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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of Good Sense, by Baron D'Holbach
+
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+Title: Good Sense
+
+Author: Baron D'Holbach
+
+Release Date: January, 2005 [EBook #7319]
+[Yes, we are more than one year ahead of schedule]
+[This file was first posted on April 12, 2003]
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+Edition: 10
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+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK GOOD SENSE ***
+
+
+
+
+Good Sense by Paul Henri Thiry, Baron D'Holbach (08?-Dec-1723 to 21-Jan-1789)
+Originally published in French in 1772.
+
+
+
+
+Transcribed by the Freethought Archives <freethought@despammed.com>
+
+
+
+
+Transcriber's note: this e-text is based on an undated English
+translation of "Le Bon Sens" published c. 1900.  The name of the
+translator was not stated.
+
+
+
+
+
+GOOD SENSE
+WITHOUT GOD:
+
+OR
+
+FREETHOUGHTS
+OPPOSED TO
+SUPERNATURAL IDEAS
+
+
+
+A TRANSLATION OF BARON D'HOLBACH'S
+"LE BON SENS"
+
+
+
+
+"_Atheism_ leaves men to Sense, to Philosophy, to Laws, to Reputation,
+all which may be guides to moral Virtue, tho' Religion were not: but
+Superstition dismounts all these, and erects an absolute Monarchy in
+the Minds of Men.  Therefore, Atheism did never perturb States; but
+Superstition hath been the confusion of many.  The causes of Superstition
+are pleasing and sensual rights, and Ceremonies; Excess of Pharisaical
+and outside holiness, Reverence to Traditions and the stratagems of
+Prelates for their own Ambition and Lucre."--_Lord Bacon._
+
+
+
+
+
+"FREETHINKER'S LIBRARY" SERIES
+
+LONDON:
+W. STEWART & CO.
+
+
+
+
+
+PUBLISHER'S NOTE
+
+
+The chief design in reprinting this translation, is to preserve
+"_the strongest atheistical work_" for present and future generations
+of English Freethinkers.
+
+The real author was, unquestionably, Paul Thyry; Baron D'Holbach,
+and not John Meslier, to whom this work has been wrongly attributed,
+under the title of "Le Bon Sens" (Common Sense).
+
+In 1770, Baron D'Holbach published his masterpiece, "Systeme de la Nature,"
+which for a long time passed as the posthumous work of M. de Mirabaud.
+That text-book of "Atheistical Philosophy" caused a great sensation,
+and two years later, 1772, the Baron published this excellent
+abridgment of it, freed from arbitrary ideas; and by its clearness of
+expression, facility, and precision of style, rendered it most suitable
+for the average student.
+
+"Le Bon Sens" was privately printed in Amsterdam, and the author's name
+was kept a profound secret; hence, Baron D'Holbach escaped persecution.
+
+
+
+
+THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE
+
+
+When we examine the opinions of men, we find that nothing is more
+uncommon, than common sense; or, in other words, they lack judgment
+to discover plain truths, or to reject absurdities, and palpable
+contradictions.  We have an example of this in Theology, a system
+revered in all countries by a great number of men; an object regarded
+by them as most important, and indispensable to happiness.  An
+examination of the principles upon which this pretended system
+is founded, forces us to acknowledge, that these principles are
+only suppositions, imagined by ignorance, propagated by enthusiasm
+or knavery, adopted by timid credulity, preserved by custom which
+never reasons, and revered solely because not understood.
+
+In a word, whoever uses common sense upon religious opinions, and
+will bestow on this inquiry the attention that is commonly given to
+most subjects, will easily perceive that Religion is a mere castle
+in the air.  Theology is ignorance of natural causes; a tissue of
+fallacies and contradictions.  In every country, it presents romances
+void of probability, the hero of which is composed of impossible
+qualities.  His name, exciting fear in all minds, is only a vague
+word, to which, men affix ideas or qualities, which are either
+contradicted by facts, or inconsistent.
+
+Notions of this being, or rather, _the word_ by which he is designated,
+would be a matter of indifference, if it did not cause innumerable
+ravages in the world.  But men, prepossessed with the opinion that
+this phantom is a reality of the greatest interest, instead of
+concluding wisely from its incomprehensibility, that they are not
+bound to regard it, infer on the contrary, that they must contemplate
+it, without ceasing, and never lose sight of it.  Their invincible
+ignorance, upon this subject, irritates their curiosity; instead of
+putting them upon guard against their imagination, this ignorance
+renders them decisive, dogmatic, imperious, and even exasperates
+them against all, who oppose doubts to the reveries which they have
+begotten.
+
+What perplexity arises, when it is required to solve an insolvable
+problem; unceasing meditation upon an object, impossible to understand,
+but in which however he thinks himself much concerned, cannot but
+excite man, and produce a fever in his brain.  Let interest, vanity,
+and ambition, co-operate ever so little with this unfortunate turn
+of mind, and society must necessarily be disturbed.  This is the reason
+that so many nations have often been the scene of extravagances of
+senseless visionaries, who, believing their empty speculations to
+be eternal truths, and publishing them as such, have kindled the zeal
+of princes and their subjects, and made them take up arms for opinions,
+represented to them as essential to the glory of the Deity.  In all
+parts of our globe, fanatics have cut each other's throats, publicly
+burnt each other, committed without a scruple and even as a duty, the
+greatest crimes, and shed torrents of blood.  For what?  To strengthen,
+support, or propagate the impertinent conjectures of some enthusiasts,
+or to give validity to the cheats of impostors, in the name of a being,
+who exists only in their imagination, and who has made himself known
+only by the ravages, disputes, and follies, he has caused.
+
+Savage and furious nations, perpetually at war, adore, under divers names,
+some God, conformable to their ideas, that is to say, cruel, carnivorous,
+selfish, blood-thirsty.  We find, in all the religions, "a God of armies,"
+a "jealous God," an "avenging God," a "destroying God," a "God," who
+is pleased with carnage, and whom his worshippers consider it a duty
+to serve.  Lambs, bulls, children, men, and women, are sacrificed to him.
+Zealous servants of this barbarous God think themselves obliged even
+to offer up themselves as a sacrifice to him.  Madmen may everywhere
+be seen, who, after meditating upon their terrible God, imagine that to
+please him they must inflict on themselves, the most exquisite torments.
+The gloomy ideas formed of the deity, far from consoling them, have
+every where disquieted their minds, and prejudiced follies destructive
+to happiness.
+
+How could the human mind progress, while tormented with frightful phantoms,
+and guided by men, interested in perpetuating its ignorance and fears?
+Man has been forced to vegetate in his primitive stupidity: he has
+been taught stories about invisible powers upon whom his happiness was
+supposed to depend.  Occupied solely by his fears, and by unintelligible
+reveries, he has always been at the mercy of priests, who have reserved
+to themselves the right of thinking for him, and of directing his actions.
+
+Thus, man has remained a slave without courage, fearing to reason,
+and unable to extricate himself from the labyrinth, in which he has
+been wandering.  He believes himself forced under the yoke of his gods,
+known to him only by the fabulous accounts given by his ministers, who,
+after binding each unhappy mortal in the chains of prejudice, remain
+his masters, or else abandon him defenceless to the absolute power
+of tyrants, no less terrible than the gods, of whom they are the
+representatives.
+
+Oppressed by the double yoke of spiritual and temporal power, it
+has been impossible for the people to be happy.  Religion became sacred,
+and men have had no other Morality, than what their legislators and
+priests brought from the unknown regions of heaven.  The human mind,
+confused by theological opinions, ceased to know its own powers,
+mistrusted experience, feared truth and disdained reason, in order
+to follow authority.  Man has been a mere machine in the hands of
+tyrants and priests.  Always treated as a slave, man has contracted
+the vices of slavery.
+
+Such are the true causes of the corruption of morals.  Ignorance and
+servitude are calculated to make men wicked and unhappy.  Knowledge,
+Reason, and Liberty, can alone reform and make men happier.  But
+every thing conspires to blind them, and to confirm their errors.
+Priests cheat them, tyrants corrupt and enslave them.  Tyranny ever
+was, and ever will be, the true cause of man's depravity, and also
+of his calamities.  Almost always fascinated by religious fiction,
+poor mortals turn not their eyes to the natural and obvious causes
+of their misery; but attribute their vices to the imperfection of
+their natures, and their unhappiness to the anger of the gods.
+They offer to heaven vows, sacrifices, and presents, to obtain the
+end of sufferings, which in reality, are attributable only to the
+negligence, ignorance, and perversity of their guides, to the folly
+of their customs, and above all, to the general want of knowledge.
+Let men's minds be filled with true ideas; let their reason be
+cultivated; and there will be no need of opposing to the passions,
+such a feeble barrier, as the fear of gods.  Men will be good, when
+they are well instructed; and when they are despised for evil, or
+justly rewarded for good, which they do to their fellow citizens.
+
+In vain should we attempt to cure men of their vices, unless we
+begin by curing them of their prejudices.  It is only by showing
+them the truth, that they will perceive their true interests,
+and the real motives that ought to incline them to do good.
+Instructors have long enough fixed men's eyes upon heaven; let
+them now turn them upon earth.  An incomprehensible theology,
+ridiculous fables, impenetrable mysteries, puerile ceremonies,
+are to be no longer endured.  Let the human mind apply itself to
+what is natural, to intelligible objects, truth, and useful knowledge.
+
+Does it not suffice to annihilate religious prejudice, to shew,
+that what is inconceivable to man, cannot be good for him?
+Does it require any thing, but plain common sense, to perceive,
+that a being, incompatible with the most evident notions--that
+a cause continually opposed to the effects which we attribute
+to it--that a being, of whom we can say nothing, without falling
+into contradiction--that a being, who, far from explaining the
+enigmas of the universe, only makes them more inexplicable--that
+a being, whom for so many ages men have vainly addressed to obtain
+their happiness, and the end of sufferings--does it require, I say,
+any thing but plain, common sense, to perceive--that the idea of
+such a being is an idea without model, and that he himself is merely
+a phantom of the imagination?  Is any thing necessary but common sense
+to perceive, at least, that it is folly and madness for men to hate
+and damn one another about unintelligible opinions concerning a being
+of this kind?  In short, does not every thing prove, that Morality
+and Virtue are totally incompatible with the notions of a God,
+whom his ministers and interpreters have described, in every
+country, as the most capricious, unjust, and cruel of tyrants,
+whose pretended will, however, must serve as law and rule the
+inhabitants of the earth?
+
+To discover the true principles of Morality, men have no need of
+theology, of revelation, or of gods: They have need only of common
+sense.  They have only to commune with themselves, to reflect upon
+their own nature, to consider the objects of society, and of the
+individuals, who compose it; and they will easily perceive, that
+virtue is advantageous, and vice disadvantageous to themselves.
+Let us persuade men to be just, beneficent, moderate, sociable;
+not because such conduct is demanded by the gods, but, because it
+is pleasant to men.  Let us advise them to abstain from vice and
+crime; not because they will be punished in another world, but
+because they will suffer for it in this.--_These are,_ says Montesquieu,
+_means to prevent crimes--these are punishments; these reform manners--
+these are good examples._
+
+The way of truth is straight; that of imposture is crooked and dark.
+Truth, ever necessary to man, must necessarily be felt by all upright
+minds; the lessons of reason are to be followed by all honest men.
+Men are unhappy, only because they are ignorant; they are ignorant,
+only because every thing conspires to prevent their being enlightened;
+they are wicked only because their reason is not sufficiently developed.
+
+By what fatality then, have the first founders of all sects given to
+their gods ferocious characters, at which nature revolts?  Can we
+imagine a conduct more abominable, than that which Moses tells us
+his God showed towards the Egyptians, where that assassin proceeds
+boldly to declare, in the name and by the order of _his God_, that Egypt
+shall be afflicted with the greatest calamities, that can happen to
+man?  Of all the different ideas, which they give us of a supreme
+being, of a God, creator and preserver of mankind, there are none
+more horrible, than those of the impostors, who represented themselves
+as inspired by a divine spirit, and "Thus saith the Lord."
+
+Why, O theologians! do you presume to inquire into the impenetrable
+mysteries of a being, whom you consider inconceivable to the human
+mind?  You are the blasphemers, when you imagine that a being,
+perfect according to you, could be guilty of such cruelty towards
+creatures whom he has made out of nothing.  Confess, your ignorance
+of a creating God; and cease meddling with mysteries, which are
+repugnant to _Common Sense_.
+
+
+
+
+
+TABLE OF CONTENTS
+
+GIVEN IN THE FRENCH EDITION
+
+
+Section
+
+1.  APOLOGUE
+
+2, 3.  What is Theology?
+
+4.  Man is not born with any ideas of Religion
+
+5.  It is not necessary to believe in a God
+
+6.  Religion is founded on credulity
+
+7.  All religion is an absurdity
+
+8.  The idea of God is impossible
+
+9.  On the Origin of Superstition
+
+10.  On the Origin of all Religion
+
+11.  Religious fears expose men to become a prey to imposters
+
+12, 13.  Religion seduces ignorance by the aid of the marvellous
+
+14.  There would never have been any Religion, if there had not been
+     ages of Stupidity and Barbarism
+
+15.  All Religion was produced by the desire of domination
+
+16.  What serves as a basis to Religion is most uncertain
+
+17, 18.  It is impossible to be convinced of the existence of a God
+
+19.  The existence of God is not proved
+
+20.  It explains nothing to say, that God is a spirit
+
+21.  Spirituality is an absurdity
+
+22.  Whatever exists is derived from Matter
+
+23.  What is the metaphysical God of modern Theology?
+
+24.  It would be less unreasonable to adore the Sun, than to adore
+     a spiritual Deity
+
+25.  A spiritual Deity is incapable of volition and action
+
+26.  What is God?
+
+27.  Some remarkable Contradictions in Theology
+
+28.  To adore God, is to adore a fiction
+
+29.  Atheism is authorised by the infinity of God, and the impossibility
+     of knowing the Divine essence
+
+30.  Believing in God is neither safer nor less criminal than not
+     believing in him
+
+31.  Belief in God is a habit acquired in infancy
+
+32.  Belief in God is a prejudice established by successive generations
+
+33.  On the Origin of Prejudices
+
+34.  On the effects of Prejudices
+
+35.  The Religious principles of modern Theology could not be believed
+     if they were not instilled into the mind before the age of reason
+
+36.  The wonders of nature do not prove the existence of God
+
+37, 38.  Nature may be explained by natural causes
+
+39, 40.  The world has never been created: Matter moves of itself
+
+41.  Additional proofs that motion is essential to Matter, and that
+     consequently it is unnecessary to imagine a Spiritual Mover
+
+42.  The existence of Man does not prove the existence of God
+
+43.  Nevertheless, neither Man nor the Universe are the effects of chance
+
+44, 45.  The order of the Universe does not prove the existence of a God
+
+46.  A Spirit cannot be intelligent it is absurd to adore a divine
+     intelligence
+
+47, 48.  All the qualities, which Theology gives to its God are contrary
+         to the Essence which is attributed to him
+
+49.  It is absurd to say that the human race is the object and end
+     of the formation of the Universe
+
+50.  God is not made for Man, nor Man for God
+
+51.  It is not true that the object of the formation of the Universe
+     was to render Man happy
+
+52.  What is called Providence is a word without meaning
+
+53.  This pretended Providence is the enemy of Man
+
+54.  The world is not governed by an intelligent being
+
+55.  God cannot be considered immutable
+
+56.  Good and evil are the necessary effects of natural causes.
+     What is a God that cannot change any thing?
+
+57.  The consolations of Theology and the hope of paradise and of
+     a future life, are imaginary
+
+58.  Another romantic reverie
+
+59.  It is in vain that Theology attempts to clear its God from human
+     defects: either this God is not free, or else he is more wicked
+     than good
+
+60, 61.  It is impossible to believe that there exists a God of
+         infinite goodness and power
+
+62.  Theology makes its God a monster of absurdity, injustice,
+     malice, and atrocity
+
+63.  All Religion inspires contemptible fears
+
+64.  There is no difference between Religion, and the most somber
+     and servile Superstition
+
+65.  To judge from the ideas which Theology gives of the Deity, the
+     love of God is impossible
+
+66.  An eternally tormenting God is a most detestable being
+
+67.  Theology is a tissue of palpable contradictions
+
+68.  The pretended works of God do not prove Divine Perfections
+
+69.  The perfection of God is not rendered more evident by the
+     pretended creation of angels
+
+70.  Theology preaches the Omnipotence of its God, yet constantly
+     makes him appear impotent
+
+71.  According to all religious systems, God would be the most
+     capricious and most foolish of beings
+
+72.  It is absurd to say that Evil does not proceed from God
+
+73.  The foreknowledge attributed to God would give men a right
+     to complain of his cruelty
+
+74.  Absurdity of the theological stories concerning Original Sin,
+     and concerning Satan
+
+75.  The Devil, like Religion, was invented to enrich the priests
+
+76.  If God has been unable to render human nature incapable of sin,
+     he has no right to punish man
+
+77.  It is absurd to say, that the conduct of God ought to be a mystery
+     for man
+
+78.  Ought the unfortunate look for consolation, to the sole author
+     of their misery
+
+79.  A God, who punishes the faults which he might have prevented,
+     is a mad tyrant, who joins injustice to folly
+
+80.  What is called Free Will is an absurdity
+
+81.  But we must not conclude that Society has no right to punish
+
+82, 83.  Refutation of the arguments in favour of Free Will
+
+84.  God himself, if there were a God, would not be free: hence the
+     inutility of all Religion
+
+85.  According to the principles of Theology, man is not free a
+     single instant
+
+86.  There is no evil, no disorder, and no sin, but must be attributed
+     to God: consequently God has no right either to punish or recompence
+
+87.  The prayers offered to God sufficiently prove dissatisfaction of
+     the divine will
+
+88.  It is the height of absurdity to imagine, that the injuries and
+     misfortunes, endured in this world, will be repaired in another world
+
+89.  Theology justifies the evil and the wickedness, permitted by its God,
+     only by attributing to him the principle, that "Might makes Right,"
+     which is the violation of all Right
+
+90.  The absurd doctrine of Redemption, and the frequent exterminations
+     attributed to Jehovah, impress one with the idea of an unjust and
+     barbarous God
+
+91.  Can a being, who has called us into existence merely to make us
+     miserable, be a generous, equitable, and tender father?
+
+92.  Man's life, and all that occurs, deposes against the liberty of Man,
+     and against the justice and goodness of a pretended God
+
+93.  It is not true, that we owe any gratitude to what is called
+     _Providence_
+
+94.  It is folly to suppose that Man is the king of nature, the favourite
+     of God, and unique object of his labours
+
+95.  A comparison between Man and brutes
+
+96.  There are no animals so detestable as Tyrants
+
+97.  A refutation of the excellence of Man
+
+98.  An oriental Tale
+
+99.  It is madness to see nothing but the goodness of God, or to think
+     that this universe is only made for Man
+
+100.  What is the Soul?
+
+101.  The existence of a _Soul_ is an absurd supposition; and the existence
+      of an _immortal_ Soul still more absurd
+
+102.  It is evident that Man dies _in toto_
+
+103.  Incontestible arguments against the Spirituality of the Soul
+
+104.  On the absurdity of the supernatural causes, to which Theologians
+      are constantly having recourse
+
+105, 106.  It is false that Materialism degrades
+
+107.  The idea of a future life is only useful to those, who trade on
+      public credulity
+
+108.  It is false that the idea of a future life is consoling
+
+109.  All religious principles are derived from the imagination.
+      God is a chimera; and the qualities, attributed to him,
+      reciprocally destroy one another
+
+110.  Religion is but a system imagined in order to reconcile
+      contradictions by the aid of mysteries
+
+111, 112, 113.  Absurdity and inutility of all Mysteries, which were only
+                invented for the interests of Priests
+
+114.  An universal God ought to have revealed an universal Religion
+
+115.  What proves, that Religion is unnecessary, is, that it is
+      unintelligible
+
+116.  All Religions are rendered ridiculous by the multitude of creeds,
+      all opposite to one another, and all equally foolish
+
+117.  Opinion of a famous Theologian
+
+118.  The God of the Deists is not less contradictory, nor less chimerical
+      than the God of the Christians
+
+119.  It by no means proves the existence of God to say, that, in every
+      age, all nations have acknowledged some Deity or other
+
+120.  All Gods are of a savage origin: all Religions are monuments of
+      the ignorance, superstition, and ferocity of former times: modern
+      Religions are but ancient follies, re-edited with additions and
+      corrections
+
+121.  All religious usages bear marks of stupidity and barbarism
+
+122.  The more a religious opinion is ancient and general, the more it
+      ought to be suspected
+
+123.  Mere scepticism in religious matters, can only be the effect of
+      a very superficial examination
+
+124.  Revelations examined
+
+125.  Where is the proof that God ever shewed himself to Men, or ever
+      spoke to them?
+
+126.  There is nothing that proves miracles to have been ever performed
+
+127.  If God has spoken, is it not strange that he should have spoken
+      so differently to the different religious sects?
+
+128.  Obscurity and suspicious origin of oracles
+
+129.  Absurdity of all miracles
+
+130.  Refutation of the reasoning of Pascal concerning the manner in which
+      we must judge of miracles
+
+131.  Every new revelation is necessarily false
+
+132.  The blood of martyrs testifies _against_ the truth of miracles, and
+      _against_ the divine origin attributed to Christianity
+
+133.  The fanaticism of martyrs, and the interested zeal of missionaries,
+      by no means prove the truth of Religion
+
+134.  Theology makes its God an enemy to Reason and Common Sense
+
+135.  Faith is irreconcilable with Reason; and Reason is preferable
+      to Faith
+
+136.  To what absurd and ridiculous sophisms every one is reduced, who
+      would substitute Faith for Reason!
+
+137.  Ought a man to believe, on the assurance of another man, what is
+      of the greatest importance to himself
+
+138.  Faith can take root only in feeble, ignorant, or slothful minds
+
+139.  To teach, that any one Religion has greater pretensions to truth
+      than another, is an absurdity, and cause of tumult
+
+140.  Religion is unnecessary to Morality
+
+141.  Religion is the weakest barrier that can be opposed to the passions
+
+142.  Honour is a more salutary and powerful bond than Religion
+
+143.  Religion does not restrain the passions of kings
+
+144.  Origin of "the divine right of kings," the most absurd, ridiculous,
+      and odious, of usurpations
+
+145.  Religion is fatal to political ameliorations: it makes despots
+      licentious and wicked, and their subjects abject and miserable
+
+146.  Christianity has propagated itself by preaching implicit obedience
+      to despotism
+
+147.  One object of religious principles is to eternize the tyranny
+      of kings
+
+148.  How fatal it is to persuade kings that they are responsible for
+      their actions to God alone
+
+149.  A devout king is the scourge of his kingdom
+
+150.  Tyranny sometimes finds the aegis of Religion a weak obstacle
+      to the despair of the people
+
+151.  Religion favours the wickedness of princes by delivering them
+      from fear and remorse
+
+152.  What is an enlightened Sovereign?
+
+153.  Of the prevailing passions and crimes of the priesthood
+
+154.  The quackery of priests
+
+155.  Religion has corrupted Morality, and produced innumerable evils
+
+156.  Every Religion is intolerant
+
+157.  The evils of a state Religion
+
+158.  Religion legitimates and authorizes crime
+
+159.  Refutation of the argument, that the evils attributed to Religion
+      are but the bad effects of human passions
+
+160.  Religion is incompatible with Morality
+
+161.  The Morality of the Gospel is impracticable
+
+162.  A society of Saints would be impossible
+
+163.  Human nature is not depraved
+
+164.  Concerning the effects of Jesus Christ's mission
+
+165.  The dogma of the remission of sins was invented for the interest
+      of priests
+
+166.  Who fear God?
+
+167.  Hell is an absurd invention
+
+168.  The bad foundation of religious morals
+
+169.  Christian Charity, as preached and practised by Theologians!!!
+
+170.  Confession, priestcraft's gold mine, and the destruction of the
+      true principles of Morality
+
+171.  The supposition of the existence of a God is by no means necessary
+      to Morality
+
+172.  Religion and its supernatural Morality are fatal to the
+      public welfare
+
+173.  The union of Church and State is a calamity
+
+174.  National Religions are ruinous
+
+175.  Religion paralyses Morality
+
+176.  Fatal consequences of Devotion
+
+177.  The idea of a future life is not consoling to man
+
+178.  An Atheist is fully as conscientious as a religious man, and has
+      better motives for doing good
+
+179.  An Atheistical king would be far preferable to a religious king
+
+180.  Philosophy produces Morality
+
+181.  Religious opinions have little influence upon conduct
+
+182.  Reason leads man to Atheism
+
+183.  Fear alone makes Theists
+
+184.  Can we, and ought we, to love God?
+
+185.  God and Religion are proved to be absurdities by the different
+      ideas formed of them
+
+186.  The existence of God, which is the basis of Religion, has not yet
+      been demonstrated
+
+187.  Priests are more actuated by self-interest, than unbelievers
+
+188.  Pride, presumption, and badness, are more often found in priests,
+      than in Atheists
+
+189.  Prejudices last but for a time: no power is durable which is not
+      founded upon truth
+
+190.  What an honourable power ministers of the Gods would obtain,
+      if they became the apostles of reason and the defenders of liberty!
+
+191.  What a glorious and happy revolution it would be for the world,
+      if Philosophy were substituted for Religion!
+
+192.  The recantation of an unbeliever at the point of death proves
+      nothing against the reasonableness of unbelief
+
+193.  It is not true that Atheism breaks the bonds of society
+
+194.  Refutation of the often repeated opinion, that Religion is necessary
+      for the vulgar
+
+195.  Logical and argumentative systems are not adapted to the capacity
+      of the vulgar
+
+196.  On the futility and danger of Theology
+
+197, 198.  On the evils produced by implicit faith
+
+199.  History teaches us, that all Religions were established by
+      impostors, in days of ignorance
+
+200.  All Religions, ancient or modern, have borrowed from one
+      another ridiculous ceremonies
+
+201.  Theology has always diverted philosophy from its right path
+
+202.  Theology explains nothing
+
+203, 204.  Theology has always fettered Morality, and retarded progress
+
+205.  It cannot be too often repeated and proved, that Religion is an
+      extravagance and a calamity
+
+206.  Religion prevents us from seeing the true causes of misfortunes
+
+
+
+
+
+GOOD SENSE WITHOUT GOD
+
+
+APOLOGUE
+
+
+1.  There is a vast empire, governed by a monarch, whose strange
+conduct is to confound the minds of his subjects.  He wishes to be
+known, loved, respected, obeyed; but never shows himself to his subjects,
+and everything conspires to render uncertain the ideas formed of his
+character.
+
+The people, subjected to his power, have, of the character and laws of
+their invisible sovereign, such ideas only, as his ministers give them.
+They, however, confess, that they have no idea of their master; that
+his ways are impenetrable; his views and nature totally incomprehensible.
+These ministers, likewise, disagree upon the commands which they pretend
+have been issued by the sovereign, whose servants they call themselves.
+They defame one another, and mutually treat each other as impostors and
+false teachers.  The decrees and ordinances, they take upon themselves
+to promulgate, are obscure; they are enigmas, little calculated to be
+understood, or even divined, by the subjects, for whose instruction
+they were intended.  The laws of the concealed monarch require
+interpreters; but the interpreters are always disputing upon the
+true manner of understanding them.  Besides, they are not consistent
+with themselves; all they relate of their concealed prince is only
+a string of contradictions.  They utter concerning him not a single
+word that does not immediately confute itself.  They call him supremely
+good; yet many complain of his decrees.  They suppose him infinitely
+wise; and under his administration everything appears to contradict
+reason.  They extol his justice; and the best of his subjects are
+generally the least favoured.  They assert, he sees everything;
+yet his presence avails nothing.  He is, say they, the friend of
+order; yet throughout his dominions, all is in confusion and disorder.
+He makes all for himself; and the events seldom answer his designs.
+He foresees everything; but cannot prevent anything.  He impatiently
+suffers offence, yet gives everyone the power of offending him.
+Men admire the wisdom and perfection of his works; yet his works,
+full of imperfection, are of short duration.  He is continually doing
+and undoing; repairing what he has made; but is never pleased with
+his work.  In all his undertakings, he proposes only his own glory;
+yet is never glorified.  His only end is the happiness of his subjects;
+and his subjects, for the most part want necessaries.  Those, whom he
+seems to favour are generally least satisfied with their fate; almost
+all appear in perpetual revolt against a master, whose greatness they
+never cease to admire, whose wisdom to extol, whose goodness to adore,
+whose justice to fear, and whose laws to reverence, though never obeyed!
+
+This EMPIRE is the WORLD; this MONARCH GOD; his MINISTERS are the PRIESTS;
+his SUBJECTS MANKIND.
+
+
+2.  There is a science that has for its object only things
+incomprehensible. Contrary to all other sciences, it treats only of what
+cannot fall under our senses.  Hobbes calls it the _kingdom of
+darkness_.  It is a country, where every thing is governed by laws,
+contrary to those which mankind are permitted to know in the world they
+inhabit.  In this marvellous region, light is only darkness; evidence is
+doubtful or false; impossibilities are credible: reason is a deceitful
+guide; and good sense becomes madness. This _science_ is called
+_theology_, and this theology is a continual insult to the reason of
+man.
+
+
+3.  By the magical power of "ifs," "buts," "perhaps's," "what do we know,"
+etc., heaped together, a shapeless and unconnected system is formed,
+perplexing mankind, by obliterating from their minds, the most clear
+ideas and rendering uncertain truths most evident.  By reason of this
+systematic confusion, nature is an enigma; the visible world has
+disappeared, to give place to regions invisible; reason is compelled
+to yield to imagination, who leads to the country of her self-invented
+chimeras.
+
+
+4.  The principles of every religion are founded upon the idea of a GOD.
+Now, it is impossible to have true ideas of a being, who acts upon none
+of our senses.  All our ideas are representations of sensible objects.
+What then can represent to us the idea of God, which is evidently an
+idea without an object?  Is not such an idea as impossible, as an
+effect without a cause?  Can an idea without an archetype be anything,
+but a chimera?  There are, however, divines, who assure us that the idea
+of God is innate; or that we have this idea in our mother's womb.  Every
+principle is the result of reason; all reason is the effect of experience;
+experience is acquired only by the exercise of our senses: therefore,
+religious principles are not founded upon reason, and are not innate.
+
+
+5.  Every system of religion can be founded only upon the nature of God
+and man; and upon the relations, which subsist between them.  But to
+judge of the reality of those relations, we must have some idea of the
+divine nature.  Now, the world exclaims, the divine nature is
+incomprehensible to man; yet ceases not to assign attributes to this
+incomprehensible God, and to assure us, that it is our indispensable
+duty to find out that God, whom it is impossible to comprehend.
+
+The most important concern of man is what he can least comprehend.
+If God is incomprehensible to man, it would seem reasonable never to
+think of him; but religion maintains, man cannot with impunity cease
+a moment to think (or rather dream) of his God.
+
+
+6.  We are told, that divine qualities are not of a nature to be
+comprehended by finite minds.  The natural consequence must be, that
+divine qualities are not made to occupy finite minds.  But religion
+tells us, that the poor finite mind of man ought never to lose sight
+of an inconceivable being, whose qualities he can never comprehend.
+Thus, we see, religion is the art of turning the attention of mankind
+upon subjects they can never comprehend.
+
+
+7.  Religion unites man with God, or forms a communication between them;
+yet do they not say, God is infinite?  If God be infinite, no finite being
+can have communication or relation with him.  Where there is no relation,
+there can be no union, communication, or duties.  If there be no duties
+between man and his God, there is no religion for man.  Thus, in saying
+God is infinite, you annihilate religion for man, who is a finite being.
+The idea of infinity is to us an idea without model, without archetype,
+without object.
+
+
+8.  If God be an infinite being, there cannot be, either in the present
+or future world, any relative proportion between man and his God.
+Thus, the idea of God can never enter the human mind.  In supposition
+of a life, in which man would be much more enlightened, than in this,
+the idea of the infinity of God would ever remain the same distance
+from his finite mind.  Thus the idea of God will be no more clear in
+the future, than in the present life.  Thus, intelligences, superior
+to man, can have no more complete ideas of God, than man, who has not
+the least conception of him in his present life.
+
+
+9.  How has it been possible to persuade reasonable beings, that
+the thing, most impossible to comprehend, was most essential to them?
+It is because they have been greatly terrified; because, when they fear,
+they cease to reason; because, they have been taught to mistrust their
+own understanding; because, when the brain is troubled, they believe
+every thing, and examine nothing.
+
+
+10.  Ignorance and fear are the two hinges of all religion.  The
+uncertainty in which man finds himself in relation to his God, is
+precisely the motive that attaches him to his religion.  Man is
+fearful in the dark--in moral, as well as physical darkness.  His
+fear becomes habitual, and habit makes it natural; he would think
+that he wanted something, if he had nothing to fear.
+
+
+11.  He, who from infancy has habituated himself to tremble when
+he hears pronounced certain words, requires those words and needs
+to tremble.  He is therefore more disposed to listen to one, who
+entertains him in his fears, than to one, who dissuades him from them.
+The superstitious man wishes to fear; his imagination demands it;
+one might say, that he fears nothing so much, as to have nothing to fear.
+
+Men are imaginary invalids, whose weakness empirics are interested to
+encourage, in order to have sale for their drugs.  They listen rather
+to the physician, who prescribes a variety of remedies, than to him,
+who recommends good regimen, and leaves nature to herself.
+
+
+12.  If religion were more clear, it would have less charms for the
+ignorant, who are pleased only with obscurity, terrors, fables, prodigies,
+and things incredible.  Romances, silly stories, and the tales of ghosts
+and wizards, are more pleasing to vulgar minds than true histories.
+
+
+13.  In point of religion, men are only great children.  The more a
+religion is absurd and filled with wonders, the greater ascendancy
+it acquires over them.  The devout man thinks himself obliged to
+place no bounds to his credulity; the more things are inconceivable,
+they appear to him divine; the more they are incredible, the greater
+merit, he imagines, there is in believing them.
+
+
+14.  The origin of religious opinions is generally dated from the time,
+when savage nations were yet in infancy.  It was to gross, ignorant,
+and stupid people, that the founders of religion have in all ages
+addressed themselves, when they wished to give them their Gods, their
+mode of worship, their mythology, their marvellous and frightful fables.
+These chimeras, adopted without examination by parents, are transmitted,
+with more or less alteration, to their children, who seldom reason any
+more than their parents.
+
+
+15.  The object of the first legislators was to govern the people;
+and the easiest method to effect it was to terrify their minds, and
+to prevent the exercise of reason.  They led them through winding
+bye-paths, lest they might perceive the designs of their guides;
+they forced them to fix their eyes in the air, for fear they should
+look at their feet; they amused them on the way with idle stories;
+in a word, they treated them as nurses do children, who sing lullabies,
+to put them to sleep, and scold, to make them quiet.
+
+
+16.  The existence of a God is the basis of all religion.  Few appear
+to doubt his existence; yet this fundamental article utterly embarrasses
+every mind that reasons.  The first question of every catechism has been,
+and ever will be, the most difficult to resolve.  (In the year 1701,
+the holy fathers of the oratory of Vendome maintained in a thesis,
+this proposition--that, according to St. Thomas, the existence of God
+is not, and cannot be, a subject of faith.)
+
+
+17.  Can we imagine ourselves sincerely convinced of the existence
+of a being, whose nature we know not; who is inaccessible to all
+our senses; whose attributes, we are assured, are incomprehensible
+to us?  To persuade me that a being exists or can exist, I must be
+first told what that being is.  To induce me to believe the existence
+or the possibility of such a being, it is necessary to tell me things
+concerning him that are not contradictory, and do not destroy one another.
+In short, to fully convince me of the existence of that being, it is
+necessary to tell me things that I can understand.
+
+
+18.  A thing is impossible, when it includes two ideas that mutually
+destroy one another, and which can neither be conceived nor united in
+thought.  Conviction can be founded only upon the constant testimony
+of our senses, which alone give birth to our ideas, and enable us to
+judge of their agreement or disagreement.  That, which exists necessarily,
+is that, whose non-existence implies a contradiction.  These principles,
+universally acknowledged, become erroneous, when applied to the existence
+of a God.  Whatever has been hitherto said upon the subject, is either
+unintelligible, or perfect contradiction, and must therefore appear
+absurd to every rational man.
+
+
+19.  All human knowledge is more or less clear.  By what strange fatality
+have we never been able to elucidate the science of God?  The most
+civilized nations, and among them the most profound thinkers, are
+in this respect no more enlightened than the most savage tribes and
+ignorant peasants; and, examining the subject closely, we shall find,
+that, by the speculations and subtle refinements of men, the divine
+science has been only more and more obscured.  Every religion has
+hitherto been founded only upon what is called, in logic, _begging
+the question_; it takes things for granted, and then proves, by
+suppositions, instead of principles.
+
+
+20.  Metaphysics teach us, that God is a _pure spirit_.  But, is
+modern theology superior to that of the savages?  The savages
+acknowledge a _great spirit_, for the master of the world.  The
+savages, like all ignorant people, attribute to _spirits_ all the
+effects, of which their experience cannot discover the true causes.
+Ask a savage, what works your watch?  He will answer, _it is a spirit_.
+Ask the divines, what moves the universe?  They answer, _it is a spirit_.
+
+
+21.  The savage, when he speaks of a spirit, affixes, at least, some
+idea to the word; he means thereby an agent, like the air, the breeze,
+the breath, that invisibly produces discernible effects.  By subtilizing
+every thing, the modern theologian becomes as unintelligible to
+himself as to others.  Ask him, what he understands by a spirit?
+He will answer you, that it is an unknown substance, perfectly simple,
+that has no extension, that has nothing common with matter.  Indeed,
+is there any one, who can form the least idea of such a substance?
+What then is a spirit, to speak in the language of modern theology,
+but the absence of an idea?  The idea of _spirituality_ is an idea
+without model.
+
+
+22.  Is it not more natural and intelligible to draw universal existence
+from the matter, whose existence is demonstrated by all the senses,
+and whose effects we experience, which we see act, move, communicate
+motion, and incessantly generate, than to attribute the formation of
+things to an unknown power, to a spiritual being, who cannot derive
+from his nature what he has not himself, and who, by his spiritual
+essence, can create neither matter nor motion?  Nothing is more evident,
+than that the idea they endeavour to give us, of the action of mind
+upon matter, represents no object.  It is an idea without model.
+
+
+23.  The material _Jupiter_ of the ancients could move, compose, destroy,
+and create beings, similar to himself; but the God of modern theology
+is sterile.  He can neither occupy any place in space, nor move matter,
+nor form a visible world, nor create men or gods.  The metaphysical God
+is fit only to produce confusion, reveries, follies, and disputes.
+
+
+24.  Since a God was indispensably requisite to men, why did they
+not worship the Sun, that visible God, adored by so many nations?
+What being had greater claim to the homage of men, than the day-star,
+who enlightens, warms, and vivifies all beings; whose presence enlivens
+and regenerates nature, whose absence seems to cast her into gloom
+and languor?  If any being announced to mankind, power, activity,
+beneficence, and duration, it was certainly the Sun, whom they ought
+to have regarded as the parent of nature, as the divinity.  At least,
+they could not, without folly, dispute his existence, or refuse to
+acknowledge his influence.
+
+
+25.  The theologian exclaims to us, that God wants neither hands nor
+arms to act; that _he acts by his will_.  But pray, who or what is that
+God, who has a will, and what can be the subject of his divine will?
+
+Are the stories of witches, ghosts, wizards, hobgoblins, etc., more
+absurd and difficult to believe than the magical or impossible action
+of mind upon matter?  When we admit such a God, fables and reveries
+may claim belief.  Theologians treat men as children, whose simplicity
+makes them believe all the stories they hear.
+
+
+26.  To shake the existence of God, we need only to ask a theologian
+to speak of him.  As soon as he has said a word upon the subject, the
+least reflection will convince us, that his observations are totally
+incompatible with the essence he ascribes to his God.  What then is God?
+It is an abstract word, denoting the hidden power of nature; or it is
+a mathematical point, that has neither length, breadth, nor thickness.
+David Hume, speaking of theologians, has ingeniously observed, _that
+they have discovered the solution of the famous problem of Archimedes--
+a point in the heavens, whence they move the world_.
+
+
+27.  Religion prostrates men before a being, who, without extension,
+is infinite, and fills all with his immensity; a being, all-powerful,
+who never executes his will; a being, sovereignly good, who creates
+only disquietudes; a being, the friend of order, and in whose government
+all is in confusion and disorder.  What then, can we imagine, can be
+the God of theology?
+
+
+28.  To avoid all embarrassment, we are told, "that it is not necessary
+to know what God is; that we must adore him; that we are not permitted
+to extend our views to his attributes."  But, before we know that we
+must adore a God, must we not know certainly, that he exists?  But,
+how can we assure ourselves, that he exists, if we never examine
+whether the various qualities, attributed to him, do really exist
+and agree in him?  Indeed, to adore God, is to adore only the fictions
+of one's own imagination, or rather, it is to adore nothing.
+
+
+29.  In view of confounding things the more, theologians have not
+declared what their God is; they tell us only what he is not.  By
+means of negations and abstractions, they think they have composed
+a real and perfect being.  Mind is that, which is _not_ body.  An
+infinite being is a being, who is _not_ finite.  A perfect being
+is a being, who is _not_ imperfect.  Indeed, is there any one, who
+can form real ideas of such a mass of absence of ideas?  That, which
+excludes all idea, can it be any thing but nothing?
+
+To pretend, that the divine attributes are beyond the reach of human
+conception, is to grant, that God is not made for man.  To assure us,
+that, in God, all is infinite, is to own that there can be nothing
+common to him and his creatures.  If there be nothing common to God
+and his creatures, God is annihilated for man, or, at least, rendered
+useless to him.  "God," they say, "has made man intelligent, but he
+has not made him omniscient;" hence it is inferred, that he has not
+been able to give him faculties sufficiently enlarged to know his
+divine essence.  In this case, it is evident, that God has not been
+able nor willing to be known by his creatures.  By what right then
+would God be angry with beings, who were naturally incapable of knowing
+the divine essence?  God would be evidently the most unjust and
+capricious of tyrants, if he should punish an Atheist for not having
+known, what, by his nature, it was impossible he should know.
+
+
+30.  To the generality of men, nothing renders an argument more
+convincing than fear.  It is therefore, that theologians assure us,
+_we must take the safest part_; that nothing is so criminal as
+incredulity; that God will punish without pity every one who has
+the temerity to doubt his existence; that his severity is just,
+since madness or perversity only can make us deny the existence of
+an enraged monarch, who without mercy avenges himself on Atheists.
+If we coolly examine these threatenings, we shall find, they always
+suppose the thing in question.  They must first prove the existence
+of a God, before they assure us, it is safest to believe, and horrible
+to doubt or deny his existence.  They must then prove, that it is
+possible and consistent, that a just God cruelly punishes men for
+having been in a state of madness, that prevented their believing
+the existence of a being, whom their perverted reason could not conceive.
+In a word, they must prove, that an infinitely just God can infinitely
+punish the invincible and natural ignorance of man with respect
+to the divine nature.  Do not theologians reason very strangely?
+They invent phantoms, they compose them of contradictions; they
+then assure us, it is safest not to doubt the existence of these
+phantoms they themselves have invented.  According to this mode of
+reasoning, there is no absurdity, which it would not be more safe
+to believe, than not to believe.
+
+All children are born Atheists; they have no idea of God.  Are they
+then criminal on account of their ignorance?  At what age must they
+begin to believe in God?  It is, you say, at the age of reason.
+But at what time should this age commence?  Besides, if the profoundest
+theologians lose themselves in the divine nature, which they do not
+presume to comprehend, what ideas must man have of him?
+
+
+31.  Men believe in God only upon the word of those, who have no more
+idea of him than themselves.  Our nurses are our first theologians.
+They talk to children of God as if he were a scarecrow; they teach
+them from the earliest age to join their hands mechanically.  Have
+nurses then more true ideas of God than the children whom they teach
+to pray?
+
+
+32.  Religion, like a family estate, passes, with its incumbrances,
+from parents to children.  Few men in the world would have a God,
+had not pains been taken in infancy to give them one.  Each would
+receive from his parents and teachers the God whom they received
+from theirs; but each, agreeably to his disposition, would arrange,
+modify, and paint him in his own manner.
+
+
+33.  The brain of man, especially in infancy, is like soft wax, fit
+to receive every impression that is made upon it.  Education furnishes
+him with almost all his ideas at a time, when he is incapable of
+judging for himself.  We believe we have received from nature, or
+have brought with us at birth, the true or false ideas, which, in
+a tender age, had been instilled into our minds; and this persuasion
+is one of the greatest sources of errors.
+
+
+34.  Prejudice contributes to cement in us the opinions of those who
+have been charged with our instruction.  We believe them much more
+experienced than ourselves; we suppose they are fully convinced of
+the things which they teach us; we have the greatest confidence in them;
+by the care they have taken of us in infancy, we judge them incapable
+of wishing to deceive us.  These are the motives that make us adopt
+a thousand errors, without other foundation than the hazardous
+authority of those by whom we have been brought up.  The prohibition
+likewise of reasoning upon what they teach us, by no means lessens
+our confidence; but often contributes to increase our respect for
+their opinions.
+
+
+35.  Divines act very wisely in teaching men their religious principles
+before they are capable of distinguishing truth from falsehood, or
+their left hand from their right.  It would be as difficult to instill
+into the mind of a man, forty years old, the extravagant notions that
+are given us of the divinity, as to eradicate them from the mind of
+him who had imbibed them from infancy.
+
+
+36.  It is observed, that the wonders of nature are sufficient to lead
+us to the existence of a God, and fully to convince us of this important
+truth.  But how many are there in the world who have the time, capacity,
+or disposition, necessary to contemplate Nature and meditate her progress?
+Men, for the most part, pay no regard to it.  The peasant is not struck
+with the beauty of the sun, which he sees every day.  The sailor is
+not surprised at the regular motion of the ocean; he will never draw
+from it theological conclusions.  The phenomena of nature prove the
+existence of a God only to some prejudiced men, who have been early
+taught to behold the finger of God in every thing whose mechanism
+could embarrass them.  In the wonders of nature, the unprejudiced
+philosopher sees nothing but the power of nature, the permanent and
+various laws, the necessary effects of different combinations of matter
+infinitely diversified.
+
+
+37.  Is there any thing more surprising than the logic of these divines,
+who, instead of confessing their ignorance of natural causes, seek
+beyond nature, in imaginary regions, a cause much more unknown than
+that nature, of which they can form at least some idea?  To say, that
+God is the author of the phenomena of nature, is it not to attribute
+them to an occult cause?  What is God?  What is a spirit?  They are
+causes of which we have no idea.  O wise divines!  Study nature and
+her laws; and since you can there discover the action of natural causes,
+go not to those that are supernatural, which, far from enlightening,
+will only darken your ideas, and make it utterly impossible that
+you should understand yourselves.
+
+
+38.  Nature, you say, is totally inexplicable without a God.  That is
+to say, to explain what you understand very little, you have need of
+a cause which you understand not at all.  You think to elucidate what
+is obscure, by doubling the obscurity; to solve difficulties, by
+multiplying them.  O enthusiastic philosophers!  To prove the existence
+of a God, write complete treatises of botany; enter into a minute
+detail of the parts of the human body; launch forth into the sky,
+to contemplate the revolution of the stars; then return to the earth
+to admire the course of waters; behold with transport the butterflies,
+the insects, the polypi, and the organized atoms, in which you think
+you discern the greatness of your God.  All these things will not
+prove the existence of God; they will prove only, that you have not
+just ideas of the immense variety of matter, and of the effects,
+producible by its infinitely diversified combinations, that constitute
+the universe.  They will prove only your ignorance of nature; that
+you have no idea of her powers, when you judge her incapable of producing
+a multitude of forms and beings, of which your eyes, even with the
+assistance of microscopes, never discern but the smallest part.
+In a word, they will prove, that, for want of knowing sensible agents,
+or those possible to know, you find it shorter to have recourse to a
+word, expressing an inconceivable agent.
+
+
+39.  We are gravely and repeatedly told, that, _there is no effect
+without a cause_; that, _the world did not make itself_.  But the
+universe is a cause, it is not an effect; it is not a work; it has
+not been made, because it is impossible that it should have been made.
+The world has always been; its existence is necessary; it is its own cause.
+Nature, whose essence is visibly to act and produce, requires not, to
+discharge her functions, an invisible mover, much more unknown than
+herself.  Matter moves by its own energy, by a necessary consequence
+of its heterogeneity.  The diversity of motion, or modes of mutual
+action, constitutes alone the diversity of matter.  We distinguish
+beings from one another only by the different impressions or motions
+which they communicate to our organs.
+
+
+40.  You see, that all is action in nature, and yet pretend that nature,
+by itself, is dead and without power.  You imagine, that this all,
+essentially acting, needs a mover!  What then is this mover?  It is
+a spirit; a being absolutely incomprehensible and contradictory.
+Acknowledge then, that matter acts of itself, and cease to reason
+of your spiritual mover, who has nothing that is requisite to put
+it in action.  Return from your useless excursions; enter again into
+a real world; keep to _second causes_, and leave to divines their
+_first cause_, of which nature has no need, to produce all the effects
+you observe in the world.
+
+
+41.  It can be only by the diversity of impressions and effects, which
+bodies make upon us, that we feel them; that we have perceptions and
+ideas of them; that we distinguish one from another; that we assign
+them properties.  Now, to see or feel an object, the object must act
+upon our organs; this object cannot act upon us, without exciting
+some motion in us; it cannot excite motion in us, if it be not in
+motion itself.  At the instant I see an object, my eyes are struck
+by it; I can have no conception of light and vision, without motion,
+communicated to my eye, from the luminous, extended, coloured body.
+At the instant I smell something, my sense is irritated, or put in
+motion, by the parts that exhale from the odoriferous body.  At the
+moment I hear a sound, the tympanum of my ear is struck by the air,
+put in motion by a sonorous body, which would not act if it were not
+in motion itself.  Whence it evidently follows, that, without motion,
+I can neither feel, see, distinguish, compare, judge, nor occupy my
+thoughts upon any subject whatever.
+
+We are taught, that _the essence of a thing is that from which all
+its properties flow_.  Now, it is evident, that all the properties
+of bodies, of which we have ideas, are owing to motion, which alone
+informs us of their existence, and gives us the first conceptions
+of them.  I cannot be informed of my own existence but by the motions
+I experience in myself.  I am therefore forced to conclude, that
+motion is as essential to matter as extension, and that matter cannot
+be conceived without it.
+
+Should any person deny, that motion is essential and necessary to matter;
+they cannot, at least, help acknowledging that bodies, which seem dead
+and inert, produce motion of themselves, when placed in a fit situation
+to act upon one another.  For instance; phosphorus, when exposed to the
+air, immediately takes fire.  Meal and water, when mixed, ferment.
+Thus dead matter begets motion of itself.  Matter has then the power
+of self-motion; and nature, to act, has no need of a mover, whose
+pretended essence would hinder him from acting.
+
+
+42.  Whence comes man?  What is his origin?  Did the first man spring,
+ready formed, from the dust of the earth?  Man appears, like all other
+beings, a production of nature.  Whence came the first stones, the
+first trees, the first lions, the first elephants, the first ants,
+the first acorns?  We are incessantly told to acknowledge and revere
+the hand of God, of an infinitely wise, intelligent and powerful
+maker, in so wonderful a work as the human machine.  I readily confess,
+that the human machine appears to me surprising.  But as man exists
+in nature, I am not authorized to say that his formation, is above
+the power of nature.  But I can much less conceive of this formation,
+when to explain it, I am told, that a pure spirit, who has neither
+eyes, feet, hands, head, lungs, mouth nor breath, made man by taking
+a little clay, and breathing upon it.
+
+We laugh at the savage inhabitants of Paraguay, for calling themselves
+the descendants of the moon.  The divines of Europe call themselves
+the descendants, or the creation, of a pure spirit.  Is this pretension
+any more rational?  Man is intelligent; thence it is inferred, that
+he can be the work only of an intelligent being, and not of a nature,
+which is void of intelligence.  Although nothing is more rare, than
+to see man make use of this intelligence, of which he seems so proud,
+I will grant that he is intelligent, that his wants develop this faculty,
+that society especially contributes to cultivate it.  But I see nothing
+in the human machine, and in the intelligence with which it is endued,
+that announces very precisely the infinite intelligence of the maker
+to whom it is ascribed.  I see that this admirable machine is liable to
+be deranged; I see, that his wonderful intelligence is then disordered,
+and sometimes totally disappears; I infer, that human intelligence
+depends upon a certain disposition of the material organs of the body,
+and that we cannot infer the intelligence of God, any more from the
+intelligence of man, than from his materiality.  All that we can
+infer from it, is, that God is material.  The intelligence of man
+no more proves the intelligence of God, than the malice of man proves
+the malice of that God, who is the pretended maker of man.  In spite
+of all the arguments of divines, God will always be a cause contradicted
+by its effects, or of which it is impossible to judge by its works.
+We shall always see evil, imperfection and folly result from such a
+cause, that is said to be full of goodness, perfection and wisdom.
+
+
+43.  "What?" you will say, "is intelligent man, is the universe,
+and all it contains, the effect of _chance_?"  No; I repeat it,
+_the universe is not an effect_; it is the cause of all effects;
+every being it contains is the necessary effect of this cause, which
+sometimes shews us its manner of acting, but generally conceals its
+operations.  Men use the word _chance_ to hide their ignorance of
+true causes, which, though not understood, act not less according
+to certain laws.  There is no effect without a cause.  Nature is
+a word, used to denote the immense assemblage of beings, various
+matter, infinite combinations, and diversified motions, that we
+behold.  All bodies, organized or unorganized, are necessary effects
+of certain causes.  Nothing in nature can happen by chance.  Every
+thing is subject to fixed laws.  These laws are only the necessary
+connection of certain effects with their causes.  One atom of matter
+cannot meet another _by chance_; this meeting is the effect of permanent
+laws, which cause every being necessarily to act as it does, and
+hinder it from acting otherwise, in given circumstances.  To talk
+of the _fortuitous concourse of atoms_, or to attribute some effects
+to chance, is merely saying that we are ignorant of the laws, by
+which bodies act, meet, combine, or separate.
+
+Those, who are unacquainted with nature, the properties of beings,
+and the effects which must necessarily result from the concurrence
+of certain causes, think, that every thing takes place by chance.
+It is not chance, that has placed the sun in the centre of our
+planetary system; it is by its own essence, that the substance, of
+which it is composed, must occupy that place, and thence be diffused.
+
+
+44.  The worshippers of a God find, in the order of the universe,
+an invincible proof of the existence of an intelligent and wise being,
+who governs it.  But this order is nothing but a series of movements
+necessarily produced by causes or circumstances, which are sometimes
+favourable, and sometimes hurtful to us: we approve of some, and
+complain of others.
+
+Nature uniformly follows the same round; that is, the same causes
+produce the same effects, as long as their action is not disturbed
+by other causes, which force them to produce different effects.
+When the operation of causes, whose effects we experience, is interrupted
+by causes, which, though unknown, are not the less natural and necessary,
+we are confounded; we cry out, _a miracle!_ and attribute it to a cause
+much more unknown, than any of those acting before our eyes.
+
+The universe is always in order.  It cannot be in disorder.  It is
+our machine, that suffers, when we complain of disorder.  The bodies,
+causes, and beings, which this world contains, necessarily act in
+the manner in which we see them act, whether we approve or disapprove
+of their effects.  Earthquakes, volcanoes, inundations, pestilences,
+and famines are effects as necessary, or as much in the order of nature,
+as the fall of heavy bodies, the courses of rivers, the periodical
+motions of the seas, the blowing of the winds, the fruitful rains,
+and the favourable effects, for which men praise God, and thank him
+for his goodness.
+
+To be astonished that a certain order reigns in the world, is to be
+surprised that the same causes constantly produce the same effects.
+To be shocked at disorder, is to forget, that when things change, or
+are interrupted in their actions, the effects can no longer be the same.
+To wonder at the order of nature, is to wonder that any thing can exist;
+it is to be surprised at any one's own existence.  What is order to
+one being, is disorder to another.  All wicked beings find that every
+thing is in order, when they can with impunity put every thing in
+disorder.  They find, on the contrary, that every thing is in disorder,
+when they are disturbed in the exercise of their wickedness.
+
+
+45.  Upon supposition that God is the author and mover of nature,
+there could be no disorder with respect to him.  Would not all the
+causes, that he should have made, necessarily act according to the
+properties, essences, and impulses given them?  If God should change
+the ordinary course of nature, he would not be immutable.  If the
+order of the universe, in which man thinks he sees the most convincing
+proof of the existence, intelligence, power and goodness of God,
+should happen to contradict itself, one might suspect his existence,
+or, at least, accuse him of inconstancy, impotence, want of foresight
+and wisdom in the arrangement of things; one would have a right to
+accuse him of an oversight in the choice of the agents and instruments,
+which he makes, prepares, and puts in action.  In short, if the order
+of nature proves the power and intelligence of the Deity, disorder
+must prove his weakness, instability, and irrationality.
+
+You say, that God is omnipresent, that he fills the universe with
+his immensity, that nothing is done without him, that matter could
+not act without his agency.  But in this case, you admit, that your
+God is the author of disorder, that it is he who deranges nature,
+that he is the father of confusion, that he is in man, and moves
+him at the moment he sins.  If God is every where, he is in me,
+he acts with me, he is deceived with me, he offends God with me,
+and combats with me the existence of God!  O theologians! you
+never understand yourselves, when you speak of God.
+
+
+46.  In order to have what we call intelligence, it is necessary
+to have ideas, thoughts, and wishes; to have ideas, thoughts, and
+wishes, it is necessary to have organs; to have organs, it is necessary
+to have a body; to act upon bodies, it is necessary to have a body;
+to experience disorder, it is necessary to be capable of suffering.
+Whence it evidently follows, that a pure spirit can neither be intelligent,
+nor affected by what passes in the universe.
+
+Divine intelligence, ideas, and views, have, you say, nothing common
+with those of men.  Very well.  How then can men judge, right or wrong,
+of these views; reason upon these ideas; or admire this intelligence?
+This would be to judge, admire, and adore that, of which we can have
+no ideas.  To adore the profound views of divine wisdom, is it not
+to adore that, of which we cannot possibly judge?  To admire these
+views, is it not to admire without knowing why?  Admiration is always
+the daughter of ignorance.  Men admire and adore only what they do not
+comprehend.
+
+
+47.  All those qualities, ascribed to God, are totally incompatible
+with a being, who, by his very essence, is void of all analogy with
+human beings.  It is true, the divines imagine they extricate themselves
+from this difficulty, by exaggerating the human qualities, attributed
+to the Divinity; they enlarge them to infinity, where they cease to
+understand themselves.  What results from this combination of man with God?
+A mere chimera, of which, if any thing be affirmed, the phantom, combined
+with so much pains, instantly vanishes.
+
+Dante, in his poem upon _Paradise_, relates, that the Deity appeared
+to him under the figure of three circles, forming an iris, whose
+lively colours generated each other; but that, looking steadily upon
+the dazzling light, he saw only his own figure.  While adoring God,
+it is himself, that man adores.
+
+
+48.  Ought not the least reflection suffice to prove, that God can
+have none of the human qualities, all ties, virtues, or perfections?
+Our virtues and perfections are consequences of the modifications
+of our passions.  But has God passions as we have?  Again: our good
+qualities consist in our dispositions towards the beings with whom
+we live in society.  God, according to you, is an insulated being.
+God has no equals--no fellow-beings.  God does not live in society.
+He wants the assistance of no one.  He enjoys an unchangeable felicity.
+Admit then, according to your own principles, that God cannot have what
+we call virtues, and that man cannot be virtuous with respect to him.
+
+
+49.  Man, wrapped up in his own merit, imagines the human race to
+be the sole object of God in creating the universe.  Upon what does
+he found this flattering opinion?  We are told: that man is the only
+being endued with intelligence, which enables him to know the Deity,
+and to render him homage.   We are assured, that God made the world
+only for his own glory, and that it was necessary that the human species
+should come into this plan, that there might be some one to admire his
+works, and glorify him for them.  But, according to these suppositions,
+has not God evidently missed his object?  1st. Man, according to
+yourselves, will always labour under the completest impossibility
+of knowing his God, and the most invincible ignorance of his divine
+essence.  2ndly. A being, who has no equal, cannot be susceptible
+of glory; for glory can result only from the comparison of one's own
+excellence with that of others.  3rdly. If God be infinitely happy,
+if he be self-sufficient, what need has he of the homage of his feeble
+creatures?  4thly. God, notwithstanding all his endeavours, is not
+glorified; but, on the contrary, all the religions in the world
+represent him as perpetually offended; their sole object is to reconcile
+sinful, ungrateful, rebellious man with his angry God.
+
+
+50.  If God be infinite, he has much less relation with man, than
+man with ants.  Would the ants reason pertinently concerning the
+intentions, desires, and projects of the gardener?  Could they
+justly imagine, that a park was planted for them alone, by an
+ostentatious monarch, and that the sole object of his goodness was
+to furnish them with a superb residence?  But, according to theology,
+man is, with respect to God, far below what the vilest insect is to man.
+Thus, by theology itself, which is wholly devoted to the attributes
+and views of the Divinity, theology appears a complete folly.
+
+
+51.  We are told, that, in the formation of the universe, God's only
+object was the happiness of man.  But, in a world made purposely for
+him, and governed by an omnipotent God, is man in reality very happy?
+Are his enjoyments durable?  Are not his pleasures mixed with pains?
+Are many persons satisfied with their fate?  Is not man continually
+the victim of physical and moral evils?  Is not the human machine,
+which is represented as a master-piece of the Creator's skill, liable
+to derangement in a thousand ways?  Should we be surprised at the
+workmanship of a mechanic, who should shew us a complex machine,
+ready to stop every moment, and which, in a short time, would break
+in pieces of itself?
+
+
+52.  The generous care, displayed by the Deity in providing for the
+wants, and watching over the happiness of his beloved creatures,
+is called _Providence_.  But, when we open our eyes, we find that
+God provides nothing.  Providence sleeps over the greater part of
+the inhabitants of this world.  For a very small number of men who
+are supposed to be happy, what an immense multitude groan under
+oppression, and languish in misery!  Are not nations forced to
+deprive themselves of bread, to administer to the extravagances
+of a few gloomy tyrants, who are no happier than their oppressed
+slaves?
+
+At the same time that our divines emphatically expatiate upon the
+goodness of Providence, while they exhort us to repose our confidence
+in her, do we not hear them, at the sight of unforeseen catastrophes,
+exclaim, that _Providence sports with the vain projects of man_,
+that she frustrates their designs, that she laughs at their efforts,
+that profound wisdom delights to bewilder the minds of mortals?
+But, shall we put confidence in a malignant Providence, who laughs at,
+and sports with mankind?  How will one admire the unknown ways of
+a hidden wisdom, whose manner of acting is inexplicable?  Judge of
+it by effects, you will say.  We do; and find, that these effects
+are sometimes useful, and sometimes hurtful.
+
+Men think they justify Providence, by saying, that, in this world,
+there is much more good than evil to every individual of mankind.
+Supposing the good, we enjoy from Providence, is to the evil, as
+a _hundred to ten_; will it not still follow, that, for a hundred
+degrees of goodness, Providence possesses ten of malignity; which
+is incompatible with the supposed perfection of the divine nature.
+
+Almost all books are filled with the most flattering praises of
+Providence, whose attentive care is highly extolled.  It would
+seem as if man, to live happily here below, needed not his own
+exertions.  Yet, without his own labour, man could subsist hardly
+a day.  To live, he is obliged to sweat, toil, hunt, fish, and
+labour without intermission.  Without these second causes, the
+first cause, at least in most countries, would provide for none
+of our wants.  In all parts of the globe, we see savage and
+civilized man in a perpetual struggle with Providence.  He is
+necessitated to ward off the strokes directed against him by
+Providence, in hurricanes, tempests, frosts, hail-storms,
+inundations, droughts, and the various accidents, which so often
+render useless all his labours.  In a word, we see man continually
+occupied in guarding against the ill offices of that Providence,
+which is supposed to be attentive to his happiness.
+
+A bigot admired divine Providence for wisely ordering rivers to
+pass through those places, where men have built large cities.
+Is not this man's reasoning as rational, as that of many learned
+men, who incessantly talk of _final causes_, or who pretend that
+they clearly perceive the beneficent views of God in the formation
+of all things?
+
+
+53.  Do we see then, that Providence so very sensibly manifests
+herself in the preservation of those admirable works, which we
+attribute to her?  If it is she, who governs the world, we find
+her as active in destroying, as in forming; in exterminating, as
+in producing.  Does she not every moment destroy, by thousands,
+the very men, to whose preservation and welfare we suppose her
+continually attentive?  Every moment she loses sight of her
+beloved creature.  Sometimes she shakes his dwelling, sometimes
+she annihilates his harvests, sometimes she inundates his fields,
+sometimes she desolates them by a burning drought.  She arms all
+nature against man.  She arms man himself against his own species,
+and commonly terminates his existence in anguish.  Is this then
+what is called preserving the universe?
+
+If we could view, without prejudice, the equivocal conduct of Providence
+towards the human race and all sensible beings, we should find, that
+far from resembling a tender and careful mother, she resembles rather
+those unnatural mothers, who instantly forgetting the unfortunates
+of their licentious love, abandon their infants, as soon as they
+are born, and who, content with having borne them, expose them,
+helpless, to the caprice of fortune.
+
+The Hottentots, in this respect are much wiser than other nations,
+who treat them as barbarians, and refuse to worship God; because,
+they say, _if he often does good, he often does evil_.  Is not this
+manner of reasoning more just and conformable to experience, than
+that of many men, who are determined to see, in their God, nothing
+but goodness, wisdom, and foresight, and who refuse to see that
+the innumerable evils, of which this world is the theatre, must
+come from the same hand, which they kiss with delight?
+
+
+54.  Common sense teaches, that we cannot, and ought not, to judge
+of a cause, but by its effects.  A cause can be reputed constantly
+good, only when it constantly produces good.  A cause, which produces
+both good and evil, is sometimes good, and sometimes evil.  But the
+logic of theology destroys all this.  According to that, the phenomena
+of nature, or the effects we behold in this world, prove to us the
+existence of a cause infinitely good; and this cause is God.  Although
+this world is full of evils; although disorder often reigns in it;
+although men incessantly repine at their hard fate; we must be convinced,
+that these effects are owing to a beneficent and immutable cause;
+and many people believe it, or feign believe.
+
+Every thing that passes in the world, proves to us, in the clearest
+manner, that it is not governed by an intelligent being.  We can
+judge of the intelligence of a being only by the conformity of the
+means, which he employs to attain his proposed object.  The object
+of God, is the happiness of a man.  Yet, a like necessity governs
+the fate of all sensible beings, who are born only to suffer much,
+enjoy little, and die.  The cup of man is filled with joy and bitterness;
+good is every where attended with evil; order gives place to disorder;
+generation is followed by destruction.  If you say, that the designs
+of God are mysterious and that his ways are impenetrable; I answer,
+that, in this case, it is impossible to judge whether God be intelligent.
+
+
+55.  You pretend, that God is immutable!  What then produces a continual
+instability in this world, which you make his empire?  Is there a
+state, subject to more frequent and cruel revolutions, than that
+of this unknown monarch?  How can we attribute to an immutable God,
+sufficiently powerful to give solidity to his works, a government,
+in which every thing is in continual vicissitude?  If I imagine
+I see a God of uniform character in all the effects favourable to my
+species, what kind of a God can I see in their continual misfortunes?
+You tell me, it is our sins, which compel him to punish.  I answer,
+that God, according to yourselves, is then not immutable, since the
+sins of men force him to change his conduct towards them.  Can a being,
+who is sometimes provoked, and sometimes appeased, be constantly the same?
+
+
+56.  The universe can be only what it is; all sensible beings in it
+enjoy and suffer; that is, are moved sometimes in an agreeable, and
+sometimes in a disagreeable manner.  These effects are necessary;
+they result necessarily from causes, which act only according to
+their properties.  These effects necessarily please, or displease,
+by a consequence of nature.  This same nature compels me to avoid,
+avert, and resist some things, and to seek, desire, and procure others.
+In a world, where every thing is necessary, a God, who remedies nothing,
+who leaves things to run in their necessary course,--is he any thing
+but destiny, or necessity personified?  It is a deaf and useless God,
+who can effect no change in general laws, to which he is himself
+subject.  Of what importance is the infinite power of a being, who
+will do but very little in my favour?  Where is the infinite goodness
+of a being, indifferent to happiness?  Of what service is the favour
+of a being, who, is able to do an infinite good, does not do even
+a finite one?
+
+
+57.  When we ask, why so many miserable objects appear under the
+government of a good God, we are told, by way of consolation, that
+the present world is only a passage, designed to conduct man to a
+happier one.  The divines assure us, that the earth we inhabit, is
+a state of trial.  In short, they shut our mouths, by saying, that
+God could communicate to his creatures neither impossibility nor
+infinite happiness, which are reserved for himself alone.  Can such
+answers be satisfactory?  1st. The existence of another life is
+guaranteed to us only by the imagination of man, who, by supposing it,
+have only realized the desire they have of surviving themselves,
+in order to enjoy hereafter a purer and more durable happiness.
+2ndly. How can we conceive that a God, who knows every thing, and
+must be fully acquainted with the dispositions of his creatures,
+should want so many experiments, in order to be sure of their
+dispositions?  3rdly. According to the calculations of their
+chronologists, our earth has existed six or seven thousand years.
+During that time, nations have experienced calamities.  History
+exhibits the human species at all times tormented and ravaged by
+tyrants, conquerors, and heroes; by wars, inundations, famines,
+plagues, etc.  Are such long trials then likely to inspire us with
+very great confidence in the secret views of the Deity?  Do such
+numerous and constant evils give a very exalted idea of the future
+state, his goodness is preparing for us?  4thly. If God is so kindly
+disposed, as he is asserted to be, without giving men infinite happiness,
+could he not at least have communicated the degree of happiness, of
+which finite beings are susceptible here below?  To be happy, must
+we have an _infinite_ or _divine_ happiness?  5thly. If God could
+not make men happier than they are here below, what will become of
+the hope of a _paradise_, where it is pretended, that the elect will
+for ever enjoy ineffable bliss?  If God neither could nor would avert
+evil from the earth, the only residence we can know, what reason have
+we to presume, that he can or will avert evil from another world,
+of which we have no idea?  Epicurus observed: "either God would
+remove evil out of this world, and cannot; or he can, and will not;
+or he has neither the power nor will; or, lastly, he has both the
+power and will.  If he has the will, and not the power, this shews
+weakness, which is contrary to the nature of God.  If he has the
+power, and not the will, it is malignity; and this is no less contrary
+to his nature.  If he is neither able nor willing, he is both impotent
+and malignant, and consequently cannot be God.  If he be both willing
+and able (which alone is consonant to the nature of God) whence comes
+evil, or why does he not prevent it?"  Reflecting minds are still
+waiting for a reasonable solution of these difficulties; and our
+divines tell us, that they will be removed only in a future life.
+
+
+58.  We are told of a pretended _scale of beings_.  It is supposed,
+that God has divided his creatures into different classes, in which
+each enjoys the degree of happiness, of which it is susceptible.
+According to this romantic arrangement, from the oyster to the celestial
+angels, all beings enjoy a happiness, which is suitable to their nature.
+Experience explicitly contradicts this sublime reverie.  In this world,
+all sensible beings suffer and live in the midst of dangers.  Man cannot
+walk without hurting, tormenting, or killing a multitude of sensible
+beings, which are in his way; while he himself is exposed, at every
+step, to a multitude of evils, foreseen or unforeseen, which may
+lead him to destruction.  During the whole course of his life, he
+is exposed to pains; he is not sure, a moment, of his existence,
+to which he is so strongly attached, and which he regards as the
+greatest gift of the Divinity.
+
+
+59.  The world, it will be said, has all the perfection, of which
+it is susceptible: since it is not God who made it, it must have
+great qualities and great defects.  But we answer, that, as the world
+must necessarily have great defects, it would have been more conformable
+to the nature of a good God, not to have created a world, which he could
+not make completely happy.  If God was supremely happy, before the
+creation of the world, and could have continued to be supremely happy,
+without creating the world, why did he not remain at rest?  Why must
+man suffer?  Why must man exist?  Of what importance is his existence
+to God?  Nothing, or something?  If man's existence is not useful
+or necessary to God, why did God make man?  If man's existence is
+necessary to God's glory, he had need of man; he was deficient in
+something before man existed.  We can pardon an unskilful workman
+for making an imperfect work; because he must work, well or ill,
+upon penalty of starving.  This workman is excusable, but God is not.
+According to you, he is self-sufficient; if so, why does he make men?
+He has, you say, every thing requisite to make man happy.  Why then
+does he not do it?  Confess, that your God has more malice than goodness,
+unless you admit, that God, was necessitated to do what he has done,
+without being able to do it otherwise.  Yet, you assure us, that
+God is free.  You say also, that he is immutable, although it was
+in _Time_ that he began and ceased to exercise his power, like the
+inconstant beings of this world.  O theologians!  Vain are your
+efforts to free your God from defects.  This perfect God has always
+some human imperfections.
+
+
+60.  "Is not God master of his favours?  Can he not give them?
+Can he not take them away?  It does not belong to his creatures to
+require reasons for his conduct.  He can dispose of the works of his
+own hands as he pleases.  Absolute sovereign of mortals, he distributes
+happiness or misery, according to his good pleasure."  Such are
+the solutions given by theologians to console us for the evils which
+God inflicts upon us.  We reply, that a God, who is infinitely good,
+cannot be _master of his favours_, but would by his nature be obliged
+to bestow them upon his creatures; that a being, truly beneficent,
+cannot refrain from doing good; that a being, truly generous, does
+not take back what he has given; and that every man, who does so,
+dispenses with gratitude, and has no right to complain of finding
+ungrateful men.
+
+How can the odd and capricious conduct, which theologians ascribe
+to God, be reconciled with religion, which supposes a covenant, or
+mutual engagements between God and men?  If God owes nothing to his
+creatures, they, on their part, can owe nothing to their God.  All
+religion is founded upon the happiness that men think they have a
+right to expect from the Deity, who is supposed to say to them:
+_Love me, adore me, obey me: and I will make you happy_.  Men, on
+their part, say to him: _Make us happy, be faithful to your promises,
+and we will love you, we will adore you, and obey your laws_.
+By neglecting the happiness of his creatures, distributing his
+favours according to his caprice, and retracting his gifts, does
+not God break the covenant, which serves as the basis of all religion?
+Cicero has justly observed, that _if God is not agreeable to man,
+he cannot be his God_.  Goodness constitutes deity; this goodness
+can be manifested to man only by the blessings he enjoys; as soon
+as he is unhappy, this goodness disappears, and with it the divinity.
+An infinite goodness can be neither limited, partial, nor exclusive.
+If God be infinitely good, he owes happiness to all his creatures.
+The unhappiness of a single being would suffice to annihilate unbounded
+goodness.  Under an infinitely good and powerful God, is it possible
+to conceive that a single man should suffer?  One animal, or mite,
+that suffers, furnishes invincible arguments against divine providence
+and its infinite goodness.
+
+
+61.  According to theology, the afflictions and evils of this life
+are chastisements, which guilty men incur from the hand of God.
+But why are men guilty?  If God is omnipotent, does it cost him more
+to say: "Let every thing in the world be in order; let all my subjects
+be good, innocent, and fortunate," than to say: "Let every thing exist"?
+Was it more difficult for this God to do his work well, than badly?
+Religion tells us of a hell; that is, a frightful abode, where,
+notwithstanding his goodness, God reserves infinite torments for
+the majority of men.  Thus after having rendered mortals very unhappy
+in this world, religion tells them, that God can render them still
+more unhappy in another!  The theologian gets over this, by saying,
+that the goodness of God will then give place to his justice.  But
+a goodness, which gives place to the most terrible cruelty, is not
+an infinite goodness.  Besides, can a God, who, after having been
+infinitely good, becomes infinitely bad, be regarded as an immutable
+being?  Can we discern the shadow of clemency or goodness, in a God
+filled with implacable fury?
+
+
+62.  Divine justice, as stated by our divines, is undoubtedly a quality
+very proper to cherish in us the love of the Divinity.  According to
+the ideas of modern theology, it is evident, that God has created
+the majority of men, with the sole view of putting them in a fair
+way to incur eternal punishment.  Would it not have been more conformable
+to goodness, reason, and equity, to have created only stones or plants,
+and not to have created sensible beings; than to have formed men,
+whose conduct in this world might subject them to endless punishment
+in the other?  A God perfidious and malicious enough to create a
+single man, and then to abandon him to the danger of being damned,
+cannot be regarded as a perfect being; but as an unreasonable, unjust,
+and ill-natured.  Very far from composing a perfect God, theologians
+have formed the most imperfect of beings.  According to theological
+notions, God would resemble a tyrant, who, having put out the eyes
+of the greater part of his slaves, should shut them up in a dungeon,
+where, for his amusement, he would, incognito, observe their conduct
+through a trap-door, in order to punish with rigour all those, who,
+while walking about, should hit against each other; but who would
+magnificently reward the few whom he had not deprived of sight, in
+avoiding to run against their comrades.  Such are the ideas, which
+the dogma of gratuitous predestination gives us of the divinity!
+
+Although men are continually repeating that their God is infinitely
+good; yet it is evident, that in reality, they can believe nothing
+of the kind.  How can we love what we do not know?  How can we love
+a being, whose character is only fit to throw us into inquietude
+and trouble?  How can we love a being, of whom all that is said
+tends to render him an object of utter detestation?
+
+
+63.  Many people make a subtle distinction between true religion and
+superstition.  They say, that the latter is only a base and inordinate
+fear of the Deity; but that the truly religious man has confidence
+in his God, and loves him sincerely; whereas, the superstitious man
+sees in him only an enemy, has no confidence in him, and represents
+him to himself as a distrustful, cruel tyrant, sparing of his benefits,
+lavish of his chastisements.  But, in reality, does not all religion
+give us the same ideas of God?  At the same time that we are told,
+that God is infinitely good, are we not also told, that he is very
+easily provoked, that he grants his favours to a few people only,
+and that he furiously chastises those, to whom he has not been pleased
+to grant favours?
+
+
+64.  If we take our ideas of God from the nature of things, where we
+find a mixture of good and evil, this God, just like the good and evil
+of which we experience, must naturally appear capricious, inconstant,
+sometimes good, and sometimes malevolent; and therefore, instead of
+exciting our love, must generate distrust, fear, and uncertainty.
+There is then no real difference between natural religion, and the
+most gloomy and servile superstition.  If the theist sees God only
+in a favourable light; the bigot views him in the most hideous light.
+The folly of the one is cheerful, that of the other is melancholy;
+but both are equally delirious.
+
+
+65.  If I draw my ideas of God from theology, he appears to inspire
+aversion.  Devotees, who tell us, that they sincerely love their God,
+are either liars or fools, who see their God only in profile.  It is
+impossible to love a being, the very idea of whom strikes us with
+terror, and whose judgments make us tremble.  How can we, without
+being alarmed, look upon a God, who is reputed to be barbarous enough
+to damn us?  Let not divines talk to us of a filial, or respectful fear,
+mixed with love, which men ought to have for their God.  A son can
+by no means love his father, when he knows him to be cruel enough
+to inflict upon him studied torments for the least faults he may commit.
+No man upon earth can have the least spark of love for a God, who
+reserves chastisements, infinite in duration and violence, for
+ninety-nine hundredths of his children.
+
+
+66.  The inventors of the dogma of eternal hell-torments have made
+of that God, whom they call so good, the most detestable of beings.
+Cruelty in men is the last act of wickedness.  Every sensible mind
+must revolt at the bare recital of the torments, inflicted on the
+greatest criminal; but cruelty is much more apt to excite indignation,
+when void of motives.  The most sanguinary tyrants, the Caligulas,
+the Neros, the Domitians, had, at least, some motives for tormenting
+their victims.  These motives were, either their own safety, or the
+fury of revenge, or the design of frightening by terrible examples,
+or perhaps the vanity of making a display of their power, and the
+desire of satisfying a barbarous curiosity.  Can a God have any of
+these motives?  In tormenting the victims of his wrath, he would
+punish beings, who could neither endanger his immoveable power, nor
+disturb his unchangeable felicity.  On the other hand, the punishments
+of the other life would be useless to the living, who cannot be
+witnesses of them.  These punishments would be useless to the damned,
+since in hell there is no longer room for conversion, and the time
+of mercy is past.  Whence it follows, that God, in the exercise of
+his eternal vengeance, could have no other end than to amuse himself,
+and insult the weakness of his creatures.  I appeal to the whole human
+race;--is there a man who feels cruel enough coolly to torment, I do
+not say his fellow-creature, but any sensible being whatever, without
+emolument, without profit, without curiosity, without having any thing
+to fear?  Confess then, O theologians, that, even according to your
+own principles, your God is infinitely more malevolent than the worst
+of men.
+
+Perhaps you will say, that infinite offences deserve infinite punishments.
+I answer, that we cannot offend a God, whose happiness is infinite;
+that the offences of finite beings cannot be infinite; that a God,
+who is unwilling to be offended, cannot consent that the offences
+of his creatures should be eternal; that a God, infinitely good,
+can neither be infinitely cruel, nor grant his creatures an infinite
+duration, solely for the pleasure of eternal torments.
+
+Nothing but the most savage barbarity, the most egregious roguery,
+or the blindest ambition could have imagined the doctrine of eternal
+punishments.  If there is a God, whom we can offend or blaspheme,
+there are not upon earth greater blasphemers than those, who dare
+to say, that this same God is a tyrant, perverse enough to delight,
+during eternity, in the useless torments of his feeble creatures.
+
+
+67.  To pretend, that God can be offended at the actions of men,
+is to annihilate all the ideas, which divines endeavour to give us,
+in other respects, of this being.  To say, that man can trouble
+the order of the universe; that he can kindle the thunder in the
+hands of his God; that he can defeat his projects, is to say,
+that man is stronger than his God, that he is the arbiter of his
+will, that it depends upon him to change his goodness into cruelty.
+Theology continually pulls down, with one hand, what it erects with
+the other.  If all religion is founded upon a God, who is provoked
+and appeased, all religion is founded on a palpable contradiction.
+
+All religions agree in exalting the wisdom and infinite power of
+the Deity.  But no sooner do they display his conduct, than we see
+nothing but imprudence, want of foresight, weakness and folly.
+God, it is said, created the world for himself; and yet, hitherto,
+he has never been able to make himself suitably honoured by it.
+God created men in order to have, in his dominions, subjects to
+render him their homage; and yet, we see men in continual revolt
+against him.
+
+
+68.  They incessantly extol the divine perfections; and when we demand
+proofs of them, they point to his works, in which, they assure us,
+these perfections are written in indelible characters.  All these
+works are, however, imperfect and perishable.  Man, who is ever
+regarded as the most marvellous work, as the master-piece of the
+Deity, is full of imperfections, which render him disagreeable to
+the eyes of the almighty Being, who formed him.  This surprising
+work often becomes so revolting and odious to its author, that he
+is obliged to throw it into the fire.  But, if the fairest of God's
+works is imperfect, how can we judge of the divine perfections?
+Can a work, with which the author himself is so little pleased,
+induce us to admire the ability of its Maker?  Man, considered in a
+physical sense, is subject to a thousand infirmities, to numberless
+evils, and to death.  Man, considered in a moral sense, is full of
+faults; yet we are unceasingly told, that he is the most beautiful
+work of the most perfect of beings.
+
+
+69.  In creating beings more perfect than men, it appears, that
+heretofore God has not better succeeded, nor given stronger proofs
+of his perfection.  Do we not see, in many religions, that angels,
+have even attempted to dethrone him?  God proposed the happiness
+of angels and men; yet, he has never been able to render happy
+either angels or men;--the pride, malice, sins, and imperfections
+of the creatures have always opposed the will of the perfect Creator.
+
+
+70.  All religion is obviously founded upon this principle, that
+_God does what he can, and man what he will_.  Every system of religion
+presents to us an unequal combat between the Deity on one part,
+and his creatures on the other, in which the former never comes off
+to his honour.  Notwithstanding his omnipotence, he cannot succeed
+in rendering the works of his hands such as he would have them.
+To complete the absurdity, there is a religion, which pretends,
+that God himself has died to redeem mankind; and yet, men are not
+farther from any thing, than they are from what God would have them.
+
+
+71.  Nothing is more extravagant, than the part, theology makes the
+Divinity act in every country.  Did he really exist, we should see
+in him the most capricious, and senseless being.  We should be compelled
+to believe, that God made the world only to be the theatre of his
+disgraceful wars with his creatures; that he created angels, men,
+and demons, only to make adversaries, against whom he might exercise
+his power.  He renders men free to offend him, malicious enough to
+defeat his projects, too obstinate to submit; and all this merely
+for the pleasure of being angry, appeased, reconciled, and of repairing
+the disorder they have made.  Had the Deity at once formed his
+creatures such as he would have them, what pains would he not have
+spared himself, or, at least, from what embarrassments would he not
+have relieved his theologians!
+
+Every religion represents God as busy only in doing himself evil.
+He resembles those empirics, who inflict upon themselves wounds,
+to have an opportunity of exhibiting to the public the efficacy
+of their ointment.  But we see not, that the Deity has hitherto
+been able radically to cure himself of the evil, which he suffers
+from man.
+
+
+72.  God is the author of all; and yet, we are assured that evil
+does not come from God.  Whence then does it come?  From man.
+But, who made man?  God.  Evil then comes from God.  If he had
+not made man as he is, moral evil or sin would not have existed
+in the world.  The perversity of man is therefore chargeable to God.
+If man has power to do evil, or to offend God, we are forced to
+infer, that God chooses to be offended; that God, who made man,
+has resolved that man shall do evil; otherwise man would be an
+effect contrary to the cause, from which he derives his being.
+
+
+73.  Man ascribes to God the faculty of foreseeing, or knowing
+beforehand whatever will happen; but this prescience seldom turns
+to his glory, nor protects him from the lawful reproaches of man.
+If God foreknows the future, must he not have foreseen the fall
+of his creatures?  If he resolved in his decrees to permit this fall,
+it is undoubtedly because it was his will that this fall should take
+place, otherwise it could not have happened.  If God's foreknowledge
+of the sins of his creatures had been necessary or forced, one might
+suppose, that he has been constrained by his justice to punish the
+guilty; but, enjoying the faculty of foreseeing, and the power of
+predetermining every thing, did it not depend upon God not to impose
+upon himself cruel laws, or, at least, could he not dispense with
+creating beings, whom he might be under the necessity of punishing,
+and rendering unhappy by a subsequent decree?  Of what consequence
+is it, whether God has destined men to happiness or misery by an
+anterior decree, an effect of his prescience, or by a posterior
+decree, an effect of his justice?  Does the arrangement of his
+decrees alter the fate of the unhappy?  Would they not have the
+same right to complain of a God, who, being able to omit their
+creation, has notwithstanding created them, although he plainly
+foresaw that his justice would oblige him, sooner or later, to
+punish them?
+
+
+74.  "Man," you say, "when he came from the hand of God, was pure,
+innocent, and good; but his nature has been corrupted, as a punishment
+for sin."  If man, when just out of the hands of his God, could sin,
+his nature was imperfect.  Why did God suffer him to sin, and his
+nature to be corrupted?  Why did God permit him to be seduced,
+well knowing that he was too feeble to resist temptation?  Why did
+God create _satan_, an evil spirit, a tempter?  Why did not God,
+who wishes so much good to the human race, annihilate once for all
+so many evil genii, who are naturally enemies of our happiness; or
+rather, why did God create evil spirits, whose victories and fatal
+influence over mankind, he must have foreseen?  In fine, by what
+strange fatality in all religions of the world, has the evil principle
+such a decided advantage over the good principle, or the divinity?
+
+
+75.  There is related an instance of simplicity, which does honour
+to the heart of an Italian monk.  One day, while preaching, this
+pious man thought he must announce to his audience, that he had,
+thank heaven, at last discovered, by dint of meditation, a sure
+way of rendering all men happy.  "The devil," said he, "tempts men
+only to have in hell companions of his misery.  Let us therefore
+apply to the Pope, who has the keys of heaven and hell; let us prevail
+upon him to pray to God, at the head of the whole church, to consent
+to a reconciliation with the devil, to restore him to favour, to
+reinstate him in his former rank, which cannot fail to put an end
+to his malicious projects against mankind."  Perhaps the honest
+monk did not see, that the devil is at least as useful as God to
+the ministers of religion.  They have too much interest in their
+dissensions, to be instrumental in an accommodation between two
+enemies, upon whose combats their own existence and revenues depend.
+Let men cease to be tempted and to sin, and the ministry of priests
+will be useless.  Manicheism is evidently the hinge of every religion;
+but unhappily, the devil, invented to clear the deity from the
+suspicion of malice, proves to us, every moment, the impotence
+or unskilfulness of his celestial adversary.
+
+
+76.  The nature of man, it is said, was necessarily liable to corruption.
+God could not communicate to him _impeccability_, which is an inalienable
+attribute of his divine perfection.  But if God could not make man
+impeccable, why did he give himself the pains to make man, whose nature
+must necessarily be corrupted, and who must consequently offend God?
+On the other hand, if God himself could not make human nature impeccable,
+by what right does he punish men for not being impeccable?  It can
+be only by the right of the strongest; but the right of the strongest
+is called violence, and violence cannot be compatible with the justest
+of beings.  God would be supremely unjust, should he punish men for
+not sharing with him his divine perfections, or for not being able
+to be gods like him.
+
+Could not God, at least, have communicated to all men that kind of
+perfection, of which their nature is susceptible?  If some men are
+good, or render themselves agreeable to their God, why has not that
+God done the same favour, or given the same dispositions to all beings
+of our species?  Why does the number of the wicked so much exceed
+the number of the good?  Why, for one friend, has God ten thousand
+enemies, in a world, which it depended entirely upon him to people
+with honest men?  If it be true, that, in heaven, God designs to
+form a court of saints, of elect, or of men who shall have lived
+upon earth conformably to his views, would he not have had a more
+numerous, brilliant, and honourable assembly, had he composed it of
+all men, to whom, in creating them, he could grant the degree of
+goodness, necessary to attain eternal happiness?  Finally, would
+it not have been shorter not to have made man, than to have created
+him a being full of faults, rebellious to his creator, perpetually
+exposed to cause his own destruction by a fatal abuse of his liberty?
+
+Instead of creating men, a perfect God ought to have created only
+angels very docile and submissive.  Angels, it is said, are free;
+some have sinned; but, at any rate, all have not abused their liberty
+by revolting against their master.  Could not God have created only
+angels of the good kind?  If God has created angels, who have not
+sinned, could he not have created impeccable men, or men who should
+never abuse their liberty?  If the elect are incapable of sinning
+in heaven, could not God have made impeccable men upon earth?
+
+
+77.  Divines never fail to persuade us, that the enormous distance
+which separates God and man, necessarily renders the conduct of God
+a mystery to us, and that we have no right to interrogate our master.
+Is this answer satisfactory?  Since my eternal happiness is at stake,
+have I not a right to examine the conduct of God himself?  It is
+only in hope of happiness that men submit to the authority of a God.
+A despot, to whom men submit only through fear, a master, whom they
+cannot interrogate, a sovereign totally inaccessible, can never merit
+the homage of intelligent beings.  If the conduct of God is a mystery,
+it is not made for us.  Man can neither adore, admire, respect, nor
+imitate conduct, in which every thing is inconceivable, or, of which
+he can often form only revolting ideas; unless it is pretended, that
+we ought to adore every thing of which we are forced to be ignorant,
+and that every thing, which we do not know, becomes for that reason
+an object of admiration.  Divines!  You never cease telling us, that
+the designs of God are impenetrable; that _his ways are not our ways,
+nor his thoughts our thoughts_; that it is absurd to complain of his
+administration, of the motives and springs of which we are totally
+ignorant; that it is presumption to tax his judgments with injustice,
+because we cannot comprehend them.  But when you speak in this strain,
+do you not perceive, that you destroy with your own hands all your
+profound systems, whose only end is to explain to us the ways of
+the divinity, which, you say, are impenetrable?  Have you penetrated
+his judgments, his ways, his designs?  You dare not assert it, and
+though you reason about them without end, you do not comprehend
+them any more than we do.  If, by chance, you know the plan of God,
+which you wish us to admire, while most people find it so little
+worthy of a just, good, intelligent, and reasonable being, no
+longer say, this plan is impenetrable.  If you are as ignorant of
+it as we are, have some indulgence for those who ingenuously confess,
+they comprehend nothing in it, or that they see in it nothing divine.
+Cease to persecute for opinions, of which you understand nothing
+yourselves; cease to defame each other for dreams and conjectures,
+which every thing seems to contradict.  Talk to us of things intelligible
+and really useful to men; and no longer talk to us of the impenetrable
+ways of God, about which you only stammer and contradict yourselves.
+
+By continually speaking of the immense depths of divine wisdom,
+forbidding us to sound them, saying it is insolence to cite God
+before the tribunal of our feeble reason, making it a crime to judge
+our master, divines teach us nothing but the embarrassment they are in,
+when it is required to account for the conduct of a God, whose conduct
+they think marvellous only because they are utterly incapable of
+comprehending it themselves.
+
+
+78.  Physical evil is commonly regarded as a punishment for sin.
+Diseases, famines, wars, earthquakes, are means which God uses to
+chastise wicked men.  Thus, they make no scruple of attributing
+these evils to the severity of a just and good God.  But, do not
+these scourges fall indiscriminately upon the good and bad, upon
+the impious and devout, upon the innocent and guilty?  How, in this
+proceeding, would they have us admire the justice and goodness of a
+being, the idea of whom seems comforting to so many wretches, whose
+brain must undoubtedly be disordered by their misfortunes, since
+they forget, that their God is the arbiter, the sole disposer of
+the events of this world.  This being the case, ought they not to
+impute their sufferings to him, into whose arms they fly for comfort?
+Unfortunate father!  Thou consolest thyself in the bosom of Providence,
+for the loss of a dear child, or beloved wife, who made thy happiness.
+Alas!  Dost thou not see, that thy God has killed them?  Thy God has
+rendered thee miserable, and thou desirest thy God to comfort thee
+for the dreadful afflictions he has sent thee!
+
+The chimerical or supernatural notions of theology have so succeeded
+in destroying, in the minds of men, the most simple, dear, and natural
+ideas, that the devout, unable to accuse God of malice, accustom
+themselves to regard the several strokes of fate as indubitable
+proofs of celestial goodness.  When in affliction, they are ordered
+to believe that God loves them, that God visits them, that God wishes
+to try them.  Thus religion has attained the art of converting evil
+into good!  A profane person said with reason--_If God Almighty thus
+treats those whom he loves, I earnestly beseech him never to think of me_.
+
+Men must have received very gloomy and cruel ideas of their God, who
+is called so good, to believe that the most dreadful calamities and
+piercing afflictions are marks of his favour!  Would an evil genius,
+a demon, be more ingenious in tormenting his enemies, than the God
+of goodness sometimes is, who so often exercises his severity upon
+his dearest friends?
+
+
+79.  What shall we say of a father, who, we are assured, watches
+without intermission over the preservation and happiness of his weak
+and short-sighted children, and who yet leaves them at liberty to
+wander at random among rocks, precipices, and waters; who rarely
+hinders them from following their inordinate appetites; who permits
+them to handle, without precaution, murderous arms, at the risk of
+their life?  What should we think of the same father, if, instead
+of imputing to himself the evil that happens to his poor children,
+he should punish them for their wanderings in the most cruel manner?
+We should say, with reason, that this father is a madman, who unites
+injustice to folly.  A God, who punishes faults, which he could have
+prevented, is a being deficient in wisdom, goodness, and equity.
+A foreseeing God would prevent evil, and thereby avoid having to
+punish it.  A good God would not punish weaknesses, which he knew
+to be inherent in human nature.  A just God, if he made man, would
+not punish him for not being made strong enough to resist his desires.
+_To punish weakness is the most unjust tyranny._  Is it not calumniating
+a just God, to say, that he punishes men for their faults, even in
+the present life?  How could he punish beings, whom it belonged to
+him alone to reform, and who, while they have not _grace_, cannot act
+otherwise than they do?
+
+According to the principles of theologians themselves, man, in his
+present state of corruption, can do nothing but evil, since, without
+divine grace, he is never able to do good.  Now, if the nature of
+man, left to itself, or destitute of divine aid, necessarily determines
+him to evil, or renders him incapable of good, what becomes of the
+free-will of man?  According to such principles, man can neither merit
+nor demerit.  By rewarding man for the good he does, God would only
+reward himself; by punishing man for the evil he does, God would
+punish him for not giving him grace, without which he could not
+possibly do better.
+
+
+80.  Theologians repeatedly tell us, that man is free, while all
+their principles conspire to destroy his liberty.  By endeavouring
+to justify the Divinity, they in reality accuse him of the blackest
+injustice.  They suppose, that without grace, man is necessitated
+to do evil.  They affirm, that God will punish him, because God has
+not given him grace to do good!
+
+Little reflection will suffice to convince us, that man is necessitated
+in all his actions, that his free will is a chimera, even in the
+system of theologians.  Does it depend upon man to be born of such
+or such parents?  Does it depend upon man to imbibe or not to imbibe
+the opinions of his parents or instructors?  If I had been born of
+idolatrous or Mahometan parents, would it have depended upon me to
+become a Christian?  Yet, divines gravely assure us, that a just God
+will damn without pity all those, to whom he has not given grace to
+know the Christian religion!
+
+Man's birth is wholly independent of his choice.  He is not asked
+whether he is willing, or not, to come into the world.  Nature does
+not consult him upon the country and parents she gives him.
+His acquired ideas, his opinions, his notions true or false, are
+necessary fruits of the education which he has received, and of
+which he has not been the director.  His passions and desires are
+necessary consequences of the temperament given him by nature.
+During his whole life, his volitions and actions are determined by
+his connections, habits, occupations, pleasures, and conversations;
+by the thoughts, that are involuntarily presented to his mind; in
+a word, by a multitude of events and accidents, which it is out of
+his power to foresee or prevent.  Incapable of looking into futurity,
+he knows not what he will do.  From the instant of his birth to that
+of his death, he is never free.  You will say, that he wills,
+deliberates, chooses, determines; and you will hence conclude,
+that his actions are free.  It is true, that man wills, but he
+is not master of his will or his desires; he can desire and will
+only what he judges advantageous to himself; he can neither love
+pain, nor detest pleasure.  It will be said, that he sometimes
+prefers pain to pleasure; but then he prefers a momentary pain
+with a view of procuring a greater and more durable pleasure.
+In this case, the prospect of a greater good necessarily determines
+him to forego a less considerable good.
+
+The lover does not give his mistress the features which captivate him;
+he is not then master of loving, or not loving the object of his
+tenderness; he is not master of his imagination or temperament.
+Whence it evidently follows, that man is not master of his volitions
+and desires.  "But man," you will say, "can resist his desires;
+therefore he is free."  Man resists his desires, when the motives,
+which divert him from an object, are stronger than those, which
+incline him towards it; but then his resistance is necessary.  A man,
+whose fear of dishonour or punishment is greater than his love of money,
+necessarily resists the desire of stealing.
+
+"Are we not free, when we deliberate?"  But, are we masters of knowing
+or not knowing, of being in doubt or certainty?  Deliberation is
+a necessary effect of our uncertainty respecting the consequences
+of our actions.  When we are sure, or think we are sure, of these
+consequences, we necessarily decide, and we then act necessarily
+according to our true or false judgment.  Our judgments, true or false,
+are not free; they are necessarily determined by the ideas, we have
+received, or which our minds have formed.
+
+Man is not free in his choice; he is evidently necessitated to choose
+what he judges most useful and agreeable.  Neither is he free, when
+he suspends his choice; he is forced to suspend it until he knows,
+or thinks he knows, the qualities of the objects presented to him,
+or, until he has weighed the consequences of his actions.  "Man,"
+you will say, "often decides in favour of actions, which he knows
+must be detrimental to himself; man sometimes kills himself; therefore
+he is free."  I deny it.  Is man master of reasoning well or ill?
+Do not his reason and wisdom depend upon the opinions he has formed,
+or upon the conformation of his machine?  As neither one nor the other
+depends upon his will, they are no proof of liberty.  "If I lay a wager,
+that I shall do, or not do a thing, am I not free?  Does it not depend
+upon me to do it or not?"  No, I answer; the desire of winning the
+wager will necessarily determine you to do, or not to do the thing
+in question.  "But, supposing I consent to lose the wager?"  Then
+the desire of proving to me, that you are free, will have become
+a stronger motive than the desire of winning the wager; and this
+motive will have necessarily determined you to do, or not to do,
+the thing in question.
+
+"But," you will say, "I feel free."  This is an illusion, that may
+be compared to that of the fly in the fable, who, lighting upon the
+pole of a heavy carriage, applauded himself for directing its course.
+Man, who thinks himself free, is a fly, who imagines he has power to
+move the universe, while he is himself unknowingly carried along by it.
+
+The inward persuasion that we are free to do, or not to do a thing,
+is but a mere illusion.  If we trace the true principle of our actions,
+we shall find, that they are always necessary consequences of our
+volitions and desires, which are never in our power.  You think yourself
+free, because you do what you will; but are you free to will, or
+not to will; to desire, or not to desire?  Are not your volitions
+and desires necessarily excited by objects or qualities totally
+independent of you?
+
+
+81.  "If the actions of men are necessary, if men are not free, by
+what right does society punish criminals?  Is it not very unjust to
+chastise beings, who could not act otherwise than they have done?"
+If the wicked act necessarily according to the impulses of their
+evil nature, society, in punishing them, acts necessarily by the
+desire of self-preservation.  Certain objects necessarily produce
+in us the sensation of pain; our nature then forces us against them,
+and avert them from us.  A tiger, pressed by hunger, springs upon
+the man, whom he wishes to devour; but this man is not master of
+his fear, and necessarily seeks means to destroy the tiger.
+
+
+82.  "If every thing be necessary, the errors, opinions, and ideas of
+men are fatal; and, if so, how or why should we attempt to reform them?"
+The errors of men are necessary consequences of ignorance.  Their
+ignorance, prejudice, and credulity are necessary consequences of
+their inexperience, negligence, and want of reflection, in the same
+manner as delirium or lethargy are necessary effects of certain diseases.
+Truth, experience, reflection, and reason, are remedies calculated to
+cure ignorance, fanaticism and follies.  But, you will ask, why does
+not truth produce this effect upon many disordered minds?  It is
+because some diseases resist all remedies; because it is impossible
+to cure obstinate patients, who refuse the remedies presented to them;
+because the interest of some men, and the folly of others, necessarily
+oppose the admission of truth.
+
+A cause produces its effect only when its action is not interrupted
+by stronger causes, which then weakens or render useless, the action
+of the former.  It is impossible that the best arguments should be
+adopted by men, who are interested in error, prejudiced in its favour,
+and who decline all reflection; but truth must necessarily undeceive
+honest minds, who seek her sincerely.  Truth is a cause; it necessarily
+produces its effects, when its impulse is not intercepted by causes,
+which suspend its effects.
+
+
+83.  "To deprive man of his free will," it is said, "makes him a mere
+machine, an automaton.  Without liberty, he will no longer have either
+merit or virtue."  What is merit in man?  It is a manner of acting,
+which renders him estimable in the eyes of his fellow-beings.  What is
+virtue?  It is a disposition, which inclines us to do good to others.
+What can there be contemptible in machines, or automatons, capable
+of producing effects so desirable?  Marcus Aurelius was useful to
+the vast Roman Empire.  By what right would a machine despise a machine,
+whose springs facilitate its action?  Good men are springs, which second
+society in its tendency to happiness; the wicked are ill-formed springs,
+which disturb the order, progress, and harmony of society.  If, for its
+own utility, society cherishes and rewards the good, it also harasses
+and destroys the wicked, as useless or hurtful.
+
+
+84.  The world is a necessary agent.  All the beings, that compose it,
+are united to each other, and cannot act otherwise than they do, so
+long as they are moved by the same causes, and endued with the same
+properties.  When they lose properties, they will necessarily act in
+a different way.  God himself, admitting his existence, cannot be
+considered a free agent.  If there existed a God, his manner of acting
+would necessarily be determined by the properties inherent in his nature;
+nothing would be capable of arresting or altering his will.  This being
+granted, neither our actions, prayers, nor sacrifices could suspend,
+or change his invariable conduct and immutable designs; whence we are
+forced to infer, that all religion would be useless.
+
+
+85.  Were not divines in perpetual contradiction with themselves, they
+would see, that, according to their hypothesis, man cannot be reputed
+free an instant.  Do they not suppose man continually dependent on his
+God?  Are we free, when we cannot exist and be preserved without God,
+and when we cease to exist at the pleasure of his supreme will?  If
+God has made man out of nothing; if his preservation is a continued
+creation; if God cannot, an instant, lose sight of his creature; if
+whatever happens to him, is an effect of the divine will; if man can
+do nothing of himself; if all the events, which he experiences, are
+effects of the divine decrees; if he does no good without grace from
+on high, how can they maintain, that a man enjoys a moment's liberty?
+If God did not preserve him in the moment of sin, how could man sin?
+If God then preserves him, God forces him to exist, that he may sin.
+
+
+86.  The Divinity is frequently compared to a king, whose revolted
+subjects are the greater part of mankind; and it is said, he has a
+right to reward the subjects who remain faithful to him, and to punish
+the rebellious.  This comparison is not just in any of its parts.
+God presides over a machine, every spring of which he has created.
+These springs act agreeable to the manner, in which God has formed
+them; he ought to impute it to his own unskilfulness, if these springs
+do not contribute to the harmony of the machine, into which it was
+his will to insert them.  God is a created king, who has created to
+himself subjects of every description; who has formed them according
+to his own pleasure whose will can never find resistance.  If God
+has rebellious subjects in his empire, it is because God has resolved
+to have rebellious subjects.  If the sins of men disturb the order
+of the world, it is because it is the will of God that this order
+should be disturbed.
+
+Nobody dares to call in question the divine justice; yet, under the
+government of a just God, we see nothing but acts of injustice and
+violence.  Force decides the fate of nations, equity seems banished
+from the earth; a few men sport, unpunished, with the peace, property,
+liberty, and life of others.  All is disorder in a world governed
+by a God who is said to be infinitely displeased with disorder.
+
+
+87.  Although men are for ever admiring the wisdom, goodness, justice,
+and beautiful order of Providence, they are, in reality, never satisfied
+with it.  Do not the prayers, continually addressed to heaven, shew,
+that men are by no means satisfied with the divine dispensations?
+To pray to God for a favour, shews diffidence of his watchful care;
+to pray to him to avert or put an end to an evil, is to endeavour
+to obstruct the course of his justice; to implore the assistance of
+God in our calamities, is to address the author himself of these
+calamities, to represent to him, that he ought, for our sake, to
+rectify his plan, which does not accord with our interest.
+
+The Optimist, or he who maintains that _all is well_, and who incessantly
+cries that we live in _the best world possible_, to be consistent, should
+never pray; neither ought he to expect another world, where man will be
+happier.  Can there be a better world than _the best world possible_?
+Some theologians have treated the Optimists as impious, for having
+intimated that God could not produce a better world, than that in
+which we live.  According to these doctors, it is to limit the power
+of God, and to offer him insult.  But do not these divines see, that
+it shews much less indignity to God, to assert that he has done his
+best in producing this world, than to say, that, being able to produce
+a better, he has had malice enough to produce a very bad one?  If the
+Optimist, by his system, detracts from the divine power, the theologian,
+who treats him as a blasphemer, is himself a blasphemer, who offends
+the goodness of God in espousing the cause of his omnipotence.
+
+
+88.  When we complain of the evils, of which our world is the theatre,
+we are referred to the other world, where it is said, God will make
+reparation for all the iniquity and misery, which, for a time, he
+permits here below.  But if God, suffering his eternal justice to
+remain at rest for a long time, could consent to evil during the
+whole continuance of our present world, what assurance have we,
+that, during the continuance of another world, divine justice will
+not, in like manner, sleep over the misery of its inhabitants?
+
+The divines console us for our sufferings by saying, that God is
+patient, and that his justice, though often slow, is not the less sure.
+But do they not see, that patience is incompatible with a just,
+immutable, and omnipotent being?  Can God then permit injustice,
+even for an instant?  To temporize with a known evil, announces
+either weakness, uncertainty, or collusion.  To tolerate evil,
+when one has power to prevent it, is to consent to the commission
+of evil.
+
+
+89.  Divines every where exclaim, that God is infinitely just; but
+that _his justice is not the justice of man_.  Of what kind or nature
+then is this divine justice?  What idea can I form of a justice,
+which so often resembles injustice?  Is it not to confound all ideas
+of just and unjust, to say, that what is equitable in God is iniquitous
+in his creatures?  How can we receive for our model a being, whose
+divine perfections are precisely the reverse of human?
+
+"God," it is said, "is sovereign arbiter of our destinies.  His supreme
+power, which nothing can limit, justly permits him to do with the works
+of his own hands according to his good pleasure.  A worm, like man, has
+no right even to complain."  This arrogant style is evidently borrowed
+from the language, used by the ministers of tyrants, when they stop
+the mouths of those who suffer from their violences.  It cannot then
+be the language of the ministers of a God, whose equity is highly
+extolled; it is not made to be imposed upon a being, who reasons.
+Ministers of a just God!  I will inform you then, that the greatest
+power cannot confer upon your God himself the right of being unjust
+even to the vilest of his creatures.  A despot is not a God.  A God,
+who arrogates to himself the right of doing evil, is a tyrant; a tyrant
+is not a model for men; he must be an object execrable to their eyes.
+
+Is it not indeed strange, that in order to justify the Divinity,
+they make him every moment the most unjust of beings!  As soon as
+we complain of his conduct, they think to silence us by alleging,
+that _God is master_; which signifies, that God, being the strongest,
+is not bound by ordinary rules.  But the right of the strongest is
+the violation of all rights.  It seems right only to the eyes of
+a savage conqueror, who in the heat of his fury imagines, that he
+may do whatever he pleases with the unfortunate victims, whom he has
+conquered.  This barbarous right can appear legitimate only to slaves
+blind enough to believe that everything is lawful to tyrants whom
+they feel too weak to resist.
+
+In the greatest calamities, do not devout persons, through a ridiculous
+simplicity, or rather a sensible contradiction in terms, exclaim, that
+_the Almighty is master_.  Thus, inconsistent reasoners, believe, that
+the _Almighty_ (a Being, one of whose first attributes is goodness,)
+sends you pestilence, war, and famine!  You believe that the _Almighty_,
+this good being, has the will and right to inflict the greatest evils,
+you can bear!  Cease, at least, to call your God _good_, when he does
+you evil; say not, that he is just, say that he is the strongest, and
+that it is impossible for you to ward off the blows of his caprice.
+
+_God_, say you, _chastises only for our good_.  But what real good
+can result to a people from being exterminated by the plague, ravaged
+by wars, corrupted by the examples of perverse rulers, continually
+crushed under the iron sceptre of a succession of merciless tyrants,
+annihilated by the scourges of a bad government, whose destructive
+effects are often felt for ages?  If chastisements are good, then
+they cannot have too much of a good thing!  _The eyes of faith_ must
+be strange eyes, if with them they see advantages in the most dreadful
+calamities, in the vices and follies with which our species are afflicted.
+
+
+90.  What strange ideas of divine justice must Christians have, who
+are taught to believe, that their God, in view of reconciling to
+himself the human race, guilty, though unconscious, of the sin of
+their fathers, has put to death his own son, who was innocent and
+incapable of sinning?  What should we say of a king, whose subjects
+should revolt, and who, to appease himself, should find no other
+expedient than to put to death the heir of his crown, who had not
+participated in the general rebellion?  "It is," the Christian will
+say, "through goodness to his subjects, unable of themselves to
+satisfy divine justice, that God has consented to the cruel death
+of his son."  But the goodness of a father to strangers does not
+give him the right of being unjust and barbarous to his own son.
+All the qualities, which theology ascribes to God, reciprocally
+destroy one another.  The exercise of one of his perfections is
+always at the expense of the exercise of another.
+
+Has the Jew more rational ideas of divine justice than the Christian?
+The pride of a king kindles the anger of heaven; _Jehovah_ causes
+the pestilence to descend upon his innocent people; seventy thousand
+subjects are exterminated to expiate the fault of a monarch, whom
+the goodness of God resolved to spare.
+
+
+91.  Notwithstanding the various acts of injustice, with which all
+religions delight to blacken the Divinity, men cannot consent to
+accuse him of iniquity.  They fear, that, like the tyrants of this
+world, truth will offend him, and redouble upon them the weight of
+his malice and tyranny.  They hearken therefore to their priests,
+who tell them, that their God is a tender father; that this God is
+an equitable monarch whose object in this world is to assure himself
+of the love, obedience and respect of his subjects; who gives them
+liberty of acting only to afford them an opportunity of meriting
+his favours, and of acquiring an eternal happiness, which he does
+not owe them.  By what signs can men discover the tenderness of
+a father, who has given life to the greater part of his children
+merely to drag out upon the earth a painful, restless, bitter
+existence?  Is there a more unfortunate present, than that pretended
+liberty, which, we are told, men are very liable to abuse, and
+thereby to incur eternal misery?
+
+
+92.  By calling mortals to life, what a cruel and dangerous part
+has not the Deity forced them to act?  Thrown into the world without
+their consent, provided with a temperament of which they are not
+masters, animated by passions and desires inherent in their nature,
+exposed to snares which they have not power to escape, hurried away
+by events which they could not foresee or prevent, unhappy mortals
+are compelled to run a career, which may lead them to punishments
+horrible in duration and violence.
+
+Travellers inform us, that, in Asia, a Sultan reigned, full of fantastical
+ideas, and very absolute in his whims.  By a strange madness, this
+prince spent his time seated at a table, upon which were placed
+three dice and a dice-box.  One end of the table was covered with
+pieces of silver, designed to excite the avarice of his courtiers
+and people.  He, knowing the foible of his subjects, addresses them
+as follows: _Slaves, I wish your happiness.  My goodness proposes
+to enrich you, and make you all happy.  Do you see these treasures?
+Well, they are for you; strive to gain them; let each, in his turn,
+take the box and dice; whoever has the fortune to throw sixes, shall
+be master of the treasure.  But, I forewarn you, that he who has not
+the happiness to throw the number required, shall be precipitated
+for ever into a dark dungeon, where my justice demands that he be
+burned with a slow fire._  Upon this discourse of the monarch, the
+company look at each other affrighted.  No one wishes to expose
+himself to so dangerous a chance.  _What!_ says the enraged Sultan,
+_does no one offer to play?  I tell you then you must; My glory
+requires that you should play.  Play then; obey without replying._
+It is well to observe, that the dice of the despot are so prepared,
+that out of a hundred thousand throws, there is but one, which can
+gain the number required.  Thus the generous monarch has the pleasure of
+seeing his prison well filled, and his riches seldom ravished from him.
+Mortals! this SULTAN is your GOD; his TREASURE IS HEAVEN; his DUNGEON
+IS HELL, and it is you who hold the DICE!
+
+
+93.  Divines repeatedly assure us, that we owe Providence infinite
+gratitude for the numberless blessings it bestows.  They loudly extol
+the happiness of existence.  But, alas! how many mortals are truly
+satisfied with their mode of existence?  If life has sweets, with
+how much bitterness is it not mixed?  Does not a single chagrin often
+suffice suddenly to poison the most peaceable and fortunate life?
+Are there many, who, if it were in their power would begin again,
+at the same price, the painful career, in which, without their consent,
+destiny has placed them?
+
+They say, that existence is a great blessing.  But is not this existence
+continually troubled with fears, and maladies, often cruel and little
+deserved?  May not this existence, threatened on so many sides, be
+torn from us any moment?  Where is the man, who has not been deprived
+of a dear wife, beloved child, or consoling friend, whose loss every
+moment intrudes upon his thoughts?  There are few, who have not been
+forced to drink of the cup of misfortune; there are few, who have not
+desired their end.  Finally, it did not depend upon us to exist or not
+to exist.  Should the bird then be very grateful to the fowler for
+taking him in his net and confining him in his cage for his diversion?
+
+
+94.  Notwithstanding the infirmities and misery which man is forced
+to undergo, he has, nevertheless, the folly to think himself the
+favourite of his God, the object of all his cares, the sole end
+of all his works.  He imagines, that the whole universe is made
+for him; he arrogantly calls himself the _king of nature_, and
+values himself far above other animals.  Mortal! upon what canst
+thou found thy haughty pretensions?  It is, sayest thou, upon thy
+soul, upon thy reason, upon the sublime faculties, which enable
+thee to exercise an absolute empire over the beings, which surround
+thee.  But, weak sovereign of the world; art thou sure, one moment,
+of the continuance of thy reign?  Do not the smallest atoms of matter,
+which thou despisest, suffice to tear thee from thy throne, and deprive
+thee of life?  Finally, does not the king of animals at last become
+the food of worms?  Thou speakest of thy soul!  But dost thou know
+what a soul is?  Dost thou not see, that this soul is only the
+assemblage of thy organs, from which results life?  Wouldst thou
+then refuse a soul to other animals, who live, think, judge, and
+compare, like thee; who seek pleasure, and avoid pain, like thee;
+and who often have organs, which serve them better than thine?
+Thou boastest of thy intellectual faculties; but do these faculties,
+of which thou art so proud, make thee happier than other animals?
+Dost thou often make use of that reason, in which thou gloriest,
+and to which religion commands thee not to listen?  Are those brutes,
+which thou disdainest, because they are less strong or less cunning
+than thou art, subject to mental pains, to a thousand frivolous
+passions, to a thousand imaginary wants, to which thou art a continual
+prey?  Are they, like thee, tormented by the past, alarmed at the future?
+Confined solely to the present, does not what you call their _instinct_,
+and what I call their _intelligence_, suffice to preserve and defend
+them, and to supply them with all they want?  Does not this instinct,
+of which thou speakest with contempt, often serve them better than
+thy wonderful faculties?  Is not their peaceful ignorance more
+advantageous to them, than those extravagant meditations and worthless
+researches, which render thee unhappy, and for which thy zeal urges
+thee even to massacre the beings of thy noble species?  Finally,
+have these beasts, like so many mortals, a troubled imagination,
+which makes them fear, not only death, but likewise eternal torments?
+
+Augustus, hearing that Herod, king of Judea, had put his sons to
+death, exclaimed: _It is much better to be Herod's hog, than his son_.
+As much may be said of man.  This dear child of Providence runs far
+greater risks than all other animals; having suffered much in this
+world, does he not imagine, that he is in danger of suffering eternally
+in another?
+
+
+95.  Where is the precise line of distinction between man and the animals
+whom he calls brutes?  In what does he differ essentially from beasts?
+It is, we are told, by his intelligence, by the faculties of his mind,
+and by his reason, that man appears superior to all other animals, who,
+in all their actions, move only by physical impulses, in which reason
+has no share.  But finally, brutes, having fewer wants than man, easily
+do without his intellectual faculties, which would be perfectly useless
+in their mode of existence.  Their instinct is sufficient; while all
+the faculties of man scarcely suffice to render his existence supportable,
+and to satisfy the wants, which his imagination and his prejudices
+multiply to his torment.
+
+Brutes are not influenced by the same objects, as man; they have
+not the same wants, desires, nor fancies; and they very soon arrive
+to maturity, while the mind of man seldom attains to the full enjoyment
+and free exercise of its faculties and to such a use of them, as is
+conducive to his happiness.
+
+
+96.  We are assured, that the human soul is a simple substance.  It
+should then be the same in every individual, each having the same
+intellectual faculties; yet this is not the case.  Men differ as
+much in the qualities of the mind, as in the features of the face.
+There are human beings as different from one another, as man is
+from a horse or a dog.  What conformity or resemblance do we find
+between some men?  What an infinite distance is there between the
+genius of a Locke or a Newton, and that of a peasant, Hottentot,
+or Laplander?
+
+Man differs from other animals only in his organization, which enables
+him to produce effects, of which animals are not capable.  The variety,
+observable in the organs of individuals of the human species suffices to
+explain the differences in what is called their intellectual faculties.
+More or less delicacy in these organs, warmth in the blood, mobility
+in the fluids, flexibility or stiffness in the fibres and nerves,
+must necessarily produce the infinite diversity, which we observe
+in the minds of men.  It is by exercise, habit and education, that
+the mind is unfolded and becomes superior to that of others.  Man,
+without culture and experience, is as void of reason and industry,
+as the brute.  A stupid man is one, whose organs move with difficulty,
+whose brain does not easily vibrate, whose blood circulates slowly.
+A man of genius is he, whose organs are flexible, whose sensations
+are quick, whose brain vibrates with celerity.  A learned man is he,
+whose organs and brain have been long exercised upon objects to which
+he is devoted.
+
+Without culture, experience, or reason, is not man more contemptible
+and worthy of hatred, than the vilest insects or most ferocious beasts?
+Is there in nature a more detestable being, than a Tiberius, a Nero,
+or a Caligula?  Have those destroyers of the human race, known by
+the name of conquerors, more estimable souls than bears, lions, or
+panthers?  Are there animals in the world more detestable than tyrants?
+
+
+97.  The superiority which man so gratuitously arrogates to himself
+over other animals, soon vanishes in the light of reason, when we
+reflect on human extravagances.  How many animals shew more mildness,
+reflection, and reason, than the animal, who calls himself reasonable
+above all others?  Are there among men, so often enslaved and oppressed,
+societies as well constituted as those of the ants, bees, or beavers?
+Do we ever see ferocious beasts of the same species mangle and destroy
+one another without profit?  Do we ever see religious wars among them?
+The cruelty of beasts towards other species arises from hunger, the
+necessity of nourishment; the cruelty of man towards man arises only from
+the vanity of his masters and the folly of his impertinent prejudices.
+Speculative men, who endeavour to make us believe, that all in the
+universe was made for man, are much embarrassed, when we ask, how
+so many hurtful animals can contribute to the happiness of man?
+What known advantage results to the friend of the gods, from being
+bitten by a viper, stung by a gnat, devoured by vermin, torn in
+pieces by a tiger, etc.?  Would not all these animals reason as
+justly as our theologians, should they pretend that man was made
+for them?
+
+
+98.  AN EASTERN TALE.
+
+At some distance from Bagdad, a hermit, renowned for his sanctity,
+passed his days in an agreeable solitude.  The neighbouring inhabitants,
+to obtain an interest in his prayers, daily flocked to his hermitage,
+to carry him provisions and presents.  The holy man, without ceasing,
+gave thanks to God for the blessings, with which providence loaded him.
+"O Allah!" said he, "how ineffable is thy love to thy servants.  What
+have I done to merit the favours, that I receive from thy bounty?
+O Monarch of the skies!  O Father of nature! what praises could worthily
+celebrate thy munificence, and thy paternal care!  O Allah! how great
+is thy goodness to the children of men!"  Penetrated with gratitude,
+the hermit made a vow to undertake, for the seventh time, a pilgrimage
+to Mecca.  The war which then raged between the Persians and Turks,
+could not induce him to defer his pious enterprise.  Full of confidence
+in God, he sets out under the inviolable safeguard of a religious habit.
+He passes through the hostile troops without any obstacle; far from
+being molested, he receives, at every step, marks of veneration from
+the soldiers of the two parties.  At length, borne down with fatigue,
+he is obliged to seek refuge against the rays of a scorching sun;
+he rests under the cool shade of a group of palm-trees.  In this
+solitary place, the man of God finds not only an enchanting retreat,
+but a delicious repast.  He has only to put forth his hand to gather
+dates and other pleasant fruits; a brook affords him the means of
+quenching his thirst.  A green turf invites him to sleep; upon waking
+he performs the sacred ablution, and exclaims in a transport of joy:
+"O Allah! how great is thy goodness to the children of men!"  After
+this perfect refreshment, the saint, full of strength and gaiety,
+pursues his way; it leads him across a smiling country, which presents
+to his eyes flowery hillocks, enamelled meadows, and trees loaded
+with fruit.  Affected by this sight, he ceases not to adore the rich
+and liberal hand of providence, which appears every where providing
+for the happiness of the human race.  Going a little farther, the
+mountains are pretty difficult to pass; but having once arrived
+at the summit, a hideous spectacle suddenly appears to his view.
+His soul is filled with horror.  He discovers a vast plain laid
+waste with fire and sword; he beholds it covered with hundreds of
+carcases, the deplorable remains of a bloody battle, lately fought
+upon this field.  Eagles, vultures, ravens and wolves were greedily
+devouring the dead bodies with which the ground was covered.  This
+sight plunges our pilgrim into a gloomy meditation.  Heaven, by
+special favour, had enabled him to understand the language of beasts.
+He heard a wolf, gorged with human flesh, cry out in the excess of
+his joy: "O Allah! how great is thy goodness to the children of wolves.
+Thy provident wisdom takes care to craze the minds of these detestable
+men, who are so dangerous to our species.  By an effect of thy Providence,
+which watches over thy creatures, these destroyers cut one another's
+throats, and furnish us with sumptuous meals.  O Allah! how great
+is thy goodness to the children of wolves!"
+
+
+99.  A heated imagination sees in the universe only the blessings
+of heaven; a calmer mind finds in it both good and evil.  "I exist,"
+say you; but is this existence always a good?  "Behold," you say,
+"that sun, which lights; this earth, which for you is covered with
+crops and verdure; these flowers, which bloom to regale your senses;
+these trees, which bend under the weight of delicious fruits; these
+pure waters, which run only to quench your thirst; those seas, which
+embrace the universe to facilitate your commerce; these animals, which
+a foreseeing nature provides for your use."  Yes; I see all these things,
+and I enjoy them.  But in many climates, this beautiful sun is almost
+always hidden; in others, its excessive heat torments, creates storms,
+produces frightful diseases, and parches the fields; the pastures
+are without verdure, the trees without fruit, the crops are scorched,
+the springs are dried up; I can only with difficulty subsist, and
+now complain of the cruelties of nature, which to you always appears
+so beneficent.  If these seas bring me spices, and useless commodities,
+do they not destroy numberless mortals, who are foolish enough to seek
+them?  The vanity of man persuades him, that he is the sole center
+of the universe; he creates for himself a world and a God; he thinks
+himself of sufficient consequence to derange nature at his pleasure.
+But, concerning other animals, he reasons like an atheist.  Does he
+not imagine, that the individuals different from his own are automatons
+unworthy of the blessings of universal providence, and that brutes
+cannot be objects of his justice or goodness?  Mortals regard the
+happy or unhappy events, health or sickness, life or death, plenty
+or want, as rewards or punishments for the right use or abuse of
+the liberty, with which they erroneously imagine themselves endowed.
+Do they reason in the same manner concerning the brutes?  No.
+Although they see them, under a just God, enjoy and suffer, equally
+subject to health and sickness, live and die, like themselves, it
+never occurs to them to ask by what crime, these beasts could have
+incurred the displeasure of their Creator?  Have not men, blinded
+by their religious prejudices, in order to free themselves from
+embarrassment, carried their folly so far as to pretend that beasts
+have no feeling?
+
+Will men never renounce their foolish pretensions?  Will they never
+acknowledge that nature is not made for them?  Will they never see
+that nature has placed equality among all beings she has produced?
+Will they never perceive that all organized beings are equally made
+to be born and die, enjoy and suffer?  Finally, far from having any
+cause to be puffed up with their mental faculties, are they not forced
+to grant, that these faculties often make them more unhappy than beasts,
+in which we find neither opinions, prejudices, vanities, nor follies,
+which every moment decide the welfare of man?
+
+
+100.  The superiority which men arrogate over other animals, is
+chiefly founded upon their opinion, that they have the exclusive
+possession of an immortal soul.  But ask them what this soul is,
+and they are puzzled.  They will say, it is an unknown substance--
+a secret power distinct from their bodies--a spirit, of which they
+have no idea.  Ask them how this spirit, which they suppose to be
+like their God wholly void of extension, could combine itself with
+their material bodies, and they will tell you, they know nothing
+about it; that it is to them a mystery; that this combination is
+an effect of the omnipotence of God.  These are the ideas that men
+form of the hidden, or rather imaginary substance, which they consider
+as the main spring of all their actions!
+
+If the soul is a substance essentially different from the body,
+and can have no relation to it, their union would be, not a mystery,
+but an impossibility.  Besides, this soul being of a nature different
+from the body, must necessarily act in a different manner; yet we see
+that this pretended soul is sensible of the motions experienced by
+the body, and that these two substances, essentially different,
+always acts in concert.  You will say that this harmony is also
+a mystery.  But I will tell you, that I see not my soul, that I know
+and am sensible of my body only, that it is this body which feels,
+thinks, judges, suffers, and enjoys; and that all these faculties
+are necessary results of its own mechanism, or organization.
+
+
+101.  Although it is impossible for men to form the least idea of
+the soul, or the pretended spirit, which animates them; yet they
+persuade themselves that this unknown soul is exempt from death.
+Every thing proves to them, that they feel, that they think, that
+they acquire ideas, that they enjoy and suffer, only by means of
+the senses, or material organs of the body.  Admitting even the
+existence of this soul, they cannot help acknowledging, that it
+depends entirely upon the body, and undergoes, all its vicissitudes;
+and yet it is imagined, that this soul has nothing, in its nature,
+similar to the body; that it can act and feel without the assistance
+of the body; in a word, that this soul, freed from the body, and
+disengaged from its senses, can live, enjoy, suffer, experience
+happiness, or feel excruciating torments.  Upon such a tissue of
+absurdities is built the marvellous opinion of the _immortality
+of the soul_.  If I ask, what are the motives for believing the soul
+immortal, they immediately answer, that it is because man naturally
+desires to be immortal: but, because you desire a thing ardently,
+can you infer that your desire will be fulfilled?  By what strange
+logic can we dare affirm, that a thing cannot fail to happen, because
+we ardently desire it?  Are desires, begotten by the imagination,
+the measure of reality?  The impious, you say, deprived of the
+flattering hope of another life, wish to be annihilated.  Very well:
+may they not then as justly conclude, from _their_ desire, that
+they shall be annihilated, as you may conclude from _your_ desire,
+that you shall exist for ever.
+
+
+102.  Man dies, and the human body after death is no longer anything
+but a mass incapable of producing those motions, of which the sum
+total constituted life.  We see, that it has no longer circulation,
+respiration, digestion, speech, or thought.  It is pretended, that
+the soul is then separated from the body; but to say, that this soul,
+with which we are unacquainted, is the principle of life, is to say
+nothing, unless that an unknown power is the hidden principle of
+imperceptible movements.  Nothing is more natural and simple,
+than to believe, that the dead man no longer lives: nothing is more
+extravagant, than to believe, that the dead man is still alive.
+We laugh at the simplicity of some nations, whose custom is to bury
+provision with the dead, under an idea that it will be useful and
+necessary to them in the other life.  Is it then more ridiculous
+or absurd to suppose, that men will eat after death, than to imagine,
+that they will think, that they will be actuated by agreeable or
+disagreeable ideas, that they will enjoy or suffer, and that they
+will experience repentance or delight, after the organs, adapted
+to produce sensations or ideas, are once dissolved.  To say that
+the souls of men will be happy or unhappy after death, is in other
+words to say, that men will see without eyes, hear without ears,
+taste without palates, smell without noses, and touch without hands.
+And persons, who consider themselves very reasonable, adopt these ideas!
+
+
+103.  The dogma of the immortality of the soul supposes the soul
+to be a simple substance; in a word, a spirit.  But I ask again,
+what is a spirit?  "It is," say you, "a substance void of extension,
+incorruptible, having nothing common with matter."  If so, how is
+your soul born, and how does it grow, how does it strengthen or
+weaken itself, how does it get disordered and grow old, in the same
+progression as your body?
+
+To all these questions you answer, that these are mysteries.  If so,
+you cannot understand them.  If you cannot understand them, why do
+you decide about a thing, of which you are unable to form the least
+idea?  To believe or affirm any thing, it is necessary, at least,
+to know in what it consists.  To believe in the existence of your
+immaterial soul, is to say, that you are persuaded of the existence
+of a thing, of which it is impossible for you to form any true notion;
+it is to believe in words without meaning.  To affirm that the thing
+is as you say, is the height of folly or vanity.
+
+
+104.  Are not theologians strange reasoners?  Whenever they cannot
+divine the _natural_ causes of things, they invent what they call
+_supernatural_; such as spirits, occult causes, inexplicable agents,
+or rather _words_, much more obscure than the _things_ they endeavour
+to explain.  Let us remain in nature, when we wish to account for the
+phenomena of nature; let us be content to remain ignorant of causes
+too delicate for our organs; and let us be persuaded, that, by going
+beyond nature, we shall never solve the problems which nature presents.
+
+Even upon the hypothesis of theology, (that is, supposing an all-powerful
+mover of matter,) by what right would theologians deny, that their
+God has power to give this matter the faculty of thought?  Was it
+then more difficult for him to create combinations of matter, from
+which thought might result, than spirits who could think?  At least,
+by supposing matter, which thinks, we should have some notions of the
+subject of thought, or of what thinks in us; whereas, by attributing
+thought to an immaterial being, it is impossible to form the least
+idea of it.
+
+
+105.  It is objected against us, that materialism makes man a mere
+machine, which is said to be very dishonourable.  But, will it be
+much more honourable for man, if we should say, that he acts by the
+secret impulses of a spirit, or by a certain _I know not what_, that
+animates him in a manner totally inexplicable.
+
+It is easy to perceive, that the supposed superiority of _spirit_
+over matter, or of the soul over the body, has no other foundation
+than men's ignorance of this soul, while they are more familiarized
+with _matter_, with which they imagine they are acquainted, and of
+which they think they can discern the origin.  But the most simple
+movements of our bodies are to every man, who studies them, as
+inexplicable as thought.
+
+
+106.  The high value, which so many people set upon spiritual
+substance, has no other motive than their absolute inability to
+define it intelligibly.  The contempt shewn for _matter_ by our
+metaphysicians, arises only from the circumstance, that familiarity
+begets contempt.  When they tell us, that _the soul is more excellent
+and noble than the body_, they say what they know not.
+
+
+107.  The dogma of another life is incessantly extolled, as useful.
+It is maintained, that even though it should be only a fiction,
+it is advantageous, because it deceives men, and conducts them to
+virtue.  But is it true, that this dogma makes men wiser and more
+virtuous?  Are the nations, who believe this fiction, remarkable
+for purity of morals?  Has not the visible world ever the advantage
+over the invisible?  If those, who are trusted with the instruction
+and government of men, had knowledge and virtue themselves, they
+would govern them much better by realities, than by fictions.  But
+crafty, ambitious and corrupt legislators, have every where found
+it better to amuse with fables, than to teach them truths, to unfold
+their reason, to excite them to virtue by sensible and real motives,
+in fine, to govern them in a rational manner.  Priests undoubtedly
+had reasons for making the soul immaterial; they wanted souls to
+people the imaginary regions, which they have discovered in the other
+life.  Material souls would, like all bodies, have been subject to
+dissolution.  Now, if men should believe, that all must perish with
+the body, the geographers of the other world would evidently lose
+the right of guiding men's souls towards that unknown abode; they
+would reap no profits from the hope with which they feed them, and
+the terrors with which they oppress them.  If futurity is of no real
+utility to mankind, it is, at least, of the greatest utility to those,
+who have assumed the office of conducting them thither.
+
+
+108.  "But," it will be said, "is not the dogma of the immortality of
+the soul comforting to beings, who are often very unhappy here below?
+Though it should be an error, is it not pleasing?  Is it not a blessing
+to man to believe, that he shall be able to enjoy hereafter a happiness,
+which is denied him upon earth?"  Thus, poor mortals! you make your
+wishes the measure of truth; because you desire to live for ever,
+and to be happier, you at once conclude, that you shall live for ever,
+and that you shall be more fortunate in an unknown world, than in
+this known world, where you often find nothing but affliction!
+Consent therefore to leave, without regret, this world which gives
+the greater part of you much more torment than pleasure.  Submit to
+the order of nature, which demands that you, as well as all other beings,
+should not endure for ever.
+
+We are incessantly told, that religion has infinite consolations for
+the unfortunate, that the idea of the soul's immortality, and of a
+happier life, is very proper to elevate man, and to support him under
+adversity, which awaits him upon earth.  It is said, on the contrary,
+that materialism is an afflicting system, calculated to degrade man;
+then it puts him upon a level with the brutes, breaks his courage,
+and shows him no other prospect than frightful annihilation, capable
+of driving him to despair and suicide, whenever he is unhappy.  The
+great art of theologians is to blow hot and cold, to afflict and
+console, to frighten and encourage.
+
+It appears by theological fictions, that the regions of the other
+life are happy and unhappy.  Nothing is more difficult than to become
+worthy of the abode of felicity; nothing more easy than to obtain
+a place in the abode of torment, which God is preparing for the
+unfortunate victims of eternal fury.  Have those then, who think
+the other life so pleasant and flattering, forgotten, that according
+to them, that life is to be attended with torments to the greater
+part of mortals?  Is not the idea of total annihilation infinitely
+preferable to the idea of an eternal existence, attended with
+anguish and _gnashing of teeth_?  Is the fear of an end more
+afflicting, than that of having had a beginning!  The fear of
+ceasing to exist is a real evil only to the imagination, which
+alone begat the dogma of another life.
+
+Christian ministers say that the idea of a happier life is joyous.
+Admitted.  Every person would desire a more agreeable existence
+than that he enjoys here.  But, if paradise is inviting, you will
+grant, that hell is frightful.  Heaven is very difficult, and hell
+very easy to be merited.  Do you not say, that a _narrow_ way leads
+to the happy regions, and a _broad_ way to the regions of misery?
+Do you not often say, that _the number of the elect is very small,
+and that of the reprobate very large_?  Is not Grace, which your
+God grants but to a very few, necessary to salvation?  Now, I assure
+you, that these ideas are by no means consoling; that I had rather
+be annihilated, once for all, than to burn for ever; that the fate
+of beasts is to me more desirable than that of the damned; that
+the opinion which relieves me from afflicting fears in this world,
+appears to me more joyous, than the uncertainty arising from the
+opinion of a God, who, master of his grace, grants it to none but
+his favourites, and permits all others to become worthy of eternal
+torment.  Nothing but enthusiasm or folly can induce a man to prefer
+improbable conjectures, attended with uncertainty and insupportable
+fears.
+
+
+109.  All religious principles are the work of pure imagination, in
+which experience and reason have no share.  It is extremely difficult
+to combat them, because the imagination, once prepossessed by chimeras,
+which astonish or disturb it, is incapable of reasoning.  To combat
+religion and its phantoms with the arms of reason, is like using
+a sword to kill gnats; as soon as the blow is struck, the gnats and
+chimeras come hovering round again, and resume in the mind the place,
+from which they were thought to have been for ever banished.
+
+When we reject, as too weak, the proofs given of the existence of a God,
+they instantly oppose to the arguments, which destroy that existence,
+an _inward sense_, a deep persuasion, an invincible inclination, born
+in every man, which holds up to his mind, in spite of himself, the
+idea of an almighty being, whom he cannot entirely expel from his mind,
+and whom he is compelled to acknowledge, in spite of the strongest
+reasons that can be urged.  But whoever will analyse this _inward sense_,
+upon which such stress is laid, will perceive, that it is only the
+effect of a rooted habit, which, shutting their eyes against the
+most demonstrative proofs, subjects the greater part of men, and
+often even the most enlightened, to the prejudices of childhood.
+What avails this inward sense, or this deep persuasion, against
+the evidence, which demonstrates, that _whatever implies a contradiction
+cannot exist_?
+
+We are gravely assured, that the non-existence of God is not demonstrated.
+Yet, by all that men have hitherto said of him, nothing is better
+demonstrated, than that this God is a chimera, whose existence is
+totally impossible; since nothing is more evident, than that a being
+cannot possess qualities so unlike, so contradictory, so irreconcilable,
+as those, which every religion upon earth attributes to the Divinity.
+Is not the theologian's God, as well as that of the deist, a cause
+incompatible with the effects attributed to it?  Let them do what
+they will, it is necessary either to invent another God, or to grant,
+that he, who, for so many ages, has been held up to the terror of
+mortals, is at the same time very good and very bad, very powerful
+and very weak, unchangeable and fickle, perfectly intelligent and
+perfectly void of reason, of order and permitting disorder, very
+just and most unjust, very skilful and unskilful.  In short, are
+we not forced to confess, that it is impossible to reconcile the
+discordant attributes, heaped upon a being, of whom we cannot speak
+without the most palpable contradictions?  Let any one attribute
+a single quality to the Divinity, and it is universally contradicted
+by the effects, ascribed to this cause.
+
+
+110.  Theology might justly be defined the _science of contradictions_.
+Every religion is only a system, invented to reconcile irreconcilable
+notions.  By the aid of habit and terror, man becomes obstinate in the
+greatest absurdities, even after they are exposed in the clearest manner.
+All religions are easily combated, but with difficulty extirpated.
+Reason avails nothing against custom, which becomes, says the proverb,
+_a second nature_.  Many persons, in other respects sensible, even
+after having examined the rotten foundation of their belief, adhere
+to it in contempt of the most striking arguments.  Whenever we
+complain of religion, its shocking absurdities, and impossibilities,
+we are told that we are not made to understand the truths of religion;
+that reason goes astray, and is capable of leading us to perdition;
+and moreover, that _what is folly in the eyes of man, is wisdom in
+the eyes of God_, to whom nothing is impossible.  In short, to surmount,
+by a single word, the most insurmountable difficulties, presented
+on all sides by theology, they get rid of them by saying, these are
+_mysteries_!
+
+
+111.  What is a mystery?  By examining the thing closely, I soon
+perceive, that a mystery is nothing but a contradiction, a palpable
+absurdity, a manifest impossibility, over which theologians would
+oblige men humbly to shut their eyes.  In a word, a mystery is
+whatever our spiritual guides cannot explain.
+
+It is profitable to the ministers of religion, that people understand
+nothing of what they teach.  It is impossible to examine what we do
+not comprehend; when we do not see, we must suffer ourselves to be led.
+If religion were clear, priests would find less business.
+
+Without mysteries there can be no religion; mystery is essential to it;
+a religion void of mysteries, would be a contradiction in terms.
+The God, who serves as the foundation of _natural religion_, or
+_deism_, is himself the greatest of mysteries.
+
+
+112.  Every revealed religion is filled with mysterious dogmas,
+unintelligible principles, incredible wonders, astonishing recitals,
+which appear to have been invented solely to confound reason.
+Every religion announces a hidden God, whose essence is a mystery;
+consequently, the conduct, ascribed to him, is no less inconceivable
+than his essence.  The Deity has never spoken only in an enigmatical
+and mysterious manner, in the various religions, which have been
+founded in different regions of our globe; he has everywhere revealed
+himself only to announce mysteries; that is, to inform mortals, that
+he intended they should believe contradictions, impossibilities, and
+things to which they were incapable of affixing any clear ideas.
+
+The more mysterious and incredible a religion is, the more power
+it has to please the imagination of men.  The darker a religion is,
+the more it appears divine, that is, conformable to the nature of
+a hidden being, of whom they have no ideas.  Ignorance prefers the
+unknown, the hidden, the fabulous, the marvellous, the incredible,
+or even the terrible, to what is clear, simple, and true.  Truth
+does not operate upon the imagination in so lively a manner as fiction,
+which, in other respects, everyone is able to arrange in his own way.
+The vulgar like to listen to fables.  Priests and legislators, by
+inventing religions and forging mysteries have served the vulgar
+people well.  They have thereby gained enthusiasts, women and fools.
+Beings of this stamp are easily satisfied with things, which they
+are incapable of examining.  The love of simplicity and truth is
+to be found only among the few, whose imagination is regulated by
+study and reflection.
+
+The inhabitants of a village are never better pleased with their parson,
+than when he introduces Latin into his sermon.  The ignorant always
+imagine, that he, who speaks to them of things they do not understand,
+is a learned man.  Such is the true principle of the credulity of the
+people, and of the authority of those, who pretend to guide nations.
+
+
+113.  To announce mysteries to men, is to give and withhold; it is
+to talk in order not to be understood.  He, who speaks only obscurely,
+either seeks to amuse himself by the embarrassment, which he causes,
+or finds his interest in not explaining himself too clearly.  All
+secrecy indicates distrust, impotence, and fear.  Princes and their
+ministers make a mystery of their projects, for fear their enemies
+should discover and render them abortive.  Can a good God amuse
+himself by perplexing his creatures?  What interest then could he
+have in commanding his ministers to announce riddles and mysteries?
+
+It is said, that man, by the weakness of his nature, is totally
+incapable of understanding the divine dispensations, which can be
+to him only a series of mysteries; God cannot disclose to him secrets,
+necessarily above his reach.  If so, I answer again, that man is not
+made to attend to the divine dispensations; that these dispensations
+are to him by no means interesting; that he has no need of mysteries,
+which he cannot understand; and consequently, that a mysterious
+religion is no more fit for him, than an eloquent discourse is for
+a flock of sheep.
+
+
+114.  The Deity has revealed himself with so little uniformity in
+the different countries of our globe, that in point of religion,
+men regard one another with hatred and contempt.  The partisans
+of the different sects think each other very ridiculous and foolish.
+Mysteries, most revered in one religion, are objects of derision to
+another.  God, in revealing himself to mankind, ought at least, to
+have spoken the same language to all, and saved their feeble minds
+the perplexity of inquiring which religion really emanated from him,
+or what form of worship is most acceptable in his sight.
+
+A universal God ought to have revealed a universal religion.  By
+what fatality then are there so many different religions upon earth?
+Which is really right, among the great number of those, each of which
+exclusively pretends to be the true one?  There is great reason to
+believe, that no religion enjoys this advantage.  Division and disputes
+upon opinions are indubitable signs of the uncertainty and obscurity
+of the principles, upon which they build.
+
+
+115.  If religion were necessary at all, it ought to be intelligible
+to all.  If this religion were the most important concern of men,
+the goodness of God would seem to demand, that it should be to them
+of all things the most clear, evident, and demonstrative.  Is it
+not then astonishing, that this thing so essential to the happiness
+of mortals, is precisely that, which they understand least, and
+about which, for so many ages, their teachers have most disputed?
+Priests have never agreed upon the manner of understanding the will
+of a God, who has revealed himself.
+
+The world, may be compared to a public fair, in which are several
+empirics, each of whom endeavours to attract the passengers by
+decrying the remedies sold by his brothers.  Each shop has its
+customers, who are persuaded, that their quacks possess the only
+true remedies; and notwithstanding a continual use of them, they
+perceive not the inefficacy of these remedies, or that they are
+as infirm as those, who run after the quacks of a different shop.
+
+Devotion is a disorder of the imagination contracted in infancy.
+The devout man is a hypochondriac, who only augments his malady by
+the application of remedies.  The wise man abstains from them entirely;
+he pays attention to his diet, and in other respects leaves nature
+to her course.
+
+
+116.  To a man of sense, nothing appears more ridiculous, than the
+opinions, which the partisans of the different religions with equal
+folly entertain of each other.  A Christian regards the _Koran_,
+that is, the divine revelation announced by Mahomet, as nothing but
+a tissue of impertinent reveries, and impostures insulting to the
+divinity.  The Mahometan, on the other hand, treats the Christian
+as an _idolater_ and a _dog_.  He sees nothing but absurdities in his
+religion.  He imagines he has a right to subdue the Christian, and
+to force him, sword in hand, to receive the religion of his divine
+prophet.  Finally, he believes, that nothing is more impious and
+unreasonable, than to worship a man, or to believe in the Trinity.
+The _protestant_ Christian who without scruple worships a man, and
+firmly believes the inconceivable mystery of the _trinity_, ridicules
+the _catholic_ Christian for believing in the mystery of
+_transubstantiation_; he considers him mad, impious, and idolatrous,
+because he kneels to worship some bread, in which he thinks he sees God.
+Christians of every sect regard, as silly stories, the incarnations
+of _Vishnu_, the God of the Indies; they maintain, that the only true
+_incarnation_ is that of _Jesus_, son of a carpenter.  The deist, who
+calls himself the follower of a religion, which he supposes to be
+that of nature, content with admitting a God, of whom he has no idea,
+makes a jest of all the mysteries, taught by the various religions
+in the world.
+
+
+117.  Is there any thing more contradictory, impossible, or mysterious,
+than the creation of matter by an immaterial being, who, though
+immutable, operates continual changes in the world?  Is any thing
+more incompatible with every notion of common sense, than to believe,
+that a supremely good, wise, equitable and powerful being presides
+over nature, and by himself directs the movements of a world, full
+of folly, misery, crimes and disorders, which by a single word, he
+could have prevented or removed?  In fine, whenever we admit a being
+as contradictory as the God of theology, how can we reject the most
+improbable fables, astonishing miracles, and profound mysteries.
+
+
+118.  The Deist exclaims: "Abstain from worshipping the cruel and
+capricious God of theology; mine is a being infinitely wise and good;
+he is the father of men, the mildest of sovereigns; it is he who
+fills the universe with his benefits."  But do you not see that
+every thing in this world contradicts the good qualities, which
+you ascribe to your God?  In the numerous family of this tender
+father, almost all are unhappy.  Under the government of this just
+sovereign, vice is triumphant, and virtue in distress.  Among those
+blessings you extol, and which only enthusiasm can see, I behold
+a multitude of evils, against which you obstinately shut your eyes.
+Forced to acknowledge, that your beneficent God, in contradiction
+with himself, distributes good and evil with the same hand, for
+his justification you must, like the priest, refer me to the regions
+of another life.  Invent, therefore, another God; for yours is no
+less contradictory than that of theologians.
+
+A good God, who does evil, or consents to the commission of evil;
+a God full of equity, and in whose empire innocence is often oppressed;
+a perfect God, who produces none but imperfect and miserable works;
+are not such a God and his conduct as great mysteries, as that of
+the incarnation?
+
+You blush for your fellow-citizens, who allow themselves to be persuaded,
+that the God of the universe could change himself into a man, and die
+upon a cross in a corner of Asia.  The mystery of the incarnation appears
+to you very absurd.  You think nothing more ridiculous, than a God,
+who transforms himself into bread, and causes himself daily to be
+eaten in a thousand different places.  But are all these mysteries
+more contradictory to reason than a God, the avenger and rewarder
+of the actions of men?  Is man, according to you, free, or not free?
+In either case, your God, if he has the shadow of equity, can neither
+punish nor reward him.  If man is free, it is God, who has made him
+free; therefore God is the primitive cause of all his actions; in
+punishing him for his faults, he would punish him for having executed
+what he had given him liberty to do.  If man is not free to act
+otherwise than he does, would not God be most unjust, in punishing
+man for faults, which he could not help committing.
+
+The minor, or secondary, absurdities, with which all religions abound,
+are to many people truly striking; but they have not the courage
+to trace the source of these absurdities.  They see not, that a
+God full of contradictions, caprices and inconsistent qualities,
+has only served to disorder men's imaginations, and to produce
+an endless succession of chimeras.
+
+
+119.  The theologian would shut the mouths of those who deny the
+existence of God, by saying, that all men, in all ages and countries,
+have acknowledged some divinity or other; that every people have
+believed in an invisible and powerful being, who has been the object
+of their worship and veneration; in short, that there is no nation,
+however savage, who are not persuaded of the existence of some
+intelligence superior to human nature.  But, can an error be changed
+into truth by the belief of all men?  The great philosopher Bayle
+has justly observed, that "general tradition, or the unanimous consent
+of mankind, is no criterion of truth."
+
+There was a time, when all men believed that the sun moved round
+the earth, but this error was detected.  There was a time, when
+nobody believed the existence of the antipodes, and when every one
+was persecuted, who had temerity enough to maintain it.  At present,
+every informed man firmly believes it.  All nations, with the
+exception of a few men who are less credulous than the rest,
+still believe in ghosts and spirits.  No sensible man now adopts
+such nonsense.  But the most sensible people consider it their
+duty to believe in a universal spirit!
+
+
+120.  All the gods, adored by men, are of savage origin.  They have
+evidently been imagined by stupid people, or presented, by ambitious
+and crafty legislators, to ignorant and uncivilized nations, who
+had neither capacity nor courage to examine the objects, which
+through terror they were made to worship.
+
+By closely examining God, we are forced to acknowledge, that he
+evidently bears marks of a savage nature.  To be savage is to
+acknowledge no right but force; it is to be cruel beyond measure;
+to follow only one's own caprice; to want foresight, prudence,
+and reason.  Ye nations, who call yourselves civilized!  Do you
+not discern, in this hideous character, the God, on whom you
+lavish your incense?  Are not the descriptions given you of the
+divinity, visibly borrowed from the implacable, jealous, revengeful,
+sanguinary, capricious inconsiderate humour of man, who has not
+cultivated his reason?  O men!  You adore only a great savage,
+whom you regard, however, as a model to imitate, as an amiable
+master, as a sovereign full of perfection.
+
+Religious opinions are ancient monuments of ignorance, credulity,
+cowardice, and barbarism of their  ancestors.  Every savage is a
+child fond of the marvellous, who believes every thing, and examines
+nothing.  Ignorant of nature, he attributes to spirits, enchantments,
+and to magic, whatever appears to him extraordinary.  His priests
+appear to him sorcerers, in whom he supposes a power purely divine,
+before whom his confounded reason humbles itself, whose oracles are
+to him infallible decrees which it would be dangerous to contradict.
+
+In religion, men have, for the most part, remained in their primitive
+barbarity.  Modern religions are only ancient follies revived, or
+presented under some new form.  If the savages of antiquity adored
+mountains, rivers, serpents, trees, and idols of every kind; if the
+EGYPTIANS paid homage to crocodiles, rats, and onions, do we not see
+nations, who think themselves wiser than they, worship bread, into
+which they imagine, that through the enchantments of their priests,
+the divinity has descended.  Is not the Bread-God the idol of many
+Christian nations, who, in this respect, are as irrational, as the
+most savage?
+
+
+121.  The ferocity, stupidity, and folly of uncivilized man have
+ever disclosed themselves in religious practices, either cruel or
+extravagant.  A spirit of barbarity still survives, and penetrates
+the religions even of the most polished nations.  Do we not still
+see human victims offered to the divinity?  To appease the anger of
+a God, who is always supposed as ferocious, jealous and vindictive,
+as a savage, do not those, whose manner of thinking is supposed
+to displease him, expire under studied torments, by the command
+of sanguinary laws?  Modern nations, at the instigation of their
+priests, have perhaps improved upon the atrocious folly of barbarous
+nations; at least, we find, that it has ever entered the heads of
+savages to torment for opinions, to search the thoughts, to molest
+men for the invisible movements of their brains?
+
+When we see learned nations, such as the English, French, German,
+etc., continue, notwithstanding their knowledge, to kneel before
+the barbarous God of the Jews; when we see these enlightened nations
+divide into sects, defame, hate, and despise one another for their
+equally ridiculous opinions concerning the conduct and intentions
+of this unreasonable God; when we see men of ability foolishly
+devote their time to meditate the will of this God, who is full
+of caprice and folly, we are tempted to cry out: O men, you are
+still savage!!!
+
+
+122.  Whoever has formed true ideas of the ignorance, credulity,
+negligence, and stupidity of the vulgar, will suspect opinions
+the more, as he finds them generally established.  Men, for the
+most part, examine nothing: they blindly submit to custom and
+authority.  Their religious opinions, above all others, are those
+which they have the least courage and capacity to examine: as they
+comprehend nothing about them, they are forced to be silent, or at
+least are soon destitute of arguments.  Ask any man, whether he
+believes in a God?  He will be much surprised that you can doubt it.
+Ask him again, what he understands by the word _God_.  You throw
+him into the greatest embarrassment; you will perceive immediately,
+that he is incapable of affixing any real idea to this word, he
+incessantly repeats.  He will tell you, that God is God.  He knows
+neither what he thinks of it, nor his motives for believing in it.
+
+All nations speak of a God; but do they agree upon this God?  By
+no means.  But division upon an opinion proves not its evidence;
+it is rather a sign of uncertainty and obscurity.  Does the same
+man always agree with himself in the notions he forms of his God?
+No.  His idea varies with the changes, which he experiences;--
+another sign of uncertainty.  Men always agree in demonstrative
+truths.  In any situation, except that of insanity, every one
+knows that two and two make four, that the sun shines, that the
+whole is greater than its part; that benevolence is necessary
+to merit the affection of men; that injustice and cruelty are
+incompatible with goodness.  Are they thus agreed when they
+speak of God?  Whatever they think, or say of him, is immediately
+destroyed by the effects they attribute to him.
+
+Ask several painters to represent a chimera, and each will paint
+it in a different manner.  You will find no resemblance between
+the features, each has given it a portrait, that has no original.
+All theologians, in giving us a picture of God, give us one of
+a great chimera, in whose features they never agree, whom each
+arranges in his own way, and who exists only in their imaginations.
+There are not two individuals, who have, or can have, the same
+ideas of their God.
+
+
+123.  It might be said with more truth, that men are either skeptics
+or atheists, than that they are convinced of the existence of God.
+How can we be assured of the existence of a being, whom we could
+never examine, and of whom it is impossible to conceive any permanent
+idea?  How can we convince ourselves of the existence of a being,
+to whom we are every moment forced to attribute conduct, opposed
+to the ideas, we had endeavoured to form of him?  Is it then possible
+to believe what we cannot conceive?  Is not such a belief the opinions
+of others without having any of our own?  Priests govern by faith;
+but do not priests themselves acknowledge that God is to them
+incomprehensible?  Confess then, that a full and entire conviction
+of the existence of God is not so general, as is imagined.
+
+Scepticism arises from a want of motives sufficient to form a judgment.
+Upon examining the proofs which seem to establish, and the arguments
+which combat, the existence of God, some persons have doubted and
+withheld their assent.  But this uncertainty arises from not having
+sufficiently examined.  Is it possible to doubt any thing evident?
+Sensible people ridicule an absolute scepticism, and think it even
+impossible.  A man, who doubted his own existence, or that of the sun,
+would appear ridiculous.  Is this more extravagant than to doubt the
+non-existence of an evidently impossible being?  Is it more absurd
+to doubt one's own existence, than to hesitate upon the impossibility
+of a being, whose qualities reciprocally destroy one another?  Do we
+find greater probability for believing the existence of a spiritual
+being, than the existence of a stick without two ends?  Is the notion
+of an infinitely good and powerful being, who causes or permits an
+infinity of evils, less absurd or impossible, than that of a square
+triangle?  Let us conclude then, that religious scepticism can result
+only from a superficial examination of theological principles, which
+are in perpetual contradiction with the most clear and demonstrative
+principles.
+
+To doubt, is to deliberate.  Scepticism is only a state of
+indetermination, resulting from an insufficient examination
+of things.  Is it possible for any one to be sceptical in matters
+of religion, who will deign to revert to its principles, and closely
+examine the notion of God, who serves as its basis?  Doubt generally
+arises either from indolence, weakness, indifference, or incapacity.
+With many people, to doubt is to fear the trouble of examining things,
+which are thought uninteresting.  But religion being presented to men
+as their most important concern in this and the future world, skepticism
+and doubt on this subject must occasion perpetual anxiety and must
+really constitute a bed of thorns.  Every man who has not courage
+to contemplate, without prejudice, the God upon whom all religion
+is founded, can never know for what religion to decide: he knows
+not what he should believe or not believe, admit or reject, hope
+or fear.
+
+Indifference upon religion must not be confounded with scepticism.
+This indifference is founded upon the absolute assurance, or at any
+rate upon the probable belief, that religion is not interesting.
+A persuasion that a thing which is pretended to be important is not
+so, or is only indifferent, supposes a sufficient examination of the
+thing, without which it would be impossible to have this persuasion.
+Those who call themselves sceptics in the fundamental points of religion,
+are commonly either indolent or incapable of examining.
+
+
+124.  In every country, we are assured, that a God has revealed himself.
+What has he taught men?  Has he proved evidently that he exists?
+Has he informed them where he resides?  Has he taught them what he is,
+or in what his essence consists?  Has he clearly explained to them
+his intentions and plan?  Does what he says of this plan correspond
+with the effects, which we see?  No.  He informs them solely, that
+_he is what he is_; that he is a _hidden God_; that his ways are
+unspeakable; that he is exasperated against all who have the temerity
+to fathom his decrees, or to consult reason in judging him or his works.
+
+Does the revealed conduct of God answer the magnificent ideas which
+theologians would give us of his wisdom, goodness, justice, and
+omnipotence?  By no means.  In every revelation, this conduct
+announces a partial and capricious being, the protector of favourite
+people, and the enemy of all others.  If he deigns to appear to some
+men, he takes care to keep all others in an invincible ignorance of
+his divine intentions.  Every private revelation evidently announces
+in God, injustice, partiality and malignity.
+
+Do the commands, revealed by any God, astonish us by their sublime
+reason or wisdom?  Do they evidently tend to promote the happiness
+of the people, to whom the Divinity discloses them?  Upon examining
+the divine commands, one sees in every country, nothing but strange
+ordinances, ridiculous precepts, impertinent ceremonies, puerile
+customs, oblations, sacrifices, and expiations, useful indeed to the
+ministers of God, but very burthensome to the rest of the citizens.
+I see likewise, that these laws often tend to make men unsociable,
+disdainful, intolerant, quarrelsome, unjust, and inhuman, to those
+who have not received the same revelations, the same ordinances, or
+the same favours from heaven.
+
+
+125.  Are the precepts of morality, announced by the Deity, really
+divine, or superior to those which every reasonable man might imagine?
+They are divine solely because it is impossible for the human mind
+to discover their utility.  They make virtue consist in a total
+renunciation of nature, in a voluntary forgetfulness of reason,
+a holy hatred of ourselves.  Finally, these sublime precepts often
+exhibit perfection in a conduct, cruel to ourselves, and perfectly
+useless to others.
+
+Has a God appeared?  Has he himself promulgated his laws?  Has he
+spoken to men with his own mouth?  I am told, that God has not appeared
+to a whole people; but that he has always manifested himself through
+the medium of some favourite personages, who have been intrusted with
+the care of announcing and explaining his intentions.  The people have
+never been permitted to enter the sanctuary; the ministers of the gods
+have alone had the right to relate what passes there.
+
+
+126.  If in every system of divine revelation, I complain of not seeing
+either the wisdom, goodness, or equity of God; if I suspect knavery,
+ambition, or interest; it is replied, that God has confirmed by
+miracles the mission of those, who speak in his name.  But was it
+not more simple for him to appear in person, to explain his nature
+and will?  Again, if I have the curiosity to examine these miracles,
+I find, that they are improbable tales, related by suspected people,
+who had the greatest interest in giving out that they were the messengers
+of the Most High.
+
+What witnesses are appealed to in order to induce us to believe incredible
+miracles?  Weak people, who existed thousands of years ago, and who,
+even though they could attest these miracles, may be suspected of being
+duped by their own imagination, and imposed upon by the tricks of
+dexterous impostors.  But, you will say, these miracles are written
+in books, which by tradition have been transmitted to us.  By whom
+were these books written?  Who are the men who have transmitted them?
+They are either the founders of religions themselves, or their adherents
+and assigns.  Thus, in religion, the evidence of interested parties
+becomes irrefragable and incontestable.
+
+
+127.  God has spoken differently to every people.  The Indian believes
+not a word of what He has revealed to the Chinese; the Mahometan
+considers as fables what He has said to the Christian; the Jew regards
+both the Mahometan and Christian as sacrilegious corrupters of the
+sacred law, which his God had given to his fathers.  The Christian,
+proud of his more modern revelation, indiscriminately damns the Indian,
+Chinese, Mahometan, and even the Jew, from whom he receives his sacred
+books.  Who is wrong or right?  Each exclaims, _I am in the right!_
+Each adduces the same proofs: each mentions his miracles, diviners,
+prophets, and martyrs.  The man of sense tells them, they are all
+delirious; that God has not spoken, if it is true that he is a spirit,
+and can have neither mouth nor tongue; that without borrowing the organ
+of mortals, God could inspire his creatures with what he would have them
+learn; and that, as they are all equally ignorant what to think of God,
+it is evident that it has not been the will of God to inform them on
+the subject.
+
+The followers of different forms of worship which are established,
+accuse one another of superstition and impiety.  Christians look with
+abhorrence upon the Pagan, Chinese, and Mahometan superstition.
+Roman Catholics treat, as impious, Protestant Christians; and the
+latter incessantly declaim against the superstition of the Catholics.
+They are all right.  To be impious, is to have opinions offensive to
+the God adored; to be superstitious, is to have of him false ideas.
+In accusing one another of superstition, the different religionists
+resemble humpbacks, who reproach one another with their deformity.
+
+
+128.  Are the oracles, which the Divinity has revealed by his different
+messengers, remarkable for clearness?  Alas! no two men interpret
+them alike.  Those who explain them to others are not agreed among
+themselves.  To elucidate them, they have recourse to interpretations,
+to commentaries, to allegories, to explanations: they discover _mystical
+sense_ very different from the _literal sense_.  Men are every where
+wanted to explain the commands of a God, who could not, or would not,
+announce himself clearly to those, whom he wished to enlighten.
+
+
+129.  The founders of religion, have generally proved their missions
+by miracles.  But what is a miracle?  It is an operation directly
+opposite to the laws of nature.  But who, according to you, made
+those laws?  God.  Thus, your God, who, according to you, foresaw
+every thing, counteracts the laws, which his wisdom prescribed to
+nature!  These laws were then defective, or at least in certain
+circumstances they did not accord with the views of the same God,
+since you inform us that he judged it necessary to suspend or
+counteract them.
+
+It is said, that a few men, favoured by the Most High, have received
+power to perform miracles.  But to perform a miracle, it is necessary
+to have ability to create new causes capable of producing effects
+contrary to those of common causes.  Is it easy to conceive, that
+God can give men the inconceivable power of creating causes out of
+nothing?  Is it credible, that an immutable God can communicate to
+men power to change or rectify his plan, a power, which by his essence
+an immutable being cannot save himself?  Miracles, far from doing
+much honour to God, far from proving the divinity of a religion,
+evidently annihilate the God idea.  How can a theologian tell us,
+that God, who must have embraced the whole of his plan, who could
+have made none but perfect laws, and who cannot alter them, is forced
+to employ miracles to accomplish his projects, or can grant his
+creatures the power of working prodigies to execute his divine will?
+An omnipotent being, whose will is always fulfilled, who holds in
+his hand his creatures, has only to _will_, to make them believe whatever
+he desires.
+
+
+130.  What shall we say of religions that prove their divinity by miracles?
+How can we credit miracles recorded in the sacred books of the Christians,
+where God boasts of hardening the hearts and blinding those whom he
+wishes to destroy; where he permits malicious spirits and magicians to
+work miracles as great as those of his servants; where it is predicted,
+that _Antichrist_ shall have power to perform prodigies capable of shaking
+the faith even of the elect?  In this case, by what signs shall we know
+whether God means to instruct or ensnare us?  How shall we distinguish
+whether the wonders, we behold, come from God or devil?  To remove our
+perplexity, Pascal gravely tells us, that _it is necessary to judge the
+doctrine by the miracles, and the miracles by the doctrine; that the
+doctrine proves the miracles, and the miracles the doctrine_.  If there
+exist a vicious and ridiculous circle, it is undoubtedly in this splendid
+reasoning of one of the greatest defenders of Christianity.  Where is the
+religion, that does not boast of the most admirable doctrine, and which
+does not produce numerous miracles for its support?
+
+Is a miracle capable of annihilating the evidence of a demonstrated truth?
+Although a man should have the secret of healing all the sick, of making
+all the lame to walk, of raising in all the dead of a city, of ascending
+into the air, of stopping the course of the sun and moon, can he thereby
+convince me, that two and two do not make four, that one makes three,
+and that three make only one; that a God, whose immensity fills the
+universe, could have been contained in the body of a Jew; that the
+ETERNAL can die like a man; that a God, who is said to be immutable,
+provident, and sensible, could have changed his mind upon his religion,
+and reformed his own work by a new revelation?
+
+
+131.  According to the very principles either of natural or revealed
+theology, every new revelation should be regarded as false; every
+change in a religion emanated from the Deity should be reputed an
+impiety and blasphemy.  Does not all reform suppose, that, in his
+first effort, God could not give his religion the solidity and
+perfection required?  To say, that God, in giving a first law,
+conformed to the rude ideas of the people whom he wished to enlighten,
+is to pretend that God was neither able nor willing to render the
+people, whom he was enlightening, so reasonable as was necessary
+in order to please him.
+
+Christianity is an impiety, if it is true that Judaism is a religion
+which has really emanated from a holy, immutable, omnipotent, and
+foreseeing God.  The religion of Christ supposes either defects in
+the law which God himself had given by Moses, or impotence or malice
+in the same God, who was either unable or unwilling to render the
+Jews such as they ought to have been in order to please him.  Every
+new religion, or reform of ancient religions, is evidently founded
+upon the impotence, inconstancy, imprudence, or malice of the Divinity.
+
+
+132.  If history informs me, that the first apostles, the founders
+or reformers of religions, wrought great miracles; history also
+informs me, that these reformers and their adherents were commonly
+buffeted, persecuted, and put to death, as disturbers of the peace
+of nations.  I am therefore tempted to believe, that they did not
+perform the miracles ascribed to them; indeed, such miracles must
+have gained them numerous partisans among the eye-witnesses, who
+ought to have protected the operators from abuse.  My incredulity
+redoubles, when I am told, that the workers of miracles were cruelly
+tormented, or ignominiously executed.  How is it possible to believe,
+that missionaries, protected by God, invested with his divine power,
+and enjoying the gift of miracles, could not have wrought such
+a simple miracle, as to escape the cruelty of their persecutors?
+
+Priests have the art of drawing from the persecutions themselves,
+a convincing proof in favour of the religion of the persecuted.
+But a religion, which boasts of having cost the lives of many
+martyrs, and informs us, that its founders, in order to extend it,
+have suffered punishments, cannot be the religion of a beneficent,
+equitable and omnipotent God.  A good God would not permit men,
+intrusted with announcing his commands, to be ill-treated.  An
+all-powerful God, wishing to found a religion, would proceed in a
+manner more simple and less fatal to the most faithful of his servants.
+To say that God would have his religion sealed with blood, is to say
+that he is weak, unjust, ungrateful, and sanguinary; and that he is
+cruel enough to sacrifice his messengers to the views of his ambition.
+
+
+133.  To die for religion proves not that the religion is true,
+or divine; it proves, at most, that it is supposed to be such.
+An enthusiast proves nothing by his death, unless that religious
+fanaticism is often stronger than the love of life.  An impostor
+may sometimes die with courage; he then makes, in the language
+of the proverb, _a virtue of necessity_.
+
+People are often surprised and affected at sight of the generous
+courage and disinterested zeal, which has prompted missionaries
+to preach their doctrine, even at the risk of suffering the most
+rigorous treatment.  From this ardour for the salvation of men,
+are drawn inferences favourable to the religion they have announced.
+But in reality, this disinterestedness is only apparent.  He, who
+ventures nothing should gain nothing.  A missionary seeks to make
+his fortune by his doctrine.  He knows that, if he is fortunate
+enough to sell his commodity, he will become absolute master of
+those who receive him for their guide; he is sure of becoming the
+object of their attention, respect, and veneration.  Such are the
+true motives, which kindle the zeal and charity of so many preachers
+and missionaries.
+
+To die for an opinion, proves the truth or goodness of that opinion
+no more than to die in battle proves the justice of a cause, in
+which thousands have the folly to devote their lives.  The courage
+of a martyr, elated with the idea of paradise, is not more supernatural,
+than the courage of a soldier, intoxicated with the idea of glory,
+or impelled by the fear of disgrace.  What is the difference between
+an Iroquois, who sings while he is burning by inches, and the martyr
+ST. LAURENCE, who upon the gridiron insults his tyrant?
+
+The preachers of a new doctrine fail, because they are the weakest;
+apostles generally practise a perilous trade.  Their courageous
+death proves neither the truth of their principles nor their own
+sincerity, any more than the violent death of the ambitious man,
+or of the robber, proves, that they were right in disturbing society,
+or that they thought themselves authorised in so doing.  The trade
+of a missionary was always flattering to ambition, and formed a
+convenient method of living at the expense of the vulgar.  These
+advantages have often been enough to efface every idea of danger.
+
+
+134.  You tell us, theologians! that _what is folly in the eyes of men,
+is wisdom before God, who delights to confound the wisdom of the wise_.
+But do you not say, that human wisdom is a gift of heaven?  In saying
+this wisdom displeases God, is but folly in his sight, and that he is
+pleased to confound it, you declare that your God is the friend only
+of ignorant people, and that he makes sensible people a fatal present
+for which this perfidious tyrant promises to punish them cruelly at
+some future day.  Is it not strange, that one can be the friend of
+your God, only by declaring one's self the enemy of reason and good sense?
+
+
+135.  According to the divines, _faith is an assent without evidence_.
+Whence it follows, that religion requires us firmly to believe
+inevident things, and propositions often improbable or contrary
+to reason.  But when we reject reason as a judge of faith, do
+we not confess, that reason is incompatible with faith?  As the
+ministers of religion have resolved to banish reason, they must
+have felt the impossibility of reconciling it with faith, which
+is visibly only a blind submission to priests, whose authority
+seems to many persons more weighty than evidence itself, and
+preferable to the testimony of the senses.
+
+"Sacrifice your reason; renounce experience; mistrust the testimony
+of your senses; submit without enquiry to what we announce to you
+in the name of heaven."  Such is the uniform language of priests
+throughout the world; they agree upon no point, except upon the
+necessity of never reasoning upon the principles which they present
+to us as most important to our felicity!
+
+I will _not_ sacrifice my reason; because this reason alone enables
+me to distinguish good from evil, truth from falsehood.  If, as you
+say, my reason comes from God, I shall never believe that a God,
+whom you call good, has given me reason, as a snare, to lead me
+to perdition.  Priests! do you not see, that, by decrying reason,
+you calumniate your God, from whom you declare it to be a gift.
+
+I will _not_ renounce experience; because it is a guide much
+more sure than the imagination or authority of spiritual guides.
+Experience teaches me, that enthusiasm and interest may blind and
+lead them astray themselves; and that the authority of experience
+ought to have much more influence upon my mind, than the suspicious
+testimony of many men, who I know are either very liable to be
+deceived themselves, or otherwise are very much interested in
+deceiving others.
+
+I _will_ mistrust my senses; because I am sensible they sometimes
+mislead me.  But, on the other hand, I know that they will not always
+deceive me.  I well know, that the eye shews me the sun much smaller
+than it really is; but experience, which is only the repeated
+application of the senses, informs me, that objects always appear
+to diminish, as their distance increases; thus I attain to a certainty,
+that the sun is much larger than the earth; thus my senses suffice
+to rectify the hasty judgments, which they themselves had caused.
+
+In warning us to mistrust the testimony of our senses, the priests
+annihilate the proofs of all religion.  If men may be dupes of
+their imagination; if their senses are deceitful, how shall we
+believe the miracles, which struck the treacherous senses of our
+ancestors?  If my senses are unfaithful guides, I ought not to
+credit even the miracles wrought before my eyes.
+
+
+136.  You incessantly repeat that _the truths of religion are above
+reason_.  If so, do you not perceive, that these truths are not
+adapted to reasonable beings?  To pretend that reason can deceive
+us, is to say, that truth can be false; that the useful can be hurtful.
+Is reason any thing but a knowledge of the useful and true?  Besides,
+as our reason and senses are our only guides in this life, to say
+they are unfaithful, is to say, that our errors are necessary, our
+ignorance invincible, and that, without the extreme of injustice,
+God cannot punish us for following the only guides it was his
+supreme will to give.
+
+To say, we are obliged to believe things above our reason, is ridiculous.
+To assure us, that upon some objects we are not allowed to consult
+reason, is to say, that, in the most interesting matter, we must
+consult only imagination, or act only at random.  Our divines say,
+we must sacrifice our reason to God.  But what motives can we have
+to sacrifice our reason to a being, who makes us only useless
+presents, which he does not intend us to use?  What confidence
+can we put in a God, who, according to our divines themselves,
+is malicious enough to harden the heart, to strike with blindness,
+to lay snares for us, to _lead us into temptation?_  In fine, what
+confidence can we put in the ministers of this God, who, to guide
+us more conveniently, commands us to shut our eyes?
+
+
+137.  Men are persuaded, that religion is to them of all things the
+most serious, while it is precisely what they least examine for
+themselves.  In pursuit of an office, a piece of land, a house,
+a place of profit; in any transaction or contract whatever,
+every one carefully examines all, takes the greatest precaution,
+weighs every word of a writing, is guarded against every surprise.
+Not so in religion; every one receives it at a venture, and believes
+it upon the word of others, without ever taking the trouble to examine.
+
+Two causes concur to foster the negligence and carelessness of men,
+with regard to their religious opinions.  The first is the despair
+of overcoming the obscurity, in which all religion is necessarily
+enveloped.  Their first principles are only adapted to disgust
+lazy minds, who regard them as a chaos impossible to be understood.
+The second cause is, that every one is averse to being too much
+bound by severe precepts, which all admire in theory, but very
+few care to practice with rigour.  The religion of many people
+is like old family ties, which they have never taken pains to
+examine, but which they deposit in their archives to have recourse
+to them occasionally.
+
+
+138.  The disciples of Pythagoras paid implicit faith to the doctrine
+of their master; _he has said it_, was to them the solution of every
+problem.  The generality of men are not more rational.  In matters
+of religion, a curate, a priest, an ignorant monk becomes master
+of the thoughts.  Faith relieves the weakness of the human mind,
+to which application is commonly painful; it is much more convenient
+to depend upon others, than to examine for one's self.  Inquiry,
+being slow and difficult, equally, displeases the stupidity of
+the ignorant, and the ardour of the enlightened.  Such is undoubtedly
+the reason why Faith has so many partisans.
+
+The more men are deficient in knowledge and reason, the more zealous
+they are in religion.  In theological quarrels, the populace, like
+ferocious beasts, fall upon all those, against whom their priest
+is desirous of exciting them.  A profound ignorance, boundless
+credulity, weak intellect, and warm imagination, are the materials,
+of which are made bigots, zealots, fanatics, and saints.  How
+can the voice of reason be heard by them who make it a principle
+never to examine for themselves, but to submit blindly to the
+guidance of others?  The saints and the populace are, in the
+hands of their directors, automatons, moved at pleasure.
+
+
+139.  Religion is an affair of custom and fashion.  _We must do as
+others do._  But, among the numerous religions in the world, which
+should men choose?  This inquiry would be too painful and long.
+They must therefore adhere to the religion of their fathers, to that
+of their country, which, having force on its side, must be the best.
+
+If we judge of the intentions of Providence by the events and
+revolutions of this world, we are compelled to believe, that
+He is very indifferent about the various religions upon earth.
+For thousands of years, paganism, polytheism, idolatry, were
+the prevailing religions.  We are now assured, that the most
+flourishing nations had not the least idea of God; an idea,
+regarded as so essential to the happiness of man.  Christians
+say, all mankind lived in the grossest ignorance of their duties
+towards God, and had no notions of him, but what were insulting
+to his Divine Majesty.  Christianity, growing out of Judaism,
+very humble in its obscure origin, became powerful and cruel
+under the Christian emperors, who, prompted by holy zeal,
+rapidly spread it in their empire by means of fire and sword,
+and established it upon the ruins of paganism.  Mahomet and his
+successors, seconded by Providence or their victorious arms,
+in a short time banished the Christian religion from a part of
+Asia, Africa, and even Europe; and the _gospel_ was then forced
+to yield to the _Koran_.
+
+In all the factions or sects, which, for many ages have distracted
+Christianity, _the best argument has been always that of the
+strongest party_; arms have decided which doctrine is most
+conducive to the happiness of nations.  May we not hence infer,
+either that the Deity feels little interested in the religion
+of men, or that he always declares in favour of the opinions,
+which best suit the interest of earthly powers; in fine, that
+he changes his plan to accommodate their fancy?
+
+Rulers infallibly decide the religion of the people.  The true
+religion is always the religion of the prince; the true God is
+the God, whom the prince desires his people to adore; the will
+of the priests, who govern the prince, always becomes the will
+of God.  A wit justly observed, that _the true religion is always
+that, on whose side are the prince and the hangman._  Emperors
+and hangmen long supported the gods of Rome against the God of
+Christians; the latter, having gained to his interest the emperors,
+their soldiers, and their hangmen, succeeded in destroying the
+worship of the Roman gods.  The God of Mahomet has dispossessed
+the God of Christians of a great part of the dominions, which
+he formerly occupied.
+
+In the eastern part of Asia, is a vast, flourishing, fertile,
+populous country, governed by such wise laws, that the fiercest
+conquerors have adopted them with respect.  I mean China.
+Excepting Christianity, which was banished as dangerous, the
+people there follow such superstitions as they please, while
+the _mandarins_, or magistrates, having long known the errors
+of the popular religion, are vigilant to prevent the _bonzes_
+or priests from using it as an instrument of discord.  Yet we
+see not, that Providence refuses his blessing to a nation,
+whose chiefs are so indifferent about the worship that is
+rendered to him.  On the contrary, the Chinese enjoy a happiness
+and repose worthy to be envied, by the many nations whom religion
+divides, and often devastates.
+
+We cannot reasonably propose to divest the people of their follies;
+but we may perhaps cure the follies of those who govern the people,
+and who will then prevent the follies of the people from becoming
+dangerous.  Superstition is to be feared only when princes and
+soldiers rally round her standard; then she becomes cruel and
+sanguinary.  Every sovereign, who is the protector of one sect
+or religious faction, is commonly the tyrant of others, and
+becomes himself the most cruel disturber of the peace of his
+dominions.
+
+
+140.  It is incessantly repeated, and many sensible persons are
+induced to believe, that religion is a restraint necessary to men;
+that without it, there would no longer exist the least check for
+the vulgar; and that morality and religion are intimately connected
+with it.  "The fear of the Lord," cries the priest, "is the
+beginning of wisdom.  The terrors of another life are _salutary_,
+and are proper to curb the passions of men."
+
+To perceive the inutility of religious notions, we have only to
+open our eyes and contemplate the morals of those nations, who
+are the most under the dominion of religion.  We there find proud
+tyrants, oppressive ministers, perfidious courtiers, shameless
+extortioners, corrupt magistrates, knaves, adulterers, debauchees,
+prostitutes, thieves, and rogues of every kind, who have never
+doubted either the existence of an avenging and rewarding God,
+the torments of hell, or the joys of paradise.  Without the least
+utility to the greater part of mankind, the ministers of religion
+have studied to render death terrible to the eyes of their followers.
+If devout Christians could but be consistent, they would pass their
+whole life in tears, and die under the most dreadful apprehensions.
+What can be more terrible than death, to the unfortunate who are told,
+_that it is horrible to fall into the hands of the living God; that
+we must work out our salvation with fear and trembling!_  Yet we are
+assured, that the death of the Christian is attended with infinite
+consolations, of which the unbeliever is deprived.  The good Christian,
+it is said, dies in the firm hope of an eternal happiness which
+he has strived to merit.  But is not this firm assurance itself
+a presumption punishable in the eyes of a severe God?  Ought not
+the greatest saints to be ignorant whether they are _worthy of love
+or hatred?_  Ye Priests! while consoling us with the hope of the
+joys of paradise; have you then had the advantage to see your names
+and ours inscribed _in the book of life?_
+
+
+141.  To oppose the passions and present interests of men the
+obscure notions of a metaphysical, inconceivable God,--the incredible
+punishments of another life,--or the pleasures of the heaven, of
+which nobody has the least idea,--is not this combating realities
+with fictions?  Men have never any but confused ideas of their God:
+they see him only in clouds.  They never think of him when they are
+desirous to do evil: whenever ambition, fortune, or pleasure allures
+them, God's threatenings and promises are forgotten.  In the things
+of this life, there is a degree of certainty, which the most lively
+faith cannot give to the things of another life.
+
+Every religion was originally a curb invented by legislators, who
+wished to establish their authority over the minds of rude nations.
+Like nurses who frighten children to oblige them to be quiet, the
+ambitious used the name of the gods to frighten savages; and had
+recourse to terror in order to make them support quietly the yoke
+they wished to impose.  Are then the bugbears of infancy made for
+riper age?  At the age of maturity, no man longer believes them,
+or if he does, they excite little emotion in him, and never alter
+his conduct.
+
+
+142.  Almost every man fears what he sees much more than what he
+does not see; he fears the judgments of men of which he feels the
+effects, more than the judgments of God of whom he has only fluctuating
+ideas.  The desire of pleasing the world, the force of custom, the
+fear of ridicule, and of censure, have more force than all religious
+opinions.  Does not the soldier, through fear of disgrace, daily
+expose his life in battle, even at the risk of incurring eternal
+damnation?
+
+The most religious persons have often more respect for a varlet,
+than for God.  A man who firmly believes, that God sees every thing,
+and that he is omniscient and omnipresent, will be guilty, when alone,
+of actions, which he would never do in presence of the meanest of
+mortals.  Those, who pretend to be the most fully convinced of the
+existence of God, every moment act as if they believed the contrary.
+
+
+143.  "Let us, at least," it will be said, "cherish the idea of a God,
+which alone may serve as a barrier to the passions of kings."  But,
+can we sincerely admire the wonderful effects, which the fear of this
+God generally produces upon the minds of princes, who are called his
+images?  What idea shall we form of the original, if we judge of it
+by the copies!
+
+Sovereigns, it is true, call themselves the representatives of God,
+his vicegerents upon earth.  But does the fear of a master, more
+powerful than they are, incline them seriously to study the welfare
+of the nations, whom Providence has intrusted to their care?  Does
+the pretended terror, which ought to be inspired into them by the
+idea of an invisible judge, to whom alone they acknowledge themselves
+accountable for their actions, render them more equitable, more
+compassionate, more sparing of blood and treasure of their subjects,
+more temperate in their pleasures, more attentive to their duties?
+In fine, does this God, by whose authority kings reign, deter them
+from inflicting a thousand evils upon the people to whom they ought
+to act as guides, protectors, and fathers?  Alas!  If we survey the
+whole earth, we shall see men almost every where governed by tyrants,
+who use religion merely as an instrument to render more stupid the
+slaves, whom they overwhelm under the weight of their vices, or whom
+they sacrifice without mercy to their extravagancies.
+
+Far from being a check upon the passions of kings, Religion, by its
+very principles, frees them from all restraint.  It transforms them
+into divinities, whose caprice the people are never permitted to
+resist.  While it gives up the reins to princes, and on their part
+breaks the bonds of the social compact, it endeavours to chain the
+minds and hands of their oppressed subjects.  Is it then surprising,
+that the gods of the earth imagine every thing lawful for them, and
+regard their subjects only as instruments of their caprice or ambition?
+
+In every country, Religion has represented the Monarch of nature
+as a cruel, fantastical, partial tyrant, whose caprice is law; the
+Monarch God, is but too faithfully imitated by his representatives
+upon earth.  Religion seems every where invented solely to lull the
+people in the lap of slavery, in order that their masters may easily
+oppress them, or render them wretched with impunity.
+
+
+144.  To guard against the enterprises of a haughty pontiff who wished
+to reign over kings, to shelter their persons from the attempts of
+credulous nations excited by the priests, several European princes
+have pretended to hold their crowns and rights from God alone, and
+to be accountable only to him for their actions.  After a long contest
+between the civil and spiritual power, the former at length triumphed;
+and the priests, forced to yield, acknowledged the divine right of
+kings and preached them to the people, reserving the liberty of
+changing their minds and of preaching revolt, whenever the divine
+rights of kings clashed with the divine rights of the clergy.  It
+was always at the expense of nations, that peace was concluded
+between kings and priests; but the latter, in spite of treaties,
+always preserved their pretensions.
+
+Tyrants and wicked princes, whose consciences continually reproach
+them with negligence or perversity, far from fearing their God,
+had rather deal with this invisible judge who never opposes any
+thing, or with his priests who are always condescending to the
+rulers of the earth, than with their own subjects.  The people,
+reduced to despair, might probably _appeal_ from the divine right
+of their chiefs.  Men when oppressed to the last degree, sometimes
+become turbulent; and the divine rights of the tyrant are then
+forced to yield to the natural rights of the subjects.
+
+It is cheaper dealing with gods than men.  Kings are accountable for
+their actions to God alone; priests are accountable only to themselves.
+There is much reason to believe, that both are more confident of the
+indulgence of heaven, than of that of earth.  It is much easier to
+escape the vengeance of gods who may be cheaply appeased, than the
+vengeance of men whose patience is exhausted.
+
+"If you remove the fear of an invisible power, what restraint will
+you impose upon the passions of sovereigns?"  Let them learn to reign;
+let them learn to be just; to respect the rights if the people;
+and to acknowledge the kindness of the nations, from whom they
+hold their greatness and power.  Let them learn to fear men, and
+to submit to the laws of equity.  Let nobody transgress these laws
+with impunity; and let them be equally binding upon the powerful and
+the weak, the great and the small, the sovereign and the subjects.
+
+The fear of gods, Religion, and the terrors of another life, are the
+metaphysical and supernatural bulwarks, opposed to the impetuous
+passions of princes!  Are these bulwarks effectual?  Let experience
+resolve the question.  To oppose Religion to the wickedness of tyrants,
+is to wish, that vague, uncertain, unintelligible speculations may
+be stronger than propensities which every thing conspires daily to
+strengthen.
+
+
+145.  The immense service of religion to politics is incessantly
+boasted; but, a little reflection will convince us, that religious
+opinions equally blind both sovereigns and people, and never enlighten
+them upon their true duties or interests.  Religion but too often
+forms licentious, immoral despots, obeyed by slaves, whom every
+thing obliges to conform to their views.
+
+For want of having studied or known the true principles of administration,
+the objects and rights of social life, the real interests of men and
+their reciprocal duties, princes, in almost every country, have
+become licentious, absolute, and perverse; and their subjects abject,
+wicked, and unhappy.  It was to avoid the trouble of studying these
+important objects, that recourse was had to chimeras, which, far from
+remedying any thing, have hitherto only multiplied the evils of mankind,
+and diverted them from whatever is most essential to their happiness.
+
+Does not the unjust and cruel manner in which so many nations are
+governed, manifestly furnish one of the strongest proofs, not only
+of the small effect produced by the fear of another life, but also
+of the non-existence of a Providence, busied with the fate of the
+human race?  If there existed a good God, should we not be forced
+to admit, that in this life he strangely neglects the greater part
+of mankind?  It would seem, that this God has created nations only
+to be the sport of the passions and follies of his representatives
+upon earth.
+
+
+146.  By reading history with attention, we shall perceive that
+Christianity, at first weak and servile, established itself among
+the savage and free nations of Europe only intimating to their chiefs,
+that its religious principles favoured despotism and rendered them
+absolute.  Consequently, we see barbarous princes suddenly converted;
+that is, we see them adopt, without examination, a system so favourable
+to their ambition, and use every art to induce their subjects to
+embrace it.  If the ministers of this religion have since often
+derogated from their favourite principles, it is because the theory
+influences the conduct of the ministers of the Lord, only when it
+suits their temporal interests.
+
+Christianity boasts of procuring men a happiness unknown to preceding
+ages.  It is true, the Greeks knew not the _divine rights_ of tyrants
+or of the usurpers of the rights of their country.  Under paganism,
+it never entered the head of any man to suppose, that it was against
+the will of heaven for a nation to defend themselves against a ferocious
+beast, who had the audacity to lay waste their possessions.  The religion
+of the Christians was the first that screened tyrants from danger, by
+laying down as a principle that the people must renounce the legitimate
+defence of themselves.  Thus Christian nations are deprived of the
+first law of nature, which orders man to resist evil, and to disarm
+whoever is preparing to destroy him!  If the ministers of the church
+have often permitted the people to revolt for the interest of heaven,
+they have never permitted them to revolt for their own deliverance
+from real evils or known violences.
+
+From heaven came the chains, that were used for fettering the minds
+of mortals.  Why is the Mahometan every where a slave?  Because his
+prophet enslaved him in the name of the Deity, as Moses had before
+subdued the Jews.  In all parts of the earth, we see, that the first
+legislators were the first sovereigns and the first priests of the
+savages, to whom they gave laws.
+
+Religion seems invented solely to exalt princes above their nations,
+and rivet the fetters of slavery.  As soon as the people are too
+unhappy here below, priests are ready to silence them by threatening
+them with the anger of God.  They are made to fix their eyes upon heaven,
+lest they should perceive the true causes of their misfortunes, and
+apply the remedies which nature presents.
+
+
+147.  By dint of repeating to men, that the earth is not their true
+country; that the present life is only a passage; that they are not
+made to be happy in this world; that their sovereigns hold their
+authority from God alone, and are accountable only to him for the
+abuse of it; that it is not lawful to resist them, etc., priests
+have eternized the misgovernment of kings and the misery of the people;
+the interests of nations have been basely sacrificed to their chiefs.
+The more we consider the dogmas and principles of religion, the more
+we shall be convinced, that their sole object is the advantage of
+tyrants and priests, without regard to that of societies.
+
+To mask the impotence of its deaf gods, religion has persuaded mortals,
+that iniquities always kindle the wrath of heaven.  People impute
+to themselves alone the disasters that daily befal them.  If nations
+sometimes feel the strokes of convulsed nature, their bad governments
+are but too often the immediate and permanent causes, from whence
+proceed the continual calamities which they are forced to endure.
+Are not the ambition, negligence, vices, and oppressions of kings
+and nobles, generally the causes of scarcity, beggary, wars, pestilences,
+corrupt morals, and all the multiplied scourges which desolate the earth?
+
+In fixing men's eyes continually upon heaven; in persuading them,
+that all their misfortunes are effects of divine anger; in providing
+none but ineffectual and futile means to put an end to their sufferings,
+we might justly conclude, that the only object of priests was to divert
+nations from thinking about the true sources of their misery, and thus
+to render it eternal.  The ministers of religion conduct themselves
+almost like those indigent mothers, who, for want of bread, sing their
+starved children to sleep, or give them playthings to divert their
+thoughts from afflicting hunger.
+
+Blinded by error from their very infancy, restrained by the invisible
+bonds of opinion, overcome by panic terrors, their faculties blunted
+by ignorance, how should the people know the true causes of their
+wretchedness?  They imagine that they can avert it by invoking the gods.
+Alas! do they not see, that it is, in the name of these gods, that they
+are ordered to present their throats to the sword of their merciless
+tyrants, in whom they might find the obvious cause of the evils under
+which they groan, and for whom they cease not to implore, in vain,
+the assistance of heaven?
+
+Ye credulous people!  In your misfortunes, redouble your prayers,
+offerings, and sacrifices; throng to your temples; fast in sack-cloth
+and ashes; bathe yourselves in your own tears; and above all,
+completely ruin yourselves to enrich your gods!  You will only
+enrich their priests.  The gods of heaven will be propitious,
+only when the gods of the earth shall acknowledge themselves,
+men, like you, and shall devote to your welfare the attention
+you deserve.
+
+
+148.  Negligent, ambitious, and perverse Princes are the real causes
+of public misfortunes.  Useless, unjust Wars depopulate the earth.
+Encroaching and despotic Governments absorb the benefits of nature.
+The rapacity of Courts discourages agriculture, extinguishes industry,
+produces want, pestilence and misery.  Heaven is neither cruel nor
+propitious to the prayers of the people; it is their proud chiefs,
+who have almost always hearts of stone.
+
+It is destructive to the morals of princes, to persuade them that
+they have God alone to fear, when they injure their subjects, or
+neglect their happiness.  Sovereigns!  It is not the gods, but
+your people, that you offend, when you do evil.  It is your people
+and yourselves that you injure, when you govern unjustly.
+
+In history, nothing is more common than to see Religious Tyrants;
+nothing more rare than to find equitable, vigilant, enlightened princes.
+A monarch may be pious, punctual in a servile discharge of the
+duties of his religion, very submissive and liberal to his priests,
+and yet at the same time be destitute of every virtue and talent
+necessary for governing.  To princes, Religion is only an instrument
+destined to keep the people more completely under the yoke.  By the
+excellent principles of religious morality, a tyrant who, during
+a long reign, has done nothing but oppress his subjects, wresting,
+from them the fruits of their labour, sacrificing them without mercy
+to his insatiable ambition,--a conqueror, who has usurped the provinces
+of others, slaughtered whole nations, and who, during his whole life,
+has been a scourge to mankind,--imagines his conscience may rest,
+when, to expiate so many crimes, he has wept at the feet of a priest,
+who generally has the base complaisance to console and encourage
+a robber, whom the most hideous despair would too lightly punish
+for the misery he has caused upon earth.
+
+
+149.  A sovereign, sincerely devout, is commonly dangerous to the state.
+Credulity always supposes a contracted mind; devotion generally absorbs
+the attention, which a prince should pay to the government of his people.
+Obsequious to the suggestions of his priests, he becomes the sport of
+their caprices, the favourer of their quarrels, and the instrument and
+accomplice of their follies, which he imagines to be of the greatest
+importance.  Among the most fatal presents, which religion has made
+the world, ought to be reckoned those devout and zealous monarchs,
+who, under an idea of working for the welfare of their subjects, have
+made it a sacred duty to torment, persecute, and destroy those, who
+thought differently from themselves.  A bigot, at the head of an empire,
+is one of the greatest scourges.  A single fanatical or knavish priest,
+listened to by a credulous and powerful prince, suffices to put a state
+in disorder.
+
+In almost all countries, priests and pious persons are intrusted with
+forming the minds and hearts of young princes, destined to govern nations.
+What qualifications have instructors of this stamp!  By what interests
+can they be animated?  Full of prejudices themselves, they will teach
+their pupil to regard superstition, as most important and sacred; its
+chimerical duties, as most indispensable, intolerance and persecution,
+as the true foundation of his future authority.  They will endeavour
+to make him a party leader, a turbulent fanatic, a tyrant; they will
+early stifle his reason, and forewarn him against the use of it; they
+will prevent truth from reaching his ears; they will exasperate him
+against true talents, and prejudice him in favour of contemptible ones;
+in short, they will make him a weak devotee, who will have no idea
+either of justice or injustice, nor of true glory, nor of true greatness,
+and who will be destitute of the knowledge and virtues necessary to the
+government of a great nation.  Such is the plan of the education of
+a child, destined one day to create the happiness or misery of millions
+of men!
+
+
+150.  Priests have ever shewn themselves the friends of despotism, and
+the enemies of public liberty: their trade requires abject and submissive
+slaves, who have never the audacity to reason.  In an absolute government,
+who ever gains an ascendancy over the mind of a weak and stupid prince,
+becomes master of the state.  Instead of conducting the people to
+salvation, priests have always conducted them to servitude.
+
+In consideration of the supernatural titles, which religion has forged
+for the worst of princes, the latter have commonly united with priests,
+who, sure of governing by opinion the sovereign himself, have undertaken
+to bind the hands of the people and to hold them under the yoke.  But the
+tyrant, covered with the shield of religion, in vain flatters himself
+that he is secure from every stroke of fate; opinion is a weak rampart
+against the despair of the people.  Besides, the priest is a friend
+of the tyrant only while he finds his account in tyranny; he preaches
+sedition, and demolishes the idol he has made, when he finds it no
+longer sufficiently conformable to the interest of God, whom he makes
+to speak at his will, and who never speaks except according to his
+interests.
+
+It will no doubt be said, that sovereigns, knowing all the advantages
+which religion procures them, are truly interested in supporting it
+with all their strength.  If religious opinions are useful to tyrants,
+it is very evident, that they are useful to those, who govern by the
+laws of reason and equity.  Is there then any advantage in exercising
+tyranny?  Are princes truly interested in being tyrants?  Does not
+tyranny deprive them of true power, of the love of the people, and
+of all safety?  Ought not every reasonable prince to perceive, that
+the despot is a madman, and an enemy to himself?  Should not every
+enlightened prince beware of flatterers, whose object is to lull him
+to sleep upon the brink of the precipice which they form beneath him?
+
+
+151.  If sacerdotal flatteries succeed in perverting princes and making
+them tyrants; tyrants, on their part, necessarily corrupt both the great
+and the humble.  Under an unjust ruler, void of goodness and virtue,
+who knows no law but his caprice, a nation must necessarily be depraved.
+Will this ruler wish to have, about his person, honest, enlightened,
+and virtuous men?  No.  He wants none but flatterers, approvers,
+imitators, slaves, base and servile souls, who conform themselves
+to his inclinations.  His court will propagate the contagion of vice
+among the lower ranks.  All will gradually become corrupted in a state,
+whose chief is corrupt.  It was long since said, that "Princes seem
+to command others to do whatever they do themselves."
+
+Religion, far from being a restraint upon sovereigns, enables them
+to indulge without fear or remorse, in acts of licentiousness as
+injurious to themselves, as to the nations whom they govern.  It is
+never with impunity, that men are deceived.  Tell a sovereign, that
+he is a god;  he will very soon believe that he owes nothing to any one.
+Provided he is feared, he will care very little about being loved:
+he will observe neither rules, nor relations with his subjects, nor
+duties towards them.  Tell this prince, that he is _accountable for
+his actions to God alone_, and he will soon act as if he were accountable
+to no one.
+
+
+152.  An enlightened sovereign is he, who knows his true interests;
+who knows, that they are connected with the interests of his nation;
+that a prince cannot be great, powerful, beloved, or respected, while
+he commands only unhappy slaves; that equity, beneficence, and vigilance
+will give him more real authority over his people, than the fabulous
+titles, said to be derived from heaven.  He will see, that Religion
+is useful only to priests, that it is useless to society and often
+troubles it, and that it ought to be restrained in order to be prevented
+from doing injury.  Finally, he will perceive, that, to reign with glory,
+he must have good laws and inculcate virtue, and not found his power
+upon impostures and fallacies.
+
+
+153.  The ministers of religion have taken great care to make of their
+God, a formidable, capricious, and fickle tyrant.  Such a God was
+necessary to their variable interests.  A God, who should be just
+and good, without mixture of caprice or perversity; a God, who had
+constantly the qualities of an honest man, or of a kind sovereign,
+would by no means suit his ministers.  It is useful to priests, that
+men should tremble before their God, in order that they may apply
+to them to obtain relief from their fears.  "No man is a hero before
+his valet de chambre."  It is not surprising, that a God, dressed up
+by his priests so as to be terrible to others, should rarely impose
+upon them, or should have but very little influence upon their conduct.
+Hence, in every country, their conduct is very much the same.  Under
+pretext of the glory of their God, they every where prey upon ignorance,
+degrade the mind, discourage industry, and sow discord.  Ambition and
+avarice have at all times been the ruling passions of the priesthood.
+The priest every where rises superior to sovereigns and laws; we see
+him every where occupied with the interests of his pride, of his cupidity,
+and of his despotic, revengeful humour.  In the room of useful and social
+virtues, he everywhere substitutes expiations, sacrifices, ceremonies,
+mysterious practices, in a word, inventions lucrative to himself and
+ruinous to others.
+
+The mind is confounded and the reason is amazed upon viewing the
+ridiculous customs and pitiful means, which the ministers of the
+gods have invented in every country to purify souls, and render
+heaven favourable.  Here they cut off part of a child's prepuce,
+to secure for him divine benevolence; there, they pour water upon
+his head, to cleanse him of crimes, which he could not as yet have
+committed.  In one place, they command him to plunge into a river,
+whose waters have the power of washing away all stains; in another,
+he is forbidden to eat certain food, the use of which will not fail
+to excite the celestial wrath; in other countries, they enjoin upon
+sinful man to come periodically and confess his faults to a priest,
+who is often a greater sinner than himself, etc., etc., etc.
+
+
+154.  What should we say of a set of empirics, who, resorting every
+day to a public place, should extol the goodness of their remedies,
+and vend them as infallible, while they themselves were full of the
+infirmities, which they pretend to cure?  Should we have much confidence
+in the recipes of these quacks, though they stun us with crying,
+"take our remedies, their effects are infallible; they cure every body;
+except us."  What should we afterwards think, should those quacks spend
+their lives in complaining, that their remedies never produced the
+desired effect upon the sick, who take them?  In fine, what idea should
+we form of the stupidity of the vulgar, who, notwithstanding these
+confessions, should not cease to pay dearly for remedies, the inefficacy
+of which every thing tends to prove?  Priests resemble these alchymists,
+who boldly tell us, they have the secret of making gold, while they
+have scarcely clothes to cover their nakedness.
+
+The ministers of religion incessantly declaim against the corruption
+of the age, and loudly complain of the little effect of their lessons,
+while at the same time they assure us, that religion is the _universal
+remedy_, the true _panacea_ against the wickedness of mankind.  These
+priests are very sick themselves, yet men continue to frequent their
+shops, and to have faith in their divine antidotes, which, by their
+own confession, never effect a cure!
+
+
+155.  Religion, especially with the moderns, has tried to identify
+itself with Morality, the principles of which it has thereby totally
+obscured.  It has rendered men unsociable by duty, and forced them
+to be inhuman to everyone who thought differently from themselves.
+Theological disputes, equally unintelligible to each of the enraged
+parties, have shaken empires, caused revolutions, been fatal to
+sovereigns, and desolated all Europe.  These contemptible quarrels
+have not been extinguished even in rivers of blood.  Since the extinction
+of paganism, the people have made it a religious principle to become
+outrageous, whenever any opinion is advanced which their priests
+think contrary to _sound doctrine_.  The sectaries of a religion,
+which preaches, in appearance, nothing but charity, concord,
+and peace, have proved themselves more ferocious than cannibals or
+savages, whenever their divines excited them to destroy their brethren.
+There is no crime, which men have not committed under the idea of
+pleasing the Divinity, or appeasing his wrath.
+
+The idea of a terrible God, whom we paint to ourselves as a despot,
+must necessarily render his subjects wicked.  Fear makes only slaves,
+and slaves are cowardly, base, cruel, and think every thing lawful,
+in order to gain the favour or escape the chastisements of the master
+whom they fear.  Liberty of thinking alone can give men humanity
+and greatness of soul.  The notion of a tyrant-god tends only to
+make them abject, morose, quarrelsome, intolerant slaves.
+
+Every religion, which supposes a God easily provoked, jealous,
+revengeful, punctilious about his rights or the etiquette with
+which he is treated;--a God little enough to be hurt by the opinions
+which men can form of him;--a God unjust enough to require that we
+have uniform notions of his conduct; a religion which supposes such
+a God necessarily becomes restless, unsociable, and sanguinary; the
+worshippers of such a God would never think, that they could, without
+offence, forbear hating and even destroying every one, who is pointed
+out to them, as an adversary of this God; they would think, that it
+would be to betray the cause of their celestial Monarch, to live in
+friendly intercourse with rebellious fellow-citizens.  If we love
+what God hates, do we not expose ourselves to his implacable hatred?
+
+Infamous persecutors, and devout men-haters!  Will you never discern
+the folly and injustice of your intolerant disposition?  Do you not
+see, that man is no more master of his religious opinions, his belief
+or unbelief, than of the language, which he learns from infancy?
+To punish a man for his errors, is it not to punish him for having
+been educated differently from you?  If I am an unbeliever, is it
+possible for me to banish from my mind the reasons that have shaken
+my faith?  If your God gives men leave to be damned, what have you
+to meddle with?  Are you more prudent and wise, than this God, whose
+rights you would avenge?
+
+
+156.  There is no devotee, who does not, according to his temperament,
+hate, despise, or pity the adherents of a sect, different from his own.
+The _established_ religion, which is never any other than that of the
+sovereign and the armies, always makes its superiority felt in a very
+cruel and injurious manner by the weaker sects.  As yet there is no
+true toleration upon earth; men every where adore a jealous God, of
+whom each nation believes itself the friend, to the exclusion of all
+others.
+
+Every sect boasts of adoring alone the true God, the universal God,
+the Sovereign of all nature.  But when we come to examine this Monarch
+of the world, we find that every society, sect, party, or religious
+cabal, makes of this powerful God only a pitiful sovereign, whose
+care and goodness extend only to a small number of his subjects,
+who pretend that they alone have the happiness to enjoy his favours,
+and that he is not at all concerned about the others.
+
+The founders of religions, and the priests who support them, evidently
+proposed to separate the nations, whom they taught, from the other
+nations; they wished to separate their own flock by distinguishing
+marks; they gave their followers gods, who were hostile to the other
+gods; they taught them modes of worship, dogmas and ceremonies apart;
+and above all, they persuaded them, that the religion of others was
+impious and abominable.  By this unworthy artifice, the ambitious
+knaves established, their usurpation over the minds of their followers,
+rendered them unsociable, and made them regard with an evil eye all
+persons who had not the same mode of worship and the same ideas as
+they had.  Thus it is, that Religion has shut up the heart and for
+ever banished from it the affection that man ought to have for his
+fellow-creature.  Sociability, indulgence, humanity, those first
+virtues of all morality, are totally incompatible with religious
+prejudices.
+
+
+157.  Every national religion is calculated to make man vain, unsociable,
+and wicked; the first step towards humanity is to permit every one
+peaceably to embrace the mode of worship and opinions, which he judges
+to be right.  But this conduct cannot be pleasing to the ministers
+of religion, who wish to have the right of tyrannizing over men even
+in their thoughts.
+
+Blind and bigoted princes!  You hate and persecute heretics, and order
+them to execution, because you are told, that these wretches displease God.
+But do you not say, that your God is full of goodness?  How then can you
+expect to please him by acts of barbarity, which he must necessarily
+disapprove?  Besides, who has informed you, that their opinions
+displease your God?  Your priests?  But, who assures you, that your
+priests are not themselves deceived or wish to deceive you?  The same
+priests?  Princes!  It is then upon the hazardous word of your priests,
+that you commit the most atrocious crimes, under the idea of pleasing
+the Divinity!
+
+
+158.  Pascal says, "that man never does evil so fully and cheerfully,
+as when he acts from a false principle of conscience."  Nothing is
+more dangerous than a religion, which lets loose the ferocity of the
+multitude, and justifies their blackest crimes.  They will set no
+bounds to their wickedness, when they think it authorized by their God,
+whose interests, they are told, can make every action legitimate.
+Is religion in danger?--the most civilized people immediately becomes
+true savages, and think nothing forbidden.  The more cruel they are,
+the more agreeable they suppose they are to their God, whose cause
+they imagine cannot be supported with too much warmth.
+
+All religions have authorized innumerable crimes.  The Jews, intoxicated
+with the promises of their God, arrogated the rights of exterminating
+whole nations.  Relying on the oracles of their God, the Romans
+conquered and ravaged the world.  The Arabians, encouraged by their
+divine prophet, carried fire and sword among the Christians and
+the idolaters.  The CHRISTIANS, under pretext of extending their
+holy religion, have often deluged both hemispheres in blood.
+
+In all events favourable to their own interest, which they always
+call _the cause of God_, priests show us the _finger of God_.
+According to these principles, the devout have the happiness to
+see the _finger of God_ in revolts, revolutions, massacres, regicides,
+crimes, prostitutions, horrors; and, if these things contribute ever
+so little to the triumph of religion, we are told, that "God uses
+all sorts of means to attain his ends."  Is any thing more capable
+of effacing every idea of morality from the minds of men, than to
+inform them, that their God, so powerful and perfect, is often forced
+to make use of criminal actions in order to accomplish his designs?
+
+
+159.  No sooner do we complain of the extravagancies and evils, which
+Religion has so often  caused upon the earth, than we are reminded,
+that these excesses are not owing to Religion; but "that they are
+the sad effects of the passions of men."  But I would ask, what has
+let loose these passions?  It is evidently Religion; it is zeal,
+that renders men inhuman, and serves to conceal the greatest atrocities.
+Do not these disorders then prove, that religion, far from restraining
+the passions of men, only covers them with a veil, which sanctifies them,
+and that nothing would be more useful, than to tear away this sacred
+veil of which men often make such a terrible use?  What horrors would
+be banished from society, if the wicked were deprived of so plausible
+a pretext for disturbing it!
+
+Instead of being angels of peace among men, priests have been demons
+of discord.  They have pretended to receive from heaven the right of
+being quarrelsome, turbulent, and rebellious.  Do not the ministers
+of the Lord think themselves aggrieved, and pretend that the divine
+Majesty is offended, whenever sovereigns have the temerity to prevent
+them from doing evil?  Priests are like the spiteful woman who cried
+_fire! murder! assassination!_ while her husband held her hands to
+prevent her from striking him.
+
+
+160.  Notwithstanding the bloody tragedies, which Religion often acts,
+it is insisted, that, without Religion, there can be no Morality.
+If we judge theological opinions by their effects, we may confidently
+assert, that all Morality is perfectly incompatible with men's religious
+opinions.
+
+"Imitate God," exclaim the pious.  But, what would be our Morality,
+should we imitate this God! and what God ought we to imitate?
+The God of the Deist?  But even this God cannot serve us as a very
+constant model of goodness.  If he is the author of all things, he is
+the author both of good and evil.  If he is the author of order, he
+is also the author of disorder, which could not take place without his
+permission.  If he produces, he destroys; if he gives life, he takes
+it away; if he grants abundance, riches, prosperity, and peace, he
+permits or sends scarcity, poverty, calamities, and wars.  How then
+can we receive as a model of permanent beneficence, the God of Deism
+or natural religion, whose favourable dispositions are every instant
+contradicted by all the effects we behold?  Morality must have a basis
+less tottering than the example of a God, whose conduct varies,
+and who cannot be called good, unless we obstinately shut our eyes
+against the evil which he causes or permits in this world.
+
+Shall we imitate the _beneficent, mighty Jupiter_ of heathen antiquity?
+To imitate such a god, is to admit as a model, a rebellious son, who
+ravishes the throne from his father.  It is to imitate a debauchee,
+an adulterer, one guilty of incest and of base passions, at whose
+conduct every reasonable mortal would blush.  What would have been
+the condition of men under paganism, had they imagined, like Plato,
+that virtue consisted in imitating the gods!
+
+Must we imitate the God of the Jews!  Shall we find in _Jehovah_
+a model for our conduct?  This is a truly savage god, made for
+a stupid, cruel, and immoral people; he is always furious, breathes
+nothing but vengeance, commands carnage, theft, and unsociability.
+The conduct of this god cannot serve as a model to that of an honest
+man, and can be imitated only by a chief of robbers.
+
+Shall we then imitate the _Jesus_ of the Christians?  Does this God,
+who died to appease the implacable fury of his father, furnish us
+an example which men ought to follow?  Alas! we shall see in him only
+a God, or rather a fanatic, a misanthrope, who, himself plunged in
+wretchedness and preaching to wretches, will advise them to be poor,
+to combat with and stifle nature, to hate pleasure, seek grief,
+and detest themselves.  He will tell them to leave father, mother,
+relations, friends, etc., to follow him.  "Fine morality!" you say.
+It is, undoubtedly, admirable: it must be divine, for it is impracticable
+to men.  But is not such sublime morality calculated to render virtue
+odious?  According to the so much boasted morality of the _man_-God
+of the Christians, a disciple of his in this world must be like
+_Tantalus_, tormented with a burning thirst, which he is not allowed
+to quench.  Does not such morality give us a wonderful idea of the
+author of nature?  If, as we are assured, he has created all things
+for his creatures, by what strange whim does he forbid them the use
+of the goods he has created for them?  Is pleasure then, which man
+continually desires, only a snare, which God has maliciously laid
+to surprise his weakness?
+
+
+161.  The followers of Christ would have us regard, as a miracle,
+the establishment of their Religion, which is totally repugnant to
+nature, opposite to all the propensities of the heart, and inimical
+to sensual pleasures.  But the austerity of a doctrine renders it
+the more marvellous in the eyes of the vulgar.  The same disposition,
+which respects inconceivable mysteries as divine and supernatural,
+admires, as divine and supernatural, a Morality, that is impracticable,
+and beyond the powers of man.
+
+To admire a system of Morality, and to put it in practice, are two
+very different things.  All Christians admire and extol the Morality
+of the gospel; which they do not practise.
+
+The whole world is more or less infected with a Religious morality,
+founded upon the opinion, that to please the Divinity, it is absolutely
+necessary to render ourselves unhappy upon earth.  In all parts of
+our globe, we see penitents, fakirs, and fanatics, who seem to have
+profoundly studied the means of tormenting themselves, in honour of
+a being whose goodness all agree in celebrating.  Religion, by its
+essence, is an enemy to the joy and happiness of men.  "Blessed are
+the poor, blessed are they, who weep; blessed are they, who suffer;
+misery to those, who are in abundance and joy."  Such are the rare
+discoveries, announced by Christianity!
+
+
+162.  What is a Saint in every religion?  A man, who prays, and fasts,
+who torments himself, and shuns the world; who like an owl, delights
+only in solitude, abstains from all pleasure, and seems frightened
+of every object, which may divert him from his fanatical meditations.
+Is this virtue?  Is a being of this type, kind to himself, or useful
+to others?  Would not society be dissolved, and man return to a
+savage state, if every one were fool enough to be a Saint?
+
+It is evident, that the literal and rigorous practice of the divine
+Morality of the Christians would prove the infallible ruin of nations.
+A Christian, aiming at perfection, ought to free his mind from whatever
+can divert it from heaven, his true country.  Upon earth, he sees
+nothing but temptations, snares, and rocks of perdition.  He must
+fear science, as hurtful to faith; he must avoid industry, as a means
+of obtaining riches, too fatal to salvation; he must renounce offices
+and honours, as capable of exciting his pride, and calling off his
+attention from the care of his soul.  In a word, the sublime Morality
+of Christ, were it practicable, would break all the bonds of society.
+
+A Saint in society is as useless, as a Saint in the desert; his
+humour is morose, discontented, and often turbulent; his zeal
+sometimes obliges him in conscience to trouble society by opinions
+or dreams, which his vanity makes him consider as inspirations
+from on high.  The annals of every religion are full of restless
+Saints, intractable Saints, and seditious Saints, who have become
+famous by the ravages, with which, _for the greater glory of God_,
+they have desolated the universe.  If Saints, who live in retirement,
+are useless, those who live in the world, are often very dangerous.
+
+The vanity of acting, the desire of appearing illustrious and peculiar
+in conduct, commonly constitute the distinguishing character of Saints.
+Pride persuades them, that they are extraordinary men far above human
+nature, beings much more perfect than others, favourites whom God
+regards with much more complaisance than the rest of mortals.
+Humility, in a Saint, is commonly only a more refined pride than
+that of the generality of men.  Nothing but the most ridiculous
+vanity can induce man to wage continual war against his own nature.
+
+
+163.  A morality, which contradicts the nature of man, is not made
+for man.  "But," say you, "the nature of man is depraved."  In what
+consists this pretended depravity?  In having passions?  But, are
+not passions essential to man?  Is he not obliged to seek, desire,
+and love what is, or what he thinks is, conducive to his happiness?
+Is he not forced to fear and avoid what he judges disagreeable or
+fatal?  Kindle his passions for useful objects; connect his welfare
+with those objects; divert him, by sensible and known motives, from
+what may injure either him or others, and you will make him a reasonable
+and virtuous being.  A man without passions would be equally indifferent
+to vice and to virtue.
+
+Holy Doctors! you are always repeating to us that the nature of man
+is perverted; you exclaim, "that _all flesh has corrupted its way_,
+that all the propensities of nature have become inordinate."  In
+this case, you accuse your God; who was either unable, or unwilling,
+that this nature should preserve its primitive perfection.  If this
+nature is corrupted, why has not God repaired it?  The Christian
+immediately assures me, "that human nature is repaired; that the
+death of his God has restored its integrity."  How then, I would ask,
+do you pretend that human nature, notwithstanding the death of a God,
+is still depraved?  Is then the death of your God wholly fruitless?
+What becomes of his omnipotence and of his victory over the Devil,
+if it is true that the Devil still preserves the empire, which,
+according to you, he has always exercised in the world?
+
+According to Christian theology, Death is the _wages of sin_.  This
+opinion is conformable to that of some negro and savage nations, who
+imagine that the Death of a man is always the supernatural effect
+of the anger of the Gods.  Christians firmly believe, that Christ
+has delivered them from sin; though they see, that, in their Religion,
+as in others, man is subject to Death.  To say that Jesus Christ has
+delivered us from sin, is it not to say, that a judge has pardoned
+a criminal, while we see that he leaves him for execution?
+
+
+164.  If shutting our eyes upon whatever passes in the world, we
+would credit the partisans of the Christian Religion, we should believe,
+that the coming of their divine Saviour produced the most wonderful
+and complete reform in the morals of nations.
+
+If we examine the Morals of Christian nations, and listen to the
+clamours of their priests, we shall be forced to conclude, that
+Jesus Christ, their God, preached and died, in vain; his omnipotent
+will still finds in men, a resistance, over which he cannot, or
+will not triumph.  The Morality of this divine Teacher, which his
+disciples so much admire and so little practise, is followed, in
+a whole century only by half a dozen obscure saints, and fanatics,
+and unknown monks, who alone will have the glory of shining in the
+celestial court, while all the rest of mortals, though redeemed by
+the blood of this God, will be the prey of eternal flames.
+
+
+165.  When a man is strongly inclined to sin, he thinks very little
+about his God.  Nay more, whatever crimes he has committed, he always
+flatters himself, that this God will soften, in his favour, the rigour
+of his decrees.  No mortal seriously believes, that his conduct can
+damn him.  Though he fears a terrible God, who often makes him tremble,
+yet, whenever he is strongly tempted, he yields; and he afterwards
+sees only the God of _mercies_, the idea of whom calms his apprehensions.
+If a man commits evil, he hopes, he shall have time to reform, and
+promises to repent at a future day.
+
+In religious pharmacy, there are infallible prescriptions to quiet
+consciences: priests, in every country, possess sovereign secrets
+to disarm the anger of heaven.  Yet, if it be true that the Deity
+is appeased by prayers, offerings, sacrifices, and penances, it can
+no longer be said, that Religion is a check to the irregularities
+of men; they will first sin, and then seek the means to appease God.
+Every Religion, which expiates crime and promises a remission of them,
+if it restrain some persons, encourages the majority to commit evil.
+Notwithstanding his immutability, God, in every Religion, is a true
+_Proteus_.  His priests represent him at one time armed with severity,
+at another full of clemency and mildness; sometimes cruel and unmerciful,
+and sometimes easily melted by the sorrow and tears of sinners.
+Consequently, men see the Divinity only on the side most conformable
+to their present interests.  A God always angry would discourage his
+worshippers, or throw them into despair.  Men must have a God, who
+is both irritable, and placable.  If his anger frightens some timorous
+souls, his clemency encourages the resolutely wicked, who depend upon
+recurring, sooner or later, to the means of accommodation.  If the
+judgments of God terrify some faint-hearted pious persons, who by
+constitution and habit are not prone to evil, _the treasures of
+divine mercy_ encourage the greatest criminals, who have reason
+to hope they participate therein equally with the others.
+
+
+166.  Most men seldom think of God, or, at least, bestow on him serious
+attention.  The only ideas we can form of him are so devoid of object,
+and are at the same time so afflicting, that the only imaginations
+they can arrest are those of melancholy hypochondriacs, who do not
+constitute the majority of the inhabitants of this world.  The vulgar
+have no conception of God; their weak brains are confused, whenever
+they think of him.  The man of business thinks only of his business;
+the courtier of his intrigues; men of fashion, women, and young
+people of their pleasures; dissipation soon effaces in them all
+the fatiguing notions of Religion.  The ambitious man, the miser
+and the debauchee carefully avoid speculations too feeble to
+counterbalance their various passions.
+
+Who is awed by the idea of a God?  A few enfeebled men, morose and
+disgusted with the world; a few, in whom the passions are already
+deadened by age, by infirmity, or by the strokes of fortune.
+Religion is a check, to those alone who by their state of mind
+and body, or by fortuitous circumstances, have been already brought
+to reason.  The fear of God hinders from sin only those, who are
+not much inclined to it, or else those who are no longer able to
+commit it.  To tell men, that the Deity punishes crimes in this
+world, is to advance an assertion, which experience every moment
+contradicts.  The worst of men are commonly the arbiters of the world,
+and are those whom fortune loads with her favours.  To refer us to
+another life, in order to convince us of the judgments of God, is
+to refer us to conjectures, in order to destroy facts, which cannot
+be doubted.
+
+
+167.  Nobody thinks of the life to come, when he is strongly smitten
+with the objects he finds here below.  In the eyes of a passionate lover,
+the presence of his mistress extinguishes the flames of hell, and her
+charms efface all the pleasures of paradise.  Woman! you leave, say you,
+your lover for your God.  This is either because your lover is no longer
+the same in your eyes, or because he leaves you.
+
+Nothing is more common, than to see ambitious, perverse, corrupt, and
+immoral men, who have some ideas of Religion, and sometimes appear
+even zealous for its interest.  If they do not practise it at present,
+they hope to in the future.  They lay it up, as a remedy, which will
+be necessary to salve the conscience for the evil they intend to commit.
+Besides, the party of devotees and priests being very numerous, active,
+and powerful, is it not astonishing, that rogues and knaves seek its
+support to attain their ends?  It will undoubtedly be said, that many
+honest people are sincerely religious, and that without profit; but
+is uprightness of heart always accompanied with knowledge?
+
+It is urged, that many learned men, many men of genius have been
+strongly attached to Religion.  This proves, that men of genius may
+have prejudices, be pusillanimous, and have an imagination, which
+misleads them and prevents them from examining subjects coolly.
+Pascal proves nothing in favour of Religion, unless that a man of
+genius may be foolish on some subjects, and is but a child, when
+he is weak enough to listen to his prejudices.  Pascal himself tells
+us, that _the mind may be strong and contracted, enlarged and weak_.
+He previously observes, that _a man may have a sound mind, and not
+understand every subject equally well; for there are some, who,
+having a sound judgment in a certain order of things, are bewildered
+in others_.
+
+
+168.  What is virtue according to theology?  _It is_, we are told,
+_the conformity of the actions of man to the will of God_.  But,
+what is God?  A being, of whom nobody has the least conception,
+and whom every one consequently modifies in his own way.  What is
+the will of God?  It is what men, who have seen God, or whom God
+has inspired, have declared to be the will of God.  Who are those,
+who have seen God?  They are either fanatics, or rogues, or ambitious
+men, whom we cannot believe.
+
+To found Morality upon a God, whom every man paints to himself
+differently, composes in his way, and arranges according to his
+own temperament and interest, is evidently to found Morality upon
+the caprice and imagination of men; it is to found it upon the
+whims of a sect, a faction, a party, who believe they have the
+advantage to adore a true God to the exclusion of all others.
+
+To establish Morality or the duties of man upon the divine will,
+is to found it upon the will, the reveries and the interests of those,
+who make God speak, without ever fearing that he will contradict them.
+In every Religion, priests alone have a right to decide what is pleasing
+or displeasing to their God, and we are certain they will always decide,
+that it is what pleases or displeases themselves.  The dogmas, the
+ceremonies, the morals, and the virtues, prescribed by every Religion,
+are visibly calculated only to extend the power or augment the
+emoluments of  the founders and ministers of these Religions.
+The dogmas are obscure, inconceivable, frightful, and are therefore
+well calculated to bewilder the imagination and to render the vulgar
+more obsequious to the will of those who wish to domineer over them.
+The ceremonies and practices procure the priests, riches or respect.
+Religion consists in a submissive faith, which prohibits the exercise
+of reason; in a devout humility, which insures priests the submission
+of their slaves; in an ardent zeal, when Religion, that is, when the
+interest of these priests, is in danger.  The only object of all
+religions is evidently the advantage of its ministers.
+
+
+169.  When we reproach theologians with the barrenness of their
+divine virtues, they emphatically extol _charity_, that tender love
+of one's neighbour, which Christianity makes an essential duty of
+its disciples.  But, alas! what becomes of this pretended charity,
+when we examine the conduct of the ministers of the Lord?  Ask them,
+whether we must love or do good to our neighbour, if he be an impious
+man, a heretic, or an infidel, that is, if he do not think like them?
+Ask them, whether we must tolerate opinions contrary to those of the
+religion, they profess?  Ask them, whether the sovereign can show
+indulgence to those who are in error?  Their charity instantly
+disappears, and the established clergy will tell you, that
+_the prince bears the sword only to support the cause of the
+Most High_: they will tell you that, through love for our neighbour,
+we must prosecute, imprison, exile, and burn him.  You will find
+no toleration except among a few priests, persecuted themselves,
+who will lay aside Christian charity the instant they have power
+to persecute in their turn.
+
+The Christian religion, in its origin preached by beggars and
+miserable men, under the name of _charity_, strongly recommends alms.
+The religion of Mahomet also enjoins it as an indispensable duty.
+Nothing undoubtedly is more conformable to humanity, than to succour
+the unfortunate, to clothe the naked, to extend the hand of beneficence
+to every one in distress.  But would it not be more humane and
+charitable to prevent the source of misery and poverty?  If Religion,
+instead of deifying princes, had taught them to respect the property
+of their subjects, to be just, to exercise only their lawful rights,
+we should not be shocked by the sight of such a multitude of beggars.
+A rapacious, unjust, tyrannical government multiplies misery; heavy
+taxes produce discouragement, sloth, and poverty, which in their
+turn beget robberies, assassinations, and crimes of every description.
+Had sovereigns more humanity, charity, and equity, their dominions
+would not be peopled by so many wretches, whose misery it becomes
+impossible to alleviate.
+
+Christian and Mahometan states are full of large hospitals, richly
+endowed, in which we admire the pious charity of the kings and sultans,
+who erected them.  But would it not have been more humane to govern
+the people justly, to render them happy, to excite and favour industry
+and commerce, and to let men enjoy in safety the fruit of their labours,
+than to crush them under a despotic yoke, to impoverish them by foolish
+wars, to reduce them to beggary, in order that luxury may be satisfied,
+and then to erect splendid buildings, which can contain but a very
+small portion of those, who have been rendered miserable?  Religion
+has only deluded men; instead of preventing evils, it always applies
+ineffectual remedies.
+
+The ministers of heaven have always known how to profit by the
+calamities of others.  Public misery is their element.  They have
+every where become administrators of the property of the poor,
+distributors of alms, depositaries of charitable donations; and
+thereby they have at all times extended and supported their power
+over the unhappy, who generally compose the most numerous, restless,
+and seditious part of society.  Thus the greatest evils turn to the
+profit of the ministers of the Lord.  Christian priests tell us,
+that the property they possess is the property of the poor, and
+that it is therefore sacred.  Consequently they have eagerly
+accumulated lands, revenues, and treasures.  Under colour of
+charity, spiritual guides have become extremely opulent, and
+in the face of impoverished nations enjoy wealth, which was
+destined solely for the unfortunate; while the latter, far from
+murmuring, applaud a pious generosity, which enriches the church,
+but rarely contributes to the relief of the poor.
+
+According to the principles of Christianity, poverty itself is
+a virtue; indeed, it is the virtue, which sovereigns and priests
+oblige their slaves to observe most rigorously.  With this idea,
+many pious Christians have of their own accord renounced riches,
+distributed their patrimony among the poor, and retired into deserts,
+there to live in voluntary indigence.  But this enthusiasm, this
+supernatural taste for misery, has been soon forced to yield to
+nature.  The successors of these volunteers in poverty sold to the
+devout people their prayers, and their intercessions with the Deity.
+They became rich and powerful.  Thus monks and hermits lived in
+indolence, and under colour of charity, impudently devoured the
+substance of the poor.
+
+The species of poverty, most esteemed by Religion, is _poverty of mind_.
+The fundamental virtue of every Religion, most useful to its ministers,
+is _faith_.  It consists in unbounded credulity, which admits, without
+enquiry, whatever the interpreters of the Deity are interested in
+making men believe.  By the aid of this wonderful virtue, priests
+became the arbiters of right and wrong, of good and evil: they
+could easily cause the commission of crimes to advance their interest.
+Implicit faith has been the source of the greatest outrages that
+have been committed.
+
+
+170.  He, who first taught nations, that, when we wrong Man, we must
+ask pardon of God, appease _him_ by presents, and offer _him_ sacrifices,
+evidently destroyed the true principles of Morality.  According to
+such ideas, many persons imagine that they may obtain of the king
+of heaven, as of kings of the earth, permission to be unjust and
+wicked, or may at least obtain pardon for the evil they may commit.
+
+Morality is founded upon the relations, wants, and constant interests
+of mankind; the relations, which subsist between God and Men, are
+either perfectly unknown, or imaginary.  Religion, by associating
+God with Man, has wisely weakened, or destroyed, the bonds, which
+unite them.  Mortals imagine, they may injure one another with
+impunity, by making suitable satisfaction to the almighty being,
+who is supposed to have the right of remitting all offences
+committed against his creatures.
+
+Is any thing better calculated to encourage the wicked or harden
+them in crimes, than to persuade them that there exists an invisible
+being, who has a right to forgive acts of injustice, rapine, and
+outrage committed against society?  By these destructive ideas,
+perverse men perpetrate the most horrid crimes, and believe they
+make reparation by imploring divine mercy; their conscience is at rest,
+when a priest assures them that heaven is disarmed by a repentance,
+which, though sincere, is very useless to the world.
+
+In the mind of a devout man, God must be regarded more than his creatures;
+it is better to obey him, than men.  The interests of the celestial
+monarch must prevail over those of weak mortals.  But the interests
+of heaven are obviously those of its ministers; whence it evidently
+follows, that in every religion, priests, under pretext of the interests
+of heaven or the glory of God, can dispense with the duties of human
+Morality, when they clash with the duties, which God has a right to
+impose.  Besides, must not he, who has power to pardon crimes, have
+a right to encourage the commission of crimes?
+
+
+171.  We are perpetually told, that, without a God there would be no
+_moral obligation_; that the people and even the sovereigns require
+a legislator powerful enough to constrain them.  Moral constraint
+supposes a law; but this law arises from the eternal and necessary
+relations of things with one another; relations, which have nothing
+common with the existence of a God.  The rules of Man's conduct are
+derived from his own nature which he is capable of knowing, and not
+from the Divine nature of which he has no idea.  These rules constrain
+or oblige us; that is, we render ourselves estimable or contemptible,
+amiable or detestable, worthy of reward or of punishment, happy or
+unhappy, accordingly as we conform to, or deviate from these rules.
+The law, which obliges man not to hurt himself, is founded upon the
+nature of a sensible being, who, in whatever way he came into this
+world, is forced by his actual essence to seek good and shun evil,
+to love pleasure and fear pain.  The law, which obliges man not to
+injure, and even to do good to others, is founded upon the nature
+of sensible beings, living in society, whose essence compels them
+to despise those who are useless, and to detest those who oppose
+their felicity.
+
+Whether there exists a God or not, whether this God has spoken or not,
+the moral duties of men will be always the same, so long as they are
+sensible beings.  Have men then need of a God whom they know not,
+of an invisible legislator, of a mysterious religion and of chimerical
+fears, in order to learn that every excess evidently tends to destroy
+them, that to preserve health they must be temperate; that to gain
+the love of others it is necessary to do them good, that to do them
+evil is a sure means to incur their vengeance and hatred?  "Before
+the law there was no sin."  Nothing is more false than this maxim.
+It suffices that man is what he is, or that he is a sensible being,
+in order to distinguish what gives him pleasure or displeasure.
+It suffices that one man knows that another man is a sensible
+being like himself, to perceive what is useful or hurtful to him.
+It suffices that man needs his fellow-creature, in order to know
+that he must fear to excite sentiments unfavourable to himself.
+Thus the feeling and thinking being has only to feel and think,
+in order to discover what he must do for himself and others.
+I feel, and another feels like me; this is the foundation of
+all morals.
+
+
+172.  We can judge of the goodness of a system of Morals, only by
+its conformity to the nature of man.  By this comparison, we have
+a right to reject it, if contrary to the welfare of our species.
+Whoever has seriously meditated Religion; whoever has carefully
+weighed its advantages and disadvantages, will be fully convinced,
+that both are injurious to the interests of Man, or directly opposite
+to his nature.
+
+"To arms! the cause of your God is at stake!  Heaven is outraged!
+The faith is in danger!  Impiety! blasphemy! heresy!"  The magical
+power of these formidable words, the real value of which the people
+never understand, have at all times enabled priests to excite revolts,
+to dethrone kings, to kindle civil wars, and to lay waste.  If we
+examine the important objects, which have produced so many ravages
+upon earth, it appears, that either the foolish reveries and whimsical
+conjectures of some theologian who did not understand himself, or
+else the pretensions of the clergy, have broken every social bond
+and deluged mankind with blood and tears.
+
+
+173.  The sovereigns of this world, by associating the Divinity in
+the government of their dominions, by proclaiming themselves his
+vicegerents and representatives upon earth, and by acknowledging
+they hold their power from him, have necessarily constituted his
+ministers their own rivals or masters.  Is it then astonishing,
+that priests have often made kings feel the superiority of the
+Celestial Monarch?  Have they not more than once convinced temporal
+princes, that even the greatest power is compelled to yield to the
+spiritual power of opinion?  Nothing is more difficult than to
+serve two masters, especially when they are not agreed upon what
+they require.
+
+The association of Religion with Politics necessarily introduced
+double legislation.  The law of God, interpreted by his priests,
+was often repugnant to the law of the sovereign, or the interest
+of the state.  When princes have firmness and are confident of the
+love of their subjects, the law of God is sometimes forced to yield
+to the wise intentions of the temporal sovereign; but generally the
+_sovereign_ authority is obliged to give way to the _divine_ authority,
+that is, to the interests of the clergy.  Nothing is more dangerous
+to a prince, than to _encroach upon the authority of the Church_,
+that is, to attempt to reform abuses consecrated by religion.
+God is never more angry than when we touch the divine rights,
+privileges, possessions, or immunities of his priests.
+
+The metaphysical speculations or religious opinions of men influence
+their conduct, only when they judge them conformable to their interest.
+Nothing proves this truth more clearly, than the conduct of many
+princes with respect to the spiritual power, which they often resist.
+Ought not a sovereign, persuaded of the importance and rights of
+Religion, to believe himself in conscience bound to receive respectfully
+the orders of its priests, and to regard them as the orders of the
+Divinity?  There was a time, when kings and people, more consistent
+in their conduct, were convinced of the rights of spiritual power,
+and becoming its slaves, yielded to it upon every occasion, and
+were but docile instruments in its hands.  That happy time is passed.
+By a strange inconsistency the most devout monarchs are sometimes
+seen to oppose the enterprises of those, whom they yet regard as
+the ministers of God.  A sovereign, deeply religious, ought to
+remain prostrate at the feet of his ministers, and regard them
+as true sovereigns.  Is there upon earth a power which has a right
+to put itself in competition with that of the Most High?
+
+
+174.  Have princes then, who imagine themselves interested in
+cherishing the prejudices of their subjects, seriously reflected
+upon the effects, which have been, and may be again produced by
+certain privileged demagogues, who have a right to speak at pleasure,
+and in the name of heaven to inflame the passions of millions of subjects?
+What ravages would not these sacred haranguers cause, if they should
+conspire, as they have so often done, to disturb the tranquillity of
+a state!
+
+To most nations, nothing is more burthensome and ruinous than the
+worship of their gods.  Not only do the ministers of these gods
+every where constitute the first order in the state, but they also
+enjoy the largest portion of the goods of society, and have a right
+to levy permanent taxes upon their fellow-citizens.  What real
+advantages then do these organs of the Most High procure the people,
+for the immense profits extorted from their industry?  In exchange
+for their riches and benefits, what do they give them but mysteries,
+hypotheses, ceremonies, subtle questions, and endless quarrels,
+which states are again compelled to pay with blood?
+
+
+175.  Religion, though said to be the firmest prop of Morality,
+evidently destroys its true springs, in order to substitute imaginary
+ones, inconceivable chimeras, which, being obviously contrary to
+reason, nobody firmly believes.  All nations declare that they
+firmly believe in a God, who rewards and punishes; all say they
+are persuaded of the existence of hell and paradise; yet, do these
+ideas render men better or counteract the most trifling interests?
+Every one assures us, that he trembles at the judgments of God;
+yet every one follows his passions, when he thinks himself sure
+of escaping the judgments of Man.  The fear of invisible powers
+is seldom so strong as the fear of visible ones.  Unknown or remote
+punishments strike the multitude far less forcibly than the sight
+of the gallows.  Few courtiers fear the anger of their God so
+much as the displeasure of their master.  A pension, a title, or
+a riband suffices to efface the remembrance both of the torments
+of hell, and of the pleasures of the celestial court.  The caresses
+of a woman repeatedly prevail over the menaces of the Most High.
+A jest, a stroke of ridicule, a witticism, make more impression
+upon the man of the world, than all the grave notions of his Religion.
+
+Are we not assured that _a true repentance_ is enough to appease
+the Deity?  Yet we do not see that this _true repentance_ is very
+sincere; at least, it is rare to see noted thieves, even at the
+point of death, restore goods, which they have unjustly acquired.
+Men are undoubtedly persuaded, that they shall fit themselves for
+eternal fire, if they cannot insure themselves against it.  But,
+"Some useful compacts may be made with heaven."  By giving the
+church a part of his fortune, almost every devout rogue may die
+in peace, without concerning himself in what he gained his riches.
+
+
+176.  By the confession of the warmest defenders of Religion and
+of its utility, nothing is more rare than sincere conversions, and,
+we might add, nothing more unprofitable to society.  Men are not
+disgusted with the world, until the world is disgusted with them.
+
+If the devout have the talent of pleasing God and his priests,
+they have seldom that of being agreeable or useful to society.
+To a devotee, Religion is a veil, which covers all passions;
+pride, ill-humour, anger, revenge, impatience, and rancour.
+Devotion arrogates a tyrannical superiority, which banishes
+gentleness, indulgence, and gaiety; it authorizes people to
+censure their neighbours, to reprove and revile the profane
+for the greater glory of God.  It is very common to be devout,
+and at the same time destitute of every virtue and quality
+necessary to social life.
+
+
+177.  It is asserted, that the dogma of another life is of the
+utmost importance to peace and happiness; that without it, men
+would be destitute of motives to do good.  What need is there
+of terrors and fables to make man sensible how he ought to
+conduct himself?  Does not every one see, that he has the
+greatest interest, in meriting the approbation, esteem, and
+benevolence of the beings who surround him, and in abstaining
+from every thing, by which he may incur the censure, contempt,
+and resentment of society?  However short an entertainment,
+a conversation, or visit, does not each desire to act his part
+decently, and agreeably to himself and others?  If life is but
+a passage, let us strive to make it easy; which we cannot effect,
+if we fail in regard for those who travel with us.  Religion,
+occupied with its gloomy reveries, considers man merely as
+a pilgrim upon earth; and therefore supposes that, in order
+to travel the more securely, he must forsake company, and deprive
+himself of pleasure and amusements, which might console him for
+the tediousness and fatigue of the journey.  A stoical and morose
+philosopher sometimes gives us advice as irrational as that of
+Religion.  But a more rational philosophy invites us to spread
+flowers upon the way of life, to dispel melancholy and banish
+terrors, to connect our interest with that of our fellow-travellers,
+and by gaiety and lawful pleasures, to divert our attention from
+difficulties and accidents, to which we are often exposed; it
+teaches us, that, to travel agreeably, we should abstain from
+what might be injurious to ourselves, and carefully shun what
+might render us odious to our associates.
+
+
+178.  It is asked, _what motives an Atheist can have to do good?_
+The motive to please himself and his fellow-creatures; to live
+happily and peaceably; to gain the affection and esteem of men.
+"Can he, who fears not the gods, fear any thing?"  He can fear men;
+he can fear contempt, dishonour, the punishment of the laws; in short,
+he can fear himself, and the remorse felt by all those who are
+conscious of having incurred or merited the hatred of their
+fellow-creatures.
+
+Conscience is the internal testimony, which we bear to ourselves,
+of having acted so as to merit the esteem or blame of the beings,
+with whom we live; and it is founded upon the clear knowledge we
+have of men, and of the sentiments which our actions must produce
+in them.  The Conscience of the religious man consists in imagining
+that he has pleased or displeased his God, of whom he has no idea,
+and whose obscure and doubtful intentions are explained to him only
+by men of doubtful veracity, who, like him, are utterly unacquainted
+with the essence of the Deity, and are little agreed upon what can
+please or displease him.  In a word, the conscience of the credulous
+is directed by men, who have themselves an erroneous conscience, or
+whose interest stifles knowledge.
+
+"Can an Atheist have a Conscience?  What are his motives to abstain
+from hidden vices and secret crimes of which other men are ignorant,
+and which are beyond the reach of laws?"  He may be assured by constant
+experience, that there is no vice, which, by the nature of things,
+does not punish itself.  Would he preserve this life? he will avoid
+every excess, that may impair his health; he will not wish to lead
+a languishing life, which would render him a burden to himself and
+others.  As for secret crimes, he will abstain from them, for fear
+he shall be forced to blush at himself, from whom he cannot flee.
+If he has any reason, he will know the value of the esteem which
+an honest man ought to have for himself.  He will see, that unforeseen
+circumstances may unveil the conduct, which he feels interested
+in concealing from others.  The other world furnishes no motives
+for doing good, to him, who finds none on earth.
+
+
+179.  "The speculative Atheist," says the Theist, "may be an honest man,
+but his writings will make political Atheists.  Princes and ministers,
+no longer restrained by the fear of God, will abandon themselves,
+without scruple, to the most horrid excesses."  But, however great
+the depravity of an Atheist upon the throne, can it be stronger
+and more destructive, than that of the many conquerors, tyrants,
+persecutors, ambitious men, and perverse courtiers, who, though
+not Atheists, but often very religious and devout, have notwithstanding
+made humanity groan under the weight of their crimes?  Can an atheistical
+prince do more harm to the world, than a Louis XI., a Philip II.,
+a Richelieu, who all united Religion with crime?  Nothing is more rare,
+than atheistical princes; nothing more common, than tyrants and ministers,
+who are very wicked and very religious.
+
+
+180.  A man of reflection cannot be incapable of his duties, of
+discovering the relations subsisting between men, of meditating
+his own nature, of discerning his own wants, propensities, and
+desires, and of perceiving what he owes to beings, who are necessary
+to his happiness.  These reflections naturally lead him to a knowledge
+of the Morality most essential to social beings.  Dangerous passions
+seldom fall to the lot of a man who loves to commune with himself,
+to study, and to investigate the principles of things.  The strongest
+passion of such a man will be to know truth, and his ambition to
+teach it to others.  Philosophy cultivates the mind.  On the score
+of morals and honesty, has not he who reflects and reasons, evidently
+an advantage over him, who makes it a principle never to reason?
+
+If ignorance is useful to priests, and to the oppressors of mankind,
+it is fatal to society.  Man, void of knowledge, does not enjoy reason;
+without reason and knowledge, he is a savage, liable to commit crimes.
+Morality, or the science of duties, is acquired only by the study of Man,
+and of what is relative to Man.  He, who does not reflect, is unacquainted
+with true Morality, and walks with precarious steps, in the path of virtue.
+The less men reason, the more wicked they are.  Savages, princes, nobles,
+and the dregs of the people, are commonly the worst of men, because
+they reason the least.  The devout man seldom reflects, and rarely
+reasons.  He fears all enquiry, scrupulously follows authority, and
+often, through an error of conscience, makes it a sacred duty to commit
+evil.  The Atheist reasons: he consults experience, which he prefers
+to prejudice.  If he reasons justly, his conscience is enlightened;
+he finds more real motives to do good than the bigot whose only motives
+are his fallacies, and who never listens to reason.  Are not the motives
+of the Atheist sufficiently powerful to counteract his passions?
+Is he blind enough to be unmindful of his true interest, which ought
+to restrain him?  But he will be neither worse nor better, than the
+numerous believers, who, notwithstanding Religion and its sublime
+precepts, follow a conduct which Religion condemns.  Is a credulous
+assassin less to be feared, than an assassin who believes nothing?
+Is a very devout tyrant less tyrannical than an undevout tyrant?
+
+
+181.  Nothing is more uncommon, than to see men consistent.  Their
+opinions never influence their conduct except when conformable to
+their temperaments, passions, and interests.  Daily experience shows,
+that religious opinions produce much evil and little good.  They are
+hurtful, because they often favour the passions of tyrants, of
+ambitious men, of fanatics, and of priests; they are of no effect,
+because incapable of counter-balancing the present interests of
+the greater part of mankind.  Religious principles are of no avail,
+when they act in opposition to ardent desires; though not unbelievers,
+men then conduct themselves as if they believed nothing.
+
+We shall always be liable to err, when we judge of the opinions
+of men by their conduct, or of their conduct by their opinions.
+A religious man, notwithstanding the unsociable principles of a
+sanguinary religion, will sometimes by a happy inconsistency, be
+humane, tolerant, and moderate; the principles of his religion do
+not then agree with the gentleness of his character.  Libertines,
+debauchees, hypocrites, adulterers, and rogues, often appear to
+have the best ideas upon morals.  Why do they not reduce them to
+practice?  Because their temperament, their interest, and their
+habits do not accord with their sublime theories.  The rigid
+principles of Christian morality, which many people regard as
+divine, have but little influence upon the conduct of those,
+who preach them to others.  Do they not daily tell us, _to do
+what they preach, and not what they practise?_
+
+The partisans of Religion often denote an infidel by the word
+_libertine_.  It is possible that many unbelievers may have loose
+morals, which is owing to their temperament, and not to their opinions.
+But how does their conduct affect their opinions? Cannot then an immoral
+man be a good physician, architect, geometrician, logician, or
+metaphysician?  A man of irreproachable conduct may be extremely
+deficient in knowledge and reason.  In quest of truth, it little
+concerns us from whom it comes.  Let us not judge men by their opinions,
+nor opinions by men; let us judge men by their conduct, and their
+opinions by their conformity with experience and reason and by their
+utility to mankind.
+
+
+182.  Every man, who reasons, soon becomes an unbeliever; for reason
+shows, that theology is nothing but a tissue of chimeras; that religion
+is contrary to every principle of good sense, that it tinctures all
+human knowledge with falsity.  The sensible man is an unbeliever,
+because he sees, that, far from making men happier, religion is
+the chief source of the greatest disorders, and the permanent
+calamities, with which man is afflicted.  The man, who seeks
+his own welfare and tranquillity, examines and throws aside
+religion, because he thinks it no less troublesome than useless,
+to spend his life in trembling before phantoms, fit to impose
+only upon silly women or children.
+
+If licentiousness, which reasons but little, sometimes leads to
+irreligion, the man of pure morals may have very good motives for
+examining his religion, and banishing it from his mind.  Religious
+terrors, too weak to impose upon the wicked in whom vice is deeply
+rooted, afflict, torment and overwhelm restless imaginations.
+Courageous and vigorous minds soon shake off the insupportable
+yoke.  But those, who are weak and timorous, languish under it
+during life; and as they grow old their fears increase.
+
+Priests have represented God as so malicious, austere, and terrible
+a being, that most men would cordially wish, that there was no God.
+It is impossible to be happy, while always trembling.  Ye devout!
+you adore a terrible God!  But you hate him; you would be glad,
+if he did not exist.  Can we refrain from desiring the absence or
+destruction of a master, the idea of whom destroys our happiness?
+The black colours, in which priests paint the Divinity, are truly
+shocking, and force us to hate and reject him.
+
+
+183.  If fear created the gods, fear supports their empire over the
+minds of mortals.  So early are men accustomed to shudder at the mere
+name of the Deity, that they regard him as a spectre, a hobgoblin,
+a bugbear, which torments and deprives them of courage even to wish
+relief from their fears.  They apprehend, that the invisible spectre,
+will strike them the moment they cease to be afraid.  Bigots are too
+much in fear of their God to love him sincerely.  They serve him like
+slaves, who, unable to escape his power, resolve to flatter their
+master, and who, by dint of lying, at length persuade themselves,
+that they in some measure love him.  They make a virtue of necessity.
+The love of devotees for their God, and of slaves for their despots,
+is only a feigned homage.
+
+
+184.  Christian divines have represented their God so terrible and
+so little worthy of love, that several of them have thought they
+must dispense with loving him; a blasphemy, shocking to other
+divines, who were less ingenuous.  St. Thomas having maintained,
+that we are obliged to love God as soon as we attain the use of
+reason, the Jesuit Sirmond answered him, _that is very soon_.
+The Jesuit Vasquez assures us, that _it is enough to love God
+at the point of death_.  Hurtado, more rigid, says, _we must love
+God very year_.  Henriquez is contented that we love him _every
+five years_; Sotus, _every Sunday_.  Upon what are these opinions
+grounded? asks father Sirmond; who adds, that Suarez requires us
+to _love God sometimes_.  But when?  He leaves that to us; he knows
+nothing about it himself.  _Now_, says he, _who will be able to
+know that, of which such a learned divine is ignorant?_  The same
+Jesuit Sirmond further observes, that _God_ "does not command us
+to love him with an affectionate love, nor does he promise us
+salvation upon condition that we give him our hearts; it is enough
+to obey and love him with an effective love by executing his orders;
+this is the only love we owe him; and he has not so much commanded
+us to love him, as not to hate him."  This doctrine appears heretical,
+impious, and abominable to the Jansenists, who, by the revolting
+severity they attribute to their God, make him far less amiable,
+than the Jesuits, their adversaries.  The latter, to gain adherents,
+paint God in colours capable of encouraging the most perverse of
+mortals.  Thus nothing is more undecided with the Christians,
+than the important question, whether they can, ought, or ought
+not to love God.  Some of their spiritual guides maintain, that
+it is necessary to love him with all one's heart, notwithstanding
+all his severity; others, like father Daniel, think that, _an act
+of pure love to God is the most heroic act of Christian virtue,
+and almost beyond the reach of human weakness_.  The Jesuit Pintereau
+goes farther; he says, _a deliverance from the grievous yoke of
+loving God is a privilege of the new covenant_.
+
+
+185.  The character of the Man always decides that of his God;
+every body makes one for himself and like himself.  The man of
+gaiety, involved in dissipation and pleasure, does not imagine,
+that, God can be stern and cross; he wants a good-natured God,
+with whom he can find reconciliation.  The man of a rigid, morose,
+bilious, sour disposition, must have a God like himself, a God
+of terror; and he regards, as perverse, those, who admit a placable,
+indulgent God.  As men are constituted, organized, and modified
+in a manner, which cannot be precisely the same, how can they
+agree about a chimera, which exists only in their brains?
+
+The cruel and endless disputes between the ministers of the Lord,
+are not such as to attract the confidence of those, who impartially
+consider them.  How can we avoid complete infidelity, upon viewing
+principles, about which those who teach them to others are never agreed?
+How can we help doubting the existence of a God, of whom it is evident
+that even his ministers can only form very fluctuating ideas?  How
+can we in short avoid totally rejecting a God, who is nothing but
+a shapeless heap of contradictions?  How can we refer the matter
+to the decision of priests, who are perpetually at war, treating
+each other as impious and heretical, defaming and persecuting each
+other without mercy, for differing in the manner of understanding
+what they announce to the world?
+
+
+186.  The existence of a God is the basis of all Religion.
+Nevertheless, this important truth has not as yet been demonstrated,
+I do not say so as to convince unbelievers, but in a manner
+satisfactory to theologians themselves.  Profound thinkers have
+at all times been occupied in inventing new proofs.  What are
+the fruits of their meditations and arguments?  They have left
+the subject in a worse condition; they have demonstrated nothing;
+they have almost always excited the clamours of their brethren,
+who have accused them of having poorly defended the best of causes.
+
+
+187.  The apologists of religion daily repeat, that the passions
+alone make unbelievers.  "Pride," say they, "and the desire of
+signalizing themselves, make men Atheists.  They endeavour to
+efface from their minds the idea of God, only because they have
+reason to fear his terrible judgments."  Whatever may be the motives,
+which incline men to Atheism, it is our business to examine,
+whether their sentiments are founded in truth.  No man acts
+without motives.  Let us first examine the arguments and afterwards
+the motives.  We shall see whether these motives are not legitimate,
+and more rational than those of many credulous bigots, who suffer
+themselves to be guided by masters little worthy of the confidence
+of men.
+
+You say then, Priests of the Lord! that the passions make unbelievers;
+that they renounce Religion only through interest, or because it
+contradicts their inordinate propensities; you assert, that they
+attack your gods only because they fear their severity.  But, are
+you yourselves, in defending Religion and its chimeras, truly exempt
+from passions and interests?  Who reap advantages from this Religion,
+for which priests display so much zeal?  Priests.  To whom does
+Religion procure power, influence, riches, and honours?  To Priests.
+Who wage war, in every country, against reason, science, truth, and
+philosophy, and render them odious to sovereigns and people?  Priests.
+Who profit by the ignorance and vain prejudices of men?  Priests.--
+Priests! you are rewarded, honoured and paid for deceiving mortals,
+and you cause those to be punished who undeceive them.  The follies
+of men procure you benefices, offerings, and expiations; while those,
+who announce the most useful truths, are rewarded only with chains,
+gibbets and funeral-piles.  Let the world judge between us.
+
+
+188.  Pride and vanity have been, and ever will be, inherent in the
+priesthood.  Is any thing more capable of rendering men haughty and
+vain, than the pretence of exercising a power derived from heaven,
+of bearing a sacred character, of being the messengers and ministers
+of the Most High?  Are not these dispositions perpetually nourished
+by the credulity of the people, the deference and respect of sovereigns,
+the immunities, privileges, and distinctions enjoyed by the clergy?
+In every country, the vulgar are much more devoted to their spiritual
+guides, whom they regard as divine, than to their temporal superiors,
+whom they consider as no more than ordinary men.  The parson of
+a village acts a much more conspicuous part, than the lord of the
+manor or the justice of the peace.  Among the Christians, a priest
+thinks himself far above a king or an emperor.  A Spanish grandee
+having spoken rather haughtily to a monk, the latter arrogantly
+said, "Learn to respect a man, who daily has your God in his hands,
+and your Queen at his feet."  Have priests then a right to accuse
+unbelievers of pride?  Are they themselves remarkable for uncommon
+modesty or profound humility?  Is it not evident, that the desire
+of domineering over men is essential to their trade?  If the ministers
+of the Lord were truly modest, should we see them so greedy of respect,
+so impatient of contradiction, so positive in their decisions, and
+so unmercifully revengeful to those whose opinions offend them?
+Has not Science the modesty to acknowledge how difficult it is
+to discover truth?  What other passion but ungovernable pride can
+make men so savage, revengeful, and void of indulgence and gentleness?
+What can be more presumptuous, than to arm nations and deluge the
+world in blood, in order to establish or defend futile conjectures?
+
+You say, that presumption alone makes Atheists.  Inform them then
+what your God is; teach them his essence; speak of him intelligibly;
+say something about him, which is reasonable, and not contradictory
+or impossible.  If you are unable to satisfy them, if hitherto none
+of you have been able to demonstrate the existence of a God in a
+clear and convincing manner; if by your own confession, his essence
+is completely veiled from you, as from the rest of mortals, forgive
+those, who cannot admit what they can neither understand nor make
+consistent with itself; do not tax with presumption and vanity
+those who are sincere enough to confess their ignorance; do not
+accuse of folly those who find themselves incapable of believing
+contradictions; and for once, blush at exciting the hatred and
+fury of sovereigns and people against men, who think not like
+you concerning a being, of whom you have no idea.  Is any thing
+more rash and extravagant, than to reason concerning an object,
+known to be inconceivable?  You say, that the corruption of the
+heart produces Atheism, that men shake off the yoke of the Deity
+only because they fear his formidable judgments.  But, why do you
+paint your God in colours so shocking, that he becomes insupportable?
+Why does so powerful a God permit men to be so corrupt?  How can
+we help endeavouring to shake off the yoke of a tyrant, who, able
+to do as he pleases with men, consents to their perversion, who
+hardens, and blinds them, and refuses them his grace, that he may
+have the satisfaction to punish them eternally, for having been
+hardened, and blinded, and for not having the grace which he refused?
+Theologians and priests must be very confident of the grace of heaven
+and a happy futurity, to refrain from detesting a master so capricious
+as the God they announce.  A God, who damns eternally, is the most
+odious of beings that the human mind can invent.
+
+
+189.  No man upon earth is truly interested in the support of error,
+which is forced sooner or later to yield to truth.  The general good
+must at length open the eyes of mortals: the passions themselves
+sometimes contribute to break the chains of prejudices.  Did not
+the passions of sovereigns, centuries ago, annihilate in some
+countries of Europe the tyrannical power, which a too haughty
+pontiff once exercised over all princes of his sect?  In consequence
+of the progress of political science, the clergy were then stripped
+of immense riches, which credulity had accumulated upon them.  Ought
+not this memorable example to convince priests, that prejudices
+triumph but for a time, and that truth alone can insure solid
+happiness?
+
+By caressing sovereigns, by fabricating divine rights for them,
+by deifying them, and by abandoning the people, bound hand and foot,
+to their will, the ministers of the Most High must see, that they
+are labouring to make them tyrants.  Have they not reason to apprehend,
+that the gigantic idols, which they raised to the clouds, will one
+day crush them by their enormous weight?  Do not a thousand examples
+remind them that these tyrants, after preying upon the people, may
+prey upon them in their turn.
+
+We will respect priests, when they become sensible men.  Let them,
+if they please, use the authority of heaven to frighten those princes
+who are continually desolating the earth; but let them no more adjudge
+to them the horrid right of being unjust with impunity.  Let them
+acknowledge, that no man is interested in living under tyranny;
+and let them teach sovereigns, that they themselves are not
+interested in exercising a despotism, which, by rendering them
+odious, exposes them to danger, and detracts from their power
+and greatness.  Finally, let priests and kings become so far
+enlightened as to acknowledge, that no power is secure which is
+not founded upon truth, reason, and equity.
+
+
+190.  By waging war against Reason, which they ought to have protected
+and developed, the ministers of the gods evidently act against their
+own interest.  What power, influence, and respect might they not have
+gained among the wisest of men, what gratitude would they not have
+excited in the people, if, instead of wasting their time about their
+vain disputes, they had applied themselves to really useful science,
+and investigated the true principles of philosophy, government, and
+morals!  Who would dare to reproach a body with its opulence or
+influence, if the members dedicating themselves to the public good,
+employed their leisure in study, and exercised their authority in
+enlightening the minds both of sovereigns and subjects?
+
+Priests!  Forsake your chimeras, your unintelligible dogmas, your
+contemptible quarrels!  Banish those phantoms which could be useful
+only in the infancy of nations.  Assume, at length, the language
+of reason.  Instead of exciting persecution; instead of entertaining
+the people with silly disputes; instead of preaching useless and
+fanatical dogmas, preach human and social morality; preach virtues
+really useful to the world; become the apostles of reason, the
+defenders of liberty, and the reformers of abuses.
+
+
+191.  Philosophers have every where taken upon themselves a part,
+which seemed destined to the ministers of Religion.  The hatred of
+the latter for philosophy was only a jealousy of trade.  But, instead
+of endeavouring to injure and decry each other, all men of good sense
+should unite their efforts to combat error, seek truth, and especially
+to put to flight the prejudices, that are equally injurious to
+sovereigns and subjects, and of which the abettors themselves sooner
+or later become the victims.
+
+In the hands of an enlightened government, the priests would become
+the most useful of the citizens.  Already richly paid by the state,
+and free from the care of providing for their own subsistence, how
+could they be better employed than in qualifying themselves for the
+instruction of others?  Would not their minds be better satisfied
+with discovering luminous truths, than in wandering through the
+thick darkness of error?  Would it be more difficult to discern
+the clear principles of Morality, than the imaginary principles
+of a divine and theological Morality?  Would men of ordinary
+capacities find it as difficult to fix in their heads the simple
+notions of their duties, as to load their memories with mysteries,
+unintelligible words and obscure definitions, of which they can
+never form a clear idea?  What time and pains are lost in learning
+and teaching things, which are not of the least real utility!
+What resources for the encouragement of the sciences, the
+advancement of knowledge, and the education of youth, well
+disposed sovereigns might find in the many monasteries, which
+in several countries live upon the people without in the slightest
+degree profiting them!  But superstition, jealous of its exclusive
+empire, seems resolved to form only useless beings.  To what advantage
+might we not turn a multitude of cenobites of both sexes, who,
+in many countries, are amply endowed for doing nothing?  Instead
+of overwhelming them with fasting and austerities; instead of
+barren contemplations, mechanical prayers, and trifling ceremonies;
+why should we not excite in them a salutary emulation, which may
+incline them to seek the means, not of being _dead_ to the world,
+but of being _useful_ to it?  Instead of filling the youthful minds
+of their pupils with fables, sterile dogmas, and puerilities, why
+are not priests obliged, or invited to teach them truths, and to
+render them useful citizens of their country?  Under the present
+system, men are only useful to the clergy who blind them, and to
+the tyrants who fleece them.
+
+
+192.  The partisans of credulity often accuse unbelievers of insincerity,
+because they sometimes waver in their principles, alter their minds
+in sickness, and retract at death.  When the body is disordered,
+the faculty of reasoning is commonly disordered with it.  At the
+approach of death, man, weak and decayed, is sometimes himself
+sensible that Reason abandons him, and that Prejudice returns.
+There are some diseases, which tend to weaken the brain; to create
+despondency and pusillanimity; and there are others, which destroy
+the body, but do not disturb the reason.  At any rate, an unbeliever
+who recants in sickness is not more extraordinary, than a devotee
+who neglects in health the duties which his religion explicitly enjoins.
+
+Ministers of Religion openly contradict in their daily conduct the
+rigorous principles, they teach to others; in consequence of which,
+unbelievers, in their turn, may justly accuse them of insincerity.
+Is it easy to find many prelates humble, generous, void of ambition,
+enemies of pomp and grandeur, and friends of poverty?  In short,
+is the conduct of Christian ministers conformable to the austere
+morality of Christ, their God, and their model?
+
+
+193.  _Atheism_, it is said, _breaks all the ties of society.
+Without the belief of a God, what will become of the sacredness
+of oaths?  How shall we oblige a man to speak the, truth, who
+cannot seriously call the Deity to witness what he says?_  But,
+does an oath strengthen our obligation to fulfil the engagements
+contracted?  Will he, who is not fearful of lying, be less fearful
+of perjury?  He, who is base enough to break his word, or unjust
+enough to violate his engagements, in contempt of the esteem of men,
+will not be more faithful therein for having called all the gods
+to witness his oaths.  Those, who disregard the judgments of men,
+will soon disregard the judgments of God.  Are not princes, of all
+men, the most ready to swear, and the most ready to violate their oaths?
+
+
+194.  _The vulgar_, it is repeatedly said, _must have a Religion.
+If enlightened persons have no need of the restraint of opinion,
+it is at least necessary to rude men, whose reason is uncultivated
+by education_.  But, is it indeed a fact, that religion is a restraint
+upon the vulgar?  Do we see, that this religion preserves them from
+intemperance, drunkenness, brutality, violence, fraud, and every
+kind of excess?  Could a people who have no idea of the Deity conduct
+themselves in a more detestable manner, than these believing people,
+among whom we find dissipation and vices, the most unworthy of
+reasonable beings?  Upon going out of the churches, do not the
+working classes, and the populace, plunge without fear into their
+ordinary irregularities, under the idea, that the periodical homage,
+which they render to their God, authorizes them to follow, without
+remorse, their vicious habits and pernicious propensities?  Finally,
+if the people are so low-minded and unreasonable, is not their
+stupidity chargeable to the negligence of their princes, who are
+wholly regardless of public education, or who even oppose the
+instruction of their subjects?  Is not the want of reason in
+the people evidently the work of the priests, who, instead of
+instructing men in a rational morality, entertain them with fables,
+reveries, ceremonies, fallacies, and false virtues which they
+think of the greatest importance?
+
+To the people, Religion is but a vain display of ceremonies, to
+which they are attached by habit, which entertains their eyes,
+and produces a transient emotion in their torpid understandings,
+without influencing their conduct or reforming their morals.
+Even by the confession of the ministers of the altars, nothing is
+more rare than that _internal_ and _spiritual_ Religion, which
+alone is capable of regulating the life of man and of triumphing
+over his evil propensities.  In the most numerous and devout nation,
+are there many persons, who are really capable of understanding
+the principles of their religious system, and who find them powerful
+enough to stifle their perverse inclinations?
+
+Many persons will say, that _any restraint whatever is better than none._
+They will maintain, that _if religion awes not the greater part,
+it serves at least to restrain some individuals, who would otherwise
+without remorse abandon themselves to crime_.  Men ought undoubtedly
+to have a restraint, but not an imaginary one.  Religion only
+frightens those whose imbecility of character has already prevented
+them from being formidable to their fellow-citizens.  An equitable
+government, severe laws, and sound morality have an equal power
+over all; at least, every person must believe in them, and perceive
+the danger of not conforming to them.
+
+
+195.  Perhaps it will be asked, _whether Atheism can be proper for
+the multitude?_  I answer, that any system, which requires discussion,
+is not made for the multitude.  _What purpose then can it serve to
+preach Atheism?_  It may at least serve to convince all those who
+reason, that nothing is more extravagant than to fret one's self,
+and nothing more unjust than to vex others, for mere groundless
+conjectures.  As for the vulgar who never reason, the arguments
+of an Atheist are no more fit for them than the systems of a natural
+philosopher, the observations of an astronomer, the experiments of
+a chemist, the calculations of a geometrician, the researches of
+a physician, the plans of an architect, or the pleadings of a lawyer,
+who all labour for the people without their knowledge.
+
+Are the metaphysical reasonings and religious disputes, which have so
+long engrossed the time and attention of so many profound thinkers,
+better adapted to the generality of men than the reasoning of an Atheist?
+Nay, as the principles of Atheism are founded upon plain common sense,
+are they not more intelligible, than those of a theology, beset with
+difficulties, which even the persons of the greatest genius cannot
+explain?  In every country, the people have a religion, the principles
+of which they are totally ignorant, and which they follow from habit
+without any examination: their priests alone are engaged in theology,
+which is too dense for vulgar heads.  If the people should chance
+to lose this unknown theology, they mighty easily console themselves
+for the loss of a thing, not only perfectly useless, but also
+productive of dangerous commotions.
+
+It would be madness to write for the vulgar, or to attempt to cure
+their prejudices all at once.  We write for those only, who read and
+reason; the multitude read but little, and reason still less.
+Calm and rational persons will require new ideas, and knowledge
+will be gradually diffused.
+
+
+196.  If theology is a branch of commerce profitable to theologians,
+it is evidently not only superfluous, but injurious to the rest of
+society.  Self-interest will sooner or later open the eyes of men.
+Sovereigns and subjects will one day adopt the profound indifference
+and contempt, merited by a futile system, which serves only to make
+men miserable.  All persons will be sensible of the inutility of
+the many expensive ceremonies, which contribute nothing to public
+felicity.  Contemptible quarrels will cease to disturb the tranquility
+of states, when we blush at having considered them important.
+
+Instead of Parliament meddling with the senseless combats of your
+clergy; instead of foolishly espousing their impertinent quarrels,
+and attempting to make your subjects adopt uniform opinions--strive
+to make them happy in this world.  Respect their liberty and property,
+watch over their education, encourage them in their labours, reward
+their talents and virtues, repress licentiousness; and do not concern
+yourselves with their manner of thinking.  Theological fables are
+useful only to tyrants and the ignorant.
+
+
+197.  Does it then require an extraordinary effort of genius to
+comprehend, that what is above the capacity of man, is not made
+for him; that things supernatural are not made for natural beings;
+that impenetrable mysteries are not made for limited minds?
+If theologians are foolish enough to dispute upon objects,
+which they acknowledge to be unintelligible even to themselves,
+ought society to take any part in their silly quarrels?  Must
+the blood of nations flow to enhance the conjectures of a few
+infatuated dreamers?  If it is difficult to cure theologians
+of their madness and the people of their prejudices, it is at
+least easy to prevent the extravagancies of one party, and the
+silliness of the other from producing pernicious effects.  Let
+every one be permitted to think as he pleases; but never let
+him be permitted to injure others for their manner of thinking.
+Were the rulers of nations more just and rational, theological
+opinions would not affect the public tranquillity, more than
+the disputes of natural philosophers, physicians, grammarians,
+and critics.  It is tyranny which causes theological quarrels
+to be attended with serious consequences.
+
+Those, who extol the importance and utility of Religion, ought
+to shew us its happy effects, the advantages for instance,
+which the disputes and abstract speculations of theology can
+be to porters, artisans, and labourers, and to the multitude
+of unfortunate women and corrupt servants with which great
+cities abound.  All these beings are religious; they have
+what is called _an implicit faith_.  Their parsons believe
+for them; and they stupidly adhere to the unknown belief
+of their guides.  They go to hear sermons, and would think
+it a great crime to transgress any of the ordinances, to which,
+in childhood, they are taught to conform.  But of what service
+to morals is all this?  None at all.  They have not the least
+idea of Morality, and are even guilty of all the roguery, fraud,
+rapine, and excess, that is out of the reach of law.
+
+The populace have no idea of their Religion; what they call Religion
+is nothing but a blind attachment to unknown opinions and mysterious
+practices.  In fact, to deprive people of Religion is to deprive
+them of nothing.  By overthrowing their prejudices, we should only
+lessen or annihilate the dangerous confidence they put in interested
+guides, and should teach them to mistrust those, who, under the
+pretext of Religion, often lead them into fatal excesses.
+
+
+198.  While pretending to instruct and enlighten men, Religion in
+reality keeps them in ignorance, and stifles the desire of knowing
+the most interesting objects.  The people have no other rule of
+conduct, than what their priests are pleased to prescribe.  Religion
+supplies the place of every thing else: but being in itself essentially
+obscure, it is more proper to lead mortals astray than to guide them
+in the path of science and happiness.  Religion renders enigmatical
+all Natural Philosophy, Morality, Legislation and Politics.  A man
+blinded by religious prejudices, fears truth, whenever it clashes
+with his opinions: he cannot know his own nature he cannot cultivate
+his reason, he cannot perform experiments.
+
+Everything concurs to render the people devout; but every thing tends
+to prevent them from being humane, reasonable and virtuous.  Religion
+seems to have no other object, than to stupefy the mind.
+
+Priests have been ever at war with genius and talent, because
+well-informed men perceive, that superstition shackles the human mind,
+and would keep it in eternal infancy, occupied solely by fables and
+frightened by phantoms.  Incapable of improvement itself, Theology
+opposed insurmountable barriers to the progress of true knowledge;
+its sole object is to keep nations and their rulers in the most
+profound ignorance of their duties, and of the real motives, that
+should incline them to do good.  It obscures Morality, renders
+its principles arbitrary, and subjects it to the caprice of the
+gods or of their ministers.  It converts the art of governing
+men into a mysterious tyranny, which is the scourge of nations.
+It changes princes into unjust, licentious despots, and the people
+into ignorant slaves, who become corrupt in order to merit the
+favour of their masters.
+
+
+199.  By tracing the history of the human mind, we shall be easily
+convinced, that Theology has cautiously guarded against its progress.
+It began by giving out fables as sacred truth: it produced poetry,
+which filled the imagination of men with its puerile fictions:
+it entertained them with its gods and their incredible deeds.
+In a word, Religion has always treated men, like children, whom
+it lulled to sleep with tales, which its ministers would have us
+still regard as incontestable truths.
+
+If the ministers of the gods have sometimes made useful discoveries,
+they have always been careful to give them a dogmatical tone, and
+envelope them in the shades of mystery.  Pythagoras and Plato,
+in order to acquire some trifling knowledge, were obliged to court
+the favour of priests, to be initiated in their mysteries, and to
+undergo whatever trials they were pleased to impose.  At this price,
+they were permitted to imbibe those exalted notions, still so
+bewitching to all those who admire only what is perfectly unintelligible.
+It was from Egyptian, Indian, and Chaldean priests, from the schools
+of these visionaries, professionally interested in bewildering human
+reason, that philosophy was obliged to borrow its first rudiments.
+Obscure and false in its principles, mixed with fictions and fables,
+and made only to dazzle the imagination, the progress of this philosophy
+was precarious, and its theories unintelligible; instead of enlightening,
+it blighted the mind, and diverted it from objects truly useful.
+
+The theological speculations and mystical reveries of the ancients
+are still law in a great part of the philosophic world; and being
+adopted by modern theology, it is heresy to abandon them.  They tell
+us "of aerial beings, of spirits, angels, demons, genii," and other
+phantoms, which are the object of their meditations, and serve as
+the basis of _metaphysics_, an abstract and futile science, which
+for thousands of years the greatest geniuses have vainly studied.
+Hypothesis, imagined by a few visionaries of Memphis and Babylon,
+constitute even now the foundations of a science, whose obscurity
+makes it revered as marvellous and divine.
+
+The first legislators were priests; the first mythologists, poets,
+learned men, and physicians were priests.  In their hands science
+became sacred and was withheld from the profane.  They spoke only
+in allegories, emblems, enigmas, and ambiguous oracles--means well
+calculated to excite curiosity, and above all to inspire the astonished
+vulgar with a holy respect for men, who when they were thought to be
+instructed by the gods, and capable of reading in the heavens the
+fate of the earth, boldly proclaimed themselves the oracles of
+the Deity.
+
+
+200.  The religions of ancient priests have only changed form.
+Although our modern theologians regard their predecessors as impostors,
+yet they have collected many scattered fragments of their religious
+systems.  In modern Religions we find, not only their metaphysical
+dogmas, which theology has merely clothed in a new dress, but also
+some remarkable remains of their superstitious practices, their magic,
+and their enchantments.  Christians are still commanded to respect
+the remaining monuments of the legislators, priests, and prophets
+of the Hebrew Religion, which had borrowed its strange practices
+from Egypt.  Thus extravagancies, imagined by knaves or idolatrous
+visionaries, are still sacred among Christians!
+
+If we examine history, we shall find a striking resemblance among
+all Religions.  In all parts of the earth, we see, that religious
+notions, periodically depress and elevate the people.  The attention
+of man is every where engrossed, by rites often abominable, and by
+mysteries always formidable, which become the sole objects of meditation.
+The different superstitions borrow, from one another, their abstract
+reveries and ceremonies.  Religions are in general mere unintelligible
+rhapsodies, combined by new teachers, who use the materials of their
+predecessors, reserving the right of adding or retrenching whatever
+is not conformable to the present age.  The religion of Egypt was
+evidently the basis of the religion of Moses, who banished the worship
+of idols: Moses was merely a schismatic Egyptian.  Christianism is
+only reformed Judaism.  Mahometanism is composed of Judaism,
+Christianity, and the ancient religion of Arabia, etc.
+
+
+201.  Theology, from the remotest antiquity to the present time,
+has had the exclusive privilege of directing philosophy.  What
+assistance has been derived from its labours?  It changed philosophy
+into an unintelligible jargon, calculated to render uncertain the
+clearest truths; it has converted the art of reasoning into a jargon
+of words; it has carried the human mind into the airy regions of
+metaphysics, and there employed it in vainly fathoming an obscure
+abyss.  Instead of physical and simple causes, this transformed
+philosophy has substituted supernatural, or rather, _occult_ causes;
+it has explained phenomena difficult to be conceived by agents
+still more inconceivable.  It has filled language with words,
+void of sense, incapable of accounting for things, better calculated
+to obscure than enlighten, and which seems invented expressly to
+discourage man, to guard him against the powers of his mind, to
+make him mistrust the principles of reason and evidence, and to
+raise an insurmountable barrier between him and truth.
+
+
+202.  Were we to believe the partisans of Religion, nothing could
+be explained without it; nature would be a perpetual enigma, and
+man would be incapable of understanding himself.  But, what does
+this Religion in reality explain?  The more we examine it, the
+more we are convinced that its theological notions are fit only
+to confuse our ideas; they change every thing into mystery: they
+explain difficult things by things that are impossible.  Is it
+a satisfactory explanation of phenomena, to attribute them to
+unknown agents, to invisible powers, to immaterial causes?  Does
+the human mind receive much light by being referred to _the depths
+of the treasures of divine wisdom_, to which, we are repeatedly
+told, it is vain to extend our rash enquiries?  Can the divine
+nature, of which we have no conception, enable us to conceive
+the nature of man?
+
+Ask a Christian, what is the origin of the world?  He will answer,
+that God created it.  What is God?  He cannot tell.  What is it
+to create?  He knows not.  What is the cause of pestilence, famine,
+wars, droughts, inundations and earthquakes?  The anger of God.
+What remedies can be applied to these calamities?  Prayers, sacrifices,
+processions, offerings, and ceremonies are, it is said, the true
+means of disarming celestial fury.  But why is heaven enraged?
+Because men are wicked.  Why are men wicked?  Because their nature
+is corrupt.  What is the cause of this corruption?  It is, says
+the theologian, because the first man, beguiled by the first woman,
+ate an apple, which God had forbidden him to touch.  Who beguiled
+this woman into such folly?  The devil.  Who made the devil?
+God.  But, why did God make this devil, destined to pervert mankind?
+This is unknown; it is a mystery which the Deity alone is acquainted with.
+
+It is now universally acknowledged, that the earth turns round the sun.
+Centuries ago, this opinion was blasphemy, as being irreconcileable
+with the sacred books which every Christian reveres as inspired by
+the Deity himself.  Notwithstanding divine revelation, astronomers
+now depend rather upon evidence, than upon the testimony of their
+inspired books.
+
+What is the hidden principle of the motions of the human body?
+The soul.  What is a soul?  A spirit.  What is a spirit?  A substance,
+which has neither form, nor colour, nor extension, nor parts.
+How can we form any idea of such a substance?  How can it move
+a body?  That is not known; it is a mystery.  Have beasts souls?
+But, do they not act, feel, and think, in a manner very similar
+to man?  Mere illusion!  By what right do you deprive beasts of a soul,
+which you attribute to man, though you know nothing at all about it?
+Because the souls of beasts would embarrass our theologians, who are
+satisfied with the power of terrifying and damning the immaterial souls
+of men, and are not so much interested in damning those of beasts.
+Such are the puerile solutions, which philosophy, always in the
+leading strings of theology, was obliged to invent, in order to
+explain the problems of the physical and moral world?
+
+
+203.  How many evasions have been used, both in ancient and modern
+times, in order to avoid an engagement with the ministers of the gods,
+who have ever been the tyrants of thought?  How many hypotheses and
+shifts were such men as Descartes, Mallebranche, and Leibnitz, forced
+to invent, in order to reconcile their discoveries with the fables
+and mistakes which Religion had consecrated!  In what guarded phrases
+have the greatest philosophers expressed themselves, even at the risk
+of being absurd, inconsistent, or unintelligible, whenever their ideas
+did not accord with the principles of theology!  Priests have been
+always attentive to extinguish systems which opposed their interest.
+Theology was ever the bed of Procrustes, to be adapted to which,
+the limbs of travellers, if too long were cut off, and if too short
+were lengthened.
+
+Can any sensible man, delighted with the sciences and attached to
+the welfare of his fellow-creatures, reflect, without vexation and
+anguish, how many profound, laborious, and subtle brains have been
+for ages foolishly occupied in the study of absurdities?  What a
+treasure of knowledge might have been diffused by many celebrated
+thinkers, if instead of engaging in the impertinent disputes of
+vain theology, they had devoted their attention to intelligible
+objects really important to mankind?  Half the efforts which
+religious opinions have cost genius, and half the wealth which
+frivolous forms of worship have cost nations would have sufficed
+to instruct them perfectly in morality, politics, natural philosophy,
+medicine, agriculture, etc.  Superstition generally absorbs the
+attention, admiration, and treasures of the people; their Religion
+costs them very dear; but they have neither knowledge, virtue,
+nor happiness, for their money.
+
+
+204.  Some ancient and modern philosophers have been bold enough
+to assume experience and reason for their guides, and to shake off
+the chains of superstition.  Democritus, Epicurus, and other Greeks
+presumed to tear away the veil of prejudice, and to deliver philosophy
+from theological shackles.  But their systems, too simple, too sensible,
+and too free from the marvellous, for imaginations enamoured with
+chimeras, were obliged to yield to the fabulous conjectures of such
+men as Plato and Socrates.  Among the moderns, Hobbes, Spinosa,
+Bayle, etc., have followed the steps of Epicurus; but their doctrine
+has found very few followers, in a world, still intoxicated with
+fables, to listen to reason.
+
+In every age, it has been dangerous to depart from prejudices.
+Discoveries of every kind have been prohibited.  All that enlightened
+men could do, was to speak ambiguously, hence they often confounded
+falsehood with truth.  Several had a _double doctrine_, one public
+and the other secret; the key of the latter being lost, their true
+sentiments, have often become unintelligible and consequently useless.
+
+How could modern philosophers, who, under pain of cruel persecution,
+were commanded to renounce reason, and to subject it to faith,
+that is, to the authority of priests; how, I say, could men,
+thus bound, give free scope to their genius, improve reason,
+and accelerate the progress of the human mind?  It was with fear
+and trembling that even the greatest men obtained a glimpse of truth;
+rarely had they the courage to announce it; and those, who did,
+were terribly punished.  With Religion, it has ever been unlawful
+to think, or to combat the prejudices of which man is every where
+the victim and the dupe.
+
+
+205.  Every man, sufficiently intrepid to announce truths to the world,
+is sure of incurring the hatred of the ministers of Religion, who
+loudly call to their aid secular powers; and want the assistance
+of laws to support both their arguments and their gods.  Their
+clamours expose too evidently the weakness of their cause.
+
+     "None call for aid but those who feel distressed."
+
+In Religion, man is not permitted to err.  In general, those who
+err are pitied, and some kindness is shewn to persons who discover
+new truths; but, when Religion is thought to be interested either
+in the errors or the discoveries, a holy zeal is kindled, the
+populace become frantic, and nations are in an uproar.
+
+Can any thing be more afflicting, than to see public and private
+felicity depending upon a futile system, which is destitute if
+principles, founded only on a distempered imagination, and incapable
+of presenting any thing but words void of sense?  In what consists
+the so much boasted utility of a Religion, which nobody can comprehend,
+which continually torments those who are weak enough to meddle with it,
+which is incapable of rendering men better, and which often makes them
+consider it meritorious to be unjust and wicked?  Is there a folly
+more deplorable, and more justly to be combated, than that, which
+far from doing any service to the human race, only makes them blind,
+delirious, and miserable, by depriving them of Truth, the sole cure
+for their wretchedness.
+
+
+206.  Religion has ever filled the mind of man with darkness,
+and kept him in ignorance of his real duties and true interests.
+It is only by dispelling the clouds and phantoms of Religion,
+that we shall discover Truth, Reason, and Morality.  Religion
+diverts us from the causes of evils, and from the remedies which
+nature prescribes; far from curing, it only aggravates, multiplies,
+and perpetuates them.  Let us observe with the celebrated
+Lord Bolingbroke, that "_theology is the box of Pandora; and
+if it is impossible to shut it, it is at least useful to inform men,
+that this fatal box is open_."
+
+
+THE END.
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Good Sense, by Baron D'Holbach
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