this imaginary essence of +Being. The Absolute may be as meaningless to it as his fetish is to a +converted negro. It must in all seriousness go through the process of +conversion to the mysticism of reality. Abandoning all stage +decorations and declamation, let it try to get its experience in +living nature. + +There is no Essence of Being, but only infinite Being in infinite +manifestations. It is only through the manifestations of Being, and +only through those with which I enter into relations, that my being +has any intercourse with infinite Being. The devotion of my being to +infinite Being means devotion of my being to all the manifestations of +Being which need my devotion, and to which I am able to devote myself. + +Only an infinitely small part of infinite Being comes within my reach. +The rest of it drives on past me, like distant ships to which I make +signals they do not understand. But by devoting myself to that which +comes within my reach and needs me, I make spiritual, inward devotion +to infinite Being a reality and thereby give my own poor existence +meaning and richness. The river has found its sea. + +From devotion to the Absolute there comes only a dead spirituality. It +is a purely intellectual act. No motives to activity are given in it. +Even the ethic of resignation can only eke out a miserable existence +on the soil of such an intellectualism. But in the mysticism of +reality devotion is no longer a purely intellectual act, but one in +which everything that is alive in man has its share. There is +therefore dominant in it a spirituality which carries in itself [pg +243] in elemental form the impulse to action. The gruesome truth that +spirituality and ethics are two different things no longer holds good. +Here the two are one and the same. + +Now, too, the ethic of self-perfecting and the ethic of devotion can +interpenetrate each other. They now become, we see, cosmic in +nature-philosophy, which leaves the world as it is. Hence they cannot +but meet each other in a thought (which satisfies in every direction +the laws of thinking), of living devotion to Being which lives. In +this thought lie passive and active self-perfecting in mutual +agreement and perfect union. They comprehend each other as the working +out of one and the same inner compulsion. Having become one they no +longer need first of all to exert themselves to establish by joint +efforts the completed ethic of influencing the world through +liberation from the world. The completeness is now automatically +attained. Now there ring out in wonderful harmonies all the notes in +the gamut of ethics, from the vibrations in which resignation begins +to be audible as ethics, up to the higher notes in which ethics pass +over into the harsh noises of the commands which are proclaimed by +society to be ethical. + +Subjective responsibility for all life which comes within his reach, +responsibility which widens out extensively and intensively to the +limitless, and which the man who has become inwardly free from the +world experiences and tries to make a reality, that is ethics. It +originates in world- and life-affirmation. It makes itself a reality in +life-denial. It is completely bound up with optimistic willing. Never +again can the belief-in-progress get separated from ethics, like a +badly-fastened wheel from a cart. The two turn inseparably on the same +axle. + +The basic principle of ethics, that principle which is a necessity of +thought, which has a definite content, which is ever bringing itself +into steady, living, and practical agreement with reality, proclaims +itself to be: Devotion to life out of reverence for life. + + + + +[pg 244] + +CHAPTER XXI + +THE ETHIC OF REVERENCE FOR LIFE + + +The basic principle of the moral + +COMPLICATED and laborious are the roads along which ethical thought, +which has mistaken its way and lost itself, must be brought back. Its +course, however, maps itself out quite simply if, instead of taking +apparently convenient short cuts, it keeps to its right direction from +the very beginning. For this three things are necessary. + +It must have nothing to do with an ethical interpretation of the +world. + +It must become cosmic and mystical, that is, it must seek to conceive +all the devotion which rules in ethics as a manifestation of an +inward, spiritual relation to the world. + +It must not go astray into abstract thinking, but must remain +elemental, understanding self-devotion to the world to be +self-devotion of human life to every form of living being with which +it can come into relation. + +The origin of ethics is that I think out the full meaning of the +world-affirmation which is given by nature together with the +life-affirmation in my will-to-live, and try to make it a reality. + +To become ethical means to begin to think sincerely. + +Thinking is the agreement between willing and knowing which is come to +within me. Its course is a naïve one, if the will demands of the +knowledge to be shown a world which corresponds to the impulses which +it carries within itself, and if the knowledge attempts to satisfy +this requirement. The place of this dialogue, a dialogue which is +doomed beforehand to produce no result, must be taken by a correct +one, in which the will demands from the knowledge only what it really +knows. + +[pg 245] + +If the knowledge answers solely with what it knows, it is always +teaching the will one and the same fact, viz., that in and behind all +phenomena there is will-to-live. Knowledge, though ever becoming +deeper and more inclusive, can do nothing except take us deeper into +the enigmatic fact that all that is, is will-to-live. Progress in +science consists only in increasingly accurate description of the +phenomena in which life in its innumerable forms appears and passes, +letting us discover life where we did not previously expect it, and +putting us in a position to turn to our own use in this or that way +what we have learnt of the course of the will-to-live in nature. But +what life is, no science can tell us. + +For our world- and life-view, then, the gain derived from knowledge is +only that it makes it harder for us to be thoughtless, because it +forces upon our attention ever more strongly the mystery of the +will-to-live which we see stirring everywhere. Hence the difference +between learned and unlearned is an entirely relative one. The +unlearned man who, at the sight of a tree in flower, is overpowered by +the mystery of the will-to-live which is stirring all round him, knows +more truly than the learned one who studies under the microscope or in +physical and chemical activity a thousand forms of the will-to-live, +but who, with all his knowledge of the life-course of these +manifestations of the will-to-live, is unmoved by the mystery that +everything which exists is will-to-live, while he is puffed up with +vanity at being able to describe exactly a fragment of the course of +life. + +All true knowledge passes on into experience. The nature of the +manifestations I do not know, but I form a conception of it in analogy +to the will-to-live which is within myself, and thus my knowledge of +the world becomes experience of the world. The knowledge which is +becoming experience does not allow me to remain in face of the world a +subject who merely knows; it forces upon me an inward relation to the +world, and fills me with reverence for the mysterious will-to-live +which is in everything. By making [pg 246] me think and wonder, it +leads me ever upwards to the heights of reverence for life. There it +lets my hand go. It cannot accompany me further. My will-to-live must +now find its way about the world by itself. + +It is not by informing me what this or that manifestation of life +means in the sum-total of the world that knowledge brings me into +connexion with the world. It goes about with me not in outer circles, +but in the inner ones. From within outwards it puts me in relation to +the world by forcing my will-to-live to feel everything around it as +also will-to-live. + +With Descartes, philosophy starts from the dogma: “I think, therefore +I exist.” With this poverty-stricken, arbitrarily chosen beginning, it +is landed irretrievably on the road to the abstract. It never finds +the entrance to ethics, and remains entangled in a dead world- and +life-view. True philosophy must start from the most immediate and +comprehensive fact of consciousness, which says: “I am life which +wills to live, in the midst of life which wills to live.” This is not +a cleverly composed dogmatic formula. Day after day, hour after hour, +I live and move in it. At every moment of reflexion it stands fresh +before me. There bursts forth again and again from it as from roots +that can never dry up, a living world- and life-view which can deal +with all the facts of Being. A mysticism of ethical union with Being +grows out of it. + +As in my own will-to-live there is a longing for wider life and for +the mysterious exaltation of the will-to-live which we call pleasure, +with dread of annihilation and of the mysterious encroachment on the +will-to-live which we call pain; so is it also in the will-to-live all +around me, whether it can express itself before me, or remains dumb. + +Ethics consist, therefore, in my experiencing the compulsion to show +to all will-to-live the same reverence as I do to my own. There we +have given us that basic principle of the moral which is a necessity +of thought: It is good to maintain and to promote life; it is bad to +destroy life or to obstruct it. + +[pg 247] + +As a matter of fact everything which in the ordinary ethical valuation +of the relations of men to each other ranks as good, can be brought +under the description of material and spiritual maintenance or +promotion of human life, and of effort to bring it to its highest +value. Conversely, everything which ranks as bad in human relations is +in the last analysis material or spiritual destruction or obstruction +of human life, and negligence in the effort to bring it to its highest +value. Separate individual categories of good and evil which lie far +apart and have apparently no connexion at all with one another fit +together like things which belong to each other, as soon as they are +comprehended and deepened in this the most universal definition of +good and evil. + +The basic principle of the moral means, however, not only an ordering +and deepening of the current views of good and evil, but also a +widening of them. A man is truly ethical only when he obeys the +compulsion to help all life which he is able to assist, and shrinks +from injuring anything that lives. He does not ask how far this or +that life deserves one’s interest as being valuable, nor, beyond that, +whether and how far it can appreciate such interest. Life as such is +sacred to him. He tears no leaf from a tree, plucks no flower, and +takes care to crush no insect. If in summer he is working by +lamplight, he prefers to keep the window shut and breathe a stuffy +atmosphere rather than see one insect after another fall with singed +wings upon his table. + +If he goes into the street after a shower and sees an earthworm which +has strayed on to it, he bethinks himself that it must get dried up in +the sun, if it does not get back soon enough to ground into which it +can burrow, and so he lifts it from the deadly stone surface, and puts +it on the grass. If he comes across an insect which has fallen into a +puddle, he stops a moment in order to hold out a leaf or a stalk on +which it can save itself. + +He is not afraid of being laughed at as sentimental. It is the fate of +every truth to be a subject for laughter until [pg 248] it is +generally recognized. Once it was considered folly to assume that men +of colour were really men and ought to be treated as such, but the +folly has become an accepted truth. To-day it is thought to be going +too far to declare that constant regard for everything that lives, +down to the lowest manifestations of life, is a demand made by +rational ethics. The time is coming, however, when people will be +astonished that mankind needed so long a time to learn to regard +thoughtless injury to life as incompatible with ethics. + +Ethics are responsibility without limit towards all that lives. + +The definition of ethics as a relation to things within a disposition +to reverence for life, strikes one in its absolutely universal extent +as cold. But it is the only complete one. Sympathy is too narrow to +rank as the essence of the ethical. It denotes, of course, only +interest in the suffering will-to-live. But ethics include also +feeling as one’s own all the circumstances and all the aspirations of +the will-to-live, its pleasure, too, and its longing to live itself +out to the full, as well as its urge to self-perfecting. + +Love means more, since it includes fellowship in suffering, in joy, +and in effort, but it shows the ethical only in a simile, although in +a natural and deep one. It makes the solidarity produced by ethics +analogous to that which nature calls forth on the physical side, for +more or less temporary purposes between two beings which complete each +other sexually, or between them and their offspring. + +Thought must strive to bring to expression the nature of the ethical +in itself. To effect this it comes inevitably to defining ethics as +devotion to life which is inspired by reverence for life. Even if the +word reverence for life sounds so general as to seem somewhat +lifeless, what is signified by it is nevertheless something which the +man into whose thought it has made its way can never get rid of. +Sympathy, and love, and every kind of valuable emotion are given +within it. With a restless living force [pg 249] reverence for life +works upon the disposition into which it has entered, and throws it +into the unrest of a feeling of responsibility which at no place and +at no time ceases to affect it. Just as the screw which burrows +through the water drives the ship along, so does reverence for life +the man. + +Arising, as it does, from an inner compulsion, the ethic of reverence +for life is not dependent on the extent to which it is able to think +itself out to a satisfying life-view. It need give no answer to the +question of what significance the ethical man’s work for the +maintenance, promotion, and exalting of life can have in the total +happenings of the course of nature. It does not let itself be misled +by the calculation that the maintaining and completing of life which +it practises is hardly worth consideration beside the tremendous, +unceasing destruction of life which goes on through natural forces. +Having the will to action, it can leave on one side all the problems +of the success of its work. Full of significance for the world is the +fact in itself that in the ethically developed man there has made its +appearance in the world a will-to-live which is filled with reverence +for life and devotion to life. + +In my will-to-live the universal will-to-live experiences itself +otherwise than in its other manifestations. In them it shows itself in +a process of individualising which, so far as I can see from the +outside, is bent merely on living itself out to the full, and in no +way on union with any other will-to-live. The world is a ghastly drama +of will-to-live divided against itself. One existence makes its way at +the cost of another; one destroys the other. One will-to-live merely +exerts its will against the other, and has no knowledge of it. But in +me the will-to-live has come to know about other wills-to-live. There +is in it a longing to arrive at unity with itself, to become +universal. + +Why does the will-to-live experience itself in this way in me alone? +Is it because I have acquired the capacity of reflecting on the +totality of Being? What is the goal of this evolution which has begun +in me? + +[pg 250] + +To these questions there is no answer. It remains a painful enigma for +me that I must live with reverence for life in a world which is +dominated by creative will which is also destructive will, and +destructive will which is also creative. + +I can do nothing but hold to the fact that the will-to-live in me +manifests itself as will-to-live which desires to become one with +other will-to-live. That is for me the light that shines in the +darkness. The ignorance in which the world is wrapped has no existence +for me; I have been saved from the world. I am thrown, indeed, by +reverence for life into an unrest such as the world does not know, but +I obtain from it a blessedness which the world cannot give. If in the +tenderheartedness produced by being different from the world another +person and I help each other in understanding and pardoning, when +otherwise will would torment will, the division of the will-to-live is +got rid of. If I save an insect from the puddle, life has devoted +itself to life, and the division of life against itself is got rid of. +Whenever my life devotes itself in any way to life, my finite +will-to-live experiences its union with the infinite will in which all +life is one, and I enjoy a feeling of refreshment which prevents me +from pining away in the desert of life. + +I therefore recognize it as the destiny of my existence to be obedient +to this higher revelation of the will-to-live in me. I choose for my +work the removal of this division of the will-to-live against itself, +so far as the influence of my existence reaches. Knowing now the one +thing needful, I leave on one side the enigma of the world and of my +existence in it. + +The surmisings and the longings of all deep religiousness are +contained in the ethic of reverence for life. This religiousness, +however, does not build up for itself a completed world-view, but +resigns itself to the necessity of leaving its cathedral unfinished. +It finishes the choir only, but in this choir piety maintains a living +and never-ceasing divine service. + +[pg 251] + +The ethic of resignation. An ethic of veracity towards oneself, and an +activist ethic + +The ethic of reverence for life shows its truth also in that it +includes in itself the different elements of ethics in their natural +connexion. Hitherto no ethic has been able to present in their +parallelism and their interaction the effort after self-perfecting, in +which man acts upon himself from outside without deeds, and the +activist ethic. The ethic of reverence for life can do this, and +indeed in such a way that it not only answers academic questions, but +also produces a deepening of ethical insight. + +Ethics are reverence for the will-to-live within me and without me. +From the former comes first the profound life-affirmation of +resignation. I apprehend my will-to-live as not only something which +can live itself out in happy occurrences, but also something which has +experience of itself. If I refuse to let this self-experience +disappear in thoughtlessness, and persist in feeling it to be +valuable, I begin to learn the secret of spiritual self-assertion. I +win an unsuspected freedom from the various destinies of life. At +moments in which I had expected to find myself overwhelmed, I find +myself exalted in an inexpressible and surprising happiness of freedom +from the world, and I experience therein a clearing of my life-view. +Resignation is the vestibule through which we enter ethics. Only he +who in deepened devotion to his own will-to-live experiences inward +freedom from outward occurrences, is capable of devoting himself in +profound and steady fashion to the life of others. + +Just as in the reverence for my own will-to-live I struggle for +freedom from the destinies of life, so I struggle too for freedom from +myself. Not only in face of what happens to me, but also with +attention to the way in which I deal with the world, I practise the +higher self-maintenance. Out of reverence for my own existence I place +myself under the compulsion of veracity towards myself. Everything [pg +252] I acquired would be purchased too dearly by action in defiance of +my convictions. I fear that if I were untrue to myself I should be +wounding my will-to-live with a poisoned spear. + +The fact that Kant makes, as he does, veracity towards oneself the +centre point of his ethic, testifies to the depth of his ethical +feeling. But because in his search for the essential nature of the +ethical he fails to find his way through to reverence for life, he +cannot comprehend the connexion between veracity towards oneself and +an activist ethic. + +As a matter of fact the ethic of veracity towards oneself passes +imperceptibly into that of devotion to others. Such veracity compels +me to actions which manifest themselves as devotion in such a way that +ordinary ethics derive them from devotion. + +Why do I forgive anyone? Ordinary ethics say, because I feel sympathy +with him. They allow men to seem to themselves, when they pardon +others, frightfully good, and allow them to practise a style of +pardoning which is not free from humiliation of the other. They thus +make forgiveness a sweetened triumph of self-devotion. + +The ethic of reverence for life does away with this unpurified view. +All acts of forbearance and of pardon are for it acts forced from one +by veracity towards oneself. I must practise unlimited forgiveness +because, if I did not, I should be wanting in veracity to myself, for +it would be acting as if I myself were not guilty in the same way as +the other has been guilty towards me. Because my life is so liberally +spotted with falsehood, I must forgive falsehood which has been +practised upon me; because I myself have been in so many cases wanting +in love, and guilty of hatred, slander, deceit, or arrogance, I must +pardon any want of love, and all hatred, slander, deceit, or arrogance +which have been directed against myself. I must forgive quietly and +without drawing attention to it; in fact I do not really pardon at +all, for I do not let things develop to any such act of judgement. Nor +is this any eccentric proceeding; [pg 253] it is only a necessary +widening and refinement of ordinary ethics. + +The struggle against the evil that is in mankind we have to carry on +not by judging others, but by judging ourselves. Struggle with oneself +and veracity towards oneself are the means by which we work upon +others. We quietly draw them into our efforts after the deep spiritual +self-assertion which springs out of reverence for one’s own life. +Power makes no noise. It is there, and works. True ethics begin where +the use of language ceases. + +The innermost element then, in activist ethics, even if it appears as +self-devotion, comes from the compulsion to veracity towards oneself, +and obtains therein its true value. The whole ethic of being other +than the world flows pure only when it comes from this source. It is +not from kindness to others that I am tender-hearted, peaceable, +forbearing, and friendly, but because by such behaviour I prove my own +deepest self-assertion to be true. Reverence for life which I apply to +my own existence, and reverence for life which keeps me in a temper of +devotion to other existence than mine, interpenetrate each other. + +Ethics and thoughtlessness. Ethics and self-assertion + +Ordinary ethics, because they are without any basic principle of the +ethical, are obliged to engage at once in the discussion of +conflicting duties. The ethic of reverence for life has no such need +for hurry. It takes its own time to think out in all directions its +own principle of the moral. Knowing itself to be firmly established, +it then settles its position with regard to these conflicts. + +It has to come to terms with three adversaries: these are +thoughtlessness, egoistic self-assertion, and society. + +To the first of these it pays usually insufficient attention, because +no open conflicts arise between them. This adversary does, +nevertheless, obstruct it imperceptibly. + +There is, however, a wide field which our ethic can take [pg 254] +possession of without any collision with the troops of egoism. Man can +accomplish much that is good, without having to require of himself any +sacrifice. And if there really goes with it a bit of his life, it is +something so insignificant that he feels it no more than if he were +losing a hair or a piece of dead skin. + +Over wide stretches of conduct the inward liberation from the world, +the being true to oneself, the being different from the world, yes, +and even devotion to other life, is only a matter of giving attention +to this particular relation. We fall short so much, because we do not +keep ourselves up to it. We do not stand sufficiently under the +pressure of any inward compulsion to be ethical. The steam hisses at +all points out of the leaky boiler. The resulting losses of energy are +as high as they are in ordinary ethics, because these ethics have at +their disposal no single basic principle of the moral which works upon +thought. They cannot repair the boiler; they do not, indeed, ever even +examine it. Reverence for life, however, being something which is ever +present to thought, penetrates unceasingly and in all directions men’s +observation, reflexion, and resolutions. A man can keep himself clear +of it as little as the water can prevent itself from being coloured by +the dye-stuff which is dropped into it. The struggle with +thoughtlessness is started, and is always advancing. + +But what is the relation between ethics and reverence for life in the +conflicts which arise between inward compulsion to devotion, and +necessary self-assertion? + +I too am subject to division of my will-to-life against itself. In a +thousand ways my existence stands in conflict with that of others. The +necessity to destroy and to injure life is imposed upon me. If I walk +along an unfrequented path, my foot brings destruction and pain upon +the tiny creatures which populate it. In order to preserve my own +existence, I must defend myself against the existence which injures +it. I become a hunter of the mouse which inhabits my house, a murderer +of the insect which wants to have its nest there, a mass-murderer of +the bacteria which [pg 255] may endanger my life. I get my food by +destroying plants and animals. My happiness is built upon injury done +to my fellow-men. + +How does our ethic assert itself in the tragic necessity to which I am +subjected through the division of my will-to-live against itself? + +Ordinary ethics seek compromises. They try to lay down how much of my +existence and of my happiness I must sacrifice, and how much of them I +may preserve at the cost of the existence and happiness of other +lives. With this distinction they produce an experimental, relative +ethic. They offer as ethical what is in reality not ethical but a +mixture of non-ethical necessity and ethics. They thereby establish a +huge confusion, and allow the starting of an ever-increasing +obscuration of the conception of the ethical. + +The ethic of reverence for life knows nothing of a relative ethic. It +allows to rank as good only the maintenance and promotion of life. All +destruction of and injury to life, under whatever circumstances they +take place, it condemns as evil. It does not keep in store adjustments +between ethics and necessity all ready for making up. It is always +again and again and in ways that are always original coming to terms +in men with reality. It does not abolish for man all ethical +conflicts, but compels him to decide for himself in each case how far +he can remain ethical and how far he must submit himself to the +necessity for destruction of and injury to life, and therewith incur +guilt. It is not by receiving instruction about agreement between +ethical and necessary, that a man makes progress in ethics, but only +by coming to hear more and more plainly the voice of the ethical, by +becoming ruled more and more by the longing to preserve and promote +life, and by becoming more and more obstinate in resistance to the +necessity for destroying or injuring life. + +In ethical conflicts man can arrive only at subjective decisions. No +one can lay down for him at what point, on each occasion, lies the +extreme limit of possibility for [pg 256] his persistence in the +preservation and promotion of life. He alone has to decide, by letting +himself be guided by a feeling of the highest possible responsibility +towards other life. + +We must never let ourselves become blunted and dull. We are living in +truth, when our experience in these conflicts is ever deepening. The +good conscience is an invention of the devil’s. + +Man and other living creatures + +What does reverence for life say about the relations between men and +the animal world? + +Whenever I injure life of any sort, I must be quite clear whether it +is necessary. Beyond the unavoidable, I must never go, not even with +what seems insignificant. The farmer who has mown down a thousand +flowers in his meadow to feed his cows, must be careful on his way +home not to strike off in thoughtless pastime the head of a single +flower by the roadside, for he thereby commits a wrong against life +without being under the pressure of necessity. + +Those who experiment with operations or the use of drugs upon animals, +or inoculate them with diseases, so as to be able to bring help to +mankind with the results gained, must never quiet any misgivings they +feel with the general reflexion that their gruesome proceedings aim at +a valuable result. They must first have considered in each individual +case whether there is a real necessity to force upon any animal this +sacrifice for the sake of mankind, and they must take the most careful +pains to ensure that the pain inflicted is made as small as possible. +How much wrong is committed in scientific institutions through neglect +of anæsthetics, which to save time or trouble are not administered! +How much, too, through animals being subjected to torture merely to +give to students a demonstration of perfectly understood phenomena. By +the very fact that animals have been subjected to experiments, and +have by their pain won such valuable results for suffering [pg 257] +men, a new and special relation of solidarity has been established +between them and us. From that springs for each one of us a compulsion +to do to every animal all the good we possibly can. By helping an +insect when it is in difficulties I am thereby attempting to cancel +part of man’s ever new debt to the animal world. Whenever an animal is +in any way forced into the service of man, every one of us must be +concerned with the suffering which it has thereby to undergo. None of +us must allow to take place any suffering for which he himself is not +responsible, if he can hinder it in any way, at the same time quieting +his conscience with the reflexion that he would be mixing himself up +in something which does not concern him. No one must shut his eyes and +regard as non-existent the sufferings of which he spares himself the +sight. Let no one regard as light the burden of his responsibility. +While so much ill-treatment of animals goes on, while the moans of +thirsty animals in railway trucks sound unheard, while so much +brutality prevails in our slaughter-houses, while animals have to +suffer in our kitchens painful death from unskilled hands, while +animals have to endure intolerable treatment from heartless men, or +are left to the cruel play of children, we all share the guilt. + +We are afraid of making ourselves conspicuous, if we let it be noticed +how we feel for the sufferings which man brings upon the animals. We +think at the same time that others have become more “rational” than we +are, and that they take as being usual and as a matter of course, what +we are excited about. Yet suddenly they will let slip a word which +shows us that they too have not yet learnt to acquiesce. And now, +though they are strangers, they are quite near us. The mask in which +we misled each other falls off. We know now, from one another, that we +are alike in being unable to escape from the gruesome proceedings that +are taking place unceasingly around us. What a happy making of a new +acquaintance! + +The ethic of respect for life guards us from letting each other +believe through our silence that we no longer experience [pg 258] +what, as thinking men, we must experience. It prompts us to keep each +other sensitive to what distresses us, and to talk and to act together +without any feeling of shyness, just as the responsibility we feel +moves us to. It makes us keep on the look-out together for +opportunities of bringing some sort of help to animals, to make up for +the great misery which men inflict on them, and thus to step for a +moment out of the incomprehensible horror of existence. + +The ethic of the relation of man to man + +In the matter also of our relation to other men, the ethic of +reverence for life throws upon us a responsibility so unlimited as to +be terrifying. + +Here again it offers us no rules about the extent of the +self-maintenance which is allowable; again, it bids us in each case +come to terms with the absolute ethic of self-devotion. I have to +decide in accordance with the responsibility of which I am conscious, +how much of my life, my possessions, my rights, my happiness, my time, +and my rest I must devote to others, and how much of them I may keep +for myself. + +In the question of possession, the ethic of reverence for life is +outspokenly individualist in the sense that wealth acquired or +inherited must be placed at the service of the community, not through +any measures taken by society, but through the absolutely free +decision of the individual. It expects everything from a general +increase in the feeling of responsibility. Wealth it regards as the +property of society left in the sovereign control of the individual. +One man serves society by carrying on a business in which a number of +employees earn their living; another by giving away his wealth in +order to help his fellows. Between these two extreme kinds of service +let each decide according to the responsibility which he finds +determined for him by the circumstances of his life. Let no one judge +his neighbour. The one thing that matters is that each shall value +what he possesses as means to action. Whether this is [pg 259] +accomplished by his keeping and increasing his wealth, or by surrender +of it, matters little. Wealth must reach the community in the most +varied ways, if the latter is to profit by it in the best way. + +Those who possess little wealth to call their own are most in danger +of holding what they have in a purely selfish spirit. There is +profound truth in the parable of Jesus which makes the servant who had +received least the least loyal to his duty. + +My rights too the ethic of reverence for life does not allow to belong +to me. It forbids me to quiet my conscience with the reflexion that as +the stronger, but by quite legitimate means, I am advancing myself at +the cost of one who is weaker than I. In what the law and public +opinion allow me it sets a problem before me. It bids me think of +others, and makes me ponder whether I can allow myself the inward +right to pluck all the fruit that my hand can reach. Thus it may +happen that in obedience to consideration for the existence of others +I do what seems to ordinary opinion to be folly. Yes, it may even show +itself to be folly by the fact that my renunciation has not been of +the slightest benefit to him for whom it was made. And yet I was +right. Reverence for life is the highest court of appeal. What it +commands has its own significance, even if it seems foolish or +useless. We all look, of course, in one another, for the folly which +indicates that we have higher responsibilities making themselves felt +in ourselves. Yet it is only in proportion as we all become less +rational, in the meaning given it by ordinary calculation, that the +ethical disposition develops in us, and allows problems to become +soluble which have hitherto been insoluble. + +Nor will reverence for life grant me my happiness as my own. At the +moments when I should like to enjoy myself without restraint, it wakes +in me reflexion about misery that I see or suspect, and it does not +allow me to drive away the uneasiness thereby caused to me. Just as +the wave cannot exist for itself, but is ever a part of the heaving +surface of ocean, so must I never live my life for itself, but [pg +260] always in the experience which is going on around me. It is an +uncomfortable doctrine which the true ethic whispers into my ear. You +are happy, it says; therefore you are called upon to give much. +Whatever more than others you have received in health, natural gifts, +working capacity, success, a beautiful childhood, harmonious family +circumstances, you must not accept as being a matter of course. You +must pay a price for them. You must show more than average devotion of +life to life. + +To the happy the voice of the true ethic is dangerous, if they venture +to listen to it. When it calls to them, it never damps down the +irrational which glows within it. It assails them to see whether it +can get them out of their rut and turn them into adventurers of +self-devotion, people of whom the world has too few. . . . + +Reverence for life is an inexorable creditor! If it finds anyone with +nothing to pledge but a little time and a little leisure, it lays an +attachment on these. But its hardheartedness is good, and sees +clearly. The many modern men who as industrial machines are engaged in +callings in which they can in no way be active as men among men, are +exposed to the danger of merely vegetating in an egoistic life. Many +of them feel this danger, and suffer under the fact that their daily +work has so little to do with spiritual and ideal aims and does not +allow them to put into it anything of their human nature. Others +acquiesce; the thought of having no duties outside their daily work +suits them very well. + +But that men should be so condemned or so favoured as to be released +from responsibility for devotion as men to men, the ethic of reverence +for life will not allow to be legitimate. It demands that every one of +us in some way and with some object shall be a man for men. To those +who have no opportunity in their daily work of giving themselves as +man to men, and have nothing else that they can give, it suggests +their offering something of their time and leisure, even if these have +been granted to them in scanty measure. Find for yourselves some +secondary [pg 261] work (it says to them), an inconspicuous one, +perhaps a secret one. Open your eyes and look for a human being or +some work devoted to human welfare which needs from some one a little +time or friendliness, a little sympathy, or sociability, or work. +There may be a solitary or an embittered fellow-man, an invalid or an +inefficient person to whom you can be something. Perhaps it is an old +person or a child. Or some good work needs volunteers who can offer a +free evening, or run errands. Who can enumerate the many ways in which +that costly piece of fixed capital, a human being, can be employed! +More of him is wanted everywhere! Hunt, then, for some situation for +your humanity, and do not be frightened away if you have to wait, or +to be taken on trial. And do not be disturbed by disappointments. +Anyhow, do not be without some secondary work in which you give +yourself as a man to men. There is one that is marked out for you, if +you only truly will to have it. . . . + +Thus does the true ethic speak of those who have only a little time +and a little human nature to give. Well will it be with them if they +listen to it, and are preserved from becoming stunted natures, because +they have neglected this devotion of self to others. + +But to everyone, in whatever state of life he finds himself, the ethic +of respect for life does this: it forces him ever and again to be +inwardly concerned with all the human destinies and all the other +life-destinies which are going through their life-course around him, +and to give himself, as man, to the man who needs a fellow-man. It +will not allow the learned man to live only for his learning, even if +his learning makes him very useful, nor the artist to live only for +his art, even if by means of it he gives something to many. It does +not allow the very busy man to think that with his professional +activities he has fulfilled every demand upon him. It demands from all +and every that they devote a portion of their life to their fellows. +In what way and to what extent this is laid down for him the +individual must gather from the thoughts which arise in [pg 262] him, +and from the destinies in which his life moves. One man’s sacrifice is +outwardly unpretentious. He can accomplish it while continuing to live +a normal life. Another is called to some conspicuous devotion, and +must therefore put aside regard for his own progress. But let neither +judge the other. The tasks of men have to be decided in a thousand +ways to let the good become actual. What he has to bring as an +offering is the secret of each individual. But one with another we +have all to recognize that our existence reaches its true value only +when we experience in ourselves something of the truth of the saying: +“Whoever shall lose his life, the same shall find it” (S. Matt. x. +39). + +Personal and supra-personal responsibility. Ethics and humanity + +The ethical conflicts between society and the individual arise out of +the fact that the latter has to bear not only a personal, but also a +supra-personal responsibility. When my own person only is concerned, I +can always be patient, alway forgive, use all possible consideration, +always be tender-hearted. But each of us comes into a situation when +he is responsible not for himself only, but also for some undertaking, +and then is forced into decisions which conflict with personal +morality. + +The industrialist who manages a business, however small, and the +musician who undertakes public performances, cannot be men in the way +they would like to be. The one has to dismiss a worker who is +incapable or given to drink, in spite of any sympathy he has for him +and his family; the other cannot let a singer whose voice is the worse +for wear perform any longer, although he knows what distress he thus +causes. + +The more extensive a man’s activities, the oftener he finds himself in +the situation of having to sacrifice something of his humanity to his +supra-personal responsibility. Out of this conflict consideration +brings the average person to the decision that the wider +responsibility does, as a matter of principle, annul the personal. It +is with this idea [pg 263] that society addresses the individual. For +the quieting of consciences for which this decision is too categorical +it perhaps lays down a few principles which undertake to determine in +a way that is valid for everybody, how far in any case personal +morality can have a say in the matter. + +To the current ethic no course remains open but to sign this +capitulation. It has no means of defending the fortress of personal +morality, because it has not at its disposal any absolute notions of +good and evil. Not so the ethic of reverence for life. That possesses, +as we can see, what the other lacks. It therefore never surrenders the +fortress, even if the latter is permanently invested. It feels itself +in a position to persevere in holding it, and by continual sorties to +keep the besiegers on the _qui vive_. + +Only the most universal and absolute purposiveness in the maintenance +and promotion of life, which is the objective aimed at by reverence +for life, is ethical. All other necessity or expediency is not +ethical, but only a more or less necessary necessity, or a more or +less expedient expediency. In the conflict between the maintenance of +my own existence and the destruction of, or injury to, another, I can +never put the ethical and the necessary together to form a relative +ethical; I must choose between ethical and necessary, and, if I choose +the latter, must take it upon myself to be guilty through an act of +injury to life. Similarly I am not at liberty to think that in the +conflict between personal and supra-personal responsibility I can +balance the ethical and the expedient to make a relative ethical, or +even annul the ethical with the purposive; I must choose between the +two. If under the pressure of the supra-personal responsibility I +yield to the expedient, I become guilty in some way or other through +failure in reverence for life. + +The temptation to combine with the ethical into a relative ethical the +expedient which is commanded me by the supra-personal responsibility +is especially strong, because it can [pg 264] be shown, in defence of +it, that the person who complies with the demand of this +supra-personal responsibility, acts unegoistically. It is not to his +individual existence or his individual welfare that he sacrifices +another existence or welfare, but he sacrifices an individual +existence and welfare to what forces itself upon him as expedient in +view of the existence or the welfare of a majority. But ethical is +more than unegoistic. Ethical is nothing but the reverence felt by my +will-to-live for every other will-to-live. Whenever I in any way +sacrifice or injure life, I am not within the ethical, but I become +guilty, whether it be egoistically guilty for the sake of maintaining +my own existence or welfare, or unegoistically guilty for the sake of +maintaining a greater number of other existences or their welfare. + +This so easily made mistake of accepting as ethical a violation of +reverence for life if it is based upon unegoistic considerations, is +the bridge by crossing which ethics enter unintentionally the +territory of the non-ethical. The bridge must be broken down. + +Ethics go only so far as humanity does, humanity meaning respect for +the existence and the happiness of individual human beings. Where +humanity ends pseudo-ethics begin. The day on which this boundary is +once for all universally recognized and marked out so as to be visible +to everyone, will be one of the most important in the history of +mankind. Thenceforward it can no longer happen that ethics which are +not ethics at all are accepted as real ethics, and deceive and ruin +individuals and peoples. + +The ethics hitherto current have hindered us from becoming as earnest +as we must be by the fact that they have utterly deceived us as to the +many ways in which each one of us, whether through self-assertion, or +by actions justified by supra-personal responsibility, become guilty +again and again. True knowledge consists in being gripped by the +secret that everything around us is will-to-live and seeing clearly +how again and again we incur guilt against life. + +Fooled by pseudo-ethics, man stumbles about in his [pg 265] guilt like +a drunken man. If he becomes instructed and earnest he seeks the road +which leads him least into guilt. + +We are all exposed to the temptation of lessening the guilt of +inhumanity which comes from our working under supra-personal +responsibility, by withdrawing as far as possible into ourselves. But +such freedom from guilt is not honestly obtained. Ethics start with +world- and life-affirmation, and therefore will not allow us this +flight into negation. They forbid us to be like the housewife who +leaves the killing of the eels to her cook, and compels us to +undertake all duties involving supra-personal responsibility which +fall to us, even if we should be in a position to decline them for +reasons more or less satisfactory. + +Each one of us, then, has to engage, so far as he is brought to it by +the circumstances of his life, in work which involves supra-personal +responsibility, but we must do it not in the spirit of the collective +body, but in that of the man who wishes to be ethical. In every +individual case we struggle therefore to preserve as much humanity as +is ever possible in such work, and in doubtful cases we venture to +make a mistake on the side of humanity rather than on that of the +object in view. When we have become instructed and earnest, we think +of what is usually forgotten: that all public activity of whatever +sort has to do not with facts only, but also with the creation of that +spirit and temper which is desirable in the collective body. The +creation of such a spirit and temper is more important than anything +directly attained in the facts. Public work, in which the utmost +possible effort is not made to preserve humanity, ruins the +disposition. He who under the influence of supra-personal +responsibility simply sacrifices men and human happiness when it seems +commanded, accomplishes something. But he has not reached the highest +level. He has only outward, not spiritual influence. We have spiritual +influence only when others notice that we do not decide coldly in +accordance with principles laid down once and for all, but in each +individual case fight for humanity. + +[pg 266] + +There is too little among us of this kind of struggling. From the +smallest who is something in the smallest business, right up to the +political ruler who holds in his hands the decision for peace or war, +we act too much as men who in any given case can prepare without +effort to be no longer men, but merely the executive of general +interests. Hence there is no longer among us any trust in a +righteousness lighted up with human feeling. Nor have we any longer +any real respect for one another. We all feel ourselves in the power +of a mentality of cold, impersonal, and usually unintelligent +opportunism, which stiffens itself with appeals to principle, and in +order to carry out small interests is capable of the greatest +inhumanity and the greatest folly. We therefore see among us one +temper of impersonal opportunism confronting another, and all problems +are executed in a useless conflict of force against force because +there is nowhere at hand such a spirit and temper as will make them +soluble. + +Only through our struggles for humanity can forces which work in the +direction of the truly rational and expedient become powerful, while +the present spirit and temper prevails. Hence the man who works under +supra-personal responsibilities has to feel himself answerable not +only for the successful result which is to be realized through him, +but for the general spirit and temper which has to be created. + +We therefore serve society without losing ourselves in it. We do not +allow it to be our guardian in the matter of ethics. That would be as +if the solo violinist allowed his bowing to be regulated by that of +the double-bass player. Never for a moment do we lay aside our +mistrust of the ideals established by society, and of the convictions +which are kept by it in circulation. We always know that society is +full of folly and will deceive us in the matter of humanity. It is an +unreliable horse, and blind into the bargain. Woe to the driver if he +falls asleep! + +All this sounds too hard. Society serves ethics by giving legal +sanction to its most elementary principles, and handing [pg 267] on +the ethical principles of one generation to the next. That is much, +and it claims our gratitude. But society is also something which +checks the progress of ethics again and again, by arrogating to itself +the dignity of the ethical teachers. To this, however, it has no +right. The only ethical teacher is the man who thinks ethically, and +struggles for an ethic. The conceptions of good and evil which are put +in circulation by society are paper-money, the value of which is to be +calculated not by the figures printed upon it, but by its relation to +its exchange value in gold of the ethic of reverence for life. But so +measured, its exchange value reveals itself as that of the paper-money +of a half-bankrupt state. + +The collapse of civilization has come about through ethics being left +to society. A renewal of it is possible only if ethics become once +more the concern of thinking human beings, and if individuals seek to +assert themselves in society as ethical personalities. In proportion +as we secure this, society will become, instead of the purely natural +entity, which it naturally is, an ethical one. Previous generations +have made the terrible mistake of idealizing society as ethical. We do +our duty to it by judging it critically, and trying to make it, so far +as is possible, more ethical. Being in possession of an absolute +standard of the ethical, we no longer allow ourselves to make +acceptable as ethics principles of expediency or even of the vulgarest +opportunism. Nor do we remain any longer at the low level of allowing +to be current as in any way ethical meaningless ideals, of power, of +passion, or of nationalism which are set up by miserable politicians +and maintained in some degree of respect by bewildering propaganda. +All the principles, dispositions, and ideals which make their +appearance among us we measure, in their showy pedantry, with a rule +on which the measures are given by the absolute ethic of reverence for +life. We allow currency only to what is consistent with the claims of +humanity. We bring into honour again regard for life and [pg 268] for +the happiness of the individual. Sacred human rights we again hold +high; not those which political rulers exalt at banquets and tread +underfoot in their actions, but the true ones. We call once more for +justice, not that which purblind authorities have elaborated in a +legal scholasticism, nor that about which demagogues of all shades of +colour shout themselves hoarse, but that which is filled to the full +with the value of each single human existence. The foundation of law +and right is humanity. + +Thus we bring the principles, dispositions, and ideals of the +collective body into agreement with humanity. At the same time we +shape them in accordance with reason, for only what is ethical is +truly rational. Only so far as the current disposition of men is +animated by ethical convictions and ideals is it capable of truly +purposive activity. + +The ethic of reverence for life puts in our hands weapons for fighting +false ethics and false ideals, but we have strength to use them only +so far as we—each one in his own life—preserve our humanity. Only when +those men are numerous who in thought and in action bring humanity to +terms with reality, will humanity cease to be current as a mere +sentimental idea and become what it ought to be, a leaven in the +spirit and temper of individuals and of society. + + + +[pg 269] + +CHAPTER XXII + +THE CIVILIZING POWER OF THE ETHIC OF REVERENCE FOR LIFE + + +Civilization as a product of reverence for life + +THE reverence for life which has grown up in the will-to-live which +has become reflective, contains world- and life-affirmation and ethics +side by side and interpenetrating each other. It therefore cannot but +continually think out and will all the ideals of ethical civilization, +and bring them into agreement with reality. + +Reverence for life will not allow to pass as current the purely +individualistic and inward conception of civilization as it rules in +Indian thought and in mysticism. That man should make efforts for +self-perfecting by withdrawing into himself is to it a deep, but an +incomplete, ideal of civilization. + +In no way does reverence for life allow the individual to give up all +interest in the world. It is unceasingly compelling him to be +concerned about all the life that is round about him, and to feel +himself responsible for it. Whenever life is in question the +development of which we can influence, our concern with it, and our +responsibility for it, are not satisfied by our maintaining and +promoting its existence as such; they demand that we shall try to +raise it to its highest value in every respect. + +The being that can be influenced in its development by us is man. +Reverence for life compels us, therefore, to picture to ourselves and +to will every kind of progress of which man and humanity are capable. +It throws us into a restless condition of ever picturing to ourselves +and willing civilization, but as ethical men. + +Even a not yet deepened world- and life-affirmation [pg 270] produces +this picturing and willing of civilization, but it leaves a man to +exert himself more or less without guidance. In reverence for life, +however, and the willing which accompanies it, to raise men and +humanity to their highest value in every respect, he possesses the +guidance which leads him to complete and purified ideals of +civilization which with full consciousness of their goal come to terms +with reality. + +Defined from outside and quite empirically, complete civilization +consists in making actual all possible progress in discovery and +invention and in the arrangements of human society, and seeing that +they work together for the inward perfecting of individuals which is +the real and final object of civilization. Reverence for life is in a +position to complete this conception of civilization and to supply a +foundation for its most inward elements. This it does by defining what +is meant by the inward perfecting of man, and making it consist in +reaching the spirituality of an ever deepening reverence for life. + +In order to give a meaning to the material and spiritual progress +which is to be made actual by the individual man and mankind, the +ordinary representation of civilization has to assume an evolution of +the world, in which such progress has a meaning. But to do so, it puts +itself in dependence on a play of phantasy which reaches no result. It +is impossible to depict an evolution of the world in which the +civilization produced by the individual man and mankind means +something. + +In reverence for life, on the contrary, civilization recognizes that +it has nothing at all to do with the evolution of the world, but +carries its meaning in itself. The essence of civilization consists in +this, that the reverence for life which in my will-to-live is +struggling for recognition does get stronger and stronger in +individuals and in mankind. Civilization, then, is not a phenomenon of +any world-evolution, but an experience of the will-to-live within us, +which it is neither possible nor necessary to bring into [pg 271] +relation with the course of nature as we know it from outside. As a +perfecting of our will-to-live it is sufficient for itself. What the +development that takes place in us means in the totality of the +development in the world we leave on one side as something +undiscoverable. That as a result of all the progress which men and +mankind can make there shall exist in the world as much as possible of +will-to-live, putting reverence for life into practice on all life +which comes within reach of its influence, and seeking perfection in +the spiritual atmosphere of reverence for life: this and nothing else +is civilization. So completely does it carry its value in itself that +even the certainty of the human race ceasing to exist within a +calculable period, would not be able to lead us away from our efforts +to attain to civilization. + +As a development in which the highest experience of the will-to-live +lives itself out, civilization has a meaning for the world without +needing any explanation of the world. + +The four ideals of civilization. The struggle for a civilized mankind +in the machine age + +The will-to-live which is filled with reverence for life is interested +in the most lively and persevering way that can be imagined in all +kinds of progress. Moreover, it possesses a standard by which to +assess their value correctly, and can create a spirit and temper which +allows them all to work in with one another in the most effective way. + +Three kinds of progress come within the purview of civilization: +progress in knowledge and power; progress in the social organization +of mankind; progress in spirituality. + +Civilization is made up of four ideals: the ideal of the individual; +the ideal of social and political organization; the ideal of spiritual +and religious social organization; the ideal of humanity as a whole. +On the basis of these four ideals thought comes to terms with +progress. + +Progress in knowledge has a directly spiritual significance [pg 272] +when it is interpreted by thought. It makes us recognize, ever more +completely, that everything which exists is power, that is to say, +will-to-live; it is ever making larger the circle of the will-to-live +of which we can form conceptions by analogy with our own. What a +significance it has for our meditation on the world that we have +discovered in the cell an individual existence, in the capacity of +which for activity and suffering we see repeated the elements of our +own vitality! By our ever-growing knowledge we are roused to ever +greater astonishment at that secret of life which surrounds us on +every hand. From simple simplicity we arrive at a more profound +simplicity. + +From our knowledge comes also power over the forces of nature. Our +powers of movement and of action are increased in an extraordinary +way. There comes about a far-reaching change in the circumstances of +our life. + +The progress which accompanies it, however, is not to the same extent +an advantage for the development of man. By the power we obtain over +the forces of nature we do indeed free ourselves from nature, and make +her serviceable to us, but at the same time we thereby also cut +ourselves loose from her, and slip into conditions of life, the +unnatural character of which brings with it dangers of many sorts. + +We press the forces of nature into our service by means of machines. +There is a story in the writings of Chwang-tse of how a pupil of +Confucius saw a gardener who, to get water for his flower-beds, went +down to the spring with his bucket every time. So he asked him whether +he would not like to lessen his labour. “How can I?” replied the +other. “You take a long piece of wood for a lever,” said Confucius’ +pupil, “weighted behind, but light in front; with this you dip for the +water and it comes up without the least trouble. They call this device +a draw-well.” But the gardener, who was something of a philosopher, +answered: “I have heard my teacher say: ‘If a man uses machines, he +carries on all the affairs of life like a machine; whoever [pg 273] +carries on his affairs like a machine gets a machine-like heart; and +when anyone has a machine-like heart in his breast, he loses true +simplicity.’” + +The dangers that were suspected by that gardener in the fifth century +B.C. are active among us in full force. Purely mechanical labour has +become the lot of numbers among us to-day. Cut loose from their own +house and from any ground of their own which might feed them, they +live in a depressing, materialist unfreedom. As a result of the +revolution which the machine has produced, we are almost all of us +subjected to an existence of labour which is far too much governed by +rule, too limited in its nature, and too trying to the system. +Reflexion and collectedness are made difficult for us. Family life and +the upbringing of our children are impoverished. We are all more or +less in danger of becoming human things instead of personalities. Many +sorts of material and spiritual injury to human existence form +therefore the dark side of the achievements of discovery and +invention. + +Even our capacity for civilization is endangered. Claimed entirely for +so severe a struggle for existence, many of us are no longer in a +position to think about ideals which make for civilization. Such men +cannot reach the objective mood which is necessary for it. All their +attention is directed to the improvement of their own existence. The +ideals which they set up for this latter object they proclaim to be +ideals of civilization, and thus they start confusion in the general +picture of what civilization is. + +In order to fit ourselves to the state of things produced by the +results of these achievements of discovery and invention which are, +indeed, desirable although injurious, we must think out the ideal of +humanity and wrestle with circumstances to make them hinder as little, +and help as much as possible the development of man up to this ideal. + +The ideal of civilized man is none other than that of a man who in +every relation of life preserves true human nature. To be civilized +men means for us almost this: [pg 274] that in spite of the conditions +of modern civilization we remain human. It is only taking thought for +everything which belongs to true human nature that can preserve us, +amid the conditions of the most advanced external civilization, from +going astray from civilization itself. It is only if the longing to +become again truly man is awakened in the man of to-day, that he will +be able to find his way out of the confusion in which, blinded by +conceit at his knowledge and pride in his powers, he is at present +wandering. Only then, too, will he be in a position to work against +the pressure of those relations of life which threaten his human +nature. + +Reverence for life demands, therefore, as the ideal of the material +and spiritual being of man, that with the completest possible +development of all his faculties and in the widest possible freedom, +both material and spiritual, he strives to be honest with himself and +to take a sympathetic and helping interest in all the life that is +around him. In earnest concern about himself he must ever keep in mind +all the responsibilities which are his lot, and so, as sufferer and as +actor, preserve in his relation to himself and to the world a living +spirituality. There should ever be before him as true human nature the +duty of being ethical in the profound world- and life-affirmation of +reverence for life. + +If it is recognized as the aim of civilization that every man shall +attain to true human nature in an existence which is as fully as +possible worthy of him, then the uncritical overvaluing of the +external elements of civilization which we have taken over from the +end of the nineteenth century can no longer prevail among us. We are +forced more and more into a reflexion which compels us to distinguish +between the essentials and the unessentials of civilization. +Unspiritual pride in civilization loses its power over us. We dare to +face the truth that with the progress of discovery and invention +civilization has become not easier, but more difficult. We become +conscious of the problem of the mutual relations between the material +and [pg 275] the spiritual. We know that we all have to wrestle with +circumstances on behalf of our human nature, and make it an object of +our care to transform the almost hopeless struggle which many have to +carry on to preserve their human nature, into one which offers some +hope. + +As a spiritual help in this struggle we offer them the spirit and +temper which will allow no man ever to be sacrificed to circumstances, +as if he were a mere human thing. Formulated by so-called thinkers and +popularized in all possible forms, the conviction is general that +civilization is the privilege of an _élite_, and that man in the mass +is only a means for realizing it. At the same time the spiritual help +which they can claim is denied to these men who have to wrestle to +preserve their human nature. That is the effect of the devotion to +reality to which we have surrendered ourselves. But reverence for life +rebels against it, and produces a spirit and temper in which there is +offered to every man in the thoughts of others the human value and the +human dignity which the circumstances of life would deny him. The +struggle has thus lost its extreme bitterness. Man has now to assert +himself only against his circumstances, and no longer against his +fellow-men at the same time. + +Further, the temper of reverence for life helps those who have to +struggle hardest on behalf of their human nature by keeping alive the +conception of human nature as the privilege which must be preserved at +any price. It keeps them from engaging with one-sided aims in their +struggle for the diminishing of their material unfreedom, and bids +them bethink themselves that much more of human nature and inward +freedom can be combined with their actual life-circumstances than they +actually secure. It leads them on to preserve recollectedness and +inwardness when they have hitherto given them up. + +There must come about a spiritualizing of the masses. The mass of +individuals must begin to reflect about their lives, about what they +want to secure for their lives in the [pg 276] struggle for existence, +about what makes their circumstances difficult, and about what they +themselves renounce. They are wanting in spirituality because they +have only a confused conception of what spirituality is. They forget +to think, because elementary thought about themselves has become +something unfamiliar to them. In what is in our day cultivated as +spirituality and practised as thought, there is absolutely nothing +that comes directly home to them as necessary for them. But if it +comes about that the thoughts suggested by reverence for life become +common among us, there will be a mode of thought provided which will +work in everybody, and a spirituality aroused which will show itself +in everybody. Even those who are engaged in the hardest struggle on +behalf of their human nature will then be led to reflexion and +inwardness, and will thereby obtain powers which they did not before +possess. + +Though all of us are alike aware that the maintenance of civilization +is dependent first and foremost on the breaking out of the fountains +of spiritual life in us, we shall nevertheless zealously take in hand +our economic and social problems. The highest possible material +freedom for the greatest possible number is a requirement of +civilization. + +The recognition that we evidently have so little power over economic +relations does not discourage us. We know this to be to a considerable +extent a result of the fact that hitherto facts were contending with +facts, and passions with passions. Our powerlessness comes from our +feeling for reality. We shall be able to deal with things much more +effectively, if we resolve to try to solve our problems by a change of +spirit and temper. And we are at length ready for the recognition of +this. The efforts for control which were made on the strength of +economic theories and Utopias were in every respect failures, and have +brought us into a terrible condition. There remains nothing for us to +do but to try a radical change of policy, [pg 277] viz., the solution +of our problems by means of a helpful understanding and confidence in +a way that will prove effective. It is reverence for life alone which +can create the spirit and temper needed for this. The understanding +and confidence which we mutually accord to each other with a view to +what is most purposive, and by means of which we obtain the utmost +power that is possible over circumstances, can be enjoyed only if +everyone can assume in everyone else reverence for the existence of +the other and regard for his material and spiritual welfare as a +spirit and temper which influences them to the depths of their being. +Only through reverence for life can we attain the standards of +economic justice, about which we have to come to an understanding with +each other. + +Will it be possible to bring about this development? We must, if we +are not to be ruined together, materially and spiritually. All +progress in discovery and invention works itself out at last to a +fatal result, if we do not maintain control over it through a +corresponding progress in our spirituality. Through the power which we +gain over the forces of nature we get in an inexplicable way as human +beings control over other human beings. With the possession of a +hundred machines a single man or a company is given a supremacy over +all who work the machines. Some new invention makes it possible for +one man by a single movement to kill not merely a hundred, but ten +thousand of his fellow-men. In no sort of struggle is it possible to +avoid becoming ruinous to one another by economic or physical power. +At best the result is that the oppressor and the oppressed exchange +rôles. The only thing that can help is that we renounce the power +which is given us over one another. But that is something to be done +by spirituality. + +Intoxicated by the progress in discovery and invention with which our +age has been flooded, we forgot to trouble ourselves about men’s +progress in spirituality. In the absence of all thought we slid +without knowing it into [pg 278] pessimism, believing, that is, in all +sorts of progress, but no longer in the spiritual progress of the +individual and of mankind. + +Facts call us now to bethink ourselves, just as movements of their +capsizing vessel drive the crew up on to the deck and into the +rigging. Belief in the spiritual progress of the individual and of +mankind has already become almost impossible for us, but with the +courage of despair we must force ourselves into it. That we shall all +unanimously again will this spiritual progress and again hope for it: +that is the reversal of the helm which we must succeed in making, if +our vessel is at the last moment to be brought once more before the +wind. + +Only through thoughtful reverence for life shall we become capable of +this achievement. If that reverence begins anywhere to work in our +thinking and in our spirit and temper, then the miracle is possible. +The power of the elementary and living spirituality that is to be +found in it is beyond calculation. + +Church and State as historical entities, and as ideals of civilization + +State and Church are only modified forms of the organization of men +towards humanity. The ideals of social-political and religious +organization are therefore determined by the necessity of these +entities being made effective aids to the spiritualizing of men, and +to their organization towards humanity. + +The fact that the ideals of State and Church among us are not at work +in their true form is due to our historical sense. The men of the +“Aufklärung” assumed that State and Church had come into existence by +reason of estimates made of their usefulness. They sought to +comprehend the nature of these two entities by means of theories about +their origins, but in this proceeding they did nothing but read back +their own view into history. Not feeling the least reverence for any +natural historical entity, they [pg 279] found it easy to approach +them with demands suggested by a rational ideal. We, on the contrary, +have such a measure of this reverence that we feel shy of wishing to +transform in accordance with theoretical ideas what had a quite +different origin. + +But State and Church are not merely natural historical entities; they +are also necessary ones. The only way in which reflexion can deal with +them is to be always at work, transforming them from what they are as +received, into organisms which are in accordance with reason and +effective in every respect. Only in this capacity for development is +their existence fully apprehended and justified. + +The natural historical entity presents us always only with initial +facts which lead on to corresponding further happenings, but never +with facts in which the nature of the society, that is to say the way +in which we are to behave towards it and to belong to it, can be +determined. If one allows that in the conception of the natural entity +there is also given one of a self-determined purpose, there arises a +fundamental confusion in people’s notion of the organization. The +individual and humanity as a whole, which are just as truly natural +entities as the two historical ones, are robbed of their rights and +sacrificed to the latter. The increased understanding with which we +now study the natural policy of societies with historical origin can +therefore not alter at all our demand that State and Church shall +direct their course more and more with reference to the ideal of man +and of humanity as their natural poles, and be obliged to find in them +their higher effectiveness. + +Civilization demands, then, that State and Church become capable of +development. This presupposes that the relations of influence between +the collective body and individual members of it will become different +from what they have been. In the last few generations the individual +has in face of State and Church surrendered more and more of his +spiritual independence. He received his spirit [pg 280] and temper +from them, instead of the spirit and temper that was growing within +him working as a shaping force upon State and Church. + +This abnormal relation was unavoidable. The individual had, of course, +nothing in which he could be spiritually independent. He had, +therefore, no spirit and temper in which he could come to terms with +the entities of real life. Nor was he in a position to think out +ideals which could work upon reality. There was no course left for him +but to adopt as an ideal an idealized reality. + +But in the world- and life-view of reverence for life he obtains the +means to a firm and valuable self-determination. It is with a will and +a hope which he carries ready shaped within himself that he faces +reality. It is to him something self-evident that every society that +is formed among men must serve towards the maintenance, the +advancement, and the higher development of life, and the production of +true spirituality. + +That which is decisive for the commencement of a development of State +and Church which has civilization for its aim and object, is that the +mass of men belong to these two entities in the spirit and temper of +reverence for life and the ideals which grow out of it: when that is +the case there arises in State and Church a spirit which works for +their transformation into something ethical and spiritual. + +A forecast of the course this process will take cannot be made, nor is +one needed. The spirit and temper of reverence for life is a force +which works effectively in every direction. The important thing is +that it shall be present with a strength and a steadiness which will +suffice to bring about the transformation. + +The moralizing of the religious and political community + +If the Church is to accomplish its task, it must unite men in +elementary, thoughtful, ethical religiousness. This [pg 281] it has +done hitherto very imperfectly. How far it is from being what it ought +to be, its absolute failure in the war revealed. There devolved on it +the duty of summoning men out of the struggle of national passions to +reflexion, and to keep them in the spirit and temper of the highest +ideals. It was not able to do this, and indeed did not seriously +attempt to. Only too completely historical, and too well organized, +and too little a directly religious association, itself succumbed to +the spirit of the time and mixed up with religion the dogmas of +nationalism and pragmatism. There was only one tiny church, the +community of the Quakers, which attempted to defend the unconditional +validity of reverence for life, as it is contained in the religion of +Jesus. + +The spirit and temper of reverence for life is able to work for the +transformation of the Church to the ideal of a religious association, +because it is itself deeply religious. In all historically formulated +belief it seeks to bring into general acceptance as the elemental and +essential thing in piety the ethical mysticism of oneness with the +infinite Will, which experiences itself in us as the will to love. By +putting in the very centre of things the most living and universal +element of piety, it leads the different religious associations out of +the narrowness of their historical past, and paves the way for +understanding and union between them. + +But this spirit and temper does even more than that. Besides bringing +the existing historical religious associations out of their historical +existence into a development towards the ideal of a religious +association, it works also where they can do nothing, in the sphere of +non-religion. There are many non-religious people among us. They have +become so partly through thoughtlessness and absence of any +world-view, and partly because as a result of honest thinking they +could no longer be content with a traditional religious world-view. +The world- and life-view of reverence for life enables these +non-religious minds to [pg 282] learn that every world- and life-view +which begins to think honestly necessarily becomes religious. Ethical +mysticism reveals to them the necessity to thought of the religion of +love, and leads them back to paths which they believed they had +abandoned for ever. + +Just as the transformation of the religious association must be the +result primarily of an inward change, so must that of the social and +political community also. + +It is true, indeed, that to believe in the possibility of transforming +the modern state into the civilized state is a piece of heroism. The +modern state finds itself to-day in an unprecedented condition of +material and spiritual penury. Collapsing under the weight of debts, +torn by economic and political struggles, stripped of all moral +authority, and scarcely able any longer to maintain its authority in +practical matters, it has to wrestle for its existence in a succession +of fresh troubles. Whence is it to get power to develop, in the face +of all these things, into a truly civilized state? + +What crises and catastrophes the modern state is still destined to go +through cannot be foreseen. Its position is further endangered +especially by the fact that it has far overstepped the limits of its +natural sphere of operation. It is an extraordinarily complicated +organism which intervenes in all social relationships, which tries to +regulate everything, and therefore in every respect functions +ineffectively; it tries to dominate economic life as it dominates +spiritual life; and for its activities over this extensive field it +works with machinery which in itself at once constitutes a danger. + +At some time and in some way or other the modern state must emerge +from its financial trouble, and reduce its activity to a normal +standard, but by what methods it can ever again get back to a natural +and healthy condition remains still a riddle. + +The tragic thing is, then, that we have to belong to the unsympathetic +and unhealthy modern state while cherishing [pg 283] the will to +transform it into a civilized state. There is demanded from us an +absolutely impossible achievement of faith in the power of the spirit. +But the ethical world- and life-view gives us strength for the task. + +Living in the modern state and thinking out the ideal of the civilized +state, we first of all put an end to the illusions which the former +cherishes about itself. Only by the majority of its members taking up +a critical attitude towards it can it come to itself again in +reflexion about itself. The absolute impossibility of the continuance +of the state in its present condition must become the universal +conviction before things can become in any way better. + +But at the same time, through meditation on the civilized state, the +perception must become common property that all merely external +measures for raising and making healthy the modern state, however +effective they may be in themselves, will have only a quite imperfect +result unless the spirit of the state becomes quite different. Let us, +then, undertake to drive the modern state, so far as the power of our +thought reaches, into the spirituality and the morality of the +civilized state as it is to be, by following the ideas contained in +reverence for life. We demand from it that it shall become more +spiritual and more ethical than any state has hitherto been called on +to become. Only with efforts to reach the true ideal do we get +progress. + +The objection is raised that, according to all experience, the state +cannot exist by relying merely on truth, justice, and ethical +considerations, but has in the last resort to take refuge in +opportunism. We smile at this experience. It is refuted by the dreary +results it has produced. We have, therefore, the right to declare the +opposite course to be true wisdom, and to say that true power for the +state as for the individual is to be found in spirituality and the +ethical. The state lives by the confidence of those who belong to it; +it lives by the confidence felt in it by other [pg 284] states. +Opportunist policy may have temporary successes to record, but in the +long run it assuredly lands itself in failure. + +Thus ethical world- and life-affirmation lays upon the modern state +the requirement that it shall aspire to making itself an ethical +personality. It presses this obstinately upon the state, and does not +let itself be deterred by the smiles of superior persons. The wisdom +of to-morrow has a different tone from that of yesterday. + +Only by a new spirit and temper ruling within it can the state attain +to peace within its borders; only by a new spirit and temper arising +between them can different states come to understand each other, and +cease to bring destruction upon each other; only by treating the +overseas world in a different spirit and temper from that of the past +and of to-day, can the modern state cease to load itself in that +quarter with guilt. + +Such moral talk about the civilized state has often been produced in +the past. Certainly it has. But it acquires a special tone at a time +when the modern state is perishing in misery, because it refused in +the past to continue to be in any way spiritually ethical. It +possesses a new authority, too, to-day because in the world- and +life-view of reverence for life there is revealed the significance of +the ethical in its full extent and its full profundity. + +We are therefore freed from any duty of forming a conception of the +civilized state which accords with the declarations of nationalism and +national civilization, and we are at liberty to turn back to the +profound _naïveté_ of thinking it to be a state which allows itself to +be guided by an ethical spirit and temper. With confidence in the +strength of the civilized spirit and temper which springs from +reverence for life we take upon ourselves the task of making this +civilized state an actuality. + +We look round beyond peoples and states upon humanity as a whole, +feeling ourselves responsible to the civilized spirit and temper. To +anyone who has surrendered himself [pg 285] to ethical world- and +life-affirmation the future of men and of mankind is an object of care +and of hope. To become free from this care and hope is poverty; to be +wholly surrendered to it is riches. Thus it is our consolation, that +in a time of difficulty and without knowing how much we may still +experience of a better future, we are paving the way, solely by our +confidence in the power of the spirit, for a civilized mankind which +is to come. + +Kant published, with the title _Towards Perpetual Peace_, a work +containing rules which were to be observed with a view to lasting +peace whenever treaties of peace were concluded. It was a mistake. +Rules for treaties of peace, however well intended and however ably +drawn up, can accomplish nothing. Such thinking as brings power to the +spirit and temper produced by reverence for life is the only thing +which can bring to mankind perpetual peace. + +FINIS + + + + +FOOTNOTES + + +Preface Notes + +1 [_Translator’s Note_.—Weltanschauung. This compound word may be +translated “theory of the universe,” “world-theory,” +“world-conception,” or “world-view.” The first is misleading as +suggesting, wrongly, a scientific explanation of the universe; the +second and third as suggesting, less ambitiously but still wrongly, an +explanation of how and why our human world is what it is. The last +indicates a sufficiently wide knowledge and consideration of our +corner of the universe to allow all factors to be taken into +consideration which bear on the question at issue. + +There may be passages in which it is desirable to vary the +translation, and others in which it is possible to give the meaning in +more elegant English, for good English style does not take kindly to +such compound words. But this latter consideration can be only a +secondary one in the translation of a philosophical work, the first +object of which must be to ensure that the author’s meaning shall be +reproduced as clearly as possible.] + + +CHAPTER III Notes + +2 Friedrich Jodl: _A History of Ethics as Philosophical Science_, 2nd +ed., 2 vols. (Vol. I., 1906; Vol. II., 1912). It treats of the ethics +of Western philosophy only. + + +CHAPTER V Notes + +3 Very important for our knowledge of the old philosophy and ethics +are the ten books entitled _The Lives and Teaching of Famous +Philosophers_, Diogenes Laertius in the third century after Christ. +Just because they are purely anecdotal, They have preserved for us +much information and many views which otherwise—for the works on the +philosophers treated of have all been lost—we should not possess. + +4 Xenophon, one of the generals who led the ten thousand back out of +Asia, wrote down his recollections of Socrates after the latter’s +death. By his report of the simple conversations of the master he +seeks to render impotent for all time the accusation that he corrupted +the youth and taught atheism, for even after his death teachers of +rhetoric did in fact draw up formal complaints against him. Xenophon’s +straightforward, realistic portrait of Socrates is extraordinarily +valuable. + +5 The most important dialogues in this connexion are the _Protagoras_, +the _Gorgias_, the _Phædrus_, the _Symposium_, the _Phædo_, and the +_Philebus_. + +6 Of the writings of the Cyrenaics and the Cynics, of Democritus, +Epicurus, Zeno, and the older Stoics hardly anything has come down to +us. Our knowledge of them is derived mostly from Diogenes Laertius. + +The Cyrenaics were known as the philosophers of pleasure because +Aristippus, the first preacher of the world-wisdom of joy, hailed from +Cyrene. The Cynics, or dog-philosophers, derived their name from the +fact that they despised the amenities of life and often delighted in a +coarse naturalness. The best known of them is Diogenes of Sinope (died +323 B.C.). + +Zeno’s philosophy was called Stoicism because he taught at Athens in a +colonnaded portico called the Stoa Poikile (_i.e._, the painted +portico). + +7 _Translator’s Note_.—Irony is intentional self-depreciation or +disclaiming what one really possesses. + +8 Of Seneca quite a series of ethical treatises have come down to us. +We mention here: _On Clemency_ (_De Clementia_, addressed to Nero); +_On Benefits_ (_De Beneficiis_); _On Tranquillity of Soul_ (_De +Tranquillitate Animi_), _On Anger_ (_De Ira_). + +Our knowledge of the teachings of Epictetus we owe to his pupil, +Flavius Arrianus, the historian. The latter has recorded a number of +his master’s lectures in eight books, of which four have survived. In +addition to these he collected and published a number of his sayings +on morality in the _Enchiridion_. + +In the popular philosophizings of Cicero (106-43 B.C.) as well, we can +see an attempt to produce a new ethic which is really living. + + +CHAPTER VI Notes + +9 Bacon was Lord Chancellor under James I. of England, but was in 1621 +deprived of his office because found guilty of corruption. His two +chief works are the _Novum Organum Scientiarum_ (1620) and _De +Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum_ (1623). Of the _New Atlantis_ only +a fragment has survived. + +10 See the writer’s books: _Das Messianitäts- und Leidensgeheimniss. +Eine Skizze des Lebens Jesu_ (1901). English version: _The Mystery of +the Kingdom of God_ (1914 A. & C. Black). _Geschichte der +Leben-Jesu Forschung_ (1906; new edition, 1922). English version: _The +Quest of the Historical Jesus_ (1911; 3rd impression, 1922 A. & C. +Black). + +11 Gassendi: _De vita, moribus, et doctrina Epicuri_ (1647) and +_Syntagma philosophiæ Epicuri_ (1649). + + +CHAPTER VII Notes + +12 D. Hartley: _Observations on Man, his Frame, his Duty, and his +Expectations_ (1749; 6th ed., 1834). + +13 D. von Holbach: _Système de la nature ou des lois du monde physique +et du monde moral_ (1770). + +14 Thomas Hobbes: _Elementa philosophica de cive_ (1642); _Leviathan, +or the Matter, Form, and Authority of Government_ (1651); _De homine_. + +15 John Locke: _An Essay concerning Human Understanding_ (2 vols., +1690). + +16 Adrien Helvetius: _Traité de l’Esprit_ (1758). + +17 Jeremy Bentham: _An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and +Legislation_ (1780). E. Dumont (1759-1828) of Geneva, an admirer of +Bentham who was domiciled in England, reproduced this work in French +in a free abbreviation as _Traités de législation civile et pénale_ +(1802). Frederick Edward Beneke followed this abbreviation when he +produced a German translation with the title: _Grundsätze der Civil- +und Criminalgesetzgebung_ (1830). + +18 _Translator’s Note_.—German “enthusiastisches Handeln.” The +explanatory periphrasis is added once for all, since “enthusiastic” +implies a kind and degree of feeling which is not implied in these +philosophical passages. + +19 David Hume: _A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to +introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects_ +(1740). German translation by Heinrich Jacob (2 vols., 1791): _Inquiry +Concerning the Principles of Morals_ (1751). + +20 Adam Smith: _The Theory of Moral Sentiments_ (1759); _Inquiry into +the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations_ (1770). German +translation of _The Theory of Moral Sentiments_ by L. Th. Kosegarten +(1791). Adam Smith was Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow. + +21 “L’amour de la gloire est inné dans les belles âmes; il n’y a qu’à +l’animer, il n’y a que l’exciter, et des hommes qui végétaient +jusqu’alors, enflammès par ce heureux instinct, vous paraîtront +changés en demi-dieux.”—_Œuvres de Frédéric le Grand_, vol. ix., p. +98. + +22 R. Cudworth: _Intellectual System of the Universe_ (1678); +_Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality_ (postumous, +1731). + +23 H. More: _Enchiridium Ethicum_ (1667). + +24 S. Clarke: _A Discourse concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of +Natural Religion, and the Truth and Certainty of the Christian +Revelation_ (1706). + +25 R. Cumberland: _De legibus naturæ disquisitio philosophica_ (1672). + +26 W. Wollaston: _The Religion of Nature Delineated_ (1722). + +27 _Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times_ (3 vols., 1711). +In the second volume there is included his ethical treatise entitled, +_Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit_, which appeared first, in 1699, +independently. It was published in French in 1745 by Denis Diderot. + +28 F. Hutcheson: _An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty +and Virtue_ (1725); _A System of Moral Philosophy_ (1755, posthumous). + +29 Joseph Butler: _Fifteen Sermons upon Human Nature, or Man +considered as a Moral Agent_ (1726). + + +CHAPTER VIII Notes + +30 The freely thinking, anti-dogmatic religiousness of Socinianism had +maintained itself chiefly in Poland, Holland, Hungary, England, and +North America. Its closer adherents called themselves also +Latitudinarians, the more distant ones Unitarians. The fact that +religious rationalism had already existed in a literary form made its +appearance in the eighteenth century easier. + +31 Tindal’s work bears the title _Christianity as Old as the Creation_ +(1730). Pierre Bayle’s famous _Dictionnaire historique et critique_ +appeared for the first time in two volumes in 1695. + +32 The most impressive, and perhaps the most profound document of the +religion of reason is the confession of faith which Rousseau in his +novel _Emile_ (1762) puts into the mouth of a country minister from +Savoy. + +33 F. V. Reinhard: _Essay concerning the Plan which the Founder of the +Christian Religion drew up for the Benefit of Mankind_ (1791; 4th ed., +1798). K. H. Venturini: _Natural History of the Great Prophet of +Nazareth_ (1800-1802). See for an account of them the writer’s work: +_The Quest of the Historical Jesus_ (1906; 4th ed., 1922 (German); 1st +English ed., 1910; 3rd, 1922). + +34 Expulsion of the Jesuits from Portugal, 1759; from France, 1764; +from Spain and Naples, 1767; from Parma, 1768. + +35 _Short Theses upon the Sin of Witchcraft and the Practice of Trial +Therefor_. + +36 See G. Lenôtre: “Les Agents Royalists sous la Revolution” (_Revue +des Deux Mondes_, 1922). + +37 Her dictum is given in the English periodical, _The Atlas_, in its +issue of January 27th, 1828. + +38 _Esquissè d’un tableau historique des progrès de l’esprit humain_. +It was published in 1795, after the author’s death, at the expense of +the National Convention. + + +CHAPTER IX Notes + +39 Immanuel Kant: _Kritik der reinen Vernunft_ (1781); _Grundlegung +zur Metaphysik der Sitten_ (1785); _Kritik der praktischen Vernunft_ +(1788); _Kritik der Urteilskraft_ (1790); _Die Religion innerhalb der +Grenzen der blossen Vernunft_ (1793); _Metaphysik der Sitten_ (1797). + + +CHAPTER X Notes + +40 _Tractatus theologico-politicus_ (anonymous, 1670); _Ethica ordine +geometrico demonstrata_ (posthumous and anonymous, 1677; German +translation by Johann Lorenz Schmidt, 1744); _Tractatus politicus_ +(posthumous and anonymous, 1677). First complete edition of Spinoza’s +works, 1802-3. + +41 Lao-tze (born, _circa_. 604 B.C.): _Taoteking_; Chwang-tse (fourth +century B.C.): _The True Book of the Southern Flower Land_; Lie-tse +(fourth century B.C.): _The True Book of the Primitive Water-spring_. + +42 G. W. Leibniz: _Système nouveau de la nature, et de la +communication des substances_ (1695); _Nouveaux Essais_ (1704); _La +Monadologie_ (1714). + + +CHAPTER XI Notes + +43 The greatest representatives of Gnosticism are Basilides, +Valentinus, and Marcion, all three living in the first half of the +second century B.C. At the beginning of that century all sorts of +Gnostic systems spring up, as did speculative ones at the beginning of +the nineteenth. The two great Christian teachers of Alexandria, +Flavius Clemens at the end of the second century A.D., and Origen at +the beginning of the third, try to bring the Gnostic speculations into +harmony with the doctrine of the Church. + +44 J. G. Fichte: _The Foundations of All Scientific Theories_ (1794); +_The System of Moral Teaching According to the Principles of Science_ +(1798); _The Destiny of Man_ (1800); _How to Attain to the Happy Life_ +(1806); _Addresses to the German Nation_ (1808). + +A complete edition of J. G. Fichte’s works was edited by his son, J. +H. Fichte, in 1845 and the following years. A good selection has been +published by F. Medicus (1908 to 1912). + +45 This and the following quotations are from _The Destiny of Man_. + + +CHAPTER XII Notes + +46 D. E. Schleiermacher: _Discourses on Religion for the Educated +among its Contemners_ (1799); _Monologues_ (1800); _Outlines of a +Critique of Moral Philosophy down to the Present Day_ (1803); +_Christian Belief_ (1821-23); _Draft of a System of Moral Philosophy_ +(posthumous, 1835). + + +CHAPTER XIII Notes + +47 Friedrich Hegel: _Phenomenology of the Spirit_ (1807); _The Science +of Logic_ (3 vols., 1812-26); _Encyclopædia of the Philosophical +Sciences_ (1817); _The Philosophy of Law_ (1821); _The Philosophy of +History_ (posthumous, 1840). Complete edition of his works in eighteen +volumes, prepared by his pupils, 1832-45. + +48 _The Encyclopædia_, Part III. (1845 ed.), p. 386. + +49 _The Encyclopædia of Philosophical Sciences_, Part III. (1845 ed.), +p. 359. + + +CHAPTER XIV Notes + +50 F. E. Beneke: _Prolegomena to a Physiology of Morals_ (1822); _The +Natural System of Practical Philosophy_ (3 vols., 1837-40). By his +appearance as a champion of utilitarianism and his consequent attitude +of hostility to Kant, Beneke drew upon himself the enmity of Hegel, +and was compelled in 1822 to stop the course of lectures which he was +giving as a _Privat-dozent_ at Berlin University. After Hegel’s death +he filled a professorship at Berlin. + +51 L. A. Feuerbach: _What is Christianity?_ (1841); _Divinity, +Freedom, and Immortality from the Standpoint of Anthropology_ (1866). + +52 Ernst Laas: _Idealism and Positivism_ (3 vols., 1879-84). + +53 _The Physiology of Society_ is the fourth volume of Comte’s _Course +of Positive Philosophy_ (6 vols., 1830-42). + +54 John Stuart Mill: _Principles of Political Economy_ (2 vols., +1848); _Utilitarianism_ (1861). There is a German translation of his +works by Th. Gomperz (12 vols., 1869-86). It was J. S. Mill who +introduced into philosophy the word “utilitarian” as the descriptive +title of this particular school of ethic. + +55 Charles Darwin: _The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to +Sex_ (1871). + +56 Herbert Spencer: _Social Statics_ (1851); _The Data of Ethics_ +(1879); _The Principles of Ethics_ (1892). + +57 Henri de Saint-Simon: _L’Organisateur_ (1819-20); _Catéchisme des +Industriels_ (1823-24). + +58 Charles Fourier: _Le nouveau monde industriel et sociétaire_ +(1829). + +59 P. J. Proudhon: _Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?_ (1840). + +60 Robert Owen: _A New View of Society_ (1813); and _Book of the New +Moral World_ (7 parts, 1836-49). + +61 Ferdinand Lassalle: _Das System der erwonbenen Rechte_ (2 vols., +1861); _Offenes Antwortschreiben an das Centralkomitee zur Berufung +eines allgemeinen deutschen Arbeiterkongresses_ (1863). + +62 Karl Marx: _Manifesto of the Communist Party_ (1848, in +collaboration with Friedrich Engels); _Capital_ (vol. i., 1867; the +second and third volumes were published in 1884 and 1894 by Friedrich +Engels). + +63 The same spirit pervades the work of the national economist, Gustav +Schmoller of Berlin: _Concerning Some Questions of Law and National +Economy_ (1875). Schmoller was the leader of the so-called “Socialists +of the Chair.” + +64 The first to set before Christendom its duty to take part in the +solution of the social question is Félicité de Lamennais (1782-1854) +in his _Paroles d’un croyant_ (1833). This book was condemned by the +Pope in 1834. + +65 The English public was made familiar with working-class misery by +Kingsley’s novel _Yeast_ (which appeared in 1848 in _Fraser’s +Magazine_, and in 1851 was printed as a book), and by two articles of +Henry Mayhew’s in the _Morning Chronicle_ (December 14th and 18th, +1849). That Christian Socialism made its appearance first in England +and France is connected with the fact that the industry which creates +social problems developed earliest in these countries. + +66 Leo Tolstoi: _My Confessions_; German translation as _Worin besteht +mein Glaube_ (1884); French as _Ma Religion_ (1884); English as +_Christ’s Christianity_ (1885). See also _What then shall we do?_ +(German, 1886). The fact that Tolstoi’s ethical Christianity +associates itself with contempt for civilization brings it near to +primitive Christianity. But the all-important question, how the power +of the ethical thoughts of Jesus are to work in the temper and the +circumstances of modern times, it does not answer. Tolstoi is a great +stimulator but no guide. + +67 Eduard Bernstein: _The Presuppositions of Socialism, and the Tasks +of Social Democracy_ (1899). + + +CHAPTER XV Notes + +68 What Schopenhauer wrote after this, his chief work, which was +printed when he was thirty, are only appendixes and popular +explanations of it: _Concerning the Will in Nature_ (1836), _The Two +Fundamental Problems of Ethics_ (1840), _Parerga and Paralipomena_ (2 +vols., 1851). + +69 In 1802-1804 Anquetil Duperron (1731-1805) published in two +volumes, with a Latin translation, the _Oupnek’hat_, a collection of +fifty Upanishads, which he had brought back from India in a Persian +text. + +70 _The World as Will and Idea_, vol. ii., chap. xli. + +71 _The World as Will and Idea_, vol. i., chap. lxix. + +72 That the man who has won through to complete world- and life-denial +remains holy even if he commits actions which according to accepted +ideas are unethical, is taught by the Bhagavadgita as well as by the +Upanishads. + +73 _The World as Will and Idea_, vol. i., chap. lxviii. + +74 Friedrich Nietzsche: _Old-fashioned Reflexions_ (4 parts, +1873-1876), _Human and All too Human_ (3 vols., 1878-1880), _Joyous +Science_ (1882), _Thus spake Zarathustra_ (4 parts, 1883-1885), +_Beyond Good and Evil_ (1886), _On the Genealogy of Morality_ (1887), +_The Will to Power_ (posthumous, 1906). + +75 Max Stirner (1806-1856), whose real name was Kaspar Schmidt, has +recently been regarded as a predecessor of Nietzsche’s on account of +his book, _The Individual and His Property_ (1845), in which he +supports the theory of merciless egoism. But he is not one. He has +provided no really deep philosophical background for his anarchistic +egoism. He speaks as a mere logician, and does not rise above the +level of the Greek sophists. A religious reverence for life, such as +Nietzsche feels, is not to be found in him. + + +CHAPTER XVI Notes + +76 H. Sidgwick: _The Method of Ethics_ (1874). (German translation by +C. Bauer, 1909.) + +77 Leslie Stephen: _The Science of Ethics_ (1882). + +78 S. Alexander: _Moral Order and Progress: An Analysis of Ethical +Conceptions_ (1889). + +79 Wm. Wundt: _Ethics: An Examination of the Facts and Law of the +Moral Life_ (1887). + +80 Friedrich Paulsen: _A System of Ethics_ (1889). + +81 Friedrich Jodl: _A History of Ethics as Philosophical Science_ (2 +vols., 2nd ed., 1906 and 1912). + +82 Georg von Gizyki: _Moral Philosophy, expounded so as to be +intelligible to all_ (1888). + +83 Harald Höffding (a Dane): _Ethics_ (1887). (German translation, +1888.) + +Georg Simmel (1858-1918) adopts a critical attitude towards modern +“scientific” ethics in his _Introduction to Moral Science_ (1892). + +84 H. Cohen: _Kant’s Foundation given to Ethics_ (1877); _The Ethic of +the Pure Will_ (1904). + +85 W. Herrmann: _Ethics_ (1901). + +In France Charles Renouvier (1838-1903) tries, in his _Science of the +Moral_ (1869), to restore the Kantian system of ethics. + +86 Jas. Martineau: _Types of Ethical Theory_ (2 vols., 1885). + +87 F. H. Bradley: _Ethical Studies_ (1876). + +88 T. H. Green: _Prolegomena to Ethics_ (posthumous, 1883). + +89 Simon Laurie: _Ethica, or the Ethics of Reason_ (1885). (A French +translation by Georges Remack, 1902.) + +90 James Seth: _Study of Ethical Principles_ (3rd ed., 1894). + +91 Josiah Royce: _The Spirit of Modern Philosophy_ (1892); _Religious +Aspects of Philosophy_ (4th ed., 1892). + +92 A. Fouillée: _Critique des systèmes de morale contemporaine_ +(1883); _Evolutionisme des idées-forces_ (1890; German translation, +1908); _La morale des idées-forces_ (1907). + +93 Jean Marie Guyau: _La morale anglaise contemporaine_ (1879); +_Esquisse d’une morale sans obligation ni sanction_ (1885); +_L’irreligion de l’avenir_ (1886). A German version of his works +appeared in 6 vols. in 1912. + +94 “Toute idée enveloppe un élément impulsif; nulle idée n’est un état +simplement représentatif.” (Every idea contains an element of impulse; +no idea is merely a condition of re-presenting something in thought.) + +95 . . . “notre conscience de nous-même tendant à sa plénitude par son +expansion en autrui.” ( . . . our consciousness of ourselves, which +presses on to its full growth by expanding into others.) + +96 “Agis envers les autres comme si tu avais conscience des autres en +même temps que de soi.” + +97 Fouillée reveals his attitude towards Nietzsche in a work entitled +_Nietzsche and Immoralism_. Notes on the works of Fouillée and Guyau +have been preserved by Nietzsche. + +98 Eduard von Hartmann: _Philosophy of the Unconscious_ (1869); +_Phenomenology of the Moral Consciousness_ (1879). + +99 _Phenomenology_, p. 670. + +100 _Phenomenology_, p. 700. + +101 Henri Bergson: _Sur les données immédiates de la conscience_ +(1888). (English translation by F. L. Pogson, 1910: _Time and +Freewill; An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness_.) _Matière +et memoire. Essai sur la relation du corps et de l’esprit_ (1896). +(English translation by N. M. Paul and W. S. Palmer: _Matter and +Memory_, 1911.) _L’énvolution créatrice_ (1907). (English translation +by A. Mitchell: _Creative Evolution_, 1911.) + +102 H. S. Chamberlain: _The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century_ +(1899). (14th impression, 1922.) _Immanuel Kant_ (1905); _Goethe_ +(1912). + +103 Count Hermann Keyserling: _The Structure of the World_ (1906); _A +Philosopher’s Travel-Diary_ (2 vols., 1919); _Philosophy as Art_ +(1920). + +104 So Otto Braun in his essay “Monism and Ethics” in the volume +entitled _Monism Expounded in Contributions from its Representatives_ +(edited by Arthur Drews; vol. i., 1908). The poverty of this ethic is +clearly revealed when the editor tries to indicate its content. + + +CHAPTER XX Notes + +105 This book dates from about the eleventh century A.D. It has been +translated into English by James Legge (_Sacred Books of the East_, +1891) and by T. Susuki and P. Carus (Chicago, 1906); into French by M. +A. Rémusat (_Le livre des récompenses et des peines_, 1816), and by +Stanislas Julien (1835); into German by W. Schüler (_Zeitschrift für +Missionskunde_, 1909). + +“Be human with animals, and do no harm to insects, plants, and trees,” +is the command of one saying in this book. The following acts are +condemned: “Hunting men or animals to death; shooting with bow and +arrow at birds; hunting quadrupeds; driving insects out of their +holes; frightening birds which are asleep in the trees; blocking up +the holes of insects, and destroying birds-nests.” To delight in +hunting is described as a serious moral perversion. + + + + +[pg 286] + +INDEX + + +Alexander the Great, 50 +Alexander II., 103 +Alexander, Samuel, 182 +Amos, 21 +Antisthenes, 36 +Anti-Utilitarians(ism), 86, 87, 107 +Aristippus, 36 n. +Aristotle, 21,42,44 ff., 65 +Arrian, 53 n. +Augustine, 58 + +Bach, J. S., 91 +Bacon, Lord Verulam, 64 +Basilides, 125 n. +Bayle, 93 +Beneke, 151 +Bentham, 75, 77, 79, 83, 96, 103, +144, 151, 159, 222, 233 +Bergson, 198 f., 203 +Bernstein, 163 +Bodin, 68 +Bradley, 184 f. +Braun, 201 n. +Buddha, 21, 25, 27, 133, 172, 174, 214, 238 +Butler, Bp., 89 + +Carus, P., 234 n. +Chamberlain, 198 f. +Charron, 68 +Cherbury, Lord H. of, 93 +Chwang-tse, 27, 54, 118, 120 f., +131, 133, 139, 179, 236 f., 272 +Cicero, 52 n., 65 +Clarke, 86 +Clemens, Flavius, 126 n. +Clement XIV., 95 +Cohen, 183 f. +Collins, 93 +Comte, 152, 154 +Condorcet, 89, 104 +Confucius (Kung-tse), 21, 27, 34, +54, 91, 104, 139, 237 f., 272 +Copernicus, 61, 114 +Cudworth, 86 +Cumberland, 86 +Cynics, 34, 36, 43 +Cyrenaics, 34, 36, 43 + +Darwin, Chas., 14,153 ff., 193, 233 +Democritus, 36 f. +Descartes, 13, 62, 116, 123, 137, +233, 246 +Diderot, 87 n., 89 +Diogenes Laertius, 32 n., 36 n. +Diogenes of Sinope, 36 n. +Domitian, 52 +Drews, 201 n. +Du Bois-Raymond, 209 + +Engels, 161 +Epictetus, 52-6, 58, 60, 65 +Epicurus(ism), 21, 36-9, 51, 58, 68 +Erasmus, 66 f. +Ernesti, 93 +Essenes, The, 98 + +Feuerbach, 152 +Fichte, J. G., 21, 126 ff., 136-145, +147, 150 f., 166-171, 177, 185, +189, 209, 223, 231, 237 f. +Fichte, Imm. H., 126 n., 166 +Firmian, Archbishop, 95 +Fouillée, 186-193, 198 +Fourier, 161 +Frederick the Great, 81, 96 +Freemasons, 97 + +Galileo, 62 +Gassendi, 68 +Giordano, Bruno, 62, 88 +Gizyki, von, 182 +Gnostics, 60, 125 f. +Goethe, 89, 136 ff., 140, 199 +Gomperz, 153 n. +Green, T. H., 184 ff. + +[pg 287] + +Grotius, 68, 96 +Guyau, 187-93 + +Haeckel, 201 +Hartley, 72, 152 +Hartmann, 194-197 +Hegel, 21, 102, 126, 141-149, 150, +162, 167, 170, 173, 197, 202, +237 f. +Helvetius, 75-79 +Heraclitus, 32 +Herbart, 166 +Herder, 89 +Herrmann, 183-185 +Hobbes, 75-79, 85, 120 +Höffding, 182 +Holbach, von, 72, 152 +Humanism, 92 +Hume, 80-84, 93, 152, 155, 181, +188 +Hutcheson, 89 + +Illuminati, The, 97 +Indian Philosophy, 11, 14, 17, 25, +27, 28, 30, 34, 42, 54, 66, 88, +113, 117 f., 121, 123, 145 f., +158, 166, 171, 194, 214, 223, +231, 237, 239 +Intellectualists, 87, 106 +Intuitionists, 87, 106, 184 +Isaiah, 21 + +Jacobi, 116 +James, 210 +Jenner, 97 +Jesuits, 95, 98 +Jesus, 21, 25, 27, 34, 63, 64, 65, +66, 67, 94, 98, 158, 202 +Jodl, 24, 182 +Joseph II., 99 +Josephus, 98 + +Kant, 13, 21, 23, 25, 41, 87, +106-115, 122, 127-129, 134, +136, 137, 140, 147, 150, 151, +166, 169, 184, 190, 199, 206, +209, 223, 231, 233, 252 +Kepler, 62 +Keplerbund, 209 +Ketteler, 162 +Keyserling, 198-200, 203 +Kingsley, Charles, 162 f. + +Laas, 152 +Lamennais, 162 n. +Lange, 162, 192 f. +Lao-tse, 21, 27, 34, 37, 118, 120, +121, 133, 139, 179, 236 f. +Lassalle, 161, 164 +Latitudinarians, 93 n. +Laurie, 184 f. +Legge, 234 n. +Leibniz, 93, 116, 122-124, 137 +Leonardo da Vinci, 61, 200 +Lenôtre, 96 n. +Lessing, 89, 93 +Lie-tse, 118, 120, 179 +Locke, 21, 75-79, 85 + +Machiavelli, 68 +Marcus Aurelius, 52-60, 65, 68 +Marcion, 125 n. +Martineau, 184 f. +Marx, 161 f. +Maurice, F. D., 162 +Mayhew, 163 n. +Mendelssohn, Moses, 89, 93, 116 +Meng-tse, 27, 47, 51, 54, 237 +Michaelis, 93 +Mill, James, 153 +Mill, John Stuart, 150, 153 +Mo-di, 237 +Mohammed, 27 +Monism, 60, 90, 114, 138, 189, +201 +Montaigne, 67 +More, Henry, 86 + +Napoleon Buonaparte, 100, 102 +Neoplatonism, 60 +Neopythagoreanism, 60 +Nero, 52 + +[pg 288] + +Newton, Isaac, 69, 86 +Nicolai, 129 +Nietzsche, 21, 23, 165, 174-180, +188 f., 197, 201, 223, 231, 236 +Origen, 126 n. +Orphism, 42 +Owen, Robert, 161 + +Paracelsus, 62 +Paulsen, 182 +Paul (the Apostle), 21 +Plato, 21, 33-35, 40-52, 85, 223 +Plotinus, 60 +Positivism, 152 +Prophets, the Jewish, 21, 27, 34, 231 +Proudhon, 161 +Pythagoreanism, 42 + +Rationalists (ism), 6, 90-105,124-131, +135, 139, 147, 150 f., 190, +211 +Reformation, 66 +Reimarus, 93 +Reinhard, 94 +Renaissance, 21, 61 f., 69 +Renouvier, 183 +Ritschl, 210 +Rousseau, 93 +Royce, 186 + +Saint Simon, 161 +Schelling, 126 +Schiller, 136-138, 140 +Schleiermacher, 138-140, 145 +Schmoller, 162 +Scholasticism, 61 +Schopenhauer, 11, 13, 21, 23, 30, +165-174, 179 f., 189, 197, 223, +231, 234 +Schweitzer, Albert, 67 n., 94 n. +Semler, 93 +Seneca, 52-60, 65 +Seth, 184 f. +Sforza, 200 +Shaftesbury, Lord, 21, 85-87, 138 +Sidgwick, H., 182 +Simmel, 182 n. +Smith, Adam, 80-84, 87, 152 +155 f., 185 +Socinians, 92 +Socrates, 21, 33-47, 52, 71, 74, +177 +Sophists, 32, 48, 178 +Spencer, H., 153-158, 202 +Spinoza, 13, 21, 25, 88, 104 +116-124, 133, 137-140, 143 +167, 189, 223, 237 f. +Staël, Madame de, 103 +Stephen, Leslie, 182 +Stern, 192 f., 234 +Stirner, 179 n. +Stoics, 21, 35-9, 54, 57, 237 + +Taoism, 37 +Telesio, 62 +Thomasius, 95 +Tindal, 93 +Toland, 93 +Tolstoi, 163 + +Unitarians, 93 +Unold, 201 +Utilitarianism, 80-83, 87-89, 107 +109, 150-164, 166, 221, 232 + +Valentinus (Gnostic), 125 n. +Venturini, 94, 98 +Voltaire, 89, 90, 93, 122 + +Wieland, 89 +Wollaston, 86 +Wolff, 93, 124 +Wundt, 182, 233 + +Xenophanes, 32 +Xenophon, 33, 39 + +Yang-tse, 179, 236 + +Zarathustra, 21, 27 f., 179, 231 +Zelter, 91 +Zeno, 36 f., 54, 57 +Zwingli, 92 + + + + +TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES + + +The formatting of both the .htm and .txt files followed that of three +similar books, The Quest of the Historical Jesus, The Mystery of the +Kingdom of God and The Decay and Restoration of Civilization already +in Project Gutenberg. I have included page numbers in the format [pg +xxx] for both .htm and .txt. + +I made several hyphenation choices, forced by de-hyphenation at +the ends of lines: + +1. Will-lessness p. 194. +2. birds-nests note 105 p. 234. + +Cases of inconsistent use (both hyphenated and unhyphenated are +present) were left as they are: two-fold, non-sensible, Kung-tse, +un-civilization, pre-conceptions, pre-suppositions, thorough-going, +re-fashion, present-day, world-view, driving-force, sum-total, +will-to-power, belief-in-progress, nature-philosophy, +rationally-pleasurable, ever-new, general-notion, world-and-life +affirmation, matter-of-fact, wage-system, fellow-men, bass-note, +world-religions, so-called, will-to-action, ready-made, all-round, +optimistic-ethical. + +I left the misspelled word “postumous” in footnote 22 from p. 86, the +misspelled word “alway” from p. 262 but I corrected the birth date for +Henri Bergson from 1560 to 1860 on p. 198, I corrected the spelling of +the translator of Mill in the Index to “Gomperz”, the spelling of the +German philosopher “Leibniz” on p. 93 and the Index and the spelling +of the German philosopher “Nietzsche” on p. 175 and 176. I eliminated +the small caps used for the first name of each starting letter in the +Index. + +In the .txt version I have used utf8 encoding and the following +markers: + +1. italic text surrounded by _ +2. footnote references in the form _(_number_)_ + + + + + + + + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 76061 *** |