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diff --git a/75243-0.txt b/75243-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..360f6d7 --- /dev/null +++ b/75243-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,4905 @@ + +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 75243 *** + + + + + + THE + HELL BOMB + + + BY + + _William L. Laurence_ + +[Illustration: [Logo]] + + 1951 NEW YORK + + ALFRED A. KNOPF + + + + +[Illustration: THIS IS A BORZOI BOOK, PUBLISHED BY ALFRED A. KNOPF, +INC.] + +_Copyright 1950 by The Curtis Publishing Co. Copyright 1950 by William +L. Laurence. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced +in any form without permission in writing from the publisher, except by +a reviewer who may quote brief passages in a review to be printed in a +magazine or newspaper. Manufactured in the United States of America. +Published simultaneously in Canada by McClelland & Stewart Limited._ + + FIRST AND SECOND PRINTINGS + BEFORE PUBLICATION + THIRD PRINTING, JANUARY 1951 + + + + + To _FLORENCE_ + + + + + FOREWORD + + +The material in this book falls into two categories: (1) a popular +version in terms understandable to the layman of technical data +published in scientific literature in this country and abroad, and +widely known among scientists everywhere; and (2) technical conclusions +reached by deduction based on these published facts and theory, for +which I assume the sole responsibility. In doing so, I wish to make it +emphatically clear that I have had no access to any classified +information on the current hydrogen-bomb program, and also that whatever +access I had to H-bomb information during my stay at Los Alamos in the +spring and summer of 1945 was strictly limited to the somewhat vague and +general discussions carried on there in 1945 and earlier. + +I hereby take the opportunity to express my profound appreciation to Dr. +James G. Beckerley, Director of Classification, Atomic Energy +Commission, Washington, D. C., and to Mr. Corbin Allardice, Director, +Public Information Service, of the AEC’s New York Operations Office, for +their generous cooperation in clearing this manuscript for publication. +It must be strictly understood that any such clearance merely means that +the AEC has “no objection to publication” on the grounds of security. It +does not in any way vouch for the accuracy or correctness of the book’s +contents. + + WILLIAM L. LAURENCE + + _New York City + July 30, 1950_ + + + + + CONTENTS + + + I The Truth about the Hydrogen Bomb 3 + + II The Real Secret of the Hydrogen Bomb 29 + + III Shall We Renounce the Use of the H-bomb? 57 + + IV Korea Cleared the Air 88 + + V A Primer of Atomic Energy 114 + + APPENDIX: The Hydrogen Bomb and International Control 149 + A. _Significant Events in the History of International + Control of Atomic Weapons_ 151 + B. _The International Control of Atomic Weapons: a Brief + History of Proposals and Negotiations_ 155 + C. _The Atomic Impasse_ 168 + D. _Possible Questions Regarding H-bombs and International + Control_ 171 + + + + + INTRODUCTION + + “Democracy Depends on an Informed Electorate” + + +“_It is most important in our democracy that our government be frank and +open with the citizens. In a democracy it is only possible to have good +government when the citizens are well informed. It is difficult enough +for them to become well informed when the information is easily +available. When that information is not available, it is impossible. +While there may be some cases in which the information which the citizen +needs, in order to make an intelligent judgment of national policy, must +be kept secret, so that military potential will not be jeopardized, the +present use of secrecy far exceeds this minimum limit. These are the +methods of an authoritarian government and should be vigorously opposed +in our democracy...._ + +“_The citizen must choose insofar as that is possible. Today, if he +tries to come to some conclusion about what should be done to increase +the national security, the citizen runs up against a high wall of +secrecy. He can, of course, take the easy solution and say that these +are questions which should be left to the upper echelons of the military +establishment to decide. But these questions are so important today, +that to leave them to the military men to decide is for the citizen +essentially to abrogate his basic responsibility. If, in time of peace, +questions on which the future of our country depends are left to any +small group, not representative of the people, to decide, we have gone a +long way toward authoritarian government._ + +“_The United States has grown to be a strong nation under a constitution +which wisely has laid great emphasis upon the importance of free and +open discussion. Urged by a large number of people who have fallen for +the fallacy that in secrecy there is security, and, I regret, encouraged +by many, including eminent scientists, to prophesy doom just around the +corner, we are dangerously close to abandoning those principles of free +speech and open discussion which have made our country great. The +democratic system depends on making intelligent decisions by the +electorate. Our democratic heritage can only be carried on if the +citizen has the information with which to make an intelligent +decision._” + + (From a talk on the hydrogen bomb, March 27, 1950, at Town Hall, Los + Angeles, by PROFESSOR ROBERT F. BACHER, head of the Physics + Department, California Institute of Technology. Professor Bacher + served as the first scientific member of the Atomic Energy Commission + and was one of the major architects of the atomic bomb at Los Alamos, + New Mexico.) + + + + + THE HELL BOMB + + + + + I + THE TRUTH ABOUT THE HYDROGEN BOMB + + +I first heard about the hydrogen bomb in the spring of 1945 in Los +Alamos, New Mexico, where our scientists were putting the finishing +touches on the model-T uranium, or plutonium, fission bomb. I learned to +my astonishment that, in addition to this work, they were already +considering preliminary designs for a hydrogen-fusion bomb, which in +their lighter moments they called the “Superduper” or just the “Super.” + +I can still remember my shock and incredulity when I first heard about +it from one of the scientists assigned to me by Dr. J. Robert +Oppenheimer as guides in the Dantesque world that was Los Alamos, where +the very atmosphere gave one the sense of being in the presence of the +supernatural. It seemed so fantastic to talk of a superatomic bomb even +before the uranium, or the plutonium, bomb had been completed and +tested—in fact, even before anybody knew that it would work at all—that +I was inclined at first to disbelieve it. Could anything be more +powerful, I found myself thinking, than a weapon that, on paper at +least, promised to release an explosive force of 20,000 tons of TNT? It +was a screwball world, this world of Los Alamos, I kept saying to +myself, and this was just a screwball notion of my younger scientific +mentors. + +So at the first opportunity I put the question to Professor Hans A. +Bethe, of Cornell University, one of the world’s top atomic scientists, +who headed the elite circle of theoretical physicists at Los Alamos. Dr. +Bethe, I knew, was the outstanding authority in the world qualified to +talk about the subject, since he was the very man who first succeeded in +explaining how the fusion of hydrogen in the sun is the source of energy +that will make it possible for life to continue on earth for billions of +years. + +“Is it true about the superbomb?” I asked him. “Will it really be as +much as fifty times as powerful as the uranium or plutonium bomb?” + +I shall never forget the impact on me of his quiet answer as he looked +away toward the Sangre de Cristo (Blood of Christ) mountain range, their +peaks turning blood-red in the New Mexico twilight. “Yes,” he said, “it +could be made to equal a million tons of TNT.” Then, after a pause: +“Even more than a million.” + +The tops of the mountains seemed to catch fire as he spoke. + +Long before it was discovered that vast amounts of energy could be +liberated by the fission (splitting) of the nuclei of a twin of the +heaviest element in nature—namely, uranium of atomic mass 235 (235 times +the mass of the hydrogen atom, lightest of all the elements)—scientists +had known that truly staggering amounts of energy would be released if +one could fuse together four atoms of hydrogen, the first element on the +atomic table, into one atom of helium, element number two on that table, +which weighs about four times as much as hydrogen. In December +1938—three weeks before the discovery of uranium fission was announced +in Germany—Dr. Bethe had published his famous hypothesis about the +fusion of four hydrogen atoms in the sun to form helium. This provided +the first satisfactory explanation of the mechanism that enables the sun +to radiate away in space every second a quantity of light and heat +equivalent to the energy content of nearly fifteen quadrillion tons of +coal. And while Dr. Bethe was the first to work out the fine details of +the process, scientists had been speculating for more than twenty years +on the likelihood of hydrogen fusion in the sun as source of the sun’s +eternal radiance. + +American audiences first heard about hydrogen as the solar fuel in a +lecture, on March 10, 1922, at the Franklin Institute, Philadelphia, by +Professor Francis William Aston, famous British Nobel-Prize-winning +chemist, who even at that early date warned mankind against what he +called “tinkering with the angry atoms.” His words on that occasion have +a strange prophetic ring, though most of what he said is now known to be +wrong. “Should the research worker of the future discover some means of +releasing this energy [from hydrogen] in a form which could be +employed,” he predicted, “the human race will have at its command powers +beyond the dreams of scientific fiction, but the remote possibility must +always be considered that the energy, once liberated, will be completely +uncontrollable and by its violence detonate a neighboring substance. If +this happens, all of the hydrogen on earth might be transformed [into +helium] at once, and this most successful experiment might be published +to the rest of the universe in the form of a new star of extraordinary +brilliance, as the earth blew up in one vast explosion.” + +By 1945 we had learned that many things were wrong in Professor Aston’s +prophecy. It had been definitely established, for example, that it would +be impossible to “transform all the hydrogen on earth at once,” no +matter how many superduper hydrogen bombs were to be exploded. In fact, +we had learned that, under conditions as they exist on earth, we could +never use common hydrogen, the element that makes up one ninth by weight +of all water, either in a superduper bomb or as an atomic fuel for +power. On the other hand, ten years after Dr. Aston’s lecture a new type +of hydrogen was discovered to exist in nature. It was found to +constitute one five-thousandth part of the earth’s waters, including the +water in the tissues of plants and animals. It was shown to have an +atomic weight of two—double the weight of common hydrogen—and was named +deuterium. The nucleus, or center, of the deuterium atom was named the +deuteron, to distinguish it from the nucleus of common hydrogen, known +as the proton. Deuterium also became popularly known as “heavy +hydrogen.” Water containing two deuterium atoms in place of the two +atoms of light hydrogen became known as “heavy water.” + +The most startling fact learned about deuterium soon after its discovery +in 1932 was that it offered potentialities as an atomic fuel, or an +explosive, of tremendous energy, provided one condition could be met. +This condition was a “match” to light it with. And here was the catch. +The flame of this match, it was found, would have to have a temperature +of the order of 50,000,000 degrees centigrade, two and a half times the +temperature in the interior of the sun. + +Oddly enough, the discovery of the principle that made the atomic bomb +possible also brought with it the promise that a “deuterium fire” might, +after all, be lighted on earth. Early studies had revealed that the +explosion of an atomic bomb, if it lived up to expectations, would +generate a central temperature of about 50,000,000 degrees centigrade. +Here, at last, was the promise of realization of the impossible—the +50,000,000 degree match. + +The men of Los Alamos thus knew that if the atomic bomb they were just +completing for its first test worked as they hoped it would, it could be +used as the match to light the deuterium fire. They could build a +superduper bomb of a thousand times the power of the atomic bomb by +incorporating deuterium in the A-bomb, the explosion of which would act +as the trigger for the superexplosion. And they also knew that the +deuterium bomb held such additional potentialities of terror, beyond its +vastly greater blasting and burning power, that the step from the duper +to the super would be just as great as the step from TNT to the duper. + +The hydrogen bomb, H-bomb, or hell bomb, as the fusion bomb had become +popularly known, thus became a reality in the flash of the explosion of +the first atomic bomb at 5:30 of the morning of July 16, 1945, on the +New Mexico desert. As the men of Los Alamos, of whom I was at that time +a privileged member, watched the supramundane light and the apocalyptic +mushroom-topped mountain of nuclear fire rising to a height of more than +eight miles through the clouds, they did not have to wait until they +checked with their measuring instruments to know that a match sparking a +flame of about 50,000,000 degrees centigrade had been lighted on earth +for the first time. The size of the fire mountain and the +end-of-the-world-like thunder that reverberated all around, told the +tale better than any puny man-made instruments. + +And there in our midst, as we learned only recently, stood a Judas, +Klaus Fuchs, a name that “will live in infamy” along with that of other +archtraitors of history. By the greatest of ironies, there he was, this +spy, standing right in the center of what we believed at the time to be +the world’s greatest secret, waiting at that very moment to tell the +Russians of our success and how we achieved it. As he confessed five +years later, he betrayed to them the most intimate details not only +about the A-bomb but about the H-bomb as well—details that he learned as +a member of the innermost of inner circles. For, alas, he was a trusted +member of the theoretical division, the sanctum sanctorum of Los Alamos. +This select group of scientists, behind doubly and triply locked doors, +discussed in whispers their ideas about the superduper. + +His associates at Los Alamos, who should know, sadly admit that Fuchs +made it possible for Russia to develop her A-bomb at least a year ahead +of time. It is my own conviction that the information he gave the +Russians made it possible for their scientists to attain their goal at +least three, and possibly as much as ten, years sooner than they could +have done it on their own. Yet, though Fuchs confessed everything he +told the Russians, the content of his confession is still kept a top +secret from the American people, who sadly need information on one of +the greatest problems facing mankind. The reason given is that we cannot +actually be sure that Fuchs told the Russians all that he says he did, +and, if published, his confession might, by his tricky design, give the +Russians additional information. Of course, anything is possible for a +warped mind such as that of Fuchs. Nevertheless, it seems highly +implausible that this traitor, who went to the Russians voluntarily, +should withhold any vital information from them for as long as five +years. The best evidence that he didn’t is the Russian A-bomb. + +Yet some good comes even of the greatest evil. All the circumstantial +evidence points to the fact that during the five-year period following +the end of the war our work on the hydrogen bomb had stopped completely. +The A-bomb was the mightiest weapon in the world, we seem to have +reasoned, and it would take Russia many years before she would get an +A-bomb of her own. Why spend great efforts on a superbomb? + +The shock when Russia exploded her first A-bomb much sooner than we +expected, topped by the second shock that Fuchs had handed Moscow all +our major secrets on a platter—including, as must be surmised, those of +the H-bomb—awakened us to the facts of life. It is no accident that +President Truman’s official announcement of the order to build “the +so-called hydrogen bomb or superbomb” came within three days of the +announcement of Fuchs’s arrest and confession. The President gave his +order with full knowledge of Fuchs’s confession, which made it evident +that the Russians were already at work on the hydrogen bomb and had +probably been working on it uninterruptedly since 1945. The tragic +prospect is that instead of the Russians catching up with us, it is we +who may have to catch up with them. + +Five years after the first announcement of the explosion of the A-bomb +over Hiroshima, even the most intelligent Americans still have only the +vaguest idea about the facts. Yet these facts are within the +understanding of the average man. If we keep the earlier analogy of the +match in mind, it becomes simple to understand the principles underlying +both the A-bomb, now more correctly identified as the “fission bomb,” +and the hydrogen bomb, more properly described as the “fusion bomb.” + +Our principal fuel is coal, which, as everyone knows, is “bottled +sunshine,” stored up in plants that grew about two hundred million years +ago. When we apply the small amount of heat energy from a match, the +bottled energy is released in the form of light and heat, which we can +use in a great variety of ways. The point here is that it requires only +the application of a very small amount of energy from a match to release +a very large amount of energy that has been stored for millions of years +in the ancient plants we know as coal. + +Now, during the past half century we discovered that the nuclei, or +centers, of the smallest units of which the ninety-odd elements of the +material universe are made up—units we know as atoms—had stored up +within them since the beginning of creation amounts of energy millions +of times greater than is stored up by the sun in coal. But we had no +match with which to start an atomic fire burning. + +Then, in January 1939, came the world-shaking discovery of the +phenomenon known as uranium fission. In simple language, we had found a +proper “match” for lighting a fire with a twin of uranium, the +ninety-second, and last, natural element. This twin is a rare form of +uranium known as uranium 235—the figure signifying that it is 235 times +heavier than common hydrogen. Doubly phenomenal, the discovery of +uranium fission meant that to light the atomic fire, with the release of +stored-up energy three million times greater than that of coal and +twenty million times that of TNT (on an equal-weight basis) would +require no match at all. When proper conditions are met, the atomic fire +would be lighted automatically by spontaneous combustion. + +What are these proper conditions? In the presence of certain chemical +agencies, spontaneous combustion will take place when an easily burning +substance, such as sawdust, for example, accumulates heat until it +reaches the kindling temperature at which it ignites. The chemical +agencies here are the equivalent of a match. + +The requirement to start the spontaneous combustion of uranium 235, and +also of two man-made elements named plutonium and uranium 233 (all three +known as fissionable materials or nuclear fuels), is just as simple. In +this operation you do not need a critical temperature, but what is known +as a critical mass. This simply means that spontaneous combustion of any +one of the three atomic fuels takes place as soon as you assemble a lump +of a certain weight. The actual critical mass is a top secret. But the +noted British physicist, Dr. M. L. E. Oliphant, of radar fame, published +in 1946 his own estimate, which places its weight between ten and thirty +kilograms. If so, this would mean that a lump of uranium 235 (U-235), +plutonium, or U-233, weighing ten or thirty kilograms, as the case may +be, would explode automatically by spontaneous combustion and release an +explosive force of 20,000 tons of TNT for each kilogram undergoing +complete combustion. In the conventional A-bomb a critical mass is +assembled in the last split second by a timing mechanism that brings +together, let us say, one tenth and nine tenths of a critical mass. The +spontaneous combustion that followed such a consummation on August 6 and +9, 1945 destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. + +Thus, if we substitute the familiar phrase “spontaneous combustion” for +the less familiar word “fission,” we get a clear understanding of what +is known in scientific jargon as the “fission process,” a +“self-multiplying chain reaction with neutrons,” and similar technical +mumbo-jumbo. These terms simply mean the lighting of an atomic fire and +the release of great amounts of the energy stored in the nuclei of U-235 +since the beginning of the universe. The two so-called man-made elements +are not really created. They are merely transformed out of two natural +heavy elements in such a way that their stored energy is liberated by +the process of spontaneous combustion. + +Why, one may ask, does not spontaneous combustion of U-235 take place in +nature? Why, indeed, has not all the U-235 in nature caught fire +automatically long ago? To this also there is a simple answer. Just as +in the spontaneous combustion of sawdust the material must be dry enough +to burn, so must the U-235. Only in place of the word “dry” we must use +the word “concentrated.” The U-235 found in nature is very much diluted +with another element that makes it “wet.” It therefore must be separated +first, by a very laborious and costly process, from the nonfissionable, +or “wetting,” element. Even then it won’t catch fire, and could not be +made to burn by any means, until the amount separated (“dried”) reaches +the critical mass. When these two conditions—conditions that do not +exist in nature—are met, the U-235 catches fire just as sawdust does +when it reaches the critical temperature. + +The fact that as soon as a critical mass is assembled the three +elemental atomic fuels burst into flame automatically thus puts a +definite limit to the amount of material that can be used in the +conventional A-bomb. The best you can do is to incorporate into a bomb +two fragments, let us say, of nine tenths of a critical mass each. To +enclose more than two such fragments would present difficulties that +appear impossible to overcome. It is this limitation of size, an +insurmountable roadblock put there by mother nature, that makes the +basic difference between the A-bomb and the H-bomb. + +For, as we have already seen, to light an atomic fire with deuterium it +is necessary to strike a match generating a flame with a temperature of +about 50,000,000 degrees centigrade. As long as no such match is +applied, no fire can start. It thus becomes obvious that deuterium is +not limited by nature to a critical mass. A quantity of deuterium a +thousand times the amount of the U-235, and hence a thousand times more +powerful, can therefore be incorporated in an ordinary A-bomb, where it +would remain quiescent until the A-bomb match is struck. Weight for +weight, deuterium has only a little more energy content than U-235, so +that a bomb incorporating a 1,000 kilograms (one ton) of deuterium would +thus have an energy of 20,000,000 tons of TNT. + +Here must be mentioned another form of hydrogen, named tritium. It has +long ago disappeared from nature but it is now being re-created in +ponderable amounts in our atomic furnaces. Tritium, the nucleus of which +is known as a triton, weighs three times as much as the lightest form of +hydrogen. It has an energy content nearly twice that of deuterium. But +it is very difficult to make and is extremely expensive. Its cost per +kilogram at present AEC prices is close to a billion dollars, as +compared with no more than $4,500 for a kilogram of deuterium. A +combination of deuterons and tritons would release the greatest energy +of all, 3.5 times the energy of deuterons alone. It would reduce the +amount of tritons required to half the volume and three fifths of the +weight required in a pure triton bomb, thus making the cost considerably +lower. + +But why bother with such fantastically costly tritons when we can get +all the deuterium we want at no more than $4,500 a kilogram, while we +can make up the difference in energy by merely incorporating two to +three and a half times as much deuterium? Here we are dealing with what +is probably the most ticklish question in the design of the H-bomb. + +To light a fire successfully, it is not enough merely to have a match. +The match must burn for a time long enough for its flame to act. If you +try to light a cigarette in a strong wind, the wind may blow out your +match so fast that your cigarette will not light. The same question +presents itself here, but on a much greater scale. The match for +lighting deuterium—namely, the A-bomb—burns only for about a hundred +billionths of a second. Is this time long enough to light the +“cigarette” with this one and only “match”? + +It is known that the time is much too slow for lighting deuterium in its +gaseous form. But it is also known that the inflammability is much +faster when the gas is compressed to its liquid form, at which its +density is 790 times greater. At this density it would take only seven +liters (about 7.4 quarts) per one kilogram (2.2 pounds), as compared +with 5,555 liters for gaseous deuterium. And it catches fire in a much +shorter time. + +Is this time long enough? On the answer to this question will depend +whether the hydrogen bomb will consist of deuterium alone or of +deuterium and tritium, for it is known that the deuteron-triton +combination catches fire much faster than deuterons or tritons alone. + +We were already working with tritium in Los Alamos as far back as 1945. +I remember the time when Dr. Oppenheimer, wartime scientific director of +Los Alamos, went to a large safe and brought out a small vial of a clear +liquid that looked like water. It was the first highly diluted minute +sample of superheavy water, composed of tritium and oxygen, ever to +exist in the world, or anywhere in the universe, for that matter. We +both looked at it in silent, rapt admiration. Though we did not speak, +each of us knew what the other was thinking. Here was something, our +thoughts ran, that existed on earth in gaseous form some two billion +years ago, long before there were any waters or any forms of life. Here +was something with the power to return the earth to its lifeless state +of two billion years ago. + +The question of what type of hydrogen is to be used in the H-bomb +therefore hangs on the question of which one of the possible +combinations will catch fire by the light of a match that is blown out +after an interval of about a hundred billionths of a second. On the +answer to this question will also depend the time it will take us to +complete the H-bomb and its cost. To make a bomb of a thousand times the +power of the A-bomb would require a 1,000 kilograms of deuterium at a +cost of $4,500,000, or 171 kilograms of tritium and 114 kilograms of +deuterium at a total cost of more than $166,000,000,000 at current +prices, not counting the cost of the A-bomb trigger. Large-scale +production of tritium, however, will most certainly reduce its cost +enormously, possibly by a factor of ten thousand or more, while, as will +be indicated later, the amount of tritium, if required, may turn out to +be much smaller. + +[Illustration: MAP BY DANIEL BROWNSTEIN] + +We can thus see that if deuterium alone is found to be all that is +required to set off an H-bomb it will be cheap and relatively easy to +make in a short time—both for us and for Russia. Furthermore, such a +deuterium bomb would be practically limitless in size. One of a million +times the power of the Hiroshima bomb is possible, since deuterium can +be extracted in limitless amounts from plain water. On the other hand, +if sizable amounts of tritium are found necessary, the cost will be much +higher and it will take a considerably longer time, since the production +of tritium is very slow and costly. This, in turn, will place a definite +limit on the power of the H-bomb, since, unlike deuterium, the amounts +of tritium will necessarily always be limited. As will be shown later, +we are at present in a much more advantageous position to produce +tritium than is Russia, so that if tritium is found necessary, we have a +head start on her in H-bomb development. + +The radius of destructiveness by the blast of a bomb with a thousand +times the energy of the A-bomb will be only ten times greater, since the +increase goes by the cube root of the energy. The radius of total +destruction by blast in Hiroshima was one mile. Therefore the radius of +a superbomb a thousand times more powerful will be ten miles, or a total +area of 314 square miles. A bomb a million times the power of the +Hiroshima bomb would require 1,000 tons of deuterium. Such a +super-superduper could be exploded at a distance from an abandoned, +innocent-looking tramp ship. It would have a radius of destruction by +blast of 100 miles and a destructive area of more than 30,000 square +miles. The time may come when we shall have to search every vessel +several hundred miles off shore. And the time may be nearer than we +think. + +The radius over which the tremendous heat generated by a bomb of a +thousandfold the energy would produce fatal burns would be as far as +twenty miles from the center of the explosion. This radius increases as +the square root, instead of the cube root, of the power. The Hiroshima +bomb caused fatal burns at a radius of two thirds of a mile. + +The effects of the radiations from a hydrogen bomb are so terrifying +that by describing them I run the risk of being branded a fearmonger. +Yet facts are facts, and they have been known to scientists for a long +time. It would be a disservice to the people if the facts were further +denied to them. We have already paid too high a price for a secrecy that +now turns out never to have been secret at all. + +I can do no better than quote Albert Einstein. “The hydrogen bomb,” he +said, “appears on the public horizon as a probably attainable goal.... +If successful, radioactive poisoning of the atmosphere, and hence +annihilation of any life on earth, has been brought within the range of +technical possibilities.” + +What Dr. Einstein meant by “radioactive poisoning of the atmosphere, and +hence the annihilation of any life on earth,” was explained in realistic +detail by such eminent physicists as Dr. Bethe, Dr. Leo Szilard, Dr. +Edward Teller, and others. All of them may even now be engaged on work +on the hydrogen bomb. + +Here is how “poisoning of the atmosphere” may result from the explosion +of a hydrogen bomb: Tremendous quantities of neutrons, which can enter +any substance in nature and make it radioactive, are liberated. In the +case of a deuterium bomb, one eighth of the mass used—125 grams per +kilogram—is liberated. In the case of a deuteron-tritium bomb, fully one +fifth of the mass—200 grams per kilogram—is released, while in a bomb +using pure tritium, fully one third of the mass—333 grams per +kilogram—is liberated as free neutrons. There are 600,000 billion +billion neutrons in each gram, each capable of producing a radioactive +atom in its environment. The neutron is one of the two building blocks +of the nuclei of all atoms. + +These neutrons can be used to make any element radioactive, Professor +Szilard and his colleagues point out. It follows that the casing of the +bomb could be selected with a view to producing, after the neutrons +enter it, an especially powerful radioactive substance. Since each +artificially made, radioactive element gives out a specific type of +radiation and has a definite life span, after which it decays to one +half of its radioactivity, the designer of the bomb could rig it in such +a way that its explosion would spread into the air a tremendous cloud of +specially selected radioactive substances that would give off lethal +radiations for a definite period of time. In such a way a large area +could be made unfit for human or animal habitation for a definite period +of time, months or years. + +Take, for example, the very common element cobalt. When bombarded with +neutrons, it turns into an intensely radioactive element, 320 times more +powerful than radium. Any given quantity of neutrons would produce sixty +times its weight in radioactive cobalt. If the bomb contains a ton of +deuterium, 250 pounds would come out as neutrons. On the assumption that +every neutron enters a cobalt atom, this would produce 7.5 tons of +radioactive cobalt. That quantity would give out as much radioactivity +as 2,400 tons of radium. + +Now, this radioactive cobalt has a half-life of five years, meaning that +it loses half of its radioactive power at every five-year period. So +after a lapse of that period of time its radioactivity would be equal to +1,200 tons of radium, in ten years to 600 tons, and so on. If used as a +bomb-casing it would be pulverized and converted into a gigantic +radioactive cloud that would kill everything in the area it blankets. +Nor would it be confined to a particular area, since the winds would +take it thousands of miles, carrying death to distant places. + +The radioactivity produced by the Bikini bombs was detected within one +week in the United States. In that short time the westerly winds swept +the radioactive air mass from Bikini, 4,150 miles away, to San +Francisco. When it reached our shores, the activity was weak and +completely harmless, but it was still detectable. That, by the way, was +how we learned that the Russians had exploded their first atomic bomb. + +But, in the words of Professor Teller, one of the Los Alamos men who +made the preliminary studies on the hydrogen bomb, “if the activity +liberated at Bikini were multiplied by a factor of a hundred thousand or +a million, and if it were to be released off our Pacific Coast, the +whole of the United States would be endangered.” He added that “if such +a quantity of radioactivity should become available, an enemy could make +life hard or even impossible for us without delivering a single bomb +into our territory.” + +One limitation to such an attack, Professor Teller points out, is the +boomerang effect of these gases on the attacker himself. The radioactive +gases would eventually drift over his own country, too. He adds, +however, that since these gases have different rates of decay—some +faster, some slower—the attacker is in a position to choose those +radioactive products best suited to his attack. “With the proper choice +he could ensure that his victim would be seriously damaged by them, and +that they would have decayed by the time they reached his own country.” + +“It is not even impossible to imagine,” in the words of Professor +Teller, “that the effects of an atomic war fought with greatly perfected +weapons and pushed by utmost determination will endanger the survival of +man.... This specific possibility of destruction may help us realize +more clearly the probable consequences of an atomic war for our +civilization and the possible consequences for the whole human race.” + +On this point Professor Szilard is much more specific. “Let us assume,” +he said at a University of Chicago Round Table, “that we make a +radioactive element which will live for five years and that we just let +it go into the air. During the following years it will gradually settle +out and cover the whole earth with dust. I have asked myself, ‘How many +neutrons or how much heavy hydrogen do we have to detonate to kill +everybody on earth by this particular method?’ I come up with about +fifty tons of neutrons as being plenty to kill everybody, which means +about 400 tons of heavy hydrogen” (deuterium). + +Now, obviously Professor Szilard was stating the extreme case. He merely +called attention to the scientific fact that man now has at his +disposal, or soon will have, means that not only could wipe out all life +on earth, but could also make the earth itself unfit for life for many +generations to come, if not forever. Here we have indeed what is +probably the greatest example of irony in man’s history. The very +process in the sun that made life possible on earth, and is responsible +for its being maintained here, can now be used by man to wipe out that +very life and to ruin the earth for good. + +It is inconceivable that any leaders of men today, or in the near +future, would resort to such an extreme measure. But the fact remains +that such a measure is possible. And it is by no means unthinkable that +a Hitler, faced with certain defeat, would not choose to die in a great +Götterdämmerung in which he would pull down the whole of humanity with +him to destruction. And who can be bold enough to guarantee that another +Hitler might not arise sometime, somewhere, possibly in a rejuvenated +Germany making another bid for world domination or total annihilation? + +It is more likely, of course, that an attacker, particularly if he is +otherwise faced with certain defeat, might choose the less drastic +method outlined by Professor Teller, selecting for his weapon a +short-lived radioactive element that would have spent itself by the time +it reached his shores. If he is the sole possessor of the hydrogen bomb, +he may not even have to use it, a threat of its use being sufficient to +end the war on terms to his liking. In the face of such a threat, as +Professor Szilard pointed out, who would dare take the responsibility of +refusing? + +These are the stark, unvarnished facts about the “so-called hydrogen +bomb.” They raise many questions to which the American people as a whole +will have to find the answer. It is possible, and the odds here are more +than even, that the very possession of the hydrogen bomb by both +ourselves and Russia will make war unthinkable, since neither side could +be the winner. This would be a near certainty if we had the answer to +Russia’s Trojan Horse method of taking over nations by first taking over +their governments, as was done in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and +the Balkan countries. Suppose the Communists take over Italy, then +Germany, by the same method. What would we do then? The answer is, of +course, that if we wait until “then,” everything would be lost, no +matter what we did. It therefore becomes obvious that our very existence +may depend on what we do _here_ and _now_ to prevent such an +eventuality. + +Now that the hydrogen bomb has come out into the open after five years +as a super-top secret, the authorities, and particularly the Atomic +Energy Commission, may be called upon to answer some embarrassing +questions. “Why,” we may ask, “was the work on the hydrogen bomb +apparently dropped altogether during the past five years?” According to +Professor Bethe, it would take about three years to develop it. This +means that, had we continued working on it in 1945 and thereafter, we +would have had it as far back as 1948. We have thus lost five precious +years, our loss being Russia’s gain. + +Some scientists and others contend that, because of our great harbor and +industrial cities, the hydrogen bomb would be a greater threat to us +than to the Soviet, because most Russian cities are much smaller than +ours, while her industries are much more dispersed. There may be some +truth in this. But on the other hand there are some great advantages on +our side. With a strong Navy and good submarine-detecting devices we may +have control of the seas and be able to prevent the delivery of the +hydrogen bomb by ship or submarine. With a strong Air Force and radar +system we could prevent the delivery of hydrogen bombs from the air. + +By far the most important advantage the possession of the hydrogen bomb +would give us against Russia is its possible use as a tactical weapon +against huge land armies. Since they can devastate such large areas, one +or two hydrogen bombs, depending on their size, could wipe out entire +armies on the march, even before they succeeded in crossing the border +of an intended victim. The H-bomb would thus counterbalance, if not +completely nullify, the one great advantage Russia possesses—huge land +armies capable of overrunning western Europe. The bomb might thus serve +as the final deterrent to any temptation the Kremlin’s rulers may have +to invade the Atlantic Pact countries. + +Yet no matter how one looks at it, the advent of the H-bomb constitutes +the greatest threat to the survival of the human race since the Black +Death. + +One is reminded of a dinner conversation in Paris in 1869, recorded in +the _Journal_ of the Goncourt brothers. Some of the famous savants of +the day were crystal-gazing into the scientific future a hundred years +away. The great chemist Pierre Berthelot predicted that by 1969 “man +would know of what the atom is constituted and would be able, at will, +to moderate, extinguish, and light up the sun as if it were a gas lamp.” +(This prophecy has almost come true.) Claude Bernard, the greatest +physiologist of the day, saw a future in which “man would be so +completely the master of organic law that he would create life +[artificially] in competition with God.” + +To which the Goncourt brothers added the postscript: “To all of this we +raised no objection. But we have the feeling that when this time comes +to science, God with His white beard will come down to earth, swinging a +bunch of keys, and will say to humanity, the way they say at five +o’clock at the salon: ‘Closing time, gentlemen!’” + + + + + II + THE REAL SECRET OF THE HYDROGEN BOMB + + +Can the hydrogen bomb actually be made? If so, how soon? How much will +it cost in money and vital materials? Above all, will it, if made, add +enough to our security to make the effort worth while? + +As was pointed out by Prof. Robert F. Bacher of the California Institute +of Technology, one of the chief architects of the wartime atomic bomb +and the first scientific member of the Atomic Energy Commission, “since +the President has directed the AEC to continue with the development [‘of +the so-called hydrogen, or super bomb’] we can assume that this +development is regarded as both possible and feasible.” Many eminent +physicists believe that it can be made, and the use by the President of +the word “continue” suggests that this belief is based on more than +theory. No less an authority than Albert Einstein has stated publicly +that he regards the H-bomb as “a probably attainable goal.” + +On the other hand, there are scientists of high eminence, such as Dr. +Robert A. Millikan, our oldest living Nobel-Prize-winner in physics, who +doubt whether the H-bomb can be made at all. And there are also those +who express the view that, while it probably could be made, it would not +offer advantages great enough, if any, to justify the cost in vital +strategic materials necessary for our security. + +Fortunately, facts mostly buried in technical literature make it +possible for us to go behind the scientific curtain and look intimately +at the reasons for these differences in opinion. More important still, +these facts not only provide us with a clearer picture of the nature of +the problem but also enable us to make some reasonable deductions or +speculations. The scientists directly involved do not feel free to +discuss these matters openly, not because they would be violating +security, but because of the jittery atmosphere that acts as a damper on +open discussion even of subjects known to be non-secret. + +We already know that the so-called hydrogen bomb, if it is to be made at +all, cannot be made of the abundant common hydrogen of atomic mass one, +and that there are only two possible materials that could be used for +such a purpose: deuterium, a hydrogen twin twice the weight of common +hydrogen, which constitutes two hundredths of one per cent of the +hydrogen in all waters; and a man-made variety of hydrogen, three times +the weight of the lightest variety, known as tritium. We also know that +to explode either deuterium or tritium (also known, respectively, as +heavy and superheavy hydrogen) a temperature measured in millions of +degrees is required. This is attainable on earth only in the explosion +of an A-bomb, and therefore the A-bomb would have to serve as the fuse +to set off an explosion of deuterium, tritium, or a mixture of the two. + +These facts, fundamental as they are, merely give us a general idea of +the conditions required to make the H-bomb. All concerned, including Dr. +Millikan, fully accept the validity of these facts. But there is one +other factor at the very heart of the problem—the extremely short time +at our disposal in which to kindle the hydrogen bomb with the A-bomb +match. According to statements attributed to him in the press, Dr. +Millikan believes that the time is too short; in other words, he seems +to be convinced that the A-bomb match will be blown out before we have +time to light the fire. Those of opposite view believe that methods can +be devised for “shielding the match against the wind” for just long +enough to light the fire. As we shall presently see, it is these methods +for shielding the match that lead some to doubt whether the game would +be worth the candle, or the match, if you will. These honest doubts are +based on the possibility that, even if successful, the shielding might +exact too high a price in terms of vital materials, particularly the +stuff out of which A-bombs are made—plutonium. According to this view, +we may at best be getting but a very small return for our investment in +materials vitally important in war as well as in peace. Even though the +price in dollars were to be brought down to a negligible amount. + +A closer look at the details of the problem may enable us to penetrate +the thick fog that now envelops the subject. We may begin with a +quotation from Dr. Bacher, who outlined the principle involved with +remarkable clarity. “The real problem in developing and constructing a +hydrogen bomb,” he said in a notable address before the Los Angeles Town +Hall, + + + is, “How do you get it going?” The heavy hydrogens, deuterium and + tritium, are suitable substances if somehow they could be heated hot + enough and kept hot. This problem is a little bit like the job of + making a fire at 20 degrees below zero in the mountains with green + wood which is covered with ice and with very little kindling. Today, + scientists tell us that such a fire can probably be kindled. + + Once you get the fire going, of course, you can pile on the wood and + make a very sizeable conflagration. In the same way with the hydrogen + bomb, more heavy hydrogen can be used and a bigger explosion obtained. + It has been called an open-ended weapon, meaning that more materials + can be added and a bigger explosion obtained. + + +The phrase that goes to the very heart of the problem is “very little +kindling,” which is another way of illustrating the difficulty of +lighting a fire in a high wind when you have only one match. We know +that to ignite deuterium, by far the cheaper and more abundant of the +two H-bomb elements, a temperature comparable to those existing in the +interior of the sun, some 20,000,000 degrees centigrade, is necessary. +This temperature can be realized on earth only in the explosion of an +A-bomb. We also know that the wartime model A-bombs generated a +temperature of about 50,000,000 degrees, more than enough to light a +deuterium fire. The trouble lies in the extremely short time interval, +of the order of a millionth of a second (microsecond), and a fraction +thereof, during which the A-bomb is held together before it flies apart. +In the words of Professor Bacher, we must make our green, ice-covered +wood catch fire in the subzero mountain weather before the “very little +kindling” we have is burned up. + +The times at which deuterium will ignite at any given temperature, in +both its gaseous and its liquid form, are widely known among nuclear +scientists everywhere, including Russia, through publication in official +scientific literature of a well-known formula, originally worked out by +two European scientists as far back as 1929, and more recently improved +upon by Professor George Gamow and Professor Teller. By this formula, +derived from actual experiments, it is known that deuterium in its +gaseous form will require as long as 128 seconds to ignite at a +temperature of 50,000,000 degrees centigrade, well above 100,000,000 +times longer than the time in which our little kindling is used up. This +obviously rules out deuterium in its natural gaseous form as material +for an H-bomb. + +How about liquid deuterium? We know that the more atoms there are per +unit volume (namely, the greater the density), the faster is the time of +the reaction. The increase in the speed of the reaction (in this case +the ignition of the deuterium) is directly proportional to the square of +the density. For example, if the density, (that is, the number of atoms +per unit volume) is increased by a factor of 10, the time of ignition +will be speeded up by the square of 10, or 100 times faster. Since +liquid deuterium has a density nearly 800 times that of gaseous +deuterium, this means that liquid deuterium (which must be maintained at +a temperature of 423 degrees below zero Fahrenheit at a pressure above +one atmosphere) would ignite 640,000 times faster (namely, in +1/640,000th part of the time) than its gaseous form. Arithmetic shows +that the ignition time for liquid deuterium at 50,000,000 degrees +centigrade will be 200 microseconds, still 200 times longer than the +period in which our kindling is consumed. + +The same formula also reveals the time it would take liquid deuterium to +ignite at higher temperatures, the increase of which shortens the +ignition time. These figures show that the ignition time for liquid +deuterium at 75,000,000 degrees centigrade is 40 microseconds. At +100,000,000 degrees the time is 30 microseconds; at 150,000,000 degrees, +15 microseconds; and at 200,000,000 degrees on the centigrade scale, +about 4.8 millionths of a second. Doubling the temperature speeds up the +ignition time for liquid deuterium by a factor of about six. + +The problem thus is a dual one: to raise the temperature at which the +A-bomb explodes, and to extend the time before the A-bomb flies apart. +It is also obvious that if the liquid deuterium is to be ignited at all, +it must be done before the bomb has disintegrated—that is, during the +incredibly short time interval before it expands into a cloud of vapor +and gas, since by then the deuterium would no longer be liquid. + +Can we increase the A-bomb’s temperature fourfold to 200,000,000 degrees +and literally make time stand still while it holds together for nearly +five millionths of a second? To get a better understanding of the +problem we must take a closer look at what takes place inside the A-bomb +during the infinitesimal interval in which it comes to life. + +This life history of the A-bomb is an incredible tale, from the time its +inner mechanisms are set in motion until its metamorphosis into a great +ball of fire. As explained earlier, the A-bomb’s explosion takes place +through a process akin to spontaneous combustion as soon as a certain +minimum amount (critical mass) of either one of two fissionable +(combustible) elements—uranium 235 or plutonium—is assembled in one +unit. The most obvious way it takes place is by bringing together two +pieces of uranium 235 (U-235), or plutonium, each less than a critical +mass, firing one of these into the other with a gun mechanism, thus +creating a critical mass at the last minute. If, for example, the +critical mass at which spontaneous combustion takes place is ten +kilograms (the actual figure is a top secret), then the firing of a +piece of one kilogram into another of nine kilograms would bring +together a critical mass that would explode faster than the eye could +wink—in fact, some thousands of times faster than TNT. + +Just as an ordinary fire needs oxygen, so does an atomic fire require +the tremendously powerful atomic particles known as neutrons. Unlike +oxygen, however, neutrons do not exist in a free state in nature. Their +habitat is the nuclei, or hearts, of the atoms. How, then, does the +spontaneous combustion of the critical mass of U-235 or plutonium begin? +All we need is a single neutron to start things going, and this one +neutron may be supplied in one of several ways. It can come from the +nucleus of an atom in the atmosphere, or inside the bomb, shattered by a +powerful cosmic ray that comes from outside the earth. Or the emanation +from some radioactive element in the atmosphere, or from one introduced +into the body of the bomb, may split the first U-235 or plutonium atom, +knock out two neutrons, and thus start a chain reaction of +self-multiplying neutrons. + +To understand the chain reaction requires only a little arithmetic. The +first atom split releases, on the average, two neutrons, which split two +atoms, which release four neutrons, which split four atoms, which +release eight neutrons, and so on, in a geometric progression that, as +can be seen, doubles itself at each successive step. Arithmetic shows +that anything that is multiplied by two at every step will reach a 1,000 +(in round numbers) in the first ten steps, and will multiply itself by a +1,000 at every ten steps thereafter, reaching a million in twenty steps, +a billion in thirty, a trillion in forty, and so on. It can thus be seen +that after seventy generations of self-multiplying neutrons the +astronomical figure of two billion trillion (2 followed by 21 zeros) +atoms have been split. + +At this point let us hold our breath and get set to believe what at +first glance may appear to be unbelievable. The time it takes to split +these two billion trillion atoms is no more than one millionth of a +second (one microsecond). If we keep this time element in mind we can +arrive at a clear understanding of the tremendous problem involved in +exploding an A- or an H-bomb. + +And while we are recovering from the first shock we may as well get set +for another. That unimaginable figure of two billion trillion atoms +represents the splitting (explosion) of no more than one gram (1/28th of +an ounce) of U-235, or plutonium. + +Now, the energy released in the splitting of one gram of U-235 is +equivalent in power to the explosive force of 20 tons of TNT, or two +old-fashioned blockbusters. Since we know from President Truman’s +announcement following the bombing of Hiroshima that the wartime A-bomb +“had more power than 20,000 tons of TNT,” it means that the atoms in an +entire kilogram (1,000 grams) of U-235 or plutonium must have been +split. In other words, after the A-bomb had reached a power of 20 tons +of TNT, it had to be kept together long enough to increase its power a +thousandfold to 20,000 tons. This, as we have seen, requires only ten +more steps. It can also be seen that it is these ten final crucial steps +that make all the difference between a bomb equal to only two +blockbusters, which would have been a most miserable two-billion-dollar +fiasco, and an atomic bomb equal in power to two thousand blockbusters. + +With the aid of these facts we are at last in a position to grasp the +enormousness of the problem that confronted our A-bomb designers at Los +Alamos and is confronting them again today. It can be seen that for a +bomb to multiply itself from 20 to 20,000 tons in ten steps by doubling +its power at every step, it has to pass successively the stages of 40, +80, 160, 320, and so on, until it reaches an explosive power of 2,500 +tons at the seventh step. Yet it still has to be held together for three +more steps, during which it reaches the enormous power of 5,000 and +10,000 tons of TNT, without exploding. + +Here was an irresistible force, and the problem was to surround it with +an immovable body, or at least a body that would remain immovable long +enough for the chain reaction to take just ten additional steps +following the first seventy. There is only one fact of nature that makes +this possible, or even thinkable—the last ten steps from 20 to 20,000 +tons take only one tenth of a millionth of a second. The problem thus +was to find a body that would remain immovable against an irresistible +force for no longer than one tenth of a microsecond, 100 billionths of a +second. + +This immovable body is known technically as a “tamper,” which pits +inertia against an irresistible force that builds up in 100 billionths +of a second from an explosive power of 20 tons of TNT to 20,000 tons. +The very inertia of the tamper delays the expansion of the active +substance and makes for a longer-lasting, more energetic, and more +efficient explosion. The tamper, which also serves as a reflector of +neutrons, must be a material of very high density. Since gold has the +fifth highest density of all the elements (next only to osmium, iridium, +platinum, and rhenium), at one time the use of part of our huge gold +hoard at Fort Knox was seriously considered. + +With these facts and figures in mind, it becomes clear that an H-bomb +made of deuterium alone is not feasible. It is certainly out of the +question with an A-bomb of the Hiroshima or Nagasaki types, which +generate a temperature of about 50,000,000 degrees, since, as we have +seen, it would take fully 200 microseconds to ignite it at that +temperature. It is one thing to devise a tamper that would hold back a +force of 20 tons for 100 billionths of a second, and thus allow it to +build up to 20,000 tons. It is quite another matter to devise an +immovable body that would hold back an irresistible force of 20,000 tons +for a time interval 2,000 times larger, particularly if one remembers +that in another tenth of a microsecond the irresistible force would +increase again by 1,000 to 20,000,000 tons. Obviously this is +impossible, for if it were possible we would have a superbomb without +any need for hydrogen of any kind. + +It is known that we have developed a much more efficient A-bomb, which, +as Senator Edwin C. Johnson of Colorado has inadvertently blurted out, +“has six times the effectiveness of the bomb that was dropped over +Nagasaki.” We are further informed by Dr. Bacher that “significant +improvements” in atomic bombs since the war “have resulted in more +powerful bombs and in a more efficient use of the valuable fissionable +material.” It is conceivable and even probable that the improvements, +among other things, include better tampers that delay the new A-bombs +long enough to fission two, four, or even eight times as many atoms as +in the wartime models. But since, as we have seen, the ten steps of the +final stages require only an average of 10 billionths of a second per +step, increasing the power of the new models even to 160,000 tons (eight +times the power of the Hiroshima type) would take only three steps, in +an elapsed time of no more than 30 billionths of a second. And even if +we assume that the improved bomb generates a temperature of 200,000,000 +degrees, it would still be too cold to ignite the deuterium during the +interval of its brief existence, since, as we have seen, it would take +4.8 microseconds to ignite it at that temperature. In fact, calculations +indicate that it would require a temperature in the neighborhood of +400,000,000 degrees to ignite deuterium in the time interval during +which the assembly of the improved A-bomb appears to be held together, +which, as may be surmised from the known data, is within the range of +1.2 microseconds. + +From all this it may be concluded with practical certainty that an +H-bomb of deuterium only is out of the question. Equally good, though +entirely different, reasons also rule out an H-bomb using only tritium +as its explosive element. + +There are several important reasons why an H-bomb made of tritium alone +is not feasible. The most important by far, which alone excludes it from +any serious consideration, is the staggering cost we would have to pay +in terms of priceless A-bomb material, as each kilogram of tritium +produced would exact the sacrifice of eighty times that amount in +plutonium. The reason for this is simple. Both plutonium and tritium +have to be created with the neutrons released in the splitting of U-235, +each atom of plutonium and each atom of tritium made requiring one +neutron. Since an atom of plutonium has a weight of 239 atomic mass +units, whereas an atom of tritium has an atomic weight of only three, it +can be seen that a kilogram, or any given weight, of tritium would +contain eighty times as many atoms as a corresponding weight of +plutonium, and hence would require eighty times as many neutrons to +produce. In other words, we would be buying each kilogram of tritium at +a sacrifice of eighty kilograms of plutonium, which, of course, would +mean a considerable reduction in our potential stockpile of plutonium +bombs. + +We would cut this loss by more than half because a kilogram of tritium +would yield about two and a half times the explosive power of plutonium. +But even this advantage would soon be lost, since tritium decays at the +rate of fifty per cent every twelve years, so that a kilogram produced +in 1951 would decay to only half a kilogram by 1963. Plutonium, on the +other hand, can be stored indefinitely without any significant loss, +since it changes slowly (at the rate of fifty per cent every twenty-five +thousand years) into the other fissionable element, U-235, which in turn +decays to one half in no less than nine hundred million years. What is +more, plutonium, if the day comes when we can beat our swords into +plowshares, will become one of the most valuable fuels for industrial +power, the propulsion of ships, globe-circling airplanes, and even, +someday, interplanetary rockets. It holds enormous potentialities as one +of the major power sources of the twenty-first century. Tritium, on the +other hand, can be used only as an agent of terrible destruction. It +will yield its energy in a fraction of a millionth of a second or not at +all. The only other possible uses it may have would be as a research +tool for probing the structure of the atom, and as a potential new agent +in medicine, in which it may be used for its radiations. + +How much tritium would it take to make an H-bomb 1,000 times the power +of the wartime model A-bombs? Since tritium has about 2.5 times the +power per given weight of U-235 or plutonium, it would take 400 +kilograms (about 1,880 quarts of the liquid form) of tritium to make a +bomb that would equal the power of 1,000 kilograms of plutonium. Such a +bomb, we can see, would have to be made at the sacrifice of 32,000 +kilograms of plutonium. In other words, we would be getting a return, in +terms of energy content, of 1,000 kilograms for an investment of 32,000. +And we would be losing fully half of even this small return every twelve +years. + +How many A-bombs would we be sacrificing through this investment? On the +basis of Professor Oliphant’s estimate that the critical mass of an +A-bomb is between 10 and 30 kilograms, we would sacrifice at least +1,066, and possibly as many as 3,200, if we take the lower figure. And +we must not forget that a bomb a thousand times the power will produce +only ten times the destructiveness by blast and thirty times the damage +by fire of an A-bomb of the old-fashioned variety. + +These cold facts make it clear that a tritium bomb, particularly one a +thousand times the power of the A-bomb, is completely out of the +picture. + +But, one may ask, if a deuterium bomb is not possible and a tritium bomb +is not feasible, and these are the only two substances that can possibly +be used at all, isn’t all this talk about a superbomb sheer moonshine? +And if so, how explain President Truman’s directive “to continue” work +on it? + +To find the answer let us go back for a moment to Dr. Bacher’s man in +the mountains, confronted with the problem of lighting a fire with +green, ice-covered wood at twenty degrees below zero with “very little +kindling.” Obviously the poor fellow would be doomed to freeze to death +were it not for one little item he had almost forgotten. Somewhere in +his belongings he discovers a container filled with gasoline, which +increases the inflammability of the wet wood to the point at which it +will catch fire with a quantity of kindling that would otherwise be much +too small. + +Something closely analogous is true with the H-bomb. It so happens that +a mixture of deuterium and tritium is the most highly inflammable atomic +fuel on earth. It yields 3.5 times the energy of deuterium and about +twice the energy of tritium when they are burned individually. Most +important of all, the deuterium-tritium mixture, known as D-T, ignites +much faster than either deuterium or tritium by themselves. For example, +the D-T combination ignites 25 times faster than deuterium alone at a +temperature of 100,000,000 degrees, and the ignition time is fully 37.5 +times faster than for deuterium at 150,000,000 degrees. + +The published technical data show that at a temperature of 50 million +degrees the D-T mixture ignites in only 10 microseconds, or 20 times +faster than deuterium alone. At 75 million degrees it takes only 3 +microseconds, as against 40 for deuterium, while at 100 million degrees +it needs only 1.2 microseconds to catch fire, a time, as we have seen, +only 0.1 microsecond longer than it took the wartime A-bomb to fly +apart. Since the latter held together for 1.1 microseconds at a +temperature of about 50 million degrees, it is reasonable to assume that +the improved and more efficient models generate a temperature at least +twice as high, and that this is done by holding them together for about +1.2 microseconds. + +It can thus be deduced that the only feasible H-bomb is one in which a +relatively small amount of a deuterium-tritium mixture will serve as +additional superkindling, to boost the kindling supplied by the improved +model A-bomb, for lighting a fire with a vast quantity of deuterium. +This, it appears, is the real secret of the H-bomb, which is really no +secret at all, since all the deductions here presented are arrived at on +the basis of data widely known to scientists everywhere, including +Russia. And since it is no secret from the Russians, whom the +arch-traitor Fuchs has supplied with the details still classified top +secret, the American people are certainly entitled to the known facts, +so vitally necessary for an intelligent understanding of one of the most +important problems facing them today. + +A deuterium bomb with a D-T booster would become a certainty if the +temperature of the A-bomb trigger could be raised to 150 million or, +better still, to 200 million degrees. At the former temperature the D-T +superkindling ignites in 0.38 microseconds; at the higher temperature +the ignition time goes down to as low as 0.28 microseconds. Now, the D-T +mixture releases four times as much energy as plutonium, and the faster +the time in which energy is released, the higher goes the temperature. +Since four times as much energy is released at a rate four times faster +than in the wartime model A-bomb, it is not unreasonable to assume that +the temperature generated would be high enough to ignite the green wood +in the bomb—its load of deuterium. + +How much tritium would be required for the kindling mixture? On this we +can only speculate at present. Since the D-T kindling calls for the +fusion of one atom of tritium with one atom of deuterium, and the atomic +weight of tritium is three as compared with two for deuterium, the +weight of the two substances will be in the ratio of 3 for tritium to 2 +for deuterium. Thus if the amount to be used for the kindling mixture is +to be one kilogram, it will be made up of 600 grams of tritium and 400 +grams of deuterium. Since, as we have seen, it would take eighty +kilograms of plutonium to produce one kilogram of tritium, we would have +to use up only 48 kilograms of plutonium to create the 600 grams, or the +equivalent of one and a half to about five A-bombs, according to Dr. +Oliphant’s estimate. + +But would we need as much as 600 grams of tritium? Such an amount, mixed +with 400 grams of deuterium, would yield an explosive power equal to +80,000 tons of TNT, an energy equivalent of 100 million kilowatt-hours. +A twentieth part of this amount would still be equal in power to 4,000 +tons of TNT, equivalent in terms of energy to 5,000,000 kilowatt-hours. +Now one twentieth of 600 grams, just 30 grams of tritium, could be made +at a cost of no more than 2.4 kilograms of plutonium. Thus we would be +paying only one twelfth to one fourth of an A-bomb (in addition to the +one used as the trigger) to get the equivalent of ten A-bombs in +blasting power and of thirty times the incendiary power, which would +totally devastate an area of more than 300 square miles by blast and of +more than 1,200 square miles by fire. + +Would 30 grams of tritium be enough to serve as the superkindling for +exploding, let’s say, 1,000 kilograms (one ton) of deuterium? We shall +probably not know until we actually try it. It will largely depend on +the temperature generated by our more powerful A-bomb models. If it is +true, as Senator Johnson informed his television audience, that they +have “six times the effectiveness of the bomb that was dropped over +Nagasaki” (which, by the way, had more than twice the effectiveness of +the Hiroshima model), it is quite possible that their temperature is as +high as 150 million, or even 200 million, degrees. In that case, the +extra kindling of a 20–30 gram D-T mixture, with its tremendous burst of +5,000,000 kilowatt-hours of energy in 0.28 to 0.38 microseconds (added +to the vast quantity already being liberated by the exploding plutonium, +or U-235), might well heat the deuterium to the proper ignition +temperature and keep it hot long enough for its mass to explode well +within 1.2 microseconds. In any case it would appear logical to expect +that a mixture of 150 grams of tritium and 100 grams of deuterium, which +would release an energy equal to that of the Hiroshima bomb, should be +able to do the job with plenty of time to spare. + +We thus have a threefold answer to the question: Can the H-bomb +_actually_ be made? As we have seen, the deuterium bomb is definitely +not possible. The tritium bomb is theoretically possible, but definitely +not practicable. But a large deuterium bomb using a reasonably small +amount of a deuterium and tritium mixture as extra kindling is both +possible and feasible. + +We now also stand on solid ground in dealing with the questions of cost +and of the time it would take us to get into production. With these +questions answered, we can then decide whether the H-bomb, if made, will +add enough to our security to make the effort worth while. + +We know at this stage that the H-bomb requires three essential +ingredients. It needs, first of all, an A-bomb to set if off. We have a +sizable stockpile of them. It needs large quantities of deuterium. We +have built several deuterium plants during the war, and they should be +large enough to supply our needs. Since it is extracted from water, the +raw material will cost us nothing. The only item of cost will be the +electric power required for the concentration process, and this should +not be above $100 per kilogram, and probably less. The third vital +ingredient, tritium, can be made in the giant plutonium plants at +Hanford, Washington. Thus it can be seen that all the essential +ingredients of the H-bomb, the costliest and those that would take +longest to produce, as well as the multimillion-dollar plants required +for their production, are already at hand. + +This means that as far as the essential materials are concerned, we are +ready to go right now. And as for the cost, it would appear to require +hardly any new appropriations by Congress, or, at any rate, only +appropriations that would be mere chicken feed compared with the five +billion we have already invested in our A-bomb program. + +The raw material out of which tritium is made is the common, cheap light +metal lithium, the lightest, in fact, of all the metals. It has an +atomic weight of six, its nucleus consisting of three protons and three +neutrons. When an extra neutron invades its nucleus, it becomes unstable +and breaks up into two lighter elements, helium (two protons and two +neutrons) and tritium (one proton and two neutrons). They are both gases +and they are readily separated. And while lithium of atomic weight six +constitutes only 7.5 per cent of the element as found in nature (it +comes mixed with 92.5 per cent of lithium of atomic weight seven), there +is no need to separate it from its heavier twin, since the latter has no +affinity for neutrons and nearly all of them are gobbled up by the +lighter element. + +The production of tritium, even in small amounts, will nevertheless be a +formidable process. As we have seen, it takes eighty times as many +neutrons to produce any given amount of tritium as to produce a +corresponding amount of plutonium. Since the lithium will have to +compete with uranium 238 (parent of plutonium) for the available supply +of neutrons, and since the number of atoms of U-238 per given volume is +nearly forty times greater than the number of lithium atoms, the rate of +tritium production would be very much slower than that of plutonium. On +the other hand, even if it took as much as two hundred times as long to +produce a given quantity of tritium, the handicap would be considerably +overcome because of the relatively small amounts that may be required. +If, for example, we should need only 30 to 150 grams of tritium per +bomb, it would take our present plutonium plants only six to thirty +times longer to produce these quantities than it takes them to produce +one kilogram of plutonium. A hypothetical plant such as the one +mentioned in the official Smyth Report, designed to produce one kilogram +of plutonium per day, would thus yield 30 grams of tritium in six days. + +How much tritium would be needed for an adequate stockpile of H-bombs? +Since our primary reasons for building it are to deter aggression, to +prevent its use against us or our allies, and as a tactical weapon +against large land armies, it would appear that as few as twenty-five, +or fifty at the most, would be adequate for the purpose. On the basis of +the larger figure (assuming 30 to 150 grams of tritium per bomb), it +would mean an initial stockpile of only 1.5 to 7.5 kilograms of tritium, +which would entail the sacrifice of about 120 to 600 kilograms of +plutonium. Once this initial outlay had been made, however, our +plutonium sacrifice would be reduced annually to only one twenty-fourth +of the original respective amounts—namely, 5 to 25 kilograms a year—just +enough to make up for the decay of the tritium at the rate of fifty per +cent every twelve years. + +One of the major problems to be solved, in addition to the main problem +of designing the assembly, arises from the fact that the deuterium and +the tritium booster will have to be in liquid form. Liquid hydrogen +boils (that is, reverts to gas) at a temperature of 423 degrees below +zero Fahrenheit under a pressure of one atmosphere (fifteen pounds per +square inch). To liquefy it, it is necessary to cool it in liquid air +(at 313.96 below zero F.) while keeping it at the same time under a +pressure of 180 atmospheres. To transport it, it must be placed in a +vacuum vessel surrounded by an outer vessel of liquid air. This would +point to the need of giant refrigeration and storage plants, as well as +of refrigerator planes for transporting large quantities of liquid +deuterium and its tritium spark plug. + +Will the H-bomb, if made, add enough to our security to make the effort +worth while? We have seen that the required effort may, after all, not +be very great. In fact, it may turn out to be a relatively small one, in +view of the fact that all the basic ingredients and plants are already +at hand and fully paid for. But supposing even that the effort turns out +to be much more costly than it now appears? The question we must then +ask ourselves is: Can we afford not to make the effort? + +It is true, of course, as some have pointed out, that ten or even fewer +A-bombs could destroy the heart of any metropolitan city, while only one +would be quite enough, as we know, for cities the size of Hiroshima or +Nagasaki. But that neglects to take into consideration the fact that one +H-bomb concentrates within itself the power of thirty A-bombs to destroy +by fire and by burns an area of more than 1,200 square miles at one +blow. Nor does it take into consideration the military advantage of +delivering the power of a combination of ten and thirty A-bombs in one +concentrated package, which would make it a tremendous tactical weapon +against a huge land army scattered over many miles, or its possible +enormous psychological effect against such an army. + +Most important of all, this view grossly minimizes the apocalyptic +potentialities of the H-bomb for poisoning large areas with deadly +clouds of radioactive particles. It is a monstrous fact that an H-bomb +incorporating one ton of deuterium, encased in a shell of cobalt, would +liberate 250 pounds of neutrons, which would create 15,000 pounds of +highly radioactive cobalt, equivalent in their deadliness to 4,800,000 +pounds of radium. Such bombs, according to Professor Harrison Brown, +University of Chicago nuclear chemist, could be set on a north-south +line in the Pacific approximately a thousand miles west of California. +“The radioactive dust would reach California in about a day, and New +York in four or five days, killing most life as it traverses the +continent.” + +“Similarly,” Professor Brown stated in the _American Scholar_, “the +Western powers could explode H-bombs on a north-south line about the +longitude of Prague which would destroy all life within a strip 1,500 +miles wide, extending from Leningrad to Odessa, and 3,000 miles deep, +from Prague to the Ural Mountains. Such an attack would produce a +‘scorched earth’ of an extent unprecedented in history.” + +Professor Szilard, one of the principal architects of the A-bomb, has +estimated, as already stated, that four hundred one-ton deuterium bombs +would release enough radioactivity to extinguish all life on earth. +Professor Einstein, as we have seen, has publicly stated that the +H-bomb, if successful, will bring the annihilation of all life on earth +within the range of technical possibilities. The question we must +therefore ask ourselves is: Can we allow Russia to be the sole possessor +of such a weapon? + +There can be no question that Russia is already at work on an H-bomb. +Like ourselves, she already has the plutonium plants for producing both +A-bombs and tritium. She can produce deuterium in the same quantities as +we can. In Professor Peter Kapitza she has the world’s greatest +authority on liquid hydrogen. + +Furthermore, she has great incentives to produce H-bombs. Since she is +still behind us in her A-bomb stockpile, she can, in a sense, catch up +with us much more quickly by converting her fewer A-bombs into H-bombs +that would be the equivalents of ten to thirty A-bombs each, thus +increasing the power of her stockpile ten to thirty times. Equally if +not more important from Russia’s point of view is the stark fact that an +H-bomb could be much more easily exploded near a coastal city from a +submarine or innocent-looking tramp steamer, since most of our great +cities are on the seacoast, whereas Russia practically has no coastal +cities. + +Even if we openly announced that we would not make any H-bombs, it would +not deter Russia from making them as fast as she could, not only because +she would not believe us but also because her sole possession would +greatly weight the scales in her favor. If, God forbid, she finds +herself one day with a stockpile of H-bombs when we have none, she would +be in a position to send us an ultimatum similar to the one we sent to +the Japanese after Hiroshima: “Surrender or be destroyed!” + +Valuing their liberty more than their lives, the American people will +never surrender. But while there is time, would anyone advocate that we +run the risk of ever facing such a choice? + + + + + III + SHALL WE RENOUNCE THE USE OF THE H-BOMB? + + +A few days after President Truman announced that he had directed work +“to continue” on “the so-called hydrogen, or super bomb,” a group of +twelve eminent physicists, including half a dozen of the major +architects of the atomic bomb at Los Alamos, who, no doubt, are playing +a similar role in the development of the H-bomb, issued a statement +urging the United States to make “a solemn declaration that we shall +never use the bomb first,” and “that the only circumstances which might +force us to use it would be if we or our allies were attacked by _this_ +bomb.” They added that “there can be only one justification for our +development of the hydrogen bomb, and that is to prevent its use.” + +Signers of the statement, unprecedented in the annals of science (with +the possible exception of a secret memorandum submitted to the +government just before the A-bomb was used), included such outstanding +physicists as Hans A. Bethe of Cornell; Kenneth T. Bainbridge of +Harvard; Samuel K. Allison, University of Chicago; Dean George B. +Pegram, Columbia; C. C. Lauritsen, California Institute of Technology; +Bruno Rossi and Victor F. Weisskopf, Massachusetts Institute of +Technology; F. W. Loomis and Frederick Seitz, University of Illinois; +Merle A. Tuve, Carnegie Institution of Washington; R. B. Brode, +University of California; and M. G. White, Princeton—all, with the +exception of Dr. Tuve, professors of physics at their respective +universities. Those among them who did not directly participate in the +development of the A-bomb played major parts in other scientific wartime +projects, such as radar and the proximity fuse. + +Implicit in their statement was the first confirmation—indeed, the most +authoritative we have had so far from scientists with first-hand +knowledge of the subject—that a hydrogen bomb of a thousand times the +power of the A-bomb could be made. More than that, they informed us that +Russia may complete the H-bomb in less than four years, meaning, of +course, that we too could achieve the same goal in the same period. We +were thus provided by the experts with a time-table on which we must act +if we are not to run the risk of Russia’s getting the H-bomb ahead of +us, and so being in a position to use it, or threaten its use, against +the nations of western Europe, as the greatest blackmail weapon in +history. + +The statement summarizes in essence the principal points of view that +have been advanced so far on what policy we should adopt on the H-bomb, +and since it was promulgated by men known to have definite inside +knowledge of the subject, it deserves closer scrutiny than it has +hitherto received. + +“It was stated correctly,” they inform us at the outset, + + + that a hydrogen bomb, if it can be made, would be capable of + developing a power 1,000 times greater than the present atomic bomb. + New York, or any of the greatest cities of the world, could be + destroyed by a single hydrogen bomb. + + We believe that no nation has the right to use such a bomb, no matter + how righteous its cause. The bomb is no longer a weapon of war, but a + means of extermination of whole populations. Its use would be a + betrayal of morality and of Christian civilization itself. + + Senator Brien McMahon has pointed out to the American people that the + possession of the hydrogen bomb will not give positive security to + this country. We shall not have a monopoly of this bomb, but it is + certain that the Russians will be able to make one, too. In the case + of the fission bomb the Russians required four years to parallel our + development. _In the case of the hydrogen bomb they will probably need + a shorter time._ + + We must remember that we do not possess the bomb but are only + developing it, and Russia has received, through indiscretion, _the + most valuable hint that our experts believe the development possible_. + Perhaps the development of the hydrogen bomb has already been under + way in Russia for some time. But if it was not, our decision to + develop it must have started the Russians on the same program. If they + had already a going program, they will redouble their efforts. + + Statements in the press have given the power of the H-bomb as between + two and 1,000 times that of the present fission bomb. Actually, the + thermonuclear reaction on which the H-bomb is based is limited in its + power only by the amount of hydrogen which can be carried in the bomb. + Even if the power were limited to 1,000 times that of a present atomic + bomb, the step from an A-bomb to an H-bomb would be as great as that + from an ordinary TNT bomb to the atom bomb. + + To create such an ever-present danger for all the nations of the world + is against the vital interests of both Russia and the United States. + Three prominent Senators have called for renewed efforts to eliminate + this weapon and other weapons of mass destruction from the arsenals of + all nations. Such efforts should be made, and made in all sincerity + from both sides. + + In the meantime, we urge that the United States, through its elected + government, make a solemn declaration that we shall never use this + bomb first. + + +Before discussing in detail the merits of the proposal that the United +States renounce the use of the H-bomb, “no matter how righteous its +cause,” except in retaliation for its use against us or our allies, it +behooves us to examine the effect of our decisions to proceed with the +development of the H-bomb on Russia’s A-bomb progress. + +We know that the H-bomb requires an A-bomb for its trigger. We also have +strong grounds for assuming that, in addition to the A-bomb, an H-bomb +will require certain quantities of tripleweight hydrogen, or tritium, as +extra superkindling to boost the A-bomb. We know, furthermore, that it +takes eighty times as many neutrons to make a given quantity of tritium +as it does to make a corresponding amount of plutonium, which, of +course, means a reduction in A-bombs. + +Hence, should Russia decide to embark on an H-bomb program of her own, +or to “redouble her efforts,” it would lead inevitably to a serious +curtailment in her stockpile of A-bombs. While we would have to make the +same sacrifice of plutonium, it is obvious that we can afford the +sacrifice much better than Russia, since we already have a sizable +stockpile of both plutonium and uranium bombs, whereas she has just +begun building her stockpile. The situation for her would be much worse +if she has put all her atomic eggs in the plutonium basket without +bothering to build the much more complicated and costly uranium +separation plants, as the incomplete evidence available would seem to +indicate. In that case she would be faced with a serious dilemma indeed, +for you cannot have H-bombs without A-bombs, and you cannot have A-bombs +without plutonium, and if, as the evidence indicates, she has built her +A-bomb program exclusively around plutonium, she would have to sacrifice +quantities she could ill afford to spare, at this stage of her +development, of the only element she desperately needs for building up +her A-bomb stockpile. + +How do we know that Russia’s A-bomb is made of plutonium? We have the +testimony of Senator Johnson of Colorado, who assured us in his famous +television broadcast of November 1, 1949 that “there’s no question at +all that the Russians have a bomb more or less similar to the bomb that +we dropped at Nagasaki, a plutonium bomb.” In this single sentence the +Senator from Colorado, who as a member of the Joint Congressional +Committee on Atomic Energy has access to such information, inadvertently +let at least three cats out of the bag. He confirmed that the Nagasaki +bomb was made of plutonium (though, in fairness, it must be said that +this had been known unofficially for some time); he told us that we had +found out not only that “an atomic explosion had occurred in the +U.S.S.R.,” as the President had announced in carefully chosen words, but +that the explosion was that of an atomic bomb and that, more important +still, the bomb was made of plutonium. And in doing so he, furthermore, +gave away the secret of how we had obtained that information, something +the Russians very much wanted to know. Not being a scientist, Senator +Johnson obviously did not realize that the split fragments (fission +products) of a plutonium bomb differ from those given off by the +explosion of a uranium bomb, so that in revealing that we knew what the +bomb was made of he would also be revealing at the same time that we +found it out by examining radioactive air samples and finding them to +contain fission fragments of plutonium, as well as whole plutonium atoms +that escaped fission. + +There is thus no doubt that the Russians have built nuclear reactors for +producing plutonium from nonfissionable uranium 238. We cannot, of +course, be sure that they have not at the same time also built plants +for concentrating uranium 235, but the odds favor the negative. We built +uranium separation plants at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and plutonium plants +at Hanford, Washington, during the war because we didn’t know at the +time which method would work, and we gambled on the chance that, by +building plants for producing fissionable materials by four different +methods, at least one of them might work. Had we known at the time that +the plutonium plants were practical, it is quite likely that we would +not have invested a billion dollars in building the uranium separation +plants. Since the Russians have obviously decided on plutonium plants as +the simplest and cheapest (three plutonium plants cost us a total of +$400,000,000, whereas a single large uranium separation plant cost half +a billion), it is hardly likely that they would consider it worth while +to invest in the much more costly uranium separation plants. + +As Senator Johnson said in the same broadcast: “We tried out four +different methods of making a bomb and all of them succeeded, but one of +these methods was superior to all the others in simplicity and +effectiveness, and we told the Russians and we told the world that fact. +Of course, they didn’t have to make the experiments that we had to make +to find out by elimination which method was the most effective and which +the one that they should follow.” + +The evidence is thus strongly in favor of the assumption that Russia has +only plutonium plants as her sole source of A-bomb material, whereas we +have both plutonium plants and gigantic uranium plants in full +operation. If that is so, then our forcing Russia to embark on an H-bomb +program, at a time when her A-bomb program is barely started, will place +her under a double handicap in her race to catch up with us in A-bombs, +and at least to keep abreast of us, if not ahead, in H-bombs. For in +this grim race we have a dual if not a triple advantage: our much +superior stockpile, both in numbers and no doubt in quality, and our +gigantic plants for concentrating U-235, the production of which would +not have to be curtailed at all, since tritium can be made only in +plutonium plants. In fact, we are now in the process of construction of +two great additions to the uranium plant at Oak Ridge. + +One may visualize the masters of the Kremlin gnashing their teeth in +impotent rage at what they no doubt regard as a diabolical plot on our +part to sabotage their A-bomb effort. Indeed, there can be no question +that our decision to proceed with the H-bomb was an answer to Russia’s +challenge to our atomic supremacy, and it appears quite plausible that +one of the motives behind the decision was the knowledge that it would +force Russia either to build great additions to her atomic plants, at +great expense in money and materials and at the loss of considerable +precious time, or to curtail her production of A-bomb material. And +while any such motive could not possibly have been the determining +factor, the ultimate effect of our decision was the same as though we +had succeeded in getting a team of expert saboteurs behind the Iron +Curtain to plant a good-sized monkey wrench in the Soviet atomic +machinery. + +With this in mind we begin to appreciate how dangerous a move it would +be, to ourselves and to world peace, if we were to make a solemn +declaration at the outset, even before we have a single H-bomb, that we +will never use it, “no matter how righteous our cause,” unless it is +used first against us or our allies. By making such a unilateral +declaration, without even making it conditional upon Russia issuing a +similar solemn renunciation, we would, in effect, be saying to Russia: +“We humbly beg your pardon. We did not realize that we would be putting +a nasty monkey wrench in the machinery of your vital A-bomb program. We +shall remove the wrench at once so that you may proceed with your +program unhindered by us in any way.” + +The masters of the Kremlin would, indeed, have every right to laugh long +and loud, and to take such foolhardy action on our part as further +evidence of what they call “the decadence of the bourgeois democracies.” +For, once we make such a magnanimous unilateral solemn renunciation of +the one weapon that promises to become the greatest single deterrent +against war, without even bothering to ask Russia publicly to do +likewise, Russia could then proceed calmly at her leisure to build up +her A-bomb stockpile, with the complete assurance from us that she need +not worry about our H-bomb as long as she does not use one against us or +our allies. After she has accumulated an adequate A-bomb stockpile—and +fifty to one hundred would be adequate from her standpoint—she would +then be in a position, already attained by us now, to proceed with her +H-bomb program, knowing full well that we would never use H-bombs +against her while she is still without them. And while she obviously +could not use anything she does not have, she could well afford to make +aggressive war even before she has an H-bomb, or to bide her time until +she does, the choice being entirely hers. And if she waits until she has +the H-bomb, the decision whether to use it or not would still be +entirely hers, so that she could use it whenever she decides it is to +her advantage to do so, whereas we should have to wait on her pleasure, +having morally bound ourselves, without qualification, not to use it +first, even if our very existence depended on it. + +It can thus be easily seen that this “after you, my dear Alphonse” +gesture on our part in a matter that may involve our very existence +would be more than quixotic. It is likely to prove suicidal. It will not +improve the prospects of world peace; on the contrary it will weaken +them. It will not enhance our moral stature, since the world does not +have much respect for starry-eyed dreamers with their heads in the +clouds. + +But while we must keep our feet planted on the ground, we need not lose +sight of the stars. Our refusal to expose ourselves by giving Russia the +great advantages mentioned, does not mean that we retain the right to +use the H-bomb indiscriminately as though it were just another weapon. +There are, I shall presently show, both legitimate and illegitimate uses +to which the H-bomb can be put, and it is the failure so far, even by +eminent scientists, to distinguish between these two types of possible +uses that is responsible for a great deal, if not all, of the confusion +and much futile debate that have followed the President’s announcement +of his directive to continue work on the hydrogen bomb, and for the +flood of verbiage that will continue to plague and bewilder us until we +take time to acquaint ourselves with the facts about the H-bomb. + +One of the major difficulties in our approach to the subject stems from +the general tendency to talk about the H-bomb as though it were just one +weapon, which obviously it is not. As we know, it is several weapons in +one package, which can be designed for various uses, depending on the +intent of its designer. It is, on the one hand, a weapon that can cause +total destruction by blast over a radius of ten miles, or an area of +more than 300 square miles, with graduated lesser damage over a much +larger area. Secondly, it is a weapon that can produce fires and severe +flash burns over a radius of twenty miles—that is, over an area of more +than 1,200 square miles. These two functions, destruction by blast and +by fire, go together. They are inseparable as far as the bomb itself is +concerned, though their relative effects can be regulated by the height +from which the bomb is dropped, by the terrain over which it is used, +and by its mode of delivery other than by air. + +Then, of course, there is the third weapon of terror, the tremendous +quantities of deadly radioactive particles that the H-bomb may release +in the atmosphere, which, as Dr. Einstein said, would bring within the +range of technical possibilities “the annihilation of life on earth.” +This, however, would depend on the choice and purpose of the designer. +If he so chooses, he can design an H-bomb that would produce only +slightly greater radioactivity than its A-bomb trigger. Or he can rig it +in such a manner that one bomb would release into the atmosphere the +equivalent of nearly five million pounds of radium that would poison the +atmosphere for thousands of miles, killing all life wherever it goes. +The catchword here is “rig,” and the rigging depends entirely, not on +the contents of the bomb itself, but on the material of which its outer +shell is composed. If, for example, the casing chosen is a material such +as steel, the radioactivity produced would be practically harmless. If +the shell is made of cobalt, the radiations released would cause untold +havoc. The reason for the vast difference is not difficult to +understand. The H-bomb, when it explodes, releases tremendous quantities +of neutrons, the most penetrating particles in nature. As soon as it is +liberated, a neutron enters the nucleus of the nearest element at hand. +This may produce a wide variety of changes in the nature of the element +penetrated by the neutron, the changes depending on the element. Some +elements, such as cobalt, become intensely radioactive, others only +mildly so, and still others not at all. Furthermore, each element thus +made radioactive has its own characteristic decay period, lasting from +seconds to many years, so that the designer of the bomb has a great +variety to choose from. + +From this it can be seen that, instead of one, there are actually two +types of H-bombs—the non-rigged and the rigged. With this vital +distinction in mind the problem of its use becomes much more simplified. +We are in a position to reach full agreement with the scientists that no +nation has the right to use such a “rigged” bomb, no matter how +righteous its cause. For the rigged H-bomb would add nothing to the +military value of the non-rigged H-bomb, which is already more than +enough to achieve any military objective. It would merely be piling +horror upon horror for no purpose beyond wanton destruction for its own +sake. Its use even in small numbers would ruin large segments of the +earth for years. It would, as the scientists said, “be a betrayal of +morality and of Christian civilization itself.” There can therefore be +no question that when this distinction between the non-rigged and the +rigged H-bomb is made clear to the American people—something the +scientists failed to do—they would overwhelmingly lend their support to +a move on the part of our government solemnly declaring that we would +never use the rigged H-bomb first; that our only aim in building it is +to prevent its use, and that the only circumstances under which we would +find ourselves forced to use it would be in retaliation for its use +against us or our allies. + +We can, and should, make such a solemn declaration unilaterally, +regardless of whether Russia makes a similar declaration. We would lose +nothing by doing so from a military or strategic point of view, and we +would gain enormously in moral stature and on the battlefront of ideas +if we were to do it now. Otherwise we run the risk that Russia might do +it first. If she takes advantage of this lost opportunity of ours, we +shall have handed her a great moral victory. In fact, the law of nations +compels us to make such a declaration. Unlike the A-bomb, in which the +radioactivity is part and parcel of the bomb itself, the rigged H-bomb +is purposely designed to produce radioactive poisoning in the +atmosphere. Since it has to be specially incorporated into the casing of +the bomb, it comes under the international convention outlawing the use +of poison gas. For there can be no question that a radioactive cloud +that may lay waste to whole areas is the most diabolical and deadly +poison gas so far invented. + +But the twelve scientists do not seem to be satisfied with the mere +renunciation of the rigged H-bomb. They ask us to declare that we would +not be the first to use even the non-rigged bomb, on the grounds that it +“is no longer a weapon of war, but a means of extermination of whole +populations.” This requires closer scrutiny. + +It has become customary to think of the A-bomb, and now of the H-bomb, +as purely strategic weapons for destroying industrial centers producing +war materials, thus depriving the armies at the front of the vital +sinews of war. It is also regarded as a weapon of superterror to bring a +nation to its knees, as the A-bomb did in Japan. Since industrial +centers, particularly in the United States, are densely populated areas, +and since, conversely, all large cities are also important industrial +centers, it has become almost axiomatic that the A-bomb and the H-bomb +could be used only in strategic bombing of large centers of population, +which, of course, means the wholesale slaughter of millions of civilians +and the wiping out of cities with populations of more than 200,000. + +But to think along such lines would be thinking of World War III, which +we must do our utmost to prevent, in terms of World War II, which would +be just as fatal as thinking in terms of World War I was to the French +in World War II. For even a cursory examination of the situation should +reveal that strategic bombing of cities may, and very likely would be, +as obsolete in the next war as trench warfare was in the last. One does +not have to be a military expert to know the reason why. In the last war +strategic bombing was resorted to in order to deprive the army at the +front of weapons and supplies. Obviously, if you had a superweapon that +could wipe out an entire army in the field or on the march at one blow, +there would be no further need of depriving an army that was no longer +in being. + +That is exactly what the non-rigged H-bomb is. As a blast weapon, we +have seen, it can cause total destruction of everything within an area +of more than 300 square miles. As an incinerator it would severely burn +everything within an area of more than 1,200 square miles. It is thus +the tactical weapon par excellence. No army in the field or on the march +could stand up against it. Had we possessed it at the Battle of the +Bulge, just one could have wiped out the entire Bulge. If the Nazis had +had it before D-Day, one would have been enough to wipe out our entire +invasion army even before it landed; or they could have waited and wiped +out our entire Normandy beachhead. In a word, the non-rigged H-bomb has +produced a major revolution in tactics and strategy. It has made +strategic bombing of cities as obsolete as the trench of World War I, +except as a weapon of pure terror and wanton wholesale destruction of +life and property. It would be absolutely useless to the victor as well +as to the vanquished, as the victor would have no spoils of victory left +and would have to rebuild what he had needlessly destroyed. + +Viewed in this light, the non-rigged H-bomb, just because it is the +weapon for the annihilation of armies, becomes vis-à-vis Russia, the +greatest deterrent against war that could possibly be devised in the +present state of affairs. For, after all, the only great advantage +Russia has over us today is her land army and her great reserve of +manpower. The non-rigged H-bomb, supported by a large and up-to-date air +force capable of delivering it either by air or from a seized airhead +behind the lines, could nullify that advantage in a few hours. At least +the threat of such a possibility will always be there. It is therefore +doubtful, to say the least, that any group of men would willingly take +such a risk. + +Since the greatest and most effective use of the non-rigged H-bomb would +thus be as a tactical weapon against armies in the field, while its +strategic use against civilian populations would be simple wanton +destruction from the point of view of both victor and vanquished, then +not only morality and Christian civilization but plain common sense +would dictate the wisdom of our solemnly declaring right now that we +will never be the first to use either the non-rigged H-bomb or even the +A-bomb against civilian populations, and that the only circumstance that +would compel us to use them so would be in retaliation for their use +against us or our allies. In fact, we could renounce strategic bombing +altogether. By doing so we would gain one of the greatest moral +victories, for then if Russia failed to make a similar declaration, as +she most likely would, she would stand before the world as a nation bent +on wholesale slaughter of civilian populations. We have nothing to lose +and everything to gain by such a declaration, and the sooner we make it +the better. + +Should we make such a declaration, it would place Russia in an +embarrassing position indeed. For while as a tactical weapon the +non-rigged H-bomb offers us great advantages as a counterforce to +neutralize her huge army, she can use the H-bomb, both the rigged and +the non-rigged, as a constant threat against our densely populated +cities. As Senator Brien McMahon, of Connecticut, chairman of the Joint +Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, has warned, an H-bomb attack +“might incinerate 50,000,000 Americans—not in the space of an evening +but in the space of a few minutes.” We have eleven cities of one million +or more inhabitants, whereas Russia has only three or four. We have +forty cities of 200,000 and over, inhabited by 40,000,000, or 27 per +cent of our population, whereas Russia has only twenty cities of 200,000 +and over, inhabited by only 20,000,000, or 10 per cent of her +population. Furthermore, her industries are now largely dispersed, +whereas our industries are highly centralized. Russia would thus get +much the worse of the bargain if she were to accept our challenge to +renounce the use of strategic bombing, particularly that of the A- and +H-bombs, while we still retain the right to use them in tactical bombing +against her armies. + +Suppose Russia in this dilemma, and recognizing the need to avoid the +moral opprobrium of the peoples of the world that her refusal to meet +our renunciation would entail, comes forth with a counterproposal to +renounce the use of both A- and H-bombs altogether, as strategic as well +as tactical weapons, thus exchanging the elimination of the threat of +the annihilation of our teeming cities and industries, for the removal +of the threat of destruction to her armies. Suppose that at the same +time she repeats her demand, frequently voiced by her in the United +Nations, that all stockpiles of A- and H-bombs be destroyed and a +convention signed to outlaw their uses. The world already knows the +answer, for we have already made it again and again. + +Immediately after the close of the last war we declared our readiness to +give up the A-bomb. In 1946, at a time when we were the sole possessor +of the bomb, when we had every reason to believe that our monopoly would +last for a number of years, we submitted a far-reaching plan for the +international control of atomic energy, the most generous offer by far +ever made by any nation in history. In this historic plan we not only +declared our readiness to give up our stockpile of A-bombs and to agree +to refrain from further production; we even offered to give up our +sovereignty over our multibillion-dollar atomic plants to an +international agency. We further agreed to submit to unhindered, free +inspection by such an agency to assure the world, and Russia in +particular, that we were not manufacturing A-bombs, or A-bomb materials, +in secret. No nation in history had ever gone so far in its desire to +show its goodwill and its peaceful intentions as to make a voluntary +offer to surrender the world’s most powerful weapon of war, and an +important part of its sovereignty to boot. The offer still stands. It +has been enthusiastically endorsed by all the members of the United +Nations except Russia and her satellites. After three years of futile +negotiations and discussions Russia still insists that she would not +surrender any part of her sovereignty or submit to the only kind of +inspection that could assure the world against clandestine production of +atomic bombs and materials. + +Hence, should Russia demand that we renounce the right to use the A- and +H-bombs not only as strategic but also as tactical weapons against her +armies in exchange for a similar offer on her part, it would on the face +of it be a mere repetition of her earlier efforts to trick us into +giving up our greatest weapons while she remained free to produce them +in secret, since she insists upon her right to retain ownership of the +atomic plants and materials and upon the inspection of only those plants +she acknowledges to exist, thus making it impossible to find plants +whose existence she does not admit. To accept such an offer would be +tantamount to surrender, since our giving up the right to use the H-bomb +as a tactical weapon against her armies would leave her free to march +into the countries of western Europe. It would then be too late to stop +her, for we could not drop the H-bomb on the cities of western Europe. +The only time to stop Russia’s armies is before they cross into the +territory of our allies, during the crucial period when they are +mobilized in large numbers and on the march. + +The American people, and the other free peoples of the world, could not +agree to such a scheme to disarm them in advance and thus give the +masters of the Kremlin a free hand. To do so would not prevent war, it +would encourage it. It would not even delay it, it would hasten it. +Instead of being preventable, it would become inevitable. We wouldn’t +even save our cities from the fate of strategic bombing with A- and +H-bombs, since the Kremlin has never kept its promises when they did not +suit its purposes. When we had lost our greatest chance to wipe out her +armies in one mighty blow, Russia would be in a position to trade our +industries and cities for her dispersed and still primitive industrial +plants and cities. If at that stage she should offer us, as well as our +neighbors to the south and Britain and her Dominions, independence and +complete sovereignty, while she assumed hegemony over all of Europe and +Asia, could we then refuse, at the risk of the lives of our millions? +Supposing the nations of western Europe, overrun by the Red Army, become +“people’s democracies,” Russian style, would we risk our millions to +liberate nations whose governments would by then have joined the ranks +of our enemy? + +These are the brutal facts that would confront us were we to renounce +the right to use A- and H-bombs as tactical weapons against armies in +the field. As long as we retain that right, the chances are good that we +could prevent global war, for no nation would be likely to risk such a +war in the face of the possibility that the main bulk of its armies +might be wiped out at the outset. If we give up that right, we would +also prevent war—by surrendering in advance. Russia, of course, might +figure that she could still make war, when she decides the time is ripe, +taking the calculated risk that we would not use the A- and H-bombs +against her armies for fear of her retaliation against our cities and +industries. But whether she would consider that calculated risk worth +taking would depend on how good our defenses were. Senator McMahon’s +warning that an H-bomb attack “might incinerate 50,000,000 Americans ... +in the space of a few minutes” would become a possibility only if we +allowed ourselves to be surprised for a second time by a “super Pearl +Harbor,” which, of course, is inconceivable. While it is generally +agreed that it is impossible to decentralize our cities and industries, +because of the tremendous cost (estimated at $300 billion) and the short +time at our disposal between now and the ultimate showdown, when Russia +is expected to be ready to make major moves at the risk of “accepting” +war, we have many advantages not possessed by Britain and Germany during +the last war as far as defenses against strategic bombing were +concerned. Britain, as well as Poland, Holland, and Belgium—little, +densely populated countries—were within very short range of Germany’s +airfields. So was Germany, in her turn, within easy range from Britain. +Radar, as compared with its modern types, was primitive in quality and +inadequate in quantity. Automatic antiaircraft guns, interceptor planes, +and night fighters were either nonexistent in the early days of the +blitz or in a crude stage of development compared with present +equivalents. + +How vastly different is our situation today vis-à-vis Russia! Instead of +a short hop across the English Channel she would have to cross the +Atlantic or the Pacific to reach our continent, whereas we can reach her +heartland from bases all around her borders. It is unthinkable that any +of her bombers can cross either ocean without being detected hundreds of +miles before they reach our shores. With modern radar devices, which are +constantly being improved, and fleets of fast interceptors far in +advance of anything Russia could develop, we would destroy them long +before they would do us any harm. If she attempts to fly over the North +Pole, she will still have to cross all of Canada before she can reach +us, and if we and our Canadian friends are on the alert, as we must and +shall be, any hostile planes could be detected and destroyed over the +Arctic. + +There is, of course, the possibility of exploding an H-bomb some +distance off shore from a submarine or from a tramp steamer, but here, +too, eternal vigilance will be the price of our liberties and our lives. +There can be no question that we shall succeed in finding the answer to +the detection of the Snorkel-type submarine and master it just as we +mastered the earlier types. American ingenuity and superior technology +have never failed yet in the face of an emergency, and it is unthinkable +that they should fail now. + +We often hear it said that an enemy could smuggle an A-bomb in small +parts into this country and assemble it here. While such an operation is +possible, its successful execution against a nation fully on guard is +highly improbable. As for the H-bomb, it requires large quantities of +liquefied gas, which must be kept in a vacuum surrounded by large +vessels of liquid air. In addition it must have its A-bomb trigger and +other complicated devices. All this makes its surreptitious smuggling +into a country such as ours even more improbable. + +We have had it dinned into our ears for so long that there is no defense +against the atomic bomb, and that the only choice confronting us is “one +world or none,” without anyone taking the trouble to challenge these two +pernicious catch-phrases, that we have accepted them as gospel truth, +particularly since they were uttered by some of our more articulate +atomic scientists. That scientists should at last step out from their +laboratories and classrooms to take an active interest in public affairs +is highly commendable and welcome. But that does not give them the right +to take advantage of the great respect and confidence the public has for +them with utterances that serve only to create fear and hysteria and a +sense of helplessness, while at the same time offering remedies they +know to be unattainable. + +The truth of the matter is that there can be and there is a defense +against atomic weapons, as against any other weapon. Basically it is the +same as the defense against submarines or enemy bombers: detect them and +destroy them before they reach you. The difference is largely a matter +of degree. Since the atomic-bomb carrier can do greater damage, the +measures of defense against it must be correspondingly greater. With the +aid of the vast stretches of the Atlantic and the Pacific, augmented by +an effective radar and interceptor system, on the one hand; and with +effective counter-submarine measures on the other, the odds would be +against a single A- or H-bomb reaching our shores. + +Faced with such an impregnable system of defense, and with a threat of +the swift annihilation of its armies as soon as they begin marching for +war, the Kremlin could no longer, unless its masters went completely +berserk, regard war, or even a challenge to war, a risk worth taking. +The cold war may get warmer, as it did in Korea, but as long as we keep +our heads and don’t give way to fear and hysteria, trusting in God and +keeping our H-bombs “wet,” it may never reach the boilingpoint. + +And we have in addition a weapon even more powerful than the H-bomb or +any other physical weapon, which instead of bringing misery and death +would bring new life and new hope to hundreds of millions now enslaved. +We have not yet even begun to fight on the battlefield of ideas, in +which we can match freedom against tyranny, friendship against class +hatred, truth against lies, a society based on the respect and dignity +of the individual and the giving of full scope to human aspirations +against a society modeled after the beehive and the ant-heap. + +“Real peace,” former Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle, Jr., +said in the _New Leader_, “is deeper than absence of war. That will be +won in the realm of philosophy and ideas. Indeed, the great reason for +preventing war is to permit ideas to meet ideas on their own merits.... +The statesman’s business is to keep the conflagration at bay and give +ideas their chance, relying on the moral strength of the ideals he +represents to bring to their support the masses throughout the world.” +In such a war of ideas, he adds, there could be no doubt about the +outcome, as the West can oppose all its positives against Moscow’s +negatives. We meet “a betrayed revolution, in a decadent, imperialist, +dictatorial phase, building an empire on the negatives of human +behavior. Such empires engage no permanent loyalties; they invariably +break up. War would defeat this empire in any case. First rate +statesmanship can avoid that war.” + +In the words of General George C. Marshall, “the most important thing +for the world today is a spiritual regeneration.... We must present +democracy as a force holding within itself the seeds of unlimited +progress for the human race. We should make it clear that it is a means +to a better way of life within nations and to a better understanding +among nations. Tyranny inevitably must fall back before the tremendous +moral strength of the gospel of freedom and self-respect for the +individual.” + +As an advance army in this war of ideas we already have a fifth column +of millions waiting for our signal to march, the millions of the +enslaved satellite countries—Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Baltic +countries, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania—as well as millions upon millions +behind the Iron Curtain in Russia itself. The greatest mistake made by +Hitler was his failure to utilize the readiness and eagerness of a large +percentage of the Russian masses to turn against their oppressors. When +the Nazi armies marched into the Ukraine, large numbers of Ukrainians, +who had been longing for independence for centuries, greeted them as +their liberators with the traditional bread and salt, symbol of welcome. +Russian soldiers surrendered by the thousands and they, along with the +men of the villages, volunteered in great numbers to fight against their +enslavers. In the hearts of millions of Russians behind the front, the +longing for liberty, never extinguished, was given its greatest stimulus +since the days when they overthrew the Czarist regime. They, too, were +waiting for the Germans to give them back the revolution the Communists +had stolen from them with lies and deceit. + +With the stupidity characteristic of all criminals, Hitler and Himmler +proclaimed that the Russians were to be treated as an “inferior race.” +Everywhere their armies went they burned and pillaged and raped. Instead +of liberators they turned out to be most savage barbarians, who behaved +even worse than the commissars. It was this inconceivable folly of +Hitler, as well as our Lend-Lease, that played a major role in enabling +the Kremlin to win the war. + +The Russian masses and those of the enslaved satellite countries are +still waiting for their liberators. The masters of the Kremlin know it, +but they hope that, like the Nazis, we will be too stupid to take +advantage of it. If a war ever breaks out, we shall have millions +joining our ranks provided we do not destroy these millions, those not +in uniform, with A- or H-bombs in the strategic bombing of their cities. +But we should not wait until a war breaks out. We must begin mobilizing +them right now for the war of ideas. + +The so-called Iron Curtain is a fake, like the rest of the Communist +set-up. It is made of tinsel and is full of thousands of holes, through +which we can pass if we will. Those thousands of miles of border ringing +the vast Russian Empire could be utilized as great thoroughfares of +ideas, to be smuggled to the millions waiting for them. There isn’t a +guard on those borders who couldn’t, with the proper approach and +inducements, be enlisted in our army of ideas. In addition to flooding +the air over Russia with tiny balloons, each carrying a message of +freedom and hope, we could also smuggle into the country small radio +receiving sets by the millions to bring the Voice of America to millions +of Russian homes. We could attach to those balloons small loaves of +bread, packages of cigarettes, little trinkets for babies, nylon +stockings for women, on a scale that no police could cope with. Nor +could the Kremlin risk forbidding it, as that would place it in the +position of further depriving its starved and hungry people of things +they badly need and want. + +With these weapons on the battlefront in the war of ideas, and with the +A- and H-bomb to give the Kremlin pause, we would be well on the way to +win any war, cold or hot. Our justification for building the hydrogen +bomb is thus not merely to prevent its use, but to prevent World War +III, and to win it if it comes. We are not building it to bring Russia +to her knees. We are building it to bring her to her senses. We must +make the Kremlin realize with General Marshall that “tyranny inevitably +must fall back before the tremendous moral strength of the gospel of +freedom and self-respect for the individual.” + + + + + IV + KOREA CLEARED THE AIR + + +As this is being written, the Korean war is just one month old. By the +time these lines appear in print we may know whether the naked Communist +aggression on the Republic of South Korea was an episode, a prelude, or +the first act of World War III. But whatever history records, the first +flash of the Communist guns, supplied by the Kremlin, has revealed to +the free world at last the face of the enemy in all its hideousness. It +brought the first phase of the so-called cold war to a definite end. It +aroused freedom-loving peoples everywhere and put them on the alert. It +served as a powerful headlight in the night, revealing many dangerous +curves on the road ahead. It has given the United Nations its first +great opportunity to display its vitality for all the world to see. + +Among other things, the flash of the North Korean guns has illumined for +us more clearly than ever before the path we must follow in our policy +on atomic weapons, both the A-bomb and the H-bomb. It has revealed the +extreme danger lurking in any plan to outlaw production and use of +atomic weapons in a world constantly threatened by a savage +dictatorship, ready to pounce on it at the first sign of weakening in +its armor. + +The flash of the Red guns, in the first place, made it clear to free men +everywhere that to renounce our right to the production of atomic +weapons as potentially the greatest deterrents against the further +spread of Communist aggression, and as the most powerful defenders of +the spiritual and moral values without which our way of life would +become meaningless, would allow the Red Army to overrun what remains of +the free world. Such a move on our part, for the present and the +foreseeable future, may herald the last appearance of free men on the +stage of history. It would be, as the Goncourt brothers feared, “closing +time, gentlemen!” + +In addition to warning us what we must not do, the Red guns also gave +warning of a more positive nature. They warned us to make all haste in +the construction of the hydrogen bomb, to get it ready as soon as +possible, against the eventuality that Russia may decide it would be to +her advantage to precipitate World War III before our H-bomb is ready. +Instead of the estimated pre-Korea time-table of three years, it now +becomes a vital necessity for us to complete our H-bomb, and facilities +for its production at a speedy rate, within a year. And if the history +of our development of the A-bomb may serve as an example, it almost +becomes a certainty that we shall do so. While we may not announce it to +the world, we have good reason to expect that the first H-bomb will be +ready for testing sometime in 1951, possibly in early summer. + +This forecast is not based on merely guesswork. When we decided to go +all out in developing the A-bomb—and we didn’t really go to work in +earnest until May 1943—nobody knew that it could be successfully made. +There were two enormous major problems to be solved, and solved in time +to be of use in winning the war. One was to produce unheard-of +quantities of fissionable materials (U-235 and plutonium), literally in +quantities billions of times greater than had ever been produced before. +Nobody knew whether it could be done or how it could be done. Three +gigantic plants were built, at a cost of $1,500,000,000, on the mere +chance, “calculated risk” we called it, that one of them would work. As +it turned out, they all worked, some more efficiently than others, +though all contributed to the shortening of the war. The second major +problem, among a host of smaller ones, all important to the successful +attainment of the goal, was how to assemble the materials produced in +the billion-dollar plants into a bomb that would live up to +expectations. Both major problems had to be solved simultaneously. The +designing of the bomb went on for more than two years with only trickles +of the active material. + +Yet despite all these enormous difficulties the A-bomb was completed for +testing in about two years and three months after the beginning of the +large-scale effort. Compared with the enormousness of the problems that +had to be solved, and were solved successfully in this remarkably short +time, the problems still to be solved for building the hydrogen bomb +appear relatively simple, since all the materials required and the +plants to produce them are already built, paid for, and operating +successfully. As already pointed out, we have the A-bombs to serve as +triggers, large stockpiles of deuterium, and the refrigeration equipment +and techniques to liquefy it. We have an adequate supply of lithium for +the production of tritium, which, as explained earlier, would be used as +the extra kindling to the A-bomb match. And we have, of course, our +gigantic plutonium factories at Hanford, Washington, in which the +lithium could be converted into tritium in the desired amounts. + +Thus, instead of having to start from scratch as we were forced to do +with the A-bomb, we have at hand all the necessary ingredients for the +H-bomb with the possible exception of sufficient tritium, and since we +have the plutonium plants, greatly expanded and improved since the end +of the war, it is reasonable to make a “guestimate,” to use a word +popular in wartime, that a few months should suffice for them, if they +are employed exclusively for that purpose, to produce tritium in proper +amounts. + +That we have decided to complete the construction of the H-bomb in the +shortest possible time was made clear on July 7, two weeks following the +Communist attack on South Korea, when President Truman asked Congress to +furnish $260,000,000 in cash “to build additional and more efficient +plants and related facilities” for materials that can be used either for +weapons or for fuels potentially useful for power purposes. The +appropriation, he said, was required “in furtherance of my directive of +January 31, 1950,” in which he had ordered the Atomic Energy Commission +“to continue its work on the so-called hydrogen bomb”; and this was +further clarified in a letter to the President by the Budget Director, +Frederick J. Lawton, recommending the money request, to the effect that +the materials to be produced in the proposed plants could be used for +either atomic bombs or hydrogen bombs. Since the only type of plant that +could produce materials for both the A-bomb and the H-bomb is a nuclear +reactor for producing plutonium, and since tritium is the only H-bomb +element that could be produced in a plutonium plant, the request by the +President may be interpreted as the first, though indirect, official +confirmation that tritium is looked upon as one of the ingredients +necessary for a successful H-bomb. We were given a hint of a possible +time-table when it was revealed that the all-cash request would have to +be obligated in one year though its actual disbursal could be spread +over four years. This suggests the possibility that the nuclear reactors +for the large-scale production of tritium might be rushed to completion +within one year. + +While these new reactors for the production of tritium are being built, +we can convert all our Hanford reactors for that purpose so that no time +need be lost. Whatever amounts of plutonium would have to be sacrificed +by diverting the Hanford plants from plutonium to tritium would be +offset by the new uranium concentration plants at Oak Ridge, and by the +fact that we already have a large stockpile of both U-235 and plutonium +accumulated over a period of five years. + +The one and only major problem to be solved is how to assemble into an +efficient H-bomb the materials we already have at hand or will have in a +few months. Here, too, we are much farther advanced than we were at the +time we decided to build the A-bomb, as we are not called upon to start +from scratch. For whereas in the early days of the A-bomb development +scientists were doubtful whether it could be made at all and were +actually hoping that their investigations would prove that it was +impossible, for the Nazis as well as for us, no such doubts seem to +exist in the minds of those most intimately associated with the problem. +On this score we have had more than hints from a number of those in the +know, among them Senator McMahon. “The scientists,” he said in a +historic address to the United States Senate on February 2, 1950, “feel +more confident that this most horrible of armaments [the hydrogen bomb] +can be developed successfully than they felt in 1940 when the original +bomb was under consideration. The hydrogen development will be cheaper +than its uranium forerunner. Theoretically, it is without limit in +destructive capacity. A weapon made of such material would destroy any +military or other target, including the largest city on earth.” + +What is this confidence based on? Scientists are a very conservative +lot, not given to jumping to conclusions without experimental evidence +on which to base them. I remember well the agonizing hours preceding the +test of the first A-bomb in New Mexico, when everyone present, +particularly the intellectual hierarchy that was most responsible, was +beset by grave doubts whether the A-bomb would go off at all, and if it +did, whether it would live up to expectations or turn out to be no more +than an improved blockbuster. Very few, if any, felt confident that it +would be as good as it finally turned out to be. For example, in a pool +in which everyone bet a dollar to guess the ultimate power of the bomb +in terms of TNT, Dr. Oppenheimer placed his bet on 300 tons. This makes +it evident that the scientists were not very confident even as late as +1945, up to the very last minute, when “the brain child of many minds +came forth in physical shape and performed as it was supposed to do.” + +If the scientists are more confident today than they were in 1940, and +even, it would seem, in 1945, when the bomb stood on its steel tower +ready for its first test, it can only mean that their confidence is +based on innumerable experiments carried out during the five years that +have elapsed since Hiroshima. By the semiannual reports to Congress by +the Atomic Energy Commission, and reports presented before the American +Physical Society, or published in official publications, by members of +the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory and other leading institutions, we +have been officially informed of many experiments that have been carried +out on nuclear reactions between deuterons and deuterons, tritons and +tritons, and deuterons and tritons—namely, the very reactions to be +expected in an H-bomb using deuterium, tritium, or a mixture of the two. +This makes it obvious that during the five years since Hiroshima we have +accumulated a vast body of knowledge about the reactions necessary for a +successful H-bomb. Furthermore, this gives us the assurance that we are +five years ahead of Russia on the H-bomb as well as the A-bomb, since we +have had plutonium plants in which to make tritium for at least five +years, whereas she has just placed her plutonium plants in operation +and, as we have seen, can ill afford to sacrifice the vital plutonium +she needs for building up her A-bomb stockpile to begin experiments we +had most likely carried out five years ago. + +The best evidence so far that we have made much progress during the past +five years on the design of the H-bomb—evidence strongly indicating that +it had passed the blueprint stage and was ready for construction—was +supplied recently by Lewis L. Strauss, a member of the original Atomic +Energy Commission, when he revealed that “the greatest issue of +division” (between himself and other members of the AEC) “was whether or +not to proceed with the hydrogen bomb, as for some time I had strongly +urged to do.” Now, Strauss, who went into the Navy in World War II as a +lieutenant commander and rose to be a rear admiral, is a leading +financier of wide experience, so it may be taken for granted that if for +some time he had “strongly urged” proceeding with the hydrogen bomb, it +must have been because he had been assured by the scientific experts +that it was feasible. Men of his background and experience do not +“strongly urge” the diversion of resources to projects unless they are +strongly convinced that the project is both practical and feasible. His +words, when read in the light of statements by other members of the AEC, +suggest that the division of opinion on this score among the members of +the Commission was not over the feasibility of the H-bomb but over the +belief that the A-bomb was good enough as long as we were its sole +possessors and that we could maintain our advantage for a long time by +building more and better A-bombs. + +On the other hand, the fact that the majority of the AEC did not agree +with Strauss on the necessity of proceeding with the hydrogen bomb must +certainly not be interpreted to mean that they halted all studies on the +subject, for that would be charging them with gross negligence. It is +much more reasonable to assume that the “greatest issue of division” +(mark the use of the word “greatest,” which indicates many a heated +debate) was whether or not to proceed at once with the actual building +of the bomb, after it had been fully designed and shown to be feasible +in a host of painstaking studies over a period of at least four years. + +There can therefore be no question that as soon as the President issued +his directive to the AEC “to continue” its work on the hydrogen bomb, +the first item on the program was to proceed at once with the production +of tritium in sizable amounts, since all known facts point to the need +of tritium as extra kindling for the A-bomb trigger. We can also be sure +that the production of whatever other auxiliary paraphernalia may be +necessary was at once placed on the top-priority list. By the end of +1950, if not earlier, we should thus have all the necessary materials +ready in the desired amounts. Meantime, we can be sure that our top +scientists have been putting the finishing touches on designs for +assembling the materials—the _finishing_ touches, since there can be no +doubt that the blueprints for a successful H-bomb have been completed +for at least a year and possibly for three or four. It would be +unthinkable that we were so careless as to drop all work on such a vital +matter, which as far back as 1945 appeared to be a definite possibility. + +For this we have no less an authority than Dr. Oppenheimer. In an +article in the book _One World or None_, published late in 1945, +discussing atomic weapons of the future, he described bombs “that would +reduce the cost of destruction per square mile probably by a factor of +10 or more,” which, as we now know, would be a bomb of a thousand times +the power that destroyed Hiroshima—namely, a hydrogen bomb. “Preliminary +investigations” of proposals for such a bomb, Dr. Oppenheimer wrote at +that early date, “appeared sound.” If the preliminary investigations +“appeared sound” to scientists such as Dr. Oppenheimer in 1945, and +bearing in mind President Truman’s orders to the AEC in 1950 “to +continue its work,” we can only conclude that the interim years produced +results far beyond the preliminary stage, when they merely “appeared” to +be sound. Judging by the reaction of some leading physicists to the +President’s order, the H-bomb appears to be an ominous reality, a +completed architectural plan requiring only a few polishing touches. In +a word, we are almost ready to go. + +And while Dr. Bethe estimated that it would take three years to complete +the first H-bomb, we must remember that he spoke several months before +the guns of Korea gave the alarm. And we must not forget that had it not +been for the threat of the Nazis we might not have had the A-bomb in +less than twenty-five and possibly fifty years, according to the best +estimates, though the present Communist threat might have reduced the +time considerably. + +Furthermore, we also have the word of Senator McMahon, who should know, +that “the hydrogen development will be cheaper than its uranium +forerunner.” This lends weight to the earlier deduction that only +relatively small amounts of tritium will be necessary, since, as we have +seen, large amounts would be prohibitively costly in terms of vast +quantities of plutonium. Small amounts of tritium, in turn, mean that it +would take a relatively short time to produce them. A reasonable +“guestimate,” assuming that 150 to 300 grams of tritium would be +required, is that such amounts could be produced within a few months, +particularly if we employ all our huge plutonium plants at Hanford on +the task of producing tritium. + +It is therefore within the realm of possibility that when we carry out +the announced tests of the latest models of our A-bombs at Eniwetok, +sometime in the spring or summer of 1951, one of them will be the first +H-bomb. It may not be the best model, and it need not be the equal in +power to a thousand wartime model A-bombs. In fact, it would be highly +inadvisable to use such a bomb in a mere test. It will be an H-bomb, +nevertheless, and from it we shall learn how to make bigger and better +ones, which is all that a test is supposed to do. For unlike the A-bomb, +which cannot be made below or above a certain size, the H-bomb can be +made as small or as large as the designer wants it to be. As Professor +Bacher has pointed out, the H-bomb is “an open-ended weapon.” + +One of the major outcomes of the Korean aggression instigated by the +Kremlin has thus been to bring the H-bomb into being much sooner than it +would otherwise have been. And that is only one branch of the chain +reaction that the Korean guns have set in motion. + +In addition to unmasking completely the Kremlin’s ultimate intentions to +enslave mankind, and alerting the free nations of the world to the +danger facing them as they had not been alerted since Hitler’s attack on +Poland, the flash of the Korean guns has also shed new light on the +Politburo’s strategy of conquest. The best-informed opinion in the +summer of 1950 holds that the Kremlin has decided on a series of little +wars that would slowly drain our lifeblood and ruin our economy, and +thus bring about the collapse and ruin of the rest of the world’s free +nations, rather than force a global war, German style. Among other +reasons for such a strategy—and there are many logical reasons for it +from Russia’s point of view—is the fact, already become evident in +Korea, that in such little wars, fought with Russian equipment and other +people’s blood, we would not use atomic weapons of any kind, not only +because there are no suitable targets, but because dictates of humanity +make the use of such weapons on little peoples, caught in the net of +Communism, wholly inconceivable. By deciding on a series of little wars, +over a prolonged period, one following the other or coming +simultaneously, Russia may thus figure that she could gain her ultimate +objective in the cheapest possible way, while at the same time making +sure that our atomic-bomb stockpile is wholly neutralized. + +If this turns out to be true, we would at least escape atomic warfare, +and since we, and the rest of the civilized world, fervently wish to +avoid being forced to use atomic weapons, this would be all to the good. +But we must also take into consideration the possibility that the very +decision on Russia’s part to wage little wars and avoid a global war may +have been greatly influenced by the fact that we have a large stockpile +of A-bombs while her stockpile is still negligible, forcing her to adopt +a strategy in which our superiority would be nullified. It is also +possible that after her first experience with the production of A-bombs +she may have realized that it would be much too costly to try to catch +up with us and have therefore decided on a strategy in which atomic +weapons could not possibly play any part. On the other hand, it may also +mean that she will not risk a global war until she has built up an +adequate stockpile of her own, meantime softening us up with a series of +little wars. + +With all this in mind, it behooves us to take a closer look at our +program for the outlawing of atomic weapons and the placing of atomic +energy under international control. It was a noble ideal, one of the +noblest conceived by man: the most powerful nation in the world +voluntarily offered to give up the right to produce or use the greatest +weapon ever designed. Alas, it almost died at birth, and now, after four +years of nursing in an incubator, the Korean guns have given it a fatal +blow. We might as well face the facts squarely: the majority plan for +the international control of atomic energy, the only acceptable plan +possible, is dead, one of the first casualties of the Korean guns. + +We still talk about trying to find ways for compromise between our plan, +accepted by all the nations outside the Iron Curtain, and that of +Russia. We are still talking, at least officially, as though somehow a +compromise can and will be found. The truth of the matter is that the +plan as it stands today is completely out of tune with the times. As we +look on it by the light of the North Korean guns, it becomes clear that +it is wholly visionary, without any relation to the realities. + +We still talk as though our original offer still stands. The truth of +the matter is that even were the impossible to happen and Russia were to +say to the world: “We have been mistaken. We accept the American and the +majority plan _in toto_ without any reservations,” we should be forced +to say: “Sorry, it is too late, you have missed your chance. Your +actions have made the plan unworkable, since it cannot possibly work in +an atmosphere of mutual distrust and the constant threat of little +wars!” + +And even if wise diplomacy prevented us from saying it in such blunt +language, and though we may still find it expedient to pay lip service +to the majority plan, so that Russia could not use it in her propaganda +war as evidence that we were insincere from the very beginning, we would +have to wriggle to get out of the very serious predicament in which +Russia’s acceptance would place us. And even if diplomacy dictated that +we sign a convention with Russia to outlaw production and use of all +atomic weapons, to destroy our stockpiles and hand over all our atomic +plants to an international atomic authority, as our present plan calls +for, there can be no question that such a convention could never muster +the approval of even a majority of the Senate, and certainly not the +required consent of two thirds of the Senate called for by the +Constitution. What is more, such a rejection would have the overwhelming +approval of American people, once the facts were made clear to them, and +any administration daring to enter such a pact would be overwhelmingly +defeated. + +All this has been so evident for more than two years that it is +remarkable that the Russians have failed so far to take advantage of our +potential embarrassment and thus win one of their greatest victories on +the propaganda front. In fact, their failure to do so, with the sure +knowledge that they would risk nothing by accepting a plan that would +most certainly be rejected by our own people, not only reveals lack of +subtlety on their part, but appears on the surface as crass stupidity, +the same type of stupidity displayed by Hitler, which appears to be an +inevitable trait of all monolithic dictatorships that must lead to their +ultimate undoing. + +The time has come for us to stop talking about giving away our greatest +weapons, the only ones, as President Truman and Winston Churchill have +told us, that have kept the Red Army hordes from overrunning the free +world. It is time for us to face reality and place the blame where it +belongs. The evil does not lie in weapons per se. It lies in war itself. +It is no evil to build and possess the most powerful weapons at our +command with which to defend ourselves against a ruthless aggressor. On +the contrary, it would be an evil thing to throw away the principal +weapon standing between us and possible defeat. It is no evil to use a +weapon to destroy your enemy just because your weapon happens to be the +most powerful in existence. It is no greater evil to destroy thousands +of your enemy in one great flash than to destroy them by goring them +with bayonets. The real evildoer is the nation that starts an aggressive +war. Those attacked have the right and duty to defend themselves by all +means at their command. + +Our confusion has been the result of our first use of the A-bomb to +destroy a city with thousands of its civilian population. Let us admit +that the mass bombing of large populated cities (which, by the way, was +started by the Nazis) is wholly inexcusable with any kind of weapons, +and that we should never resort to such strategic bombing again. That +does not mean that we should renounce our right to use A-bombs to +destroy an enemy’s armies, navies, and airfields, his transportation +facilities and his oil wells—in a word, his capacity to make war against +us. And as long as we use the A-bomb and the H-bomb only as weapons of +tremendous power to destroy by blast and by fire, they are no different +from ordinary blockbusters or incendiaries except that they concentrate +their power in a small package. Is there any difference, morally +speaking, between the use of thousands of blockbusters and tens of +thousands of incendiaries and a weapon that concentrates all their power +in one? + +Probably the main reason for the confused thinking that has singled out +atomic weapons as a greater evil than other weapons of mass destruction +has been their radioactivity. But even the A-bombs exploded over Japan +were purposely dropped from a height that carried most of the +radioactivity away into the upper atmosphere. Nor will the H-bomb, as +explained earlier, release great quantities of radioactivity unless it +is purposely rigged to do so. We should, therefore, lose nothing and +gain much if we renounced the use of A- and H-bombs as radioactive +weapons except in retaliation against the use of such weapons on us or +our allies. But to renounce their use altogether would be tantamount not +only to physical but to spiritual suicide as well, for it would mean +condoning the advance of the Red Army. + +It has become customary to talk about Russia’s atom bomb as though she +already was, or soon will be, on a par with us. It is true that +eventually she will catch up with us in the development of a large +stockpile of her own and in designing more efficient models. But that is +only one side of the picture. As of 1950, and for at least until 1952, +years that may well be crucial, our superiority in A-bombs will remain +unchallenged, not only qualitatively but quantitatively. By that time we +shall have greatly increased our lead by the possession of an effective +stockpile of H-bombs. Since Russia cannot build H-bombs at the present +stage without sacrificing quantities of plutonium she needs to build up +her A-bomb stockpile, she will find herself compelled to build +additional plutonium plants, which not only will greatly strain her +resources but, more important from our point of view, will gain us +additional time. + +How many A-bombs can Russia make? Former Secretary of War Henry L. +Stimson has told us that the A-bombs we dropped on Japan “were the only +ones we had ready.” Counting the test bomb at Alamogordo, we had thus +produced three bombs by mid-August 1945. This represented the total +output of a two-billion-dollar plant, employing three major methods of +production, after the plants had been in operation for an average of +about six months. In other words, it took our two-billion-dollar plant +about six months to produce three A-bombs—a rate of six A-bombs a year. + +Now all the evidence at hand, as already pointed out, indicates that, +instead of building three different types of plants for producing A-bomb +materials, Russia is concentrating entirely on plutonium. Hence, if we +assume that she built a plutonium plant equal in output to the total +capacity of our wartime uranium and plutonium plants, and further +assuming that her methods for producing plutonium are as efficient as +ours, the best she could do at present would be at the rate of six +plutonium bombs a year. At this rate she would have about eighteen by +the middle of 1952. This would be a sizable stockpile for a nation in +sole possession of such a weapon. But would any nation with such a +stockpile dare challenge a nation with a stockpile many times bigger, +consisting of bombs many times more powerful, and possessing a few +hydrogen bombs to boot? + +Russia will, no doubt, improve her production methods. But to improve +them to the extent of producing, let us say, two bombs per month, she +would have to step up her production by four hundred per cent. It is +doubtful if such a step-up could be achieved in less than three years. + +Then there are other factors to be considered that greatly balance the +scales in our favor. To produce plutonium bombs requires tremendous +quantities of uranium, something that cannot be conjured up by just +dialectic materialism. It so happens that we have access to the only two +rich uranium deposits known in the world: the Belgian Congo, and the +Great Bear Lake area in Canada. There were no known rich uranium +deposits in Russia proper or in the territories of her satellites, with +the possible exception of Czechoslovakia. We know this from the fact +that she never competed for the world markets for radium, extracted +economically only from rich uranium ores, which sold before the war at +$25,000 per gram, or at the rate of nearly $12,000,000 a pound. The best +evidence, however, that she does not have at her command rich uranium +deposits either in Russia or elsewhere is her ruthless exploitation, at +the cost of thousands of human lives, of the depleted uranium mines in +the mountains of Saxony, which had long been abandoned by their German +owners. The only other known source of pitchblende (the mineral richest +in uranium) under Russian control is Joachimsthal (Jachymov) in Bohemia, +from which came the first radium sample isolated by Mme Curie about +fifty years ago. This mine, too, has been largely depleted, though much +of its uranium may possibly be recoverable from the dump-heaps, if they +have not in the meantime been disposed of. + +Now, every ton of pure uranium metal contains just fourteen pounds of +the fissionable element uranium 235. The latter, when split, releases +the neutrons that create plutonium out of nonfissionable uranium 238. On +the basis of one hundred per cent efficiency, impossible in this +operation, the yield of plutonium would thus be fourteen pounds per ton. +Since the plutonium must be extracted long before all the U-235 atoms +have been split, however, the likelihood is that the yield would be no +more than two to four pounds per ton. Russia would thus need tens of +thousands of tons of uranium ore to build up a sizable stockpile of +A-bombs, and while she may be able to process low-grade ores, it would +take her much longer to produce a given quantity of plutonium than it +takes us to produce it from our much richer ores. For example, an ore +containing fifty per cent uranium would yield a given quantity of +plutonium ten times faster than an ore containing only five per cent, +unless a refining plant ten times the size is built at ten times the +cost of construction and of operation. + +If we take Professor Oliphant’s published estimate that the critical +mass (that is, the minimum amount) needed for an A-bomb is between 10 +and 30 kilograms (22 and 66 pounds), we get a clear picture of the +enormous difference there is between rich ores and poor ores for the +building up of an A-bomb stockpile, and a further concept of the +difficulties that Russia will face in trying to produce an H-bomb. + +According to the best available prewar information, the pitchblende of +the Belgian Congo has a uranium content as high as 60 to 80 per cent; +the Canadian ore yields from 30 to 40 per cent. A conservative estimate +would thus place the average uranium content of Belgian and Canadian +ores at somewhere around 50 per cent. This contrasts sharply with a +prewar figure of around 3 per cent uranium for the pitchblende of +Czechoslovakia, and the ore in the mountains of Saxony is of even lower +grade. + +Hence on the basis of two to four pounds of plutonium per ton of uranium +metal, it would require the mining and processing of only 2 tons of +Belgian and Canadian ore to obtain that amount as compared with 34 tons +for the ore from Czechoslovakia, and a larger amount for the Saxon ore. +To make a bomb containing 22 pounds of plutonium would thus require us +to mine and process from 11 to 22 tons of ore, whereas Russia would need +from 187 to 374 tons. For a bomb requiring 66 pounds, the amount, of +course, would be correspondingly tripled, reaching a possible figure of +1,122 tons of ore to produce one A-bomb, as compared with a maximum of +no more than 66 tons of the ores available to us. In a state employing +slave labor and heedless of the wastage of human lives, the production +cost does not count. But even Russia’s manpower is not unlimited, and +workers removed from other lines of production must inevitably hurt the +economy. This factor must put a definite limit to Russia’s capacity to +produce A-bombs and will make it very difficult, if not impossible, for +her to produce a large stockpile in a short time. + +When it comes to producing an H-bomb, the disparity between ourselves +and Russia assumes astronomical proportions. It takes 80 pounds of +uranium 235 to produce one pound of tritium. Since, as we have seen, +there are only 14 pounds of U-235 in a ton of natural uranium metal, +this means that 5.7 tons of uranium metal would be required, assuming +one hundred per cent efficiency of utilization, which is out of the +question. On the basis of figures already given, it can be seen that we +would require the mining and processing of only 11.4 tons of ore whereas +Russia would have to use as much as 194 tons to produce that single +pound of the element which, as the facts cited earlier appear to +demonstrate, is vital for the construction of a successful H-bomb. + +All these basic facts, never presented before, should convince us that, +despite the fact that Russia has exploded her first A-bomb, we still +have tremendous advantages over her that she will find extremely +difficult to overcome. And we must not forget other advantages on our +side that may prove decisive even after Russia succeeds in building up a +sizable stockpile. Bombs can be delivered against us at present only by +airplane or by submarine. A look at the map will show that whereas the +Atlantic and Pacific Oceans stand between us and Russia’s nearest bases, +we are in a much better position to deliver A-bombs to her vital +centers, such as the oil fields in the Caucasus, for example, from bases +close by. It is, furthermore, not unreasonable to assume that we, as the +most advanced industrial nation in the world, will manage to maintain +our lead not only in methods of delivery by superior and faster +airplanes, or by guided missiles, but also in the development of radar, +sonar, and other detection devices, as well as of superior interceptors +and other defensive measures, which would make delivery of A-bombs +against us much more difficult than it would be for us to deliver them +against Russia. + +For the next three years, it can thus be seen, and possibly for a +considerably longer period, the initiative, as far as atomic weapons are +concerned, will remain with us. Let us therefore be done with all +visionary plans for destroying the shield that now protects civilization +as we know it, and proceed to build bigger and better shields, hoping +that by our very act of doing so we can prevent the ultimate cataclysm. +Right now the outlook is not bright, but our strength, physical and +spiritual, should give us faith that the forces of good will prevail in +the end over the forces of evil, as they have always done throughout +history; that the four freedoms will triumph over the Four Horsemen of +the Apocalypse. + + + + + V + A PRIMER OF ATOMIC ENERGY + + +The material universe, the earth and everything in it, all things living +and non-living, the sun and its planets, the stars and the +constellations, the galaxies and the supergalaxies, the infinitely large +and the infinitesimally small, manifests itself to our senses in two +forms, matter and energy. We do not know, and probably never can know, +how the material universe began, and whether, indeed, it ever had a +beginning, but we do know that it is constantly changing and that it did +not always exist in its present form. We also know that in whatever form +the universe may have existed, matter and energy have always been +inseparable, no energy being possible without matter, and no matter +without energy, each being a form of the other. + +While we do not know how and when matter and energy came into being, or +whether they ever had a beginning in time as we perceive it, we do know +that while the relative amounts of matter and energy are constantly +changing, the total amount of both, in one form or the other, always +remains the same. When a plant grows, energy from the sun, in the form +of heat and light, is converted into matter, so that the total weight of +the plant is greater than that of the elementary material constituents, +water and carbon-dioxide gas, out of which its substance is built up. +When the substance of the plant is again broken up into its original +constituents by burning, the residual ashes and gases weigh less than +the total weight of the intact plant, the difference corresponding to +the amount of matter that had been converted into energy, liberated once +again in the form of heat and light. + +All energy as we know it manifests itself through motion or change in +the physical or chemical state of matter, or both, though these changes +and motions may be so slow as to be imperceptible. As the ancient Greek +philosopher Heraclitus perceived more than two thousand years ago, all +things are in a constant state of flux, this flux being due to an +everlasting conversion of matter into energy and energy into matter, +everywhere over the vast stretches of the material universe, to its +outermost and innermost limits, if any limits there be. + +Each manifestation of energy involves either matter in motion or a +change in its physical state, which we designate as physical energy; a +change in the chemical constitution of matter, which we know as chemical +energy; or a combination of the two. Physical energy can be converted +into chemical energy and vice versa. For example, heat and light are +forms of physical energy, each consisting of a definite band of waves of +definite wave lengths in violent, regular, rhythmic oscillations. A +mysterious mechanism in the plant, known as photosynthesis, uses the +heat and light energy from the sun to create complex substances, such as +sugars, starches, and cellulose, out of simpler substances, such as +carbon dioxide and water, converting physical energy, heat, and light +into the chemical energy required to hold together the complex +substances the plant produces. When we burn the cellulose in the form of +wood or coal (coal is petrified wood), the chemical energy is once again +converted into physical energy in the form of the original heat and +light. As we have seen, the chemical energy stored in the plant +manifested itself by an increase in the plant’s weight as compared with +that of its original constituents. Similarly, the release of the energy +manifests itself through a loss in the total weight of the plant’s +substance. + +It can thus be seen that neither matter nor energy can be created. All +we can do is to manipulate certain types of matter in a way that +liberates whatever energy had been in existence, in one form or another, +since the beginning of time. All the energy that we had been using on +earth until the advent of the atomic age had originally come from the +sun. Coal, as already said, is a petrified plant that had stored up the +energy of the sun in the form of chemical energy millions of years ago, +before man made his appearance on the earth. Oil comes from organic +matter that also had stored up light and heat from the sun in the form +of chemical energy. Water power and wind power are also made possible by +the sun’s heat, since all water would freeze and no winds would blow +were it not for the sun’s heat energy keeping the waters flowing and the +air moving, the latter by creating differences in the temperature of air +masses. + +There are two forms of energy that we take advantage of which are not +due directly to the sun’s radiations—gravitation and magnetism—but the +only way we can utilize these is by employing energy derived from the +sun’s heat. In harnessing Niagara, or in the building of great dams, we +utilize the fall of the water because of gravitation. But as I have +already pointed out, without the sun’s heat water could not flow. To +produce electricity we begin with the chemical energy in coal or oil, +which is first converted into heat energy, then to mechanical energy, +and finally, through the agency of magnetism, into electrical energy. + +The radiations of the sun, of the giant stars millions of times larger +than the sun, come from an entirely different source, the greatest +source of energy in the universe, known as atomic or, more correctly, +nuclear energy. But even here the energy comes as the result of the +transformation of matter. The difference between nuclear energy and +chemical energy is twofold. In chemical energy, such as the burning of +coal, the matter lost in the process comes from the outer shell of the +atoms, and the amount of matter lost is so small that it cannot be +weighed directly by any human scale or other device. In nuclear energy, +on the other hand, the matter lost by being transformed into energy +comes from the nucleus, the heavy inner core, of the atom, and the +amount of matter lost is millions of times greater than in coal, great +enough to be weighed. + +An atom is the smallest unit of any of the elements of which the +physical universe is constituted. Atoms are so small that if a drop of +water were magnified to the size of the earth the atoms in the drop +would be smaller than oranges. + +The structure of atoms is like that of a minuscule solar system, with a +heavy nucleus in the center as the sun, and much smaller bodies +revolving around it as the planets. The nucleus is made up of two types +of particles: protons, carrying a positive charge of electricity, and +neutrons, electrically neutral. The planets revolving about the nucleus +are electrons, units of negative electricity, which have a mass about +one two-thousandth the mass of the proton or the neutron. The number of +protons in the nucleus determines the chemical nature of the element, +and also the number of planetary electrons, each proton being +electrically balanced by an electron in the atom’s outer shells. The +total number of protons and neutrons in the nucleus is known as the mass +number, which is very close to the atomic weight of the element but not +quite equal. Protons and neutrons are known under the common name +“nucleons.” + +There are two important facts to keep constantly in mind about protons +and neutrons. The first is that the two are interchangeable. A proton, +under certain conditions, loses its positive charge by emitting a +positive electron (positron) and thus becomes a neutron. Similarly, a +neutron, when agitated, emits a negative electron and becomes a proton. +As we shall see, the latter process is taken advantage of in the +transmutation of nonfissionable uranium into plutonium, and of thorium +into fissionable uranium 233. The transmutation of all other elements, +age-old dream of the alchemists, is made possible by the +interchangeability of protons into neutrons, and vice versa. + +The second all-important fact about protons and neutrons, basic to the +understanding of atomic energy, is that each proton and neutron in the +nuclei of the elements weighs less than it does in the free state, the +loss of weight being equal to the energy binding the nucleons. This loss +becomes progressively greater for the elements in the first half of the +periodic table, reaching its maximum in the nucleus of silver, element +47. After that the loss gets progressively smaller. Hence, if we were to +combine (fuse) two elements in the first half of the periodic table, the +protons and the neutrons would lose weight if the newly formed nucleus +is not heavier than that of silver, but would gain weight if the new +nucleus thus formed is heavier than silver. The opposite is true with +the elements in the second half of the periodic table, the protons and +neutrons losing weight when a heavy element is split into two lighter +ones, and gaining weight if two elements are fused into one. + +Since each loss of mass manifests itself by the release of energy, it +can be seen that to obtain energy from the atom’s nucleus requires +either the fusion of two elements in the first half of the periodic +table or the fission of an element in the second half. From a practical +point of view, however, fusion is possible only with two isotopes +(twins) of hydrogen, at the beginning of the periodic table, while +fission is possible only with twins of uranium, U-233 and U-235, and +with plutonium, at the lower end of the table. + +The diameter of the atom is 100,000 times greater than the diameter of +the nucleus. This means that the atom is mostly empty space, the volume +of the atom being 500,000 billion times the volume of the nucleus. It +can thus be seen that most of the matter in the universe is concentrated +in the nuclei of the atoms. The density of matter in the nucleus is such +that a dime would weigh 600 million tons if its atoms were as tightly +packed as are the protons and neutrons in the nucleus. + +The atoms of the elements (of which there are ninety-two in nature, and +six more man-made elements) have twins, triplets, quadruplets, etc., +known as isotopes. The nuclei of these twins all contain the same number +of protons and hence all have the same chemical properties. They differ, +however, in the number of neutrons in their nuclei and hence have +different atomic weights. For example, an ordinary hydrogen atom has a +nucleus of one proton. The isotope of hydrogen, deuterium, has one +proton plus one neutron in its nucleus. It is thus twice as heavy as +ordinary hydrogen. The second hydrogen isotope, tritium, has one proton +and two neutrons in its nucleus and hence an atomic mass of three. On +the other hand, a nucleus containing two protons and one neutron is no +longer hydrogen but helium, also of atomic mass three. + +There are hundreds of isotopes, some occurring in nature, others +produced artificially by shooting atomic bullets, such as neutrons, into +the nuclei of the atoms of various elements. A natural isotope of +uranium, the ninety-second and last of the natural elements, contains 92 +protons and 143 neutrons in its nucleus, hence its name U-235, one of +the two atomic-bomb elements. The most common isotope of uranium has 92 +protons and 146 neutrons in its nucleus and hence is known as U-238. It +is 140 times more plentiful than U-235, but cannot be used for the +release of atomic energy. + +Atomic, or rather nuclear, energy is the cosmic force that binds +together the protons and the neutrons in the nucleus. It is a force +millions of times greater than the electrical repulsion force existing +in the nucleus because of the fact that the protons all have like +charges. This force, known as the coulomb force, is tremendous, varying +inversely as the square of the distance separating the positively +charged particles. Professor Frederick Soddy, the noted English +physicist, has figured out that two grams (less than the weight of a +dime) of protons placed at the opposite poles of the earth would repel +each other with a force of twenty-six tons. Yet the nuclear force is +millions of times greater than the coulomb force. This force acts as the +cosmic cement that holds the material universe together and is +responsible for the great density of matter in the nucleus. + +We as yet know very little about the basic nature of this force, but we +can measure its magnitude by a famous mathematical equation originally +presented by Dr. Einstein in his special theory of relativity in 1905. +This formula, one of the great intellectual achievements of man, +together with the discovery of the radioactive elements by Henri +Becquerel and Pierre and Marie Curie, provided the original clues as +well as the key to the discovery and the harnessing of nuclear energy. + +Einstein’s formula, E = mc², revealed that matter and energy are two +different manifestations of one and the same cosmic entity, instead of +being two different entities, as had been generally believed. It led to +the revolutionary concept that matter, instead of being immutable, was +energy in a frozen state, while, conversely, energy was matter in a +fluid state. The equation revealed that any one gram of matter was the +equivalent in ergs (small units of energy) to the square of the velocity +of light in centimeters per second—namely, 900 billion billion ergs. In +more familiar terms, this means that one gram of matter represents +25,000,000 kilowatt-hours of energy in the frozen state. This equals the +energy liberated in the burning of three billion grams (three thousand +tons) of coal. + +The liberation of energy in any form, chemical, electrical, or nuclear, +involves the loss of an equivalent amount of mass, in accordance with +the Einstein formula. When 3,000 metric tons of coal are burned to +ashes, the residual ashes and the gaseous products weigh one gram less +than 3,000 tons; that is, one three-billionth part of the original mass +will have been converted into energy. The same is true with the +liberation of nuclear energy by the splitting or fusing (as will be +explained later) of the nuclei of certain elements. The difference is +merely that of magnitude. In the liberation of chemical energy by the +burning of coal, the energy comes from a very small loss of mass +resulting from the rearrangement of electrons on the surface of the +atoms. The nucleus of the coal atoms is not involved in any way, +remaining exactly the same as before. The amount of mass lost by the +surface electrons is one thirtieth of one millionth of one per cent. + +On the other hand, nuclear energy involves vital changes in the atomic +nucleus itself, with a consequent loss of as high as one tenth to nearly +eight tenths of one per cent in the original mass of the nuclei. This +means that from one to nearly eight grams per thousand grams are +liberated in the form of energy, as compared with only one gram in three +billion grams liberated in the burning of coal. In other words, the +amount of nuclear energy liberated in the transmutation of atomic nuclei +is from 3,000,000 to 24,000,000 times as great as the chemical energy +released by the burning of an equal amount of coal. In terms of TNT the +figure is seven times greater than for coal, as the energy from TNT, +while liberated at an explosive rate, is about one seventh the total +energy content for an equivalent amount of coal. This means that the +nuclear energy from one kilogram of uranium 235, or plutonium, when +released at an explosive rate, is equal to the explosion of twenty +thousand tons of TNT. + +Nuclear energy can be utilized by two diametrically opposed methods. One +is fission—the splitting of the nuclei of the heaviest chemical elements +into two uneven fragments consisting of nuclei of two lighter elements. +The other is fusion—combining, or fusing, two nuclei of the lightest +elements into one nucleus of a heavier element. In both methods the +resulting elements are lighter than the original nuclei. The loss of +mass in each case manifests itself in the release of enormous amounts of +nuclear energy. + +When two light atoms are combined to form a heavier atom, the weight of +the heavier is less than the total weight of the two light atoms. If the +heavier atom could again be split into the two lighter ones, the latter +would resume their original weight. As explained before, however, this +is true only with the light elements, such as hydrogen, deuterium, and +tritium, in the first half of the periodic table of the elements. The +opposite is true with the heavier elements of the second half of the +periodic table. For example, if krypton and barium, elements 36 and 56, +were to be combined to form uranium, element 92, the protons and the +neutrons in the uranium nucleus would each weigh about 0.1 per cent more +than they weighed in the krypton and barium nuclei. It can thus be seen +that energy could be gained either through the loss of mass resulting +from the fusion of two light elements, or from the similar loss of mass +resulting from the fission of one heavy atom into two lighter ones. + +In the fusion of two lighter atoms, the addition of one and one yields +less than two, and yet half of two will be more than one. In the case of +the heavy elements the addition of one and one yields more than two, yet +half of two makes less than one. This is the seeming paradox of atomic +energy. + +Three elements are known to be fissionable. Only one of these is found +in nature: the uranium isotope 235 (U-235). The other two are man-made. +One is plutonium, transmuted by means of neutrons from the +nonfissionable U-238, by the addition of one neutron to the 146 present +in the nucleus, which leads to the conversion of two of the 147 neutrons +into protons, thus creating an element with a nucleus of 94 protons and +145 neutrons. The second man-made element (not yet in wide use, as far +as is known) is uranium isotope 233 (92 protons and 141 neutrons), +created out of the element thorium (90 protons, 142 neutrons) by the +same method used in the production of plutonium. + +When the nucleus of any one of these elements is fissioned, each proton +and neutron in the two resulting fragments weighs one tenth of one per +cent less than it weighed in the original nucleus. For example, if U-235 +atoms totaling 1,000 grams in weight are split, the total weight of the +fragments will be 999 grams. The one missing gram is liberated in the +form of 25,000,000 kilowatt-hours of energy, equivalent in explosive +terms to 20,000 tons of TNT. But the original number of protons and +neutrons in the 1,000 grams does not change. + +The fission process, the equivalent of the “burning” of nuclear fuels, +is maintained by what is known as a chain reaction. The bullets used for +splitting are neutrons, which, because they do not have an electric +charge, can penetrate the heavily fortified electrical wall surrounding +the positively charged nuclei. Just as a coal fire needs oxygen to keep +it going, a nuclear fire needs the neutrons to maintain it. + +Neutrons do not exist free in nature, all being tightly locked up within +the nuclei of atoms. They are liberated, however, from the nuclei of the +three fissionable elements by a self-multiplication process in the chain +reaction. The process begins when a cosmic ray from outer space, or a +stray neutron, strikes one nucleus and splits it. The first atom thus +split releases an average of two neutrons, which split two more nuclei, +which in turn liberate four more neutrons, and so on. The reaction is so +fast that in a short time trillions of neutrons are thus liberated to +split trillions of nuclei. As each nucleus is split, it loses mass, +which is converted into great energy. + +There are two types of chain reactions: controlled and uncontrolled. +The controlled reaction is analogous to the burning of gasoline in an +automobile engine. The atom-splitting bullets—the neutrons—are first +slowed down from speeds of more than ten thousand miles per second to +less than one mile per second by being made to pass through a +moderator before they reach the atoms at which they are aimed. +Neutron-“killers”—materials absorbing neutrons in great numbers—keep +the neutrons liberated at any given time under complete control in a +slow but steady nuclear fire. + +The uncontrolled chain reaction is one in which there is no +moderator—and no neutron-absorbers. It is analogous to the dropping of a +match in a gasoline tank. In the uncontrolled chain reaction the fast +neutrons, with nothing to slow them down or to devour them, build up by +the trillion and quadrillion in a fraction of a millionth of a second. +This leads to the splitting of a corresponding number of atoms, +resulting in the release of unbelievable quantities of nuclear energy at +a tremendously explosive rate. One kilogram of atoms split releases +energy equivalent to that of 20,000,000 kilograms (20,000 metric tons) +of TNT. + +It is the uncontrolled reaction that is employed in the explosion of the +atomic bomb. The controlled reaction is expected to be used in the +production of vast quantities of industrial power. It is now being +employed in the creation of radioactive isotopes, for use in medicine +and as the most powerful research tool since the invention of the +microscope for probing into the mysteries of nature, living and +non-living. + +In the controlled reaction the material used is natural uranium, which +consists of a mixture of 99.3 per cent U-238 and 0.7 of the fissionable +U-235. The neutrons from the U-235 are made to enter the nuclei of U-238 +and convert them to the fissionable element plutonium, for use in atomic +bombs. The large quantities of energy liberated by the split U-235 +nuclei in the form of heat is at too low a temperature for efficient +utilization as power, and is at present wasted. To be used for power, +nuclear reactors capable of operating at high temperatures are now being +designed. + +In the atomic bomb only pure U-235, or plutonium, is used. + +In both the controlled and the uncontrolled reactions a minimum amount +of material, known as the “critical mass,” must be used, as otherwise +too many neutrons would escape and the nuclear fire would thus be +extinguished, as would an ordinary fire for lack of oxygen. In the +atomic bomb two masses, each less than a critical mass, which together +equal or exceed it, are brought in contact at a predetermined instant. +The uncontrolled reaction then comes automatically, since, in the +absence of any control, the neutrons, which cannot escape to the +outside, build up at an unbelievable rate. + +Whereas the fission process for the release of nuclear energy entails +making little ones out of big ones, the fusion process involves making +big ones out of little ones. In both processes the products weigh less +than the original materials, the loss of mass coming out in the form of +energy. According to the generally accepted hypothesis, the fusion +process is the one operating in the sun and the stars of the same +family. The radiant energy given off by them, it is believed, is the +result of the fusion of four hydrogen atoms into one atom of helium, two +of the protons losing their positive charge, thus becoming neutrons. +Since a helium atom weighs nearly eight tenths of one per cent less than +the total weight of the four hydrogen atoms, the loss of mass is thus +nearly eight times that produced by fission, with a corresponding +eightfold increase in the amount of energy liberated. This process, +using light hydrogen, is not feasible on earth. + +The nuclei of all atoms are thus vast storage depots of cosmic energy. +We must think of them as cosmic safe-deposit vaults, in which the +Creator of the universe, if you will, deposited at the time of creation +most of the energy in the universe for safekeeping. The sun and the +other giant stars that give light have, as it were, drawing accounts in +this “First National Bank and Trust Company of the Universe,” whereas we +on this little planet of ours in the cosmic hinterland are much too poor +to have such a bank account. So we have been forced all these years we +have been on earth to subsist on small handouts from our close neighbor +the sun, which squanders millions all over space, but can spare us only +nickels, dimes, and quarters (depending on the seasons of the year) for +a cup of coffee and a sandwich. We are thus in the true sense of the +word cosmic beggars, living off the bounty of a distant relative. + +The discovery of fission in 1939 meant that after a million years of +exclusive dependence on the sun we had suddenly managed to open a modest +drawing account of our own in this bank of the cosmos. We were enabled +to do it by stumbling upon two special master keys to five of the cosmic +vaults. One of these keys we call fission; the other, which allows us +entry into a much richer chamber of the vault, we call fusion. We can +get a lot of the stored-up cosmic treasure by using the key to the +fission vaults alone, but, as with our terrestrial bank vaults, which +generally require two keys before they can be opened, it is not possible +to use the key to the fusion vault unless we first use the fission key. + +Except for the payment of our heat and light bill, the sun gives us +nothing directly in cash. Instead it deposits a very small pittance in +the plants, which serve as its major terrestrial banks. The animals then +rob the plants and we rob them both. When we eat the food we live by we +thus actually eat sunshine. + +The sun makes its deposits in the plant through an agent named +chlorophyll, the stuff that makes the grass green. Chlorophyll has the +uncanny ability to catch sunbeams and to hand them over to the plant. A +chemical supergenius inside the plant changes the sunlight energy into +chemical energy, just as a bank teller changes bills into silver. With +this chemical energy at their disposal, a great number of devilishly +clever chemists in the plants’ chemical factory go to work building up +many substances to serve as vaults in which to store up a large part of +the energy, using only part of it for their own subsistence. + +The building materials used by these chemists inside the plants consist +mainly of carbon-dioxide gas from the atmosphere, and water from the +soil, plus small amounts of minerals either supplied by the good earth +or by fertilizers. Carbon dioxide, by the way, composed of one atom of +carbon and two atoms of oxygen, is the stuff you exhale. In solid form +it is what we know as dry ice, used in efforts to make rain. It is +present in the atmosphere in large amounts. + +Out of the carbon dioxide and water the chemists in the plants build +cellulose, starch, sugar, fat, proteins, vitamins, and scores of other +substances, all of which serve as vaults for the sun’s rays caught by +the chlorophyll. The biggest vaults of all, storing most of the energy, +are the cellulose, sugars and starches, fats and proteins. There the +stored energy remains until it is released by processes we call burning +or digestion, both of which, as we shall see, are different terms for +the same chemical reaction. When we burn wood, or the petrified ancient +wood we know as coal, we burn largely the cellulose, the chief component +of the solid part of plants. When we eat the plants, or the animals in +whom the plant tissues are transformed into flesh by the solar energy +stored within them, it is the sugars, starches, fats, and proteins that +give us the energy we live by. + +In the process of burning wood or coal the large cellulose vaults, +composed of carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen, are broken up, thus allowing +the original solar energy, stored up within them as chemical energy, to +escape in the form of heat and light. This is the same heat and light +deposited there by the sun many years before—in the case of coal, some +two hundred million years back. The process of burning thus transforms +the chemical energy in the plants back to its original form of light and +radiant heat energy. The complex carbon and hydrogen units in the +cellulose are broken up, each freed carbon atom uniting within two +oxygen atoms in the air to form carbon dioxide again, while two hydrogen +atoms unite with one of oxygen to form water. Thus we see that the +cellulose vaults are broken up once more into the original building +bricks out of which the chemists in the plants had fashioned them. + +When we eat plant or animal food to get the energy to live by, exactly +the same process takes place except at a lower temperature. The sunlight +deposit vaults of sugar, starch, and fat, also composed, like cellulose, +of carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen, are broken up by the digestive system +into their component parts, thus allowing the original solar energy +stored within them to get free in the form of chemical energy, which our +body uses in its essential processes. Here, too, the end products are +carbon dioxide, which we exhale, and water. About half the energy we +thus obtain is used by us for the work we do. The other half is used by +the body for building up the tissues burned up as part of the regular +wear and tear of life. + +We thus burn food for our internal energy as we burn cellulose for our +external energy. The interesting thing here is that, in both types of +burning, fission as well as fusion processes take place. The fission is +the splitting of the cellulose, sugar, fats, starches, and proteins into +carbon and hydrogen atoms. The fusion part is the union of the carbon +and the hydrogen with oxygen to form carbon dioxide and water. The +fusion part is just as necessary to release the stored-up solar energy +in the wood or coal as is the fission part, for, as everyone knows, +unless there is oxygen for the carbon to fuse with, no combustion +(burning) can take place and hence no release of energy. The plant +vaults would remain closed absolutely tight. + +At this point two things become clear. We see, in the first place, that +whenever we get any kind of energy in any form we do not in any way +create any of it. All we do is merely draw on something that is already +stored up; in the case of coal and wood by the sun, in the case of +uranium and hydrogen by the same power that created the sun and all +energy. We draw water from the spring, but we do not make the water. On +the other hand, we cannot draw the water unless we first find the +spring, and even then we cannot draw it unless we have a pitcher. + +And we also see, in the second place, that fission and fusion are common +everyday phenomena that occur any time you burn anything. Both are +essential whenever energy is released, whether it is the chemical energy +from coal or the atomic energy from the nuclei of uranium, deuterium, or +tritium. When you light a cigarette you employ both fission and fusion +or you don’t smoke. The first fission and fusion take place in the +lighting of the match, the cellulose in the match (whether it is wood or +paper) being fissioned (that is, split into its component atoms of +carbon and hydrogen). These atoms are then fusioned with the oxygen in +the air. The same thing happens when the tobacco catches fire. In each +case the fusion with the oxygen makes possible the fission of the +cellulose. When we burn U-235, or plutonium, we again get both fission +and fusion, except that, instead of oxygen, the nuclei of these elements +first fuse with a neutron before they are split apart. Thus we see that +the process of burning U-235, or plutonium, requires not only fission +but fusion as well, without which they could not burn. This is true also +in hydrogen fusion. When you burn deuterium by fusing two deuterons +(nuclei of deuterium) to form helium of atomic weight three, plus a +neutron, one of the two deuterons is split in half in the process. +Similarly, when you burn tritium by fusion two tritons (nuclei of +tritium), one of the tritons splits into two neutrons and a proton, the +one proton joining the other triton to form helium of atomic weight +four. + +Thus we see that fission and fusion are the cosmic firebrands that are +always present whenever a fire is lighted, chemical or atomic, whether +the fuel is wood, coal, or oil, or uranium, plutonium, deuterium, or +tritium. Both, with some variations, are essential for opening the +cosmic safe where the energy of the universe is kept in storage. The +only reason you get much more energy in the fission and fusion of atomic +nuclei is that so much more had been stored in them than in the +cellulose vaults on this planet. + +The same reason that limits our ability to obtain stored chemical energy +to a few fuels also limits our ability to obtain atomic energy. Coal, +oil, and wood are the only dividend-paying chemical-energy stocks. +Similarly only five elements, uranium 233 and 235, plutonium, deuterium, +and tritium are the only dividend-paying atomic-energy stocks, and of +these only two (U-235 and deuterium) exist in nature. The other three +are re-created from other elements by modern alchemical legerdemain. +What is more, we know for a certainty that it will never be possible to +obtain atomic energy from any other element, by either fission or +fusion. + +This should put to rest once and for all the notion of many, including +some self-styled scientists, that the explosion of a hydrogen bomb would +set the hydrogen in the waters, and the oxygen and the nitrogen in the +air, on fire and thus blow up the earth. The energy in common hydrogen +is locked up in one of those cosmic vaults which only the sun and the +stars that shine can open and which no number of H-bombs could blow +apart. Oxygen and nitrogen are locked even for the sun. As for the +deuterium in the water, it cannot catch fire unless it is highly +concentrated, condensed to its liquid form, and heated to a temperature +of several hundred million degrees. Hence all this talk about blowing up +the earth is pure moonshine. + +But while we know that we have reached the limit of what can be achieved +either by fission or by fusion, that by no means justifies the +conclusion that we have reached the ultimate in discovery and that +fission and fusion are the only possible methods for tapping the energy +locked up in matter. We must remember that fifty years ago we did not +even suspect that nuclear energy existed and that until 1939 no one, +including Dr. Einstein, believed that it would ever become possible to +use it on a practical scale. We simply stumbled upon the phenomenon of +fission, which in its turn opened the way to fusion. + +If science tells us anything at all, it tells us that nature is infinite +and that the human mind, driven by insatiable curiosity and probing ever +deeper into nature’s mysteries, will inevitably find ever greater +treasures, treasures that are at present beyond the utmost stretches of +the imagination—as far beyond fission and fusion as these are beyond +man’s first discovery of how to make a fire by striking a spark with a +laboriously made flint. The day may yet come, and past history makes it +practically certain that it will come, when man will look upon the +discovery of fission and fusion as we look today upon the crudest tools +made by primitive man. + +A great measure of man’s progress has been the result of serendipity, +the faculty of making discoveries, by chance or sagacity, of things not +sought for. Many an adventure has led man to stumble upon something much +better than he originally set out to find. Like Columbus, many an +explorer into the realms of the unknown has set his sights on a shorter +route to the spices of India only to stumble upon a new continent. +Unlike Columbus, however, the explorers in the field of science, instead +of being confined to this tiny little earth of ours, have the whole +infinite universe as the domain of their adventures, and many a virgin +continent, richer by far than any yet discovered, still awaits its +Columbus. + +Roentgen and Becquerel were exploring what they thought was an untrodden +path in the forest and came upon a new road that led their successors to +the very citadel of the material universe. Young Enrico Fermi was +curious to find out what would happen if he fired a neutron into the +nucleus of uranium, hoping only to create a heavier isotope of uranium, +or at best a new element. His rather modest goal led five years later to +the fission of uranium, and in another six years to the atomic bomb. + +Yet, as we have seen, in both fission and fusion only a very small +fraction of the mass of the protons and neutrons in the nuclei of the +elements used is liberated in the form of energy, while 99.3 to 99.9 per +cent of their substance remains in the form of matter. We know of no +process in nature which converts 100 per cent of the matter in protons +and neutrons into energy, but scientists are already talking about +finding means for bringing about such a conversion. They are seeking +clues for such a process in the mysterious cosmic rays that bombard the +earth from outer space with energies billions of times greater than +those released by fission or fusion, great enough to smash atoms of +oxygen or nitrogen, or whatever other atoms they happen to hit in the +upper atmosphere, into their component protons and neutrons. Luckily, +their number is small and most of their energy is spent long before they +reach sea level. + +But we have already learned how to create secondary cosmic-ray particles +of relatively low energies (350,000,000 electron-volts) with our giant +cyclotrons. The creation of these particles, known as mesons, which are +believed to be the cosmic cement responsible for the nuclear forces, +represents the actual conversion of energy into matter. This is the +exact reverse of the process taking place in fission and fusion, in +which, as we have seen, matter is converted into energy. And we are now +about to complete multibillion-volt atom-smashers that will hurl atomic +bullets of energies of from three to ten billion volts at the nuclei of +atoms. With these gigantic machines, known as the cosmotron (at the +Brookhaven National Laboratory of the Atomic Energy Commission) and the +bevatron (at the University of California), we shall be able to smash +nuclei into their individual component protons and neutrons and thus get +a much more intimate glimpse of the forces that hold the nuclei +together. What is more, instead of creating only mesons, particles with +only 300 electron masses, we shall be able for the first time to convert +energy into protons and neutrons, duplicating, as far as is known, an +act of creation that has not taken place since the beginning of the +universe. Man at last will be creating the very building blocks out of +which the universe is made, as well as the cosmic cement that holds them +together. + +What new continents will our first glimpse into the mechanism of the +very act of creation of matter out of energy reveal? What new secrets +will be uncovered before the dazzled eyes and mind of man when he takes +the nucleus of the atom completely apart at last? Not even Einstein +could tell us. But, as Omar Khayyám divined, “a single Alif” may provide +“the clue” that, could we but find it, leads “to the Treasure-House, and +peradventure to the Master too.” The fact is that we already have opened +the door to the anteroom of the treasure-house, and we are about to +unlock the door to one of its inner chambers. What shall we find there? +No one as yet knows. But we do know that every door man has opened so +far has led to riches beyond his wildest dreams, each new door bringing +greater rewards than the one before. On the other hand, we also know +that the treasure-house has many mansions, and that no matter how many +chambers he may enter, he will always find new doors to unlock. For we +have learned that the solution of any one secret always opens up a +thousand new mysteries. + +We also have learned, to our sorrow, that any new insight gained into +nature’s laws and forces can be used for great good and for equally +great evil. The greater the insight, the greater the potentialities for +good or evil. The new knowledge he is about to gain by his deeper +insight into the heart of matter, and by his ability to create it out of +energy, may offer man the means to make himself complete master of the +world he lives in. It is equally true, alas, that he could use it to +destroy that world even more thoroughly than with the hydrogen bomb. + +As already stated, scientists are even now discussing the possibility of +finding means for the complete annihilation of matter by the conversion +of the entire mass of protons and neutrons into energy, instead of only +0.1 to 0.7 per cent. And while the total annihilation of protons and +neutrons still seems highly speculative, we already know that such a +process actually does take place in the realm of the electron. This is +the phenomenon already achieved numerous times on a small scale in the +laboratory, in which a positive electron (positron) and an electron with +a negative charge completely destroy each other, their entire mass being +converted into energy. Luckily, this is at present only a laboratory +experiment, in which each positron must be individually produced, since +there are hardly any positive electrons in our part of the universe. But +suppose the new knowledge we are about to pry loose from the inner +citadel of matter reveals to us a new process, at present not even +suspected, that would release positrons in large numbers, just as the +fission and fusion processes made possible for the first time the +liberation of large quantities of neutrons. Such an eventuality, by no +means beyond the realm of the possible, would open potentialities of +horror alongside which those of the H-bomb, even the rigged one, would +be puny. For any process that would release large numbers of positrons +in the atmosphere, in a chain reaction similar to the one now liberating +neutrons, may envelop the earth in one deadly flash of radioactive +lightning that would instantly kill all sensate things. And although +this is admittedly purely speculative, no one dare say that such a +discovery will not be made, not when one remembers how remote and +unlikely a process such as fission seemed to be just before it was made. + +Though many of the great discoveries came about as the result of chance, +they came because, as Pasteur said, “chance favors the prepared mind.” +Actually they came largely through the intellectual synthesis of what +had originally appeared as unrelated phenomena or concepts. When Faraday +discovered the principle of electromagnetic induction, he established +for the first time that electricity and magnetism, looked upon since +prehistoric times as two separate and distinct phenomena, were actually +only two aspects of one basic natural force, which we know today as +electromagnetism. This great intellectual synthesis led directly to the +age of electricity and all its wonders. About thirty years later the +great Scottish physicist James Clerk Maxwell demonstrated that +electromagnetic action traveled through space in the form of transverse +waves similar to those of light and having the same velocity. This +revealed the existence in nature of electromagnetic waves, better known +to us today as radio waves. About a quarter century later the great +German-Jewish physicist Heinrich Hertz not only produced these +electromagnetic waves but showed that they are propagated just as waves +of light are, possessing all other properties of light, such as +reflection, refraction, and polarization. This led directly to wireless +telegraphy and telephony, radio and television, radiophotography and +radar. + +When Einstein, in his special theory of relativity of 1905, united +matter and energy in one basic cosmic entity, the road was opened to the +atomic age. Yet Einstein was never satisfied and has devoted more than +forty-five years of his life to the search for a greater, all-embracing +unity underlying the great diversity of natural phenomena. In his +general theory of relativity of 1915 he formulated a concept that +encompasses the universal law of gravitation in his earlier synthesis of +space and time, of which matter and energy were an integral part. This +synthesis, wrote Bertrand Russell in 1924, “is probably the greatest +synthetic achievement of the human intellect up to the present time. It +sums up the mathematical and physical labors of more than two thousand +years. Pure geometry from Pythagoras to Riemann, the dynamics and +astronomy of Galileo and Newton, the theory of electromagnetism as it +resulted from the researches of Faraday, Maxwell, and their successors, +all are absorbed, with the necessary modifications, in the theories of +Einstein, Weyl, and Eddington. + +“So comprehensive a synthesis,” he continued, “might have represented a +dead end, leading to no further progress for a long time. Fortunately, +at this moment quantum theory [the theory applying to the forces within +the atom] has appeared, with a new set of facts outside the scope of +relativity physics [which applies to the forces governing the cosmos at +large]. This has saved us, in the nick of time, from the danger of +supposing that we know everything.” + +Yet Einstein, working away in majestic solitude, has been trying all +these years to construct a vast intellectual edifice that would embrace +all the laws of the cosmos known so far, including the quantum, in one +fundamental concept, which he designates as a “unified field theory.” +Early in 1950 he published the results of his arduous labors since 1915. +This he regards as the crowning achievement of his life’s work, a +unified theory that bridges the vast gulf that had existed between +relativity and quantum, between the infinite universe of the stars and +galaxies and the equally infinite universe within the nucleus of the +atom. If he is right, and he has always been right before, his latest +contribution will prove to be a greater synthetic achievement of the +human intellect than ever before, embracing space and time, matter and +energy, gravitation and electromagnetism, as well as the nuclear forces +within the atom, in one all-encompassing concept. In due time this +concept should lead to new revelations of nature’s mysteries, and to +triumphs even greater than those which followed as a direct consequence +of all earlier intellectual syntheses. + +If the synthesis of matter and energy led to the atomic age, what may we +expect of the latest, all-inclusive synthesis? When Einstein was asked +about it he replied: “Come back in twenty years!” which happens to +coincide with the end of the hundred-year period recorded by the +brothers Goncourt: God swinging a bunch of keys, and saying to humanity: +“Closing time, gentlemen!” + +The search for new intellectual syntheses goes on, and no doubt new +relationships between the diverse phenomena of nature will be found, +regardless of whether Einstein’s latest theory stands or falls in the +light of further discovery. Physicists, for example, are speculating +about a fundamental relationship between time and the electronic charge, +one of the most basic units of nature, and there are those who believe +that this relationship will turn out to be much more fundamental than +that between matter and energy. Should this be found to be true, then +the discovery of the relationship between time and charge may lead to +finding a way for starting a self-multiplying positron-electron chain +reaction, just as the relationship between matter and energy led +inevitably to the self-multiplying chain reaction with neutrons. If this +comes about, then closing time will come much closer. + +Yet the sound of the swinging keys need not necessarily mean closing +time for man at the twilight of his day on this planet. It could also +mean the opening of gates at a new dawn, to a new earth—and a new +heaven. + + + + + APPENDIX + + + THE HYDROGEN BOMB AND INTERNATIONAL CONTROL + +_In the fall of 1949 Senator McMahon directed the staff of the Joint +Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy to study the hydrogen bomb in +relation to international control of atomic energy. The material in the +following pages, with the exception of the comments in Appendix D, was +prepared by the staff at the chairman’s request to assist the joint +committee in considering the problem._ + +_It is my belief that this valuable material, until now unavailable in +such excellent summary form, will also assist Americans in general in +considering this vital problem. Readers of this volume should find it +helpful in arriving at conclusions of their own, particularly in the +light of the facts and discussion presented in Chapters III and IV. I +further believe that a careful perusal of the following material will +lend strong support to my view that the international control of atomic +weapons, as envisaged in the majority plan of the United Nations,—the +only plan that may give assurance against a surprise atomic attack—had +become wholly impractical even before the entry of the H-bomb into the +picture, and that the imminent development of the H-bomb has made it so +unworkable that any further plan to revive it would be futile._ + +_This material makes it clear (a) that Russia never had any intention of +reaching any agreement on international control and had set out to +sabotage any plan from the very beginning; and (b) that no plan, no +matter how foolproof, could hope to succeed in the absence of complete +mutual trust and confidence. Events in Korea, I am convinced, have +driven the last nail into the coffin of the UN control plan._ + + + A + SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC + WEAPONS + + May 1945: Secretary of War Stimson appoints interim Committee to study + problem of atomic energy. + + August 6, 1945: Hiroshima. + + October 3, 1945: President’s message to Congress outlines necessity + for international control of atomic energy and proposes + conversations with Canada and United Kingdom. + + November 15, 1945: Three-nation agreed declaration on atomic energy + (Truman-Attlee-King declaration). Calls for United Nations + Commission to make proposals for international control plan. + Proposals should provide safeguards “by way of _inspection and + other means_.” (Wherever used in the following pages, italics are + supplied.) + + December 27, 1945: U.S.-U.K.-U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister communiqué on + results of Moscow Conference. Proposes that Canada, China, and + France join with Big Three in sponsoring resolution calling for + United Nations Atomic Energy Commission with terms of reference + stipulated in Truman-Attlee-King declaration. + + January 24, 1946: General Assembly resolution establishing United + Nations Commission on Atomic Energy. Composed of members of + Security Council plus Canada. + + March 28, 1946: Acheson-Lilienthal report. Urges that mines and + “dangerous” atomic-energy facilities be put under _international + ownership_ and _management_ of Atomic Development Authority. + Additional safeguards in the form of _inspection_. Nations to + operate “safe” plants under ADA license. Plants to be distributed + among nations in keeping with _strategic balance_. Control plan to + be implemented by stages. + + June 14, 1946: Baruch proposals to United Nations. Closely follow + Acheson-Lilienthal recommendations. Ask “condign punishment,” for + violations, and request agreement that UN Charter _veto_ clause + not apply to sanctions for stipulated violations of atomic-energy + treaty. + + June 19, 1946: Soviet Union counterproposals. Demand prohibition of + atomic weapons and destruction of existing stockpiles _before_ + international control plan is negotiated. Soviet proposals provide + no safeguards against evasion. + + December 31, 1946: First Report of UNAEC. Incorporates essential + features of Baruch proposals into statement of principles for plan + for international control of atomic energy. Adopted 10 to 0, with + U.S.S.R. and Poland abstaining. + + June 11, 1947: U.S.S.R. control proposals. Soviets assent to _periodic + inspection_, but this would apply only to _declared_ plants. + + August 11, 1947: Soviets consent in principle to concept of _quotas_. + + September 11, 1947: Second Report of UNAEC. Outlines powers, + functions, and limitations thereon of any international agency in + implementing effective control plan. + + May 17, 1948: Third Report of UNAEC. Reports impasse because Soviets + refuse to accept majority plan and persist in refusing to put + forward effective proposals of their own. Concludes that further + work in UNAEC is fruitless until Soviet cooperation in broader + fields of policy is secured. Recommends that Commission’s work be + suspended until sponsoring powers find that basis for agreement + exists. + + September 25, 1948: Soviets modify position by asking that conventions + for prohibition of atomic weapons and for international control go + into effect simultaneously. + + November 4, 1948: By vote of 40 to 6, UN General Assembly endorses + majority control plan. Calls upon UNAEC to continue work and + requests that sponsoring powers consult to explore possible basis + of agreement. + + August 9, 1949: First meeting of sponsoring powers of UNAEC. + + September 23, 1949: President Truman’s announcement of Soviet atomic + explosion. + + October 25, 1949: Canada, China, France, United Kingdom, United States + statement reveals Soviet attitude still prevents agreement. + + November 23, 1949: General Assembly resolution calls upon sponsoring + powers to continue consultations. + + November 23, 1949: Soviets reverse position on quotas, abandoning + previous assent in principle. + + January 19, 1950: U.S.S.R. walks out of sponsoring powers + consultations over China recognition issue. + + January 31, 1950: President Truman announces that United States will + proceed with development of hydrogen bomb. + + + B + THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC WEAPONS: A BRIEF HISTORY OF + PROPOSALS AND NEGOTIATIONS + +_Early steps looking toward international control_ + +Even before the test explosion at Alamogordo, N. Mex., had ushered in +the atomic age, the United States Government was studying methods of +making atomic energy a socially constructive force. + +In May 1945 an Interim Committee appointed by Secretary of War Stimson +commenced investigating the problem. The Committee recognized “that the +means of producing the atomic bomb would not forever remain the +exclusive property of the United States....” Therefore, “Secretary of +War Stimson was one of the first to recommend a policy of international +supervision and control of the entire field of atomic energy....” + +When on August 6, 1945, President Truman made the first public statement +on the atomic bomb, he made clear that “under present circumstances it +is not intended to divulge the technical process of production or all +the military application, pending further examination of possible +methods of protecting us and the rest of the world from the danger of +sudden destruction.” He assured the American people that he would “make +further recommendations to the Congress as to how atomic power can +become a powerful and forceful influence toward the maintenance of world +peace.” + +The President’s recommendations were transmitted to the Congress on +October 3, 1945. He spoke of the necessity for “international +arrangements looking, if possible, to the renunciation of the use and +development of the atomic bomb, and directing ... atomic energy ... +toward peaceful and humanitarian ends.” So great a challenge could not +await the full development of the United Nations. The President, +therefore, proposed initiating discussions “first with our associates in +this discovery, Great Britain and Canada, and then with other +nations....” + + +_The Truman-Attlee-King declaration_ + +In the three nations agreed declaration of November 15, 1945—frequently +called the Truman-Attlee-King declaration—was recorded the concerted +objectives of the three nations that had developed the atomic bomb. + +According to the declaration, any international arrangements should have +a dual goal: Preventing the use of atomic energy for destructive +purposes, and promoting its use for peaceful and humanitarian ends. To +reach these objectives, the signatory nations proposed a United Nations +Commission empowered to make recommendations to the parent body. It was +asked that the Commission make specific proposals “for effective +safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect states +against the hazards of violations and evasions.” It was further +suggested that the Commission’s work “proceed by separate stages, the +successful completion of each of which will develop the necessary +confidence of the world before the next stage is undertaken.” + +Contained in the agreed declaration was the genesis of the basic feature +of the control proposals subsequently advanced by the United States, and +accepted by a large majority of the United Nations: safeguards through +inspection and _other means_. It was recognized even at this early date +that “effective, reciprocal, and enforceable safeguards” against evasion +represented the minimum prerequisite of a satisfactory international +arrangement. + +At the Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held in +December 1945, the Truman-Attlee-King proposals received the Soviet +Union’s endorsement. The United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet +Union agreed to invite Canada, China, and France to join with them in +sponsoring a resolution calling for a United Nations Atomic Energy +Commission. Such a Commission would consist of the 11 members of the +Security Council plus Canada when that state was not sitting on the +Council. It is noteworthy that the Commission’s proposed terms of +reference were exactly those suggested by the Truman-Attlee-King +declaration. + +In its first substantive resolution, the United Nations General Assembly +unanimously adopted the recommendations of the Moscow Conference and +established the United Nations Commission on Atomic Energy on January +24, 1946. + + +_The Acheson-Lilienthal report_ + +In order to inquire into the nature of the “effective, reciprocal, and +enforceable safeguards” called for in the Truman-Attlee-King +declaration, Secretary of State Byrnes in January 1946 appointed a +Committee headed by Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson. The Committee +in turn enlisted the aid of a Board of Consultants under the +chairmanship of David Lilienthal. + +The findings of the two groups were made public on March 28, 1946, in +the Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy, commonly +called the Acheson-Lilienthal report. It was advanced “not as a final +plan but as a place to begin, a foundation on which to build.” + +The report concluded that no security against atomic attack could be +found in an agreement that merely “outlawed” these weapons. Nor was it +considered feasible to control atomic energy “only by a system which +relies on inspection and similar police-like methods.” Instead, +inspection must be supplemented by _international ownership and +management_ of raw materials and key installations. “Dangerous” +operations—those of potential military consequence—would be carried out +by an Atomic Development Authority, an international agency under the +United Nations. Only “safe” activities—those of no military +importance—would be conducted by the individual nations, under licenses +from the Atomic Development Authority. Any plan finally agreed upon +would be implemented by _stages_ with the United States progressively +transferring its fund of theoretical and technological knowledge to an +international authority as safeguards were put into effect. + +The report amplified the Truman-Attlee-King proposals in two important +respects. + +First, it stated that international ownership—not specifically mentioned +in the earlier declaration—was a necessary adjunct of international +inspection. Second, it advanced the concept of “strategic balance” or +“quotas.” The Report held that an acceptable plan must be “such that if +it fails or the whole international situation collapses, any nations +such as the United States will still be in a relatively secure position, +compared to any other nation.” To help attain this end, it was proposed +that the Atomic Development Authority’s stock piles and plants be well +distributed geographically. + + +_The Baruch proposals to the United Nations_ + +Less than 3 months after the publication of the Acheson-Lilienthal +report, the United States Government gave the world its proposals for +the international control of atomic energy. On June 14, 1946, Bernard +Baruch presented them to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission “as +a basis for beginning our discussion.” + +Mr. Baruch stated that: + + + When an adequate system for control of atomic energy, including the + renunciation of the bomb as a weapon, has been agreed upon and put + into effective operation and condign punishments set up for violations + of the rules of control which are to be stigmatized as international + crimes, we propose that: + + 1. manufacture of atomic bombs shall stop; + + 2. existing bombs shall be disposed of pursuant to the terms of the + treaty; and + + 3. the Authority shall be in possession of full information as to the + know-how for the production of atomic energy. + + +The methods suggested for achieving international control were the +following: + + + The United States proposes the creation of an International Atomic + Development Authority, to which should be entrusted all phases of the + development and use of atomic energy, starting with the raw material + and including— + + 1. Managerial control or ownership of all atomic energy activities + potentially dangerous to world security. + + 2. Power to control, inspect, and license all other atomic activities. + + 3. The duty of fostering the beneficial uses of atomic energy. + + 4. Research and development responsibilities of an affirmative + character intended to put the Authority in the forefront of atomic + knowledge and thus to enable it to comprehend, and therefore to + detect—misuse of atomic energy. To be effective, the Authority must + itself be the world’s leader in the field of atomic knowledge and + development and thus supplement its legal authority with the great + power inherent in possession of leadership in knowledge. + + +These proposals represented a broadening—rather than essential +modification—of the Acheson-Lilienthal recommendations. The additional +features concerned (1) _condign punishment_, and (2) the so-called power +of veto of the United Nations Charter. + +Whereas the Acheson-Lilienthal report had not dealt with the subject of +sanctions, Mr. Baruch held that a realistic agreement must provide for +penalties “of as severe a nature as the nations may wish and as +immediate and certain in their execution as possible....” Such “condign +punishment” would be meted out if _previously stipulated_ violations of +a control plan occurred. + +This problem, Mr. Baruch stated, was intimately related with the veto +provisions of the United Nations Charter. Under the Charter, sanctions +can be invoked only with the concurrence of the five permanent members +of the Security Council, i.e., China, France, United Kingdom, United +States, and the Soviet Union. Mr. Baruch maintained, however, that +“there must be no veto to protect those who violate their solemn +agreements not to develop or use atomic energy for destructive +purposes.... The bomb does not wait on debate.” He pointed out that the +United States was “concerned here with the veto power only as it affects +this particular problem.” + +A United States memorandum of July 12, 1946, stressed that “Voluntary +relinquishment of the veto on questions relating to a specific weapon +previously outlawed by unanimous agreement because of its uniquely +destructive character, in no wise involves any compromise of the +principle of unanimity of action as applied to general problems or to +particular situations not foreseeable and therefore not susceptible of +advance unanimous agreement.” + + +_The first Soviet proposals—Gromyko’s statement of June 19, 1946_ + +A week after the American plans were put forward, the Soviet Union +announced its own proposals. They were marked chiefly by Soviet +insistence that the United States agree to stop the production of atomic +weapons and destroy existing bombs _before_ international control +arrangements were negotiated. + +Although they called for “an international convention for outlawing +weapons based on the use of atomic energy,” the Soviet proposals did not +provide “effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to +protect complying states against the hazards of violations and +evasions.” They proposed that the “rule of unanimity” in the Security +Council apply to atomic-energy matters. Hence if one of the permanent +members of the Security Council or a friend violated a control scheme, +the other members of the United Nations would have no legal means, under +the Charter, of invoking sanctions against it. + +Throughout 1946 the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission continued +its investigations of the control problem. On December 31, 1946, the +Commission issued its _First Report_. It revealed that the essential +features of the Baruch proposals had won the support of all the members +of the Commission except the Soviet Union and Poland. + + +_The Soviet Proposals of June 11, 1947_ + +A year after it suggested a convention for “outlawing” atomic weapons, +the Soviet Union came forward with a set of control proposals. + +A chief point of interest in the plan was the fact that the Soviets now +assented to “_periodic_ inspection of facilities for mining and +production of atomic materials” by an international inspectorate. In +answer to a United Kingdom inquiry, however, the Russians stated that +“normally, inspectors will visit only _declared_ plants”—with this +supplemented by special investigations when there were “grounds for +suspicion” of violation of the convention for the prohibition of atomic +weapons. The power of the Control Commission would be further limited to +making recommendations to governments and to the Security Council. On +other matters that separated the Soviet Union from the majority +position—such as international ownership and management, and the veto +question—there was no change in the Russian position. + +The subsequent half-year brought one sign of a further modification of +the U.S.S.R. stand. On August 11, 1947, Mr. Gromyko seemingly brought +the Soviets closer to the majority position by agreeing that “the idea +of quotas deserves attention and serious consideration by the Atomic +Energy Commission....” + + +_The Second and Third Reports of the United Nations Atomic Energy +Commission—September 11, 1947, and May 17, 1948_ + +The _Second Report_ of the Atomic Energy Commission spelled out in +detail the precise powers and functions and the limitations thereon of +any international agency in implementing an effective control plan. When +the _Report_ was approved by the General Assembly by a vote of 40 to 6, +the plan developed in the UNAEC became a world plan—to which only the +Soviet Union and her satellites took exception. + +By the spring of 1948 the UNAEC became convinced that the Soviet Union’s +refusal to accept any plan that met the technical requirements of +controlling atomic energy was symptomatic of broader differences which +made further negotiations on the Commission level fruitless. + +The _Third Report_ stated that “the majority of the Commission has been +unable to secure the agreement of the Soviet Union to even those +elements of effective control from the technical point of view, let +alone their acceptance of the nature and extent of participation in the +world community required of all nations in this field....” + +It appeared to the Commission that the atomic deadlock was but one +manifestation of the more widespread dispute between the Soviet Union +and the rest of the world. In view of this, the Commission majority +recommended that negotiations in the Commission be suspended until the +permanent members of the UNAEC found that “there exists a basis for +agreement on the international control of atomic energy....” + +The following were regarded as the basic considerations which, even on a +technical level, made the U.S.S.R. position untenable: + + + I. The powers provided for the International Control Commission by the + Soviet Union proposals, confined as they are to _periodic inspection_ + and _special investigations_, are insufficient to guarantee against + the diversion of dangerous materials from known atomic facilities, and + do not provide the means to detect secret activities. + + II. Except by recommendations to the Security Council of the United + Nations, the International Control Commission has no powers to enforce + either its own decisions or the terms of the convention or conventions + on control. + + III. The Soviet Union Government insists that the convention + establishing a system of control, even so limited as that contained in + the Soviet Union proposals, can be concluded only _after_ a convention + providing for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the destruction of + existing atomic weapons has been “signed, ratified, and put into + effect.” [Italics in original.] + + +The Commission’s work had come to a standstill. + + +_Atomic energy negotiations since 1948_ + +Meeting in Paris in the fall of 1948 the General Assembly, by a vote of +40 to 6, approved the general findings and recommendations of the FIRST +REPORT and the specific proposals of part II of the SECOND REPORT “as +constituting the necessary basis for the establishing of an effective +system of international control of atomic energy.” However, it called +upon the UNAEC to continue its work and to study such subjects as it +deemed “practicable and useful,” and asked that the permanent members of +the Commission “consult in order to determine if there exists a basis +for agreement....” The permanent members were requested to transmit the +results of their consultations to the General Assembly. + +In the meanwhile, the Soviet Union had served notice of what appeared to +be a significant change in its position. In a draft resolution dated +September 25, 1948, the Soviets proposed— + + + To elaborate draft conventions for the banning of atomic weapons and + conventions for the establishment of international effective control + over atomic energy, taking into account that the convention for the + banning of atomic weapons and the convention for the establishment of + international control over atomic energy must be signed and + implemented and entered into force _simultaneously_. + + +It was the last word of this resolution that marked a change in the +U.S.S.R. stand. Previously, the Soviets had demanded that atomic weapons +production be prohibited and stock piles be destroyed _before_ a control +plan was discussed. + +Nonetheless, the new Soviet proposal gave no indication that the Soviets +would accede to what the majority regard as an _effective_ control plan. +Furthermore, the proposal for simultaneous prohibition and control was +considered to be physically impossible to implement. “The development of +atomic energy is the world’s newest industry, and already is one of the +most complicated. It would not be reasonable to assume that any +effective system of control could be introduced and enforced overnight. +Control and prohibition must, therefore, go into effect over a period of +time and by a series of stages.” + +The record of negotiations from the fall of 1948 to the present is +largely one of inaction. + +On September 23, 1949, President Truman announced that an atomic +explosion had occurred in the Soviet Union. One month later, the +sponsoring powers of the UNAEC revealed that the consultations between +them “had not yet succeeded in bringing about agreement between the +U.S.S.R. and the other five powers.” + +Despite this, the General Assembly, on November 23, 1949, asked that the +permanent members of the Commission continue their consultations and +keep the Commission and the General Assembly informed of their work. On +the same day, Vishinsky revealed that the Soviets no longer entertained +favorably the principle of quotas. + +On January 19, 1950, consultations came to an end when the Soviet Union +withdrew from the discussions over the question of recognition of the +Chinese Government. + + + C + THE ATOMIC IMPASSE + +Regarded in fundamental terms, the deadlock in international control +negotiations reflects diametrically opposed notions of the +responsibilities of individual nations in a world of atomic energy. + +All nations except the Soviet Union and her satellites “put world +security first, and are prepared to accept innovations in traditional +concepts of international cooperation, national sovereignty, and +economic organization where these are necessary for security. The +government of the U.S.S.R. puts its sovereignty first and is unwilling +to accept measures which may impinge upon or interfere with its rigid +exercise of unimpeded state sovereignty.” + +This basic variance in the objectives of the Soviet Union and the other +members of the United Nations is mirrored in the majority and minority +control proposals. + +The specific differences in the two plans may be summarized as follows: + + +INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION + + _United Nations._—Complete and continuing inspection by international + personnel, including aerial and ground surveys, and inspection of + atomic facilities. + + _Soviet Union._—Periodic inspection of declared plants. Special + investigations when there exist “grounds for suspicion”—not that + the control agreement has been violated—but that the convention + outlawing atomic weapons has been violated. (This could mean that + only if a nation were subjected to surprise atomic attack would + the necessary “grounds for suspicion” enter into existence.) + + +INTERNATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT + + _United Nations._—International ownership or management of dangerous + facilities and international ownership of source materials and + their fissionable derivatives—in order to prevent diversion of + such material from existing plants. + + _Soviet Union._—Complete opposition to international ownership or + management provisions. + + +STRATEGIC BALANCE (QUOTAS) + + _United Nations._—National quotas to be incorporated into + international control treaty. + + _Soviet Union._—Sees in quotas an instrument for “American + domination.” + + +SANCTIONS + + _United Nations._—No veto to protect those who violate stipulated + provisions of international agreement. + + _Soviet Union._—All decisions require unanimous consent of permanent + members of Security Council. + +The permanent members of the UNAEC have summarized the differences +between the Soviet plan and the world plan in the following fashion: + +“The Soviet Union proposes that nations should continue to own explosive +atomic materials. + + “The other five Powers feel that under such conditions there would be + no effective protection against the sudden use of these materials + as atomic weapons. + +“The Soviet Union proposes that nations continue, as at present, to own, +operate, and manage facilities making or using dangerous quantities of +such materials. + + “The other five Powers believe that, under such conditions, it would + be impossible to detect or prevent the diversion of such materials + for use in atomic weapons. + +“The Soviet Union proposes a system of control depending on periodic +inspection of facilities the existence of which the national government +concerned reports to the international agency, supplemented by special +investigations on suspicion of treaty violations. + + “The other five Powers believe that periodic inspection would not + prevent the diversion of dangerous materials and that the special + investigations envisaged would be wholly insufficient to prevent + clandestine activities.” + + + D + POSSIBLE QUESTIONS REGARDING H-BOMBS AND INTERNATIONAL CONTROL[1] + + + _The answers to many of the questions which follow are obvious. The + answer to other questions are less obvious. Each question has been + selected to suggest and to illustrate the kind of problem which may be + involved, whether easy or difficult of solution. It should be + emphasized that the original United States proposals and the existing + United Nations plan foresee and carefully take into account the + possibility of an H-bomb, as evidenced by the language they contain. + The same is true of the McMahon Act for domestic control of atomic + energy within the United States._ + + +Footnote 1: + + All material in this appendix, except those paragraphs headed + “Author’s Comments,” has been prepared by the staff of the Joint + Committee on Atomic Energy. + + +1. IS THE HYDROGEN BOMB A MORE OR LESS IMPORTANT WEAPON THAN THE ATOMIC +BOMB? MIGHT HYDROGEN BOMBS PROVE TO BE DECISIVE IN WAR, OR HAS THEIR +SIGNIFICANCE BEEN EXAGGERATED? + +Dr. Harold Urey, a Nobel Prize winner in [chemistry], has suggested that +the H-bomb would be militarily decisive; Dr. Hans Bethe, [and other +noted physicists, have] indicated that the step from A-bombs to H-bombs +is as great as the original step from conventional to atomic explosives. +However, Dr. Robert F. Bacher, a former AEC Commissioner, states that— + + + while it [the H-bomb] is a terrible weapon, its military effectiveness + seems to have been grossly overrated in the minds of laymen. + + +Some of the questions which may bear upon this difference of opinion are +as follows: + +(1) _Shock effect._—To what extent do H-bombs excel A-bombs in +permitting a highly destructive attack to be compressed in time? + +(2) _Comparative numbers._—What quantity of A-bombs are required to do +the same job as a given number of H-bombs? + +(3) _Neutron economy._—How much fissionable material for A-bombs is +sacrificed by using the neutrons available in reactors for making H-bomb +materials? + +(4) _Deliverability._—Under various combat conditions, is the delivery +of H-bombs cheaper and surer than delivery of an “equivalent” number of +A-bombs? + +(5) _Aiming accuracy._—How superior is a weapon which need strike only +within a number of miles in order to destroy its target over one which +must strike within 1 or 2 miles? + +(6) _Psychology._—As compared with the A-bomb, to what extent might the +H-bomb impair an enemy’s will to resist and accelerate recognition of +defeat? + +(7) _Tactical employment._—What is the relative value of A-bombs and +H-bombs in tactical situations—when used against troops in the field, +guerrilla fighters, forces preparing for amphibious invasion, a fleet, a +string of air strips or submarine bases, atomic facilities, underground +installations, etc.? + +(8) _Definition of “military effectiveness.”_—Would the use of H-bombs +to destroy large urban centers containing no armaments plants have no +“military effectiveness,” or would such destruction aid the attacker and +therefore represent “militarily effective” use of the weapon? Is it +possible to distinguish, in an era of total war, between “military” and +“nonmilitary” targets? + + + AUTHOR’S COMMENT + +The answer to (1) becomes obvious in light of the answers to (2), (3), +(4), (5), and (6), all of which must be considered together. We know +that a standard H-bomb would be the equal to ten nominal A-bombs in its +power to destroy by blast and to as many as thirty A-bombs in its +incendiary effects. In terms of total area, the H-bomb can destroy by +blast an area of more than 300 square miles, as compared with an area of +only ten square miles for the nominal A-bomb, and more than 1,200 square +miles by fire and burns, as compared with only four square miles for the +early A-bomb model. As for neutron economy, we have seen that this vast +increase in power could be achieved at a cost in fissionable A-bomb +material possibly as low as one twelfth, and no higher, at the most, +than the plutonium required (according to Professor Oliphant’s estimate) +for just one A-bomb. It thus becomes obvious that such a weapon not only +is much cheaper, in terms of destruction and cost of materials, than the +conventional A-bomb, but is much more easily and safely delivered, since +it would still be highly effective as a blasting weapon if exploded more +than five miles from its target, while as an incendiary it would still +be highly effective as far as fifteen miles away. Hence there can be no +question that H-bombs vastly excel A-bombs in permitting a highly +destructive attack to be compressed in time, and that its psychological +effect in impairing an enemy’s will to resist is also incalculably +greater. + +Its vastly greater range of destructiveness, its economy of material, +and its surer delivery also make the H-bomb vastly superior to the +A-bomb as a tactical weapon. Neither the H-bomb nor the A-bomb appears +to be practical for use against guerrilla fighters, except possibly as a +threat. + +As already discussed at length in Chapter III, there could be no +possible justification, on moral as well as military grounds, for using +the H-bomb as a strategic weapon to destroy large urban centers, +especially those containing no armaments plants, except in retaliation +for such use against us or our allies. + + +2. IF THE H-BOMB IS DEEMED TO BE DECISIVE OR FAR MORE DANGEROUS THAN THE +A-BOMB, SHOULD INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF HYDROGEN WEAPONS TAKE PRIORITY +OVER CONTROL OF ORDINARY ATOMIC WEAPONS? SHOULD THE UNITED STATES +PROPOSE A SEPARATE PLAN EXCLUSIVELY DESIGNED TO REGULATE H-BOMBS? + +The official United Nations proposals for international control of +atomic energy apparently involve the assumption that A-bombs are so +unique technically and so menacing as to set them apart from +conventional weapons and to justify separate consideration in the United +Nations and a separate regulatory system. If the step from A-bombs to +H-bombs is considered to be as great as the step from conventional +weapons to A-bombs, does it follow that hydrogen warfare should become +the subject of a separate control proposal and should receive separate +consideration in the United Nations? + +Are the technical facts of atomic and hydrogen weapons so intimately +related that both must be controlled if either is to be controlled? Are +the political facts such that the two problems must be regarded +inseparably? + + + AUTHOR’S COMMENT + +Since the H-bomb requires the A-bomb as a trigger, it becomes obvious +that the two problems are inseparable. + + +3. IS THE EXISTING UNITED NATIONS PLAN TECHNICALLY ADEQUATE TO CONTROL +H-BOMBS? + +The United Nations plan has been couched in such a manner that an +international agency would possess discretionary authority in defining +and controlling materials and processes that may be employed to +manufacture nuclear weapons of mass destruction. + +For instance, the _Second Report_ of the United Nations Atomic Energy +Commission defines “atomic energy” as including “all forms of energy +released in the course of, or as a result of, nuclear fission _or of +other nuclear transformation_.” “Source material” is taken to mean “any +material containing one or more key substances in such concentration as +the international agency may by regulation determine.” “Key substance” +is defined to mean “uranium, thorium _and any other element from which +nuclear fuel can be produced, as may be determined by the international +agency_.” (p. 71). Similarly, the report defines “nuclear fuel” as +“plutonium, U-233, U-235, uranium enriched in U-235, material containing +the foregoing, _and any other material which the international agency +determines to be capable of releasing substantial quantities of atomic +energy through nuclear chain reaction of the material_.” (p. 71.) The +_report_ likewise observes that: “Dangerous activities or facilities are +those which are of _military significance_ in the production of atomic +weapons. The word “dangerous” is used in the sense of _potentially +dangerous to world security_.” (p. 70). [Italics supplied throughout.] + +Does such breadth of phraseology mean that manufacturing processes and +source materials needed in the production of H-bombs could be properly +controlled, through the existing UN plan? + +Since nearly 2 years of work were required to formulate the UN plan, can +this plan be regarded as adequate for hydrogen weapons so long as the +control measures for the atomic energy industry are not explicitly +elaborated with the same detail as the arrangements evolved for +controlling U-235 and plutonium? + +It may also be pointed out that the existing UN plan contains no +provision for physically protecting informants who advise the +international agency of violations. Might potential informants keep +silent for fear of being punished by their national governments? Is this +factor important if the existing UN plan were subjected to the added +strain of controlling hydrogen weapons as well as atomic weapons? + +What safeguards would assure that the employees of an international +control agency would be faithful and loyal to the objectives of the +agency and that they would not work purely in the interests of some +national government—perhaps a national government other than that of +their own country? + + + AUTHOR’S COMMENT + +The language makes it obvious that the United Nations plan “foresees and +carefully takes into account the possibility of an H-bomb.” In view of +Russia’s attitude, however, and to leave no room for future quibbling, +the present plan should be explicitly elaborated to include hydrogen +weapons. On the other hand, since Russia will have none of the plan, +such elaboration would at best be purely academic. + +As for protecting informants, certainly no plan could contemplate that +citizens would act as spies against their own country, even if they find +that their country is violating an international agreement. The plan is +designed so that such violations could be detected by the official +employees of the international control agency. Obviously, such official +employees stationed in any country should not be nationals of that +country and should be protected by diplomatic immunity. Each country, in +selecting its representatives to the control agency, would naturally +subject them to a most careful screening as to their character and +loyalty, and would use all necessary checks to make certain that they +are faithful and loyal to the objectives of the agency. + + +4. IS CONTROL OVER FISSIONABLE MATERIALS SUFFICIENT TO PREVENT THE +PRODUCTION OF HYDROGEN BOMBS? IF SO, IS THE EXISTING UN PLAN ADEQUATE TO +THIS TASK? + +The technical facts suggest that H-bombs may be regulated in at least +two ways: (1) Control over the fissionable material usable as a +“trigger” and (2) control over deuterium and tritium. + +Perhaps control over _all_ fissionable material would give effective +control over hydrogen weapons. However, by way of specific example, the +introduction to volume VI of the Scientific Information Transmitted to +the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, June 14, 1946-October 14, +1946 (see State Department Publication 2661, pp. 151–152), comments as +follows: + + + It is difficult to define the amount of activity in the illicit + production of atomic weapons which is significant. The illicit + construction of a single atomic bomb by means of a decade of + successful evasion would not provide an overwhelming advantage, if it + can be assumed that it would take another decade to produce a second + bomb. But the secret production of one bomb per year would create a + definite danger, and the secret production of five or more per year + would be disastrous. This report assumes arbitrarily that the minimum + unit of noncompliance is the secret production of one atomic bomb per + year or a total of five bombs over any period of time. [This example + is chosen because UN documents published later omit concrete + illustrations, although the stress which these documents place upon + international ownership, operation, and management clearly reflects a + determination to reduce to the rock-bottom minimum any illicit mining + or production.] + + +Considering that five illicit A-bombs might, under certain +circumstances, lead to five illicit H-bombs, what margin of +inefficiency—if any—in controlling source and fissionable material is +permissible? Is absolute protection against illegal diversion of source +and fissionable material technically possible? Does the existing UN plan +provide absolute or near-absolute protection? Can greater technical +protection be secured than under the present UN plan? + + + AUTHOR’S COMMENT + +It can be stated unequivocally that, in the absence of complete mutual +faith and goodwill on the part of all concerned, neither the existing UN +plan nor any other technical plan that can be devised will provide +absolute or near-absolute protection. No plan could be devised that +would provide assurance against the diversion of enough material in any +one year to make at least one atomic bomb. In five years this would mean +the secret production of five hydrogen bombs. + + +5. MUST H-BOMB CONTROLS RELATE TO DEUTERIUM AND TRITIUM AS WELL AS TO +FISSIONABLE MATERIAL? IF THEY MUST, CAN THE PRESENT UN PLAN FULLY +PROVIDE FOR THESE CONTROLS OR DOES IT REQUIRE REVISION OR CHANGES IN +EMPHASIS? + +Should control over both fissionable material and deuterium and tritium +call for the same emphasis and consideration which the United Nations +Atomic Energy Commission has already given to control of U-235 and +plutonium? Would surveillance of deuterium and tritium manufacture +furnish better insurance against illicit H-bomb construction than +surveillance of U-235 and plutonium, or is the reverse more apt to be +true? Are added safeguards necessary to regulate deuterium and tritium? +Or is the UN plan, as now constituted, sufficiently flexible and +comprehensive to take care of light-element control? + + + AUTHOR’S COMMENT + +Since H-bombs require either U-235 or plutonium, as well as deuterium +and tritium, and since absolute or near-absolute control of U-235 or +plutonium is not possible, it becomes obvious that H-bomb controls must +relate to both deuterium and tritium as well as to fissionable material. +Since the UN plan does not mention them by name, added safeguards are +necessary to regulate deuterium and tritium. No safeguards, however, +could be devised even in this respect to provide absolute or +near-absolute protection. + + +6. IS IT TECHNICALLY POSSIBLE TO DETECT THE MANUFACTURE OF HEAVY WATER +AND DEUTERIUM THROUGH INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION? WOULD AN INTERNATIONAL +AGREEMENT FLATLY PROHIBITING PRODUCTION IN QUANTITY BE DESIRABLE? + +The manufacture of heavy water and the separation of deuterium are +relatively simple processes. They may be carried out in small plants +which can exist in a variety of locales. + +The _Second Report_ of the UN Commission comments as follows: + + + The international agency shall have the authority to require periodic + reports from nations regarding the production, shipment, location, and + use of specialized equipment and supplies directly related to the + production and use of atomic energy, such as mass spectrometers, + diffusion barriers, gas centrifuges, electromagnetic isotope + separation units, very pure graphite in large amounts, heavy water, + and beryllium or beryllium compounds in large amounts. In addition, + the agency shall have authority to require reports as specified of + certain distinctive facilities and construction projects having + features of size and design, or construction or operation, which, in + combination with their location and/or production or consumption of + heat or electricity, are peculiarly comparable to those of known + atomic facilities of dangerous character (p. 54). + + +Would inspectors possessing freedom of movement be able to locate +deuterium and heavy water plants? Would aerial surveys and aerial +photographs of industrial areas help detect processes which produce +hydrogen as a byproduct and which might therefore be concerned with the +manufacture of heavy water or deuterium? Should quantity production of +deuterium be prohibited even though it is used in certain types of +peacetime reactors such as the Canadian reactor at Chalk River, the +French reactor at Chatillon, Swedish reactors under construction, and a +research reactor at the Argonne National Laboratory? Is it possible on +technical grounds to enforce such a prohibition? + + + AUTHOR’S COMMENT + +It would not be desirable to prohibit production of heavy water and +deuterium in quantity since heavy water is the best moderator of +neutrons in the large-scale production of atomic power for industrial +uses. Furthermore, such a prohibition could never be enforced, since, as +stated, the manufacture of heavy water and the separation of deuterium +are relatively simple processes that “may be carried out in small plants +which can exist in a variety of locales.” What makes it even more +difficult, if not impossible, to detect any violation of such a +prohibition is the fact that the raw material for heavy water or +deuterium is just plain water. + + +7. SHOULD THE PROVISIONS OF THE PRESENT UN PLAN RELATING TO INSPECTION, +SURVEYS, AND EXPLORATIONS BE MODIFIED TO CONTROL HEAVY WATER AND +DEUTERIUM PRODUCTION? + +The United Nations plan assumes that the production of fissionable +material cannot be regulated without strict supervision over the mining +of source materials such as uranium and thorium: + + + Without the control of raw materials, any other controls that might be + applied in the various processes of atomic energy production would be + inadequate because of the uncertainty as to whether or not the + international agency has knowledge of the disposition of _all_ raw + material. (_Second Report_, p. 30.) + + +Whereas uranium and thorium are needed to produce U-235, [U-233] and +plutonium, the production of deuterium is not subject to such limitation +of source materials. Only water, the existence of power, and +comparatively simple plants are needed for the manufacture of heavy +water and deuterium. In view of these facts, can the existing United +Nations plan cope with the problem of regulating deuterium production? + +In commenting upon spot aerial surveys, for example, the _Second Report_ +recommends that “the [international] agency shall conduct spot aerial +surveys in each period of 2 years over areas not exceeding 5 percent of +the territory under the control of each nation or areas not to exceed +2,000 square miles, whichever is the larger. (These area limitations +apply to spot aerial surveys only)” (p. 68). If aerial surveys were to +be used not only in controlling raw materials but also to help in +spotting deuterium and heavy water plants, must they be carried out more +frequently than is provided in the existing plan? + +The _Second Report_ also indicates that a UN inspectorate should be +compelled to secure permission, through a warrant procedure, before +inspecting “private and restricted property not open to visitation by +the population in the locality, and in the case of certain ground +surveys and aerial surveys which are additional to others which the +agency may conduct without warrant or other special authorization” (p. +60). Do the technical facts surrounding heavy water and deuterium +production suggest that such a restriction on an international agency’s +authority would have to be modified? + + + AUTHOR’S COMMENT + +See comment on question 6. + + +8. WHAT SAFEGUARDS ARE NECESSARY TO PREVENT CLANDESTINE PRODUCTION OF +TRITIUM? WOULD AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT FLATLY PROHIBITING PRODUCTION +IN QUANTITY BE DESIRABLE? + +U-235 and plutonium may be used either in weapons or as fuels for +peacetime reactors. Here is the reason most frequently cited for +requiring that international control include not only inspection but +also such further guaranties as United Nations ownership, operation, and +management of “dangerous” plants. The potentiality, both for good and +evil, that characterizes fissionables does not appear to characterize +tritium, which has no known peacetime uses except as a laboratory +research tool. Is it therefore possible that the reason for requiring +inspection plus other guaranties as regards U-235 and plutonium does not +apply to tritium and that inspection alone would answer? + +If quantity production of tritium were altogether forbidden—as having no +peacetime purpose—the mere act of preparing lithium (the tritium raw +material) for irradiation and the mere act of inserting it in a nuclear +reactor might be considered a violation. Would such action be impossible +to conceal from managers and inspectors stationed at each reactor +permitted under the control agreement? Would an illegal reactor itself +be impossible to conceal from inspectors enjoying freedom of movement? + +A few private commentators have argued that the UN plan fundamentally +errs in assuming industrial power to be around the corner. They estimate +that this goal is actually a decade or two away and that meanwhile the +control problem would be simplified if all high-powered reactors were +dismantled. Does the role of reactor-produced tritium in H-bomb +production strengthen such an argument? + +The UN plan distinguishes between atomic facilities which are +sufficiently “dangerous” to require UN management and facilities which +may be operated by national governments and merely require international +inspection. Since all reactors produce neutrons and hence might be +useful in some degree—however small—in manufacturing tritium, is it now +necessary to regard certain reactors formerly considered to be +“non-dangerous” as now being in the “dangerous” category? + +Are there other methods, apart from reactors, for producing tritium? If +so, how can they be controlled? Would the right of the international +control agency to own, operate, and manage “dangerous” plants and to own +and regulate both fissionable materials and “fusionable materials” meet +such a situation? + + + AUTHOR’S COMMENT + +The most efficient and rapid method for producing tritium is by +inserting lithium metal into a large nuclear reactor, thus exposing it +to irradiation by neutrons, which transmute the lithium into tritium and +helium. Tritium could also be produced in a similar manner in the +smaller nuclear reactors used for research purposes, and though these +smaller reactors would produce it at a considerably slower rate, the +fact that the amounts of tritium required may be rather small would +inevitably shift these reactors from the “non-dangerous” to the +“dangerous” category. Such small reactors are essential for research, +and their prohibition would strike a vital blow at the progress of +science. Furthermore, they could be much more easily hidden than large +reactors. This fact, therefore, weakens, rather than strengthens the +argument for the dismantling of all high-powered reactors, as such +dismantling would not prevent the production of tritium. + +There are other, though less efficient, methods for producing tritium, +however, that do not require any reactors at all. A good neutron source +can be provided by exposing beryllium to radium, radon, or polonium. +These neutrons could then be used to bombard lithium and convert it into +tritium. Nor is lithium necessary, for at least four other elements, +including deuterium, helium 3, boron, and nitrogen, can be transmuted by +neutrons from the beryllium into tritium. What is more, even neutrons +are not absolutely essential, since deuterons (nuclei of deuterium) and +beryllium could be made to yield tritium by bombarding them with other +deuterons. The latter method, however, would require the use of giant +cyclotrons and would be very slow. + +All this would indicate that it would be extremely difficult, if not +impossible, to provide safeguards against the clandestine production of +tritium. + + +9. SHOULD A WORLD-WIDE GEOLOGICAL SURVEY COVER CONCENTRATED LITHIUM +DEPOSITS? + +A key feature of the United Nations plan is the provision for a +world-wide geological survey of uranium and thorium—the raw materials +potentially usable in A-bombs. This survey is considered necessary in +order to permit tracing of materials as they progress from the mines +through various processing phases and finally enter a nuclear reactor. +Does the same kind of logic apply to lithium—raw material for tritium? +How formidable is the technical problem of locating and controlling +deposits of lithium? + +Pegmatite minerals constitute a principal source of lithium ores, which +are currently produced as a byproduct of the nonmetallic mineral +industry. Commercial deposits of lithium are known to exist in the Black +Hills of North Dakota; northern New Mexico; Saskatchewan, Canada; and +southwest Africa. Production of ores rose to about 900 tons of lithium +oxide in 1944 and is now about 200 tons. So long as requirements do not +exceed byproduct production, supply does not appear to present a +problem. If requirements exceed byproduct supply, the cost of the excess +might be high. Lithium is now used commercially in glass, as a compound +in welding fluxes, in storage batteries, in fluorescent light tubes, and +as an alloying element. + +Are the quantities of lithium ore required on an order of magnitude that +makes control feasible? + + + AUTHOR’S COMMENT + +Such a world-wide geological survey would be futile, as only a few +hundred pounds of lithium would be necessary to produce enough tritium +for a relatively large H-bomb stockpile, and such amounts could be +hidden right now from available stocks. + + +10. DO THE TECHNICAL FACTS OF THE H-BOMB MEAN THAT NOW, MORE THAN EVER, +THE UNITED NATIONS PLAN IS THE CORRECT APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL +CONTROL? + +Various critics of the UN plan have denied that management control over +“dangerous” plants is essential to protect against violations. +High-power reactors are among the plants to be classified as “dangerous” +under the UN plan, and these same reactors are the ones which might +produce not merely plutonium but tritium in quantity. Likewise, an +international agency would possess authority to check the design of any +isotope separation unit and to assume the right of construction and +operation if these fall into the “dangerous” category. Deuterium may be +obtained through isotopic separation. Do such facts as these refute the +critics and demonstrate that managerial and material control by the +United Nations, over and above inspection, is more than ever necessary +in order to prevent diversion of nuclear fuel or illegal irradiation of +lithium? + + + AUTHOR’S COMMENT + +In the light of the technical facts about the H-bomb, the argument as to +whether managerial control over “dangerous” plants is essential to +protect against violations becomes wholly academic. We have seen that +even managerial control would not offer either absolute or near-absolute +protection. No plan that does not offer at least near-absolute +protection against the clandestine production of even one H-bomb per +year could be trusted when a nation’s very existence may be at stake. + + +11. HOW DOES THE H-BOMB AFFECT THE PROBLEM OF “STAGES”? + +The United Nations plan would take effect by “stages”—one stage to +include, among other projects, a world-wide geological survey, another +stage, to involve, among other projects, the taking over of atomic +installations, and still another to bring about the disposition of +fissionable materials. + +At what point in some such progression would national stockpiles of +deuterium and tritium be placed under control? When this point was +reached, would they be destroyed or be held in storage under United +Nations auspices? If a nation pretended to make known its entire +stockpile of tritium and deuterium while actually it kept hidden a +substantial portion, how would the international agency discover such a +violation? + + + AUTHORS COMMENT + +See comment on questions 12 and 13. + + +12. HOW DOES THE H-BOMB BEAR UPON THE PROBLEM OF DISPOSITION OF EXISTING +STOCKS OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL? + +When a control plan takes effect, what should be done with supplies of +U-235 and plutonium in excess of a quantity immediately usable for +peacetime purposes? This problem has received relatively little +consideration in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. If excess +stocks were destroyed, a valuable future source of energy and storehouse +of neutrons would be lost. On the other hand, if the stocks were kept in +existence under UN guard, seizure by an aggressor state might rapidly +permit it to attack with atomic bombs—and innocent countries might have +relatively little warning. + +Such seizures might quickly lead, under certain circumstances, to the +construction of “triggers” for H-bombs. Does this fact tip the balance +in favor of destroying excess U-235 and plutonium? Or are these +substances still too valuable and too difficult to replace to justify +destruction? Is there a third alternative—possibly involving partial +destruction or the use of “denaturants” or the construction of many +power reactors, regardless of cost factors—to keep excess stocks of +fissionables contaminated with fission products? + + + AUTHORS COMMENT + +The problem of the disposition of existing stocks of fissionable +materials was given little consideration because it was too hot to +handle. From the very beginning Russia insisted that all atomic bombs be +destroyed, and she left no doubt that she meant the destruction of the +fissionable materials with which bombs could be quickly assembled. Even +before the H-bomb, such destruction might have meant suicide to nations +that complied, since they would have been at the complete mercy of +noncomplying nations. The advent of the H-bomb makes all talk of such +destruction, wholly apart from the waste of a priceless, irreplaceable +natural resource, completely unrealistic, as any such act would be +tantamount to abdication, a prelude to a super-Munich by the free +nations. Denaturing, which makes fissionable materials temporarily +useless for bombs, is also out of the question, since it would take a +long time to reconcentrate them, giving nations with a hidden stock of +nondenatured material a tremendous advantage that might well mean the +difference between survival and annihilation for a nation that acted in +good faith. All this also applies to the destruction of stocks of +deuterium and tritium. + + +13. HOW DOES THE H-BOMB BEAR UPON “QUOTAS”? + +The United Nations plan envisages that reactors and other atomic +facilities will be distributed among the nations according to “quotas” +and a “strategic balance”—whereby no one nation, by seizing the plants +within or near its borders, could gain an undue military advantage over +innocent nations. This “quota” feature has been criticized as +unnecessary and as likely to hinder individual countries in developing +the peacetime uses of atomic energy to the maximum extent. + +Does the fact that reactor fuels, if seized by an aggressor, might make +available H-bomb “triggers” tend to render all the more desirable the +“quota” idea? How long a time would an aggressor require to make enough +deuterium and tritium for H-bombs in seized plants? Could a world +control authority, by requiring that certain design features be +incorporated in the plants under its control, extend this time period? +What should be done with plants in existence at the time a control +agreement takes effect and well suited to H-bomb production but poorly +suited to peacetime uses? How should such plants, if they were not +dismantled, figure in “quota” allotments? + + + AUTHOR’S COMMENT + +From its very inception the quota system was totally impossible of +realization. Today it is likely to prove a snare and a delusion, giving +a false sense of security, since it could not guarantee against the +clandestine production of at least one H-bomb a year. The plutonium for +the trigger could be produced in hidden small reactors, while the +deuterium and tritium could be produced in other small plants that could +be equally hidden. As we have seen, tritium production does not even +require a nuclear reactor. + +Like the “quota system,” the system of “stages” has also become +completely out of date, since it was predicated on the control system +taking effect before Russia developed her own atomic bombs or had built +her own nuclear reactors. Today there is no longer any logical reason +for any stages, since any delay would make effective control more +difficult. Even today, if an international agency were to take over +stockpiles, it could never be certain that considerable amounts had not +been hidden away. In other words, even if the UN plan were to be adopted +today, it would not give security against a surprise atomic attack, +which is the very purpose of the plan. + + +14. HOW DOES THE H-BOMB BEAR UPON RESEARCH TO BE PERFORMED BY THE UNITED +NATIONS CONTROL AGENCY? + +Under the United Nations plan, individual nations would be forbidden to +engage in atomic weapons research, but such research would be performed +by the world control agency itself, as a means of keeping it at the +forefront of knowledge in this field and thereby enabling it to detect +violations which might otherwise pass unnoticed through ignorance. Is +research upon H-bombs so dangerous that not even the world control +agency should be allowed to undertake it? + + + AUTHOR’S COMMENT + +If an international agency is ever established, it is obvious that it +would have to carry on research on H-bombs for the same reason that +would make it vital for it to carry on research on A-bombs—“to keep at +the forefront of knowledge” so that it would be in a position to “detect +violations.” This would become all the more imperative just because the +H-bomb is so much more dangerous. + + +15. SHOULD TECHNICAL INFORMATION REGARDING THE H-BOMB BE TRANSMITTED TO +THE UNITED NATIONS AS A BASIS FOR A DISCUSSION OF HYDROGEN CONTROL? + +In 1946 the United States transmitted six volumes of technical +information on atomic energy to the United Nations. This was one +important means of providing members of the United Nations Atomic Energy +Commission with sufficient basic data to discuss international control. + +No similar body of material on hydrogen bombs has been transmitted to +the United Nations. Can the Commission now discuss the control of +hydrogen warfare without further official information on its technical +aspects? If such information is to be provided, who should be the +provider, the United States or the Soviet Union, or both? + + + AUTHOR’S COMMENT + +All the information so far has come from the United States. In fact, the +Smyth Report, the six volumes of technical information submitted to the +UN, the testimony by scientists at the Congressional hearings on the +McMahon Act, and much declassified information have been of invaluable +aid to Russia in developing her own atomic bomb. It is about time that +this one-way flow of information came to a stop. Not a trickle has so +far come out of Russia—not even an official acknowledgment that she has +exploded her first A-bomb—and until she shows her willingness to +co-operate fully, we must stop playing Santa Claus. + + +16. SHOULD A NEW PANEL OF EXPERTS ANALOGOUS TO THE ACHESON-LILIENTHAL +BOARD BE APPOINTED TO STUDY THE H-BOMB IN RELATION TO INTERNATIONAL +CONTROL? + +It is now more than 4 years since the Acheson-Lilienthal Board made its +recommendations on international control. Their findings have since been +largely incorporated into the UN plan. + +Do the events of the last 4 years make it desirable, for technical +reasons, to rethink the control problem? Are the technical data of +hydrogen bombs such, as to demand a recasting and change of emphasis in +the existing UN plan? Have the prospects of large-scale peacetime +applications of atomic energy sufficiently changed that a different +orientation in control measures is desirable? + +If re-examination of the control question is indicated, should this +inquiry be undertaken in the first instance by a group of qualified +Americans? Or should the United States suggest that an internationally +constituted board initially take on this assignment? + +Considering the strong Soviet opposition to the UN plan, is it useful to +consider the problem of control? Is the Soviet attitude at all likely to +change in the foreseeable future? Would a rethinking of the control +problem contribute to a solution unless Soviet representatives +participated? Would the appointment of a new “Acheson-Lilienthal Board” +raise false hopes? + + + AUTHOR’S COMMENT + +As indicated in Chapter IV and in the preceding comments, the UN plan +for the international control of atomic energy is wholly out of date, +and the sooner we realize it, the better for us and for the world. It +was at best a noble ideal, which did not have the slightest chance of +realization from the very start. A re-examination of the entire problem, +even before the advent of the H-bomb, had been long overdue. Today it is +all the more imperative. Since such a re-examination requires, or at +least implies, the withdrawal of the plan, originally sponsored by this +country, it should be done by an international board, preferably at the +suggestion of some nation other than the United States. + +The new board, in considering the whole problem anew, should avoid our +original error of regarding control of atomic weapons as a problem +wholly separate from that of other weapons of mass destruction. It +should recognize the facts of life and not aim at bringing the +millennium overnight. It should not seek absolute security, since the +facts show it to be unattainable. Rather should it accept as a wise +maxim that even partial security is better than none. + +If the board set for itself certain limited objectives, they would have +a much better chance of universal acceptance than if its aims were too +high, as they were in the original United States plan, now the plan of +the majority of United Nations. Its first limited objective should be a +general agreement to outlaw the use of all weapons of mass destruction +against civilian populations. This would mean outlawing the use not only +of A- and H-bombs against large urban centers of population, but also of +all other conventional weapons for the mass killing of noncombatants. + +A second limited objective should be the outlawing of radiological +warfare in all forms, which should include the use of the rigged H-bomb +as well as the use of A-bombs in a manner that takes advantage of their +radioactive effects. This would mean the prohibition of the explosion of +A- or H-bombs from a low altitude, or their explosion underwater in a +harbor. + +These limited objectives would still permit nations to manufacture +atomic weapons and to use them as tactical weapons against military +personnel, while they would eliminate their use as strategic weapons +against large urban centers. The very possession of atomic weapons by +both sides, however, may in itself prevent their use even tactically. In +fact, there would still be the hope that they would serve as effective +deterrents against war itself. + +The advantage of such a plan of limited objectives is the likelihood, or +at least the possibility, that even Russia would not dare to turn it +down and thus stand before the world as preventing the prohibition of +the use of atomic weapons against civilian populations. And once we +reached agreement with Russia on one set of limited objectives, the door +may possibly have been opened for further agreement on other limited +objectives. + +Peace, step by step, appears to be the only alternative to possible +catastrophe. One limited objective after another must become our major +policy. + + + A NOTE ON THE TYPE IN WHICH THIS BOOK IS SET + +_The text of this book is set in Caledonia, a Linotype face designed by +W. A. Dwiggins. This type belongs to the family of printing types called +“modern face” by printers—a term used to mark the change in style of +type-letters that occurred about 1800. Caledonia borders on the general +design of Scotch Modern, but is more freely drawn than that letter._ + +_The book was composed, printed, and bound by Kingsport Press, Inc., +Kingsport, Tennessee._ + +[Illustration: [Logo]] + +------------------------------------------------------------------------ + + + + + _Also by_ WILLIAM L. LAURENCE + + + DAWN OVER ZERO + + [_1946_, _1947_] + + + _This is a Borzoi Book, published in New York by Alfred A. Knopf_ + +------------------------------------------------------------------------ + + + + + TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES + + + Page Changed from Changed to + + 56 Valuing their liberty more their Valuing their liberty more than + lives, the American their lives, the American + + 122 Einstein’s formula, E = mc₂, Einstein’s formula, E = mc², + revealed that matter revealed that matter + + ● Typos fixed; non-standard spelling and dialect retained. + ● Enclosed italics font in _underscores_. + + + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 75243 *** |