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diff --git a/75617-0.txt b/75617-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e9d49e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/75617-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,9868 @@ + +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 75617 *** + + + + + +Transcriber’s Notes: + + +This is Volume II of a two-volume set. Volume I is available at Project +Gutenberg: https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/75616. + +Italics are enclosed in _underscores_. Additional notes will be found +near the end of this ebook. + + + + +THE BRITISH BATTLE FLEET + +[Illustration: DREADNOUGHTS ANCHORING--1912.] + + + + + THE + BRITISH BATTLE + FLEET + + ITS INCEPTION AND GROWTH + THROUGHOUT THE CENTURIES + TO THE PRESENT DAY + + + BY + FRED T. JANE + + AUTHOR OF “FIGHTING SHIPS,” “ALL THE WORLD’S AIRCRAFT,” + “HERESIES OF SEA POWER,” ETC., ETC. + + WITH ILLUSTRATIONS IN COLOUR + FROM ORIGINAL WATER-COLOUR DRAWINGS BY + + W. L. WYLLIE, R.A. + + AND NUMEROUS PLANS AND PHOTOGRAPHS. + + + VOL. II. + + + London + The Library Press, Limited + 26 Portugal St., W.C. + 1915 + + + + +CONTENTS + + + CHAPTER PAGE + + I. THE BARNABY ERA 1 + + II. THE WHITE ERA 54 + + III. THE WATTS ERA 117 + + IV. THE DREADNOUGHT ERA (WATTS) 133 + + V. SUBMARINES 208 + + VI. NAVAL AVIATION 218 + + VII. AUXILIARY NAVIES 231 + + VIII. GENERAL MATTERS IN THE LAST HUNDRED YEARS 242 + + + + +LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS + + IN COLOUR + FROM PICTURES BY W. L. WYLLIE, R.A. + + + PAGE + + DREADNOUGHTS ANCHORING--1912 _Frontispiece_ + + BOARDING A SLAVE DHOW 41 + + SECOND CLASS CRUISER OF THE NAVAL DEFENCE ACT ERA, NOW CONVERTED + INTO A MINELAYER 73 + + WHITE ERA BATTLESHIPS OF THE MAJESTIC CLASS 91 + + EARLY TYPE OF “27 KNOT” DESTROYERS 111 + + THE “DREADNOUGHT,” 1906 147 + + “INDEFATIGABLE” AND “INVINCIBLE,” 1911 171 + + EARLY “30 KNOT” DESTROYERS 189 + + SUBMARINES LEAVING PORTSMOUTH HARBOUR 209 + + BATTLE CRUISER “NEW ZEALAND” ON THE STOCKS 1912 235 + + + SHIP PHOTOGRAPHS + + “INFLEXIBLE” AS ORIGINALLY COMPLETED 1881 3 + + “BENBOW” SHIP OF THE ADMIRAL CLASS 29 + + SUBMARINE E2 213 + + BRITISH NAVY SEAPLANE 219 + + HOISTING A NAVAL SEAPLANE ON BOARD THE “HIBERNIA” 223 + + + PORTRAITS + + SIR N. BARNABY 45 + + SIR WILLIAM WHITE 55 + + SIR PHILIP WATTS 123 + + GENERAL CUNIBERTI 135 + + ADMIRAL FISHER 243 + + ADMIRAL SIR JOHN JELLICOE 249 + + + PLANS, DIAGRAMS, ETC. + + EARLY TURRET SHIPS OF THE BARNABY ERA 7 + + FOREIGN SHIPS PURCHASED FOR THE NAVY IN 1877–78 11 + + BARNABY BARBETTE SHIPS 17 + + SOME FAMOUS RAMS 21 + + CHARACTERISTIC BARNABY SHIPS 33 + + TURRET SHIPS OF THE BARNABY ERA 37 + + BATTLESHIPS OF THE WHITE ERA 79 + + SYSTEMS OF WATER-LINE PROTECTION 83 + + PRINCIPAL CRUISERS OF THE WHITE ERA 95 + + PRE-DREADNOUGHTS OF THE WATTS ERA 119 + + ALTERNATIVE DESIGNS FOR THE DREADNOUGHT 151 + + ORIGINAL DREADNOUGHT DESIGNS 157 + + EARLY EXAMPLES OF WING TURRETS 161 + + DREADNOUGHTS 167 + + CENTRE-LINE SHIPS OF VARIOUS DATES 177 + + DIAGRAM TO ILLUSTRATE WEAK POINT OF THE ÉCHELON SYSTEM 181 + + + + +THE BRITISH BATTLE FLEET. + + + + +I. + +THE BARNABY ERA. + + +The characteristic _motif_ of the Barnaby designs has been described +as a “maximum of offensive power and the minimum of defence.” This +is not altogether correct; though as a generalization it is no very +great exaggeration. In every Barnaby design proper, offence was the +first thing sought for, but defence as then understood was by no means +overlooked as to-day it appears to have been. + +The bed rock “Reed idea” was to produce a ship which could attack and +destroy the enemy without much risk of being damaged in doing so. The +“Barnaby idea” was that “the best defensive is a strong offensive”; and +a strict subordination of defence to what might best serve the attack +on the same displacement. + +The first big armoured ship to be laid down at all on Barnaby +principles, the _Inflexible_, was built under somewhat peculiar +circumstances. In the year 1871 a Committee was appointed. One of its +findings was as follows:-- + + “As powerful armament, thick armour, speed, and light draught + cannot be combined in one ship, although all are needed for the + defence of the country; there is no alternative but to give the + preponderance to each in its turn amongst different classes of + ships which shall mutually supplement one another.”[1] + +Amongst the Committee’s suggestions had been the abolition of the +complete belt, and its concentration amidships. This recommendation +was mainly intended to refer to cruising ships rather than to ships +definitely intended for the line of battle; but the idea soon spread. + +These suggestions had already been embodied in a modified form in the +_Shannon_, of which particulars will be found later on. The _Shannon_, +however, was frankly a “belted cruiser,” and no idea had then been +entertained of adapting a similar system for heavy armoured ships. + +In the year 1874, however, it transpired that the Italians were +evolving an entirely new type of battleship, the _Duilio_ and +_Dandolo_, and adopting a central box system. By this means they were +able to protect the citadel with 22-inch armour and mount four 100-ton +guns in two turrets _en échelon_, so that all four could bear ahead and +astern as well as on either broadside. The seriousness of the situation +was increased by the fact that in most of the tactical ideas of the +day, end-on approach figured largely.[2] + +Compared with these Italian designs, the most powerful British ironclad +of those days, the _Dreadnought_, with a belt of only 14-inch to +11-inch armour, and bearing but two of her four 38-ton guns end-on, cut +a sorry figure. + +[Illustration: + + _Photo_] [_Ellis_. + +THE _INFLEXIBLE_, AS ORIGINALLY COMPLETED, 1881.] + +It was deemed essential to build a “reply.” The largest gun actually +available at the time was, however, the 81-ton M.L.; so this was +adopted for the new ship. The _Inflexible_ being frankly an adoption +of Italian ideas, she can hardly be described as the design of any one +man; Sir N. Barnaby having been tied down to an extent with which +(from his subsequent writings) he did not, it would appear, altogether +agree. A smaller central citadel than that of the Italian ships was +adopted, but the thickness was carried to 24-inch, the thickest armour +ever introduced into an ironclad either before or since. The bulkheads +were 20-in. The freeboard of the central redoubt was 10ft. Round about +it, fore and aft, on an armoured raft-body were built a bow and stern, +with superstructures curtailed to the centre line sufficiently to allow +of unimpeded end-on fire from the big guns, which, like those of the +Italians, were placed in échelonned turrets. + +With a view to satisfying the “masted turret-ship” ideal, an absurd +brig rig was fitted to the _Inflexible_. With this it was possible for +the ship to drift before the wind, haystack-fashion, but the rig was +so much of the “placebo” order that it was designed to be taken down +and thrown overboard in case of action! At a later date it was removed +altogether and a military rig substituted. + +The _Inflexible_ was crammed with novelties. Like the _Devastation_ +she was the “_Dreadnought_” of her time. Chief among her innovations +were the adoption of submerged torpedo tubes (of which she had two), +the mounting of Nordenfeldts as a definite anti-torpedo-boat armament, +and an ingenious anti-rolling arrangement, whereby water was admitted +amidships to counteract the roll. This was very partially successful; +but in 1910 the idea re-appeared in a slightly altered form and is now +used in certain big Atlantic liners. + +An ingenious feature of the _Inflexible_ concerned the big guns. In the +_Devastation_ and _Dreadnought_ types these could be run in and loaded +inside the turret. With the much larger guns of the _Inflexible_ +this was impossible, without a very considerable increase of the size +of the turrets. Outside loading without protection was recognised as +unsuitable and practically impossible. A special glacis was, therefore, +designed, which admitted of outside loading under cover, and at the +same time ensured that, in the event of premature discharge, the +projectile would emerge above the water-line and not below it. + +This device is of special interest as the “last word” of those +muzzle-loading guns to which the British Navy adhered so long as it +possibly could. Had it been thought of earlier, the British Navy might +perhaps have adhered to muzzle-loaders even longer than it did. As +things were, the _Inflexible_ device came too late to stay the tide +which had already begun to set strongly in the breechloader direction. + +Details of the _Inflexible_ were:-- + + Displacement--11,880 tons. + + Length (between perpendiculars)--320ft. + + Beam--75ft. + + Maximum Draught--26⅓ft. + + Armour--Belt amidships 24--16-inch, beyond that a protective deck + only; 22--14-inch bulkhead, all iron; and 17-inch compound armour + turrets. + + Armaments--Four 81-ton guns (to which eight 4-inch breechloaders + were added later on). Two submerged tubes and two above-water + launching appliances for torpedoes. + + Horse-power--8,010 (I.H.P.). + + Speed--13.8 knots. + + Coal--1,300 tons = nominal 10-knot radius of 5,200 miles. + + Built at Portsmouth Dockyard. Engined by Elder. Completed 1881. + +[Illustration: + + DUILIO. + DREADNOUGHT. + INFLEXIBLE. + +EARLY TURRET-SHIPS OF THE BARNABY ERA.] + +On completion she was sent to the Mediterranean, with Captain Fisher +(afterwards Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Fisher) in command of her. He +was the chief gunnery officer of those days and the founder of the +torpedo school. At the time it was put on record that, asked by a Press +interviewer what he would do if the fortunes of war brought it about +that he had to encounter a similar “last word” in naval construction, +he replied that he would keep away from her till nightfall, and +then send in the, then, novel second-class torpedo-boats which the +_Inflexible_ carried, to settle the foe. Over which statement the +historian of fifty years hence may yet place Lord Fisher among the +prophets. To-day, some thirty years later, similar ideas obtain, but +have got no further. Fifty years hence----? + +In 1882 the _Inflexible_ was the central figure at the bombardment of +Alexandria. The damage she did was infinitesimal compared to the ideas +which the public had formed of her. Far more actual mischief was done +by Lord Charles Beresford in a trivial gunboat, the _Condor_, which +steered into close range of the hostile guns and knocked them over. At +the time this was regarded as an act of spectacular heroism; but the +historian of the future is far more likely to discover in it (as in the +Fisher torpedo-boats) something closely akin to the reasoning behind +Nelson when he destroyed the French fleet at the Nile or charged into +them at Trafalgar. The commonplace expression, “sizing up the other +man,” and acting accordingly, is the secret. In peace time we are all +too apt to assess hostile weapons at their theoretical potentiality. +The victors in war are those who gauge correctly the handling ability +of the man behind the weapon and--act accordingly. + +About the years 1877–78, towards the close of the Turco-Russian War, an +Anglo-Russian war seemed probable, and four foreign ships building in +England were purchased for the British Navy. + +These were the Brazilian _Independencia_, an improved _Monarch_, +designed by Sir E. J. Reed, which went into the British service as +the _Neptune_. Save that she carried 38-ton guns instead of 25-ton, +she reproduced the _Monarch_ idea almost exactly. After certain +vicissitudes she entered the British service, and eventually was fitted +with a couple of military masts. The points of special interest about +her were that (1) owing to some error her funnels were put in sideways +instead of as designed; and (2) in service in any bad weather the sea +regularly washed out her wardroom; (3) she was the first ship of the +British Navy to carry a bath-room. As an effective warship she never +figured to any large extent. + +The other three purchased ships had been destined for the Turkish Navy; +and all three turned out worse than the _Neptune_. The _Hamidieh_, +re-christened _Superb_, more or less duplicated the _Hercules_. She +took part in the bombardment of Alexandria a little later, and it +was there discovered that her guns could not train at all well in +comparison with contemporary British naval ships. + +[Illustration: + + SUPERB + NEPTUNE + BELLEISLE + +FIRE ZONES OF THE BELLEISLE (4 GUNS) + +FIRE ZONES OF THE DEVASTATION (4 GUNS) + +FOREIGN SHIPS PURCHASED FOR THE NAVY IN 1877–78.] + +Of the fighting value of the other two ships, _Pakyi-Shereef_ and +_Boordyi-Zaffir_, which became the _Belleisle_ and _Orion_, the least +said the better. They turned out to be nothing but improvements on a +type of “coast defender,” already obsolete, diminutives of the original +Reed broadside idea applied to a _Hotspur_ type hull. In place of +the single 25-ton gun of the _Hotspur_, they carried four similar +guns--the old 12-inch 25-ton M.L. These guns were carried in a central +raised battery, from which, as in the _Hotspur_, one gun could always +bear, and from which two bearing on an exact and unlikely broadside +might be looked for. + +No useful service was ever performed by these ships. The _Belleisle_ +ended her service as a target, the _Orion_ as a hulk. They proved +conclusively that the central battery idea was obsolete and so far +probably did good service. In the past Sir E. J. Reed had argued, +and for that matter proved, that for a given weight of armour and +armament eight guns, four on either broadside, could be mounted with +equal protection and economy of weight as against two pairs of guns in +turrets.[3] The _Belleisle_ gave the lie to this idea, however, when +it came to be applied to half the number of guns. The step from that +to the same thing with more guns was made easy, and the turret idea +assured, out of the _Belleisle_ type. To the _Belleisle_ and _Orion_ +more than any other ships may be traced the first real appreciation of +“angles in between”--the demonstration that “right ahead” or “right +on the broadside” were ideal positions which no enemy would willingly +assume. + +The _Devastation_ and her sisters had, of course, anticipated this +idea; but to the _Belleisle_, at most fighting angles only able to +bring a quarter of her battery into action, may be traced most modern +developments in gun disposition. + +Contemporaneous with the special Barnaby ships, reference may be made +to the entirely nondescript _Téméraire_. She may be described as an +absolute hybrid--partly Reed, partly Barnaby, partly gun inventors of +the era, and partly nothing in particular. + +Details of this ship are:-- + + Displacement--8,540 tons. + + Length (between perpendiculars)--285ft. + + Beam--62ft. + + Draught--27¼ft. + + Armament--Four 25-ton 11-inch M.L. (two in barbettes), four 18-ton + M.L.--two above water torpedo tubes. + + Armour (iron)--Complete 11--8in. belt. Bulkheads 8--5in. Barbettes + 10--8in. Battery 10--8in. Horse-power--7,520 = 14.5 knots. + + Coal--620 tons = 2,680 miles at economical speed (nominal). + +The _Téméraire_ was unique in the world’s navies in that two of her +25-ton guns were carried--one forward, one aft--on special Moncrieff +mountings, an adaption for naval purposes of the “disappearing gun,” +invented for forts of that era. The gun, loaded under cover, was raised +to fire by hydraulic mechanism, and then recoiled to the loading +position. The ship was otherwise essentially of the Reed box-battery +type; the other two 25-ton guns being in a central main-deck battery, +and capable of a good deal of ahead fire. The other big guns (18 tons) +were cut off from the 25-ton by an armoured bulkhead, and merely had +the ordinary broadside training. + +Like the _Inflexible_, the _Téméraire_ had a heavy brig rig. Towards +the end of her active service career this was replaced by a military +rig; but all her active work was done as a brig. She was built at +Chatham Dockyard, engined by Humphrys, and completed for sea in 1877. + +In 1882 she was at the bombardment of Alexandria, and there did more +execution than any other ship. Her subsequent career was uneventful, +and in her own way she was a “monstrosity” as much as the _Polyphemus_ +was. She is generally understood to have been a “naval officers’ ideal” +ship, rather than the regular production of the Chief Constructor. +Whether this be true is, at least, doubtful. Certainly she may equally +well be regarded as the forlorn hope of those who looked to see the +general principles of the central battery system adapted to suit the +new ideas as to ironclads. French ideas[4] also had probably something +to do with her peculiar design. + +The idea embodied in the _Inflexible_ was so pleasing to the +authorities of that period that she was duplicated in two smaller +vessels of the same type, the _Ajax_ and _Agamemnon_, though the +precise purpose for which these vessels were built is difficult to +fathom. They were in every way inferior to the _Inflexible_, and +mainly of interest as indicating the definite abandonment of the idea +of the masted battleship, and they were also the last ships to mount +muzzle-loading guns:-- + +Particulars of these ships were:-- + + Displacement--8,660 tons. + + Length (between perpendiculars)--280ft. + + Beam--66ft. + + Draught (mean)--24ft. + + Guns--Four 38-ton M.L., two 6-inch 81-cwt. B.L. + + Horse-power--5,440. + + Speed--13.25 knots. + +These were followed by the _Colossus_ and _Edinburgh_, which were laid +down in 1879. In these ships the 12-inch breechloader was adopted, +and an attempt at what was then a very considerable speed was made. +An auxiliary armament made its first really definite appearance, five +6-inch guns being mounted on the superstructure. + +Particulars of these ships were:-- + + Displacement--9,420 tons. + + Length (between perpendiculars)--325ft. + + Beam--68ft. + + Draught (mean)--26ft. 3ins. + + Guns--Four 45-ton B.L.R., five 6-inch, 89-cwt. do. + + Horse-power--7,500. + + Speed--15.50 knots. + +At and about the same time considerable interest was being taken in +rams. This resulted in the laying down of the _Conqueror_, a species of +improved _Rupert_, and a type of ship destined to be enlarged upon in +the future. + +Particulars of the _Conqueror_ were:-- + + Displacement--6,200 tons. + + Length--270ft. + + Beam--58ft. + + Draught--24ft. + + Armament--Two 45-ton B.L.R., four 6-inch 89-cwt. do., six 14-inch + torpedo tubes (above water). + + Horse-power--(maximum) 6,000. + + Speed--15.5 knots. + + Coal--650 tons. + +The _Conqueror_ was launched in September, 1881. Some three years later +a sister, the _Hero_, was laid down, and launched towards the end of +1885. She differed from the _Conqueror_ only in that all four of her +6-inch guns were mounted on the superstructure, whereas the _Conqueror_ +carried two of them on the main deck inside the superstructure. + +[Illustration: + + TEMERAIRE + IMPERIEUSE + + BRITISH SYSTEM IDEAL + + FRENCH SYSTEM IDEAL + +BARNABY BARBETTE SHIPS.] + +Although developed from the _Rupert_, the _Conqueror_ differed a good +deal in appearance, on account of the whole of the after part of the +ship being one huge superstructure. In her, the superstructure, as a +very definite feature instead of a mere accessory, may be said to have +made its first appearance, to remain as a factor of growing importance +for many years. + +Contemporaneously with these ships two entirely different types made +their appearance. One of these was the “torpedo ram” _Polyphemus_, an +absolutely unique vessel, the outcome (though not so designed) of the +influence of the torpedo. The ship was never duplicated, and never +performed much service, but it would be rash to assert that the future +may not see something like her re-appear. She was first projected as a +“ram” pure and simple, so long ago as 1873, and designed by Barnaby to +suit the specifications of certain naval officers as embodying their +ideals of the warship of the future. This is the generally accepted +theory, though Sir N. Barnaby[5] has made public a somewhat different +view of the matter, and according to him, Admiral Sir George Sartorius, +the naval officer principally concerned, lost his interest in the +_Polyphemus_ when it was decided to give her an armament of torpedo +tubes and some quick-firers against torpedo attack. So far as can be +gauged, the torpedo tubes were likewise a naval innovation with which +Sir N. Barnaby was also not much in sympathy. At any rate, he has put +on record the view[5] that:-- + + “The introduction of torpedoes made the ship far more costly than + she need have been, and it is possible that the type would have + been continued and improved had the simplicity of the ram been + adhered to.” + +The _Polyphemus_ performed little useful service; her life on the Navy +List was short; and she is always spoken of as a “failure.” Officers +who served in her were, however, invariably enthusiastic about her, and +had war occurred during the time that she was in existence there is no +telling what she might have accomplished or how profoundly she might +have affected naval construction. + +In essence the _Polyphemus_ was a semi-submerged craft, those parts of +her which were above water being merely a light superstructure for the +accommodation of her crew in peace time. + +She was of 2,640 tons displacement, length 240ft. between +perpendiculars, beam 40ft., and a normal mean draught of 20ft. In form +she was cigar-shaped, plated with 3-inch armour on the upper part of +her curved sides. With 5,520 I.H.P. she had the then very high speed +of 17.8 knots. She carried 300 tons of coal, sufficient for a nominal +radius of 3,400 miles at economical speed. + +Her principal feature, however, was the fitting of five submerged +tubes, one in the bow the others on the broadside. For repelling a +torpedo attack she carried six 6-pounders and a couple of machine guns. + +[Illustration: + + POLYPHEMUS. + ALARM. + KATAHDIN. + +SOME FAMOUS RAMS.] + +It is here of interest to relate that some years later the U.S. Navy +created a species of _Polyphemus_ imitation in the “ram” _Katahdin_. To +a certain extent they had anticipated her likewise in the _Alarm_, 720 +tons, launched in 1873, which carried a 15-inch smooth-bore gun _under +water_ in her ram, and the _Intrepid_ (launched 1873), of 1,123 tons, +of which no details ever transpired, and it may be said that she was +“strangled at birth.” But the _Polyphemus’s_ ancestry is undoubtedly +American. The _Katahdin_ (first produced as the “ram” _Ammen_) was not +launched till 1893. She was of 2,050 tons and seventeen knots, and +having no torpedo tubes, being a “ram” pure and simple, exactly +reproduced the Sartorious-Barnaby idea. She soon disappeared from the +U.S. Navy List, and she never did anything. She doubled the armour of +the _Polyphemus_, whilst lacking her torpedo armament. Since then, the +idea has found expression in three small U.S. “semi-submerged” boats, +with the torpedo as their main armament; but these three boats never +got beyond the “designed” stage. No other nation ever exhibited the +least interest in the _Polyphemus_ idea. + +Reference has already been made to the _Shannon_, which was the +first armoured cruiser of the British Navy. She was launched towards +the end of 1875 and completed two years later. In substance she +was a development of the idea which first found expression in the +_Inconstant_, heavy armament being preferred to the protection of +the guns. A narrow belt of armour with a maximum thickness of 9-ins. +protected three-quarters of the water-line. This belt commenced at the +stern and ended in a bulkhead some 70ft. from the bow. Forward of this +bulkhead was an under-water protective deck, and a certain amount of +armour was concentrated on the ram under water. The bulkhead, which +was from 9in. to 8in. thick, rose to the upper deck, and afforded +protection to a couple of 18-ton muzzle-loaders, capable of right-ahead +fire. The remainder of her armament consisted of seven 12½ton guns, and +was entirely unprotected. + +Other details of the ship are as follows:-- + + Displacement--5,390 tons. + + Length--260ft. + + Beam--54ft. + + Draught--23ft. 4in. + + Horse-power--3,370. + + Speed--12.35 knots. + + Coal carried--580 tons = nominal economical radius of 2,260 miles. + +The speed of the _Shannon_ was so low, even in those days, that it +is a little difficult to surmise for what purpose she was designed, +especially as this design was more or less contemporary with the +re-designing of the _Dreadnought_.[6] It found favour, however, since +she was almost immediately followed by two larger replicas, the +_Nelson_ and the _Northampton_, details of which were:-- + + Displacement--7,630 tons. + + Length (between perpendiculars)--280ft. + + Beam--60ft. + + Draught (maximum)--26ft. 6in. + + Armour--Belt amidships, 9in. to 6in., compound: bulkhead ditto. + Armour deck only, at ends. + + Main Armament--Four 18-ton M.L.R., eight 12-ton M.L.R., two + above-water 14-inch torpedo tubes. + + Horse-power--6,640. + + Speed--14.41 knots. + + Coal carried--1,150 tons = nominal radius of 3,850 miles. + +These ships differed from the _Shannon_ in that the armour belt was +confined to a water-line strip amidships, while the after guns were +also protected by a bulkhead. The most curious, and to modern ideas, +eccentric feature of these ships, was that they were fitted with +triangular rams, which, “for the sake of safety,” could be removed in +peace time and merely put on for war purposes! As a matter of fact, +the ships always carried their rams without rendering themselves +dangerous to anybody. On the other hand, shortly after construction, +the _Northampton_ was run into by a small trading schooner, which cut +her down to the water’s edge. The ships, therefore, started with an +unfavourable reputation, which the _Northampton_ followed up by a total +inability to make even her moderate designed speed. The _Nelson_, on +the other hand, proved herself a comparatively good steamer, so much +so that at a later date she was to a certain extent modernised. Both +ships were originally heavily masted, the idea being to perform most +of their peace service when convenient under sail. The _Nelson_ sailed +moderately well, but the _Northampton_ very badly. It was possibly with +some view to remedying this that some years later, when it was decided +that the _Imperieuse_, originally built as a brig, should be given a +military rig, her lofty iron fore and mainmast were taken out of her +and substituted for the two equivalent masts in the _Northampton_. The +change, however, was not satisfactory, as thereafter she sailed if +anything worse than ever. + +At and about this year protected cruisers made their first appearance +in the _Comus_ class. Of these altogether eleven were built, the best +known of these being the _Calliope_, which in the early nineties became +famous through steaming out of Samoa Roads in the teeth of a hurricane, +which utterly destroyed every foreign vessel anchored there at the +same time. The _Comus_ class consisted of the _Calliope_, _Calypso_, +_Canada_, _Carysfort_, _Champion_, _Cleopatra_, _Comus_, _Conquest_, +_Constance_, _Cordelia_, and _Curacoa_. They averaged 2,380 tons +displacement, though the first mentioned, which were the last to be +built, were slightly larger. The original armament consisted of two +6-ton muzzle-loaders and twelve 64-pounders. This was afterwards +varied by the substitution of breechloaders. The ships generally had +a speed of about thirteen knots, and were completed between the years +1877, for the earliest, and 1884 for the latest. They had a 1½-inch +protective deck for the engines amidships. These ships, which were +generally officially known as the “C” class cruiser, were undoubtedly +diminutives of the _Shannon_, or, at any rate, inspired by a similar +idea. + +Besides growing downwards the idea also grew upwards, and resulted in +the building of six ships of the “Admiral” class, of which the first +was the _Collingwood_. These, which were the apotheosis of the Barnaby +idea, represented an absolute revolution in naval construction, so far +as big ships were concerned. + +The “Admirals” were not all identical, as they formed four different +groups in the matter of displacement and three in armament. In all, +however, the integral idea was the same. Amidships was a narrow belt, +150ft. long by 7½ft. wide, which sufficed to protect engines, boilers, +and communication tubes of the barbettes. This belt varied in thickness +from 18ins. to 8ins, of compound armour. The ends of the belt were +closed up by 16-inch bulkheads. Forward and aft was merely a curved +protective deck; there was also a flat protective deck on top of the +armour belt. The ships were of low freeboard, forward and aft, but +had a large superstructure built up amidships. At either end of the +superstructure, with their bases unprotected by armour except for the +communication tubes already referred to, were many-sided barbettes +with plates set at an angle of about forty-five degrees. These +barbettes were about 11½ins. thick, and carried each a couple of the +heaviest guns then available. These were 12-inch breechloaders in the +_Collingwood_, and 13.5-inch in the other ships, except the _Benbow_, +which mounted one 16.5 inch 110-ton in each barbette instead. An +auxiliary armament was mounted inside the superstructure. The speed of +these ships was about seventeen knots, and was considerably in excess +of the average for the period. + + =====================+====================+=====================+=====================+==================== + Name. | _Collingwood._ | _Rodney_, | _Anson_, | _Benbow._ + | | _Howe._ | _Camperdown._ | + ---------------------+--------------------+---------------------+---------------------+-------------------- + Displacement, tons | 9,500 | 10,300 | 10,600 | 10,600 + | | | | + Length (_p.p._) ft.| 325 | 325 | 330 | 330 + | | | | + Beam, ft. | 68 | 68 | 68½ | 68½ + | | | | + Draught (_mean_) ft. | 26¾ | 27¼ | 26¾ | 27¼ + | | | | + H.P. | 9,500 | 11,500 | 11,500 | 11,500 + | | | | + Nominal Speed, | | | | + knots | 16.5 | 16.7 | 17.2 | 17.5 + | | | | + Armament | 4--12in., 6--6in. | 4--13.5, 6--6in. | 4--13.5, 6--6 in. | 2--16.25, 10--6in. + | | | | + Built at | Pembroke Yard | _Rodney_, | _Anson_, | Thames, I.W. + | | Chatham Yd. | Pembroke Yd. | + | | _Howe_, Pembroke Yd.| _Camperdown_, | + | | Chatham Yd. | Por’th. | + | | | | + Engines by | Humphrys | _Rodney_, Humphrys | _Anson_, Humphrys | Maudslay + | | _Howe_, Humphrys | _Camperdown_, Maud’y| + | | | | + Armour belt | 18in.-8in. | 18in.-8in. | 18in.-8in. | 18in.-8in. + | | | | + barbettes | 14in.-12in. | 11½in.-10in. | 16in.-6in. | 12in.-4in. + | | | | + bulkheads | 16in.-6in. | 16in.-6in. | 14in.-12in. | 18in.-6in.* + | | | | + Armament | 4--12in., 6--6in., | 4--13.5, 6--6in., | 4--13.5, 6--6in., | 2--16.25, 10--6in., + | and smaller, | and smaller, | and smaller, | and smaller, + | 2 sub. and 4 | as _Collingwood_ | as _Collingwood_ | as _Collingwood_ + | above water tubes | | | + =====================+====================+=====================+=====================+==================== + +As compared with the _Colossus_ and _Edinburgh_ class of the same date +and era of design, the “Admirals” were somewhat inferior in armour +protection, but because of that secured a far better speed and a +greatly superior big gun command. + +In all the “Admiral” class the armour weighed about 2,500 tons--say, +20 per cent. of the displacement. This proportion has never been very +greatly varied from either before or since, and the popular idea that +Barnaby designs sacrificed armour weight for other features is entirely +incorrect. The real Barnaby ideal is better described (the conditions +of his own time being kept in mind) as an attempt to put into practice +“everything or nothing,” so far as protection was concerned. To-day, +a compromise is in fashion, and Barnaby is very much out of date. +It may well be but a phase in the cycle of naval design. Properly +to appreciate the _Admiral_ class ideal, we have to translate it +into the ideal which obtains to-day. Thus put, the _Admirals_ would +be somewhat swifter than our existing battle-cruisers, their vitals +would be invulnerable and their armaments superior to that of any +potential enemy. They would not, in fact, very greatly differ from +Admiral Bacon’s conception (published some five years before the +present war) of the battleship of the future, in which he predicted the +disappearance of much of the side armour of to-day. + +[Illustration: + + _Photo_] [_Symonds & Co._ + +THE _BENBOW_--A SHIP OF THE “ADMIRAL” CLASS.] + +The coming of the medium calibre quick-firer soon rendered the +“Admirals” obsolete and even ridiculous. The medium calibre quick-firer +profoundly modified design until the development of the big gun +enabled it to act well beyond the effective range of the medium gun, +and incidentally enabled it to fire nearly as fast as the elementary +quick-firers were built to do. Thus we have come back to something very +akin to the condition under which the Barnaby ships were designed. + +These ships could not, perhaps, be described as an absolutely original +idea, save in so far as the British Navy was concerned, since the +Italian _Italia_ was launched in the same year that the _Collingwood_, +the first of the “Admirals” was laid down. The _Italia_, equally +abnormally fast (or faster) for the period, carried four 100-ton guns +échelonned in one large heavily armoured barbette amidships, but had +no water-line belt whatever, and relied entirely upon an armour-deck +to protect the motive power. In the “Admirals” the motive power was +thoroughly protected by the vertical belt amidships, while flotation +otherwise depended upon internal sub-divisions. + +The “Admiral” class idea was re-developed into armoured cruisers in +a somewhat curious fashion. At that time the French Navy was second +in the world, and French ideas of construction commanded a great deal +of respect. French notions at that era ran largely to single gun +positions, four guns being separately disposed in four barbettes placed +one ahead, one astern, and one on either side. The particular point of +this arrangement was that while British designs accepted two or four +big guns bearing, the French system allowed for a definite mean of +three. More practically put, this may be translated into a conception +that an enemy would use every effort to avoid positions in which four +big guns could be brought to bear on him, and seek those in which he +was exposed to two only. A gun-arrangement which gave three big guns +bearing in _any_ position seemed therefore far more reasonable on paper. + +It stands to the credit of Sir N. Barnaby (or else to the credit of the +Admiralty of the era) that he recognised the impossibility of any such +manœuvres in fleet actions, but at the same time he also realised how +heavily it might tell in cruiser duels. Out of which the _Imperieuse_ +and _Warspite_ were born. + +Details of these ships:-- + + Displacement--8,400 tons. + + Length (between perpendiculars)--315ft. + + Beam--62ft. + + Draught (maximum)--27⅓ft. + + Armament--Four 9.2 24-ton B.L., six 6-inch, 89cwt., six torpedo + tubes. + + Horse-power--10,000=16.75 knots. + + Coal--1,130 tons = nominal radius of ten knots of 7,000 miles. + + Armour--Belt amidships of 10in. compound, with 9-inch bulkheads, + 8-inch barbettes. No armour to lesser guns. 3-inch protective + deck fore and aft, and on top of belt. + +[Illustration: + + SHANNON. + NORTHAMPTON. + ADMIRAL class. + “C” class. + ORLANDO class. + +CHARACTERISTIC BARNABY SHIPS.] + +The _Imperieuse_ was built at Portsmouth Dockyard and engined by +Maudslay. The _Warspite_, built at Chatham, was engined by Penn. +Both were completed in 1886 at a total cost of about £630,000 each. +They were copper sheathed, and (like the _Inflexible_) originally +were to carry a heavy brig-rig. This was removed at an early stage, +and a single military mast between the funnels substituted. The +_Imperieuse’s_ masts were subsequently put in the _Northampton_ +(which see). Both proved faster than anticipated; but the coming of +the quick-firer placed them in the semi-obsolete category almost as +soon as they were completed. The type was never repeated. Till recently +the _Imperieuse_ still existed as a depot ship for destroyers; the +_Warspite_ has long since gone to the scrap heap. Years after their +conception a modernised version of them was to some extent reproduced +in the _Black Prince_ class. In their own day, however, they appeared +and that was all. + +The “battleship of the future” ideal of those days had to some extent +been foreshadowed in the _Benbow_, with her couple of 110-ton guns. +The monster gun was “the vogue” and no way of carrying it on existing +displacements allowed of more than two such pieces being mounted. + +The idea of the moment became the mounting of guns capable of +delivering deadly blows, and (corollary therewith) protection to ensure +that that deadly blow could be delivered with relative impunity. Since +the secondary gun had now come in, auxiliary guns and a secondary +battery were a _sine quâ non_; but the ideal ship was to be one +incapable of vital injury from such weapons. On lines such as these the +_Victoria_ class was designed. + +The call was for an improved _Benbow_. The armament was to be no less +and, if possible, more; while better protection was an essential +feature. + +Details of the _Victoria_ type, of which only two were built, are as +follows:-- + + Displacement--10,470 tons (approximately that of the _Benbow_). + + Length (between perpendiculars)--340ft. + + Beam--70ft. + + Draught (maximum)--27¼ft. + + Armament--Two 110-ton guns (in a single turret), one 9.2 (aft), + twelve 6-inch; twenty-one anti-torpedo guns, and six torpedo + tubes (14-inch). + + Armour (compound)--18-inch to 16-inch belt amidships, redoubt and + bulkheads, 18-inch turret, 2-inch in battery. Armour deck, and + heavily armoured conning tower. + + Horse-power--14,000 = 16.75 knots. + + Coal--1,200 tons = 7,000 miles at 10 knots. + +The _Victoria_ was built at Elswick and engined by Humphrys; launched +in 1887 and completed for sea in 1889. The _Sanspareil_, engined by the +same firm, but built at Blackwall (Thames Ironworks) was launched a +year later, but completed about the same time. + +The design of these ships closely approximated to the _Conqueror_, +of which they were merely enlarged editions with a heavily increased +battery. + +[Illustration: + + RUPERT. + CONQUEROR. + VICTORIA. + DREADNOUGHT. + TRAFALGAR. + +TURRET SHIPS OF THE BARNABY ERA.] + +The _Victoria_ on completion became the flagship in the Mediterranean +of Admiral Sir George Tryon. In the course of evolutions off the +coast of Syria on June 22nd, 1893, she was rammed and sunk by the +_Camperdown_. The disaster, which cost the lives of the Admiral and +321 officers and men, teaches no useful lesson, saving the danger of +transverse bulkheads. Water-tight doors were shut too late. The sea +entered. The ship gradually turned over, then suddenly “turned turtle” +and capsized. + +The mystery of her loss has never been fully explained. Admiral Tryon +gave an order for the fleet, then in two lines, to turn inboard sixteen +points, while at six cables apart. This manœuvre, with turning +circles as they were, was bound to create a collision. This was +pointed out to Admiral Tryon, who, however, took no notice of the +representations. It has since been assumed that he went suddenly mad. +A more reasonable explanation is that he intended the ships to “jockey +with their screws” (a manœuvre which he never employed as a rule), +and forgot to mention the fact, though details of evidence in the +court-martial hardly bear this out. + +The exact signal as made was:-- + + “Second division alter course in succession sixteen points to + starboard, preserving the order of the Fleet.” + + “First division alter course in succession sixteen points to port, + preserving the order of the Fleet.” + +This signal was capable of more than one interpretation. Along one of +them each ship in the two squadrons might easily have rammed the other +in succession, according to some interpretations. Using screws, both +divisions might have closed in very closely but quite safely. Acting +other than simultaneously they might anyway have effected the manœuvre +without disaster. At eight cables (a distance which was suggested to +the Admiral an hour before) it might have been done quite safely. There +have been other explanations also. + +In the Fleet at the time everything was believed, except the “blunder” +theory which has gone down to history. To this day that is accepted +with reservation. But the rest is mystery. + +The _Camperdown_, in turning, crashed into the _Victoria_, striking +her forward, curiously enough directly on a bulkhead, just as the +_Vanguard_ was struck when she was rammed. + +It was not expected that the _Victoria_ would be sunk. Had the +water-tight doors been closed during the manœuvre, instead of at the +last moment, she would probably have remained afloat. As things were, +it was impossible to close many at the time the order was given, but +her low-freeboard also played a part. The sea invaded the door on the +starboard side of the superstructure and thence got everywhere on that +side of the ship. It was that which threw her over and capsized her, +but the chance circumstance of the blow on the lateral bulkhead should +not be forgotten. The _Victoria_ was struck just on one of the points +where all the odds were against her being struck. + +The _Sanspareil_ had an uneventful career, and was eventually sold +out of the Service somewhat suddenly under the “scrap-heap” policy of +Admiral Fisher in 1904. + +Following upon the _Imperieuse_ type, an entirely new class of armoured +cruisers, the _Orlandos_, were designed. Just as the _Victorias_ were +improved and enlarged _Conquerors_, so the _Orlandos_ were “improved +_Merseys_.” Particulars of these ships, of which seven were built +altogether, are as follows:-- + + Displacement--5,600 tons. + + Length (between perpendiculars)--300ft. + + Beam--56ft. + + Draught (maximum)--22½ft. (actually more). + + Armament--Two 9.2in. B.L.; ten 6in.; and six torpedo tubes. + + Armour (compound)--Belt amidships 10in., with 16in. Bulkheads. + Protective deck at ends. All guns protected by shields only. + + Horse-power--8,500 = 18 knots. + + Coal (maximum)--900 tons = nominal radius of 8,000 miles. + +[Illustration: BOARDING A SLAVE DHOW] + +They were built as follows:-- + + ===============+===========+============= + NAME. | BUILDER. | ENGINED BY + ---------------+-----------+------------- + _Orlando_ | Palmer | Palmer + _Australia_ | Glasgow | Napier + _Aurora_ | Pembroke | Thompson + _Galatea_ | Glasgow | Napier + _Immortalité_ | Chatham | Earle + _Narcissus_ | Hull | Earle + _Undaunted_ | Palmer | Palmer + ===============+===========+============= + +They were laid down in 1885 and 1886. The _Orlando_ was completed in +1888, all the others in 1889. They were launched in 1886 and 1887, and +some of them, fitted with wooden guns (“Quakers”), served to swell the +Fleet at the great Jubilee Review of 1887. All made over their designed +speeds on trial, but they did their trials “light.” In service all +proved fairly useful, and the _Undaunted_, with Lord Charles Beresford +as her captain in the Mediterranean, “made history” to the extent +of first creating an Anglo-American _entente_, beginning with the +U.S.S. _Chicago_, captained then by the now universally known naval +author, Admiral Mahan. Beresford first achieved fame in the _Condor_ +at Alexandra, in 1882; but it was in the _Undaunted_ that he first +“made history” by ending the previously existing hostility between the +British and U.S. Navies; and establishing the naval brotherhood of +those who speak the same language. + +The _Orlandos_ were the last of the essentially Barnaby ships. +Barnaby was associated with the Navy thereafter; but the _Nile_ and +_Trafalgar_, though produced under his régime, were not “Barnaby +ships,” and differences of opinion with the Admiralty about them +eventuated in his resignation. + +The tide of naval opinion was then setting back in the old +_Dreadnought_ direction. More complete protection was being demanded. +The quick-firer was just coming in and its potentialities seemed +enormous. The secondary battery had to be protected. Destruction of +communications on board began to take on a fresh and more serious +aspect. In a word, the Admiralty reverted to Reed ideas, and in +reverting exaggerated them. In such circumstances the general idea of +the _Trafalgars_ was born. + +Sir N. Barnaby totally dissented from the Admiralty line of thought. +In his view the size of a ship could not legitimately be increased +unless her offensive powers increased in proportion; in the _Trafalgar_ +idea both speed and armament were reduced as compared to the _Admiral_ +class, and over a thousand odd tons added entirely to carry extra +defensive armour. Over which dispute he resigned his position. + +Details of the _Nile_ and _Trafalgar_ as built are:-- + + Displacement--11,940 tons. + + Length (between perpendiculars)--345ft. + + Beam--73ft. + + Draught (mean)--27½ft. + + Armament--Four 13.5-inch, six 4.7 Q.F., also smaller guns, and four + 14-inch torpedo tubes, of which two were submerged. + + Armour (compound)--Belt, 230ft. long (_i.e._, 80ft. longer than + in the _Admirals_ and _Victorias_), 20--16in., with 16--14 inch + bulkheads, protective deck at ends and over main belt. + + Over this a redoubt 141ft. long, 18in. thick. Above the redoubt a + battery, 4in. thick. Turrets, 18in. + + Horse-power--12,000 = 17 knots. + + Coal--(normal) 900 tons; (maximum) 1,200 tons = 6,500 miles at 10 + knots. + +[Illustration: + + _Photo_] [_Russell & Sons._ + +SIR N. BARNABY. + +A recent photograph.] + +The _Nile_ was built at Pembroke and engined by Maudslay. She was laid +down in April, 1886, launched in March, 1888, and completed some two +years later. The _Trafalgar_ was laid down at Portsmouth in January, +1886, and launched in September, 1887. Her machinery was supplied by +Humphrys. The armour of these ships weighed no less than 4,230 tons, +_i.e._, some 35 per cent. of the displacement instead of the more usual +25 per cent. or so. The then first Lord of the Admiralty took the +occasion of the launch to remark that the days of such armoured ships +were over, and that probably these were the last ironclads that would +ever be built--the future would lie with fast deck-protected vessels! +As, for three years, no more armoured ships were laid down, he at least +enunciated a definite policy when these heavily armoured successors of +the _Admiral_ class were put afloat. They differed from the _Admirals_ +in that turrets were reverted to instead of barbettes, and, as already +mentioned, they were really nothing but modernised versions of the old +low freeboard _Dreadnought_. + +At a later date 6-inch Q.F. were substituted for the 4.7’s; but no +other schemes of modernising the ships ever came to a head. + + +_PROTECTED CRUISERS OF THE BARNABY ERA._ + +Four ships of the _Amphion_ Class--_Amphion_, _Arethusa_, _Leander_, +and _Phæton_, of which the first (_Arethusa_) was laid down in +1880--represented the first Barnaby idea of the protected cruiser. They +were of 4,300 tons displacement, and 16.5 knots nominal speed. They +carried ten 6-inch guns, and a 1½-inch deck amidships. According to the +ideas of those days they were heavily over-gunned. They always steamed +well; but it is doubtful whether Barnaby, left to himself, would ever +have produced them. Incidentally, they were always bad sea-boats. + +In 1883, completed about the same time as the _Victoria_, the _Mersey_ +class--_Mersey_, _Thames_, _Severn_, and _Forth_--of 4,050 tons +displacement, and carrying two 8-inch and ten 6-inch, were commenced: +practically early essays at the _Orlando_ class idea which followed. +The _Orlandos_, on only a thousand or so tons more displacement, +carried 9.2’s instead of 8-inch, had armour-belts as well as protective +decks, and were a good knot faster. Both the _Amphions_ and _Merseys_ +may be described as representing strictly naval Admiralty ideas--the +_Orlando_, Barnaby ones. Each type was quickly rendered obsolete by the +coming of the quick-firer; but the Barnaby type of cruiser, for 20 per +cent. extra displacement, certainly offered better chances than any +rival proposition, if only we consider matters in the light of what +existed in those days and what promised best at that time. + +So ends the Barnaby era. Barnaby’s constructional ideas were blown to +mincemeat by the advent of the quick-firer. Even to-day his ideas seem +somewhat obsolete. Yet a few years hence (if big ships survive) they +stand every chance of being reverted to, because to-day the big gun has +more or less come back to where it was in 1875–1885. Barnaby, though +he worked into its era, never realised the preponderance or possible +preponderance of the “secondary gun.” In his era it fired too slowly to +count for very much; in our own, range neutralises whatever it may have +accomplished in the rapidity of fire direction. + +Likely enough, the reversion to Barnaby ideals, which is reasonably +probable for the immediate future, will be merely a phase; and casual +historians will ever put him down as the naval constructor who was +least able to anticipate the years ahead of his creations. But a +hundred years hence Barnaby may come into his own in a way little +suspected to-day. A hundred years hence, when all the most modern ideas +are ancient history, Barnaby may stand with Phineas Pett, and the Navy +which he created stand for something infinitely more than the scrap +heap to which a later age swiftly relegated it. Only the historian +of the distant future can estimate him at his real value. His own +generation never placed much faith in his ships; the generation that +followed generally regarded them with scorn. It was probably wrong, but +only the future can prove it to have been so. + +_GUNS IN THE ERA._ + +The guns which especially belong to the Barnaby era were as follows:-- + + ======+=======+========+==========+==========+=========+================ + | | | | | | Penetration + | Weight| Length | Weight | Muzzle | Muzzle | 2000 yds. + Cal. | in | in |projectile| velocity | energy +-------+-------- + ins. | tons. | cals. | lbs. | f.s. | ft. | iron. | comp. + ------+-------+--------+----------+----------+---------+-------+-------- + M.L. | | | | | | | + 16 | 81 | 18 | 1684 | 1590 | 29,530 | 22 | 15 + ----- +-------+--------+----------+----------+---------+-------+-------- + B.L. | | | | | | | + 16.25 | 110 | 30 | 1800 | 2148 | 57,580 | 29 | 19 + 13.5 | 67 | 30 | 1250 | 2025 | 35,560 | 26 | 17 + 12 | 45 | 25 | 714 | 2000 | 18,060 | 19 | 12½ + 9.2 | 22 | 25 | 380 | 1809 | 8622 | 15 | 10 + 8 | 14 | 30 | 210 | 2200 | 7060 | 14 | 9 + 6 | 5 | 26 | 100 | 1960 | 2665 | 8 | 5 + ======+=======+========+==========+==========+=========+=======+======== + +In the early part of the period, guns of the Reed era, down to the +10-inch 18-ton M.L., were also made use of; but generally speaking, +the Barnaby designs coincide with early breechloading types. It is +interesting to note that the 81-ton gun figured in one ship only (the +_Inflexible_), and that after this the 38-ton 12.5 M.L. was reverted +to, to be replaced in later designs by the 45-ton 12-inch B.L. + +The M.L. guns available for early Barnaby designs were considerably +superior to earlier examples of their type; as after the fiasco of +the _Glatton_ trials,[7] copper gas checks were introduced. These +were affixed to the base of the projectile and expanded on firing. +They led to a certain increased power and accuracy; but, even so, +only of a relative nature compared with the better results obtained +from breechloaders. The _Thunderer_ gun disaster, which after many +experiments was found to have been caused by doubly loading the gun, +added another argument to the anti-muzzle-loader cause. + +The 12-inch, which was the first large B.L. to be introduced, compared +as follows with the 12-inch M.L.:-- + + ==========+========+======+=======+==========+=========================== + | | | | | Penetration of iron at + |Length |Weight|Muzzle |Weight of +--------------------------- + Gun. |in cals.| tons.|energy |projectile|Muzzle.|1000 yds.|2000 yds. + | | | ft. | lbs. | in. | in. | in. + ----------+--------+------+-------+----------+-------+---------+--------- + 12in. M.L.| 13½ | 35 | 9470 | 706 | 16 | 15 | 13 + 12in. B.L | 25 | 45 |18,060 | 1250 | 30½ | 28 | 26 + ==========+========+======+=======+==========+=======+=========+========= + +The enormous difference in efficiency was of course traceable to other +causes than the adoption of the breechloader instead of the old M.L.; +but this was, equally naturally, overlooked; which, perhaps, was just +as well--otherwise the muzzle-loader might have persisted to quite +recent times. Though the _Thunderer_ disaster showed that a M.L. could +be loaded twice over by accident, this was an obviously unlikely thing +to occur again. The impression was made by the fact that the 12-inch +B.L. was far more powerful than the old 16-inch M.L. It was possibly +this which directly led to the “monster-gun craze” of the Barnaby +era, the way to which had already been shewn by the 16-inch M.L. +Incidentally it is interesting to note that the present monster gun era +is the third in which, after a period of adhesion to a 12-inch gun, +greatly increased calibres have suddenly and more or less generally +been resorted to. + + +_THE COMING OF THE TORPEDO._ + +Reference has been made in the past chapter to Sir E. J. Reed’s +recognition of the possibilities of the torpedo; and floating mines +were, of course, well known. It was not, however, till 1874 that either +mine or torpedo came to be regarded at all seriously. + +The earliest Whitehead “fish torpedo” was produced in 1868; though it +was then little more than a curiosity. It was a crude weapon, although +it embodied, with two notable exceptions, most of the features that it +possesses to-day. Its motive power was compressed air; it carried an +explosive head with a sensitive pistol. + +The secret was bought by the British Government at an early stage. +It was made strictly confidential; indeed, to the present day, the +internal mechanism of a torpedo is more or less sacred. Most other +nations purchased the secret also, and guarded it with like care! + +It is but fair to add that this ridiculous situation was brought about +by the inventor, who particularly specified that the balance chamber +must not be revealed even to admirals commanding fleets, but only to +specially selected officers. + +A main difficulty with the torpedo was how to discharge it. For some +while only two methods existed: the first, a mechanism of catapult +type which hurled the torpedo into the water; the other, by a crude +application of dropping gear, suitable, of course, for launches only. +In either case, especially the former, there was a strong element of +uncertainty as to the direction the torpedo would take; for one to +describe a circle and return to the firer was not unknown.[8] + +The charge was inconsiderable, and range and speed were both very small. + +An instrument called the Harvey torpedo was more or less +contemporaneous with the Whitehead. It was a very primitive idea, +consisting as it did merely in attempting to tow explosives across +the course of an enemy. It was too obviously cumbersome to cause +disquietude, and with the invention of torpedo tubes passed into +oblivion. + +The advantages of the torpedo tube were quickly recognised; and though +the range was still little over a hundred yards or so--at any rate, so +far as any probability of hitting was concerned--the torpedo quickly +became a part of the armament of all important ships. So much was this +the case that the submerged tube was developed with sufficient celerity +to be adopted into the equipment of the _Inflexible_, of 1874 design. + +None the less, however, the possible results of torpedo attack remained +uninvestigated till 1874, and even then only came to be inquired into +after the _Oberon_ experiments, which were primarily if not entirely +brought about by the advent of the observation mine as a practical +thing. + +The mine’s arrival counted for little; the automobile torpedo being +at the moment much in the public eye, the point that the _Oberon_ +experiments were primarily designed to test the effect of mines got +somewhat lost sight of. The essential fact is that by 1874 the fact of +other enemies to the ship than the gun was established. For a long time +it affected ship design no further than the gradual introduction of an +anti-torpedo-boat armament; but this was mainly due to Sir E. J. Reed +having in the _Bellerophon_ design endeavoured to anticipate torpedo +effect. In 1874, and onward therefrom for some time, the double bottom, +combined with water-tight bulkheads, was considered a suitable “reply” +to the “new arm,” and it was not for many years that torpedo nets were +in any degree appreciated. + +In the later eighties some torpedo experiments were conducted against +the old ironclad _Resistance_, in which the Bullivant net defence +system proved altogether superior to the cumbersome old wooden booms +which were in use: but, despite this, nothing was done for many a year, +and the old pattern was adhered to. + + +_ESTIMATES IN THE ERA._ + + ===============+=============+=========== + Financial Year.| Amount. | Personnel. + ---------------|-------------|----------- + 1869 | 9,996,641 | 63,000 + 1870 | 9,370,530 | 61,000 + 1871 | 9,789,956 | 61,000 + 1872 | 9,532,149 | 61,000 + 1873 | 9,899,725 | 60,000 + 1874 | 10,440,105 | 60,000 + 1875 | 10,825,194 | 60,000 + 1876 | 11,288,872 | 60,000 + 1877 | 10,971,829 | 60,000 + 1878 | 12,129,901 | 60,000 + 1879 | 10,586,894 | 58,800 + 1880 | 10,566,935 | 58,800 + 1881 | 10,945,919 | 58,100 + 1882 | 10,483,901 | 57,500 + 1883 | 10,899,500 | 57,250 + 1884 | 11,185,770 | 56,950 + 1885 | 12,694,900 | 58,334 + ===============+=============+=========== + + + + +II. + +THE WHITE ERA. + + +The appointment of Sir William White as Chief Constructor more or less +synchronised with a considerable revolution in naval construction and +ideas. The institution of naval manœuvres drew great attention to the +sea-going quality of various types of ships. The manœuvres of 1887 +mostly centred around the _Polyphemus_, and her charging a boom at +Berehaven. Little was here proved except that boom defences were easily +to be annihilated. In 1888, however, the manœuvres were of a much more +extensive nature, and a Committee was appointed to consider and report +upon them, especially with regard to the following points:-- + + “The feasibility or otherwise of maintaining an effective blockade + in war of an enemy’s squadron or fast cruisers in strongly + fortified ports, including the advantages and disadvantages of-- + + (a) Keeping the main body of the blockading Fleets off the ports + to be blockaded with an inshore squadron. + + (b) Keeping the main body of the blockading Fleets at a base, + with a squadron of fast cruisers and scouts off the blockaded + ports, having means of rapid communication with the Fleet. + + (c) In both cases the approximate relative number of battleships + and cruisers that should be employed by the blockading Fleet, + as compared with those of the blockaded Fleet. + + “The value of torpedo-gunboats and first-class torpedo boats both + with the blockading and blockaded Fleets, and the most efficient + manner of utilising them. + + “As to the arrangements made by B squadron for the attack of + commerce in the Channel, and by A squadron for its protection. + + “As to the feasibility and expediency of cruisers making raids on + an enemy’s coasts and unprotected towns for the purpose of levying + contribution. + + “As to the claims and counterclaims made by the Admirals in command + of both squadrons with regard to captures made during the operation. + + “As to any defects of importance which were developed in any of the + vessels employed, and their cause.” + +As Supplementary Instructions there were:-- + + (1) As to the behaviour and sea-going qualities of, or the + defects in, the new and most recently commissioned vessels, + as obtained from the reports of the Admirals in command of + the respective squadrons. + + (2) The general conclusion to be drawn from the recent + operations.” + +A summary of the findings[9] is as follows:-- + + “That to maintain an effective blockade of a Fleet in a strongly + fortified port a proportion of at least five to three would be + essential and possibly an even larger proportion, unless a good + anchorage could be found near the blockaded port which could + be used as a base, in which case a proportion of four to three + might suffice, supposing the blockading squadron to be very amply + supplied with look-out ships and colliers.” + +Torpedo boats were condemned as being of little value to blockaders, +though useful to the blockaded. For blockade purposes the +torpedo-gunboats of the _Rattlesnake_ class were highly commended. + +Attention was drawn to the large number of deck hands employed down +below on account of the insufficient engine-room complements, and +the excess of untrained stokers. The case of the _Warspite_ was +specifically mentioned. In order to break the blockade at sixteen +knots she sent thirty-six deck hands down below at a time when every +available deck hand would have been required above had the operations +been real war. + +A special supplementary report was called for as to the sea-going +qualities of the ships. Considerable historical interest attaches to +this particular report, and the following extracts are especially +interesting:-- + +_Admiral_ class. + + “So far as could be judged, these vessels are good sea-boats, and + their speed is not affected when steaming against a moderate wind + and sea; but we are of opinion that their low freeboard renders + them unsuitable as sea-going armour-clads for general service + with the Fleet, as their speed must be rapidly reduced when it is + necessary to force them against a head sea or swell. + + “On the only occasion on which the _Collingwood_ experienced any + considerable beam swell she is reported to have rolled 20 degrees + each way; this does not make it appear as if the _Admiral_ class + will be very steady gun-platforms in bad weather. + + “They are said to be ‘handy’ at 6 knots and over. + + “In the _Benbow_ much difficulty was experienced in stowing the + bower anchors. This is the case in all low freeboard vessels, + more or less, but the evil appears to have been intensified in + this instance by defective fittings, and by the fact of her being + supplied with the old-fashioned iron-stocked anchors instead of + improved Martins. + + “Serious complaints are made from these ships that the forecastles + leak badly, and that the mess-deck is made uninhabitable whenever + the sea breaks over the forecastle at all; it would seem that this + defect might be remedied.” + +This opinion was not shared by Admiral Sir Arthur Hood, who commented +as follows:-- + + “I cannot concur in this opinion, my view being that the objects + of primary importance to be fulfilled in a first-class battleship + are: (1) That, on a given displacement, the combined powers of + offence and defence shall be as great as can be given; (2) that she + shall be handy and possess good speed in ordinary weather, combined + with sea-worthiness; (3) that she shall have large coal-carrying + capacity. I certainly do not consider that the _Admiral_ class, + which, on account of their comparatively low freeboard forward, + must have their speed reduced when steaming against a heavy + head sea or swell to a greater extent than is the case with the + long, high freeboard, older armour-clads, as the _Minotaur_, + _Northumberland_, _Black Prince_ are for this reason rendered + unsuitable as sea-going armour-clads for general service with a + Fleet. The power of being able to force a first-class battleship + at full speed against a head sea is not, in my opinion, a point + of the first importance, although in the case of a fast cruiser + it certainly is. Admiral Tryon draws an unfavourable comparison + between the speed of the new battleships and that of the long ships + of the old type, when steaming against a head sea. I admit at once + that vessels like the _Minotaur_ class would maintain their speed + and make better weather of it when being forced against a head + sea than would the _Admirals_; but this advantage, under these + exceptional conditions, cannot for a moment be compared with the + enormous increase in the power of offence and defence possessed by + the _Admirals_.” + +[Illustration: + + _Photo_] [_Russell & Sons._ + +SIR WILLIAM WHITE.] + +The _Conqueror_ and _Hero_ were reported to roll a great deal. Being +short they felt a head sea quickly, and on account of their low +freeboard it was found impossible to drive them against a heavy sea at +anything approaching full speed. Incidentally these ships were known as +“half-boots.” + +Here, again, Admiral Sir Arthur Hood dissented. In connection with +these points, Admiral Tryon submitted a report in which he emphasised, +as he had done with the _Admirals_, that however fast these short ships +might be in smooth water, their speeds fell off rapidly in a seaway. + +The _Mersey_ class were described as being handy, steady gun platforms +and able to fight their guns longer than most ships.[10] The captain +of the _Severn_, however, reported a view that the 8-inch guns should +be removed and lighter pieces substituted. Admiral Baird agreed with +this. Sir Arthur Hood, in his comments, stated that he was “decidedly +opposed” to any reduction of armament, both in this case and that of +the other cruisers. + +The _Arethusa_ type were reported to roll so heavily when the sea was +abeam or abaft that “accurate shooting would be impossible and machine +guns in the tops would be useless.” + +The Committee concurred with Admiral Baird that the armament of these +should be reduced. + +For the _Archer_ class it was unanimously suggested that lighter guns +should be fitted forward. Sir Arthur Hood agreed with this view, which, +however, was never carried into effect. + +Particular interest attaches to the _Rattlesnake_[11] class of +torpedo-gunboats--these vessels being really prototypes of the +destroyers of the present day. They were reported as “safe, provided +they were handled with care.” Their handiness was unfavourably reported +on. It was strongly urged that the 4-inch gun mounted forward should be +removed. This, however, was never done. + +With reference to any new vessels of this type, the Committee reported +as deserving immediate consideration:-- + + (1) Generally strengthen the hull in this type of vessel. + + (2) Raise the freeboard forward. + + _or_ (3) “Turtle-back” the forecastle. + +In the gunboats that followed the freeboard forward was considerably +raised; but when destroyers came to be built several years later, it +is interesting to observe that the turtle-back forecastle was adopted, +and it was not till after over a hundred had been built that the high +forecastle, recommended so long before, appeared in the _River_ class. + +The report concluded:-- + + “The proportion of untrained (2nd class) stokers which were drafted + to several of the ships appears to have been too large; in point of + physique they are reported as unequal to their work, and in many + instances the experience of these men in stokehold (or any other + work on board ship) was nil. + + “As a means of affording opportunities for training newly-raised + stokers we recommend that at least one year should be served + by them as supernumerary in a sea-going ship before they are + considered fit to be draughted as part complement to any vessel; + we further are of opinion that a Committee should be appointed + to inquire into the sufficiency or otherwise of the complements + allowed in the steam department of each class of ship, the + proportion of 2nd class stokers which should be borne, and the + amount of training which they should be required to undergo before + they can usefully be borne as part complement in a fighting ship.” + +An agitation as to the state of the Navy, which was commenced in the +year 1887, mainly by the initiative of the _Pall Mall Gazette_,[12] +finally resulted in the passing of the Naval Defence Act of 1889. This +provided for the construction of a total of seventy vessels, consisting +of ten armoured ships, nine first-class cruisers, twenty-nine +second-class cruisers, four third-class and eighteen torpedo gunboats, +to be built as quickly as possible at the estimated cost of £21,500,000. + +The substantial part of the programme of 1886 had consisted of two big +turret ships, the _Nile_ and _Trafalgar_, and two armoured cruisers, +_Immortalité_ and _Aurora_ of the _Orlando_ class. In 1887 nothing +larger than second-class cruisers was laid down; and in 1888 the most +important vessels on the programme were only the protected cruisers, +_Blake_ and _Blenheim_. There was, therefore, ample material for panic. + +Details of the _Blake_ class:-- + + Length (_p.p._)--375 ft. + + Beam--65 ft. + + Guns--Two 9.2 in., 22-ton B.L.R., ten 6-in. Q.F., eighteen 3-pdr. + + H.P.--20,000. + + Designed speed--22.0 kts. + + Coal--1500 tons. + + Builder of Ship--_Blake_, Chatham; _Blenheim_, Thames Ironworks. + + Builder of machinery--_Blake_, Maudsley; _Blenheim_, Thames + Ironworks. + + Launched--_Blake_, 1889; _Blenheim_, 1890. + +Special features of these ships were a combination of the armament +of the _Orlando_ class with greatly increased speed secured by the +development of deck armour in place of the belts of the _Orlando_ +class. In so far as a special type of ship may be said to be the +development of some predecessor, the _Blake_ and _Blenheim_ may be +described as enlarged _Merseys_. They were, however, unique on account +of their relatively great length and great increase of displacement +as compared with preceding vessels. In them the armoured casemate, a +leading characteristic of nearly all Sir William White’s ships, made +its first appearance. It was employed in the _Blake_ and _Blenheim_ for +four main deck guns, the upper deck guns being behind the usual shields. + +The coming of the casemate, curiously enough, attracted little +attention, compared to its importance. It may be said to have rendered +possible the return to main deck guns in unarmoured ships. In the +_Orlando_ class, ten 6-inch guns were all bunched together on the upper +deck amidships. Since these ships were designed the 6-inch quickfirer +had made its first appearance, and the largest possible distribution of +armament was therefore desirable. The adoption of the two-deck system +of the _Blake_ and _Blenheim_ secured this much larger distribution, +rendering it impossible for a single shell to put more than one of the +five broadside 6-inch out of action, whereas in the _Orlando_ class at +least three guns were at the mercy of a single shell. + +Another novelty of the type was the introduction of a special armoured +glacis around the engine hatches. This system had, of course, been used +before in the Italian monster ships _Italia_ and _Lepanto_, but it was +first introduced in the British Navy in the _Blakes_.[13] + +The ships were very successful steamers, for all that neither made her +expected twenty-two knots on trial. + +Trial results:-- + + _Blake_: Eight hours’ natural draught, mean I.H.P.--14,525 = 19.4 + knots. + + _Blenheim_: Eight hours’ natural draught, mean I.H.P.--14,925 = + 20.4 knots. + + _Blake_: Four hours’ force draught, mean I.H.P.--19,579 = 21.5 + knots. + + _Blenheim_: Four hours’ forced draught, mean I.H.P.--21,411 = 21.8 + knots. + +The principal item of the Naval Defence Act was eight first-class and +two second-class battleships. All these ships were designed by Sir +William White, and may be described as battleship editions of the +_Blake_ and _Blenheim_, so far as the disposition of their armament was +concerned. For the rest they may be described as attempts to combine +in one ship the best features of the Read and Barnaby ideals. In place +of the low freeboard of the _Admiral_ class, seven of the _Royal +Sovereigns_ were given high freeboard fore and aft, with the big guns +about twenty-three feet above water. The eighth ship, the _Hood_, was +modified to suit the ideals of Admiral Hood, and was to some extent an +improved _Trafalgar_, her big guns being in turrets some seventeen feet +above the water, in turrets instead of _en barbette_, with guns exposed +as in the rest of the class. + +In them, among other special features, 18-inch torpedo tubes were first +introduced instead of 14-inch, and a stern torpedo tube appeared. + +The original idea of end-on torpedo tubes was torpedo attack from the +bow in place of the ram. The _Polyphemus_ was the first ship in which +an end-on tube appeared (submerged). In cruisers of a later date the +bow tube was found to injure speed, and there was always the danger of +a ship over-running her own torpedo. On this account the bow-tube never +secured in the British Navy that vogue which it obtained, and still +has, in Germany. + +The stern-tube appears to owe its origin to an idea that a defeated or +overpowered ship, running from an enemy, might save herself by it: dim +ideas of “runaway tactics” had also begun to appear. + +Sir William White never claimed for himself that he had anticipated the +future in any way in his torpedo armament, even when defending himself +against criticisms, to the effect that he “gave too little for the +displacement.” Yet his torpedo innovations, besides discounting the +future, all helped to swell the total weight; as also did many internal +strengthenings of the kind which do not show on paper. Possibly he +did not realise his own greatness as the designer of a class of ship +which was so much better than any contemporary vessel, that even in +these days of “Super-Dreadnoughts” the _Royal Sovereigns_ are still +looked back upon with respect, and invariably regarded as marking the +beginning of an entirely new phase in ship construction. + +In April, 1889, their designer read a paper about them at the +Institution of Naval Architects, in which the principal points which +he claimed were that much superior command of guns was given, and that +the auxiliary armament was nearly three times the weight of that of the +_Trafalgars_. The following points were also mentioned by him:-- + + “(_a_) ‘That (it was officially decided that) it was preferable to + have two separate strongly protected stations for the four heavy + guns, rather than to have a single citadel.’ + + “(_b_) ‘That on the whole the 4-inch armour amidships, from the + belt deck to the main deck, associated as it would be with the + internal coal bunkers, sub-divided into numerous compartments, + might be considered satisfactory; but that if armour weight became + available, it could be profitably utilised in thickening the 4-inch + steel above the middle portion of the belt.’ + + “I would draw particular attention to the first of these + conclusions, since it expresses a most important distinction + between the two systems of protection. + + “With separate redoubts, placed far apart, the two stations + are isolated, and there is practically no risk of simultaneous + disablement by the explosion of shells, or perforation of + projectiles from the heaviest guns. Each redoubt offers a small + target to the fire of an enemy, and its weakest part--the thick + steel protective plating on the top--is of so small extent that the + chance of its being struck is extremely remote. Serious damage to + the unarmoured turret bases therefore involves the perforation of + the thick vertical armour on the redoubts. + + “With a single citadel, extending the full breadth of a ship, the + case is widely different. + + “Over a comparatively large area of the protective deck-plating in + the neighbourhood of each turret, perforation of the deck, or its + disruption by shell explosions at any point, involves very serious + risk of damage to the turret bases and the loading apparatus. In + fact, such damage may be effected and the heavy guns put out of + action while the thick vertical armour on the citadel is uninjured. + Moreover, as the turrets stand at the ends of a single citadel, + there is a possibility of their simultaneous disablement by the + explosion of heavy shell within the citadel. + + “This last risk may be minimised (as in the _Nile_ and _Trafalgar_) + by constructing armoured ‘traverses’ within the citadel; but it + cannot be wholly overcome, so long as both turrets stand in one + armoured enclosure. + + “It may be thought that the risk of damage to a 3-inch steel deck + situated 11 ft. above water is remote; but I think the facts are as + stated, when actions at sea are taken into account. + + “For example, if a ship of 70 to 75 ft. beam is rolling only to 10 + degrees from the vertical, which is by no means a heavy roll, she + presents a target having a vertical (projected) height of 13 to 14 + ft. to an enemy’s fire, and even if she is a steady, slow-moving + ship, she will do this four or five times in each minute. + + “Now, at this angle of inclination, assuming the flight of + projectiles to be practically horizontal, even the thickest + protective steel decks yet fitted in battleships are liable to + serious damage from the fire of guns of moderate calibre, and this + danger is increased by the employment of high explosives. Of + course, I do not mean to say that this damage is to follow from + fire intentionally aimed at the protective deck; but with a great + and sustained volume of fire, such as is possible with a powerful + auxiliary armament, and especially with quick-firing guns, it is + obvious that there is a very real danger of chance shots injuring + seriously the wide expanse of the protective deck at the top of a + long citadel. + + “Again, it must be noted that the chances of damage to a deck + placed 10 or 11 ft. above water, and with large exposed surfaces + in the neighbourhood of the turrets when a ship is inclined or + rolling, are greater far than those of a deck 7 or 8 ft. lower, + and with 5-inch armour on the sides protecting the deck from the + direct impact of shells containing heavy bursters. It is for the + naval gunner to estimate these chances of injury; but, unless I am + greatly mistaken, their verdict will be that a far greater number + of shots are likely to strike at a height of 8 to 10 ft. above + water than at a height of 4 to 5 ft. + + “These considerations, I submit, amply justify the selection of the + separate redoubt system, in association with the thin side armour + above the belt, and the lowering of the protective deck to the top + of the belt in the new designs. + + “It may be urged that, if the redoubt system be adopted, it should + be associated with side armour and screen bulkheads of greater + thickness than 5-inch steel, and more strongly backed. This is + perfectly practicable, but necessarily costly, involving an + additional load of armour, and a corresponding increase in the size + of the ship.” + +The designs were vigorously criticised by Sir Edward Reed, whose chief +objections centred on the fact that the lower-deck protection was thin +armour only. Sir William White combatted this idea, and proved very +conclusively that, according to the needs of the moment, his views +were correct. It is, however, worthy of record that at a later date +with the _Majestic_ class (see a few pages further on), he effected +modifications which brought his ships more into line with what Sir +Edward Reed had advocated. It should, however, be mentioned that +this was not done until improvements in armour construction rendered +possible things that were certainly impossible in the days of the +_Royal Sovereigns_. + +In connection with the later career of the _Royal Sovereign_ +class these items may be added. On completion they were found +to be singularly simple in all their internal arrangements, and +extraordinarily strong. When they went to the scrap-heap in 1911–12, +they were, constructionally, practically as good as when built. They +proved to be good sea boats, but at first rolled very badly, which +resulted in their getting an unenviable notoriety in this respect. This +was, however, completely cured by the fitting of bilge keels, after +which the ships were everything that could be desired in the way of +being steady gun platforms. + +The ever increasing vogue of the quickfirer tended to render them +rather quickly obsolescent over things which to-day would count much +less than they did in the past. The defects of the _Sovereigns_, as +realised not very long after completion, were:-- + + (1) That the big guns’ crews were practically unprotected, and + easily to be annihilated by the newly-introduced high + explosive shells of the secondary armament of an enemy. + + (2) Only four of the ten 6-inch were armour protected, which also + was considered a fatal drawback. + +In the first case nothing was ever done; but in the second, about the +year 1900, casemates were fitted for the upper-deck guns of all ships +except the _Hood_,[14] which on survey was found unsuitable for such +reconstruction. + +The only thing that remains to add is that although in the course of +years the ships lost the speeds for which they were designed, up to the +very end they proved capable of doing about thirteen knots indefinitely. + +In addition to the _Sovereigns_ two “second-class battleships” were +built, the _Centurion_ and _Barfleur_, of which details are:-- + + Displacement--10,500 tons. Complement, 620. + + Length--(Waterline) 360ft. + + Beam--70ft. + + Draught--(Maximum) 27ft. + + Armament--Four 10-inch, ten 4.7-inch, eight 6-pounders, twelve + 3-pounders, two Maxims, two 9-pounder boat guns. Torpedo tubes + (18-inch)--two submerged and one above water in the stern. + +The _Barfleur_ was laid down at Chatham in November, 1890, launched in +August, 1892, and completed two years later. The _Centurion_, laid down +at Portsmouth in March, 1891, was launched a year later, but completed +before her sister. + +The ships were armoured generally on the _Royal Sovereign_ plan, +with 12-inch belts which, however, were only 200ft. long, instead +of 250ft. The bulkheads were six inches only, and the upper belt +(nickel steel) an inch less than in the big ships. The barbettes were +reduced to nine inches only, but on the other hand were made circular +instead of pear-shaped, and 6-inch shields were provided for the big +guns--probably as the result of criticisms of the unprotected big guns +of the _Sovereigns_. With a few early exceptions as to the shape of the +base, and with certain variation in form, this kind of “turret” has +been adhered to ever since in the British Navy and copied into every +other. + +Both ships were engined by the Greenock Foundry Company, and designed +for 13,000 H.P., with forced draught, giving a speed of 18.5 knots, +which speed both exceeded on trial. This high speed and their coal +endurance--they carried a maximum of 1,125 tons, sufficient for +a nominal 9750 mile radius--makes them something more than the +“second-class battleships” which they nominally were. + +Compared to the _Sovereigns_ they were:-- + + =========================+====================+================== + _Minus Points_: | _Barfleurs._ | _Sovereigns._ + | | + Displacement (tons) | 10,500 | 14,100 + Principal guns | 4--10in., 10--4.7 | 4--13.5, 10--6in. + Armour belt | 12 inches. | 18 inches. + -------------------------+--------------------+------------------ + _Plus Points_: | | + | | + Horse Power | 13,000 | 13,000 + Speed | 18.5 | 17 + Nominal endurance (kts.) | 9,750 | 7,900 + =========================+====================+================== + +From which the existence of an elementary conception of the +“battle-cruiser” of to-day seems fairly apparent. To-day the +battle-cruiser, instead of having guns of reduced calibre, carries a +reduced number, but the general principle of “moderate sacrifices for +increased speed” obtains. + +The _Barfleur_ and _Centurion_ proved excellent steamers and good +sea-boats. Their defect was their weak armament, and in 1903 it was +decided to remedy this. In that year they were “reconstructed.” Their +4.7’s were taken out and 6-inch guns substituted, and the six on the +upper deck were put into casemates. As a species of make-weight the +foremast was taken out of both ships; but this made little difference. +The “improvements” were a total failure; the ships were immersed +far below what they had been designed for, and they never thereafter +realised much more than about sixteen knots. Within seven years they +were removed from the Navy List altogether, and such service as they +performed after modernising was entirely of a subsidiary order. + +For the first-class cruisers of the Naval Defence Act reduced examples +of the _Blenheim_ were decided on. These vessels were the _Edgar_, +_Endymion_, _Grafton_, _Hawke_, _St. George_, _Gibraltar_, _Crescent_, +and _Royal Arthur_ (formerly designated as the _Centaur_). They were +launched between 1891 and 1892, averaging 7,350 tons (unsheathed) +and 7,700 tons (sheathed and coppered, in the case of the last four +mentioned). Except the two last, all had the _Blenheim_ armament of two +9.2 and ten 6-inch. The two latter had a couple of extra 6-inch on a +raised forecastle substituted for the forward 9.2. + +No attempt was made to obtain the high speed of the _Blenheims_--19.5 +knots being the utmost aimed at. Not only, however, did the _Edgar_ +class exceed expectations on trial, but they proved most remarkably +good steamers in service. No engine-room defects of moment were ever +encountered in any of them, and twenty years after launch most were +still able to steam at little short of the designed speed. Like the +battleships, they were given 18-inch torpedoes in place of the 14-inch +of the _Blenheims_. + +In the course of their service careers, the _St. George_ (or rather +her crew) earned distinction in the Benin Expedition. The _Crescent_ +was served in by King George V, and the _Hawke_ achieved notoriety by +ramming the _Olympic_ in the Solent in 1911. + +The lesser cruisers of the Naval Defence Act numbered altogether 28. Of +these twenty belonged to the _Apollo_ class of 3,400 tons (unsheathed) +and 3,600 tons (sheathed). They were _Apollo_, _Andromache_, _Latona_, +_Melampus_, _Naiad_, _Sappho_, _Scylla_, _Terpsichore_, _Thetis_, +_Tribune_ (unsheathed), and _Aeolus_, _Brilliant_, _Indefatigable_ +(named _Melpomene_ in 1911), _Intrepid_, _Iphigenia_, _Pique_, +_Rainbow_, _Retribution_, _Sirius_, and _Spartan_ (sheathed). + +In all, the armament was two 6-inch and six 4.7, with lesser guns, and, +above-water, 14-inch torpedo tubes. The speed was twenty knots in the +unsheathed, and a quarter of a knot less in the sheathed ones. + +When built all proved able to steam very well, but after some years +service certain of them fell off very badly in speed. Others, however, +remained as fast as when they were built--the _Terpsichore_, in 1908, +averaging 20.1 knots, and the _Aeolus_, in 1909, nearly nineteen knots. + +During their service, the _Melampus_ was commanded by King George as +Prince George, while the _Scylla_, under Captain Percy Scott, gave +birth to the “dotter,” and the “gunnery boom” which followed. In +1904 and onwards seven of them, scrapped from regular service--the +_Latona_, _Thetis_, _Apollo_, _Andromache_, Iphigenia, _Intrepid_, and +_Thetis_--were totally or partially disarmed and converted into mine +layers. + +[Illustration: SECOND CLASS CRUISER OF THE NAVAL DEFENCE ACT ERA. NOW +CONVERTED INTO A MINE-LAYER] + +The remaining eight cruisers of the Act--_Astræa_, _Bonaventure_, +_Cambrian_, _Charybdis_, _Flora_, _Forte_, _Fox_, and _Hermione_--were +increased in size up to 4,360 tons, and given a couple of extra +4.7, and 18-inch in place of 14-inch tubes. Instead of their 4.7’s +being mounted in the well amidships, they were placed on the upper +deck level, a much better position in a sea-way, but they never +proved themselves quite such good ships for their size as did the +earlier type. They served to illustrate the general rule that slight +improvements on a design are rarely satisfactory, and that while every +staple design has its defects, it is extremely difficult to remove +one drawback without creating another. Moreover, such improvements +invariably cause increased cost, and an essential with the small +cruiser is that she shall be cheap enough to be numerically strong. +Four _Astræas_ cost as much as five _Apollos_. They were rather more +seaworthy, but no faster--if as fast. The total broadsides obtained +were only _one_ 4.7 more and _two_ 6-inch _less_.[15] A considerably +greater possible bunker capacity was obtained; but the normal supply +(400 tons) was the same for both. + +In the British Navy, in 1908–11, a precisely similar thing obtained. +It was probably inevitable. In the German Navy, between 1897 and 1907, +displacement for small cruisers rose from 2,645 to 4,350 tons, with +practically the same armament. But here the horse-power rose from about +8,500 or less to 20,000, and designed speeds in proportion, from a +twenty-one knots (not made) to a 25.5, which, on trial, turned out to +be 27,000 I.H.P. and over twenty-seven knots. + +Here, however, there was a definite aim--increased speed, with only +trivial improvements in any other direction. With similar British +cruisers the defect has invariably been “general improvements” on what +the original design _might have been_ if plotted a year or two later +than it actually was. There is no question--or very little--but that +Germany in its ultra-conservative policy gauged the situation better +than any British Admiralty ever did till just before the war. + +Minor cruisers _must_ be cheap to construct. Any improvement in them +_must_ have a definite intrinsic value. Lacking that, it is worth very +little. The _Astræas_, as cited, indicated how a supposed advantage may +even be a real deficit from another point of view. + +The value of increased speed cannot be put into £ s. d., but armament +easily can be. Like reconstruction, minor “improvements” on a design +rarely pay. With the original conception the naval architect is given +certain data for which he arranges accordingly. Ordered to improve upon +it in any direction he can only add displacement and upset the balance +of everything. + +The Naval Defence Act also included a certain number of third-class +cruisers--_Pallas_, _Pearl_, _Philomel_, and _Phœbe_--for the ordinary +service, and five similar ships for the Australian station, originally +named _Pandora_, _Pelorus_, _Persian_, _Phœnix_, and _Psyche_. These +were later altered to Australian names, _Katoomba_, _Mildura_, +_Wallaroo_, _Tauranga_, and _Ringarooma_. They were of 2,575 tons, with +2½ decks, armaments of eight 4.7-inch and four above-water 14-inch +tubes. The designed speed was 19 knots. + +Thirteen torpedo gunboats, improved _Rattlesnakes_, were laid down +under the Act, corresponding to nine others of the normal Programme, +of which two were for Australia. The Naval Defence boats were _Alarm_, +_Antelope_, _Circe_, _Gleaner_, _Gossamer_, _Hebe_, _Renard_, +_Speedy_--all laid down in 1889, as also were the _Whiting_ (afterwards +_Boomerang_) and _Wizard_ (renamed _Karahatta_) for Australia. Those +laid down normally in the previous year were the _Salamander_, +_Seagull_, _Sheldrake_, _Skipjack_, _Spanker_, _Speedwell_, for the +British Navy. Two others, _Assaye_ and _Plassy_, were built for the +Indian Marine at and about this time. All carried a couple of 4.7-inch +guns, were of about 750–850 tons displacement, and were first known as +“catchers.” They were all intended to steam at 19 knots or over with +locomotive boilers; but in service none ever did. At a later date, +reboilered with water-tubes, many reached or exceeded the designed +speed, and the majority of them are still in service for auxiliary +purposes--many being specially fitted as mine sweepers, and the rest +used as tenders for various services. + +They are of considerable interest on account of the fact that the +destroyers of 1909–12 were practically the same displacement and +general shape, with a not very dissimilar armament--two 4-inch instead +of two 4.7. The modern destroyers, however, were approximately ten +knots faster--an interesting commentary on engineering improvements in +the course of twenty years! + +More interesting still, however, is the fact that Sir William White +should have evolved twenty years ago almost exactly what--except in the +matter of modern speed possibilities--is to-day the recognised ideal +for destroyers. + +In the British Navy the torpedo gunboats never get beyond the “catcher” +stage--they never had the opportunity; but it is worthy of note +that the first two ships to be torpedoed under anything like modern +war conditions--the Chilian _Blanco Encalada_ and the Brazilian +_Aquidaban_--were both sunk by vessels of almost exactly the same type +as the “catchers,” and not by torpedo boats. + +So far as the British Navy was concerned, the “catchers” tested in the +“secret manœuvres” of 1891 did uncommonly well. They hung about off the +torpedo bases, and though only about one to four, accounted for at +least 90 per cent. of the hostile torpedo boats. To this very success, +perhaps, was due the fact that in their own day they were not thought +of as an offensive arm against big ships--destruction of the torpedo +boat was then the principal aim in view. This they fulfilled. The South +American Republics discovered their “other uses,” and so really led the +way to the evolution of the destroyer of a later era. + +Perhaps the only nation which really read the lesson involved was +Germany. So long ago as 1895 she had launched the 2,000-ton “small +cruiser” _Hela_; in 1898 the _Gazelle_ of 2,645 tons was set afloat. +For years Germany added to the _Gazelle_ class, at a time when all the +rest of the world had decreed that “third-class cruisers” were useless. +Not for many a year did the British Admiralty discover that Germany had +seen the matter of the _Lynch_ and the _Sampaio_[16] better than any +other Power. + +Neither of these ships in attacking got hit. They got home without. But +they might have been hit. Germany evolved something that even if hit +badly would still float long enough to get off her torpedoes. + +Till the Chilian “catchers” in 1891 proved their offensive abilities, +no one had ever considered that side of the question. To this day +Germany has never really received her meed of credit for perceiving +that a small third-class cruiser has potentialities with torpedoes +against a battleship at night. + +[Illustration: + + HOOD. + ROYAL SOVEREIGN. + BARFLEUR. + RENOWN. + MAJESTIC. + LONDON. + KING EDWARD. + +BATTLESHIPS OF THE WHITE ERA.] + +So late as the present day much comment about German small cruisers +being inadequately gunned, a clear indication that just as in the +past there was a difficulty in conceiving of the torpedo-gunboat for +other than her nominal use, so the possibilities of the small cruiser +in the role of destroyer were still apt to be generally overlooked. + +In February, 1893, there was laid down the _Renown_, the only armoured +ship of the 1892–93 Estimates; an improved _Centurion_, with thinner +belt armour. Harvey armour--three inches of which had the resisting +value of four inches of compound or six inches of iron--was adopted in +this ship for the first time. Influences other than taking advantage of +the reduced weight required for a given protective value were, however, +at work, for in the _Renown_ sacrifices were made at the water-line in +order to secure better protection to the lower deck side. + +Details of the _Renown_:-- + + Displacement--12,350 tons. + + Length (between perpendiculars)--380ft. + + Beam--72⅓ft. + + Draught--(maximum) 27ft. + + Armament--Four 10-inch, ten 6-inch 40 cal., twelve 12-pounders, + four submerged 18-inch tubes, and one above water-line in stern. + + Armour--8--6in. belt, 200ft. long amidships, 6in. side above. + Bulkheads 10--6in., barbettes 10in., casemates, main deck ones + 6in., upper deck ones, 4in. + + Horse-power--12,000 = 18 knots. + + Coal--(normal) 800 tons; (maximum) 1,760 tons = nominal 7,200 miles + at ten knots. + +Built at Pembroke; engined by Maudslay; she was launched in May, 1895, +and completed for sea in April, 1897, having taken no less than 4¼ +years to build. Cost, £746,247. + +She proved one of the best steamers ever built for the Navy. On a +four-hour trial she made 18.75 knots, with 12,901 I.H.P. Her economical +speed proved to be fifteen knots. She always steamed well, and after +thirteen years’ service did 17.4 knots with ease. + +The special feature of this ship was that in her instead of the +ordinary flat deck on top of the belt, a sloping deck behind the belt +was first introduced. This system--rigidly adhered to in the British +Navy ever since, and copied eventually into every other Navy--was +based upon the idea of reinforcing the deck-protected cruiser with +side armour. The principle involved was that at whatever angle the +belt might be hit and penetrated, the incoming projectile would then +meet a further obstruction at a 45° angle, calculated to present a +maximum of deflecting resistance. Professor Hovgaard and others have +since indicated that, weight for weight, three inches of inclined +deck armour, having to be spread more, represent as much or more +tons as six inches of vertical armour (the nominal equivalent), and +protective decks behind armour are to-day much thinner than of yore +and little better than “splinter decks.” The principle, however, +remains, as originated by Sir William White, and is, perhaps, the most +characteristic feature of his era: seeing how universally the idea was +copied. + +The French were the last to adopt it. Instead, they used the flat deck +below the belt in addition to the one on top of it. This was made use +of so late as the _République_ and _Liberté_ class. While ideally +better for resisting projectiles which might penetrate the belt, it +was impossible of really practical application amidships on account of +the difficulty of keeping the engines entirely below it. + +[Illustration: + + PROTECTED CRUISER. + ROYAL SOVEREIGN. + RENOWN. + SUFFREN (FRENCH) + +SYSTEMS OF WATER-LINE PROTECTION.] + +The _Renown_ was the first ship to carry all her secondary guns in +casemates. She was fitted as a flagship, and first served on the +North American Station. When Admiral Fisher went from there to the +Mediterranean he took the _Renown_ with him as flagship, presumably +with the idea that speed was better than power in a flagship. The +_Renown’s_ fighting power was small even then, but she was well fitted +for the social side of flagship work--so nicely, indeed, that the +flash-plates of the big guns had been taken up so as not to interfere +with ladies’ shoes in dances! + +After leaving the Mediterranean the _Renown_ was still further +converted into a “battleship yacht,” the six-inch guns being removed. +She was painted white, and used to convey the then Prince of Wales to +India. Thereafter she practically disappeared from the effective list +and eventually became a training ship for stokers. + +The _Renown_ was followed by the ships of the Spencer programme, +nine battleships of the _Majestic_ class, which were spread over the +1893–94 Estimates, and those of the next year. The _Majestics_ were in +substance amplified _Renowns_, their special and particular feature +being that in place of the two amidships belt of varying thickness a +single belt of 16ft. wide of a uniform 9in. thickness was substituted. + +In the _Majestics_, the 13.5, which had been for so long the standard +gun for first-class battleships, disappeared in favour of a new type +of 12-inch, a Mark VIII. of 35 calibres. The two types compare as +follows:-- + + =====+=======+=======+===========+================================= + | | | |Maximum Penetration against K.C. + Bore.|Length.|Weight.|Projectile.| (capped projectiles). + Inch.| Cals. | Tons. | lbs. | at 5000 yds. | at 3000 yds. + | | | | in. | in. + -----+-------+-------+-----------+-----------------+--------------- + 13.5 | 30 | 67 | 1250 | 9 | 12 + | | | | | + 12 | 35 | 46 | 850 | 11½ | 14½ + =====+=======+=======+===========+=================+=============== + +The new gun was, therefore, superior in everything except weight of +projectile, and that was not considered much in those days. To-day, of +course, it has quite a special meaning. + +In the _Majestics_, except in the first two, all-round loading +positions for the big guns were introduced in place of the cumbersome +old system whereby, after firing, the guns had to return to an end-on +position, tilt up, and at a fixed angle take their charges at what was +little but an adaption for breechloaders of the loading system evolved +twenty years before for the old _Inflexible_. + +Details of these ships:-- + + Displacement--14,900 tons. + + Length--(between perpendiculars) 390ft., (over-all) 413ft. + + Beam--75ft. + + Draught--(mean), 27½ ft., (maximum) about 30ft. + + Armament--Four 12-inch 35 cal., twelve 6-inch 40 cal., sixteen + 12-pounders, twelve 3-pounders. Torpedo tubes (18-inch), four + submerged and one above water in stern. + + Armour (Harvey)--Belt, (220ft. by 16ft.) 9in. Bulkheads, 14in. + Barbettes, 14in. with 10in. turrets. Casemates, 6in. + + Horse-power--12,000 = 17.5 knots. + + Coal--(normal) 1,200 tons; (maximum) 2,200 tons = nominal radius of + 7,600 miles at 10 knots and 4,000 at 15 knots. + +The ships were built, etc., as follows:-- + + ================+============+=============+================== + Name. | Laid down. | Builder. | Engined by + ----------------+------------+-------------+------------------ + _Magnificent_ | Dec. ’93 | Chatham | Penn + _Majestic_ | Feb. ’94 | Portsmouth | Vickers + _Hannibal_ | April, ’94 | Pembroke | Harland & Wolff + _Victorious_ | May, ’94 | Chatham | Hawthorn, Leslie + _Mars_ | June, ’94 | Laird | Laird + _Prince George_ | Sept. ’94 | Portsmouth | Humphrys + _Jupiter_ | Oct. ’94 | Clydebank | Clydebank + _Cæsar_ | March, ’95 | Portsmouth | Maudslay + _Illustrious_ | March, 95 | Chatham | Penn + ================+============+=============+================== + +Mostly they were completed inside two years, the only ones which took +appreciably longer being the _Hannibal_ and the _Illustrious_. In these +and the _Cæsar_ an innovation introduced in the others--the placing of +the chart house round the base of the foremast with the conning tower +well clear ahead--was done away with, and the old system of the bridge +over the conning tower reverted to. In the _Cæsar_ and _Illustrious_, +laid down later than the others, an improvement was effected by +the introduction of circular instead of pear-shaped barbettes. The +_Majestic_, _Magnificent_, and _Cæsar_ were built in dry dock instead +of on slips--the first instance of this since the days of early +coast-defence monitors. + +The total cost was approximately a million per ship. + +On trials most of them exceeded the designed speed, but all were light +on trials. They proved very handy ships, with circles of 450 yards at +fifteen knots. Coal consumption was always high. + +Compared to the _Sovereigns_, the following figures are of interest:-- + + =============+============+=========+==========+=======+======== + | | | Weight of| | + |Displacement|Weight of|Armament &| |Normal + Name. | (tons). | Armour |Ammunition| | Coal + | | (tons). | (tons). | H.P. |(tons). + -------------+------------+---------+----------+-------+-------- + _Majestics_ | 14,900 | 4260 | 1500 |12,000 | 1200 + _Sovereigns_ | 14,100 | 4600 | 1410 |13,000 | 900 + =============+============+=========+==========+=======+======== + +The total dead weight carried in armament, armour, and coal thus works +out at practically the same figure, despite the rise of 800 tons in +displacement. On these grounds certain attacks were made upon the +ships, mainly by those who argued against the unarmoured ends. The +criticisms were, however, mainly of the captious order--the ships were +certainly the finest specimens of naval architecture of their day. + +At a later date electric hoists were fitted to the 6-inch guns, and +400 tons of oil fuel were added to the fuel capacity (the maximum coal +capacity being reduced by 200 tons). The first ship to be so fitted was +the _Mars_. Another innovation was shifting the torpedo nets, first in +the _Mars_, then in all the others, from the upper deck to the main +deck level; the idea being to keep the nets clear of the 6-inch guns. + +The _Majestic_ and _Magnificent_ served for a long time as flagships in +the Channel Fleet. Admiral Sir F. Stephenson and Sir A. K. Wilson flew +their flags in the _Majestic_, of which ship Prince Louis of Battenberg +was at one time captain. + +It was during the early service of the _Majestics_ in the Channel Fleet +that “invisible” colours for warships first came into consideration, +all ships up to that date being painted with black hulls, white upper +works, and yellow masts and funnels. For these experiments the +_Magnificent_ was painted black all over, the _Majestic_ and _Hannibal_ +were given grey and light green upper works respectively. The latter +was really the more “invisible” of the two, but both ships were left +with black hulls. Ultimately a grey, a little darker than that which +the Germans had long used, was adopted as the regulation, though for +some time it varied greatly between ship and ship, following the old +system under which a good deal of latitude in painting was allowed.[17] + +To this era, 1894–95, belong two groups of protected cruisers, the +_Powerfuls_ and the _Talbots_. The latter, nine in all, were merely +enlarged (5,600 tons) editions of the later cruisers of the Naval +Defence Act, and call for no comment. The former group were the +_Powerful_ and _Terrible_, “replies” to the Russian _Rurik_ and +_Rossiya_. They displaced nearly as much as the battleships--14,200 +tons--and ran to the then unheard of length of 500ft. between +perpendiculars. They carried no belt armour whatever, but were given +stout protective decks, no less than 6in. on the slopes amidships. +The two big guns (40 calibre, 9.2) were given 6in. Harvey barbettes, +the twelve other guns[18] (6-inch) being in 6-inch casemates. Sixteen +12-pounders were disposed about the upper works. Designed horse-power +25,000 = 22 knots. Total bunker capacity of 3,000 tons, equal to a +nominal 7,000 miles at fourteen knots. Both ships were laid down in +1894, the _Powerful_ by Vickers and the _Terrible_ at Clydebank. They +were launched in the following year. + +In service the _Powerfuls_ proved capable of keeping up a speed of +twenty knots almost indefinitely. For the rest, they were unhandy ships +with large turning circles. At the time of the South African War, both +of them were at the Cape, and did service with landed naval brigades. +Of these, one from the _Powerful_, with some 4.7’s on special Percy +Scott gun-carriages, materially assisted in the defence of Ladysmith. + +During the year 1911 the decision was come to that it was not worth +while preserving either ship, on account of the large crews required +and their comparatively small fighting value under modern conditions. + +Two considerable novelties were embodied in these ships. The first of +these was the adoption of electrical gear for the big guns. The other +and more far-reaching was the adoption of Belleville boilers. + + +_THE BATTLE OF THE BOILERS._ + +Owing to favourable reports of their use in the French Navy, Belleville +boilers were in 1895 experimentally fitted to the _Sharpshooter_, +torpedo gunboat; but the decision to adopt them in large ships was +taken from French rather than any British experience. Trouble and +failure were freely predicted. With the result frequently attending +lugubrious predictions, very little trouble has ever been experienced +with any type and then only in the very early stage when the water-tube +boiler was an almost unknown curiosity to the engine-room staff. + +The chief advantages claimed for Belleville boilers were the higher +working pressures, economy in maintenance and fuel consumption, saving +of weight, rapid steam raising, and great facility for repairs. + +[Illustration: WHITE ERA BATTLESHIPS OF THE MAJESTIC CLASS] + +The Belleville was the first water-tube boiler to come +into prominence; other types, however, soon appeared. In the +period 1895–98, torpedo gunboats were experimentally fitted as +follows:--_Sharpshooter_, Belleville; _Sheldrake_, Babcock; _Seagull_, +Niclausse; _Spanker_, Du Temple; _Salamander_, Mumford; _Speedy_, +Thornycroft--these three last being of the small tube type. Other +existing types were the Yarrow, White-Foster, Normand, Reed, +Blechynden, all these being of the small tube type also, and regarded +as suitable for small craft only.[19] + +In the matter of big ships, so far as the British Navy was concerned, +“water-tube boiler” for some years meant Bellevilles only, whence it +came that in the insensate “Battle of the Boilers,” which presently +broke out, Bellevilles were the main object of attack in Parliament and +elsewhere. Actually, of course, the whole principle was in the melting +pot. All the elements opposed to change in any form rallied to the +attack, led on and influenced in some cases by those whose interests +were bound up with the old style cylindrical boilers. It was all over +again the old story of the fight for the retention of the paddle +against the screw propeller, with an equal disregard for facts. + +Unfortunately the party of progress played somewhat into the hands of +the reactionaries. In fitting the Belleville type only, they had not +much alternative, other types being then in a less forward state. The +error made was that in the wholesale adoption of a new type of steam +generator, requiring twice the skill and intelligence necessary for +the old type, it was practically impossible to train quickly enough a +sufficiency of engineers and stokers. Hence troubles soon arose. An +even greater error was that the boilers were mostly built in England +to the French specifications, without, in many cases, sufficient +experienced supervision; and minor “improvements,” such as fusible +plugs and restricting regulations, were introduced by more or less +amateur Admiralty authorities--which also produced trouble. + +For example, French practice had taught that adding lime to the feed +water was desirable; but in many British ships this rule was ignored. +Again, one Belleville essential was to throw on coal in very small +quantities at a time, in contradistinction to the old cylindrical +practice in which shovelling on enormous quantities of coal was the +recipe for increased speed. This feature was often disregarded. + +The Belleville, ever a complicated and delicate mechanism, if its full +efficiency is to be secured, was a worse boiler for the experiments +than many of the simpler types of to-day would have been. But no +water-tube boiler of any type would have stood any chance of success +against the opposition. There were some terrible times in the boiler +rooms in those days. One or two ships whose chief engineers had been +specially trained in France secured marvellous results, usually by +ignoring Admiralty improvements and regulations.[20] But for one +success there were many early failures. + +[Illustration: + + EDGAR. + POWERFUL. + DIADEM. + CRESSY. + DRAKE. + COUNTY. + DEVONSHIRE. + +PRINCIPAL CRUISERS OF THE WHITE ERA.] + +The agitation triumphed to the extent of a Committee of Inquiry being +appointed. An interim report of this Committee made a scape-goat of the +Belleville, to the extent of recommending that no more should be +fitted. But the victory of the retrogrades ended there. A species of +compromise with public opinion inflamed against the water-tube system +was temporarily adopted, and absurd mixed installations of cylindrical +and water-tube boilers were fitted to some ships. Four large tube types +were selected as substitutes for Bellevilles, the Niclausse, Dürr (a +German variant of the Niclausse), the Babcock and Wilcox, and the +Yarrow large tube. + +It may approximately be said that every water-tube boiler is a species +of compromise between facility for rapid repair on board ship and +complication, and the need of great care in using and working. It is +usual to put the Belleville at one end of this scale and the Yarrow +(large tube) at the other, this last boiler now requiring little, if +any, more care than the old type of cylindrical. + +In the course of comparatively short experiments, both the Niclausse +and the Dürr were found to possess most of the alleged deficiencies of +the Belleville without its advantages; and it was decided to fit all +future types of large ships with the Babcock and Yarrow types only. The +absurd mixture of cylindrical and water-tube boilers was wisely done +away with. Curiously enough, the Belleville boiler, once the agitation +had ceased, also ceased to be troublesome. This was no doubt due to the +increased experience which had been gained in the interim. + +Both the Babcock and Yarrow boilers have been immensely improved since +the days when they were first brought out. Something of the same sort +is, of course, true of all the standard types, and there is to-day +hardly any question as to which of them may be the best or worst. Each +type has some special advantage of its own, and in no case, probably, +is that advantage sufficiently pronounced to render any one type +absolutely the best. When adopted by the Admiralty the Belleville was +certainly the best water-tube boiler available. Had it been persisted +in and not “improved” by amateurs it would probably have done quite as +well as any type adopted to-day. The real issue was mainly not one of +type, but of principle. That principle was the water-tube boiler as +opposed to the old type cylindrical. + +The Estimates for 1896–97 provided for five battleships which were +somewhat sarcastically alluded to as “improved” _Majestics_. These +ships were the _Canopus_ class, and they mark a species of early +striving after the ideal of the battle-cruisers of to-day. That is +to say, certain sacrifices were made in them with a view to securing +increased speed. + +Particulars of these ships:-- + + Displacement--12,950 tons. + + Length--(over all) 418ft. + + Beam--74ft. + + Draught--(maximum) 26½ft. + + Armament--Four 12in., 35 cal., twelve 6in. 40 cal., ten + 12-pounders, four submerged tubes (18in.) + + Armour--Harvey-Nickel. Belt amidships 6in. with 2in. extension + to the bow and 1½in. skin aft on the water-line. Bulkheads and + barbettes 12in. Turrets 8in. + + Horse-power--31,500 = 18.25 knots. + + Coal--(normal) 1,000 tons; (maximum) 2,300 tons = nominal radius of + 8,000 miles at 10 knots. + +The adoption of Harvey-Nickel armour, which was of superior resisting +power to Harvey armour in the ratio of about 5 to 4, partly, but not +entirely accounted for the thinning of the armour of this class. +Theoretically, the 9in. armour belt of the _Majestic_ was equal to +18in. of iron, while the belt of the _Canopus_ class was equal to +about 15in. of iron. In place of the 4in. deck of the _Majestics_, the +_Canopus_ class had only a 2½in. deck. The thin bow (2in.) plating +was introduced as a sop to a public agitation against soft-ended +ships. Such a belt is, of course, perfectly useless against any heavy +projectile, or, for that matter, against 6in., except at very long +range indeed. Sir William White never made any secret of his cynical +disbelief in these bow belts. They were and always have been what +doctors call a “placebo.” + +In the following year the sixth ship of this class was built--the +_Vengeance_. She differed from the others in the form of her turrets, +which were flat sided for the first time. In her also a mounting was +first introduced, whereby, in addition to being loaded in any position, +big guns could also be loaded at any elevation. + +Some other details of the _Canopus_ class are:-- + + =============+=============+=================+============+========== + Name. | Built by | Engines by | Laid down. |Completed. + -------------+-------------+-----------------+------------+---------- + _Canopus_ | Portsmouth | Greenock | Jan. ’97 | 1900 + _Goliath_ | Chatham | Penn | Jan. ’97 | 1900 + _Albion_ | Thames I.W. | Maudslay | Dec. ’96 | 1902 + _Ocean_ | Devonport | Hawthorn Leslie | Feb. ’97 | 1900 + _Glory_ | Laird | Laird | Dec. ’96 | 1901 + _Vengeance_ | Vickers | Vickers | Aug. ’97 | 1901 + =============+=============+=================+============+========== + +The cruisers of the following year were eight cruisers of the much +discussed _Diadem_ class, small editions of the _Powerful_ (11,000 +tons), and carrying a pair of 6-inch guns in place of the 9.2’s of the +_Powerfuls_. For the first four (the _Diadem_, _Andromeda_, _Europa_, +and _Niobe_) a speed of 20.5 knots only was provided, but in the late +four (the _Argonaut_, _Ariadne_, _Amphitrite_, and _Spartiate_) the +horse-power was increased to 18,000, in order to provide twenty-one +knots. At the present time (1912) these ships have for all practical +purposes already passed from the effective list, all the weak points of +the _Powerfuls_ being exaggerated in them. + +In the Estimates for the years 1895 to 1898, provision was made also +for eleven small third-class cruisers of the “P” class of 2135 tons +and twenty knot speed. The armament consisted of eight 4-inch guns. On +trials most of them did well, but in a very short time their speeds +fell off, and at the present time, such of them as remain on the active +list are slower than the far older cruisers of the _Apollo_ class. + +In the Estimates for 1897–98, in addition to the _Vengeance_, already +mentioned, three improved copies of the _Majestic_ were provided. These +ships were:-- + + ===============+============+============+=========== + Name. | Laid down. | Built at. | Engines by. + ---------------+------------+----------- +----------- + _Formidable_ | March, ’98 | Portsmouth | Earle + _Irresistible_ | April, ’98 | Chatham | Maudslay + _Implacable_ | July, ’98 | Devonport | Laird + ===============+============+============+=========== + +The only difference between them and the _Majestics_ lies in advantage +being taken of improvements in gunnery and armour to increase the +offensive and defensive items. The absurd 2-inch bow belt of the +_Canopus_ was repeated in them, but raised within 2½ft. of the main +deck. A 40-calibre 12-inch was mounted, also a 45-calibre 6-inch. + +These were the first ships of the British Navy in which Krupp +cemented armour was used. This armour, generally known as “K.C.,” has +approximately a resisting power three times that of iron armour. That +is to say, the 9in. belts of the _Formidables_ were approximately 33 +per cent. more effective than the similar belts of the _Majestics_. +These ships proved faster and more handy, easily exceeding their +designed eighteen knots. The superior handiness was brought about by a +superior form of hull--the deadwood aft being cut away for the first +time in them. + +In this year’s Estimates armoured cruisers definitely re-appeared, six +ships of the _Cressy_ type being laid down. + +Particulars of these:-- + + Displacement--12,000 tons. + + Length--454ft. + + Beam--69½ft. + + Draught--(maximum) 28ft. + + Armament--Two 9.2, 40 cal., twelve 6-inch, 45 cal., twelve + 12-pounders, two 18in. submerged tubes. + + Armour--6in. Krupp belt amidships, 250ft. long by 11½ft. wide, 2in. + continuation to the bow. Barbettes 6in. Casemates 5in. + + Horse power--21,000 = 21 knots. + + Coal--(normal) 800 tons; (maximum) 1,600 tons. + + ============+============+===========+============ + Name. | Laid down. | Built at. | Engines by. + ------------+------------+-----------+------------ + _Sutlej_ | Aug. ’98 | Clydebank | Clydebank + _Cressy_ | Oct. ’98 | Fairfield | Fairfield + _Aboukir_ | Nov. ’98 | Fairfield | Fairfield + _Hogue_ | July, ’98 | Vickers | Vickers + _Bacchante_ | Dec. ’99 | Clydebank | Clydebank + _Euryalus_ | July, ’99 | Vickers | Vickers + ============+============+===========+============ + +In substance these ships were armoured editions of the _Powerful_. They +steamed very well in their time, but have now fallen off considerably +and are no longer of any importance. Total weight of armour 2,100 +tons. An innovation introduced in these ships was the fitting of +non-flammable wood, which at a later date was objected to on the +grounds that it deteriorated the gold lace of the uniforms stored in +drawers made of it. The _Cressy_ was completed in 1901; the others, +excepting the _Euryalus_, in 1902. This latter ship was greatly delayed +from various causes, and not completed until 1903. + +The 1898–99 Estimates consisted of three battleships and four armoured +cruisers. The battleships were practically sisters to the _Formidable_, +but differed from her in that the main belt, instead of being a patch +amidships, has a total length of 300ft. from the bow. At the bow it is +2in., quickly increasing to 4in., 5in., 6in., and finally to 9in., and +this provided a measure of protection that the 2in. belts of preceding +ships could never afford. The flat-sided turrets, first introduced in +the _Vengeance_, were also fitted in these ships, the _Formidables_ +having the old pattern turrets. + +The advantages of flat-sided turrets lie in the fact that K.C. can +be used for them instead of the relatively softer non-cemented. K.C. +is not applicable to curved surfaces, for which reason barbettes, +casemates, and batteries with curved portholes in them and rounded +turrets cannot be constructed of it. Flat-sided turrets consist of +a number of flat plates placed to meet each other at predetermined +angles, thus forming one homogeneous whole. + +These battleships were:-- + + ============+============+===========+============ + Name. | Laid down. | Built at. | Engines by. + ------------+------------+-----------+------------ + _London_ | Dec. ’98 | Portsmouth| Earle + _Bulwark_ | March, ’99 | Devonport | Hawthorn + _Venerable_ | Nov. ’99 | Chatham | Maudslay + ============+============+===========+============ + +All were completed in 1902. + +The cruisers of the same year, the _Drake_ class, were “improved” +_Cressies_, with increased displacement, power and speed. The increased +displacement allowed of four extra 6-inch guns being mounted, these +being placed in casemates on top of the amidships casemates. + +Particulars of the _Drake_ class:-- + + Displacement--14,000 tons. + + Length--(over all) 529½ft. + + Beam--71ft. + + Draught--(maximum) 28ft. + + Armament--Two 9.2, 45 cal. (instead of 40 cal., as in the + _Cressies_), sixteen 6-inch, 45 cal., and fourteen 12-pounders, + two submerged tubes (18in.). + + Armour--2,700 tons, as in _Cressy_, except that the casemates are + 6in. thick. + + Horse-power--30,000 = 23 knots. Boilers, 43 Belleville. + + Coal--(normal) 1,250 tons; (maximum) 2,500. + +These ships were altogether superior to the _Cressy_ class. On trial +they all easily made their contract speeds and subsequently greatly +exceeded them. It was discovered that increased speed was to be +obtained by additional weight aft, and this was so much brought to a +fine art that weights were adjusted accordingly, and in one of them, +seeking to make a speed record, the entire crew were once mustered aft +in order to vary the trim! + +Building details are as follows:-- + + ===============+============+==========+===========+============== + Name. | Laid down. |Completed.| Built at. | Engines by. + ---------------+------------+----------+-----------+-------------- + _Good Hope_ | Sept. ’99 | 1902 | Fairfield | Fairfield + _Drake_ | April, ’99 | 1902 | Pembroke | Humphrys & T. + _Leviathan_ | Nov. ’99 | 1903 | Clydebank | Clydebank + _King Alfred_ | Aug. ’99 | 1903 | Vickers | Vickers + ===============+============+==========+===========+============== + +For some years these were the fastest ships in the world. In 1905, in +a race by the Second Cruiser Squadron across the Atlantic, with ships +of nominally equal speed, the _Drake_ came in first. In December, 1906, +at four-fifths power for thirty hours, she averaged 22.5 knots. In +1907, the _King Alfred_ averaged 25.1 knots for one hour, and made an +eight hours’ mean of 24.8. They proved very economical steamers, being +able to do nineteen knots at an expenditure of eleven tons of coal an +hour, and though they are now getting old, as warships go, they have +never yet been beaten on the results achieved by horse-power per ton of +displacement. + +The Estimates of 1898–99 included a supplementary programme of four +armoured ships which, like the _Canopus_ class, again foreshadowed the +battle cruisers of to-day. These were the famous _Duncan_ class, and +may be described as slightly smaller editions of the _London_, with +armour thickness sacrificed for superior speed. The belt amidships was +reduced from 9in. to 7in., but against this the belt at the extreme +bow was made an inch thicker, and 25ft. away from the ram became +5in. thick. The displacement sank by 1,000 tons, the horse-power was +increased by 3,000, and the speed by one knot. + +The total weight of armour is about 3,500 against 4,300 tons in the +_Londons_. The _Duncans_ may be regarded as a species of recrudescence +of Barnaby ideas, plus a later notion that a well-extended partial +protection was better than a more concentrated protection of less +area. Generally speaking, they were improved duplicates of the +_Canopus_ class, in the same way that the _Formidable_ and the ships +that followed her were duplicates of the _Majestic_. Two ideas +were obviously at work. In other forms these two ideas have (with +variations) existed to the present day. Then it was purely a question +between ratios devoted to speed and protection. To-day (1912) matters +have been so far modified that increased displacements are given to +secure speed advantages, but protection remains proportionately as it +was. Reduced armament has always been accepted. + +Construction details of the _Duncans_, of which two more figured in the +estimates for 1899–1900:-- + + ============+============+==============+============= + Name. | Laid down. | Built at. | Engines by. + ------------+------------+--------------+------------- + _Duncan_ | July, ’99 | Thames, I.W. | Thames, I.W. + _Russell_ | March, ’99 | Palmer | Palmer + _Cornwallis_| July, ’99 | Thames, I.W. | Thames, I.W. + _Exmouth_ | Aug. ’99 | Laird | Laird + _Albemarle_ | Jan. ’00 | Chatham | Thames, I.W. + _Montagu_ | Nov. ’99 | Devonport | Laird + ============+============+==============+============= + +The _Montagu_ was wrecked on Lundy Island in 1906. + +Contemporaneous with the _Drakes_, and extending over four ships in +the Estimates of 1898–99 to two in the following and four in the year +later, ten armoured cruisers were provided for, which in essence were +little but an attempt to provide a normal second-class protected +cruiser of the _Talbot_ class, with armour protection. These ships--the +_County_ class--are of 9,800 tons displacement, and may also be +regarded as diminutives of the _Drake_ and _Cressy_ classes, with a +touch of the _Diadems_ thrown in. In place of the fore and aft 9.2’s +of the _Drake_ and _Cressy_, they were supplied with a couple of pairs +of 6-inch guns mounted in turrets fore and aft. The belt amidships +was reduced to 4in. (a thickness in K.C. which has no virtues over +armour of earlier type) with the usual extension of 2in. to the bow. +The twin turrets, in which, like those of the _Powerful_, electrical +control was once more introduced, have never given satisfaction, being +very cramped for working purposes, and probably no more efficient than +single gun turrets would have been, certainly less than the single gun +7--5in. turrets, originally proposed as an alternative, would have been. + +Had the ships been regarded frankly as modern variants of the +second-class protected cruisers, they probably would have been esteemed +more than they were. Unfortunately they have always been regarded as +“armoured ships” and discounted on account of their obvious inferiority +to the _Drakes_. In the matter of steaming all of them have invariably +done well (except in the case of the _Essex_, over which a mistake in +design was made). The anticipated twenty-three knots was made quite +easily, once certain early propeller difficulties were overcome. The +Boiler Commission, already referred to, affected these ships, in so far +that, instead of the hitherto inevitable Bellevilles, the _Berwick_ and +_Suffolk_ were given Niclausse boilers and the _Cornwall_ Babcocks. The +total weight of armour is 1,800 tons. + +Details of the construction of this class are:-- + + ==============+===========+==============+============== + Name. | Laid down.| Built at. | Engines by. + --------------+-----------+------------- +-------------- + _Essex_ | Jan. ’00 | Pembroke | Clydebank + _Kent_ | Feb. ’00 | Portsmouth | Hawthorn + _Bedford_ | Feb. ’00 | Fairfield | Fairfield + _Monmouth_ | Aug. ’99 | L. & Glasgow | L. & Glasgow + _Lancaster_ | Mar. ’01 | Elswick | Hawthorn L. + _Berwick_ | April, ’01| Beardmore | Humphrys + _Donegal_ | Feb. ’01 | Fairfield | Fairfield + _Cornwall_ | Mar. ’01 | Pembroke | Hawthorn + _Cumberland_ | Feb. ’01 | L. & Glasgow | L. & Glasgow + _Suffolk_ | Mar. ’02 | Portsmouth | Humphrys & T. + ==============+===========+==============+============== + +All were completed during 1903 and 1904. + +For the year 1900–01 only two battleships were provided: the _Queen_, +built at Devonport and engined by Harland and Wolff, and the _Prince +of Wales_, built at Chatham and engined by the Greenock Foundry Co. +These were laid down in 1901 and completed in 1904. They were copies of +the _Londons_ in every detail, saving that, instead of being enclosed, +their upper deck batteries were left open as in the _Duncans_. The +_Queen_ was given Babcock boilers instead of Bellevilles. + +The 1901–02 Estimates provided three battleships and six armoured +cruisers of the _County_ class. These were the last ships designed +by Sir William White. The battleships, of which eight were built +altogether--three for 1901–02, two for the next year--were of a +different type from any which had preceded them, and to some extent may +be said to mark the birth of the _Dreadnought_ era. That is to say, in +them the old idea of the two calibres, 12in. and 6in., died out, and +heavier auxiliary guns began to appear. + +Particulars of these ships, _the King Edward VII_ class, are as +follows:-- + + Displacement--16,350 tons. + + Length--(over all) 453¾ft. + + Beam--78ft. + + Draught--(maximum) 26¾ft. + + Armament--Four 12-inch, 40 cal., four 9.2, 45 cal., ten 6-inch, + 45 cal., twelve 12-pounders, fourteen 3-pounders, five 18-inch + submerged tubes (of which one is in the stern). + + Armour--As in the _London_ (but a 6in. battery instead of + casemates). + + Horse-power--18,000 = 18.9 knots. + + Coal--(normal) 950 tons; (maximum) 2,150 tons, also 400 tons of + oil, except in the _New Zealand_. + + ==============================+===========+============+============== + Name. | Laid down.| Built at. | Engines by. + ------------------------------+-----------+------------+-------------- + _Commonwealth_ | June, ’01 | Fairfield | Fairfield + _King Edward_ | Mar. ’02 | Devonport | Harland & W. + _Dominion_ | May, ’02 | Vickers | Vickers + _Hindustan_ | Oct. ’02 | Clydebank | Clydebank + _New Zealand_ (now _Zelandia_)| Feb. ’03 | Portsmouth | Humphrys & T. + _Africa_ | Jan. ’04 | Chatham | Clydebank + _Britannia_ | Feb. ’04 | Portsmouth | Humphrys & T. + _Hibernia_ | Jan. ’04 | Devonport | Harland & W. + ==============================+===========+============+============== + +Except the last three, all were completed in 1905. The others were +completed very shortly afterwards. + +The boilers fitted to these ships varied considerably. The _King +Edward_, _Hindustan_, and _Britannia_ were given a mixed installation +of Babcocks and cylindricals; the _New Zealand_ Niclausse boilers; +the other ships Babcock only. In the _Britannia_, super-heaters were +also fitted to six of her boilers. The point differentiating these +ships from their predecessors was the mounting of four 9.2 guns in +single turrets at the angles of the superstructure. Equally novel was +the placing of 6-inch guns in a battery behind the armour on the main +deck.[21] Fighting tops, a feature of all previous ships, disappeared, +and in place of them fire-control platforms were substituted. + +When produced, these ships were considered as something like the “last +word”; but in service later on it was very soon found that the two +calibres of big guns rendered fire-control extremely difficult, and +they have been a somewhat costly lesson in that respect. They cost +about £1,500,000 each, and were found to be all that could be desired +tactically, their turning circles with engines being only about 340yds. +at fifteen knots. All of them did not make their speeds on trials, and +some have never quite come up to expectations in that respect, but +they have all proved remarkably reliable steamers. + +Six armoured cruisers provided for in the 1901–02 Estimates were the +_Devonshires_. These were originally intended to have been enlarged +_Counties_, carrying a single 7.5 fore and aft, in place of the twin +6-inch turrets of the prototype ships. The design was, however, +modified to the extent of substituting a single 7.5 for each of the +forward pairs of 6-inch casemates. + +Details of these ships are:-- + + Displacement--10,850 tons. + + Length (between perpendiculars)--450ft. + + Beam--68½ft. + + Draught--(maximum) 25½ft. + + Armament--Four 7.5, six 6-inch, 45 cal.; two 12-pounders, + twenty-two 3-pounders, two 18in. torpedo tubes submerged. + + Armour Belt--(length 325ft. from the bow, width 10½ft.), 6in. + amidships, thinning to 2in. right forward. Barbettes 6in. Turrets + 5in. Casemates 6in. + + Horse-power--21,000==22.5 knots. + + Coal--(normal) 800; (maximum) 1,800 tons. + +Other details are:-- + + ================+============+==================+============== + Name. | Laid down. | Built at. | Engined by. + ----------------+------------+------------------+-------------- + _Devonshire_ | Mar. ’02 | Chatham | Thames I.W. + _Antrim_ | Aug. ’02 | Clydebank | Clydebank + _Argyll_ | Sept. ’02 | Greenock Foundry | Greenock F.C. + _Carnarvon_ | Oct. ’02 | Beardmore | Beardmore + _Hampshire_ | Sept. ’02 | Elswick | Elswick + _Roxburgh_ | June, ’02 | L. & Glasgow | L. & Glasgow + ================+============+==================+============== + +Like the _King Edwards_, various boilers were given to them. All +of them have one-fifth cylindrical boilers. The _Devonshire_ and +_Carnarvon_ were otherwise given Niclausse; _Antrim_ and _Hampshire_, +Yarrow; _Argyll_, Babcock; and _Roxburgh_, Dürr. The designed speed was +exceeded by all on trials, but none have proved successful steamers +ever since. They were completed between 1904 and 1905. + +These were the last ships to be designed by Sir William White. He +resigned his position from ill-health; but, like his predecessors, left +under a cloud--at any rate, with his services not really appreciated. +He had created a magnificent fleet; but its very magnificence made many +of his designs look poor on paper against any foreign construction of +less displacement, but--_on paper_--of equal or superior qualities. It +is the fate of the naval architect in peace-time to be judged on paper +with small regard to issues such as nautical qualities, constructional +strength, and a score of other details which are not to be expressed +by any statistical formulæ, but yet make all the difference between +efficiency and the absence of it. + +[Illustration: EARLY TYPE OF “27 KNOT” DESTROYERS.] + +Sir William White’s period of office was marked by an almost +complete naval revolution. It began with the quick-firer and the +disappearance of the low freeboard battleships. It ended with the +coming of submarines, fire-control, and wireless. In between, it +included the coming of the destroyer, the re-birth of the armoured +cruiser; the arrival of the water-tube boiler, new forms of hull, +unprecedented advances in both guns and armour--in fact, almost every +conceivable change. Through these troubled waters with a steady hand +and cool brain Sir William White guided the destiny of the Fleet and +the millions of pounds expended in shipbuilding. Already his era +is “the pre-_Dreadnought_” one, and to present-day ideas the term +“pre-_Dreadnought_” is already very nearly akin to “pre-historic.” +His creations preserved the peace, for which very reason they failed +to secure glory. Already some have gone to the scrap-heap, and others +are well on their way thither to join the Reed and Barnaby ships in +that oblivion to which modern _Dreadnoughts_ will just as surely go in +their season. More might be said: but _cui bono?_ Such public epitaph +as Sir William White received when he retired was of the “about time, +too!” order. The creator of the finest fleet that the world has ever +seen left office with less honour and no more public interest than did +half-a-dozen mediocre admirals who had chanced to fly their flags in +some of his creations. It is not given for the stage manager to stand +in the lime-light reserved for the principal actors. But the historian +of a hundred years hence, placing great Englishmen in perspective, will +assuredly place Sir William White far ahead of many who loom greater in +the public eye to-day. + + +_GUNS IN THE ERA._ + +The guns which especially belong to the White era are as follows:-- + + ===============+========+============+=========+============================ + Designation. | Weight.| Projectile.| Velocity| Maximum Penetration with + | Tons. | lbs. | f.s. | capped shot against K.C. at + | | | +------------+--------------- + | | | | 5000 yds. | 3000 yds. + ---------------+--------+------------+---------+------------+--------------- + 13.5, 30 cal. | 67 | 1250 | 2016 | 9 | 12 + | | | | | + 12in., 35 cal. | 46 | 850 | 2367 | 11½ | 14½ + 12in., 40 cal. | 50 | 850 | 2750 | 16 | 20 + | | | | | + 10in., 32 cal. | 29 | 500 | 2040 | 5½ | 7½ + | | | | | + 9.2, 30 cal. | 24 | 380 | 2065 | 4 | 6 + 9.2, 40 cal. | 25 | 380 | 2347 | 6¾ | 9¼ + 9.2, 45 cal. | 27 | 380 | 2640 | 8¾ | 11¼ + | | | | | + 7.5, 45 cal. | 14 | 200 | 2600 | 5¾ | 7½ + | | | | | + 6in., 40 cal. | 7½ | 100 | 2200 | -- | -- + | | | | | + 6in., 45 cal. | 7 | 100 | 2535 | -- | 4½ + ===============+========+============+=========+============+=============== + + +_PURCHASED SHIPS._ + +In the year 1902 two ships, the _Constitucion_ and _Libertad_, were +laid down at Elswick and Vickers-Maxims’ respectively for the Chilian +Government. They were designed by Sir Edward Reed, and compare +interestingly with the _King Edwards_ in being much longer and +narrower. It will be remembered that in the past Reed ideals had always +centred round a “short handy ship.” They had also always embodied the +maximum of protection, while these ships carried medium armour only. +His ships had, further, always been characterised by extremely strong +construction, while these verged on the flimsy, the scantlings being +far lighter than in British naval practice. + +Out of all which it has been held that they represented the Reed ideal +of armoured cruisers interlaced with whatever limitations the Chilian +authorities may have specified. + +Particulars of these ships, which in 1903 were purchased for the +British Navy and renamed _Swiftsure_ (ex _Constitucion_) and _Triumph_ +(ex _Libertad_):-- + + Displacement--11,800. Complement, 700. + + Length--(over all) 470ft. + + Beam--71ft. + + Draught--(Maximum) 24ft. 8in. + + Armament--Four 10-inch, 45 cal.; fourteen 7.5-inch, 50 cal.; + fourteen 14-pounders, four 6-pounders, four Maxims; two 18-inch + submerged tubes. + + Armour--Practically complete belt 8ft. wide, 7-inch thick + amidships, reduced to 3-inch at ends. 10-inch bulkheads at ends + of thick portion of belt. Redoubt above (250ft. long), 7-inch on + sides 6-inch bulkheads to it. Deck 1½-inch on slopes amidships, + 3-inch on slopes at ends. Barbettes 10-inch, with 8 to 6-inch + turrets. Battery and upper deck casemates, 7-inch. + + Horse-power--14,000 = 20 knots. Yarrow boilers. + + Coal--(normal) 800 tons; (maximum) 2,000 tons. + +These ships compare interestingly with the _King Edwards_ and +_Devonshires_, between which they struck a mean, as follows:-- + + ===============+=================+===============+=============== + | _King Edward._ | _Swiftsure._ | _Devonshire._ + ---------------+-----------------+---------------+--------------- + Displacement | 16,350 | 11,800 |10,850 + Principal Guns | 4--12in. | 4--10in. | 4--7.5. + | 4--9.2 | 14--7.5 | 6--6in. + | 16--6in. | | + | 5--18in. tubes | 2--18in. tubes| 2--18in. tubes + ---------------+-----------------+---------------+--------------- + Armour belt | 9--2in. | 7--3in. | 6--2in. + Speed | 18.9 knots | 20 knots | 22.25 knots + Coal (Normal) | 950 | 800 | 800 + Coal (Maximum) | 2,150--400 (oil)| 2,000 | 1,800 + ===============+=================+===============+=============== + +Other items of interest are that the armament of the _Swiftsures_ +(10-inch and 7.5’s) had somewhere about that time been laid down by +Admiral Fisher as the ideal armament of the future, on the principle +that the best possible was “the smallest effective big gun, and the +largest possible secondary gun.” + +In service these ships never proved brilliantly successful. They rarely +managed to make their speeds successfully, and there was a great deal +of vibration with them. They were shored up internally in places with a +view to strengthening them. On the other hand, it should be mentioned +that some of these alleged defects have been put down to conservatism +in nautical ideas, and that the shoring up was not really required. +Their great drawback was that so far as the British Navy was concerned +they were neither one thing nor the other, being too light in heavy +guns to be satisfactory with the battleships, and too slow to act with +the cruisers. Had there been six or so of them they would, possibly +enough, have formed an ideal squadron. Being two ships only, they of +necessity became round pegs in square holes. + + +_NAVAL ESTIMATES IN THE ERA._ + + ===========+=============+============+===================================== + Financial | | | Ships. + Year. | Amount. | Personnel. +--------------+-----------+---------- + | | | | Armoured | Protected + | | | Battleships. | Cruisers. | Cruisers. + -----------+-------------+------------+--------------+-----------+---------- + 1887–88 | 12,476,800 | 62,500 | -- | -- | 3 + 1888–89[22]| 13,082,800 | 62,500 | -- | -- | 2 + 1889–90 | 13,685,400 | 62,400 | -- | -- | -- + 1890–91 | 13,786,600 | 65,400 | 8 | -- | 42 + 1891–92 | 14,557,856 | 68,800 | 2 | -- | -- + 1892–93 | 14,240,200 | 67,700 | 1 | -- | -- + 1893–94 | 14,340,000 | 70,500 | 6 | -- | 2 + 1894–95 | 17,365,900 | 83,000 | 3 | -- | 9 + 1895–96 | 18,701,000 | 88,850 | -- | -- | 8 + 1896–97 | 21,823,000 | 93,750 | 6 | -- | 3 + 1897–98 | 21,838,000 | 100,050 | 7 | 6 | -- + 1898–99 | 23,780,000 | 106,390 | 3 | 4 | -- + 1899–00 | 26,594,000 | 110,640 | 2 | 2 | 1 + 1900–01 | 28,791,900 | 114,880 | 2 | 6 | 1 + 1901–02 | 30,875,500 | 118,625 | 3 | 6 | -- + 1902–03 | 31,255,500 | 122,500 | 2 | 2 | -- + ===========+=============+============+==============+===========+========== + +In the following year 1903–04 three ships (the last of the _King +Edwards_) were provided for. The total number of battleships designed +for the British Navy by Sir William White was therefore 48. There were +in addition 26 armoured cruisers--making a total of 74 armoured ships, +and about as many protected cruisers, including some for Colonial +service. + + + + +III. + +THE WATTS ERA. + + +Sir William White was succeeded by Mr., afterwards Sir Philip Watts, +who came to the Admiralty from Elswick, where he had been Chief +Constructor. He came with the reputation of “putting in plenty of +guns,” and his appointment was favourably received, both inside the +Navy and outside. + +The armoured cruisers _Duke of Edinburgh_ and _Black Prince_ were the +first ships for which he was personally responsible. + +Details of these:-- + + Displacement--13,550 tons. + + Length (between perpendiculars)--480ft. + + Beam--73½ft. + + Draught--(maximum) 27½ft. + + Armament--Six 9.2, 45 cal., ten 6-inch, 50 cal.; twenty-two + 3-pounders. Torpedo tubes:--Three submerged (18in.). + + Horse-power--23,500 = 22.3 knots. + + Coal--(normal) 1,000 tons; (maximum) 2,000; also 400 tons of oil. + +The former ship was laid down at Pembroke and engined by Hawthorn; the +latter was built and engined by the Thames Iron Works. In the matter +of armament and its arrangement the ships were to some extent cruiser +versions of the _King Edward_; but equally, in the adoption of a number +of single gun-houses for big guns, and the jump from two to a larger +number of big guns, the influence of the Chilian _O’Higgins_, built +at Elswick, may be noticed. The big guns were placed one forward and +one aft, two on either beam and two on either quarter. The 6-inch +were placed in an armoured battery below. As originally designed, +right ahead fire was given to the forward battery guns, but this was +dispensed with at a later date. The ships were never good sea boats, +and the 6-inch guns were soon found to be well-nigh useless in any sea. + +The armour was disposed in generous fashion--a complete belt reaching +up to the main deck, 4in. forward, 6in. for some 260ft. amidships, and +3in. aft of that. A 6in. battery (K.N.C.) with bulkheads surmounts the +belt-7in. barbettes with 6in. K.C. flat-sided gunhouses. + +Both were given a mixed installation of Babcock and cylindrical +boilers. A novelty was the standardisation of all their machinery, a +very valuable innovation, which has been followed ever since. Parts of +any one ship’s machinery can be used for any other of her class, thus +facilitating rapid repairs and requiring a considerably reduced stock +of spares. + +On trials the _Duke of Edinburgh_ did on her eight hours’ full power +trial I.H.P. 23,685 = 22.84 knots, the _Black Prince_ 23,939 = 23.6 +knots. In service, however, the former has generally proved the better +steamer. Another innovation in these ships was the re-appearance of +the stern torpedo tube, first introduced in the _Centurions_. As +re-introduced it was built submerged, a feature long desired, but which +had previously presented innumerable difficulties in design. + +[Illustration: + + SWIFTSURE. + + WATTS ERA. + LORD NELSON. + BLACK PRINCE. + WARRIOR. + MINOTAUR. + +PRE-DREADNOUGHTS OF THE WATTS ERA.] + +For the Estimates of the following year (1903–04) four more ships of +the same type were provided-- + + ===========+============+===========+============= + Name. | Laid down. | Builders. | Engines by. + -----------+------------+-----------+------------- + _Achilles_ | Feb. ’04 | Elswick | Hawthorn + _Cochrane_ | Mar. ’04 | Fairfield | Fairfield + _Warrior_ | Jan. ’04 | Vickers | Vickers + _Natal_ | Nov. ’03 | Pembroke | Wallsend Co. + ===========+============+===========+============= + +In these the defect of the low 6-in. battery of the _Black Princes_ was +anticipated, and instead of ten 6-inch guns, four 7.5 were mounted in +gun-houses on the upper deck amidships. Yarrow and cylindrical boilers +mixed were installed. Otherwise no change was made. On trial the +_Achilles_ reached a maximum of 23.27, the other three ships all made +their contracts or over. + +These four, generally known as the _Warriors_, proved to be the finest +cruisers as sea-boats ever built for the British Navy. They have always +proved most remarkably steady gun platforms. Shooting from them is +invariably good--they have always been near the top of the list in +gunnery returns. For a single ship in a single commission good shooting +is attributable to causes other than the ship; but with four ships and +different crews at different times the effect of the design is obvious. +Apparently the extra weight on their upper decks is responsible; for +their dimensions are identical with those of the unsatisfactory _Black +Princes_. + +In all these ships, as in the _Devonshires_ which preceded them, raking +masts and stumpy funnels were introduced. The latter proved most +inconvenient for navigating purposes, and in 1911 all the _Warriors_ +had their funnels considerably heightened. + +In these four latter the “dove-cot” platform fire-controls first +appeared; they were fitted also to the three latest ships of the _King +Edward_ class. + +The main defect of all six is the trivial anti-torpedo armament. The +3-pounders are perfectly useless against destroyers. Incidentally it +may be noticed that the class signalled the scientific placing of such +guns for control purposes. In the _Warriors_ some guns were mounted on +turret tops also, this being with a view to their survival after an +action. It was contended that an actual hit was extremely improbable on +any anti-t.b. guns, but that shells bursting underneath might easily +disable them. Hence the search for an armoured base. This idea seems to +have originated in the German Navy, though the Germans never adopted +the turret-top position. + +The Estimates (1904–05) provided for two battleships and three armoured +cruisers. The latter of these, the _Minotaur_ class, were “improved +_Warriors_”; but, as a matter of fact, except for a larger armament, +they proved somewhat inferior to their immediate predecessors:-- + +Details are: + + Displacement--14,600 tons (as against 13,550). + + Length (between perpendiculars)--490ft., (over all) 525ft. + + Beam--74½ft. (but a foot more in _Shannon_). + + Draught--(maximum) 28ft. (but a foot less in _Shannon_). + + Armament--Four 9.2, 50 cal., ten 7.5, fourteen 12-pounders, five + 18in. tubes (submerged). + + Horse-power--27,000 = 23 knots. + + Coal--(normal) 1,000 tons (950 only in _Shannon_); (maximum) 2,000, + also 400 tons oil. + +[Illustration: SIR PHILIP WATTS.] + +The 9.2 were placed in double turrets fore and aft. For those of the +_Minotaur_ electric manœuvring was substituted for the usual hydraulic. +The 7.5’s are disposed in ten single gun houses on the upper deck, +_Warrior_ fashion. The armour belt is of the same maximum thickness, +but only 3in. for 50ft. from the bow. Thereafter it thickens gradually +for the next 75ft. then reaches its maximum. Vertical armour above +the main deck was given up in order to allow for the increased weight +of armament and its protection--a total of 2,073 tons. The _Minotaur_ +has Babcock, the other two Yarrow large-tube boilers. No cylindricals +were fitted; the opponents of the water-tube system having lost their +influence by 1905, when the ships were laid down. + +None of these ships came up to expectations on trial, though they +developed considerably more than the contract horse-power. The +_Minotaur_ just made her speed, the _Defence_ just failed to reach it, +the _Shannon_ failed by half-a-knot. This last ship had been varied +from the others with an idea that a new form of hull, would produce +better speed--an unfortunate surmise. Shortly after completion all had +15ft. added to their funnels. The increased draught added to their +power somewhat, but did not materially better their speeds. + +Further details of these three ships are:-- + + ============+============+===========+================== + Name. | Laid down. | Built at. | Engined by. + ------------+------------+-----------+------------------ + _Minotaur_ | Jan. ’05 | Devonport | Harland & Wolff + _Defence_ | Feb. ’05 | Pembroke | Scott S. & E. Co. + _Shannon_ | Jan. ’05 | Chatham | Humphrys + ============+============+===========+================== + +All were completed in 1908. Average cost, £1,400,000 per ship. In them +solid bulkheads first appear, their engine-rooms having no water-tight +doors. + +The battleships of the same programme (1904–05) were the _Lord Nelson_ +and _Agamemnon_. + +Details are:-- + + Displacement--16,500 tons. + + Length (between perpendiculars)--410 ft., (over all) 445ft. + + Beam--79½ft. + + Draught--(mean) 27ft. + + Armament--Four 12-inch, 45 cal., ten 9.2, 50 cal. fifteen + 12-pounders, sixteen 3-pounders, five submerged tubes (18in.). + + Horse-power--16,750 = 18.5 knots. + + Coal--(normal) 900 tons; (maximum) 2,000 tons; also 400 tons oil. + +The _Lord Nelson_ was built and engined by Palmer, the _Agamemnon_ +by Beardmore and engined by Hawthorn. The former was given Babcock, +the latter Yarrow boilers. Both on trial easily exceeded the contract +speed, and proved abnormally handy ships. They cost £1,500,000 or only +a little more than the _Minotaurs_. + +The _Nelsons_ are often counted as “Dreadnoughts”; but their only +claim to the position is they do not happen to carry any 6-inch guns. +Actually they are nothing but improved _King Edwards_, bearing to those +ships very much the same relation as the _Warriors_ to the _Black +Princes_. Their comparatively slow speeds and their mixed armaments +entirely differentiate them from the swifter “all-big-gun” ship which +followed, and, for that matter, caught them up.[23] + +The _Nelsons_ were never really successful ships outside the points +alluded to above. Eight of their ten 9.2’s were placed in twin +turrets, and in many circumstances two 9.2 so mounted proved very +little superior in efficiency to a similar single gun in an isolated +gun-house.[24] + +In the matter of protection the _Nelsons_ far exceeded the _King +Edwards_. In place of a 9in. belt amidships they were given a 12in. +one, while the 8in. and 6in. strakes above of the earlier ships +became a uniform 8in. The bow belt forward was also augmented to 6in. +on the water-line, surmounted by 4in., instead of a belt uniformly +increasing from 2in. to 6in. further aft. But none of this made them +“Dreadnoughts,” and the absence of “Dreadnought” features relegated +them to the second line very soon after they were completed. + +In these ships the tripod mast, the idea of which dates back to the +_Captain_ era, re-appeared. The _Nelsons_ were given as mainmasts the +first of those modern tripods which have characterised nearly every +British capital ship since built till the _Lion_ was altered. + +The idea of the tripod mast is to avoid the many shrouds of an ordinary +mast; and so give greater training to the guns. Whether the idea be +of use is another matter. Generally speaking ideas abandoned by our +forefathers have failed to live long if resuscitated. + +In the 1902–03 and 1903–04 Estimates provision was made for four +vessels each year of a new type, known as “Scouts.” These were the +_Adventure_ and _Attentive_ (Elswick), _Forward_ and _Foresight_ +(Fairfield), _Pathfinder_ and _Patrol_ (Laird), _Sentinel_ and +_Skirmisher_ (Vickers-Maxim). One was awarded each year to each of the +firms mentioned, but all were actually laid down between June, 1903, +and January, 1904. The first four to be given out to contract were +originally named _Eddystone_, _Nore_, _Fastnet_, and _Inchkeith_. + +These vessels came to be built owing to an appreciation of the fact +that destroyers had altogether lost their original rôle and had become +torpedo-boats, pure and simple. The “Scouts,” though from three to four +times the size, were the old “catchers” re-introduced. + +They compared with these as follows:-- + + =========+===============+==========+==================== + | Average | Average | + | Displacement. | Designed | Armament. + | | Speed. | + ---------+---------------+----------+-------------------- + “Scouts” | 2850 | 25 | 12 to 14--12pdr., + | | | 2--14in. tubes[25] + Halcyons | 1070 | 18.5 | 2--4.7, 4--6pdr., + | | | 5--18in. tubes + =========+===============+==========+==================== + +A 1½ deck on slopes amidships was provided for the “Scouts,” which +incidentally were designed for ten 12-pounders only. By the year +1912 it became abundantly clear that, like their predecessors the +“catchers,” they were doomed to pass quickly into the “little use” +category on account of their weak armaments and small sea-keeping +capacity. + + +_TORPEDO CRAFT._ + +It has already been mentioned that Sir William White’s period of +office saw the coming of the destroyer. The origin of this craft is +to be found in a public agitation, which arose out of the tremendous +attention paid to torpedo boats by the French, who were then our most +likely enemy, and who had an overwhelming superiority in torpedo craft. + +Some years before a type of craft, the torpedo gunboats already +referred to, which were first known as “torpedo boat catchers” and +subsequently as “catchers” had been introduced. It soon, however, +became very clear that they were little likely to achieve this end, and +the doctrine that “the torpedo boat is the answer to the torpedo boat” +was being steadily preached. At that time (1892) the then insignificant +navy of Germany was in possession of eight very large torpedo boats, +which were known as “division boats.” Austria also had one or two fast +craft, capable of dealing with torpedo boats. Upon these existing lines +a new type of craft was developed for the British Navy. The first two +to be built were the _Havock_ and _Hornet_, which were launched in +1893. In substance they were very large torpedo boats of about 250 +tons displacement, designed by Messrs. Yarrow. Their speed of 27 knots +was well in excess of that of any existing torpedo boat, and it was +confidently expected that they would easily run down and destroy any +such. In addition to what was then the very considerable armament of +one 12-pounder and three 6-pounders, they were also fitted with torpedo +tubes.[26] The original idea of this was that when hostile torpedo +boats had been annihilated by them, the destroyers could be used as +torpedo boats in case of need. + +In 1894 the _Havock_ and _Hornet_ were used in manœuvres and tested by +being made to lie by for twenty-four hours in the Bay of Biscay. They +underwent the test very well, and to this is probably attributed the +realisation of the fact that in them a more or less really effective +sea-going torpedo boat had been evolved. A large number of duplicates +were ordered; at first of 27 knots. Later this was increased to 30, and +in a few boats to a little more. + +The whole of these boats were nothing but enlarged editions of existing +torpedo boats, and some of them proved rather weak for the service +demanded of them. In the year 1902 and onwards, therefore, a type of +better sea-going qualities was demanded, and the River class, which +totalled about 35 boats, began to be built. A feature of the River +class was that they were a blend of the early torpedo gunboats of the +Rattlesnake type, with the later and heavier torpedo gunboats. There +was a reduction of speed to 25½ knots, with a view to securing better +sea-going qualities. On account of their slow speed the River class are +verging on the obsolete to-day, but the high forecastle first embodied +in them has never been departed from, and the very latest types of +destroyers are nothing but swifter and larger editions of them. + +It is interesting to note that here again to some extent the Germans +led the way. German destroyers had the North Sea to consider, whereas +all early British destroyers were built with a view to being used only +in the Channel. Consequently and naturally enough the Germans were the +first to perceive the necessity for a high forecastle. + +The submarine also appeared in the pre-Dreadnought era, but the boats +of that time were of such a primitive type that they need hardly be +specially mentioned. They will be found alluded to in a later chapter. + + +_END OF THE PRE-DREADNOUGHT ERA._ + +So ended the pre-Dreadnought era. It was characterised by a +multiplicity of types which had included:-- + + First class battleships. + Second class battleships. + Fast intermediate battleships. + First rate armoured cruisers. + Second rate armoured cruisers. + First class protected cruisers. + Second class protected cruisers. + Third class protected cruisers. + Scouts. + Torpedo gunboats. + Sloops. + Gunboats. + Destroyers. + Torpedo boats. + Submarines. + +Although the whole of these types were not all building or provided +for at any one and the same time, yet towards the end of the period +there was a general feeling that too many types of ships were in use. +Reductions in this direction were announced, at first indicating that +in future programmes provision would be made only for:-- + + “Armoured ships.” + Destroyers. + Submarines. + +Contemporaneously with this came Admiral Fisher’s famous “scrap-heap +policy,” whereby some eighty vessels of one kind and another were +struck off the effective list, and either sold or relegated to +subsidiary service. + +The ships removed included all battleships and armoured cruisers of +earlier date than the _Trafalgar_, several ships of the _Apollo_ class, +all earlier protected cruisers, some of the “P” class, and the bulk of +the small fry in the way of sloops and gunboats. + +This action aroused a certain amount of criticism on the grounds that +the clearance was excessive. As some of the ships were subsequently +restored to the active list, something is undoubtedly to be said for +that point of view; especially as no steps were taken to replace the +scrapped cruisers. On the other hand, most of the ships removed were +of trivial fighting value; though here again the zeal of the reformer +somewhat overlooked the fact that the police duties rendered by the +small fry had been valuable. + +In connection with this policy some of the outlying naval bases were +done away with, and there commenced a “reorganisation” of the Fleet +which has continued intermittently from that day to this! Certain other +considerable changes affecting the _personnel_ will be found dealt with +in a later chapter. + + + + +IV. + +THE DREADNOUGHT ERA--(WATTS). + + +A new era in battleship design, not only for the British Navy, but +for the navies of the entire world, was opened with the advent of the +_Dreadnought_. As has been seen, it was in a way led up to by previous +designs, notably the _Lord Nelson_ class. The essential point of +difference, however, lies in the fact that whereas the _Lord Nelson_ +carries heavy guns of two calibres, in the _Dreadnought_ the main +armament is confined to one calibre only. The advantages of this on +paper are not particularly great, but for practical purposes, such +as fire control and so forth, the superiority to be obtained by a +uniformity of big gun armament is tremendous. + +As the historical portion of this book indicates, the “Dreadnought +idea” has been a fairly regular feature of British Naval Policy, but +in this particular case the inception would seem to have been due to +accident and circumstance rather than to any settled policy. + +Immature and abortive attempts to realise something of the “Dreadnought +ideal” had taken place in the past. The earliest ship claimed to +represent the Dreadnought ideal was the U.S. _Roanoake_, built at +the time of the Civil War. This was a high freeboard ship, fitted +with three turrets in the centre line. A few years later something +of the same sort found expression in the four-turreted British +_Royal Sovereign_ and _Prince Albert_, though these were merely coast +defence ships. Still later in the _Tchesma_ class, Russian, and in the +_Brandenburg_ class of the German Navy, six big guns were installed +as the primary armament. Both these two ideas were laughed out of +existence; and it became a settled fashion to carry four big guns, two +forward and two aft. + +[Illustration: GENERAL CUNIBERTI.] + +Matters were at this stage when the late “Colonel” Cuniberti, +Constructor to the Italian Navy, conceived the idea of a ship carrying +a considerable number of big guns, and embodying in herself the +power of two or three normal battleships. This design was considered +altogether too ambitious for the Italian Navy; but permission was +given him to publish the general idea, subject to official revision. +It first saw the light in “_Fighting Ships_,” in 1903, and is now so +historically interesting that I here reproduce the article in full, the +original being long since out of print:-- + +“Admiral Sir John Hopkins, late Controller of the British Navy, in his +admirable article, ‘Intermediates for the British Fleet,’ published in +the last edition (1902) of this Annual, asks what results it would be +possible to obtain in the British Navy by extending the ideas of the +two Italian Ministers of Marine, Admiral Morin and Admiral Bettolo, +which were translated into fact in the _Vittorio Emanuele III_ (12,625 +tons), so as to arrive at the much greater tonnage of recent British +battleships, in the same manner as the ideas that found concrete form +in the projected vessels of the _Amalfi_ class were amplified and +realised in the Italian battleships alluded to and regarding which, +even now, so many doubts are expressed as to such realisation being +practicable. + +“To proceed from 8,000 to 12,000, and from 12,000 to 17,000 tons of +displacement, constitutes not only a problem of naval architecture, but +also involves high considerations of quite another nature, such as the +special functions of the Fleet, so as to harmonise with the political +objects of any given maritime Power, the geographical position of that +Power, the state of its finances, etc., etc. So that not only does the +answer to such a question entail a certain amount of difficulty from +the constructive point of view, but before the answer can be seriously +considered it is absolutely necessary to determine exactly what end +this ideal British battleship is to serve; for it is not to be imagined +that we are going merely to enlarge the _Vittorio Emanuele_ until we +arrive at a displacement equal to that of the _King Edward VII._ For +example, putting an extra 4,000 tons on board will produce a vessel +that will perhaps be a little steadier in heavy weather than the +original ship. + + * * * * * + +“In Britain are to be found naval experts of the highest possible +order, and they will have their own ideas as to what type of vessels +best fulfil the needs and ideals of the British Fleet, so that it +would almost appear a presumption on my part to offer suggestions for +any Navy other than the Italian. But in deference to the courteous +interrogation of Admiral Hopkins I may be permitted to point out that +from the purely human point of view there are two leading methods by +which one can strike to the ground one’s opponent, either by gradually +developing the attack and disposing of him little by little, or, on +the other hand, killing him at one blow without causing him prolonged +suffering. In like manner there are two distinct modes of sending an +enemy’s ship to the bottom. + +“Let us take, for example, a human combat. The first--the most commonly +used, and the most practical in the majority of cases--has as its basis +the progressive dismemberment of the enemy. + +“Two mortal foes place themselves on guard at a distance; they begin +with exceptional strokes, with feints, with opportune advances and +retreats, never coming to close quarters for a deadly blow until the +capabilities of the enemy, both offensive and defensive, are well +tested, and until some fortunate stroke, even although not actually +deadly, has considerably weakened the foe, has rendered his defence +less able, and has somewhat demoralised him. Covered with blood, +stunned, mutilated, and hardly capable of remaining on his feet, then +comes the moment when his adversary closes in upon him and delivers +the final and mortal blow. And we may almost imagine we hear the +beaten one, with thick and choking voice, repeat the terrible words of +Francesco Ferruccio at the battle of Gavinana: ‘Maramaldo, thou but +killest a man already dead!’ + +“Similarly, two opposing ships, with but slight differences in their +powers, will commence their combat at a great distance, utilising their +evolutionary abilities and their speed in prudent manœuvres, seeking +to gain as much advantage as possible from their offensive powers, +and attempting to place every obstacle in the way of the antagonist +utilising powers in either direction. The discharge of projectiles will +commence in earnest, greatly assisted by the rapid loading of which +the guns of medium and small calibre are now capable. What results +can reasonably be expected from the discharge of the smaller guns at +such great distances is hard to say; nor can the slender expectation +of, let us say, chancing to hit the captain of the opposing ship in +the eye with a lucky shot, at all justify such a waste of ammunition. +Gradually nearing one another, the ships manœuvring less freely, hits +will become more dangerous; the boats that were not set adrift before +the action began will be alight and burning fiercely; the cowls of the +wind trunks, the funnels, and the masts will be in fragments. + +“The crew, wounded and reduced in numbers, will have lost their calm, +and consequently the firing will have become wilder; finally, one of +the two antagonists will get in a lucky shot that will disable the +other. She will speedily become unmanageable, and her enemy will as +speedily close into within the thousand metres which will permit of a +torpedo being launched with every chance of success, or the battle may +be concluded by a final rush and the point of the ram. + +“As the wounded hull sinks slowly beneath the waves, the flag which had +put such heart into the crew, and the sight of which had spurred them +to fight to the last, may well seem as it disappears to repeat to the +enemy these sad words, ‘Thou but slayest one already dead.’ + +“Four ships in place of two, eight in place of four, will repeat in a +perhaps more complex action the same phases of attack, and the same +foolish waste of ammunition, which in these days causes the greatest +preoccupation of those who, having to design warships, must decide on +the quantity of ammunition and projectiles provided for each different +calibre of the armament. + + * * * * * + +“There is, however, another method of fighting and sending your enemy +to the bottom; but it is one that is capable of adoption only by a +Navy at the same time most potent and very rich. + +“Let us imagine a vessel whose armour is so well distributed and so +impervious as to be able to resist all the attacks of an enemy’s +artillery with the exception of the projectiles of the 12-inch guns. +Such a ship could approach her enemy without firing a shot, without +wasting a single round of ammunition, absolutely regardless of all the +scratchings that her antagonist might inflict on the exterior of her +armour plates. + +“And as to-day the belts of fighting ships are generally of such +thickness that, when we leave the results of the proving ground and +come to the conditions of actual combat, we find that it would be more +than difficult to penetrate them with 6-inch guns, we see at once that +it would be useless to equip our contemplated ship with such artillery. + +“Further, if this ideal vessel which we have imagined to be so potently +armoured is also very swift, and of a speed greater than that of a +possible antagonist, she could not only prevent this latter from +getting away, but also avail herself of her superiority in this respect +for choosing the most convenient position for striking the belt of the +enemy in the most advantageous manner. + +“For this swift vessel a numerous and uniform armament of 8-inch guns, +such as was contemplated for the _Amalfi_ class,[27] would appear to be +sufficient, if we had only to consider the penetration at right angles +of modern belts, especially if capped projectiles are adopted. + +“If, however, the hit is an oblique one, and the distance is +considerable, it appears necessary that we should adopt the calibre of +12-inch if we want to be absolutely certain of sinking the adversary, +striking him _only_ on the belt. But the loading of such guns is as yet +very slow, although it has been greatly improved of late. Besides, the +number of hits that one can get in on to the belt itself is small. From +this it appears that in our ideal and intensely powerful ship we must +increase the number of pieces of 12-inch so as to be able to get in at +least one fatal shot on the enemy’s belt at the water-line before she +has a chance of getting a similar fortunate stroke at us from one of +the four large pieces now usually carried as the main armament. + +“We thus have outlined for us the main features of our absolutely +supreme vessel--with medium calibres abolished--so effectually +protected as to be able to disregard entirely all the subsidiary +armament of an enemy, and armed only with twelve pieces of 12-inch. +Such a ship could fight in the second method we have delineated, +without throwing away a single shot, without wasting ammunition. Secure +in her exuberant protection with her twelve guns ready, she would +swiftly descend on her adversary and pour in a terrible converging fire +at the belt. + +“Having disposed of her first antagonist, she would at once proceed +to attack another, and almost untouched, to despatch yet another, not +throwing away a single round of her ammunition, but utilising all +for sure and deadly shots. A large and abundant supply of 12-inch +projectiles and ammunition can be provided, in addition to the belt and +guns contemplated, out of the 4,500 tons of increase of displacement +that will be disposable in the enlargement of the _Vittorio Emanuele +III_ to become the national British type of vessel in place of the +_King Edward VII_. + +“It will be necessary to defend our ‘_Invincible_’ with a thick +complete belt of twelve inches, and a battery also protected with the +12-inch armour (for the redoubt must be thus defended as well as the +water-line, so as to eliminate the perils of the first system of attack +sketched out, of progressive damages being adopted against her); and at +the same time she must be armed with twelve pieces of 12-inch, arranged +as in the _Amalfi_ class or in the _Vittorio Emanuele III_, so as to +be able herself to attack in the second method that has been outlined, +that is to say, the system of the stronger, of the better defended, and +most certainly that of the richer. But when a certain number of such +colossi of 17,000 tons--six, for example--had been constructed, it is +more than probable that the adversary would do his utmost to prevent +their getting near him, and, fearful of the fatal result of so unequal +a combat, would seek to betake himself elsewhere immediately on the +appearance of the famous _Invincible_ division. + +“In that case the command of the seas, or a deluded belief that they +have such command, will remain with these _Invincible_ ships, even +although they may be of slow speed; but to stop at this point would +be too little and unworthy of the Navy of the richest and most potent +Power in the world. + +“For this squadron or division, however ‘invincible,’ will not be +really and truly _supreme_ if it cannot also catch hold of the enemy’s +tail. The bull in the vast ring of the amphitheatre deludes himself +with the idea that because he is more powerful than the agile toreador +he therefore has absolute command of the scene of the combat; but he +is too slow in following up his adversaries and these almost always +succeed in eluding his terrible horns. + +“We must, therefore, come to the conclusion that the type of vessel +will not be absolutely _supreme_ and worthy of such a nation unless +we furnish it with such speed that it can overtake any of the enemy’s +battleships and oblige them to fight. It is, then, possible to give to +a vessel of 17,000 tons displacement-- + + Protective armour of 12ins. + + Twelve guns of 12-inch calibre. + + An abundant supply of ammunition, and + + A very high speed, superior to that of all and existing battleships + afloat. + +“It has been said and written--indeed, repeatedly written--that the +_Vittorio Emanuele III_ was a practical impossibility. But before long +she will be actually in the water, and facts already show how vain were +the suppositions and criticisms of such croakers.[28] + +“But it has also been asserted that in the case of this vessel +surpassing the contemplated speed of 21½ knots on trial and attaining +that hoped for of 22 knots, such would only prove that that particular +tonnage of displacement especially lends itself to obtaining a form +of hull with which we can realise a very high speed, and more so than +with larger ships. This, however, is not quite exact. The law which +governs the speed and displacement, other things being equal, is well +known to all naval constructors, who have by heart the rule that +whilst the displacement increases as the cube of the dimensions, the +resistance, on the other hand, at a given speed does not increase in +the same proportion as the displacement. The pith of the kernel lies +in utilising the most opportune dimensions, or, rather, let us say, in +adopting the special form of hull most adapted to those dimensions, +more than in the actual amount of the displacement itself. + +“The amount of the displacement, however, is intimately bound up with +the question of the defensive and offensive powers that it is wished to +give to a ship; so that once the particular objectives of the Italian +Navy had been laid down, and thereby the defensive and offensive power +sought for decided on, the question resolved itself into harmonising +them with a form of hull of the greatest possible efficiency, and this +worked out at 12,600 tons. Nor does it appear that the problem could +have been satisfactorily solved with a vessel of less displacement, +as in that case it would have been impossible to realise the required +power, while with a greater displacement the ship would have been +incapable of obtaining the desired speed. + +“In the same manner the defensive and offensive power of the projected +ships of the _Amalfi_ class was harmonised with a form of hull of such +high efficiency that it would have been possible to obtain a speed of +23 knots and probably more; but the statement that the problem could +not have been solved with a displacement of much less or much greater +tonnage than that projected, is not to be taken as insisting that the +solution must be interpreted in a too absolute manner, asserting that +the speed of 23 knots could not be efficiently obtained save with a +displacement of from 8,000 to 9,000 tons, for this would be inexact. + +“If now the question be put--Is it possible for some naval architect +to design a special form of hull having a displacement of 17,000 tons, +and with which we can realise a very high speed--twenty-four knots, for +example? + +“‘Without doubt,’ will answer all practical naval constructors. + +“If we go further, and ask--Is it possible for him at the same time to +arm such a vessel with twelve pieces of 12-inch? + +“‘Without doubt,’ will answer but a certain number of such experienced +men. + +“But if we go still further, and demand, finally--Is it also possible +for him to protect such a ship with 12-inch armour? + +“‘Without doubt,’ will answer only one here and there who may have +already made researches in that direction. + +“And as the solving of such a problem necessitates many and many a +calculation, and no amount of discussion or argument on the matter +could in any way be conclusive unless based on definite plans and +figures, these lines might well conclude here. + +“But, in deference to the courteous inquiry of Admiral Hopkins, this +brief article must not be allowed to close in a manner so indefinite. + +“I would, therefore, say frankly at once that the designs for such a +vessel have already been worked out, and that its construction seems +quite feasible and attainable. Following up the progressive scale of +displacement from 8,000 to 12,000 tons, and then on to 17,000 tons, +a new _King Edward VII_ has been designed, 521½ft. (159 metres) in +length, with a beam of eighty-two feet (twenty-five metres), and mean +draught of 27ft. (8.5 metres); with the water-line protected with +12-inch plates, and the battery similarly armoured; having two turrets +at the ends, each armed with a pair of 12-inch guns, and two central +side turrets high up (similar to the two with 8-inch guns in the +_Vittorio Emanuele III_), also each armed with two pieces of 12-inch, +and four turrets at the four angles of the upper part of the battery, +having each one 12-inch gun. + +“This vessel has no ports whatever in her armour; she carries no +secondary armament at all, but only the usual pieces of small calibre +for defence against torpedo attack. + +“The speed to be realised, as proved by the tank trials, is twenty-four +knots.” + +The idea was at first received with derision and scepticism, which +lasted until, in the Russian-Japanese War, it was announced that the +Japanese had laid down two battleships, the _Aki_ and _Satsuma_, which +“were to be more or less on the lines of the ship projected by Colonel +Cuniberti.” Contemporaneous with this the United States authorised the +building of the _South Carolina_ and _Michigan_, which carry eight +12-inch guns, so disposed as to be available on either broadside. + +Both these ideas were public property before the British _Dreadnought_ +was laid down. She was, however, built with such rapidity that she was +completed long before any other vessel of the type. + +[Illustration: THE “DREADNOUGHT”--1906.] + +In the design for a new type of British capital ship, a great many +ideas were considered and rejected. Eventually, however, it was decided +to equip the _Dreadnought_ with five turrets so disposed that eight +guns were available on either broadside and six guns available ahead +or astern. The designed speed of the ship was twenty-one knots. + +Together with this type of ship, another type, somewhat more resembling +the Cuniberti ideal, was laid down. Three ships of this class, the +_Invincible_ class, were designed for a speed of twenty-five knots, and +given big guns so disposed that eight guns were available on either +broadside and six big guns ahead or astern. + +The _Dreadnought_ was officially laid down in December, 1905, and +completed ten months later. Actually, however, materials for her were +collected months beforehand, and the rate at which she was built,[29] +like the secrecy with which her building was surrounded, consisted in +great measure of a theatrical display, very impressive to the general +public at the time, but to-day generally regarded as “unfortunate” +on account of the foreign attention thus attracted. But, while the +previous chapter is clear proof of the futility of any real secrecy +about the “Dreadnought idea,” so far as the British Navy was concerned, +it likewise serves to refute a charge which has been made to the effect +that the “secrecy policy” induced foreign nations to build Dreadnoughts +also. The most that can be said is that had the _Dreadnought_ been +built without so much attention being attracted to her, foreign nations +might have been less in a hurry to copy her. But it is absolutely clear +that the all-big-gun ship era had arrived, just as in the past the +ironclad era came, or, in earlier days still, the gun and steam eras +did. The actual place of the _Dreadnought_ in history is that she marks +a wise and rapid recognition of new conditions. + +Details of the _Dreadnought_ are as follows:-- + + Displacement--17,900 tons. + + Length--526ft. (over all). + + Beam--82ft. + + Draught--Maximum, 29ft. (normal). + + Armament--Ten 12-inch, 45 cal.; twenty-seven 12 pounders; five + submerged tubes (18 inch). + + Armour Belt--11-in. to 6-in. forward; and 4-in. aft. On turrets + 11-inch (K.C.) + + Machinery--Parsons Turbine; four screws. + + Horse-power--23,000 = 21 knots. + + Boilers--Babcock. + + Coal--(normal) 900 tons; (maximum) 2,000 tons; oil fuel also. + + Built at Portsmouth; Engined by Vickers. + +The _Dreadnought_ was unique in every particular. The exact disposition +of her big gun armament was only arrived at after a long and careful +consultation, and the consideration of a number of alternatives. It +admits of eight big guns bearing in nearly every position, and allows +a minimum fire of six in any case. It is understood that, in addition +to the plan actually adopted, in the earliest plan of all (which was +merely an adaption of the _Lord Nelson_ class), consideration was +given to a scheme of five turrets, all in the centre line, and also to +an arrangement whereby the two amidship turrets would be placed _en +échelon_. + +One of the particular arguments in favour of the plan ultimately +adopted was that next to four, eight big guns form the best workable +unit for fire control purposes. It was also considered that eight guns +would probably be the maximum that could safely be fired together +continuously, with full charges in battle conditions. + +[Illustration: ALTERNATIVE DESIGNS FOR THE DREADNOUGHT.] + +In these days when all big gun armaments are the rule, there is a +tendency to overlook the fact that the _Dreadnought’s_ main armament +was double that of previous ships, with only a comparatively small +increase of displacement, and that no intermediate experience existed +as to what might be expected. + +With a view to standing the shock of discharge, the _Dreadnought_ was +built with very heavy scantlings and generally given an immensely +strong hull. The armouring followed orthodox lines, except that a +certain amount was applied internally under-water as a protection +against torpedoes. In addition she was given solid bulkheads,[30] +though this was no novelty except with the British Navy, as they had +been introduced some years before in the battleship _Tsarevitch_ and +the armoured cruiser _Bayan_, built for the Russians at La Seyne. +Another novelty in the _Dreadnought_ was the adoption of a high +forecastle, she being the first British battleship in which this +appears. Another innovation was the placing of the officers’ quarters +forward and putting the men aft, a system which, however, has since +been abandoned in the most recent vessels. + +The greatest novelty of the _Dreadnought_, however, was the adoption of +turbine machinery, and the form of her hull, with a 30ft. overhang aft, +in order to adapt the ship to the new means of propulsion. The fitting +of turbines to the new _Dreadnought_ was perhaps an even greater +novelty than her armament, she being the first warship, other than +small cruisers, to be so equipped. + +The introduction of turbines was regarded with a good deal of +apprehension in certain quarters, especially when it became known that +the three other big ships belonging to the same programme were also to +be turbine propelled. The type selected for all was the Parsons with +four shafts. The wing shafts of the _Dreadnought_ have each one high +pressure ahead and one high pressure astern turbine. The amidship ones +are fitted with three turbines each--one low pressure one ahead, and +one low pressure astern, and one turbine for going astern. Each turbine +has 39,600 blades. + +On her first trials the _Dreadnought_ exceeded her designed speed for +short spurts by three-quarters of a knot, but on the eight hours’ +run barely succeeded in making a mean of twenty-one knots. Shortly +afterwards she fell a little below this, but at a later date picked +up again, and on more than one occasion since she has easily made +twenty-two knots or over. Such early difficulties as occurred were due +to the fact that her engine-room complement were at first necessarily +unfamiliar with working so large an installation. The total cost of the +_Dreadnought_, which belongs to the 1905–06 programme, was £1,797,497, +and save that her draught somewhat exceeded anticipations, the ship was +a success in every way, proving a remarkably steady gun-platform. + +The Committee which sat on the _Dreadnought_ design was by no means +entirely unanimous as to what sacrifice should be made for speed. +The _Dreadnought_ herself, despite a considerable increase of speed +as compared with the battleships that preceded her, did not obtain +that speed by the sacrifice of any battleship qualities, but almost +entirely on account of the substitution of turbines for reciprocating +engines. To that extent, therefore, though nearly as fast as the +armoured cruisers of a few years before, she may be said to have +developed entirely along normal lines, rather than on those laid down +by Cuniberti. + +The table on the next page and diagrams indicate how the original +Cuniberti idea compares with the first results obtained. It will be +noticed that, except in the case of the _Invincible_ type, and there +only at a sacrifice of armour and armament, was, however, anything +like the Cuniberti speed attempted. It should be stated that in the +Cuniberti ship the peculiar “girder construction” of his _Vittorio +Emanuele_ was obviously contemplated. This construction, which admits +of far lighter scantlings than usually employed, has not been attempted +in any other Navies, and a corresponding extra dead-weight results. + +Coming to details, there is uncertainty as to the exact original design +of the _Satsuma_; but a uniform armament of big guns was certainly the +first to be projected. It is not clear whether it was abandoned from a +preference for a numerically larger but mixed battery; or with a view +to utilising such guns as were most likely to be available for early +delivery. Japan was then at war, and there was the natural anticipation +that the ships might be wanted before the war was over. It should, on +the other hand, be borne in mind that the _Kashima_ and _Katori_, of +16,400 tons, carrying four 12-inch, four 10-inch, twelve 6-inch, and +twelve 14-pounders, with 9-inch belts and 18.5 knot speeds were at that +time held up in England on account of the war. Hence it has with some +considerable show of reason been argued that the _Satsuma_ and _Aki_ +are nothing but normal developments of the _Kashima_ design, bearing +just the same relation to it as the British _Lord Nelsons_ bear to the +_King Edwards_. It was also practically admitted by the Japanese at a +later date that for diplomatic reasons, in accounts of the contemporary +armoured cruisers of the _Tsukuba_ class, the armaments[31] were +exaggerated. + + +ORIGINAL DREADNOUGHT DESIGNS. + + ============================+===============+==================================+=======+========+============ + | Normal | | | Des’d. | + | Displacement. | Armament. | Belt. | Speed. | Laid + | Tons. | | in. | Knots. | Down. + ----------------------------+---------------+----------------------------------+-------+--------+------------ + _Cuniberti_ (as built) | 17,000 | 12--12in., 18--12 pdr. | 12 | 24 | _pro._ 1903 + _Satsuma_ Design | 19,250 | 12 _or_ 10--12in., 12--4.7 | 9 | 20 | ---- + ----------------------------+---------------+----------------------------------+-------+--------+------------ + _Satsuma_ | 19,250 | 4--12in., 12--10in., 12--6 | 9 | 20 | 1905 + _S. Carolina, pro._ | 16–17,000 | 8--12in., (_or_ 4--12in., | 10 | 18–20 | ---- + | | 8--10in.), 30--14 pdr. | | | + _S. Carolina_ | 16,000 | 8--12in., 22--14 pdr. | 12 | 18½ | 1906 + _Dreadnought_, 1st Design | ? | 10--12in. | .. | .. | ---- + _Dreadnought_ (as built) | 17,900 | 10--12in., 27--12 pdr. | 11 | 21 | 1905 + _Invincible_ | 17,250 | 8--12in., 16--4in. | 7 | 25 | 1906 + _Nassau_ (as “S”) | ? | 8--11in., 12--6in., 10--24 pdr. | ? | 19½ | 1906 + _Nassau_ | 18,500 | 12--11in., 12--6in., 10--24 pdr. | 9¾ | 19½ | 1907 + ============================+===============+==================================+=======+========+============ + +_Note._--The _Nassau_ was delayed a year owing to alterations in design. + + +Be all these things as they may, however, Japan is obviously entitled +to some considerable share in originating the “Dreadnought movement.” + +The claims of the United States Navy rest on a stronger basis. The +_South Carolina_ type, all big guns in the centre line, all bearing +on either broadside, was a distinct advance and novelty. The actual +chronological date of laying down goes for nothing; the ships were +designed and authorised long before they were commenced. No secrecy +whatever was observed about them, and a strong body of opinion will +always credit the United States with being the first Navy that +definitely adopted the “all-big-gun idea.” It is interesting to note +(see table) that at one stage a mixed 12-inch and 10-inch armament was +regarded as a possible alternative. + +[Illustration: + + CUIBERI. + SATSUMA. + S CAROLINA. FIRST DESIGN + S CAROLINA. + FIRST BRITISH DREADNOUGHT DESIGN + DREADNOUGHT. + INVINCIBLE. + NASSAU FIRST DESIGN + NASSAU AS BUILT + +ORIGINAL DREADNOUGHT DESIGNS.] + +It has been claimed, either by those responsible for the _Dreadnought_ +herself, or by others professing to speak for them, that the +_Dreadnought_ was evolved entirely independently of Cuniberti’s ideal. +It is practically impossible to say definitely how far there can be any +truth in this. In all Admiralties, ships are, as a rule, designed as +“projects” long before they see the light (some never see it at all, +as witness the sea-going masted turret-ship of his design referred to +by Sir Edward Reed in some remarks quoted on an earlier page!). The +first British all-big-gun ship design (see diagram) is a lineal enough +descendant of the _King Edward_ and _Lord Nelson_, just as Cuniberti’s +is a descendant of the _Vittorio Emanuele_. + +The Cuniberti design appears, however, to have been submitted as early +as 1901. In any case, to Cuniberti belongs the first clear exposition +of the idea, while the ridicule with which it was at first received +indicates the general novelty. + +Germany is also a claimant to having evolved Dreadnoughts with the +“_S_” type, intended to have been laid down in 1906, to follow the +_Deutschlands_. These ships can hardly have been designed much later +than 1904. When first heard of they were reported to carry four big gun +turrets, of which two were placed on either side amidships. Six big +guns was the first reputed armament, later each turret was to carry two +guns. + +The absurd secrecy with which subsequent German designs have been +shrouded was not then in evidence; and all the indications are that the +_Nassau_, as originally contemplated, was to have been a four-turret +ship--the two extra 11-inch being Germany’s equivalent for the four +12-inch, four 9.2, of our _King Edwards_. This would perhaps accord +Germany a priority in actually adopting the principle of an increased +number of heavy guns. + +All of which suffices to indicate that the adoption of more than four +big guns had little or nothing to do with the somewhat theatrical +building of the original _Dreadnought_. + +On the other hand (with the possible and doubtful exception of the +_South Carolinas_[32]) it appears clear that the _Dreadnought_ was +the first ship in which the all-big-gun principle was adopted as a +technical asset in gun-laying over and above guns _qua_ guns. After +four, eight was the “tactical unit” of guns, promising results +altogether out of proportion to anything that six, or for that matter, +ten (in proportion) could achieve. + +[Illustration: + + 1879. French AMIRAL DUPERRÉ. + 1886. French HOCHE. + 1886. Austria K.E.RUDOLPH. + 1886. Russian TCHESMA. + 1889. German SIEGFRIED. + +EARLY EXAMPLES OF WING TURRETS.] + +It may not be too much to say that what Cuniberti “saw as through a +glass darkly,” the _Dreadnought_ translated into fact, and that she was +the first battleship avowedly so designed. + +“Fire control” was a new thing in 1905. No navy, save the British, +had considered it to any appreciable degree. The _King Edwards_ had +taught that control of two calibres from one position was a practical +impossibility. Mixed calibres were damned accordingly, and there was no +outlet but the _Dreadnought_. + +But for Cuniberti she might, and possibly would, have remained a +theoretical desirability for several more years. The measure of his +genius may be the demonstration that such an ideal ship could be built. +It is to be argued that he did nothing more than put into practicable +shape what already existed as a hypothesis. Even so, however, to him +belongs the honour of indicating that the step from theory to practice +was possible; and on that account alone he deserves to go down to +posterity as the actual creator of Dreadnoughts. + +In the other three ships of the 1905–06 programme, however, a high +speed was accepted as the governing factor. The ships as built were +designated “armoured cruisers,” and in so far as the Japanese were +known to be building armoured cruisers carrying battleship guns, +that designation was legitimate. For that matter, there also existed +a paper by Professor Hovgaard, of the Massachusetts School of Naval +Architecture, in which it was tentatively laid down that the ideal +armoured cruiser of the future would be a battleship in armament and +armour, increased in size, to obtain greater speed. + +The three companion ships to the _Dreadnought_--the _Invincible_, +_Inflexible_, and _Indomitable_--adhered no more closely to the +Hovgaard ideal than to the Cuniberti one. In principle they varied from +the _Dreadnought_ design only in that they sacrificed a certain amount +of armour in order to obtain a greater speed. By the adoption of the +échelon system, the same broadside-fire was secured for them (on paper, +at any rate) as for the _Dreadnought_, though with a turret less. +In practice it has been found that there are very few positions in +which they can bring more than six big guns to bear, but this must be +considered as an error of construction rather than of principle. They +have turned out to be wonderful steamers, but considerably inferior +sea-boats to the _Dreadnought_, and in the British Navy are generally +likely in the future to become regarded as obsolete long before the +former. For all that, they probably approximate more nearly to the +warship of the future than the _Dreadnought_. + +Admiral Bacon, in his views as to the warship of the future, generally +inclined to the idea of very large and very swift ships, relying on +armament, speed, and super-scientific internal sub-division rather than +on armour protection. These ships would act more or less independently, +each, as it were, representing a divided squadron group of to-day. + +It is interesting to note that Italy, which in the seventies evolved in +the _Duilio_ and _Dandolo_ the “Dreadnought” of that period, eventually +developed a very similar idea in the _Italia_ and _Lepanto_, which had +no side armour whatever. In later designs a thin belt was reverted to, +and finally the old cycle was resumed. + +This result was brought about by the quickfirer, which appeared as a +rival to the hitherto predominant monster gun. To-day the torpedo is +becoming paramount and a danger to a fleet in close order at almost any +range--hence the Bacon ideal. It remains to be seen whether the future +will produce any analogy to the cycle of the quickfirer of the eighties. + +Details of the _Invincible_ type are:-- + + Displacement--17,250 tons. + + Length (over all)--562ft. (_p.p._, 530ft.). + + Beam--78½ft. + + Draught--29ft. + + Armament--Eight 12-inch, XI, 45 calibre, sixteen 4-inch (model + 1907); three submerged tubes. + + Armour Belt--7-inch, reduced to 4-inch at the ends. + + Machinery--Parsons Turbine. + + Horse-power--41,000 = 25 knots. + + Boilers--(_Invincible_ and _Inflexible_) Yarrow, (_Indomitable_) + Babcock. + + Coal--(normal) 1,000 tons; (maximum) 3,000 tons; oil fuel also. + + Builders--(_Invincible_) Elswick, (_Inflexible_) Clydebank, + (_Indomitable_) Fairfield. + + Engined--(_Invincible_) Humphrys, (_Inflexible_) Clydebank, + (_Indomitable_) Fairfield. + +As originally designed, the anti-torpedo guns of these ships would +have been the same as the _Dreadnought’s_, but, having been completed +nearly two years later and a new pattern 4-inch quickfirer having been +invented in the interim, they were fitted with these guns. The trial +results were as follows:--_Invincible_, 26.6 knots; _Inflexible_, 26.5 +knots; and _Indomitable_, 26.1 knots; the designed horse power being +considerably exceeded in every case. After they were commissioned and +had shaken down, these trial speeds were considerably exceeded, and at +one time and another they all did well over 28 knots; the _Indomitable_ +having made a record of 28.7. + +The fuel consumption of these ships is naturally enormous. The +_Indomitable_, in crossing the Atlantic at full speed, burned about +500 tons of coal a day, as well as about 120 tons of oil. As steamers +they are to be considered remarkably successful. The average cost of +construction was about £1,752,000, which works out at a little under +£102 per ton. + +Towards the close of the year 1911 the official designation of +“armoured cruiser” for them and similar ships was abandoned, and the +term “battle cruiser” substituted. No further secret was made of the +fairly obvious fact that they were designed as “fast battleships,” +intended to engage and hold a retreating enemy till such time as the +main squadron could come up. + +Curiously enough, for some while, though every nation started building +_Dreadnoughts_, Germany alone proceeded to build _Invincibles_ also. +In 1911 Japan ordered a ship of fast battleship type; but, generally +speaking, foreign nations have abstained from embodying this portion of +the Cuniberti ideal in their designs. + +[Illustration: + + DREADNOUGHT. + INDOMITABLE. + NEPTUNE. + INDEFATIGABLE. + +DREADNOUGHTS.] + +The programme for the years 1906–07 had been originally intended +to include the building of four armoured ships, presumably one +_Dreadnought_ and three _Invincibles_; but the Liberal party, which +had just come into power, modified this to three battleships of an +improved _Dreadnought_ type. This action led to a popular agitation +which ultimately eventuated in the provision of no less than eight +armoured ships in the estimates of three years later. + +The three ships which followed, the _Dreadnought_, the _Bellerophon_, +_Téméraire_, and _Superb_, are some seven hundred tons heavier, but +otherwise differ only in minor details. For the one heavy tripod of +the _Dreadnought_, two were substituted, and the 4-inch anti-torpedo +gun was also mounted. In the next year the _St. Vincent_ class, a +group of similar type, but increased by 650 tons, were provided. The +anti-torpedo armament is carried to 20 guns in the _St. Vincent_ class, +which are 10ft. longer than their predecessors, and carry fifty-calibre +big guns in place of the forty-five calibre pieces of the earlier +ships. The constructive particulars of these ships are as follows:-- + + ==============+============+====================+===========+===========+======== + Name. | Built at. | Machinery by. | Laid down.| Completed.| Trials. + --------------+------------+--------------------+-----------+-----------+-------- + _Bellerophon_ | Portsmouth | Fairfield | Dec., ’06 | Feb., ’07 | 21.9 + _Téméraire_ | Devonport | Hawthorn, Leslie | Jan., ’07 | May, ’09 | + _Superb_ | Elswick | Wallsend Co. | Feb., ’07 | June, ’09 | + --------------+------------+--------------------+-----------+-----------+-------- + _St. Vincent_ | Portsmouth | Scott Eng. & S. Co.| Dec., ’07 | Jan., ’10 | 21.9 + _Collingwood_ | Devonport | Hawthorn, L. | Feb., ’08 | Jan., ’10 | 22 + _Vanguard_ | Vickers | Vickers | April, ’08| Feb., ’10 | 22.1 + ==============+============+====================+===========+===========+======== + +In the Estimates for 1908–09, the armoured ships provided were reduced +to two, the _Neptune_ and the _Indefatigable_. Provision in the United +States, Argentine, and Brazilian Navies for ships bearing ten big guns +on the broadside and the prospect of ships with equal broadsides being +constructed elsewhere is presumably the reason why in the _Neptune_ +the original _Dreadnought_ design was varied, and a new arrangement +of turrets introduced. The _Neptune_, which is of 20,200 tons, is +a species of compromise between the _Dreadnought_ and _Invincible_ +designs, the amidship guns being _en échelon_, and so mounted that +they give a very full arc of fire on either broadside. The increased +space occupied by this arrangement necessitated a certain cramping aft, +for which reason the forward of the two after turrets was superposed to +train over the aftermost, American fashion. + +Particulars of the _Neptune_ are as follows:-- + + Displacement--20,200 tons. + + Length (over all)--546ft. + + Beam--85ft. + + Draught--29ft. + + Guns--Ten 12-inch, fifty calibre, twenty 4-inch. + + Armour--Belt 12-in. amidships, 6-in. forward, 4-in. aft. Lower + deckside, 9¾-in. Turrets, 12--8-in. + + Machinery--Parsons Turbine. + + Horse-power--25,000 = 21 knots. + + Boilers--Yarrow. + + Coal--(normal) 900 tons; (maximum) 2,700 tons; oil fuel also. + + Built at Portsmouth Dockyard. + + Engined by Harland and Wolff. + +On trial she developed at three-quarter power I.H.P. 18,575, with a +speed of nineteen knots, and at full power 27,721, with 21.78 knots. +Her best maximum spurt speed was 22.7--that is to say, about one and +three-quarter knots over contract. + +In the _Neptune_ the original _Dreadnought_ practice of mounting the +anti-torpedo armament on top of the turrets was entirely abandoned, and +these guns were placed inside or on top of the superstructure in three +main groups. + +The number of torpedo tubes was reduced to three, the reason for this +being partly to save space and also to take advantage of improved +methods for securing rapidity of fire. In the _Neptune_ the possibility +of aero craft first received consideration, the upper deck being built +sufficiently thick to be proof against bombs dropped from aloft. + +[Illustration: “INDEFATIGABLE” AND “INVINCIBLE” 1911.] + +The _Neptune_ was one of the cheapest ships ever built for the British +Navy, her cost working out at a little under £87 per ton. + +The other ship of the same programme was the _Indefatigable_, an +improved _Invincible_. She represents an increase of nearly 2,000 tons +over the type ship, with an increase in length of 18ft. and a foot more +beam. Save for the addition of four more anti-torpedo guns the armament +remains the same, but an extra inch is added to the belt. The principal +improvement achieved in her is that the two amidship turrets are much +less crowded up than in the type ship, thus securing a considerably +better range of fire. + +Although the horse power is proportionately less than that of the +_Invincibles_, the better lines of the ship have made her even more +speedy. She easily exceeded her designed speed on trial, and has +reached as high as 29.13 knots. + +The cost of construction was £1,547,426, which works out at about +£82 10s. per ton, as against the average £120 per ton that the +_Invincibles_ cost to build. She was the cheapest ship ever built for +the British Navy,[33] to her date. + +Details of the _Indefatigable_ are:-- + + Displacement--19,200 tons. + + Length--578ft. + + Beam--79½ft. + + Draught--27¾ft. + + Guns--Eight 12-inch, fifty calibre, twenty 4-inch. + + Armour Belt--8-in. amidships, diminished to 4-in. at the ends. + + Machinery--Parsons Turbine. + + Horse-power--43,000 = 25 knots. + + Boilers--Babcock. + + Coal--(normal) 1,000 tons; (maximum) 2,500 tons; oil fuel also. + + Built at Devonport Dockyard. + + Engined by J. Brown & Co., of Clydebank. + +Two other battle-cruisers almost identical to the _Indefatigable_, +the _Australia_ at Clydebank, for the Australian Navy, and the _New +Zealand_ at Fairfield, a gift from New Zealand to the British Navy, +were launched in 1911. + +The programme for 1908–09, consisting as it did of only two armoured +ships, and the fact that the corresponding German programme was +increased by one capital ship, bringing the total to four, brought the +naval agitation to a head. Meetings demanding eight “Dreadnoughts” were +held all over the country, with the result that the British programme +for 1909–10 rose to four armoured ships with four other “conditional” +ships. The ships of the former programme were the _Colossus_, +_Hercules_, _Orion_, and _Lion_, and the first two of these were laid +down some months before the usual date, the _Colossus_ being commenced +in July instead of at the end of the year. + +The “conditional” ships were all eventually laid down in April of the +following year. They were the _Monarch_, _Conqueror_, _Thunderer_, and +_Princess Royal_. + +Under this programme there were no less than three distinct types of +ships. The first two, the _Colossus_ and _Hercules_, are practically +sisters of the _Neptune_, but of 400 tons greater displacement. They +differ in appearance in having but one tripod mast instead of two. +This, like the _Dreadnought’s_, is placed abaft the foremost funnel. +The _Colossus_ was built and engined by the Scott Shipbuilding and +Engineering Co., commenced in July, 1909, and completed two years +later. The _Hercules_, built by Palmer’s, followed a month later in +both cases. The first is fitted with Babcock, and the second with +Yarrow boilers. A point of minor interest about these two ships is that +whereas the anti-torpedo armament of the _Neptune_ is in three groups, +that of the _Colossus_ and _Hercules_ is in two groups only, the +mounting of small guns between the échelon turrets being done away with. + +The other two types of the 1909–10 Estimates are the ships generally +known as “super-Dreadnoughts.” + + +_SUPER-DREADNOUGHTS._ + +The most obvious feature of the so-called “super-Dreadnoughts” is +the introduction of the 13.5-inch gun, particulars of which will be +found at the end of this chapter. This gun was experimented with +with a certain amount of secrecy, and was for a long time officially +designated as the 12-inch “A,” although practically everybody knew +that it was really a 13.5. It was only rendered possible by recent +improvements in gun-mountings and gun-construction. It is not very +appreciably heavier than the latest type of 12-inch, as mounted in the +_Colossus_, and its adoption was not so much a matter of obtaining +an increased range and penetration, as of securing the tremendously +increased smashing power of the heavier projectile. + +Somewhat less obvious to the general public, but really of a great deal +more far-reaching importance, is the “Americanising” of British naval +design exhibited in all the “super-Dreadnoughts.” Though differing in +detail, the arrangement of the armament in all the “super-Dreadnoughts” +followed the American centre-line system, an interesting indication +of the progress of the United States Navy from the days, not so very +long ago, when American warship design was more or less a _pour faire +rire_! It is none the less interesting from the fact that in the +earliest designs, in all ships carrying more than two turrets, the +centre line was the only arrangement ever built or even considered. +Yet when an increased number of turrets came into being, the American +Navy was the only one which followed the original practice. In all +other Navies ideas of the period 1870–1880, when strong end-on fire was +considered an all-important essential, influenced design. America alone +appreciated the prophecy long ago made by Admiral Colomb to the effect +that whatever else might temporarily obtain, broadside to broadside +would always be reverted to for battle, on the grounds that thus, and +thus only, could the maximum number of guns be utilised. + +It is proper here to remark that though the Americans adopted the +centre line from the outset for practical reasons, this disposition +became more or less a necessity when 13.5’s came in, owing to the +infinitely greater strain on the structure. This has been occasionally +used as an argument against American influence having made itself felt, +but the balance of evidence shows that even had the 13.5-inch not +appeared, the centre line system would have figured in the Navy. The +original centre-line idea disappeared because the échelon system looked +so superior. The échelon system of the 1875–85 era, however, died +out in its turn on account of certain practical disadvantages. It was +resurrected when these had been forgotten in the lapse of years; but +the disadvantages entailed in firing across a deck soon made themselves +felt again once the system was reverted to. + +[Illustration: + + U.S. ROANOKE. + British. ROYAL SOVEREIGN. + Russian. ADMIRAL LAZAREFF. + French. AMIRAL BAUDIN. + German. BRANDENBURG. + U.S. S. CAROLINA. + +CENTRE-LINE SHIPS OF VARIOUS DATES.] + +One of the earliest advocates, if not the first of modern advocates, of +the centre-line in England was Admiral Hopkins. Discussing the original +Cuniberti ideal, Admiral Hopkins pointed out that although for an +absolute right-ahead or astern fire wing-turrets gave an advantage, a +very slight yaw entirely altered the proportion, and that circumstance +in which the enemy was dead right-ahead necessitating such a yaw were +likely to occur very rarely indeed in war. He leaned, therefore, to the +opinion that a fewer number of guns all in the centre line would be +equally as efficacious, practically, as a larger number disposed partly +in wing turrets. + +The échelon system, of course, renders practically no assistance +here, the arc of the guns firing across the deck being necessarily +restricted, even with the best échelon arrangement. While, therefore, +the échelon system is good for absolute end-on, or for more or less +absolute broadside firing, any intermediate and more probable position +renders it less efficient than a centre-line arrangement. + +Another defect of the échelon system is that with it, except exactly +end-on, one side of the ship is necessarily more efficient than the +other, and that this is reversed according to whether the enemy is +ahead or astern, twenty-five per cent. of the big-gun armament being +affected thereby in a four turreted ship. + +Though attention never seems to have been drawn to the matter, it is +a fact worthy of some attention that the _Von der Tann_, which is to +be regarded as Germany’s “answer” to the _Invincibles_, has (like all +German[34] ships on the same system) her échelonned turrets exactly in +reverse order to British ones. All British ships have the port turret +foremost; all German ones the starboard. The net result of this is that +(as the diagram indicates) there are two worst and two best positions +for either design. An _Invincible_ getting and keeping a _Von der +Tann_ upon her starboard bow or port quarter would have a twenty-five +per cent. superiority over her, while, supposing the German type to +maintain a position on her starboard quarter or port bow she would be +to the same extent over-matched, and to a certain extent “in chancery.” + +With the centre line system, the imposition of fighting one side +rather than the other is not imposed, and overhauling or being +overhauled causes no disadvantage. Nothing is lost, save in the almost +hypothetical case of two ships engaging exactly end-on--a condition +which in no case would endure for more than a very short space of time, +to say nothing of the fact that practically all gunnery errors being +of “elevation” and not of “direction,” a ship adopting the end-on +position offers the equivalent of a vertical target of some 60ft. to +70ft. instead of the equivalent of 30ft. or so that she would present +broadside on. + +The centre-line system may, therefore, be expected to endure against +all other dispositions pending the appearance of some fresh +condition of affairs which would cause the old end-on idea to be +reverted to.[35] + +[Illustration: DIAGRAM TO ILLUSTRATE WEAK POINT OF THE ÉCHELON SYSTEM.] + +The _Orion_ was the only one of her class which belonged to the +normal Estimates, 1909–10, the other three--_Conqueror_, _Thunderer_, +_Monarch_--being “contingent ships.” Details of the class are as +follows:-- + + Displacement--23,500 tons. + + Length--(between perpendiculars) 554½ft; (over all) 584ft. + + Beam--88½ft. + + Draught--(mean) 27¾ft. + + Armament--Ten 13.5-inch, forty-five calibre; sixteen 4-inch; three + 21-inch torpedo tubes. + + Armour Belt--12--4-inch. Turrets, 12-inch. + + Machinery--Parsons turbine. + + Horse-power--27,000 = 21 knots. + + Boilers--Babcock. + + Coal--(nominal) 900 tons; (maximum) 2,700 tons; oil, 1,000 tons. + + ============+=============+============= + Name. | Built at. | Engines by. + ------------+-------------+------------- + _Orion_ | Portsmouth | Wallsend Co. + _Conqueror_ | Beardmore | Beardmore + _Thunderer_ | Thames I.W. | Thames I.W. + _Monarch_ | Elswick | Hawthorn + ============+=============+============= + +The _Orion_ was laid down in November, 1909, the others in April, 1910. + +The _Orion_ was the first of these ships to be commissioned, and her +gunnery trials were watched with great interest. Few details of them +transpired, save that part of the secondary battery was injured by +blast. After commissioning, the _Orion_ was sent for a voyage across +the Bay of Biscay, and attracted much attention by rolling very +heavily, this being attributed to the fact that her bilge keels were +not large enough--not to any general structural defect. + +An interesting feature of the _Orion_ type is that in it provision +first appears for the protection of boats in action. + +Belonging to the same programme (1909–10), the first belonging to the +normal Estimates and the second to the “contingent,” are the battle +cruisers _Lion_ and _Princess Royal_. A great deal of secrecy was +observed about these ships, but their main details are approximately as +follows:-- + + Displacement--25,000 tons. Full load, 26,350 tons. + + Length--(water-line), 675ft.; (over all) 690ft. + + Beam--86½ft. + + Draught--(maximum) 30ft. + + Armament--Eight 13.5 inch 45 calibre, twenty 4-inch, three 21-inch + torpedo tubes. + + Armour--Belt, 9--4-inch. + + Machinery--Parsons Turbine. + + Horse-power--(as designed) = 28 knots. + + Boilers--Yarrow. + + Coal--(normal) 1,000 tons; (maximum) 3,500 tons; oil also. + + _Lion_--Built at Devonport; engined by Vickers. + + _Princess Royal_--Built at Vickers; engined by Vickers. + +The _Lion_ was laid down in November, 1909, and launched in the +following year. The _Princess Royal_ was laid down in April, 1910, and +launched a year later. Both were arranged to be completed during 1912. + +The _Lion_ was somewhat delayed owing to slight repairs being required +to her turbines. In addition, the authorities very wisely did not +“hurry” her--hurrying ships to fit an exact official date having done +more mischief than anything else in the past. + +The _Lion_ did her trials early in 1912, and reached a maximum of +31.7 knots by patent log, with a mean of 29 knots at full power and +24.5 or so at three-quarter power. For her trials the _Lion_ burned +coal only, and this at the seemingly enormous rate of 950 tons a day, +which worked out at approximately about a ton and a quarter per mile. +This consumption, heavy though it seems, really pans out at about the +usual “ton a mile,” as the ship developed horse-power far in excess +of the contract. At the same time it necessarily draws attention to +the enormous increase in coal stores required for supplying modern +warships. It is unfortunately by no means clear that the question of +the very great increase in coal required for modern warships has been +thoroughly realised by the authorities. The amount provided may be said +to be what ships needed in the pre-Dreadnought era. It is now an open +secret that at the time of the “war scare” with Germany in 1911, the +British Home Fleet was unable to proceed to sea owing to a shortage +of coal supply, many ships being a thousand tons short and no proper +arrangements for rapid remedy existing. This state of affairs, at +one time alleged to be merely a newspaper _canard_, is not likely to +occur again; but it is an indication of how difficult it is adequately +to realise the problem of coal supply to ships of ever-increasing +horse-power. + +During the _Lion’s_ trials it was found that the heat from the fore +funnel was so great that the fire-control station (then carried on +a tripod mast placed immediately over the forward funnel) was so +intense as to render that position practically impossible. On the +navigating bridge also, instruments were badly affected by the heat. +The ship was consequently further delayed in order to effect essential +modifications. These included the abolition of the tripod mast, +shifting the fore funnel back a long way, and enormously increasing the +height of all funnels. + +The principal item of the Estimates of 1910–11 was five armoured ships. +Of these, four, the _King George V_ class, are slightly improved +replicas of the _Orion_, while the remaining vessel, the _Queen Mary_, +is a battle-cruiser of the _Lion_ type. + +Ships of the _George V_ class are as follows:-- + + ================+===============+============== + Name. | Built at. | Machinery by. + ----------------+---------------+-------------- + _King George V_ | Portsmouth Y. | Hawthorn + _Centurion_ | Devonport Y. | Hawthorn + _Ajax Scotts_ | Scotts | Scotts + _Audacious_ | Cammell-Laird | Cammell-Laird + ================+===============+============== + +The over-all length is increased to 596ft., and the horse-power to +31,000. All were laid down during 1911, with a view to launching during +1912 and completion in 1913. The displacement of these ships is 23,000 +tons odd. + +The _Queen Mary_, laid down at Palmers’ early in 1911, and engined by +Clydebank, is virtually a sister to the _Lion_, differing from her +merely in a slight variation of the lines, and some increase in length. +Save for these items, and a small difference in the arrangement of the +anti-torpedo armament, the ship belongs to the same class and type. + +The 1911–12 Estimates provided for five further large armoured ships, +which represent an increase in dimensions over their predecessors. Of +these the first four are battleships varying from their predecessors +in the inevitable increase in size to allow of somewhat superior +protection and an improved secondary battery--twelve 6-inch being +substituted for the sixteen 4-inch of the _King George_ class. + +The selection of the 6-inch gun as the anti-torpedo craft weapon was +due partly to the way in which Germany had persisted in her rigid +adherence to that calibre for her minor armament, and partly to the +rapidly increasing size of destroyers. It was held as questionable, +even by the most ardent believers in the ability of the big ship +to defend herself against destroyer attack, whether the 4-inch was +sufficient to disable large destroyers. Hence the adoption of the +6-inch--the largest gun that can be man-handled. + +The nominal displacement of these battleships, the _Iron Duke_ class, +rises to 25,000 tons as against 23,000 of the previous class. The +length is increased to 620ft. and the beam to 89½ (instead of 89ft.). +Owing to improved lines, the horse-power is reduced to 30,000 without +any very material loss of speed. In all these super-Dreadnoughts, as +in the Dreadnoughts themselves, 21 knots has always been the selected +speed, though in units there have been slight variations. + +Ships of the _Iron Duke_ class are as follows:-- + + ====================+===============+============== + Name. | Built at. | Machinery by. + --------------------+---------------+-------------- + _Iron Duke_ | Portsmouth Y. | Cammell-Laird + _Benbow Beardmore_ | Beardmore | Beardmore + _Emperor of India_ | Vickers | Vickers + _Marlborough_ | Devonport Y. | Hawthorn + ====================+===============+============== + +The _Emperor of India_ was originally named _Delhi_. The first two were +given Babcock, and the second two Yarrow boilers. All were completed +in 1914, but only the _Iron Duke_ was available for service on the eve +of the outbreak of the war with Germany and Austria. The other three +were, however, rapidly completed and put into commission. + +The fifth ship of the 1911–12 Estimates was the battle cruiser _Tiger_, +nominally belonging to the _Lion_ group, but actually differing very +considerably in various important details. + +She was laid down at Clydebank in June, 1912, a great deal of official +reticence being maintained concerning her. She was not complete on +the outbreak of war; but as she was available for service not long +afterwards she is included in this survey. + +The marked and most characteristic difference between her and the +_Lions_ is that the third turret instead of being cramped amidships +as in the _Lion_ design, is moved further aft, thus giving a greatly +improved arc of fire. Twelve 6-inch were substituted for the sixteen +4-inch of the _Lions_ for reasons already given. + +The _Tiger_ is approximately 720ft. long, with a nominal horse-power of +75,000. Babcock type boilers are fitted. Her nominal speed is 27 knots, +but this has more than once been very considerably exceeded. + +For 1912–13 the Estimates provided for four capital ships, the usual +twenty destroyers, and a new type of warship designated as “lightly +armoured cruisers.” + +This programme is of abounding interest, not only on account of the +fact that--so far as the larger types of ships are concerned--it +probably embodies the last new construction available for the British +Fleet in the war (unless the war endure beyond all anticipations) but +also because of its more or less revolutionary nature. + +[Illustration: EARLY “30 KNOT” DESTROYERS.] + +The big ships of the programme were as follows:-- + + ==================+=================+============== + Name. | Built at. | Machinery by. + ------------------+-----------------+-------------- + _Queen Elizabeth_ | Portsmouth Yard | Wallsend + _Warspite_ | Devonport Yard | Hawthorn + _Valiant_ | Clydebank | Fairfield + _Barham_ | Fairfield | Fairfield + _Malaya_ | Elswick | Wallsend + ==================+=================+============== + +The fifth ship in this list, the _Malaya_, is an extra vessel paid for +and presented to the British Navy by the Federated Malay States. + +In general appearance these ships of the _Queen Elizabeth_ class do not +greatly differ from their predecessors; but there all resemblance ends. +In every other way they embody a “new idea”--an attempt so to blend +the battleship proper with the battle-cruiser so as to secure the best +points of both. + +Roughly, the battleship proper sacrifices speed for extra gun power +and protection; while the battle-cruiser sacrifices these two latter +for speed. The speed of the _Queen Elizabeths_ was fixed at 25 +knots--something rather less than that of battle-cruisers, but still +sufficiently high to take them out of the ordinary battleship category +as hitherto understood. Certainly they differ from the normal quite +as much as the original _Dreadnought_ differed from her immediate +predecessors. + +It was only possible to secure this high speed, plus other qualities, +by the bold adoption of oil fuel only--in itself of the nature of a +gigantic experiment, which, however, results have more than justified. +The designed horse-power to secure 25 knots is 58,000. + +If, however, the motive power embodied novelty, still more so did the +armament. For the ten 13.5’s of preceding ships, eight 15-inch guns +were substituted. So far as power is concerned the 13.5 is ample for +all contingencies, but the 15-inch embodies a marked superiority in +range and the additional accuracy which a heavier projectile naturally +affords. Furthermore--a very important point--the “life” of the 15-inch +gun is much longer, owing to there being no necessity to utilise the +full power of which it is capable. + +The general arrangement of turrets is that of all the +super-Dreadnoughts, with the middle turret (always the most restricted +in arc of fire) omitted. + +Nothing has ever been officially stated as to the armour protection; +but it is known to be equal or superior to that of any preceding +battleships. + +When war broke out, the first two of these ships were nearing +completion--the first being completed about the end of 1914 and the +second at the end of March, 1915. + +The 1913–14 Estimates provided for five more or less normal battleships +designed for coal fuel,[36] the usual 21 knots speed, but 15-inch +instead of 13.5-inch guns. + + ==================+===============+============== + Name. | Built at. | Machinery by. + ------------------+---------------+-------------- + _Royal Sovereign_ | Portsmouth Y. | (not stated) + _Royal Oak_ | Devonport Y. | (not stated) + _Resolution_ | Palmer | Palmer + _Ramillies_ | Beardmore | Beardmore + _Revenge_ | Vickers | Vickers + ==================+===============+============== + +Beyond that they are of 25,750 tons, and were designed for 31,000 +horse-power, no details of these ships have been furnished. Two were +estimated to be completed by the end of 1915--the others in 1916. + +The rest of the programme consisted of eight more lightly armoured +cruisers, a reduced number of destroyers and an increased number of +submarines. + +In the 1914–15 Estimates three more battleships of the _Royal +Sovereign_ class--to be named _Renown_, _Repulse_, and +_Resistance_--were provided for, also a sixth ship of the _Queen +Elizabeth class_, which was provisionally named _Agincourt_. The +participation of any of these in the war is very improbable. + +The other vessels of the programme were four lightly armoured cruisers, +twelve destroyers and an unstated number of submarines. + +When war broke out three battleships building in British Yards--two for +Turkey and one for Chili--were taken over by the British Admiralty. +Details of these are as follows:-- + + ==========================+===============+============================== + Name. | Displacement. | Armament. + --------------------------+---------------+------------------------------ + _Agincourt_ | | + (ex-_Sultan Osman I_) | 27,500 | 14--12in., 20--6in.; 3 tubes. + | | + _Erin_ | | + (ex-_Sultan Rechad V_) | 23,000 | 10--13.5, 16--6in.; 3 tubes. + | | + _Canada_ | | + (ex-_Almirante Latorre_)| 28,000 | 10--14in., 16--6in.; 4 tubes. + ==========================+===============+============================== + +There were also taken over three Brazilian armoured gunboats--renamed +_Humber_, _Severn_, and _Mersey_--of 1,200 tons each, carrying two +6-inch guns forward and two 4.7-inch howitzers aft. The speed is about +11½ knots, and early use was made of these vessels on the Belgian coast +shortly after the outbreak of war. + +In addition to the above, two large Chilian destroyers building at +Cowes were taken over and renamed _Broke_ and _Faulknor_. + +A variety of other vessels were likewise incorporated into the British +Fleet, liners (to act as auxiliary cruisers), trawlers (to act as +mine sweepers), plus various hospital ships, transports, and so on and +so forth. Roughly, from 25 to 33 per cent. of the British Mercantile +Marine came to be used in some way or other by the Admiralty--to say +nothing of innumerable private yachts and motor boats. + +The destroyers of the period have not materially differed from their +predecessors of the Dreadnought era, save for the adoption of two, and +subsequently three, 4-inch guns in the armament, instead of one. + +Submarines and aerial craft are dealt with in a separate chapter. + + * * * * * + +At and about the year 1912, the “super-Dreadnought” may be said to have +reached its apotheosis. + +For what it is worth, however, it may here be put on record that +junior opinion in the Navy was then becoming opposed not only to +“super-Dreadnoughts” but to Dreadnoughts in any shape or form. Hardly +any naval officer under the rank of Commander, and an ever-increasing +percentage over that rank, was to be found who was not more or less +convinced that the days of the Dreadnoughts and “super-Dreadnoughts” +might be nearly numbered, and that we were possibly on the verge of +some as yet indeterminate revolution in naval construction as great as +any that the “fifties” saw. + +As yet no very clear argument can be produced. Only vaguely it is put +forward that with torpedo range what it is, the big ship’s chance +against torpedo craft is practically relegated to not being found, and +“not being found” depends mainly upon the “super-Dreadnought” being +screened with very numerous smaller craft. + +When Lord Charles Beresford put it on record that a hundred +anti-torpedo attack guns would be useless in a battleship, he spoke for +all progressive naval ideas. A destroyer may be hit and hit vitally, +but it is hard to imagine a hit which will stop her drifting within +easy range of her quarry before going down. If hostile destroyers get +in, the only real chance of big ships is to sweep their decks with +the modern variant of “case shot” and so kill the crews, a difficult +proposition at the best owing to the small amount of time available. +The proposition is rendered tenfold harder by the certainty that +attack, if it comes, will not come from one quarter only, but from +several. Consequently to preserve the Dreadnoughts, an ever increasing +number of auxiliaries is demanded. Of these no Navy can be said to have +a sufficiency. Hence it is argued that a destroyer attack is bound to +succeed sooner or later, while even did a sufficiency of small craft +exist, the big ship has to be so nursed and protected that her sphere +of usefulness is enormously reduced. Submarines also are a deadly +danger. + +On the other hand it is argued that, given sufficient bulk to the big +ship, torpedoes are likely to be relatively harmless to her; it is also +asked how can the small craft protect their own big ships and also +search out and attack the enemy’s mastodons? + +There, till the war proves something definite one way or the other, +the matter must be left. The big ship has been doomed so often, and +so often adapted itself to changed conditions, that it may well do so +again, despite the seemingly heavy odds against it. + + +_PROTECTED CRUISERS OF THE DREADNOUGHT ERA._ + +The original conception of the Dreadnought era was “nothing between +the most powerful armoured ships and torpedo craft,” though so far as +second class cruisers were concerned the last of these had been laid +down in 1901. + +The persistence with which Germany continued yearly to build +small protected cruisers eventually, however, began to cause some +perturbation; and in the 1908–09 Estimates five protected cruisers +of the _Bristol_ class were provided for. These were the _Bristol_ +(Clydebank), _Glasgow_ (Fairfield), _Gloucester_ (Beardmore), +_Liverpool_ (Vickers), _Newcastle_ (Elswick). The designed displacement +was 4,820 tons, length 453 feet over all, beam 47 feet, and mean +draught 15¼ feet. Armament two 6-inch, ten 4-inch, and two submerged +tubes. A speed of 25 knots was expected from 22,000 horse-power. On +trials all exceeded 26 knots. All were fitted with Yarrow boilers, also +turbines of the Parsons type, except in the _Bristol_, in which Curtiss +type turbines were installed. + +For 1909–10 four more similar ships were provided--the _Weymouth_ +class. Displacement rose to 5,250 tons, and a uniform armament of eight +6-inch was substituted for the mixed armament of the _Bristol_ class. +These four “Town” cruisers were the _Weymouth_ (Elswick), _Yarmouth_ +(London and Glasgow Co.), _Dartmouth_ (Vickers), and _Falmouth_ +(Beardmore). All were given Yarrow boilers and Parsons turbines except +the _Weymouth_, which was supplied with Curtiss turbines. + +The Estimates of 1910–11 contained three cruisers, the _Chatham_, +_Dublin_, and _Southampton_, of the same type, but with a displacement +increased by 200 tons. Three more, the _Birmingham_, _Nottingham_, and +_Lowestoft_, figured in the Estimates of 1911–12. + +In 1907 the practice was instituted of building a Scout or two a year, +those constructed to date being the _Boadicea_, _Bellona_, _Blanche_, +_Blonde_, _Active_, _Amphion_, and _Fearless_, all of which are +unarmoured, and so more or less compelled to fight modern destroyers on +equal terms. Of these the _Amphion_ was lost early in the war by a mine. + +Of the original type were three Australian cruisers, _Sydney_, +_Melbourne_ and _Brisbane_, of which two were built in this country and +the third built, or put together, in Australia. In all these ships the +slight increase in displacement was due to the introduction of a thin +armour belt amidships--a “reply” to a similar innovation in the German +Navy. + +The 1912–13 Estimates saw no more of the “Town” class cruisers being +provided for, but, as already stated, they heralded the appearance of +eight vessels of a new type, officially described as “lightly armoured +cruisers.” + +They were at one and the same time an entirely new type, and also +a reversion to the original _Bristol_ with modifications born of +experience. + +In essence, these ships of the _Arethusa_ class--_Arethusa_, _Aurora_, +_Galatea_, _Inconstant_, _Royalist_, _Penelope_, _Phaeton_ and +_Undaunted_, compared with the prototype as follows:-- + + ====================+========================+====================== + | _Arethusa._ | _Bristol._ + --------------------+------------------------+---------------------- + Displacement (tons) | 3520 | 4800 + Armament | 2--6in. | 2--6in. + | 6--4in. | 10--4in. + | 4 above water t. tubes | 2 submerged t. tubes + Side protection | 2½″ | _nil._ + H.P. | 30,000 | 22,000 + Speed (est.) kts. | 30 | 25 + ====================+========================+====================== + +Fuel supply has never been given out officially, but it may be stated +that, roughly, by making use of oil fuel in the _Arethusa_, a radius +equal to that of the _Bristols_ was secured with a considerable saving +in weight. + +Incidentally, this is one of the most interesting examples of how +the progress of invention makes possible to-day the impossibility +of yesterday. When the _Bristols_ were designed they were the “best +possible” of 1908. Four years later oil fuel had opened out an entirely +novel vista. + +In the 1913–14 Estimates another eight of similar cruisers were +provided for, with, however, 250 tons odd added to the displacement +and an extra 6-inch gun forward allowed for; though this, however, +was altered afterwards, as this batch of cruisers, the _Calliope_, +_Caroline_, _Carysfort_, _Champion_, _Cleopatra_, _Comus_, _Conquest_, +_Cordelia_, do not carry any 6-inch guns forward like the _Arethusa_, +but mount a couple, one abaft the other aft--a wise arrangement, as a +heavy weight forward does not make for sea-worthiness. + +The _Arethusas_ and the “C” class, therefore, compare as follows:-- + + ==============+==========+============+=================== + | Forward. | Amidships. | Aft. + --------------+----------+------------+------------------- + _Arethusas_ | One 6in. | Four 4in. | One 6in., two 4in. + “_C_” _class_ | Two 4in. | Six 4in. | Two 6in. + ==============+==========+============+=================== + +which indicates a couple of 4-inch guns gained for the extra 250 tons. + +In the 1914–15 Estimates four similar vessels were provided for, but no +details whatever have been published concerning them. + + +_DESTROYERS IN THE DREADNOUGHT ERA._ + +The Dreadnought era, while simplifying types of big ships, was the +early institution of two distinct types of destroyers, plus an +experimental vessel which was not duplicated. The original staple +idea of Dreadnought era destroyers was to build very fast ocean-going +destroyers for fleet work, and smaller craft, “coastals,” for +local duties. A considerable flourish of trumpets accompanied the +announcement of this decision, which, however, was in no way really +novel. It merely reproduced in destroyers the long exploded idea of +sea-going and coast-defence ironclads. + +Of these boats the first instalment amounted to a total of eighteen; +the most important being the experimental boat _Swift_, which was given +a displacement of 1,825 tons, and so might just as well have been +designated a fast small cruiser. The horse-power provided was no less +than 30,000, the speed 36 knots, though on trials she once reached +nearly 39 knots. Armament four 4-inch, two 18-inch tubes. Cost about +£280,500. + +It is interesting to note that in 1885 a precisely similar idea found +vent in a _Swift_ (afterwards renamed t.b. 81) of 125 tons against the +40 to 65 tons that was then normal for torpedo boats. It was nine years +before anything else of the same size was built. + +The first standard destroyers of the era were the “Oceans” (often known +as “Tribals”). These averaged 880 tons, 33 knot speed with oil fuel +only. Between 1906 and 1910 altogether a dozen were built. The armament +given to the five first was five 12-pounder, and two 18-inch tubes; +in later boats two 4-inch, 25-pounder were substituted for the five +12-pounders. + +The “coastal destroyers,” which have since lost that name, and are now +known as first-class torpedo-boats, were built in groups of twelve for +three years; the first batch averaging 225 tons, and later boats about +260 tons. In all the armament is two 12-pounder and three 18-inch +torpedo tubes; speed 26 knots. Parsons turbines in all, and oil fuel +instead of coal. + +In 1908–09 there came a revulsion of official feeling against both +types, and an attempt to evolve a species of intermediate was made. +It was held that the Oceans were exceedingly costly; also somewhat +fragile. The new boats, the _Beagle_ class, averaged 900 tons instead +of the thousand tons that the latest Oceans were getting to. Armament +was reduced to one 4-inch, 25-pounder, and three 12-pounders, with the +usual two 18-inch torpedo tubes. Speed was cut down to 27 knots. Oil +fuel was done away with, and coal reverted to. + +The 1909–10 programme provided for 20 destroyers of the _Acorn_ class. +These are slightly smaller than the _Beagles_, armed with two 4-inch +and two 12-pounders, but with oil again instead of coal only. + +On account of considerable agitation in Parliament as to the small +number of modern British destroyers, the construction of all this class +was accelerated by a few months, and with a single exception they were +completed in June, 1911. + +Up till this time considerable latitude had been given to contractors +for destroyers. In the 1910–11 programme the _Acheron_ class, an +Admiralty design, was given out for fourteen of the boats, which, +except that they had two funnels instead of three, closely corresponded +with the destroyers of the preceding year. In the other six boats the +firms of Thornycroft, Yarrow, and Parsons were given some considerable +freedom of design with two boats each, and an increased speed was +obtained with all. + +For 1911–12 boats a similar principle was followed, and there was also +still further acceleration. These latest boats are somewhat faster +than heretofore, and an interesting innovation in the case of one of +them--the Thornycroft type--is the appearance of the Diesel engine for +partial propulsion instead of steam. As a matter of fact, this idea +did not eventually materialise, owing to various circumstances of the +side issue nature. More or less contemporaneously with this the Yarrow +firm in the _Archer_ and _Attack_, their special destroyers, evolved a +system of super-heated steam, which led to a very considerable increase +in speed, as compared with older methods. A conflict between steam +and “gas engines” for destroyers was, therefore, in 1912, a probable +feature of the early future, a conflict still in the “to-morrow” stage; +but it may be unwise to place too much reliance on the fact that a +similar conflict with motor cars ended in the practical extinction +of steam, for all that the probabilities point in that direction. +The superior convenience of the Diesel engine whether for destroyers +or larger ships is obvious, but there are undoubtedly still certain +practical difficulties which cannot be ignored. + +In 1912 the destroyer may be said to have reached its apotheosis. Later +boats are considerably larger, more powerfully armed, and occasionally +a trifle faster, but, taken all in all, they do not indicate any +definite advance on the “general idea” of a destroyer. + +Novelty, such as it exists, is confined to the introduction of flotilla +leaders. The idea is not new, since the Germans hit on it for torpedo +boats long before destroyers as we understand them were evolved. There +is also the still older idea of our original _Swift_. + +The integral notion is in each case the same. The idea is to provide +the commander of the flotilla with a boat swifter and more powerful +than those of his normal command, and thus to enable him to reinforce +as requisite any particular portion of his squadron. Thus viewed, +the idea is, of course, as old as naval warfare itself, or, for that +matter, any warfare whatever; and it is strange that the principle of +the superior power of the chief should ever have been allowed to lapse. + +It is, however, curious to note that at the outbreak of the present war +the British was the only Navy in which the idea was in actual practice. +Not till the war is over shall we learn whether the seeming advantage +is or is not of real value. All the indications, however, are that it +should be an immense asset if properly handled. + + +_GUNS OF THE WATTS ERA._ + +The principal guns of the Watts era are as follows:-- + + =======+========+========+==========+========================= + Calibre| Length | Weight |Weight of | Maximum penetration + in. | in | tons. |projectile| A.P. capped against K.C. + | cals. | | lbs. +------------+------------ + | | | |at 5000 yds.| 3000 yds. + -------+--------+--------+----------+------------+------------ + | | | | in. | in. + 13.5 | 45 | 80 | 1250 | 22 | 26 + 12 | 50 | 58 | 850 | 19 | 24 + 12 | 45 | 50 | 850 | 17½ | 22 + 9.2 | 50 | 30 | 380 | 10 | 13 + 9.2 | 45 | 27 | 380 | 8¾ | 11¼ + =======+========+========+==========+============+============ + +It may be noted that the 12-inch, 45 cal. (as mounted in the original +_Dreadnought_) is quite capable of penetrating anything in existence +at most ranges, and the 12-inch, 50 cal. anything likely to exist. The +main advantage of the 13.5 is the superior weight of the projectile and +the better capacity of its shell. + +Modern progress in gunnery is remarkably demonstrated by a comparison +between the 13.5 of the Barnaby era and the same calibre of the Watts +era. + + ========+========+========+==========+======================+================ + Calibre | Length | Weight |Projectile| Maximum penetration | Corresponding + in. | in | tons. | lbs. | A.P. capped against | value in K.C. + | cals. | | | K.C. at | of belt of ship + | | | +-----------+----------+ carrying + | | | | 5000 yds. | 3000 yds.| + --------+--------+--------+----------+-----------+----------+---------------- + 13.5 | 30 | 80 | 1250 | 9 | 12 | 9 + 13.5 | 45 | 67 | 1250 | 22 | 26 | 12 + ========+========+========+==========+===========+==========+================ + +From which it will be seen that armour has in no way kept pace with the +gun, except in so far as that in the conditions which obtained with the +old 13.5 a range of 3,000 yards was considered an outside limit, 12,000 +yards is now held in the same or even less estimation. + +Along such lines progress has been practically nullified during the +last twenty years. But the limit of vision has now been reached, and +increased gun-power cannot, practically speaking, any longer be met by +range. Whence the argument of many that, failing the production of some +armour altogether superior to anything now existing, the armoured ship +is closely approaching the status of the armoured soldier of the Middle +Ages. A precisely similar remark, however, was first made in 1887,[37] +and proved an incorrect prophecy. To-day, therefore, those best able to +judge are extremely careful about prophecying. + +Meanwhile, the outbreak of war synchronised with the fact that both the +British and German Navies had under construction ships carrying 15-inch +guns; thus indicating a trend of opinion towards ships capable of +delivering heavier and heavier projectiles. + + +_TORPEDO PROGRESS._ + +The principal feature of the last few years has been the steadily +increasing efficiency of torpedoes, mainly by the adoption of improved +engines. For many years 2,000 yards had been the maximum torpedo range. +About 1904 an 18-inch Whitehead with 4,000 yards range and a maximum +speed of 33 knots came into service. This was presently improved upon +by torpedoes of 7,000 yards range. The exact range of the latest type +Hardcastle torpedo--so called after its inventor, Engineer Commander +Hardcastle--is a matter of uncertainty, but it is supposed to be +capable of about 7,000 yards at 45 knots, and up to 11,000 at 30 knots. +As a torpedo would take about 5½ minutes to travel this distance, it is +obviously unlikely to be able to anticipate the position of a single +enemy sufficiently to ensure hitting her, except by pure chance. On the +other hand, if a fleet be fired at, hits with a torpedo are almost as +likely as hits from a gun, and it seems impossible that the old idea of +ships fighting in line can possibly survive, and Admiral Bacon’s theory +that for the squadron of the past there will have to be substituted +the isolated monster ship of the future seems the only reasonable one, +despite all the protests against “mastodons.” + +With the improvement of torpedoes, especial attention has been +devoted to under-water protection against them. One form of this, the +solid bulkheads of the original _Dreadnought_, was, after a time, +partially abandoned owing to its extreme inconvenience. Another form +of protection adopted in all Dreadnoughts is a certain amount of +internal armour, an idea first evolved in France for the battleship +_Henri IV_, which was laid down in July, 1897. Experiments with a view +to testing the efficiency of this device were not very promising. An +improvement on the system was effected by M. Lagane, of La Seyne, in +the Russian _Tsarevitch_ in 1899. This ship was actually torpedoed +in the Russo-Japanese War, but unfortunately she was not hit on the +specially-protected portion, so no experience was gained of the war +utility of the system. While at the outbreak of war it was believed by +some that the modern system is proof against half a dozen torpedoes, +others were extremely sceptical as to whether any real immunity is +afforded. The most that could ever be prophesied was that the next +naval war would see the torpedo accomplish either a great deal more or +a great deal less than is generally assumed. A paradoxical position; +but so things are! No one can predict with any more certainty, even now +that war is on us. We do not know what may happen. Some of us adhere to +the idea that the torpedo is going to be omnipotent: that the gun is +going to be relegated to the second place. The future is likely enough +to discount the destroyer idea. But, from the submarine the torpedo +is likely to do many unexpected things. If the Germans realise the +torpedo, startling things are toward.[38] + +The period just preceding the war saw a curious state of affairs in +connection with net defence against torpedoes. Practically ever since +nets were invented the use of them had been confined to the British, +Russian and Japanese Navies--most other navies making no use of net +defence. Curiously enough the adoption of nets by Germany and Austria +coincided with their abandonment in the British Navy--the British +theory being that net cutters had become so efficient that any kind of +net would immediately be cut through. Incidentally it may be observed +that with nets down a ship can only proceed at a very slow speed. + + +_NAVAL ESTIMATES OF THE WATTS ERA._ + + ==========+============+===========+=============================================== + Financial | Amount. | Personnel.| Ships provided. + Year. | | +-----------+----------------------------------- + | | |Battleships|Battle-cruisers|Armoured |Prot. + | | | | |cruisers.|cruisers. + ----------+------------+-----------+-----------+---------------+---------+--------- + 1902–03 | 31,003,977 | 122,500 | 2 | | 2 | + 1903–04 | 35,709,477 | 127,100 | 3 | | 4 | + 1904–05 | 36,859,681 | 131,100 | 2 | | 3 | + 1905–06 | 33,389,500 | 129,000 | 1 | 3 | | + 1906–07 | 31,472,087 | 129,000 | 3 | | | + 1907–08 | 31,419,500 | 128,000 | 3 | | | + 1908–09 | 32,319,500 | 128,000 | 1 | 1 | | 5 + 1909–10 | 35,142,700 | 138,000 | 6 | 2 | | 3 + 1910–11 | 40,603,700 | 131,000 | 4 | 1 | | 3 + 1911–12 | 44,392,500 | 134,000 | 4 | 1 | | 3 + 1912–13 | 44,085,400 | 136,000 | 3 | 1 | | + ==========+============+===========+===========+===============+=========+========= + +Later in 1912 the sum of £1,000,000 was handed to the Navy out of the +Budget surplus. This sum, the “supplementary estimate,” was allotted in +order to set off a corresponding German increase. + +The decrease of 1905–1908 is probably directly responsible for the +increase 1910–1912; owing to the fact that the British decrease was +met by a corresponding rise in German expenditure. It was the fashion +before the war to deplore the sums spent on naval armaments, while +little or nothing was said about the military estimates. + +For 1912–13 the Naval Estimates were £45,075,400. + +For 1912–14 they increased to £48,809,300, and for 1914–15 they stood +at £51,550,000. + +On the face of things, this ever-increasing naval outlay looked likely +to lead to ultimate financial ruin. This, however, is really a somewhat +superficial view, and mostly nothing but a modern equivalent to that +“Insular Spirit” which has been referred to in previous pages. + +Compared to the national interests at stake, the increase regarded as +an insurance is more apparent than real. It is, if anything, a smaller +percentage on national existence; also over a period of a hundred years +it is far less than the corresponding increase in the Civil Service +Vote, which lacks any claims to be considered an “insurance.” The +entire amount spent in shipbuilding is expended in the country, and +about 70 per cent. of it goes in direct payment to “Labour”: which is +probably a larger percentage than would be achieved were the same sum +spent in any other way whatever. + +The “ruinous competition in naval armaments” so prated on by certain +publicists was really little better than an idle phrase so far as the +British nation is concerned; and there was never any real reason to +regard future increases with apprehension. + +Now that the nation is at war this fact is being recognised. We must +continue to recognise it. In trenches over the water we may attack. But +on the British Navy depends our defence of home interests. + + + + +V. + +SUBMARINES. + + +The submarine as anything of the nature of a practical arm made its +first appearance as a “submarine torpedo boat,” useful merely for +harbour defence. As such it was eagerly embraced by the French Navy, +and had a considerable vogue therein, besides being a commonplace in +the United States long before the British Admiralty accepted it as +serious in a way. + +As a matter of fact, till the invention of the periscope enabled it +to see where it was going when submerged, the submarine was little if +anything but a paper menace. The periscope altered all this. + +The first submarines for the British Navy figured in the 1901–2 +Estimates. Five copies of the American _Holland_ were laid down at +Barrow, the first being launched in October, 1901. These boats were of +120 tons submerged displacement, and used merely as instructional or +experimental craft almost as soon as completed. + +[Illustration: SUBMARINES LEAVING PORTSMOUTH HARBOUR.] + +They were followed immediately by the “A” class, totalling thirteen +boats in all. Displacement submerged, 207 tons. Those numbered from +five to thirteen were given sixteen cylinder surface motors of 550 +horse-power in place of the 450 horse-power twelve cylinder ones of +the earlier boats. In 1904 A1 was lost with all hands under tragic +circumstances off Spithead, being run down by a merchant steamer. This +disaster led to the installation of double periscopes in later types. +A3 was lost off Spithead in 1912, being run down by the _Hazard_, very +near where A1 was lost. + +The B class which followed numbered eleven boats, of which B1 was +originally known as A14. The remaining B class belong to the 1904–05 +Estimates. The submerged displacement in these rises to 313 tons, and +the surface speed to thirteen knots, instead of eleven and a half, +though, owing to improved lines, the horse-power was little increased. + +New boats, completed in 1906 and later, though generally identical +with the B class, were known as the C class, and totalled thirty-eight +altogether. One, C11, was lost at sea from a collision. + +In 1907 the earliest boat of a new type (D Class) was put in +hand. Displacing 600 tons submerged, she practically doubled her +predecessors. Her surface speed rose to sixteen knots with 1,200 +horse-power. Three instead of two torpedo tubes were fitted, also +wireless telegraphy was experimentally adopted in her. She herself +was never any great success, but the rest of the type were far more +successful. + +By the end of 1911 eight boats of the D class had been launched. It was +originally intended to build a total of nineteen of this class, but +meanwhile an improved boat of the E type was evolved. The E class are +177ft. long, with a submerged displacement of 800 tons or thereabouts, +and four 21-inch tubes. They are fitted with wireless. Their special +feature, however, is the fitting of guns, as a regular and integral +part of the design. + +The first submarine to mount a gun was D4, in which a special +12-pounder was experimentally mounted, so that it could be housed when +the boat was submerged; for later boats two guns were decided on. + +The E class were followed by an F class--and a variety of other boats, +most of which have been completed since the war began and concerning +which it is obviously undesirable to say anything whatever. + +Guns for submarines were expected to appear sooner than they actually +did. At an early stage it was foreseen that, once radii developed, +submarines were likely enough to find themselves in contact with +hostile submarines and to need something to attack them with. The +original idea of the submarine as “the weapon of the weaker Power” soon +went the same way as did a similar idea about torpedo boats at their +first inception. + +In torpedo-boats it was at once self-evident that, whatever the value +of the torpedo boat, the stronger Power was able to build far more than +the weaker, and to annihilate accordingly. + +For a time the submarine seemed to defy this law. It was fatuously +hoped that “submarines cannot injure hostile submarines”; and that the +“torpedo boat is the answer to the torpedo boat” would not have as +sequel “the submarine is the answer to the submarine.” + +[Illustration: + + _Photo_] [_Stephen Crabb. Southsea._ + +SUBMARINE E 2.] + +It may well be in the womb of the future that submarines to-morrow, +or perhaps to-day, may be what the ironclad was yesterday or the day +before. The submarine battleship may appear and render obsolete the +“Dreadnought” of to-day! But nothing can alter the cardinal fact that, +given equal efficiency, the Power with most such craft must win, +and that, given an inferior efficiency, defeat may be looked for as +the natural corollary on lines entirely unconnected with whether +the “capital ship” is of a type that floats only or one that can be +submerged at will. + +Tactics may alter, the means may alter, and the most obvious +instruments of naval strategy may do the same. But nothing whatever +can affect the bedrock truth that, given equal efficiency, “numbers +only can annihilate.” Given the “equal efficiency” nothing else really +matters! + +If the creators of weapons keep themselves to date, if those who supply +them see to it that the supply is sufficient, if those who work the +weapons are efficient, the part of those in chief control resolves +itself into little save achieving victory with the minimum of loss. The +day may yet arrive when someone discovers that a good deal of what has +been written about the genius of various famous admirals of the past is +verbiage rather than fact, that they were a part of one great whole, +rather than the sole controlling organisation--at any rate, once battle +was engaged. + +In the future, if the submarine “Dreadnought” becomes an actuality, +this is probably likely to be so to a greater extent than anything +which obtained in the past. So far as we can to-day conceive of such +future fights, much of the battle, at any rate, will entail more or +less blind work under the surface, individual enemies engaging one +another, the leader compelled to rely more and more upon the efficiency +of his individual units and less and less upon his own tactical +combinations. + +Of course things may turn out otherwise. Inventions yet undreamed of +may come to the fore, and the nether waters present no greater obstacle +to regular operations than the surface does to-day. Plunging may offer +no salvation to a beaten enemy. We can only make idle speculations now. + +Yet, however things may shape, success or failure, victory or defeat +must assuredly depend in a great measure on the makers of the +weapons and the efficiency of those who work them--the tools, on the +reliability of which every admiral must trust for victory. + +When this war started there were roughly thirty German submarines to +something like seventy British. At the moment of writing (June, 1915) +at least twenty of those German submarines have gone below. How and why +cannot be published: but they have gone under in one way or another. +Means of defeating submarines are being developed. + +Where big ships are concerned the principle means in use are high speed +and a zig-zag course, the combination making it difficult for the +relatively slow submarine to arrive at the correct striking point. + +In this connection it has to be remembered that the vision of a +submarine is limited; and so that though the range of modern torpedoes +is something like five miles, the actual effective range of a +submarine’s torpedoes is nearer a mile or less. + +So much is this the case that German submarines are fitted with a +torpedo which has a range of only a thousand yards or thereabouts, the +reduced range being compensated for by a greatly increased charge. This +charge, 420 lbs. of very high explosive instead of the usual charge +of 300 lbs. or less, accounts for the devastating effects of German +torpedoes fired from submarines. + +It is merely a phase in submarine warfare. At present a submarine +dare not fire too near its victim lest it be involved in the common +destruction. That, however, is likely enough to be guarded against +in future construction, and the prospects of the early future is +one of more importance for submarines rather than less. They are +bound to become larger and larger, their radius increasing with the +size. Coincidently with this we may expect to see the birth of small +submarines designed to attack big ones: some new variant of the +swordfish and the whale. + + + + +VI. + +NAVAL AVIATION. + + +The aeroplane idea is so old that we find it in Greek mythology, and it +is consequently of unknown antiquity. Hundreds of years before Christ +there were hoary old legends of Dædalus and Icarus, who made wings for +themselves and flew. Icarus flew too high, the sun melted his wings, +with the result that there happened to him what happens about once a +week to aviators to-day, he fell and died. Contemporary with these +legends, are legends of floating rocks which spurted out fire--stories +which sounded inestimably silly till steamships came along. We may +imagine prophets able to look ahead[39] and to invest their day with +visions of the future. Equally we can discard prophets and imagine a +civilisation long since dead which knew all about flying and steamers, +and survives in legends only. + +[Illustration: + + _Photo_] [“_Topical._” + +BRITISH NAVY SEAPLANE.] + +The latter alternative is really the more reasonable of the two. While +imagination can do a very great deal and exaggerate to any extent, +it must have a base to work on. It is easier to believe in some long +gone and extinct civilisation which destroyed itself in the air, than +to believe that pure imagination accounts for the flying stories +of long ago. Africa is full of traces of vast cities older than any +history, telling of past civilisations of which nothing is or ever will +be known. Also there is practically no known age in which anything but +the motive power stood between aeroplane theories and their realisation. + +In support of the theory that men flew before to-day there is the +following:--Somewhere about the year 1100, that is to say, back in the +reign of King Stephen, a French historian relates the appearance of “as +it were, a ship, in the air over London.” It anchored, and the citizens +of London got hold of the anchor. The airship sent a man down to free +it, and the citizens of London caught him and drowned him in the river. +The rest of the aviators then cut the rope and sailed away. + +This incident is mentioned so baldly and casually and so much mixed up +with ordinary petty chat of the era (chat which proves to have been +quite true), that it takes far more faith to accept it as “pure lies” +than to accept it as fact more or less. + +These legends cannot be disregarded lightly. They one and all give +priority to the aeroplane--the “heavier than air” vehicle. Once in a +way the “lighter than air” idea got a casual look in; but it was not +till the end of the eighteenth century that it got into the regions of +practical politics with the French Montgolfiers. But there were people +who invented elementary aeroplanes long before Montgolfier. + +From the end of the eighteenth century until to-day the Montgolfier +idea of “lighter than air” has got little further. The shape has +altered; instead of hot air, hydrogen gas is now employed; and by +means of motors the balloon no longer drifts before the wind. But +progress is terribly slow. That it is so, is a very important thing to +recognise, as slow development is by no means a reason for ignoring an +invention. Sometimes it is quite the opposite. + +It will probably be a good many years before it is definitely settled +whether the “heavier than air” or “lighter than air” principle is the +better for Naval purposes, though there are not wanting enthusiasts who +decry the “lighter than air” machines altogether. + +This is probably a grave mistake, brought about by the fact that +practical balloons existed long before practical aeroplanes, and +dirigibles made flights before ever aeroplanes rose off the earth. Yet +the dirigible is in a far more elementary stage than the aeroplane +is. Not only is the aeroplane a much older idea in the theoretical +direction, but, being very much smaller, it on that account has very +possibly developed more quickly. + +The world has been building ships for thousands of years, yet it has +only recently developed _Tigers_ and _Olympics_, and both are still +developing and likely to do so for some time to come. Row-boats, +however, arrived at perfection a good thousand years ago. That is +to say, there has been no alteration or improvement in them at all +commensurate with the alterations that have taken place in big ships +during the same period. + +[Illustration: + + _Photo_] [_Sport & General._ + +HOISTING A NAVAL SEAPLANE ON BOARD THE _HIBERNIA_.] + +Something of the same sort is quite possible with aeroplanes. It is +already comparatively easy to forecast their eventual form without much +danger of being proved a false prophet later on. We may safely say +that they will become capable of much higher speeds than at present; +also (which is perhaps more important) _slower_ speeds; and that all +existing troubles with stability will eventually be overcome. But +experiments made with birds indicate that the run which an aeroplane +has to take before it can rise occurs in much the same proportion with +birds; and so there are few, if any, practical men who now expect to +see future aeroplanes capable of rising vertically from the ground, or +hovering in the air except under such conditions as any bird can hover +without inconvenience. + +The possibilities of the dirigible, on the other hand, no man can +foresee. The gasbag that can be brought to the ground by a single +bullet hole in it, is a very different thing from the possibility of +airships of the future, which may be a mile or two long, divided into +innumerable compartments, filled with non-explosive gas such as is sure +to be discovered sooner or later. Two miles seems an extraordinary +length to-day, but a ship ten miles long would only be something like +the ratio of the early dirigible to the future ones compared to the +ratio Dreadnoughts bear to the first ships built by men. + +On the water, bulk is limited by the depth and size of harbours, but +in the vast regions of the air there are practically no limitations +whatever, and there is virtually nothing to limit size, save the +building of land docks on open plains into which airships could descend +for purposes of repair and so forth. Consequently those who hastily +assume from a few accidents that the “lighter than air” craft has no +future are probably making a mistake; at any rate, so far as naval work +is concerned. Certain definite uses are apparent even now to those who +think and ignore commercial rivalries. + +It has been wisely laid down that aeroplanes for naval purposes must +be capable of rising from and descending on the water. The Curtiss +was the first successful hydro-aeroplane, but since then floats have +been fitted to various other types with equal success. It is doubtful +whether naval aeroplanes will ever be carried on shipboard like boats, +although this is by no means impossible. It will, however, be more +convenient for a variety of reasons to use them like submarines with +their own special depot ships. + +The main naval use of aeroplanes at the outbreak of war was for +scouting purposes. How near they would be able to approach a hostile +fleet was a question not likely to be solved until the day of battle. +The question of their being hit is secondary to the question of their +being upset, owing to tremendous concussions of heavy gun fire. The +idea of aeroplanes dropping bombs down the funnels of warships can be +dismissed as the entirely fanciful dreams of people who know nothing +whatever about aeroplanes or the mathematical problems involved. +Judging by recent events, dropping bombs anywhere upon a moving ship is +nearly or entirely impossible, except at ranges where the aviator would +at once be brought down by rifle fire. + +A far more likely and useful service would be the destruction of enemy +aeroplanes. For this purpose a special gun, firing a species of chain +shot, has already been suggested, and the naval aeroplane of the future +was always certain to carry a gun of some kind. The off-chance of doing +a certain amount of damage to a hostile ship by dropping a bomb upon +it, is nothing compared to the importance of destroying the enemy’s +aeroplanes. This last seems likely to be all-important as time goes on. + +The duties of naval airships will be of a different nature. Already a +point kept in view in their design is ability to “keep the air” for a +considerable period, and with what are in these days “large airships” +of the Zeppelin type (to which the ill-fated Naval Airship No. 1 +_Mayfly_ belonged) there seems no reason why an airship should not be +kept in the air for three or four days already. + +The fuel problem is not very difficult, because a great deal can +already be done without the use of the engines, or with only partial +use of them. It is also more than probable that with a view to +further economy some kind of sails, combined with sea-anchors, will +be evolved, whereby the ship might become able to sail in the air +nearly as well as the old three-deckers, or, at any rate, as well as +the masted ironclads, sailed in the water. The difficulty of “keeping +the air” is the inevitable leakage of gas, but as leakage nowadays is +infinitesimally less than it once was, the assumption is that as the +years go on it will eventually be reduced to almost a minus quantity. +Gales will be met by “bulk” and efficient anchors, on the principle +that the gale which swamps a fishing-boat or blows over a haystack has +no effect on a Dreadnought or a cathedral. + +Ability to keep the air will enable all Fleets to be accompanied by +airships, which would detect mines and perhaps submarines, and with +their ability to adapt their speeds at will, the presumption is that +they would be able to destroy submarines by bombs. + +A further and very important duty would be the detection of torpedo +attacks at night. Experiments carried out in Austria some few years +ago with a captive balloon proved conclusively that except in cases +of thick fog any vessels in motion are easily detected at a distance +of ten or twelve miles. It is not merely the tell-tale flames in the +funnels which betray attacking vessels; their wakes are always clearly +visible, and as a general rule the vessels themselves, no matter how +dark the night. + +Bomb-dropping from an airship must be a more serious matter than from +aeroplanes, as so much more in the way of explosives could be carried. +The chance of being hit, however, would probably be so much greater +that it was (when war broke out) unlikely that any airships would be +risked for such purposes. Nor is it very probable that naval airships +will for some time to come attack each other, if they can possibly +avoid it, the reason being that for a good many years they will be +comparatively few in number, and the attack would have, in most cases, +to be delivered in the presence of a fleet, which would make the +attack, to say the least of it, very hazardous. + +Eventually, of course, aerial Dreadnoughts fighting each other are +probable enough; but “the Trafalgar of the air” is unlikely to be +witnessed within the lifetime of most or any of us now living. Nor is +it likely that aerial Dreadnoughts will replace Dreadnoughts of the +water, although as years go on they may cause profound modifications in +design in order to allow of mounting guns for vertical fire. + +We are in the presence of the introduction of a “new arm.” But between +what a “new arm” can actually accomplish, and what enthusiastic +inventors say it will do, there is always an enormous gap. Inventors, +when they come to prophesying, are usually one of two things--asses, or +prodigious asses! France--once the second Naval Power in Europe--became +of little or no account because it took the submarine at the +enthusiastic inventor’s face value, and neglected the present and +immediate future. + +The present stage of aerial progress in the British Navy is briefly to +be summarised as follows:-- + +1. A big Zeppelin type naval airship was built in 1909–1911. It proved +a total failure. + +2. In 1911 four naval officers were appointed to learn aeroplane work. +Subsequently a few others were appointed. Others, again, qualified +privately. In 1912, the Royal Flying Corps was established--both naval +and military aviators becoming “wings” of the same body--an excellent +principle, but one necessarily experimental so far as practical work +was concerned. + +3. In practice it proved a failure; so the Naval Air Service was formed +into a branch by itself. Four small army airships were handed over +to it--craft too small to be of any value except for instructional +purposes. + +At the outbreak of war there were two effective dirigibles--one of +French type of Astra-Torres design, the other a Parseval purchased in +Germany. Neither of these ships is in any way comparable to the German +Zeppelins in dimensions or endurance. A number of other dirigibles +of varying sizes were on order, but it is inadvisable to publish any +particulars on this subject. The designs for these were foreign, but +the construction was British. + +In the matter of aeroplanes a number of special naval stations were +established and supplied with seaplanes and landplanes of various +types, while strenuous efforts were made towards the training of a +large number of efficient pilots. The building of an aeroplane is a +matter of only a few weeks, whereas the training of a really efficient +pilot is a matter of a year or thereabouts. + + + + +VII + +AUXILIARY NAVIES. + + +No account of the British battle fleet would be complete without +reference to the various auxiliary navies. Though none of them +possesses any very serious fighting value, yet all possess +potentialities for the future which can with difficulty be computed. + +The auxiliary navies may be divided into two main sections--(1) those +which are direct branches of the British Navy, and (2) those which +belong to the semi-independent colonies. + +Of the former, the principal is the Royal Indian Marine, which +consists of a number of armed troopships. Of these the chief are the +_Northbrook_, launched at Clydebank in 1907, 5,820 tons, 16 knot speed, +and an armament of six 4-inch and six 3-pounders. The _Dufferin_, which +was launched in 1904, is of 7,457 tons, has a speed of 19 knots, and an +armament of eight 4-inch and eight 3-pounders. The _Hardinge_, launched +1900, is of 6,520 tons, 18 knots speed, and carries six 4.7-inch guns +as well as six 3-pounders and 4 Maxims. + +There are three older troopships, the _Minto_ (1893), the _Elphinstone_ +(1887), and the _Dalhousie_ (1886). These are supplemented by ten small +steamers and nine small mining vessels. + +The germ of this fleet was created in the early seventies when the +breastwork monitors _Abyssinia_ and _Magdala_ were sent out for the +defence of Indian harbours. These were small predecessors of the +_Devastation_, very similar to the home coast-defence monitors of the +_Cyclops_ class, and carried four 18-ton muzzle-loading guns. + +About the year 1888 some new torpedo boats (Nos. 100–106) were lent for +the Indian Marine service. These, with their names and numbers, were +as follows:--_Baluch_ (100), _Ghurka_ (101), _Kahren_ (102), _Pathan_ +(103), _Maharatta_ (104), _Sikh_ (105), and _Rajput_ (106). The two +earliest numbers were built by Thornycroft, and were of 92 tons; the +others were built by White, of Cowes, and were of 95 tons displacement. + +In the years 1890–91 two torpedo gunboats, _Plassy_ and _Assaye_, of +the _Sharpshooter_ class, were launched at Elswick for the Indian +Marine, in which they remained until withdrawn in the early years of +the present century. + +On a similar footing to the Royal Indian Marine are the flotillas, +mostly consisting of river gunboats, maintained in North and South +Nigeria and in Central Africa, and the gunboats on the Nile under the +Egyptian Government. + +The Colonial Navies are on a different standing. First place in their +formation belongs to Australia. The monitor _Cerberus_, practically a +sister of the _Abyssinia_ and _Magdala_ already mentioned, was launched +at Jarrow in 1868 for Victoria. This vessel (which still exists as a +drill ship) is of 3,480 tons, armed with four 18-ton muzzle-loaders, +and protected with an 8-inch belt. + +In 1884 Australia’s local defence was re-inforced with four gunboats as +follows:--The _Protector_, of 920 tons, carrying one 8-inch and five +6-inch guns, for South Australia. She, as well as the others, was built +at Elswick. For Western Australia a similar vessel of 530 tons, named +the _Victoria_, was built, armed with one 18-ton muzzle-loader. The +_Gayundah_ and _Paluma_, also of the same type, carrying one old 8-inch +and one 6-inch, were built for Queensland. Their displacement is 360 +tons each. + +From that time onward the Australian Navy occasionally sent a few +officers and men for training in the British Navy. + +Towards the end of the eighties interest began to be taken in +Australian naval defence, and five cruisers and two torpedo gunboats +were ordered for local Australian service while borne on the Royal +Navy List. Of these vessels the five cruisers were the _Katoomba_ (ex +_Pandora_), _Mildura_ (ex _Pelorus_), _Ringarooma_ (ex _Psyche_), +_Tauranga_ (ex _Phœnix_), and the _Wallaroo_ (ex _Persian_), all 2,575 +vessels of the old _Pallas_ class, of which at the time of writing +the _Philomel_ still exists. These ships had a designed speed of 16.5 +knots, a protective deck, and an armament of eight 4.7-inch and some +smaller guns. + +The torpedo gunboat _Boomerang_ (ex _Whiting_) and _Karrakatta_ (ex +_Wizard_) belonged to the _Sharpshooter_ class, and were lent under the +same conditions as the cruisers. + +In the course of time all of them wore out and were eventually recalled. + +Coincident with this the Australians commenced to have a revived +interest in Imperial defence, and in the year 1905–6 Australia and New +Zealand contributed £240,000 to Imperial naval defence, and a project +was put forward for the building of eight destroyers and four torpedo +gunboats for Colonial Defence purposes. + +A few years later this project took a more definite shape, and +about the year 1910 the battle-cruiser _Australia_, a sister of the +_Indefatigable_, was ordered. As part of the same programme, three +protected cruisers of the _Dartmouth_ type, the _Melbourne_, _Sydney_, +and _Brisbane_, were also ordered. Previously to this, three destroyers +of the _Paramatta_ type had been commenced, and in 1911 three more were +ordered, thus forming a nucleus of a serious Australian Navy.[40] + +New Zealand’s interest in the Imperial Navy may be said to have +commenced about the year 1900. It eventuated in paying for the +battleship _New Zealand_[41] of the _King Edward_ class, which was +laid down in September, 1903. An old gunboat of the _Magpie_ class +was purchased, re-christened the _Amokoura_, and used for training +purposes, while to replace some old torpedo boats, which had been sent +to New Zealand about the same time as similar boats went to Australia, +three destroyers of the _Paramatta_ type were ordered. Finally, an +offer from the New Zealand Premier to supplement the Dreadnought +efficiency of the British Navy culminated in the battle-cruiser _New +Zealand_, which was offered to be provided about the same time or a +little before Australia offered a similar vessel.[42] + +[Illustration: BATTLE CRUISER “NEW ZEALAND” ON THE STOCKS--1912.] + +The Dominion of Canada has always maintained a certain number of +small vessels for Customs duties or fishery protection, also for +service on the Great Lakes. In 1909 the question of a Canadian Navy +became insistent, and two old British cruisers--the _Niobe_ of the +_Diadem_ class and the _Rainbow_ of the _Apollo_ class--were purchased +as training ships for the Canadian Navy. A project was also brought +forward for the creation of Canadian dockyards and building therein +four second-class cruisers of the _Dartmouth_ class and six destroyers, +though up to the time of writing none of these ships have materialised, +and the Canadian Navy is still very much a project in the air. + +Newfoundland has a naval reserve, trained over many years in the +drill-ship, which is ex H.M.S. _Calypso_. + +The whole subject of Colonial Navies is somewhat involved, owing to +the question as to how far they should be under the orders of and part +of the British Navy, liable to be used when and where required for +Imperial needs, and how far they should be regarded as merely for local +defence. It has been argued from one point of view that Colonial Navies +acting on their own responsibility might create undesirable Imperial +complications--as for instance, Australia with Japan, or Canada with +the United States. On the other hand it is argued that it would not +be possible to arouse Colonial enthusiasm for a Colonial fleet which +was not always on the spot, despite any strategical grounds that might +exist for its being elsewhere. New Zealand, in May, 1912, negatived +this by presenting her battle-cruiser to the Imperial Navy for use +where most needed, but generally speaking Colonials think first of +local defence. + +These two divergent points of view, which are certainly extremely +delicate, may be said to be still _subjudice_, but in the year 1911 +the following agreement, which is of the nature of a very judicious +compromise, was drawn up:-- + +1. The naval services and forces of the Dominions of Canada and +Australia will be exclusively under the control of their respective +Governments. + +2. The training and discipline of the naval forces of the Dominions +will be generally uniform with the training and discipline of the fleet +of the United Kingdom, and by arrangement, officers and men of the said +forces will be interchangeable with those under the control of the +British Admiralty. + +3. The ships of each Dominion naval force will hoist at the stern the +white ensign as the symbol of the authority of the Crown, and at the +jack-staff the distinctive flag of the Dominion. + +4. The Canadian and Australian Governments will have their own +naval stations as agreed upon and from time to time. The limits of +the stations are described in Schedule A (Canada) and Schedule B +(Australia). + +5. In the event of the Canadian or Australian Government desiring +to send ships to a part of the British Empire outside of their own +respective stations, they will notify the British Admiralty. + +6. In the event of the Canadian or Australian Government desiring to +send ships to a foreign port, they will obtain the concurrence of +the Imperial Government, in order that the necessary arrangements +with the Foreign Office may be made, as in the case of ships of the +British Fleet, in such time and manner as is usual between the British +Admiralty and the Foreign Office. + +7. While ships of the Dominions are at a foreign port a report of +their proceedings will be forwarded by the officer in command to +the Commander-in-Chief on the station or to the British Admiralty. +The officer in command of a Dominion ship so long as he remains in +the foreign port will obey any instructions he may receive from the +Government of the United Kingdom as to the conduct of any international +matters that may arise, the Dominion Government being informed. + +8. The commanding officer of a Dominion ship having to put into a +foreign port without previous arrangement on account of stress of +weather, damage, or any unforeseen emergency, will report his arrival +and reason for calling to the Commander-in-Chief of the station or to +the Admiralty, and will obey, so long as he remains in the foreign +port, any instructions he may receive from the Government of the +United Kingdom as to his relations with the authorities, the Dominion +Government being informed. + +9. When a ship of the British Admiralty meets a ship of the Dominions, +the senior officer will have the right to command in matters of +ceremony or international intercourse, or where united action is agreed +upon, but will have no power to direct the movements of ships of the +other service unless the ships are ordered to co-operate by mutual +arrangement. + +10. In foreign ports the senior officer will take command, but not so +as to interfere with the orders that the junior may have received from +his Government. + +11. When a court-martial has to be ordered by a Dominion and a +sufficient number of officers are not available in the Dominion +service at the time, the British Admiralty, if requested, will make +the necessary arrangements to enable a court to be formed. Provision +will be made by order of his Majesty in Council and by the Dominion +Governments respectively to define the conditions under which officers +of the different services are to sit on joint courts-martial. + +12. The British Admiralty undertakes to lend to the Dominions during +the period of development of their services, under conditions to be +agreed upon, such flag officers and other officers and men as may be +needed. In their selection preference will be given to officers and +men coming from, or connected with, the Dominions, but they should all +be volunteers for the service. + +13. The service of officers of the British Fleet in the Dominion naval +forces or of officers of those forces in the British Fleet will count +in all respects for promotion, pay, retirement, etc., as service in +their respective forces. + +14. In order to determine all questions of seniority that may arise, +the names of all officers will be shown in the Navy List, and their +seniority determined by the date of their commissions, whichever is the +earlier, in the British, Canadian, or Australian services. + +15. It is desirable in the interests of efficiency and co-operation +that arrangements should be made from time to time between the British +Admiralty and the Dominion for the ships of the Dominions to take part +in fleet exercises or for any other joint training considered necessary +under the Senior Naval Officer. While so employed the ships will be +under the command of that officer, who would not, however, interfere +in the internal economy of ships of another service further than is +absolutely necessary. + +16. In time of war, when the naval service of a Dominion or any part +thereof has been put at the disposal of the Imperial Government by +the Dominion authorities, the ships will form an integral part of +the British Fleet, and will remain under the control of the British +Admiralty during the continuance of the war. + +17. The Dominions having applied to their naval forces the King’s +Regulations and Admiralty Instructions and the Naval Discipline Act, +the British Admiralty and Dominion Governments will communicate to each +other any changes which they propose to make in these Regulations or +that Act. + +The Schedules A and B defined the stations of Canadian and Australian +ships respectively. These stations cover the territorial and contiguous +waters in each case. The agreement generally seems framed in an +exceedingly able and statesmanlike spirit, designed so far as may be +to avoid any possible friction or misunderstanding in the future, and +in preparation for the day when the Imperial British Fleet shall be +something very much more than a dream or just a fancy. + +This chapter merely records the birth of something the end of which +none can foretell. It may be the first hint of a great world-wide +English-speaking confederation: it may be the swan song of the British +Empire. But it is probably one or the other in full measure. + + + + +VIII. + +GENERAL MATTERS IN THE LAST HUNDRED YEARS. + + +Since the Great French Wars the British Navy has altered out of all +recognition in its _materiel_; but changes in the _personnel_ are often +considerably less than appears on the surface. + +To take matters in the same order as they are taken in Chapter VIII, +Vol. I., uniform has, of course, long established itself. It has done +so with a formality which, in the view of many, has “established the +régime of the tailor rather than the sailor.” Within the last few years +a slight change for the better has occurred; but of the greater part +of the period so far as concerns purposes for which uniform was first +introduced--the sailor and tailor exchanged places. Much has been +written about admirals and captains whose ideas of naval efficiency +were limited by “spit and polish,”[43] but “spit and polish” at its +worst was never so bad as that tailoring idea which was the ultimate +result of George II admiring the costume of the Duchess of Bedford.[44] + +[Illustration: + + _Photo_] [_Stuart, Southampton._ + +ADMIRAL FISHER.] + +The mischief is popularly supposed to lie with naval officers. +Actually its roots lie with officials, who have piled regulation upon +regulation, and the Vanity of Vanities is to be found so far back +as the days of the great St. Vincent and his recorded orders about +officers shoe-laces. Lesser lights than he, being in authority, +blindly imitated. And so the uniform fetish grew and prospered. + +This is not to be taken wholly as a condemnation--for all that a system +which made one of the most important duties of a lieutenant to be the +carrying round of a tape measure with a view to ascertaining whether +every man was “uniform” within a fraction of an inch may seem more +suggestive of comic opera than of naval efficiency. Within reasonable +limits, conformity has many virtues; and a man slovenly in observing +uniform regulations is likely enough to be slovenly in things of +greater moment. Like most bad things in the Navy, the principle was +ideal: only the carrying of it too far was at fault. There is not the +remotest reason to believe that a Navy not in uniform would be as +efficient as one in uniform--all the probabilities are that it would +be less so. The man who invented the saying that “a pigmy in uniform +is more impressive than a giant in plain clothes” was making no idle +statement, but stating a general verity. The trouble is solely in the +difficulty that has ever been experienced in striking a common-sense +mean--a difficulty created by the first mediocrity who tried to stand +in St. Vincent’s shoes, and who lacked the brains to realise that +what St. Vincent had started with a definite Service object in view, +he--the unknown mediocrity--had merely lost in the _means_. An example +once created had to be followed. The hardships of conformity--of which +overmuch is heard nowadays--are actually trivial, on account of the +custom. The mischief lies not in the conforming, but in the waste of +time of those who are made responsible for that conformity. + +In essence, modern uniform is simple enough: that the various ranks +should be noted by special insignia is obviously desirable. For +combatant officers, the distinguishing sleeve-marks are:-- + +[Illustration: Admiral Vice-Admiral Rear-Admiral Commodore Captain + Commander Lieutenant-Commander Lieutenant Sub-Lieutenant] + +Engineer officers wear the same insignia with purple between the +stripes. Non-combatant officers are without the curl to the stripes, +and wear colours to distinguish them as follows:--Doctors, red; +Paymasters, white; Naval Instructors, blue. + +The system for the supply of the _personnel_ is to-day altogether +different from what it was a hundred years ago. Till comparatively +recently future deck officers were taken very young, passed into the +Service as Naval Cadets, and thence promoted up to Midshipmen, etc., +while Engineers and officers of the other civilian branches joined +later in life. + +More or less contemporaneously with the Dreadnought era this was +altered by the “New Scheme of Entry,” also known as the “Selbourne +Scheme,” after the then first Lord of the Admiralty, but really the +creation of Admiral Fisher, the Sea Lord who was the moving spirit at +the Admiralty at that time. + +Few schemes have been more virulently criticised--few, in some cases, +more unfairly. Like nearly all Admiral Fisher’s innovations, the scheme +was better on paper than in fact. Like all his other schemes it was +carried through at far too great a pace for the ultra-conservative +moods of the British Navy, which has ever resented anything but the +most gradual of changes. On the other hand, it is too often forgotten +by critics that a great agitation on the part of naval engineer +officers, backed by very considerable shore-influences, was then in +existence. Something had to be done, and done quickly. Of Admiral +Fisher it may ever be said that he acted where others merely argued. + +Under the New Scheme, the deck-officer, the engineer, and the +marine-officer were all to enter as cadets at a very tender age, +undergo a common training, and be specialised for any Branch at option +or at Admiralty discretion later on. + +Whatever may be said against the New Scheme, it was magnificent on +paper. Engineer officers had first come into the Navy as mechanics to +work an auxiliary motive-power in which no “seamen” had much faith. +From that humble beginning the status of their Branch grew and grew, +till both motive-power and the existence of nearly everything on +ship-board depended on the engineers. At the same time the official +status of the Branch remained practically in the same stage as it +did when the first few “greasers” were entered. The deck-officer was +(nominally, at any rate) drawn from the aristocracy; the engineer +officer from the democracy in a great measure. In so far as this +obtained, “social war” was added to the real issue. It was obvious that +this state of affairs was detrimental to naval efficiency. Something +had to be done. + +Admiral Fisher cut the Gordian knot in his own fashion. In substance +his Scheme provided that future engineer officers were to be drawn from +the same class as deck-officers--to gild the pill, marine officers were +flung into the same melting pot. He might have done better: but far +more conceivably harm might have been perpetrated. + +As an argument behind him, he had Drake and Elizabethan conditions, +the history of the days when every man was made to “sail his ship and +fight it too.” The U.S. Navy had already plunged on a somewhat similar +experiment. When the Russo-Japanese War came, the Japanese, in the +middle of a life-and-death fight, suddenly granted executive rank to +their engineer officers--_i.e._, that right to control and punish their +own men which British marine officers have always had. + +The Scheme met its first rock in the Marines. For three hundred years +or thereabouts the “Sea Regiment” has been afloat as a thing apart. +The “leather-necks”--as the sailors call them--have built up their own +traditions. They have ever remained a force apart from both Army and +Navy, belonging to both and yet to neither. The record of the Marines +is such that when, recently, it was proposed that they should have a +regimental colour with their battles emblazoned on it, the idea had to +be abandoned because there was not room on the flag for their services! + +Any attempt to interfere with the continuity of such a corps was +fore-doomed to failure from the first. The Marines resisted being +turned into sailors just as they would have resisted being turned +into soldiers. They stood out uncompromisingly for being “the Sea +Regiment.” The expected happened. By 1911 this part of the New Scheme +was practically shelved, and the most unique body of men in the world +was left to carry out its own traditions. + +[Illustration: + + _Photo_] [_Russell & Sons, Southsea._ + +ADMIRAL SIR JOHN JELLICOE.] + +In the matter of future engineers, snags were struck likewise, but +here a more or less unreasoning conservatism on the part of parents +played its full part. The average parent objected to his son becoming +an engineer specialist over old-time reasons. A further and weightier +objection was, and continues to be, raised by engineering experts, +who argue that engineering is a life profession, not to be picked up +efficiently by casual specialization. + +The matter is still under discussion, and its verification or otherwise +rests with the future. As to the first point, a serious effort to +overcome it was made early in 1912 by the promulgation of an order that +New Scheme officers, specialised for engineering, would be eligible for +the command of submarines equally with deck-officers. + +The importance of this particular point is great; for by the end +of 1911 it was generally believed that the motor warship would at +some more or less early date in the future replace the steam-driven +one; and so the “sail-his-ship-and-fight-it-too” theory found a new +interpretation. + +As regards the rank and file of the Navy, the difference of a hundred +years has been so great and so commented on that to-day we perhaps tend +to make it, seem far greater than it really is. It is to be doubted +whether the “prime seaman” has altered to anything like the extent +imagined. We are all too prone to forget that in the days of the Great +French Wars _all_ the crews were not jail-birds, pressed-men, and +riff-raff. The leaven of the mass were the “prime seamen,” who, in +their own way, were as well trained for the naval service as are the +bluejackets of to-day. + +Since then the “prime seamen” have had many vicissitudes. So long ago +as the time of the Crimean War men of ten years’ continuous service +were in existence, but whatever the “paper” value of this force may +have been, the extracts given in Chapter VIII, Vol. I, make it +abundantly clear that the “prime seaman” was in practice very scarce. +It is long since then that the long service system was built up. + +Under this every bluejacket was a “prime seaman” either in _posse_ +or in _esse_. He was entered for a period of ten years, with option +to re-engage for a further ten years at slightly increased pay and a +pension on retirement. At a later and comparatively recent stage this +total of twenty years got increased to twenty-two years. The prospects +were improved to the extent that the best men of the Lower Deck upon +reaching Warrant Rank were able, towards the close of their careers, to +reach the rank of lieutenant on the Active List. In a word, the idea of +a Navy consisting entirely of “prime seamen” was more or less actually +reached. + +This system had, however, one drawback. It was, relatively speaking, +very expensive. When the Fisher revolution took place Economy was very +much the motto of the day. It was pointed out that outside the Royal +Naval Reserve, consisting of merchant seamen, no effective reserve +existed. It was further pointed out that on board a modern battleship +there were many duties which could just as well be performed by +partially trained or even untrained men as by skilled men. + +Out of these two points (according to some critics), by using the first +as a cloak for the economy of the second, a certain retrograde movement +was established in the institution of the Short Service System. Under +this the old time “landsman” was revived under another name. Under +the Short Service System a man could enter the Navy for five years, +receiving ordinary pay for ordinary duties, but without prospects of +promotion or pension, except in so far as he might afterwards be +utilised for reserve purposes. + +How far this scheme made for efficiency is a moot point, but it +certainly led to economy. As certainly it was bitterly resented by +the men of the Navy. The views of the officers on the subject of +“ticklers”--as Short Service men were termed afloat--were less decided. +Some considered the scheme an abomination; others thought it very +satisfactory. + +With so conservative an institution as the British Navy, it is yet too +early to give a definite decision one way or the other on the subject. +But it is worth noting that no one seems to have remarked on the fact +that it was a tentative return, under modern and peace conditions, to +what obtained in the days of the Great French Wars, and then at least +satisfactorily answered requirements. + +No one really knew, and no one could do more than surmise, what would +be required for manning the Fleet in the next great war in which the +British Navy was engaged. It was generally assumed that in the present +century the re-institution of the press-gang would be quite impossible +owing to public opinion. + +Public opinion, however, is a variable quantity, and with a Navy in +desperate plight for men there is no saying definitely what might or +might not happen, either publicly or _sub rosa_. It was generally +agreed on all hands that, large as the trained _personnel_ of the +British Navy is, it might prove totally inadequate in a big naval +war. In such case extra men would have to be found--sentiment or no +sentiment. The Short Service System, despite all its drawbacks, has so +far proved a loophole to avoid the horrors of the press-gang of the +old days; and much which on the face of it was at the time obviously +unsatisfactory may in the future prove to have been foresight of an +unexpectedly high order. + +It only remains to add that nothing of this sort has ever been advanced +in extenuation by advocates of Short Service, who have confined +themselves entirely to the obvious point of economy and the more or +less debatable point of an efficient reserve. + +To-day, of course, the crews do not find their ships a prison; but it +is a moot question whether they are relatively much better off than +in Nelson’s day. A great deal of leaven is given--far more, indeed, +than is represented by philanthropic agitators--but it is mainly of +the nature of “short leave.” This--in these days of travel--means very +little relatively, since it rarely allows of a trip home. For good or +ill, the bluejacket of to-day is a “home-bird”; consequently, what +a hundred years ago would have represented “ample liberty,” to-day +appears much on all fours with the old time confinement to the ship. +Modern facilities for travel have swallowed up most of the difference! +This is among the matters not understood by the Powers That Be. The +perspective has changed; and Service Conditions have not yet been fully +accommodated to the alteration. + +Food remains a source of naval grievance to-day almost as much as in +the days of the Great Mutiny. That it does so is mostly an inherited +tradition of the past; for both quality and quantity are now excellent. +An impression prevails, however, that were messing provided by the +Admiralty on non-profit lines instead of by contract, “extras” would +either be cheaper, or that what are now “canteen profits” on them would +be more available than they are at present. There is little reason +to believe that this is so. Like the purser of a hundred years ago, +the modern contractor probably does not make a tenth of the profit +that he is legendarily supposed to make, nor is there any clear proof +that things could be materially bettered, except in details which have +little or nothing to do with the main point. + +When all is said and done, the bluejacket of the Twentieth Century +has always been fed as well or better than his brother in civilian +life, and his growls upon the subject of messing do not demand any +very serious attention. Just as the Great Mutiny of 1797 brought about +an attention to details of uniform, regulations and things of that +sort which have ever since endured, so it perpetuated a corresponding +impression that an official eye must ever be directed to keeping +messing more or less up to the mark. And that eye has never slumbered. + +In Chapter VIII, Vol. I, a page is devoted to surgery in the Great War +Era. Here, as in some other matters, progress may be more real than +imaginary. Now, as then, the Navy offers little in the way of lucrative +inducements to a good surgeon. In one sense it offers less than it did; +for, though exceptions can be found, the general naval conception of +the doctor is still the old-fashioned notion of someone to cure the +sick man rather than the more modern idea of preventing the man from +becoming sick. + +The problem, it must, however, be admitted, is a difficult one in many +ways. In peace conditions the medical staff is rather too large than +too small; for all that, for modern war conditions it is probably +hopelessly inadequate. + +It is more or less accepted that in modern battle the wounded must lie +where they fall. Theoretically, at any rate, this is mitigated by +certain instructions in First Aid, and the furnishing of hypodermic +syringes to one member of each gun’s crew for use on the badly wounded. +The days when lint was forbidden as a useless extravagance, and +sponges were restricted for the sake of economy, have indeed gone, +just as surely as has the old-time surgeon who, unable to afford his +own instruments, had to borrow from the carpenter an ordinary saw to +amputate a limb! But--relatively to shore-practice of equal date--the +naval medical service is not much less hampered than it was a hundred +odd years ago; and a really big naval action is likely enough to see as +much superfluous agony (relatively speaking) as in the old days! + +The true position of the surgeon in a warship is not recognised; the +official duties of a doctor are officially purely “curative,” very +rarely “preventive.” Some or most of this is due to the prevalence +of old-fashioned obsolete ideas in high quarters; but some also +is to be laid at the door of the “Churches,” and their fancy for +differentiating between diseases. The matter is not one that admits of +further discussion here; but the enforcement upon naval surgeons (who +have to deal with large bodies of men crowded into spaces necessarily +favourable for contagion) of conditions which, rightly or wrongly, are +deemed to be for the public’s ultimate welfare on shore, are a terrible +menace to naval efficiency. Things are indeed bettering in this +respect, but still somewhat slowly. + +After the Great Mutiny of 1797 the pay of the men was approximately +trebled. Although “extras” have since been added, the normal pay +has remained to all intents and purposes stationary, while if +qualifications be taken into account it has actually decreased, since +the “ordinary” of to-day is called on to do just about what the “able +seamen” of a hundred odd years had to do. + +The respective rates[45] are:-- + + ================+============+============= + | 1797 | 1914 + | per week. | per week + | | (minimum). + ----------------+------------+------------- + Ordinary seamen | 6/6 | 8/9 + Able seamen | 8/4 | 11/8 + ================+============+============= + +Since the cost of living has certainly gone up at least twenty per +cent. in the interim, and since the normal increase is undoubtedly +under that, a _prima facie_ case is certainly made out for those who +contend that the British sailor is, if anything, worse paid than he was +a hundred years ago. + +The board and lodging which he obtains of course adds to the actual +total; but the fact remains that the board and lodging labourer of +to-day, who takes no risks of his life, is now as much ahead of the +sailor as he was behind him in 1797. And “uniform” means a heavy extra +expense for clothing. + +In 1912 the men of the Navy definitely asked for a twenty per cent. +increase of pay. It amounted to nothing but an adjustment of 1797 +conditions to modern ones. They did not obtain it--unasked for +off-chances of “Democracy on the Quarter Deck” were given instead. +Later on a 3d. a day concession was made to able seamen after the +completion of six years’ more service. + +There at the moment the question remains. It has to a certain extent +been obscured by question of naval punishments; about which a good deal +of nonsense has been written by people who in some cases should know +better. + +Naval punishments are severe; but discipline necessitates punishments, +and these have been regularly toned down to the spirit of the age. +The real and genuine grievances of to-day are almost identical with +the genuine grievances of which the “prime seamen” complained in +1797:--pay, leave, and the treatment of men who happen to come into the +hands of the ship’s medical staff through no fault of their own. + +In 1912 a Commission was enquiring into punishments, and further +reductions in them to suit modern ideas resulted; but it is by no means +certain that any advantage in efficiency will be acquired therefrom. +Naval Discipline--no matter how harsh--is a tricky thing to tamper +with. The highest possible ideal of Discipline was reached by the +Japanese, who, previous to the war with Russia, ran their Navy on “the +honour of the flag” lines; and presumably had some similar system in +the Army. In what is certainly the most patriotic land of our era +this succeeded in peace time. Yet in the attacks on Port Arthur, when +a great assault was made, when the time came to cease bombarding the +hostile position, the guns were turned on the possible line of retreat, +ensuring that for a man to retire was more dangerous to him than to +go forward. In the case of the Japanese it was perhaps an unnecessary +precaution, but it was borrowed from old-time precautionary usage in +Europe. + +Every system of discipline is based on the fact that either sooner or +later there will be some man who will be frightened enough to turn +tail, and lead others to follow his example, unless there is something +still worse to stop him. On this foundation stone the most seemingly +trivial items of discipline are based. + +No normal man, _when it comes to the point_, cares to risk his life +or limbs. Here and there an individual of the “don’t care” order is +to be found; but generally speaking he is an anomaly. In the ordinary +way the safest assumption is that he will think more of his skin +than anything else--and on this theory all systems of discipline are +founded. All rely on the ultimate fact that “it is worse to go back +than to go forward.” The curse of the present age is the semi-educated +humanitarian who criticises the _means_ (often crude enough) without +taking the _end_ into proper account. At the other extreme are those +who, though familiar with the story of the Russian sentry regularly +placed to protect a favourite flower which had died two hundred years +before, understand that there is a _reason_ for everything, but fail to +realise fully that conditions change. + +Many works have been written on the tactical and strategical +superiority of those who have led British Fleets to victory; but in +the great majority of cases there is little to show that the majority +of our admirals were really more clever than many of their opponents. +He would be a bold man who set out to prove in black and white that +Collingwood had more brain than Villeneuve, or would have done better +than that unlucky admiral had they changed places with each other. Nor +would he have much more luck in attempting to prove that at any era in +history British sailors were really braver than French ones. + +In one critical period of English history Drake appeared--and the most +lasting sign of “how he did it” was “spit and polish”! In another +dark time came St. Vincent--and his sign manual was “tailoring” and +“routine.” In yet another critical hour came Nelson who supplied +enthusiasm by his care for the health of his men. But it was Nelson who +went out of his way to congratulate St. Vincent on hanging mutineers +out of hand on a Sunday instead of keeping them till the Monday! These +three great men knew what they relied upon. + +The real secret of British naval success has surely lain in the +possession of naval architects able to create the kind of ship best +calculated to stand hammering, and hard-hearted folk in authority who +created a discipline which, however unreasonable some of it may now +seem, has ever ensured victory. + +Superior British courage then, as now, was a pleasing topic for the +music hall or its equivalent; but the real driving power of the British +battle fleet in the past was “discipline.” Those who to-day would amend +or alter even the most seemingly ridiculous anomalies of discipline +will do well to ponder and walk warily, lest they upset greater things +than they wot of--lest they damage the keystone embodied in the crude +words of that unknown stoker who said: “It’s just this--do your blanky +job.” + + + + +WARSHIP NICKNAMES + +PAST AND PRESENT. + + + _Achilles_ A-chilles, _also_ The Chilly + _Aeolus_ Oily + _Anson_ Handsome + _Agamemnon_ Aggie, _also_ Mother Weston + _Alexandra_ Alex + _Ajax_ Queen of Hearts + _Andromache_ Andrew Mark + _Apollo_ Pollie + _Ariadne_ Harry Agony, _also_ Hairy Annie + _Bacchante_ Boozer, _also_ Black Shanty + _Belleisle_ Belle-isle + _Bellerophon_ Bellyfull + _Black Prince_ British Public + _Brilliant_ Hair Wash + _Caesar_ Gripes + _Calliope_ Cally-ope + _Cambrian_ Taffy + _Camperdown_ Scamperdown + _Circe_ Sirse + _Collingwood_ Collywobbles + _Colossus_ Costly + _Conqueror_ Corncurer + _Cornwallis_ Colliwobbles + _Cumberland_ Cumbersome + _Curacoa_ Cocoa + _Curlew_ Curly + _Cyclops_ Sickly + _Daphne_ Duffer + _Devastation_ Devy + _Diana_ Die Anyhow + _Dido_ Diddler + _Donegal_ Don’t Again + _Duke of Wellington_ The Dook + _Dreadnought_ Fearnought + _Endymion_ Andy Man + _Fantome_ Ghost + _Galatea_ Gal to Tea + _Gibraltar_ Gib + _Glory_ Ruddigore + _Gorgon_ Guzzler + _Grasshopper_ Grass Bug + _Hannibal_ Annie Bell + _Hawke_ Awkward + _Hecate_ Tom Cat + _Hercules_ Her-cules + _Hermione_ Hermy-one + _Highflyer_ Aeroplane + _Hindustan_ Dusty One + _Hogue_ Road Hog + _Howe_ Anyhow + _Illustrious_ Lusty + _Immortalité_ Immortal Light, _also_ Immorality + _Imperieuse_ Impy + _Indefatigable_ Antipon + _Iphigenia_ Silly Jane + _Isis_ Icy + _Jupiter_ Jupes + _King Alfred_ Alfie + _King Edward_ Neddie, _also_ King Ned + _Lancaster_ Lanky + _Leda_ Bleeder + _Lion_ Liar, _also_ Lie On + _Magnificent_ Maggie + _Melpomene_ Melpo-mean + _Montagu_ Montie + _Narcissus_ Nasty Sister + _Niger_ Nigger + _Nile_ Jew + _Northampton_ Northo’, _also_ Bradlaugh + _Northumberland_ Northo’ + _Onyx_ Only One + _Pandora_ Paddler + _Penelope_ Penny Lope + _Perseus_ Percy + _Philomel_ Filly + _Polyphemus_ Polly + _Prince George_ P.G. + _Psyche_ Sue, _or_ Sukey, _also_ Sickly + _Queen Elizabeth_ Black Bess, _also_ Bessie, _also_ Lizzie + _Ramillies_ Mutton Chop + _Rattlesnake_ Ratto + _Repulse_ Beecham + _Resolution_ Reso + _Royal Sovereign_ Royal Quid + _Salamander_ Sally and her Ma + _Sanspareil_ San Pan + _Scylla_ Silly + _Seagull_ Gull + _Sheldrake_ Shell Out + _St. Vincent_ Saint + _Sutlej_ Suble J. + _Tartar_ Emetic + _Téméraire_ Temmy + _Terrible_ Orrible + _Undaunted_ Dauntless + _Yarmouth_ Lunatic + _Warspite_ War Spider + +_Note._--From time to time Nicknames vary, as occasionally they are +bestowed by other ships. This list is not quite complete on that +account. + + + + +FOOTNOTES + + +[1] Most of the criticism past and present of the Barnaby era is +rendered worthless by an ignoring of this report. + +[2] This is instanced by the increasing ahead fire given to the +broadside ironclads. + +[3] _Our Ironclad Ships._ + +[4] In this connection see _Imperieuse_ and _Warspite_ later on. + +[5] _Naval Developments of the Century_, by Sir N. Barnaby, pp. 163–164. + +[6] Re-designed to give extra protection. + +[7] _See_ Reed Era. + +[8] In the Chili-Peruvian War--as late as 1879–81--a torpedo fired from +the _Huascar_ did this. + +[9] The full report is to be found in Part IV of _Brassey’s Naval +Annual_, 1888–9. + +[10] It is worthy of note that these ships were abnormally +“over-gunned” according to the ideas which were then in official +favour, and which, later on, came more into favour still. The same +applies to the _Arethusa_ class. + +[11] It is interesting to note that the Laird firm, who built the +_Rattlesnake_, which was easily the fastest of her class, made her +engines considerably heavier than Admiralty specifications. For this +they were fined £1,000, which sum, however, was remitted after the +brilliant success of the ship in the manœuvres above referred to. + +[12] Mr. W. T. Stead, who edited the _Pall Matt Gazette_ at that time, +intimated some twenty years later that Lord Fisher was behind him in +commencing the agitation. Lord Charles Beresford, then in political +life, brought the Bill forward. + +[13] In 1899 the _Blake_ was re-boilered. The ships remained upon the +effective list till 1906, when they were converted into sea-going depot +ships for destroyers, most of their guns being removed. They now carry +each 670 tons of coal of their own, and 470 tons stowed in one cwt. +bags for use by destroyers. + +[14] This ship very greatly exceeded her nominal displacement of 14,200 +tons. She was actually 15,400 tons. The essentially White ships were, +on the other hand, of about their nominal displacement. Of the _Hood_ +it may further be added that she was greatly inferior to the others as +a sea-boat--a serious set-off against her superior big gun protection. + +[15] 4 _Astræas_ = 8--6in., 16--4.7. 5 _Apollos_ = 10--6in., 15--4.7 + +[16] The _Lynch_ and _Condell_ (launched 1890) sank the Chilian _Blanco +Encalada_ in 1891; the _G. Sampaio_ (1893) the Brazilian _Aquidaban_ in +1894. + +[17] In 1894 the _Thunderer_ had her upper works painted in black and +white chequers, like the old three-deckers of the Nelson era. Ships +with the top of their upper works yellow were also not uncommon. + +[18] About 1902–3 four additional casemates for 6-inch guns were added +on top of the four amidship casemates. + +[19] The large tube Yarrow, now so general, did not appear till at a +later date. + +[20] Comparatively recently a ship--best left unnamed--made wonderful +speed. With a new Engineer Commander she suddenly lost 25 per cent. of +her horse-power. The newcomer was rather inexperienced in the type, and +closely followed Admiralty regulations. Presently the ship recovered +her power--he had given up following the book! It is only fair to +say that the restrictive regulations of the Admiralty were mostly +forced upon them by people ashore, who probably had not even a nodding +acquaintance with the engine-room of a warship, or warship requirements. + +[21] This idea was borrowed from the Continent. Germany had long +adopted batteries, and nearly every other nation had followed suit. + +[22] Also under Naval Defence Act an additional sum of £10,000,000, +spread over seven years. + +[23] The _Nelsons_ were delayed in completion, as the 12-inch guns made +for them were appropriated for the _Dreadnought_, in order to ensure +rapid completion of that ship. + +[24] To some extent this is probably true of slower firing of larger +guns. The only warships with single 12-inch--the Italian _Victor +Emanuele_ class--have generally achieved almost as many hits at target +practice as the _Brine_, with two pairs of 12-inch. Improved mountings +have since appeared, but certain advantages still seem inevitable to +the single gun. Its disadvantage lies, of course, in much extra weight, +and to-day in the space question also. + +[25] Armament recently altered to 9--4 inch. + +[26] They had a bow tube besides broadside tubes. This bow tube was +soon done away with and a couple of 6-pounders substituted. + +[27] The vessels of the _Amalfi_ class designed by Col. Cuniberti in +1899 were of 8,000 tons displacement; they were to have been armed with +twelve 203-m/m (8-inch), twelve 76-m/m (12-pounders), and twelve 47-m/m +(3-pounders). The armour belt was 152-m/m (6-inches) thick, as also was +the armour of the battery and of the turrets. The engines were to be +19,000 H.P., and the speed with 15,000 H.P. was to be 22 knots. + +[28] The _Vittorio Emanuele_ proved a most successful ship, answering +all expectations of her. One of her chief novelties was the employment +of a special girder construction, and the scientific reduction of +all superfluous weights upon a scale never before attempted. Though +apparently lightly built the ship was found to be abnormally strong. + +[29] The false impression that a British battleship could be built in +about a third of the time that German ships take to construct had far +more to do with subsequent shipbuilding reductions than any deliberate +ignoring of naval needs, such as those responsible were accused of. + +[30] They first appeared, as already recorded, in British cruisers +of the _Minotaur_ class. Their safety record is to be found in the +survival of the _Pallada_ at Port Arthur; their inconvenience in the +fact that in the _Neptune_ they were abandoned. + +[31] These were announced as intended to carry four 12-inch and eight +10-inch, besides smaller guns. The 10-inch proved later on to be +mythical. + +[32] American scientific gunnery rather post-dates the _South Carolina_ +design. + +[33] It should be remembered that alterations were made in the +_Invincible_ class in the course of construction, and this probably +helped to swell the cost. + +[34] In the Chinese ships _Ting Yuen_ and _Chen Yuen_, built in Germany +in 1882 with big guns _en échelon_, the former had the port big guns +foremost, the latter the starboard ones--presumably an appreciation +of and an attempt to overcome the inherent defect of the échelon +system--the two ships being intended to fight in company, and so have +one of the two always in the best fighting position were the enemy +anywhere on the beam or quarter. + +[35] The torpedo, for example, may possibly bring about something +of the sort by a state of speed and accuracy which leads to heavy +or anticipated heavy long-range losses from it in fleet actions. To +offer only one-fifth or so of the target would then be a serious +consideration. + +[36] This is rumoured to have been abandoned for oil fuel. + +[37] Something of the same kind was also observed about 1870 or +earlier, when a Whitworth gun punched through a 6-inch iron plate! + +[38] Since these words were written the _Lusitania_ has been torpedoed. +I see no reason whatever to alter the original thesis. + +[39] Dean Swift in “Gulliver’s Travels” described almost exactly the +moons of Mars long before their existence was ever suspected. + +[40] Of these, the third in either case was built or put together in +Australia. + +[41] Now renamed _Zelandia_. + +[42] In May, 1912, the _New Zealand_ was definitely handed over to the +British Navy. The _Australia_ still remains a Commonwealth ship. + +[43] See Vol. I., Chap. III. No less a man than Sir Francis Drake +appears to have invented “spit and polish.” + +[44] See Vol. I., page 194. + +[45] The minimum is given in each case. + + + + +Index. + + + Aboukir, Battle of, 152, v. i + + Abuses, Naval, 65, v. i + + Acquitaine, 11, v. i + + Admiral Bacon’s Theory, 204, v. ii + + Admiral Hopkins--Earliest Advocate of Centre-Line in England, 179, v. + ii + + Aerial Bombs First Provided Against, 173, v. ii + + Aerial Dreadnoughts, 171, v. ii + + Aerial Experiments in Austria, 228, v. ii + + Aerial Guns, 226, v. ii + + Aeroplanes for Naval Purposes, 226, v. ii + + Agreement with the Colonies, Naval, 237, v. ii + + Aircraft, Possibilities of, 95, v. i + + Aircraft, Potentialities in, 228, v. i + + Alexander, 162, v. i + + Alexandria, 163, v. i + + Alfred the Great, 1, 14, v. i + + Alfred, King, 60, 73, v. i + + Algiers, 59, v. i + + All-Big-Gun Ship Arguments, 143, v. ii + + Alterations to “Lion,” 185, v. ii + + Alternative “Dreadnought” Ideal, 165, v. ii + + Alva, Duke of, 48, v. i + + American Colonies Revolution, 124, v. i + + American Frigates, 189, v. i + + Americanising of British Naval Designs, 176, v. ii + + American Monitors and Conning Towers, 272, v. i + + American Monitors, limitations of, 292, v. i + + American Navy, 189, v. i + + American War, 189, v. i + + Amiens, Peace of, 163, v. i + + Anson, Commodore, 109, v. i + + “Answer” British, to frégates blindées, 249, v. i + + Antigua, 172, v. i + + Antwerp, 183, v. i + + Appreciation of Barnaby, 49, v. ii + + Arch Duke Charles, 98, v. i + + Archers, English, 27, v. i + + Armada, Defeat of, 57, v. i + + Armada, Delayed, 48, v. i + + Armada, Force of, 49, v. i + + Armada, Indifferent Gunnery of, 50, v. i + + Armada, Real History of, 57, v. i + + Armament, Ratio of Size, 95, v. i + + Armed Neutrality, The, 161, v. i + + Armour, 204, v. ii + + Armoured Cruisers Re-appear, 101, v. ii + + Armour Experiments at Woolwich, 219, v. i + + Armoured Forecastles, 284, v. i + + Armoured Scouts, 197, v. ii + + Armstrong and Percussion Shell, 227, v. i + + “Army of Invasion,” 170, v. i + + Articles of War, 11, v. i + + Artificial Ventilation, 225, v. i + + Armstrong, Guns of, 241, v. i + + Artillery, Superior, 229, v. i + + Assize of Arms, The, 10, v. i + + Athelston, 7, v. i + + Australia, Navy of, 233, v. ii + + Auxiliary Navies, 231, v. ii + + + Battle of Trafalgar, 177, v. i + + Belle Island Captured, 122, v. i + + Berwick Captured by French (1795), 138, v. i + + Blockade, Scientific, First Instituted, 120, v. i + + Blockade Work, 165, v. i + + Bomb Dropping, 226, 228, v. ii + + Bombs from Airships, 228, v. ii + + Bomb Vessels Introduced, 87, v. i + + Bonaparte (see Napoleon), 230, v. i + + Bordelais Captured, 158, v. i + + Boscawen, 120, v. i + + Boswell, Invention of, 107, v. i + + Bounty, 200, v. i + + Bounty, Given by Henry VII, 36, v. i + + Bounty to Seamen, 234, v. i + + Bourbon, Isle of, Captured, 185, v. i + + Box-Battery Ironclads, 318, v. i + + Brading, Battle of, 5, v. i + + Breaking the Line, First Attempt at, 128, v. i + + Breaking the Line by Rodney, 129, v. i + + Breastwork Monitors, 292, 307, 308, v. i + + Breech Blocks, Elementary, 320, v. i + + Breechloaders, Armstrongs, 320, v. i + + Brest, 157, v. i + + Brest, Cornwallis off, 172, v. i + + Bridport, 139, v. i + + Brig Sloop of 18 Guns, 178, v. i + + British Battle Fleet, 257, v. i + + British Defects in the Crimean War, 234, v. i + + British Empire, an English-Speaking Confederation, 241, v. ii + + British Flag, 75, v. i + + British and French Ideals, 249, v. i + + British v. French Ships Discussed in Parliament, 37, v. i + + British Guns, 232, v. i + + British Merchant Ships Trade with Russia During War, 186, v. i + + British Methods of Warfare, 41, v. i + + British Navy, Birth of, 34, v. i + + British Squadron, Defeat of, 186, v. i + + British Tactics, 231, v. i + + Broadside Ironclads, 257, v. i + + Broke, Captain, 189, v. i + + Brown, Samuel, Invents a Propeller (1825), 216, v. i + + Bruat, 234, v. i + + Brueys, 152, v. i + + Bruix, 154, v. i + + Buckingham, Duke of, 65, v. i + + Bullivant Torpedo Defence, 53, v. ii + + Burchett, 92, v. i + + Burgoyne, Alan H., 59, v. i + + Burgoyne, Captain, 288, v. i + + Bushnell, David, and his Submarine, 124, v. i + + Busk, Hans, 237, v. i + + Busses, 11, v. i + + Byng, 99, v. i + + Byng, Shot, 116, v. i + + + Cadiz, 171, v. i + + Cadiz, Collingwood off, 175, v. i + + Calais, 27, 30, 33, v. i + + Colder, 172, v. i + + Calcutta, Recapture of (1757), 119, v. i + + Calypso, 237, v. ii + + Campaign of Trafalgar (Corbett), 170, v. i + + Camperdown, Battle of, 150, v. i + + Canada Acquired by England, 123, v. i + + Canadian Dockyards, 237, v. ii + + Canadian Navy, 237, v. ii + + Cannon, Early, 38, v. i + + Cannon, First use of, 29, v. i + + Canute, 8, v. i + + Cape St. Vincent, Battle of (1759), 121, v. i + + “Capital Ship” Adjusts Itself, 218, v. ii + + Capital Ship, Galley Replaced by Galleon, 27, v. i + + Cape La Hogue, Battle of, 90, v. i + + Capraja, “Queen Charlotte” blown up off (1880), 160, v. i + + “Captain,” Nelson in, 142, v. i + + Carronades, 129, v. i + + Carronades, Part of Armament, 201, v. i + + Cartagena, Vernon Fails at, 109, v. i + + Catapults, 15, 30, 38, v. i + + Catherine the Great, 154, v. i + + Cayenne Captured, 184, v. i + + Cellular Construction, 267, v. i + + Central Africa, 232, v. ii + + Central Battery Ironclads, 292, v. i + + Centre-line, System, 179, v. ii + + Cerberus, 232, v. ii + + Cette, 103, v. i + + Chads, Captain and Gunnery Experiments, 220, v. i + + Chads, Captain, 223, v. i + + Chagres Bombarded, 109, v. i + + Channel Policed, 10, v. i + + Channel Protected by Merchants, 33, v. i + + Chappel, Captain, 215, v. i + + Charles I, 65, v. i + + Charles II, 81, v. i + + Charles, Prince, 73, v. i + + Charring, 107, v. i + + Charter of Ethelred, 8, v. i + + Chartres, Duke of, 126, v. i + + Chateau, Renault, 96, v. i + + Chatham, Earl of, 183, v. i + + Christian VII, 180, v. i + + Cinque Ports, 22, 29, 35, v. i + + Cinque Ports Established, 10, v. i + + Civil War, 75, v. i + + Claxton, Captain, 215, v. i + + Clive, 119, v. i + + Clothing, 65, v. i + + Clydebank, 188, v. ii + + Coal, Larger Store of, Affects + + Construction, 263, v. i + + Coal Stores, 185, v. ii + + “Coastals,” 199, v. ii + + “Coastal Destroyers,” 199, v. ii + + Coast Defence Ironclads, 199, v. ii + + Coat of Mail Idea, 249, v. i + + Cockpit, Horrors of, 204, v. i + + Cochrane, Lord, and Fire Ships, 183, v. i + + Cochrane Opposes Vote of Thanks to Lord Gambier, 183, v. i + + Code of Naval Discipline, 12, v. i + + Colonials and Local Defence, 237, v. ii + + Colour Experiments, 89, v. ii + + Command of the Sea (First Appearance of), 75, v. i + + Commerce Defence, 75, v. i + + Commission, Report of (1806), 187, v. i + + Compass, 12, v. i + + Coles, Captain Cowper, 272, v. i + + Coles, Captain, 280, v. i + + Coles, 275, v. i + + Coles, Captain, 284, v. i + + Collingwood Incompetent, 202, v. i + + Collingwood, Resignation of, 148, v. i + + Colomb, Admiral, Quoted, 53, v. i + + Communication Tube, First for + + Conning Tower, 318, v. i + + Conflict Between Steam and Gas Engines, 201, v. ii + + Congreve Rocket, 236, v. i + + Conning Towers in American Monitors, 272, v. i + + Constantinople Bombarded, 179, v. i + + Continuous Service, 251, v. ii + + Contractors, Unscrupulous, 65, v. i + + Contemporary Art, 195, v. i + + Contraband of War, 161, v. i + + Contract-Built Ships First Advocated, 280, v. i + + Controller of the Navy and Constructor, Disputes Between, 258, v. i + + Converted Ironclads, 257, 258, v. i + + Convoys, 92, v. i + + Cook, Captain, 115, v. i + + Copper Bottoms, 123, v. i + + Copper Bottoms, Rapid Deterioration of, 129, v. i + + Copenhagen, 161, v. i + + Cornwall, Captain, 108, v. i + + Cornwallis off Brest, 172, v. i + + Cornwallis, 139, v. i + + Corsairs, 91, 102, v. i + + Cost per Gun for Sailing Man-of-War, 238, v. i + + Cost per Gun for Steamers, 238, v. i + + Cotton, Sir Charles, 184, v. i + + Crimean War, British Defects in, 237, v. i + + Crimean War, the British Navy in: Little Better than a Paper Force, + 228, v. i + + Cromwell, 73, v. i + + Cronstadt, 226, v. i + + Cross Raiding, 75, v. i + + Cruisers of the Super-Dreadnought Era, 188, v. ii + + Crusaders, 10, v. i + + “Conditional” Ships, 174, v. ii + + Cost of Oak, 132, v. i + + Cost per Gun for Early Ironclads, 238, v. i + + Cumberland, Inventor of Stoving, 107, v. i + + Cuniberti, 179, v. ii + + Cuniberti’s Conception of All Big-Gun ships, 139, v. ii + + Curtis, Captain of the Fleet, 136, v. i + + Curtiss Aeroplane, 226, v. ii + + Curtiss Turbines, 196, v. ii + + Cutting Out Expeditions Instituted, 41, v. i + + + Daedalus, 221, v. ii + + “Dandy” Captains, 195, v. i + + “Dandy” Sailors, 195, v. i + + Danes, 1, v. i + + Danish Fleet Surrendered, 162, v. i + + Danish Ships Hired, 5, v. i + + Darien, 108, v. i + + Dawkins, Captain, 299, v. i + + Dean, Sir Anthony, 94, v. i + + Dean, Sir John, 94, v. i + + Decline of the Navy, 43, v. i + + De Conflans, 121, v. i + + Defects of the échelon System, 179, v. ii + + Defects of the “Royal Sovereigns,” 69, v. ii + + De la Clue, 120, v. i + + Delegates of Mutineers, 147, v. i + + “Democracy on the Quarter Deck,” 257, v. ii + + De Pontis, 102, v. i + + De Witt, 79, v. i + + Deptford Yard, 107, v. i + + De Ruyter, 85, v. i + + D’Estaing, 126, v. i + + D’Estrees, 85, v. i + + Descharges, Inventor of Portholes, 38, v. i + + Destroyer Attack Bound to Succeed, 195, v. ii + + Destroyers in the Dreadnought Era, 199, v. ii + + De Tourville, 90, v. i + + Devastation idea evolved, 232, v. ii + + Devonport Yard, 191, v. ii + + Dibden (ref.), 34, v. i + + Diesel Engine, 201, v. ii + + Dirigibles, 222, v. ii + + Discipline, 20, v. i; 258, v. ii + + Discipline, Jervis Idea of, 141, v. i + + Discipline, Lack of, in time of Charles I, 66, v. i + + Disputes Between the Controller of the Navy and Constructor, 258, v. i + + Doctors, Naval, 256, v. ii + + Dominion of Canada, 234, v. ii + + D’Orvilliers, 125, v. i + + Double Bottoms, 267, v. i + + Dover, 219, v. i + + Downs, Battle in (1639), 76, v. i + + Drake, Character of, 48, v. i + + Drake, Sir Francis, 47, v. i + + Drake, Methods of, 48, v. i; 259, v. ii + + Dreadnought (analogy), 69, v. i + + Dreadnought, first idea of, 164, v. ii + + Dromons, 33, v. i + + Dropping Bombs, 226, v. ii + + Dry Dock, First, 35, v. i + + Dubourdieu, 186, v. i + + Du Casse, 97, v. i + + Ducas, 234, v. i + + Duchess of Bedford and Uniform, 194, v. i + + Ducking, 12, v. i + + Duckworth, Sir John, 179, v. i + + Duguay-Trouin, 92, 177, v. i + + Dumanoir, 177, v. i + + Duncan, 147, v. i + + Dundonald, Earl of (Cochrane), 216, v. i + + Dutch Fleet Captured by Anglo-Russian Force, 159, v. i + + Dutch War, First, 75, v. i + + Dutch War, Second, 81, v. i + + Dutch War, Third, 83, v. i + + + Eagle attacked by Submarine, 124, v. i + + Earliest Advocate of the centre-line in England, Admiral Hopkins, + 179, v. ii + + Early Aerial Ideas, 218, v. ii + + Early Wire Guns, 247, v. i + + Economists Limit Lint and Sponges, 207, v. i + + Economists on Shore, 201, v. i + + Economy, 36, 114, v. i + + Economy in Construction, 97, v. i + + Edgar, 7, v. i + + Edmund, 7, v. i + + Edward I, 22, v. i + + Edward II, 23, v. i + + Edward III, 23, v. i + + Edward IV, 33, v. i + + Edward the Confessor, 8, v. i + + Effects of Shell Fire, 219, v. i + + Egyptian Government, 232, v. ii + + Electro, 219, v. i + + Elementary Quickfirers, 243, v. i + + Elizabeth, 73, v. i + + Elizabeth, First Acts of, 44, v. i + + Elizabethan Fleet, 73, v. i + + Elphinstone, Captain in Russian Navy, 154, v. i + + Elswick, 227, v. i; 232, v. ii + + End-on Fire, 176, v. ii + + End-on Idea, 179, v. ii + + End of the White Era, 116, v. ii + + Engineer Agitation, 247, v. ii + + Engines of “Glatton” built in Royal Dockyard, 311, v. i + + England, Austria, and Sweden at war, 180, v. i + + “Equal Efficiency,” 215, v. ii + + Ericsson, 272, v. i + + Ericsson Patents Propeller (1836), 216, v. i + + Espagnols-sur-Mer, Les, 29, v. i + + Ethelred’s Navy, 8, v. i + + Excellence of the “Warrior” Class, 121, v. ii + + Experiments, Gunnery, 219, v. i + + Experiments to Improve Sailing Ships, 211, v. i + + “Explosion” Vessels, 182, v. i + + Eustace the Monk, 21, v. i + + + Feeding of Men During Great War, 200, v. i + + Ferrol, 96, 172, v. i + + Fight--Shannon (British) v. Chesapeake (U.S.), 189, v. i + + Finisterre, 172, v. i + + Finisterre, Rodney off, 127, v. i + + Fire, Raking, 211, v. i + + Fire Ships, 54, 84, 182, v. i + + Fire Ships, Decline of, 131, v. i + + Fireworks, Use of, 69, v. i + + First English Over-Sea Voyage, 11, v. i + + First of June, Battle of, 135, v. i + + First Ship of Royal Navy, 35, v. i + + Fisher, Admiral Lord, 247, v. ii + + Flag, Neutral, 161, v. i + + Fleet Decoyed Away, 172, v. i + + Fleet Saved by a Military Officer, 103, v. i + + Fleet of Richard I, 10, v. i + + Floating Batteries, First Use of, 130, v. i + + Florida Acquired by England, 123, v. i + + Flotilla, 163, v. i + + Flotilla Invasion, 166, v. i + + Flushing Blockaded, 183, v. i + + Food, 65, v. i; 254, v. ii + + Forecastle, Armoured, 284, v. i + + Forecastles on Turret Ships, 284, v. i + + Fort, S. Phillip, 116, v. i + + Frames, Trussed, Introduced, 210, v. i + + France, Why Beaten in Great War, 233, v. i + + France, War with, 37, 113, v. i + + Frégates Blindées, 247, 250, v. i + + French Fleet in Crimean War, 230, v. i + + French and British Ideals, 253, v. i + + French Warships, Superb Qualities of, 92, v. i + + French Fleet Superior to British, 193, v. i + + French Floating Batteries, 225, v. i + + French Revolution, 132, v. i + + Freya, Danish Frigate, Captured, 159, v. i + + Frisians, 5, v. i + + “Fulton” Driven by steam Paddle, 193, v. i + + Future Fights, 215, v. ii + + + “Galatea” Fitted with Paddles, 213, v. i + + Galleon as Dreadnought of the 14th Century, 27, v. i + + Galley, Replaced as Capital Ship, 27, v. i + + Gambier, Admiral, 179, v. i + + Gambier, Lack of Energy of, 182, v. i + + Gambier, Lord, Acquitted, 183, v. i + + Gambier, Lord, Vote of Thanks to Opposed by Cochrane, 183, v. i + + Gambling, Punishment for, 12, v. i + + Ganteaume, 163, v. i + + Ganteaume, Admiral Escapes from Rochefort, 181, v. i + + Garay, Inventor of Steamship, (1543), 214, v. i + + Genereux Captured by Nelson, 160, v. i + + Genius of Famous Admirals, 216, v. ii + + Genoa, Hotham’s Battle of, 138, v. i + + Gentlemen Adventurers, 45, v. i + + George I, 104, v. i + + George II, 107, v. i + + George II and Institution of Uniform, 194, v. i + + German Seamen, 233, v. i + + Germans Agitate for British Naval Efficiency, 231, v. i + + Germany, 233, v. i + + Germany (analogy), 65, v. i + + Germany, Guns from, 43, v. i + + Gibraltar, 130, 172, v. i + + Gibraltar, Nelson at, 172, v. i + + Glasgow, “Black Prince,” Built at, 250, v. i + + Globe Circumnavigated by Drake, 45, v. i + + Godwin, 9, v. i + + Good Hope, Cape Dutch Squadron Captured at, 141, v. i + + Graham, Sir James, 236, v. i + + Grasse, De, 129, v. i + + Greek Fire, 15, 243, v. i + + Guadaloup Captured, 137, 185, v. i + + Guarda-Costas, 108, v. i + + Guerre de Course, 102, v. i + + Guichen, 128, v. i + + Guillaume Tell Captured, 161, v. i + + Gunners, Training of, 241, v. i + + Gunnery, Enemy’s Inefficiency of, 176, v. i + + Gunnery Errors, 179, v. ii + + Gunnery Experiments, 231, v. ii + + Guns Against Aircraft, 226, v. ii + + Guns, British, 232, v. i + + Guns in the Reed Era, 319, v. i + + Guns in Submarine, 212, v. ii + + Guns of the Watts Era, 202, v. ii + + Guns, Pivot, 272, v. i + + Guns, Rapid Fire, Development of, 227, v. i + + Guns, Turkish Monster, 179, v. i + + + Hales, Dr., Ventilation System of, 115, v. i + + Hamelin, 234, v. i + + Hampden, John, 73, v. i + + Hanniken, 28, v. i + + Hardcastle Torpedo, 204, v. ii + + Hardy, Sir Charles, 127, v. i + + Harvey-Nickel Armour Introduced, 99, v. ii + + Hawkins, 46, v. i + + Hawthorn, 188, v. ii + + “Heavier than Air,” 221, v. ii + + Heavy Rolling of the “Orion,” 183, v. ii + + Henry II, 10, v. i + + Henry III, 20, v. i + + Henry IV, 30, v. i + + Henry V, 33, v. i + + Henry VII, 34, v. i + + Henry VIII, 37, v. i + + “Hermione,” Mutiny in, 145, v. i + + Hickley, Captain, 299, v. i + + Hire of Danish Ships, 8, v. i + + Hired Ships, 28, 33, 36, v. i + + Holy Land, 11, v. i + + Hood, 130, 137, v. i + + Hopkins, Admiral, Ideas of, 134, v. ii + + Horsey, Admiral de, 322, v. i + + Hoste, Captain William, 186, v. i + + Hotham, 138, v. i + + Howard, Sir Edward, 41, v. i + + Howe, 134, v. i + + Hubert de Burgh, 20, v. i + + Hurrying Ships, 185, v. ii + + Hyeres, Battle of, 138, v. i + + + Icarus, 218, v. ii + + Imperial British Fleet, 241, v. ii + + Imperial Needs, 237, v. ii + + Impressment, 234, v. i + + Increased Gun-Power, 203, v. ii + + Increased Smashing Power of Projectiles, 175, v. ii + + Indecisiveness in British Operations, 137, v. i + + Indies, Spanish Wealth from, 47, v. i + + Inexperienced Officers, 233, v. i + + “Inflexible” at the Nore Mutiny, 147, v. i + + Inman, Dr., 187, v. i + + Inscription, Maritime, 233, v. i + + Instructors, Spanish, in English Navy, 42, v. i + + “Insular Spirit,” 5, 73, 82, v. i + + Insurance, 206, v. ii + + Internal Armour, 206, v. ii + + Introduction of Steam, 214, v. i + + Introduction of 13.5-inch Gun, 175, v. ii + + Invasion, 30, 163, v. i + + Invasion, Nelson’s Schemes Against, 161, v. i + + Invasion of England, 47, 119, v. i + + Invasion Projected by French, 91, v. i + + Ironclads, Converted, 257, 263, v. i + + Ironclads, The First British, 249, v. i + + Ironclad Ships, 229, v. i + + Iron for Shipbuilding Instead of Oak, 219, v. i + + Iron-plated Ships, 237, v. i + + Iron Ships Condemned (1850), 223, v. i + + Iron Steamer Existed in 1821, 219, v. i + + Island Empires, 6, v. i + + + Jacobite Element in the Fleet, 88, v. i + + Jacobite Rising, 105, v. i + + James I, 59, v. i + + James II, 86, v. i + + James Watt, 236, v. i + + Jarrow, 232, v. i + + Java, Isle of, Captured, 187, v. i + + Jean Bart, 92, v. i + + Jervis, Sir John, 141, v. i + + Jews, 209, v. i + + John, King, 16, 30, 60, v. i + + Juan, Fernandez, 110, v. i + + Julius Cæsar, 1, v. i + + Junction of the Fleets, 98, v. i + + + “Kamptulicon,” 219, v. i + + Keel-Hauling, 12, v. i + + “Keeping the Air,” 227, v. ii + + Keith, 154, 163, v. i + + Keppel, 125, v. i + + Killala Bay, French Expedition to, 151, v. i + + Kinburn Bombarded, 225, 248, v. i + + Kipling (ref.), 34, v. i + + Kronstadt, 162, v. i + + Kronstadt, Anglo-Danish Demonstration at, 107, v. i + + Krupp Fire, Shell, 244, v. i + + + La Gallisonnier, 116, v. i + + “Labour” and the Navy, 207, v. ii + + Lagane, 204, v. ii + + Laird, Messrs., of Birkenhead, 284, 288, v. i + + Laird, 321, v. i; 186, v. ii + + Lalande de Joinville, 234, v. i + + Lancaster Guns, 227, v. i + + “Lancaster,” The, at Camperdown, 150, v. i + + “Landsmen,” 252, v. ii + + La Rochelle, 30, v. i + + La Rochelle, Expedition to, in time of Charles I, 66, v. i + + “Last Word,” 258, v. i + + Latouche-Treville, 169, v. i + + Laughton, Professor, Quoted, 50, v. i + + Laughton’s, Professor, Summary, 176, v. i + + Laws of Oberon, 17, v. i + + Leake, Sir John, 101, v. i + + Leave, 254, v. ii + + Legends of Floating Rocks, 218, v. ii + + Leissegues, Vice-Admiral, 177, v. i + + Louisbourg Invested (1758), 119, v. i + + “Lighter than Air,” 221, v. ii + + Linois, 163, v. i + + Liquid Fire, Norton’s, 243, v. i + + Lisbon, 102, v. i + + Lissa, Battle of, 186, 300, v. i + + Little Englanders, 73, v. i + + Lloyd, 237, v. i + + Loading, Greater Rapidity in, 231, v. i + + London, Citizens of, Fit out Fleet Against Spain, 48, v. i + + London, Dutch Guns heard in, 83, v. i + + Longridge, C. E., 244, v. i + + Lord Charles Beresford, 195, v. ii + + Lord of the Sea, 22, v. i + + Lorient, French Squadron, break-out of, 188, v. i + + Lorient, Partial Battle of (1795), 139, v. i + + Loss of the “Victoria,” 39, v. ii + + Louis Napoleon, 230, v. i + + Lower Deck, The, 97, v. i + + Lowestoft, 207, v. ii + + + Machine of Meerlers, 90, v. i + + Macintosh, 226, v. i + + Maderia Captured, 180, v. i + + Maintenance Allowance Increased, 182, v. i + + Malaga, Battle of, 101, v. i + + Mallett, 244, v. i + + Malta, Russian Designs on, 159, v. i + + Malta Captured, 160, v. i + + Malta Starved into Surrender, 160, v. i + + Marines, Objection to New Scheme, of the, 251, v. ii + + Marryat, Captain, 12, 212, v. i + + Martinique, 137, v. i + + Masefield, John, Quoted, 204, v. i + + Mastless Ships, 292, v. i + + Masts, Tripod, 287, v. i + + Mauritius Attacked, 185, v. i + + Medal, Tempus, Charles I, 74, v. i + + Medine Sidonia, 53, v. i + + Mediterranean, 59, v. i + + Mediterranean, English Fleet First Stationed, 91, v. i + + Meerlers, Machine Ships of, 90, v. i + + Meerlers “Smoak-boat,” 90, v. i + + Memoirs of Torrington, 100, v. i + + Men Wanting, 237, v. i + + Men, Lack of Training of, 236, v. i + + Messing, 254, v. ii + + Messing in Tudor Times, 43, v. i + + Methods of Drake, 45, v. i + + Military Officer Saves Fleet, 103, v. i + + Military Warfare, 7, v. i + + Milne, Admiral, 288, v. i + + Mines Appear, 226, v. i + + Mines, Russian, 226, v. i + + Minorca, Battle of, 119, v. i + + Moderate Dimensions, 135, v. i + + Modern Protective Decks Introduced, 85, v. ii + + Modern Variant of “Case Shot,” 195, v. ii + + Monk, 76, v. i + + Monitor and Merrimac, Fight between, 275, v. i + + Montgolfier, 221, v. ii + + Motor-Destroyers, 201, v. ii + + Mounting of Small Guns Between the échelon Turrets done away with, + 175, v. ii + + Murder, Punishment for, 12, v. i + + Mutiny at Spithead, 145, 200, v. i + + Mutiny, The Great, 255, v. ii + + Muzzle Loaders, 320, v. i + + + Nachimoff, Admiral (Russian), 223, v. i + + Napier, Admiral Sir Charles, K.C.B., 234, 235, v. i + + Napoleon, at Toulon, 133, v. i + + Napoleon, Deportation of, to Elba, 193, v. i + + Napoleon, Deportation of, to St. Helena, 193, v. i + + Napoleon, Emperor, 164, v. i + + Napoleon, First Consul, 159, v. i + + Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia, 188, v. i + + Napoleon and Nelson, 169, v. i + + Napoleon, Re-appearance of, 193, v. i + + Napoleon, Renovates his Navy, 181, v. i + + Napoleon and “Sea Power,” 163, v. i + + National Interests, 206, v. ii + + Naval Abuses, 65, v. i + + Naval Aeroplanes, 225, v. ii + + Naval Agreement with the Colonies, 237, v. ii + + Naval Aviation, 222, v. ii + + Naval Defence Act, 63, v. ii + + Naval Defence Act Cruisers, 71, v. ii + + Naval Commission, 81, v. i + + Naval Regulations of John, 16, v. i + + Naval Pay in Great War, 209, v. i + + Naval Scare of 1887–89, 61, v. ii + + Naval Punishments, 20, v. i + + Naval War, The Next, 265, v. ii + + Navarino, Battle of, 213, v. i + + Navy of Canute, 8, v. i + + Navy, Non-Existence of, in Early Times, 19, v. i + + Nelson, 12, 97, 162, v. i; 260, v. ii + + Nelson (analogy), 42, v. i + + Nelson at Gibraltar, 172, v. i + + Nelson at Toulon, 133, v. i + + Nelson in the “Agamemnon,” 138, v. i + + Nelson in the Mediterranean, 157, v. i + + Nelson (ref.), 34, v. i + + Nelson at Cadiz, 149, v. i + + Nelson, First Appearance of (1780), 128, v. i + + Nelson, Costume of Men, in Era of, 196, v. i + + Nelson Defeated at Santa Cruz, 150, v. i + + Nelson, Drawing Away of, 171, v. i + + Nelson Institutes Theatricals, 200, v. i + + Nelson, Last Order of, 177, v. i + + Nelson’s Limitations, 169, v. i + + Nelson Mortally Wounded, 176, v. i + + Nelson and Mutineers, 151, v. i + + Nelson’s Schemes of Invasion, 162, v. i + + Neutral Flag, Property Under, 161, v. i + + Neutrality, Armed, 161, v. i + + New Forest, Oak Plantations, 132, v. i + + New Scheme, The, 247, v. ii + + Newfoundland Naval Reserve, 237, v. ii + + New Zealand and the British Fleet, 234, 237, v. ii + + New Zealand’s Interest in the Imperial Navy, 234, v. ii + + Nore, Mutiny at, 146, v. i + + Norman Invasion, 9, v. i + + Normans, 21, v. i + + Norris, Sir John, 105, v. i + + Norton’s Liquid Fire, 243, v. i + + North Foreland, Battle of, 82, v. i + + Nova Scotia, 103, v. i + + Nile, Battle of (analogy), 42, v. i + + North and South Nigeria, 232, v. ii + + “Numbers Only Can Annihilate,” 215, v. ii + + + Oak Plantations, 132, v. i + + Oberon, Laws of, 17, v. i + + Ocean-going Destroyers, 199, v. ii + + Odessa Bombarded, 224, v. i + + Odin, 216, v. i + + Officering the Fleet, 115, v. i + + Officers, Inexperience of, 233, v. i + + Officers’ Wine for Wounded, 207, v. i + + Ogle, 109, v. i + + Oil Fuel, 200, v. ii + + Original Conception of the Dreadnought Era, 196, v. ii + + Ormonde, Duke of, 96, v. i + + Ornamental Work Reduced, 97, v. i + + Ostend Attacked, 82, v. i + + Ostend Captured (1706), 103, v. i + + + Paddle Experiments, 212, v. i + + Paddles, “Galatea” Fitted with, 213, v. i + + Paddle Recognised as a Source of Danger (1825), 216, v. i + + Paddle Wheels Exposed, 216, v. i + + Paint on Warships, 69, v. i + + Paixham, General, 223, v. i + + Palmer’s, 175, v. ii + + Parma, Duke of, 49, v. i + + Parker, Sir Hyde, 161, v. i + + Parliament Discusses French v. British Ships, 137, v. i + + Parliamentarians, 74, v. i + + Parson’s Turbine, 183, 196, 200, v. ii + + Paul, Russia, 159, v. i + + Pay (1653), 65, v. i + + Pay, Modern, 257, v. ii + + Payta Captured by Captain Anson, 111, v. i + + Peace of Amiens, 86, v. i + + Pembroke, Earl of, 29, v. i + + “Penelope” Fitted with Engines, 216, v. i + + Penelope Frigate attacks Guillaume Tell, 160, v. i + + Pennington, Sir John, 73, v. i + + Pensions for Wounds, Time of John, 17, v. i + + Pepys, 79, v. i + + Period of Broadside Ironclads Ends, 263, v. i + + Personality, 97, v. i + + Peterborough, Earl of, 103, v. i + + Peter the Great, 95, v. i + + Phineas Petts, 59, 69, 80, v. i + + Phœnicians, 1, v. i + + Pierola, 322, v. i + + Pigot, Captain of “Hermione,” 151, v. i + + Pigtail, Origin of, 197, v. i + + Pinnaces, 41, v. i + + Piracy, 43, 44, v. i + + Piracy, English Acts of, 22, v. i + + Pirates, 30, v. i + + Pitt and Sea Power, 141, v. i + + Pivot Guns, 272, v. i + + Pizarro, 110, v. i + + Plymouth Hoe, Drake on, 50, v. i + + Plymouth, Mutiny at, 146, v. i + + Plymouth Sacked, 23, v. i + + Policing the Channel, 10, v. i + + Politics and Admirals, 130, v. i + + Pomone, French Frigate, Captured (1794), 135, v. i + + Portholes, 49, v. i + + Portsmouth, Review at (1512), 37, v. i + + Portsmouth Sacked, 29, v. i + + Portsmouth Yard, 191, v. ii + + Possibility of Airships in the Future, 226, v. ii + + Possibility of Dreadnoughts Considered, 145, v. ii + + Present Stage of Aerial Progress, 229, v. ii + + Press Gang, 199, 200, v. i + + Presumed End of Ironclads, 47, v. ii + + Prime Seamen, 115, 196, v. i; 251, v. ii + + Prince Charles, 74, v. i + + Prince of Hesse, 99, v. i + + Private Ships, 36, v. i + + Privateering, 43, 91, 111, v. i + + Privateers Attack Henry IV, 30, v. i + + Privateers, French, Activity of, 189, v. i + + Private Yards, 132, v. i + + Progress Nullified During the Last Twenty Years, 203, v. ii + + Progressive Naval Ideas, 196, v. ii + + Promotion on the Lower Deck, 252, v. ii + + Protection of Boats in Action, 184, v. ii + + Providence and the Armada, 53, v. i + + Provisioning of Ships Under John, 17, v. i + + Punishments, 12, v. i + + Punishments (Modern), 259, v. ii + + Pursers, 146, v. i + + Pym, Captain, 185, v. i + + + Quebec, Abortive Attack on, 104, v. i + + Queen Anne, 95, v. i + + Queensland, 233, v. ii + + Quiberon, 121, v. i + + Quick Firers, Elementary, 243, v. i + + Quick Lime, Use of, 21, v. i + + + Raking Fire, 211, v. i + + Raleigh, Sir Walter, 60, 65, v. i + + Ram Tactics, 300, v. i + + Ramming, 17, v. i + + Rapidity in Loading, 231, v. i + + Rates in English Navy, Time of Queen Anne, 95, v. i + + Rating, New, of Ships Introduced (1817), 211, v. i + + “Re-construction Never Pay,” 312, v. i + + Reed, Sir E. J., 257, 266, v. i + + Reed, Sir E. J., Anticipates Torpedoes, 268, v. i + + Reed Broadside Ships, 283, v. i + + Reed Ideals in the White Era, 115, v. ii + + Reed, Sir E. J., Turret Ships, 292, v. i + + Regular Stores Instituted, 132, v. i + + Repairs, Cost of, 132, v. i + + Reserve Ships, Speedy Equipment of, 132, v. i + + Restoration, The, 81, v. i + + Retirement of Sir W. White, 113, v. ii + + Richard I, 10, v. i + + Richard II, 10, 30, v. i + + Richard III, 33, 60, v. i + + Right Ahead Fire, 258, v. i + + Rigging, Firing at, 129, v. i + + Right of Search, 159, 161, v. i + + Robinson, Commander, on Causes of Mutiny, 146, v. i + + Robinson, Commander, R.N., Quoted, 194, v. i + + Rocket, Congreve, 236, v. i + + Rodjestvensky (analogy), 53, v. i + + Rodney, 127, 129, v. i + + Rogerswick, Harbour of, 180, v. i + + Rogues in Authority, 201, v. i + + Rolling of the “Orion,” 183, v. ii + + Romans in Britain, 1, v. i + + Rooke, Sir George, 96, v. i + + Routine, 260, v. ii + + Row Boats, 222, v. ii + + Royal Indian Marine, 233, v. ii + + Royal Naval College Established, Portsmouth, 187, v. i + + Royal Navy, Birth of, 35, v. i + + Royal Ships, 35, v. i + + Royal Yachts, 33, v. i + + “Ruinous Competition in Naval Armaments,” 206, v. ii + + Russel, 90, 91, v. i + + Russell, John Scott, 237, 249, v. i + + Russia, War with (1720), 106, v. i + + Russian Mines, 226, v. i + + Russian Navy Established by England, 95, v. i + + Russo-Japanese War, 205, v. ii + + Ryswick, Peace of, 92, v. i + + + Samaurez, 163, v. i + + Samaurez in the Baltic, 180, v. i + + San Domingo, Battle of, 178, v. i + + Sandwich, Earl of, 84, v. i + + Saints, Battle of the, 129, v. i + + San Juan Nicaragua, Nelson at, 128, v. i + + Santa Croix, Capture of, 180, v. i + + Santa Cruz, Marquis of, 49, v. i + + Santissima Trinidad (130), 145, v. i + + Saxon Fleet, 8, v. i + + Saxons, 1, v. i + + Scantlings, 135, v. i + + Scarcity of Oak, 132, v. i + + “Scouts” Appear, 127, v. ii + + “Scrapping,” 311, v. i + + Scheldt, 183, v. i + + School of Naval Architecture, 187, v. i + + Scotts, 186, v. ii + + Scott Shipbuilding and Engineering Company, 175, v. ii + + Sea-Fights with the Danes, 2, v. i + + Seamen, Bounty to, 234, v. i + + Seamen, Foreign, 235, v. i + + Seamen, German, 233, v. i + + Sea-Going Masted Turret Ship, 276, v. i + + Sea-Going Qualities of Barnaby Ships, 59, v. ii + + Seamen, Improved, 44, v. i + + Sea Kings, Elizabethan, 47, v. i + + Seamanship, 114, v. i + + Sea Power and Napoleon, 163, 169, v. i + + Sea Regiment, The, 251, v. ii + + Search, Right of, 159, 161, v. i + + Sebastopol Attacked, 224, v. i + + Sebastopol, Siege of, 224, v. i + + Semenoff, Captain (quoted), 243, v. i + + “Semi-Dreadnoughts,” 127, v. ii + + Senegal Captured, 184, v. i + + Senyavin in the Mediterranean, 181, v. i + + Senyavin, Ships of, Restored, 186, v. i + + Serpents, 15, v. i + + Seymour, Sir Hamilton, 235, v. i + + Shah and Huascar Action, 322, v. i + + Shell Guns, Adopted, 220, v. i + + Shell, Percussion, 227, v. i + + Shell, Thermite, 244, v. i + + Sheerness, Dutch at, 83, v. i + + Ships, Engaging exactly End-on, 179, v. ii + + Ships, Iron-plated, 237, v. i + + Ships, Ironclad, 239, v. i + + Ships of King Alfred, 5, v. i + + + _SHIPS MENTIONED BY NAME._ + + Aboukir, 101, v. ii + + Abyssinia, 231, v. ii + + Acheron class, 200, v. ii + + Achilles, 257, 258, v. i + + Acorn class, 200, v. ii + + Active, 197, v. ii + + Admiral class, 47, v. ii + + Adventure, 127, v. ii + + Aeolus, 72, v. ii + + Africa, 108, v. ii + + Agamemnon, 133, 138, v. i + + Agincourt, 279, v. i + + Ajax, 186, v. ii + + Aki, 146, v. ii + + Alarm, 76, v. ii + + Albemarle, 105, v. ii + + Albion, 99, v. ii + + Alexandra, 277, 318, v. i + + Amphitrite, 99, v. ii + + Amethyst, 322, v. i + + Antrim, 109, v. ii + + Amokoura, 234, v. ii + + Amphion, 47, 197, v. ii + + Andromache, 72, v. ii + + Andromeda, 99, v. ii + + Anna Pink (1740), 111, v. i + + Antelope, 76, v. ii + + Apollo class, 72, v. ii + + Aquidaban, 77, v. ii + + Archer, 201, v. ii + + Argonaut, 99, v. ii + + Arethusa, 197, v. ii + + Ariadne, 99, v. ii + + Argyll, 109, v. ii + + Assaye, 232, 76, v. ii + + Astraeas, 76, v. ii + + Atalanta, 187, v. i + + Attack, 200, v. ii + + Attentive, 127, v. ii + + Audacious, 277, 295, v. i + + Audacious (1794), 134, 295, v. i; 186, v. ii + + Aurora, 197, v. ii + + Australia, 174, v. ii + + + Bacchante, 101, v. ii + + Badere Zaffer (Turkish), 232, v. i + + Bahama (Spanish), 177, v. i + + Baluch, 232, v. ii + + Barfluer, 69, 70, v. ii + + Beagle class, 200, v. ii + + Bellerophon, 266, 279, v. i; 169, v. ii + + Belleisle, 232, v. i + + Bellona, 197, v. ii + + Berwick, 106, v. ii + + Birmingham, 197, v. ii + + Black Prince, 250, v. i; 35, v. ii + + Blake, 61, 63, v. ii + + Blanco Encalada (Chilian), 77, v. ii + + Blanche, 197, v. ii + + Blenheim, 61, 63, v. ii + + Blonde, 321, v. i; 197, v. ii + + Boadicea, 197, v. ii + + Bonaventure, 72, v. ii + + Boomerang, 76, 233, v. ii + + Brilliant, 72, v. ii + + Britannia (1688), 87, v. i + + Britannia, 108, v. ii + + Brisbane, 197, v. ii + + Bulwark, 102, v. ii + + + Cæsar, 87, v. ii + + Caledonia, 181, 263, v. i + + Calypso, 237, v. ii + + Cambrian, 72, v. ii + + Camperdown, 39, v. ii + + Canopus, ex-Franklin (French prize), 150, v. i + + Canopus, 99, 100, v. ii + + Carnarvon, 109, v. ii + + Captain, 283, v. i + + Captain, Loss of, 291, v. i + + Centurion (1740), 112, v. i + + Centurion (1891), 81, v. ii + + Cerebus (Australian), 292, v. i + + Charybdis, 72, v. ii + + Chatham, 196, v. ii + + Chen Yuen (Chinese), 180, v. ii + + Chicago (U.S.), 43, v. ii + + Circe, 76, v. ii + + Cog, Thomas, The, 28, v. i + + Commonwealth, 108, v. ii + + Conqueror, 59, 174, v. ii + + Cornwall, 106, v. ii + + Cornwallis, 105, v. ii + + County class, 105, v. ii + + Crescent, 71, v. ii + + Cressy, 101, v. ii + + Cumberland, 106, v. ii + + Cyclops, 308, v. i; 242, v. ii + + + Dalhousie, 231, v. ii + + Dartmouth, 234, 237, v. ii + + Dauntless, 219, v. i + + Defence, 257, v. i + + Devastation (1870), 248, 312, v. i + + Devonshires, 109, v. ii + + Diadem, 99, v. ii + + Diana, 212, v. i + + Dominion, 108, v. ii + + Donegal, 106, v. ii + + Drake, 105, 106, v. ii + + Dreadnought (old), 292, 317, v. i + + Dreadnought (1908), 164, v. ii + + Dublin, 196, v. ii + + Dufferin, 231, v. ii + + Duncans, 105, v. ii + + + Edgar, 71, v. ii + + Elphinstone, 231, v. ii + + Endymion, 71, v. ii + + Entrepennant (French), 187, v. i + + Erebus, 225, v. i + + Essex, 106, v. ii + + Etna, 225, v. i + + Europa, 99, v. ii + + Euryalus, 101, v. ii + + Exmouth, 105, v. ii + + + Fearless, 197, v. ii + + Flora, 72, v. ii + + Formidable, 100, 102, v. ii + + Foresight, 129, v. ii + + Forth, 48, v. ii + + Forward, 129, v. ii + + Foudroyant, 140, 160, v. i + + Franklin (French prize), 150, v. i + + Fulton, 190, v. i + + + Galatea, 197, v. ii + + Gayundah, 233, v. ii + + Gazelle, 78, v. ii + + Gibraltar, 71, v. ii + + Glasgow, 196, v. ii + + Glatton (1795), 140, v. i + + Glatton, 308, v. i + + Gleaner, 76, v. ii + + Glory, 99, v. ii + + Gloucester (1740), 112, v. i + + Gloucester, 204, v. ii + + Goliath, 99, v. ii + + Good Hope, 103, v. ii + + Gorgon, 308, v. i + + Gossamer, 76, v. ii + + Grace de Dieu, The, 38, v. i + + Grafton, 71, v. ii + + Great Harry, 35, 37, v. i + + Ghurka, 237, v. ii + + + Hampshire, 109, v. ii + + Hannibal, 87, v. ii + + Hardinge, 231, v. ii + + Havock, 129, v. ii + + Hawke, 71, v. ii + + Hebe, 76, v. ii + + Hecate, 308, v. i + + Hector, 257, v. i + + Hela (German), 78, v. ii + + Henri IV (French), 204, v. ii + + Hercules, 279, 283, 288, 295, v. i; 175, v. ii + + Hermione, 72, v. ii + + Hero, 59, v. ii + + Hibernia, 108, v. ii + + Hindustan, 108, v. ii + + Holland, 218, v. i + + Hood, 68, v. ii + + Hornet, 129, v. ii + + Hotspur (British), 321, v. i + + Huascar (Peruvian), 322, v. i + + Hydra, 308, v. i + + + Immortalitie, 43, v. ii + + Inflexible, 52, v. ii + + Intrepid, 72, v. ii + + Imperieuse, 43, v. ii + + Iphigenia, 72, v. ii + + Iron Duke, 187, v. ii + + Illustrious, 87, v. ii + + Implacable, 100, v. ii + + Inconstant, 321, v. i + + Indefatigable, 72, 100, v. ii + + Independencia, 280, v. i + + Invincible, 295, 319, v. i; 183, v. ii + + Iphigenia, 185, v. i + + Irresistible, 100, v. ii + + Italia (Italian), 63, v. ii + + + Jupiter, 87, v. ii + + + Kahren, 232, v. ii + + Karrahatta, 76, 233, v. ii + + Katoomba, 76, 233, v. ii + + Kent, 106, v. ii + + King Alfred, 103, v. ii + + King Edward VII class, 107, 108, 114, 233, v. ii + + King George V, 186, v. ii + + + Lady Nancy (Gun raft), 272, v. i + + La Forte (French), 231, v. i + + La Gloire (French), 254, v. i + + Lancaster, 106, v. ii + + Latona, 72, v. ii + + Lave La, 248, v. i + + Lavinia, 232, v. i + + Leander, 47, v. ii + + Lepanto (Italian), 63, v. ii + + Leviathan, 103, v. ii + + L’Hercule (French), 231, v. i + + Liberté class (French), 82, v. ii + + Lion, The (1800), 160, v. i + + Lively, frégate, 141, v. i + + Liverpool, 196, v. ii + + London, 231, v. i; 104, 107, v. ii + + Lord Clyde, 263, v. i + + Lord Nelson, 133, v. ii + + Lord Warden (British), 288, v. i + + Lorne, 212, v. i + + Lynch, 78, v. ii + + + Magdala class, 232, v. ii + + Magnificent, 87, 88, v. ii + + Maharatta, 232, v. ii + + Majestic, 236, v. i; 85, 86, v. ii + + Marengo (French), 231, v. i + + Marlborough, 187, v. ii + + Mars, 231, v. i; 87, v. ii + + Melampus, 72, v. ii + + Melbourne, 234, v. ii + + Melpomene, 72, v. ii + + Merrimac, 190, v. i + + Mersey, 48, v. ii + + Meteor, 225, v. i + + Mildura, 76, 233, v. ii + + Minotaur, 258, 272, v. i + + Monarch, 280, 283, 284, v. i; 175, v. ii + + Monarch, 183, v. ii + + Montagu, 105, v. ii + + + Naiad, 72, v. ii + + Narcissus, 43, v. ii + + Neptune (1797), 151, v. i + + Newcastle, 196, v. ii + + New Zealand, 107, 108, v. ii + + Nile, 44, v. ii + + Niobe, 99, 234, v. ii + + Northbrook, 231, v. ii + + Northumberland, 257, 258, v. i; 59, v. ii + + Nottingham, 197, v. ii + + + Oberon, 53, v. ii + + Ocean, 263, v. i; 99, v. ii + + Olympic, 71, v. ii + + Orion, 183, v. ii + + Orlando, 48, 63, v. ii + + + Pallas class, 76, 233, v. ii + + Paluma, 233, v. ii + + Pandora, 76, v. ii + + Pathan, 232, v. ii + + Pathfinder, 127, v. ii + + Pearl (1740), 112, v. i; 76, v. ii + + Pelican, The, 45, v. i + + Pelorus, 72, v. ii + + Penelope, 279, v. i + + Persian, 76, v. ii + + Phaeton, 197, v. ii + + Phœbe, 76, v. ii + + Philomel, 76, 233, v. ii + + Pique, 72, v. ii + + Plassy, 76, 232, v. ii + + Polyphemus, 64, v. ii + + Powerful, 89, v. ii + + Prince Albert, 275, v. i; 134, v. ii + + Prince Consort, 261, 263, v. i + + Prince George, 87, v. ii + + Prince of Wales, 107, v. ii + + Prince Regent, 236, v. i + + Prince Royal, The, 59, v. i; 174, v. ii + + Princessa (Spanish), 114, v. i + + Protector, 232, v. ii + + Psyche, 76, v. ii + + + Queen, 107, v. ii + + Queen Charlotte, 161, v. i + + Queen Mary, 186, v. ii + + + Rainbow, 72, 234, v. ii + + Rajput, 232, v. ii + + Raleigh, 321, v. i + + Ram, The, 300, v. i + + Rattler, 219, v. i + + Rattlesnake class, 76, v. ii + + Re d’Italia, 300, v. i + + Regent, 35, v. i + + Renard, 76, v. ii + + Renown, 79, 81, v. ii + + Republique (French), 82, v. ii + + Repulse, 263, v. i + + Resistance, 255, 257, v. i + + Retribution, 72, v. ii + + Revolutionaire (French), (1794), 134, 158, v. i + + Ringarooma, 76, 233, v. ii + + “River” class destroyers, 131, v. ii + + Rossiya (Russian), 89, v. ii + + Royal Alfred, 263, v. i + + Royal Arthur, 71, v. ii + + Royal George, The, 114, v. i + + Royal James, The, 84, v. i + + Royal Oak, 263, v. i + + Royal Sovereign, 275, 284, v. i; 198, v. ii + + Royal Sovereign (1657), 69, v. i + + Royal Sovereign (1795), 139, v. i + + Royal Sovereigns, (old), 81, v. i + + Roxburgh, 109, v. ii + + Rupert reconstructed, 311, v. i + + Rurik (Russian), 89, v. ii + + Russell, 105, v. ii + + + Salamander, 93, 76, v. ii + + Sampaio, 78, v. ii + + San Ildefonso (Spanish), 177, v. i + + Sappho, 72, v. ii + + Satsuma (Japanese), 146, v. ii + + Scorpion, 287, v. i + + Scylla, 72, v. ii + + Sea Gull, 76, 93, v. ii + + Sea-horse, 232, v. i + + Sentinel, 129, v. ii + + Severn, 112, v. i; 48, v. ii + + Shah, 321, v. i + + Sharpshooter class, 90, 93, 232, v. ii + + Sheldrake, 76, 93, v. ii + + Sikh, 232, v. ii + + Sirius, 185, v. i + + Skipjack, 76, v. ii + + Skirmisher, 127, v. ii + + Southampton, 196, v. ii + + Sovereign, The, 37, v. i + + Spanker, floating battery, 188, v. i + + Spanker, 76, 93, v. ii + + Spartan, 72, v. ii + + Spartiate, 99, v. ii + + Speedwell, 76, v. ii + + Speedy, 76, 93, v. ii + + St. George, 71, v. ii + + Suffolk, 106, v. ii + + Sultan, 304, 313, 318, v. i + + Sutlej, 101, v. ii + + Swift, 200, v. ii + + Swiftsure, 177, 295, v. i + + Sybil, 231, v. i + + Sydney, 197, v. ii + + + Talbot, 89, v. ii + + Tauranga, 76, 233, v. ii + + Terpsichore, 72, v. ii + + Terrible, 89, v. ii + + Terror, 225, v. i + + Thames, 48, v. ii + + Thetis, 72, v. ii + + Thunder, 225, v. i + + Thunderer, 50, 175, v. ii + + Thunderbolt, 225, v. i; 50, v. ii + + Tiger, 188, v. ii + + Ting Yuen (Chinese), 180, v. ii + + Tonnant (French), 248, v. i + + “Town” class cruisers, 197, v. ii + + Trafalgar, 43, 64, v. ii + + Transports, 22, v. i + + “Tribals,” 199, v. ii + + Tribune, 72, v. ii + + Triumph, 58, 295, v. i + + Trusty, 225, v. i + + Tryal (1740), 111, v. i + + Tsarevitch (Russian), 204, v. ii + + + Undaunted, 197, v. ii + + + Valiant, 257, v. i + + Vanguard, 268, 295, v. i; 169, v. ii + + Venerable, 102, v. ii + + Vengeance, 99, v. ii + + Vernon, 254, v. i + + Victoria, 48, v. ii + + Victoria (Colonial), 233, v. ii + + Victorious, 189, v. i; 87, v. ii + + Victory, 231, v. i + + Viper, 276, v. i + + Vixen, 276, v. i + + Von der Tann (German), 180, v. ii + + + Wager (1740), 111, v. i + + Wallaroo, 76, 233, 256, v. ii + + Wampanoag (U.S.), 320, v. i; 233, v. ii + + Warrior, 254, 257, 267, v. i + + Warspite, 195, v. ii + + Waterwitch, 276, v. i + + Weymouth class, 196, v. ii + + Whiting, 76, v. ii + + Wizard, 76, v. ii + + Wsewolod (Russian), 232, v. i + + + Yarmouth, 196, v. ii + + + Zealous, 263, v. i + + Zelandia, 108, 234, v. ii + + + Ship Money, 7, 69, v. i + + Ships, Short, handy, 264, v. i + + Shipwrights’ Company Established, 59, v. i + + Short Service System, 253, v. ii + + Shovell, Sir Cloudesley, 98, v. i + + Sidon, 216, v. i + + Simoon, 223, v. i + + Sinope, Battle of, 224, v. i + + Syracuse, Neutrality of, Disregarded by Nelson, 152, v. i + + Sir Charles Napier, 213, v. i + + “Sirius” and “Magicienne” Aground, 185, v. i + + Sir W. White’s Views on the “Sovereigns,” 65, v. ii + + “Slop Chest,” 195, v. i + + Sluys, 24, v. i + + Small Cruisers and First Cost, 75, v. ii + + Small German Protected Cruisers, 197, v. ii + + Smith, Sir Sidney, 180, v. i + + “Smoak-Boat” of Meerlers, 90, v. i + + Sole Bay, Battle of, 85, v. i + + Solid Bulkhead, 204, v. ii + + Suffren, 129, v. i + + Southampton Sacked, 23, v. i + + South Australia, 232, v. ii + + Southsea Beach, 175, v. i + + Sovereignty of the British Seas, 10, 16, v. i + + Sovereignty of the Seas upheld by Cromwell, 75, v. i + + Spain, First War with, 28, v. i + + Spain, Operations against, 45, v. i + + Spanish Instructors in English Navy, 43, v. i + + Spanish Wars (Succession), 95, v. i + + Spanish Treasure Ship Captured by Captain Anson, 111, v. i + + Spanish Treasure Ships, 158, v. i + + Specialisation in Elizabethan Times, 46, v. i + + Speed in the “Drake” class, 103, v. ii + + “Spit and Polish,” 242, v. ii + + Spithead Mutiny, 146, 202, v. i + + Spragge, 85, v. i + + St. Andre, Jean Bon, 134, v. i + + St. Bride’s Day Massacre, 8, v. i + + St. Lucia Captured (1794), 137, v. i + + St. Malo, 90, 119, v. i + + St. Thomas Captured, 180, v. i + + St. Vincent, 145, v. i + + St. Vincent, Cape, Battle of, 145, v. i + + Steam Ships Anticipated, 212, v. i + + Steam Tugs added to Navy, 213, v. i + + Steam Vessel, The First, 215, v. i + + Steam Vessels, Auxiliary, 219, v. i + + Steam Warships, 215, v. i + + Steering Gear Unprotected, 257, v. i + + Sterns made Circular, 211, v. i + + Stewart Kings and the Navy, 87, v. i + + Stones from Aloft, 27, v. i + + Stores regularly Instituted, 132, v. i + + Stour, Battle of, 2, v. i + + Stoving, 107, v. i + + Strachan, Rear Admiral Sir E., 177, 183, v. i + + Sub-divisions, 271, v. i + + Submarine, Americans refuse to officially sanction, 190, v. i + + Submarine Battleship may appear, 215, v. ii + + Submarine, First, 59, v. i + + Submarine, First appearance of, 190, v. i + + Submarine, First use of, in War, 125, v. i + + Submarine, The, 228, v. i; 208, v. ii + + Submarines, a Danger to Big Ships, 194, v. ii + + Submarines and Harbour Defence, 208, v. ii + + Succession, War of the Spanish, 95, v. i + + Super-Dreadnoughts, 175, v. ii + + Super-heated Steam, 201, v. ii + + Superior Artillery, 231, v. i + + Supply of Oak, 132, v. i + + Surgeons, 207, v. i; 257, v. ii + + Sveaborg, 235, v. i + + Swain, King of Denmark, 8, v. i + + Sweden becomes French Ally, 186, v. i + + Sweden, War with (1715), 105, v. i + + Sweden, Peace with, Declared (1812), 188, v. i + + Swedish Fleet, 162, v. i + + Sweeps superseded by Paddles, 213, v. i + + + Tactics, 60, v. i + + Tactics at Trafalgar, 176, v. i + + Tactics, Early, 28, v. i + + Tactics, English, 230, v. i + + Tactics, First appearance of, 21, v. i + + Tagus Blockaded, 181, v. i + + “Tailoring,” 260, v. ii + + Tarpaulin Seamen, 115, v. i + + Tegethoff at Lissa (analogy), 100, v. i + + Tercera, Battle of, 48, v. i + + Teignmouth Attacked, 89, v. i + + Texel, 84, v. i + + Thames Iron Works, Blackwall, 250, v. i + + Thames, Project to Block, 84, v. i + + The Australian Navy, 237, v. ii + + The “Battle of the Boilers,” 93, v. ii + + The Cape, 176, v. i + + The Coming of the Torpedo, 51, v. ii + + The “Dreadnought” Commenced, 149, v. ii + + The Duties of Naval Airships, 227, v. ii + + The Earliest Naval Manœuvres, 54, v. ii + + The “Échelon” System Resurrected, 179, v. ii + + The First British Ironclads, 249, v. i + + Theft, Punishment for, 12, v. i + + The Future of Submarines, 215, v. ii + + “The Offensive,” 321, v. i + + The Origin of “Dreadnoughts,” 137, v. ii + + The Periscope, 208, v. ii + + “The Torpedo Boat, the Answer to the Torpedo Boat,” 212, v. ii + + “The Trafalgar of the Air,” 228, v. ii + + Thermite Shell, 244, v. i + + “Theseus,” Nelson’s Ship at Santa Croix, 150, v. i + + “Thieving Pursers,” 201, v. i + + Thompson, Messrs, of Clydebank, 304, v. i + + Thornycroft, 201, v. ii + + Three Days’ Battle, 76, v. i + + Three-Masters, 11, v. i + + Thurot, 121, v. i + + Ticklers, 253, v. ii + + Tiddy, Mr. David, 299, v. i + + Tilset, Peace of, 180, v. i + + Timber, Boiling, 107, v. i + + Timber, Supply of, 132, v. i + + Tiptoft, Sir Robert, 22, v. i + + Torpedo (analogy), 41, v. i + + Torpedo Boat, 120, v. i; 199, v. ii + + Torpedoes anticipated by Reed, 268, v. i + + Torpedo, First use of, from Big Ship in Action, 322, v. i + + Torpedo Gun-Boats, 77, v. ii + + Torpedo, The, 228, v. i + + Torpedoes, 322, v. i + + Torpedo Progress, 203, v. ii + + Torrington, 88, v. i + + Toulon, 163, 171, v. i + + Toulon Abandoned, 133, v. i + + Toulon, Attack on Defeated (1707), 103, v. i + + Toulon, Royalists at, 133, v. i + + Toulouse, Comte de, 98, v. i + + Trafalgar, Battle of, 232, v. i + + Trafalgar, First Battle deliberately fought under White Ensign, 210, + v. i + + Trafalgar, Losses to the Allied Fleets at, 177, v. i + + Trafalgar Made a Certainty, 166, v. i + + Trafalgar, Tactics at, 175, v. i + + Training, Lack of, 233, v. i + + Training of Gunners, 241, v. i + + Treadwell, Professor Daniel, 244, v. i + + Treasure Ships Captured (Spanish), 158, v. i + + “Trident,” First Iron Warship, 219, v. i + + Trinidad, 214, v. i + + Tripod Masts, 287, v. i; 175, 186, v. ii + + Troubridge, 152, v. i + + Trousers, Ample, 196, v. i + + Tsushima, 244, v. i + + Tudor Navy, 35, v. i + + Tumble Home Sides, 41, v. i + + Turbines Introduced for Big Ships, 155, v. ii + + Turning Circles, 272, v. i + + Turkish Monster Guns, 179, v. i + + Turret Craze, 275, v. i + + Turret on Rollers, 275, v. i + + Turret Ships, Idea of, 275, v. i + + Turret Ship, Sea-Going Masted, 276, v. i + + Turret Ship Controversy, 292, v. i + + Turret Ships, Panic About, 292, v. i + + Twelve-Inch “A,” 175, v. ii + + Two-Power Standard, 96, 131, v. i + + + Under-Water Protection, 204, v. ii + + Uniform, Anson’s Use of, 113, v. i + + Uniform, 25, v. ii + + Uniform Badge of Pressed Men and Jail Birds, 195, v. i + + Uniform, Description of First, 194, v. i + + Uniform, First Use of, for Officers, 194, v. i + + Union Flag Altered, 209, v. i + + Union Jack, 209, v. i + + United Provinces, 63, v. i + + Unprotected Steering Gear, 257, v. i + + Unscrupulous Contractors, 65, v. i + + Ushant, 125, v. i + + U.S. Monitors, 285, v. i + + + Vaisseaux Blindées, 248, v. i + + Van Drebel, 59, v. i + + “Vanguard,” The, Nelson in, 152, v. i + + Van Tromp, 76, 84, v. i + + Venetian Frigates Captured, 187, v. i + + “Vengeur” Sunk (1795), 136, v. i + + Ventilation, 115, v. i + + Ventilation, Artificial, 225, v. i + + Vernon, Admiral, 108, 109, v. i + + Versailles, Treaty of, 130, v. i + + Vickers, Lts., 192, v. ii + + Villaret-Joyeuse, 134, 139, v. i + + Villeneuve, 233, v. i + + Villeneuve Appointed, 169, v. i + + Villeneuve Gets Out of Toulon, 171, v. i + + Villeneuve Returns to Toulon, 172, v. i + + Victualling, 146, v. i + + + Walpole, 107, v. i + + War, Contraband of, 161, v. i + + “War Scare” with Germany in 1911, 185, v. ii + + Wars of the Roses, 33, v. i + + Warwick, Earl of, 33, v. i; 198, v. ii + + Warry (Early Idea of Quick Firer), 242, v. i + + Walcheren Expedition, 183, v. i + + Watts, Isaac, Sir, 254, 258, v. i + + Waterloo, Battle of, 193, v. i + + Weather Gauge, 21, v. i + + Western Australia, 232, v. ii + + West Indies, 171, 177, v. i + + Whitehead, 204, v. ii + + White, of Cowes, 232, v. ii + + Whitworth, Works of, 239, v. i + + Who First Adopted Cuniberti Ideas?, 159, v. ii + + Why France was Beaten, 233, v. i + + Willaumez, Leaves Brest, 182, v. i + + Willaumez, Rear Admiral, 177, v. i + + Willaumez Blockaded in Basque Roads, 182, v. i + + Will Dreadnoughts Die Out?, 195, v. ii + + William of Orange, 88, v. i + + William the Conqueror, 10, v. i + + Wire Guns, Early, 247, v. i + + Wolfe, 122, v. i + + Wood-Copper Sheathing Re-introduced, 295, v. i + + Woolwich, 183, v. i + + World Circumnavigated by Drake, 45, v. i + + + Yarmouth Ships, 22, v. i + + Yarrow Boilers, 97, 196, v. ii + + York, New, 237, v. i + + + Zarate, Don Francisco de, 46, v. i + + Zeppelin Type (Dirigible), 227, v. ii + + +THE END. + + + NETHERWOOD, DALTON & CO., RASHCLIFFE, HUDDERSFIELD. + + + + +Transcriber’s Notes + + +Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a +predominant preference was found in the original book; otherwise they +were not changed. + +Simple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced quotation +marks were remedied when the change was obvious, and otherwise left +unbalanced. + +Armament and other sizes and quantities were printed in inconsistent +ways. + +Illustrations in this eBook have been positioned between paragraphs +and outside quotations. In versions of this eBook that support +hyperlinks, the page references in the List of Illustrations lead to +the corresponding illustrations. + +Footnotes, originally at the bottoms of the pages that referenced them, +have been collected, sequentially renumbered, and placed near the end +of the book, just before the index. + +The index for both volumes was printed at the end of the second volume. +The Transcriber has copied that index to the first volume. + +Many alphebetization errors in the index were remedied, but some may +remain. Page references in the index were checked automatically, but +some may be incorrect. + +Page 28: The table contains an asterisk for which there is no matching +footnote. + + + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 75617 *** |