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+Project Gutenberg's Good Sense, by Paul Henri Thiry, Baron D'Holbach
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Good Sense
+       1772
+
+Author: Paul Henri Thiry, Baron D'Holbach
+
+Translator: Unknown
+
+Release Date: January, 2005 [EBook #7319]
+Posting Date: July 29, 2009
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK GOOD SENSE ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Freethought Archives
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+GOOD SENSE WITHOUT GOD:
+
+OR
+
+FREETHOUGHTS OPPOSED TO SUPERNATURAL IDEAS
+
+
+By Baron D'holbach
+
+
+"Freethinker's Library" Series
+
+London: W. Stewart & Co.
+
+
+
+A Translation Of Baron D'holbach's "Le Bon Sens"
+
+
+Transcriber's note: this e-text is based on an undated English translation
+of "Le Bon Sens" published c. 1900. The name of the translator was not
+stated.
+
+
+
+     "_Atheism_ leaves men to Sense, to Philosophy, to Laws, to
+     Reputation, all which may be guides to moral Virtue, tho'
+     Religion were not: but Superstition dismounts all these, and
+     erects an absolute Monarchy in the Minds of Men.  Therefore,
+     Atheism did never perturb States; but Superstition hath been
+     the confusion of many.  The causes of Superstition are
+     pleasing and sensual rights, and Ceremonies; Excess of
+     Pharisaical and outside holiness, Reverence to Traditions
+     and the stratagems of Prelates for their own Ambition and
+     Lucre."--_Lord Bacon._
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+1. APOLOGUE
+
+2. What is Theology?
+
+3. What is Theology?
+
+4. Man is not born with any ideas of Religion
+
+5. It is not necessary to believe in a God
+
+6. Religion is founded on credulity
+
+7. All religion is an absurdity
+
+8. The idea of God is impossible
+
+9. On the Origin of Superstition
+
+10. On the Origin of all Religion
+
+11. Religious fears expose men to become a prey to imposters
+
+12. Religion seduces ignorance by the aid of the marvellous
+
+13. Religion seduces ignorance by the aid of the marvellous
+
+14. No Religion, if not ages of Stupidity and Barbarism
+
+15. All Religion was produced by the desire of domination
+
+16. What serves as a basis to Religion is most uncertain
+
+17. It is impossible to be convinced of the existence of a God
+
+18. It is impossible to be convinced of the existence of a God
+
+19. The existence of God is not proved
+
+20. It explains nothing to say, that God is a spirit
+
+21. Spirituality is an absurdity
+
+22. Whatever exists is derived from Matter
+
+23. What is the metaphysical God of modern Theology?
+
+24. Less unreasonable to adore the Sun, than adore a spiritual Deity
+
+25. A spiritual Deity is incapable of volition and action
+
+26. What is God?
+
+27. Some remarkable Contradictions in Theology
+
+28. To adore God, is to adore a fiction
+
+29. Atheism is authorised by the infinity of God
+
+30. Believing not safer than not believing in God
+
+31. Belief in God is a habit acquired in infancy
+
+32. Belief in God is a prejudice ov successive generations
+
+33. On the Origin of Prejudices
+
+34. On the effects of Prejudices
+
+35. Theology must be instilled before the age of reason
+
+36. The wonders of nature do not prove the existence of God
+
+37. Nature may be explained by natural causes
+
+38. Nature may be explained by natural causes
+
+39. The world has never been created: Matter moves of itself
+
+40. The world has never been created: Matter moves of itself
+
+41. Motion is essential to Matter: no Spiritual Mover
+
+42. The existence of Man does not prove the existence of God
+
+43. Neither Man nor the Universe are the effects of chance
+
+44. Order of the Universe does not prove the existence of a God
+
+45. Order of the Universe does not prove the existence of a God
+
+46. Absurd to adore a divine intelligence
+
+47. Qualities given God contrary to the Essence attributed to him
+
+48. Qualities given God contrary to the Essence attributed to him
+
+49. Absurd to say that the human race is the object of the Universe
+
+50. God is not made for Man, nor Man for God
+
+51. Untrue that the object of the Universe was to render Man happy
+
+52. What is called Providence is a word without meaning
+
+53. This pretended Providence is the enemy of Man
+
+54. The world is not governed by an intelligent being
+
+55. God cannot be considered immutable
+
+56. Good and evil are the necessary effects of natural causes
+
+57. The consolations of Theology and paradise are imaginary
+
+58. Another romantic reverie
+
+59. Vain that Theology attempts to clear its God from human defects
+
+60. Impossible to believe God is of infinite goodness and power
+
+61. Impossible to believe God is of infinite goodness and power
+
+62. Theology's God a monster of absurdity and injustice
+
+63. All Religion inspires contemptible fears
+
+64. Religion, the same as the most somber and servile Superstition
+
+65. The love of God is impossible
+
+66. An eternally tormenting God is a most detestable being
+
+67. Theology is a tissue of palpable contradictions
+
+68. The pretended works of God do not prove Divine Perfections
+
+69. The perfection of God and the pretended creation of angels
+
+70. Theology preaches Omnipotence of its God, yet makes impotent
+
+71. Per all religious systems, God is capricious and foolish
+
+72. It is absurd to say that Evil does not proceed from God
+
+73. The foreknowledge of God proves his cruelty
+
+74. Absurdity of the stories concerning Original Sin, and Satan
+
+75. The Devil, like Religion, was invented to enrich the priests
+
+76. God has no right to punish man
+
+77. It is absurd to say, that the conduct of God a mystery
+
+78. Ought we look for consolation, from the author of our misery?
+
+79. God who punishes the faults which he might have prevented
+
+80. What is called Free Will is an absurdity
+
+81. But we must not conclude that Society has no right to punish
+
+82. Refutation of the arguments in favour of Free Will
+
+83. Refutation of the arguments in favour of Free Will
+
+84. God, if there were a God, would not be free
+
+85. According to Theology, man is not free a single instant
+
+86. There is no evil, and no sin, but must be attributed to God
+
+87. The prayers prove dissatisfaction of the divine will
+
+88. Absurd to imagine repair of misfortune in another world
+
+89. Theology justifies the evil permitted by its God
+
+90. Jehovah, exterminations prove an unjust and barbarous God
+
+91. Is God a generous, equitable, and tender father?
+
+92. Man's life, deposes against goodness of a pretended God
+
+93. We owe no gratitude to what is called _Providence_
+
+94. It is folly to suppose that Man is the favourite of God
+
+95. A comparison between Man and brutes
+
+96. There are no animals so detestable as Tyrants
+
+97. A refutation of the excellence of Man
+
+98. An oriental Tale
+
+99. It is madness to see nothing but the goodness of God
+
+100. What is the Soul?
+
+101. The existence of a _Soul_ is an absurd supposition
+
+102. It is evident that Man dies _in toto_
+
+103. Incontestible arguments against the Spirituality of the Soul
+
+104. On the absurdity of the supernatural causes
+
+105. It is false that Materialism degrades
+
+106. It is false that Materialism degrades
+
+107. Idea of future life only useful to priest's trade
+
+108. It is false that the idea of a future life is consoling
+
+109. All religious principles are derived from the imagination
+
+110. Religion a system to reconciles contradictions by mysteries
+
+111. Absurdity of all Mysteries, invented for the interests of Priests
+
+112, Absurdity of all Mysteries, invented for the interests of Priests
+
+113. Absurdity of all Mysteries, invented for the interests of Priests
+
+114. An universal God ought to have revealed an universal Religion
+
+115. Religion is unnecessary, as it is unintelligible
+
+116. All Religions are rendered ridiculous by the multitude of creeds
+
+117. Opinion of a famous Theologian
+
+118. The God of the Deists is not less contradictory
+
+119. Aged belief in a Deity does not prove the existence of God
+
+120. All Gods are savage: all Religions are monuments of ignorance
+
+121. All religious usages bear marks of stupidity and barbarism
+
+122. The more a religion is ancient and general, the more suspect
+
+123. Scepticism in religious matters from very superficial study
+
+124. Revelations examined
+
+125. Where is the proof that God ever shewed himself or spoke to Men
+
+126. There is nothing that proves miracles to have been ever performed
+
+127. Strange that God spoke differently to different sects
+
+128. Obscurity and suspicious origin of oracles
+
+129. Absurdity of all miracles
+
+130. Refutation of the reasoning of Pascal on miracles
+
+131. Every new revelation is necessarily false
+
+132. Blood of martyrs testifies _against_ the truth of miracles
+
+133. Fanaticism of martyrs, and the interested zeal of missionaries
+
+134. Theology makes its God an enemy to Reason and Common Sense
+
+135. Faith irreconcilable with Reason; and Reason preferable to Faith
+
+136. To what absurd and ridiculous sophisms the religious are reduced
+
+137. Ought a man to believe, on the assurance of another man
+
+138. Faith can take root only in feeble, ignorant, or slothful minds
+
+139. That one Religion has greater pretensions to truth an absurdity
+
+140. Religion is unnecessary to Morality
+
+141. Religion the weakest barrier that can be opposed to the passions
+
+142. Honour is a more salutary and powerful bond than Religion
+
+143. Religion does not restrain the passions of kings
+
+144. Origin of "the divine right of kings"
+
+145. Religion is fatal to political ameliorations
+
+146. Christianity preaching implicit obedience to despotism
+
+147. One object of religious principles: eternize the tyranny of kings
+
+148. Fatal it is to persuade kings they are responsible to God alone
+
+149. A devout king is the scourge of his kingdom
+
+150. Tyranny finds Religion a weak obstacle to the despair of the people
+
+151. Religion favours the wickedness of princes
+
+152. What is an enlightened Sovereign?
+
+153. Of the prevailing passions and crimes of the priesthood
+
+154. The quackery of priests
+
+155. Religion has corrupted Morality, and produced innumerable evils
+
+156. Every Religion is intolerant
+
+157. The evils of a state Religion
+
+158. Religion legitimates and authorizes crime
+
+159. The argument, that evils attributed to Religion are faults of men
+
+160. Religion is incompatible with Morality
+
+161. The Morality of the Gospel is impracticable
+
+162. A society of Saints would be impossible
+
+163. Human nature is not depraved
+
+164. Concerning the effects of Jesus Christ's mission
+
+165. The remission of sins was invented for the interest of priests
+
+166. Who fear God?
+
+167. Hell is an absurd invention
+
+168. The bad foundation of religious morals
+
+169. Christian Charity, as preached and practised by Theologians!!!
+
+170. Confession, priestcraft's gold mine
+
+171. Supposition of the existence of a God unnecessary to Morality
+
+172. Supernatural Morality are fatal to the public welfare
+
+173. The union of Church and State is a calamity
+
+174. National Religions are ruinous
+
+175. Religion paralyses Morality
+
+176. Fatal consequences of Devotion
+
+177. The idea of a future life is not consoling to man
+
+178. An Atheist is fully as conscientious as a religious man
+
+179. An Atheistical king far preferable to a religious king
+
+180. Philosophy produces Morality
+
+181. Religious opinions have little influence upon conduct
+
+182. Reason leads man to Atheism
+
+183. Fear alone makes Theists
+
+184. Can we, and ought we, to love God?
+
+185. God and Religion are proved to be absurdities
+
+186. The existence of God, has not yet been demonstrated
+
+187. Priests are more actuated by self-interest, than unbelievers
+
+188. Presumption, and badness, more in priests, than in Atheists
+
+189. Prejudices last but for a time
+
+190. What if priests the apostles of reason
+
+191. If Philosophy were substituted for Religion!
+
+192. Recantation of an unbeliever at the point of death proves nothing
+
+193. It is not true that Atheism breaks the bonds of society
+
+194. Refutation of the opinion, that Religion necessary for the vulgar
+
+195. Logical systems are not adapted to the capacity of the vulgar
+
+196. On the futility and danger of Theology
+
+197. On the evils produced by implicit faith
+
+198. On the evils produced by implicit faith
+
+199. All Religions were established by impostors, in days of ignorance
+
+200. All Religions borrow from one another ridiculous ceremonies
+
+201. Theology has always diverted philosophy from its right path
+
+202. Theology explains nothing
+
+203. Theology has always fettered Morality, and retarded progress
+
+204. Theology has always fettered Morality, and retarded progress
+
+205. Religion is an extravagance and a calamity
+
+206. Religion prevents us from seeing the true causes of misfortunes
+
+
+
+
+PUBLISHER'S NOTE
+
+
+The chief design in reprinting this translation, is to preserve "_the
+strongest atheistical work_" for present and future generations of English
+Freethinkers.
+
+The real author was, unquestionably, Paul Thyry; Baron D'Holbach, and not
+John Meslier, to whom this work has been wrongly attributed, under the
+title of "Le Bon Sens" (Common Sense).
+
+In 1770, Baron D'Holbach published his masterpiece, "Systeme de la
+Nature," which for a long time passed as the posthumous work of M. de
+Mirabaud. That text-book of "Atheistical Philosophy" caused a great
+sensation, and two years later, 1772, the Baron published this excellent
+abridgment of it, freed from arbitrary ideas; and by its clearness of
+expression, facility, and precision of style, rendered it most suitable
+for the average student.
+
+"Le Bon Sens" was privately printed in Amsterdam, and the author's name
+was kept a profound secret; hence, Baron D'Holbach escaped persecution.
+
+
+
+
+THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE
+
+
+When we examine the opinions of men, we find that nothing is more
+uncommon, than common sense; or, in other words, they lack judgment
+to discover plain truths, or to reject absurdities, and palpable
+contradictions. We have an example of this in Theology, a system revered
+in all countries by a great number of men; an object regarded by them
+as most important, and indispensable to happiness. An examination of
+the principles upon which this pretended system is founded, forces us
+to acknowledge, that these principles are only suppositions, imagined
+by ignorance, propagated by enthusiasm or knavery, adopted by timid
+credulity, preserved by custom which never reasons, and revered solely
+because not understood.
+
+In a word, whoever uses common sense upon religious opinions, and will
+bestow on this inquiry the attention that is commonly given to most
+subjects, will easily perceive that Religion is a mere castle in the
+air. Theology is ignorance of natural causes; a tissue of fallacies
+and contradictions. In every country, it presents romances void of
+probability, the hero of which is composed of impossible qualities. His
+name, exciting fear in all minds, is only a vague word, to which, men
+affix ideas or qualities, which are either contradicted by facts, or
+inconsistent.
+
+Notions of this being, or rather, _the word_ by which he is designated,
+would be a matter of indifference, if it did not cause innumerable ravages
+in the world. But men, prepossessed with the opinion that this phantom is
+a reality of the greatest interest, instead of concluding wisely from its
+incomprehensibility, that they are not bound to regard it, infer on the
+contrary, that they must contemplate it, without ceasing, and never lose
+sight of it. Their invincible ignorance, upon this subject, irritates
+their curiosity; instead of putting them upon guard against their
+imagination, this ignorance renders them decisive, dogmatic, imperious,
+and even exasperates them against all, who oppose doubts to the reveries
+which they have begotten.
+
+What perplexity arises, when it is required to solve an insolvable
+problem; unceasing meditation upon an object, impossible to understand,
+but in which however he thinks himself much concerned, cannot but excite
+man, and produce a fever in his brain. Let interest, vanity, and ambition,
+co-operate ever so little with this unfortunate turn of mind, and society
+must necessarily be disturbed. This is the reason that so many nations
+have often been the scene of extravagances of senseless visionaries, who,
+believing their empty speculations to be eternal truths, and publishing
+them as such, have kindled the zeal of princes and their subjects, and
+made them take up arms for opinions, represented to them as essential to
+the glory of the Deity. In all parts of our globe, fanatics have cut each
+other's throats, publicly burnt each other, committed without a scruple
+and even as a duty, the greatest crimes, and shed torrents of blood. For
+what? To strengthen, support, or propagate the impertinent conjectures of
+some enthusiasts, or to give validity to the cheats of impostors, in the
+name of a being, who exists only in their imagination, and who has made
+himself known only by the ravages, disputes, and follies, he has caused.
+
+Savage and furious nations, perpetually at war, adore, under divers names,
+some God, conformable to their ideas, that is to say, cruel, carnivorous,
+selfish, blood-thirsty. We find, in all the religions, "a God of armies,"
+a "jealous God," an "avenging God," a "destroying God," a "God," who
+is pleased with carnage, and whom his worshippers consider it a duty to
+serve. Lambs, bulls, children, men, and women, are sacrificed to him.
+Zealous servants of this barbarous God think themselves obliged even to
+offer up themselves as a sacrifice to him. Madmen may everywhere be seen,
+who, after meditating upon their terrible God, imagine that to please him
+they must inflict on themselves, the most exquisite torments. The gloomy
+ideas formed of the deity, far from consoling them, have every where
+disquieted their minds, and prejudiced follies destructive to happiness.
+
+How could the human mind progress, while tormented with frightful
+phantoms, and guided by men, interested in perpetuating its ignorance and
+fears? Man has been forced to vegetate in his primitive stupidity: he has
+been taught stories about invisible powers upon whom his happiness was
+supposed to depend. Occupied solely by his fears, and by unintelligible
+reveries, he has always been at the mercy of priests, who have reserved to
+themselves the right of thinking for him, and of directing his actions.
+
+Thus, man has remained a slave without courage, fearing to reason, and
+unable to extricate himself from the labyrinth, in which he has been
+wandering. He believes himself forced under the yoke of his gods, known
+to him only by the fabulous accounts given by his ministers, who, after
+binding each unhappy mortal in the chains of prejudice, remain his
+masters, or else abandon him defenceless to the absolute power of tyrants,
+no less terrible than the gods, of whom they are the representatives.
+
+Oppressed by the double yoke of spiritual and temporal power, it has been
+impossible for the people to be happy. Religion became sacred, and men
+have had no other Morality, than what their legislators and priests
+brought from the unknown regions of heaven. The human mind, confused
+by theological opinions, ceased to know its own powers, mistrusted
+experience, feared truth and disdained reason, in order to follow
+authority. Man has been a mere machine in the hands of tyrants and
+priests. Always treated as a slave, man has contracted the vices of
+slavery.
+
+Such are the true causes of the corruption of morals. Ignorance and
+servitude are calculated to make men wicked and unhappy. Knowledge,
+Reason, and Liberty, can alone reform and make men happier. But every
+thing conspires to blind them, and to confirm their errors. Priests cheat
+them, tyrants corrupt and enslave them. Tyranny ever was, and ever will
+be, the true cause of man's depravity, and also of his calamities. Almost
+always fascinated by religious fiction, poor mortals turn not their eyes
+to the natural and obvious causes of their misery; but attribute their
+vices to the imperfection of their natures, and their unhappiness to the
+anger of the gods. They offer to heaven vows, sacrifices, and presents, to
+obtain the end of sufferings, which in reality, are attributable only to
+the negligence, ignorance, and perversity of their guides, to the folly of
+their customs, and above all, to the general want of knowledge. Let men's
+minds be filled with true ideas; let their reason be cultivated; and there
+will be no need of opposing to the passions, such a feeble barrier, as the
+fear of gods. Men will be good, when they are well instructed; and when
+they are despised for evil, or justly rewarded for good, which they do to
+their fellow citizens.
+
+In vain should we attempt to cure men of their vices, unless we begin by
+curing them of their prejudices. It is only by showing them the truth,
+that they will perceive their true interests, and the real motives that
+ought to incline them to do good. Instructors have long enough fixed men's
+eyes upon heaven; let them now turn them upon earth. An incomprehensible
+theology, ridiculous fables, impenetrable mysteries, puerile ceremonies,
+are to be no longer endured. Let the human mind apply itself to what is
+natural, to intelligible objects, truth, and useful knowledge.
+
+Does it not suffice to annihilate religious prejudice, to shew, that
+what is inconceivable to man, cannot be good for him? Does it require any
+thing, but plain common sense, to perceive, that a being, incompatible
+with the most evident notions--that a cause continually opposed to
+the effects which we attribute to it--that a being, of whom we can say
+nothing, without falling into contradiction--that a being, who, far
+from explaining the enigmas of the universe, only makes them more
+inexplicable--that a being, whom for so many ages men have vainly
+addressed to obtain their happiness, and the end of sufferings--does it
+require, I say, any thing but plain, common sense, to perceive--that the
+idea of such a being is an idea without model, and that he himself is
+merely a phantom of the imagination? Is any thing necessary but common
+sense to perceive, at least, that it is folly and madness for men to hate
+and damn one another about unintelligible opinions concerning a being of
+this kind? In short, does not every thing prove, that Morality and Virtue
+are totally incompatible with the notions of a God, whom his ministers
+and interpreters have described, in every country, as the most capricious,
+unjust, and cruel of tyrants, whose pretended will, however, must serve as
+law and rule the inhabitants of the earth?
+
+To discover the true principles of Morality, men have no need of theology,
+of revelation, or of gods: They have need only of common sense. They have
+only to commune with themselves, to reflect upon their own nature, to
+consider the objects of society, and of the individuals, who compose
+it; and they will easily perceive, that virtue is advantageous, and vice
+disadvantageous to themselves. Let us persuade men to be just, beneficent,
+moderate, sociable; not because such conduct is demanded by the gods, but,
+because it is pleasant to men. Let us advise them to abstain from vice
+and crime; not because they will be punished in another world, but because
+they will suffer for it in this.--_These are,_ says Montesquieu, _means
+to prevent crimes--these are punishments; these reform manners--these are
+good examples._
+
+The way of truth is straight; that of imposture is crooked and dark.
+Truth, ever necessary to man, must necessarily be felt by all upright
+minds; the lessons of reason are to be followed by all honest men. Men are
+unhappy, only because they are ignorant; they are ignorant, only because
+every thing conspires to prevent their being enlightened; they are wicked
+only because their reason is not sufficiently developed.
+
+By what fatality then, have the first founders of all sects given to
+their gods ferocious characters, at which nature revolts? Can we imagine
+a conduct more abominable, than that which Moses tells us his God showed
+towards the Egyptians, where that assassin proceeds boldly to declare, in
+the name and by the order of _his God_, that Egypt shall be afflicted
+with the greatest calamities, that can happen to man? Of all the different
+ideas, which they give us of a supreme being, of a God, creator and
+preserver of mankind, there are none more horrible, than those of the
+impostors, who represented themselves as inspired by a divine spirit, and
+"Thus saith the Lord."
+
+Why, O theologians! do you presume to inquire into the impenetrable
+mysteries of a being, whom you consider inconceivable to the human mind?
+You are the blasphemers, when you imagine that a being, perfect according
+to you, could be guilty of such cruelty towards creatures whom he has
+made out of nothing. Confess, your ignorance of a creating God; and cease
+meddling with mysteries, which are repugnant to _Common Sense_.
+
+
+
+DETAILED TABLE OF CONTENTS GIVEN IN THE FRENCH EDITION
+
+
+  Section
+
+  1.  APOLOGUE
+
+  2, 3.  What is Theology?
+
+  4.  Man is not born with any ideas of Religion
+
+  5.  It is not necessary to believe in a God
+
+  6.  Religion is founded on credulity
+
+  7.  All religion is an absurdity
+
+  8.  The idea of God is impossible
+
+  9.  On the Origin of Superstition
+
+  10.  On the Origin of all Religion
+
+  11.  Religious fears expose men to become a prey to imposters
+
+  12, 13.  Religion seduces ignorance by the aid of the marvellous
+
+  14.  There would never have been any Religion, if there had not been
+       ages of Stupidity and Barbarism
+
+  15.  All Religion was produced by the desire of domination
+
+  16.  What serves as a basis to Religion is most uncertain
+
+  17, 18.  It is impossible to be convinced of the existence of a God
+
+  19.  The existence of God is not proved
+
+  20.  It explains nothing to say, that God is a spirit
+
+  21.  Spirituality is an absurdity
+
+  22.  Whatever exists is derived from Matter
+
+  23.  What is the metaphysical God of modern Theology?
+
+  24.  It would be less unreasonable to adore the Sun, than to adore
+       a spiritual Deity
+
+  25.  A spiritual Deity is incapable of volition and action
+
+  26.  What is God?
+
+  27.  Some remarkable Contradictions in Theology
+
+  28.  To adore God, is to adore a fiction
+
+  29.  Atheism is authorised by the infinity of God, and the impossibility
+       of knowing the Divine essence
+
+  30.  Believing in God is neither safer nor less criminal than not
+       believing in him
+
+  31.  Belief in God is a habit acquired in infancy
+
+  32.  Belief in God is a prejudice established by successive generations
+
+  33.  On the Origin of Prejudices
+
+  34.  On the effects of Prejudices
+
+  35.  The Religious principles of modern Theology could not be believed
+       if they were not instilled into the mind before the age of reason
+
+  36.  The wonders of nature do not prove the existence of God
+
+  37, 38.  Nature may be explained by natural causes
+
+  39, 40.  The world has never been created: Matter moves of itself
+
+  41.  Additional proofs that motion is essential to Matter, and that
+       consequently it is unnecessary to imagine a Spiritual Mover
+
+  42.  The existence of Man does not prove the existence of God
+
+  43.  Nevertheless, neither Man nor the Universe are the effects of chance
+
+  44, 45.  The order of the Universe does not prove the existence of a God
+
+  46.  A Spirit cannot be intelligent it is absurd to adore a divine
+       intelligence
+
+  47, 48.  All the qualities, which Theology gives to its God are contrary
+           to the Essence which is attributed to him
+
+  49.  It is absurd to say that the human race is the object and end
+       of the formation of the Universe
+
+  50.  God is not made for Man, nor Man for God
+
+  51.  It is not true that the object of the formation of the Universe
+       was to render Man happy
+
+  52.  What is called Providence is a word without meaning
+
+  53.  This pretended Providence is the enemy of Man
+
+  54.  The world is not governed by an intelligent being
+
+  55.  God cannot be considered immutable
+
+  56.  Good and evil are the necessary effects of natural causes.
+       What is a God that cannot change any thing?
+
+  57.  The consolations of Theology and the hope of paradise and of
+       a future life, are imaginary
+
+  58.  Another romantic reverie
+
+  59.  It is in vain that Theology attempts to clear its God from human
+       defects: either this God is not free, or else he is more wicked
+       than good
+
+  60, 61.  It is impossible to believe that there exists a God of
+           infinite goodness and power
+
+  62.  Theology makes its God a monster of absurdity, injustice,
+       malice, and atrocity
+
+  63.  All Religion inspires contemptible fears
+
+  64.  There is no difference between Religion, and the most somber
+       and servile Superstition
+
+  65.  To judge from the ideas which Theology gives of the Deity, the
+       love of God is impossible
+
+  66.  An eternally tormenting God is a most detestable being
+
+  67.  Theology is a tissue of palpable contradictions
+
+  68.  The pretended works of God do not prove Divine Perfections
+
+  69.  The perfection of God is not rendered more evident by the
+       pretended creation of angels
+
+  70.  Theology preaches the Omnipotence of its God, yet constantly
+       makes him appear impotent
+
+  71.  According to all religious systems, God would be the most
+       capricious and most foolish of beings
+
+  72.  It is absurd to say that Evil does not proceed from God
+
+  73.  The foreknowledge attributed to God would give men a right
+       to complain of his cruelty
+
+  74.  Absurdity of the theological stories concerning Original Sin,
+       and concerning Satan
+
+  75.  The Devil, like Religion, was invented to enrich the priests
+
+  76.  If God has been unable to render human nature incapable of sin,
+       he has no right to punish man
+
+  77.  It is absurd to say, that the conduct of God ought to be a mystery
+       for man
+
+  78.  Ought the unfortunate look for consolation, to the sole author
+       of their misery
+
+  79.  A God, who punishes the faults which he might have prevented,
+       is a mad tyrant, who joins injustice to folly
+
+  80.  What is called Free Will is an absurdity
+
+  81.  But we must not conclude that Society has no right to punish
+
+  82, 83.  Refutation of the arguments in favour of Free Will
+
+  84.  God himself, if there were a God, would not be free: hence the
+       inutility of all Religion
+
+  85.  According to the principles of Theology, man is not free a
+       single instant
+
+  86.  There is no evil, no disorder, and no sin, but must be attributed
+       to God: consequently God has no right either to punish or recompence
+
+  87.  The prayers offered to God sufficiently prove dissatisfaction of
+       the divine will
+
+  88.  It is the height of absurdity to imagine, that the injuries and
+       misfortunes, endured in this world, will be repaired in another world
+
+  89.  Theology justifies the evil and the wickedness, permitted by its God,
+       only by attributing to him the principle, that "Might makes Right,"
+       which is the violation of all Right
+
+  90.  The absurd doctrine of Redemption, and the frequent exterminations
+       attributed to Jehovah, impress one with the idea of an unjust and
+       barbarous God
+
+  91.  Can a being, who has called us into existence merely to make us
+       miserable, be a generous, equitable, and tender father?
+
+  92.  Man's life, and all that occurs, deposes against the liberty of Man,
+       and against the justice and goodness of a pretended God
+
+  93.  It is not true, that we owe any gratitude to what is called
+       _Providence_
+
+  94.  It is folly to suppose that Man is the king of nature, the favourite
+       of God, and unique object of his labours
+
+  95.  A comparison between Man and brutes
+
+  96.  There are no animals so detestable as Tyrants
+
+  97.  A refutation of the excellence of Man
+
+  98.  An oriental Tale
+
+  99.  It is madness to see nothing but the goodness of God, or to think
+       that this universe is only made for Man
+
+  100.  What is the Soul?
+
+  101.  The existence of a _Soul_ is an absurd supposition; and the existence
+        of an _immortal_ Soul still more absurd
+
+  102.  It is evident that Man dies _in toto_
+
+  103.  Incontestible arguments against the Spirituality of the Soul
+
+  104.  On the absurdity of the supernatural causes, to which Theologians
+        are constantly having recourse
+
+  105, 106.  It is false that Materialism degrades
+
+  107.  The idea of a future life is only useful to those, who trade on
+        public credulity
+
+  108.  It is false that the idea of a future life is consoling
+
+  109.  All religious principles are derived from the imagination.
+        God is a chimera; and the qualities, attributed to him,
+        reciprocally destroy one another
+
+  110.  Religion is but a system imagined in order to reconcile
+        contradictions by the aid of mysteries
+
+  111, 112, 113.  Absurdity and inutility of all Mysteries, which were only
+                  invented for the interests of Priests
+
+  114.  An universal God ought to have revealed an universal Religion
+
+  115.  What proves, that Religion is unnecessary, is, that it is
+        unintelligible
+
+  116.  All Religions are rendered ridiculous by the multitude of creeds,
+        all opposite to one another, and all equally foolish
+
+  117.  Opinion of a famous Theologian
+
+  118.  The God of the Deists is not less contradictory, nor less chimerical
+        than the God of the Christians
+
+  119.  It by no means proves the existence of God to say, that, in every
+        age, all nations have acknowledged some Deity or other
+
+  120.  All Gods are of a savage origin: all Religions are monuments of
+        the ignorance, superstition, and ferocity of former times: modern
+        Religions are but ancient follies, re-edited with additions and
+        corrections
+
+  121.  All religious usages bear marks of stupidity and barbarism
+
+  122.  The more a religious opinion is ancient and general, the more it
+        ought to be suspected
+
+  123.  Mere scepticism in religious matters, can only be the effect of
+        a very superficial examination
+
+  124.  Revelations examined
+
+  125.  Where is the proof that God ever shewed himself to Men, or ever
+        spoke to them?
+
+  126.  There is nothing that proves miracles to have been ever performed
+
+  127.  If God has spoken, is it not strange that he should have spoken
+        so differently to the different religious sects?
+
+  128.  Obscurity and suspicious origin of oracles
+
+  129.  Absurdity of all miracles
+
+  130.  Refutation of the reasoning of Pascal concerning the manner in which
+        we must judge of miracles
+
+  131.  Every new revelation is necessarily false
+
+  132.  The blood of martyrs testifies _against_ the truth of miracles, and
+        _against_ the divine origin attributed to Christianity
+
+  133.  The fanaticism of martyrs, and the interested zeal of missionaries,
+        by no means prove the truth of Religion
+
+  134.  Theology makes its God an enemy to Reason and Common Sense
+
+  135.  Faith is irreconcilable with Reason; and Reason is preferable
+        to Faith
+
+  136.  To what absurd and ridiculous sophisms every one is reduced, who
+        would substitute Faith for Reason!
+
+  137.  Ought a man to believe, on the assurance of another man, what is
+        of the greatest importance to himself
+
+  138.  Faith can take root only in feeble, ignorant, or slothful minds
+
+  139.  To teach, that any one Religion has greater pretensions to truth
+        than another, is an absurdity, and cause of tumult
+
+  140.  Religion is unnecessary to Morality
+
+  141.  Religion is the weakest barrier that can be opposed to the passions
+
+  142.  Honour is a more salutary and powerful bond than Religion
+
+  143.  Religion does not restrain the passions of kings
+
+  144.  Origin of "the divine right of kings," the most absurd, ridiculous,
+        and odious, of usurpations
+
+  145.  Religion is fatal to political ameliorations: it makes despots
+        licentious and wicked, and their subjects abject and miserable
+
+  146.  Christianity has propagated itself by preaching implicit obedience
+        to despotism
+
+  147.  One object of religious principles is to eternize the tyranny
+        of kings
+
+  148.  How fatal it is to persuade kings that they are responsible for
+        their actions to God alone
+
+  149.  A devout king is the scourge of his kingdom
+
+  150.  Tyranny sometimes finds the aegis of Religion a weak obstacle
+        to the despair of the people
+
+  151.  Religion favours the wickedness of princes by delivering them
+        from fear and remorse
+
+  152.  What is an enlightened Sovereign?
+
+  153.  Of the prevailing passions and crimes of the priesthood
+
+  154.  The quackery of priests
+
+  155.  Religion has corrupted Morality, and produced innumerable evils
+
+  156.  Every Religion is intolerant
+
+  157.  The evils of a state Religion
+
+  158.  Religion legitimates and authorizes crime
+
+  159.  Refutation of the argument, that the evils attributed to Religion
+        are but the bad effects of human passions
+
+  160.  Religion is incompatible with Morality
+
+  161.  The Morality of the Gospel is impracticable
+
+  162.  A society of Saints would be impossible
+
+  163.  Human nature is not depraved
+
+  164.  Concerning the effects of Jesus Christ's mission
+
+  165.  The dogma of the remission of sins was invented for the interest
+        of priests
+
+  166.  Who fear God?
+
+  167.  Hell is an absurd invention
+
+  168.  The bad foundation of religious morals
+
+  169.  Christian Charity, as preached and practised by Theologians!!!
+
+  170.  Confession, priestcraft's gold mine, and the destruction of the
+        true principles of Morality
+
+  171.  The supposition of the existence of a God is by no means necessary
+        to Morality
+
+  172.  Religion and its supernatural Morality are fatal to the
+        public welfare
+
+  173.  The union of Church and State is a calamity
+
+  174.  National Religions are ruinous
+
+  175.  Religion paralyses Morality
+
+  176.  Fatal consequences of Devotion
+
+  177.  The idea of a future life is not consoling to man
+
+  178.  An Atheist is fully as conscientious as a religious man, and has
+        better motives for doing good
+
+  179.  An Atheistical king would be far preferable to a religious king
+
+  180.  Philosophy produces Morality
+
+  181.  Religious opinions have little influence upon conduct
+
+  182.  Reason leads man to Atheism
+
+  183.  Fear alone makes Theists
+
+  184.  Can we, and ought we, to love God?
+
+  185.  God and Religion are proved to be absurdities by the different
+        ideas formed of them
+
+  186.  The existence of God, which is the basis of Religion, has not yet
+        been demonstrated
+
+  187.  Priests are more actuated by self-interest, than unbelievers
+
+  188.  Pride, presumption, and badness, are more often found in priests,
+        than in Atheists
+
+  189.  Prejudices last but for a time: no power is durable which is not
+        founded upon truth
+
+  190.  What an honourable power ministers of the Gods would obtain,
+        if they became the apostles of reason and the defenders of liberty!
+
+  191.  What a glorious and happy revolution it would be for the world,
+        if Philosophy were substituted for Religion!
+
+  192.  The recantation of an unbeliever at the point of death proves
+        nothing against the reasonableness of unbelief
+
+  193.  It is not true that Atheism breaks the bonds of society
+
+  194.  Refutation of the often repeated opinion, that Religion is necessary
+        for the vulgar
+
+  195.  Logical and argumentative systems are not adapted to the capacity
+        of the vulgar
+
+  196.  On the futility and danger of Theology
+
+  197, 198.  On the evils produced by implicit faith
+
+  199.  History teaches us, that all Religions were established by
+        impostors, in days of ignorance
+
+  200.  All Religions, ancient or modern, have borrowed from one
+        another ridiculous ceremonies
+
+  201.  Theology has always diverted philosophy from its right path
+
+  202.  Theology explains nothing
+
+  203, 204.  Theology has always fettered Morality, and retarded progress
+
+  205.  It cannot be too often repeated and proved, that Religion is an
+        extravagance and a calamity
+
+  206.  Religion prevents us from seeing the true causes of misfortunes
+
+
+
+
+GOOD SENSE WITHOUT GOD
+
+
+
+
+APOLOGUE
+
+
+
+
+1.
+
+There is a vast empire, governed by a monarch, whose strange conduct is
+to confound the minds of his subjects. He wishes to be known, loved,
+respected, obeyed; but never shows himself to his subjects, and everything
+conspires to render uncertain the ideas formed of his character.
+
+The people, subjected to his power, have, of the character and laws of
+their invisible sovereign, such ideas only, as his ministers give them.
+They, however, confess, that they have no idea of their master; that his
+ways are impenetrable; his views and nature totally incomprehensible.
+These ministers, likewise, disagree upon the commands which they pretend
+have been issued by the sovereign, whose servants they call themselves.
+They defame one another, and mutually treat each other as impostors and
+false teachers. The decrees and ordinances, they take upon themselves
+to promulgate, are obscure; they are enigmas, little calculated to be
+understood, or even divined, by the subjects, for whose instruction they
+were intended. The laws of the concealed monarch require interpreters;
+but the interpreters are always disputing upon the true manner of
+understanding them. Besides, they are not consistent with themselves; all
+they relate of their concealed prince is only a string of contradictions.
+They utter concerning him not a single word that does not immediately
+confute itself. They call him supremely good; yet many complain of his
+decrees. They suppose him infinitely wise; and under his administration
+everything appears to contradict reason. They extol his justice; and the
+best of his subjects are generally the least favoured. They assert, he
+sees everything; yet his presence avails nothing. He is, say they, the
+friend of order; yet throughout his dominions, all is in confusion and
+disorder. He makes all for himself; and the events seldom answer
+his designs. He foresees everything; but cannot prevent anything. He
+impatiently suffers offence, yet gives everyone the power of offending
+him. Men admire the wisdom and perfection of his works; yet his works,
+full of imperfection, are of short duration. He is continually doing and
+undoing; repairing what he has made; but is never pleased with his work.
+In all his undertakings, he proposes only his own glory; yet is never
+glorified. His only end is the happiness of his subjects; and his
+subjects, for the most part want necessaries. Those, whom he seems to
+favour are generally least satisfied with their fate; almost all appear
+in perpetual revolt against a master, whose greatness they never cease to
+admire, whose wisdom to extol, whose goodness to adore, whose justice to
+fear, and whose laws to reverence, though never obeyed!
+
+This EMPIRE is the WORLD; this MONARCH GOD; his MINISTERS are the PRIESTS;
+his SUBJECTS MANKIND.
+
+
+
+
+2.
+
+There is a science that has for its object only things incomprehensible.
+Contrary to all other sciences, it treats only of what cannot fall under
+our senses. Hobbes calls it the _kingdom of darkness_. It is a country,
+where every thing is governed by laws, contrary to those which mankind are
+permitted to know in the world they inhabit. In this marvellous region,
+light is only darkness; evidence is doubtful or false; impossibilities
+are credible: reason is a deceitful guide; and good sense becomes madness.
+This _science_ is called _theology_, and this theology is a continual
+insult to the reason of man.
+
+
+
+
+3.
+
+By the magical power of "ifs," "buts," "perhaps's," "what do we know,"
+etc., heaped together, a shapeless and unconnected system is formed,
+perplexing mankind, by obliterating from their minds, the most clear ideas
+and rendering uncertain truths most evident. By reason of this systematic
+confusion, nature is an enigma; the visible world has disappeared, to give
+place to regions invisible; reason is compelled to yield to imagination,
+who leads to the country of her self-invented chimeras.
+
+
+
+
+4.
+
+The principles of every religion are founded upon the idea of a GOD. Now,
+it is impossible to have true ideas of a being, who acts upon none of our
+senses. All our ideas are representations of sensible objects. What then
+can represent to us the idea of God, which is evidently an idea without an
+object? Is not such an idea as impossible, as an effect without a cause?
+Can an idea without an archetype be anything, but a chimera? There are,
+however, divines, who assure us that the idea of God is innate; or that
+we have this idea in our mother's womb. Every principle is the result of
+reason; all reason is the effect of experience; experience is acquired
+only by the exercise of our senses: therefore, religious principles are
+not founded upon reason, and are not innate.
+
+
+
+
+5.
+
+Every system of religion can be founded only upon the nature of God and
+man; and upon the relations, which subsist between them. But to judge
+of the reality of those relations, we must have some idea of the divine
+nature. Now, the world exclaims, the divine nature is incomprehensible to
+man; yet ceases not to assign attributes to this incomprehensible God, and
+to assure us, that it is our indispensable duty to find out that God, whom
+it is impossible to comprehend.
+
+The most important concern of man is what he can least comprehend. If God
+is incomprehensible to man, it would seem reasonable never to think of
+him; but religion maintains, man cannot with impunity cease a moment to
+think (or rather dream) of his God.
+
+
+
+
+6.
+
+We are told, that divine qualities are not of a nature to be comprehended
+by finite minds. The natural consequence must be, that divine qualities
+are not made to occupy finite minds. But religion tells us, that the poor
+finite mind of man ought never to lose sight of an inconceivable being,
+whose qualities he can never comprehend. Thus, we see, religion is the
+art of turning the attention of mankind upon subjects they can never
+comprehend.
+
+
+
+
+7.
+
+Religion unites man with God, or forms a communication between them; yet
+do they not say, God is infinite? If God be infinite, no finite being can
+have communication or relation with him. Where there is no relation, there
+can be no union, communication, or duties. If there be no duties between
+man and his God, there is no religion for man. Thus, in saying God is
+infinite, you annihilate religion for man, who is a finite being. The idea
+of infinity is to us an idea without model, without archetype, without
+object.
+
+
+
+
+8.
+
+If God be an infinite being, there cannot be, either in the present or
+future world, any relative proportion between man and his God. Thus, the
+idea of God can never enter the human mind. In supposition of a life, in
+which man would be much more enlightened, than in this, the idea of the
+infinity of God would ever remain the same distance from his finite mind.
+Thus the idea of God will be no more clear in the future, than in the
+present life. Thus, intelligences, superior to man, can have no more
+complete ideas of God, than man, who has not the least conception of him
+in his present life.
+
+
+
+
+9.
+
+How has it been possible to persuade reasonable beings, that the thing,
+most impossible to comprehend, was most essential to them? It is because
+they have been greatly terrified; because, when they fear, they cease
+to reason; because, they have been taught to mistrust their own
+understanding; because, when the brain is troubled, they believe every
+thing, and examine nothing.
+
+
+
+
+10.
+
+Ignorance and fear are the two hinges of all religion. The uncertainty in
+which man finds himself in relation to his God, is precisely the motive
+that attaches him to his religion. Man is fearful in the dark--in moral,
+as well as physical darkness. His fear becomes habitual, and habit makes
+it natural; he would think that he wanted something, if he had nothing to
+fear.
+
+
+
+
+11.
+
+He, who from infancy has habituated himself to tremble when he hears
+pronounced certain words, requires those words and needs to tremble. He is
+therefore more disposed to listen to one, who entertains him in his fears,
+than to one, who dissuades him from them. The superstitious man wishes to
+fear; his imagination demands it; one might say, that he fears nothing so
+much, as to have nothing to fear.
+
+Men are imaginary invalids, whose weakness empirics are interested to
+encourage, in order to have sale for their drugs. They listen rather to
+the physician, who prescribes a variety of remedies, than to him, who
+recommends good regimen, and leaves nature to herself.
+
+
+
+
+12.
+
+If religion were more clear, it would have less charms for the ignorant,
+who are pleased only with obscurity, terrors, fables, prodigies, and
+things incredible. Romances, silly stories, and the tales of ghosts and
+wizards, are more pleasing to vulgar minds than true histories.
+
+
+
+
+13.
+
+In point of religion, men are only great children. The more a religion is
+absurd and filled with wonders, the greater ascendancy it acquires over
+them. The devout man thinks himself obliged to place no bounds to his
+credulity; the more things are inconceivable, they appear to him divine;
+the more they are incredible, the greater merit, he imagines, there is in
+believing them.
+
+
+
+
+14.
+
+The origin of religious opinions is generally dated from the time, when
+savage nations were yet in infancy. It was to gross, ignorant, and
+stupid people, that the founders of religion have in all ages addressed
+themselves, when they wished to give them their Gods, their mode of
+worship, their mythology, their marvellous and frightful fables. These
+chimeras, adopted without examination by parents, are transmitted, with
+more or less alteration, to their children, who seldom reason any more
+than their parents.
+
+
+
+
+15.
+
+The object of the first legislators was to govern the people; and the
+easiest method to effect it was to terrify their minds, and to prevent
+the exercise of reason. They led them through winding bye-paths, lest they
+might perceive the designs of their guides; they forced them to fix their
+eyes in the air, for fear they should look at their feet; they amused them
+on the way with idle stories; in a word, they treated them as nurses do
+children, who sing lullabies, to put them to sleep, and scold, to make
+them quiet.
+
+
+
+
+16.
+
+The existence of a God is the basis of all religion. Few appear to doubt
+his existence; yet this fundamental article utterly embarrasses every mind
+that reasons. The first question of every catechism has been, and ever
+will be, the most difficult to resolve. (In the year 1701, the
+holy fathers of the oratory of Vendome maintained in a thesis, this
+proposition--that, according to St. Thomas, the existence of God is not,
+and cannot be, a subject of faith.)
+
+
+
+
+17.
+
+Can we imagine ourselves sincerely convinced of the existence of a being,
+whose nature we know not; who is inaccessible to all our senses; whose
+attributes, we are assured, are incomprehensible to us? To persuade me
+that a being exists or can exist, I must be first told what that being is.
+To induce me to believe the existence or the possibility of such a
+being, it is necessary to tell me things concerning him that are not
+contradictory, and do not destroy one another. In short, to fully convince
+me of the existence of that being, it is necessary to tell me things that
+I can understand.
+
+
+
+
+18.
+
+A thing is impossible, when it includes two ideas that mutually destroy
+one another, and which can neither be conceived nor united in thought.
+Conviction can be founded only upon the constant testimony of our senses,
+which alone give birth to our ideas, and enable us to judge of their
+agreement or disagreement. That, which exists necessarily, is that, whose
+non-existence implies a contradiction. These principles, universally
+acknowledged, become erroneous, when applied to the existence of a
+God. Whatever has been hitherto said upon the subject, is either
+unintelligible, or perfect contradiction, and must therefore appear absurd
+to every rational man.
+
+
+
+
+19.
+
+All human knowledge is more or less clear. By what strange fatality have
+we never been able to elucidate the science of God? The most civilized
+nations, and among them the most profound thinkers, are in this respect no
+more enlightened than the most savage tribes and ignorant peasants; and,
+examining the subject closely, we shall find, that, by the speculations
+and subtle refinements of men, the divine science has been only more and
+more obscured. Every religion has hitherto been founded only upon what is
+called, in logic, _begging the question_; it takes things for granted, and
+then proves, by suppositions, instead of principles.
+
+
+
+
+20.
+
+Metaphysics teach us, that God is a _pure spirit_. But, is modern theology
+superior to that of the savages? The savages acknowledge a _great spirit_,
+for the master of the world. The savages, like all ignorant people,
+attribute to _spirits_ all the effects, of which their experience cannot
+discover the true causes. Ask a savage, what works your watch? He will
+answer, _it is a spirit_. Ask the divines, what moves the universe? They
+answer, _it is a spirit_.
+
+
+
+
+21.
+
+The savage, when he speaks of a spirit, affixes, at least, some idea to
+the word; he means thereby an agent, like the air, the breeze, the breath,
+that invisibly produces discernible effects. By subtilizing every thing,
+the modern theologian becomes as unintelligible to himself as to others.
+Ask him, what he understands by a spirit? He will answer you, that it is
+an unknown substance, perfectly simple, that has no extension, that has
+nothing common with matter. Indeed, is there any one, who can form the
+least idea of such a substance? What then is a spirit, to speak in the
+language of modern theology, but the absence of an idea? The idea of
+_spirituality_ is an idea without model.
+
+
+
+
+22.
+
+Is it not more natural and intelligible to draw universal existence from
+the matter, whose existence is demonstrated by all the senses, and whose
+effects we experience, which we see act, move, communicate motion, and
+incessantly generate, than to attribute the formation of things to an
+unknown power, to a spiritual being, who cannot derive from his nature
+what he has not himself, and who, by his spiritual essence, can create
+neither matter nor motion? Nothing is more evident, than that the idea
+they endeavour to give us, of the action of mind upon matter, represents
+no object. It is an idea without model.
+
+
+
+
+23.
+
+The material _Jupiter_ of the ancients could move, compose, destroy,
+and create beings, similar to himself; but the God of modern theology is
+sterile. He can neither occupy any place in space, nor move matter, nor
+form a visible world, nor create men or gods. The metaphysical God is fit
+only to produce confusion, reveries, follies, and disputes.
+
+
+
+
+24.
+
+Since a God was indispensably requisite to men, why did they not worship
+the Sun, that visible God, adored by so many nations? What being had
+greater claim to the homage of men, than the day-star, who enlightens,
+warms, and vivifies all beings; whose presence enlivens and regenerates
+nature, whose absence seems to cast her into gloom and languor? If any
+being announced to mankind, power, activity, beneficence, and duration, it
+was certainly the Sun, whom they ought to have regarded as the parent of
+nature, as the divinity. At least, they could not, without folly, dispute
+his existence, or refuse to acknowledge his influence.
+
+
+
+
+25.
+
+The theologian exclaims to us, that God wants neither hands nor arms to
+act; that _he acts by his will_. But pray, who or what is that God, who
+has a will, and what can be the subject of his divine will?
+
+Are the stories of witches, ghosts, wizards, hobgoblins, etc., more absurd
+and difficult to believe than the magical or impossible action of mind
+upon matter? When we admit such a God, fables and reveries may claim
+belief. Theologians treat men as children, whose simplicity makes them
+believe all the stories they hear.
+
+
+
+
+26.
+
+To shake the existence of God, we need only to ask a theologian to
+speak of him. As soon as he has said a word upon the subject, the
+least reflection will convince us, that his observations are totally
+incompatible with the essence he ascribes to his God. What then is God?
+It is an abstract word, denoting the hidden power of nature; or it is a
+mathematical point, that has neither length, breadth, nor thickness. David
+Hume, speaking of theologians, has ingeniously observed, _that they have
+discovered the solution of the famous problem of Archimedes--a point in
+the heavens, whence they move the world_.
+
+
+
+
+27.
+
+Religion prostrates men before a being, who, without extension, is
+infinite, and fills all with his immensity; a being, all-powerful, who
+never executes his will; a being, sovereignly good, who creates only
+disquietudes; a being, the friend of order, and in whose government all
+is in confusion and disorder. What then, can we imagine, can be the God of
+theology?
+
+
+
+
+28.
+
+To avoid all embarrassment, we are told, "that it is not necessary to know
+what God is; that we must adore him; that we are not permitted to extend
+our views to his attributes." But, before we know that we must adore a
+God, must we not know certainly, that he exists? But, how can we assure
+ourselves, that he exists, if we never examine whether the various
+qualities, attributed to him, do really exist and agree in him? Indeed,
+to adore God, is to adore only the fictions of one's own imagination, or
+rather, it is to adore nothing.
+
+
+
+
+29.
+
+In view of confounding things the more, theologians have not declared what
+their God is; they tell us only what he is not. By means of negations and
+abstractions, they think they have composed a real and perfect being. Mind
+is that, which is _not_ body. An infinite being is a being, who is _not_
+finite. A perfect being is a being, who is _not_ imperfect. Indeed, is
+there any one, who can form real ideas of such a mass of absence of ideas?
+That, which excludes all idea, can it be any thing but nothing?
+
+To pretend, that the divine attributes are beyond the reach of human
+conception, is to grant, that God is not made for man. To assure us, that,
+in God, all is infinite, is to own that there can be nothing common to him
+and his creatures. If there be nothing common to God and his creatures,
+God is annihilated for man, or, at least, rendered useless to him. "God,"
+they say, "has made man intelligent, but he has not made him omniscient;"
+hence it is inferred, that he has not been able to give him faculties
+sufficiently enlarged to know his divine essence. In this case, it
+is evident, that God has not been able nor willing to be known by his
+creatures. By what right then would God be angry with beings, who were
+naturally incapable of knowing the divine essence? God would be evidently
+the most unjust and capricious of tyrants, if he should punish an Atheist
+for not having known, what, by his nature, it was impossible he should
+know.
+
+
+
+
+30.
+
+To the generality of men, nothing renders an argument more convincing
+than fear. It is therefore, that theologians assure us, _we must take the
+safest part_; that nothing is so criminal as incredulity; that God will
+punish without pity every one who has the temerity to doubt his existence;
+that his severity is just, since madness or perversity only can make
+us deny the existence of an enraged monarch, who without mercy avenges
+himself on Atheists. If we coolly examine these threatenings, we shall
+find, they always suppose the thing in question. They must first prove the
+existence of a God, before they assure us, it is safest to believe, and
+horrible to doubt or deny his existence. They must then prove, that it is
+possible and consistent, that a just God cruelly punishes men for having
+been in a state of madness, that prevented their believing the existence
+of a being, whom their perverted reason could not conceive. In a word,
+they must prove, that an infinitely just God can infinitely punish the
+invincible and natural ignorance of man with respect to the divine nature.
+Do not theologians reason very strangely? They invent phantoms, they
+compose them of contradictions; they then assure us, it is safest not
+to doubt the existence of these phantoms they themselves have invented.
+According to this mode of reasoning, there is no absurdity, which it would
+not be more safe to believe, than not to believe.
+
+All children are born Atheists; they have no idea of God. Are they then
+criminal on account of their ignorance? At what age must they begin to
+believe in God? It is, you say, at the age of reason. But at what time
+should this age commence? Besides, if the profoundest theologians lose
+themselves in the divine nature, which they do not presume to comprehend,
+what ideas must man have of him?
+
+
+
+
+31.
+
+Men believe in God only upon the word of those, who have no more idea of
+him than themselves. Our nurses are our first theologians. They talk
+to children of God as if he were a scarecrow; they teach them from the
+earliest age to join their hands mechanically. Have nurses then more true
+ideas of God than the children whom they teach to pray?
+
+
+
+
+32.
+
+Religion, like a family estate, passes, with its incumbrances, from
+parents to children. Few men in the world would have a God, had not
+pains been taken in infancy to give them one. Each would receive from his
+parents and teachers the God whom they received from theirs; but each,
+agreeably to his disposition, would arrange, modify, and paint him in his
+own manner.
+
+
+
+
+33.
+
+The brain of man, especially in infancy, is like soft wax, fit to receive
+every impression that is made upon it. Education furnishes him with almost
+all his ideas at a time, when he is incapable of judging for himself. We
+believe we have received from nature, or have brought with us at birth,
+the true or false ideas, which, in a tender age, had been instilled into
+our minds; and this persuasion is one of the greatest sources of errors.
+
+
+
+
+34.
+
+Prejudice contributes to cement in us the opinions of those who have been
+charged with our instruction. We believe them much more experienced than
+ourselves; we suppose they are fully convinced of the things which they
+teach us; we have the greatest confidence in them; by the care they have
+taken of us in infancy, we judge them incapable of wishing to deceive us.
+These are the motives that make us adopt a thousand errors, without other
+foundation than the hazardous authority of those by whom we have been
+brought up. The prohibition likewise of reasoning upon what they teach us,
+by no means lessens our confidence; but often contributes to increase our
+respect for their opinions.
+
+
+
+
+35.
+
+Divines act very wisely in teaching men their religious principles before
+they are capable of distinguishing truth from falsehood, or their left
+hand from their right. It would be as difficult to instill into the mind
+of a man, forty years old, the extravagant notions that are given us of
+the divinity, as to eradicate them from the mind of him who had imbibed
+them from infancy.
+
+
+
+
+36.
+
+It is observed, that the wonders of nature are sufficient to lead us to
+the existence of a God, and fully to convince us of this important truth.
+But how many are there in the world who have the time, capacity, or
+disposition, necessary to contemplate Nature and meditate her progress?
+Men, for the most part, pay no regard to it. The peasant is not struck
+with the beauty of the sun, which he sees every day. The sailor is not
+surprised at the regular motion of the ocean; he will never draw from it
+theological conclusions. The phenomena of nature prove the existence of a
+God only to some prejudiced men, who have been early taught to behold the
+finger of God in every thing whose mechanism could embarrass them. In the
+wonders of nature, the unprejudiced philosopher sees nothing but the
+power of nature, the permanent and various laws, the necessary effects of
+different combinations of matter infinitely diversified.
+
+
+
+
+37.
+
+Is there any thing more surprising than the logic of these divines, who,
+instead of confessing their ignorance of natural causes, seek beyond
+nature, in imaginary regions, a cause much more unknown than that nature,
+of which they can form at least some idea? To say, that God is the author
+of the phenomena of nature, is it not to attribute them to an occult
+cause? What is God? What is a spirit? They are causes of which we have no
+idea. O wise divines! Study nature and her laws; and since you can
+there discover the action of natural causes, go not to those that are
+supernatural, which, far from enlightening, will only darken your ideas,
+and make it utterly impossible that you should understand yourselves.
+
+
+
+
+38.
+
+Nature, you say, is totally inexplicable without a God. That is to say,
+to explain what you understand very little, you have need of a cause which
+you understand not at all. You think to elucidate what is obscure, by
+doubling the obscurity; to solve difficulties, by multiplying them. O
+enthusiastic philosophers! To prove the existence of a God, write complete
+treatises of botany; enter into a minute detail of the parts of the human
+body; launch forth into the sky, to contemplate the revolution of the
+stars; then return to the earth to admire the course of waters; behold
+with transport the butterflies, the insects, the polypi, and the organized
+atoms, in which you think you discern the greatness of your God. All these
+things will not prove the existence of God; they will prove only, that you
+have not just ideas of the immense variety of matter, and of the effects,
+producible by its infinitely diversified combinations, that constitute the
+universe. They will prove only your ignorance of nature; that you have no
+idea of her powers, when you judge her incapable of producing a multitude
+of forms and beings, of which your eyes, even with the assistance of
+microscopes, never discern but the smallest part. In a word, they will
+prove, that, for want of knowing sensible agents, or those possible
+to know, you find it shorter to have recourse to a word, expressing an
+inconceivable agent.
+
+
+
+
+39.
+
+We are gravely and repeatedly told, that, _there is no effect without
+a cause_; that, _the world did not make itself_. But the universe is
+a cause, it is not an effect; it is not a work; it has not been made,
+because it is impossible that it should have been made. The world has
+always been; its existence is necessary; it is its own cause. Nature,
+whose essence is visibly to act and produce, requires not, to discharge
+her functions, an invisible mover, much more unknown than herself. Matter
+moves by its own energy, by a necessary consequence of its heterogeneity.
+The diversity of motion, or modes of mutual action, constitutes alone the
+diversity of matter. We distinguish beings from one another only by the
+different impressions or motions which they communicate to our organs.
+
+
+
+
+40.
+
+You see, that all is action in nature, and yet pretend that nature, by
+itself, is dead and without power. You imagine, that this all, essentially
+acting, needs a mover! What then is this mover? It is a spirit; a being
+absolutely incomprehensible and contradictory. Acknowledge then, that
+matter acts of itself, and cease to reason of your spiritual mover,
+who has nothing that is requisite to put it in action. Return from
+your useless excursions; enter again into a real world; keep to _second
+causes_, and leave to divines their _first cause_, of which nature has no
+need, to produce all the effects you observe in the world.
+
+
+
+
+41.
+
+It can be only by the diversity of impressions and effects, which bodies
+make upon us, that we feel them; that we have perceptions and ideas
+of them; that we distinguish one from another; that we assign them
+properties. Now, to see or feel an object, the object must act upon our
+organs; this object cannot act upon us, without exciting some motion in
+us; it cannot excite motion in us, if it be not in motion itself. At
+the instant I see an object, my eyes are struck by it; I can have no
+conception of light and vision, without motion, communicated to my
+eye, from the luminous, extended, coloured body. At the instant I smell
+something, my sense is irritated, or put in motion, by the parts that
+exhale from the odoriferous body. At the moment I hear a sound, the
+tympanum of my ear is struck by the air, put in motion by a sonorous body,
+which would not act if it were not in motion itself. Whence it evidently
+follows, that, without motion, I can neither feel, see, distinguish,
+compare, judge, nor occupy my thoughts upon any subject whatever.
+
+We are taught, that _the essence of a thing is that from which all its
+properties flow_. Now, it is evident, that all the properties of bodies,
+of which we have ideas, are owing to motion, which alone informs us of
+their existence, and gives us the first conceptions of them. I cannot be
+informed of my own existence but by the motions I experience in myself. I
+am therefore forced to conclude, that motion is as essential to matter as
+extension, and that matter cannot be conceived without it.
+
+Should any person deny, that motion is essential and necessary to matter;
+they cannot, at least, help acknowledging that bodies, which seem dead and
+inert, produce motion of themselves, when placed in a fit situation to
+act upon one another. For instance; phosphorus, when exposed to the air,
+immediately takes fire. Meal and water, when mixed, ferment. Thus dead
+matter begets motion of itself. Matter has then the power of self-motion;
+and nature, to act, has no need of a mover, whose pretended essence would
+hinder him from acting.
+
+
+
+
+42.
+
+Whence comes man? What is his origin? Did the first man spring, ready
+formed, from the dust of the earth? Man appears, like all other beings, a
+production of nature. Whence came the first stones, the first trees, the
+first lions, the first elephants, the first ants, the first acorns? We
+are incessantly told to acknowledge and revere the hand of God, of an
+infinitely wise, intelligent and powerful maker, in so wonderful a work as
+the human machine. I readily confess, that the human machine appears to me
+surprising. But as man exists in nature, I am not authorized to say that
+his formation, is above the power of nature. But I can much less conceive
+of this formation, when to explain it, I am told, that a pure spirit, who
+has neither eyes, feet, hands, head, lungs, mouth nor breath, made man by
+taking a little clay, and breathing upon it.
+
+We laugh at the savage inhabitants of Paraguay, for calling themselves
+the descendants of the moon. The divines of Europe call themselves the
+descendants, or the creation, of a pure spirit. Is this pretension any
+more rational? Man is intelligent; thence it is inferred, that he can be
+the work only of an intelligent being, and not of a nature, which is void
+of intelligence. Although nothing is more rare, than to see man make use
+of this intelligence, of which he seems so proud, I will grant that he is
+intelligent, that his wants develop this faculty, that society especially
+contributes to cultivate it. But I see nothing in the human machine, and
+in the intelligence with which it is endued, that announces very precisely
+the infinite intelligence of the maker to whom it is ascribed. I see that
+this admirable machine is liable to be deranged; I see, that his wonderful
+intelligence is then disordered, and sometimes totally disappears; I
+infer, that human intelligence depends upon a certain disposition of the
+material organs of the body, and that we cannot infer the intelligence of
+God, any more from the intelligence of man, than from his materiality. All
+that we can infer from it, is, that God is material. The intelligence of
+man no more proves the intelligence of God, than the malice of man proves
+the malice of that God, who is the pretended maker of man. In spite of all
+the arguments of divines, God will always be a cause contradicted by its
+effects, or of which it is impossible to judge by its works. We shall
+always see evil, imperfection and folly result from such a cause, that is
+said to be full of goodness, perfection and wisdom.
+
+
+
+
+43.
+
+"What?" you will say, "is intelligent man, is the universe, and all it
+contains, the effect of _chance_?" No; I repeat it, _the universe is not
+an effect_; it is the cause of all effects; every being it contains is
+the necessary effect of this cause, which sometimes shews us its manner of
+acting, but generally conceals its operations. Men use the word _chance_
+to hide their ignorance of true causes, which, though not understood, act
+not less according to certain laws. There is no effect without a cause.
+Nature is a word, used to denote the immense assemblage of beings, various
+matter, infinite combinations, and diversified motions, that we behold.
+All bodies, organized or unorganized, are necessary effects of certain
+causes. Nothing in nature can happen by chance. Every thing is subject
+to fixed laws. These laws are only the necessary connection of certain
+effects with their causes. One atom of matter cannot meet another _by
+chance_; this meeting is the effect of permanent laws, which cause every
+being necessarily to act as it does, and hinder it from acting otherwise,
+in given circumstances. To talk of the _fortuitous concourse of atoms_, or
+to attribute some effects to chance, is merely saying that we are ignorant
+of the laws, by which bodies act, meet, combine, or separate.
+
+Those, who are unacquainted with nature, the properties of beings, and
+the effects which must necessarily result from the concurrence of certain
+causes, think, that every thing takes place by chance. It is not chance,
+that has placed the sun in the centre of our planetary system; it is by
+its own essence, that the substance, of which it is composed, must occupy
+that place, and thence be diffused.
+
+
+
+
+44.
+
+The worshippers of a God find, in the order of the universe, an invincible
+proof of the existence of an intelligent and wise being, who governs it.
+But this order is nothing but a series of movements necessarily produced
+by causes or circumstances, which are sometimes favourable, and sometimes
+hurtful to us: we approve of some, and complain of others.
+
+Nature uniformly follows the same round; that is, the same causes produce
+the same effects, as long as their action is not disturbed by other
+causes, which force them to produce different effects. When the operation
+of causes, whose effects we experience, is interrupted by causes, which,
+though unknown, are not the less natural and necessary, we are confounded;
+we cry out, _a miracle!_ and attribute it to a cause much more unknown,
+than any of those acting before our eyes.
+
+The universe is always in order. It cannot be in disorder. It is our
+machine, that suffers, when we complain of disorder. The bodies, causes,
+and beings, which this world contains, necessarily act in the manner in
+which we see them act, whether we approve or disapprove of their effects.
+Earthquakes, volcanoes, inundations, pestilences, and famines are effects
+as necessary, or as much in the order of nature, as the fall of heavy
+bodies, the courses of rivers, the periodical motions of the seas, the
+blowing of the winds, the fruitful rains, and the favourable effects, for
+which men praise God, and thank him for his goodness.
+
+To be astonished that a certain order reigns in the world, is to be
+surprised that the same causes constantly produce the same effects. To
+be shocked at disorder, is to forget, that when things change, or are
+interrupted in their actions, the effects can no longer be the same. To
+wonder at the order of nature, is to wonder that any thing can exist; it
+is to be surprised at any one's own existence. What is order to one being,
+is disorder to another. All wicked beings find that every thing is in
+order, when they can with impunity put every thing in disorder. They find,
+on the contrary, that every thing is in disorder, when they are disturbed
+in the exercise of their wickedness.
+
+
+
+
+45.
+
+Upon supposition that God is the author and mover of nature, there could
+be no disorder with respect to him. Would not all the causes, that he
+should have made, necessarily act according to the properties, essences,
+and impulses given them? If God should change the ordinary course of
+nature, he would not be immutable. If the order of the universe, in
+which man thinks he sees the most convincing proof of the existence,
+intelligence, power and goodness of God, should happen to contradict
+itself, one might suspect his existence, or, at least, accuse him of
+inconstancy, impotence, want of foresight and wisdom in the arrangement of
+things; one would have a right to accuse him of an oversight in the choice
+of the agents and instruments, which he makes, prepares, and puts in
+action. In short, if the order of nature proves the power and intelligence
+of the Deity, disorder must prove his weakness, instability, and
+irrationality.
+
+You say, that God is omnipresent, that he fills the universe with his
+immensity, that nothing is done without him, that matter could not act
+without his agency. But in this case, you admit, that your God is the
+author of disorder, that it is he who deranges nature, that he is the
+father of confusion, that he is in man, and moves him at the moment he
+sins. If God is every where, he is in me, he acts with me, he is deceived
+with me, he offends God with me, and combats with me the existence of God!
+O theologians! you never understand yourselves, when you speak of God.
+
+
+
+
+46.
+
+In order to have what we call intelligence, it is necessary to have ideas,
+thoughts, and wishes; to have ideas, thoughts, and wishes, it is necessary
+to have organs; to have organs, it is necessary to have a body; to act
+upon bodies, it is necessary to have a body; to experience disorder, it is
+necessary to be capable of suffering. Whence it evidently follows, that a
+pure spirit can neither be intelligent, nor affected by what passes in the
+universe.
+
+Divine intelligence, ideas, and views, have, you say, nothing common with
+those of men. Very well. How then can men judge, right or wrong, of these
+views; reason upon these ideas; or admire this intelligence? This would be
+to judge, admire, and adore that, of which we can have no ideas. To adore
+the profound views of divine wisdom, is it not to adore that, of which we
+cannot possibly judge? To admire these views, is it not to admire without
+knowing why? Admiration is always the daughter of ignorance. Men admire
+and adore only what they do not comprehend.
+
+
+
+
+47.
+
+All those qualities, ascribed to God, are totally incompatible with a
+being, who, by his very essence, is void of all analogy with human beings.
+It is true, the divines imagine they extricate themselves from this
+difficulty, by exaggerating the human qualities, attributed to the
+Divinity; they enlarge them to infinity, where they cease to understand
+themselves. What results from this combination of man with God? A mere
+chimera, of which, if any thing be affirmed, the phantom, combined with so
+much pains, instantly vanishes.
+
+Dante, in his poem upon _Paradise_, relates, that the Deity appeared
+to him under the figure of three circles, forming an iris, whose lively
+colours generated each other; but that, looking steadily upon the dazzling
+light, he saw only his own figure. While adoring God, it is himself, that
+man adores.
+
+
+
+
+48.
+
+Ought not the least reflection suffice to prove, that God can have none
+of the human qualities, all ties, virtues, or perfections? Our virtues and
+perfections are consequences of the modifications of our passions. But
+has God passions as we have? Again: our good qualities consist in our
+dispositions towards the beings with whom we live in society. God,
+according to you, is an insulated being. God has no equals--no
+fellow-beings. God does not live in society. He wants the assistance of no
+one. He enjoys an unchangeable felicity. Admit then, according to your own
+principles, that God cannot have what we call virtues, and that man cannot
+be virtuous with respect to him.
+
+
+
+
+49.
+
+Man, wrapped up in his own merit, imagines the human race to be the sole
+object of God in creating the universe. Upon what does he found this
+flattering opinion? We are told: that man is the only being endued with
+intelligence, which enables him to know the Deity, and to render him
+homage. We are assured, that God made the world only for his own glory,
+and that it was necessary that the human species should come into this
+plan, that there might be some one to admire his works, and glorify him
+for them. But, according to these suppositions, has not God evidently
+missed his object? 1st. Man, according to yourselves, will always labour
+under the completest impossibility of knowing his God, and the most
+invincible ignorance of his divine essence. 2ndly. A being, who has no
+equal, cannot be susceptible of glory; for glory can result only from the
+comparison of one's own excellence with that of others. 3rdly. If God be
+infinitely happy, if he be self-sufficient, what need has he of the homage
+of his feeble creatures? 4thly. God, notwithstanding all his endeavours,
+is not glorified; but, on the contrary, all the religions in the world
+represent him as perpetually offended; their sole object is to reconcile
+sinful, ungrateful, rebellious man with his angry God.
+
+
+
+
+50.
+
+If God be infinite, he has much less relation with man, than man with
+ants. Would the ants reason pertinently concerning the intentions,
+desires, and projects of the gardener? Could they justly imagine, that a
+park was planted for them alone, by an ostentatious monarch, and that the
+sole object of his goodness was to furnish them with a superb residence?
+But, according to theology, man is, with respect to God, far below what
+the vilest insect is to man. Thus, by theology itself, which is wholly
+devoted to the attributes and views of the Divinity, theology appears a
+complete folly.
+
+
+
+
+51.
+
+We are told, that, in the formation of the universe, God's only object was
+the happiness of man. But, in a world made purposely for him, and governed
+by an omnipotent God, is man in reality very happy? Are his enjoyments
+durable? Are not his pleasures mixed with pains? Are many persons
+satisfied with their fate? Is not man continually the victim of physical
+and moral evils? Is not the human machine, which is represented as a
+master-piece of the Creator's skill, liable to derangement in a thousand
+ways? Should we be surprised at the workmanship of a mechanic, who should
+shew us a complex machine, ready to stop every moment, and which, in a
+short time, would break in pieces of itself?
+
+
+
+
+52.
+
+The generous care, displayed by the Deity in providing for the wants,
+and watching over the happiness of his beloved creatures, is called
+_Providence_. But, when we open our eyes, we find that God provides
+nothing. Providence sleeps over the greater part of the inhabitants of
+this world. For a very small number of men who are supposed to be happy,
+what an immense multitude groan under oppression, and languish in misery!
+Are not nations forced to deprive themselves of bread, to administer to
+the extravagances of a few gloomy tyrants, who are no happier than their
+oppressed slaves?
+
+At the same time that our divines emphatically expatiate upon the goodness
+of Providence, while they exhort us to repose our confidence in her, do
+we not hear them, at the sight of unforeseen catastrophes, exclaim, that
+_Providence sports with the vain projects of man_, that she frustrates
+their designs, that she laughs at their efforts, that profound wisdom
+delights to bewilder the minds of mortals? But, shall we put confidence in
+a malignant Providence, who laughs at, and sports with mankind? How will
+one admire the unknown ways of a hidden wisdom, whose manner of acting is
+inexplicable? Judge of it by effects, you will say. We do; and find, that
+these effects are sometimes useful, and sometimes hurtful.
+
+Men think they justify Providence, by saying, that, in this world, there
+is much more good than evil to every individual of mankind. Supposing the
+good, we enjoy from Providence, is to the evil, as a _hundred to ten_;
+will it not still follow, that, for a hundred degrees of goodness,
+Providence possesses ten of malignity; which is incompatible with the
+supposed perfection of the divine nature.
+
+Almost all books are filled with the most flattering praises of
+Providence, whose attentive care is highly extolled. It would seem as
+if man, to live happily here below, needed not his own exertions. Yet,
+without his own labour, man could subsist hardly a day. To live, he is
+obliged to sweat, toil, hunt, fish, and labour without intermission.
+Without these second causes, the first cause, at least in most countries,
+would provide for none of our wants. In all parts of the globe, we see
+savage and civilized man in a perpetual struggle with Providence. He is
+necessitated to ward off the strokes directed against him by Providence,
+in hurricanes, tempests, frosts, hail-storms, inundations, droughts, and
+the various accidents, which so often render useless all his labours. In a
+word, we see man continually occupied in guarding against the ill offices
+of that Providence, which is supposed to be attentive to his happiness.
+
+A bigot admired divine Providence for wisely ordering rivers to pass
+through those places, where men have built large cities. Is not this man's
+reasoning as rational, as that of many learned men, who incessantly
+talk of _final causes_, or who pretend that they clearly perceive the
+beneficent views of God in the formation of all things?
+
+
+
+
+53.
+
+Do we see then, that Providence so very sensibly manifests herself in the
+preservation of those admirable works, which we attribute to her? If it
+is she, who governs the world, we find her as active in destroying, as
+in forming; in exterminating, as in producing. Does she not every moment
+destroy, by thousands, the very men, to whose preservation and welfare
+we suppose her continually attentive? Every moment she loses sight of
+her beloved creature. Sometimes she shakes his dwelling, sometimes she
+annihilates his harvests, sometimes she inundates his fields, sometimes
+she desolates them by a burning drought. She arms all nature against man.
+She arms man himself against his own species, and commonly terminates his
+existence in anguish. Is this then what is called preserving the universe?
+
+If we could view, without prejudice, the equivocal conduct of Providence
+towards the human race and all sensible beings, we should find, that far
+from resembling a tender and careful mother, she resembles rather those
+unnatural mothers, who instantly forgetting the unfortunates of their
+licentious love, abandon their infants, as soon as they are born, and who,
+content with having borne them, expose them, helpless, to the caprice of
+fortune.
+
+The Hottentots, in this respect are much wiser than other nations, who
+treat them as barbarians, and refuse to worship God; because, they
+say, _if he often does good, he often does evil_. Is not this manner of
+reasoning more just and conformable to experience, than that of many men,
+who are determined to see, in their God, nothing but goodness, wisdom, and
+foresight, and who refuse to see that the innumerable evils, of which this
+world is the theatre, must come from the same hand, which they kiss with
+delight?
+
+
+
+
+54.
+
+Common sense teaches, that we cannot, and ought not, to judge of a cause,
+but by its effects. A cause can be reputed constantly good, only when it
+constantly produces good. A cause, which produces both good and evil, is
+sometimes good, and sometimes evil. But the logic of theology destroys all
+this. According to that, the phenomena of nature, or the effects we behold
+in this world, prove to us the existence of a cause infinitely good; and
+this cause is God. Although this world is full of evils; although disorder
+often reigns in it; although men incessantly repine at their hard fate;
+we must be convinced, that these effects are owing to a beneficent and
+immutable cause; and many people believe it, or feign believe.
+
+Every thing that passes in the world, proves to us, in the clearest
+manner, that it is not governed by an intelligent being. We can judge of
+the intelligence of a being only by the conformity of the means, which he
+employs to attain his proposed object. The object of God, is the happiness
+of a man. Yet, a like necessity governs the fate of all sensible beings,
+who are born only to suffer much, enjoy little, and die. The cup of man
+is filled with joy and bitterness; good is every where attended with evil;
+order gives place to disorder; generation is followed by destruction.
+If you say, that the designs of God are mysterious and that his ways are
+impenetrable; I answer, that, in this case, it is impossible to judge
+whether God be intelligent.
+
+
+
+
+55.
+
+You pretend, that God is immutable! What then produces a continual
+instability in this world, which you make his empire? Is there a state,
+subject to more frequent and cruel revolutions, than that of this unknown
+monarch? How can we attribute to an immutable God, sufficiently powerful
+to give solidity to his works, a government, in which every thing is in
+continual vicissitude? If I imagine I see a God of uniform character in
+all the effects favourable to my species, what kind of a God can I see in
+their continual misfortunes? You tell me, it is our sins, which compel
+him to punish. I answer, that God, according to yourselves, is then not
+immutable, since the sins of men force him to change his conduct towards
+them. Can a being, who is sometimes provoked, and sometimes appeased, be
+constantly the same?
+
+
+
+
+56.
+
+The universe can be only what it is; all sensible beings in it enjoy and
+suffer; that is, are moved sometimes in an agreeable, and sometimes in a
+disagreeable manner. These effects are necessary; they result necessarily
+from causes, which act only according to their properties. These effects
+necessarily please, or displease, by a consequence of nature. This same
+nature compels me to avoid, avert, and resist some things, and to seek,
+desire, and procure others. In a world, where every thing is necessary,
+a God, who remedies nothing, who leaves things to run in their necessary
+course,--is he any thing but destiny, or necessity personified? It is a
+deaf and useless God, who can effect no change in general laws, to which
+he is himself subject. Of what importance is the infinite power of a
+being, who will do but very little in my favour? Where is the infinite
+goodness of a being, indifferent to happiness? Of what service is the
+favour of a being, who, is able to do an infinite good, does not do even a
+finite one?
+
+
+
+
+57.
+
+When we ask, why so many miserable objects appear under the government of
+a good God, we are told, by way of consolation, that the present world
+is only a passage, designed to conduct man to a happier one. The divines
+assure us, that the earth we inhabit, is a state of trial. In short, they
+shut our mouths, by saying, that God could communicate to his creatures
+neither impossibility nor infinite happiness, which are reserved for
+himself alone. Can such answers be satisfactory? 1st. The existence of
+another life is guaranteed to us only by the imagination of man, who,
+by supposing it, have only realized the desire they have of surviving
+themselves, in order to enjoy hereafter a purer and more durable
+happiness. 2ndly. How can we conceive that a God, who knows every thing,
+and must be fully acquainted with the dispositions of his creatures,
+should want so many experiments, in order to be sure of their
+dispositions? 3rdly. According to the calculations of their chronologists,
+our earth has existed six or seven thousand years. During that time,
+nations have experienced calamities. History exhibits the human species
+at all times tormented and ravaged by tyrants, conquerors, and heroes; by
+wars, inundations, famines, plagues, etc. Are such long trials then likely
+to inspire us with very great confidence in the secret views of the Deity?
+Do such numerous and constant evils give a very exalted idea of the
+future state, his goodness is preparing for us? 4thly. If God is so kindly
+disposed, as he is asserted to be, without giving men infinite happiness,
+could he not at least have communicated the degree of happiness, of which
+finite beings are susceptible here below? To be happy, must we have an
+_infinite_ or _divine_ happiness? 5thly. If God could not make men happier
+than they are here below, what will become of the hope of a _paradise_,
+where it is pretended, that the elect will for ever enjoy ineffable
+bliss? If God neither could nor would avert evil from the earth, the only
+residence we can know, what reason have we to presume, that he can or
+will avert evil from another world, of which we have no idea? Epicurus
+observed: "either God would remove evil out of this world, and cannot; or
+he can, and will not; or he has neither the power nor will; or, lastly, he
+has both the power and will. If he has the will, and not the power, this
+shews weakness, which is contrary to the nature of God. If he has the
+power, and not the will, it is malignity; and this is no less contrary
+to his nature. If he is neither able nor willing, he is both impotent and
+malignant, and consequently cannot be God. If he be both willing and able
+(which alone is consonant to the nature of God) whence comes evil, or
+why does he not prevent it?" Reflecting minds are still waiting for a
+reasonable solution of these difficulties; and our divines tell us, that
+they will be removed only in a future life.
+
+
+
+
+58.
+
+We are told of a pretended _scale of beings_. It is supposed, that God
+has divided his creatures into different classes, in which each enjoys
+the degree of happiness, of which it is susceptible. According to this
+romantic arrangement, from the oyster to the celestial angels, all
+beings enjoy a happiness, which is suitable to their nature. Experience
+explicitly contradicts this sublime reverie. In this world, all sensible
+beings suffer and live in the midst of dangers. Man cannot walk without
+hurting, tormenting, or killing a multitude of sensible beings, which are
+in his way; while he himself is exposed, at every step, to a multitude of
+evils, foreseen or unforeseen, which may lead him to destruction. During
+the whole course of his life, he is exposed to pains; he is not sure, a
+moment, of his existence, to which he is so strongly attached, and which
+he regards as the greatest gift of the Divinity.
+
+
+
+
+59.
+
+The world, it will be said, has all the perfection, of which it is
+susceptible: since it is not God who made it, it must have great qualities
+and great defects. But we answer, that, as the world must necessarily have
+great defects, it would have been more conformable to the nature of a
+good God, not to have created a world, which he could not make completely
+happy. If God was supremely happy, before the creation of the world, and
+could have continued to be supremely happy, without creating the world,
+why did he not remain at rest? Why must man suffer? Why must man exist? Of
+what importance is his existence to God? Nothing, or something? If man's
+existence is not useful or necessary to God, why did God make man? If
+man's existence is necessary to God's glory, he had need of man; he was
+deficient in something before man existed. We can pardon an unskilful
+workman for making an imperfect work; because he must work, well or ill,
+upon penalty of starving. This workman is excusable, but God is not.
+According to you, he is self-sufficient; if so, why does he make men? He
+has, you say, every thing requisite to make man happy. Why then does he
+not do it? Confess, that your God has more malice than goodness, unless
+you admit, that God, was necessitated to do what he has done, without
+being able to do it otherwise. Yet, you assure us, that God is free. You
+say also, that he is immutable, although it was in _Time_ that he began
+and ceased to exercise his power, like the inconstant beings of this
+world. O theologians! Vain are your efforts to free your God from defects.
+This perfect God has always some human imperfections.
+
+
+
+
+60.
+
+"Is not God master of his favours? Can he not give them? Can he not take
+them away? It does not belong to his creatures to require reasons for
+his conduct. He can dispose of the works of his own hands as he pleases.
+Absolute sovereign of mortals, he distributes happiness or misery,
+according to his good pleasure." Such are the solutions given by
+theologians to console us for the evils which God inflicts upon us.
+We reply, that a God, who is infinitely good, cannot be _master of his
+favours_, but would by his nature be obliged to bestow them upon his
+creatures; that a being, truly beneficent, cannot refrain from doing good;
+that a being, truly generous, does not take back what he has given; and
+that every man, who does so, dispenses with gratitude, and has no right to
+complain of finding ungrateful men.
+
+How can the odd and capricious conduct, which theologians ascribe to
+God, be reconciled with religion, which supposes a covenant, or mutual
+engagements between God and men? If God owes nothing to his creatures,
+they, on their part, can owe nothing to their God. All religion is founded
+upon the happiness that men think they have a right to expect from the
+Deity, who is supposed to say to them: _Love me, adore me, obey me: and I
+will make you happy_. Men, on their part, say to him: _Make us happy, be
+faithful to your promises, and we will love you, we will adore you,
+and obey your laws_. By neglecting the happiness of his creatures,
+distributing his favours according to his caprice, and retracting his
+gifts, does not God break the covenant, which serves as the basis of all
+religion? Cicero has justly observed, that _if God is not agreeable to
+man, he cannot be his God_. Goodness constitutes deity; this goodness can
+be manifested to man only by the blessings he enjoys; as soon as he is
+unhappy, this goodness disappears, and with it the divinity. An infinite
+goodness can be neither limited, partial, nor exclusive. If God be
+infinitely good, he owes happiness to all his creatures. The unhappiness
+of a single being would suffice to annihilate unbounded goodness. Under an
+infinitely good and powerful God, is it possible to conceive that a single
+man should suffer? One animal, or mite, that suffers, furnishes invincible
+arguments against divine providence and its infinite goodness.
+
+
+
+
+61.
+
+According to theology, the afflictions and evils of this life are
+chastisements, which guilty men incur from the hand of God. But why are
+men guilty? If God is omnipotent, does it cost him more to say: "Let every
+thing in the world be in order; let all my subjects be good, innocent, and
+fortunate," than to say: "Let every thing exist"? Was it more difficult
+for this God to do his work well, than badly? Religion tells us of a
+hell; that is, a frightful abode, where, notwithstanding his goodness,
+God reserves infinite torments for the majority of men. Thus after having
+rendered mortals very unhappy in this world, religion tells them, that God
+can render them still more unhappy in another! The theologian gets over
+this, by saying, that the goodness of God will then give place to his
+justice. But a goodness, which gives place to the most terrible cruelty,
+is not an infinite goodness. Besides, can a God, who, after having been
+infinitely good, becomes infinitely bad, be regarded as an immutable
+being? Can we discern the shadow of clemency or goodness, in a God filled
+with implacable fury?
+
+
+
+
+62.
+
+Divine justice, as stated by our divines, is undoubtedly a quality very
+proper to cherish in us the love of the Divinity. According to the ideas
+of modern theology, it is evident, that God has created the majority of
+men, with the sole view of putting them in a fair way to incur eternal
+punishment. Would it not have been more conformable to goodness, reason,
+and equity, to have created only stones or plants, and not to have created
+sensible beings; than to have formed men, whose conduct in this world
+might subject them to endless punishment in the other? A God perfidious
+and malicious enough to create a single man, and then to abandon him to
+the danger of being damned, cannot be regarded as a perfect being; but
+as an unreasonable, unjust, and ill-natured. Very far from composing
+a perfect God, theologians have formed the most imperfect of beings.
+According to theological notions, God would resemble a tyrant, who, having
+put out the eyes of the greater part of his slaves, should shut them up
+in a dungeon, where, for his amusement, he would, incognito, observe their
+conduct through a trap-door, in order to punish with rigour all those,
+who, while walking about, should hit against each other; but who would
+magnificently reward the few whom he had not deprived of sight, in
+avoiding to run against their comrades. Such are the ideas, which the
+dogma of gratuitous predestination gives us of the divinity!
+
+Although men are continually repeating that their God is infinitely good;
+yet it is evident, that in reality, they can believe nothing of the
+kind. How can we love what we do not know? How can we love a being, whose
+character is only fit to throw us into inquietude and trouble? How can we
+love a being, of whom all that is said tends to render him an object of
+utter detestation?
+
+
+
+
+63.
+
+Many people make a subtle distinction between true religion and
+superstition. They say, that the latter is only a base and inordinate fear
+of the Deity; but that the truly religious man has confidence in his God,
+and loves him sincerely; whereas, the superstitious man sees in him only
+an enemy, has no confidence in him, and represents him to himself as
+a distrustful, cruel tyrant, sparing of his benefits, lavish of his
+chastisements. But, in reality, does not all religion give us the same
+ideas of God? At the same time that we are told, that God is infinitely
+good, are we not also told, that he is very easily provoked, that he
+grants his favours to a few people only, and that he furiously chastises
+those, to whom he has not been pleased to grant favours?
+
+
+
+
+64.
+
+If we take our ideas of God from the nature of things, where we find a
+mixture of good and evil, this God, just like the good and evil of which
+we experience, must naturally appear capricious, inconstant, sometimes
+good, and sometimes malevolent; and therefore, instead of exciting our
+love, must generate distrust, fear, and uncertainty. There is then no
+real difference between natural religion, and the most gloomy and servile
+superstition. If the theist sees God only in a favourable light; the bigot
+views him in the most hideous light. The folly of the one is cheerful,
+that of the other is melancholy; but both are equally delirious.
+
+
+
+
+65.
+
+If I draw my ideas of God from theology, he appears to inspire aversion.
+Devotees, who tell us, that they sincerely love their God, are either
+liars or fools, who see their God only in profile. It is impossible to
+love a being, the very idea of whom strikes us with terror, and whose
+judgments make us tremble. How can we, without being alarmed, look upon
+a God, who is reputed to be barbarous enough to damn us? Let not divines
+talk to us of a filial, or respectful fear, mixed with love, which men
+ought to have for their God. A son can by no means love his father, when
+he knows him to be cruel enough to inflict upon him studied torments for
+the least faults he may commit. No man upon earth can have the least spark
+of love for a God, who reserves chastisements, infinite in duration and
+violence, for ninety-nine hundredths of his children.
+
+
+
+
+66.
+
+The inventors of the dogma of eternal hell-torments have made of that God,
+whom they call so good, the most detestable of beings. Cruelty in men is
+the last act of wickedness. Every sensible mind must revolt at the bare
+recital of the torments, inflicted on the greatest criminal; but cruelty
+is much more apt to excite indignation, when void of motives. The most
+sanguinary tyrants, the Caligulas, the Neros, the Domitians, had, at
+least, some motives for tormenting their victims. These motives were,
+either their own safety, or the fury of revenge, or the design of
+frightening by terrible examples, or perhaps the vanity of making
+a display of their power, and the desire of satisfying a barbarous
+curiosity. Can a God have any of these motives? In tormenting the victims
+of his wrath, he would punish beings, who could neither endanger his
+immoveable power, nor disturb his unchangeable felicity. On the other
+hand, the punishments of the other life would be useless to the living,
+who cannot be witnesses of them. These punishments would be useless to the
+damned, since in hell there is no longer room for conversion, and the
+time of mercy is past. Whence it follows, that God, in the exercise of
+his eternal vengeance, could have no other end than to amuse himself,
+and insult the weakness of his creatures. I appeal to the whole human
+race;--is there a man who feels cruel enough coolly to torment, I do
+not say his fellow-creature, but any sensible being whatever, without
+emolument, without profit, without curiosity, without having any thing
+to fear? Confess then, O theologians, that, even according to your own
+principles, your God is infinitely more malevolent than the worst of men.
+
+Perhaps you will say, that infinite offences deserve infinite punishments.
+I answer, that we cannot offend a God, whose happiness is infinite; that
+the offences of finite beings cannot be infinite; that a God, who
+is unwilling to be offended, cannot consent that the offences of his
+creatures should be eternal; that a God, infinitely good, can neither be
+infinitely cruel, nor grant his creatures an infinite duration, solely for
+the pleasure of eternal torments.
+
+Nothing but the most savage barbarity, the most egregious roguery, or the
+blindest ambition could have imagined the doctrine of eternal punishments.
+If there is a God, whom we can offend or blaspheme, there are not upon
+earth greater blasphemers than those, who dare to say, that this same God
+is a tyrant, perverse enough to delight, during eternity, in the useless
+torments of his feeble creatures.
+
+
+
+
+67.
+
+To pretend, that God can be offended at the actions of men, is to
+annihilate all the ideas, which divines endeavour to give us, in other
+respects, of this being. To say, that man can trouble the order of the
+universe; that he can kindle the thunder in the hands of his God; that
+he can defeat his projects, is to say, that man is stronger than his God,
+that he is the arbiter of his will, that it depends upon him to change
+his goodness into cruelty. Theology continually pulls down, with one hand,
+what it erects with the other. If all religion is founded upon a God,
+who is provoked and appeased, all religion is founded on a palpable
+contradiction.
+
+All religions agree in exalting the wisdom and infinite power of the
+Deity. But no sooner do they display his conduct, than we see nothing
+but imprudence, want of foresight, weakness and folly. God, it is said,
+created the world for himself; and yet, hitherto, he has never been able
+to make himself suitably honoured by it. God created men in order to have,
+in his dominions, subjects to render him their homage; and yet, we see men
+in continual revolt against him.
+
+
+
+
+68.
+
+They incessantly extol the divine perfections; and when we demand
+proofs of them, they point to his works, in which, they assure us, these
+perfections are written in indelible characters. All these works are,
+however, imperfect and perishable. Man, who is ever regarded as the
+most marvellous work, as the master-piece of the Deity, is full of
+imperfections, which render him disagreeable to the eyes of the almighty
+Being, who formed him. This surprising work often becomes so revolting and
+odious to its author, that he is obliged to throw it into the fire. But,
+if the fairest of God's works is imperfect, how can we judge of the
+divine perfections? Can a work, with which the author himself is so little
+pleased, induce us to admire the ability of its Maker? Man, considered
+in a physical sense, is subject to a thousand infirmities, to numberless
+evils, and to death. Man, considered in a moral sense, is full of faults;
+yet we are unceasingly told, that he is the most beautiful work of the
+most perfect of beings.
+
+
+
+
+69.
+
+In creating beings more perfect than men, it appears, that heretofore God
+has not better succeeded, nor given stronger proofs of his perfection.
+Do we not see, in many religions, that angels, have even attempted to
+dethrone him? God proposed the happiness of angels and men; yet, he has
+never been able to render happy either angels or men;--the pride, malice,
+sins, and imperfections of the creatures have always opposed the will of
+the perfect Creator.
+
+
+
+
+70.
+
+All religion is obviously founded upon this principle, that _God does what
+he can, and man what he will_. Every system of religion presents to us
+an unequal combat between the Deity on one part, and his creatures on the
+other, in which the former never comes off to his honour. Notwithstanding
+his omnipotence, he cannot succeed in rendering the works of his hands
+such as he would have them. To complete the absurdity, there is a
+religion, which pretends, that God himself has died to redeem mankind; and
+yet, men are not farther from any thing, than they are from what God would
+have them.
+
+
+
+
+71.
+
+Nothing is more extravagant, than the part, theology makes the Divinity
+act in every country. Did he really exist, we should see in him the most
+capricious, and senseless being. We should be compelled to believe, that
+God made the world only to be the theatre of his disgraceful wars with
+his creatures; that he created angels, men, and demons, only to make
+adversaries, against whom he might exercise his power. He renders men free
+to offend him, malicious enough to defeat his projects, too obstinate to
+submit; and all this merely for the pleasure of being angry, appeased,
+reconciled, and of repairing the disorder they have made. Had the Deity at
+once formed his creatures such as he would have them, what pains would he
+not have spared himself, or, at least, from what embarrassments would he
+not have relieved his theologians!
+
+Every religion represents God as busy only in doing himself evil. He
+resembles those empirics, who inflict upon themselves wounds, to have an
+opportunity of exhibiting to the public the efficacy of their ointment.
+But we see not, that the Deity has hitherto been able radically to cure
+himself of the evil, which he suffers from man.
+
+
+
+
+72.
+
+God is the author of all; and yet, we are assured that evil does not come
+from God. Whence then does it come? From man. But, who made man? God. Evil
+then comes from God. If he had not made man as he is, moral evil or sin
+would not have existed in the world. The perversity of man is therefore
+chargeable to God. If man has power to do evil, or to offend God, we are
+forced to infer, that God chooses to be offended; that God, who made man,
+has resolved that man shall do evil; otherwise man would be an effect
+contrary to the cause, from which he derives his being.
+
+
+
+
+73.
+
+Man ascribes to God the faculty of foreseeing, or knowing beforehand
+whatever will happen; but this prescience seldom turns to his glory,
+nor protects him from the lawful reproaches of man. If God foreknows
+the future, must he not have foreseen the fall of his creatures? If he
+resolved in his decrees to permit this fall, it is undoubtedly because it
+was his will that this fall should take place, otherwise it could not have
+happened. If God's foreknowledge of the sins of his creatures had been
+necessary or forced, one might suppose, that he has been constrained by
+his justice to punish the guilty; but, enjoying the faculty of foreseeing,
+and the power of predetermining every thing, did it not depend upon God
+not to impose upon himself cruel laws, or, at least, could he not dispense
+with creating beings, whom he might be under the necessity of punishing,
+and rendering unhappy by a subsequent decree? Of what consequence is it,
+whether God has destined men to happiness or misery by an anterior decree,
+an effect of his prescience, or by a posterior decree, an effect of
+his justice? Does the arrangement of his decrees alter the fate of the
+unhappy? Would they not have the same right to complain of a God, who,
+being able to omit their creation, has notwithstanding created them,
+although he plainly foresaw that his justice would oblige him, sooner or
+later, to punish them?
+
+
+
+
+74.
+
+"Man," you say, "when he came from the hand of God, was pure, innocent,
+and good; but his nature has been corrupted, as a punishment for sin."
+If man, when just out of the hands of his God, could sin, his nature was
+imperfect. Why did God suffer him to sin, and his nature to be corrupted?
+Why did God permit him to be seduced, well knowing that he was too feeble
+to resist temptation? Why did God create _satan_, an evil spirit, a
+tempter? Why did not God, who wishes so much good to the human race,
+annihilate once for all so many evil genii, who are naturally enemies of
+our happiness; or rather, why did God create evil spirits, whose victories
+and fatal influence over mankind, he must have foreseen? In fine, by what
+strange fatality in all religions of the world, has the evil principle
+such a decided advantage over the good principle, or the divinity?
+
+
+
+
+75.
+
+There is related an instance of simplicity, which does honour to the heart
+of an Italian monk. One day, while preaching, this pious man thought
+he must announce to his audience, that he had, thank heaven, at last
+discovered, by dint of meditation, a sure way of rendering all men happy.
+"The devil," said he, "tempts men only to have in hell companions of his
+misery. Let us therefore apply to the Pope, who has the keys of heaven
+and hell; let us prevail upon him to pray to God, at the head of the whole
+church, to consent to a reconciliation with the devil, to restore him to
+favour, to reinstate him in his former rank, which cannot fail to put an
+end to his malicious projects against mankind." Perhaps the honest monk
+did not see, that the devil is at least as useful as God to the ministers
+of religion. They have too much interest in their dissensions, to be
+instrumental in an accommodation between two enemies, upon whose combats
+their own existence and revenues depend. Let men cease to be tempted
+and to sin, and the ministry of priests will be useless. Manicheism is
+evidently the hinge of every religion; but unhappily, the devil, invented
+to clear the deity from the suspicion of malice, proves to us, every
+moment, the impotence or unskilfulness of his celestial adversary.
+
+
+
+
+76.
+
+The nature of man, it is said, was necessarily liable to corruption. God
+could not communicate to him _impeccability_, which is an inalienable
+attribute of his divine perfection. But if God could not make man
+impeccable, why did he give himself the pains to make man, whose nature
+must necessarily be corrupted, and who must consequently offend God? On
+the other hand, if God himself could not make human nature impeccable, by
+what right does he punish men for not being impeccable? It can be only
+by the right of the strongest; but the right of the strongest is called
+violence, and violence cannot be compatible with the justest of beings.
+God would be supremely unjust, should he punish men for not sharing with
+him his divine perfections, or for not being able to be gods like him.
+
+Could not God, at least, have communicated to all men that kind of
+perfection, of which their nature is susceptible? If some men are good,
+or render themselves agreeable to their God, why has not that God done the
+same favour, or given the same dispositions to all beings of our species?
+Why does the number of the wicked so much exceed the number of the good?
+Why, for one friend, has God ten thousand enemies, in a world, which it
+depended entirely upon him to people with honest men? If it be true, that,
+in heaven, God designs to form a court of saints, of elect, or of men who
+shall have lived upon earth conformably to his views, would he not have
+had a more numerous, brilliant, and honourable assembly, had he composed
+it of all men, to whom, in creating them, he could grant the degree of
+goodness, necessary to attain eternal happiness? Finally, would it not
+have been shorter not to have made man, than to have created him a being
+full of faults, rebellious to his creator, perpetually exposed to cause
+his own destruction by a fatal abuse of his liberty?
+
+Instead of creating men, a perfect God ought to have created only angels
+very docile and submissive. Angels, it is said, are free; some have
+sinned; but, at any rate, all have not abused their liberty by revolting
+against their master. Could not God have created only angels of the good
+kind? If God has created angels, who have not sinned, could he not have
+created impeccable men, or men who should never abuse their liberty? If
+the elect are incapable of sinning in heaven, could not God have made
+impeccable men upon earth?
+
+
+
+
+77.
+
+Divines never fail to persuade us, that the enormous distance which
+separates God and man, necessarily renders the conduct of God a mystery
+to us, and that we have no right to interrogate our master. Is this answer
+satisfactory? Since my eternal happiness is at stake, have I not a right
+to examine the conduct of God himself? It is only in hope of happiness
+that men submit to the authority of a God. A despot, to whom men submit
+only through fear, a master, whom they cannot interrogate, a sovereign
+totally inaccessible, can never merit the homage of intelligent beings.
+If the conduct of God is a mystery, it is not made for us. Man can neither
+adore, admire, respect, nor imitate conduct, in which every thing is
+inconceivable, or, of which he can often form only revolting ideas; unless
+it is pretended, that we ought to adore every thing of which we are forced
+to be ignorant, and that every thing, which we do not know, becomes for
+that reason an object of admiration. Divines! You never cease telling us,
+that the designs of God are impenetrable; that _his ways are not our
+ways, nor his thoughts our thoughts_; that it is absurd to complain of
+his administration, of the motives and springs of which we are totally
+ignorant; that it is presumption to tax his judgments with injustice,
+because we cannot comprehend them. But when you speak in this strain, do
+you not perceive, that you destroy with your own hands all your profound
+systems, whose only end is to explain to us the ways of the divinity,
+which, you say, are impenetrable? Have you penetrated his judgments, his
+ways, his designs? You dare not assert it, and though you reason about
+them without end, you do not comprehend them any more than we do. If, by
+chance, you know the plan of God, which you wish us to admire, while
+most people find it so little worthy of a just, good, intelligent, and
+reasonable being, no longer say, this plan is impenetrable. If you are as
+ignorant of it as we are, have some indulgence for those who ingenuously
+confess, they comprehend nothing in it, or that they see in it nothing
+divine. Cease to persecute for opinions, of which you understand nothing
+yourselves; cease to defame each other for dreams and conjectures, which
+every thing seems to contradict. Talk to us of things intelligible and
+really useful to men; and no longer talk to us of the impenetrable ways of
+God, about which you only stammer and contradict yourselves.
+
+By continually speaking of the immense depths of divine wisdom, forbidding
+us to sound them, saying it is insolence to cite God before the tribunal
+of our feeble reason, making it a crime to judge our master, divines
+teach us nothing but the embarrassment they are in, when it is required to
+account for the conduct of a God, whose conduct they think marvellous only
+because they are utterly incapable of comprehending it themselves.
+
+
+
+
+78.
+
+Physical evil is commonly regarded as a punishment for sin. Diseases,
+famines, wars, earthquakes, are means which God uses to chastise wicked
+men. Thus, they make no scruple of attributing these evils to the severity
+of a just and good God. But, do not these scourges fall indiscriminately
+upon the good and bad, upon the impious and devout, upon the innocent and
+guilty? How, in this proceeding, would they have us admire the justice
+and goodness of a being, the idea of whom seems comforting to so many
+wretches, whose brain must undoubtedly be disordered by their misfortunes,
+since they forget, that their God is the arbiter, the sole disposer of the
+events of this world. This being the case, ought they not to impute their
+sufferings to him, into whose arms they fly for comfort? Unfortunate
+father! Thou consolest thyself in the bosom of Providence, for the loss of
+a dear child, or beloved wife, who made thy happiness. Alas! Dost thou not
+see, that thy God has killed them? Thy God has rendered thee miserable,
+and thou desirest thy God to comfort thee for the dreadful afflictions he
+has sent thee!
+
+The chimerical or supernatural notions of theology have so succeeded in
+destroying, in the minds of men, the most simple, dear, and natural ideas,
+that the devout, unable to accuse God of malice, accustom themselves to
+regard the several strokes of fate as indubitable proofs of celestial
+goodness. When in affliction, they are ordered to believe that God loves
+them, that God visits them, that God wishes to try them. Thus religion has
+attained the art of converting evil into good! A profane person said with
+reason--_If God Almighty thus treats those whom he loves, I earnestly
+beseech him never to think of me_.
+
+Men must have received very gloomy and cruel ideas of their God, who is
+called so good, to believe that the most dreadful calamities and piercing
+afflictions are marks of his favour! Would an evil genius, a demon,
+be more ingenious in tormenting his enemies, than the God of goodness
+sometimes is, who so often exercises his severity upon his dearest
+friends?
+
+
+
+
+79.
+
+What shall we say of a father, who, we are assured, watches without
+intermission over the preservation and happiness of his weak and
+short-sighted children, and who yet leaves them at liberty to wander at
+random among rocks, precipices, and waters; who rarely hinders them from
+following their inordinate appetites; who permits them to handle, without
+precaution, murderous arms, at the risk of their life? What should we
+think of the same father, if, instead of imputing to himself the evil that
+happens to his poor children, he should punish them for their wanderings
+in the most cruel manner? We should say, with reason, that this father is
+a madman, who unites injustice to folly. A God, who punishes faults, which
+he could have prevented, is a being deficient in wisdom, goodness, and
+equity. A foreseeing God would prevent evil, and thereby avoid having to
+punish it. A good God would not punish weaknesses, which he knew to be
+inherent in human nature. A just God, if he made man, would not punish
+him for not being made strong enough to resist his desires. _To punish
+weakness is the most unjust tyranny._ Is it not calumniating a just God,
+to say, that he punishes men for their faults, even in the present life?
+How could he punish beings, whom it belonged to him alone to reform, and
+who, while they have not _grace_, cannot act otherwise than they do?
+
+According to the principles of theologians themselves, man, in his present
+state of corruption, can do nothing but evil, since, without divine grace,
+he is never able to do good. Now, if the nature of man, left to itself,
+or destitute of divine aid, necessarily determines him to evil, or renders
+him incapable of good, what becomes of the free-will of man? According to
+such principles, man can neither merit nor demerit. By rewarding man for
+the good he does, God would only reward himself; by punishing man for the
+evil he does, God would punish him for not giving him grace, without which
+he could not possibly do better.
+
+
+
+
+80.
+
+Theologians repeatedly tell us, that man is free, while all their
+principles conspire to destroy his liberty. By endeavouring to justify
+the Divinity, they in reality accuse him of the blackest injustice. They
+suppose, that without grace, man is necessitated to do evil. They affirm,
+that God will punish him, because God has not given him grace to do good!
+
+Little reflection will suffice to convince us, that man is necessitated
+in all his actions, that his free will is a chimera, even in the system of
+theologians. Does it depend upon man to be born of such or such parents?
+Does it depend upon man to imbibe or not to imbibe the opinions of his
+parents or instructors? If I had been born of idolatrous or Mahometan
+parents, would it have depended upon me to become a Christian? Yet,
+divines gravely assure us, that a just God will damn without pity all
+those, to whom he has not given grace to know the Christian religion!
+
+Man's birth is wholly independent of his choice. He is not asked whether
+he is willing, or not, to come into the world. Nature does not consult
+him upon the country and parents she gives him. His acquired ideas, his
+opinions, his notions true or false, are necessary fruits of the education
+which he has received, and of which he has not been the director. His
+passions and desires are necessary consequences of the temperament given
+him by nature. During his whole life, his volitions and actions are
+determined by his connections, habits, occupations, pleasures, and
+conversations; by the thoughts, that are involuntarily presented to his
+mind; in a word, by a multitude of events and accidents, which it is out
+of his power to foresee or prevent. Incapable of looking into futurity,
+he knows not what he will do. From the instant of his birth to that of
+his death, he is never free. You will say, that he wills, deliberates,
+chooses, determines; and you will hence conclude, that his actions are
+free. It is true, that man wills, but he is not master of his will or
+his desires; he can desire and will only what he judges advantageous to
+himself; he can neither love pain, nor detest pleasure. It will be
+said, that he sometimes prefers pain to pleasure; but then he prefers
+a momentary pain with a view of procuring a greater and more durable
+pleasure. In this case, the prospect of a greater good necessarily
+determines him to forego a less considerable good.
+
+The lover does not give his mistress the features which captivate him; he
+is not then master of loving, or not loving the object of his tenderness;
+he is not master of his imagination or temperament. Whence it evidently
+follows, that man is not master of his volitions and desires. "But man,"
+you will say, "can resist his desires; therefore he is free." Man resists
+his desires, when the motives, which divert him from an object, are
+stronger than those, which incline him towards it; but then his resistance
+is necessary. A man, whose fear of dishonour or punishment is greater than
+his love of money, necessarily resists the desire of stealing.
+
+"Are we not free, when we deliberate?" But, are we masters of knowing or
+not knowing, of being in doubt or certainty? Deliberation is a necessary
+effect of our uncertainty respecting the consequences of our actions. When
+we are sure, or think we are sure, of these consequences, we necessarily
+decide, and we then act necessarily according to our true or false
+judgment. Our judgments, true or false, are not free; they are necessarily
+determined by the ideas, we have received, or which our minds have formed.
+
+Man is not free in his choice; he is evidently necessitated to choose what
+he judges most useful and agreeable. Neither is he free, when he suspends
+his choice; he is forced to suspend it until he knows, or thinks he knows,
+the qualities of the objects presented to him, or, until he has weighed
+the consequences of his actions. "Man," you will say, "often decides in
+favour of actions, which he knows must be detrimental to himself; man
+sometimes kills himself; therefore he is free." I deny it. Is man master
+of reasoning well or ill? Do not his reason and wisdom depend upon the
+opinions he has formed, or upon the conformation of his machine? As
+neither one nor the other depends upon his will, they are no proof of
+liberty. "If I lay a wager, that I shall do, or not do a thing, am I
+not free? Does it not depend upon me to do it or not?" No, I answer; the
+desire of winning the wager will necessarily determine you to do, or not
+to do the thing in question. "But, supposing I consent to lose the wager?"
+Then the desire of proving to me, that you are free, will have become a
+stronger motive than the desire of winning the wager; and this motive
+will have necessarily determined you to do, or not to do, the thing in
+question.
+
+"But," you will say, "I feel free." This is an illusion, that may be
+compared to that of the fly in the fable, who, lighting upon the pole of
+a heavy carriage, applauded himself for directing its course. Man, who
+thinks himself free, is a fly, who imagines he has power to move the
+universe, while he is himself unknowingly carried along by it.
+
+The inward persuasion that we are free to do, or not to do a thing, is but
+a mere illusion. If we trace the true principle of our actions, we shall
+find, that they are always necessary consequences of our volitions and
+desires, which are never in our power. You think yourself free, because
+you do what you will; but are you free to will, or not to will; to desire,
+or not to desire? Are not your volitions and desires necessarily excited
+by objects or qualities totally independent of you?
+
+
+
+
+81.
+
+"If the actions of men are necessary, if men are not free, by what right
+does society punish criminals? Is it not very unjust to chastise beings,
+who could not act otherwise than they have done?" If the wicked act
+necessarily according to the impulses of their evil nature, society,
+in punishing them, acts necessarily by the desire of self-preservation.
+Certain objects necessarily produce in us the sensation of pain; our
+nature then forces us against them, and avert them from us. A tiger,
+pressed by hunger, springs upon the man, whom he wishes to devour; but
+this man is not master of his fear, and necessarily seeks means to destroy
+the tiger.
+
+
+
+
+82.
+
+"If every thing be necessary, the errors, opinions, and ideas of men
+are fatal; and, if so, how or why should we attempt to reform them?" The
+errors of men are necessary consequences of ignorance. Their ignorance,
+prejudice, and credulity are necessary consequences of their inexperience,
+negligence, and want of reflection, in the same manner as delirium or
+lethargy are necessary effects of certain diseases. Truth, experience,
+reflection, and reason, are remedies calculated to cure ignorance,
+fanaticism and follies. But, you will ask, why does not truth produce this
+effect upon many disordered minds? It is because some diseases resist all
+remedies; because it is impossible to cure obstinate patients, who refuse
+the remedies presented to them; because the interest of some men, and the
+folly of others, necessarily oppose the admission of truth.
+
+A cause produces its effect only when its action is not interrupted by
+stronger causes, which then weakens or render useless, the action of the
+former. It is impossible that the best arguments should be adopted by men,
+who are interested in error, prejudiced in its favour, and who decline all
+reflection; but truth must necessarily undeceive honest minds, who seek
+her sincerely. Truth is a cause; it necessarily produces its effects, when
+its impulse is not intercepted by causes, which suspend its effects.
+
+
+
+
+83.
+
+"To deprive man of his free will," it is said, "makes him a mere machine,
+an automaton. Without liberty, he will no longer have either merit or
+virtue." What is merit in man? It is a manner of acting, which renders
+him estimable in the eyes of his fellow-beings. What is virtue? It is a
+disposition, which inclines us to do good to others. What can there be
+contemptible in machines, or automatons, capable of producing effects so
+desirable? Marcus Aurelius was useful to the vast Roman Empire. By what
+right would a machine despise a machine, whose springs facilitate its
+action? Good men are springs, which second society in its tendency to
+happiness; the wicked are ill-formed springs, which disturb the order,
+progress, and harmony of society. If, for its own utility, society
+cherishes and rewards the good, it also harasses and destroys the wicked,
+as useless or hurtful.
+
+
+
+
+84.
+
+The world is a necessary agent. All the beings, that compose it, are
+united to each other, and cannot act otherwise than they do, so long as
+they are moved by the same causes, and endued with the same properties.
+When they lose properties, they will necessarily act in a different way.
+God himself, admitting his existence, cannot be considered a free
+agent. If there existed a God, his manner of acting would necessarily
+be determined by the properties inherent in his nature; nothing would be
+capable of arresting or altering his will. This being granted, neither our
+actions, prayers, nor sacrifices could suspend, or change his invariable
+conduct and immutable designs; whence we are forced to infer, that all
+religion would be useless.
+
+
+
+
+85.
+
+Were not divines in perpetual contradiction with themselves, they would
+see, that, according to their hypothesis, man cannot be reputed free an
+instant. Do they not suppose man continually dependent on his God? Are we
+free, when we cannot exist and be preserved without God, and when we cease
+to exist at the pleasure of his supreme will? If God has made man out of
+nothing; if his preservation is a continued creation; if God cannot, an
+instant, lose sight of his creature; if whatever happens to him, is an
+effect of the divine will; if man can do nothing of himself; if all the
+events, which he experiences, are effects of the divine decrees; if he
+does no good without grace from on high, how can they maintain, that a man
+enjoys a moment's liberty? If God did not preserve him in the moment
+of sin, how could man sin? If God then preserves him, God forces him to
+exist, that he may sin.
+
+
+
+
+86.
+
+The Divinity is frequently compared to a king, whose revolted subjects are
+the greater part of mankind; and it is said, he has a right to reward the
+subjects who remain faithful to him, and to punish the rebellious. This
+comparison is not just in any of its parts. God presides over a machine,
+every spring of which he has created. These springs act agreeable to the
+manner, in which God has formed them; he ought to impute it to his own
+unskilfulness, if these springs do not contribute to the harmony of the
+machine, into which it was his will to insert them. God is a created king,
+who has created to himself subjects of every description; who has formed
+them according to his own pleasure whose will can never find resistance.
+If God has rebellious subjects in his empire, it is because God has
+resolved to have rebellious subjects. If the sins of men disturb the order
+of the world, it is because it is the will of God that this order should
+be disturbed.
+
+Nobody dares to call in question the divine justice; yet, under the
+government of a just God, we see nothing but acts of injustice and
+violence. Force decides the fate of nations, equity seems banished from
+the earth; a few men sport, unpunished, with the peace, property, liberty,
+and life of others. All is disorder in a world governed by a God who is
+said to be infinitely displeased with disorder.
+
+
+
+
+87.
+
+Although men are for ever admiring the wisdom, goodness, justice, and
+beautiful order of Providence, they are, in reality, never satisfied with
+it. Do not the prayers, continually addressed to heaven, shew, that men
+are by no means satisfied with the divine dispensations? To pray to God
+for a favour, shews diffidence of his watchful care; to pray to him to
+avert or put an end to an evil, is to endeavour to obstruct the course
+of his justice; to implore the assistance of God in our calamities, is to
+address the author himself of these calamities, to represent to him, that
+he ought, for our sake, to rectify his plan, which does not accord with
+our interest.
+
+The Optimist, or he who maintains that _all is well_, and who incessantly
+cries that we live in _the best world possible_, to be consistent, should
+never pray; neither ought he to expect another world, where man will be
+happier. Can there be a better world than _the best world possible_? Some
+theologians have treated the Optimists as impious, for having intimated
+that God could not produce a better world, than that in which we live.
+According to these doctors, it is to limit the power of God, and to
+offer him insult. But do not these divines see, that it shews much less
+indignity to God, to assert that he has done his best in producing this
+world, than to say, that, being able to produce a better, he has had
+malice enough to produce a very bad one? If the Optimist, by his system,
+detracts from the divine power, the theologian, who treats him as a
+blasphemer, is himself a blasphemer, who offends the goodness of God in
+espousing the cause of his omnipotence.
+
+
+
+
+88.
+
+When we complain of the evils, of which our world is the theatre, we are
+referred to the other world, where it is said, God will make reparation
+for all the iniquity and misery, which, for a time, he permits here below.
+But if God, suffering his eternal justice to remain at rest for a long
+time, could consent to evil during the whole continuance of our present
+world, what assurance have we, that, during the continuance of another
+world, divine justice will not, in like manner, sleep over the misery of
+its inhabitants?
+
+The divines console us for our sufferings by saying, that God is patient,
+and that his justice, though often slow, is not the less sure. But do
+they not see, that patience is incompatible with a just, immutable, and
+omnipotent being? Can God then permit injustice, even for an instant? To
+temporize with a known evil, announces either weakness, uncertainty,
+or collusion. To tolerate evil, when one has power to prevent it, is to
+consent to the commission of evil.
+
+
+
+
+89.
+
+Divines every where exclaim, that God is infinitely just; but that _his
+justice is not the justice of man_. Of what kind or nature then is
+this divine justice? What idea can I form of a justice, which so often
+resembles injustice? Is it not to confound all ideas of just and unjust,
+to say, that what is equitable in God is iniquitous in his creatures?
+How can we receive for our model a being, whose divine perfections are
+precisely the reverse of human?
+
+"God," it is said, "is sovereign arbiter of our destinies. His supreme
+power, which nothing can limit, justly permits him to do with the works
+of his own hands according to his good pleasure. A worm, like man, has no
+right even to complain." This arrogant style is evidently borrowed from
+the language, used by the ministers of tyrants, when they stop the mouths
+of those who suffer from their violences. It cannot then be the language
+of the ministers of a God, whose equity is highly extolled; it is not made
+to be imposed upon a being, who reasons. Ministers of a just God! I will
+inform you then, that the greatest power cannot confer upon your God
+himself the right of being unjust even to the vilest of his creatures. A
+despot is not a God. A God, who arrogates to himself the right of doing
+evil, is a tyrant; a tyrant is not a model for men; he must be an object
+execrable to their eyes.
+
+Is it not indeed strange, that in order to justify the Divinity, they make
+him every moment the most unjust of beings! As soon as we complain of his
+conduct, they think to silence us by alleging, that _God is master_; which
+signifies, that God, being the strongest, is not bound by ordinary rules.
+But the right of the strongest is the violation of all rights. It seems
+right only to the eyes of a savage conqueror, who in the heat of his fury
+imagines, that he may do whatever he pleases with the unfortunate victims,
+whom he has conquered. This barbarous right can appear legitimate only to
+slaves blind enough to believe that everything is lawful to tyrants whom
+they feel too weak to resist.
+
+In the greatest calamities, do not devout persons, through a ridiculous
+simplicity, or rather a sensible contradiction in terms, exclaim, that
+_the Almighty is master_. Thus, inconsistent reasoners, believe, that the
+_Almighty_ (a Being, one of whose first attributes is goodness,) sends you
+pestilence, war, and famine! You believe that the _Almighty_, this good
+being, has the will and right to inflict the greatest evils, you can bear!
+Cease, at least, to call your God _good_, when he does you evil; say not,
+that he is just, say that he is the strongest, and that it is impossible
+for you to ward off the blows of his caprice.
+
+_God_, say you, _chastises only for our good_. But what real good can
+result to a people from being exterminated by the plague, ravaged by wars,
+corrupted by the examples of perverse rulers, continually crushed under
+the iron sceptre of a succession of merciless tyrants, annihilated by the
+scourges of a bad government, whose destructive effects are often felt for
+ages? If chastisements are good, then they cannot have too much of a good
+thing! _The eyes of faith_ must be strange eyes, if with them they see
+advantages in the most dreadful calamities, in the vices and follies with
+which our species are afflicted.
+
+
+
+
+90.
+
+What strange ideas of divine justice must Christians have, who are taught
+to believe, that their God, in view of reconciling to himself the human
+race, guilty, though unconscious, of the sin of their fathers, has put to
+death his own son, who was innocent and incapable of sinning? What should
+we say of a king, whose subjects should revolt, and who, to appease
+himself, should find no other expedient than to put to death the heir of
+his crown, who had not participated in the general rebellion? "It is,"
+the Christian will say, "through goodness to his subjects, unable of
+themselves to satisfy divine justice, that God has consented to the cruel
+death of his son." But the goodness of a father to strangers does not
+give him the right of being unjust and barbarous to his own son. All
+the qualities, which theology ascribes to God, reciprocally destroy one
+another. The exercise of one of his perfections is always at the expense
+of the exercise of another.
+
+Has the Jew more rational ideas of divine justice than the Christian?
+The pride of a king kindles the anger of heaven; _Jehovah_ causes the
+pestilence to descend upon his innocent people; seventy thousand subjects
+are exterminated to expiate the fault of a monarch, whom the goodness of
+God resolved to spare.
+
+
+
+
+91.
+
+Notwithstanding the various acts of injustice, with which all religions
+delight to blacken the Divinity, men cannot consent to accuse him of
+iniquity. They fear, that, like the tyrants of this world, truth will
+offend him, and redouble upon them the weight of his malice and tyranny.
+They hearken therefore to their priests, who tell them, that their God
+is a tender father; that this God is an equitable monarch whose object in
+this world is to assure himself of the love, obedience and respect of
+his subjects; who gives them liberty of acting only to afford them
+an opportunity of meriting his favours, and of acquiring an eternal
+happiness, which he does not owe them. By what signs can men discover
+the tenderness of a father, who has given life to the greater part of his
+children merely to drag out upon the earth a painful, restless, bitter
+existence? Is there a more unfortunate present, than that pretended
+liberty, which, we are told, men are very liable to abuse, and thereby to
+incur eternal misery?
+
+
+
+
+92.
+
+By calling mortals to life, what a cruel and dangerous part has not the
+Deity forced them to act? Thrown into the world without their consent,
+provided with a temperament of which they are not masters, animated by
+passions and desires inherent in their nature, exposed to snares which
+they have not power to escape, hurried away by events which they could not
+foresee or prevent, unhappy mortals are compelled to run a career, which
+may lead them to punishments horrible in duration and violence.
+
+Travellers inform us, that, in Asia, a Sultan reigned, full of fantastical
+ideas, and very absolute in his whims. By a strange madness, this prince
+spent his time seated at a table, upon which were placed three dice and a
+dice-box. One end of the table was covered with pieces of silver, designed
+to excite the avarice of his courtiers and people. He, knowing the
+foible of his subjects, addresses them as follows: _Slaves, I wish your
+happiness. My goodness proposes to enrich you, and make you all happy. Do
+you see these treasures? Well, they are for you; strive to gain them; let
+each, in his turn, take the box and dice; whoever has the fortune to throw
+sixes, shall be master of the treasure. But, I forewarn you, that he who
+has not the happiness to throw the number required, shall be precipitated
+for ever into a dark dungeon, where my justice demands that he be burned
+with a slow fire._ Upon this discourse of the monarch, the company look at
+each other affrighted. No one wishes to expose himself to so dangerous
+a chance. _What!_ says the enraged Sultan, _does no one offer to play? I
+tell you then you must; My glory requires that you should play. Play then;
+obey without replying._ It is well to observe, that the dice of the despot
+are so prepared, that out of a hundred thousand throws, there is but one,
+which can gain the number required. Thus the generous monarch has the
+pleasure of seeing his prison well filled, and his riches seldom ravished
+from him. Mortals! this SULTAN is your GOD; his TREASURE IS HEAVEN; his
+DUNGEON IS HELL, and it is you who hold the DICE!
+
+
+
+
+93.
+
+Divines repeatedly assure us, that we owe Providence infinite gratitude
+for the numberless blessings it bestows. They loudly extol the happiness
+of existence. But, alas! how many mortals are truly satisfied with their
+mode of existence? If life has sweets, with how much bitterness is it not
+mixed? Does not a single chagrin often suffice suddenly to poison the most
+peaceable and fortunate life? Are there many, who, if it were in their
+power would begin again, at the same price, the painful career, in which,
+without their consent, destiny has placed them?
+
+They say, that existence is a great blessing. But is not this existence
+continually troubled with fears, and maladies, often cruel and little
+deserved? May not this existence, threatened on so many sides, be torn
+from us any moment? Where is the man, who has not been deprived of a dear
+wife, beloved child, or consoling friend, whose loss every moment intrudes
+upon his thoughts? There are few, who have not been forced to drink of the
+cup of misfortune; there are few, who have not desired their end. Finally,
+it did not depend upon us to exist or not to exist. Should the bird then
+be very grateful to the fowler for taking him in his net and confining him
+in his cage for his diversion?
+
+
+
+
+94.
+
+Notwithstanding the infirmities and misery which man is forced to undergo,
+he has, nevertheless, the folly to think himself the favourite of his God,
+the object of all his cares, the sole end of all his works. He imagines,
+that the whole universe is made for him; he arrogantly calls himself the
+_king of nature_, and values himself far above other animals. Mortal! upon
+what canst thou found thy haughty pretensions? It is, sayest thou, upon
+thy soul, upon thy reason, upon the sublime faculties, which enable thee
+to exercise an absolute empire over the beings, which surround thee. But,
+weak sovereign of the world; art thou sure, one moment, of the continuance
+of thy reign? Do not the smallest atoms of matter, which thou despisest,
+suffice to tear thee from thy throne, and deprive thee of life? Finally,
+does not the king of animals at last become the food of worms? Thou
+speakest of thy soul! But dost thou know what a soul is? Dost thou not
+see, that this soul is only the assemblage of thy organs, from which
+results life? Wouldst thou then refuse a soul to other animals, who live,
+think, judge, and compare, like thee; who seek pleasure, and avoid pain,
+like thee; and who often have organs, which serve them better than thine?
+Thou boastest of thy intellectual faculties; but do these faculties, of
+which thou art so proud, make thee happier than other animals? Dost
+thou often make use of that reason, in which thou gloriest, and to
+which religion commands thee not to listen? Are those brutes, which thou
+disdainest, because they are less strong or less cunning than thou art,
+subject to mental pains, to a thousand frivolous passions, to a thousand
+imaginary wants, to which thou art a continual prey? Are they, like thee,
+tormented by the past, alarmed at the future? Confined solely to the
+present, does not what you call their _instinct_, and what I call their
+_intelligence_, suffice to preserve and defend them, and to supply them
+with all they want? Does not this instinct, of which thou speakest with
+contempt, often serve them better than thy wonderful faculties? Is not
+their peaceful ignorance more advantageous to them, than those extravagant
+meditations and worthless researches, which render thee unhappy, and
+for which thy zeal urges thee even to massacre the beings of thy noble
+species? Finally, have these beasts, like so many mortals, a troubled
+imagination, which makes them fear, not only death, but likewise eternal
+torments?
+
+Augustus, hearing that Herod, king of Judea, had put his sons to death,
+exclaimed: _It is much better to be Herod's hog, than his son_. As much
+may be said of man. This dear child of Providence runs far greater risks
+than all other animals; having suffered much in this world, does he not
+imagine, that he is in danger of suffering eternally in another?
+
+
+
+
+95.
+
+Where is the precise line of distinction between man and the animals whom
+he calls brutes? In what does he differ essentially from beasts? It is,
+we are told, by his intelligence, by the faculties of his mind, and by his
+reason, that man appears superior to all other animals, who, in all their
+actions, move only by physical impulses, in which reason has no share.
+But finally, brutes, having fewer wants than man, easily do without his
+intellectual faculties, which would be perfectly useless in their mode of
+existence. Their instinct is sufficient; while all the faculties of man
+scarcely suffice to render his existence supportable, and to satisfy the
+wants, which his imagination and his prejudices multiply to his torment.
+
+Brutes are not influenced by the same objects, as man; they have not the
+same wants, desires, nor fancies; and they very soon arrive to maturity,
+while the mind of man seldom attains to the full enjoyment and free
+exercise of its faculties and to such a use of them, as is conducive to
+his happiness.
+
+
+
+
+96.
+
+We are assured, that the human soul is a simple substance. It should
+then be the same in every individual, each having the same intellectual
+faculties; yet this is not the case. Men differ as much in the qualities
+of the mind, as in the features of the face. There are human beings
+as different from one another, as man is from a horse or a dog. What
+conformity or resemblance do we find between some men? What an infinite
+distance is there between the genius of a Locke or a Newton, and that of a
+peasant, Hottentot, or Laplander?
+
+Man differs from other animals only in his organization, which enables
+him to produce effects, of which animals are not capable. The variety,
+observable in the organs of individuals of the human species suffices to
+explain the differences in what is called their intellectual faculties.
+More or less delicacy in these organs, warmth in the blood, mobility
+in the fluids, flexibility or stiffness in the fibres and nerves, must
+necessarily produce the infinite diversity, which we observe in the minds
+of men. It is by exercise, habit and education, that the mind is
+unfolded and becomes superior to that of others. Man, without culture and
+experience, is as void of reason and industry, as the brute. A stupid man
+is one, whose organs move with difficulty, whose brain does not easily
+vibrate, whose blood circulates slowly. A man of genius is he, whose
+organs are flexible, whose sensations are quick, whose brain vibrates
+with celerity. A learned man is he, whose organs and brain have been long
+exercised upon objects to which he is devoted.
+
+Without culture, experience, or reason, is not man more contemptible and
+worthy of hatred, than the vilest insects or most ferocious beasts? Is
+there in nature a more detestable being, than a Tiberius, a Nero, or a
+Caligula? Have those destroyers of the human race, known by the name of
+conquerors, more estimable souls than bears, lions, or panthers? Are there
+animals in the world more detestable than tyrants?
+
+
+
+
+97.
+
+The superiority which man so gratuitously arrogates to himself over other
+animals, soon vanishes in the light of reason, when we reflect on human
+extravagances. How many animals shew more mildness, reflection, and
+reason, than the animal, who calls himself reasonable above all others?
+Are there among men, so often enslaved and oppressed, societies as
+well constituted as those of the ants, bees, or beavers? Do we ever
+see ferocious beasts of the same species mangle and destroy one another
+without profit? Do we ever see religious wars among them? The cruelty
+of beasts towards other species arises from hunger, the necessity of
+nourishment; the cruelty of man towards man arises only from the vanity of
+his masters and the folly of his impertinent prejudices. Speculative men,
+who endeavour to make us believe, that all in the universe was made for
+man, are much embarrassed, when we ask, how so many hurtful animals can
+contribute to the happiness of man? What known advantage results to
+the friend of the gods, from being bitten by a viper, stung by a gnat,
+devoured by vermin, torn in pieces by a tiger, etc.? Would not all these
+animals reason as justly as our theologians, should they pretend that man
+was made for them?
+
+
+
+
+98.
+
+AN EASTERN TALE.
+
+At some distance from Bagdad, a hermit, renowned for his sanctity, passed
+his days in an agreeable solitude. The neighbouring inhabitants, to obtain
+an interest in his prayers, daily flocked to his hermitage, to carry him
+provisions and presents. The holy man, without ceasing, gave thanks to God
+for the blessings, with which providence loaded him. "O Allah!" said he,
+"how ineffable is thy love to thy servants. What have I done to merit the
+favours, that I receive from thy bounty? O Monarch of the skies! O Father
+of nature! what praises could worthily celebrate thy munificence, and thy
+paternal care! O Allah! how great is thy goodness to the children of men!"
+Penetrated with gratitude, the hermit made a vow to undertake, for the
+seventh time, a pilgrimage to Mecca. The war which then raged between the
+Persians and Turks, could not induce him to defer his pious enterprise.
+Full of confidence in God, he sets out under the inviolable safeguard of
+a religious habit. He passes through the hostile troops without any
+obstacle; far from being molested, he receives, at every step, marks of
+veneration from the soldiers of the two parties. At length, borne down
+with fatigue, he is obliged to seek refuge against the rays of a scorching
+sun; he rests under the cool shade of a group of palm-trees. In this
+solitary place, the man of God finds not only an enchanting retreat, but
+a delicious repast. He has only to put forth his hand to gather dates
+and other pleasant fruits; a brook affords him the means of quenching his
+thirst. A green turf invites him to sleep; upon waking he performs the
+sacred ablution, and exclaims in a transport of joy: "O Allah! how great
+is thy goodness to the children of men!" After this perfect refreshment,
+the saint, full of strength and gaiety, pursues his way; it leads him
+across a smiling country, which presents to his eyes flowery hillocks,
+enamelled meadows, and trees loaded with fruit. Affected by this sight, he
+ceases not to adore the rich and liberal hand of providence, which appears
+every where providing for the happiness of the human race. Going a little
+farther, the mountains are pretty difficult to pass; but having once
+arrived at the summit, a hideous spectacle suddenly appears to his view.
+His soul is filled with horror. He discovers a vast plain laid waste
+with fire and sword; he beholds it covered with hundreds of carcases,
+the deplorable remains of a bloody battle, lately fought upon this field.
+Eagles, vultures, ravens and wolves were greedily devouring the dead
+bodies with which the ground was covered. This sight plunges our pilgrim
+into a gloomy meditation. Heaven, by special favour, had enabled him to
+understand the language of beasts. He heard a wolf, gorged with human
+flesh, cry out in the excess of his joy: "O Allah! how great is thy
+goodness to the children of wolves. Thy provident wisdom takes care to
+craze the minds of these detestable men, who are so dangerous to our
+species. By an effect of thy Providence, which watches over thy creatures,
+these destroyers cut one another's throats, and furnish us with sumptuous
+meals. O Allah! how great is thy goodness to the children of wolves!"
+
+
+
+
+99.
+
+A heated imagination sees in the universe only the blessings of heaven;
+a calmer mind finds in it both good and evil. "I exist," say you; but is
+this existence always a good? "Behold," you say, "that sun, which lights;
+this earth, which for you is covered with crops and verdure; these
+flowers, which bloom to regale your senses; these trees, which bend under
+the weight of delicious fruits; these pure waters, which run only to
+quench your thirst; those seas, which embrace the universe to facilitate
+your commerce; these animals, which a foreseeing nature provides for your
+use." Yes; I see all these things, and I enjoy them. But in many climates,
+this beautiful sun is almost always hidden; in others, its excessive heat
+torments, creates storms, produces frightful diseases, and parches the
+fields; the pastures are without verdure, the trees without fruit, the
+crops are scorched, the springs are dried up; I can only with difficulty
+subsist, and now complain of the cruelties of nature, which to you
+always appears so beneficent. If these seas bring me spices, and useless
+commodities, do they not destroy numberless mortals, who are foolish
+enough to seek them? The vanity of man persuades him, that he is the
+sole center of the universe; he creates for himself a world and a God;
+he thinks himself of sufficient consequence to derange nature at his
+pleasure. But, concerning other animals, he reasons like an atheist. Does
+he not imagine, that the individuals different from his own are automatons
+unworthy of the blessings of universal providence, and that brutes cannot
+be objects of his justice or goodness? Mortals regard the happy or unhappy
+events, health or sickness, life or death, plenty or want, as rewards or
+punishments for the right use or abuse of the liberty, with which they
+erroneously imagine themselves endowed. Do they reason in the same manner
+concerning the brutes? No. Although they see them, under a just God, enjoy
+and suffer, equally subject to health and sickness, live and die, like
+themselves, it never occurs to them to ask by what crime, these beasts
+could have incurred the displeasure of their Creator? Have not men,
+blinded by their religious prejudices, in order to free themselves from
+embarrassment, carried their folly so far as to pretend that beasts have
+no feeling?
+
+Will men never renounce their foolish pretensions? Will they never
+acknowledge that nature is not made for them? Will they never see that
+nature has placed equality among all beings she has produced? Will they
+never perceive that all organized beings are equally made to be born and
+die, enjoy and suffer? Finally, far from having any cause to be puffed
+up with their mental faculties, are they not forced to grant, that these
+faculties often make them more unhappy than beasts, in which we find
+neither opinions, prejudices, vanities, nor follies, which every moment
+decide the welfare of man?
+
+
+
+
+100.
+
+The superiority which men arrogate over other animals, is chiefly founded
+upon their opinion, that they have the exclusive possession of an immortal
+soul. But ask them what this soul is, and they are puzzled. They will say,
+it is an unknown substance--a secret power distinct from their bodies--a
+spirit, of which they have no idea. Ask them how this spirit, which they
+suppose to be like their God wholly void of extension, could combine
+itself with their material bodies, and they will tell you, they know
+nothing about it; that it is to them a mystery; that this combination is
+an effect of the omnipotence of God. These are the ideas that men form of
+the hidden, or rather imaginary substance, which they consider as the main
+spring of all their actions!
+
+If the soul is a substance essentially different from the body, and
+can have no relation to it, their union would be, not a mystery, but an
+impossibility. Besides, this soul being of a nature different from the
+body, must necessarily act in a different manner; yet we see that this
+pretended soul is sensible of the motions experienced by the body, and
+that these two substances, essentially different, always acts in concert.
+You will say that this harmony is also a mystery. But I will tell you,
+that I see not my soul, that I know and am sensible of my body only, that
+it is this body which feels, thinks, judges, suffers, and enjoys; and
+that all these faculties are necessary results of its own mechanism, or
+organization.
+
+
+
+
+101.
+
+Although it is impossible for men to form the least idea of the soul, or
+the pretended spirit, which animates them; yet they persuade themselves
+that this unknown soul is exempt from death. Every thing proves to them,
+that they feel, that they think, that they acquire ideas, that they enjoy
+and suffer, only by means of the senses, or material organs of the body.
+Admitting even the existence of this soul, they cannot help acknowledging,
+that it depends entirely upon the body, and undergoes, all its
+vicissitudes; and yet it is imagined, that this soul has nothing, in
+its nature, similar to the body; that it can act and feel without the
+assistance of the body; in a word, that this soul, freed from the body,
+and disengaged from its senses, can live, enjoy, suffer, experience
+happiness, or feel excruciating torments. Upon such a tissue of
+absurdities is built the marvellous opinion of the _immortality of the
+soul_. If I ask, what are the motives for believing the soul immortal,
+they immediately answer, that it is because man naturally desires to be
+immortal: but, because you desire a thing ardently, can you infer that
+your desire will be fulfilled? By what strange logic can we dare affirm,
+that a thing cannot fail to happen, because we ardently desire it? Are
+desires, begotten by the imagination, the measure of reality? The impious,
+you say, deprived of the flattering hope of another life, wish to be
+annihilated. Very well: may they not then as justly conclude, from _their_
+desire, that they shall be annihilated, as you may conclude from _your_
+desire, that you shall exist for ever.
+
+
+
+
+102.
+
+Man dies, and the human body after death is no longer anything but a mass
+incapable of producing those motions, of which the sum total constituted
+life. We see, that it has no longer circulation, respiration, digestion,
+speech, or thought. It is pretended, that the soul is then separated from
+the body; but to say, that this soul, with which we are unacquainted, is
+the principle of life, is to say nothing, unless that an unknown power is
+the hidden principle of imperceptible movements. Nothing is more natural
+and simple, than to believe, that the dead man no longer lives: nothing
+is more extravagant, than to believe, that the dead man is still alive. We
+laugh at the simplicity of some nations, whose custom is to bury provision
+with the dead, under an idea that it will be useful and necessary to them
+in the other life. Is it then more ridiculous or absurd to suppose, that
+men will eat after death, than to imagine, that they will think, that they
+will be actuated by agreeable or disagreeable ideas, that they will enjoy
+or suffer, and that they will experience repentance or delight, after the
+organs, adapted to produce sensations or ideas, are once dissolved. To say
+that the souls of men will be happy or unhappy after death, is in other
+words to say, that men will see without eyes, hear without ears, taste
+without palates, smell without noses, and touch without hands. And
+persons, who consider themselves very reasonable, adopt these ideas!
+
+
+
+
+103.
+
+The dogma of the immortality of the soul supposes the soul to be a simple
+substance; in a word, a spirit. But I ask again, what is a spirit? "It
+is," say you, "a substance void of extension, incorruptible, having
+nothing common with matter." If so, how is your soul born, and how does it
+grow, how does it strengthen or weaken itself, how does it get disordered
+and grow old, in the same progression as your body?
+
+To all these questions you answer, that these are mysteries. If so, you
+cannot understand them. If you cannot understand them, why do you decide
+about a thing, of which you are unable to form the least idea? To believe
+or affirm any thing, it is necessary, at least, to know in what it
+consists. To believe in the existence of your immaterial soul, is to
+say, that you are persuaded of the existence of a thing, of which it is
+impossible for you to form any true notion; it is to believe in words
+without meaning. To affirm that the thing is as you say, is the height of
+folly or vanity.
+
+
+
+
+104.
+
+Are not theologians strange reasoners? Whenever they cannot divine the
+_natural_ causes of things, they invent what they call _supernatural_;
+such as spirits, occult causes, inexplicable agents, or rather _words_,
+much more obscure than the _things_ they endeavour to explain. Let us
+remain in nature, when we wish to account for the phenomena of nature; let
+us be content to remain ignorant of causes too delicate for our organs;
+and let us be persuaded, that, by going beyond nature, we shall never
+solve the problems which nature presents.
+
+Even upon the hypothesis of theology, (that is, supposing an all-powerful
+mover of matter,) by what right would theologians deny, that their God
+has power to give this matter the faculty of thought? Was it then more
+difficult for him to create combinations of matter, from which thought
+might result, than spirits who could think? At least, by supposing matter,
+which thinks, we should have some notions of the subject of thought, or of
+what thinks in us; whereas, by attributing thought to an immaterial being,
+it is impossible to form the least idea of it.
+
+
+
+
+105.
+
+It is objected against us, that materialism makes man a mere machine,
+which is said to be very dishonourable. But, will it be much more
+honourable for man, if we should say, that he acts by the secret impulses
+of a spirit, or by a certain _I know not what_, that animates him in a
+manner totally inexplicable.
+
+It is easy to perceive, that the supposed superiority of _spirit_ over
+matter, or of the soul over the body, has no other foundation than men's
+ignorance of this soul, while they are more familiarized with _matter_,
+with which they imagine they are acquainted, and of which they think they
+can discern the origin. But the most simple movements of our bodies are to
+every man, who studies them, as inexplicable as thought.
+
+
+
+
+106.
+
+The high value, which so many people set upon spiritual substance, has no
+other motive than their absolute inability to define it intelligibly. The
+contempt shewn for _matter_ by our metaphysicians, arises only from the
+circumstance, that familiarity begets contempt. When they tell us, that
+_the soul is more excellent and noble than the body_, they say what they
+know not.
+
+
+
+
+107.
+
+The dogma of another life is incessantly extolled, as useful. It
+is maintained, that even though it should be only a fiction, it is
+advantageous, because it deceives men, and conducts them to virtue. But
+is it true, that this dogma makes men wiser and more virtuous? Are the
+nations, who believe this fiction, remarkable for purity of morals? Has
+not the visible world ever the advantage over the invisible? If those, who
+are trusted with the instruction and government of men, had knowledge and
+virtue themselves, they would govern them much better by realities, than
+by fictions. But crafty, ambitious and corrupt legislators, have every
+where found it better to amuse with fables, than to teach them truths,
+to unfold their reason, to excite them to virtue by sensible and real
+motives, in fine, to govern them in a rational manner. Priests undoubtedly
+had reasons for making the soul immaterial; they wanted souls to people
+the imaginary regions, which they have discovered in the other life.
+Material souls would, like all bodies, have been subject to dissolution.
+Now, if men should believe, that all must perish with the body, the
+geographers of the other world would evidently lose the right of guiding
+men's souls towards that unknown abode; they would reap no profits from
+the hope with which they feed them, and the terrors with which they
+oppress them. If futurity is of no real utility to mankind, it is, at
+least, of the greatest utility to those, who have assumed the office of
+conducting them thither.
+
+
+
+
+108.
+
+"But," it will be said, "is not the dogma of the immortality of the soul
+comforting to beings, who are often very unhappy here below? Though it
+should be an error, is it not pleasing? Is it not a blessing to man to
+believe, that he shall be able to enjoy hereafter a happiness, which
+is denied him upon earth?" Thus, poor mortals! you make your wishes the
+measure of truth; because you desire to live for ever, and to be happier,
+you at once conclude, that you shall live for ever, and that you shall be
+more fortunate in an unknown world, than in this known world, where you
+often find nothing but affliction! Consent therefore to leave, without
+regret, this world which gives the greater part of you much more torment
+than pleasure. Submit to the order of nature, which demands that you, as
+well as all other beings, should not endure for ever.
+
+We are incessantly told, that religion has infinite consolations for the
+unfortunate, that the idea of the soul's immortality, and of a happier
+life, is very proper to elevate man, and to support him under adversity,
+which awaits him upon earth. It is said, on the contrary, that materialism
+is an afflicting system, calculated to degrade man; then it puts him
+upon a level with the brutes, breaks his courage, and shows him no other
+prospect than frightful annihilation, capable of driving him to despair
+and suicide, whenever he is unhappy. The great art of theologians is to
+blow hot and cold, to afflict and console, to frighten and encourage.
+
+It appears by theological fictions, that the regions of the other life are
+happy and unhappy. Nothing is more difficult than to become worthy of the
+abode of felicity; nothing more easy than to obtain a place in the abode
+of torment, which God is preparing for the unfortunate victims of
+eternal fury. Have those then, who think the other life so pleasant and
+flattering, forgotten, that according to them, that life is to be attended
+with torments to the greater part of mortals? Is not the idea of total
+annihilation infinitely preferable to the idea of an eternal existence,
+attended with anguish and _gnashing of teeth_? Is the fear of an end more
+afflicting, than that of having had a beginning! The fear of ceasing to
+exist is a real evil only to the imagination, which alone begat the dogma
+of another life.
+
+Christian ministers say that the idea of a happier life is joyous.
+Admitted. Every person would desire a more agreeable existence than that
+he enjoys here. But, if paradise is inviting, you will grant, that hell is
+frightful. Heaven is very difficult, and hell very easy to be merited. Do
+you not say, that a _narrow_ way leads to the happy regions, and a _broad_
+way to the regions of misery? Do you not often say, that _the number of
+the elect is very small, and that of the reprobate very large_? Is not
+Grace, which your God grants but to a very few, necessary to salvation?
+Now, I assure you, that these ideas are by no means consoling; that I had
+rather be annihilated, once for all, than to burn for ever; that the
+fate of beasts is to me more desirable than that of the damned; that the
+opinion which relieves me from afflicting fears in this world, appears to
+me more joyous, than the uncertainty arising from the opinion of a God,
+who, master of his grace, grants it to none but his favourites, and
+permits all others to become worthy of eternal torment. Nothing but
+enthusiasm or folly can induce a man to prefer improbable conjectures,
+attended with uncertainty and insupportable fears.
+
+
+
+
+109.
+
+All religious principles are the work of pure imagination, in which
+experience and reason have no share. It is extremely difficult to combat
+them, because the imagination, once prepossessed by chimeras, which
+astonish or disturb it, is incapable of reasoning. To combat religion and
+its phantoms with the arms of reason, is like using a sword to kill gnats;
+as soon as the blow is struck, the gnats and chimeras come hovering round
+again, and resume in the mind the place, from which they were thought to
+have been for ever banished.
+
+When we reject, as too weak, the proofs given of the existence of a God,
+they instantly oppose to the arguments, which destroy that existence,
+an _inward sense_, a deep persuasion, an invincible inclination, born in
+every man, which holds up to his mind, in spite of himself, the idea of an
+almighty being, whom he cannot entirely expel from his mind, and whom he
+is compelled to acknowledge, in spite of the strongest reasons that can
+be urged. But whoever will analyse this _inward sense_, upon which such
+stress is laid, will perceive, that it is only the effect of a rooted
+habit, which, shutting their eyes against the most demonstrative proofs,
+subjects the greater part of men, and often even the most enlightened, to
+the prejudices of childhood. What avails this inward sense, or this deep
+persuasion, against the evidence, which demonstrates, that _whatever
+implies a contradiction cannot exist_?
+
+We are gravely assured, that the non-existence of God is not demonstrated.
+Yet, by all that men have hitherto said of him, nothing is better
+demonstrated, than that this God is a chimera, whose existence is totally
+impossible; since nothing is more evident, than that a being cannot
+possess qualities so unlike, so contradictory, so irreconcilable, as
+those, which every religion upon earth attributes to the Divinity. Is not
+the theologian's God, as well as that of the deist, a cause incompatible
+with the effects attributed to it? Let them do what they will, it is
+necessary either to invent another God, or to grant, that he, who, for so
+many ages, has been held up to the terror of mortals, is at the same time
+very good and very bad, very powerful and very weak, unchangeable and
+fickle, perfectly intelligent and perfectly void of reason, of order
+and permitting disorder, very just and most unjust, very skilful and
+unskilful. In short, are we not forced to confess, that it is impossible
+to reconcile the discordant attributes, heaped upon a being, of whom
+we cannot speak without the most palpable contradictions? Let any
+one attribute a single quality to the Divinity, and it is universally
+contradicted by the effects, ascribed to this cause.
+
+
+
+
+110.
+
+Theology might justly be defined the _science of contradictions_. Every
+religion is only a system, invented to reconcile irreconcilable notions.
+By the aid of habit and terror, man becomes obstinate in the greatest
+absurdities, even after they are exposed in the clearest manner. All
+religions are easily combated, but with difficulty extirpated. Reason
+avails nothing against custom, which becomes, says the proverb, _a second
+nature_. Many persons, in other respects sensible, even after having
+examined the rotten foundation of their belief, adhere to it in contempt
+of the most striking arguments. Whenever we complain of religion, its
+shocking absurdities, and impossibilities, we are told that we are not
+made to understand the truths of religion; that reason goes astray, and is
+capable of leading us to perdition; and moreover, that _what is folly
+in the eyes of man, is wisdom in the eyes of God_, to whom nothing
+is impossible. In short, to surmount, by a single word, the most
+insurmountable difficulties, presented on all sides by theology, they get
+rid of them by saying, these are _mysteries_!
+
+
+
+
+111.
+
+What is a mystery? By examining the thing closely, I soon perceive, that
+a mystery is nothing but a contradiction, a palpable absurdity, a manifest
+impossibility, over which theologians would oblige men humbly to shut
+their eyes. In a word, a mystery is whatever our spiritual guides cannot
+explain.
+
+It is profitable to the ministers of religion, that people understand
+nothing of what they teach. It is impossible to examine what we do not
+comprehend; when we do not see, we must suffer ourselves to be led. If
+religion were clear, priests would find less business.
+
+Without mysteries there can be no religion; mystery is essential to it;
+a religion void of mysteries, would be a contradiction in terms. The God,
+who serves as the foundation of _natural religion_, or _deism_, is himself
+the greatest of mysteries.
+
+
+
+
+112.
+
+Every revealed religion is filled with mysterious dogmas, unintelligible
+principles, incredible wonders, astonishing recitals, which appear to have
+been invented solely to confound reason. Every religion announces a hidden
+God, whose essence is a mystery; consequently, the conduct, ascribed to
+him, is no less inconceivable than his essence. The Deity has never spoken
+only in an enigmatical and mysterious manner, in the various religions,
+which have been founded in different regions of our globe; he has
+everywhere revealed himself only to announce mysteries; that is, to
+inform mortals, that he intended they should believe contradictions,
+impossibilities, and things to which they were incapable of affixing any
+clear ideas.
+
+The more mysterious and incredible a religion is, the more power it has
+to please the imagination of men. The darker a religion is, the more it
+appears divine, that is, conformable to the nature of a hidden being, of
+whom they have no ideas. Ignorance prefers the unknown, the hidden, the
+fabulous, the marvellous, the incredible, or even the terrible, to what is
+clear, simple, and true. Truth does not operate upon the imagination in so
+lively a manner as fiction, which, in other respects, everyone is able to
+arrange in his own way. The vulgar like to listen to fables. Priests and
+legislators, by inventing religions and forging mysteries have served the
+vulgar people well. They have thereby gained enthusiasts, women and fools.
+Beings of this stamp are easily satisfied with things, which they are
+incapable of examining. The love of simplicity and truth is to be
+found only among the few, whose imagination is regulated by study and
+reflection.
+
+The inhabitants of a village are never better pleased with their parson,
+than when he introduces Latin into his sermon. The ignorant always
+imagine, that he, who speaks to them of things they do not understand, is
+a learned man. Such is the true principle of the credulity of the people,
+and of the authority of those, who pretend to guide nations.
+
+
+
+
+113.
+
+To announce mysteries to men, is to give and withhold; it is to talk in
+order not to be understood. He, who speaks only obscurely, either seeks to
+amuse himself by the embarrassment, which he causes, or finds his interest
+in not explaining himself too clearly. All secrecy indicates distrust,
+impotence, and fear. Princes and their ministers make a mystery of their
+projects, for fear their enemies should discover and render them abortive.
+Can a good God amuse himself by perplexing his creatures? What interest
+then could he have in commanding his ministers to announce riddles and
+mysteries?
+
+It is said, that man, by the weakness of his nature, is totally incapable
+of understanding the divine dispensations, which can be to him only a
+series of mysteries; God cannot disclose to him secrets, necessarily above
+his reach. If so, I answer again, that man is not made to attend to the
+divine dispensations; that these dispensations are to him by no means
+interesting; that he has no need of mysteries, which he cannot understand;
+and consequently, that a mysterious religion is no more fit for him, than
+an eloquent discourse is for a flock of sheep.
+
+
+
+
+114.
+
+The Deity has revealed himself with so little uniformity in the different
+countries of our globe, that in point of religion, men regard one another
+with hatred and contempt. The partisans of the different sects think
+each other very ridiculous and foolish. Mysteries, most revered in one
+religion, are objects of derision to another. God, in revealing himself
+to mankind, ought at least, to have spoken the same language to all, and
+saved their feeble minds the perplexity of inquiring which religion really
+emanated from him, or what form of worship is most acceptable in his
+sight.
+
+A universal God ought to have revealed a universal religion. By what
+fatality then are there so many different religions upon earth? Which is
+really right, among the great number of those, each of which exclusively
+pretends to be the true one? There is great reason to believe, that no
+religion enjoys this advantage. Division and disputes upon opinions are
+indubitable signs of the uncertainty and obscurity of the principles, upon
+which they build.
+
+
+
+
+115.
+
+If religion were necessary at all, it ought to be intelligible to all. If
+this religion were the most important concern of men, the goodness of God
+would seem to demand, that it should be to them of all things the most
+clear, evident, and demonstrative. Is it not then astonishing, that this
+thing so essential to the happiness of mortals, is precisely that, which
+they understand least, and about which, for so many ages, their teachers
+have most disputed? Priests have never agreed upon the manner of
+understanding the will of a God, who has revealed himself.
+
+The world, may be compared to a public fair, in which are several
+empirics, each of whom endeavours to attract the passengers by decrying
+the remedies sold by his brothers. Each shop has its customers, who
+are persuaded, that their quacks possess the only true remedies; and
+notwithstanding a continual use of them, they perceive not the inefficacy
+of these remedies, or that they are as infirm as those, who run after the
+quacks of a different shop.
+
+Devotion is a disorder of the imagination contracted in infancy. The
+devout man is a hypochondriac, who only augments his malady by the
+application of remedies. The wise man abstains from them entirely; he pays
+attention to his diet, and in other respects leaves nature to her course.
+
+
+
+
+116.
+
+To a man of sense, nothing appears more ridiculous, than the opinions,
+which the partisans of the different religions with equal folly entertain
+of each other. A Christian regards the _Koran_, that is, the divine
+revelation announced by Mahomet, as nothing but a tissue of impertinent
+reveries, and impostures insulting to the divinity. The Mahometan, on the
+other hand, treats the Christian as an _idolater_ and a _dog_. He sees
+nothing but absurdities in his religion. He imagines he has a right to
+subdue the Christian, and to force him, sword in hand, to receive the
+religion of his divine prophet. Finally, he believes, that nothing is
+more impious and unreasonable, than to worship a man, or to believe in the
+Trinity. The _protestant_ Christian who without scruple worships a man,
+and firmly believes the inconceivable mystery of the _trinity_,
+ridicules the _catholic_ Christian for believing in the mystery of
+_transubstantiation_; he considers him mad, impious, and idolatrous,
+because he kneels to worship some bread, in which he thinks he sees God.
+Christians of every sect regard, as silly stories, the incarnations
+of _Vishnu_, the God of the Indies; they maintain, that the only true
+_incarnation_ is that of _Jesus_, son of a carpenter. The deist, who
+calls himself the follower of a religion, which he supposes to be that of
+nature, content with admitting a God, of whom he has no idea, makes a jest
+of all the mysteries, taught by the various religions in the world.
+
+
+
+
+117.
+
+Is there any thing more contradictory, impossible, or mysterious, than the
+creation of matter by an immaterial being, who, though immutable, operates
+continual changes in the world? Is any thing more incompatible with every
+notion of common sense, than to believe, that a supremely good, wise,
+equitable and powerful being presides over nature, and by himself directs
+the movements of a world, full of folly, misery, crimes and disorders,
+which by a single word, he could have prevented or removed? In fine,
+whenever we admit a being as contradictory as the God of theology, how can
+we reject the most improbable fables, astonishing miracles, and profound
+mysteries.
+
+
+
+
+118.
+
+The Deist exclaims: "Abstain from worshipping the cruel and capricious God
+of theology; mine is a being infinitely wise and good; he is the father of
+men, the mildest of sovereigns; it is he who fills the universe with his
+benefits." But do you not see that every thing in this world contradicts
+the good qualities, which you ascribe to your God? In the numerous family
+of this tender father, almost all are unhappy. Under the government of
+this just sovereign, vice is triumphant, and virtue in distress. Among
+those blessings you extol, and which only enthusiasm can see, I behold a
+multitude of evils, against which you obstinately shut your eyes. Forced
+to acknowledge, that your beneficent God, in contradiction with himself,
+distributes good and evil with the same hand, for his justification you
+must, like the priest, refer me to the regions of another life. Invent,
+therefore, another God; for yours is no less contradictory than that of
+theologians.
+
+A good God, who does evil, or consents to the commission of evil; a
+God full of equity, and in whose empire innocence is often oppressed; a
+perfect God, who produces none but imperfect and miserable works; are not
+such a God and his conduct as great mysteries, as that of the incarnation?
+
+You blush for your fellow-citizens, who allow themselves to be persuaded,
+that the God of the universe could change himself into a man, and die upon
+a cross in a corner of Asia. The mystery of the incarnation appears to you
+very absurd. You think nothing more ridiculous, than a God, who transforms
+himself into bread, and causes himself daily to be eaten in a thousand
+different places. But are all these mysteries more contradictory to
+reason than a God, the avenger and rewarder of the actions of men? Is man,
+according to you, free, or not free? In either case, your God, if he has
+the shadow of equity, can neither punish nor reward him. If man is free,
+it is God, who has made him free; therefore God is the primitive cause of
+all his actions; in punishing him for his faults, he would punish him for
+having executed what he had given him liberty to do. If man is not free to
+act otherwise than he does, would not God be most unjust, in punishing man
+for faults, which he could not help committing.
+
+The minor, or secondary, absurdities, with which all religions abound, are
+to many people truly striking; but they have not the courage to trace
+the source of these absurdities. They see not, that a God full of
+contradictions, caprices and inconsistent qualities, has only served
+to disorder men's imaginations, and to produce an endless succession of
+chimeras.
+
+
+
+
+119.
+
+The theologian would shut the mouths of those who deny the existence of
+God, by saying, that all men, in all ages and countries, have acknowledged
+some divinity or other; that every people have believed in an invisible
+and powerful being, who has been the object of their worship and
+veneration; in short, that there is no nation, however savage, who are not
+persuaded of the existence of some intelligence superior to human nature.
+But, can an error be changed into truth by the belief of all men? The
+great philosopher Bayle has justly observed, that "general tradition, or
+the unanimous consent of mankind, is no criterion of truth."
+
+There was a time, when all men believed that the sun moved round the
+earth, but this error was detected. There was a time, when nobody believed
+the existence of the antipodes, and when every one was persecuted, who
+had temerity enough to maintain it. At present, every informed man firmly
+believes it. All nations, with the exception of a few men who are less
+credulous than the rest, still believe in ghosts and spirits. No sensible
+man now adopts such nonsense. But the most sensible people consider it
+their duty to believe in a universal spirit!
+
+
+
+
+120.
+
+All the gods, adored by men, are of savage origin. They have evidently
+been imagined by stupid people, or presented, by ambitious and crafty
+legislators, to ignorant and uncivilized nations, who had neither capacity
+nor courage to examine the objects, which through terror they were made to
+worship.
+
+By closely examining God, we are forced to acknowledge, that he evidently
+bears marks of a savage nature. To be savage is to acknowledge no right
+but force; it is to be cruel beyond measure; to follow only one's own
+caprice; to want foresight, prudence, and reason. Ye nations, who call
+yourselves civilized! Do you not discern, in this hideous character, the
+God, on whom you lavish your incense? Are not the descriptions given
+you of the divinity, visibly borrowed from the implacable, jealous,
+revengeful, sanguinary, capricious inconsiderate humour of man, who has
+not cultivated his reason? O men! You adore only a great savage, whom
+you regard, however, as a model to imitate, as an amiable master, as a
+sovereign full of perfection.
+
+Religious opinions are ancient monuments of ignorance, credulity,
+cowardice, and barbarism of their ancestors. Every savage is a child
+fond of the marvellous, who believes every thing, and examines nothing.
+Ignorant of nature, he attributes to spirits, enchantments, and to
+magic, whatever appears to him extraordinary. His priests appear to him
+sorcerers, in whom he supposes a power purely divine, before whom his
+confounded reason humbles itself, whose oracles are to him infallible
+decrees which it would be dangerous to contradict.
+
+In religion, men have, for the most part, remained in their primitive
+barbarity. Modern religions are only ancient follies revived, or presented
+under some new form. If the savages of antiquity adored mountains, rivers,
+serpents, trees, and idols of every kind; if the EGYPTIANS paid homage to
+crocodiles, rats, and onions, do we not see nations, who think themselves
+wiser than they, worship bread, into which they imagine, that through
+the enchantments of their priests, the divinity has descended. Is not the
+Bread-God the idol of many Christian nations, who, in this respect, are as
+irrational, as the most savage?
+
+
+
+
+121.
+
+The ferocity, stupidity, and folly of uncivilized man have ever disclosed
+themselves in religious practices, either cruel or extravagant. A spirit
+of barbarity still survives, and penetrates the religions even of the
+most polished nations. Do we not still see human victims offered to
+the divinity? To appease the anger of a God, who is always supposed as
+ferocious, jealous and vindictive, as a savage, do not those, whose manner
+of thinking is supposed to displease him, expire under studied torments,
+by the command of sanguinary laws? Modern nations, at the instigation of
+their priests, have perhaps improved upon the atrocious folly of barbarous
+nations; at least, we find, that it has ever entered the heads of savages
+to torment for opinions, to search the thoughts, to molest men for the
+invisible movements of their brains?
+
+When we see learned nations, such as the English, French, German, etc.,
+continue, notwithstanding their knowledge, to kneel before the barbarous
+God of the Jews; when we see these enlightened nations divide into
+sects, defame, hate, and despise one another for their equally ridiculous
+opinions concerning the conduct and intentions of this unreasonable God;
+when we see men of ability foolishly devote their time to meditate the
+will of this God, who is full of caprice and folly, we are tempted to cry
+out: O men, you are still savage!!!
+
+
+
+
+122.
+
+Whoever has formed true ideas of the ignorance, credulity, negligence, and
+stupidity of the vulgar, will suspect opinions the more, as he finds
+them generally established. Men, for the most part, examine nothing: they
+blindly submit to custom and authority. Their religious opinions, above
+all others, are those which they have the least courage and capacity to
+examine: as they comprehend nothing about them, they are forced to be
+silent, or at least are soon destitute of arguments. Ask any man, whether
+he believes in a God? He will be much surprised that you can doubt it. Ask
+him again, what he understands by the word _God_. You throw him into
+the greatest embarrassment; you will perceive immediately, that he is
+incapable of affixing any real idea to this word, he incessantly repeats.
+He will tell you, that God is God. He knows neither what he thinks of it,
+nor his motives for believing in it.
+
+All nations speak of a God; but do they agree upon this God? By no means.
+But division upon an opinion proves not its evidence; it is rather a sign
+of uncertainty and obscurity. Does the same man always agree with himself
+in the notions he forms of his God? No. His idea varies with the changes,
+which he experiences;--another sign of uncertainty. Men always agree in
+demonstrative truths. In any situation, except that of insanity, every one
+knows that two and two make four, that the sun shines, that the whole
+is greater than its part; that benevolence is necessary to merit the
+affection of men; that injustice and cruelty are incompatible with
+goodness. Are they thus agreed when they speak of God? Whatever they
+think, or say of him, is immediately destroyed by the effects they
+attribute to him.
+
+Ask several painters to represent a chimera, and each will paint it in a
+different manner. You will find no resemblance between the features, each
+has given it a portrait, that has no original. All theologians, in giving
+us a picture of God, give us one of a great chimera, in whose features
+they never agree, whom each arranges in his own way, and who exists only
+in their imaginations. There are not two individuals, who have, or can
+have, the same ideas of their God.
+
+
+
+
+123.
+
+It might be said with more truth, that men are either skeptics or
+atheists, than that they are convinced of the existence of God. How can we
+be assured of the existence of a being, whom we could never examine,
+and of whom it is impossible to conceive any permanent idea? How can
+we convince ourselves of the existence of a being, to whom we are
+every moment forced to attribute conduct, opposed to the ideas, we had
+endeavoured to form of him? Is it then possible to believe what we cannot
+conceive? Is not such a belief the opinions of others without having
+any of our own? Priests govern by faith; but do not priests themselves
+acknowledge that God is to them incomprehensible? Confess then, that a
+full and entire conviction of the existence of God is not so general, as
+is imagined.
+
+Scepticism arises from a want of motives sufficient to form a judgment.
+Upon examining the proofs which seem to establish, and the arguments which
+combat, the existence of God, some persons have doubted and withheld their
+assent. But this uncertainty arises from not having sufficiently examined.
+Is it possible to doubt any thing evident? Sensible people ridicule an
+absolute scepticism, and think it even impossible. A man, who doubted his
+own existence, or that of the sun, would appear ridiculous. Is this more
+extravagant than to doubt the non-existence of an evidently impossible
+being? Is it more absurd to doubt one's own existence, than to hesitate
+upon the impossibility of a being, whose qualities reciprocally destroy
+one another? Do we find greater probability for believing the existence of
+a spiritual being, than the existence of a stick without two ends? Is the
+notion of an infinitely good and powerful being, who causes or permits
+an infinity of evils, less absurd or impossible, than that of a square
+triangle? Let us conclude then, that religious scepticism can result only
+from a superficial examination of theological principles, which are in
+perpetual contradiction with the most clear and demonstrative principles.
+
+To doubt, is to deliberate. Scepticism is only a state of indetermination,
+resulting from an insufficient examination of things. Is it possible for
+any one to be sceptical in matters of religion, who will deign to revert
+to its principles, and closely examine the notion of God, who serves
+as its basis? Doubt generally arises either from indolence, weakness,
+indifference, or incapacity. With many people, to doubt is to fear the
+trouble of examining things, which are thought uninteresting. But religion
+being presented to men as their most important concern in this and the
+future world, skepticism and doubt on this subject must occasion perpetual
+anxiety and must really constitute a bed of thorns. Every man who has not
+courage to contemplate, without prejudice, the God upon whom all religion
+is founded, can never know for what religion to decide: he knows not what
+he should believe or not believe, admit or reject, hope or fear.
+
+Indifference upon religion must not be confounded with scepticism. This
+indifference is founded upon the absolute assurance, or at any rate upon
+the probable belief, that religion is not interesting. A persuasion that
+a thing which is pretended to be important is not so, or is only
+indifferent, supposes a sufficient examination of the thing, without which
+it would be impossible to have this persuasion. Those who call themselves
+sceptics in the fundamental points of religion, are commonly either
+indolent or incapable of examining.
+
+
+
+
+124.
+
+In every country, we are assured, that a God has revealed himself. What
+has he taught men? Has he proved evidently that he exists? Has he informed
+them where he resides? Has he taught them what he is, or in what his
+essence consists? Has he clearly explained to them his intentions and
+plan? Does what he says of this plan correspond with the effects, which
+we see? No. He informs them solely, that _he is what he is_; that he is
+a _hidden God_; that his ways are unspeakable; that he is exasperated
+against all who have the temerity to fathom his decrees, or to consult
+reason in judging him or his works.
+
+Does the revealed conduct of God answer the magnificent ideas which
+theologians would give us of his wisdom, goodness, justice, and
+omnipotence? By no means. In every revelation, this conduct announces a
+partial and capricious being, the protector of favourite people, and the
+enemy of all others. If he deigns to appear to some men, he takes care to
+keep all others in an invincible ignorance of his divine intentions. Every
+private revelation evidently announces in God, injustice, partiality and
+malignity.
+
+Do the commands, revealed by any God, astonish us by their sublime reason
+or wisdom? Do they evidently tend to promote the happiness of the people,
+to whom the Divinity discloses them? Upon examining the divine commands,
+one sees in every country, nothing but strange ordinances, ridiculous
+precepts, impertinent ceremonies, puerile customs, oblations, sacrifices,
+and expiations, useful indeed to the ministers of God, but very
+burthensome to the rest of the citizens. I see likewise, that these laws
+often tend to make men unsociable, disdainful, intolerant, quarrelsome,
+unjust, and inhuman, to those who have not received the same revelations,
+the same ordinances, or the same favours from heaven.
+
+
+
+
+125.
+
+Are the precepts of morality, announced by the Deity, really divine,
+or superior to those which every reasonable man might imagine? They are
+divine solely because it is impossible for the human mind to discover
+their utility. They make virtue consist in a total renunciation of nature,
+in a voluntary forgetfulness of reason, a holy hatred of ourselves.
+Finally, these sublime precepts often exhibit perfection in a conduct,
+cruel to ourselves, and perfectly useless to others.
+
+Has a God appeared? Has he himself promulgated his laws? Has he spoken to
+men with his own mouth? I am told, that God has not appeared to a whole
+people; but that he has always manifested himself through the medium
+of some favourite personages, who have been intrusted with the care of
+announcing and explaining his intentions. The people have never been
+permitted to enter the sanctuary; the ministers of the gods have alone had
+the right to relate what passes there.
+
+
+
+
+126.
+
+If in every system of divine revelation, I complain of not seeing either
+the wisdom, goodness, or equity of God; if I suspect knavery, ambition, or
+interest; it is replied, that God has confirmed by miracles the mission of
+those, who speak in his name. But was it not more simple for him to appear
+in person, to explain his nature and will? Again, if I have the curiosity
+to examine these miracles, I find, that they are improbable tales, related
+by suspected people, who had the greatest interest in giving out that they
+were the messengers of the Most High.
+
+What witnesses are appealed to in order to induce us to believe incredible
+miracles? Weak people, who existed thousands of years ago, and who, even
+though they could attest these miracles, may be suspected of being duped
+by their own imagination, and imposed upon by the tricks of dexterous
+impostors. But, you will say, these miracles are written in books,
+which by tradition have been transmitted to us. By whom were these books
+written? Who are the men who have transmitted them? They are either the
+founders of religions themselves, or their adherents and assigns. Thus,
+in religion, the evidence of interested parties becomes irrefragable and
+incontestable.
+
+
+
+
+127.
+
+God has spoken differently to every people. The Indian believes not a word
+of what He has revealed to the Chinese; the Mahometan considers as fables
+what He has said to the Christian; the Jew regards both the Mahometan and
+Christian as sacrilegious corrupters of the sacred law, which his God had
+given to his fathers. The Christian, proud of his more modern revelation,
+indiscriminately damns the Indian, Chinese, Mahometan, and even the
+Jew, from whom he receives his sacred books. Who is wrong or right? Each
+exclaims, _I am in the right!_ Each adduces the same proofs: each mentions
+his miracles, diviners, prophets, and martyrs. The man of sense tells
+them, they are all delirious; that God has not spoken, if it is true
+that he is a spirit, and can have neither mouth nor tongue; that without
+borrowing the organ of mortals, God could inspire his creatures with what
+he would have them learn; and that, as they are all equally ignorant what
+to think of God, it is evident that it has not been the will of God to
+inform them on the subject.
+
+The followers of different forms of worship which are established, accuse
+one another of superstition and impiety. Christians look with abhorrence
+upon the Pagan, Chinese, and Mahometan superstition. Roman Catholics
+treat, as impious, Protestant Christians; and the latter incessantly
+declaim against the superstition of the Catholics. They are all right.
+To be impious, is to have opinions offensive to the God adored; to be
+superstitious, is to have of him false ideas. In accusing one another of
+superstition, the different religionists resemble humpbacks, who reproach
+one another with their deformity.
+
+
+
+
+128.
+
+Are the oracles, which the Divinity has revealed by his different
+messengers, remarkable for clearness? Alas! no two men interpret them
+alike. Those who explain them to others are not agreed among themselves.
+To elucidate them, they have recourse to interpretations, to commentaries,
+to allegories, to explanations: they discover _mystical sense_ very
+different from the _literal sense_. Men are every where wanted to explain
+the commands of a God, who could not, or would not, announce himself
+clearly to those, whom he wished to enlighten.
+
+
+
+
+129.
+
+The founders of religion, have generally proved their missions by
+miracles. But what is a miracle? It is an operation directly opposite to
+the laws of nature. But who, according to you, made those laws? God. Thus,
+your God, who, according to you, foresaw every thing, counteracts
+the laws, which his wisdom prescribed to nature! These laws were then
+defective, or at least in certain circumstances they did not accord with
+the views of the same God, since you inform us that he judged it necessary
+to suspend or counteract them.
+
+It is said, that a few men, favoured by the Most High, have received power
+to perform miracles. But to perform a miracle, it is necessary to have
+ability to create new causes capable of producing effects contrary to
+those of common causes. Is it easy to conceive, that God can give men the
+inconceivable power of creating causes out of nothing? Is it credible,
+that an immutable God can communicate to men power to change or rectify
+his plan, a power, which by his essence an immutable being cannot save
+himself? Miracles, far from doing much honour to God, far from proving
+the divinity of a religion, evidently annihilate the God idea. How can
+a theologian tell us, that God, who must have embraced the whole of his
+plan, who could have made none but perfect laws, and who cannot alter
+them, is forced to employ miracles to accomplish his projects, or can
+grant his creatures the power of working prodigies to execute his divine
+will? An omnipotent being, whose will is always fulfilled, who holds in
+his hand his creatures, has only to _will_, to make them believe whatever
+he desires.
+
+
+
+
+130.
+
+What shall we say of religions that prove their divinity by miracles? How
+can we credit miracles recorded in the sacred books of the Christians,
+where God boasts of hardening the hearts and blinding those whom he wishes
+to destroy; where he permits malicious spirits and magicians to work
+miracles as great as those of his servants; where it is predicted, that
+_Antichrist_ shall have power to perform prodigies capable of shaking the
+faith even of the elect? In this case, by what signs shall we know whether
+God means to instruct or ensnare us? How shall we distinguish whether
+the wonders, we behold, come from God or devil? To remove our perplexity,
+Pascal gravely tells us, that _it is necessary to judge the doctrine by
+the miracles, and the miracles by the doctrine; that the doctrine proves
+the miracles, and the miracles the doctrine_. If there exist a vicious and
+ridiculous circle, it is undoubtedly in this splendid reasoning of one of
+the greatest defenders of Christianity. Where is the religion, that does
+not boast of the most admirable doctrine, and which does not produce
+numerous miracles for its support?
+
+Is a miracle capable of annihilating the evidence of a demonstrated truth?
+Although a man should have the secret of healing all the sick, of making
+all the lame to walk, of raising in all the dead of a city, of ascending
+into the air, of stopping the course of the sun and moon, can he thereby
+convince me, that two and two do not make four, that one makes three, and
+that three make only one; that a God, whose immensity fills the universe,
+could have been contained in the body of a Jew; that the ETERNAL can
+die like a man; that a God, who is said to be immutable, provident, and
+sensible, could have changed his mind upon his religion, and reformed his
+own work by a new revelation?
+
+
+
+
+131.
+
+According to the very principles either of natural or revealed theology,
+every new revelation should be regarded as false; every change in
+a religion emanated from the Deity should be reputed an impiety and
+blasphemy. Does not all reform suppose, that, in his first effort, God
+could not give his religion the solidity and perfection required? To say,
+that God, in giving a first law, conformed to the rude ideas of the people
+whom he wished to enlighten, is to pretend that God was neither able nor
+willing to render the people, whom he was enlightening, so reasonable as
+was necessary in order to please him.
+
+Christianity is an impiety, if it is true that Judaism is a religion which
+has really emanated from a holy, immutable, omnipotent, and foreseeing
+God. The religion of Christ supposes either defects in the law which God
+himself had given by Moses, or impotence or malice in the same God, who
+was either unable or unwilling to render the Jews such as they ought to
+have been in order to please him. Every new religion, or reform of
+ancient religions, is evidently founded upon the impotence, inconstancy,
+imprudence, or malice of the Divinity.
+
+
+
+
+132.
+
+If history informs me, that the first apostles, the founders or reformers
+of religions, wrought great miracles; history also informs me, that these
+reformers and their adherents were commonly buffeted, persecuted, and put
+to death, as disturbers of the peace of nations. I am therefore tempted to
+believe, that they did not perform the miracles ascribed to them;
+indeed, such miracles must have gained them numerous partisans among the
+eye-witnesses, who ought to have protected the operators from abuse. My
+incredulity redoubles, when I am told, that the workers of miracles
+were cruelly tormented, or ignominiously executed. How is it possible to
+believe, that missionaries, protected by God, invested with his divine
+power, and enjoying the gift of miracles, could not have wrought such a
+simple miracle, as to escape the cruelty of their persecutors?
+
+Priests have the art of drawing from the persecutions themselves, a
+convincing proof in favour of the religion of the persecuted. But a
+religion, which boasts of having cost the lives of many martyrs, and
+informs us, that its founders, in order to extend it, have suffered
+punishments, cannot be the religion of a beneficent, equitable and
+omnipotent God. A good God would not permit men, intrusted with announcing
+his commands, to be ill-treated. An all-powerful God, wishing to found a
+religion, would proceed in a manner more simple and less fatal to the most
+faithful of his servants. To say that God would have his religion sealed
+with blood, is to say that he is weak, unjust, ungrateful, and sanguinary;
+and that he is cruel enough to sacrifice his messengers to the views of
+his ambition.
+
+
+
+
+133.
+
+To die for religion proves not that the religion is true, or divine; it
+proves, at most, that it is supposed to be such. An enthusiast proves
+nothing by his death, unless that religious fanaticism is often stronger
+than the love of life. An impostor may sometimes die with courage; he then
+makes, in the language of the proverb, _a virtue of necessity_.
+
+People are often surprised and affected at sight of the generous courage
+and disinterested zeal, which has prompted missionaries to preach their
+doctrine, even at the risk of suffering the most rigorous treatment. From
+this ardour for the salvation of men, are drawn inferences favourable to
+the religion they have announced. But in reality, this disinterestedness
+is only apparent. He, who ventures nothing should gain nothing. A
+missionary seeks to make his fortune by his doctrine. He knows that, if he
+is fortunate enough to sell his commodity, he will become absolute master
+of those who receive him for their guide; he is sure of becoming the
+object of their attention, respect, and veneration. Such are the true
+motives, which kindle the zeal and charity of so many preachers and
+missionaries.
+
+To die for an opinion, proves the truth or goodness of that opinion
+no more than to die in battle proves the justice of a cause, in which
+thousands have the folly to devote their lives. The courage of a martyr,
+elated with the idea of paradise, is not more supernatural, than the
+courage of a soldier, intoxicated with the idea of glory, or impelled
+by the fear of disgrace. What is the difference between an Iroquois, who
+sings while he is burning by inches, and the martyr ST. LAURENCE, who upon
+the gridiron insults his tyrant?
+
+The preachers of a new doctrine fail, because they are the weakest;
+apostles generally practise a perilous trade. Their courageous death
+proves neither the truth of their principles nor their own sincerity,
+any more than the violent death of the ambitious man, or of the robber,
+proves, that they were right in disturbing society, or that they thought
+themselves authorised in so doing. The trade of a missionary was always
+flattering to ambition, and formed a convenient method of living at the
+expense of the vulgar. These advantages have often been enough to efface
+every idea of danger.
+
+
+
+
+134.
+
+You tell us, theologians! that _what is folly in the eyes of men, is
+wisdom before God, who delights to confound the wisdom of the wise_. But
+do you not say, that human wisdom is a gift of heaven? In saying this
+wisdom displeases God, is but folly in his sight, and that he is pleased
+to confound it, you declare that your God is the friend only of ignorant
+people, and that he makes sensible people a fatal present for which this
+perfidious tyrant promises to punish them cruelly at some future day. Is
+it not strange, that one can be the friend of your God, only by declaring
+one's self the enemy of reason and good sense?
+
+
+
+
+135.
+
+According to the divines, _faith is an assent without evidence_. Whence it
+follows, that religion requires us firmly to believe inevident things, and
+propositions often improbable or contrary to reason. But when we reject
+reason as a judge of faith, do we not confess, that reason is incompatible
+with faith? As the ministers of religion have resolved to banish reason,
+they must have felt the impossibility of reconciling it with faith, which
+is visibly only a blind submission to priests, whose authority seems to
+many persons more weighty than evidence itself, and preferable to the
+testimony of the senses.
+
+"Sacrifice your reason; renounce experience; mistrust the testimony of
+your senses; submit without enquiry to what we announce to you in the name
+of heaven." Such is the uniform language of priests throughout the world;
+they agree upon no point, except upon the necessity of never reasoning
+upon the principles which they present to us as most important to our
+felicity!
+
+I will _not_ sacrifice my reason; because this reason alone enables me
+to distinguish good from evil, truth from falsehood. If, as you say, my
+reason comes from God, I shall never believe that a God, whom you call
+good, has given me reason, as a snare, to lead me to perdition. Priests!
+do you not see, that, by decrying reason, you calumniate your God, from
+whom you declare it to be a gift.
+
+I will _not_ renounce experience; because it is a guide much more sure
+than the imagination or authority of spiritual guides. Experience
+teaches me, that enthusiasm and interest may blind and lead them astray
+themselves; and that the authority of experience ought to have much more
+influence upon my mind, than the suspicious testimony of many men, who I
+know are either very liable to be deceived themselves, or otherwise are
+very much interested in deceiving others.
+
+I _will_ mistrust my senses; because I am sensible they sometimes mislead
+me. But, on the other hand, I know that they will not always deceive me.
+I well know, that the eye shews me the sun much smaller than it really
+is; but experience, which is only the repeated application of the senses,
+informs me, that objects always appear to diminish, as their distance
+increases; thus I attain to a certainty, that the sun is much larger than
+the earth; thus my senses suffice to rectify the hasty judgments, which
+they themselves had caused.
+
+In warning us to mistrust the testimony of our senses, the priests
+annihilate the proofs of all religion. If men may be dupes of their
+imagination; if their senses are deceitful, how shall we believe the
+miracles, which struck the treacherous senses of our ancestors? If my
+senses are unfaithful guides, I ought not to credit even the miracles
+wrought before my eyes.
+
+
+
+
+136.
+
+You incessantly repeat that _the truths of religion are above reason_. If
+so, do you not perceive, that these truths are not adapted to reasonable
+beings? To pretend that reason can deceive us, is to say, that truth
+can be false; that the useful can be hurtful. Is reason any thing but a
+knowledge of the useful and true? Besides, as our reason and senses are
+our only guides in this life, to say they are unfaithful, is to say, that
+our errors are necessary, our ignorance invincible, and that, without the
+extreme of injustice, God cannot punish us for following the only guides
+it was his supreme will to give.
+
+To say, we are obliged to believe things above our reason, is ridiculous.
+To assure us, that upon some objects we are not allowed to consult reason,
+is to say, that, in the most interesting matter, we must consult only
+imagination, or act only at random. Our divines say, we must sacrifice our
+reason to God. But what motives can we have to sacrifice our reason to a
+being, who makes us only useless presents, which he does not intend us to
+use? What confidence can we put in a God, who, according to our divines
+themselves, is malicious enough to harden the heart, to strike with
+blindness, to lay snares for us, to _lead us into temptation?_ In fine,
+what confidence can we put in the ministers of this God, who, to guide us
+more conveniently, commands us to shut our eyes?
+
+
+
+
+137.
+
+Men are persuaded, that religion is to them of all things the most
+serious, while it is precisely what they least examine for themselves. In
+pursuit of an office, a piece of land, a house, a place of profit; in any
+transaction or contract whatever, every one carefully examines all,
+takes the greatest precaution, weighs every word of a writing, is guarded
+against every surprise. Not so in religion; every one receives it at a
+venture, and believes it upon the word of others, without ever taking the
+trouble to examine.
+
+Two causes concur to foster the negligence and carelessness of men, with
+regard to their religious opinions. The first is the despair of overcoming
+the obscurity, in which all religion is necessarily enveloped. Their first
+principles are only adapted to disgust lazy minds, who regard them as a
+chaos impossible to be understood. The second cause is, that every one
+is averse to being too much bound by severe precepts, which all admire in
+theory, but very few care to practice with rigour. The religion of many
+people is like old family ties, which they have never taken pains to
+examine, but which they deposit in their archives to have recourse to them
+occasionally.
+
+
+
+
+138.
+
+The disciples of Pythagoras paid implicit faith to the doctrine of their
+master; _he has said it_, was to them the solution of every problem. The
+generality of men are not more rational. In matters of religion, a curate,
+a priest, an ignorant monk becomes master of the thoughts. Faith relieves
+the weakness of the human mind, to which application is commonly painful;
+it is much more convenient to depend upon others, than to examine for
+one's self. Inquiry, being slow and difficult, equally, displeases the
+stupidity of the ignorant, and the ardour of the enlightened. Such is
+undoubtedly the reason why Faith has so many partisans.
+
+The more men are deficient in knowledge and reason, the more zealous they
+are in religion. In theological quarrels, the populace, like ferocious
+beasts, fall upon all those, against whom their priest is desirous of
+exciting them. A profound ignorance, boundless credulity, weak intellect,
+and warm imagination, are the materials, of which are made bigots,
+zealots, fanatics, and saints. How can the voice of reason be heard by
+them who make it a principle never to examine for themselves, but to
+submit blindly to the guidance of others? The saints and the populace are,
+in the hands of their directors, automatons, moved at pleasure.
+
+
+
+
+139.
+
+Religion is an affair of custom and fashion. _We must do as others do._
+But, among the numerous religions in the world, which should men choose?
+This inquiry would be too painful and long. They must therefore adhere
+to the religion of their fathers, to that of their country, which, having
+force on its side, must be the best.
+
+If we judge of the intentions of Providence by the events and revolutions
+of this world, we are compelled to believe, that He is very indifferent
+about the various religions upon earth. For thousands of years, paganism,
+polytheism, idolatry, were the prevailing religions. We are now assured,
+that the most flourishing nations had not the least idea of God; an idea,
+regarded as so essential to the happiness of man. Christians say, all
+mankind lived in the grossest ignorance of their duties towards God, and
+had no notions of him, but what were insulting to his Divine Majesty.
+Christianity, growing out of Judaism, very humble in its obscure origin,
+became powerful and cruel under the Christian emperors, who, prompted by
+holy zeal, rapidly spread it in their empire by means of fire and sword,
+and established it upon the ruins of paganism. Mahomet and his successors,
+seconded by Providence or their victorious arms, in a short time banished
+the Christian religion from a part of Asia, Africa, and even Europe; and
+the _gospel_ was then forced to yield to the _Koran_.
+
+In all the factions or sects, which, for many ages have distracted
+Christianity, _the best argument has been always that of the strongest
+party_; arms have decided which doctrine is most conducive to the
+happiness of nations. May we not hence infer, either that the Deity feels
+little interested in the religion of men, or that he always declares in
+favour of the opinions, which best suit the interest of earthly powers; in
+fine, that he changes his plan to accommodate their fancy?
+
+Rulers infallibly decide the religion of the people. The true religion
+is always the religion of the prince; the true God is the God, whom the
+prince desires his people to adore; the will of the priests, who govern
+the prince, always becomes the will of God. A wit justly observed, that
+_the true religion is always that, on whose side are the prince and the
+hangman._ Emperors and hangmen long supported the gods of Rome against the
+God of Christians; the latter, having gained to his interest the emperors,
+their soldiers, and their hangmen, succeeded in destroying the worship of
+the Roman gods. The God of Mahomet has dispossessed the God of Christians
+of a great part of the dominions, which he formerly occupied.
+
+In the eastern part of Asia, is a vast, flourishing, fertile, populous
+country, governed by such wise laws, that the fiercest conquerors have
+adopted them with respect. I mean China. Excepting Christianity, which was
+banished as dangerous, the people there follow such superstitions as
+they please, while the _mandarins_, or magistrates, having long known the
+errors of the popular religion, are vigilant to prevent the _bonzes_ or
+priests from using it as an instrument of discord. Yet we see not,
+that Providence refuses his blessing to a nation, whose chiefs are so
+indifferent about the worship that is rendered to him. On the contrary,
+the Chinese enjoy a happiness and repose worthy to be envied, by the many
+nations whom religion divides, and often devastates.
+
+We cannot reasonably propose to divest the people of their follies; but we
+may perhaps cure the follies of those who govern the people, and who
+will then prevent the follies of the people from becoming dangerous.
+Superstition is to be feared only when princes and soldiers rally round
+her standard; then she becomes cruel and sanguinary. Every sovereign, who
+is the protector of one sect or religious faction, is commonly the tyrant
+of others, and becomes himself the most cruel disturber of the peace of
+his dominions.
+
+
+
+
+140.
+
+It is incessantly repeated, and many sensible persons are induced to
+believe, that religion is a restraint necessary to men; that without
+it, there would no longer exist the least check for the vulgar; and that
+morality and religion are intimately connected with it. "The fear of
+the Lord," cries the priest, "is the beginning of wisdom. The terrors of
+another life are _salutary_, and are proper to curb the passions of men."
+
+To perceive the inutility of religious notions, we have only to open our
+eyes and contemplate the morals of those nations, who are the most
+under the dominion of religion. We there find proud tyrants, oppressive
+ministers, perfidious courtiers, shameless extortioners, corrupt
+magistrates, knaves, adulterers, debauchees, prostitutes, thieves, and
+rogues of every kind, who have never doubted either the existence of an
+avenging and rewarding God, the torments of hell, or the joys of paradise.
+Without the least utility to the greater part of mankind, the ministers
+of religion have studied to render death terrible to the eyes of their
+followers. If devout Christians could but be consistent, they would pass
+their whole life in tears, and die under the most dreadful apprehensions.
+What can be more terrible than death, to the unfortunate who are told,
+_that it is horrible to fall into the hands of the living God; that we
+must work out our salvation with fear and trembling!_ Yet we are assured,
+that the death of the Christian is attended with infinite consolations, of
+which the unbeliever is deprived. The good Christian, it is said, dies in
+the firm hope of an eternal happiness which he has strived to merit. But
+is not this firm assurance itself a presumption punishable in the eyes of
+a severe God? Ought not the greatest saints to be ignorant whether they
+are _worthy of love or hatred?_ Ye Priests! while consoling us with the
+hope of the joys of paradise; have you then had the advantage to see your
+names and ours inscribed _in the book of life?_
+
+
+
+
+141.
+
+To oppose the passions and present interests of men the obscure notions of
+a metaphysical, inconceivable God,--the incredible punishments of another
+life,--or the pleasures of the heaven, of which nobody has the least
+idea,--is not this combating realities with fictions? Men have never any
+but confused ideas of their God: they see him only in clouds. They
+never think of him when they are desirous to do evil: whenever ambition,
+fortune, or pleasure allures them, God's threatenings and promises are
+forgotten. In the things of this life, there is a degree of certainty,
+which the most lively faith cannot give to the things of another life.
+
+Every religion was originally a curb invented by legislators, who wished
+to establish their authority over the minds of rude nations. Like nurses
+who frighten children to oblige them to be quiet, the ambitious used the
+name of the gods to frighten savages; and had recourse to terror in order
+to make them support quietly the yoke they wished to impose. Are then the
+bugbears of infancy made for riper age? At the age of maturity, no man
+longer believes them, or if he does, they excite little emotion in him,
+and never alter his conduct.
+
+
+
+
+142.
+
+Almost every man fears what he sees much more than what he does not see;
+he fears the judgments of men of which he feels the effects, more than
+the judgments of God of whom he has only fluctuating ideas. The desire
+of pleasing the world, the force of custom, the fear of ridicule, and
+of censure, have more force than all religious opinions. Does not the
+soldier, through fear of disgrace, daily expose his life in battle, even
+at the risk of incurring eternal damnation?
+
+The most religious persons have often more respect for a varlet, than for
+God. A man who firmly believes, that God sees every thing, and that he is
+omniscient and omnipresent, will be guilty, when alone, of actions,
+which he would never do in presence of the meanest of mortals. Those,
+who pretend to be the most fully convinced of the existence of God, every
+moment act as if they believed the contrary.
+
+
+
+
+143.
+
+"Let us, at least," it will be said, "cherish the idea of a God, which
+alone may serve as a barrier to the passions of kings." But, can we
+sincerely admire the wonderful effects, which the fear of this God
+generally produces upon the minds of princes, who are called his images?
+What idea shall we form of the original, if we judge of it by the copies!
+
+Sovereigns, it is true, call themselves the representatives of God, his
+vicegerents upon earth. But does the fear of a master, more powerful than
+they are, incline them seriously to study the welfare of the nations, whom
+Providence has intrusted to their care? Does the pretended terror, which
+ought to be inspired into them by the idea of an invisible judge, to whom
+alone they acknowledge themselves accountable for their actions, render
+them more equitable, more compassionate, more sparing of blood and
+treasure of their subjects, more temperate in their pleasures, more
+attentive to their duties? In fine, does this God, by whose authority
+kings reign, deter them from inflicting a thousand evils upon the people
+to whom they ought to act as guides, protectors, and fathers? Alas! If we
+survey the whole earth, we shall see men almost every where governed by
+tyrants, who use religion merely as an instrument to render more stupid
+the slaves, whom they overwhelm under the weight of their vices, or whom
+they sacrifice without mercy to their extravagancies.
+
+Far from being a check upon the passions of kings, Religion, by its
+very principles, frees them from all restraint. It transforms them into
+divinities, whose caprice the people are never permitted to resist. While
+it gives up the reins to princes, and on their part breaks the bonds of
+the social compact, it endeavours to chain the minds and hands of their
+oppressed subjects. Is it then surprising, that the gods of the earth
+imagine every thing lawful for them, and regard their subjects only as
+instruments of their caprice or ambition?
+
+In every country, Religion has represented the Monarch of nature as a
+cruel, fantastical, partial tyrant, whose caprice is law; the Monarch God,
+is but too faithfully imitated by his representatives upon earth. Religion
+seems every where invented solely to lull the people in the lap of
+slavery, in order that their masters may easily oppress them, or render
+them wretched with impunity.
+
+
+
+
+144.
+
+To guard against the enterprises of a haughty pontiff who wished to
+reign over kings, to shelter their persons from the attempts of credulous
+nations excited by the priests, several European princes have pretended to
+hold their crowns and rights from God alone, and to be accountable only
+to him for their actions. After a long contest between the civil and
+spiritual power, the former at length triumphed; and the priests, forced
+to yield, acknowledged the divine right of kings and preached them to the
+people, reserving the liberty of changing their minds and of preaching
+revolt, whenever the divine rights of kings clashed with the divine rights
+of the clergy. It was always at the expense of nations, that peace was
+concluded between kings and priests; but the latter, in spite of treaties,
+always preserved their pretensions.
+
+Tyrants and wicked princes, whose consciences continually reproach them
+with negligence or perversity, far from fearing their God, had rather deal
+with this invisible judge who never opposes any thing, or with his priests
+who are always condescending to the rulers of the earth, than with their
+own subjects. The people, reduced to despair, might probably _appeal_ from
+the divine right of their chiefs. Men when oppressed to the last degree,
+sometimes become turbulent; and the divine rights of the tyrant are then
+forced to yield to the natural rights of the subjects.
+
+It is cheaper dealing with gods than men. Kings are accountable for their
+actions to God alone; priests are accountable only to themselves. There is
+much reason to believe, that both are more confident of the indulgence of
+heaven, than of that of earth. It is much easier to escape the vengeance
+of gods who may be cheaply appeased, than the vengeance of men whose
+patience is exhausted.
+
+"If you remove the fear of an invisible power, what restraint will you
+impose upon the passions of sovereigns?" Let them learn to reign; let them
+learn to be just; to respect the rights if the people; and to acknowledge
+the kindness of the nations, from whom they hold their greatness and
+power. Let them learn to fear men, and to submit to the laws of equity.
+Let nobody transgress these laws with impunity; and let them be equally
+binding upon the powerful and the weak, the great and the small, the
+sovereign and the subjects.
+
+The fear of gods, Religion, and the terrors of another life, are the
+metaphysical and supernatural bulwarks, opposed to the impetuous passions
+of princes! Are these bulwarks effectual? Let experience resolve the
+question. To oppose Religion to the wickedness of tyrants, is to wish,
+that vague, uncertain, unintelligible speculations may be stronger than
+propensities which every thing conspires daily to strengthen.
+
+
+
+
+145.
+
+The immense service of religion to politics is incessantly boasted; but, a
+little reflection will convince us, that religious opinions equally blind
+both sovereigns and people, and never enlighten them upon their true
+duties or interests. Religion but too often forms licentious, immoral
+despots, obeyed by slaves, whom every thing obliges to conform to their
+views.
+
+For want of having studied or known the true principles of administration,
+the objects and rights of social life, the real interests of men and
+their reciprocal duties, princes, in almost every country, have become
+licentious, absolute, and perverse; and their subjects abject, wicked, and
+unhappy. It was to avoid the trouble of studying these important objects,
+that recourse was had to chimeras, which, far from remedying any thing,
+have hitherto only multiplied the evils of mankind, and diverted them from
+whatever is most essential to their happiness.
+
+Does not the unjust and cruel manner in which so many nations are
+governed, manifestly furnish one of the strongest proofs, not only of
+the small effect produced by the fear of another life, but also of the
+non-existence of a Providence, busied with the fate of the human race? If
+there existed a good God, should we not be forced to admit, that in this
+life he strangely neglects the greater part of mankind? It would seem,
+that this God has created nations only to be the sport of the passions and
+follies of his representatives upon earth.
+
+
+
+
+146.
+
+By reading history with attention, we shall perceive that Christianity,
+at first weak and servile, established itself among the savage and free
+nations of Europe only intimating to their chiefs, that its religious
+principles favoured despotism and rendered them absolute. Consequently,
+we see barbarous princes suddenly converted; that is, we see them adopt,
+without examination, a system so favourable to their ambition, and use
+every art to induce their subjects to embrace it. If the ministers of this
+religion have since often derogated from their favourite principles, it
+is because the theory influences the conduct of the ministers of the Lord,
+only when it suits their temporal interests.
+
+Christianity boasts of procuring men a happiness unknown to preceding
+ages. It is true, the Greeks knew not the _divine rights_ of tyrants or
+of the usurpers of the rights of their country. Under paganism, it never
+entered the head of any man to suppose, that it was against the will of
+heaven for a nation to defend themselves against a ferocious beast, who
+had the audacity to lay waste their possessions. The religion of the
+Christians was the first that screened tyrants from danger, by laying down
+as a principle that the people must renounce the legitimate defence
+of themselves. Thus Christian nations are deprived of the first law
+of nature, which orders man to resist evil, and to disarm whoever is
+preparing to destroy him! If the ministers of the church have often
+permitted the people to revolt for the interest of heaven, they have never
+permitted them to revolt for their own deliverance from real evils or
+known violences.
+
+From heaven came the chains, that were used for fettering the minds of
+mortals. Why is the Mahometan every where a slave? Because his prophet
+enslaved him in the name of the Deity, as Moses had before subdued the
+Jews. In all parts of the earth, we see, that the first legislators were
+the first sovereigns and the first priests of the savages, to whom they
+gave laws.
+
+Religion seems invented solely to exalt princes above their nations, and
+rivet the fetters of slavery. As soon as the people are too unhappy here
+below, priests are ready to silence them by threatening them with the
+anger of God. They are made to fix their eyes upon heaven, lest they
+should perceive the true causes of their misfortunes, and apply the
+remedies which nature presents.
+
+
+
+
+147.
+
+By dint of repeating to men, that the earth is not their true country;
+that the present life is only a passage; that they are not made to be
+happy in this world; that their sovereigns hold their authority from God
+alone, and are accountable only to him for the abuse of it; that it is not
+lawful to resist them, etc., priests have eternized the misgovernment of
+kings and the misery of the people; the interests of nations have been
+basely sacrificed to their chiefs. The more we consider the dogmas and
+principles of religion, the more we shall be convinced, that their sole
+object is the advantage of tyrants and priests, without regard to that of
+societies.
+
+To mask the impotence of its deaf gods, religion has persuaded mortals,
+that iniquities always kindle the wrath of heaven. People impute to
+themselves alone the disasters that daily befal them. If nations sometimes
+feel the strokes of convulsed nature, their bad governments are but
+too often the immediate and permanent causes, from whence proceed
+the continual calamities which they are forced to endure. Are not
+the ambition, negligence, vices, and oppressions of kings and nobles,
+generally the causes of scarcity, beggary, wars, pestilences, corrupt
+morals, and all the multiplied scourges which desolate the earth?
+
+In fixing men's eyes continually upon heaven; in persuading them, that
+all their misfortunes are effects of divine anger; in providing none but
+ineffectual and futile means to put an end to their sufferings, we might
+justly conclude, that the only object of priests was to divert nations
+from thinking about the true sources of their misery, and thus to render
+it eternal. The ministers of religion conduct themselves almost like those
+indigent mothers, who, for want of bread, sing their starved children to
+sleep, or give them playthings to divert their thoughts from afflicting
+hunger.
+
+Blinded by error from their very infancy, restrained by the invisible
+bonds of opinion, overcome by panic terrors, their faculties blunted
+by ignorance, how should the people know the true causes of their
+wretchedness? They imagine that they can avert it by invoking the gods.
+Alas! do they not see, that it is, in the name of these gods, that they
+are ordered to present their throats to the sword of their merciless
+tyrants, in whom they might find the obvious cause of the evils under
+which they groan, and for whom they cease not to implore, in vain, the
+assistance of heaven?
+
+Ye credulous people! In your misfortunes, redouble your prayers,
+offerings, and sacrifices; throng to your temples; fast in sack-cloth and
+ashes; bathe yourselves in your own tears; and above all, completely ruin
+yourselves to enrich your gods! You will only enrich their priests. The
+gods of heaven will be propitious, only when the gods of the earth shall
+acknowledge themselves, men, like you, and shall devote to your welfare
+the attention you deserve.
+
+
+
+
+148.
+
+Negligent, ambitious, and perverse Princes are the real causes of public
+misfortunes. Useless, unjust Wars depopulate the earth. Encroaching and
+despotic Governments absorb the benefits of nature. The rapacity of Courts
+discourages agriculture, extinguishes industry, produces want, pestilence
+and misery. Heaven is neither cruel nor propitious to the prayers of the
+people; it is their proud chiefs, who have almost always hearts of stone.
+
+It is destructive to the morals of princes, to persuade them that they
+have God alone to fear, when they injure their subjects, or neglect their
+happiness. Sovereigns! It is not the gods, but your people, that you
+offend, when you do evil. It is your people and yourselves that you
+injure, when you govern unjustly.
+
+In history, nothing is more common than to see Religious Tyrants; nothing
+more rare than to find equitable, vigilant, enlightened princes. A
+monarch may be pious, punctual in a servile discharge of the duties of his
+religion, very submissive and liberal to his priests, and yet at the same
+time be destitute of every virtue and talent necessary for governing. To
+princes, Religion is only an instrument destined to keep the people
+more completely under the yoke. By the excellent principles of religious
+morality, a tyrant who, during a long reign, has done nothing but oppress
+his subjects, wresting, from them the fruits of their labour, sacrificing
+them without mercy to his insatiable ambition,--a conqueror, who has
+usurped the provinces of others, slaughtered whole nations, and who,
+during his whole life, has been a scourge to mankind,--imagines his
+conscience may rest, when, to expiate so many crimes, he has wept at the
+feet of a priest, who generally has the base complaisance to console and
+encourage a robber, whom the most hideous despair would too lightly punish
+for the misery he has caused upon earth.
+
+
+
+
+149.
+
+A sovereign, sincerely devout, is commonly dangerous to the state.
+Credulity always supposes a contracted mind; devotion generally absorbs
+the attention, which a prince should pay to the government of his people.
+Obsequious to the suggestions of his priests, he becomes the sport of
+their caprices, the favourer of their quarrels, and the instrument and
+accomplice of their follies, which he imagines to be of the greatest
+importance. Among the most fatal presents, which religion has made the
+world, ought to be reckoned those devout and zealous monarchs, who, under
+an idea of working for the welfare of their subjects, have made it
+a sacred duty to torment, persecute, and destroy those, who thought
+differently from themselves. A bigot, at the head of an empire, is one of
+the greatest scourges. A single fanatical or knavish priest, listened to
+by a credulous and powerful prince, suffices to put a state in disorder.
+
+In almost all countries, priests and pious persons are intrusted with
+forming the minds and hearts of young princes, destined to govern nations.
+What qualifications have instructors of this stamp! By what interests can
+they be animated? Full of prejudices themselves, they will teach their
+pupil to regard superstition, as most important and sacred; its chimerical
+duties, as most indispensable, intolerance and persecution, as the true
+foundation of his future authority. They will endeavour to make him a
+party leader, a turbulent fanatic, a tyrant; they will early stifle his
+reason, and forewarn him against the use of it; they will prevent truth
+from reaching his ears; they will exasperate him against true talents, and
+prejudice him in favour of contemptible ones; in short, they will make him
+a weak devotee, who will have no idea either of justice or injustice, nor
+of true glory, nor of true greatness, and who will be destitute of the
+knowledge and virtues necessary to the government of a great nation. Such
+is the plan of the education of a child, destined one day to create the
+happiness or misery of millions of men!
+
+
+
+
+150.
+
+Priests have ever shewn themselves the friends of despotism, and the
+enemies of public liberty: their trade requires abject and submissive
+slaves, who have never the audacity to reason. In an absolute government,
+who ever gains an ascendancy over the mind of a weak and stupid prince,
+becomes master of the state. Instead of conducting the people to
+salvation, priests have always conducted them to servitude.
+
+In consideration of the supernatural titles, which religion has forged for
+the worst of princes, the latter have commonly united with priests, who,
+sure of governing by opinion the sovereign himself, have undertaken to
+bind the hands of the people and to hold them under the yoke. But the
+tyrant, covered with the shield of religion, in vain flatters himself that
+he is secure from every stroke of fate; opinion is a weak rampart against
+the despair of the people. Besides, the priest is a friend of the tyrant
+only while he finds his account in tyranny; he preaches sedition, and
+demolishes the idol he has made, when he finds it no longer sufficiently
+conformable to the interest of God, whom he makes to speak at his will,
+and who never speaks except according to his interests.
+
+It will no doubt be said, that sovereigns, knowing all the advantages
+which religion procures them, are truly interested in supporting it with
+all their strength. If religious opinions are useful to tyrants, it is
+very evident, that they are useful to those, who govern by the laws of
+reason and equity. Is there then any advantage in exercising tyranny? Are
+princes truly interested in being tyrants? Does not tyranny deprive them
+of true power, of the love of the people, and of all safety? Ought not
+every reasonable prince to perceive, that the despot is a madman, and
+an enemy to himself? Should not every enlightened prince beware of
+flatterers, whose object is to lull him to sleep upon the brink of the
+precipice which they form beneath him?
+
+
+
+
+151.
+
+If sacerdotal flatteries succeed in perverting princes and making them
+tyrants; tyrants, on their part, necessarily corrupt both the great and
+the humble. Under an unjust ruler, void of goodness and virtue, who knows
+no law but his caprice, a nation must necessarily be depraved. Will this
+ruler wish to have, about his person, honest, enlightened, and virtuous
+men? No. He wants none but flatterers, approvers, imitators, slaves, base
+and servile souls, who conform themselves to his inclinations. His court
+will propagate the contagion of vice among the lower ranks. All will
+gradually become corrupted in a state, whose chief is corrupt. It was long
+since said, that "Princes seem to command others to do whatever they do
+themselves."
+
+Religion, far from being a restraint upon sovereigns, enables them to
+indulge without fear or remorse, in acts of licentiousness as injurious to
+themselves, as to the nations whom they govern. It is never with impunity,
+that men are deceived. Tell a sovereign, that he is a god; he will very
+soon believe that he owes nothing to any one. Provided he is feared, he
+will care very little about being loved: he will observe neither rules,
+nor relations with his subjects, nor duties towards them. Tell this
+prince, that he is _accountable for his actions to God alone_, and he will
+soon act as if he were accountable to no one.
+
+
+
+
+152.
+
+An enlightened sovereign is he, who knows his true interests; who knows,
+that they are connected with the interests of his nation; that a prince
+cannot be great, powerful, beloved, or respected, while he commands only
+unhappy slaves; that equity, beneficence, and vigilance will give him
+more real authority over his people, than the fabulous titles, said to be
+derived from heaven. He will see, that Religion is useful only to priests,
+that it is useless to society and often troubles it, and that it ought to
+be restrained in order to be prevented from doing injury. Finally, he will
+perceive, that, to reign with glory, he must have good laws and inculcate
+virtue, and not found his power upon impostures and fallacies.
+
+
+
+
+153.
+
+The ministers of religion have taken great care to make of their God, a
+formidable, capricious, and fickle tyrant. Such a God was necessary to
+their variable interests. A God, who should be just and good, without
+mixture of caprice or perversity; a God, who had constantly the qualities
+of an honest man, or of a kind sovereign, would by no means suit his
+ministers. It is useful to priests, that men should tremble before their
+God, in order that they may apply to them to obtain relief from their
+fears. "No man is a hero before his valet de chambre." It is not
+surprising, that a God, dressed up by his priests so as to be terrible
+to others, should rarely impose upon them, or should have but very little
+influence upon their conduct. Hence, in every country, their conduct is
+very much the same. Under pretext of the glory of their God, they every
+where prey upon ignorance, degrade the mind, discourage industry, and sow
+discord. Ambition and avarice have at all times been the ruling passions
+of the priesthood. The priest every where rises superior to sovereigns and
+laws; we see him every where occupied with the interests of his pride,
+of his cupidity, and of his despotic, revengeful humour. In the room
+of useful and social virtues, he everywhere substitutes expiations,
+sacrifices, ceremonies, mysterious practices, in a word, inventions
+lucrative to himself and ruinous to others.
+
+The mind is confounded and the reason is amazed upon viewing the
+ridiculous customs and pitiful means, which the ministers of the gods have
+invented in every country to purify souls, and render heaven favourable.
+Here they cut off part of a child's prepuce, to secure for him divine
+benevolence; there, they pour water upon his head, to cleanse him of
+crimes, which he could not as yet have committed. In one place, they
+command him to plunge into a river, whose waters have the power of washing
+away all stains; in another, he is forbidden to eat certain food, the use
+of which will not fail to excite the celestial wrath; in other countries,
+they enjoin upon sinful man to come periodically and confess his faults to
+a priest, who is often a greater sinner than himself, etc., etc., etc.
+
+
+
+
+154.
+
+What should we say of a set of empirics, who, resorting every day to a
+public place, should extol the goodness of their remedies, and vend them
+as infallible, while they themselves were full of the infirmities, which
+they pretend to cure? Should we have much confidence in the recipes of
+these quacks, though they stun us with crying, "take our remedies, their
+effects are infallible; they cure every body; except us." What should we
+afterwards think, should those quacks spend their lives in complaining,
+that their remedies never produced the desired effect upon the sick,
+who take them? In fine, what idea should we form of the stupidity of the
+vulgar, who, notwithstanding these confessions, should not cease to pay
+dearly for remedies, the inefficacy of which every thing tends to prove?
+Priests resemble these alchymists, who boldly tell us, they have the
+secret of making gold, while they have scarcely clothes to cover their
+nakedness.
+
+The ministers of religion incessantly declaim against the corruption of
+the age, and loudly complain of the little effect of their lessons, while
+at the same time they assure us, that religion is the _universal remedy_,
+the true _panacea_ against the wickedness of mankind. These priests are
+very sick themselves, yet men continue to frequent their shops, and to
+have faith in their divine antidotes, which, by their own confession,
+never effect a cure!
+
+
+
+
+155.
+
+Religion, especially with the moderns, has tried to identify itself with
+Morality, the principles of which it has thereby totally obscured. It has
+rendered men unsociable by duty, and forced them to be inhuman to everyone
+who thought differently from themselves. Theological disputes, equally
+unintelligible to each of the enraged parties, have shaken empires, caused
+revolutions, been fatal to sovereigns, and desolated all Europe. These
+contemptible quarrels have not been extinguished even in rivers of blood.
+Since the extinction of paganism, the people have made it a religious
+principle to become outrageous, whenever any opinion is advanced which
+their priests think contrary to _sound doctrine_. The sectaries of a
+religion, which preaches, in appearance, nothing but charity, concord, and
+peace, have proved themselves more ferocious than cannibals or savages,
+whenever their divines excited them to destroy their brethren. There is
+no crime, which men have not committed under the idea of pleasing the
+Divinity, or appeasing his wrath.
+
+The idea of a terrible God, whom we paint to ourselves as a despot, must
+necessarily render his subjects wicked. Fear makes only slaves, and slaves
+are cowardly, base, cruel, and think every thing lawful, in order to
+gain the favour or escape the chastisements of the master whom they fear.
+Liberty of thinking alone can give men humanity and greatness of soul.
+The notion of a tyrant-god tends only to make them abject, morose,
+quarrelsome, intolerant slaves.
+
+Every religion, which supposes a God easily provoked, jealous, revengeful,
+punctilious about his rights or the etiquette with which he is treated;--a
+God little enough to be hurt by the opinions which men can form of him;--a
+God unjust enough to require that we have uniform notions of his conduct;
+a religion which supposes such a God necessarily becomes restless,
+unsociable, and sanguinary; the worshippers of such a God would never
+think, that they could, without offence, forbear hating and even
+destroying every one, who is pointed out to them, as an adversary of
+this God; they would think, that it would be to betray the cause of
+their celestial Monarch, to live in friendly intercourse with rebellious
+fellow-citizens. If we love what God hates, do we not expose ourselves to
+his implacable hatred?
+
+Infamous persecutors, and devout men-haters! Will you never discern the
+folly and injustice of your intolerant disposition? Do you not see, that
+man is no more master of his religious opinions, his belief or unbelief,
+than of the language, which he learns from infancy? To punish a man for
+his errors, is it not to punish him for having been educated differently
+from you? If I am an unbeliever, is it possible for me to banish from my
+mind the reasons that have shaken my faith? If your God gives men leave
+to be damned, what have you to meddle with? Are you more prudent and wise,
+than this God, whose rights you would avenge?
+
+
+
+
+156.
+
+There is no devotee, who does not, according to his temperament, hate,
+despise, or pity the adherents of a sect, different from his own.
+The _established_ religion, which is never any other than that of the
+sovereign and the armies, always makes its superiority felt in a very
+cruel and injurious manner by the weaker sects. As yet there is no true
+toleration upon earth; men every where adore a jealous God, of whom each
+nation believes itself the friend, to the exclusion of all others.
+
+Every sect boasts of adoring alone the true God, the universal God, the
+Sovereign of all nature. But when we come to examine this Monarch of the
+world, we find that every society, sect, party, or religious cabal, makes
+of this powerful God only a pitiful sovereign, whose care and goodness
+extend only to a small number of his subjects, who pretend that they
+alone have the happiness to enjoy his favours, and that he is not at all
+concerned about the others.
+
+The founders of religions, and the priests who support them, evidently
+proposed to separate the nations, whom they taught, from the other
+nations; they wished to separate their own flock by distinguishing marks;
+they gave their followers gods, who were hostile to the other gods; they
+taught them modes of worship, dogmas and ceremonies apart; and above
+all, they persuaded them, that the religion of others was impious and
+abominable. By this unworthy artifice, the ambitious knaves established,
+their usurpation over the minds of their followers, rendered them
+unsociable, and made them regard with an evil eye all persons who had not
+the same mode of worship and the same ideas as they had. Thus it is, that
+Religion has shut up the heart and for ever banished from it the affection
+that man ought to have for his fellow-creature. Sociability, indulgence,
+humanity, those first virtues of all morality, are totally incompatible
+with religious prejudices.
+
+
+
+
+157.
+
+Every national religion is calculated to make man vain, unsociable, and
+wicked; the first step towards humanity is to permit every one peaceably
+to embrace the mode of worship and opinions, which he judges to be right.
+But this conduct cannot be pleasing to the ministers of religion, who wish
+to have the right of tyrannizing over men even in their thoughts.
+
+Blind and bigoted princes! You hate and persecute heretics, and order them
+to execution, because you are told, that these wretches displease God. But
+do you not say, that your God is full of goodness? How then can you expect
+to please him by acts of barbarity, which he must necessarily disapprove?
+Besides, who has informed you, that their opinions displease your God?
+Your priests? But, who assures you, that your priests are not themselves
+deceived or wish to deceive you? The same priests? Princes! It is
+then upon the hazardous word of your priests, that you commit the most
+atrocious crimes, under the idea of pleasing the Divinity!
+
+
+
+
+158.
+
+Pascal says, "that man never does evil so fully and cheerfully, as when he
+acts from a false principle of conscience." Nothing is more dangerous than
+a religion, which lets loose the ferocity of the multitude, and justifies
+their blackest crimes. They will set no bounds to their wickedness, when
+they think it authorized by their God, whose interests, they are told, can
+make every action legitimate. Is religion in danger?--the most civilized
+people immediately becomes true savages, and think nothing forbidden. The
+more cruel they are, the more agreeable they suppose they are to their
+God, whose cause they imagine cannot be supported with too much warmth.
+
+All religions have authorized innumerable crimes. The Jews, intoxicated
+with the promises of their God, arrogated the rights of exterminating
+whole nations. Relying on the oracles of their God, the Romans conquered
+and ravaged the world. The Arabians, encouraged by their divine prophet,
+carried fire and sword among the Christians and the idolaters. The
+CHRISTIANS, under pretext of extending their holy religion, have often
+deluged both hemispheres in blood.
+
+In all events favourable to their own interest, which they always call
+_the cause of God_, priests show us the _finger of God_. According to
+these principles, the devout have the happiness to see the _finger of
+God_ in revolts, revolutions, massacres, regicides, crimes, prostitutions,
+horrors; and, if these things contribute ever so little to the triumph
+of religion, we are told, that "God uses all sorts of means to attain his
+ends." Is any thing more capable of effacing every idea of morality from
+the minds of men, than to inform them, that their God, so powerful and
+perfect, is often forced to make use of criminal actions in order to
+accomplish his designs?
+
+
+
+
+159.
+
+No sooner do we complain of the extravagancies and evils, which Religion
+has so often caused upon the earth, than we are reminded, that these
+excesses are not owing to Religion; but "that they are the sad effects of
+the passions of men." But I would ask, what has let loose these passions?
+It is evidently Religion; it is zeal, that renders men inhuman, and serves
+to conceal the greatest atrocities. Do not these disorders then prove,
+that religion, far from restraining the passions of men, only covers them
+with a veil, which sanctifies them, and that nothing would be more useful,
+than to tear away this sacred veil of which men often make such a terrible
+use? What horrors would be banished from society, if the wicked were
+deprived of so plausible a pretext for disturbing it!
+
+Instead of being angels of peace among men, priests have been demons of
+discord. They have pretended to receive from heaven the right of being
+quarrelsome, turbulent, and rebellious. Do not the ministers of the
+Lord think themselves aggrieved, and pretend that the divine Majesty is
+offended, whenever sovereigns have the temerity to prevent them from
+doing evil? Priests are like the spiteful woman who cried _fire! murder!
+assassination!_ while her husband held her hands to prevent her from
+striking him.
+
+
+
+
+160.
+
+Notwithstanding the bloody tragedies, which Religion often acts, it is
+insisted, that, without Religion, there can be no Morality. If we judge
+theological opinions by their effects, we may confidently assert, that all
+Morality is perfectly incompatible with men's religious opinions.
+
+"Imitate God," exclaim the pious. But, what would be our Morality, should
+we imitate this God! and what God ought we to imitate? The God of the
+Deist? But even this God cannot serve us as a very constant model of
+goodness. If he is the author of all things, he is the author both of good
+and evil. If he is the author of order, he is also the author of disorder,
+which could not take place without his permission. If he produces, he
+destroys; if he gives life, he takes it away; if he grants abundance,
+riches, prosperity, and peace, he permits or sends scarcity, poverty,
+calamities, and wars. How then can we receive as a model of permanent
+beneficence, the God of Deism or natural religion, whose favourable
+dispositions are every instant contradicted by all the effects we behold?
+Morality must have a basis less tottering than the example of a God, whose
+conduct varies, and who cannot be called good, unless we obstinately shut
+our eyes against the evil which he causes or permits in this world.
+
+Shall we imitate the _beneficent, mighty Jupiter_ of heathen antiquity? To
+imitate such a god, is to admit as a model, a rebellious son, who ravishes
+the throne from his father. It is to imitate a debauchee, an adulterer,
+one guilty of incest and of base passions, at whose conduct every
+reasonable mortal would blush. What would have been the condition of men
+under paganism, had they imagined, like Plato, that virtue consisted in
+imitating the gods!
+
+Must we imitate the God of the Jews! Shall we find in _Jehovah_ a model
+for our conduct? This is a truly savage god, made for a stupid, cruel,
+and immoral people; he is always furious, breathes nothing but vengeance,
+commands carnage, theft, and unsociability. The conduct of this god cannot
+serve as a model to that of an honest man, and can be imitated only by a
+chief of robbers.
+
+Shall we then imitate the _Jesus_ of the Christians? Does this God, who
+died to appease the implacable fury of his father, furnish us an example
+which men ought to follow? Alas! we shall see in him only a God, or
+rather a fanatic, a misanthrope, who, himself plunged in wretchedness and
+preaching to wretches, will advise them to be poor, to combat with and
+stifle nature, to hate pleasure, seek grief, and detest themselves. He
+will tell them to leave father, mother, relations, friends, etc., to
+follow him. "Fine morality!" you say. It is, undoubtedly, admirable: it
+must be divine, for it is impracticable to men. But is not such sublime
+morality calculated to render virtue odious? According to the so much
+boasted morality of the _man_-God of the Christians, a disciple of his in
+this world must be like _Tantalus_, tormented with a burning thirst, which
+he is not allowed to quench. Does not such morality give us a wonderful
+idea of the author of nature? If, as we are assured, he has created all
+things for his creatures, by what strange whim does he forbid them the
+use of the goods he has created for them? Is pleasure then, which man
+continually desires, only a snare, which God has maliciously laid to
+surprise his weakness?
+
+
+
+
+161.
+
+The followers of Christ would have us regard, as a miracle, the
+establishment of their Religion, which is totally repugnant to nature,
+opposite to all the propensities of the heart, and inimical to sensual
+pleasures. But the austerity of a doctrine renders it the more marvellous
+in the eyes of the vulgar. The same disposition, which respects
+inconceivable mysteries as divine and supernatural, admires, as divine and
+supernatural, a Morality, that is impracticable, and beyond the powers of
+man.
+
+To admire a system of Morality, and to put it in practice, are two very
+different things. All Christians admire and extol the Morality of the
+gospel; which they do not practise.
+
+The whole world is more or less infected with a Religious morality,
+founded upon the opinion, that to please the Divinity, it is absolutely
+necessary to render ourselves unhappy upon earth. In all parts of our
+globe, we see penitents, fakirs, and fanatics, who seem to have profoundly
+studied the means of tormenting themselves, in honour of a being whose
+goodness all agree in celebrating. Religion, by its essence, is an enemy
+to the joy and happiness of men. "Blessed are the poor, blessed are
+they, who weep; blessed are they, who suffer; misery to those, who are
+in abundance and joy." Such are the rare discoveries, announced by
+Christianity!
+
+
+
+
+162.
+
+What is a Saint in every religion? A man, who prays, and fasts, who
+torments himself, and shuns the world; who like an owl, delights only
+in solitude, abstains from all pleasure, and seems frightened of every
+object, which may divert him from his fanatical meditations. Is this
+virtue? Is a being of this type, kind to himself, or useful to others?
+Would not society be dissolved, and man return to a savage state, if every
+one were fool enough to be a Saint?
+
+It is evident, that the literal and rigorous practice of the divine
+Morality of the Christians would prove the infallible ruin of nations. A
+Christian, aiming at perfection, ought to free his mind from whatever can
+divert it from heaven, his true country. Upon earth, he sees nothing but
+temptations, snares, and rocks of perdition. He must fear science, as
+hurtful to faith; he must avoid industry, as a means of obtaining riches,
+too fatal to salvation; he must renounce offices and honours, as capable
+of exciting his pride, and calling off his attention from the care of
+his soul. In a word, the sublime Morality of Christ, were it practicable,
+would break all the bonds of society.
+
+A Saint in society is as useless, as a Saint in the desert; his humour is
+morose, discontented, and often turbulent; his zeal sometimes obliges him
+in conscience to trouble society by opinions or dreams, which his vanity
+makes him consider as inspirations from on high. The annals of every
+religion are full of restless Saints, intractable Saints, and seditious
+Saints, who have become famous by the ravages, with which, _for the
+greater glory of God_, they have desolated the universe. If Saints, who
+live in retirement, are useless, those who live in the world, are often
+very dangerous.
+
+The vanity of acting, the desire of appearing illustrious and peculiar in
+conduct, commonly constitute the distinguishing character of Saints. Pride
+persuades them, that they are extraordinary men far above human nature,
+beings much more perfect than others, favourites whom God regards with
+much more complaisance than the rest of mortals. Humility, in a Saint,
+is commonly only a more refined pride than that of the generality of men.
+Nothing but the most ridiculous vanity can induce man to wage continual
+war against his own nature.
+
+
+
+
+163.
+
+A morality, which contradicts the nature of man, is not made for man.
+"But," say you, "the nature of man is depraved." In what consists this
+pretended depravity? In having passions? But, are not passions essential
+to man? Is he not obliged to seek, desire, and love what is, or what he
+thinks is, conducive to his happiness? Is he not forced to fear and avoid
+what he judges disagreeable or fatal? Kindle his passions for useful
+objects; connect his welfare with those objects; divert him, by sensible
+and known motives, from what may injure either him or others, and you will
+make him a reasonable and virtuous being. A man without passions would be
+equally indifferent to vice and to virtue.
+
+Holy Doctors! you are always repeating to us that the nature of man is
+perverted; you exclaim, "that _all flesh has corrupted its way_, that
+all the propensities of nature have become inordinate." In this case, you
+accuse your God; who was either unable, or unwilling, that this nature
+should preserve its primitive perfection. If this nature is corrupted, why
+has not God repaired it? The Christian immediately assures me, "that human
+nature is repaired; that the death of his God has restored its integrity."
+How then, I would ask, do you pretend that human nature, notwithstanding
+the death of a God, is still depraved? Is then the death of your God
+wholly fruitless? What becomes of his omnipotence and of his victory over
+the Devil, if it is true that the Devil still preserves the empire, which,
+according to you, he has always exercised in the world?
+
+According to Christian theology, Death is the _wages of sin_. This opinion
+is conformable to that of some negro and savage nations, who imagine that
+the Death of a man is always the supernatural effect of the anger of the
+Gods. Christians firmly believe, that Christ has delivered them from sin;
+though they see, that, in their Religion, as in others, man is subject to
+Death. To say that Jesus Christ has delivered us from sin, is it not to
+say, that a judge has pardoned a criminal, while we see that he leaves him
+for execution?
+
+
+
+
+164.
+
+If shutting our eyes upon whatever passes in the world, we would credit
+the partisans of the Christian Religion, we should believe, that the
+coming of their divine Saviour produced the most wonderful and complete
+reform in the morals of nations.
+
+If we examine the Morals of Christian nations, and listen to the clamours
+of their priests, we shall be forced to conclude, that Jesus Christ, their
+God, preached and died, in vain; his omnipotent will still finds in men,
+a resistance, over which he cannot, or will not triumph. The Morality
+of this divine Teacher, which his disciples so much admire and so little
+practise, is followed, in a whole century only by half a dozen obscure
+saints, and fanatics, and unknown monks, who alone will have the glory
+of shining in the celestial court, while all the rest of mortals, though
+redeemed by the blood of this God, will be the prey of eternal flames.
+
+
+
+
+165.
+
+When a man is strongly inclined to sin, he thinks very little about
+his God. Nay more, whatever crimes he has committed, he always flatters
+himself, that this God will soften, in his favour, the rigour of his
+decrees. No mortal seriously believes, that his conduct can damn him.
+Though he fears a terrible God, who often makes him tremble, yet, whenever
+he is strongly tempted, he yields; and he afterwards sees only the God
+of _mercies_, the idea of whom calms his apprehensions. If a man commits
+evil, he hopes, he shall have time to reform, and promises to repent at a
+future day.
+
+In religious pharmacy, there are infallible prescriptions to quiet
+consciences: priests, in every country, possess sovereign secrets to
+disarm the anger of heaven. Yet, if it be true that the Deity is appeased
+by prayers, offerings, sacrifices, and penances, it can no longer be said,
+that Religion is a check to the irregularities of men; they will first
+sin, and then seek the means to appease God. Every Religion, which
+expiates crime and promises a remission of them, if it restrain some
+persons, encourages the majority to commit evil. Notwithstanding his
+immutability, God, in every Religion, is a true _Proteus_. His priests
+represent him at one time armed with severity, at another full of clemency
+and mildness; sometimes cruel and unmerciful, and sometimes easily melted
+by the sorrow and tears of sinners. Consequently, men see the Divinity
+only on the side most conformable to their present interests. A God always
+angry would discourage his worshippers, or throw them into despair.
+Men must have a God, who is both irritable, and placable. If his anger
+frightens some timorous souls, his clemency encourages the resolutely
+wicked, who depend upon recurring, sooner or later, to the means of
+accommodation. If the judgments of God terrify some faint-hearted pious
+persons, who by constitution and habit are not prone to evil, _the
+treasures of divine mercy_ encourage the greatest criminals, who have
+reason to hope they participate therein equally with the others.
+
+
+
+
+166.
+
+Most men seldom think of God, or, at least, bestow on him serious
+attention. The only ideas we can form of him are so devoid of object, and
+are at the same time so afflicting, that the only imaginations they can
+arrest are those of melancholy hypochondriacs, who do not constitute the
+majority of the inhabitants of this world. The vulgar have no conception
+of God; their weak brains are confused, whenever they think of him.
+The man of business thinks only of his business; the courtier of his
+intrigues; men of fashion, women, and young people of their pleasures;
+dissipation soon effaces in them all the fatiguing notions of Religion.
+The ambitious man, the miser and the debauchee carefully avoid
+speculations too feeble to counterbalance their various passions.
+
+Who is awed by the idea of a God? A few enfeebled men, morose and
+disgusted with the world; a few, in whom the passions are already deadened
+by age, by infirmity, or by the strokes of fortune. Religion is a check,
+to those alone who by their state of mind and body, or by fortuitous
+circumstances, have been already brought to reason. The fear of God
+hinders from sin only those, who are not much inclined to it, or else
+those who are no longer able to commit it. To tell men, that the
+Deity punishes crimes in this world, is to advance an assertion, which
+experience every moment contradicts. The worst of men are commonly the
+arbiters of the world, and are those whom fortune loads with her favours.
+To refer us to another life, in order to convince us of the judgments
+of God, is to refer us to conjectures, in order to destroy facts, which
+cannot be doubted.
+
+
+
+
+167.
+
+Nobody thinks of the life to come, when he is strongly smitten with
+the objects he finds here below. In the eyes of a passionate lover, the
+presence of his mistress extinguishes the flames of hell, and her charms
+efface all the pleasures of paradise. Woman! you leave, say you, your
+lover for your God. This is either because your lover is no longer the
+same in your eyes, or because he leaves you.
+
+Nothing is more common, than to see ambitious, perverse, corrupt, and
+immoral men, who have some ideas of Religion, and sometimes appear even
+zealous for its interest. If they do not practise it at present, they hope
+to in the future. They lay it up, as a remedy, which will be necessary
+to salve the conscience for the evil they intend to commit. Besides, the
+party of devotees and priests being very numerous, active, and powerful,
+is it not astonishing, that rogues and knaves seek its support to attain
+their ends? It will undoubtedly be said, that many honest people are
+sincerely religious, and that without profit; but is uprightness of heart
+always accompanied with knowledge?
+
+It is urged, that many learned men, many men of genius have been strongly
+attached to Religion. This proves, that men of genius may have prejudices,
+be pusillanimous, and have an imagination, which misleads them and
+prevents them from examining subjects coolly. Pascal proves nothing in
+favour of Religion, unless that a man of genius may be foolish on some
+subjects, and is but a child, when he is weak enough to listen to his
+prejudices. Pascal himself tells us, that _the mind may be strong and
+contracted, enlarged and weak_. He previously observes, that _a man may
+have a sound mind, and not understand every subject equally well; for
+there are some, who, having a sound judgment in a certain order of things,
+are bewildered in others_.
+
+
+
+
+168.
+
+What is virtue according to theology? _It is_, we are told, _the
+conformity of the actions of man to the will of God_. But, what is God?
+A being, of whom nobody has the least conception, and whom every one
+consequently modifies in his own way. What is the will of God? It is what
+men, who have seen God, or whom God has inspired, have declared to be the
+will of God. Who are those, who have seen God? They are either fanatics,
+or rogues, or ambitious men, whom we cannot believe.
+
+To found Morality upon a God, whom every man paints to himself
+differently, composes in his way, and arranges according to his own
+temperament and interest, is evidently to found Morality upon the caprice
+and imagination of men; it is to found it upon the whims of a sect, a
+faction, a party, who believe they have the advantage to adore a true God
+to the exclusion of all others.
+
+To establish Morality or the duties of man upon the divine will, is to
+found it upon the will, the reveries and the interests of those, who make
+God speak, without ever fearing that he will contradict them. In every
+Religion, priests alone have a right to decide what is pleasing or
+displeasing to their God, and we are certain they will always decide, that
+it is what pleases or displeases themselves. The dogmas, the ceremonies,
+the morals, and the virtues, prescribed by every Religion, are visibly
+calculated only to extend the power or augment the emoluments of the
+founders and ministers of these Religions. The dogmas are obscure,
+inconceivable, frightful, and are therefore well calculated to bewilder
+the imagination and to render the vulgar more obsequious to the will of
+those who wish to domineer over them. The ceremonies and practices procure
+the priests, riches or respect. Religion consists in a submissive faith,
+which prohibits the exercise of reason; in a devout humility, which
+insures priests the submission of their slaves; in an ardent zeal, when
+Religion, that is, when the interest of these priests, is in danger. The
+only object of all religions is evidently the advantage of its ministers.
+
+
+
+
+169.
+
+When we reproach theologians with the barrenness of their divine virtues,
+they emphatically extol _charity_, that tender love of one's neighbour,
+which Christianity makes an essential duty of its disciples. But, alas!
+what becomes of this pretended charity, when we examine the conduct of the
+ministers of the Lord? Ask them, whether we must love or do good to our
+neighbour, if he be an impious man, a heretic, or an infidel, that is,
+if he do not think like them? Ask them, whether we must tolerate opinions
+contrary to those of the religion, they profess? Ask them, whether the
+sovereign can show indulgence to those who are in error? Their charity
+instantly disappears, and the established clergy will tell you, that _the
+prince bears the sword only to support the cause of the Most High_: they
+will tell you that, through love for our neighbour, we must prosecute,
+imprison, exile, and burn him. You will find no toleration except among a
+few priests, persecuted themselves, who will lay aside Christian charity
+the instant they have power to persecute in their turn.
+
+The Christian religion, in its origin preached by beggars and miserable
+men, under the name of _charity_, strongly recommends alms. The religion
+of Mahomet also enjoins it as an indispensable duty. Nothing undoubtedly
+is more conformable to humanity, than to succour the unfortunate, to
+clothe the naked, to extend the hand of beneficence to every one in
+distress. But would it not be more humane and charitable to prevent the
+source of misery and poverty? If Religion, instead of deifying princes,
+had taught them to respect the property of their subjects, to be just, to
+exercise only their lawful rights, we should not be shocked by the sight
+of such a multitude of beggars. A rapacious, unjust, tyrannical government
+multiplies misery; heavy taxes produce discouragement, sloth, and poverty,
+which in their turn beget robberies, assassinations, and crimes of every
+description. Had sovereigns more humanity, charity, and equity, their
+dominions would not be peopled by so many wretches, whose misery it
+becomes impossible to alleviate.
+
+Christian and Mahometan states are full of large hospitals, richly
+endowed, in which we admire the pious charity of the kings and sultans,
+who erected them. But would it not have been more humane to govern the
+people justly, to render them happy, to excite and favour industry and
+commerce, and to let men enjoy in safety the fruit of their labours, than
+to crush them under a despotic yoke, to impoverish them by foolish wars,
+to reduce them to beggary, in order that luxury may be satisfied, and then
+to erect splendid buildings, which can contain but a very small portion
+of those, who have been rendered miserable? Religion has only deluded men;
+instead of preventing evils, it always applies ineffectual remedies.
+
+The ministers of heaven have always known how to profit by the calamities
+of others. Public misery is their element. They have every where become
+administrators of the property of the poor, distributors of alms,
+depositaries of charitable donations; and thereby they have at all times
+extended and supported their power over the unhappy, who generally compose
+the most numerous, restless, and seditious part of society. Thus the
+greatest evils turn to the profit of the ministers of the Lord. Christian
+priests tell us, that the property they possess is the property of the
+poor, and that it is therefore sacred. Consequently they have eagerly
+accumulated lands, revenues, and treasures. Under colour of charity,
+spiritual guides have become extremely opulent, and in the face of
+impoverished nations enjoy wealth, which was destined solely for the
+unfortunate; while the latter, far from murmuring, applaud a pious
+generosity, which enriches the church, but rarely contributes to the
+relief of the poor.
+
+According to the principles of Christianity, poverty itself is a virtue;
+indeed, it is the virtue, which sovereigns and priests oblige their slaves
+to observe most rigorously. With this idea, many pious Christians have of
+their own accord renounced riches, distributed their patrimony among the
+poor, and retired into deserts, there to live in voluntary indigence. But
+this enthusiasm, this supernatural taste for misery, has been soon forced
+to yield to nature. The successors of these volunteers in poverty sold to
+the devout people their prayers, and their intercessions with the Deity.
+They became rich and powerful. Thus monks and hermits lived in indolence,
+and under colour of charity, impudently devoured the substance of the
+poor.
+
+The species of poverty, most esteemed by Religion, is _poverty of mind_.
+The fundamental virtue of every Religion, most useful to its ministers,
+is _faith_. It consists in unbounded credulity, which admits, without
+enquiry, whatever the interpreters of the Deity are interested in making
+men believe. By the aid of this wonderful virtue, priests became the
+arbiters of right and wrong, of good and evil: they could easily cause the
+commission of crimes to advance their interest. Implicit faith has been
+the source of the greatest outrages that have been committed.
+
+
+
+
+170.
+
+He, who first taught nations, that, when we wrong Man, we must ask pardon
+of God, appease _him_ by presents, and offer _him_ sacrifices, evidently
+destroyed the true principles of Morality. According to such ideas, many
+persons imagine that they may obtain of the king of heaven, as of kings
+of the earth, permission to be unjust and wicked, or may at least obtain
+pardon for the evil they may commit.
+
+Morality is founded upon the relations, wants, and constant interests
+of mankind; the relations, which subsist between God and Men, are either
+perfectly unknown, or imaginary. Religion, by associating God with Man,
+has wisely weakened, or destroyed, the bonds, which unite them. Mortals
+imagine, they may injure one another with impunity, by making suitable
+satisfaction to the almighty being, who is supposed to have the right of
+remitting all offences committed against his creatures.
+
+Is any thing better calculated to encourage the wicked or harden them in
+crimes, than to persuade them that there exists an invisible being, who
+has a right to forgive acts of injustice, rapine, and outrage committed
+against society? By these destructive ideas, perverse men perpetrate the
+most horrid crimes, and believe they make reparation by imploring divine
+mercy; their conscience is at rest, when a priest assures them that heaven
+is disarmed by a repentance, which, though sincere, is very useless to the
+world.
+
+In the mind of a devout man, God must be regarded more than his creatures;
+it is better to obey him, than men. The interests of the celestial monarch
+must prevail over those of weak mortals. But the interests of heaven are
+obviously those of its ministers; whence it evidently follows, that in
+every religion, priests, under pretext of the interests of heaven or the
+glory of God, can dispense with the duties of human Morality, when they
+clash with the duties, which God has a right to impose. Besides, must
+not he, who has power to pardon crimes, have a right to encourage the
+commission of crimes?
+
+
+
+
+171.
+
+We are perpetually told, that, without a God there would be no _moral
+obligation_; that the people and even the sovereigns require a legislator
+powerful enough to constrain them. Moral constraint supposes a law; but
+this law arises from the eternal and necessary relations of things with
+one another; relations, which have nothing common with the existence of a
+God. The rules of Man's conduct are derived from his own nature which he
+is capable of knowing, and not from the Divine nature of which he has no
+idea. These rules constrain or oblige us; that is, we render ourselves
+estimable or contemptible, amiable or detestable, worthy of reward or of
+punishment, happy or unhappy, accordingly as we conform to, or deviate
+from these rules. The law, which obliges man not to hurt himself, is
+founded upon the nature of a sensible being, who, in whatever way he came
+into this world, is forced by his actual essence to seek good and shun
+evil, to love pleasure and fear pain. The law, which obliges man not
+to injure, and even to do good to others, is founded upon the nature of
+sensible beings, living in society, whose essence compels them to despise
+those who are useless, and to detest those who oppose their felicity.
+
+Whether there exists a God or not, whether this God has spoken or not, the
+moral duties of men will be always the same, so long as they are sensible
+beings. Have men then need of a God whom they know not, of an invisible
+legislator, of a mysterious religion and of chimerical fears, in order to
+learn that every excess evidently tends to destroy them, that to preserve
+health they must be temperate; that to gain the love of others it is
+necessary to do them good, that to do them evil is a sure means to incur
+their vengeance and hatred? "Before the law there was no sin." Nothing is
+more false than this maxim. It suffices that man is what he is, or that
+he is a sensible being, in order to distinguish what gives him pleasure or
+displeasure. It suffices that one man knows that another man is a sensible
+being like himself, to perceive what is useful or hurtful to him. It
+suffices that man needs his fellow-creature, in order to know that he must
+fear to excite sentiments unfavourable to himself. Thus the feeling and
+thinking being has only to feel and think, in order to discover what he
+must do for himself and others. I feel, and another feels like me; this is
+the foundation of all morals.
+
+
+
+
+172.
+
+We can judge of the goodness of a system of Morals, only by its conformity
+to the nature of man. By this comparison, we have a right to reject it,
+if contrary to the welfare of our species. Whoever has seriously meditated
+Religion; whoever has carefully weighed its advantages and disadvantages,
+will be fully convinced, that both are injurious to the interests of Man,
+or directly opposite to his nature.
+
+"To arms! the cause of your God is at stake! Heaven is outraged! The faith
+is in danger! Impiety! blasphemy! heresy!" The magical power of these
+formidable words, the real value of which the people never understand,
+have at all times enabled priests to excite revolts, to dethrone kings, to
+kindle civil wars, and to lay waste. If we examine the important objects,
+which have produced so many ravages upon earth, it appears, that either
+the foolish reveries and whimsical conjectures of some theologian who did
+not understand himself, or else the pretensions of the clergy, have broken
+every social bond and deluged mankind with blood and tears.
+
+
+
+
+173.
+
+The sovereigns of this world, by associating the Divinity in the
+government of their dominions, by proclaiming themselves his vicegerents
+and representatives upon earth, and by acknowledging they hold their power
+from him, have necessarily constituted his ministers their own rivals or
+masters. Is it then astonishing, that priests have often made kings feel
+the superiority of the Celestial Monarch? Have they not more than once
+convinced temporal princes, that even the greatest power is compelled to
+yield to the spiritual power of opinion? Nothing is more difficult than
+to serve two masters, especially when they are not agreed upon what they
+require.
+
+The association of Religion with Politics necessarily introduced double
+legislation. The law of God, interpreted by his priests, was often
+repugnant to the law of the sovereign, or the interest of the state. When
+princes have firmness and are confident of the love of their subjects,
+the law of God is sometimes forced to yield to the wise intentions of the
+temporal sovereign; but generally the _sovereign_ authority is obliged
+to give way to the _divine_ authority, that is, to the interests of the
+clergy. Nothing is more dangerous to a prince, than to _encroach upon the
+authority of the Church_, that is, to attempt to reform abuses consecrated
+by religion. God is never more angry than when we touch the divine rights,
+privileges, possessions, or immunities of his priests.
+
+The metaphysical speculations or religious opinions of men influence their
+conduct, only when they judge them conformable to their interest. Nothing
+proves this truth more clearly, than the conduct of many princes with
+respect to the spiritual power, which they often resist. Ought not a
+sovereign, persuaded of the importance and rights of Religion, to believe
+himself in conscience bound to receive respectfully the orders of its
+priests, and to regard them as the orders of the Divinity? There was
+a time, when kings and people, more consistent in their conduct, were
+convinced of the rights of spiritual power, and becoming its slaves,
+yielded to it upon every occasion, and were but docile instruments in
+its hands. That happy time is passed. By a strange inconsistency the most
+devout monarchs are sometimes seen to oppose the enterprises of those,
+whom they yet regard as the ministers of God. A sovereign, deeply
+religious, ought to remain prostrate at the feet of his ministers, and
+regard them as true sovereigns. Is there upon earth a power which has a
+right to put itself in competition with that of the Most High?
+
+
+
+
+174.
+
+Have princes then, who imagine themselves interested in cherishing the
+prejudices of their subjects, seriously reflected upon the effects, which
+have been, and may be again produced by certain privileged demagogues, who
+have a right to speak at pleasure, and in the name of heaven to inflame
+the passions of millions of subjects? What ravages would not these sacred
+haranguers cause, if they should conspire, as they have so often done, to
+disturb the tranquillity of a state!
+
+To most nations, nothing is more burthensome and ruinous than the worship
+of their gods. Not only do the ministers of these gods every where
+constitute the first order in the state, but they also enjoy the largest
+portion of the goods of society, and have a right to levy permanent taxes
+upon their fellow-citizens. What real advantages then do these organs of
+the Most High procure the people, for the immense profits extorted from
+their industry? In exchange for their riches and benefits, what do they
+give them but mysteries, hypotheses, ceremonies, subtle questions, and
+endless quarrels, which states are again compelled to pay with blood?
+
+
+
+
+175.
+
+Religion, though said to be the firmest prop of Morality, evidently
+destroys its true springs, in order to substitute imaginary ones,
+inconceivable chimeras, which, being obviously contrary to reason, nobody
+firmly believes. All nations declare that they firmly believe in a God,
+who rewards and punishes; all say they are persuaded of the existence of
+hell and paradise; yet, do these ideas render men better or counteract
+the most trifling interests? Every one assures us, that he trembles at
+the judgments of God; yet every one follows his passions, when he thinks
+himself sure of escaping the judgments of Man. The fear of invisible
+powers is seldom so strong as the fear of visible ones. Unknown or remote
+punishments strike the multitude far less forcibly than the sight of
+the gallows. Few courtiers fear the anger of their God so much as the
+displeasure of their master. A pension, a title, or a riband suffices to
+efface the remembrance both of the torments of hell, and of the pleasures
+of the celestial court. The caresses of a woman repeatedly prevail over
+the menaces of the Most High. A jest, a stroke of ridicule, a witticism,
+make more impression upon the man of the world, than all the grave notions
+of his Religion.
+
+Are we not assured that _a true repentance_ is enough to appease the
+Deity? Yet we do not see that this _true repentance_ is very sincere;
+at least, it is rare to see noted thieves, even at the point of death,
+restore goods, which they have unjustly acquired. Men are undoubtedly
+persuaded, that they shall fit themselves for eternal fire, if they cannot
+insure themselves against it. But, "Some useful compacts may be made with
+heaven." By giving the church a part of his fortune, almost every devout
+rogue may die in peace, without concerning himself in what he gained his
+riches.
+
+
+
+
+176.
+
+By the confession of the warmest defenders of Religion and of its utility,
+nothing is more rare than sincere conversions, and, we might add, nothing
+more unprofitable to society. Men are not disgusted with the world, until
+the world is disgusted with them.
+
+If the devout have the talent of pleasing God and his priests, they
+have seldom that of being agreeable or useful to society. To a devotee,
+Religion is a veil, which covers all passions; pride, ill-humour,
+anger, revenge, impatience, and rancour. Devotion arrogates a tyrannical
+superiority, which banishes gentleness, indulgence, and gaiety; it
+authorizes people to censure their neighbours, to reprove and revile the
+profane for the greater glory of God. It is very common to be devout, and
+at the same time destitute of every virtue and quality necessary to social
+life.
+
+
+
+
+177.
+
+It is asserted, that the dogma of another life is of the utmost importance
+to peace and happiness; that without it, men would be destitute of motives
+to do good. What need is there of terrors and fables to make man sensible
+how he ought to conduct himself? Does not every one see, that he has the
+greatest interest, in meriting the approbation, esteem, and benevolence of
+the beings who surround him, and in abstaining from every thing, by which
+he may incur the censure, contempt, and resentment of society? However
+short an entertainment, a conversation, or visit, does not each desire to
+act his part decently, and agreeably to himself and others? If life is but
+a passage, let us strive to make it easy; which we cannot effect, if we
+fail in regard for those who travel with us. Religion, occupied with
+its gloomy reveries, considers man merely as a pilgrim upon earth; and
+therefore supposes that, in order to travel the more securely, he must
+forsake company, and deprive himself of pleasure and amusements, which
+might console him for the tediousness and fatigue of the journey. A
+stoical and morose philosopher sometimes gives us advice as irrational
+as that of Religion. But a more rational philosophy invites us to spread
+flowers upon the way of life, to dispel melancholy and banish terrors, to
+connect our interest with that of our fellow-travellers, and by gaiety and
+lawful pleasures, to divert our attention from difficulties and accidents,
+to which we are often exposed; it teaches us, that, to travel agreeably,
+we should abstain from what might be injurious to ourselves, and carefully
+shun what might render us odious to our associates.
+
+
+
+
+178.
+
+It is asked, _what motives an Atheist can have to do good?_ The motive to
+please himself and his fellow-creatures; to live happily and peaceably;
+to gain the affection and esteem of men. "Can he, who fears not the gods,
+fear any thing?" He can fear men; he can fear contempt, dishonour, the
+punishment of the laws; in short, he can fear himself, and the remorse
+felt by all those who are conscious of having incurred or merited the
+hatred of their fellow-creatures.
+
+Conscience is the internal testimony, which we bear to ourselves, of
+having acted so as to merit the esteem or blame of the beings, with whom
+we live; and it is founded upon the clear knowledge we have of men, and of
+the sentiments which our actions must produce in them. The Conscience of
+the religious man consists in imagining that he has pleased or displeased
+his God, of whom he has no idea, and whose obscure and doubtful intentions
+are explained to him only by men of doubtful veracity, who, like him, are
+utterly unacquainted with the essence of the Deity, and are little agreed
+upon what can please or displease him. In a word, the conscience of the
+credulous is directed by men, who have themselves an erroneous conscience,
+or whose interest stifles knowledge.
+
+"Can an Atheist have a Conscience? What are his motives to abstain from
+hidden vices and secret crimes of which other men are ignorant, and which
+are beyond the reach of laws?" He may be assured by constant experience,
+that there is no vice, which, by the nature of things, does not punish
+itself. Would he preserve this life? he will avoid every excess, that
+may impair his health; he will not wish to lead a languishing life, which
+would render him a burden to himself and others. As for secret crimes, he
+will abstain from them, for fear he shall be forced to blush at himself,
+from whom he cannot flee. If he has any reason, he will know the value
+of the esteem which an honest man ought to have for himself. He will
+see, that unforeseen circumstances may unveil the conduct, which he feels
+interested in concealing from others. The other world furnishes no motives
+for doing good, to him, who finds none on earth.
+
+
+
+
+179.
+
+"The speculative Atheist," says the Theist, "may be an honest man, but his
+writings will make political Atheists. Princes and ministers, no longer
+restrained by the fear of God, will abandon themselves, without scruple,
+to the most horrid excesses." But, however great the depravity of an
+Atheist upon the throne, can it be stronger and more destructive, than
+that of the many conquerors, tyrants, persecutors, ambitious men, and
+perverse courtiers, who, though not Atheists, but often very religious and
+devout, have notwithstanding made humanity groan under the weight of their
+crimes? Can an atheistical prince do more harm to the world, than a
+Louis XI., a Philip II., a Richelieu, who all united Religion with crime?
+Nothing is more rare, than atheistical princes; nothing more common, than
+tyrants and ministers, who are very wicked and very religious.
+
+
+
+
+180.
+
+A man of reflection cannot be incapable of his duties, of discovering
+the relations subsisting between men, of meditating his own nature, of
+discerning his own wants, propensities, and desires, and of perceiving
+what he owes to beings, who are necessary to his happiness. These
+reflections naturally lead him to a knowledge of the Morality most
+essential to social beings. Dangerous passions seldom fall to the lot of
+a man who loves to commune with himself, to study, and to investigate the
+principles of things. The strongest passion of such a man will be to know
+truth, and his ambition to teach it to others. Philosophy cultivates the
+mind. On the score of morals and honesty, has not he who reflects and
+reasons, evidently an advantage over him, who makes it a principle never
+to reason?
+
+If ignorance is useful to priests, and to the oppressors of mankind, it is
+fatal to society. Man, void of knowledge, does not enjoy reason; without
+reason and knowledge, he is a savage, liable to commit crimes. Morality,
+or the science of duties, is acquired only by the study of Man, and of
+what is relative to Man. He, who does not reflect, is unacquainted with
+true Morality, and walks with precarious steps, in the path of virtue. The
+less men reason, the more wicked they are. Savages, princes, nobles,
+and the dregs of the people, are commonly the worst of men, because they
+reason the least. The devout man seldom reflects, and rarely reasons. He
+fears all enquiry, scrupulously follows authority, and often, through an
+error of conscience, makes it a sacred duty to commit evil. The Atheist
+reasons: he consults experience, which he prefers to prejudice. If he
+reasons justly, his conscience is enlightened; he finds more real motives
+to do good than the bigot whose only motives are his fallacies, and who
+never listens to reason. Are not the motives of the Atheist sufficiently
+powerful to counteract his passions? Is he blind enough to be unmindful
+of his true interest, which ought to restrain him? But he will be neither
+worse nor better, than the numerous believers, who, notwithstanding
+Religion and its sublime precepts, follow a conduct which Religion
+condemns. Is a credulous assassin less to be feared, than an assassin who
+believes nothing? Is a very devout tyrant less tyrannical than an undevout
+tyrant?
+
+
+
+
+181.
+
+Nothing is more uncommon, than to see men consistent. Their opinions never
+influence their conduct except when conformable to their temperaments,
+passions, and interests. Daily experience shows, that religious opinions
+produce much evil and little good. They are hurtful, because they often
+favour the passions of tyrants, of ambitious men, of fanatics, and of
+priests; they are of no effect, because incapable of counter-balancing the
+present interests of the greater part of mankind. Religious principles
+are of no avail, when they act in opposition to ardent desires; though not
+unbelievers, men then conduct themselves as if they believed nothing.
+
+We shall always be liable to err, when we judge of the opinions of men
+by their conduct, or of their conduct by their opinions. A religious man,
+notwithstanding the unsociable principles of a sanguinary religion, will
+sometimes by a happy inconsistency, be humane, tolerant, and moderate; the
+principles of his religion do not then agree with the gentleness of his
+character. Libertines, debauchees, hypocrites, adulterers, and rogues,
+often appear to have the best ideas upon morals. Why do they not reduce
+them to practice? Because their temperament, their interest, and their
+habits do not accord with their sublime theories. The rigid principles of
+Christian morality, which many people regard as divine, have but little
+influence upon the conduct of those, who preach them to others. Do they
+not daily tell us, _to do what they preach, and not what they practise?_
+
+The partisans of Religion often denote an infidel by the word _libertine_.
+It is possible that many unbelievers may have loose morals, which is
+owing to their temperament, and not to their opinions. But how does
+their conduct affect their opinions? Cannot then an immoral man be a good
+physician, architect, geometrician, logician, or metaphysician? A man of
+irreproachable conduct may be extremely deficient in knowledge and reason.
+In quest of truth, it little concerns us from whom it comes. Let us not
+judge men by their opinions, nor opinions by men; let us judge men by
+their conduct, and their opinions by their conformity with experience and
+reason and by their utility to mankind.
+
+
+
+
+182.
+
+Every man, who reasons, soon becomes an unbeliever; for reason shows, that
+theology is nothing but a tissue of chimeras; that religion is contrary to
+every principle of good sense, that it tinctures all human knowledge with
+falsity. The sensible man is an unbeliever, because he sees, that, far
+from making men happier, religion is the chief source of the greatest
+disorders, and the permanent calamities, with which man is afflicted. The
+man, who seeks his own welfare and tranquillity, examines and throws aside
+religion, because he thinks it no less troublesome than useless, to spend
+his life in trembling before phantoms, fit to impose only upon silly women
+or children.
+
+If licentiousness, which reasons but little, sometimes leads to
+irreligion, the man of pure morals may have very good motives for
+examining his religion, and banishing it from his mind. Religious terrors,
+too weak to impose upon the wicked in whom vice is deeply rooted, afflict,
+torment and overwhelm restless imaginations. Courageous and vigorous
+minds soon shake off the insupportable yoke. But those, who are weak and
+timorous, languish under it during life; and as they grow old their fears
+increase.
+
+Priests have represented God as so malicious, austere, and terrible a
+being, that most men would cordially wish, that there was no God. It is
+impossible to be happy, while always trembling. Ye devout! you adore a
+terrible God! But you hate him; you would be glad, if he did not exist.
+Can we refrain from desiring the absence or destruction of a master, the
+idea of whom destroys our happiness? The black colours, in which priests
+paint the Divinity, are truly shocking, and force us to hate and reject
+him.
+
+
+
+
+183.
+
+If fear created the gods, fear supports their empire over the minds of
+mortals. So early are men accustomed to shudder at the mere name of the
+Deity, that they regard him as a spectre, a hobgoblin, a bugbear, which
+torments and deprives them of courage even to wish relief from their
+fears. They apprehend, that the invisible spectre, will strike them the
+moment they cease to be afraid. Bigots are too much in fear of their God
+to love him sincerely. They serve him like slaves, who, unable to escape
+his power, resolve to flatter their master, and who, by dint of lying, at
+length persuade themselves, that they in some measure love him. They make
+a virtue of necessity. The love of devotees for their God, and of slaves
+for their despots, is only a feigned homage.
+
+
+
+
+184.
+
+Christian divines have represented their God so terrible and so little
+worthy of love, that several of them have thought they must dispense
+with loving him; a blasphemy, shocking to other divines, who were less
+ingenuous. St. Thomas having maintained, that we are obliged to love God
+as soon as we attain the use of reason, the Jesuit Sirmond answered him,
+_that is very soon_. The Jesuit Vasquez assures us, that _it is enough to
+love God at the point of death_. Hurtado, more rigid, says, _we must
+love God very year_. Henriquez is contented that we love him _every five
+years_; Sotus, _every Sunday_. Upon what are these opinions grounded? asks
+father Sirmond; who adds, that Suarez requires us to _love God sometimes_.
+But when? He leaves that to us; he knows nothing about it himself. _Now_,
+says he, _who will be able to know that, of which such a learned divine is
+ignorant?_ The same Jesuit Sirmond further observes, that _God_ "does not
+command us to love him with an affectionate love, nor does he promise us
+salvation upon condition that we give him our hearts; it is enough to obey
+and love him with an effective love by executing his orders; this is the
+only love we owe him; and he has not so much commanded us to love him, as
+not to hate him." This doctrine appears heretical, impious, and abominable
+to the Jansenists, who, by the revolting severity they attribute to their
+God, make him far less amiable, than the Jesuits, their adversaries. The
+latter, to gain adherents, paint God in colours capable of encouraging
+the most perverse of mortals. Thus nothing is more undecided with the
+Christians, than the important question, whether they can, ought, or
+ought not to love God. Some of their spiritual guides maintain, that it
+is necessary to love him with all one's heart, notwithstanding all his
+severity; others, like father Daniel, think that, _an act of pure love
+to God is the most heroic act of Christian virtue, and almost beyond the
+reach of human weakness_. The Jesuit Pintereau goes farther; he says, _a
+deliverance from the grievous yoke of loving God is a privilege of the new
+covenant_.
+
+
+
+
+185.
+
+The character of the Man always decides that of his God; every body
+makes one for himself and like himself. The man of gaiety, involved in
+dissipation and pleasure, does not imagine, that, God can be stern and
+cross; he wants a good-natured God, with whom he can find reconciliation.
+The man of a rigid, morose, bilious, sour disposition, must have a God
+like himself, a God of terror; and he regards, as perverse, those, who
+admit a placable, indulgent God. As men are constituted, organized, and
+modified in a manner, which cannot be precisely the same, how can they
+agree about a chimera, which exists only in their brains?
+
+The cruel and endless disputes between the ministers of the Lord, are not
+such as to attract the confidence of those, who impartially consider them.
+How can we avoid complete infidelity, upon viewing principles, about which
+those who teach them to others are never agreed? How can we help doubting
+the existence of a God, of whom it is evident that even his ministers
+can only form very fluctuating ideas? How can we in short avoid totally
+rejecting a God, who is nothing but a shapeless heap of contradictions?
+How can we refer the matter to the decision of priests, who are
+perpetually at war, treating each other as impious and heretical, defaming
+and persecuting each other without mercy, for differing in the manner of
+understanding what they announce to the world?
+
+
+
+
+186.
+
+The existence of a God is the basis of all Religion. Nevertheless, this
+important truth has not as yet been demonstrated, I do not say so as
+to convince unbelievers, but in a manner satisfactory to theologians
+themselves. Profound thinkers have at all times been occupied in inventing
+new proofs. What are the fruits of their meditations and arguments?
+They have left the subject in a worse condition; they have demonstrated
+nothing; they have almost always excited the clamours of their brethren,
+who have accused them of having poorly defended the best of causes.
+
+
+
+
+187.
+
+The apologists of religion daily repeat, that the passions alone make
+unbelievers. "Pride," say they, "and the desire of signalizing themselves,
+make men Atheists. They endeavour to efface from their minds the idea
+of God, only because they have reason to fear his terrible judgments."
+Whatever may be the motives, which incline men to Atheism, it is our
+business to examine, whether their sentiments are founded in truth. No man
+acts without motives. Let us first examine the arguments and afterwards
+the motives. We shall see whether these motives are not legitimate, and
+more rational than those of many credulous bigots, who suffer themselves
+to be guided by masters little worthy of the confidence of men.
+
+You say then, Priests of the Lord! that the passions make unbelievers;
+that they renounce Religion only through interest, or because it
+contradicts their inordinate propensities; you assert, that they attack
+your gods only because they fear their severity. But, are you yourselves,
+in defending Religion and its chimeras, truly exempt from passions and
+interests? Who reap advantages from this Religion, for which priests
+display so much zeal? Priests. To whom does Religion procure power,
+influence, riches, and honours? To Priests. Who wage war, in every
+country, against reason, science, truth, and philosophy, and render them
+odious to sovereigns and people? Priests. Who profit by the ignorance and
+vain prejudices of men? Priests.--Priests! you are rewarded, honoured
+and paid for deceiving mortals, and you cause those to be punished who
+undeceive them. The follies of men procure you benefices, offerings, and
+expiations; while those, who announce the most useful truths, are rewarded
+only with chains, gibbets and funeral-piles. Let the world judge between
+us.
+
+
+
+
+188.
+
+Pride and vanity have been, and ever will be, inherent in the priesthood.
+Is any thing more capable of rendering men haughty and vain, than the
+pretence of exercising a power derived from heaven, of bearing a sacred
+character, of being the messengers and ministers of the Most High? Are not
+these dispositions perpetually nourished by the credulity of the people,
+the deference and respect of sovereigns, the immunities, privileges, and
+distinctions enjoyed by the clergy? In every country, the vulgar are much
+more devoted to their spiritual guides, whom they regard as divine, than
+to their temporal superiors, whom they consider as no more than ordinary
+men. The parson of a village acts a much more conspicuous part, than the
+lord of the manor or the justice of the peace. Among the Christians, a
+priest thinks himself far above a king or an emperor. A Spanish grandee
+having spoken rather haughtily to a monk, the latter arrogantly said,
+"Learn to respect a man, who daily has your God in his hands, and your
+Queen at his feet." Have priests then a right to accuse unbelievers of
+pride? Are they themselves remarkable for uncommon modesty or profound
+humility? Is it not evident, that the desire of domineering over men is
+essential to their trade? If the ministers of the Lord were truly modest,
+should we see them so greedy of respect, so impatient of contradiction, so
+positive in their decisions, and so unmercifully revengeful to those
+whose opinions offend them? Has not Science the modesty to acknowledge
+how difficult it is to discover truth? What other passion but ungovernable
+pride can make men so savage, revengeful, and void of indulgence and
+gentleness? What can be more presumptuous, than to arm nations and deluge
+the world in blood, in order to establish or defend futile conjectures?
+
+You say, that presumption alone makes Atheists. Inform them then what your
+God is; teach them his essence; speak of him intelligibly; say something
+about him, which is reasonable, and not contradictory or impossible. If
+you are unable to satisfy them, if hitherto none of you have been able to
+demonstrate the existence of a God in a clear and convincing manner; if
+by your own confession, his essence is completely veiled from you, as from
+the rest of mortals, forgive those, who cannot admit what they can neither
+understand nor make consistent with itself; do not tax with presumption
+and vanity those who are sincere enough to confess their ignorance; do
+not accuse of folly those who find themselves incapable of believing
+contradictions; and for once, blush at exciting the hatred and fury of
+sovereigns and people against men, who think not like you concerning a
+being, of whom you have no idea. Is any thing more rash and extravagant,
+than to reason concerning an object, known to be inconceivable? You say,
+that the corruption of the heart produces Atheism, that men shake off the
+yoke of the Deity only because they fear his formidable judgments.
+But, why do you paint your God in colours so shocking, that he becomes
+insupportable? Why does so powerful a God permit men to be so corrupt? How
+can we help endeavouring to shake off the yoke of a tyrant, who, able to
+do as he pleases with men, consents to their perversion, who hardens, and
+blinds them, and refuses them his grace, that he may have the satisfaction
+to punish them eternally, for having been hardened, and blinded, and for
+not having the grace which he refused? Theologians and priests must be
+very confident of the grace of heaven and a happy futurity, to refrain
+from detesting a master so capricious as the God they announce. A God,
+who damns eternally, is the most odious of beings that the human mind can
+invent.
+
+
+
+
+189.
+
+No man upon earth is truly interested in the support of error, which is
+forced sooner or later to yield to truth. The general good must at length
+open the eyes of mortals: the passions themselves sometimes contribute
+to break the chains of prejudices. Did not the passions of sovereigns,
+centuries ago, annihilate in some countries of Europe the tyrannical
+power, which a too haughty pontiff once exercised over all princes of his
+sect? In consequence of the progress of political science, the clergy
+were then stripped of immense riches, which credulity had accumulated
+upon them. Ought not this memorable example to convince priests, that
+prejudices triumph but for a time, and that truth alone can insure solid
+happiness?
+
+By caressing sovereigns, by fabricating divine rights for them, by
+deifying them, and by abandoning the people, bound hand and foot, to their
+will, the ministers of the Most High must see, that they are labouring to
+make them tyrants. Have they not reason to apprehend, that the gigantic
+idols, which they raised to the clouds, will one day crush them by
+their enormous weight? Do not a thousand examples remind them that these
+tyrants, after preying upon the people, may prey upon them in their turn.
+
+We will respect priests, when they become sensible men. Let them, if they
+please, use the authority of heaven to frighten those princes who are
+continually desolating the earth; but let them no more adjudge to them the
+horrid right of being unjust with impunity. Let them acknowledge, that no
+man is interested in living under tyranny; and let them teach sovereigns,
+that they themselves are not interested in exercising a despotism, which,
+by rendering them odious, exposes them to danger, and detracts from
+their power and greatness. Finally, let priests and kings become so
+far enlightened as to acknowledge, that no power is secure which is not
+founded upon truth, reason, and equity.
+
+
+
+
+190.
+
+By waging war against Reason, which they ought to have protected and
+developed, the ministers of the gods evidently act against their own
+interest. What power, influence, and respect might they not have gained
+among the wisest of men, what gratitude would they not have excited in the
+people, if, instead of wasting their time about their vain disputes, they
+had applied themselves to really useful science, and investigated the
+true principles of philosophy, government, and morals! Who would dare to
+reproach a body with its opulence or influence, if the members dedicating
+themselves to the public good, employed their leisure in study, and
+exercised their authority in enlightening the minds both of sovereigns and
+subjects?
+
+Priests! Forsake your chimeras, your unintelligible dogmas, your
+contemptible quarrels! Banish those phantoms which could be useful only in
+the infancy of nations. Assume, at length, the language of reason. Instead
+of exciting persecution; instead of entertaining the people with silly
+disputes; instead of preaching useless and fanatical dogmas, preach human
+and social morality; preach virtues really useful to the world; become the
+apostles of reason, the defenders of liberty, and the reformers of abuses.
+
+
+
+
+191.
+
+Philosophers have every where taken upon themselves a part, which seemed
+destined to the ministers of Religion. The hatred of the latter for
+philosophy was only a jealousy of trade. But, instead of endeavouring
+to injure and decry each other, all men of good sense should unite their
+efforts to combat error, seek truth, and especially to put to flight the
+prejudices, that are equally injurious to sovereigns and subjects, and of
+which the abettors themselves sooner or later become the victims.
+
+In the hands of an enlightened government, the priests would become the
+most useful of the citizens. Already richly paid by the state, and free
+from the care of providing for their own subsistence, how could they
+be better employed than in qualifying themselves for the instruction
+of others? Would not their minds be better satisfied with discovering
+luminous truths, than in wandering through the thick darkness of error?
+Would it be more difficult to discern the clear principles of Morality,
+than the imaginary principles of a divine and theological Morality? Would
+men of ordinary capacities find it as difficult to fix in their heads the
+simple notions of their duties, as to load their memories with mysteries,
+unintelligible words and obscure definitions, of which they can never
+form a clear idea? What time and pains are lost in learning and teaching
+things, which are not of the least real utility! What resources for the
+encouragement of the sciences, the advancement of knowledge, and the
+education of youth, well disposed sovereigns might find in the many
+monasteries, which in several countries live upon the people without in
+the slightest degree profiting them! But superstition, jealous of its
+exclusive empire, seems resolved to form only useless beings. To what
+advantage might we not turn a multitude of cenobites of both sexes,
+who, in many countries, are amply endowed for doing nothing? Instead
+of overwhelming them with fasting and austerities; instead of barren
+contemplations, mechanical prayers, and trifling ceremonies; why should
+we not excite in them a salutary emulation, which may incline them to seek
+the means, not of being _dead_ to the world, but of being _useful_ to it?
+Instead of filling the youthful minds of their pupils with fables, sterile
+dogmas, and puerilities, why are not priests obliged, or invited to teach
+them truths, and to render them useful citizens of their country? Under
+the present system, men are only useful to the clergy who blind them, and
+to the tyrants who fleece them.
+
+
+
+
+192.
+
+The partisans of credulity often accuse unbelievers of insincerity,
+because they sometimes waver in their principles, alter their minds in
+sickness, and retract at death. When the body is disordered, the faculty
+of reasoning is commonly disordered with it. At the approach of death,
+man, weak and decayed, is sometimes himself sensible that Reason abandons
+him, and that Prejudice returns. There are some diseases, which tend to
+weaken the brain; to create despondency and pusillanimity; and there are
+others, which destroy the body, but do not disturb the reason. At any
+rate, an unbeliever who recants in sickness is not more extraordinary,
+than a devotee who neglects in health the duties which his religion
+explicitly enjoins.
+
+Ministers of Religion openly contradict in their daily conduct the
+rigorous principles, they teach to others; in consequence of which,
+unbelievers, in their turn, may justly accuse them of insincerity. Is it
+easy to find many prelates humble, generous, void of ambition, enemies
+of pomp and grandeur, and friends of poverty? In short, is the conduct of
+Christian ministers conformable to the austere morality of Christ, their
+God, and their model?
+
+
+
+
+193.
+
+_Atheism_, it is said, _breaks all the ties of society. Without the belief
+of a God, what will become of the sacredness of oaths? How shall we oblige
+a man to speak the truth, who cannot seriously call the Deity to witness
+what he says?_ But, does an oath strengthen our obligation to fulfil the
+engagements contracted? Will he, who is not fearful of lying, be less
+fearful of perjury? He, who is base enough to break his word, or unjust
+enough to violate his engagements, in contempt of the esteem of men, will
+not be more faithful therein for having called all the gods to witness his
+oaths. Those, who disregard the judgments of men, will soon disregard the
+judgments of God. Are not princes, of all men, the most ready to swear,
+and the most ready to violate their oaths?
+
+
+
+
+194.
+
+_The vulgar_, it is repeatedly said, _must have a Religion. If enlightened
+persons have no need of the restraint of opinion, it is at least necessary
+to rude men, whose reason is uncultivated by education_. But, is it indeed
+a fact, that religion is a restraint upon the vulgar? Do we see, that
+this religion preserves them from intemperance, drunkenness, brutality,
+violence, fraud, and every kind of excess? Could a people who have no idea
+of the Deity conduct themselves in a more detestable manner, than these
+believing people, among whom we find dissipation and vices, the most
+unworthy of reasonable beings? Upon going out of the churches, do not the
+working classes, and the populace, plunge without fear into their ordinary
+irregularities, under the idea, that the periodical homage, which they
+render to their God, authorizes them to follow, without remorse, their
+vicious habits and pernicious propensities? Finally, if the people are
+so low-minded and unreasonable, is not their stupidity chargeable to
+the negligence of their princes, who are wholly regardless of public
+education, or who even oppose the instruction of their subjects? Is not
+the want of reason in the people evidently the work of the priests, who,
+instead of instructing men in a rational morality, entertain them with
+fables, reveries, ceremonies, fallacies, and false virtues which they
+think of the greatest importance?
+
+To the people, Religion is but a vain display of ceremonies, to which
+they are attached by habit, which entertains their eyes, and produces
+a transient emotion in their torpid understandings, without influencing
+their conduct or reforming their morals. Even by the confession of the
+ministers of the altars, nothing is more rare than that _internal_ and
+_spiritual_ Religion, which alone is capable of regulating the life of
+man and of triumphing over his evil propensities. In the most numerous
+and devout nation, are there many persons, who are really capable of
+understanding the principles of their religious system, and who find them
+powerful enough to stifle their perverse inclinations?
+
+Many persons will say, that _any restraint whatever is better than none._
+They will maintain, that _if religion awes not the greater part, it serves
+at least to restrain some individuals, who would otherwise without remorse
+abandon themselves to crime_. Men ought undoubtedly to have a restraint,
+but not an imaginary one. Religion only frightens those whose imbecility
+of character has already prevented them from being formidable to their
+fellow-citizens. An equitable government, severe laws, and sound morality
+have an equal power over all; at least, every person must believe in them,
+and perceive the danger of not conforming to them.
+
+
+
+
+195.
+
+Perhaps it will be asked, _whether Atheism can be proper for the
+multitude?_ I answer, that any system, which requires discussion, is
+not made for the multitude. _What purpose then can it serve to preach
+Atheism?_ It may at least serve to convince all those who reason, that
+nothing is more extravagant than to fret one's self, and nothing more
+unjust than to vex others, for mere groundless conjectures. As for the
+vulgar who never reason, the arguments of an Atheist are no more fit for
+them than the systems of a natural philosopher, the observations of
+an astronomer, the experiments of a chemist, the calculations of a
+geometrician, the researches of a physician, the plans of an architect,
+or the pleadings of a lawyer, who all labour for the people without their
+knowledge.
+
+Are the metaphysical reasonings and religious disputes, which have so
+long engrossed the time and attention of so many profound thinkers, better
+adapted to the generality of men than the reasoning of an Atheist? Nay,
+as the principles of Atheism are founded upon plain common sense, are they
+not more intelligible, than those of a theology, beset with difficulties,
+which even the persons of the greatest genius cannot explain? In every
+country, the people have a religion, the principles of which they
+are totally ignorant, and which they follow from habit without any
+examination: their priests alone are engaged in theology, which is too
+dense for vulgar heads. If the people should chance to lose this unknown
+theology, they mighty easily console themselves for the loss of a thing,
+not only perfectly useless, but also productive of dangerous commotions.
+
+It would be madness to write for the vulgar, or to attempt to cure their
+prejudices all at once. We write for those only, who read and reason;
+the multitude read but little, and reason still less. Calm and rational
+persons will require new ideas, and knowledge will be gradually diffused.
+
+
+
+
+196.
+
+If theology is a branch of commerce profitable to theologians, it is
+evidently not only superfluous, but injurious to the rest of society.
+Self-interest will sooner or later open the eyes of men. Sovereigns
+and subjects will one day adopt the profound indifference and contempt,
+merited by a futile system, which serves only to make men miserable.
+All persons will be sensible of the inutility of the many expensive
+ceremonies, which contribute nothing to public felicity. Contemptible
+quarrels will cease to disturb the tranquility of states, when we blush at
+having considered them important.
+
+Instead of Parliament meddling with the senseless combats of your clergy;
+instead of foolishly espousing their impertinent quarrels, and attempting
+to make your subjects adopt uniform opinions--strive to make them happy
+in this world. Respect their liberty and property, watch over their
+education, encourage them in their labours, reward their talents and
+virtues, repress licentiousness; and do not concern yourselves with their
+manner of thinking. Theological fables are useful only to tyrants and the
+ignorant.
+
+
+
+
+197.
+
+Does it then require an extraordinary effort of genius to comprehend,
+that what is above the capacity of man, is not made for him; that things
+supernatural are not made for natural beings; that impenetrable mysteries
+are not made for limited minds? If theologians are foolish enough to
+dispute upon objects, which they acknowledge to be unintelligible even to
+themselves, ought society to take any part in their silly quarrels? Must
+the blood of nations flow to enhance the conjectures of a few infatuated
+dreamers? If it is difficult to cure theologians of their madness and
+the people of their prejudices, it is at least easy to prevent the
+extravagancies of one party, and the silliness of the other from producing
+pernicious effects. Let every one be permitted to think as he pleases; but
+never let him be permitted to injure others for their manner of thinking.
+Were the rulers of nations more just and rational, theological opinions
+would not affect the public tranquillity, more than the disputes of
+natural philosophers, physicians, grammarians, and critics. It is
+tyranny which causes theological quarrels to be attended with serious
+consequences.
+
+Those, who extol the importance and utility of Religion, ought to shew
+us its happy effects, the advantages for instance, which the disputes
+and abstract speculations of theology can be to porters, artisans, and
+labourers, and to the multitude of unfortunate women and corrupt servants
+with which great cities abound. All these beings are religious; they have
+what is called _an implicit faith_. Their parsons believe for them; and
+they stupidly adhere to the unknown belief of their guides. They go to
+hear sermons, and would think it a great crime to transgress any of the
+ordinances, to which, in childhood, they are taught to conform. But of
+what service to morals is all this? None at all. They have not the least
+idea of Morality, and are even guilty of all the roguery, fraud, rapine,
+and excess, that is out of the reach of law.
+
+The populace have no idea of their Religion; what they call Religion
+is nothing but a blind attachment to unknown opinions and mysterious
+practices. In fact, to deprive people of Religion is to deprive them
+of nothing. By overthrowing their prejudices, we should only lessen or
+annihilate the dangerous confidence they put in interested guides, and
+should teach them to mistrust those, who, under the pretext of Religion,
+often lead them into fatal excesses.
+
+
+
+
+198.
+
+While pretending to instruct and enlighten men, Religion in reality keeps
+them in ignorance, and stifles the desire of knowing the most interesting
+objects. The people have no other rule of conduct, than what their priests
+are pleased to prescribe. Religion supplies the place of every thing else:
+but being in itself essentially obscure, it is more proper to lead mortals
+astray than to guide them in the path of science and happiness. Religion
+renders enigmatical all Natural Philosophy, Morality, Legislation and
+Politics. A man blinded by religious prejudices, fears truth, whenever
+it clashes with his opinions: he cannot know his own nature he cannot
+cultivate his reason, he cannot perform experiments.
+
+Everything concurs to render the people devout; but every thing tends to
+prevent them from being humane, reasonable and virtuous. Religion seems to
+have no other object, than to stupefy the mind.
+
+Priests have been ever at war with genius and talent, because
+well-informed men perceive, that superstition shackles the human mind, and
+would keep it in eternal infancy, occupied solely by fables and
+frightened by phantoms. Incapable of improvement itself, Theology opposed
+insurmountable barriers to the progress of true knowledge; its sole object
+is to keep nations and their rulers in the most profound ignorance of
+their duties, and of the real motives, that should incline them to do
+good. It obscures Morality, renders its principles arbitrary, and subjects
+it to the caprice of the gods or of their ministers. It converts the
+art of governing men into a mysterious tyranny, which is the scourge
+of nations. It changes princes into unjust, licentious despots, and the
+people into ignorant slaves, who become corrupt in order to merit the
+favour of their masters.
+
+
+
+
+199.
+
+By tracing the history of the human mind, we shall be easily convinced,
+that Theology has cautiously guarded against its progress. It began by
+giving out fables as sacred truth: it produced poetry, which filled the
+imagination of men with its puerile fictions: it entertained them with its
+gods and their incredible deeds. In a word, Religion has always treated
+men, like children, whom it lulled to sleep with tales, which its
+ministers would have us still regard as incontestable truths.
+
+If the ministers of the gods have sometimes made useful discoveries, they
+have always been careful to give them a dogmatical tone, and envelope them
+in the shades of mystery. Pythagoras and Plato, in order to acquire some
+trifling knowledge, were obliged to court the favour of priests, to be
+initiated in their mysteries, and to undergo whatever trials they were
+pleased to impose. At this price, they were permitted to imbibe those
+exalted notions, still so bewitching to all those who admire only what
+is perfectly unintelligible. It was from Egyptian, Indian, and Chaldean
+priests, from the schools of these visionaries, professionally interested
+in bewildering human reason, that philosophy was obliged to borrow its
+first rudiments. Obscure and false in its principles, mixed with fictions
+and fables, and made only to dazzle the imagination, the progress of this
+philosophy was precarious, and its theories unintelligible; instead of
+enlightening, it blighted the mind, and diverted it from objects truly
+useful.
+
+The theological speculations and mystical reveries of the ancients are
+still law in a great part of the philosophic world; and being adopted by
+modern theology, it is heresy to abandon them. They tell us "of aerial
+beings, of spirits, angels, demons, genii," and other phantoms, which are
+the object of their meditations, and serve as the basis of _metaphysics_,
+an abstract and futile science, which for thousands of years the greatest
+geniuses have vainly studied. Hypothesis, imagined by a few visionaries
+of Memphis and Babylon, constitute even now the foundations of a science,
+whose obscurity makes it revered as marvellous and divine.
+
+The first legislators were priests; the first mythologists, poets, learned
+men, and physicians were priests. In their hands science became sacred
+and was withheld from the profane. They spoke only in allegories, emblems,
+enigmas, and ambiguous oracles--means well calculated to excite curiosity,
+and above all to inspire the astonished vulgar with a holy respect for
+men, who when they were thought to be instructed by the gods, and capable
+of reading in the heavens the fate of the earth, boldly proclaimed
+themselves the oracles of the Deity.
+
+
+
+
+200.
+
+The religions of ancient priests have only changed form. Although our
+modern theologians regard their predecessors as impostors, yet they have
+collected many scattered fragments of their religious systems. In modern
+Religions we find, not only their metaphysical dogmas, which theology has
+merely clothed in a new dress, but also some remarkable remains of their
+superstitious practices, their magic, and their enchantments. Christians
+are still commanded to respect the remaining monuments of the legislators,
+priests, and prophets of the Hebrew Religion, which had borrowed its
+strange practices from Egypt. Thus extravagancies, imagined by knaves or
+idolatrous visionaries, are still sacred among Christians!
+
+If we examine history, we shall find a striking resemblance among all
+Religions. In all parts of the earth, we see, that religious notions,
+periodically depress and elevate the people. The attention of man is
+every where engrossed, by rites often abominable, and by mysteries always
+formidable, which become the sole objects of meditation. The different
+superstitions borrow, from one another, their abstract reveries and
+ceremonies. Religions are in general mere unintelligible rhapsodies,
+combined by new teachers, who use the materials of their predecessors,
+reserving the right of adding or retrenching whatever is not conformable
+to the present age. The religion of Egypt was evidently the basis of the
+religion of Moses, who banished the worship of idols: Moses was merely a
+schismatic Egyptian. Christianism is only reformed Judaism. Mahometanism
+is composed of Judaism, Christianity, and the ancient religion of Arabia,
+etc.
+
+
+
+
+201.
+
+Theology, from the remotest antiquity to the present time, has had the
+exclusive privilege of directing philosophy. What assistance has been
+derived from its labours? It changed philosophy into an unintelligible
+jargon, calculated to render uncertain the clearest truths; it has
+converted the art of reasoning into a jargon of words; it has carried the
+human mind into the airy regions of metaphysics, and there employed it in
+vainly fathoming an obscure abyss. Instead of physical and simple causes,
+this transformed philosophy has substituted supernatural, or rather,
+_occult_ causes; it has explained phenomena difficult to be conceived by
+agents still more inconceivable. It has filled language with words, void
+of sense, incapable of accounting for things, better calculated to obscure
+than enlighten, and which seems invented expressly to discourage man,
+to guard him against the powers of his mind, to make him mistrust the
+principles of reason and evidence, and to raise an insurmountable barrier
+between him and truth.
+
+
+
+
+202.
+
+Were we to believe the partisans of Religion, nothing could be explained
+without it; nature would be a perpetual enigma, and man would be incapable
+of understanding himself. But, what does this Religion in reality explain?
+The more we examine it, the more we are convinced that its theological
+notions are fit only to confuse our ideas; they change every thing into
+mystery: they explain difficult things by things that are impossible. Is
+it a satisfactory explanation of phenomena, to attribute them to unknown
+agents, to invisible powers, to immaterial causes? Does the human mind
+receive much light by being referred to _the depths of the treasures of
+divine wisdom_, to which, we are repeatedly told, it is vain to extend
+our rash enquiries? Can the divine nature, of which we have no conception,
+enable us to conceive the nature of man?
+
+Ask a Christian, what is the origin of the world? He will answer, that God
+created it. What is God? He cannot tell. What is it to create? He knows
+not. What is the cause of pestilence, famine, wars, droughts, inundations
+and earthquakes? The anger of God. What remedies can be applied to these
+calamities? Prayers, sacrifices, processions, offerings, and ceremonies
+are, it is said, the true means of disarming celestial fury. But why is
+heaven enraged? Because men are wicked. Why are men wicked? Because their
+nature is corrupt. What is the cause of this corruption? It is, says the
+theologian, because the first man, beguiled by the first woman, ate an
+apple, which God had forbidden him to touch. Who beguiled this woman into
+such folly? The devil. Who made the devil? God. But, why did God make this
+devil, destined to pervert mankind? This is unknown; it is a mystery which
+the Deity alone is acquainted with.
+
+It is now universally acknowledged, that the earth turns round the sun.
+Centuries ago, this opinion was blasphemy, as being irreconcileable with
+the sacred books which every Christian reveres as inspired by the Deity
+himself. Notwithstanding divine revelation, astronomers now depend rather
+upon evidence, than upon the testimony of their inspired books.
+
+What is the hidden principle of the motions of the human body? The soul.
+What is a soul? A spirit. What is a spirit? A substance, which has neither
+form, nor colour, nor extension, nor parts. How can we form any idea
+of such a substance? How can it move a body? That is not known; it is a
+mystery. Have beasts souls? But, do they not act, feel, and think, in a
+manner very similar to man? Mere illusion! By what right do you deprive
+beasts of a soul, which you attribute to man, though you know nothing at
+all about it? Because the souls of beasts would embarrass our theologians,
+who are satisfied with the power of terrifying and damning the immaterial
+souls of men, and are not so much interested in damning those of beasts.
+Such are the puerile solutions, which philosophy, always in the leading
+strings of theology, was obliged to invent, in order to explain the
+problems of the physical and moral world?
+
+
+
+
+203.
+
+How many evasions have been used, both in ancient and modern times, in
+order to avoid an engagement with the ministers of the gods, who have ever
+been the tyrants of thought? How many hypotheses and shifts were such men
+as Descartes, Mallebranche, and Leibnitz, forced to invent, in order to
+reconcile their discoveries with the fables and mistakes which Religion
+had consecrated! In what guarded phrases have the greatest philosophers
+expressed themselves, even at the risk of being absurd, inconsistent, or
+unintelligible, whenever their ideas did not accord with the principles of
+theology! Priests have been always attentive to extinguish systems which
+opposed their interest. Theology was ever the bed of Procrustes, to be
+adapted to which, the limbs of travellers, if too long were cut off, and
+if too short were lengthened.
+
+Can any sensible man, delighted with the sciences and attached to the
+welfare of his fellow-creatures, reflect, without vexation and anguish,
+how many profound, laborious, and subtle brains have been for ages
+foolishly occupied in the study of absurdities? What a treasure of
+knowledge might have been diffused by many celebrated thinkers, if instead
+of engaging in the impertinent disputes of vain theology, they had devoted
+their attention to intelligible objects really important to mankind? Half
+the efforts which religious opinions have cost genius, and half the wealth
+which frivolous forms of worship have cost nations would have sufficed
+to instruct them perfectly in morality, politics, natural philosophy,
+medicine, agriculture, etc. Superstition generally absorbs the attention,
+admiration, and treasures of the people; their Religion costs them very
+dear; but they have neither knowledge, virtue, nor happiness, for their
+money.
+
+
+
+
+204.
+
+Some ancient and modern philosophers have been bold enough to assume
+experience and reason for their guides, and to shake off the chains of
+superstition. Democritus, Epicurus, and other Greeks presumed to tear
+away the veil of prejudice, and to deliver philosophy from theological
+shackles. But their systems, too simple, too sensible, and too free from
+the marvellous, for imaginations enamoured with chimeras, were obliged to
+yield to the fabulous conjectures of such men as Plato and Socrates. Among
+the moderns, Hobbes, Spinosa, Bayle, etc., have followed the steps of
+Epicurus; but their doctrine has found very few followers, in a world,
+still intoxicated with fables, to listen to reason.
+
+In every age, it has been dangerous to depart from prejudices. Discoveries
+of every kind have been prohibited. All that enlightened men could do, was
+to speak ambiguously, hence they often confounded falsehood with truth.
+Several had a _double doctrine_, one public and the other secret; the
+key of the latter being lost, their true sentiments, have often become
+unintelligible and consequently useless.
+
+How could modern philosophers, who, under pain of cruel persecution, were
+commanded to renounce reason, and to subject it to faith, that is, to the
+authority of priests; how, I say, could men, thus bound, give free scope
+to their genius, improve reason, and accelerate the progress of the human
+mind? It was with fear and trembling that even the greatest men obtained
+a glimpse of truth; rarely had they the courage to announce it; and those,
+who did, were terribly punished. With Religion, it has ever been unlawful
+to think, or to combat the prejudices of which man is every where the
+victim and the dupe.
+
+
+
+
+205.
+
+Every man, sufficiently intrepid to announce truths to the world, is sure
+of incurring the hatred of the ministers of Religion, who loudly call to
+their aid secular powers; and want the assistance of laws to support both
+their arguments and their gods. Their clamours expose too evidently the
+weakness of their cause.
+
+     "None call for aid but those who feel distressed."
+
+In Religion, man is not permitted to err. In general, those who err are
+pitied, and some kindness is shewn to persons who discover new truths;
+but, when Religion is thought to be interested either in the errors or
+the discoveries, a holy zeal is kindled, the populace become frantic, and
+nations are in an uproar.
+
+Can any thing be more afflicting, than to see public and private felicity
+depending upon a futile system, which is destitute if principles, founded
+only on a distempered imagination, and incapable of presenting any thing
+but words void of sense? In what consists the so much boasted utility of
+a Religion, which nobody can comprehend, which continually torments those
+who are weak enough to meddle with it, which is incapable of rendering men
+better, and which often makes them consider it meritorious to be unjust
+and wicked? Is there a folly more deplorable, and more justly to be
+combated, than that, which far from doing any service to the human race,
+only makes them blind, delirious, and miserable, by depriving them of
+Truth, the sole cure for their wretchedness.
+
+
+
+
+206.
+
+Religion has ever filled the mind of man with darkness, and kept him in
+ignorance of his real duties and true interests. It is only by dispelling
+the clouds and phantoms of Religion, that we shall discover Truth, Reason,
+and Morality. Religion diverts us from the causes of evils, and from the
+remedies which nature prescribes; far from curing, it only aggravates,
+multiplies, and perpetuates them. Let us observe with the celebrated
+Lord Bolingbroke, that "_theology is the box of Pandora; and if it is
+impossible to shut it, it is at least useful to inform men, that this
+fatal box is open_."
+
+
+THE END.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+End of Project Gutenberg's Good Sense, by Paul Henri Thiry, Baron D'Holbach
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